The Australian Policy Handbook: A Practical Guide to the Policymaking Process [7 ed.] 9781032399072, 9781032399201, 9781003351993, 1032399074

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The Australian Policy Handbook

The seventh edition of this classic handbook on the policy process is fully updated, featuring new material on policy making amid local and global disruption, the contestable nature of modern policy advice, commissioning and contracting, public engagement and policy success and failure. The Australian Policy Handbook shows how public policy permeates every aspect of our lives. It is the stuff of government, justifying taxes, driving legislation and shaping our social services. Public policy gives us roads, railways and airports, emergency services, justice, education and health services, defence, industry development and natural resource management. While politicians make the decisions, public servants provide analysis and support for those choices. This updated edition includes new visuals and introduces a series of case studies for the first time. These cases—covering family violence, behavioural economics, justice reinvestment, child protection and more—illustrate the personal and professional challenges of policymaking practice. Drawing on their extensive practical and academic experience, the authors outline the processes used in making public policy. They systematically explain the relationships between political decision makers, public service advisers, community participants and those charged with implementation. The Australian Policy Handbook remains the essential guide for students and practitioners of policy making in Australia. Professor Catherine Althaus previously worked in Queensland Treasury. She is currently ANZSOG Professorial Chair of Public Service Leadership and Reform at UNSW Canberra, ANZSOG Deputy Dean (Teaching and Learning), an Extraordinary Professor at the University of Pretoria and Honorary Fellow of the South Asian Network of Public Administration. Dr Sarah Ball is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne and a trainer/facilitator with the Australian Public Service Commission. Peter Bridgman is a barrister and consultant specialising in public policy, governance and integrity and has worked within and for governments in Australia and internationally. Professor Glyn Davis AC is a former director general of the Department of Premier and Cabinet in Queensland. He is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University and at ANZSOG, and the Chief Executive Officer of the Paul Ramsay Foundation. David Threlfall is a PhD researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, studying political rhetoric. He worked previously as Chief of Staff at ANZSOG, in the Office of the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Melbourne and in the Victorian Education Department.

The Australian Policy Handbook

A Practical Guide to the Policymaking Process Seventh edition

Catherine Althaus, Sarah Ball, Peter Bridgman, Glyn Davis and David Threlfall

Designed cover image: Getty Images Seventh edition published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business © 2023 Catherine Althaus, Sarah Ball, Peter Bridgman, Glyn Davis and David Threlfall The right of Catherine Althaus, Sarah Ball, Peter Bridgman, Glyn Davis and David Threlfall to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-39907-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-39920-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-35199-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993 Typeset in Bembo by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of illustrations List of case studies Introduction: Why The Australian Policy Handbook? The story of this book Critical reception This seventh edition 1 Why policy matters Disruption: a shifting policymaking environment Defining policy Policy as authoritative choice Policy as hypothesis Policy as objective Policy as public value Understanding policy making 2 The institutions of public policy The Australian system of government The executive Cabinet Public servants Ministerial advisers The opposition A map of government Consultants The third sector Social movements The fourth estate—the media Lobbyists and stakeholders System integrity A functional map of government Government as politics

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Contents Government as policy Government as administration Bringing the players together Coordination through routines

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3 The Australian policy cycle

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Alternatives to the policy cycle Policymaking vacuums An Australian policy cycle The policy cycle and the policy ecosystem Good process and good policy 4 Identifying issues The policy agenda Issue drivers Agenda shaping from within Which issues make the agenda? The issue attention cycle Case 4.1: Shark attacks in Western Australia Identifying issues Defining problems Case 4.2: Wicked problems—child protection Non-decisions Issue identification skills 5 Policy analysis Who does policy analysis? Rationality A sequence for policy analysis Case 5.1: When good policy analysis may not be enough—the national occupational

licensing system Evidence-based policy The analyst’s toolkit Agreement: an analytic tool Why analysis? Case 5.2: Tasmania develops a policy to address family violence 6 Policy instruments Classifying policy instruments The Australian policy context A taxonomy of Australian policy instruments Policy through advocacy

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Policy through law Policy through money Policy through direct government action Policy through behavioural techniques Case 6.1: The Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government Policy through network Choosing a policy instrument 7 Engagement The imperative for engagement Advantages and challenges Different types of engagement Case 7.1: A study in partnership—parks policy in the Northern Territory New directions in engagement Designing an engagement process Engagement as participation 8 Coordination Coherence Consistency Consultation and efficiency Central agencies Other consultation within government Coordination comments Coordination in departments Joined-up government Case 8.1: The Education First Youth Foyers Coordination and politics 9 Decision Cabinet routines What goes to cabinet? Briefing ministers Recording cabinet decisions Executive council Cabinet confidentiality Case 9.1: Mining in Kakadu Cabinet 10 Implementation Good policy design includes implementation Policy learning and policy feedback loops

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viii Contents Organisational unlearning Case 10.1: Contracting Commonwealth employment services Cabinet implementation units Political dimensions to policy implementation Conditions for successful implementation Implementation instruments Implementation traps Implementation under pressure Turning great ideas into successful implementation 11 Evaluation Evaluation across the policy cycle Evaluation criteria Case 11.1: Indigenous evaluation Evaluation measures Evaluation process Evaluation methods The risks of measurement Evaluation findings Case 11.2: Evaluating circle sentencing in NSW 12 Managing the policy process Procedural integrity Roles and ethics Politicisation, professionalisation and democratisation Planning projects Timing Case 12.1: Creating universal access to pre-school education Context for policy choices Making choices Case 12.2: Responding to a pandemic Policy capacity 13 Policy failure and success

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Learning from policy failure Case 13.1: A study in policy failure—Robodebt Policy success Case 13.2: A study in policy success—the Maranguka justice reinvestment project

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Glossary Appendix I: Principles and guides for policy development Some principles for well-organised public policy

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Contents Summary of the policy process Policy objectives checklist Policy advice objectives checklist Managing the policy cycle checklist Policy cycle objectives checklist Appendix II: The Uluru Statement from the Heart References Index

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Illustrations

Figures 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 8.1 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.3

Defining policy The public value approach The three spheres of responsible government Coordinating the three domains of government The Australian policy cycle The issue attention cycle The stages of problem identification The rational comprehensive approach to decision making Policy analysis iteration Frameworks for policy analysis Policy instruments Choosing a policy instrument Arnstein’s ladder—degrees of citizen participation The stages of engagement Whole-of-government coordination The federal cabinet process PSRG policy implementation and evaluation cycle Policy cycle learning dynamics Implementation under pressure

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IAP2 public participation spectrum Typical cabinet conventions and procedures Implementation instruments Steps involved in planning an evaluation Indicative timetable for a policy cycle Summary of the policy process

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Case Studies

Case 4.1 Shark attacks in Western Australia Case 4.2 Wicked problems—child protection Case 5.1 When good policy analysis may not be enough—the national

occupational licensing system Case 5.2 Tasmania develops a policy to address family violence Case 6.1 The Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government Case 7.1 A study in partnership—parks policy in the Northern Territory Case 8.1 The Education First Youth Foyers Case 9.1 Mining in Kakadu Case 10.1 Contracting Commonwealth employment services Case 11.1 Indigenous evaluation Case 11.2 Evaluating circle sentencing in NSW Case 12.1 Creating universal access to pre-school education Case 12.2 Responding to a pandemic Case 13.1 A study in policy failure—Robodebt Case 13.2 A study in policy success—the Maranguka justice reinvestment

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Introduction: Why The Australian Policy Handbook?

The Australian Policy Handbook is designed for those engaged in the turbulent world of public policy, that fascinating terrain between politics and public administration. Policy makers range from ministers to public servants, from senior advisers and executives to technical advisers. Standing outside the process, looking in, are students of politics and policy, lobbyists and interest groups keen to influence policy choices. They too might find something of interest in these pages. The Australian Policy Handbook offers one view of the policy process and suggestions about each step. It is designed to be pragmatic and accessible, of immediate use to practitioners and those who observe. We aspire to best practice in public policy but recognise the constraints on all who enter the maze. The cycle identified in these pages is by no means the only way to make sense of policy making, but it is a systematic approach that can bring a consistent set of actions to each policy issue.

Our world is shaped through public policy. For this reason, preparing a policy proposal can be daunting, requiring intense activity and coordination with other government decisions to ensure consistency. The process is long and often convoluted, as decision makers weigh up expert evidence, political and bureaucratic advice and the competing interests of those affected by the policy proposal. Yet there are threads to guide us through the policy maze, and skills to master. Despite initial appearances, policy processes generally follow a logic, a system. Capable decision makers learn to: • • • • •

hear about issues understand options test informed opinion make choices evaluate their actions.

In The Australian Policy Handbook we suggest a model to describe this system: a cycle depicting the rhythms and patterns of the policy world. This is a tool to illustrate the sequence of steps involved in decision making. The policy cycle helps to identify a need, explore possible responses, apply the resources and expertise of government and civil society and, finally, test whether the desired outcome has been achieved.

Introduction: Why The Australian Policy Handbook?

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This is not an idealised model, but a way of proceeding tied closely to the reality of cabinet processes in a Westminster-style democracy. It is linked to familiar institutions and therefore specific to a place, time and way of decision making, but the underlying logic should speak to wider good sense about making choices. To some, the idea of a policy handbook might seem misguided; if policy is the artistic pinnacle of political enterprise, a policy handbook might seem like painting by numbers. Yet good process can help us create better policy. By process, we do not mean something mechanical or standardised; policy is shaped by the particular problem it addresses and by a rich constellation of laws, budgets and political circumstance too immediate to reduce to immutable rules. However, there are constants in good policy making—an intellectual rigour about issues, a commitment to procedural integrity and a willingness to experiment and learn through implementation and adaptation. Further, there are processes which offer the prospect of a systematic approach to problem-solving. Policies are theories about the world: some flourish while others wither. The better designed the theory, the more rigorously tested its assumptions through evidence and engagement, the greater the chances of success. The Australian Policy Handbook discusses policy making primarily in an Australian context, since local institutions and traditions order how choices are reached. Because national and subnational governments in Australia rely on similar policy structures and routines, it should be possible to describe a process that holds true across this country. Variations across jurisdictions seem less important than shared Australian assumptions about how to make public policy. Readers can substitute their particular for our general. You might notice too we occasionally cite material from Aotearoa New Zealand, which shares many attributes with Australia but has a rich tradition of policy innovation all its own. We have learned much from studying practice there. In this seventh edition of The Australian Policy Handbook we look at a world much chan­ ged. A global pandemic, the first in a century, has altered assumptions about the role of government across the world. In Australia, as elsewhere, a public health emergency makes government more central to daily lives and heightens expectations about policy decisions. The COVID-19 crisis highlighted the key role of experts—public health officials became central players in the drama of lockdowns and mass vaccination programs. The need for rapid responses to a virus which respected neither borders nor political differences required a level of cooperation which can be difficult to achieve in the Australian federal system. Inevitably, it also showed up fractures amid collaboration, missteps and some controversial policy choices. In a world where disease can close international borders, create recessions and upend millions of lives, a policy cycle remains useful, if not always attainable. Good process is a foundation for good policy, even when crisis does not allow for the careful, sequential policy cycle discussed in these pages. It is important to be realistic yet still strive for the best possible policy outcomes. The Australian Policy Handbook makes a small contribution to that aspiration. More than a public health emergency has changed in the Australian policy setting. 2022 saw a change of federal government, but this text was completed before the election. Anything more than cursory indication of potential policy-related trends stemming from the result is therefore beyond our scope. Nevertheless, we welcome the increased focus post-election on the Uluru Statement from the Heart. Adopted at a 2017 First Nations National Constitutional Convention, the Uluru Statement has made the voice of First Nations people a central concern of policy making. The Uluru Statement won the 2021

xiv Introduction: Why The Australian Policy Handbook? Sydney Peace Prize, an eloquent reminder the federation has a gap at its core while poli­ tical institutions fail to engage with First Nations Australians as equals. The text is attached as an appendix to this book. The Uluru Statement from the Heart draws attention to pressing issues not addressed since the 1967 referendum acknowledged the First Peoples as citizens of the Australian nation. The process of policy making described in this book—essentially a formula for work inside government—must become more inclusive if it is to embrace the aspirations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples for voice and recognition so powerfully stated at Uluru. In the spirit of reconciliation and recognition of the power of language, we are concerned through this text with appropriately respectful terminology when speaking of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Practice varies greatly, with some preferring ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘Torres Strait Islander’, others ‘Indigenous’. Some stress local clan identities, language groups or names drawn from larger geographic regions. ‘First Nations’ has also found a new prominence in many narratives, while ‘First Australians’ is heard less often at present. Circumstance matters, and many of these terms appear through The Australian Policy Handbook. Whenever possible we follow the explicit preference of those at the centre of the story. When this information is not available, we employ language chosen for the context. We respect, and seek to reflect, the diversity of perspectives held by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples about identification.

The Story of this Book Our story began more than 25 years ago, when Glyn and Peter worked together in the Queensland Cabinet Office. They realised colleagues could use a simple handbook which described how policy choices are made, and provided practical advice—how do I test this assumption, who do I call for more information on a topic? What emerged was a ‘primer’, a how-to guide for those encountering public policy anew. It went beyond the formal advice presented in cabinet handbooks to draw on practitioner and academic knowledge. Soon people outside the office were calling, asking for copies. Glyn and Peter decided to write the book again from first principles, this time with a national audience in mind. The first Australian Policy Handbook combined description with prescription, since effective action requires both. Woven into that mixture was context about the institutions of government and an introduction to concepts informing the policy literature, so readers could pursue more critical knowledge. A key educational challenge was describing the policy process in accessible terms. How to convey the unending nature of policy work, the way the cycle links the familiar institutions of Australian government, and the mechanics involved in turning a cryptic command into a coherent document that could inform a cabinet decision? To resolve the dilemma, we turned to classic writing in the field, in particular the work of Harold Lasswell (1951). He characterised policy making as a sequence of intelligence; recommendation; prescription; invocation; application; appraisal; and termination. In sub­ sequent decades, many writers offered different labels, but essentially stayed with the schema of policy making as a sequence of actions. Such steps were presented not as strict rationality but rather as logical and pragmatic—a chain of steps with each one informing the next. A policy cycle approach views government as a process rather than a collection of venerable institutions. It disaggregates complex phenomena into manageable steps. A policy cycle recommends a sequence that practitioners can use to address a policy issue

Introduction: Why The Australian Policy Handbook? xv from start to finish. The target audience for the Handbook was and remains modest: public servants who must develop a policy and guide it through the institutions of government, and those interested in understanding and influencing the process. Hence the policy cycle starts with an issue, seeks evidence, tests proposals and puts recommendations before cabinet. Its outcomes are subject to evaluation and the cycle begins again. First published in 1998, The Australian Policy Handbook quickly found an audience. It remains a textbook for many policy and public administration programs across the country and for the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). Feedback confirms The Australian Policy Handbook is used in many agencies; one federal department provides a copy to all new senior executive service appointments. Messages and inquiries from beyond Australia suggest the policy cycle approach proves helpful in other contexts. The book was updated first in 2000 and again in 2004, along the way tracking changes in Australian political leadership and governance practices. For the fourth edition of The Australian Policy Handbook in 2007 we welcomed co-author Catherine Althaus to the team. As a younger policy analyst, and before heading to Canada to pursue her scholarly career, Catherine challenged original assumptions and invited reconsideration of many sections. A fifth edition followed in 2013, while a sixth edition in 2018 paid particular attention to updating and expanding the international literature informing the book.

Critical reception Through multiple editions, The Australian Policy Handbook has drawn not just readers but critics too. Indeed, Hal Colebatch (2006) edited an entire volume dedicated to demonstrating that policy making is more complex than the policy cycle articulated in this book. Quite so—all editions of this book stress the policy cycle as just a starting point for understanding. Its role is to teach policy to those for whom it is not a familiar companion from a lifetime of practice and study. We argue that a standard model helps to order reality and provide some sense of direction. With time, it might seem too reductionist—but by then the model has done its work, identifying patterns in apparent chaos, helping participants to build understanding and a critical perspective. So the policy cycle is a heuristic, an organising model from which reality curves away. It is designed to help answer the daunting question ‘What do I do now?’ Following a policy cycle might assist a public servant to move from vague problem to authoritative government deliberation. The Australian Policy Handbook offers that first step to open up a broader world of inquiry and interest. As readers move beyond the concepts in these pages, so they begin the journey to grasping and influencing complexity.

This Seventh Edition For this seventh edition we welcome two younger scholars to the team. Dr Sarah Ball is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, researching the digital governance of welfare programs. Sarah brings expertise on behavioural insights and experimental methods in social policy. Her experience includes five years as a policy officer with the Australian Public Service. David Threlfall brings curriculum and administrative skills demonstrated through work at ANZSOG, the University of Melbourne and in the Victorian Public Service. He has a

xvi Introduction: Why The Australian Policy Handbook? deep interest in the language of politics and policy formulation. David recently completed a master’s degree at the University of Cambridge and is enrolled in a doctoral program at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Catherine Althaus, now returned to Australia as the ANZSOG Chair of Public Service Leadership and Reform at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, joins the original authors once more to complete the team. This edition takes advantage of a very welcome addition to Australian policy studies— the John L. Alford Case Library supported by ANZSOG. This extraordinary collection began in 2004, under the aegis of influential researcher and teacher Professor John Alford, to address the shortage of contemporary case studies about policy making. There are now more than two hundred case studies, with more on the way. The case library is available online as a unique public resource. For this edition we have drawn on examples from the John L. Alford Case Library in almost every chapter, marking these in text boxes to encourage further exploration. The links between ANZSOG and this volume go further, with Dean Professor Ken Smith kindly providing support through the year of writing and revision and assisting with the graphics found throughout the volume. These will be used also in ANZSOG masters and short course teaching. We express our shared gratitude to Professor Smith for his generous encouragement. We extend our thanks likewise to the team at Liberate Learning for their assistance in developing these graphics. This seventh edition is also a farewell to our long-term publisher. This book began with a commission from Allen & Unwin and its publishing legend the late John Iremonger, to whom we dedicated the original volume. His encouragement and imagination mattered a great deal to the project, and John is missed still. Elizabeth Weiss from Allen & Unwin continued in this tradition, masterfully stretching us to improve the text and its application, always demonstrating deep passion for the role of policy making in the advancement of Australian society. We value her insightful and convivial support for our shared endeavours. Recently Allen & Unwin sold its academic list to Taylor & Francis, and we have enjoyed engaging with new publisher Simon Bates and his team. In this post-pandemic world, the discussions have been done remotely, with Simon working from Singapore while the authors are scattered along the east coast of Australia. We are grateful to five anonymous referees who provided valuable suggestions, and to the many readers who have offered ideas and comments, enthusiastic affirmation or important reservations to contemplate. Each helps make, we hope, a seventh edition that will continue to encourage better public policy. Catherine Althaus, Sarah Ball, Peter Bridgman, Glyn Davis and David Threlfall

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Why policy matters

We can agree public policy is important yet not be certain of the definition. Rather, we can think of policy making as an action and a process, with some shared character­ istics. Public policy:

• • • • •

is intentional, designed to achieve a stated or understood purpose involves decisions and their consequences is structural and orderly is political in nature is dynamic.

This chapter describes public policy as an authoritative statement by a government about its intentions. It views public policy as shaped by hypotheses about cause and effect and structured around objectives and public values.

Public policy is how politicians make authoritative decisions as the elected decision makers with formal responsibility for complex, intricate subsystems of participants and players. Policy is the instrument of governance, the decisions that allocate public resources in one direction but not another. Policy is the outcome of the endless competition between ideas, interests and ideologies that impels our political system.

Disruption: a shifting policymaking environment The contemporary policymaking environment is characterised by deep societal divisions, heated contestation, global crises, seismic geopolitical shifts, local complexity and uncer­ tainty, fake news and misinformation, the questioning of democracy and the erosion of trust. Amid these tensions policies can promote stability and, if done well, aid civility. Yet good policy generally requires good process to address societal expectations and aspirations. While perfection always eludes, seeking and achieving continuous improvement in policymaking excellence is possible. If there is a theme in contemporary governance, it is governments at the mercy of events. Recent decades have seen terrorist attacks in global capitals, military interventions, a global financial crisis, powerful concerns about sexism and racism in contemporary society reflected in the #MeToo and Black Lives Matter movements, the rise of misinformation through social media, and clear signs of climate change at work. The Australian bushfires of 2019–20 will be remembered not just for their widespread devastation, but as a harbinger of the future. DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-1

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The Australian Policy Handbook

Above all, political leaders have faced a public health crisis not seen for a century, a global pandemic which emerged in late 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted global trade, work and health systems, prompted unprecedented restrictions on personal freedom and, in doing so, exposed fissures in social structures. Such developments require both crisis policy responses and shifts in long-term thinking. They upend settled procedures for making decisions, who has authority, and what counts as evidence. The pandemic saw several decades of patient low-key work by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) overturned with the creation of a National Cabinet, as Australian governments struggled to coordinate responses. Inventing a new institution underlined the seriousness of the crisis but could not always solve questions of jurisdiction or the underlying challenge of making federalism work amid disruption. Meanwhile, intergovernmental public service working groups long focused on complex policy pro­ blems for COAG found themselves in limbo. One decision made in isolation in a crisis can exacerbate other tensions. Disruption then does not negate the need for coherent policymaking processes. Rather, the disruptions which mark this new millennium necessitate deeper under­ standing to enact reform where and when it is needed most. New challenges and new forms of governance require authoritative, well-informed decision making—much like the policy challenges of old. For at heart, policy is always about choice between competing values and constrained resources. Society will inevitably grapple with how to allocate scarcity. There is never sufficient money, people or attention. Governments must focus on the familiar tasks of taxing and spending, regulation and reform, legislation and monitoring, struggling always to find sufficient clear time to think about emerging challenges. In some senses the multiple demands on any administration are an ancient dilemma. Yet techniques and technology can help improve problem definition and generate possible solutions (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, 2012). Improved communications help governments identify clever ideas, while social sciences have developed important processes such as the randomised controlled trial to test the efficacy of policy interventions (Leigh, 2018). Learning from failure through systematic evaluation has changed practice in many policy domains (Syed, 2015). Policy learning and transferring lessons across nations have become part of the policy conversation. Australia is both policy borrower and exporter—drawing in ideas such as labelling food for nutrition while sharing abroad innovations including income contingent loans for tertiary students and skills-based criteria for migration decisions. Meanwhile, pressure for international cooperation has tied many local policy choices to global issues. Trade agreements are areas of success, climate change the most pressing example of faltering cooperation. Numerous successive Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings to consider global climate measures have not delivered agreement, prompting youth action to demand governments find a more coherent response. Likewise, many expected COVID-19 to prompt collaborative policy making on an international scale. Instead, the pandemic saw widespread retreat into stove piped national responses with closed borders and accusations of vaccine hoarding. So while globalisation can seem to be an irresistible force toward an integrated world, often on particular policy issues—climate and migration come first to mind—the bonds of global solidarity fray rather than grow stronger. This policy setting is made more difficult by a pervasive media presence focused on emotional persuasion, marketing and promotion. It can feel like policy making is nine-tenths

Why policy matters

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press release and one-tenth substance. Analysts worry that policy ideas are being assessed for their emotive fit as much as—if not more than—logic, consistency, intellectual rigour or political coherence. Timing imperatives, too, have shifted to accommodate continual media scrutiny. This can be celebrated as promoting transparency in decision making or viewed as a challenge when governments feel compelled to respond instantly to problems requiring thought, evidence and judgement. The speed, urgency and sheer workload of contemporary policy making has shifted the rhythm of policy making. Compressed timeframes and the mounting volume of policy work required to meet expectations underscore a need for even stronger processes and quality checks to buttress the policymaking endeavour, lest speed sacrifice high standards. Faced with disenchantment and distrust of institutions, many governments have moved toward greater participation and more trust-building activities as part of policy making. Citizen expectations of network governance and responsive services, and increased reliance on third party provision, see government managing complex networks of services and providers. The result can be an enriched policy environment, but there is risk of significant failure when government no longer commands the expertise and resources to oversee a demanding policy area. Some recent reports argue that govern­ ment has surrendered too much internal policy capacity and must rely heavily on con­ tractors to provide advice and analysis once sourced from within the public sector (see, for example, the Independent Review of the Australian Public Service, 2019). Others suggest that policy consultants can be used and leveraged strategically to bring additional expertise and capability to public choices (Althaus, Carson and Smith, 2021). The Australian population is changing too. Cultural diversity is an integral component of Australian society. The 2016 Census indicated Australians speak over 300 languages, including more than 60 languages spoken by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Aus­ tralians. One in five Australians now speak a language other than English at home. By 2016 Australia had ‘the largest overseas-born population of all large OECD nations, with nearly half of our population either born overseas, or with one or both parents born overseas’ (Scanlon Foundation, 2016: 2). While barriers to racial equality endure in Australia, Scanlon Foundation data (2021: 5) shows that 84 percent of Australians believe that multiculturalism has been good for the country. Diversity, of course, extends across gender, age, sexual orientation and social status. For example, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2016) indicates that around 18 percent of the Australian population live with a disability. The Australian Human Rights Commission (2014: 26) draws on Australian Department of Health data to suggest that ‘Australians of diverse sexual orientation, sex or gender identity may account for up to 11 percent of the Australian population’. Successful policy makers understand and thrive in this varied setting. It helps greatly when those making choices reflect the differences found across the population they seek to help. A presence for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples in policy making can encourage choices which speak to, and for, the aspiration of the First Nations of Aus­ tralia—honouring the principle of ‘nothing about us without us.’ Shifting the cultural diversity of the public sector workforce encourages new perspectives and different ways of thinking about accepted policy traditions and practices (Rice, 2010; Norman-Major and Gooden, 2015). Workforce diversity promotes cultural safety as well as cultural compe­ tency skills. The policy system needs cultural fluency and agility, so the policy process better addresses inclusion and inequality.

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The Australian Policy Handbook

Cultural fluency and agility are more than cultural appreciation. They include behaviours, attitudes and policies so systems, organisations and professionals can work effectively in intercultural situations (APSC, 2012b). Cultural diversity skills present opportunities to reconceptualise public programs and rethink the cultural assumptions that underpin policy choices (Althaus, 2021). These aim to minimise the high costs of intercultural incompetence, conflict and poor policy outcomes. Policy makers who respect and include the many faces of society in the policy process are in high demand. Taken together—disruption, social divisions, declining trust in government, global expectations, new technical skills, opportunities for greater engagement yet increased scrutiny for fast decisions, all in a society that has become more differentiated—there are formidable challenges for policy making. Yet, we suggest, this contemporary policy­ making milieu has not overwhelmed the opportunity for coherent policy that emerges from deliberation and careful process. It just reminds us the stakes are higher—but the potential rewards of good choices even more worthwhile. The world changes, and with it the demands on, and opportunities for, policy makers.

Defining public policy There are many attempts to define “public policy”, but its meaning and boundaries remain ambiguous. Some policy documents and pronouncements are clearly expressions of public policy. Others are of uncertain status. For example: • • • • •

A proposed law states policy but might not gain approval in parliament. A white paper states government policy intentions but these might not be realised. A ministerial statement might be policy, or it might just be one view on the way to the government forming a position. Election platforms describe a political party’s intentions but might not shape the policy of the resulting government. Is it ‘policy’ when departmental activities proceed without explicit statement of intent, continuing from government to government without ever exciting public interest or political scrutiny?

Nonetheless, proposed definitions of “public policy” jostle for attention. Early policy science pioneer Harold Lasswell said that policy designates ‘the most important choices made either in organised or private life’ (Lasswell, 1951: 5). Policy ‘is what governments do and neglect to do,’ say Klein and Marmor (2006: 892). Sometimes we use the term to describe very specific choices, yet the notion also embraces general directions and philosophies. There are times when “policy” becomes clear only in retrospect; we look back and discern the patterns and continuities within a set of choices, and call these “policy”. Turner et al. (2015: 99, adapted from Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) argue “policy” variously designates: • • •

a field of activity such as a program (e.g. the Stronger Communities program or HomeBuilder program); a statement of general purpose or a desired state of affairs such as an output (e.g. 2020 Defence Strategic Update); a specific proposal, such as outcomes (e.g. 90 percent COVID vaccination of the Australian public);

Why policy matters

AN AUTHORITATIVE CHOICE

A HYPOTHESIS

A response to public issues or problems that is intentional, structured and programmatic

A proposed explanation of cause and effect, to create incentives or disincentives to particular actions

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WHAT IS POLICY?

AN OBJECTIVE

PUBLIC VALUE

A course of action designed to achieve specific, measurable results

A means of producing the most effective outcomes to benefit the greatest number of citizens

Figure 1.1 Defining policy

• •

decisions of government, such as a theory or model (e.g. a balanced budget); and formal authorisation, such as a process (authorisation as described in the Cabinet Handbook).

This multitude of meanings is inevitable, as policy is a shorthand description for everything from an analysis of past decisions to the imposition of current political thinking. This chapter describes policy in four different but compatible ways. First, policy can be the authoritative choice of a government. Second, policy is a hypothesis, an expression of theories about cause and effect. Third, policy is explored as the objective of governmental action. Finally, policy as public value, a variation of policy as objective, is discussed.

Policy as authoritative choice Public policy emerges from the world of politics. This can be a chaotic place in which ideas must find a path between the intentions of politicians, the interests of government institutions, the interpretations of bureaucrats and the intervention of pressure groups, media and citizens. Central to this political world is the executive, that group of ministers around the leader, who exercise the authority of government on behalf of the parliament. Ministers under­ stand the political nature of their work, but also know other players need authoritative statements of policy direction. Clarity matters. Power is exercised through the ability to issue directives and make decisions expressing intention. Through policies, governments make their mark. From the chaos of politics emerges the certainty of action. The more precise the instructions, the better chance action will mirror ministerial intention. Policy, then, can be seen as an authoritative response to a public issue or problem. This suggests that public policy:

6 • • • • •

The Australian Policy Handbook is intentional—public policy means pursuing specific government goals through the application of identified public or private resources; is about making decisions and testing their consequences; is structured, with identifiable players and a recognisable sequence of steps (it is therefore often institutional, too); is political in nature, expressing the electoral and program priorities of the executive; and is programmatic, because it expresses a proposed set of actions.

Policies reached through a decision-making framework express a considered response to a policy issue, help shape a government’s philosophy, and provide an authoritative framework of the government’s beliefs and intentions in the policy area. Policy decisions convey authority because they are made by people with legitimate power in our system of government. These decisions might bind public servants to act in a parti­ cular way, direct future action (such as preparing legislation for parliament’s consideration) or allocate money to a program. Realistically, though, even authoritative decisions might not be realised. The slip between hope and outcome is too familiar. Nor does the authoritative nature of public policy mean that government has deliberated on every issue. Each government must work from the legacy of its predecessors, and comfortable bureaucratic routines might reflect an ancient policy decision. Policies can accumulate without consideration of coherence. All the more important, then, for a well-developed policy process to ensure intentions are regularly considered and examined against results.

Policy as hypothesis Policies are built on theories of the world, models of cause and effect. Policies must make assumptions about behaviour. They contain incentives to encourage one behaviour over another, or disincentives to discourage particular actions. Policies must incorporate guesses about take-up and commitment, mechanisms to deal with shirking and induce­ ments to encourage compliance. That said, public policy is not a laboratory experiment. It can be difficult to test behavioural assumptions before a policy is implemented. Cabinet might, for example, judge that a pack­ age of taxation measures will elicit a desired response from citizens. Until the government announces the tax and measures its effects, ministers remain unsure whether they have cor­ rectly identified cause and effect in the tax system. Once announced, it might be politically difficult to rescind a tax policy even when the results are not those anticipated. Policy is created amid uncertainty and tested in the most demanding of circumstances. Policy makers learn by finding and correcting errors in policy assumptions and design. They improve policy by recognising changes in the environment alongside shifts in the needs and desires of the community and elected officials. Policy rarely endures indefi­ nitely—time and circumstance transform the policy environment, opportunities invite exploration, while risks must be managed. Appreciation for the policy environment is as important as shifts in government priorities, resources and contexts. Good policy processes make explicit their behavioural assumptions, so decision makers understand the model of the world that supports a recommendation. To think of policy as hypothesis puts into words the mental calculations that guide all policy advisers and makers.

Why policy matters

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Understanding policy as hypothesis also stresses the importance of learning from policy implementation and evaluation. Good policy making assumes an ability to draw lessons from policy experience and to apply those lessons in the next run through the policy cycle. Given the multiple players in policy making, conflicting evidence about results, and the often-drawn-out processes involved, incorporating policy learning can be difficult. As Levi-Faur and Vigoda-Gadot (2006: 254) point out, policy learning is not an uncritical transfer of policy such that governments become ‘rule takers rather than rule makers’. Governments can draw from a body of policy experience ‘rather than having to work from scratch every time’ (Marsh and Sharman, 2009: 282). Hence the importance of a structured policy process, so lessons are documented and passed on with an eye for extracting general principles. Legendary American policy analyst Aaron Wildavsky (1987: 393) observed, ‘we hope that new hypotheses expand into theories that better explain the world’. These better theories, guided by the results of evaluation, become the basis for improved public policies.

Policy as objective Public policy is ultimately about achieving objectives. It is a means to an end. Policy is a course of action by government designed to attain specific results. The policy process should help decision makers clarify their objectives. A policy without purpose might do harm. When policies lack coordination, programs begin to draw in different directions, the overall strategy disappears, and commentators soon speak of a government ‘losing its way’. Good policy advice avoids this trap by making explicit: • • •

the form of authoritative statement required; the model of cause and effect underpinning the policy; and the goals to be achieved.

As later chapters illustrate, an effective policy cycle checks a particular policy proposal against the broader objectives of government. Through engagement and coordination, the policy cycle encourages consistency, so a new policy will fit within the wider picture of government activity. Public policy is made by many people, in a chain of processes that includes analysis, implementation, evaluation and reconsideration. This coordination is only possible if policy objectives are stated clearly and honestly. When intentions are uncertain or contradictory, a policy has little chance of success. Setting an objective is a first step in a long process. It is also the most important, as only an objective can give point and reason to a public policy choice. It is easy to lose sight of policy objectives. The “solution” might become more important than the problem. Policy activity is very fast moving; once a decision is made, work gathers momentum. Time and authority to reflect on the chosen direction are limited, allowing a poor decision to cascade into a policy far removed from the original intention. Objectives might be overtaken by unintended consequences—side effects discovered only after the policy is implemented, which undermine the policy’s effect or create new, complex problems. A scheme to license a particular activity can create a powerful elite, strongly wedded to the policy and so politically influential that later modification

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The Australian Policy Handbook

becomes costly and difficult. Taxation relief might distort the market for goods or services other than those originally targeted. To keep policies focused on objectives, policy makers rely on a policy cycle that includes project planning and evaluation. Along the way they are likely to ask: • •

What is the purpose of the policy? How will it affect: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

• • • •

overall government direction government agencies client groups interest groups society?

What is the relationship between the means of implementation and the policy objectives? Are there other means of implementation that are simpler? How will this policy relate to other government objectives? Will the policy make the difference intended?

Through a systematic policy cycle, decision makers seek an authoritative choice, based on a plausible hypothesis, to deliver the required outcomes. This deceptively simple formula sums up the challenge of good public policy.

Policy as public value Policy as objective can be interpreted as top-down directives imposed by the most senior decision makers. This does not always capture the significant ground-up policy con­ tributions of citizens, commercial interests and the not-for-profit sector. Nor does it necessarily capture the motivational forces that guide policy development (Stoker, 2006a). Much policy involves negotiation with relevant players. At a minimum this requires engagement. It can extend to codesign and coproduction when government is willing to meet citizens as peers in policy choices. Harvard Kennedy School’s Mark Moore proposes the concept of public value to frame the benefits and costs of policy not only in terms of money but how government actions affect civic and democratic principles (Moore, 1997; Kavanagh, 2014). Policy is not just a problem to be solved or an objective to be attained, but a net benefit to be delivered. In Moore’s formulation, public value is contrasted with private consumption—those products and services we pay for and use for private benefit. Public value lies in out­ comes generated by government—public transport, defence and so on through a long list of benefits, direct or little acknowledged, generated through the public sector (Mazzu­ cato, 2013, 2018). Many such outcomes flow directly from public organisations; others result from public policy settings. Requirements for fire escapes and other safety measures in private buildings, for example, are set by governments and so can be considered aspects of public value. As Moore notes, the test of public value is not who produces a service but who consumes it. Public value might appear intangible at times, but it is achieved through policy choi­ ces. A public value approach invites policy makers to consider the most effective way of

Why policy matters

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producing outcomes to benefit the greatest possible number of citizens. This implies democratic processes so that preferences can be expressed and understood. As many goals are not compatible, policy making involves value choices. This can require weighing up general principles, such as individual liberty, against a desirable public good, such as fewer fatalities through car crashes. When seats belts were made compulsory in Australia from 1971, there were complaints about ‘government com­ pulsion’. Yet the result was ‘significant and marked decreases in driver and passenger fatality and injury rates’ (McDermott and Hough, 1979). This was a trade-off policy makers considered justified as a contribution to public value. To express the considerations at play in promoting public value, Professor Moore devel­ oped a “strategic triangle”, which has proved influential in policy making (see Figure 1.2). The triangle represents three considerations in a policy choice—the aspiration to create public value, the authorising environment, and “productive capabilities” which test whether the goal can be achieved in practice (in effect, organisational capacity). As the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG, 2017) records, a public value approach requires a policy maker to ask: • • •

Should I do it? May I do it? Can I do it?

The definition of public value is open-ended—and contested by critics of the theory— but gives priority to measurable democratic accountability in which value can be inherent

MAY I DO IT? Authorising environment Political support Legitimacy

SHOULD I DO IT? Public value Purpose Mission Goals Objectives

Figure 1.2 The public value approach Source: based on Moore, 1997.

CAN I DO IT? Organisational capacity Staff Skills Technology Infrastructure

10 The Australian Policy Handbook or extrinsic but is always relational (Bryson et al., 2014: 448; Bennington, 2019; Brown, 2021a). A ‘public value framework provides an affirmation of managerial ingenuity and expertise, albeit within a binding democratic order and a finite resource base’ (Williams and Shearer, 2011: 1372). This ingenuity and expertise extend beyond the realm of public servants and advisers. Ideas and proposals, reports on experience and suggestions for improvement can arise from across society. Public value is enhanced when opportunities for participation are extended and embraced. Critics of the public value approach to policy making suggest it lacks empirical substantiation. Yet traction between public value ideas, theorists and practitioners is strong (Bryson et al., 2014). This approach to thinking about the policy process has found many adherents in Australian policy circles, and influenced teaching by, among others, the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (Ballintyne and Mintrom, 2018). The idea of public value speaks to the aspirations of those designing policy to make a considered difference to the public realm.

Understanding policy making In academic literature, as in practice, public policy invites a range of models and debates, sparking critique and stimulating reappraisal of mindsets and approaches. We provide here just a sample of a large Australian and international literature (Cohen et al., 1972; Perrow, 1984; Collman, 1988; Dye, 2007; Boin et al., 2008; Colebatch, 2009; Gerston, 2010; Scott and Baehler, 2010; Haigh, 2012; John, 2012; Maddison and Denniss, 2013; Miller and Orchard, 2014; Pal, 2014; Sabatier and Weible, 2014; Head and Crowley, 2015; Birkland, 2016; Wilson, 2016; Kraft and Furlong, 2018; Weible and Sabatier, 2018; Cairney, 2019; Knill and Tosun, 2020). We note also a welcome expansion beyond mainstream inter­ pretations of policy making, for example: longstanding feminist analyses of public policy making and bureaucracy (Ferguson, 1984; Yeatman, 1990, 1998; Ackelsberg, 1992; Stivers, 2000; Chappell, 2002); gender budgeting (Sawer and Stewart, 2020) and gender tax and social policy (Stewart, 2017); feminist perspectives on evidence in policy making (Malbon et al., 2018); feminist foreign policy (D’Aoust, 2017); studies of non-western public adminis­ tration (Drechsler, 2015); and Indigenous public leadership (Althaus and O’Faircheallaigh, 2019). We are certain there is much more to come. These contending and supplementary texts are encouraging. They suggest a concerted pursuit of improved policymaking processes and understandings, and a shared desire to learn from diverse perspectives and a wide range of experience and incorporate the les­ sons in future policy design. The Australian Policy Handbook uses a staged approach to the policy cycle, with an underlying commitment to analysis and informed decisions through a logical sequence of choices. This reflects the influence of Harold Lasswell and Herbert Simon as pioneers of these ideas in public administration. We bow pragmatically to the realities of later models including incrementalism, systems and network thinking, institutional analysis, social constructivist ideas and garbage can theory. We acknowledge the inevitable gap between ideal approaches and the practical work of making decisions for a specific time and place. Nevertheless, we remain committed to the value of a heuristics approach (learning tools) to understanding policy making. This provides priorities for the work of policy analysts and values the contribution of rational logic combined with creativity, passion and public engagement. As we suggested elsewhere ‘[t]he policy cycle does not assert that policy making is rational, occurs outside politics, or proceeds as a logical sequence rather than as a contest of ideas and interests’ (Althaus et al., 2015: 112).

Why policy matters

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Starting with an ideal form such as a policy cycle helps practitioners make sense of complexity yet allows them to move to specific solutions as need and circumstance demand and policy skills permit. Such an approach fosters professional expertise while encouraging the skills and development to make a methodical approach to policy part of the armoury but never the last word. In The Australian Policy Handbook we draw on academic literature as well as our knowl­ edge and connection with policy practice and our teaching and learning efforts. We bring teaching and learning experiences into our theory and practice insights. This allows us to deploy learning tools and encourage practitioners to apply their own judgement. Policy making is analysis and evidence, experience and intuition, critical and creative reflection to craft, execute and evaluate good policy (Threlfall and Althaus, 2021). Research helps to question practice, promote improvement, and invite a critical reappraisal of concepts. ‘Theory-building as well as practice improvement is a shared enterprise’ (Althaus and Threlfall, 2021: 284). There is a valuable depth of knowledge and understanding developed in the academic and grey literature over the past 40 years, as more voices join the conversation about public policy. All deploy a hypothesis about the world and its operation, whether recognised or implicit; there is no such thing as theory-free practice (Threlfall and Althaus, 2021: 33). So connecting practice with theory remains an enduring concern—a goal with an end, which is effective policy action. In this endeavour, a heuristic such as the policy cycle provides a way to make sense of the world, and to change it.

2

The institutions of public policy

Public policy cannot be separated from its institutional context. Policy is essentially an expression of the political will of a government. So for policy professionals and partisan participants alike, an understanding of the nature of government and the political dynamic is crucial. In this chapter, the traditional hierarchical theory of responsible government is com­ plemented by a functional division of government into political, policy and administrative roles to explain the reality of the institutions and operations of government.

Governments pursue their objectives by implementing policy. A statement of public policy is therefore a statement of political priority. Yet in the Australian system of government not all actors involved in policy formulation are political. Indeed, much policy advice is prepared by public servants committed to notions of professional neutrality. The system must find ways to mesh such impartial expert advice with a political perspective. This chapter sketches the institutional context of policy making. It offers both the formal model of the Australian political system—usually described as ‘responsible government’— and a more dynamic representation of the interaction between politicians, advisers, the public service and other actors in the policy sphere.

The Australian system of government Australia is a liberal democracy. Emy and Hughes (1991: 226–63) broadly define a liberal democracy as a political system heavily influenced by liberal concepts of politics characterised by belief in the individual, a consensual theory of society, belief in reason and progress, and suspicion of concentrated forms of power. The Australian liberal democracy is a hybrid polity organised according to particular views of power, legitimacy, justice and freedom. The Australian system of government melds notions of ministerial responsibility, drawn from the House of Commons in the Palace of Westminster in London, with a federal Senate modelled on US practice. It includes a governor-general as the representative of the King, and a powerful executive that reflects party domination of the parliament. This unique system, given national expression in the Commonwealth Constitution of 1900, combines parliamentary government with federal institutions. Australian governments gain their authority and legitimacy through the electoral process. A compulsory universal adult franchise makes voting both a civic privilege and a duty for all adults. The people elect representatives to serve in the parliament and to exercise power on their behalf. The national and state political scenes were historically characterised by two DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-2

The institutions of public policy

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strong, major party blocs. In recent decades the vote commanded by major parties has fallen, with a stronger presence for smaller parties and independents, particularly in national and state upper houses. Several states have experienced minority government in recent years while the Gillard ministry, formed following the 2010 federal election, proved Australia’s first sustained experience with minority government since 1940. The falling vote for major political parties does not negate the role of parties in aggregating and expressing community sentiments, but adds complexity to considera­ tions around forming governments, maintaining majorities and negotiating con­ troversial matters through both the House of Representatives and, most notably, the Senate. The decline of party loyalty, at least so far, has not overturned the basic dynamics or institutions of Australia’s parliamentary system. Responsible government is traditionally described as three spheres of activity: 1 2

3

legislative, or the making of laws, exercised by parliament. executive, or the administration and enforcement of the law, and the management of the resources of government. This function is carried out by ministers and the administrative agencies of government such as departments and statutory authorities. judicial, the application and interpretation of the law to particular cases. This is the function of the courts and tribunals.

The responsible government system acknowledges some overlap between these roles. Ministers are also members of parliament. Parliament delegates some law-making power to the executive. The judiciary comprises independent judges who value highly their separa­ tion from political decision making but are appointed by ministers. Judicial determinations, in turn, can decide which policy initiatives and ways of governing are constitutionally acceptable and consistent with the law.

LEGISLATIVE Parliament delegates some law-making power to the executive Ministers are also members of parliament

EXECUTIVE Ministers appoint judges

JUDICIAL Determinations can decide which policies are constitutionally acceptable and consistent with the law

Figure 2.1 The three spheres of responsible government

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The Australian Policy Handbook

The executive The principal focus of The Australian Policy Handbook is the executive arm of government. The various Australian, state and territory constitutions vest formal authority in the executive council. However, the governor-general, governor or administrator who presides over the council is only a symbolic repository of power. The real authority of government is exercised by the cabinet. The principles of responsible government make parliament paramount. The execu­ tive must comply with parliament’s wishes, expressed as legislation. Parliament can and does amend proposals made by the government and monitors executive activity through an extensive committee system. Yet in practical terms, the executive controls the legislative program of the parliament. Ministers hold office because they are part of a majority in the lower house and lose office if that majority falters at or between elections. The executive arm of government comprises ministers, who are responsible for the policy directions of government departments and agencies under their supervision. Ministers must account to parliament for their stewardship of public service functions. Short of personal impropriety, though, resignations for poor administration are exceedingly rare in Australia (Thompson and Tillotsen, 1999). As Maddigan (2011) notes, ‘individual ministerial responsibility is not a part of the current political reality in Australia’.

Cabinet The cabinet is a meeting of ministers, chaired by the prime minister, premier or chief minister, at which political and policy decisions are made. Not all ministers necessarily sit in cabinet; the Commonwealth cabinet comprises only the most senior ministers although junior ministers (from the ‘outer ministry’) might be present for cabinet consideration of issues affecting their portfolios. State and territory cabinets typically include all ministers. Cabinet is the apex of government, the institution that must consider political, policy and administrative implications of any proposition, and settle a government position. Although in most jurisdictions a body without formal legal standing, it is the source for an authoritative allocation of government resources. In their classic text on the Australian Commonwealth, Quick and Garran (1901: 704–5) note that cabinet is ‘an informal body having no definite legal status; it is in fact an institution unknown to the law; it exists by custom alone, and yet it is the dominant force in the Executive Government’. The legal status of cabinet is evolving with legislative changes and judicial challenges to freedom of information decisions, but the curiously opaque status of the centre of government remains central to its mystique and authority: Despite the power and significance of cabinet, it is essentially an informal body governed largely by convention. There is no reference to cabinet, or to the other key office of prime minister, in the Constitution… This informality has generally been seen as an advantage, providing much needed flexibility that has allowed cabinet to evolve with changing political patterns. (Keating and Weller, 2000: 46)

The institutions of public policy

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Patrick Weller (1990: 33) argues that cabinet performs at least six major roles: •

• •

• •

•

Cabinet as a clearing house—across government, committees meet and choices are reached that require ratification. Cabinet acts as a clearing house for this activity. Including a matter on the cabinet agenda makes all ministers aware of issues that might have been handled by a small committee, and provides an authoritative decision on an issue. Cabinet as an information exchange—government is so complex ministers can find it difficult to see beyond their own portfolio role. Weekly meetings of cabinet ensure ministers see the broader picture and know what their colleagues are doing. Cabinet as arbiter—when government agencies disagree, cabinet provides a forum for resolution. More generally, cabinet arbitrates the inevitable tensions over resources and priorities that every government must address. This role is particularly important in the annual budget process, when agencies and programs compete for limited resources. Cabinet as political decision maker—though signed by ministers, most submissions put before cabinet are written by public servants. Cabinet must cast a political eye over policy proposals, asking about the electoral consequences of a course of action. Cabinet as coordinator—since agency responsibilities often overlap, policies that contra­ dict initiatives elsewhere in government might arise. Cabinet is the only institution that can impose a coherent overall direction for government, by ensuring coordination of policies. Cabinet as guardian of the strategy—a government needs to set overall themes and objectives for its term in office, yet ministers can quickly become locked into a departmental perspective, seeing all issues from the narrow view of their own policy concerns. Cabinet is the forum that balances the particular with the general, so encouraging ministers to see issues from a whole-of-government viewpoint.

In performing these multiple roles, cabinet relies on the skill of the chair. It is the prime minister who must look to the overall strategy and weigh the benefits of a proposal against the goals of the government. There is no technical calculus guiding cabinet in many of its choices, only a willingness to think through all the implications of a sub­ mission and judge which course of action is best for the government and for the polity. Ministers are assigned responsibility for certain organisational structures of government, the departments and agencies, and for administration of various laws and programs. The Acts, organisations and programs listed in the administrative arrangements order make up the minister’s portfolio. Each minister at the cabinet table represents portfolio concerns and presents the portfolio’s proposals for consideration.

Public servants Public servants are employees in the executive arm of government. Not all public service work is directly concerned with policy development, but all public service work is affected by public policy because the work of public servants is driven by the policy priorities of the government of the day. Hence service delivery, administration and policy advice are encompassed within the political direction of the government. In an ideal responsible government system, public servants advise governments on policy but do not become involved in direct political

16 The Australian Policy Handbook questions. These are the prerogative of the cabinet and of parliament. At least in principle ministers make decisions, while public servants offer advice and then implement the government’s choices. Reality is less neat. In recent years senior public servants have lost both anonymity and job security. It is common for senior officials rather than ministers to be held accountable for agency decisions and performance. Many agency leaders exit their role on change of government, whether voluntarily or by forced departure. The 2019 Independent Review of the Australian Public Service (2019: 291) documented that more than 20 percent of departmental secretaries have been dismissed from office over the past 24 years. There is a risk such actions impose an implicit expectation of political responsiveness embedded in these changes (Mulgan, 2008; Stewart, 2008). Former Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold (2014), acknowledges the precarious position of departmental secretaries but insists good leaders do not temper their advice: ‘My experience suggests that speaking truth to power is more a matter of conviction and courage than contractual condition.’ Yet crossing a min­ ister can be career-limiting. As Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce told a community forum (quoted in Karp, 2019): I found out one of the only ways I could deal with them when I was the ag minister I invited the head of the department up, brought him into my office and sacked him—just to remind him where the authority starts from. And then I got a lot more sense out of the rest of them, they were great. Once mandarins were perceived as powerful and secure (Weller, 2001). Clearly that age has diminished, if not ended (Althaus, 2016). Senior public servants can find themselves ‘caught between the demands of politicians and the expectations of citizens’ (Davis et al., 2016). They are expected to take “acceptable” risks and be innovative, to serve the public interest, and yet never to cross or embarrass their minister. The obvious tension between competing demands for both responsiveness and impartiality can expose senior officials to disproportionate penalties for failure (Bridgman, 2019).

Ministerial advisers Beginning in the 1970s, a significant group within the Australian executive played a new role in policy making. Ministerial staff are appointed as partisan activists to ‘provide a firewall around ministers’ (Walter, 2006: 26), acting as ‘gatekeeper[s]’ and ‘shock absor­ bers’ (Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014: 2–3). Their contribution has expanded greatly, owing to pressures placed on ministers to respond to media demands, as well as increasing expectations associated with ministers’ departmental and parliamentary roles. Today the Commonwealth employs more than 2,000 ministerial staff. Over 50 years of operation the office of ministerial adviser has shifted from the margins of the political system to a central role. Ministerial staff have come to ‘mediate between the political and administrative domains; to drive, sieve and skew advice; and to insist upon what the minister wants as opposed to the public interest or the integrity of the political process’ (Walter, 2006: 24). Ministerial staff have come to occupy a unique position with few constitutional constraints. Ministerial staff roles include chiefs of staff, policy advisers and media advisers. They have sufficient authority to display their own styles, depending on ministerial personality

The institutions of public policy

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and government need. Skill sets range from office management and organisation, to ‘guardians’ of philosophy or ideology, ‘keeper of the government’s story’, ‘pest con­ troller’, ‘political proxy’ and ‘spin doctor’ (Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014: 105–106). As ministerial staff are not accountable to parliament or the public in the same way as public servants, there is risk such roles might operate without commensurate oversight or responsibility. Ministerial advisers are anomalies in the Westminster chain. While the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 and an enterprise agreement govern the employment fra­ mework of such staff, the accountability processes surrounding their role and activities have long been seen as substantially outdated (e.g. Tiernan, 2007). In 2008 the Commonwealth government issued the Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff, setting out 21 standards expected of ministerial staff. The code included standards covering the relationship between ministerial staff and public servants, expressly stating that ministerial staff cannot direct public servants, as executive decisions are made by ministers and officials and not by ministerial staff (APSC, 2008). Nonetheless, concerns continued. The 2019 Independent Review of the Australian Public Service (2019: 134) quoted a senior public servant describing ministerial offices as ‘a whole new layer or level of government’. There is little formal training for these roles, no independent human resources support or processes, and modest accountability despite the much-expanded roles performed by ministerial staff. The Independent Review recommended a legislated code of conduct, with enforcement provisions, supported by appropriate induction, training and professional development. It also proposed more systematic rotation of public servants in ministerial offices, so that senior executive service officers understand the political process and ministerial advisers, in turn, have a better understanding of departmental capabilities and responsibilities. These report recommendations about the structure, tenure and administrative arrange­ ments for ministerial staff were not accepted. The Morrison government response to the review (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2019: 18) said such changes would not be necessary because the government already expected ‘all ministerial staff to uphold the highest standards of integrity’. Yet subsequent allegations of sexism, bullying, lewd behaviour, harassment, and rape among ministerial staff triggered first a Review of the Parliamentary Workplace, focused on serious incidents (Foster, 2021), and then a wider review of workplace standards in the Commonwealth Parliament by Sex Discrimination Commissioner Kate Jenkins (AHRC, 2021). Again these reviews recommended attention to ingrained sexism in parliament and the need for cultural change, different and better leadership, clarity about roles, appropriate human resources systems, clear standards and compulsory training, sanctions for unacceptable conduct, legislation governing staff appointments, management and termination, strengthened codes of conduct, standardised reporting, an Independent Parliamentary Standards Commission, and policies governing alcohol in the workplace. At their best, ministerial advisers assist ministers in the policymaking process and help public servants secure ministerial attention and approval of policies. They can also prove a source of tension in the dynamics of ministerial-departmental relations—‘meretricious players flitting across the stage’ in the memorable formulation of one departmental leader. The inclusion of ministerial advisers in the system as an authoritative force, interposed between political decision makers and neutral officials, muddies any neat model of responsible government, but is now a well-established norm that must be acknowledged and understood (see Ng, 2016; Maley, 2020).

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The Australian Policy Handbook

The opposition Winning government is the ultimate goal of partisan politics. In parliament, the government sits on the “treasury benches” to the right of the Speaker. Across the chamber sits His Majesty’s “loyal opposition”, aiming to snare the prize of government but until then work­ ing to hold their opponents to account. Government senators also sit to the President of the Senate’s right even when another party, grouping (or just everyone not in government) holds more numbers. Thus parliament is both institutionally and politically adversarial. The opposition is the parliamentary party, coalition or formal grouping most capable of forming an alternative government. Even if the opposition party is outnumbered by independents, only organised groupings can form the opposition (Oaten, 2016). There are important advantages to being the formal opposition. The office brings authority, a media focus and, significantly, resources in the form of additional staff and offices, travel money and extra remuneration for the leaders of the opposition and members of the shadow cabinet. Shadow cabinet, the quasi-institution of alternative government, is a relatively recent invention (Farr, 2015) and its processes seem particular to each leader unlike the more methodical policy process of executive government and the cabinet (Bateman, 2008). In trying to wrestle government from the other side the opposition will develop policies as well as endeavour to disrupt the government’s policy agenda. Those policies form the basis of the election platform. If government should change hands, the incoming party will expect the public service to understand, and be ready to implement, the new platform. An important role for policy officers is the preparation of incoming government briefs in the caretaker period while an election is underway, necessitating knowledge and analysis of the opposition’s announced policies (Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2016). This task is sometimes complicated when an opposition party adopts a ‘small target’ approach, avoiding too much scrutiny on the (only sometimes accurate) adage that oppositions do not win elections, governments lose them. Public servants do not access the opposition directly in policy formation. Sometimes, through the Minister, the opposition might be invited to participate in—or at least be told about—important policy developments, typically when complicated legislation is required. Declining loyalty to major parties has resulted in the election of more minor party and independent members and senators, slimmer majorities for governments and, in recent years, minority governments. While the executive continues to dominate policy devel­ opment and activity, a fragile hold on government in the lower house and lack of a majority in the Senate create a different policy dynamic. The executive must negotiate with the opposition or minor parties and independents to advance its legislative agenda. The result of the 2022 federal election—including a “teal wave” of independents in formerly safe Liberal Party seats and record number of lower house members from the Greens—reinforces this sense of change. Policy responses must become nimbler to meet short timeframes and deliver negotiated changes.

A map of government This standard picture of responsible government offers a chain of accountability: public servants answer to ministers, ministers to parliament, parliament to the people. Some institutions, though, do not fit into this simple scheme. Ministerial staff are one example. Others include the courts, which can override the executive on some issues but are not

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accountable to the people. Further complications arise from administrative law, with its accountability measures outside the standard chain. Accountability agencies including auditors-general and ombudsmen have quite distinct, sometimes anomalous, reporting relationships. Still, the familiar institutions of parliament, the executive, the public service and the courts are usefully defined and linked as the responsible government model. Of course, theoretical niceties do not always explain or allow for the vagaries of reality, and policy makers ignore complexities and additional actors at their peril. Contemporary governance suggests much less strict boundaries, with policy choices influenced by staff within and key players traditionally outside the formal political system. Once policy advice came strictly from the public service but is now contestable and offered by a complex network of policy actors. One of the most influential of these is the business sector, whose longstanding influence from outside government has grown within, through increasing use of consultants to complement or substitute for public service advice. Beyond business, there is also the third sector and the media. Recognition of these players is essential to building a broader perspective of how Australian governments operate.

Consultants Just as ministerial staff have taken on some policy adviser roles once provided by the public service, so too paid management consultants have become regular players in policy development. Overall federal expenditure on management consultancies doubled from $250 million in 2012–13 to $520 million in 2016–17 (ANAO, 2017: 21n31), and reached over $600m in 2020 (AusTender, 2021). The Department of Finance (2020a: 18) defines a consultancy as ‘engagement of temporary services that involve the development of an intellectual output that assists with decision making’. Such external assistance with decision making might displace traditional public service policy advice. Proponents argue external policy advice is necessary given the public service’s reduced capability to develop high-quality and timely analysis. Good consultants provide essential specialist technical skills, drawing on the sophisticated analytical capacity of large manage­ ment consultant firms. This can include swift access to international data and experience, as governments seek quick responses to challenging and urgent policy questions. Critics suggest the reduction in public service capability is created by the very decision to seek external advice, reinforced by longstanding cuts in expenditure on the public service. They note too the different ethos in play, with consulting firms responding to a brief written by the minister and advisers, rather than considering a broader public value calculation. Regardless of merit, the practical outcome to the use of consultants is that ‘some [m]inisters no longer regard the APS as their primary, nor even their preferred, source of advice’ (Tiernan et al., 2019: 13). This is a fundamental challenge to a core institution in the Australian polity, the role of the public service in providing apolitical and objective policy advice. Contracting of policy work has created a policy dynamic in which ministers can seek the advice they want rather than challenging evidence. The Independent Review of the Australian Public Service (2019: 134) argued ‘the APS must respond by embracing contestability and redefining its role as the principal adviser to government’. In addition to continued provision of ‘high-quality and impartial advice’, this new role would require ‘the APS to help ministers make sense of the many perspectives they hear through their advisory networks’.

20 The Australian Policy Handbook Finding effective ways to source urgent expertise from consultants yet integrate this into public sector operations will be essential if governments are to manage widespread private input into public policy development (O’Flynn and Sturgess, 2019). This issue goes beyond policy advice to the commissioning and contracting of government service delivery more broadly. The second wave of COVID-19 infections in Victoria in 2020 is a case in point. Outsourcing management of hotel quarantine to private security com­ panies proved deadly and costly, and yet the Victorian COVID-19 Royal Commission report could not identify who made the key decision to hire contractors (COVID-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiry 2020; Rundle, 2021). In the absence of a considered policy process—albeit amid a crisis—an unquestioned assumption that services should be sourced externally, although without sufficient quality control over contract provision, resulted in the lethal failure of the program. Consultants can be important in driving policy outcomes, for example as supplementary resources to meet tight timeframes, and to complement public service skills, including with highly specialised personnel. Consultants can add external validation to important work and potentially reignite policy capacity in agencies (Althaus et al., 2021). The operation of Australian government has changed forever, so management consultants will always play a significant role. The test is to develop the right operational framework and balance.

The third sector Lyons (2001: 5) defines the third sector as ‘organisations that are not part of the public or business sectors’. It is often referred to as the non-profit sector, the social economy, civic or civil society, the non-government organisation sector, the community sector or the voluntary sector. Third sector organisations are: • • • • • •

private formally organised the product of collective action that generates common value and benefit voluntary in nature not seeking personal profit usually democratically controlled (Lyons, 2001: 6–9).

This sector is diverse—and large. The 56,000 or so registered non-government organisations across Australia range from large charities delivering community services to lobby and interest groups alongside schools, research organisations and think tanks that span a huge array of activities, sizes, structures and objectives (Fraussen and Halpin, 2016a). Australian culture and history records the third sector playing a significant role in society, particularly in delivery of charitable services to people living with disadvantage (Davis, 2021a). Approximately 80 percent of Australians belong to at least one third sector organisation (Australian Consortium for Social & Political Research Inc., 2014). Formal volunteering rates in 2019 stood at just under 6 million adult Australians, or 29.5 percent of the population. This dropped during the global pandemic (ABS, 2021; Volunteering Australia, 2021). Yet while Australians donate to third sector organisations at about a third of the rate found in the United States, Australians have a higher record of voluntary activity (McGregor-Lowndes et al., 2014; Giving USA Foundation, 2014; ABS, 2011; United States Department of Labor, 2011).

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There is much interaction between the third sector and government (Fitzgerald, 2006). In recent years, large charities and foundations have emerged as important inter­ mediaries for this interaction (Williamson and Leat, 2021). The third sector is often involved in the delivery of government-funded services, such as support for disability or employment services. Third sector organisations lobby government on behalf of neglec­ ted Australians or emerging causes. They act as an alert mechanism for government, primarily to secure goals on behalf of their constituents or representative interests. In turn politicians use third sector organisations to talk to voting blocs and community opinion. The third sector contributes in significant ways to the development, implementation and evaluation of policies. The establishment in 2012 of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission was a move by government to maximise the effectiveness of the third sector and regulate profit organisations that can receive public donations. Yet there can be tensions between the third sector and government over policy goals and the scope of legitimate activism: in 2021 the Assistant Treasurer sought to restrict charitable status for organisations he believed were pursuing political goals. The sector pushed back, pointing out that any engagement with policy goals can be framed as political. The Senate agreed, striking down the proposals (Karp and Knaus, 2021). A related third sector development is the growing influence of think tanks. Organisations such as the Grattan Institute are private professional policy analysts, outside government but committed to influencing policy choices. Think tanks often join forces with other third sector organisations, such as philanthropic or peak bodies, to promote policy change in specific areas. Examples include school funding, health, environmental regulation and domestic violence (Shaw et al., 2015, Fraussen and Halpin, 2016b). Think tanks—or “knowledge-based policy influence organisations”—work across political institutions, media and lobbyists to mobilise opinion and advocate policy outcomes (Dunn, 2016: 15, 100; Wellstead and Howlett, 2021). Some public sector organisations, such as the Productivity Commission, share characteristics of independent think tanks, seeking to influence choices through evidence and public reports. At their best, think tanks can produce detailed reports on key public policy issues, and point to less discussed but possibly worthwhile policy options, as did John Daley on retiring after a decade leading the Grattan Institute (Daley, 2021). Yet not all think tanks are committed to objective reporting. Some are explicitly ideological, committed to a point of view with partisan consequences. This is no criticism—democracy works best when there is lively and public debate about ideas and evidence—but it does require analysts to think carefully about the case presented when drawing on think tank reports (Barros and Taylor, 2020): it is the very nature of independent think tanks that they can work free from public sector impartiality constraints.

Social movements While political parties seek to represent broad bodies of opinion in society, and third sector organisations to deliver essential services and lobby for system change, social movements represent another voice in the policy world. They are, by definition, ephemeral—arising in response to a community concern, such as local opposition to a new freeway or anger over refugee policy. A few transform into enduring political organisations, such as environmental organisations coalescing over time as the Australian Greens. Others become long term campaigners, such as Bravehearts and GetUp! Most will vanish as their issue resolves or attention moves to other concerns.

22 The Australian Policy Handbook Nonetheless, social movements can prove deeply influential on policy choices. It took years of struggle for activists to gain public attention for climate change. The topic was not welcomed by some parties and media organisations and treated as marginal to mainstream political conversation. Only persistent campaigning forced environmental concerns onto the political agenda, with every party now required to express a position. This is a case of social movements, rather than politicians, leading policy thinking. These external policy actors have made environmental protection a salient political issue. Similarly, the #MeToo and Black Lives Matter movements have shown the power of social movements in the digital age. The Women’s March 4 Justice has encour­ aged widespread mobilisation to demand respect and an end to gendered violence. Opposition to systemic sexism and racism has galvanised supporters in physical protest and digital activism in many countries worldwide, pressuring traditional political institutions and societies more broadly to reckon with long histories of exclusion and mistreatment.

The fourth estate—the media A further prominent actor in the policy process is the media, sometimes referred to as the fourth estate (Schultz, 1998, 2015; Young, 2007). The term derives from the early 19th century and the age of revolutions, as press influence grew alongside that wielded by the traditional three estates of parliament—the king and church, the lords and nobility, and the common people. The arrival of mass circulation newspapers changed politics dramatically, challenging the control of information and giving voice to criticism of government policies. This trend was impelled further by the rise of radio, television and digital technology. In recent decades the traditional media has found its own authority undermined by the arrival of social media, which allows citizens to bypass existing channels through Twitter, Facebook and countless imitations. The influential role some media once played in the political process, as gatekeepers to the public square, has been much diminished. As with other institutions in the political world, the media has always been subject to criticism. The rhetoric of a free press talks of journalists as important watchdogs for the public interest, blowing the whistle on wrongdoing by bringing neglected issues to public attention. Governments often complain the media becomes a de facto opposition which lacks, in turn, its own democratic institutions or practices of review (Muller, 2014; Finkelstein and Tiffen, 2015). Ministers worry the 24-hour news cycle prevents sustained attention on important topics and makes entertainment the dominant currency of cov­ erage. Yet much that politicians say and do, including policy pronouncements, is designed to attract media attention. Elected officials might grumble about superficiality but play the game nonetheless. The media, in turn, are more than reporters. Traditionally media have been among the most profitable industries in Australia, not afraid to pursue commercial interests through political coverage. Australia has rates of concentrated ownership of commercial media rare in liberal democracies, tempered in part by public broadcasting through the ABC and SBS. This makes policy about media ownership among the most contentious issues in politics, particularly as economic change erodes profitability. The rise of inter­ net-based advertising has seen the cash flow of traditional media decrease markedly (Simons, 2012, 2013). Newsroom closures and job losses have become common—a trend exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Reinforcing the challenge of increased competition, trust in traditional media channels has fallen consistently. A crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic can briefly restore attention to traditional media, but this diminished as the public grew concerned about COVID-19 misinformation, amid increasingly fractious debate and protest about public health measures such as lockdowns (Park et al., 2021). Fewer journalists, less opportunity to support quality reporting, the rise of opinion over fact, and the lure of social media have taken a toll on once-esteemed journalistic codes: The new [government-media] symbiotic relationship is all too often one of transmission rather than meaningful scrutiny… what was once known as political coverage [is now] increasingly an echo chamber of talking points, occasional rebuttals and a never-ending loop of “national conversations” in which the same few talk over everyone else. (Schultz, 2015: 46) Journalists debate whether they constitute a trade, profession or craft, but regardless they make a sustained contribution to political dialogue. As Tingle (2015) argues, media coverage is also governance memory, the collective record of public experience and knowledge. This is a role now under threat. Earlier hopes for the contribution of crowd-sourced and citizen journalism (Simons 2012, 2013; Goode, 2012) as the new future of the fourth estate’s insti­ tutional contribution have faded. In its place is a discord of competing players and online misinformation. The fourth estate remains a player in the policy discourse, and influences choices still, but its fragmentation and falling influence leave a lacuna in public debate. An older paradigm of communication between politicians and citizens about policy through journalism has exhausted, without its replacement yet becoming clear.

Lobbyists and stakeholders Good policy processes include connection between decision makers and the views of those affected by a policy. Stakeholders gather in different ways. Some loosely associate to express their position, responding for example to invitations for submissions to par­ liamentary inquiries, or attending public meetings. Other stakeholders, particularly those representing economic interests, pay keen attention to policy decisions and form tightly knit groups to compile and communicate views. Such stakeholders will seek meetings with ministers and an invitation to comment on possible policy options. If unhappy, they might launch public campaigns to stymie unwelcome proposed reforms, as the pharmacy industry peak body has done with conspicuous success over many years. Lobbyists are a unique form of stakeholder; indeed, they have their own regulation, the Australian Government Register of Lobbyists. This records specialist individuals and cor­ porations who conduct purposeful activities aimed at influencing government decision making. While stakeholders, broadly speaking, emerge and participate through the demo­ cratic process to inject civic participation in policy activities, lobbyists are professionals engaged explicitly to sway decision making in particular directions. Their objective is to shift the power balance in policy decision making.

System integrity How ministers and officials relate to lobbyists becomes an important test of system integrity. Lobbying is legal and common, but occasional corruption scandals and

24 The Australian Policy Handbook enduring questions about interaction between politicians, officials and lobbyists, including the post-politics employment of ministers, remind us that ethical conduct requires constant vigilance (Kirby and Webbe, 2019). Personal integrity by policy makers cannot be taken for granted (Sampford, 2011), yet there remain major discrepancies between corruption and integrity regimes across Australia. Some states and territories have well-resourced and high-profile integrity agencies. Investigations by the Independent Commission Against Corruption in NSW resulted in the resignation of two premiers within a decade, Barry O’Farrell in 2014 and Gladys Berejiklian in 2021. Ministers and public servants have been held to account, and even jailed, for corruption in various state jurisdictions. On the other hand, Canberra has not yet embraced calls for a significant federal integrity body with wide-ranging powers, despite promises to upgrade the Commonwealth integrity regime (Attorney-General’s Department, 2019). Many states and territories regulate lobbying and require public disclosure of minis­ terial meetings with lobbyists in the interests of transparency. Every three months the NSW government uploads all such details on the website Ministers’ Diary Disclosures maintained by the Department of Premier and Cabinet (2022). The Commonwealth is more reluctant to share details. It maintains a Lobbying Code of Conduct (Attorney­ General’s Department, 2022) and a Register of Lobbyists but has resisted claims under freedom of information legislation to disclose meetings or cabinet deliberations. Instead, Canberra relies on the Code and Register to set out principles of ethical engagement between ministers and officials and lobbyists. These principles are intended to promote sound processes that in turn uphold good outcomes and democratic equality in the contributions of civic and corporate views. System integrity depends also on ethical behaviour by politicians, ministerial staff and public servants in a broader sense than corruption alone. Increasing public disengagement from politics and dissatisfaction with the political class (Stoker et al., 2018) stems also from repeated recent incidents of proven and alleged sexism, infidelity, abuse and even rape against federal politicians and cabinet ministers. With the rape allegations against a fellow Liberal staffer made by Brittany Higgins in 2021, these toxic issues in the workplace culture of Canberra’s Parliament House came to a head. Sex Discrimination Commissioner Kate Jenkins found one in three staff working in commonwealth parliamentary workplaces (CPWs) had experienced sexual harassment, 51 percent had experienced at least one incident of bullying, sexual harassment or actual or attempted sexual assault and ‘over three quarters had experienced, witnessed or heard about bullying, sexual harassment and/or actual or attempted sexual assault in CPWs’ (AHRC, 2021: 17). The Jenkins review highlighted an alcohol-driven “boys club” cul­ ture where bullying and sexual harassment are rife and sexual assault not uncommon, signalling the need for systemic change to rectify activities carried out within the purview of parliament and the executive. While attention rightly focuses on workplaces, like the parliament, broader societal change in attitudes towards women and vulnerable groups is also needed (Heurich and Coghlan, 2021).

A functional map of government The Australian policy process can be portrayed through the institutions, organisations and players described so far—the executive, cabinet, the public service, ministerial advisers, opposition, consultants, the third sector, social movements, media, stakeholders and

The institutions of public policy

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lobbyists. These operate within published cabinet rules, codes of conduct and integrity processes. These are the processes which, in sum, translate political preferences into policy choices. We can describe policy making as the intersection of constitutional roles and political practices. There are, though, other ways to look at the policy process within Australian government. A functional approach sets hierarchical notions aside and considers government from the perspective of three key coordination tasks (Davis, 1995: 28), overlapping as in a Venn diagram: •

•

•

Politics. In a parliamentary system, governments must be seen to be united and coherent, to speak with one voice. Such consistency is an important political virtue, portraying a shared philosophy and shared goals. Politics is not only about implementing party plat­ form; it also involves attaining and keeping government through policies to attract voters. While philosophy and ideology are important, pragmatic politics will pervade every government’s judgements about the consequences of its decisions. Policy. A government stands or falls on its policy choices. These choices must be well considered and sufficiently coordinated so that one policy does not undermine another. Governments need to develop and monitor policy, and to achieve consistency across the many agencies that make up a modern public sector. The formulation of public policy is thus a key government task. Administration. Policies mean nothing if not implemented. Typically this means relying on the public servants and contractors who work for government. Ministers are accountable for efficient, effective and honest administration, and answer for the programs located within their portfolios.

Some overlap is inevitable between these functions. Ministers perform political roles but are also involved in policy development and administration. Public servants are principally focused on policy advice and administration but must also be sensitive to the political cir­ cumstances of their ministers. Viewing the political system in terms of political, policy and administrative tasks helps separate roles while providing some sense of the interplay between governmental players. The following sections outline each of these roles, and its characteristic participants, in more detail.

Government as politics Walk around Parliament House in Canberra and the intense activity is hard to miss. Parliament is the centre of the political world, the place where ministers put in long hours governing while their opposition numbers plot and scheme to bring them down. Gathered around the politicians are their advisers, partisan figures hired to assist with political strategy and media presentation. Many also develop significant policy expertise in their own right and offer ministers alternative political views about appropriate courses of action. While the public service tradition endures from one government to the next, advisers hold office only while their patron prospers. Their terms might prove to be influential but short-lived. At the centre of the political world is the office of the leader—the prime minister in Canberra, the premier or chief minister in the states and territories. In a parliamentary setting, prime ministers are powerful but not presidential; they are still subject to the party in power and can be removed from office by their own side. Prime ministers must

26 The Australian Policy Handbook offer effective and strong leadership, while maintaining party room support. The standard test is electability—leaders who seem likely to win the next election can usually carry their colleagues in any challenge. It does not take much to frighten the party room, however, and the turnover of leadership can be rapid and repeated (Davis, 2011). Leaders matter because they provide a public identity for a government, and a sense of coherence and direction. Leaders play a political role, but they are also the point at which politics must be married with policy and administration. While advisers are largely confined to the political world, prime ministers must reach beyond the confines of Parliament House to engage the broader agenda of public policy. The boundaries of government are clear, but the political system extends more widely. The official opposition, minor parties and independent parliamentarians are all busy pitching policy thoughts. Sometimes these find an audience within government, and an idea makes the transition from political currency to policy status.

Government as policy When politicians become ministers, they assume responsibility for public policy outcomes. This requires ministers to work together as a cabinet in setting goals for the government. Policy duties also bring ministers into regular contact with the public service, and so into a world wider than politics. At the centre of the policy system is cabinet, with its multiple roles and never-ending workload. To manage cabinet business, including the huge paper flow involved in cir­ culating submissions and decisions, governments rely on the cabinet secretariat within a central policy agency. In Canberra, this is the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) working with the Cabinet Secretary (previously an official, now a political appointment). In most states a department of the premier and cabinet includes a policy division or office of the cabinet to manage the flow of submissions and provide advice to key ministers. Alongside handling the logistics of cabinet meetings, PM&C provides the prime minister, as chair of cabinet, with a detailed briefing on all submissions (Walter, 1992; Weller, 2007). This ensures the prime minister has briefing notes on all government business and can interrogate any minister about the detail of a submission. PM&C is structured in a way that allows it to ‘serve both the prime minister’s prerogatives and the prime minister’s priorities’ (Tiernan and Weller, 2010: 202). Officials from PM&C also sit in on cabinet meetings and take detailed notes, although they never speak unless asked a direct question by the chair; in some states all public servants are excluded from the cabinet room unless required to make a technical presentation on some matter. While the political domain draws primarily on parliamentarians, their political advisers, the party political machines and the organised lobbies, the policy domain inevitably draws on the wider public sector. Much of the substantive policy development takes place in government agencies, at interdepartmental committees, and on consultative bodies. It relies on expert and impartial bureaucratic advisers as well as the input of interested parties and specialist experts. Policy might be finalised in the political forum of cabinet, but this is frequently done on the basis of advice from professional public ser­ vants complemented with information and perspectives from other policy process participants. This policy world is in one sense a rule-bound place, in which submissions and deci­ sions follow strict formats, with clear roles ascribed to central agencies, keen to maintain

The institutions of public policy

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the quality and accuracy of cabinet material. In the ‘ideal’ version of this model the authoritative nature of cabinet decisions demands that choices be reached on the basis of full and relevant information, succinctly stated options, and clear articulation of the advantages and problems of any proposal.

Government as administration To be effective, policies rely on the resources and power of government. Once choices are made, activity must be directed to achieving the intended objective. This is the domain of administration, in which services are delivered, taxes collected, laws enforced. The public service, that collection of departments and agencies, staff and resources making up the machinery of government, resides in this domain. Here ministers preside, responsible to the parliament for the administrative detail of how staff, money and other resources are deployed, how policies are implemented and whether they realise the objectives set by government. However, it is departmental and street-level staff (Lipsky, 1983) rather than the ministers who do most of the day-to-day policy work. Indeed, the minister might rarely visit their department, working instead from parliament house or centralised ministerial offices (Weller et al., 2021: 53). The division of labour between minister and public servant becomes crucial in the administrative domain. Ministers rely on chief executives to understand and pursue their political priorities, and on public servants to act in the interests of the government of the day. Ministers have little time or capacity for close involvement in the work of their portfolio; their interest is captured by continual consultation with interest groups, elec­ toral matters, parliament and media activities. Ministerial staff often keep a watching brief and could be a source of friction as they seek to intervene in departmental matters and drive administrative activity in the direction required by the minister. Most policy implementation, though, takes place deep within the public service, far from political eyes. Good ministers find ways to assert control when appropriate while allowing the professional public service to get on with its work. Three instruments assist cabinet to maintain authority over the public service: the architecture of government, an annual budget, and rules setting out personnel policies. Traditionally, the architecture of government is the responsibility of the prime minister, chief minister or premier. Departments can be created or abolished through administrative order, although changes to a statutory body usually require consideration by parliament. Incoming leaders often rearrange departmental titles and responsibilities to reflect their own priorities. One Canadian study tracked in detail how successive prime ministers restructured central agencies to match their ‘personal philosophies of leadership, management styles, and political objectives’ (Aucoin, 1986: 3–4). Similarly, the operational style of Australia’s PM&C is in part dependent upon prime ministerial preferences (Weller et al., 2011: xx), with the prime minister also afforded the power to appoint and dismiss departmental secretaries (Weller, 2007: 253). Reorganisation allows leaders to provide a sense of direction and purpose for their governments. In 1987 Bob Hawke restructured the entire federal bureaucracy around a ‘micro-economic reform’ agenda. Nearly a decade later, incoming prime minister John Howard signalled a shift in federal policy by downgrading some functions inherited from Labor, while providing extra positions and offices for those policy concerns of particular interest to the Coalition. Kevin Rudd did much the same in 2007, establishing new departments to manage his government’s policy priorities such as climate change and

28

The Australian Policy Handbook

broadband communications. When elected leader by the Liberal Party room in 2015, Malcolm Turnbull largely retained the administrative structures established by his pre­ decessor as prime minister, Tony Abbott. Only when returned in the 2016 election did Turnbull make more substantive changes to the architecture of the ministry and Aus­ tralian public service, so that departmental structures more clearly reflected his stated priorities. After taking the premiership from Turnbull in 2018, Scott Morrison made his own round of changes in 2019, reducing the number of federal departments from 18 to 14, and dismissing five departmental secretaries (Davis, 2021b). Constant change to the structure of government is a familiar pattern in state and territory governments also, and in some ways a distinctively Australian approach; jurisdictions such as Britain and Canada might change ministerial titles regularly but incline to fewer administrative restructures. But then, Australian prime ministers expect to exert greater authority over the entire operation of government. As then Prime Minister Scott Morrison (2019: 4) argued, although public servants might offer advice the job of the Australian Public Sector is to ‘deliver the government’s agenda… It is ministers who provide policy leadership and direction.’ If the architecture of government symbolises the grand design, an annual budget is an opportunity for ministers to get into the detail of departmental operations. Recent decades have seen significant improvements in financial control technology (Wanna et al., 2000). Enhanced software, new accounting procedures and program structures allow central agencies, especially treasury and finance departments, to track financial performance. Such information in turn allows greater ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny of public sector activity. Budget processes provide an annual review and statement of policy in every area of government operation. Commonwealth and state governments rely on an Expenditure Review Committee (ERC), or its equivalent, to work through portfolio plans. The ERC is chaired by the prime minister or treasurer but includes senior ministers and is assisted by officials from central agencies. It sets broad financial parameters for the year ahead and then makes allocations across portfolios and programs. Ministers appear before the committee to argue a case. Optimists seek an additional allocation for new programs; realists hope to leave with their budget intact or cut by no more than the average. Many know that new spending in one portfolio will be balanced by cuts elsewhere. Regular across-the-board reductions in administrative expenditure, known by the euphemism of “efficiency dividends”, have become a standard part of the budget process. Rules governing public service employment and operations are less dramatic and public than budget cycles but can also be important in shaping agency activity. Public services across the nation are governed by legislation describing a permanent, merit-selected, equitable, impartial public sector outside the direct control of ministers. Some of these attributes no longer pertain in practice. Permanence has little effective meaning, as large-scale redundan­ cies are now a feature of public service life. The principle of tenure is no longer available to senior officers, who must sign fixed-term contracts and are subject to removal at any time by the government (Bridgman, 2019: 33–35). The issue of merit selection is also contentious. The ideal of a non-partisan public service clashes with the desire of many ministers for political appointments to senior positions. Enhanced merit selection has been raised in successive blueprints for reform of federal government administration. In 2010 Ahead of the Game recommended senior leadership and public service values respect merit-based employment and be ‘frank, impartial and non-partisan’ (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010: 46).

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Our future, our public service in 2019 recommended extending a merit and transparency policy to all appointments—including secretaries and the APS Commissioner, who were formerly excluded from the policy (Independent Review of the APS, 2019: 287). The proposal was rejected by the Commonwealth. It is difficult to reconcile merit appointment with partisan affiliation. The resolution for now has seen limited-term political appointments, particularly in central agencies. Some states have amended public sector legislation to allow a number of partisan appointments within the senior executive service, and all pay particular attention to the selection of chief executive officers. Australia has not entirely embraced the US ‘spoils’ system, where each new administration replaces the entire senior ranks of government with its own supporters, but the line between politics and the public sector fluctuates in many jurisdictions. In some accounts, the cumulative effect of public service change has been to ‘hollow out’ professional competence. Journalist Laura Tingle (2015) writes of the lack of insti­ tutional memory now informing policy advice to government. Stark (2019a) notes the prevalence of institutional amnesia in government, while Tiernan (2018) asks about the consequences of incessant reform for trust, policy capacity and institutional memory. Bridgman (2019: 59–65) urges a rethink of how merit works together with diversity to ensure the best person for the job, contextualised for contemporary understanding of the public sector.

Bringing the players together Government requires coordination across each of the political, policy and administrative domains. Some players cross more than one domain, but all look to the centre for coherence. Each domain is represented at the centre of government through figures who can speak with authority for their area of responsibility. In Canberra, the political world is represented by ministers and by the prime minister’s chief of staff. The policy domain speaks through the heads of central agencies such as PM&C, the Department of Finance and Treasury, although policy itself is typically developed within the relevant policy department. The central agencies also speak for the final domain, administration. Similar configurations are found in most states. Figure 2.2 sets out the key players and routines of the political, policy and administrative domains in Canberra. A key leadership task is to bring the three domains into alignment, so all aspects of government work in concert towards shared goals, taking into account the role of players external to government such as the media and the third sector and community more generally. An effective prime minister uses proximity to each domain as a basis for coordinating government. From the leader’s point of view, the intersection of political, policy and administrative domains organises information and advice around a small group at the centre of government. With just a few people in the room, the prime minister can discuss strategic issues from different angles, and judge how a particular proposal might sit within the government’s overall program. Those who work in each domain understand they play a specific role. If they are politicians or ministerial advisers, they worry about politics and the media. Policy staff focus on cabinet procedures and documents. Administrators ensure programs are implemented, run effectively and evaluated. Making the system work requires the division of tasks into manageable pieces. Nonetheless, politicians and officers often talk across the boundaries, recognising the common enterprise of government and

30 The Australian Policy Handbook EXTERNAL PLAYERS Players Community

Routines Electoral cycle

Third sector

Lobbying

Media Business sector

Public submissions to inquiries & Royal Commissions

POLITICS Players Prime minister Prime minister’s office & Chief of staff Ministers Ministerial staff

POLICY

Routines Central strategy and direction Network of ministerial officers

Players Ministers Outer ministry Cabinet

Media coordination

Routines Cabinet process Taskforces and committees

PM&C Senior departmental officers

Government media unit

Treasury

ADMINISTRATION Players Departmental secretaries PM&C Finance

Routines Budget process Leadership board Key coordinating committees

Public service agencies Industrial Relations Department

Figure 2.2 Coordinating the three domains of government Source: based on Davis, 1995: 28, and Tiernan, 2018: 169.

the blurring of expectations that makes for the magic and messiness of politics. All know, though, their place in a wider scheme, the duties and the limits of their assigned roles. Different time dimensions operate within the domains. In the political world, all issues are urgent. Time is measured in hours, as controversies flare and are addressed or dissipate. The media demand immediate responses, making long-term planning a rare luxury. When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson said ‘a week is a long time in politics’ he conveyed the rapid turnover in people and ideas marking his experience. He spoke before the invention of social media. Policy advisers also face the weekly cycle of cabinet. They too must comprehend the political issues of the moment, being aware, informed and able to accommodate political needs while advising neutrally and without presumption (Cole, 2020). Nonetheless, they operate in a more orderly and rule-bound world, in which every issue before government

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is subjected to a standardised form of analysis and consideration. The policy–political demarcation is often chaotic and unclear. Preferably, the system should encourage careful analysis and thoughtful research, even if some policy decisions are made on the run. The Cabinet Handbook usually requires agencies to prepare submissions weeks before they are brought to cabinet, allowing time for engagement and modification. While occasional urgent items disrupt the routines of decision making, the policy domain is less subject to the roar and tumult of political life. Administration, too, follows a pattern, often using an annual cycle of budgets, strategic plans, program evaluations and staff appraisal. Accountability and management require­ ments are served through a predictable, repetitive sequence of tasks. For those busy delivering services, the political world can seem remote and even irrelevant. These different temporal cycles encourage each domain to develop its own characteristic routines and language. Political advisers speak in ways that might seem brutal and blunt to a policy adviser or program manager, yet they express no more than the imperatives of their world, and the inevitably short time frame available to solve pressing problems. Public servants, in turn, can seem too concerned with process and propriety for ministers and their advisers. The task of those at the centre is to ensure communication remains open, so the domains can function together around shared objectives and timeframes.

Coordination through routines To achieve coherence across the domains of politics, policy and administration, governments rely on routines—those standardised procedures that structure decision making. Cabinet processes are the most visible routine. They organise information, pass proposals through a single channel for consideration, and record decisions made by government. Each domain has its own set of routines—standard operating procedures to remind players who can make decisions, what information is required, and what steps must be taken in particular circum­ stances. Routines are the standard repertoire of any institution, and exist as ‘rules and codes which guide action and give effect to values’ (Davis, 1995: 25). As March and Olsen (1989: 24) suggest, the ubiquity of routines often makes political institutions appear to be bureaucratic, rigid, insensitive or even stupid. The simplification provided by rules is clearly imperfect, and the imperfection is often manifest, especially after the fact. But some major capabilities of modern institutions arise from their effectiveness in requiring rule-bound behaviour. Routines make it possible to coordinate many simultaneous activities in a way that makes them mutually consistent. Routines help avoid conflicts; they provide codes of meaning that facilitate interpretation of ambiguous worlds; they constrain bargaining within comprehensible terms and enforce agreements. The policy cycle presented in The Australian Policy Handbook is a routine for decision making. Each step carries its own sequence of procedures and processes, rules and con­ ventions. The overall routine aims to gather information about a problem, assemble evidence and opinion, secure a decision, implement a course of action, and then begin the cycle again by requiring evaluation and rethinking. Yet these routines do not just structure actions within government. Routines legitimise power. If cabinet alone can make a particular decision, and if cabinet will only consider a submission prepared according to particular rules, then all players along the way understand their tasks and the lines of authority established by the routine. In this way routines guide action, but also tell us who is authorised to make a choice, and how that choice will be reached. The routines required

32 The Australian Policy Handbook for a policy cycle are the essential mechanisms of government, a continual reminder of who governs within the Australian political system. The map of government provided in this chapter complements the more traditional responsible government model and accommodates the existence and significance of players other than just politicians. ‘Ministers are on top, public servants on tap’ but seeing government as three intersecting tasks—as a meeting of political, policy and administrative routines—conveys the close working relationships found at the centre of government. This model reinforces the notion that effective policy making requires people not only to understand their roles, but to accommodate the differing needs of other players. As Sir Paul Hasluck (1968: 1), a former Australian foreign minister and later governor-general, once noted, ‘the public service cannot avoid politics any more than fish can avoid the water in which they swim’. Likewise, ministers and their advi­ sers cannot avoid the public service, and none can ignore the political machinations and abilities of business, the third sector, the media or the wider citizenry. All players increase their influence by learning from, and accommodating, the others. A policy cycle highlights the coordination of various routines to focus numerous players and relationships into a recognised process for making authoritative decisions. Routines coordinate influence and evidence, timing and governmental resources into a single policy process. Knowing how the system works is a first step to contributing to policy making, identifying gaps, and aiming for good practice (Althaus et al., 2015).

3

The Australian policy cycle

A policy cycle brings a system and a rhythm to a world that might otherwise appear chaotic and unordered. This chapter describes the Australian policy cycle. It starts with identifying issues, then moves through analysis and implementation to evaluation of the policy’s effects. The cycle is a guide designed to inject rigour but not to limit potential and creativity.

For the Australian system of government to produce viable public policies, some order must arise from the endless interaction of political, policy and administrative worlds. That order is achieved through routines which define the role of each player and channel policy ideas along a recognised sequence on their way to cabinet consideration, and then to realisation. This chapter describes how a policy cycle can be used to understand and structure policy development. The most influential ways of describing policy making remain those that break the policy process into clear and identifiable steps. As early as 1951, Harold Lasswell was characterising policy making as a sequence of intelligence, recommendation, prescrip­ tion, invocation, application, appraisal and termination. Later writers stayed with the idea of steps, but offered variations on the labels, usually suggesting that policy making is a sequence of problem identification, agenda setting, adoption, implementation and policy evaluation (Sabatier, 2007: 6). For example, Anderson (2005:4) suggests that choices follow a ‘common sense’ sequence: • • • • •

getting the government to consider action on an opportunity or problem deciding what is proposed to be done about the situation getting the government to accept a particular approach applying the government’s policy to the issue asking ‘did the policy work?’

The Australian Policy Handbook works within this tradition by adopting a policy cycle approach. It suggests policy develops through a sequence of tasks that can be framed as activities or questions. The policy cycle presented here has been developed because it is a useful organising device, with a range of strengths. The policy cycle approach stresses that government is a process, and not just a collection of venerable institutions. A cycle conveys movement of ideas and resources, the iteration of policy making, and a routine that does not finish with a decision but carries through to implementation, evaluation and fresh consideration of the issues. DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-3

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This process is dynamic, shifting over time and according to circumstance. The unique nature of every policy is accommodated by the heuristic, which encourages practitioners to apply their own assessments to what is needed and what might be possible. A policy cycle disaggregates complex phenomena into manageable steps, allowing us to focus on the different issues and needs of each phase in the cycle. In this way it encourages attention to quality, continuous improvement and learning about how process can serve policymaking enhancement. A policy cycle allows some synthesis of existing knowledge about public policy. We can incorporate appropriate literature at the relevant step in the cycle, locking key lessons from policymaking studies into the overall sequence. The cyclical approach acknowledges that policy making is non-linear, again facilitating recognition of the fluidity of the process. A winding or zig-zag path, even a recursive one, can be as valuable for policy outcomes as more direct routes. Finally, a policy cycle serves as a potential description of policy making, to assist in making sense of policy development, past and present. The Australian policy cycle purposefully creates space for practitioners to deploy their judgement and experience as well as their critical reflection and engagement with theory into the art and craft of policy making (Threlfall and Althaus, 2021). For us, the point of the Australian policy cycle is to spur practice improvement built on debate about con­ tending paradigms (Threlfall and Althaus, 2021: 42). In the memorable words of Box, ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful’ (cited in Box et al., 2005: 440). A policy cycle offers simple tools to help practitioners do their jobs better. It rests on an assumption that better process can help encourage better outcomes. Decades of scholarship and theory suggest ideas and experience worth incorporating into policy making. Ultimately, of course, the task of good policy making rests with policy makers themselves. If a policy cycle assists their work, it is worth adding to the repertoire. The normative values of a policy cycle are deliberate and explicit. Policy making is not a strictly logical pursuit, but a complex matrix of politics, policy and administration. When electoral considerations, budget constraints and implementation problems pull in different directions, problems are open to multiple solutions, or no solution at all. No single procedure guarantees a successful result; governments can make howling errors even using the most rigorous and exact policy processes. Even as an explanatory tool, the policy cycle has its critics (see, for example, Adams et al., 2015). They often note the world is messy and complex. Policy making can appear rather like history—just one thing after another, with each event tied to earlier actions until it becomes impossible to separate cause from effect, problem from solution. To impose a policy cycle might create artificial expectations of a reliable, predictable policy world. It also presupposes the political will to follow due process in policy making when determination is not always present or possible. There is merit in such concerns. Life is less than neat—but not necessarily inexplicable. Faced with ‘history’ we look for the common elements to policy making, seeking pat­ tern amid otherwise chaotic events. A policy cycle ‘does not assert that policy making is rational, occurs outside politics, or proceeds as a logical sequence rather than as a contest of ideas and interests’ (Althaus et al., 2015: 112). Rather, the policy cycle provides the analytical tools, even if each example of policy making is unique, and often a narrative with the steps in all the wrong order and moving in dissociated directions. The Australian policy cycle provides an entry point into policy making, serving as a heuristic to help practitioners make their own sense of what is or could be happening,

The Australian policy cycle

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and to apply their own logic and judgement according to unique circumstance (Althaus and Threlfall, 2021: 287; see also Howard, 2005). The policy cycle is no recipe given the complexity, fluidity and happenstance of the real world of policy making. Instead, it is a device to aid the work of practitioners, tasked with responding coherently to the urgent needs and opportunities that exist in society. We make a second, more contentious value claim in presenting a policy cycle: that good policy should include the basic elements of the cycle. That is, a policy process that does not include everything from problem identification to implementation to evalua­ tion has less chance of success. This will not hold true for every example—some policy issues are so simple that investment in process is redundant. But on balance, drawing on experience of policy making, a more thorough policy process is less likely to produce an obvious policy mistake. A policy cycle assists systematic thinking, even if many different types of policy cycle are conceivable.

Alternatives to the policy cycle Many models have been developed to bring order to the political-policy-administrative maelstrom. Sabatier (2007: 6–7) points out that while the ‘stages heuristic’ style of policy making that divides the policy process into numerous discrete stages was highly influen­ tial during the 1970s and early 1980s, it began to attract substantial criticism as the dec­ ades progressed. In response, a number of theories developed and others were revised to address key complaints that the stages heuristic approach lacked clear causal drivers, was descriptively inadequate or overly legalistic. Alternatives of note include Burch and Wood’s (1989) analogy that portrays government as a firm, taking public and private resources on the supply side of the manufacturing process, pro­ ducing goods and services, rules and regulations and transfer payments as policy outputs. Feed­ back to government through the citizenry influences future supply side choices. Richard Simeon (1976: 556) describes a ‘funnel of causality’ that allows policy to be under­ stood at different levels. At the funnel’s widest point, policies are responses to social and eco­ nomic settings, attempting to steer people and institutions towards goals. The narrower the funnel, the more immediate the factors that come into play, until at its narrowest we see only those matters relevant to the policy under examination (see also Blomquist, 2007). Simeon’s model is a powerful reminder that policy is context dependent, and reflects the dominant thinking of the day. Consider the practice of removing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families that occurred from the 1930s. Policies that produced the Stolen Generation were based on assumptions about race and family attachment we find repellent today. Indeed, in 2008 the prime minister led the nation in apologising for the hurt that resulted, acknowledging the state should no longer view Indigenous affairs through the lens of paternalistic intervention. Which contemporary policies, apparently now so natural and logical, will in the future prove to be just as obviously a product of their times and become unacceptable? Other models focus on the many participants in the policy process. Sabatier and JenkinsSmith (1993, updated in Sabatier and Weible, 2007) offer an ‘advocacy coalition framework’ that describes policy making in areas subject to long-term negotiation between government and interest groups. They argue that the interaction between coalitions of interests, policy brokers and political institutions produces a policy community that discusses ideas and develops a shared understanding of the problem, even while disagreeing about the solution. Environ­ mental policy is one area ripe for analysis using this model, given established interactions

36 The Australian Policy Handbook between green groups and industry as they work with government through consultative committees. Repeated interactions can foster ‘epistemic communities’, in which different interests come together around shared knowledge and achieve agreed policy choices (Haas, 1992). This model reminds us that policy making is an ongoing dynamic, rarely one-off, and involves powerful interests other than government. Kingdon (2003) advocates multiple streams analysis, synthesising otherwise independent streams of activity of problem definition, idea and policy formation and politics. His work draws on Cohen et al.’s (1972) ‘garbage can’ model of policy making to suggest that pro­ blems, solutions and choices exist in the decision-making trashcan incoherently and dis­ connectedly until the three streams align in a policymaking window of opportunity, thereby allowing a discrete policy to emerge and progress on the agenda. This model prizes the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in taking advantage of stream convergence. Rather than being driven by a rational, comprehensive approach which places problems before analysis and then solutions, Kingdon’s work reverses this logic: ‘choices look for issues, problems look for decision situations in which they can be aired, solutions look for problems to which they might be the answer, and politicians look for pet problems or policies by which they might advance their careers’ (quoted in Cohen-Vogel and McLendon, 2009). As this brief survey suggests, there are contending views about how policy is made. Each view brings particular aspects to the fore. Some focus on linear logic, others on path dependency. Some emphasise key players and the various relationships that interact fluidly across policymaking processes. Others concentrate on the messy embedded system within which policy is decided and enacted. Each approach has limitations. The policy cycle model is a valuable description and guide to action but it does not provide causal explanations for why a policy has developed in particular ways. As a normative model, there is a risk the policy cycle might impose too great a neatness on policy making, renowned for complexity and discontinuity rather than the relentlessly logical unfolding implied in the diagram. Yet despite claims such models have outlived their usefulness (Sabatier, 2007: 7) a policy cycle helps us pursue better practices, even if it cannot tame entirely the human and political imbroglio of making public policy.

Policymaking vacuums What would policy making be like in the absence of structured approaches? Creativity, adlibbing and spontaneity in the policy process are like innovation in the creative arts—it comes only with great skill and experience. A jazz musician must have a deep knowledge of harmony and instrumental technique before apparently abandoning them to perform with the spirit and pizzazz of their craft. The same can be said of policy making. A skilled player sees the various available heuristics not as rules to be strictly applied, but as basic principles to inform natural talents, invention, innovation, ingenuity and imagination in the pursuit of good policy processes. Models help policy makers follow through on the particular requirements of the problem at hand. It is not always expected that a standardised, ordered process will be appropriate, let alone followed. Many policy makers bemoan the “irrationality” of politics with its power struggles and manoeuvrings, pork-barrelling, media hype and spin, and layers of awkward coalitions that constrain the purity of analysis. Policy makers feel frustrated when politicians make snap decisions that must be justified after the fact with material pulled together to sup­ port a predetermined position. Such is life in government, but the idea of good policy is worth holding on to, even if the process can sometimes be hard to defend.

The Australian policy cycle

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Policy makers know politics can be both asset and challenge but it is always the context of choices. Of course, the tensions between contending interests and ideas can result in imaginative, even brilliant outcomes in the face of the complex dilemmas faced by gov­ ernments. In a democracy the political system is designed to bring political judgement to bear on policy problems and opportunities. Policy making is part of that process, not some separate process set up in opposition. The genius of the system is to combine the technical and the popular, in a way that can be tested each election.

An Australian policy cycle While policy making can be represented in many ways, Australian experience suggests a policy cycle can helpfully begin with issue identification, and then proceed through policy analysis, policy instruments, engagement, coordination, decision, implementation and evaluation (see Figure 3.1).

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Figure 3.1 The Australian policy cycle

Much policy begins with identifying issues. A new pro­ blem or opportunity emerges in private discussions with interest groups, or in the media, with demands for gov­ ernment action. Sometimes an existing policy ceases to be effective and requires an overhaul—there is never a shortage of people telling government what it should do. Issues have many sponsors, and proponents compete to attract attention for their cause. Much of politics is about defining an agenda for public policy.

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

38 The Australian Policy Handbook Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Once an issue has caught the eye of government, policy analysis becomes important. For without informa­ tion it will be difficult to frame options. With long­ standing problems, governments might be guided by their overall party philosophy and program. New issues, though, demand research and reflection. Policy analysis is often—although increasingly less so—the work of the public service, drawing on broader debates among spe­ cialists and practitioners in a policy field. Analysis is designed to provide decision makers with sufficient information about the policy challenge to make an informed judgement, and typically takes the form of briefing papers for senior officials and ministers. Should government intervention appear likely, policy analysis leads to identification of appropriate policy instruments. Some problems require legislation, others adjustment of the internal operations of government agencies or use of tools that promote the cooperation and motivation of players in the policy community. It is not sufficient to understand an issue, as little will be achieved if the likely policy response is not targeted and plausible; analysis must carry through to recommending policy responses. One important method to develop ideas and test the strength of the analysis, and the feasibility of the proposed response, is engagement. The architecture of government tends toward duplication and overlap, because many pro­ blems draw in a wide range of players. Any constructive policy initiative in a broad field such as economic devel­ opment or social policy will inevitably involve more than one agency. Within government, therefore, it is essential to discuss and develop proposed policy initiatives with related agencies. This is internal consultation. External engagement will probably also include discussions and proactive interaction with non-government interests. In many complex areas, government relies heavily on the expertise of those working in the field. Through engagement, policy proposals are improved, ideas tested and, when appropriate, support gathered. Once a policy proposal is ready for consideration by the government, issues of coordination arise. This typically requires discussions with treasury about available funding for a policy, and with other central agencies over the relation between a new proposal and overall govern­ ment direction including coherence and consistency with other existing policies. Coordination might also be necessary to resolve issues between agencies sharing an interest in a field; mechanisms such as interdepartmental

The Australian policy cycle committees bring together related agencies and work towards agreement on a common policy strategy. As the cycle proceeds, a policy issue is identified, analysed, matched with appropriate instruments, dis­ cussed with relevant interests, and tested against central policy and financial considerations. The time for a deci­ sion has arrived. In the Australian setting, this often means consideration by cabinet. Each week cabinet receives a range of submissions and must make binding choices about each. If insufficient information is pro­ vided, cabinet might require the whole process of identification and analysis to begin again; too much information and cabinet could be unable to work through the detail and achieve a resolution. The art of good policy advice is to provide sufficient information in a format that carries the reader through a sequence of evidence towards options or a recommendation. Good policy advice also recognises the final judgement properly belongs with ministers. The cycle does not conclude with a cabinet decision. Implementation must follow, in which the policy is given expression through legislation or a program, in pursuit of the goals agreed by ministers. And, because policies in practice often drift from the objectives of the original submission or are imperfect in realising their goals, evaluation is essential so government can gauge the effects of a policy and adjust or rethink policy design as appropriate. Such evaluation, of course, starts the cycle afresh, with a new look at the problem, and a reconsideration of the recommended instruments. Making policy is a wheel continually turning, a task never completed.

39

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

The policy cycle and the policy ecosystem Much of the work implied in the policy cycle is undertaken by public servants. However, the cycle ranges across all the institutions of the Australian political system and encompasses the contributions of many sectors. A cycle tethers decision making to its institutional con­ text, grounding advice and decision making and assisting compliance with norms (Freeman, 2013). Cabinet submissions have political, policy and administrative implications, and all these domains will be involved throughout the cycle. Input varies, depending on the poli­ tical prominence of the issue. Policy can proceed in linear fashion through the policy cycle, but this is rare. Political pressure can see a whole-of-government approach emerge quickly. There is, however, also a tendency for ‘parallel processing’ within government. Even if politicians do not pick up the first signs of community and industry distress or excitement around an issue, routine bureaucratic processes should collect and analyse data and advise the minister. The sequential steps in the policy cycle include internal cycles as issues are revisited and

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The Australian Policy Handbook

reanalysed. Political responses pre-empt later activity, as electoral considerations come to the fore. Ideas and problems do not come from just one source but are traded across government. Some policy proposals emerge from political considerations, others are more administrative in character. All will journey through the policy cycle, although the trajectory of each will be unique. While some might view the policy cycle as a machine-like approach to policy making, it aligns better with the metaphor of an ecosystem: complex, richly diverse, dynamic and interconnected. The elemental forces that shape nature are equally as strong in policy making. The Australian policy cycle demands practitioners pay attention to the bound­ aries and interactions between elements of the policy ecosystem, the nutrients that energise the policy process, and the forces that destroy or promote stability. Whether in equilibrium or crisis, the policy cycle suggests a certain level of harmony can be achieved if practitioners are willing and able to bring comprehensive focus to bear on the issues and uncertainties at hand.

Good process and good policy A policy cycle is a first foray into complexity. It organises observations into familiar patterns and provides a guide for future action. It suggests a process that transcends individuals and institutions to operate across an entire government. Yet the claims made for a policy cycle (or any other model of policy making) must be modest. In political life processes tend to be shaped by problems, with each issue demanding attention in its own way. The dilemmas of making policy do not resemble a ‘Gordian knot awaiting the cut of a single superior technique’. Rather, policy is a ‘dis­ continuous series of actions, played out simultaneously across multiple arenas, given unity only through the selection and synthesis of a narrator’ (Davis and Weller, 1987: 384). Used carefully, a policy cycle can go some way towards constructing a narrative. Like all good stories, it suggests ways we might behave in future and so shapes the world it describes. Former head of the Treasury Ken Henry describes successful narratives as those which invoke ‘support of policy reform and institutional change’ (Henry, 2007). In the end, a solid narrative might make or break a policy initiative, for as former Prime Min­ ister Paul Keating commented, ‘You gotta be able to tell the stories.’ The policy cycle model begs the question: ‘Does good process lead to good policy?’ Experience suggests that good process is integral to consistently good policy. While some very poor policies can grow out of the most rigorous process, rarely does good policy grow from a haphazard approach. Consistently good policy will only be developed by combining rigour of both process and intellect. The best process in the world cannot substitute for high-quality thinking and analysis. Likewise, the most creative and technically exacting thinking can fail to produce good policy if there is no process to integrate the complex web of activities that marks any public policy endeavour. A policy cycle cannot capture the full ebb and flow of a sophisticated policy debate, nor does it accommodate fully the value-laden world of politics. Any normative sequence is easily disrupted. The policy dance aspires to choreographed order but must live with a deal of improvisation. The interplay of politics, policy and administration is a hurly-burly, pulling sometimes this way, sometimes that. Decisions can be pre-empted. Outcomes can be delayed or sacrificed by powerful forces. Reality impinges on the order of a normative process,

The Australian policy cycle

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resulting in apparently messy and accidental activity. Sometimes the end product is essential creativity, at others unruly disorder. Our system of government dictates that politics wins any contest of wills, and policy’s role is to make sense of that victory. The policy cycle merely provides a framework for understanding. Policy makers use practical reason, a concept used to describe a form of reflection on the world using applied judgement (Kane and Patapan, 2006). Practical reason involves assess­ ment of the usefulness and applicability of the policy cycle, selecting the stage at which the policy might be and judging how an issue might best be conceptualised and managed. The policy cycle does not demand a consistent, ordered, sequential process. Instead, the model provides a map of how things could be done and how, perhaps, they might be done better.

4

Identifying issues

This chapter asks how a few issues are selected for attention among the myriad matters pressed on government. Many topics vie for a policy response, but few are chosen. Policy professionals understand how issues arise and recognise the risk that key concerns might be overlooked if they fail to attract political interest.

The policy agenda Political life is a contest around issues. Parties and interest groups, parliament and media, departments and private companies all compete to draw attention to their key concerns. Contending voices use parliament, the media, public events and private lobbying to press their case. Information, uncertainty and prioritisation are the ‘stuff’ of issue development (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Politics becomes an argument about which topics, and which interpretation of any particular topic, command a legitimate right to government responses and public resources. The outcome of this contest is a “policy agenda”. A policy agenda represents the narrowing of an infinite array of possible policy problems to those few commanding government interest and resources. When an issue is identified, it becomes part of the policy cycle, subject to analysis, policy instrument development and, eventually, cabinet consideration. This is a crucial moment in the policy process, the point at which a private concern is transformed into a policy issue. Suddenly the issue commands the resources of government while myriad other concerns languish as merely private matters. No wonder competition among issue advocates is so fierce. This chapter examines how and why topics are accorded this privilege. It explores how an issue becomes important enough for government to commit resources, by looking first at the nature of the drivers of the policy agenda, and then at the nature of policy problems. Policy officers develop sensitivity to the nature of issues, minimise surprise, and anticipate problems. They understand how lobbyists work to influence government agendas, how social media can draw attention to aspects of issues, and the self-interested nature of many proposals offered as public policy solutions. The battle to elevate issues to the attention of cabinet, in microcosm, is the struggle of interests and ideas that marks all politics. To speak of a policy “agenda” is to use a metaphor implying a vast committee with a single set of topics for discussion. Although cabinet is in one sense the commanding committee of government, politics and the policy debate are not particularly neat. At DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-4

Identifying issues

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any moment there will be urgent issues demanding instant attention, while once pressing problems fade until they are almost forgotten. Some issues of narrow but strongly held concern attract no public interest at all. Other important issues languish because influential forces seek to preserve the status quo. When cabinet meets, ministers do have an agenda, a list of topics for discussion. This list is only a small sample from the policy agenda, a tiny selection from a universe of possible topics. The idea of a policy agenda is simply a useful reminder that, with limited time and resources, policy makers pay attention to only a few issues. So what drives some issues onto the agenda while confining others to also-ran status?

Issue drivers Much detailed policy advice arises from within government. The domains of politics, policy and administration interact to produce an agenda for government, assign responsibility for preparing options, and draw up a timetable for cabinet consideration and implementation. Governments will often have a series of political priorities that help form their agenda. These priorities can include: • • • •

election commitments and party political platforms areas of particular interest to key government supporters international agreements ministerial and governmental changes.

Some political issue drivers are becoming codified and more transparent. The use of charter or portfolio priority letters began with the Hawke Government and continued through succes­ sive governments, albeit inconsistently. They are also in use by state governments. Charter letters from the prime minister to each minister are sent at the start of a new term. These identify election commitments and outline the leader’s expectations and priorities. Charter letters typically state broad policy directions and set targets. These letters complement the Administrative Arrangements Orders setting out the responsibilities of ministers and depart­ ments in terms of Acts of parliament and functions. Traditionally these letters are tightly held. The Rudd government did not write down instructions, preferring confidential meetings between the prime minister and ministers (Weller, 2014). The Turnbull government resisted opposition requests for access to its charter letters under freedom of information legislation, arguing publication might reveal matters currently before cabinet (Albanese, 2016). The Morrison administration, likewise, declined to release its letters to ministers setting out prio­ rities and responsibilities for each portfolio (Hurst and Karp, 2021). By contrast, some state governments now publish charter letters as a public record. These have grown in length over the years from a crisp three or four pages to ten or more, and have become accountability tools for reporting against progress (Podger, 2009; APSC, 2012a; Victorian Public Sector Commission, 2015). The political domain is volatile. The rise or fall of a prominent minister can dramati­ cally shift priorities. When the balance of power is held by a thin margin, independent and crossbench members might become significant sources of policy initiatives. In the aftermath of the 2010 federal election, negotiations with independent and crossbench members of the House of Representatives were key to forming government. Indepen­ dent MPs demanded attention to their agenda, notably poker machine reform, climate change initiatives and aspects of tax. Following the 2013 and 2016 elections, crossbench

44 The Australian Policy Handbook senators used their numbers to block key government programs on taxation, higher education and other important government agendas. In 2021, the crossbench defeated government proposals to regulate charities engaged in policy advocacy. In each case, independents and minor parties exercised a powerful influence over the government’s policy agenda (Kefford and Weeks, 2020). Minority government creates a particularly fluid environment for selecting some issues over others. Even a change of prime minister within the same government can produce surprising differences in policy approach. As Zucchini (2011) notes, the influence of parliament in setting the agenda varies considerably, in part depending on the unity of the government. Internal defections change the range of the possible, as Liberal dissenters demonstrated in early 2022 when they voted with the opposition to defeat provisions extending religious discrimination provisions. Politics is a demanding master. The ideology of the government party will dictate certain issues. This is clearest immediately after a change in government, as new ministers make a virtue of introducing initiatives different in character from those of their predecessors. After some years in office, the fiery reforming zeal of opposition might be exhausted. Governments come to rely more on policy advice and issue identification from within the public sector as well as from alternative sources such as policy think tanks (Fitzgerald, 2006; Stone, 1996). Still, politics never disappears entirely from the equation. Events make apparently settled policies suddenly contestable. Even long-established governments find themselves over­ taken by new issues or driven by events beyond their control. A major financial crisis, a global pandemic or a war abroad require rapid redefinition of policy priorities. The policy agenda is largely—but not entirely—externally driven. Ministers bring their own policy preferences and, in some cases, long held ambitions around a parti­ cular policy question. As central players in government deliberations, ministers can ensure new ideas find an audience, and persist with proposals which at first find little favour among colleagues. No minister sets their agenda all the time—events overtake even the most determined politician—but policy professionals learn that an individual minister’s preferences are important and must be accommodated. Internal drivers Factors within government that could contribute to the agenda include: • • • • • • • • •

emerging issues monitored by government policy specialists, who structure information and so shape the political domain’s view of the matter monitoring policy issues in other jurisdictions (e.g. overseas responses to particular issues, successes or failures of policies in other states) ongoing monitoring of wicked problems and intractable issues of perennial government concern coordination of policy issues across government and between government structures and agendas regular, programmed reviews, built into the budget cycle statutory “sunset” dates budget overruns unfavourable audit reports or evaluations performance audits, and benchmark failures.

Identifying issues

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These internal factors require constant monitoring and activity by government. Some are picked up in annual review cycles, scanning by central agencies or regular reports to cabinet on policy progress. Early detection of emerging issues—staying ahead of the game—is a valued skill among policy professionals. Meanwhile the wheels of govern­ ment keep turning, generating their own schedules and rotations of routine system maintenance. However, much of the policy agenda is foisted on ministers from outside. Issues can be brought into focus by advocacy groups, disasters, scandals and through media scrutiny or court rulings. Crisis management has marked this century to date, with events from the 9/11 attacks in the United States to a global financial crisis, conflict in the Middle East, Africa and Ukraine, public health emergencies, rolling natural disasters and the over­ hanging threat of climate change. Each demands sudden rearrangement of affairs and plans. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic governments demonstrated another rapid shift in policy and political priorities—in doing so abandoning other long-cherished ambitions, including returning the Commonwealth budget to an operating surplus. In theory, ministers are masters of the policy cycle. They decide whether an issue receives attention, and how much. In reality, politicians are subject to an array of external influences—parliament and their colleagues, the party they represent, interest groups and political donors, the media and public opinion. The political agenda reflects a shifting mix of ministerial policy concerns and those external issues that cannot be ignored. Ministers do not control the world that buffets government from outside. Powerful external forces shape the agenda and demand immediate attention, limiting the policy responses available to government. External drivers Examples of drivers from outside government include: • • • • • • • •

economic forces (e.g. share market fluctuations, interest rate adjustments, credit crunches, employment rates, business fortunes) media attention opinion polls legal shifts (e.g. High Court judgments) natural disasters international relations (e.g. refugee arrivals, diplomatic representations over human rights issues, wars between other nations) technological development (e.g. bitcoin moving currency outside the existing tax net; shifts from coal-fired power stations to renewables) demographic shifts (e.g. population growth and movement change patterns of demand for government services).

A sudden dip in the Shanghai stock exchange can have ripple effects on Australian economic policy. Deeper economic shifts change fundamentally the priorities of government, exem­ plified by the Australian response to fluctuations in global mineral and grain prices. A High Court decision might force a reinterpretation of policy fundamentals, such as the memorable decision in Mabo v Queensland in 1992, which overturned the doctrine of terra nullius and so recognised the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to traditional lands. A foreign decision to restrict commodity imports can shift industry policy priorities. An

46 The Australian Policy Handbook influential company or community group can exert great pressure for its particular interest to be brought into public policy. A war on another continent shifts resources from one policy activity to another. Drought, flood, fire and cyclones demand attention and money for dis­ placed residents and financially stricken farms and businesses. A lone gunman can change a nation’s approach to weapons policy. Market forces are probably the most powerful external driver, precisely because they are beyond the regulation of governments. Cabinet might control the rate of industrial relations change, but no government can control the price an Australian commodity fetches in the international market, with its implications for national income and employment. As governments adopt market approaches to economic policy, floating exchange and interest rates, they surrender instruments that might dampen economic dislocation. The significant economic growth that accompanied deregulation in the 1980s, and continued until the COVID crisis of 2020, comes at some cost to political authority and reach. Individuals and groups outside government can also shape agendas through public protest and other action, elevating an issue to a point where government attention becomes necessary. The notion of the “Overton window” captures this sense of policy proposals acceptable to the wider public at a given time. Named for American political analyst, the late Joseph P. Overton, the concept essentially frames those areas in which change is acceptable—and those where it is not. Overton was keen conservatives move their issues ‘into the window of political possibility’ (Astor, 2019), and in doing so pointed to the nature of the policy agenda. For him, politics is the art of redefining the unacceptable into policies which can speak to the mainstream. This aspiration to mobilise support around policy proposals is the rationale of advocacy groups such as Get Up! These link issue campaigning with the new possibilities of social media. Similarly, sustained recent focus on systemic racism and systemic sexism, through the Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements, demonstrates the power of physical protest and digital activism—in combination—as political issue drivers (cf. Tufekci, 2017). Environmental groups too, after decades of work, have found their concerns taken up by a wide audience. The media are an integral part of governance, although outside the usual institutional requirements for transparency and accountability. Beyond defamation laws, and the blandishments of professional codes of conduct, there is no legal requirement for media reporting to be accurate, fair, balanced or informative. Journalists benefit from documents released under freedom of information laws, although media companies are not subject to the same scrutiny. As Julianne Schultz (1998: 1) notes, the ‘fourth estate’ has retained its independence through a ‘curious process of hype, self-promotion, definitional flexibility and being a good idea’. Nonetheless, for ministers the media remain an indispensable instant guide to the policy agenda. This becomes particularly salient when media campaign on an issue, forcing politicians to ask who sets the policy agenda. Such controversy rein­ forces a familiar point: the policy agenda is not a neutral, value-free process, but an intensely hard-fought clamour for attention and relevance.

Agenda shaping from within While political and external drivers shape much that governments do, policy professionals also influence the agenda. They do so from many perspectives: there is no single policy profession in Australia, but policy analysis, development and advocacy are integral to the

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public service repertoire of skills. Public servants craft the words considered by cabinet, develop policy models and policy options and control the routine workings of the policy dynamic. Such policy professionals work in a political context, although their role is not political. Rather, they must provide independent policy advice on the issues of the day—and on those issues that deserve attention, even if currently unknown, still emerging or long ignored. The responsible government model assumes a permanent, independent public service bringing continuity and stability to the administration of government (Halligan, 2001; Bridgman, 2019). The policy specialist dwells in a grey world that is neither politics nor public administration but sits at the intersection of the political, policy and administrative domains (see Alford et al., 2017). One option for government is “horizon scanning”—a constant search to anticipate likely issues. The 2020 Summit, a gathering of 1,000 Australians in Parliament House in 2008, warned government that pandemics would likely become a public health and security issue, and urged national preparation (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2008: 365). Horizon scanning can draw on the work of government-funded research organisations such as the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Geoscience Australia, the Australasian Joint Agencies Scanning Network and the Australian Institute of Criminology. It can also include paying consultants, think tanks or academic bodies to undertake research into pressing issues. This process will often include a process of reflecting on the challenges and best practices emerging internationally. Many governments have established strategic foresight units to scan the policy horizon. More than 100 such units now exist globally across 18 countries, including Australia (Berze, 2019). They perform work consistent with advice from the United Nations (Guterres, 2021) and European Union (EU) calling for greater multi-sectoral collaboration and futures thinking and preparation (European Commission, 2021). Aotearoa New Zealand is experi­ menting with long-term insights briefings as a concerted mechanism to structure political thinking and encourage long-term policy stewardship (Washington, 2021). Big data is a further potential source for issue identification (Margetts et al., 2016). Governments confront real challenges and opportunities in the capture, analysis and use of vast amounts of technologically produced data, not the least in developing internal information technology and data analysis skills capacity. Big data can be mined to promote better issue identification and to target services better and more efficiently, although privacy and confidentiality act as important limits (Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2013). A key example is healthcare. The Productivity Commission (2016a: 7) reported that over 90 percent of Australians support use of de-identified public and private healthcare data to improve patient care and medical research. This public acceptance was put to the test during the COVID-19 crisis. Suddenly de-identified data was insufficient and replaced by real time venue check-ins with tracking of contacts to trace infection. Daily updates on caseloads, hospitalisations and deaths provided a constant public reminder of the role of data in understanding and addressing the pandemic. The experience made evident both the extraordinary con­ vening power of data technologies and the risk of embedded assumptions and cultural biases. Investment in big data introduces a drag into the process—path dependency on a technology solution that can be difficult to shift quickly when circumstances require. The failure of the COVIDSafe app promoted by the Commonwealth government pointed to some shortcomings in persuasion and preparedness—Australians did not

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The Australian Policy Handbook

trust the privacy protections or believe an app that tracked the movement of every citizen was essential. With insufficient uptake by the public, the app could not provide the coverage required, and was quietly dropped (Colls, 2021).

Which issues make the agenda? Cobb and Elder (1972: 161–2) suggest those issues with mass appeal have the best prospect of attracting the attention of politicians. Hence interest groups seek to define an unsaleable issue ‘as ambiguously as possible, with implications for as many people as possible, invol­ ving issues other than the dispute in question … and as simply as is feasible’. Fitting through the Overton window remains the aim. According to Cobb and Elder, there are common steps in how problems develop. Interest groups, officials and politicians identify a particular problem, and strive to make it of concern to the widest public. If they succeed, the issue becomes part of the policy agenda, with dis­ cussion in the media, the legislature and the political process. If government feels it must respond, the issue is assigned to a public institution and so drawn into the policy cycle. These common steps suggest a typical policy agenda will have several key characteristics. The agenda arises from competition among voices seeking attention. It is determined politically, with no guarantee the most significant issues will break through the pack. The policy agenda is biased towards areas already receiving government attention or with capacity to attract political interest. Bandwidth is limited—a government addressing an economic crisis has limited scope to simultaneously address health policy, despite its importance (Workman et al., 2009: 81). The agenda is set often not by policy opinion or media attention but by influential elites already in government or with access to decision makers. This can include steering both what is and isn’t considered to be worthy of attention (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). Those who work in the policy process recognise the potential for important issues to be lost in the crush. The policy agenda is whatever preoccupies government at a particular moment, regardless of objective importance. If policy makers rely solely on a mixture of political process, bureaucratic convenience and media enthusiasm to compile an agenda, they will be reacting to a very limited set of interests. Most issues can emerge through these familiar processes, but the government agenda can be expanded through regular horizon scanning of economic and social conditions, extensive use of data and indicators, evaluations of policy effectiveness and a willingness to look beyond the easy subjects.

The issue attention cycle Whatever the good intentions, government is susceptible to the media, with its capacity to present some issues as ‘problems’—even ‘crises’—demanding urgent attention (Ward, 1995). Crises can quickly become political, particularly when the public expect a more rapid response from government. Such topics travel through what Downs (1972) labels an ‘issue attention cycle’. Pressure groups try to attract attention for some serious problem, but often must wait until a dramatic event and media coverage carries it onto the policy agenda. Then alarmed discovery and brave promises inspire a scramble by political, policy and adminis­ trative players for solutions, followed by growing realisation of the costs of achieving meaningful change. By the time institutions and budgets have been established, the public has already lost interest and is chasing the next exciting problem. The issue might be largely forgotten, but at least there are now some programs, institutions and resources in place.

Identifying issues

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1

Pre-problem stage 2

Alarmed discovery / euphoric enthusiasm

5

Post-problem stage 3

Realisation of the cost of significant progress 4

Gradual decline in public interest

Figure 4.1 The issue attention cycle Source: based on Downs, 1972: 39–41.

The following case study, developed from the longer original ANZSOG case, provides a specific, interesting example of an issue gaining attention. Padula (2015) explored how calls for a shark cull became a pressing issue in Western Australia, with a response that attracted more controversy than expected; the proposal was quietly dropped when the trial ended.

Case 4.1: Shark attacks in Western Australia Shark related fatalities in Australia are rare, with approximately one per year recorded over recent decades. However, when five deaths and several attacks were reported in WA between 2010 and 2013, Perth earned the ‘dubious honour of being the world’s shark fatality capital’. Concern was growing amongst the public and there was significant increased media coverage, driven mainly by messages of danger, loss and entitlement, emphasising the risk that a ‘man-eater’ was stalking the coast, threa­ tening tourism and curtailing freedom to enjoy the beach (Couper and Walters, 2021). Following the death of surfer Chris Boyd in an attack in late 2013, the WA government swiftly announced the trial of a drum-line policy. Drum lines, which are long floating lines with baited hooks designed to attract nearby sharks, would be deployed at selected beaches for a three-month period. As part of the trial, the government would catch and kill target sharks (tiger, great white or bulls greater than 3 metres) found within one kilometre of the shore. The trial was part of a planned four-year, $22 million Shark Hazard Mitigation Program, which included almost $4 million in research funds. The government claimed that the trial was necessary in the interests of public safety, to preserve the public’s enjoyment of coastal areas, and to protect tourism.

50 The Australian Policy Handbook However, while the policy was designed to address concern the government was not doing enough to protect citizens, there was also a strong critical response to the trial. The Greens Party launched legal action to prevent the cull. A poll in January 2014 reported a strong majority of Australians opposed killing sharks. The issue was taken up widely across social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, with the Support Our Sharks Facebook page gaining tens of thousands of supporters. By May 2014 a petition had been tabled in the Western Australian Parliament, two protest rallies at Cottesloe Beach attracted thousands of participants, and the Western Australian Department of the Premier and Cabinet had received 286,000 emails and letters on the issue. When the trial ended in April 2014, the government decided the policy should not con­ tinue. Since that time the WA government has predominantly adopted non-lethal measures of shark hazard mitigation. In the 2014–15 summer, the WA government reached an agreement with the Australian government that would enable them to take action when a shark was found to pose an imminent threat to the public, rather than proactively culling.

Not all issues attract this cycle of attention—crisis, action and then a policy agenda that moves on, leaving some modest initiatives in place. Many subjects lack dramatic impact because they affect only small groups or do not lend themselves to simple analysis and pre­ sentation. Such issues are unlikely to find a broader audience. The policy agenda, always constrained, is further restricted when issues must also offer entertainment value.

Identifying issues There are a number of stages in problem identification. To make the policy agenda and be taken up by government, an issue must meet at least four simple conditions: •

•

•

Is it a problem? A problem only exists for government when significant interests and individuals agree that present circumstances are unacceptable. Most issues presented to government fail to find a sponsor. It usually requires a coalition of voices within and outside government to raise an issue to the status of a problem requiring an authoritative response. The ideological framework of the governing party or parties might also influence whether ministers wish to deal with an issue, or consider an issue is a problem for a different level of government. Does it need to be addressed right now? Although policy makers might agree an issue exists and can be addressed, political considerations come into play. Each dollar spent on an issue is a dollar not available for some other program, and cabinet must be persuaded a problem is of sufficient consequence to warrant time and investment. Is it our problem? Is this a problem best suited to government intervention? And which level of government? The COVID-19 crisis beginning in 2020 provides a vivid case study of governments arguing about who owned a problem such as Is it a problem? Significant interests and individuals agree that the present circumstances are unacceptable

Does it need to be addressed right now? The problem is of sufficient consequence to warrant time and investment

Figure 4.2 The stages of problem identification

Is it our problem?

Is there a solution?

The problem is best suited to government intervention

The problem has a plausible solution

Identifying issues

•

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supervising quarantine for returning travellers. Often in politics, the best problem is one that can be firmly attached to other levels of government. Is there a solution? Even with agreement on the nature of a problem, policy makers prefer issues with plausible solutions. Some intractable problems cannot be avoided, but it is easier to sell a topic to cabinet where resolution seems possible. Few politicians are drawn to issues promising certain failure.

A key challenge is to ascertain where an issue fits into the accepted structures and methods of dealing with public problems. Unless the issue “fits” politically, administratively and systemically, it might fall from attention or languish until there is sufficient energy for the “fit” to be constructed. This can be a major design challenge for policy advisers. Politicians and their advisers scan the political environment to identify potential political risks. They run a risk filter over emerging issues to see if the topic is salient or “too hot to handle”. Whether a policy problem is encountered, or a policy position is proactively created (maybe using sophisticated data and communication techniques), political risk identification delineates the initial issue, ascertains the political risk and dimensions, and drives the strategies and solutions available for use. Political risk calculation can elevate a matter to the top of the priorities or eliminate it from consideration (Althaus, 2008). Most problems do not progress in the policy cycle but die at the issue identification stage. Kingdon (2003: 116) uses a provocative biological metaphor: issue identification is like natural selection, in which external factors such as agreement on a problem, or technical feasibility, select only a few issues for the next stage of the policy cycle. Kingdon stresses just how many problems, issues and ideas fall by the wayside early. Issues judged unacceptable—those ‘that do not square with policy community values, that would cost more than the budget will allow, that run afoul of opposition in either the mass or specialised publics, or that would not find a receptive audience among elected politicians—are less likely to survive than proposals that meet these standards’. Unseen but systematic biases can distort this judgement, a risk made all the greater when assumptions are not articulated.

Defining problems Before a policy can tackle some pressing issue, the problem must be given shape and bound­ aries. Herbert Simon (1973) proposes a key distinction between ill-structured and well-structured problems. We encounter ill-structured problems all the time: issues such as poverty or discrimina­ tion demand attention but are open to endless interpretations and potential solutions. To become the object of public policy, such problems must be tightly defined so they can be analysed. A well-structured problem is one open to solution. ‘Much problem solving effort is directed at structuring problems, and only a fraction of it at solving problems once they are structured,’ argues Simon (1973: 187). To address an ill-structured problem, suggests Simon, we should break it into smaller, well-structured issues. By solving each of these, we address the wider, and still ill-structured, issue. Defining a problem is only a beginning. Structure arises from acquiring knowledge about the issue, so boundaries can be drawn and smaller component problems extracted from the larger issue. With structure, and the statement of the issue, come the first steps towards problem resolution. An issue that defies structure, and therefore boundaries, sends a powerful signal. It suggests the risk of an intractable problem. If a policy is a hypothesis about making

52 The Australian Policy Handbook change in the world, it needs an understanding of cause and effect and a sense of which variables might assist resolution. As problems become more complex, cause and effect might be barely discernible, or discernible only after the event. No matter how much expertise is garnered, without agreement on causation the chances of policy success are, at best, random. The policy sphere is rife with such complexity. Many issues cannot be sliced and dissected and tested, laboratory-like, against definition and experimentation for a host of technical and ethical reasons. They are simply not open to solution, no matter how well structured the problem. Sometimes the challenge is finding an acceptable balance. It is difficult to encourage more new housing and prevent further erosion of fragile ecologies. There might be better ways to proceed but the underlying tension will not resolve. Historical factors, competing interests or sunk costs can make all sides to a dispute unwilling to compromise. Analysts talk of wicked problems, those dilemmas that either cannot be defined or, at best, are not open to easy formulation (Head, 2022). Rittel and Webber (1973) explain that wicked problems are unstable because they are characterised by embedded inter­ dependencies in which a possible “solution” just creates yet another interlocking com­ plex problem. Moreover, it is difficult to obtain clear or definitive expertise about possible solutions because the problem is either “shifting” or there is no way of learning about the issue without trying potential “answers” that come with unintended con­ sequences. It is impossible to isolate the problem, let alone work out what to do about it. Much social and economic policy is about managing—but not solving—wicked and intractable problems. The capacity of government to impose its will on a recalcitrant world is always limited, and no policy can be final. Much policy making is not about solving policy problems but about managing policy conflicts. Policy makers who seek “once and for all” solutions to wicked and intractable problems condemn themselves to frustration and failure. The second case study in this chapter, also by Padula (2010) for the ANZSOG case library, points to a tragic wicked problem, that of child protection. Keeping children safe from harm is an overriding goal for every government, and contemporary approaches place the interests of the child at the centre of care. Yet as currently practiced, child protection systems are fallible, difficult to implement and haunted by tragic failure. They bring in their wake a destructive impact on families, community and culture. Case 4.2: Wicked problems—child protection Wicked problems present policy makers with unsolvable challenges. They represent complex issues that lack a single, obvious solution, but are often still important to address. One example of a wicked problem is the challenge of child protection. Initially, child protection appeared a straightforward issue— removing children from harm and placing them in an institution or with a foster family was a plausible solution to the harm of violence, neglect or unsafe home environments. Yet over time it became clear that assessing harm is challenging, the long-term adverse effects of separating children from their family are significant, and there is more to protection than providing a place to stay. Stable family relation­ ships, culture and belonging are not easily replicated. According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2021) about 3 percent of all children aged 0–17, approximately 175,000 in 2019–20, come into contact with

Identifying issues Australia’s child protection systems each year. Adding an additional complexity to this issue is the massive over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander chil­ dren in care, almost 1 in 6 of the cohort. Deep concerns about the management of child protection have been articulated for decades. Significant evaluation and research into the child protection systems in each state and territory have identified myriad failings. One such example is the 2009 Inquiry into the Northern Territory Families and Children Division (Padula, 2010). This Inquiry was prompted by a series of major departmental failures including the case of an infant boy who starved to death in the care of his mother, despite her long history of involvement with Northern Territory Families and Children. The Board of Inquiry released its report into the child protection system in late 2010 titled ‘Growing them Strong, Together. Promoting the safety and wellbeing of the Northern Territory’s Children’. The report was a broad-ranging examination of a system in deep crisis. Approximately six months after the release of the report, the Department of Children and Families (formerly known as Northern Territory Families and Children) released a Progress Report. This instalment focused on the 34 urgent recommendations made by the Board but also looked at progress towards the remaining 103 recommendations. The Northern Territory government also announced an extra $25.2 million in the 2011– 12 budget for the Department. It was hoped the changes made would make a positive impact but only 5 years later a Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory was established. The Royal Commission made similar findings, describing a system under-resourced and under strain. It also made similar recommendations, calling on the vital importance of greater funding and more community engagement. It warned of a ‘cycle of crisis’ that could only be broken through early intervention and major reform. This highlights several key issues for wicked problems like child protection. These issues often contain many complex elements where there is no objective or indis­ putable solution (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Even the problem is not definitive. Is the issue the harm to the child? Or is the issue systemic, stemming from the challenges of poverty and ineffective social support? Owing to the social context in which wicked problems arise, there are often many issues at play, all interacting. Seeking to solve one problem can result in unanticipated problems elsewhere. Mandatory reporting of child abuse is one such example. While most would agree that mandatory reporting is important for protecting children from abusive situations, the rate of reporting is very high while the rate of substantiation is low. In 2019–20 some 486,000 reports were made. About 183,000 were investigated, with just under 50,000 substantiated. In each case a risk of significant harm must be confirmed and this is often very challenging to achieve. Child protection is a decision not to be taken lightly, given the impact of removal for the child. Finding supportive foster homes is yet another challenge, particularly for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children who are preferably placed within their community in line with the Aboriginal Child Placement Policy. So, multiple reviews later, the wicked problem endures: there are children who need protection, but serious concerns about each possible policy instrument available to address the challenge. The problem remains stark, the solution elusive.

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54 The Australian Policy Handbook

Non-decisions One way to avoid wicked and intractable problems, or just plain difficult ones, is to make no decision at all. Government might find it easier not to discuss a matter than to disappoint some supporters. In the words of British prime minister Harold Wilson, ‘a decision deferred is a decision made.’ Non-decisions can be an expression of the same biases that keep issues from the agenda. They are an important exercise of power, an assertion that some matters do not warrant attention from government. Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 641) suggest non-decisions occur ‘when the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions’. In effect, non-decisions happen when government refuses to define a topic as a problem requiring a public policy response. A government might also choose a policy approach akin to a non-decision called a ‘placebo policy’ (McConnell, 2020). In response to a wicked or intractable policy issue a policy maker might decide to intervene in such a way that ‘reduces (or at least tries to reduce) the agenda burdens placed on them’ but avoids the difficulties of addressing deep casual factors (McConnell, 2020: 965). Often a placebo policy is about being seen to do something—a token budget, a small study, a promise of further research, appointment of an official with an imposing title. This is a rhetoric of action instead of meaningful engagement, a “feelgood” measure that does not address the tough issue. Placebo policies are a response to pressure on government to address an issue over which they have limited control.

Issue identification skills The question of how to identify and define problems has long troubled those seeking a rigorous approach to decision making. There is nothing necessarily rational or fair about those issues that government notices. Although problem definition is essential to the policy cycle, there can be no reliable, prescribed way to proceed. Defining the policy agenda is the point at which creativity, chance, power and politics—rather than analytical method—are most likely to hold sway. Amid the constant jostling for attention, issue identification provides opportunity. A crisis can open the range of acceptable policy responses. Natural disasters often spark extensive renewed commitment to volunteerism and encourage innovation at community level. One striking example is the profusion of local programs to ‘build back stronger’ after the deadly fires of 2019–20, including new approaches to land management policy to mitigate future conflagration (Monash Sustainable Development Institute, 2021). Likewise, the COVID-19 global pandemic encouraged many policy innovations around issues long excluded from the policy agenda, such as initiatives to find accom­ modation for people suffering homelessness and more efficient use of allied health pro­ fessionals in primary care. The skill for policy makers is determining whether a new Overton window can be opened when others close. Public problems are not like games or puzzles, with neatly defined rules and ready solutions. They are mental constructs, abstractions from reality shaped by our values, perceptions and interests. For politicians, seeking to define the key problems facing society and advocating their preferred solution is the currency of the partisan contest.

Identifying issues

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Public officials must understand those debates while scanning for issues that have yet to surface and for pressing problems that lack effective advocates. They need instruments to take the matters surfaced in the imprecise and subjective world of issue identification and turn them into issues that can be defined and weighed. It is to this challenge of policy analysis we now turn.

5

Policy analysis

Good decision making requires analysis. Policy problems are complex, and causation can be hard to identify. Research and logic are therefore a fundamental early stage in the policy cycle, the moment when an issue is scoped, intentions are defined and options developed. This chapter explores the role of analysis, sets out a practical series of steps, and locates this practice within the analytic frameworks used by government. It notes that most policy choices move between building on what exists (incrementalism), borrow­ ing from somewhere else (policy diffusion) and trying something significantly new (punctuated equilibrium).

‘Policy analysis is an art,’ argues Wildavsky (1987: 15), pointing to an important paradox about the policy process. Problems do not arrive with neat definitions, available evidence and expert commentary on options. Rather, suggests Wildavsky, the subject matter of policy analysis is ‘public problems that must be solved at least tentatively to be under­ stood’. Looking for a solution might be necessary before we properly understand the nature of the issue. To structure a problem is to give it shape and meaning through policy analysis. By the time we tie down the issue, we can already see the solutions which might follow. Issue identification becomes entwined in policy analysis and uses analytical methods. ‘Policy analysis’ implies a rigorous method, informing ‘public decisions’ with ‘social values’ (Weimer and Vining, 2011: 23). This can be optimistic—not every problem falls neatly into a convenient analytical category. It is in the nature of policy problems that analysis can be difficult, and evidence hard to secure. This is sometimes a question of timing—many policy challenges that confront government must be addressed inflight. They are not solved, only ameliorated. It can also reflect the interrelated variables in play—think, for example, of the difficulties governments experience when seeking to reduce family and domestic violence. Policy analysis implies a solution when sometimes all that is possible is iteration toward better approaches for what remain intractable problems. Lest this sound like despair, there are valuable analytic techniques available to public policy practitioners. Good policy makers understand and deploy these analytical tools, working with a mix of technical analytical skill, pragmatic realism and, when appropriate, passionate idealism. They seek to learn from experience; thinking about why an earlier policy did not work is to discover more about the issue at hand. DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-5

Policy analysis

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So judgement precedes application of any analytic device. How important is this pro­ blem? How much time and effort should be expended in seeking a solution? What is the appropriate approach? The art is in determining how much science is required. Policy makers develop shortcuts for these judgements. Emerging problems might be addressed by small adjustments to existing programs, a process known as incrementalism. There is also policy diffusion or policy transfer when decision makers cast around for existing programs from other jurisdictions and apply them locally. This is understandable in an era in which ‘policy developers no longer have the luxury of time and resources’ (Gilding, 2019: 243). It takes significant investment to analyse a new problem and develop options. Policy makers know perfect rationality is not available in a world of limited attention, constrained resources and contingent politics, and seek to minimise search time. Learning from others, and thinking about how to transfer a policy idea, becomes an expected practice—particularly in a federation. Policy ideas and programs spread across jurisdictions (Gilardi, 2016). Over time, the literature on policy learning and transfer has become more nuanced. Bardach (1994, 1998, 2006) introduced the concept of smart practice into practitioner lexicon to overcome problems associated with securing the “best” from best practice benchmarking. Smart practice encourages policy makers to move beyond imitation and emulation, and instead take the essence of an activity or idea from other policy places and translate this into a new setting—drawing on principles rather than cherry-picking attractive practices. This approach recognises the importance of context to the application of clever policy ideas and highlights the well-seized opportunity. Practitioners have refined this comparative practice literature by introducing the terms emerging and promising practices. Emerging practices are worthy of investigation because they are consistent with the philosophy of the task at hand and seem to lead to desirable outcomes. As yet they lack sufficient evaluation data to prove causality. Promising practices are supported by preliminary evaluation data to support the ori­ ginal program, but as yet lack replication in other settings. For example, a program would classify as a promising practice if supported by randomised controlled trial results but not yet subject to more widespread trials or other credible evaluation processes (Althaus, 2017). Wise practices extend this lexicon further, placing a strong emphasis on appreciation of history and culture and the need for the program to connect with community needs. This is particularly relevant—and too often missing—in policies aimed at service delivery for Canadian Indigenous communities (Wesley-Esquimaux and Calliou, 2011). In short, policy analysis is inherently technical, if situated in a world of ambiguity. An ideal synthesis would provide detailed and precise analysis, linking quantitative evidence with case specific studies, while acknowledging the inescapable ambiguity of working amid politics in real time (Althaus and Tedds, 2012). This remains ambition rather than reality. Policy analysis is science and art, in which method is important but judgement helps.

Who does policy analysis? Most government departments employ ‘policy experts’—people who study policy problems and offer solutions. They might make up a special section of the organisation as a policy unit. In other agencies, each division is expected to contain this expertise as it develops briefing notes and option papers for consideration by senior managers.

58 The Australian Policy Handbook Ministerial offices also take a strong interest in policy analysis. Ministers often employ staff with detailed policy knowledge who pass a political eye over proposals. Meanwhile clients, interest group advocates, third-sector practitioners and media commentators contribute their own perspectives on what needs to be done, when and how. Many sophisticated non-government players also employ dedicated policy experts. Policy analysis is not decision making. Rather it is about assembling evidence and options to inform a policy choice. Typically this is distilled into a briefing note by a department for a minister or an information paper for cabinet. However, policy analysis can take many forms, including recommendations from an external inquiry, royal commission, management consultants or political advisers. This openness to alternative sources can help government reach beyond a staid menu of choice. Yet it can also undermine the conventional practice in which ministers rely on impartial and tough-minded analysis from their public servants to inform the best possible decision. As noted when discussing the institutions of policy, the most recent review of the Australian Public Service observed that alternative sources of policy advice have proliferated: Ministers now access advice from think tanks, consultants, academics, lobbyists, interest groups and the media. This means that some ministers no longer regard the APS as their primary or even preferred source of advice. (Independent Review of the APS, 2019: 133) Diversity of policy analysis widens the circle of ideas but carries risk if data and advice is not compiled with a professional commitment to objective and impartial information. Good analysis helps a minister appreciate the costs and benefits of a range of approa­ ches to a policy problem. Good policy analysis puts personal preference and vested interests aside and does the hard work of testing ideas, weighing options and offering proposals to address the policy challenge at hand.

Rationality The ideal of a scientific approach to problem solving—logical, value-free, reliable, available for a wide array of problems—is attractive. Who would not prefer rational advice informing how to deal with pressing public problems? Why would anyone defend ad hoc, incremental decisions over those reached through careful analysis? Yet experience suggests rationality is illusory and impractical in the complex, political world of public policy. Rational decision making only occurs when there is agreement on objectives and a clear understanding of means. Such circumstances are rare. They might occur when established epistemic policy communities—long-established gather­ ings of experts dealing with familiar issues—develop consensus about an appropriate solution to a problem within shared resource constraints. Most public policy choices do not rest on such firm foundations, as governments seek to balance contending interests and manage expanding demands for resources. Prescriptions for a “rational” policy process remain influential but unrealised. In its classic form, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, this approach is known as the rational comprehen­ sive model—rational because it follows a logical, ordered sequence, and comprehensive because it canvasses, assesses and compares all options. While many variations appear in the policy literature, all share the six basic and obligatory steps:

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1

Problem identified and defined, objective set 2

Values and goals determined and ranked in priority order 3

All options identified

4

Each option tested for costs and benefits 5

Cost-benefit ratios compared

6

Decision maker selects option that best meets the objective

Figure 5.1 The rational comprehensive approach to decision making

This model appears regularly in older policy textbooks, along with well-developed criticisms. A rational comprehensive model assumes things about the world that usually do not hold true: that problems are clear, separate and stable; that decision makers are certain of their values; that goals are hierarchical rather than multiple, conflicting and circumstantial. The model requires consideration of all options, which can be difficult if not impossible, and the comparison of options that might not be quantifiable. The costs of comprehensive analysis might exceed the benefits of improved decision making. In practice, decision making is infrequently rational in this formal sense. It is more likely to reflect the limits of time, resources and knowledge. Simon (1957) proposed we accept the limits imposed by the reality of human cognition and operate instead on the basis of ‘bounded rationality’. Thus we do not always undertake every step in the rational model, and often make assumptions rather than analysing data. Decision making is also rarely comprehensive. Political realities, competing priorities, budgets and time usually limit those options worth serious consideration, and human frailty seldom yields the vision needed to accommodate a truly comprehensive list. The idea of bounded rationality has found new life in economics and behavioural approaches to organisational decision making (see, for example, Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Bendor, 2010). In setting out a useful sequence for making choices, the rational model at least reminds policy makers to work systematically and to provide some justification for favoured

60 The Australian Policy Handbook options. The following sections offer a simplified version of the model, one without the virtues of strict rationality but with the advantages of order and process in addressing policy problems.

A sequence for policy analysis There are cycles within the policy cycle. Policy analysts typically work through problems in an orderly way. The analyst’s cycle might include the following phases (also shown in Figure 5.2): • • • • •

formulate the problem set out objectives and goals identify decision parameters search for alternatives propose a solution or options.

This sequence does not end the process. Subsequent steps in the policy cycle, such as the selection of instruments, engagement, and the political decision-making process could change aspects of the analysis or prompt a fresh evaluation of the problem. Policy analysis is not a “once and for all” activity but a starting point to the next steps in the policy cycle. As agreement on the nature and scale of the problem varies, so the analysis must shift to take account of new realities. Policy analysis is invariably iterative. Information is usually incomplete. People disagree over objectives. Parameters shift. Policy analysts must be reconciled to developing options, testing them against departmental and ministerial opinion, and then working through them again and again. Formulate the problem As the previous chapter discussed, defining the problem is the essential opening; an ill-structured issue is difficult to resolve. So the first step towards viable policy advice is to formulate the problem. Generally, some external process—lobbying by an 1

2 Formulate the problem

3 Identify decision parameters

Set out goals and objectives

Policy analysis iteration

4

5 Search for alternatives

Figure 5.2 Policy analysis iteration

Propose a solution

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interest group, media campaigns or reports showing a persistent failure of programs to achieve objectives—draws the attention of decision makers to an issue. Ministers then seek advice about the nature, scale and characteristics of the concern. Australian governments rely on a number of institutional routines to restrain overly narrow or self-interested problem specification. These routines include engagement prior to cabinet consideration and evaluation of policy proposals by central agencies. Yet the emer­ gence of consultant reports commissioned by ministers has undermined an expectation that agencies have a crucial role providing impartial advice (Davis, 2021b). Policy analysts within government work to a professional obligation to offer options that can be defended on their own terms. Consultancy reports, however skilled, respond to terms of reference provided by the minister or agency commissioning the work. There is no single method for formulating problems because the scale and content of the issue, and the way it is originally presented, tend to frame the research that follows. Each problem can be unique. It might not be clear who is in charge, as ‘multi-centric governance’ brings many actors to a policy question, each vying for influence if not control (see Cairney et al., 2019: 33). The story of the national occupational licencing system, told below, is an all-too familiar story of broad agreement on a policy process undone by local lobbying and poor buy-in from key players. What seemed a sensible policy choice in principle, supported by clear and sensible analysis, became ultimately unachievable in the long journey from problem identification to implementation. Case 5.1: When good policy analysis may not be enough—the national occupational licensing system Policy issues have one common element—a degree of complexity given the many moving parts in any issue that involves people, organisations and interests within and beyond government. No matter how good the policy analysis, it is only the first stage of a much larger process. Take an apparently straight-forward aspiration, to standardise the licensing of professions such as plumbing across Australia. For premiers, chief ministers and the prime minister, the economic argument for a single national licencing system made much sense: with plumbing and other building skills in short supply, they sought a scheme to encourage mobility of labour across state and territory boundaries. Janet Tyson (2016) takes up the story in her ANZSOG case study of the introduction of a national occupational licensing system. The policy conversation began in 2005 when the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training was asked to ensure federal funding for training was consistent across jurisdictions, a first step toward consistency in occupational licensing and regulation. The following year the Council of Australian Governments created a COAG Skills Recognition Taskforce, chaired by Julie Yeend from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It began the work of turning a simple aspiration for consistency of skills recognition across borders into a viable public policy. Inevitably, and quickly, differences emerged. For many years each state and territory had licensed (or not) trades, working with local industry. In most states, for example, working with pipes required licensing as a plumber. Not so in South Australia, at least for people working with cold pipes less than 25 mm in diameter. The COAG taskforce soon

62 The Australian Policy Handbook identified at least 27 different regulatory systems in operation, managed by perhaps 50 agencies, each with its own definitions, fee schedules and schedules of certification. From 2007 a process began to identify current arrangements and understand the many details of skills licensing. In 2008 this turned into a nine-month sprint to consult with industry and agencies, negotiate possible options, and report back to the COAG and ministerial committees with a stake in the policy process. Officials eventually distilled this huge body of evidence, with its many divergent opi­ nions, into five options for consideration. They recommended the third option, in part because it commanded the greatest stakeholder support. This proposed a national agency model to develop consistent policy for delivery at state and territory level. Standard procedures, a common set of eligibility criteria, and a single licence for each profession would allow greater national mobility and consumer confidence when employing trades. In April 2009 COAG adopted The Intergovernmental Agreement for a National Licensing System for Specified Occupations. This triggered the next phase of work to translate policy into actions. This involved a new expert panel, a PWC report and further extensive consultations. Implementation included a Regulatory Impact State­ ment process and development of legislation finally introduced in 2010 after further consideration by a ministerial council. Policy takes time, in this case nearly a decade from aspiration to implementation. It would not be until 2012 that a National Occupational Licensing Authority (NOLA) was finally established. Even when there is agreement on an objective, the serious work of understanding a problem and framing plausible policy analysis takes significant resour­ ces and considerable leadership. The national occupational licensing project was a tri­ umph of good policy analysis and then patience and diplomacy by policy makers, who needed to persuade industries and agencies often very comfortable with the status quo. Even with the authority of COAG behind its work, the project encountered obstacles. These continued long after the process of policy analysis and recognition was complete. As the NOLA conceded in a 2012 submission to the Productivity Commission, the scheme agreed by jurisdictions did not resolve some significant problems, assuage public confusion about new rules or agree a plausible timetable for change. Oversight arrangements for the new rules remained ambiguous, and amid the complexity of feder­ alism, the policy lacked a ‘champion’ (NOLA, 2012). Despite so much care and work in framing policy options, the COAG agreement did not hold. In 2013 a number of states and territories decided not to implement the scheme as agreed, citing concerns about the model and its costs. The following year NOLA was disbanded. It would be 2021 before an alternative emerged, with an amendment to the Mutual Recognition Act 1992. This simply ensures trade licences gained in one state or territory are recognised in all others—worthy, but a significant retreat from the original policy objective of standardised processes, licences and qualifications.

Set out objectives and goals Defining objectives is fundamental to policy choices. The objectives selected will in turn shape the priorities in a policy area, the choice of problems to address, the tools used, and the goals for eventual evaluation.

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Yet even this apparently simple task can prove difficult in practice. The officials involved in establishing a national occupational licencing system worked to an agreed goal. They discovered along the way that maintaining a consensus about the goal can be difficult. State and territory agencies had established close partnerships with local industry and could see little benefit in change. Politicians, too, proved fickle—happy to support an initiative until various interest groups raised objections. So even after agreement on a goal and a policy to achieve the outcome, the objective could not carry a coalition of the willing through to implementation. This is not unusual. All policy decisions occur in a wider setting. No goal is pursued without regard to the consequences. As an ideal healthcare system would consume much of the national product, health system solutions are inevitably compromises. The goal— quality of care—remains unchanged, but in practice this objective is balanced against other, non-health, considerations. As Wildavsky (1987: 216) observed, ‘the objectives people have, the goals they seek to achieve, are a function not merely of their desirability but also of their feasibility. What we try to do depends to some degree on what we can do’. To deal with ambiguous or conflicting objectives, policy analysts produce a range of options for decision makers. Each option presents a different configuration of problem definition, policy objective and proposed solution. Ministers can choose among an array of values and opportunities. As with problem definition, shaping options imposes an ethical requirement on analysts to treat the alternatives fairly. Identify decision parameters Policy advisers can frame options once they know: • • • •

the the the the

objectives of the minister and government possibility of obtaining additional resources timeframes required for consideration and action relative priority of the problem.

Often departments prepare briefing notes to test the minister’s concern and resolve on an issue. If the minister indicates interest, further options or a single policy proposal will be prepared. If the minister does not see a problem as a priority, it might remain unaddressed. It is often challenging to elevate a new problem onto a government agenda already crowded with more demands than ministers can satisfy. Hence an iterative process of notes and briefings between the department and the minister’s office to test the relative importance of an issue. Keeping a close eye on the media helps too—nothing promotes an issue more effectively than public attention. As constraints on a policy program become clear, analysts can judge how much time and attention a problem should receive. If the issue is unlikely to attract strong interest, policy makers might lean to an incremental solution—a minor modification of an exist­ ing program, or an extension of familiar procedures to a new domain. This minimises search and analysis time. On the other hand, policy makers might confront new problems for which incremental solutions are not available. Analysis is required to create new laws, programs or institutions. Much greater investment must occur in research and evaluation before a policy approach emerges (Hayes, 1992).

64 The Australian Policy Handbook Sometimes, even with that investment, viable policy options remain elusive. This might reflect: • • • • •

a lack of reliable information about the problem at hand an inability to break the problem into separate, manageable units a lack of confidence in the causal models informing policy options an incapacity to cost various courses of action the absence of policy instruments to tackle the issue.

When analysis fails, and the parameters affecting a decision remain unclear, this is usually a caution: it suggests policy makers might be dealing with an intractable problem likely to defy policy intervention. While not all such problems are ‘wicked’ in a technical sense (Rittel and Webber, 1973), a problem without clear agreement on the issue or plausible interventions is a warning (Peters, 2017). At a minimum, it indicates that more research and thinking are required. It is also an invitation to humility—much political and administrative capital is wasted on ill-defined public problems. A minister needs to know when a problem has no solution. United States Pre­ sident Lyndon B. Johnson accepted advice from his cabinet and staff that war in Vietnam could be won. In retrospect, he lacked accurate information about the problem. The White House did not understand its enemy, work from a reliable causal model about the likely course of events, nor assess with any realism the cost of victory. Had the president’s advisers been more self-aware about their limited knowledge of Vietnam and its history, and provided a wider range of options, Johnson might not have destroyed his presidency by pursuing a tragic, deadly and doomed policy. He might instead, as one Republican senator wisely proposed, have decided to ‘declare victory and leave’. Honest appraisal might include a return to issue identification. Sometimes failure to develop viable options reflects muddy thinking about the nature of the problem itself. Revisiting issue identification often is a necessary reality test, even when viable options have emerged. Many policy issues are served up to government by interest groups looking for their ideal solution. The ministers they encounter might prove sympathetic but must think about administrative challenges or resource constraints. A more viable approach might require reconceptualising the underlying policy problem and then working afresh through the policy cycle. Search for alternatives The search phase of analysis requires research. The objective is to acquire as much rele­ vant information as required and to identify possible responses. Given that problems usually present multiple faces (economic, social, environmental, legal, technical, political), a team approach to analysis can be important. Sources for ideas might include: • • • • •

current policies, locally and in other jurisdictions international findings on best practice in the field recent reviews and reports on the issue data sets, new or commissioned academic journals

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discussions with experts within and outside government, including think tanks that have explored the issue in detail engagement with clients and external stakeholders engagement with service delivery and operational staff.

The search phase identifies possible options. It also narrows down the possibilities, compressing the potential universe of responses into those choices judged most likely to meet the objectives of decision makers. Considerations will include proportion­ ality, political feasibility, consistency with other government decisions, and work­ ability. This judgement is inevitably subjective, and so requires supporting argument and evidence. In some policy areas, it is possible to model the consequences of a course of action, using data and quantification to describe and compare options. Modelling is often strongest when dealing with financial or technical information and less effective when trying to calculate the social or political consequences of an option. Governments can model the cost of a new road, the likely usage, and the environmental consequences of choosing one route over others. Advocates of criminal justice reform have developed sophisticated models to compare the known cost of building additional prisons with the likely implementation costs of diversion programs and other alternatives to incarceration (Schwartz, 2010; Willis and Kapira, 2018). Providing models—or at least logical arguments—for each option imposes an important discipline on policy analysts. The requirement to model consequences asks policy advisers to make explicit statements about causation, with assumptions spelled out and reliability specified. Propose solutions Finally, robust policy analysis should point to potential courses of action. Some problems are amenable to a single solution, but most can be addressed in multiple ways, depending on resources and enthusiasm. The product of a policy analysis is usually a briefing paper or report that mirrors the steps in analysis—that is, a single document that formulates the problem, establishes objectives, identifies parameters, states alternatives and concludes with one or more recommendations. Three broad options are available for most policy proposals. Incremental adjustment of existing arrangements. This can address technical issues or questions of policy drift. Over long periods, incremental approaches can sum to large changes, but generally this is a cautious, even reactive, approach to policy challenges. Policy diffusion occurs when successful policies from other jurisdictions are adopted locally. These either modify or replace entirely existing approaches (Linos, 2013). One virtue of a federation such as Australia is the opportunity to try out new approaches in one state or territory before they are embraced nationally. Rarer are complete breaks with past practice. It often requires a crisis and widespread agreement current approaches are failing before government will invest in major new policy development and implementation. This approach is sometimes called punctuated equilibrium, a term borrowed from evolutionary biology. It notes that policies might experience long periods of stability, with just incremental changes, until some major shift in circumstances. This creates the conditions for a radical reassessment—followed by another long period of relative policy stability.

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Whatever the chosen approach, policy analysts seek to put options before decision makers, often mirroring the spectrum from modest change to wholesale rethinking of a policy issue. Such options should be accompanied by a comparison of implications and risks and, if appropriate, the case for commending one choice over others. Ministers will not feel bound by bureaucratic findings, but at least will know how a professional policy analysis has dissected the issue and weighed the alternatives. If the choices on offer are unpalatable, politicians might seek further information or change some aspect of the equation. This is sensible practice; often we need to see options before we can be certain of our objectives. Once the cost of a policy is clear, ministers might rethink a priority or change direction. Experienced policy analysts are reconciled to iteration, to reworking policy options many times in the search for workable choices.

Evidence-based policy When searching for solutions to policy problems, evidence plays an important role. Leigh (2009; 2018) suggests that policy research should be rigorous, including meta-analysis and use of randomised trials and ‘natural experiments’ in which data sources can support comparative work. Practical considerations, including a lack of time and money, often militate against formal studies in response to emerging issues. Nonetheless, many governments have expressed a preference for ‘evidence-based policy making’ (Marston and Watts, 2003; Nutley et al., 2003; Sanderson, 2009, 2011). This broadens the circle of advisers in the policy formulation process, offering opportunities for policy brokers, entrepreneurs and experts to contribute to deliberations. In the United Kingdom the drive for evidence has fostered funding for independent ‘what works’ centres that assess policy outcomes and options in areas of specialist policy. Not surprisingly, the drive to evidence has critics too. In his review of the topic, Pawson (2006: xviii) suggests ‘the problem with the term, and it is quite a big one, is that there is no such thing as evidence-based policy.’ This is contestable, but others prefer to speak of ‘evidence influenced policy’ (Julnes, 2007). The experience of global climate change debate has highlighted too the hostility to expertise with unwelcome policy messages. Portes (2017) calls independent experts an ‘embattled breed’, quoting the comment of then British Lord Chancellor Michael Gove that ‘the people of this country have had enough of experts’. Gove was criticising analysts who warned about the long-run economic costs of Brexit. The British people apparently shared his assessment, voting to leave the European Union regardless. Just a few years later public health experts became essential in responding to COVID-19. Suddenly government health officials and research epidemiologists proved in high demand and became trusted voices in media commentary and cabinet discussion. Technical expertise—which is to say, under­ standing of evidence—came to the fore. Politicians justified unpopular decisions about lockdown, curfews and other measures on the basis of following the best available expert advice. Policy is a political process. Experts find themselves welcomed or side-lined as interests dictate. Amid this reality that expertise is not always welcome, the idea of evidence-based policy remains potent, if only because it implies a less value-laden assessment of choices. The movement is strongly associated with the concept of evidence-based practice in the

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human services sector and in medicine. It advocates that policy processes can be improved by forging stronger links between researchers and public policy decision makers, and between research and practice. A key driver for evidence-based policy is a problem without an obvious solution. Research becomes important in identifying options, as do “policy entrepreneurs” or “policy brokers”. These are people with the technical skills and institutional connections to get new ideas into the conversation. There are also people with solutions to promote who have been waiting for the right problem. A crisis such as COVID-19 introduces new players with proposals about how to handle an unfamiliar challenge. Using research and evidence to inform policy appears self-evidently desirable, begging the question why an evidence-based policy movement is required. The answer lies in the research and policy worlds working to different priorities, different languages, different timescales, different reward systems and different ends (Burton, 2006). The interface between these two worlds is often tenuous. Research empha­ sises knowledge advancement and understanding, whereas policy is motivated towards practical action. Politics is driven by values and rarely has the luxury of time. It can take a crisis to bring the two worlds together. There are strengths and weaknesses associated with evidence-based policy. Under­ standing these can assist knowing when to call on expertise, and how to tie together policy and solution. Strengths • • • • • • • •

Asking the right questions. The requirement to conduct research and find evidence demands policy makers take time to define the problem at hand. This discipline encourages more targeted policy making. Efficiency and effectiveness. Evidence-based policy can result in more efficient and effec­ tive policy making, leading to improved value for money and avoidance of wastage. Enhanced transparency in policy making. Inclusion. Evidence-based policy making offers an opportunity to connect research­ ers, policy makers, decision makers, the public and other interest groups, potentially yielding better informed and more inclusive policies. Appraisal and risk minimisation. Evidence-based policy can assist in appraising the likely reactions of stakeholders and contribute to risk minimisation in the policy­ making process. Best practice. Searching for evidence encourages policy makers to look for exemplars in addressing a problem and learn too from the mistakes of others. Defensibility. Evidence-based policy making provides a sound basis for providing objective answers to policy questions. Coherent information. Evidence is drawn from established disciplinary bases, bringing coherence to the understanding of the issues and options.

Weaknesses •

Time pressures. Governments are under constant pressure to address problems quickly. The time allocated to problem solving is usually short, denying policy makers the opportunity to commission new research or wait for detailed research results before

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•

•

•

•

•

•

decisions are required. Liberal democratic governments are subject to electoral cycles that can make research seem a luxury. Temporal disjuncture. Pressure on time highlights the different cycles for politics and research. A randomised controlled trial on learning outcomes in schools takes time, but a political controversy on curriculum change requires an immediate response. This temporal disjuncture is best addressed by a regular program of research as policy analysts think ahead and anticipate likely areas of future demand. They can be assisted by deep connections with research experts able to draw quickly on existing research. Nonetheless, it is a rare new problem for which appropriately targeted evidence is available in the necessary timeframe. Contested evidence. Unanimous agreement about evidence is not common. Differ­ ences in research methodologies and scientific interpretation of data can lead to conflicting information being presented to decision makers. It is all evidence, but it might be difficult to evaluate or rank. There might be disagreement about what evidence is relevant or should be weighted when providing recommendations Community concerns. The experience of climate change debate and anti-vaccination marches during COVID-19 highlight that expert evidence does not persuade everyone. There is a human tendency to promote evidence that is congenial and dispute all other findings, a trait daily displayed on social media. Evidence alone is unlikely to settle a political controversy. Subject matter limitations. Some policy initiatives involve assumptions that are fundamentally untestable. People and programs cannot always be isolated into test groups, causality cannot always be established, appropriate sample sizes might be impossible to obtain given the nature of the programs, and key drivers affecting the future and uptake of certain policies cannot be measured or pre­ dicted with accuracy. So judgement is required. This will be more reliable if informed by evidence, but some doubt and uncertainty linger at the heart of the scientific endeavour. Public sector requirements. Attention to due process, ethics and public accountability is a mainstay of public sector decision making, meaning that governments often cannot use or access certain pieces of evidence. Ethical and political dilemmas apply to experimental approaches to public policy: different treatment of different groups in society and the potential misapplication of public funds constrains what is possible or desirable. The cost of research is significant, and governments must demonstrate value for money. There is an inherent expectation that new research must be costbeneficial, which in practice is difficult to promise in advance. Politicisation and downplaying democracy. Recourse to evidence and managerial approa­ ches to policy making can conflict with democratic participation and public opinion. Parsons (2002) notes that ‘Whose evidence?’ and ‘What counts as evidence in the first place?’ are important questions to ask. Evidence can be a rhetorical flourish, masking pragmatism: what counts is what works, and evidence can constrain what is possible.

In sum, evidence matters for good policy making, but public problems are difficult to hold stable while alternative approaches are tested. The policy process is not a simple, stratified matter of accumulation, assessment, assimilation and presentation of research, but requires a dynamic and organic approach. Fischer (2003: 201, 202) suggests evidence should not be understood solely as the gathering and presentation of scientifically rational information. Rather, ‘policy analysis can be understood as “crafted argument” encouraging a “logic of

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policy deliberation” that stresses the force of “the better argument”’. ‘The goal,’ concludes Fischer, ‘is to improve policy argumentation by illuminating contentious questions, identi­ fying the strengths and limitations of supporting evidence, and elucidating the political implications of contending positions.’ Overall, the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence-based policy approach commend a balanced regard for what counts as evidence. From a strictly scientific research perspective, governments are variously choosing, puzzling and constructing policy in a relatively haphazard manner. Complex problems resist cause–effect ana­ lysis. In developing solutions to problems, policy makers might rely as much on post-hoc observation as on formal research. Head (2008: 6) suggests a three-lens model of evidence, so that political judgement, professional and operational practices, and scientific research are drawn into policy ana­ lysis. The interplay of these differing perspectives on evidence leads Head to conclude that policy analysis informs rather than determines policy outcomes.

The analyst’s toolkit Sourcing and deploying evidence is an essential starting point for policy advice. The next step is to look among the many tools available for policy analysis and chose those most suitable for the issue at hand. Here we describe some major frameworks commonly used by analysts. No policy professional will possess all the expertise identified in these frameworks. Instead, policy advisers call on the expertise of others, and draw a multiplicity of advice into their work. This approach exposes assumptions to scrutiny and tests them. Collaboration and peer testing are important steps towards building a robust policy that can engage the real world in the way decision makers intend. The most fundamental of all analysis takes place in the substantive context of the policy problem itself: good policy can only be built on a strong understanding of the content. Educational, economic, health, agricultural and legal issues all require a focus from relevant policy professionals, who bring substantive experience to bear on the matter, and can advise on secondary issues such as transaction costs associated with a policy choice. For example, if the policy will alienate a significant group, opposition might create financial or legal impe­ diments which bring the option undone or need to be accommodated by incorporating effective dispute management strategies within the policy. Economic framework The analytic hegemony of our times is economic. Much public debate is about eco­ nomic and financial management, so governments need continuing advice on economic and budgeting policy choices. Accordingly, many government initiatives are framed through the perspective of analytical tools based on economic models. These models, in turn, influence the major policy instruments used by government. There are two streams of analysis at play here. The first is applying economic analysis to policy problems by establishing the cost and economic impact of various options. This is standard practice, and every cabinet submission will expect an economic statement about the dimensions of the problem and the consequences, for government and private players, of a recommended course of action.

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The second extensive use of an economic framework is employment of market solu­ tions—that is, taking a problem in the public realm and recommending how it can be managed through private provision subject to competitive forces. Here policy analysis is closely integrated with preferred approach, with an underlying assumption that private provision will be more efficient. Both forms of economic analysis ask similar questions about demand and supply, who provides and purchases particular goods or services, and the incentives (and impediments) for participants in the market. Shifting from government monopoly toward market provision has proved a common policy approach in Australia and internationally (Gash et al., 2012). It is tempered, though, by doubts whether savings established through privatisation are sustained over the long run. The example of private prisons illustrates both the complexity and power of this approach. Traditionally, state governments manage prisons. They hold offenders convicted under both state and Commonwealth laws, and there is a national system for transfer of prisoners between jurisdictions. Prisons are costly to build and run. Holding offenders in secure custody requires significant infrastructure and staff: a prison needs cells, walls, yards, kitchens, sick bays and recreation areas, and properly skilled and equipped staff to secure these areas. Rehabilitation of offenders, in the hope they will re-enter society able to participate in a lawful and responsible way, is costly. Professional attention and quality programs to help offenders manage their behaviour and reduce prospects of reof­ fending are also resource intensive. An economic cost–benefit analysis might identify significant fiscal savings to a government if prisons are built, operated and managed by private operators. There are several such prisons in Australia. Savings can be achieved through service innovation, work practice changes to reduce overall staff costs, more modern infrastructure and use of contractors for specialised services. Competition can matter too, if only as an incentive to seek new and more effective ways to provide contracted services. Of course, economic considerations will not be the only concern for policy makers. To improve efficiency in jails, in particular to reduce the significant costs of rigid indus­ trial arrangements, the Queensland government experimented with private prisons from the late 1990s. These operated for nearly twenty years at a cost typically lower than public counterparts. Yet alongside reduced outlays came another, less welcome feature— a rising concern about corruption in private prisons. A December 2018 Crime and Corruption Commission report raised worrying evidence of poor practice. In 2021 the Queensland Corrective Services Minister announced the state’s two privately operated prisons would be transferred to the public system—even though this would impose nearly $30 million a year in additional costs. Here economic benefit was offset by non-economic but very real costs. The example of prisons under private provision has sparked important thinking about incentives in the corrections system. Beginning in the USA, and now operating in Australia, a “justice reinvestment” model questions the value of prisons overall as an economic investment by the community. It employs a different form of economic analysis and reasoning: if communities can make changes that reduce local crime and provide alternatives to incarceration, governments can reinvest the savings from the corrections system into that community. In the words of Just Reinvest NSW (2020): Justice reinvestment is a way of working that is led by the community, informed by data and builds strategies to address issues at a local level. The aim is to redirect

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funding away from prisons and into communities that have high rates of contact with the criminal justice system, through both community-led initiatives and state-wide policy and legislative reform. Economic analysis underpins this approach—a reminder that economic methods need not come laden with obvious policy solutions, such as privatisation, but can be used to argue for innovation. Identifying cost is an important diagnostic start—thinking about new ways to address that cost is the mark of good policy analysis. Ultimately, policy analysis is more than budgets and economics; problems also need attention from social, environmental, legal and political perspectives. Any one mode of analysis can be reductionist, driving toward binary choices, but taken together a range of analytical frameworks can address public problems in all their complexity. Social framework Analysing policy issues and options from a social perspective recognises dimensions different in character from an economic framework. A policy might achieve its primary economic goal yet introduce undesirable consequences for women, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, rural communities, culturally and linguistically diverse peoples, people with mobility problems or those living with disadvantage. Policy options need to carefully consider such unintended effects. Social impact studies offer this perspective on policy choices. The social infrastructure—those institutions that deliver social programs—is also important. A program to rationalise, say, local post offices, can have an important impact because of the many ways a community uses this resource. This becomes particularly important when an unexpected change, such as a global pandemic, suddenly requires new ways of supporting communities. Social policy analysis is often focused on one of four social objectives: • • • •

provision of universal social services such as basic health and education and com­ munity safety provision of targeted services for special needs groups inclusion of groups living with disadvantage and reduced access to services analysis of problems from alternative perspectives, especially based on characteristics such as gender, ability and ethnicity.

Analysts often find social justice principles useful to anchor their analysis of an issue or options. These include: • • •

Rights. Does the policy protect or advance individual rights and educate about social obligations? Equity. Have interested community groups and individuals been identified and empowered in the policy process? How does each option affect them? If a policy option advantages some at the expense of others, this should be intended and desirable. Participation. Full participation in society is a goal of social policy, so options should be examined against people’s ability to engage. This is especially true for individuals who lack resources through distance, poverty, absence of social institutions validating their participation, or poor language or numeracy skills.

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Access. Individuals need access to social services. Well-structured and diverse access allows the service provider to respond more effectively to the needs and expecta­ tions of the target groups.

Environmental framework Policy options can affect the environment, especially if considering approval for a major project. Analysis must cover not just the economic feasibility of a proposal, but the potential impact on the locale and wider physical context. It might be good economics to build a new airport in western Sydney to manage air traffic volumes, but what does the proposal mean for the environment? The environmental impact statement (EIS) is the major tool for answering this question. In its many variants, an EIS seeks to specify the consequences of any course of action for the environment, and for communities. This could bring together scientific measurement of a habitat with population data about fauna and flora, and an evaluation of the envir­ onmental consequences of a particular project. How many koala deaths from a proposed new road are acceptable? Does the number threaten the overall local population, or is even one roadkill an unacceptable price? Environmental evaluation includes not just land, air and water pollution, or pollution by noise and light. Biodiversity must also be considered, bringing specifics of plant and animal habitat into the analyst’s frame. The technical sophistication of such work has grown in complexity and sophistication, with learned journals such as Environmental Impact Assessment Review devoted to questions of method and evidence. Human activity has significant and often irreversible ecological impacts, so ecological sustainability must be considered. Ecological sustainability assumes that activities should be structured to allow regeneration and preservation of ecology. Other important considerations for environmental policy include habitat preservation, environmental quality and natural resource management. All these considerations will be incorporated into a well-structured environmental impact study. The EIS process has been complicated as an analytical tool by controversy about the causes and effects of climate change. Should policy analysts consider only the direct effect of human action on the local environment, or account for cumulative impacts on inter­ connected global ecosystems? If there are intergenerational implications, how should equity be addressed and what timeframes might inform policy calculations? This is no longer an abstract concern. Australia has made international commitments through successive United Nations Climate Change Conferences, which require considera­ tion for domestic policy choice. The huge bushfires that marked recent Australian summers point to profound shifts in weather patterns, as does recent widespread flooding. Policy responses such as whether to rebuild communities burned out in bushfire or destroyed by flood requires difficult prior questions about whether now settled areas will remain viable for human habitation. Legal framework Modern notions of government are founded on the resources available to fund programs, employ staff and build infrastructure. More traditional descriptions of the body politic start with the idea of power, exercised by the parliament in the form of law making.

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Many policies require legislation, and all policies take place in a legal context because governments are themselves subject to the rule of law. Fundamental law—the constitutions of the Commonwealth, states and territories— describes the limits of governmental power. For example, the Commonwealth might possess the most powerful parliament in our federation, but it is unable to levy taxes differentially across the nation because the Commonwealth Constitution prohibits such action. States might wish to protect their markets by imposing excises on interstate trade, but this option is not constitutionally open. Alongside fundamental law, each jurisdiction in Australia has similar laws of general application, setting certain requirements on the policy process. For example, there are laws requiring the auditing of public funds. Policy officers must be aware of such laws when recommending policy options and ensure program design conforms to government accountability obligations. Similarly, each jurisdiction has a framework of criminal law, and myriad requirements covering employment, work health and safety and other matters. Decision makers must be confident that options meet the principles in these laws but need not specify all relevant legislation when offering policy advice. Cabinet will assume policy recommendations from agencies are consistent with applicable laws. There are also legal obligations when developing a legislative proposal for a policy option. These are often described as fundamental legal principles that must be respected in every new piece of legislation. The Queensland Parliament (2018), for example, requires that proposed laws are consistent with a ‘parliamentary democracy based on the rule of law.’ The detailed principles that follow include making administrative power open to review, respecting the principle of natural justice, limiting the delegation of powers and protecting citizens from arbitrary actions by government. These principles require that laws are unambiguous and clearly drafted. They must have ‘sufficient regard to Aboriginal tradition and Island custom.’ Policy jurisprudence remains an under-researched field, yet it matters for a tech­ nical understanding of policy options and limits. We can posit some general princi­ ples that guide legal policy analysis beyond the specific policy choice in question. These include: •

• • •

Democracy. This means ensuring our system of representative democracy subject to the rule of law is recognised and protected in policy development; that the nature of the franchise and the authority of electors is fostered; and that governance principles are clearly stated and understood. Justice. This involves looking to the institutions and rules that support social order and allow the exercise of rights; access to justice; understanding of the law; cost and speed of justice; and relevance of legal force and sanctions. Reform. This ensures the law reflects and develops society. It asks that “reform” legislation offers a genuine improvement to current law, with a clear and articulated rationale. Service. This entails providing a professional standard of advice to decision makers.

Other analytic frameworks need to be understood in their legal context, too. For example, the economics of competition policy is implemented within a complex legal framework, including the competition and consumer and fair-trading laws. Social policy manifests itself in laws such as those prohibiting discriminatory behaviour.

74 The Australian Policy Handbook ECONOMIC Economic analysis Establish the cost and economic impact of various options

SOCIAL Rights Protect individual rights and educate about social obligations Equity

Non-economic solutions Investigate other initiatives that could address the issue indirectly Market solutions Consider whether a problem can be managed through private provision

Identify the impact on individuals and community groups Participation Examine people’s ability to participate Access Allow service providers to respond to the needs and expectations of the target groups

ENVIRONMENTAL

LEGAL

Biodiversity

Reform

Consider impact to specific plant and animal habitats

Offer a genuine improvement to current law

Pollution Specify impact on land, air, water, noise and light Natural resource management Consider how the quality of natural resources will be monitored and maintained Ecological sustainability Structure activities to allow regeneration and preservation of ecology

Democracy Recognise and protect democracy and the rule of law Service Provide a professional standard of advice to decision makers Justice Allow the exercise of rights and access to justice

Figure 5.3 Frameworks for policy analysis

Political analysis Political analysis of options is a priority for the political domain, but not the task of the policy analyst employed in a public agency. It is typically managed by ministerial advisers. Nonetheless, public servants sometimes express concern about this aspect of the interaction with the political system. Some call this ‘political nous’ (Hartley et al., 2013; Alford et al., 2017). Advisers are expected to provide policy advice that is sensitive to political context, although analysts are not privy to a minister’s political calculus. Mackie (2021) takes up this challenge in a review of environmental policy making. Few areas of government action are more contentious, yet there has been little detailed study of policy making in the field. Mackie (2021: 210) interviewed a range of senior public servants advising government on the environment. Her inter­ viewees ‘considered the art of policy making to be intuitive, perfected through a mix of policy nous, judgement and experience.’ Over and over Mackie’s respondents describe the shadowy dynamics of working with politicians. Much depends on a minister with a clear policy mandate and understanding of decision-making protocols. Officials learn to seize opportunities to advance the agenda identified by the minister. In turn this requires that ‘politicians, their advisers and departmental senior executives need to be able to fully trust the officials providing advice and policy solutions. The hidden but vital role of officials, as they try to steer policy towards success, is difficult to see in practice or express in theory’ (Mackie 2021: 213). In short, officials learn through experience how to work effectively with politicians. There is little guidance available beyond the basic operating doctrines of Westminster-style government. A skilful official learns to make sense of the politics surrounding a policy issue while taking care to avoid being positioned as partisan or aligned to stakeholder groups. This is art guided by principle, an ability to understand politics without acting politically. Good advice is sensitive to the policy goals of a government, without necessarily seeing these as optimal. The policy analyst’s role is to ensure political input is provided at

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appropriate times during the analysis stage of policy development. Policy choices must show awareness of the governing party’s principles and platform, and sensitivity to issues important to the political domain. “How would this look as tomorrow’s headline?” is often a sobering and relevant question for the astute policy adviser.

Agreement: an analytic tool American economist Charles Lindblom proposes a very different method for testing policy analysis: agreement. Lindblom’s (1959, 1965) influential work on incrementalism began as a critique of the rational comprehensive model. Lindblom observed that ends and means in policy making are rarely clear. Often our objectives are defined by available resources or shift as we learn more about the problem. Real and lasting solutions are rare; most problems receive only amelioration until they fade from view or are superseded. The urgent tends to crowd out the important. Further, there is never enough time or energy to conduct a comprehensive search for alternatives. We do not address each new problem by starting from first principles. Policy makers prefer ‘successive limited comparisons’ with current practice, modifying existing programs to deal with new issues. Sometimes these modifications are tested through pilot programs. Policy proceeds by small experiments to see whether familiar responses can resolve an emerging problem. What, then, is the test of a good policy? Not a strong cost–benefit ratio or specification of lost opportunities, argues Lindblom, but agreement. A successful policy is one that commands consensus among policy makers, interest groups and citizens. In this view, policy makers build up a bank of knowledge about a policy area and programs to match. This makes policy makers reluctant to move suddenly in an entirely different direction; it is more effective to experiment with small changes than seek major policy departures. An incremental approach builds an inherent conservatism into the policy process. Like the rational comprehensive model it sought to displace, incrementalism has many critics. Some argue that small steps might produce only circular movement. Others argue that agreement among elites is no guarantee that broader social interests are being served by a policy, and major problems facing society might need a radical push, not an incremental approach. Policy shocks are difficult to absorb through gradual accommodation. The COVID-19 crisis, for example, required major shifts in policy to deal with social dislocation. Suddenly the Commonwealth and state gov­ ernments adopted policies once considered implausible—a universal basic income for people stood aside from employment, a doubling of social security payments, free childcare, hotel accommodation for those sleeping rough, even a moratorium on rent payment and eviction. Emergency payments briefly lifted millions of Australians above the poverty line (Davis, 2021a: 57–58). Yet such breakouts from policy orthodoxy are rare—it required a global pan­ demic to prompt such radical measures. Once the crisis passed, most of the COVID-19 innovations were shut down, and policy making returned to more conventional measures. For despite the many reservations, incrementalism most accurately describes how policy making proceeds. It stresses the expertise of bureaucrats and the economy of working out from familiar programs. To use only incrementalism would be as serious a mistake as relying too heavily on cost–benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses to make decisions; however, as Lindblom suggests,

76 The Australian Policy Handbook policy analysts must sometimes use their judgement about how much time and thought to invest in a problem. The quick and rough calculations of incrementalism, framed as agreement about analysis and recommendation, might be the most effective way to proceed.

Why analysis? Policy issues are usually complex and costly to address. The process of analysis ensures decision makers are well informed and can choose from an array of potential solutions, each explored thoroughly. Through analysis, we give shape to a problem—establishing its characteristics, drawing boundaries, bringing crucial variables into clear relief. Analysis allows a policy professional to “frame” an issue, stating it in terms that make the problem open to possible policy approaches. When solutions are not obvious, analysts learn to reframe the question, stating the problem in different ways to gain a broader sense of the question at hand. Often the initial presentation of an issue constrains the range of options too tightly. Sometimes, too, a problem is first presented in terms of a solution. “We need to amend the Act to impose a night-time flight curfew”, laments one person. “No, money is needed to build a new airport for the city”, cries another. Each is proposing a solution, rather than stating the problem in policy terms. The effective analyst starts with a problem and a policy objective, then expands and contracts the dimensions of the issue by asking questions, gathering and analysing data, and seeking opinions and views. The aim is to frame an issue in terms that make it intelligible to others, and open to the analytic tools available to policy professionals. This assumes considerable scope to work on an issue from first principles. Sometimes political exigencies override consideration of alternatives, as when a government announces public-funded car parks near rail stations in electorates of concern. Here the analyst’s task is thus inverted, seeking not a policy solution but a set of outcomes that can be justified within the parameters of the policy. The problem becomes an implementa­ tion challenge: given the government has announced a goal and funding, how can policy makers offer advice on the best program design to ensure fairness, transparency and the optimal use of public money? Discussions of technique in policy analysis tend to imply a single rational and sequen­ tial process. Experience tells policy analysts to expect iteration. As problems are defined and redefined, solution parameters shift and objectives waver. This is not a counsel of despair, just a warning that the way of policy analysis rarely runs smooth. Policy analysis is a balance between art and science. Some problems deserve sustained attention from teams, with full modelling and careful consideration of all variables. Others can be resolved quickly, with minimal search for alternatives. There is no magic that distinguishes one type of policy from the other, only the benefit of thought and experience. Eminent practitioners discussing policy analysis usually conclude with a plea for judgement—that indefinable mix of experience and intelligence said to guide good policy analysts. One might also call for attention to ethical scruples, in particular the importance of objectivity when selecting and presenting options. The potential conflict between the two (judgement requiring subjectivity; ethics preferring impartiality) is a

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paradox of professional life. Good policy analysis presents options without spin, but it does not present all options—only those judged most likely to meet stated objectives. In The Politics of Policy Analysis, Cairney (2021) notes that while policy analysis has a significant technical component, it is always about power and politics. Cairney offers some practical advice therefore on how to proceed: Know your client • • • •

Understand their deadlines See problems and solutions through their eyes Identify their beliefs Anticipate potential concerns about the analysis you present

Use political goals and value judgements to compare alternatives • • • • • •

Explain the effectiveness of alternatives in addressing a problem Consider the fairness of contending options Discuss the administrative and technical feasibility Explain costs—how much, borne by whom and willingness to pay Provide information on the efficiency and sustainability of options Ensure consistency with human rights and other overriding values

Understand the most common values and methods that dominate policy analysis •

Efficiency and effectiveness are typically tested through: ○ Cost-benefit analysis to identify the most efficient outcome ○ Cost-effectiveness analysis to identify costs for particular constituencies or outputs ○ Public agency strategic analysis to identify how a government agency can improve the “public value” of its actions

•

Be able to use each when necessary—while also understanding their limits.

Be efficient and pragmatic when gathering evidence • • •

Given evidence is often inconsistent, time is short, and deadlines pressing, an ideal pro­ cess is rarely possible, so use practical wisdom to define problems and potential options Draw on research whenever circumstances allow to understand how others see and respond to a problem Be willing to adopt and tailor what works elsewhere

Communicate clearly and concisely • • •

Prepare, plan and produce information, knowing the audience might make quick judgements on material presented Analysis can be technical in nature but must communicate key points to the client Broader “documentation” framing a technical report can provide context and an explanation that avoids jargon and makes evidence intelligible

78 The Australian Policy Handbook •

Learn how decision makers utilise your policy analysis to improve effectiveness in preparing policy advice

Communicate risk and uncertainty in a responsible and ethical way • • •

Use statistics, graphs and diagrams to inform not persuade—a rounded picture is better than selective facts to make an argument Acknowledge when data is not available, reliable or informative Translate key numbers into words—what does “very likely” mean when presented as a probability?

This is an impressive distillation of lessons from Cairney (2021). It resonates strongly with the observations of experienced public servants reported by Mackie (2021). We can explore some of these themes in a study of a complex issue, such as the development of a Tasmanian policy to address family violence. Every policy development process is different, and this is an example of a policy developed quickly in a strongly supportive political and bureaucratic context, yet determined to understand the issue and the clients, gather evidence, consider alternatives and put options before decision makers. Case 5.2: Tasmania develops a policy to address family violence Rosie Batty is a remarkable Australian, a tireless campaigner against domestic violence after a horrific experience in her family. Her selection as Australian of the Year in 2015 prompted a national conversation about the scourge of such violence. It raised, inevitably, questions for state and territory governments about their policy responsibilities to protect their citizens. In Tasmania, the state government responded with a rapid policy development process. This is documented in an ANZSOG video case study by Grube (2018; cf. Corbett et al., 2018). Domestic and family violence, argues Grube, is a wicked problem. Such problems can be difficult to get onto the political agenda—it is hard to discuss a problem for which answers seem unavailable or beyond the resources of any level of government. The elevation of Rosie Batty, however, sparked discussions in COAG, and in every community, about reducing family violence. Batty’s strong voice, and a realisation this problem requires a consolidated approach, encouraged the Tasmanian government to commission a government-wide policy process. This strong external incentive over­ came many constraints on policy development. Leadership began at the top with Tasmanian Premier Will Hodgman. He made clear the government would invest the time and resources necessary to gather evidence and consult. Premier Hodgman established a cabinet sub-committee to address family violence, including the Attorney-General and Minister for Corrections. It was advised by a steering committee of agency heads, led by Secretary of the Department of Premier and Cabinet Greg Johannes and including Police Commissioner Darren Hine. The interdisciplinary frame was important. Normally responses to family violence are scattered across many government agencies, from human services to police and justice. A single process allowed a rare holistic approach.

Policy analysis To undertake the detailed work, a taskforce of officials drawn from all relevant agencies was given eight weeks to develop a policy for cabinet consideration. This multi-layered structure for policy development, with a cabinet committee, secretaries’ steering group and taskforce of officials, established ‘three levels of governance that all needed to fit together’ in the words of Nick Evans, then Deputy Secretary of the Department of Justice. This process also worked across the political spectrum. Minister for Human Services and Minister for Women Jacqui Petrusma, a Liberal, reached out to the leadership of the Tasmanian Greens and Labor and secured their agreement the parliament would tackle family and domestic violence together. This ensured a policy process not constrained by partisan considerations, and so able to consider the widest range of options. As Johannes noted, these arrangements required ‘the senior people within the government and within the bureaucracy getting together regularly, having any barriers to collaboration being identified very quickly and being removed.’ To develop an effective plan, the Tasmanian government decided to co-locate the taskforce of officials for two days a week at the Department of Premier and Cabinet. Arrangements combined formal weekly meetings with the informal interaction necessary to trial ideas and test thinking across agencies. It allowed each relevant aspect of policy ana­ lysis of family violence—economic, social and legal—to be considered in the final package for cabinet. The regular conversation through co-location pooled not just expertise but evidence and data. Each participant was asked to serve as a conduit back to their home ministry or department, so sharing the policy analysis even more widely within government. The first time that officials met, they spent much of a day scoping the problem and discussing what approaches might make sense—so combining policy analysis with process design. Officials worked out a timetable, a communication protocol and agreement about how the three elements involved—ministers, heads of departments and expert officials—would work together. To test ideas, the taskforce conferred externally. This deployed an existing channel, a consultation group already working with the Tasmanian government on the national family violence action plan. This stakeholder forum was expanded, beginning with an all-day workshop on key issues. Consultation committee members were encouraged to discuss issues with their communities. A media campaign also supported a wider public debate about the issues, which informed the policy process. As Secretary Johannes argued, ‘good public policy is always based on robust consultation… it is policy development 101.’ The timetable was tight. A typical policy development process might take many months, but ministers wanted an urgent response. They noted the significant prior engagement on related issues, the accumulation of evidence collected, and informa­ tion about which interventions produce change. Tasmania also felt it could learn from similar policy exercises in other jurisdictions. Hence it did not need to undertake a complete research process but could move more swiftly to policy formulation. The resulting policy, titled Safe Homes, Safe Families, was published in August 2015 (Tasmanian Government, 2015). It opened with a forward from the Premier and quotes from Minister Petrusma, Rosie Batty and Commissioner Hine about how violence can happen to anyone, and why it is unacceptable. An 18-point plan followed, with separate sections focused on establishing a coordinated Tasmanian government response, chan­ ging attitudes and behaviour, supporting families affected by violence, and strengthening

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80 The Australian Policy Handbook legal responses. The plan was updated in 2019, adding a further focus on sexual violence, now with 40 action points. Grube argues this Tasmanian policy process was effective because it included three essential elements:

• Strong and united political and administrative leadership; • A collaborative mindset across a whole range of government agencies; and • A determination to learn the lessons of how it was done, to create a strong reservoir of institutional memory. From a policy analysis viewpoint, the responses to family violence benefitted from an openness to ideas unconstrained by partisanship, from an existing consultation forum, and from a “burning platform”—a reason to make rapid but thoughtful decisions. Bringing political leaders, agency heads and officials together in a concentrated work program gave structure and impetus to the project. Ensuring all relevant agencies were in the room encouraged swapping of ideas while also producing buy-in for the policy recommendations across government. The resulting policy has endured and been expanded, which suggests institutional learning as evaluation and further consideration encouraged updating. Sadly not every policy process has this luxury of support from the top, a consolidated period to work collaboratively, and access to much existing data and evidence to inform deliberation.

6

Policy instruments

Policy instruments are the means governments use to achieve their ends. Here we describe six types of policy instrument:

• • • • • •

policy through advocacy—educating or persuading, using information available to government policy through law—legislation, regulation and use of government’s authority policy through money—using spending and taxing powers to shape activity beyond government policy through direct government action—delivering services through public agencies policy through behavioural techniques—influencing and shaping the individual and collective choices of citizens policy through network—cultivating and leveraging relationships within and across government and with external partnership bodies to develop and implement desired goals and behaviours

Good policy advice relies on choosing the right mix of instruments for the problem at hand

To make a difference in the world, the excitement and bustle of politics and the technical judgement of policy advice must yield eventually to the more measured process of turning ideas into reality. A policy idea means nothing if it cannot be converted into practice. This chapter is concerned with this transformation from concept to program, and the range of “policy instruments” available to government to achieve its ends. Governments pursue policy objectives through a repertoire of policy instruments. If results are the ends of the policy process, instruments are the means—the programs, staffing, budgets, organisations, campaigns and laws giving effect to policy decisions (Lascoumbes and Simard, 2011). The policy cycle asks policy professionals to consider policy instruments once they are clear about objectives and goals. Analytically, it is important to keep objectives separate from instruments. There will be more than one way to achieve the same goal, and instruments usually operate in combination. Some instruments carry political costs that prove too high. In Australia a significant example is the long shadow of the carbon “tax”. After years of debate and failed attempts to introduce an instrument to encourage redu­ cing carbon emissions, former Prime Minister Julia Gillard finally successfully introduced a Clean Energy Act in 2012 (labelled by critics as a carbon tax). Antagonism to the policy DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-6

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became a cornerstone of the opposition party platform for the next election, pointing to rising costs and the impact on business. When the opposition won the 2013 election it repealed the Act, promising to find more effective means to achieve the same end. Here the instrument, not the goal, became the focus of political debate. The language of carbon pricing became a poisoned chalice for leaders interested in approaching the issue of carbon emissions. It left Australia in a difficult position inter­ nationally as the European Union (EU) began implementing a carbon border adjustment mechanism. This exposes Australian exports to significant EU tariffs in the absence of a domestic carbon pricing scheme (de Orte Júlvez, 2021). A tactical win one year becomes a significant roadblock a decade later. The temptation to call on an instrument before fully analysing the nature of the issue is risky for the policy analyst. The means might become the end, the instrument a solution in search of a problem. This can be particularly hazardous with innovative instruments such as nudges, design thinking and artificial intelligence (or algorithmic) solutions. Choosing the approach first and analysing the problem later is a familiar if unfortunate trap. All instruments have strengths and weaknesses. As with selection of options, professional judgement is required when advising on choices. Decision makers need to know whether policy options are viable, the comparative merits of alternative approaches, and how suggested instruments will work together.

Classifying policy instruments Typologies might seem irrelevant to the main game of making public policy—a sport for professors. Yet policy ideas are of little use without appropriate means. Knowledge about the range of choices is therefore essential. No typology captures fully the complexity of policy instrument choice, but categories are important. They help make sense of various government actions. An array of instrument choice draws attention to alternative ways of achieving goals. There are myriad policy instruments, from the very broad to the highly specific. Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 90) identify some 64 different instruments in the field of economic policy alone. With so many different options, it is important to ensure policy instrument choice accommodates the overall goals of a policy (Howlett, 2009). Instruments must be matched precisely to objectives (see, for example, Howlett, 2011). While there are many policy instruments available, often trends emerge. For example, reliance on legislation as a preferred policy instrument waxes and wanes. Earlier this century the strengthening of the parliamentary committee systems, and parliamentary scrutiny of legislation committees, encouraged a trend towards less intrusive instruments. This has somewhat reversed in recent years, in part because legislation has become important to politicians who seek emblematic statements about cultural and ideological issues. At the same time governments have embraced behaviourally informed instruments, such as nudges, in part to avoid the additional regulatory and enforcement burdens associated with legislation.

The Australian policy context In a federal system, policy instruments differ across jurisdictions. The Australian con­ stitution gives the Commonwealth powers and responsibilities not open to the states, and exclusive access to important revenue streams.

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These Commonwealth powers have grown over the decades, aided by successive centralising governments, High Court support for Commonwealth legislation and, in rare cases, successful referenda. The intergovernmental deal that established a goods and services tax following the 1998 election saw states and territories surrender many remaining taxation powers. The Commonwealth now dominates the federation in financial matters. States might spend large amounts on education, transport and health, but they rely on the Commonwealth for most of their income, creating a “vertical fiscal imbalance”. This financial dependency allows the Commonwealth, through special purpose payments, to dictate policy in areas nominally the responsibility of states. Regular meetings of prime ministers, premiers and chief ministers commit to reversing this trend, but in practice sub­ sidiarity—allocating powers to the lowest level possible—remains an aspiration rather than a realistic description of the Australian federation at work. In a crisis such as COVID-19, ambiguities over authority and finances become sig­ nificant. Faced with an international crisis the Commonwealth was not able to take independent control of decision making. This led to the formation in 2020 of the National Cabinet, a decision-making body with responsibility for managing the national response, replacing the Council of Australian Governments. While the federal government was able to exert control over international borders, and to provide economic stimulus, states were primarily responsible for managing the public health response. This led to ongoing tension between Commonwealth authority and state action, often at the cost of a consistent approach across Australia. Local government is the sometimes-forgotten partner in the division of powers. It draws authority from state Acts and is not mentioned in the Australian constitution. Just as the states depend on Canberra, so local government relies heavily on permission and grants from state and territory governments. The federal division of powers is a major constraint on selection of policy instru­ ments in an Australian setting. The constitution, and subsequent intergovernmental arrangements, limit the choices available at all levels of government. Yet innovation is possible: a number of “cooperative federalism” initiatives show the potential for coordination around shared goals. The federal government used this approach to encourage uniform national competition policy implementation, mutual recognition of regulations about sale of goods and regulation of occupations, and national, essential infrastructure markets such as electricity, gas, and water products. The net effect of cooperative federalism has tilted power to the federal government despite the various deals and incentives, political reasons for collaborating and some discretion in implementation (Hollander, 2006).

A taxonomy of Australian policy instruments There are many taxonomies of policy instruments. Among the most influential is Hood (1983), who describes Nodality, Authority, Treasure and Organisation. These categories refer to the provision of advice or information, the exertion of regulatory authority, the use of economic levers such as taxes or grants and finally the use of public organisations. There have been many later additions to these categories, notably the development of techniques drawn from behavioural economics. In the Australian context of federalism, there is a further category of instruments, the use of networks which extend to different levels of government and beyond as a

84 The Australian Policy Handbook Advocacy Educating or persuading, using information available to government

Law Using government authority, legislation or regulation

Money

POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Using spending and taxing powers to shape activity beyond government

Direct government action Delivering services through public agencies

Behavioural techniques Designing incentives to influence individual and collective choices

Network Cultivating and leveraging relationships within and across government and with external partnership bodies to develop and implement desired goals and behaviours

Figure 6.1 Policy instruments

mechanism for delivering policies. This draws attention to the critical role of relationship building and network management in transforming a policy idea into policy practice. Hence we identify six key categories of policy instrument: • • • • • •

policy policy policy policy policy policy

through through through through through through

advocacy law money direct government action behavioural techniques network.

Policy through advocacy Advocacy instruments argue a case rather than force or engineer a result. Often advocacy draws government into working closely with interest groups. Vaccination campaigns, for example, bring together state and federal departments of health and stakeholder groups such as the Australian Medical Association, community groups and local governments.

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Such advocacy is a growing feature of policy formation. In the COVID-19 crisis some local government mayors proved particularly effective voices encouraging vaccination, as did local medical practitioners. Advocacy instruments often begin by providing more information. They range from factual approaches such as press conferences providing daily COVID numbers or other public health messages to persuasive media campaigns. The Slip-Slop-Slap campaign and its later developments encourage Australians to be more sun smart. A generation ago the Grim Reaper television campaign urged Australians to understand the nature of HIV/AIDS and take appropriate protective measures. As the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) case study on the campaign noted, sometimes shock tactics are required as a powerful wake-up call (Padula, 2006: 5). In the contemporary political realm, the currency of emotion can be just as significant as rationality or informed debate. Narrative, conceived broadly as storytelling in written, oral or visual form, represents an advocacy instrument. It connects with feelings to either buttress existing opinions or convert audiences to new positions (Shanahan et al., 2013). Like advocacy and beha­ vioural economics, policy through narrative draws on the power of emotions to shape behaviour, and the strong preference many have for the compelling place of stories in the human psyche. Narrative is available as a policy instrument because it connects with media and social media to shape how policy is framed and communicated. While critics warn of the tendency towards spin over substance, many modern practitioners use the power of narrative to enact policy objectives with great skill. A compelling narrative can impel or thwart agendas as well as delivery practices.

Policy through law Law is a traditional instrument of government policy, and the final guarantee that policy intent can be translated into action. Laws can facilitate by allowing a course of action; coerce, through requiring or prohibiting certain behaviour; or create and govern institutions. Some laws are symbolic, stating aspira­ tions and social values. In passing laws, parliament empowers the executive government to act and provides a framework for enforcement through the police and courts. Laws are also binding on government, and many impose specific and unique obligations on the political, policy and administrative domains. Freedom of information legislation, for example, opens government documents to public scrutiny while financial accountability laws require gov­ ernment agencies to account for and report on use of money. Laws establish a framework for government action, but much of the detail is contained in delegated legislation authorised by an Act and implemented by officials. Delegated legislation includes regulations, local laws and ordinances. Local governments, for example, make laws using the authority delegated to them by state Acts. Delegated leg­ islation authorises discretionary administrative decisions by ministers and officials. About half of all Commonwealth legislation by volume is expressed in more than 100 types of delegated legislation (Odgers, 2012: 415–6). Indeed Neudorf (2020) argues that ‘dele­ gated legislation has become the principal form of law making in Australia’s legal system. By volume, it makes up the majority of new federal law that is made each year. It is everywhere, touching upon nearly all areas of law.’

86 The Australian Policy Handbook This growth in delegated legislation has increased the importance of regulatory design for Australian governments (Sparrow, 2020a, 2020b). The preparation of regulatory impact statements has likewise become a core component of public sector practice, as governments seek to improve the quality of their regulatory policy frameworks—seeing this as an important productivity issue (Office of Best Practice Regulation, 2020). To interpret this universe of laws requires courts and numerous quasi-judicial bodies. Such legal bodies make independent judgments and decisions, even though they are funded by government. Legal instruments also include voluntary agreements as a substitute for, or complement to, regulation, whereby a party agrees to a certain course or standard of conduct instead of being regulated. “Soft regulation” such as making recommendations, issuing nonbinding guidelines and facilitating self-regulation, might also be effective in achieving a desired policy outcome.

Policy through money Governments have multiple objectives when making fiscal decisions. At the broadest level, they hope to influence the economy, although deregulation of financial markets and international trade agreements have diminished greatly the capacity of the Commonwealth to control macro-economic outcomes. A second objective for government is to ensure sufficient revenue. Tax policy must strike a balance between encouraging enterprise and funding government programs. People want services but might be reluctant to pay indirectly through the tax system. Tax increases are unpopular, and governments often struggle to balance their books. A third objective is to influence behaviour through financial incentives or disin­ centives. Taxes on cigarettes are defended as necessary to dissuade smoking. The use of targeted wage subsidies offer encouragement for employers to employ citizens who live with disability or other labour market challenges. Governments also use money to achieve outcomes. Tax dollars fund industry devel­ opment, schools, universities and other instruments of government policy. Groups and institutions outside government spend much time lobbying for money, arguing about the contribution they could make if appropriately funded.

Policy through direct government action While much money held by government is used for transfer payments—to other levels of government, to private organisations, to individuals—the largest proportion is invested in public sector programs and agencies. Such public sector activities are considered in an annual budget round and settled by cabinet before presentation to parliament. Governments deliver services through the public sector, accounting for expenditure through annual reports and parliamentary scrutiny. Although government influences much in society, the main points of contact for citizens are often with such services, from transport to hospitals to policing. Nonetheless, all levels of government see movement away from direct government action. Governments choose to “contract out” many functions, relying on private providers who deliver services to a standard specified in a contract. As O’Flynn and Sturgess (2019) note in a report written for ANZSOG, the Commonwealth government spends three times more on buying goods and services than on employing public servants. The volume

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involved is considerable—in a single year the Australian government signed 73,500 new contracts and spent nearly $100 billion buying goods and services from companies and not-for-profit organisations. This trend requires significant new investment in systems and people to design, implement and manage contracts on behalf of the public sector. O’Flynn and Sturgess conclude the shift to government action through contracted services needs a more sophisticated approach to designing and managing policy imple­ mentation through agents. They urge a commitment to “strategic commissioning” skills—a shift away from low-risk contract choices, based principally on price, toward longer-term investments in organisations and innovation, assessed against government objectives rather than simple contractual terms.

Policy through behavioural techniques A more recent but popular policy instrument is the use of “nudges”, an idea emerging from behavioural economics. Behavioural techniques seek to influence individual and collective choices. The underlying theoretical and experimental design has been recog­ nised with the award of Nobel Prizes in economics to the psychologist Daniel Kahne­ man in 2002 and economist Richard Thaler in 2017. It was given public prominence in the bestseller Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Nudges posit that careful design encourages people to choose certain paths. Letters seeking payment of overdue rates—by describing how others in the same community have met their local government obligations—can prompt higher compliance. Placing healthier options at eye line and the chocolate bars in a less convenient location doesn’t change the appeal of the chocolate, but it does make it easier to make the healthy decision. The nudge as policy instrument is often presented as an alternative to regulation. Advocates use principles and data drawn from psychology, economics and other social sciences to predict decision making and actions and design cost-effective “choice archi­ tecture.” The aim is to motivate people in desired directions without restricting their freedom of choice. For example, nudge thinking has encouraged governments to make organ donation the default choice when people renew their driver’s licence. People can choose otherwise. There is no mandate to donate your organs and no financial incentive, but a simple change from opt-in to opt-out significantly increases the number of people agreeing to be organ donors (Halpern and Sanders, 2016). Importantly, behavioural techniques have applications broader than nudge. It can also inform more effective design of regulation, taxes or incentives by taking into account the impact of heuristics and biases in decision making. Not surprisingly, this has promoted a lively debate about the ethics of behavioural techniques in public policy (e.g. Baldwin, 2014; Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs, 2012; Sunstein, 2015). Some suggest that behavioural techniques have been diminished by identification as nudges, with an allied concern about manipulation of citizens through clever psychological incentives (Finighan, 2015; Sunstein, 2015). There are many opportunities to incorporate insights about human behaviour when designing and implementing policy instruments, but it is equally important to ensure these are indeed the most appropriate choice in managing the policy problem. Beha­ vioural techniques are unlikely to be the most effective solution to intractable policy challenges such as unemployment, poverty or family violence but might prove a helpful part of the toolbox.

88 The Australian Policy Handbook Case 6.1: The Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government The Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA) was established in February 2016 within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. This centralised team works in col­ laboration with partners across federal agencies and departments to find behaviourally informed solutions to policy problems. Inspired both by the academic research and the success of the Behavioural Insights Team in the UK, BETA set out to ‘bring together evidence from behavioural economics, psychology and other social sciences to design and test behavioural insights interventions’ (BETA, 2021a). BETA have applied behavioural insights in a myriad of ways. They have recreated several classic nudge-based interventions such as the use of SMS to encourage on-time reporting (BETA, 2017). Working with colleagues from the Behavioural Economics and Research Team (BERT) in the federal Department of Health, BETA encouraged a reduc­ tion in the over prescription of antibiotics through the use of social norms (BERT & BETA, 2018). This study involved sending targeted letters to doctors whose prescription rates were higher than the norm, encouraging them to reflect on the reasons for this difference. The most effective intervention reduced antibiotic prescription by 12 percent. In addition to using nudges, BETA has also used behavioural science to under­ stand recruitment within the APS, and designed programs to attract high performing students to teaching. They have worked on better information for consumers on power bills, retirement planning and savings, improved information about insurance and warnings about cybersecurity—just some of the projects described on the team website (BETA, 2021b). In their study of APS recruitment, the team designed a trial to explore the impact of deidentifying application materials—removing information about gender, ethnicity and other significant variables. Unexpectedly, the trial found that deidentification reduced diversity in candidate selection. The most significant result showed that ‘Indigenous female candidates… were 22.2% more likely to be shortlisted when identifiable com­ pared to when applications were de-identified’ (Hiscox et al., 2017: 6). Similar beha­ vioural science informed the development and trial of an app for university students designed to improve completion rates (BETA, 2021c). These trials use more complex behavioural science techniques than just nudges to address complex problems. These diverse interventions demonstrate the breadth of ways behavioural techni­ ques can be used to shape policy interventions. Teams such as BETA have emerged around the globe and subsequently become increasingly important players in provid­ ing advice on policy design and implementation. Behavioural techniques have moved from fad to accepted policy instrument.

Policy through network Many descriptions of the policy process begin with a hierarchical government bureau­ cracy that interacts repetitively and uniformly with society to implement government objectives. This command-and-control model implies a “them and us” approach in which public officials maintain a discrete and anonymous distance from those they serve.

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In practice, much policy making involves networks—clusters of people within and beyond government who work together around a shared policy problem or goal. Policy networks range widely in scope and ambition. There are tightly integrated policy communities, which operate as a subsystem as stakeholders coalesce with departmental structures and processes to focus on a policy agenda. Public health initiatives, for example, often arise from meetings between health officials, indepen­ dent advisory agencies, professional practice groups and community organisations. The Australian response to HIV/AIDS was developed and sustained through a formal network that linked governments, health services and community organisations in a long-term partnership. While the federal government is often technically the deci­ sion-maker, policy emerged through the network and intergovernmental collabora­ tion, as the Commonwealth funded an array of initiatives that reached far beyond the capacity of officials to deliver, from needle exchange programs to street level education for sex workers (Bowtell, 2005). There was tension aplenty within the policy community, and not all voices felt included, but the model of policy making in responding to HIV/AIDS remained far from a top-down approach. Other policy networks remain a loose conglomerate of interested parties, which emerge around an issue but otherwise remain autonomous, self-governing and outside government direction (Rhodes, 1997). Through the COVID-19 crisis a group of owners and agents representing live music venues worked with state governments on rules to allow at least some limited operations amid public health restrictions. The results often disappointed those eager to resume live performances, but they achieved some influence through regular contact with officials. Networks function vertically as well as horizontally. An extensive network might include representatives from different levels of government, third sector organisations, private sector participants and even individual citizens who bring expertise or community authority to the conversation. A policy network is a configuration of players built around prior relationships, information, and exchanges of information and ideas. All, by definition, are inter­ ested parties—they have an incentive to participate in the mutual interaction and joint exchange that impels policy making. Using networks, governments can become policy facilitators rather than necessarily carrying the dominant role in service deliv­ ery or policy enactment (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Networks are also an important part of intergovernmental workings, as senior officials from jurisdictions gather to work through the detail of decisions of the National Cabinet and its committees. While intergovernmental processes do not often include external players, they set up a lively policy network across Commonwealth, state and federal bureaucracies and so help coordinate advice and implementation (Davis and Silver, 2015). Policy co-design is emerging as an important instrument in a more networked governance environment. Co-design sees networks work together actively with government, voluntarily or as clients or users of services, to design public policy. These networks can include advocacy groups, non-government organisations and experts and sometimes the private sector but will also involve citizens directly in some manner. There are three components to the use of co-design. The first includes the use of iterative design processes, oriented toward problem definition and innovation. Second is recognition that people should be respected as experts in their own lives and therefore valuable contributors to the policymaking process. Third is the

90 The Australian Policy Handbook use of creative methods and tools to allow involvement in many modes. Networking tools are a way to ‘generate more innovative ideas, achieve economic efficiencies by improving responsiveness, foster cooperation between different groups, reinvigorate trust between citizens and public servants, and have transformative effects on participants’ agency and wellbeing’ (Blomkamp, 2018: 739).

Choosing a policy instrument The criteria for selecting the best policy instrument—or, more often, the best combina­ tion of instruments—involves both technical efficiency and political nous. Some simple questions can guide the choice: • • • • • • • •

appropriateness—is this a reasonable way of proceeding in this policy area? efficiency—will this instrument be cost-effective? effectiveness—can this instrument get the job done? equity—are the likely consequences fair? suitability—will there be any conflict with existing processes or policies? workability—is the instrument simple and robust, and can it be implemented? scalability—can the instrument be expanded or contracted efficiently and effectively? sustainability—can the chosen combination of policy instruments adapt to changing circumstances? What will their long-term impact be?

The choice of policy instruments matters. It is the link between an objective and its attainment. The right set of instruments will be appropriate, efficient, effective, equitable, workable, scalable and sustainable.

Suitability will there be any conflict with existing processes or policies?

Appropriateness is this a reasonable way of proceeding in this policy area?

Efficiency will this instrument be cost-effective?

CHOOSING A POLICY INSTRUMENT

Effectiveness can this instrument get the job done?

Equity are the likely consequences fair?

Figure 6.2 Choosing a policy instrument

Workability is the instrument simple and robust,and can it be implemented? Scalability can the instrument be expanded or contracted efficiently and effectively? Sustainability can the chosen combination of policy instruments adapt to changing circumstances? What will their long-term impact be?

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Like much else in the policy cycle, judgement as well as science is required to select the best available instrument or package of instruments. As Hood (1983: 163) notes, policy instruments do not enable government ‘to shape the world outside in any way that it likes. There are some inherent limitations.’ The simple application of a government toolkit cannot solve wicked or intractable problems nor address poorly structured issues. Policy instruments need to be backed by sufficient authority and money and chosen within a framework of rigorous thinking about ends as well as means. They need careful choice and design— because policy instruments work together, the inherent complexity of how instruments interact with the changing world can result in unexpected effects (APSC, 2009). Some policy objectives are simply beyond government. The surrender of many eco­ nomic controls over the economy, for example, might have long-term benefits for growth and competitiveness but mean government has limited ability to influence important (and politically sensitive) variables such as inflation or interest rates. It is imperative to choose the right policy instrument. It is equally important to be plain-spoken when no such instrument exists, or the problem is not amenable to gov­ ernment influence. Good tools cannot rescue bad ideas or misdirected effort.

7

Engagement

Engagement takes place throughout the policy cycle. It can define the nature of policy making, from simply seeking advice and testing options to co-designing an initiative with the public. Engagement encompasses the many ways government can frame, design and deliver a policy. Good engagement supports legitimacy and builds support for policy choices. This chapter examines the wide array of engagement techniques and approaches available to policy makers.

The defining feature of Australian representative democracy is free and fair elections. Yet citizens often expect a say between elections about choices affecting their community. The ubiquity of social media has strengthened expectations of public participation. Once secrecy was the hallmark of the policy domain, but community expectations have shifted. Groups outside government expect involvement in decision making. Indeed, the legiti­ macy of much public policy now rests on a perceived exchange between citizens and their government. Public servants and politicians must find ways to draw relevant communities of interest into the policy process, while avoiding unreasonable delays, vetoes from unre­ presentative groups, or abrogation of responsibility to vested interests. Traditionally, governments used the term “consultation” to reflect formal discussions within, and sometimes beyond, the state. Increasingly this is perceived as too narrow, as greater emphasis on participation marks much policy making. Options papers, invitations to submit ideas, citizen juries to make substantial choices about budget priorities—all have joined the policymaking repertoire as groups outside the structures of the state seek a direct voice in policy choices. Engagement can range from seeking views through to co-produc­ tion. ‘Nothing about us without us’, a powerful long-standing mantra about policy and programs among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, anticipates a wider challenge to the right of government to impose choices without opportunity first for voice.

The imperative for engagement The pressure on governments to interact with citizens and stakeholders about public policy is considerable. New forms of accountability, including developments in admin­ istrative law, encourage engagement as a phase within the public policy cycle. Using regulation as an example, the OECD (2021a) provides case studies of public participation at every point in the policy cycle. This reflects the reality that engagement, particularly for new regulation, is often a legal requirement as well as just smart policy making. DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-7

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Perhaps more significant, governments know that giving people a voice and showing they are heard can improve trust as well as enhance policy development and implementation. An engagement process offers policy makers a way to structure debate. It supports a solution more likely to “stick” because it reflects the realities of the problem and the competing interests of those involved. Engagement also provides an opportunity for policy makers to seek stakeholder input about whether a policy is feasible. In project planning, a feasibility study is a way to avoid costly mistakes while grasping the full range of economic, technical, cultural and legal issues at stake. Feasibility information helps improve the confidence of decision makers that a policy is not going to be riddled with embarrassing problems before it commences the implementation phase. Beyond testing feasibility, an engagement process can help define a problem and move toward co-design and co-production. This promotes trust and transparency in the policy process (Alford, 2017; Linders, 2012). Co-designed policy invites stakeholders to shape the problem as well as possible solutions. This encourages commitment as well as innovative, informed thinking (Evans, 2015; Holmes, 2011). Yet engagement carries costs, including the expenses and delays inherent in managing a large engagement exercise. A public process risks debate dominated by committed but unrepresentative voices, and stalemate because any choice is unacceptable to some. While engagement is valued by government for addressing legitimacy problems over contentious decisions, engagement has its own legitimacy issues. Who can claim a voice in engagement? If government alone decides, it risks imposing its preferences and so undermining the benefits of engagement. If self-appointed spokespeople for “the public interest” dominate the process, the results might not reflect broader community feeling. There are also challenges when weighing differing voices. Access to the engagement process and the capacity to state a case are seldom distributed evenly. It is always easier to deal with interest groups that can speak authoritatively for their membership, even though such groups might eclipse other representative but less-organised interests—or not be representative at all. Some activists become experts in their own right, who ‘jointly inhabit with technical, profes­ sional and business experts a world of high-intensity engagement’ (Stoker, 2006b: 116). This can lead to activism and public participation ‘dominated by the better off’ (Hay et al., 2008), isolated from those who are socially disadvantaged and unengaged. Goldfinch and colleagues (2009) found that wealthier, better educated and digitally savvy members of the public were more likely to engage than others. The intention behind engagement and participation can be lost in the rush to secure tangible evidence of engagement. Politics is for amateurs too. An important development in engagement practices has been the recognition of a diverse public. Cameron and Grant-Smith (2005) argue for layers of engagement to capture two views of citizenship: the transcendent (where the citizen acts with unreflective self-interest, thereby promoting beneficial difference in the community); and the transformative (where the citizen is reminded of others’ claims and is open to their own identity being transformed through reflection on other people’s perspectives). To encourage meaningful engagement Cameron and Grant-Smith (2005: 30) suggest a number of phases in the process, including separate engagement activities to provide marginalised groups with ‘safe spaces’ in which to explore and establish identity and ideas with like-minded people. At the same time, open forums can enable diverse groups to express and learn from alternative views and ‘respond to the perspectives of others in a process of public deliberation’. Participation and engagement are neither simple nor one-off events. Like most other points in the policy cycle, there are questions of judgement. A bias toward engagement is a

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helpful starting point, but decisions are required about the most appropriate approach. Pro­ ductive and meaningful engagement requires time, energy, clarity, deliberate purpose, and dedication. Only by paying attention to the unique characteristics in each engagement exercise will dividends follow. Deciding whether to use engagement requires analysis of costs and benefits, based on the type of decision and the value of sharing the choice with interested individuals and groups. Formal cost–benefit studies might sometimes be appropriate but can engender cynicism if seen as a box-ticking exercise. For example, an analysis of community engagement asso­ ciated with the Murray–Darling Basin suggests some engagement processes were perceived by their community as ‘a new benchmark for tokenism’ (Crase et al., 2005). When the engagement process was repeated in 2012, it was made more transparent, with nearly 12,000 submissions published on the Murray Darling Basin Authority website, and all proposals for change to the plan for the Basin analysed and reported by the Authority. In addition to the analysis of the costs and benefits, the decision to undertake con­ sultation is as much about political judgement. While engagement has many benefits, political objectives can, ultimately, override policy imperatives. Decisions about public participation in decision making reflect a dialogue between the technical requirements of public service advisers and the political needs of elected officials. Engagement is a ‘tool for involving the public in the right style of decision-making in the right context’ (Brackertz and Meredyth, 2009: 158). Sometimes this might not support the preferred outcomes that emerged from the process. For example, political goals appeared to shape the final decision after a huge two-and-a-half-year community engagement exercise was undertaken for the Tasmania Together blueprint (Althaus, 2008). Political imperatives also dominated the development of South Australia’s Strategic Plan, with a centralised and government-driven engagement process arriving at what was felt to be a predetermined outcome (Manwaring, 2010). Engagement processes can serve to shape the design and implementation of a policy but, in the end, might not determine the final decision made by government.

Advantages and challenges Engagement offers a wide array of advantages, while also posing some challenges. Sometimes it is useful to consider how a decision reached in isolation might look as tomorrow’s headline, and ponder whether some prior engagement might be prudent. Engagement can be frustrating too, adding time to already difficult processes. It can threaten technocratic sensibilities, shifting control away from ministers and bureaucrats to those invited into the policy process. Under traditional policy process models, much policy development takes place within the public sector. It is public servants who write the documents on which decisions are based. Ministers might relate extensively to the community, their political party, their constituents and the stakeholders in the portfolio, but broadly rely on public servants to manage the process, especially in the early and later stages of policy development. This often creates only a narrow band of time for public participation. Traditional bureaucracies are inherently constrained by process. This dampens engage­ ment processes, since public servants can ask questions but not commit to accepting advice— the final decision belongs to ministers. Bureaucracies must accommodate due process while adhering to confidentiality and privacy rules and other public accountability requirements. Accountability mechanisms do not always lend themselves to community engagement.

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Often governments do not articulate very clearly their objectives for engagement. This lack of clarity has mixed implications. On the one hand, the general acceptance of engagement as inherently desirable, even without clear goals, demonstrates its powerful appeal within modern societies. Engagement is part of the democratic process. On the other hand, the failure to establish clear objectives means that engagement programs are more likely to be inappropriately designed, inefficient, difficult to evaluate, and disappointing or even disillusioning for the public and public administrators alike. These kinds of outcomes serve only to discredit engagement efforts. Engagement is not a panacea for policymaking success, but rather an opportunity to improve outcomes and encourage creative thinking.

Different types of engagement There have been numerous attempts to classify engagement, but many begin with the simple but persuasive ‘ladder of participation’ developed by Sherry Arnstein. While working in a United States government agency, Arnstein (1969) became sceptical about what passed for engagement in policy making. Eventually she categorised opportunities for participation, from the token to the substantial, as shown in Figure 7.1. As her labels make clear, Arnstein was sceptical about much accepted practice, which she described as manipulation by officials at its worst, or just therapy to make people feel good but change nothing. These she rejected as not really engagement. Only on step 3 of her ladder does engagement begin to take shape, at first as sharing information, later as meetings and discussions. Even these leave officials as the decision makers. For Arnstein, meaningful engagement requires power to be shared through partnership and delegation or ceded through citizen control.

Figure 7.1 Arnstein’s ladder—degrees of citizen participation Source: Arnstein, 1969: 217.

96 The Australian Policy Handbook Arnstein’s influential work, first published in a planning journal, has influenced commu­ nity activists ever since (see, for example, Lauria and Slotterback, 2021). It is a call to arms to resist token attempts at engagement and instead demand substantive participation, with an appropriate mode of deliberation to match the problem in hand. The ladder of participation has likewise encouraged officials to think carefully about the purpose of engagement and to suggest processes that map onto government decision making. For example, an OECD study by Shand and Arnberg (1996: 21) suggested that public involvement in government action could be placed on a continuum, from minimal interaction through to complete cooperation. This work of designing better engagement mechanisms continues, with the OECD (2020) urging governments to ‘catch the deliberative wave’ so citizens are involved in decision making. The range of engagement choices is expressed well in a ‘public participation spectrum’ developed by the International Association for Public Participation Australasia and shown in Table 7.1. Table 7.1 IAP2 public participation spectrum Increasing level of public impact –> Inform

Consult

Involve

Collaborate

Empower

To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspira­ tions are consistently understood and considered.

To partner with the public in each aspect of the deci­ sion including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution.

To place final decisionmaking in the hands of the public.

We will work with you to ensure that your concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision.

We will look to you for direct advice and innovation in formulating solutions and incorporate your advice and recommendations into the decisions to the maximum extent possible.

We will imple­ ment what you decide.

Workshops Deliberative polling

Citizen Advisory Committees Consensus building Participatory decision-making

Citizen juries Ballots Delegated decisions

Public participation goal To provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problems, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions.

To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives and/ or decisions.

Promise to the public We will keep you informed.

We will keep you informed, listen to and acknowledge concerns and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision.

Example techniques to consider Fact sheets Websites Open houses

Public comment Focus groups Surveys Public meetings

© International Association for Public Participation (www.iap2.org), 2004.

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The IAP2 schema offers an implicit sequence of engagement steps, each tied to specific instruments (acknowledging that many of the example techniques in fact serve across multiple participation levels—websites or deliberative polling might inform a citizen jury, for example). The five steps of the participation spectrum include: Inform Information involves advising people about government policy. An advertising campaign to encourage safer driving—and announce the introduction of lower urban speed limits—is a familiar example of a government information campaign. This is a one-way process, educating the public about some policy initiative and its objectives. It does not allow client input to a choice. Information campaigns adopt the standard techniques of marketing. Surveys provide data on public opinion. This work is almost always done outside government by market research companies competing for government contracts. Companies also provide focus group research to test and refine a message. Focus groups bring together people chosen for their demographic characteristics who discuss a particular issue, view a trial advertisement or respond to key words and phrases. Such groups indicate how the intended audience will respond to the government’s message. Finally, with the research completed, governments use a mix of advertising avenues to present a public information campaign. Information campaigns are a necessary, and sometimes controversial, part of governing. Such campaigns typically attract criticism over cost and appropriateness. During the COVID-19 crisis the federal government attracted criticism first for advertisements that were seen as ineffective, obscure and too late to influence public behaviour when it was required. Later, a message showing a young COVID patient gasping for air was con­ demned as too confronting. The government persisted nonetheless, shifting focus toward a more socially acceptable message promoting widespread vaccination. Ministers understand that despite the criti­ cism, information campaigns can be important in changing opinions and behaviour. Often policy success relies on implementation by the public (as in getting a COVID vaccination). But information campaigns are not meaningful engagement because the flow of information goes just one way. Such campaigns have a role in the policy process but will not satisfy those looking for more consequential interaction. Consult Engagement seeks input from individuals and groups to a policy decision. Here consultation involves an exchange, although decision makers remain in charge of the agenda and out­ come. The process might involve surveys, public hearings or, more typically, meetings with interest groups representing various players in the policy arena. The goal is to improve policy and enhance its acceptability by taking into account the comments and interests of those likely to be affected. Regulation covering workplace health and safety, for example, is developed in this mode, with regular discussions between government, industry and unions. The engagement mode seeks to solicit, and respond to, views about a policy proposal from relevant people and groups. It can happen occasionally at a national level, as in the Australia 2020 Summit held in 2008 (Conley-Tyler, 2009; Davis, 2008). The Summit, co-chaired by the prime minister, was intended to bring together a broad cross section of stakeholders to shape a long-term strategy for the nation’s future across 10 different, broad policy areas.

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Most engagement, though, occurs around specific proposals ahead of scheduled gov­ ernment decisions. The most common mechanism for inclusion is the advisory committee. Community representatives on an advisory committee provide policy makers with direct and unfiltered views. Governments appreciate the two-way exchange provided by committees—greater community input into policy, but also an opportunity for policy makers to test their approach and objectives. Since key contacts might be a limited group, policy makers also arrange other gath­ erings such as interest group meetings to exchange views on a policy area with those who represent a viewpoint on government action. Should a policy proposal have implications for a community, as in an urban renewal or freeway project, or the construction of a new dam, policy makers might also organise town hall meetings or a community cabinet so the local community can hear about, and express views on, a proposed course of action. If the constituency is too diffuse, or the players too many to allow face-to-face meet­ ings, government can introduce a more formal engagement process. Many proposed regulations, for example, are made available through circulation of proposals. An intention to change a subordinate law is advertised in the press, with a date set for responses. Interested parties can put their case to be considered in the final policy decision. Similarly the discussion paper, or “green paper”, is a traditional means of consulting widely about a policy proposal. Interested parties make submissions that the govern­ ment assesses before publishing its decisions in a “white paper”. Alternatively, a process of public hearings is established, in which policy makers or specialist outsiders such as judges listen to points of view and consider the various cases before making recommendations. Whatever combination of techniques is adopted, consultation always involves opportu­ nities for public input. Yet policy makers remain in control of the process and its results. Faced with opposition to a proposal, policy makers might find it wise to withdraw but are under no obligation to do so. Consultation offers input but not a veto for individuals or interest groups on policy choices. Involve Involvement implies a partnership, a sharing of problem definition and responses. Part­ nership hands some control of a decision from public officials to the public. In this mode, clients can do more than just express opinions. They have some say about policy con­ tent, working in cooperation with decision makers. Often this is achieved through engagement structures, with clients and experts sitting on advisory boards, helping to shape policy and its implementation. Many welfare services, for example, use advisory boards of clients and public servants to decide priorities within the government’s overall framework. Involvement strategies draw the community into decision making. In Arnstein’s terms, this involves a sharing of power, as officials engage with people and communities affected by a decision. In specialist areas, government might establish formal policy communities—regular meetings of key interested parties in a policy field with some authority, implicit or formal, to set rules around policy choices. Contentious policy areas, such as urban planning, the environment and industrial relations are often managed through this form of engagement. Policy communities allow the players to understand each other’s concerns and interests and seek agreements balancing competing interests.

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Epistemic communities of experts can develop similar characteristics, as players build a shared understanding of a policy issue (see Chandler, 2008). Whatever the benefits, a policy com­ munity might struggle for legitimacy, particularly when experts develop over time a shared understanding of a problem that seems a long way from broader community attitudes. Policy communities can be slow and difficult forums for policy discussion, but they might find resolutions where otherwise only conflict and disagreement prevail. Representativeness must be carefully considered when consulting through partnership bodies. Can a public housing client or an employee’s representative claim to speak for others? Why, when discussing people with disabilities, should one organisation but not another be given a voice in the engagement? Governments often address this concern by asking peak bodies to represent their sector. Sometimes governments go further and create such peak bodies. The Consumers Health Forum of Australia, for example, was founded and funded by government to represent consumer interests in various health policy discussions, and so allow structured engagement. Case 7.1: A study in partnership—parks policy in the Northern Territory As Traditional Owners, Aboriginal people control much ancestral country in the Northern Territory, an association integral to identity and meaning. Such ownership was long disputed, and legal rulings have been important if sometimes inconclusive in establishing prior rights. For a time, litigation became the preferred policy instrument— let the courts decide tenure so the Territory government could work within a regime defined by judges. As Brown (2021b) shows in an ANZSOG case study on parks policy, a new gov­ ernment in the Territory decided to think again about its approach to land use. It turned to engagement, and ultimately negotiation, in the search for a less adversarial and legalistic approach. Governments often have multiple objectives, and land use policy in the Territory inclu­ ded aspiration for Aboriginal recognition and self-determination, better economic returns from the land, particularly for tourism, regional development including Aboriginal employment, and the consolidation of environmentally sensitive parks for conservation and preservation. Finding a path to a policy settlement was the responsibility of a newly established Office of Indigenous Policy within the Department of the Chief Minister. It worked with a range of agencies, including the Territory Parks and Wildlife Service. Many of the new parks proposed by the Territory government would require leases from the Traditional Owners, represented through the Northern Land Council and the Central Land Council. Those title holders had other options. They could withdraw support for parks the Territory government hoped to gazette, with consequences for existing tourism and mining operations. Any subsequent litigation over national title was likely to be expensive and lengthy. Meanwhile the always lively politics of the Territory, and some existing tensions among the parties, ensured any confidential process might be sabotaged through media leaks. The policy process chosen required a carefully coordinated process of engagement. This began with Chief Minister Clare Martin meeting the leadership of the two land councils and putting a detailed package on the table for consideration. A taskforce of key players then worked through the detail. At heart was a complex but workable

100 The Australian Policy Handbook proposal: the Territory government would negotiate an Indigenous Land Use Agree­ ment for each new park. This would allow land for the park to be leased back to the Territory without extinguishing the underlying native title. The work took a year, but an agreement was eventually captured in the Parks and Reserves (Framework for our Future) Act 2003. Along the way the concept was framed as a benefit to all Territorians and pursued through stakeholder engage­ ment. This eventually extended beyond the Land Councils to all affected Traditional Owners and Native Title Holders. Most but not all eventually signed on, and in some cases the Territory government abandoned a proposed park rather than depart from the agreed process. The establishment of significant new parks across the Northern Territory, with agree­ ment from Traditional Owners, was slow, but likely still achieved more quickly than the alternative legal process. More importantly, the outcome reflected a willingness to work with landholders as partners through engagement and negotiation. The process recog­ nised the differing interests of the parties but, through discussion, identified shared objectives for an agreement. Two decades later the key policy goals remain secure, from preservation of biodiversity to new employment prospects for Aboriginal rangers. Further, the precedent provided the basis for further park development and so assisted the large tourism industry that now benefits the people of the Territory.

Collaborate Collaboration hands control of the policy agenda to a group outside government. It can allow for local place-based decisions. Collaboration can also be a way to provide officials and ministers with some distance from contentious decisions. In most states, for example, parole for prisoners is delegated to a community board, with no direct role for politicians. Access to fisheries—a perennially intractable policy matter—is also often handled by a statutory authority such as the Australian Fisheries Management Authority. Monetary policy is man­ aged by the independent Reserve Bank, and public broadcasting by independent boards for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Special Broadcasting Service. Collaboration shifts policy responsibility to an institution or process outside political con­ trol. This might be as close as the policy cycle ever comes to the “rational” process in which evidence is collected and weighed, and judgement provided with supporting arguments— even if the impact on learning and decision making is not always evident (Stark, 2019b). Public inquiries are a standard feature of Australian policy formulation. They provide an impartial forum to explore an issue and settle on authoritative recommendations (Prasser and Tracey, 2014; Mintrom et al., 2020). The Australian Law Reform Commission (2009: 47) investigated Royal Commissions and official inquiries in the Australian context and found governments are likely to use these mechanisms when: • • • •

confronted with an issue or problem where immediate action is necessary lacking the expertise or coercive powers to handle an issue or investigation needing to explore a very complex or novel matter in a manner that is beyond the scope of administrative resources needing to investigate allegations of impropriety where the government, or an individual working in government, is involved.

Engagement 101 Inquiries invite submissions to obtain evidence and views. Public hearings provide opportunities for engagement. Reports typically list the range of arguments and evi­ dence put before the inquiry, indicating the dimensions of the policy debate. Of course, inquiries can also be a way for governments to defer contentious issues—in the words of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, royal commissions ‘take minutes and waste years’. The use of assessment studies is a more recent style of delegation. Here, govern­ ments impose a process on decision making that puts decisions at one remove from ministers. Proposals for a new tourism development, airport or mine must meet certain threshold standards before government will issue the necessary approval or lease. Independent consultants study the proposal and consult with the local com­ munity. Their detailed reports inform the government’s decision and might constrain ministerial options. Environmental impact statements are the most familiar form of this kind of assessment, and social impact studies are also becoming important to policy making (e.g. see McIntosh, 2010; see also Chapter 5, about policy analysis frameworks). Such studies are particularly useful when communities are sharply divided on the merits of a proposal, since the study provides detailed and authoritative data on all aspects of the choice, including the views of interested parties. Increasingly, Health Impact Assessments are also becoming important in health policy making, with practical guides to assessing now available for policy officers (Harris et al., 2007). Assessment studies provide government with grounds for a decision on technical rather than political criteria. Empower Finally, it is possible to pass control of a policy issue entirely to the public—to empower citizens to make a key decision. Section 128 of the Australian Constitution establishes the referendum as a means for direct decision by the people about an amendment to the rules. The threshold is high—a successful referendum must be approved by both houses of parliament followed by a majority of voters in a majority of states and territories. In practice this means opposition by either major political block ensures defeat, as has been the experience over the past century. There have been 21 national referenda since federation, offering 44 proposals for constitutional change. Only eight proposals have been accepted. A constitutional change must command a very broad coalition to prevail. The 1967 referendum to count Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the census is the paradigm case, with 90.7 percent support. Even so, generations later governments still hesitate about proposing a further vote on recognition and reconciliation as outlined by the Uluru Statement from the Heart, which proposes a First Nations Voice enshrined in the constitution (the text of the Statement is presented in Appendix 2). A variation on a referendum is a plebiscite—in effect, advice to parliament through a non-binding vote on a contentious issue. This is an instrument rarely used at national level to date but provides an avenue to resolve an intractable political disagreement without the difficult formal requirements of a referendum. A plebiscite tests the national mood and provides a clear message to Parliament. When the Coalition could not reach internal agreement over marriage equality provisions, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced a postal ballot. The vote in late 2017 saw 61.6 percent of Australian voters approve a change to marriage law. The Coalition

102 The Australian Policy Handbook government then supported legislation through Parliament, although some Coalition members maintained their opposition to the move. Plebiscites have also been employed to determine issues that are not constitutional questions, such as the choice of national anthem, the introduction of daylight saving, and extended trading hours. Popular control of a policy issue is an important way to settle controversial topics in which the policy process is unlikely to reach a satisfactory or legitimate resolution. Two other options for control are available, although neither is usually described as a form of empowerment. The first is the non-decision. At various times governments find themselves bound by laws they do not wish to enforce but would struggle to secure a parliamentary majority to overturn. Such issues are typically moral rather than partisan, with sensitivities that run across party lines. Hence laws about abortion, prostitution, euthanasia and sexuality might have little relation to actual practice. It can be easier to leave old statutes in place but ignore them than to open difficult debates. The second method for transferring policy control is privatisation. Organisations once directed by government are sold, shifting government responsibility from ser­ vice provision to a market. Familiar examples include Telstra, electricity generation, employment services and support for those living with disability through the National Disability Insurance Scheme. Privatisation removes potential conflicts of interest between government as trading entity and government as regulator and policy maker. Privatisa­ tion solves a problem for government by outsourcing unpopular decisions but might in time introduce new complications as government proves unable to influence major concerns of citizens.

New directions in engagement Finding ways to engage, discuss and share decisions is a burgeoning field. There are consultancies that help government structure programs around particular policy issues, and a lively literature on techniques for improved citizen participation (see, for example, Holmes, 2011; Hendriks et al., 2020; Hendriks and Dzur, 2021; OECD, 2020). While any list will be incomplete, a number of engagement modes have become prominent in Australian practice and might well endure. Charrette A charrette is a structured way to work through an issue, using design principles devel­ oped in urban planning contexts. For a charette a planning agency will assemble a team with interdisciplinary expertise—architects, planners, economists, engineers—for an intensive workshop around a development proposal. Typically this happens at the site of the proposed construction, so the context is clear and visible. The charrette might be completed in a single afternoon or over several days, but the focus is on solving key design questions through collaboration until a plausible plan emerges, which can be recommended to government (World Bank, 2015). While the charrette model has limitations when applied beyond urban design projects, the idea of a workshop placed under time pressure to find a policy answer has obvious merits. A charrette requires diverse interests to work together on actionable advice—that is, to propose an immediate solution rather than a call for further studies or more time.

Engagement 103 Deliberative democracy The deliberative democracy movement argues that when ‘given the authority, time, and information, everyday people take the tough questions, side-step party lines, and deliver sensible answers’ (newDemocracy, 2021). Hence proponents of deliberative democracy recommend collective decision making using fora other than parliament to investigate, debate and ultimately vote on a policy proposition. Examples of deliberative democracy techniques include focus groups, deliberative polling, mini-publics, citizens’ assemblies, citizens’ juries and calls for citizens chosen by lottery to replace elected politicians for some issues (Belgiorno-Nettis, 2020). Deliberative democracy offers techniques policy makers can deploy to reduce conflict and build consensus. It is a form of “public education” that encourages citizens to understand the dilemmas inherent in a policy choice when they, like politicians, must face the complex task of making decisions in the interests of the common good and not just based on their own preferences. The notion of deliberative democracy encourages people to develop a community view without necessarily holding a direct interest in the issue. Yet the deliberative democracy project is fraught with its own tensions. The concept of parliamentary government is sometimes pitted against engagement. As representatives of an electoral community, politicians are constantly engaged in seeking information, talking with community, and political polling. They can argue their role in a democracy should carry more weight than any engagement processes. There is no clear answer as to when a decision is best made by representative or deliberative democracy. In 2009, Australia’s first Citizens’ Parliament was convened, involving 150 randomly selected citizens, one from each federal electorate. They were invited to discuss the topic ‘How can Australia’s political system be strengthened to serve us better?’ A number of local preparatory meetings were held in state capitals and an online forum established for initial proposal development and discussions to be presented at the final session of the Citizens’ Parliament. This four-day convening was designed to encourage citizens to understand the proposals put forward, allow them to review initial stances on the issues formed during the preparatory meetings, and listen to expert opinion on the policy area. Six recommendations were ultimately made and presented to government. Dryzek’s (2009) analysis of the event found that citizens’ views changed significantly through the process. When citizens are allowed to deliberate, they develop a sense of ownership over the political system and view it as worthwhile. It is perhaps telling that none of the key recommendations from the Australian Citizens’ Parliament were taken up and implemented by the professional political class. Citizens’ forums or juries ‘seek to bring a small panel of randomly selected lay citizens together to deliberate on a policy issue’ (Hendriks, 2002: 65). The process typically involves experts, who might include academics or interest groups, making presentations to the forum, which in turn develops policy recommendations on the basis of the information provided. In a case involving container disposal in New South Wales, Hendriks (2002) describes how commercial interest groups found the process threatening and ultimately withdrew. The interest groups were accustomed to communicating directly with government and were hostile to the idea of infor­ mation being interpreted by people ‘who have no knowledge or interest in the issue’. It is these very characteristics, argues Hendriks (2002: 69), that make citizens’ forums ‘effective for the democratic project’.

104 The Australian Policy Handbook The Melbourne City Council developed a ten-year city strategy through a citizen jury process. Such exercises have become common in local government; in the case of Mel­ bourne the approach built on earlier experiments with a strategy and Council budget designed by a jury drawn from the ratepayers of the city. Such juries follow a well-established approach. In late 2015 the Lord Mayor of Mel­ bourne appointed six “ambassadors”, prominent citizens to lead an engagement process in three phases. The first phase invited citizens to submit their ideas for the city, using both template documents and their own preferences. Those interested were provided with data about the city to inform their contributions. Open for two months, the broad engagement process attracted 2,000 people across 30 public events, and about the same number through online channels. In the second phase, city officials and the six ambassadors reviewed all the data received, including nearly 1,000 ideas from the public, and used it to provide a detailed commentary on the existing city plan. This document informed the final phase of the process, deliberation. Melbourne resi­ dents were invited to apply to join a citizens’ jury, with 50 chosen to reflect key demographic categories. Jury members met each Saturday over six weeks to work through an agenda that reflected input from the first two phases, the original strategy plan to be updated, and the views of jury members about priorities. After much lively conversation, and an emerging consensus about key issues, a final document was reviewed by the ambassadors and presented to the Melbourne City Council, where it was adopted unanimously. Future Melbourne 2026 (Melbourne City Council, 2016), updated each four years, remains the city’s key strategic statement. Such deliberative democracy projects can provide government with a “mandate to act”. Key deliberative democracy protagonists Lyn Carson and Janette Hartz-Karp (2005: 122) suggest three criteria to guide effective deliberative processes: 1 2 3

Influence. The process should have the ability to influence policy and decision making. Inclusion. The process should be representative of the population and inclusive of diverse viewpoints and values, providing equal opportunity for all to participate. Deliberation. The process should provide open dialogue, access to information, respect, space to understand and reframe issues, and movement towards consensus.

Digital engagement Australians are enthusiastic in adopting new technology. Despite challenges with the National Broadband Network roll-out, and issues with digital exclusion, costs and reliability, some 99 percent of Australians report access to the network (ACMA, 2021). Social media platforms have become a standard forum for communication. In an emergency—pandemics, bushfires, floods—Australians count on text messages on their smart phones from govern­ ment agencies with the latest information. Numerous government services are now online, and integration of access to personal information is standard through the MyGov portal and other apps. Governments have used technology to simplify familiar tasks, from annual tax returns and the national census to checking vaccination status at public venues. The focus of connection in the digital domain is often better service delivery. The use of the internet as an aid to meaningful policy engagement has been less successful. Aspirations for improvement in citizen engagement are yet to materialise at the scale or level of impact predicted. As the 2019 review of the Australian Public Service concluded,

Engagement 105 ‘the APS is in an early stage of digital literacy and behind comparable governments. It needs to accelerate digital transformation’ (Independent Review of the APS, 2019: 143). There are many promising individual examples of digital engagement, from crowdsourcing policy ideas—‘citizen sourcing’ (Loukis et al., 2015)—to interactive feedback mechanisms about government programs and policy suggestions. The Victorian govern­ ment has developed an ‘Engage Victoria’ web portal, a single site that provides links to every current engagement project open across the state (Engage Victoria, 2021). The City of Perth council runs a similar webpage, an invitation to participate in planning and feedback about projects past and present in the city (City of Perth, 2021). It includes links to events, and opportunities to contribute to policy conversations such as discussion around a LGBTQIA+ plan for Perth. Nonetheless, much digital interaction with citizens remains either transactional service delivery or new delivery for familiar models. The use of formal green papers and requests for submissions has become a web-based activity but is essentially an old model trans­ ferred to email; even the Digital Transformation Agency (2020) issued a conventional public engagement paper when seeking comment on a new digital identity system. Despite instances of innovation and success, social media and online connectivity have yet to transform policy making, or even policy engagement. A “like” button for a policy proposition hardly translates into policy co-production. Nevertheless, social media and the digital government movement are important and, in time, should change much about management and shape of the policy cycle (O’Reilly, 2011). Social capital and collective impact ‘Social capital’ is a concept introduced by Harvard academic Robert Putnam (1995, 2000). It argues that citizens need not just information and a voice through voting, but opportunities to be part of networks, to interact with others, to test their thinking through many and varied forms of engagement. Such networks build shared values and trust across the community. For government, social capital is an unstated prerequisite for successful policy formulation and implementation. A community that hears regular conversations about public health, has access to viewpoints from a range of expert opinion, is comfortable debating ideas and trusts public agencies is more likely to participate in a vaccination program during a pandemic. Social capital is the shared norms, values and understanding that enable a society to work together on a common agenda. The Productivity Commission (2003: 1) talks of social capital as the glue to bind together society in a coherent and positive manner. In Bowling Alone (1995), Putnam stressed that much social capital forms outside the state. Connections and networks spring from human interaction—from involvement in sporting associations, churches, professional societies, unions, school groups, voluntary and service clubs. All express—and build—social capital. Those who are rich in social capital become deeply connected, resilient and comfortable about navigating amid diversity and differing views. What worried Putnam was a decline in social capital towards solitarism and rank individualism, with the breakdown of social ability that follows. For government the dilemma is simple: social capital helps policy succeed but cannot be mandated. In the United Kingdom, a Minister for Loneliness has been established to address social isolation and encourage greater connections among citizens (Keller, 2019). Yet some argue that ‘social capital cannot be legislated, bought, taught, or standardised’ (Allen Consulting Group, 2006: 37). It can, though, be encouraged through government

106 The Australian Policy Handbook initiatives, which provide citizens with meaningful voice in policy decisions that affect them and their communities. The role of engagement in the policy cycle serves a pur­ pose that goes beyond the immediate decision in play—it builds the underlying social capital that governments need to operate successfully. One manifestation of social capital built outside government but ultimately important for local program delivery is the move toward place-based initiatives called collective impact— creating and deploying social capital to involve an entire community in understanding and addressing a shared problem (Cottam, 2019; Davis, 2021a). For example, the Adelaide Zero Homelessness project brings together 35 partners around a shared goal of providing better choices for the 148 people sleeping rough on Adelaide streets when the project launched. The work began with a Charter—an invitation for citi­ zens to get involved. Then came a call for volunteers, with up to 50 people working each night to find and support homeless people (Don Dunstan Foundation, 2021). Any collective impact project stands at the very edge of traditional government policy making, because decision making is no longer in the hands of ministers or officials. The Adelaide Zero Homelessness project was created by the Don Dunstan Foundation, and although government is involved it is not in control. Collective action initiatives—such as the Maranguka justice reinvestment program in Bourke, Logan Together in south-east Queensland or The Hive in the western suburbs of Sydney—ask community to lead and government to follow. They expect government services to reconfigure around the collective impact goals, to coordinate and share service delivery in ways often deeply uncomfortable for public agencies. Nothing builds social capital like a community that decides to address homelessness, or school readiness, youth employment or local incarceration. Yet this is no longer gov­ ernment in the familiar sense—it is transfer of control, a shift in power to the higher rungs of Arnstein’s ladder of participation. A collective impact project marks the point at which engagement is no longer just part of the policy cycle but transfers control from government to community.

Designing an engagement process Engagement is a two-way exchange. When active participation or direct control is part of policy making, governments must balance their own process needs with those of the affected communities. This requires planning, care, information sharing, and respect for disparities in experience and understanding. To avoid the pitfalls of poor engagement, processes must be tightly structured, with clearly specified terms of reference, timelines and goals. This lets parties to engagement know the process ahead and keeps the discussion and decision making focused. Purpose Policy makers might decide on engagement to: • • •

improve the quality of policy decisions through access to relevant information and perspectives, including exchange of problem and solution definitions, alternatives and criteria ensure understanding, acceptance and legitimacy of proposed policies promote consensus about policy choices

Engagement 107 • •

anticipate challenges to the policy process by providing transparency, accountability and opportunities for participation encourage social capital to assist policy implementation, and as an inherently worthwhile objective in a democracy.

From the purpose, and the problem to be addressed, flows the appropriate type of engagement. Method • • •

The resources to be spent on engagement should reflect the nature and significance of the problem to be addressed, and the time available. Most engagement processes use a range of instruments, aiming to limit the inherent biases of any one approach by seeking opinion through a range of different avenues. Agencies should be clear about their objectives. These can range from disseminating information, through to engagement, partnership, delegation or control.

Identifying stakeholders • • •

While engagement material might be distributed to those identified by policy makers as relevant interests, there must be avenues for others to self-identify as par­ ties to the engagement process. Barriers such as language, physical and educational disadvantage, resources and time might prevent some stakeholders from contributing. The mix of engagement methods must address inclusiveness in the process. It is important to advertise the engagement process, even if most who see the advertisement choose not to participate.

Beginning engagement • • • •

The objectives and parameters of engagement should be clear. Documentation should establish in advance the purpose, process and outputs of the engagement phase. Policy makers must identify the full impact of a proposal so all affected parties understand the issue at stake. The process of engagement should be transparent throughout. Engagement should begin early enough to permit consideration of comments and suggested alternatives.

Consulting with individuals and groups • • •

Policy makers should meet with the main interest groups to discuss their views. The purpose and agenda of such meetings, as well as the kind of information that will be useful, should be clear in advance. Reaching an “unorganised” public is more difficult and might rely on circulating written proposals, calling public meetings, and using talkback radio, social media and other techniques designed to solicit opinions. Agencies should avoid “engagement overload”, particularly with voluntary community groups, by coordinating processes, stakeholders and schedules among departments.

108 The Australian Policy Handbook • •

Enough time is needed for representative bodies to consult their members. For most engagements, three months should be the norm and two months the absolute minimum. Engagement places a burden on those consulted. To minimise these costs, any written information should be concise and clearly show the issues at stake.

When engagement is complete • • • •

Comments should be acknowledged as soon as possible. It is important to “close the loop”. Interest groups and the public should know how their input has been used. This is essential for building trust and credibility. Details of the outcome should be provided to commentators. Feedback should include a summary of the views and information collected, and the resulting pro­ posals or action. Processes for listening to citizens after policies are implemented can help identify problems on a continuing basis and ensure continuous improvement.

Engagement traps • • • • •

Not all citizen action groups or industry spokespeople are legitimate representatives of their community. The basis on which people claim to speak for others must be clear. Highly organised and expert interest groups are most likely to participate in the process, digest the information offered and provide substantive comments. There is a risk that professional lobby groups will dominate engagement processes, particularly if the issues are technical, complex or otherwise difficult to communicate for less organised or financed groups. The credibility of the engagement process depends on sound reputation. Engage­ ment strategies that pay lip-service to drawing communities into the policy process will not return positive outcomes. Policy makers should not presume that they already know the issues or the answers. Just like any human relationship-building exercise, second-guessing and making 1

Set the direction • Define the objective • Select a method • Identify stakeholders 2

Engage with stakeholders • Meet with main interest groups and stakeholders • Consult with and inform the public 3

Close the loop • Acknowledge stakeholder comments • Inform stakeholders of outcomes

Figure 7.2 The stages of engagement

Engagement 109

•

assumptions are unhelpful. All parties to the engagement process should be given the chance to think through and communicate their views and ideas. A fundamental trap is the failure to consult relevant parties, including other agencies of government, opinion makers and affected bodies.

Designing an engagement process is frequently complex, time-consuming work. The lists above set out in detail the many elements in play—Figure 7.2 summarises their key features.

Engagement as participation Engagement is essential but often not easy. It can be difficult to identify all the stakeholders in a policy area. Often there are multiple interests at stake—those who will benefit from a new toll road, but also people living in the path of the development; businesses along the old road likely to lose custom; environmental concerns about a forest or area of cultural significance; lobbies for and against greater access to the new transport corridor. Each will criticise the process if they do not achieve their desired result. Engagement is unlikely to find a simple path through the con­ undrum but if done well it will ensure people have a chance to be heard, to present relevant evidence, to ensure government understands every dimension of the choice to be made. Without engagement, legitimate and workable solutions to many problems prove elusive. Rather than despair at the complications, policy makers can develop better tools for engagement, provide opportunities for greater participation in the policy cycle, and deploy the many opportunities digital communications open to lively community participation in decision making.

8

Coordination

Governments strive to work in a coordinated way, so the parts work together. Cabinets institutionalise coordination through documented routines and established structures. Routines are procedures required of policy advisers. Structures include the central agencies that manage the routines and provide whole-of-government advice to key ministers. This chapter describes the routines and structures used in Australian governments, and the relationship between bureaucratic coordination and political control.

Policies are based on shared goals. Government programs should work together, not at cross-purposes, and priorities must be assigned between competing proposals. Coordina­ tion in government is a virtue. Coordination in government takes many forms. It can refer to a sense of coherence in overall government direction; it can speak of a sense of consistency in the specific objectives and policies of government; it can reflect ideas of efficient interaction between multiple parties working together to achieve a common goal; and it can refer to the need to consult with multiple parties to allow input that will ensure a particular policy is a workable proposal. At a program level, coordination can deliver systems working toward a shared goal. States and territories, for example, run maternal and child health programs. Hospitals, health departments and family services agencies collaborate during the early years of life to ensure babies are thriving, vaccinations happen on schedule, and signs of stress or domestic violence are reported. It is a system that is free, universal and has developed over decades. The success of maternal and child health programs shows the benefit from coordination as many parts work together. In theory, such coordination should be possible at every step in the policy process. Ideally it would characterise not just policy delivery but policy design, a continuous conversation among ministers, officials and citizens. In practice, reality is rarely so neat. Time is short, goals can conflict, and each agency has its own mission to pursue. Problems arise quickly and demand answers before there is time to test for coherence. This is a world described by complexity theory. It suggests the normal state of nature is not one of balance and response, but of ‘recovery from the last disaster’. Complex systems are ‘on the edge of chaos’ (see Geyer and Rihani, 2010). In an unstable world, coordination is the means to manage an orderly disorder.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-8

Coordination 111

Coherence Modern governments are networks of loosely linked organisations rather than a single hierarchy amenable to command and control (Painter, 1987: 9). Departments and statutory authorities have their own goals and perspectives. Coordination amid this complexity requires rules about giving advice to decision makers. The policy process must include ways for advisers to: • • • •

acknowledge potential conflict over policy goals report the perspective of each player in the decision consider the arguments in a structured way arrive at a recommendation.

Ideally, government will have a well-developed and widely distributed policy framework, setting out economic, social and environmental objectives. It will behave corporately—a unity with multiple parts in pursuit of the same goals. Many state and federal documents set out an overarching guide to the government’s strategic agenda (Althaus, 2008). Few go as far as New Zealand, where successive prime ministers mandate goals that cut across ministerial responsibilities. The aim is coordi­ nation and collaboration against national objectives. The Public Finance Act 1989 requires each minister to certify their department’s plan ‘is consistent with the policies and performance expectations of the Government’ (see, for example, New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2018). The challenge with a whole-of-government strategic plan is often the translation from broad goals to specific actions. Much government activity will not be mentioned in the plan and, even when covered, the plan is unlikely to provide detailed instruction. How would an overall goal around improved community health, or better outcomes for children, guide priorities within an already existing, complex, maternal and child health network? Coordination through the cabinet process is an important routine for seeking this clarification and consistency. It means when a decision is made the perspectives of other relevant departments, and the advice of coordinating agencies, can be brought into the discussion. This reflects the reality of government. Policy goals are scattered through many sources: budget papers, white papers, electoral pronouncements, social justice strategies and recent legislation. Occasionally, a prime minister or premier makes a landmark speech outlining a comprehensive program. More often, overall policy objectives must be inferred from various sources and tested through engagement and coordination. Central agencies work for key ministers, in particular the prime minister and treasurer, who are key players in establishing this overall framework. Like line departments, central agencies must often work from clues rather than explicit state­ ments of intent. But proximity to decision makers and consistent involvement in policy development across government ensure central agencies are well informed about government pronouncements and intentions. Hence central agencies both act as a resource for departments about policy frameworks and advise cabinet on the fit between a proposal and the heritage of policy choices. Securing policy coordination is their core responsibility.

112 The Australian Policy Handbook

Consistency Consistency in government requires: • • • •

internal consistency of policies and decisions equal treatment of citizens or regions within the jurisdiction ethical and appropriate behaviour by officials, with a recognition of any conflicts of interest adherence to due process and official procedures.

Achieving consistency by coordinating within government is not easy. Governments in a federal system such as Australia must also grapple with the additional coordina­ tion overlay across governments of different levels. Coordination of relationships, functions and goals between federal, state and local governments must be managed if policy intentions are to be achieved. Governments also need consistency between government and external providers and policy actors. Finally, there are international agreements with other nations and organisations, and with transnational networks, making multi-dimensional governance a common reality. Coordination turns policy makers into glass bead players. The complexity and scale of government, and the need for specialisation, make it impossible for any one person—or even a committee such as cabinet—to track all the relevant variables in motion. The considerable cost of closely meshing policies and programs can outweigh the benefits. Coordination may be necessary, but it is an aspiration realised only with many compromises. Governments have multiple and sometimes conflicting goals. At any given moment they are under pressure to reduce red tape yet regulate new technology, to restrain urban sprawl yet make housing affordable, to lower taxes yet invest more in defence. Decision makers and policy advisers learn to live with some incoherence. Coordination aims to minimise, but may not eliminate, logical inconsistencies.

Consultation and efficiency Governments include a coordination phase in their policy cycle because they seek tolerable compatibility across activities. Coordination is institutionalised through a combination of pro­ cedures and structures. All government departments face coordination challenges, and central agencies have particular responsibilities for achieving a level of coherence in public policies. A first step in coordination requires agencies to consult within government, as this allows other departments to offer suggestions about the appropriateness of a new policy proposal. Consultation draws a proposal into the framework of existing programs admi­ nistered by other agencies. In the networked environment, departmental consultation might incorporate the views and input of collaborators and partners in the network, or these parties would be consulted separately. Review by central agencies follows. This imposes a whole-of-government perspective, so a particular policy idea from a line department is tested against the overall policy direction of government. Central agencies ask a number of simple questions—usually imposed by the format of cabinet submissions—about the policy, financial and administrative implications of a proposal. Is the submission consistent with existing objectives? Can it be afforded? Are

Coordination 113 there legal or organisational issues? Are there consequences for particular interest groups? Who was engaged in policy development and what was their response? The answers to these questions—those supplied by line departments and those reached by central agencies—form the basis of policy briefs to senior ministers. Such briefs are a key instrument of coordination. They let cabinet decide about consistency. Central agencies use standardised routines to test the consistency of a submission with other government objectives. Routines require agencies to state, for example, whether funding is available, along with the social, economic, regulatory or environ­ mental implications of the proposal. Central agencies coordinate intergovernmental discussions through mechanisms such as the National Cabinet, or one of the many ministerial coordinating committees that bring representatives of the Commonwealth, states, territories and sometimes local government into policy conversations. The routines of coordination operate as checklists of questions asked by central agencies about policy proposals. These query the importance of an issue, the quality of the original policy analysis, the choice of instruments and the depth of consultation—in essence checking the work of the policy cycle. If the submission lacks information or does not answer serious concerns about the proposal, central agencies request more detail from the originating department. The objective is not to obstruct policy ideas but to ensure that submissions address all relevant aspects of the proposal, and thus empower cabinet to make well-informed decisions. Coordination is pursued through procedure, starting with the strict format of the cabinet submission, which demands detail against a range of headings. The draft submission is circulated to relevant agencies for consultation comments, then lodged with the central agencies, which check information, evaluate content, and suggest modifications. Only then will the submission proceed to cabinet for its deliberation. Of course, this form of coordination relies on the rigour of the cabinet process. When decision making occurs outside this forum, the opportunities for coordination are diminished. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO, 2021) investigated the operation of the Commuter Car Park Projects program within the Commonwealth’s Urban Congestion Fund, and found the mechanisms designed to ensure coordination with broader policy goals had not been effective. While the Department of Infra­ structure had developed technical criteria for selecting appropriate projects consistent with program objectives, the ANAO found ‘it was not demonstrated that projects were selected on merit’ (ANAO, 2021). Instead, choices were highlighted by minis­ terial staff and approved by the relevant minister just prior to the 2019 election campaign. A process that occurred outside cabinet produced investments of ques­ tionable value that did not most effectively advance the urban congestion goals government articulated in policy. The car parks case is an example of political imperative over consistent, coordinated policy choices. It is hardly unique—the careful logic built into a deliberative process will often rub up against the desire for quick and politically pressing decisions. Cabinet is tra­ ditionally the forum for weighing up all considerations, but with much delegated legisla­ tion, and a trend toward ministerial discretion on allocating funds, coordination may not strongly influence outcomes. Governments, of course, seek to avoid political gaffes and glaringly inconsistent policy positions, but there are times when consistency through coordination will be sacrificed. For officials, the challenge is to achieve a measure of cooperation and policy coherence amid competing imperatives.

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Central agencies Government is divided into departments, each with its own mission, culture and resources. Departmentalisation allows specialisation and focus, but risks dividing government into contradictory programs, with pointless competition between units and inconsistent outcomes for citizens. Central agencies work to resist this fragmentation by providing consistent rules and pro­ cesses. They view government as a single venture that balances devolved responsibilities with adherence to a shared set of norms. Central agencies offer a whole-of-government per­ spective when dissecting financial, administrative and policy aspects of a cabinet submission in briefing papers to ministers. From a policy perspective, central agencies check that proposals: • • • • • • •

are logical and well considered are consistent with other government announcements and programs are consistent with governing party policy are consistent with intergovernmental and international obligations meet cabinet guidelines are well presented and expressed clearly acknowledge precedence and are suitably timed.

From a financial perspective, central agencies must ensure that: • • • • •

money requested is really needed the initiative represents value for money the right priorities are met the overall budget is not exceeded there are no hidden traps likely to require sudden funding increases.

Finally, from an administrative perspective, central agencies will report on any implica­ tions of a policy proposal for: • • •

public sector employment, including equal opportunity implications employment or industrial relations generally legal, equity and fairness considerations.

The division of responsibility for examining these issues varies across jurisdictions. The list of “central agencies” is flexible, changing over time and by issue. Because all gov­ ernments must address policy, financial, legal and administrative issues, central agencies tend to be organised around these responsibilities. Generally, policy issues are pursued by the central policy agency, financial questions by Treasury and personnel arrangements by the public sector management agency. The prime minister will receive briefs on a cabinet submission from all three, along with legal advice if relevant from the attorney-general’s portfolio and political advice from the prime minister’s office. An important job of the leader is to maintain the general strategy of the government. These briefs from central agencies are therefore an important coordination mechanism—a way to pull together the diverse threads of policy. A whole-of-government perspective from the centre allows leaders to impose consistency on the vast array of decisions before any cabinet.

Coordination 115 Central policy agencies In Canberra, central policy coordination is the responsibility of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). In the states and territories, this task falls to the cabinet office, or to the Department of the Premier and Cabinet or Chief Minister. Some large local government authorities have developed a similar central policy capacity around the office of the mayor. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2021a, 2021b) describes itself as the team that provides ‘high quality advice and support to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, Portfolio Ministers and Assistant Ministers to achieve a coordinated and innovative approach to the development and implementation of Government policies.’ PM&C pub­ lications stress the agency’s role in reconciling differing views to provide the prime minister with a whole-of-government perspective (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2021b: 5). From a coordination perspective, the central policy agency’s role is to: • • • • • • • •

ensure policy proposals put to the prime minister, other ministers in the portfolio and cabinet are developed in a coherent, informed and coordinated fashion coordinate and monitor implementation and delivery of government decisions, policies and priorities, recognising that ministers are responsible individually for the administration of their departments and collectively for matters decided by cabinet provide services to the prime minister, cabinet and the government to enable the business of government to be managed in an efficient, effective and coordinated manner manage parliamentary and executive council support coordinate and facilitate government administration, intergovernmental relations and communications with state and territory governments ensure policy proposals meet Australia’s national and international commitments consult across government, the private sector, the not-for-profit sector and the community work closely with the Australian Public Service Commission to foster a high performing public service able to implement the government’s agenda.

These objectives, shared by Commonwealth and state and territory central policy agencies, require a structure that mirrors activities across government. The central policy agency employs specialists in every major area facing government to test views offered by line departments. These policy officers, often drawn from the agencies they monitor, are the core staff of policy coordination. In Canberra, PM&C staff are grouped around four coordination priorities—domestic policy, national security and international policy, gov­ ernance, and operating systems. Each contains specialist units, including working groups drawn together around particular priorities or projects. This structure allows the central policy agency to provide advice on every matter before government. It also provides capacity to coordinate intergovernmental negotiations, working to settle an agenda for each meeting of the National Cabinet. The relevant group will work closely with line agencies to ensure a consistent position on various working parties, and ensure the prime minister is briefed fully before attending meetings of government leaders. The central policy agency will also handle sensitive topics on behalf of government. This occurs when coordination challenges demand the authority of the prime minister,

116 The Australian Policy Handbook usually for a short time through a project. An example is the creation in March 2021 of the Office of the Climate Coordinator in PM&C to coordinate whole-of-government Australian government input to the UN Climate Change Conference late that year (Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, 2021: 95–99). Simi­ larly, Queensland’s Department of the Premier and Cabinet created a Taskforce for the Olympic Games scheduled for Brisbane in 2032. Central policy agencies in all jurisdictions operate in similar ways and must spend sig­ nificant time coordinating across jurisdictional boundaries. Senior officials from Canberra and the states and territories meet regularly to provide a measure of consistency in policy advice across borders (see Davis and Silver, 2015). Briefs prepared by the central policy agency are forwarded to the prime minister, premier or chief minister. There will be a brief on every item before cabinet, regular “topical” briefs on matters of the day and occasionally longer briefs that explore emer­ ging or long-running issues. Earlier annual reports listed the number of written briefs provided to the prime minister, assisting ministers and parliamentary secretaries—up to 5,000 annually according to former departmental secretary Peter Shergold (2004: 10). The complexity of issues and volume of material can only have increased. Leaders chair cabinet armed with an array of information and analysis supplied by central agencies. They can question ministers on details of a proposal, or how it fits into the wider scheme of government. Central financial agencies As the central policy agency advises on policy activity, so central financial agencies keep a close eye on the fiscal implications of existing and proposed policies. This function typically sits in the “budget” division of the state Treasury or Commonwealth Treasury and Department of Finance. When a line department prepares a cabinet submission, it must consult with the central financial agencies. Finance will certify that costings on the proposal are “agreed”—that is, Treasury agrees with the line agency that figures included in the submission accurately reflect the likely costs of the proposed program. Such agreement does not commit the treasurer to supporting the proposal in cabinet, nor Finance to brief its minister suppor­ tively. It is simply agreement the sums are accurate. Central financial agencies oversee the annual budget cycle that sets priorities among all programs for the year ahead. This is the government’s key annual commitment to coordination, as it captures in one document all the agreed priorities for the coming year. Departments make bids for new policy funds, through their minister, as part of the budget round. The central financial agency is likely to oppose spending outside the budget process, as this upsets fiscal forecasts and undermines budget discipline. Cabinet submissions outside the budget cycle therefore largely focus on implementation of policy proposals included in the budget papers. Nonetheless, governments must respond to issues not anticipated in the budget and maintain reserves (known in some jurisdictions as “the treasurer’s reserve”) to deal with these contingencies. Alternatively, agencies with an urgent policy proposal are instructed to find the necessary funds within their existing allocation. The Treasury or Finance Department is likely to provide a brief for its minister on matters included in the cabinet agenda, just as central policy agencies brief the chair of cabinet. Advice will be concerned principally, but not exclusively, with financial

Coordination 117 considerations. In most jurisdictions the treasurer’s brief is forwarded for information to the prime minister and included in the leader’s briefing papers. As with cabinet offices, budget divisions often mirror the structures of government, with specialist teams reporting on economic policy, social policy, national defence and other key expenditure areas. Budget officers become expert in the portfolios they monitor, working closely with line agencies on new proposals. The Commonwealth Department of Finance, for example, views the analysis and evaluation of new spending proposals as one of its central tasks. A prudent department will discuss a policy proposal with Treasury or Finance before presenting a cabinet submission. The Attorney-General’s Department When submissions carry legal implications, or require new legislation, departments must consult with the government’s legal agencies. Depending on the matter at hand, con­ sultation may be required with the Attorney-General’s Department, the Crown Solicitor or Solicitor-General and the Parliamentary Counsel, along with legal staff in the central policy agency. It is embarrassing (and often expensive) for governments to make mistakes about legal issues, so care is taken to ensure appropriate scrutiny before cabinet is asked to make a decision. The Commonwealth, for example, sets down very strict requirements in the Legislation Handbook about consultation for submissions with legal requirements. It suggests that legislation be considered only as a ‘last resort’. The Attorney-General’s Department carries a ‘whole-of-government responsibility for issues relating to legislation in key areas such as clearer Commonwealth laws, constitutional law, international law, human rights law, administrative law, criminal law, information law, private international law, federal courts and federal jurisdiction.’ Given the importance of legal frameworks for many policy areas, the Department provides the public sector with online resources to develop and test potential legislation (Attorney-General’s Department, 2021). Central personnel agencies When a submission has implications for the public sector workforce, advice is sought from the agency with responsibility for personnel. In most jurisdictions, this function is attached to the premier’s department, although some states and the Commonwealth retain free-standing personnel agencies, such as the Australian Public Service Commission (itself part of the prime minister’s portfolio). Providing coverage across all cabinet submissions can be a challenge— with just 200 staff, ‘the APSC is small for an organisation designed to drive strategic people management and uphold institutional integrity’ (Independent Review of the APS, 2019: 297). Advice from a central personnel agency may be included in the brief provided by the central policy agency or forwarded directly to the responsible minister. In the Com­ monwealth, the minister assisting the prime minister on public service matters may take to the cabinet table a brief on any public sector consequences from a submission. The central personnel agency will ensure government objectives around equal employment opportunity have been considered in developing a cabinet proposal. Employment implications may also attract the interest of departments responsible for employment or industrial relations. However, employees increasingly are treated as an element of budget rather than managed separately, and detailed personnel implications are left for the relevant line department to settle.

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Other consultation within government A line agency with a policy proposal to put before cabinet must consult the central agencies. It must persuade those agencies the proposal makes sense from a whole-of-government perspective and has been cleared for financial and legal consequences, with proper con­ sideration of public sector implications. This is often a process of bargaining, with significant modification of a submission before it finally reaches the cabinet agenda. The coordination process does not stop with the central agencies. Indeed, a daunting array of Commonwealth agencies may need to be consulted if affected by proposals. These can include: • • • • •

the Productivity Commission for regulatory matters the Treasury and Australian Taxation Office for taxation issues Department of the Environment for proposals with environmental consequences the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for issues concerning assistance to other countries Department of Home Affairs on security matters

The list can be expanded almost endlessly at Commonwealth level, and likewise for each state and territory. This form of internal government consultation is intended to assist coordination. It brings the proposals of one agency into alignment with practices elsewhere in government. As agency boundaries overlap, prior discussions about policy proposals anticipate disputes and lock in support before cabinet deliberation. The machinery of Central agency review

Departmental consultation Allows other departments to offer suggestions about the appropriateness of a new policy proposal

Imposes a whole-of-government perspective, where a policy idea from a line department is compared with the overall policy direction of government

Treasury Assesses the fiscal implications of existing and proposed policies

CENTRAL POLICY COORDINATION

When submissions carry legal implications, or require new legislation

When a submission has implications for the public sector workforce

Department of the Attorney-General

Central personnel agencies

Carries a whole-of-government responsibility for issues relating to legislation and ensures appropriate scrutiny is undertaken before cabinet is asked to make a decision

Provides advice from the agency with responsibility for personnel

Figure 8.1 Whole-of-government coordination

When affected by a proposal

Other consultation Brings the proposals of one agency into alignment with practices elsewhere in government (e.g. Productivity Commission, Australian Taxation Office)

Coordination 119 government changes to accommodate issues as they rise and fall in political or public pro­ minence. Keeping up to date with shifts in agency responsibilities, and ensuring appropriate consultation around policy proposals, is an essential if endless task.

Coordination comments Cabinet practice varies across jurisdictions, but in all Australian governments, cabinet submissions must include detail of consultation with other government agencies. This introduces contestability into the policy process. These “coordination comments” advise ministers on views about a policy proposal from within and beyond government. They alert cabinet to any inconsistencies between the proposals in the submission and practices elsewhere in government, and to concerns from some agencies about a proposal. The Commonwealth Cabinet Handbook (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020: 20) sets out in detail the two stages of coordination, consultation and reporting: 1

2

A proposed cabinet submission must be circulated in advance of a cabinet meeting or cabinet committee as an ‘exposure draft’ (or even, on occasion, a ‘pre-exposure draft’). This is a working paper, which invites departments to provide ‘substantive policy comments and drafting suggestions.’ The Cabinet Handbook warns that ‘ministers and departments must be prepared to amend the text of a draft in response to suggestions that are made in the consultation process’. Following consultation the amended cabinet submission—known in Canberra as the ‘Co-ordination final version’—is submitted to central agencies and affected departments for coordination comment.

Once completed and cleared by the cabinet secretary, the submission is included in the cabinet folders provided to each minister. Ministers can read the views of all interested agencies when considering a submission. To ensure time to receive and digest coordination comments, the completed documents must be circulated at least three working days before the relevant meeting. This three-day rule can only be breached with the agreement of the cabinet secretary. The Cabinet Handbook notes that coordination comments reflect ‘the impartial advice of the Australian Public Service to the Cabinet’. For many submissions, ministerial offi­ cers and the prime minister’s office may provide their own political comments, which sit alongside the central agency advice in the “Cabinet folders” circulated to ministers. This is, deliberately, an exhaustive process. Coordination comments allow cabinet to compare a particular policy proposal with the overall framework of government direction. They are designed to encourage consistency in government, not least by documenting explicitly any substantial disagreement. A key purpose of early consultation in the develop­ ment of proposals is to ensure that differences between ministers are resolved in advance of Cabinet consideration. If resolution is not possible, the briefing papers will identify the considerations and invite cabinet to reach an informed decision.

Coordination in departments Every complex organisation must grapple with ways to bring its disparate parts together— to “assemble” coherence amid many moving parts. This is as true for individual agencies as

120 The Australian Policy Handbook it is for governments, although on a smaller scale. The policy domain within agencies is usually charged by the chief executive with orderly management of policy processes and documents, with fulfilling the centre’s demands for routine intra-governmental consulta­ tion, and with testing the integrity and quality of divisional proposals to ensure overall direction matches agency and government strategy. The need for internal coordination has seen policy divisions and liaison units developed within departments, usually close to the agency head. These units are responsible for policy development and appraisal, liaison with the centre, and smooth management of interagency and ministerial council negotiations. Finance divisions or economists in policy units will scrutinise costings; the advice of personnel sections will focus on human resource implications, mirroring their counterparts in the centre of government. Like central agencies, departmental policy groups must develop keen sensitivity to policy shifts, an ability to predict responses from within and without, and astuteness about the demands of the political and policy domains. As with central agencies, departmental policy specialists experience tensions as they strive to coordinate within, to find common ground across government and to arm their ministers for cabinet deliberations.

Joined-up government The demand for consistency and coherence in government policy making has seen various jurisdictions experiment with whole-of-government initiatives and “joined-up” govern­ ment. These focus on service delivery rather than policy consistency, but the conversations required to set up and manage an initiative such as Access Canberra or Service NSW trigger discussion about consistency. The Commonwealth has joined this search for greater integration of offerings with Service Australia. Ideally such initiatives in joined-up government improve services to citizens, remove pain points and improve customer experience, simplify offers, streamline digital interactions and reconfigure existing government infrastructure around citizens (Independent Review of the APS, 2019: 165). There are also impressive projects to improve policy planning and outcomes in priority areas. The Joined Up Human Services project in Tasmania used a range of interventions to improve outcomes for citizens, including place-based initiatives, a focus on wrapping services around individuals, an overall service improvement initiative, a review of overall system design, and information sharing with the community (Tasmanian Department of Health and Human Services, 2017). Joined-up government is both an expression of aspiration and a practical response to constraints for the public service (Keast, 2011: 225). Government comprises many agencies and programs, so policy coordination is the search for horizontal alignment. Joined-up government seeks to reinforce inter-organisational cooperation and colla­ boration to battle problems of “silos”. It needs to work closely with vertical alignment, which ensures within each agency that goals, resources and structures link policy intent with program design and delivery. Child protection as a policy area attracts policy alignment attention. Horizontal alignment requires that early years and school systems, police, health officers, social and youth workers unite around support for “at-risk” children, so that they are not lost somewhere in complex government systems. Vertical alignment requires ‘collaborative competence’ among those in the field, a shared understanding among practitioners about how disciplines and services join together in the interests of the child (Price-Robertson et al., 2020).

Coordination 121 The policy challenge is to design services for children that can easily cross departmental boundaries. This requires shared data systems and expert advice about which children require enhanced preventative care. The stakes are high—for the lives of the children and their families and for the society that carries the costs when mistakes are made. Success shields children from abuse, looks after those in out-of-family care and provides options for those who come into contact with the judicial system. Horizontal coordina­ tion across agencies, and vertical alignment of policy and people within a department, matter greatly for our most vulnerable citizens. A range of models can provide joined-up or connected government arrangements for an issue such as child protection: •

•

•

• •

•

National Cabinet. To deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commonwealth replaced the long-standing COAG with a weekly meeting of the prime minister, premiers and chief ministers, often conducted online given regular lockdowns in many jurisdictions. The National Cabinet has no formal legal standing, and agreements reached did not always hold. Nonetheless, as Fenna (2021: 4) notes in an ANZSOG case study, the National Cabinet ‘represented a significant exercise in cooperative federalism and put a reassuringly collaborative gloss on the process. There were, nonetheless, areas of tension between the Commonwealth and the States.’ Lead agency model. One department provides leadership, often with other agencies represented on a taskforce. These are specialist teams brought together to deal with complex or sensitive policy dilemmas requiring coordination. The governance arrangements will often be tightly determined by the lead agency. Taskforces may last for months or years, depending on the issue. Committee model. This model can include purely internal government meetings of officials (interdepartmental committees) or gatherings that include non-government players. Whether tightly focused on a policy question such as child protection, or more exploratory, a committee model creates a continuing conversation across a loose confederation of players charged to consider a particular policy area or pro­ blem. Governance arrangements are usually shared among the parties. Board model. The policy and coordination tasks are handed to a separate entity with independent governance arrangements. This is a way to ensure clear and compre­ hensive responsibility for an activity being undertaken on behalf of the government. Case management and program linkages model. Whole-of-government action focuses on the client or individual. Instead of a client making individual multiple contacts with agencies, services are coordinated around the individual in a way that avoids dupli­ cation and provides complementary support. Agencies often have agreements or protocols among themselves to coordinate a packaged service for the client. One-stop-shop model. This model shifts whole-of-government activity away from coordination among multiple agencies towards coordination of multiple functions within one agency. This form is often used in regional centres as governments attempt to provide “seamless service” to citizens. State governments have experimented with this model by creating “mega-departments” that combine health, housing, aged care, children and disability services under one umbrella.

Coordination is essential for policy alignment. Crisis management needs fast, synchronised and effective government responses because of the high levels of uncertainty, the dynamic nature of crises, and the need for often-siloed agencies to work together. Terrorist incidents,

122 The Australian Policy Handbook or natural disasters such as bushfires, heighten the need for government cooperation and consistency. This adds the complication of ensuring uniformed services talk to each other, and to government agencies. Policy action demands not just technical procedures and insti­ tutional interaction but close bonds built on trust and clarity—whether the issue is an immediate crisis or a continuing area of challenge, such as support for children at risk. Citizens also expect close policy alignment. Technological change and innovation have facilitated service improvements but have also raised expectations. Citizens who experience seamless online service from the private sector expect no less from government. To explore the practical challenges of coordinating complex policy and multiple agencies, we turn to an ANZSOG case study about the coordination of services for young people facing multiple issues of homelessness, education, employment and safety. Case 8.1: The Education First Youth Foyers Youth homelessness is a perennial problem, stubbornly resistant to reduction despite some ambitious programs. In their ANZSOG case study of a community-led initiative to rethink policy around home­ lessness, Mallett, Thornton and Bryant (2018) explore how govern­ ment was persuaded to explore new models of coordination leading to integrated service delivery. The model proposed, drawn from the United Kingdom and promoted in Australia by the Brotherhood of St Laurence (BSL) and Hanover Welfare Services, would create “foyers”. These are accessible centres that provide accommodation while addressing important underlying causes of youth homelessness, especially low completion rates for Year 12—giving rise to low skills to secure employment. Without qualifications or a job, the private rental market is often closed to young people who end up on the street, living in shelters or couch surfing. Understandably, existing services—focused on emergency accommodation and the short-term risks facing young people without reliable shelter—operate according to a ‘short-term, crisis-driven approach’ to meet immediate needs. The foyer approach would instead provide an overarching set of goals to such services—get young people re-engaged with school and provide coaching to help them develop capability. Called ‘Education First Youth Foyers’, the program would provide the means for young people to find a role and place in society. However, the model faced an immediate problem. Current services were funded through a Commonwealth program—the National Partnership Agreement on Home­ lessness—and delivered through human services agencies. The new approach would require housing to collaborate with education and training providers, and so coordinate across two very different sectors of government. Officials responsible for homelessness services would need to work closely with Technical and Further Education providers (TAFEs) and figure out new funding flows to support each foyer. While government agreed to support the foyer concept, the program presented a classic coordination problem: how to steer the program through the machinery of government without diluting the innovative elements core to its design? When the Victorian government faced this dilemma in 2011, the answer followed familiar lines. An Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC) was created to develop the program. It would reach beyond government to include the chief executives of BSL and

Coordination 123 Hanover, industry representatives and an independent chair. Unusually, this IASC would report directly to the minister for housing rather than to agency chairs. Work began in May 2011, using two working groups—one focused on service devel­ opment and the second on the design and build of the foyers. Difficulties included a dis­ pute between agencies about constructing foyers on TAFE property, arguments about the quality of accommodation to be provided on-site, and contending views about the nature of services to be offered within each foyer operation. Each was resolved by the IASC, although often involving lengthy negotiations; the co-design process for services required some 40 iterations to reach agreement. Two years later, in May 2013, the first Education First Youth Foyer opened at Holmesglen TAFE. Others followed at various TAFE colleges, although not all foyers followed the same rules. Different combinations of design, local provider, management and participants developed across the foyer network, although all were supported and advised by BSL. Evaluation began almost along with the program and was formalised when a five-year longitudinal study commenced in 2017. Results suggest EFY Foyer students are ‘significantly more likely to be both securely housed and enrolled in education three months after exit’. Although a change of government saw the IASC disbanded, the program has endured and grown. It has earned respect as an innovative response to previous policy and service fragmentation, offering instead a ‘holistic policy response to a complex, multi-faceted social problem like youth homelessness’ (Mallett et al., 2018: 9).

Coordination and politics Many policy arguments reflect the clashing agendas of departments. A proposal to increase woodchip exports might attract support from the agriculture and forestry portfolios but opposition from environment and heritage counterparts. Consultation may highlight differences in opinion rather than create consensus. The central agency brief can point to the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal, to national and international agreements, to scientific evidence and expert opinion. They may sometimes propose one or more compromise recommendations, but only cabinet can make the final, difficult choice. Governments have many clients, often with incompatible demands. Coordination is essential but, in the end, politics rules. There are limits to coordination within a policy process. Some issues cannot be resolved regardless of departmental consultation or central agency coordination. When disagreement centres on politics rather than policy, public servants can only present the facts and leave the argument to be settled by ministers. Coordination may help clarify the options, but a choice by cabinet requires judgement and political imprimatur. Hence our focus now turns to the decision.

9

Decision

In the Australian political system, cabinet is the forum in which public service advice, technical information and political judgement combine to make decisions for government. Cabinet uses well-established routines to pursue consistency and strategy. This chapter explores decision making within the policy cycle:

• • •

The role of cabinet as the focus point for government The information required for cabinet deliberations, and conventions and procedures for cabinet consideration The role of public servants in briefing ministers, recording decisions and, when necessary, completing formalities through executive council

Parliament is the final authority in government, the representative body that must authorise spending and legislation. It brings a political lens to questions, often negotiating the complexities between agreed technical detail, moral and ethical consideration, and party interests. Policy is often multi-dimensional and can only be settled through a political decision (Bridgman, 2016). Parliamentary debates are only a small fraction of government decision making. Much everyday governing occurs below the visible parliamentary and electoral level. Here reside the day-to-day determinations of myriad officials—administrators, police officers, teachers, health workers, welfare officers and diplomats—who shape the course of policy through their judgements and actions. At the centre of these networks and institutions is cabinet, the formal decision-making authority within government. Cabinet is the fulcrum of the public policy cycle, the point on which all previous and subsequent work balance, the moment when the past and future meet. Here political judgement is delivered in light of technical advice, analysis of options, comparison of possible instruments, engagement and coordination efforts. From the world of possible issues and problems, a small number have been selected, developed and formulated as recommendations put forward by a minister for cabinet’s decision. At any time, many thousands of proposals parade before government. They occupy different places in the policy cycle, some nearing completion, others barely defined. Most are working towards a single moment: a place on the cabinet agenda. In most Australian jurisdictions cabinet convenes each week to consider and decide on a dozen or even fewer submissions. A cabinet decision brings legitimacy and the prospect DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-9

Decision 125 of implementation. If a submission clears this all-important hurdle, it is on the way to becoming public policy. The sheer volume of material awaiting consideration, and the need for minimum standards of information and analysis, mean that cabinets operate by strict rules. Submissions follow a predetermined format. They are considered in a set order. Decisions are recorded and distributed according to a standard process. Cabinet is the only opportunity for ministers, acting collectively, to consider the full range of ideas before government. As a regular, closed-door forum for frank debates about policy alternatives, the cabinet process assumes ministers are active, engaged and willing to offer views on submissions outside their own portfolio area. Debate works best when not monopolised by a dominant premier or prime minister. The political dimension to cabinet decision making is important. Ministers and the prime minister keep an eye on the political risks and benefits associated with each policy option. They take into account the political environment and partisan stringencies as much as any technical criteria. Meanwhile prime ministers and premiers use cabinet as they can: the place to exercise prime ministerial authority. After all, ‘cabinet was never intended to be democratic’ (Weller, 2007: 273). When discussing submissions, ministers balance political consequences, policy objectives, administrative convenience, media attractiveness and their own place in history. Given this pressure, ministers insist on proper process, so all necessary data and advice are before cabinet when choosing. Advisers must ensure cabinet activity is streamlined and unnecessary dis­ putation mitigated—even when word limits are enforced vigorously the cabinet bag is still a formidable weekly read, requiring hours of attention. So securing support in cabinet requires much precursory work within departments and with stakeholders to iron out problems and secure support. When agreement is not possible cabinet acts as a necessary arbiter, bringing political perspectives into play to settle the choice between options. Policy advisers must be thoroughly proficient in the rules governing cabinet. A good policy idea is not enough, even if engagement and coordination indicate widespread support. Proposals must answer all the questions posed in the format for submissions. They must be supported with financial, legal and social impact data and any other rele­ vant information. Ministers want to make informed decisions. The routines of cabinet government are designed to ensure consistency, coherence and clarity, and to reinforce the political nature of this pivotal moment. Neglecting these routines diminishes the effectiveness of cabinet.

Cabinet routines Cabinet routines are expressed as rules, and codified in the Cabinet Handbook (see, for example, the current 14th edition, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020). These guidelines set out formats for all types of submission options and timelines for con­ sideration. The Cabinet Handbook was first made publicly accessible in 1983, opening up the internal processes of cabinet and removing much of the secrecy surrounding the cabinet process (Tiernan and Weller, 2010: 160–1). Cabinet routines establish a timetable for business within government. Agencies organise their work agenda around the cabinet schedule. Cabinet also requires certain regular sub­ missions—quarterly performance indicators, budget submissions, annual strategic plans and reports. Government is always prone to crisis and disruption, but the orderly business of cabinet provides some measure of stability and predictability.

126 The Australian Policy Handbook The policy cycle has been in play long before cabinet considers a submission. Once an issue has been identified, a line department undertakes policy analysis and makes recommendations to the minister about an appropriate policy instrument. The ministerial office will likely offer views. The minister might ask for further policy development or suggest a draft submission be circulated and feedback sought from related government agencies and key interest groups. Following external engagement and internal consultation, the draft submission—by now well developed—is for­ warded to the central agencies for consideration and comment. Only with the engagement and coordination phases complete is an agency finally ready to approach cabinet through its minister for a decision. Of course, some cabinet submissions do not take so long to develop and submit. When crises and other circumstances require fast action, the cabinet process can accommodate speedy turnaround times. Nonetheless, an orderly process is usually followed, even for urgent matters following a truncated pathway. The Commonwealth cabinet process provides a standard Australian model for cabinet deliberations, also shown in Figure 9.1: • • • • •

•

Once cleared by the central policy agency, a submission is lodged with the cabinet office. An electronic document management system is used for the lodging and circulation of cabinet submissions, agenda papers, minutes and business lists. Submissions at the cabinet meeting are considered according to an agenda prepared by the cabinet secretary and approved by the prime minister as chair of cabinet. The minister presenting a submission puts the case for cabinet acceptance, and debate might follow. At the close of discussion, the chair will sum up, perhaps suggesting words for the decision to reflect the meeting’s mood. Votes in cabinet are rare; a submission with insufficient support in the room tends to lapse or be deferred for further development. After the meeting, the cabinet secretary (along with two other note takers) draws up the minutes and, if necessary, confirms these with the prime minister. Decisions (known as cabinet minutes) are then circulated to agencies for action or information.

In addition to these six steps, the submission must follow the standard format and timelines required in the Cabinet Handbook, with details of prior engagement and warning of any likely complications or objections. The submission is divided into four parts—an executive summary or cover sheet covering key points, detailed recommendations proposed by the submission, an analysis of the proposal, and any attachments with supporting data, including coordination comments. In the past, Commonwealth cabinet rules restricted the combined cover sheet and body to just 15 pages. This model might not always hold: decision routines vary across time and jurisdictions. There are exceptions also—defence procurement, for example, has its own rules for submissions and memoranda. But the key conventions for cabinet are well understood and outlined in Table 9.1. Cabinet retains a central role in the Australian system of government. Minority govern­ ment aside, the executive controls the numbers in the House of Representatives, so cabinet decisions are legitimate and authoritative. Cabinet sets the agenda for the executive and the public service. Cabinet is the forum where choices are endorsed, information exchanged and initiatives coordinated.

Decision 127 1 Once cleared by the central policy agency, the submission is ready to be lodged with the cabinet office.

3 2

An electronic document management system is used to lodge and circulate cabinet submissions, agenda papers, minutes and business lists.

3 Submissions at the cabinet meeting are considered according to an agenda prepared by the cabinet secretary and approved by the prime minister as chair of cabinet.

4 The minister presenting a submission puts the case for cabinet acceptance, and debate may follow.

5

At the close of discussion, the chair will sum up, perhaps suggesting words for the decision to reflect the meeting’s mood. Votes in cabinet are rare; a submission with insufficient support in the room tends to lapse or be deferred for further development.

6

After the meeting, the cabinet secretary (along with two other note takers) draws up the minutes and, if necessary, confirms these with the prime minister. Decisions (known as cabinet minutes) are then circulated to agencies for action or information.

Figure 9.1 The federal cabinet process

A cabinet decision serves to settle any disagreement arising during the policy process. A sub­ mission might have strong supporters and detractors within government but only cabinet can consider and finalise the issue. Cabinet consideration is the singular moment in the policy cycle when all perspectives focus on a proposal, and the arguments must translate to a decision. It is also the point at which policy officers shift focus from the formation of policy to its realisation.

What goes to cabinet? Cabinet ministers sometimes complain of being overloaded, of having to read and think about too many different policy problems. Agencies, on the other hand, might be frustrated by an inability to get urgent business onto the cabinet agenda. Establishing firm rules about what cabinet will consider is a difficult task. Ministers need sufficient information to feel in control, yet they also wish to maintain a strategic outlook, setting policy direction rather than trading in detail. The most recent Commonwealth Cabinet Handbook (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020: 16) advises agencies on which matters should be considered by cabinet.

128 The Australian Policy Handbook Table 9.1 Typical cabinet conventions and procedures Collective responsibility

Cabinet ministers must publicly support all decisions taken in cabinet, whatever view they advanced during the meeting. A cabinet minister who cannot accept collective responsibility should resign. Cabinet solidarity Whatever the disagreements within cabinet, once a decision is made it must be supported by all ministers. There can be no public discussion of differences in view. Ministers who cannot accept cabinet solidarity on an issue must resign. Ministerial responsibility Ministers are responsible for the submissions they bring forward, even though others, mainly departmental officials, have developed and drafted the material. Portfolios Ministers represent their portfolios in cabinet. Public servants or advisers cannot deputise for a minister in cabinet. Policy approval Major policy initiatives cannot be announced or implemented until approved by cabinet (unless cleared by the leader). In many cases decisions also require formal approval by executive council. Confidentiality To reach the best decisions, cabinet discussions must be frank. The meet­ ing, together with all related documents, is subject to strict confidentiality. Interests In cabinet discussions, ministers must indicate any conflict of interest concerning a submission and excuse themselves from deliberations if appropriate. Committees There are many cabinet committees, but their decisions are not binding until endorsed by cabinet. Agenda The agenda is usually approved in advance by the chair of cabinet, along with the contents of the cabinet folders. Non-agenda items An item not listed for discussion can be raised only with the prior agreement of the chair of cabinet. Timely lodgement rules To ensure sufficient time for evaluation and briefing of ministers, sub­ missions must be lodged a specified number of days before cabinet meets. Circulation Several days before each cabinet meeting the cabinet secretariat will circulate folders containing submissions, memoranda and other cabinet material. These are subject to secrecy provisions and cannot be shown to others outside cabinet security protocols. Submissions Cabinet submissions must include all information specified in the Cabinet Handbook, be of no more than the specified page limit (excluding attachments), signed by the minister and, if concerned with policy, contain options and recommendations. Secrecy All cabinet submissions include a secrecy classification level and are marked ‘cabinet-in-confidence’. Secretary The secretary of cabinet is bound by the same rules of secrecy as min­ isters and must never breach the confidentiality of the cabinet process. Note takers The secretary might be supported by note takers, who are also bound by cabinet confidentiality. While notebooks might include comments that assist in framing decisions, no verbatim record is made of the meeting. Officials Officials other than note takers attend meetings only with the per­ mission of the chair of cabinet, and only to answer questions about factual or technical matters. Officials should leave the room before any decision is taken. Decisions In theory the chair approves the wording of decisions before circula­ tion. In practice officials write up cabinet minutes. Ministers can object to the wording at the next meeting or in writing to the prime minister.

Decision 129 Records

Executive Council

The records created by a government are only available to that gov­ ernment. New governments do not have access to the cabinet records of their predecessors. A final authorisation is required of many cabinet decisions, including legislation approved by parliament. Executive council is a constitu­ tional procedure, involving the King’s representative and assigned ministers. In many jurisdictions, executive council deliberations are governed by a separate handbook, with rules that echo cabinet procedures.

See also Glossary.

In the Commonwealth, matters that must go to cabinet include: • • • • • • • • • • •

proposals relating to the delivery of the Government’s priorities significant or controversial policy issues proposals affecting the Government’s financial position, or important financial commitments proposals that are challenging to implement due to their complexity or timeline for delivery significant matters affecting state and territory government relations the most significant international business, including international treaties and agreements national emergencies, including any decision to take military action proposals that affect Australia’s constitutional arrangements proposals requiring significant new or amendments to legislation or regulations any significant or controversial exercise of a minister’s statutory power significant Government appointments.

Similar statements govern cabinet procedures in most states and territories. All emphasise controlling the volume of business. Where agencies can settle a matter between themselves, or when a concern is not of sufficient importance to make a demand on cabinet’s scarce time, it must be resolved at a ministerial level. To regulate the volume of material for cabi­ net, the Cabinet Handbook suggests that ministers ‘give serious consideration as to whether a matter could be dealt with by correspondence, for example, minor policy matters that are non-controversial’ (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020: 16). If need be, the proposed solution can be then forwarded to the prime minister for approval. As a matter of principle, cabinet usually declines to consider matters not listed on the agenda—although as chair of cabinet, and the person who approves the agenda, the prime minister might allow urgent matters to be considered without advance notice or supporting papers. In the Commonwealth, each type of submission has a specified format. Policy submissions are the most extensive, with fifteen or more different headings that must be addressed. Policy submissions are signed by ministers and seek to commit the government to a course of action. Memoranda are prepared and signed by departmental officials, usually in response to a cabinet request for further information or more options in some policy discussion. Committee reports reflect the importance of cabinet committees. Cabinet will likely create a series of standing and ad hoc committees to deal with the volume of business, and to provide focused discussion on sensitive or detailed issues. Almost all are nominally

130 The Australian Policy Handbook chaired by the prime minister, although in practice a senior minister might take the running. Many submissions pass through a committee before they get to cabinet, pro­ viding a forum for debate and negotiation among relevant ministers. If subsequent cabi­ net consideration is required, the committee recommendation is printed on blue paper; otherwise it is simply noted and approved by cabinet. Ministers are reluctant to reopen in cabinet an issue already settled at committee level and cannot do so if they are a member of that committee (Codd, 1990: 6). Legislation submissions take several forms, depending on the stage of the proposal: • •

An Authority to prepare submission invites cabinet to approve the broad outlines, and drafting instructions, for a new bill. Cabinet, or a cabinet legislation committee, might later consider an Authority to introduce submission, which sets out the completed bill, outlines the engagement process and its results, and indicates whether and how the proposed legislation differs from the outline originally approved by cabinet.

In some jurisdictions there are also separate submissions for significant appointments. In the Commonwealth this is often handled through a letter to the prime minister seeking approval, although some significant appointments will require cabinet approval (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020: 22–23). In either case there is still a standard checklist covering the name and qualifications of the candidate, the nature of the office, regional and gender balance considerations, and any matters likely to cause controversy. Similarly some jurisdictions require cabinet approval of significant subordinate legislation. Information papers inform cabinet of discussions in ministerial councils and inter­ governmental forums. As intergovernmental relations become more complex, ministers need to know what options are being considered by their colleagues. Such items are described as “under the line” because they are usually listed for noting rather than for discussion. Matters without submission offer an opportunity to discuss urgent business. The prime minister or premier might also address questions of political strategy or parliamentary business. Executive council minutes include appointments, expenditure that requires governor-general in council approval, issue of commissions, and subordinate legislation. Cabinet must ensure a schedule of ministers who will attend the formal meetings of the executive council. Cabinet might also allocate engagements for important events the prime minister is unable to attend, although this is typically handled through ministerial offices rather than in the cabinet room.

Briefing ministers Each type of submission carries a security classification. Only those advisers and public servants with appropriate security clearance can view a submission, and all governments have strict rules about the handling, distribution and filing of cabinet material. Cabinet meetings last half a day or more and can cover anything from national security to schedules of public appearances and media campaigns. Even ministers with no items on the agenda must be ready to discuss any proposals with cross-portfolio implications. Hence a key function of departments is to brief ministers on the overall contents of the cabinet folder. Ministers are not merely responsible for their portfolio; they share collective responsibility for management of the entire policy agenda.

Decision 131 Each agency has its own format for briefings. Most keep a briefing note to a single page. The department will tell its minister what the submission is about, how it might affect the portfolio, indicate a position, and possibly suggest amendments. The brief provides a script for the minister to participate in the debate, and a way for the agency to share any concerns with cabinet colleagues. A minister’s office might also provide its own briefs on matters in the cabinet folder, addressing issues from a political viewpoint. For submissions prepared by the department, the brief will be more extensive. Minis­ ters must be able to promote and defend their submissions. They need at their fingertips all the necessary facts and figures. Nervous ministers rehearse arguments with senior officials before going to cabinet. Later, senior line department managers cluster in the minister’s office to learn whether cabinet accepted the departmental recommendations. An important role for the prime minister in cabinet is to provide whole-of-government scrutiny on submissions. As chair, the prime minister must stand above the interests of individual departments to consider the interests of the government. The prime minister is provided with extensive briefing notes on every agenda item. These include detailed ana­ lysis of the policy and financial consequences of a submission, and a recommendation for or against acceptance. These briefs are prepared by specialist policy officers from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Many sources of advice make the prime minister the best-informed participant in cabinet discussions, able to interrogate ministers about the detail and implications of their proposals. The treasurer and the minister for finance also take extensive briefing notes to cabinet, although with an economic and budget emphasis. Other ministers with cross-govern­ ment responsibilities, such as the attorney-general and the minister for industrial relations, might also work from specialised analysis of submissions. Any concerns held by their agencies are also incorporated into briefs prepared by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. While departments provide ministers with technical advice, ministerial offices supply a political perspective on cabinet business. In particular, the prime minister’s office advises on the electoral and media implications of submissions. These political judgements are outlined in a briefing note that sits alongside departmental advice in the prime minister’s cabinet folder. The submissions and briefing notes draw together political, policy and administrative advice and bring them to the cabinet process. Ministers enter cabinet discussion alive to the implications of proposals. They have the information required to balance political interests with sound policy, and to avoid unmanageable proposals. Cabinet becomes a central focus of government, a time and place when a political perspective engages with line departmental submissions to produce public policy choices.

Recording cabinet decisions The practice for recording cabinet decisions varies across jurisdictions. Some state govern­ ments ban all public servants from the cabinet room, relying on a seconded member of parliament to note decisions. Most jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth, prefer to support cabinet with a professional secretariat. These public servants prepare, collate and distribute cabinet papers; take notes during meetings; retrieve cabinet material for con­ fidential storage; write up cabinet minutes and distribute these to departments and ministers. By tradition, elaborate procedures are used to code cabinet decisions. Some jurisdictions such as Queensland use different shades of paper to indicate the significance of a decision. A

132 The Australian Policy Handbook record of decision on gold-edged paper is forwarded to the minister with implementation responsibility. Chief executives assigned tasks by cabinet receive the relevant decision on silver-edged paper. For the rest, decisions arrive on blue paper—signalling an interest in the decision but no implementation responsibility—or white for information only. The Commonwealth does not follow such elaborate colour coding with cabinet minutes, although the cabinet secretariat uses colour coding within cabinet folders to distinguish cabinet committee decisions from matters requiring cabinet consideration. The record of cabinet decisions is direct and to the point. A minute is framed in terms of submission recommendations: ‘Cabinet decided to increase spending on rural drought assistance by $24 million in the coming financial year, subject to no break in current weather patterns.’ These decisions often form the basis of precise interpretation and use for legislative drafting purposes. It is imperative, therefore, that officers preparing submissions write recommendations that can translate to decisions and actions. The central policy agency pays close attention to a submission’s recommendations because these document the decision cabinet is asked to endorse. Recommendations must be accurate, a logical product of the submission, and be capable of statement as an action. As with submissions, access to cabinet decisions is also governed by security con­ siderations. Very sensitive decisions, such as those with important defence or trade implications, might be circulated only to senior ministers, or not at all. In any case, all cabinet decisions must be secured using prescribed filing procedures. They are returned to the cabinet secretariat on a change of government, when the records of the outgoing administration are collated and locked away.

Executive council While cabinet is the focus of decision making, Commonwealth and state constitutions vest much formal authority in an executive council. This is the body that proclaims legislation, appoints people to statutory positions, changes administrative arrangements and endorses international treaties. The governor-general presides over the Federal Executive Council and its constituent ministers. It is also known as ‘the governor-general in council’. All ministers, and federally, parliamentary secretaries or assistant ministers, are sworn in as executive councillors, and so known by the title ‘The Honourable’. State executive councils are the governor and min­ isters and are called ‘the governor in council’. The state bodies often meet weekly, while the Federal Executive Council, chaired by the governor-general, generally meets fortnightly at Government House in Canberra. Ministers are rostered to attend. Convention dictates that, with the governor-general presiding, two executive councillors are required to provide a quorum (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2021c). As with cabinet submissions, there is a specified format for material being pre­ sented to executive council. This is set out in a federal Executive Council Handbook (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2021c). The governor-general might seek assurances about recommendations in an executive council minute and might decline to approve the minute until further information is provided. Such interludes are rare; executive council is essentially a constitutional formality rather than a deliberative meeting. Protocol requires that decisions requiring the approval of the governor-general in council are not announced until executive council has met.

Decision 133

Cabinet confidentiality Cabinet decisions are presumed to be confidential. As Rodrigues (2010) notes, the issue of cabinet confidentiality has been contested, but remains the norm. This is defended in the Cabinet Handbook: Effective Cabinet confidentiality requires the protection of Cabinet deliberations not only at the time an issue was current but also in the future. Ministers in successive Governments have relied on the convention that their views, either written or spoken will remain confidential well into the future. It is only with the confidence in this convention that ministers can enjoy freedom to explore all policy options without the need to temper their comments or views. (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020: 10) The secrecy of cabinet meetings was challenged during the 1990s when a judge ruled in favour of disclosing 113 cabinet notebooks to test concerns the Northern Land Council had been unfairly dealt with through the passage of the Land Rights Act 1976. On appeal, the High Court held that opening the cabinet record was not in the public interest. Cabinet’s privacy remains intact (see Weller, 2007: 225–6). Cabinet deliberations are protected from release under freedom of information legislation provided a document was created for, and served to support, cabinet deliberations. Many cabinet records are now released after just 20 years. Given this lag, any case study of a cabinet decision must examine an historic policy choice. Although issues change with time, the dynamics of cabinet—and the pressures to make a decision—remain very contemporary. Case 9.1: Mining in Kakadu When the cabinet papers from 1990–91 were released, they pro­ vided detail of a famous cabinet dispute. In a report on the cabinet record, Gabrielle Chan (2016) explored how a rift among ministers over a contentious decision contributed to Bob Hawke losing the prime ministership. At issue was a proposed mine expansion at Coronation Hill, known by local Aboriginal people as Guratba, in the Northern Territory (Keen, 1993: 344). This was originally a uranium mine, but drilling during the 1980s uncovered gold, platinum and potentially other precious metals on the site. An application for new drilling on site ran into significant opposition. The Jawoyn people, on whose country the mine was located, resolutely opposed the development. They identified the site as a place of sickness, with significant cultural consequences if further disturbed. The Jawoyn were supported by environmentalists. The mine was close to the Kakadu National Park, a World Heritage site. Conservation groups campaigned against the project and its potential environmental consequences. An independent contingent valuation study by the Resource Assessment Commission supported the conclusion that any value from the project was outweighed by the environmental cost (Hamilton, 2016). Yet a mining consortium led by BHP was anxious to proceed, pointing to the potential economic windfall for the Northern Territory of a major new gold mine

134 The Australian Policy Handbook (Young, 1996). The consortium had already invested $16m. in the project and turned to Canberra expecting support from the federal government. This was a difficult time for the Hawke administration. Despite winning an historic fourth term in March 1990, long running tensions between Prime Minister Hawke and Treasurer Paul Keating had risen to the surface, causing considerable friction within cabinet. As the Coronation Hill issue developed, Hawke and Keating found themselves on opposite sides of the issue—Hawke worried by Jawoyn opposition, while Keating favoured the benefits from proceeding with the mine. Cabinet was scheduled to meet on 30 May 1991, with the dispute between Hawke and Keating widely anticipated. Each man was supported by a cadre of ministers. The disagreement became, in part, an argument about alternative visions for the govern­ ment. It reflected too a growing split between environmental concerns and economic development within the Labor movement. Just hours before cabinet was due to meet, the political world was shaken by public revelations of the “Kirribilli Agreement” reached between Hawke and Keating in late 1988. Hawke had committed to standing down sometime after the 1990 election in favour of Keating. Now, as the government deliberated over Coronation Hill, Treasurer Keating accused the Prime Minister of failing to honour his promise. Amid this drama the cabinet discussion about Coronation Hill was deferred. Keating challenged for the leadership, lost, and retired to the backbench. He was not in cabinet on 18 June, therefore, when ministers returned to the question of the mine. For five hours cabinet argued the merits of the case. Subsequent reports suggest a majority of ministers favoured proceeding with mining at Coronation Hill. Hawke, however, used his authority as chair to argue cabinet was too divided to proceed. Given the stalemate, he decided no approval could be provided. In a bitter close to the debate, Hawke accused some of his cabinet colleagues of ‘innate bias’ against the Jawoyn people (Chan, 2016). With the release of the cabinet papers, it is possible to see not just the split among ministers, but divisions across government as agencies briefed for or against the Coronation Hill project. Chan (2016) reports the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet ‘largely hedged its bets’, although its briefing note advised the ‘most crucial consideration relates to Aboriginal issues’. The Treasury, in contrast, supported the mine, citing a sovereign risk for Australia’s ability to attract international capital. However, Treasury noted any mine would need the agreement of the Jawoyn. The Industry Department supported the mine also and considered the controversy over environmental damage and Aboriginal rights would prove ‘short term’. Like Treasury, Industry worried about international perceptions of Australia as a reliable destination for investment if the mine was cancelled. This was not the view of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. ‘Suggestions that the no-mining option would have a significant negative impact on investor confidence’, said DFAT officials in their cabinet briefing paper, ‘do not appear to be firmly based, other than in areas which have similar Aboriginal or national heritage complexities’. The aftermath of the cabinet discussion was much discussed in memoirs of many players. Northern Territory Senator Bob Collins supported the mine, and later told the ABC about acrimony in the cabinet room:

Decision 135 ‘It was pretty bloody personal and very nasty and everyone started walking out. And Hawke just sat there. I was in the doorway, with about half a dozen other ministers, sort of walking through, and people were just shaking their heads, because everyone knew this decision stinks… Bob [Hawke] called out after us, “Oh, well, everybody’s happy about this now, are they?” I can’t remember who now, but about six people just turned on him and actually walked back to the table, and I was one of them, and said, “No, we’re bloody well not. And don’t you dare, you know, walk away with that impression. We’re supporting you because a decision’s been made, but none of us are bloody happy about it.”’ (Collins in Chan, 2016) The Coronation Hill decision stood, with the site eventually incorporated in the Kakadu National Park. Ministers honoured the principle of cabinet solidarity. It became clear, however, the Prime Minister would pay a significant cost for imposing a contentious outcome. Rancour over the decision continued, and when Keating challenged just six months later, he won the leadership. Hawke departed parliament and his political career. Most cabinet business is routine, but occasionally decision making incites drama with the highest possible stakes. Cabinet members went into the Coronation Hill discussion with all the technical information they needed, and a range of perspectives from gov­ ernment agencies. Inevitably, though, a political judgement was required. The balance between economic development, Indigenous rights and environmental protection is an expression of values. There is no rational calculus for such a decision, only the considered judgement of individuals weighing up contending concerns. Making such decisions is the core function of cabinet.

Cabinet Cabinet is an institution with an endless agenda, a feature of all Australian governments. As the Commonwealth’s Cabinet Handbook observes: The Cabinet is a product of convention and practice. There is no reference to the Cabinet in the Commonwealth Constitution and its establishment and procedures are not the subject of any legislation. Provided the guiding principles of a Cabinet system are met—collective responsibility and solidarity—it is for the Prime Minister of the day to determine the shape, structure and operation of the Cabinet. (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020: 6) This might suggest a level of flexibility rarely seen in practice. The sheer volume of decisions required, and the relentless pace of events, impose overwhelming pressure on cabinet to operate as a highly structured and predictable executive for government. Making cabinet decisions is a complex business. Most submissions take some weeks to work through the pre-cabinet phase, to find a place in the program and then to be considered and settled. Public servants, ministers and advisers complain at times about the elaborate procedures, secrecy and ritual of cabinet deliberations. Such routines are an important control mechanism. They introduce rigour. They spare cabinet from incom­ plete or inappropriate submissions. Routines ensure sufficient minimum information

136 The Australian Policy Handbook before a topic is discussed. They structure decision making, creating a sequence that invites analysis of proposals from a range of perspectives. Finally, cabinet rules establish clear responsibilities for enactment, assigning implementation responsibility to particular ministers and agencies. As an institution, cabinet is a psychologically interesting experiment. Human decision making is subject to a range of cognitive biases, particularly during times of high stress and limited capacity. The short timeframes involved in cabinet decision making necessitate a reliance on assumptions and rules of thumb (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981). Competing ideas and priorities make for complicated choices. Cabinet acts as a bulwark against these cognitive limitations by bringing together advice from multiple streams on the principle ‘teams solve problems faster when they’re more cognitively diverse’ (Reynolds and Lewis, 2017). By insisting on a structured process across every aspect of an issue, cabinet seeks to overcome the limited attention and information any one individual could bring to a policy decision. Through cabinet routines, governments pursue consistency. By bringing all proposals to the same meeting of ministers, and requiring information about objectives, finances, legal, regulatory, environmental, social and administrative consequences, proposals can be compared and tested. Ministers use cabinet processes to demonstrate how a submission fits with government’s overall strategy, and how its recommendations will be promoted to the community, interest groups and the media. A cabinet that works well is essential if a government is to survive politically.

10 Implementation

Good policies are meaningless unless implemented effectively. Policy analysts must consider implementation needs early in the development of a proposal. This chapter explores implementation methods, and some familiar pitfalls. It concludes with a checklist for successful implementation and argues that advisers should develop implementation plans during policy development to enable timely implementation once cabinet approves the policy.

Once a decision is made, the policy cycle moves to implementation. People are informed of the choice, policy instruments are created and put in place, staff instructed, services delivered, money spent and bills prepared for parliament. The machine of government smoothly implements the wish of cabinet—in theory. Often, of course, the story of implementation does not always run so well. The gap between intention and outcome might be large. Implementation failures in the public sector are the stuff of political debate, and quickly identified by political opponents and the media alike as examples of government incompetence. Even mishaps some distance from ministerial control can become controversial: a technical failure in electronic lodgement of census forms with the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2016 caused considerable political anxiety for the Commonwealth government of the day. This case will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. To minimise the risk of failure, implementation issues must be considered long before a submission goes to cabinet. Policy makers should pay attention to the demands of implementation at every stage of the policy cycle. In fact, continuous implementation— the idea of constant, conscious attention to implementation as a dynamic driver of policy making—is a mark of robust policy making. Recognising the dynamism of the policy process and learning from previous iterations are signs of a well-led policy process. The rigours of the real world are the ultimate test of a policy. Poor design means a policy might fail, once implemented. Consequently, implementation must begin with policy analysis, and carry through to recommendations for practical, achievable programs. Implementation presents a critical pivot point, one that can either successfully turn decision into action or spiral policy towards miscarriage or collapse.

Good policy design includes implementation Public policies aim to achieve clearly stated objectives. The task of the policy adviser includes identifying implementation and design problems, and developing strategies to meet these. DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-10

138 The Australian Policy Handbook The challenges are many. Former Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Martin Parkinson acknowledged that ‘implementation is 150 times harder’ than policy design (Donaldson, 2016). Of particular importance is the division of authority between multiple and sometimes competing agencies, differing objectives within government, and the complexities of a federal system. In the Australian context, implementation must accommodate, and delicately balance, diverse regional claims with centralised systems (see Smyth et al., 2005). The wide disparities between urban and rural populations can add to the complexity of the task. Linear, hierarchical systems of decision making do not always accommodate the fluidity of network delivery. Noting these formidable constraints, some argue that public policies are largely doomed to fail, an issue explored further in Chapter 13. Academic studies find that many implementation misfires are either due to flawed policy design or because government agencies lacked the expertise or resources to implement the design. Declining public trust in government can also contribute to disappointing outcomes (Hill and Hupe, 2021). It is one thing for politicians to promise, another for the public service to deliver. Yet no experiment is wasted—there is always something to learn. Pressman and Wildavsky’s influential study Implementation (1973) focused on failure but inspired further studies and a series of important findings. Public policies will indeed fail if not designed carefully, with an eye to the many constraints on government action. Through skilful analysis, evaluation and evolution, policy programs can improve over time and eventually meet their objectives. Policies are hypotheses that become more precise through testing and refinement. Implementation rarely works if an afterthought to policy design. The Public Service Research Group (PSRG) at the University of New South Wales has developed an implementation and evaluation cycle as an offshoot of the policy cycle (PSRG, 2019). This argues that implementation and evaluation deserve specialised attention. The PSRG propose a dedicated implementation and evaluation cycle with ten actions: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Focus on desired policy outcomes Internal context External context Identify what success will look like Determine what system changes will be needed Identify types and location of required capabilities Assess and plan for risk and communicating Plan performance and accountability measurement, review and evaluation Project planning and management to enact implementation Ongoing review and revision.

The PSRG implementation and evaluation cycle is also shown in Figure 10.1. This is a template that must be modified with each implementation challenge to take into account structural, contextual and systemic issues. The intention, though, remains constant—deliberate consideration of unintended consequences, capabilities, continuous improvement and system-level analyses (PSRG, 2019). This PSRG implementation and evaluation cycle similarly reinforces the idea of a “cycle within a cycle”: in essence a heuristic within a heuristic, to promote the importance of each stage of the Australian policy cycle and the thinking and process(es) required for that stage. Implementation warrants nuanced deliberation. Even small tweaks during

Implementation 139

Figure 10.1 PSRG policy implementation and evaluation cycle Source: PSRG, 2019. © UNSW Canberra, 2019.

implementation can avoid undermining the original policy intentions and create new options for more well-rounded and successful results.

Policy learning and policy feedback loops In Chapter 5, the role of policy learning was considered as part of policy analysis. Policy learning is just as central to implementation. Just as policy analysis informs all that follows in the policy cycle, so policy makers will be looking forward early and often to the imple­ mentation choices implied in policy options. Implementation becomes a continuous exer­ cise, relevant at every stage in the policy cycle (Dunlop, 2020: 42). Public policy is about ‘conscious choice’ and so needs to be tested constantly against evidence and experience (John, 2012: 129). Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom (2005: 255–288) essentially argued that all policies need to move beyond any grand sense of optimality to be viewed as ongoing learning: experiments that demand monitoring, evaluation, and adaptation over time.

140 The Australian Policy Handbook Hence contemporary organisational practice emphasises the importance of knowledge management and the learning organisation (see Mulgan, 2003, Martin 2005). Knowledge management sees an agency embrace knowledge as a strategic asset to drive performance (in a private sector environment, competitive advantage) through the identification, cap­ ture and management of intellectual and human capital. Knowledge management helps policy and decision makers access easily and in the right form the information they need. Beyond its utility within government, knowledge management can make evidence and information better available to citizens and stakeholders. The specific application depends on the nature of the policy making taking place, but with technology platforms to sort and access information, knowledge management can be flexible, adapted to the stage of the policy cycle and the degree of engagement proposed for the policy in ques­ tion. The importance of knowledge management is highlighted by establishment of the Australian Government Information Management Office to ‘make Australia a leader in the productive application of information communication technologies to government administration information and services’ (Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2011). Best practice knowledge management is ‘enhanced through a series of interrelated pro­ cesses of knowledge creating, transfer and utilisation’ (Handzic and Hasan, 2003: 20). Knowledge management makes it possible for policy makers and government to easily and quickly access the information they need, when they need it. There is no one way to do knowledge management and learning the best knowledge management system takes time. An agency uses technology to better structure, store, retrieve, code and “data mine” information. For example, the Australian Family Law Council implemented a knowledge management strategy to reconsider how knowledge is stored and transferred through the organisation (Osborne, 2004). The learning organisation movement complements knowledge management by inviting agencies to value thinking linked with learning. The learning organisation movement encourages interaction between operational and policy actors to promote strategic internal debate (Garratt, 2000) and to improve performance (Doherty and Horne, 2002). Success in this movement can lead to knowledge-based or knowledge-intensive organisations that create and exploit knowledge (see Makani and Marche, 2010; Rosendaal, 2006). The Australian Public Service Commission has committed to making learning and development systematic across the public service through establishment of the APS Learning Board, APS Academy and APS Learning and Development Action Plan (APSC, 2020a). These initiatives prompt the public service to embrace collaboration, innovation, experimentation and a willingness to learn from failure (APSC, 2014). The connection between policy development and implementation is an age-old issue, yet the relevance has increased with the fragmentary nature of contemporary governance and the conscious separation of purchasers from providers and policy from delivery. Learning achieved through policy feedback links the practical experience of service delivery operators with the ideas of policy makers (Althaus, 1997). An institutional connection or a transfer of expertise between policy and operational arms of implementation is essential if policy objectives are to be achieved effectively and efficiently. Sharing lessons ‘enables policy-makers to reduce the uncertainty around policy initiatives’ (Haigh, 2012: 144). Without this connection, service deliverers can miss a policy goal, while policy makers might fail to translate objectives into practice. Opportunities to improve service delivery are lost and the risk of implementation failures heightened. In the age of network governance, multiple, separate organisations interact with each other to achieve agreed goals. Feedback loops become critical for policy development and implementation to inform each other and so improve the policymaking process.

Implementation 141 Indeed, the interactive and dynamic nature of the Australian policy cycle demands and embraces feedback loops at each stage. In an ideal policymaking world, these feedback loops occur in a spirit of continuous learning and improvement rather than amid a culture of blame and shame. As such, feedback loops are best undertaken by agencies acting as learning organisations, wedded to using knowledge management processes—as depicted in Figure 10.2.

Organisational unlearning Sometimes policymaking processes need more than a blank sheet of paper: they demand proactive unlearning. As John Maynard Keynes (1936) famously said, ‘The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones’. The role of organisational unlearning has gained prominence since the advent of knowledge management and the learning organisation. Routines, processes, information or feedback can be forgotten and lost but unlearning refers to the intentional discarding by organisations of things that otherwise prove unhelpful to meeting goals and vision (Tsang and Zahra, 2008). Toxic culture, disruptive processes or broken routines can hamper effective policy making, so organisational unlearning might prove as important to imple­ mentation as the forging of feedback loops (Gilson et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2013). Sometimes government has to rethink how a problem is conceptualised before it can make any progress with developing or implementing a solution (Brook et al., 2016). Research confirms that organisational unlearning does promote new learning (Fiol and O’Connor, 2017). When old patterns are displaced, this can trigger purposeful experi­ mentation, alongside deliberate release of old understandings and development of new ones (Fiol and O’Connor, 2017). The changes arising from organisational unlearning can be intentional or not (Grisold et al., 2020). This matters because unlearning is often associated with cognitive approaches that embrace innovation and creativity without knowing necessarily where the organisation or program ought to end up. In contrast, goal-directed unlearning demands behavioural change that aligns with deliberate knowledge-change intentions (Grisold et al., 2020). Unlearning has implications in the public policy sense, not only for the public sector itself, but for the citizens it serves. When unlearning is intended, communication and engaging citizens in the process is critical if the implementation demands of a policy initiative are to The Australian Policy Cycle

Issue identification Evaluation Policy analysis

Implementation Policy instruments

Decision Engagement Coordination

demands and embraces policy feedback loops

undertaken by learning organisations

using knowledge management

+

unlearning & related processes

Together, this helps close the gap between policy ideas and their implementation.

Figure 10.2 Policy cycle learning dynamics

142 The Australian Policy Handbook have any chance of success. It is not enjoyable for an agency to explain why a well-established policy has not and will not deliver, but sharing the evidence and discarding practices associated with the failed policy is an essential step to finding a better way. Studies in healthcare settings show that public service unlearning can result in improvements to patient-centred care and health outcomes, but unlearning agents need time for the positive impacts of unlearning to take effect (Stenvall et al., 2018). If implementation is about testing and refining a policy idea, unlearning is the process of acknowledging what needs to change and planning the shift with care, so the rationale and implications are clear to officials and citizens alike. Case 10.1 surveys the challenges of policy learning mid-implementation, through the case of Commonwealth employment services. More than twenty years after the switch to private, contracted delivery of employment services, and after many iterations of the new model, issues remain in delivering government objectives. Case 10.1: Contracting Commonwealth employment services Employment services are an important example of a service originally provided through direct government action but now delivered by private agents. Originally known as the Common­ wealth Employment Service (CES), services were provided directly by the Australian government through local CES offices. These labour market programs were intended to address the challenges of the unemployed, particularly those experiencing long-term unemployment. Successive reviews from the 1980s drew attention to the bureaucracy and com­ plexity involved in CES services and noted a bias toward placing jobseekers into training or activation programs rather than securing sustainable employment. In the late 1990s the Howard government decided a new model would deliver better outcomes. The government contracted out the service, switching to a purchaser-pro­ vider model (and the associated underpinning of principal-agent theory; Burgess, 2003). In this new model, government would employ a network of private organisa­ tions seeking to connect job seekers to potential employers. At the centre, Centrelink coordinates and maintains the network and allocates job seekers to local employment service providers. The federal government tenders for employment services on a roll­ ing basis to a mix of around 200 private and not-for-profit providers. The new approach was launched in 1998 as Job Network. Job Network would focus on employment outcomes and involve four key services: self-service systems for all jobseekers regardless of income support, job matching for those on income support, job search training and intensive assistance. Each service would attract pay­ ments from government on the achievement of outcomes. This ‘reflected a marked change in emphasis. The government had moved from a publicly provided service that prescribed programs for job seekers to the purchase of employment outcomes from a diverse range of providers’ (O’Flynn, 2007: 9). In making this change, government sought to address unemployment through a supply-side focus, by creating a market for matching job seekers to employers. Policy success would depend on clarity of objectives, a large number of service providers with adequate experience and local knowledge, incentives that match provider interests

Implementation 143 with job seekers’ needs, and rigorous monitoring for service quality, consistency, and achievement of program objectives rather than “quick-fix, quick-money” placements. Challenges appeared soon after the new model commenced, as aspects of the system worked well while others failed to meet the original objectives. Job Network, the original articulation of the new ambition, proved the first of many transitions. Over time, the model was modified to deal with implementation shortfalls. In part these were addressed by more rules controlling providers. Early changes included measures to rank providers based on performance through to the use of star ratings, in 2003. In 2009 all employment services were consolidated under one contract and renamed Job Services Australia. In 2015 the system was again overhauled: now called Jobactive, the third iteration brought emphasis on payment-by-results and “mutual obligation requirements” for jobseekers. Yet even with regular reviews and modifications, some parts of the Jobactive program failed to meet original objectives. This calls into question the basic policy design guiding the initiative. Repeated redesign of employment services failed to ‘overcome the funda­ mental problems of an incentive-based system’ (Quiggin, 2006: 23). Despite attempts to place a greater emphasis on community input and local partnerships, the incentives remained predominantly market based, with payments linked to job placement (Ramia and Carney, 2010). Considine et al. (2014: 484) argue such issues are inevitable, as the search for better services at lower cost is a ‘recipe for continuous restructure’. They suggest the contracting model promotes ‘a relentless turning over of the system itself to prevent gaming and to reduce opportunistic decay’. The transition from direct government service to implementation via the private sector was driven by the hope that competition and outcome payments might improve the efficiency, flexibility and tailoring of employment services. Yet employment ser­ vices continue to be criticised for their failure to deliver strong outcomes for the unemployed, particularly those experiencing high levels of disadvantage. This goes to the heart of the issue: despite many iterations, policy learning during ongoing implementation can only bring minor adjustments without reconsideration of the underlying policy design. Each iteration of the program has maintained a standardised bureaucratic logic to assist participants, yet recent studies suggest a tailored approach is required for unique groups of employment seekers, such as the disadvantaged, and youth—whose unemployment rate continues to be higher than the national average (Moore, 2019). The Senate Education and Employment References Committee (2019) report Jobactive: failing those it is intended to serve indicates a one-size-fits-all approach fails multiple constituent groups such as people with a disability, those with tertiary qualifications, First Nations peoples, women and citizens over the age of 50. Many current problems stem from the very fixes designed to resolve earlier issues. Analysts note that government oversight of private sector providers has produced inflexibility because the costs of taking risks threatens a provider’s star rating or even their contract. Large providers have introduced routines to minimise costs. The complexity of the tendering and monitoring process priced out many of the smaller, boutique service providers. The system has also worked against providers who service clients experiencing significant barriers to employment, as funding is outcomes-based (Considine et al., 2020). Continuous concern about the underlying policy approach is a characteristic of intractable and wicked problems. Contracting out job placement work was a response

144 The Australian Policy Handbook to concerns about the quality of previously government-run services. The replacement approach introduced its own problems, and now demand for continuous improvement—during implementation—endures. A new agency, Workforce Australia, took over the program on 1 July 2022. A very public change in program name and rhetoric might be a way to politically claim “reform” when policy in practice is in fact making little headway on the issue. The problems highlighted by implementation might require a deeper policy rethink, another turn through the policy cycle.

Cabinet implementation units Implementation becomes more prominent when politicians and the public complain the public sector is failing to deliver on government objectives (see Tingle, 2015). In several jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth, cabinet implementation units have been established to ‘work with agencies to ensure timely and effective implementation of government decisions’ (McPhee, 2006). These implementation units reside in the premier’s or prime minister’s department and undertake a dual role. They alert cabinet through an early warning system about potential risks associated with implementation plans for particular cabinet submissions. They also monitor progress of initiatives approved by cabinet (Weller et al., 2011: 224) and conduct in-depth studies of ‘existing areas of administration, especially cross-cutting issues or where systemic implementation problems appeared [sic] to be delaying achievements’ (Wanna, 2006: 360). A ‘traffic lights’ system (green for satis­ factory progress, amber for concerns and red for major problems or hold-ups) is used to rate, checklist and prioritise implementation concerns (Tiernan, 2006; Wanna, 2006). If successful, such work is invisible—program implementation that might become a problem is kept on track and so remains unremarkable. The use of implementation units signals the growing government concern about policy incapacity and the political damage inflicted by high-profile delivery failures. The fashion for implementation units is one manifestation of policy design paying attention to implementation issues throughout the cycle. Yet such units in Australia focus only on intra-jurisdictional implementation, whereas contemporary Australian federalism increasingly dictates that policy delivery should occur across jurisdictions (Althaus, 2011). The absence of inter-jurisdictional implementation units and accom­ panying focus on cross-border delivery is particularly pertinent as Australia battles contemporary policy challenges such as COVID-19.

Political dimensions to policy implementation The concept of mandate is used by governments to deliver their policies on the grounds of authority gained through the electoral process. The Constitution Commission of Victoria (2002: 16) gives the following definition of a mandate: • •

A government has the right and duty to organise and operate the machinery of government effectively, accountably, and subject to the supervision of parliament. A government has the right and the duty to govern, although not to do whatever it likes.

Implementation 145 • •

A government has the right and duty to implement its specifically outlined initiatives and the broad directions of its election policy, subject to parliamentary supervision of detail. Electors are entitled to expect that a government will honour and implement its promises.

Policy makers must pay attention to a government’s mandate as it sets out the core policy program the government intends to pursue. Chapter 4 considered a number of political drivers including party political platforms and statements of intent, which might be reflected in commissioning letters to ministers. Yet implementation by policy makers of a government’s objectives is not always clear and simple. Public sector officials are “servants” of their political masters, but their service cannot be uncritical compliance devoid of commitment to the public interest. The policymaking process, and the implementation phase in particular, is not just the delivery arm for a political machine. In 2004 then Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Peter Shergold queried the status of public servants as ‘lackies, careerists, political stooges’. He was drawing attention to criticism aimed at the quality of public service in Australia (Barker, 2007). Quoting Melbourne Age journalist, Kenneth Davidson, Shergold (2004: 4–5) sum­ marised the critique as follows: ‘Now, when the government says, “Jump”, the response of the bureaucracy is “How high?”… The suggestion today… is that there now exists a con­ spiracy of silence between government and public service. It is alleged that public servants provide to government only the information and advice that it wishes to hear.’ Dr Shergold rejected the charge, but the controversy highlights a cautionary tale: implementation is full of subtlety and nuance. It demands appreciation for, and applica­ tion of, the obligations surrounding public sector responsiveness. Diligent commitment to the implementation of government objectives can include challenging ministerial requests on public interest grounds, or frank and fearless advice about a ministerial request. As Mulgan (2008: 350) suggests, ‘[a]n honest bureaucracy, defending legality and due process, is clearly essential to democracy and therefore in the public interest’. Nonetheless, public servants must remember that government and its ministers are ‘legitimate partners in policy-making and service delivery’ (Mulgan, 2010: 298). There is a political dimension to implementation (see Nevill, 2007). At core, a minister must be advised that a policy proposal is unlikely to succeed. If, after consideration, the government chooses to proceed then the public service must seek the best possible outcome given the constraints. Such an approach is a reminder that policy making does not end with a cabinet decision. Much deliberation is needed afterwards about imple­ mentation. Translating policy decisions into legislation, for example, is a rich process that involves judgement from policy makers charged with legal drafting. Parliamentary Coun­ sel—who draft legislation—ask challenging questions of instructing officers in order to determine the precise intent of government. It is impractical to obtain cabinet feedback or approval on drafting minutiae. Instead, the instructor and drafter decide how best to put the government’s objective into practice. This often occurs on tight timeframes even though the selection of a particular word might have a profound impact on the future course of a policy.

Conditions for successful implementation Many factors influence policy implementation. Along with broad contextual matters such as economic, social and political conditions, Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 154–5) note that implementation is affected by:

146 The Australian Policy Handbook • • • •

the the the the

nature of the problem diversity of problems being tackled by government size of the target group extent of behavioural change required.

Moon et al. (2017: 18–21) suggest this list should also include: • •

contextual factors such as the temporal and spatial scales of the policy in question; and the starting assumptions and hypotheses framing problem definition and its associated implementation resolution.

In their interrogation of the implementation literature, Moon et al. (2017) identify three different approaches to implementation and how its success might be approached. The first approach comprises pro-fidelity implementation enthusiasts, who define implementation success as a pass/fail exercise and make judgements according to whether policies are implemented as intended. If outcomes differ from original intention, then implementation has failed and discussion of divergence and deviation ensue. The second approach gathers pro-adaptation supporters who allow implementation to move beyond initial conceptualisations. This recognises the need for modification or tailoring to meet changed circumstances or perceptions of the original problem and its solutions. The third pragmatic method links policy durability adherents, who look to the stability of political commitment to core objectives to assess whether implementation is successful or not. This characterisation of implementation success helps make sense of why different assessors might frame a policy as an implementation success or failure. The criteria require clarification, as do the circumstances of policy makers, who must work within cabinet objectives, available resources and competing priorities. Implementation now attracts a large academic and practitioner literature. This identi­ fies some key lessons for successful implementation (Ingram, 1990: 462; Davis and Weller, 1993: 17): •

• • •

All policies are built on implicit theories about the world and how it operates. If these theories are mistaken about cause and effect, the policy will fail. On the other hand, if the model is simple, robust and tested through experience, then a policy may prevail. Policies should include as few steps as possible between formulation and implementa­ tion. The more complex the policy sequence, the more likely that misunderstanding or competition will arise, with deleterious effects. Timing is everything—implementation schedules must pay attention to the electoral cycle. Policies frequently fail if responsibility is shared among too many players. This is particularly a problem in federal systems. As more agencies become involved, the complexity of coordination overwhelms the original policy intent. Wherever possi­ ble, a successful policy will therefore be implemented by just one, or at most a small number, of agencies. If diverse delivery partners are involved, their respective needs and system demands should be recognised and factored into the implementation architecture.

Implementation 147 • •

•

• •

There must be a clear chain of accountability. One person or agency must have responsibility for the success of the program, and a capacity to intervene when implementation runs into difficulties. Those who deliver a program should be involved in policy design. “Street-level bureaucrats”—the people who provide the service to customers—must be informed, enthusiastic and cooperative if a program is to work. If the policy delivery will vary according to cohort and geography this must be given due recognition in program design and implementation. Continuous evaluation is crucial if a policy is to evolve and become more effective. As Sabatier (1988: 131) notes, ‘numerous studies have shown that ambitious programs which appeared after a few years to be abject failures received more favourable evalua­ tions when seen in a longer time frame; conversely, initial successes may evaporate over time’. Those implementing policies learn from experience and modify subtly so early difficulties are overcome and the policy finds its way. Measurement is essential. The test for success must be specified in advance and be capable of robust assessment. Finally, policy makers should pay as much attention to implementation as to policy formulation: ‘implementation cannot be divorced from policy. There is no point in having good ideas if they cannot be carried out’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 143).

Edwards (2001) identifies oversight of implementation by politicians as necessary, but often neglected, to ensure policy success. ‘Politicians often lose interest after the main decisions are made. This can mean that, unintentionally, what they hope to achieve does not eventuate’ (Edwards, 2001: 182). Policy makers need to maintain the interest and support of relevant ministers to champion a policy or give added weight to the seriousness of implementation.

Implementation instruments The selection of policy instruments will largely dictate the mode of implementation (see Chapter 6 for more on policy instruments). Early in the policy cycle, the theory under­ pinning a policy proposal should include a view on the implementation instruments to be used. The cabinet submission may, for example, recommend the use of legislation or changes in government spending. Such instruments are often specifically mentioned in the cabinet minute (‘cabinet approved introduction to parliament of the Recognition of Overseas Tertiary Qualifications Bill’). However, cabinet will rarely consider the imple­ mentation instruments in great detail, leaving discretion to individual ministers and agencies. There will often be more than one implementation instrument required for successful implementation, even for relatively simple policies. If cabinet alters the original submis­ sion recommendation, or provides a lesser level of resources, an agency might need to rethink the choice of policy instruments. There are numerous instruments open to government when planning implementation. Table 10.1 provides some examples based on coercive and non-coercive categories of implementation instrument. The choice of instrument is inevitably a judgement about factors such as cabinet intention, available resources, the policy target group, the risks of failure and any likely constraints on particular courses of action, such as an overall government preference for

148 The Australian Policy Handbook Table 10.1 Implementation instruments Non-coercive forms of action

Examples

Communication

Press releases, advertisements, brochures, community meetings, staff training, instruction manuals—these all communicate the policy to affected individuals and groups. Legal agreements to regulate the private provision of government services. The purchase by government of goods, services, equipment, land and other resources, and engaging staff to achieve policy objectives. The examination of premises, products or records to test whe­ ther these conform to officially required standards. Making public resources available to citizens or businesses for specific purposes. Government involvement in a market to buy, sell or provide goods. Provision by government of services to the public, sometimes accompanied by enforceable rights. Taxation benefits can be used as an incentive to sanction or encourage particular types of behaviour from citizens or corporations.

Contracts Expenditures

Inspection Loans, subsidies and benefits Market operations Service delivery Taxation incentives

Coercive forms of action

Examples

Licensing Legislation and regulation

Government authorisation to engage in a business or profession. Use of laws to sanction or proscribe particular forms of beha­ viour. These are sometimes particular, such as licences to do certain things that are otherwise prohibited, and sometimes more general, such as the criminal law. Binding directions to public servants about how they must conduct themselves, or the services they are to provide. Mandatory requirements on corporations to report on aspects of operations and performance. Taxation can be used to direct private activity in particular directions, and to extract returns for government from particular forms of economic activity.

Administrative directions Reporting Taxation

markets over regulation. Ideally, cabinet will make this calculation when it accepts or modifies a policy submission. In practice, departments often find themselves forced to remake the decision as they seek to turn general instructions into specific programs. New policies might require altered organisational arrangements, even the invention of whole agencies. As the development of endless new institutions can create coordination and accountability problems for government, policy design should reach for major administrative change only when more modest avenues, such as incorporation of the new service within existing programs, are not feasible.

Implementation traps There are recognised traps that can bring policies and programs to grief. Even a welldesigned policy can derail ‘because of bungled implementation’ (Mintrom, 2012: 286).

Implementation 149 The Rudd government’s home insulation program is one such case—the rapid roll-out and large project size in an unregulated industry resulted in failed implementation on some measures with tragic loss of life (see Hawke, 2010). According to the subsequent review by Dr Shergold (2015), the home insulation program suffered from severe deficiencies in policy advice. Officials paid insufficient attention to external sectoral expertise and failed to test the ministerial appetite for risk, assuming the political need for speed trumped the requirement to brief the minister as the program evolved. There was no robust, considered design to meet changing imple­ mentation circumstances. Updates relied on oral briefings. Cabinet decision-making processes were deficient. Project management and relevant technical expertise at the Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts were poor. Overall, Ian Hanger AM QC, who led the 2014 Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program concluded: ‘I would recommend that the Australian Government use the experience of the Home Insulation Program as a means by which to learn from the mistakes identified in the report, many of which can be traced to overconfidence and unrealistic optimism… I do not think the deficiencies I have identified are ones that could only have occurred in the specific circumstances of the Home Insulation Program. Several systemic or fundamental shortcomings can be identified which not only are capable of repetition… but which might be avoided through diligence and the taking of some additional measures’ (Shergold, 2015: ii). In a classic work, Lindblom (1980: 65ff) identifies the most common implementation traps. All relate to the agencies that must implement policies, and the risk that program objectives will be lost amid bureaucratic politics. Incomplete specification Policies are rarely complete or able to anticipate every contingency. Policy objectives might be confusing or complex. Even well-specified objectives must allow some discre­ tion to those who implement and operate the program. If policy objectives are too vague, however, agencies find them difficult to implement. The result might be a policy that pursues objectives not intended by cabinet or wastes resources because those responsible cannot be certain what was intended. The information required in cabinet submissions is designed to avoid incomplete specifica­ tion. Nonetheless, often issues not contemplated by ministers arise during implementation, because matters of detail are rarely considered by cabinet. Incomplete specification is especially difficult for networked delivery arrangements. Governments cannot abrogate their responsi­ bility by shifting implementation to an external organisation. Even if governments trust an external delivery agent, the chain of accountability demands the minister and commissioning agency ultimately remain responsible for program success or failure. As Mulgan (2006: 56) notes in relation to the Job Network program, ‘Every attempt is being made to encourage private providers to act with the same degree of professionalism as that expected from public servants… This is not to say that ministers or their senior officials never engage in buck-passing. Indeed, an increase in attempted blame-shifting and buckpassing has become a familiar feature of a more open and differentiated public sector.’ Whatever the good intentions, accountability dilemmas remain when implementation is shared. Knowing and specifying exactly what the government wants is necessary if the purchaser is to avoid problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that often characterise the principal-agent (or purchaser-provider) relationship (Althaus, 1997).

150 The Australian Policy Handbook Inappropriate agency The allocation of responsibility to a particular agency will affect the expertise available and the way a policy is delivered. Government agencies have characteristic ways of running programs, often determined by the training and outlook of the core professional workforce (Taylor, 1993). A poor choice of agency can undermine policy objectives. Education departments, for example, are set up to teach on school premises within school hours. This makes sense for many child-based activities but might prove inflexible for other needs, such as early intervention programs for young children living with disadvantage. A welfare department, on the other hand, is experienced in delivering home-based services and might be better suited to the task. Similarly, schools might not be the best environment for adults seeking to complete an interrupted schooling, but a TAFE college might offer a viable alternative. Cabinet decisions must be clear about who is responsible and will be held accountable for implementation. Cabinet may, for example, address the risk of inappropriate assignment by supporting an innovative third-party provider with an explicit mission to use school premises out of hours to deliver services to children—and their parents—struggling with the consequences of poverty. This is the mission of Our Place, a not-for-profit organi­ sation that integrates services by working with, and adding to, existing government programs (Davis, 2021a). Conflicting objectives All governments have multiple objectives, and these might be written into policy pro­ posals. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for example, has humanitarian objectives but also supports diplomatic efforts, promotes Australian technology and develops new markets (see, for example, Rosser, 2008). How should these priorities be ranked and acted upon? To be coherent, the implementation agency must settle on operating principles that choose between conflicting objectives. This can be a source of tension with ministers, as they stress the objective they seek from a policy, potentially at the expense of overall coherence and effectiveness. Incentive failures Agencies need some discretion about which tasks to emphasise. Without sufficient incentive to implement carefully and thoroughly, policies can fail through neglect. Implementation requires a high priority from the agency, and strategies to commu­ nicate the benefits of a new policy direction. Failure is even more common when implementation is handed over to non-government bodies with private or community concerns that could conflict with the government’s public purpose. Conflicting directives Those who must implement a policy are often subject to conflicting instructions. Public servants, for example, might be told to cut budgets and staff numbers by cabinet, yet required to expand existing service delivery programs by clients and government. Policies are more likely to come to grief when the priorities of the agency are not clear to all involved.

Implementation 151 Limited capacity Many political objectives do not sit comfortably with agency capacity. An instruction to stamp out the drug trade, for example, is difficult for the police to implement, even if accompanied by additional resources. Service delivery is difficult for a policy agency, as the Home Insulation Program inquiry made clear (Hanger, 2014). Limited capacity is not just a dilemma of responding to shifting community values or stretched resourcing. In work commissioned by the Northern Territory government, Carson et al. (2014), identify policy capacity risk factors including workforce turnover, lack of deep content knowledge and corporate memory, poor training or experience, and diversion away from detailed policy analysis to reactive responses especially to media demands. Alongside capability, competence can be thinly spread despite the authority imparted by cabinet instruction. Inadequate administrative resources Cabinets sometimes announce new policies without providing adequate funds. Agencies must either find the money elsewhere (and so cripple some existing program) or doom the new policy to failure through insufficient funds or expertise. ‘Don’t allow yourself to accept responsibility for inadequately resourced initiatives’ is sensible advice, if often not always a practical course of action for administrators. Communication failures Many policies rely on cooperation between government agencies and their clients. If the purpose of policy change is not explained carefully to the public sector workforce, and to those they serve, the policy is unlikely to achieve the necessary levels of commitment. Policy settings Overly complicated policy settings or too many interacting policy instruments can make the job of implementing policy more difficult. Inadequate proof-of-concept and other testing of policy settings can also impede implementation and unravel otherwise good ideas. Instrument choice Choosing inflexible or non-scalable implementation instruments can mean that even small changes in circumstances result in implementation failure. If any of these faults occur, decision makers will not get the policy outcomes they seek. Instead, agencies will be drawn into policy making, scaling down and redesigning the program. When cabinet makes symbolic gestures about a problem without providing precise instructions, a clear ranking of priorities or the right incentives and resources, it ensures implementation cannot succeed. When agencies allow too much discretion, a policy can be subverted from within, intentionally or by mistake. On the other hand, if discretion is too limited and instructions too rigid, policies could be implemented literally but without sensitivity to objectives or context.

152 The Australian Policy Handbook

Implementation under pressure Implementation traps are frequently heightened by time-dependent yet complex demands from the political domain. The expanding use of information and communications tech­ nology and the growth of 24-hour news media has placed pressure on governments to provide immediate responses to emerging issues in the name of transparency, openness and inclusiveness. Processes to access government information have grown rapidly, from the Commonwealth Ombudsman to freedom of information legislation, privacy commissioners, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Migration Review Tribunal, Social Security Appeals Tribunal and many forms of judicial review. The Auditor-General has substantial authority to scrutinise government while there is now increased capacity on the part of parliament to interrogate public servants. At the same time, governments utilise media to meet real-time policy demands. In periods of crisis, including the extended COVID-19 pandemic, governments use social media to inform citizens of risks and strategies, educate the public, create online com­ munities and promote new ways of managing public communication needs. These online media outlets place new demands on implementation even as they open opportunities. In 2020 the Australian National Audit Office released a contemporary implementation lesson book based on its analysis of Australian audit insight reports. This suggests that with rapid implementation expected, policymakers require new skills to perform with proficiency and professionalism under severe time, knowledge and capability constraints. The ANAO (2020) summarised key lessons for implementation under pressure: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Identify challenges and risks to rapid implementation Engage with stakeholders Establish fit-for-purpose governance and planning arrangements Identify and mobilise necessary skills, resources and systems to support rapid implementation Document and apply approved assessment processes and requirements Maintain focus on objectives Maintain appropriate records Maintain active budget oversight and financial management Adopt an active management posture. 1

2 Identify challenges and risks to rapid implementation

3 Engage with stakeholders

Establish fit-for­ purpose governance and planning arrangements

4

Identify and mobilise necessary skills, resources and systems to support rapid implementation

Implementation under pressure

5 Document and apply approved assessment processes and requirements

6

7 Maintain focus on objectives

Maintain appropriate records

Figure 10.3 Implementation under pressure Source: based on ANAO, 2020.

8

9 Maintain active budget oversight and financial management

Adopt an active management posture

Implementation 153 There is often a balancing act between timeliness and accuracy. One important variable in implementation is the growth in ministerial staff and their greater involvement in the policymaking process (Edwards, 2002). Ministers use ministerial staff to cope with the seemingly voracious demands of media. In turn ministerial staffers demand higher levels of responsiveness from public servants. This was evident in the 2001 “children overboard” controversy. Inquiries into the incident found that the conduct and beha­ viour of the Minister for Defence’s media adviser created a number of difficulties because of frequent and sometimes aggressive interactions with often quite junior public servants (Tiernan, 2007). Government is often stressful and timelines short. Implementing a detailed policy amid the full glare of public scrutiny introduces further pressures. As the ANAO observes, the challenge is to maintain good process amid a demanding context. Good conduct and ethical behaviour from everyone involved in the process can only assist.

Turning great ideas into successful implementation The temptation for politicians is to blame program failure on the public service, but the fault more usually resides with poor policy design. Here ministers and their advisers are likely to share fault. They can reduce the risk through a policy cycle that insists on systematic use of analysis, review and reconsideration. Ideally, a policy will be based on a thoroughly tested model of cause and effect, with agreement about policy objectives; a central role for a single agency, which is able to learn and adapt; engagement; staff commitment to the program; and regular evaluation. Special complexity arises in a federal system. More players come into the field, each with their own reporting lines and agency objectives. The nature of policy design must change to reflect these circumstances. A bottom-up process of negotiation between interests, greater local participation and a willingness to live with some inconsistency and overlap might be required. The success of implementation rests on the skill of policy makers, and their capacity to produce viable, realistic objectives that will translate into sustainable programs. In this regard it is important to note the significance of pre-evaluation monitoring in the policy cycle. Monitoring of policy implementation is a helpful mechanism for policy makers to keep a policy on track and to identify unplanned factors in order to develop redress mechanisms if needed. In Chapter 11 we discuss the formal stage of evaluation and there we stress the notion of continuous evaluation. Incorporating pre-evaluation monitoring into the policy process helps policy implementation to be conducted more smoothly and with greater efficacy. It aids evaluation by inculcating the policy process with lessons learned as implementation occurs. Policies often become more effective over time because politicians, managers and agencies reflect on implementation. This is the process of policy learning. It uses the lessons of implementation to reshape and refine a program (Majone and Wildavsky, 1984: 170). As Lindblom (1980: 65) perceptively observes, ‘implementation always makes or changes policy in some degree’.

11 Evaluation

The policy cycle ends—and begins again—with evaluation. An issue has been identi­ fied, worked through analysis and engagement and framed as a policy proposal. Cabinet has decided and implementation has begun. This turn of the cycle is almost complete, but now evaluation comes to the fore. When used well, evaluation should serve three purposes:

• • •

to ask how well a policy meets its objectives; to hold ministers and officials accountable for the implementation of a policy; and to provide important clues for future policy making.

Evaluation generates data for improved policy analysis and suggestions for making the program more effective. It assists policy learning. This is both the end of the cycle and the next beginning, the starting point for a new round of identification, analysis and decisions. In this context, evaluation is a tool for collecting and managing information about policies and programs. In a report for the Department of Finance and Deregulation (2010), Tune suggests evaluation assists decision makers and managers to: • • • • •

design new policies and programs support policy making and implementation strengthen accountability support budget decision making (performance-based budgeting) support departments and agencies in their ongoing program management.

Evaluation criteria should be built into the original program design so results can influ­ ence future policy advice and design. A commitment to evaluation carries analytical rigour through the cycle and emphasises that policy is iterative—an endless chain of experiments and rethinking, as policies and programs adjust to their changing circumstances.

Evaluation across the policy cycle Evaluation is an important consideration throughout the policy cycle. During the initial stages it is critical to consider how success will be gauged. Can it be measured? Thinking early about measures of impact will assist policy makers avoid an intervention that cannot easily be evaluated or that tracks toward the wrong outcomes. DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-11

Evaluation 155 Knowing what to measure matters. For example, governments often deploy aware­ ness raising campaigns to address a problem. Advertisements draw attention to the many behaviours involved in domestic and family violence, and so help people recog­ nise warning signs for abuse. However, it is likely reporting of domestic violence will increase in response to the intervention. Considering measurement and evaluation early in the process can assist in agreeing which trends to monitor when assessing policy effectiveness. One way to think through the design of measures early in the process is to ensure the policy or program is built upon a series of SMART objectives. SMART is an acronym for specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed. The concept emerged from the field of management (Doran, 1981) and is popular across the Australian Public Service. Applying these criteria early can establish a strong foundation for measuring performance later on. SMART thinking is valuable but there are limits; as the cliché notes, not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted. Early thinking about what is specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed around a policy proposal allows scope for pre-implementation evaluation. This pre­ implementation phase can include trials or research into the possible instruments to be used, the methods of coordination or any concerns relevant to the implementation pro­ cess. This is commonly known as formative or process evaluation. A large-scale example includes the trial of the Australian Government’s New Employment Services Model (NESM). A test in two regions in Australia from 2019–2022 allowed government to discern what challenges NESM service providers might encounter when moving to the new model. Changes followed feedback about the benefits and challenges from the test sites (DESE, 2021a). On a smaller scale the Australian Department of Health, in collaboration with the Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government, ran a trial to test incentives for general practitioners to reduce antibiotic prescribing (where safe) in order to address the growing risk of antimicrobial resistance in Australia (see Case 6.1 for further detail; BERT & BETA, 2018). This trial was successful and informed fur­ ther interventions. The Australian government has introduced an assurance review process, linked to budget planning, which involves a centrally coordinated evaluation of major projects and programs. These evaluations are undertaken in high risk, high value, complex or priority initiatives. As opposed to an evaluation that takes place after implementation, the assur­ ance review process embeds evaluation within implementation planning. It can entail implementation readiness reviews, designed to minimise development issues before project delivery, or intensive gateway reviews during the implementation lifecycle. These are coordinated by the Department of Finance (2020b), which describes a gateway review as appropriate for a high-risk proposal. A series of ‘short, intensive reviews will be con­ ducted at critical points across a proposal’s implementation lifecycle’. This provides an agency with independent assurance on project progress. While these pre-implementation reviews and trials provide valuable feedback, evaluation more commonly takes place after a policy or program has been imple­ mented. There is a substantial technical literature on evaluating programs, with spe­ cialist evaluation branches in many federal and state agencies. The Commonwealth requires agencies to evaluate programs, taking into account materiality, policy sig­ nificance, and risk. In addition to specific evaluation activity, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act sets out a broad system for accountability and

156 The Australian Policy Handbook performance management in Commonwealth entities. Performance criteria are stated in publicly accessible corporate plans at the commencement of the reporting cycle, then measured in performance statements and ultimately annual reports (Depart­ ment of Finance, 2016). Along with evaluation by individual agencies, separate evaluation and audit activity concerning Indigenous programs is undertaken by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). It is also possible to evaluate the initial advice that informed a policy. In 2001 the ANAO conducted the performance audit ‘Developing Policy Advice’ to determine whether advice met expected standards for policy outputs (ANAO, 2001). Policy advice is the foundation of programs; if the theory is flawed, implementation will fail. Yet interest in evaluating policy advice is surprisingly recent, and not yet sys­ tematic. A number of policy advice evaluations have examined inputs, process, out­ puts and outcomes in much the same manner as a standard program evaluation. Agencies can also evaluate their effectiveness in briefing ministers, preparing cabinet submissions and framing recommendations. Evaluations of policy formulation and decision making assess whether ministers and managers are receiving policy advice that ‘meets fully the required standards of rigour, honesty, relevance and timeliness’ (Waller, 1996: 9). Like all evaluations, such exercises also keep policy advisers accountable for their work.

Evaluation criteria The OECD (2021a) proposes a set of six evaluation criteria to assist policy makers evaluate their policies and programs. These criteria include: •

• • • • •

relevance—is the intervention doing the right things? Does it meet the needs and priorities of stakeholders? A key question might be whether government, the private sector, the third sector or community are best placed to deliver the service. coherence—how well does the intervention fit with other interventions being deliv­ ered? Is there overlap? Overreach? efficiency—how well are inputs used to obtain a given output? Is the intervention efficient in the way it uses public money for policy purposes? effectiveness—is the intervention producing worthwhile results? Do the outcomes justify the expense? Is it meeting its objectives? impact—what difference does the intervention make? Has it generated significant positive or negative effects? Were there any unintended effects? sustainability—will the impact of the intervention be sustained over time?

Evaluations might not consider all of these criteria. For some reviews, a full impact evaluation might need to be delivered. For other exercises with more limited objectives a focus on just efficiency and effectiveness might be more appropriate. The subject matter at hand, and the purpose of the evaluation, should define the level of analysis. Ultimately the decision on what to evaluate will be determined by timing, resources, availability of data and methodological concerns. These decisions will also be shaped by the needs of the relevant stakeholders and political will.

Evaluation 157

Case 11.1: Indigenous evaluation Indigenous and cross-cultural evaluations are emerging as sig­ nificant evaluation forms. These approaches recognise the impor­ tance of cultural difference and sensitivity given unique worldviews and ways of knowing outside traditional western philosophies and epistemologies. If evaluators are serious about this difference, they must recalibrate their assumptions and methods as well as their own behaviours, often in quite radical ways (Rhodes, 2016). Evaluations conducted with Australian Indigenous communities demand historical understanding, respect and reciprocity in information sharing, and responsibility in communication and consultation including high cultural sensitivity and agility (Markie­ wicz, 2012; Cram, 2018). Many evaluators see such characteristics as part of their ethical norm. However, substantive differences are at play. For example, there must be serious recognition of intergenerational and historical issues, attention to spiritual, holistic and community practices, connection with country and elders, recognition of the potential harm from certain information being shared or collected, and recognition that evaluation information is the property of the community itself. There is also likely to be need and benefit from embedding community members into the evaluation process, taking cues from them on how the evaluation should be shaped, led, and used. Without community involvement, the evaluation might miss its mark, leaving out important contextual information, measuring the wrong things, inflicting further harm and trauma onto communities, affronting their worldviews and offensively treating them as objects of study (Kelaher et al., 2018). Furthermore, a strengths-based approach to evaluation activities, and broader policy work, is highly recommended. Many studies have criticised the deficit discourse present in Indigenous affairs policy making, which frames and represents Indigenous peoples and their identity through narratives of deficiency and failure (Fforde et al., 2013). This deficit discourse cements negative stereotypes and denies the agency, voices, perceptions, wellbeing and aspirations of Indigenous peoples. Fogarty et al. (2018) show how a strengths-based approach can overcome the pernicious influence of a deficit discourse, opening up options to reframe both the narrative and the positive results of policy making. The National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA) places evidence front and centre in engagement with policy questions. As the NIAA notes, ‘Evaluation helps us to gain an understanding of what works and what doesn’t, for whom and why. This kind of knowledge can help us to learn and improve what we do, supporting decision-making with the best available evidence’. To this end, the NIAA (2018) has developed an evaluation framework for assessing pro­ grams that engage with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. Evaluation should:

• • • •

generate high-quality evidence that is used to inform decision making strengthen Indigenous leadership in evaluation build capability by fostering a collaborative culture of evaluative thinking and continuous learning emphasise collaboration and ethical ways of doing high-quality evaluation at the forefront of evaluation practice in order to inform decision making

158 The Australian Policy Handbook • promote dialogue and deliberation to further develop the maturity of evaluation over time. This approach informs a commitment to close examination of programs such as Family Vio­ lence Prevention Legal Services, the subject of a June 2019 review (Williams and Westhorp, 2019). This examined the 14 Family Violence Prevention Legal Services (FVPLS) providers established to provide First Nations people with ‘culturally safe legal assistance and support including casework, counselling and court support.’ These services also provide ‘referrals, community legal education and early intervention and prevention services.’ The focus is victims and survivors of family violence. The FVPLS evaluation grappled with the challenge of identifying outcomes achieved and the proportion of victims supported. Evaluation is confounded by marked differences across communities, difficulties obtaining sufficient funding or qualified staff, the cross­ over of counselling and legal services in a single agency, the wide multiplicity of legal actions required by the mission to defend those afflicted by family violence and differing cultural views about the legal remedies open to victims. In sum, says the report, it is difficult to produce valid comparative data to assess indi­ vidual legal services. This reflects an impossibly wide mandate and inadequate funding:

Given the scale of the problem, the normalisation of violence, the prevalence of contributing factors such as drug and alcohol abuse, and the underlying context of colonisation and victimisation, the minimum requirements specified in FVPLS funding contracts for education and early intervention services are not adequate to generate measurable outcomes in relation to prevention. This is an important finding, as it argues the core measures used to fund and assess a program to support victims of family violence are inappropriate. More recently, a 2020 Productivity Commission report, A Guide to Evaluation under the Indigenous Evaluation Strategy promotes the importance of centring Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, perspectives, priorities and knowledges. This means that evaluation results should reflect what Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples value and recognise them as experts in their own lived experience. The philosophy underlying evaluation completed in this way also points to the important principle of data sovereignty. This is the idea that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people should have control over what data is used, and how, when assessing programs focused on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lives. The Maiam nayri Wingara Indigenous Data Sovereignty Collective has developed several key principles to guide how data is used, stemming from three foundational statements:

• Indigenous data is information or knowledge, in any format or medium, that is about and might affect Indigenous peoples both collectively and individually.

• Indigenous data sovereignty—Indigenous peoples should exercise ownership over •

Indigenous data. This data can be expressed through its creation, collection, access, analysis, interpretation, management, dissemination and reuse. Indigenous data governance refers to the right of Indigenous peoples to autono­ mously decide what, how and why this knowledge and data are collected, accessed and used. It ensures that data on or about Indigenous peoples reflects their priorities, values, cultures, worldviews and diversity (Maiam nayri Wingara, 2018).

Evaluation 159

Evaluation measures To evaluate a policy or program against the OECD criteria of relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, it is essential to begin with a clear idea of how the policy is intended to work. This is often described as a theory of change. Drawing on the British Treasury’s Magenta Book: Central Government guidance on evaluation (HM Treasury, 2020), a theory of change should capture the context of an intervention, the problem it aims to address, the change it hopes to bring about, the actors involved and the conditions for success. A theory of change should use evidence to support its claims and map the process between the inputs (the raw materials and resources used to deliver a policy), the outputs (what is produced), the outcome (the results of policy implementation) and eventually, the impact. This process is known as a causal chain, the link between cause and effect. A theory of change sets evaluation apart from traditional auditing. While auditing counts inputs and checks compliance with process rules, evaluation is distinguished by the next step, the attribution question: ‘to what extent, if any, did the program cause the observed out­ comes?’ (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006: 23). Evaluation thus encompasses the entire process—inputs, process, outputs, outcomes and causality. Outputs are often more easily measured than outcomes or impact. It can take years for the effects of a policy to become clear. Will a more modest target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions have serious environmental consequences? Will urban renewal strategies improve community safety? When hard data is not available, policy makers need to estimate likely outcomes. And even when outcomes are gauged, the causal connections between the pro­ gram and its outcomes are difficult to establish with certainty. This is why beginning with SMART objectives, and carefully considering methods of measurement, are important steps in any evaluation.

Evaluation process Evaluations often follow a standard format. For example, Tune (Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2010) suggests a simple approach to conducting evaluation: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Understand the program and its assumptions Develop evaluation objectives Design an evaluation plan Collect and assess information and data Report outcomes Integrate findings.

Depending on the stakeholders involved and the size of the evaluation, terms of reference might be prepared for consideration by a steering committee and the eva­ luation team. An evaluation strategy will be prepared, specifying the questions to be tested and the approach to be taken. Data can then be collected, and engagement undertaken with clients, stakeholders and staff. The information gathered is analysed, leading to findings and recommendations. Evaluation, though, is rarely simple or straightforward (O’Faircheallaigh, 2002). There is often a contest over what and whose goals should be used to evaluate a program. Is the evaluation intended to merely satisfy external accountability requirements or is a more

160 The Australian Policy Handbook probing investigation desired? Who should be incorporated into the evaluation process? Are stakeholders or clients to be included in developing evaluation criteria? Will they participate in the evaluation process and, if so, are they willing and capable of partici­ pating? What comparisons, if any, will be used? Are causal relationships easily identifiable and commonly accepted or are they subject to debate that requires adjudication? An important decision is whether internal or external evaluation will be undertaken. An internal process might be preferable because in some instances a program evaluation will double as an internal management review. Those involved with the program can also provide valuable and candid perspectives in an internal evaluation, which can provide benefits in drawing lessons and implementing findings. To avoid conflicts of interest for an internal review, agencies sometimes establish evaluation branches, seconding relevant staff for a given review. On the other hand, when a report is likely to be contentious or there is a need to establish independence of the evaluation and its findings, agencies might turn to external consultants. The ‘disadvantage of turning evaluation over to outsiders is that they lack intimate knowledge of the program, lack the experience of having seen its difficulties and savoured its successes as they were achieved’ (Corbett, 1996: 181). To address these issues, the Victorian government’s Department of Planning and Community Development (2008) suggests that external eva­ luators should be brought into evaluation planning as early as possible, explicitly setting out expectations, methodologies and timelines before evaluation commences. Agencies should assess their capacity to perform evaluation and the development of organisational culture that promotes evaluation as a routine part of the policymaking process (Beere, 2005). In addition to the issue of internal or external review, there is also an important question regarding who will be involved in the evaluation process. The concept of including stakeholders directly within the evaluation process gained prominence with David Fetterman’s (1994) advocacy of empowerment evaluation. Evaluation can be as political as any other facet of the policy process and it is important to understand the political context in which the evaluation takes place (Slattery, 2010; Markiewicz, 2008). Along with the issues noted above, Conley-Tyler (2005) outlines the following list as factors that might influence the choice of evaluation approach and method: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

cost availability knowledge of program and operations knowledge of context ability to collect information flexibility specialist skills and expertise perceived and real objectivity accountability for use of government funds willingness to criticise utilisation of evaluation dissemination of results ethical issues organisational investment.

In short, the evaluation process mirrors the original policy cycle: the process is iterative, dynamic and political. Much depends on what kind of evaluation is intended or wanted.

Evaluation 161 Table 11.1 Steps involved in planning an evaluation Stage

Key evaluation steps

Evaluation scoping

• Understand the intervention,

Evaluation design

• Identify the evaluation

Choosing appropriate methods

• Decide on the methods, both

Conduct the evaluation

• Execute the evaluation,

Key project management steps

• Identify decision-points, learning what it aims to achieve, by goals and the type of evaluation when and for whom (develop needed. SMART objectives). • Review programme documenta­ • Understand the evidence base tion and have discussions / surrounding the intervention. workshops making use of problem structuring methods where • Develop the theory of change. appropriate. • Understand the questions to be answered. approach(es) that will help meet the learning goals. • Begin to plan the evaluation, deciding on the design and questions to be answered and the reporting points where evidence is needed.

• Agree governance, funds,

timetable, and method of delivery (internal/externally commissioned). • Understand whether it is possible to make changes to the policy design to improve evaluation design. • Agree required outputs and timings. • Agree evaluation questions with main stakeholders.

• Estimate the cost of the for analysis and data collection, chosen methods. that can answer the evaluation • Estimate timings and questions. likely reporting points. • Ensure the chosen methods complement each other and are as efficient as possible. modifying design in response to learning and policy changes/ stakeholder needs. • Feed in evidence where possible in line with known and new decision points.

• Draft and quality assure (QA) specification for the work.

• Commission external

elements of the work.

• Agree ongoing QA process.

• Agree dissemination plans. • Maintain tight oversight of work. • Feed in progress and emerging outputs to policy/programme board. Review progress and modify where necessary.

Dissemination, use and learning

• Prepare final evaluation analysis and outputs.

•

Implement end of project QA plan. • Implement dissemination plan, including publication. • Work with policy/other stakeholders to utilise learning. • Conduct lessons learned exercise.

Source: HM Treasury, 2020: 20. © Crown copyright, 2020. Licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/

162 The Australian Policy Handbook

Evaluation methods The precise method to be followed by the evaluation team should reflect the questions to be answered. These questions will be determined in part by the theory of change, the objectives of the evaluation and the measures and data available. The Magenta Book: Central Government guidance on evaluation (HM Treasury, 2020) offers an entire chapter on evaluation methods and provides valuable guidance on what types of method are commonly used. It establishes five broad groups of evaluation methods: 1 2 3 4 5

Process evaluation methods Theory-based impact evaluation methods Experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluation methods Value-for-money methods Meta-evaluations or evidence synthesis.

Process evaluation methods are used to evaluate how the intervention or policy was implemented. These types of evaluation tend to use more straightforward measures and focus primarily on input and output indicators. The use of administrative data or surveys are common. There are also important subjective, contextual concerns regarding how well the policy was delivered. This might include the use of inter­ views, focus groups or observational data to capture the views of those involved in an intervention. Both theory-based and experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation methods attempt to capture causal evidence of whether an intervention made an impact. Theory-based methods are best suited to understanding why and how a change occurred. This might include using process tracing, realist evaluation and qualitative comparative analysis. These methods will allow for the attribution of causality but not produce an estimate of effect size. Experimental and quasi-experimental methods on the other hand, such as randomized controlled trials, regression models or propensity score matching, are able to provide a measure of effect size, but might not explain why or how the effect occurred. This is because they measure the impact of an intervention by comparing those who received the inter­ vention against a control group of those who did not. A strong correlation is deeply encouraging but might not be sufficient to explain causation. Value-for-money methods assess cost effectiveness in a way that allows policy makers to compare policies and programs. This is commonly undertaken through cost-benefit analysis. Importantly, while the results are quantified, the calculations involved in cost-benefit analysis include making complex, theory-based assessments of value. Measurements of quality are often highly subjective and can present significant challenges for policy assessment. Meta-evaluations or evidence synthesis refer to methods used to aggregate multiple evaluations to achieve improvements in overall knowledge on a topic, such as the inde­ pendent, non-profit activities of the Campbell Collaboration, which is a ‘an international social science research network that produces high quality, open and policy-relevant evidence syntheses, plain language summaries and policy briefs’ (Campbell Collaboration, 2022). A similar international non-profit initiative tailored to the health sector is Cochrane, which produces systematic assessments of evidence associated with clinical trials and healthcare interventions, aimed at supporting informed decision making on the best available research (Cochrane, 2022). A meta-analysis might also assess the evaluation

Evaluation 163 process itself. As agencies are required to evaluate programs, are their evaluation practices professional, sensitive to the social and physical environment of the program and pro­ ducing reports that influence management choices? (See ANAO, 1999.)

The risks of measurement One important instrument to assist in the process of evaluation is the performance indi­ cator. Performance indicators have become an integral part of program design. Com­ monwealth practice requires every new policy proposal include a plan of action for evaluation (ANAO, 2014). Performance indicators can be developed for each level of analysis, from ‘the agency will deliver the program nationally within a budget of $33 million’ as a general efficiency test, through to sophisticated outcome measures about, for example, the expected reduction in road deaths following the adoption of new safety regulations and lower speed limits. Despite the benefits, there are predicaments created by the use of performance data. To start, there is often a lack of measurement consistency. Different jurisdictions use different indicators, a common problem for federal systems. Performance indicators change over time, making the evaluation of longer-term policy outcomes difficult (Lonti and Gregory, 2007). Even if agreement on a consistent set of indicators is reached, over time this settlement can change, and the time series might become hopelessly muddled and yield meaningless results for comparative purposes. The challenges of ongoing, crossjurisdictional, time series data prove too much. Greater attention has been paid to social services policy areas in recent times and attempts to secure comparative data continue. The standard criticism of the frameworks, however, remains: measures are usually geared to budgeting requirements rather than good policy outcomes (see for example Tilbury, 2006, commenting on child protection data collection; Productivity Commission, 2016b). There are also problems of data collection, aggregation and accountability. Performance frameworks are being utilised to monitor and manage policy delivery, funding arrangements, and the achievement of outputs and outcomes as well as due process. This is becoming more important with the growth of network and purchaser-provi­ der arrangements. Incorporation of evaluation mechanisms into contracts and other network instruments is an essential “must”, even if it is often forgotten and involves significant costs. It is desirable, but not always possible, to demand evaluation of service providers which are external to formal government; although integral to performance, they often work outside the scope of traditional government scrutiny frameworks. Audit offices around the country now concentrate on securing “follow the money” powers to overcome current incapacity to investigate service trails across different jurisdictions and sectors (Kelly, 2010). Performance indicators allow qualified rather than absolute judgements. Few programs are unambiguous successes or failures. The typical pattern is progress towards goals, rarely complete attainment. The language of absolutes is therefore of little help. If the target for a new police initiative is “no street crime”, failure is certain. If, on the other hand, per­ formance indicators can demonstrate a reduction in street incidents, a lower rate of reported crimes or improved public perception about safety in public places, then the same program might well be judged a success. When ‘goals are stated as absolutes … anything less than complete success tends to be construed as failure. This reading masks the real accomplishments of many public policies’ (Anderson, 2005: 310).

164 The Australian Policy Handbook Hood (2006) has also identified the existence of significant gaming activity with respect to the use of performance frameworks in the modern governance era. At least three types of gaming can occur: • • •

The ratchet effect, in which incremental target adjustments encourage managers to deliver well below their performance frontier. The threshold effect, which occurs where uniform targets give incentive to man­ agers to perform just to target and not to full capacity or with any innovation. Output distortion, which involves manipulating behaviour and reported outcomes in order to meet the specificities of targets at the expense of meeting the intention behind their establishment.

The inappropriate use of performance regimes, in short, can stifle the genuine policy learning and growth inspired by evaluation in favour of name, blame and shame activ­ ities. Much depends on the incentive regime put in place and the general culture underpinning the role of evaluation in any given policy process. If the public, media and actors are prepared to allocate time and resources and genuine learning and growth acceptance to the evaluation role, much can be done to promote improved policy into the future. Without this “safe-space” mentality, evaluation risks turning into a mere tick and flick exercise, or worse, a blame game.

Evaluation findings An evaluation must produce concise and defensible findings if it is to influence future policy design. Evaluation reports therefore resemble briefing papers offering policy ana­ lysis. They must specify the object under study, present the evidence, explore alternative explanations for the findings and justify the particular recommendations presented. Sometimes an evaluation process struggles to reach conclusions. Obstacles might include: • • • • • •

uncertainty over policy goals difficulty in determining causality diffuse policy impacts difficulties in data acquisition resistance within or outside government a limited time perspective. (Anderson, 2005: 271–5)

The fault might reside within the evaluation process or reflect poor design in the program under scrutiny. It might also reflect a fundamental tension that is experienced between balancing the needs of management with that of the evaluator. Behn (1991) explains that the evaluation task usually demands program stability in order to gather necessary data to measure behaviour and outcomes over time. Program managers, on the other hand, are concerned with making the program work and continuous improvement amid change. Effective policy processes must somehow balance the needs of simultaneously worth­ while tasks so that management and evaluation achieve their respective goals. Much will hinge on the tolerance granted by the electoral and media cycles, public interest, and the demand for quick answers—as opposed to genuine learning, which occurs over a longer period of time.

Evaluation 165 Yet studies argue that evaluation must live with ambiguity (Guba and Lincoln, 1989: 253–6). Many social and political variables cannot be measured, but they influence the effectiveness of government programs all the same. Evaluation teams should see their work as collaborative exercises, a learning opportunity for all involved. The lessons generated will change the program before the evaluation is complete. Available time and methods constrain definitive judgements about much that govern­ ment does; the short-term investigations of evaluation teams sit uncomfortably with the gradual accumulation of outcomes that characterises public sector activity. Still, evalua­ tion findings remain an important moment for self-reflection—an opportunity, yet again, to begin the policy cycle. Ultimately, evaluation is essential if programs are to improve. Information generated through evaluation informs the next round of policy development and implementation. Evaluation keeps programs adaptive and responsive. It provides a formal focus for policy learning, a way to record and share the lessons of program experience. The time and resources allocated to evaluation are therefore significant issues. Not all evaluation meets worthy intentions or delivers on potential benefits. Still, evaluation can be a positive force, driving policy improvement. It can be used to justify policies or as a political tool to be deployed against counter-information. It can reveal, and so address, impacts that were unintended or indirect (Rogers et al., 2015). Evaluators committed to evidence-based policy are conscious that evaluation doesn’t always deliver highest policy impact. Nonetheless, the agenda of impact evaluation is to establish and secure positive concrete influence on policy improve­ ment, recognising that political or pragmatic realities can frustrate the deployment of evaluation as a helpful tool. There are dilemmas for government in undertaking evaluation. Evaluations might show that a particular program is not achieving its goals or is no longer required. In the business sector the response would be to cut the program. Governments, however, operate under political constraints. Hospital, school or rail line closures are often not feasible options. Politicians who promote the community benefits, say, of a neighbour­ hood watch program are unlikely to welcome an evaluation that shows the results are uneven (in practice only half of neighbourhood watch programs have any effect on local crime—see Bennett et al., 2009). The policymaking process must accommodate and incorporate this political reality into evaluation studies. While public sector evaluations should not incorporate partisan analysis, intangibles should be acknowledged in the analysis of the success or failure, and the future, of a particular policy. It can be difficult to persuade those who offer policy advice or deliver services that evaluation is a positive. Few people enjoy close scrutiny, or suggestions from outsiders about how to improve their performance. It takes management skill, and a professional standard of evaluation report, to maintain the commitment and enthusiasm of those subject to review. Yet without evaluation, the next turn of the policy cycle will lack new information to deliver better outcomes. To illustrate the role of evaluation in program assessment and improvement, we close with a further case study drawing on the John L. Alford Case Library hosted by ANZSOG. Here Tyson (2010) examines the evaluation of a New South Wales program design to address over-representation of Indigenous people in jail. Her report captures the enthusiasm for the program, and so the disconcerted response when an early eva­ luation questioned program outcomes. Only with time and further evidence from ongoing evaluations were the aspirations of circle sentencing realised.

166 The Australian Policy Handbook Case 11.2: Evaluating circle sentencing in New South Wales Circle sentencing involves a collaboration between Aboriginal people and the courts to determine appropriate sentences. It was adopted by the New South Wales (NSW) government in 2002, and widely welcomed in justice circles as a way to reduce recidivism in the jail system. Circle sentencing had already been used in other jurisdictions and looked promising for a government grappling both with high incarceration rates for Aboriginal people—2 percent of the overall population but 20 percent of prisoners—and a 50 percent rate of reoffending (Tyson, 2010: 2). The circle sentencing idea was developed in Canada a decade earlier. For Indigen­ ous offenders, the sentencing court would convene at the relevant community, with all participants to the process invited to ‘sit in a circle to discuss the offence, the offen­ der, background and consequences of the offence, and to jointly derive a sentence appropriate for that offender’ (cited in Tyson, 2010: 2). The circle approach is restricted to local courts and less serious offences, and usually available only to those pleading guilty. Eligibility is tested by court officers and a Community Justice Group drawn from local Elders. The decision involves 12 or more people—three to four Elders, the magistrate, the police prosecutor, the project officer, the offender and the offender’s solicitor, the victim and their support person, and sometimes the victim’s solicitor. The circle does not convene within the courtroom, but in a neutral space where participants meet as equals. With a commitment to test the concept before wider implementation, the NSW government first experimented with circle sentencing in Nowra in early 2002. The government would eventually codify 8 clear objectives for the program. Circle sen­ tencing should: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Include members of Aboriginal communities in the sentencing process Increase the confidence of Aboriginal communities in the sentencing process Reduce barriers between Aboriginal communities and the courts Provide more appropriate sentencing options for Aboriginal offenders Provide effective support to victims of offences by Aboriginal offenders Provide for the greater participation of Aboriginal offenders and their victims in the sentencing process Increase the awareness of Aboriginal offenders of the consequences of their offences on their victims and the Aboriginal communities to which they belong Reduce recidivism in Aboriginal communities.

A supportive magistrate and a local Aboriginal Community Justice Group worked with Nowra court officials to set up the trial. The local police prosecutor was sceptical but agreed to participate. He would eventually find merit in the process. Nearly 18 months later, the first evaluation of the circle sentencing trial was published, following a collaborative review between the Judicial Commission of New South Wales and the NSW Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council. The report concluded the Nowra trial had ‘succeeded on a number of levels’ with positive results against each of the eight agreed program objectives. Although penalties imposed are ‘no less onerous than those imposed for similar offences in conventional courts’, the circle achieved positive

Evaluation 167 reductions in harmful behaviour and a reduction in reoffending (Potas et al., 2004). The evaluation report recommended extending the trial beyond Nowra. As Tyson notes (2010: 4), such evaluations are rare in the criminal justice system. The encouraging result, some very positive media coverage and endorsement by leading state judicial figures and the Attorney-General encouraged extension of the circle sen­ tencing approach to 8 additional centres across rural and outer metropolitan NSW. Not all were persuaded. The New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) worried that such a small sample and brief time for the study might be misleading, particularly around recidivism rates. They had an opportunity to test these concerns in 2006 when the NSW government announced a full evaluation against the eight program objectives. CIRCA, the Cultural and Indigenous Research Centre Australia, won the tender, with BOCSAR to provide quantitative analysis. What followed was a careful examination of the program from two perspectives, with CIRCA in the field interviewing some 115 involved in the program, while BOCSAR worked through the data. CIRCA identified much support from those involved but noted inconsistencies in practice between sites and selectivity about who accessed the circle sentencing program. Nonetheless, CIRCA concluded the program was achieving positive outcomes against seven of eight targets, although not influencing recidivism rates. In particular, the program achieved its objective of reducing barriers between Aboriginal communities and the justice system. The BOCSAR finding was less positive. Using comparative analysis, with a control group matched on age and gender, the data suggested no difference between the subsequent criminal behaviour of those sentenced by circles and others. Although the sample of participants in circle sentencing was small and selective compared with the larger cohort of Aboriginal people before the courts, said BOCSAR, to date ‘circle sentencing has no effect on the frequency, timing or seriousness of offending’ (Tyson, 2010: 7). The contrasting outcomes point to different modes of evaluation. The CIRCA report was qualitative in approach and documented the widespread perception among par­ ticipants that circle sentencing influences outcomes beyond the formal scorecard. The BOSCAR approach, on the other hand, reviewed the quantitative evidence. It con­ cluded that whatever the other merits of circle sentencing, on present evidence it did not reduce reoffending. In the debate which followed, some opposition politicians characterised circle sen­ tencing as an ‘expensive and ineffective tool’ (Tyson, 2010: 8). The program survived in NSW but did not grow as quickly as expected. A key variable in evaluation is time. The BOCSAR study argued the original sample was too small and early to draw conclusions about recidivism. Over several years, however, the program was further reviewed and refined. Nearly two decades after the original Nowra trial, a follow-up assessment by BOCSAR confirmed at last the result advocates hoped to hear. Now with a larger sample and controlling once again for variables such as prior offending, age, gender and socio-economic status, a new sta­ tistical evaluation found that Aboriginal people who participate in circle sentencing indeed have lower rates of imprisonment and recidivism (Yeong and Moore, 2020). The original aspirations for circle sentencing had been realised—aided in part by evalua­ tions through the life of the program, and the improvements these have suggested.

12 Managing the policy process

The policy process does not run itself. At each stage, ministers, their staff, policy professionals and administrators are responsible for the sequence of actions required to move policy from ideas to implementation and beyond. Those managing policy development must deal with inherent complexity, scarce resources and skills, time pressures and conflicting roles. This chapter:

• • •

examines the importance of procedural integrity; examines ethical considerations in policy work; and explores some of the management challenges in public policy and techniques available to meet them.

The Australian Policy Handbook provides tools for practitioners working within govern­ ment. It suggests a sequence of steps in the form of a policy cycle to structure what happens in policy making. The cycle is neither static nor predictable but dynamic, iterative and organic. Hence the cycle can only be an approximation of a complex, nuanced reality. In the most famous passage from Alice in Wonderland, the Cheshire Cat tells Alice that walking in any direction is fine if you don’t care where you end up. A policy cycle assumes decision makers have a destination in mind. The desire to impose some sense of order on the complex world of policy making reflects the practical demands placed on practitioners: policy briefs must be developed; decisions prepared and implemented; evaluation undertaken; analysis conducted. The policy cycle never stops. Even amid implementation, new problems arise, new advice must be sought, new choices accommodated. This is no counsel of despair. A better process has a chance of producing better policy, and in this chapter we survey some of the contextual issues around the policy cycle. Public policy is the stuff of resourceful organisations: departments, community action groups, statutory authorities, non-governmental organisations, private corporations and entire governments. It is usually multidisciplinary and always involves multiple players. Policy is made possible by the contribution and interaction of those in the political, policy and administrative domains. Managing those interactions and the myriad officials who develop, implement and evaluate policy proposals is a key challenge for both ministers and senior managers. Policy proposals based on good quality analysis and consultation still require management. This task is necessarily divided among many officials. Policy development is not a single, DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-12

Managing the policy process 169 continuous activity, but many related functions that sum to a policy cycle. At various stages, policy development might be in the hands of ministers and policy specialists (identifying a problem), line agencies and networked service delivery bodies (policy analysis, imple­ mentation), central agencies (coordination) or the cabinet (decision making). Each must ensure its part of the process is done well and flows smoothly into the next step. Managing the public policy process is not the responsibility of just one person or institu­ tion. The policy cycle depends on a shared commitment to procedural integrity and pro­ fessional ethics, on clear and accessible procedures, on adequate resources and appropriate structures, on delineation of roles, and on capacity to plan and complete projects.

Procedural integrity The substantive work of public policy—the technical, creative and intellectual rigour that makes policy—must be complemented by an approach to ensure each domain is afforded its proper role. The policy cycle is structured by detailed procedures, many reflected in the cabinet handbook and other procedure manuals. This documentation is often the only authoritative guide to processes that can otherwise seem disconnected and overly rule-bound. Documenting process captures institutional memory that might otherwise be lost with staff changes. Documentation is the basis of procedural integrity—a set of rules policy players can understand and implement. In the complex world of politics, procedural integrity is a source of consistency, a way to encourage systematic policy development amid political excitement. The cabinet expects submissions that document evidence, set out the case for and against options and reports on responses from engagement. Embedded in the headings of a cabinet submission are expectations about process, professional ethics, and the information required to make an informed choice. Procedural integrity means respecting process rules and living within their spirit, ensuring processes and records are accurate, detailed and honest. Policy procedures must be kept up-to-date, and all players informed about cabinet requirements. In the age of networked partnerships and high involvement of third sector and private sector partici­ pants in the policy process, it is important players external to government understand and work within the principles of “due process”. External agencies need to understand public sector rules of accountability and professional integrity. Sometimes this demands tight contract provisions and constant monitoring. For agencies, ministers are the ultimate decision makers. For them, procedural integrity relies on “playing by the rules”—taking policy proposals to cabinet, presenting a detailed and balanced case, ensuring the passage of legislation or implementation and living with the decision. Ministers who leak information to the media to strengthen their hand in debate or insist on cabinet considering hasty and ill-prepared submissions, undermine the overall process. The breakdown of policy process rules is a reliable sign a government is divided and undisciplined—and perhaps desperate. The prime minister or premier as chair of cabinet holds a pivotal position in the policy cycle. When prime ministers insist on procedural integrity, they signal a commitment to coherence and method in making policy choices. This requires self-restraint, avoiding the temptation to dominate all choices. Mike Codd (1990: 10), a former Commonwealth cabinet secretary, notes the prime minister is ‘guardian of the principles underlying the cabinet system’. Should cabinet processes cease to work properly, ministers become restless and the prime minister’s authority is undermined.

170 The Australian Policy Handbook The policy process, of course, is fallible. Clever operators might get proposals into cabinet without appropriate scrutiny, citing urgency or pressing political concerns, or sometimes simply by asserting seniority. The crisis atmosphere of political life and the constant manoeuvring accentuate short-term expediency. Everyone expects, and can live with, occasional flexibility, but if the rules are broken regularly and without penalty, if routines apply to some but not others, procedural integrity is lost as political and policy costs accumulate.

Roles and ethics The policy cycle depends on a division of labour to make sense of the complexity of government. Those involved within the formal government structures are: • • •

political players—ministers and their staff, who must consider the political implications of a policy proposal policy advisers—central agency officials and policy specialists within departments who provide detailed advice on submissions, coordinate government action and manage the flow of business through government administrators—staff in agencies who develop cabinet submissions and then implement and evaluate decisions, providing material for the next iteration of the policy cycle.

Outside the formal structure of government, the third sector, private sector participants, and citizen and community groups contribute through networks and contracted arrangements. Engagement with these groups could be dedicated to the public interest, but their ultimate concern is usually about stakeholder, shareholder or member needs. While good policy depends on close working relationships between these groups, the differing objectives of political staff and public officials must be respected. Australia’s tradition of a professional and impartial public service defines limits for involvement by policy advisers and administrators in the policy process—even if this tradition is giving way to an awkward hybrid system, in which incoming governments replace some offi­ cials with their own choices. There is an ‘ethic of role’ that governs behaviour in office (see Uhr, 2005; EARC, 1992: 21–8). Ministers and their staff subject policy advice and implementation proposals to intense political scrutiny. They ask: ‘Is this proposal a sensible move for the govern­ ment? What are the implications for marginal electorates? Are there more politically sensitive ways to proceed?’ These are legitimate questions to ask about policy—indeed, they are precisely the political concerns ministers and their staff are employed to pursue. Policies are an expression of political objectives. The ethic of political office also requires restraint. Ministers might reject advice on political grounds but cannot demand public servants do political work such as writing speeches for party political events, give partisan political advice, or survey citizens for political opinions. Nor should ministers become involved in the internal administration of an agency, particularly on matters such as staff selection. The minister’s political agenda is supported by the ministerial office, not by the department. Officials too have an ethic of role. The landmark report on the conduct of public officials by Queensland’s Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC, 1992: 16) identifies the traditional roles expected of public officials when serving gov­ ernments. These include loyal and honest service, care not to undermine public

Managing the policy process 171 confidence in the government or its members, responsiveness and accountability, integ­ rity, diligence, economy and efficiency. Public officials must abide by codes of conduct and values stated formally in public employment laws such as the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1999. This ethic of role has important implications for policy officials. They must provide advice “without fear or favour” and avoid involvement in partisan political deliberations within government. Policy officials must respect the confidentiality of cabinet deliberations, including those of previous governments, and protect the confidentiality of public informa­ tion, upholding privacy, avoiding defamation, maintaining commercial-in-confidence information, and respecting freedom of information and other accountability demands. Above all, officials accept the right of elected ministers to make the final decision. As former Governor-General Peter Cosgrove said, ‘It’s your job to understand the political dimensions. Understand them—not to comment on them, not to participate in them and not to promote them’ (quoted in Fidler, 2014). Commentary, even via anonymised social media, can have serious implications as the High Court decision in Comcare v Banarji demonstrates, even if this has a chilling effect on public observations by public officials (Dastyari, 2020; Pender, 2019). Distinct roles ensure continuity for the policy system. When ministers or governments change, public officials remain to provide advice and administrative support to the new team. A policy cycle based on recognition of different contributions can thus endure, offering each government an opportunity for discipline and coherence in decision making.

Politicisation, professionalisation and democratisation The demands on policy makers are intense, multi-layered and sometimes paradoxical. They must be servants as well as leaders, media-savvy yet independent, managers as well as operators and advisers, apolitical yet politically astute, respectful of tradition while embracing change, innovators as well as stabilisers, specialists as well as generalists. While the moment is always singular and complex, many traditional debates continue into the contemporary era. Tinged though they might be with new flavours, these discussions reflect enduring dilemmas of the policy process. One of those perennial questions is the role of public servants in the political process. ‘Claims of politicisation go back as far as federation’ according to former APS Commissioner Lynelle Briggs (2009), who notes that while ‘this view has been considerably overstated, there have been times when Australian public servants have felt themselves under pressure to make decisions or tailor advice in ways that furthered a government’s political interests’. The debate peaks every now and again; sometimes because governments are in power for long periods, at other times because governments change quickly, bringing in staff of their own liking. Politicisation can refer to use of the public service for partisan purposes or to personnel or staffing decisions made on the basis of party political influence rather than neutrality and independence (see Mulgan, 2010). The ethic of role requires public services to provide loyal service to whatever gov­ ernment is elected, but not to pull punches. Should a government push its agencies to become policy cheerleaders, it loses a critical but constructive element of the policy process—and in the case of limiting the independence of intelligence agencies, the gov­ ernment removes its most important warning mechanism.

172 The Australian Policy Handbook A merit-based career public service is the aim in the Australian system but within that framework there are significant matters of detail (Bridgman, 2019: 59–64). For example, is security of tenure essential for the provision of independent advice? This is especially pertinent in an age of contract-based employment and partnership arrangements. The most recent guidelines for the Commonwealth set out a merit-based process for selecting most senior officers, including competitive applications and assessment of applicants’ capabilities (APSC, 2020b). Yet the policy explicitly excludes departmental secretaries. Moreover, Scott Morrison, then prime minister, subsequently rejected recommendations from an independent review to strengthen the employment security of departmental secretaries (Davis, 2021b: 11ff). Capturing the precise demarcation between politics and policy advice is left to codes of conduct. In practice it can be challenging to balance ethical duties with political realities. There are legitimate political interests in the policy process, and sometimes the subtleties of these interactions complicate the ethical demands on public servants (MacDermott, 2008). At what point, for example, does strategic communication of a government’s initiatives cross over into advocacy? (Salomonsen et al., 2016). Overt partisan activity might be disallowed (APSC, 2016), but public servants with communications roles must present policy develop­ ments in a lively and informative way without traversing electoral advantages. Policy makers must perform a further balancing act, constraining ministers and their advisers should boundaries be reached. On the one hand, public servants serve demo­ cratically elected officials and facilitate the implementation of the government of the day. On the other, there is an assumption officials will act in the public interest and protect democracy against unauthorised actions by elected politicians (see Barker, 2007). The ultimate expression of role ethic could be telling a minister that a course of action is not open. Sometimes public servants must deliver difficult messages. Yet ‘rarely is the “frankness” of policy advice delivered through heated confrontation’ notes former Secretary of Prime Minister and Cabinet Dr Peter Shergold. ‘More typically the public servant will seek to persuade the Minister through argument, persistence and guile. In my experience the most effective quality of advice is not that it is “fearless” but that it is convincing’ (Shergold, 2006). It requires skill to mix policy substance with democratic sensibilities and political understanding. The public service world comprises many professions. These combine to frame policy, implement programs and run the machinery that supports government. Policy making is emerging as its own area of professional expertise and might in time be recognised alongside other professional streams, such as human resources, digital and data expertise within the Australian Public Service (APSC, 2021). Certainly, some training is valuable for those new to policy work, who find themselves confronting value judgements about political preferences, professional advice and the challenge of reconciling technical input from a wide array of specialists and agencies. This clash of objectives and perspectives was sometimes evident when politicians and chief health officers shared a public stage in the COVID-19 pandemic (Ferracioli, 2021). Good policy process insists on coordination. When proposals are developed against whole-of-government objectives, and tested with sceptical central agencies, this provides an opportunity to canvas diverse professional advice. Properly managed, the policy cycle brings together political, policy and administrative players in government. Professionals are an important part of the equation. Their role—as with other advisers—is to contribute to a wider process, and to accept that policy balances professional rationality with political need and administrative practicality.

Managing the policy process 173

Planning projects Planning for public policy is partly structured by the cabinet process, partly by annual budgets and partly by the ebb and flow of the electoral cycle. The information required for a cabinet submission—along with external engagement, internal consultation rounds, central agency negotiation, cabinet’s decision and then implementation—provides a regular sequence to policy making. The budgetary process ‘sets the framework for the conduct of fiscal policy and establishes policy priorities and strategies for the nation’s governance’ (Smith, 2005). Departments adjust their budget proposals in line with direction given through established review and committee processes. They incorporate the perspectives of politicians and central agencies, taking into account shifting agendas and resource constraints. The cycle of elections every three or four years ensures politicians have only a narrow window in which to decide and implement an agenda. As one journalist observed: ‘The first year you take the risks. The second year you bed down your risks. And the third year you give away all the money you saved in the first two years’ (Kingston, 2001). Managers develop routines for each step to keep the cycle moving. These “routines within routines” evoke a familiar, systematic approach for every new policy problem, allowing a degree of standardisation of the unfamiliar. Managers stay in control by learning to plan projects according to a standard, proven methodology. Across the policy cycle, managers seek to identify the task at hand, the resources and time required, and the sequence to be followed. The objective is not elaborate plans, but simple and regular processes ensuring proper consideration at each stage of the policy cycle. Planning policy projects rarely needs elaborate tools. For the most part, a list of tasks and a timetable will do the trick, complemented by the discipline of counting backwards from the desired end date. Planning is important throughout the policy cycle, and managers should become familiar with the range of standard planning tools. Among the most familiar is a Gantt chart, used to sequence activities, allocate resources and budget time, and the critical path method, which also helps budget time but is more sophisticated. This method recognises a complex sequence of actions might be required, with some tasks completed simultaneously before the next can begin. Even more elaborate planning methods are adaptable for large policy projects such as Prince2 (developed for use in the British Government) and the Project Management Body of Knowl­ edge (for the United States government), along with numerous commercial plan­ ning products. Managers make judgements about the required level of data, the resources to be dedicated to the task, and available timelines for the project in order to plan properly. If deadlines are always too tight, and resources barely adequate, this is just situation normal for policy projects. Nonetheless, planning is essential, even if circumstances are rarely ideal; working through the policy project, as through the policy cycle, offers the best prospect for a considered and sustainable outcome.

Timing Policy professionals become skilled at knowing how much time to put aside for each step of the process. This will vary depending on the urgency of the matter, its complexity and

174 The Australian Policy Handbook size. The range of players interested in the decision is a major determinant of complexity. In a few urgent cases, cabinet submissions are prepared, discussed and approved in a short space of time. When problems emerge—for example, responding to international ter­ rorism events—new legislation can sometimes be drafted and presented to the parliament in a matter of days, even if haste might encourage disproportionate responses (Lynch, 2006; Williams, 2013). Crises demand a response—often immediately—to quell panic and instil a sense of calm and order again within the community. The policy process must provide some sense of explanation to tragedy and chaos, and so investigations are often initiated to “find answers” or at least provide something or someone to blame. Crises provide a compressed and dramatic episode in the policy cycle—something that can be seen either as an intrusion or an opportunity. For savvy policy makers, crises are a mechanism for promoting otherwise untouchable policy ideas—land use planning policy can take on new turns after massive flood events. While some the­ orists (Sanderson, 2006) suggest ‘gentle policy action’ in the aftermath of crises, others advocate the use of narratives and ‘story-telling’ to reframe and interpret the event, turning urgency into new means for securing policy innovation (Bevir, 2011). Whatever their place in the policy cycle, crises showcase the occasional need for speed in policy processes. Most government activities, though, proceed at a slower pace. This is necessary if each step of the policy cycle is to receive the attention required and be completed to a satisfactory standard. For a typical policy issue that becomes the subject of a cabinet submission, each step in the policy cycle is illustrated in Table 12.1. While these timelines are illustrative only, the typical policy cycle takes from four months to two years between recognition of a pro­ blem and program implementation. Long-standing policies might go through the cycle many times, with review and modification encouraging a continuous improvement approach to policy development. Managing a policy cycle, even outside a crisis, brings many challenges. Demands for fast turn-around and political responsiveness do not always sit easily with the obligation to give considered advice and to remain apolitical. There might be awkward interactions with colleagues in other agencies, with impatient ministerial advisers and, of course, with politicians. Analytical and writing ability might not be sufficient. Managing the policy process thus needs significant judgement and people skills. All facets of managing the policy process require sensitivity to political demands: ‘ministers expect officials to correctly anticipate the political ramifications of any given issue and policy proposal’ (’t Hart and Wille, 2006: 131). Discreet attention must be paid to anticipating the potential political risks and ramifications of plans, the potential to generate “package deals” with stakeholders, the trade-offs that might spill over into unrest or adverse media attention. It is a challenging assignment. Ministers and political advisers are keen to protect their own turf and do not want public officials second guessing politics. At the same time, they do not want policy advice tainted by political naivety. Balancing these tasks is a formidable undertaking. As so often with policy making, judgement about context matters. Our next case study details the development of universal national access to pre­ school education, to explore the challenges of policy process management more closely.

Managing the policy process 175 Table 12.1 Indicative timetable for a policy cycle Indicative times Policy step

Process

Identifying issues • a briefing paper is prepared • minister and agency agree a policy problem exists • work is commissioned Policy analysis • data collected about the problem • agency seeks information on responses in other jurisdictions • a policy paper is prepared and considered by the agency and minister Policy • potential policy instruments considered, instruments compared, and a choice made • if necessary, draft legislation prepared for consultation Engagement • discussion with relevant government agencies • discussion with external interest groups • intra- and inter-governmental negotiations • may be undertaken concurrently with other tasks Coordination • analysis by central agencies • links to budget and legislative program established • negotiation over cabinet submission • clearance for inclusion on cabinet agenda Decision • consideration by cabinet • decision issued as a cabinet minute Implementation • agency secures resources to act • necessary legislation passed by parliament and given assent (parliamentary times depend on available sittings and are not included) • subordinate legislation developed and promulgated • program established and operational Evaluation • program review, report and modifications Timing range • assumes legislation takes no longer than six months to prepare, and excludes parliamentary stages

Short

Long

3 weeks

2 months

4 weeks

4 months

2 weeks

5 months

(drafting legislation can take longer) 4 weeks

3 months

2 weeks

3 months

2 weeks

1 month

5 weeks

6 months

26 weeks

1 year

48 weeks

3 years

176 The Australian Policy Handbook Case 12.1: Creating universal access to pre-school education Investment in formal pre-school early childhood education provides immediate and enduring longer-term benefits for children, particu­ larly those who must live with disadvantage. Despite a substantial body of international and Australian research supporting such pro­ grams, before 2009 there was no universal access to pre-school education in Australia. Instead, a patchwork of programs operated across states and territories. These were variably public or non-government, free or fee paying, and in some cases completely absent. All operated without federal involvement. In her ANZSOG case, Mercer (2016) describes a policy cycle on creating universal access to pre-school education. This began with analysis, as the then Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) established a small policy unit in 2001. It would take six years and a change of government in the 2007 federal election for the issue to move to the next stage of the cycle. The government led by Kevin Rudd took to the election a commitment to provide universal access to pre-school education— defined as a ‘structured play-based learning program delivered by a degree-qualified teacher’—for children in their last year before full-time school. The Labor platform promised 15 hours of quality pre-school a week per child by 2013 but included no further detail on how to achieve this goal. Delivering on this promise would require two layers of administrative reform. First would be a new cooperative approach to early childhood educational delivery between federal and state and territory governments. This would also require federal machinery of government change, beginning with the creation of complex federal–state working group arrangements to unify dispersed responsibilities for early childhood education, childcare, families, health and Indigenous policy. Managing this policy process was Dr Wendy Jarvie, formerly of DEST, who joined the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) as Deputy Secretary and long-term lead for the pre-school policy team. Jarvie chaired the inter­ governmental Early Childhood Development Subgroup (ECDS). Faced with competing state positions, Jarvie learned ‘the Commonwealth needed to adopt a mediating role’ if the ECDS was to successfully tackle ‘the many service delivery challenges… in an area that had previously been left to the states and territories’ (Mercer, 2016: 4). Through the Early Childhood Development Subgroup, Jarvie and her colleagues managed multiple partners and stakeholders. The replacement of DEST with the new joined-up super-department of DEEWR brought new challenges in securing time with the Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard. 2008 was already a year of ‘difficult dead­ lines and COAG-directed workload’ as new federal-state arrangements were hashed out at the macro—overarching funding arrangements—and micro—such as universal access to pre-school—level. The difficulty of ministerial communication only increased with the onset of the global financial crisis, which necessitated ‘highly centralised and crisis-driven policy making’ (Mercer, 2016: 6). Pre-school education moved down the priority list. Central agencies and ministers became even less available. Nevertheless, work continued as Jarvie and colleagues addressed the problems of communication, coordination and decision both within their new super-department and between their many federal, state and territory partners in the ECDS. Ultimately,

Managing the policy process 177 the larger COAG reform agenda delivered an avenue to address pre-school education. The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations (COAG, 2008) author­ ised block funding to states and territories to deliver pre-school education. Five-year National Partnership agreements with the Commonwealth would support a devolved solution to universal pre-school. This maintained existing state and territory delivery arrangements and regulation where they were fit-for-purpose. Quality frameworks, already commenced, would be agreed upon to ensure high standards across the nation. This complex and lengthy turn through the policy cycle has brought longstanding success. In 2021 the Morrison government announced a further extension to the scheme, with $2 billion in funding for the years 2022–25 (DESE, 2021b). Before the COAG agreement, in 2007–08, the Productivity Commission reported that less than 70 percent of four- to five-year-olds went to pre-school; by 2012 the ABS reported that number at 89 percent (Mercer, 2016: 2, 7). Managing this policy process demanded policy skill with a strong dose of political nous. Jarvie and her colleagues made the most of the window provided by the change of government and focus after the 2007 election. Success after years of policy analy­ sis and planning—readiness to act—can hinge on good timing, and sometimes even good fortune.

Context for policy choices The policy cycle described in this book is deeply embedded in the Westminster model of decision making, assuming institutional arrangements familiar in an Australian context. As this context is not always explicit, it is worth touching on a number of background elements that shape choices open to policy makers. Machinery of government As Dr Jarvie and her colleagues discovered when proposing early childhood initiatives, machinery of government changes can be a major issue in many policy processes, suddenly changing the configuration of players and interests engaged in the debate. The architecture of government is not something public servants can much influence; they must live within decisions made by government, knowing an election—or even just a change of minister—might be accompanied by a sudden rearrangement of responsi­ bilities. These might be well-founded choices about structure but are likely to be mixed blessings. Bridgman (2015: 13–15) draws attention to the heady mix of influ­ ences in machinery of government changes: pragmatism and politics, control and devolution, constituencies and symbols, concern over efficiency and effectiveness, aspirations for coordination and cohesion. Continuity of policy capacity might not be a major consideration as the Prime Minister announces yet another reorganisation of the public service. Reform agendas can result in the creation of new departments and the abolition of old ones, movement of authority from one agency to another and closure of functions. The government legitimately expects its agenda and policy to be implemented even amid disruption to established norms, organisations and careers; managing machinery of government change is an occupational hazard for public servants engaged in policy work.

178 The Australian Policy Handbook Scale constraints Alongside disruption from the merger of departments, Dr Jarvie encountered the familiar challenges of federalism when addressing early childhood education. Her experience reflec­ ted the different foci of governments. With some notable exceptions the Commonwealth concentrates on policy rather than service delivery, so many Commonwealth agencies have well-resourced policy capacity. States and territories are more focused on services. The vast bulk of their resources are committed to public officials who deliver services to the com­ munity rather than policy advice to the government of the day. This is accentuated in small jurisdictions with few people to devote to policy development. This difference in policy capability is also applicable within governments. Larger agencies such as health, education and transport can afford to meet the organisational cost of strong policy support. Smaller agencies might struggle with the overhead of dedicated policy teams. Recognising the inherent differences, and ensuring smaller players are heard in the policy conversation, is a particular responsibility for central agencies. The minister The minister may be a public official, rotated regularly with political fortunes, but the current incumbent matters. Along with the office comes a person, with unique interests and skills, deficits to be recognised and managed, relative standing in the cabinet and their own political aspirations. A great minister listens, challenges and encourages; a poor one equivocates when faced with a decision or, alternatively, insists on their own pre­ ferences regardless of the evidence or sound advice. The machinery of government and portfolio allocation decisions made by the prime minister delineate a minister’s responsibilities and describe those policy matters that require attention. The more diverse the portfolio, the more complex the skills needed both by the minister and by public servants, and the greater the investment required in policy effort and organisation. The prime minister can play with the structure of government, granting or removing responsibilities and dictating key relationships. Hence arguments about the allocation of responsibilities are common and might trigger conflict between ministers. Control of higher education research grant programs swings between education and industry ministers, depending on who prevailed when the latest Administrative Orders were published. It will be a source of tension regardless of who wins the prize. Even a prime minister is constrained by the realpolitik of governing. They too must navigate the independent authority of some other ministers, the limited resources available for new initiatives, the relative skills and personalities of their ministers, the need to balance divergent political groupings within the governing party and the political flux. Politics is not a game for the faint-hearted. Ministerial staff Ministerial office staff are an unpredictable variable in the policy process. They are a heterogeneous group, some chosen for their fierce party loyalties, others because they bring specialist skills or helpful links to interest groups. Not surprisingly, such a mixed cohort has many and varied approaches to their roles—from scrupulous honouring of the

Managing the policy process 179 demarcation between political and public service concerns, to subjecting every policy recommendation to a partisan filter. Policy officers often deal with the relevant minister principally through the ministerial office, and perhaps also with those who work for the prime minister’s chief of staff. It requires skill and patience to deal with a minister through third parties. The chief executive The agency chief executive—called a secretary in many jurisdictions—must deliver policy and executive support to the minister and manage the agency overall. Chief executives are usually expected to contribute to whole-of-government or cross-portfolio outcomes rather than building an empire separate from other government objectives. Government priorities and directions also constrain a chief executive, as does a minister’s capacity, style and interests. Again, this is no argument for retreating from frank and fearless advice, but it might recommend some subtlety in approach and timing. Like every other part of the policy system, the chief executive must find a path between competing pressures, from central agency expectations to a minister and ministerial staff with strong views on policy prio­ rities. The timing of the policy cycle within the agency will likely reflect the chief executive’s careful negotiation between political and organisational imperatives. The law The context for all policy making in Australia is the federal constitution, which dis­ tributes power among the Commonwealth and the states and territories. These entities then allocate authority in turn to local government and state-related entities. Governments are creatures of the law and can do only what the law authorises—yet in turn they shape the law as a policy instrument. Over time Australian legislation has deliv­ ered much power and many resources to ministers and public officials. The expectation is that power will be exercised, and resources managed, honestly and lawfully. The court system can test the lawfulness of decisions made by officials through judicial review and other administrative law remedies. Within this general setting there are laws that constrain actions by ministers and public servants. These include legislation such as public service acts and financial management and audit laws. There are also acts governing non-discriminatory treatment of people, workplace health and safety and industrial practices, remuneration and other entitlements. Perhaps top of mind for policy makers are the anti-corruption bodies, which articulate and enforce ethical standards.

Making choices Machinery of government, limits to scale, the ambitions of the minister and their staff, legal and administrative expectations on chief executives, and the binding legal obliga­ tions of public servants: taken together, these elements sketch a restrictive context for policy making. To these constraints we might add accountability frameworks, internal government processes, and limited time, money and attention. And yet choices occur all the time. Policy gets developed, presented to ministers, debated in cabinet, endorsed, implemented and evaluated as the cycle starts again. The

180 The Australian Policy Handbook context of government is complicated and can slide into incoherence if not well mana­ ged—but it can also be mastered and directed toward important public purposes. Many of these contextual constraints were on display when Australian governments faced the onset of the global COVID-19 pandemic. As global trade and travel, cities and businesses closed down from late 2019, the usual processes for policy planning and implementation were dramatically curtailed. The immediate public health emergency rapidly brought on an economic crisis. Australia has been dealing with the ramifications since. The following case study, again drawn from the John L. Alford Case Library at ANZSOG, surveys the policy and administrative lessons from the first two years of the national response to this lengthy crisis. Case 12.2: Responding to a pandemic The novel coronavirus was first detected in Australia in late January 2020. It quickly spread through the nation, with the first death recorded just weeks later. A nation still burdened by the unprece­ dented bushfires of the 2019–20 summer suddenly found itself facing ‘an enormous and protracted challenge’, the greatest public health crisis in a century (Fenna, 2021: 1). Over the next two years there would be much tension and some criticism of policy responses. Federalism was tested and sometimes found wanting. Yet the nation avoided the high death rates of Europe and the United States, with their wrenching experience of overrun hospital facilities and mass graves. The Australian response required a swift mobilisation of health advice. Governments scrambled to secure adequate medical supplies and personal protective equipment, and frame rules for controls not required since the Spanish Influenza at the close of the First World War—masks in public, lockdown of cities and whole states, check­ points at state borders, and isolation of the infected to reduce spread until effective vaccines could be developed, sourced and administered. As Fenna (2021: 3) notes, the key variable in any response was the federal divisions of power. The constitution gives the Commonwealth responsibility for quarantine and international border controls, while states and territories run the primary medical system and carry responsibility for public health and public order, including laws to close internal borders and impose curfews and restrictions on public movement. Extensive collaboration would be essential for an effective overall response. Yet the existing machinery of intergovernmental relations, with periodic meetings of COAG, was not designed to support the detailed and continuous coordination demanded by a global pandemic. It was replaced by National Cabinet—in effect a standing committee of elec­ ted leaders, meeting weekly and underpinned by a National Partnership Agreement on COVID-19. The National Cabinet approach committed all governments to coordinated responses and close attention to advice from public health experts. Each meeting was followed by public announcements to reinforce the sense of the federation working together. National Cabinet, says Fenna (2021: 3), ‘was welcomed by the States as a much more collegial form of decision-making than they had enjoyed under previous arrangements.’

Managing the policy process 181 Meanwhile, governments began announcing important policy actions. The Common­ wealth published a response plan for the virus and activated powers under the Biose­ curity Act 2015. This in effect closed the national borders to control the movement of people in and out of Australia and imposed mandatory isolation for those allowed to return from abroad. Meanwhile, states began to lock down residents as COVID-19 surfaced in many communities, creating immediate economic disruption, ending access to most work­ places and requiring the education system to pivot, in a matter of weeks, from in-person school and university lessons to online learning. Although the number and intensity of lockdowns varied by state and territory, the overall effect was unmistakable: millions of Australians found themselves trying to work from home while also home-schooling their children, or simply unemployed, as an economy that survived several earlier financial crises entered its first recession in nearly 30 years. To keep families afloat, the Commonwealth introduced at short notice an innovative program—JobKeeper. This payment would allow many companies and organisations at risk of losing income to continue to pay their employees at public expense. At the same time the Commonwealth lifted significantly the rate of social security payments as a Covid response measure and, in doing so, lifted hundreds of thousands of Australian out of poverty, albeit only for the duration of this early period of the crisis. In announcing JobKeeper at the close of March 2020, then Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Treasurer Josh Frydenberg embraced what the Secretary of the Treasury later described as ‘the largest single fiscal measure in Australia’s history’, at a pro­ jected overall cost of around $90 billion (Kennedy, 2021). In the first phase of the scheme, from March to September 2020, more than 3.8 million Australians were subsidised to remain employed. Although in a technical recession, this rapid response by the Commonwealth kept the unemployment rate low. Combined with other federal and state initiatives, including free childcare, hotel accommodation for people living on the streets, and a moratorium on rent payment and eviction, the Australian COVID-19 response in 2020 was rapid and effective. By 2021 this clear initial success gave way to increasing discord. JobKeeper was reduced in late 2020 and ended during 2021, despite a third wave of infections in early 2022. Social security payments were likewise reduced. Agreements reached in National Cabinet did not always hold. Partisan politics were never far from the surface, with many instances of federal and state politicians taking aim at decisions by the other. There were criticisms that the Commonwealth did not use its constitutional quarantine authority with sufficient vigour, leaving state governments to manage mandatory isolation for international arrivals. As the 2022 federal election approached, the COVID-19 response could seem like politics by other means. In the early months of the crisis, masks, lockdowns and border controls were among the only responses available until vaccines became widely available. The federal gov­ ernment struggled to secure the flow of vaccines expected, so some interim measures, notably lockdowns, were extended for uncomfortably long periods. It was February 2021 before the first Australian vaccination program launched, three months later than in the UK. It was October before a significant majority of Australians received two doses. Errors of vaccine procurement, a sluggish start to the rollout and a poor public health communication campaign all contributed to this failure. COVID-19 misinformation shared amongst online networks similarly complicated the push for high vaccination

182 The Australian Policy Handbook rates. Meanwhile, growing backlash against lockdowns and other public health mea­ sures at times provoked strong public order responses. Despite the head start afforded Australia by success in controlling the virus during 2020, Australia’s pandemic response during 2021 struggled to maintain momentum and community support. Early success in maintaining employment was offset by the difficul­ ties securing timely vaccination and widespread screening equipment. These challenges tested public patience, as did evident disharmony between levels of government. New institutions, including National Cabinet and a short-lived National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board, failed to reassure Australians that governments were working well toge­ ther to address a national emergency. Supply chain issues, which saw shortages of basic foodstuffs and essentials, did not encourage confidence in government planning. By 2022, what had begun as a focused and successful response to crisis presented a more mixed picture of success and failure, of genuine innovation and lack of foresight. Policy success, particularly in a crisis, is unlikely to avoid mistakes and disappoint­ ments. The pandemic response needs to be judged in its own moment, with information short, options limited and a public reeling from disruption to normal life. Officials at all levels faced unpalatable choices. Policy learning was not always evident. There were tensions between agencies about responsibility for core actions such as managing quarantine. The crisis highlighted the strength and commitment of front-line health and emergency staff, along with some unhappy lapses in judgement and capability among ministers and officials. Across the world governments struggled with the COVID-19 crisis, and Australia performed well on many measures. As with the Spanish Influenza, the COVID-19 crisis might prove to be a once-in-a-century emergency and lead over time to improved public health systems and better decision making across the federation. It might encourage a rethink of some fundamentals about the division of responsibilities in the Australian nation. For the moment it will stand as a reminder that crisis can overwhelm standard processes and reveal the limits of policy reach.

Policy capacity A crisis such as COVID-19 tests the policy skills available to government. The Independent Review of the APS (2019), conducted before the pandemic, identified a skill shortage in policy advice. This seems to hold across Australia, as jurisdictions grapple with a perceived deficit in policy capacity. The cost of insufficient policy resources became clear through COVID-19, as governments struggled to manage the simultaneous streams of decision making imposed by a crisis. Even in settled times a perceived capacity deficit has been expressed as public sector unresponsiveness (Bridgman, 2019: 93–105). Painter and Pierre (2005: 2) describe policy capacity as ‘the ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce resources to public ends’. A well-functioning public sector provides not just immediate advice, but a collective wisdom about what works and why—the public service as institutional memory. When policy capacity declines, so does the ability of government to offer vision or to follow-through on decisions and strategic thinking about the future. Such decline might be triggered when ministers no longer look to departments for policy advice, when agencies fail

Managing the policy process 183 to recruit a policy workforce, or through poor coordination and collaboration across the sector (Tiernan et al., 2019; cf. Tiernan and Wanna, 2006). A loss of policy capacity is not just an administrative and management dilemma but a political dilemma. Statecraft depends on the combination of cogent policy advice with political judgement. If policy capacity declines, in time governments will struggle to make coherent decisions and implement their priorities. Successful policy making involves integration of complex information, processes and relationships; negotiation and arbitration of these same complexities using political, policy and administrative skills, and; practical appreciation that policy making is not technically pure or perfect but realistically pragmatic and political. The policy cycle is a form of coordination, a way to sequence the various tasks and skills necessary for making, delivering and evaluating public policy. It requires management widely shared across government, using documented procedures available to all involved. Continuity is provided by the routines of decision making, and the commitment of dedi­ cated people working for better processes and better policy. No system is perfect, but a wellmanaged policy cycle and stable routines provide coherence and logic to making choices. In uncertain times this is, perhaps, the best hope for a better world.

13 Policy failure and success

Those who do not learn from failure are doomed to repeat their mistakes. Learning requires systematic evaluation allied to imagination—how might we do this differently and better next time? Learning is the key to effective policy design and success.

The policy cycle reduces the risk of failure but cannot guarantee success. Despite best efforts, policies fail regularly, overwhelmed by poor design or inadequate implementation. Some problems are intractable, some government responses are adopted too hastily in the need to “do something”. Even well-planned initiatives come to grief because funding was insufficient or external circumstances changed quickly. Policies might fail because: • • • • • • • • •

Policy analysis does not identify causal relationships between the objective and the proposed intervention. Agencies lack the necessary expertise or commitment. Implementation mechanisms are too rigid and unwieldy. People do not respond to the program in ways government expects. The cost of realising the policy objective becomes too great. The program assumes cooperation across levels of government that does not occur. The program assumes powers that are beyond government’s control. There are too few incentives to encourage compliance. Those implementing the program do not understand what is required.

Risk of failure is the price of trying anything new, public or private. Many new busi­ nesses and community initiatives fail too. Twenty percent of new businesses close down in their first year, and 70 percent within a decade (Carter, 2021). Studies suggest change management projects experience a failure rate of between 60 and 80 percent (NSW Health, 2020). It is hard to make an enduring difference. As with policy makers, those involved in commercial or community failures ponder the lessons and seek to improve outcomes next time round. Of course, success and failure sometimes rest in the eye of the beholder and might hinge on the timeframe employed. Work from Norway stresses how sense making and perception shift subtly through the lifecycle of a policy. Early failures become later suc­ cesses, and the reverse (Hagebakken et al., 2020). Most policies can contain elements of both success and failure, and must be judged on a spectrum rather than in absolute terms DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-13

Policy failure and success

185

(McConnell, 2010). An evaluation will help explain a particular outcome, but assessing overall policy success or failure can point to broader systemic lessons and opportunities for improvement.

Learning from policy failure In 2014 Dr Peter Shergold, a former Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, was commissioned by the federal government to consider findings from inquiries into the Home Insulation Program and an audit of early decisions around the National Broadband Network. The terms of reference invited Shergold to make prac­ tical recommendations about improving the design and implementation of large public programs by the Australian Public Service. Shergold (2015: ii) responded the following year, recommending many changes to avoid ‘repetition of failure’. His report carried the memorable title Learning from Failure: Why large government policy initiatives have gone so badly wrong in the past and how the chances of success in the future can be improved. In essence, Shergold urged strengthened processes at various cri­ tical stages of the policy cycle. Good policy design starts with robust advice. It requires cabinet to be well supported when making decisions, noting the intense pressures to make decisions too quickly. The public service needs a ‘positive risk culture’, with processes that acknowledge and manage risk as an inevitable feature of any foray into policy imple­ mentation. This should be linked to clear accountabilities and responsibility for program leadership. Further, Shergold recommended opening up the public service to a wider array of experience to prevent ‘group think’. More business skills would help government manage the complexity of large projects. It would introduce greater contestability, as traditional public servants test their judgement against those expert in aspects of program delivery. The result should be ‘adaptive government’, honest about failure when it occurs, and able to learn and improve. After looking over case studies of problems in Australian policy areas, along with books such as The Blunders of Our Governments (King and Crewe, 2013), Shergold formulated ten conclusions about policy and the reasons it can fail: 1 Policy is only as good as the manner in which it is delivered. The policy cycle cannot end with a decision but must flow through to implementation and evaluation. Flaws in implementation frequently follow from mistakes in design. 2 Policy advice can only be frank and fearless if it is supported by written argument. In the rush of government, oral advice is not recorded and cannot be interrogated later for logic and consistency. A written record is the basis of thoughtful government. Writing down advice—particularly using a cabinet template—requires the construction of an argument, the deployment of evidence and frank advice about risks. 3 Deliberations, oral and in writing, need to be protected. It should be possible to provide advice without fear or favour, bluntly expressing the realities of a policy situation. Legislative guarantees for such advice help underpin this vital frankness. Of course, all advice is available on the public record eventually, but in the heat of political controversy, truth-telling should be encouraged through confidentiality. 4 Deliberative documents need to be preserved, whether written on paper or delivered by digital means. To interrogate a policy choice, it must be possible to reconstruct the original logic and advice. This means maintaining records, even ephemera such as emails.

186 The Australian Policy Handbook 5 Ministers, not officials, make policy decisions. The policy process must be clear about who makes authoritative choices. The cabinet system is designed to ensure ministers are the final source of choices. It is the role of officials to ensure cabinet decides with “eyes wide open”, something achieved through high-quality policy advice alive to all the implications of each option. 6 Effective management of risk is just as important in the public sector as in the private sector. Major projects carry expensive risks. These need to be enumerated, and strategies to address each hazard set out carefully. If the risks cannot be mitigated, cabinet must be aware before making a choice. Ministers must know any program will be managed carefully through to completion. The world is risky, but recognition and prevention are the “first line of defence”. 7 Program management requires far greater professional status. The policy cycle focuses on how decisions are made. Yet the full test of a policy is the implementation of that choice, and the measurement of its impact. “Results by outcomes” requires a greater recognition of program-management skills. This can be a challenge, given traditional recruitment patterns for the public service. 8 Good governance increasingly depends on collaboration across sectors. Many government pro­ grams are now delivered through contractual networks of public agencies and private organisations. Policy design has to recognise this implementation reality, and find new ways for the leadership of organisations to share knowledge, monitor the performance of a program and inform the next iterations of policy. As with program management, this requires a new set of skills not always associated with public service practice. 9 The Australian Public Service needs to be opened up further. If new capabilities are required for successful policy, these can be acquired through changes to recruitment. New recruits bring additional expertise, and can encourage learning and culture change within agencies. 10 An adaptive government can respond rapidly to changing circumstances without taking unne­ cessary (and unforeseen) risks. An adaptive government can acknowledge the risk of failure and demonstrate flexibility—a new policy is an experiment, its implementa­ tion will be monitored constantly, and the policy adjusted swiftly in response to its effects. The start-up mantra of “fail fast, fail better” can apply to government— small-scale trials and demonstration sites can be good ways to fine-tune a policy, since ‘the rollout of major national programs is fraught with danger’. Of course, learning from failure begins with recognition that a policy has not achieved its mission. This can be more difficult than expected. Spotting big policy failure is easy, at least in hindsight, but as Edmondson (2011) points out, most organisations are not adept at detecting failures beyond those that are immediate and obvious causes of potential harm. Martin Parkinson (2016), then Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, said of the Australian Public Service, ‘Our relatively weak capacity to evaluate potential success or impending failure is a capability gap in itself.’ Learning from failure requires a culture and public context where mistakes are accepted and learning is valued over a “blame, name and shame” approach. Learning is only possible when information is widely shared and open to challenge—something not always allowed by privacy and confidentiality protections. Indeed, this question of protection for public service advice from freedom of information legislation, raised by Shergold in his report, triggered a controversy about the conundrum of confidential advice amid expectations of “open government” (see, for example, Bartos, 2016).

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Agreement on failure or success is rarely straight-forward. We read policies through values and perspectives, which shift over time. Failure can be a matter of judgement rather than objective data, while success is often built on paradox and good fortune. The Australian Policy Handbook argues that policies embody a theory of change. They assume a particular action by government can alter the world, and hopefully achieve specific and measurable outcomes. As theories, policies must be verified against practice. A successful policy will typically shift over time in response to evaluation, accommodat­ ing lessons and reframing the theory at the heart of its design. It might start as a broad approximation but should, over time, move ever closer to achieving its goals. Evaluation is key, through testing and reformulation. Yet evaluation expert John Owen (2015: 2) argues the ‘influence of evaluation on the policy process is weak’ in Australia. Systematic attention to assessing policy success or failure remains modest in Australian public administration. The Independent Review of the Australian Public Service (2019: 269) noted the scarcity of evaluation skills and recommended the Commonwealth ‘rebuild its evaluation capability and practices, sup­ porting regular evaluation of government programs to assess the value they deliver.’ Much program evaluation occurs, typically coordinated by the Department of Finance, but the report argued a ‘culture of evaluation and learning from experience’ requires system-wide evaluation practices and expertise, and an in-house capability in each agency so examining policy outcomes becomes a key part of public service culture (Independent Review of the APS, 2019: 327). Learning from failure is a necessary condition of improved policy, yet organisations are often not good at absorbing lessons. Key findings sit in reports but are forgotten next time a problem requires a policy solution. Policy success relies on good governance—a well-functioning policy cycle that encourages continuous improvement through review, evaluation and external advice. Otherwise even a major policy failure can be hard to unravel in retrospect. Such is the case with a failed debt recovery system, abandoned within a few years of its launch. Case 13.1: A study in policy failure—Robodebt On budget night in May 2015, Treasurer Scott Morrison highlighted a bold scheme he called the ‘Welfare Payment Infrastructure Transforma­ tion’ (Morrison, 2015). This would replace the existing system for welfare payments through Centrelink for 7.3 million Australians with a ‘large information technology system’ to ‘modernise government service delivery to meet the demands of today’s digital world.’ The new system promised smart online services for users, and significant savings for taxpayers. Five years later the new approach was abandoned as the Commonwealth govern­ ment settled a large legal challenge mounted by angry Centrelink clients. At a total cost of around $1.2 billion—taking into account the refunds, compensation and cancelled debts for welfare recipients—this is likely the most expensive class action vic­ tory in Australian history (Whiteford, 2020). Although the program moved through a number of formal titles during its brief life, it is best known by its colloquial name: Robodebt. When Treasurer Morrison announced the plan he set out the policy aims: improved service for payment recipients along with better detection of fraud or overpayment. The new process would allow the Department

188 The Australian Policy Handbook of Human Services to ‘detect, investigate and deter suspected welfare fraud and non­ compliance.’ It would target ‘unexplained wealth, undeclared income, and undisclosed changes of customer circumstances’ that make people ineligible for payments. The scheme, concluded the Treasurer, would deliver a net saving to taxpayers of $1.5 billion. Over previous years the Commonwealth had been working to synchronise data between the Australian Tax Office and other agencies. This would enable Human Ser­ vices to compare Centrelink payments with tax records and so identify discrepancies and reclaim overpayments. In the first iteration from 2011, public servants reviewed the data and, if warranted, issued debt notices. Under the new approach announced by the Treasurer, software would largely replace manual checks, and automatically issue letters of demand. This process was known as an Online Compliance Intervention and would make possible a huge expansion in surveying payments. The Department of Human Services recognised the risk of error and trialled the scheme with a small sample of recipients in 2015 before wider implementation from July 2016. Soon large numbers of debt notices were being issued, and many paid, recovering significant income for the Commonwealth. There was speculation the scheme might be extended to other federal payments, such as the age pension. However, issues soon emerged. Those receiving debt notices discovered the onus of proof had reversed—now they had to prove they were not overpaid. A 2017 Senate committee report would describe this as “outsourcing”—shifting the burden from Human Services to recipients to check the accuracy of payments. Eventually 443,000 people would be notified of debts cumulatively amounting to $1.76 billion. Before the program was abandoned the Commonwealth unlawfully recovered $751 million, some by using private debt collectors. Concerned Centrelink clients began seeking legal advice about the letters, many arguing the debt claims were incorrect or beyond their means to repay. Media reports noted inappropriate and inaccurate debt letters issued to people with complex mental health issues or, in some cases, to the deceased. As individual challenges to debt notices began working through the courts, journalists and lawyers questioned the basis of the Commonwealth policy. Decisions in the Federal Court and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal pointed to significant errors when Human Services and the Tax Office averaged annual income to determine whether a debt existed. ANU policy analyst Peter Whiteford (2020) describes the income averaging method as the central flaw in the program, and the reason for its failure. ‘Essentially, the Robodebt fiasco arises from the very formulation of the policy.’ Mounting public concern saw first a review by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and then two Senate inquiries. The Ombudsman recommended major changes to the scheme, including a return to some manual oversight by public servants. The report also noted concerns about the accuracy of averaging incomes. The first Senate inquiry was blunter: ‘the Online Compliance Intervention program should be put on hold until all procedural fairness flaws are addressed’ (Community Affairs References Committee, 2017: ix). Court challenges underlined uncertainty about the legality of averaged income data as the basis for debt recovery, and the Commonwealth announced in May 2020 it would abandon the scheme and repay in full some 470,000 inappropriate debt notices. Attorney-General Christian Porter conceded the averaging approach was not valid. He

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nonetheless declined to apologise, saying the government ‘had received advice that the scheme was lawful at the time’ (Henriques-Gomes, 2020). Assessed against the original policy aims announced by the Treasurer, the Robo­ debt scheme failed on every criterion. It did not improve the service experience for Centrelink clients. On the contrary it traumatised hundreds of thousands of people and, some claim, led to suicides. Nor did the scheme provide a more efficient way to detect fraud and overpayment. The costs conceded by the Commonwealth in the final legal settlement suggest consistent inaccuracy. Finally, given the cost of the payout to Centrelink clients and the damages involved, the initiative did not save the Commonwealth money. When the legal settlement that ended the scheme was approved by the Federal Court in June 2021, Justice Bernard Murphy described the policy as a ‘shameful chapter’ in public administration. The Judge argued it should have been ‘obvious’ to ministers and public servants the scheme was flawed and its debt-raising mechanism unlawful. That said, he did not think the government knew it was embarking on an illegal exercise. ‘I am reminded of the aphorism that, given a choice between a stuff-up, even a massive one, and a conspiracy, one should usually choose a stuff-up’, said Justice Murphy (Henriques-Gomes, 2021). It would be valuable to examine the Robodebt program against the criteria for policy failure identified by Shergold. Clearly there were technical problems at the heart of the design, but it is less obvious whether monitoring and evaluation mechanisms during the life of the program identified the errors and what, if anything, was done in response. Yet an overall understanding of this policy failure proves difficult. There has been no independent review of the program since it concluded, no opportunity for expert analysis of whatever combination of ministerial decisions and public service advice contributed to the outcome. Key documents have not been released nor participants subject to crossexamination. No minister took personal responsibility for the error and no official was held to account, at least on the public record. (However, at the time of publication, the newly elected federal government had announced a Royal Commission into the scheme.) Without scrutiny and transparency to share lessons, the risk of repeat policy failure remains. Future governments will be keen to deploy artificial intelligence to target Commonwealth payments in complex programs such as the National Disability Insur­ ance Scheme. Learning from earlier failure is the best way to avoid the same outcome.

Policy success When is a policy successful? One definition suggests: The most successful policies are ones which achieve or exceed their initial goals in such a way that they become embedded; able to survive a change of government; represent a starting point for subsequent policy development or remove the issue from the immediate policy agenda. (Rutter et al., 2012: 7)

190 The Australian Policy Handbook This definition captures both longevity and change, an ability to address a problem and adopt. It is drawn from a 2012 British study of policy outcomes that reversed the usual approach: instead of asking why policies fail, the authors explored common factors in policy success. Their ambit was broad, from privatisation of public assets to minimum wage changes, pension reform, measures to discourage smoking and legislation to address climate change. Those involved in formulating policy were invited to a “reunion”, at which the logic of the policy choice was discussed and evaluated. The findings—perhaps not surprisingly—emphasise the role of careful preparation in successful policy making. Reunion participants stressed the importance of close relation­ ships between ministers and public servants, and even time in opposition as a chance to ponder and recalibrate. Parliamentary committees were praised as places to think aloud about policy problems and commission policy analysis. The authors found much benefit in regular conversations between politicians and civil society. Policies succeed when they are tested with interest groups and constituents, compared with initiatives in other sec­ tors, examined through new eyes. Inevitably such exercises produce a list—in many senses the reverse of those ten factors Shergold identified to prevent failure. Here the focus is how to design a successful public policy: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Understand the past and learn from failure.

Open up the policy process.

Be rigorous in analysis and use of evidence.

Take time and build in scope for iteration and adaptation.

Recognise the importance of individual leadership and strong personal relationships.

Create new institutions to overcome policy inertia.

Build a wider constituency of support (Rutter et al., 2012: 7).

Former British Cabinet Secretary in the United Kingdom Gus O’Donnell (2012) offered his own list of conditions for policy success, which can be paraphrased as: • • • • • • • •

Be clear about the outcomes you want to achieve. ‘Lack of strategic clarity, [not] knowing the problem you are trying to solve, is a cardinal sin.’ Evaluate policy as objectively as possible. Be clear about how you determine success and relate the measures of success to the desired outcome. Do not bear false witness against your neighbour’s policies. Complex public problems operate across departmental boundaries, so collective buy-in and coordination are critical. Do not assume the government must solve every problem. There are models of policy thinking that assume government action is required for every problem. It is not. Do not rush to legislate. Politicians work in a legislative world, but legislation should be a last resort. Honour the evidence and use it to make decisions. There is a wealth of information that should be used to inform policy decisions, but often this is inconclusive or there is not enough, so new evidence must be generated through quality research and analysis. Be clear who is accountable for what and line up the powers and the accountabilities. Alignment of power and responsibility is important, but so too is alignment with outcomes and the means of evaluating success. Do not kill the messenger. Internal debate is critical to ensuring proper contestability. ‘If you don’t encourage internal debate then the first time you will learn about your mistakes will be from your enemies not your friends.’

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Remember that it is a privilege to serve. ‘In government, the taxpayers pay our salaries and they deserve good value for money and to know we will always strive to follow the Codes that encapsulate our values.’ Keep a sense of proportion. It is easy to be drawn into a sense of crisis. ‘Keep a focus on what the real impact is on people’s lives.’

Policy success and failure are difficult to track as officials move from one problem to the next. The policy cycle might take only a few months, with consequences that unfold over years. So if lists of lessons begin to sound like homilies, offerings for a retirement speech, it is because over time officials see policy successes as their most important con­ tribution to public life. Understanding how and why a policy works is not just hard-won experience; it is wisdom, and worth sharing. In Successful Public Policy: lessons from Australia and New Zealand (2019b), editors Luetjens, Mintrom and ’t Hart survey 19 examples in which governments have designed and implemented a policy that meets its objectives. In Australia these include gun control, the response to HIV/AIDS, the higher education contribution scheme, child support and national competition policy. The New Zealand list is similarly notable, including settlements under the Treaty of Waitangi, no-fault accident compensation and reform to retirement income. As the editors observe (Luetjens et al., 2019a: vii), celebrating success in public policy can seem counter-intuitive. Much policy commentary is marked by ‘scepticism, negati­ vism and disillusionment’. Yet there are examples in which government ‘by and large got it right and made positive differences to the lives and wellbeing of countless citizens, to the strength of their economies and, sometimes, to their country’s standing in the world.’ As networked decision making becomes more familiar, policy is most likely to succeed when power is shared between ministers, agencies and community, combining local knowledge with the authority and resources of the state. Complex social challenges, for example, are explored best through approaches that recognise that community might lead, and governments follow—often a difficult proposition for ministers and officials alike. To close this seventh edition of the Australian Policy Handbook we look to a new model of policy making, reaching beyond the traditional role of government, through a project addressing justice outcomes in the city of Bourke. Case 13.2: A study in policy success—the Maranguka justice reinvestment project The collective impact approach addresses difficult public policy problems using a combination of community, government and nongovernment resources (Kania and Kramer, 2011). It asks govern­ ment to follow but not lead, so reversing the usual pattern of many programs. Instead leadership arises through collaboration—by articulating a common agenda, agreeing a shared measurement system, setting up programs to address an issue from many angles, and pursuing coordination through a backbone organisation and continuous dialogue among the players. There are numerous examples of collective impact projects across Australia, but this case study focuses on just one: work in the town of Bourke, in western New

192 The Australian Policy Handbook South Wales, to improve school retention, reduce the number of young people in the juvenile justice system, and provide better pathways toward employment, further study and a fulfilling adult life. The central concern in Bourke has been young Aboriginal people, who have long experienced exceptionally high rates of imprisonment. Bourke held the dubious dis­ tinction of the highest conviction rate for Aboriginal youth under 17 in New South Wales. Once in the juvenile justice system, further offending became common: one assessment suggested that ‘90 per cent of young people released from custody were in trouble with the law again’ within a year (Milliken, 2018). In this small town of less than 2,000 people, the cycle of disadvantage, children removed from families, youth crime, imprisonment and subsequent unemployment, ill health and poverty was all too familiar. Aboriginal community leaders in Bourke deci­ ded to confront the problem and find a better way. They chose partnership, not gov­ ernment programs, as their best option. The moment for change was taken up by local Aboriginal leaders such as Alister Ferguson. Along with collective impact, he drew inspiration from an approach in the United States known as “justice reinvestment”. Justice reinvestment proposes a social contract—community will work with authorities to keep young people out of jail on condition the savings to government are reinvested in the community. The Australian Law Reform Commission (2021) describes justice reinvestment as an economic approach in which ‘resources are redirected from punitive responses to crime into preventative strategies and early diversion away from the criminal justice system in areas with high crime rates’. This approach assumes that imprisoning people is a policy and social failure. Better, it argues, to invest in initiatives that keep young people out of juvenile justice facilities, and instead in school or employment. In adapting collective impact and justice reinvestment to local circumstances in Bourke, Ferguson and his supporters built a coalition of Aboriginal organisations in the town and beyond, linked to law reform advocates in Sydney and to professional service firms. They created a backbone organisation—Maranguka, which means ‘caring for others’ in the Ngemba language—and spent considerable time in close conversation, working out shared goals, a program of action and potential measures of success (Just Reinvest NSW, 2021). Only when community had a clear vision of its ambitions and approach did the Maranguka project approach government. The request was partnership, not control— government to walk side by side in pursuit of a common agenda to reduce incarcera­ tion and invest instead in social justice. It was a challenge the NSW government accepted, with then Attorney-General Brad Hazzard agreeing to serve as the ‘cross sector champion’ responsible for coordinating and authorising government agencies around the agreed shared goals. Collective impact projects take time, moving from smaller projects to larger ambi­ tion, building alliances and collaborations that evolve and deepen with experience. Many of Maranguka’s early initiatives were small and targeted, described as “circuit breakers”, such as encouraging young people to get birth certificates so they can apply for driver’s licences and access community services. Securing documentation and providing driving lessons removed a common source of friction between young people and police.

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Attention could then turn to schools, to policing and alternatives to imprisonment. Maranguka encouraged analysis of the many contributing factors to disadvantage, from inadequate housing and limited employment opportunities to programs for early learning, child safety and, later in life, responsible use of alcohol and drugs. Maranguka also invited some challenging inward reflection, particularly about the high rates of domestic and family violence. One of Maranguka’s local working groups, Men of Bourke, took up the challenge with initiatives that included a Men’s Space, built on the site of an old prison. Over several years reported rates of violence within families fell by nearly half (Maranguka Community Hub, 2021). As trust developed, so new links formed. The Maranguka Community Hub began convening daily meetings with local police, Bourke Shire Council officials, school principals, youth workers and other service providers to ask what happened in the town over the past day—such as who might have missed school—and then strategise responses—such as what could be done to encourage those missing to rejoin their classes. Through this forum, the Maranguka team holds people and organisations accountable to the commitments they’ve made. For successful policy, measurement is vital. From the beginning, Maranguka has set targets and tracked performance. The results are often encouraging, with more students completing Year 12 in Bourke and falls in juvenile offences and incarceration. One early study suggested a saving over five years of $7 million in justice costs available for reinvestment in the community (KPMG, 2018). However, social change is never easy. Not all indicators have moved as hoped or sustained their promising early improvement. Collective impact is the work of a generation, not a sudden transformation. The Maranguka justice reinvestment project points to a new pattern for policy making and service delivery. It invites collaboration between civil society and government, a partnership for change rather than a program designed in Canberra or a state capital and then imposed on a community. This is policy “built bottom-up”, as community sets an agenda and authority is shared. It imposes complex tests of coordination, given multiple levels of government, and considerable patience, which might sit awkwardly with election cycles. A collective impact project is also often a commitment to place, to a long timeline and to decisions made locally. These can be difficult for familiar cabinet processes, budget cycles and accountabilities within the public sector. Such programs are also high risk. Failing, and then failing better, is the way backbone organisations learn, refining their initiatives over time to align more precisely with the community that they serve. For all these reasons and more, place-based initiatives aimed at addressing dis­ advantage make governments nervous. Yet their promise must be compared with the unambiguous failure of previous approaches in a town such as Bourke. Place-based and community-led collective impact offers a way to break down the standardised decisionmaking and service delivery approach of Australian public policy. It offers instead the prospect of community-led partnerships in pursuit of shared goals—and a model that points to a different, more collaborative, Australian policy cycle.

Glossary

A common language is prerequisite to shared policy understanding. This glossary is offered to facilitate that common language. Act administrator agency; government agency amendment appropriations; annual appropriation

law made by parliament; that is, a bill passed by parliament and given assent. See also: legislation Compare: bill; regulation head of state for the Northern Territory. See also: head of state Compare: governor; governor-general a department or other entity, usually formed under an Act, that discharges government functions. Compare: department of state

a legislated alteration to a bill or Act 1. Acts that appropriate money for the government to spend on its activities. 2. parliament’s authority to a government to spend monies from consolidated funds or loan funds for specified pur­ poses. See also: budget assent; royal assent approval of a bill by the governor-general or governor, making it law. The final stage of parliament’s legislative action, making a bill into an Act. See also: commencement aye word used for voting ‘yes’ in parliament backbench 1. members of parliament who are not ministers or shadow min­ isters, and who hold no other special office (e.g. speaker or pre­ sident). 2. the seats at the back of a legislative chamber, occupied by those members. See also: member Ballot paper a piece of paper listing the names of those putting themselves forward for election, on which voters mark the person or people they want elected, in order of preference bicameral system a parliamentary system with two houses of parliament. In Australia the Commonwealth and all state parliaments, with the exception of Queensland, are bicameral. Literally, two rooms. See also: house of parliament Compare: unicameral system bill proposed Act introduced to parliament, but not yet passed and given assent. See also: assent Compare: Act; subordinate legislation bipartisan support or membership of two political parties or factions budget government’s annual plan of revenue and expenditure. The budget is a major statement of policy intentions, and takes the form of appro­ priation bills, various budget statements and the treasurer’s budget DOI: 10.4324/9781003351993-14

Glossary 195 speech (the second reading speech on the appropriation bills). See also: appropriations by-election an election to fill a seat left vacant because a member has resigned or died or is otherwise ineligible to sit as a member. Compare: general election cabinet 1. a group of senior ministers, responsible for a government’s major policy decisions. In some states and the territories, all ministers are in the cabinet. 2. a meeting of ministers called as cabinet cabinet committee a group of cabinet ministers formed to discuss a particular policy issue or group of policy issues and make recommendations to the full cabinet cabinet folder a collection of cabinet papers, delivered in an envelope and usually kept in a locked briefcase. The folder contains the agenda and submissions for a cabinet meeting cabinet submission a document prepared for cabinet’s consideration on a policy matter campaign 1. period before an election in which parliamentary candidates and parties seek to win the support of voters. 2. contest between rival candidates or parties seeking political office capital expenditure government payments spent on the acquisition, construction or enhancement of fixed assets. Compare: recurrent expenditure caretaker a convention that allows the incumbent government to continue convention to govern after the dissolution of parliament for an election. Major policy decisions and appointments are deferred until after the results of the election are clear and a new government is sworn in central agency a department or office within a department responsible for policy, economic, legal or personnel co-ordination across government. Central policy agencies are usually those supporting the head of government. Compare: line department chamber the room in which a house of parliament meets chief minister the leader of a territory’s government. Compare: prime minister; premier [to] Christmas tree an informal term from the United States Congress to describe legislation adorned by a large number of unrelated amendments (“riders”), often providing special benefits to special interest groups COAG Council of Australian Governments, comprising the prime minis­ ter, premiers and chief ministers, replaced in 2020 by National Cabinet. See also: Council for the Australian Federation; ministerial council; National Cabinet coalition combination of two or more political parties to form a govern­ ment or an opposition collective doctrine that ministers must publicly support cabinet’s decisions, responsibility or resign

196 The Australian Policy Handbook the starting date for an Act. Acts commence on assent, unless stated otherwise. The alternative is for the Act to commence by a proclamation made by the executive council, usually done to allow other implementation to take place after the Act is passed, such as subordinate legislation Commonwealth 1. the national entity of Australia, called “the Commonwealth of Aus­ tralia”. 2. the national level of government within the federation. 3. short name for the Commonwealth of Nations, mostly consisting of member states once British colonies. See also: federation; state confidence 1. the measure of the lower house of parliament’s support for a government. Success of a motion of “no confidence” or “want of confidence” normally results in a government resigning, and another government being formed, or an election being called. 2. a measure of the support of a house of parliament in a minister conscience vote vote in which members of parliament are not bound by party discipline, commonly used when issues of morality are debated, such as euthanasia or sexual preference consolidated fund; the fund created to receive revenue raised by, or granted to, the consolidated Commonwealth or a state or territory government and which revenue fund requires parliamentary authorisation to be expended constitution 1. the legal foundation of the nation, a state or territory, consisting of constitutional laws and practice. 2. the act of parliament that defines the role and power of the parliament. 3. The Common­ wealth of Australia Constitution Act consultation 1. a structured process within government to seek, and respond to, views from agencies about a policy issue. 2. more generally, a process to seek views from interested parties and community about a policy proposal. See also: engagement co-ordination the act of ensuring that politics, policy and administration work together cost-benefit systematic tool for the monetised comparison of alternative policy analysis proposals to determine which will produce the greatest benefit for society relative to costs. This technique looks at the trade-offs between costs and benefits within a proposed intervention. Compare: cost-effectiveness analysis cost-effectiveness analysis of relative costs between two or more interventions. Monetary analysis costs and policy effectiveness (or outcome) are measured separately. The value of an intervention relative to alternatives is measured as the additional cost to achieve an incremental benefit. Can be used where cost-benefit analysis is constrained, for example by the inability to monetise elements such as in health policy. This technique looks at trade-offs between costs and effectiveness of alternative interventions or options. Compare: cost-benefit analysis Council for the forum of the state premiers and territory chief ministers designed Australian to improve service delivery and co-ordination of governments. Federation Compare: COAG; National Cabinet commencement

Glossary 197 cross the floor crossbench

crown

cultural agility data visualisation debate decision delegated legislation department of state; government department discussion paper

dissolution of parliament

division double dissolution electorate

engagement

estimates evaluation executive council

to vote in parliament against party policy position seats in the chamber occupied by independents or members of minor parties that form neither government nor opposition. Compare: backbench; frontbench 1. the King as head of state, represented by the governor-general for the Commonwealth and the governors for the states. 2. the legal entity of the Commonwealth or the states (as in “the Crown in the right of the Commonwealth”) See also: executive government knowledge, skill and appreciation to act in respectful ways across and within diverse cultures the presentation of large data sets in easily accessible and visually appealing form formal discussion of an issue in parliament, conducted in accordance with standing orders 1. a formal resolution of cabinet. 2. choices made by government See: subordinate legislation organisational structure within government, staffed by public ser­ vants. Ministers are responsible for one or more departments, although a department might have several ministers, especially large Commonwealth departments document released by government seeking public comment on a matter, traditionally (but now rarely) printed on green paper See also: green paper Compare: policy paper; white paper termination of parliament by issue of writs for a general election. Usually called by the King’s representative either on the advice of the leader of the government, or when a government loses par­ liament’s confidence a formal vote in parliament in which a detailed record of members’ votes is taken a simultaneous election for both houses of parliament Compare: general election 1. the area that a Member of Parliament represents. 2. all of the people who live in an area represented by a Member of Parliament. 3. for the Senate, the state or territory electing a senator the process of involving wider voices—individual and community, personal and speaking for interests—into a policy discussion. Meaningful engagement means taking views expressed into account when formulating advice, and whenever possible sharing information about outcomes with those who contributed to the process See also: consultation expenditure plans for departments or programs See also: budget a process for examining the worth of a program, by measuring outputs and outcomes, and comparing these with targets the body that advises the head of state in the discharge of the government’s formal functions. Ministers are members of the executive council Compare: cabinet

198 The Australian Policy Handbook that part of government concerned with policy choices and the delivery of public services, in contrast to the legislature and the judiciary See also: separation of powers externality unpriced side-effects. The costs or benefits of an action that indirectly affect other parties and otherwise are not borne in market prices and accounted for by the decision maker federation 1. the creation in 1901 of the Commonwealth of Australia from the colonies that became the states. 2. the federated states and the Commonwealth government See also: Commonwealth first reading speech the stage in parliamentary proceedings introducing a bill to a house, and ordering the bill be printed. The first reading is immediately followed by the second reading speech Compare: second reading speech fiscal policy use of government resources to stabilise or manage the economy through budgetary expansion or contraction Compare: monetary policy franchise the right to vote in an election frontbench 1. the senior members of the government, being the ministers. 2. The opposition shadow ministers. 3. the seats at the front of a chamber, occupied by those members Compare: backbench; crossbench fundamental requirements that ensure legislation has sufficient regard to the legislative rights and liberties of individuals and the institution of parliament, principles thereby supporting the system of parliamentary democracy based on the rule of law general election an election for all members of the lower house Compare: by-election; double dissolution governance 1. the distribution of authority to make decisions and the systems of accountability for exercising that authority. 2. processes, systems and controls for the effective management of an organisation. 3. processes, institutions and relationships through which citizens articulate their interests and exercise their rights to government. 4. the obligations of fairness, transparency and accountability imposed on the leaders of a government or corporate entity government the party or parties in coalition that maintain the confidence of the lower house, and from whose number ministers are appointed Compare: governance; opposition government See: department of state department government bills prepared under authority of the government and introduced legislation by a minister Compare: private member’s bill government of 1. the executive branch of government. 2. the government holdthe day ing office at any one time, used as such to describe government as a stable institution, independent from political notions of a party group winning power and becoming the government governor the King’s representative in a state, and the head of state for that jurisdiction See also: administrator; governor-general; head of state executive government

Glossary 199 governor in council governor-general governor-general in council green paper

the executive council of a state See also: governor-general in council the King’s representative in Australia and head of state for the Commonwealth See also: administrator; governor; head of state the executive council of the Commonwealth

a discussion paper, so called because it was in Westminster traditionally printed on green paper See also: discussion paper Compare: white paper grey literature policy or research publications produced by government and other actors outside traditional academic channels Hansard written, largely verbatim records of parliamentary debate Compare: votes and proceedings head of the prime minister of the Commonwealth, the premier of a state government and the chief minister of a territory See also: COAG; Council for the Australian Federation Compare: head of state; senior officials head of power authority given in an Act for a body other than parliament to make subordinate legislation or make a certain decision. If there is no head of power, the subordinate legislation or decision is unlawful head of state the King, represented in the Commonwealth by the governorgeneral, in the states by governors and the Northern Territory by the administrator See also: administrator; governor; governor-generalCompare: crown; head of government house of assembly the lower house of parliament in South Australia and Tasmania See also: legislative assembly house of parliament 1. the building in which parliament meets. 2. each house in a bicameral system (e.g. House of Representatives and the Senate for the Commonwealth; Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council for most states) and the one house in a unicameral system (in Australia, the Legislative Assemblies of the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and Queensland) See also: parliament House of the lower house of the Commonwealth parliament Representatives implementation the process of converting a policy decision into action intractable problem enduring issues simply not open to solution no matter how well structured the problem. Compare: wicked problem issues the subject matter of politics, expressed as key topics of public debate and policy deliberation leader of the member responsible for the conduct of the government’s government business through a house of parliament, usually a minister Combusiness pare: whip leader of the the leader of the party or group of parties forming the parliamentary opposition opposition legislation law made by parliament, or by another person or body under a delegation by parliament See also: Act; head of power; regulation; subordinate legislation

200 The Australian Policy Handbook legislative assembly the lower house in the states. For Queensland and the territories, the only house of parliament See also: house of assembly Com­ pare: House of Representatives; Senate legislative council the upper house in the states, except Queensland a department responsible for delivery of specific services to the line department community on behalf of the executive government Compare: central agency a ministerial council comprising the Commonwealth and state and loan council territory treasurers that meets annually to co-ordinate public sector borrowing levels for the new financial year See also: ministerial council lobby 1. the area immediately outside the chamber reserved for use by members, where they meet journalists, policy advisers or “lobby­ ists”. 2. attempt to influence opinions or policy decisions of government the house of parliament from which the government of the day lower house derives. For the Commonwealth, the House of Representatives, and for the bicameral states, the Legislative Assembly or House of Assembly the structure of executive government departments, determined machinery of by the head of the government in allocating portfolio responsi­ government bilities to ministers macroeconomics the economic forest; the study of economic systems and their interdependencies, focusing on elements such as aggregate pro­ duction and consumption, unemployment, inflation, and eco­ nomic cycles Compare: microeconomics support claimed by a government for its policies from its most mandate recent electoral victory 1. a person elected to a seat in a house of parliament. 2. a member of member a lower house: MHR for Member of the House of Representatives; MHA for Member of the House of Assembly (South Australia and Tasmania); MLA for Member of the Legislative Assembly; MLC for Member of the Legislative Council. Many state assemblies use the abbreviation MP for Member of Parliament the economy close-up; the study of the behaviour of individual microeconomics households and firms that make up an economy, including supply and demand responses to market prices Compare: macroeconomics a member of the government responsible for administering a minister portfolio, including the prime minister, premier or chief minister of a jurisdiction. Ministers are members of the executive council. The cabinet is made up of some or all ministers See also: minis­ terial responsibility; responsible government ministerial adviser a member of a minister’s staff who provides political and policy advice; they are neither elected nor public service officials, often known colloquially as ‘minders’ ministerial council a meeting of Commonwealth, state and territory ministers responsible for a certain policy area. New Zealand and Papua New Guinea’s

Glossary 201

ministerial responsibility

minority government

monetary policy multiplier effect National Cabinet

natural justice

non-government legislation opportunity cost opposition

order in council outcome

output parliament

parliamentary committee parliamentary counsel peak body

ministers sometimes participate See also: National Cabinet; COAG; Council for the Australian Federation; Loan Council a doctrine, only occasionally honoured, that holds ministers responsible for their government’s policies and for the actions of public servants in their departments, including the cabinet docu­ ments prepared in the minister’s name See also: responsible govern­ ment; Westminster system a government that is formed when a political party does not have a parliamentary majority in its own right and is dependent on agreements with minor parties or independents to stay in office. The formation of the second Gillard government as a result of the 2010 Australian federal election is an example Central Bank manipulation of supply, availability and cost of money to stabilise or manage the economy Compare: fiscal policy amplified economic benefit to the economy, where returns exceed the amount initially spent A regular meeting of the heads of Australian governments, com­ prising the prime minister, premiers and chief ministers, to discuss shared policy and federalism issues See also: COAG legal rules requiring decision makers to act fairly and in good faith, without bias (pre-judgement or interest in a matter), to provide details of any matters affecting individuals, and to ensure a fair hearing See: private member’s bill Compare: government legislation the highest valued alternative forgone in making a choice the main political party or coalition of parties that is not the gov­ ernment, but is recognised in parliament as the official opposition Compare: government a form of subordinate legislation made by the executive council See also: subordinate legislation the impact or consequences of government activity. Ideally these are sought or expected in a given policy area, and provide the rationale for government interventions goods or services provided by government agencies or programs to citizens or clients to achieve outcomes 1. the legislative arm of government. For the Commonwealth, the King, represented by the governor-general, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Generally, the head of state and each house of parliament. 2. the period between general elections (for example the 15th Commonwealth Parliament, from 1937 to 1940) a group of members assigned a task of investigating and reporting to the parliament or a house of parliament on a particular matter specialists in drafting legislation pressure group representing interests of many other groups with related interests See also: lobby; pressure group

202 The Australian Policy Handbook perverse incentive policy instrument that unintentionally encourages the very beha­ viour a policy seeks to avoid petition document presented in a required form to a house of parliament by a person or group of people asking for action on a particular subject. Once conducted on paper, now usually electronic plain English content, language, presentation, structure and style aimed at making material readable and understandable by the target audi­ ence. Often contrasted with legalese. Also contrasted with simply poorly written material. Complex ideas might still require com­ plex language, even in plain English platform the electoral promises of a political party plebiscite A rarely used non-binding popular vote on a matter of public interest Compare: referendum policy a statement of government intent, implemented through the use of policy instruments See also: policy instruments policy analysis 1. analysis of a policy problem, designed to state the nature of the problem, leading to options for addressing the issue. 2. analysis of government’s action, designed to discern the underlying policy choices of that government policy analyst See: policy professional policy instrument the means by which a policy is put into effect policy paper statement of a government’s policy intention in a particular area. Also called a “white paper” because it was traditionally printed on white bond paper Compare: discussion paper; green paper policy professional an adviser with expertise and skills in a substantive policy area. Also called “policy analyst”. The terms are used only rarely in Australia portfolio the responsibilities of a minister, made up of the Acts the minister administers, the organisations accountable to the minister and other functions of the minister. Portfolios are assigned by the prime minister, premier or chief minister See also: departments PPP public-private partnership, a risk sharing relationship between government and the private sector for delivery of major infra­ structure or services. The types of partnership include BOT (build-own-transfer), BOO (build-own-operate) and BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer) schemes, PFI (private financing of infrastructure) models, and PFPs (privately financed projects) premier the leader of a state government Compare: prime minister; chief minister president the presiding officer of the Senate Compare: speaker press gallery 1. journalists accredited to report on parliamentary proceedings. 2. special galleries in a house of parliament where accredited jour­ nalists sit to observe parliamentary debates, and in which they might make notes, an activity prohibited for the public in the general gallery pressure group group that attempts to influence opinions or decisions of govern­ ment or opposition without themselves seeking election to par­ liament See also: lobby

Glossary 203 prime minister principal-agent theory

private member’s bill prorogation

public good

public policy public servant

public value

question time

randomised controlled trial recurrent expenditure red tape

referendum

regulation representative government

the leader of the Commonwealth government Compare: chief minister; premier economic theory that analyses the relationship between an agent and the principal on whose behalf the agent acts, a significant purpose being to structure incentives, so the agent acts to benefit the principal. In the public sector, used to analyse government as an agent for society or institutions as agent for government a bill introduced by a member other than a minister Compare: government legislation termination of a parliamentary session by the governor-general or governor without a general election Compare: dissolution of parliament a good that is unlikely to be privately profitable to produce because individuals cannot be excluded from consuming it (non­ excludable) and consumption by an individual does not reduce its availability to others (non-rivalrous) 1. intentions and deeds of a government. 2. description of princi­ ples governing the way decisions are made employee of government under a Public Service Act, usually in a department of government. Compare employees in statutory authorities, or staff employed under specific Acts, such as police officers a way of framing the benefits and costs of policy not only in terms of money but how government actions affect civic and democratic principles an allotted time in each house of parliament when ministers are asked questions by members of parliament about their areas of responsibility method that tests a hypothesis by selecting two random groups, one provided with the intended “treatment” whilst the other group is not government payments for goods and services consumed within an accounting period, in contrast to expenditure on capital assets Compare: capital expenditure pejorative term for official forms and procedures, especially those that are complex and time-consuming, that are required to gain approval for something. The expression alludes to the former British custom of tying up official documents with red ribbon a vote by all voters on a particular question. In Australia it is nearly always used in relation to proposed laws to change the Constitu­ tion, and requires a national majority of voters and a majority of voters in at least four states to pass Compare: plebiscite form of subordinate legislation made by executive council, usually describing detailed administrative or technical matters form of government in which franchise holders elect a person to represent their interests in parliament

204 The Australian Policy Handbook reserve powers responsible government

retrospective operation

royal assent second reading speech

Senate senator separation of powers

shadow cabinet shadow minister Sir Humphrey

sitting days social capital social media social movement speaker standing orders state

powers reserved to the head of state, including, for example, power to dismiss a government system of government in which the executive must be supported by parliament, and answerable to the people through an electoral pro­ cess. Sometimes called the Westminster system, reflecting its origins in the British parliament located in the Palace of Westminster See also: representative government application of laws before the day the law comes into effect, a device usually considered repugnant because people cannot obey a law that did not exist at the relevant time. Sometimes used to implement taxation changes from the date the policy was announced to prevent tax avoidance in the interim See: assent speech made by the member introducing a bill into parliament, stating the policy of the bill. These speeches are admissible evidence in court of the intention of the law. For government legislation, this speech is made by the relevant minister Compare: first reading speech The upper house of the Commonwealth parliament Compare: House of Representatives a member of the Senate Compare: member doctrine holding that the legislative, judicial and executive arms of government should be separate and, in particular, that the execu­ tive should not seek to direct the work of the judiciary or to misuse for political purposes the discretionary authority of the police service meeting of shadow ministers member of the opposition responsible for a nominated policy area, and said to “shadow” the relevant minister a senior public servant who maintains the status quo or stifles reform by using a treasure trove of baffling phrases, paradoxical reasoning and enigmatic explanations. Taken from the popular British comedy series Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister See also: red tape days on which a house of parliament meets productive benefit arising from solidarity achieved through social connections and networks mediated social interaction through information communication technologies promoting virtual networks and communities large grouping of individuals or organisations in civil society aimed at social change the presiding officer of the lower house of parliament rules about the conduct of debate and business in a house of parliament 1. the legal entity of a nation at international law, for example, the Commonwealth of Australia. 2. one of the six states within the federation. 3. the legal entity of a jurisdiction (e.g. Common­ wealth of Australia; state of New South Wales; Australian Capital

Glossary 205 Territory). 4. geographical area of one of the six states. 5. the body politic See also: Commonwealth; federation; territory statutory authority an agency of the government, created under an Act Compare: department of state street-level public servants who implement and enforce government policy at bureaucrat the “street level” and have frequent interactions with members of the community. Key examples include police officers, fire fighters, teachers, nurses and social workers subordinate legislation made under an Act by a person other than parliament. legislation Regulations, made by executive council, are the most common. Also called delegated legislation because it is made under parlia­ ment’s delegation supply budget allocation that allows government to fund its programs, including salaries to public servants See also: appropriations; budget territory The Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, each of which has self-government under Commonwealth Acts. Terri­ tories are represented in the Senate, but by fewer senators than for the states. Compare: state think tank a research and advocacy organisation aimed at policy influence tragedy of the economic dilemma in which individual maximisation of the ben­ commons efits of a common resource inevitably leads to its depletion triple bottom line a framework for measuring and reporting on performance according to economic, social and environmental measures unicameral system a parliamentary system with one house of parliament. This system prevails in Queensland and the territories. New Zealand’s parlia­ ment is also unicameral uniform legislation legislation that applies uniformly throughout the federation because each jurisdiction has made or adopted the law. Compare Commonwealth legislation that applies throughout the federation and overrides any incompatible state or territory law upper house one of two houses in bicameral systems. The Senate for the Commonwealth; the legislative council for a state. Compare: lower house votes and official record of parliamentary business. Compare: Hansard proceedings Westminster See: responsible government system whip the member of a party responsible for keeping the party members informed about parliament’s business, especially if a vote is expected. The whip and deputy whip are usually not ministers Compare: leader of government business white paper See: policy paper Compare: discussion paper; green paper wicked problem a problem that is hard to define, multi-causal and offers no clear solution. They are usually highly complex, involve many stakeholders and are rarely restricted to one agency or government’s area of responsibility Compare: intractable problem

Appendix I: Principles and guides for policy development

The Australian Policy Handbook is based on a policy cycle and designed to encourage a systematic approach to decision making. Good process cannot guarantee good policy, but it does encourage rigour and reduce elementary mistakes. Policy making is political and hence unpredictable. Few decisions are afforded suffi­ cient time or resources for every step in the policy cycle; most are rushed, and the pressure for ad hoc responses remains great. Reality tempers the ideal of systematic policy development. Over time, policy cycle routines and role prescriptions foster policy skills. Policy makers learn to recognise the interplay of politics, policy and administration. They become profi­ cient at designing and testing policy options, and sensitive to the responses of others. Preparing concise, informative briefing notes and cabinet submissions becomes a familiar activity, as do engagement and evaluation. Ministers and their advisers become familiar with the rhythms of cabinet process, the format of key documents and the data needed for informed decisions. Such policy skills, widely dispersed, are essential for good government. They assist a professional approach to decision making. Policy participants who value thoughtful, well-argued and properly evaluated policy proposals reduce the risk of foolish choices, and of bringing government into disrepute. Policy making is a co-operative venture between political operatives, public servants, and players from civic society. Each domain plays to its strengths, yet they maintain separate roles. It does not help the policy process if public servants become politicised. Equally, ministers are not well served if their advisers become bureaucrats, more concerned about the technical detail than the government’s political objectives. Nor can third sector or private sector operators assume the authority—or the associated chain of accountability—granted to elected officials. Policy making must meld different perspectives into viable cabinet submissions and programs. These balance politics with policy, and good ideas with sound administration. Issues move back and forward across the players on their long journey from ideas to implementation and then evaluation. The routines of cabinet provide structure for the policy process, but significant discretion remains for departments and other policy players and domains to establish their own procedures. Within government each agency or policy domain develops unique and characteristic ways of making policy. Some stress documentation of each step. Others are more informal, relying on the skills and experience of policy officers and policy community practitioners to carry policy development through the cycle. These differences in operating procedure do not matter if policy outputs are of high and consistent quality, and policy outcomes achieve the changes required. They

Appendix I

207

might even add diversity, and with it the potential for creativity within the strictures of process. We offer the following principles for well-organised policy, along with a summary of the policy process and several policy checklists, knowing that even experienced policy specialists need occasionally to refresh their skills and knowledge.

Some principles for well-organised public policy There are no fixed formulas for building policy organisations, but there are some useful principles to keep in mind when making choices about these elements and their interactions. Policy advice and development is a public service activity The public service is the major conduit of policy information to ministers and the cabinet. It manages the flow of documents, ensures the coherence and integrity of the systems that support the policy cycle, and is uniquely positioned to provide government with an insider’s view of issues. •

•

External advisers are often used to inform policy development and analysis, bringing specialised skills and knowledge, and a remoteness from government that might sometimes assist stakeholder engagement. But external advisers rarely possess the process knowledge or skills to manage an issue through the entire policy cycle. The overhead cost inherent in a system rigorous enough for cabinet processes is not commercially viable, and in many instances external service providers will not build the necessary relationship of trust with ministers over the longer term and with continuity covering change of minister or government. Departments also need to serve ministers’ need for advice on the operations and policy relating to independent bodies within the portfolio. Examples include inde­ pendent auditors, police, quasi-judicial bodies and service agencies or licensing and regulatory authorities established to keep issues at arm’s length. Such bodies should not be responsible for developing policy proposals, because that could destroy their independence. These bodies should be consulted on policy developments affecting them, but it is the responsible department that should offer independent, contestable advice to the minister.

Embed contestability The institutionalised contestability provided by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, and Finance could be replicated in other agencies. Knowing that another set of critical eyes will read, analyse and report is a useful check. Chief executives and min­ isters should be provided with the best analysis, and that means more than one perspective has been used in its development. This might be as simple as economic and legal analysis being applied routinely; or more sophisticated, with tight controls and multiple pathways. Embedding contestability will help overcome any tendency to “group think”, or policy officers becoming trapped into linear thinking and more-of-the-same approaches. A strong commitment to contestability is a bulwark against policy units becoming remote from the very real contest of ideas in the world outside the public service.

208 The Australian Policy Handbook Capture information without being captured The opposite of contestable advice could well be “capture” of policy staff by vested interests. Staff naturally form strong relationships with stakeholders and develop deep understanding of issues. It is their job to find out, and reflect, the views of stakeholders, but to do so objectively. Timely advice usually requires specialist and detailed knowledge. Capturing that knowledge without being captured by interest groups and stakeholders is a challenge. Conscious, methodical rotation and turnover of staff can be a useful tool for managers, along with independent advisers on procurement and selection panels. Be flexible—build capacity to respond Policy challenges might arise suddenly. If staff are heavily committed on pre-planned projects, there will be little capacity to respond to emerging issues without other prio­ rities falling behind. A culture of responsiveness is also important. The skill base of the agency needs to be sustainable, implying that more than one person can provide a service, and some consideration needs to be given to succession planning in the event of a key individual’s departure or the exit of a significant genera­ tion of officials. Be proactive—build capacity to forecast Of course, it is better to predict than respond. A habit of exploring possibilities will position agencies to manage the unexpected as well as the expected. Staff need to keep informed about developments in other jurisdictions, as well as national and international trends in the substantive policy areas, and to be aware of academic and journalistic opi­ nion. Futures research has increasingly taken on importance in the policymaking sphere. Coupled with complexity, systems and chaos theory and an increasing role for strategic planning in the public sector, certain conceptual distinctions have become important. Sanders (2009) argues that hindsight about the past, insight about the present and fore­ sight about the future can be distinguished from mere forecasting. Foresight builds on complexity ideas, inspiring new sets of dynamic questions to be asked. It is delineated from forecasting because it goes beyond linear trend extrapolation. Moreover, chaos theory indicates that little events in one sector can create massive ruptures in another, so linear cause and effect thinking does not adequately address system thinking. Accord­ ingly, complexity and systems thinking promote the use of foresight as the identification of early warning signs rather than predictions. The demand for a public servant to be proactive goes well beyond being abreast of contemporary thinking to include informed defensible assessments, even if they are not perfect, of how a system is likely to change and where to focus attention. Enhance the policy skills of others Inherent in contestability is the idea that other people understand how to make a con­ tribution. Policy effort is best shared among many rather than kept exclusively, even if there are tight controls and rigorous process to maintain high standards. Encouraging and building a learning organisation, including the incorporation of appropriate unlearning, will improve the quality of policy work, enhance the connection between service

Appendix I

209

delivery and government direction, and assist in broadening the vision of staff who might visit policy effort only occasionally. Build networks from the centre to the edge Size is not everything. Small, well-structured policy units can be very potent by mar­ shalling the resources around them. Trust and relationships are important elements of a fully functioning policy area. Ministers and chief executives must know that advice offered is able to be trusted, and that the people can do their job well, with discretion. In turn, policy officers should be able to build effective relationships with stakeholders, other staff, counterparts in other agencies (external and internal to government) and ministerial advisers.

Summary of the policy process Table 14.1 Summary of the policy process Policy cycle step

Political domain

Policy domain

Administrative domain

Identifying issues

• search for ideas • regular discussion

• regular advice to government about current and emer­ ging issues

• data capture and flow

Policy analysis

Policy instruments

Engagement

with sources of policy advice • sensitivity to emer­ ging policy concerns • specification of • briefs on policy policy issues and issues and their the range of choi­ consequences ces government • technical analysis might consider • indication of minis- • policy instrument terial preference options • advice on legal and resource issues

• stakeholder

identification • political level consultation

Co-ordination

• ministerial office negotiations • clearance of cabinet submissions

• data and technical support

• data and technical support

• agency stakeholder • process support identification

• policy community consultation

• analysis and

• • • •

documentation of the results of engagement preparation of policy submissions negotiations with central agencies document quality control policy quality control

• financial, adminis­ trative and person­ nel data for cabinet submissions and policy

210 The Australian Policy Handbook Policy cycle step

Political domain

Policy domain

Administrative domain

Decision

• determination by cabinet

• action planning on basis of cabinet minutes

Implementation

• minister kept informed on progress

• preparation of cabi­ net minutes and further briefs • resource identification • legal document preparation • communication planning

Evaluation

• resource

allocation and utilisation • feedback loops • skill development

• regular evaluation, • monitoring reporting of for information performance results, adjustments • political analysis of • analysis of data to programs results from evaluation • decisions about • identification of continuation issues for next turn of the cycle

• requests

Policy objectives checklist • • • • •

•

Does a policy statement express a considered response to an issue? Is the policy consistent with, and expressive of, government philosophy? Is the policy a clear and authoritative statement of intent? Is it listed in an appropriate place such as a cabinet submission? Does the policy provide sufficient detail to allow implementation:

   

—implementation responsibility assigned —resources identified —any conflicting criteria recognised and ranked —implementation plan prepared —implementation project team identified and available —drafting instructions for legislative changes?

     

Are the goals sufficiently precise and detailed to allow later evaluation: —costs and benefits articulated —benchmarks identified —performance criteria stated and agreed?

•

Are resources available to implement the policy: —operating costs —capital costs and set up costs?

•

  

 

Is some other agency required to contribute financially or in kind: —staff —staff training program —office space in appropriate centres

  

Appendix I —office equipment and requisites —plant and equipment —contractors —support services —communication plan? •

211     

Is the policy enforceable: —legally sustainable —enforcement resources identified and available —enforcement procedures identified —timely enforcement practical and achievable —sanctions and rewards relate to desired behavioural change?

    

Policy advice objectives checklist • Will the decision maker hear about relevant issues in a timely manner?  • Is the decision maker informed about contending opinion on the matter?  • Are clear, different options available and presented honestly to the decision maker?  • Does the decision maker have sufficient information to make a decision: —budget information —staff and other resource requirements —legal implications —social, environmental, political and other impacts —technical data —engagement and its results? •

     

Can the decision be tested by evaluating program performance: —performance criteria developed —benchmarks established —measurement instruments —reporting requirements established?

   

Managing the policy cycle checklist • • • • • • •

Are there procedure manuals to guide the policy process? Are staff allocated responsibility for co-ordinating policy responses within the agency and across government or external networks as necessary? Are adequate skills available for well-rounded analysis? Is there appropriate project planning? Is the need for procedural integrity, and the separation of political and policy roles, understood and built into the policy development process? Is the project timetable realistic? Does the project manager understand the need to manage up, across, out and down?

      

212 The Australian Policy Handbook • • • •

Is there appropriate project governance? Is there appropriate engagement with internal stakeholders? Have the perspectives of relevant professionals been included in policy advice? Have communication and evaluation and interaction with the ministerial office been sufficiently clarified and streamlined?

   

Policy cycle objectives checklist Issue identification • • • • •

Is there agreement on the nature of the problem, and how it is characterised? Are there feasible solutions to the problem? Is this an appropriate issue for government? For whom in government is this a problem? For whom in the community is this a problem?

    

Policy analysis • • • • • • •

Has the issue been accurately formulated? Are objectives and goals explicit and clear? Has the search for alternatives, both in terms of different options as well as experiences to be gained from policy learning, been thorough? Have the appropriate analytical tools been used for the issue? Have resource constraints, legal requirements and external accountability been taken into account in any policy advice? Is there a superior alternative? Have implementation and evaluation been considered in policy design?

      

Policy instruments • • • • • • • •

What is the appropriate mix of advocacy, money, direct government action, narrative, incentives, co-production, and law to approach this issue? Is this a reasonable way of proceeding in this policy area? Will the preferred instrument mix be cost-effective? Can this instrument mix get the job done? Are the chosen instruments simple and robust, and can they be implemented? Is there a transparent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed instruments? What evaluation tools are available for this mix of instruments? Has reflection been given over time to confirm or modify instrument choice?

       

Engagement • • •

Are the objectives of the engagement process clear? What existing partnerships and networks exist and are they appropriate fora for the policy or should new or other parties be included? What level of participation is wanted for this policy?

  

Appendix I • • • • • • • • • •

Has an appropriate information, engagement, partnership, delegation or control strategy been developed? Is there adequate control over the engagement process, especially if it has been outsourced? Does the timetable allow sufficient scope for meaningful input and consideration? Can the engagement process adapt over time if necessary? Are the resources to be committed commensurate with the importance of the problem? Have all relevant stakeholders been identified and included? Is the engagement process open and transparent? Has the process been approved by the minister or cabinet? Have contributions been acknowledged? Has feedback from engagement been incorporated into policy advice and ongoing implementation?

213          

Coordination • • • • • • • •

Is the required money, or other resources, properly targeted and fully budgeted? Have the employment, industrial, equity and fairness consequences of a proposal been worked through? Have relevant central agencies been involved appropriately and at the right stages? Have a timetable and milestones been agreed, consistent with a project plan? Have other factors that might influence attainment of policy objectives been identified? Are proposals logical, well considered and consistent with other government initiatives? Does this policy require whole-of-government instruments? What parties and relationships are required to ensure enactment of the policy?

       

Decision • • • • • •

Should this matter go to cabinet? Is the submission in the appropriate format? Do the recommendations provide an adequate basis for a cabinet minute? Has an implementation timetable been indicated in the submission? Have the minister and ministerial office been briefed on likely objections? Does cabinet have sufficient information to understand the consequences of its choice?

     

Political dimensions • • •

What level of political involvement is required in the policy process from ministers or the prime minister/premier? Is a political champion required for this policy? Are political responsibility and authority allocated appropriately?

  

214 The Australian Policy Handbook • • • • • • •

What level of political involvement is required from the ministerial office in this policy process to secure goals and ensure smooth process? How consistent is this policy with government objectives and priorities? How relevant is this policy to the community and broader concerns beyond the government mandate? What level and type of inter-agency and cross-sector partner relationships are necessary to give effect to the policy and what instruments should be used to facilitate the smooth operation of the policy within political confines? What kind of political approvals are necessary as opposed to second-guessing political desires or intentions? Is the policy likely to appear in media coverage and, if so, what kind of coverage would it receive? Is there any aspect of this policy that is likely to cause political embarrassment to the minister or government?

      

Implementation • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Is the objective clear and the underlying causal model reliable and tested? Is a top-down or bottom-up approach most appropriate to the issue? A mix? Is the assigned agency the most appropriate to implement the policy? Can implementation steps and players be kept to a minimum? Is there an agreed project leader and a clear chain of accountability with appropriate authorities or delegations? Have capacity issues been addressed, including in-house capability versus outsourcing? Have front-line bureaucrats been involved in implementation design? Has an evaluation strategy been included in the implementation plan? Is legislation necessary, and used only as a “last resort”? How will the policy’s effect be communicated to staff and clients? Has consideration been given to the needs of special audiences (for example remote communities, languages other than English, accessible written information)? What are the implementation risks and have they been addressed? Is the policy enforceable? (see Policy objectives checklist) Will implementation meet the desired objective and achieve the desired results? Has a communications plan (covering all media formats) been developed and clearly articulated to those impacted and the general public? Have regular and clear reporting mechanisms been instituted and feedback and monitoring processes prioritised? Have information system requirements been specified and challenges met?

                

Evaluation • •

Is the appropriate measurement of policy success evaluation of: inputs, process, outputs or outcomes, or a mixture? Given the nature of the policy problem, has an appropriate level, source and type of evaluation been identified?

 

Appendix I • • • •

What is the evaluation timetable and how has it been communicated to those responsible? Can performance indicators be developed for the program? Have evaluation findings informed the next cycle of policy advice? Should the program be continued, modified or terminated?

215    

Appendix II: The Uluru Statement from the Heart

We, gathered at the 2017 National Constitutional Convention, coming from all points of the southern sky, make this statement from the heart: Our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tribes were the first sovereign Nations of the Australian continent and its adjacent islands and possessed it under our own laws and customs. This our ancestors did, according to the reckoning of our culture, from the Creation, according to the common law from ‘time immemorial’, and according to science more than 60,000 years ago. This sovereignty is a spiritual notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother nature’, and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who were born therefrom, remain attached thereto, and must one day return thither to be united with our ancestors. This link is the basis of the ownership of the soil, or better, of sovereignty. It has never been ceded or extinguished, and co-exists with the sovereignty of the Crown. How could it be otherwise? That peoples possessed a land for sixty millennia and this sacred link disappears from world history in merely the last two hundred years? With substantive constitutional change and structural reform, we believe this ancient sovereignty can shine through as a fuller expression of Australia’s nationhood. Proportionally, we are the most incarcerated people on the planet. We are not an innately criminal people. Our children are aliened from their families at unprecedented rates. This cannot be because we have no love for them. And our youth languish in detention in obscene numbers. They should be our hope for the future. These dimensions of our crisis tell plainly the structural nature of our problem. This is the torment of our powerlessness. We seek constitutional reforms to empower our people and take a rightful place in our own country. When we have power over our destiny our children will flourish. They will walk in two worlds and their culture will be a gift to their country. We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution. Makarrata is the culmination of our agenda: the coming together after a struggle. It captures our aspirations for a fair and truthful relationship with the people of Aus­ tralia and a better future for our children based on justice and self-determination. We seek a Makarrata Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making between governments and First Nations and truth-telling about our history. In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard. We leave base camp and start our trek across this vast country. We invite you to walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future.

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Index

Note: Locators in italic and bold refer to figures and tables, respectively. #MeToo movement 1, 22, 42 Abbott, Tony 28 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians xiii–xiv, 3, 71, 92, 216; 1967 referendum on Indigenous constitutional recognition 101; child protection 53; evaluation framework for 157–158; First Australians xiv; First Nations xiv; First Nations Voice (to Parliament) 101; ownership 99; in policy making 3; removing children from families of 35; rights of 45 Aboriginal Child Placement Policy 53 abortion, laws about 122 Access Canberra 120 Acts of parliament 43, 194 Adelaide Zero Homelessness project 106 administration 25; government as 27–29; procedural pattern of 31 Administrative Appeals Tribunal 152 Administrative Arrangements Orders 43 administrative law 19, 92, 117 administrative resources, inadequate 151 administrators 170, 194 advisory committee 98 advocacy: coalition framework 35–36; of empowerment evaluation 160; policy through 84–85 agency/agencies 194; chief executive 179; inappropriate 150; and ministers 169; policy capacity 151 agenda (of cabinet) 128, 129, 130, 131, 135 agility 4 agreement as analytic tool 75–76 Ahead of the Game 28 Alford, John xvi Althaus, Catherine xv, xvi amendment 62, 101, 131, 194 annual appropriation 194 annual budget 15, 27, 28, 86, 116, 173 Aotearoa New Zealand xiii, 47

appropriations 194 Arnstein, Sherry 95 Arnstein’s ladder of participation 95–96, 95 assembly, house of 199 assent 194 assessment studies 101 assurance review process 155 Attorney-General’s Department 117 auditor-general 152 Australia: federation 82–83; liberal democracy of 12; policymaking environment in 2; population 3; system of government 12–13 Australia 2020 Summit 97 Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) xv, xvi, 9, 10, 61, 85, 86 Australian Broadcasting Corporation 100 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 137, 177 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 21 Australian Constitution 73, 101, 196; Commonwealth Constitution 1900 12; distribution of power by 179; plebiscites 101–102; referenda 101 Australian Department of Health 155 Australian Fisheries Management Authority 100 Australian Human Rights Commission 3 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 3, 52–53 Australian Law Reform Commission 100, 192 Australian Medical Association 84–85 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 113, 152, 153, 156 Australian Public Service (APS) 19, 104–105 see also Independent Review of Australian Public Service Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) 117, 140 Australian Tax Office (ATO) 118, 118, 188

242 Index backbench 134, 194 ballot paper 101, 194 Ball, Sarah xv, xvi Bardach, Eugene 57 Batty, Rosie 78 behavioural economics: BETA 88, 155; policy instruments 81, 84, 87 Behavioural Economics Team of Australian Government (BETA) 88, 155 behavioural techniques, policy through 87 benchmarking 57 Berejiklian, Gladys 24 bias toward engagement 93–94 bicameral system 194 big data 47–48 bill 130, 194 biodiversity 72 bipartisan 194 Black Lives Matter movement 1, 22, 46 “blame, name and shame” approach 186 Blunders of Our Governments, The (King and Crewe) 185 board model 121 bounded rationality 59 Bowling Alone (Putnam) 105 Boyd, Chris 49 Bridgman, Peter xiv, xvi, 29, 177 Brotherhood of St Laurence (BSL) 122 budget, concept of 194–5; (annual) budget process or cycle, 15, 27–28, 30, 86, 116, 193; budget divisions 117; budget planning 155, 173; budget processes 28; gender budgeting 10; performance-based budgeting 154 bureaucracies 94, 145 Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) 167 business 115, 129, 184, 185, 199; cabinet 26, 131, 135; sector 19, 20 by-election 195 cabinet 11, 14, 46, 124, 135–136, 195; addressing risk of inappropriate assignment 150; agenda 118, 126; Australian model for deliberations 126; briefing ministers in 130–131; committee reports 129–130, 195; community 98; confidentiality 133; conventions and procedures 128–129; coordination through 111; decisions 124–125, 127, 131–132, 133, 135; deliberations 133; executive council minutes 130, 132; federal process 127; folders 119, 195; implementation units 144; information papers 130; instruments 27; legislation submissions 130; matters without submission 130; meetings 130; memoranda 129; ministers role in 125; policy

recommendations from agencies 73; practice 119; processes 31; roles of 15, 42–43, 127, 129–130; routines 124, 125–127, 206; secrecy 133; shadow 18; significant appointments 130; significant subordinate legislation 130; submissions 31, 39, 112–113, 114–119, 124–132, 135, 144, 147, 149, 169, 170, 174, 195 Cabinet Handbook 31, 119, 125–127, 129, 133, 135 cabinet secretary 26, 119, 126, 127 cabinet solidarity 128 Cairney, Paul 77, 78 campaign 195; media 46, 79; public information 97; Slip-Slop-Slap 85 Campbell Collaboration 162 capital expenditure 195 carbon emissions reduction 81–82 carbon pricing 82 carbon “tax” 81 caretaker convention 195 Carson, Lyn 104 case management and program linkages model 121 causal chain process 159 Census 2016 failure 137 central agencies 111, 114, 195; Attorney-General’s Department 117; cabinet submissions 112–113; financial agencies 116–117; personnel agencies 117; policy agencies 115–116; using standardised routines 113 Central Land Council 99 central policy coordination 115 chamber 18, 23, 195 Chan, Gabrielle 133, 134 change, theory of 159 chaos theory 208 charities 20, 21, 44 charrette 102 charter letters 43 chief executives 207, 209 chief minister 14, 25, 27, 61, 83, 116, 121, 195 child protection 52–53, 120 choice architecture 87 circle sentencing evaluation in New South Wales 166–167 circuit breakers 192 circulation 128 circulation of proposals 98 co-design 89–90, 93, 123 COAG Skills Recognition Taskforce 61–62 coalition 18, 27, 36, 50, 63, 195 Coalition government 101–102 Cochrane initiative 162 Codd, Mike 169 Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff 17 Cohen, Michael 36 Colebatch, Hal xv

Index 243 collaboration 69, 88, 100–101, 111, 120, 140,

157, 180; circle sentencing 166; removing

barriers to 79; intergovernmental 89;

multi-sectoral collaboration 47

collective impact project 105–106, 191–193 collective responsibility 128, 130, 135, 195

Collins, Bob 134–5 commencement 153, 196

committees 128; interdepartmental 121; model 121; reports 129–130 Commonwealth 24, 117, 120, 131, 132, 181,

196; agencies 118; Cabinet Handbook 119;

cabinet process 126; cabinet submissions in

129–130; legislation 85; Ombudsman 152,

188; powers and responsibilities 82–83;

Public Service Act 1999 171; requiring

agencies to evaluate programs 155–156;

Urban Congestion Fund 113

Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) 142–144 commonwealth parliamentary workplaces

(CPWs) 24

communication failures 151

communities: cabinet 98; epistemic 36, 99;

policy communities 98

Commuter Car Park Projects program 113

complexity theory 110, 208

Conference of the Parties (COP) 2

confidence 196

confidentiality 128

conscience vote 196

consolidated fund 196

consolidated revenue fund 196

constitution see Australian Constitution Constitution Commission of Victoria 144

consultants 19–20, 24, 47, 58, 101, 160

consultation 92, 97–98, 196; and efficiency 112–113; within government 118–119 Consumers Health Forum of Australia 99

contestability, embedding 207

“cooperative federalism” initiatives 83

coordination 110, 196, 213; central agencies

114–117; coherence 111; comments 119;

consistency in government 112; consultation

and efficiency 112–113; consultation within

government 118–119; in departments

119–120; joined-up government 120–122;

and Politics 123; whole-of-government 118

Cosgrove, Peter 171

cost-benefit analysis 70, 77, 162, 196

cost-effectiveness analysis 75, 77, 196

Council for Australian Federation 196

Council of Australian Governments (COAG)

2, 61, 195

COVID-19 pandemic xiii, 2, 45, 47, 50, 54,

75; ambiguities over authority and finances

in 83; Australian response to 180–182;

information campaigns during 97; role of

advocacy instruments in 85; vaccination

campaigns 84–85, 97

COVIDSafe app failure 47–48 crafted argument 68

crisis management 45, 121–122 critical path method 173

crossbench members 43–44, 197

cross the floor 197

crown 197

cultural agility 3–4, 157, 197

Cultural and Indigenous Research Centre

Australia (CIRCA) 167

cultural diversity 3, 4

cultural fluency 3–4 Daley, John 21

data visualisation 197

Davidson, Kenneth 145

Davis, Glyn xiv, xvi

debate 10, 125, 130, 131, 171, 197; climate

change 68; about contending paradigms 34;

parliamentary 124; policy 40, 42, 101;

political 137; public 21, 23, 69, 79

decision making 39, 128, 136, 197, 213; cabinet

125; decision parameters identification 63–64;

decisions about public participation in 94;

objectives and goals of policy analysis for

62–63; pre-emption of 40–41; rational

comprehensive model to 58–60, 59;

Westminster model of 177

delegated legislation 85–86, 113, 197

delegation 95, 101

democracy 21, 73; deliberative 103–104; liberal

12; representative 92

democratic principles 8

democratisation of public service 171–172 Department of Children and Families 53

Department of Education, Employment and

Workplace Relations (DEEWR) 176

Department of Education, Science and

Training (DEST) 61, 176

Department of Finance 28–30, 116–7, 155,

187, 207

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 134, 150

Department of Human Services 188

Department of Planning and Community

Development 160

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

(PM&C) 26, 27, 29, 115, 116, 207

departments 207; policy groups 120; of state 197

Developing Policy Advice (ANAO)156 digital engagement 104–105 Digital Transformation Agency 105

direct government action, policy through 86–87 directives, conflicting 150

discrimination 51

244 Index discussion paper see green paper

disruption 2

dissolution of parliament 197

diverse public 93

diversity 3–4, 29, 88, 105, 158

division of labour 27, 197

documentation 169; for cabinet, 126–7

domestic violence 78

Don Dunstan Foundation 106

double dissolution 197

Downs, Anthony 48

drum lines 49

“due process” principles 169

Early Childhood Development Subgroup

(ECDS) 176

ecological sustainability 72

economic analysis: cost–benefit analysis 70;

“justice reinvestment” model 70–71; to

policy problems 69, 70

economic and financial management 69

economic framework 69–71, 74

economic policy 52, 82

Education First Youth Foyers 122–123 “efficiency dividends” 28

efficient interaction 110

Electoral and Administrative Review

Commission (EARC) 170

electorate 76, 103, 197

emerging practices 57

employment of market solutions 70

empowerment 101–102 engagement 92, 197, 212–213; advantages and

challenges 94–95; bias toward 93–94;

charrette 102; collective impact 105–106;

deliberative democracy 103–104; designing

106–109; digital 104–105; IAP2 public

participation spectrum 95–102; imperative

for 92–94; overload 107; as participation

109; social capital 105–106; stages of 108;

traps 108, 109; types of 95, 96, 97

environmental evaluation 72

environmental framework 72, 74

Environmental Impact Assessment Review 72

environmental impact statement (EIS) 72, 101

environmental policy 36

environmental quality 72

epistemic communities 36, 99

estimates 197

ethics: codes of conduct 17, 25, 46, 171, 172;

ethic of political office 170; ethic of role

170–171, 172

euthanasia, laws about 122

evaluation 154, 197, 214–215; circle sentencing

in New South Wales 166–167; criteria 154,

156; environmental 72; experimental and

quasi-experimental impact evaluation

methods 162; findings 164–165; formative

155; Indigenous 157–158; measurement

159; meta-evaluations or evidence synthesis

162–163; methods 162–163; policy 39;

across policy cycle 154–156; process

159–160; risks of measurement 163–164;

steps in planning 161

Evans, Nick 79

evidence-based policy 66–67; strengths 67; weaknesses 67–68 evidence, three-lens model of 69

executive 5; in Australian government 12;

function 13, 14; government 198

executive council 129, 197, 199; minutes 130;

role in cabinet 132

Executive Council Handbook 132

Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) 28

external advisers 207

externality 198

Facebook 22, 50

family violence 78

Family Violence Prevention Legal Services

(FVPLS) 158

feasibility information 93

federal government: blueprints for reform of 28;

change of xiii; as decision-maker 89; facing

criticism during COVID-19 crisis 97, 181

federalism, Australian context of 83–84 federation 198; complexity arising in federal

system 153; “cooperative federalism”

initiatives 83

Fetterman, David 160

Finance Department see Department of Finance first reading speech 198

fiscal policy 173, 198

focus group research 97

formative evaluation 155

fourth estate see media franchise 12, 73, 198

frontbench 198

Frydenberg, Josh 181

fundamental law 73

fundamental legislative principles 198

‘funnel of causality’ 35

Future Melbourne 2026 104

‘garbage can’ model of policy making 36

Garran, Robert R. 14

gateway reviews 155

general election 198

Gillard, Julia 81, 176

Gillard government or ministry 13, 201

globalisation 2

Gove, Michael 66

governance 198; arrangements 121; digital xv;

good 186, 187; Indigenous data 158;

Index 245 instrument of 1; memory 23; multi-centric 61; network governance see network governments 198; as administration 27–29;

agencies 150, 194; architecture of 27–28, 38;

Australian system of 12–13, 33, 126; cabinet

role in 14–15; complexity and scale of 112;

consistency in 112; consultants role in

19–20; consultation within 118–119;

coordination in 31–32, 110; crisis and

disruption 125; of day 198; department 197,

198; distributed policy framework 111;

executive arm of 5, 12, 13–14; external issue

drivers from outside 45–46; factors

contribute to policy agenda within 44–45;

functional map of 24–25; head of 199;

horizon scanning 47; information campaigns

97; joined-up 120–122; leader of 199;

legislation 198; lobbyists and stakeholders’

role 23; local 83, 85; machinery of 27, 118,

122, 144, 177, 178, 179, 200; map of 18–19,

32; media role in 22–23; ministerial advisers

16–17; objectives 12, 81, 86, 99; placebo

policy 54; as policy 26–27; policy as

authoritative choice of 5–6; policy making

of 7, 10–11; political, policy and

administrative domains 29–31, 30; as politics

25–26; as process 33; public servants in

15–16; responsible 12, 13; role of opposition

18; social movements 21–22; system

integrity 23–24; third sector in 20–21;

two-way exchange 98

governor-general 12, 14, 129, 130, 132, 194,

197, 198, 199, 201, 203

governor-general in council see executive council governor 14, 194, 197, 198, 199, 203

Grattan Institute 21

green paper see discussion paper Greens Party 18, 21, 50; Tasmanian Greens 79

grey literature 11, 199

‘group think’ 185, 207

habitat preservation 72

Hanger, Ian 149

Hanover Welfare Services 122

Hansard 199

Hartz-Karp, Janette 104

Hasluck, Sir Paul 32

Hawke, Bob 27, 133–135 Hawke Government 43

Health Impact Assessments 101

Henry, Ken 40

heuristic 36, 87; policy cycle as xv, 10, 11,

34–5, 138, ‘stages heuristic’ style of policy

making 35

High Court: Comcare v Banarji 171; Mabo v

Queensland 45; support for Commonwealth

legislation 83

Hine, Darren 78, 79

Home Insulation Program 149

homelessness 54, 106, 122–123

Hood, Christopher 83, 91, 164

horizon scanning 47, 48

horizontal alignment 120

House of Representatives 13, 43, 126, 199

Howard, John 27

Howard government 142

hypothesis, policy as 5, 6–7, 51–2

ill-structured issues/problems 51, 60

Implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky) 138

implementation of policies 39, 137, 199, 214;

cabinet implementation units 144;

conditions for successful 145–147; failures in

public sector 137; instruments 147–148,

148; monitoring of 153; organisational

unlearning 141–142; in policy design

137–139; policy feedback loops 139–141;

policy learning 139–141; political

dimensions to 144–145; under pressure

152–153; traps 148–151

implementation readiness reviews 155

incentive failures 150

incremental adjustment 65

incrementalism 57, 75

Independent Parliamentary Standards

Commission 17

Independent Review of the Australian

Public Service 16, 17, 19, 29, 58, 104–5,

172, 182, 187

Indigenous data 158

Indigenous data governance 158

Indigenous data sovereignty 158

Indigenous evaluation 157–158 individual liberty 9

industrial relations 98, 117, 131

information 97; campaigns 97; capture 208;

papers 130

information and communications

technology 152

Inquiry into the Northern Territory Families

and Children Division (2009) 53

Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC)

122, 123

interdepartmental committees 121

interest group meetings 98

interests 128

Intergovernmental Agreement for a National

Licensing System for Specified Occupations,

The 62

Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal

Financial Relations 177

International Association for Public Participation Australasia (IAP2) 96–97 intractable problems 51–52, 54, 56, 64, 91, 199

246 Index involvement 98–99 Iremonger, John xvi

“irrationality” of politics 36–37 issues 124, 199; agenda making 48; agenda

shaping 46–48; attention cycle 48–50, 49;

big data 47–48; drivers 43–46; identification

37, 39, 50–51, 50, 212; identification skills

54–55; ill-structured 60; non-decisions 54;

policy agenda on 42–43; as problems 51–53

Jarvie, Wendy 176, 177, 178

Jawoyn people 133

Jenkins, Kate 17, 24

Jobactive program 142, 149

JobKeeper program 181

Job Network program see Jobactive program Job Services Australia see Jobactive program Johannes, Greg 78, 79

John L. Alford Case Library xvi, 165, 180

Johnson, Lyndon B. 64

joined-up government 120–122 Joined Up Human Services project in

Tasmania 120

journalists 22, 23, 46, 173

Joyce, Barnaby 16

judicial function 13

judicial review 152, 179

justice 73

“justice reinvestment” model 70–71, 192

Kahneman, Daniel 87, 136

Kakadu National Park 133–135 Keating, Paul 40, 134

Keynes, John Maynard 141

Kingdon, John 36, 51

knowledge-based policy influence organisations see think tanks knowledge management 139–140 Land Rights Act 1976 133

Lasswell, Harold xiv, 4, 10, 33

law 179; about abortion, prostitution,

euthanasia, sexuality 122; administrative 19,

92, 117; fundamental 73; policy through

85–86

lead agency model 121

learning organisation 139, 140

legal framework 72–73, 74

legislative/legislation 199; assembly 200;

council 200; delegated 85–86, 113, 197;

function 13; non-government 201;

submissions 130; subordinate 130, 205;

uniform 205

liberal democracy of Australia 12

Lindblom, Charles 75, 149, 153

line department 111, 112, 113, 115–117, 126,

131, 200

loan council 200

lobbying 23–24, 200

Lobbying Code of Conduct 24

lobbyists 23

local government 83, 85, 104, 112, 113, 115

lower house 14, 18 200

machinery of government 27, 118, 122, 144,

177, 178, 179, 200

Mackie, Kathleen 74, 78

macroeconomics 200

Magenta Book: Central Government guidance

on evaluation (HM Treasury) 159, 162

Maiam nayri Wingara Indigenous Data

Sovereignty Collective 158

Makarrata Commission 216

mandate, concept of 144–145, 200

Maranguka Community Hub 193

Maranguka justice reinvestment project 106,

191–193

markets, as policy solution 70, 74, 86, 102,

142–4, 147–8, 148

market forces 45–46 marriage equality 101

Martin, Clare 99

matters without submission, to cabinet 130

media: 24-hour news cycle 22, 152; fourth

estate 22–23, 46; ownership 22

Melbourne City Council 104

Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 17

members of parliament 13, 200

memoranda 129

merit selection 28–29 microeconomics 200

Migration Review Tribunal 152

mining in Kakadu 133–135 ministerial advisers 16–17, 18, 27, 178–179, 200

ministerial council 130, 200–201 ministerial offices 17, 27, 58, 130, 131

ministerial responsibility 12, 14, 128, 201

ministerial staff see ministerial advisers ministers 5, 6, 13–18, 23, 25, 178, 200, 207,

209; briefing in cabinet 130–131; cabinet 24,

125; ethic of role 170–171, 172; information

campaigns 97; using ministerial staff 153;

policy development, role in 94; political

roles 25; politicians as 26; responsibility to

ERC 28

minority government 13, 18, 201

monetary policy 100, 201

money, policy through 86

Moore, Mark 8–9 Morrison administration or government 17,

43, 177

Morrison, Scott 28, 172, 181, 187

multi-centric governance 61

multiculturalism 3

Index 247 multiple streams analysis 36

multiplier effect 201

Murphy, Bernard 189

Murray–Darling Basin Authority 94

Mutual Recognition Act 1992 62

narrative as policy instrument 34, 40, 85

National Broadband Network 104, 185

National Cabinet 2, 113, 115, 121,

180–182, 201

National Constitutional Convention (2017) 216

National Disability Insurance Scheme 102, 189

National Indigenous Australians Agency

(NIAA) 157

national occupational licencing system 61–62

National Occupational Licensing Authority

(NOLA) 62

National Partnership Agreement on

Homelessness 122

native title 45, 100

natural disasters 1, 54, 72, 104, 122, 180

natural justice 73, 201

natural resource management 72

network: governance 3, 89, 140; policy

through 88–90

New Employment Services Model (NESM) 155

New South Wales program design 165

non-agenda items, at cabinet 128

non-decisions 54, 102

non-government legislation 201

non-profit sector see third sector of government

Northern Land Council 99, 133

Northern Territory Families and Children see

Department of Children and Families

note takers 128

nudges, as policy instrument 82, 87, 88

objectives: checklist 210; conflicting 150;

defining 62–63; of governmental action 5;

policy instruments and 82

O’Donnell, Gus 190

O’Farrell, Barry 24

Office of Indigenous Policy within Department

of the Chief Minister 99

Office of the Climate Coordinator 116

officials 128

one-stop-shop model 121

Online Compliance Intervention 188

opportunity cost 201

opposition 25, 26, 201; role in government 18;

to systemic sexism and racism 22; time in 190

opposition, leader of 199

order in council 201

organ donation 87

organisational unlearning 141–142

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) 3, 92; evaluation

criteria 156, 159; study of public

involvement in government action 96

Ostrom, Elinor 139

Our future, our public servicesee Independent Review of the Australian Public Service output distortion 164

“outsourcing” 188

“Overton window” 46; Overton, Joseph P. 46

Parkinson, Martin 138, 186

Parks and Reserves (Framework for our

Future) Act 2003 100

parks policy in the Northern Territory 99–100 parliament(ary) 14, 25, 124, 201; Acts of 43,

194; committee 201; counsel 145, 201;

dissolution of 197; house of 199; members

of 13, 200; Queensland Parliament 73; role

of members of 12, 13

Parliament House, Canberra 24; culture 24

participation 93; Arnstein’s ladder of 95–96, 95;

engagement as 109; public participation

spectrum 96

partnership 98

peak body 23, 201

performance indicators 125, 163

permanence 28

personal integrity by policy makers 24

personnel policies 27

perverse incentive 202

petition 50, 202

Petrusma, Jacqui 79

placebo policy 54

plain English 202

platform 25, 75, 202; burning 80; election 18;

opposition party 82

plebiscites 101–2, 202

policy advice 7, 15, 16, 25, 39, 47, 69, 170;

alternate sources of 19–20, 44, 58; cabinet,

role in 125; consistency across borders 116;

deficiencies in (Home Insulation Program)

149; evaluation and 149, 156; “frank and

fearless” 172, 185; loss of institutional

memory 29; neutrality 12, 30, 171;

objectives checklist 211; and policy failure

see policy failure; political judgement 174;

technical judgement of 81

policy advisers 6, 16, 51, 65, 69, 110, 125, 170,

200; facing weekly cycle of cabinet 30–31;

identifying decision parameters 63

policy analysis 38, 56, 57, 202, 212; agreement

75–76; analyst’s toolkit 69; identifying

decision parameters 63–64; economic

framework 69–71, 74; environmental

framework 72, 74; evidence-based policy

66–68; iteration 56, 60, 66; legal framework

72–73, 74; objectives and goals 62–63;

policy experts 57–58; political analysis

248 Index 74–75; problem formulation 60, 61; purpose of 76–78; rationality in 58–60; search phase 64–65; sequence for 60; social framework 71–72, 74; solutions, proposing 65–66 policy approval 128 policy capacity 182–3 policy cycle 7, 33, 183; alternatives to 35–36; approach, xiv–xv; Australian 34–35, 37–39, 37, 40; in cabinet 126; characteristics of 33–34; checklist management 211–212; division of labour 170; evaluation across 154–156; good process and good policy 40–41; implementation 137; indicative timetable for 175; learning dynamics 141; management 174; model xii–xiii; normative values of 34; objectives checklist 212–215; policy analysts 60; and policy ecosystem 39–40; and policy instruments 81; pre-evaluation monitoring in 153; reducing risk of failure 184; routines 31–32, 206; sense of complexity 11; staged approach to 10; systematic 8 policy failure: learning from 185–187; prevention 190; risk of 184; study in 187–189 policy implementation see implementation of policies policy instruments 37, 81, 84, 152, 202, 212; advocacy, policy through 84–85; Australian 83–84; Australian policy context 82–83; behavioural techniques, policy through 87; choice 151; classification of 82; criteria for selection 90–91, 90; direct government action, policy through 86–87; law, policy through 85–86; as means 81; money, policy through 86; network, policy through 88–90; objectives and 81, 82 policy making 7, 10–11, 33, 206; attention to government’s mandate 145; in Australian context xiii; characteristics of 1, 4; complexity of xv; constants in xiii; and COVID-19 pandemic 2; decision on engagement 106–107; developing shortcuts for judgements 57; engagement and 95; environment 1–4; ‘garbage can’ model of 36; incrementalism 57; “irrationality” of politics 36–37; paying attention to issues 43; using practical reason 41; process 145; process of xiv; shortage of contemporary case studies about xvi; ‘stages heuristic’ style of 35; and Uluru Statement xiii–xiv; vacuums 36–37 policy/policies 1, 2, 25, 66, 202; action/activity 7, 11, 122; for addressing family violence in Tasmania 78–79; through advocacy 84–85; agenda on issues 42–43, 45; analyst 202; through behavioural techniques 87; brokers

35, 66, 67; capacity 178, 182–183; capacity risk factors 151; challenges 121, 208; co-design 89; co-production 105; communities 98; coordination 38–39; decisions 6; deliberation, logic of 68–69; development 168–169; diffusion 57, 65; through direct government action 86–87; documents 4; engagement 38; entrepreneurs 36, 67; evaluation 39; experts 57–58; feedback loops 139–141; government as 26–27; handbook xiii; issues 61; jur­ isprudence 73; through law 85–86; learning 2, 7, 57, 139–141; makers 172; through money 86; through network 88–90; objectives 149, 210–211; officers 42, 179; paper 202; placebo 54; professionals 12, 42, 44, 46, 47, 173, 202; proposals 168; responses 72; settings 151; shocks 75; skills 208–209; submissions 129; tax 86; transfer 57 policy–political demarcation 31, 172, 179 policy process 168, 170, 186; context for policy choices 177–179; creativity, adlibbing and spontaneity in 36; democratisation 171–172; good policy for 35; making choices 179–180; management 174; paradox about 56; planning projects 173; policy capacity 182–183; politicisation 171–172; procedural integrity 169–170; professionalisation 171–172; roles and ethics 170–171; summary of 209–210; timing 173–174; ways for advisers 111 policy process models, traditional xiv, 33, 94 policy success 184, 189; failure prevention 190; O’Donnell’s conditions for 190–191; study in 191–193; think tanks 44 political/politics 25, 37; agenda 45; analysis 74–75; coordination and 123; dimensions 144–145, 213–214; domains of 43; government as 25–26; “irrationality” of 36–37; players 170; politicisation of public service 171–172; priorities 27; responses 40; responsiveness 16, 174; risks 51, 125, 174 Politics of Policy Analysis, The (Cairney) 77 Porter, Christian 188–189 portfolios 128, 202; minister’s 14, 15, 27; portfolio priority letters 43 positive risk culture 185 poverty 51, 71, 75, 87, 150, 181, 192 powers 5; Commonwealth 82–83; federal division of 83; head of 199; separation of 204 premier 14, 25–26, 27, 111, 115–6, 121, 125, 144, 169, 199, 202 pre-school education, creation of universal access to 176–177 president 202 press gallery 202

Index 249 pressure group 5, 48, 202 prime minister 14, 15, 25–28, 29, 115–117, 144, 169, 203; cabinet, role in 125; central agencies work for 111; Charter letters from 43; and leadership task 29; machinery of government 27, 177, 178, 179 principal-agent theory 142, 149, 203 private member’s bill 203 privatisation 70, 71, 102, 190 problems 124; definition 54; formulation in policy analysis 60, 61; ill-structured 51; intractable 52, 54; issues as 51–53; public 54, 56; well-structured 51; wicked 52–53, 54, 205 procedural integrity 169–170 process evaluation see formative evaluation process evaluation methods 162 productive capabilities 9 Productivity Commission 21, 47, 105 professionalisation of public service 171–172 promising practices 57 prorogation 203 prostitution, laws about 122 public administration 10, 47, 187, 189 public decisions 56 public education 103 Public Finance Act 1989 111 public good 9, 203 Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 155–156 public health crisis/emergency xiii, 2, 45, 180 public health initiatives 89 public health measures 23, 66, 83, 85 public hearings 98 public information campaign 97 public inquiries 100 public officials see public servants public participation spectrum 96–97, 96; collaboration 100–101; consultation 92, 97–98; empowerment 101–102; information 97; involvement 98–99 public policy 1, 5–6, 168, 203; as authoritative choice of government 5–6; definition of 4–5, 5; as hypothesis 5, 6–7; as objective 5, 7–8; planning for 173; principles for 207–209; as public value 5, 8–10 public-private partnership (PPP) 202 public servants 15–16, 18, 92, 145, 203; policy development, role in 94; role in policy agenda 47; roles in issue identification 55 public service 27; activity 207; change cumulative effect 29; democratisation of 171–172; merit-based career 172; policy analysis by 37; politicisation of 171–172 Public Service Act 1999 171 Public Service Research Group (PSRG) 138; implementation and evaluation cycle 138–139, 139

public value 5, 8–10, 9, 19, 77, 203 punctuated equilibrium 56, 65 purchaser-provider model 142 Putnam, Robert 105 Queensland Parliament 73 question time 203 Quick, John 14 racial equality 3 randomised controlled trial 2, 57, 66, 68, 203 ratchet effect 164 rational comprehensive model 58–60, 59; “rational” process 100 records 129, 132, 133, 152, 169, 185 recurrent expenditure 203 red tape 203 referendum xiv, 83, 101, 203 reform 2, 28, 53, 73, 144; administrative 176; COAG reform agenda 177; criminal justice 65; pension 190; structural 216 Register of Lobbyists 23, 24 regulation 203 Regulatory Impact Statement process 62 rehabilitation of offenders 70 reorganisation 27 representative government 203 representativeness 99 Reserve Bank 100 reserve powers 204 responsible government 12, 204; overlap between roles 13; principles of 14; spheres of 13, 13 retrospective operation 204 Review of the Parliamentary Workplace 17 Robodebt program 187–189 routines 31–32, 33, 141, 173; in cabinet 124, 125–127, 206; of coordination 113; institutional 61; policy cycle 206; standardised 113 royal assent 194, 204 Royal Commissions 20, 53, 58, 100, 149, 189 Rudd government 43, 149, 176 Rudd, Kevin 27, 176 rules 28 rule of law 73, 74, 198 Sabatier, Paul A. 35, 147 “safe-space” mentality 164 Safe Homes, Safe Families 79–80 scale constraints 178 Scanlon Foundation 3 second reading speech 204 secrecy 92, 125, 128, 133, 135 secretary 128, 179 Senate 12, 13, 18, 21, 188, 204

250 Index Senate Education and Employment References Committee 143 senator 18, 44, 204 service 73 Service NSW 120 sexuality, laws about 122 shadow cabinet 18, 204 shadow minister 198, 204 shared enterprise 11 Shark attacks in Western Australia 49–50 Shergold, Peter 16, 116, 145, 149, 172, 185, 186 Simeon, Richard 35 Simon, Herbert 10, 51, 59 sitting days 204 Slip-Slop-Slap campaign 85 smart practice concept 57 Smith, Ken xvi smoking 86, 190 social capital 105–106, 204 social framework 71–72, 74 social infrastructure 71 social justice principles 71 social media 1, 22, 23, 30,, 42, 46, 68, 85, 104, 105, 107, 152, 204 social movements 21–22, 204 Social Security Appeals Tribunal 152 social security payments 181 social values 56 soft regulation 86 South Australia’s Strategic Plan 94 speaker 18, 204 Special Broadcasting Service 100 specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed objectives (SMART objectives) 155, 159, 161 stakeholders 23, 24, 67, 84, 92, 125, 140, 156, 159, 160, 170; co-designed policy 93; coalesce 89; engagement 93; forum 79; identification 107; “package deals” with 174 standing orders 204 state 73, 110, 115, 116, 129, 178, 179, 204–205; head of 199; integrity agencies 24; minority government 13; premier and cabinet 26; public sector legislation 29; responsibility of 83; vertical fiscal imbalance 83 statutory authority 100, 205 Stolen Generation 35 “strategic commissioning” skills 87 strategic triangle 9 street-level bureaucrats 27, 147, 205 submissions 26, 94, 98, 101, 105, 128 subordinate legislation 98, 130, 175, 196, 203, 205 Successful Public Policy: lessons from Australia and New Zealand (Luetjens, Mintrom and ’t Hart) 191

supply 205 supply chain issues 182 surveys 97, 142, 162, 180 system integrity 23–24 systems theory 208 Taskforce for the Olympic Games 116 Tasmania Together blueprint 94 tax system: gender tax policy 10; taxation incentives 148; taxation powers 83; taxation relief 8; tax increases 86; tax policy 6, 45, 73, 83, 86, 148, 204; tax policy and the crossbench 43–44 Technical and Further Education providers (TAFEs) 122–123, 150 territory/territories 24, 25, 73, 83, 101, 110, 113, 115, 129, 177, 179, 180, 205 terrorist incidents 121–122 Thaler, Richard 87 theory-based impact evaluation methods 162 think tanks 20, 21, 44, 47, 58, 65, 205 third sector of government 19, 20–21, 24, 29, 32, 58, 89, 156, 169, 170, 206 Threlfall, David xv–xvi threshold effect 164 timely lodgement rules, for cabinet 128 timing 3, 32, 56, 146, 173–4, 175, 179 Tingle, Laura 23, 29 town hall meetings 98 toxic culture see organisational unlearning ‘traffic lights’ system 144 tragedy of the commons 205 transcendent citizenship 93 transformative citizenship 93 treasurer 28, 111, 131; brief 117; reserve 116 Treasury 28–30, 114, 116–117, 118, 134, 207 triple bottom line 205 Tune, David 154, 159 Turnbull government 43 Turnbull, Malcolm 28, 101 Twitter 22, 50 Uluru Statement from the Heart xiii–xiv, 101, 216 UN Climate Change Conference 116 unicameral system 205 uniform legislation 205 United Nations Climate Change Conferences 72 “unorganised” public 107 upper house 13, 200, 204, 205 vaccination xiii, 4, 68, 84–85, 97, 104, 105, 182–182 value-for-money methods 162 vertical alignment 120 Victorian COVID-19 Royal Commission report 20 votes and proceedings 205

Index 251 weapons policy 46 Weiss, Elizabeth xvi well-structured problems 51 Weller, Patrick 15 Westminster system xiii, 12, 17, 74, 177, 204, 205 whip 205 white paper 4, 98, 111, 202, 205 whole-of-government: action 121; approach 39; coordination 118; initiatives 120; perspective 112, 114, 115, 118; responsibility 117;

scrutiny on submissions 131; strategic

plan 111

wicked problems 44, 52–53, 54, 78, 91, 143, 205 Wildavsky, Aaron 7, 56, 63 Wilson, Harold 30, 54, 101 wise practices 57 Women’s March 4 Justice 22 Yeend, Julie 61 Yes Minister 204 youth homelessness 122–123