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The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Title Pages (p.i) The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse (p.ii) (p.iii) The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse
(p.vi) Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in India by Oxford University Press YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110 001, India © Oxford University Press The moral rights of the author have been asserted First published in 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted Page 1 of 2
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Dedication
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Dedication (p.v) To D. Virendra Heggade and his family, Dharmastala, for providing me free degree education (p.vi)
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Preface
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
(p.ix) Preface This book is an attempt to explore the varied ways in which the Bhagavadgita has been inducted to participate in the making of Indian nationalist discourse. I was nudged into studying the theme sometime in 1995 when I was reminded by a Kannada work that ‘Bhagavadgeeteya chintane bharatada rashtriya baravanigegala pradaana aakarshaneyaagittu,’ or ‘that nationalist writings were often fascinated with and drawing from the ideas and teachings of the Gita’. After some initial study of its viability and scope, I realized what rich maze of a subject I was stepping into. I worked on the theme for my doctoral thesis in Mangalore University under the supervision of Valerian Rodrigues. But I have since interrogated my own initial findings and opinions, visited other sources of insight and arguments and revised my views to present them in this book. The Gita is a much-adored and much-interpreted ‘Song Celestial’. It has lent itself to several readings to defend or contest various views on life, morality and metaphysics, to the sectarian claims, to universal truths. In the eighteenth century when modern Hinduism was ‘discovered’ it nearly achieved the status of the Bible. Not surprisingly it became an unfailing source of nationalist imagination and sustenance. The nationalist engagement with the Gita was both emotional and intellectual, since nationalism expressed itself, whether as sui generis or as a response-product of engagement with colonialism, at those levels. Locating the source of nationalism in the Gita was a way of rejecting the Western claim that nationalist impulse and ideology were its exclusive gift. It also meant sanctifying a (p.x) modernist project with the words of God, and with the ethico-moral prescriptions excavated from the Gita. It was a way of nationalizing the Bhagavadgita. In fact, the nationalist dialogue with the Gita went beyond the sectarian universals that India was traditionally wont to look for. It sought out the various socio-political projects for the country, and people seeking freedom and change. That the Gita was able to yield such variety of Page 1 of 2
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Preface answers to different interrogators is as much a measure of the rich variety of questions with which they went to the Gita as the conditions and compulsions that spawned the questions. Such dialogic possibilities have given the Gita an aura of a timeless text. This book presents the various styles and moods in which such nationalist dialogues were held in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, producing different hues of ideological sanctions. Sure, they are available to further dialogues. I am indebted to a number of people and institutions during the course of my study and writing of the book. First, I should record my gratitude to my teacher and research guide, Valerian Rodrigues, for introducing me to the dazzling richness of social science research and guiding me through it when I could well have lost my way. I also thank him for his continuous support even from Delhi, where he is at present. I am indebted to B. Surendra Rao, formerly of Department of History, Mangalore University, who generously spared his time to read the manuscript and suggest corrections. His trenchant critique has added a historical perspective to my study. I am also thankful to Kesavan Veluthat, Sudipta Kaviraj, Thomas Pantham, Rajaram Tolpady, Lokesh, Udaya Barkur, Devinder Paul Kaur, and Arun Kanti Jana for their valuable comments and suggestions at various stages of composing or amending my ideas for the book. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my uncle, K. Chinnappa Gowda, presently the Registrar, Mangalore University, for his financial and moral support. I thank Mangalore University, particularly its library and staff, for supporting my academic pursuit. I thank the Oxford University Press and its indefatigable editorial team for seeing the book through in print. I gratefully appreciate the unfailing affection, patience, and support I have received from my wife Beena and the many pleasant distractions from my naughty little daughter, Varshini, providing relief from the grim profundities I had dared to dabble with. 24 January 2011 Nagappa Gowda K. Udupi
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Introduction
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Introduction Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0009
Abstract and Keywords The introduction discusses the importance of the Bhagavadgita in the nationalist discourse in India. No religious text has been as frequently invoked or as passionately deployed by Indian nationalists as the Bhagavadgita. In fact, nationalists of different stripes, including exponents of modern Hinduism, critical modernists, ethical and spiritual nationalists, seem to agree that they could all draw sustenance and seek vindication from the Song Celestial. This chapter also provides an outline of the coverage of this book. Keywords: Bhagavadgita, nationalist discourse, India, religious text, Indian nationalists, modern Hinduism, critical modernists, spiritual nationalists, ethical nationalists, Song Celestial
Nationalism can be an authentic experience that eludes easy understanding or simple definition. It is as much an assertion as it is an excavation. It seeks to surge ahead by constantly looking backwards. It cries for change while being narcissistic. It finds its history by constructing it and its heritage by defining it. It discovers its cultural opulence, its common spiritual reservoir, and its vast, untapped inner strength as assurance of its infinite possibilities of progress and insurance against the forces that undermine it. It hopes to conquer its weaknesses and humiliations of the present by invoking and drawing on the constructed memory of its past successes against such weaknesses and humiliations. Drawing on religious texts—and in the process nationalizing them—is not an unfamiliar practice in the construction of nationalism. It more than fulfils the need for constructing a history and owning it. It transcends the mundane, daring Page 1 of 8
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Introduction to touch the spiritual and the divine. It explores and vindicates the ethico-moral realms of aspirations and achievements, traces the contours of social relations, and even looks for assuring, if hazy, political blue-prints. Invoking religious texts or harnessing them to the nation’s cause confers on the project a halo of sanctity that conspires to make nationalism more than just a mundane scheme. However, this does not guarantee consensus, either of intentions or strategies, much less of its results. It can be a field of contest, of fierce or sober interpretations, of pious manipulations, and of quiet interpolations or polite erasures. This should not be construed as violence done to the text. In fact, this (p.2) is the way religious texts are formed. Commentators and their exegeses have constructed the texts by deconstructing them, by reading meanings into them. In the context of nationalism, religious texts have attracted new commentators and produced new exegeses. It is not a break in, but a continuation of the fortunes of the religious text. No religious text has been as frequently invoked or as passionately deployed by Indian nationalists as the Bhagavadgita. It was not that there were no other parallel texts at hand; India had obviously produced an abundant of non pareil literature at different times such as the Srutis, Smritis, Puranas, political tracts like the Arthasastra, Darshanas, and even rich Sanskrit writings. Certain social reformers had even suggested the Vedas and Upanishads with their stress on monotheism and universalism as the constitute basis of a renewed India. But no other text has attracted the heed of the nationalists as the Gita did. In fact, nationalists of different stripes, including exponents of modern Hinduism, critical modernists, ethical and spiritual nationalists, seem to agree that they could all draw sustenance and seek vindication from the Song Celestial. After all, Lord Krishna did not address his words to Arjuna alone. Besides, the Bhagavadgita claims to be the quintessence of all the Upanishads, of the best and the noblest of all Indian thoughts.1 The greatest of the acharyas, including Samkara, Ramanuja, and Madhva, had interpreted or invested meanings into it.2 However, these credentials alone did not make the Gita the religious text par excellence of the Hindus. The context of colonialism and the making of colonial knowledge provide a clue to the new status which the Bhagavadgita acquired in the eighteenth century. The European interface with India triggered off a passion to explore its religion and culture, producing sometimes overlapping and at other times conflicting results. Some did so out of personal or academic curiosity and others as part of the larger project of colonialism. Religion, particularly of others, can be both a matter of curiosity and of ready judgement. The European notion of religion with which they explored and evaluated other religions, was rooted in the making and practice of Semitic religions. Central to it are the notions of the Revelation, the Prophet, and the Book. Looking for these constituents, they found them in what the native informants told them as to what the sources of their religion were. The native informants were the brahmins—a small, literate monopoly class in the Page 2 of 8
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Introduction country, who thus became the sole spokepersons of religion. Brahmanical religion became the Hindu religion, and Brahmanical texts became the official Hindu texts. Of them Krishna and his Song Celestial (p.3) seemed to meet the Semitic notion of a revealed religion. Here was an incarnation, a saviour, who not only fulfilled the purpose of his earthly descent but bequeathed to posterity His Song Celestial to guide it. He revealed Himself through His Words. He seemed to fit into the Semitic pattern the Europeans knew of. Krishna became to Hinduism what Jesus was to Christianity, and the Bhagavadgita the Hindu Bible. The Orientalists and Sanskritists hastened to translate it into English, the first one being that of Charles Wilkins in 1785. It was to showcase the glory of Sanskrit and the loftiness of the Hindu thought although, as Thomas Trautmann shows, some of them like Sir William Jones could not help but link the Hindu thought with the Mosaic tradition. The Bhagavadgita won ecstatic plaudits from European Romantics like Schopenhauer, which was good advertisement for the Orientalists.3 However, for strategic reasons the Christian missionaries preferred to latch on to their own constructed image of the ‘Hindu Prophet’ Krishna to compare him with their own Son of God. In their writings and preachings and in their roadside harangues they revelled in projecting Krishna as a cad, a prankster, a philanderer, a trickster, and a wily politician. His life had nothing gracious or divine about it and everything of an impostor. He could not be remotely compared with the noble Jesus who lived and died for the salvation of the human race. The missionaries could reject such things in Hinduism as polytheism, karma, rebirth, and so on, but these debates would not make much sense to their target groups. As a propaganda strategy they thought the best way to go about it was to show that people had been hitherto misled by a false prophet. How could an impostor like Krishna gift mankind anything remotely true and divine? Other gods in the Hindu pantheon too came in for their share of derision and repudiation, but Krishna remained the favourite punching bag. They also made fun of, and poured scorn over, the fabulous chronology and geography of the Puranas—their outrageous time-spans, their seas of milk and treacle, their jostling gods who could outdo even the worst sinners in their immoral pranks and foolish escapades, and who habitually fought with the demons and were as habitually beaten by them.4 The utilitarians like James Mill had distanced themselves from both the Orientalists and the Evangelical groups although they too, like the latter, did not have much to say in favour of Hindu religion or the scriptures that revealed it. Mill felt that they were responsible for the creation of despotism in thought and practice which had been the bane of India for centuries, and which was the duty of Britain to eradicate through education and legislations. Many of the debates around the religion (p.4) and culture of India took place in the pages of Asiatic Researches and later Indian Antiquary. They fulfilled the intellectual urges of the colonial rulers as much as they allowed immense space for intellectual resolutions of their wish-fulfillment. Page 3 of 8
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Introduction Thus, in the eighteenth century, we see both the Orientalist and missionary discourses (without conflating the two in the Saidian sense)5 nudging the Bhagavadgita and its author to the centrestage of attention and engagement. The Bhagavadgita became the text for Hinduism and Krishna the Prophet. India did not see it as a reductionist exercise but as a context to respond to. If nationalism is a response to the various colonial demands and challenges, the nationalist preference for the Bhagavadgita as the site for constructing their thoughts and schemes should not come as a surprise. It became a destination and sometimes a defence, of both the Prophet and his words. The Bhagavadgita became the reference point of Hindu wisdom, its timelessness and its perennial court of appeal. It became something of a symbol of Hindu conscience. The Orientalist applause and the missionary denigration had both projected it as the scripture par excellence. The reformers who wanted the society to change, slowly or in a hurry, appealed to it. So did die-hard conservatives. Raja Rammohun Roy had use for it in his campaigns for the abolition of sati; his opponents too swore by Lord Krishna’s words. Even Ambedkar, who repudiated nationalist status to the Gita on the ground that it offered a cogent defence of the brahminical point of view and hence constituted the central text of the counter-revolution against Buddhism, had used it in his nationalist discourse based on Buddhism. Everyone seemed to seek endorsement from the Gita. It seemed to speak, rising above partisanship, parochialism, and sectarianism, the universal language of wisdom. Krishna seemed to be with everyone who sought Him, as He was with everyone of the adoring gopis in Brindavan. He did not even mind the occasional anger among His devotees! This study is an attempt to explore the different strands of nationalist discourse based on the Gita by Bankimchandra Chatterjee, Balgangadhar Tilak, Swami Vivekananda, Aurobindo Ghosh, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave, and B.R. Ambedkar. However, this is not to suggest that all those whose writings on the Gita has been taken up for study fit snugly into one mould. Their temperament and nationalist agenda differed. The contexts of their projects differed too. If Tilak went to the Gita in a quiet mood of critical introspection and vindication of his political activism, Aurobindo sought to suffuse its spirituality into a nationalist project. Vivekananda’s thoughts on the subject are dispersed (p.5) but not any less intense, and they have to be gleaned from his lectures and writings often addressed to the Western audience. Vinoba’s views on the Gita too were expressed in his lectures. Gandhi did not write an exegesis on the Bhagavadgita but it was his constant companion and intimate counsel. Bankim was more analytical on the subject and more combative, which is indicative of his response to the missionary aggressions and provocations. He needed to prove the historicity of Krishna to match the historical presence of Jesus in the armoury of the missionaries. The contexts in which these persons dialogued with Gita influenced their views, and they go into their analyses. Together they reveal the myriad hues and moods that constituted Indian nationalism. In fact, the Page 4 of 8
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Introduction nationalist dialogues with the Bhagavadgita show that the text was frequently and compulsively contextualized and in the process, constituted. The study also unfolds the several national questions eager to find endorsement from the Gita, which was really their way of seeking the nation’s approval. Dialogue with the Bhagavadgita was indeed a dialogue with the Self in the context of the Universal Self, which the nation stood for. They belonged to the rare moments when nationalism was sliding into spiritual realms. These moments could be fleeting and yet real. Apparently Ambedkar’s views on the Gita do not seem to fit into the conventional nationalist framework. He had rejected the brahminical hegemony in India and all those scriptural props that sustained it. His critical engagement with the text and authority of Bhagavadgita was designed to question and reject the social inequities and injustice which it legitimized or sanctioned. His notion of nationalism went beyond the immediacy of anti-colonial struggles. The salvationary potential or efficacy of nationalism could be tested only if it could uplift millions of the downtrodden in India and give them freedom and justice. Nationalism was not a stagnant category; it had engaged in constant review of itself to renew itself. Spiritualism, political activism, pacifism, and even revolutionary extremism could be located in, and retrieved from, the Gita no doubt, but it could also be subjected to a critical social audit. Instead of looking at it as the timeless words of God, it can be seen as a hegemonic text that ordered and sanctioned hierarchies, subordination, and exploitation in society. Marxist scholars like Kosambi had found in Gita the reflections of feudal ideology and the society that produced it. Ambedkar’s dialogue was that of a person whose nationalism was rooted in a critical appraisal of Hindu society with a view to changing it. In rejecting the conventional affirmative evaluation of the Bhagavadgita, Ambedkar gives another dimension to its understanding.
(p.6) Outline of Study The first chapter focuses on Bankim’s interpretation of the Gita, the first major stirring of the Indian counter-discourse, reflected in his Krishna Charitra, the Dharmatattwa, and the commentary on the Gita. It argues that Bankim’s continuous insistence on the historicity of the text was done with the overt purpose of refuting the Orientalist and Evangelicals’ claims of the Western and Christian superiority in the realm of moral theories and practice. His interpretation of Dharma as the symmetrical maturation of all the faculties is a clear departure from the traditional notion of it and certainly an attempt to offer a new nationalist aura to Hinduism. It thus outlines Bankim’s notion of patriotism. Tilak’s philosophy of Karma Yoga forms the crux of the second chapter. In his Gita-Rahasya, Tilak sees the Gita as a work on ethics that upheld not utilitarian or intuitional uprightness but a morality of disinterested action. He was convinced that the moral foundation for the Indian nation could be built on the Page 5 of 8
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Introduction basis of the Gita. He formulates the ethic of the Gita around the heroic notion and figure of sthitaprajna, and resolutely rejecting the pursuit of samnyasa. Further, Tilak’s interpretation of the Gita as upholding karma yoga not only highlights the need to productively engage with the world but lends itself to the defence of several contentious issues like occasional expressions of righteous violence and retaliation in politics. Tilak also suggests that the masses are entitled to their entry into politics even as bhakti allows them admission to the high realms of religion. In the third chapter, it is shown that while Vivekananda too regarded karma yoga as the central teaching of the Gita, he differed from Tilak in significant ways. He does not hold any brief to the historicity of the Gita. Instead he shows that the Gita projects the masses to the centre-stage of life by marshalling the notions of Naranarayana and Daridranarayana. He accused the priesthood for reading of the text as defending privileged interests, which while denying the access of the Gita to people at large also led to the cultural degeneration of India. Unlike his predecessors, Aurobindo regarded the Gita as a spiritual text, arguing not for any mode of social or ethical action but for the spiritual, involving uncritical submission to the Absolute Truth. His interpretation of the Gita could easily lend itself to justifying violence in the national struggle for freedom, argues the fourth chapter. Gandhiji’s understanding of the Gita is the subject of the fifth chapter. It shows how, unlike Tilak and Vivekananda, he used the text to defend the notions of non-violence, truth, svadharma, swadeshi, and satyagraha. Gandhi considered the Gita as an expression of standard ethico-moral (p.7) philosophy expressed in the doctrine of anasakti, which reaches out to the different sects and religions. The chapter suggests that Gandhi’s version of the Gita cautiously defends a form of chaturvarna as an ordained form of division of labour. For, if the Gita were to support caste divisions it would have clashed with the principle of advaita upheld by it. The sixth chapter looks at the interpretation of the Gita by Vinoba. For him the central teaching of the text consists in the pursuit of svadharma, or, one’s own dharma in the social sense and the position of the Gita on karma, jnana and bhakti lends itself to united action rather than diversity of practices. The chapter argues that the concept of svadharma in Vinoba could easily lend itself to justifying traditional social practices too. Unlike the other luminaries discussed here, Ambedkar sees the Gita as advancing the justifications for iniquitous social practices in the context of a weakened brahminical order against a rational and equalitarian Buddhism. Traditional practices of the brahminical religion could not be defended against Page 6 of 8
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Introduction the severe criticisms of Buddhism. In this context the Gita was seen to be advancing a set of new arguments and principles, which effectively defended traditional social institutions and practices. For Ambedkar the Gita becomes the central text of the brahminical counter-revolution against the Buddhist revolution. The conclusion and appendix attempt a comparative analysis of the moral map of the nation that these interpreters of the Gita advance. They were clearly meant to provide a moral and ethical basis for nationalist thought and practice, drawing upon the legitimacy which the premier text of Hinduism was capable of offering. Notes:
(1.) Sarvopanishado gaavo dogdhaa gopaalanandanah; Paartho vatsah sudheer bhoktaa dugdham geetaamritam mahat. (4th verse of Gita Dhyanam, Meditation on the Gita) (All the Upanishads are the cows; the milker is Krishna; the cowherd boy, Partha (Arjuna), is the calf; men of purified intellect are the drinkers; the milk is the great nectar of the Gita). (2.) The interpretative tradition about the Gita has started not merely with nationalist discourse; it was a central text of interpretation in the writings of Acharyas in the pre-modern times. The Acharyas such as Samkara, Madhva, and Ramanuja who were scriptural exegetes advanced their own versions of it to justify their ideological cults—Advaita, Dvaita, and Visistadvaita respectively. Samkara, a Hindu philosopher of the Advaita Vedanta School, wrote a number of works on ancient scriptures which are classified under Bhasya (commentary), Prakarana Grantha (philosophical treatise) and Stotra (devotional hymn) and among them Bhagavadgita Bhasya is important. For his Gita translation, see The Bhagavadgita Bhasya, Poona: The Oriental Book Agency, 1931; Alladi Mahadeva Sastri, The Bhagavadgita: With the Commentary of Sri Sankaracharya, Madras: Samata Books, 1977; A.G. Krishna Warrier, Srimad Bhagavad Gita Bhasya of Sri Sankaracharya, Madras: Ramakrishna Math, 1983. Madvacharya who expounded Dvaita philosophy also took on board several of the elements from the Gita to validate his position on Vedanta. His Gita translations include Bhagavadgita Bhasya and Bhagavadgita Tatparyanirnaya. These two works are together known as Gitaprasthana. S. Subbha Rau, Gitabhasya with the Commentary of Sri Madvacharya, Tirupathi: Sri Vyasa Press, 1936; B.N.K. Sharma, Madva’s Teachings in His Own Words, Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1997; History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981; Swami Tapasyananda, Sri Madvacharya, His Life, Religion and Philosophy, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1981. The Visistadvaita philosophy of Ramanuja also benefited from the philosophy of the Gita. See M.R. Sampatkumaran, The Gitabhasya of Ramanuja, Bombay: Ananthacharya Indological Research Institute, 1985; C.J. Bartley, The Theology
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Introduction of Ramanuja: Realism and Religion, London: Routledge Curzon, 2002; Swami Adidavananda, Sri Ramanuja Gitabhasya, Delhi: Vedanta Press and Books, 1992. (3.) Modern historiography on the text started with colonial perceptions of India’s past. These can principally be categorized as British Orientalists, who mostly admired the text, German Orientalists, who acknowledged India as spiritualist ab antiquo, Utilitarians and Evangelicals who were critical of India and Marxists who viewed India through their popular Asiatic Mode of Production. Indian historians were also responsive to the Indian history writings by the Europeans particularly Orientalists. The Bhagavadgita attracted the attention of the Orientalists, Indologists and European Romantics such Sir William Jones, Charles Wilkins, Colebrook, H.H. Wilson, Max Müller, Thomas Trautmann, Arthur Schopenhauer, and others. Some of them have produced independent discourses on it and some others quoted it most frequently in their history writings. Sir Charles Wilkins, who helped William Jones to establish the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, was the first Orientalist to translate Bhagavadgita into English. Sir Charles Wilkins, Bhagvat-geeta, or Dialogues of Kreeshna and Arjoon, London: Nourse, 1785. In 1787, this English translation was translated into French and in 1802 into German. The translation significantly influenced the Romantic literature and the European perception of Hindu philosophy. Another notable Orientalist who discussed the Gita in his writings is Sir William Jones. Sir William Jones, Discourses Delivered before the Asiatic Society and Miscellaneous Papers, on the Religion, Poetry, Literature, etc., of the Nations of India, England: C.S. Arnold, 1824. For his Collected works see, Garland Cannon (ed.), The Collected Works of Sir William Jones, New York: New York University Press, 13 vols, 1993; Garland Cannon, Oriental Jones: A Biography of Sir William Jones, 1746–1794, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964; Garland Cannon (ed.), The letters of Sir William Jones, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970; S.N. Mukherjee, Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth-century British Attitudes to India, London: Cambridge University Press, 1968; Max F. Muller, Science and Religion, London: Longmans Green and Co., 1882; India– What it can Teach Us?, New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1905; Sacred Books of the East, 58 vols., New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1970; Thomas Trautmann, Aryans and British India, USA: University of California Press, 1997; India: Brief History of a Civilization, USA: Oxford University Press, 2010. (4.) Horace Hayman Wilson (ed.), The History of British India, London: James Madden, fourth edition, 10 vols, 1848. (5.) Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
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Culturing the Nation
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Culturing the Nation Bankim’s Reading of the Gita Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0001
Abstract and Keywords This chapter examines Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay's understanding of the text of the Bhagavadgita as reflected in his Krishnacharitra, the Dharmatattwa, and the commentary on the Gita. It suggests that Bankim's continued insistence on the historicity of the Bhagavadgita was aimed at refuting the Orientalists and Evangelicals' claims of the Western and Christian superiority in the realm of moral theories and practice. It also discusses Bankim's concept of patriotism. Keywords: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, Bhagavadgita, Krishnacharitra, Dharmatattwa, moral theories, Orientalists, Evangelicals, patriotism, Christian superiority, Western superiority
The attempts to draw the text of the Gita into the nationalist discourse in colonial India to outline an alternative moral foundation for the nation were initiated by Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838–1894), a nineteenth-century Bengali scholar. He was one of the most popular and widely read personalities, often quoted both in Indian and Western writings, particularly in Indian sociological and philosophical discussions. Being widely appreciated as ‘a poet and stylist, a seer and nation builder, and a thorough-rooted post-enlightened Orientalist-rationalist thinker’1 in nationalist writings for his contributions to Indian literary history and ethico-political questions facing the nation, Bankim sowed the seeds for the genesis of the Bengali novel and prose writings, and wrote fourteen exquisite novels. These writings were not simply pieces of fiction, except sporadically, but were reflections of the socio-historical conditions and the nationalist fervour of nineteenth-century Bengal. Besides, he widely Page 1 of 39
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Culturing the Nation commented on ancient Indian scriptures including Buddhism and Samkhya philosophy and his commentary on the Gita was one of the most significant among them.2
Hermeneutics on the Gita The Srimadbhagabadgita, a commentary on the Gita, is one of the later unfinished religious writings of Bankim. Originally written in Bengali, (p.10) Bankim began publishing his commentary serially in the journal Prachar between 1886 and 1888. The first part of his comments, that is, till the seventeenth sloka of the second chapter of the Gita, was published in December 1886; the process was abruptly interrupted for more than a year till April/May 1888, when he re-initiated publishing his exposition on the remaining slokas of the second chapter. The rest of his Gita commentary remained in the form of manuscripts for over a decade and in 1902, posthumously, his son-in-law Dibyendusundar Bandyopadhyay compiled all of his Gita articles and published them in book form. However, the text remained untouched and unedited for more than four decades, and in 1941 it was incorporated, without any modification, in Bankim Rachanabali (Complete Works of Bankim) edited by Jogesh Chandra Bagal. Thus after having been consigned to obscurity for the non-Bengali world for a century, the attempt of translating the text into English with the ‘obvious purpose of making it available for a general reader’ was made in the year 2001 by Hans Harder.3 One of the major reasons for overlooking Bankim’s interpretation of the Gita in the discussions of his philosophy is perhaps the partial, heterogeneous, and fragmentary character of his commentary. Surprisingly, out of eighteen chapters of the original Gita, Bankim commented on only the first three chapters and half of the fourth; the rest of the fourteen chapters remained untouched, not even cursorily. Although Bankim did not advance any reason for this incomplete and unsystematic exercise, Harder presumes that this was probably due to his busy schedule of professional obligations as a deputy collector and his engagement with other literary works.4 However, a closer look at the hermeneutic nature and thematic structure, and even the symmetrical master–disciple format of the Gita and his other slightly earlier text Dharmatattva, would reveal that probably Bankim should have fulfilled his desire for writing a detailed and innovative commentary on the Gita in the Dharmatattva. The issues and chapters that are left undiscussed in his Gita commentary are discussed literally in the Dharmatattva, and Bankim sees the teachings of the Gita as a complete justification for the position that he was trying to evolve in the Dharmatattva. Moreover, Bankim accepts the Gita as an authority for his polemics in the Dharmatattva and frequently quotes the original Sanskrit slokas to testify and evaluate his arguments. To strengthen this, in the very first chapter of the Dharmatattva, Bankim explicitly claims that he had derived the theory of culture, the theme of the text, from the Gita. Unless related to the Dharmatattva, his Gita commentary, if taken as an insular text, would certainly pose a question Page 2 of 39
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Culturing the Nation as to whether he had (p.11) thought the last fourteen chapters of the Gita to be insignificant to the understanding of its message, or that they simply elaborate and embellish the theories set in the first four chapters. But Dharmatattva gives a facile resolution of the issue. Bankim produced his commentary, according to his own admission, with the explicit purpose of re-discovering the message of the Gita through the employment of Western methods and ideas, besides filling the lacunae created by the non-Sanskrit commentaries on the text.5 Given the mindset of English educated Indians, schooled in the European system of knowledge, Bankim felt that the traditional Indian ways of interpreting the text should be replaced by one informed by the Western scientific spirit. He states in his short preface to the Gita: Normally (exclusively) those are called ‘educated’ who are educated in Western learning … Some may be more educated, some less; but whether it be more or less—I know that the majority of the readers in this country belong to the ‘educated class’. Now, the problem is that this educated class cannot understand the utterances of the ancient pundits without difficulties … Our educated class has, from childhood on, followed the Western way of thinking, the ancient Indian way of thinking is unknown to them; the ancient ideas cannot be conveyed to them by a linguistic reversal. If they are to be taught, Western methods must be adopted, and the help of Western ideas has to be used. The aim of my commentary is thus to teach them the meaning of the Gita according to Western methods and with the help of Western ideas.6 Bankim’s critique of the conventional interpretations of the Gita was based on his approval of Western ideas and methods and their efficacy in questioning the conservative and depraved elements of ancient Indian traditions.
[T]here is no possibility for a person acquainted with Western literature, science and philosophy to follow the ancients at all times … I have no sympathy whatsoever with those people who think that all the native ancient pundits said is true, and all what Westerners say about material principles (jagatik tattva) is wrong.7 However, the hermeneutic method that Bankim followed partially resembles the premodern interpretations such as that of Samkaracharya, Ramanuja, Sridhara Swami, and Madhusudhana Sarasvati.8 He adopted a similar methodology of interpreting the message of the Gita sloka by sloka, sometimes quoting verbatim, instead of writing a general account— a methodology which the later nationalist writings hardly acknowledged. Although subsequently Lokmanya Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi adopted (p.12) a similar style in their Gita commentaries, they also wrote elaborate introductions to the actual translations of the slokas, where they compared the philosophy of the Gita with other ancient scriptures.
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Culturing the Nation Quite interestingly, the Bhagavadgita is the only ancient text that Bankim translated in his long literary career. Probably in the last decade of his life, he felt the need to energize and root his ideas in a textual and cultural legacy. Although he had commented on the Samkhya philosophy and Buddhism a decade before his Gita commentary, they were primarily in the nature of tracts. Moreover, Bankim regarded the Gita as the central text of Hinduism and attempted to understand its core through Western scientific method, which he felt would ennoble and cleanse Hindu moral philosophy by discarding ‘it’s worthless aspects’, and also demonstrate to the world that the ethical texture of ancient scriptures was thoroughly scientific and rational. In doing so, he would counter the critique of Hinduism made by some Indologists. It was on the moral foundation of this ‘rejuvenated Hinduism’ that Bankim thought the Indian nation should be founded—the exercise that, later on, Vivekananda would undertake in his own distinctive way.
History, Mahabharata, and the Gita One of the striking features of Bankim’s analysis is his overwhelming conviction that to prove the authenticity and legitimacy of texts and institutions, their histories need to be established first. Since history ’is that which narrates what had taken place in the past; besides that nothing else can be called itihasa’9 Bankim felt that history is the receptacle of truth, the attributes of which can well be an object of critical–rational and scientific inquiry. In fact, Bankim’s belief and confidence in history as the essential method of understanding truth came alive with his second great historical novel, Durgeshnandini, where he recollects the story of the virulent struggle between the Pathans and the Mughals for the cause of Bengal. This was followed by the part-historical account, Kapalkundala, but his historical sense reached its highest and fullest expression in Krishnacharitra. Krishnacharitra was an attempt by Bankim to describe the life and philosophy of Krishna and appreciate his character as an ideal for humanity. This was in response to the method of rational inquiry adopted by Indologists to study Krishna. Besides, he also undertook the hermeneutic task of segregating the ‘veritable’ and the ‘original’ character of Krishna from the later interpolations by citing a number of scriptures such as the Mahabharata, Harivamsa, Purana, Bhagavata, (p.13) and so on. Bankim explicitly states that the Krishancharitra was aimed at fulfilling two primary objectives. First, expressing simple and uncritical belief in the moral statement of the Mahabharata, the Gita and the character of Krishna without engaging in a reasonable degree of fundamental critique would not be commendable to ‘European scholars’ and ‘their followers’ in India.10 As these scriptures contained two parts—the one ‘original’ and ‘real’ which was scientific, rational, and historical, the other incorporated later, which was verisimilitude but unscientific and unhistorical in spirit—the task was to shear away the interpolated layer to reach the ‘original’. Second, to demonstrate that the critique of the Mahabharata and the Gita by Indologists was merely Page 4 of 39
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Culturing the Nation based on those unhistorical and interpolated parts, and hence erroneous, as it failed to grasp the kernel. Bankim begins this project with the statement that the Mahabharata, of which the Gita is a part, is unquestionably historical. Although it contains several unhistorical and unscientific narrations and has acquired supernatural and mythical accretions, that does not mean that the Mahabharata in its ‘original’ is unhistorical. In fact, mixing of historical with unhistorical stories or with allegorical and symbolic descriptions is not an exclusive feature of Indian history. The historical writings produced by Herodotus or Livy, for instance, contain, contrary to historical accounts, many irrational stories but they have been regarded as authentic historical texts in Europe. Therefore, the presence of unhistorical accounts in the Mahabharata would not be a reason for disqualifying and omitting it as a source of history. In all races such a mixture of the historical and the unhistorical, the true and the false, has occurred in ancient history. Livy and other Roman historians, Herodotus and other Greek historians, Ferishta and other Muslim historians have mixed with the historical accounts supernatural and unhistorical tales. Their works are all accepted as history; why should the Mahabharata alone be cast aside as unhistorical? I am aware that modern Europeans do not respect these historians (Livy, Herodotus, etc.). But they do not say that because their books are full of unnatural matters, therefore they are to be rejected. (sic) … whatever the tribe of modern critics may say, no history of Rome or Greece has been written even today discarding Livy or Herodotus.11 Even if we exonerate Livy and Herodotus for infusing a great deal of unhistorical tales in their historical texts and consider the fact that they were not applauded as the mainstay of European writers on the subject, Bankim argues that the more respected historical writings of Megasthenes and Ktesias too were full of mythical and extraordinary (p.14) accounts. Since these are treated as ‘believable history’ in Europe, the Mahabharata can well be accommodated within the framework of historical sources.12
For Bankim, undervaluing or rejecting the historicity of the Mahabharata on the ground that it employed a poetic style is faulty, since a number of ‘approved’ historical writings in the West were also written in verse. [O]n getting to know of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, European scholars decided that these two works were epic poems … no question of their historicity remained … However … in the Mahabharata the poetic element is very beautiful. The type of beauty which Europeans specify as characteristic of epic poetry, that genre of beauty being present in it plentifully, they call it Epic. But, on examination that type of beauty is found present in many European primary histories: among the English in the works of Macaulay, Carlyle and Froude; among the French in Page 5 of 39
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Culturing the Nation Lamartine and Michele; of the Greeks in Thucydides and in other historical works. Humanity itself is the finest staple of poetry. The historian also describes mankind. If he is able to do his job well, then in the process itself his history will get infused with the beauty of poetry. Because of beauty those works have not been rejected as unhistorical; the Mahabharata too, cannot be.13 Thus, once Bankim had demonstrated the historicity of the Mahabharata on scientific grounds, he engages in acrimonious arguments with the opinions of Indologists regarding the date, milieu, and philosophy of the Mahabharata. One such argument was with Albrecht Weber’s opinion that the Mahabharata must have been composed after Megasthenes’ visit to India because he did not mention its existence in his historical documents.
The ancient glory of Bharatavarsa is intolerable to the descendants of the forest-dwelling barbarians of Germany of those days … In his opinion (Weber) there is no major evidence for considering that the Mahabharata existed before the birth of Christ … Panini’s aphorisms contain the word ‘Mahabharata’ and the names of Yudhisthira and others. But that does not convince him because Panini, too, in his opinion, was born only the other day … Megasthenes, who belongs to the third or fourth century before Christ and had come to Bharatavarsa and lived in Chandragupta’s captial, has not mentioned the Mahabharata in his work. Hence, in Mr. Weber’s opinion, at his time the Mahabharata did not exist.14 According to Bankim this assessment was utterly biased, as being unstated or omitted from contemporary historical records cannot rationally prove the non-existence of a text. Moreover, historical accounts by Megasthenes, in which Indologists, particularly Weber, expressed uncritical faith, were not extant or were available only in fragments and (p.15) their major portions were lost over centuries, certainly much before Weber had started writing history. Directing a jibe towards Weber, Bankim remarked: ‘Many Hindus have visited Germany and written books. In none of their works have I seen Mr. Weber’s name. Does this then inevitably mean that Mr. Weber never existed?’15
Bankim argued that the Mahabharata was not the only text that had been discredited in Europe. In fact, most of the writings of ancient India, irrespective of being historical or unhistorical, had been thus downplayed. [T]heir arguments’ main thread is that in the books of Bharatavarsa what is found in favour of Bharata is false or interpolated; what is against … is alone true. The story of … the Pandavas is false … but Draupadi’s five husbands are true for thereby it is proved that the ancient people of Bharatavarsa were tribals and among them polyandry was prevalent. Mr. Ferguson has come to the conclusion, on the basis of some nude female figures found in palace ruins[,] that in ancient Bharatavarsa women did not wear clothes … Mr. Weber, unable to cast aside lightly the antiquity of Hindu astronomy, has decided that Hindus had obtained the lunar sidereal Page 6 of 39
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Culturing the Nation system from the Babylonians. That the Babylonians never had the lunar sidereal system was suppressed. Despite the lack of proof, Mr. Whitney said that it was possible because the intellectual acumen of Hindus is not so sharp that they can achieve so much by their own intelligence.16 As Bankim treated the Mahabharata as a historical text, he regarded all the characters in it as historical figures. After engaging in a comprehensive textual examination of the evidences from different ancient texts, Bankim argued that neither the battlefield of Kurukshetra,17 nor the Pandavas and other characters, were figments of the author’s imagination. That they were historical can be proved from the evidences accumulated in the Puranas, Bhagavata, and astronomical sources and also from other Sanskrit testimonials. It was from the standpoint of these evidences that Bankim criticized the Indologists, contending that picking up sporadic words and instances from texts to argue for their imaginary or symbolic or allegorical character18 by ignoring their central arguments is an act of prevarication.
The Europeans might argue that the Satapatha Brahmana … has the names of Dhrtarastra, Pariksit and Janamejaya but not a trace of the Pandavas’ names; and consequently the Pandavas did not exist … No book of Bharatavarsa contains any reference to Macedonian Alexander; … Do we have to decide whether any person named Alexander existed and whether whatever Greek historians wrote about him is but poetic imagination?19 (p.16) Surprisingly, neither in Srimadbhagabadgita nor in Krishnacharitra does Bankim state clearly whether the Gita is a historical narrative or not. In fact, he had argued that the first chapter of the Gita, in which ‘two fully equipped armies situated face to face in the battle array of Kurukshetra was described‘ contained ‘no principles of dharma’ but ‘excellent piece of kavya’, the kind ‘rare in the world of literature’.20 But that cannot deny the historicity of the Gita as Bankim believed that historical texts across the world are saturated with ‘kavya’ or poetic imaginations. However, in both the texts, Bankim undertakes the task of comparing the Gita with the Mahabharata from the standpoints of thematic agreements, similarities of characters, and the likeness in the interpolated parts, which in turn implies that he had regarded the Gita, too, as a historical text.
First, Bankim’s argument was that ‘Srimadbhagabadgita in the Bishmaparvan of the Mahabharata, also known in the name [of] Bhagavadgitaparvadhyaya’,21 is certainly an undetachable part of the epic because characters, themes, and relationships in both are quite similar. While regarding the Gita as an indivisible part of the Mahabharata22 Bankim says: It is hard to believe that this discussion between Krishna and Arjuna really did take place at the beginning of the war on the battlefield. But it seems acceptable that the creator of the Gita, using his imagination in this way, inserted the compiled essentials of the dharma proclaimed by Krishna into the Mahabharata.23 Second, just as the Mahabharata contained numerous additions and later interpolations,24 so the Gita too contains similar incorporations. Bankim states that the Page 7 of 39
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Culturing the Nation nineteenth and twentieth slokas of the second chapter of the Gita, for instance, were interpolated from the Kathopanisad;25 the slokas 34, 35, 36, and 37 were also later incorporations as they do not fit into the stream of arguments in the preceding and subsequent slokas of the Gita.26 It is possible that in many parts the author expressed his own opinion through the mouth of the Lord.27
Third, and perhaps the most important, Bankim argues that the dharma proclaimed by the Mahabharata and the Gita are identical. If we accept the historicity of the Mahabharata and if we see that the expounding of dharma attributed to Krishna at different places by the Mahabharata composer is everywhere of the same nature, and if we see again that this dharma is different in nature from the prevalent dharma, then we can say that this dharma is founded by Krishna alone. Again, if we see that the dharma which is expounded at length and in full in the Gita is in harmony with that dharma propagated by (p.17) Krishna which is merely a partial expression of it, then we shall say that the dharma of the Gita is propounded truly by Krishna himself.28 To Bankim, then, history is a record of truth, and seemingly unhistorical parts within historical records can be regarded as imaginative inclusions or figments by the authors of history. By the employment of a scientific– rational method these imaginary portions can be cast aside and truly historical material can be retrieved. The truth of the scriptures and traditions is historical, and their validity and authenticity lie in their historical demonstrations. Bankim felt that the nation and its sociopolitical institutions should similarly be rediscovered and rooted in history. He also felt that the nation should be redefined on the foundation of the ‘genuinely historical’ by sifting through the unhistorical layers that had veiled its spirit. In other words, the Indian nation should be founded on historical memories, the task that Bankim sets himself in his nationalist writings.
Historicity of Krishna and the Theory of Avatar Bankim’s belief in the historical–scientific method as the procedure for determining the truth was expressed more systematically in his analysis of Krishna. Here he first attempted to establish the status of Krishna in the moral philosophies of the central texts and scriptures of ancient India, which, he felt, was essential as any theorization or conclusion about Krishna would actually determine the moral validity of these texts. In other words, if the historicity of Krishna was proved, then the task of demonstrating the historicity of these texts would be easy in as much their moral philosophies revolved around Krishna. If the old is to be preserved, then it is imperative to see what is there that is to be retained. And if the ancient is to be put aside, even then an analysis of Krishna’s nature is required; for, unless Krishna is removed, it will not be possible to remove the ancient.29 Bankim acknowledged that the life of Krishna as depicted in various scriptures contained many supernatural and magical stories, which variously portrayed him as God-incarnate, an ideal person, rescuer, and social servant, and some others, Page 8 of 39
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Culturing the Nation particularly missionary writings, as a ‘lecherous trickster’, and a ‘fake’, thereby hiding his ‘real character’. But Krishna, outside these unhistorical and imaginary constructions, is a thoroughly rational and historical figure. ‘I have found out that all the sinful tales about Krishna … are baseless; and that on eliminating the (p.18) romantic fiction about Krishna created by the romancers, what remains is utterly unalloyed, wholly pure, [and] exceedingly sublime’.30
While repudiating the critique of the Indologists that ‘Krishna was not the central figure of the Mahabharata‘, Bankim argues that then even Moltke, whose generalship was carried out through letters or telegrams and not with ‘sword in hand’, should not be considered as central to the victories of Gravelotte, Woerth Metz, Sedan, Paris during the Franco- Prussian war. Refuting Wheeler’s opinion that ‘Dvaraka is separated from Hastinapura by 700 Krosa and the intimate relationship between Krishna and the Pandavas narrated in the Mahabharata is impossible’, Bankim asks, how is it then possible to explain the close ties between Bengal’s Muslims, Delhi’s Mughals and the Pathans?31 By taking recourse to ancient scriptures, particularly the Puranas and Bhagavata, and by repudiating the Indologists’ accounts, Bankim tried to establish the historicity of Krishna on rational grounds. From that rational position he then attempted to reinterpret one of the most central theories of Indian philosophy—the theory of incarnation. Although Bankim did not bother much about the incarnation theory associated with Krishna, he argued that all the supernatural and extraordinary qualities attributed to Krishna were baseless and hence irrelevant in understanding his character. ‘What is accomplished by him, in that I believe; but what is not done by him, in such unnatural matters why should I believe? Asura Salva established his aerial city of Saubhanagar and waged war there from … and in such other matters why should one believe.’32 Bankim argues: ‘Just as a tribal may consider a clock or messages sent over the electric wires supernatural phenomena, so we too consider many incidents in the same fashion.’33 However, the supernatural actions carried out by the divine can be accepted because nothing is impracticable for divine prowess or a human being if they are in accordance with natural laws. The supernatural narrations associated with Krishna can similarly be admitted had his divine character been rationally proved, but the task, Bankim thought, is hard to accomplish. Bankim argued that the divine assuming human form at a particular phase in history is not a supernatural or unnatural occurrence but deeply rooted in the scientific theory of incarnation. If the divine or supernatural Krishna would ‘accomplish things by using miraculous or divine power’, then ‘assuming a human body’34 is not required because ‘He who is omnipotent, the prime mover, whose will is law, at whose behest all creatures are created and destroyed, he can, without taking on a human body, only by using his divine power, destroy any demon or (p.19) human or accomplish any other intended work’.35 For Bankim, the divine takes human birth with certain unusual attributes and properties for Page 9 of 39
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Culturing the Nation the fulfillment of specific objectives, but those objectives are not restricted to the destruction of selected demons for their wicked deeds. [J]ust for killing a solitary Kamsa or Sisupala God Himself should have to be born on earth as a man does appear undoubtedly an impossible matter … Actually, those who are unable to comprehend the essence of Hinduism, only they believe that the aim of an incarnation is the slaying of demons or the wicked.36 The purpose of the divine birth is to set an example for people and assist them in their pursuit of dharma. While quoting the original 19–24 slokas of the third chapter and the eighth sloka of the fourth chapter of the Gita, Bankim argued that this was the objective of Krishna’s birth in human form.
The complete dharma’s perfect ideal is none other than the Divine. But the attribute-less Divine cannot be our ideal … Hence, if God Himself manifests among people in a finite and bodily form, then by deliberating on that ideal the genuine upliftment of Dharma can take place. It is for this reason that there is the need for the incarnation of the Divine … In such a situation, that God should assume human form out of compassion for his creatures, why should it be impossible.37 Elsewhere, Bankim contended that the birth of Krishna had two definite objectives to be realized—first, the establishment of dharma narrated at length in the Mahabharata and second, the propagation of dharma, the exegesis of which was in the Gita of the Bhismaparva.38 To be an ideal for humanity, all these unnatural and imaginary assertions were unimportant because genuine human mind could not comprehend them. It could only understand what human nature and limitations could accomplish. Krishna was an ideal because he did not achieve things by using incredible powers, and he expressed ‘human nature’ in its full in his life and actions. Citing from a lecture delivered by Dr Brookly at Trinity Church, Boston on 29 March 1885, and a couple of instances from the ‘Udyogaparvan’ of the Mahabharata, Bankim argued that a complete ideal would always be human.
God, for the purpose of teaching mankind, takes birth among men as an ideal man … He will never carry out any worldly or superhuman tasks by using powers beyond those of this world … those parts of the Mahabharata are baseless and interpolations where superhuman powers have been ascribed to Krishna … nowhere does Krishna declare himself to be God and nowhere has he revealed that he has any sort of supernatural power. Where someone (p.20) has attributed divinity to him, he has not sanctioned it nor has he behaved in any such fashion whereby that assumption of theirs could acquire firm foundations … He painstakingly performs actions and behaves as befits a human being.39 True ideal, besides being human, would engage himself incessantly in the service of mankind, ‘for the ideal man sees himself in all creatures and other than this he has no sense of self-identity’.40 Apart from preaching religion, he would engage in extirpating the wicked and establishing dharmarajya. For Bankim, Christ or Buddha could not Page 10 of 39
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Culturing the Nation really be ‘ideal men’ because, though they had engaged themselves in preaching religion and redeeming the sinners and the fallen, ‘to the extent that Krishna did not,’41 their religion contained ‘mostly in the form of advice‘, whereas true religion lies ‘in action’.42 Since they hardly contributed to the establishment of dharmarajya or to the quelling or uprooting the unrighteous from society, hence they were ‘not ideal men, but the best of men’.43 In other words, an ideal man should possess all those ideal qualities appropriate for all men of all time.
Is this Christian Ideal the ideal of true humanity? Will the national ideal of every race invariably be such? … It is the full development and balanced existence of all the faculties of man. He in whom these have achieved their supreme fruition and harmony is the Ideal Man. In Christ this is not so; in Krishna it is … if the Jews oppressed by Rome had risen in revolt for independence and made Jesus their commander-in-chief, what would Jesus have done? He had neither the strength nor the inclination to fight a war … The ideal man ought to be the ideal of all classes. For this reason it is impossible for Sri Krishna to become an ascetic like Sakyasimha, Jesus or Chaitanya and adopt the preaching of religion as his business. Krishna is of this world, a householder, statesman, warrior, dispenser of punishment, ascetic, propagator of dharma … he is the ideal of each and, all in all, the ideal of consummate manhood … By placing in the ideal seat the ideal man of the flawed Buddhist or Christian religion, we will not be able to comprehend the ideal man of that Hindu dharma which is complete.44 For Bankim, the Indian nation reconstructed on historical grounds would position Sri Krishna at its centre as an ideal character with human qualities. He is to be the role model for the nation and the citizen, and the likes of him in totality cannot be approximated by the figures of Christ or Buddha. Bankim’s uncritical faith in Hinduism and Krishna, and the moral tracts around him, did not allow any room for a favourable consideration of other religions and made him impatient towards their ideals and moral philosophy. Though he expressed complete faith in the (p.21) Western scientific–rational method, the political notions and institutions evolved therein did not occupy much place in Bankim’s thought.
However, question remains as to the reasons behind Bankim straining himself so much to prove the historicity of the Mahabharata or Krishna. It is quite clear that Bankim, like other reformers of the time, was responding to the missionaries’ evaluation of Hinduism. Their expectations in the ‘Hindu’ religion were dictated by the standards of the Semitic religions—the Book, the Prophet, their historical roots, and so on. The Gita and Krishna seemed to answer their needs, and hence their preoccupations with both, the latter as a target of ridicule. The nationalists, including the reformers, were merely being aggressively defensive about both. Bankim, in fact, dialogues with the nonpresent missionaries.
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Culturing the Nation Science–Philosophy Debate Bankim’s attempt to reinterpret Hinduism by employing the scientific– rational method can also be seen in his engagement in a fairly long debate with science to prove the scientific character of one of the central tenets of Hinduism—the presence of the atman in the perishable body and its indestructibility. Such an exercise, Bankim felt, was essential because Hinduism would otherwise lose the credibility of being a scientific religion and would be rejected by the Europeans and particularly by ‘the educated Bengalis’. It was also crucial for establishing the superiority of Hinduism by constructing a rational philosophy about its supreme essence. Although the philosophy of the existence of the imperishable atman in the inconstant mortal body is the contribution of Hinduism to the world of religious philosophy, the other major religions—Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam—are also cognizant of it. However, Bankim argues, the superiority of Hinduism lies in its attempt to relate atman to the paramatman, which other religions failed to perceive. This fundamental conception concerning the theory of atman is contained in Christianity as well as in any other dharma. But another conception, very subtle and astonishing, is found only in the Hindu dharma … all the different atmans enclosed in animate beings, while being separated, still belong to the universal atman; when someone frees himself from bondage, he merges in the universal atman. The Hindu philosophers call this universal atman Paramatman … So far for Hindu dharma; no other dharma has been able to come even near to this most elaborate theory … it is in no way inadequate to say that, among the theories known to mankind, there is no concept more elaborate than this … Actually, when one is discussing this theory, one cannot count them among humans, but feels inclined to call them gods.45 (p.22) Bankim begins this debate with an acknowledgement that both science and religion exert unbound influence over each other and the life of society, but their relative superiority is a matter of debate. For many, religion is an unimpeachable force as it provides a lasting answer to the predicaments of people, while for others, particularly educated Bengalis, science stands superior to religion. This dispute cannot be resolved, Bankim argues, unless one engages in assessing critically their competence and limitations in understanding truth.
Both dharma and science are true. Consequently we shall have to consider … how much truth there is on each side. Especially the educated Bengalis whether they know about science or not, are stricken with unshakeable devotion towards it … science, (bijnan) is higher to them than knowledge (jnana). Since this commentary is being written for educated Bengalis … consider the counterarguments of science against the theory of atman.46 Bankim argues that science is based on the principle of evidence for acquiring objective knowledge and this can be acquired through direct perception and inference based on direct perception. It does not validate any other proof as rational except Page 12 of 39
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Culturing the Nation these two. Although ancient Indian risis had proved the existence and immutable character of the atman through inference, for science, it is invalid because the conclusions that they had arrived at were not based on direct perception. Bankim argues that the application of either of these two methods cannot sufficiently prove the existence of the atman or its indestructibility. ‘The proofs that have been applied … do not stand the test. As a result, there is no proof of the existence of the atman’.47 However, even if science has failed to construct a rational theory about the atman, its existence and permanence cannot be disproved. For Bankim, one’s faith itself would be a convincing and reliable proof for the presence of atman in the perishable body. After quoting a couple of passages from J.S. Mill’s Three Essays on Religion and S. Johnson’s Oriental Religion, India, he argues that the application of a scientific point of view only shows the limitations and incompetence of rational knowledge.
[T]he cord of proof is tied to the waist of science; where should science find the atman that is inaccessible to proof? … He who does not find God in his heart will not find him through science. And he who has found God in his heart does not feel any necessity of a scientific proof regarding the theory of atman.48 After pre-empting the possible criticisms and objections by scientists and materialists, Bankim pushes the issue a little further and expresses (p.23) distrust in the validity of the proofs offered by positive science. His argument is that the proofs which science invokes for obtaining knowledge are not proofs of universal character; they have limited application. Sometimes, a scientific proof cannot be proof enough for resolving questions of a religious and philosophical nature, and it should not even attempt it because a proof appropriate for science may not fit into the science of philosophy. Therefore, each subject has to evolve its own appropriate proofs. In an essay in the Krishnacharitra, Bankim says:
In human life all those works that are accomplished can be carried out depending upon proofs. However, depending on the issue, the greater or lesser degree of strength of the proof is important. Without proofs greater than those on the basis of which we carry out our day-to-day duties, a court case cannot be decided; and the type of proof on the basis of which a judge arrives at a decision in court, without proofs of greater weight than that, the scientist cannot arrive at any decision regarding a scientific matter. For this reason, different disciplines of proofs have been created depending on the subject. Thus, for courts the Law of Evidence, for science[,] Logic or Inductive Philosophy and for historical matters too there is such a system of proofs.49 The existence of the atman can, therefore, be affirmed by two other proofs: First furnished by the ancient Indian philosophers which states upamana (analogy) and sabda (oral, verbal) as evidences for acquiring knowledge. For Bankim, analogy is not reliable as ‘in many cases, instead of verified knowledge, erroneous knowledge is produced by it’, but no proof could be more authoritative, rational, and scientific than authoritative texts (‘Sabda’, that is, an utterance devoid of illusion, error). Since the Vedas and the Gita contain many evidences for the atman, they themselves would constitute proof. Page 13 of 39
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Culturing the Nation If we can acknowledge an utterance as divine, then that is a genuine Sabda proof … a proof, superior even to direct perception and inference … If then someone deems this Gita a divine utterance, he shall not have to search for any other proof regarding the existence and indestructibility of the atman; this Gita will be an irrefutable proof.50 The second proof is provided in the writings of the German scholar Immanuel Kant who states that transcendental knowledge is evidence.
[A s]cientist would not accept the divinity of the Gita or any other texts … there is an answer by the German philosophers … They say that a number of principles are per se proved in the human mind … the proof Kant has given of this theory provides us with a marvellous exposition of the human mind. Kant also says that, (p.24) apart from that which we call the intellect … we possess another power superior to it … It provides us with knowledge concerning the unity of God, the atman and the world.51 But neither the proof of positive science, nor authoritative texts, nor transcendental philosophy is indisputable in the theoretical world of debate. All theories have innate weaknesses and limitations and hence a perfect and universally acknowledged theory about the atman and its attributes is well nigh impossible. Therefore, after engaging in a long debate with Western science, Bankim arrives at a theistic conclusion: that all these factors are insignificant as long as one believes in the existence of the atman in one’s heart. ‘A devotee has no need of all theses quarrels … it is sufficient that God exists … proclaimed Himself to be the paramatman and to have descended among all living beings’.52
Bankim follows the same method of reasoning in interpreting another crucial doctrine of Hinduism—the theory of rebirth. Unlike the atmic theory where Bankim attempts to defy or transcend Western science, he does not strive much to demonstrate the doctrine of rebirth scientifically as he explicitly acknowledges that such an endeavour would be a vain exercise since no scientific theory based on direct perception and inference can confirm rebirth. However, the possibility of rebirth of the soul after death cannot be denied for lack of rational evidence as authoritative texts provide genuine proofs of it.53 Bankim attempts to harness several theories from across European literature, Indologists, and Indian writers to demonstrate the genuineness of the theory of rebirth; some of them are thoroughly unscientific. He cites, for instance, a ghost theory prevalent among the uncivilized communities,54 other-worldly accounts of heaven and hell,55 besides compulsive theories born out of the indestructible character of the atman.56 Besides invoking the views of Rhys David, Tyler, Samuel Johnson, and Schlegel, he quotes stories from Carpenter which mention a belief that men could recollect accounts of their former lives to argue that although the doctrine of transmigration cannot be proved rationally, the inability of science to grasp and theorize it would in no way disprove the possible rebirth of the soul.57 However, Bankim’s conclusion is that all these questions would
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Culturing the Nation find no consideration in a true devotee since he believes in the infallibility of God.58 It may be noted here that although Bankim undertook the project of proving the scientificity of the central tenets of Hinduism, particularly the belief on atman and rebirth much seriously on a claim that such an exercise would obliterate all preconceived opinions about Hinduism, it in (p.25) its major part involved a fundamental critique of European science. In fact, Bankim uses harsh language to denigrate science’s claim for superiority over all that is non-scientific. Science, Bankim argues, is preoccupied with the task of destroying all that is orthodox and replacing them with the results of scientific investigation. She [science] is a demoness come to rule—a demoness who carries with her the stench of putrid flesh and, bedecked with cannon and gunpowder, breech-loader and torpedo, turns with one hand the wheels of industry and sweeps away with the other all that is ancient, all that is pure, and all that for countless ages we have held dear. She has turned her accursed brazen face towards us also; and thousands of Bengalis like you—educated, illiterate or semi-illiterate—have fallen under her spell …59
Dharma and Svadharma Bankim‘s distinctive interpretation of Hinduism through the central philosophy of the Gita is also evident in his attempt to redefine the two specific notions of the text—the notions of dharma and svadharma. The nationalist discourse of Bankim precludes all precedent theorems of dharma that Hinduism had hitherto acknowledged for the inclusion of the twin faces of piety and a socially ordered concept. His argument is that every creature on earth, whether animate or inanimate, possesses a ‘distinctive quality’ in itself, for instance, ‘treeness’ in a tree, ‘plantness’ in a plant, or ‘humanness’ in a human being. These qualities would be elementarily in embryonic form; the evolution and development of the ‘treeness’ or ‘plantness’ to the fullest possible extent through ‘cultivation’ and ‘nourishment’ is what is called ‘tree’ or ‘plant’; ’the final development of a sprout, is a great tree’.60 Similarly, ‘humanness’ in a human being would be rudimentary; its cultivation and sustenance to the fullest degree is what is ‘the true human being’. ‘The child you see is the sprout of a man. Through proper cultivation, it can achieve true humanity. It can become a man, possessing all virtues and all happiness. This is human development’.61 This development in a human being essentially involves the nurturing of two faculties—the physical and the mental. Physical development is the proper development of the body and its various components, that is, ‘hands, feet, and other organs of action; eyes, ears, and other senseorgans; brain, heart, lungs, bowels and other lifesupporting organs; bones, marrow, fat, flesh, blood, and other constituents of the body, and the physical faculties of hunger, thirst, and so on’.62 The development of the mind involves nourishment of faculties such as knowledge-gathering and judgement-making faculties, action-inducing organs, and pleasure (p.26) giving Page 15 of 39
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Culturing the Nation or aesthetic faculties.63 In other words, physical development, that is, transforming the body ‘to be strong, healthy and efficient at all the physical functions’, and making the mind a container of all virtues and thus reaching a state in which ‘a person is fully developed in all respects’64 is humanity. This is Bankim’s concept of dharma. Now what is man’s dharma? Whatever has to do with humanity. What has to do with humanity? Man has body and mind. What is body, and what is mind? The body is a conglomerate of a number of substances and has a number of powers. When these powers disappear from the body, humanity does not remain; for one can hardly say that there is humanity in a man’s corpse. Therefore one has to leave out the substances—those physical powers alone are the true constituents of the human body. Elsewhere (Dharmatattva) I have called them ‘physical faculties’. The human mind too is such an aggregate of powers or faculties. Let these be called ‘mental faculties’. Now it can be seen that man, or the humanity of man, consists in these physical and mental faculties. If that be so, then the prescribed cultivation of all these faculties is man’s dharma. What do we do through the use of these faculties? Either we act, or we acquire knowledge. There are no fruits of human life except action and knowledge.65 Thus, according to Bankim, harmonious and equivalent advancement of all the physical and mental faculties are the essential constituents of dharma. Harmonious growth does not, however, imply equal maturation of all faculties; the nascent qualities of certain faculties such as devotion, love, pity would have to be developed unrestrictedly to the highest measure and others such as lust, anger, greed, desire, and so on, would have to be confined to natural needs. For Bankim the proper, harmonious, and equivalent advancement of certain sensibilities and control over certain others is the true meaning of dharma. He uses a beautiful analogy to explain this:
[A]ppropriate development does not mean that the jasmine and the rose should attain the same height as the palmyra or the coconut palm. Each must grow according to its own capacity. If the unrestricted growth of one stifles that of another, if the spread of the tamarind causes the rose to wither and die in its bed, then balance suffers. It is the same with human nature … I do not say that it should be uprooted altogether, for even the tamarind has its uses. Similarly, the baser instincts have theirs …66 Dharma is happiness that lies in humanism, and humanism constitutes culturing the human being of his faculties such as physical, mental, executive, and aesthetic to their appropriate and fullest possible extent. Such culturing of all faculties becomes incomplete unless engrafted with bhakti, as ‘there can be no humanism except by the comprehensive and (p.27) appropriate development of the faculties; neither can there be any unless all of them are directed towards the goal of devotion. Perfect humanism is produced by the combination of these two’.67 More clearly, bhakti would be the parameter for measuring the intensity and completeness of such honing of all faculties or else, it would be the epitome of such cultivation of humanism. Theoretically, bhakti is ‘the state when all human faculties turn towards God in Page 16 of 39
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Culturing the Nation veneration and subordinate themselves to His divine dispensation’.68 But bhakti outlined by the Gita, Bankim argues, does not merely involve unwavering faith in God, it is enthralled by an incessant love and benevolence towards the distressed. It is more of a social attribute, the culturing of which engender an appropriate degree of veneration for social authority and men of moral upright on the one hand and engage in social service on the other.
Quite surprisingly, if superficially understood, Bankim’s commentary on the Gita does not seem to directly support the nationalist discourse as its overarching preference is towards Bhaktiyoga and not Karmayoga. To strengthen this Bankim literally states that the Gita is essentially ‘a scripture on bhakti’. However, the pursuit of bhakti as theorized by Bankim does not fructify in passivity or a religiously ascetic life of severe self-discipline by abjuring all actions, or in the wishful Vedic deeds. The karma performed through cultivated physical faculties, and knowledge acquired through matured mental faculties would open the gates of bhakti that results only in the performance of pious actions. ‘You must turn all your faculties in the direction of the divine ideal or else your actions will not remain true to the divine purpose. This doctrine of disinterested action is nothing but bhakti, only differently called’.69 At their consummated state both karma and jnana take the form of bhakti— desireless performance of action. ‘At the summit of their development, both knowledge and actions fuse into bhakti’. Bankim states: The first condition of karmayoga is that the performance of karma is a must. But karma means … duty … that are dedicated to God … have to perform these acts without becoming attached to them or without aspiring to their results … But for this, all your faculties must be turned over to Him in worshipful submission. But this submission is really an expression of bhakti; so karmayoga is really bhaktiyoga in practice. The oneness of karma with bhakti thus stands revealed.70 Now Bankim’s argument is that all national predicaments, gigantic or minute, are the result of either contempt or disregard shown to this philosophy of culture of faculties through bhakti. ‘Sickness’ for instance, Bankim argues, is the result of unpaid attention for nourishing (p.28) the physical faculties to perfection; ‘restlessness’, or eager to ponder excessively, to lascivious instincts, or ‘craving after sense pleasure’, are the failure of mental cultivation, poverty, and so on, similarly are the outcome of ‘straying from the rules of righteous conduct and the failure to fully develop the human potentials’.
But this perfect state in all respects is not facile and accomplished without effort. It cannot be achieved in its entirety at once. ‘I do admit that, so far, nobody had reached this pinnacle of perfection,’ Bankim argues. In the theory of dharma, ‘it is not that attainment of this ultimate ideal that is important; rather, it is the fixing of this ideal as the objective that is; so that, in striving to acquire all virtues and happiness, we may acquire many.’71 For Bankim, only the divine can fulfil the complete unfolding and highest development of all virtues. However, if one strived, perceiving the divine as an ideal, it is not a state of Page 17 of 39
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Culturing the Nation impossibility. ‘There is no reason to believe that the finest specimens of mankind will not succeed in attaining humanity if they try.’72 God, being infinite and attribute-less, cannot become an ideal for ordinary human beings in the realization of their dharma. Therefore, human beings can strive to achieve the highest virtues through following ideal characters from religious history, particularly Krishna. After all, religious histories are alive for this purpose. In the initial stages of worship, the divine example will not do. What is required is the study of religious history, which recounts the lives of great men who … were so completely virtuous that they can be regarded either as almost Godlike or as embodiments of God Himself in flesh. Therefore, if at the beginning the godhead seems difficult to conceptualize, these men could serve as your ideals. In fact, this is how Christ has become the God of Christians … The best parts of the New Testament and the original Puranas are those that reveal the greatness of such perfect specimens of the human race … But … there is one person in the history of the Hindus who surpasses them all in greatness … Lord Krishna … Krishna is the most perfect specimen of humanity, the greatest exemplification of the benefits of Culture. His physical faculties, having been honed to perfection … His mental faculties similarly developed … that transcends the ken of ordinary mortals.73 Having explained dharma as the complete development and unfolding of all physical and mental faculties, and adharma as those hampering such progress, Bankim establishes a link between dharma and svadharma in a characteristic way. Although ‘the dharma one has is one’s svadharma,’74 Bankim argues, it does not mean that the institution of svadharma prescribed in the Gita implies the dharma of the Manusmritis’ fourfold divisions of society. Such interpretations would not only localize (p.29) the universal character of the institution of svadharma, but militate against the central philosophy of the Gita. Therefore, all pre-modern interpretations of the text including Samkara are untenable.
We seem to have understood that the svadharma of the Hindu dharma, which depends upon the varna-system, can be determined according to the divisions of the varnas. But what is svadharma for non-Hindus? The sum of all brahmins, kshatriyas, vaisyas and sudras is still a very minor part of the world population. Most people on earth are outside the four varnas; do they not have any svadharma?75 Bankim’s argument is that although all human beings possess a specific quality of humanness, the growth of the different physical and mind faculties varies from one individual to another. There are some people, for instance, whose physical components are cultured to their complete measure, and others would have registered similar excellence in relation to mental faculties. The extent of advancement of these faculties determines the functions that they would perform in the external world.76 In other words, in the external world, certain functions such as learning, protection, production, and collection are to be performed; people would engage in these functions commensurate with the growth of their physical and mental faculties. Page 18 of 39
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Culturing the Nation Therefore, knowledge and action are man’s svadharma. If all were to make use of all their faculties in a prescribed fashion, both knowledge and action would be the svadharma of all men. But usually this does not happen during the undeveloped state of a society. Someone gives knowledge the main status of his svadharma, another likewise mainly adopts action as his svadharma … those whose svadharma is the acquisition of knowledge can be called brahmins … Action can be divided into three categories. But in order to understand this, action must be clearly conceived. In the world, there are inner and outer objects. The inner objects cannot be submitted to action; only the outer ones are objects of action. Whether it be a number or all[,] these outer objects are consumable by man. Human action resorts to consumable objects. This resorting is of three kinds: (1) production, (2) connection or collection, and (3) protection … Those who produce are those having agriculture as their dharma … Can the readers accept that their other names are vice-versa kshatriyas, vaisyas, and sudras?77 It is important that for Bankim, division into the four-fold categories of brahmin, kshatriya, vaisya, and sudra would not determine social function; conversely their actions would decide the via-media for fulfillment. The actions are left to the subjects’ choice corresponding to their physical (p.30) and mental maturity, and hence are not hereditary. The consummated state of culture bars svadharma that gives minimum latitude for choice, making one fit for all actions. Till the ultimate nourishment of all the physical, mental, executory, and aesthetic is acquired, one is to pursue the function that befits corresponding to the degree of culture, but at the summit acquire qualities appropriate for any action. Therefore, although Dronacharya, Parasurama, Kripacharya, Asvatthama, and others were all brahmins by birth, the growth of their physical faculties enabled and befitted them to carry out military functions incomparably.78
For Bankim this perfect state of all round and symmetrical development of all faculties as outlined by the Gita has never been the objective of western education; the latter emphasized the nourishment of a specific faculty with a view to create a specialized agent (it compartmentalized man’s talents as appropriate to a specific function). The flaw in modern education is that a student has to become proficient in only one or few chosen subjects … He who displays a scientific bent of mind should study the sciences … He who has a flair for literature should concentrate only on it … But how can all the mental faculties possibly develop in this way? Every individual turns out to be only half a human being … Both are devoid of humanism, and consequently, both fail to measure up to the standards of dharma.79 For Bankim, all the earlier interpretations of svadharma are absurd and perverted understandings of the concept. The concept is based on equality since all the components and sense organs of the body are equal. However, deep in his heart Bankim was convinced that in the external world, the four-fold divisions of the varna Page 19 of 39
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Culturing the Nation system represented unequal relations. This is evident when, in Dharmatattva, he compares the qualities of a brahmin with those of a sudra, considering the brahmin as an ideal,80 and large portions of his descriptions of brahmins are panegyrical. The inferior position that he assigns to sudras is implicit in his Gita interpretation in the statement that ’when the actions of those whose dharma is knowledge, war, commerce or agriculture are so abundant as to disable the respective agents to discharge all of their daily and other necessary actions, then a number of people (sudras) get employed in the service’.81
Karma and Nishkama Karma The word karma in the Gita, Bankim argues, was not used in the Vedic sense of sacrifice, rituals, and so on because the latter always pointed towards the fulfillment of transitory pleasures such as heaven, wealth, (p.31) bodily indulgences, and obtaining divine benediction for the fulfillment of other worldly desires.82 For the Gita no action based on such transient satisfactions could be flawless, as the doer of such karma would have to experience distress once the virtues he had in his credit got exhausted. Therefore, karma in the Gita is not Vedic karma. [W]hen taking the ritualistic karman said in the Vedas as the meaning of karman, we cannot arrive at any comprehensible theory … it is very evident that the ritualistic karman mentioned in the Vedas is not meant by the nishkama karman of the Gita.83 Bankim believed that karma implied two things in the Gita. First, karma is an unavoidable rule of life. ‘No-one can ever be without doing an action; even if he refrains from all other action, still, subject to inherent nature (svabhava) or prakriti (nature), he definitely has to perform some actions, such as eating, sitting, lying, respiration, inhalation, etc. Consequently, the word karman clearly denotes that which is usually called karman and not sacrifices, etc.’84
Second, perhaps the most important, karma denotes svadharma. Svadharma is performance of one’s action derived from the growth of one’s physical components and the faculties of the mind. He remarks: ‘[T]he svadharma is not the same for all men … The soldier’s svadharma is to wound the enemy; the doctor’s is to treat such wounds. There are as many kinds of svadharma as there are actions of men’.85 For the advancement of a specific quality or svabhava in men, these svadharmas have to be performed, but mere performance of svadharma would not serve the purpose of dharma. Actions have to be performed desirelessly, with pure intellect and complete involvement of the heart, as ‘there is no humanity without desireless action. And without humanity, there is no steady pleasure in this birth or world’.86 For Bankim, all actions including the most decried action of war can be performed desirelessly as fulfillment of svadharma. From this arises the conception of karmayoga.87
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Culturing the Nation The highest state of culture, that is, the perfection of the totality of the faculties through bhakti is the epitome of nishkama karma. As all the faculties have grown to the ultimate degree of bhakti where one cannot eschew deeds, karma becomes incumbent upon nishkama karmi. Karma means duty and this duty, in turn, comprises only ‘those acts that are dedicated to God and are intended to fulfill the divine will’. The karma becomes desireless as there is no presence of self in it; hence it becomes bhakti and vice-versa. ‘The doctrine of disinterested action is nothing (p.32) but the way of karma or worship through the performance of deeds and actions’.88 It is important to note that Bankim did not develop a systematic and coherent theory of nishkama karma of the Gita as many subsequent nationalist writers like Tilak, Vivekananda, or Gandhi did. He, in fact, preferred to highlight its various aspects and underlying principles. These aspects are dispersed in his commentary on the second and third chapter of the Gita. However, analysis of these principles are extremely important, for much of what later commentators say by way of making nishkama karmi a central figure in their nationalist discourse was palpably a development or response to the nishkama dharma portrayed by Bankim. For Bankim, nishkama karma implies several things. Nishkama karma implies that the actor or svadharmi would develop singlemindedness in his action and would not let his senses disperse into several subjects. He would keep his mind unperturbed and firm in samadhi state. ‘It does not run towards many themes … his buddhi of worshipping God is singleminded … the Lord makes clear that karmayoga is not those actions for fulfilling wishes but their contrary’.89 Nishkama karma denotes proficient performance of action, that is, ’performing action as kartavya (duty)’. Nishkama karmi would fulfill his svadharma as prescribed and not for any gain. Whatever he does, he does because it is to be performed … he is a yogin who is skilful in action, that is, who exercises all his actions to be performed as prescribed, yogah karmasu kausalam.90 Nishkama karma implies subjugation of self-identity in all actions including the deeds of benevolence. Self-identity in charity symbolizes craving for results and hence, the desireless attitude is ‘benevolence is action to be performed, and I will practise it; I do not want any fruit whatsoever’.91
Nishkama karma suggests that the actor would refrain from all sinful actions for the pursuit of virtuous deeds. Evil actions would deter the progress of one’s humanity which in turn vitiates dharma. A nishkama karmi, therefore, nurtures his physical, mental, and executory faculties to the fullest extent and limiting the pleasure-giving faculties to the necessary. ‘Some deeds we call good, as Page 21 of 39
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Culturing the Nation benevolence, etc … is the main component of humanity. Therefore … “actions to be performed”’.92 Nishkama karma means achieving equanimity towards the results of svadharma; equanimity implies abandonment of elation in success and (p.33) sorrow in failure. Since he would be indifferent towards the results of action, he ‘would feel no elation in case of successful attainment of fruits and no sorrow in its reverse’.93 Nishkama karma implies only the subduing of the senses and not their total destruction. ‘If anger is completely extirpated, for instance, there would be no stimulus to resist the wrong-doers; a complete suppression of sexual urges similarly would result in the extinction of human race’. The reason is that any longing for sense pleasure in excess of what is required to keep oneself in a state of health ultimately stifles the growth of other faculties and upsets their balance. If by restraint, you mean destruction that is not correct. If lust were destroyed, the human race would be destroyed. Therefore it is not dharma to destroy even this extremely ugly faculty—it is adharma … But an unfolding of this faculty beyond what is necessary for religion is … detrimental to harmony … If by restraint you mean hindrances to improper use of this faculty, then indeed it is restraint which is the proper unfolding of these faculties[‘] … highest dharma.94 Nishkama karma does not even insist on the elimination of all passions. In fact, it differentiates between the passions to be retained and those to be subdued. All the passions which support the unfolding of one’s faculties to the highest degree would be compatible with desirelessness.95 Nevertheless, nishkama karma does not stand for abdication of one’s pleasure in action; it only implies pleasure by curbing the senses and effacing desires.
Why should it not be possible to feel joy about outer objects when one is desireless? … The mere performance of action is joyful; and when in addition to this there is the knowledge of the similarity of success and failure, this joy never again decreases. And such joy is in the atman, it does not depend on anyone … this is no Asceticism … The obstacle in the enjoyment of what enjoyable pleasure there is in the world is the intensity of desire and of the senses, etc. When this is controlled, no more hindrance in the enjoyment of all the worldly pleasures persists … if the wish for pleasure is given up, pleasure itself is not yet abandoned … He who is devoid of wishes for pleasure can enjoy every sort of pleasure … The central meaning of karmayoga is that one should perform actions desirelessly. The fruit of action is pleasure; he who accomplishes an action to be executed also attains the pleasure born from it … he who is dominated by desire or wishes when acting, attains no pleasure; desires
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Culturing the Nation and wishes are causes of action not to be executed and thus of sin and pain.96 Desirelessness does not mean abandonment of actions. ‘Non-action (naiskarman) is not attained by merely refraining from action … (p.34) perfection is not attained by mere abandonment of action’.97 In fact, by giving up of actions neither perfection could be attained nor dharma be fulfilled. Further attachment is the primary adversary of nishkama karma; therefore desirelessness implies non-attachment or absence of desire in one’s action besides restrained senses. Once attachment is removed, nishkama karma takes one towards one’s dharma.98
Worshipping God is the corollary of sense control and obliteration of desire. In other words, abandonment of desire automatically leads to God-worship. Control of the senses and abandonment of desire; that is the state of being given to the brahman (nishkama karmi) … this is only a characteristic of the mind absorbed in God—the abandonment of desire does not happen without worship of the Lord.99 Nishkama karma necessarily involves worshipping of God, primarily in two forms: first, by performing actions as intended by the divine. These actions can be of two kinds: first, natural karma for the maintenance of vital functions such as bathing, drinking, eating, and so on. He performs these functions as driven perforce by nature and second, performance of svadharma in tune with svabhava. Second, one can also worship God by observing ‘God’s rules in one’s action’. Observance of divine rules means developing an attitude of impartiality and oneness towards all beings and performing one’s karma for the welfare of all. In other words, nishkama karmi would perform actions for the benefit of people as worship of God.
Worship of God is, of course, His satisfaction …The execution of the action intended by Him and the observance of His rules are His satisfaction; these are the genuine worship of God … impartiality regarding all beings, knowledge that all beings are similar to oneself, and beneficence towards all beings. Thus the only purpose of the action of a karmayogin is beneficence towards all beings.100 Last, in nishkama karma, actions would neither be unintentional nor purposeless, nor would they imply perfunctory actions; in fact, the actor would strive to fulfil ‘desired objectives’ in his deeds. Only ungodly, immoral, adharmic, and malevolent actions or desires in actions were to be discarded, refrained from and retaining kama (desire) in doing moral, godly, and virtuous deeds would be permissible, and in fact be regarded as the kernel of nishkama dharma.
[T]o say that there is no effort for the attainment of fruits in desireless action is impossible; this is, moreover, not the intention of the Gita either. He whose (p.35) goal is liberation desires liberation and makes efforts fit for the attainment of liberation. Neither in the Gita nor anywhere else is the word kama employed without implying the effort for the attainment of its fruits. Imagine that the accomplishment of one’s country’s or race’s welfare is due action. It can never be that someone who strives for the Page 23 of 39
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Culturing the Nation welfare of his country does so without desiring the welfare of his country. Thus it is our duty … If that person acts while only desiring the welfare of his own country, then his action is desireless. And if he engages in doing what is beneficial for his country while longing for his glory, honour, prestige and advancement, he is one whose actions are with desire.101 Although nishkama karma is desirelessness, it is also anusheelan—desirous of achieving certain virtuous goals. It does not always distance itself from all kinds of desires in actions; it is giving up of only evil desires and deeds. Desiring for universal welfare in one’s actions or rendering national service by the motivation of desire does not affect desirelessness, and hence, ipso facto nishkama dharma.
To Bankim, then, nishkama karma is not total desirelessness or complete nonattachment; one is to hold virtuous desires in one’s action and restrain all those desires which would hinder the fulfillment of dharma. Dharma lies in fulfilling both natural deeds and one’s svadharma for the satisfaction of God in the form of dedicating them to the welfare of the people. Nishkama karmi is not an ascetic, lethargic, or indolent actor; he is an active, energetic, vigorous, and ambitious one, who performs his deeds (karma) with genuine intellect (knowledge) and untainted heart (bhakti). This utilitarian ethic, combined with desireless dharma, was the ethic that Bankim proposed for the Indian nation. This ethic, and the character of Krishna as an ideal for the performance of svadharma and nishkama karma were to occupy a central place in modern India. In the colonial context, the British were an evil force and therefore, a nishkama karmi’s desire to overthrow it would not be contrary to nishkama karma. In fact, it would be the highest dharma as per the Gita.
Nishkama Karma, Non-violence, and the Nation The relation that Bankim establishes between nishkama karma and nonviolence and between the two and the nation is yet another important aspect of his interpretation of the Gita. As per the ethics of nishkama karma all actions which are in accordance with or sanctioned by dharma are virtuous and others despicable. Similarly, all actions which are conducive to the good of all are meritorious and those that harm people are scornful deeds. It was through this argument that Bankim put forward his theory of non-violence and the exceptions to it. (p.36) For Bankim, refraining from violence at all times and under all situations or observing non-violence in all circumstances without exception is not commended by nishkama karma. As per this theory, all actions, including violent ones, are permitted if they are desireless and contributory to the evolution of humanity. Therefore, the maxim ‘ahimsa paramodharmah’, that is, no dharma is superior or higher than nonviolence, does not mean observing non-violence in all situations without exception; it only means abhorring violence when it is not required by dharma.
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Culturing the Nation Bankim’s justification of violence and exceptions to non-violence were based on two grounds: sanction of dharma and accomplishment of human welfare. First, the principle of non-violence is not violated if violence is carried out for the preservation of human life. Although it would be spontaneous or a forced act of violence, nevertheless integral to the maintenance of human life, and hence, sanctioned by dharma. That non-violence is the highest dharma does not mean that violence in any situation whatsoever is sin. The divine law is that we cannot live for a second without causing violence to creatures. With the water we drink we consume thousands and thousands of creatures seen under the microscope; with every breath numerous such creatures are forced into our nostrils and at every step thousands and thousands of creatures are crushed … If it is said that these are violence done in ignorance and so not sinful, then in reply I say that without knowingly causing violence we cannot preserve our lives.102 Second, the principle of non-violence is not infringed if one resorts to practising violence for the protection of life under unavoidable situations, because the dharma that protects life is superior to the observance of ahimsa.
That dacoit who, entering my home at night weapon in hand, is stealing everything, if there be no way to prevent him other than destroying him, then I am morally justified in destroying him … Alexander, or Mahmud of Ghazni, Attila or Chengiz Khan, Timur or Nadir Shah, Fredrick II or Napoleon, who had invaded other kingdoms for appropriating the wealth and lands of others with innumerable trained brigands, even though they be in hundreds of thousands, each and every one of them ought to be killed according to [the] dictates of dharma. Here violence itself is dharma.103 Hence, the killing of aggressors such as ‘the incendiary, the poisoner, the one with weapon in hand, the thief of wealth, the thief of land, and the abductor of women’104 is not incompatible with dharma; rather it is the (p.37) highest dharma as per the Gita. The sin of killing an aggressor is not embodied in the killer but the aggressor himself.
Violence to prevent an aggressor is not adharma; rather is it the supreme dharma … a hunter named Balaka had slain a ferocious carnivore, who was indiscriminately slaying creatures, and the moment he did so, flowers began to rain from the sky … The virtuous deed of the hunter was that he had used violence against the violent.105 But the dictum ‘violence sanctioned by dharma’ is not to be taken to mean ‘violence for the sake of dharma’, because no religion sanctions persecution for its own sake. Rather it approves violent deeds under certain inescapable and unavoidable circumstances for the welfare of the people. Therefore assuming the sanction of dharma for justifying all sorts of ‘murders’ as ‘for the sake of dharma’ is adharma in its basest form.
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Culturing the Nation ‘Non-violence is the supreme dharma ’… the dictum not to be violent unless required by dharma creates great confusion … Because dharma required it, millions of men were sent to death’s door by the Inquisition. St. Bartholomew’s murder was also for the sake of dharma. In the cause of dharma the crusaders befouled the earth with blood and mire. The Mussalmans killed hundreds of thousands of people for spreading dharma. Possibly, the number of human beings destroyed by men out of misconceptions regarding dharma has not been paralleled in any other cause.106 Third, non-violence is also not infringed by indulging in violent deeds for selfprotection. Further, violence is in conformity with dharma, if it is resorted to for the protection of society. In these wars, ‘the warrior gains not adharma, but highest dharma. This is not solely a matter of observing one’s svadharma, but infinite merit is acquired along with it. The warrior whose fate furnishes him a dharmayuddha is extremely fortunate’.107
War is nobody’s duty (karttabya) when it can be avoided. But there occur situations when such a cruel undertaking becomes unavoidable and indispensable … Taimurlang or Nadir comes to burn down and rob the country, then for whoever knows how to fight, war is his unavoidable and indispensable svadharma.108 Similarly, violence practised for the protection of one’s rights does not violate the principle of non-violence. In fact, it is highest dharma to protect one’s belongings. For instance, if someone has seized property that does not belong to him then recovery of it is a social duty. ‘If everyone becomes indifferent about recovering one’s property, society will disintegrate in no time, and hence, the use of force is justified by dharma.’109
(p.38) Last, violence is also permitted if it is necessary for the fulfilment of one’s svadharma. ‘The war Arjuna is engaged in is a dharmayuddha. A ksatriya has no higher dharma than dharmayuddha’.110 However, all these do not imply that the ethic of non-violence is not characterized with universal appeal. Bankim argues that the Gita regarded non-violence as the supreme virtue among all universally accepted ethical principles, for instance, truth, forgiveness, donations, askesis, worshipping gods and between non-violence and truth, nonviolence is regarded as the higher dharma. [T]hat rather can a falsehood be uttered but never is violence against creatures a duty … ’ahimso paramodharma’ is not the exact translation of Krishna’s words. The correct version is, ’In my opinion, non-violence towards creatures is best of all’.111 It is from this point of view that Bankim criticizes European understanding of nonviolence. Non-violence, its exceptions, and violence are completely misunderstood in Europe and that has resulted in violence time and again.
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Culturing the Nation According to Europeans there is no greater glory than seizing the kingdom of another. Its name is ’Conquest’, ’Glory’, ’Extension of Empire’ and so on and so forth. As in English, so also in other European languages there is similar glorification of looting the kingdoms of others. Infatuated solely by one word, ’Glorie’, Frederick II of Prussia set Europe aflame thrice with war and caused the destruction of millions of human beings. Except such blood-thirsty ogres, other people will easily apprehend that there is hardly any difference between such ‘Glorie’ and dacoity …112 Bankim interprets the notion of truth and falsehood in the same way and argues that truth is not violated by uttering a lie if it is sanctioned by dharma or is aimed at bringing about universal welfare. Truth is not violated if one pronounces falsehood for self-protection or for the protection of one’s moral rights. In fact, in those contexts speaking a lie would be considered as the highest dharma.
[W]hatever is sanctioned by dharma is truth and what is against it is falsehood … if anyone enquires of another about a person with the intention of killing him, then the person enquired of ought to maintain silence. If speech is unavoidable, then in such a case using falsehood is the duty. In such circumstances falsehood becomes truth.113 The exceptions to non-violence and truth cannot be perceived as maxims that can be practised by everyone. The Gita, while permitting a nishkama (p.39) karmi to make exceptions to non-violence, differentiates between the ‘desireful’ and ‘desireless’ states. Only a person with a desireless mind is allowed to practise violence in accordance with dharma and universal welfare.114
Quite interestingly, Bankim’s nationalist views are woven around the theory of culture. Although, Bankim argues, the perfection of culture lies in developing the feeling of universal love wherein it does not differentiate between self and others, and sees ‘the earth and the universe and all the elemental properties are merely so many manifestations of Vishnu’ and hence ‘never distinguish between himself and others’,115 self-love, love for society, and the nation are not contrary to it, but rather channels for it. Feeling of self-love at the height of contemplating universal love, for instance, does not contravene dharma as the latter’s persistence lies in self-love. Also, indulging in self-defence is not possible unless desirous of self-love. Hence, self-defence through self-love is the only means of protecting oneself and others and giving service to them. Preservation of self is essential to the preservation of God’s creation … it is an act that is consecratory to God … it is possible to convert it into a dispassionate act … Comparatively, the importance of self-preservation is greater … that comes before benevolence … Give unto others by all means, but having given, see that there is enough for you to eat. If there is not enough to go around, refrain from sharing and keep everything for yourself … He who sees unity in all matters and in all creatures, who sees self and others alike, is able to give to others as easily as he is able to keep for himself. This is what dharma is … self must be equated with non-self … Page 27 of 39
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Culturing the Nation altruism and self seeking are both moral obligations for me. Self-love and universal love are one.116 The protection of society is similarly essential for contemplating universal love and for its fullest expression.
Bankim’s defence of the nation and patriotism were grounded on similar reasoning. The nation, he argues, is a channel for the cultural course of nourishing humanism. ‘The purpose of culture is to animate all the faculties and raise their condition to a level of godly perfection … [however] there can be no life of virtue or morality except within the parameters of a social [national] arrangement’. Further, nation is essential for the actions of self-protection and the protection of society as the latter lies in the former. If self-preservation and the protection of our near and dear ones constitute dharma, so does the protection of the motherland … there can be no protection of self without the protection of the motherland … Indeed, it is all the more important since it combines the preservation of both self and society.117 (p.40) The nation is an instrument for the protection of dharma and the removal of its detriments. ‘The state that is conducive to dharma may be called swadheenata [sic]. Swadheenata is not a home-grown term. It is an import from England; being the equivalent of the English word “liberty” … such a state is absolutely essential for the growth of dharma’.118
Patriotism does not militate against universal love; it is an essential part of it. There is no possibility of a clash between the two since national defence rests in this universal love. There is really no conflict between this and the ideal of universal love. We shall protect ourselves against the aggressor; but why must we be loveless towards him … universal love is not that we must allow ourselves to be set upon by others without murmur or resistance. It means that, when everybody else is equal to me, I shall not seek to do any wrong to others— neither to any individual nor to any nation or race. Just as I shall work for the benefit of my own country, so … shall I work for others … I shall not seek to improve the lot of my own country at the expense of another and, likewise, shall not allow anyone to serve his country at the expense of my own. This is the true unity of perception.119 Given the condition that India was situated in, Bankim argues, patriotism is the highest dharma, the noblest ideal of all, and an instrument to fulfil the divine purpose—‘the defence of the country is an act dedicated to fulfilling God’s holy purpose, for the good of the whole world is implicit in it … for the good of the world it is the duty to defend the motherland’.120
For Bankim, the British have to be overthrown since none of the reasons that justify nationalist hopes in India confirms their presence. In the Dharmatattva Bankim engages in a fairly long debate on European nationalism where he Page 28 of 39
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Culturing the Nation bitterly criticizes their patriotism, avarice for territory and power, and their attempt for defying universal love taught by Hinduism. ‘European patriotism is a dastardly crime! Its objective is to enrich one’s own country by wresting what one can from others’,121 Bankim states, ’like dogs, these civilized races jostle and fight with one another over these territories. Like curs in a market-place snapping and snarling over a morsel of food, all human societies fight among themselves for whatever they can grab. The strong are constantly waiting to pounce on the weak’.122
Idol Worship and Religious Plurality Although Bankim did not devote much space in his Srimadbhagabadgita for the discussion of such issues as idol worship and religious plurality, they remained the major area of focus in Anandamath and particularly (p.41) in his year-long controversy with an English writer, Hastie. What is striking in his Gita commentary, however, is the attempt he makes to locate these issues within the ambit of nishkama karma. ‘We do find idol worship daily in every village; India is full of the veneration of idols.’123 Bankim observes, a practice that appears to be completely conventional and unscientific would be revealed in a different light once the relationship between the object of worship and the true brahman is established. For the Gita the objects of worship are immaterial; the true essence of worship is the state of mind or inveterate feeling attached to the idols. But is there no adoration (upasana) of corporeal (gods) in Hindu dharma? … [T]he Hindu veneration (archana) of idols is not worship of the shaped, and the Hindu who venerates an idol will, unless he is utterly ignorant or uneducated, never imagine the Idol to be God, or … God’s genuine image. If a person who adores a Kali made of a lump of clay has only the slightest idea about the adoration offered by himself, then he knows that this painted lump of clay is not God … it cannot possibly be the portrait of God.124 Bankim argues that since God is infinite, all-pervading, unthinkable, invisible, and beyond comprehension and adoration, idol worship is a way to comprehend the invisible.
[W]hy does he worship a lump of clay? He does not find the One he wants to worship … So he … says: you can manifest (abhirbhuta) yourself everywhere … Manifest yourself in this form which I made when imagining you; let me worship you. Otherwise I cannot make up my mind where to put the sandal paste.125 In fact, bhakti practised with a clear distinction between the object of worship and formless God is the kernel of Hindu dharma. In an essay in the Krishnacharitra Bankim emphatically states this:
I cannot comprehend what the attribute-less God is … For, man has no such faculty whereby he can apprehend the attribute-less God … for we lack that power … That is why Herbert Spencer after so many years has Page 29 of 39
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Culturing the Nation left the attributeless God in favour of not only a divine with attributes, but ‘something higher than personality’ … By calling God attribute-less we cannot find the Creator, Providence, Protector, Saviour, none of them. Why commit such folly?126 Even if this distinction between the object of worship and the formless God is not made by the devotee, it is not impossible for God to pervade an object or shape. To argue that God cannot acquire a form would be limiting the omnipotent power and pervasive character of God. Bankim argues: ‘[H]e whose will is law, who is omnipotent, why can he not assume a form despite being formless … He who has given form to this (p.42) material world, why can he not assume a form himself if he so wishes?’127 Therefore, the criticism by Europeans and religious reformers in India that the degeneration of the Indian state was a result of the overwhelming importance given to idol worship is prejudiced.
For this idol-worship the English, our teachers, are very angry with us, and their pupils, the new Indians, as well. The reason for the anger of the English is that the Bible forbids it. The educated Indians are angry because the English are angry … The English say that India has been ruined because of this idol-worship, and shall be utterly ruined if it is not abolished … It is true that ancient states like Rome, Greece, etc., had developed despite their worshipping of idols; but the English maintain that India will be ruined through idol-worship … Many members of the educated class think like this. Judging differently is, to them, the result of wrong education, perverted intelligence and depravedness. We cannot approve of such utterances.128 Bankim interprets polytheism in Hinduism through the central philosophy of the Gita on the same ground and reasoning. The argument is that just as no action, whether desire-ful or desireless, can be ignored as there would be no desirelessness without desire-ful action, so no worship of God, whether formed or formless, cattle or sheep is to be ignored because all kinds of worship are finally threaded to the all-pervading Brahman. The worshipping of different deities is the result of differences and the extent of culture that a worshipper has acquired, for the central philosophy of the Gita devotion in any form is a primary step towards the highest.
The earth has manifold procedures of worship. Some worship the formless, others the formed. Some worship only the Lord of the world; others worship many deities … All these are worship; although … there are differences of quality in them. But … are only [differences in] the amount of knowledge of the worshipper. He who is absolutely ignorant sees on the roadside some piece of stone on which flowers, sandal and vermilion have been put, and goes on putting flowers, sandal and vermilion on it; he who has come to know a bit is perhaps a worshipper of the formless brahman.129 Bankim argued that not only the worshipper of different deities but even he who worships none and is content with the senses is also acceptable to the framework of
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Culturing the Nation the Gita—‘even if a man does not worship any god, but only serves his senses, etc., that too is my service … the fruits according to the kind of worship and desires’.130
Of course, the highest worship is the worship of the one all-pervading Brahman but other forms of worship are not worthless though inferior to the former. The real test of adoration or worship is the devotion and (p.43) extent of ‘desirelessness’ in one’s bhakti. ‘He who does not wish anything, i.e. who is desireless, attains … only such worship which is sanctioned by his pure svabhava may be acceptable for Him’.131 For Bankim, the Gita’s claim that behind all kinds of worship of innumerable gods there is one supreme Brahman, monotheism behind polytheism, indicates that Hinduism is not only a universal and inclusive religion but superior to all other religions of the world. Bankim takes the eleventh sloka of the fourth chapter of the Gita as proof for such a stance. The dharma proclaimed in this sloka is the world’s only non-sectarian (asampradayik) dharma; the only dharma to be followed by all people. It is the genuine Hindu dharma too. There is no other dharma as generous as the Hindu dharma; and there is no other great utterance comparable to this sloka.132 The practice of idol worship is not unscientific or irrational if the worshipper is conscious of the distinction between the object of worship and the formless God. Since the human being does not possess such faculties through which he can understand unmanifest God, idol worship is an apologia for his inability to comprehend the attributeless. ‘A worldly person is not forbidden from performing idol worship since, by this, a gradual purification of his soul may take place’. For Bankim the Gita undermines inequality in the worship of plural gods by claiming that all kinds of worship lead to the worship of one universal God. The relation that the Gita establishes between the object of worship and the formless God, and between pluralism and monotheism made Hinduism a superior and truly universal religion in the world of religions.
A Broader Framework for Humanity Bankim’s fascination for the Gita and his attempts to make it the central treatise around which his nationalist views or hopes are woven may be gathered from his incomplete commentaries on the Bhagavadgita, his Krishnacharita and Dharmatattva. They orchestrate his passion for Krishna both as a complete representation of godhead but also as a relevant moral, spiritual, political, and nationalist metaphor. His Dharmatattva reflects the fullness of his views on the subject. Following the Upanishadic strategy of the master–disciple dialogue, which seems to suggest the philosophical fruition of Vedic expansiveness, Dharmatattva is meant to be inclusive of many applied values that modern India seemed to be looking for and some of which, by fatal seduction, it had imbibed from the West. In fact, Bankim has an ambivalent attitude to the West. While he is critical of (p.44) science and the Western notion of patriotism, he thinks that dharma as conceived by the Gita can ennoble humanity. There are, no doubt, Page 31 of 39
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Culturing the Nation many strands of socially conscious philosophical ideas in the West, like Utilitarianism or Positivism, but none as holistic and elevating as what the kernel of Hindu thought has to offer. For instance, he points out that the active ‘sannyasa’ that the Gita expounds, which he interprets as ‘the abjuration of all actions that are driven by aspirations’, would transform the mindless, insensitive, marauding science of the West into a creative force. ‘Men shall be gods the day European science and technology, and this doctrine of disinterested action of Bharatavarsha become one’.133 Bankim’s nationalism is founded not on the total repudiation of the West but on its critique; it is also based on the strong spiritual and cultural roots as well as assurances in the best of all the religious and moral texts there is in the Gita. Bankim’s Dharmatattva literally raises and tries to answer several questions relating to life, which is seen as integral. Spiritual, moral, religious, social, or political dimensions of human life cannot be separated from one another. The Gita advocates an integral outlook to life, and Bankim’s notion of nationalism is vitally embedded in it. He uses the word ‘culture’ to denote this totality. For him Krishna was both a teacher and a doer par excellence. He is also the greatest of all Teachers because he, in his words and deeds, affirmed life. All notions of spirituality, morality, and salvation have to be conceived and achieved in life. Sometimes Krishna of Jayadeva, if imperfectly understood, could lend himself to derision. But Bankim’s model is Krishna of the Mahabharata and Kurukshetra. What Krishna taught Arjuna, when the latter was overtaken by enervating indecision and tragic flight of soldierly masculinity, is metaphorically valid for India of the nineteenth century. The idea of nishkama karma as taught by Krishna is a way of elevating one’s action out of mundane considerations; it makes action duties. At its most expansive it touches the whole humanity. Patriotism has to be, therefore, defined not in the narrow context of predatory national ambitions as often seen in the West, but within a broader framework of humanity and its larger good. However, that does not mean neglect of one’s safety and defence. For instance, Bankim makes a strong plea for the development of physical faculties ‘that are necessary for the protection of self, kinsmen, and the country’. This did not mean taking up arms against the British, the apprehension of which had made the rulers pass the Arms Act. Bankim’s dynamic nationalism, which did not preclude a comprehensive development of physical faculties, (p.45) however, was yet couched in loyalist prose. He says that the Act was wrong, and ‘as her Majesty’s loyal subjects, it is only natural that we be allowed to take up arms to defend her dominions’. The idea of fighting for the British was not to be construed as abject, unthinking loyalty, but a duty to the nation. Often, when we try to understand the nationalist idioms of nineteenth-century India, we see them happily coexisting with expressions of loyalism. This should not come as a surprise. Nationalism developed as a response to colonial rule, and not necessarily as a reaction against it. The response largely hovered between a critical admiration Page 32 of 39
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Culturing the Nation for the West and a growing awareness of one’s own foundational heritage which could be critiqued but not repudiated, although sometimes we stumble upon uncritical acceptance of both. One thing that seemed to trouble Bankim is the debilitating passivity of India in thought and action, a kind of sentimental paralysis that made Arjuna drop his famed Gandiva in the battlefield. It is a metaphor for the condition India was in. Krishna’s charisma and exhortation alone could rejuvenate Arjuna and make him battle-fit. Hence Bankim’s appeal to Krishna and his words. by implication, the Pandavas were out in Kurukshetra not as aggressors or to grab the territories which did not belong to them. They were only claiming what was rightfully theirs. Not to do it would be tantamount to announcing national impotence and betrayal. But the metaphor should not be pushed too far. It was not a seditious exhortation to take up arms against the British, but to cultivate an awareness of the social and political realities in India and an appropriate response to them. Early nationalism had to accommodate many of the ambivalences which it could discard only later. In fact, Bankim’s Dharmatattva ends with an epilogue that seeks to know how well the Disciple has understood the meaning and scope of dharma or culture. The Disciple answers by linking dharma with humanism, non-duality between self-love and love for humanity because God pervades all and to love God is to love all. But he reminds us that ‘considering the condition of man, it is the love for one’s country that must be called the highest ideal, the supreme dharma’. The Master is satisfied and blesses him, with a reinforced emphasis: ‘only, remember that love for one’s country is the highest dharma and ranks above all else’.134 Notes:
(1.) Rabindranath Tagore who called Bankim a ‘rationalist thinker’, was one of the early critics of Bankim’s writings and for his assessment of Bankim, see Bhabatosh Chatterjee (ed), Bankimchandra Chatterjee: Essays in Perspective, New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1994, pp. 7–15. Aurobindo regarded him as ‘a poet and stylist, a seer and nation-builder’. After the death of Bankimchandra in 1894, Aurobindo wrote a series of articles which were first published from Bombay in the journal Induprakash from 16 July 1894 to 27 August 1894. They included seven articles containing biographical accounts of Bankim along with his literary activities and contributions to the nationalist movement. They were collected in Sri Aurobindo, The Harmony of Virtue, Early Cultural Writings: Birth Centenary Library, vol. 3, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1970, pp. 73–102; see also his Bankim-Tilak-Dayananda, Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1970. Most recently, Partha Chatterjee, one of the first systematic commentators of the nationalist discourse considered him ‘a thorough-rooted, post-enlightened orientalist thinker’. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986.
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Culturing the Nation (2.) Bankim began his literary career as early as 1852, when he first published his poems in the literary magazine Sambad Prabhakar, the editor of which was Isvarachandra Gupta, whom Bankim regarded as a role model for his literary style. The remarkable nationalist novel Anandamath, which inspired the nationalist movement with its epoch-making national song ‘Vande Mataram’, was written in 1882. In the same year he wrote Letters on Hinduism in English, in 1884 Dharmajijnasa, and Debtattva O Hindudharma in Bengali in 1884–5. He started writing Krishnacharitra in 1886–92, Srimadbhagabadgita in 1886–8, and Dharmatattva in 1888. (3.) Hans Harder, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, Translation and Analysis (hereafter Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita), Delhi: Manohar, 2001. The book contains, in addition to Bankim’s comments, a critical evaluation of his other religious writings and compares them with the Bhagavadgita. (4.) Ibid., pp. 14–15, 159–60. (5.) ‘Preface’, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 19. (6.) Ibid., pp. 19–20. (7.) Ibid., p. 20. (8.) In addition to the references to ancient Indian interpreters and modern Bengali translations Bankim often compares and contrasts his ideas with the works of Indologists such as Thomson, Davies, Telang, Johnson, Rhys Davids, Lassen, Muir, and Haug. He also quotes from a host of Western scientists such as Tylor, A.V. Schlegel, Goethe, Kant, and particularly J.S. Mill, Comte, and Carpenter. However, inexplicably, he does not mention Charles Wilkins. This failure is intriguing as Wilkins was the first English translator of the Gita. (9.) Pradip Bhattacharya, Classics of the East: Bankimchandra Chatterjee, Krishnacharitra (hereafter Classics of the East), Calcutta: The M.P. Birla Foundation, 1991, p. 29. (10.) Ibid., p. 33. (11.) Ibid., pp. 29–30, 48. (12.) Ibid., p. 30. (13.) Ibid., p. 33. (14.) Ibid., p. 34. (15.) Ibid., pp. 34–5.
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Culturing the Nation (16.) Ibid., pp. 26–7 (17.) Bankim devoted a chapter in the Krishnacharitra to proving the historicity of the place Kurukshetra and the date of the Mahabharata war. Here the accumulation of astronomical evidences by Bankim is quite impressive. Classics of the East, pp. 37–41. Bankim also sets on its hermeneutic in his Gita commentary. Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 21–4. (18.) Bankim believes that there are many words and figures in the Mahabharata, particularly Arjuna, Phalguna, Krishna, Indra, Kuru, Panchala, etc., that can have symbolic, allegorical, and imaginary meanings. Classics of the East, pp. 47, 49. (19.) Ibid. pp. 45–6. (20.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 26, 34. (21.) Ibid., p. 21. (22.) Ibid., pp. 38–9. (23.) Ibid., p. 38. (24.) In addition to his arguments in various chapters of the Krishnacharitra in favour of this, he devotes three chapters exclusively for proving the interpolated portions of the Mahabharata and the methodology that he had adopted for such a conclusion. Classics of the East, pp. 57–65. (25.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 71–2. (26.) Ibid., pp. 78–9. (27.) Ibid., p. 38. (28.) Classics of the East, pp. 258–9. (29.) Ibid., p. 22. (30.) Ibid., p. 22. (31.) Ibid, pp. 53–4. (32.) Ibid., pp. 69, 73, 76, etc. (33.) Ibid., pp. 68–9. (34.) Ibid., p. 69. (35.) Ibid., pp. 69–70. Page 35 of 39
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Culturing the Nation (36.) Ibid., pp. 72–3. (37.) Ibid., pp. 73–4. (38.) Ibid., p. 258. (39.) Ibid., pp. 209–10. (40.) Ibid., p. 223. (41.) Ibid., p. 225. (42.) Ibid., p. 224. (43.) Ibid., pp. 225–6. (44.) Ibid., pp. 226–7. (45.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 44. (46.) Ibid., p. 43. (47.) Ibid., pp. 46–7. (48.) Ibid., p. 47. (49.) Classics of the East, p. 61. (50.) Gita, p. 48. (51.) Ibid., pp. 48–9. (52.) Ibid., p. 49. (53.) Ibid., pp. 49–50. (54.) Ibid., p. 50. (55.) Ibid., pp. 51–2. (56.) Ibid., pp. 52–3. (57.) Ibid., pp. 55–9. (58.) Ibid., p. 60. (59.) Apratim Ray (trans.), Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Dharmatattva (hereafter Bankim’s Dharmatattva), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 77. (60.) Ibid., pp. 50–1. Page 36 of 39
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Culturing the Nation (61.) Ibid., p. 51. (62.) Ibid., p. 52. (63.) Ibid., p. 54. (64.) Ibid. (65.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 39–40. (66.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, pp. 65–6. (67.) Ibid., p. 121. (68.) Ibid., p. 119. (69.) Ibid., pp. 138–9. (70.) Ibid., p. 139. (71.) Ibid., p. 52. (72.) Ibid., p. 54. (73.) Ibid., pp. 56–7. (74.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 39. (75.) Ibid. (76.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, pp. 53–4. (77.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 40–1. (78.) Ibid., p. 24. (79.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, pp. 100–1. (80.) Ibid., pp. 110–12. (81.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 41. (82.) Ibid., pp. 83–7. (83.) Ibid., p. 96. (84.) Ibid., p. 97. (85.) Ibid., p. 70. (86.) Ibid., p. 116. Page 37 of 39
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Culturing the Nation (87.) Ibid., pp. 79, 133. (88.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, p. 136. (89.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 83. (90.) Ibid., p. 101. (91.) Ibid., pp. 98–9. (92.) Ibid., p. 98. (93.) Ibid., p. 100. (94.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, pp. 66–7; Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 106. (95.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 105. (96.) Ibid., pp. 104–5, 108, 110, etc. (97.) Ibid., p. 114. (98.) Ibid., p. 107. (99.) Ibid., p. 111. (100.) Ibid., p. 116. (101.) Ibid., pp. 153–4. (102.) Classics of the East, pp. 322–3. (103.) Ibid., p. 323. (104.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 31. (105.) Classics of the East, p. 323. (106.) Ibid., p. 324. (107.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 77. ‘Selfprotection is also intended by God. The Lord of the world has loaded the burden of self-protection on each and every one’; p. 116. (108.) Ibid., p. 70. (109.) Classics of the East, pp. 251–2, 61; Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 37. (110.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 65, 70, 77. Page 38 of 39
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Culturing the Nation (111.) Classics of the East, p. 324. (112.) Ibid., p. 261. (113.) Ibid., pp. 327–8. (114.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, pp. 73–4, 106, etc. (115.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, p. 165. (116.) Ibid., pp. 189–91. (117.) Ibid., p. 90. (118.) Ibid., p. 91. (119.) Ibid., p. 210. (120.) Ibid., p. 209. (121.) Ibid., p. 210 (122.) Ibid., p. 90 (123.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 67. (124.) Ibid., pp. 67–8. (125.) Ibid., p. 68. (126.) Classics of the East, pp. 71–2. (127.) Ibid., p. 72; Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 69. (128.) Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Srimadbhagabadgita, p. 68. (129.) Ibid., p. 146. (130.) Ibid., p. 146. (131.) Ibid., pp. 145–6. (132.) Ibid., pp. 146–7. (133.) Bankim’s Dharmatattva, p. 149. (134.) Ibid., p. 234.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Tilak and the Gita Rahasya Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0002
Abstract and Keywords The nationalist leader and social reformer Bal Gangadhar Tilak's thoughts on the Bhagavadgita based on his book Gita Rahasya are discussed in this chapter. It suggests that Tilak saw the Bhagavadgita as a work on ethics that upheld a morality of disinterested action and he believed that the moral foundation for the Indian nation could be built on the basis of the Gita. It explains that Tilak also suggested that the masses are entitled to their entry into politics even as bhakti allows them admission to the high realms of religion. It argues that Tilak also believed in the importance of Sthitaprajna (Steady-in-Mind) as the foundation of nationalism. Keywords: Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bhagavadgita, Gita Rahasya, ethics, morality, Indian nation, politics, bhakti, Sthitaprajna, nationalism
Gita Rahasya (Esoteric Import of the Gita in English) or Karma Yoga Sastra1 is one of the most celebrated works of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak. It was written during his long period of imprisonment at the Mandalay jail in Burma. It is said that he completed the work in jail within five months, from 2 November 1910 to 30 March 1911.2 Published in two volumes, the work runs into 1,300 pages. In this massive work Tilak explores the recondite philosophy of Brahman, atman, and cosmos, the ethico-moral principles related to this-worldly life, the significance of karma, jnana, and bhakti, and man’s attempt to find a way out of the snares of samsara (worldly illusions), as expressed in ancient scriptures, Page 1 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation both sacred and profane, from the Vedas to the Buddhist literatures in general and the ethics of the Gita in particular. Tilak approached the Gita, according to his own admission, with the intention of finding out solutions for certain fundamental problems that human beings face. In his introduction to Gita Rahasya he states three factors that induced him to write this commentary on the Gita. First, the gulf between eternal knowledge and worldly life upheld by the Samkhya philosophy.3 Second, the impression that he obtained when he was a boy, that ‘Bhagavadgita was universally acknowledged to be a book containing all the principles and philosophy of the Hindu Religion’.4 Third, the (p.51) impression that he acquired that the interpretations of it by the acharyas were ‘doctrine-oriented’ and not independently arrived at.5
The Gita as the Framework for the Nation Tilak’s reading of the Gita was based on the firm conviction that a nation requires a moral foundation. Social and politico-legal orders in such a nation can be long-lasting only when they are based on such a foundation. Tilak observed that the principles of morality necessary for the nationalist construct are not adequately expressed in the discourses prior to the Gita and in post-Gita literatures. The ethical principles in the later texts are vague and inconsistent with obvious internal contradictions.6 The ethics of the Vedic karma kanda consists, for instance, in ‘ritualistic performance of karma’ but this karma is considered as a lower kind of ‘desire-prompted’ for the achievement of ‘heaven’ and purusartha7 by the later scriptures. The highest morality of the Vedic jnana kanda consists in the acquisition and realization of the eternal principle, but it concedes an innate antagonism between such an objective and the material world. The Upanisads believe in the eternity of the atman, the absoluteness of Brahman as the ultimate unity behind the multiplicity of the world, and the theory of moksa or salvation through knowledge, but they too, like the Vedic jnana kanda, lay an overwhelming emphasis on the renunciation of the worldly life. The philosophy of Samkhya is based on the distinction between the nonperishable and perishable elements, purusha and prakriti respectively, but it does not acknowledge the Vedic jnana kanda or Upanisadic concept of a unifying principle behind the prakriti and purusha in the form of the ultimate Brahman, though regarding the matter of worldly life, it admits the Upanisadic assertion. The ethics of Manusmriti lay in its classification of man’s life into various stages, but in the final stage it follows the Upanisadic path of samnyasa. Although, the Bhagavata expounds Vedic bhakti in the form of the path of devotion systematically, it rejects the worthiness of Vedic karma kanda. Buddhism and Jainism propound atheism and denounce the ultimate authority of the Vedas, but they too, like the earlier scriptures, propagate the renunciation of thisworldly life.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Tilak’s central argument is that the Indian nation cannot be constructed on the basis of the obsolete framework of the Vedico-Upanisadic or the Smriti’s ethical principles because they lack clarity and conclusiveness. It is necessary to create a new framework of institutions that can surmount these limitations and shortcomings. Tilak, however, does not think that it can be fulfilled by taking recourse to the European approaches on these (p.52) issues. He takes a twofold stand in this context. First, for the purpose of nation-building, India need not approach the West in search of ethical elements. Second, no ancient ethical writings can be used in their present form since they consist of contradictory elements on ethics. What India then needs is a discourse on ethics that can negotiate across all the mutually contradictory elements and rearticulate them into a harmonious whole. Tilak felt that the Gita is a text par excellence which not only attempts to synthesize the contradictory and discordant ethical principles expressed in these writings but presents them in a most scientific way. Tilak puts across the following line of reasoning to establish the significance of this text in the national reconstruction in his discourse. First, he does not agree with the earlier interpretations of the Gita and the conclusions arrived at in critical commentaries. He argues that these interpretations are not unbiased; they are limited by ‘expressions of intellectual egoism’. They have ‘extracted’ only those local and temporal systems of metaphysics from the text as its core message to appropriate their own ‘ideological cult’,8 and to invigorate these sectarian beliefs they have wrongly constructed new interpretations to words and sentences of the text. Hence, Tilak rejects these as contentious nonauthentic interpretations. ‘Pre-conceived’, ‘prejudiced’, ‘prepossessed’, ‘doctrinal-supporting’, ‘wrong’, ‘incorrect’9 are some of the adjectives that run through the Gita Rahasya to reject all pre-modern interpretations. However, among the various interpretations of the text Tilak regards the Samkhya interpretation of Samkara as the most viable. While rejecting the earlier interpretations, Tilak admits that his reading could only be another alternative. Second, Tilak regards the Gita as a unique text among the ancient scriptures as it expounded the abstruse and deep philosophy of adhyatma, absolute Brahman, self and cosmos in a simple and succinct manner. Although the Gita is not a part of the canon earlier, Tilak maintains that its core principles are taken from earlier scriptures—absolute Brahman, self and cosmos, and theory of karma from the Vedas, the notion of jnana from the Vedanta, philosophy of construction and destruction of the cosmos from the Samkhya, the concept of bhakti from the Bhagavata, and other principles from the Smritis, Brahma Sutras, Sastras, Mahabharata and Puranas.10 Thus, the traditional criteria of Srutis, Smritis, Sadacaras, Sadvipra, etc., receive a new resurgence within the central philosophy of the text and come to be an integral part of Tilak’s nationalist discourse.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Third, Tilak disavows the claims of superiority of Western ethics. He insists that the Bible, from which the ethics of the West mainly sprang, (p.53) owes its central precepts to Buddhist literature and through Buddhism to the Gita and other Vedic writings.11 Hence, the foundation of universal and scientific ethics is not laid down in the Bible or in ancient Greece, where the Western concerns for ethical principles first originated, but long before them in Indian writings, and the world has not unearthed or experienced anything new in this regard.12 For Tilak, therefore, with the advancement and growing influence of science and Western materialism, the value of ancient Indian traditions and ethical principles has not declined; on the contrary, these developments intensified, and heightened their relevance. Fourth, Tilak rejects outright the philosophy of Samkhya (renunciation) as the central message of the Gita, and this rejection is primarily based on two major concerns. At the philosophical level, he disagrees with the Samkhya rejection of absolute spirit (God) and at the pragmatic he rejects the Samkhya claim of antagonism between this-worldly life and spiritual realization. He argues that the Samkhya philosophy acted as the chief impediment to all the attempts by the philosophy of Karmayoga to establish a relationship between knowledge and worldly activity. This argument has two implications. First, the path of renunciation or a life of severe self-denial without concern for the world as expounded by the Vedanta and Samkhya is not an apt course for modern India. Second, the Indian nation should actively engage with the world without actually marginalizing the age-old philosophy of spiritual quest. The nationalist discourse of Tilak conceives Karmayoga13 as the central theme of the Gita and the sthitaprajna—a completely integrated person whose reason is steadied by the practice of Karma yoga combined with jnana and bhakti, whose heart throbs with the heart of all humanity—as the central figure, who is to set himself an ideal for ethical pursuit, or set an example of performance of one’s duties without any expectations for the common. The ethicality of all actions including the ‘unethical such as himsa, war, stealing, and untruth’ and so on, is to be determined by the sthitaprajna or he is to set the standard for the ethical doability and non-doability. Karmayoga is the means and the Karmayogi sthitaprajna is the goal of the Gita. It is explicit that the Karmayoga as expounded by the Gita is central to Tilak’s articulation of Indian nationalism, and the sthitaprajna sort of ‘new-brahminism’ is to be the basis of ethical norms and rule of law in the nation. The nation is not expressed through the framework of constitutional democracy but the heroic personality– karma yogi sthitaprajnan. Although Tilak emphasized karma yogi sthitaprajnan as the central figure in modern India, he was conscious of (p.54) the mass base of Indian nationalism and therefore attempted to reconcile the sthitaprajna (elite) with the masses through bhakti. The quest for karma and knowledge of the former is karma and
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation devotion for the ‘lowreasoned’ masses. Thus a kind of unity is established between the elite and the general populace in his nationalist writing.
Orientalist Construction of the Gita Tilak most strikingly counterposes Gita Rahasya to its orientalist reading. In fact, orientalist writings have not expressed a homogenous understanding and response to the central teaching of the Gita, and this heterogeneity is fundamental in some of the discourses. For scholars such as Bohtlingk, Garbe, Hopkins, Holtzman, and many others, the text suffers from contradictory and conflicting ethical arguments and consists of many, sometimes irreconcilable, statements regarding its central theme.14 Hence, the Gita has no obvious message to offer. For many others such as Hill, Arnold, Franklin Edgerton, Winternitz, Max Muller, the Gita is not plural in composition and has a definite message to offer; it is a Vedico-Upanisadic synthetic text. It attempts to reformulate certain brahminical ideas within the framework of orthodox traditions, so as to consolidate those traditions at a time of major social, philosophical, and spiritual changes.15 Tilak refers to several Orientalist philosophers and many modern writings of the West such as those of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Friedrich Hegel, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Nietzsche, Morley, Thomas Hill Green, Ernst Haeckel, Sidgwick, Albrecht Weber, Paul Deussen, David Hume, William James, Rhys Davids, James Sully, Schopenhauer, Thompson in many places of the Gita Rahasya. He explicitly states that this undertaking was only for the purpose of establishing how they were conversant with Indian philosophy and how their ethical theories converge with that of the Gita, and how the issues raised by the Gita are still pertinent. Some of our new scholars are of opinion that as a result of the present growth of the Material sciences in the West, the deductions laid down in ancient times with reference to the Karma Yoga, on the basis of the Philosophy of the Absolute Self, cannot possibly be fully applicable to modern conditions. In order to prove that this idea is wrong, I have briefly mentioned in various places in my exposition of the Gita Rahasya (Esoteric Import of the Gita) the doctrines of Western philosophers, which are similar to those in the Gita … human knowledge not yet gone beyond the doctrines laid down on this subject by our philosophers … doctrines laid down in the Gita.16 (p.55) Although Tilak does not engage in any major debate with their understanding of the Gita, his opposition to certain orientalist interpretations is quite explicit. He rejects the arguments of ‘certain Christian Missionary treatises’, particularly Dr Laurincer who says that the Gita must have borrowed its central theme from the Christian religion. He also criticizes Thompson for taking the yoga in the Gita to mean Patanjala Yoga. Referring to Garbe’s opinion that ‘certain slokas were later interpolated into the original Gita’, Tilak says: Page 5 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation These theories are entirely wrong in my opinion. These people have conceived these wrong ideas as a result of their having failed to understand the historical tradition of the various aspects of the Vedic Religion, and the real meanings of the words ‘Samkhya’ and ‘Yoga’ used in the Gita, and especially because these people had before their eyes the history of the unphilosophical, that is, purely devotional Christian religion.17
Critique of Earlier Interpretations Tilak begins his Gita Rahasya with a statement that the Vedas have advanced two distinctive philosophies—the philosophy of renunciation (jnana kanda) and philosophy of energism (karma kanda). The Upanisads were basically written with the objective of defending the Vedic jnana kanda. As the Upanisads were produced and compiled by different rsis at different times, they contain contradictory thoughts, and Badarayanacharya in his Vedanta Sutras harmonized them.18 The Gita was written later on with the purpose of harmonizing the Vedic karma kanda and the Vedic jnana kanda (Upanisads.) As these three were the lineal of the Vedas, they came to be regarded as ‘prasthana-trayi’,19 the authoritative texts on the Vedas, and the place and ‘worthiness’ of subsequent literature came to be determined on their consistency of arguments with these ‘prasthana-trayi’. This was what happened in the case of earlier interpretations.20 The acharyas had religious cults of their own and to invest these with authority and make them acceptable to a section of society, they wrote commentaries on the Gita and attempted to find in it a justification for the cults. [T]he protagonist Acharyas of each of the various cults … had somehow or other to prove that according to these three works … the particular cult promulgated by them was the correct cult, and that the other cults were inconsistent with those scriptures. Because, if they had admitted that these authoritative religious treatises would support other cults besides those propounded by themselves, the value of their particular cult would to that extent suffer and that was not desirable for any of these protagonists … The commentaries or criticisms which are (p.56) now available on the Gita, are more or less all of this kind, that is to say, they are written by Acharyas pertaining to diverse sects; and on that account, although the original Bhagavadgita propounds only one theme, yet it has come to be believed that the same Gita supports all the various cults.21 Tilak argues that although the Gita is a text of quite a homogeneous composition on the philosophy of Karmayoga (energism) and the self, the acharyas made it heterogeneous by emphasizing either of the three notions of the text—bhakti, jnana, and karma, as its central purport, and turned it into a weapon of offence and defence against other cults and philosophies. Samkarabhasya, for instance, considers the Gita as a text on knowledge and renunciation; for Ramanujacharya, it teaches bhakti and renunciation; for Madhvacharya, bhakti, and karma; for Jnanesvara, the Gita teaches Page 6 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Patanjala Yoga. Tilak argues that it is not possible to arrive at these divergent conclusions unless one approaches the text with a pre-possessed mind of one’s religious beliefs. This is the main charge that runs through the Gita Rahasya against the major earlier interpretations.
Therefore, different commentators, who have propounded different doctrines, usually accept as important only such of these statements as are consistent with their own particular cult, and either say that the others are unimportant, or skillfully twist the meanings of such statements as might be totally inconsistent with their cults, or wherever possible, they draw hidden meanings or inferences favourable to themselves from easy and plain statements, and say that the particular work is an authority for their particular cult.22 For Tilak, there is nothing that is obscure or paradoxical in the text, as its message is universal, comprehensive, and sharply precise. It advances one universal philosophy transcending all sectarianism and rigid determinism, and proposes jnana, bhakti, and karma as three autonomous but mutually interdependent courses. This can be understood in the life of sthitaprajna, whose mind is to be filled with the knowledge of the absolute (jnana), who is to perform all the duties that befall his lot (karma), and who is to dedicate all activities for the pleasure of the divine (bhakti). The Gita is personified in Sthitaprajna who is to perform all duties and channelize that karma through jnana and bhakti. Tilak felt that the synthesis of the Gita—synthesis of karma, jnana, and bhakti in the highest universal philosophy— is central which no other canon earlier or later proposes. This transcends the temper of a sectarian reader, but this synthetic mind of the Gita is untouched or intentionally marginalized by the bhasyakaras.
Just as when the ocean was churned, though one person got nectar, another one got poison, and others got Laksmi, Airavata, Kaustubha, Parijata, and other (p.57) articles, yet the real nature of the ocean was not thereby fixed, so also is the case of the commentators who have churned the ocean of the Gita on a doctrinal basis … the Bhagavadgita is one and the same, people following different cults see it in a different light.23 Why has the text conveying a clear message on ethics become a subject of contestation? Tilak advances two reasons—it is either due to the failure of the bhasyakaras to comprehend the synthetic philosophy of the text or second, their preconceived ideological cult that did not allow them to approach the text independently, but both the reasons are extrinsic of the text. ‘The Gita is not such a pot of jugglery that any one can extract any meaning he likes out of it’.24 This argument was later contested by Vinoba Bhave, who saw this as inherent in the nature of the text itself,25 and partly by S. Radhakrishnan, who saw fault both in the text and in the readers.26
Tilak argues that the best way to determine true meaning, particularly of a scripture like the Gita, is not the one adopted by the acharyas but as is suggested by the Mimamsa writers,27 according to whom the true purport of a scripture can be determined by chronologically applying seven principles—the Page 7 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation commencement of the work, the end of the work, repetitive words and sentences, newness of the statement, effect, statement on subsidiary matters, and value of such statements.28 Now Tilak’s argument is that however one applies these principles to the text of the Gita, one would certainly come to the conclusion that the true moral teaching of the text was never touched by these acharyas. Not that the acharyas were unfamiliar with the principles and suggestions given by Jaimini in his Purva Mimamsa for determining the meaning of the text. They knew it perfectly, but they were looking only for a corroboration of their own religious beliefs in the Gita. [O]nce a man’s vision has become doctrinal, he naturally adopts that method by which he can prove that the cult … doctrinal commentators start with this fixed pre-conceived notion regarding the purport of a book, that if it yields some purport, inconsistent with their own doctrine, that purport is wrong, and that some other meaning is intended; and though some rule of the Mimamsa logic is violated when they attempt to prove that the meaning, which in their opinion is the proved correct meaning has been accepted everywhere, these commentators, as a result of this fixed pre-conviction are not in the least perturbed thereby.29 It should be noted here that although Tilak rejects the earlier interpretations of the Gita as ‘doctrinal’ and ‘prejudiced’, and considers his interpretation as a superior alternative to the existing ones, yet the Gita Rahasya is an attempt to co-opt earlier commentaries and the major traditions (p.58) of India. By underplaying the earlier interpretations by different sects in India, Tilak attempts to construct a homogeneous nationalism based on the ethical principles of the Gita. He reads the Gita as an attempt by Krishna to harmonize the contradictory traditions of ancient India.30 In fact, the Gita Rahasya was a product of one discourse of nationalism. Much in the same way the acharyas sought to derive their creed or philosophy from the Gita, Tilak too was deriving his nationalist beliefs from this ‘song celestial’. Although he offered a sharp critique of the bhasyakaras, he acknowledged their scholarship and philosophical positions as their interpretations added significantly to the general scheme of knowledge and the comprehensive understanding of the text.31
Critique of European Ethical Visions: Superiority of the Gita One of the major contributions that Tilak made to the interpretation of the Gita which has not received much critical attention is his scholarly exposition of the ethical doctrines of the Gita in relation to those of European moralists. Through such exposition, Tilak calls for a revival of European moral philosophies in the light of the Gita principles which are also anterior in time to that of Europe. In fact, his knowledge and understanding of the European moralist writings seems to be quite impressive as he mentions more than fifty European works in his Gita Rahasya, although a detailed analysis of them was not a part of his undertaking. He compares and contrasts European ethical principles with those of the Gita only to argue for the greater congruence of Indian ethics with the scientific
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation temper of the modern age. Through a forceful defence of the Gita, he seeks to demonstrate the superiority of its ethical principles to European ethical writings. Tilak argues that universally accepted ethico-moral principles that govern the individual and society originated not in Greek philosophical writings but in the Indian scriptures. Therefore, the claim on the part of Europeans that their religion can offer a suitable moral philosophy for the modern age is preposterous. In fact, Europe has simply paraphrased the ethical principles expounded in the Gita and other Vedic writings. Pythagoras’ renunciatory doctrine, for instance, or the ethical principles enunciated by Socrates and Aristotle were not totally unknown to the world since they had been formulated in the Gita. [T]he first systematic treatise on the discrimination between Right and Wrong Action or on Morality … had been examined long before Aristotle in a more exhaustive and scientific manner in the Mahabharata and in the Gita; and no (p.59) moral doctrine has yet been evolved, which is different from the doctrines metaphysically expounded in the Gita. The solution given by Aristotle … the opinion of Socrates … The doctrine of the Epicureans and the Stoics … tallies with the descriptions of the Sthitaprajna (Steady-in-Mind) given in the Gita. Similarly, the dictum of Mill, Spencer, Kant, and other Materialistic philosophers … is included in the external characteristic of a Sthitaprajna … and the arguments relating to Ethics, and the doctrines regarding Freedom of Will, enunciated by Kant and Green, are to be found mentioned in the Gita …32 He further claims that not merely Greek philosophy but Christianity and the Bible, that are the spiritual mainstays of modern Europe, are greatly influenced by the Gita and other Vedic writings. Therefore, the attempt of the Christian missionaries to Europeanize Indian social structure and discredit its popular religious practices and beliefs is an attempt of great irrationality. For Tilak, the activist ritualism of the Jewish religion, the name ‘Jehovah’, the principle deity of worship for the Jews, the Esi sect from which Christianity arose, the renunciatory and bhakti ideal of Christianity, and even the tradition of sending missionaries to other countries to preach and popularize religious principles are instances of the influence of Buddhism on Christianity. Not merely the central doctrine of Christianity but the life of Christ too was an imitation of Buddha and his life. In other words, the core tenets of the Old and New Testaments, such as self-identification, renunciation, non-enmity, devotion, or the practice of idol worship, etc., are more or less verbatim reproductions of Buddhist and other Vedic writings.
After the Buddhistic religion had in this way spread everywhere at the date of Asoka, the principles of Renunciation began to find a way into the purely Activistic Jewish religion; and Christ ultimately added to it the Philosophy of Devotion, and established His own religion … that far from the Gita having taken something from the Christian religion … the Christian religion from Buddhism, and therefore, indirectly from the Vedic religion; Page 9 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation and that, Indians had no need to look to other people for finding these religious principles.33 Tilak argues that the modern knowledge of ethics the world over is based on ancient Indian ethical type. The Vedico-Sastric methodological categories of basing human knowledge or ethics as adhibhautika, adhidaivika, and adhyatmika, and the superiority of the adhyatmika method of examining the object over the adhidaivika and adhibhautika, for instance, are literally paraphrased in the most acclaimed Western writings, particularly in the Comtian Positivistic literatures.34 Similarly, the intellectual division in Europe between the pupils of the path of (p.60) action and those of the path of renunciation, that presents itself in the moral writings of Aristotle, Spencer, Mill, Comte, Nietzsche (who upheld karma), and Schopenhauer and Hartmann (who propagated renunciation), parallels the Vedic karmakanda, and the Vedic jnanakanda respectively. For Tilak, hence, not merely the moral precepts that Europe copied, but their social structure and its regulating principles too are of Indian imitation.
This achievement by the ancient Indian moral scriptures, with their conventional and unsophisticated tools of research, has no parallel in modern Europe, with their scientific tools and instruments of analysis. Referring to ancient India’s knowledge about the body, atman, and cosmos, Tilak states, it, in theory and practice, outclasses European Materialism. When we realize that … the doctrines advanced by Western philosophers like Kant etc. are very much akin to the doctrines of Vedanta philosophy, we cannot but feel a wonder about the supermanly mental powers of those persons, who laid down these doctrines of Vedanta by mere introspection, in an age when the Material sciences were not so advanced as they are in the present day; but we must not stop with feeling wonder about this matter—we must feel proud of it.35 In this context, Tilak addresses another significant question: why is it that the Indian ethical discourses, particularly the ethical principles expressed in the Gita, are less popular to European philosophy? He does not think it is due to the failure of the Indian moral philosophies to face up to their European counterparts to establish their relevance to modern times. He, in fact, holds the colonial system of education responsible for this devaluation of Indian ethical principles.
The same position seems to have been accepted in modern times by some Western philosophers … as the works of purely materialistic philosophers on ethics are principally taught in our colleges the fundamental principles of the Karma-Yoga mentioned in the Gita, are not well understood even by learned persons among us, who have had an English education.36 For Tilak, the Indian moral philosophies have greater intrinsic value because they connect mundane affairs to the transcendental, which is missing in Europe. Their moral considerations are limited by finite concerns, but the ‘pure’, ‘permanent’, ‘universal’, and ‘complete’ ethical elements cannot be only material—they are metaphysical and immutable.37 Only those elements which take into consideration transcendental consequences of an act can provide a lasting basis for society. The
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation universal nature (p.61) of ‘Truth’ and the exceptions to it, for instance, are clearly expressed in European philosophy such as in the writings of Sidgwick, Mill, Millman, St Paul, L. Stephen, Green, Bain, and others, as in Indian writings. But the exceptions laid down by the Indian scriptures are based on metaphysical implications, and not positivistic, thus demonstrating a deeper understanding than those in Europe. Referring to the Mahabharata and Manu, Tilak says:
[T]here is no sin in speaking the untruth on the following five occasions, namely, if in joke, or while speaking with women, or at the time of marriage, or if your life is in danger or for protecting your own property … that does not mean that one must always speak the untruth in speaking with women, and these exceptions are to be understood … as those mentioned by Prof. Sidgwick with reference to ‘children, or madmen or invalids’. But Western philosophers, who have shelved the metaphysical as also the next-world view of the matter, have gone further and have barefacedly permitted even merchants to tell any lies they like for their own benefit, which is a thing our lawgivers have not done.38 Tilak’s claim for the superiority of the Indian ethical vision was based on the finite limits of positive science and its refusal to consider metaphysical consequences of an action. He advances a similar argument in criticizing the Utilitarian philosophy on ethics39 advanced by J.S. Mill, Bentham, and others. He rejects them on two major grounds. First, the Utilitarian method does not discriminate between dharma (moral) and adharma (immoral), papa (sin) and punya (non-sin), and karma (action) and akarma (non-action) from the metaphysical point of view but purely from the material standpoint. It substitutes justice (nyaya) for dharma and injustice (anyaya) for adharma by merely taking into account the external results, but external effect of an action cannot be the definite measure for moral action. It can be decided on how far it helps one to outgrow self-interest to effectuate moral development that is conducive to atmic benefit. Second, the application of positive method for scientifically considering the science of Karmayoga is not proper because the latter finds salvation only in the metaphysical.
Tilak never approved of the stereotypical Orientalist classification of the West being superior in the sphere of politics and science, and the East superior in the spiritual domain, and that an assimilation of these elements would constitute national reconstruction. On the other hand, he felt that the ancient Indian moral discourses are sufficient and capable of providing the necessary foundation for the Indian nation. He argued that the ethical philosophy discussed in the Vedic writings was incorporated into the Bible and other moral writings of the West through Buddhism, (p.62) but these principles never became the spirit of life in Europe. Therefore, the European claim that they are the founders of universal ethical principles which are superior to others is a counterfeit argument. In the formulation of its nationalist project and its ethical foundations, India need not consider European claims about a suitable moral philosophy. Positivism and Materialism that laid a solid foundation for the nations of Europe did not find any place in the nationalist discourse of Tilak.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Universality of Ethical Principles and their Exceptions The contrast between transcendental ethics and this-worldly morality brings out another crucial aspect of Tilak’s ethico-philosophical system: the notion of nonviolence. In fact, Tilak’s arguments are particularly striking when he engages with the doctrines of non-violence and truth, and their implications on mundane affairs. His views on them were deeply influenced by his extensive reading of the various scriptural texts including the Vedas, Smritis, and the Mahabharata, but they differ from the latter in a fundamental way both in terms of their basic assumptions and underlying principles. He considers non-violence, truth, forgiveness, etc., as high ethico-moral values, but they are to be determined in relation to the actor and the circumstances in which the action is performed. The crucial aspect in Tilak’s understanding of these notions is that these are not universal and permanent ethical principles in a substantive sense or without qualification. These principles are to be followed immutably only in a society where internal conditions are harmonious and everyone consents to these principles as the highest virtues. Their application in an absolute form to an imperfect state would produce disastrous consequences. So long as every human being in this world has not started living according to these rules, should virtuous people, by their virtuous conduct, allow themselves to be caught in the nets spread by rascals or should they give measure for measure by way of retaliation and protect themselves?40 Tilak later comments: ‘otherwise life in this world, which is full of villains, is difficult’.41
It is in this context that Tilak argued the nationalist movement could not attain its goal only through peaceful methods. Although success can be achieved on various occasions by taking recourse to the peaceful method, anger and hatred cannot be completely discarded under imperfect social conditions. ‘Forgiveness in all cases or warlikeness in all cases is not the proper thing’.42 Therefore, a certain degree of himsa, untruthfulness, (p.63) and non-forgiveness, could be justified because India was not a society consisting of perfect and harmonious internal relations, but one with imperfect conditions under colonialism.43 Rejection of the absolute validity of ethics, however, does not mean that anybody in an imperfect society can justify acts that follow from desire, ill-will, and anger. Exceptions can be made only for those who have attained equability of reason, and will act for universal welfare. The sthitaprajnas would qualify to be such ethical leaders. The understanding of these historical circumstances in which exceptions are to be made is very important; otherwise it will encourage casuistry, and the use of the authority of the Gita to sanction unacceptable violence. Those ordinary persons whose Mind has not reached the state of equability, add their feeling of mine-ness (mamatva) to this law of Cause and Effect, and making the counterblow stronger than the blow, take their Page 12 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation revenge for the blow; or if the other person is weak, they are ready to take advantage of some trifling or imaginary affront, and rob him to their own advantage, under pretext of retaliation.44 Hence, it is the state of mind or the spirit behind an action (bhavana) rather than an absolute definition of violence that decides whether it is performed for loksamgraha (welfare of all). If an act is guided by selflessness, detachment, and the feeling of achieving universal welfare, it qualifies as loksamgraha, though it may involve a great deal of violence. Tilak advances these arguments in his chapters ‘The Desire to Know the Right Action’ (karma jijnasa),45 and ‘The State and the Activities of the Siddha’ (Perfect) (siddhavastha and siddhavyavahara) where he extensively quotes from authoritative texts, justifying the necessity of employing both violence and nonviolence under different circumstances.46
It may be stated that Tilak’s arguments regarding non-violence, truth, and other moral virtues are based on three underlying principles. First, there are no permanent and universal ethical principles that can be applied in their absolute form to an imperfect society, or a society that bristles with internal contradictions, but they may be applied immutably, without exceptions, to a society which has harmonious internal conditions. Second, the effect of violent action done by a sthitaprajna with a desire for loksamgraha should be morally considered as an act of non-violence. In such a violent act the subject attains merit, and its victim is the real sinner.47 Third, ahimsa does not consist in abhorring violence at all times and under all conditions, and following nonviolence at all times and under all circumstances. (p.64) Tilak’s notion of non-violence and the specification of circumstances constituting exceptions to this principle are in keeping with his ideas of moral right, moral duty, self-protection, and just war. First, Tilak maintains that practice of absolute non-violence is an impossibility, and this is due to inescapable situations in life that necessitate men to entail in both intended and unintended violence. Non-violence, therefore, does not enjoin ‘ahimsa in all cases’ but necessitates ‘himsa’ in certain cases because ‘even the most principled maxim of ethics, namely that of harmlessness, does not escape the necessity of discrimination between the duty and the non-duty’.48 Having defined himsa as ‘not only destroying life but also harming the minds or the bodies of others’, and patricide, matricide, homicide, and so on as the most terrible forms of himsa,49 and ahimsa as ‘not harming, in any way, any living being’,50 Tilak makes exceptions very clearly throughout his expositions between justified himsa and unjustified himsa (violence), between justified non-violence and unjustified non-violence (ahimsa), and takes justified himsa (violence) and unjustified non-violence (ahimsa) to be a part of ahimsa. Regarding unconscious himsa, Tilak says that it is impossible to lead even a single minute of life on this earth without doing violence to other creatures in a big or small way, or in some form or other.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation The slaughter of animals for the purposes of ritualistic sacrifice (yajna) … can be avoided by making an animal of flour for purposes of sacrifice … But how are you going to stop the killing of the numerous micro-organisms with which the air, water, fruit, etc., and all other places are filled? … there are in this world so many micro-organisms invisible to the naked eye, of which the existence can, however, be imagined, that merely by the moving of one’s eye-lids, their limbs will be destroyed. Then, where is the sense of repeating orally ‘Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not kill’?51 Himsa being so much a part and parcel of life, there is no meaning whatsoever in the principle of ‘absolute non-violence’. In this context, he adduces references to a conversation between a hunter and a brahmin, and states that even in ordinary life ‘everybody eats everybody’, and therefore, ‘life is the life of life’ (jivo jivasya jivanam).52 It is on the basis of this argument that Tilak criticizes the Buddhist and Christian ethical commandments such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’ as having limited value at least in relation to microscopic organisms.
Second, the principles of non-violence and truth are not transgressed in cases which involve self-defence and just war. Although in these cases (p.65) there is conscious himsa, it should be regarded as ahimsa to the ethical world of nonviolence. [S]ome villain has come, with a weapon in his hands to kill you, or to commit rape on your wife or daughter … then should you close your eyes and treat with unconcern such a villain (atatayin) saying: ‘ahimsa paramo dharmah?’ or should you, as much as possible, punish him if he does not listen to reason? … On these occasions, self-protection is considered to be of higher importance than Harmlessness … if the child is being born by transverse presentation, is it not necessary to cut the child and deliver the mother?53 Third, non-violence also consists of enjoying certain moral rights, which are in relation to ‘self-protection’, ‘the protection of innocents’, and ‘general welfare’. Tilak argues that the principles of non-violence is not violated or affected in cases where one commits violence for the protection of society and social order, and thus, works for the general interest.
I nevertheless commit the sin of helping evil-doers or undeserving persons, and of harming deserving saints and even society itself to that extent, if I allow some one to take that which he ought not to get … equability does not mean giving to a man the grass, which is fit for a cow … that sattvika charity which is to be made as datavya, that is, because it is a duty to give, must be given, considering ‘dese kale ca patre ca’, that is, considering the propriety of the place, the time, and the deservingness of the person.54 The principle of non-violence is not infringed if one perpetrates violence for selfprotection. In the chapter ‘Karma Jijnasa’, Tilak argues that although theft or acquiring the wealth of others by force will result in chaos, there are exceptions. So a man
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation cannot be considered a sinner when saving his life by stealing during a calamity when ‘food cannot be had’ at any cost. He alludes to the story of Mahabharata:
[W]hen such a difficult contingency befell Visvamitra, as a result of famine for twelve consecutive years, he was on the point of saving his life by stealing a leg of dog’s flesh hung up in the home of a butcher, and by eating that uneatable food; thereupon, this butcher gave him much advice based on the Sastras, not to commit the sin of eating such uneatable food, and that too by theft … But Visvamitra rejected that advice.55 Further, the principle of non-violence is not violated if one commits violent action for the protection of innocent people from possible massacre. It is, in fact, the duty of a sthitaprajna to circumvent evils and save the life of saints from such circumstances.
(p.66) Suppose, you have seen some persons escaping from the hands of marauders and hiding in a thick forest; and the marauders … ask you, where those people are … Will you speak the truth or will you save the lives of unoffending and innocent people? … preventing the murder of innocent people is according to the Sastras a religion, as highly important as Truth itself.56 Fourth, when the question of general welfare is involved, then it is the moral duty of a sthitaprajna to punish the evil-doers without the slightest hesitation because in that case neither is the principle of ‘non-violence violated by killing an evil-doer’, nor does he entangle himself in the sin of murder. On the other hand, he is morally permitted to follow the course of countering ‘kick for a kick’, ‘thorn by a thorn’, and ‘measure for measure’.
[T]he summary of the entire teaching of the Gita is that: even the most horrible warfare which may be carried on in these circumstances, with an equable state of mind, is righteous and meritorious … instead of accepting the doctrine of the School of Renunciation that ‘Non-inimicality’ (nirvaira) means inactivity or non-retaliation, the philosophy of Karma-Yoga says, that ‘nirvaira’ means merely giving up ‘vaira’ or ‘the desire to do evil …57 Here, Tilak takes resort to the highly suffused terms of ‘non-inimicality’ and ‘selfidentification’ to highlight activist meanings, and even equates and interlocks them with general interest and desireless karma. For Samkara, Tilak argues, ‘nirvaira’ means inactivity or non-retaliation even if an antagonist commits terrible harm or unjustified violence. For the Gita never supports the position taken by Samkara because the karma yogi as outlined in it is not an apathetic Vedic samnyasi who discards material life, and lives in silence and inactivity; he is an active and responsible ethico-spiritual man who lives for the general welfare.
The Gita neither advises nor intends that when one becomes non-inimical, one should also become non-retaliatory … Karma-Yogins, who have reached the most perfect state … never fail to do that duty which has befallen them according to their own status in life … with a frame of mind, which is unattached; and that any Action which is performed in this manner, does not in the least prejudicially affect the equability of Reason of the doer.58
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Three conclusions emerge from the above arguments. First, when one eliminates concern for the self (mamatva) and expectation of result, and replaces them with general welfare, even violent actions would be considered morally just, and on account of whom one carries out such (p.67) violent actions would be regarded as a sinner. Second, ethically unjustified violence should be met with ethically just violence and not with non-violence. Similarly, morally just violence should be measured and treated as part of ethical non-violence and therefore exception to the principle of non-violence. Tilak’s argument is that the unjust has no right to expect the just to be just towards him as the latter is towards the just: ‘that man who has come forward to cut the throats of others by his own evil-doings, has no more any ethical right to expect that others should behave towards him like saints’.59
Third, the duty of refraining from violence, except when morally justified, is a higher duty from the ethical point of view than considering whether the ‘universality’ of the principle is affected by pursuing such morally justified violent actions. To Tilak, then, European moralist writings, which see these principles as universal, permanent, absolute, and eternal and regulating public life at all times are mere religious stunts to fortify and popularize their religious cult. ‘Moralists will not in the present times, as a rule, consider it justifiable to delude people or to cheat them and convert them’.60 For Tilak, therefore, the religion of the Gita is far superior to that of Europe. ‘Our religion does not ask us to save the life of a murderer by telling a lie. Because, as the Sastras themselves have prescribed the punishment of death for a murderer, such a person is certainly punishable or fit for death’.61 Tilak is particularly harsh here on Western moralists, and argues that European religion has failed to understand and establish the relationship between the philosophical aspect of religion and the practical aspect of life, which the Gita does scientifically through karma yogi, ‘who, notwithstanding that his Reason has become non-inimical and unattached, takes part in all Energistic activities with that same non-inimical, and unattached Reason’.62 Hence, for Tilak, the ideal nationalist orientation should be a mixture of saintliness, and power and reason with deep concern for general welfare.
Sthitaprajna: The Central Figure in the Nation The exposition of Karmayoga and its implications also brings out another crucial aspect of Tilak’s philosophy, perhaps the foundation of the philosophy of Karmayoga: the description of sthitaprajna as an exemplar for ordinary people of poor intelligence for deciding the propriety and impropriety (karmakarma-vicikitsa) of action and surmise the subtleties of the Absolute Self. This is perhaps central to the philosophy of Karmayoga,63 and Tilak thinks that his life can serve as a complete ideal (p.68) for all men of all social categories. In his chapter ‘State of a Siddha and Worldly Affairs’, Tilak outlines the fundamental traits of sthitaprajna as a virtuous, sober, tranquil, and a completely integrated person whose mind has become desireless and indifferent to the transient world. The practice of dispassionate Karmayoga and the realization of the Absolute Self earn him a perfect control over his mind. Hence, sthitaprajna Page 16 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation is a man of both pure reason (vyavasayatmika buddhih) and pure practical reason (vasanatmika buddhih). Tilak then compares these traits with those of the ‘philosopher–king’ portrayed in Plato’s Republic, the notion of ‘jnani’ in the writings of Aristotle, the ‘ideal-wise man’ depicted in the literatures of Epicurus, and the concept of ‘absolute ethics’ illustrated in the writings of Herbert Spencer, and argues that European history is full of parallel descriptions. It is important that Tilak draws a sharp line between the Karmayogin sthitaprajna and the samnyasin sthitaprajna, and argues that the Gita’s portrayal is that of a Karmayogin sthitaprajna and not the samnyasin sthitaprajna. The essential traits of a Karmayogin sthitaprajna, such as knowledge of the brahman, peace of mind, self-identification, the desireless equability of mind, etc., do not differ from those of a samnyasin sthitaprajna, but after realization the Karmayogin sthitaprajna will continue to perform all the activities till death while samnyasin sthitaprajna will renounce such worldly activities as painful and insipid. Therefore, the words and sentences used in the text related to sthitaprajna are related to the Karmayogin sthitaprajna; the claim of the protagonists of the path of renunciation that these are related to the samnyasin sthitaprajna are, according to Tilak, due to the misunderstanding of the words and the context. For the science of Karmayoga the mode of life of the Karmayogin sthitaprajna is an example to ordinary people to determine what is right and wrong, and not the samnyasin sthitaprajna. Therefore, in the Gita, Arjuna was asked to become Karmayogin sthitaprajna and perform all his actions desirelessly. It is true, Tilak argues, the sthitaprajna’s course of life and his essential characteristics are difficult to accomplish in ordinary society by an ordinary man as ‘such a thing is not a matter of ordinary occurrence, and only one out of the thousand who makes an effort in this direction, ultimately attains this beatific ideal state’, but not an absolute impossibility if strived by means of mental control and effort. Tilak was sure that ancient India in Krtayuga had produced such a society. The criticism of Kant that such a state of society can only be a figment of imagination is, according to Tilak, highly mischievous. (p.69) As this state is extremely difficult of accomplishment, the German philosopher Kant says that the description given by Greek philosophers of such a state, is not of the state of any living being; but that they have personified the ‘Pure Desire’, which is the root of all Ethics, in order to impress the elements of pure morality on the minds of people; and have created this picture of a super-Jnanin and moral person out of their own imagination. But, our philosophers say that such a state of things is not an imaginary state and that it can be accomplished by man in this life by mental control and effort; and we have seen actual examples of such persons in our country.64
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation For Tilak, sthitaprajna is an ideal man whose sublime characters and ethical observations are living examples for ordinary men of all occupations. As his discriminatory reason (vyavasayatmika buddhih), by erasing ego presence, has acquired purity and equability, and follows the dictates of pure practical reason (vasanatmika buddhih) he cannot indulge in any sinful deeds contrary to the will of the society and hence, it is absurd to conjecture that in such a quietist state, he will perform actions for selfinterest. ‘It is as impossible that a person who has acquired this highest Knowledge, and is possessed of the purest Reason, should commit sin, as that nectar should cause death’.65
Once the mind is so constructed, then it is natural that self-interest (asihkarma) would merge with the other’s interest (nirmama), and Karmayogin sthitaprajna would not contemplate anything except public welfare. Therefore, whatever action he performs in the society becomes prima facie for the benefit of the world (sarvabhutahita). The laws which are followed by the sthitaprajna are, in fact, ‘dharma’ or the modes of pure behaviour for ordinary men. Hence, ‘just as an assayer tests the golden ornament … by comparing it with a simple piece of hundred carat gold in his possession’, so the ethicality of one’s activities and behaviour can be tested and decided by comparing them with those of the sthitaprajna. That man whose Pure Reason has become capable of realizing the identity, that ‘there is only one Atman in all created things’ … must also possess a Desire (vasana) which is pure. And when his Practical Reason has in this way become pure … such a preceptor as will give to us a visible reply, in the form of his own life, to the difficult question … what is a duty and what is not a duty (karyakaryavyavasthiti).66 To Tilak, then, laying down ethico-moral guidelines or principles of ethics to be observed by sthitaprajna, or restricting and binding him in a cage of morality or immorality is an act of great irrationality. In fact, the practical nature of the Gita does not bind the sthitaprajna with (p.70) any readymade list of traits and principles to be followed by him in his actions; it firmly establishes that he will continually exert himself for the general welfare. In other words, the combination of pure reason and pure practical reason in the sthitaprajna, or the essence of morality such as purity, equability, non-inimicality, sinlessness present in him will not let him do anything other than altruistic service.
[T]he man, who has once accomplished this ultimate state, does not need to be taught any laws about what should be done or should not … laying down laws of Ethics for such a Sthitaprajna would be as unreasonable … No Desire exists in their minds; and, therefore, they are not induced to perform Action by any motive … sin or meritorious action, morality or immorality, can never be applied to the conduct of such persons … They have gone beyond the bounds of sin and merit.67 In turn, this contented, self-realized, God-fearing, egoless, moral person himself would work out the essential elements of morality for the common people and the underlying principles that will bind the society. While doing so, he would keep himself above the Page 18 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation laws that govern the (imperfect) society—‘laws of conduct are framed on the basis of the Actions performed by such persons … these saints become the fathers of those laws of behaviour, and are never the slaves of them’.68
Tilak’s understanding of the notion of the sthitaprajna cannot be seen in a limited material sense, but is to be understood as a person of high and profound spiritual depth. His character traits, therefore, cannot be measured by any material scale or by the effects of his action, but purely by his inner reason. Tilak rejects the objections raised by ‘Utilitarian philosophy’ and some ‘Christian missionaries’ that ‘the sthitaprajnas are at liberty to commit any sin they like’, or ‘they are not bound by rules of right and wrong’, or ‘theirs is an extremely selfcentred egoistical personalities’, or ‘there is no meaning whatsoever for the permanence of ethical principles through them’ on the ground that it is irrational to think a man who has completely renounced his interests for others, and has nothing to achieve for himself, is at liberty to commit crimes in the material sense. It is impossible to see, other than longing for universal benefit, any selfish desire or egoistical motive in the actions of a sthitaprajna. [T]he case is different with the man who has reached the state of perfection … although some Action of his might appear improper from the ordinary point of view … must be essentially sinless … The same is the reason why Abraham in the Bible was not guilty of the sin of attempting infanticide … Parasurama was not guilty of matricide though he killed his own mother.69 (p.71) For Tilak, the criticisms levelled against the philosophy of the Gita are the result of an overwhelming admiration for their own religion, or ‘of some other nefarious or evil emotions’, and hence perverse. This conceit made them either overlook or misunderstand or marginalize the import of the Gita, just ‘as a black-asebony Negro from Africa is unfit for or incapable of appreciating the principles of Ethics accepted in civilized countries’.70
Tilak then brings up what he thinks is the central problem of relationship between absolute ethical principles and a perfect society, on the one hand, and between relative ethical principles and an imperfect society, on the other. In a perfect society, Tilak argues, since persons are congenial to Karmayogins, the ethical principles can be applied without any exception, and no changes are required in their absoluteness.71 The application of these principles in their absolute form to an imperfect society would produce fiendish effects, or would have diabolical consequences because an expression of piety, truth, harmlessness and kindness by a saint to all kinds of offenders and evil doers would ultimately lead to the total destruction of himself and the social structure. Therefore, to an imperfect society application of these permanent virtues of the highest order should be qualified to the extent of its ‘imperfectness’. However, their ultimate purpose is to gradually clean up the ‘imperfectness’ of that society.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation [T]he Sthitaprajna … is not a man living in a society which has reached the perfect state of the Krta-yuga, but is one who has to live in a society in this Kali-yuga … the rules of Right and Wrong, applicable to a society in which the majority is of avaricious persons, must be at least somewhat different from the rules of Right and Wrong and of Absolute Ethics applicable to a society in which every person is a Sthitaprajna …72 What is important, according to the ethics of the Gita, is that theoretically there would be no change in the nature of the absoluteness or permanence of the ethical principles, whether it is a perfect society or an imperfect society. But when these principles are to be applied by the sthitaprajna to an imperfect society, then relative changes and exceptions are made according to the nature and extent of ‘imperfectness’ of an imperfect society. In other words, the sthitaprajna, while taking into account the nature of right and wrong present in the perfect state, decides necessary changes in those rules in this material world.73 These changes should be viewed from the ‘imperfect societal point of view’ and not from the standpoint of ‘absolute ethics’. Neither the permanence nor the universality and absoluteness of ethics would be affected by this change. Imperfect social (p.72) order and not ethics, therefore, should be inculpated for such changes. ‘[O]ne cannot blame these Ethical laws for that … The fault here is not of ethics, but of the society’.74 For Tilak, the Gita consciously works out the necessity of reforming the society first from a state of imperfectness to perfectness, or at least purge it of avarice and ignorance in order to apply absolute ethical principles in their original universal form. So long as the imperfectness in the internal structure of the society persists, it affects the ‘universality of the ethical elements to that extent, without, however, affecting the intrinsic quality of the principles’. The Indian nation with discordant internal relations is to observe relative ethical principles until it is elevated into a harmonious social order.
It may be noted that the portrayal of the sthitaprajna seems to be similar to the portrayal of Nietzsche’s ‘overman’ who is beyond right and wrong. However, it is difficult to relate his views on violence v/s nonviolence to his nationalist creed and praxis. His views on revolutionaries, or connections with them, are wellknown. Tilak seems to be justifying ‘righteous violence’ of the revolutionaries; the case of his justification of Afzal Khan’s killing by Shivaji is symbolism in the context of the revolutionary activities. Moreover, Tilak theoretically defends the revolutionaries on the sthitaprajna plank.
Nationalism Having defined the fundamental principle of the philosophy of Karmayoga that ‘that is to be called religion which leads to the benefit of the entire human race, nay of all living beings’, Tilak locates the notion of nationalism within the fundamental frame of the concept of ‘universality’. It is, in fact, entirely in keeping with the ‘imperfectness’ of the existing social structure of the world. His argument is that nationalism is not an ultimate object to be realized by mankind; the final goal is ‘universal welfare’.75 Nevertheless, nationalism is to imbue both the perfect and imperfect societies though the reasons in each case are
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation different. These reasons are to be understood through the underlying principle of the philosophy of the absolute self. Tilak’s considerations towards the two kinds of nationalism, perfect and imperfect, are of the same kind as the sthitaprajna confronts with good and evil. There are two grounds on which Tilak justifies nationalism for an imperfect society. First, patriotism in an imperfect society is a natural means to reaching the perfect state. Just as the worship of the qualityful (saguna) Brahman is necessary in order to attain to the qualityless (nirguna) Brahman, so also is the ladder of pride of one’s (p.73) family, pride of one’s community, pride of one’s religion, pride of one’s country etc. necessary in order to acquire the feeling of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ (i.e., ‘the whole universe is the family’); and as every generation of society climbs up this ladder, it is always necessary to keep this ladder intact.76 Constitution of one’s self-identity—‘all created things are in me, and I am in all created things’—cannot be accomplished all at once; it occurs gradually through factors such as one’s family, friends, relations, gotra (clan), village, co-religionists, country, and ultimately through identification with all human beings.77 Similarly, the perfect state cannot be attained all at one stroke, and therefore, love for one’s family, religion, village, or pride of one’s own country are the necessary ascending steps to it.
Second, just as a sthitaprajna makes certain adjustments in the highest ethical principles when he descends to ordinary life to counteract the imbeciled and unprincipled, nationalism should be cherished to meet the nationalism of other countries. There is no doubt that the state of every human being in the world will improve gradually and reach the stage when every one realizes the identity of the Atman in every created being … But, it naturally follows that so long as every one has not reached this ultimate state of development of the Atman, saints must, having regard to the state of other countries or other societies, preach the creed of pride of one’s country etc., which will for the time being be beneficial to their own societies.78 The imperialist country which is responsible for the destruction of other countries by its own evil-doings, or ‘that nation which is prepared to cause any amount of harm to another nation for its own benefit’, has no more any ethical right to expect just and non-violent response from the subjugated countries as evildoers cannot expect excuse from the sthitaprajna. Therefore, self-protection of the country against the imperial nations is not only just but an inherent natural right.
If, therefore, someone seeks to justify the selfish conduct of a society, which is bigger in numbers than another society, on the ground that the benefit of a larger multitude, is of higher importance than the benefit of an individual or of a smaller multitude, such a method of reasoning must be looked upon as demonical (raksasi). Therefore … if other people behave Page 21 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation unjustly in this way, then the inherent ethical right of everybody of protecting himself, is of higher importance than the benefit of a larger multitude; nay, of even the whole world …79 Tilak also justifies patriotism of a perfect society on two major planks. First, just as a Karmayogin who has reached a high transcendental state (p.74) nevertheless performs his earthly duty as befits his life’s station, so also rootedness in one’s family, relations, village, and one’s country never becomes irrelevant. Therefore, perfect nationalism should perform a dual function of elevating the imperfect societies to perfection, and fight injustice on an ethical basis. ‘Those persons, who are on the higher steps of that ladder, have occasionally to follow the principle of “measure for measure”, in order to counteract the injustice of those who are on the lower steps’.80 Second, patriotism in a flawless society is quite natural.
[A]s it is not possible to do away with the lower floors of a building, when the higher floors are built … so also does patriotism … not become unnecessary, although one has reached the topmost stage of the welfare of all created things. Because, considering the matter from the point of view of the reform of society, that specific function, which is performed by the pride of one’s family, cannot be got merely out of pride of one’s country … even in the highest state of society, patriotism and pride of one’s family and other creeds are always necessary to the same extent as Equability of Reason.81 It will be noticed here that, for Tilak, nationalism is neither the highest ethical ideal nor a permanent stage in the life of the human race; it is only a ladder to reach the state of universal love. It is only a preparatory stage and hence, will have to be abandoned, if necessary, from the universal point of view of ethics.82 But given the condition of the Indian nation patriotism becomes the highest dharma. Tilak’s nationalist discourse seems to be approving the patriotic fervour expressed in Bankim.
Bhakti and the Mass Base of Indian Nationalism The notion of bhakti is yet another fundamental principle that Tilak employs to demonstrate that the Gita’s philosophy of Karmayoga, the philosophy of the absolute self, and its proposed social institutions do not disassociate themselves from the large mass of the people although it posits sthitaprajna as the central figure. The path of knowledge, he argues, is accessible and susceptible exclusively for those who are endowed with sound reason (buddhigamya),83 and not intended for people who are born with limited receptive reason (duhkakaraka). But nature is not satisfied with the creation of only ‘keen intelligent people’; it also produces those who possess ‘weak’ and ‘immature’ reason. There are some whose minds are susceptible to grasp all kinds of recondite knowledge, but there are others who are naturally incompetent of sensing such knowledge, particularly knowledge of the attributeless Brahman. If jnana marga is the only way suggested to acquire knowledge and attain release, then (p.75) millions of people who do not possess keenness of intelligence would be left out because ‘highly intelligent people are necessarily always few’.84 In order to abate this elitist view of knowledge and salvation becoming an asset of gentility and the Page 22 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation monopoly of a few, the Gita outlines bhakti as an ‘easy’ (kartum susukham) path to reach the highest Brahman. In other words, the idea that underpins bhakti is that majority of the people in the material universe cannot comprehend the esoteric knowledge of eternal principles due to the ‘natural weakness of restlessness’ and the ‘limited receptiveness’ of their reason. [T]he path or manner of acquiring that Equability of Reason, is wholly dependent on the Reason itself, ordinary persons feel a doubt as to how one can acquire that keenness of Intelligence … if somebody’s Reason is not so keen, that man must be considered as lost … In short, how is a man possessing only an ordinary Reason to realize this indescribable, unimaginable Parabrahman, which is absolutely different from the visible world (drsyasrstivilaksana) … and how is a man to thereby acquire the state of Equability and afterwards attain Release?85 Tilak argues that bhakti in the Gita is a social leveller which attempts to exterminate inequality and its associated exploitation in the world. Knowledge of the abstruse Brahman cannot be understood without keen intuition; the path of bhakti emphasizing personal God with visible qualities is to fill the space, as a more accessible understanding of the Absolute by the possessor of limited reason.86 Therefore, it is one of the three paths suggested by the Gita for the attainment of release—jnana for the ‘sound reason’ and bhakti for ‘ordinary people of poor intelligence’— and thus expresses its readiness to meet the genteel and the ordinary man on their own grounds. However, bhakti is in no way inferior to jnana; it is ‘quite potent’ and as ‘effective method’ as the latter for the attainment of knowledge.
Although the ordinary man in the street may not have sufficient intelligence to investigate into whether or not it is really qualityless, and to discuss the pros and cons, yet, Faith is not such a quality that it is possessed only by persons of the highest intelligence. Even the most ignorant man has no dearth of faith, and if he carries on all his numerous affairs with the help of Faith, there is not the slightest difficulty in the way of his believing by Faith that the Brahman is qualityless.87 According to Tilak, although the two paths of jnana and bhakti besides karma were measured differently by the acharyas, both the paths would lead to the same realization, and the differences in paths do not (p.76) differentiate the highest state. Therefore, bhakti as cultivating an intense and desireless love (nirhetuka)88 for the eternal principle is in no way fundamentally different from karma as the desireless performance of duty or the performance of one’s action without expecting the reward, and jnana as the desireless understanding of the qualityless and the inexpressible Brahman. This non-attached and non-possessive notion of bhakti, karma, and jnana, according to Tilak, is the core of the philosophy of Karmayoga. Hence, mere bhakti, or karma, or jnana alone would not lead to release and the philosophy of Karmayoga would be incomplete without any one of these attributes. Therefore, for true realization bhakti would necessarily have to be combined and united with knowledge.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation [I]n order to perfect the knowledge which has been acquired by Intelligence, and in order that that knowledge should be translated by means of the Intelligence into behaviour and action, such knowledge has always to rely on Faith, Kindness, Affection, Love of Duty, and other inherent mental tendencies; and That … does not … must be looked upon as bare, incomplete, perversely inferential, and barren or immature … after having gone by the cart-road of Intelligence as far as possible for completely Realizing the eternal … one has to go further, at least to some extent, by the foot-path of Faith and Affection.89 The sthitaprajna, eulogized in the Gita, therefore, is not a man of mere bhakti or mere jnana or karma; he is a pursuer in whom all these ethicospiritual traits are amalgamated and poised together.90
For Tilak, then, the assertion by the different sects of pre-modern times that karma, jnana, and bhakti would lead to different results and produce different spiritual seekers is completely absurd. Similarly, the arguments by Christian missionaries that mere faith and devotion to the perceptible is sufficient for attaining salvation, or the belief in ‘certain leading sections’ of Indian society that mere knowledge would lead to release, and no other faculty is necessary for attaining salvation except jnana are misplaced. They are the result of the mutual exclusion of science and metaphysics that has bred either a rejection of science or an overwhelming adherence to the inferential reasoning of science.91 Neither ‘Christianity’ nor ‘leading sections’ of Indian society, therefore, has understood the true import of the Vedic religion. The importance of this harmony between imperceptible Knowledge (jnana) and perceptible Devotion (bhakti), was not fully appreciated by the philosophers pertaining to the religion which adhered merely to the perceptible Christ; and it is not a matter of surprise, that from their onesided and philosophically short-sighted point of view, there should appear to them an inconsistency in the (p.77) philosophy of the Gita. But, the most surprising part of it all is, that instead of appreciating this valuable quality of our Vedic religion, some imitative persons among us have come forward to find fault with that very religion!92 Having advanced this argument of bhakti that salvation is not the privilege of a small intellectual minority, Tilak then goes on to establish that bhakti has proved quite useful even for practical reasons. His argument is that bhakti is the basis of the affairs of the material world and thus, the edifice of the latter is erected on the bhakti foundation.
[H]undreds of persons carry on their activities, relying on the statements of trustworthy persons. There will be very few persons who will be in a position to explain scientifically … why when a second figure one is placed after the first figure one, we get eleven, and not two. Nevertheless, the affairs of the world are going on in the belief by Faith that these statements are true.93 Page 24 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Tilak argues that although the experience of bhakti is quite fundamental, it cannot be rationalized and explained in all circumstances. This, however, does not invalidate the experience altogether.
It is true that the purpose of Intelligence is to analyze the Knowledge which has been acquired by Faith, and to give an explanation of it; but though a proper explanation of that Realization is not forthcoming, it cannot, on that account, be said that the Knowledge which has been acquired by Faith is a mere illusion.94 For Tilak, then, the rational explanation of science is not adequate under all circumstances, nor is it sufficient to grasp all subjects. There are subjects, the knowledge of which cannot be acquired by the mere application of science. If science cannot define certain experiences properly, the actuality of the experience cannot always be negated. Hence, Tilak values bhakti, experience, faith, and emotion above the rationality of science. As Bankim downplays the appropriateness of science in understanding the philosophy of Karmayoga, Tilak too does it for the exaltation of bhakti and emotions.
The characteristic feature of bhakti, says Tilak, is that it begins with the separation between the worshipper and the worshipped, or the knower and the knowable, or the mind (citta) and the object of worship, but all such dualities would be obliterated when the bhakta reaches the highest state of equability of reason, or brahmi state, or the state of sthitaprajna.95 In other words, bhakti with dualities in its earlier stage would lead to the non-dualistic state of Paramesvara in its final realization. Tilak mentions the life of Saint Tukarama as the personification of such bhakti. By following the bhakti path in his spiritual quest he had reached this (p.78) highest non-dualistic state, and his realization of the highest was not only intellectual but experiential. Therefore, bhakti is not an object to be achieved, the goal being the imperceptible, reverential purusottama; it is only a means for the attainment of the highest non-dualistic state. It may be noted that Tilak demarcates between terms such as ‘karma marga’/‘karma nistha’; ‘jnana marga’/‘jnana nistha’; and ‘bhakti marga’. ‘Marga’ means ‘means’ [(sadhana) or the course of life that a sadaka leads from the very beginning of his spiritual quest. The ‘nistha’, on the other hand, means being engrossed in the same path even after realization of the absolute spirit and hence, it is the highest stage in the state of perfection (siddhavastha). The following diagram (Fig. 2.1) clearly shows this:
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation At the beginning karma marga, bhakti marga, and jnana marga are different paths according to the qualifications of the sadhaka, but all having a single, self-same object of attaining the same equability of reason and the same Paramesvara (knowledge). But after the realization, the karma marga Figure 2.1 The Stages of Perfection (nistha) and jnana marga (nistha) would continue as two independent courses of life, the former being engrossed in desireless karma, and the latter steeped in knowledge abandoning all actions. Bhakti would not remain as ‘bhakti nistha’; it would merge with the ‘jnana nistha’, and the earlier follower of the bhakti marga would not perform desireless action, as the Karmayogi does, after the attainment of realization, but turn to be jnani and remain engrossed in the abandonment of duty. Hence, ‘the ultimate resolution of bhakti is into jnana’. Therefore, according to (p.79) the Gita, there are three paths (means) but only two nisthas. Why the pursuer of bhakti would necessarily merge in the jnana nistha in the final stage and not in the karma nistha Tilak does not explain.96 Bhakti requires its pursuers to concentrate and steady their mind on the imperceptible, qualityless (avyakta) Brahman through the worship of some perceptible objects (saguna). The Gita, therefore, far from interdicting and marginalizing the spiritual quest of ordinary masses who are naturally frail, outlines the bhakti marga and the worship of the perceptible as an excuse to the realities of human nature (see Fig. 2.2). The above diagram shows that both paths are different at the beginning of sadhana but would merge in the same equability of reason. The only difference is that, while in the jnana marga the sadhaka, from the very beginning, would concentrate on the imperceptible knowledge, the other would concentrate on the perceptible at the beginning of sadhana, but merge in the same knowledge
Figure 2.2 The Different Parts of Sadhana
of the imperceptible.97
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation [A]s the Mind is naturally restless, it cannot understand on what to concentrate itself, unless it has before itself, by way of support, some steady object, which is perceptible to the organs …‘pratyaksa’ (visible) … Who is the cause of everything, omnipotent, and omniscient, that is to say, qualityful, but who is yet formless, that is to say, imperceptible (avyakta). Nay, unless some perceptible thing has been seen, the human mind cannot conceive the idea of the Imperceptible …You may call this the natural quality or the defect of the human mind.98 (p.80) Hence, the perceptible object is only a means, not the final state to be reached, and when one reaches the final state, the perceptible object would cease to matter. Therefore, the object chosen for the worship of the imperceptible Brahman is immaterial because what redeems the bhakta is faith and love, which he invests on the object. Significance, then, lies in the state of mind rather than the symbol of worship. ‘If idols of deities or temples had any redeeming power in themselves, then even such sensual persons or thieves must attain Release’. For Tilak, the Gita explicitly narrates these conditions of the perceptible and imperceptible through the account of vishwarupa (cosmic form) shown to Arjuna.
[A]lthough the worship of Vasudeva has been given an important position in the Gita, in so far as it is a means to an end, yet, considering the matter from the Metaphysical point of view, it has been stated in the VedantaSutras, as also further on in the Gita itself, that a symbol (pratika) is only a kind of means, and that the true all-pervading and permanent Paramesvara cannot be limited to any one of these symbols … this form (vishwarupa) which you see is not My true form, this is only a Maya; and in order to see My real form, you must go beyond this Maya.99 Having advanced the argument that the Gita maintains a clear-cut distinction between the faith (mind) and the symbol (pratika), Tilak—in a very crucial argument—rejects the claims of superiority or inferiority of the chosen objects of worship. His argument is related both to practical consequences and metaphysical reasons. He says that the claims regarding the relative superiority or inferiority, or the non-existence of symbols of worship and the resultant disputes are acts of ‘irrationality’, ‘ignorance’, ‘delusion’, ‘false arrogance’, and ‘acts of regrettable stupidity’ of man. In fact, the Gita states that there is nothing in this material world which is not eternal. ‘If all the things or qualities to be seen in the world are only forms or symbols of the Paramesvara, how can one say that the Blessed Lord is in one of them and not in another …’100 Therefore, any chosen object of worship would lead to salvation if the faith is pure and absolute.
Whatever may be your faith with reference to the symbol, it is the fruit of your Devotion, which the Paramesvara—not the symbol—gives you … If your faith is not pure, then, however good the symbol may be, what is the use of it? If the whole day you are engaged in deceiving others, then, it will be impossible for you to attain the Paramesvara, notwithstanding that you go to worship an idol in a temple … and whether every morning and evening, or on feast days.101
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation (p.81) Hence, the reward of the worship is equal to the faith and not the object of bhakti. If a person obtains some material gains while worshipping a particular symbol, ignorant people may tend to see it as a reward given to him by the symbol he has worshipped, and in case he acquires more material gains or prosperity, then that object comes to be regarded as superior among the various symbols. ‘[T]he Paramesvara … gives the reward may … be One, yet, as He gives a different reward to each one according to his good or evil intentions, the results of the worship of different symbols or deities are seen to be different, from each other’.102 Although such an attitude leads to a lot of misery and bitter warfare, but such are the realities of the world. This problem can be overcome by separating symbolism from eternal principles and the human faith.
Why do such differences arise? For Tilak, they are due to variations in the mental construct of human beings. If the reason is impure, then the mind (practical reason), however sattvik it may be, also becomes impure and if the mind is weak, the reason automatically becomes unsteady. For such a weak mind any amount of knowledge or advice about the conditions of the pure, qualityless brahman, the value of the perceptible object, and the relationship between the perceptible and imperceptible would not impress. In turn, it would increase the already existing impurity and bewilderment, ‘specially if the Faith and the Reason are both initially immature and weak—the man takes a perverse view of that advice itself’. Tilak mentions, for instance, the ebony black Abyssinian in Africa: ‘When Christian Missionaries begin to preach about the Christian religion, he cannot by any means get a true idea … of the Christian religion; and … whatever is said to him, is imbibed by him in an incongruous meaning, according to his immature Reason’103 According to Tilak, it is on these fundamental grounds of immaturity and impurity of reason and mind that certain sections of the Vedic society were regarded as unfit for listening to the Vedas.104 But the Gita, he argues, does not differentiate or interdict the acquisition of knowledge on similar grounds. Assuming natural differences in the mental faculty of human beings, that is, variations in the sattvik, rajas, and tamas qualities, it propounds different paths to be followed by people of different potentials to attain salvation. Hence, the Vedic claim that knowledge or salvation is the privilege of the three upper classes, especially brahmins, is not envisaged in the Gita.105 Social or gender groups are not inhibiting categories in the Gita. What is important is faith and selflessness rather than the caste or social category. In the framework of the Gita, not only the three upper classes, brahmin, ksatriya, and vaisya, but also sudras, (p.82) women, and the lowest of the low—chandalas—are regarded as equally competent to attain salvation through the path of faith and bhakti. [T]hat man whose Reason has become equable towards all, is the highest of men, whether he is a carpenter, or a merchant, or a butcher by profession … the spiritual worth of a man does not depend on the profession … or on the caste to which he belongs, but entirely on the purity of his conscience … To the Paramesvara, women, or the lowest of mixed Page 28 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation tribes, or Brahmins are the same. ’The Paramesvara craves (only) for your Faith’. He does not care for symbols … for the difference between men and women, or castes like the Brahmins or the Chandalas …106 Tilak’s position seems to be contradictory because in politics and in matters of social reforms he was an arch conservative, or a ‘manuvadi’ to use a phrase popularized recently. Many of his writings in Kesari and Mahratta project him as a champion of social orthodoxy. He defended the supremacy of the brahmins and other strata in religion and society, and opposed the same to other categories. One instance of his orthodoxy is his opposition to women’s education.
The Ethical Basis for the Nation Tilak considered it imperative that the emerging nationalism in India be founded on clearly articulated moral principles, ideals, and exemplars. The Orientalist literature had certain clearly articulated positions in this regard. It found an absence of an authoritative text, like the Bible or the Koran, that could suggest such moral foundations. They pointed out that the contradictions and inconsistencies found in scriptural writings and the fragmented sects and traditions within Hinduism could not throw up a pan-Hindu or a pan-Indian ethical doctrine which would hold good across the sects and traditions. There was an attempt by certain Orientalist writers to suggest that cultural texts of the tradition, such as the Gita, were deeply influenced by Occidental writings such as the Bible. Tilak had a three-fold response to such Orientalist writings. He admits that there are certain contradictions and inconsistencies across religious and moral texts in India as is the case in the West. However, he thinks the Gita is that singular text which rises above these inconsistencies and contradictions while at the same time not denying the authority of tradition. Tilak does not agree with the sectarian appropriation of the Gita by different sects and religious traditions in India. He thinks that their appropriation of the Gita and the paradigm around which they constructed it is necessarily partisan. By underplaying the earlier (p. 83) interpretations of the Gita articulated by different sects, Tilak attempts to retrieve the Gita to formulate the ethical basis of a pan-Indian nationalism. He finds that the moral principles upheld by the Gita are superior to anything that came to be formulated in the West in this regard. In fact, Tilak feels that the central moral themes found in the New Testament are derivatives from the Gita via the Buddhist interface. It is in this way that he reverses the terms of the Orientalist discourse. One of the most important emphases of Tilak is the necessity of formulating a set of ethical principles to govern social relations and individual pursuits. His vehement criticism of sectarian paraphrases of the Gita is partly on account of their emphasis on disengagement with the material universe. Tilak wants to bring the nation to engage with this world, and the emphasis on Karmayoga and the downgrading of jnana yoga are meant to serve these ends. He, however, recognizes the importance of wielding together sects and traditions within the Page 29 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation fold of nationalism. Therefore, while he delegitimizes sects and partisan traditions to the extent that they are exclusivist, at the same time he recognizes them as significant to map out the trajectory of the nation. The nation, however, is irreducible to them. Tilak constitutes the basis of nationalism around the sthitaprajnas as its exemplars. These virtuous characters are guided by nishkama karma and are the models for the nation. The sthitaprajna may hail from the traditional elite but he can also emerge from the masses through the path of bhakti. Consequently, the national elite in Tilak’s imagination can come from the traditional elite as well as the masses but to be leaders of the nation, they necessarily need to embody the ideal of the sthitaprajna. Tilak subscribes deeply to this form of moral elitism. However, traditional elites in Tilak do not have automatic claims to be the leaders of the new national dispensation. His emphasis on karma marga, and the relation that he establishes between nishkama karma and Karmayoga lay great emphasis on human agency and its engagement with the world. Tilak does not favour samnyasa as he discredits all those earlier renditions of the Gita which emphasize renunciation in the name of enlightenment. The emphasis on the heroic figure of the sthitaprajna makes Tilak disregard established and accepted ethical norms and the rule of the law. Indian nationalism would be anchored not on constitutional democracy but on the heroic personality of the sthitaprajna who is to guide the destiny of the nation. Although he leaves space for the evolution of the sthitaprajnas from among the masses through bhakti, the masses are assigned primarily work and devotion rather than pursuit of knowledge. (p.84) Overtly, Tilak denounces Utilitarianism as a set of moral principles characteristic of the modern West. However, his ideas on the moral basis of the nation revolve, to a great extent, on considerations of utility. The kind of modernity that Tilak envisages for India is deeply seeped in such ideas of utility. In fact, later on Aurobindo was to draw attention to this issue in a pointed way. Further, Tilak seeks an integral India with a combination of jnana and bhakti via his reading of the Gita. Thereby, he attempts to co-opt the bhakti tradition within the fold of his new brahminical pursuasion of the sthitaprajna by asking the new elite to show their love, devotion, and consideration towards the masses which was hitherto absent in them. As Tilak underplays the differences between sects and their symbols of worship (pratika), he exalts an all-India Hinduism as the basis of Indian nationalism. However, it is difficult to determine the extent of exclusivity of his concept. His journey through the Gita rests on grounds of reason rather than tradition. Even the most hallowed aspect of the tradition such as Samkara’s Gita Bhasya does not hold much sanctity for Tilak. He vehemently contests the traditional four-fold authority on morals based on Srutis, Smritis, Sadacara (hallowed usages), and
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation Sadvipra (the testimony of the wise), and replaces them with the concept of sthitaprajna arrived at through discursive reasoning. Notes:
(1.) Gita Rahasya was originally written in Marathi and was published in 1915. In 1917, it was published in Hindi and Gujarathi. Its Telugu and Kannada editions were brought out in 1919. In 1924 it was translated into Bengali and Tamil. Thus in the beginning, it was published in various vernacular languages. In 1935, Gita Rahasya (hereafter GR) was translated into English by B.S. Sukthankar, the solicitor of the Bombay High Court, as The Esoteric Import of the Gita, and published by Tilak Brothers at the Bombay Vaibhav Press, Bombay. (2.) B.S. Suktankar, ‘Translator’s Preface’, GR, vol. i, p. xxxv; ‘Author’s Preface’, p. xlv. (3.) The term Samkhya is used with two different meanings. The first is the Samkhya philosophy as expounded by Kapilacharya. The word Samkhya is derived from the root ‘sam-khya’ (calculation), which means ‘one who counts’. Kapilacharya Samkhya is known by this name because it counts twenty-five fundamental elements as responsible for the creation of the universe. It advances the theory of dualism, of intrinsically independent prakriti and purusha, and their interaction causing the cosmic process; the nature and function of the three gunas (constituent qualities) of sattva, rajas, and tamas; the twenty-five principles–purusha (spirit), prakriti (matter), mahan (reason), ahamkara (individuation) mind, five tanmatras (subtle) or fine elements such as sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, five organs of perception such as nose, eyes, ears, tongue, and skin, five organs of action such as hands, feet, voice, anus, and generative organs, and five primordial elements (visesas or gross) such as ether, air, fire, water, and earth–and discriminative knowledge of prakriti and purusha leading to emancipation. The Bhagavadgita shows familiarity with these fundamental tenets of Kapilacharya’s Samkhya system, but it introduces a few changes in the light of Vedanta, the most significant being the substitution for the basic atheism of Samkhya by the notion of Paramatman (the twenty-sixth element), of which purusha and prakriti are viewed as only two forms, the higher and lower respectively. The second meaning is not in this classical sense or philosophy of the legendary sage Kapila but general philosophy denoting knowledge or renunciation as the path of salvation. For Tilak, although the Gita fully conceded Kapilacharya’s Samkhya philosophy regarding the construction of the Universe and added to it a twenty-sixth element, the Paramatman, it mostly used the term Samkhya in the second sense. (The same philosophy, which is advanced by Kapilacharya, is also advanced by Vedanta and hence, the Gita must have borrowed it from the Vedanta and not from Kapila. It’s usage in the Gita is not as a part of any system known by this name but in the general sense of renunciation.) Therefore, Tilak calls Samkara’s Page 31 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation interpretation of the Gita as ‘Samkhya interpretation’, as it argued for the renunciation of the world. GR, vol. i, pp. 167–267. See also P.N. Bazaz, The Role of Bhagavadgita in Indian History, New Delhi: Sterling, 1975, p. 181; W. Douglas and P. Hill, The Bhagavadgita, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1953 (2nd edition), p. 38; M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968 (first published in 1932), p. 128; James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. ii, New York: Edinburg, 1971, p. 537; S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. ii, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 455; Swami Sivananda, The Bhagavadgita: Text, Word to Word Meaning, Translation and Commentary, Sivanandanagar, Tehri Garhwal, 1969, pp. 42, 66, 121–2, 387–9. (4.) GR, vol. i, p. xxlv. At the age of sixteen Tilak first got acquainted with the Gita, that is, in 1872. See ‘Author’s Preface’, p. xliii. (5.) Ibid., vol. i, p. xxiv. (6.) Tilak observed that while he was not concerned with the inconsistencies and contradictions of the ancient scriptures, they were truly full of them. Ibid., vol. i, pp. 16, 40–69, 72, 401. (7.) Dharma (morality), artha (wealth), kama (desire), and moksa (release), vol. i, p. 72. (8.) ‘Mr. Tilak on the Gita Rahasya’, GR, vol. i, pp. xxiv–xxv. (9.) Ibid., pp. xxiv–xxv, 18–30, 133, 305, 345, 416–509, etc.; vol. ii, pp. 662, 666, 703, 705–6, 750, 752, 758, 766, etc. (10.) At the end of vol. ii, Tilak gives a list of ancient scriptures whose arguments corroborate those of the Gita. (11.) GR, vol. ii, p. 822. Tilak presumes the existence of the Gita in its present form at least 500 years before the Saka era, and Buddhism arose a few centuries before Christ and one or two centuries after the Gita. Ibid., pp. 796, 799–800, 801–31. (12.) ‘Preface’, GR, vol. i, p. l. (13.) Tilak also titled his monumental Gita Rahasya as Karma Yoga Sastra–the ‘Hindu Philosophy of Life, Ethics and Religion’–which also implies the central teaching of the text according to him. (14.) Otto von Bohtlingk, quoted in V.S. Moon (ed.), Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. iii, Bombay: Government of Maharastra, 1987, p. 357; Holtzman, quoted in ibid., p. 358; Garbe, ‘The Bhagavadgita’, in James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. ii, New York: Edinburg, Page 32 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation 1971, p. 538; E. Hopkins, The Religions of India, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1977, pp. 390–400. Hopkins argues that the present version of the text contains alterations or interpolations in the original, p. 389. Garbe favours its composition after Christ, that is, in the second century AD. Ibid., p. 538. (15.) W. Douglas and P. Hill, The Bhagavadgita, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. He asserts that the message of the Gita is a message for the ordinary man; p. 44. Karma yoga in the Bhagavadgita is a corrective to the prevailing philosophy of renunciation; p. 59 Edwin Arnold, The Song Celestial, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970; Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavadgita or Song of the Blessed One: India’s Favourite Bible, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1925. To quote him, ‘None has had a larger influence on the development of Hindu religious thought as Gita had’; p. ii. M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, vol. i, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1972. For him, the Gita was composed a few centuries before Christ; p. 438; Max Müller, The Sacred Books of the East, vol. iii, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970. Tilak also refers to translations of the Gita by K.T. Telang, Buhler, Mc Crindle, Brooks, Geiger, Laurincer, Vincent Smith, Takakasu, Thibaut, Thompson, Wilson, and so on. (16.) ‘Author’s Preface’, GR, vol. i, p. xlix. (17.) Ibid., vol. II, pp. 747–8, 760, 792, 799–800, 820–1, 829. He also criticizes Thibaut (p. 758); Buhler (pp. 773–4, 788), and Rhys Davids (p. 827). (18.) Vedanta sutras are also known as Brahma sutras and Sariraka sutras. Ibid., vol. i, p. 16. (19.) Upanisads, Vedanta sutras, and the Bhagavadgita. ‘Prasthana’ means ’authority’; ‘trayi’ means ‘three’–three authoritative texts on the Vedic religion. Ibid., p. 17. (20.) Tilak’s commentary on the earlier commentaries of the Gita covers the writings of Samkaracharya, Madhvacharya, Ramanujacharya, Vallabhacharya, Nimbarkacharya, Sridhara Swamy, Jnanesvara, Anandagiri, Madhusudana, and few modern Marathi saints. He calls all the earlier interpretations as bhasya (critical and logical examination of the entire work) and not tika (paraphrase of the text). Ibid., p. 16. (21.) Ibid., pp. 17–18. (22.) Ibid., p. 29. (23.) Ibid., pp. 28–9. (24.) Ibid., p. 28.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation (25.) Vinoba Bhave, Talks on the Gita, Kashi: Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1959. (26.) Unlike Vinoba and like Tilak, Radhakrishnan sees reason in the different interpretations in the bhasyakaras: ’The teachers of the Vedanta are obliged to justify their special doctrines by an appeal to these three authorities (prasthanatrayi) and so wrote commentaries on them expounding how the texts teach their special point of view … After the decline of Buddhism in India, different sects arose … The various commentaries on the Gita were written by the teachers in support of their own traditions (sampradaya) and in refutation of those of others‘. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1967, p. 16. Unlike Tilak and like Vinoba, Radhakrishnan finds its share of mistakes in the text: ’These writers are able to find in the Gita their own systems of religious thought and metaphysics, since the author of the Gita suggests that the one eternal truth which we are seeking, from which all other truth derives, cannot be shut up in a single formula’ ibid., p. 16. Thus, Radhakrishnan reconciles the different reasons given by Tilak and Vinoba Bhave. (27.) Mimamsa writings are Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa and Badarayanacharya’s Uttaramimamsa. GR, vol. i, pp. 72, 401, 435, 613; vol. ii, p. 761. (28.) GR, vol. i, p. 30. (29.) Ibid., p. 33. (30.) The earlier attempts to harmonize contradictory traditions of India were Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa and Badarayanacharya’s Uttaramimamsa. Tilak sees the Gita basically as a work of the above kind. Quite interestingly, subsequently Ambedkar was to argue that the Gita was later than Jaimini’s text, and composed to support the tradition started by Jaimini–‘counter-revolution, a revolution against Buddhism in justification of brahminical domination’ (31.) GR, vol. i, pp. xliii, liii–iv, 28. (32.) Ibid., pp. xlix–li. (33.) GR, vol. ii, p. 831. (34.) The Vedic methods of adhibhautika, adhidaivika and adhyatmika are respectively called positive, theological, and metaphysical in Comtian writings. The only distinction between the two is that the Vedas consider adhyatmika as superior to the adhibhautika and adhidaivika, but Comte considers the positive method as superior to the theological and the metaphysical. Tilak calls this reordering of the Vedic tripartite method as ’new historical order’, but it is not Europe’s original contribution to the sociological analysis. GR, vol. i, pp. 83–358. (35.) Ibid., p. 201. Page 34 of 38
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation (36.) Ibid., p. 93. (37.) Ibid., pp. 40’69, 268–358. (38.) Ibid., pp. 50–1, 526. (39.) Tilak hierarchically organizes Utilitarian ethics into pure or naked selfishness, long-sighted selfishness, enlightened selfishness, and benevolent selfishness. In the hierarchy, naked selfishness occupies the lowest rung and benevolent selfishness the highest. He calls the first two schools as tamasic, third rajasic, and benevolent selfishness, that is, ’the greatest good of the greatest number’ as satvika. He criticizes the Utilitarianism as expressed in the writings of Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, Hobbes, and Hume. Ibid., pp. 102–28. (40.) Ibid., p. 42. (41.) Ibid., p. 46. (42.) Ibid., p. 45. (43.) Ibid., p. 546. (44.) Ibid., p. 550. (45.) Ibid., pp. 40–69. (46.) Ibid., pp. 510–65. (47.) Ibid., p. 549. (48.) Ibid., p. 44. (49.) Ibid., p. 43. (50.) Ibid. (51.) Ibid., pp. 43–4. (52.) Ibid., p. 44. (53.) Ibid., p. 43. (54.) Ibid., pp. 548–9. (55.) Ibid., pp. 54–5. (56.) Ibid., pp. 46–8. (57.) Ibid., p. 550.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation (58.) Ibid., pp. 555–6. (59.) Ibid., p. 554. (60.) Ibid., p. 49. (61.) Ibid., p. 48. (62.) Ibid., pp. 546–7. (63.) For Tilak, the protagonists of renunciation and devotion do not consider the issue important: ‘[T]hey do not trouble to deal with the question of the doable and the not-doable in the state of a householder … Srimat Samkaracharya … has in his commentary on the Gita either belittled the statements in the Gita advising Energism, or considered them to be merely laudatory … Lord advised Arjuna on the battle-field to follow only the renunciatory paths of Release, namely, the path of pure Devotion, or the Patanjala-Yoga’. Ibid., pp. 510–11. (64.) Ibid., p. 515. While rejecting Western opinion, Tilak firmly believes that such a society dominated by the sthitaprajnas would occur soon. See pp. 513, 556. (65.) Ibid., p. 533. (66.) Ibid., pp. 511–12, 528. (67.) Ibid., pp. 515–17, 533, 543. (68.) Ibid., pp. 518–19. (69.) Ibid., pp. 517–18. (70.) Ibid., pp. 532–3. (71.) Ibid., pp. 512–13. (72.) Ibid., pp. 522–3. (73.) Ibid., p. 523. (74.) Ibid., p. 525. (75.) Ibid., pp. 555v6 (76.) Ibid., p. 556. (77.) Ibid., p. 560. (78.) Ibid., pp. 556–7, 560–1.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation (79.) Ibid., p. 559. (80.) Ibid., p. 556. (81.) Ibid., p. 557. (82.) Tilak finds a corresponding opinion in the Mahabharata: ’If there is a conflict between the pride of one’s family, the pride of one’s country, and ultimately the benefit of the entire human kind, then … duties of a lower order should be sacrificed for duties of a higher order . For protecting a family, one person may be abandoned; for protecting a town, a family may be abandoned; for the protection of society, a town may be abandoned; and for the protection of the Atman, even the earth may be abandoned’. Ibid., pp. 558–9. (83.) Tilak quotes a few passages from the Gita, the Kathopanisad and Sruti texts to show that the Vedic jnana was exclusively, if not substantially, limited to a few. Ibid., p. 567. (84.) Ibid. (85.) Ibid., pp. 566–7. (86.) Ibid., p. 582. (87.) Ibid., p. 571. (88.) Ibid., p. 572. (89.) Ibid., pp. 569–70. (90.) Ibid., pp. 572, 578, 583, 596. (91.) Ibid., p. 568. (92.) Ibid., p. 607. (93.) Ibid., pp. 568–71. (94.) Ibid., p. 571. (95.) Ibid., pp. 598–9. (96.) Ibid., pp. 435, 577–9. (97.) Ibid., pp. 576–7. (98.) Ibid., pp. 574–5. (99.) Ibid., p. 586.
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The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation (100.) Ibid., p. 585. (101.) Ibid., pp. 587–8. (102.) Ibid., p. 589. (103.) Ibid., p. 593. (104.) Tilak, while quoting Max Müller, says that it was principally because of the nature of the mental frame (weak reason and mind) that sudras and other ignorant classes in ancient times were looked upon as unfit to study the Vedas. Ibid., p. 594. (105.) Ibid., p. 613. The difference is that while for the Vedas the lower classes, due to their weak reason, are unfit for acquiring knowledge, for the Gita bhakti is the path by which those sections can attain salvation. Tilak mentions a few such instances from the Mahabharata where sudras obtained release through the bhakti path; see pp. 614–15. (106.) Ibid., pp. 614–15.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Nishkama Karma and the Masses Vivekananda’s Understanding of the Gita Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0003
Abstract and Keywords This chapter examines Swami Vivekananda's reading and interpretation of the Bhagavadgita. It suggests that Vivekananda considered karma yoga as the central teaching of the Bhagavadgita. It highlights that Vivekananda accused priests of misreading the text, defending privileged interests, and denying the people access to the Bhagavadgita which had led to the cultural degeneration of India. Vivekananda believed that nishkama karma or non-attachment is the core teaching of the Gita. It was inclusive in nature and could take the masses into its fold. From this philosophy he evolved two concepts, naranarayana and daridranarayana, which occupy a central place in his mission to revive the youth of India. Keywords: Swami Vivekananda, Bhagavadgita, karma yoga, priesthood, cultural degeneration, nishkama karma, naranarayana, daridranarayana
Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), a religious savant with arguably unsurpassed adulation in contemporary India, was one of the most important Bengali thinkers at the turn of the nineteenth century to expound the principles of ethical nationalism. Widely read, particularly in Indian philosophy, he was a great admirer as well as a critic of ancient Indian traditions, social structures, and cultural heritage. Although his Complete Works consists of nine large volumes,1 it is primarily in his Thoughts on the Gita that he attempts a systematic exposition of his ideas of nationalism, national identity, and social systems. While he was deeply critical of some aspects of the Vedas, Upanisads, Puranas, Page 1 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses Mahakavyas, priest-craft and several social and political practices associated with them, he was profoundly appreciative of the Gita and its central character Krishna. Unlike many other nationalist writers, he did not write any independent commentary on the Gita. His exposition of it was primarily in the form of speeches and lectures delivered to Western audiences.
The Moral Basis The practice of interpreting the Gita for the overt purpose of extracting the ethico-moral principles necessary for the nationalist reconstruction is also evident in Vivekananda. Like his predecessors, Vivekananda too felt that the Indian nation should have an ethical foundation and its (p.91) socio-political system be adjudged on such a foundation. Hallowed texts such as the Vedas and Upanisads could be central to this nationalist project, but the central moral tenets of these texts were misinterpreted and deformed by a section of society and appropriated for the justification and validation of certain unfair and oppressive institutions such as the caste-varna systems, brahminical supremacy. These interpretations merely reinforced orthodoxy and made spirituality and salvation the exclusive right of the priestly class. For Vivekananda, the Gita is the ‘loftiest of all the ancient scriptures’, which outlines its moral philosophy as greatly appealing to popular emotions. It rejects the exclusive religion of the Vedas to make it universal and all-inclusive, particularly for those who were ignoble and marginalized in the VedicoUpanisadic morality, and establishes the weak and despised as religiously and spiritually as potent as the priestly strata. Its metaphysical basis for the equality of all individuals undermines brahminical supremacy and suggests practices that are less ritualistic and burdensome than the one suggested by the Vedas. Hence, the nationalist discourse of Vivekananda sees the Gita as providing a suitable moral basis for the Indian nation.
The Nation and the Masses Vivekananda pursues his ideas of nationalism and national identity in the context of a widely shared feeling of the cultural decline of India among educated Indians of his time. He felt that the programme of national reconstruction would be highly circumscribed if it merely insisted on the forgotten Vedic samnyasa or atmashuddi; it would also yield nothing if it simply upheld the advanced state of priestly class intellectuality and made it its central concern. At the same time it would not be wholesome to simply hold the priestly classes to scorn and attempt to bring them down to the level of frail sections of the society. India as a newly emergent nation could not afford to simply follow the model set by Western culture and civilization. It needed ethical grounding to help liberate the masses from the bonds of Vedic rituals and caste exploitation and make salvation available to everyone, thus bringing them back to Vedic religion.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses It may be pointed out here that Vivekananda did not consider nationalism, national reconstruction, or national identity as merely expressions of anticolonial consciousness. He also did not regard it as awakening of anti-brahmin consciousness, pitting the poor against the tyranny of the brahmins in history. It was for him a mission for the redemption of the poor and the lower sections of the society. In other words, it was a (p.92) conscious-creating and courageinspiring movement among the masses to make religion and salvation as accessible to them as to the brahmins. For this, he evolved two concepts—that of naranarayana and daridranarayana— from the philosophy of the Gita, which occupied a central place in his nationalist project. It also entailed a movement for reinstating the ‘original truth’ of the civilization by undermining the ceremonies, rituals, and traditions that had obscured it. This would, Vivekananda felt, make India a strong nation and spiritual guide for the world. This was the kind of nationalist project Vivekananda proposed and he found the philosophy of the Gita validating and supporting this project.
In Defence of Equality Superficially considered, Vivekananda’s reading and understanding of the Gita can well be accommodated within the same mode of ethical interpretation as that of his contemporary Tilak. His vision and approaches, however, were significantly different. Vivekananda thought that India, built on the ethical principles of the Gita, can provide an ethical lead for the world. Hence, it was a mission not merely for India but also for the larger world. Moreover, Vivekananda was not a political writer in the sense Tilak was. Tilak used the text of the Gita for political dialogues, particularly for the justification of violent struggle against the colonial administration and the establishment of selfgovernment, while Vivekananda used it for the rejuvenation of the cultural heritage of the past. For Tilak and many other karma yogic writers, the central teaching of the Gita is found in the forty-seventh sloka of the second chapter and other related slokas scattered in different chapters. Karmanyevadhikaraste ma phalesu kadacana I ma karmaphalaheturbhurma te sangostvakarmani II (2.47)
(Your authority extends only to the performance of action; the fruit is never within your authority; do not be the one who performs action with the motive that a particular fruit should be obtained, nor should you insist on non-performing action). For Vivekananda, the core of the text lies in the second chapter and related slokas in other chapters. In fact, ‘the gist or the essence of the text’, according to Vivekananda, is embedded in the second and third slokas of the second chapter (2.2, 2.3),2 which are as follows: kutastva kasmalamidam visame samupastitam I Page 3 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses anaryajustamasvargyamakirtikaramarjuna II (2.2) (p.93) klaibyam ma sma gamaha partha naitattvatyupapadyate I ksudram hrdayadaurbalyam tyaktvottista paramtapa II (2.3)
(In such a strait, whence come upon thee, O Arjuna, this dejection, unArya-like, disgraceful, and contrary to the attainment of heaven? Yield not to unmanliness, O Son of Pritha, for it does not become thee. Cast off this mean faintheartedness and arise, O scorcher of thine enemies!) Related to the above are the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth slokas in the thirteenth chapter (13.27, 13.28), which are as follows: samam sarvesu bhutesu tistantam paramesvaram I vinasyastvavinasyantam yaha pasyati sa pasyati II (13.27) samam pasyan hi sarvatra samavastitamisvaram I na hinastyatmanatmanam tato yati param gatim II (13.28)
(He who sees, the Supreme Lord dwelling equally in all beings, the Imperishable in things that perish, he sees verily. For seeing the Lord as the same, everywhere present, he does not destroy the Self by the Self, and thus he goes to the highest goal).3 By privileging these parts of the Gita, Vivekananda rejected caste and other social hierarchies. Further, it is not enough if social rankings are rejected; the masses too have to be energized just as Lord Krishna motivates Arjuna. The state of Arjuna corresponds to the state of common man. Arjuna’s dejection and retreat from the thought of war, and the questions that he raised regarding dharma, adharma, karma, kula, varnasamkara, himsa, and so on, are taken as representing the predicaments of the masses who are suffering from cowardice and want of strength. Vivekananda then tries to understand Krishna’s reply to these questions in the four slokas above as implying two things:
First, the true religious savant, jnani, should see everyone as representing the same single truth, atman, and hence not discriminate between various lives, animate or inanimate. This implied that the priestly class would have to revise its understanding of Vedic religion, atman, universe, and mukti, and change its claim that it is superior to and different from others, particularly the downtrodden sections of the society. Second, the poor should not consider themselves to be below or inferior to others, particularly the so-called ‘intellectual strata’ of the society. The brahmin is not to claim to be superior, nor should the lower classes think themselves inferior. Everyone is equal, and salvation is open to all. If people are essentially equal, there is no reason to treat some as unequal to others. For Vivekananda, the Gita, thus, professed the philosophy of egalitarianism.
(p.94) History and the Ideal Vivekananda begins his Thoughts on the Gita with the questions: ‘What is truth? And is it historical?’ In responding to the claims of Christianity that truth is historical and historicity is its only test, Vivekananda argues that truth is not Page 4 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses historical. It is universal, boundless and everlasting. Only infinity and eternity are the real tests of truth. If the Christian stands up and says, ‘My religion is a historical religion and therefore yours is wrong and ours is true’, the Mimamsaka replies, ‘Yours being historical, you confess that a man invented it nineteen hundred years ago. That which is true must be infinite and eternal. That is the one test of truth. It never decays, it is always the same. You confess your religion was created by such-andsuch a man. The Vedas were not. By no prophets or anything … Only infinite words, infinite by their very nature, from which the whole universe comes and goes’. In the abstract it is perfectly correct.4 Hence, history is neither the receptacle of universal truth nor its reflection; truth always remains above and beyond the ambit of history. For proving the universal validity of truth, historical demonstrations are unnecessary and preposterous. Vivekananda regards the truth of the Gita, too, as universal and not historical. Historical veracity and enquiries may have their meaning and relevance within the domain of historical affirmation, but they have nothing to do with the universal nature of truth. In the text of the Gita, the abiding force is its message and not history. A true bhakta, therefore, does not bother about historical accounts, and considers historical enquiries and underpinnings as mere literary devices. Vivekananda illustrates the same by citing a narrative of his own guru:
Bhagavan Ramakrishna used to tell a story of some men who went into a mango orchard and busied themselves in counting the leaves, the twigs, and the branches … and then got up a learned discussion … which were undoubtedly highly interesting to them. But one of them, more sensible than the others, did not care for all these things, and instead thereof, began to eat the mango fruit … This kind of work (counting the leaves etc.) has its proper place, but … to be a Bhakta, it is not at all necessary for you to know whether Krishna was born in Mathura or in Vraja … Say ‘Shantih, Shantih’ to their learned controversies, and let us ‘eat the mangoes’.5 Just as Vivekananda does not consider the Gita as a historical text, so he does not regard the characters in it as historical figures. For him, the relevance of these characters consists of their representation of the highest truth. Whether they were otherwise real historical personalities or symbolic or allegorical characters is of no great significance except for (p.95) historical enquiries. ‘… he does not care whether reason can or cannot prove that Christ or Buddha existed … or for the exact moment of Krishna’s birth; what he cares for is their personalities, their lovable figures’.6
Vivekananda thought that the universal value of truth did not depend upon its historical presentation. In fact, the historical mode of reasoning is quite unsuitable for establishing the ‘genuineness’ of the Gita or to admit it as an authority for ethical life. The object of the Puranas is to teach mankind the sublime truth in various forms; and even if they do not contain any historical truth, they form a great authority for us in respect of the highest truth which they inculcate Page 5 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses … Our philosophy does not depend upon any personality for its truth … It is to be noted that Christianity cannot stand without Christ, Mohammedanism without Mohammed, and Buddhism without Buddha, but Hinduism stands independent of any man … we need not consider the question whether the personages treated of therein were really material men or were fictitious characters.7 Thus, for Vivekananda, all the historical questions, including the one that presumes the Gita as having been incorporated subsequently into the Mahabharata, need not be heeded by the true religious seeker as he would regard these as inappropriate and irrelevant so long as its message is abiding. However, in the capacity of a historian, Vivekananda considered the internal designs and similarity of objectives in the Mahabharata and the Gita and argued that this suspicion was unfounded and that the Gita was certainly an undetachable part of the Mahabharata.
The special teachings of the Gita are to be found in every part of the Mahabharata, and if the Gita is to be expunged, as forming no part of it, every other portion of it which embodies the same teachings, should be similarly treated.8 To Vivekananda, then, the historical mode of reasoning was not the appropriate way to ascertain the truth of the Gita. Its truth is universal, unchanging, eternal, and transcendental and hence, cannot be found through historical debates, critical enquiries and theoretical discussions. Historical queries have their proper place in the historical domain but are inappropriate to the one which is ahistorical, universal, and abiding. Hence, they are completely worthless as sources for understanding the truth of universal character.
Vivekananda’s mode of reasoning and understanding of this part of the text seems to run along the lines as that of other nationalist writers. But unlike others, who devoted very little space to the discussion on the historicity of the text and eagerly claimed its universal, integral, and (p.96) unchanging meaning, Vivekananda attempts a historical examination of the text, its author, and characters such as Krishna and Arjuna.9 But his conclusions were the same as those of other writers—that the historical enquiries and researches have an entirely different meaning and purpose. [T]here is no connection between these historical researches and our real aim, which is the knowledge that leads to the acquirement of Dharma. Even if the historicity of the whole thing is proved to be absolutely false today, it will not in the least be any loss to us.10 Vivekananda reinforces the argument that the truly universal cannot be an object of historical or critical enquiry by giving two additional reasons. The first reason is that ancient Indian writers did not write their ‘actual names’, ‘authentic information regarding their families’, and ‘milieu’ in their literatures and tended to make them popular in generic names. He conjectured that it might have also happened in the case of the Gita.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses We know that there were many who went by the name of Veda-Vyasa; and among them who was the real author of the Gita—the Badarayana Vyasa or Dvaipayana Vyasa? ‘Vyasa’ was only a title. Anyone who composed a new Purana was known by the name of Vyasa … Gita, had not been much known to the generality of people before Samkaracharya made it famous by writing his great commentary on it … Some infer that Samkaracharya was the author of the Gita, and that it was he who foisted it into the body of the Mahabharata.11 The second reason is that in ancient Indian society there was very little concern about historical enquiries, and they did not feel it essential to prove the validity of the truth of the scriptures through historical demonstration. In its place there were tales, fables, fictions, legends, myths, and other kinds of imaginations. The Gita was composed at a time when there was little hankering for or little value assigned to historical research. Therefore, the application of the historical mode of reasoning to find the truth of scriptures such as the Gita was a preposterous act.
In ancient times there was very little tendency in our country to find out truths by historical research … imagination ran riot. And so we meet with such fantastic creations of the brain as sweet-ocean, milk-ocean, clarifiedbutter-ocean, curdocean, etc!12 Vivekananda similarly expressed his views regarding allegorical interpretations of the Gita. He did not consider allegorical debates on the text irrational or irrelevant. He himself made such attempts13 but suggested (p.97) that these might have their proper place within the bounds of intellectuality. In the final analysis they do not affect the truth.
How could there be so much discussion about Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga on the battle-field, where the huge army stood in battle array ready to fight, just waiting for the last signal? … Kurukshetra War is only an allegory. When we sum up its esoteric significance, it means the war, which is constantly going on within man between the tendencies of good and evil. This meaning, too, may not be irrational.14 The truth of the Gita, therefore, is neither historical nor allegorical; it is universal, transcendental, and everlasting. The historical and allegorical methods of reasoning would have their proper places within their respective range, but these are inadequate as ‘sources’ to understand the truth of the Gita. That is to say, irrespective of historical testimony there is a truth, which is unified. For Vivekananda, the foundations of India, as well as other societies, should be based on this truth of the Gita. This, however, need not overlook historical enquiry. But such an enquiry should be foregrounded on this truth.
What then is the use of allegorical or historical enquiries, which stirred enormous passions in the historians? Vivekananda would suggest that historical enquiries can be used to cast fables, legends, and myths anew and model them upon the truth. These fables, legends, and myths are not essential to understand the truth, but it does not mean they are totally useless. They do contain certain vague elements of truth, but they have to be recast in the mould of truth.15 The Page 7 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses texts on the life of Krishna, or the life of Buddha, or Christ, as handed down to the present day, for instance, contain an abundance of parables on the ‘original and real character’. Through the use of historical investigation, they can be deployed to reinforce the accepted life and character of Krishna and Buddha. A great many people do not believe that he (Krishna) ever existed. Some believe that (the worship of Krishna grew out of) the old sun worship. There seem to be several Krishnas: one was mentioned in the Upanisads, another was king, another a general. All have been lumped into one Krishna … The fact is, some individual comes who is unique in spirituality. Then all sorts of legends are invented around him. But, all the Bibles and stories which come to be cast upon this one person have to be recast in [the mould of] his character. All the stories of the New Testament have to be modelled upon the accepted life (and) character of Christ. In all of the Indian stories about Buddha the one central note of that whole life is kept up–sacrifice for others.16 (p.98) Hence, historical research is useful in refining folk stories and brushing aside their unnecessary accretions that surround the one central truth. The central truth in the life of Krishna is detachment or non-attachment, and the legends and tales should be made to suit this central idea. He says, ‘you must find they (fables) are all polished and manipulated to fit into the character … You find in Krishna that non-attachment is the central idea … the character of the man. Otherwise these fables could not be brought down to the one idea of non-attachment’.17
Considering that the nation is foregrounded as an ideal, reconstructing the history of the nation is important for Vivekananda. Historical researches can be of great help in throwing light on its different facets, but a nation is not the outcome of the totality of historical investigation.
The Nation and Priest-craft Vivekananda felt that Vedic truth was distorted and concealed by various superstitions, practices, and beliefs over the centuries. The universal character of Vedic truth was discredited due to institutional degeneration of all kinds by priest-craft to uphold their superiority over others, which had, in fact, no warrant in the scriptures. He admitted, too, that these could not be defended as appropriate ways of life any longer. He even devoted one of his speeches delivered in America to explain how, contrary to Vedic truth, the brahmins were brutal in exploiting the poor, that they terrorized people by imposing unfair demands in the name of traditions, and that they should expiate for their past sins. According to him, the Upanisads challenged some of these traditions and ceremonies in a significant way but the Gita emerged as a text that would reconcile the conflicting positions in the Vedas and the Upanisads.18 He argues that these superstitions, rituals, and ceremonies are blind if considered independent of ‘truth’, or developed not from the real ‘self’ but from the ‘ego’, just as fables and stories are meaningless if understood without their true relations with the central truth of the text. If traditions are practised with the Page 8 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses highest detachment by the Karmayogi, or with the object of setting an example for the ignorant, these ceremonies and rituals would no longer be ‘blind’, and could be regarded as the highest truth. Vivekananda finds such a presence in Krishna. My regard for him is for his perfect sanity. No cobwebs in that brain, no superstition. He knows the use of everything, and when it is necessary to (assign a place to each), he is there. Those that talk, go everywhere, question about the mystery of the Vedas, etc., they do not know the truth. They are no better than (p.99) frauds. There is a place in the Vedas (even) for superstition, for ignorance. The whole secret is to find out the proper place for everything.19 Vivekananda justified idol worship, or worship of different gods, for instance, on the same ground. Idol worship may be perverse in itself if it is not combined with, or detached from, absolute truth. But if it is derived from the highest realization or done as an example for the ignorant, it is as good as worshipping the imperceptible.
Even if you have knowledge, do not disturb the childlike faith of the ignorant. On the other hand, go down to their level and gradually bring them up. That is a very powerful idea, and it has become the ideal in India. That is why you can see a great philosopher going into a temple and worshipping images. It is not hypocrisy … Can’t you understand that whatever a man has in his own heart is God—even if he worships a stone? 20
Vivekananda suggested a relation between such practices and historical investigation. Historical enquiries can be used to recast all these practices, rituals, ceremonies which had come to be invented around the universal truth and to model them as accepted attributes of truth in order to avoid blind and equivocal practices. However, it would not alter the truth in any way.
Then what is the use of so much historical research, you may ask. It has its use, because we have to get at the truth … Many of the sects believe that in order to preach a good thing, which may be beneficial to many, there is no harm in telling an untruth … But our duty should be to convince ourselves of the truth, to believe in truth only. Such is the power of superstition, or faith in old traditions without inquiry into its truth, that it keeps men bound hand and foot, so much so, that even Jesus the Christ, Mohammed, and other great men believed in many such superstitions and could not shake them off. You have to keep your eye always fixed on truth only, and shun all superstitions completely.21 To Vivekananda, then, history should be employed in the service of the ideal. However, sometimes it can be used to keep the universal ideal under a veil. It should, in fact, be used to explain and qualify the anecdotes and legends that mask the ideal. In other words, historical enquiry and research should shed light on practices and processes to reinforce the ideal.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses Nishkama Karma as the Moral Foundation For Vivekananda, nishkama karma or non-attachment is the core teaching of the Bhagavadgita. It is central to the text as ‘sacrifice and love’ are central to Buddhism and ‘service and love’ to Christianity. It is based on (p.100) the belief that every action in nature produces some effects, good or bad, thus entailing bondage upon the doer. As a mode of seeking release from this bondage, the text does not advocate abstention from the worldly affairs or samnyasa, or performance of action with selfish interest. The solution does not lie either in the pursuance of seclusion or self-centred action, but in nishkama karma—working incessantly without attachment and without expecting reward. The Gita explains nishkama karma as letting karma operate naturally and ceaselessly through the soul.22 Every work must necessarily be a mixture of good and evil … good and bad are both bondages of the soul. The solution reached in the Gita in regard to this bondage-producing nature of work is that, if we do not attach ourselves to the work we do, it will not have any binding effect on our soul … This is the one central idea in the Gita; work incessantly, but be not attached to it.23 For Vivekananda, the concept of nishkama karma implies four things. First, it implies the necessity of purification of mind. As the mind is the instrumental cause for every good and bad action, its purification is the first necessity. A nishkama karmi would, therefore, control his mind from the bondage-producing external objectives and develop a proper perspective.
How to attain purity living this life? … If the mind is not under control, it is no use living in a cave because the same mind will bring all disturbances there … If the mind is under control, we can have the cave anywhere, wherever we are. It is our own mental attitude, which makes the world what it is for us. Our thoughts make things beautiful; our thoughts make things ugly … Everything in the world is good, is holy and beautiful. If you see something evil, think that you are not understanding it in the right light.24 Secondly, it suggests the purification of heart. It is through the heart that one identifies oneself with happenings in the external world. The heart is the root of ‘mineness’ and ‘thine-ness’ and hence, the basis for all kinds of attachment. A nishkama karmi would keep his heart untainted by not contemplating the results of his actions. ‘Attachment to the unreal will bring misery. There is only one Existence that is real … unattached love will not hurt you.’25
Third, nishkama karma implies the absence of passion and tenderness. Passion and tenderness are the foundations of attachment. Therefore, a nishkama karmi would perform his karma for karma’s sake, without giving way to any ‘emotionalism’ and ‘sentimentalism’. He is not a feeble person to surrender to the feelings and excitements of the external world but he will be able to master
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses them. Arjuna was not a nishkama karmi in (p.101) the sense that he was not controlled by his real self but by his emotions and sentiments. The nearer we are to (beasts and) birds, the more we are in the hells of emotion. We call it love. It is self-hypnotisation. We are under the control of our (emotions) like animals … There emotion has no place, nor sentimentalism, nor anything that belongs to the senses–only the light of pure reason. (There) man stands as spirit. Now, Arjuna is under the control of this emotionalism. He is not what he should be—a great self-controlled, enlightened sage working through the eternal light of reason. He has become like an animal, like a baby, just letting his heart carry away his brain, making a fool of himself and trying to cover his weakness with the flowery names of ‘love’ and so on.26 Lastly, nishkama karma also implies the concentration of one’s full energy on work. A nishkama karmi would work with concentration and a steady mind. It is concentration that nullifies the ‘self-ego’ and ‘attachment’ and makes a man’s full energy completely focused on action. Hence, Vivekananda regarded this as the most important aspect of nishkama karma.
Gita teaches Karma-Yoga. We should work through Yoga (concentration). In such concentration in action (Karma-Yoga), there is no consciousness of the lower ego present … If the painter, losing the consciousness of his ego, becomes completely immersed in his painting, he will be able to produce masterpieces … The Gita teaches that all works should be done thus. He who is one with the Lord through Yoga performs all his works by becoming immersed in concentration, and does not seek any personal benefit. Such a performance of work brings only good to the world, no evil can come out of it. Those who work thus never do anything for themselves.27 To Vivekananda, then, actions done continuously and tirelessly with a pure mind and untainted heart, with one’s full energy concentrated on the means without attachment to the self, and regarding God as the source of everything is the nishkama karma of the Gita. This has great implications for the nation. In a nation, masses that are equal in a profound sense would regulate their lives and their mutual relations on this foundation. In its application to politics and society, nishkama karma, however, has a wider meaning and objectives.
Nishkama Karma and Priest-craft Vivekananda viewed nishkama karma in the text as directed against priest-craft and specifically against brahminism and their religious practices. In different speeches delivered in the West and various parts of (p.102) India, Vivekananda criticized priest-craft for its repressive and inhuman exploitation of the poor in the name of religion. In one of his speeches delivered in San Francisco, he argued that the Vedico-Upanisadic religion, which was originally pure and universal, was subsequently made elitist by priest-craft, keeping it at a great distance from the masses and making it the privilege of a small minority. To maintain this privileged position they applied an extremely rigid attitude Page 11 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses towards the seekers of spirituality by fabricating or imposing rituals, and declaring that salvation was the monopoly of a few and that the path of karma with its culmination in jnana, bhakti and Brahmanirvana was not equally open to every human being in society. To validate this discrimination further, they allocated a higher position to the ‘learned’ and rigidified social divisions. Hence, priest-craft was responsible for making religion and salvation as difficult as possible for the poor and the marginalized, an excluding them from spiritual quest.28 On another occasion, too, he expressed the same opinion. Why, you priest-class never let the non-Brahmin classes read the Vedas and Vedanta and all such weighty Sastras—never touch them even. You have only kept them down. It is you who have always done like that through selfishness. It was the Brahmins who made a monopoly of the religious books and kept the question of sanction and prohibition in their own hands. And repeatedly calling the other races of India low and vile, they put this belief into their heads that they were really such. If you tell a man, ‘You are low, you are vile’, in season and out of season, then he is bound to believe in course of time that he is really such. This is called hypnotism.29 For Vivekananda, nishkama karma avowed by the Gita does not make religion the privilege of the few. It is, in fact, directed against vested interests such as the priestly classes. Against the monopolization of the Vedic religion by priest-craft, it attempts to democratize religious participation and ethical pursuits. Hence, it aims to achieve a double purpose of exterminating rituals and ceremonies and universalizing the Vedic religion.
The Upanisads were in the hands of the Samnyasin (Rahasya, esoteric); he went into the forest! Samkara was a little kind and said even Grihasthas (householders) may study the Upanisads … But still the idea is that the Upanisads talked only of the forest life of the recluse … the authoritative commentary on the Vedas, has been made … by Krishna in the Gita … These conceptions of the Vedanta must come out, must remain not only in the forest … cave, but … to work at the bar and the bench, in the pulpit, and in the cottage of the poor man, (p.103) with the fishermen that are catching fish, and with the students that are studying. They call to every man, woman and child whatever be their occupation, wherever they may be.30 Nishkama karma suggests that the religion of the brahmins does not consist of criticizing the poor and the weak or assuming themselves to be a standard for the poor in their religious performances and seekings. It lies in providing service to the ordinary masses that have no access to the Vedas and the Upanisads.
Because it is good for you, do not jump to the conclusion that your method is everybody’s method, that Jack’s coat fits John and Mary. All the uneducated, uncultured, unthinking men and women have been put into that sort of strait jacket! … What rights have you to say that this man’s method is wrong? … says Krishna, if you have knowledge and see a man Page 12 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses weak, do not condemn him. Go to his level and help him if you can. He must grow.31 Nishkama karma calls for a change in the attitude of the brahmins towards religion and towards the masses and asks them to re-orient their religion to make the service to the poor and the low its central thrust.
[A] large majority of the human race who cannot come up to the ideal … the highest position to take is to be sympathetic and helpful to those who are weak … to look around, stretch out a helping hand to the weak and bring them up.32 Nishkama karma, therefore, does not provide privileges to anybody in ethico-religious pursuits. It asks the brahmins to cleanse their heart and mind, to work with concentration and come out of their self-centred and egoistic religion to place themselves in the service of the poor. It rejects the claims of the brahmins that they represent a higher and superior truth than others and negates class divisions as decisive in seeking spirituality. It states that if the brahmins claim that they have better access to truth, the only way they can defend their claim is by helping others pursue the truth.
It is interesting to compare Vivekananda’s understanding of this part of the Gita with Tilak’s commentary in the Gita Rahasya. For Tilak, society basically consists of two kinds of individuals—one possessing weak reason and the other possessing mental strength. It is the responsibility of the strong-minded, the sthitaprajnas, who are well versed in religion, and whose moral practices have an epistemic foundation, to guide and lead the masses. Therefore, the nation is going to be led by the sthitaprajnas, a new brahmin class. Unlike Tilak, Vivekananda completely underplayed the concept of the sthitaprajna that dominates the Gita Rahasya. On the (p.104) contrary, Vivekananda considered everyone as equal. Those who consider themselves as savants have to prove their claim by putting into practice the ethics of the Gita.
A Doctrine for the Masses Vivekananda argued that the doctrine of nishkama karma pays greater attention to the masses, particularly the poor in the society. He felt that the ancient scriptures such as the Vedas and Upanisads were more concerned with ethics and morals rather than the economic life of the masses. The application of these morals to society by priest-craft, in fact, worsened the position of the poor. But the success of any religious system largely depends on its economic concerns and policies and programmes for the poor. There runs an economic struggle through every religious struggle. This animal called man has some religious influence, but he is guided by economy. Individuals are guided by something else, but the mass of mankind never made a move unless economy was involved … Whenever any religion succeeds, it must have economic value. Thousands of similar sects will be struggling for power, but only those who meet the real Page 13 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses economic problem will have it. Man is guided by the stomach. He walks and the stomach goes first and the head afterwards … For the religion of the Upanisads to be popularized was a hard task. Very little economy is there, but tremendous altruism.33 Vivekananda suggested that the Gita put greater emphasis on economic concerns as central to religion. It overturned the spiritual and altruistic religion of the Vedas into an economic religion through the concept of daridranarayana34. For the Gita, the highest religion does not lie in samnyasa or worshipping various gods in the form of idols or in following the priestly version of the Vedic religion. The highest truth lies in nishkama karma, service of the poor. Therefore, it called on its followers to worship ‘daridra’ as ‘narayana’ and seek transcendence in their service. However, this service does not consist of just providing temporary relief to their problems; they need to be addressed religiously.
Go on and work, without any sorrow, without any misery. See His play in the slums, in the saloons! Work to lift people! Not that they are vile or degraded; Krishna does not say that … My lady goes to the slum … She gives a few ducats and says, ‘My poor men, take that and be happy!’ Or my fine woman, walking through the street, sees a poor fellow and throws him five cents. Think of the blasphemy of it! … Serve the living God! God comes to you in the blind, in the halt, in the poor, in the weak, in the diabolical. What a glorious chance for you to worship!35 (p.105) It is through the philosophy of nishkama karma that Krishna shows his concern for redeeming the fallen, whom the Vedic texts had ignored. Hence, for Vivekananda, Krishna qualifies as a universal God. ‘Shri Krishna is the God of the poor, the beggar, the sinner, the son, the father, the wife, and of everyone. He enters intimately into all our human relations … He is the God who … reveals himself to the ignorant and the children.’36
Not only does the Gita make religion accessible to the poor, but it extends an immense psychological and moral support to the weaker sections of the society. Vivekananda regarded Arjuna’s weakness, dejection, and timidity as expressions of the ‘weakness’ of the marginalized and Krishna’s repeated exhortation as an expression of this psychological and moral support. Krishna did not lambast Arjuna for his cowardice, ignorance, and occasional irrelevant questions and gradually persuaded him to believe that he would not be a sinner if he participated in war. He shows that the poor, the women, the weak, the sudras, or those who suffer from want of courage are not to be suppressed or humiliated, rather they are to be inspired towards the right path. Hence, the highest religion consists not in decrying the poor but in making earnest attempts to draw their attention to the right path.37 [I]t was not that the disinclination of Arjuna to fight arose out of the overwhelming predominance of pure Sattva Guna (quality); it was all Tamas that brought on this unwillingness … Arjuna was afraid, he was overwhelmed with pity … In order to remove this delusion … what did the Page 14 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses Bhagavan say? … you should not decry a man by calling him a sinner, but that you should draw his attention to the omnipotent power that is in him, in the same way does the Bhagavan speak to Arjuna. ‘Nai tat tvayy upapadyate’–‘It doth not befit thee!’ ‘Thou art Atman imperishable, beyond all evil. Having forgotten thy real nature, thou hast, by thinking thyself a sinner, as one afflicted with bodily evils and mental grief, thou hast made thyself so—this doth not befit thee!’ … Shake off this weakness, this faintheartedness!38 Vivekananda regards this aspect of nishkama karma as the future course of his mission, and appeals to his ‘fellow young persons who decided to take brahmacharya and samnyasa’39 to propagate and fulfill this teaching of the text across the world.
If you, my sons, can proclaim this message to the world–klaibyam ma sma gamah partha nai tat tvayy upapadyate—then all this disease, grief, sin and sorrow will vanish … go to the mouth of the cannon, fear not. Hate not the most abject sinner, look not to his exterior. Turn thy gaze inward, where resides the Paramatman. Proclaim to the whole world with trumpet voice, “There is no sin in thee, there is (p.106) no misery in thee; thou art the reservoir of omnipotent power. Arise, awake, and manifest the Divinity within!”40 It is worth noting here that nishkama karma emphasizes the economic aspect of religion and insists that the poor and lowly come out of their ‘weakness’ and realize the universal truth. What is really creditable is that the Gita analyzes the economic conditions of the people while reconsidering Vedic religions, which paid scant attention to this aspect of life. In doing so, it suggests new concerns for the ‘spiritual’ duties of the priestly class. For Vivekananda, the Indian nation is to be reconstructed on this economic foundation of the Gita religion.
Nishkama Karma and Naranarayana For Vivekananda, the doctrine of nishkama karma upholds the universal essence of human beings, thereby proclaiming the equality of all. Each individual, whether poor or weak, learned or brahmin, woman or sudra, represents the same essence. Vivekananda considered this as the central meaning of nishkama karma, irrespective of differences in interpretation and understanding this reality. [L]et every man and woman and child, without respect of caste or birth, weakness or strength, hear and learn that behind the strong and the weak, behind the high and the low, behind everyone, there is that Infinite Soul, assuring the infinite possibility and the infinite capacity of all to become great and good … Too much of inactivity … weakness … hypnotism has been and is upon our race … Teach yourselves, teach everyone his real nature, … Power will come … if there is anything in the Gita that I like, it is these two verses, coming out strong as the very gist, the very essence of Krishna’s teaching—He who sees the Supreme Lord dwelling alike in all beings, the Imperishable in things that perish, he sees indeed. For seeing Page 15 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses the Lord as the same, everywhere present, he does not destroy the Self by the Self, and thus he goes to the highest goal.41 As there are differences in understanding this reality, nishkama karma favours mutual compassion between those who are intellectually, ethically, and economically strong and the poor, who need them the most. The weak need to follow the path of the learned, receiving guidance from them. But both need to believe that ‘neither is giving’, ‘nor is receiving’, as both represent the same truth. The ‘giver of service’ is not to arrogate for himself a superior position. ‘The moment you think you are “helping”, you undo the whole thing and degrade yourself’.42 The ‘receiver of service’, too, is not to identify himself in his receiving. ‘Do not seek help from any one. We are our own help. If we cannot help ourselves, there is none to help us’.43 Identification of oneself in one’s actions implies the presence (p.107) of self-ego. Nishkama karma calls upon people to outgrow self-directed and egoistic actions.
Nishkama Karma and the Varna System Vivekananda felt that the pursuit of nishkama karma does not confine itself to any one section of the society but is accessible to everyone— brahmin, kshatriya, vaishya and sudra. In other words, it does not circumscribe itself to the castevarna divisions as it can be done from any station in life. It gives the pristine Vedico-Upanisadic religion a strong popular appeal. … the Advaita, was its being worked out so long on the spiritual plane only … time has come when you have to make it practical. It shall no more be a Rahasya, a secret, it shall no more live with monks in caves and forests, and in the Himalayas; it must come down to the daily, everyday life of the people … in the cottage of the poor, by the beggar in the street … Therefore do not fear whether you are a woman or a Sudra, for this religion is so great, says Lord Krishna, that even a little of it brings a great amount of good.44 For him, Krishna, through nishkama karma, was the first, long before Buddha and Christ, to open the door of religion to men and women of all sections of society and make salvation for ordinary men as easy as possible on their own grounds. ‘His was the first heart that was large enough to see truth in all, his the first lips that uttered beautiful words for each and all.45
Nishkama Karma and the Diversity of Religious Pursuits Nishkama karma recognizes the diversity of religious pursuits. In his speech delivered in California, on 1 April 1900, Vivekananda argued that given the fact that people with low reason or ordinary intelligence fail to grasp the subtle Vedic religion, the Gita pronounced diversity of practices, traditions, beliefs, ceremonies, rituals, and so on as primary steps in religious seeking. Of course, these are not regarded as the highest achievement, or equated with the ‘highest truth’, but the Gita does not denounce them altogether as irrelevant. It provides for these practices a proper place within the larger religion and considers them as ‘touching the primary “layers” of the highest truth’.46 Vivekananda regarded
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses the Gita’s statement that ‘every method has its own merit’ as part of nishkama karma and its criticism by the priestly class as biased. Krishna saw plainly through the vanity of all the mummeries, mockeries, and ceremonials of the old priests; and yet he saw some good in them … Everyone (p.108) says, ‘Woe unto you people!’ Who says, ‘Woe unto me that I cannot help you?’ The people are doing all right to the best of their ability … the ceremonials, worship of gods, and myths, are all right, Krishna says … all these are links in the chain … Get hold of any one of these chains that are stretched out from the common centre … Blame no view of religion so far as it is sincere. Hold on to one of these links, and it will pull you to the centre.47 The Gita does not simply dismiss various kinds of bhakti practices or the worship of different gods or even the worship of the Supreme One for material gain. It concedes that different human beings have different needs in their specific circumstances. Therefore, it endorses all these practices as a concession to the realities of human differences.
Various sorts of worship we see in this world. The sick man is very worshipful to God … There is the man who loses his fortune; he also prays very much, to get money. The highest worship is that of the man who loves God for God’s sake … The other (types of worship) are lower-grade; but Krishna has no condemnation for anything. It is better to do something than to stand still. The man who begins to worship God will grow by degrees and begin to love God for love’s sake.48 Further, nishkama karma does not adopt a rigid attitude towards the pursuers of a diversity of religious ways. It acknowledges their chosen mode of worship, according to their ability and faculty. Accepting differences in human nature, interest, reason, and ability to understand the highest truth, it adopts an extremely liberal attitude and relates itself with one’s svabhava.49
How hard it is to arrive at … non-attachment! Therefore Krishna shows us the lower ways and methods. The easiest way for everyone is to do his or her work and not take the results … If you are strong, take up the Vedanta philosophy … If you cannot do that, worship God; if not, worship some image. If you lack strength even to do that, do some good works without the idea of gain. Offer everything you have unto the service of the Lord … If you cannot do anything … then take refuge in the Lord … Do thou with all thy soul and heart take refuge in Him.50 Thus, nishkama karma as an ethic does not try to streamline, homogenize, and hierarchize. It does not prescribe strict religious or spiritual doctrines, but adopts flexibility in religious pursuits. It believes in ‘the greatness of little things’. It believes that non-attachment characterizes all such pursuits and efforts of individuals.51
In another speech given in San Francisco on 29 May 1900, two months after his speech in California, Vivekananda further clarified the (p.109) Gita’s assertion: Page 17 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses ‘Nothing is lost in this world. Whatever one does, that remains as one’s own’. Vivekananda’s understanding of this part of the Gita is that any sincere and selfinformed action, whether it followed the method of karma, jnana, or bhakti, would ultimately be a gain in the religious persuasion. ‘Whatever path we follow with devotion, must take us to freedom … lay hold of one link of the chain and the whole must come after it by degrees’.52 The highest forms of desireless karma, jnana, and bhakti are not easy to attain for ordinary people, but in due course their acts would purify their motives, and to that extent they are virtuous (sukrtino). Their actions can be inferior to nishkama karma in its highest form, individuals and their actions are not to be judged by the highest standards of nishkama karma but according to their own temperament or svabhava. In other words, the highest is not the standard by which the whole universe is to be judged.53 Further, even if these efforts are not sincere and meticulous, mere condescension or criticism would not help. The duty of the one who has achieved the highest realization is to become an example to others and lead them to the true path in accordance with their svabhavas. ‘One should not unsettle the understanding of the ignorant, attached to action by teaching them Jnana; the wise man, himself steadily acting, should engage the ignorant in all work’.54 The svabhava of the highest nishkama karmi lies in showing sympathy and being helpful to the weak and not ignoring their actions on social substandards. Vivekananda cited here the instance of the unethical action of stealing. Stealing is regarded as legally unjustifiable and ethically depraved in every social order, and the thief would be punished for his wrongdoings according to the prevailing social law. However, from the point of view of nishkama karma, such a punishment is wrong. Effective action lies not in castigating the thief according to the social law, but in making him realize the self and understand the unethicality of his action. If the priestly classes merely condemn the wrongdoer in order to maintain their superior position, they would have to suffer for their karma as the thief does.55 All societies are based upon bad generalization. The law can only be formed upon perfect generalization … There is a man stealing there. Why does he steal? You punish him. Why can you not make room for him and put his energy to work? … You say, ‘You are a sinner’, and many will say he has broken the law … We call upon the gods to save us and nobody blames himself. That is the pity of it … ‘None, O Arjuna, can swerve from my path’ … We have to go through all this Maya. God made the heaven, and man made the hell for himself.56 (p.110) To Vivekananda, then, nishkama karma considers every pursuit as virtually good. It upholds pluralism and individual freedom in religious attainment and selfdevelopment. It implies that every religion has its relevance in so far as it helps access
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses the divine. Rather than follow a standard, people may pursue different avocations according to their powers and resources. Resources and supports should be made available to them so that they can realize their fullest self-development in accordance with their powers. If some people believe that their avocations are best for them, they should not be condemned but helped to pursue them.
Nishkama Karma and Organized Religions Nishkama karma does not respect organized religions, as they indiscriminately impose their rigid doctrines and socio-religious practices on their followers. Nishkama karma maintains that the imposition by organized religions of certain fixed religious practices, beliefs, ceremonies, and rituals uniformly without taking into account any heterogeneity in religious pursuits is irrational. For the Gita, religion does not consist of dogmas, principles, values, and standards that can be universally applied. It believes that nishkama karma is a process of evolution of one’s temperament; a process of realizing one’s self, hence it is deeply individual-centred. [R]eligion is a (matter of) growth, not a mass of foolish words … Does what Moses did when he saw God save you? No man’s seeing God can help you the least bit except that it may excite you and urge you to do the same thing. That is the whole value of the ancients’ examples … signposts on the way. No man’s eating can satisfy another man. No man’s seeing God can save another man … All these people fighting about what God’s nature is— whether He has three heads in one body or five heads in six bodies … What fools we mortals be! Sure, lunatics!57 Organized religions may be useful when man’s journey towards spirituality is in an embryonic stage, but thereafter they serve no good purpose. ‘Churches, doctrines, forms—these are merely the hedges to protect the tender plant of religion; but later on they must all be broken down, that the little plant may become a tree. So the various religious sects, Bibles, Vedas and Scriptures are just ‘tubs’ for the little plant; but it has to get out of the tub and fill the world’.58 Man, therefore, would have to sever his relations with them and go beyond their compelling obligations. Doctrines, dogmas, rituals, ceremonies that gradually evolved and got associated with the truth and imposed themselves on the weak in the form of organized religions are no better than religious persecution. For Vivekananda, the religion of nishkama karma breaks down the rigidities (p.111) of organized religions and puts an end to persecution in the name of the absolute truth.
What do you mean by ‘saving people’ and all believing in the same doctrine? It cannot be … Enter not the door of any organized religion. (Religion) is only between you and your God, and no third person must come between you. Think what these organized religions have done! What Napoleon was more terrible than those religious persecutions? … If you and I organize, we begin to hate every person. It is better not to love, if loving only means hating others … If loving your own people means hating everybody else, it is the quintessence of selfishness and brutality, and the
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses effect is that it will make you brutes. Therefore, better die working out your own natural religion …59 For Vivekananda organized religions are not indispensable to the pursuit of nishkama karma and the latter is not reducible to organized religions. Nishkama karma believes in the universal character of human beings, which is ‘beyond all time and space’, it does not divide people on religious lines. However, organized religions are useful when persons’ religious seekings are nascent but would have to be deserted when they grow to understand the universal truth. Constructing the Indian nation on a specific system of religion is inconsistent with the universal character of nishkama karma.
Nishkama Karma and Vedic Ritualism Vivekananda said that a nishkama karmi who has attained the highest state would not let ego motivate his actions. In fact, his actions would be guided by love, selflessness, and a sense of duty. He would not be a sentimental or emotional jnani; he is a Krishna with the qualities of ‘wonderful samnyasin and householder in one’60. However, in the Vedas, every action was based on ego and motive61, the motive being the achievement of purusartha, which was regarded as the highest religion. For nishkama karma, the highest cannot be realized without giving up one’s ego and self. Hence, it contests and rejects Vedic ritualism and asks its adherents to serve no selfish motive through their actions. For the rule with regard to a seeker of the Atman is that he should undergo spiritual practice, but have no eye to its results. It follows thence that these practices are simply the cause of the purification of the aspirant’s mind. For if the Atman could be directly realized as a result of these practices, then scriptures would not have enjoined on the aspirant to give up the results of work. So it is with a view to combating the PurvaMimamsa doctrine of work with motive producing results that the philosophy of work without motive has been set forth in the Gita.62 (p.112) For Vivekananda, the objections raised by European philosophy—that it is not possible to perform actions in the absence of self-ego, as actions require motives and objectives—is based on ignorance. The Gita not only argues against the Vedic conception of karma—that action is possible in the absence of self-ego—but considers it as the whole secret of nishkama karma. The life of Buddha represents this truth. ‘They have never seen unselfish work except under the influence of fanaticism, and, therefore, they speak in that way … one man who actually carried this teaching of Karma-Yoga … is Buddha. He is the one man who ever carried this into perfect practice’.63
However, work without motive does not imply that the doer will be untouched by pain and pleasure or unmoved by external activities. It only means that he has denounced self-interest, self-ego, and desire for a higher purpose. What is the meaning of working without motive? Nowadays many understand it in the sense that one is to work in such a way that neither pleasure nor pain touches his mind … Robbers ruin other people by robbing them of their possessions; but if they feel quite callous to pleasure Page 20 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses or pain, then they also would be working without motive … If such be the significance of working without a motive, then a fearful doctrine has been put forth by the preaching of the Gita … if we look into the lives of those who were connected with the preaching of the Gita, we should find them living quite a different life. Arjuna killed Bhishma and Drona in battle, but withal, he sacrificed all his self-interest and desires and his lower self millions of times.64 Nishkama karma does not suggest a ‘purposeless act’, since the individuals would serve the purpose of duty and welfare of all. Further, desireless karma would not indicate selfish or animal-like indifference. It implies an active and self-sacrificing love without the least sense of ego, consciously working for the loksamgraha, welfare of all, with complete knowledge of the Lord and his representation in human beings (atmic knowledge).
People nowadays understand … being unattached is to become purposeless … Many others, again, give the example of Janaka … Janaka did not acquire that distinction by bringing forth children … The true Nishkama Karmi (performer of work without desire) is neither to be like a brute, nor to be inert, nor heartless. He is not Tamasika but of pure Sattva. His heart is so full of love and sympathy that he can embrace the whole world with his love. The world at large cannot generally comprehend his all-embracing love and sympathy. The reconciliation of the different paths of Dharma, and work without desire or attachment–these are the two special characteristics of the Gita.65 (p.113) To Vivekananda, then, non-attachment is neither disinterestedness nor purposelessness. It denotes only the absence of self and motive in actions. It does not suggest physical renunciation; it calls for active engagement with the world. In the pursuit of nishkama karma, emotions and passions are not undermined or given up but energized and activated. Vivekananda calls for a joyous and full life. There is an active civil society implicit in the optimistic vision that Vivekananda outlines.
Nishkama Karma and Non-violence For Vivekananda, the central teaching of the Gita does not distinguish between actions as long as they are directed from the self and aimed to achieve universal welfare. Hence, nishkama karma, in its highest state, is indiscriminate regarding violent or not-violent actions. The basic argument is that the result of every action involves a mix of both good and evil. There is no good action without evil consequences; there is no bad action that has no good results. The performance of good action naturally involves the destruction of evil forces; the restoration of dharma, therefore, embraces the destruction of evil elements. The nishkama karmi performs every action, violent or non-violent, selflessly and egolessly with all knowledge and concentration and hence, he is not affected by it, as he engages in such action for the good of the world. Even if the individual is at a lower spiritual level, the criterion for judging the ethicality of his actions is ‘whether they make him move God-ward or not’. ‘Any action that makes us go God-ward is a good action, and is our duty; any action that makes us go Page 21 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses downward is evil, and is not our duty’66. Arjuna’s killing of Bhishma and Drona, Krishna’s killing of Kamsa, Jarasandha, and others were part of such pursuits, nishkama karma. The result of every work is mixed with good and evil … Like smoke round the fire, some evil always clings to work. We should engage in such works as bring the largest amount of good and the smallest measure of evil. Arjuna killed Bhishma and Drona; if this had not been done Duryodhana could not have been conquered, the force of evil would have triumphed over the force of good … We are reading the Gita by candle-light, but numbers of insects are being burnt to death … Those who work without any consciousness of their lower ego are not affected with evil, for they work for the good of the world … This secret of Karma-Yoga is taught by the Lord Shri Krishna in the Gita.67 If the actions are based on tamasika quality, that is, directed to fulfil selfish interests and not drafted to achieve the highest, they are not considered virtuous but depraved by the text. ‘Even forgiveness, if weak and passive, (p.114) is not true; fight is better’68. Arjuna’s claim at the beginning of the war that ‘non-resistance is better than resistance’ was based on selfish compassion and not on the highest sattva.
Vivekananda seems to admit that violence, at least at the microscopic level, is an integral part of the universal construction. Nishkama karma is outlined to lessen the effects of such actions by placing them in the arena of ethics and allowing only the nishkama karmi to be involved in such actions. Later, Aurobindo was to develop this argument in his own characteristic way.
Nishkama Karma and Conflicting Religions Apart from the damage inflicted by the priestly classes, one of the major reasons that Vivekananda thought was responsible for the unpopularity of the Vedic religion among major sections of the Indian society was the conflict with regard to central concepts such as belief in God and Universe, and their relations—the notions of karma, jnana, bhakti, theory of incarnation, and so on, outlined in the Vedas. In a series of lectures delivered in San Francisco and many places in India, Vivekananda argued that this was the central reason that not only divided Hinduism deeply but prevented it from becoming a religion of universal appeal. Therefore, for the reconstruction of India, there was an imperative need to unite the different sects and restore Vedic religion to its original form. This concern was to occupy a central place in his considerations on modern India and found great support in the Gita. For Vivekananda, the Gita, through its philosophy of non-attachment, attempts to harmonize several ideas, elements, and institutions of the Vedic religion that were deeply divided earlier. Its attempt at reconciling all the dissonant elements is the ‘original contribution of the Gita, which distinguishes it from all other preceding scriptures’69.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses First, the nishkama karma reconciles the differences between the karma-kanda and the jnana-kanda of the Vedic religion regarding the nature of God, the concept of karma, the relevance of animal sacrifice, and importance of rituals, ceremonies, and so on. Further, it reconciles a life of enjoyment with its renunciation70. It upholds the karma-kanda of the Vedanta but considers motivebased action as of a lower kind; it sustains the jnana-kanda too but discards its view on abdicating the material world. It advances a philosophy that ‘a man can attain perfection, the highest goal, sitting on a throne, commanding armies, working out big plans for nations’71. (p.115) When the Gita was first preached, there was then going on a great controversy between two sects. One party considered the Vedic Yajnas and animal sacrifices and such like karmas to constitute the whole of religion. The other preached that the killing of numberless horses and cattle can not be called religion … latter … were mostly Samnyasins and followers of Jnana. They believed that the giving up of all work and the gaining of the knowledge of the Self was the only path to Moksha. By the preaching of His great doctrine of work without motive … the Gita set at rest the disputes of these two antagonistic sects.72 Secondly, the Gita harmonizes different Vedic ideas, ceremonies, rituals, and legends. It unites idol worship, for instance, by relating it to the highest universal God. It finds a unity in the worship of different gods by regarding it as a concession to the varying nature of individuals. It fills the gap between the brahmins and sudras by making spiritual salvation lie in working for the sudras and considering suffering in the service of one’s fellow men, especially the poor, as a far more effective way of realizing the highest truth. It makes dharma a concept of losing oneself in the active service of mankind. It also regards yajna as continuous offering of one’s entire life at the altar of mankind. It admits all beliefs and practices of the Vedas and the Upanisads but considers only those that have a perennial significance as constituting the core of religion; and its purpose is to ‘find out the proper place for everything.’73
Third, and perhaps the most important, nishkama karma brings together the conflicting paths of karma, jnana and bhakti. Wherein lies the originality of the Gita, which distinguishes it from all preceding scriptures? It is this: Though before its advent, Yoga, Jnana, Bhakti, etc. had each its strong adherents, they all quarrelled among themselves, each claiming superiority for his own chosen path; no one ever tried to seek for reconciliation among these different paths. It was the author of the Gita who for the first time tried to harmonize these. He took the best from what all the sects then existing had to offer, and threaded them in the Gita.74 While the Gita mediated antagonistic elements and claims within Vedic religions, the philosophy of nishkama karma also made it more acceptable to later religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. Vivekananda felt that the teachings of the Gita, Buddhist writings, and the Bible were different attempts to redeem and enlighten human beings. Page 23 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses There are a great many similarities in the teachings of the New Testament and the Gita. The human thought goes the same way … I will find you the answer in the words of Krishna himself: ‘Whenever virtue subsides and irreligion prevails, I (p.116) come down. Again and again I come. Therefore, whenever thou seest a great soul struggling to uplift mankind, know that I am come, and worship … ’75 Further, Vivekananda found close similarities between saints and savants of the Vedic religion and those of other religions. This is particularly the case between Krishna, Buddha, and Jesus Christ.
There are in other great books, sermons on love—as with Buddha, as with Jesus … There is a great deal of similarity between the lives of Jesus and Krishna … There was the tyrannical king in both places. Both were born in a manger. The parents were bound in both cases. Both were saved by angels. In both cases all the boys born that year were killed. The childhood is the same … Again, in the end, both were killed. Krishna was killed by accident; he took the man who killed him to heaven. Christ was killed, and blessed the robber and took him to heaven.76 It will be noticed that Vivekananda regarded the Gita as a text that reconciles the Vedas and Upanisads, and other ideas, practices, and institutions that spread across the different literatures preceding it. It also shows agreement with other dominant religions of the world, particularly Christianity and Buddhism. All ideas and practices, which are regarded as insignificant or contradictory to the highest truth, are accommodated within its wider ambit. It makes religion accessible to everyone—high, low, meek, women and sudras. Nishkama karma in the text, hence, provides a bridgehead to diverse religions and religious practices. These Vedantic principles in the Gita, Vivekananda felt, could become the principles of an active regeneration for India as well as the world.
The Guiding Principle for the World Through the Gita, Vivekananda aimed to rejuvenate Indian society, institutions, and prevalent beliefs and practices. He thought that the doctrine of nishkama karma in the Gita would become the central guiding principle for the nation. Nishkama karma does not uphold self-oriented and egoistic actions; in fact, it calls upon people to outgrow all such partisan interests. The doctrines of nonattachment and non-expectation of rewards for one’s action, Vivekananda believed, would reinforce concerns for the poor and the lowly. However, nishkama karma is not confined to any one station in life; it is not the privilege of a few. Equality of consideration is inherent in its very expression. Vivekananda believed that the Gita sharply undermines inequality and upholds egalitarianism. He found a metaphysical basis for equality in the association of the atman with Brahman. Mere assertion of (p.117) egalitarianism, however, is not enough; there is need for pro-active action to translate such egalitarianism
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses into practice. Vivekananda’s concepts of naranarayana and daridranarayana embody these concepts very powerfully. The Gita does not outline a national morality merely for India but has a message for the whole world. Vivekananda does not privilege national bonds unduly. According to him, superior spiritual insights and better reasons should qualify one’s allegiance to one’s nation. Indians could be truly proud of their heritage because it had been infused with teachings such as those of the Gita. It is this tremendous pride and confidence in our heritage that enabled him to be critical of the Vedas and be appreciative of other cultures. Vivekananda adopted a very radical stance with respect to the role and place of the common people in the nation. There is no superior or inferior as far as the atman is concerned. He decried priesthood and their ritualism, which held the masses in subjugation. He argued that those who are superior need to prove their superiority through service towards those below them. Their claim becomes legitimate to the extent that it elevates those below them towards their authentic strivings. In short, those who are superior are trustees of those below them. For Vivekananda there is an ideal to be pursued irrespective of its historical manifestation. The ideal, therefore, is irreducible to history. The foundation of India as well as other societies should be based on this ideal. This need not, however, sideline historical enquiries. History should always be in the service of the ideal and historical enquiries should be employed to critique practices and processes in past and present societies. Further, Vivekananda laid a strong stress on rational enquiry. However, as in the case of historical investigation, so too in the case of rational enquiry, there are limits. These limits are set by the supreme ideal of self-realization. The philosophy of non-attachment is distinguished from disinterestedness. It asks people to be engaged with rather than retreat from the world. Emotions and passions do energize non-attachment. It does not try to streamline, homogenize, and hierarchize; it lets different pursuits thrive. It only demands that actions be characterized with the quality of non-attachment. This kind of reading of the Gita suggests a joyous, active, and full life. Vivekananda decries poverty and the degradation that it brings about in no uncertain terms. He felt the Vedantic principle could become the principle for an active regeneration of India as well as the world. Similarly, the kind of engagement that Vivekananda called for (p.118) made him underplay the notion of the sthitaprajna in a striking way. He felt that it betrayed elitism and there was a patronizing air about it. He also felt that the concept was inward-looking and not positively oriented towards engagement with the world.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses Vivekananda also came to avow very strongly the freedom of religion. Every religion has its relevance and in its own way enables access to the divine. Vivekananda did not display any patronizing tolerance of other beliefs but called for inter-religious dialogue to enable their adherents in their search for the divine. Vivekananda envisaged the possibility of India being the spiritual teacher of the world. The Gita could be the foundation of a universal morality. In making these claims, he recognized that there is ultimately one truth. However, everyone has to pursue that truth in his way and with the resources available. Those who claim to have better access to truth can defend their claim only by helping others to pursue the truth, which they recognize as such. Notes:
(1.) The Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, first published The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda in four volumes, as the Mayavati Memorial Edition, in 1907. Subsequently, these were published in eight volumes in 1951. It was only in 1997 that the ninth volume was published. The present study is based on The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Mayavati, Advaita Ashrama, 1995 (twenty-first reprint) (hereafter CWSV), and Thoughts on the Gita, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1996 (sixteenth impression) (hereafter Thoughts). (2.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 107–10. Although in his lectures Vivekananda also mentions slokas from other chapters, especially the third, fourth, and fifth, he views them as only further strengthening the meaning of the above stated slokas of the second chapter. (3.) ‘The Mission of the Vedanta’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 193–4. While criticizing the priestly class for ‘hypnotizing the poor’, Vivekananda argues that the religion of the former has no warrant in the Gita. For such a criticism, he uses the meaning of the above two verses, which see every life in the universe as equal. In his Thoughts on the Gita, it is stated that he had picked up these meanings from the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth slokas of the thirteenth chapter of the text. But closer observation would also suggest that there is a word-by-word repetition of the words used in the slokas that were supposed to have been taken from the thirteenth chapter, in different slokas in the second chapter itself. This would further justify that for Vivekananda, the central teaching of the Gita is fully contained in the second chapter, and he saw it ‘as the very gist’ of the whole text. Thoughts, p. 13, ’Reply to Maharaja of Khetri’, CWSV, vol. iv, p. 329. (4.) ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 448–9; Thoughts, p. 32. (5.) ‘Bhakti Yoga’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 49–50.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses (6.) ‘The Ideal of a Universal Religion’, CWSV, vol. ii, p. 386. For Vivekananda ‘ … intellectual assent we may today subscribe to many foolish things, and change our minds altogether tomorrow. But true religion never changes. Religion is … being and becoming, not hearing or acknowledging’. Ibid., p. 396. (7.) ‘Interviews’, CWSV, vol. v, p. 207. (8.) ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses’, CWSV, vol. v, p. 247. A similar argument was put forward by him on another occasion: ‘Most of the adjectives used in the Gita to explain matters spiritual are used in the Vana and other Parvans of the Mahabharata…the line of thought in the Gita is the same as in the Mahabharata …’ ‘The Paris Congress of Religions’, vol. iv, p. 428. (9.) Vivekananda in his Thoughts on the Gita considered several important questions: First, was the authorship attributed to Veda-Vyasa true? Was the Gita a part of the Mahabharata? Or was it a mere interpolation within the great epic? Second, was there any historical personality by the name of Krishna? Third, did the great war of Kurukshetra as mentioned in the Gita take place historically? Fourth, were Arjuna and others real historical persons? Vivekananda analyzed issues with various historical evidences, but his conclusion was that to reach correct solutions in these cases, even after citing historical evidences and instances, was well-nigh impossible. Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 102–6. (10.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, p. 105. (11.) Ibid., pp. 102–3. To quote him further: ‘Indian writers are not like modern writers who steal ninety per cent of their ideas from other authors, while only ten per cent is their own, and they take care to write a preface in which they say, ‘For these ideas I am responsible’. Those great master minds producing momentous results in the hearts of mankind were content to write their books without even putting their names … they practically carried out the great mandate, ‘To work you have the right, but not to the fruits thereof”. ‘The Work Before Us’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 274–5. (12.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 103–4. Vivekananda’s perspective in this regard is corroborated by the fact that finding out the name of authors and their writings is, even today, a great challenge in the history of Sanskrit literature because classical Sanskrit writings contained, contrary to the historical mode, patently a great deal of myths, legends, and imaginations. Even the authorships of the Vedas, Upanisads, Puranas, Ramayana, and Mahabharata are still under debate. In fact, in the history of Sanskrit literature, there are numerous writings whose authorships are obscure, and equally, there are a number of authors whose writings are unknown.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses (13.) For Vivekananda, the beginning of the Gita is allegorical. To quote him: ’The first discourse in the Gita can be taken allegorically’. ‘Sayings and Utterances’, CWSV, vol. v, p. 416; ‘Notes of Lectures and Classes’, vol. ix, p. 282. And he elaborates on this on many occasions: ‘Krishna, the Lord of Souls’, talks to Arjuna or Gudakesha, ‘Lord of Sleep’ (he who has conquered sleep). The ‘field of virtue’ (the battlefield) is this world; the five brothers (representing righteousness) fight the hundred other brothers (all that we love and have to contend against); the most heroic brother, Arjuna (the awakened soul), is the general. We have to fight all sense-delights, the things to which we are most attached, to kill them’. ‘Inspired Talks’, vol. vii, p. 19, ‘The Gita II’, vol. i, p. 459. (14.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, p. 105. (15.) For instance, ‘Take the story of Radha and Krishna in Rasalila. The story simply exemplifies the true spirit of a bhakta, because no love in the world exceeds that existing between a man and a woman … Krishna is God and Radha loves Him; read those books which describe that story, and then you can imagine the way you should love God. But how many understand this?’ ‘Bhakti’, CWSV, vol. iii, p. 364. (16.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 438. (17.) ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 456–7. (18.) In his lectures on ‘The Gita I’ delivered in San Francisco on 26 May 1900, Vivekananda argued that the Gita harmonized the philosophical and practical differences between the Vedas and the Upanisads. After analyzing the conflicting positions they had taken, Vivekananda said, ‘So the great struggle began in India and it comes to one of its culminating points in the Gita. When it was causing fear that all India was going to be broken up between the two groups, there rose this man Krishna, and in the Gita he tries to reconcile the ceremony and the philosophy of the priests and the people.’ ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 455–6. (19.) ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 457. (20.) ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 468. (21.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 105–6. Vivekananda was fully aware of such blind and legendary faiths. To quote one example: ‘The Hindus are great in telling stories … If the Christian missionaries tell one story from their Bible; the Hindus will produce twenty stories. You say the whale swallowed Jonah; the Hindus say someone swallowed an elephant.’ ‘The Gita I’, Ibid., vol. i, p. 456.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses (22.) Vivekananda repeatedly states this on several occasions. One example: ‘The whole gist of this teaching is that you should work like a master and not as a slave; work incessantly, but do not do slave’s work’. ‘Karma-Yoga’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 57. See also pp. 31–2, 56, 58, 87, 116–17; vol. ii, pp. 1–3, 292; vol. iii, pp. 156, 213, 256; vol. iv, pp. 128, 130–1, 286; vol. vii, p. 198, etc. (23.) ‘Karma Yoga’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 53. (24.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 440–1. (25.) Ibid., p. 442. (26.) ‘The Gita II’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 460. (27.) ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses’, CWSV, vol. v, pp. 247–8; Also see, ‘The Gita II’, vol. i, p. 462; ‘Work and its Secret’, vol. ii, pp. 1–3; ‘Conversations and Dialogues’, vol. vii, p. 211; ‘Discourses on Jnana-Yoga’, vol. viii, pp. 2, 40, etc. (28.) ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 446–58. He delivered this speech at San Francisco on 26 May 1900. He devoted it largely to scorning priest-craft and analyzing their understanding of the Vedico-Upanisadic religion. (29.) ‘Conversations and Dialogues’, CWSV, vol. vii, pp. 172–3. To quote him further: ‘Priest-craft is in its nature cruel and heartless. That is why religion goes down where priest-craft arises’. ‘Vedanta and Privilege’, vol. i, p. 428. For his criticisms of brahmanism see also Letter to Sashi, 9 March 1884, Letters of Swami Vivekananda, Mayavati, Calcutta, 1970 (hereafter Letters), p. 81. (30.) ‘Vedanta and Indian Life’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 244–5, ‘What We Believe in’, vol. iv, p. 359. (31.) ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 470; See also ‘Krishna’, CWSV vol. i, p. 439; Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 108–9. (32.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 437. (33.) ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 454–5. (34.) ‘Daridranarayana’ consists of two terms: ‘Daridra’ (poor) and ‘Narayana’ (God)—worshipping (serving) the poor as God in religion. (35.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 441–2. (36.) ‘Notes of Class Talks and Lectures’, CWSV, vol. vi, p. 111. (37.) Here, Vivekananda understands Arjuna as representing the voice of the poor, and Krishna as the highest spirit, and Krishna’s inspiration to Arjuna to Page 29 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses cast off his mean faint-heartedness and participate in the war as the course to be followed by the learned towards the weak. (38.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 108–9. (39.) ‘Preface to the Fifth Edition’, Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, p. v. Vivekananda regarded this as the central part of the text. To quote him: ‘If one reads this one Sloka— klaibyam ma sma gamah partha nai tat tvayy upapadyate ksudram hrdayadaurbalyam tyaktv ttista paramtapa—one gets all the merits of reading the entire Gita; for in this one Sloka lies embedded the whole Message of the Gita’. Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, p. 110. This further indicates that Vivekananda regarded the Gita as written for the masses against the Vedic religion of the priestly class. (40.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 109–10. (41.) ‘The Mission of the Vedanta’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 193–4. (42.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 442. (43.) ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 478. (44.) ‘The Vedanta’, CWSV, vol. iii, p. 427. (45.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 438. To quote him further: ‘Krishna had opened the gates of spiritual knowledge and attainment to all irrespective of sex or caste’. ‘Historical Evolution of India’, vol. vi, p. 160. (46.) To quote him: ‘Know that though one may be a little bubble and another may be a mountain-high wave, yet behind both the bubble and the wave there is the infinite ocean. Therefore there is hope for everyone. There is salvation for everyone. Everyone must sooner or later get rid of the bonds of Maya’. ‘Indian Spiritual Thought in England’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 444–5; ‘Conversations and Dialogues’, vol. vii, p. 191. (47.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 439. (48.) Ibid., p. 440. (49.) Readers have variously interpreted the concept of svabhava in the text. For Tilak, it implied both the result of past karma and present action. He used it sometimes for atman, sometimes for the mind and at other times for rational constructions. Later, Aurobindo took it to indicate atman, the real svabhava. However, for Vivekananda, svabhava meant what man possesses—his mental frame, ability, faculty, etc. Generally, svabhava is taken to mean the outcome of past karma. ‘Hints on Practical Spirituality’, CWSV, vol. ii, p. 36. (50.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 443. Page 30 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses (51.) ‘Epistles’, CWSV, vol. vi, p. 436. (52.) ‘Discourses on Jnana-Yoga’, CWSV, vol. viii, p. 27; ‘The Ideal of a Universal Religion’, vol. ii, p. 385. (53.) ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses’, CWSV, vol. v, p. 241. (54.) Ibid., pp. 263–4; ‘The Ideal of a Universal Religion’, CWSV, vol. ii, pp. 384– 5; ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 69–70, 468. (55.) Vivekananda explicitly states this in his speech: ‘You may preach religion, but to excite the minds of undeveloped children! You will have to suffer for that … For every weakening thought you have put into anybody’s head you will have to pay with compound interest. The law of Karma must have its pound of flesh …’ ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 478–9. (56.) Ibid., pp. 475–6. Vivekananda cited a story of Pavhari Baba of Ghazipur to show what the higher classes should do when they see ignorants. When a thief stole one of his pans, the Baba ran after him and, referring to him as ‘My Lord’, tried to convince him to take the other pan he had. ‘Never talk about the faults of others, no matter how bad they may be’. ‘Notes of Class Talks and Lectures’, vol. vi, p. 127. (57.) ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 469; ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 438. Vivekananda considered this as a point of difference between Christianity and Hinduism. For Christianity, religion consists of doctrines, for the Gita it consists of ‘giving opportunities for the evolution of one’s temperament’, ‘attempting to understand self’, and ‘respecting individual’s efforts’. To quote him: ‘For the (Christians) the problem is how to escape the wrath of the terrible God. For the Indians it is how to become what they really are, to regain their lost Selfhood …’ ‘The Gita III’, vol. i, p. 468. (58.) ‘Discourses of Jnana-Yoga’, CWSV, vol. viii, p. 27. (59.) ‘The Gita III’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 473–4. (60.) ‘The Sages of India’, CWSV, vol. iii, pp. 256–7; ‘Thoughts on the Gita’, vol. iv, p. 107; ‘Krishna’, vol. i, p. 439; ‘Sayings and Utterances’, vol. viii, p. 279. (61.) ‘The Gita II’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 462–3. (62.) ‘Conversations and Dialogues’, CWSV, vol. vii, pp. 178–9. (63.) ‘Karma-Yoga’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 116–17; ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses’, vol. v, p. 248. (64.) ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses’, CWSV, vol. v, p. 247.
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses (65.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, p. 107. (66.) ‘Karma-Yoga’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 64. (67.) ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses’, CWSV, vol. v, pp. 248–9. (68.) ‘Jnana and Karma’, CWSV, vol. viii, p. 227; ‘Karma-Yoga’, vol. i, pp. 38–9. (69.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, p. 106. (70.) Vivekananda argues that there were disagreements between the Vedas (karma-kanda) and the Upanisads (jnana-kanda or philosophical portion) on five major points: First, the Vedas did not believe in God, they only acknowledged the ‘Eternal words’, while the Upanisads believed in God. Second, the Vedas argued for motive-based karma and supported surrender to it. While the Upanisads accepted the idea of eternal bondage of karma, they also proposed a way out. Third, the Vedas accepted animal sacrifice as integral to religion, but the Upanisads opposed them fundamentally. Fourth, the Vedas believed in rituals, ceremonies etc., which the Upanisads did not, especially those that involved the killing of animals. Fifth, the Vedas believed in a life of enjoyment on earth, the Upanisads propagated a religion of total renunciation. ‘The Gita I’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 446–58. Interestingly, Vivekananda considered the Upanisads as a revolt against the cruel exploitations of the priestly classes and hence, went into extreme opposition to them; the Gita was a compromise between the two. ‘So the great struggle began in India (between the Vedas and the Upanisads) and it comes to one of its culminating point in the Gita.’ ‘The Gita I’, vol. i, p. 455; Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 106–7. (71.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, p. 439. (72.) ‘Notes from Lectures and Discourses ’, CWSV, vol. v, p. 246. (73.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, p.106; ’Discourses on Jnana-Yoga’, vol. viii, pp. 8–9; ’The Gita I’, vol. l, pp. 446, 457, etc. (74.) Thoughts on the Gita, CWSV, vol. iv, pp. 106–7. It should be noted that for Vivekananda, the Gita united karma, jnana and bhakti and various other rituals, rites, ceremonies, etc., of the Vedas and the Vedanta through nishkama karma —‘jnana bhakti yukto karmayoga’. But he did not emphasize the point that the philosophy of the Gita itself later gave birth to several sects and warring paths. (75.) ‘Krishna’, CWSV, vol. i, pp. 444–5. (76.) Ibid., p. 443–4; ‘The Gita I’, vol. i, p. 456. It must be stated here that in his lectures on the Gita, Vivekananda compared Krishna with Christ and Buddha, but the issues of comparison were minor, or in other words unimportant from the deeper doctrinal point of view, and hardly reflected doctrinal comparison. In Page 32 of 33
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Nishkama Karma and the Masses fact, it was not a comparison of their teachings but of their external lives. This was particularly true with regard to Christ and the Christian religion. This may probably be because most of his lectures were given in Europe and to the European audience. His ‘universalism’ and ‘internationalism’ seem to be a product of his dialogue with the West.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Nation in Spiritual Quest Aurobindo and the Gita Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0004
Abstract and Keywords This chapter explores Sri Aurobindo's spiritual reading and understanding of the Bhagavadgita. Aurobindo felt that the Bhagavadgita could easily lend itself for the justification of violence in the national struggle for freedom. Unlike other interpreters of the Gita, Aurobindo felt that nationalism was not a mere political programme but a religion, an avatar that had come from God. Aurobindo argued that its text expounded a single universal truth while borrowing from certain philosophical systems. He considered all the contemporary interpretations of the Gita that immediately preceded him as Karmayogic interpretations and appeared to want to reproduce the Orientalist image of India as primarily a spiritual realm. Keywords: Sri Aurobindo, Bhagavadgita, spiritual text, Absolute Truth, violence, national struggle, avatar, Karmayoga, Orientalist image
Biographical Outline and Hermeneutics of the Gita Aurobindo Ghosh (1872–1950)1 was one of the first systematic expounders of the principles of revolutionary nationalism in India. His nationalist activities have been interpreted under different descriptions—militant, terrorist, extremist, revolutionary, and spiritual. In the early phase of his career, till 1902, when he took an oath with the revolutionary groups in Bengal and western India, Aurobindo was more concerned with militant nationalist activities and spreading the cult of the eternal and timeless Mother India. Later, when he came into contact with the Indian National Congress in 1902 and became an active Page 1 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest participant in its nationalist programmes, Aurobindo increasingly felt that an armed revolution, and not just militancy and terrorism, was a legitimate weapon in a country’s fight for independence. For that purpose, he maintained his contacts with revolutionary groups almost till the end of his stay in Bengal until 1910. It was during this period that Aurobindo developed more systematically the concept of ‘Mother Land’, an attempt to connect divine and earthly life, and wanted to use the Indian National Congress to realize it, and transform the Congress, from its belief in peaceful methods, to an instrument of revolutionary action. However, in 1907, after a full survey of the Indian situation as a leader of the Congress, Aurobindo was more convinced than ever that in the (p.125) circumstances, an open agitation, non-cooperation, passive resistance, and broad-based programmes for securing complete national freedom were necessary. He propounded these ideas in a series of articles on passive resistance in Bande Mataram. By 1909–10, Aurobindo had realized that a political career and nationalist activities were only parts of spiritual realization, especially the Karmayogic dimension. Therefore, while he was involved with nationalist-political activities, he increasingly turned inwards to make himself an instrument (dharma sadana) of the divine. In short, Aurobindo, by this time, felt that the concept of ‘Mother Land’ was not an end in itself but only a means for the spiritual sadana and a way to the evolution of divine consciousness. In 1910, Aurobindo left Calcutta for Chandernagore, where he lived incognito for a month and a half, and then left Chandernagore and Calcutta permanently to settle in French-occupied Pondicherry, where he lived for the next forty years, that is, till the last days of his life. From 1910 to 1914, Aurobindo kept himself aloof from mainstream politics but made his appearance in 1914 with the publication of a monthly journal Arya, which he continued to publish till 1921. It was in this journal that Aurobindo first published his Essays on the Gita in two series—from August 1916 to July 1918, and from August 1918 to July 1920— fortyeight essays in forty-eight months. Later they were revised and published in the form of a book, and in 1950, The Sri Aurobindo Library, New York, published both these series in a one-volume edition.2 These essays on the Gita are perhaps the most systematic expression of the central themes of Aurobindo’s philosophy. Like many nationalist writers of his time, Aurobindo also drew upon the Gita extensively to formulate his own concepts and institutions. For example, his concepts of the motherland and nationalism are deeply influenced by the famous couplets of the Gita regarding the descent of God on earth to awaken spiritual consciousness, and the necessity of conquering everything that comes in the way of spiritual evolution.3 He felt that nationalism was not a mere political programme but a religion, an avatar that had come from God. It could not be crushed since it was immortal. British rule in India was thoroughly atheistic, materialistic, and utilitarian, having had Page 2 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest no moorings of spiritualism at all. Therefore, the first course necessary for spiritual evolution was freedom from slavish imitation of the ways of the West by Indians. India had to be restored to the lost Aryan way of life. The British in India had introduced utilitarian and materialistic ways by abolishing the Aryan spiritual way of life. The restoration and resurgence of the Aryan way of life by replacing the English was, for Aurobindo, (p.126) an important constituent of nationalism and national identity. Such a spiritual realization was the first necessity, but it could not be achieved or even started unless the British were made to quit India along with their culture. In other words, the overthrow of the British would lead to the retrieval of the spiritual essence of India. Nationalism, therefore, is not only a socio-economic emancipation but also a spiritual one. Aurobindo thought that India’s spiritual rejuvenation would infuse such a spirit in the entire world. Swaraj and swadeshi did not merely consist of the establishment of democratic forms of government but experiencing swaraj within oneself, i.e., understanding one’s true character. Similarly, svadharma lay in following one’s own dharma— one’s own inner law of being, rather than the other’s. The work of national emancipation through various strategies such as boycott, swadeshi, national education was a great, holy sacrifice and other acts, great or small, contributed as parts of the yajna. Further, for the defence of violence in the national struggle for freedom, Aurobindo drew enormous support from the Gita. According to him, the Gita justified violence if it was for a righteous cause, or sometimes if it was the law of nature. Thus, Aurobindo’s patriotism and politics were deeply rooted in spirituality. They did not mean anything unless they were connected with and made a part of the individual’s sadana for the realization of the Supreme. His language of politics, nationalism, national identity, and independence was greatly suffused with spirituality. From an objective point of view, spirituality and politics may be poles apart, but in the context of the struggle for independence, India’s nationalist politics was envisaged very differently by its protagonists. Like Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi, Aurobindo felt the Gita was not a theoretical or academic discourse. Mere intellectual exercises have no use unless they are capable of transforming life and leading to effective action. Aurobindo did not understand the text as an ‘ordinary narrative’ with ‘ordinary purport’ to meet the demands of an ‘ordinary person’, but a spiritual text meant for those who have raised themselves above the ‘ordinary level’ to the ‘ethical state’ and have at least acquired preliminary knowledge regarding the body, the cosmos, and the supreme cosmic truth. Aurobindo divided the text into three parts: he wrote twenty-four essays on the first six chapters of the Gita, which he felt dealt with the notion of karma and its relation with jnana. He wrote twelve essays on the next six chapters and stated Page 3 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest that these dealt with the theory of bhakti (p.127) and its relation with karma and jnana. He devoted twelve essays to the remaining six chapters, which he thought outlined metaphysical statements regarding the cosmos, the manifest world, and the supracosmic truth. The concepts of brahmic consciousness, equality, the qualities of bhakta, vibhuti, and so on, are dealt with across these three divisions. Thus, he treats the first six chapters of the text as a unified section with emphasis on karma and jnana and the remaining twelve as two closely connected sections. This, in turn, implied that any of these sections could be treated as an independent unit. Aurobindo thought that the central teaching of the Gita was based on two fundamental principles. First, the idea that destiny has its own design. Whether man wills it or not, the universe is set in motion and is moving as if it were ‘yantraroodha’, hitched to a machine. No man with his ethical or other attributes can change the design of the universe. Second, the creatures in the cosmos are mere puppets in the hands of the supracosmic purushottama—the maker, sustainer, and the Lord—and are themselves but a nimittamatra, a mere instrument in the evolution of the universe. However, this does not mean that human reason has nothing to do with the design of the universe; its primary and only duty is admitting, conceding, and appreciating this nimittamatra truth and submitting itself to God. For Aurobindo, since the Gita developed its central teaching on this foundation, the Karmayogic-ethical interpretations that largely admitted and recognized the contributions of man in shaping the nature of the universe could not be correct. Hence, the central teaching of the text does not lie in the appreciation of man’s reason-based social karma, nor does it lie in the relinquishment of worldly life. According to Aurobindo, the meaning of the Gita lies in the following verse: sarvadharmanparityajya mamekam saranam vraja I aham tva sarvapapebyo moksayisyami ma sucah II (18.66)
(Give up all kinds of religions (dharma), that is, means of attaining the Paramesvara, and surrender yourself to Me alone. I shall redeem you from all sins, do not be afraid). Commentators usually draw out a Karmayogic interpretation from the following verse: Karmanyevadhikaraste ma phalesu kadacana I ma karmaphalaheturbhurma te sangosvakarmani II (2.47).
(Your authority extends only to the performance of Action; the Fruit is never within your authority (control), do not be one who performs Action with the (p.128) motive that a particular fruit should be obtained, nor do you also insist on notperforming Action).4 For Aurobindo, this complete surrender to the divine intention cannot be done from any social position. It can only follow transcendence from the ordinary state to the Page 4 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest ethical state, a sattvic, or state of brahmic consciousness. It is assumed that the message of the Gita is applicable to those who have achieved this state. In other words, for Aurobindo, the teaching of the text begins with this state.
It should be noted here that in Aurobindo’s reading of the Gita, there is little focus on the constitutional order or organization of power of the nation. Nationalism was, for him, a civilizational rejuvenation and spiritual retrieval. National reconstruction was spiritual awakening of the self. Although, Aurobindo’s thought does not lend itself to the establishment of constitutional order and organization of power, the Gita could be a text par excellence to undertake a search of the above kind.
Critique of Earlier Interpretations: Aurobindo’s Distinctive Reading of the Gita Aurobindo begins his Essays on the Gita with the statement that an overwhelming part of religious scriptures in the world, including the Gita, have become subject to diverse kinds of readings. Each reading claims distinct ways and methods to understand the ‘truth of the text’ and the ‘truth’ it finally discovers as the only possible one. Each reading regards the ways and methods others adopt to understand the truth as either ‘impostures’ or ‘at best imperfectly inspired’.5 But because there are diverse readings and interpretations of a scriptural text, one is not to draw the conclusion that the ‘truth’ of a scripture is also diverse and plural in character. The truth of every sacred scripture is identical and never equivocal; it is always universal, unified, single, unchanging and transcendental, which can only be realized through the experience of one’s life. The plurality lies in the interpretation of the truth and not in the truth itself. Therefore, Aurobindo argues, every scripture consists of two parts—one is the ‘original and the real truth’ of the scripture which lies in its ‘original text’, and the second is the explanation and interpretation of the ‘original truth’ by various readers. Since the interpretations are moulded by the intellectual visions of the interpreters and greatly influenced by the traditions of society, country, and time and conditions of living, the ‘truth of a text which they discovered’ should be regarded as either imperfect, or largely imaginary, not possessing the same force as the ‘original’.6 (p.129) [T]here is undoubtedly a Truth one and eternal which we are seeking … in the statement of the Truth the actual form given to it, the system and arrangement, the metaphysical and intellectual mould, the precise expression used must be largely subject to the mutations of Time and cease to have the same force; for the human intellect modifies itself always … it is always leaving old expression and symbol for new or, if it uses the old, it so changes its connotation or at least its exact content and association that we can never be quite sure of understanding an ancient book of this kind precisely in the sense and spirit it bore to its contemporaries. What is of entirely permanent value is that which besides
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Nation in Spiritual Quest being universal has been experienced, lived and seen with a higher than the intellectual vision.7 The commentaries do not explain the truth of the text in its ‘original and real form’ and can hardly be assumed to rise above their contexts to be objective. Similarly, if their view necessitates them to exclude the truth underlying other interpretations, they reject them passionately. Therefore, there are such immense differences between one commentary and another. Further, there is no hope of salvaging the original meaning either, even though we may employ the best techniques and theories for the purpose. Every age, therefore, attempts to discover truths appropriate and relevant to them in the Gita. This is not an injustice done to the text, for ‘that is after all what Scriptures were written to give’. However, despite these limitations, there are interpretations that come close to being objective. For Aurobindo, the Gita should be read for, as the commentators did in the past, actual living truths suitable to the mentality and spiritual needs of the time.8
But Aurobindo reflected on the issue at length: why did the Gita become susceptible to diverse kinds of readings? He offers two reasons. First, there are certain ideas and institutions in the text that are, in fact, not fleeting and local, but universal and permanent in character, but can be understood by their temporal and local meanings if interpreted literally. Aurobindo mentions, for instance, the notions of ‘sacrifice’ and the ‘fourfold sastric social order’.9 The Gita used these ideas and institutions in tune with its universal philosophy and as part of its central teaching but readers have invested them with literal and local meanings, sometimes completely out of context. Hence, they have failed to perceive the ‘real sense’ in which these institutions are used in the text. ‘And if they are too much pressed in their literal sense’, Aurobindo argues, ‘narrow so much at least of the teaching, deprive it of its universality and spiritual depth and limit its validity for mankind at large.’10 (p.130) The second reason is that each interpretation focuses on a particular notion, idea, and institution of the Gita and gives it centrality to put forward predominantly its claims, almost to the exclusion of other doctrines and other interpretations. For instance, Aurobindo says, the Gita deals with Samkhya and Yoga;11 it also deals with pure monism, qualified monism, mayavada, Vaisnava theism and other Vedico-Upanisadic systems such as karma, jnana, and bhakti; but it also synthesizes all these systems and philosophies into a universal truth. In other words, each interpretation regards itself as decisive and exclusive and others as dubious, and this sectarian approach leads them to advance diverse interpretations of the text. The language of the Gita, the structure of thought, the combination and balancing of ideas belong neither to the temper of a sectarian teacher nor to the spirit of a rigorous analytical dialectics cutting off one angle of the truth to exclude all the others; but rather there is a wide, undulating, encircling movement of ideas which is the manifestation of a vast synthetic
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Nation in Spiritual Quest mind and a rich synthetic experience … It does not cleave asunder, but reconciles and unifies.12 Aurobindo regards these ‘local’ and ‘sectarian’ readings of the Gita, as inadequate and suitable for ‘academic disputation’. For him, the real text of the Gita consists, contrary to the claims of polemist commentators, of the universal synthesis of umpteen themes and motifs contained within it. ‘The Gita is not a weapon of dialectical warfare; it is a gate opening on the whole world of spiritual truth … It maps out, but it does not cut up or build walls or hedges to confine our vision.13 Therefore, eulogizing a particular notion, idea or institution as central to the text is a mere literary device.
However, this is how the text of the Gita was understood from ancient times. The first such ‘sectarian’, ‘exclusivist’, and ‘partial reading’ was by the Samkhya system of renunciation. Aurobindo thought that this interpretation brought to the fore verses related to renunciation without understanding the peculiar ways in which they are used in the text, and without relating them to the central assertion of the text. The second was the bhakti reading of dualism. And the last, perhaps the most important, was the Karmayogic reading by modern commentators. Aurobindo felt all these readings were partial, prejudiced, and incomplete because they emphasized one philosophical system over the other, i.e. knowledge, devotion, and action; and none was able to grasp its universal meaning.
(p.131) Karmayogic and Spiritual Readings of the Gita One of the significant interpretations, to the analysis of which Aurobindo devoted many pages in his Essays on the Gita, is the modern Karmayogic interpretation of the text. The central argument is that the Gita’s concept of karma received the highest expression in these interpretations but they failed to link it with the spiritual message. They were also sectarian and exclusive as they unduly emphasized action to understate devotion and knowledge. In other words, for Aurobindo, the Gita expounds a single universal truth while borrowing from certain philosophical systems such as Samkhya, yoga, bhakti, and so on, from different scriptures; it does so with spiritual intention. But at the present day … the tendency is to subordinate its elements of knowledge and devotion, to take advantage of its continual insistence on action and to find in it a scripture of the Karma Yoga … Undoubtedly, the Gita is a Gospel of Works, but of works which culminate in knowledge, that is, in spiritual realization and quietude, and of works motived by devotion, that is, a conscious surrender of one’s whole self first into the hands and then into the being of the Supreme, and not at all of works as they are understood by the modern mind, not at all an action dictated by egoistic and altruistic, by personal, social, humanitarian motives, principles, ideals.14 Interestingly, Tilak and Gandhi had critiqued the Samkhya reading of the text by using such words as ‘pre-determined’, ‘pre-conceived’, and ‘prejudiced’. Aurobindo used the Page 7 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest same terminology to criticize and reject the Karmayogic interpretations. For instance, Bankim offered a modern interpretation of the Gita based on the verse ‘karmanyevadhikaraste maphalesu kadacana’, as simple social action or disinterested performance of one’s duty. For Aurobindo, this was nothing but a materialistic interpretation of this treatise and, hence, prejudiced.
Bankimchandra Chatterji, who first gave to the Gita this new sense of a Gospel of Duty … laid an almost exclusive stress on the first three or four chapters and in those on the idea of equality, on the expression Kartavyam karma, the work that is to be done, which they render by duty, and on the phrase ‘Thou hast a right to action, but none to the fruits of action’ which is now popularly quoted as the great word, mahavakya, of the Gita. The rest of the eighteen chapters with their high philosophy are given a secondary importance, except indeed the great vision in the eleventh. This is natural enough for the modern mind which is, or has been till yesterday, inclined to be impatient of metaphysical subtleties and far-off spiritual seekings, eager to get to work and, like Arjuna himself, mainly concerned for a workable law of works, a dharma. But it is the wrong …15 (p.132) For Aurobindo, the central philosophy of the text does not lie in the socioethical interpretation of ‘karmanyevadhikaraste maphalesu kadacana’ but in the spiritual understanding along the direction ‘sarvadharman parityajya mamekam saranam vraja’. The Gita does not advocate, as modern interpreters have emphatically argued, the disinterested performance of duty, nishkama karma in the social or altruistic sense, but in the spiritual sense in order to access brahmic consciousness. Hence, according to Aurobindo, the interpretations of the Gita in the ethico-moral sense by Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi, were ‘modern misreadings’ of the ancient scripture.
That which the Gita teaches is not a human, but a divine action; not the performance of social duties, but the abandonment of all other standards of duty or conduct for a selfless performance of the divine will working through our nature; not social service, but the action of the Best, the Godpossessed, the Master-men done impersonally for the sake of the world and as a sacrifice to Him who stands behind man and Nature. In other words, the Gita is not a book of practical ethics, but of the spiritual life.16 Not only did Aurobindo reject Karmayoga as the central teaching of the text, he also argued that commentators had completely failed to understand the relationship the Gita establishes between karma and spirituality. He felt that the Karmayogic interpretation of the Gita would contravene the spiritual core of the text because what it preached was not a life of social action but surrender to the will of God, and in such a surrender of one’s will, the Gita sometimes prefers abandonment of all kinds of social action. This was exactly what came about in the case of Buddha, Ramakrishna, and Vivekananda. The conditions in life and urgent call of the divine not only impelled them to forsake all worldly duties but prompted them to give up everything held dear by worldly people. Therefore, according to Aurobindo, although the Gita prefers action to inaction, it does not rule out the necessity of inaction, or abandonment of all actions as one of the ways of spiritual life. Hence, he insisted that in the framework of the Gita, Page 8 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest responding to the imperative call of God is primary. Whether it is done through action or abandonment of action is unimportant. The call of God and the necessity of surrendering to it cannot be weighed against any of these considerations.17
Aurobindo claimed that his criticism against the modern interpretations of the text as being ‘pre-conceived’ and ‘prejudiced’ readings was neither borne out of his own intellectual preferences nor exterior to their texts but was justified, displayed, and exhibited in them. The (p.133) internal design and thematic arrangement of the Gita, however, does not really warrant any such exclusive readings. In fact, Aurobindo analyzed the situational context of the Gita, that is, the dilemma that Arjuna faced, the questions he raised, and the teachings of his preceptor, to argue that Arjuna’s problems did not arise from a social context and therefore could never be solved by directing him, in the ordinary sense, to perform his social duties dispassionately and disinterestedly. Asking Arjuna to simply perform his social duties disinterestedly, for Aurobindo, would be a teaching of social science and not that of a scripture like the Gita: [T]o tell him that he must do his duty disinterestedly … may be the teaching of a State, of politicians, of lawyers, of ethical casuists … if that is what the Gita has to say on a most poignant moral and spiritual problem, we must put it out of the list of the world’s Scriptures and thrust it, if anywhere, then into our library of political science and ethical casuistry.18 The Gita is, thus, primarily spiritual in its teachings. The different notions, ideas, and institutions employed in the text have only spiritual significance. It talks about, for instance, equality and indifference to sin and virtue, good and evil, not as a social reference but as integral to the brahmic consciousness. It is addressed to the spiritual man who has outgrown social relations and ethical ties, and who has advanced well enough on the way to fulfil the supreme rule.19
Similarly, for Aurobindo, the notion of duty can be interpreted in two ways— pragmatic or social sense, and spiritual duty. Pragmatic duty implies one’s relations with others—a father’s duty, for instance, to his children, a lawyer’s duty to his client, or a soldier’s duty to fight for the cause of the country. Here the duty is regulated and governed by external social laws, and the ethicality of the action is determined within the social circumference. Spiritual duty, on the other hand, does not rest upon any social reference. It does not imply social relations; it only signifies an aroused inner perception of man. Here duty is governed by inner law and not external social law, and the external social laws do not, in any way, apply to and affect the spiritual being.20 The Gita uses the concept of duty not in the pragmatic or social sense but in the larger and higher spiritual sense. In fact, Aurobindo felt that the Gita certainly rejected nonpossessive duty in the social sense for spiritual non-possession, and preferred the latter to the former in case of a conflict between the two. In short, it does not use the term ‘duty’ in the sense of any altruistic utilitarian service but as an inner awakened service to the divine.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (p.134) The Gita … does not ask the awakened moral consciousness to slay itself on the altar of duty as a sacrifice and victim to the law of the social status … it bids us ascend to a supreme poise above the mainly practical, above the purely ethical, to the Brahmic consciousness. It replaces the conception of social duty by a divine obligation … the Brahmic consciousness, the soul’s freedom from works and the determination of works in the nature by the Lord within and above us—is the kernel of the Gita’s teaching with regard to action.21 For Aurobindo, these Karmayogic interpretations were greatly influenced by the nineteenth-century European utilitarian philosophy. Nineteenth-century Europe represented two fundamental features. First, the life in Europe was driven by practical and pragmatic concerns. The spiritual life had either vanished or been reduced to secondary status. In other words, the social life of modern Europe had subjugated its religion, and that was the major reason why spirituality had disappeared from Europe. ‘It has got rid of God or kept Him only for Sunday use and erected in His place man as its deity and society as its visible idol. At its best it is practical, ethical, social, pragmatic, altruistic and humanitarian’.22 Allured by the patriotic and philanthropic devotion of Europe, the modern ethicists have looked for altruistic and humanitarian philosophy in the highly spiritual Gita.
Secondly, Europe had overemphasized three aspects of life—materialism, power, and progress—and regarded these as the base for social organization. For the pursuit of power, the European mind was exiled from two essential things—the eternal and spiritual—or had made them subservient to man and society. In short, Europe’s undue emphasis on these mundane elements and its undue courting of practical things in life pushed spirituality to irrelevance.23 In another essay, Aurobindo argued more clearly that those who did not believe in God, the revelation of Christianity and spirituality, and had a sceptical or atheistic point of view, or had an overwhelming love for humanity interpreted and transmuted spiritual notions into social meanings.24 For Aurobindo, the main concern of the ethical interpretations of the Gita was ‘pragmatism’, which was similar to European utilitarianism. This framework explored workable social laws in the text by undermining its metaphysical and spiritual elements and made the latter an adjunct of man and society. Hence, they were either exclusively European or substantially Europeanized readings of the spiritual treatise. (p.135) This is a modern misreading, a reading of the modern mind into an ancient book, of the present-day European or Europeanized intellect into a thoroughly antique, a thoroughly Oriental and Indian teaching.25 It may be noted here that Aurobindo rejected the social interpretations of the Gita and the socio-economic institutions outlined by them. He viewed these as admiring to a great extent the European vision of life. He expressed a substantive belief that a fundamental critique of the moral foundations of the West, which have led to the Page 10 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest present politico-economic arrangements, is required if a new order is to be established. This new order should be founded on spiritualism and socio-political institutions should be the channels for spiritual pursuit. A profound disregard of sociomaterial life and complete belief in the divine as controlling and guiding the human quest are explicit in Aurobindo.
The Concept of Avatar in the Gita Aurobindo’s project on the Gita does not place any importance on the sociological concept of dharma and the ethical notion of incarnation. This is, in fact, Aurobindo’s clear departure from the socio-ethical interpretations advanced by the Karmayogic readers. Ethical interpreters such as Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi, for instance, interpreted the concept of dharma in the text in sociological terms, and loksamgraha (holding together) as general welfare and the ethical basis of social existence. They also interpreted avatar in the sense of an ethical person who plays, by his conspicuous and dexterous ethical character, a predominant role in society. Apart from his disagreement with the social interpretations of dharma and loksamgraha, Aurobindo also did not admit the dominant role given to the social individual in these textual readings. He would, on the other hand, say that spiritual men should dominate the future India and the nationalist regeneration should lie in the establishment of ‘the kingdom of God’.26 This was how Aurobindo defined the concepts of dharma and the institution of avatar in the text. He devoted three essays in his Essays on the Gita on these subjects, and began these essays by acknowledging the Gita’s admission of the Vedantic argument of ‘unity of existence’. Aurobindo set up his argument by positing that the supreme Brahman is the fundamental and universal principle from which all animate and inanimate elements on the earth, or the whole cosmos, come into existence. The divine produces these elements by the use of two things, divine and prakriti, keeping Himself hidden in the designs of prakriti. (p.136) Since the divine, although in veil, dwells in every existence, every being is ‘a partial being of the Lord’ (mamaivamsah).27 There is nothing beyond or above the element of divinity. Prakriti, with its three qualities (sattva, rajas and tamas), is an element of ignorance concealing the spirit (the spark of the divine) and gives rise to gradation in the cosmic universe. Thus, in the first birth of the divine, the inherent consciousness of the divine dwelling in the being is shrouded partly or fully by ignorance and in that type the manifest being thinks that the manifest body, not the soul, prakriti, not the purusha (brahman), is infinite. Hence, ignorance or prakriti dominates the soul and the inherent consciousness of being is overridden by this ignorance. In the second type of divine birth, the soul grows out of ‘unawareness’ or ignorance of prakriti and opens out to ‘inherent consciousness’ or self-knowledge, thinking that prakriti is illusion and only purusha is infinite being. In this birth, the awakened soul adopts in its external activities ethico-moral principles (brahmic consciousness) and internally continues to grow and evolve into spirituality. Between these two types of divine births, the former is the ordinary social birth; a birth of the divine into ignorance Page 11 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest produced by yogamaya; but it is the same yogamaya that manifests selfknowledge leading to divine birth. But neither of the two, strictly speaking, is an incarnation of the divine, although the latter is a state of the descent of God (brahmic consciousness). In the third type of divine birth, Godhead manifests itself in the human form.28 The conscious embodied soul (dehi) is the spark of the divine fire and that soul in man opens out to self-knowledge as it develops out of ignorance of self into self-being. The Divine also, pouring itself into the forms of the cosmic existence, is revealed ordinarily in an efflorescence of its powers, in energies and magnitudes of its knowledge, love, joy, developed force of being (Vibhuti), in degrees and faces of its divinity. But when the divine Consciousness and Power, taking upon itself the human form and the human mode of action, possesses it not only by powers and magnitudes, by degrees and outward faces of itself but out of its eternal self-knowledge, when the Unborn knows itself and acts in the frame of the mental being and the appearance of birth, that is the height of the conditioned manifestation; it is the full and conscious descent of the Godhead, it is the Avatar.29 In another essay, Aurobindo stated this deep mystical and philosophical theory in direct and clear terms. In the first birth, God takes birth into ignorance or prakriti. The second birth is an ascent, the re-birth of the born soul into Godhead, ‘the birth of man into the Godhead, man rising into the divine nature and consciousness, madbhavam agatah; it is the (p.137) being born anew in a second birth of the soul’.30 To assist the second birth of ascent, God manifests himself in the human form. ‘But it is to assist that ascent or evolution the descent is made or accepted; that the Gita makes very clear’.31 Generally speaking, all the three are avatars of the divine; but for the Gita, the first birth and the ascent in the second birth cannot be regarded as eternal avatar because it is the most general condition of the universal construct and, according to Aurobindo, only descent in the third type of birth can be regarded as avatarhood in the form the Gita outlines.
Once the oneness between divinity and the cosmic phenomenon is firmly established and the latter is understood as a part of the Godhead, mamaivamsah,32 the occurrence of the divine incarnation in the very structure of the cosmic existence, ‘not as an isolated and miraculous phenomenon, but in its proper place in the whole scheme of the world manifestation’33, is posited. Aurobindo felt the theory of divine avatar would no longer remain a ‘dogma’, a popular superstition, or ‘an imaginative theory’, or ‘mystic deification of historical or legendary supermen’,34 but deeply founded and embedded in the Vedantic view of existence, of divinity and the universe. In fact, it was from this standpoint of Vedantic unity in the Gita that Aurobindo criticized several concepts of avatarhood envisaged both in the West and East. And these criticisms were largely based on their failure to establish an intimate link between the divinity and humanity.35
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Nation in Spiritual Quest For the rationalists, Aurobindo argued, the oneness between divinity and humanity was based on irrationality, and the material world was not an instrument in the hands of God but governed and swayed by a set of mechanical laws. God was too mysterious to be placed as a part in the human body because the human body is only a corporeal and finite organ, which cannot have an infinite element. For dualists, God’s nature was distinct and separate from human nature. Similarly, Christianity too could not deal with this principle of divine root in humanity and presented the theory of avatar as a mere dogma without a proper base. In the West this belief has never really stamped itself upon the mind because it has been presented through exoteric Christianity as a theological dogma without any roots in the reason and general consciousness and attitude towards life.36 Aurobindo felt that the text of the Gita alone provided a lucid and clear description in this regard and demonstrated the possibility of divine incarnation in the very root of unity between divine and human nature—‘all here is God, the disguised Narayana’, and God exists in (p.138) every manifest and unmanifest element—Brahman, ekamevadvitiyam (nothing can be different from brahman).37 Hence, the Gita did not present the theory of avatar as mere dogma but as providing a strong spiritual basis for its central teaching, and for the transmutation of human limitations.
Having outlined the three kinds of births in the Gita, Aurobindo stated that the Gita did not regard the second type of birth, that is, birth from ignorance, as an avatar. It is here that Aurobindo’s reading of the Gita’s system of avatar deviates fundamentally from those of the ethico-Karmayogic interpreters. For the ethical readings such as that of Tilak, for instance, when an individual emerges from ignorance in the second birth and opens out into self-knowledge and develops ‘divine qualities’, the Gita regards him as an avatar of God. Therefore, avatar is not a separate phenomenon but integral to the spiritual progress and state of sthitaprajna. In short, becoming sthitaprajna through ascent and adopting divine qualities (ethical) both in one’s internal nature and external activity is the highest realization, the final goal. For Aurobindo, this represents only a partial truth and the Gita’s system of avatar was quite different from such an ethical understanding. In this context, Aurobindo advances two arguments, and both of them fundamentally refute the ethical readings of the Gita. First, an avatar is a person who manifests extraordinary divine qualities, moral and intellectual, surpassing human powers. Both Aurobindo and the ethical readers admitted that the acquisition of unusual divine qualities is an essential part of the avatar. While Aurobindo calls this acquisition of divine qualities becoming vibhuti and brahmic consciousness, ethical readers call such a seeker sthitaprajna. Since an avatar should have an external and manifest body and have divine qualities manifest in his external activities, both readings acknowledged that the avatar was at the same time the vibhuti.38 Page 13 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest For ethical readers, the avatar is not merely a sthitaprajna but every sthitaprajna is also an avatar because both are receptacles of divinity and not separate entities. Man’s ascent into self-knowledge is affirmed by the descent of the divine. Avatar is the receptive quality of the human being. This is, for Aurobindo, only a prejudiced understanding of truth and the Gita does not support it. He thought that though the soul’s growth into self-knowledge and becoming sthitaprajna or vibhuti purusha are an essential part of the spiritual endeavour, it is not an avatar according to the Gita because acquiring divine qualities is part of man’s ascent into the divine process and not a descent of God. Avatar is (p.139) a separate entity, apart from vibhuti or sthitaprajna; it is the descent of God from above. But still the Vibhuti is not the Avatar … The heightening of the power of the qualities is part of the becoming, bhutagrama, an ascent in the ordinary manifestation; in the Avatar there is the special manifestation, the divine birth from above, the eternal and universal Godhead descended into a form of individual humanity, atmanam srjami, and conscious not only behind the veil but in the outward nature.39 Second, when man grows into self-knowledge and merges himself and ceases to be his separate self-identity, he calls down the descent of God into himself and is either possessed by the divine consciousness or becomes his effective reflection or channel. This is what sthitaprajna is, according to Tilak and Gandhi. This argument is based on the idea that in the first birth, God (spirit) descends into matter (ignorance) and in the second birth, matter ascends into spirit and, hence, possesses divine consciousness, and man becomes no less than God himself. Or to put it in another way, the possession of divine consciousness through spiritual ascendance is accompanied by a reflex action of the divine entering into the human parts of his being, infusing his mind and corporeality. Hence, his action would no longer be his but of God himself, he is being a mere channel of God.40 Aurobindo argued that this was only a ‘partial avatarhood’ or ‘a partial account of avatar’. While referring to the life of saint Chaitanya, Aurobindo pointed out that what had happened to him was still a part of the process of spiritual ascendance and the acquisition of divine qualities and consciousness was the result of such a process. The Gita’s concept of avatar does not refer to this process of ascendance and the inculcation of divine qualities, but the ‘descent of the divine from above into humanity’ by using yogamaya or prakriti.41
It may be noted that Aurobindo’s interpretation is much more mystical and spiritual than the ethical proponents’ as the latter attempted to locate their theory within ethical bounds. More importantly, it is in Aurobindo’s reading that the relation between divinity and humanity, oneness and separateness, and the transitions into prakriti, purusha, purusottama are more clearly spelt out. The ethical readers conceived the highest state of the human as ceasing to be a separate identity between divine and man. For Aurobindo, even at the highest state man cannot become purusottama; at the most he can acquire certain divine
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Nation in Spiritual Quest qualities; the state beyond prakriti and purusha will always maintain its separate identity and existence.
(p.140) Nationalism as the Avatar Aurobindo regarded nationalism as an avatar, which comes from God. This is indicated in his understanding of the objectives of divine incarnation. He recognized two objectives42 for the avatar, and considered both the objectives in a wider national-spiritual meaning. First, the life of an avatar, both in his external activity and internal consciousness, is to serve as a complete ideal for all men. Externally, he is to show the veiled gross manifestation (dehi), how he can pursue divine qualities by following certain outward actions, feelings, principles, and thought that constitute ethico-moral virtues and transfigure himself into the divine. This is expressed in the significance of the human Krishna, the apocalypse of avatar in the text, and his claim of holding himself as a divine exemplar for others. Incarnation holds before men his own example and declares of himself that he is the way and the gate … that Krishna in the human body, manusim tanum asritam, and the supreme Lord … are but two revelations of the same divine Purushottama …43 Thus, externally, the avatar is to set himself as exemplar for the worldly ethical life and internally, he is to resuscitate man towards his real divine nature and destiny, and help him ascend from lower life into its higher state—the upholding of dharma.
It is to give a spiritual mould of divine manhood into which the seeking soul of the human being can cast itself. It is to give a Dharma, a religion— not a mere creed, but a method of inner and outer living,—a way, a rule and law of selfmoulding by which he can grow towards divinity. It is too, since this growth, this ascent is not mere isolated and individual phenomenon, but like all in the divine world-activities, a collective business, a work and the work for the race, to assist the human march, to hold it together in its great crises …44 Since the avatar is a complete paragon and model of excellence for ordinary men, Aurobindo argued that it is not a supernormal, miraculous phenomenon or which comes as a ‘thaumaturgic magician’, but a leader and exemplar of a divine humanity. To be a living example to ordinary people, he would have to undergo all the experiences and hardships that ordinary human beings endure; he should not merely be an enjoyer of life but a sufferer too, so that it will be easier for them to accept suffering as a means of redemption. Aurobindo viewed the sufferings that Christ and Buddha had to undergo, for instance, in this light. He criticized the rationalist argument that the avatar cannot be a sufferer but only an (p.141) enjoyer of life as baseless and irrational. In other words, for Aurobindo, the avatar is to show how not merely enjoyment but also suffering can be the technique of divine realization.45
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Nation in Spiritual Quest The avatar’s suffering as a passage to divine realization is also accepted by Tilak and Gandhi. But for the latter, he has to suffer for the desireless performance of social action; for Aurobindo, he has to show how one can perform actions for the sake of God, being an instrument of him. But this distinction is not, in any sense, fundamental because what Aurobindo asserted was from the point of view of the divine, and Tilak and Gandhi from the standpoint of the divine seeker. More importantly, Aurobindo did not reject the desireless performance of social action as contrary to spirituality, and explicitly stated that the sthitaprajna would set an example in all activities including social action as per the best ideal of the age or yugadharma. The desireless action will subserve spiritual seeking. The second purpose of the avatar is the revival of dharma. From time to time when dharma languishes and decays, and adharma flourishes, the avatar will intervene to restore dharma to its original strength and vitality. For Aurobindo, dharma in the text does not imply any creed or dogma but a law of self-moulding by which human beings can grow towards spirituality. Adharma is contrary to divine seeking and hinders spiritual progress. Aurobindo’s understanding of nationalism as the avatar is implicit here. The object of the avatar is to stand witness to the truth of the vision, to give a call to humanity to prepare itself and help all souls to respond to the spiritual call. The avatar can be interpreted more in the nature of a promise or hope of the future perfection of mankind. It is in this sense that Aurobindo regarded nationalism as an avatar that had come from God as it promises and affords an opportunity to rouse the spiritual consciousness of the Indians. Life under British colonialism represented ignorance, egoism, and materialism and, hence, adharma. In this system spirituality could not evolve. The imitation of this pattern of life by the Indians would not yield spiritual benefit either. Hence, it is the age, yuga, for the birth of the nation in the form of avatar to rescue the decaying dharma and restore it to its original form. Aurobindo understood nationalism as dharma. As the first step in the spiritual awakening, it would promise the revival of the Aryan way of spiritual life against the British. It would ensure the dignity of Indians expressed in Aryan ethics which would allow the individual freedom to evolve along the lines of one’s own temperament and bridge the gulf between individual efforts and social relations within the framework of the moral order. This kind (p.142) of nationalism would provide an opportunity for dharma to flourish by destroying British rule (adharma) and restoring the spiritual pursuits of the past.
The Concept of Dharma Aurobindo’s understanding of the Gita’s notion of dharma is very different from the one offered by other nationalist discourses. The notion of dharma can be construed through social or pragmatic meanings. It can also be interpreted through purely ethical or religious connotations. Socially, dharma implies the observation of social laws in external life, and politically it denotes political Page 16 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest justice. Ethically, dharma involves the law of righteousness, the application of ethico-moral virtues in daily life; and from the point of view of religion, it suggests the law of religious life. Collectively, dharma denotes a worldly existence where people are duty-bound to observe religious and ethical principles in outward actions and in relation to others by controlling one’s own senses and dispositions. Aurobindo thought that the avatar does not herald changes in the life of the individual in the material or utilitarian sense, or the restoration of dharma in any of these senses, for ‘Avatarhood for the sake of the Dharma would be an otiose phenomenon’. Such a change in material life can be accomplished by the divine through ordinary, distinguished personalities such as sages, kings, and religious teachers without any actual incarnation.46 Aurobindo compared, for instance, the differences between the transformation that the Reformation in Europe and the French Revolution brought about and the changes the avatar would initiate. The former were primarily attempts at transforming an impoverished society into a thriving one, and a chaotic one into a well-ordered society, hence, the changes were mainly intellectual and practical; for such transformations the intervention of the avatar is not needed. It can be fulfilled by eminent persons, vibhuti purushas. Hence, for similar revolutionary changes in material prosperity, an avatar is not required. The changes the avatar brings are neither social nor material nor utilitarian. They are not even merely ethical but spiritual; and only in a crisis in the consciousness of humanity does an avatar arise as an exemplar.47 That is to say, for any changes in the nation, in the material, social or political sense, nationalism in the form of avatar is not required; it can be brought about by distinguished personalities or vibhuti purushas. However, when the crisis the nation faces transcends the social or political into the spiritual, it is essential to set the country on spiritual pursuit. (p.143) Nationalism, according to Aurobindo, is a representation of the growing spiritual consciousness among Indians. For Aurobindo, the outward and ethical accounts of avatar, as ‘ascent of humanity into divinity’, and in terms of dharma as ‘the restoration of the declined ethical balance of mankind’, are incorrect and insufficient. They exclude the most central part of the concept, the spiritual account.48 Aurobindo felt that the notion of dharma used in the text had a deeper and larger spiritual significance than its mere ethical or social connotations. It stands for the regulation and governance of all the relations of man with other beings, with nature or prakriti, and with the Supreme Being. So it is both an inner and outer law. As an inner law, it is the law of the inner activities through which man develops a divine nature49, and as an outer law it is the law governing his unruly thought and action as well as his relations with others that further his spiritual evolution and that of the human race towards the divine ideal. In short, dharma invests all human relations with divine purpose.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest Dharma is both that which we hold to and that which holds together our inner and outer activities. In its primary sense it means a fundamental law of our nature which secretly conditions all our activities, and in this sense each being, type, species, individual, group has its own Dharma. Secondly, there is the divine nature, which has to develop and manifest in us, and in this sense Dharma is the law of the inner workings by which that grows in our being. Thirdly, there is the law by which we govern our outgoing thought and action and our relations with each other so as to help best both our own growth and that of the human race towards the divine ideal.50 Dharma taken in this sense implies a set of principles, which are eternal, unchanging, enduring, and permanent. But as the force of divine manifestation or degree of spiritual growth varies in each being, dharma continually moulds its principles according to the extent of progress towards spirituality. Hence, dharma implies man’s attempt to move towards spirituality and acquire divine qualities; those elements that resist such strivings and pull one away from such attempts are unrighteous. There is a continuous and perpetual battle between the principles that lure one towards divinity and those that rebuff. In this struggle, ‘sometimes the upward and sometimes the downward forces prevail’.51
This battle between dharma and adharma determines the work of the avatar and the meaning and significance of dharma. The avatar’s descent in this spiritual struggle is to make man conscious of his divine nature and elevate him from his ego-state to his divine self. It works for ‘loksamgraha, for the maintaining of all in their Dharma and the Dharma, (p.144) for the maintenance of their growth in all its stages and in all its paths towards the divine’.52 Dharma is the expression of this truth. For Aurobindo, the battle between dharma and adharma, humanity and divinity, and principles that entice and elements that liberate are part and parcel of the entire universal striving. There is no dharma without adharma, no humanity without divinity, no avatar without the circumstances that call for its embodiment. It is only in this struggle that dharma evolves. It is this struggle that constitutes the theatre for the divinity to descend on earth—for loksamgraha. The game of struggle and conflict is an inexorable aspect of the universe.
Historicity of the Gita Having argued for the spiritual significance of the institution of incarnation, and dharma, and interpreted the haunting questions of Arjuna and Krishna’s reply as spiritual, Aurobindo did not feel it essential to demonstrate the historicity of the text or its characters. Such downplaying of the historicity of the Gita can also be seen in ethical interpretations such as Tilak and Gandhi. In fact, Aurobindo stated quite explicitly that such questions were irrelevant in understanding and pursuing the truth. His firm belief was that in the last analysis it is the truth, not historicity, that is most abiding, and that truth cannot be found in and through Page 18 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest intellectual- historical debates, but only in the experience of one’s life through spiritual pursuits.53 In fact, Aurobindo felt that there were three aspects in the Gita that proved the spiritual nature of the text and that made its historical examination trivial—the teacher, the disciple, and the context of teaching. The teacher was ‘God himself descended into humanity’; Krishna was only an external form; he was, in his inner consciousness, the divine himself, the avatar. The disciple was ‘the first, as we might say in modern language, the representative man of his age, closest friend and chosen instrument of the avatar’, not an ordinary being but spiritual pursuer. The occasion was ‘the violent crisis’, symbolizing ‘anguish and moral difficulty’54. Once the spiritual significance of these three things is admitted, Aurobindo argued, there is no need to bother about historical questions. Historical debates may have their significance in the arena of history, but hardly any religious importance. Historicity is a European fashion, and not the right method to understand the truth of the Gita and Krishna. Such controversies as the one that has raged in Europe over the historicity of Christ, would seem to a spiritually-minded Indian largely a waste of time … for what does it matter in the end whether a Jesus, son of the carpenter Joseph, was (p.145) actually born in Nazareth or Bethlehem … So too the Krishna who matters to us is the eternal incarnation of the Divine and not the historical teacher and leader of men.55 Hence, all historical and allegorical questions raised in the context of the Gita and the Mahabharata, that ‘the Gita is a later composition inserted into the mass of the Mahabharata by its author in order to invest its teaching with the authority and popularity of the great national epic’, were exercises in futility.
Although Aurobindo argued that the message of the Gita had nothing to do with historicity, he was deeply aware of the historical debates centered around Krishna and the Gita. He mentioned, for instance, several historical Krishnas that appear in the Chhandogyopanisad, Puranas, Harivamsha, and in a number of pre-Christian literatures.56 It was only to argue that these may have a great deal of historical importance; as far as the teaching of the text is concerned, however, the questions of historicity or ahistoricity are immaterial. The crucial aspect is its ethico-spiritual message. Ethical readings of the Gita have a similar viewpoint on the question of historicity. But for Aurobindo, the interpretation of the Gita as a mere allegory of the inner life with no concern for external life and action, as it deals with the struggle of the soul to reach a higher state, is a partial understanding of the text. For him, outward action and social conflict are not the central themes of the Gita, its core being the awakening of the inner soul, yet external action does occupy a definite place in its teaching ‘as the outer life is of immense importance for the inner development, and the consummation in the mental and physical Page 19 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest symbol assists the growth of the inner reality’57. The Gita was meant to solve the inner struggle of Arjuna, but it did so without ignoring his outer life. Hence, it has a bearing on the internal crisis at hand and the application of spirituality to the human social life. The argument that the text is concerned with the inner struggle only is not tenable. The language of the Veda and part at least of the Puranas is plainly symbolic, full of figures and concrete representations of things that lie behind the veil, but the Gita is written in plain terms and professes to solve the great ethical and spiritual difficulties which the life of man raises, and it will not do to go behind this plain language and thought and wrest them to the service of our fancy.58 To Aurobindo, then, the historical approach is not the appropriate method for determining the truth of the Gita. Its truth is spiritual, not historical. It is also not an object of critical or theoretical enquiry. Its truth (p.146) is to be found only in the experience of one’s life, by the perpetual practice of ethico-spiritual living. Much like the other nationalists of his day, Aurobindo rejected inferential and critical sciences as the foundations for modern India. He believed that nations should be founded on spiritual objectives and not historical or material concerns. Aurobindo also shared the belief that India would soon be the spiritual teacher of the world.
Himsa and Ahimsa For Aurobindo, the Gita called upon individuals to take refuge in and surrender themselves completely to the divine will. In its understanding of the universe, the Gita conceptualized individuals as mere instruments in the hands of God. It conceived of divine will as prevailing ultimately, and individuals’ reason as merely limited to admitting this truth of the universe and devoted to the evolution of divine consciousness or the knowledge that the self is God himself. In other words, human reason is completely subject to divine will. In such a spiritual trajectory, Aurobindo comes to terms with the Gita’s justification of the much critiqued and decried concept in ethical theory—the concept of violence. In his Essays on the Gita, he devoted four essays to the discussion of the Gita’s concept of violence. His argument in this regard was in no way corroborated by the ethical arguments of Bankim, Tilak, and Gandhi. For Gandhi, the Gita was basically a text on non-violence. For Bankim and Tilak, although, the Gita justified non-violence, in the final analysis it substantially supported violence on ethical grounds. Aurobindo went far beyond them and argued that the Gita was basically a text on violence and not non-violence, as he believed violence to be a natural and innate aspect of the universal project of emancipation59. Aurobindo begins these essays with the argument that for the Gita, the material life of human beings is a clash of vast and obscure forces, such as good and evil, spirit and flesh, light and darkness, and individual ego and cosmic spirit as symbolized by the Pandavas and Kauravas—the good and the far more numerous evil tendencies in man—leading to great crises such as that of Kurukshetra. He, however, thought that such clashes between contending forces were absolutely Page 20 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest essential, otherwise the cosmic cycle would cease to exist. Everything in the universe finds its meaning and place only in its relation with the opposite force. There is no good without evil, no higher spirituality without lower egocentric action, no light without darkness and no construction in the universe without destruction. All of them are natural parts of the human cycle60. In short, construction is facilitated naturally by destruction. (p.147) War, said Heraclitus, is the father of all things, War is the king of all … there is not only no construction here without destruction, no harmony except by a poise of contending forces won out of many actual and potential discords, but also no continued existence of life except by a constant self-feeding and devouring of other life.61 Aurobindo mentioned this truth as central even to modern science. Modern science, for instance, is founded on the truth that the visible world consists of contending and warring forces, due to which it proceeds and grows. This, Aurobindo argued, is nothing but a paraphrase of the ancient truth ‘expressed by the apophthegm of Heraclites and the figures employed by the Upanishads’. The Darwinian scientific theory of evolution too, he felt, was simply a rephrasing of this truth of construction and destruction. ‘The eater eating is eaten, this is the formula of the material world, as the Darwinians rediscovered when they laid it down that the struggle for life is the law of evolutionary existence.’62
Aurobindo argued that attempts at spiritual advancement should lie first in submission to this truth. Nietzsche’s theory of the essentiality of war and conflict as an aspect of life was also based on the acknowledgement of this truth. Even though Nietzsche’s conclusions were different from the ancient truths, Aurobindo viewed this theory as a modern attempt to rejuvenate the ancient truth and recall it to humanity, saving modern man from utter moral disaster.63 To Aurobindo, it is not only the material life and physical body that are conditioned by and subject to construction and destruction; there can be no progress in the intellectual, mental, and moral aspects of life, too, unless and until they undergo a similar kind of test in battle ‘between what exists and lives and what seeks to exist and live and between all that stands behind either’64. In other words, cosmic progress is stipulated by the dynamics of conflicting and discordant elements. As a result of the battle of these contending forces, the old is renewed or relieved as the case may be, and the perennial truth is constantly reshaped and developed. Man cannot control these contending forces, however hard he may try, by material or physical means; but he can do so by accepting and becoming part of them and striving for higher and final spiritual harmony. Aurobindo felt that as construction is conditioned by destruction, a complete repudiation of violence with non-violence is impossible because non-violence is conditioned naturally by violence. The technique of nonviolence can be employed in a perfect world or the perfect world with the highest spiritual harmony can underlie non-violence, but conflicting (p.148) forces cannot be Page 21 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest repelled by any method that is created by human reason— non-violence, soulforce, or self-sacrifice, and so on. To repel violence by the employment of soulforce or self-sacrifice is absurd because one’s abstinence from violence will not necessarily be reciprocated by others65. Aurobindo read in the Gita an acknowledgement that violence and nonviolence are part of the divine creation as good and evil are integral to the divine cycle. Complete non-violence in the physical or material sense is impossible as long as evil persists (evil does not merely imply external objects, it also includes internal attributes such as ego, love, hate, pity, compassion). Evil is a part of creation and hence cannot possibly be eliminated. Just as it would continue as a natural part, violence too would continue as a part of the divine creation.66 It is impossible, at least as men and things are … to observe really and utterly that principle of harmlessness … We will use only soul-force and never destroy by war … until soul-force is effective … But even soul-force, when it is effective, destroys … Evil cannot perish without the destruction of much that lives by the evil, and it is no less destruction even if we personally are saved the pain of a sensational act of violence.67 This does not, however, mean that Aurobindo did not admit the principles of selfsacrifice, soul-force, or non-violence as good. They are virtuous elements as they play a useful role in moulding the ethical character of man, but at the same time, he argued, we need to take cognizance of their opposites. The former do not lend themselves to the outcome that man intends. Often, the result is opposite. Further, self-sacrifice or nonviolence would not eliminate violence because in their highest expression they are the acknowledgement of the law of life by death and the existence of violent, selfassertive, and self-centred forces. Sacrifice at its highest ‘becomes an offering on the altar of some power that demands a victim in order that the work desired may be done’.68
Aurobindo mentioned, for instance, the patriot’s impulse to sacrifice himself for the protection of the country, or the religious martyr’s for the religious ideal. However, sooner or later, it becomes obvious that the course that events take does not correspond to these ideals.69 Therefore, Aurobindo thought that the Gita considered it an obligation on the part of spiritual man in the fulfillment of spiritual life to act for the elimination of evil forces and elevate humanity to the final harmony and not use soul-force or self-sacrifice to vanquish violence, evil, strife, and destruction. Since evil (violence) is part of the universal construct, it is impossible to attain spiritual perfection so long as it lingers; the spiritual man will (p.149) not only not abstain from the act of eliminating evil but will eagerly and earnestly participate in it. The Gita accepted the destruction of evil as part of one’s spiritual life. It involves less violence than the violence let loose by evil. Abstinence from violence would leave evil slayers of creatures scot-free, and this is no less an act of violence.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest To Aurobindo, the Gita shows universal dynamics and social existence caught up in the diametric of opposites—war and peace, strife and union, hatred and love, egoism and universality, death and immortality are opposite sides of the same existence. The terrible Kali is not only the protector but also the destroyer; Krishna is not only the creator of creatures but also the devourer—‘Time the Creator’ (Shiva), ‘Time the Destroyer’ (Rudra).70 As violence and non-violence are inseparable parts of the cosmic system, the solution does not lie in ethical replacement of war by peace or strife by union. It lies in the acceptance, appreciation, and submission to the discordance of existence and believing in the universal being and surrendering one’s will to the will of divine71#x2014;‘Give up all kinds of religion and surrender yourself to Me alone’. This reading of Aurobindo is completely inconsistent with Tilak’s reading of the Gita, as the latter argued that ‘the free will of man’ will endure even after achieving complete union with the highest. But the solution offered by the Gita, Aurobindo said, has never gripped the life of human beings across history because either the civilization was not prepared for such a solution or the evolution of nature did not admit and allow any such transcendence. The system of life in modern society is much more deceitful as it has discarded this truth of the Gita in order to establish itself on humanitarian concerns. Aurobindo stated optimistically that the day when men would submit to this truth was not far off and would occur soon.72
Himsa and the Institution of Varna Having argued the Gita’s acknowledgement of the presence of evil forces in nature and the necessity of struggle between contraries, Aurobindo felt that the Gita attempted to minimize the catastrophe of war by limiting the military obligation to a small class, that is, the kshatriyas who, by their birth, temperament and traditions, were marked out for this function. The kshatriyas were one among the other ethical types that the Gita drew up but the framework allowed them to fulfill their roles and thus attain spiritual evolution. ‘& the function of war was obliged to help in ennobling and elevating instead of brutalizing those who performed it’. Thus, the Gita, while reducing the outrageous effects of war, regulated it (p.150) to serve like other activities the ethical and spiritual development of the subject and of the race.73 Aurobindo did not regard the four-fold division of society outlined in the Gita either as social allotments or economic institutions. He did not regard them as ethical institutions either. He conceived of them as spiritual institutions that, taking into account the different forces that are at play in the universe, sought the spiritual enlightenment of all people. For him, they were specializations and functional divisions of society in terms of differences in nature, aimed at lessening the burden of engaging with all activities of social life by all categories of people by distributing each specialized function to a specialized body of the community whose temperament and nature suited that function. The four-fold Page 23 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest division was only the outward manifestation of general characteristics necessary for the completeness of human perfection. Hence, the emphasis was not so much on its external, social, economic, or ethical aspects but on the inner spiritual significance. Unlike ethical writers, for Aurobindo, these divisions were based on differences in souls and not three gunas (qualities) of the lower prakriti. Nature itself consists of four different kinds of souls (jiva or svabhava), each soul underlying a special property. These special characters of the souls determine the functions each soul should pursue in the external world. The special character of one soul is thought and knowledge, the second soul is valour and courage, the third is production and marketing, and the fourth labour and service. It is by pursuing the function suited to one’s soul that one can attain spiritual enlightenment.74 For Aurobindo, the Gita supported the Aryan social order by viewing man primarily as a spiritual being and the social order as a device for the spiritual development of each division and not for social or altruistic fulfillment.75 Thought and knowledge, war and government, production and distribution, labour and service were carefully differentiated functions of society, each assigned to those who were naturally called to it and providing the right means by which they could individually proceed towards their spiritual development and self-perfection.76 It was on the basis of the Gita’s attempt to reduce the burden of undertaking every activity by a single community, particularly actions such as war, that Aurobindo criticized the modern social order based on mere socio-economic considerations as universal in its distress compared to the one described by the Gita. He viewed it as good for the all-round development of human personality as it conceives man a thinker, worker, (p.151) artist, philosopher, priest, merchant, producer, defender, fighter all in one, but it is too social and economic, overemphasizing external aspects rather than inner spiritual evolution. It is also too universal in its consequences. Aurobindo mentions, for instance, the nature of modern war, which is not only not limited to a particular community but is universal and indiscriminate in its destruction.
Aurobindo thought that there were two important reasons given in the Gita in defence of physical violence, and in justification of Arjuna’s part in the battle of Kurukshetra. The first was based on the enduring character of the soul and the fleeting nature of the physical body. Since the soul is permanent, the death of a being is only a moment in spiritual evolution and a necessary step in man’s progress towards immortality. Hence, whether Arjuna willed it or not, all those kings (including Arjuna) who partook in the war could not escape from the clutches of nature because ‘death was already given to every creature’77 in the form of an inevitable circumstance of the soul’s self-manifestation. For Aurobindo, the killing of the Kauravas in the war by Arjuna was justified on four major grounds. First, the Dhritarastrians represented the unrighteous and dark forces in the battle of Kurukshetra, and the Gita lends sanction to the killing of unrighteous forces. From the point of view of the Kauravas, it would help them Page 24 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest evolve from unrighteousness to righteousness and from righteousness to spirituality since destruction was an essential step in the spiritual journey. Secondly, from Arjuna’s point of view, killing of the unrighteous asuric elements would be a matter of merit that would take him from the base nature to the higher state of spirituality because spiritual evolution necessarily involves the destruction of forces that thwart such progress. Third, from the general standpoint, killing of the unrighteous forces would protect the innocents, and ‘those who were excused from that duty, debarred from protecting themselves, and therefore, at the mercy of the strong and the violent (Kshatriyas)’. And fourth, from the point of view of nature, it was a necessary part in its evolution. The second was based on the social idea of duty and honour. The svabhava of the kshatriyas is ‘courage, bravery, nobility, force, etc’; their svadharma lies in the protection of the right and vulnerable from the unrighteous forces and ‘an unflinching acceptance of the gage of battle is their virtue and duty’. Slaying unrighteous elements is an occasion for their inner development, their spiritual progress. Arjuna, being a kshatriya, was thus justified in killing the Kauravas. In other words, Krishna’s exhortation to Arjuna to fight the righteous battle of (p. 152) Kurukshetra, coming unsought, was also due to the fact that it was the dharma of the kshatriya. His virtue and his duty (svadharma required by the svabhava of the Kshatriyas) lie in battle and not in abstention from battle; it is not slaughter, but non-slaying which would here be the sin.78
Himsa and the Notion of Vishvarupa Aurobindo further clarified this argument in two other essays—‘The Vision of the World-Spirit—Time the Destroyer’ and ‘The Vision of the World-Spirit—The Double Aspect’. Here he considered the meaning and significance of the inscrutable vishvarupa (the transcendental majesty of the divine) revealed to Arjuna in the middle of the Gita discourse.79 He felt that it was to demonstrate that ahimsa and himsa, construction and destruction, Ishwara and Rudra, and the pleasing and the odious are different faces of the truth, that the Gita brought to the fore the anecdote of universal spirit, vishvarupa, all-comprehending vision of God, half representing Ishwara with divine qualities of grace, love, and beauty, and the other half representing Rudra with the abhorrent qualities of the terrible. This implied that these contraries are necessary movements in the life of people towards the establishment of the kingdom of right and truth, dharmarajya. Hence, for the Gita, this other negative and frightful aspect is also a natural and ubiquitous quality of God as much as the qualities of love, beauty, assurance, and resplendence. For Aurobindo, any human attempt to refuse these dimensions because they are horrid, unpleasant, and hard to bear would be nothing more than closing one’s eyes to truth.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest The raw religionist, the superficial optimistic thinker, the sentimental idealist, the man at the mercy of his sensations and emotions agree in twisting away from the sterner conclusions, the harsher and fiercer aspects of universal existence. Indian religion has been ignorantly reproached for not sharing in this general game of hiding, because, on the contrary, it has built and placed before it the terrible as well as the sweet and beautiful symbols of the Godhead.80 Understanding God only as ‘Time the Protector’ and refusing to see ‘Time the Destroyer’ is to see existence only partially and piecemeal. The truth should be understood in its entirety; God the prodigal creator, benign preserver, and time the devourer, and creation and destruction as ineluctable. The human attempt to cease or marginalize the destructive dimension will not, in any way, prevent the universe from its furious actions. Therefore, acceptance and subordination to this reality is the (p. 153) only path available; for Aurobindo, the divine transfiguration signified this truth. ‘The discords of the worlds are God’s discords and it is only by accepting and proceeding through them that we can arrive at the greater concords of his supreme harmony’.81
In fact, Aurobindo’s was the first nationalist discourse to interpret the account of the divine transfiguration—World Spirit—in this way. Tilak, for instance, considered it the culmination of the highest knowledge; for Gandhi, it was the absolute truth. Bankim and Vivekananda did not set on its hermeneutic. For Aurobindo, this was the meaning of vishvarupa; man, his reason, his action, its results, and hence, everything in the world moves as per the divine will, and nature is an instrument and executive force of this will.82 This, however, does not mean that destruction is the only underlying quality and essential will of the universal existence; it only means that creation is chequered by equilibrium of preservation and destruction as was shown in the vishvarupa. Destruction is followed by construction and construction, in turn, is conditioned by destruction. When man obliterates his ego-character, for instance, he constructs himself in the supreme character. Every nation, community, and race would be extirpated when the time comes, which would result in the creation of a new nation, community, and race ‘as these things are no accident, but an inevitable seed that has been sown and a harvest that must be reaped’.83 The present will of the divine in Kurukshetra was destruction, and abstention by Arjuna would not obstruct nature’s movement, ‘will not help, and will not prevent the fulfillment of the destroying will’.84 This kind of interpretation by Aurobindo has specific implications for his understanding of national resurgence. He considered the destruction that the British had introduced as divine will, providing an opportunity for selfdevelopment through spiritual war for India just as the Kauravas had given to the Pandavas. The destruction of the British element by Indians in the spiritual evolution was also divine will as the destruction of the Kauravas by the Pandavas was a movement towards the establishment of dharmarajya, and the will of Page 26 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest Krishna. That destruction must, Aurobindo insisted, take place; it could not be avoided by any other alternative, soul-force, self-sacrifice, non-violence, or abstention from karma. Therefore, ‘no real peace can be till the heart of man deserves peace; the law of Vishnu cannot prevail till the debt to Rudra is paid … Christ and Buddha have come and gone, but it is Rudra who still holds the world’.85 (p.154) It will be noticed here that Aurobindo’s spiritual interpretation of the text did not place any importance on the elements of human reason and will in relation to ‘human thought’ and ‘knowledge’, or the progress of existence. He undermined human freedom and privileged God’s will. Further, he regarded the human body as a mere event and moment in the universal plan, having no value in itself except when related to divinity. Human reason and will are not ‘free will’, as conceptualized by ethicists, but are called upon to make an uncritical submission to the will of the divinity. Nature becomes the executive mechanism of the divine will and men and all other manifest forces are at the behest of that will. Implicit in Aurobindo’s thought is the great influence of the late nineteenthcentury Christian theology, particularly as came to be formulated by several influential thinkers going back to Calvin. As in this theology, Aurobindo exalted the absolute transcendence of God and proportionately limited the scope of human powers and capacities and man’s dependence on His grace. Aurobindo’s nationalist writing seems to be completely patting the revolutionaries and radicals of his day and their incessant justification, sometimes unblushing, of violence.
Nishkama Karma, Sacrifice, and Loksamgraha The central position that strikingly distinguished Aurobindo from the general orthodox readings of the text and also from other contemporaneous interpretations, particularly ethical readings, was his criticism and rejection of social interpretations of nishkama karma, sacrifice, and loksamgraha. In five consecutive essays in his Essays on the Gita, Aurobindo established that the Gita never expounded nishkama karma, sacrifice, and loksamgraha in the sociological, ordinary, or ethico-moral sense, as the Karmayogic readers had proved, but its concern was outrightly spiritual. The whole argument was that as long as man’s action is rooted in ego and transient concerns, he will never be able to overcome the predicaments of his life; and as long as he remains engrossed in social action, it precludes desirelessness. Real desirelessness is possible when man surpasses ego-based social action and stands above and beyond social concerns. The Gita’s philosophy of Karmayoga, Aurobindo thought, begins from this state of brahmic consciousness, which underlies the necessity of preliminary understanding of the reality of universe and not from the ordinary social state in which man is dwelling.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest In the first of the five essays, ‘The Yoga of the Intelligent Will’,86 Aurobindo argued that the Gita’s philosophy of work and desirelessness (p.155) begins with the significance of the acquisition of ‘brahmic consciousness’, and the recourse to intelligent will is the foundation to set on this exploration. This intelligent will requires the pursuer to withdraw himself from ego-based actions and destroy his lower self-formations to understand the truth of the manifest world. For it is because he acts ignorantly … It is because of this wrong intelligence that he has hope and fear, wrath and grief and transient joy; otherwise works are possible with a perfect serenity and freedom … To act with right intelligence and, therefore, a right will, fixed in the One, aware of the one self in all and acting out of its equal serenity, not running about in different directions … is the Yoga of the intelligent will (brahmic consciousness).87 Aurobindo thought that the Gita, following the Samkhya classification of prakriti (nature force) and purusha (soul force), classified intelligence (consciousness) into two forms: ‘there are, says the Gita, two types of intelligence in human being’, one is the social intelligence that evolves from the nature-force and the other is brahmic intelligence derived from the ‘original, conscious soul’. In social intelligence, man’s consciousness is dissipated and scattered in ‘intractable outward life and works and their fruits’.88 He remains under the domination and control of the nature force whose foundation is desire, passion or emotions: ‘That life is the life of desire’. In brahmic intelligence, on the other hand, his consciousness is fixed and stilled in one truth. He remains under the control and influence of the soul force, the characteristic of which is desirelessness, renunciation, and freedom from passions and emotions. The two forms of intelligence correspondingly perform two different functions: social consciousness takes man downwards and keeps him in the perplexing state of prakriti with its triple play, but the brahmic consciousness, while rejecting discursive actions of the social intelligence, leads to liberation. In other words, standing above the social consciousness and the distractions of nature in the brahmic consciousness is, for Aurobindo, the first clue of spiritual evolution.
It is the upward and inward orientation of the intelligent will that we must resolutely choose with a settled concentration and perseverance, vyavasaya; we must fix it firmly in the calm self-knowledge of the Purusa.89 Aurobindo insisted that when the text talked about the renunciation of prakriti to take refuge in the soul, it did not speak of physical renunciation of work or an external asceticism as Samkhya interpretations understood. Such a subjective and physical relinquishment is impossible; in fact, it is (p.156) possible only with the the death of body. It is retirement, nivritti, from the objects of the senses and not the sense organs themselves. It is not subjective cessation of the object but an inner withdrawal, a renunciation of desire. And this nivritti ‘is possible, param drstva, by the vision of the Supreme’.90
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Nation in Spiritual Quest Thus, Aurobindo thought that karma merely as physical activity is the least of the concerns in the Gita. Its main concern is mental activity; since mental existence is the instrumental cause for all physical activities, its purification is the first requirement; physical purification would naturally and automatically follow. Any work done through this purified mind does not bring bondage to the soul as ‘the soul has reached to naiskarmya’. Therefore, what is important, if not possible, is the intelligent withdrawal of the will from the activity of prakriti, ‘as the tortoise draws in its limbs into the shell’ into the desireless calm, unity, and passionless serenity of brahmic poise (pure soul); the action of prakriti through the physical body would continue—not as desire but as a natural process. This was how, Aurobindo thought, the Gita advanced the concept of nishkama karma as part of the brahmic intelligence, the original and pure soul, by overriding prakriti. Only in this state can one be really desireless as he has surged out of prakriti, the ordinary motives for human activities and desires. In this state, knowledge and actions are not antithetical; the former finds its fulfillment in the latter. In social intelligence, not only are knowledge and karma antithetical but also bondage and hence, cannot become desireless. It is non-attachment; it is to do works without clinging with the mind to the objects of sense and the fruit of the works. Not complete inaction…an impossibility … For knowledge does not mean renunciation of works; it means equality and non-attachment to desire … high-uplifted above the lower instrumentation of Prakriti.91 Aurobindo criticized the sociological, ethical and Samkhya interpretations of nishkama karma as narrow and untenable. In fact, ‘nityakarma’, ‘kartavyakarma’, and ‘niyatakarma’ are the terms for which the karmayogi, Samkhya and Aurobindo advanced different meanings as appropriate to their stereotyped readings. For the ethicists, nishkama karma meant disinterested performance of one’s social duty; for the Samkhya it denoted the disinterested performance of Vedic sacrifice. But both are based on the acknowledgement of the ineluctable character of karma. The karmayogi performs these formal social works fixed by external rules not because they are enjoined by the sastras but impelled by prakriti; for (p.157) the Samkhya performs sacrifice because it is enjoined by the sastras. Both regard nishkama karma as derived from pure reason and will (sattva), as part of prakriti. But neither of these, Aurobindo thought, was rational because in the text desirelessness is used to imply spiritual works controlled by the purified buddhi and the awakened soul without any trace of the influence of prakriti (ego). This ‘impersonality’ can neither be accomplished by the simple obliging of the sastric rule nor by undertaking one’s social duty as driven by prakrit, but by transcending both in the pure soul. For, Aurobindo, prakriti is the foundation of desires; in the impersonal, pure soul desire can find no place.
For what we call ordinarily disinterested action is not really desireless; it is simply a replacement of certain smaller personal interests by other larger desires … All action … done by the Gunas of Prakriti, by our nature; in acting according to the Sastra we are still acting according to our nature … That is what the Gita teaches and desirelessness is only a means to this Page 29 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest end … It is evident that all works and not merely sacrifice and social duties can be done in this spirit; any action may be done either from the egosense, narrow or enlarged, or for the sake of the Divine.92 Having thus criticized the modern Karmayogic interpretation of nishkama karma, Aurobindo followed the same method of reasoning to interpret the notion of sacrifice. When the Gita spoke about sacrifice, Aurobindo argued, it was not done in the Vedic sense because in Vedic sacrifice, the intelligent will does not transcend the ego, mind, and senses and is motivated by the acquisition of transient pleasure. The Gita regarded as sacrifice all the offerings to the divine that are derived from the pure soul (not dominated or influenced by prakriti) in which the intelligent will would return from the ‘differentiating powers of nature to the undifferentiating and immutable’.93
This does not mean that the Gita denounced Vedic sacrifice as altogether useless, as it does not denounce prakriti altogether; it merely suggested transcendence from prakriti and Vedic sacrifice in the pure purusha. Vedic sacrifice and its material results are good and better than social sacrifice, as it will eventually put the agents on the right path of spirituality, but will have to be transcended for true spiritual realization. It is in this sense that, Aurobindo argues, the Gita regarded Vedic sacrifice as inferior to brahmic sacrifice. But the highest only comes when the sacrifice is no longer to the gods, but to the one all-pervading Divine established in the sacrifice … In that self and not in any personal enjoyment he finds now his sole satisfaction … selfdelight is all-sufficient to him, but does works for the sake of the Divine only, as a pure (p.158) sacrifice, without attachment or desire … Thus is sacrifice his way of attaining to the Highest.94 For Aurobindo, the concept of loksamgraha, too, is not used in the text in the socioutilitarian sense of bringing about universal social welfare; its concern is primarily spiritual.95 It is for the same reason and on the same grounds as nishkama karma and sacrifice that Aurobindo criticized and rejected the modern ethico-social interpretation of loksamgraha.
It is not the rule of a large moral and intellectual altruism, which is here announced, but that of a spiritual unity with God … It is not an injunction to subordinate the individual to society and humanity or immolate egoism … but to fulfill the individual in God and to sacrifice the ego … the modern mind which is at the stage indeed of a struggle to shake off the coils of egoism, but is still mundane in its outlook and intellectual and moral rather than spiritual in its temperament.96 Aurobindo thought that the ethical conception of loksamgraha violated the spiritual assertions of the text by subordinating the spiritual life to the claims of society. For the Gita, man’s response to the spiritual call is more crucial than the demands of social life, hence, it expected the individual to surpass his ego-based deeds not on the altar of the collective society but on divinity. A strong assertion of individualism that dominated eighteenth-century Europe is implicit in Aurobindo.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest [F]irst the development of the individual, the highest need of the individual … not by losing all his personal aims in the aims of an organized human society, but by enlarging heightening, aggrandizing himself … Gita is the rule for the masterman, the superman, the divinized human being, the Best, not in the sense of any Nietzschean, any one-sided and lopsided, any Olympian, Apollonian or Dionysian, any angelic or demoniac supermanhood, but in that of the man whose whole personality has been offered up into the being … loss of the smaller self has found its greater self …97 In fact, Aurobindo interpreted loksamgraha in two different ways, but both as related to spirituality. First, he related it to the avatar. He referred to the term loksamgraha here to imply the attempt on the part of the avatar to spiritualize people, to help them transcend the allurements of the external world, and to set their egoistic personality on the track of higher unegoistic spirituality. This is the desire a person in brahmic consciousness will have to retain in his action, a desire not of the mind but of the pure soul. The motive behind loksamgraha, cikirsur, is neither personal nor altruistic, for that has been abandoned; it is not even self-development by means of disinterested work, ‘for the call has been (p.159) answered, the development is perfect and fulfilled’. The motive behind such action, therefore, is to enlighten others, to prevent the world from ‘falling into the bewilderment and confusion’.98
Secondly, in the essay ‘The Principle of Divine Works’, Aurobindo said that ‘the sadaka (perfect seeker) would perform all functions as sacrifice for loksamgraha’. He used the term loksamgraha here to mean ‘for the sake of God’. Hence, he would perform all the functions for the spiritualization of people and this function is for the sake of God. He not only interprets his own action as derived from the Brahman but also attempts, by providing his own example and inspiration, to prompt people’s actions, too, to be derived from the same cradle.99 This was the meaning, Aurobindo thought, of the Gita’s notions of nishkama karma, sacrifice, and loksamgraha. However, neither nishkama karma nor sacrifice nor loksamgraha nor the state of brahmic consciousness was the supreme aim of the text; they are only the gateways; the final aim is to transcend all these to unite with the all-pervading purusottama. By interpreting nishkama karma, sacrifice, and loksamgraha as integral to the brahmic consciousness, and calling the subordination of society and social interests to individual spiritual interest, Aurobindo strongly subscribed to a form of spiritual elitism. This also implied that he quite disregarded the masses constituting the nation. He did not give any importance to different pursuits that individuals carry out in social life according to their ability and competence. He did not even place any emphasis on socio-ethical virtues that build, guide, and control social life and social order. In fact, Aurobindo did not reckon with the existence of large masses in India who, by disposition or necessity, cannot undertake the kind of journey that he had in store for India. More importantly, he completely ignored the tremendous impact that the Gita had had in shaping
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Nation in Spiritual Quest the ethico-social life of the people. It was these values through which thinkers like Bankim, Tilak, and others attempted to rejuvenate the Indian nation.
Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Self-realization It is clear in Aurobindo’s interpretation that the concepts of karma, jnana, and bhakti are treated not as compartmentalized or competing elements but complementary paths, and ‘three interdependent’ movements merging in ‘integral life’. Neither karma nor jnana nor bhakti alone, as exclusivist ways, will push man to the highest state of paramesvara, nor will they make him an effective channel and instrument of the divine. For such a pursuit, all these attributes have to be coalesced together—‘integral (p.160) self-finding through action, integral self-becoming through knowledge and integral self-giving through love’.100 This integrated life, not mere desirelessness, is the highest teaching of the text, a life where desireless karma unites with desireless jnana, and bhakti into one ‘integrated truth’. ‘Love completes the triple cord of the sacrifice, perfects the triune key of the highest secret uttamam rahasyam’.101 First, it is through knowledge that man realizes the unity of the self, paramatman, and all existence, and perceives the body as representing the lower nature. This knowledge begins with discerning and differentiating between the lower prakriti and the self, which leads to spiritual vision. This illumination helps him outgrow ego-based actions, to grow into one’s true being and see all existence without exception in the self. True knowledge will, therefore, by its very nature break obstacles to reflect itself in universal love expressed in dedicated and detached service. Knowledge does not contradict karma; both are reciprocal and inevitably interdependent. Second, that which is gained by knowledge will persist through karma in the form of submission of the entire will, thought, and action to the will of divine. This submission is not passionate but supported by knowledge and bhakti. Third, knowledge thus gained in the first movement and the submissive spirit obtained in the second step will find their fulfillment in devotion. Bhakti does not imply lip-worship or infirm praise of God; it is boundless love and faith in the divine will. Bhakti supported by knowledge and action will take the form of sacrifice. This was how Aurobindo understood the Gita’s synthesis of karma, jnana, and bhakti in the integrated life. So comes a synthesis of mind and heart and will in the one self and spirit and with it the synthesis of knowledge, love and works in this integral union, this embracing God-realization, this divine Yoga.102 When man unfolds into the integrated life through harmonious paths of karma, jnana, and bhakti, he becomes one with God and an effective channel of Him, the highest teaching of the text.103 The sectarian understanding of karma, jnana, and bhakti is conceived as contrary to the integral philosophy in Aurobindo’s nationalist discourse.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest An Orientalist Image Aurobindo brackets all the contemporary interpretations of the Gita that immediately preceded him as Karmayogic interpretations, which are caught up in the insinuations of the world. This is based on his concept of the two-fold journey, the ascent and the descent. While the atman tends (p.161) to attain the divine, that search could be complete only by the divine descending into the self. He thought that this alone could be a feasible interpretation of the theory of avatar. The Karmayogic interpretations mistake the ascent of the soul for the descent of the divine and, therefore, they are primarily stuck in the dynamics of this world and in offering blueprints for its improvement. For Aurobindo, the surrender of the self before the divine is the essential prerequisite for the ultimate release from this world. This is what the Gita upholds as Arjuna is asked to give up all his concerns and submit himself to the divine will, to the descent of the divine. Accordingly Aurobindo privileges certain parts of the Gita over others. But the self, which surrenders itself to the divine, is not the ordinary self but the self that has succeeded in breaking all its ties and attachments with the world. The Gita addresses such an ascendant self and not the common people. The elitism that Aurobindo subscribes to marks him out among all major interpretations of the Gita in contemporary times. It is the spiritually ascendant elites who are the bearers of the age-old spiritual quest, the representative quest of India. For Aurobindo, true nationalism rests in this quest and it is this example that India should hold forth before the world. Aurobindo regarded Indian nationalism as an avatar and consequently the descent of God on earth. This sets the task before the Indian nation; it should pursue a relentless spiritual quest, which was its characteristic in the past. For him, the masses do not have much of a role to play in this quest except as silent spectators, as they simply cannot pursue such a stupendous ideal. Aurobindo thought that the overthrow of the British from India would lead to the flourishing of such a spiritual quest, which would not be confined to India. It is on the basis of this criterion that a fundamental critique of the moral foundations of the West has to be carried out instead of bowing down to their ideologies and institutions. He shared the widespread belief that India was destined to be the spiritual leader of the world. In Aurobindo’s formulation, the historicity of the nation is fully undermined and the nation is conceived as the site of ethics, morality and spirituality. He did not focus on the constitutional order and the organization of political power in the nation. Aurobindo marginalized human freedom in a central way and exalted the divine will. Consequently, there is not much place in his interpretation for reason, dignity, and capacity of the average people. In a way, Aurobindo’s ideal was the transcendent and supremely free divine akin to the God of Calvin.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (p.162) Human freedom, individually and collectively, has little role to play in shaping events and processes as they are ultimately governed by the divine will. The course of violence or non-violence is not open to human options; the divine plan is in operation through either of them or even without them. This position of Aurobindo severely undercuts a moral regime founded on human reason. In a way, human reason is reduced to being a spectator before the divine splendour. The attribution of agency to the human person itself becomes an illusion. Although it is assumed that Aurobindo seemed to disregard any consideration towards concrete social relations, he definitely upheld the varna distinctions in society on the grounds of specialization and functional divisions of the society by giving it a spiritual aura. Such specialization is attributed to temperament and the nature of the concerned social agent. In a way, he fashioned an overt spiritual racism through the gradation of souls. It is quite difficult to make sense of his nationalism when it makes no allowance for the spiritually unevolved non-yogis. Aurobindo’s ‘elitism’ is a reflection of his revolutionary days. Further, Aurobindo seems to reproduce the orientalist image of India as primarily a spiritual realm and is little concerned with the sociopolitical and ethical challenges before the Indian nation. When he was arrested in 1908 by the British government for antigovernment activities is when, it is said, he read the ancient Indian scriptures extensively and he stated: ‘The British imprisonment has given me an opportunity to see Purusottama. They are the enemies who craved my destruction but far from destruction, it constructed and unfolded my truth.’104 Notes:
(1.) Aurobindo Ghosh was a philosopher, mystic, one of the greatest spiritual leaders of modern India, and a widely acclaimed expounder of Indian philosophy. He wrote extensive commentaries on Indian scriptures. Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, has published most of his original writings. On the life of Sri Aurobindo, see A.B. Purani, The Life of Sri Aurobindo, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1978; his Sri Aurobindo: Some Aspects of His Vision, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1977; Haridas Chaudhuri, Sri Aurobindo: The Prophet of Life Divine, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1973; Peter Heehs, Sri Aurobindo: A Brief Biography, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989; Sisirkumar Mitra, Sri Aurobindo, New Delhi, 1972; John Price, An Introduction to Sri Aurobindo’s Philosophy, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1982. (2.) The first series of Essays on the Gita that appeared in the Arya were published in book form in 1922, 1926, 1937, 1944, and 1949 and the second series in 1928, 1942, 1945, and 1949. The Sri Aurobindo Library, New York, published both these series in a one-volume edition in 1950. The present study is
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Nation in Spiritual Quest based on Essays on the Gita, Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1970 (hereafter Essays). (3.) The seventh and eighth slokas of the fourth chapter: yadayada hi dharmasya glanirbhavati bharata I abhyutthanamadharmasya tadatmanam srijamyaham II (4.7) paritranaya sadhunam vinasaya ca duskrtam I dharmasamstapanartaya sambhavami yuge yuge II (4.8)
(O Bharata! Whenever Righteousness declines and Unrighteousness becomes powerful, then I Myself come to birth. I take birth in different Yugas for protecting the Righteous and destroying the Unrighteous, and for establishing Righteousness [dharma].) (4.) Aurobindo interprets the same verse not as related to an ordinary person but to sthitaprajna, a moral man, and for spiritual meaning. For Tilak, this verse implies that man, while performing his duty, would surrender himself to the perceptible God; Aurobindo thought that it never indicates the perceptible God (saguna brahman), but surrender to the imperceptible brahman (nirguna brahman). And thus, they understand this sloka according to their respective interpretations—Karmayogic and spiritual. In the sloka ‘your authority extends only to the performance of action’, ‘performance of action’ implies for Tilak all actions in one’s state. For Aurobindo, it implies the action of surrendering oneself to the imperceptible brahman and hence, it is not ordinary action. This difference between Aurobindo and Tilak actually sets the tone for their interpretations of the text. (5.) Essays, p. 1. (6.) Ibid., pp. 1–2. (7.) Ibid., pp. 2–3. (8.) Ibid., p. 3. (9.) Ibid., pp. 3–4, 26, etc. (10.) Ibid., pp. 4–5. (11.) Ibid., pp. 62–86. For Aurobindo, the word Samkhya in the text does not indicate Kapila Samkhya, nor does Yoga imply Patanjala Yoga. Ibid., p. 5. (12.) Ibid., pp. 5–6. (13.) Ibid., pp. 6–8. (14.) Ibid., pp. 27–8. Page 35 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (15.) Ibid., p. 32. (16.) Ibid., p. 28. (17.) Ibid., pp. 29–30. (18.) Ibid., p. 30. (19.) Ibid., pp. 30–1. (20.) Ibid., p. 31. (21.) Ibid., pp. 31–2. (22.) Ibid., p. 28. (23.) Ibid., p. 29. (24.) Ibid., p. 162. (25.) Ibid., p. 28. (26.) Ibid., p. 150. (27.) Ibid., p. 153. (28.) Ibid., pp. 146–8. (29.) Ibid., pp. 10–11. (30.) Ibid., pp. 140, 146–7. (31.) Ibid., pp. 140, 150. (32.) Ibid., p. 149. The Gita, by outlining the unity between the divinity and cosmic phenomenon, provided a rational basis and deep theoretical and philosophical foundation for the system of mukti or realization and the Advaitic statement of ‘see oneself in all and all in oneself’. It also questioned the Dvaitic conception of separateness between the divinity and cosmic elements. Hence, mukti or realization or conceiving ‘oneself in all and all in oneself’ are no longer dogmas or dry intellectual conceptions but founded in the deep metaphysical and religious truth. Aurobindo is now theoretically justified in his assertion that for the Gita, all cosmic elements are mere ‘instruments in the hands of God’, hence its objective is ‘sarvadharman parityajya mamekam saranamvraja’—a concept of realization. Ibid., pp. 140–67. (33.) Ibid., p. 141. (34.) Ibid., p. 140. Page 36 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (35.) Ibid., pp. 141–2. (36.) Ibid., p. 10. (37.) Ibid., p. 142. (38.) Ibid., p. 151. (39.) Ibid., p. 152. Arjuna was not an avatar but vibhuti. Therefore, the questions he raised in the beginning of the war never expressed his ignorance but the awakening of the spirit in the second birth, from the veil of ignorance to the supreme in the hour of spiritual crisis. Ibid., pp. 352–62. (40.) Ibid., p. 153. (41.) Ibid., pp. 154–5. (42.) It may be noted here that Aurobindo also differed from the ethical readers in understanding the objectives of the avatar. Like the ethical readings, he recognized two objectives for divine incarnation, but unlike the former who limited it to the ethical objectives, he went far beyond and located them within the contours of spirituality. Both seem to be right on their own grounds as it is neither possible to negate the importance of the ethical element in the text, nor is Aurobindo’s position unjustifiable, because the supreme and ultimate aim of ethical life is always the attainment of divinity. (43.) Ibid., pp. 140–1. (44.) Ibid., pp. 150–1. (45.) Ibid., p. 156. (46.) Ibid., pp. 139–40. (47.) Ibid., pp. 159–60. (48.) Aurobindo stated that the crises in which avatars occurred in different stages of history, such as Krishna to kill ‘unjust Kauravas’, Rama to kill ‘unrighteous Ravana’, Parasurama to destroy the ‘princely caste, the Kshatriyas’, Vamana to destroy ‘Titan Bali’, etc., were of spiritual nature. Ibid., pp. 160–1. (49.) ‘Dharma in the spiritual sense is not morality or ethics. Dharma … is action governed by the Svabhava, the essential law of one’s nature.’ Ibid., p. 263. (50.) Ibid., pp. 162–3. (51.) Ibid., p. 163.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (52.) Ibid., pp. 164–5. The word ‘loksamgraha’ has been used in the text not in the utilitarian or ethical sense, but in the spiritual sense, to make man aware of the divine truth. (53.) Ibid., p. 162. (54.) Ibid., p. 10. Aurobindo, in three consecutive essays, ‘The Divine Teacher’, ‘The Human Disciple’ and ‘The Core of the Teaching’, asserted that these were only divine examples given by God to man to be perfected in human existence. Essays, pp. 9–35. (55.) Ibid., p. 12. (56.) For Aurobindo, the human Krishna in the Gita has only symbolic and allegorical significance. The real significance lies in his spiritual role. Ibid., pp. 12–14. (57.) Ibid., pp. 157–8. (58.) Ibid., pp. 17–18. (59.) According to Aurobindo, Arjuna was asked to fulfill violent and not nonviolent activities. This was implied in such words as ‘inevitable circumstances’ (apariharyerthe), ‘body being killed’ (hanyamane sarire), ‘sorrow for those who are dead’ (shoka), etc. Therefore, Gandhi’s argument that the Gita only signifies a spiritual war or battle was, for Aurobindo, incorrect and an untenable position. (60.) For Aurobindo, violent activity is a step forward in the spiritual quest and a march towards establishing non-violence (supreme peace). Essays, p. 37. (61.) Ibid., p. 37. (62.) Ibid., p. 38. (63.) Ibid., p. 38. (64.) Ibid., p. 39. (65.) It is implicit here that Aurobindo rejected Gandhi’s philosophy that ‘if one hits you on one cheek show the other’, and defeat evil by soul force. (66.) For Aurobindo, this was what Krishna meant when he declared to Arjuna that ‘even if you (Arjuna) do not kill these people who stand before you, they would not last for long and creation would devour them when the time comes— Lord the Universal Destroyer’. (67.) Essays, p. 39. Page 38 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (68.) Ibid., p. 40. (69.) Aurobindo employs this part of the Gita to justify violence against British colonialism. Ibid., pp. 40–1. (70.) Shiva is the symbol of peace, union, love, universality, immortality etc., Rudra is the sign of war, strife, hatred, death etc., Shiva creates and the same Shiva becomes Rudra (destroyer) and destroys creatures when the time comes and thus keeps the cycle of the universe intact. Aurobindo devoted two essays to explain the two faces of the creator, ‘Time the Protector’ (Shiva) and ‘Time the Destroyer’ (Rudra). Ibid., pp. 363–81. (71.) This is how Aurobindo reads the eleventh verse of the second chapter— ‘gatasunagatasumca manusocanti panditaha‘—Knowers do not lament for the dead or the not dead; and the sixty-sixth verse of the eighteenth chapter— sarvadharman parityajya mamekam saranam vraja. (72.) Ibid., p. 45. (73.) Ibid., p. 47. (74.) Aurobindo’s argument with regard to the Gita’s concept of chaturvarnya diverges strikingly not merely from those of the ethical proponents but, in fact, almost all interpretations of the Indian scriptures. All these readings agree that although the concept in itself and its external appearance have very little value, still it is a necessary means and proper channel for attaining the higher position. Besides, there is nothing in this theory that approves the contemporary caste system. Nevertheless, there is this difference between the views of different commentators: For ethical interpretations, ‘svabhava’ implies the qualities determined by the three gunas and ‘Svadharma’ corresponds to these differences in the qualities. For Aurobindo, svabhava never implies this lower prakriti of three qualities but the atman, a partial truth of Purusottama, and svadharma means work determined by the ‘real atmic nature’. Hence, the brahmana, kshatriya, vaisya and sudra are not determined by the differences in the qualities of satva, rajas, and tamas, which are in hierarchical order, but the ‘jiva’ itself takes four forms and divisions. ‘There are four distinct orders of the active nature, or four fundamental types of the soul in nature, svabhava, and the work and proper function of each human being corresponds to his type of nature’. Essays, p. 492. Hence, in the Gita’s statement, ‘It was created by Me according to the divisions of the Gunas and Works’—the gunas (qualities) imply, for the ethical readers, the qualities of satva, rajas, and tamas; for Aurobindo, they imply divine law, the svabhava, that is, the atman or a part of the Purusottama. And Arjuna was asked to do all works, svadharma, by standing on the svabhava of the atman and not the gunas of prakriti. Here, Aurobindo may probably be right in his criticism of the ethical writers. On the one hand, they say that these divisions are based on the divisions in qualities, brahmana-sattva, Page 39 of 41
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Nation in Spiritual Quest kshatriya-sattva+rajas, vaisya-rajas+tamas and shudra-tamas; on the other hand, these do not imply superior-inferior relations. But satva, rajas, and tamas are not indiscriminate orders, ethically, religiously and spiritually; they imply higher-lower qualities. How can a system, which is based on these inferiorsuperior relations, become equal for the socio-ethical purpose? For Aurobindo that problem does not arise. For him the differences in the jivas are the creations of the divine, not based on gunas of prakriti. Essays, pp. 490–507. (75.) Aurobindo thinks that a relentless spiritual pursuit was characteristic of India’s past. It was this spirituality that the Gita talks about in chaturvarnya. He entitles one of the essays as ‘The Creed of the Aryan Fighter’ to imply what Arjuna represents. Essays, pp. 52–61. (76.) Ibid., p. 46. (77.) Ibid., pp. 42, 56–8. (78.) Ibid., p. 59. (79.) Chapter XI is entitled ‘Vishvarupa, The Lord’s Transfiguration’. Aurobindo regarded this ‘poetic passage’ as the core of the text as it personified the message of the Gita. (80.) Ibid., p. 367. (81.) Ibid., p. 368. (82.) Ibid., p. 369. (83.) Ibid., pp. 370–1. (84.) Ibid., p. 371. (85.) Ibid., pp. 371–2. (86.) Ibid., pp. 87–97. (87.) Ibid., p. 88. (88.) Ibid., p. 89. (89.) Ibid., pp. 91–2. (90.) Ibid., pp. 92–3. (91.) Ibid., pp. 101–2. (92.) Ibid., pp. 103–4.
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Nation in Spiritual Quest (93.) Ibid., p. 110. (94.) Ibid., pp. 110–11. (95.) It is interesting to note that most of the interpretations of the Gita took the notion of loksamgraha exclusively in the utilitarian sense of altruistic duty, and sacrifice as one’s sacrifice with that object. In spite of their differences on other matters, all argued that by doing social work dispassionately for the welfare of the people (loksamgraha), one can accumulate virtues and by that gradually attain liberation. Aurobindo criticized these as influenced by European utilitarian philosophy. Etymologically, loksamgraha implies ‘holding together’; for Aurobindo, it is the evolving of the soul ensnared in the triple play of nature to the oneness of the all-pervading. Essays, pp. 110–16, 127–31, 136–67, etc. (96.) Ibid., p. 128. (97.) Ibid., p. 129. (98.) Ibid., pp. 129–31, 137–78. (99.) Ibid., p. 131. (100.) Ibid., p. 276. (101.) Ibid., p. 276. (102.) Ibid., p. 311. (103.) Ibid., pp. 315–16. (104.) These words but in different ways also appear in A.B. Purani, The Life of Sri Aurobindo, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1978; V.P. Varma, The Political Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960; ‘As a mystic, he (Aurobindo) declared that God was behind Indian nationalism and was the real leader of the movement. The repression, humiliation and coercion used by the British authorities were also in the plane of the divine dialectic, which was using these methods to train the Indian people in the art of self discipline.’ (Translation of Aurobindo’s llion, Book Three: ‘Zeus who with secret compulsion orders the ways of our nature; Veiled in events he lives and working disguised in the mortal, Build our strength by pain, and an empire is born out of ruins.’ Quoted in V.P. Varma, Modern Political Thought, Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 2000 [reprint], p. 294).
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Gandhi’s Interpretation of the Gita Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0005
Abstract and Keywords Mahatma Ghandhi influenced the nationalist movement unlike any other leader. He drew much from the Gita for his nationalist project. Much of his thoughts can be found in the book Hind Swaraj and his philosophy of anasakti (nonattachment) is discussed in this chapter. It shows how Gandhi used the Bhagavadgita to defend the notions of ahimsa, truth, svadharma, swadeshi, and satyagraha. It also argues that Gandhi's version of the Bhagavadgita cautiously defends the institution of varna as an ordained form of division of labour. It explains how Gandhi's concept of anasaktiyoga translates into active engagement with one's fellowmen through service of the world. Keywords: Bhagavadgita, anasakti, ahimsa, truth, svadharma, swadeshi, satyagraha, varna, anasaktiyoga, Mahatma Ghandi
It is generally known that Gandhi1 attempted to give an ethical, moral base to modern India through concepts such as swaraj, satyagraha, ahimsa, and truth. However, these concepts are usually not linked to Gandhi’s interpretation of the Bhagavadgita. In fact, Gandhi established a profound connection between these concepts and the ethical tradition of the Gita in a marked way. In the process he reinterprets tradition, particularly that which is attributed to the teachings of the Gita, to reconstruct what he thought was the ethic for our times.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Gandhi’s Engagement with the Gita The Gita was one of the ancient Hindu scriptures from which Gandhi claims to have received profound inspiration for life and for some of his most complex ideas of the nationalist discourse.2 It was a text which Gandhi admired, revered, and recited as ‘Eternal Mother’ from the very core of his heart and considered its reading as ‘a religious practice, a prayer, a fasting’.3 He regarded it as a solace in difficulties, providing ready solutions for highest spiritual questions and for day-to-day problems. The influence of the Gita on Gandhi can be traced as far back as 1908 when he was imprisoned in Johannesburg. ‘I read the Bhagavadgita,’ he recounts, ‘which I had carried with me. I read the verses, which had a (p.169) bearing on my situation and, meditating on them, managed to compose myself.’4 Further, he regarded it as an infallible ‘guide of conduct’5 and a spiritual dictionary for daily references.6 His life was a constant and continuous attempt to live up to the ideal of the Gita. The Gita is for me a perennial guide to conduct. From it I seek support for all my actions and, if, in a particular case, I do not find the needed support, I would refrain from the proposed action or at any rate feel uncertain about it … Every time I have suffered the loss of a relative or friend, I sought consolation in the Gita.7 In 1889, at the age of twenty Gandhi was first introduced to the Gita by two of his English friends. Gandhi states that it was they who ‘induced‘8 him to read the Gita and offered him a copy of its English translation by Edwin Arnold, entitled Song Celestial.9 He read it thoroughly, and according to his own admission, was fascinated by it. He confessed ‘this was my first introduction to the Gita. Since then, I have read many other translations and commentaries and listened to many discourses but the impression made by that first reading persists’.10 Since then, Gandhi began to construct his life, ideas, and beliefs according to the Gita. Between 1890–1925, although Gandhi did not present or write any independent discourse on the Gita, he quoted it often in his speeches delivered at different places, and in letters written to his friends and relatives such as Kashi Gandhi, Maganlal Gandhi, Manilal Gandhi, Chhaganlal Gandhi, Raoji Bhai Patel, Sakarlal Dave, Tilak, Mathuradas Trikumji, D.B. Kalelkar, Satis Chandra Das Gupta, and so on.
In 1926, Gandhi delivered 218 lectures on the Gita at the Satyagraha Ashram, Ahmedabad, during morning prayers over a period of nine months, from 24 February to 27 November. Mahadev Desai and Punjabhai, who also lived at the Ashram, collected notes of these lectures.11 In 1930, his first systematic translation of the Gita, entitled Anasaktiyoga, was written in Gujarati and published on 12 March 1930, the day on which he marched to Dandi from Sabarmati.12 It was a scholarly translation, consisting of highly profound and philosophical arguments, not merely from the Gita but also from other religions such as Christianity, Islam, Sufism, and Buddhism, and even from Taoism. But soon after the publication of Anasaktiyoga, members of the Sabarmati Ashram complained about its obscurity to Gandhi who was then at Yeravda prison. Thereupon he wrote a series of letters to the Ashram, explaining each chapter of Page 2 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination the Anasaktiyoga in a simple way, in which he devoted one letter to each chapter of the Gita, beginning from 4 November 1930.13 (p.170) Between 1931–48, that is, till his death, Gandhi used the text and quoted it most frequently in his public speeches and letters.
Different Readings of the Gita Gandhi found that the Gita had become subject to a variety of interpretations, and felt that ‘it was difficult to be pleased with any of them’14 because, ‘they were all literary interpretations.’15 No literary interpretation of the Gita is legitimate and acceptable because such interpretations, while engaging themselves with the letter of the text, ignored the true spirit of it. ‘The fact is that a literal interpretation of the Gita lands one in a sea of contradiction. The letter truly killeth, the spirit giveth life.’16 One of the interpretations that Gandhi takes up for discussion in his writings is Tilak’s Gita Rahasya. He felt that the Gita Rahasya brought Tilak both fame and mass support but it was basically a literary interpretation. He also critiqued Tilak’s interpretation as being largely influenced by European Philosophy. He [Tilak] has written on the inner meaning of the Gita. But I have always felt that he has not understood the age-old spirit of India, has not understood her soul and that is the reason why the nation has come to this pass. Deep down in his heart, he would like us all to be what the Europeans are.17 Further, the conclusions that Tilak arrived at were unfair and not independent. They were mainly meant to justify a specific political ideology and programme. As Gandhi underplayed Tilak’s interpretation, he regarded his interpretation as a better alternative to the Gita Rahasya.
The grim fact is that the terrorists have in absolute honesty, earnestness and with cogency used the Gita, which some of them know by heart, in defence of their doctrine and policy. Only they have no answer to my interpretation of the Gita, except to say that mine is wrong and theirs is right. Time alone will show whose is right.18 Gandhi recognized the fact that Tilak’s interpretation appealed to the revolutionaries. He seems to be rejecting both the philosophy of the revolutionaries in theory and practice and interpretation of Tilak. Of course, for Gandhi different interpretations of the text to the best of one’s knowledge are essential as they may facilitate the discovery of truth in its entirety. But the truth of the text does not merely lie in these interpretations; ‘mere bookish souls can never attain moksha’,19 it basically lies in its practice. Hence, these interpretations cannot be exalted to the status of the text.
(p.171) Who is the best interpreter? Not learned men surely. Learning there must be. But religion does not live by it. It lives in the experiences of its Saints and Seers, in their lives and sayings. When all the most learned commentators of the scriptures are utterly forgotten, the accumulated Page 3 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination experience of the Sages and Saints will abide and be an inspiration for ages to come.20 Thus, Gandhi’s firm belief was that different interpretations could not be resolved theoretically, for the Gita was not a theoretical treatise; ‘it was a living but silent guide whose directions one has to understand by patient striving’.21 For him, he was the best interpreter who had attempted to live according to the truth of the text. In other words, only the application of this truth to one’s life could show certainly whether one’s interpretation was right or wrong, or the correctness of the interpretation would be in proportion to one’s success in living according to the teaching.
Only he can interpret the Gita correctly who tries to follow its teaching in practice … It may be a profound one, but in my view the realization of its profound quality depends on the depth of one’s sincerity in putting its teaching into practice.22 Gandhi considered the issue a little further: why has the Gita become a subject of different interpretations? To this, his argument was that the Gita was not a technical or scientific work composed with mathematical precision. It abounds in repetitions, loose expressions and overemphases, which led everyone to arrive at very different conclusions regarding its central message.
[I]t is possible to put more than one interpretation on the words of the Gita and that all of them may be right. The central meaning would remain the same, and consistent with it there may be as many interpretations as one may wish, which together, like the numerous instruments in an orchestra, produce a beautiful symphony…This is not a defect, but it is there.23 It was due to these features of the text that one could find whatever one desired to discover in it—perfection or imperfection—and Gandhi confessed that ‘his own interpretation too may not be acceptable to everyone.24 In the given universe of interpretations, he felt, it was not possible to decide the right interpretation, or to postulate that among diverse readings there would be one right interpretation. In a letter to Santoji Maharaj, Gandhi emphatically stated ‘it is almost impossible to decide which out of the many interpretations of religious works represent undiluted truth’.25 But in the end all these are secondary, only the living (p.172) practice of one’s faith is abiding. ‘One who reads the Gita with the intention of discovering errors in it may well succeed in doing so. But to him who desires liberation, the Gita shows the surest way thereto.’26
It does not, however, mean for Gandhi that the Gita has no definite philosophy or deliverance and it abounds in contradictions and inconsistencies. He quite clearly stated ‘the Bhagavadgita is consistent from the first to the last verse’.27 Further, he thought that by applying its teachings to one’s life, one can unearth the path for self-realization and thus, evolve the science of moksha. In his letter to Ketkar, he explained it lucidly: ‘I really do not think that the Gita is a scientific treatise to be treated scientifically. We may, however, evolve science out of it’.28 To Gandhi, then, applying the scientific method to interpret or understand the central philosophy of the Gita is not appropriate. The different readings are Page 4 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination different attempts to understand the truth of the text but truth is not reducible to these readings; truth reclines outside the theoretical debates. For Gandhi, the conflicts arising from a diversity of interpretations of the text could be overcome through the systematic practice of its teachings.
Gandhi’s Approach to the Gita: History and Allegory One of the significant positions that Gandhi takes in his writings, and particularly in Hind Swaraj, is that for acquiring an objective knowledge of a moral subject, one is not expected to concentrate attention on tracing its internal histories, its origins and processes of evolution and growth, because these facts would neither change the truth nor would they add to it, and hence, they have nothing to do with the truth of an object or a text. Truth is absolute, unchanging and universal; history has not touched it, nor can it ever do so in the future. The ‘truth’, which guides human beings at all times to deliver them from the bondage of karma and leads them to moral life, cannot be based on historical explanation. Such a truth always remains outside and beyond the purview of history. Hence, the validation of truth does not lie in its historical demonstrations; such efforts are futile in the pursuit of truth. In fact, this is an epistemological criterion that Gandhi adopted in every case. He explicitly stated that to understand the message of scriptures, knowing their histories is not essential. Even to comprehend social institutions and their efficacy, understanding their evolution and growth are not required. Regarding the caste system, for instance, he says, ‘it is a custom whose origin I do not know and do not need to know for the satisfaction of my spiritual hunger’.29 He rejected the Sastras and their (p.173) histories in his pursuit of truth. Gandhi emphatically stated, ‘nothing in the Sastras which is manifestly contrary to universal truths and morals can stand’.30 For Gandhi, history is not a guide to determine actions. To demonstrate the possibilities and authenticity of actions, one is not supposed to cite similar instances or identical situations from history. ‘To believe that what has not occurred in history will not occur at all is to argue disbelief in the dignity of man’.31 In his interpretation of the Gita, Gandhi similarly displayed a persistent unwillingness to accept it as a historical narrative, and laid stress on its allegorical nature. He would neither admit that the Gita is a text of historical dialogue nor would he accept that its truth is a historical one. He, on the other hand, consistently argued that the Gita is a ‘great allegory’.32 The Bhagavadgita is not a historical work … The poet has seized the occasion of the war … on the field of Kurukshetra for drawing attention to the war going on in our bodies between the forces of Good (Pandavas) and the forces of Evil (Kauravas) …33 This is not to demonstrate that Gandhi was not bothered about the history of the text or was utterly indifferent towards historical details; historical truth had altogether Page 5 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination different meaning for him. Truth is universal, and historical facts would not affect it, and, hence, textual discoveries have nothing to do with the message of the Gita. Mahadev Desai states it very lucidly:
There seems to be no doubt in the mind of the scholars that the present text of the Gita is a redaction of a much earlier original … when this original is discovered, it will not make much difference to souls like Gandhiji … This does not mean that Gandhiji is indifferent to the efforts of scholars in this direction … In the quiet of the Yeravda Central Prison I have seen him spending hours discussing a reading or a text. But his attitude is that in the last analysis it is the message that abides, and he is sure that no textual discovery is going to affect by a jot the essence or universality of the message.34 Further, Gandhi did not regard Krishna, the central figure of the text, as a historical person. He acknowledged that there may be numerous historical Krishnas, for instance, or the characters who figured in the Gita might be historical persons, or there might have existed in a particular history ‘an extraordinary personality combining in himself the qualities of a hero and a statesman, a warrior and a philosopher, of which we have no record’.35 But it did not, for that reason, imply that the Krishna of the (p.174) Gita too was a similar personality. The narrative of Krishna in the Gita was not about a particular personality but an impersonal soul who had achieved ultimate realization and, hence, it was an allegory.
The same thing may be said about questions of the historical Krishna and the genesis and history of the Krishna-Vasudeva worship, i.e. the Bhagawat Dharma … no labour and time spent on research in this connection would be ill-spent, for Gandhiji, the quest of a historical Krishna has an entirely different meaning … when the author of the Gita introduces Krishna as speaking first person, it is no personal Krishna speaking but the Divine in Arjuna and in every one of us.36 Thus, for Gandhi, Krishna in the Gita was not a historical personage whose account could be compared with the historical Krishnas but the personification of right knowledge.37 Not only does Gandhi not regard the Gita as a historical treatise, he quite explicitly stated that the great epic Mahabharata, of which the Gita is a part, is not a historical description either. He insisted that if the Mahabharata is interpreted more in an allegorical than in a historical sense, then the Gita could be taken to represent the moral duel that is perpetually on in the heart of mankind. The author of the great epic introduced historical names only to drive home ethical and religious principles.
Even in 1888-89, when I first became acquainted with the Gita, I felt that it was not a historical work, but that, under the guise of physical warfare, it described the duel that perpetually went on in the hearts of mankind, and that physical warfare was brought in merely to make the description of the internal duel more alluring … A study of the Mahabharata gave it added confirmation …The persons therein described may be historical, but the author of the Mahabharata has used them merely to drive home his religious theme.38 Page 6 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination For Gandhi, the Mahabharata is certainly not history, ‘it was a dharma-grantha’.39 Whenever Gandhi was confronted with the historicity of the great war, or the families such as the Kauravas and the Pandavas, he would argue that historically there might have occurred such a war and there could have lived such families but it does not mean that these historical incidents form the essence of the Mahabharata and the Gita. The objective in the Gita is not to give historical accounts of these wars or families, but to expound the ethical truth of how a man could achieve spiritual progress.40
Gandhi’s argument was that ascribing superhuman or subhuman characters to historical persons or to historical events and dialogues is not (p.175) the exclusive characteristic of the Gita. Modern literatures too, for instance, undertake these allegorical descriptions. In all such cases emphasis should be laid not so much on historical accounts, but the message that they bear. Gandhi points out that poets, dramatists, and historians have a poetic licence to ascribe imaginary characteristics to historical persons. This could have been an effective method for impressing upon the minds of the readers a profound message. I have never asserted that the Pandavas, Krishna and other characters are not historical persons. My view is that, though all of them might be historical persons, the Mahabharata is not a work of history in the modern sense of the term. Caesar, John, Henry, etc., were historical kings, but we know that Shakespeare’s plays named after them are not works of history. He used historical events and characters for his dramatic purpose in the plays.41 Gandhi argued that the internal design of the Mahabharata and the Gita too do not validate these as historical narratives. If they are only historical treatises, then, physical warfare would have been the core object and the texts would have dwelled upon the rules of conduct governing physical warfare. Far from this, the Gita, from the second chapter onwards, expounds spiritual truths and the means of attaining perfection. This orientation of the text has nothing to do with mere historicity.
In the characteristics of the perfected man of the Gita, I do not see any need to correspond to physical warfare. Its whole design is inconsistent with the rules of conduct governing the relations between warring parties.42 It may be noted here that, for Gandhi, history records only partial truth about past events; it shows remissness in recording it in its entirety. It records, in its most part, only those elements and forces that destroyed or distorted truth, hence, it cannot be taken as an authentic source to understand it. It is particularly true with regard to the histories of nations.
Two brothers quarrel; one of them repents and re-awakens the love that was lying dormant in him; the two again begin to live in peace; nobody takes note of this. But if the two brothers, through the intervention of solicitors or some other reason take up arms or go to law—which is another form of the exhibition of brute force—their doings would be immediately noticed in the Press, they would be the talk of their
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination neighbours and would probably go down in history. And what is true of families and communities is true of nations.43 Gandhi’s treatment of the Gita and the Mahabharata as dharma-granthas, or religious treatises rather than historical narratives has implications for (p.176) his concept of the nation. He regards them as texts that could serve as an ethical foundation not only for India but for the entire world. In a way this interpretation is an extension of and complementary to Hind Swaraj and other nationalist writings, where he argues that India is poised for an ethical mission in the world.
Anasakti as the Central Theme of the Gita Anasakti or non-attachment is the highest ideal that Gandhi discovered in his reading of the Bhagavadgita. He found this ideal expressed in the entire text, and stated that every chapter of the text, in one way or the other, deals with the concept of anasakti. Hence, it is the central theme around which other concepts of the text are constructed. The third, the fourth and the following fifth chapter should be read together, as they explain to us what the Yoga of Selfless Action (anasakti) is and what are the means of practising it … The remaining chapters deal in detail with the ways and means of achieving anasakti. We should study the Gita from this point of view, and if we pursue this study, we shall find without much trouble a solution of the problems, which confront us from day to day.44 It was through the concept of anasakti that Gandhi evolved two important notions in his nationalist discourse: the satyagraha and non-cooperation. Although, Gandhi applied the principles of satyagraha widely in various situations, in the context of anasakti it meant performance of dispassionate, ceaseless, and intense activity by a Karmayogi by strictly adhering to ahimsa and truth and ultimately attaining selfrealization. Similarly, the notion of non-cooperation meant non-engagement in others’ duty. Satyagraha is the positive form of anasakti and non-cooperation is its negative aspect.
[T]he Bhagavadgita’s intention that one should go on working without attachment to the fruits of work (anasakti). I deduce the principle of Satyagraha from this … As far back as 1889, when I had my first contact with the Gita, it gave me a hint of Satyagraha and, as I read it more and more, the hint developed into a full revelation of Satyagraha.45 Gandhi proceeds to explain the concept of anasakti in the Gita by positing two general statements: ‘not one embodied being is exempted from doing work,’46 and ‘it is beyond dispute that all action binds’.47 These statements imply two things. First, human beings have no other option but to be engaged in action, and nature or prakriti does not leave any choice in this regard. Second, the performance of one action regulates (p.177) and begets further action, or whatever one does owing to the demand of prakriti, would bind one to further action. Then how does one elude the bondage? The only way to escape this bondage is to take refuge in the Supreme.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Gandhi insists that the Gita begins its teaching with this point, and posits several alternatives to free oneself from the bondage but finally subscribes to the norms of anasakti as the highest and the only virtue to be followed in the quest for understanding and discovering the truth. Gandhi considered the concept of anasakti in terms of its external nature and internal character. The external nature refers to the merging of the ideas of nishkama karmi and karma through bhakti and knowledge. The internal character consists in the spirit in which one performs one’s action. In the first case the emphasis is wholly on one’s ‘outer being’, and in the second, the ‘inner being’. In other words, anasakti does not imply mere action or mere devotion or knowledge. The attempts to understand the concepts of karma, bhakti and jnana separately or highlighting a single facet without establishing mutual relationships would arrive to a wrong conclusion and hence, would be a futile exercise. ‘Knowledge and action in the absence of devotion are dry as dust and are likely to make us confirmed bond-slaves’.48 Anasakti upholds karma, which in turn involves the unity of bhakti and jnana; together they purify one’s mind and heart and thus, action itself. This (anasakti or karma) is the centre round which the Gita is woven. This renunciation is the central sun, round which devotion, knowledge and the rest revolve like planets … Every action is tainted, be it ever so trivial … how can one be free from action … The Gita has answered … ‘By desireless action; by renouncing fruits of action; by dedicating all activities to God, i.e., by surrendering oneself to Him body and soul’.49 Knowledge is neither a ‘magic talisman’ as David Hume describes it,50 nor book learning or an intellectual process, but in its broader sense would include practical application to arrive at an end. A Vedic pandit, for instance, may have equipped himself with scriptural knowledge and recite the Vedas and religious hymns from memory, yet he may be steeped in self-indulgence if this knowledge does not translate into selfless action. True knowledge cannot be attained by intellectual feat; it is attainable only by a constant heart-churning. It implies a constant relation between the mind and the self in the search of truth.51
Theoretical knowledge would not enable a man to judge the ethical correctness of an action; nor would theoretical distinction between right (p.178) and wrong be taken to mean perfect jnana. The deliberations by the mind or reason without the involvement of the heart are mere intellectual snobbery or theoretical knowledge. Right knowledge, therefore, would be felt in the heart. For Gandhi, it is not enough that one remains devoted and committed; his actions should be soaked with the feeling of anasakti. ‘Knowledge and devotion, to be true, have to stand the test of renunciation of fruits of action’.52 Bhakti is not lip-service or uttering and reciting Vedic mantras like ‘a blind parrot’ without understanding their true import in the heart. It is a constant application of one’s heart to action. ‘It is not enough … that one knows them by heart… having learnt…put the teaching into practice.53 Bhakti also does not mean performance of yajnas or yagas and making numerous material offerings in Page 9 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination one’s worship. The genuineness of one’s bhakti cannot be judged on the basis of material offerings; it needs to be selfless and devoid of attachments to its outcome. The devotion required by the Gita is no soft-hearted effusiveness … to be a real devotee is to realize oneself. Self-realization is not something apart. One rupee can purchase for us poison or nectar, but knowledge or devotion can not buy us either salvation or bondage … They are themselves the things we want. In other words, if the means and the end are not identical, they are almost so. The extreme of means is salvation. Salvation of the Gita is perfect peace.54 Thus, bhakti fills the heart and mind with love of God and translates them to one’s actions. Though it is constant striving for self-realization; it does not imply ineptitude in practical affairs.55 ‘His conduct will always be in harmony with dharma … devotee finds no difficulty to attending to the practical affairs of life.’56 Such selfless devotion reaches out to others and fructifies in service.
Gandhi insisted that this concept of bhakti and qualities of the bhakta are quite different from the popular and feigned notions of bhakti.57 Similarly, it is different from the Vedic bhakti as the latter was neither heart-churning nor knowledge-based; it was selfish and aimed to obtain divine benediction for material ends. It disengaged the bhakta from performing loving service to mankind. For Gandhi, knowledge need not beget commitment. Therefore, jnana needs to be combined with bhakti. The mind should be reinforced by the heart and it should be expressed in effective action. However, action should not be performed with an eye on the benefits that it accrues. Non-attachment or anasakti becomes the crowning principle of the confluence of jnana, bhakti, and karma. It alone leads to self-realization. (p.179) Gandhi says that this principle of anasakti, that is, non-utilitarian, nonpossessive unity of jnana, bhakti, and karma, can be the guiding principle for India. Having discussed the institution of anasakti in its external character in the form of unity between jnana, bhakti, and karma, Gandhi comes to its primary concern —its internal character. Internally, anasakti would mean non-attachment, detachment, or renunciation. Non-attachment is its negative description, while detachment is its positive form. Renunciation would not imply Vedico-Upanisadic and Samkhya concept of physical renunciation and engaging in ceaseless meditation, but renunciation of the fruits of action. Anasakti, therefore, implies three things. First, anasakti is based on desireless action. Desirous action and attachment lead to worldly involvement, which entails the bondage of karma, which, in turn implies man’s inability to escape from the binding cycle of birth and death and reach perfection.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Literalists perform Vedic rites directed to the acquisition of material rewards. If one rite does not yield the expected fruit, they have recourse to another … thus they suffer from utter mental confusion. As a matter of fact, it is up to us to do our duty without wasting a single thought on the fruits of our action.58 Further, it is from desire that passions like anger, hatred, greed, and ambition grow, and they are related in one way or the other to the achievement of specific worldly objectives. In other words, the root cause of all predicaments of human beings is action that desires gain. An aspirant of self-realization must, therefore, cultivate a state of total desirelessness. ‘… action without attachment, in the words of the Gita, is the duty of a seeker after moksha’.59
Secondly, anasakti is based on renunciation of the fruits of action. Renunciation is not the total absence of interest or indifference to result. Gandhi quite explicitly insisted that a Karmayogi would be conscientious regarding the duties to be done, ways and means of doing them60 and following up the consequences of his actions. But it does not mean that he expects reward for the performance of his duties. Hence, renunciation can neither be taken to mean a total indifference to the results, nor expectation of reward, but only absence of hankering after fruit. This is the unmistakable teaching of the Gita … renunciation of fruit in no way means indifference to the result … one must know the result that is expected to follow, the means thereto, and the capacity for it. He, who, being thus equipped, is without desire for the result and is yet wholly engrossed in the due fulfillment of the task before him is said to have renounced the fruits of his action … the (p.180) author of the Gita discovered the path of renunciation of fruit and put it before the world in a most convincing manner.61 Thus, renunciation as outlined in the Gita was never interpreted by Gandhi as absence of purpose, but it only implied absence of self-benefiting purpose. Every action should have a purpose behind it because no action can be performed abstractly. Similarly, detachment does not mean an anasakta would have no eye on the fruit or would have no fruit or be ignorant of it. ‘On the contrary, the ultimate fruit is made all the more certain by the renunciation of the desire for it’.62 But that purpose and result cannot be other than self-realization. This self-realization can be obtained only by an unqualified dedication to duty.
Third, anasakti is also meant dedication of all action to God, that is, surrendering oneself to Him, body and soul. Gandhi thought that dedication would not only help a Karmayogi to keep his attention concentrated on the duty but would release him from the bondage of karma. ‘Each repetition of God’s name carries you nearer and nearer to God’.63 Further, it also implies that ‘desirelessness’ and ‘renunciation’ are not objectiveless. Dedication to God is a connecting bond between desirelessness and renunciation.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination If one wishes to escape their attentions, he must not go about in search of action. He must not hanker after this today, that tomorrow and the other thing the day after. But he should hold himself ready to render for the sake of God such service as falls to his share … feeling that whatever he does is in fact an act of God and not his own, and his egoism will be a thing of the past.64 To Gandhi, anasakti would neither produce Vedic pandits preoccupied with empty ritualism nor would it produce scholars of rational and scientific knowledge. It produces active but humble Karmayogi satyagrahis who would, with their unswerving ethico-moral practices and commitment, always be ready to serve the people. For Gandhi, anasakti could become an ethic of the masses, while at the same time imparting dignity, commitment, and efficacy for the action they undertake. The great service that the Karmayogi satyagrahis would offer to humanity would be the core of anasakti for Gandhi.
Anasakti and Avatar Anasakti as a philosophy is also reflected in universal beliefs and in spiritual texts of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Jainism, and Buddhist writings. Gandhi characterized it with another fundamental idea—the institution of the avatar. He used the Gita’s theory of the avatar to present his idea of (p.181) anasakti in a striking way, and to dispel the belief that such ideas cannot be made accessible to ordinary people in their daily lives. In fact, Gandhi believed that the Gita hardly prescribed any idea that cannot be followed in ordinary life. He stated this quite clearly. The common belief is that religion is always opposed to material good … the author of the Gita has dispelled this delusion. He has drawn no line of demarcation between salvation and worldly pursuits … I have felt that the Gita teaches us that what cannot be followed out in day-to-day practice cannot be called religion.65 Gandhi begins his theory of the avatar by refuting its Vedico-Puranic description that the avatar is a sudden descent of God into the human form, or God incarnating as man with extraordinary mental and spiritual dimensions, or the momentous birth of God in human form to propagate new religious cults, or to uphold the right against the wrong under specific historical circumstances.66 Gandhi argued that this theory was not founded on a rational understanding of the concept. The theory would be falsified if one thought that God is attributeless and therefore, cannot descend into the human form. The terms ‘avatar’, ‘descent’, or ‘ascent’ cannot be applied to an ‘impersonal God’; they could only be applied to finite mortal beings. Hence, the Vedico-Puranic understanding of avatar was irrational and mere philosophical speculation. Although, generally avatar is thus understood, for Gandhi, it is the personification of right knowledge. Avatar is much less a historical event than a universal truth.
Here is comfort for the faithful and affirmation of the truth that Right ever prevails … for Right—which is Truth—cannot perish; the wicked are destroyed … Knowing this let man cease to arrogate to himself authorship and eschew untruth, violence and evil. Inscrutable Providence—the unique Page 12 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination power of the Lord—is ever at work. This in fact is avatar, incarnation. Strictly speaking there can be no birth for God.67 Thus, Gandhi rejected the Vedico-Puranic theory of avatar as a construct of imagination and unrealistic. He regarded the theory advocated by the Gita as ‘rationalistic’, and understood it in relation with anasakti which also differentiated between the two versions of the theory. In the Vedico- Puranic understanding of avatar the emphasis is on God’s descent into a human form whereas in the Gita’s framework the emphasis is not so much on God’s descent but on man’s ascent to the state of God.
Further, Gandhi does not consider divine incarnation as the sudden birth of God to set in order the decaying ethico-social values. According (p.182) to him, every embodied being is born with atman (divine spark) but that does not qualify him as an avatar. An avatar has to cultivate divine qualities and perform selfless actions by spurning all worldly passions and relations. ‘[I]t is not usual to consider every living being an “incarnation” for the simple reason that almost all of us reveal the human or the mortal part of us more predominantly than the immortal and the ‘incarnate’ part of us’.68 In short, for Gandhi, avatar meant either God working out a cosmic purpose through the universal law or man’s ascent to the state of God by wholly divesting himself of all his earthliness through engaging in selfless actions. Therefore, to be regarded as a perfect incarnation some extraordinary service to mankind is necessary. Those, who are regarded as avatars, are regarded so, not because they are born with divine atman, but because they have performed great works for the benefit of humanity. Krishna in the Gita, for instance, is considered as divine incarnation not because he is God’s descent into the human form as the Vedico-Puranic writings had argued, but that he has worked for the welfare of society.69 In Hinduism, incarnation is ascribed to one who has performed some extraordinary service of mankind … I can see nothing wrong in this procedure … It is in accordance with this train of thought, that Krishna enjoys … the status of the most perfect incarnation.70 For Gandhi, none other than nishkama karmi or anasakta is to be regarded as an avatar. He would internally annihilate the self and identify ‘oneness’ with ‘otherness’, and externally, he would dispassionately engage in duty. ‘The man of selfless action holds himself to be the world’s debtor, and he repays what he owes to every one else and does him full Justice’.71 When the purified self of the anasakta is thus related to the detached performance of his duty in the outward life, his self would be called an avatar. Annihilation of the self, pure detachment and perfection are the true tests of an avatar.
The utmost self-purification, through action without attachment to fruit, and without thought of self, is what is the avatar in the Gita … Those are the only tests whereby we can measure the extent to which we might say
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination God has descended in our own individual life … the Gita stands out as unique in our literature and the crowning glory of the Mahabharata.72 Gandhi thought that the object of an avatar is to restore and rejuvenate decaying socio-ethical values, and vivify the degenerating social system by destroying the wicked, but this does not imply that every revolutionary (p.183) who is engaged in the destruction of evil is an avatar of God. The destruction of the wicked does not mean physical engagement in the destruction of evil; it is the disinterested protection of right, by strictly adhering to the principles of anasakti. The understanding of the tests of an avatar is very important to Gandhi as it would differentiate between ‘revolutionary idealists’ and the ‘real avatar’.
I do not regard this verse as an exhortation to physical warfare … it is God, the All-Knowing who descends to the earth to punish the wicked. I may be pardoned if I refuse to regard every revolutionary as an All-Knowing God or an avatar.73 To Gandhi, the avatar cannot be understood within the confines of a historical process; he is the highest expression of universal truth. To reach the state of an avatar one is not expected to renounce the worldly activities or attain certain superhuman qualities; one can achieve that state through the service of others. This rationalistic-universal application of avatar is the Gita’s departure from scriptural texts, where avatar is conceived as descent of God on earth from above. Gandhi interpreted the Gita’s message on avatar from the point of view of human beings rather than from the standpoint of the absolute God. The speculative theory of an avatar is transformed into rational and pragmatic in the nationalist discourse of Gandhi.
The Gita and Ahimsa The exposition of anasakti and its underlying principles raises an important issue of its relation to ahimsa. Ahimsa is one of the most significant concepts in Gandhian philosophy, for which he lived and died. In fact, Gandhi links many of his ideas to ahimsa in fundamental ways and anasakti is one of them. Quite interestingly, he developed the notion of ahimsa from his reading of the Gita, but repeatedly asserts that the Gita is not basically a text on ahimsa; its highest ideal is anasakti. However, the complete understanding and observance of anasakti requires the perfection of ahimsa and truth. Hence, ahimsa and truth are the necessary complements to anasakti, or more clearly, for Gandhi, the entire conceptual edifice of anasakti depends upon the institutions of ahimsa and truth. Gandhi himself gave detailed expositions about the concepts of ahimsa and truth, besides commentaries on his expositions. Since there is an abundance of literature on Gandhi’s concept of ahimsa and its location in the wider sociopolitical context, this study only attempts to explain the impact that his reading of the Gita has had on his concept of ahimsa. (p.184) Gandhi argued, ‘it may be freely admitted that the Gita was not written to establish ahimsa’; its primary purpose was ‘to deliver the message of renunciation of fruit’,74 that is, anasakti or non-attachment. Despite being a text Page 14 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination on anasakti, it did not underemphasize ahimsa. It believed in ahimsa but only as a part of anasakti, or it adroitly put forth anasakti as its central preaching but made its understanding difficult, if not, impossible without properly understanding the ideal of ahimsa. It is true, Gandhi argued, the Gita sought to explain the ideals of anasakti, ahimsa, and truth consciously through warlike situations rather than other situations from life which would have presented these ideals more effectively and convincingly. The reason for this was that the Gita did not see any incompatibility between physical warfare and ahimsa. It (ahimsa) was an accepted and primary duty even before the Gita age … But if the Gita believed in ahimsa or it was included in desirelessness, why did the author take a warlike illustration? When the Gita was written, although people believed in ahimsa, wars were not only not taboo, but nobody observed the contradiction between them and ahimsa.75 Further, because the Gita’s central concern is anasakti, it does not imply that Vyasa, the author of the Gita, had little concern with ahimsa and truth or that he reduced them to secondary concerns. Gandhi felt that his central object was to discover anasakti with its ethico-philosophical and social elements and. hence, for the moment, he had to concentrate his attention on anasakti. It does not also mean that he had explored anasakti in all its depths and complexities but that in the moment of writing the text, he had grasped a truth, which was quite different from settled beliefs; he simply presented it before the world without exactly reckoning its consequences. At the time of writing the Gita, the settled belief in sacrifice, for instance, was necessarily Vedic, but the author grafted another truth on it and presented it before the world without weighing its pros and cons. Similar is the case of samnyasa and ahimsa.
In assessing the implications of renunciation of fruit, we are not required to probe the mind of the author of the Gita as to his limitations of ahimsa and the like … In the Gita continuous concentration on God is the king of sacrifices. The third chapter seems to show that sacrifice chiefly means body-labour for service. The third and the fourth chapters read together will give us other meanings for sacrifice, but never animal-sacrifice … according to the letter of the Gita it is possible to say that warfare is consistent with renunciation of fruit. But after forty years’ unremitting endeavour fully to enforce the teaching of the Gita in (p.185) my own life, I have in all humility, felt that perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observance of ahimsa in every shape and form.76 Having explained this preliminary background, Gandhi saw the values of ahimsa and truth as coterminous with anasakti. The argument was that the complete realized soul, who has acquired detachment and unification with the universal self, would only perform deeds that are beneficial to the society. In other words, he would engage in the unflinching performance of ethico-moral practices for the benefit of the world. Desire leads to attachment; attachment provokes anger and anger results in violence. Violence is the result of unfulfilled desires.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination The slave drivers in this case are kama (desire) and krodha (anger) … As dust hides a mirror, smoke suffocates a fire and the womb covers the embryo, even so anger deprives knowledge of its luster and suffocates it. And desire is insatiable like fire, and taking possession of man’s senses, mind and intellect, knocks him down.77 Actions, which are incapable of being performed without selfish attachment, or inspired by the desire to attain the cherished end, are ‘wrong actions’, hence, unethical according to the Gita. When there is no scheming for fruit, there is no temptation for untruth or himsa. ‘Man’s life then becomes simple, and from that simpleness springs peace … one is bound to follow Truth and Ahimsa’.78 Hence, the cultivation of the state of total desirelessness is the only solution for attachment and anger.
In action he sees inaction and he understands at once what wrong action is … theft, adultery and the like. These simply cannot be done in a spirit of detachment … A man who has thus abandoned the attachment to the fruit of action is always contented … is neither elated by the one, nor unnerved by the other. All his work is done as a sacrifice (yajna) … as service to the world. He meditates upon God in all his actions and in the end comes to Him.79 Not that anasakta would consciously and intentionally avoid all those situations in which he may have to involve in the performance of ‘wrong actions’ such as violence, untruth, theft, ‘for no occasion can arise for such a man to indulge in violence’. The fact is that the innate characteristic of desirelessness in an anasakta would permit him to perform only those actions which would benefit the world. ‘He who does something without egoism may be said to be not doing it in spite of his doing it, for he is not bound by his action.’80 Therefore, ahimsa is necessarily the consequence of anasakti, and it is a natural and concomitant course in the perfect state.
(p.186) For Gandhi, as in the Gita Rahasya, the ethical correctness of an action cannot be decided merely by considering its outward effects but by assessing whether the agent involved in it is selfless or tainted by the desire for fruit. The results of an action performed by a realized soul would no longer be his but only of the divine expression through him. This is also the criterion for deciding the ethics of world-benefiting actions. Gandhi anticipated the difficulties involved in this position of the Gita, namely that it could be used to justify unethical crimes or could lead one to argue that any agent might call himself an instrument in the hands of God and perpetrate all kinds of excesses.81 For this Gandhi would insist that the Gita’s exhortation to perform one’s duty is not for those who are guided by ill-will, hatred, and personal gain or those who are yet to be free from egoism. It is exclusively for the pure and desireless realized soul. Arjuna … had cleansed himself of all desire … he had no interest left in fighting and that is why he was worthy enough to be urged to fight without the thought of reward of the sense of ‘I’. The divine sermon would have been lost on a Duryodhana or a Karna or even a Bhima, who could not have Page 16 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination fought without the thought of ‘I’ … of success or failure … hatred or vengeance.82 Pretentious claims made by egoistic people will not last for long. They can be easily segregated from humble claims on the basis of distinctions between the agent and his deeds or between the ‘realized soul with pure intent’ and ‘an ordinary mortal being with the feverish delusion of ignorance’. The claim made by Hitler, for instance, cannot be compared with the deeds of great seers like Dadhichi, Prahalad, Shibi, and Sudhanva. The real test for judging ‘the realized soul’ and ‘those who pretend so’ is not merely the agent himself or his claims but also how the world judges him.
[T]he world has luckily its rough and ready standard to judge the man who makes the claim to murder in God’s name. There is indeed Hitler … world does not believe that he is doing God’s work, nor would it do so if a follower of the Gita made such a claim … Dadhichi who laid down his life and offered his bones to be made into a thunderbolt to fight miscreants, of King Shibi … Prahlad and Sudhanva who went through untold ordeals for His sake—not one Christ but many Christs if I may permit myself to say so. However, the test … is not the claim advanced by the doer … but how the world judges him.83 Having advanced the concepts of ahimsa and truth and their relations with selfless action in this way, Gandhi felt that anasakti certainly excluded the use of violence. Violence requires the foundation of selfish (p.187) desire and anger, which cannot find place in anasakti. Selfish motive, attachment, and anger are the attributes of ordinary mortal beings. ‘Truth excludes the use of violence, because man is not capable of knowing the Absolute Truth and therefore not competent to punish. God alone is competent’.84
Gandhi regarded anasakti as an ideal established in the Gita that could serve as a standard in matters of conduct. Performing actions involving violence, and untruth and then claiming the state of utter desirelessness is not possible. In fact, for Gandhi, selfless action, anasakti and violent and untruthful actions are totally incompatible courses. Therefore, a plea of selfless action cannot be taken to justify violence in general. In Gandhi’s framework, ahimsa and truth are the means and ‘selflessness’ is the end to be achieved. He who has made ashes of ‘self’, whose motive is untainted may slay the whole world, if he wills. But in reality he who has annihilated ‘self’ has annihilated his flesh too … Such a being can be one and only one—God … For mortal man the royal road … is ahimsa—holding all life sacred.85 Gandhi’s interpretations of ahimsa, truth, and anasakti make the following points clear: First, desires lead to violence. Therefore, if one has to perform action that does not spring from desires, then non-violence becomes a concomitant virtue. Pursuit of anasakti definitely involves pursuit of non-violence. Secondly, selfless action is the only alternative for motive-based actions. The basic assumption here is that if the doer is tainted by selfish desire and attachment for fruit, his action would be binding. Then the right course would be selfless action. Third, the notion of himsa is utterly Page 17 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination incompatible with the highest virtue of the Gita, i.e., anasakti. Anasakti is founded on complete desirelessness, a state which knows neither anger, nor attachment, nor hatred. Violence is based on desire, which is expressed not only in anger but also in attachment and hatred. Desire is not compatible with anasakti and ahimsa, and it leads to attachment and violence. Fourth, the cultivation of the state of desirelessness would make one wholly disposed to universal welfare. Himsa and other ‘wrong actions’ such as hatred, theft, adultery, anger, untruthfulness, and so on, have no place in the state of anasakti.
Ahimsa as the Highest Virtue For Gandhi ahimsa is the highest virtue to be pursued in one’s actions. Although, the Gita’s primary emphasis is on anasakti, the pursuance of anasakti makes one withdraw completely from taking recourse to himsa, (p.188) hatred, attachment or untruthful actions and teaches the principle of ‘conquering hate and anger by love, untruth by truth and eschew ill-will by good faith’.86 He believed that the actions founded on ahimsa are moral actions because no good deed could be done through recourse to himsa87 and force.88 Further, the spirit of anasakti does not even allow one to punish the tyrant,89 and calls to sacrifice oneself. ‘Killing an enemy proceeds from impatience and impatience proceeds from attachment’.90 In reply to the claim made by some that the Gita permitted violence, Gandhi argued that the allegorical issues should not be taken to be real; ‘the names mentioned are not of persons but of qualities which they represent’.91 He advanced his unflinching faith in non-violence. Muslims and some students of the Gita tell me that it is a religious duty to use the sword on some occasions. Lord Krishna himself urged Arjuna to battle. For me, however, non-violence is the highest dharma.92
The Gita and Varnadharma In his interpretation of the Gita, Gandhi is most clear and consistent when he analyses the institutions of varna and the notion of rebirth. Gandhi considered the institution of varna central to the philosophy of the Gita and hence, he defended and accepted it as axiomatic throughout his interpretation. When he was asked whether he derived his belief on varnadharma from the sastras, he quite emphatically stated that he interpreted it from the Gita. Not my own. I derive it from the Bhagavadgita … I swear by the Bhagavadgita because it is the only book in which I find nothing to cavil at. It lays down principles and leaves you to find the application for yourself.93 Gandhi’s observations were based on the fundamental principle that engagement in the performance of satkarma would lead the Karmayogi to the highest position of selfrealization. However, one is not expected to laboriously wander in search of satkarma as it is not to be chosen; it is an inborn quality of the Karmayogi. Hence, one’s position or allotted duties are not externally induced but are in accordance with one’s nature.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination It (niyatam i.e., allotted task or task that falls to one’s lot) seems to be a synonym for the words svakarma, one’s own task, svadharma, one’s duty, svabhavniyatam, determined by or in accordance with one’s nature, and sahajam, to which one is born. What falls to one’s lot does not therefore mean work imposed upon one, but work which one has found out to be in accordance with one’s nature, one’s bent, the law of one’s being.94 (p.189) But this does not mean that one cannot exercise any control over oneself. One’s nature is determined by pre-natal and post-natal conditions or by one’s previous karma or karma pursued in the present. Past karma is inevitable and cannot be suppressed, but quite a large part of present and future actions are within one’s choice and regulation. ‘Man has to strive by self-examination to find out the inevitable part and the mendable part, or, to use Epictetus’ language, “the things in his power” and “the things not in his power”’.95
For Gandhi the institution of varna is based on the fact that society consists of different types of works which cannot be fulfilled by people having the same qualities aptitudes, and gifts. Similarly people vary in regard to their attainments, qualities and aptitudes. Hence, the Gita outlined the system of varna to appropriate inner qualities and skills of human beings with different types of works in the external world. In other words, as an occupational division varna is the natural basis of social organization to make people competent to give their best service to the community and society. In terms of religion, the pursuit of varna will help people in their desire for self-realization. The atman advances through action that is natural to it and falls back through action that is contrary to its nature. I found this definition of svadharma (one’s own duty determined by one’s nature and station) more convincing. According to the Gita, death in pursuit of svadharma is preferable to duty foreign to one’s nature, however attractive in itself.96 Gandhi’s analysis of varna was based on two philosophical concepts of guna and karma, but the exposition of guna and karma was entirely in keeping with the idea of anasakti. First, Gandhi thought that the system of varna was based on gunas, that is, inherent temperamental qualities which predisposed each social group in the system to their course of action. In other words, it is based on divisions in qualities and duties, and the respective duties of the brahmin, kshatriya, vaisya, and sudra are determined in accordance with their natural qualities and not left to their choice. Each social division is dominated by particular qualities; the natural qualities of a Brahman are ‘calmness, self-discipline, austerity, purity, forgiveness, uprightness, wisdom … Kshatriya … valour, splendour, firmness, resourcefulness, not flying from battle … Vaishya’s task is “to till the ground, tend cattle, venture trade” (Edwin Arnold) and service is the Sudra’s work’.97 However, the qualities that are determinants of social division are not exclusive of the group to which they have been ascribed.
(p.190) Surely the qualities predominantly ascribed to the different divisions are not denied to the others. Is bravery to be the prerogative only of the Kshatriya and restraint only of the Brahmana? Are Brahmanas,
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Kshatriyas and Sudras not to protect the cow? Can any one remain a Hindu without readiness to die for a cow?98 It only means that the outward actions of an agent must evolve from within oneself, so that it would be a living expression of the soul’s inborn powers and thus promote inner growth. If the karma is thus fixed, it would not only avoid undesirable competition or feeling of hatred among different divisions, but would free the Karmayogi from the bondage of karma. In short, if one’s inborn qualities are channelized through selfless performance of duties ascribed to him, the norms of varna would be fulfilled.
[Q]ualities and work … serve as signs for the recognition of a man’s varna … if each does his duty selflessly according to his nature, he will reach perfection … A man may remain free from sin when he performs the task naturally allotted to him, as he is then free from selfish desires; the very wish to do something else arises from selfishness … the natural duty is done without desire for its fruit, and thus loses its binding force.99 He maintains that the concept of varna is not hierarchical and does not establish special privileges to some groups at the cost of denial to others. The qualities and duties of a brahmin and kshatriya, for instance, may be more endearing than the vaisya and sudra but it does not mean that brahmin and kshatriya are superior to vaisya and sudra, ‘there is no question here of high and low’.100 It only means that they have different ‘responsibility’ and ‘quality appropriate for services allotted to them’ and not ‘superior status or rank’ in the social organization.101 The very feeling of superiority would hinder the path to detachment.
The Gita teaches us that members of all the four castes should be treated on an equal basis. It does not prescribe the same dharma for the Brahmins as for the Bhangi. But it insists that the latter shall be entitled to the same measure of consideration and esteem as the former with all his superior learning.102 For Gandhi, the brahmin and kshatriya would lose their respective brahminhood or kshatriyahood, if they considered themselves higher or superior to others. Gandhi emphatically states this as follows: ‘He will cease to be a Brahmana if he considers himself superior to others …To say that Brahmana should not touch the plough is a parody of Varnashra-madharma and a prostitution of the meaning of the Bhagavadgita’.103
(p.191) Hence, for Gandhi, salvation lies neither in hankering after superior duties nor in the pursuit of other’s duties against inborn qualities, but in the performance of one’s duty inscribed in one’s capacities however uninviting it may be.104 Significance lies not in the nature of duty but in the spirit in which it is performed. In other words, performance of one’s allotted duty as per varna rule with complete detachment and selflessness, anasakti is the highest morality of the Gita. Before God the work of man will be judged by the spirit in which it is done, not by the nature of the work, which makes no difference whatsoever. Whoever acts in a spirit of dedication fits himself for salvation … Epictetus Page 20 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination who, though a slave, conquered his slavery by becoming the slave of God: “Remember you are an actor in a drama of such a kind as the Author pleases to make it … If it be His pleasure you should be a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your business—to act well the part assigned to you; to choose it is another’s”.’105 Further, Gandhi argues that longing for superior duties beyond one’s potential implies attachment; attachment in turn denotes moral decay. ‘When a man’s senses rove at will, he is like a rudderless ship, which is at the mercy of the gale and is broken to pieces on the rocks’.106 A selfish performance even of the best things would not yield good results.
Thus, anasakti can be practised while one is engaged in action. One cannot freely shift from one vocation to the other because such a shift is the expression of desires, which will bind one to worldly concerns. Gandhi, therefore, came to strongly defend the varna system and saw it as the law of the world. It should be noted here that Gandhi did not interpret the term ‘guna’ as sattva, rajas, and tamas, but as inborn qualities. The major aspects of these inborn qualities are the results of the agent’s karma in his past life. The earlier scriptural interpretation of sattva, rajas, and tamas was ‘the highest, the middling and the lowest respectively’.107 The Acharyas, particularly Samkaracharya, would identify brahmins with sattva, kshatriya as a mixture of sattva and rajas, vaisya as a blending of rajas and tamas, and sudras with tamas. This would justify the argument that the brahmins and the kshatriya were superior to the other two groups in status. This was probably one of the reasons why the system of varna was considered as hierarchical. For Gandhi, the qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas are not the monopoly of any particular varna. If a brahmin performs his duty of worship with attachment, then his action becomes tamas and if a sudra performs his services without desire and attachment, (p.192) they would be considered as sattva. Hence, for Gandhi, the varna system is not hierarchical nor does it imply any special privileges to certain categories. The possibility of one’s salvation depends not on the nature of karma but the spirit in which one performs one’s duties. However, Gandhi deep in his heart felt that the duty that the brahmin inherits was more privileged and relatively superior to that of the kshatriya. He did tend to hierarchize varna duties when he compared the position of the brahmin to the head in the human body and kshatriya to the shoulder.108 But he was convinced that the Gita’s doctrine of anasakti undercut the hierarchy associated with it. Secondly, varna is based on karma. The inherent temperamental qualities of human beings are determined by previous action, which also decides the number of births that men would have to take on earth. Each birth is a result of ‘imperfection’ in the previous life. Gandhi remarks,
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination A man’s birth on earth is a result of bondage to one’s karma and, therefore, involves this inherent imperfection … the alchemy of detachment will turn all imperfection into perfection. Let man go through life in a complete spirit of detachment, and his detachment will win him the supreme perfection of nonbinding action.109 Men’s birth on earth is, therefore, not free. It takes into account the kind of lives they had led in the earlier births. In other words, men would carry with them the effects of karma from previous lives, and the present action which is determined partly by ‘prenatal conditions’ and partly by ‘post-natal conditions’ will decide the fate of future births.
Naked we came out of our mother’s womb and naked we must return to the womb of Mother Earth. But this is a partial truth … we do not come quite naked, we come with something—the impress of our actions, our character, our karma—and we return with something, if we do. The Gita says that this heritage that we bring with us is either godly or ungodly, the godly helping to deliver us from the bondage of flesh, the ungodly tightening the bondage.110 Gandhi maintained that even birth in a particular category or family is not accidental; it is the result of karma one has led in former lives. Each sattvika karma, that is, allotted task performed with detachment is a step forward into perfection, and each tamasika deed a step backward. Gandhi seems to be endorsing unusual empyrean-hell stories of the Puranas that if one is good, one will end up in heaven after death, and, in hell if one’s actions are to the contrary:
(p.193) [N]o one who takes the right path ever comes to an evil end. After death he lives for a time in some Celestial world according to his merit and is then reborn on the earth into a holy family. But such a birth is difficult to obtain. He then regains the mental impressions developed in his former lives, and struggling harder for perfection, reaches the supreme goal. Thus making an assiduous effort some attains equanimity soon, while others do so after a number of lives in accordance with the measure of their faith and endeavour.111 It is instructive here to compare the analysis of the effects of karma that Gandhi arrives at with the one arrived at by Tilak in his Gita Rahasya. Both believed in the philosophical statement that ‘for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap’, that is, the inexorable law of karma would give rewards commensurate with one’s action. Such rewards would be in proportion to the kind of actions one has done in one’s former life. Therefore, the effects of karma, whether sin or merit, would be enjoyed by him through rebirths on earth. This cycle would continue till one reached the highest perfection. Advancing this argument both arrived at very different conclusions. For Tilak ‘if an enemy lifts his sword against one, then the duty of the latter is to lift his sword against the enemy’ because in that case those who first lifted the sword would be sinners and the latter would only gain merit.112
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination For Gandhi, this was not the case. He argued that ‘if an enemy lifts his sword against one, the duty of the latter is not to lift his sword against the enemy because if the latter too lifts his sword in response then both would be regarded as sinners and have to suffer the consequences of their actions by entering the cycle of birth again’. Gandhi said that if the latter is a believer in anasakti, it would not let him raise his sword.113 God’s reward to the latter would be in accordance with his karma and not the karma of the enemy. Then to lessen the evil effects of karma or to be mindful of one’s own karma and consequent rebirths, one would have to return soul-force for himsa, love for anger, truth for untruth, and forgiveness for unforgiveness. The Buddhist text—akkodhena jine kodham—does not conflict with this … If it be true that God metes out the same measure to us that we mete out to others, it follows that, if we would escape condign punishment, (bondage and rebirth), we may not return anger for anger but gentleness against anger. And this is the law not for the unworldly …114 Thus, for Tilak, action done for loksamgraha (universal welfare) would always bring merit for the performer, even if it is ‘violent’ in the absolute sense of the term. For Gandhi, every action, good or bad, would have (p.194) consequences as to the number and nature of rebirth, and therefore, even action done for loksamgraha would result in good or bad consequences.
Third, varna is determined by birth. Since varna is based on guna and karma, which are inherited by birth, Gandhi thought that varna too is to be determined by birth: ‘The Gita does talk of varna being according to guna and karma, but guna and karma are inherited by birth. The law of varna is nothing if not by birth.’115 Gandhi thought that the Vedico-Upanisadic and sastric institution of four-fold varna outlined in the Gita could be a useful institution for the organization of contemporary society. Therefore, his suggestion was to re-organize the society on the basis of old varnas in their original form.116 However, the emphasis here too was not so much on the intrinsic goodness of the institution of varna but its access to anasakti. Besides, Gandhi saw in the Gita the idea that salvation was not a monopoly of any particular social group and that the path of anasakti is equally open to every social division associated with varna as the divine qualities are the asset of none. The system of varna does not hierarchize society because the ethical rule of life is the same for all, that is, inoffensiveness, truth, nonthieving, freedom from wrath and greed, and desire to do good to mankind.117
Varna, Equality, and Nation For Gandhi, the institution of varna was based on equality.118 He does not see any social hierarchies inherent in the varna system. In many of his works he emphatically stated that if anyone, particularly a brahmin or kshatriya, claims that he is superior in status and position to the rest of the community, he would lose the credibility to be a brahmin or a kshatriya. ‘A Brahmin ceases to be a Page 23 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Brahmin when he considers a single man as inferior to him’.119 Although, Gandhi felt that the duties of the brahmin and kshatriya are more inviting in the eye of the material world to the ones allotted to the vaisyas and sudras, he was fully convinced that these comparisons would find no place in the world of anasakti. He stated: In the language of the Bhagavadgita that when in our heart (through anasakti) occupy an equal place both Brahmana and Chandala, that very day will see there is no non-brahmin problem remaining for solution.120 However, Gandhi, in his analysis of selfless action, does not emphasize much on the other face of anasakti which has led to the formation of brutal, hierarchical, and discriminative caste system in the present society. (p.195) It does not mean that he was unaware of this. He is quite aware of it which is explicit in his speeches121 but his conviction was that if anasakti were pursued properly, it would not lead to a situation, which contemporary society is experiencing.
I have myself said time without number that varnasrama as it is at present understood and practised is a monstrous parody of the original, but in order to demolish this distinction let us not seek to demolish the original.122 Further, there is an unusual touch of acerbity in his attempt to establish the relationship between anasakti, varna and caste. Varna is an empirical fact, an alignment of power in prevailing social relations as caste draws its social and moral resources from it. Anasakti on the other hand, is an ethical ideal. The state of anasakti can be fulfilled through the strict observance of varna system; varna is a means to achieve an end of selflessness. If this ideal is applied to the varna strictly, then the Gandhian idea would be acceptable as a universal democratic system. But what would be the result if the ethic of anasakti is not accepted as moral norms in the varna application? Gandhian ideal can be deployed to legitimize the existing order (caste system), and make it mass-based.
Quite surprisingly, Gandhi seemed to acknowledge the inherent superiority of the upper castes, but he did not want them to assert it. If they did, social harmony would be undermined. He wanted the brahmins and kshatriyas not to undermine their credibility. What would be the position of the lower castes or were they entitled to look up? Gandhi did not quite approve it, for, that would mean violation of anasakti. Since Gandhi was working out a social engineering based on the principle of truce rather than questioning the foundation of entrenched hierarchies, he was pushing certain issues under the carpet. That obviously invited contests from B.R. Ambedkar. Similarly, Gandhi thought that unwavering performance of one’s allotted duty (anasakti) can help in the service of the nation as well: [I]f a merchant who deals in cloth now has any plans of selling firewood as well in the future … would be arambha (undertaking) on his part, and the devotee will have none of it. This principle is applicable to service of the Page 24 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination nation … a worker in the khadi department today will not take up cowkeeping tomorrow, agriculture the day after and medical aid on the fourth day. He will do his best in whatever has come to him.123 Gandhi bases his doctrine of swadeshi on the Gita’s doctrine of varna. He states that the notion of swadeshi is used in a much broader sense (p.196) of ‘national’, and the same swadeshi becomes svadharma when applied to one’s immediate environment. ‘Interpreted in terms of one’s physical environment this gives us the law of swadeshi. Swadeshi is svadharma applied to one’s immediate environment’. Both believed in a fundamental principle that excellence lies in doing one’s own duty and not getting lured by other interests.124
It should be noted here that in the Gandhian discourse on the Gita, the nation does not get privileged but becomes the site which holds aloft an ethical vision (anasakti) of self-realization as ultimate salvation to its citizens. The nation is supposed to further this objective. However, the task is not left to the state but to the collective that makes up the varna system.
Anasaktiyoga and the Engagement with this World: The Concept of Service The analysis of anasakti and its fundamental attributes raises one important question in Gandhian philosophy: how does anasaktiyoga translate itself into active engagement with one’s fellowmen in the service of the world? Although Gandhi himself did not state this problem explicitly, it was central to his philosophical system. Two approaches to this issue become clear in his thought. First, the central feature of anasakti is love and compassion. It is characterized by truthfulness, forgiveness, pity, sympathy, fearlessness, tyaga, resourcefulness, constancy, spiritedness, generosity, tranquility, devotion to duty, and so on, (these are called daivi sampattis, divine qualities in the text).125 These qualities cannot create passivity in anasakta; they drive him to give his best to the cause of the nation and welfare of the universe: ‘The spirit of patriotism does not come unless one has a true sense of dharma’.126 In other words, these qualities are of those kinds which oblige one to fully and actively engage in the service of the nation and through it the service of humanity. ‘By the compassion … I only understand that we should dedicate ourselves wholly, body, mind, and possessions to relieving the suffering of those around us whom we find in distress’.127 For Gandhi, patriotism is a corollary of selfless action. Secondly, anasakti does not mean for Gandhi an absolute cessation of desire in one’s work. It only meant that agent would absolutely denounce ‘selfish desire’ and not desire as such. The understanding of this difference between ‘selfish desire’ and ‘satvic desire’ is very important for Gandhi because having the desire for national or universal welfare is not against (p.197) the spirit of anasakti, in fact, it is its central attribute. He stated this lucidly as follows:
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination There should be no selfish purpose behind our actions. That of gaining swaraj is not a selfish purpose … to be detached from fruits of actions is not to be ignorant of them, or to disregard or disown them.128 Thus, for Gandhi, anasakti and its central attributes result in strong commitments to the nation. Anasaktiyoga also impels its practitioner to keep strong attachments to the welfare of the world through compassion and love. It does not imply total abandonment of action or expectations; instead it creates an urge for universal welfare and service of others. Anasakti is ‘unattached’ attachment for patriotism, universal love, and active engagement with the world. This part of Gandhi’s understanding seems to be corroborating Bankim’s ‘cultural agent’.
Anasakti and National Morality The interpretation of the Gita in this way had specific bearings on the national imagination by Gandhi. Gandhi felt that the Indian nation would be founded not on historical memories, at least not merely on them, but on ethical foundations. Karma, jnana, and bhakti, qualified with anasakti would be central in this regard. He felt that the pursuit of anasakti did not lead one to take recourse to samnyasa or partisan interest. The doctrine does not disregard goals for which action is undertaken. In fact, its adherents pursue truth relentlessly while rising above self-centeredness. It is in this way that one commits oneself to the service of the world. Through anasakti, while one is engaged in action, one is not expecting the fruits thereof to be accrued to oneself. Thereby action dissociates itself from any selfish and narrow considerations and places itself in the service of universal good. In this sense, for Gandhi, service becomes religion or pursuit of God. Since the anasakti ethic is not tied up with any immediate gains or expectations accruing to oneself, the quantum of task to be performed becomes immaterial. Their fruits replenish the universal kitty. Gandhi felt that the Gita offered a guide to action to each and every one. Gandhi thought that the anasakti ethic would consolidate communal solidarity and varna since it was tied to universal welfare. Anasakti regarded striving for public good and God-realization as identical. Further, anasaktiyoga places human beings at a much deeper level of equality than mere consideration of material possessions or vocation. The ethic (p.198) of the Gita demands that all such calculations are set aside. Everyone confronts ultimately the product of his collective endeavour and shapes his life disinterestedly towards the future. Therefore, he felt that anasakti questioned hierarchical social relations. While Gandhi defended varna obligations, he undercut the ranking built into them. This is one of the reasons why from strong commendation of the caste system he became its sworn enemy. However, he defended the varna as a system which would facilitate order in the social organization.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination Gandhi establishes an association between anasakti, non-violence, and truth. The Gita elaborately explained how violence and anger seek partisan ends and are not in the service of universal welfare. The course of anasakti does not privilege any single group in society. It is not a religion of the elite; it imparts dignity, and commitment for the action that the masses undertake. In other words, Gandhi felt that the community of anasaktas would constitute the role models for the masses. However, such a community would be inclusive and nonhierarchical and put the ethics of anasakti into practice. Notes:
(1.) The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi consists of eighty-seven volumes. The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, first published them in 1958. This study is based on the reprint of the same (hereafter CWMG). (2.) Gandhi himself admitted this on several occasions. In one instance he said: ‘I do not believe that “my philosophy” is an indifferent mixture of Tolstoy and Buddha … I still somehow or other fancy that “my philosophy” represents the true meaning of the teaching of the Gita’. ‘A Revolutionary’s Defence’, CWMG, vol. 26, p. 140. He admits that some of his central ideas such as ‘mental equipoise’, ‘swadharma’, ‘equality’, ‘non-cooperation’, etc., directly come from the Gita. (3.) ‘Fasting and Prayer’, CWMG, vol. 16, p. 231; ‘Hinduism’, vol. 21, p. 249; Letter to Narandas Gandhi, 4 November 1930, vol. 44, p. 276; M.K. Gandhi, Gita —My Mother, ed. A.T. Hingorani, Bombay: Popular, 1965, p. 2. (4.) ’My Second Experience in Gaol (III)’, CWMG, vol. 9, p. 148; Letter to Kashi Gandhi, London, 28 August 1909, CWMG, vol. 9, p. 374. (5.) This was Gandhi’s opinion on the Gita that runs throughout his writings. An example: ‘the Bhagavadgita is … the only dictionary of reference, in which I find all the sorrows, all the troubles, all the trials arranged in the alphabetical order with exquisite solutions’. Letter to Gulzarilal Nanda, 28 May 1927, CWMG, vol. 33, p. 384. (6.) ‘An Autobiography’, CWMG, vol. 39, pp. 211–12; Speech at Ashram on Ramanavami Day, 30 March 1928, CWMG, vol. 36, pp. 165–6. (7.) Speech on the shraddha of C.R. Das, Calcutta, 1 July 1925, CWMG, vol. 27, p. 315. (8.) Gandhi himself used this word to confess that by that time he had no special desire to read the Gita. ‘Meaning of the Gita’, CWMG, vol. 28, pp. 315–16.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination (9.) The Song Celestial was first published in 1885. Gandhi acknowledged and admired this translation throughout his interpretation of the Gita. In his letter to Gulzarilal Nanda written on 28 May 1927, Gandhi stated, ‘The Song Celestial was the best rendering I had come across of the Bhagavadgita’. Letter to Gulzarilal Nanda, 28 May 1927, CWMG, vol. 33, p. 384; ‘Meaning of the Gita’, vol. 28, p. 316. (10.) ‘Meaning of the Gita’, CWMG, vol. 28, p. 316. (11.) These Discourses on the Gita were collected in his CWMG, vol. 32, pp. 94– 376. Originally, they were edited by Narahari Parikh and published in Gujarati in 1955. These were simple translations of the eighteen chapters of the Gita. (12.) Gandhi completed his Anasaktiyoga on 27 June 1929. He began the English translation of the introduction to his Gujarati translation of the Gita at Yeravda Jail in 1930. This was first published in Young India on 6 August 1931, CWMG, vol. 41, p. 90. Mahadev Desai first published it in a book form in English in 1946 under the title, The Gospel of Selfless Action or The Gita According to Gandhi. The present study is based on Mahadev Desai, The Gospel of Selfless Action or The Gita According to Gandhi, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1984 (Seventh Impression) (hereafter Gita According to Gandhi). (13.) These letters were basically written in Gujarati. Valji Govindji Desai, Gandhi’s disciple, translated them into English in 1960 as Discourses on the Gita. It is interesting to note here that the first letter deals with chapter XII of the text, which describes the notion of bhakti in the text. Then he comes to the first, second, and the remaining chapters. It has been argued that it implied the importance that Gandhi gave to the institution of bhakti. To quote his statement on bhakti: ‘Whenever there is a wedding in the Ashram, we ask the couple to learn by heart and ponder over this chapter (chapter XII on bhakti) as one of the five sacrifices they have to offer’. M.K. Gandhi, Discourses on the Gita, translated by V.G. Desai (hereafter Discourses) p. 3. (14.) ‘Gujarath’s Gift’, CWMG, vol. 16, p. 245. (15.) ‘My Notes’, Ibid., vol. 21, p. 337. (16.) Young India, 12 March 1925, Ibid., vol. 26, p. 289. (17.) Prayer Discourse in Ashram, 17 March 1918, Ibid., vol. 14, p. 126. (18.) ‘The Law of Our Being’, CWMG, vol. 63, pp. 319–20. Gandhi felt that the revolutionary terrorists used Tilak’s interpretation of the Gita found in Gita Rahasya to unfairly justify their recourse to violence. (19.) Letter to Manilal Gandhi, 12 April 1914, CWMG, vol. 12, p. 405.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination (20.) ‘Dr Ambedkar’s Indictment-II’, Ibid., vol. 63, p. 153. (21.) ‘The Law of Our Being’, Ibid., vol. 63, p. 320. (22.) Letter to Santoji Maharaj, Bangalore, 2 July 1927, Ibid., vol. 34, p. 89; ‘The Law of Our Being’, Ibid., vol. 63, p. 320. (23.) ‘A Letter’, Yeravda Mandir, 31 December 1930, Ibid., vol. 45, p. 43. (24.) ‘Meaning of the Gita’, Ibid., vol. 28, p. 315. (25.) Letter to Santoji Maharaj, Bangalore, 2 July 1927, Ibid., vol. 34, p. 91. (26.) Speech at Bihar Student’s Conference, 1917, Ibid., vol. 14, p. 134. (27.) ‘Discourses on the Gita’, Ibid., vol. 32, p. 100. (28.) Letter to G. V. Ketkar, May 12, 1925, Ibid., vol. 27, p. 88. (29.) ‘Dr Ambedkar’s Indictment-II’, Ibid., vol. 63, p. 153. (30.) ‘Caste Has to Go’, Ibid., vol. 62, p. 121. (31.) ‘Hind Swaraj’, Ibid., vol. 10, p. 40. (32.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 7, 10–12, 127. (33.) Satyagraha Leaflet, No. 18, 8 May 1919, CWMG, vol. 15, pp. 288–9; ‘Crusade against Non-co-operation’, Ibid., vol. 18, p. 115. (34.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 6. (35.) Ibid., p. 9. (36.) Ibid., pp. 6–7. (37.) ‘General Knowledge about Health’, CWMG, vol. 12, p. 166; Letter to Maganlal Gandhi, 9 September 1911, Ibid., vol. 11, p. 156. Gandhi repeated this on many occasions. ‘Sikhism’, vol. 28, p. 264; Gita According to Gandhi, p. 128. (38.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 127–8. (39.) ‘Discourses on the Gita’, CWMG, vol. 32, p. 95; ‘Sikhism’, Ibid., vol. 28, p. 264. (40.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 136; ‘Notes’, CWMG, vol. 20, p. 130. Gandhi refused to take even the term Kurukshetra to mean the specific historical place called Kurukshetra. Discourses, pp. 8–9.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination (41.) Lettert to Kashinath Trivedi, 17 January 1931, CWMG, vol. 45, p. 96; Speech on the shraddha of C.R. Das, Calcutta, 1 July 1925, vol. 27, pp. 315–16; Gita According to Gandhi, p. 12. (42.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 128. (43.) ‘Hind Swaraj’, CWMG, vol. 10, p. 48. (44.) Discourses, p. 24. (45.) Letter to Sakarlal Dave, 19 May 1919, CWMG, vol. 15, pp. 312–13. It is interesting to note here that Gandhi himself explicitly associated many of his notions with the teaching of the Gita. While referring to Narayan Chandavarkar’s article on the Gita and Non-cooperation he said, ‘I think I too have been a student of the Gita in my own way. I have seen in it the principle of Non-cooperation’. ‘What the Scriptures Say’, CWMG, vol. 18, pp. 115, 125, etc. His belief in spinning of the charakha too was derived from the Gita. He says, ‘the reader will be interested in knowing that my belief is derived largely from the Bhagavadgita’. ‘Notes: The Charakha in the Gita’, CWMG, vol. 21, pp. 307, 337. Gandhi uses the text to occasionally justify his other notions too. One such instance was his defence of swadeshi on the basis of the Gita’s exhortation on ‘one’s own dharma’. ‘Surely, the Bhagavadgita does not say that we should dress ourselves in delicate Japanese fabrics. Every Sastra says that only our own dharma can save us, and it is our dharma, in our country, to wear cloth made by our workers in their homes, singing hymns as they work’. Speech on Swadeshi, Bombay, 7 September 1919, CWMG, vol. 16, p. 112. (46.) The school of Samnyasa argued for the abandonment of all actions on the belief that ‘no action is here seen to be done by one who is without desire, the spring of whatever action one does is desire’. Against this, Gandhi’s argument was that ‘it is not desire that vitiates the action, but selfish desire’. The abandonment of the desire for fruit is both samnyasa and tyaga, both having the etymological meaning “give up”. Here, he who abstains from action altogether is not a samnyasi but only an idler or hypocrite according to Gandhi. Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 98, 364, etc.; Discourses, pp. 25–9; ‘The man who renounces the prescribed duties and professes himself a barren brahmavadin will have no footing any where’. Letter to Manilal Gandhi, 12 April 1914, vol. 12, p. 405; Gita According to Gandhi, p. 129. (47.) Gita According to Gandhi, Gita p. 131. (48.) Discourses, p. 3. (49.) Gita According to Gandhi, Gita p. 129.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination (50.) Mahadev Desai criticizes David Hume for conceptualizing the Upanisadic and the Gita’s knowledge as ‘magic talisman’, and says that this was due to his overwhelming emphasis on knowledge without understanding the mutual relation that knowledge should have with action and bhakti. Gita According to Gandhi, Gita pp. 105–11. (51.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 129–30; Discourses, p. 24. (52.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 130. (53.) Letter to Raojibhai Patel, 27 February 1918, CWMG, vol. 14, p. 223. (54.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 130. (55.) On other occasions, Gandhi interpreted bhakti as suffering, the latter as an opportunity to show the intensity of one’s devotion’. Letter to Maganlal Gandhi, April 18, 1910, CWMG, vol. 10, p. 206. (56.) Speech at Wardha, 21 December 1925, CWMG, vol. 29, p. 340. (57.) ‘The popular notion of bhakti is soft-heartedness, telling beads and the like, and disdaining to do even a loving service, lest the telling of beads etc. might be interrupted. This bhakti, therefore, leaves the rosary only for eating, drinking and the like, never for grinding corn or nursing patients’. Gita According to Gandhi, p. 131. (58.) Discourses, pp. 11, 43; Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 80, 159–60, 177. (59.) ‘Is this Humanity?—VII’, 21 November 1926, CWMG, vol. 32, p. 73. (60.) ‘Those who work in the Gita spirit never overwork themselves, because they work with complete detachment which means utter freedom from anxiety’. Letter to Satis Chandra Das Gupta, 13 December 1928, CWMG, vol. 38, p. 68. (61.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 131–2. (62.) Ibid., pp. 161–2; ‘Still at It’, CWMG, vol. 36, p. 109. (63.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 280. (64.) Discourses, p. 19. (65.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 132. (66.) ‘The mere belief in the Incarnation, which, as I have said, springs from the imaginative attitude, can scarcely carry one very far, and may indeed be a delusion and a snare, unless it becomes rationalized into a belief in “a perpetual
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination cosmic and personal process”, to adopt Miss Underhill’s phrase’. Gita According to Gandhi, Gita p. 48. (67.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 196. (68.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 48. (69.) Krishna was regarded as an avatar because he was equiminded towards all creations of God and his actions were for the welfare of the society (anasakti). Ibid., p. 183. (70.) Ibid., p. 128. (71.) Discourses, p. 29. (72.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 51. (73.) Ibid., pp. 196–7. (74.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 132–3. Gandhi says that this is brought out as early as in the second chapter. Further he states that ahimsa is interwoven with other concepts, particularly anasakti. On one instance he explicitly said: ‘Karma means dharma, dharma means morality, and morality means truth and non-violence. Truth is the end; non-violence is the means to attaining it’. ‘What is one’s Dharma’, CWMG, vol. 41, p. 209. (75.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 132–3. (76.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 133–4. (77.) Discourses, pp. 19–20. (78.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 132. (79.) Discourses, pp. 22–3. (80.) Discourses, pp. 65–6. (81.) Gandhi quite explicitly stated ‘you should know that the Gita can be interpreted so as to justify crimes’. Speech at Juhu, 30 March 1924, CWMG, vol. 23, p. 337; Speech at Bardoli Taluka Conference, 29 January 1922, vol. 22, p. 292. (82.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 110–11. (83.) Ibid., p. 111. (84.) Ibid., p. 369.
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination (85.) Ibid., pp. 368–9. (86.) ‘Notes on Tilak’s Letter’, 18 January 1920, CWMG, vol. 16, pp. 490–1; Speech at Meeting in Wai, 6 November 1920, CWMG, vol. 18, p. 441. (87.) ‘Religious Authority for Non-cooperation’, CWMG, vol. 18, pp. 195–6. (88.) ‘It was said in the Gita that to use force was not religious and religion did not consist in using force’. Speech at Public Meeting, Gaya, 12 August 1921, CWMG, vol. 20, p. 498. (89.) ‘What the Scriptures Say’, CWMG, vol. 18, p. 125. (90.) Letters to Sakarlal Dave, 19 May 1919, CWMG, vol. 15, pp. 312–13. (91.) For Gandhi, the Gita does not prohibit physical fighting altogether. ‘Discourse on the Gita’, CWMG, vol. 32, p. 96. (92.) Speech at Bardoli Taluka Conference, 29 January 1922, CWMG, vol. 22, p. 292. (93.) ‘Appendices’, CWMG, vol. 35, p. 522. (94.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 175. (95.) Ibid., p. 187. (96.) Letter to Chhaganlal Gandhi, 28 July 1914, CWMG, vol. 12, p. 521. For Gandhi’s explanation of the major features of the varna system in the Gita, see Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 102–4. (97.) Discourses, p. 69. (98.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 376. Gandhi explicitly stated that the divisions were flexible and qualities were transferable and interchangeable. ‘The division is no division into water-tight compartments’. Gita According to Gandhi, Gita p. 102; ‘there were no exclusive divisions, as we know from several cases of intermixture of functions and varnas in the Mahabharata’. p. 104. (99.) Discourses, p. 69. For Gandhi, historically the varna acted as a social balancer. Gita According to Gandhi, p. 102. (100.) Ibid., p. 69. (101.) The Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 103, 188, 199–200, 376. (102.) Speech at Untouchability Conference, Belgaum, 27 December 1924, CWMG, vol. 25, p. 511; ‘The moment superior status is arrogated, it becomes worthy to be trampled under foot.’ Gita According to Gandhi, Gita p. 200; ’Each Page 33 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination requirement was assigned to be fulfilled by a class possessing the particular gifts necessary for its fulfillment. The evident inequality of individual attainments was recognized, but the possession of gifts added to one’s responsibility rather than improved one’s rank’. Gita According to Gandhi, p. 103. (103.) Gita According to Gandhi, Gita, p. 376; ‘Notes’, CWMG, vol. 21, p. 447. (104.) Discourses, p. 18; Gita According to Gandhi, p. 228. (105.) Ibid., p. 188. (106.) Discourses, p. 13. For Gandhi, the system of varna and its’ duty distributions are more clearly manifest in India than in the West. ‘The Gita makes the moral law clearer than any other ethical system in the world’. Gita According to Gandhi, Gita pp. 104–5. (107.) Discourses, p. 54. (108.) To quote an instance: ‘Brahmanism is the culmination of other varnas just as the head is the culmination of the body’. Gita According to Gandhi, p. 199. (109.) Ibid., pp. 99–100. (110.) Ibid., p. 94. (111.) Discourses, pp. 32–3; Gita According to Gandhi, p. 74. (112.) Gita Rahasya, vol. I, p. 549. (113.) ‘When detachment governs our actions, even the weapon raised in order to strike an enemy down falls out of our hand’. Discourses, p. 21. (114.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 198–9. (115.) Ibid., p. 199. (116.) Speech at Tanjore, 16 September, 1927, CWMG, vol. 35, p. 2. Gandhi makes distinctions between varna and caste, and calls the latter as perverted form of varna. Gita According to Gandhi, p. 102. (117.) Gita According to Gandhi, p. 103; ‘Curious Ideas’, CWMG, vol. 32, pp. 88– 9; ‘It is stated in the Gita itself that every one, whether a woman, a vaisya or a sudra can acquire spiritual knowledge if they have devotion to God’. ‘Discourses on the Gita’, vol. 32, p. 96; Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 103–4. (118.) Gandhi explicitly stated this on many occasions. Speech at Women’s Meeting, Dakor, 27 October 1920, CWMG, vol. 18, p. 392; Speech at Cocanada, 2 April 1921, vol. 19, p. 504; ‘In the estimation of a Brahmin knowing and living Page 34 of 35
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Anasaktiyoga and the Nationalist Imagination his religion, a sudra is as good as himself. The Bhagavadgita has nowhere taught that a Chandala is in any way inferior to a Brahmin’. Speech at Ellore, 3 April 1921, CWMG, vol. 19, p. 512; ‘Notes’, vol. 21, p. 214. (119.) Speech at Reception at Mayavaram, CWMG, vol. 13, p. 70; Speech at Cocanada, 2 April 1921, vol. 19, p. 504. (120.) Speech at Public Meeting, Madras, 8 April 1921, CWMG, vol. 19, p. 547. (121.) After rejecting the invitation to speak before the Dhed community Gandhi regretted, ‘… not aware of who they were, I expressed my inability … Had I known their caste, I would have certainly come earlier. I feel proud that I am now meeting (members of) this caste. They are our own brethren, and to regard them with the slightest disrespect not only argues our own unworthiness but is morally wrong, for it is contrary to the teaching of the Bhagavadgita’. Speech at Reception by Dheds, Durban, 9 July 1914, CWMG, vol. 12, p. 459; ‘The idea of untouchability as it is practised today has no place … in the Gita …’. ‘Purifying Flame’, CWMG, vol. 27, p. 274. Speech at Villager’s Meeting, Pudupalayam, 21 March 1925, CWMG, vol. 26, p. 349; Interview to Katherine Mayo, 17 March 1926, CWMG, vol. 30, p. 123. (122.) Speech at Tanjore, 16 September 1927, CWMG, vol. 35, p. 2. (123.) Discourse, pp. 5–6. (124.) Gita According to Gandhi, pp. 188–9. (125.) Gandhi considered devotion to duty as central to anasakti. Letter to Gangabehn Vaidya, 19 May 1930, CWMG, vol. 43, p. 413. (126.) Speech at Foundation Laying of Vanita Vishram, Ahmedabad, 29 June 1919, CWMG, vol. 15, p. 411. (127.) Ibid. (128.) ‘Still at It’, CWMG, vol. 36, p. 109.
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Svadharma and the Nation
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Svadharma and the Nation Vinoba’s Reading of the Gita Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0006
Abstract and Keywords This chapter discusses Vinoba Bhave's explanation of the message of the Bhagavadgita. It argues that Bhave considered the central teaching of the Bhagavadgita as involving the pursuit of svadharma — one's own dharma in the social sense, and united action. It also contends that Bhave's concept of svadharma is applicable in the justification of traditional social practices. Bhave considered the Gita as an ordinary text with a message for the ordinary man. He equated svadharma with varnadharma and provided distinctive meanings to the attributes of karma, bhakti, and jnana. Bhave also attempted to retrieve and invigorate traditional practices and customs in India using the authority of the Gita. Keywords: Vinoba Bhave, Bhagavadgita, svadharma, dharma, united action, social practices, varnadharma, karma, bhakti, jnana
Acharya Vinoba Bhave (1895–1983) was a socio-religious thinker, a rabid Gandhian, and the most notable personality in the history of social reformation in India. He was widely known as a ‘social reformist’ in Indian literature, particularly in twentieth-century Indian sociology and political economy. His reformist attempts were primarily aimed at uprooting socio-economic inequalities and reinforcing the ethical and spiritual foundations of India. The Bhoodan movement was one of the most notable among such attempts. It was, like Gandhi’s trusteeship movement, based on moral appeal. Vinoba Bhave spoke
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Svadharma and the Nation a great deal on social, political, and ethical questions. His Talks on the Gita1 is one of the most prominent among them. In fact, Vinoba was one of the later nationalist thinkers to comment on the Gita at a juncture when the masses were a significant presence in the nationalist movement. This had left him with two options: either to proceed with the recurrent theme of recognizing and assigning a significant role and position to the masses in the Indian nation, or to sort out a new strategy for them. Vinoba seems to have chosen in favour of the latter alternative through his interpretation of the Gita. It is important to keep this in mind as he offers not only distinctive suggestions for the nation on the basis of the Gita, but he also departs significantly from the mainstream nationalist interpretations of the text.
(p.206) Moral Basis for the Nation Vinoba’s tryst with the Gita and the intention behind its churning resembles the other nationalist writers. Like the earlier nationalist commentators on the Gita, Vinoba thought that the Indian nation should be reconstructed on a moral foundation. A nation is not merely a political organization; it is a community working for the moral progress of the people. This moral foundation necessary for the nation could be constituted from her past legacy, but the nation could be proud of itself only if it undermined some of its obsolete social institutions, practices, and pursuits and rejuvenated the Vedic religion. Like Vivekananda, he too expressed tremendous pride and confidence in India’s cultural heritage, and hence, hesitated to criticize the Vedas. For Vinoba, the Vedic religion with its stress on varnasramadharma, and rituals and practices infused in the Gita could become the religion of active regeneration, and the moral basis of the Indian nation.
Hermeneutics of the Gita Vinoba’s Talks on the Gita is one of his most significant attempts to recast the ethico-moral foundations of Indian nationhood. It is a comprehensive treatise expounding the great religious and moral philosophy of the Gita, and shows awareness of the philosophical subtleties of the Vedas, Upanisads, Smritis, and Sastras. Like the ethicists conclusions, this discourse interprets the Gita as a pragmatic treatise on practical ethics and altruistic social duty. But unlike the Gita Rahasya, Anasaktiyoga, and Essays on the Gita, Vinoba’s Talks on the Gita is not a scholarly exposition in the sense that its style of argumentation, thematic arrangement, and consistency in presenting materials are not of a high standard and innovative. Except the interpretations of a few concepts such as karma, vikarma, akarma, and varnadharma, to which he engrafted new meanings, his interpretations of other subtle concepts such as atman, paramatman, prakriti are accommodated within the ethical frame. In other words, it is a discursive study of the philosophy of the Gita, and Vinoba is less diligent about organizing and presenting the theme systematically. This is probably because these lectures were initially delivered to his fellowprisoners in Dhulia Jail taking cognizance of Page 2 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation their perceiving ability, and Vinoba did not revise them for publication as a book.2 In his Talks on the Gita, Vinoba divided the text of the Gita into five parts: he regarded the first part, that is, the first to fifth chapters, as dealing with the philosophy of life, with the life of the sthitaprajna (steadfast seer), and sublime characters of karma yoga; the second part, (p.207) that is, from the sixth to twelfth chapters, as considering bhakti, its various techniques, and kinds of vikarma; the third part, that is, from the thirteenth to fifteenth, as concentrating on jnana yoga; the fourth part, that is, the sixteenth and seventeenth, as supplements; and the last part, that is, the eighteenth chapter, as conclusion for the whole text. The logic behind such arrangements was to argue that the teaching of the Gita was the exposition of a karmayogi’s uninterrupted progress through bhakti to the perfect jnana.3 Further, he interprets the text chapter by chapter, and not verse by verse, or sentence by sentence, as several other readers happen to do. He rarely quotes Sanskrit slokas from the text.
Critique of Earlier Interpretations Vinoba’s comments on the earlier interpretations of the Gita embrace those who read independent and exclusive meanings into the Gita’s notions of Karmayoga, Bhaktiyoga, and Jnanayoga. He acknowledges that the Gita was subjected to conflicting interpretations and understandings, and some of them, at least, interpreted it as a sectarian text. Such sectarian approaches were expressed in the Samkhya readings, which viewed Jnanayoga as its central teaching; bhakti readings, which regarded Bhaktiyoga as its central purport; and Karmayogic readings, which suggested philosophy of action as its central teaching. Vinoba’s argument is that all these readings were sectarian, fragmentary, and parochial because they had relegated the universal philosophy of the text to an auxiliary position, or sidelined its central attributes to vindicate their predetermined philosophical systems. Hence, they completely fell short of arriving at unmistakable and unimpeachable conclusions from their interpretations. For Vinoba, the Gita is beyond such rigid determinism and its teaching is universal and comprehensive, transcending all sorts of sectarianism. To some seekers … karma … others … bhakti … still others choose jnana. Life does not mean mere karma or mere bhakti or mere jnana … Nor do I like the utilitarian philosophy of a little of bhakti, a little of jnana and a little of karma … The three are mingled together … In the same way, the spirit should pervade every action of our life—every action should be full of service, full of love and full of knowledge. Every part of life should be filled to overflowing with karma, bhakti, and jnana. This is called purusottamayoga.4 Unlike the other interpreters, particularly Tilak and Aurobindo who had reproached the readers for misinterpreting the Gita, Vinoba accuses both the readers and the text for lending such diversities. The intrinsic (p.208) quality of the text, its many-sided Page 3 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation thoughts, its synthetic grasp of different aspects of the ethico-spiritual life, and its attempt to reinforce some of the conventional notions, he feels, made such multifarious interpretations possible.
The Gita has a way of using old philosophical terms in new senses … That is why the words of the Gita have gained a wider meaning; they have remained so fresh and green that thinkers could discover in them different meanings according to their own needs and experience. All these interpretations are possible, each from its’ own point of view, and, as I understand it, we can interpret the Gita for ourselves without having to contradict any of them.5 Vinoba believes that most of the technical terms and sentences used in the text could be interpreted for different understandings. He cites a metaphor from the Upanishads to show how a word could be interpreted in a variety of ways.
Once the devas (bright gods), danavas (dark gods) and men, all three went to Prajapati (the Creator) for advice. Prajapati gave all three of them the same word of advice, the one syllable ‘da’. The bright gods said …Brahma, by the sound ‘da’ has told us to acquire ‘damana’, self-control. The dark gods said … the Creator has advised us … to cultivate ‘daya’, compassion. The men said … by saying ‘da’, Prajapati has advised us to practise ‘dana’, giving of gifts. The Creator approved of all their interpretations, because they had each arrived at their meaning in terms of their own experience. While understanding the technical terms of the Gita, we should bear in mind this story from the Upanishads.6 Vinoba’s critique of earlier interpretations refers only to the traditional commentaries on the Gita and does not mention, except briefly, the Gita Rahasya. Even these criticisms are not on philosophical, or theoretical, or thematic subjects of the text but simple, cursory, and superficial treatments of the external aspects of it. The theoretical–historical and allegorical debate that triggered great response in the Karmayogic interpretations did not evoke any response from Vinoba.
The Gita as the Moral Code for the Common Man Like some of his predecessors, particularly Vivekananda and Gandhi, Vinoba regarded the Gita as an ordinary text with a message for the ordinary man. It is a text which shuns all subtle and rigid philosophies and systems of the ancient scriptures, and makes its religion practical and attainable. Vinoba felt that the text borrowed and used certain philosophical terms such as karma, bhakti, jnana, sthitaprajna, svadharma not in a high, spiritual but in a wider, socio-ethical sense. It designs (p.209) its teaching to fulfil the ordinary man on his own ground, and to make liberation as easy as possible for him. Against the genteel religion of the Vedas, the Gita expounds its dharma, religious practices, and salvation as accessible to the ordinary masses. In short, Vinoba felt that the message of the Gita is for humanity at large.
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Svadharma and the Nation Many people mistakenly imagine that the spiritual life and books like the Gita are intended only for ascetics … Such thinking has divided humanity into two kinds of beings, ascetics and worldly men. Lokmanya Tilak has drawn our attention to this in his Gita Rahasya. I wholeheartedly endorse his view that the Gita is a scripture intended for ordinary men, living their daily lives in the world … It is prepared to go to the lowest, the weakest, the least cultured of men. And it goes to him not to keep him where he is, but to grasp him by the hand and lift him up. The Gita wishes that man should make his actions pure, and attain the highest state.7 Further, Vinoba argued that the ordinary character of the Gita is also expressed in its recognition of the contributions of ordinary men in religious seeking, however minute and trivial, as part of religious pursuit. It gives them psychological support in their religious strivings. For Vinoba, the Gita is a text on ‘the art of living’, explaining the life of purity to the common man.
At the ghats of the Ganga, they teach swimming; a rope is tied to a tree on the bank and the other end to the waist of the learner, before he is thrown into the water. But the teacher stands in the water ready to pull him up. The novice sinks and rises up a few times, but in the end masters the art of swimming. In the same way, the Lord teaches us the art of living.8 As in the earlier readings, particularly in Vivekananda, Vinoba thought that the Gita was born in a context where religion was admitted to be the monopoly of a privileged few, to which ordinary man had no access. Hence, the Gita was a protest against the exclusivist and selective religion of the Vedas.
These various rites (Vedic) were filled with subtle ideas. How could the common folk comprehend them … few had the fitness to study the Vedas … The moksa that lay locked up in the Vedas as in a strong box, the Lord has brought out and placed at the cross-roads. What a direct and easy way to moksa!9 Vinoba’s position was that the Gita as an ordinary text renders its message to the larger humanity by laying great emphasis on the practical aspects of religion. It undermines all sorts of religious insularities (p.210) of the Vedas. Its essential message is not subtle as that of the Vedas; it is unequivocal and universal. This sets the tone for Vinoba’s considerations on the institutions of svadharma, idol worship, and Vedic rituals and practices.
Svadharma as the Central Teaching of the Gita For Vinoba, the central teaching of the text consists in the first and second chapters, where as a response to Arjuna’s many-sided queries, Krishna pleads with him to perform his svadharma, natural-born duty, as a kshatriya— svadharmamapi caveksya. His svadharma or law of action required him to engage in the battle of Kurukshetra. Protection of dharma by performing all actions, including the one that involves great violence, is an ethical duty of a kshatriya.10
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Svadharma and the Nation The dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna takes into account and discusses a variety of issues such as karma, bhakti, jnana, nature of the seeker, Brahman as personal and impersonal, the role of sthitaprajna. All these issues, Vinoba felt, are discussed in the text on the foundation of svadharma. For Vinoba, the Gita proposes the idea of svadharma as the sine qua non of its teaching. A large part of the text is meant to demonstrate how people could integrate and raise themselves with the help of their svadharma rather than searching for goodness and merit in other’s duties. For Vinoba, two factors are important in the reading of the text. First, the fundamental teaching of the text is contrived from the standpoint of the sadhaka or seeker after perfection, and not siddha or the perfect seer.11 Second, it conceived svadharma as the centre around which karma, bhakti, jnana, and other attributes revolve. Hence, for Vinoba, the Gita is an ordinary text asking people to engage themselves in the performance of svadharma through bhakti and jnana, and reach the state of Purusottama. This svadharma has its pupil in Arjuna. The Gita emphasizes svadharma as the ‘foundation on which the edifice of its teaching was built. The Gita arranges a number of other matters around this svadharma’.12 The purpose of the Gita is to remove the illusion that stands between us and our svadharma. Arjuna was perplexed about his dharma; a delusion had arisen in his mind over his svadharma … The Gita’s main task is to remove this illusion, this sense of ‘mine’, this attachment. This is why … Arjuna replies, ‘Yes, Lord. The illusion has left me; my svadharma is clear to me’. If then we put together the beginning and the end of the Gita, we see that its aim and effect is to remove illusion.13 (p.211) Svadharma is a natural system of arrangement according to which one is to observe the duties befallen to his lot in his life’s station. For Vinoba, it is an arrangement based on divisions in qualities and duties to enable man to give his best to the community. It helps in concentrating one’s full energy in the performance of the duty based on his temperament and inborn qualities, and it necessarily leads to good results. If a son born in a trading family, for instance, engages in the svadharma of his ancestors, his inherent qualities make his performance easy, skilful, and productive. The diversion of one’s concentration and energy into various activities, or roving in quest of duties leads to anarchy.
If the rain falling on a mountain-top runs in all directions, it disappears, leaving no trace behind; the water is scattered and wasted. But when the same water flows in one direction, it becomes a river … there is great value in svadharma … We should think constantly of our svadharma and devote all our energies to it …14 Further, excellence lies in the pursuit of one’s svadharma meticulously even if it is devoid of merit. The pursuit of another’s duty unsuitable to one’s inborn qualities would only produce contaminated results, and thus obstruct religious growth. Page 6 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation ‘Svadharma is not the sort of thing that one takes up because one thinks it is noble, or gives up because it seems lowly’.
Arjuna felt at odds with his svadharma. But however unattractive a man’s svadharma may be, he has to find fulfillment by persisting in it, because it is only through such persistence that growth is possible … It is equal to our measure … However superior another’s dharma may appear to be, it is not good for me to adopt it … even if someone else’s dharma seems easier, one should not take it up … One’s dharma consists in following one’s true vocation.15 A simple performance of svadharma without untainted mind and clean heart would not yield virtuous results; for that it should be performed diligently with one’s energy and skill fully concentrated on the work. Vinoba felt that to make svadharma righteous, the Gita proposed the concepts of desirelessness and dedication. If one performs one’s svadharma desirelessly16 with bhakti,17 and arpana bhavana, that is, disposition of dedication to God,18 it becomes pure and meritorious. Vinoba insisted that every action, great or minute, can be performed this way.19 That is to say, if one remains loyal to svadharma, one can attain moksa. Thus, Vinoba thought that the Gita sought to maintain social equilibrium by insisting on svadharma.
(p.212) Svadharma and Varnasramadharma Quite strikingly, Vinoba equated svadharma with varnadharma.20 He stated explicitly at many places in his Gita talks that svadharma and varnadharma are based on similar principles, and the virtue of both concepts lay in their ‘naturalness’, and the ‘dharma’ consisting in them. As varnadharma comes naturally and hereditarily, svadharma too comes naturally and patrimonially. One does not have to go out in search of one’s own dharma … as we are born, our svadharma is also born with us. But we can also say that it is there waiting for us even before we are born; for it is the purpose of our being born … I would compare svadharma to one’s mother. It was not left to me to choose my mother in this birth. It had already been determined for me. No matter what sort of person she is, there is no pushing her away. That is precisely the case with svadharma—it is inescapable. Besides svadharma, we have nothing else in all this world to rely on, to rest in … no one should ever let go his hold on svadharma.21 Vinoba thought that svadharma comes naturally as ‘a child learns to walk, talk, or eat naturally’, or as ‘sun works naturally in the universe’. It is not based on the principle of ‘high’ or ‘low’; it expresses equality among the diverse states of hereditary and natural belonging.22 Vinoba insisted that it is the bhavana (spiritual outlook) or motive behind the action, and not the action itself, that is binding. ‘The meaning of it all is that whatever actions we do, whether good or bad, a new dimension of power enters into them the moment we surrender them [bhavana] to the Lord.’23
Vinoba’s position, then, is that the social order could be cherished through one’s contribution to it as per one’s nature. He, however, does not establish how svadharma could imply equality. More importantly, he does not highlight the exploitation, inequality, and hierarchy inherent in the Vedic varna system. In Page 7 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation fact, he argues that problems in society are the result of disregard and inattention paid to the varna system. At present, everywhere, there is talk of social reform. We are constantly discussing the minimum comfort the common man should have, and the structure of society necessary to bring this about. On the one hand there is excessive comfort, and on the other absolute privation. On the one side wealth is piled up and for the rest there is a bottomless depth of poverty. How can we remove these vast inequalities in society? There is only one natural way for everyone to get the necessaries of life; that is for everyone to shake off laziness and work hard (as per the varna system).24 Vinoba thus effectively endorses the traditional social structure in India, and looks upon it as the moral basis of the Indian nation. In a way, he (p.213) ignores the largescale protests that had arisen in this regard, and the attempts to subdue exploitation resulting from them. However, it is not clear whether he reduces the varna system into the caste system. But the characteristics of svadharma and varnadharma that he highlights are not much different from the characteristics of the caste system. Vinoba’s Bhoodan Movement seems to be directed against the exploitation inbuilt in the varna system, and he owes this to the Gita.
Svadharma, Bhakti, and Jnana Vinoba gives distinctive meanings to the attributes of karma, bhakti, and jnana of the text. He equates karma with svadharma, and both with one’s dharma. For him, karma does not imply spiritual activities, nor does it imply only ordinary activities such as eating, drinking, for these are actions of asramadharma and not varnadharma. Karma is the concrete, outward action that one performs in one’s life’s station as svadharma, and is acquired through heredity, or is implanted naturally. Our eating, drinking, sleeping, are all actions, but it is not these actions that the Gita refers to when it talks of karma. Karma there means the practice of svadharma. But in order to achieve freedom from desire through the practice of svadharma, something more is necessary—victory over kama and krodha, craving and anger.25 Svadharma (karma) alone cannot lead one to the state of sattvic attainments, nor can it become yoga; for that svadharma should be buttressed and assisted by bhakti.26 If svadharma is self-centered and covetous, performed with the intention of achieving reward, it cannot become genuine and sattvic. Bhakti is loving attachment to and complete faith in one’s svadharma, or it is one’s full involvement and engagement with the pursuit of svadharma.
To attain purity of mind many vikarmas are prescribed, like yajna and dana (sacrifice and gifts), japa and tapas (prayer and penance), dhyana and dharana (meditation and concentration) … If in yajna, yaga, dhyana, and tapas the heart does not enter, how can purity of mind result? It is the involvement of the heart that is bhakti … If a trained nurse, attending on a
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Svadharma and the Nation patient, has not the bhavana, the mental attitude of service, how could it be true service?27 Further, bhakti alone cannot fulfil the cycle of svadharma; it should be amalgamated with jnana. Jnana is not bookish intellect; it is the vision by which one realizes one’s true being (self), the absolute self, and all existence without exception in the self, the consciousness by which ego (p.214) and desires are emptied28 and the light by which one understands the true significance of svadharma. It reflects itself in an allembracing love. It assists svadharma and bhakti, and transforms them into desirelessness.29 In other words, jnana helps the svadharmi in three ways. First, it supports him in understanding the body as a mere lump of flesh and blood, a fabric woven from the three qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas, and the soul as real and permanent. Second, it brings the consciousness of similarity between the self and Paramatman. Third, it helps him to assimilate svadharma with bhakti, and dedicate it to God.
In raja yoga (jnana), both karma and bhakti are combined … For attaining purity of mind, we should give away the fruit. Dedicate to the Lord every action as it takes shape. As actions take shape before our eyes, dedicate them then and there to the Lord and be content. We do not give up the fruit; we only give it over to the Lord. Why only the fruit, even the vasanas, the tendencies that arise in the mind, and the deformations like lust and anger—place them all at the feet of the Lord, and be free from care … the best and noblest way to use every one of the senses is with the intellect surrendered to the Lord. This is called raja yoga.30 Vinoba says that, ‘when vikarma, the action of the mind (jnana) and heart (bhakti) enters into karma (svadharma), the outward action, desirelessness grows within us, little by little’.31 The mind and body can be cleansed gradually, step by step, with determination, a thorough understanding of the worthlessness of the body and the reality of the soul,, equality of creation, and the necessity of surrendering oneself to God. For Vinoba, every action can be done in this way dispassionately.32
But desirelessness can be achieved only through the observation of one’s svadharma; involving oneself in paradharma (another’s duty), however intelligently and proficiently, would not produce desirelessness. Vinoba feels this is because if one shifts from one’s svadharma to paradharma, the hankering for change implies the presence of desire. Therefore, desirelessness is an integral part of svadharma, and not of another’s dharma. Let your crooked nose remain as it is. If you attempt to cut it and improve it, you will only make it more frightful … Though defective, because they come naturally, sattvik actions should not be given up … that its fruit can be renounced … While thus, for love of the fruit, he desires to perform paradharma, the action that rightly belongs to others, he will let slip the fruit also; he will have no steadiness in life. The attachment to action will cling to his mind … Therefore perform only … Svadharma.33
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Svadharma and the Nation (p.215) Svadharma is regarded as equivalent to karma; and karma, bhakti, and jnana are seen as integral to one another. In this way, Vinoba not merely asks people to continue to pursue their traditional vocations, which are mainly based on caste, but also pursue them with dedication. He gives an ethico-spiritual aura to the rigid and much decried institution of varna, and makes it central to the social order. He uses the authority of the Gita to retrieve and reinforce the traditional structure in India. Further, as he forbids cross-varna mobility, he undermines human reason, freedom, and capacity to one’s svadharma (heredity). Even the human body becomes an instrument to fulfil varna goals.
Svadharma and Traditional Practices Vinoba not only defends the varna system in India through the notion of svadharma, he also attempts, by using the authority of the Gita, to retrieve and invigorate traditional practices and customs. He upholds saguna bhakti against nirguna bhakti of the Upanisads; he supports worship with the motive (desireful or sakama karma) of achieving purusartas. For Vinoba, acting for the accomplishment of purusartas is distinguishable from ordinary motives, and hence, part of desirelessness.34 He regards idol worship too as a means for realizing the Supreme. Many people have opposed image-worship. Foreigners, and even thinkers of our own country, have found fault with it. But the more I think of it, the more I realize its beauty. What is the meaning of it? Image-worship is the vidya, the art, of experiencing the whole universe in a little object.35 Vinoba supports various customs and traditional ways of life as they would contribute to the evolution of desirelessness in one’s actions.36 Practices such as worshipping the Ganga or Jamuna as sacred, and throwing coins ‘into their feet’, throwing bones of the dead body into ‘their vast womb’,37 or worshipping snakes as divine, he feels, are not superstitious, but based on firm principles of ethics. The bhavana or belief behind these exercises transcends all disputes regarding their worthiness. Therefore, he refuses to entertain scientific or historical questions about the rationality of these practices.
Look at the fire in whose worship the Vedas begin. When I see its flames, I am reminded of the excitement and agitation of our human souls … Scientists would say that they flicker because of ether, or because of the pressure of the wind. But so far as I am concerned, I see in the fire its eagerness to join the Supreme Being up there, the ocean of light, Suryanarayana, and hence it’s restless, perpetual and upward movement … The sun is the whole of which the flames are parts … It (p.216) never considers how far away from the sun it is. All it knows is how to rise above the earth to its utmost capacity.38 Vinoba also offers a critique of the contemporary education system. ‘Day by day, my conviction becomes stronger that the effect of this formal education is just nothing; it is like superficial plastering or the colourwash outside’.39 ‘As a result of faulty education, the minds of children today are filled with evil samskaras, wrong tendencies’.40 His preference is the gurukula kind of education system and hostels41 to Page 10 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation the modern formal education. He feels that in gurukula education, there is full involvement of the heart and mind, which is not the case with the present system. He even criticizes the scientific inventions carried out supposedly for the betterment of human beings.
Medical science is performing many miracles today. Into the body of a living animal they inject disease germs and watch its effects. The knowledge gained by giving all this pain to a living creature is used for the sake of the worthless human body. And all this goes on in the name of ‘compassion to creatures’ … Many such terrible actions are being done. This body, for whose sake we do so much, is as brittle as glass and will be shattered … we go on trying to preserve the delicate human body, it goes on disintegrating. It is not as if we do not understand all this, and yet we keep trying to fatten it and make much of it.42 Vinoba similarly rejects certain perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs as blind.43 He also rejects the contemporary social order and its goals, and favours the traditional order and practices.
Today, the film of materialism obscures our wisdom. Instead of beginning with an invocation of Ganesa, we begin with the question, ‘Does God exist anywhere?’ … Life is full of passion and greed, full of distortions. The best of our philosophers today cannot rise beyond the thought of finding food for everybody … Today’s main problem is food. Out best brains are busy solving it … If in such a strange social order, even something as straight and easy as dedication to the Lord becomes very difficult …44 It is difficult to connect his sneers at those who are ‘busy finding food for everybody’ with his later preoccupation with the Bhoodan Movement, although we cannot anticipate it when he gave his talks on the Gita.
Svadharma and Altruism For Vinoba, the central teaching of the Gita, thus, is the performance of svadharma, one’s inborn duty. But how does svadharma turn itself into altruistic social duty? Vinoba’s arguments proceed on the following lines: (p.217) If this duty is performed to achieve selfish interest or to satisfy mamatva (kinship), it would not release the svadharmi; rather it would helplessly bind him. Renunciation of mamatva and selfish motives are the two central aspects of svadharma. There are many external forms assumed by the illusion, which strews with thorns the path of svadharma. Yet, if we examine them … restricted and shallow identification of oneself … Myself, and those related to me through the body, set the limits of my expansion … This identification … builds a wall around me and cuts me off; and the odd thing about it is that I regard only the bodies as ‘me’ and ‘mine’. Falling into this double trap of identification of oneself and one’s people … we start putting up all sorts of
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Svadharma and the Nation little walls … the wretched germs of disease multiply, and the health which is svadharma is destroyed.45 This renunciation of mamatva and selfishness can be obtained only through the pursuit of one’s svadharma. It can neither be fulfilled through paradharma, nor by accepting samnyasa, or physical renunciation of svadharma. By giving up mamatva, the svadharmi purifies his mind, develops a single focus in his action, understands the distinction between the body and the soul, and realizes the divine pervading both animate and inanimate beings. In such a state, Vinoba feels, social service or altruism would occupy the place of mamatva naturally and automatically. ‘The jnani performs good actions as naturally as the birds sing … Service to others comes naturally to a jnani, just as eating, drinking and sleeping do to ordinary people.46 Thus, when man abandons mamatva, he becomes a karma yogi, and his actions are filled with bhakti and jnana. Social service, in this case, is not intentional or desired but serves as a means of removing personal ego, delusion, and mamatva.
The Gita teaches the Purusottama-Yoga and brings to perfection the life of karma. He is Purusottama, the Lord, receiving service; I am His servant, and all this creation the instrument for His service. If once we realize this relationship … Then continuous service will proceed … This is what the Gita teaches again and again; I shall remove from myself all sense of ‘I’ and surrender my life to the Lord and fill it with bhakti … Where is the talk of possession now? Life has no care anymore.47 Thus, Vinoba attempts to undermine kinship or mamatva and asks people to place themselves at the disposal of the common good. He attempts to build altruism into a hierarchical social structure through the notion of nishkama karma. He does not see any conflict between altruism and svadharma. In this sense, altruism can be very narrow (p.218) and becomes merely an apology for svadharma, and can be used for the legitimization of prevailing social practices. Further, Vinoba underplays the traditional institution of samnyasa and asks people to be engaged with the duties of the world. Work becomes worship. This is in tune with the ethic of emerging capitalism in India without undermining the prevailing social structure.
A Conservative Nationalism Although at places Vinoba uses language similar to that of Gandhi, his considerations on the Gita, and the consequences that he suggests are very different. The whole consequence of his endeavour is oriented towards the stabilization of social relations in India and breathing into them a moral spirit. He emphasizes svadharma as the central tenet of the Gita, but leaves it ambivalent enough to be interpreted in different ways. It can be interpreted as one’s station in life that suits one according to one’s attributes, or one’s position that has been carved out through one’s efforts; it can be a modern profession of one’s own choice, or it can be the position one occupies on account of varna dharma or caste position. These ambivalences helped Vinoba to incorporate diverse ideological nuances within his understanding of the Gita. It allows him to legitimize varna and caste institutions, and also incorporate changes in those systems. This position that Vinoba came to advance did not seriously probe into the basis of the self which others did on account of their reference to Vedanta, Page 12 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation and the equality of the atman upheld therein, or from the perspective of the liberal position the equality of the human person suggested therein. Vinoba does not merely call for the performance of one’s traditional role assigned in the social structure; performance of the duties of one’s station must be done with requisite jnana and bhakti. In a way, Vinoba argues for social relations that came to predominate in India through the assimilation of traditional roles and modern professions and entrepreneurship. His emphasis on svadharma, however, bears heavily on the masses located either in traditional or modern roles, as they have to perform assigned tasks ungrudgingly and without protest, detaching themselves from the fruits of their labour. Moreover, he directs the energies of the national movement to reinforce social roles rather than question inequities. Vinoba’s deployment of the Gita in the nationalist discourse must have appealed to the elite sections of society, both modern and traditional. The conservative nationalism that he came to reinforce was distinctive (p.219) in itself, although it was widely shared by certain strata in the Indian society. Notes:
(1.) Vinoba Bhave’s Talks on the Gita were lectures in Marathi, originally delivered to his co-prisoners in Dhulia Jail, Bombay, on eighteen successive Sundays, beginning on 21 February 1932, and ending on 19 June1932. They were first recorded and published in Marathi and later, the book was translated into various vernacular languages, including Kannada, Konkani, and Sindhi. Its English translation was published in installments in the journal Sunday Standard simultaneously from three cities—Madras, Bombay and Delhi, from December 1956 to September 1957. In 1958 these installments were compiled and published in a book form by Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh. This study is based on the second edition of this English translation. Acharya Vinoba Bhave, Talks on the Gita (hereafter Talks), Kashi: Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1959. (2.) The book consists of eighteen lectures on eighteen chapters of the Gita with no introduction or summing up. ‘Preface’, Talks. (3.) Talks, pp. 158, 230. (4.) Ibid., pp. 230–1. (5.) Ibid., pp. 11–12. (6.) Ibid., p. 12. (7.) Ibid., pp. 67–8. (8.) Ibid., pp. 106, 177. Page 13 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation (9.) Ibid., pp. 110–11. (10.) For Vinoba, the central teaching of the Gita is fully contained in the first and second chapters which talk about svadharma. (11.) Vinoba draws a sharp line demarcating sadaka and siddha. Sadaka is the earlier stage of siddha. The disinterested performance of svadharma with the knowledge of Brahman takes the sadaka to the position of siddha, a complete sthitaprajna, jivan-mukta, or jnana nistha. Talks, pp. 19, 26, 63–4, etc. (12.) Ibid., pp. 11, 177. (13.) Ibid., p. 9. (14.) Ibid., pp. 204–5, 105. (15.) Ibid., pp. 7–8, 205–8. (16.) Ibid., pp. 20–3, 40, 42–5, 63–6, 208. (17.) Ibid., pp. 30–2, 85–6, 115, 120, 122. (18.) Ibid., pp. 114–28. (19.) ‘If the karma yogi is a farmer, he will till the land, considering it his svadharma’. Ibid., pp. 32–4. (20.) Vinoba does not make a distinction between svadharma and varnadharma, but does so between varnadharma and asramadharma. ‘Man has a varnadharma and an asramadharma. While varnadharma does not change, asramadharma is constantly changing … The “you-ness” in you, you cannot give up’. Ibid., p. 274. (21.) Ibid., pp. 13, 205–8. For Vinoba, the virtue, samskara, which one obtains in this life, would determine the nature of category to which one is to born in the next birth because, ‘The end of this janma is the beginning of the next (punarjanma)’. If one is born in a sattvic family, that means he had greater virtue in his previous birth; if in a tamasic family, he had lesser virtue in the previous birth. Although Vinoba explicitly states that varnadharma is non-hierarchical, his theory of svadharma and punarjanma tends to make them hierarchical rather than equal. Moreover, Vinoba does not show much acerbity in explaining how a system based on hierarchical constituents, (sattva, rajas, and tamas) becomes non-hierarchical for social purpose; his belief in svadharma subdues all these difficulties. Ibid., pp. 81–2, 98. In one of the chapters, Vinoba acknowledges the inbuilt defects in the system of varna. But his firm belief is that ‘any system which is used for a device to maintain a social order, must necessarily admit of exceptions. We have to accept these exceptions’. Ibid., p. 275. (22.) Ibid., pp. 7–8, 205–6. Page 14 of 16
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Svadharma and the Nation (23.) Ibid., pp. 120, 122–3, 31–2, etc. (24.) Ibid., pp. 16, 198–9. Vinoba puts the same idea in another way: ‘[T]his system has now fallen into decay … it would be an excellent thing if only we could reform and revive it.’ (25.) Ibid., p. 41. (26.) For Vinoba, Samkhya is a theory, principle (sastra) about the absoluteness of the soul. Yoga is an art (kala) putting the principles into practice. Hence, for Vinoba, Samkhya and Yoga used in the text do not imply the Samkhya philosophy expounded by Kapilamuni and Patanjalayoga. They are used not as systems, but as theory and practice. Samkhya means understanding svadharma theoretically, and yoga implies its practice. Ibid., pp. 19–20, 25–8, etc. (27.) Ibid., pp. 85–6. (28.) Ibid., pp. 129–47. (29.) Vinoba assigns distinctive meanings to the concepts of karma, vikarma, akarma, and samnyasa. Karma means svadharma; vikarma means an attempt for inner purity of mind, and heart (bhakti); and akarma means the result that emerges from the union of both (jnana). The formula he proposes is: karma (svadharma) + vikarma (mind and heart, that is, jnana and bhakti) = akarma (perfect desireless state or sthitaprajna). When svadharma is united with vikarma, svadharma ceases to be karma, but becomes akarma or desirelessness, i.e., sahaja karma. This is his departure from Tilak’s Gita Rahasya. Further, Vinoba does not take the notion of samnyasa in the sense of the Vedic jnana nistha (Samkhya); he takes it in the sense of renunciation of fruit (union between svadharma, bhakti, and jnana). For him, samnyasa and karma are identical. A karmayogi is understood by the way of his karma (goal comes later, that is, goal through ways), a samnyasi is defined by the goal (karma is considered later, that is, ways through goal). Ibid., pp. 48–66. (30.) Ibid., pp. 14–15, 114–17, 183–95. (31.) Ibid., pp. 42–3. (32.) Ibid., p. 216. (33.) Ibid., p. 273. (34.) Ibid., pp. 89–93. (35.) Ibid., pp. 30, 151, 167, 175, etc.
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Svadharma and the Nation (36.) One example is that he preferred the horse-cart to the bicycle: ‘If there is a puddle or a ditch to cross, the bicycle stops, but the horse jumps over. This beautiful and loving animal is a form of the Lord’. Ibid., p. 138. (37.) ‘You may laugh, but that does not alter the fact. To me this bhavana, this faith appears worthy of acceptance and indeed holy’. Ibid., pp. 136–7. (38.) Ibid., pp. 143–4. Vinoba even rejects history as a source of knowledge. Regarding Hindu–Muslim unity he says: ‘[T]o achieve Hindu–Muslim unity the only means is to forget the past. Aurangzeb may have been a tyrant, but how long will you repeat it?’ Ibid., p. 154. But this issue does not occupy much place in his discourse. (39.) Ibid., p. 80. (40.) Ibid., p. 180. (41.) Ibid., pp. 219–20 and 124 respectively. (42.) Ibid., p. 184. (43.) He believes that ignorant beliefs and practices could be shaken off through European influence. ‘Today, the cultures of the east and of the west are influencing each other … The impact of Western culture disturbs our unthinking beliefs … What is good will remain … It is not as if belief alone can be blind, that it has a monopoly of blindness. Unbelief too can be blind’. Ibid., pp. 254–5. (44.) Ibid., pp. 80, 131. (45.) Ibid., p. 14. (46.) Ibid., p. 54. (47.) Ibid., p. 224.
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The Gita and Ambedkar
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
The Gita and Ambedkar Buddhism as the Alternative Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0007
Abstract and Keywords Unlike other interpreters of the Bhagavadgita, Ambedkar saw the Gita as a historical text written after the Purvamimamsa to uphold Brahminism. This chapter contends that Ambedkar always felt that the Gita could never form the moral foundation of the nation. To him, the Gita espoused violence and the varna system. Instead he proposed Buddhism as the alternative to the Gita. Keywords: B.R. Ambedkar, Bhagavadgita, social practices, Brahminism, Buddhism, Buddhist revolution
Babasaheb Ambedkar (1891–1956) was an uncompromising critic of the Hindu social order and an irrepressible iconoclast of the last century. He was widely recognized as ‘the champion of the downtrodden’, and ‘the leader of the untouchables’, in the history of social movements in India. Several of his writings and speeches focused critically on Sanskrit texts such as the Vedas, Upanisads, Puranas, Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Manusmriti, and on the specific social structures of India.1 His interpretation of the Gita reflects some aspects of such criticism. Scholars, however, widely differ in understanding Ambedkar’s perception and understanding of the Gita. M.S. Gore argues that Ambedkar regarded the Gita ‘as a text worthy of respect or as an authority.2 K.N. Kadam, while taking a different stand, states that for Ambedkar, the Gita was a ‘cruel perversion of the philosophy of Kapila (Samkhya)’, and ‘a justification of caste system as the law of
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The Gita and Ambedkar Hindu social life’.3 Dhananjay Keer, his biographer, suggests that ‘he regarded the Gita’s philosophy as acceptable to both the touchables and the untouchables’,4 although, ‘it upheld the essence of the Vedas, raising Brahmanism to the supreme position.’5 This diversity and contrast in the perception of Ambedkar’s understanding of the Gita is mainly due to his changing position on a range of related issues. Till the Round Table Conferences (1930–3), Ambedkar (p.223) thought that it was possible to reform Hinduism and the Hindu social order. One of the possible directions of such a reform was through the route suggested in the Gita. It is in this context that the following statement, made before the Bombay High Court on 2 April 1930, on the issue of the burning of the Manusmriti, can be understood. It is said that the Varna system is the foundation of Hindu religion. This is unacceptable to me. I do not accept that Hindus outside the four Varnas are untouchables. There are Hindus who do not accept the authority of the Vedas. I do not accept any book except the Bhagavadgita to be worthy of respect or as an authority. Though I do not accept the authority of the Vedas, I consider myself to be Sanatan Hindu.6 Between 1928 and 1935 Ambedkar took several positive steps to keep the untouchable community as part of Hinduism, condoned the Hindu social order through participating in the celebration of the Ganapati festival in Bombay, dissuaded attempts on the part of the Mahar community to construct a separate and parallel Hindu temple for themselves at Trymbak, and performed several Vedic rituals in social practices. But once Ambedkar realized that all these were desperate efforts, a futile exercise, and there was no way of reforming Hinduism that would dismantle the inbuilt hierarchy, he increasingly turned towards Buddhism as a possible ethic to construct modern India. Ambedkar’s commentary on the Gita as a text defending the ‘counter-revolution’ was written during this phase of his decisive shift towards Buddhism.7
Ambedkar’s principle intervention with respect to the Gita can be found in his Essays on the Bhagavadgita: Philosophic Defence of Counter- Revolution. This was one of the unpublished works of Ambedkar. The introduction to the third volume of his Collected Works mentions that these essays originally consisted of forty typed pages.8 They were first published in the third volume in 1987.
The Gita as a Historical Text One of the most striking features of Ambedkar’s interpretation of the Gita is that he regarded the Bhagavadgita as a historical text meant to shape events and thoughts at a particular juncture in a determinate direction. His argument proceeds in the following way: For a long time Hindus regarded the VedicoUpanisadic texts, which conferred special privileges on the brahmins, as the only authoritative texts. These scriptures also organized social relations on the basis of graded inequality. For the first time, this advantageous position of the brahmins and the (p.224) conception of graded inequality were questioned by Page 2 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar the ‘revolution’ effected by the Buddha, and the social order upheld by the Buddhist states, particularly the state under Ashoka’s reign. Under Buddhism ‘which was the most enlightened and the most rationalistic age India has known’,9 the dominant position of the brahmins was threatened by the values of ahimsa and equality, and they were relegated to the level of ordinary people. It was to destroy Buddhism and the menace posed by it through initiating ‘revolution’, and to restore brahminical domination that a ‘counter-revolution’ was led by Pushyamitra, a samavedi brahmin. Under Ashoka, Buddhism did not remain as one of the many diverse religions then in vogue. Ashoka made it the religion of the state. This of course was the greatest blow to Brahminism. The Brahmins lost all state patronage and were relegated to a secondary and subsidiary position in the Empire of Ashoka … The Brahmins had not only lost state patronage but they lost their occupation which mainly consisted in performing sacrifices for a fee … The Brahmins, therefore, lived as the suppressed and Depressed Classes for nearly 140 years during which the Maurya Empire lasted. A rebellion against the Buddhist state was the only way of escape left to the suffering Brahmins and there is special reason why Pushyamitra should raise the banner of revolt against the rule of the Mauryas … No wonder if Pushyamitra who as a Samavedi Brahmin was the first to conceive the passion to end the degradation of the Brahmins by destroying the Buddhist state which was the cause of it and to free them to practise their Brahminic religion … the object of the regicide by Pushyamitra was to destroy Buddhism as a state religion and to make the Brahmins the sovereign rulers of India so that with the political power of the state behind it Brahminism may triumph over Buddhism.10 It was to defend and safeguard brahminical domination through Pushyamitra and to give administrative guidelines to the latter that the Purvamimamsa of Jaimini was written. However, Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa could not withstand the sway of Buddhist influence because the practices of the Vedic karma kanda that it advocated lacked philosophical foundation necessary for its defence. Ambedkar felt that the Bhagavadgita was mainly produced to fulfil this philosophical scarcity of Jaimini against Buddhism.
It was to save them from the attack of Buddhism that the Bhagavadgita came into being … There is no doubt that under the furious attack of Buddhism, Jaimini’s counter-revolutionary dogmas were tottering and would have collapsed had they not received the support which the Bhagavadgita gave them.11 (p.225) The Gita, by providing a philosophical base, not only animated the dogmas of counter-revolution without which it could not have survived, but also attempted to vitiate Buddhism to a great extent.
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The Gita and Ambedkar None-the-less there is not the slightest doubt that without the help of the Bhagavadgita the counter-revolution would have died out, out of the sheer stupidity of its dogmas. Mischievous as it may seem, to the revolutionaries the part played by the Bhagavadgita, there is no doubt that it resuscitated counterrevolution and if the counter-revolution lives even today, it is entirely due to the plausibility of the philosophic defence which it received from the Bhagavadgita … There is therefore no difference between Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa and the Bhagavadgita. If anything, the Bhagavadgita is a more formidable supporter of counter-revolution than Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa could have ever been. It is formidable because it seeks to give to the doctrines of counter-revolution that philosophic and therefore permanent basis which they never had before and without which they would never have survived.12 Hence, against the central nationalist discourse in India, Ambedkar regarded the Gita not only as a historical text but also a text written later than Buddhism and Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa. This was quite distinctive, in the sense that no other mainstream nationalist discourse regarded Buddhism as anterior to the Gita, which helped them to easily disclaim the argument that the Gita borrowed its central philosophy from Buddhism. Ambedkar quite comfortably established this argument through historical analyses, and asserted that it was composed to uphold the counter-revolution of Pushyamitra, and the brahminical domination brought about in its wake.
The Gita as Defence of Brahminical Counter-revolution Ambedkar resolutely countered the argument that the Gita could be the moral foundation that could bring the Indian nation together. He also argued that it could not be an archetypal moral treatise. It primarily defended certain dogmas of the pre-Buddhist Vedic religion in a philosophical language. Therefore, it could not be treated as a gospel like the Koran or the Bible. The Bhagavadgita is not a gospel and it can therefore have no message and it is futile to search for one. The question will no doubt be asked: what is the Bhagavadgita if it is not a gospel? My answer is that the Bhagavadgita is neither a book of religion nor a treatise on philosophy. What the Bhagavadgita does is to defend certain dogmas of religion on philosophic grounds. If on that account anybody wants to call it a book of religion or a book of philosophy he (p.226) may please himself. But essentially it is neither. It uses philosophy to defend religion.13 It was from this standpoint that Ambedkar criticized different interpretations of the Gita. After stating diverse readings, both orthodox and modern,14 Ambedkar argued that the variety of opinions and interpretations of the text were due to the endeavours to discover a universal message in it. Scholars approached the text with a ‘preconceived mind’ that the Gita was a gospel and hence, had a definite doctrine to preach. This, he felt, led them to arrive at wrong conclusions, and resulted in the creation of a variety of texts on the Bhagavadgita.
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The Gita and Ambedkar It cannot but be a matter of great surprise to find such a variety of opinions as to the message which the Bhagavadgita preaches. One is forced to ask why there should be such divergence of opinion among scholars. My answer to this question is that scholars have gone on a false errand. They have gone on a search for the message of the Bhagavadgita on the assumption that it is a gospel as the Koran, the Bible or the Dhammapada is. In my opinion this assumption is quite a false assumption.15 While rejecting the Gita as a gospel in the way that the Bible is for Christians and the Dhammapada is for Buddhists, he thought that the Gita had played a major role in the defence of brahminism in the post-Buddhist phase. It had done so not merely by advancing a set of reasons for the Vedic karma kanda, but by deploying a range of Buddhist concepts to reinforce its position.16 The central doctrines of the Gita—such as its philosophy of brahmanirvana and its various steps such as shraddha (faith in onself), vyavasaya (firm determination), smriti (rememberance of the goal), Samadhi (earnest contemplation), prajna (insight, or true knowledge), etc.; the qualities of the true devotee such as maitri (loving kindness), karuna (compassion), mudita (sympathizing joy), upeksa (unconcernedness); the subjects of kshetra-kshetrajna, and its various aspects such as humility, forgiveness, purity—were drawn from the Buddhist writings. Its philosophy of karma, such as yajna (sacrifices), dana (gifts), tapas (penances), and svadhyaya (Vedic selfstudy) was permeated by Buddhist teachings, particularly as expressed in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, Mahapadana Sutta, and Tevijja Sutta, Majjhima Nikay.17 Except institutions such as chaturvarna, violence, etc., and the practices in defence of them which it borrowed from the Vedas and Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa, there was ‘verbatim reproduction’ of Buddhist philosophy, and ‘the words of Buddha’ across large parts of the Gita.
(p.227) For if it is true to say that the Gita is saturated with Samkhya philosophy it is far more true to say that the Gita is full of Buddhist ideas. The similarity between the two is not merely in ideas but also in language … The Bhagavadgita discusses bramha-nirvana … The whole idea is peculiarly Buddhist and is borrowed from Buddhism … the Mahaparinibbana Sutta … the character of a true devotee … From where has the Bhagavadgita borrowed … the source is Buddhism … the Tevijja Sutta … the Bhagavadgita has … reproduced word for word the main doctrines of Buddhism? … interpretation of karmas … compare with this what Buddha is reported to have said in the Majjhima Nikaya … the Bhagavadgita seems to be deliberately modeled on Buddhist Suttas … No parallel can be closer than what exists between Buddhism and Bhagavadgita.18
Reassertion of Chaturvarna For Ambedkar, the institution of chaturvarna was one of the central dogmas of the counter-revolution that the Gita defended through its philosophy. It did not simply defend it as it was handed down to it by Jaimini; it went further to provide a philosophical foundation to protect it from the Buddhist impact. It Page 5 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar propounded a ‘divine’ law of inborn qualities, and made it integral to the Hindu social order unlike the situation earlier. Another dogma to which the Bhagavadgita comes forward to offer a philosophic defence is Chaturvarna. The Bhagavadgita, no doubt, mentions that the Chaturvarna is created by God and therefore sacrosanct. But it does not make its validity dependent on it. It offers a philosophic basis to the theory of Chaturvarna by linking it to the theory of innate, inborn qualities in men. The fixing of the Varna of man is not an arbitrary act says the Bhagavadgita. But it is fixed according to his innate, inborn qualities.19 One belongs to the different varnas based on graded inequality on account of the distinctive properties one inherits. Of course, for Ambedkar, the Vedas had expounded the theory of chaturvarna before the Gita did so. The teaching of the Buddha led to the system of chaturvarna being undermined, and the whole society being reorganized on the principle of equality.
Buddha preached against Chaturvarna. He used some of the most offensive similes in attacking the theory of Chaturvarna. The framework of Chaturvarna had been broken. The order of Chaturvarna had been turned upside down. Sudras and women could become Samnyasis … People who had accepted the gospel of social equality and who were remaking society on the basis of each one according to his merits—how could they accept the Chaturvarna theory of gradation, and separation of man based on birth simply because the Vedas say so?20 (p.228) Ambedkar thought that Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa sincerely argued for the continued validity of the Vedic karma kanda on grounds of unquestionable Vedic authority. However, such an assertion without any philosophical basis was not acceptable to the followers of Buddhism, and the Gita provides this philosophical support to Jaimini’s description of karma kanda. It reinforces the chaturvarna enormously, and makes it much more formidable than it was in the Vedic texts.
Particularly formidable than Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa is the philosophic support which the Bhagavadgita gives to the central doctrine of counterrevolution— namely Chaturvarna. The soul of the Bhagavadgita seems to be the defence of Chaturvarna and securing its observance in practice, Krishna does not merely rest content with saying that Chaturvarna is based on Guna-Karma but he goes further and issues two positive injunctions. The first injunction is contained in chapter III verse 26. In this Krishna says: that a wise man should not by counter propaganda create a doubt in the mind of an ignorant person who is follower of karma kanda which of course includes the observance of the rules of Chaturvarna. In other words, you must not agitate or excite people to rise in rebellion against the theory of karma kanda and all that it includes. The second injunction is laid down in chapter XVIII verses 41–48. In this Krishna tells that every one do the duty prescribed for his Varna and no other and warns those who worship him and are his devotees that they will not obtain Page 6 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar salvation by mere devotion but by devotion accompanied by observance of duty laid down for his Varna. In short, a Sudra however great he may be as a devotee will not get salvation if he has transgressed the duty of the Sudra—namely to live and die in the service of the higher classes.21 However, Ambedkar finds that the reasons advanced in the Gita in defence of chaturvarna are inadequate.
Childish is the defence of the Bhagavadgita of the dogma of Chaturvarna. Krishna defends it on the basis of the Guna theory of the Samkhya. But Krishna does not seem to have realized what a fool he has made of himself. In the Chaturvarna there are four Varnas. But the Gunas according to the Samkhya are only three. How can a system of four Varnas be defended on the basis of a philosophy, which does not recognize more than three Varnas? The whole attempt of the Bhagavadgita to offer a philosophic defence of the dogmas of counter-revolution is childish—and does not deserve a moment’s serious thought.22 Ambedkar advanced the same argument in another essay where he considered the opinions of the various Hindu scriptures on the system of varna. His viewpoint was that except in the Upanisads,23 there was no basic disagreement in the opinions of the various texts such as the (p.229) Vedas, Manusmriti, Purvamimamsa, and the Bhagavadgita regarding the system of varnas, as they are all agreed on the same fundamental features of the system. They ‘are woven on the same pattern, the same thread runs through them and are really parts of the same fabric’.24 The only distinction that he identified was that while the Vedas and the Bhagavadgita dealt with the general theory of varna, the Manusmriti and the Purvamimamsa specifically provided for the ‘persecution of Buddhists under Pushyamitra’ to back brahminical tyranny.25 The Gita, Ambedkar declared, upheld the conventional system with great clarity and force:
What the Bhagavadgita teaches is also beyond controversy. Its teaching may be summarized in the following four pronouncements made by Krishna in the Bhagavadgita. (1) ‘I myself have created the arrangement known as Chaturvarna (i.e. the fourfold division of society into four castes: Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras) assigning them different occupations in accordance with the native capacities …’—Gita, IV. 13. (2) ‘Even if it may be easier to follow the occupation of another Varna yet to follow the occupation of one’s own Varna is more meritorious … to follow the occupation of another Varna is risky’—Gita, III. 35. (3) ‘The educated should not unsettle the faith of the uneducated who have become attached to their occupation. He himself should perform the occupation of his Varna and make others perform their’s accordingly …’—Gita, III. 26, 29.
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The Gita and Ambedkar (4) ‘Oh, Arjun! Whenever this religion of duties and occupations (i.e. this religion of Chaturvarna) declines, then I myself will come to birth to punish those who are responsible for its downfall and to restore it.’— Gita, IV. 7–8.26 Given such a position of the Gita, Ambedkar found it to be no different from that of Manusmriti.
Such is the position of the Gita. What difference is there between it and the Manusmriti? The Gita is Manu in a nutshell. Those who run away from Manusmriti and want to take refuge in the Gita either do not know the Gita or are prepared to omit from their consideration that soul of the Gita, which makes it akin to the Manusmriti.27 Ambedkar argued that the role played by the Gita was not limited to endorsing and sustaining the varna system as handed down by the earlier texts; it contributed towards invigorating two other fundamental aspects. First, it bestowed on the hitherto ‘legal character or code’ of varna a divine foundation by declaring the whole system as created by God (chaturvarnyam maya srstam). It made the system more cruel, unkind, inflexible, and binding.28 Second, it disallowed cross-varna mobility, (p.230) or any other attempt to uproot or change it. It forbade every kind of ‘propaganda against the varna system’.29 The Gita perversely reinforced the varna system by ignoring individual effort, freedom, and equality, and breathed into it a divine air.
Defence of War and Violence Ambedkar argued that against the central doctrine of Buddhism, the Gita advanced a philosophical defence for genocide in war. He felt that there were two lines of reasoning that the Gita offers for the purpose. First, the world is perishable, and man is mortal. The mode or time of death does not make a difference to a wise man. If death is inevitable, why should one bother how it occurs, or whether man dies a natural death, or whether he dies as a result of violence? Second, the body and soul are two fundamentally different principles. The soul is eternal and imperishable; the body is contingent and perishable. When death occurs, it is the body that dies, and the soul exonerating itself from the body is set free to the kind of state that it deserves. The first instance one comes across in reading the Bhagavadgita is the justification of war. Arjuna had declared himself against the war, against killing people for the sake of property. Krishna offers a philosophic defence of war and killing in war … The philosophic defence of war offered by the Bhagavadgita proceeds along two lines of argument … War and killing need therefore give no ground to remorse or to shame, so argues the Bhagavadgita.30 Ambedkar felt that Arjuna was urged to participate in the battle on the basis of these arguments. When Arjuna was reluctant, Krishna intimated him of his kshatriya dharma, and explained that war was an ineluctable duty of a kshatriya. When Arjuna was still unmoved, Ambedkar argued, Krishna showed him the vishvarupa in order to frighten him. Page 8 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar This is the argument which Krishna used to compel Arjuna to fight. And this argument of coercion and compulsion made Arjuna fight. Krishna probably threatened Arjuna with brute force if he did not actually use it. The assumption of vishvarupa by Krishna is only a different way of describing the use of brute force.31 For Ambedkar, the Gita’s justification of violence was specifically directed against Buddhism, as the latter had not merely condemned violence, it had attempted to uproot all actions that led to violence. Hence, it had opposed the Vedic karma kanda on the ground of its commendation of animal sacrifice.
(p.231) Buddha had condemned the karma kanda and the yajnas. He condemned them on the ground of himsa or violence. He condemned them also on the ground that the motive behind them was a selfish desire to obtain bonus. What was the reply of the counter-revolutionaries to this attack? Only this. These things were ordained by the Vedas, the Vedas were infallible, therefore the dogmas were not to be questioned … People who had come to believe in non-violence as a principle of life and had gone so far as to make it a rule of life—how could they be expected to accept the dogma that the Kshatriya may kill without sinning because the Vedas say that it is his duty to kill?32 Ambedkar found that the reasoning that the Gita put forward for the defence of violence does not merely go against the ethical foundation of Buddhism, but also against its central metaphysics such as the doctrine of anatta and kammasiddanta. This line of reasoning would, therefore, undercut Buddhism, and uphold the Vedic karma kanda as described in Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa.
Interpretative Specificity The other commentators on the Gita had considered it as an ethical– metaphysical treatise expounding the nature of the Brahman, the relation of the Brahman to the self, and the relation between the Brahman, the self, and the world. They thought that it upheld a certain path to selfrealization in general, or suggested a mode of reconciliation between the divergent paths of realization. Ambedkar, however, argues that the Gita has to be read in the context of ‘counter-revolution’, and its concepts have to be situated accordingly. He does not consider the doctrines of karma and jnana either as independent courses to be followed, or interdependent paths in the attainment of moksha. He argues that the concept of karma in the Gita implies Vedic karma, or karma as outlined in Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa, and jnana came from Uttaramimamsa, or as explained by Badarayana in his Brahma Sutras. The pronouncements of the Gita pertain to the debate between them. He criticizes ethical readers for not only considering these concepts as ethical givens, but for also attempting to create an impression that the Gita was an independent and self-contained treatise. Most writers on the Bhagavadgita translate the word Karma yoga as ‘action’ and the word Jnana yoga, as ‘knowledge’ and proceed to discuss the Bhagavadgita as though it was engaged in comparing and contrasting Page 9 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar knowledge versus action in a generalized form. This is quite wrong … By Karma yoga or action Gita means the dogmas contained in Jaimini’s Karma kanda and by Jnana yoga or knowledge it means the dogmas contained in Badarayana’s Brahma Sutras. That the Gita in (p.232) speaking of karma is not speaking of activity or inactivity, quieticism or energism, in general terms but religious acts and observances, cannot be denied by anyone who has read the Bhagavadgita. It is to lift the Gita from the position of a party pamphlet engaged in a controversy on small petty points and make it appear as though it was a general treatise on matters of high philosophy that this attempt is made to inflate the meaning of the words karma and jnana and make them words of general import. Mr. Tilak is largely to be blamed for this trick of patriotic Indians. The result has been that these false meanings have misled people into believing that the Bhagavadgita is an independent self-contained book and has no relation to the literature that has preceded it … in speaking of karma yoga the Bhagavadgita is referring to nothing but the dogmas of Karma kanda as propounded by Jaimini which it tries to renovate and strengthen.33 Ambedkar believes that the Gita took over these notions from their context, and bestowed its own meaning on them. It replaced the redundant and blind practices, for instance, that had developed around the Vedic karma by insisting on desireless action (anasakti) and its intelligent performance. It effected these modifications because of the large-scale protest and criticism that were directed against the Vedic karma kanda.
The line it takes to defend Karma yoga is by removing the excrescence which had grown upon it and which had made it appear quite ugly. The first excrescence was blind faith. The Gita tries to remove it by introducing the principle of Buddhi yoga as a necessary condition for Karma yoga. Become Sthitaprajna i.e., ‘Befitted with Buddhi’ there is nothing wrong in the performance of Karma kanda. The second excrescence on the Karma kanda was the selfishness which was the motive behind the performance of the Karmas. The Bhagavadgita attempts to remove it by introducing the principle of Anasakti i.e., performance of Karma without any attachment for the fruits of the Karma. Founded in Buddhi yoga and dissociated from selfish attachment to the fruits of Karma[,] what is wrong with the dogma of Karma kanda? This is how the Bhagavadgita defends the Karma marga.34 Ambedkar feels that the reinvigoration of these notions in the Gita was largely due to the influence of Buddhism.35
In other words, he suggests that the upholding of karma marga in the Gita primarily accords approval to the ‘performance of observances’ such as yajna as a way to salvation. Buddhism had come to denounce these yajnas. Jaimini however, attempted to defend such practices on the authority of the Vedas. Ambedkar feels that the Gita came to the defence of Jaimini, but by rendering these observances in more acceptable terms. It introduced the principle of Page 10 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar ‘buddhi yoga’, that is, befitted with buddhi while undertaking these observances. Certain Vedic practices (p.233) were also caught up in selfish motives; the Gita transcended such motives by insisting on desirelessness.
The Teaching of the Buddha as the Basis of the National Ethic While some of the most important nationalist leaders in India attempted to retrieve the ethical basis of Indian nationalism through the reading of the Gita, Ambedkar resorts to the teachings of the Buddha for this purpose. His magnum opus, Buddha and His Dhamma, was posthumously published in 1957. In this work and his other writings on Buddhism, Ambedkar attempts to construct a national ethic based on Buddha’s teaching, and he places these teachings in opposition to Hindu scriptures and particularly the Gita. While Hindu scriptures, particularly Jaimini’s Mimamsa, upheld authority and counterposed themselves to reasoning and argumentation, Ambedkar understands the Buddha’s teachings within the paradigm of reason. Unlike the belief in the Supreme Being and eternal atman that the Hindu scriptures uphold, Buddha rejects the existence of the Supreme Being or the eternal soul. Ambedkar finds Buddha’s teachings as upholding the moral foundations of society. There is place for dissent and disagreement. Buddha denounced the doctrine of chaturvarna and proclaimed equality. Buddha rejected the violence that was pervasive in society and advocated a nonviolent way of life. He condemned karma kanda and yajnas as sites of violence and inequality. Against the trans-historical and transcendental aspiration that the Hindu scriptures promoted, the Buddha called upon people to engage in this world, and to collectively work to solve the problems of this world. Against the individualistic strivings towards perfection in the Vedic religion, the Buddha stressed on community life and collective investigation as expressed in the sangh. For Ambedkar, therefore, Buddhism becomes the ideological terrain on which the claims of rights, equality, and community need to be constructed.
A Rejection of Brahmanocracy Ambedkar strikes a very different note from others as far as the Gita is concerned. His setting of the text of the Gita in the post-Buddhist period, and his argument that it is a text aimed to defend and justify Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa and thereby undercut Buddhism set the tone for his interpretation of the Gita. His central proposition is that the Gita offers a legitimization of the brahminical counter-revolution against Buddhism. He gives little heed to any transcendental considerations of the text, (p.234) such as found in the works of Gandhi and Aurobindo. Ambedkar also is not interested in locating the text in the Vedantic traditions. It was written at a particular historical and political juncture. The Gita draws a lot of arguments and concepts from Buddhism, but their objective is to outwit Buddhism and defend Vedic rituals and practices as enunciated by
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The Gita and Ambedkar Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa. Krishna is a mischievous and contradictory character for Ambedkar, who has no claims to be God. Certain central concepts, such as sthitaprajna, anasakti, and svadharma that are used by other scholars to define a national ethic, are seen by Ambedkar as mere reinforcement of the chaturvarna. According to him, the Gita primarily offers a defence of brahminical priesthood against democratic and emancipatory striving of the masses that Buddhism upholds. Ambedkar seems to suggest through his rebuttal of the Gita that all the contemporary endeavours to eulogize it are attempts to install a ‘brahmanocracy’ in India. His own alternative is to retrieve the Buddhist tradition, and to reinforce a regime of rights and equality not merely in India but wherever possible. Notes:
(1.) Babasaheb Ambedkar was an economist, constitution expert, historian, satirist, political leader, and one of the most acclaimed social reformers of the twentieth century. His writings and speeches run into seventeen thick volumes. These include both published and unpublished works. These volumes were compiled by Vasant Moon, and posthumously published by the Education Department, Government of Maharastra in 1987, as Writings and Speeches (hereafter WS). (2.) M.S. Gore, The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar’s Political and Social Thought (hereafter Social Context), New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993, p. 106. (3.) K.N. Kadam, Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar and the Significance of his Movement, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1993, p. 124. (4.) Dhananjay Keer, Dr Ambedkar: Life and Mission (hereafter Dr Ambedkar), Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1995, p. 90. (5.) Ibid., p. 368. (6.) Social Context, p. 106. (7.) Valerian Rodrigues, B.R. Ambedkar, Essential Writings, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001; Eleanor Zelliot, From Untouchables to Dalits, New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1996. (8.) WS, vol. iii, pp. xi-xvii; See also ‘Editor’s Note’, vol. iii, p. 357. (9.) Ibid., p. 363. (10.) Ibid., pp. 267–9; D.C. Ahir (ed,), Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Buddhist Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India (hereafter Buddhist Revolution), Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1996, pp. 74–5. Page 12 of 14
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The Gita and Ambedkar (11.) Ibid., pp. 363–4. (12.) Ibid., pp. 364–5. Not only does Ambedkar regard the Gita as a historical text, he quite emphatically states that the Gita was not a part of the Mahabharata. After analysing the internal and external features of the text, Ambedkar proves that the Gita was later incorporated into the Mahabharata in order to embellish its thought. Both were certainly later than Buddhism. Ibid., pp. 376, 379. (13.) Ibid., p. 361. (14.) In his Essays on the Gita, Ambedkar quotes both orthodox and modern interpretations of the Gita. He states the views expressed by Bohtlingk, Hopkins, Holtzman, Garbe, Telang, and others, as the views of modern scholars. He locates the interpretations of the Gita by Samkaracarya, Karmayoga readings such as Tilak, etc., and Bhakti readings within the framework of orthodox interpretations. In fact, Ambedkar criticizes Tilak severely for his attempt to locate the Gita as a text earlier than Buddhism. Ibid., pp. 71–9, 357–60. (15.) Ibid., pp. 360–1. (16.) Ibid., pp. 127–8, 369. (17.) Ibid., pp. 369–71. (18.) Ibid. (19.) Ibid., pp. 360–1. (20.) Ibid., pp. 363–4. (21.) Ibid., p. 365. (22.) Ibid., p. 364. (23.) For Ambedkar, this was mainly due to the reason that barring the Upanisads, ‘the whole body of Hindu Religious Literatures’ were produced by the brahmins, and hence they basically represented ‘brahminical doctrines or their domination’ in the society. Ibid., p. 81. (24.) Ibid. (25.) For his criticism of Manusmriti see, ‘Philosophy of Hinduism’, Ibid., pp. 76– 81, 108–18, 121–6, 207–73, 276–84, 332–8. (26.) Ibid., pp. 80–1. (27.) Ibid., p. 81.
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The Gita and Ambedkar (28.) Ibid., p. 127. (29.) Ibid., pp. 127–8. (30.) Buddhist Revolution, pp. 159–60. (31.) Ibid., p. 176. (32.) Ibid., p. 162. (33.) Ibid., pp. 362–3. WS, vol. iii. (34.) Ibid., p. 362. (35.) Ibid., p. 363.
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Conclusion
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
Conclusion Nagappa K. Gowda
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.003.0008
Abstract and Keywords This concluding chapter sums up the key arguments and various interpretations of the Bhagavadgita as well as its role in the formation of the nationalist discourse in India. The results indicate that the interpretations of the text were clearly meant to provide a moral and ethical basis for nationalist thought and practice, drawing upon the legitimacy which the premier text of Hinduism was capable of offering. The findings also suggest that the different understandings of the Bhagavadgita represented various moods of nation-making and they were expressed as responses to the challenges that India was facing. Keywords: Bhagavadgita, nationalist discourse, India, interpretations, moral basis, ethical basis, nationalist thought, legitimacy, Hinduism, nation-making
Indian nationalism and the struggle to define and achieve it involved engagement with many complex ideas, dilemmas, hopes and blue-prints for the nation. They tended to shift from time to time, according to the compulsions of the period, context or according to the predilections of those who were called upon to make sense of the ideal or lead the movement. Yet they were largely articulated within the parameters of anti-colonial struggle and the need to define the struggle in the making of national persona and destiny. It meant responding to colonialism as an instrument of change, both in some of its positive connotations and in many of its deleterious impact. The foreign-ness of colonialism was unmistakable, and the making of the Indian nation perforce had to take its stand on what would be authentically Indian. It was a way of rejecting colonialism. Even if some of the colonial inheritance would go into the making of the nation, it could not be declared as such. But taking one’s stand on Indian Page 1 of 11
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Conclusion genius did not mean an uncritical acceptance or adoption of it. For, Indian nation had to be crafted anew and its aspirations and destiny defined afresh, though with a firm affirmation of its indissoluble link with its glorious past. The Orientalists and Indologists like Sir William Jones, Charles Wilkins, Colebrook, H.H. Wilson, Max Müller, and others had showcased the myriad riches of its religions, art, philosophy, literature, and many other higher pursuits of human mind. These were assurances and testimonials from the fastidious rulers; Indians could well bank and build on them, and assert that history was eloquently on their side. (p.237) Such a national discourse also needed to discover and project a moral regime on which to base the concept of the nation. The imperialist prose had often asserted that India was historically ill-served by any righteous moral regime, socially and politically, leading to political degeneration, surrender to despotism and periodic imposition of foreign rule.1 The missionaries were much less sophisticated in denying the presence of any moral order in Hindu India. They were more forthright and often crudely denunciatory about the monstrosities of Hindu religious thought and practice, which, according to them, had ordered the flourishing inequities of Indian society. Many of them, however, were too patent to be refuted, although the missionary scheme tended to exaggerate the warts more than any possible merits therein. They were all too keen to show that Hinduism, and therefore India, was bereft of any universal, encompassing morality governing it, which indeed accounted for its flourishing hierarchies, inequalities and social and political oppressions. The Indian response to such criticisms touched the different shades of its spectrum. While some endorsed it fully to renounce Hinduism and some, armed to the teeth, defended it entirely, many paused to review it critically to launch reformist projects to conform India to the presiding Western notion of modernity. The socio-religious reform movements in the nineteenth century India, with which the names of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Swami Dayananda Saraswati, Ishwarachandra Vidyasagar, Justice Ranade, and others are associated, sought to see the modern in the ancient, notwithstanding the differences in their articulations. The new, modern moral regime for India, however, had to be crafted from out of the inherited ones. It meant an affirmation of the Indian-ness for India. That alone would fit into the ‘national scheme’. Any denial of it would mean capitulation to the colonial gravitational field. For all the links and debt which these socio-religious movements had to the Western ideas and colonial insinuations, they had to anchor themselves in what they perceived as the genuine, pristine Indian national inheritance. By this time ‘Hinduism’ had been ‘discovered’ too.2 Inquisitive scholars and interested missionaries had interrogated the Indian religious theories and practices within the epistemological and moral frameworks of Judeo-Christian tradition. They insisted on seeing the Book and the Prophet in Hinduism to conform it to the notion of religion they had inherited and found them in the Page 2 of 11
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Conclusion Gita, the ‘Song Celestial’ and Krishna who revealed it. If some of them like found in Gita the source of transcendent wisdom, some of the missionaries did not miss the opportunity to denigrate Krishna as the false prophet of Hinduism. Either way, the Prophet (p.238) and his Word were pitch-forked into the centre-stage. Nationalist India would invoke the Gita for its defence and vindication, and by implication, to show how insubstantial the charges of the missionaries were. If the Orientalists ‘discovered’ the Gita as the Hindu scripture par excellence, the nationalists gratefully acknowledged it and made it the mirror and statement of their hopes and agenda. It provided a haloed site for debate and contest with colonialism. It provided for a critical defence of Hinduism; it guaranteed an unimpeachable Indian-ness for India discovering itself; it provided a moral framework ostensibly sanctioned by the Divine; it offered to meet the societal need for assurance in this world and beyond. It seemed to suggest that God himself was willingly with the nationalist project, which was assurance enough that the project was bound to succeed.3 In fact, the national movement in India developed not merely a critique of the power relations that colonialism engendered but also a critique of the ways of life it fostered, the kind of relations that it suggested between man and nature, between human beings, and between man and God.4 Against the insinuations of the Orientalist writers, nationalists found it essential to formulate these issues afresh and differently from the modes suggested by the colonial encounter. This resulted in the search for an alternative by churning the tradition, and nothing seemed to fit scheme better than the transcendental words of ‘Thus Spake Lord Krishna’. They were addressed to Arjuna in the context of his escapist, debilitating self-doubt ahead of the great battle, but its message or directive was to the entire humankind. It should ideally answer all the questions to resolve all the dilemmas facing the embattled Indians. God’s message was designed to be timeless, and logically it should have an all-encompassing reach to touch every aspect of the nation’s life. Nationalism was not merely about rejection of colonialism and the unpalatable judgements it had made on India. It was about a critical response the challenges posed by colonialism with a view to crafting a new, dynamic nation. It entailed not just spurning the foreign rule but cleansing many of the fungus-growth within the social and political inheritance of the country. It involved a critical engagement with its history, affirming some and rejecting some others to move to the beckoning Brave New World. The Bhagavadgita eminently suited the nationalist project as a supreme touchstone because its clarion call was for action. For all the learned or passionate debates on the nature or centrality of its teachings or on its philosophical imports, the indubitable fact is that the context of its teachings is the battlefield of Kurukshetra, and what Lord Krishna did was (p.239) to exhort Arjuna was to fight. That is the bottom line. All philosophical arguments, moral persuasions and the burdens of allotted duty within the ordained socio-ethical milieu were merely meant to tell Arjuna that as a warrior in a battlefield he just Page 3 of 11
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Conclusion had to fight.5 Slinking away from the fight is not a way of the warrior; nor is it the way to deal with the challenges of the world. Nation-making is a struggle; it is an engagement with an idea and a fight for it. It involves making choices;— choices that bring in many moral and contingent issues that affect not merely those have to make the choices, but also those who are unwittingly drawn into them. In that sense, the fight becomes the fight of all, and for all. When we talk about ‘national discourse’ we should reckon with many accommodating differences within its elastic framework. The framework quivered and changed with times and under certain compulsions, so much so it often presented the picture of a collage rather than of single undifferentiated project. The broad unifying agenda was nation-making. But it had to address a variety of competing, conflicting issues regarding what, how, when, for whom and so on. It touched many aspects of definition, spread, problems of exclusion and inclusion, strategies and logistics, their moral defence, societal implications and so on. How should India respond to the political, economic, cultural and moral invasion of the West? What should be the nature of resistance? Who should resist? What should the New India be if the resistance is successful? Are we to hope for merely political freedom or for the rejection of many of the unfreedoms we had historically inherited, even from the ancient times? All such questions were not necessarily directly posed against colonialism but were done in the context of it, through the awareness of freedom that India was experiencing. This was drawn from the larger impact of the Western science and notions of nationalism and liberalism which had triumphed in the West. But they were not always acknowledged as debt, lest that would be seen as Indian indigence in these values. The Indian national discourse has a complex package of admiration and rejection of the West, and the apparently contradictory responses could sometimes converge and negotiate with each other in certain contexts without embarrassment. In fact, together they make the nationalist discourse. That they do is shown by the ways in which various nationalist ideas, hopes and projects were teased out of the Bhagavadgita.
Nationalist Defence of the Text Nationalist discourse in India thus strove to fashion a common identity among Indians and galvanize them against colonialism not merely on (p.240) grounds of shared concerns, history, culture, and tradition but also in underscoring a moral regime which will privilege and justify a set of social and personal practices. The recasting of the moral domain became an issue of urgent practical necessity since many Orientalist writers accused Hinduism as bereft of any canon of universal morality as its canons privileged and justified hierarchical relations. If India was to ever attain independent national status, their conclusion was that members of the nation would not be extended equal treatment; conversely, this argument was used to deny the status of an autonomous nationhood to India. This argument led to other consequences too, including attempts to split the national movement on the basis of nonPage 4 of 11
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Conclusion brahminical or dalit persuasion. Against such fragmentation and diversion, nationalist writers felt the pressing need to develop a national ethic which could incorporate all Indians within its framework and thereby rescue Indian nationalism from the inevitable fragmentation that the nationalist discourse suggested. Apart from these large concerns associated with the national question, there was the pressing need to select a set of moral principles to regulate and justify social relations. It was realized that principles, which had hitherto held sects and communities together, were inadequate to draw all Indians, particularly on grounds of equal considerations. There was an increasing desire for equality, and the threat of a breakdown of social relations loomed large. Certain shades of the nationalist discourse, therefore, wanted to devise moral norms, which would make the nationalist project viable without lending itself to chaos and anarchy. The Gita was to be drawn centrally into the concerns mentioned above, and arguments were to be teased out from it to respond to these concerns. Given the strength of the reflections that focused on the Gita as a possible site to respond to the considerations outlined above, any formulation of an alternative necessarily involved contestation with the legitimacy of the Gita. This made the Gita not merely a deeply engaged text of the nationalist discourse, but a profoundly contested one too. Quite interestingly, there is no consistent body of reasoning as to why the Gita came to be privileged vis-a-vis other hallowed texts of the tradition. However, with the precipitation of the masses into the national arena, the increasing dependence on the Gita as the possible moral basis for the Indian nation, and even to reconstitute the world and the other texts such as the Vedas and the Upanisads, which recede from such a consideration correspondingly. Sometimes, however, the Gita was commented upon without the masses being prominently present in the nationalist arena, but even in such cases it was assumed that any serious theory of (p.241) the nation would be untenable without the role of the masses, integral to such a conception, presuming a degree of equal consideration towards the masses. Inferentially, however, we can conjecture many reasons as to why the Gita came to be projected as central to the nationalist discourse, although these reasons might have varied from one commentator to another. The Gita laid great stress on karma yoga, and engagement with the world. Consequently, it undermined the asceticism of the Upanisadic persuasion, and emotionalism and devotionalism of the bhakti persuasion. Engagement with the world through the path of karma was a necessity in the lives of the common people. Therefore, by implication, the Gita does privilege the common people, while it celebrates engagement with this world. The nationalist discourse found the moral stance of the Gita very persuasive in upholding a specific engagement with the world which, they felt, was in tune with the spiritual calling of man, and strongly opposed to the utilitarian considerations dominant in the West. This discourse saw the Gita as calling upon people irrespective of any gradation to involve Page 5 of 11
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Conclusion themselves in their engagement with the world, pursue their vocations ardently without waiting for the fruits of their labour. Mainstream nationalist discourse felt that the Gita undercut the caste system, and suggested organization of social relations on the basis of varna. The categorization of people into varna divisions was defended in the Gita not on a hereditary basis, but on the theory of guna. One belongs to a particular varna because one is constituted primarily of sattva, rajas, or tamas or one of their combinations. At the same time, the Gita underplayed the status attached to varna by arguing that one cannot hanker for the honour and proceeds of the action that one performs. Many nationalist readings of the Gita were almost unanimous in suggesting such an interpretation. The Gita is seen by the mainstream nationalist discourse as upholding a deep commitment to equality. The grounds for such equality of consideration, however, were differently emphasized. One of them was an account of the similar nature that human beings were constituted of. Since we are supplicants before the divine majesty and are required to shed all attachments to the fruits of our actions, we are all on the same moral footing. This commitment to equality evoked through the Gita undermined the hierarchy of the caste system, and also the exclusivism practised in many sects and communities in India. The Gita, therefore, was seen as bringing all the people of India on a common platform. Similarly, the Gita was interpreted as approving diverse social practices (p.242) through its complex division of labour. Therefore, the ethic of the Gita could be a meeting point between people of diverse religious persuasions and occupations. The ideal projected in the Gita was perceived as transcending the limitations of religious and cultural divide. This ideal was the sthitaprajna, that is, someone who achieves absolute equanimity of the self by establishing total control over mundane provocations and desires. This ideal did not exclude the common people from having access to ultimate realization. They also did not have to abandon their vocations to achieve this state. They could approach the ideal through the path of bhakti, devotion, and commitment. The ethic of the Gita could be interpreted as being congruous with the demands of capital to the extent that one does not demand the fruits of one’s own labour, but carries on with one’s vocation with dedication and commitment irrespective of it. Of course, the consideration of equality would require certain reforms, but those reforms would not in any way threaten the basis of capital. There could possibly be an argument as to why Buddhism was not as prominently deployed in the nationalist discourse as the Gita was. A number of reasons may be cited in this connection. Commentators increasingly came to construct Buddhism, both in theory and practice, as distinct from Hinduism from Page 6 of 11
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Conclusion the early decades of the nineteenth century. Therefore, there was the problem of acceptability of an ethic premised on Buddhism. Further, there were a wide variety of texts in the body of literature of Buddhism, which could not form a viable and specific body of principles to constitute the moral anchoring of the nation. Subsequently, when Ambedkar attempted to reformulate the nationalist foundation of India on the basis of the teachings of the Buddha, he found the need to write a new gospel of Buddha’s teaching—The Buddha and his Dhamma. There was also a problem of formulating an ethic based on Buddhism, as the Buddhist world consisted of a number of nationalities. The Gita would not have any such problems.
Nationalist Debate When Bankimchandra Chatterjee engaged dialogically with the Gita in his Krishna Charitra, the Dharmatattwa, and the commentary on the Gita, the idea of the freedom movement was not really in the air, although the notion of nationalism, Indian-ness as against the imposed, dwarfing standards of the West, were keenly debated. Bankim was largely responding to the Orientalist and Evangelical efforts at declaring the Gita as the words (p.243) of a false prophet. He was keen to prove the historicity of Krishna and the Gita to show that neither was any less than Jesus or the Bible. His ideal was not the Krishna of Jayadeva, who could tempt some people to cast aspersions on his frolicking ways, but the Krishna of Mahabharata and Kurukshetra, where he is both a teacher and a doer par excellence. He saw in the Gita an exposition of Dharma not in the narrow predatory sense in which the West seemed to understand it but as a symmetrical maturation of all faculties. It preached the ideal of nishkama karma, of action without being jockeyed by avarice. It was a lifeaffirming philosophy, which has place for fight, struggle, morality, spirituality and a whole gamut of values that emanate from active life, which, according to, Bankim, has to find its supreme expression in love for one’s country. Krishna’s exhortations to Arjuna to take up his mighty bow, Gandiva, could be construed as a suggestive plea for taking up arms against the British; but Bankim is quick to point out that it had no seditious intention or suggestion. All it meant was that Indians should cultivate an awareness of the social and political realities in which they were placed and ready themselves to appropriate responses to them. In the early phases, the nationalist project was able to craftily combine proclaimed stances of political loyalty with suggestive prose of subversion. It was as much an intellectual predicament of the times and station of their protagonists as of the compulsions in which they worked. Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s interpretation of Gita as Karma Yoga fitted well with the political activism with which he had identified himself and his group. His Gita Rahasya was written in his reflective mood in the Mandalay cell where he was incarcerated, but in defence of his political creed. Gita was a work of ethics of universal import, addressing humanity in all its moods and predicaments, and hence, superior to what the materialist West had to offer. For Page 7 of 11
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Conclusion Tilak, the Gita was crafting the heroic notion of sthitaprajna. Any person with this quality did not retreat from life and fight. Karma Yoga implied rejection of samnyasa and active engagement with life. It also implied that righteous violence has a moral sanction, since ideally non-violence would be rejection of fight in life and surrender to its more cynical, bellicose forces. But could all become evolved sthitaprajnas? Was Tilak suggesting that fight for freedom was all about leaders and nothing significantly about the followers? In fact, the Tilakian phase in freedom struggle marked monitored admission of the masses to active politics. Tilak was defending the eligibility of the masses to participate in politics even as they were allowed entry into the salvationary realms of religion by the simple but efficacious path (p.244) of devotion or bhakti. May be not for them the abstruse symbolisms of jnana or other nuances of metaphysical claims and arguments, but they could yet included in the nationalist project. Was there a condescending suggestion that they could only follow but not lead? But then, could one lead without an assurance of being followed? National movement always had to define itself within these often conflicting frameworks. Vivekananda, who was less of an active knight in the freedom struggle than an eloquent nationalist interpreter of Indian culture to the West, saw Krishna as the supreme expounder of Karma Yoga. But he was not inclined to see Gita in historical terms, as did Bankim or Tilak did. Instead, he saw it as an embodiment of national culture in true sense. He harnessed the notion of Naranarayana and Daridranarayana to argue that Gita was keen to bring the masses to the centrestage of nation’s conscience. It implied that salvation of all, here and beyond, was the design of the Lord, but the priestly monopoly had read it differently for the people. This exclusion had a demoralizing effect of the country and people, and led to their cultural degeneration. Vivekananda admitted to some of the failings which the Western observers saw in India but diagnosed them as having emanating not from the Indian genius but from some of the subversive interventions that needed to be cured with stern urgency. Religion should be for all and not for a few, even as nation should be. This juxtaposition of religion and nation was possible only when one democratised both religion and nation. Aurobindo, a revolutionary who turned into Sage of Auroville, interpreted the Gita as a supreme spiritual text that went beyond its social or ethical import. It was verily the word of God and it merited nothing less than total surrender to its dictates. For, Absolute Truth is what encompasses every transient truths and experiences. A total surrender to its dictates would also imply that in the struggle for freedom violence had a rightful place. Kurukshetra was not just a site and context of the Great War where the Words of the Lord were revealed. It symbolized the struggle from which we have no escape and from which we can, morally and practically, ill-afford to retreat, except to our or our country’s peril and eternal damnation. A complete surrender to the Will of the Absolute Truth or its supreme spokesman would not saddle the doer with any sin even if he is Page 8 of 11
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Conclusion called upon to commit violence. The revolutionary in Aurobindo defended the heroic and righteous violence when it is consecrated to the cause the nation and its liberation from thraldom. But the Father of the Nation thought differently. Unlike Tilak and Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi saw in Gita supreme endorsement to (p.245) the notions such as non-violence, Swadeshi, Svadharma and Satyagraha. According to him, the idea of anasakti expressed the highest standards of ethico-practical philosophy, reaching out to all creeds and sects. Non-violence and Satyagraha are truly heroic, reflecting the essential, if un-retrieved strength of human soul. Realizing it as such would be realization of Truth which is no different from God. And Truth as God universalises religion. There were, however, some doubts expressed that Gandhi’s notion of truth in Gita implied defence of Chaturvarna as an ordained social order which society should upturn at its own peril. How far this notion of ordained caste division based on unequal and iniquitous division of labour gel with the notion of Advaita embedded in Gita is hard to argue. In a sense, Vinoba’s reading of Gita follows the path of his preceptor. His idea of svadharma as a collective societal action rather than diversity of practices has interesting implications for the defence of orthodoxy both in idea and practice. Social cohesion and discountenancing inner conflicts can as well be acceptance and endorsement of the established order, which is essentially the credo of conservatism. Even if the interpreters did not quite want the Old Order to stay and flourish, they could well become its exponents by fearing the cataclysmic consequences of change. If all the above national thinkers found in Gita a perennial fount of inspiration, assurance and direction to nation in hewing its new path, Dr. Ambedkar saw it in different light. For him it was a text that justified and fortified the iniquitous social order. He looked at the crafting of the text in the context of weakened Brahminical order in the wake of the Buddhist criticisms against it. Gita was created to defend the Old Order with a new set of arguments as emanating from the mouth of God. In fact, to Ambedkar Gita became the central text of Brahminical counter-revolution against the Buddhist revolution. Significantly, even while refuting the conventional or nationalist interpretations of Gita, Ambedkar recognised the importance of Gita in nation-making. He did so not by adhering to its supposed teachings and import but by refuting and transcending them. Historicising the text of Gita as Ambedkar did, meant that it could not claim any timeless and universal status. It could not be regarded as the ‘Song Celestial’, for that would preclude the exercise of historicizing the text. Its significance had to be understood with reference to time and place. This critical outlook was able provide an interesting perception of Gita in the context of making sense of the nation. Nation is not an eternal or timeless entity. It has to be crafted on the basis of certain ideas. Nation is not necessarily built (p.246) one’s inherited tradition. For, tradition may mean different things to different groups in a society. If some romanticize the old ways and wish to perpetuate Page 9 of 11
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Conclusion them, some others may find them both execrable and burdensome and will have no reason to demand anything except their speedy death and burial. Nationmaking has to reckon with these conflictual ideas and practices, which stay even after it is advertised in passionate or poetic rhetoric. Although there are differences between Ambedkar and other nationalist writers on the question of the preferred cultural text for the moral foundation of the nation, such disagreements do not necessarily preclude interface on several fundamental issues such as human agency, an active engagement with the world, defence of equality, need to reform the given social structures, the role of the common people in the nation, tolerance of diversity. Even those who agreed on the Gita as the possible basis for the moral foundation of Indian nationhood, strongly disagreed on the central canons of the kind of moral regime that the nation called for. They highlighted different passages from the Gita to corroborate the kind of positions that appealed to them. In the process, they constructed a moral map for India and for the world, which although met at points, and significantly differed on others. It may appear as though these dialogues with Gita were instituted by individuals, reflecting their genius or predilections. While individuals did indeed author or express these discrete or conflicting or complementary views, they were, in fact, representing the various moods of nationmaking in India. They were responding to the various challenges that India was facing and seeking solutions from what was acknowledged as a putative text of Hindu religion and culture. Sceptics may ask the question as to whether Gita was indeed the Words of the Lord. But that is irrelevant to the play of faith, which regarded Gita as Krishna’s Words. Gita’s teachings and message became so immensely significant for that reason. Making sense of what the Lord is said to have said has always been part of religion, and harnessing it to the cause of the nation too was seen as an effective strategy to legitimizing the project. For, though nation-making is essentially a secular project, it has frequently invoked divine sanction, as much to seek popular support as to announce the inevitability of its success and fulfilment. One may revel at the thought that Gita’s transcendent profundity has lent itself to such varied and discrete interpretations. We can assure ourselves we are all like the Gopis of Brindavan who felt that each was individually and exclusively disporting with Krishna. After all, we are all entitled to be assured by (p.247) the Lord. We are also entitled to put words in the mouth of the Lord seek such assurances. Nation-making needed such exercises in ample measure. It is interesting to note that while between 1880 and 1950 so many such exercises were made, we see no such engagements in the post-Independence phase, where it has become more of a staple of religious discourses than of any serious socio-cultural criticism or directive. Nation-making has to be understood or critiqued in historical conjunctures. That explains why through the medium of Gita so many
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Conclusion interpreters of Indian nation could speak so eloquently and indefatigably. Gita has been the richer for it. Notes:
(1.) The idea of ‘Oriental Despotism’ is a refrain in colonial discourse on India, which meant many real and fancied things, in the writings of Montesquieu, Hegel and others. Jeremy Bentham and his famous acolyte, James Mill, the author of The History of British India (1817) regarded the notion as the justification for the British rule in India, and a responsibility the British should discharge for their own good as well as of those who were placed under their benevolent custody. (2.) The flourishing idea that Hinduism is as old as hills goes against the notion of it being ‘discovered’ in the eighteenth century. What the latter means is that the colonial knowledge of Hinduism went into the moulding of new Indian perception of federated Hinduism. Colonialism was wielding a power to include and exclude, which India could not but reckon in its self-perception. See P.J. Marshall (ed.), The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge, 1970. (3.) As the Gita concludes with the promise, ‘yatra yogesvara krsno yatra partho dhanur-dhara Tatra srir vijayo bhutir dhruva nitir matir mama’
(Wherever there is Krishna, the master of all mystics, and wherever there is Arjuna, the supreme archer, There will also certainly be opulence, victory, extraordinary power, and morality. That is opinion.) (4.) Tapan Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987; Sudipta Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. (5.) As the character ‘Ugly’ in the movie, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, famously said, ‘When you have to shoot, shoot; don’t talk.’
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Appendix
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
(p.248) Appendix Aurobindo Versus Ethicists Aurobindo Versus Ethicists It is instructive to compare Aurobindo’s interpretation of the Gita with those of other nationalist writers of the time, particularly Bankim, Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi. Aurobindo’s position was markedly different from the latter although they all agreed on certain issues such as the notion of the absolute, qualities of the seeker, the paths of karma, jnana, and bhakti, and India’s moral mission in the world. First, Bankim, Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi were broadly in agreement that the message of the Gita was a message to the ordinary man on his own ground, and was applicable to his state in society; the prior acquisition of ethical qualifications was not essential for the purpose. In short, the aim of the text was to make men ‘ethical’, its teaching culminating in the acquisition of sattva guna, which was the attribute of the sthitaprajna. Ascending to the state of sattva and becoming sthitaprajna was self-realization. It made man ethical by obliterating personal ego, conceit, and passion and disposed him to altruistic, social, and ethical pursuits. Aurobindo located this reading within the framework of the utilitarian philosophy of the West but the Gita’s teaching was not limited to social concern. Although Tilak in his Gita Rahasya excoriated the Utilitarian Philosophy of Mill, Bentham, and others and presented his theory of action in opposition to them, Aurobindo felt that the means and end relationship expressed therein was Utilitarian in nature. Hence, (p.249) he called these ethical readings ‘European’, or ‘Europeanized Indian readings’. In fact, Aurobindo argued that the application of their deductions to ordinary life would have the most pernicious consequences as they would not liberate man from the entanglement of this world. For him, before applying the Gita’s message to one’s Page 1 of 5
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Appendix life, one should have to acquire certain moral qualifications, and the most important among them was reaching the state of sattvic quality, the corresponding ethical life and the brahmic state. The conclusions drawn from the Gita by Bankim, Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi are the point of beginning for Aurobindo. Moreover, to Tilak, Vivekananda, and Gandhi, the Gita was an ethical text that situated its teaching in the ordinary conditions of life, and took its adherents to ethical heights. Hence, it was a text of life, ethics, and philosophy of action. To Aurobindo, it was a spiritual text, beginning its teaching from ethical grounds, and proceeding to the height of spirituality. Hence, it was a metaphysical treatise advocating surrender to the will of God rather than an ethically desirable life of action. Second, Aurobindo did not treat the Gita as a historical text, and like ethical readers, regarded it as an ahistoric narrative. Still, there were significant differences between these thinkers. Gandhi regarded the Gita as an allegory of internal struggle, and felt that its emphasis was not on external action. Its objective was self-purification, and purification of the sense-motives and reason, and not of manifest activities. He believed that if the motive is altruistic and pure, then action would also be pure, which made the Gita an allegory of internal struggle. Aurobindo, however, insisted that it was not merely concerned with internal struggle, or at any rate not with it alone. It considered external action to be as important as internal struggle because it was external action that led to the mobility and evolution of the universe. Third, Aurobindo emphatically stated that the Gita was not a text on nonviolence. For Tilak and Vivekananda, although the Gita did not explicitly support violence, its description of the highest ethical state was a great deal of compromise on violence. Gandhi, on the other hand, thought that since the Gita was an allegorical design for the internal character, its objective was to purify reason, mind, motives, and senses, and this purification could not be achieved through violent motives. Hence, he interpreted the Gita as a text advocating non-violence. Unlike Gandhi, Aurobindo thought that external action was as important as internal activities, and hence the text saw violence (destruction) and non-violence (construction) as necessary and indivisible parts of the cosmic structure. For him, the Gita did not glorify violence but saw innate propensity (p.250) for violence in the universal construct. Violence is justified when it is pursued for the righteous cause of spiritual progress, or conversely, since the manifest world is a mere tool in the hands of God, violence would take place only for righteous purpose. Every violent activity is a divine movement, the will of the divine; the seeds of violence in the embryonic form are sown in the universe, and hence it is righteous. This meaning is amply clear in the central verse of the text that God is responsible for every event in the world. Bankim, Tilak, and Aurobindo seem to have a lot in common regarding the Gita’s views on violence.
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Appendix They justified it, however, on different grounds and for different reasons and purposes. Fourth, they adopted the notions of karma, jnana, and bhakti and called for their application in accordance with their social and spiritual perspectives. For Tilak and Gandhi, man should perform his allotted social duties in the social organization through jnana and bhakti. Hence, karma, jnana, and bhakti in the text are pragmatic notions, uniting not competing, making man moral and raising his action from the mundane to the ethical plane, leaving the bondage of the lower consciousness for the liberty of a higher ethical law. Aurobindo did not understand these notions in this sense. He raised them from the social to the level of spirituality. He too fully agreed with them that karma was integrated with knowledge and devotion. However, this was not understood in the sociopragmatic sense of transforming a social being into an ethical being, but in the spiritual sense of elevating an ethical being into a spiritual being. Hence, these three paths together led man to spiritual realization and conscious surrender of his whole self to the supreme will. Aurobindo rejected the centrality of the principle ‘karmany evadhikaraste ma phalesu kadacana’ in the second chapter of the text, and opted for the principle of ‘sarvadharman parityajya mam ekam saranam vraja’ found in the last chapter (eighteenth). Fifth, regarding the concepts of realization and mukti, Aurobindo’s viewpoint differed fundamentally from Tilak’s and Gandhi’s. For Tilak, the state of sthitaprajna was identical with the highest realization. Gandhi understood realization as becoming an ethical person by transcending the ego and passions, and attaining the sattvic state. Hence, realization was a moral uplifting of oneself. Aurobindo understood attainment of the sattvic state by retreating from the ego and passions as only the beginning of the ascending process of evolution. Hence, realization was not simply moral upliftment of one’s being but spiritual upliftment as well. Aurobindo proceeded on the same line of reasoning to understand the notions of equality, svadharma, svabhava, loksamgraha and so on. (p.251) Equality, that is, ‘seeing oneself in all and all in oneself’, for instance, is not possible for an ordinary social being with human attributes, but only for him who cuts himself from all such social relations and bindings. Sixth, for Aurobindo, the Gita expounded two types of desires and motives. One is the will and the desire derived from the lower prakriti (a product of social relations). Any will or desire or motive derived from this is contrary to dharma and therefore, is to be subdued. The other will is evolved from the svabhava, jiva, or one’s real nature; it is not a mere ethical will. For ethical readers, the Gita never propounded two ‘wills’. For them, when man reaches the sattvic will, he has reached his highest state. The sattvic will is, therefore, the goal to be reached. For Aurobindo, ‘desireless action’ performed in this state, as depicted by the Karmayogic proponents, can never be really ‘desireless’. It could never become the dharma of the Gita. True desirelessness and dharma lie above the Page 3 of 5
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Appendix sattvic state. In short, ‘desire’ will continue even in the highest state, but it is not to be regarded as desire, as it is ‘purposeful will’ and hence, not contrary to the integral life. Thus, for Aurobindo, the central teaching of the text, the supreme secret, guhyataram, lay in ‘surrendering one’s will to the will of God‘. He understood everything as representing the divine will, the material forces, whether animate or inanimate, manifest or obscure. He conceived not merely divine workers as instruments of the divine will, but each and every part of action, good or egobased, as the desire of God. Each action is an attempt to unfold and unveil the concealed truth (svabhava), the outward actions through bodily instruments and their consequences being of relatively lesser importance for spirituality of the Gita. For him, every concept used in the text has a spiritual core apart from the ethical or social, as understood by other readers of the text. The notions of karma, jnana, and bhakti are the paths and integral Brahman is the goal in ethicoreligious pursuits. The ethical interpretations of these, and their associated concepts are for Aurobindo a misreading of the text. Aurobindo thought that even the concept of personal God, which is the centre of focus in ethical readings, and the interpretation of it in tune with the varied capacities and intellectual levels of men, was never implied. For the Vedanta, the seeker in his highest state would concentrate his mind only on the immutable and unmanifest Brahman who is above all the universe of relations. For the Gita, the immutable and the unmanifest are actually mutable and manifest in the world in the form of jiva (personal God), which in its highest state is supracosmic, but in nature it is below prakriti and veiled representation. Therefore, personal God does not imply idol (p.252) worship of Brahman, but worship through personal God (atman). The unmanifest is adorable through bhakti, understandable through jnana, and realizable through karma integrally. Therefore, personal God is jiva (atman), the impersonal implies supracosmic—worship of the immutable through the mutable jiva. Liberation, too, does not imply bypassing the personal God, but realization of the one supreme spirit through personal God. It is in this spirit that Aurobindo understood various notions and institutions of the Gita— chaturvarnya, svabhava, svadharma, punarjanma (rebirth), and so on. Therefore, Aurobindo did not look to the Gita for a philosophy of action, as his firm belief was that any action derived from reason, whether in its pure or maligned form (sattva or tamas), represents egoism. It becomes unegoistic and virtuous when it is evolved from the true nature of the universe, svabhava or atman. This kind of reading goes completely against the general orthodox and ethico-Karmayogic interpretations of the Gita. It is worth noting that Aurobindo’s interpretation of the Gita in the context of national independence implied that he did not regard nationalism as a mere anticolonial consciousness. He recognized the limitations of political nationalism, and the inadequacy of the anti-colonial nationalism to fully constitute the nation. By looking beyond the ‘negative’ and ‘oppositional’ politics of the anti-colonial Page 4 of 5
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Appendix movement of his time, he drew attention to the different dimensions of nationalism—cultural, civilizational, ethical, and spiritual. In his interpretation of the Gita, it is quite clear that the significance of the national movement was not merely attaining national independence. Its real significance consisted in the attainment of ethical, spiritual, and hence, mental liberation. National unity and identity required a deeper spiritual foundation, and this could not be borrowed from the British culture because they represented, in his opinion, tamasic guna, which was a ‘falsifying agent’ in the spiritual evolution. It could be provided only by the great ideal of the Aryan culture. Freedom from British subjection did not necessarily mean for him the attainment of swaraj; it was not a political concept but an ethical and spiritual one, which implied not being swayed by passions and blind, ego-based urges.
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Glossary
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
(p.253) Glossary The English equivalents used here are context-bound and primarily refer to the usage of the terms in the nationalist discourse considered here. acharya scholar-philosophers; referred to Samkaracharya, Madhvacharya, Ramanujacharya, and other classical interpreters of the Hindu scriptures, particularly the Gita adharmya immoral adhibhautika materialistic or physical adhidaivika something which is not wholly physical but which has not yet attained the state of being spiritual; intuitionist adhyatmika metaphysical Adiparva one of the cantos of the epic Mahabharata Advaita non-dualism agatah man rising into the divine nature ahamkara (ahankara) ego or egoism—literally ‘the “I”-making’; the state that asserts ‘I know’ ahimsa (ahinsa)
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Glossary non-violence, not merely the negative and restrictive meaning of nonkilling, but the positive and comprehensive meaning of ‘love embracing all creation’ Airavata vehicle of Indra, elephant akarma non-action (p.254) akasa the sky, ether akkodhena non-anger, love ananta god-serpent anasaktiyoga non-attachment, selfless action anatta selflessness, absence of soul antakarana the conscience; the heart, soul; the seat of thought and feeling; the thinking faculty, mind: Anta = last or extreme point; karana = an organ of sense, an instrument or means of action antararama rest with the soul, inner peace or quietitude antarjyoti inner light, realized soul antasukha inner happiness anyaya unjust, immoral aparigraha freedom from hoarding or collecting apariharyarte inevitable circumstances appatti calamity arambha undertaking arhat the seeker arpana bhavana sense of dedication; disposition of dedicating to God Arthasastra the book by Kautilya; also, science of wealth artha Page 2 of 18
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Glossary wealth asat non-existence, unreal ascaryam mystery asihkarma self- interest asrama four states of life asteya non-stealing asura hostile being, rivals of the gods atmajnana self-knowledge atman soul or supreme principle atmanista rest with the soul, peace atmasuddhi (attmashuddi) purification of the soul, heart atatayin villain avatar incarnation of God avidya ‘ignorance’ in the spiritual sense avyakta imperceptible Badarayanacarya (Badarayanacharya) author of the Vedanta Sutras Badarayana Vyasa one of the supposed authors of the epic Mahabharata Bahva one of the characters in the Srutis Bali mythical ruler of the nether world (p.255) Baskali another character in the Srutis Bhagavata (Bagavata) text containing descriptions on the life and teaching of Vishnu (Krishna) bhakta a lover and devotee of the divine Page 3 of 18
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Glossary bhakti love for the divine, devotion to the divine bhaktimarga one of the paths to reach the divine through deep attachment to a personal God bhangi scavenger Bharata Mahabharata bhasya (basya) commentary bhasyakaras commentators bhavana spirit behind the act bhutagramam multitude of creations bhutani creation (creatures) bikku (bhikku) one who seeks enlightenment and is dedicated wholly to the teachings of the Buddha Brahmabuta one with the Brahman brahmacarya (brahmacharya) celibacy, self-restraint Brahman the reality, eternal, infinite; one besides whom there exists none Brahmanas a portion of the Vedas containing rules for the right performance of rituals etc Brahmanirvana realization of the soul Brahmanista (-nistha) one who reposes in Brahman, realized soul Brahma Sutras or Vedanta Sutras, text attributed sage Badarayana Brahmatmaikyastiti the state of one with the Brahman Brahmavadin one who speaks on behalf of Brahman Brahmavidya the knowledge of Brahman Brahmic Page 4 of 18
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Glossary state of the Brahman, ethical brahminism an ideology in defence of graded inequality, ranking and status bruna hatya killing of tender infants; the crime of destroying foetus buddhi reason, intellect, discriminative judgement buddigamya (buddhigamya) resort to sound reason buddhiyoga caratinihsprhaha path of reason, intellect, knowledge (charatinihsprahaha) movement in the dark; renouncer of everything chandala (candala) those supposedly born from the mixture of brahmin and sudras; forest dwellers Chandogyopanisad one of the Upanisads (p.256) charakha (charaka) wheel chaturvarna (caturvarna) (chaturvarnya) the fourfold order of ancient Indian society, brahmans, ksatriyas, vaisyas and sudras cikirsur motive behind works cit consciousness citta the mind in its total or collective sense, being composed of three categories-mind (manas), reason (buddhi) and ego (individuation) chinnadvaidha qualified monism daitya demon damana self-control dana gift danavas dark gods daridranarayana lowly; the poor as God darshana (darsana) philosophy Page 5 of 18
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Glossary daivi good qualities; qualities of God desa place or state dehi veiled gross manifestation; soul devas bright gods dhamma religion or dharma daya pity, compassion dharma derived from the root ’dhr’ meaning to uphold, maintain, support; dharma means religion, law of being, law, merit, righteousness, good work, sometimes used as an equivalent of the English term religion. It is also used to imply the ethical and spiritual dharma-grantha book on religion or religious book dharana concentration, bearing dharmaksetra holy land, name of a plain, the scene of the great battle between the Pandavas and Kauravas in the Mahabharata War; it is the battlefield where Krishna expounded the Bhagavadgita to Arjuna. It is also known as Kurukshetra dharmarajya kingdom of God dharmasadhana pursuit; instrument of dharma, religion, morality, path of moksha Dharmasastras the books of religion, morality dhritarastrans the Kauravas, embodiment of undesirable qualities dhyana meditation (p.257) dukkha sorrow or pain durbar the royal court Dvaipayana Vyasa another of the supposed names for authors of the epic Mahabharata Dvaita dualism Page 6 of 18
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Glossary Dvaraka the city of nine gates; capital of Krishna dvesa hatred, enmity gotra clan grihasta householder gudakesha (gudakesa) the person who has conquered sleep; Arjuna guhyataram supreme secret guna a quality, an ingredient or construction of nature with three gunas: sattva, rajas and tamas gunatita one who is freed from and gone beyond or transcended the three qualities guru spiritual preceptor gurukula the house of the preceptor where pupils stay for their studies in ancient time harivamsa (harivansha) genealogy on Krishna’s family/A literary work himsa violence Indra the lord of the gods indriyas senses of perception and action Isvara the Supreme Being, God Jaimini the sage to whom Purvamimamsa is attributed janma birth japa recitation Jarasanda an ally and relative of the Kauravas jine krodham win over anger jiva a living being, an individual soul as distinguished from Brahman; Universal soul Page 7 of 18
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Glossary jivanmukta a person who is emancipated jivanmuktavasta a person who is emancipated during his lifetime by true knowledge or the supreme spirit jivatma the individual or personal soul jna known jnana knowledge jnana chaksu the eye of intelligence Jnanakanda that portion of the Vedas which deals with knowledge as the path to realization Jnanamarga the path of knowledge to self realization Jnananista engrossed in knowledge (p.258) Jnanendriya the sense of knowledge, hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell Jnanesvara author of Jnanesvari, interpreter of the Gita jnanin the pursuer of the path of knowledge; the realized soul Kaivalyavasta Kaivalya is the state of perfect isolation; exclusiveness; detachment of the soul from matter and union with the Lord; identification with the supreme spirit;-avasta is the state Kala/kala time; lord of death/art Kama desire, lust Kamsa uncle of Krishna and a ruthless ruler Kapilacarya (Kapilacharya) the author of Samkhya philosophy kamma action karma action, especially action determining the nature, and eventuality of the soul’s repeated existence Karmajijnasa Page 8 of 18
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Glossary the desire to know the right action Karmakanda sacrifice rituals and practices particularly as upheld by the Vedas Karmakarmavicikista the propriety and impropriety of action Karmamarga the path of karma (action) Karmamukta one who is liberated from the results or fruits of action Karmanista the follower of the path of action towards the path of realization Karmaphalatyagi one who has abandoned or renounced the fruits or rewards of action done in life Karmayogasastra text that deals with the path of action Karmayogi the pursuer of karma, engaged in desireless action Karmayogisthitaprajna pursuer of karma who is steady in mind karmendriya organs of action, of excretion, generation, hands, feet and speech kartavyakarma the work that is to be done; bounder duty kartumsusukham easy to perform kaustuba (kaustubha) a sacred instrument that god wears at his breast place kevala the Absolute khuda God Krishna (krsna) the lord of all Yogas; the celebrated hero in Hindu philosophy; the eighth incarnation of Vishnu; in the Bhagavadgita he is the (p.259) charioteer and guide of the hero Arjuna, the singer of the Gita krodha anger ksetra the body regarded as the field of activity ksetrajna the knower of the body, the soul Kubera the god of wealth kula Page 9 of 18
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Glossary clan Lakshmi goddess of wealth; wife of Krsna laya dissolution of the soul in the infinite; destruction lila play, the creation seen as the play of the divine lobha geed, avarice loksamgraha (lokasamgraha) Welfare of all, universal welfare mada pride, lust Madana god of beauty maadbhavamagatah man rising to the divine nature Madhvacarya (Madhvacharya) classical interpreter of the Gita; exponent of Dvaita siddanta, dualism Madhyamarga the middle path mahan reason Mahakavyas exalted literary works Mahavakya exalted statements mamaivamsa (mamaivansa), part of self, God mamatva ‘mine’-ness mantras Vedic hymns; sacred ritual utterances Manu The law-giver; the author of the famous Hindu law-book Manudharmasastras Mathura the birth place of Krsna maya the power of self-illusion that deludes the soul Mayavada the theory of illusion Mimamsa (Mimansa)
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Glossary a branch of learning, viewed as a form of tarka (debate); there are two parts in it, Purvamimamsa and Uttaramimamsa; Purvamimamsa (earlier half) is attributed to Jaimini and Uttaramimamsa (second half) to Badarayanacarya Mimamsaka marga the path of Mimamsa Mimamsaka sutra the laws of Mimamsa moksa (moksha) release, liberation mukti liberation naiskarmya freedom from bondage naranarayana man as God (p.260) Narayana a name of Vishnu or Krsna, who as the God in man, lives associated with human being nasti there is not nirakara formless, shapeless nimittamatra mere instrument nirguna quality less nirhetuka desireless/causeless love nirmama dissolution of mineness nirvaira non-inimical nirvana state of extinction of desires nishkama desire-less nivritti retirement niyatam allotted task or tasks that falls to one’s lot niyatamkarma karma which lead to moral or spiritual state, hence, right action nyaya Page 11 of 18
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Glossary justice, right, lawfulness, dharma Pandit (pundith) learned person papa sin parabhavam Supreme Being parabrahman the divine, Universal Being paradharma duty or action or dharma of others paramatman god, the Supreme Being paramesvara God, Brahman paraprakriti supreme existence; divine matter Parasurama son of Jamadagni, considered an avatar of Vishnu and who is supposed to have slaughtered the kshatriyas all over the earth several times pariah lowly caste, the untouchable parijata a favourite of flower of the gods parinam effect, result Partha (Parta) Arjuna Patanjalayoga (Patanjaliyoga) the philosophy of life expounded by the saint Patanjali patre person, role poorna bhakta full devotee, complete devotee Prahlada son of Hiranyakashipu and a devotee of lord Vishnu Prajapati the creator prakrti (prakriti) nature, matter, executive or working force prastanatrayi (prasthana trayi) three authoritative texts—Upanisads, Vedanta Sutras and the Bhagavadgita Page 12 of 18
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Glossary (p.261) pratika the worship of symbols, personal god; idol worship pratyaksha visible, perceptible Pritha (Prita) Arjuna punarjanma re-birth punya merit; non-sin purnavatar complete incarnation, full incarnation or descent of God from above purusa (purusha) spirit, person, conscious being; primordial being supporting the play of prakriti purusartha (purusharta) the four hallowed pursuits; dharma, artha kama, moksha purusottama (purushottama) Brahman, the ultimate being Purushottamayoga science of Brahman Purvamimamsa Jaimini Mimamsa rahat self-devotee rajas the active element rajayoga a system of yoga that makes use of mental askesis to open up divine life on all its planes raksasa demons raksasi female demon Ramanujacarya the expounder of qualified monism rasa taste, quality rasa-lila play of love Rudra Isvara; the terrible and destructive form of God; Hara saccidananda (sachidananda) existence-consciousness-bliss; attributes of the Supreme being Page 13 of 18
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Glossary sadacara (sadachara) hallowed usages and practices sadhaka (sadaka) one who practices a sadhana; pursuer of the highest goal sadhana (sadana) the practice of yoga; any system of yogic practice sadvipra the wise, learned saguna substantial; with attributes sahajam to which one is born, natural sakti (shakti) energy; the divine force in her form of power; any female consort of a male deity salagrama symbol of worship; idol samadhi state of bliss samanvaya reconciliation samarpana complete self-offering, surrender (p.262) Samkara (Sankara) (Shankara) expounder of advaita or monism, classical interpreter of the Hindu scriptures, particularly the Gita Samkhya (sankhya) (sankya) one of the major systems of Indian philosophy; It also implies the path of renunciation samnyasa (sannyasa) renunciation Samnyasin ascetic; renouncer samnyasin sthitaprajna an ascetic who is the highest state; state of self presence Sampatti quality sampradaya tradition sampradayika sectarian; traditional samsara (sansara) worldly illusion; bondage samskaras Page 14 of 18
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Glossary tendencies good or bad; character sanatana dharma the eternal law, religion; used especially since the mid-nineteenth century, as Sanskrit equivalent of the English term Hinduism; ancient religion sarvabhutahite welfare of all Sarvabhutahiterahat engrossed in the welfare of all Sastras (shastras) scriptures sat being, existence, truth satkarma good action; righteous action; ethical, religious and spiritual action satayurvaipurusha man who lives for a hundred years satva (sattva) that which is infused with truth; the ethical Satyayuga the age of truth shantih peace shoka sorrow, pain shraddha faith, eagerness Sibi (Shibi) a king siddha one who knows siddhavasta the state of realized Siva (Shiva) Isvara, God, Hara Sivalinga Symbol of Isvara, Brahman, Hara slokas Verses soma intoxicating drink; drinks of the gods sradahasva put faith in sribhasya Page 15 of 18
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Glossary the commentary of Ramanujacharya where the visistadvaita siddanta is proposed Sridhara Swamy commentator of the Hindu scriptures/wrote a tika on the Gita (p.263) sthitaprajna engrossed; steady in mind; realized soul suddhadvaita pure monism Sudhanva a great king sudra (shudra) a member of the lowest of the four orders of chaturvarnya sukrtino virtuous suryanarayana the sun-god svabhava (swabhava) one’s nature; essential nature of each being or soul svabhavaniyatam determined by or in accordance with one’s nature svadharma (swadharma) one’s own law of being; one’s duty, one’s dharma; one’s natural duty svakarma one’s own task swadeshi (svadeshi) belonging to one’s environs; indigenous swaraj (svaraj) self-rule, self-government; one’s own tamas ignorance; lowest state in the divine path tanmatras subtle or fine elements tapasya concentration of the will and energy to control and change the mind, life, and body; penance tika criticism trigunatita one who has transcended beyond the three qualities to the highest state, i.e., beyond sattva, rajas and tamas; someone who is engrossed in the highest happiness tulasi a sacred plant tyaga sacrifice; surrender to God udasina Page 16 of 18
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Glossary indifferent Uddalaka a character in the Upanishads uttamam rahasyam the highest secret vaira inimical Vaisnavism (Vaishnavism) the sect or traditions that regard Vishnu, especially in his incarnations as Krishna or Rama, as the Supreme Being Vaisnava the devotee and follower of Vishnu Vallabha the saint-philosopher who commented on the Gita Vamana one of the incarnations of Vishnu Vanaparva one of the cantos of the Mahabharata varnasankara (varnasamkara) destruction of varna; clan; dharma varnasramadharma varna = four divisions (chaturvarna) asrama = four stages of life (p.264) vasana tendencies vasanatmika buddhi practical reason Vasudeva one of the names of Krsna Vatavrksa banyan tree Vedanta a system of philosophy based on the Upanisads Vedanta Sutras writings attributed to the sage Badarayanacarya vijnana real; ideal; divine mind; science of knowledge vibhuti (vibuti)/Vibhuti awakened soul/Arjuna vidya art; knowledge; skill Vikramaditya a great historical king; generic name visesas gross Page 17 of 18
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Glossary Vishnu god as protector, known as Hari vishvarupa (vishwarupa) transcendental majesty of the divine Vishvamitra a great sage visistadvaita qualified monism Vraja the birth place of krishna vyavasayatmika buddhi discriminatory reason yaga/yajna sacrifice Yakshas lord of wealth and knowledge; goddesses yantraroodha latched on to a machine yatacetasa realized soul yatatma engrossed in the soul yati happy; ananda state yoga union with the divine; a method of attaining such union yogamaya divine birth into ignorance yogi attained soul yogasiddhi perfection in yoga yuga an age yugadharma the ideal of the age; dharma of the age yukti techniques
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Primary Sources
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
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Desai, Mahadev, The Gospel of Selfless Action or The Gita According to Gandhi, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1946. (p.266) Gandhi, M.K., Discourses on the Gita, trans. Valji Govindji Desai, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1983. Page 1 of 2
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Primary Sources _________, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 87 vols, New Delhi: Publications Division, 1958. _________, Gita—My Mother, ed. A.T. Hingorani, Bombay: Popular, 1965. Aurobindo Ghosh
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Secondary Sources
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
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Secondary Sources Athavale, P.V., Glimpses of the Life of Lord Krishna, Bombay: Shrimat Bhagavat Gita Pathashala, 1975. Bagal, Jogesh Chandra (ed), Bankim Rachanavali, Calcutta: Sahitya Samsad, 1969. Baird, Robert D. (ed.), Religion in Modern India, Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1981. Banerjee, J.N., Puranic and Tantric Religion, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1966. Banerjee, S.N., A Nation in the Making, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1925. Banerji, N.V., Buddhism and Marxism, New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 1978. Bartley, C.J., The Theology of Ramanuja: Realism and Religion, London: Routledge Curzon, 2002. Basham, A.L., The Wonder that was India, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1956. _________, A Cultural History of India, Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1985. Bazaz, P.N., The Role of Bhagavad Gita in Indian History, New Delhi: Sterling, 1975. Beitenen, J.A. Van, Ramanuja on the Bhagavad Gita, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1968. Belvalkar, S.K., Vedanta Philosophy, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1929. Besant, Annie, The Bhagavad Gita or the Lord’s Song, Madras: University of Madras, 1907. Bhandarkar, R.G., ‘Allusions to Krishna in Patanjali’s Mahabhashya’, Indian Antiquary, vol. 3, January 1874, pp. 14–16. _________, Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems, Strasburg: Karl J. Trubner, 1913. Bhargava, D., Jaina Ethics, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1968. Bhattacharya, P., The Secret of the Mahabharata, Aurangabad: Parimal Prakashan, 1984. _________, Themes and Structure in the Mahabharata, Calcutta: Dasgupta and Co., 1989.
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Secondary Sources Bloomfield, Maurice, The Religion of the Veda: The Ancient Religion of India, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1908. Bocock, R., and K. Thompson, Religion and Ideology, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. Bohtlingk, Otto von, Introduction to Bhagavad Gita, Indian Antiquary, Supplement, 1908. Bose, N.S., The Indian Awakening and Bengal, Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhyopadyaya, 1960. Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982. (p.268) Burke, M. Louise, Swami Vivekananda in America: New Discoveries, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1966. Cannon, Garland, Oriental Jones: A Biography of Sir Welliam Jones, 1746–1794, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964. _________, (ed.), The Letters of Sir William Jones, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Carpenter, Edward, Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure and Other Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921. Cashman, Richard, The Myth of Lokmanya, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Chakravarty, Radha, Marian Maddern, S.N. Mukherjee, and Sreejata Guha, The Bankimchandra Omnibus, vol. 1, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005. Chanchreek, K.L. (ed.), Dr B.R. Ambedkar, 3 vols. Delhi: H.K. Publications, 1991. Chandra, Bipan, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1966. _________, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, Delhi: Orient Longman, 1979. _________, India’s Struggle for Independence, New Delhi: Penguin, 1989. Chatterjee, Bhabatosh (ed.), Bankimchandra Chatterjee: Essays in Perspective, New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1994. Chatterjee, Margaret, Gandhi’s Religious Thought, London: Macmillan, 1983. Chatterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986. Page 3 of 20
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Secondary Sources _________ (ed.), Wages of Freedom, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Chattopadhyaya, D.P., Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism, New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1968. _________, Indian Atheism: A Marxist Approach, Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1969. _________, What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976. _________, History, Society and Polity: Integral Sociology of Sri Aurobindo, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1976. Chattopadhyaya, Sudhakar, Traditional Values in Indian Life, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1961. Chaudhuri, Haridas, Sri Aurobindo: The Prophet of Life Divine, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1973. Chirol, Valentine, The Occident and The Orient, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Creel, Austin B., Dharma in Hindu Ethics, Calcutta: KLM, 1977. Curtin, Philip D. (ed.), Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization, New York: Walker and Co., 1972. (p.269) Das, Bhagwan, Krishna—A Study in the Theory of Avataras, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962. Dasgupta, B.N., Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Delhi: Uppal Publishling House, 1980. Dasgupta, S.N., A History of Indian Philosophy, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Das, Sisir Kumar, The Artist in Chains: The Life of Bankimchandra Chatterji, New Delhi: New Statesman, 1984. Davis, Horace B., Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978. Davis, J., Hindu Philosophy, Bhagavad Gita: the Sacred Lay, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1882. Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1948.
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Secondary Sources Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966. Dutt, Bhupendranath, Swami Vivekananda–Patriot–Prophet, Calcutta: New Bharath Publishers, 1954. Dutt, R.P., India Today, Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1949. Eco, Umberto, The Role of the Reader, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. _________, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Stefan Collini (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. _________, The Limits of Interpretation, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Edgerton, Franklin, The Bhagavad Gita or Song of the Blessed One, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1925. Eggeling, Julius, Satpatha Brahmana, parts I–V, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885. Eliade, Mircea (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, New York, Macmillan, 1987. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. IX, Chicago: William Benton, 1969. Encyclopedia of Social Science, vols 11–12, New York: Macmillan, 1949. Farquhar, J.N., An Outline of the Religious Literature of India, Delhi, 1967 (reprint). _________, Modern Religious Movements in India, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967. Feuerstein, George, The Bhagavadgita: A Critical Rendering, New Delhi, 1980. Fitzgerald, Timothy, ‘Ambedkar, Buddhism and the Concept of Religion’ in S.M. Michael (ed.), Dalit in Modern India, New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1999. Fox, Richard, Gandhian Utopia, Boston: Beacon Press, 1989. Frankel, Francine R. and M.S.A. Rao (ed.), Dominance and State power in Modern India: Decline of Social Order, 2 vols, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989. (p.270) Ganguli, K.M., The Mahabharata, XII vols, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1972.
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Secondary Sources Garbe, Richards, Introduction to the Bhagavad Gita, trans. D. Mackichen, Bombay: University of Bombay, 1918. Gellner, Ernest, Thought and Change, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964. Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. Ghatak, B.K., Dr Ambedkar’s Thought, New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 1997. Ghodke, H.M., Revolutionary Nationalism in Western India, New Delhi: Classical Publishing, 1990. Ghose, Shankar, From Renaissance to Militant Nationalism in India, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1972. Ghosh, Aurobindo, Bankimchandra Chatterjee, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1954. _________, Bankim-Tilak-Dayananda, Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1970. _________, The Life Divine, 2 vols, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1973. _________, The Mother, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1974. _________, The Supramental Manifestation upon Earth, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1980. _________, The Foundations of Indian Culture, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1982. Gopal, Ram, Lokmanya Tilak, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965. _________, How India Struggled for Freedom, Bombay: Book Center, 1967. Gore, M.S., The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar’s Political and Social Thought, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993. Gotshalk, Richard, Bhagavad Gita: Translation and Commentary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1985. Guha, Ranajit (ed.), Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. _________ (ed.), Subaltern Studies III: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985. Gupta, R.C., Sri Krishna–A Socio-Political and Philosophical Study, Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1984. Page 6 of 20
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Secondary Sources Gupta, S.P. and K.S. Ramachandran, Mahabharata—Myth and Reality, New Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980. Haberman, David L., ‘Divine Betrayal: Krishna-Gopal of Braj in the Eyes of Outsiders’, Journal of Vaisnava Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 83–111. Hasting, James, and J.A. Selbie (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vols II and XII, New York: T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1971. Haug, Martin, The Origin of Brahmanism, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1863. (p.271) Hayes, Carlton J.H., The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, New York: R.R. Smith, 1931. _________, Nationalism: A Religion, New York: Macmillan, 1960. Heehs, Peter, Sri Aurobindo: A Brief Biography, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989. Heehs, Peter, The Essential Writings of Sri Aurobindo, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Heidegger, Martin, An Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959. Heimsath, Charles H., Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Held, G.J., The Mahabharata: an Ethnological Study, London: Kegan Paul, 1935. Hill, W. Douglas P., The Bhagavad Gita, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1968. _________, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1995. Hobsbawm, E.J., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981. Hoon, V.N., The Symphony of the Bhagavad Gita, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1975.
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Secondary Sources Hopkins, E.W., The Great Epic of India, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901. _________, History of the Religion, New York: Macmillan, 1916. _________, The Religions of India, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1977. Huxley, T.H., Evolution and Ethics, London: Macmillan, 1903. Inamdar, N.R., Political Thought and Leadership of Lokmanya Tilak, New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1983. Indich, William M., Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1980. Isherwood, Christopher, Ramakrishna and His Disciples, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1969. Iyer, Raghavan N., The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. _________ (ed.), The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Jain, R.C., Ethnology of Ancient Bharata, Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1970. Jaiswal, Suvira, The Origin and Development of Vaisnavism, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967. (p.272) Jha, D.N. (ed.), Feudal Social Formation in Early India, Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987. Jha, Vivekanand, ‘Varnasamkara in the Dharmasutras: Theory and Practice’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XIII, part 3, Leiden (Netherlands), 1970, pp. 273–88. _________, ‘Stages in the History of Untouchables’, The Indian Historical Review, vol. II, no. 1, New Delhi, 1974, pp. 14–31. Jha, Vivekanand, ‘Social Content of The Bhagavad Gita’, The Indian Historical Review, vol. XI, nos 1–2, July 1984–January 1985, pp. 1–44. Jondhale, S. and J. Beltz, Reconstructing the World: B.R. Ambedkar and Buddhism in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Jones, Kenneth W., Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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Secondary Sources Jones, William, Discourses Delivered before the Asiatic Society and Miscellaneous Papers on the Religion, Poetry, Literature, etc. of the Nations of India, C.S. Arnold, 1824. Jordens, J.T.F., Dayananda Saraswati: His Life and Ideas, Madras: Oxford University Press, 1978. Joshi, V.C. (ed.), Rammohun Roy and the Process of Modernization in India, Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1975. Kadam, K.N., Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar and the Significance of His Movement, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1991. Kamenka, E. (ed.), Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, London: Edward Arnold, 1976. Kane, P.V., History of Dharmashastras, 5 vols., Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1973. Karmakar, A.P., The Religions of India, vol. I, New Delhi: Mira Publishing House, 1950. Karmarkar, D.P., Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1956. Karunakaran, K.P., Religion and Political Awakening in India, New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1965. Kaviraj, Sudipta, The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995. Kedourie, Elie, Nationalism, London: Hutchinson, 1960. _________ (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970. Keer, Dhananjay, Dr Ambedkar: Life and Mission, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1962. _________, V.D. Savarkar: Biography, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966. _________, Lokmanya Tilak, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1969. _________, Mahatma Gandhi: Political Saint and Unarmed Prophet, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1973. (p.273) Khair, G.S., Quest for the Original Gita, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1969.
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Secondary Sources Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism, New York: Macmillan, 1944. _________, Nationalism, Its Meaning and History, Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1955. _________, The Age of Nationalism, New York: Harper, 1962. Kopf, David, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization 1773–1835, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Kosambi, D.D., ‘Social and Economic Aspects of the Bhagavadgita’, in Myth and Reality, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1962, pp. 12–41. Kosambi, D.D., An Introduction to the study of Indian History, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1975. _________, ‘The Historical Development of the Bhagavad-Gita’, in D. Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy, Calcutta: Bagchi, 1978, pp. 242–66. _________, The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India, New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1982. Kuber, W.N., Dr B.R. Ambedkar: A Critical Study, New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1973. Kumar, Ravinder, Western India in the Nineteenth Century, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. _________ (ed.), Gandhi and Satyagraha, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1971. Lal, R.B., The Gita in the Light of Modern Science, Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1970. Lele, Jayant (ed.), Tradition and Modernity in Bhakti Movements, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981. Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society, London: The Free Press, 1964. Lidchi, Maggi, The Battle of Kurukshetra, Calcutta: Writers Workshop, 1987. The Life of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1965. Ling, Trevor, Buddha, Marx and God, London: Macmillan, 1966. Lingat, Robert, The Classical Law of India, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Page 10 of 20
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Secondary Sources MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?’ in Bryan R. Wilson (ed.) Rationality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, pp. 62–77. _________, After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981. Madan, G.R., Western Sociologists on Indian Society: Marx, Spencer, Weber, Durkhiem, and Pareto, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. Madan, T.N., Religion in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992. (p.274) Mahadevan, T.M.P., The Philosophy of Advaita, London: Luzac and Co., 1938. _________, Gaudapada: A Study in Early Advaita, Madras: Madras University Press, 1952. Majumdar, Bimanbehari, History of Indian Social and Political Ideas: From Rammohun Roy to Dayananda, Calcutta: Bookland Private Ltd., 1976. Majumdar, B.B., Krsna in History and Legend, Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1969. Majumdar, R.C., History of Freedom Movement in India, 5 vols, Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963. _________, Three Phases of India’s Struggle for Freedom, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967. _________ (ed.), The Age of Imperial Unity, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1968. Mani, Vettam, Puranic Encyclopedia, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1984. Marshall, P.J. (ed.), The British Discovery of Hinduism in the 18th Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Marx, Karl, ‘The British Rule in India’ in K. Marx and F. Engels, The First Indian War of Independence 1857–1859, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959. Mehta, Rohit, From Mind to Super Mind: A Commentary on the Bhagavad Gita, Bombay: Manaktalas Publications, 1966. Mill, John Stuart, Nature: The Utility of Religion and Theism, London: Watts, 1904. Minor, Robert. N., ‘The Gita Way as the Only Way’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 30, no. 3, 1980, pp. 339–54. Page 11 of 20
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Secondary Sources _________, Bhagavad-Gita: An Exegetical Commentary, New Delhi: Heritage, 1982. _________ (ed.), Modern Indian Interpreters of the Bhagavadgita, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986. Mitra, Sisir Kumar, Sri Aurobindo, New Delhi, 1972. Mookerji, R.K., Nationalism in Hindu Culture, London: Theosophical Publishing House, 1921. Moore, R.J. (ed.), Tradition and Politics in South Asia, Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1979. Muir, John (ed.), Original Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and Progress of the Religion and Institutions of India, 4 vols. London, 1858–63. Mukherjee, S.L., The Philosophy of Man-Making: A Study in Social and Political Ideas Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: New Central Book Agency, 1971. Mukherjee, S.N., Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth-century British Attitudes to India, London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Müller, Max Friedrich, Science and Religion, London: Longmans Green and Co., 1882. _________, India: What it can Teach Us?, New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1905. (p.275) _________, Sacred Books of the East, 58 vols, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1970. Munshi, K.M. (ed.), Bhagavad Gita and Modern Life, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1964. _________, Krishna Avatara, VII vols, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1972. Murty, Satchidananda K., Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Myrdal, Gunnar, Asian Drama, London: Penguin, 1972. Nanda, B.R., Gandhi and His Critics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985. Nandy, Ashis, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983. _________, Tradition, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987. Page 12 of 20
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Secondary Sources _________ (ed.), History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952. _________, The Bhagavad Gita, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967. _________, An Idealist View of Life, New Delhi: George Allen and Unwin, 1971. _________, Indian Philosophy, 2 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983 (Eleventh Impression). Ranade, R. D., The Bhagavad Gita: As a Philosophy of God Realisation, Maharastra: Nagpur University Press, 1959. (p.277) Ranganathananda, Swami, Swami Vivekananda: His Life and Mission, Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1966. _________, Swami Vivekananda and The Future of India, Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1966. _________, The Meeting of the East and the West in Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1968. Rao, V.K.R.V., Vivekananda’s Message to the Youth, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1970. Rau, S. Subba, Gita Bhasya with Commentary of Sri Madhavacharya, Tirpathi: Sri Vyasa Press, 1936. Ray Chaudhuri, H.C., Political History of Ancient India, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972. Ray Chaudhuri, Tapan, Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987. Reminiscences of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1964. Rodrigues, Valerian, ‘Making a Tradition Critical: Ambedkar’s Reading of Buddhism’ in Peter Robb (ed.), Dalit Movements and the Meaning of Labour in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993. _________, B.R. Ambedkar, Essential Writings, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001 Rolland, Romain, Mahatma Gandhi: A Study in Indian Nationalism, (tr.) L.V. Ramaswami Aiyar, Madras: S. Ganesan, 1923. _________, The Life of Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1970.
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Secondary Sources _________, The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Roy, Anil Baran (ed.), The Gita, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1963. Roy S.B., Date of Mahabharata Battle, Gurgaon: Academic Press, 1976. Ruskin, John, Unto this Last, London: W.B. Clive, 1931. Ryakan, Kimura, A Historical Study of the Terms–Hinayana and Mahayana, and the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism, Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1927. Said, Edward W., Orientalism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Samkara, The Bhagavad Gita Bhasya, Poona: The Oriental Book Agency, 1931. _________, Atmabodha (Self Knowledge), Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1962. Sampath Kumavan, M.R. The Gita Bhasya of Ramanuja, Bombay: Ananthacharya Institute, 1985. Sanyal, J.M., Srimad Bhagavad Gita, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970. Sardesai, S.G. and Bose, Dilip, Marxism and The Bhagavad Gita, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1985. Sastri, Alladi Mahadeva, The Bhagavagita: With Commentary of Sri Sankaracharya, Madras: Samata Books, 1977. Sarkar, S.C., Bengal Renaissance and Other Essays, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1970. (p.278) Sarkar, Sumit, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903–08, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1973. _________, Modern India: 1885–1947, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1985. _________, ‘Kaliyuga’, ’Chakri’ and ‘Bhakti’: Ramakrishna and His Times, Economic and Political Weekly, 18 July 1992. Sarman, Rajendranatha (ed.), Visnumahapuranam, New Delhi: Nag Publishers, 1985. Seal, Anil, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Sen, M.L., Lord Sree Krishna–His life and Teachings, 3 vols, Calcutta: Oriental Publishing Company, 1955.
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Secondary Sources Seton-Watson, Hugh, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, London: Methuen, 1977. Sharma, Arvind, The Hindu Gita: Ancient and Classical Interpretations of the Bhagavadgita, London: Macmillan, 1986. Sharma, B.N.K., Sri Madhava’s Teachings in His Own Words, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1970. Sharma, Krishna, Bhakti and The Bhakti Movement: A New Perspective, A Study in the History of Ideas, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987. Sharma, R.S., Material Culture and Social Foundations in Ancient India, New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 1983. Sharma, R.S. and Jha, Vivekananda (ed.), Indian Society: Historical Probings, D.D. Kosambi Memorial edn., New Delhi, 1974. Shastri, Acharya Jagdeeshlal (ed.), Manusmriti, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1983. Shastri, Gajanana S. Sadhale (ed.), The Bhagavadgita with Eleven Commentaries, 3 vols. Delhi, 1985. Shay, T.L., The Legacy of the Lokmanya, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1956. Shrivastava, S.N.L., Samkara and Bradley, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1968. Sircar, D.C., The Bharata War and Puranic Genealogies, Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1969. Sivananda, Swami, The Bhagavad Gita: Text, Word-to-Word Meaning, Translation and Commentary, Sivanandanagar: Tehri Garhwal, 7th edn. 1969. Smith, Anthony D., Theories of Nationalism, London: Duckworth, 1971. _________, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Martin Robertson and Co., 1979. Smith, Bardwell L., Hinduism: New Essays in the History of Religions, Leiden: Kern Institute, 1976. Smith, D.E. (ed.), Religion and Political Modernization, New Haven, CT, 1974. Smith, Vincent A., Early History of India, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924. (p.279) Snyder, L., The Meaning of Nationalism, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954. Page 17 of 20
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Secondary Sources _________, Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative View, Hinsdale: Illinois, 1976. Stokes, Eric, The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. Sukthankar, Vishnu S., The Mahabharata, 19 vols. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1942. Swami Abhedananda, Swami Vivekananda and His Works, Calcutta: Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 1968. Swami Adidavananda, Sri Ramanuja Gitabhasya, Delhi: Vedanta Press and Books, 1992. Swami Atmananda, Samkara’s Teachings in His Own Words, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1958. Swami Jyotirmayananda, Vivekananda: His Gospel of Man-Making with A Garland of Tributes and A Chronicle of His Life and Times with Pictures, Pondicherry: All India Press, 1988. Swami Nikhilananda, Vivekananda: A Biography, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1964. Swami Sarvananda (ed.), Katha-Upanisad, Madras: University of Madras, 1956. Swami Sridhara Srimad Bhagavad-Gita: Text, Translation of the Text and of the Gloss of Sridhara Swami (ed.), Swami Vireswarananda, Madras: University of Madras, 1972. Swami Tapasyananda, Sri Madhavacharya: His Life, Religion and Philosophy, Madras: Sri Ramkrishna Math, 1981. Swami Viresvarananda, Brahma Sutras, Almora: Advaita Ashram 1936. Swami Vivekananda, Letters of Swami Vivekananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1970. _________, Lectures from Colombo to Almora, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1984. Telang, K.T., The Bhagavad Gita with the Sanatsujatiya and the Anugita, Oxford: Clarendon Press Publication, 1882. Thakur, V.K., ‘Social Roots of the Bhagavadgita’, Indologica Taurinensia, vol. X, Torino, 1982, pp. 289–300. Thapar, Romila, Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations, New Delhi, 1978.
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Secondary Sources Thibaut, George, ‘The Vedanta Sutras with Commentary of Samkaracharya’ in Max Muller (ed.), Sacred Books of the East, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 387–91. Thomson, J. Cockburn (trans.), The Bhagavad-Gita: or a Discourse between Krishna and Arjuna on Divine Matters; A Sanskrit Philosophical Poem, Hertford, 1855. (p.280) Tigunait, Pandit Rajmani, Seven Systems of Indian Philosophy, US: The Himalayan International Institute of Yoga Science and Philosophy, 1983. Tolstoy, Leo, ‘The Kingdom of God is Within You’, in The Kingdom of God and Other Essays, trans. Aylmer Maude, London: Oxford University Press, 1936. _________, The Slavery of Our Times, trans. Aylmer Maude, London: John Lawrence, 1972. Trautmann, Thomas, Aryans and British India, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997. _________, India: Brief History of a Civilization, New York: Oxford University Press. Unnithan, T.K. and Yogendra Singh, Tradition of Non-violence, New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann, 1973. Upadhyay, K.N., ‘The Impact of Early Buddhism on Hindu Thought with Special Reference to the Bhagavad Gita’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 18, no. 3, 1968, pp. 163–73. _________, Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgita, reprint, New Delhi, 1983. _________, Early Buddhism and Bhagavad Gita, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1971. Utgikar, N.B., ‘Garbe’s Introduction to the Bhagavad Gita’, Indian Antiquary, vol. LXVII, no. 47, Supplements II–IV, Bombay, 1918, pp. 1–35. Van Dijk, Teun A., Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse, London: Longman, 1977. Varma, V.P., The Political Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1976. Ven, Kausalyayan Anand (ed.), The Buddha and His Dhamma (in Hindi), Bombay: People’s Education Society, Siddharth College, 1971.
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Index
The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse Nagappa Gowda
Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780198072065 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072065.001.0001
(p.282) Index Advaita, 7, 107, 245 Ambedkar, B.R., 4–5, 7, 195, 222, 245–6 and Manu, 223, 229 and violence, 230–1 brahminical counter-revolution, 226, 229, 231 rejection of, 233 historicizing the Gita, 223, 225–6, 235n14 Varna, 223, 227–30 Anandamath, 40 Aristotle, 60, 68 Arjuna, 2, 16, 44–5, 93, 96, 105, 133, 145, 164n39 Arms Act, 44–5 Arnold, Edwin, 169, 189 Arthasastra, 2 Asiatic Researches, 4 Asiatic Society of Bengal, 8 atman, 21, 23, 93, 160, 182 Badarayana, 231 Bagal, Jogesh Chandra, 10 Bandyopadhyay, Dibyendusundar, 10 Bentham, Jeremy, 247n1 bhakti, 6, 26–7, 56, 75–8 Bhaktiyoga, 27 Bhasya, 7, 84, 86n20 Bhave, Vinoba, 4–5, 7, 57, 205, 245 Bhaktiyoga, 207, 213 Bhoodan movement, 205, 213 core ideas, 210–15, 220n21 education system, 216 Hindu-Muslim unity, 221n38 Jnanayoga, 207, 213 Page 1 of 6
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Index Karma yoga, 206–7 plurality of the Gita, 208–9 Purushottama yoga, 217 Varnasramadharma, 206, 212, 215 Bible, 52, 59, 61, 82, 225 Brahma Sutras, 231 Buddha, 20, 112, 132, 140, 224, 227, 231 Buddha and his Dhamma, The, 233, 242 Buddhism, 4, 7, 21, 51–3, 61, 115, 224–6, 230–1, 242 Chandavarkar, Narayan, 200n45 (p.283) Chatterjee, Bankimchandra, 4, 6, 9, 242–3, 248–50 and science, 23–5, 30 and violence, 35–8 centrality of Gita, 12, 25 critique of the Gita, 11–12, 26–8, 131 idol worship, 41–3 karma, 31–4 historicity of the Gita, 12–15, 18 need to historicize, 17, 21 patriotism, 45 Prachar, 10 rebirth, 23–4 Theory of Avatar, 17 Christ, Jesus, 3, 5, 20, 59, 140, 144 Christianity, 3, 20–1, 59, 115 historicity, 94 Colonialism, 2 discource, 247n1 Comte, Auguste, 54, 59 Darshanas, 2 Das, C.R., 198n7, 200n41 Dave, Sakarlal, 200n45, 201n90 David, Rhys, 24, 54 Desai, Mahadev, 199n12, 201n50 Dhammapada, 226 dharma, 16–17, 19, 26, 141, 144 and non-violence, 36–7 and science, 22 and the West, 43–4 for Aurobindo, 141 nishkama, 35 Dharmatattwa, 6, 10–11, 30, 43–5, 242 Durgeshnandini, 12 Dvaita, 7–8n2 Edgerton, Franklin, 54 Essays on the Bhagavadgita, 223 Essays on the Gita, 125, 128, 131, 135, 146, 206 Evangelicals, 6 Gandhi, M.K., 4–6, 11, 32, 131, 141, 208, 234, 244, 248–9 Page 2 of 6
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Index ahimsa, 168, 176, 183–4, 187 anasakti, 7, 176–7, 179–81, 183–9, 191–8, 245 and the notion of avatar, 181–3 anasaktiyoga, 169 and Chaturvarna, 188–95, 198, 245 and Gita, rejecting historicity, 173–5 and karma, 193, 197 and violence, 185–8 bhakti, karma and jnana, 177–9 chaturvarna, 7 in prison, 168 interpreting the Gita, 170 prakriti, 176 satyagraha, 6, 168, 176, 245 swadeshi, 6, 168, 245 Ghosh, Aurobindo, 4, 6, 124, 207, 234, 244, 248–9 bhakti, karma and jnana, 126–7, 130, 159–60, 250–1 critiquing other interpretations, 132, 135 dharma in the Gita, 142–4 explicating the Gita, 127–9, 131–3, 138–9, 144–6, 249–2 loksamgraha, 158–9 sacrifice, 157, 159 varna, 149–51, 162 violence and non-violence, 146–9, 151–4, 162, 165n59, 250 vishvarupa, 152–3 militant nationalism, 124–5, 154 prakriti, 135–6, 139, 143, 155–7, 160, 251 spiritualism, 126 Supreme Being, 143 (p.284) swadeshi, 126 swaraj, 126 Gita, and Buddhism, 227, 233–4 and Varna, 241 brahmanocracy, 234 historicity, 144–5 ideals, 242 Gita Rahasya, 6, 50, 52, 54–8, 103, 170, 186, 193, 206, 208–9, 243, 248 Gore, M.S., 222 Harder, Hans, 10, 46n3 Harivamsa, 12 Hastie, 41 Hegel, 54, 247n1 Herodotus, 13 Hind Swaraj, 172, 176 Hinduism, 3, 12 karma, 3, 40 sanctification of the Gita, 4–5, 21 Page 3 of 6
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Index Hume, David, 54, 177, 201n50 Indian Antiquary, 4 Indian National Congress, 124 Jaimini, 57, 224–8, 231–4 Jainism, 51 Jnanesvara, 56 Johnson, S., 22, 24 Jones, William, 3, 236 Kadam, K.N., 222 Kamsa, 19, 113 Kant, Immanuel, 23, 54, 68–9 Kapalkundala, 12 Kapilacharya, 84–5n3 karma, 30–1, 192, 250 karmayoga, 27, 53, 56, 61, 67–8, 72, 74, 76–8, 83, 101, 112, 232, 243 Karmayogi, 98–99, 135, 154, 176, 179–80, 188, 190 rejection of, 132–4 Karmayogic interpretation of the Gita, 131, 138, 161, 251–2 Keer, Dhananjay, 222 Kesari, 82 Ketkar, G.V., 172, 199n28 Koran, 82, 226 Kosambi, D.D., 5 Krishna, 2–5, 28, 93, 96, 105, 144 avatar, 17–20, 136–9, 141, 246 dialogue with Arjuna, 16, 113, 145, 151 for Bankim, 44 for Gandhi, 173, 182 historicity, 97–8 study of, 12–13, 21 Krishna Charitra, 6, 12–13, 16, 23, 41, 43, 242 Ktesias, 13 Livy, 13 Madhva, 2, 7n2, 56 Mahabharata, 12–16, 61, 145 Maharaj, Santoji, 171 Mahratta, 82 Manusmriti, 51, 61 Materialism, 62 Megasthenes, 13–14 Mill, James, 3, 247n1, 248 Mill, J.S., 22, 54, 60–1 Mimamsa writers, 57 mosaic tradition, 3 Müller, Max, 54, 89n104, 236 Nationalism, 1, 5, 32, 236 and Ambedkar, 232 and Aurobindo, 124–5, 128, 140–3, 161 and Bankim, 39–40, 45 Page 4 of 6
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Index and Tilak, 51–4, 62, 83 (p.285) and Vinoba Bhave, 206, 218 and Vivekananda, 90–1, 106, 117 Nationalist discourse, 237–1, 245–6 Nietzsche, 54, 60, 72, 147 nishkama karma, 32–5, 83, 99–108, 110–16, 132, 154–6, 217, 243 karmi, 39, 100–4, 111, 177 non-violence, 113 Oriental Despotism, 247n1 Orientalism, 8n5 Orientalist, 3–4, 6, 236, 238, 240 construction of Gita, 54, 61 Paramhamsa, Ramakrishna, 132 Plato, 68 Positivism, 62 Prakarana Grantha, 7n2 Puranas, 2–3, 12, 52 Purvamimamsa, 57, 111, 224–9, 231, 233–4 Pushyamitra, 224–5 Radhakrishnan, S., 57 Ramanuja, 2, 7n2, 11, 56 Raychaudhuri, Tapan, 247n4 Roy, Raja Rammohun, 4, 237 Samkaracharya, 2, 7n2, 11, 29, 66, 84, 102, 191 Samkhya philosophy, 9, 12, 50–1, 55, 84n3, 130–1, 155–7, 220n26, 222, 227 Guna theory, 228 Sanskritists, 3 Sarasvati, Madhusudhana, 11 Saraswati, Swami Dayanand, 237 Satapatha Brahmana, 15 Schlegel, 24 Schopenhauer, 3, 54, 60 Semitism, 2–3, 21 Smriti, 2, 52 Spencer, Herbert, 41, 54, 60 Srimadbhagabadgita, 9, 16, 40 Sridhara Swami, 11 Sruti, 2, 52 Sully, James, 54 sthitapajna, 6, 53–4, 56, 63, 65–73, 76, 79, 138–9 svabhava, 108–9, 121n49, 151 svadharma, 6–7, 28–9, 31, 126, 166n74, 188, 196, 210–15, 245, 250 and altruism, 216–17 Swadeshi, 6, 126, 195–6, 245 Tagore, Rabindranath, 45n1 Talks on the Gita, 206 Thoughts on the Gita, 90, 94 Tilak, Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar, 4, 11, 32, 50, 92, 103, 131, 141, 193, 207, 209, 232, 243, 248–50 Page 5 of 6
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Index and bhakti, 75–8 critique of the Gita, 50–2, 58–9, 76–83 Karma yoga, 6 non-violence, 62–5, 67 rejection of Samkhya, 52–3 rejection of Western theories, 55, 60–1, 67, 70, 81, 84, 87n39 sthitapajna, 6, 53–4, 56, 63, 65–73, 76, 79, 243 Trautmann, Thomas, 3 Upanishads, 2, 51, 90–1, 103, 116, 147, 228 nirguna bhakti, 215 saguna bhakti, 215 Uttaramimamsa, 231 Vaidya, Gangabehn, 204n125 Varna (caste), 29–30, 82, 107 Vedanta Sutras, 55 (p.286) Vedas, 2, 50, 90–1, 103, 116, 209–10 Vidyasagar, Iswarchandra, 237 Visistadvaita, 7–8n2 Vivekananda, Swami, 4, 6, 12, 32, 90, 208, 244, 248–9 against brahminism, 101–3 against organized religion, 110–11, 118 and equality, 93, 116 and idol worship, 99 and non-violence, 113–14 and Varna, 107 Daridranarayana, 6, 92, 105, 117, 244 historicizing the Gita, 94–6, 119n9 in America, 108, 114 Naranarayana, 6, 92, 106, 117, 244 Weber, Albrecht, 14–15, 54 Wheeler, 18 Wilkins, Charles, 3, 236 Wilson, H.H., 236
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