The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece [Reprint 2021 ed.] 9783112415863, 9783112415856

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THE BALKAN EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES AND ITS IMPACT UPON GREECE

PUBLICATIONS SCIENCES

CENTRE

DU

SOCIALES

PUBLICATIONS SCIENCES

OF

DE

D'ATHÈNES

THE

CENTER

SOCIAL

ATHENS

I

Publié avec la collaboration de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études — Sorbonne, VIe Section, Sciences Économiques et Sociales.

P A R I S

MOUTON & CO MCMLXII

THE

HAGUE

DIMITRI PENTZOPOULOS

THE BALKAN EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES AND ITS IMPACT UPON GREECE

P A R I S

MOUTON & CO MCMLXII

THE H A G U E

© 1962, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris.

To my sister

TERESA a permanent source of moral encouragement a stimulating example of willful perseverance an inspiring challenge of intellectual competition in gratitude and love

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PART

I

GREECE RECEIVES THE REFUGEES CHAPTER I . — T H E O R I G I N S O F T H E G R E E K PROBLEM

REFUGEE

Greece and the Policy of the "Megali Idea". Hellenism in Turkey. Greece and the First World War. Greek Aspirations and the Treaty of Sèvres. The Restoration of King Constantine. Greece's Anatolian Venture. The Asia Minor Disaster CHAPTER I I . — T H E L A U S A N N E C O N F E R E N C E AND T H E E X C H A N G E OF POPULATIONS CONVENTIONS Introductory Summary. The Young Turks and the Christian Minorities. The 1913 and 1914 Agreements. Turkish and Greek Motivations. The Greek-Bulgarian Exchange of Populations. The 1923 Convention : Origins. The 1923 Convention : Discussions at Lausanne. Analysis of the Convention. Appraisal of the Convention CHAPTER I I I . — T H E S E T T L E M E N T O F

SECTION

REFUGEES

I. — The International Aspect

The Refugees and Private Relief. The Refugee Question before the League. Creation of the Refugee Settlement Commission. Organization of the Commission. The 1924 Refugee Loan. The 1927 Stabilization Loan

THE BALKAN

IO

CHAPTER

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

IV. — T H E S E T T L E M E N T OF R E F U G E E S

SECTION

II.

— The Internal Aspect

The Commission and the Refugee Problem. Number and Origin of Refugees. Composition and Nature of Refugees. Land for the Settlement and Cadastral Survey. The Agricultural Settlement. The Urban Settlement. Dissolution of the Commission. The Ankara Convention of 1930

PART

95

II

THE REFUGEES ACCEPT GREECE CHAPTER

I. — T H E ETHNOLOGICAL IMPACT

National Homogeneity. The Consolidation of Hellenism. Linguistic Homogeneity. The Hellenization of Macedonia and Thrace. The Exchange of Populations and the Territorial Integrity of Greece CHAPTER

II. — T H E ECONOMIC IMPACT

Introductory Remarks. State Expenditures for the Refugees. General Observations on the Economic Role of the Refugees. The Agrarian Reform and the Cultivation of Land. Agricultural Production. The Industrial and Commercial Effects CHAPTER

143

III. — T H E POLITICAL IMPACT

Party Politics in Greece. The Political Alignment of the Refugees. The "Execution of the Six" and the Proclamation of the Republic. The Refugees in Politics. The Rise of Communism and the Refugee Settlements CHAPTER

125

171

IV. — T H E SOCIAL A N D C U L T U R A L IMPACT

The Problem of Symbiosis. Factors hindering the Symbiosis : the Refugee Consciousness. Factors hindering the Symbiosis : The Desire to Return and the Idiosyncracy of the Refugees. Relations between the Natives and the Newcomers. The Effect of the Exchange upon the Greek Language. The Aeolian School in Greek Literature

199

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

n

ANNEX

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM TODAY The Housing of the Urban Refugees, 1945-1959. The Question of the Exchangeable Property. Present Refugee Demands

225

CONCLUSIONS

239

APPENDICES

257

BIBLIOGRAPHY

277

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

I. — Distribution of Irredentist Greeks

27

II. — Distribution of Foreign Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire — Asia (Turkish Official Statistics, 1910)....

29

III. — Distribution of Foreign Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire — Asia (Greek Patriarchate Statistics, 1912).

30

TABLE IV. — Distribution of Foreign Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire — Europe (Turkish Official Statistics, 1910)

31

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE V. — Distribution of Foreign Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire — Europe (Greek Patriarchate Statistics,

1912)

32

TABLE VI. — Refugees by Departments and General Directorates — April 1923

97

TABLE VII. —Number of Refugees by Place of Origin — 1928.

99

VIII. — Lands Assigned to the Refugee Settlement Commission — 1927

104

TABLE

TABLE IX. — Agricultural Settlement of Refugees TABLE X. — Balance zation

Sheet

of

the

107

Agricultural

Coloni110

TABLE XI. — Ethnological Composition of the Population of Greece (1913-1920-1928) TABLE XII. — Distribution of the Population by Languages

(1928)

TABLE XIII. — Ethnological

(1912, 1926)

Table

of

Greek

Macedonia

128 131 134

TABLE XIV. — Distribution of the Refugees above the Age of 10 by Occupation

151

(1Q22, 1928) Tobacco (1922-1929)

TABLE

XV. — Production of Cereals

TABLE

XVI. — Production of

154 156

LIST OF TABLES TABLE TABLE TABLE

13

XVII. — Exports and Value of Tobacco

156

XVIII. — Value of Agricultural Production

158

X I X . — Agricultural Cooperative Societies (Macedonia

1925)

160

TABLE

XX.

—Expansion of the Textile Industry, 1923-1930.

163

TABLE

XXI.

— Value of industrial production, 1921-1931.

165

TABLE

XXII. — Refugee Deputies in Greek Parliaments (1923-

1933)

186 — Distribution of Refugees by Provinces (1928)

188

XXIV. — Refugee Settlement Program, 1945-1957 .. .

227

X X V . — Allocation of Credits, 1945-1957 T A B L E X X V I . — Nature and Value of the Exchangeable Property (December 31, 1955) T A B L E X X V I I . — Administration of the Exchangeable Property (1946-1956)

228

TABLE X X I I I . TABLE TABLE

231 232

LIST OF APPENDICES — Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923

257

I I . — Protocol Relating to the Settlement of Refugees in Greece and the Creation for this Purpose of a Refugees Settlement Commission

264

I I I . — Organic Statutes of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission

268

APPENDIX I .

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Source o f Appendices I, II, and III : L e a g u e o f Nations, Official Journal, 4 th Y e a r , N o . 11 ( N o v e m b e r 1923), A n n e x 565, C. 569 (I). 1923. I. and A n n e x 580, C. 655. 1923. APPENDIX

IV. — Table of Equivalents

Source : Charles B. E d d y , Greece and the Greek ( L o n d o n : G e o r g e A l l e n and U n w i n L t d . , 1931).

273 Refugees,

LIST OF MAPS

MAP

I. — G R E E C E A F T E R W O R L D W A R I. (March 25, 1921 — Centenary of Greek Independence), following40,41 Source : "The Hellenic World From 480 B.C. to 1940 A . D . " Compiled and drawn by John M. Kokkins, assisted by Richard C. Guthridge. New York City, U.S.A. Copyright 1943 by J.M.K. Printed in U.S.A. by Hinkhouse, Inc.

MAP

II. — M A P O F G R E E C E S H O W I N G R E F U G E E S E T TLEMENTS following

106

Source : League of Nations, Greek Refugee Settlement, II. Economic and Financial. 1926. II. 32 (Geneva : 1926). MAP I I I . — E T H N O G R A P H I C A L M A P O F G R E E K M A C E D O N I A , Showing the Proportion of the Different E t h n o graphical Elements in 1912, (before the B a l k a n Wars) and in 1926, (after the Settlement of R e f u g e e s ) . . following 136, 137 Source : League of Nations, Greek Refugee Settlement, II. Economic and Financial, 1926. II. 32. (Geneva : 1926).

INTRODUCTION

With the rapid advent of the concept of the national state during the 19th century and the affirmation of the principle "Jede Nation soil einen Staat bilden : Jeder Staat soil nur eine Nation umfassen" 1 a new and intricate problem appeared in the field of international relations and international law : the question of national minorities. The presence of minorities, of course, is not a recent phenomenon. Scattered social groups, differing among themselves in religion, race or language, have existed for a long time in Europe and played an active part in its historical development. Nevertheless, the political consolidation of the major countries in Central Europe after 1848 and the attempt to establish them on a nationally homogeneous basis created immediately a special position for those human conclaves which did not belong, racially, linguistically or religiously, to the majority group. Minorities, however, are not necessarily a factor of disequilibrium and a source of friction in the orderly functioning of a state. According to the latest statistics 2 , there is practically no political unit which does not contain a minority group. But so long as the state acts in an impartial and tolerant manner towards its component heterogeneous elements and, on the other hand, so long as these different factions do not have antagonistic aspirations, the problem of national minorities does not arise. This distinction necessitates a definition of the term "national minority". There is an almost® unanimous agreement among the scholars who have treated this subject that linguistic and cultural differences alone, although a necessary requisite, do not constitute the determining element of a national minority. All of them emphasize that the main characteristic is a feeling of moral unity, a sentiment 1. "Each nation should; each state form one state should embrace only one nation." Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitalenfrage und die So^ialdemokratiey p. 171. Quoted in I. L . Claude, Jr., National Minorities : An international Problem, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) p. 92. 2. U. N. Organization, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the U. N , Demographic Yearbook, 1956, (8th Ed., New York, 1956) Table 7, pp. 256-266. 3. One of the few exceptions is Janowsky who contents himself with defining a national minority as "a group of persons who differ from the majority in language, religion or culture" only. O. I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities, (New York : The MacMillan Co., 1945) p. 14.

i6

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

of belonging together which is usually described by the vague term "national consciousness". 4 When a minority develops an awareness of its own individuality and wants to assert it either by severing its ties with the majority and forming a separate unit or by joining an already existing neighboring state to which it feels nationally akin, then it becomes a national minority which may create problems of paramount political importance. As the notion of the international community developed and as the different states realized their interdependence and the direct or indirect effect which actions taken b y one of them had on the others, a change of attitude vis-à-vis the minorities occurred. While before it was generally conceded that the problem of national minorities was one which essentially fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned, after the French Revolution and especially after the middle of the last century it acquired gradually an international character. I t must be emphasized, of course, that at that time, the action taken by the states on behalf of the different minorities was not based on altruistic and humanitarian views but was rather dictated by political or commercial interests. The now famous Eastern Question is a perfect example of this point : the safeguard and well-being of the Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula were more than once invoked to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and achieve certain desired goals. This policy, obviously, saved many people from extermination and one would be making a serious mistake indeed if he disregarded this aspect. The point, however, that must be made quite explicit in this connection is the inter-relationship between the concern shown over the welfare of the suppressed minorities and the pursuance of expedient political aims—a relationship that has a direct bearing upon the genesis of the question treated in this book. It is only with the establishment of the League of Nations and the growing significance attached to the concept of international morality that a serious attempt was made to divest the question of national minorities from its power politics overtones and place it on general humanitarian principles. Aware of the dangers that could be created by the existence of national minorities and often influenced by the concept of national homogeneity, the international community tried to solve or render less acute the problem by adopting several methods. 5 B y interna4. See, e.g. C. A . Macartney, National States and National Minorities, (London : Oxford University Press, 1934) p. 16, J. Fouques Duparc, La Protection des Minorités de Race, de Langue et de Religion, (Paris : Librairie Dalloz, 1922) p. 26, P. de Azcarate y Florez, League of Nations and National Minorities, translated f r o m the Spanish by E . E . Brooke (Washington : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945) p. 4. 5. For a lengthier discussion of the policies that were followed see infra, Conclusions, p. 239.

INTRODUCTION

17

tionally guaranteeing minority rights and by accepting the existence of certain unalienable human rights, it attempted to ensure the application of some basic principles of freedom and justice of a nature to satisfy the minorities. Furthermore, by making the welfare of minority groups an international concern and by establishing the administrative channels through which complaints could be expressed and undesirable conditions alleviated, it removed the treatment of minorities from the exclusive jurisdiction of the states and minimized the possibilities of internal explosions with worldwide implications. Finally, it made an effort to solve the problem radically through frontier revisions and transfers of populations. To be precise, this method of physical elimination of national minorities can hardly be called a "solution". To quote Claude who correctly perceived the antinomic nature of this policy, this is a way "not of solving the minority problem, but of eradicating [it] by the alteration of the ethnographic conditions that give rise to it". 6 Once the method is applied and successfully concluded, there is no problem any more, for the minorities have disappeared. However, regardless of whether this method constitutes a solution or not in the exact sense of the word, the fact remains that it was applied several times during this century and most notably in the case of Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria. The Balkan peninsula, due to its geographic position between Europe and Asia and as a result of its historical evolution, was populated at the end of the last century by an array of heterogeneous ethnic groups. The reasons are quite evident: each clash that occurred between opposing civilizations, hellenistic and roman or byzantine and islamic; each battle that followed the pre-medieval invasions from the North ; each upheaval that accompanied the religious and spiritual collisions between paganism and Christianity, Orthodoxy and Mohammedanism, left its imprint on the demographic composition of the area. The desire of each group to achieve independence from the crumbling Ottoman Empire and to replace it, if possible, in the domination of the other races, as well as the antagonistic policies of the Great Powers over the Eastern Mediterranean region created "that shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests... that is veiled under the easy name of the Eastern Question".7 The last local major war in a long series of revolts and armed clashes that took place in the Balkans and the Near East was the Greek Asia Minor campaign against Turkey in 1920-1922. The debacle of the 6. Claude, Op. Cit., p. 91. 7. John Morley, as quoted by J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, A Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th Ed., (Oxford : At the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 1. 2

i8

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

Greek army and its withdrawal from Ionia was followed by a mass exodus of the Greek population from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. Refugees, destitute and morally broken, flooded Greece in an attempt to save their lives. In 1923, the decision of the Lausanne Conference to arrange for an exchange of the remaining minorities between Greece and Turkey, together with the 1919 Neuilly Convention between Greece and Bulgaria for a reciprocal emigration of their respective national minorities, further swelled the number of the uprooted Greeks. B y the end of 1923, Greece was faced with an influx of about a million and a half refugees representing one fourth of its total population. It was the first time in history that the transfer of large ethnic groups was tried as a means to separate nationally intermingled people, and the experiment drew a great deal of attention. But although the administrative machinery provided for this exchange and the immediate results were closely analyzed, no attempt has been made to appraise the long-run effects of it upon the countries involved. The general purpose of this book is to examine and evaluate the impact that the transferred people had upon the political, economic and social life of Greece. This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part, "Greece receives the refugees", provides the historical background of the problem and the manner in which it was solved. After examining briefly Greek irredentism at the beginning of this century, the thesis will outline the main political events that led to the creation of the refugee question. The Lausanne Conference, having a direct bearing on the topic under consideration, and the attitudes and motivations of the participating nations will be extensively studied and appraised. This will be followed by an analysis of the Conventions for the exchange of populations and an exposition of the institutional framework established to implement the agreements. The final chapters of the first section will deal with the settlement of the uprooted persons in Greece, the role of the League of Nations in the application of the settlement program and the contributions of the various states and of the Greek Government in the reestablishment of the refugees. Part II, "The Refugees accept Greece", will concentrate on the long-run effects of the exchange upon the Greek state. This evaluation will cover the topic of ethnology and national composition; the influence of the transferred populations in the agricultural, industrial and financial fields; the way they affected the political kaleidoscope of the country and the evolution of the internal political history after the First World War ; finally, their impact upon the social structure of Greece as well as upon her culture. The second part will conclude with a brief exposition of the contemporary phase of the

INTRODUCTION

19

refugee question and of the problems that still remain to be solved, almost forty years after the Asia Minor disaster. This dissertation, however, although limited in scope to the implications of the exchange of populations with respect to one country, has a broader aim. National minorities still exist and refugees still plague the world and stigmatize the Twentieth Century civilization. Moreover, their repercussions and the danger they present acquire ominous dimensions in the context of the present day "cold war". In the light of the Greek-Turkish experiment, can this method •—the exchange of minorities— be used to minimize some of the perils and, if so, what are the necessary prerequisites for its successful application? In the conclusions, an attempt will be made to give an answer to this fundamental question in the field of irredentism and international relations. The author, although too young to have witnessed the Asia Minor disaster and its immediate effects, has a personal experience during the course of its subsequent development. Having lived the greater part of his life in Athens, close to a refugee settlement, he has associated with these people and has had frequent opportunities to observe their problems and their aspirations. At the same time, being a native Greek, he is familiar with the reaction that this mass movement has created in Greece and the feelings it aroused among the old inhabitants of the country. This double standpoint permits him to express certain opinions, especially with regard to the social conditions of the refugees, which thus far have received little attention. The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor John B. Whitton under whose direction this project was carried out and whose critical and perspicacious suggestions have proved of immense value ; to Professor Gardner Patterson for having read the manuscript and recommended many useful alterations; to Mr. A. A. Pallis, member of the Refugee Settlement Commission, and to Mr. Constantine Yavasoglou, Senator and Under-Secretary of Social Welfare, for the interviews they gave to the author's sister and their comments on various points concerning the exchange of populations ; to Professor V. Moskovis for supplying the writer with data on the influence of the refugee influx upon the Greek language. The author is deeply grateful to Mr. Alcibiades Provatas, Director of the library of Parliament, to Mr. Evangelos Fotiades, Director of the National Library, to Mr. Constantine Themelis, high Parliament official and Miss E. Demetrakopoulou of the Gennadeios Library, for putting at Miss Pentzopoulou's disposal many helpful bibliographical sources which she transmitted to the writer; to Mr. Phaedon Morfis of the Foreign Press Division of the Ministry to the Prime

20

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

Minister and to the Statistical Service of the Ministry of Social Welfare for supplying a great number of statistical tables and official publications. Thanks are also due to Miss Marie-Hermine de Magnin for her assistance and encouragement in the writing of this book; to Mrs. George V. Cresson, for having pptiently and arduously typed this manuscript ; finally, to Princeton University for granting the author a Charlotte Elizabeth Procter Fellowship which enabled him to come to the United States and write this dissertation, and to the Princeton Firestone library and its staff for providing a great part of the source material and assisting in various ways.

PART I

GREECE RECEIVES THE REFUGEES

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK REFUGEE PROBLEM

T h e story carries us back to classic times. It is true Greek tragedy, with Chance as the ever-ready hand-maid of Fate... The interplay between the Greek love of party politics and the influence exercised over them by Venizelos constitute the action of the piece. T h e scene and the lighting are the Great War; and the theme, " H o w Greece gained the Empire of her dreams in spite of herself, and threw it away when she awoke." Winston

S.

CHURCHILL,

The

Aftermath

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK REFUGEE PROBLEM 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

— — — — — — —

Greece and the Policy of the "Megali Idea." Hellenism in Turkey. Greece and the First World War. Greek Aspirations and the Treaty of Sèvres. The Restoration of King Constantine. Greece's Anatolian Venture. The Asia Minor Disaster.

1. — Greece and the Policy of the "Megali Idea." The territorial formation of modern Greece was slow and toilsome. In contrast to the development of Italy which was able to unite under one central authority most of its nationals within the span of a few years, the making of present-day Greece took more than a century and was achieved at the cost of great sacrifices, violent convulsions and enormous human suffering. Moreover, it was realized in a manner quite unforeseen and quite contrary to all hopes and expectations. When Greece won her independence in 1830 after a nine-year old revolution that crippled the foundations of the Metternichian system and heralded the eventual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, she encompassed within the fixed boundaries only a small percentage of the Greeks living around the Aegean Sea. For the next decades down to the Asia Minor disaster, the fervent desire of the newlyborn kingdom was the liberation of the "unredeemed" Hellenes and its territorial expansion over all the regions that were inhabited by them. This aggrandizement-oriented policy was bound to involve Greece in a series of conflicts, some of which she provoked herself. 1 So long 1. Argyropoulo, P. A., "Facteurs de la Politique étrangère en Grèce", Société d'Étude* Internationales, 1959), p. 31.

BnHitin 1912-1953, (Athens,

THE BALKAN

26

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

as she claimed provinces of an essentially Greek character, such as Thessaly and the Aegean Islands including Crete, the chief opponent was Turkey. Later on, as her aspirations covered areas of inextricably interspersed populations in Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, she ran at cross-purposes with the other Balkan states. A t the final stage, having emerged as a power to be reckoned with in the Near East, she found herself at odds with other European nations, namely Italy and France. 2 To understand this nationalist behavior one must always bear in mind that the Greek feels emotionally much closer to Byzantium than to ancient Athens. The classical world is admired, venerated and studied — b u t it is dead. The Byzantine Empire, on the other hand, is very much alive in the heart of every Greek and has conditioned all his reactions since 1453. The Turkish occupation was always considered temporary and from the first years of childhood every boy and girl was taught that eventually all the Greeks will be united again and form one nation with its capital in Constantinople, or, as the Greeks usually say, with its capital in "Polis". For there are many "cities" in the world, Andrianoupolis, Philippoupolis and Alexandroupolis, but there is only one "Polis", and this is "Constantinoupolis". And even today, when one says that he is leaving for the "city", or that his father was born in the "city", or that a great fire destroyed many shops in the "city", everyone understands that he is referring to Istanbul. 3 Therefore, "not to the Parthenon at Athens, but to the Santa Sofia at Constantinople, did [the Greek's] mingled emotions of religion and political greatness yearn with a burning zeal". 4 And this zealous desire of incorporating all the irredentist Hellenes in one Greek nation, having been transubstantiated into the policy of the "Megali Idea", provided both the lodestar and the dynamic force of Greek domestic and foreign modus operandi and found its best and most skillful exponent in the person of Eleftherios Venizelos. When Venizelos came to Athens from Crete in 1910, 5 the population of Greece was barely 2,631,952 6 people. Out of the estimated 2. For a short history of contemporary Greece, see John Mavrogordato, Modem Green 1800-1931, (London : MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1931), Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece 1821-1940 (London : Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1941) and W . Miller, A History of the Greek People (1821-1921), ( N e w Y o r k : E. P. Dutton and Co., 1922). 3. Many people in Greece, and especially the refugees, maintain that the T u r k , by renaming Constantinople, affirmed more forcefully than ever the Greek character of the city; for the word "Istanbul" is nothing else but the corrupted way in w h i c h its Moslem inhabitants pronounced the Greek words "eisten-poli" (to the city) when they wanted to go to Constantinople. 4. Henry Morgenthau, I was sent to Athens, (Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1929) p. 11. 5. For a background of Venizelos' life and his role in the national affairs of Greece up to 1920 see Herbert A . Gibbons, Venizelos (Boston and N e w Y o r k : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920) and S. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos (London : Constable and Co. Ltd., 1921). 6. 1907 census.

THE

ORIGINS

OF

THE

GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

27

7,000,000 Greeks who lived around the shores of the Aegean and the Black Sea7, the people of the Greek State represented only 37% of the total figure. Venizelos, imbued by the feelings of an unredeemed Hellene (in 1910 Crete was still under the nominal sovereignty of Turkey) and symbolizing the fervent nationalism of the country, embarked upon the realization of his program. There was, however, one main obstacle that had to be overcome, namely, the intermingled nature of the populations that inhabited the areas covered by Greece, an obstacle that was even more formidable due to the peculiar character of Greek demography. Being a seafaring nation, the Greeks have always concentrated on sailing, sea-transportation or business. The unredeemed Greeks could be found along the coasts as far as Russia or in the urban centers where they formed the commercial, banking or small merchant class. On the other hand, agriculture, especially in the middle of the Balkan peninsula, was left to the Turks or to other non-Greek races which had become the backbone of rural life. As a writer expressed it, Greek civilisation was spread round the rim of the Aegean, living on land, because man must so live, but living round, over, and from the sea. It extended even further: along the Pontic shore of Anatolia, up to the Eastern coast of the Black Sea, in the Crimea. It was nowhere found far inland.8

The Balkan wars (1912-1913) revealed the enormity of this obstacle. While the first one was fought between the Balkan states on the one hand and Turkey on the other, the second one witnessed a split in the allied coalition, Serbia and Greece clashing with Bulgaria over the division of Macedonia. And although Greece was victorious in both wars and almost doubled its territory and population9, she became 7. They were roughly distributed as follows : TABLE

Macedonia Epirus Thrace Constantinople Crete Aegean Islands Cyprus Anatolia

I

65 0,000 306,000 421,000 300,000 308,000 469,000 235,000 1,684,000

A . A . Pallis, "Les effets de la Guerre sur la population de la Grèce" in A . Andreades, Les Effets Economiques et Sociaux de la Guerre en Grèce, (Publications de la Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale» Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1928), p. 147. 8. C. A . Macartney,. Refugees, the Work of ike League (London : League of Nations Union, 1931 ?), p. 74. See also Sir E . Pears, Turkey and its people (London : Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1911), p. 104. 9. According to the 1913 census taken in the New Provinces, Greece's population increased by 2,103,038 people, bringing the total population to 4,734,990. Andreades, Op. cit., p. 134. Moreover, 58,583 square kilometers were added to the previously held territory of 63,211 square kilometers for a total of 121,794 (figures computed from a statistical table of the Genike Statistike Hyperesia tes Hellados, Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados (General Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical Annual of Greece) Vol. I, 1930, p. 2. (Hereafter referred to as Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930).

28

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

much less homogeneous. According to the 1913 census, Greek Macedonia contained 528,000 Greeks as against 104,000 Bulgarians, 465,000 Moslems and 98,000 Jews, the Greeks forming only about 44,x % of the total population 10. The heterogeneous elements of the population, however, instead of being considered an obstacle to the realization of the Megali Idea, actually fortified it and gave it a new nuance. In the words of A. Pallis, [After Hellenic

1 9 1 3 ] the national Greece

many foreign naturally

elements element

official

ideal is not anymore

the establishment would

their particular

the Hellenic guage-the

but

language

coexist

national

and [using]

[the creation

of a large Hellenic with

consciousness as their

of the state.

the

Hellenic under

connecting

of] a

state

in

one,

purely which keeping

the sovereignty

link

the Greek

of lan-

11

It was towards this goal that the Greek foreign policy and the domestic programs were directed. The beginning of 1914 found the country in the process of consolidating its position in the Balkans and reorganizing its political and social structure. Having expanded as far North as the ethnological composition could justify it, Greece wholeheartedly concentrated on the development of her institutions and her economic resources, placing the liberation of the unredeemed Greeks in the background. This policy was actually dictated by the circumstances : Cyprus and the Dodecanese Islands were in the hands of England and Italy, two great powers who had repeatedly emphasized the Greek character of their possessions and their willingness to cede them to Greece sometime in the future. Northern Epirus 12 was under an " autonomous government " which safeguarded the interests of the Christian population of Southern Albania. There were many Greeks in Bulgaria, especially along the coast of Western Thrace 13, but a great majority of them had been forced to emigrate and, as that country was still bitter over its recent defeat and had already adopted a revisionist 10. A . A . Pallis, "Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the years 1912-1924", The Geographical Journal (Vol. L X V I , N o 4, Oct., 1925), p. 330. 11. A . A . Pallis, The Exchange of Populations from a legal and Historical Viewpoint and its Significance for the International Position of Greece, Speech delivered at the Panteios School of Political Sciences, April 20, 1933 (Athens : 1933), p. 18. In 1913 the minorities in Greece amounted to 644,000 persons, forming 13 % of the total population. Loc. Cit. 12. "Northern Epirus" is the southern part of Albania, comprising roughly the present-day prefectures of Koritza (Korce) and Argyrokastro (Gjirokaster). By the December 17, 1913 Protocol o f Florence the Commission in charge with the demarcation of the boundaries of the newly proclaimed state, decided in favor of incorporating the area in Albania. The Christian Greeks revolted and formed a provisional and autonomous government. For a discussion of this problem up to 1923, see E . P. Stickney, Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International A f f a i r s 1912-1923 (Stanford University Press : 1926). A map o f Northern Epirus is shown on page 82. 13. According to the official Turkish census o f 1902, there were 87,000 Greeks, forming 36.7 % of the total population. See A . A . Pallis' articlc in the Geographical Journal, October, 1925, p. 326.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK REFUGEE

PROBLEM

29

attitude with regard to the treaty of Bucarest (1913), Greece was anxious to preserve the status quo. The only large Greek settlements outside the country were in Turkey but their strength, their geographic position and their distribution made it quite evident that their incorporation into Greece could not be achieved without provoking a major international upheaval. Moreover, this question affected so many important neuralgic spots —such as the Dardanelles, the future of Constantinople and the control of Asia Minor— that the interests of most European Powers were directly involved and no bilateral Greco-Turkish agreement could have any binding force or any hope of permanence if it were not internationally approved. Future events bore out this contention irrefutably. 2. — Hellenism in Turkey. N o accurate statistics exist with regard to the expansion of Hellenism in Turkey but the numbers available are certainly impressive, the estimates varying between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 persons for Anatolia- and between 650,000 and 730,000 for Eastern Thrace and Constantinople. A s these people played an important part in the subsequent history of the Near East, being finally completely exterminated or uprooted after the First World War, they should be the object of a more analytical examination. A comparison of the official Turkish statistics of 1910 with those of the Greek Patriarchate (1912) provides a good starting point. Although the other nationalities are not of immediate interest to this dissertation, they have been included to show that the two tables do not differ very much. TABLB II 14

Distribution of Foreign Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire —

Asia

(Turkish Official Statistics, 1910). PROVINCES

TURKS

Constantinople (Asiatic shore) . . Ism id A id in (Smyrna) Brussa • Konia • Angora Trebizond Sivas Castamouni Adana Bigha (Dardanelles) .

TOTALS

135,681 184,960

GREEKS

70,906

ARMENIANS

JEWS

5,120 2,180 24,361 2,788 720 901

OTHERS

16,812

TOTAL

258,984 318,074 1,702,911 1,717,762

274,53° 85,320 54,280

3°,465 5o,935 17,247 87,932 9,426 101,388

933,572 1,086,420 212,454 136,000

35i,io4 98,270 18,160 88,010 29,000

45,094 165,741 3,061 81,250 2,000

3,300

98

488,954 170,398

8,192,589

1,777.146

594,539

39,370

219,451

10,823,095

974,225 1,346,387 i,i43,335 991,666 1,047,889

78,564 629,002

—

1,435 58,076 6,125 15,356 12,329 -

— —

1,983

—

107,240

1,254,157 1,160,564 1,444,087 1,197,583 1,109,621

14. Table II is taken from Polybius, Greece before the Conference (London : Methuen and Co. Ltd., 191 ?) p. 44. The total population of the provinces, except the province of Constantinople (Asiatic shore) can also be found in the Almanach de Gotha, 1914 (Vol. 151), p. 1187.

THE BALKAN

3°

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

T A B L E III i j (Greek Patriarchate Statistics, 1912). PROVINCES

Constantinople (Asiatic shore) . . Ismid Aidin (Smyrna) Brussa • Konia . Angora Trebizond Sivas Castamouni Adana Bigha (Dardanelles) TOTALS

.

TURKS

GREEKS

124,281 116,949 940,843

74,457

35.36O

73.134

48,635

622,810 278,421 87,021

16,419 89,966

45,873

98,798

I,I92.749

988,723 668,400 957,866 839.514 938,435

ARMENIANS

9.729

353.533

50,624

99.376

170.635

24,919

3.205 83,000

142,000 138,902

90,208 32,830

7,048,662

1,782,582

JEWS

5.965 2,500 21,781 2,854 605 478

OTHERS I8,497

1,115 57.676

TOTAL

258,560 242,333 1.659,529

—

—

I.570.124 1,101,549 822,298 1,362,023

—

—

1.109,525

6,134 15.471 8,749

2,336

3.340

2,087 108,292 81

608,707

37.523

218,102

— —

968,646 423,500 9,695,506

177.489

Both tables are substantially in agreement on the figures of minorities in Asiatic Turkey. The Greek Patriarchate census estimates that there are about 5,000 more Greeks, 2,000 more Jews and 14,000 more Armenians than the Turkish statistics indicate. A great discrepancy, however, occurs in the total of the Turkish population, a difference of over 1,000,000. Polybius claims that in the 1 9 1 0 census the number of Turks was vastly exaggerated "for the purpose of assigning to them a larger proportion of seats in the Ottoman Parliament". 1 6 Regardless of the validity of this point, the fact remains that the Turkish government estimated that the Greek population of Anatolia exceeded 1,700,000 people. Impartial observers also agree that this figure was quite accurate. Macartney places the number of Greeks in Ionia in 1 9 1 4 close to 2,000,000, 17 Puaux gives 1,715,000, 1 8 Sir Edwin Pears, even before the publication of the results of the 1910 and 1 9 1 2 censuses, holds that the Greek element was about 1,600,000 19 strong and this calculation is accepted as official by L,ord Curzon at the Lausanne Conference.20 Some writers argue that the figure may even be higher 21 while the 15. Polybius, Loc. Cit. 16. Ibid., p. 45. 17. Macartney, Refugees, p. 81. 18. R . Puaux and P. L . Alaux, Le Dlclin deI'Hellinisme (Paris : 1916), p. 24. Counting 350,000 persons in Eastern Thrace and 450,000 in Constantinople, he arrives at the figure of 2,515,000 irredentist Greeks in Turkey. 19. Sir E . Pears, Turkey and its People (2nd Ed., London : Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1 9 1 1 ) , p. 94. 20. The International Interpreter (Vol. I, No. 36) Dec. 9, 1922, p. 1 1 2 3 . 2 1 . Raoul Blanchard, for example, writes " [ T h e Greeks were] distributed chiefly along the coasts : a contingent of 150,000 to 200,000 in the region of Trebizond, smaller bodies on the southern coasts, and then, a group of the first order on the western shores and plains — perhaps a million and a half from Brussa to the neighborhood of Rhodes. Add to these the interior centers — Greek and Armenian villages of Cappadocia and groups of Christians in each town..." The Geographical Review, (Vol. X V , No. 3) July, 1925, p. 450. Moreover, in a Memorandum, dated April 30, 1919, and submitted to the Governments of the Entente

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK REFUGEE

PROBLEM

most conservative estimates accept that at the beginning of this century the Greek population of Anatolia was reckoned at 1,300,000 and was increasing rapidly. 22 In view of the lack of reliable data, it is difficult to ascertain the exact expansion of Hellenism in the Asiatic part of the Ottoman Empire, but for the purpose of this work suffice it to say that the following three statements are undoubtedly correct: (1) that there was a large Greek minority in Ionia, often quite compact, 23 which felt akin to the Greek state; (2) that Greece shared the feelings of the unredeemed Hellenes and fervently desired their union with the country; and finally, (3) that the Great Powers were well aware of this situation and of its serious repercussions upon the future of the Near East. Turning now to the ethnological composition of European Turkey before the Balkan wars, and more specifically to the ethnological composition of Thrace, 24 one is struck by the even greater racial amalgamation than that of Western Anatolia. As a basis one may take the same population censuses of 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 1 2 . TABLE

I V "

Distribution of Foreign Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire — Europe. (Turkish Official Statistics, 1910). SANDJAK OP

Adrianople Kirk-Kilisse Rodosto Gallipoli Dedeagatch Gumuldjina Chataldja Constantinople TOTALS

TURKS

31,500

GREEKS

BULGARIANS

OTHERS

TOTAL

113,500

31,500

14,700

77,000

28,500

1,150

159,650

56,000

3,000

21,800

144,300

287,700

70,500

2,000

3,200

29,000

17,000

650

107,200 91,650

22,000

25,500

2,200

234,700

48,500

—

2,340

68,840

260,000

6,000

130,000

846,000

676,500

113,500

176,040

1,940,040

Powers on behalf of the Greek Deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, it is claimed that the Greek population in European Turkey amounts to 1,810,000 (in 1918), a figure evidently exaggerated in view of the persecutions and massacres which occurred in the Ottoman Empire during the war years and which reduced the number of Greek minority considerably. The Memorandum can be found in E. Emmanouilides Ta Teleftaia Ete tes Othomanikes Aftokratorias (The Last Years of the Ottoman Empire) (Athens : 1924). The figures are quoted in A. I. Aegides, E Hellas Horis tous Prosfygas (Greece Without the Refugees) (Athens : 1934), p. 19. 22. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Anatolia. Handbook prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section, No. 59, (London : H. M. Stationary Office, 1920), p. 35. 23. J. Ancel comments that "in a periphery of 105 kilometers [around Smyrna, there were] more than 600,000 Hellenes", (translated from French by the author). Peuples et Nations des Balkans, (Paris : Librairie Armand Colin, 1926), p. 185. See also Polybius, Op. Cit., pp. 45-47. 24. As Macedonia was conquered by the Balkan allies a year later, no question of Greek irredentism arose. 25. Tables IV and V are taken from Polybius, Op. Cit., p. 41.

THE BALKAN

32

TABLE

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

V

(Greek Patriarchate Statistics 1912). SANDJAK OF

Adrianople Kirk-Kilisse Rodosto Gailipoli Dedeagatch Gumuldjina Chataldja Constantinople TOTALS

TURKS

GREEKS

BULGARIANS

OTHERS

TOTAL

123,300

32,800

15,000

298,500

86,500

28,700

1,200

171,400

65,500

3,400

22,000

155,600

90,400

2,600

3,400

129,000

38,800

16,700

800

103,700

31,700

25,600

2,300

244,600

3,200

74,000

235,200

4,300

292,800

841,000

726,100

114,100

340,700

2,017,800

54>7°°

—

In this case, however, with the exception of the estimate of the Bulgarian minority on which the tables are in full agreement, the two statistics differ considerably in many figures, especially in that of the population of Constantinople, where one depicts 450,000 Turks and 260,000 Greeks, while the other shows a reduction in both figures bringing them to 308,700 and 235,200 respectively. Moreover, the demographic conditions changed extensively immediately after the Balkan wars and the outbreak of the world crisis, Eastern Thrace and Constantinople witnessing mass migrations and population movements. H. Morgenthau, who was the U. S. Ambassador to the Sublime Porte during this period, claims that "in Constantinople alone there were between 300,000 and 400,000 permanent Greek residents, [forming] one of the strongest elements of the population". 26 In the 1919 Memorandum to which reference has been made above, 27 the Greek minority of Eastern Thrace and Constantinople is estimated at 690,000 while Venizelos claimed at the Paris Peace Conference that they were 731,000,28 a figure closer to the Greek Patriarchate census of 1912. To almost exactly the same figure arrives Professor Soteriades, on the basis of some Turkish statistics of 1912.29 What is important, however, and should be indicated here, is that according to both Tables IV and V, the Turks were predominant in the Sandjak of Gumuldjina (present-day Komotini, in Western Thrace) while the Greeks formed an overwhelming majority in Eastern Thrace, especially around the shores of the Dardanelles and on the Black Sea coast, even on the basis of the official Turkish statistics. It was not only, however, the numerical strength of Hellenism in the Ottoman Empire that created a problem of international dimensions 26. Henry Morgenthau, Op. Citp. 12. See also Blanchard, Op. Cip. 450. 27. See footnote 20. 28. Gibbons, Op. Cit., p. 337. 29. G. Soteriades, An Ethnological Map illustrating Hillenism in tbt Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor (London : E. Stanford, Ltd., 1918), pp. 5-6.

THE

ORIGINS

OF THE

GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

33

to the Sultan and presented a serious challenge t o the realization of the Y o u n g T u r k program which was being formulated about t h a t time. 30

Of equal importance was the w a y the Greek minority lived,

behaved and felt.

T h e unredeemed Hellenes were organized in sepa-

rate legal communities of an autonomous nature, discharged all their communal functions themselves, worshipped freely and

supported

their churches and schools which had kept alive through centuries the national sentiment.

This state of affairs was actually a direct

consequence of the rather liberal policy pursued b y the Empire after 1453.

Ottoman

T h e conquerors did not seek to convert

subjugated peoples to Islam.

the

T h e y enjoyed a certain degree of free-

dom of movement which permitted them to preserve their customs, their religious and educational institutions and even their basic civil structure.

I n this w a y , the Christian population did not assimilate

w i t h the Moslem society and, more important,

kept its national

consciousness. 31 T h e life and sentiments of the minorities in T u r k e y are very well described in a passage b y Mr. Tsolainos, himself a Greek irredentist who went to the United States after 1922, and who writes : That country r Asia Minor and particularly Ionia] was the cradle of Greek civilisation, namely of our Western civilisation. Ages, hundreds of years before civilisation reached its apogee in Athens, it had flourished in Asia Minor. There, in that country, the Greeks lived happily and progressed. It was their own home. Then the Turks came and subjugated us. We lost our churches, our schools, our homes and lived as slaves. But we never lost our national consciousness, our religion and the desire to liberate ourselves was supreme in our hearts. We would not have been worthy of our ancestors were we willing to accept that condition of affairs and become Turks. We worshipped in underground cellars. Quietly, secretly, we preserved our customs and our language through our religion... In spite, then, of Turkish misgovernment, we went on, we worked and we progressed. We had 22 archbishops in Asia Minor, 180,000 Greek boys and girls in Greek schools and nearly 4,000 Greek schools and colleges?* $0. The Y o u n g Turks' movement developed at the beginning of this century. Led by intelligent and progressive officers and public servants, it aimed at the destruction of Abdul Hamid's absolutism and the restoration of the Constitution. In 1908 its leaders formed in Salonica the Secret Society of Union and Progress and a few months later they forced the Sultan to restore the constitutional regime. One of the most influential members of the Society was Mustafa Kemal, the founder of Modern Turkey. See also, infra, p. 53. 31. "Although the Ottoman State was essentially theocratic in theory and structure... the Turk was one of the least intolerant of rulers. He was also one of the most indolent. So long as his material necessities were supplied by his subjects, the precise methods of local government and administration were matters of indifference to him... Hence that considerable measure of local autonomy... which largely contributed, when the time came, to the resuscitation of national self-consciousness among the conquered peoples." Marriot, Op. Cit., p. 77. See also N. Iorga, Histoire des Etats Balkaniques jusqu'à 1924 (Paris : Librairie Universitaire, J. Gamber, 192;) Chapitre 11,"Les Chrétiens d'Orient sous la Domination Turque," pp. 23-34. Charles B. Eddy, Greece and the Greek Refugees (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), pp. 17-29. 32. Kyriakos P. Tsolainos, "Greek Irredentism", The Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science, (Vol. CVIII, July, 1923), pp. 160-161.

3

34

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

The same picture emerges from other writings. Mr. Sakkas, a Greek from Tripolis, near Trebizond, who came to Athens as a refugee after the Asia Minor debacle, claimed that "all alone, in their villages, the peasants could have, and had indeed, an almost complete and unhampered freedom in their Christian and national life." And he continues, emphasizing that "the Church, the School and Commerce kept ablaze the torch of Greek Civilization and of the Great Idea". 33 3. — Greece and the First World War. The realization of this "Great Idea", shared by both the irredentist and the free Hellenes, became both feasible and expedient in 1914. It was stated earlier that Venizelos was quite cognizant of the fact that his "Megali Hellas", embracing all the Greeks and expanding over all the regions where Hellenism prospered and flourished, could not be achieved without a major international turmoil and without the cooperation of the Great European Powers whose interests had to be compatible with the goals of Greek nationalism and had to be guaranteed. The outbreak of the First World War and its immediate subsequent developments created the necessary prerequisites for the pursuance of the "Megali Idea" policy and its effectuation. If the author had to choose a date to indicate the beginning of the last Near East crisis which found its completion in the Lausanne Conference in 1923, he would select January 24, 1915. 34 On that day, Sir Francis Elliott, the British Ambassador in Athens, visited Venizelos on behalf of the Entente Allies. The imminent collapse of the Serbian army, the alignment of Turkey with the Central Powers, the planning of the Gallipoli expedition and the faltering attitude of the Bulgarian government gave to neutral Greece a special position of paramount strategic and psychological importance. The Allies decided that they had to obtain " a t all costs" 35 the intervention of Greece whose armed forces, b y assisting Serbia and collaborating in Gallipoli, could prove of great military value. England took the initiative and Sir Elliott announced to Venizelos that if the country abandoned its neutrality and associated itself with the Entente Powers, it would receive in exchange Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese except 33. George Sakkas, E Istoria ton i'JIsnon tes Tripoleos tou Pontou (The History o f the Greeks from Tripolis-Pontus) (Nikaia-Athens : N . Apatsidou Press, 1957), pp. 25-26. (Translated from Greek by the author). 34. According to the Gregorian Calendar. A s Greece still used the Julian Calendar (the adjustment was made by decree much later, in 1923) the date in Greek history is January 9, 1915. Throughout this dissertation the author will use the Gregorian Calendar. 35. S. T h . Lascaris, Diplomatike Istoria tes Syncbronou Europe) (Thessaloniki: Society of Macedonian Studies, 1954), p. 27.

Evropes,

( A Diplomatic History of Contemporary

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

35

Rhodes and "a large territorial zone on the western coast of Asia Minor". 36 The succeeding political developments in Greece fall outside the scope of this dissertation. It is common knowledge that while the Greek Prime Minister readily accepted the offer and strongly advocated the Allied cause, King Constantine, upon the advice of his General Staff which feared that the Gallipoli campaign would end in disaster from which Greece would definitely lose, and which considered the retreat of the Serbian army confronted with the superior forces of the Austria-Hungarian Empire as inevitable, decided on the continuation of Greek neutrality. The clash between the Chief of State and his Premier developed into an abysmal schism which literally divided the country into two parts, Venizelos setting up an independent government in Salonica recognized by the Allies and declaring war against the Central Powers, while the rest of Greece, under the King, blockaded and almost occupied by Anglo-French troops, maintained its neutrality! This schizophrenic situation37 ended in June, 1917, with the forced abdication of Constantine and Venizelos' return to Athens to the great satisfaction of the Entente. Meanwhile, far-reaching international developments, directly affecting Greece, had taken place in Europe. The secret treaty of London (April 26, 1915) between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, brought the latter into the war in exchange for many territories, among them Valona (in Albania), the Dodecanese Islands and Adalia with its hinterland in Southern Turkey, should the Ottoman Empire be dismembered. Moreover, two years later, during the Conference of Saint Jean-de-Maurienne (April 19, 1917), Italy's sphere of interest in Asia Minor was extended to include the district of Smyrna, 38 although the agreement never became binding since the events in Russia prevented that country —which was not present at the Conference—• from ratifying it as provided in the text. Finally, the entering of the United States in the war and the proclamation of President Wilson's Fourteen Points added another actor to the international 36. Lascaris, hoc. Cit. See also E. Driault and M. Lheritier, Histoire Diplomatique de !a Grice de 1821 i ms Jours, (Paris : Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), t. V, p. 174. For a short history of the events of this period, see two excellent articles by S. P. Duggan, "Balkan Diplomacy", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. X X X I I , No. 1 (March, 1917) and No. 2 (June, 1917). A detailed account of these years is also given in The Times, History and Encyclopedia of the War, Vol. 13, Part 165, Oct. 16, 1917, "Greece and the War, 1914-1916", pp. 289-324, and Part i66,Oct. 23, 1917 "The Abdication of King Constantine", pp. 325-342. 37. "When the whole story of the Greek episode can be told it will be a tragi-comedy unbelievable, so unreal and so preposterous were many of its circumstances" F. H. Simonds, History of the World War, (Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday Page and Co., 1919) Vol. IV, p. 162. Instead of a tragi-comedy, however, this episode turned out to be a tragedy of Olympian dimensions whose closing act ended with the utter destruction of the three-thousand year-old hellenic civilization in Ionia. 38. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (Boston : Little, Brown and Co., 1934) Vol. IV (1917), p. 87.

THE BALKAN

36

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

scene, an actor committed to the organization of the world on the basis of law and justice. 4. — Greek Aspirations and the Treaty of Sevres. The conclusion of the war found Greece on the side of the victors and headed by an able and forceful statesman, her best in modern history, Mr. Venizelos. Her aspirations, based mainly on ethnological grounds and reinforced by the pronouncements of the Entente Governments,39 were favorably received. In a report dated March 1, 1919, the Commission of Experts at the Peace Conference recorded its "unanimous agreement that the claims of Greece to that part of Turkish Thrace that might be left outside the Constantinople zone are justified". 40 In the discussion of the Commission on Greek Affairs, Great Britain and France supported the Hellenic character of Northern Epirus (February 19 and March 21, 1919, meetings) in spite of the Italian objections 41 which were finally withdrawn a few months later by the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement of July 29,1919. By the same agreement, the Dodecanese, except Rhodes, was ceded to Greece.42 The important question that remained to be settled was that of the Greek revendications on Asia Minor. The main opponent to the "Megali Idea" policy was Italy and her refusal to agree on assigning the Smyrna district to Greece would have amounted to a definite frustration of the entire project, had she not made two fatal mistakes : losing no time, she seized Adalia on the pretext of a local riot and began extending her control over the whole region of Southern Turkey ; secondly, disagreeing with the United States over Fiume, she withdrew temporarily from the Conference. The landing of Italian troops in Asia Minor gave tangible proof to Venizelos' contention that Italy envisaged the annexation of south-western Anatolia whose Christian population lived continually under the threat of Turkish massacres; on the other hand, the absence of the Italian delegation permitted the 59. In this regard, one may recall the 12th point of President Wilson's famous declaration (Jan. 8, 1918) : "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security oflife mnd an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development..." Also, the statement of Prime Minister Lloyd George on British war aims (Jan. 5, 1918) : "... we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for, three conditions must be fulfilled : first..., secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed;" W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, Readings in European International Relations since 1879. (New York and London : Harper and Brothers, 1931), pp. 549-550, 545. Finally, Signor Orlando declared on February 13, 1918, "... I proclaim here before the Italian Parliament that no one in the world can regard with more sympathy than we the aspirations of different nationalities still groaning under the aggression of dominating races." Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims, (Dec. 1916-Nov. 1918) Ed. by G . L. Dickinson, (London : G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., New York : The Macmillan Co., 1918), p. 149. 40. B. Henry Dewing, ed.t Greece and the Great Powtrs, (Washington : 1924), p. 63. 41. Driault et Lheritier, Op. Cit.y pp. 346-352. 42. Ibid., p. 362.

THE

ORIGINS

OF

THE

GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

37

other Great Powers to arrive at an agreement 43 to which Signor Orlando, finding himself faced with a fait accompli, concurred. On May io, 1919, the Council of Four authorized 44 Venizelos to occupy Smyrna for the purpose of protecting its Greek population. Three days later, twenty thousand Greek soldiers debarked at Ionia, amid the frenetic enthusiasm of the hellenic colony. Events now moved rapidly. A Turkish nationalist movement, led by an able and courageous soldier, Mustapha Kemal, reacted violently to the imminent obliteration of the Ottoman Empire. Defying the authority of the Sultan who under the presence of the allies in Constantinople had become a maniable figurehead, uniting the demoralized and despairing citizens, the new Turkish leaders moved to Angora and on January 28, 1920 the "National Pact" was proclaimed, announcing their determination to expel all foreigners from their soil. Meanwhile, the allies, disregarding this new dynamic force, completed at the San Remo conference the draft of the peace treaty and handed it to the Turkish delegation (May 11, 1920). As soon as its terms became known, sporadic fighting broke out and Venizelos, presenting himself as "the good fairy" 46 received from the Supreme Council a mandate for the Greek army to restore order in the whole North-Western district of Asia Minor. The Greek offensive began on June 22, was crowned by an immediate success, acknowledged publicly by Iyloyd George when he said, addressing the House of Commons, that Mr. Veni%elos expressed the opinion that he would be able to clear up the whole of the neighborhood between Smyrna and the Dardanelles in the course of fifteen days. The Greek troops... well organized and admirably led... did so in ten days.a

The spectacular and swift mopping up of Eastern Thrace and the capture of Adrianople and Brussa,47 the ancient capital of the Ottoman 45. T h e United States had some misgivings about the expediency and timing of this decision. H o w e v e r , Wilson " w a s convinced as a statesman that as between the virtual dismemberment o f Anarolia [envisaged by the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement] and the annexation of one-twentieth — and largely Greek — part o f it to Greece, the latter evil, if evil it was, was comparably the lesser o n e " . D e w i n g , Op. Cit., p. 76. 44. Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath (1918-1928), (New Y o r k : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 587. " M r . Lloyd George asked for a decision that M. Venizelos might be authorized to send troops to be kept on board ship at Smyrna ready for landing in case of necessity. President Wilson asked w h y the troops should not be landed at once as the men did not keep in g o o d condition on board ship. Mr. L l o y d George did not demur." Loc. Cit. It was the suggestion of the American Chief Executive that allows American Ambassador Morgenthau to write : " T h e request that Greece should occupy Smyrna and police the Ionian shore was initiated by President W i l s o n . " Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 31. 45. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 598. 46. House of Commons, The Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, V o l . 132 (London : H. M . Stationary Office, 1920), p. 478. 47. For a series o f maps on the Greek advance see H . R . H . Prince A n d r e w o f Greece, Towards Disaster : The Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1921 (London : John Murray, 1930), pp. 32, 136 and «52. A l s o W . S. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 464.

38

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

Empire, convinced the allied statesmen that the proposed peace treaty with Turkey could be enforced and executed. The U. S. Senate passed a resolution supporting its terms 48 while Mr. Millerand, the Prime Minister of France, declared that there could be "no modification in the clauses of the Treaty which detach Thrace and Smyrna from Turkish rule, for in both areas the Turks are in a minority". 49 With due solemnity, the treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey was signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. 50 The Treaty of Sèvres represents the triumphal climax of the "Megali Idea" and the realization of a five-century old hellenic dreamt 1 Eastern Thrace, as far as the Chatalja line, and the Aegan islands are united with Greece (Art. 84). The Dodecanese is ceded to Italy (Art. 122) which, in turn, according to the already mentioned Venizelos-Tittoni agreement, undertakes the obligation to give it to Greece. With regard to Ionia, the provisions are more complicated (Art. 65-83) for the eventual union with the Greek state depends on a plebiscite.62 As, however, the Greeks of the region represented almost 60 % of the entire population 63 there was very little doubt about the outcome of the referendum. Only Constantinople was still lying outside the new frontiers but many factors indicated that her incorporation could soon come.64 Full of glory and having carried his country " t o the highest pinnacle

48. "Resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including Corytza), the 12 islands of the Aegean, and the western coast of Asia Minor, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the peace conference to Greece and become incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece. ' ' Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. L I X , Part 7 (May 4 to May 24, 1920), p. 7160. 49. Answer to the Turks (July 16,1920) Dewing, Op. Cit., pp. 63-64. 50. See full text of the Treaty in The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, Vol. I I (New York : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), pp. 789-945. j 1. See Map, Greece After World War I. 52. The city of Smyrna and its territory remain under the sovereignty of Turkey which, however, transfers her rights of sovereignty to the Greek Government (Art. 69). Greece is responsible for the administration of the region (Art. 70) and for the organization of a local parliament to which all nationalities are to be proportionally represented (Art. 72). After five years, this parliament may, by a majority of votes, ask the Council of the League of Nations for the definitive incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece of the zone : The Council may require, as a preliminary, a plebiscite, and in case the results are favorable to Greece, the Turkish Sovereignty shall cease (Art. 83). 53. In the Smyrna enclave (about 20,000 sq. km) there were 550,000 Greeks, 299,000 Moslems and 92,000 other nationalities (foreign subjects, Jews, Armenians, etc.), for a total of 941 ,ooo people. A . A . Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture — and After (London : Methuen and Co. Ltd.) Appendix V , p. 224. 54. Andreades, Op. Cit., p. 148. Article 36 of the Treaty of Sèvres affirmed the rights and title of the Turkish Government over Constantinople. The second paragraph, however, of the same article reads : "Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty... particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey hereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this connection."

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

39

she has ever scaled in modern times", 55 Venizelos returned to Athens to present to the Parliament what his ardent supporters called the Greece of the two continents and of the five seas.56 Proudly, he expressed his achievements since the Balkan wars in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles ; cautiously, he pointed out that the permanent redemption of the Anatolian Greeks depended on the ability of the Hellenic nation to continue the struggle and make the peace settlement durable ; confidently, he asked for a renewal of his mandate and called for national elections. In a sudden change of fortune which resembled the apex of an Aeschylian tragedy, not only was his party defeated, but Venizelos himself was not even elected deputy to the new parliament. 5. — The Restoration of King Constantine. This sudden turn of events was due to many factors the most important of which was the death of King Alexander who had succeeded his father, King Constantine, at the time of the latter's dethronement. It is of course true, that the prolonged absences of Venizelos who was defending his country's cause in the international conferences, the inability and inefficiency of his lieutenants who had aroused much animosity back home, the war-weariness and exasperation of the male population who had been under mobilization for almost eight continuous years, had together created an atmosphere of despair in Greece. One may justifiably claim, however, that had King Alexander not been bitten by a monkey while the electoral campaign was in full swing, the historical development in the Near East would have been quite different. " I t is perhaps no exaggeration to remark that a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey's bite", 57 wrote Churchill. For the King's death brought forward the issue of monarchical succession in the ugly and irrational form of Constantine versus Venizelos. As soon as the Royalist Party won58 the general election of November 14, 1920 on a platform of promising the recall of the former King, the Prime Minister resigned and left the country. Venizelos was right in emphasizing the fragile and temporary character of the Treaty of Sèvres. It was clear that "its main clauses depended for their effect on one thing only : the Greek A r m y . " 6 9 Great Britain was certainly in favor of the hellenic aspirations, 55. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 408. 56. Europe and A s i a ; the Black Sea, the Marmara Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Ionian Sea and the Mediterranean. 57. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 409. 58. They captured 246 seats against only 120 which went to the Liberal Party (Venizelist) and 4 Independents. 59. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 399.

1

_J

20°

20° 2

2

21° ^

I 27° 3

22° ^

|

23° ^

5 GREECE

2 (

AFf^O

ynoAiz

2 6

2S

°

AFf^ORLD WAR I.

7

26

°

8

27

°

9

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

but while anxious to see St. Sophia restored to the Cross, was uneasy as to the sentiments of her Moslem subjects. If the Greeks could singlehanded expel the remnant of Turks from Europe and make good their position in Asia Minor they might rely upon the sympathetic encouragement and upon the friendly diplomatic offices of the British Government, but of nothing more.60

France, having never actually rejected tlie traditional FrancoTurkish friendship of François I, following reluctantly the pro-Greek policy of Lloyd George, supported Venizelos, "this Hellene a little too Anglicized", 61 rather coldly. Italy, her chances of establishing an Asiatic base on Turkey quickly vanishing, was outright hostile to the Greek plans. Count Sforza, the man who as Italy's High Commissioner in Constantinople "clearly declared that [he] could only serve [his] country for an early and honorable peace... excluding any idea of Turkish partition", 62 immediately denounced the VenizelosTittoni agreement upon becoming Foreign Minister, on the grounds that the "considered that it was really not for a Great Power like Italy to have written agreements to the effect that Greece should 'support' any essential point of Italian interests at the Conference" 83 and sought a pretext to free his country from any moral obligations towards her war-time ally. The excuse was found in the return of Constantine to the Hellenic throne. Considering that the restoration of a king "whose disloyal attitude and conduct toward the Allies during the War caused them great embarrassment and loss" was "a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts", the Allied Conference informed the new Greek Government that the Great Powers "reserved to themselves... complete liberty in dealing with the situation thus created". 64 This freedom of movement was particularly welcome to Italy and France. The Italian Government was quick to realize that Greece, left alone in the enforcement of the terms of the Sèvres Treaty, could not but fail completely in her Asia Minor expedition, leaving Italy the undisputed master in the Eastern Mediterranean. In France, an air of relief became manifest in the official circles after the re-ascent of Constantine to the throne, the man whom the French Prime Minister had publicly denounced as "the very symbol of treason". 66 The Nationalist Turks were harassing the French troops in Anatolia and 60. Marriott, Op. Citp.

525.

61. Maurice Baumont, ha Faillite de la Paix (1918-1939), Vol. I, " D e Rethondes à Stresa (1918-1935)," 3rd Ed. (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), p. 177, (translated from French)« 62. Count Carlo Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1930), p. 358. 63. Ibid., p. 171. 64. Driault et Lehritier, Op. Citpp.

388-9.

65. T o a correspondent of The Times, Sat., Dec. 4, 1920, p. 9.

THE

ORIGINS

OF

THE

GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

43

the press in France was calling for a reappraisal of the entire Near East policy of the Allies. As soon as the results of the Greek vote were made known, Le Temps published an article which ended with the following exhortation : "The Greek elections have created a new situation... The war in Cilicia is costing too much. These are the facts. Now to acts". 66 Even in Great Britain, where the success of the Greek cause was officially acknowledged to be in the interest of Entente Powers, an editorial of The Times, after mentioning that the Allied Governments "will not afford to Greece under the man who betrayed them... the countenance they were ready to extend to a Greece under the tried and sagacious direction of M. Venizelos", and after approving the withdrawal of all the large subsidies that were available to that country, concluded with the statement: "on all these points the Supreme Council appears to have decided wisely". 67 The whole situation is succinctly and strikingly summarized in the following quotation : [By recalling Constantine and repudiating Venizelos for the sake of whom much had to be endured] Greece had in fact become a liberator. Just at the moment when her needs were greatest and her commitments were becoming most embarrassing to herself and to others, she had on her own free will sponged the slate. It is not every day that moral creditors are so accommodating,68

6. — Greece's Anatolian Venture. Seizing upon the argument that the Treaty of Sèvres was not valid any more, since it was based on the assumption of a friendly — "docile", 69 as a French writer expressed it — government in Greece and deeming its terms "too rigorous",70 the Allied Powers called a conference in London (February 1921) in an attempt to resolve the new Gordian knot of the Near East. The conference failed entirely in reconciling the Greek and Turkish nationalist viewpoints 71 but it resulted in a Turco-French and TurcoItalian rapprochement which marked an open split in the Allied front vis-à-vis Turkey. On March 9, 1921 France agrees to evacuate Cilicia, thus provoking the sharp reaction of the British Government and of Lloyd George who, having already declared in the House of 66. Quoted in The Times, Sat. Dec. 4, 1920, p. 9. 67. The Times, Mon. Dec. 6, 1920, p. 13. 68. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 412. 69. Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des Relations Internationales, t. VII, "Les Crises du xx® Siècle", I. de 1914 à 1929 (Paris : Librairie Hachette, 1957), p. 293. ("It was not therefore possible to count on the docility of the Greek Government") (translated from the French). 70. Vicomte Terlinden, Impérialisme et Equilibre (Bruxelles : Maison F. Larcier, S. A., 1952), p. 422, 71. For a summary of the discussions see J. Mavrogordato, Op. Cit., pp. 133-134. The Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Kalogeropoulos, had proposed certain financial concessions to the Turks, strengthening heir position in Constantinople and modifications of the Sèvres Treaty with regard to the Smyrna region,

THE

44

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

Commons that "the best thing to do [is] to use the force at the disposal of the Greek Government for the purpose of clearing up the situation", 72 now proceeds to announce to the Greek Premier that the "British Government has no objection whatsoever to any military operations that Greece deems expedient to undertake against Mustapha Kemal". 73 Considering that these developments take place barely six months after the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, one cannot but question seriously the Allied policy and share the bewilderment of Churchill : At last peace with Turkey : and to ratify it, War with Turkey ! However, so far as the Great Allies were concerned the war was to be fought by proxy. Wars when fought this way by great nations are often very dangerous for the proxy?1

In this case, Greece was the unfortunate proxy. Immediately after the abortive London Conference, a new Greek offensive results in the occupation of the important railway junctions of Afium Karahissar and of Eski-Sehir on the line to Angora. 75 On May 29, (anniversary of the fall of Constantinople and the death of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine X I in 1453), King Constantine lands in Smyrna and undertakes the personal command of the Greek Army which by the end of the summer reaches Sakaria river but fails to capture Angora and destroy the Kemalist forces. In spite of the stabilization of the front for the winter, the situation was steadily becoming desperate. Greece was maintaining more than 200,000 troops in Asia Minor, underfed and underpaid, mobilized for almost ten years, at a cost of at least a quarter of a million pounds a week. "The Asia Minor campaign could have had only one end and King Constantine, practiced soldier and far-sighted general, said so from the beginning" 76 writes Prince Christopher, brother of the King ; but even Prince Andrew, his youngest brother, who was later tried and exiled for his part in the campaign as a lieutenant general of the Greek Army, admits that "no retreat was possible" 77 because it would have had "an alarming influence on the interior situation" 78 and would have left the Christian population at the mercy of the revengeful and frenzied Turks. 72. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 132, pp. 47-78. 73. Lascaris, Op. Cit., p. 167 (translated from Greek). 74. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 399. 75. See Map I. 76. Prince Christopher, Memoirs of H. R. H. Prince Christopher of Greece (London : Hurst and Blackett, L t d . , 1938), p . 172. 77. P r i n c e A n d r e w , Towards Disaster — The Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1921 ( L o n d o n : J . M u r r a y ,

'93°). P- 778. Ibid.,

p.

5.

THE

ORIGINS

OF

THE

GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

45

The Franklin Bouillon agreement of October 20, 1921, amounting to a separate Franco-Turkish peace treaty, was the coup de grâce to the Greek campaign. The French agreed to evacuate Cilicia in exchange for peace in Syria and the Turks offered commercial advantages in return for much needed munitions, to be used against the British at Ismidt and the Greeks in Western Anatolia ! Meanwhile Kemal had already signed the Treaty of Moscow 79 with Lenin, assuring the Turkish eastern frontier and receiving some war material. Having split the Allied unity and reinforced his armed forces, he was ready for the attack. For this reason he rejected the armistice that the Entente Powers proposed in March 1922, although the Greeks accepted its terms which would have entailed the evacuation of Asia Minor and a modification of the frontiers in Eastern Thrace. Meanwhile "the appalling deportations of Greeks from the Trebizond and Samsun districts " and "the methodical extermination of the Greeks in Western Anatolia " 80 became slowly known to Europe, forcing the Allies to take action. A new conference was called in Venice for August 31, but before it could be convened Kemal began the great offensive that brought him within two weeks to Smyrna.

7. — The Asia Minor Disaster.

The debacle of the Greek Army

was complete. For three years the Greeks had been fighting in Anatolia under the most adverse circumstances : deserted by their allies at whose request they had landed there and who subsequently declared " not a man, not a franc, not a gun to fight against the Turks " ; 81 " afraid that their bloodshed and their struggle would be in vain due to an inefficient governmental policy" ; 82 anxious to liberate their unredeemed brothers and to safeguard their lives, they made an intense and persevering national effort. Had they enjoyed the support in credit, munitions and goodwill of the Great Powers, no one can say for certain that they could not have enforced a peace upon the Kemalist Turks. 83

Having none of these prerequisites, they met with utter defeat. 79. March 16, 1921. 80. Churchill, Op. Cil., p. 442. 8:. Raymond Poincaré, upon becoming Prime Minister in January 1922, as quoted in The International Interpreter, Vol. I, No. 28, Oct. 14, 1922, p. 878. 82. Secret report of Colonel S. Gonata to General Hadjanestis describing the complaints and fears of the armed forces in Asia Minor (dated June 1922). It was published in his Apomnimonivmata 1897-1957 (Memoirs) (Athens : 1958), p. 193. In view of the widespread unrest that was prevailing in the ranks of the military, the author was surprised to read the following comment which proves the general misunderstanding, if not indeed ignorance, that existed, concerning the situation in the Near East : "The only hopeful thing about the country [i.e. Greece] is... the unity, efficiency and splendid morale of the Greek Army in Asia Minor". The International Interpreter, Vol. I, No. 9, June 3, 1922, p. 280. 83. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 416.

4

6

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

T h e p a n i c k y retreat and evacuation o f the G r e e k A r m y ,

however,

was n o t as disastrous as the fate that befell the Christian p o p u l a t i o n of Asia Minor.

84

In an indescribable state o f fear, man, w o m a n and

child left their homes

en masse

and fled to the different ports o f A n a -

tolia " c o n v e r g i n g in a terrified m o b o n the city o f Smyrna, w h e r e they h o p e d either to get protection or to be e v a c u a t e d " .

85

These million Greeks were caught between the sea and victory-intoxicated Turks not yet controlled by army or Government and blood-mad with their new cry " Turkey for the Turks /"... A massacre which would have appalled the imagination of the world was imminent. It was prevented by the quick action of Americans on the ground, protected by the U. S. Navy and using Greek ships.86

T h e T u r k s enter Smyrna o n September 9, 1922 "

actually

British and A m e r i c a n ships e n g a g e d in rescue w o r k " . t o destroy

completely

"Giaour-Izmir",

the

"

87

firing

on

Determined

Infidel S m y r n a " ,

they

set fire to the w h o l e city. R e a d i n g eye-witness reports in the different newspapers one is o v e r w h e l m e d b y the gigantic catastrophe. M r . W a r d Price telegraphs to the

Daily Mail :

What I see as I stand on the deck of the I r o n D u k e is an unbroken wall of fire, two miles long, in which twenty distinct volcanoes of raging flames are throwing up jagged, writhing tongues to a height of a hundred feet... From this intensely glowing mass of yellow, orange and crimson fire pour up thick clotted coils of oily black smoke that hide the moon at its zenith... The sea glows a deep copper-red, and, worst of all, from the densely packed mob of many thousands of refugees huddled on the narrow quay, between the advancingfierydeath behind and the deep water in front, comes continuously such frantic screaming of sheer terror as can be heard miles away. 88 84. There are many reports, pamphlets and books treating the closing days of the Greek campaign in Asia Minor and, particularly, the unfortunate fate of the Christians of Anatolia Smyrna. A s an example the author wishes to mention René Puaux's short studies on this topic, and mainly his La mort de Smyrne (Paris : Edition de la Revue des Balkans 1922), La Grandi Pitié des Chrétiens d'Orient (Paris : 1922) and

Les Derniers Jours de Smyrne (Paris : 1923). 85. C. A . Macartney, Refugees — The Work of the League, (London : League of Nations Union, 1931 p. 79. The Near East Relief Committee received the following message from Smyrna : "Thousands of exhausted refugees, the majority of which are women and children, are blocking all the roads leading into Smyrna. The city is terribly crowded and the refugees w h o fled with only what they could carry on their backs are exposed to famine. Many deaths have been caused by starvation..." The Times, September 11, 1922. 86. H. C. Jacquith, "America's aid to 1,000,000 Near East Refugees", Current History. Vol. X X I , N o . 3, December 1924, p. 403.

87. Macartney, Refugees, p. 80. 88. Daily Mail, September 19, 1922. See also, The Daily Telegraph, September 13, 14 and 20, 1922, Dr. Lysimachos Oeconomos, The Tragedy of the Christian Near East, the Anglo-Hellenic League, Publication No. 50 (London : 1923), and the works of René Puaux, La Mort de Smyrne (Paris : Edition de la

Revue des Balkans, 1922), Les Derniers Jours de Smyrne (Paris : 1923) and La Grande Pitié des d'Orient

(Paris : 1922).

Chrétiens

THE

ORIGINS

OF

THE

GREEK

REFUGEE

PROBLEM

47

The damage is officially estimated at $200,000,000 (over £40,000,000)89 but the financial loss is insignificant compared to the human misery and agony that accompanies it. About 12,000 persons 90 perish in flames; the Archbishop of Smyrna Chrysostomos, arrested by the Turkish authorities, is surrendered to a lynching mob which "pulls away his beard, gouges his eyes and cuts his nose and ears" ; 9 1 The able-bodied men between the ages of 18-45 are detained and marched off into the interior to form the so-called "labor battalions" 92 while many young women are left behind for the harems.93 It is no exaggeration to call the year 1922 "the most calamitous in the whole of modern Hellenic history" 94 and Gibbons is perfectly justified when he writes : The blow of September, 1922,proved to be a greater blow to Hellenism than the fall of Byzantium in 1453 or any other of the vicissitudes suffered by the Greeks in the original Turkish conquest of Asia Minor or the Balkans ; for the Turks resolved this time to stamp out Hellenism for good and all. ^

A horrified Europe wakes up to face the menace of a new Turkey which threatens to invade the international zone of the Straits and to attack the British at Chanak. Nothing much is expected from the Italians, fully satisfied by the Greek disaster, and the French withdraw their troops from the Dardanelles confirming the fact that "these were the worst years of Anglo-French relations which the twentieth century... has seen; and this was the worst moment". 96 Great Britain, however, stands firm, an Anglo-Turkish war is averted and on October 10 an armistice is signed at Mudania between the Greeks and Kemal, pledging the return of the Smyrna region and of Eastern Thrace to Turkey and calling for a Peace Conference at Lausanne. Meanwhile, "one of the most erratic and unhappy periods in modern Greek history" 97 follows the evacuation of the armed forces from Anatolia. The troops revolt and a revolutionary Government under two colonels, Gonatas and Plastiras, is formed, forcing the King to abdicate for the second time in five years, in favor of his son George.

89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 1925, 95. 96. 97.

Macartncy, Refugees, p. 79 and Oeconomos, Op. Cit., p. 11. Macartney, Loc. Cit. Report of an eye-witness Frenchman, quoted in R. Puaux, La Mort de Smyrne, p. 23. Gonatas, Op. Cit., p. 216. Only 15,000 returned to Greece later. Macartney, Refugees, p. 80. Macartney, Refugees, p. 80. The Annual Register, 1922, p. 210. Quoted in R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy 1914(New York : Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), p. 292. H. A . Gibbons, Europe Since 1918 (New York and London : The Century Co., 1923), p. 435. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 456. "Greece" (Modern History) Encyclopedia Britatmica (1958 Edition), p. 786.

48

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

The chaotic situation is further deteriorated due to the thousands of refugees who flood Greece in a state of complete destitution and suffering from a psychological condition that borders on madness. In a matter of a couple of weeks "seven hundred and fifty thousand (750,000) people [are] dumped like cattle" 98 at the ports of Greece, desperate and clamoring for immediate assistance in order to survive. Their number is swollen every day by new arrivals until they reach a figure of well over a million persons, "nearly one-fifth of the population of Turkey in Asia" 99 marking the beginning of the refugee problem in its most acute form. It was the tragic end of an adventure which obliterated in blood and fire a civilization that had flourished and progressed in Ionia since the time of Homer. It was the complete uprooting of Hellenism in Asia and the burial of the magnificent dream of the "Megali Idea". Abandoning St. Sophia, "the two-headed eagle, wounded and bleeding, sought shelter in the ruins of the Parthenon". 100

98. Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 48. 99. Jicquith, Op. Cit., p. 403. 100. D. Kousoulas, Tit Prict of Press, 1953), p. 3.

Frtethm — Grteet in World Affairs

1939-1955, (Syracuse University

CHAPTER II

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE AND THE EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS CONVENTIONS

I invite the Turkish and Gteek delegations to realize that the eyes of the world are upon us as we discuss this question [of minorities], and that, according as it is settled in an equitable and reasonable spirit or the reverse, so shall we and they be judged. Lord Curzon at the Lausanne Conference The Turk looks at the non-Turkish elements in his civilization and mutters, A plague on all your houses I Every bit of trouble, he argues, that has come to him has come through their presence in Turkey. They are the disturbing influence, and they must vanish... The International Interpreter, Vol. I, No. 40. The [Lausanne] Conference produced a treaty into which was written a short clause... By this clause 1,500,000 human beings were made homeless. Current History, Vol. X X I , No. 3.

4

C H A P T E R II

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE AND THE EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS CONVENTIONS

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

— — — — — — — — —

Introductory Summary. The Young Turks and the Christian Minorities. The 1913 and 1914 Agreements. Turkish and Greek Motivations. The Greek-Bulgarian Exchange of Populations. The 1923 Convention : Origins. The 1923 Convention : Discussions at Lausanne. Analysis of the Convention. Appraisal of the Convention.

8. — Introductory Summary. "Being united in the desire to bring to a final close the state of war which has existed in the East since 1914" 1 the Allied Powers 2 on the one hand and Turkey on the other convened in Lausanne on November 20, 1922, to draw up a Peace Treaty. Greece was represented by Venizelos who had accepted the heavy task of participating in an international meeting determined to nullify the agreement which had realized the Hellenic aspirations and which The Times now called "that futile monument of injustice and stupidity which is known as the Treaty of Sèvres". 3 Facing him was Ismet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Angora Govern1. Preamble of the Treaty o f Lausanne in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, V o l . U, p. 595. The entire text of the Treaty can be found in this volume. 2. The British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (Yugoslavia). T h e United States was represented by its Ambassador to Italy, Mr. Child, as an observer. See U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, V o l . II., Publication N o . 1262, pp. 879-889. 3. The Times, November 21, 1922.

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

ment, skillful and confident, knowing that the recent victory of the Kemalist Army had become a dominating factor in the peace settlement. Indeed, Turkey's defeat in the First World War was almost entirely forgotten and after the first days it became quite evident that "the Allies negotiated on far less than equal terms". 4 The discussions continued for months in an atmosphere of growing tensions and passionate exchange of arguments. Finally, the parties reached an agreement and February 4, 1923 was set for the signature of the treaty. The same day, however, in a sudden dramatic climax, the Turkish delegation rejected the proposed draft text and the conference was dispersed, Lord Curzon and the British delegation departing the same night for London. Two months went by before the negotiations were resumed and it was only on July 24, 1923 that the final peace settlement with Turkey was signed. For Greece the Treaty of Lausanne confirms the terms of the Mudania armistice. Smyrna and its hinterland remain under Turkish sovereignty; Eastern Thrace and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos at the entrance of the Dardanelles are returned to the new Republic of Turkey (articles 2 and 14). The Dodecanese islands are ceded to Italy (article 15). Lastly, Greece recognizes her obligation to make reparation for the damage caused in Anatolia, but on the other hand, Turkey, in consideration of the financial situation of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and from its consequences, finally renounces all claims for reparation against the Greek Government (article 59). B y far, however, the most important result of the Lausanne Conference is the Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 5 which was signed by Venizelos and Ismet Pasha on January 30, 1923. This document, unprecedented in the modern annals of Europe, forms a part of the Peace Treaty and is "a startling instance of the lengths [the Allies] were prepared to go to meet the proposals of Angora". 6 According to its provisions, all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established on Turkish territory (except the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople) and all the Greek nationals of Moslem religion established on Greek territory (except the Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace) are forcibly exchanged. As this was the first time in history that the compulsory transfer of a large number of people was officially adopted as a method

4. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 465. j . See text of the Convention in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II, pp. 1036-1043. A French translation is included in S. P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities : Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1932) Appendix V , pp. 787-794.

6. Tit Timet, February

1923.

THE LAUSANNE

CONFERENCE

53

for solving the minority problem, the Convention provoked a violent debate reflecting a variety of attitudes : some considered it a barbaric procedure violating the basic principles of human freedom and justice ; others characterized it as a dangerous precedent that was bound to be employed b y persons willing to promote international friction and unrest; a third group, finally, praising its realistic nature, described it as a successful agreement and later advocated the same technique for the settlement of the problems that arose subsequently in the years preceding the Second World War. 9. — The Young Turks and the Christian Minorities. In order to form an objective idea in regard to this Convention and to understand its expediency and limitations, one must look into the historical background of the entire Eastern Question and examine the interplay of forces that brought about its formulation in Lausanne. This analysis will provide the necessary perspective and will eliminate certain misunderstandings about the scope and the nature of the experiment. It was mentioned in the introduction 7 that the maltreatment and suppression of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire furnished the opportunity to the Great Powers to intervene repeatedly and energetically in the internal affairs of that country and to obtain many important political and financial concessions,8 epitomized in the regime of the capitulations. To the minds of the Turkish leaders, the existence of national minorities and the practice of foreign intervention in their domestic affairs were inter-related in a manner of cause and effect. Consequently, they viewed the elimination of the heterogeneous groups as a necessary prerequisite to achieving absolute sovereign independence and to transforming the Ottoman Empire into a modern national state. As early as 1910, the Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress which met in Salonica had decided upon "the Ottomanization of all Turkish subjects" but it was becoming clear that this "could never be achieved b y persuasion, and recourse must be had to force of arms". 9 The Committee also agreed that other nationalities must be refused the right of organization, for decentralization and autonomy were treachery to the Turkish Empire. 10 Four centuries of Moslem 7. See Supra, p. 16. 8. "Whatever the misdeeds of the old Turkish administration, there is no doubt that some of the Powers often used the actual or supposed grievances o f the minorities as an excuse for interfering in Turkey to further interests of their o w n . " D . Mitrany, The Effects of the War in Southeastern Europe, ( N e w H a v j n : Y a l e University Press, 1936), p. 249. 9. From a report on the proceedings o f the Congress published a year later in The Times, October 3, 1911. 10. Loc.

Cit.

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rule had failed to assimilate the different foreign subject races and the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, had already realized that extermination or forcible deportation were the only means to obtain national homogeneity. The case of the Armenian massacres is too well known to be retold. A t the beginning of the Twentieth Century it was the turn of the Greeks. As it was evident, however, that extensive manslaughter would not be tolerated b y Europe and especially by the Hellenic Government which could hardly be expected to remain apathetic to such action, the method of massively transferring the Greek element of the Smyrna region was adopted in 1914. In pursuing this policy the Young Turk leaders hoped to achieve three aims : first, to promote national security. As a result of the Balkan wars, the large Aegean islands near Anatolia had come under the sovereignty of Greece. This occupation was considered dangerous for it was felt that the unredeemed Greeks of Asia Minor would be encouraged b y the proximity of their motherland to attempt to unite with her, precipitating thereby the dissolution of the Empire. Secondly, the deportation of the people into the interior and backward regions of the country would hasten a voluntary exodus of the population toward Greece. This syllogism was proved correct and within a few months after the inauguration of this plan 150,000 Greeks were forced to leave the western coast of Asia Minor and find refuge in Greece, while another 50,000 were systematically deported in the arid and sparsely inhabited areas of central Anatolia. 1 1 10. — The 1913 and 1914 Agreements. The Young Turks, however, b y fostering their project hoped to accomplish a much more effective and far-reaching purpose, namely an agreement on transferring the minority. In the 1913 Treaty that terminated the second Balkan war between Bulgaria and Turkey, a Protocol was included formulating for the first time the idea of an exchange of populations. The first paragraph of Section C stipulated that "the two Governments agree to facilitate the optional reciprocal exchange of the Bulgarian and Moslem populations and of their properties in a zone of 15 kilometers at the maximum along their entire common frontier". 12 A Mixed Commission meeting two months later, drew up a "Convention concerning the exchange of populations" and agreed to proceed in the evaluation and liquidation of the properties of the exchangeable persons. A list of 48,570 Moslems and 46,764 Bulgarians who were 11. I .atlas, 0/). C.i!., p. 21. 12. T h e texts of the Treaty and of the Protocol are published in British and Foreign Papers, 1914 (Part I) V o l . C V I I (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1917) pp. 713-714. For an analysis of this agreement and its application see Ladas, Op. Ci/., pp. 18-20.

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entitled to the benefits of the accord was compiled but the war of 1914 interrupted the appraisal of their belongings which was never carried out. Two points regarding this Convention are important and should be emphasized : first, the historical context in which it was formulated and secondly, the voluntary nature of the transfer. Although the agreement concerned purportedly the realization of an exchange of populations, it was actually affirming a fait accompli. Due to the advance of the Bulgarian army towards Constantinople during the first Balkan war, the Moslems of the areas where extensive military operations were conducted had already fled to more securely held Turkish territories ; on the other hand, when the Ottoman Empire, taking advantage of the second Balkan war between the former allies, attacked Bulgaria and recovered Eastern Thrace and Adrianople, the Bulgarian minority of the region took flight and sought refuge in its motherland. When the Convention was signed, therefore, the transfer had already been largely effectuated and the agreement covered only a small number of the remaining inhabitants. Even in this case, however, the accord stated explicitly that "[un] échange facultatif mutuel des populations" 13 was to take place within a predetermined frontier zone. The contracting parties had insisted on a voluntary exchange in a limited area. They did not consider an obligatory transfer, nor one covering the entire Bulgarian and Turkish minorities of the two countries. It may be argued, of course, that such a transfer was unnecessary since a great number of the persons concerned had already departed. In the opinion of the author, however, a compulsory exchange was not discussed, for it was felt that it could neither be accepted by the two countries concerned — in spite of the desire of the Sublime Porte to achieve ethnological homogeneity — nor condoned by the other European Powers. For the same reasons, it was agreed that the Convention should apply to the inhabitants of a restricted area, fifteen kilometers on either side of the international common boundary. This view is further substantiated by subsequent events. Having succeeded in coming to an agreement with Bulgaria over the minority issue, the Young Turks tried within a few months after the signature of the Convention to reach the same accord with Greece. As, however, the Greek Government would never have accepted a transfer on its own free will and with no apparent reason, the Ottoman Empire sought to force the issue by adopting the plan of deporting the Anato13. Translating this phrase Ladas (Op. Cit., p. 19) renders "facultative" as "authorized". In this way he disregards one of the main characteristics of the Convention, namely its optional nature. See S. Seferiades "L'échange des Populations" in Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 1928, V o l . 24 (Paris : Librairie Hachette, 1929), p. 354.

THE

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lian Greeks. Having protested in vain against these large scale expulsions, Venizelos was forced to accept the proposal of the Sublime Porte (first suggested by the Turkish Minister in Athens as a "personal opinion" 14) to exchange the hellenic rural population of the Smyrna region against the Moslem minority of Macedonia.15 He posed, however, as prerequisites for the signature of an agreement the same two conditions of the Bulgarian-Turkish Convention, namely the spontaneous character of the emigration and the appraisal and liquidation of the properties of the exchangeable persons.16 After long diplomatic negotiations, the Ottoman Government accepted the above stipulations in its note of June 22 — July 5,1914 (No. 3563), addressed to the Hellenic Legation in Constantinople and confirming the accord with regard to the conditions for an exchange of the Greek-speaking populations of Thrace and of the Smyrna Vilayet on the one hand, and of the Moslem populations of Greek Macedonia and Epirus on the other, which would spontaneously manifest their desire to emigrate, as well as to the evaluation and exchange of the properties reciprocally abandoned by the populations which have already emigrated,17

A four-member Mixed Commission was appointed to ascertain the wishes of the persons concerned and to appraise their movable and immovable properties. Its work, however, was interrupted by the entry of Turkey in the war and the stillborn agreement was never ratified. A comparison of the 1913 Convention and of the 1914 planned accord shows that both are based on the same general principles and institute similar administrative machinery for their implementation. The spontaneous character of the transfer and the liquidation of the properties involved are guaranteed by the establishment of Mixed Commissions and by the composition of property lists. In two respects, however, the 1914 Greco-Turkish agreement introduces a new factor 14. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 21. 15. Actually this was n o t the first t i m e that the transfer o f the Smyrna G r e e k s was considered. Almost a century a g o , in 1827, some refugees f r o m Western A n a t o l i a p r o p o s e d t o the third National A s s e m b l y o f the Hellenes at T r o i z e n e that an area near the Corinth Isthmus be allocated t o them for the settlement o f a b o u t 2,000 families w h i c h wanted t o abandon the O t t o m a n E m p i r e and establish themselves in the stillb o r n K i n g d o m o f G r e e c e . (Minutes o f the T h i r d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y , 37th M e e t i n g , M a y 1, 1827). The request was favorably received and permission w a s g i v e n f o r the b u i l d i n g o f the n e w city, t o be called N e a Smyrna. T h e matter, h o w e v e r , w a s n o t pursued any further after 1829. F o r the text o f the refugee report that was submitted t o the National A s s e m b l y and the subsequent debates see A . B . Protonotarios, To Prosfygikon Provlcma ( T h e R e f u g e e Problem) (Athens : Pyrsos, 1929), p p . 22-34. 16. See S. Seferiades, Op. Cit., pp. 354-361. 17. Ibid., pp. 358-359.

(Translated f r o m French).

I n the q u o t a t i o n o f the T u r k i s h note, a v e r y serious

typographical erratum w h i c h was n o t noticed changes the character o f the w h o l e agreement.

T h e French

text reads : " u n échange des populations... de la Macédoine et de l ' F m p i r e H e l l é n i q u e . "

T h e mistake

is in the w o r d " E m p i r e " w h i c h should be " E p i r e " , i.e., " E p i r u s " .

T h e r e was n o intention t o transfer all

the M o s l e m s o f the G r e e k state and m o r e o v e r , one c o u l d n o t refer t o G r e e c e as " t h e G r e e k E m p i r e " . See also Ladas, Op. Cit., pp. 21-22.

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in the exchange of minorities : in the extent of the transfer and in the nature of the people involved. As was pointed out earlier, the 1913 Convention covered a welldefined frontier zone in which the ravages of war had caused great population displacements. It attempted, therefore, to render permanent a fait accompli by extending the exchange to the remaining few inhabitants. On the contrary, the Greek-Turkish accord intended to create a new situation. In the first place, it applied to four large regions designated by their broad geographical names (Macedonia and Epirus versus Thrace and Western Anatolia). Secondly, the number of people concerned was much larger, well over a million. Finally, the nature of the exchangeables was different. They were not persons uprooted by the tumult of war and ruined by military campaigns. They were peacefully living people, prosperous and satisfied, feeling secure and having no desire to abandon their homes. The expulsion and deportation policy of the Ottoman Government had, of course, terrified the Greeks in Smyrna and their massive flights to Greece is an undeniable proof of their anxiety. The Moslems of Greece, however, had no such reasons and their reluctance to leave their homes and their hostility to any idea of transfer were fully exhibited a few years later, when the Lausanne Convention obliged them to emigrate. To the extent, therefore, that the 1914 agreement envisaged the exchange of well-established and flourishing communities scattered in the interior of the two countries concerned, it represented a drastic departure from all accepted practice in the field of minorities. For the same reason, it may be deemed the precursor of the post-World War conventions. 11. — Turkish and Greek Motivations. The alignment of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers further aggravated the condition of the unredeemed Greeks. It was not any more the Greeks of certain villages and cities of the Aegean coast but the entire hellenic population of Western Anatolia and Eastern Thrace that became the object of expulsion. Claiming that this measure was dictated by military purposes,18 the Turkish Government deported 481,109 persons 19 in the interior during the four years of the war. Even after the armistice, in 1919 and 1920, the expulsions continued, being directed this time against the Greeks of the Black Sea littoral, around Trebizond. 20 There is no doubt, therefore, that the aim of this policy was "the sim18. A cable o f the German Embassy in Constantinople, communicated to the Archbishop of Amissos, stated that " T h e evacuation of the coast is a purely military measure... The coast will be evacuated in a distance of fifty kilometers within a month..." Seferiades, Op. C/V., p. 361, as quoted from Emmanouilides, Empire Ottoman, p. 127. (Translated from the French.) 19. Lot. Cit. 20. Sakkas, Op. CiA, p. 130 ff.

5«

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plest thing in political evolution : it [was] Turkey for the Turk in its most undiluted form". 21 The disastrous Asia Minor campaign contributed considerably to the Ottomanization of Turkey. More than a million alarmed Greeks fled away, in a desperate attempt to save their lives. But the Kemalists wanted to complete their task and when the Conference assembled at Lausanne they did not conceal that their aim was to achieve the long sought ethnological homogeneity of the country. Since there were still some Greeks left in the interior of Anatolia and in Eastern Thrace 22 "the men of Angora, inflexible in their logic..., demanded the expulsion of the Christian remnant from Turkey". 23 Violently rejecting any suggestions of repatriating the refugees, they strongly supported the transfer of all the hellenic minorities to Greece. Their attitude at Lausanne is sarcastically but quite accurately described in the following article published after Ismet Pasha had vehemently opposed all compromise solutions regarding the Greek Orthodox inhabitants who were still living in Turkey : Of all the germs of disturbance, the Greek is by far the most dangerous. He is foreign in blood and religion; in buying and in selling he is incessantly active, and together with the Armenian he gathers in the piastres of the "Faithful". In one way or another this leads to trouble, to accusations — false of course — of massacre r, and to interference from without. And, even worse than this, the Greek is a near neighbor who actually claims the soil, who declares that he had an Empire in Anatolia centuries before the Turks were heard of, when they were just wandering bands of horsemen in Khoressan, in Armenia, or along the upper streams of the Euphrates. He goes so far as to pretend that the city of Istanboul, which he names Constantinople, is by rights his, and the great mosque on the Bosporus, St. Sophia he calls it, the metropolitan cathedral of his faith. Therefore he must go, and go at once, and as quickly from Constantinople as from Smyrna.24

21* " T h e Conversion of Senator B o r a h " , The International p. 1251.

Interpreter,

V o l . I, N o . 40, (Jan. 6, 1925),

22. According to the 1920 Greek census, there were 186,000 Greeks in Eastern Thrace. In 1923, when Turkey reoccupied the region, there were 1,177 k ^ * A . A . Pallis, "Racial Migrations in the Balkans", Op. Cit., pp. 328-329. 23. R. Blanchard, " T h e Exchange of Populations between Greece and T u r k e y " , The Review, V o l . X V , N o . 3 (July 1925), p. 451.

Geographica

24. " T h e Conversion of Senator B o r a h " , The International Interpreter, V o l . I, N o . 40 (Jan. 6, 1923), p. 1251. Ambassador Morgenthau dealing with the same point, is also absolutely convinced about the intentions of the Y o u n g T u r k Government. He writes : " T h e systematic burning of the Greek quartet of Smyrna by the Turkish troops under the very eye of Kemal; the systematic slaughter of Greek men, w o m e n and children;... the segregation of all ablebodied Greek males from 16 to 50, w h o were then driven inland, where practically all perished of forced labor, their destruction being hastened by starvation and assassination; the deportation of the remaining women, children and old men to Greece. A l l these atrocities were clear evidence o f the deliberate intention of the T u r k s to remove utterly all Greek population from Asia Minor, in pursuance of the program o f the Turkish Nationalists under Kemal,

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Behind, however, this emotionally-phrased explanation of Turkish policy lies a geopolitical factor which elucidates Kemal's actions and which dictated his goals. In an attempt to find the underlying basis of the Twentieth Century Near Eastern crisis, J. Ancel offers "the struggle for the coasts" theory. The tip of the Balkan Peninsula is unquestionably Greek; Northern Aegean is a mixture of Christian races with a Turkish minority scattered among them; the Turkish claims in Europe are debatable but nobody can dispute the national composition of the Anatolian plateau. The East is predominantly Moslem but a hellenic element, deployed along the shores, bars the outlet. "Who will be the master of this coast, of these approaches to the sea?... The coastal Greek state or the continental Turkish one?" 25 This was the crucial question. Kemal realized that Smyrna under the sovereignty of Greece would not only strengthen the Hellenic State but also convert the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake. Moreover, "its detachment from Turkey would have practically destroyed the economic life of that country". 26 Even after he occupied it, he wanted to insure that no basis whatsoever would be left for any future Greek claims to the Western shores of Anatolia. Had he accepted the repatriation of the refugees or had he not insisted on the expulsion of the remaining Christian inhabitants, the heterogeneous character of the Ottoman Empire would have persisted. He was determined, therefore, that there should be no settlement or compromise without the exchange of minorities. Meanwhile, the situation in Greece was verging on chaos. A nation about five million strong, with few developed natural resources, politically divided and economically ruined by ten years of wars and revolutions, was suddenly faced with a revengeful triumphant enemy on the one hand and a flood of destitute refugees on the other, in numbers equal to one fourth of its population.27 "The excited hopes of the Turks and the bitter desperation of the Greeks are disturbing forces which may wreck all preconceived views of state and authority" 28 wrote The Times in an editorial, and the situation was so appalling

by which Asia Minor was to be completely " T u r k e y f i e d " . Morgenthau, Op. Cit.y pp. 47-48. See also E. Gardner : " T h e Turkish Policy towards the Greeks of Asia Minor, w h o formed the most enterprising and prosperous part of the population, became one of literal extermination". Greece and the Aegean, (London : G . G . Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1933) N e w Edition 1938, p. 28. 25. J. Ancel, Op. Ci/., pp. 186-187 (translated from the French). 26. Bowman, Op. Cil., pp 403-404. 27. In a pessimistic tone Gibbons asked the question that was in everybody's mind: " H o w can a country, not self-supporting, bankrupt and without credit abroad, take care of a 20 per cent increase in its population, not o f able-bodied men, but of dependents ? " Europe since 1918, p. 440. 28. The Times, December 2, 1922.

6o

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that there was talk of a renewed war. 29 Immediate and effective action was necessary to alleviate the misery and prevent the total collapse of the country. Anxious to avoid any further prolongation of the anarchic conditions which could only lead to more bloodshed and greater anguish, the Greek Government signed on January 30, 1923 the Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations. 12. — The Greek-Bulgarian Exchange of Populations. This was the second agreement involving a mass movement of populations that was signed by Greece. Due to the publicity given to the GreekTurkish exchange and to the dramatic circumstances under which it was executed, it is often forgotten that on November 27, 1919, Greece and Bulgaria approved a Convention Respecting the Reciprocal Emigration of their Racial Minorities.30 According to it, about 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria while 53,000 Bulgarians emigrated to their motherland. To these figures one must add 16 000 Hellenes and 39,000 Slavs who had formerly left their homes during the world war and who availed themselves of the Convention for the liquidation of their properties.31 On the whole the Greeks showed a greater willingness to come to their country 32 for they were threatened with an agrarian reform in Bulgaria and hoped to obtain better lands in the northern Hellenic provinces where they could settle permanently and safely. The Bulgarians did not emigrate as readily 33 and quite a 29. Gibbons, Europe since 1918, p. 440. The Greek Army was organized in Western Thrace (the famous " E v r o s Army") and its Commander, General Pangalos, was ready for an offensive. See G . Daphnes, J3 Hellas Metaxy dyo Po!tmon1 1923-1940 (Greece between two Wars, 1923-1940), (Athens : Icaros, 1954) Vol. I, pp. 21-24. 30. The Convention was based on Article 56, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly) which provided that "Bulgaria undertakes to recognize such provisions as the [Allies] may consider opportune with respect to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of persons belonging to racial minorities." See text of the treaty in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 (New York : 1924), Vol. II, pp. 653-78;. 31. The figures were given by the Mixed Commission which supervised the exchange and are quoted in Ladas, Op. Cit., pp. 122-123. See also H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics — A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia, (Liverpool : The University Press : 1951), p. 262. L . A . Mills and C. H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition (New York : Henry Holt and Co., 1956), p. 57 and Aegides, Op. Cit., p. 28. (He gives the number of emigrated Greeks as 52,891, 20,000 of whom had left Bulgaria before 1919. The discrepancy, however, is not too great). 32. Macartney, Refugees, p. 88. The only writer who differs is E. Forster, Op. Cit., p. 155 : " T h e Bulgarians in Greek territory showed more eagerness to leave Greece than did the Greeks in Bulgaria to migrate into Greece." This statement is not substantiated by the Mixed Commission's reports, which show that three years after the signing of the Convention the Bulgarian minority had not expressed any desire to emigrate. Only when the Asia Minor refugees began pouring in Greece in 1922 did the Commission receive the first declarations for emigration. Ladas, Op. Cit., pp. 104-107. 33. One of the reasons was the activities of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (better known as I. M. R. O.) which put pressure upon the peasants to dissuade them from emigrating and consequently decreasing the Slav minority of Macedonia. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 104. See also E . Barker, Macedonia, Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 30 : "Both coun-

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large number, about 82,000 persons,34 preferred to remain in Greece, living mainly in Western Macedonia. The Convention concerning the reciprocal emigration of the national minorities followed the general principles of the pre-world war GreekTurkish and Turco-Bulgarian agreements. From one point of view, however, it represented an uncontestable improvement, "an advantage of form" 35 as Professor Seferiades characterized it, which shows that the problem was approached in a more humane manner : the words "exchange" or "transfer" of populations do not appear in its text. It is, of course, only a question of semantics, but one should not disregard the importance of words, especially during a period of unrest and of strained international relations. The agreement was presented as a plan for a mutual and voluntary emigration of those people who wished to move to their motherland ; and although its spontaneous character was often violated,36 the fact remains that its verbal form made its acceptance by the contracting parties and by the people directly affected easier and prompt. 13. — The 1923 Convention : Origins. The advantageous phrasing of the 1919 Convention becomes even more evident when one compares it to that of 1923. Of all the acts 37 signed in Lausanne, the agreement concerning the compulsory exchange of the Greek and Turkish minorities provoked undoubtedly the greatest reaction. For tries... welcomed the Convention, but it was opposed by I. M. R. O., whose leaders presumably felt, rightly, that the exchange would seriously weaken Bulgaria's ethnographical claim to Greek Macedonia. I. M. R. O. forbade the Bulgarians (or Slav Macedonians) of Greece to take advantage of the Convention.'' Mylonas claims that the I. M. R. O. was carrying governmental instructions : "The Bulgarian peasants of Macedonia were forbidden by the Macedonia Revolutionary Organization, acting for the official government of Bulgaria, to take advantage of the agreement." 0/>. Cit., p. 157. 54. The exact number according to the Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados, 1930 (Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930), p. 98, was 81,984 (1928 census). Some estimates, however, are somewhat higher approaching the figure of 100,000 people. See Barker, Op. Cit., p. 12. 35. Op. Cit., p. 369. 36. While most law-respecting nations are fully aware of the sanctity of international pacts and avoid any direct breach of them, quite often, nevertheless, without expressively denouncing them, they violate their spirit. Greece, wanting to expedite the emigration and to force the movement of as many persons as possible, adopted several measures (i.e., she deported 1,500 — 2,000 Slav families to the islands) or failed to safeguard the rights of the Bulgarians whose lands were swamped by the Asia Minor refugees and in this way she obliged the minorities to avail themselves of the benefits of the Convention and emigrate. The circumstances naturally were such that all the inhabitants of the country had to assist the newcomers who otherwise would have starved or frozen to death. There is no doubt, however, that this idea of sheltering the refugees and sharing the burden of their settlement acted as a stimulus and prompted the departure of many Bulgarians. See Ladas, Op. Cit., pp. 105-108. On the same point Percy Alden remarks : "To consolidate the Greek position in Western Macedonia is not a sufficient reason for a policy which would certainly tend to drive out the entire Bulgarian population.'' Alden, "The Refugee Problem", The Contemporary Review, Vol. CXXVII, (May 1925), p. 575. See also Macartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 439-443. He comes to the conclusion that "the genuine voluntary emigrants were... few indeed." Ibid., p. 440. 37. There were seventeen.

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the first time in history the international community accepted the forcible uprooting and the accompanying distress and hardship of hundreds of thousands of peaceful and law-abiding citizens. The Convention was considered as a regression from the inalienable principles of human rights and to a certain extent it was actually a reversal of the professed axioms of the Allies. For the benefit of historical justice, however, one should state that the representatives at the Conference were fully aware of the severe and painful character of the agreement which they endorsed with great reluctance and reservations. Their feelings are clearly manifested not only by their statements, but also by the promptness with which all the parties concerned rejected the paternity of the project. 38 Indeed one of the most intricate and interesting questions concerns the identity of the statesman who first formulated and presented the plan. From the available documents and the speeches that were delivered, the following account seems to interpret quite accurately the developments preceding the signature of the Convention. On September 16, 1922 after the burning of Smyrna and the mass exodus of the Christian population towards Greece and Eastern Thrace, Colonel Procter, Dr. Nansen's 39 Deputy Commissioner in Constantinople, asked authorization from the Council of the League of Nations to apply the machinery he had at his disposal and some funds in order to relieve the great distress of the people who had flooded the former capital of the Ottoman Empire. Two days later, the Fifth Committee of the League adopted a resolution 40 recommending that the High Commissioner of the League be authorised to utilise the services of the Russian Refugee organisation to assist in the relief of refugees from the Near East.

The Assembly accepted the recommendation and instructed Dr. Nansen to proceed to Constantinople and act as mediator between the Greek and Turkish Governments. 41 In Turkey he met several 38. " T h i s proposal [for the obligatory exchange] broke with all the accepted principles of international law, as with all the humanitarian traditions o f Europe; this was reflected in the curious effort of each o f the negotiators concerned — Ismet Pasha for Turkey, M . Venizelos for Greece and Dr. Nansen... — to shift responsibility for it upon one of the others..." Mitrany, Op. Cit., pp. 249-250. 39. D r . Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), the famous Norwegian explorer and statesman, was appointed Commissioner o f the League of Nations for the repatriation of war prisoners after the Armistice. In 1919, he was responsible for the relief of the Russian refugees w h o had fled to Constantinople. While he was engaged in this humanitarian w o r k , the Asia Minor disaster occurred and created the appalling problem of the Greek refugees. 40. League of Nations, Greek and Armenian Refugees from Asia Minor in Constantinople, Resolution adopted by the Fifth Committee on September 18, 1922, A . 80, 1922. 41. For a detailed account of the negotiations see League of Nations, Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees, September 4, 1923, A . 30, 1923. X I I , Part III, pp. 23-24. A l s o L a d a s , Op.Cit., pp. 336-338 and Seferiades, Op. Cit., pp. 372-376.

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times with Hamid Bey, the diplomatic representative at Constantinople of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and presented him with a memorandum setting forth "the various questions with which he desired to deal, particularly the question of an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey". 42 Meanwhile the Minister of the Interior in Angora declared that the Turkish Government had decided to propose at L,ausanne the compulsory exchange of the Greek and Turkish minorities. As soon as Venizelos was informed about this policy decision, he cabled to Dr.Nansen requesting him to "endeavor to arrange that transfer of the populations begin before signature of peace". 43 Mr. Venizelos' action was motivated by his desire to provide adequate housing facilities for the Asia Minor refugees by settling them on the premises of the 350,000 Turks who lived in Greece and who would emigrate to Turkey. Foreseeing, however, the long diplomatic negotiations in I^ausanne, he sought to make the exchange independent of the peace settlement and to execute the agreement as soon as possible. It appears, therefore, that Venizelos did not believe that there could be any other solution to the problems created by the catastrophic Anatolian campaign, and so accepted the Turkish decision as irrevocable. On October 15th the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan in Constantinople, endorsing Venizelos' position, formally invited Dr. Nansen "to take all possible steps" to reach an agreement regarding an exchange of populations "as soon as possible, independently of the peace negotiations". The Greek Government expressed its desire for an early conclusion of a Convention and Mustapha Kemal Pasha informed Dr. Nansen that "the exchange was acceptable in principle" but that it would have to be considered by the Government at Angora. The Nationalist Government having agreed on the exchange "excluding Western Thrace", it empowered Hamid Bey to conduct the necessary negotiations. It must be pointed out that until this time the nature of the exchange, i. e., whether it was going to be voluntary or obligatory, had not been discussed,44 the concerned parties having refrained from expressing any views on this point. On October 31, however, 42. Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees A . 30, 1923, X I I , p. 23. A l l the subsequent quotations on the negotiations for the transfer, unless otherwise indicated, are taken f r o m this document. 43. Ladas, Op. Citp.

336.

The cable was sent on October 13, 1922.

44. Mr. Ladas, commenting on Venizelos' cable of October 13, deduces that " M . Venizelos was proposing a total exchange and probably a compulsory o n e . " (Loc. Cit.) The author agrees with him to the extent that the Greek statesman was thinking in terms of an accord covering the minorities of the entire t w o countries and not of selected geographical provinces. It cannot, however, be substantiated that he envisaged an obligatory exchange and subsequent events prove that he was against the forcible transfer of the populations.

64

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MINORITIES

Hatnid Bey informed Dr. Nansen that "the Angora Government only permitted him to negotiate on the basis of a total and enforced exchange of populations" from which the population of Constantinople would not be excluded. The High Commissionner did not assent to these qualifications and sent a memorandum to Kemal asking him whether he was prepared to negotiate "without delay" an agreement for the exchange of populations "on the basis of a voluntary emigration of the racial minorities... including the civilians detained in Asia Minor". A t the same time he informed the Greek Government of the conditions that Hamid Bey had posed and requested its views on them. Greece replied immediately that " i t could not agree to a total and enforced exchange of populations, including that of Constantinople". 45 Hamid Bey's sudden departure for Switzerland and the failure of the Angora Government to answer Dr. Nansen's memorandum brought to an end the negotiations undertaken b y the High Commissioner. 14. — The 1923 Convention : Discussions at Lausanne. The second phase of the discussions on the problem of exchanging the minority populations opened in Lausanne on December 1, 1922.46 The Territorial and Military Commission invited Dr. Nansen to make a statement presenting the background of the question and his suggestions as to the manner in which it could be solved. He expressed the opinion that a transfer should be effectuated as soon as possible, justifying it on economic and psychological reasons : an early exchange b y the end of February 1923 would permit the emigrants to settle and cultivate the lands for the summer. But more important was the politico-psychological argument. " I t would be easier", he declared, " t o carry through an exchange... at the moment such as the present, immediately after the great crisis" which had already resulted in great population displacements, than later on, when the situation 4J. Again the author disagrees with Mr. Ladas f interpretation o f the Greek Government's reply. Mr. Ladas quotes the following passage from a Report by D r . Nansen, dated NOT. 15, 1922 (C. 756. M . 447, 1922): " I [submitted] the question of a total and enforced exchange o f populations, including that of Constantinople, to the Greek Government. The reply of the Greek Government to my communication on this subject, a reply which was clearly unfavorable to the last point, reached me..." (League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, N o . 1, (Part II). Jan. 1923, pp. 128-129). He then proceeds to show that the words "clearly unfavorable" refer to the exchange of the Greek minority in Constantinople and that therefore " i t would seem that the Greek Government was not 'clearly unfavorable' to compulsory exchange". Op. Cii., p. 337. T h e author believes that in view of the unequivocal statement of Dr. Nansen, quoted above in the main body o f the dissertation, there is no reason to resort to an argumentum a contrario, especially when this syllogism brings one to conclusions which conflict with the official Greek pronouncements and with the position taken by the Greek Delegation at Lausanne. 46. For a detailed account of the debates that preceded the signature o f the Convention see Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1923), Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923. Records of Proceeding and Draft Terms of Peace, Cmd 1814 (London : H . M . Stationery Office, 1923). Hereafter referred to as Lausanne Conference.

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CONFERENCE

65

would be normalized and "affairs have settled down to a quieter routine". 47 As it will be seen, this is a noteworthy point closely interrelated with the prerequisites and limitations of the transfer of populations method as a solution to minority problems. Dr. Nansen concluded by listing the three preparatory political questions upon which a decision had to be taken before an agreement could be signed : (a) whether the treaty should be based on the principle of compulsory or voluntary emigration, (b) what should be the area of its application and (c) what should be the nature of the Mixed Commission or other machinery to be established.48 It is evident, therefore, that the nature of the exchange, in spite of all the preceding negotiations, was still undetermined. During the same session, Venizelos emphasized "that he did not wish to oblige the Turkish population to leave Greece" and that "what he had in mind was a voluntary exchange...". He was, however, ready to consider an exchange of populations, either obligatory or voluntary. 49 Lord Curzon agreed with him in that "every one would instinctively prefer a voluntary exchange... but he thought that compulsion would very probably be found necessary ", 50 It seems, therefore, that the Conference, slowly and reluctantly, was accepting the principle of obligatory transfer, mainly because it could see no other alternative. The matter was referred for further and detailed examination to a sub-commission consisting of representatives of each of the three inviting Powers (Great Britain, France and Italy) of Turkey and of Greece under the chairmanship of Mr. Montagna, former Italian Minister to Greece. While this body was convening, the Commission itself discussed the question of protection for minorities, commenting parenthetically on the nature of the exchange. As soon, however, as it was publicly and authoritatively disclosed that the possibility of an obligatory transfer of populations was seriously considered by the Conference, public opinion among the refugees and the Moslems in Greece was aroused to the point of hysteria. Public demonstrations were organized, appeals were circulated and the petitions sent to Lausanne, the League of Nations and the Allied Governments "literally stalemated the Conference... by requesting that the compulsory exchange be not accepted". 51 "Stirred by the instinctive feeling of attachment to the land and homes where their ancestors have lived for centuries" declared Mr. Venizelos, "both the Greek 47. Lausanne Conference, pp. i i j - 1 1 6 . 48. Ibid., p. 116. 49. 50. 51. (Paris

Ibid., p. 121. l.oc. Cit. S. Friedman, Le Problème des Minorités Ethniques et sa Solution par VAutonomie et la Personnification, : Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1927), p. 154 (translated from French). 5

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MINORITIES

and the Turskih populations involved... are protesting against this procedure... and display their dissatisfaction by all the means at their disposal.52 Confronted by this vehement and hostile public response, the protagonists at the Conference made " a manifest attempt... to shift responsability for the origin of the idea of exchange and for the proposal for a compulsory exchange". 53 Ismet Pasha stated that his impression was that the proposal came from the Greek delegation. 54 Mr. Venizelos retorted that, on the contrary, such exchange was repugnant to his Government and that "the idea had been suggested by Dr. Nansen", 55 who thought the Turkish authorities would never assent to the refugees' return to their homes. Moreover, he declared that if there was a misunderstanding on this subject, and if the Ottoman delegation were prepared to consider another solution of the problem based on principles which were more humane and more in accordance with the natural rights of populations, he was prepared to withdraw his consent to the method of compulsory exchange — a method which he had only accepted under stress of necessity.56

The High Commissioner, however, was not disposed to accept the paternity of the idea and claimed that the initiative came from the representatives of the four Great Powers in Constantinople.57 This allegation was not correct, for although his statement was true, it did not acknowledge the fact that two days before the official invitation of the High Commissioners, Dr. Nansen himself had written to Hamid Bey mentioning the exchange of populations.58 Concluding, therefore, this discussion of the question of how the idea of transferring the minorities and, particularly, its compulsory nature, originated, one may positively and irrevocably state that the idea belonged to Dr. Nansen who first conceived i t ; that, on the other hand, the obligatory character of the agreement was due to Hamid Bey who advanced it on behalf of the Turkish Government as a conditio sine qua non. 52. Lausanne Conference,

pp. 223-224.

53. Ladas, Op. (..it., p. 340.

54. Lausanne Conference, p. 188.

See also Seferiades, Op. Cit., p. 372.

55. Lausanne

A considerable n u m b e r o f scholars u p h o l d s this v i e w . C f . F . L . S c h u -

Conference,

p. 210.

m a n : " I n January, 1923, at the s u g g e s t i o n o f D r . N a n s e n . . . a T u r c o - G r e e k c o n v e n t i o n w a s s i g n e d " . International

Politics,

1st ed. ( N e w Y o r k and L o n d o n : M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o . Inc., 1933), p. 319.

Ma-

cartney : " A t D r . N a n s e n ' s advice, clauses w e r e inserted i n the T r e a t y p r o v i d i n g f o r the c o m p u l s o r y

exchange".

Refugees,

p. 86.

56. Lausanne Conference, p. 227. 57. In his statement o f D e c e m b e r 1, 1922, he s a i d : " I w a s i n v i t e d by the representatives o f the f o u r G r e a t P o w e r s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e t o e n d e a v o u r to initiate n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n the T u r k i s h a n d G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t s w i t h a v i e w to the c o n c l u s i o n o f a treaty f o r the e x c h a n g e o f m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n s " . Ibid.,

58. See supra, pp. 62-63.

p. 1 1 4 .

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CONFERENCE

67

This interpretation does not only "conform to the known attitude of the parties" 59 but is also officially endorsed by Sir Horace Rumbold. 60 One cannot avoid the impression, however, that Venizelos himself was rather favorably inclined towards the principle of compulsory exchange. It must be admitted that he was "too hasty in indicating his willingness" 61 to consider the idea seriously and did not actually exploit the possibility of other alternatives. This may be due to his conviction that Turkey would not accept any other solution and his belief may be well justified by the explicit declarations and broad political aims of the Young Turks. At the same time, however, one should not disregard the wide-spread repugnance of the civilized world to the idea of massively uprooting hundreds of thousands of people against their will and transferring them to another state. Venizelos could have found strong supporters for the case of a voluntary emigration among the allies, and Lord Curzon himself did not hesitate to characterize "the solution now being worked out [as] a thoroughly bad and vicious [one], for which the world would pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come".62 Had he followed this course, he would have avoided the bitter criticism which was directed against him after the signing of the Convention and which castigated the exchange of populations as "the greatest crime of Venizelos' whole political career". 63 15. — Analysis of the Convention. The Convention that was drafted by the appointed sub-committee affirmed the obligatory character of the exchange 64 in its first article which reads : As from 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively. 59. Mitrany, Op. Cit., p. 250. 60. "When the Greek population fled from Asia Minor..., the High Commissioners met to examine the problem. Dr. Nansen... was invited to attend the meetings, and the idea of an exchange of populations came from him.... It was at this point that Dr. Nansen approached Hamid Bey... and the latter replied categorically that the question... could only be considered on an obligatory basis." Lausanne Conference, p. 227. See also Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem-Report of a Survey (London : Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 15. 61. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 342. 62. Lausanne Conference, p. 212. 63. A . Th. Polyzoides, "Greece in the Agonies of Revolutionary Conflict" Current History, Vol. X X I , No. 3, (December 1924), p. 401. 64. The author was surprised to find out that in spite of the world-wide publicity that the Convention received and of the passionate debates it created, there are still people in high political positions who speaking on this subject think that the exchange was voluntary. Lord Strabolgi, for example, addressed

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It was also agreed that those Greeks and Moslems who had already, and since 18th October, 1912, left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which were to be respectively exchanged, would be considered as in the exchange provided for in Article 1. Article 2 defined the persons who were exempt from the exchange : they were the Moslems of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Constantinople. An eleven-member 65 Mixed Commission was established "to supervise and facilitate the emigration and to carry out the liquidation of the movable and immovable property" (articles 11 and 12). The total sums due of the basis of this liquidation would constitute a government debt from the country where the liquidation took place to the government of the country to which the emigrant belonged; the emigrant would in principle be entitled to receive in the country to which he emigrated, as representing the sums due to him, property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which he had left behind (article 14). Finally, the Contracting Parties agreed not to apply any pressure, direct or indirect, on the exchangeable populations with a view to making them leave their homes or abandon their property before the date fixed for their departure (article 16). A close analysis of the clauses of the Convention indicates that it was directed actually to two different groups of people : first, there were those Christians living in the Ottoman Empire and Moslems inhabiting Greece who after October 18, 1912 (date of the declaration of the First Balkan War) and until the signature of the 1923 agreement had left their homes for Greece and Turkey respectively. For them the Convention amounted to permanent exile 66 : they were forbidden to return to their native soil. The second group comprised the minorities of the two countries. A t the time of the Lausanne Conference, there were still about 200,000 Greeks remaining in Anatolia; the Moslem population of Greece, not having been subjected to the turmoil of the Asia Minor campaign, was naturally almost intact. These were the people who, properly speaking, had to be exchanged. The clauses of the Convention, however, which provided for the evaluation and liquidation of properties, covered both groups, the refugees who had already emigrated and the persons who were to be transferred.67 the House o f Lords and said in 1944 : " T h e leading case is the exchange of populations between the two wars, between the Greeks and the Turks, that was carried out under most favorable circumstances. It was a voluntary exchange..." House o f Lords, "Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (1943-44), V o l . 130 (London : 1944), p. 1105. (The author's italics). 65. Four Greeks, four Turks and three neutrals. T h e Presidency of the Commission was exercised in turn by each of these neutral members. 66. " T h e Treaty in effect denied these refugees [who had fled] the right to return to T u r k e y . " L. A . Mills and C. H . McLaughlin, Op. Cit., p. 57. 67. For the purpose o f this dissertation, the words "exchanged persons" will cover both groups, for there is actually no important reason to maintain the distinction.

THE LAUSANNE

CONFERENCE

69

16. — Appraisal of the Convention. T h e agreement, characterized as a " b r i l l i a n t " 6 8 achievement of K e m a l , was considered a great Turkish victory on t w o accounts : on the number of persons involved and on the economic and psychological state of the exchangeables. T u r k e y , which even before the war was sparsely populated, received 354,647 69 Moslems w h o could be housed adequately in the abandoned premises of the Christians and employed productively on their farms. Greece, on the other hand, suffering from chronic overpopulation, 7 0 had to absorb, socially and economically, the staggering number of over 1,200,000 persons. This disequilibrium is further aggravated if one examines the material conditions of the people involved. T h e T u r k s left under most favorable circumstances, in peacetime and in a methodical fashion, not h a v i n g experienced the tragedy of war and carrying w i t h t h e m their movable property. Their lot was considered v e r y fortunate and enviable indeed, compared to the turbulent exodus of the Christian families which, mourning the loss of close relatives and separated from their male members detained in Asia Minor, arrived in Greece hungry, sick and on the verge of mental breakdown. Valid and justified as these remarks m a y be, they nevertheless fail to place the issue in a realistic context. T h e question should not be approached from the viewpoint of T u r k e y ' s accomplishments, b u t of Greece's capabilities, i.e., w h a t actions the Greek Government could take to arrive at a more satisfactory solution. A scholar has suggested t h a t Greece should h a v e appealed to the l e a g u e of Nations whose intervention in this humane matter " w o u l d h a v e been imminent". 7 1 T h e same author, however, admits t h a t the international organization was too y o u n g to handle an issue involving so m a n y Great Powers. Moreover, he disregards the fact t h a t such an appeal was actually made b y Dr. Nansen ; b u t the allies, " w a n t i n g to keep the whole matter in their own hands... were not to be moved", 7 2 in spite of the support t h a t the proposal received f r o m the lesser European states. A n y dispassionate and objective evaluation of the exchange of populations solution depends on the answer to a fundamental question : was T u r k e y willing to accept the return of the refugees w h o had fled in panic? Mr. I^adas claims t h a t from the conversations he h a d a t A n g o r a and Istanbul some years after the Conference, he gathered 68. G . S. Frangoudls, L'Hellénisme en Lutte contre l'Orient et l'Occident — Les Traités de Sèvres et de Lausanne (Athènes : Imprimerie Franco-Hellenique, 1925), p. 224. 69. Eddy, Op. Cit., p. 202. The figure was taken from the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations : Opinion o f the Neutral Members of June 12, 1930. 70. T h e emigration of Greeks to the United States had started well before the world war. 71. A . Deimezis, Situation Sociale créée en Grèce à la Suite de l'Echange des Populations (Paris : Jean Budry and Co., 1927), p. 10. 72. F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, V o l . I, (London : Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 214-215.

7°

THE BALKAN

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OF

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the impression that "no final decision was taken to insist at Lausanne upon the compulsory exchange of the Greek and Turkish minorities". 73 This view may be accurate. The fact, however, remains that not only Hamid Bey had declared that an obligatory exchange was the sole basis on which an agreement could be negotiated, but also that the Turkish Government gave no indication whatsoever of its disposal to consider any other alternative. Once Greece esteemed the Turkish position as categorical and irreversible, the number of policy decisions which she could make was limited indeed. Most of the Greek officials who authoritatively comment on the exchange accept its inevitability. Colonel Gonatas, the Premier of the Revolutionary Government after the Asia Minor defeat, writes that "the Greek Delegation was forced to sign these agreements [about the exchange of populations and of the prisoners of war] for the Turks had explicitly declared that they would not accept the repatriation of the Greeks who had departed from Turkey". 74 A. A. Pallis, an authority on the question of population movements in the Balkans and a member of the later established Refugee Settlement Commission, states that "in the face of... the impossibility of forcing Turkey to readmit the refugees except by a fresh recourse to arms, Greece bowed to the inevitable". 75 "The exchange of populations, therefore, was the only solution that imposed itself" 76 writes Deimezis and the consensus of the scholars is that for Greece "there was nothing else to be done". 77 These opinions, however, tend to emphasize one aspect of the Convention, namely, the provision that prohibited the return of the refugees to their homes. It is a very serious aspect indeed, but not the only one. If one examines the clauses pertaining to the exchange of populations properly speaking, to wit, the transfer of the Christians who continued to remain in Turkey and of the Moslems in Greece, then the agreement ceases to be unqualifiedly favorable to Turkey. On the contrary, the compulsory exchange of the still existing minorities clearly benefited Greece. By authorizing the forced emigration of the Turks who had no desire to leave 7 8 and whose status could have hardly been affected if the exchange were on a voluntary basis, the agreement permitted the Greek Government to alleviate to a certain 73. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 725. 74. Gonatas, Op. Cit., p. 267 (translated from Greek).

See also Daphnes, Op. Cit., Vol. I, p. 42.

75. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture — and After, p. 168. 76. Deimezis, Op. Cit., pp. 12, 15-16. 77. D. Powell, Remember Greece, (London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1941), p. 73. See also Mitrany, Op. Cit., p. 250 : "For Greece... it was largely a matter of bowing to an accomplished fact." 78. "Many of them [the Moslems]... went against their will. They were not illtreated in Europe and had no wish to be uprooted and transplanted to a ruined country." Blanchard, Op. Cit., p. 453.

THE LAUSANNE

CONFERENCE

7i

extent the problem of refugee settlement through the utilization of their abandoned properties. Furthermore, it can not be maintained that this benefit was offset by the arrival of the remaining unredeemed Greeks exchanged under the auspices of the Mixed Commission. In the first place, the statistics show that the number of transferred Moslems was twice as great as that of the Christians.79 Secondly, it can be contended that a great percentage of these people would have emigrated anyway. Separated from their compatriots, faced with the triumphant Turkish nationalist attitude, confronted with Kemal's social revolution and the rise of Turkey as a modern national state, they would have found it impossible to maintain their previous privileged position and would have been obliged to find refuge in their motherland. This reasoning can be fully substantiated by the experience of the Greeks in Constantinople : although exempt from the exchange, over 35,000 of them 80 left their homes voluntarily and moved to Athens as soon as conditions permitted them to undertake this step without suffering great economic losses. Some experts go even further and assert that to some extent the provisions of the Convention were dictated by a desire to protect the Christians in Anatolia. " I t was... the plight of the Greeks remaining in Turkey which gave rise to the obligatory arrangement" 81 writes Azcarate while Mitrany does not hesitate to declare that the Greek minority "was perhaps saved from extinction by that agreement". 82 In view of these opinions and of the prevailing unfavorable circumstances for Greece, one can not argue that the actual exchange of the populations led to a deterioration of the state of affairs in that country. The refugee issue was created by the people who fled Asia Minor during the war and immediately after the disaster until the signature of the Convention. Naturally the group which came as a result of the execution of the population exchange agreement further increased the number of destitutes but did not seriously affect the already wide-spread social turmoil. Once Turkey refused to accept the return of the refugees, Greece was faced with a tremendous problem involving actually the existence and integrity of the country. Could it accomplish the gigantic task of absorbing more than a million desperate people and transform them into satisfied and respected individuals, into economically self-supporting and politically loyal citizens?

79. 354,647 Moslems against 192,356 Greeks. 80. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 41. 81. Azcarate, Op. Cit., pp. 54-55. 82. Mitrany, Op. Ci1.t p. 250.

Eddy, Op. Cil., p. 202.

CHAPTER

III

THE SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

SECTION I THE INTERNATIONAL

ASPECT

It is evident that Greece could have never coped with the great problems of the refugee settlement with some possibility of success without the financial assistance given to her from abroad and without the establishment of the Refugee Settlement Commission. A.

PAPANASTASSIOU,

Prime Minister of Greece

CHAPTER

III

THE SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

SECTION

I

THE INTERNATIONAL

17. 18. iq. 20. 21. 22.

— — — — — —

ASPECT

The Refugees and Private Relief. The Refugee Question before the League. Creation of the Refugee Settlement Commission. Organization of the Commission. The 1924 Refugee Loan. The 1927 Stabilization Loan.

17. — The Refugees and Private Relief. The political turbulences and social upheavals of the recent decades have profoundly affected human emotions and national reactions. The present-day world, having experienced large-scale suffering and extreme misery, seems to accept human distress as a lamentable but nevertheless unavoidable by-product of our revolutionary age. A t the same time, however, knowledge about how to deal with it has increased and efficient means have been devised by the international community to alleviate it and prevent it from reaching a desperate stage. These aspects were not present at the beginning of the century. During the First World War the sentiments of the people had not been anaesthetized by continuous torment, and sufferance provoked much easier philanthropic reactions. To take as an example the object of this dissertation, the existence of refugees, a wide-spread phenomenon today, was at that time rather rare and extraordinary. Because of its exceptional nature, however, the nations were not adequately equipped to cope with the problem, especially when it acquired large proportions. After the establishment of the International Red Cross, whose scope was anyhow limited, the League of Nations provided for

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the first time the framework within which truly international action could be taken to meet the challenge of massive tragedies. Its contribution in assisting the Russian and Armenian refugees and subsequently those of Asia Minor can hardly be overemphasized and will always remain a laudable page of its history. When Dr. Nansen, authorized by the Council's resolution to assist the Near-Bast refugees,1 arrived in Constantinople, he realized immediately that the situation was desperate indeed. Consequently, on October u , he sent a telegram to the Secretariat of the League stating that he considered the refugee problem "far more serious even than that presented to the Assembly". 2 There were over 750,000 homeless people, mostly women and children, scattered over every part of Greece, whose condition was "deplorable". The Government and other relief organizations were making "gallant efforts to meet the most urgent needs and to keep [them] alive... but further help on a large scale [was] absolutely essential if a great catastrophe [was] to be avoided". He concluded by "most urgently" appealing to the public opinion of the world "for its fullest support". 3 The state of affairs deteriorated during the winter when adverse climatic conditions, and the arrival of new refugees after the terms of the Lausanne Convention became known, brought Greece to the very brink of chaos. The Greeks of Anatolia, hastily flung across the Aegean and strewn about the country, "had their lives and absolutely nothing more" 4 writes H. C. Jaquith, Director of the Near East Relief in Greece and Turkey. "The old Greek refugees, aged and broken,... are beyond human help in many cases" reported the Chairman of the Anglo-Hellenic League, the Hon. W. Pember Reeves upon his return from the Near East. "Except in so far as we can alleviate the misery of their last few years, there is nothing much to be done for them". 5 The Greek Government was making a tremendous effort to meet the challenge but in spite of its great willingness to help the refugees, Greek and non-Greek,6 — besides the Greeks, there were over 50,000 Armenians who sought refuge in the country, — the problem was far beyond its capacity. The private organizations that were formed by leading Greek citizens such as the Refugee

1. Sec supra, p. 62. 2. League of Nations, Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. n (November 1922), p. 1 1 4 1 . 3. Lot. Cit. 4. Jaquith, Op. Cit., pp. 403-404. 5. Anglo-Hellenic League, Annual General Meeting, (Wednesday, June 25, 1924), Publication No. $4, (London : 1924), p. 29. 6. J . Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 205208.

THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

77

Treasury F u n d 7 could hardly be expected to contribute to its solution. In October 1922 Venizelos appealed to the world through the columns of The International Interpreter; in a letter to its editor, Mr. Nixon, he emphasized that " t o be able to bring the slightest alleviation to their sufferings, we need the sympathy and the active assistance of the whole world". He expressed the view, then, that as Europe was at the stage of recovering from the war and could not participate in the relief program in any effective manner, any substantial assistance would have to come from the United States : Europe has been sorely tried by the convulsions through which she has gone during the last decade, and is, perhaps, too worn out to cast more than an apathetic glance on this mass of human suffering. And so it is to America that we chiefly turn, and, indeed America has responded magnificently to the appeal... There is one point which I particularly wish to stress, and it is that we need help in the organisation of the relief as much as we need funds?

The response to which Venizelos referred was the reaction of the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief Organization which took an immediate and active interest in assisting the refugees and in preventing the dangerous consequences of the large-scale distress. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the American Red Cross sent representatives to Greece and organized a Relief Commission 9 as soon as it was informed about the emergency. For eight months, it worked incessantly, feeding people, suppressing epidemics, saving the orphans. In March 1923, no less than 533,240 refugees received food supplies daily and about 291,000 were inoculated against typhus and cholera. 10 The total cost of this relief work amounted to $ 2,605,696.09 11 for the period of October 1922-June 30, 1923 when the Red Cross withdrew from Greece. 18. — The Refugee Question before the League. It became increasingly evident, however, that the refugee problem, "more acute in

7. For a history of its formation and its activities — it lasted from October 1922 until October 1923 when the League of Nation's Refugee Settlement Commission arrived in Greece — see Morgenthau, Op. Cit., pp. 71-78. 8. The International Interpreter, Vol. I, N o . 33, p. 1035. Exactly 25 years later, Greece finding herself in the midst of another chaotic situation, turned to the United States which "responded magnificently" once more through the Truman Doctrine. 9. For its relief w o r k see The American National Red Cross, Annual Report for the Year Ending, June 30, 1923, (Washington), pp. 54-65. The Red Cross was in charge o f the operations in Greece while the Near East Relief concentrated its activities in Turkey, concerned primarily with assisting the orphans whose number swelled to 18,500. 10. Ibid., p. 64, 65. 11. Ibid., p. 90.

7»

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EXCHANGE

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Greece than in any other country", 12 was of such nature and magnitude that the Greek Government could not solve it sucessfully if it were left alone and unaided. As early as January 1923, the American Red Cross Commissioner for Greece recommended that his organization discontinue the relief operations "for the simple reason that the problem is going to drag on for years". 13 Dr. Nansen reported to the Council of the League that in spite of the "great efforts" of the Greek authorities and the "splendid work" of the voluntary organizations, "the conditions of the refugees [had] become steadily and universally worse". 14 A large amount of capital was a fundamental prerequisite for the settlement of the transferred persons on a self-supporting basis and this could only be provided by the outside world. " I can not emphasize too strongly the urgency of the need", declared the High Commissioner, "or the good use to which capital for reconstructive purposes could be put in Greece". 15 A t the eleventh meeting of the Council, held on February 2, 1923, the representative of Greece, Mr. N. Politis, officially acknowledged the inability of the Greek Government to cope with the situation with the financial resources at its disposal and announced that an international loan was "absolutely indispensable". Since Greece could obtain it only at a very high rate of interest if it relied on its own action alone, — the uncertain conditions in the country could not be expected to attract foreign capital, — the Greek Government desired "the moral support of the League" for the success of its operations. The loan would amount to the sum of 10 million pounds sterling and ample security for the interest and the sinking fund would be given. 18 The Council adopted the proposal of Mr. Politis, and referred the question of the proposed loan to the Financial Committee of the League for examination and report. Two months later, in April 1923, the High Commissioner again drew the attention of the Council to the need for expediting the settlement of the refugees in view of the approaching withdrawal of the American Red Cross. There were no other organizations able to undertake relief on a large scale, and unless outside financial help was forthcoming "the refugees were literally faced with starvation in the middle 12. F. R. Dulles, The American Red Cross — A History, (New Y o r k : Harper and Brothers; 1950), p. 203. 13. Letter of the American Red Cross Commissioner for Greece (Haskell) to the Chairman of the American Red Cross (Payne) dated Athens, January 29, 1923 and published in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, Department of State Publication No. 1262, V o l . II, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1938), p. 319. (Hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1923). 14. League of Nations, Official Journal, Ajb Year, N o . 3, (March 1923), Appendix 471, "Refugees in the Near East", p. 384. 15. Ibid., p. 386. 16. Ibid., p. 235.

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of the summer". 17 Such, a catastrophe, however, could be averted by speedy action on the part of the League. The Council, taking cognizance of the fact that the Greek Government had already begun collecting the essential information that was requested by the Financial Committee in order that the latter examine "the practicability of the floatation of a loan on the basis of securities which Greece could offer", adopted a twofold resolution : on the one hand, it asked the High Commissariat " t o consider whether... it would be possible to replace the temporary relief measures... by a general plan" which would enable the refugees to be settled permanently on the land or otherwise established "on a self-supporting basis" and, in case of an affirmative answer, "to prepare a scheme for this purpose". On the other hand, it appointed a Sub-Committee, — known later as the Greek Sub-Committee, — consisting of the British, French and Italian members of the Council and a representative from Greece, which would receive the reports of the Financial Committee and of the High Commissioner for Refugees and "advise the Council at its next session whether the League itself can properly and usefully accept any responsibility or take any action". 18 Conforming to this resolution, Dr. Nansen invited his deputy, Colonel Porter, to proceed to Greece and draft a detailed report, outlining a feasible plan for the settlement of the refugees in the event that an international loan would be approved by the League. The Financial Committee, meanwhile, having examined the economic situation in Greece, presented a report to the Greek Sub-Committee in which it expressed the opinion that the securities for the loan offered by the Greek Government were sufficient for its servicing. Emphasizing, however, that "the receipts are considerably affected by general political conditions" 19 and taking into consideration the domestic turmoil of the country, it suggested that "the refugee loan be reduced to very modest dimensions",20 proposing the figure of £ 6,000,000 instead of the £ 10,000,000 which the Greek Government had requested. This proposal, naturally, was not very well received by Greece mainly because the suggested reduced loan was not sufficient for 17. League of Nations, Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees, No. A . 30, 1923. X I I . p. 29. 18. The quotations in this paragraph are taken from the resolution adopted by the Council of April 23, 1923. See League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, No. 6. (June 1923), p. 603. 19. "Extracts from the Report of the Financial Committee Presented in 1923 to the Greek Sub-Committee of the Council", (June 25 tb, 1923), League of Nations, The Settlement of Greek Refugees, No. C. 524, M. 187. 1924. II., (Geneva : October 30thy 1924), p. 11. 20. Ibid., p. 13.

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the planned settlement. Moreover, as the Financial Committee itself had recognized that the requested amount of £ 10 millions was a reasonable estimate of the expenditure involved, 21 its report amounted to a virtual rejection of the appeal of Greece. Behind the cautious phrasing of its opinion, one had no difficulty in discerning the reluctance of the Committee to support the Greek Government's plan. Although the report alluded to the internal political instability of the country, the actual obstacle to an unreserved adoption of the request was the international situation. As the Lausanne Conference was still in session and no peace treaty with Turkey had been signed, there was a wide-spread impression among certain Powers, notably France and Italy, that the funds of the loan would be spent for military purposes.22 This belief was a fundamental factor to the "fierce opposition" 23 which the Greek proposal faced and which rendered impracticable at that time the issue of a long-term loan, even one not exceeding £ 6,000,000. Fortunately, however, Great Britain and the United States were favorable to the idea of solving the Greek refugee problem by assisting that country in transforming the helpless victims of the Asia Minor catastrophe into productive and self-supporting individuals. As early as March 1923, the United States Government expressed the view that "finding permanent homes for the refugees... will require the cordial cooperation of the local authorities... and of the Powers whose territorial and other interests in the Mediterranean area may make it possible for them to assist". 24 When Great Britain, France and Italy indicated their willingness to cooperate on this question, the State Department informed the U. S. Ambassador in Switzerland 25 that the United States would attend the meetings of the Financial Committee in a consultative capacity. 26 Prodded by the interest that these Great Powers showed in this humanitarian project, the Council of the I,eague adopted a resolution

21. "Preface" by J. A . Salter, Ibid., p. 4. 22. Cf. Daphnes, Op. Cit., V o l . I, p. 268. A year later, Mr. Morgenthau publicly acknowledged this fear: " T h e Bank of England, and particularly the British Treasury, were not convinced that these [funds] would not be used for illicit purposes — to prepare Greece for war or to improve her n a v y . " League o f Nations, Official Journal, 5th Year, N o . 10, (October 1924), p. 1300. 23. Daphnes, Op. Cit., V o l . I, p. 268. 24. Note of the Secretary of State, Charles E . Hughes, to the British, French and Italian Ambassadors in Washington, dated March 31, 1923 and published in Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1923, p. 331. 25. Joseph Clark Grew. 26. F. R. Dolbeare was instructed to proceed to Geneva and be present at the meetings at which the refugee problem would be discussed. See also Time, V o l . I, N o . 18 (July 2, 1923), p. 12. A t the same time, Colonel L o g a n attended the meetings of the Greek Sub-Committee as the representative of the United States.

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in July 1923, declaring that "the securities offered b y the Greek Government appear to be suitable as a basis for the negotiation of a loan." If Greece succeeded in floating the loan, the Council was willing to assist in organizing the administration of the funds produced by it. The supervision of the I,eague was considered necessary "in order to give the lenders assurance that the funds will be employed in accordance with the scheme". 27 The resolution reflected the reservations expressed b y the Financial Committee. The clauses "the securities... appear to be suitable", "if the Greek Government succeeds in arranging a loan" and the desire to emphasize that the proceeds of the loan would be spent only for the settlement of the refugees show that the League had some reservations about the effectiveness of the plan and had not yet defined explicitly its own role in the project. Furthermore, it was a little reluctant to get deeply involved in a financial experiment whose failure could have adverse repercussions on the young international organization. Mr. Caclamanos, the Greek Minister to London who took an active part in the negotiations, gives a vivid picture of the attitude of some members of the Council. Almost twenty years later, in 1941, he divulged that France was opposed to the entire scheme, fearing that the League would certainly lose prestige if the results anticipated for the settlement failed to materialize : When in 1923 I appeared at the table of the Council... to request the support of the League for a Greek loan to be devoted to the establishment of the 1,300,000 refugees from Asia Minor and Thrace, I faced a hard rebuke from M. Hanotaux, the French delegate : " Address yourselves to bankers", he said, "We are not financiers here." I will always remember with gratitude the attitude of the British member of the Council, Lord Robert Cecil... in rescuing my Government and myself from an almost desperate position.™

Due to these unfavorable conditions, the Greek Government preferred to open direct negotiations with the Bank of England. The latter agreed to advance the sum of £ 1,000,000 to the Bank of Greece with the provision that the amount would be placed at the disposal of a Special Settlement Commission, suggested by the Council, and would be repaid from the forthcoming loan. On the basis of this

z7. " E i g h t h Meeting of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Council held on July J tb, 1925." Nations, Official Journal, 4tb Year, No. 8 (August 1923), p. 903.

League of

28. D . Caclamanos, "Greece, her Friends and Foes," The Contemporary Review, V o l . C L I X , N o . 904 (April 1941), pp. 369-370. 6

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initial economic advance, the Greek Government asked the League of Nations to adopt a scheme for the solution of the refugee problem. 2 9 T h e Greek Sub-Committee drafted a plan and presented it to the Council in the form of a Protocol and Organic Statutes pertaining to the refugee settlement. On September 29, 1923, the Council of the L e a g u e approved the proposed documents 3 0 and, on the same day, the Greek representative signed them, after h a v i n g expressed " o n behalf of the Greek people his deep gratitude for the part the Council and the Secretariat h a d t a k e n in the drawing up of [the] scheme". 3 1 19. — Creation of the Refugee Settlement Commission. T h e plan for the settlement of the uprooted Greeks was contained in t w o agreements, a Protocol entitled " P r o t o c o l Relating to the Settlement of Refugees in Greece and t h e Creation for this Purpose of a Refugees Settlement Commission" and an A p p e n d i x to it defining the "Organic Statutes of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission". 3 2 The main provisions of the agreement are the following : T h e Greek Government undertook to establish a Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) which would possess t h e constitution, capacity and functions set out in the Organic Statutes. I t also agreed to a d j u s t the internal law of the country in a manner t h a t would ensure t o the Commission the prescribed capacity and powers. Finally, the government was to assign to the Settlement Commission 500,000 hectares of land to be held b y the latter as its absolute property for the purpose of establishing the refugees. Greece would " a s soon as possible" raise a loan to an amount not falling below the equivalent of £ 3,000,000 nor exceeding the sum of £ 6,000,000 and place its proceeds under the disposal of the Commission. T h e service of the loan would be assured b y the International Financial Commission which was established in 1898 for the purpose of protecting the foreign lenders of the country. 3 3 T h e Government undertook to secure " a

29. "Letter from M. D . Caclamanos, Greek Minister in London, to the Secretary-General of the League o f Nations," (dated August i6tb, 1923), League of Nations, The Settlement of Greek Refugees, N o . C. 524 M . 187. 1924, II, p. 13. 30. League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, N o . 11 (November 1923), p. 1357. 31. Ibid., p. 1356. 32. For the full text of these documents see Ibid., Annex 580, pp. 1506-1509. Later, the name o f the Commission became the "Refugee Settlement Commission" and this will be the title used in this disseitation. The Protocol and its appendix are reproduced at the end of this book, Appendix II. 33. France was against this provision. Cf. Miller, Greece, p. 1 1 7 : "France has had no share, pecuniary or otherwise, in the greatest work of contemporary Greece — the settlement of the refugees. O n the contrary, her sudden refusal to sign the annex to the General protocol, entrusting the direction o f the new Greek loans to the International Financial Commission, until the Greeks paid their war debt, held up the loans..."

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»3

complete equilibrium" between the ordinary receipts and the expenses of the State, and to refrain from creating any charges by way of security upon its other revenues without the consent of the International Financial Commission. As a final obligation, it was agreed that the Refugee Settlement Commission would be exempt from all taxes and that the Greek Government would pay to the Commission each year the total sum at which the occupiers of lands held by the latter were assessed for taxation, until the forthcoming loan was completely refunded. The Organic Statutes defined the legal status, composition, procedure, functions and powers of the Refugee Settlement Commission. It was established as a legal person competent to sue and be sued in its own name, to hold and alienate property of all kinds, and in general to perform any acts which could be performed by a corporation possessing full legal personality under the law of Greece. The Commission was to have four members, two appointed by the Greek Government which could be replaced by it at any time ; one selected by the Council of the league ; and a fourth one, its Chairman, which had to be a national of the United States representing relief organizations and which could be appointed in such method as the Council would from time to time decide. The last two members would enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities in Greece and could be replaced by the Council only. Decisions were to be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having the determinant one in the event of an equal division of the members. The salaries of the members as well as all other expenses of the Commission would be payable out of the funds placed at its disposal, but the Greek Government undertook the obligation to refund to it the amount of the salaries of the two Greek nationals. According to Articles X I I and X V , the function of the Commission was, by means of the lands assigned to it, the funds placed at its disposal and its own income, to promote the establishment of refugees in productive work. Its income could not be expended on the relief of distress or other charitable purposes and all assistance was to be given on terms involving ultimate repayment. These provisions may be considered as the most important of the entire agreement, for they constituted the broad policy directives within the framework of which the Commission had to act. The Council emphasized repeatedly this point and, wanting to underline its significance, it reiterated it in the resolution by which the Protocol and the Organic Statutes were approved. Paragraph 5 of the adopted resolution reads :

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The Council... 5. Decides to issue a public communication which will make it clear that, since the loans to be administered by the Refugee Settlement Commission are to be devoted exclusively to settlement in productive work and the Commission is specifically prevented from using them for the purpose of relieving distress, and since it is inevitable that much distress must remain which cannot be dealt with, or cannot be dealt with at once, by those means, the work of charitable societies is an essential complement to the settlement scheme

The Commission, therefore, was not a substitute for the private agencies which were trying until then to meet the Greek emergency, but an organization expected to formulate and execute a long-range program for the permanent solution of the problem, while the relief authorities would continue to deal with alleviating the daily distress.35 Finally, the Commission undertook to submit quarterly reports to the Council which in turn had the right to consider them and take any action or conduct any inquiries that it believed necessary. In this way, by defining the powers and obligations of the RSC, the League was at the same time outlining the pattern of its own responsibilities.36 Broadly speaking, the League of Nations was to coordinate relief and settlement efforts but not provide the funds. B y placing the project under its aegis, it offered a guarantee to the foreign lenders that the loans would be spent efficiently and for the purpose they were floated, and that they would be repaid on time. Lastly, the prestige of the League extended to its subsidiary organs, such as the Refugee Settlement Commission, which could operate without governmental interference.37 B y the Decree-Law of September 17, 1923, promulgated by Greece, the internal law of the country was brought in accord with the provisions of the Protocol and the Organic Statutes. The Greek Parliament ratified the two documents on June 7, 1924; later, the amendments that were made, after one year's experience of the Commission showed the desirability of certain changes in the Protocol, were ratified 34. League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, N o . I I (November 1923), p. 1357. 35. T h e American Red Cross withdrew from Greece on June 30,1923 as it had announced. Fortunately, D r . Nansen was able to obtain assurances from the Near East Relief, the All-British Appeal and the "Save the Children" Fund that they would continue their relief operations. See League o f Nations, Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees, (September 4 th, 1923), N o . A . 30. 1923, X I I , p. 30. A s late as 1925, the "Save the Children" Fund, administering also on behalf of the Imperial War Relief Fund, was still feeding "some 40,000 refugees." P. Alden, " T h e Refugee Problem", The Contemporary Review, V o l . C X X V I I , May 1925, p. 571. 36. Cf. D . S. Cheever and H . F. Haviland Jr., Organising For Peace, (Cambridge, Mass.; The Riverside Press, 1954), p. 615. 37. T h i s point is very important; it was proven that whenever a disagreement arose between the R S C and the Greek Government the latter had to consider its position very carefully before it took any action contrary to the wishes of the Commission.

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on October 24, 1924. Meanwhile, the Council of the League appointed 3 8 Sir John Campbell as League member of the Commission and Mr. Henry Morgenthau, former U. S. Ambassador in Constantinople, as its chairman; it also approved the appointments of Mr. Etienne Delta and Mr. Pericles Argyropoulos, nominated by Greece, as the two Greek members.39 On November 11, 1923 the Commission met for the first time in Salónica, starting its great humanitarian work which lasted for seven continuous years, until December 1930. 20. — Organization of the Commission. When the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) began its operations, the Greek Government and Dr. Nansen's Organization had already made some progress in settling refugees in Western Thrace. 40 As a matter of fact, it was the success of this limited program that gave to the High Commissioner the idea that a general project along similar lines could be undertaken — an idea endorsed by the Council and concretized in the establishment of the Commission. Because of the satisfactory results of the initial experiment, the RSC considered it "obviously unnecessary to make an entirely fresh start" 41 and preferred to adopt the machinery that was in operation by bringing it under its authority. The work of the Commission was organized along three departments :42 financial, urban and agricultural. The first, formed by officials of the Bank of Greece, had as its function to control all the financial transactions of the RSC. The second consisted of the Commission's own employees and of personnel loaned by the Ministries of Public Welfare and Public Health. Its purpose was the formation of urban settlements for refugees around the main cities of the country. The third department, finally, dealt with the agricultural settle38. During its twenty-sixth session, at its twenty-fourth meeting, held on September 29tb, 1923. League of Nations, Official Journal, i,th Year, No. 11 (November 1923), p. 1357. 39. The changes in the membership of the Commission were as follows : Mr. Morgenthau (September 1923-December 1924); Dr. Alfred Bonzon (temporary chairman) (December 1924-February 1925); Mr. Charles P. Howland (February 7, 1925-Scptcmbet 1926); Mr. Charles B. Eddy (October 1926-December 1930). Sir John Campbell (September 1923-January 1927); Sir John Hope Simpson (January 1927-December 1930). Mr. Argyropoulos (September 1923-August 1924); Mr. Delta (September 1923-August 1925); Mr. Theodore Eustathopoulos (August 1924-August 192;); Mr. Alexander Pallis and Mr. Achilles Lambros (September 1925-December 1930). 40. By April 1923, 10,000 refugees had been settled in that region. See League of Nations, Official Journal 4th Year, No. 6, (June 1923), Annex 51;, "Near East Refugees : Western Thrace Refugee Settlement", No. C. 347. 1923, pp. 696-703. 41. League of Nations, Official Journal, jtb Year, No. 4 (April 1924), Annex 610, "Greek Refugees" (First Quarterly Report of the Commission) No. C. 91. M. 30. 1924, II, p. 586. 42. See I-eague of Nations, Greek Refugee Settlement (translation) II. Economic and Financial Publications, 1926. II. 32. (Geneva : 1926), pp. 9-11. (Hereafter referred to as Greek Refugee Settlement). See also Ladas, Op. Cit., pp. 629-631.

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ments. It was the most important, both in terms of persons involved and of the policy that the government pursued. Agriculture is an economic branch that permits a family to become self-supporting in a short period of time. It was felt, therefore, that even if the persons concerned did not achieve immediately prosperity, they could at least avoid starvation by cultivating the piece of land that was allocated to them. Moreover, as the agricultural regions of Northern Greece were depopulated due to the transfer of the Slav and Moslem element and as they were the most fertile areas of the country, they were the most suitable for the settlement of refugees. For these reasons, the Commission concentrated its funds and efforts on the agricultural field. The Agricultural Colonization Department, with headquarters in Athens, supervised the settlement in the entire country and issued the general directions. In Macedonia, however, there was organized a General Directorate of Colonization, having a General Director and three Directors for Western, Central and Eastern Macedonia. A second colonization department was established in Western Thrace. Both were sub-divided into many colonization bureaus, each one directed by an agricultural expert who was in charge of twenty-five superintendents. Each superintendent was responsible for an area containing about 250 refugee families. This administrative structure was created by the Greek Government and the Commission accepted it with slight modifications, mainly in the number of colonization bureaus which had to be increased and in the nature of employees : more technical and hydraulic experts, engineers and accountants were added. All this personnel was Greek and many of them were refugees, especially in the lower echelons where manual work was necessary. According to Mr. Morgenthau, this was a conscious attempt on the part of the Commission to provide the unfortunate exchangeables with work, even of a temporary nature, and to engender confidence in themselves by giving them hope for a better future : Following the policy which I laid down at the beginning of our work, all positions in this building program which could possibly be filled by refugees were given to them, and it is interesting to record that 70 per cent of the people who have done this great work of reconstruction have been refugees,43

43. Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 238. The number of employees as given in Report of the Commission was the following : End of 1924 784 1928 1925 1822 1929 (first quarter) 1926 1829 1930 (beginning of)

the twenty-Seventh Quarterly 2042 2003 1416

Due to the impending dissolution of the Commission the number decreased rapidly during 1930. League of Nations, Officiol Journal, 11 th Year, N o . 11 (November 1930), Annex 1235, "Twenty-Seventh Quarterly Report of the Commission" N o . C. 444. M . 202. 1930. II [F. 831.], p. 1473.

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21. — The 1924 Refugee Loan. The most important problem which confronted the Commission and on whose solution depended its entire work was the question of adequate funds. The £ 1 million advance of the Bank of Eng'and could not last for more than a few months and the Greek Government was "at the end of its ressources", having spent up to that time about 550,000,000 drachmas or 2 million pounds.44 A loan had to be floated as promptly as possible but its timing was closely connected with the achievement of internal political stability. Morgenthau, emphasizing this point in his first press conference when he outlined the purposes of the RSC, declared that "what our Commission proposes to do is to help Greece recreate her credit standing in the money markets of the world". 45 Instead of attaining governmental order, however, the country plunged into a controversial debate involving the continuation of the existing regime. The settlement program was neglected and the operations of the Commission were seriously hampered by lack of funds, while the parties discussed whether Greece should remain a Constitutional Monarchy or become a Republic. In March, Morgenthau appealed directly to the public, drawing its attention to the fact that the entire settlement plan was being compromised and might be discontinued. " I t might be unwise to prolong these activities", he said, unless there were definite prospects of floating a permanent loan. Before this could be done, it would he absolutely necessary for Greece to demonstrate that it would maintain a stable government.4S

By the spring of 1924 a plebiscite settled the political debate and Greece became a Republic.47 The funds of the Commission, however, were exhausted and, as the negotiations for the loan required a protracted preparation, the only solution was a second advance from the Bank of England. The Chairman of the Commission went to England and was able to persuade that financial institution 48 to lend to the Bank of Greece another £ 1,000,000 ; this sum permitted the RSC to continue its operations until the end of the year. The improvement of the internal situation justified a second appeal of the Greek Government to the Council, asking it to reconsider the question of the £ 10,000,000 loan. In an address which may be considered " a guarded expression of impatience" 49 the Chairman of the 44. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 633. 45. Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 112. 46. Statement to the Press, March 19, 1924. Ibid., p. 158.

47. See infra, p. 181 ff. 48. For a detailed report of the negotiations see Morgenthau, Op. Cit., pp. 175-205. 49. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 634.

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Commission fully supported the Greek request and asked the League to investigate the present economic conditions of Greece through the Financial Commission and "to put its stamp of approval on her desire to appear before the financial public of the world and to raise this loan". 60 The matter was referred to the Greek Sub-Committee and to the Financial Commission to which the Greek Government submitted a memorandum,51 offering additional securities which guaranteed full repayment of the loan. These securities can be divided into four categories : 52 a first charge on certain revenues, such as monopolies, customs, tobacco and stamp duties in the new provinces (Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean Islands) ; secondly, an inferior charge on all other existing revenues which were already subject to certain prior charges in respect to earlier loans; land assigned for settlement and the buildings erected on i t ; and lastly repayment by refugees and taxes payable by them. Adding up the revenues of the first two categories one reached the total sum of 1,213,974,936 63 drachmas which represented five times the amount necessary for the service of a loan of £ 10,000,000. Moreover, the land assigned for the settlement was estimated by the Committee as being worth at least £ 10,400,000,54 exclusive of any value added by the expenditure of the loan itself. Finally, the taxes that would be paid by the refugees were pledged as a further source from which the service of the loan could be met. The Greek Government rightly felt, therefore, that payment of the proposed loan was amply guaranteed and the Council, sharing its view, approved an amendement of

50. League of Nations, Official Journal, }th Year, No. 10 (October 1924), p. 1300. J1. "Memorandum Addressed to the Financial Committee on September 18th, 1924,by M. Tsouderos, Greek Minister of Finance", League of Nations, Tbe Settlement of Greek Refugees, C. 524. M. 187. 1924. II, pp. 34-38. j 2. Ibid., p. 5. 53. The exact figures are as follows : I

Public revenues free of all charges : (a) Monopolies in the new provinces (salt, matches, playing-cards, cigarette paper) (1b) New Customs duties (Canea, Candia, Samos, Chios, Mitylene, Syra) (f) Tobacco monopoly in the new provinces (,d) Stamp duties in the new provinces (e) Alcohol in the whole of Greece

210,930,000 50,600,000 170,000,000 542,257,000

TOTAL

II Excess of revenue after deducting the sums pledged for the servicing of prior liens TOTAL o p I AND I I

54. This was a very conservative estimate. being at least £ 6,000,000 higher.

55,000,000 55,727,000

671,717,963 1,213,974,963

The Bank of Greece appraised the value of the land as

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S9

the Refugee Settlement Protocol authorizing the issue of a loan up to £

10,ooo,ooo.55

At this point one should observe that the financial experts of Greece and of the League of Nations were mainly interested in making sure that the country would have the revenue required for the servicing of the loan. There is no doubt that the securities offered were more than ample, as was subsequently demonstrated. The real problem, however, was not whether Greece would have the necessary sum of drachmas to repay the loan but whether she could obtain the foreign exchange needed for this purpose. This was the crucial problem which was disregarded and which later made imperative a general reform of the finances of the country when the internal economic conditions deteriorated. Having the moral support of the League of Nations, the Greek Government signed contracts with three banks 56 in London, New York and Athens, providing for the issue of a seven per cent loan of £ 12,300,000 face amount.57 The issue took place at the rate of 88, but by deducting the British stamp duty of 2 % and the expenses and commissions of the three banks of 5 % , the net rate was 81. In this way, the nominal interest of 7 % rose finally to 8.71 %. 5 8 For the lenders the real rate of interest was 8 % and the loan was naturally a great success.59 Its net proceeds were £ 9,970,016 6s gd. The conditions under which the loan was floated created a big debate in Greece. Even before the Government gave the additiona securities, the public considered the provisions of the Protocol as being against the national interest of the country. 60 The political leaders agreed that the terms were unfavorable but they pointed out that "so were the circumstances". 61 Nevertheless, the interest of the loan was undoubtedly very high, especially if one takes into consideration the guarantee provided by the prestige of the League of Nations 55. "Minutes of the Thirtieth Session of the Council," Seventh Meeting, held on September 19th, 1924, League of Nations, Official Journal, jib Year, N o . 10 (October 1924), pp. 1308-1309. For a comparison o f the two texts see "Amendments to the Protocol of September 29/A, 1923, Concerning the Settlement of the Greek Refugees" Appendix 677, C. 490. 1924. II. C.C.S G . 9, Ibid., pp. 1558-1563. 56. Hambro's Bank Ltd. in London, Speyer and Co.'s Bank of N e w Y o r k and the National Bank o f Greece. 57. O f this sum £ 7,500,000 were to be issued in London, £ 2,500,000 in Athens and £ 2,300,000 in New York.

58. Andreades, Op. (.¡1., p. 101. 59. The sum required of the public was covered nearly twenty times in London, five and a half times in Athens, and was entirely subscribed by Speyer and Co. in N e w Y o r k . 60. Polzoides claims that "the terms... are such, indeed, that not even Venizelos dared support [them]." Op. Ci/., p. 401. This v i e w is inaccurate. Gonatas, w h o was the Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government, declared in the Parliament on July 17, 1924 that Venizelos had sent him the following telegram : " I wish to warmly recommend that you accept not only without scruples but with enthusiasm the proposed terms." Op. Cif., p. 321. (translated from Greek). 61. Gonatas, Lot. Cit.

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and the prevailing rates at that time. Most of the governmental loans floated during the second semester of 1924 had an interest between 4 — 5 % , 6 2 the only exception being that of the Kingdom of Hungary, issued under the auspices of the League for the reconstruction of that country. 63 In addition, the high rate is more distressing if one contemplates the purpose of the loan, although such considerations have no influence on foreign lenders. Still, the funds were to be devoted to the rehabilitation of the innocent victims of a war and the Greek people expected more favorable financial terms. I,adas sums up their reaction in two bitter phrases : This is a tragi-comic commentary on the high-sounding discussion of the Refugee Loan as a humanitarian and philanthropic work ! Greece could probably have raised such a loan without the intervention of the League.'*

22. — The 1927 Stabilization Loan. The adequacy of the offered securities was proven immediately. The second Chairman of the RSC informed the Council in 1925 that "the assigned revenues for the service of all Greek foreign loans amount to more than double the amount necessary for the services of these loans". 65 In its Nineteenth Quarterly Report the Commission stated that the 1926 yield of the State revenues assigned to the service of the Refugee loan was sufficient "to cover the service... more than six times over". 66 In 1927 the revenues exceeded by more than eleven times the sum required for interest and redemption.67 It was obvious, therefore, that if one disregarded the problem of foreign exchange, the securities offered by the Greek Government were not only adequate for the £ 10,000,000 but could guarantee the service of any further loan that might be required for the completion of the Commission's work. B y 1926, 622,865 refugees,68 about half of their total number, had been settled and had become economically self-supporting. The remainder, however, was still living under deplorable conditions and the RSC, drawing up its plans to assist them, estimated that it needed 62. Some interest rates of loans, taken at random, are as f o l l o w s : Union o f South Africa 5 % , Government of Victoria 4 8 / 4 % , Sudan Government 4 % . See The Statist, A Journal of Pract ical Finance and Trade, V o l . C I V (July-December 1924), (London : M D C C C C X X V ) . 63. The loan was issued at 88, the interest rate being 7 1 / 2 % . Ibid., p. 29. 64. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 635. 65. League of Nations, Official Journal, 6th Year, N o . 10 (October 1925), p. 1360. 66. The revenues amounted to 2,143,332,004 drachmas while the sum required for interest and ordinary redemption was 359,588,152. League of Nations, Official Journal, 8th Year, N o . 4 (April 1927), Annex 945, "Thirteenth Quarterly Report", C. 79. M . 32. 1927. II. [F. 375].p. 520. 67. League of Nations, Official Journal, 9th Year, No. 4 (April 1928), Annex 1013, "Seventeenth Quarterly Report", C. 51. M. 25. 1928. II [F. 474], p. 482. 68. 550,635 rural refugees and 72,230 urban ones. League of Nations, Official Journal, jtb Year, N o . 7 (July 1926), Annex 874, " T e n t h Quarterly Report", C. 308. M. 117. 1926. II, p. 925.

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

9i

about £ 5,000,000 for improving the existing facilities and for settling about 28,000 new families.69 In its Tenth Quarterly Report it suggested that a new loan be granted and the Financial Committee agreed to investigate the economic situation in Greece and to decide accordingly. Accepting the view of the Greek Government that the completion of the refugee work was bound up with a general reform of the finances of the country, the Committee recommended the floating of a £ 9,000,000 loan whose purpose was to be threefold : £ 3,000,000 would be devoted to continue "the urgent work of establishment"70 for the next two years; another £ 3,000,000 would cover the deficits that the budget had left and the arrears due in 1927; and finally, the remaining sum would be used to stabilize the drachma on a gold exchange basis and to reorganize and strengthen the National Bank of Greece.71 After a long period of negotiations and after the Council approved a scheme for currency and banking reforms in Greece,72 the Stabilization Loan was issued in 1928 in London and New York. The nominal value subscribed through the banks was £ 7,500,000 but its net yield was £ 6,500,000, the difference being due to the various duties and commissions. Issued at 91 per cent and at 6 % interest, the net produce was 86 and the real interest amounted to 7.05 % which was an improvement compared to the 8.71 % real interest of the 1924 loan.73 The remaining sum of £ 2,500,000 ($12,167,000) of the authorized £ 9,000,000 loan was granted to Greece by the United States Government under the terms of the settlement of the Greek war debt to America. Its interest was 4 % and was to be repaid in twenty years in half-yearly instalments. The entire loan, granted at par, was given to the RSC for the continuation of its work and "could indeed properly be considered a refugee settlement loan". 74 Due to its 69. The estimated expenditure was as follows : A. B. C. Loc.

For the extension of existing installation For the sctdement of 8,000 new rural families . For the setdement of 20,000 new urban families Cit.

£ 2,200,000 800,000 2,000,000

70. The Financial Committee agreed that the Refugee Commission's estimate of £ 5,000,000 was "reasonable" but it felt that only £ 3,000,000 were required to cover the fundamental needs of the settlement. League of Nations, Official Journal, tth Year, No. 7 (July 1927), Annex 973, "Work of the Financial Committee during the Twenty-Seventh Session", C. 336. M. n o . 1927. II., p. 921. 7 1 . Ibid., p. 922. 72. "The Council... approves in particular the scheme drawn up to enable Greece to continue the settlement of the refugees, to balance finally its budget and to stabilize its currency". Resolution adopted at the sixth Meeting of the Forty-Sixth Session of the Council, September 15th, 1927. League of Nations, Official Journal, %th Year, No. 10, (October 1927), p. 1134. 73. For a full account of the negotiations and the pertaining documents, see League of Nations, Greek Stabilisation and Refugee Loan-Protocol and Annexes, C. 556. M. 198. 1927. II. (Geneva, November 141b, 1927), Publications of the League of Nations, II. Economic and Financial, 1927. II. 74., pp. 1-43. 74. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 638.

92

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

moderate terms and to the reasonable 4 % interest, it was very welcome by the Greek Government and underlined the interest of the American Government in the humanitarian activities of the Refugee Commission. In summary, one may say that the assistance of the international community to the solution of the Greek refugee problem took three forms : the first one was temporary and private. The protagonists were the various philanthropic and relief organizations which as soon as they were informed about the emergency situation rushed to the scene and succeeded in alleviating the immediate and dangerous impact of the catastrophe. Secondly, the League of Nations, by creating an autonomous supra-national body, provided the administrative framework for the permanent settlement of the refugees. The financial world, finally, encouraged by the fact that the reconstruction project was under the auspices of the international organization, agreed to furnish the economic means for the implementation of this long-range program. In this historical background, the Refugee Settlement Commission, with the cooperation of the Greek Government, undertook the realization of an "epic enterprise". 75

75. Morgenthau, Op. Ci/., p. i.

CHAPTER

IV

THE SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

SECTION I I THE INTERNAI, ASPECT

If ever the Four Horsemen of the Apokalypse rode down upon a nation it was when the appalling host appeared upon the shores of Greece that was trampled by the flying hoofs of their charges and scourged by the spectral riders of War, Famine, Pestilence and Death... The present-day Greeks... have just performed one of the most epochal and inspiring achievements of modern times — a veritable modern labor of Hercules, in which any race or nation might take a glorious pride. Henry M O R G E N T H A U , I was sent to Athens.

CHAPTER IV THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

SECTION I I T H E INTERNAL, ASPECT

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

— — •—• — — — — •—

The Commission and the Refugee Problem. Number and Origin of Refugees. Composition and Nature of Refugees. Land for the Settlement and Cadastral Survey. The Agricultural Settlement. The Urban Settlement. Dissolution of the Commission. The Ankara Convention of 1930.

23. — The Commission and the Refugee Problem. Knowledge and experience are of course two of the most important factors in the successful solution of human problems. The first of them permits one to form an objective picture of the situation and to outline succinctly the necessary requirements to meet the challenge. Experience, on the other hand, allows the application of the principle of analogy. For although most problems present their own individual characteristics, they often have certain comparable precedents which provide some indication of the line of action that must be taken. The question of the Greek refugees, however, is an exception to this rule. As it was the first time in history that an extensive exchange of populations necessitated the economic settlement of a large number of helpless human beings, the Refugee Commission had no useful parallel to follow. Moreover, some fundamental information was lacking concerning the object of its activities : having arrived in Greece for the purpose of settling the refugees on land, the Commission had no statistical data either about the number of the refugees or the

96

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

number of available acres. These were the two main obstacles that confronted it during the first period of its operations. In one respect, however, the RSC was in an advantageous position : it had a clear conception of its need and of the importance of its task. The day it met in Salonica, Mr. Morgenthau made a tour of the city and realized immediately the magnitude of the challenge which the Commission was called upon to face. Visiting the port, he was present at the arrival of a ship from Asia Minor and fully understood the humanitarian nature of his work. Profoundly moved by the misery he witnessed, he gave a vidid description of the incident: I went down to the quay and saw a shipload of refugees land. A more tragic sight could hardly be imagined. I saw seven thousand people crowded in a ship that would have been taxed to normal capacity with two thousand. They were packed like sardines upon the deck, a squirming, writhing mass of human misery. They had been at sea for four days. There had not been a space to permit them to lie down to sleep ; there had been no food to eat; there was not access to any toilet facilities. For these four days and nights many had stood upon the open deck, drenched by an autumn rain, pierced by the cold night wind, and blistered by the noonday sun. They came ashore in rags, hungry, sick, covered with vermin, hollow-eyed, exhaling the horrible odor of human filth — bowed with despair... A human problem ! And I at the moment, above all others, pledged to redeem this throng I What an awful responsibility ! How could I dare to fail them, when my failure meant a deeper misery to these people — to thousands of them, death i 1

24. — Number and Origin of Refugees. It was obvious that the emergency required immediate action. The relief work being undertaken by the private organizations, the Commission had to implement the permanent settlement. But as was mentioned earlier, it had no statistical data concerning the number of persons who had come to Greece. Information about the refugees and the exchangeables, their nature, their previous occupations and their place of origin was a determinant prerequisite to the plans of the RSC. Y e t , the Asia Minor catastrophe had befallen with such rapidity and under such tragic circumstances that, in spite of the refugee stations that were established on the mainland in order to list the immigrants, many uprooted persons, frantically trying to escape death, never went through them and were never recorded as having arrived in the country. The Commission, therefore, underlined in its first quarterly report 2 that it did not know the exact figure it was supposed to settle, having at its disposal only a tentative census taken in 1923. 1. Morgenthau, Op. Ci/., pp. 101-102. 2. League of Nations, Official Journal, Fifth Year, No. 4 (April 1924) Annex 610, No. C. 91 M. 30. 1924, II, p. 590.

THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

97

According to it, by April 1923 there were 786,431® refugees, 351,313 men and 435,118 women. As was expected, the female element predominated since all the men who were captured by the Turks were deported to inner Anatolia to form the labor battalions. Most of the refugees were located in Thrace and Eastern Macedonia, and around Salonica and Athens which were faced with a tremendous population problem. The following table is the first one published by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Relief on the basis of which the Settlement Commission drew its preliminary plans : TABLE V I «

REFUGEES BY DEPARTMENTS AND GENERAL DIRECTORATES REFUGEES

DEPARTMENT

MEN Eastern M a c e d o n i a . . . . Western Macedonia . . . Epirus Thessaly and Arta . . . . Salonica Thrace Ionian Islands Crete Cyclades Lesbos Peloponnesus Samos Central Greece Chios TOTAL

WOMEN

$8,471 5,661 5,060 14,710

42,220

74,9"

87.507 52,007

47,906 10,298 12,611 7,620 26,114 20,322

6,503

6,922

19.315 15.157

16,210 11,230

31.394

TOTAL 80,691 12,164 11,982

34,025

162,418

99.913 25.455 28,821 18,850

57,508

26,519 12,181

46,841

«,315

9'.956 15.997

158,076 28,312

351 313

435118

9.194

66,120

21.375

786,431

It was estimated that about 200,000 more had come to Greece after April and there were about 150,000 persons who were expected through the execution of the Exchange of Populations Convention. As, however, new refugees kept arriving and as the work of the Commission progressed, the need for precise statistical tables became very important. The RSC reported in 1925 that the funds at its dissposal were not sufficient for the settlement of all the refugees and then proceeded : We have not asyet got even an approximate idea of their number. This is due to many reasons; in particular, to the fact that waves of refugees have flooded the country from time to time without passing through the hands of the official organisations, have dispersed to different parts of the country, and since then have frequently moved from one place to another. Moreover, the original estimate of the total number of refugees has been

3. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Relief, Department of Statistics, Refuge» Census Conducted during April 1923 (Athens : Ethnikon Typographeion, 1933), p. 9 (translated from Greek). 4. Loc. Cit.

7

9

8

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

greatly exceeded as a result of the unexpected increase in the number of persons to be exchanged from Asia Minor and the arriv.il of some thousands offamilies from Bulgaria,5

It was only in 1928, when a general population census was conducted, that accurate information about their numbers could be provided to the Commission. According to it, there were 1,221,849 6 refugees in Greece. This figure, however, does not represent the total number of persons who arrived in the country for it does not take into account two important factors : death, which decimated the refugees especially during the first years after the Greek debacle, and emigration to other countries. With regard to the latter factor, it is known that many people who escaped from Asia Minor and found refuge in Greece, left subsequently their motherland to join any relatives they had abroad, mainly in Egypt, France and the United States. No statistics, however, exist that give a detailed picture of their number 7 and of the countries to which they emigrated. The first factor is much more significant and some indication of its importance can be deduced from the various reports of the High Commissioner and of the RSC. In a statement before the Council of the League Dr. Nansen informed that body that from September 1922 until July 1923 "up to 70,000 [refugees] died of disease and weakness owing to malnutrition". 8 "During the last months of 1923", wrote the Refugee Settlement Commission, "the mortality rate among the refugee population was 45 per cent". 9 The rural district dispensaries that the Commission established in Macedonia in 1925 reported regularly the deaths that occurred : 426 (from July to September), 480 (September to December), 390 (January to March) ; 1 0 and one must keep in mind that these numbers refer to only one region, for lack of funds prevented the RSC from extending the dispensary program to the rest of the country. The findings of the 1928 census, therefore, do not depict the number of refugees that swarmed the country after 1922. The third Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Charles B. Eddy, did not hesitate to characterize them as an understatement and considered the figure of 1,300,000 as being more accurate. 11 Macartney expressed the view that 1,200,000 were actually "those in need of assistance... most of 5. League of Nations, Official Journal, 7th Year, N o . 2, (February 1926) Annex 832, " E i g h t h Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C 730. M . 276, 1925. II (c /s C. G . 20), p. 324. 6. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 41. 7. Ladas estimates their number at about 50,000 persons. Op. Cit., p. 644. 8. League o f Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, N o . 8 (August 1923) Annex 5 34, " G r e e k Loan for Refugees", p. 1014. 9. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 93. 10. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 11. Eddy, Op. Cit., p. 52, 248. See also M . I. Notaras, E Agrotike Apokatastasis ton Prosfygon (The Agricultural Settlement of the Refugees) (Athens : " C h r o n i k a " Press, 1934), p. 2.

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

99

whom had arrived in Greece in a state of complete destitution", 12 while certain writers estimate the number as high as 1,400,000 1 3 and even higher. 14 The difference of opinion underlines the fact that the exact figure of the Greek refugees after the First World W a r is not known; it is definitely larger than 1,300,000 but does not probably exceed 1,400,000 persons. 15 For the purpose of this dissertation, however, the tables of the 1928 census will be taken as the basis for analysis since the 1 , 2 2 1 , 8 4 9 new-comers permanently settled, in tlie country and influenced its political, economic and social development. Of their number, 1 5 1 , 8 9 2 came before the Asia Minor defeat, mainly between the years 1 9 1 3 and 1 9 2 2 ; 1 6 the remaining 1,069,957 arrived after the defeat of the Greek army, principally from Anatolia and Thrace, as Table V I I indicates : TABLE NUMBER

OF REFUGEES

VII1' BY

PLACE

REFUGEES PLACE OF ORIGIN

TOTAL

Asia Minor Thrace Pontus Bulgaria Caucasus Constantinople . . Russia Serbia Albania Dodecanese . . . . Roumania Cyprus Egypt TOTAL

...

626,954 256,635 182,169 49>°27 47,091 3MS8 ",435

BEFORE THE DISASTER

OF

ORIGIN PER

A F T E R THE DISASTER

TOTAL

I OOO R E F U G E E S BEFORE DISASTER

AFTER DISASTER

248.39 178.13 115.40 138.10 213.45 27.05 34-33 30.36 10.53 2.34 i-75 0.16

550.70 214-57 153.87 26.22 13.71 32.10 5.81 i-35 0.84 0.36 0.43 0.03

2,498 738 722 57 8

37,728 27,057 17,528 20,977 32,421 4,109 5,214 4,611 1,600 555 266 25 1

589,226 229,578 164,641 28,050 14,670 35,349 6,221 1,446 898 383 456 S2 7

513.12 210.04 149.09 40.12 38.54 31.48 9.36 4.96 2.04 0.60 0.59 0.05 O.OI

O.OI

O.OI

1,221,849

151,892

1,069,957

1.000.00

1 000.00

1 000.00

6,057

12. Macartney, Refugees, p. 83. This is also the view of the second Chairman of the RSC, Mr. Howland w h o told the Council that "there had arrived in Greece... about 1,400,000 refugees, of whom 1,200,000 were destitute; and when I use the word destitute, I mean its literal sense — many of them arriving, without clothing." League of Nations, Official Journal, 6th Y e a r , No. 10 (October 1925), p. 1359. 13. A. A.Pallis,one of the Refugee Settlement Commissioners, as quoted by Morgenthau, Op. Cit.y p. 302. 14. The figure that is normally given is 1,500,000. See J. T. Shotwell, A Balkan Mission, (New Y o r k ; Columbia University Press, 1949),p. 125. Alden also considers that 300,000 "possessed some means and... established themselves in various places". Adding them to the 1,200,000 destitute ones of Macartney, one arrives again at 1,500,000. Op. Cit.y p. 570. See also J . A. R. Marriott, Op. Citp. 546. 15. The difference in the figure of the irredentist Greeks l i v i n g ni Turkey in I 9 i 4 a n d that of the refugees from Asia Minor gives the number of people who perished during that decade. Aegides claims that "1,200,000 souls form the tragic in human losses account of the struggle that the enslaved hellenism carried o u t , " (Op. Cit., p. 20) while Notaras offers the figure of 800,000-1,000,000 Op. Cit.t p. 6. The Refugee Commission estimated that "of the total number of Greeks in Asia Minor, who before the war amounted to at least 2,000,000, scarcely half survived and sought shelter in Greece." Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 12. 16. The breakdown of the figure is as follows : 40,000 arrived in 1913 from the section of Macedonia that was given to Bulgaria, and about 300,000 came in 1914 from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, for a total of 340,000. Representing only 6.98 % of the population, their absorption in the economic life of the country was easy and was realized during the war years. Before 1920, about 70,000 fled Turkey and between 1920 and 1922, 81,892 Greeks were transferred from Bulgaria on the basis of the Neuilly Convention. See A. N. Petsalis, E Demosionomike Antimetopisis tou Prosfygikou Zetematos (The Financial Confrontation of the Refugee Question) (Athens : Hestia, 1930). 17. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 41.

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EXCHANGE

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MINORITIES

A s was expected, more than half of the refugees were from Asia Minor and about one-fifth of t h e m came from Eastern Thrace. 1 8 I t is interesting to note t h a t while most of them left their homes after 1922, this is not the case w i t h those from the Caucasus : the RussianTurkish campaigns in t h a t area and the Bolshevik Revolution with its a f t e r m a t h forced a great number of Greeks living in t h a t region to flee and find refuge in their mother country. A further observation t h a t must be made regards Constantinople. A l t h o u g h t h a t city remained as part of T u r k e y after the T r e a t y of Sèvres, v e r y few Greeks emigrated. On the contrary, after the T r e a t y of Lausanne and in spite of the provisions of the E x c h a n g e of Populations Convention which exempted the Christians of Constantinople from the obligatory transfer, about 35,000 of t h e m preferred to abandon their place of birth, afraid of the policy of the Nationalist Turks. 25. — Composition and Nature of Refugees. Turning to the composition of the refugees, the 1928 census gives 589,418 men and 632,431 women, or, counting the figures on a percentage basis, 48.24 % men and 51.76 % women. 1 9 T h e difference is not v e r y great since it is calculated on their final total number. If, however, one analyzes it further, t a k i n g as a dividing point the 1922 catastrophe, the discrep a n c y becomes more striking : before the S m y r n a disaster, the number of male refugees exceeded t h a t of the female b y 7,000 ; after 1922, however, the situation is reversed, there being 50,000 more women t h a n men. 20 T h e disequilibrium is almost entirely due to the refugees from Asia Minor : out of 589,226 people who arrived in the country following the disaster, there were only 273,309 men, the remaining 315,917 being women. E v e n these numbers, however, do not give an accurate picture of the tragic conditions t h a t confronted the Greek Government immediately after the S m y r n a holocaust, for they include the war prisoners and hostages who were detained in T u r k e y . According to Turkish sources, 21 125,000 men in the military age bracket were forcibly drafted in the labor battalions in Anatolia, returning to Greece much later, after the signature of the Lausanne Peace T r e a t y . T h e groups w h o came to Greece in 1922-1923, therefore, were composed to a v e r y large extent of women, children and old people, incapable of making a living through hard work. T h e predominance of the feminine element is also evident if one examines the distribution of the refugees b y age and sex. I n 1928, 18. T a k i n g T u r k e y as a w h o l e (Asia M i n o r , Thrace, Pontus and Constantinople), the total is 1,104,216 persons or 90.3 % o f all the refugees. 19. Ibid., pp. 46-47. 20. / .0:.

Cit.

21. T h e information was published in The Daily Telegraph o f O c t o b e r 10, 1922 and is quoted in Puaux, Ltf Mori de Smyrne, p. 29.

THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

101

on the basis of five-year age brackets, the women exceeded the men in all of them but three,22 and in some cases the discrepancy assumed alarming proportions. Between the ages of 20 and 24, for instance, the women formed 60.47 % of the total figure, the men representing a mere 39.53 % .23 Above the age of 80, the feminine element rose to well over 60 % . About one-fourth of the total number of refugee women were widows, 24 while for the total female population of Greece (including the refugees) the percentage was only 17.58. 25 These dry statistical data give some indication of the enormity of the task that the Refugee Commission had undertaken and of the difficulties with which it was faced. The refugees, coming from different parts of Asia Minor and the shores of the Black Sea, exhibited evidently a variety of characteristics and attitudes. The Commission soon realized that it was dealing with different people who, having as their common denominator the Christian religion and their affinity to Greece, had developed separately and independently : Among these brothers by race, there is a complete identity of feeling, aspirations and national and religious traditions, but, having lived in different countries and districts, they differ in character, temperament and mentality and show striking individuality.26

Among those who had lived in towns and large urban centers, these differences were not very pronounced naturally. The peasant refugees, however, reflected very strongly the environment of their origin. It was found that those who came from inner Anatolia, living in the midst of Turks and Kurds, had the characteristics of Asiatic peoples, being "backward, submissive and timid." The Cappadocians, on the other hand, represented a "serious and reflective type, hard working and energetic, enterprising and practical". Those from the Smyrna district were "true Ionians in their individualism", in their gaity and their powers of adaptability and assimilation. Around Pontus there was a great variety of specimens, "from the rough, heavy and dull-witted type to the subtlest of Greeks". From the 22. T h e s e three age brackets and the percentages are as follows : Age : 5- 9 50.02 % men 49.98 % w o m e n 10-14 52-84% " 47-I6% 45-49 52.99 % " 47-°i % Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 58. 23. Loe. Cit. 24. T h e exact percentage is 23.61; a b o v e the age of 50 the percentage of w i d o w s was 50.62 % (for the 50-54 age bracket) and 53.09 (for the 54-59 bracket); the equivalent percentages f o r the entire female p o p u lation of Greece (including the refugee w o m e n ) was only 33.54 and 39.16 respectively, ibid., p p . 63,62. 25. ibid., p. 62. 26. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 20.

102

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

mountainous areas came "the truest of the Hellenes" who spoke a Greek "rich in classical expressions and Homeric phrases". The Caucasus people differed among themselves depending on whether they were born around Kars or Tiflis; the former were "industrious and supple-minded", the latter being "less civilized". Turning to the refugees from Europe, the Thracian peasant was "quiet, slow and serious and of regular habits". Living in a patriarchial society, he possessed great endurance and tenacity and formed " a conservative and somewhat stolid element". Those who came from Bulgaria, finally, represented the true farmer "who lives by the soil and for the soil". They were remarkable in their devotion to work and capacity to save, exhibited a willingness to take the initiative and constituted "a progressive factor and a rural element of the first class".27 No statistics exist as to the former occupations of the newcomers. The Commission reported that "the notable feature in this [refugee] community was the large proportion of the urban element compared with the purely agricultural element.28 There were many more professional and artisan people than farmers, the latter coming mainly from Thrace and Bulgaria. Among the Asia Minor refugees, there was a large percentage of merchants, doctors and lawyers as well as of retail traders, craftsmen and workers of all catagories.29 Fishing and sailoring were the hereditary occupations of the coastal populations while inland most of them were in business, playing the part of "the promoter in the growing development of Asia Minor".30 Due to the emergency conditions under which most of these people came to Greece and due to the need to settle them as soon as possible, the Government did not pay much attention to their occupations. Thus, "some agriculturists swelled the ranks of urban refugees in the towns, while many urban refugees were sent to villages to till the soil". 31 This policy obviously had a double disadvantage : on the one hand, the country did not derive the maximum benefit from the influx of a large number of educated and trained people and, on the other, the refugees themselves could not exploit the opportunities that existed and were unable to earn a living. Many of the urban refugees made a genuine effort to take advantage of the land given to them but as the 27. A l l the quoted phrases are taken from Ibid., pp. 20-22. See also L . Dominian, Tbe Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe, (New Y o r k : H . Holt and Co., 1917), pp. 275-276. 28. Ibid., p. 15. Pallis claims that "the townspeople form about half of the total number o f the refugees". Andreades, Op. Cit., p. 154. It seems, however, that this is inaccurate and that the urban population exceeded by far the agricultural one. 29. See Greek Refugee Settlement, pp. 15-15 and Andreades, Op. Cit., pp. 151-155. 30. Dominian, Op. Cit., p. 276. j i . Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 646.

THE SETTLEMENT

OF REFUGEES

103

Commission remarked "only in very rare instances do town-dwellers become cultivators of the soil". 32 The superabundance of manual supply in the cities, however, kept most of the urban refugees on the farms until the improvement of the internal conditions made feasible their movement back to towns. 26. — Land for the Settlement and Cadastral Survey. When the Commission arrived in Greece, the Greek Government had already settled provisionally 72,581 agricultural families, almost entirely in Macedonia, 33 where the houses abandoned by the exchanged Moslems, 34 and the fertility of the land made their establishment practicable and auspicious. Their settlement, however, was "very far from complete", 35 for two or more families were crowded in one house and lacked the necessary tools to engage in agriculture. In addition, the Government had built 5,023 houses, mainly in the outskirts of Athens and Piraeus, creating thereby new suburbs consisting of small houses in stone, brick and mud-bricks. The scheme provided "for forming each urban settlement into a self-governing community", 36 which could function independently on a municipal system basis. The Refugee Commission, having accepted the administrative framework devised by the Greek Government,37 decided to continue the settlement work that had already begun. The uncertainty of the forthcoming funds prevented it from drawing a general plan which could involve a complete revision of the program and a redistribution of the temporarily settled persons. For the same reason, it preferred to postpone the urban settlement, requiring larger expenditures, and to concentrate on the agricultural one. To do this, however, it needed accurate statistics about the land available for this purpose. According to the Geneva Protocol, the Greek Government had undertaken the obligation to provide the Commission with 500,000 hectares, or 1,235,500 acres,38 on which refugees would be settled. It was agreed that the land would consist of three catagories : (1) Government land, that is, land owned by the State ; (2) lands sequestrated 32. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 118. 33. 66,920 in Macedonia, the remaining 5,661 being in the old Greek provinces.

Ladas, Op.

Cit.,

p. 640. 34. The houses made available by the departure o f the Moslem and Bulgarian inhabitants amounted to 65,484. 53,572 were located in Macedonia, 8,060 in Thrace, about 500 in Epirus and 3,352 in Crete. Greek Refugee Settlement, pp. 73-74, 82. 35. League of Nations, Official Journal, 5th Year, N o . 4 (April 1924), Annex 610, " G r e e k Refugees", C 91, M. 30, 1924, II., p. 588. 36. Loc., Cit. 37. See supra, p. 86. 38. 1 hectare = 10,000 sq. meters = 2,471 acres.

THE BALKAN

104

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

or expropriated from private owners through the application of an extensive agrarian reform program; and (3) land vacated by the Turks. When the Commission began its activities, the Government was in a position to hand over to it with a clean title only 50,000 hectares. I t was expected that about 100,000 would be provided by the expropriation of private estates after the agrarian reform. Consequently, the remaining 350,000 hectares were to be land left behind by the exchanged Turks and Bulgarians. This figure shows the tremendous importance of the transfer of populations in the settlement of the Greek refugees. It is obvious that without the vacated Moslem properties the solution of the refugee program through an agricultural settlement would have been very difficult indeed. The Commission recognized this fact and stated it explicitly : "The departure of the Turks released the greater part of the land" said its Chairman, Mr. Howland. " I t may be said", he continued, "that but for exchange the settlement of the refugees on land would have been problematic". 3 9 B y the end of 1924, the goal of 500,000 hectares was almost reached 40 but the needs of the Commission were so great that more land was granted to it through the vigorous expropriation of large private estates. In 1927, the total land area at the disposal of the RSC exceeded 800,000 hectares 41 and when the Commission was dissolved in 1930, the land ceded to it for settlement purposes amounted to 861,010 hectares, out of which 525,741 were cultivable land. The value of this property, (the cultivable fields) estimated on the basis of the average selling price (about 2,000 drachmas per stremma),** came to about £ 30,000,000. Actually, however, by an agreement between the Government and the Commission, the land was sold to the refugees at a much lower rate, 400 drachmas per stremma, its total value amounting to 2,102,964,100 drachmas or (at 350 drachmas to the pound) to about £ 6,000,000. 39. Greek

Refugee

Settlement,

p . 33.

40. 479,487 hectares were granted to the RSC, out of w h i c h 284,999 were cultivable land. League of Nations, Official Journal, 6th Year, No. 4 (April 1925), Annex 734 "Fifth Quarterly Report of the Commiss i o n " , No. C 112. M . 53, 1925, II, p. 509. 41. The exact figures and the distribution of the land by regions are as follows : TABLE

VIII

L A N D S A S S I G N E D T O T H E R S C — 1927 REGION

CULTIVABLE

LAND

(hectares) Macedonia Thrace Other Provinces TOTAL

Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 648. 42. i stremma = 0.2471 acres = 0.10 hectare.

44,092

NON-CULTIVABLE

TOTAL

(hectares) 277>353

616,112

65,090

151,261

21,127

65,219 812,592

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

There was a further complication related t o the land distribution program : Greece had no survey of lands or cadaster and, therefore, the boundaries of the rural properties were never well defined. There was no w a y of proving, for example, how far an estate vacated b y a Turkish emigrant extended. Consequently, the Commission could not divide it and give it to a number of refugee families permanently. I t was found necessary to allocate the lots in a temporary w a y , the e x a c t fixing of boundaries being postponed for later. This method, however, had a great psychological disadvantage. A s the farmer did not know the e x a c t extent of his property, he was afraid t h a t someone else might profit from his work through a change of boundaries, he did not cultivate his entire plot and did not engage in longrun projects such as planting trees or fertilizing the ground. 4 3 T h e Commission decided, therefore, to conduct a topographical survey and a technical service was established to make polygonic plans of the village properties in which the limits of each individual field would be clearly indicated. A t the beginning, lack of trained personnel hindered the work and the progress made was not impressive. Gradually, however, the number of surveying teams increased and b y 1930 the cadaster had covered a total of 1,261,126 hectares. 4 4 Since the lands distributed to the refugees amounted to 411,347 hectares, 4 5 it is obvious t h a t the survey included not only those b u t also lands of the natives. I n this w a y t h e w o r k of the Commission, although limited in scope and having as its object the settlement of the newcomers, benefited the entire country. 27. — The Agricultural Settlement. A t the time of the dissolution of the R S C in December 1930, 570,156 refugees, or about half of their total number, had been permanently settled in the agricultural provinces of Greece. 46 In order to avoid the potential dangers created b y large numbers of unemployed persons idling in overcrowded cities, " t h e Commission wisely followed the aim of getting as many of the refugees as possible into productive work on the land". 4 7 T h e Greek Government had also participated in this project and settled 8,688

43. "The provisional work of the partitioning is everywhere detrimental to the progress of the settlement.

Many refugees, not feeling sure that their allotment will not be exchanged or diminished, make no

improvement on it...

We have come across some who neglected flourishing vines or refused to manure

their land". Greek Refugee Settlement, pp. 52-53. 44. 1,067,100 in Macedonia, 147,000 in Thrace and 47,026 in the rest of Greece.

League of Nations,

Official Journal, n t h Year, No. 11 (November 1930), Annex 1235, "Twenty-Seventh Quarterly Report of the Commission", No. C. 444, M. 202, 1930, II [F. 831], p. 1482. 45. 378,001 in Macedonia, 13,500 in Thrace and 19,747 46. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 105.

the other provinces, Loc. Cit.

The figure covers the period until July 31, 1929.

47. H. F. Armstrong, Where the East Begins, (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1929), p. 59.

T J T TUT LR N U N B Q D ^ 5AÄ \rh A R> V^K A

>1 B L U L . .« GA. A NVVROKOPO^^V-.

R

I ^M (A ASTANLA

V-: . .4

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

107

newcomers for a total of 578,844 persons or 145,758 families.48 After 1930 the work continued at a slower pace; the final estimate was made in 1938 at which time the number of agricultural refugee families amounted to 167,079 or about 668,316 persons. 49 As Table I X indicates, most of the agricultural settlement was effectuated in Macedonia and Thrace. TABLE I X AGRICULTURAL

SETTLEMENT

S E T T L E D BY T H E R S C

PROVINCES

FAM.

Macedonia Thrace Epirus Thessaly Central Greece Peloponnesus Crete Aegean Islands

1,337 3,489

TOTAL

50

INDIV.

OF

REFUGEES

S E T T L E D BY T H E G O V M T . FAM.

INDIV.

TOTAL FAM.

INDIV.

339,°94

—

—

87,170

339,094

179,060

—

—

179,060

4,23* 7,630

57

228

652

2,608

14,286

1,092

4,368

42,790 1,394 2,903 4,58I

3,820

216

864

1,218

4,684 18,938

578,824

4,757 795

18,938 3,096

150

600

4,757 945

143,591

570,156

2,167

8,668

145,758

—

—

4,460 10,238 18,654

3,696

These regions offered many advantages some of which have already been stated. The houses left by the exchanged Moslem and Bulgarian minorities provided shelter to many families which could, therefore, be accommodated at a rather low cost, in spite of the fact that many buildings had to be repaired and made more comfortable. The land was fertile and sparsely populated. Transportation facilities could be developed more rapidly than in the mountainous areas of Western and Central Greece. Finally, considerations of national security dictated the Hellenization and economic advancement of the northern provinces of Greece.51 The first stage toward agricultural settlement consisted in assembling the refugees who desired to work on land and forming them into legally constituted groups.52 The instances of individual settlement were very rare and authorization was given only in exceptional circumstances. The ideal method would have been to reconstitute each community as it was established before its transfer. Unfortunately, 48. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p . 105. families as b e i n g 145,127.

Notaras, Op. Cit., (p. 12) gives the n u m b e r of the settled

49. D . Stephanides, Eijagoge eis ten Efermosmenen Koinoniken Oikonomian ( I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the A p p l i e d Social E c o n o m y ) (Athens : 1952), p . 112. 50. Compiled by the a u t h o r f r o m the statistical data of the Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p p . 104-105. j 1 . S e e infra,

pp.

132-140.

52. A s Macartney p o i n t s out, this m e t h o d was " i n accordance w i t h the t r a d i t i o n s of Eastern E u r o p e where the village c o m m u n i t y has preserved an individuality l o n g perished in the W e s t " . Refugees, p. 96.

io8

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

the refugees had not arrived in groups and members of one village could be found scattered in different parts of the country. I t is true that for purposes of settlement some sought to unite, forming a homogeneous colony, and the Commission encouraged this tendency. However, by 1926 "only a few communities succeeded in re-establishing themselves in their entirety". 6 3 The heads of the families constituting each legally formed community elected a council which represented the group. The refugees were then transported to a place selected b y Commission officials beforehand, where a Government representative delivered the land to the Council members b y an act signed by them and b y him. From this land individual family allotments were made, the size of each share varying according to the size of each family on the one hand and the quality of the soil and nature of cultivation on the other. Thus in the rich, fertile valley of the Maritsa river in Western Thrace the allotment was only about 15 stremmata (about 3.7 acres) while in Thessaly it often reached 120 stremmata (about 2Q.6 acres), necessary for the cultivation of cereals. 54 Their value varied naturally from place to place depending not only on the nature of the soil and of the cultivation, but on facilities for access or exploitation and nearness to or remoteness from an urban center. In some parts of Central Macedonia the value of the share was about 25,000 drachmas, (£ 66), the tobacco allotments around Cavalla were worth as much as 80,000 (about £ 213), and in Crete the value of vineyard parcels amounted to 100,000 drachmas (or £ 266). The Commission admitted that "like any other social equilibrium, the balance [was] not steady", but the ideal system under which each allotment would yield "the same amount with the same share of water and sunshine" 55 could not be achieved. As a general rule, the holdings could maintain a family if they were well cultivated. In many cases, however, lack of experience and adverse conditions prevented the maximization of production and the land was not always sufficient to meet the needs of the refugee family. The RSC, interpreting the provisions of the Protocol rather liberally, undertook expenditures which did not fall in the category of productive works properly speaking. It initiated a public utility program, building roads and bridges, expanding the irrigation system, establishing agricultural and veterinary stations and attempted thereby to strengthen in various ways the colonies whose existence seemed 53. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 44. 54. League of Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, N o . 11 (November 1930), Annex 1235, " T w e n t y Seventh Quarterly Report of the Commission", No. C. 444. M . 202, 1930. II. [F. 831], p. 1477. See also Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 46. 55. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 48.

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

109

precarious. Greece has always suffered from lack of water and often land available for cultivation could not be exploited because there was no water supply. There were cases in which the refugees had to go long distances to find water even for potable and domestic purposes. The Commission proceeded to meet the challenge by constructing aqueducts or drilling wells ; 56 in spite of its efforts, however, the problem was not entirely solved and still engages the attention of the present-day Governments. In order to strengthen the agricultural families, the Commission supplied them with a limited number of live-stock. With the exception of the Thracian peasants who arrived in Greece under rather orderly circumstances and who were able, therefore, to bring with them about 10,000 animals, the rest of the refugees did not possess any stock of their own. The Greek Government and the RSC distributed to them 145,051 cattle and horses, (including beasts for ploughing, draught animals and breeding stock) and 99,940 sheep and goats. 57 They also supplied them with agricultural implements, ploughs, carts and various other tools.58 The Commission built over 50,000 houses for the refugees. Adding to them the premises abandoned by the exchanged minorities and those constructed by the Greek Government, the agricultural housing program reached the impressive figure of 129,934 houses.59 Still, however, at the time of its dissolution, the RSC estimated that about 12,000®® supplementary houses were necessary to meet the tremendous need that existed. Lack of funds prevented their construction, the task being assigned to the Greek Government. The cost for the standard two-room houses built by the Commission was around 37,000 drachmas, or a little under £ 100, while larger houses cost 52,000 drachmas. In Thrace, where the refugees built their own homes, not only the price was much lower but the dwellings also had a picturesqueness and an individuality that the other standardized villages lacked. 56. A t the end of October, 1929, the amount of w o r k done was as follows : Aqueducts 474 o f a total length of 750 kilometers Artesian wells 508 of a total depth of 23,430 meters Ordinary wells 684 o f a total depth of 7,856 meters League of Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, N o . 6 (June 1930) Annex 1211, "Twenty-Fourth Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 559. M. 210, 1929, II [F. 727], p. 716. 57. The R S C supplied the refugees with 74,593 beasts of burden and 45,162 goats and sheep; the respective figures for the Government are 70,458 and 54,778. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 83. 58. 81,428 ploughs, 23,520 carts and 189,946 agricultural tools, Loc. Cit. 59. T h e Commission built 30,877 houses in Macedonia, 11,636 in Thrace and 10,048 in the rest o f Greece, The Government-constructed houses are 10,313 in Macedonia and 3,174 in Thrace. See E d d y . Op. Cit., p. 109. 60. 8,825 i n Macedonia and 3,300 in Thrace. League o f Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, N o . 11 (Novembre, 1930), Annex 1235, "Twenty-seventh Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 444. M . 202. 1930 II., [F. 831], p. 1479.

no

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

The balance-sheet of the colonization at the end of 1929 when the work was almost completed shows that the expenditures for the agricultural settlement amounted to £ 10,422,931 16s 2d. Table X , compiled by the author, indicates the employment of the funds and their allocation by regions. TABLE X

"

BALANCE SHEET OF T H E AGRICULTURAL

COLONIZATION

(in drachmas). USE OF FUNDS Cattle Houses Agricultural tools Advances to cultivators Advances to artisans Cadastral survey Public Utility works Public health Cost of Administration Transport Maintenance of cattle Sundries Schools

MACEDONIA

THRACE

435.I35»I84 627,975,203 86,148,413

69,461,264 91,488,231 18,414,118 28,591,854

43 2 »344>389 99.293.161 42,947,185 153.374,396 26,727,192" 147,845,882 5,712.99° 67,287,472 —

2,405,098,463

TOTAL

1,577,455 11,702,778 79,882,608 4,306,966 42,081,534 16,148,251

OLD GREECB 54,547,826 269,971,114 17,602,021 56,8II,93J 11,223,550 2,928,779 31,862,153 893.035 39,844,921 1,547,826

—

21,428,510 21,500 385,105,069

—

15.665,758 —

502,898,918

It is obvious that about two-thirds of the Commission's expenditures for the agricultural settlement were devoted to Macedonia. The results of this effort from the economic viewpoint will be described later.63 A t this point, however, one cannot but emphasize the gigantic task accomplished by the Commission and the admirable courage and tenacity of the refugee farmer who kept struggling in the face of innumerable adverse conditions. The 1926 League of Nations publication did not hesitate to characterize it a hard, complex and sometimes even colossal undertaking... In Thrace, and particularly in Macedonia, it assumed the proportions of a veritable struggle against nature, man and matter,M

The outcome of the agricultural settlement was the rejuvenation of the northern provinces of Greece. Sir John Campbell, the first ViceChairman of the Commission from 1924 to 1927, who visited Mace61. Compiled from data given in ibid.,

pp. 1474-1476.

62. Due to a typographical erratum, the public health expenditures o f the R S C in Macedonia were not included in the balance sheet. The sum of 26,727,192 drachmas was arrived at by deducting the sum o f the other expenditures from the grand total. 63. See infra,

Part II, Chapter 11.

64. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 132.

THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

i n

donia again in 1930, had difficulty in recognizing the region and stated his impressions in a report submitted to the R S C : The aspect of the country has entirely changed. Everywhere one sees the cheerful red roofs of the colonisation settlements. Where formerly vast uncultivated plains stretched, there are now flourishing villages, full of bustling activity, and showing obvious signs of comfort, and in many cases of prosperity. The whole country-side is awake and alive with new life... The progress achieved is surprising and most gratifying... These results are due, in the first place, to the courage, the energy, the capacity for work, the receptivity to new ideas, which characterise the mass of refugees,65

Professor Jacques Ancel of the "École des Hautes Études Internationales" wrote enthusiastically about the transformation that took place within a period of six years : Those miserable Turkish hamlets, nothing but hovels of mud and straw lying in the midst of an uncultivated plain or of unhealthy marshes, are now replaced by large cheerful villages... All around one sees sheaves of mai%e, fields of tobacco, kitchengardens, orchards and vines. What a miracle ! 68

This miracle, however, in order to become permanent, needed further assistance, especially in the form of direction and advice. In 1928 the Near East Relief (whose title became later the Near E a s t Foundation) sent representatives to Greece to consolidate the work of the Commission and " t o help the people to help themselves". 6 7 They engaged in various types of social and economic activities, establishing health stations, recreation centers and model farms. Their activities were so successful that "individuals concerned with rural missions came to see the program from E g y p t , the Sudan, India, China, Burma and South Africa". 6 8 The whole region served as a laboratory for the development of practical methods of settling and uplifting the morale of a war-torn and expatriated people who were forced b y unfortunate circumstances to start a new life. I t was truly a huge enterprise that benefited extensively the entire country. 28. — The Urban Settlement. Although the agricultural colonization of Macedonia and Thrace constituted the main field of the Commission's activities, absorbing a large percentage of its funds, the urban settlement of refugees was not overlooked or neglected. Undoubtedly, however, it presented many more difficulties involving not only 65. League of Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, No. 6 (June 1950), Annex 1211, "Twenty-Fourth Quarterly Report of the Commission" No. C. 559. M. 210. 1929. II [F. 727], p. 712. 66. J. Ancel's article in "L'Europe Centrale", October 5, 1929, as quoted in ibid., p. 714. 67. H. B. Allen, Come Over Into Macedonia (New Brunswick : Rutgers University Press, 1943), p. X V I I . Allen was the Director of the Program and gives a detailed account of the work that was accomplished and the problems that he faced.

68. Ibid., p. 297.

112

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

great financial expenditures but also an adjustment in the social and professional structure of the city. As Macartney aptly pointed out, "the peasants could be settled on waste or abandoned lands, but the urban refugees... had to compete for a livelihood with the preexisting urban population of Greece".69 The Government, therefore, tried to make some of them cultivators and settle them on the expropriated estates. It was realized, however, that the older generation would find the adjustment painful and encompassed with difficulties. Moreover, as the amount of available land was limited, it was more expedient from an economic viewpoint to give the land to former farmers who were experienced and could, therefore, exploit it more productively. The younger generation, which could have been settled successfully on agricultural allotments, had been decimated by the war and many of its members were still prisoners in Turkey. 70 Another solution was to provide them with houses and to encourage them to find work. When the Commission began functioning, the Government had already applied a general scheme of urban settlement by building refugee dwellings in the outskirts of the main cities where job opportunities were greater. The RSC, having decided to concentrate on the agricultural rehabilitation of the newcomers,71 did not interfere with the work of the Government until much later, in 1927, when it undertook to improve and extend the urban quarters that were already established. According to an estimate,72 about 60 % of the urban refugees lived in the three largest cities of the country, Athens, Piraeus and Salonica. This is explained by the fact that at the time of their arrival in 1922, these centers afforded the greatest number of convenient shelters, such as theaters, schools, churches, warehouses and requisitioned houses. Each box of the Royal Theater in Athens, with its velvet upholstery and the ornate golden decorations, housed one family ; each classroom of the public schools provided shelter to a number of refugees many of whom had never seen a blackboard ; and in the 69. Macartney, Refugees, p. 107. 70. A census taken by the Commission in June 1926 in the four refugee quarters around Athens showed that while the male and female refugees below the age of 16 were about equal in numbers, above that age the equilibrium was completely upset in favor of the women. O r a total of 42,204 people above 16, there were only 16,029 men and 26,175 women, or 58 % against 62 % . Ladas, Op. Ci/p. 673. See also supra, p. 100. 71. The reasons for this decision as expanded by the Commission itself were (1) lack of funds necessary f o r the urban settlement; (2) the precarious conditions of the agricultural refugees who, camped in the open, were menaced by the winter; (3) the scarcity of labor in the insufficiently populated Macedonia after the departure of the Moslems; (4) the provision of the Protocol that the available funds should be spent on productive work. See League of Nations, Official Journal, 8th Year, N o . 7 (July 1927), Annex 975, "Fourteenth Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 281. M . 104. 1927, II [F. 404], p. 946. 72. D . Kalitsounakis, "Legislation Ouvrière et Sociale Grecque pendant et après la Guerre", in Andreades, Op. Cit., p. 217.

THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

TI

3

incense perfumed churches, in the dim light of the candles, one could see a series of straw mattresses under the icons with the severe, byzantine faces of the saints. These conditions, disrupting the social, economic and religious life of the cities, had to be speedily remedied. Even before the Asia Minor disaster, Greece suffered from a housing shortage. In 1918, when the population of Athens was about 250,000, there was only one house per 10 inhabitants. In 1924, when the population had doubled after the influx of the refugees, there was a shortage of 15,000 dwellings, in spite of the fact that the Government had already constructed 9,000 houses for the newcomers. The 1917 fire in Salonica which destroyed the greater part of the city, had created an acute crisis even before the arrival of the Anatolian victims. It was imperative that a housing program begin immediately and the Government initiated it as soon as the first refugee wave debarked in Piraeus. The problem, however, was complicated due to the inter-relationship between the place of residence and the type of occupation. The urban refugees were not merely in need of houses; they also needed houses in areas where they could earn their living. The Commission drew the attention of the Council to this aspect of the urban settlement in its Fourteenth Quarterly Report: The town refugee must above all be placed where he can carry on his trade or some trade without which any house procured for him, besides being useless to him, might even injure his interests by riveting him to a spot where he could obtain no work. Most of the town refugees who emigrated from Turkey were engaged in trades and callings which were already represented in Greece. Even admitting that the existing supply was inadequate to meet the country's needs, the newcomers were too many and, at present at any rate, they lack customers.ra

The Government in cooperation with the RSC proceeded to construct buildings, which could be let or sold, around the main urban centers. This project provided at the same time work for many refugee workers such as masons and plumbers and shelter for those who wanted to settle in the large towns. A t the end of 1929, the Commission had built over 27,000 houses in about 125 urban refugee quarters.74 Some of them developed into fair-size towns and kept 73. League of Nations, Official Journal, 8th Year, N o . 7 (July 1927), p. 947. 74. The statistics on the urban settlement of the Commission differ with respect to the number o f quarters erected. The R S C reported that it had established 125 urban centers; the Statistical Service o f Greecc gives the figure at 118 while the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Eddy, reduces it to 99. T h e discrepancy is not so great, however, on the number of constructed houses : The R S C and Eddy agree on 27,343 dwellings while the Greek Government figure is 27,610. See League of Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, N o . 11 (November 1930), Annex 1235, "Twenty-Seventh Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 444. M. 202. 1930. II [F. 831], p. 1481. Statistical Annual of Greta, 1930, p. 105. Eddy, Op. Cit., p. 109. 8

THE BALKAN

ii4

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

their old name, such as Nea Smyrne, Nea Philadelpheia, Nea Kios, Nea Ionia. The state constructed more than 25,000 75 but still, in 1930, there was a large number of families, over 30,000, which lived in make-shift tin barracks. They presented a real social problem and the Second World War brought them to complete misery with the disastrous consequences for the political equilibrium in Greece.76 The urban settlement cost the Commission £ 2,011,458 16s 3d, or about one-fifth of the sum spent for the agricultural settlement. About go % of the funds were devoted to building purposes, mainly in the old provinces of Greece. The remaining capital covered expenses for works of general utility and salaries of the technical staff.77 Parallel to the construction program, the Government attempted to alleviate the distress of the urban refugees by organizing a plan of public works of all kinds in every part of Greece. Special attention was given to drainage and irrigation projects, to correcting and canalizing the course of many rivers, especially in Macedonia and to the elimination of marshes which contributed directly to the promotion of agriculture and the settlement of refugees on the reclaimed lands.78 Simultaneously, an effort was made to develop the special industries which had flourished in Asia Minor and to assist them by granting the refugees various vocational loans. A subsequent chapter will deal extensively with the progress achieved in this field. At this point, however, one may mention the oriental carpet industry, the Kiutahia pottery and the silk-working industry which were transplanted, almost to their entirety, in Greece after the exodus of the Christians from Anatolia. In 1928 the Commission made a general survey of the conditions of the urban refugees and distinguished them into three classes.79 There was, first, a numerous class which due to exceptionally good fortune or outstanding capacity was able to arrive at an enviable and sometimes even brilliant position in trade, industry or banking. It included, mainly, the exchanged persons who left Turkey under the provisions of the 1923 Convention and who brought with them their

75. Ladas, Op. Ci/., p. 675. 76. See

infra,

Part II, Chapter

HI.

77. The exact figures in drachmas are as follows : of a total sum of 897,288,350 drs., 527,519,717 were spent in Old Greece and the islands, 121,652,877 in Macedonia and 203,115,756 in Thrace. The building program absorbed 762,695,100 drs., works of general utility 71,783,068 and maintenance, administration and salaries 62,810,184. League o f Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, N o . 11 (November 1930), Annex 1235, "Twenty-Seventh Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 444. M . 202. 1930, II [F. 831] p. 1481. 78. For a summary of the w o r k done, see Ladas, Op. Cit., pp. 665-668. 79. League of Nations, Official Journal, 9th Year, No. 10 (October 1928), Annex 1069, "Nineteenth Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 406, M . 128, 1928, II [F. 560], pp. 1703-1704.

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

115

movable property and their capital. The second and most numerous class consisted of persons who succeeded in starting a new life in Greece by dint of hard work and ingenuity. Finally, there were those refugees, some of whom occupied formerly in their native land a good social position, who, due to repeated ill-luck or the sur-abundance of manual supply, could not find employment and lived from hand to mouth. They represented "the misfits that accumulate and ferment in large urban centers to an often disquieting degree". 80 Apart from this third class, the condition of the urban refugees, which at first appeared so hopeless, had greatly ameliorated. The settlement suburbs developed into independent municipalities and "constituted the so-called eighth miracle". 81 Even in the smaller towns, the refugee quarters, with their neat, practical houses and their wide streets, contrasted vividly with the old neighborhoods dominated by the oriental-type dwellings. " I t is no exageration to say", wrote Sir John Campbell, "that when visiting the refugee quarters in the majority of the towns in Macedonia and Thrace, one steps from the seventeenth to the twentieth century". 82 More important than this material modernization, however, was the new spirit that permeated the economic life of the entire country. In this respect, the influence of the first class of refugees mentioned above can hardly be overemphasized. The business world of the pre-world war Greece was "distinctly provincial in outlook" 83 and could not compete successfully in the international market. The cosmopolitan Greeks of Constantinople and Smyrna, of Odessa and Philippoupolis, with large capital in their hands,84 with their experience in international finance and their commercial connections in Western Europe, proved to be a motivating force of tremendous effectiveness in the reorganization and invigoration of the economy of Greece. This was one of the reasons that the Anatolian disaster was called a blessing in disguise for the hellenic world. 29. — Dissolution of the Commission. By a Convention concluded on January 24, 1930, the Commission handed over its work to the Greek Government at the end of December of the same year, after making careful arrangements to safeguard the interests of the bondhol80. l.oc. Cii. 81. Gonatas, Op. Ci/., p. 265. 82. League of Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, N o . 6 (June 1930), Annex 1211, "Twenty-Fourth Quarterly Report of the Commission", N o . C. 559, M. 210, 1929, II, [F. 727], p. 713. 83. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 678. 84. The exact amount of the imported capital is not known. Aegides quotes a banking official's figure of 50,000,000 gold sovereigns. A former Prime Minister of Greece, Athan. Eftaxias, estimated that "the value of the gold coins and the various jewelry imported by the refugees amounted to 56 million gold sovereigns." Op. Cit., p. 134.

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

ders.85 Under this convention the RSC transferred to the government all its property and all its rights and claims of every kind. The balance sheet of its operations amounted to £ 14,739,146 5s 5d; in general, the agricultural settlement was achieved at an expenditure averaging £ 80 per family and the urban one £ 90 (including the sums spent by the Greek State). Allowing nothing for the cost of urban sites and of farm lands, the average cost of urban and land settlement was about £ 60 for each family of about four persons.86 The figure is very low indeed, and can be explained by the cheap labor and abundance of manual workers in Greece and by the frugality of the refugee families whose only demand, during the first years, was the satisfaction of their basic wants for shelter and food. Undoubtedly, the work of the Commission is an outstanding example of the capabilities and effectiveness of international cooperation. " A miracle of inventiveness, altruistic energy and persistence has been accomplished by the Commission", 87 Thompson wrote and it is true that its achievements are really impressive. More than a million refugees had swarmed a small country exhausted by prolonged warfare and torn by internal dissent. Had the world community reacted apathetically or indecisively, anarchy and chaos would have ensued in Greece. By taking firm action and supporting the Greek Government both pragmatically and morally, by establishing the Refugee Settlement Commission and backing the financial efforts of the country, the League of Nations demonstrated the value of international organization not only in the political but in the humanitarian field as well. Praise for its initiative came from every part of the world and its contribution to the welfare of the distressed persons counterbalances to a great extent its failures in the sphere of international relations. "The work of settling the two million refugees... is one of the outstanding achievements of modern statesmanship and international effort" 88 comments Bentwich; and another writer characterizes their rehabilitation as "one of the most important social achievements of our generation". 89 The greatest accomplishment

85. Article 8 of the Convention provided that "as security for the due performance by the Hellenic Government of its obligations in regard to the service of the Refugee Loan of 1924... the transfer to the Hellenic Government of all the properties belonging to the Commission is expressly made subject to a first charge upon all immovable properties... until the Refugee Loan of 1924, raised on the security of such properties has been repaid in full." League of Nations, Official Journal, n t h Year, No. 6 (June 1950), Annex 1212, "Convention Between the Hellenic Government and the Refugee Settlement Commission", No. C. 107, M. 31, 1950, II. [F. 320 (2)], pp. 731-732. 86. Sir John Hope Simpson, Op. Cit., pp. 18-19. 87. D. Thompson, Refugees : Anarchy or Organisation (New York : Random House, 1938), p. 24. 88. N. Bentwich, "The New Magna Graecia", The Contemporary Review, Vol. C X X X V I , No. 768, (December 1929), p. 745. 89. G. E. Mylonas, Op. Cit., p. 123.

THE SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

117

was not t h a t these uprooted persons were saved from starvation and death, b u t t h a t they became an organic part of the country t h e y settled, most of them identifying themselves w i t h the national interests of Greece and h a v i n g at heart her aspirations and progress. These feelings did not grow naturally and automatically. Their development required real devotion and altruism on the part of the refugees who were asked to make extensive sacrifices in the name of Greece's domestic and foreign policy. T h e financial position of the country did not permit the immediate settlement of all of them and a large number had to content themselves w i t h provisionary and temporary shelters for a series of years. T h e approach of the Second W o r l d W a r and its aftermath necessitated increased military expenditures, the reestablishment of the refugees receiving low priority. I t was only after 1952 t h a t the Government turned again its attention to the urban settlement. 30. — The Ankara Convention of 1930. B u t perhaps the biggest concession t h a t the refugees had to make was the renunciation of their abandoned properties for the sake of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. T h e Lausanne Convention stipulated t h a t the Mixed Commission would carry out the liquidation of the properties belonging to the exchanged persons. 90 According to the declarations filed b y the Greek refugees, the value of their holdings amounted to 302,527,450 Turkish gold pounds or 100,625,549,675 drachmas. 9 1 Allowing for a large margin of mistake, there is no doubt t h a t the million and a half irredentist Greeks, most of them prosperous and well-established, had left in Asia Minor great fortunes. F o r five years the t w o governments tried unsuccessfully to arrive at an estimate of the holdings of the t w o national minorities acceptable t o both. Their disagreement did not only prolong a state of uncertainty and suspicion b u t prevented, at the same time, the amelioration of the relations of the t w o countries. W h e n Venizelos came b a c k to power in 1928 with a strong parliamentary majority, he was convinced t h a t the continuation of the négociations on the basis of the existing conventions and the presentation of conflicting claims served no useful purpose. In practice, the evaluation of properties abandoned five years ago was not feasible, resulting in a perpetuation of the existing animosity " a t the expense, primarily, of the Greek minority of Constantinople". 9 2 H a v i n g exchanged a few diplomatic notes, the t w o governments agreed to solve the 90. See supra, Chapter n, p. 68. 91. Aegides, Op. Cit., p. 25. 92. Lascaris, Op. Cit., p. 234.

THE

n 8

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

problem in a different manner and on June 10, 1930 they signed a new Convention in Ankara. According to its provisions, the immovable and movable property left by Moslem and Greek exchangeable persons in Greece and Turkey were transferred in complete ownership to the Greek and Turkish government respectively. Properties belonging to persons exempt from the exchange but seized by the state during the early years of the transfer would not be returned to their owners for such action was impossible.93 Greece agreed to make a payment of £ 425,000 covering the indemnification of Moslems in Western Thrace (£ 150,000), the indemnification of Greeks in Constantinople whose property had been seized by Turkey (£ 150,000)94 and the balance in the set-off of Greek and Turkish properties (£ 125,000). The payment of this last sum provoked a sharp reaction in Greece for it implied that the Greek Government estimated the value of the abandoned Moslem holdings in Greece as exceeding those left behind by the Christians in Asia Minor.95 The country considered this provision of the 1930 Convention as completely unjust but it wanted to put an end to the atmosphere of tension and mistrust that had prevailed for almost a decade. Greece hoped that by now consenting to certain sacrifices and losses, she might receive compensation through the reestablishment of friendly political and economic relations with Turkey.M

Venizelos' initiative was both daring and magnanimous. "Is there need to remind one that greater courage was required on the part of the leader of the defeated nation" 97 than on the part of Ataturk? asks Ambassador Kyrou. The Greek Prime Minister was not only faced with the indignation of more than a million new citizens of his country who expected the promised compensation for their abandoned properties; he did not only have to appease "the wounded feelings of a proud people and to respect the nostalgic, if unrealiza-

93. Greece had established refugees in Western Thrace on estates of Moslems exempt from the transfer and no return o f these lands to their rightful owners could be contemplated. 94. T h i s amount actually should have been paid by the Turkish Government to whose ownership the properties were transferred. In exchange, Turkey agreed to return the confiscated properties of the Greeks in Constantinople, lying within the zone of that city. 95. "Greece was convinced that the properties of 1,500,000 Greeks w h o had left Turkey at various periods, leaving behind their movable and immovable property, were much superior in value to the properties left by Moslems in Greece, w h o did not exceed 500,000". Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 583.

96. l-.oc. Cit. 97. Alexis A . K y r o u , Hellemke Exottrikc Politike (Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: E . I. Zombola Press, 1955), p. 159, (translated from Greek by the author).

THE

SETTLEMENT

OF

REFUGEES

119

ble, desire of hundreds of thousands of Greeks to see again, some day, the shores of the land in which they had lived from time immemorial"; 98 he had to renounce the ideal of the entire Greek nation, to inaugurate a new foreign policy and to provide the country with different guiding principles, giving it a new mission. For the purpose of the Ankara Convention and of the Treaties of Friendship and Commerce signed a few months later 99 was much broader than the settlement of disputes arising out of the 1923 Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations. They aimed " a t the final burial of the centuries-old national antithesis and the creation of a brotherly Greek-Turkish cooperation ". 1 0 ° In order to achieve the Greek-Turkish conciliation which he considered indispensible for the general interests of the nation, Eleftherios Venicelos gave a 'panegyrical proof' of the sincere motivation of Greece the abandonment of an ideal on which the en'ire Greek foreign policy was founded since the formation of the Kingdom of Greece.101

This ideal was the unification of all the unredeemed Hellenes and the creation of a modern Greek state with its capital in Constantinople. E x a c t l y two decades earlier, in 1910, the Cretan statesman had become Prime Minister of his country, symbolizing the realization of the "Megali I d e a " and embodying the national aspirations of his people. Twenty years later, he was the one who understood the profound significance of the Treaty of Lausanne and who, making a pragmatic reappraisal of the foreign policy of Greece, renounced the dream of the new Byzantium. Moreover, this dream had lost the basic prerequisite for its realization : Hellenism was completely erased from Asia Minor. Instead of an expansion of Greece over the areas inhabited b y the irredentist Hellenes, it was the latter who came to their motherland. The unification was achieved in a completely unforeseen and deeply disappointing manner but, in a final analysis, quisque suos patimur manes. The disappearance of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the young Turkish Republic created an entirely different situation in Eastern Mediterranean. The only healthy and constructive reaction for Greece was to accept the new state of affairs, adjust her policy accordingly and look towards the future. And this she proceeded to do. 98. D . Caclamanos, " T h e Background of the Balkan Collapse", The Contemporary Review, V o l . C L X I , N o . 916 (April 1942), p. 205. 99. Treaty o f Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration; Convention of Establishment Commerce and Navigation; signed at Ankara, October 30, 1930. See texts in League of Nations, Treaty Series, V o l . C X X V , 1931-1932, N o . 2841, p. 9 and N o . 2866, p. 371. 100. K y r o u , Op. Cit., p. 82, (translated from Greek). 101. Lascaris, Op. Cit., p. 235, (translated from Greek).

PART

II

THE REFUGEES ACCEPT GREECE

CHAPTER I THE ETHNOLOGICAL IMPACT

It is obvious that all these movements which the transfers involved... have had the effect of profoundly modifying the racial geography of the regions. There has been a complete reshuffling of races in Macedonia, Thrace and Anatolia. Where before there was great diversity, there is now nearly complete homogeneity. A . A . PALLIS.

Out of the welter and misery of those tragic times the Hellenic people have risen a compact and homogeneous nation. B . CUNLIFFE-OWEN,

Silhouettes of Kepublican Greece.

CHAPTER I

THE ETHNOLOGICAL IMPACT

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

— — — — —

National Homogeneity. The Consolidation of Hellenism. Linguistic Homogeneity. The Hellenization of Macedonia and Thrace. The Exchange of Populations and the Territorial Integrity of Greece.

31. — National Homogeneity. The desirability of achieving national homogeneity is derived from two lines of argument, a negative and a positive one, both closely related to the strength of the state. The first syllogism is that the existence of national minorities increases the vulnerability of a country and weakens its political structure. This is considered particularly true when the minority is active and vociferous. By demanding the right to establish its own political system or by asking for self-determination and union with a neighboring state to which it feels nationally akin, it can seriously disrupt the efficient functioning of a country and even precipitate its collapse. The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the experience of Czechoslovakia with the Sudenten Germans provide striking illustrations of the dangers of heterogeneity. The second line of argument, developed recently, emphasizes the positive advantage of homogeneity. As modern crises become more and more extensive and acute, affecting every segment of the population, the state is forced to call upon all its citizens for large sacrifices, expecting full loyalty and devotion. The limited wars of European history up to the present century, fought on well defined fronts and with selected troops, were won or lost on the battlefield. However, the notion of total war which governs the contemporary military thinking, and the notion of the modern welfare state with its administrative and financial machinery, underline the need for a

126

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

united and law-abiding people. It is argued, consequently, that even if a minority is peaceful and does not agitate, its mere existence within the boundaries of a country becomes a restricting factor in the freedom of action of a government. This restriction can be either direct or indirect: a government cannot adopt a measure which might antagonize the minority group or it may not follow a general policy if it is not convinced that the entire population will support it wholeheartedly. National homogeneity, therefore, is considered a great advantage, intimately connected with the power of a state. Assuming the validity of this line of thought, it is evident that the exchange of populations produces immediately one desirable goal: it eliminates the heterogeneous elements of a country. The higher this goal is valued in one's opinion, the more one favors the method of transferring the minorities. Moreover, as this result is obtained quickly and directly, it can be praised unreservedly without reference to other problems which may appear subsequently. Understandably, therefore, those who analyzed and evaluated the Greek-Turkish exchange at an early stage emphasized its ethnological aspect. Amidst the chaotic conditions in Greece and the plight of the refugees, the only encouraging consequence was the consolidation of Hellenism in the Balkan peninsula. "For the first time since Byzantine days practically all Greeks are under Greek rule, and for the first time in history they live compactly" 1 wrote Hamilton Fish Armstrong when he visited the Near East after the Lausanne Conference, and W. Miller, taking a sympathetic view towards Greece's losses in Asia Minor, found consolation in the fact that "what [the country] lost in extent in Asia, she gained in intensity in Europe". 2 Broadly speaking, the ethnological results of the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations can be divided in two categories : the condensation of the population and the Hellenization of Macedonia.3 It is difficult to say which of the two is more significant. In the last three decades, however, the Hellenization of the northern provinces of Greece has played a more important role and contributed greatly to the territorial integrity of the country. Its effect, moreover, bears upon the very existence and progress of Greece : with Macedonia and Thrace securely held and forming an integral part of the nation, she has the opportunity to survive as a free nation and to transform herself into an advanced and autodynamic state. Detached from them, she reverts to the status of a Nineteenth Century Balkan coun1. Armstrong, IVbere The East Begins, p. 57. 2. Miller, Greece, p. 73. The writer repeatedly emphasized this point: "Thus, the loss of territory in Asia Minor, severe as it was, has been accompanied by the concentration of Hellenism in Europe, which has become more intensive, if less extensive." Ibid., p. 13. 3. Frangoudis, Op. Citp.

280

THE ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

127

try, with no possibility of becoming autarkic and bound to fall within the direct sphere of influence of one the Great Powers, a peon in the international interplay of political forces. 32. — The Consolidation of Hellenism. After the Anatolian debacle and the transfer of minorities, there remained three areas outside Greece where Hellenism still prevailed and flourished : the Dodecanese Islands, under the occupation of Italy, Cyprus, annexed by Great Britain in 1914 and proclaimed a Crown colony in 1925 and Northern Epirus, being a part of Albania. The Dodecanese was ceded to Greece by the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy. 4 The question of Cyprus received world-wide attention after 1950 when an overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots voted in a plebiscite for ENOSSIS (Union) with Greece. The opposition of the Turkish minority in the island and of the Government in Ankara on the one hand, and the reluctance of Great Britain to evacuate her last military base in Eastern Mediterranean on the other, frustrated the expectations of the Greeks in Cyprus who resorted to violence. After four years of bloodshed, the three Powers concerned, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, reached an agreement in February 1959 according to which the island has become an independent Republic. Northern Epirus finally constitutes the main obstacle between Greece and Albania. The two countries are still technically in a state of war and no diplomatic representatives have been exchanged, since Albania has refused all proposals to discuss the possible issues. 5 Disregarding these three regions and the Greeks in Constantinople, one is fully justified in stating that after 1923 Hellenism had contracted within the borders of the Greek state. At the same time, the transfer of the Moslem and Bulgarian minorities had rendered the country much more homogeneous. A comparison between the 1920 and 1928 census figures reveals the tremendous change that occurred. In 1912, Greece did not have minority problem, for by natural and automatic means most of the country had been completely hellenized with the exception of about 6,000 Moslems remaining in their estates in Thessaly. After the Balkan campaigns and the First World War, however, the annexation of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace affected extensively the ethnological composition of the country. Minorities formed about 13 % of the total population in 1913 ; the 4. Section V , Article 14 : "Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the Dodecanese islands..." See text of the Treaty and commentary on the cession in "European Peace Treaties after World War II, ed. by A. C. Leiss and R. Dennett, Documents on American and Foreign Relations, Supplement to Vol. VIII, 1945/46 and IX, 1947, World Peace Foundation, (Worcester, Mass. ; The Commonwealth Press, 1954), pp. 61-62, 169. 5. As recently as February 21, 1959, King Paul made a speech in which he referred to the question of Northern Epirus as " a greater problem" than Cyprus. The Christian Science Monitor, Tuesday, May 26, •959-

THE

128

heterogeneous

BALKAN

elements numbered

EXCHANGE over

Treaty of Sèvres, representing 20 %

OF

MINORITIES

1,000,000 people

after the

of the population and the per-

centage was even greater (23 % ) if one included the district of Smyrna. 6 (1,469,000 people on a population

of

other

words,

about one out of four inhabitants

of the country was not

6,477,000).

In

Greek.

A f t e r the exchange, however, the picture was completely altered, as the following table indicates : Table ETHNOLOGICAL

COMPOSITION

XII'

OF

1913 Races

Greeks Turks Bulgars Albanians Spanish Jews . . Armenians \ Foreign ! Subjects 1 Total

POPULATION

1920*

Number .

THE

/O

OF

GREECE

1928

Number

/O

%

Number

80.75 13.91 2.51 0.32 1.17 0.02 1.32

5,822,000 103,000 82,000 20,000 70,000 35,000 73,000

93.83 1.66 1.32 0.32 1.13 0.56

1.56

4,470,000 770,000 139,000 18,000 65,000 1,000 73,000

100.00

5,536,000

100.00

6,205,000

100.00

4,176,000 370,000 104,000 25,000 70,000

86.63 7.68 2.15 0.52 1.46

75,000 4,820,000

1.18

* The figures include Eastern Thrace but not Smyrna. Before any analysis of the statistics, the author would like to quote Dudley Kirk who, writing about the minorities in Europe, makes the following very important observations : Census figures on ethnic composition are inevitably weighted in favor of the dominant nationality. Questions are customarily phrased so as to favor the dominant group and in their replies many doubtful borderline persons of double language or mixed nationalityfindit convenient to identify themselves with the dominant element. The political and economic advantage of belonging to the majority group undoubtedly results in an exaggeration of the percentage of that element in the reported census distribution, entirely aside from the manipulations of the central statistical offices. 8 6. A. A. Pallis, The Exchange of Populations from a Legal and Historical Viewpoint and its Significance for the International Position of Greece, Speech delivered at the Panteios School of Political Science, April 20, 1933, (Athens : 1933), pp. 18-19. (Hereafter referred to as The Exchange of Populations). The ethnological composition of the Smyrna region was as follows : 1) Turks 299,000 2) Others 92,000

Ibid., p. 23.

Total (1 and 2)

391,000

Greeks

550,000

Total

941,000

7. The figures for 1913 are taken from ibid., Table A , p. 23. The percentages were calculated by the author. The 1920 and 1928 data are from the Me gait Hellenike Enguyklopaedeia (Great Greek Encyclopaedia), Vol. X , "Hellas", "The Refugees Question", p. 408. 8. D . Kirk, Europe's Population in the Inter-War Years, Series of League of Nations' Publications, II. Economic and Financial, 1946. II. A . 8. (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 223.

THE ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

129

The figures, therefore, should be accepted with certain reservations and there is no doubt that some of the discrepencies, as for instance, in the number of the Albanians in 1913 and 1920, can be explained in terms of the criterion that was used in defining the minority. Generally speaking, however, they are quite accurate in representing the changes in the ethnological character of the country. With the arrival of the 1,300,000 refugees and taking into consideration the natural increase of the population, the Greeks in Greece reached the figure of 5,822,000 forming about 93.83 % of the total number of persons inhabiting the country. This is an extremely high percentage for an Eastern European country. While in Greece the heterogeneous elements amounted to only 6.17 % , in Yugoslavia they represented 15.1 % , in Roumania 28.3 % and in Czechoslovakia 32.6 %. 9 Therefore, even if one questions the absolute validity of the 1928 census, the fact remains that "on the whole, Greece comes remarkably near to the ideal of the homogeneous national state". 10 The Turks constituted the larger minority, concentrated in Western Thrace whose Moslem population was exempted from the exchange. The other parts of Greece were completely hellenized : 23,500 Turks left Crete, 7,000 departed from the island of Lesbos, 6,000 from Thessaly and 1,607 from the other Aegean islands. As it will be shown below, however, the main effect of the exchange was on Macedonia which all the Moslems were forced to evacuate. The Greco-Bulgarian Convention reduced the number of the Bulgars from 139,000 to 82,000.11 This agreement, it must be recalled, was based on the voluntary emigration of the respective minorities and not on their obligatory exchange. These Slavs, therefore, preferred to stay in Greece. The Bulgarian Government claimed that their number was much higher, approaching 300,000. 12 Although this figure seems extremely exaggerated it is nevertheless true that even after the transfer, there remained a slav-speaking group of 80,000 people, part of which possessed a slav consciousness. It could be found mainly in Western Macedonia which was not greatly affected by the 9. The percentages were computed by the author on data furnished by the respective governments and published in Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Direction de la Conjoncture et des Études Économiques, Les Minorités Ethniques en Europe Centrale et Balkanique, Études et documents, Série B - i , (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), p. 83, 53, 69. These figures should be accepted with great scepticism and many scholars have pointed out that they are intentionally falsified. (Cf. C. A . Macartney, National States and National Minorities, Appendix III, " T h e Minorities under Treaty Protection", pp. J10-5 34). T h e Megali Hellenike Enguyklopaedeia, Vol. X , p. 408, gives the following percentages as representing the minority elements in the three countries : Yugoslavia 49 % , Roumania 31 % , Czechoslovakia 50 % . 10. B. Sweet-Escott, Greece — A Political and Economic Survey 1939-1953, (London : Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1954), p. 3. 11. T h e exact figure is 81,984. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 98. 12. C. A . Macartney, National States and National Minorities, p. 530.

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

World War and the military campaigns. On the other hand, all the Slavs in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, having already suffered by the fighting that occurred in those regions, took advantage of the provisions of the Convention and emigrated. An attempt to increase the Slav minority in Greece was made by Bulgaria during the second World War. Just before the fall of Athens into the hands of the Nazi troops, the Bulgarian army occupied the northern provinces of the country on April 21, 1941, with the knowledge and consent of the Germans. The Bulgarian Government "made systematic efforts to destroy the Greek inhabitants of Macedonia and Thrace and to bring about a de facto Bulgarian occupation ". 1 3 When in October 1941 those regions were annexed by Bulgaria, about 90,000 persons fled to the remaining territory of Greece or were deported, while the Slav emigrants of the 1919 Neuilly Convention were allowed to return and take possession of their estates. 14 They were followed by other peasants and officials and by 1944, 122,000 Bulgars were settled in the annexed Greek provinces. 1 5 After the liberation, the Greeks returned to their homes while the re-installed newcomers withdrew to Bulgaria. The Albanians did not form a large minority and those who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church have been completely assimilated and have "identified themselves with the Greek national life and feeling". 16 There were, however, between 20,000 and 30,000 Albanian-speaking Mohammedans 1 7 to whom the provisions of the 1923 Lausanne Convention did not apply and who remained in Epirus, near the Albanian border. By settling about 16,000 refugees in that area, the national composition of the province changed slightly, the Greek element having increased from 77 % to 81 %. 18 33. — "Linguistic Homogeneity. The homogeneity of Greece is also demonstrated by the statistics on the different languages spoken in the country. Quite often, naturally, the national minorities are linguistic ones too. By examining, therefore, the various linguistic groups, one obtains a rather accurate picture of the strength of the

13. Army Service Forces Manual, Civil Affairs Handbook on Greece, Section Two, "Government and Administration", Preliminary Draft, p. 135. 14. Prime Minister's Office, Information department, Foreign Press Division, Note on the Slavopbonts of Greek Macedonia, Reference No. 312/001, (August 1, 1956), p. 3. 15. E . M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move — War and Population Changes, 1917-1947, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 259. 16. C. A . Macartney, National States and National Minorities, p. 529. 17. The official census figure is 18,773. Statistical Annal of Greece, 1930, p. 98. 18. Megali Hellenikt Enguyklopaedeia, Vol. X , p. 408.

THE ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

131

heterogeneous elements in a given country. In Greece, the language statistics reflect quite closely the size of the minority groups. TABLE DISTRIBUTION

OF

T H E

LANGUAGE

Greek Turkish

Macedonoslavic Spanish Armenian Vlach

XII19

POPULATION

BY

N U M B E R OF PERSONS

5.759.5 2 3

L A N G U A G E S ON

1,000

PERSONS

9*8.25

191,254

30.83

81,984 63,200 33*634 I 9»7°3

13.21 10.19 5.42 3* I 8

Albanian

18,773

3.02

Bulgarian Gypsy Russian Italian English

16,775 4>998 3*295 3* J 99 2,098

2.70 0.81 0.53 °-5i 0.34

6,248

1.01

445,161

71.70

Other foreign Languages Total of foreign speaking persons

With respect to this table one should make certain clarifying remarks, for at first glance the figures seem to vary considerably from the data of table XI. The discrepancies, however, are easily explained. The increase in the number of people speaking Turkish is due to the fact that many refugees who fled to Greece or who were transferred from the interior of Anatolia did not know any Greek.20 Thus, while the Turkish minority in Western Thrace amounted to about 100,000 people, the number of the Turkish-speaking persons was almost twice as large. Macedonoslavic is the language spoken by the Bulgars. For various reasons the Greek Government refused to adopt the Bulgarian claim that all the Slavs in the central Balkan peninsula were Bulgars and preferred to designate them as Macedonoslavs. On the other hand, the 16,000 persons who are shown in table X I I as speaking Bulgarian are Moslem Slavs, better known as Pomaks. 21 19. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 98. 20. See infra, p. 213 ff. z i . T h e r e is a lot of controversy a b o u t the o r i g i n s of the P o m a k s . T h e G r e e k s claim that they are descendants of the so-called Agrians of Alexander the Great, settled near the Balkan borders of the Maced o n i a n E m p i r e for security purposes. T h e i r language is a m i x t u r e of Greek, Slavic and T u r k i s h . I n 1956 their n u m b e r had increased to 18,664. See Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Office, I n f o r m a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t , F o r e i g n Press Division, The Pomaks, Ref. N o . 312/006, (Athens : A u g u s t 29, 1956). Macartney states that they are p u r e Bulgaroslavs whose ancestors w e r e forcibly Islamized in the 17th century and w h o , b y t a k i n g the side of the T u r k s d u r i n g the Balkan wars, " w e r e subjected t o regrettable treatment by t h e Bulg a r s . " National States and National Minorities, p. 532.

I}2

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

Spanish was spoken b y the Jewish community which had settled in Salonica many centuries ago after its expulsion from Spain. The number of persons speaking Armenian represents practically the entire minority which had immigrated to Greece following the nullification of the Treaty of Sèvres. 22 The Greek Government allowed it to establish itself in the country and assisted it in various ways b y extending the relief programs to all the Asia Minor refugees regardless of race or religion. Disregarding, finally, the languages of various nomadic groups such as gypsies and vlachs who represent a small percentage indeed, one is perfectly justified in affirming that after 1923, "Greece is one of the European states which presents great linguistic homogeneity". 23 34. — The Hellenization of Macedonia and Thrace. The most significant effect of the refugee settlement plan from the ethnological viewpoint has been the hellenization of Macedonia. Obviously the consolidation of hellenism had an impact upon the entire country and some observers, unfamiliar with the Balkan political history, may not realize the need to emphasize the national homogeneity of the two northern provinces of the Greek state. If the minorities in Greece do not exceed 6.7 % , why should one analyze in detail the ethnographic conditions of one region? The answer to this question is known to all scholars for whom the word "Macedonia" signifies a whole series of problems that have bedeviled European diplomats since the latter part of the 19th century. A discussion of the Macedonian question falls outside the scope of this book. 24 Suffice it to say that Macedonia is a geographical area covering the southern part of Yugoslavia, a small region of western Bulgaria and the north of Greece. 25 I t was under the sovereignty of the Sultan until 1912 when the Balkan states proclaimed war against the Ottoman Empire, conquered the area and tried to divide it among themselves. Due to the amalgamation of races, however, a

lz. In 1920 Grcecc had only 1,000 Armenians while by 1928 their number had increased to about j5,000. See Table X I I . 2}. M. A . Triantaphyllides, Neohellenike Grammatike, V o l . I, (Athens : D . Demetrakos Inc., 1938), P- 5 5724. For a short and impartial history see Barker, Op. Ci/.', the Greek view is expounded in C. J. Christides, The Macedonian Camouflage in the Light of Facts and Figures, (Athens : The Hellenic Publishing Company Ltd, 1949). For a pro-slav interpretation see Leon Lamouche, La Question des Minorités : II. Lés Bulgares en Macédoine dans les Confins Occidentaux et en Thrace, Action Internationale Démocratique pour la Paix, (Paris : Imprimerie de la Démocratie, 1931). 25. Its exact area is disputed. The Greeks claim that there is a historical Macedonia of 50,736. 6 km*. The Slavs reject this concept and advance the idea of geographical Macedonia covering 67,135. 7 km 2 . See Christides, Op. Cit., pp. 20-21. In both cases Greek Macedonia, forming the southern part of the region, extends over 34,602. 5 km*.

THE

ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

!33

dispute arose over the demarcation of boundaries and Bulgaria attacked her former allies in the hope of settling the problem by force. Having been defeated, she lost territory to both Serbia and Greece and ever since she has adopted the slogan of an autonomous or independent Macedonian state. Hundreds of books and volumes of statistics have been written about the ethnological composition of Macedonia. In a very interesting recent study, Mr. Wilkinson produced no less than 64 different ethnographic maps of Macedonia and Thrace,26 compiled over a period of years in support of the national claims of the Balkan countries. Many times the same scholar advanced conflicting data on the subject of nationalities in Macedonia, which led a Commission of Inquiry of the Carnegie Foundation to remark cynically with respect to a Yugoslav demographer that "the ethnographic notions of Mr. Cvijic vary... with the development of the Serbian political aspirations". 27 The ethnic medley can be attributed to the geographic position of Macedonia. The mixture of population in Soutltrn Macedonia was itself an indication of the extraordinary function of the region as a corridor route from Central Europe to the Straits, as a coastal route from the Adriatic to the Black Sea and as an outlet for the interior of the Balkans to the Mediterranean?*

Being at the crossroads of the Balkan peninsula, the Macedonian plains have been subjected to continuous migratory movements, some natural and some imposed by military campaigns, and have repeatedly changed their ethnological character. An expert on this subject, Mr. A. A. Pallis, has registered as many as seventeen mass-movements of entire populations between 1912 and 1924 "on a scale which can hardly be paralleled, unless we go back to the period of great racial migrations". 29 It is evident, therefore, that any attempt to quote statistical data is bound to be arbitrary to a certain extent. It might be more useful to rely on the figures of the Refugee Settlement Commission, after mentioning that the ethnological tables of the various

26. H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics — A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia, (Liverpool : A t the University Press, 1951). 27. Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale, linquitt dans tes Balkans, (Paris : Editions Georges Cres et Tie, 1914), p. 10 (translated from French). 28. H. R. Wilkinson, Op. Cit., p. 187. 29. A . A . Pallis, "Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912-1924", The Geographical Journal, V o l . L X V I , N o . 4, (October 1925), p. 315. Hereafter referred to as Pallis, Racial Migrations in the Balkans.

THE BALKAN

134

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

Balkan governments tend to exaggerate their respective national strength. When Greece annexed South Macedonia in 1913, changing her hitherto exclusively insular and maritime status and becoming thereby a continental power, the Greek element of that region amounted to a little over 500,000 persons.30 One must observe, however, that although the Greeks were the most numerous, they did not represent a majority, forming only 42 % of the total population. The settlement of refugees altered radically this ethnological composition. With the departure of the Moslem minority and the influx of about 700,00031 people from Turkey, the Greeks exceeded 1,200,000 persons, constituting 88 % of the inhabitants of Macedonia. Table X I I I , compiled on the basis of the census returns of 1913 and 1920, as well as on statistics of the mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, the Mixed Commission for the Voluntary Emigration of Greek and Bulgarian Populations and the Refugee Settlement Commission, depicts very vividly the racial modifications between 1912 and 1926. TABLE X I I I

32

ETHNOLOGICAL TABLE OF GREEK

MACEDONIA

1912 NATIONALITIES

Greeks Moslem1 Bulgarian Various2 TOTAL

POPULATION

513,000 475,000 119,000 98,000 1,205,000

1926 %

42.6 39.4 9.9 8.1 100.

POPULATION

%

1,341,000 2,000 77,°°o 91,000 1,511,000

88.8 0.1 5.1 6.0 100.

1 Includes Turks, Pomaks, Albanians, and Moslem Gypsies. 2 Jews, Vlachs, Albanians and foreigners.

These figures have been questioned by Wilkinson mainly because of the criterion that was used in determining the nationality of the inhabitants. As the 1923 Greek-Turkish Convention defined the exchangeable persons on the basis of religion, the same criterion was adopted for compiling Table X I I I . Therefore only Orthodox Greeks, Moslems and members of the schismatic Bulgarian Church were consi30. According to the statistics of M . A m a d o r i V i r g i l i , the Greeks in the four sandjaks of Servia, Salonica, Serres and Drama (the sandjaks that were annexed by Greece after the Balkan wars) amounted to 473,000. These figures were considered by M. Charles Vellay as "the most unfavorable to Hellenism". See Vellay, L.'Irrédentisme Hellénique (Paris : Perrin et Cie, 1913), p. 88. The Greek statistics for the same area, published in the newspaper Messager ¡l'Athènes ( 2 / ^ F e b r u a r y 1913), give a total of 497,339 Greeks. Ibid., pp. 88-90. These figures arc also quoted in Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale, Op. Cit., p. 185. 31. T h e number o f refugees w h o immigrated to Macedonia was about 776,000 ; their place o f origin was as follows : 674,000 from Turkey, 33,000 from Bulgaria, 5,000 from Serbia, 3,000 from Albania, 61,000 from Russia. Andreades, Op. Cit., p. 140. 32. Greek Refugee Settlement, at the end of the book.

THE

ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

!35

dered as national communities. "Race" and language were ignored "because of the difficulty of interpretation of such terms"33 and so no attempt was made to distinguish Albanians, Vlachs, Serbs, Pomaks and Macedonoslavs. There was, however, one justification for adopting religion as the determining characteristic, namely the nature of the refugees from inner Asia Minor. In distant Cappadocia, at the root of the Anatolian peninsula, the Orthodox Greek population submerged beneath the Turkish flood more than eight centuries ago, has retained little individuality in its religion, and nothing of its native speech but a garbled vocabulary embedded in a Turkified vocabulary. Yet even this dwindling rear-guard has been overtaken... by the returning current of national life. 34

So long as the newcomers identified themselves as Greeks, the only accurate criterion would be the one that would classify them as such. Moreover, the criticism that the Refugee Settlement Commission's table does not show in detail the strength of the various minority groups may be considered a shortcoming but it certainly does not invalidate its findings. The returns of the 1928 census verified the RSC's conclusions38 which have been accepted by the concensus of the scholars. The impact of the exchange of population was also quite profound on the ethnographic composition of Western Thrace. From one point of view, the effect of the Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish Conventions was even more impressive than in the case of Macedonia, for the hellenic element in that region was never strong. Even according to Greek statistics, it amounted to 87,000 persons (36.7 % of the total population), their number having been rapidly reduced to 17,000 36 after Bulgaria annexed the territory in 1913. At the Paris Peace Conference Venizelos could not advance any ethnological arguments in favor of Greek occupation of Western Thrace since the Greeks did not exceed 17 % 37 and the future of the province was decided on "grounds of higher policy" 38 and geographical considerations. 53. Wilkinson, Op. (.it., p. 263. 24. N. Forbes, A. J. Toynbee, D. Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth, The Balkans —• A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greta, Roumania, Turkey, (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1915), pp. 242-243. 35. See Prime Minister's Office, Note on the Slavopbones of Greek Macedonia, Appendix. 36. A. A. Pallis, Racial Migrations in the Balkans, p. 327. 37. H. F. Armstrong, The New Balkans, (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1926), p. 131. The Bulgarian Government maintained that there were not Greeks left in the region. 38. H. W. V . Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. IV, (London : Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), p. 456. Western Thrace was given to Greece on the one hand as a punishment for Bulgaria's alignment with the Central Powers and on the other for geographical reasons, in order that she could communicate by land with Eastern Thrace which contained a very large Greek minority, (253,000 persons or 44.5% of the population).

ij6

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

Greece's possession of Western Thrace would have never been secure, had the refugee settlement plan not taken place. After the emigration of the Bulgarian minority and the arrival of the Christians from Turkey, the Greek element increased considerably, reaching the figure of 189,000 persons in 1924 or 62.1 % of the population of that province. 39 The 1928 census indicates that out of the 303,171 inhabitants of Thrace, 107,607 were refugees. 40 Their role, therefore, in the hellenization of that region can hardly be overemphasized. 35. — The "Exchange of"Populationsand the Territorial Integrity of Greece. The colonization policy of the Greek Government was implemented with due consideration to national security. While it is true that Macedonia, and to a lesser extent Thrace, offered many advantages for the inexpensive and immediate rehabilitation of the refugees, 41 the number of persons settled there exceeded any figure justified by economic arguments. Many settlements, for example, were created on mountainous and rather arid areas while more fertile lands were available in Central Greece. This policy was dictated by the need to defend the territorial integrity of the country and the Prime Minister of 1922-1923, Colonel Gonatas, acknowledged that it was a conscious effort of the Government. "We settled the rural refugees particularly near the borders of the state in order to consolidate the frontier populations so that they could defend themselves against irregular aggressions" 42 he wrote in his Memoirs. Even foreign observers realized the value of this plan and its wide implications. The Republican Government proved itself gees were solidly placed in Greek Macedonia, tier, thus preventing the recurrence of that which for so long had troubled the Greek

to be far-seeing, for the refumore especially along the froneternal Macedonian question nation.43

This statement actually is rather inaccurate. The settlement of refugees did not prevent the recurrence of the Macedonian question. On the contrary, it was raised repeatedly during the Twenties. By 39. A . A . Pallis, Racial Migrations in the Balkans, p. 327. The Megali Hellenike Engtyklopaedeia (Vol.X, p. 408) gives the figure of 170,000. 40. Statistical Annual of Greece 1930, pp. 27, 46. 41. See supra, p. 107. 42. Gonatas, Op. Cit., p. 265 (Translated from Greek). How deliberate this policy was is also demonstrated by the following incident, quoted from Jaquith : "In the chaos of political upheaval within Greece, while the refugees were pouring in, about 50,000 Armenians settled upon the vacant lands of Macedonia... A little late, Greece has seen her political blunder in allowing any population but Greek to settle in Macedonia along the borders threatened by Bulgaria and Thrace. An order has therefore been issued deporting the Armenians of Macedonia". Jaquith, Op. Cit., p. 406. 43. B. Cunliffe-Owen, Silhouettes of Republican Greece (Romances and Refugees), (London : Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1927), p. 80.

E T H N O G R A P H I C A L M A P OF G R E E K LEGENDE

MACEDONIA

REFERENCES 1912

1926

Populations Greeks Moslems . . . . Bulgarians. . . . Miscellaneous . .

42,6 5M 000 475 000 39=4 1 1 9 000 9,9 8,1 98 000 , 100 1 205 000

1912 ELASSONA

Greeks. . . 88 % Moslems. . 12 % Bulgarians . — Miscellaneaous —

Populations

% % % % % %

1 341 2 77 91 1 511

78 % 18 % 4 % —

20 % 76 % 4 %

— — —

80 % 18 % 2 % —

—

96 %

7° % 20 %

—

4 %

—

60 % 40 % — — 75 % 25 %

93 % 4 % 3 % 93 % • —

7 %

FLORINA

100 %

32 32 35 i

— — —

% % % %

61 % 37 % 2 %

EDESSA

100 %

40 % 48 % 12 %

— —

—

—

86 % —

14 % —

ENOTIA

ANNASSELITSA

Greeks . . Moslems .

1926

—

10 %

—

COZANI

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

% % % % %

VERRIA

CATERINI

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

88,8 o,i 5,i 6,0 100

CAILARIA

GREVENA

Greeks. . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

000 000 000 000 000 1912

1926 100 %

%

54 %

100 %

—

Bulg. . • Miscel. .

46 %

64 % •— % 5 %

1912

1926

CASTORIA

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

56 24 19 1

% % % %

SERRES

78 % 22 %

YENITSA

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

56 % 39 % 5 % — 36 42 17 5

% % % %

96 % 4

%

29 % 26 % — 45 %

79 % 19 % 2 % 80 % 20 %

KILKIS

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

—• 66 % 29 % 3 %

97

36 % 60 % 4 % —• 86 % 14 % •— — 19 40 37 4

40 % 60 %

%

6 %

95

%

5 %

100 %

DRAMA

15 79 5 1

% % % %

29 % 69 %

3 %

2 %

100 %

97

%

3 %

% % % %

100 %

NESTOS

98 %

100 %

THASSOS

97

%

3 %

SLDEROCASTRO

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

74 % 17 % 7 % 2 %

%

CHALCIDIQUE

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

94

CAVALLA

LANGADA

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

% % % %

PRAVI

SALONIQUE

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

47 40 9 4

ZLCHNI

GHOUMENDZA

Greeks . . Moslems . Bulgarians . Miscellaneous

1926

84 % 15 % 1 %

100 %

REFUGEE

SETTLEMENT ATHENS

COMMISSION i n

h

x

o

o

r

a

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ETHNOGRAPHICAL ELEMENTS • -

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•

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OF

population«. '

REFUGEES)

THE

ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

137

intensifying the hellenic character of the province, however, the Greek Government had deprived the enemies of Greece from all rational and serious arguments. Even the IMRO, the Bulgarian revolutionary organization which had fought for the incorporation of Macedonia to Bulgaria since the beginning of the Twentieth Century, could not "justify raids into eastern Macedonian territory where there were no Slavs". 4 1 The effectiveness of the colonization policy was confirmed in a conclusive and irrefutable manner some years later when Communism made the first attempts to exploit the various trouble spots of Europe. As the U. S. S. R. favored the claim of Bulgaria to Macedonia,45 a common front of the Comintern and the IMRO was established calling for an independent Macedonian state. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) did not respond favorably to this directive 46 and was attacked violently during the Fifth World Congress of the Comintern by Manuilski, who claimed that the Greek Communists not only refused to publish the manifesto advocating the independence of Macedonia but even sent a reasoned protest against the issue of such document.47 One of the members of the Greek delegation, Serafim Máximos, answered this charge and defended the position of the K K E on ethnological grounds. It is worth quoting his speech for it shows how profoundly the exchange of population had affected the entire political scene of the country and what dangers Greece avoided by the consolidation of Hellenism. "The position of the Greek [Communist] Party on the Macedonian question," Máximos replied, is not what Manuilsky says it is. Every national minority finds a defender in us, since the struggle of the national minorities is at the same time a struggle against the dominant class... [However], after the Treaty of Lausanne, all the Turkish inhabitants of Macedonia were obliged to leave, and the Greek bourgeoisie installed 700,000 refugees in their place. The Greek Communist Party opposed, and will continue to oppose this violence andthe Treaty of Lausanne... But the fact remains that there are 700,000 Greek refugees in Macedonia. The workers and peasants of Greece were, therefore, not prepared to accept the slogan of the autonomy of Macedonia.18

44. R. L . Wolff, The Balkans in our Time, (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 146. 45. In this respect the Soviet Union was following the policy of Tsarist Russia which by the abortive Treaty of San Stefano (1877) and the creation of Gieater Bulgaria tried to establish Slav supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula. 46. A discussion of the position of the Greek Communist Party with respect to the Macedonian autonomy question can be found in the work of Mr. D . Kousoulas, The Communist Party of Greece Since 1918 Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Syracuse University, June 1956), p. 126 if. Hereafter referred to as The Communist Party. 47. Fifth Congress of the Communist International, Abridged Report of Meetings held at Moscow June \~ftb to July 8th, 1924, (London : The Communist Party of Great Britain, 1924?), p. 191. 48. Ibid., pp. 205-206.

13 8

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

Submitted to strong pressure, however, the K K E was forced to comply with the Comintern line and adopt the "Autonomous Macedonia" principle,49 an action that actually split the party and ruined its chances for electoral success. This policy was so much condemned by the Greek public, (obviously, an extremely small number of people were willing to support a political party which campaigned openly on a platform advocating the territorial dismemberment of Greece), that the K K E was obliged to reverse its position in 1935 and repudiate officially the "Autonomy" slogan. The justification for this reversal was found again in the ethnological composition of the northern provinces. This change of our slogan does not mean that we abandon the MarxistLeninist principle of self-determination of the national minorities... But in the portion of Macedonia occupied by Greece, Greek refugees have been settled, and the population today is Greek in its majority. The change in the ethnic composition in Greek Macedonia... requires the replacement of the old slogan.50

The events leading to the Second World War underlined the advantages that Greece obtained from the exchange of minorities. While Nazi Germany attacked the entire territorial regime of the Versailles Treaty and the defeated states adopted revisionist policies, the Greek Government could face the gathering storm with confidence and calm. 61 Greece had a sense of security which many other Eastern European countries with large minorities lacked. When finally the general conflagration spread to the Balkan peninsula, a united and hopeful nation met the challenge and defeated the Italian aggressor. The beneficial effects of national homogeneity were demonstrated once more during the guerrilla warfare of 1946-1949. Had there existed a sizable Slav minority in the northern provinces of Greece, the task of quelling the Communist uprising would have been far more complicated and exacting. In Western Macedonia many Slavophones, i.e. people who spoke Slavic languages, actively assisted and collaborated with the guerrillas who enjoyed also the direct support of the satellite governments of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 49. D. Kousoulas, The Communis/ Party, p. 159; Daphnes, Op. Cil., Vol. I, p. 303; Wolff, Op. Cit., p. 14750. Central Committee of the K K E , Deka Chronic Agoms 193 5-1945 (Ten Years of Struggles), (Athens: 1946), p. 66. One cannot help wondering why the Party required a whole decade to acknowledge publicly a fact known to the entire world since 1924. Allegiance to the USSR, however, has necessitated the rejection of many truths... 51. "The 1,200,000 exiles... have given a predominantly Hellenic character to Southern Macedonia and Western Thrace, a valuable and timely achievement in view of the present craving for expansion on the part of both Serbs and Bulgarians who have no historical rights to the Northern coasts of the Aegean..." Introduction by A. G . Coolidge in Armstrong, Tie New Balkans, p. 8.

THE ETHNOLOGICAL

IMPACT

139

If Greece had not hellenized the frontier areas, the Albanian and Bulgarian minorities would have certainly been a great obstacle to the effectiveness of the Greek army operations. The defeat of the Communists in 1949 has eliminated the heterogeneous elements of the country. When the remnants of the guerrilla forces retreated beyond the Greek borders, many Slavs followed them in their withdrawal. According to an official estimate, more than 35,000 Slavs fled the country, eliminating the slav minority in Macedonia. 52 In a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor, a correspondent recalled how "the Slav villages... were empty of all inhabitants because most of the population had followed the Communists". 53 Only a few older people and minors were left behind. There are of course places in Greek Macedonia where the Slavic language is spoken. However, "the inhabitants of these villages have a strong sense of national feeling for Greece — perhaps stronger than that of other Greeks." 64 As a result of the transfer of minorities the Northern provinces were removed from the arena of Balkan power politics. "Quite unexpectedly, Greek Macedonia passed out of the realm of dispute with its almost complete hellenization" 55 writes Bowman, and Newman foresaw that any future conflict over the region would be only between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 56 Indeed, when in the fall of 1958 the Bulgarian Communist leaders revived the Macedonian Question, they referred to the part of the territory held by Yugoslavia, claiming that it was inhabited by Bulgars. 57 Although these statements are clearly related to the propaganda warfare against Tito, the absence of any reference to Greek Macedonia cannot be regarded as being coincidental. Even Bulgaria realizes today that as far as Greece is concerned, no Macedonian problem exists. The regions annexed by Greece in 1913 and held precariously during the First World War were transformed by the influx of refugees into an integral part of the country. The newcomers became the frontier population which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Greece and gave her a feeling of security which she had not previously enjoyed.

52. See letter of the Greek Consul in Boston, Mr. C.P. Panayotakos, to the Christian Science Monitor, published on June 23, 1959. 53. "Macedonian Tilt Scanned" by John Rigos. Tèe Christian Science Monitor, December 31, 1958. 54. Loc. Cit. 55. Bowman, Op. Cit., p. 401. 56. "This [1922] forcible exodus at least simplified the basis of the quarrel. The population of Greek Macedonia became 90 % Greek. The dispute was now almost exclusively between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia." B. Newman, Balkan Background, (New York : The MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 60. 57. See The New York Times, "Ancient Specter Rises in Balkans" (September 28, 1958) and "Yugoslavs Avoid Macedonia Clash" (November 23, 1958) by Paul Underwood.

140

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

"It can scarcely be disputed", wrote Ashley Brown in 1927 in connection with the agricultural settlement, "that the peasant proprietor is the greatest safeguard any country can have against the spread of Bolshevism". 68 His remark was demonstrated repeatedly in the years that followed in a most irrefutable manner. Furthermore, the incontestable possession of the Macedonian plains and of the tobacco districts of Western Thrace provided the country with certain minimum requirements for its economic development. The refugee population was ready and willing to contribute loyally to this national effort.

58. A. Brown, Greece, Old and New, (London : Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1927), p. 232.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

It is evident, gentlemen, that the ten-year long war venture, the Asia Minor catastrophe and the influx of one and a half million refugees in our territory created a terrible economic crisis in Greece. This crisis still continues and every single citizen, especially the needy class, feels its impact... But the most auspicious omen for the future is the fact that the refugee population, which during the first years constituted a liability for the country and for which great sacrifices are imposed even today, has started to become an asset. A n d if one takes into consideration the wonderful human material of which this population is formed, we may be certain that Greece, with the present composition of her population, may face the future with full confidence. E.

VENIZELOS,

to the House of Parliament, October 22, 1928.

C H A P T E R II

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 36. — Introductory Remarks. 37. — State Expenditures for the Refugees. 38. — General Observations on the Economic Role of the Refugees. 39. — The Agrarian Reform and the Cultivation of Land. 40. — Agricultural Production. 41. — The Industrial and Commercial Effects. 36. — Introductory Remarks. Any sudden and anomalous increase in the population of a country has obviously far-reaching economic repercussions. It is inevitable that the newcomers, acting simultaneously as producers and consumers, affect every aspect of the national economy. It is also evident that their influence varies directly with their numeric strength in the total population : the greater their number is, the larger their impact on the economic life will be. The arrival of refugees in Greece was not an exception to these rules. It was only natural that the addition of more than a million persons, constituting about a fifth of the entire population, would modify profoundly the economic structure of the state. This increase, however, came about under certain special circumstances which intensified its influence and presented a series of particular problems. The peculiar factors in the Greek refugee question concern the nature of the country and the condition of the newcomers. A t the risk of stating the commonly known, one should emphasize that Greece is basically a poor country which has always found it difficult to provide a moderately satisfactory standard of living for her population. Any nation would face great obstacles in absorbing a large number of immigrants, but for an underdeveloped one the task is even more formidable. Furthermore, the Greek nation had just emerged from ten years of war which had ruined it financially. Even without the refugee influx she would have required a long period of recovery and adjustment. On the other hand, the condition of the exchangeables aggravated the problem. The majority were completely destitute, lacking not

144

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

only the means to support themselves, but also some fundamental material things such as clothes and covers. From a psychological point of view, they were unprepared to play an active and vigorous role in Greek life. Morally broken and mourning the loss of close relatives, they felt helpless and pathetic. It was this sentiment of passiveness and impotency which had to be fought before they could react positively to their new environment and be integrated in Greek society. As a result of the prevailing economic conditions, the refugees were at the beginning a staggering burden on Greece. Their impact was entirely negative and the Greek state had to undertake extensive financial obligations for their relief. This was the first phase during which the newcomers constituted a serious liability for the economy of the country. With the implementation of the agricultural and urban programs, however, and as time healed the moral traumata, they gradually adjusted to their new life and assumed a positive attitude towards it. Having to compete with the native inhabitants of Greece, usually from a position of inferiority, and realizing that their survival depended on their work, they applied themselves with tenacity and courage and exhibited a truly inventive and progressive spirit. During this second phase, they became an asset to the Greek economy, assisting its development to a great extent. The various production indices, the agricultural and industrial statistics and figures on business activity provide the basis for an examination of the advancement that Greece witnessed after 1923. In appraising, however, the contribution of the refugees one should be aware of the limitations that any such evaluation presents. There is, first of all, the difficulty of distinguishing between the influence of the newcomers and that of the native population. The economy of Greece was completely disrupted by the Asia Minor campaign and had reached a low level of production in 1922. It was only natural that the economic conditions should improve after the demobilization and return of labor to the farms and industries. The arrival of the refugees gave a further impetus to this economic improvement. I t is, of course, impossible to determine the exact percentage of the achieved progress that was due to them. For the figures of industrial output or of agricultural production are obviously based on the entire population of the country. Still, however, some assessment of the contribution of the refugees can be made. There are tables, concerning i.e., the cultivation of land, which refer to the latter only. Furthermore, by comparing the 1 9 1 4 and 1928 statistical data, one can draw some valuable conclusions about the part they played in the post-war recovery. Finally, the transfer of populations resulted in the transplantation of entire indus-

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

145

tries from one shore of the Aegean to the other. These industries simply did not exist in Greece before 1922 and their development can be unreservedly attributed to the Anatolian Greeks. A second set of difficulties in evaluating the contribution of the refugees is closely connected with the relation of a national economy to the world at large. International trade binds the various sovereign states together in an integral whole; consequently the world economic conditions affect directly every single country. It is a well-known fact that the decade following the First World War was characterized by a tremendous economic expansion from which Greece benefited accordingly. It is not possible, however, to determine in detail the effect that the general world prosperity has had on the economic development of the Greek state. Similarly, the iQ2q crisis in the United States, spreading a few years later all over Europe, had many detrimental repercussions on Greece and resulted in financial bankruptcy in 1932. Again, one cannot positively state to what extent the obligations assumed by the Greek Government and the expenditures incurred for the settlement of refugees were responsible for this crisis. The only statement that can be made is that the burden of establishing the newcomers aggravated considerably the condition created by the deterioration of the international financial situation. 37. — State Expenditures for the Refugees. In order to appraise the sacrifices imposed upon the Greek State by the exchange of populations one should examine the general expenditures of the government for the relief and settlement of the refugees. Fortunately, there is adequate information about the sums that were spent and every ministry or official institution has published pertinent figures. There is, however, disagreement about the total monetary cost of the refugee crisis, due mainly to the various ways in which the experts calculated it. Broadly speaking, the expenditures of the Greek State fall into two general categories : (a) expenditures from the annual budget and (b) expenditures from loans. The sums of the first category were covered by the revenues of the state and did not constitute a long-run obligation. It must be admitted, of course, that had the emergency not arisen, this money would have been devoted to some other productive purposes. After the disaster, the main preoccupation of the government was to try to alleviate the hardships of the Christians from Asia Minor. This policy was never questioned and it is not surprising that "more than half of [the Greek budget was] expended upon refugees". 1 At the end of the first decade (from the fiscal year 1922-1923 until 1. Jacquith, Op. ( it., p. 406. Jacquith refers to the budgets of the years immediately following the defeat. Later, the expenditures for the refugees decreased. 10

146

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

1931-1932) the total budgetary expenditures for the relief, housing, settlement and the exchange of populations amounted to 3,304,221,289 drachmas or 10,794,657 gold pounds (computed at the average annual price of the pound).8 This figure is obtained by adding up the funds of each separate budget earmarked for the refugee emergency. It seems to the author, nevertheless, that the total includes expenditures which, properly speaking, cannot be considered as part of the refugee burden. Taking advantage of the rural settlement of the newcomers, the government assisted many native inhabitants of the country. The Agricultural Bank received money from the Asia Minor settlers for the livestock and farm tools granted to them on a repayment basis. To arrive at an accurate estimate of the budgetary expenditures one should deduct from the 3,304 million drachmas these reimbursements and the expenses that benefited the native population. No such attempt was made, however, and the total given above is accepted as the official cost of the refugee contingency covered by the regular proceeds of the state. Since this revenue could hardly meet the financial needs of the settlement, the government resorted to a series of foreign and internal loans which can be divided in two categories : 3 (1) those floated either abroad or in Greece for the reestablishment of the rural or urban refugees and (2) those contracted in the country from the newcomers in order to indemnify them to a certain extent for the property they had abandoned in Turkey. Four loans fall in the first category, the main two having already been examined : 4 they are the refugee loan of 1924 and the part of the 1927 Stabilization Loan granted to the Refugee Settlement Commission. In addition to these, the government came to an agreement with the Tecton Company in 1927 for the construction of urban dwellings at a cost of 100,000,000 drachmas. Finally a small loan of 2,000,000 was floated in 1926 for the establishment of the Nea Smyrne suburb. The total nominal value of these four loans was 15,382,450 pounds 5 and 102,000,000 drachmas (or 272,000 pounds) for a sum total of 15,654,450 pounds. 2. Aegides, Op. Ci/., pp. 34-35. The breakdown o f the figure is a follows : Rel ief, housing, etc 1,818,378,489 drs. Settlement 718,687,542 " Exchange of populations 282,718,351 " Miscellaneous 484,436,907 " TOTAL

3,304,221,289

"

3. Ibid., pp. 36-42. 4. See supra, pp. 87-92. 5.

1924 Refugee Loan 1927 Stabilization L o a n . (a) In pounds (b) By the U. S. Government

12,300,000 pounds

....

582,450 2,500,000

" "

12,167,073)

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

147

The second category of loans is more complicated and no exact figures exist. It should be recalled that the 1923 Convention provided for the liquidation of the minority properties located in Greece and Turkey and the indemnification of the proprietors. In practice, this stipulation broke down and the 1930 Ankara Convention accepted that the abandoned fortunes were of almost equal value, leaving a small balance in favor of Turkey. Since, however, the two governments concerned had assumed the moral obligation to indemnify the refugees, they could only fulfill their duty by exploiting the Moslem and Christian holdings that existed in Greece and Turkey respectively. "This could only mean that the Greek refugees should divide among themselves the fund constituted by the property left in Greece by the Moslem emigrants", 6 the so-called exchangeable property. This property consisted of rural estates and houses which were granted to the RSC for the agricultural settlement and of urban holdings, estimated at about four billion drachmas.7 The latter were turned over by the Greek Government to the National Bank of Greece, authorizing it to issue bonds on the basis of the above property which was to be sold gradually at auction. The bonds, bearing an interest of 8 % guaranteed by the state, were given to the refugees in indemnification of their holdings abandoned in Turkey. In order to assess these holdings, special commissions were established to receive the claims of the newcomers, verify them, and in return give to the refugees a number of bonds representing a certain percentage of the value of their property in Asia Minor.8 The bonds were redeemable at par in proportion as the Moslem urban holdings were sold by the bank. The sum total of these obligatory loans from the refugees amounted to 8,592,879,144 drachmas. By adding this amount to the previous expenditures one obtains the following table, depicting the actual cost of the refugee emergency : 1. Budgetary Expenditures

3,304,221,289 drs.

2. Loans of the first category (15,654,450 pounds at 375 drs.) 3. Loans of the second category TOTAL

9

5,870,418,750

"

8,592,879,144

"

17,767,519,183

drs.

6. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 690. 7.

Loc. Cit.

8. For a detailed account of this phase o f the refugee problem see Protonotarios, Op. Cit., pp. 106. 9. The four loans that fall in this category, with their nominal value in parenthesis, are the following : (a) The Greek-Bulgarian Emigration Loan of 1923 (800,000,000 drs.). (b) The A Loan of Exchangeables of 1926 (3,500,000,000 drs). (c) The B Loan of Exchangeables of 1928 (2,500,000,000 drs.). {d) The Greek Citizens' Loan of 1927 (800,000,000 drs.) Aegides, Op. Cit., pp. 38-42.

148

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

This figure, however, does not include the interest of the loans that the Greek Government undertook to pay. It is in the calculation of these expenses that opinions vary quite extensively. This is not only due to the absence of pertinent data and to the reluctance of the competent authorities to divulge the necessary information. To a great extent the difficulty arises from the fact that the entire topic of assistance to the refugees had wide political ramifications. Evidently, the government in power tried to show that the Greek state used all the means at its disposal to alleviate their distress and made heavy sacrifices on their behalf. On the other hand, the Opposition claimed that the newcomers could receive more assistance, could be settled better and more promptly and should obtain fuller compensation for their lost property. It is not surprising, therefore, that every side offered its own figures in support of its case. When Mr. Venizelos, as Prime Minister from 1928-1932, appeared before the House of Parliament to submit the 1930 Ankara Convention for ratification, he reviewed the entire refugee question and made a detailed report of the state expenditures. "The figures which I will give you, gentlemen", he said, "are taken from an official memorandum of the General Counting-House 10 so that they can not be questioned in the least". 11 He proceeded to read an analytical financial statement which estimated the total cost at 30,290,021,587 drachmas. The sum included past expenditures as well as the obligations undertaken by the government for the repayment of loans and interests. He pointed out, moreover, that the refugees had received on an average 15 % of the value of their lost properties as well as housing facilities. These numbers which allegedly could not be disputed were soon contradicted by Mr. Tsouderos, the Governor of the Bank of Greece. In his report to the Fifth General Meeting of Shareholders (February 15, 1933) and referring to the refugee settlement he stated that "the total expenditure in respect of this colossal but successful achievement is brought up to the sum of Drs. 27,150 millions". 12 It should be remarked that the figure is lower than the one given by Mr. Venizelos in 1930, although the Governor took into consideration the expenses of two more years, until 1932. Mr. I^overdos, finally, the Minister of Finance published an article in which he claimed that the total 10. The Greek equivalent of the Bureau of the Budget. 11. Republ ic ot Greece, House of P;ir! lament, Praklika Syntiiriaston (Verbatim Records of the Meetings) B' Period, B' Synod, 91st Meeting, Wednesday, June 25, 1930. (Translated from Greek). 12. Bank of Greece, The Economic Situation in Greece and the Bank of Greece in 1932, Report read by Mr. E. J. Tsouderos, Governor of the Bank of Greece, before the Fifth General Meeting of Shareholders, held on February 15,1933, (Athens : "Hestia" Printing House, 1933), p. 6.

THE

IMPACT

ECONOMIC

149

cost of this tremendous enterprise was 78,000,000 pounds.13 Three of the most influential and competent officials of the Greek state could not agree on the subject, their estimates varying from 72,400,000 pounds (Mr. Tsouderos' figure) to 80,773,417 pounds (Mr. Venizelos' claim). 14 The actual expense falls probably between the two extremes, coming closer to the Greek Prime Minister's estimate. Regardless, however, of this controversy, the fact remains that the financial burden was heavier than Greece could successfully sustain. "From a financial point of view", wrote Mr. Papanastassiou, a former Premier, "the refugee settlement resulted in an excessive indebtment of the State abroad as well as at home. Naturally, this indebtment aggravated the economic crisis in Greece...". 16 Impartial observers corroborate this point: The high rate of interest charged on the loans raised for this reconstruction and settlement undertaking placed an extremely heavy strain on the Greek economy, resulting in a financial crisis in 1932.16

In spite of the willingness of the Greek people to face the necessary sacrifices for the rehabilitation of their unfortunate brothers, the burden imposed upon them was disproportionate in relation to the country's actual economic capacity. On April 26, 1932 Greece abandoned the Gold Standard and the Government, introducing a regime of compulsory unconvertible notes, made no provision for sinking funds and announced that the country would default on the bond coupons due on May 1. By suspending all payments of interest on the contracted loans, the Prime Minister acknowledged the bankruptcy of Greece. These developments "hardly [came] as a surprise" 17 wrote The Times next day, recognizing the adverse effect that the deterioration of international economic conditions had had on the country. 38. — General Observations on the Economic Role of the Refugees. The fact, however, that the effort to accommodate the refugees, combined with the 1929 crisis, resulted in the financial collapse of the Greek state should not lead one to conclude that the economic impact of the newcomers was negative and adverse. On the contrary, "the expulsion of the Greeks from the Turkish territory has been rightly 13. Aegides, Op. Cit., p. 50. 14. The author converted the drachmas in pounds, at 375 drs. a pound. 1 A . Papanastassiou in the introduction to Mr. Notaras' work, Op. Cit., p. 1 . (Translated from Greek). 16. Vernant, Op. Cit., pp. 205-6. See also Kousoulas, The Communist Party of Greece Since 1918, pp. 3-4. 17. The Times, (London), A p r i l 27, 1932.

I

THE

5°

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

compared to the expulsion of the Huguenots from France" 18 which contributed heavily to the industrial development of England. The Christians from Asia Minor became an economic factor whose farreaching implications surpassed the expectations of the most hopeful and optimistic observers. During the years following the Anatolian disaster Greece experienced real prosperity and progress.19 One reason for this advancement was obviously the increase of the population. As Sir Norman Angell aptly expounded it, ...the

admission

ployment.

The

of an immigrant's children

med, and the production ployment...

And

family

have to be fed of the food,

when the refugee

first

of all

and clothed

clothing,

fuel

keeps

head of the family...

money, he must spend that money, which gives employment. camp is a market

creates

and housed

and a refugee child a

work,

em-

and

war-

someone begins

in to

emearn

Even a refugee

consumer}"

Beyond, however, this simple arithmetical effect, the nature of the refugees itself contributed to the advancement. They were courageous and intelligent people, eager to work, possessing a spirit of inventiveness and boldness that the native Greeks lacked. Even those among themselves who were somewhat conservative were forced by circumstances to become aggressive. It was evident that by adopting the methods and techniques of the old inhabitants the newcomers could not expect to advance rapidly and win the position they deserved. To compete successfully with the already established enterprises, they had to employ modern technological tools and make use of the most recent agricultural methods. In this respect they became the pioneers of progress in Greece and were considered by foreign observers "the only encouraging fact in Greek economic life". 21 The Anatolian Greeks permeated every aspect of the economy, exploited the undeveloped resources, and utilized their skill. During the years 1921-1926 there were opened 221 manufactories of foodstuffs, 70 for dealing with wood, 45 for weaving, 38 for making machinery, 30 chemical manufactories, 19 paper-mills and printing establishments, 19 works for providing building materials, 12 tanneries, 8 tobacco and 1 hat manufactory. 22 In agriculture, the experienced peasants of

18. F. Wilson, Near Eastern Educational Survey, Report o f a Survey made during the months o f April, May and June 1927. Published for the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, (The Hogarth Press, 1928), p. 54. A l s o Miller, Greece, p. 284. 19. Marriott succinctly stated the feelings of the Greek people in one sentence : " T h e economic prosperity has done something to compensate Greece for political humiliation" he wrote. Op. Cit., p. 546 20. D . F. Buxton, The Economics of the Refugee Problem, with an introduction by Sir Norman Angell (London : The Focus Publishing Co. Ltd., 1945 ?), p. 7. 21. Shotwell, Op. Cit., p. r 2S. 22. Miller, Greece, p. 296.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

151

Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria provided a renovating stimulus forcing the natives to question seriously the value of their traditional cultivation w i t h the o x and the wooden plough. W i t h the guidance of the Refugee Settlement Commission and the Greek agricultural experts, rotation of crops was applied for the first time. Polyculture replaced monoculture and the production of forage plants, unknown hitherto, increased rapidly. T h e 1928 census tried to determine the extent of the refugee influence b y making a special survey of the newcomers b y categories of occupation. T w o tables were published, one of which is reproduced below to show the degree to which the newcomers penetrated every branch of Greece's economic life. TABLE

XIV

M

D I S T R I B U T I O N O F T H E R E F U G E E S A B O V E T H E A G E O F 10 B Y O C C U P A T I O N (1928) C A T E G O R Y OF O C C U P A T I O N Agriculture

Stock-breeding, h u n t i n g Fisheries M i n i n g , quarries Industry

Transportation, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s Credit, exchange, m e d i a t i o n Commerce

Personal services Liberal professions Public services W i t h o u t occupation N o profession declared TOTAL

NUMBER OF REFUGEES 242,569

9,089 3,453 979 114,512

18,742 4,347 38,516

13,864 13,023 4,9°3 340,976 73,604 878,577

I t is obvious t h a t the greater percentage of them (about 27,6 % ) engaged in agriculture w i t h industry holding the second place of importance. I t was in these t w o fields t h a t the influence of the refugees was felt more strongly and in which they contributed more extensively. 3Q. — The Agrarian Reform and the Cultivation of Land. Although Greece has always been considered an agricultural country, the native Greeks were seldom good farmers. Preferring the sea and commerce, t h e y tended to neglect the cultivation of the earth, perhaps because until the annexation of Thessaly they never had anything approaching good farmland. E v e n after the Thessalian plains became Greek in 1881, the regime of the big estates, (many of them Moslem), and the prevailing system of tenant-farmers hindered the exploitation and 2J. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 75. A m o r e detailed table can be f o u n d in Ibid., p . 83.

THE BALKAN

I52

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

development of this branch of the economy. This state of affairs continued also after 1913, since similar conditions existed in Macedonia. 24 It was evident, however, that the institution of the large property and the class of the landed gentry could not withstand the ferment of the agricultural masses. As early as 1909 the tenantfarmers convened in Thessaly and demanded the abolition of the big estates and the distribution of land. 25 Slowly and reluctantly the government accepted their platform and the law No. 1072 (November 18, 1917) provided the basis for a partial expropriation and sequestration of lands. The measures that this law envisaged are moderate compared to the ones adopted in 1923. " A f t e r the Asia Minor catastrophe and the crowded arrival of refugees... our agrarian reform legislation becomes exceptionally radical " 2 8 writes Professor Stephanides. Not only the large land property but even the medium-sized one is subjected to distribution. Furthermore, by the revolutionnary decree of February 14, 1923, the expropriation of estates is allowed without previous compensation of the proprietors for their holdings, 27 a provision that was clearly unconstitutional. "The radicalism of this legislation, dictated by the circumstances, is evident in a series of governmental decisions of a constitutional nature ; these decisions overcame all constitutional obstacles and aimed only at finding, as rapidly as possible, means of livelihood to the agricultural refugees and the numerous demobilized indigenous who came in heaps". 2 8 The agrarian law of Greece was the most revolutionary of all similar ones promulgated throughout Eastern Europe after the First World War. A survey team of the Royal Institute of International Affairs concluded that Greece led the other nations in the percentage of total agricultural land affected b y the reforms, the figure being 50 % .29 The influx of the refugees constituted the coup de grâce on the big 24. According to a 1915 statistical survey of the Service of the Hellenic Domain of Macedonia, there were 701 large estates, (tchifliks) varying from 100 to 3,000 hectares, and distributed as follows : 491 covering about 380,000 hectares, belonged to Moslems 197 — — 100,000 — — Greeks 13 — — 14,000 — — foreigners Andreades, Op. Cit., p. 156. 25. For a full account o f the agrarian reform movement see D . D . Bousdras, HApeleftherosis ton Sklavon (The Liberation of the Slaves), (Athens : " P y r s o s " , 1951). A l s o Andreades, Op. Cit., pp. 168-174. 26. Stephanides, Op. Cit., p. 97. (Translated from Greek). 27. Gonatas, Op. Cit., p. 265. 28. Stephanides, Op. Cit., p. 97. (Translated from Greek). 29. " T h e total amount of agricultural land affected by the reforms varied from 6 % in Poland to 50 % in Greece." Other selected countries : Rumania 19.7 % , Czechoslovakia 14.1 % , Yugoslavia and Hungary 10 % . World Agriculture — An International Survey. A Report by a Study G r o u p of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, (London : O x f o r d University Press, 1932), p. 149.

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

15?

estates, even the monastic ones, which were literally swept away. B y 1925, 1,496 land properties were expropriated 30 and after 1930 " i t [was] difficult to find, throughout the length and breadth of Greece, an estate exceeding 1,200 acres". 31 The agrarian reform changed fundamentally the social and economic life of the country. The Turkish tchiflik, with the landlord occupying his two-story house and the tenant-farmers living in huts, was replaced b y the village community. The new settlers were freeholders, the land belonging to the man who cultivated it. The aim of the Greek Government was to create a class of independent peasantproprietors who, having a direct interest in their farms, would make every effort to increase their production. B y resorting to a broad and sweeping program of agrarian reform, accepted almost without protest b y the land-owners, due to the tumultuous national crisis, the government succeeded in eliminating a source of potential unrest while at the same time it satisfied the needs of a large number of refugees. Land in Greece has never been abundant. Only 15 1/2 % of the total area is arable land, 55 % being classified as completely unproductive. 32 It has been mentioned earlier 33 that in order to increase the land area for cultivation, the rivers of Northern Greece were canalized and their marshes drained. An effort was also made to till regions that were considered hitherto arid or fallow. In a report of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations it is stated that "between 1925 and 1939 land area under cultivation was increased from 3.8 to 6.4 million acres, largely b y extending cultivation to infertile lands or mountain hillsides". 34 From the various water control projects more than a million acres were reclaimed for agricultural use, mainly b y developing an irrigation system. 35 Within ten years after the arrival of the refugees, the cultivated 30. M a i n l y i n T h e s s a l y ( 5 7 1 ) , M a c e d o n i a (341) a n d E p i m s (308). M . B . S i m o n i d e s , " L ' E c o n o m i e R u r a l e G r e c q u e e t l a C r i s e d e l a G u e r r e M o n d i a l e " , i n A n d r e a d e s , Op. Cit., p . 173. 31. A . A . P a l l i s , Greece1 s Anatolian

Venture — and After,

p . 175.

32. A c o m p a r i s o n o f t h i s c o u n t r y w i t h t h e o t h e r n a t i o n s o f S o u t h - E a s t e r n E u r o p e s h o w s i t s g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e i n t h i s field. P E R C E N T A G E COUNTRY

ARABLE

LAND

O F

GARDENS-VINES

G r e e c e (1929)

15 1/2

3

Y u g o s l a v i a ('30) B u l g a r i a ('27) R u m a n i a ('31) H u n g a r y ('31)

29 38 46 60

2 1 3 3

T O T A L

A R E A

PASTURE

FOREST

81/2 24 9 13 29

UNPRODUCTIVE

18

55

31 27 24 12

14 25 14 6

33. S e e supra, p . 114. 34. F o o d a n d A g r i c u l t u r a l O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Report of the F AO ( P u b l i s h e d b y t h e F A O , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : M a r c h 1947), p . 156. 35. Loc. Cit., S e e a l s o L . A . M i l l s , Op. Cit., p . 57.

Mission for

Green

THE

154

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

land area increased by 55 % . The greatest progress was achieved in Macedonia and Western Thrace, in the regions, namely, which were more densely colonized. According to the statistics of the Refugee Settlement Commission, the newcomers cultivated in 1926-1927 no less than 2,491,980 stremmata or about 613,788 acres.36 This figure refers to the area tilled by the refugees settled under the auspices of the R S C ; it does not take into consideration the lands cultivated by other refugees who established themselves by their own means and whose work, consequently, does not appear in the reports of the Settlement Commission. The Governor of the National Bank of Greece did not fail to emphasize the contribution of the newcomers in the development of agriculture. Speaking at the General Meeting of the shareholders, he said : During the year under review [1926], the agricultural population of the country, of w h o m the refugees formed an important part, carried out the same intensive work in the exploitation of the soil. The spreading of cultivation to lands now for the first time cultivated, and the intensity and improvement of the methods of cultivation presented, especially in the northern districts of the country, a satisfactory development

40. — Agricultural Production. An examination of the production figures of the various agricultural products convinces the most sceptical observer about the progress that was achieved. The cultivation of cereals, on which the refugees concentrated their efforts, was very rewarding in spite of the periodical droughts which ruined their harvest. From 1922 to 1928, the production of wheat, oats and rye almost doubled while barley and maize showed a great improvement, as Table X V indicates : TABLE

X V "

PRODUCTION OF

CEREALS

(in tons). CROPS

Wheat Barley Maslin Maize Oats Rye TOTAL .

1922

1928

245,540 450,200 128,822 222,036 26,512 26,437 143,182 — 68,102 121,546 27,633 59,360 639,811

(1926: 206,551)

879,579

36. Aegides, Op. Cit., p. 95. 37. National Bank of Greece, Report for the Year 1926 of the Governor of the National Bank of Greece Alex. N. Diomede at the General Meeting of Shareholders, on April 30, 1927 (Athens : "Hestia", 1927), p. 18. (The author's italics). 38. League of Nations, Official Journal, 9th Year, No. 10, (October 1928), Annex 1069, "Nineteenth Quarterly Report of the Commission", C. 406. M. 128. 1928. II [F. 560], p. 1691.

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

15

5

This satisfactory progress was due not only to the increase in the cultivated areas but also to the ameliorated methods that were employed. The RSC in cooperation with the government instructed the peasants about the advantages of intensive cultivation, of chemical manure, of forage and hoed plants. Seventy experimental and demonstration fields were established in Macedonia. New plants were introduced, such as clover, sugar-beet and millet. The scarcity of ploughing animals and the primitive tools that the refugees had at the beginning made machinery the only possible and effective means for cultivating fields which had for centuries been used as pasture land. Tractors, hay-cutters, winnowing machines and harvesterbinders made their appearance in Macedonia, opening new horizons to the natives. The peasant in Greece is by nature conservative and prefers to keep his traditionary methods of cultivation until he has tangible proof that other techniques yield better results. The example of the newcomers and their competition forced the indigenous farmer to revise his ideas and accept modern technology. In this way, the general standard of Greek agriculture was raised, benefiting the entire country. Vine-growing, to which the Greek soil has always been propitious, assumed great importance with the arrival of the refugees. Some of them, coming from Bulgaria and from Brussa, were experienced workers. In Macedonia and Thrace, where phylloxera had caused irreparable damage, 50,000 stremmata were planted by the refugees with new vines.39 The most important development, however, occurred in Crete. One variety of vine, the sultana, had been introduced into the island around 1900 but did not succeed in competing with the Smyrna variety, although the climatic and soil conditions were very favorable. When the newcomers from Ionia settled there, possessing great knowledge about the preparation and exportation of sultanas and with the advantage of long experience with the Continental and British markets, the situation was reversed. The Cretan sultanas ranked higher and competed successfully with the Smyrna product. The production of grapes and currants assumed such proportions, however, that a crisis in overproduction occurred. The government was forced to interfere and restrict the cultivated acres in order to avoid a catastrophic fall in the price of these products. By limiting the production and concentrating on the best qualities it succeeded in maintaining their price and preventing the economic collapse of the vine-growers.

39. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 143. Information about the agricultural progress in Greece has been extensively derived from this publication.

I

5

THE BALKAN

6

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

The same problem appeared in respect to another major product of Greece, tobacco. With the exception of cereals, tobacco-growing was the most important branch of cultivation in which the refugees engaged and excelled. Two-thirds of the total tobacco production for 1926 in Greece was due to the refugees.40 The Refugee Settlement Commission pointed out in its 19th Quarterly Report (August 15th, 1928) that the production had "more than doubled" 41 between 1922 and 1927 ; as Table X V I shows, by 1929 it had tripled. TABLE X V I PRODUCTION

OF

" TOBACCO

YEAR

KILOGRAMS

1922 192 4 192 5 19*6 192 7 192 8

25,306,656 50,096,125 65,462,009 54,724,849 61,709,013 54,180,250

19*9

85.944.99°

A great percentage of the production was exported, providing Greece with much needed foreign exchange. The exports and their value-calculated at the average rate of exchange to the pound — are as follows : TABLE X V I I EXPORTS YEAR

A N D

VALUE

" OF

TOBACCO

EXPORTS

VALUE

1924

41,832,923 kilos

42.219.525 "

6,821,236 pounds

9.500.513

192 6 192 7

55,324,172 53,460,304

8,838,981 10,786,974

19*5

" "

TOTAL . .

" "

35,947,704 pounds

In the span of four years about £ 36,000,000 of foreign exchange was brought in the country. Mr. Mantzaris, Secretary General of the Greek Exporters Federation, estimated that at least half of the total tobacco production was produced by the refugees. Thanks to them,

40. Ladas, Op. Cil., p. 662. 41. League of Nations, Official Journal, 9th Year, No. 10, (October 1928), p. 1693. 42. hoc. Cit., and League of Nations, Official Journal, nth Year, No. 6, (June 1930), p. 717. 43. League of Nations, Official Journal, 9th Year, No. 10, (October 1928), p. 1693.

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

157

therefore, the country earned 18,000,000 pounds from tobacco alone.44 The newcomers did not only double production in the country; they also introduced and spread new varieties, adaptable to Macedonia and Thrace. Greece started growing "all the finest varieties of Oriental tobacco and those most highly reputed for their aroma and flavour",45 attaining an enviable position in the world market. There are, however, many elements in the tobacco cultivation and trade which render it a delicate and hazardous industry.48 Being one of the so-called luxury products, it is very susceptible to international economic conditions. The 1929 depression, coupled with over-production in Greece, brought a sharp decline in its price. The price fall created in turn a serious labor problem which soon assumed a disquieting character. The 40,000 tobacco workers in the country, half of them refugees, felt immediately the impact of the crisis. In the vain hope of bringing about a reduction in wages, the producers had tried to increase the supply of labor by luring to the main tobacco producing centers a large number of the Greeks from Turkey. At Cavalla alone there were 11,500 people of whom hardly 5,000 could be considered as belonging to the industry. This effort failed, for the trade unions were strong enough to prevent any reduction in the wage level. When the crisis finally came, the superabundance of labor aggravated it further and ended only after a series of strikes which obliged the government to interfere and regulate the production and price level of tobacco. During the decade following the Asia Minor disaster the national income from agriculture doubled, rising from 3,171,181,457 drachmas to 6,246,938,113 drachmas. The increase would have been greater had there not been a world-wide decline in the price of agricultural products and had the various states not raised their tariffs, especially with respect to the luxury articles which constituted the main exports of Greece. It would be more useful, perhaps, to examine the progress achieved in agricultural production in terms of the average yearly 44. Examining the contribution of the refugees in this field during the first three years Mr. Mantzaris wrote : " I f we estimate the average selling price of our tobacco at 4 shillings per oke, (author's note : an oke is about 1 1/3 kilogram), the increase of our tobacco production by 22,000,000 okeseach year, due almost entirely to the refugees, increased the revenue of the national economy for the three years 1925-1925 by 66,000,000 X 4 = 264,000,000 : 20 = 13,200,000 pounds." A . Mantzaris, Ta Kapna Mas (Our Tobaccos), (Athens), p. 67. (Translated from the Greek; author's italics). 45. League of Nations, Official Journal, 9th Year, No. 10, (October 1928), p. 1693. 46. For a short but comprehensive study of the tobacco problem during this period see Ibid., p. 16921694 and Greek Refugee Settlement, pp. 148-153.

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TABLE X V I I I « VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL YEARS

1922 '9*3 1924 I9 J 5 1926 *9 2 7 1928 1929 1930 '931 1932

PRODUCTION

CULTIVATED AREA IN STREMMATA

VALUE OF PRODUCTION (drs.)

AVERAGE YEARLY PRICE OF £

VALUE OF PRO. DUCTS IN POUND

12,452,980 12,690,281 14,670,741 14,655,260 16,232,471 15,200,830

3,171,181,457 6,026,369,258 5,326,492,461

166.54 296.44

17,100,000 20,330,000 21,560,000 20,350,000 19,880,000 23,360,000 23,730,000 19,080,000 17,180,000 16,658,000 19,711,000

6,347,795,567 7,677,486,428

15,974,278

8,599,294,413 8,854,923,690

15,446,291 17,789,307 19,319,054 19,209,716

7,157,409,043 6,442,512,066 6,246,938,113 11,826,698,201

247-35 312.62 386.51 368.55 372.95 375 375 375 600

value of the pound. This analysis permits one to take into account the changes that occurred in the price level and the depreciation of the drachma. In spite of the fact that the drachma lost almost one fourth of its 1922 value, the national income from agriculture, after having increased by 6 1/2 million pounds in 1928, continued to be higher in 1932 compared to a decade ago. If there had not been a 55 % increase in the cultivated area due mainly to the settlement of refugees and if the production had not risen as a result of their intensive efforts, Greece would have suffered tremendously from the economic crisis and the depreciation of the drachma. Calculated at 600 drachmas to the pound, the 1922 agricultural production would have amounted to only 5,285,305 pounds or less than a third of its 1922 value. Instead of this reduction, its value increased to 19,711,000 pounds. A mere comparison of the two figure demonstrates the contribution of the newcomers to Greek agriculture. Obviously, the progress achieved cannot be entirely attributed to the refugees. The demobilization of the men in the armed services and their return to the farms was an important factor to the agricultural expansion that Greece underwent. Furthermore, since 1922 was a war year characterized by extensive domestic and internal turbulences, one may argue that it does not provide an objective basis for determining the improvement in this field. As the country found itself again in an atmosphere of peace and security, a certain degree of rehabilitation was bound to occur. Yet, even if one takes for parallelization purposes the best previous year, that of 1918, when Greece had attained her maximum economic development, her improved condition can not be denied. In 1918, about 14 million 47. Aegides, Op. Cit., p. 98.

THE ECONOMIC

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159

stremmata were cultivated, an all time record. In 1932 the cultivated area had increased to over 19 million stremmata, much more than justified b y the addition of Western Thrace, ceded to Greece in 1920 ; and three years later, in 1935, when the economic crisis had subsided, about 22 million stremmata (21,909,500) were tilled. 48 This intensive cultivation, far above that of 1918, should be largely attributed to the settlement of refugees. The agricultural establishment of the exchanged Christians and the radical agrarian reform had an unfortunate result: the complete fragmentation of the arable land. In an attempt to accommodate as many refugee families as possible and to transform them into independent units, the Refugee Settlement Commission divided the estates into very small holdings. In 1928, for all of Greece, "the average size of farms — including the few existing large estates and including crop land, fallow land, vineyards and orchards — was 9,1 acres". 49 Almost 90 % of the country's 953,000 farms were of twelve and a half acres or less. According to pre-1939 statistics, Greece led all major European nations in the number of farmers per producing square mile, the figure being 407 persons. 50 As time went b y , the situation deteriorated to the point where cultivation of the allotments became problematic. 51 The inheritance customs of the Southern European peasantry, requiring the distribution of the family property among its male members, had further reduced the size of individual holdings. When in 1946 a team of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations made a survey of the agricultural conditions of the country, it estimated that Greece had about 1.31 acres of arable cropland land per farm person. Concluding that "farmers in Greece are poor because they have little land per family" the report recommended among other measures an increase in the size of farms. 52 Professor Stephanides, having made a penetrating analysis of the question, states conclusively that the smallness [of the agricultural allotment] was such that one comes to the distressing conclusion that the settlement did not create small proprietors but pathological forms of dwarfish land properties. 53 48. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 145, and Statistical Annual of Greece, 1936, p. 116. 49. F. Smothers, W . H. McNeill and E . D . McNeill, Report on the Greeks, (New Y o r k : The Twentieth Century Fund, 1948), p. 54. 50. Bulgaria : 306, Y u g o s l a v i a : 295, Rumania : 251, Italy : 233, Germany : 186, France : 124, (The U. S. : 44). See Chr. Evelpidis, E. Yeoryia tes Hellados — Oikonomike kai Koinonike Apopsis (The A g r i c u l ture of Greece — Economic and Social Viewpoint), (Athens : 1944). 51. " I n many regions the fragmentation of land amounts to rendering the areas useless for cultivation." Oikonomike Epeteris tes Hellados, 1931 (Economic Annual of Greece, 1931) edited by G . Charitakis et al., (Athens : Vlastos Press, 1932), p. 15. (Translated from Greek). 52. U. N . Food and Agricultural Organization, Op. Cit., p. 20. 53. D . Stephanides, Introduction to the Applied Social Economy, p. 117. (Translated from Greek).

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In one respect, however, the small size of the farms had a beneficial result : it promoted the co-operative movement among the peasants and particularly among the refugees. As every community was established, its members found it necessary to unite their efforts in order to buy heavy agricultural machines which each family in turn used, or to build communal warehouses for their products. Their example was quickly followed by the native Greeks and, thus, in the span of a few years, between 1921 and 1925, about 1,350 agricultural associations were created. Taking Macedonia alone, where these associations were most numerous, the situation on December 31st, 1925 was as follows : TABLE X I X " A G R I C U L T U R A L C O O P E R A T I V E SOCIETIES NUMBER 191 local societies 404 refugee " 34 mixed "

MBMBBRS 18,871 30,683 3,675 of whom 1,990 refugees and 1,685 natives

The importance of the diffusion of cooperative ideas among the newcomers should not be overlooked. These people had arrived from many divergent places and possessed various individual characteristics. One would expect that a number of years had to elapse before they could form an integrated part. Yet, bound by their common misfortunes and by a desire to build up a new future, they exhibited a spirit of cooperation and willingness to work together which was rare in the indigenous population. It should also be emphasized that "the economic organization of the refugees [constituted] an effective antidote to the insidious germs of anarchy" 55 which usually develops among suffering and desperate masses. From this point of view, the agricultural settlement was very successful. On the contrary, the urban rehabilitation of the refugees, closely connected with the industrial development of the country, failed almost completely to create the prerequisites that would prevent the spreading of revolutionary doctrines. 41. — The Industrial and Commercial Effects. The impact of the transplanted Christians upon the industrial expansion of Greece may be divided into two categories : (1) their contribution to the imple54. Grttk Rifugii Seulement, p. n o . See also M. B. Simonide "Le Mouvement Coopératif et le Crédit Agricole" in Andreades, Op. Cit., pp. 181-186. 55. Grttk Rifugii Sitthmint, p. 109.

THE ECONOMIC

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161

mentation of the economic programs formulated by the Greek Government after 1922 and (2) their role in the development of new industries that did not exist previously in the country. The inter-war period is characterized by a general policy towards autarky and economic self-sufficiency. The major European nations, in an attempt to exploit to the maximum their natural resources and become economically independent, adopted a series of measures which soon spread throughout the Continent. Confronted with the various tariff barriers and the protectionist legislation of the other countries, the Greek Government was forced to undertake a vast program of public investment and industrial development in order to maintain the previous level of exports and decrease the dependency of the Greek economy on foreign products. In a period of a few years, " a true economic recreation" 56 took place in the country. New factories were built, new corporations were established and industry grew rapidly into a significant branch of the economy.57 The refugees, obviously, played an important part in this beneficial evolution, affecting it in their triple capacity as consumers, labor and entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, one can not estimate their exact contribution with respect to the first two functions. Any increase in the population of a country has a direct influence upon its economy and the need to satisfy the basic wants of the newcomers provided a stimulating impetus. Since, however, income is an important factor in consumption and since the spending power of the majority of the refugees was extremely limited, they can not be considered as having had an important impact as consumers. From the point of view of labor, the numeric analogy of the exchangeables to the indigenous population does not reflect their significance in the industrial upsurge. Due to the disadvantageous conditions of the urban settlers and to their difficulties in earning their daily bread, the newcomers provided the indispensable cheap manual work for the realization of the various economic plans of the Greek Government. As employment was not abundant, the refugee workers applied themselves with eagerness and zeal, hoping that by proving their value they would keep their job permanently. It is not a coincidence that most of the factories built during this period were located near the urban settlements where the labor force was abundant. Wages were evidently low; some provisions of the social legislation 56. G . Vouros, Panages lated from Greek).

Tsaldaris,

1867-1936, (Athens : Greek Publishing Co. Inc., 1955), p. 101. (Trans-

57. "Industry became the second branch of national activity after agriculture." Philippe Secretan, L a (Paris : " L e s Gemeaux", 1932), p. 25. (Translated from French). See also Vouros,

Grece sans Mythologic Op. Cit., p. 101.

11

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had to be tacitly abrogated, (especially the laws regulating the work of women and children) 58 in order to give the opportunity to as many persons as possible to support themselves; and the producers quite often took advantage of the misfortune of the refugees to impose upon them certain terms, concerning hours and shifts, clearly unfavorable to them. Still, the outburst of industrial activity enabled Greece to provide employment for a great number of new urban dwellers who would otherwise have had to depend on relief measures to avoid starvation. The progress achieved can be easily demonstrated by examining various statistical figures concerning the state of industry before and after 1922. In 1917 there were only 2,213 factories 59 in the country, employing about 35,000 workers. Industry in general, including small enterprises, provided employment to only 5,381 clerks and 103,777 workers. Within a period of eight years, between 1923 and 1930, no less than 918 new factories were established, the number of persons employed in industry having risen to 429,831.60 More than 300,000 people were able to start working in the newly established industrial enterprises. Most of them were refugees, employed by other more fortunate exchangeables from Thrace and Constantinople who arrived in Greece having some capital and possessing specialized knowledge. The most significant contribution to the industrial progress of Greece was made by the refugee entrepreneurs and producers. Indeed, if one analyzes more scrupulously the statistical data on the expansion of industry, singling out the branches that received the greatest impetus, a very interesting pattern emerges : the most noteworthy developments occurred in the industries on which the newcomers concentrated their attention and efforts. More useful, however, from the point of view of this dissertation, would be to investigate briefly those fields of activity to which the refugees were the principle or sole contributors, namely, textiles, including silk and woolen materials, carpet production and various arts and crafts. It was in those economic spheres that the Anatolian Greeks excelled by utilizing extensively their valuable experience and know-how. The textile industry experienced a real boom when the urban settlers, with financial assistance from the Refugee Settlement Commission and the Greek Government, bought a number of looms and established weaving shops. The following table indicates the evolution of this industry after the Asia Minor catastrophe. 58. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 189. 59. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 177. 60. Ibid., p. 182.

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

163 TAB LB X X « 1

EXPANSION OF THE TEXTILE Number o f factories Installations, looms, ctc N u m b e r o f persons employed Production (millions o f drs.)

INDUSTRY 1923 120 603

1930 238 1,360

9,359 747

22,900 1,800

Within a few years the number of factories and installations doubled while production increased two and a half times. The production of woolen fabrics jumped from 1,700,000 yards in 1922 to 2,600,000 in 1925. The same progress was achieved in silk materials. Silkworm breeding received a new impetus from the exchangeables. The community of Kios, which was previously established in the gulf of Nicomedia in Turkey and constituted one of the main centers of production, was transferred en masse to the plains of Argos, in Peloponnesus. A colony of 550 families created the settlement of Nea Kios, 6,500 stremmata were planted with mulberry trees and large quantities of silkworms were reared. While the number of silkworm eggs produced in 1922 scarcely attained 50,000 boxes, by 1926 the refugee growers alone were responsible for 160,000 boxes, exported almost entirely to the Caucasus and to Persia. Mulberry nurseries and silkworm breeding stations were also established in Macedonia and by 1930 Greece produced 1,690,460 kilos of fresh cocoons.62 The RSC predicted that "Greece will eventually become one of the most important producing countries in the international silk-market". 68 Although this anticipation did not materialize and although the development of synthetic fibres and rayon production decreased the importance of natural silk, by 1935 Greece produced enough fresh cocoons to satisfy the needs of her textile industry. For the first time in 1925, 1,000,000 square ells 64 of domestically woven silk cloth appeared in the Greek market, the production rising sharply to 3,100,000 square ells in 1930.65 The most important contribution, however, of the refugees to the industrial expansion of their new homeland was undoubtedly in the field of carpet-making. Since ancient times, naturally, the Greek women, sitting in front of their loom, equipped their homes with the

61. Compiled o n the basis of figures g i v e n in Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 191 and 1931, p . 136. 62. Ibid. 1931, p. 115. 63. Greek Refugee Settlement, p. 147. 64. 1 ell (in Greek pehys) = 27 inches or 64 centimeters. 65. A e g i d e s , Op. Cit., p. 118.

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necessary linen and carpets, utilizing the wool of their flocks. But this work could hardly compare with the famous Oriental carpets made with knotted points on a high warp. It was not until 1923 that the true carpet industry developed in Greece with the transfer of the Ionian Greeks. Expert women workers, nimble and sure of finger, imaginative designers and experienced dyers, owners of factories with international connections landed in Greece. " A moment to gather their wits and then all this world set to work once more".66 About 68,000 square meters of carpets are produced in 1925, 104,000 in 1926,147,000 in 1927 and by 1928 carpet production reaches the impressive figure of 195,411 square meters.67 A t the time of the 1929 census there are 135 carpet enterprises, all of them founded after 1922. They provide employment for 7,250, most of them women and girls.68 The centers of production are the urban refugee settlements of Nea Ionia and Nea Kokkinia in Attica and Salonica in Macedonia. Various types of carpets are manufactured with inspiring colors and patterns, competing successfully in the international market and bringing into Greece 400,000 pounds annually. It was really the birth of a new industry. The Refugee Settlement Commission sought also to re-establish certain domestic arts and crafts for which some communities in Asia Minor were renowned. For centuries the Pontians were engaged in the working of copper. The people of the city of Kiutahia were expert potters, being able to manufacture a variety of objects and enamel wares. People from the interior of Anatolia and the Caucasus had vast experience with silver and leather. Most of the women were real artists in embroideries and in articles of women's apparel and of home decoration. Workshops were established, artisans were hired and soon these semi-luxury products appeared in the domestic market. Today the majority of items associated with tourism, such as imitations of ancient vases, fancy blouses or embroidered table cloths, silverware and enamelled articles, are manufactured by the refugees. The two most prominent houses in Athens, the "Diacosmetike Decoration Company" and the "Double Axe", belong to them, attracting most of the tourist trade of the capital. The growth of industrial activity is reflected in the increased value of industrial production.

66. Greek Refugee Settlement, pp. 154-155. 67. Statistical Annual of Greece, 1930, p. 192. 68. Loc. Cit., and Xbii., p. 198.

THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT

165 TABLE X X I

»

V A L U E OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION,

1921-1931

(in drachmas). YEAR

1923 i924 *9 2 5 19*7 f the author the final solution of the problem is still pending. Another demand concerns the establishment of a Refugee Scholarship Fund. In the words of the Organizing Committee of the PanHellenic Pan-Refugee Congress,30 "thirty-five years after the national 28. The same request was reiterated during a pan-refugee meeting that took place on January 25, 1959. Newspaper Kathemerini (Daily), January 27, 1959. 29. For a discussion of this problem, see To Prosfygikon ZetBma, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 , 49-50 if. 30. This Congress has not been convoked yet.

ANNEX

235

catastrophe, the refugee world in its greatest majority finds itself in a morally disadvantageous position, for it cannot afford the large expenditures that the teaching and education of its children require". 31 This was one of the reasons advanced by the expatriates to explain the absence of their young men from positions of leadership in the Greek public services. To overcome the "prohibitive" 3 2 costs of the Gymnasium and University instruction, they proposed that 20 million drachmas from the proceeds of the exchangeable property be earmarked for a Scholarship Fund to assist all refugee students who excelled in their studies. Clearly connected with this motion was another one, suggesting the creation of two Academic Centers, one in Athens and the second in Salonica, whose purpose would be the collection and preservation of articles relating to the uprooted Hellenism of Asia Minor, Pontus and Thrace. Regional folk costumes, jewelry, scores of popular songs, as well as pertinent historical monographs, would be assembled there to provide the material for further scholarly research. These Centers would also serve to demonstrate to the autochthonous population "the miracles that were accomplished by the formerly unredeemed Greeks ", 33 I t must be observed that much progress has already been made along these lines. Many organizations exist today whose purpose is almost identical with the one outlined by the delegates at the Congress. To mention a few, the Institut Français d'Athènes has a Center of Asia Minor Studies which publishes regularly well-edited and documented scientific and philological works pertaining to the various regions of Anatolia. The Institute of Macedonian Studies has an impressive record of thoughtful and learned publications dealing with Greek irredentism.34 Different refugee associations have collected miscellaneous materials relating to their particular places of origin. The proposal of the Pan-Refugee Congress aimed mainly at the unification of the private collections and the concentration of the scattered works in two principal academic centers. These centers would be supported financially by funds from the exchangeable property. A final category of demands refers to the construction of schools and churches and the inauguration of a public utility program for the refugee urban and rural settlements. During the crucial period of the 31. To Prosfygikon Zetema, p. 13. 32. Ibid., p. 47. 53. Ibid., p. 14.

34. See, for instance, the really excellent study of M. Maravelakes and A. Vakalopoulos, Ai Prosfygika Engatastaseis en te Periohe Tbessahnikei (The Refugee Settlement in the Salonica Region), Publication No. (Salonica : Institute of Macedonian Studies, 1955).

4,

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influx in 1922-1923 and the turbulent years that followed, all government efforts were directed towards finding a shelter for the completely destitute newcomers. Little attention was paid to such questions as paving the streets of the newly created suburbs, providing an adequate electricity network, establishing telephone centers or building imposing schools at a convenient distance. A t that time, naturally, these shortcomings passed almost unnoticed and few complaints were expressed. Today, however, they give rise to feelings of dissatisfaction and exasperation. The dusty, unimproved roads, the irregularity of the bus services or the interruptions of the electrical power due to an overcharge of the lines generate accusations to the effect that the welfare and comfort of the refugees are being neglected. The Organizing Committee of the Pan-Hellenic, Pan-Refugee Congress is well aware of these daily problems and proposes that they be solved " b y credits from the proceeds of the remaining exchangeable property". 3 5 The various communities are expected to contribute to the implementation of these projects and the inhabitants to offer their own manual work. If one takes into account the generally low standard of living in Greece and the prevailing poor conditions among the entire population, some of these demands sound over-ambitious. It is also difficult to see how some of the plans, such as the creation of two Academic Centers, can be realized in the near future. From one point of view, however, the proposals that were made are encouraging and welcome : they demonstrate that the majority of the refugees have fully recovered from the shock of their transplanting, have satisfied their basic needs and face the future optimistically. For the problems of greater schooling opportunities for the children, of better housing, of more comfortable living exist in all communities and occupy the attention of the citizens of all nations. Such problems are serious indeed, but are also an unmistakable sign of an energetic and progressive people. And the majority of the refugees belong undoubtedly to this class.

35. To Prosfygikon Ztiema> p. 15. One cannot avoid: orming the impression that this exchangeable property is considered by the refugees as a cornucopia, a horn of Amalthaea, which will be always full and will provide the necessary funds for the execution of all their plans. It seems that many of these programs would require extensiveexpenditures, much larger than those that the revenues of the property could cover.

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Tempus edax rerum wrote Ovid and from a certain viewpoint it is true that the passage of time has an adverse effect upon our view of the events of the past. As years elapse, memories grow fainter, incidents are forgotten and it becomes often difficult to recapture the intense feelings of the moment and to recreate the atmosphere in which certain developments occurred. On the other hand, a time interval allows the formation of historical perspective which presents many advantages. It is a widely accepted principle that the farther away from an episode a person is, the greater are his chances of evaluating it accurately and objectively. The principle is sound for two reasons : an individual who has not experienced directly the events of a period is usually better prepared psychologically to make a dispassionate appraisal of them than the one who has lived through them and whose biases and prejudices are bound to condition his conclusions. More important, however, is the effect that time has upon the events themselves. As details are made known, as the full impact of heretofore seemingly insignificant incidents becomes visible, as subsequent developments throw new light on the past, each component of the pattern finds its proper place and a clear picture emerges. For these reasons, the four decades that have passed since an obligatory transfer of populations was effected render possible a more effective and impartial evaluation of the experiment today than earlier, when the undertaking was still in an evolving stage. The first point that should be made concerning the Greek-Turkish exchange is that it demonstrated the feasibility of such an enterprise. After 1923, the compulsive transfer of populations as a means to solving the minority problem received a permanent place in the field of international relations. Regardless of the difficulties and disadvantages that such a policy presents, the fact that it was attempted and fully implemented defeated the theoretical argument that it was unachievable. " I t hardly seems realistic to assume the utter physical impossibility of [such] a project", 1 writes Claude and his conclusion is obviously justified in view of the Greco-Turkish experience. 1. Claude, Op. Cit., p. 101.

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Not only was the method proven realizable; it gained new advocates and received a great impetus especially during World War II. The way Hitler exploited the existence of German minorities in the neighboring states of the Third Reich and the crises he precipitated in the interest alleged of their welfare convinced many leaders of the Allied nations that the only solution to German irredentism was the transfer of these groups to Germany. " I suggest", said the Earl of Mansfield in the House of Lords, "that among our peace aims should be the transference — the obligatory transference — of all German citizens" 2 from Poland and the Sudetenland. Profoundly upset by the fate that Czechoslovakia suffered in the hands of the Nazis, President Benes affirmed that "it will be necessary after the war to carry out a transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last war". 3 Speaking about the future territorial frontiers of Poland, Mr. Churchill did not hesitate to give his unreserved approval to the removal of all Germans from Eastern Europe: The transference of several millions of people would have to be effected from the East to the West or North, as well as the expulsion of the Germans — because that is what is proposed : the total expulsion of the Germans — from the area to be acquired by Poland in the West and the North. For expulsion is the method which so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble, as has been the case of Alsace Lorraine. A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed by the prospect of the disentanglement of populations, nor even by these large transferences which are more possible in modern conditions than ever before.*

The United States was also favoring the transplanting of minorities, although not on the scale contemplated by the European statesmen. During Eden's visit to Washington on March 12, 1943, President Roosevelt said that the Allies "should make some arrangement to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey; while this is a harsh procedure, it is the only 2. House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 130, Fifth Series, (1943-1944), (London : 1944), column 1098. 3. Eduard Benes, "The Organization of Postwar Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, (January 1942), p. 238. It was with great difficulty that President Benes abandoned his liberal principles and advocated this drastic measure, which he considered as a last resort. "If a solution of the minority problem is impossible in any other manner", he wrote on another occasion, "I am prepared for the grim necessity of population transfers." "Toward Peace in Central and Eastern Europe", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 232, (March 1944), p. 166. For this reason Janowsky claimed that Benes had in mind only "the elimination of those Germans and Hungarians who as disloyal irredentists plotted the destruction of the Czechoslovak State". Op. Cit., p. 138. 4. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 406 (5th Series), (London : 1945), column 1484. See also Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, (Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1949), p. 186.

CONCLUSIONS

241

way to maintain peace". 5 Summer Welles shared this opinion. "In my belief", he wrote, "the minority problems cannot be solved through frontier and territorial adjustments alone. Populations must be transferred under international control, even though in some cases such transfers may involve a million human beings". 6 The position of the State Department was more conservative, based on the displacement of a limited number of minority groups only. In the proposals prepared for the Yalta Conference, it was suggested that the U. S. government "should favor a selective transfer" 7 , the transfer of the national conclaves which had been particularly vociferous and had challenged the territorial status quo of Europe. The measure was viewed in the framework of frontier revisions, "as a means of making the boundary settlement more stable". 8 These statements demonstrate that during the Second World War the idea of forcibly removing minority groups had gained many adherents and was widely accepted. It was a radical departure from the notions that were prevalent in previous historical periods. Generally speaking, the various states had adopted two alternative courses of action in dealing with the minority problem. 9 The first one, followed until the iqth Century, was to treat the questions arising from the presence of racial, religious or linguistic heterogeneous elements as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the nation concerned. It was considered inconceivable by the other Powers that they could interfere in the internal affairs of the country on behalf of the agitating minority groups and force the government to pursue a more humane policy vis-à-vis them. Beginning with the last century, however, and as a result of the multitude of crises that were provoked by the awakened national consciousness of the supressed races, a new approach was gradually developed, an approach that culminated in the system established by the League of Nations. The Minority Treaties that were drafted after 1918 were founded on the notion that the welfare and contentment of 5. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 710. 6. Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading, (New York and London : Harper and Brothers, 1946). p. 127. Cf. "The Minority problem could have been corrected only by courageous and radical steps providing for the orderly transfer of populations." Sumner Welles, The Time of Decision, 3rd Ed., (New York and London : Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 20. Also Ibid,, p. 331. 7. Stettinius, Op. Cit., p. 38. Cf. "The U. S. Government should not favor any general transfer of minorities... The objections to a general transfer of minorities do not necessarily apply to transfers of specially selected groups." Unpublished Research Paper of the Post-War Planning Committee, dated 22 November 1944, as quoted in Claude, Op. Cit., p. 230. 8. U. S. Department of State, Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945, General Foreign Policy Series 15, Publication 3580, (Washington : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 593. 9. See, for instance, Margaret M. Ball and Hugh B. Killough, InternationaI Relations (New York : The Ronald Press Co., 1956), p. 262. 16

THE

242

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OF

MINORITIES

the various minorities was in the best interest of international peace and security. The guarantee of minority rights that the agreements instituted, the safeguard of an equal status for the majority and the minority, and the channels that were provided for the expression of complaints 10 were all directed towards one main goal: the removal of the minority problems from the exclusive jurisdiction of each individual country and the internationalization of the protection of minorities. After a few years, however, a reaction developed against this procedure. The Eastern European nations, particularly, objected to it on the grounds that it violated their sovereignty, that it prevented the assimilation of the minorities and that it was against the principle of the equality of States. Since the Great Powers of the League had not undertaken any special obligations with regard to their minorities, the smaller countries felt that the system was discriminating against them. The discontentment reached its zenith in 1934, when Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, announced to the Assembly that pending

the introduction

of minorities, cooperation vision

of

of a general

my Government with the international

the application

and uniform

is compelled organisations

by Poland

of the

system for

to refuse,

in the matter system

the

as from

protection today,

of the

of minority

all

superprotec-

tion..ll

The virtual denunciation of minority obligations by Poland was followed by the period of the pre-1939 crises. The distorted interpretation that Hitler gave to these conventions and the frenzied manner in which he incited the German irredentists in order to promote his own aggressive plans insulted and exasperated the victims of his attack. As the machinery of the League failed to achieve its purpose and finally collapsed with the proclamation of the Second World War, it was only natural that a general revulsion against it should occur and that the method of physical elimination of the minorities, particularly the German ones, should come into prominence. The Greek-Turkish exchange provided the historical precedent, and as such, its advantages were widely discussed and analyzed. 10. For a discussion of the system established by the League of Nations for the protection of minorities see C. A . Macartney, National States and National Minorities, Part II, pp. 179-419; Janowsky, Op. Cit. Part I, pp. 6-50; Julius Stone, International Guarantees of Minority Rights-Procedure of the Council of the League of Nations in Theory and Practice (London : Oxford University Press, 1932). 11. League of Nations Official Journal, Verbatim Records o f the 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement N o . 125, pp. 42-43. Walters gives a vivid description of Poland's attitude : "She was held up before the world as hard and unjust by the German minority in her Western territories; she had to answer the complaints of her subjects and often to admit that they were justified. Britain, France, Italy, Russia had none of these troubles : w h y should not Poland share their immunity ? " Walters, Op. Cit., V o l . II, p. 616.

CONCLUSIONS

2

43

Being a controversial subject, the solution of the minority problem through the transfer of populations has its antagonists and its advocates. The people who oppose this method are on the whole more vehement in their statements ; those who support it express their opinion with qualifications, exhibiting an attitude that often borders on a position of defense. They realize that the notion of obliging large masses of people to abandon their homes and move to a new country is fundamentally contrary to the basic concepts of Western civilization and violates certain widely accepted individual rights. Their defense of this method, consequently, is not usually justified on theoretical principles but on grounds of necessity in the cause of a politically stable world. Examining the arguments that were expounded by various scholars against the system of transferring the minorities, one may classify them in five major categories : humanitarian, economic, social, legal and philosophical. The humanitarian argument is the predominant one, since the suffering and physical discomfort that the exchanged groups experience is evident and often appalling. A. Mandelstamm calls the system " a barbaric procedure..., a return to the Middle Ages" ; 1 2 "only those who have seen it", writes Jaquith, "can realize the cruelty, relentless... and cold-blooded, which underlies the forcible expulsion of contented families from their homes" ; 13 the Congress of European Nationalities, held in Geneva in August 1926, characterized it as "a shame to civilization" 1 4 (Kulturschande), because of the hardships and sacrifices that it involves. Admittedly, the transfer of minorities is a dolorous and drastic course of action, but as its supporters point out, there is no guarantee that the unwelcome minority groups may not, in the long-run, suffer more by the oppression of the majority than they would through a transfer. If in the name of the highest necessities of the State a government adopts a hostile policy towards its heterogeneous elements, persecutions, confiscations of property and arbitrary arrests may maintain a minority in a constant state of fear and distress. Furthermore, as men daily witness acts of force and extensive violations of human rights, they become more insensitive to misery and tend gradually to overlook the brutal aspect of the transfer, especially since it offers a permanent solution to a potentially explosive problem. The economic and social arguments refer to the upheavals that the 12. A . Mandelstamm, La S. D. N. et les Puissances devant le Problème Arménien, (Paris : R. D . I. P., 1924). P- 47113. Jaquith, Op. Cit., p . 404. 14. Europaischer Nationalitaten-Kongress, Sitzungsbericht des Kongresses der Organisierten Nationalen Gruppen in den Staaten Europas, (Official Records of the Congres» of Organized Nationality G r o u p s of the E u r o p e a n States), (Geneva : 1926), p . 153.

244

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

exchange of large populations generate. "The disorganization to which it leads [is] out of all proportion to the benefit gained", 15 Schuman asserts, and other writers describe it as "economically suicidal", 16 likely to cause acute chronic unemployment. 17 The maladjustments caused by the transplanting of people, many of them advanced in years, are undoubtedly serious and constitute a great defect of the system. As the Greco-Turkish experiment aptly proved, the psychological trauma that the Anatolians received required a long period of time to heal, and a great number of them never fully recovered from it. It is not easy for the uprooted minorities to start their life again, however nationally akin they may feel to their new homeland. As far as the economic aspect is concerned, most writers seem to have in mind the losses sustained by the individuals only. Equally important, and often much more difficult to remedy, are the repercussions on the national economies of the affected countries. The drainage of manpower that the expelling state suffers and the surplus of labor that the receiving nation experiences may become a permanent source of disequilibrium. Few countries in Eastern Europe, — where the problem of intermingled nationalities is most acute, — do not presently feel the pressure of overpopulation. An abrupt increase in the number of their subjects will certainly result in the deterioration of the already grave demographic conditions. In the case of the 1923 exchange, the departure of the Moslems alleviated somehow the tremendous impact of the refugee influx but did not prevent the overpopulation crisis which the Greek State has faced ever since. Furthermore, had Greece been economically a more advanced nation, she would not have been able to accommodate as readily the newcomers. Sir Arthur Salter, the Financial Secretary of the l e a g u e of Nations, expressing "his delighted surprise at the manner in which the economic elasticity of Greece had enabled her to absorb such masses of immigrants", declared that "the feat [would have been] impossible for England". 18 The likelihood of economic disequilibrium that threatens the industrially developed countries is in the long-run more dangerous than the financial obligations which the transfer of populations imposes upon them and which may be met, to a certain extent, through international assistance.

15. Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, First Ed., (New York and London : McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1933), p. 320. 16. Stefan Osusky, "Liberty or Uniformity in Eastern Europe", The Contemporary Review, Vol. C L X , No. 911 (November 1941), p. 280. 17. "Laborers might not find their skills in demand when transferred to a new country." Janowsky, Op. Cit., p. 141. 18. William Miller, "Nine Months of Greek Republicanism" Tie Contemporary Review, Vol. C X X V I I , (February 1925), p. 157.

CONCLUSIONS

245

The legal arguments against the mass-shifting of minorities are derived from certain repeatedly sanctified human rights. This procedure is considered to be incompatible with the very foundation of the concept of freedom. 19 As Fauchille wrote, "populations can not be regarded as cattle, whose ownership one transmits arbitrarily". 20 Since the end of the 18th Century, the various concluded treaties have on numerous occasions 21 referred to the right of man to worship freely, to uphold his beliefs unhindered, to live and prosper in his own land. To see the civilized world officially condone, and even advocate a method manifestly contrary to this established principle is a repelling phenomenon to humanitarians. Furthermore, the transfer of populations is closely related to the complex and significant question of a person's nationality. As L,auterpacht declares, nationality may not be a "natural" or "inalienable" right. Its importance is conditioned by the existence of sovereign States claiming to be the indispensible link between the individual and international law. 2a

So long as the State remains the primary subject of international law, a person is vitally interested in his nationality. Article 15 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, explicitly states that "Everyone has the right to a nationality" and that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality". For some scholars, even this phrasing is not strong enough, for the word "arbitrarily" provides an escape clause for the governments which wish to violate the provision. "States do not purport to act arbitrarily in that matter. They act for what they believe or allege to be good reason such as punishment of disloyalty or political offenses generally". 23 Lauterpacht, therefore, proposes in his suggested "International Bill of the Rights of Man" that the article should read "every person shall be entitled to the nationality of the State where he is born". 24 In the case of an obligatory exchange of populations all these principles are disregarded. The transferred person has no

19. Friedman, Op. Cit., p. 156. 20. Paul Fauchille, Traiti de Droit International Public, 8th Ed., T . I, Seconde Partie : " P a i x " , (Paris, Librairie A . Rousseau, 1925), p. 566. (Translated from French). 21. For a detailed account of the pertinent treaties and provisions, see Seferiades, Op. Cit., pp. 316-331. 22. H . Lauterpacht, International 'Law and Human Rights, (New Y o r k : Fred. A . Praeger, Inc., 1950), P- 34723. Ibid., p. 348. 24. Ibid., p. 311.

246

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

option on this question, being forced to divest himself of the nationality he has and to move to another country. On more general considerations is based the philosophical argument, best expounded by Azcarate. Having expressed his abhorrence for the "immense cruelty" and "incalculable suffering" that the uprootings cause, he proceeds : There is, in my opinion, an even worse aspect of the forced transfers cf populations... If human society were to accept the general application of this method, it would admit its inability to organise itself in a form in which peoples of different race, language or nationality may live peaceably together and collaborate in an ordered manner.26

According to this syllogism, the expulsion of minorities is tantamount to an explicit confession that society does not tolerate diversity or that it is not in a position to cope with the problems posed by the co-existence of various heterogeneous elements. The gradual reconciliation of a community to the notion of the transfer of its minority groups constitutes the final proof of its own failure. The exponents of the method do not ponder over the philosophical implications of its adoption. Without refuting the validity of these arguments, they underline the fact that man does not live in an ideal world. If this were the case, the problem would not have arisen. But national animosities, inter-racial conflicts and doubts about the loyalty of heteroclite ethnic groups do exist, and the question that the international community faces constantly is how to find a realistic answer to the potential dangers that the presence of minorities creates. Regardless of whether national homogeneity should be considered a desirable objective in itself, most of the European governments are actually pursuing this goal. Furthermore, as the pre-war experience of Czechoslovakia demonstrated conclusively, the security and integrity of a state can be seriously threatened by the existence of an agitating minority, especially when another country is ready to espouse the cause of its irredentists. A pragmatic solution to the problem is, therefore, not only in the interest of those nations which encompass within their frontiers heterogeneous groups but in the interest of international peace in general. As a member of the House of Lords declared, it is doubtful if at the present time [1944] there is any more fruitful cause of war than the presence within one State of nationals belonging to another State, when the State to which the minority racially belongs has reason to believe, or makes the pretense, that that minority is being ill-treated. 26 25. Azcarate, Op. Cit., pp. 16-17. 26. House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 150 (1943-44), column 1097.

CONCLUSIONS

247

In order to safeguard peace and order and to eliminate a serious source of antagonisms, many people view the disentanglement of the intermingled ethnic elements as the only practical solution. 27 In the opinion of the advocates of this method, the transfer of minorities presents two further advantages. In the first place, it liberates the people involved from actual or potential suppressions and persecutions. Once moved to their new country, they are among their own kinsmen and their lives at least are not in danger; at the cost of some initial hardships, they gain permanent security. In the second place, the receiving state also derives benefits from the influx of the newcomers. "The viability of national cultures [is] enhanced by the reunion of the scattered parts of nations into integrated communities".28 By coming to their own country, the uprooted persons avoid the risk of being assimilated, and, at the same time, strenghthen the culture of their motherland. These last two advantages, however, are of secondary importance compared to the elimination of a cause of international unrest that the removal of minorities accomplishes. In an attempt to obtain the expedient effects of the exchange of populations without violating the fundamental principles of man, some scholars support the idea of a voluntary transfer instead of an obligatory one. In this case, each member of a minority group would be given the choice of either remaining in his native land or moving to the country to which he belongs nationally. By the existence of this option the right of self-determination and the individual's freedom of action are obviously respected. The success of this system, however, presupposes the absence of any type of coercion on the part of the affected nations. Unfortunately, this basic pre-requisite has seldom been met. As experience has repeatedly demonstrated, the government that desires the removal of the minority does not hesitate to apply moral pressure and often physical force to oblige it to emigrate. In the case of the GreekBulgarian exchange, the two governments intervened directly and tried to influence the decision of the people concerned.29 Having made a penetrating study of the topic under consideration, Macartney

27. "There remains as by far the most important and fundamental means of dealing with the minority question the transfer or exchange of populations." E. Taborsky, "Minority Problems in Central Europe", The National Review, Vol. 119, No. 715 (September 1942), p. 243. "Transfer of populations carried through in a sensible manner will have to form the basis of future arrangements", L. B. Namier, Conflicts — Studies in Contemporary History, (London : MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1942), p. 18. See also Mylonas, Op. Cit., p. 155; Newman, Op. Cit., pp. 15-16. 28. Claude, Op. Cit., p. 99. 29. See supra, p. 61. "The exchange of Greek and Bulgarian minorities was termed'voluntary' but, in fact, pressure was widespread". Janowsky, Op. Cit., p. 139.

248

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF MINORITIES

concludes that " a voluntary exchange simply does not take place except under conditions which amount, in reality, to compulsion".30 Nor can it be maintained that this method is an effective solution of the minority problem. In spite of all coercion, which incidentally has to be applied in a subtle manner since the transfer is presumably optional, some people have no desire whatsoever to move and refuse flatly to abandon their homes. The number of minorities may decrease but so long as some heterogeneous elements remain behind, the likelihood of potential crises still exists. It should also be pointed out that if the transfer covers frontier regions, it is often the most fanatical irredentists who choose to continue living in their place of origin ; since their main desire is the union of that area to their national country, they are particularly anxious to prevent any changes in its ethnographic composition. The voluntary exchange of populations, therefore, may ameliorate a situation but it certainly does not provide the drastic and permanent solution of the problem, contemplated by the supporters of the obligatory transfer. Only the compulsory removal of the minority groups, agreed upon by both countries concerned, can be advanced as a measure that may eliminate some grave sources of conflicts. Because of the radical character of the procedure, however, the method should be applied with extreme caution and under certain conditions whose nature can be demonstrated by taking the Greek-Turkish experiment as a case study. The first prerequisite for the transfer of minorities should be its acceptance by the countries affected by it. The possibilities of achieving a lasting settlement of disputes are very small indeed if the minority groups are moved by unilateral action. In such case, one is not confronted by a transfer, properly speaking, but by an eviction of the undesirable elements of a country. Not having consented to this policy, the receiving nation refuses to recognize the effectuated ethnological changes and considers them as temporary only, reserving the right to re-establish the status quo as soon as opportunal circumstances would permit it. Consequently, no attempt is made to settle the expelled persons who are kept in camps under most undesirable conditions and who insistently demand their repatriation. The case of the Palestine refugees and of the Germans evicted from the Western provinces of present-day Poland are the most recent examples of such unilateral forceful action. Nobody can seriously maintain that in those two instances the world is favored by a stable state of 50. Macartney,

National States and National Miiurituj, p. 449.

CONCLUSIONS

249

affairs; on the contrary, more than a decade after the occurrence of these events, the answers to the numerous issues which they created are still pending. In the long run, of course, time may provide its own solution and the states concerned may be forced to accept the expulsion of their nationals as a fait accompli. Meanwhile, however, precious years have elapsed with little or no consideration given to the welfare of the up-rooted persons, a new "refugee" generation, embittered and demoralized, grows up, and their successful settlement becomes much more difficult. On the other hand, this pre-requisite entails a special problem. It can hardly be expected that two countries would agree by their own free will to the transfer of their respective minorities. If conditions were peaceful, very seldom would the receiving nation accept the expulsion of its irredentists. On the basis of past experience, one is forced to conclude that the transfer of populations is intimately connected with the prevalence of extensive political upheavals. It is not coincidental that the application of this method has been most strongly advocated during periods of wars, when the general unsettled conditions are deemed favorable for undertaking this "surgical operation". In the absence of world-wide conflict, the states desiring to expel their minorities have found it necessary to resort to violent measures in order to achieve their goal. The attachment of the individual to the soil where he was born is so deeply rooted that only the fear of an imminent peril to his life may force him to emigrate. 31 Simultaneously, the danger of seeing its irredentist community dispersed or exterminated is the only reason that would prompt a nation to tolerate its eviction. The large-scale deportations of the Ionian Christians and the losses of life they involved were instrumental in bringing about the 1914 Greek-Turkish Agreement. 32 If the Young Turks had not started to implement this expulsion policy, Venizelos would have never consented to the proposed exchange. It should also be recalled that when Greece and Turkey agreed to sign the 1923 Convention at Lausanne, most of the Anatolians had already abandoned their homes in Asia Minor. The number of people who were actually exchanged was much smaller than the total transferred population. From this view point, the Convention was merely confirming a fait accompli as far as Greece was concerned. It was the chaotic situation resulting from the flight of the unredeemed Hellenes from Turkey that forced the Greek Government to agree to the obligatory exchange.

31. Cf. J. Fouques Duparc, Op. Cit., p. 219. 3 2 . See

supra,

pp. 5 4 - J 7 .

2J0

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

It appears, therefore, that the procedure of removing the minorities is likely to occur in periods of unrest and political turbulences. Because of these ecrhythmic conditions, a second pre-requisite to a successful transfer becomes evident: the need to place the implementation of the scheme under international supervision. While the transference is in process, relations between the two countries affected become particularly strained and national animosities are at their zenith. In spite of the most carefully phrased legal agreement, numerous disputes over interpretation arise and there are daily charges and counter-charges of perfidy and treaty violations. It is absolutely necessary that an impartial body accept the role of coordinating the various aspects of the plan and serve as an independent arbitrator, solving the different issues that may arise. In this way, direct contact between the two excited governments is avoided and the possibilities of prolonged disputes are minimized. The delicate mediation functions entrusted to such a body require that the selection of its members be done with the utmost care. The appointed officials should not only be distinguished for their legal background and administrative capacities, but should also be able to convince the nations directly concerned of their objective judgment. The Mixed Commissions in charge of the Greek-Bulgarian and GreekTurkish exchanges were unfortunately deficient in this respect.33 They lacked the abilities that their duties demanded, were reluctant to make decisions, and in the case of one of them, complaints about his partiality were often expressed.34 These factors, obviously, were not conducive to an expedient and effective termination of the transfer. A third pre-requisite to a satisfactory exchange of minorities is the institution of adequate guarantees for the economic compensation of the transplanted individuals. Provisions should be made for the careful appraisal and liquidation of the abandoned properties; and what is even more essential, such provisions should be executed. That the transferred persons are bound to sustain some economic losses is unavoidable : the value of the immovable holdings decreases almost automatically with the departure of their owners ; when a large number of houses and farms are sold en masse, the price obtained is much lower than the one that each person would have received if he had liquidated his property under normal conditions. Furthermore, the government to whose ownership this property passes, usually tends to assign to it a rather trivial value. Still, however, every }}. Ladas, Op. Cit., p. 51 ff, 358 ff. 34. Général Manrique de Lara, Ibid., p. 360.

CONCLUSIONS

251

precaution should be taken to minimize this loss. The fortunes that are left behind represent the savings and investments of an entire lifetime, the daily effort and work of many generations. If the refugees lose everything, they are plunged into a state of utter desperation and may never recover from the psychological shock thus experienced. If, on the other hand, they are fully indemnified, they do not consider their transfer to be an irreparable calamity and, even more important, they possess the financial means to start a new life in their homeland. From this viewpoint, the results of the exchange of populations in the Balkans are far from satisfactory. In spite of the pertinent clauses, the system of property liquidation broke down in practice, the Anatolian Greeks receiving only a very small percentage of the value of their fortunes. As Janowsky points out, if an orderly transfer of populations implies compensation for property ¡eft behind, the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian exchanges were a failure. The Greco-Turkish Mixed Commission failed altogether to indemnify the people affected, and payment in bonds of a large part of the Greco-Bulgarian sums resulted in heavy losses through depreciation. 36

The majority of the Greek refugees who lost their entire fortunes in 1922 still remember their financial ruination and often express their grief to the Greek State for the manner in which their rights were disregarded. It must be admitted, however, that an efficient system of property appraisal and compensation cannot be easily devised. Ideally, the individual should receive compensation for his immovable holdings at the time of his departure. Such a method, nevertheless, is almost ex hypothesi inapplicable. One can hardly avoid the basic dilemma that the problem presents : a satisfactory indemnification depends upon the existence of peaceful and orderly conditions; yet, the transfer of minorities is inescapably effectuated during periods of unrest and disorder. In times of peace or of amiable relations between minorities and majorities, any suggestion of transfer is vehemently rejected. One is forced to conclude that in the general confusion that accompanies the up-rooting of the minority groups, extensive economic losses are bound to occur. It is obvious, however, that the situation should not be allowed to evolve to the point where the people affected receive no indemnification whatsoever for their abandoned properties. The fourth and final pre-requisite of an efficient transfer is the establishment of an international machinery for the settlement of the 35. Janowsky, Op. Cit., pp. 139-140. See also République Française, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations, Études et Documents, Série B-2, (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), p. 29.

252

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

evicted persons. Even if compensation is fully guaranteed, the evaluation and liquidation of the immovable holdings may require several years. Meanwhile, the expellees must be fed, sheltered and settled productively. It is imperative that the international community take an active interest in the fate of these people and assist the receiving country financially. The case of the Greek refugee settlement has demonstrated that the best way of rendering this assistance and advice is through the creation of an ad hoc body, possessing the necessary authority and enjoying the support of the other nations. One can not underestimate the contribution of the Refugee Settlement Commission to the solution of the post-1922 crisis that the Greek State faced : It is at hast doubtful whether this [refugee] establishment would have been possible except by the machinery actually employed for the purpose. It required an organisation vested with great power and independent of local influences. Greece, with reason, would have refused to entrust the work to a foreign body of any sort whatever, but her susceptibilities were not hurt by entrusting the necessary powers to an international organisation directly supervised by the League of Nations, of which she herself was a member. 3*

Such international moral and economic assistance should not be seen exclusively in the framework of philanthropic action. The elimination of national minorities through the agreed transfer to the state to which they feel nationally akin is conducive to greater political stability. The entire international community thereby benefits from the removal of potential sources of unrest. It is only reasonable, therefore, that all nations should participate in the settlement of the up-rooted persons. It is equally in the interest of international peace and security that this settlement be implemented as expediently and successfully as possible ; for, then, the likelihood of the productively re-established refugees upsetting the new status quo is rather remote. It is not only humanitarian principles that should prompt the various countries to help in the rehabilitation of the transplanted populations but considerations of self-interest as well. The exchange of populations constitutes a landmark in the history of modern Greece. It is doubtful whether any other event has affected the country as profoundly and extensively as the influx of the million and a half irredentist Greeks arriving from every corner of the Eastern Mediterranean. For, this gigantic transmigration represents the end of an era and has left its permanent imprint on every aspect of Greek life. 36. Eddy, Op. CU., as quoted in Mitrany, Op. Cit., p. 252.

CONCLUSIONS

Once Greece achieved her independence in 1830, she embarked upon the realization of the dream that had nursed and given hope to the millions of scattered Hellenes around the Aegean during the centuries of Turkish domination : the establishment of a large Greek State with its capital in Constantinople. This Megali Idea, shared enthusiastically by its subjects and irredentists, conditioned the foreign and domestic policies of the newly-established kingdom and provided the basis for all its subsequent actions. For a hundred years the goal was pursued tenaciously at the cost of great human and material sacrifices. In Paris, finally, the objective was almost attained through the Treaty of Sèvres ; it was permanently buried, two years later, on the Anatolian battlefield. The transfer of the Christians from Turkey was the direct outcome of the military defeat. With their arrival, the vision of the Megali Idea disappeared ; with their up-rooting from Asia, the seeds of a new policy were sown in Europe ; from the ashes of Smyrna, a new phoenix arose in Athens. Post-1922 Greece is strongly influenced by the impact of the exchange of populations. Ethnologically, the concentration of Hellenism within the borders of present Greece and the departure of the Bulgarian and Turkish minorities resulted in a nationally homogeneous state. In the economic field, the newcomers proved to be " a blessing in desguise". 3 ' The agricultural settlement of refugees, entailing the financing of large public works and involving the introduction of advanced technological methods in farming and the cultivation of new products, helped tremendously the rejuvenation of agriculture. The urban refugees, with their vast experience in banking and commerce, permeated every aspect of economic activity and revived the economy of the country. Politically, the progressive outlook of the Anatolians forced a change in the traditional Greek conservatism and created a strong Liberal Center. The fusion of the European and Anatolian Greek cultures gave new impetus to literature and the fine arts, strengthened the demotic language and opened new horizons to Greek thought. The influx of the refugees, however, was not without its dark side. The urbanization and industrialization of the recent decades gave rise to a numerically strong class of proletariat. Its ranks were further swollen by the discontented and bitter expellees whose settlement had been delayed. Many of the refugee quarters around the main cities have been infected by the microbe of Communism, posing a direct threat to the security of the country. The social integration 37. Marriott, Op. Cil., p. 544.

2

54

THE BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

of the old and new inhabitants was slow and painful. These problems still persist and demand their solution. Yet, they are not very different from the ones that confront most modern nations. It seems, indeed, that this is the greatest impact of the transfer of populations : the transformation of Greece from a backward and parochial country to a forward-looking and dynamic one. The transition to an economically fully developed state has not been completed yet, but the basic prerequisites and the necessary will-power exist. And there is every reason to believe that a democratic society is able to meet the challenge that the nuclear age presents and to achieve its primary goal, — the happiness of its members.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX

I

CONVENTION CONCERNING OF G R E E K A N D TURKISH

THE

EXCHANGE

POPULATIONS

Signed at Lausanne, January 30th, 1923.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Greek Government have agreed upon the following provisions : ARTICLE I. — As from the xst May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively. ARTICLE 2. — The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1 : a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. ARTICLE 3. — Those Greeks and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912, left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged, shall be considered as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1. The expression "emigrant" in the present Convention includes all physical and juridicial persons who have been obliged to emigrate or who have emigrated since the 18th October, 1912. 17

258

THE

BALKAN

EXCHANGE

OF

MINORITIES

A R T I C L E 4. — All able-bodied men belonging to the Greek population, whose families have already left Turkish territory, and who are now detained in Turkey, shall constitute the first installment of Greeks sent to Greece in accordance with the present Convention. A R T I C L E 5. — Subject to the provisions of Articles 9 and 10 of the present Convention, the rights of property and monetary assets of Greeks in Turkey or Moslems in Greece shall be prejudiced in consequence of the exchange to be carried out under the present Convention. A R T I C L E 6. — No obstacle may be placed for any reason whatever in the way of the departure of a person belonging to the populations which are to be exchanged. In the event of an emigrant having received a definite sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence which is not yet definitive, or of his being the object of criminal proceedings, he shall be handed over by the authorities of the prosecuting country to the authorities of the country whither he is going, in order that he may serve his sentence or be brought to trial. A R T I C L E 7. — The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and will acquire the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in the territory of the latter country. Such emigrants as have already left one or other of the two countries and have not yet acquired their new nationality, shall acquire that nationality on the date of the signature of the present Convention. A R T I C L E 8. — Emigrants shall be free to take away with them or to arrange for the transport of their movable property of every kind, without being liable on this account to the payment of any export or import duty or any other tax. Similarly, the members of each community (including the personnel of mosques, tekkes, meddresses, churches, convents, schools, hospitals, societies, associations and juridical persons, or other foundations of any nature whatever) which is to leave the territory of one of the Contracting States under the present Convention, shall have the right to take away freely or to arrange for the transport of the movable property belonging to their communities. The fullest facilities for transport shall be provided by the authorities of the two countries, upon the recommendation of the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11. Emigrants who may not be able to take away all or part of their movable property can leave it behind. In that event, the local autho-

APPENDICES

259

rities shall be required to draw up, the emigrant in question being given an opportunity to be heard, an inventory and valuation of the property left b y him. Proces-verbaux containing the inventory and the valuation of the movable property left b y the emigrant shall be drawn u p in four copies, one of which shall be kept b y the local authorities, the second transmitted to the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 1 1 t o serve as the basis for the liquidation provided for b y Article 9, the third shall be handed to the Government of the country t o which the emigrant is going, and the fourth to the emigrant himself. ARTICLE 9. — I m m o v a b l e property, whether rural or urban, belonging to emigrants, or to the communities mentioned in Article 8, and the movable property left b y these emigrants or communities, shall be liquidated in accordance w i t h the following provisions b y the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 1 1 . Property situated in the districts to which the compulsory exchange applies and belonging to religious or benevolent institutions of the communities established in a district t o which the exchange does not apply, shall likewise be liquidated under the same conditions. ARTICLE 10. — T h e movable and immovable property belonging to persons who h a v e already left the territory of the High Contracting Parties and are considered in accordance w i t h Article 3 of the present Convention, as being included in the exchange of populations, shall be liquidated in accordance with Article 9. This liquidation shall take place independently of all measures of any kind whatever, which, under the laws passed and the regulations of any kind made in Greece and in T u r k e y since the 18th October, 1912, or in any other w a y , h a v e resulted in any restriction on rights of ownership over the property in question, such as confiscation, forced sale, etc. I n the event of the property mentioned in this Article or in Article 9 h a v i n g been submitted to a measure of this kind, its value shall be fixed b y the Commission provided for in Article 11, as if the measures in question had not been applied. A s regards expropriated property, the Mixed Commission shall undertake a fresh valuation of such property, if it has been expropriated since the 18th October, 1912, h a v i n g previously belonged to persons liable to the exchange of populations in the t w o countries, and is situated in territories to which the exchange applies. T h e Commission shall fix for the benefit of the owners such compensation as will repair the injury which the Commission has ascertained. The total amount of this compensation shall be carried to the credit of these owners and to the debit of the Government on whose territory the expropriated property is situated.

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In the event of any persons mentioned in Articles 8 and 9 not having received the income from property, the enjoyment of which they have lost in one way or another, the restoration of the amount of this income shall be guaranteed to them on the basis of the average yield of the property before the war, and in accordance with the methods to be laid down by the Mixed Commission. The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11, when proceeding to the liquidation of Wakf property in Greece and of the rights and interests connected therewith, and to the liquidation of similar foundations belonging to Greeks in Turkey, shall follow the principles laid down in previous Treaties with a view to fully safeguarding the rights and interests of these foundations and of the individuals interested in them. The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 shall be entrusted with the duty of executing these provisions. ARTICLE 11. — Within one month from the coming into force of the present Convention a Mixed Commission shall be set up in Turkey or in Greece consisting of four members representing each of the High Contracting Parties, and of three members chosen by the Council of the League of Nations from among nationals of Powers which did not take part in the war of 1914-1918. The Presidency of the Commission shall be exercised in turn by each of these three neutral members. The Mixed Commission shall have the right to set up, in such places as it may appear to them necessary, Sub-Commissions workint under its order. Each such Sub-Commission shall consist of a Turkish member, a Greek member and a neutral President to be designated by the Mixed Commission. The Mixed Commission shall decide the powers to be delegated to the Sub-Commission. ARTICLE 12. — The duties of the Mixed Commission shall be to supervise and facilitate the emigration provided for in the present Convention, and to carry out the liquidation of the movable and immovable property for which provision is made in Articles 9 and 10. The Commission shall settle the methods to be followed as regards the emigration and liquidation mentioned above. In a general way the Mixed Commission shall have full power to take the measures necessitated by the execution of the present Convention and to decide all questions to which this Convention may give rise. The decisions of the Mixed Commission shall be taken by a majority. All disputes relating to property, rights and interests which are to be liquidated shall be settled definitely by the Commission.

APPENDICES

261

ARTICLE 13. — The Mixed Commission shall have full power to cause the valuation to be made of the movable and immovable property which is to be liquidated under the present Convention, the interested parties being given a hearing or being duly summoned so that they may be heard. The basis for the valuation of the property to be liquidated shall be the value of the property in gold currency.

A r t i c l e 14. — The Commission shall transmit to the owner concerned a declaration stating the sum due to him in respect of the property of which he has been dispossessed, and such property shall remain at the disposal of the Government on whose territory it is situated. The total sums due on the total of these declarations shall constitute a Government debt from the country where the liquidation takes place to the Government of the country to which the emigrant belongs. The emigrant shall in principle be entitled to receive in the covntry to which he emigrates, as representing the sums due to him, property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind. Once every six months an account shall be drawn up of the sums due by the respective Governments on the basis of the declarations as above. When the liquidation is completed, if the sums of money due to both sides correspond, the accounts relating thereto shall be balanced. If a sum remains due from one of the Governments to the other Government after a balance has been struck, the debit balance shall be paid in cash. If the debtor Government requests a postponement in making this payment, the Commission may grant such postponement, provided that the sum due be paid in three annuities at most. The Commission shall fix the interest to be paid during the period of postponement. If the sum to be paid is fairly large and requires longer postponement, the debtor Government shall pay in cash a sum to be fixed by the Mixed Commission, up to a maximum of 20 per cent of the total due, and shall issue in respect of the balance loan certificates bearing such interest as the Mixed Commission may fix, to be paid off within 20 years at most. The debtor Government shall assign to the service of these loans pledges approved by the Commission, which shall be administered and of which the revenues shall be encashed by the International Commission in Greece and by the Council of the Public Debt at Constantinople. In the absence of agreement in regard to these pledges, they shall be selected by the Council of the League of Nations.

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ARTICLE 15. — With a view to facilitating emigration, funds shall be advanced to the Mixed Commission by the States concerned, under conditions laid down by the said Commission. ARTICLE 16. — The Turkish and Greek Governments shall come to an agreement with the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 in regard to all questions concerning the notification to be made to persons who are to leave the territory of Turkey and Greece under the present Convention, and concerning the ports to which these persons are to go for the purpose of being transported to the country of their destination. The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually that no pressure direct or indirect shall be exercised on the populations which are to be exchanged with a view to making them leave their homes or abandon their property before the date fixed for their departure. They likewise undertake to impose on the emigrants who have left or who are to leave the country no special taxes or dues. No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants of the districts excepted from the exchange under Article 2 exercising freely their right to remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and in Greece. This provision shall not be invoked as a motive for preventing the free alienation of property belonging to inhabitants of the said regions which are excepted from the exchange, or the voluntary departure of those among these inhabitants who wish to leave Turkey or Greece. A r t i c l e 17. — The expenses entailed by the maintenance and working of the Mixed Commission and of the organizations dependent on it shall be borne by the Governments concerned in proportions to be fixed by the Commission. ARTICLE 18. — The High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in their respective laws such modifications as may be necessary with a view to ensuring the execution of the present Convention. ARTICLE 19. — The present Convention shall have the same force and effect as between the High Contracting Parties as it if formed part of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with Turkey. It shall come into force immediately after the ratification of the said Treaty by the two High Contracting Parties. In faith whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose respective full powers have been found in good and due form, have signed the present Convention. Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923, in three copies, one of which shall be transmitted to the Greek Government, one to the

APPENDICES

263

Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and the third shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, which shall deliver certified copies to the other Powers signatory of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. (L. S.) E . K . VENISEEOS.

(L. S.) D. CACIvAmanos. (b. S.) ISMET. (IV. S.) D r . RISA NOUR. (I,. S.) HASSAN.

PROTOCOL The undersigned Turkish Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized to that effect, declare that, without waiting for the coming into force of the Convention with Greece of even date, relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations, and by way to exception to Article I of that Convention, the Turkish Government, on the signature of the Treaty of Peace, will release the able-bodied men referred to in Article 4 of the said Convention, and will provide for their departure. Done at Lausanne the 30th January, 1923. ISMET D r . RIZA NOUR HASSAN.

APPENDIX

II

PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN GREECE AND THE CREATION FOR THIS PURPOSE OF A REFUGEES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION The undersigned, acting in the name of the Hellenic Government and duly authorized for the purpose, accepts on behalf of the Hellenic Government the following plan which has been approved by the Council of the League of Nations, for the establishment of a Refugees Settlement Commission and the settlement in Greece of refugees upon lands to be assigned to the Commission or otherwise in productive work. I. — The Hellenic Government undertakes to establish a Refugees Settlement Commission to possess the constitution, capacity and functions set out in the Organic Statutes which form an Annex to the present Protocol and are considered as being an integral part thereof. The ratification of this Protocol and of the Annex by Greece shall constitute an assurance that the Hellenic Government has taken the measures required by the internal law of the country to establish the Commission and ensure to it during the period of its existence the prescribed capacity and powers. Particulars concerning these measures shall forthwith be communicated to the Council of the League and no alteration in them shall be made without the Council's consent. II. — The Hellenic Government undertakes to assign to the Refugees Settlement Commission to be held by it as its absolute property for the purposes contemplated by its Statutes, an amount of land of not less than 500,000 hectares approved by the Commission as suitable for the said purposes in regard to both its character and situation.

APPENDICES

265

III. — The Hellenic Government will secure that any advances which have been obtained by the National Bank of Greece, in connection with the Refugees Settlement Commission's foundation, for the purpose of the establishment of refugees in productive work in Greece, shall be forthwith placed at the disposal of the Commission. IV. — The Hellenic Government will as soon as possible raise a loan, or loans, to an amount not falling below the equivalent of three million pounds sterling, nor exceeding the equivalent of six million pounds sterling, and will arrange for the subscription by Greek Banks or financial groups of not less than the equivalent of one million pounds sterling of such loan or loans. The issuing houses shall place the whole proceeds of the loan or loans directly under the disposal of the Refugees Settlement Commission for the purposes specified in its Organic Statutes, and for the repayment, if necessary, of any advances. V. — The service of the loans to be raised in pursuance of Article IV shall be assured in the first instance by the International Financial Commission established by the Law on the International Control of February 26th, 1898 (in accordance with the consent given by the Governments at present represented on that Commission by the Declaration annexed to this Protocol) out of certain public Greek revenues in accordance with the following provisions : (1) Such revenue and surplus revenues as may be agreed upon between prospective lenders and the Hellenic Government (for example those indicated in Schedule I) shall be assigned to and placed under the control of the International Financial Commission, and shall be collected and paid to that Commission. (2) The revenues and surplus revenues above-mentioned shall, so far as is considered necessary, be held and applied by the International Financial Commission for the purpose of meeting the service of loans raised in accordance with Article IV. The service of the loans shall also be a first charge upon the property and income of the Refugees Settlement Commission. VI. — The Hellenic Government undertakes not to create any charges by way of security, without the consent of the International Financial Commission, upon its other revenues, and, in particular, those specified in Schedule II, except for the purpose of meeting its external obligations or of obtaining loans destined exclusively to

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improve the financial position of Greece, so as to prevent depreciation of the exchange value of Greek currency and a consequent depreciation of the value of the revenues assigned under Article V. It further undertakes to make immediately and to persist in making every effort to secure as soon as possible a complete equilibrium between the ordinary receipts and the expenses of the State. VII. — The Hellenic Government undertakes to exempt the Refugees Settlement Commission from all taxes and charges, whether general or local, in respect of all operations and property of the Commission and, in particular, of the lands assigned to it or any transaction affecting such lands : and to pay in respect of each financial year to the Commission (or to the Financial Commission if the Refugees Settlement Commission is dissolved) the total sum at which the occupiers of land originally assigned to the Refugees Settlement Commission and still continuing to be its property (or, if the Refugees Settlement Commission is dissolved, held at the disposal of the International Financial Commission pursuant to arrangements made in connection with such dissolution) are assessed for taxation upon such lands for such year, until the loans raised in pursuance of Article IV are completely refunded. VIII. — The reimbursement of advances made to refugees by the Refugees Settlement Commission shall have priority over taxation or any other claim. I X . — The Hellenic Government, accepting the provisions contained in the Organic Statutes of the Refugees Settlement Commission under which the Council of the League of Nations may enquire into and exercise a supervision over the activities of the Commission, undertakes to facilitate any enquiries which the Council may direct, and to accept and give effect to the Council's decisions taken thereupon in so far as they require action by the Hellenic Government. X . — Nothing in this Protocol or the Organic Statutes thereto annexed shall change in any way the obligations of the Hellenic Government under the Greco-Turkish Exchange of Populations Convention signed at Lausanne on January 30th, 1923, or under the Greco-Bulgarian Reciprocal Emigration Convention signed at Neuillysur-Seine, on November 27th, 1919. X I . — The obligations assumed by the Hellenic Government under this Protocol shall cease as soon as the Refugees Settlement Commission shall have been dissolved and the loans raised in accordance with Article IV of this Protocol have been repaid in full.

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267

XII. — In the event of any difference as to the interpretation of this Protocol, the opinion of the Council of the League of Nations will be accepted. X I I I . — In the event of any difference between the French and English texts of this Protocol, the English shall be considered to be authentic text. X I V . — This Protocol shall be ratified and the ratification shall be deposited at the Secretariat of the League of Nations as soon as possible and in any case not later than October 15th, 1923. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of ratification. In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized for this purpose, has signed the present Protocol. Done at Geneva on the twenty-ninth day of September 1923, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and shall be registered by it without delay. (Signed) A .

Michaxakopoulos .

Schedule I The revenues referred to in Article V of the Protocol under the number (1) are the following : (1) The monopolies of New Greece, i. e., salt, matches, cards and cigarette-paper. (2) The customs receipts received at the customs of : Canea, Candia, Samos, Chios, Mitylene, Syra. Schedule II The revenues referred to in Article V I of the Protocol are the following : (1) The surplus revenues already assigned to the International Financial Commission. (2) The tobacco duty in New Greece. (3) The stamp duty in New Greece. (4) The duty on alcohol in the whole of Greece. (5) Any of the revenues or any surplus of the revenues mentioned in Schedule I not utilized for the service of loans under the terms of Article V of the Protocol.

APPENDIX

III

ORGANIC STATUTES OF THE GREEK REFUGEES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION

I. — There is established in Greece, domiciled at such, place as it shall select after its constitution a Refugees Settlement Commission invested with the capacity and powers and entrusted with the duties specified hereinafter. II. — The Refugees Settlement Commission is established as a legal person competent to sue and be sued in its own name, to hold and alienate property of all kinds, and generally to perform any acts which can be performed by a corporation possessing full legal personality under the law of Greece. III. — The Refugees Settlement Commission shall not be dependant upon any Greek executive or administrative authority, but shall be completely autonomous in the exercise of its functions. IV. — The Refugees Settlement Commission shall be composed of four members. Two members shall be appointed by the Hellenic Government, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations ; one member shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations ; the fourth member shall be the Chairman of the Commission, shall be a national of the United States of America and a person representative of relief organizations and shall be appointed in such method as the Council of the League of Nations shall from time to time determine. The member appointed by the Council and the Chairman of the Commission shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities in Greece. V. — The members of the Refugees Settlement Commission appointed by the Hellenic Government may at any time be replaced by that Government with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations; the other two members may only be replaced by the Council of the League of Nations.

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269

VI. — The salaries of the two members of the Refugees Settlement Commission appointed by the Hellenic Government shall be fixed by that Government; the salaries of the other two members shall be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations. The salaries of all members shall be payable out of the funds of the Commission, but the Hellenic Government shall refund to the Commission the amount of the two salaries fixed by it. VII. — The first appointments of members of the Refugees Settlement Commission shall be made not later than September 30th, 1923. Thereafter, if any vacancy on the Commission is not filled by the competent authorities, the Council of the League of Nations shall be competent forthwith to appoint a person to act and to exercise the full powers of the member whom he succeeds until such time as the competent appointing authority shall itself make an appointment. The Commission shall enter upon its functions as soon as all four members have been appointed. In the event of temporary absence, the absent member shall designate a substitute who shall have the right to vote; failing which the Chairman or the member acting as Chairman shall designate such a substitute. In the event of the absence of the Chairman, the chair shall be taken by the member appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, who shall have the same voting-rights as the Chairman. The presence of three members or their substitutes including always the two members not appointed by the Hellenic Government or their duly appointed substitutes, shall be necessary to form a quorum and validate decisions of the Settlement Commission. VIII. — The Commission shall take all its decisions by a majority vote of the members present at the meeting. In the event of the votes being equally divided, the Chairman shall have a second vote. Subject to any provisions in these statutes, the Settlement Commission shall establish its own Rules of Procedure. IX. — The Chairman, or in his absence his substitute, will convene all meetings of the Settlement Commission, sign all documents and correspondance and be responsible for the execution of the decisions of the Settlement Commission. X. — The Refugees Settlement Commission shall have power to appoint and dismiss such personnel, either Greek or (when necessary for special reasons) of foreign nationality as it may require for the discharge of its functions. The work of the Commission will be carried on as far as possible with the assistance of Greek central and local administrative authorities and of private organizations.

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X I . — The expenses of the Commission shall be payable out of the funds placed at its disposal or out of its income. X I I . — The functions of the Refugees Settlement Commission shall be, by means of the lands assigned to it, the funds placed at its disposal and its own income, to promote the establishment of refugees in productive work either upon the land or otherwise in Greece. X I I I — The Refugees Settlement Commission shall receive and hold in full ownership the lands which the Hellenic Government undertakes to transfer to it under the Protocol signed on behalf of Greece at Geneva on September 29th, 1923, and shall apply such lands for the purpose specified in Article X I I above. The lands shall primarily be applied to the settlement of refugees thereon either as tenants or as owners, on the terms fixed by the Commission, but the Commission may, in its discretion, sell land held by it to persons not refugees, provided that any sums raised by the Commission from the sale of such land shall be paid into a special account and applied, by way of a sinking fund, to the redemption of the loan or loans referred to in Article X V I of these Statutes. The Commission shall sell land if such sale becomes necessary under the provisions of Article X V I . Sales of land to persons not possessing Greek nationality shall require the consent of the Hellenic Government except in the case contemplated by the last sentence of the preceding paragraph. X I V . — The Refugees Settlement Commission shall receive and apply for the purpose specified in Article X I I above, any advances obtained by the National Bank of Greece for the purposes of establishment of refugees in productive work in Greece, and the proceeds of the loans which the Hellenic Government undertakes to raise and pay over to the Commission under Protocol signed on behalf of Greece at Geneva on September 29th, 1923. X V . — The income and funds of the Refugees Settlement Commission may not be expended on the relief of distress or other charitable purposes as distinct from the settlement in productive work of the persons assisted. All assistance given shall be given on terms involving ultimate repayment. X V I . — In event of the revenues assigned by the Hellenic Government to the services of the loan in accordance with the procotol signed at Geneva on September 29th, 1923 being insufficient, the International Commission shall call upon the Settlement Commission to pay out of its income or other funds, or if necessary from the realisation of its property, such sums as may be necessary to meet any deficit on the service of the loan. Further, it shall at all times be the

APPENDICES

271

duty of the Settlement Commission to pay to the International Financial Commission for application to the service of the loan any sums which the Settlement Commission may find possible to contribute for this purpose out of its current income without prejudicing the effective performance of its functions. In the event of the International Financial Commission having in its possession sums exceeding the amounts necessary for the service of the loan, the Financial Commission will refund these sums to the Hellenic Government. X V I I . — The Refugees Settlement Commission shall communicate every three months a report upon its operations to the Hellenic Government and to the Council of the League of Nations and shall simultaneously publish such report. The Council of the League of Nations, acting, if need be, by a majority vote, shall have the right to consider the reports of the Commission and to take such measures thereon as it may consider proper. The Commission shall annually publish and forward to the Council of the League of Nations and to the Hellenic Government, audited accounts of its income and expenditure. X V I I I . — The Council of the League of Nations, acting, if need be, by a majority vote, may at any time enquire by such method as it determines into the manner in which the Refugees Settlement Commission is discharging its functions, and the necessary cost of such enquiries shall be payable to the Secretary-General of the League by the Commission out of funds at the disposal of the Commission or out of its current income. X I X . — The Refugees Settlement Commission may be dissolved when, in the opinion of the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be, by a majority vote, its services are no longer required, subject to the establishment of arrangements approved by the representatives of the lenders to secure that the assets and income of the Settlement Commission are on its dissolution placed under the control and at the disposal of the International Financial Commission for the purpose of enabling the latter to meet the service of the loans (or to accelerate as far as possible the amortisation of the loans) raised by the Hellenic Government in accordance with the Protocol signed on its behalf at Geneva on September 29th, 1923 until such loans have been repaid in full. X X . — After the dissolution of the Refugees Settlement Commission and the repayment in full of the loans mentioned in Article X I X above, the balance still remaining of all assets which have belonged to the Commission shall become the absolute property of the Hellenic State.

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X X I . — In the event of any difference as to the interpretation of these Statutes, the opinion of the Council of the league of Nations will be accepted. X X I I . — In the event of any difference between the French and English texts on these Statutes, the English shall be considered to be the authentic text. X X I I I . — This Annex shall be ratified and the ratification shall be deposited at the Secretariat of the league of Nations at the same time as the ratification of the Protocol to which this Annex is attached. In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised for this purpose, has signed the present Annex. Done at Geneva on the twenty-ninth day of September 1923, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and shall be registered by it without delay. (signed) A . M i c h a ^ a k o p o u x o s .

DECLARATION SIGNED ON B E H A L F OF GREAT BRITAIN, F R A N C E AND I T A L Y The undersigned, representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, duly authorised by their respective Governments, hereby agree that the International Financial Commission referred to in the Protocol relating to the settlement of refugees in Greece and the creation for this purpose of a Refugees Settlement Commission, which has been approved by the Council of the League of Nations and executed on behalf of the Hellenic Government, shall discharge the duties which the said Protocol contemplates shall be performed by it; and they undertake on behalf of their respective Governments that the necessary instructions will be given by these Governments to their representatives upon the said International Financial Commission. In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised for this purpose, have signed the present declaration. Done at Geneva on the twenty-ninth day of September 1923, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the League of Nations and shall be registered by it without delay. R e n n e i j , R o d d (Great Britain). D u p u y (France). G a r b a s s o (Italy).

APPENDIX

IV

TABLE OF EQUIVALENTS i Oke x kilo 1,000 Kilo 1 Ton 1 Hectare 1 Sq. Mile 1 Acre 1 Stremma £ 1 Sterling

= = = — = = = =

400 drams = 2.8264 lb. (avoirdupois) 0.78 Okes = 2.204 lb. (avoirdupois) 780 Okes = 2,204 lb. (avoirdupois) 792,527 Okes 10,000 sq. metres = 2,471 acres 259.02 hectares = 2,50 sq. kilometers 0.40468 hectare 0.2471 acre = 0.10 hectare 166.54 drs in 1922 (average for the year) 296.44 1923 1924 247-35 312.62 1925 1926 386.51 1927 368.55 1928 372.95 1929 375 1930 375 — 375 I93I 600 1932 —

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—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

18

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

OUTLINE

I. — PRIMARY SOURCES 1. —

INTERNATIONAL O R G A N I Z A T I O N S .

a. League of Nations. b. United Nations. 2. —

GREECE.

a. Government Publications. (i) Greek Parliament. (ii) Ministry of National Economy-General Statistical Service of Greece. (iii) Publications of Other Ministries. b. Other Publications. (i) Banking Institutions. (ii) Refugee Publications. 3. — 4. —

FRANCE. UNITED KINGDOM.

a. Parliamentary Debates. b. Other Publications. J. —

U N I T E D STATES.

6. —

MISCELLANEOUS.

II. — S E C O N D A R Y SOURCES 1. —

BOOKS.

2. —

PAMPHLETS.

3. —

ARTICLES.

4. —

NEWSPAPERS.

5. —

ENCYCLOPAEDIAS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. — I. —

PRIMARY

SOURCES

INTERNATIONAL O R G A N I Z A T I O N S

a. League of Nations. League of Nations. Official Journal, j r d - n t h Year, 1922-1930. . . . . , " G r e e k and Armenian Refugees from Asia Minor in Constantinople". Resolution adopted by the Fifth Committee on September 18th, 1922. A . 80. 1922. ....,

Greek Refugee Settlement. II. Economic and Financial, 1926. II. 32. Geneva : 1926. , Greek Stabilisation and Refugee Loan — Protocol and Annexes. C. 556. M . 198. 1927. II. Publications of the League of Nations. II. E c o n o m i c and Financial. 1927. II. 74. Geneva : N o v e m b e r 14th, 1927. ...., Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees, Presented by Dr. F. Nansen to the Fourth Assembly. A . 30. 1923. X I I . Geneva : September 4th, 1923. The Settlement of Greek Refugees. Scheme for an International Loan. C. j 24. ...., M . 187. 1924. II. Geneva : October 30th, 1924. . . . . , Treaty Series. V o l . C X X V , 1931-1932. b. United Nations. United Nations. Department o f Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Office of the United Nations. Demographic Yearbook 1956. 8th Edition. N e w Y o r k : 1956. F o o d and Agriculture Organization. Report of the FAO Mission for Greece. Published by the F o o d and Agriculture Organization. Washington D . C. : March 1947. 2. —

GREECE

a. Government Publications. (i) Greek Parliament. Vassileion tes Praktika Assembly Ethnikon

Hellados, D en Athenais Syntaktike ton Hellenon Synelefsis ton Synedriaseon, ( K i n g d o m o f Greece, Fourth Constituent of the Hellenes in Athens, "Minutes of the Meetings"), Athens : Typographeion, 1924.

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OF MINORITIES

Hellenike Demokratia, D en Athenais Syntaktike ton Hellenon Synelefsis, Epi ton Prosfygikon Zetematon Epitrope, Episema Praktika, (Republic of Greece, 4th Constituent Assembly of the Hellenes, Committee on Refugee Affairs, "Official Minutes"), Athens : Ethnikon Typographeion, 1926. Voule ton Hellenon, Praktika, (Greek Parliament, "Verbatim Records"), Second Parliamentary Period, First Synod, (1928), Athens: Ethnikon Typographeion, 1928. (ii) Ministry of National Economy. General Statistical Service of Greece.

Heilenike Demokratia, Hypourgeion Ethnikes Oikonomias, Genike Statistike Hyperesia tes Hellados, Statistike Epeteris Tes Hellados-i^o (Republic of Greece, Ministry of National Economy, General Statistical Service of Greece, "Statistical Annual of Greece"), Volume I. Athens : Ethnikon Typographeion, 1931. , , , Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados-i931, ("Statistical Annual of Greece-1931"), Volume II. Athens : Ethnikon Typographeion, 1932. ,

,

,

Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados-i