The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland 9780231892018

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STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW Edited by the FACULTY O F P O L I T I C A L SCIENCE O F COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y

NUMBER 558

THE ATTITUDE OF THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TOWARD NATIONALISM IN GERMANY, ITALY, AND POLAND BY

HANNAH ALICE STRAUS

THE ATTITUDE OF THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TOWARD NATIONALISM IN GERMANY, ITALY, AND POLAND

BT

HANNAH ALICE STRAUS, Ph.] .

N E W YORK COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1949

PRESS

COPYRIGHT, 1 9 4 0

BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINTED I N T H E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Published in Great Britain, Canada, and India by GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE

OXFORD U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S London, Toronto, and Bombay

PREFACE THE Congress of Vienna represents a landmark in the history of nationalism. Before its meeting, conscious modern nationalism was developing and spreading. When the Congress dispersed the rapid forward movement had been momentarily arrested. The general attitude of the diplomats at Vienna toward nationalism has been judged frequently in connection with the entire work of the Congress, but their opinions on the question have not been investigated in detail. This study is an attempt to explain their several reactions. Since the nationalist issue can be observed best in the negotiations concerning Germany, Italy, and Poland, these three problems have been chosen as basis for the inquiry.1 The assembly, meeting in Vienna in the fall of 1814, came together to arrange those European affairs which had not been settled at the Paris Peace Conference in the spring of the same year. All princes and states which had taken part in the fight against Napoleon had been invited to participate, and since many great and small sovereigns headed their delegations personally, the meeting became a very brilliant social affair. But contrary to expectations the assembly as a whole never discussed or decided any political matters. The social gatherings were larger than the meetings which took place for strictly political purposes, because the chief European powers reserved the conduct of affairs to themselves. There were a few meetings of the eight states which had signed the Treaty of Paris, but the most important among these, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, had planned to exclude the rest.2 During the 1 Aside from German, Italian, and Polish affairs, the Congress discussed Switzerland, the regulation of commerce and navigation on international rivers, and abolition of the slave trade. 2 Comte d'Angeberg, Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1S15, Paris, 1864, 4 vols, I, 249-251. Protocol: Sept. 22, 1814. Hereafter this collection of documents will be cited by the name of the editor, Angeberg. The place of origin of all documents cited in the following footnotes is Vienna, unless otherwise indicated. 5

6

PREFACE

first weeks, the French representative, Talleyrand, tried to bring about a formal opening of the entire Congress from which France could not be excluded. But after having been admitted on a basis of equality with the four major powers, Talleyrand was satisfied, and the Committee of Five, as it was then called, became the real Congress.8 It depended on this committee how often the other powers were consulted, and to what extent their wishes were taken into consideration. The " Final Act " * of the Congress of Vienna which summarized its work, makes clear that nationalism was not one of its guiding principles. Still this fact docs not imply that the nationalist doctrine was misunderstood or disregarded. Historians have offered two entirely different explanations for the negative attitude toward nationalism at Vienna. One puts the blame on the leading diplomats. They are accused of having overlooked nationalism, and of having acted thereby against the spirit of the times. The other stresses that the conditions of the times made it impossible for the statesmen to adopt nationalism as their guiding principle. Neither of these explanations emphasizes that the nationalist problem was of immense importance to the Congressional diplomats. The opinion that the latter deserve reproach was expressed by Treitschke when he condemned Metternich's plans to organize Europe as " a system born of fear, the production of a head void of ideas, who did not have the faintest notion of the driving forces of history." s The outcome of the diplomatic negotiations for Germany he attacked in a similar fashion : " It was not that the Germans were disunited, but Austria had abandoned Germany." 8 A similar but more general judgment has 3 Friedrich von Gentz, Dépêches inédites aux Hospodars de Valachie, Paris, 1876, I, I6I, June 26, 181+ All these letters are addressed to Prince Caradja, the Turkish viceroy in Bucharest. 4 Angeberg, III, 1386-1433. 5 Heinrich von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunsehnten Jahrhundert, Leipzig, 1879, I, 604. Treitschke presents both explanations., but without attempting to reconcile them. 6 Ibid., p. 789.

PREFACE

7

been passed by Sorel. Earlier, he considered, nationalism could have been misunderstood; but after 1814, such misunderstanding became an immense error. It was too late to act as if there had never been a French Revolution. 7 One of the severest criticisms of the Congress has been written by Victor Bibl. In his eyes, the principle of national self-determination had become, through the wars of liberation, an " indestructible world power." " That this fact was discounted by the diplomats, that they sinned so heavily against the spirit of the times which demanded this right so emphatically, will forever lay them open to criticism before history, and expose their decisions as a miserable patchwork." 8 In the most recent account of the Congress, published in 1946, Harold Nicolson repeated this criticism in milder form with respect to the German part of the settlement. He wrote : " The high hopes of the German nationalists and liberals were doomed to disappointment; the opportunity was missed to create a German Confederation which might well have been liberal, civilized, and humane; the unity of Germany could thereafter only be forged by blood and iron." 9 All of these historians share several assumptions. They believe that the success of the wars of liberation proves that nationalism was an extremely strong force, and in character, almost, if not quite, equal to the nationalism of later times. In addition, they make no attempt to distinguish between the sentiments of patriotism and nationalism. The confusion arises easily because patriotism is one of the elements inherent in modern nationalism. But the two are not identical. Patriotism is an ancient ideal whose worth need not be questioned. Yet part of the vehement condemnations of the attitude of the Congress of Vienna toward the rising nationalism are due to the feeling that the Viennese diplomats condemned a noble principle. 7 Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution française, Paris, 1904, V I I I , 502. 8 Victor Bibl, Der Zerfall Österreichs, Wien, 1922, I, 227. 9 H a r o l d Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, New York, 1946, p. 199.

8

PREFACE

Those who hold the conditions of the times responsible for the views and actions of the Congressional diplomats agree with the opinion expressed by the changing Treitschke, when he wrote : The half-hearted and weak result of the Viennese negotiations lay in the nature of things, and was not caused by the faults of individual men. The most serious illness of the old statesystem . . . the cleavages in Germany and Italy, had not been healed in the wars of liberation. Since public opinion, here as well as there, remained in a condition of complete immaturity, on the whole the Congress brought to both peoples a restoration.10 Among the historians who believe that the age rather than the Congress should be blamed for this neglect of nationalism, are Karl Lamprecht, 11 A. W. Ward, 12 Charles Webster, 18 Heinrich Ritter von Srbik,14 and an Italian historian of the Congress, Guido Gigli.15 All of them consider the atmosphere of 1814 as being predominantly anti-nationalist, and do not expect a great deal of interest for nationalism from the Congressional diplomats.16 While there is little doubt that great statesmen and skillful diplomats can accelerate or retard the trends of an age, 10 Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 597. 11 Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, Berlin, 1907, X, 382-385. 12A. W. Ward, "The Congress of Vienna," chapters X I X and XXI, Cambridge Modern History (1906), IX. 13 C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 4th ed., London, 1945, pp. 145-148. First publi., 1919. 14 H. Ritter von Srbik, Metternich, München, 1925, 2 vols., I, 227, and esp. Book III, Chapter IV, " Der Ideengehalt des Systems." 15 Guido Gigli, Il Congresso di Vienna, Firenze, 1938, p. 179. 16 Srbik does not completely share these sentiments, and in the midst of his effort to do justice to Metternich, speculates for a moment that a Bismarck might have succeeded where a Metternich failed. But it must remain a doubtful speculation whether a Bismarck, in Metternich's place, could or would have brought about the unification of Germany without blood and iron. See: Srbik, Metternich, I, 198.

PREFACE

9

they can hardly create a new spirit in the face of strong opposition. Still this does not excuse them automatically from dealing with new trends and new ideas. Thus there remains the question whether the Congress as a whole faced the nationalist issue with some intelligence. In this investigation it has been assumed on the basis of statements made by contemporary observers of the Congress, as well as by its participants, that in returning to the year 1814, one returns to a world which differed greatly from the kind of world known to the late nineteenth and to our present century. The Congress took place in an era of transition. Behind it lay an age which had been predominantly cosmopolitan, before it a century of which nationalism was to be the predominant mark. Nationalism itself was in a transitional stage. It presupposed a feeling of cultural unity among a group of people who spoke a common language and had a common historic tradition. When this feeling of cultural unity assumed a political complexion, the demand arose that such a group of people, such a nationality, should be unified in an independent national state, to which the primary loyalty of all citizens should belong. Modern nationalism has been defined as " a complex of nationality, national state, and national patriotism." 17 A t the time of the Congress of Vienna, many European nationalities were as yet but dimly aware of their cultural unity, but wherever nationalism had taken root, its adherents demanded a national state, if none had as yet come into existence through a previous process of historical development. The word " nationalism," as used in this study, should be understood as expressing primarily this demand. 18 17 Carlton, J. H . Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, new ed., New York, 1928, p. 257. The explanation of nationalism is based on this work and The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, New York, 1931. 18 The interests of the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna were predominantly political, and no attempt has been made here to underline economic motives for which the evidence is lacking.

IO

PREFACE

The French Revolution had proclaimed that all sovereignty resided essentially in the nation, and national patriotism had thereby become one of the duties of the citizens. During the ensuing wars of liberation, when various nations and nationalities had fought against the French, as a national enemy, nationalist sentiment had received a strong impetus. Nevertheless, the spirit of nationalism was by no means universally dominant, even in this period of danger. 19 It could be observed as a trend, broken many times by universal, local, and dynastic interests and loyalties. Later, during the Congress of Vienna, it was also entirely obvious that nationalism in Germany, Italy, or Poland, was not a mass movement in the modern sense of the term. In Germany and Italy the doctrine was embraced by the liberally inclined middle classes, and more singly by members of the nobility. In Poland, the desire for an independent national state existed very uniformly among the nobility. The middle class there was almost non-existent, and the peasants as a group were not politically active. How accurately the assembly of diplomats at Vienna reflected the pro-nationalist or antinationalist currents of their countries is difficult to state with precision. Yet at least in Germany and Italy it is evident from the efforts of all enthusiastic nationalists, from their complaints and from their failures, that a general feeling of unity among their compatriots was lacking. The diplomats who met in Vienna had been born and educated under the " ancien régime," when monarchs reigned by divine right over a society which was largely agricultural. But the " ancien régime," they knew, had been shaken in theory by the Enlightenment and in practice by the French Revolution. They themselves were products of an age of transition. and their opinions must have been formed by observing both the new and the old elements in action. Their preference 19 Friedrich Förster, Geschichte der Befreiungskriege: 1813, 1814, Berlin, 1864, vol. II. Contains many contemporary documents.

1815,

PREFACE

II

for either one would depend on the effect they expected these elements to exert on the institutions in which they believed. It was impossible to foresee in 1814 how much strength nationalism would acquire. Only speculations were possible, and one speculated with varying results. In each of the three countries which have been chosen for analyzing the opinion of the Congress, nationalism presented a peculiar problem. A t first glance it would appear that the German nationalists had the greatest chance to realize their ideals. The Germanies were free from foreign occupation, and all the little states and principalities could send their delegates to the Congress. In theory, the German states had been united for some thousand years through the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which Napoleon had abolished as recently as 1806. The Empire had borne no resemblance to a modern national state, but it provided an idea of political unity which nationalists could seize upon to justify their wishes. Italy had not been united since ancient Roman times. In 1814 the north was occupied by Austria. The kingdom of Naples in the south, was ruled by Napoleon's brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, whose right to reign was questioned by some members of the Congress. Sicily was ruled by King Ferdinand I, a Bourbon, and the kingdom of Sardinia was governed by the House of Savoy. The interests of the Papal states were of a universal, not of a national, character. Some states had no sovereign and awaited the decision of the Congress. In Poland there was a still different situation. The Polish nationality had been united politically, until, toward the end of the eighteenth century, the state suffered three partitions by its three neighbors. Napoleon resurrected a part of it under the name of the Duchy of Warsaw, which he may have intended to transform into a kingdom of Poland. The resurrection of Poland was also a project of the Russian emperor. After Napoleon's defeat, most of the country was occupied by Russian

12

PREFACE

troops. Since no part of it had an independent existence, its future depended on the decisions of the Congress. The difference in the three situations, and the divergent interests among the diplomats concerned, should afford opportunity to ascertain in some detail the attitude of the Congress of Vienna toward nationalism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS THE author will always be indebted to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, whose work on the subject of nationalism inspired this study, and who supervised the writing of this book. Many thanks are due to President Charles W. Cole of Amherst College, under whose encouraging guidance the investigation was begun, and to Professors Geoffrey Bruun, Leo Gershoy and John H. Wuorinen, who read and criticized the manuscript.

13

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE

5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

13

PART I The Congress and German Nationalism INTRODUCTION

19

CHAPTER I 23 23 36 38 41 44 Si

Supporters of German Nationalism Prussia The Mediatized Princes The Small States and Free Cities Hanover Russia Summary CHAPTER II

S3 S3 63 63 64 65 66 70 76

Opponents of German Nationalism Austria The South German States Bavaria Württemberg Baden France England Conclusion PART II The Congress and Italian and Polish Nationalism CHAPTER I

85 85 96 108 π3 121

The Congress and Italian Nationalism Introduction Austria France England Summary 15

ι6

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS PAGE

CHAPTER II The Congress and Polish Nationalism Introduction Russia Prussia Austria France England Summary

123 123 128 136 138 140 141 143

CONCLUSION

146

BIBLIOGRAPHY

155

INDEX

163

PAKT I T H E CONGRESS A N D GERMAN NATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION THE greatest amount of time at the Congress of Vienna was taken up with German affairs. The Treaty of Paris stipulated that " the German states will be independent, and united by a federal link." 1 This wording was sufficiently vague to allow many different interpretations. A great variety of possible modes of organization were proposed by the Congressional delegates. One group placed more emphasis on the fact that the German states were to be independent, while another stressed union. Disagreement centered on the strength of the federal link, not on the desirability of the link itself, since some kind of organization was deemed necessary to maintain peace in that area. The primary aim of German nationalists was the establishment of a unified national state, and the diplomats at Vienna, for the purpose of this study, are viewed as supporters or opponents of this plan. The division is somewhat arbitrary, since there were varying degrees of support and opposition. Most diplomats hoped to organize Germany with the least possible danger and the greatest possible advantage to the states they represented. Yet there was a difference between those who hoped to create a fatherland for all Germans, and those who intended to organize the Germanies as a mere association of states. The German delegates to the Congress came from a region in which nationalism had taken root. But the editor of the most nationalistically inclined German newspaper stated shortly after the beginning of negotiations that the Germans had not progressed as far in this direction as some persons believed: " A great part of the people have not yet been touched by the new life," he continued, " another part has merely been persuaded by t a l k , . . . only the smallest group has really and truly understood, and it is on this group that the hope for the future 1 Angeberg, I, 165. Treaty of Paris, May 30, 1814, Art. VI. 19

20

INTRODUCTION

rests." This is the judgment of a well-informed German nationalist on the state of German nationalism. It will be seen that it was confirmed by many of the German delegates. 2

A t the Congress of Vienna, the division for and against a unified German national state expressed itself most clearly in the policies and rivalry of Austria and Prussia. Austria was the perfect representative of the pre-revolutionary European state, economically, politically, and socially. A rural empire, composed of many different ethnic groups, Austria was governed by one of the most ancient European dynasties. The highest government posts were occupied by the Austrian aristocracy, and the imperial court at Vienna formed the center of all political activity. Although the revolutionary wars had been extremely costly, and had disturbed the conservative atmosphere of the Empire, Austria emerged from the fight as a mighty first-class power, ready to consolidate her position in Europe. For Prussia the outlook was different. Prussia was a younger, smaller power, and her population was predominantly Germanspeaking. During the Napoleonic wars, Prussia had suffered far more than Austria. She had lost one half of her territory, and the Prussian government had been forced for a time to submit to the dictates of the French emperor. T o prevent any similar humiliation in the future, Prussia was extremely eager to fortify herself by any means at her disposal. It can be observed in the following account of the negotiations at Vienna, that Prussia, unlike Austria, was not intent upon doing merely 2 Rheinischer Merkur, no. 142, NOT. 2, 1814. This paper has been reprinted in J. Görres, Gesammelte Schriften, Köln, 1928, vols. VI-XI. The R. M. was published in Coblenz with Prussian permission. The editor, Görres, was neither pro-Prussian, nor consistently pro-Austrian, but always pro-German. He hoped for the re-establishment of the German Empire headed by the Emperor of Austria, but desired German unity above any particular form or organization. The poet, Ernst Moritz Arndt, contributed to this paper, and Baron vom Stein and the Prussian delegates favored it. From April 1815 on, the paper was subjected to Prussian censorship.

INTRODUCTION

21

a good job of consolidation and fortification, but that she sought to attain something which Austria possessed: a larger territorial extent, and a more recognized status. Both Austria and Prussia were conservative in their domestic policy. In matters of foreign policy, however, Prussia was ready to employ methods which Austria considered revolutionary and dangerous.

CHAPTER I SUPPORTERS OF GERMAN NATIONALISM PRUSSIA SEVERAL weeks after the beginning of negotiations, the head of Austria's secret police received a report about Prussia's political aspirations. It informed him of the existence of two parties among the Prussians. One was composed of " raging Prussians, who would storm the sky and shrink from neither crime nor virtue to aggrandize Prussia.... The other party, the German Prussians [were] more German than Prussian. They would like to have a strong Germany, safe from attack and regarded as the true common fatherland of all who speak German." • The two Prussian delegates to the Congress—the Chancellor of state, Prince von Hardenberg, and Baron von Humboldt— belonged to the group which was more German than Prussian.4 Since Hardenberg was deaf, Humboldt was of greater importance to him than other second delegates were to their chiefs. Humboldt accompanied him to all meetings. Hardenberg s was somewhat bureaucratic, and Humboldt β was a scholar rather than a politician, but the two worked well together at that time, and had the same wishes for Germany. Frederick William III, the king of Prussia, did not interfere very frequently with the

3 M.-H. Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne. D'après les documents originaux des archives, Paris, 1917, 2 vols., I, 625, Dec. 1, 1814. 4 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, Herausgeh. Anna von Sydow, Berlin, 1910, vol. IV (1813-1815), p. 384, Sept. 9, 1814, and p. 430, Dec. 4, 1814. 5 The best, though incomplete biography of Hardenberg is Ranke's. See Leopold von Ranke, Sämmtliche Werke, Leipzig, 18^9, vols. 46-48. " Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preussischen Staates von 1793-1813." Hardenberg was a Hanoverian by birth. 6 Bruno Gebhardt, Wilhelm v. Humboldt als Staatsmann, Stuttgart, 1896, 2 vols. 23

24

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

negotiations, but his admiration for the Tsar helped to further friendly relations between Prussia and Russia.7 Humboldt's interest in the problem of German nationalism was theoretical as well as practical. A year before the Congress met, he had explained his views in a long memorandum. It appeared to him a very limited objective to organize Germany for the sole purpose of forming a defensive union against France. Germany should not only be united to protect itself against this or that neighbor, but also because union was desirable to preserve the spirit of the nation, and to further the entire national development. According to his explanation, the feeling that Germany was one could not be extinguished from any German breast. It rested on a community of customs, language, and literature, on common glory, and on dangers faced in common. Humboldt stated that nature had divided the human race into nations, and although, in his eyes, this did not oblige politicians to act in harmony with such natural divisions, he considered it better to respect them. The question, continued the memorandum, was not whether Germany belonged together, but how it could again be united. Humboldt saw two possibilities: the formation of a real constitution, or a mere association of states. A constitution appeared to him much preferable to an association. But since, in Humboldt's opinion, a constitution was something which had to grow of itself, one had to wait for the time " when head and members would proclaim themselves as such." The German state which he visualized was to be protected against external aggression by a guaranty of Russia and England.8 The Prussian delegates hoped that the Congress would bring the desired opportunity for German unification, and Humboldt wished that " a German spirit " would govern those who par7 August Foumier, Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress, Wien, Leipzig, 1913, p. 53. 8 Wilhelm von Humboldts 95-99, Dec. 1813, Frankfurt

Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, 1903, XI,

SUPPORTERS OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

2ζ

9

ticipated in it Instead of the desired German spirit, the representatives found to their astonishment an anti-Prussian one. When they discovered that many German princes regarded Prussia as a menace to " Germany's liberty," and favored Austria, Humboldt declared it " curious from both the historical and psychological points of view," especially because he and Hardenberg had made every effort to be polite and friendly.10 The Prussian plan for the organization of Germany placed chief stress on a strong national government. It included proposals for a federal army, a federal court of justice, and a guaranty of at least a minimum of political liberties in the states composing the Confederation.11 All of these institutions, by necessitating a large measure of cooperation among the German states, would tend to forge them closer together. In a note to the Austrian representative, Prince Metternich, the Prussians expressed their conviction that the nation's " security and welfare, and the continued flowering of a veritably patriotic culture, were dependent in great part on its union in a firm state organism." They declared themselves equally convinced, " that the very excellent diversity of the German peoples could only have a salutary effect if it was offset by a common association."12 The Prussian representatives emphasized that it was not their wish to see the small states oppressed by the more powerful in such an association, but that the experience of the past had shown that diversity of governments endangered Germany's independence. Union therefore was imperative. 9 Ibid., p. 64, June 1, 1814, Paris. 10 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 427-428, Dec. 4, 1814. 11 J. L. Klüber, Acten des Wiener Congresses in den Jahren 1814-1815, Erlangen, 1615-1819, 8 vols., II, 16, Feb. 10, 1815. Hereafter this collection of documents will be cited by the name of the editor, Klüber. 1 2 Ibid.

26

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E CONGRESS OF V I E N N A

Next to Austria, Prussia was the most powerful German state, and had nothing to fear from a strong central government in which she herself would doubtless play a major part. The idea also seemed advantageous to Prussia from a military point of view, and finally, a close union to develop the German spirit was important to those Prussians who hoped to merge the existence of their state with that of Germany. In order to combat the hostility of other German diplomats at the Congress, Prussia's delegates tried to appeal to German nationalism. They agreed that Prussia's strength in Germany had to rest in large part on a " moral " foundation. 18 They believed it important to avoid any appearance of using power to encroach upon the liberty of other German states.14 After a few months of effort, some progress could be noticed : " With Germany we are on better terms than before," reported Humboldt. " The little ones begin to have confidence in us. I neglect nothing in this respect. Prussia must acquire the most important influence on Germany, but — I always preach—not as a constraining power, but winning Germany of her own free will. What distinguishes us most, is the protection of the mediatized, but that in turn offends some other princes." 18 Among the princes whom Prussia offended with this policy were those governing the south German states, and above all the emperor of Austria. Shortly after Humboldt's letter had been written, the efficient secret police warned the Austrian 13 Schmidt, Geschichte der deutschen Verfassungsfrage, pp. 315-316. Dec. ri, 1814. Humboldt to Hardenberg. Caroline von Humboldt, who thought in a similar fashion, wrote to her husband : " Prussia's strength must essentially consist in the spirit which she develops in the large fatherland." See : Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 479. Feb. 23, 1815, Berlin. 14 Schmádt, Geschichte der deutschen Dec. i l , 1814, Humboldt to Hardenberg. 15 Wilhelm Feb. S, 1815·

und Caroline

von

Verfassungsfrage,

Humboldt

pp. 315-316,

in ihren Briefen,

IV, 466,

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

27

government that "Prussia offers the mediatized princes incredible favors and works to win the public opinion in all of Germany, hoping the imperial crown will be offered to her." » This last suspicion was probably unfounded. There is no evidence that Prussia aspired to re-establish the Empire under her leadership, but it is quite clear that she did not wish to see it under that of Austria. 17 Humboldt explained the Prussian viewpoint on this subject : In the first place, Austria's political interests were linked much more closely to the fate of eastern Europe and Italy than to that of Germany. The Austrian empire, according to him, was so constituted that truly German institutions could never take root there. In addition, he argued, Austria would not be endangered if France or Holland took part of the left bank of the Rhine, and therefore Austria would not be interested in its defense. A n empire, to be of use, had to be strong, and he feared Austria might abuse the imperial power in her own interest. Humboldt thought one could not expect Prussia and other German princes to submit to an Austria thus strengthened. Finally, he contended, a federal constitution had very real advantages since it could be influenced " by public opinion, by the national will, and by the spirit of the times." Even if sentiments diverged in a federal Diet, he believed it easier to obtain a majority there, favorable to the welfare of the whole, than to force an emperor to give his sanction if his interests were opposed.18 Despite all obstacles, and the strong opposition they encountered at the Congress, the Prussians considered their own state to be in a better position to lead Germany than Austria. 16 A. Fournier, Die Feb. 8, 1815. 17 Wilhelm 18-23, 1815.

Geheimpolizei

von Humboldts

auf dem Wiener

Gesammelte

Schriften,

¡Congress, p. 386. X I , 295-302, Feb.

18 Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, X I , 295-305, Feb. 18-23, 1815; also see Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I I , 199. Feb. 4, 1815.

28

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S O F

VIENNA

They had the greatest confidence in the ultimate triumph of nationalism, and regarded the future as their ally. Humboldt's wife belonged to those who believed that only Prussia could espouse German nationalism with profit, and who expected that Austria would cease to be a German power before the century had passed. She encouraged her husband in Vienna by telling him that " Germany, German national sentiment (Deutschland, deutsche und nationeile Deutschheit) is evidently still growing, and Austria will not keep pace with it. To hold back the spirit of the times no power is strong enough, and history is a good source of information on what the future conceals. But probably the gentlemen don't read history." 19 The gentlemen in question were extremely occupied with the present. A special committee had been formed for German affairs, composed of delegates from Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Hanover, the most important German states. The Prussians, and some Germans who felt similarly, from time to time criticized Austria's and Hanover's work on this committee because of their non-German interests.20 But it was impossible for Prussia to organize Germany without Austria's help. Between those two powers, there was constant disagreement Humboldt called Metternich's business methods "sloppy," and remarked in this connection that " as a German one had to feel ashamed." 21 Because of a particularly severe divergence of opinion, the sessions of the committee were interrupted for months. Disagreement centered on the fate of Saxony, an issue in which German nationalism played an important part. The king of Saxony had remained faithful to Napoleon longer than 19 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 417, Nov. 17, 1814, Berlin. 20 F. Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, New York, 1919, " Diary ol Archduke John," pp. 247-248, Dec. 20, 1814, and Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 556, May 21, 1815. The king of England was also at that time king of Hanover. 21 Ibid.. ο. 471, Feb. is, 1815.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N N A T I O N A L I S M

2Ç

M

any other German prince. During their effort to clear Germany of French troops, the allied armies had entered Saxony, where resistance forced them to fight the Saxons as well as the French. Saxon regiments joined the allied powers only when it became very apparent that Napoleon was losing. Thereupon it had been decided to punish the king of Saxony, and the Congress had assumed the right to dispose of Saxony in the manner which seemed most convenient Prussia wished to incorporate all of Saxony as compensation for losses suffered during the war and in exchange for her Polish provinces. Russia was willing to agree to this arrangement, since the Tsar had plans of his own for the Polish provinces. At first Austria also had agreed to this settlement, though in a hesitant fashion, and on condition of Prussian support in her demands on Poland. In the course of negotiations Metternich changed his mind for a number of reasons, but chiefly because he feared that the acquisition of the entire kingdom of Saxony would render Prussia too powerful. The Saxons themselves had no voice in the matter. The emissaries of the Saxon court party in Vienna tried to save at least part of the land for the king of Saxony. There also existed a very small pro-Prussian party. Prussia knew that the Saxon army and most of the Saxon nobility were against the annexation, but hoped German nationalism would win adherents among the Saxon people.23 Humboldt expressed the belief that the peoples of Germany 22 The Saxon question is discussed in detail in the following works : W. Kohlschmidt, Die Sächsische Frage auf dem Wiener Kongress und die Sächsische Diplomatie dieser Zeit, Dresden, 1930; K. von Olshausen, Die Stellung der Grossmächte zur Sächsischen Frage auf dem Wiener Kongress, Quakenbruck, 1933; C. K. Webster, England and the Polish-Saxon problem at the Congress of Vienna, Royal Historical Society Transactions, third series, London, 1913, VII, 49-101. Contains Castlereagh's correspondence on the subject. 23 K. A. Varnhagen von Ense, Denkwürdigkeiten des eigenen Lebens, 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1871, IV, 243.

30

THE

ATTITUDE

OF T H E

CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

might be gained more easily than the princes, and the Austrian secret police suspected that the Prussians saw in a " future war a fight between democracy and aristocracy, and believe that in the nature of things the former would be victorious." 25 24

Prussia left no argument untried to convince the Congress of the advantages of annexation. It was presented as essential to the happiness of Germany,28 and indispensable to Europe's balance of power.27 The Prussian delegates predicted that the division of Saxony into two parts would lead to endless complications.28 The Prussian government paid for articles concerning the question, which were distributed in Vienna. One of the most famous, Prussia and Saxony, or an Appeal to the Good Sense of Europe, admitted that the Saxons had a national character of their own, but not a very marked one, and explained that " the similarity of language, religion, and moral habits, the literary associations, and the same branches of industry unite the Saxons far more closely to the inhabitants of the Marches of Brandenburg and to the Silesians, than the inhabitants of large monarchies are generally bound." 29 The Rheinische Merkur took part in the debate, pleading sometimes for Saxon independence, sometimes for annexation. 24 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 427, Dec. 1814. 25 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 690. Dec. 16, 1814. The secret police often identified the nationalists with the Tugenbund, an organization of German patriots which had been officially dissolved in 1809 by the Prussian government. 26 Ibid., I, 631, Nov. 26, 1814. 27Angeberg, II, 533, Dec. 16, 1814, Hardenberg to the Russian emperor. 28 Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, XI, 177, Oct. 23, 1814. 29 This article is printed in The Pamphleteer, London, 1815, V, 191-217, citation, p. 209. The full title is : " Prussia and Saxony or an Appeal to the Good Sense of Europe on the Claims of the King of Saxony to the Integrity of his Dominions." It is apparently a translation of an article written by the Prussian counselor of state, Hoffmann, on request of Hardenberg. See: Varnhagen von Ense, Denkwürdigkeiten, IV, 191.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R U A N

NATIONALISM

3I

It published philosophic editorials about the differences and similarities among the German tribes of which the following is characteristic : We are separated from each other like the branches of a tree, but from other peoples like the various trees of a forest. Among each other we should have the closest communion, but none with the foreigners, since deciduous wood and pine wood have no relationship Unity must be as strong in our constitution as the original German spirit is in all of us. As the slight contrasts which existed in the original spirit have been overcome, so should the different varieties be overpowered by that which is common to all.80 Despite all these moving appeals, Austria remained unmoved. Finally, Hardenberg in desperation addressed himself directly to Metternich, asking for his cooperation : " Find some means, dear Prince, to end this state of affairs in which we so unhappily find ourselves ; save Prussia from its present situation : Flee Discord, flee from our provinces ! Depart ! Thou monster with the serpent-hair! Let there dwell on the same giant oak The double eagle and the black eagle ! Let there be henceforth in the entire German Empire One word, one feeling, led by this pair ! And where the tone of German language rings Let there flourish but one country of strength and beauty. I could not refrain from putting down here what I have found accidentally ; may it become the motto of our German constitution. and for the sake of Europe's well-being also that of Austria and Prussia!" 31 30 Rheinischer Merkur, No. 155, Nov. 28, 1814, article by Görres. 31 Klüber, vol. IX, 269-270, Dec. 3, 1814. Hardenberg's " accidental " disco/ery is the last verse of a poem entitled " N o w or never," printed in the Rheinische Merkur, No. 130, Oct. 9, 1814. The German text is as follows:

32

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E CONGRESS OF V I E N N A The

Prussian

Chancellor apparently expected

Metternich

to be stirred by this clarion call of patiotism. The picture of love and accord between the two leading German powers, marked by eagle emblems, resting together on an oak, the symbol of German strength, ready to establish a German state, summarized all the wishes Prussia had at this moment. But neither the content of the poem, nor the Teutonic idiom in which it was written, helped to settle the Saxon question. Matters came to a crisis around the New Year 1815, when Hardenberg

threatened

to declare war unless Saxony

was

turned over to Prussia, 82 and Austria concluded a secret defensive alliance with France and England against Prussia and Russia. 88 German nationalism had failed to unite Germany's leading powers, and the Rheinische

Merkur

commented dis-

approvingly that " a war in Germany, among Germans, immediately after their association for a victorious external war which they have won only as Germans, must be considered a sin."

84

Fleuch Zwietracht, fleuch von unsern Gauen! Weiche I Du Ungeheuer mit dem Schlangenhaar! Es horste auf derselben Rieseneiche Der Doppeladler und der schwarze Aar ! Es sei fortan im ganzen Teutschen Reiche Ein Wort, ein Sinn, geführt von jenem Paar! Und wo der Teutschen Sprache Laute tönen Erblühe nur ein Reich des Kräftigen und Schönen 1 32 C. K. Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815. Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe, London, 1921, pp. 277-278, Jan. 1, 1815. Report by Castlereagh. Gentz, the secretary of the Congress, claimed Hardenberg's intentions were peaceful. See: Metternich, Mémoires, ed. by M. A. de Klinkowström, 2nd ed., Paris, 1880-1884, 8 vols., II, 492-493, Feb. 12, 1815. Memorandum by Gentz. Humboldt said, he personally considered Saxony too paltry an object for war. See: Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 484, Feb. 23, 1815. 33 Angeberg, II, 589-592. Jan. 3, 1815· Bavaria, Hanover and the Netherlands were invited to accede to the treaty, and did so a few weeks later. 34 Rheinischer Merkur, No. 169, Dec. 27, 1814.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

33

In the conflict over Saxony the association between Prussian particularism and German nationalism is clearly revealed. Both forces existed side by side, but when one proved useless, it was momentarily abandoned for the other. The problem was finally solved by dividing Saxony into two parts, giving two fifths to Prussia. The king of Saxony had pleaded that the " purity " of his intentions, and " the particular situation of his states," together with " the force of circumstances," had prevented him from taking part in " the fight for Germany." 35 The Congress deemed it convenient to accept his plea, and returned to him what was left of his country. Hardly had the Saxon issue been terminated when Prussia's hopes for gain were reinforced by the unexpected return of Napoleon to Paris. The Prussian delegates had never ceased to consider the French as enemies. They had tried without success to exclude the French representative from the negotiations, 38 and had refused to consider the allotment of some German land to Napoleon's stepson, Eugene Beauharnais. The latter was the son-in-law of the king of Bavaria, but Humboldt remarked he would leave the Congress instantly if Eugene were established as a sovereign prince in Germany. 37 Hardenberg felt the same way. 38 The German adviser of the Russian delegation, Baron vom Stein, the former Prussian minister, declared that the establishment of " a French general " in Germany and his participation in the federal Diet would be " an insult to the national honor." 89 35Angeberg, II, 40a, Nov. 4, 1814. 36 Talleyrand, Memoirs, ed. by the Duke de Broglie, tr. by A. Hall, New York, 1891, 4 vols., II, 243-248, Oct. 9, 1814. All citations from this work have been checked against the French text, and wherever necessary, a more precise term has been substituted. 37 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 495, March 14. 1815· 38 Ibid., pp. 513-516, April 3, 1815. 39 Freiherr vom Stein, Briefwechsel, Denkschriften und Aufzeichnungen, ed. by E. Botzenhart, Berlin, 1933, V, 132, Feb. 1, 1815.

34

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

With the reappearance of Napoleon, German nationalism again had a tangible adversary. Humboldt reported from Vienna how strange it was to see all Prussians there " almost happy about the news. They seem to regard the event as a means of finding out where a falsehood still exists in the peoples and mankind. That this has to be eradicated, is a very correct idea." 40 His wife wrote from Berlin how incredibly pleased the army was with the event which they regarded as " the great crisis needed to cleanse and unite Germany." 41 Thus the Prussians welcomed the return of their enemy. At that time, too, the Congress allotted to Prussia part of the Rhineland, and King Frederick William announced the annexation while the allied armies were once more on the march against France. The Congress continued its session, and the royal proclamation was made from Vienna. It stated : Countries of German origin must be reunited to Germany. They cannot belong to another state to which they are alien in language, habits, customs and laws. They are the rampart of the freedom and independence of Germany; and Prussia, whose political existence has been seriously threatened since their loss,... has acquired the honorable right to defend them. I have weighed these motives, and have considered at the same time that I united to my peoples a German people, faithful and courageous, which gladly would share all dangers... to maintain its liberty. . . . With the same confidence I come into your midst... to give you back to the German fatherland, to an ancient German dynasty, and name you Prussians.... United to my brave army you will share in the glory of having founded the liberty and independence of Germany for centuries to come.42 40 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 491, March 7, 1815. " Falsehood " in this case should be interpreted as treachery against the fatherland. 41 Ibid., pp. 503-504, March 22, 1815. 42Angeberg, III, 1030, April 5, 1815.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

35

German nationalism usually was in harmony with Prussia's interests. All her efforts at the Congress were directed to fortify herself in Germany, and to strengthen Germany through a firm union. The Prussian diplomats had come to Vienna hoping to find most German states ready to become members of a state, a fatherland, in which Prussia could count on holding a leading position. Since this plan met with resistance, they turned to nationalism as a tool to break down the opposition. They believed, with undiminished optimism, that if the princes did not favor their plans it was possible to attract their subjects in due time through propaganda for " moral " unity. It seemed to the Prussian delegates that Germany as a whole would profit if they opposed the political particularism of other states, or sought to win all of Saxony, or labored for a powerful federal constitution. Nationalism was considered a peaceful and noble means to forge the German states together. Nor did the renewal of war against France displease them, since it was expected to reinforce the recruiting power of the nationalist idea. Yet they were not chauvinists with consistency. England's influence on Hanover and Austria's non-German interests were adversely criticized only if these states opposed Prussia. Humboldt had even proposed to place the German Confederation under the protection of Russia and England.43 Eighteenthcentury cosmopolitanism was not completely abandoned,44 nor was Prussia's separate identity as a state ever forgotten by the Prussian diplomats, but, conscious of their strength, they looked forward to the time " when the name of Prussia would be absorbed by that of Germany." 48

43 Wilhelm von Humboldts

Gesammelte

44 Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum 1928, esp. chapts. III, V i l i , IX.

Schriften,

XI, ioo, Dec. 1813.

und Nationalstaat, 7th ed.,München,

45 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt 18, 1815, Berlin.

m ihren Briefen, IV, 474, Feb.

36

THE

ATTITUDE

OF

THE

CONGRESS

T H E MEDIATIZED

OF

VIENNA

PRINCES

A m o n g the participants of the Congress, the

mediatized

princes were a group much courted by the Prussian delegates. 40 These princes had been deprived of their privileges and independence by Napoleon in 1806, when he dissolved the H o l y Roman Empire and created the Confederation of the Rhine. Before becoming "mediatized" through the decrees of Napoleon, these princes had held their lands immediately from the E m peror, according to feudal concept. Regardless of the German country in which their possessions lay, they were considered as sovereign princes, and exercised the highest executive, legislative, and judicial authority within their domains. Napoleon's decrees curtailed these sovereign privileges, deprived them of the right to levy taxes, and made them subjects of sovereigns in whose lands they resided. A t Vienna these princes and their representatives were in a difficult situation, since they had no independent status and no rights. Their chief objective w a s to regain as nearly as possible the position they had held prior to the changes instituted by Napoleon, and they expressed it officially in a series of notes addressed to the German C o m mittee and some of its individual members. 47 T h e five powers composing the German Committee deliberated without consulting them, and it lessened their chances that all five possessed or

claimed

territories

belonging

previously

to

mediatized

princes. It was natural that these princes wished for a return of the good old days, and the reappearance of an empire or at least a political organization as nearly akin to it as possible. T h e y feared to be oppressed by the sovereigns of the larger German states, and inclined therefore toward a policy

designed

to

46 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, II, 513, April 27, 1815. Also see p. 26 of this MS. 47 Angeberg, II, 329, Oct. 22, 1814; p. 598, Jan. 10, 1815. Kliiber, I, 36, March 21, 1&15.

SUPPORTERS OF GERMAN

NATIONALISM

3"J

48

check the might of those states. The nationalist policy had for them the double attraction of stressing the whole more than the parts, and of helping them personally to forget their relative insignificance. It was easier to give allegiance to a large fatherland than to pay respects to the grandduke of Baden, or the kings of Württemberg and Bavaria. The mediatized princes protested against " submission and subjugation," while stating their patriotic wishes and personal aspirations. The Congress, they said, should create " a voluntary political and military defensive union of the lesser estates with the great powers; that is what the German patriot can wish, and what each lesser estate must wish." 49 Although nationalist propaganda soothed their wounded feelings, there was nevertheless a considerable difference between the nationalism of the Prussians and that of the mediatized princes. The Prussian delegates were ready to help the latter regain a number of their former rights, but by no means all of them. Politically, the Prussians considered mediatization as a step toward German unity which should not be retraced.50 " Germandom must be secured in another manner than by returning to the year 1805," remarked Humboldt.61 But for the mediatized princes, patriotism partly signified a return to the past, since in their opinion the essence of German nationalism was contained in their private glorious history as independent immediate members of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. Just as the Prussians used nationalism to further their own policy, so the mediatized princes turned to a nationalism based on the ancient Empire, which seemed to justify their demands and to assure them of a privileged position. 48 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 169-170, Sept. 30, 1814. 49Klüber, I, z i , March 15, 1815. Memorandum by the mediatized princes. 50 Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, XI, 311, May ia, 1815. Humboldt to Hardenberg. 51 Ibid., ρ. 313.

38

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF V I E N N A T H E S M A L L STATES AND F R E E CITIES

Like the mediatized princes, the small states and free cities were in part attracted to the doctrine of nationalism to protect themselves against the high-handed policy of the larger states. Having no representatives on the German Committee, and yet being independent, they had a special urge to defend their rights. Nationalism was used by them in a very cautious manner, and a good example of this caution can be seen in the instructions given by Carl August of Saxe-Weimar to his delegate at the Congress. He indicated the exact point at which nationalist feelings had to make room for something else : Our President of the Chamber and plenipotentiary, Freiherr von Gersdorff, will strive during the discussions and negotiations of German affairs not to withhold his approval to any measure tending to further the welfare of the common fatherland, and strengthening the federal link designed to embrace its larger and smaller states. But he should protest strongly, once and forever, against all undignified, and to our princely and ducal condition, unsuitable demands and proposals, especially against all those which would lead to an unnecessarily subordinate position.82 Not only was nationalism used in a cautious manner, but the very kind of nationalist propaganda preferred by this group of rulers, reflected their special interests. The Prussian ideal which tended toward a blotting out of all differences could not be adapted to their policy. They did not want to disappear in a common fatherland, but to gain in importance by belonging to a larger unit. German nationalism was to lend lustre to their small courts or to the town governments. Consequently, they chose as their spokesman at the Congress a delegate whose dearest wish was the re-establishment of the German Empire. Their selection, Freiherr von Gagern, was an imperial knight, 53 Freiherr von Egloffstein, Carl August auf dem Wiener ¡Congress, Jena, 1915. Contains letters and despatches of the delegation and the duke of SaxeWeimar, p. 136, Sept. 22, 18:4.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

39

who, early in his diplomatic career, had entered the service of the House of Orange-Nassau, and was present at the Congress as representative of the Netherlands and Luxemburg.53 This latter state was destined to become a member of the German Confederation. Led by Gagern, the sovereign princes and free city governments explained to the German Committee that the German Constitution could be strengthened " only if a single chief, such as had formerly bestowed upon the German Confederation the first rank among the European powers," would again be placed with full executive powers at the head of the Confederation. They insisted an emperor must become " the first representative of the German nation." s< Their note was not answered, and after a long waiting period they renewed their demands, this time addressing themselves to Count Münster, the representative of Hanover. In this second memorandum they spoke of the German nation as an organism which was intimately united. The planned federal diet would pronounce the general will, and the emperor, having at his disposal a federal army, would execute the law. A great confederation, they declared, could not exist without a chief, and the grandeur of the German nation demanded that this chief be invested with the imperial dignity.58 Again, after a period of months during which the Committee suspended its sessions, they complained because they were not consulted, and requested the calling of an assembly composed of all future members of the German Confederation. The note ended by expressing the firm belief that such a measure was " the only way to reach a result which,

53 Freiherr von Gagern, Mein Antheil an der Politik, S vols., vol. I, passim.

Stuttgart, 1823-26,

MAngeberg, II, 442, Nov. 16, 1814. Note oí 29 sovereign princes and free cities. 65 Ibid., p. 559, Dec. 20, 1814. Note of 31 sovereign princes and free cities.

40

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E CONGRESS OF V I E N N A

in conformity with Germany's expectations, would lead to the creation of a truly national association." M The German Committee, according to Gagern, approached its task from too many different points of view, and with totally different objects in mind. He considered this all the more regrettable, since the task of creating a better destiny for the fatherland belonged in his opinion to " the most sacred obligations and the most glorious feelings of the patriot." 57 The behavior of the Committee led Luxemburg's delegate to apprehend war, and the subsequent dissolution of the Confederation. During the Napoleonic wars, he pointed out, Germany had almost disappeared. Against the recurrence of such a danger there was only one effective remedy: the imperial idea. The concept of empire would remind the Germans that there existed something else besides narrow provincialism and that they still possessed a common fatherland. Finally, the name would " confirm our nation in a position which we must not relinquish." Gagern proposed to use again the ancient words : " The Emperor and the Empire!—The Holy Roman Empire!—The Empire of German nations ! " But since the Committee was so stubbornly opposed to the resurrection of the Empire, he suggested, as a compromise measure that, instead of naming the new league simply " German Confederation," it should be called " Confederation in the German Empire," or " Confederation in the Empire of the German nation." 58 The immense importance of the imperial idea to this group of representatives made it difficult for Prussia to profit very much by their nationalism. They agreed with Prussia in believing it necessary to establish a strong central government. But at the same time German nationalism was to safeguard their power and to enhance their own dignity. They did not Sñlbid., p. 689, Feb. 2, 181-5. Declaration by 32 princes and free cities. 57 Klüber, IX, 259, Jan. 13, 1815. Gagera to Münster. 58 Angeberg, III, 1268-1269, May 29, 1815, and Gagern, Mein Antheil an der Politik, II, 226-229. The French and German texts differ slightly.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N N A T I O N A L I S M

4I

think of nationalism as a mass movement, but, paradoxical as it might seem, they employed it as a means of protecting their aristocratic pride and their individual policies.59 They partly adopted a doctrine aiming at unity, in order to preserve a certain amount of disunity. HANOVER

The same paradox of feelings existed in Hanover. National patriotism though sometimes truly felt, was used to further private interests and was encouraged as long as it did not interfere with them. This state was in a special position because it was joined in personal union to Great Britain, and as one of the most important German states, it had a seat on the German Committee. England appeared to be less interested in the affairs of Hanover than in those of the Netherlands which were important to her strategically.60 The chief British delegate, Lord Castlereagh, and the British government generally, often differed in their views from Count Münster, the Hanoverian delegate.61 The Count desired to enlarge Hanover's territory, but the head of Britain's cabinet wrote to Lord Castlereagh on the subject : " I know Count Münster will never understand that the security of Hanover to the Brunswick family will rather be diminished than increased by any additions to it. Hanover is a point of honor, and a point of honor only, to this country." 62 Münster, a Hanoverian by birth, was more a German than a British delegate in outlook. During the wars of liberation, 59 Angeberg, III, 1350, June 5, ιβΐ5· The duke of Saxe-Weimar assumed the title of grandduke during the Congress with the approval of all great powers, Austria, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Prussia. See: Angeberg, III, 1030, April 15, ιβΐ5· 60 Gagern, Mein Antheil an der Politik, II, 60, η. d. 61 Hanover had two representatives, Count Münster and Count Hardenberg, but Münster was the chief. 62 Duke of Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, ed. by his son, London, 1862, IX, 496, Dec. 23, 1814. Liverpool to Castlereagh.

42

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

he had written, full of patriotic enthusiasm, to his friend, Gagern : " The Germans are a magnificent people,—what a shame if they should remain under foreign influence and new despotism ! " 83 His nomination as representative to the Congress gave him an opportunity to serve his compatriots. When Gagern informed him that he too would be in Vienna as delegate for the House of Orange-Nassau, Münster stated his " sincere joy " at the prospect of having Gagern's cooperation " in the great task of reuniting Germany into a more or less connected whole." 64 The work, he expected, would be very difficult, in part because of the jealousies in matters of sovereignty existing here and there, and because of the fear entertained by little gentlemen of being restrained in future times from treating their subjects entirely as they pleased, . . . in part because of Austria and Prussia We must not sacrifice any rights, just to become subjected to these two monarchies, or to create a divided protectorate in Germany.es In this statement there appears again the conflict between the wish to create a German state, and the fear of seeing Hanover's importance decline. While Hanover's plenipotentiaries definitely favored a united Germany, they did not have complete faith in Austria's plans, and they had even less in those of Prussia, remembering the Prussian occupation of Hanover during the period of Napoleon's domination. The rise of the Prussian monarchy, and its incorporation of more and more German territory, led them to fear that Prussia would have " a preponderance of opinion and fact in Germany, the consequences of which are difficult to foresee.ββ As the best solution of this dilemma between union and independence, Münster advocated 63 Gagern, Mein Antheil an der Politik, II, 45, Dec. 31, 1814, Hanover. 64 Ibid., 46, Aug. 10, 1814, London. «S Ibid. 66Foumier, Die Geheimpolieei auf dem Wiener Kongress, p. 117, Sept. 7, 1814, Count Hardenberg to Münster.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

43

the re-establishment of the imperial constitution " with necessary modifications." 67 Since Austria objected to this, he declared, Hanover wished at least to help with the establishment of a federation which would " not only represent a political link among the different states, but would at the same time exhibit the image of a union of the German people in the sense understood by older constitutions." 88 Münster as well as Gagern recognized the need for some central authority, but both identified their love for Germany with their veneration of the Empire. Although Münster was touchy about Hanover's sovereign rights, he criticized the unwillingness of the South German courts " to make any sacrifices for Germany as soon as they were called on to surrender any part of their sovereignty " ; 6 9 and there is no question that in comparison with Bavaria and Württemberg, Hanover showed much more willingness to form a united German state. Hanover's position in Germany made it impossible for her to follow as self-centered a policy as the Southern courts. To the Prince Regent, this German kingdom was not of primary importance, and the British government could easily afford to be indifferent whether Hanover gained or lost the principality of Hildesheim. Since Münster's superiors were opposed to any egoistic policy in questions concerning the kingdom, the Count, even if German nationalism had left him completely cold, would have been forced to cooperate in the task of framing a constitution for a German Confederation ; and Münster cooperated willingly. As a German patriot he criticized the policy of the Congress as having " little conformity with Germany's rightful expectations," 70 but consid67 Kliiber, II, 524, June 5, 1815. 68 Ibid. Θ9 Count Münster, Political Sketches of the State 0} Europe from 18141867. Containing Count Ernst Münster's despatches to the Prince Regent from the Congress of Vienna, ed. by George Herbert Münster, Edinburgh, 1868, p. 269, June 3, 1815. 70 Ibid.

44

THE

ATTITUDE

OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

ered that for Hanover the outlook was brighter : " The League just concluded ought to be a curb on aggressions such as Prussia has allowed herself to practice toward us," he informed the Prince Regent. " Our limits have been considerably augmented, and our geographical position has gained, especially by the uninterrupted contiguity with the kingdom of the Low Countries." 7 1 Count Münster's nationalist sentiments always remained tempered by his loyalty to Hanover. He had not expected the Congress to overcome all obstacles preventing a close union, but had contented himself to work for a " more or less connected whole." 72 " German history will not end with the Congress of Vienna," he wrote consolingly to one of Germany's greatest patriots. " Leave it to time to develop what has been started." 78 RUSSIA

The only non-German power which attempted to lend some support to German nationalism at the Congress was Russia. Since the Russian empire had remained rather aloof from Western European cultural developments, excepting a few cautious essays on the part of her rulers to import Western ideas and institutions, it may seem surprising to find the head of this extremely conservative state among the supporters of such a modern principle. But Russia, in 1814, was governed by a tsar who took pride in his knowledge and understanding of the " progressive ideas " of his century. 74 Alexander I had been education by a Swiss admirer of the ideals and principles proclaimed by the French Revolution, and in addition, he had been influenced in a similar direction by his friend, Czartoryski, a young Pole. Czartoryski had endeavored 71 Ibid., p. 279, June 11, 1815.

72 See above, p. 42. 73 Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 66, Oct. 19, 1914. Münster to Stein. 74 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 355, Dec. 7, 1814. Report of a conversation between Alexander and Francis I of Austria.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

45

to impress upon the Russian tsar the value of patriotism, and the importance of the principle of nationality. 75 But Alexander was as weak as he was impressionable. Ideas could captivate him, their execution was a different matter. He combined with these traits an extreme egocentricity which made him at once sensitive and vulnerable in any discussion.78 While all other sovereigns were satisfied to leave the conduct of negotiations to their delegates, Alexander decided to take a personal part in the discussions.77 His representatives accordingly sank to the position of advisers and secretaries. They included a number of non-Russians, among them a Greek, Capo d'Istria, a German, Baron vom Stein, and the Emperor's Polish friend, Czartoryski, a combination which testified that the Tsar still flirted with progressive ideas. Alexander's most absorbing problem at the Congress was Poland. He personally took very little part in the discussions about Germany, and did not lend any serious support to the fàmous Baron vom Stein whom he had chosen as his adviser. One can thus only present a sketch of his attitude toward German nationalism. It must be emphasized in addition that Alexander's sponsorship of German nationalism was largely in the nature of caprice. The Tsar liked to play the role of a crusader, and in 1814 the idealistic side of his nature was attracted by the growing movement of liberalism and nationalism. The appointment of Stein to the Russian delegation seems to have been the result of emotional considerations, rather than an indication of a profound interest in the nationalist idea. In 1813, when Alexander's armies, in alliance with Prussian troops, had entered German territory to fight Napoleon, he 75 Prince Adam Czartoryski, Mémoires et Correspondance avec l'Empereur Alexandre I er, Paris, 1887, 2 vols., II, 220, Dec. 1809. 76 One of the most concise and interesting portrayals of Alexander is given by Metternich. See Mémoires, I, 315-332. 77 J. De Maistre, Correspondance Diplomatique 1811-1817, ed. by A. Blanc, Paris, i860, 2 vols., II, 3, Aug. 15/27, 1814. St. Petersburg.

46

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E

CONGHESS OF

VIENNA

had proclaimed his intention to help the German princes and peoples in reconquering their liberty and independence, and to aid the regeneration of the Empire with strong protection and a stable guaranty. 78 In this proclamation, the Germans were not mentioned as one people but as individual units, and Alexander's plan seemed to be the reestablishment of the status quo ante without any innovations. The personal friendship which bound him to the king of Prussia was also no indication of his interest in German nationalism. The Tsar claimed some Polish land which had formerly belonged to Prussia, and intended to compensate King Frederick William by giving him Saxony. Still, Alexander was informed about the problem of nationalism in the Germanies. His favorite sister, the Grandduchess Catherine, discussed it in a letter she wrote him in the spring of 1814, while she traveled through the German lands. " Except in Germany," she stated, " a scholar is of consequence only in respect of his science : here on the contrary he is the weatherglass of public opinion. ' Our country,' that is every third word, and what all these heads ponder is how to create and organize Germany." 79 Catherine did not confine herself to supplying her brother with information; she also advised him how to organize the country. It would be reasonable, she contended, if the various princes had sufficient power to be interested in fostering what belonged to them. But their legs should be " tied enough to prevent their running at pleasure in spheres where their independence militated against their nationality." 80 A few months after receiving Catherine's description and advice, Alexander obtained an even more detailed report from 78Angeberg, I, 7, March 13/25, 1813, Kalish. 79 Scenes from Russian Court Life. Being the correspondence of Alexander

I with his sister, Catherine, ed. by Grandduke Nicholas, tr. by N. Havelock, London, 1915, p. 203, Jan. 17, 1814, Hanover. 80 Ibid., p. 206, Feb. 2, 1814, Oldenburg.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

47

Baron vom Stein. Stein was a well-known personality.81 Born in Nassau, an imperial knight, he belonged to the group of princes mediatized by the decree of Napoleon. In the course of his career in the Prussian civil service he had risen to the position of Minister of Commerce in 1804. After a quarrel with Frederick William III he had been dismissed; the King disliked his independent spirit, and thought of him as eccentric But the proud Minister was called again to office in 1807, when Prussia had been defeated by Napoleon. This time he became Minister of the Interior, and initiated a series of decrees, abolishing serfdom and instituting reforms in the local government, which showed the liberal spirit of their author. Stein's hatred of Napoleon, and his efforts to end the period of French domination, led to his second dismissal, this time commanded by Napoleon, and forced him to leave Prussia. In 1812, he had entered the service of the Russian emperor to aid through his advice in the fight against France, and to serve thereby the German cause. He helped to bring about the Russo-Prussian alliance in 1813, and witnessed the defeat of the French emperor in the following year, but he did not yet consider his task completed. When he met Alexander in July 1814, Stein had plans for the organization of Germany. He described to the Tsar the German princes as thirty despots who were either incapable, lazy, or false and tyrannical. His report stressed that, unchecked by any superior power, these princes mistreated their subjects, and that " sensible people, patriots attached to their fatherland," looked to the Congress of Vienna for betterment. Stein did not forget to point out how much Alexander's great qualities were admired in Germany, and told him, German patriots were looking to the Tsar for help in the difficult situation.82 The outcome of the interview was 81 The two biographies of Stein which have been used are : G. H. Pertz, Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom Stein, Berlin, 1851, 6 vols., and M. Lehmann, Freiherr vom Stein, Leipzig, 1921. 82 Stein, Briefwechsel,

V, 11-13, July 9, 1814, Bruchsal.

48

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

Stein's appointment as Alexander's adviser on German affairs at the forthcoming Congress of Vienna. While this nomination was no proof that the Tsar sincerely intended to back German nationalism, it was regarded by German patriots as a hopeful sign.83 Stein's appearance in Vienna as a member of the Russian delegation was in keeping with the spirit of the times. One could then serve nationalism in a cosmopolitan fashion, and believe in addition that to further the nationalist movement was consistent with general European progress, and Europe's welfare.84 Stein's varied background was no indication whether the nationalist policy he would defend at Vienna, would be that of the mediatized prince or that of the former Prussian minister. Actually his German policy was a mixture of the two approaches to nationalism, modified by his fiery personality. He agreed with the Prussian delegates in the importance he attached to a strong central government which would restrain the sovereignty of Germany's many little princes. His plans for national organization included a federal system of defense, a federal court of justice, a federal custom system, and a federal guaranty of civil liberties in each German state.88 This last point he emphasized far more strongly than the Prussian delegation,8® which was extremely reluctant to adopt such a liberal policy, despite the fact that they wanted to spread nationalism among the population of states headed by sovereigns who opposed the Prussian viewpoint. Stein agreed with Prussia as well as with the lesser German states in his criticism of the isolationist tendencies of the South German governments. He called all separatist tendencies " unreasonable," and stated that Germany had to be organized " to 83 Ibid., p. 60, Oct. 3, 1814, Frankfurt, Arndt to Stein, Dec. 31, 1814, Gersdorff to Stein. 84 See p. 35 above. 85 Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 106-108, Dec. 26, 1814. M Ibid.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

49

preserve its nationality." It infuriated him to see the rulers of Bavaria and Württemberg regard their states as distinct nations. He even suggested that the Rheinische Merkur should comment about their unpatriotic policy, and that Görres should write an editorial about it in his usual fashion, " strong, modest, and true." 88 87

Although Stein himself was a mediatized prince, he permitted no personal interest to influence his policy. The Congress, in his opinion, paid " too much attention to the fate of the mediatized, and too little to that of the nation." 89 The Viennese police were on the right track when they suspected him of planning " to melt all the little German nationalities into one single nation." 90 His nationalist policy was also identical with that of Prussia in his attitude toward France, and in his views on the Saxon question. He was eager to end French interference in German affairs once and for all, and did not hesitate to speak of the French as " a nation possessed by the spirit of vengeance, robbery, and destitute of all morality." β1 History, he wrote, had proved for five centuries the inclination of the French to divide Germany in order to maintain her in a state of fermentation, and France was helped in this attempt by the egotism and faithlessness of the German princes.92 As such a faithless prince, Stein regarded the king of Saxony, to whom he continued to refer as " an adherent of Napoleon." 98 It seemed to Alexander's adviser that the incorporation of Saxony into Prussia would preserve Saxony from foreign influence, and would put an end 87 Ibid., p. 170, M a y 18, 1815.

Si Ibid., p. 71, Oct. 24, 1814. 89 Ibid., 69, Oct. 20, 1814. 90 W e i l , Les dessous du Congrès de tienne, I, 545, N o v . 16, 1814.

91 Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 162, March 31, 1815. 92 Ibid., pp. 56-57, Sept. 17, 1814. 93 Ibid., p. 206, Dec. 31, 1814.

50

THE

ATTITUDE

OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

to " agitations and agitators, intrigants and intrigues." 84 He argued, like the Prussian delegates, that the right of conquest had placed Saxony at the disposal of the allies, and that the annexation was in the interest of Germany and Europe. 95 In contrast to the Prussians, Stein advocated the reestablishment of the Empire. F o r a time he had not thought this absolutely necessary, but after observing the German Committee at work, he decided that a national government directed by the five largest German states, with their divergent tendencies, would not provide the strong central authority he considered indispensable. 98 In December 1814, he stated his belief that Prussia had certain qualifications for leadership which Austria lacked, 97 but in the following February he wrote a memorandum to persuade Austria to reassume the imperial crown. 98 " If one admits," he now stated, " that Austria has a lesser interest in Germany than Prussia, even that there exist within her frontiers principles tending toward separation, if one believes however, that the union of Austria to Germany is indispensable to the latter, and useful to the political interests of Europe in general, one cannot r e f u s e . . . to attach them to each other by a constitutional link," and to be strong enough this link necessitated the re-establishment of the Empire. 99 Prussian fears of Austrian predominance he deemed unwarranted. 100 Far from agreeing with Humboldt that the personal interest of an emperor would conflict with the majority opinion expressed in a federal diet, Stein thought with the group of Gagern that the historic name, Empire, would be in itself a 94 Ibid., p. 70, O c t 21, 1814. 96 Ibid., p. 101, Dec. 3, 1814. 96 Ibid., 142, Feb. 17, 1815. 97 Ibid., p. 108, Dec. 26, 1814. 98 Ibid., p. 143, Feb. 17, 1815. 99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., pp. 145-146, Feb. 27, 1815, Stein to Hardenberg.

S U P P O R T E R S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

5I

strong support to a federal diet, and to the idea of national unity. 101 Stein's actual influence at the Congress was very limited. Alexander never seems to have put much pressure on the other powers on behalf of Stein's plans, nor was the Tsar ready to defend German nationalism with any consistency as a doctrine. 102 His adviser complained about the difficulties of his position in the Russian delegation, and his lack of influence.108 Those he could influence, he described as " most imperfect human beings " who could not easily be used " as tools for great objectives." 104 Alexander himself he reproached with absent-mindedness and lack of depth.108 The Russian tsar had shown his progressive aspiration by asking Stein to be his adviser; to make full use of him was a different matter. It sufficed to Alexander to be associated with a great German patriot. In this association lay in fact the only contribution the Tsar made to German nationalism. But Stein grew tired of being used as a decoration. He left Vienna on May 28th, before the last discussions about German affairs had been held, but not to follow Alexander's expedition against Napoleon. He went home to Nassau. 106 SUMMARY

The supporters of German nationalism at the Congress of Vienna were united by the wish to establish a federal state 101 Ibid., p. 146. 102 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 323, Nov. 17, 1814. For example, in a conversation with Talleyrand who compared the misfortunes Poland had suffered by division, to the fate of Saxony, Alexander agreed with him that "division is the most unfortunate thing that can befall a nation," and stressed that the division of Poland was not his fault. He did not seem to see any inconsistency between the division of the Polish state among three alien powers, and the absorption of one German state by another. 103 Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 220, Diary note. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Lehmann, Freiherr vom Stein, pp. 571-572.

52

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

which would represent a fatherland to all Germans. To some extent their support was based on nationalist and patriotic feelings, but in many instances nationalism was backed, consciously or unconsciously, for reasons which were not directly connected with nationalism itself. The Prussian delegates were German nationalists as well as Prussian patriots, and regarded the doctrine as a spiritual bond which would link all German states firmly to each other. They could afford to favor the movement, because it coincided with their political interests. Although there were Prussians at the time who had not yet recognized this connection, both Hardenberg and Humboldt made propaganda for the nationalist movement by representing it as beneficial to Prussia, Germany, and Europe. Stein's German patriotism was as strong as theirs, stronger perhaps, since he represented no particular state, but he did not support the Prussian delegates very much; partly, because he did not fully agree with their plans, and partly because he was dependent on a vacillating sponsor. The nationalism of the mediatized princes and the lesser German states sought to combine princely independence with federal unity. The apparent consistency between Holy Roman imperialism and modern nationalism seemed to them a valid argument to justify their claims and wishes. While the entire group of supporters agreed in principle on German national unity, their approach to the problem differed widely. It may even be said that they were not very willing to make sacrifices for this nationalist aim, unless an immediate benefit to them was evident. But the cause of German nationalism depended not only on the strength of its supporters; it depended at least as much on the views and power of those who opposed it.

CHAPTER II OPPONENTS OF GERMAN NATIONALISM AUSTRIA

A PARTICIPANT of the Congress sketched Austria's attitude t o w a r d the German problem by s a y i n g : " A u s t r i a seems to be taking a livelier interest in Germany's being in process of evolution, than in the evolution of a Germany."

1

A closer ac-

quaintance with the ideas of the Austrian plenipotentiaries will illustrate the precise meaning of this remark. Officialy, E m p e r o r

Francis had named t w o delegates to

represent Austria at the C o n g r e s s ; actually, Metternich monopolized this role. T h e second delegate, Freiherr von W e s s e n berg, did most of the important paper work, such as the d r a w i n g up of memoranda, plans, and statistics, but when his views differed f r o m those of Metternich, they found no official recognition. 2 Metternich himself, the President of the Congress of Vienna, occupied the limelight. Born a Rhenish nobleman, he had entered the diplomatic service of the H o l y R o m a n Empire, a s his father had done before him. T h r o u g h his marriage with the granddaughter of Prince Kaunitz, former Austrian chancellor, and the most renowned diplomat of the eighteenth century, Metternich's fate was closely linked to the interests of A u s t r i a ' s ruling class. In 1809, Emperor Francis had appointed him chief minister. W i t h the help of skillful negotiations,

clever

calculations, and

diplomatic

amiability,

Metternich had succeeded in maneuvering Austria into a leading position in Europe, and it w a s to be expected that his efforts at the Congress would be directed toward maintaining A u s t r i a in this position. 1 Egloffstein, Carl August

auf dem Wiener

Kongress,

p. 113, May 16,

1815. Remark by von Gersdorff. 2 A. Ritter von A r n e t h , Johann Freiherr

von Wessenberg,

Wien, 1898,

2 vols, in ι, I, 212-328. S3

54

THE

A T T I T U D E OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

T h e particular interests of the Empire at the Congress were concentrated primarily on t w o matters. Through the Treaty of Paris, Austria had acquired territories in Italy which had to be organized and incorporated into the Empire. O n the other hand, Austria planned to take part in the German Federation. T o understand Metternich's views, one must remember that he never forgot Austria's other interests while dealing with German affairs. Although Austria appeared outwardly strong and victorious, there were a few danger signals which could hardly have escaped Metternich's attention. T h e secret police, which carefully screened public opinion, reported for example a speech made by a young Hungarian officer, Count Széchényi, who was quoted as having asserted that Austria was merely fighting for her existence. Despite all victories, despite the improvements in her position among foreign countries, Austria would perish, since each day brought her dissolution nearer. The event would take place before a century had passed, because the component parts of the Empire became increasingly dissimilar with every hour, and tended more and more toward separation. The secret agent had added : " The remark, probably the echo of family conversations by the Count's father, was made without reflection and without illwill. It came out with the clumsy stupidity of a calf. But the Prussians took it seriously and placed it with a comment before the King." 3 Even if Metternich did not take this prophecy seriously, he did everything to prevent its fulfillment. German nationalism to him was an obstacle, primarily because of the nature of the state he represented. In 1814, the Austrian empire included within its borders, besides its German population, Magyars, Slovaks, and Croatians in Hungary, Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, Roumanians in Transylvania, Poles in Galicia, Slovenes in Dalmatia, and Italians in Lombardy-Venetia. 3Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei

22, 1814.

auf dem Wienet

Kongress,

p. 311, Dec.

O P P O N E N T S OF G E R M A N N A T I O N A L I S M

55

This multi-national organization was governed with the help of an aristocratic hierarchy in a paternalistic manner. The Austrian aristocracy was determined not to suffer the same fate as the nobility of France, and to remain in power. Looking back over the difficulties he had faced while trying to organize Germany, Metternich stated that there had been " in the North of Germany, and in the Rhine provinces, those aspirations whose birth the year 1806 had w i t n e s s e d . . . . " " These ideas," he said, " were either strictly democratic, or they were tendencies one could not designate by any other name than ' aspirations of Teutomania.' " * Metternich appreciated that French domination and the fight against it had given an impetus to nationalist sentiments. But he had neither shared these sentiments, nor regarded them as harmless patriotic outbursts. Aspirations of Teutomania were connected in his mind with democratic tendencies, and democratic tendencies were revolutionary. He had fought for years not only against Napoleon, but against the French Revolution. "Armed jacobinism," an expression by which he designated all revolutionary tendencies, including " Teutomania," 8 had destroyed the balance of power in Europe, and jacobinism, armed or unarmed, contained ideas and spread doctrines whose acceptance by the peoples of Europe would endanger the social as well as the political constitution of the Austrian empire. Metternich regarded the organization of Germany as unavoidable, but the problem appeared extremely delicate, and was only faced with reluctance. The Secretary of the Congress, Friedrich Gentz," indicated this reluctance when he wrote: 4 Metternich, Mémoires, I» 20a. 5Angeberg, IV, 1482, Aug. 1815· Memorandum by Metternich. M. H. Weil, Le Revirement de la Politique Autrichienne à Γ égard de Joachim Murât et les négotiations secrètes entre Paris et Vienne. D'après les documents inédits. Biblioteca di Storia Italiana Recente, 1909, II, 424, Feb. 18, 1815. Metternich to M. de Vincent. fiGentz was born in Prussian Silesia, and employed his talents as a publicist in the service of the Prussian Monarchy. He soon became known as a strong opponent of the French Revolution and Napoleon, but the

56

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

" Since the idea of uniting Germany in some fashion or another has become such a strong ferment in all heads, the cabinets themselves, whatever opinions they may possess, will be obliged to lend a hand to its execution." 7 Actually, the necessity of uniting Germany for strategic reasons, and the danger of promoting nationalism while organizing the Germanies into a Confederation, represented a constant dilemma for the Austrian chancellor. A few months before Napoleon's defeat, Gentz had summarized Austria's desires concerning her role in Germany in a letter to Metternich : A German Empire can no longer exist today, but instead a well-joined mass of independent and happy German states. If we attempt to form an Empire, we would certainly lose everything. The first German state—primus inter pares—can and must be Austria.8 A month after the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, Gentz declared that the Viennese cabinet " had been sufficiently reasonable to have avoided everything which could nourish the hope for the re-establishment of a German E m p i r e . . . . government did not entirely agree with his suggestions at that time, and in r8o2 he left Prussia, after receiving an appointment as Imperial Counselor to the Court of Vienna with an annual salary of 4,000 gulden. He continued to fight Napoleon with his sharp pen, and employed German nationalism to arouse the enthusiasm of his readers. In his famous Preface to the Fragmente aus der neuesten Geschichte der politischen Gleichgewichte in Europa, St. Petersburg, 1806, p. XLVII, he pointed to the disunity in Germany as the root of all misfortunes, regretted " the slackening of the patriotic spirit," and called : " . . . If we unite ourselves, if we forget our family quarrels, if in the hour of danger, in the hour of common peril, we could decide to be Germans, we could brave any storm." But seven years later Gentz had changed. When reminded by a friend of the Preface of 1806, he said: " . . . W h o should teach me if not I myself? Have I lived for twenty years in vain ? . . . You are living in the year 1806, I in the year 1813." Cited in Golo Mann, Secretary of Europe, New Haven, 1946, p. 195. By 1814, Gentz' political outlook was markedly pro-Austrian. 7 Gentz, Oesterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen, ed. by Freiherr v. Klinkowström, Wien, 1887, p. 525, March 3, 1815. To Prince Caradja. 8 Ibid., p. 103, Nov. 5, 1813, Prag.

O P P O N E N T S OF G E R M A N N A T I O N A L I S M

57

Since a federal constitution without a head would be very impracticable, it could be predicted that the federal link mentioned in the Treaty of Paris, will only exist in a diplomatic s e n s e . . . . The German states will remain in possession of their complete independence and sovereignty, merely united by mutual treaties, or if possible through a system of alliances." β Such a limited interpretation of the Treaty of Paris actually was Metternich's intention. 10 The idea of placing his imperial master at the head of a reconstructed German empire did not attract him. The Congressional secretary said he observed " twenty times a day the affliction felt by deputies from all parts of Germany upon hearing how little hope there was for the realization of their favorite idea." 1 1 The court of Vienna, he explained, was " too wise " and knew " too well its real interests to take over the honorable but dangerous role with which Germany would like to burden it." T o accept the imperial crown on the same terms as the Emperor had worn it in 1806, would be ridiculous, he continued, since experience had proved beyond all doubt that a supreme power, if it was as feeble and precarious as that of Germany's emperor, would only lead to disorder, anarchy, and complete impotence. T o transform the imperial power into a reality, one would have to endow it with attributes which, though sincerely desired in Germany, would prove absolutely incompatible with the power exercised for half a century, by the large German states, such as Prussia, Bavaria, and Hanover, and which they were undoubtedly not willing to relinquish. Austria did not want " to accept an empty title without real value, or claim a power against which the most important members of the German Confederation would constantly protest." 12 9 Friedrich von Gentz, Oesterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen,

p. 432, June 21, and 24, 1814, to Prince Caradja. 10 Kliiber, II, 184, Nov. 12, 1814. 11 Gentz, Dépêches inédites aux Hospodars de Valachie, I, 102, Sept. 27, 1814.

12 Ibid., I, 101-103, Sept. 27, 1814.

58

THE

A T T I T U D E OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

T h e imperial dignity itself, without power, did not tempt the Austrian government. Francis I wore an imperial crown. T h e possibility of using the imperial ideal as a lure to attract German nationalists was not considered by Metternich. German nationalism had been allowed to flourish in Austria during the Napoleonic wars, because it had then served as a weapon in the fight against the French emperor. 1 3 But now the situation was changed. Peace had been restored, and it was of primary importance to cultivate the loyalty of all Austrian subjects to the House of Habsburg. If the Emperor placed too much emphasis on his German subjects, he could not demand equal loyalty from all others. T h u s apart from the doubts of the Austrian government whether the imperial crown would represent a real power in Germany, Metternich had to consider whether the use of the crown as a symbol might not harm the Austrian empire as a whole. H e therefore constantly stressed that the question of organizing Germany was primarily a European, not a German, problem. If Germany w a s organized for Europe's sake, no nationality within the Austrian empire could feel offended. W i t h this thought in mind, the Austrian plenipotentiary informed the German Committee that the sphere of its activity was limited : Territorial relationships, . . . and the stipulated construction of a state by the Austrian and Prussian kingdoms, the necessary adjustments in the frontiers of the German s t a t e s . . . belong without doubt to the important European affairs, which cannot be decided by the German Committee. 14 H e went further. In " the interest of Europe,"

no German state

was to have the right to exclude itself from the proposed union, because Germany would be pacified and strengthened by its existence. " T o permit a German state to remain outside of 13 W . C. Langsam, The Napoleonic Austria, N e w York, 1930, passim.

14Kliiber, I, 105, Nov. 22, 1814.

Wars and German Nationalism

in

O P P O N E N T S OF G E R M A N N A T I O N A L I S M

59

the Federation would be equivalent to allowing it to place itself in opposition to the general welfare." 15 The German Committee itself, with its five members, suited Metternich in several respects. It prevented meetings and general discussions of an official character by the delegates of all German states which would have been difficult to control. Moreover, a division of the work between several important German states whose interests could be played against each other was most likely to assure Austria of a determining voice. The chief obstacle to all of Austria's plans was the policy of the state which next to her, had the greatest power among the German countries—the kingdom of Prussia. During an early session of the German Committee the difference between their views on the German question clearly was revealed. Metternich declared it to be " the first wish of his master the Emperor to form a German League. The purpose of the League was to be the preservation of a lasting peace, an objective which could only be attained if a great defensive union was placed in the center of Europe." 18 The intentions of Prussia were thereupon explained by Humboldt, who declared that " the King, his master, regarded it as a duty toward his subjects to join them again in an alliance through which they would form a nation with Germany." 17 To Metternich the planned Federation appeared essential for purposes of defense. Its objective was the preservation of the peace, not the establishment of a nation. The Prussian delegates, in his opinion, combined aspirations of Teutomania with an unquenchable thirst for power. According to the Austrian point of view, Prussia had arrived at the Congress with the one extravagant wish to extend her possessions at the expense of all, and without the slightest regard for justice and decency. The source of this passion for conquest did not 15 Ibid. (Italics mine.) 16 Kliiber, II, 184, Nov. 12, 1814. 17 Ibid.

6o

THE

ATTITUDE OF T H E

CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

lie with the King or his principal minister,... but in a system founded and pursued since one hundred years, which has found new support in the general enthusiasm of the nation, the power of the army, and especially through the irresistable pressure which a certain number of distinguished military men exercise on the cabinet.18 Officially, diplomatic relations were on a more amicable basis than this statement indicated. Metternich had been most anxious to assure Hardenberg that Austria " nurses no jealousy whatsoever against Prussia. On the contrary, she regards this power as one of the most useful weights in the balance of forces in Europe." 19 The Austrian chancellor placed the greatest emphasis on the need for Austro-Prussian cooperation. A Prussian proposal to divide Germany into two spheres of influence, he firmly rejected. Hardenberg was informed that His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, " never wishes to see a division of Germany into South and North," 20 and Gentz remarked that such a partition " would have dangerous results." 21 Obviously, the Austrian government was determined to prevent Prussia from fortifying her position in the North, unchecked by Austrian supervision. These considerations were also reflected in Austria's Saxon policy. At the beginning of negotiations Metternich had felt obliged to consent in an informal manner to the annexation of Saxony by Prussia. 22 But a few months later he told Hardenberg that " the Emperor's principles, his close family ties, and all geographical considerations " were opposed to such a settlement. Besides, there was still another obstacle to the arrangement, Metternich continued, " the chief German 18 Metternich, Mémoires, II, 478, Feb. 12, 1815, Memorandum by Gentz. 19 Ibid., p. 505, Dec. 10, 1814. 20 Angeberg, II, 318, Oct. 22, 1814. 21 Gentz, Dépêches inédites, I, 103-104, Sept. 27, 1814. To Prince Garadja. 22Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress, p. 103, Aug. I, 1814. Metternich to Count Zichy, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin.

O P P O N E N T S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

6l

powers have declared their unwillingness to join the Federation on terms which were so dangerous to their own safety." F o r this reason the incorporation of Saxony " would solely result in placing the protectorate of Germany in the hands of the French government." 23 B y employing the threat of French intervention, the Austrian chancellor used one of Prussia's own weapons against her. Instead of stressing the urgency of forming a powerful German state against France, he intimated the German states would seek French protection against Prussia. T h e suggestion was to be taken seriously. Three weeks after making this statement, and four weeks after receiving Hardenberg's " Teutonic " appeal, Metternich concluded a secret defensive alliance with France. 24 For him, France was not the national enemy, and Napoleon's return did not inspire him with nationalist hatred against the French. H e was exclusively interested in getting rid of the French emperor, and proclaimed this through the chief of the allied armies, Prince Schwarzenberg, in an address to the French people : Frenchmen ! Twenty years of disturbances and misfortunes had oppressed Europe. The insatiable thirst for domination and conquest of one single man, while depopulating and ruining France, had devastated the most distant countries, and the astonished world witnessed in an enlightened century the reproduction of the disasters of the middle ages. All Europe rose, and one cry of indignation served as a rallying point to all peoples. In 1814, it depended upon the allied powers to exercise a just vengeance over France, which she certainly deserved; but great rulers, united for a single and holy cause,—'the re-establishment of the peace in Europe, —did not confound the author of so many ills with the people he had used to oppress the world. 25 23 Metternich, Mémoires, II, 506, Dec. 10, 1814. 24 Angeberg, II, 589, Jan. 3, 1815. 25 Metternich, Mémoires, II, 520-521.

62

THE ATTITUDE

OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

Metternich needed France as an ally to maintain the balance of power in Europe, a balance which Prussia, with the help of German nationalism, threatened to upset. It has been said that Metternich did not understand nationalism. 2 8 T h i s is true if the statement merely implies his o w n lack of feeling and enthusiasm for the sentiment itself. B u t if Metternich did not understand nationalism in this sense, at least he did not misunderstand its implications for Austria. Since he saw German nationalism as an obstacle and a danger, he intended to avoid the construction of a German state. A defensive union he considered imperative in the interest of peace, but the construction of a German state would represent a tribute to nationalism, and would have encouraged the nationalist movement in the entire Empire. Austria even apprehended that the re-establishment of a German empire under Francis II might cause the House of Habsburg to lose part of its possessions. A loose association of states, in which A u s t r i a played the decisive role, seemed to the Austrian chancellor the safest solution. Stein's plans, which were by no means anti-Austrian, met with extreme disapproval, and Gentz spoke of him as " the agitator against the public peace of Germany and Europe." 27 It is a compliment to Metternich's diplomatic skill that neither Stein nor the Prussian delegates realized from the beginning how opposed Austria was to their plans. Indeed Prussia's hopes were Austria's fears. O n l y toward the end of negotiations did Humboldt begin to understand w h y his suggestions constantly met with a negative response. " The German constitution will most probably come about as a shadow, but shadow is all I can call it," he complained. " A u s t r i a never wanted this thing, therefore she has followed such an unpardonable course of policy. E v e n now, she tried once more to mutilate my last plan, and to render it so indeterminate that it really amounts to nothing." 28 T h i s indeed w a s Metternich's 26 Bibl, Der Zerfall

Österreichs, I, 228.

27 Metternich, Mémoires, I I , 493, Feb. 12, 1815. 2d Wilhelm

May

15, 1815·

und

Caroline

von Humboldt

in

ihren

Briefen,

IV,

553,

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objective. Instead of leading Germany's process of evolution, Prussia was to become a useful weight in the balance of European forces. The evolution of a Germany, Austria wished to prevent. T H E SOUTH GERMAN STATES

Metternichs most useful allies against German nationalism were the representatives of the three major South German states : Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. They did not always agree with Austria, 29 but consistently opposed all Prussian proposals. All three states had gained territory and prestige during the Napoleonic period, which encouraged their rulers to seek more. The kings of both Bavaria and Württemberg jealously guarded every bit of royal power they possessed; especially Württemberg^ king had made himself a name for despotism.80 Bavaria's foreign minister, Count Montgelas, whom Stein described with the adjective " un-German," 31 did not personally attend any sessions of the Congress. But he told the Prussian ambassador in Munich that, in his opinion, it would suffice if the princes in Germany existed side by side, unconnected and without association, as in Italy. If a German constitution should actually materialize, it should serve only as a union against foreigners and have nothing to do with the internal affairs of the several states.82 In the German Committee, the Bavarian delegates, Prince Wrede and Count Rechberg, indignantly protested against a Prussian suggestion that the German states should forego their rights of separately making war, peace, and treaties. Prince Wrede explained that his king 29Gentz, Dépêches inédites, I, 163, June 26, 1815. 30 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 208, Oct. 28, 1814. The crown-prince of Württemberg seems to have been somewhat influenced by Stein and the Grandduchess Catherine whom he loved. See: Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress, p. 58, and Talleyrand, Memoirs, II. P· 355. Dec· 7. 1814· Report to Louis XVIII. 31 Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 176, Sept. 28, 1814. 32 Ibid.

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had proved by his willingness to join the common cause, " even before the battle of Leipzig, and through the energy by which he had defended it, how very much he cared for the preservation of German liberty. But he would be called to account by his people if he abandoned a right which formed part of its independence, a right which flattered the national pride, because it had been bought through incredible sacrifices of blood and money." 33 The Bavarians regarded themselves as an independent nation, and paid only the most superficial heed to the fact that they belonged to the German nationality. Germany as a state meant nothing to them. The Bavarian ambassador in London advised Prince Wrede about the conduct he thought Bavaria should follow at the Congress : " Let us abandon those chimeras of central constitution.... Let us be Europeans in the world, Germans in school, Bavarians in the cabinet and in the entire political organization of our state. The other kingdoms should follow our example." 34 The German part of the program was limited to language. No nationalist propaganda was permitted by the government, and the Rheinsiche Merkur was banned from Bavaria.85 The Germany of the Bavarians ended at Bavaria's frontiers.38 Württemberg's German policy was almost identical. Shortly before the Congress met, Winzingerode, one of Württemberg's delegates, communicated to the King his fear for the repose of my fatherland, particularly after observing the audacity with which Baron vom Stein . . . supports the dangerous spirit reigning in Germany, especially on the borders of the Rhine, in Saxony, and in Prussia. It is impossible that the great powers should ignore Stein's ideas and 33Kliiber, II, lis, Oct. 1814. 34 Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, II, 97, Jan. 19, 1815, London. 35 Rheinischer Merkur, No. 161, Dec. 10, 1814. 36 Κ. von Nostitz, Leben und Briefwechsel, Dresden, 1848, p. 156, Jan. 23, 1815.

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principles, and it is very difficult to explain to one's self the tranquillity with which they permit him to use their name to draw Germany and themselves into the abyss.87 In the German Committee, Count Winzingerode carefully analyzed the wording of each article of the constitution. During the fourth committee session he started a debate over the expression "rights of government" (Regierungsrechte). The article concerned the rights of the German states, and he preferred the use of "rights of sovereignty" (Souverainetätsrechte). The Prussian chancellor immediately spoke for the maintenance of " rights of government " to avoid, he said, the use of a " foreign word " such as sovereignty (souveraineté). 38 It would never have occurred to Winzingerode to check his vocabulary for Teutonic idioms. His purpose had been to obtain the adoption of terms which suggested most unmistakably that Württemberg remained a sovereign state. The king of Württemberg himself warned the committee to be careful in the choice of words. He pointed out that the term " nation " could be interpreted as expressing a desire " to melt different peoples, such as Prussians and Bavarians, into one nation." 88 Despite their careful supervision, the delegates of Württemberg did not immediately sign the completed document.40 They were anxious to avoid any pitfalls, and to demonstrate Württemberg's independence. Baden was deeply offended because of her exclusion from the German Committee. She sometimes lent her signature to petitions drawn up by the small German states,41 but in general her policy resembled that of her two Southern neighbors. Baden's representative, Baron von Hack, explained the views 37 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 97, Sept. Si 1814, S t Petersburg. 38 Angeberg, II, 323, Oct. 22, r8i4. 39 Ibid., p. 312, Oct. 30, 1814. 40 Ibid., III, 1385, Sept. 1, 1815. Date of signature. 41 Ibid., II, 444, Dec. 9, 1814·

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of the Grandduke to Metternich : Because of the rank, dignity, size, population, and family and political relationships of the Grandduchy, and above all because of its immense sacrifices to aid the liberation of the fatherland from a foreign yoke, it " was entitled to look forward to more than the prospect of having freed itself from foreign chains to wear perhaps its own." 42 Baden, like Württemberg, hesitated to join the Federation. 43 For all three Southern states German nationalism was a threat to their independence and sovereignty. In each article of the constitution they suspected a fetter, and behind each word a trap. They too had permitted the existence of nationalism during the wars of liberation, but if they referred to this time at the Congress, it was only to remind their fellow delegates of their former altruism which deserved a recompense. FRANCE

The South German diplomats and Prince Metternich acquired a firm and skillful supporter in their fight against German nationalism in the delegate of France, Prince Talleyrand de Périgord. 44 At the time of his arrival in Vienna, Talleyrand found himself in the not altogether comfortable position of representing the state which for two decades had made war on 42 Ibid., II, 448, Nov. 16, 1814. 43 Ibid., III, 1385, July 28, 1813. Date of signature. 44 The following account of Talleyrand is based on his own writings, contemporary judgments, and the biographies by C. Brinton, The Lives of Talleyrand, New York, 1936, and D. Cooper, Talleyrand, London, 1932. The second French representative to the Congress was the Duke of Dalberg, a nephew of the former Elector of Mainz and Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine. H e had entered the service of the French government in 1810, was made a duke by Napoleon, and helped to restore the Bourbons. He may have been chosen as delegate because of his German connections. Patriotic Germans of course considered him a traitor, and Baron vom Stein is supposed to have said, when the Duke came to visit him, that he would receive him only if he came as the French delegate; if he came as the Duke of Dalberg, he would have him thrown downstairs. In G. H. Pertz, Das Leben des Ministers Freiherr vom Stein, Berlin, 1851, IV, 114.

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a great part of Europe. To make matters worse, France had been the birthplace of the Revolution, and Talleyrand himself had been a Revolutionary while it had been profitable to occupy that role. He had also faithfully served Napoleon as foreign minister as long as the Emperor's star was rising, but after becoming aware that Napoleon had overreached the limits of his power, he prepared himself for another political change. He sponsored the return of Louis X V I I I to the throne of France, stressing the fact that Louis was a ' legitimate ' sovereign. These efforts were crowned with success, and Talleyrand could appear in Vienna as the representative of a conservative, legitimate, and therefore most respectable French king. The clear, cool, and extremely flexible intelligence of this versatile delegate, together with the willingness of the Allies to use France as a weight in the balance of power, helped Talleyrand to play an important part in the Congressional negotiations. For obvious reasons Talleyrand was as attached to the balance of power theory as Metternich, but he tried to persuade the assembled diplomats to adopt, in addition, a second principle which coincided equally well with French interests. This was the principle of legitimacy.45 It served to support the return of the expelled Bourbons to their thrones in France, Spain, and Italy, and it was equally useful as a weapon against German nationalism. As the representative of a unified national state, which had promoted the nationalist movement at home and abroad, Talleyrand was in a position to be well aware of the political possibilities inherent in the nationalist idea. France, unlike Austria, did not have to fear internal dissolution from the acceptance of nationalism within the country, but the French government had three good reasons for joining Austria in her opposition against German nationalism. First of all the Bourbon government was inimical to all revolutionary ideas. Secondly, it was eager to stress its anti-revolutionary attitude before the 45 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 159-160.

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assembly of the victors at Vienna. And finally France was afraid of Prussia. Talleyrand believed that animosity against France had reached greater dimensions in Prussia than anywhere else in Germany. While the Congress was assembling, Talleyrand observed that Prussian emissaries were agitating Germany, " representing France as bent again on invading her, and Prussia as the only power in a condition to defend her, and asking that, in order to preserve Germany, that country should be delivered to Prussia." 46 The annexation of the Rhineland by Prussia, Talleyrand treated as a fait accompli. It had been stipulated in the Treaty of Paris, and there was little he could do against it. But to prevent Prussia from acquiring too much influence over Germany, Talleyrand firmly opposed the Saxon annexation, and tried to restore Saxony to its legitimate sovereign. The French delegation in Vienna informed its foreign minister in Paris of its Saxon policy in these terms : " The importance of the question of Saxony cannot escape your notice. The principles we must defend in it are identical with those we must employ for putting a barrier to the march of revolution." *Ί By " principles," Talleyrand meant legitimacy and the balance of power. How the reference to revolution was to be understood, he himself explained in the most precise fashion to King Louis : The revolutionary spirit we observe in Germany... has a very special character. Here it is not the fight of the third estate with the privileged classes which leads to fermentation. It is the vanity of a formerly very independent military aristocracy. This class, while preparing the ground and the elements for a revolution, would prefer to live in a large state, instead of belonging to parcelled-out countries, and to sovereigns it regards as its equals. 46 Ibid., II, 177, η. d. Instructions for the Congress. 47 Ibid., p. 337, Nov. 24, 1814.

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All the mediatized princes and nobles are found at the head of that party. They attempt to unite Germany into a single monarchy, in which they can play the role of a great aristocratic element. Prussia, who has very cleverly flattered all that party, has attached it to herself, by letting it hope for a part of the privileges it formerly enjoyed. One can thus be quite certain that, if Prussia succeeded in annexing Saxony and in appropriating isolated territories on one side and another, she would become, within very few years, a military monarchy very dangerous to her neighbors, and in this assumption nothing would serve her better than the great number of enthusiasts who, under the pretext of seeking a fatherland, would create one by the most fatal upheavals. It is of the highest importance to prevent those projects, and to second Austria, in order to cope with them successfully.48 Talleyrand watched every opportunity to counteract Prussian propaganda, and to stamp out the revolutionary fire in the German states. H e tried, quite successfully, to win the ambassadors of the South German states. 49 He attempted to influence the mediatized princes. 50 H e suggested to the French government that it direct some newspaper articles against " the doctrine " of the Rheinische Merkur.β1 With a penetration and clarity unequaled by any other delegate, Talleyrand recognized and analyzed all the elements and all the motives present in the German states, which brought German nationalism to fruition. Aside from the ambition of Prussia, and that of the mediatized princes, he counted the universities as breeding grounds of German nationalism. 52 It did not escape him that 48 Ibid., II, 257, Oct. i6, 1814. 49 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 328, Oct. 18, 1814, and

Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 183, Oct. 24, 1814. 50 Ibid., I, 404, Oct. 27, 1814.

51 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 345, Nov. 30, 1814. 52 Ibid., II, 262, Oct. 17, 1814.

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many Germans attributed their past misfortunes and defeats to the division of Germany into small states. 83 He followed the movement to its roots, in order to combat it more effectively. A united Germany—the hope of the German nationalists— was a nightmare for Talleyrand. German unity [he reported to his king] that is their cry, their doctrine, their religion, carried even to fanaticism.... This unity from which France had nothing to fear when she possessed the left bank of the Rhine and Belgium, would now be a serious question for her. It is but too evident, if the Congress adjourns, if it decides nothing, it will aggravate this state of things, and it is greatly to be feared that in aggravating them, the result will be an upheaval.54 ENGLAND

The contrast between the political reflections of the French delegate and those of the English is especially interesting, because both Talleyrand and Castlereagh had the same general objective: to secure a balance of power in Europe. Lord Castlereagh's position differed in two important ways from that of his continental colleagues. He was the foreign minister of a country whose secure geographical situation placed it in a position of aloofness and a relative neutrality with respect to continental problems. England's greatest interests had been satisfied by the Treaty of Paris, which determined the formation of a Kingdom of the Netherlands by combining Holland and Belgium. This decision was important to England both from the political and economic point of view. The Netherlands promised to be of strategical value, and were expected to be strong enough to prevent France from hampering England's commerce with the continent. 55 All other continental problems which were discussed at Vienna did not touch 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., II, 215 and 269-270.

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England's security or any other English interests in so direct a manner. The second point of difference with the diplomats of the continent, though this was least noticeable in the German negotiations, was Castlereagh's ultimate responsibility to a Parliament which could refuse to grant the necessary appropriations to implement his policy. In February 1815, Lord Castlereagh had to return to London to defend his decisions and the government's budget before Parliament. Further negotiations in Vienna were turned over to the Duke of Wellington. But the most important questions had by then been settled, and the Duke of Wellington merely followed Castlereagh's instructions. Parliamentary opinion about German affairs was split along party lines. The conservative government party, the Tories, were willing to consent to the incorporation of Saxony into Prussia; the liberal Whigs favored preservation of the Saxon kingdom.50 Yet, judging from the debates which took place in Parliament, and from the advice which the Prime Minister sent to Castlereagh at Vienna, neither party had a very clear idea of the issues involved. The Whigs spoke of the Saxons as a " free nation " whose independence was in danger of being violated.57 The head of the conservative government, Lord Liverpool, regarded the Saxon question primarily from the point of view of its effect on the domestic political situation in England. " I ought to apprise you," he wrote to Castlereagh, " that there is a strong feeling in this country, respecting Saxony. The case against the king appears to me, I confess, to be complete, if it is expedient to act upon it ; but the objection of the Whigs is to the annihilation of Saxony as an independent power . . . . " 58 Liverpool therefore believed it " very 56 Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, XXIX, 554, 561, Nov. 26, 1814, p. 622, Dec. I, 1814. 57 Ibid., XXIX, 554, Nov. 26, 1814. 58 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 438, Nov. 18, 1814. (Italics are mine.)

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desirable that a noyau of Saxony at least should be preserved, even if it were under some other branch of the Saxon family." 69 Castlereagh had his own ideas about Saxony, and considered his reasons good enough to be defended against the opposition.80 In addition, it must be stressed again that the entire problem was not of such great importance to England that Castlereagh could not dare to act independently. Important and obvious in Castlereagh's political strategy was England's geographical position. He could view continental problems with a relatively detached perspective which was not always comprehensible to the other diplomats. Gentz observed in this connection that Great Britain, which could have been " the arbiter of E u r o p e . . . observed a neutrality that was often astonishing." 91 In fact he found Britain's attitude somewhat irritating. " England," he stated, " wanted peace, peace before everything, peace—I regret to say it—at any price and almost any condition." 62 Castlereagh himself had the feeling that he was the only delegate who seriously worked for a balance of power in Europe. " Our misfortune is," he wrote to Wellington, " that all the powers look to points instead of the general system of Europe, which makes an endless complication." 63 And a few days later he remarked similarly : " You will perceive from my several despatches that the difference in principle between M. Talleyrand and me is chiefly that I wish to direct my main effort to secure an equilibrium in Europe, to which object I wish to make all local points subordinate. M. Talleyrand appears to me, on the contrary, more intent upon particular local 89 Ibid. 60 Angeberg, II, 274-275, Oct. n , Despatches, IX, 357, Oct. 20, 1814.

1814. Wellington, Supplementary

61 Metternich, Mémoires, II, 480, Feb. 12, 1815. 62 Ibid., pp. 482-483. 63 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 357, Oct. 20, 1814.

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points of influence, than upon the general system of balance to be established."· 4 Castlereagh had two alternative plans for the organization of Europe. The first envisaged an alliance of the two great German powers, Austria and Prussia, backed by Britain, and connected with the minor states of Germany, in an " intermediary system " between Russia and France.· 8 The other was an alliance of Austria, France, and the South German states, supported by Britain, against the two Northern powers, with Russia and Prussia, in close alliance.·· Castlereagh preferred the first of these plans because, in his opinion, a strong central European union was the best assurance of keeping the balance between East and West, and he started negotiations with this first scheme in mind.· 7 The establishment of an intermediary system required the strengthening of Prussia through the annexation of the Saxon kingdom. Thinking of this, Castlereagh told Hardenberg in October 1814, that there was " n o principle in European politics " to which he attached greater importance than to " the substantial reconstruction of Prussia." 68 He added that, " if the incorporation of the whole of Saxony into the Prussian monarchy is necessary to assure the welfare of Europe, I would not condemn the measure from either the political or the moral point of view, although I feel some regret at the idea of seeing such an ancient family so profoundly injured." 88 The annexation or preservation of the Saxon kingdom was regarded by most diplomats as a measure which would either favor or hamper the progress of German nationalism. Talleyrand had repeatedly attempted to impress his anxiety in this 64 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, X, 173, Oct. 25, 1814. 65 Ibid., pp. 173-174, Oct. 25, 1814. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., I, 31, March 20, 1815, London. 68 Angeberg, II, 274-275, Oct. 11, 1814. 6θ Ibid.

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respect upon Castlereagh, but without success. France, in Castlereagh's opinion, had no reason to fancy herself insecure : If she were a feeble and menaced power, she might well feel jealous of such a German alliance ; but as her direct interests are all out of danger, it is unreasonable that she should impede the sole means that remains to Germany of preserving its independence, in order either to indulge in sentiment toward the king of Saxony, or to create a French party amongst the minor states. France need never dread a German league : it is in its nature inoffensive. 10 In Castlereagh's mind, the German alliance and the strengthening of Prussia would not lead to the establishment of a German state, but to his planned central European system. 71 Prussia, to him, was not the leader of German nationalism, but merely an important piece in his scheme. H e was aware of the fact that Prussia was ambitious, yet her ambitions in his estimate were Prussian ambitions. 72 without a tinge of German sentiment or sentimentalista This explains his answer to Talleyrand. Had the frontiers of England touched those of any German state, instead of being surrounded by a safety belt of water, it is entirely possible that Castlereagh would not have overlooked the political possibilities of the German nationalist movement, and would not have declared the formation of a German league " in its nature inoffensive." B y January, the political line-up which had emerged from the Congressional negotiations, had rendered Castlereagh's favorite balance scheme impossible. Instead of cooperating with each other, Austria and Prussia were on the verge of war over the Saxon question. The situation was further complicated by the cooperation between Russia and Prussia on both the Polish and the Saxon issues. The British plenipotentiary had to turn to his second plan for a European equilibrium, and entered into 70 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, X , 175, Oct. 25, 1814. 71 Wellington, Supplementary

Despatches,

I X , 357, Oct. 20, 1814.

72 Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1S15, 297, Jan. 29, 1813.

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7

the secret alliance with Austria and France. ® England thereby automatically joined the ranks of the opponents of German nationalism. After this change of policy, Castlereagh attempted to console Hardenberg by stressing the possibility of Prussian aggrandizement through the Prussification of a part of Saxony, 74 but he never approached the question from the German point of view. His problem was Europe. Upon returning to England, he emphasized before Parliament where his previous anti-Saxon policy had been attacked by the Whigs, that he had changed his course because " public feeling, not merely of the people of Germany, but of all other countries, would have been wounded by so great and complete a sacrifice of an ancient family ; . . . the general opinion of Europe would have revolted at such a proceeding, a n d . . . Prussia would have been prejudiced in the general estimate of Europe by the annexation." 75 These words were clearly intended to soothe the Whig party. Neither pity for the House of Saxony, nor fear of Prussian aggrandizement through nationalist propaganda had changed or influenced Castlereagh's policy until he had deemed it necessary to enter into alliance with Austria and France. Only then did he subscribe to an anti-nationalist German policy. His opposition to the nationalist movement did not stem from a sudden conversion to Metternich's and Talleyrand's point of view, but has to be explained as the abandonment of one scheme of balance for another. 76 The British 73 See above p. 32, note 33. With the exception of Hanover, all parties to the treaty belonged to the opposition. 74 Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815,

p. 297, Jan. 29, 1815.

75 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, I, 51, March 20, 1815, London. 76 In this connection it is interesting to read Castlereagh's own explanation of the purpose of the Congress of Vienna. He stated before Parliament that " the o b j e c t . . . was to gain, and permanently secure, greater safety on both flanks of the two states that were to form the two immediate bulwarks of Europe, to give adequate power, by means of additional strength, to that State of North Germany which should be charged with the pre-

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delegate deserves his place with the Opposition not because he himself actively opposed German nationalism, but because, from January on, his vote was cast against Prussia's wishes. His unconscious opposition, as well as his initial unconscious support were both determined by the fact that, for Castlereagh, German nationalism in itself had no weight in the European balance of power. CONCLUSION

The German Committee completed its work on June 8, 1 8 1 5 . " A federal constitution 78 had been drawn up, and the much-debated German Confederation could be inaugurated. The emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia joined the union for those of their possessions which had formerly belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. The king of Denmark joined it for the duchy of Holstein; the king of the Netherlands for the grandduchy of Luxemburg. The first article of the constitution provided that the German princes should enter the Confederation as " sovereign princes." The second article proclaimed the purpose of the Confederation as being " the maintenance of the exterior and interior security of Germany, the independence and inviolability of the federal states." Thus, while Germany was mentioned as a whole, the independence of its component parts was immediately emphasized. Practically the only restriction imposed upon the sovereignty of the German states, was their engagement not to enter into an alliance with a foreign power, if such servation of that part of the Continent. It was also desirable that a strong barrier should be interposed between the states of Italy and France, to prevent them also from ever arraying themselves against each other. It was further wished that Switzerland should be reestablished in her influence and independence, to keep up the chain of communication, and that Germany might again be confederated in the same system, to render it an impregnable bulwark between the great States in the East and West of Europe." Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, I, 31, March 20, 1815, London. 77 Angeberg, III, 1372. 78 Ibid., pp. : 37>i385.

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alliance were aimed at the Confederation as a whole or any of its members. The one central institution of the Federation was a Diet, consisting of delegates chosen by the thirty-eight rulers. Austria had reserved the presidency for herself. T o prevent any subsequent major alterations of these provisions, the constitution stipulated that " fundamental laws, organic institutions, individual rights, or religious affairs," could not be changed except by unanimous vote. N o greater tribute could have been paid to the autonomy of the German states. T h e Diet was weak because of the voting system, and because it lacked any means to enforce its decisions. N o federal army was formed, and no federal court of justice erected. There were no federal tariffs and no federal currency. The Diet was in no manner a central German government. The existence of the federal constitution in this form was acknowledged and guaranteed by all the powers which signed the Final A c t of the Vienna treaty on the 9th of June. This gesture signified that German affairs concerned all of Europe, and should not be altered without Europe's consent. German nationalism had suffered a complete defeat, and those who had fought against it had reason to be satisfied with their work. Talleyrand had felt relieved immediately after the Saxon question had been settled. " The difficulties to be overcome were endless," he told K i n g Louis X V I I I , " but the cause of royalty, legitimacy, and right is saved, and that portion of Saxony which has been preserved, joined to the territory of the ducal houses, places a mass of two million inhabitants between Austria and Prussia." 78 Talleyrand saw in German nationalism a military danger for France, and had therefore encouraged separatism with every means at his disposal. France, he believed, had nothing to fear, as long as Germany remained divided. Metternich was equally pleased with his achievements. On the day before the federal constitution was to be signed, he explained the excellence of the whole system to Emperor 79 Talleyrand, Memoirs, III, 30, Feb. 8, 1815.

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Francis: Bavaria and Württemberg would not be able to regain complete independence, since their hopes for a quarrel between Austria and Prussia would not be fulfilled. The basis of the Confederation rested on a great majority, and it had been constructed in a manner which would permit His Imperial Majesty to appear " as the truly protective power in Germany." 80 While Metternich personally dreaded nationalism as a manifestation of the Jacobin revolutionary movement, his attitude toward German nationalism was primarily determined by the wish to preserve the Austrian empire for the House of Habsburg. The South German states even mistrusted a German defensive league. They expected the Congress to reward them for their patriotism during the last period of the Napoleonic wars by making them as powerful as possible. It was only with the greatest reluctance that they joined the Federation. The manner in which the king of Saxony adhered to the German constitution was similarly hesitant. His sovereignty had been deeply offended, and his patriotism questioned. Consequently he gave proof of his independence by accepting the constitutional articles " with several reservations," and at the same time attempted to show his patriotism by expressing regrets " as a true German " that the link which had united the German states under the reign of Emperor Francis II had been dissolved nine years previously.81 Of those who had supported German nationalism, the most disappointed were the Prussians. Their formal declaration of adherence to the constitution briefly stated that Prussia believed it better to join an incomplete Confederation than no Confederation at all. They expressed the hope that imperfections would be corrected by the Diet.82 In private, their dissatisfaction was less restrained. Humboldt told his wife: 80 Cited in Arneth, Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg, 81 Angeberg, III, 1369-1370, June 6, 1815. 82 Ibid., pp. 1371-1373, June 6, 1815.

p. 287, June 7, 1815.

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. . . I would have preferred it if Prussia had by herself concluded a union with a few favorably disposed princes, instead of this. But with such a plan we could not even have counted on Hanover, and besides Austria would have tried to use all her influence to induce even smaller ones to desert us. But since the Confederation is to be concluded, as now, with Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Austria, none of which understands the meaning of a constitution nor has a spark of feeling for Germandom (Deutschheit), not a single just and liberal idea could be included in it.83 This remark, like many others, shows that the magnetic power of the national idea was not yet irresistible. The Prussians and Baron vom Stein had based their policy to a great extent on the spirit which had animated a large part of Germany during the wars of liberation, but at the Congress they found themselves in the position of pioneers. They would not have embarked on a campaign to spread " moral " influence, if " moral " unity had existed to an extent sufficient for their purposes. Among the German diplomats who hoped for a close union, distrust of Prussia"s designs often played as important a part in their policy, as the wish to create a German fatherland. The representatives of Luxemburg and Hanover, for example, had feared that the organization of Germany might lead to Prussian predominance. Both regretted the meager results of the Congress as far as Germany unity was concerned, especially Austria's refusal to accept the imperial crown, but they were pleased to preserve a large measure of freedom for their states. The grandduke of Saxe-Weimar who had been so worried that part of his " dignity " might get lost in the process of building a united Germany, expressed his delight with the results of the Congress. This national union, he said, " respects the rights of the sovereign houses of Germany, assures their worth, and contributes thereby to their splendor." 84 83 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 558, May 21, 1815. 84 Angeberg, III, 1350, June 5, 1815.

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The mediatized princes, in their acknowledgment of the federal constitution, entirely disregarded the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of the principle of nationality. They declared themselves " cruelly disappointed in their just expectations to see themselves r e s t o r e d . . . " and regarded " it as their duty to protest for themselves as well as for their descendants and subjects before the Congress and the entire world, that they reserve for themselves in perpetuity the rights and privileges they had possessed in 1805." 85 While the wish to obtain a German fatherland was often voiced at the time of the Congress, there was, according to the nationalists themselves, only a minority of their followers in the Germanies. Even Prussia possessed a Prussian party besides the German-Prussian one. Many of the German diplomats who recognized the principle of nationality regarded it from different angles, and their sentiments reached very unequal degrees of intensity. A number of them could be swayed from one side to the other by promises and propaganda. If German nationalism was not respected at Vienna, it seems that this was due rather to the weakness of the movement, as well as to apprehension about the results of its growth, than to the blindness of the majority of diplomats. Most of these recognized the existence of German nationalism, and feared the consequences of its future development. If they deserve reproach, this should be directed at their attempt to prevent any future changes and adjustments by freezing the federal constitution into a rigid system. But they cannot be accused of disregarding the spirit of their age. Without the menace of immediate external danger, separate interests still had the upper hand, and patriotism was apt to cease when it interfered with private interests. In addition, the cause of royalty, mentioned by Talleyrand, was very frequently opposed to the cause of nationality. T o pay no attention to the demands of kings and lesser nobility within Germany, was contrary to the " ancien 85 Angeberg, IV, 1448, June 13, 1815.

O P P O N E N T S OF G E R M A N

NATIONALISM

8l

régime " which many members of the Congress were intent upon preserving. The empire of the Habsburgs, the throne of the Bourbons, the authority of the Romanovs, did not rest on a recognition of the principle of nationality. Quite to the contrary, the empire, the throne, and the authority were shaken by it. Those diplomats who defended German nationalism, expressed one of the currents of the age, but those who fought against the movement relied on another. The disunity and weakness of its supporters, and the Opposition's fear of the consequences if German nationalism should grow and triumph, prevented the creation of an independent German national state.

PART II T H E CONGRESS A N D ITALIAN A N D POLISH NATIONALISM

CHAPTER I THE CONGRESS AND ITALIAN NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION

T H E same article of the T r e a t y of Paris which provided that the German states should be independent and united by a federal link, stipulated that " Italy, except for the lands to be returned to Austria, will be composed of sovereign states." 1 The provision marked a complete turn-about in the trend toward unification which had characterized Italian politics from the time of the French invasion in 1 7 9 7 to the end of the Napoleonic era in 1814. A brief account of the political climate in Italy, and the political situation which faced the Allies in Paris, is indispensable to an understanding of the negotiations which took place at the Congress of Vienna. Napoleon's interests in Italy were primarily strategic and economic, 2 but his administration of the peninsula completely transformed its political complexion. Before the French R e v o lution Italy was composed of half a dozen important states, a number of very small ones, and several minute principalities. Of Europe's non-Italian powers, A u s t r i a had exercised the most important direct political influence over Italy because she possessed the duchy of L o m b a r d y f r o m 1 7 1 4 to 1797, and because Tuscany and Modena were governed by A u s t r i a n archdukes. F o r a brief time, f r o m 1 7 9 7 to 1805, Napoleon assigned the formerly independent Venetian republic to Austria as a partial compensation for L o m b a r d y , but in 1805, after a further French victory, V e n i c e again had to be relinquished. B y the year 1 8 1 3 , the many separate Italian states had disappeared, and Italy was divided into three parts all of which were ultimately under French jurisdiction. 1 Angeberg, I, 165, May 30, 1814, Paris. 2 Cesar Cantu, Histoire des Italiens, Paris, 1861, XI, 166; R. J. Rath, The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1814), New York, 1941, p. 22. 85

86

THE

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OF T H E

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T h e kingdom of Naples in the south of the peninsula was governed by Napoleon's brother-in-law Joachim Murat. Part of northern and central Italy were linked together as the kingdom of Italy with Napoleon as king, and his stepson, Eugene Beauharnais, as viceroy. T h e Papal states, Tuscany, Piedmont, and Genoa, were not included in the Italian kingdom, but had been directly annexed to France. T h e only parts of Italy which remained free from French domination were the islands of Sardinia and Sicily. Sardinia constituted the remainder of the possessions of the House of Savoy which had also ruled Piedmont before the French invasion. Sicily still belonged to a member of the Bourbon family, King Ferdinand I , who formerly reigned over Naples and Sicily as Ferdinand I V . T h e political reorganization of the peninsula, together with the introduction of a uniform code of laws and a uniform system of government, had a very great impact on the political thought of the Italian people. This impact was enhanced by Napoleon's Italian propaganda which depicted the French emperor as Italy's "liberator," who governed the country with no other thought in mind than Italy's happiness and glory. 3 As long as Napoleon retained a firm hold over Europe, his patriotic propaganda retained some of its alluring qualities; but as his might began to crumble the nationalism which he had encouraged was turned against him. Patriotic secret societies like the F r e e Masons and the Carbonari, originally inspired by French propaganda, now multiplied themselves, imbued with the hope of driving the French from Italy. Napoleon's own family adopted Napoleonic methods against Napoleon. Joachim Murat sought the support of the Society of the Carbonari to affirm his position at Naples and in Italy. T h e goal of the Carbonari was the establishment of a free and independent Italian state, limited by the sea and the Alps, 3 Cantu, Histoire des Italiens, X I , i66 ff. The best account of French influence on Italian writers is : Paul Hazard, La Rh'olution française et les lettres italiennes, 178Ç-1815, Paris, 1910.

THE

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AND ITALIAN

NATIONALISM

87

with Rome as its capital.4 Murat was ambitious, and secretly considered the possibility of carrying out their program by uniting Italy under his sceptre.6 Eugene Beauharnais, the viceroy of the kingdom of Italy, also played with the idea of abandoning his stepfather, and taking the crown for himself.® But he hesitated to break with Napoleon until it was too late. At the end of April 1 8 1 4 , a successful revolution in Milan overthrew his government, and a provisional regency, composed of members of the Milanese middle class and liberal Milanese nobles of the anti-Beauharnais coalition, assumed the task of governing Milan. Politically, this group hoped for the establishment of an independent Italian state within the limits of the Napoleonic kingdom, or larger. 7 The leaders of Austrian and British troops fighting the French in Italy also flattered Italian patriotism. Austria's chief commanders, Marshal Bellegarde and General Nugent, issued proclamations promising the Italians deliverance from " foreign oppression," and encouraged them to fight for " national independence, the most sacred cause of your rights." 8 During the same period, Austria befriended Murat and concluded a treaty with the latter on January n , 1 8 1 4 . " Accord4 Th. B. Saint-Edme, Constitution et Organisation des Carbonari, 2nd edition, Paris, 1922, p. 38. 5 [Bertoldi], Memoirs of the Secret Societies of the South of Italy, particularly the Carbonari. Tr. from the original M.S., London, 1821, pp. ri-13. The most active promoter of the alliance between Murat and the Carbonari was the Neapolitan minister of the police, Maghella. See also: R. M. Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies, London, 1904, 2 vols., I, 224-324. 6 G. Gallavresi, " La rivoluzione lombarda del 1814 e la politica inglesi," Archivo Storico Lombardo, Milano, 1909, Ser. 4, Anno XXXVI, XI, 117. 7 Rath, The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1814). VII and VIII.

Chapts.

8 Rath, The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1814). Cited p. 54 and mentioned by Gentz, Oesterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen, p. 171, Feb. II, 1614. 9 Angeberg, I, 83-87.

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OF

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ing to its terms Murat was to give military support to Austria against France, and Austria, in turn, guaranteed in a number of secret articles Joachim's rights to the throne of Naples. She also promised to persuade King Ferdinand to renounce his claims to the kingdom. Austria promised further to use her good offices in procuring the assent of the other allied powers to this guaranty, and to a territorial increase out of the Papal states with a population of 400,000 souls. English policy moved along similar lines. Britain did not formally enter into alliance with Murat, but concluded an armistice with him, and treated him as an ally. 10 Nationalist propaganda, however, flowed even more generously from the British camp than from that of Austria. Lord William Bentinck, 11 the chief commander of England's forces in Italy, excelled in pro-Italian declarations. He did not commit himself to any definite program for Italian unity, but made the freest use of an enchanting patriotic vocabulary. 12 When Napoleon's defeat seemed certain, there was an immediate change of policy among the Allies, and it became evident that for Austria and Great Britain the nationalist direction had been nothing but a temporary expedient. The Austrians were the first to drop the patriotic mask, and to show their dislike of revolutionary theories advocating an Italian fatherland. The turn of the tide was already evident in March 1 8 1 4 when Baron von Hügel, an Austrian official who accompanied Bellegarde on his march through northern Italy, 10 R. M. Johnston, " Lord William Bentinck and Murat," English torical Review, No. 19, April 1904, pp. 269-278.

His-

11 Lord William was an ardent Whig, serving under a Tory government. He had been sent to the Mediterranean in 1811 to take command of the British forces in Sicily, and to act as diplomatic representative at the court of King Ferdinand. He virtually ruled Sicily during the last year of the war, and was the most important British agent in Italy. 12For examples of Bentinck's propaganda see: M. H. Weil, Le Prince Eugène et Murat 1813-1814, Paris, 1902, 5 vols., V, 117. T. C. Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time, London, t8i5, XXX, 390-301.

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89

regretfully noted in his diary : " There are now a great number of persons with w h o m the idea of an Italian nation, enclosed in a single great Italian state, has taken root. England and Naples may gain this party, but we will never be able to get along with it." 1 8 T h e same fear drove the Austrian ambassador at Naples to write to Metternich at the beginning of April that L o r d W i l l i a m ' s conduct seemed " unbecoming and very dangerous for Italy." H e accused the British commander of instigating " a spirit of insurrection among the people " by preaching " the union of all Italy under a single head," and by " promising a constitution based on that of E n g l a n d . " 14 L o r d William himself was quite sincere in his proclamations, but he did not pursue a consistent line of policy. O n A p r i l 26, upon entering Genoa with his troops, he promised the Genoese independence and the re-establishment of their republic as it had existed in 1797. 1 5 Such a promise was in agreement with the wishes of the Genoese but in complete contradiction to his usual appeals for Italian independence. These, however, were stopped altogether a few days after the Allies had entered Paris by an order from L o r d Castlereagh to Bentinck. Castlereagh instructed the British commander that during the w a r a policy encouraging independence had been " excusable," because " we were justified in running all risks," but that it was no longer desirable under the present circumstances. 16 A t the P a r i s meeting of Napoleon's victors the new direction was officially adopted, and all plans for Italian independence and unification in whatever form and under whatever leadership they appeared, were either circumvented or met with open resistance. A deputation from the provisional 13 F . Lemmi, ed., La Restaurazione in Italia nel 1814: Nel Diario

del

Barone von Hügel, Roma-Milano, 1910, p. 67, March 30, 1814. 14 Weil, Le Prince Eugene et Murât (1813-1814),

V, 102, Aprii 6, 1814.

Count Mier to Metternich. 15 Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, X X I X , 729-730. 16 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, X, 18, May 7, 1814, Paris.

go

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E

CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

Milanese government which had been encouraged by the war propaganda of the Allies to request their help for the establishment of an independent constitutional Italian kingdom, was rudely awakened from its dreams during the first audience with Metternich. T h e Austrian chancellor informed them that " it was useless to discourse about independence " since the Allies had decided to return Lombardy and Venetia to the Austrian empire." According to his explanation, the provinces could no longer be called " Kingdom of Italy " because Austria wanted " to avoid any suspicion among the other powers that the Emperor might have designs on the rest of the peninsula." 1 8 Emperor Francis himself made no use of diplomatic excuses but briefly told the deputies that since their country had been occupied by his troops, there could be " neither a Kingdom of Italy, nor a constitution, nor a deputation from the Kingdom." 19 In an interview with Castlereagh the deputies encountered the same resistance. T h e British foreign minister barricaded himself behind his alliance with Austria, and flatly affirmed that he would do nothing which was not agreeable to that power. 20 No move was made at Paris to carry out the terms of the January alliance between Austria and Naples. T h e kingdom of Naples had suddenly emerged as the second center of Italian nationalism on the peninsula, and Murat's revolutionary origins made themselves felt. On the other hand, the alternative to Murat was the Bourbon king, Ferdinand of Sicily, whose restoration at Naples was presumed to strengthen French influence in southern Italy. T h e Habsburgs had fought French interference in Italian politics for hundreds 17 E. Verga, " La Deputazione dei Collegi Elettorali del Regno d'Italia a Parigi nel 1814," Archileo Storico Lombardo, Milano, 1904, Ser. 4, Anno X X X I , I, 318. Report of the deputies. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 319. 20 Bianchi, Storia Documentata della Diplomazia May 15, 1814, Paris, Report of the deputies.

Europea

in Italia, I, 343,

THE CONGRESS AND ITALIAN

NATIONALISM

9I

of years, and the moment seemed propitious to end the struggle. Originally Metternich's intention had been to employ Murat and his army first as a weapon against Napoleon, and later as a shield against the Bourbons. This arrangement appeared especially convenient for Austria because it placed Murat in a position in which he was expected to need and seek Austrian support. 21 Britain also approved of Murat as a counterweight to a reviving France, and calculated that as long as Naples and Sicily remained divided, each would be weaker and therefore more responsive to the economic and political desires of the British government. 22 But in face of Murat's newly discovered " dangerous " leanings, these calculations lost in attractiveness. The problem now seemed too involved to be settled immediately, and negotiations with Naples and about Naples were postponed till the Congress of Vienna. T h e third state in Italy from which nationalist leadership might have been expected in 1814, was the kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont. Next to Austria, Sardinia was the most powerful state in northern Italy, and in an excellent position to hold the balance between France and Austria in that area. F r o m the nationalist point of view Victor Emmanuel would have had an advantage over the Austrian emperor because he counted as Italian. He was ambitious, and in many respects a shrewd politician. But in contrast to Murat, and contrary to the recommendations of some of his advisers, he refused to base his policy on nationalist doctrines. 23 V e r y shortly after 21 Weil, Le revirement de la politique autrichienne à régard de Joachim Murat, p. 419, Feb. 17, 1813. Count Saint-Marsan, delegate of Sardinia, to King Victor Emmanuel. The source of Saint- Marsan's information was Metternich. 22Ibid, and see: Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh

J&12-1&J5,

P· 494· 23 The Sardinian ambassador to Russia, Count Joseph de Maistre, who became famous as champion of ultramontanism and conservatism, wrote to his court in July 1814 : " The King should make himself chief of the Italians and employ revolutionaries indifferently in all civil and military positions ;

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his return to Turin at the end of March, he set out to destroy systematically every trace of the changes which had transformed Piedmontese institutions and Picdmontese society during the past twenty years. It was his intention, as he expressed it, to consider all that had taken place in his absence " a s a long dream." 2 4 T h e King's ultraconservatism, which went much further than the conservatism of Prussia, as well as the strategic position of his state, designated the Piedmontese monarchy as a most useful friend for Austria. Following a proposal by Austria and Great Britain, the Allies secretly decided at Paris to compensate Piedmont's loss of Savoy by assigning her Genoa. 2 5 This was contrary to the wishes of the Genoese, and contrary to the light-minded assurances L o r d William Bentinck had given them a few weeks previously. Yet neither of these counted. T h e details of the annexation were to be determined at Vienna. F r o m the British point of view the motives behind this move were balance of power calculations. 26 Austria hoped to gain an ally. 27 Neither power considered the kingdom of Sardinia as the potential leader of the Italian independence movement. Although the great powers which had courted Italian public opinion did not consider themselves in any way bound by it, even at court, and even if it is against our interests. This is a matter of essential, vital and capital importance." And a few weeks later he counseled again : " You should caress the Italian spirit." J . De Maistre, Correspondance Diplomatique 1811-1817, Paris, i960, 2 vols., I, 380, July 6/18, 1814, and p. 393, July 19/31, 1814. Both from St. Petersburg. Also see: D. D. De Pradt, The Congress of Vienna. Tr. from the French, London, 1816, p. 135 ; also see : D. Spadoni, " Carlo Comelli de Stuckenfeld e il trono dei Cesari offerto a Casa Savoja nel 1814," Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, Anno X I V , Fase. I V , 1927, pp. 593-686. 24 A. Gallenga, History

of Piedmont,

London, 1855, 3 vols., I I I , 312.

25 Angeberg, I, 171, Art. II, May 30, 1814, Paris. 26 Castlereagh, Memoirs London.

and Correspondence,

I, 35-36, March 20, 1815,

27 Bianchi, Storia Documentata della Diplomazia Europea in Italia, I, 400, July 30, 1814. Count Saint-Marsan to the Turin government.

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Italian public sentiment remained a matter of great concern to them. Conditions were still unsettled, and a movement of the dissatisfied against the restoration could easily become political capital for a clever leader. For many months the strength of the nationalistically inclined group of Italians remained a mystery, and the subject of endless speculations. The majority of patriots could be found among such groups as government officials, soldiers, and members of the middle classes. 28 In general, the Italian nobility, the clergy, and the majority of the peasants favored the return of the pre-revolutionary governments. 29 In all Italian states there were, moreover, groups of people who possessed a strong spirit of local patriotism. 30 Such sentiments were particularly evident among the Genoese who feared to lose their independence, and among the Piedmontese who were eager to increase the territory of their state. 81 All of these different opinions were represented by the Italian delegates to the Congress of Vienna. Still, their position at the Congress proved to be an extremely precarious one. N o Italian power was mighty in comparison with Austria at that time. In addition, the Treaty of Paris provided no common bond for discussion among the Italian representatives. Their varied interests prevented them from forming alliances like those formed by the representatives from the small German states and the mediatized princes. The most astute Italian diplomat was the papal legate, Cardinal Consalvi. His views 28 Sir Robert Wilson, Private Diary, London, 1861, II, 364-365, May 7, 1814, Milan. A l s o : F. Lemmi, La Restaurazione Austriaca a Milano nel 1S14, Bologna, 1902, p. 410, Aprii 26, 1614, Verona. Bellegarde to Metternich, pp. 453-455. November 22, 1814, Milan. Bellegarde to Hager. Also Johnston, " Lord William Bentinck and Murât," op. cit., p. 266. 29 Sir Robert Wilson, Private Diary, II, 365, May 7, 1814, Milan. Also : Rath, The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1814), p. 207. 30 Ibid., pp. 203-204. Rath cites an interesting letter from Metternich to Bellegarde on this subject. 31 Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, X X X , 398, May ιβ, ιβΐ4, Paris. Mr. Pareto, Genoese delegate, to Lord Castlereagh.

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about Italian nationalism w e r e in a g r e e m e n t w i t h M e t t e r n i c h s , but the t w o men d i s a g r e e d about m a n y other territorial a n d political a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h w e r e of interest t o the P a p a c y . 3 2 Despite these differences, C a r d i n a l C o n s a l v i a n d C o u n t S a i n t M a r s a n , the S a r d i n i a n minister of S t a t e , w e r e the t w o Italians w i t h w h o m M e t t e r n i c h w o u l d most frequently discuss Italian problems, if he discussed them at all. T h e court of N a p l e s h a d sent t w o v e r y able delegates, the D u k e s of C a m p o - C h i a r i o a n d Cariati. Austria

w a s , h o w e v e r , the o n l y p o w e r w h i c h

gave

them official recognition, a n d she did not oblige them in a n y other w a y . T h e representatives f r o m T u s c a n y , M o d e n a , G e n o a , S i c i l y , a n d several other of the smaller principalities w e r e v e r y rarely called f o r conferences. T h e i r role is accurately described in the w o r d s of a S w i s s diplomat, r e c o r d i n g the difficulties of the plenipotentiaries f r o m tiny L u c c a : " O n e d o e s not s e e m to be w i l l i n g to listen t o them, a l t h o u g h they say that t h e y can neither h a r m

nor

help the

European

equilibrium,

and

a l t h o u g h they promise not to be ambitious. B u t the law of the s t r o n g e r is the better l a w . "

33

N o t all g r e a t p o w e r s took an active part in the Italian n e g o tiations.

Russia

Saxony.

The

and

Prussia

Emperor

concentrated

Alexander

was

on

ready

Poland to

and

recognize

M u r a t as k i n g of N a p l e s and to secure a n Italian principality f o r his friend E u g e n e B e a u h a r n a i s , but he did not press either point. 3 4 P r u s s i a , a c c o r d i n g to a m e m o r a n d u m w h i c h H u m b o l d t d r e w up in September 1 8 1 4 , did not expect t o h a v e a determ i n i n g voice in Italian a f f a i r s . 3 5 B u t had one a s k e d H u m b o l d t , that ardent defender of G e r m a n nationalism, w h e t h e r he w a s 32 Rinieri, Corrispondenza inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacca nel tempo del Congresso di Vienna (1814-1815). Contains the most revealing documentary material about Papal policy. 33 J. -G. Eynard, Au Congrès de Vienne, ed. by E. Chapuisat, 2nd ed., Paris, 1914, I, 72, Oct. 27, 1814. 34 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 399-400, November 1614; Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 289, 290, 437, 449, 510, 634, 645, 665, 666, 679, 695, 730, 736. 35 Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, XI, 168.

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inclined to support Murat, the answer would have been a definite no. " The king of Naples," Humboldt stated in the September memorandum, " is by the nature of things excluded from any part of the Congress, to which only the sovereigns one wants to recognize can be admitted." 38 Spain took a great interest in the Italian settlement, especially in the distribution of Parma, Tuscany, and Naples, which were claimed by the Spanish government for members of the Bourbon family. Count Labrador spent most of his time in Vienna, protesting against the restoration of Archduke Ferdinand in Tuscany, the establishment of Marie Louise, daughter of the Emperor Francis, and Ex-Empress of France, at Parma, and Murat's presence at Naples. Since Spain and her protests were treated as quantité négligeable by all great great powers, Count Labrador refused to sign the Final Act of the Congress.37 In the correspondence of the Spanish plenipotentiary, published by Villa-Urrutia, 38 and in the Spanish documents forming part of the published treaty collections concerning the Congress, there is no sign that Count Labrador discussed the Italian national movement. It is, however, clear from these documents that Spain's policy was a strictly dynastic one, conducted in the name of legitimacy for Spanish interests, and in contradiction to the aspirations of Italian patriots. In general, Spanish policy followed the French lead as long as their 36 Ibid. 37Angeberg. I l l , p. 1341, June 5, 1814. Count Labrador's protest. Spain finally adhered to the treaty on May 7, 1817. 38 Marques de Villa-Urrutia, España en el Congreso de Viena según la correspondencia oficial de D. Pedro Gomes Labardor, 2nd ed., Madrid, 1928. The author says of the Spanish delegate (pp. 123-124): "Raised in Estremadura and educated in Salamanca, he was not destined for export. . . . Despite his native pride, he felt inhibited in Vienna, and although he attended all the festivities to which he was invited, he was not s e e n . . . at many aristocratic gatherings where the official title alone did not qualify him for admittance." Lord Wellington referred to Labrador with less kindness and understanding as " la plus mauvaise tête that I have ever met with." Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815, p. 311.

ç6

THE

ATTITUDE

OF

THE

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OF

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interests coincided. For our purposes it is important to know that in spirit Count Labrador was on the anti-nationalist side, as the representative of a conservative Bourbon government. H e was not in the front rank of the fighters; in fact, he was never in the front rank at all. Italian affairs were settled without Spain's assistance, and most of them against Spain's wishes. The powers which arranged the Italian map to their taste were Austria, England, and France. Austria was directly involved in Italian politics through her possessions in upper Italy. England still had troops on the peninsula and in Sicily, and had taken a very active part in the Italian campaign against Napoleon. France was unexpectedly allowed to participate after having been useful to Austria in the German crisis. Most of their negotiations and maneuvres which illuminate the stand that was taken toward Italian nationalism, were concerned with Lombardy and especially with Naples, the two strongholds of the movement. T h e anti-nationalist direction which had been adopted at Paris was pursued at Vienna. But each of the three governments followed it after its own fashion and for its own reasons. AUSTRIA

A t an eight-power meeting on the thirteenth of November 1814, discussion revolved on the best method of dealing with Italian affairs. A f t e r Count Labrador had suggested the formation of a committee similar to the one which existed for Germany, Metternich protested. German affairs, he explained to his colleagues, differed essentially from those of Italy. A c cording to the Treaty of Paris, Germany was destined to form a body of states, united by a federal link. Italy, on the other hand, was to be no more than " a combination of independent states, linked together by the same geographical expression." 89 39Angeberg, II, p. 425. Protocol of Nov. 13, 1814.

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The Austrian chancellor's statement should not be taken as evidence of his ignorance of the Italian nationalist movement, but rather as a conscious attempt to wipe out the new concept of a political Italy. It was part of his battle to save the Habsburg empire from the nationalist menace. A committee for Italian affairs might have provided a focal point for patriotic Italians, and strengthened the power of the Italian delegates. T o settle the territorial and political problems of the peninsula through private discussions, and in a piece-meal fashion, seemed much safer and more convenient. W h e n Metternich explained his opposition to an Italian committee to Cardinal Consalvi, he declared that he was against such an institution because " Italian affairs do not exist." 40 In a conversation with the Sardinian plenipotentiary during the summer of 1814, Metternich emphasized several times that Emperor Francis had no ambitious designs on the Italian peninsula, and that his only plan was " to extinguish the spirit of Italian unity and ideas about constitutions." For this very reason, Metternich said, Emperor Francis " had refrained from calling himself ' K i n g of Italy,' and had decided to dissolve the [Italian] army, and to abolish all Italian institutions which pointed toward the project or the existence of a great kingdom." Metternich stated further, that Austria regarded K i n g Victor Emmanuel as "the vanguard for the defense of the peninsula, for the maintenance of a durable peace, and the overthrow of the spirit of Italian jacobinism." 41 Despite the warnings of Austrian officials in Italy, Mettern i c h s program to " kill Italian jacobinism " 4 2 was put into effect in Lombardy and Venetia, where Austria had a free hand. Marshal Bellegarde, the chief Austrian representative 40Rinieri, Corrispondensa inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacca, p. 98, Nov. i6, 1814. 41 Bianchi, Storia Documentata 400-401, July 30, 1814.

della Diplomazia Europea in Italia, I,

42 Rinieri, Corrispondenza inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacco, p. 5, Sept. 8, 1814. These were Metternich's words to Consalvi.

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OF T H E

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in L o m b a r d y , had advised Metternich not to dissolve the Italian a r m y , but to utilize it in the service of Austria. H e pointed out that it would be too cruel to reject, mistreat, and neglect these men w h o had " sacrificed their time and their lives in the service for their f a t h e r l a n d . " 4 3 In addition, he cautioned the A u s t r i a n chancellor that the Italian soldier without occupation would be a dangerous element in Italian society. 44 T h e advice did not impress Metternich. A government order liquidated the Italian a r m y , and the soldiers became extremely anti-Austrian and restless, as Bellegarde had predicted. 4 5 In the fall of 1814 a steady flow of reports, indicating mounting discontent a m o n g the Italians, widespread hatred of A u s t r i a , prevalence of jacobin ideas, and plans of conspiracies, reached the bureaus of the secret police. 48 In the face of this Metternich continued with his Italian plans without g i v i n g thought to a policy of compromise. German and H u n g a r i a n officials were chosen to occupy high administrative posts in L o m b a r d y and Venetia. 4 7 N o separate government department w a s constituted to handle Italian affairs. A f t e r a brief provisional a r r a n g e m e n t 4 8 these were distributed among the existing imperial agencies. 49 Italian military business w a s handed over to the imperial war-office. T h e supreme court of M i l a n , a last vestige of Italian independence, 43 Lemmi, La Restaurazione

Austriaca a Milano nel 1814, pp. 410-411,

April 26, 1814, Verona. Bellegarde to Metternich. Ü Ibid., p. 411.

45Ibid., pp. 449-450, Oct. 19, 1814, Venice. Reuss to Bellegarde; pp. 4S3-45S, Nov. 22, 1&14, Milan. Bellegarde to Hager concerning the Brescian-Milanese military conspiracy. 46 Ibid., pp. 441-442, Sept. 22, 1814, in Weil, Les dessous du Congres de Vienne, I, 42, A u g . 3, 1814-

47 Weil, op. cit., p. 745, Dec. 26, 1814. 48 F r . v. H e l f e r t , Kaiser Frans I. von Österreich und die Stiftung des Lombardo-V enezianischen Königreichs in Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte, Litteratur und Sprache Österreichs und seiner Kronländer,

Innsbruck, 1901, VII, 19 ff. 49 Ibid., pp. 14-32.

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was abolished in December 1814, and its powers transferred to the imperial department of Justice in Vienna. 8 0 W h i l e the allied powers were debating over minor frontier adjustments between Lombardy and Piedmont, the Austrian government did not forget to focus its attention on Italian public opinion. Count Bellegarde pessimistically indicated to Hager that public opinion, if left to itself, would move " in a direction entirely opposed to the one desired." 81 H e suggested the publication of a literary journal which would seemingly be directed and written by Italians, but backed by Austrian money, and submitted to Austrian censorship. T h e government, he explained, would thereby gain occasion to fight " current misconceptions and extravagant hopes in an informal manner," and the device would permit Austria to be praised in a fashion which did not bear the stamp of " cheap advertisement." 82 The one imminent external danger to the success of A u s tria's efforts in her Italian provinces arose from Murat's presence at Naples. Feeling insecure, Murat had extended and consolidated his alliance with the Carbonari. Members of that organization were sent to the Romagna and Lombardy to win 50Ibid., p. 31. Also see: Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, 58-59. June 25, 1814.

X,

51 Helfert, Kaiser Frans I. von Österreich, p. 563, March 20, 1815, Milan. Bellegarde to Hager. Sì Ibid. Bellegarde suggested the famous poet and patriot, U g o Foscolo, as editor of the journal, because Foscolo would exert a strong influence over the Italians. People of that sort, Bellegarde told Hager, either had to be won or destroyed. The Italians would never believe that Foscolo could be won over completely by the Austrians, and therefore they would trust him. H i s help, in consequence, would be extremely valuable (pp. 560-561). Foscolo fled to Switzerland before the journal was begun, to avoid taking an oath of loyalty to Austria when the war was renewed through Napoleon's return (p. 203). The first issue of the journal appeared in March 1816. Among its contributors were several well-known Italian writers and scientists, and the poet Vicenzo Monti (p. 302). See also: Lemmi, La Restaurazione Austriaca a Milano nel 1814, pp. 507-508, March 2, 1816, Milan. Count Saureau to Metternich.

IOO

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF V I E N N A

the inhabitants for the king of Naples, and the idea of a united Italy.®3 Murat's followers in Italy and in Vienna constituted a continuous chorus asserting that all of Italy stood behind them. 54 The duke of Campo-Chiario warned Metternich and all other diplomats that if Murat " were driven to desperation . . . . he would raise the standard and unite under it all the discontented in Italy, proclaiming and forming a united kingdom." 58 From the French side, the Austrian chancellor was pressed to lead the Congress in a declaration for the restoration of Ferdinand I V , or to resort to military intervention in Naples, or to use both measures in conjunction. 88 Yet in the face of all rumors and warnings from the Italians, and repeated pleas by the French, Metternich made no official move against Murat, nor one in favor of King Ferdinand. The treaty of January 11 remained on file as unfinished business. Metternich was secretly resolved to get rid of Murat, but he wanted to wait for a more favorable moment. 87 The Austrian government's chief motives for delay appear in several secret messages to Louis X V I I I . Through the Austrian ambassador in Paris, Metternich informed the French king that Austria would not think it wise " to bring about complications whose effects on one of the most vulnerable points of the Empire [Lombardy-Venetia] could not be calculated " It was 53 [Bertoldi], Memoirs of the Secret Societies of the South of Italy, p. 15, and Rinieri, Corrispondenza inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacca, p. 213, Jan. S, 1815, Rome. 54 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 248, Oct. 8, 1814, pp. 294295. Oct. 14, 1814, p. 593, Nov. 25, 1814. 55 Rinieri, Corrispondenza

inedita...,

p. 39, Nov. 1, 1814.

56 Angeberg, II, 525-526, Dec. 13, 1814. Talleyrand to Castlereagh. Weil, Le revirement de la politique autrichienne..., pp. 398-399, Paris. Bombelles, Austrian ambassador, to Metternich. 57 Weil, Le revirement de ¡a politique autrichienne..., p. 395. Metternich told Saint-Marsan on Sept. 12, 1814 that " he would give anything for the news that Ferdinand IV had been re-established on the throne of Naples."

THE

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ΙΟΙ

impossible " to overlook the danger which would ensue if w a r broke out in Italy under the banner of so-called national independence, and extended its fire, perhaps very soon, into France itself." 68 Moreover, action against Naples could not be justified from the point of view of legitimacy as the French government had suggested, because A u s t r i a had recognized the Neapolitan government since the peace of 1805. 88 Metternich therefore advised K i n g L o u i s to be patient, and to await the termination of the Congress of Vienna. If the Congress ended without recognizing M u r a t ' s rights, A u s t r i a would be willing to negotiate directly with France about the best means of overthrowing the remainder of the revolutionary system.®0 F r o m the Austrian viewpoint, it was vital to avoid any m a j o r disturbance in Italy and to be branded as the aggressor. Metternich was acquainted with M u r a t ' s ambition as well as with the latter's impetuous spirit. 81 If the leader of Italian jacobinism wanted to risk a war, A u s t r i a preferred to appear as the defender of the peace. H a d events at the Congress taken a normal course, negotiations would have ended without any specific action against Murat. But Napoleon's sudden return to the Continent transformed the Neapolitan question and Italian nationalism into an acute problem. U p o n receiving the exciting news, M u r a t quickly promised through his plenipotentiaries that he would faithfully support the Allies. T h e D u k e of C a m p o - C h i a r o even proposed a defensive league between Naples, A u s t r i a , and Sardinia, to prevent the entry of any " foreign " troops into Italy. 6 2 T w o weeks after the news of the escape became known in Vienna, the Duke of Wellington, one of the best informed 58 Ibid., p. 406, Jan. 13, 1815, Metternich to Bombelles. 59 Ibid., p. 405. GO Ibid., p. 407.

61 Rinieri, Corrispondenza inedita...,

p. 303, Feb. 25, 1815.

62Helfert, Kaiser Frans I von Österreich, pp. 163-164; Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 605, March 22, 1815.

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persons in town, was still uncertain about the consequences of the event for Italy. In a note to a British official he indicated that if Murat's army simply moved forward without combining " this act of hostility with a declaration that he intends to be king of Italy, he will not be attacked." β3 T h e very fact that Wellington could make such a statement, reveals once more the great importance which was attached to the nationalist movement, and the anxiety with which it was watched. One week later, on March 30, Murat proclaimed the unity of Italy. H i s troops crossed the Neapolitan frontier as soon as he had received word of Napoleon's arrival in Paris. In a fiery declaration from Rimini, he reminded the Italians of their glorious past, of their national language, their national habits, and their national character; and he promised them a liberal constitution : " . . . . Providence, at last, calls y o u to freedom. One cry can be heard from the A l p s to the gorges of the Scylla, and that cry is: the independence oj Italy. E i g h t y thousand Neapolitans, led by their brave king, have left their home to liberate you

"

64

A

shower of incendiary speeches and

poetry followed this initial declaration. M u r a t was represented as the pater patriae, and the Italians were urged to fight for " a united Italy ; a peaceful Italy ; an independent Italy, a glorious Italy " e 5 T h e people, however, were e x ceedingly tired of war, and no longer confident of liberation. T o o many different appeals, all full of fervor and apparent sincerity, had been addressed to them during the past years. T h e group of convinced nationalists, whose strength had been feared, proyed to be very weak. Local loyalties, local animosities, and above all, general exhaustion defeated the champion 63 Ibid. 64 Comte Gregoire Orloff, Mémoires historiques, politiques et littéraires sur le Royaume de Naples, Paris, 1&19, s vols., II, 441, 443 ; Heilert, Kaiser Frans I von Österreich, p. 179.

65Lemmi, "Ciocchino Murat e le Aspirazioni Unitarie nel 1815," Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, Anno X X V I , Fase. II, Napoli,

1901, p. 196.

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AND ITALIAN

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of Italian nationalism even before he fled from Austria's advancing troops.®· In some places his dramatic undertaking w a s treated with ridicule.®7 A u s t r i a had little difficulty in reestablishing order. Count Bellegarde answered Murat's Rimini proclamation by a counter-proclamation f r o m Milan, which summarized the wishes and intentions of the imperial government. It began : " Lombards ! T h e Austrian government, upright by nature, and on principle adverse to any kind of boasting, has promised y o u peace, good order and paternalistic management, and it will keep its promises

"

68

Against

the Italian spirit, Bellegarde appealed to the Lombard spirit, and in opposition to Murat's call to arms, he pledged peace. Instead of a constitution, the inhabitants of L o m b a r d y Venetia were to e n j o y the fatherly care of Emperor Francis. In Vienna, meanwhile, the Neapolitan delegation received their passports. Metternich's policy had proved a brilliant success, and the Congress in its Final A c t officially recognized Ferdinand as " K i n g of the T w o Sicilies." 88 T h e moment of danger had been used by the Austrian chancellor to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with K i n g Ferdinand I V . 7 0 T h e defensive alliance " for the exterior and interior security of Italy " was renewed in a more detailed form on June 12, before the Sicilian delegation left Vienna. It is noteworthy documentary evidence of Austria's preoccupation with the possibility of an Italian nationalist insurrection. In a secret article it was stipulated that the contracting parties must " preserve their respective states and subjects from new reactions, and from the danger of imprudent inno66/Wd., pp. 206-207. 67 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, X, 308, April 13, 1815. Report from Rome. 68 Helfert, Kaiser Franz I von Österreich, pp. 198-199, April 7, 1814. 69 Angeberg, III, 1428, Art. CIV, June 9, 1815. 70 L. Chodzko, Recueil des traités, conventions et actes diplomatiques concernant l'Autriche et l'Italie, pp. 171-174, April 29, 1815.

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OF T H E

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71

vations which would lead to such reactions." The restored king of Sicily pledged himself " to allow no change which could not be reconciled with the ancient monarchical institutions, or with the principles adopted by His Imperial Majesty [Francis I ] for the internal government of his Italian provinces." The two governments also promised each other not to conclude any alliance contrary to " the defensive federation of Italy." 72 A similar treaty was concluded on the same day between Emperor Francis and his relative, the grandduke of Tuscany, Ferdinand I I I . It contained no secret articles, but the text shows that its purpose was identical with the objectives expressed in the alliance between Austria and Sicily. 73 After observing Metternich's policy of division, the reference to an Italian defensive federation in the Austro-Sicilian treaty comes as a surprise. Yet although the Austrian chancellor had not permitted the appearance of any Italian federation project on the Congressional agenda, the idea of an Italian defensive federation under Austrian leadership, as opposed to a federal union under nationalist leadership, had its attractions for Austria. Since the federal idea was a delicate diplomatic subject, and lent itself to a nationalist interpretation, the cautious chancellor preferred to restore order in Italy under Austrian protection before going further. He used the Congress merely as an occasion to sound the opinions of some Italian delegates on the subject of federation. 74 Cardinal Consalvi was approached from the very beginning. According to the latter's account, Metternich spoke to him about the possibility of establishing " a kind of central police 71 Ibid., p. 203. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., pp. 197-200. 74 K. Grossmann, " Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes," Historische Blätter, 4. Heft. Wien, 1931, pp. 41-52. The majority of Italian federal plans drawn up at that time proposed the Pope as head of the federation, but some mentioned the king of Sardinia or the emperor of Austria as candidates.

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to which all conspiracies, plots, and similar things could be reported," and about the simultaneous " formation of an Italian league designed to defend the country against external and internal aggression." 78 The Pope was not altogether opposed to Metternich's suggestion, but not eager to join the proposed league, because such a step might impair the neutrality of the Church. 76 T o Count Saint-Marsan, Metternich does not seem to have spoken as openly from the start. The Sardinian delegate was officially informed that Austria planned a defensive federation for Italy when Metternich concluded the alliance treaties with Sicily and Tuscany. 77 Austria represented the proposal to Sardinia as the safest solution for the maintenance of peace on the peninsula, and emphasized its particular benefits for the Sardinian kingdom. Saint-Marsan's reaction was encouraging, but non-committal. 78 During the following weeks, Sardinia, which had cooperated with Austria while it had been promised the acquisition of Genoa and of Savoy, suddenly became recalcitrant. Metternich ordered the Austrian envoy in Turin, Count Starhemberg, to show some firmness in pursuing his objective, and to stress once more the advantages of the proposal for Sardinia. With some impatience he added that there never had been a question of forming a federation with an emperor or a king at the head, but only of a defensive system under Austria. 79 For Metternich, the value of the entire plan lay in the official acknowledgment of Austrian leadership in Italy and the legal possibility of supervising every corner of the peninsula. Perhaps Starhemberg was a bad choice for this difficult diplomatic mission. 80 In any case, 75 Rinieri, Corrispondenza

inedita, pp. 6-7, Sept. 8, 1814.

76Ibid., p. 172, Nov. 13, 1814, Rome; p. 272, Feb. 1-11, 1815. 77 K. Grossmann, " Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes," op. cit., Ρ· 55· 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 80 Ibid., p. 57.

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he failed to convince the Sardinian government that a defensive system under Austrian direction was desirable. Sardinia feared Austrian domination, and despite the great conservatism of the Sardinian government in all domestic matters, K i n g Victor Emmanuel did not intend to preserve the territorial status quo in Italy. 81 Acceptance of Austria's proposal was made conditional upon the following terms : 1. Within the league, the king of Sardinia was to have equality of status with the Austrian emperor. 2. No separate treaties for Italian defense could be concluded by any of the participants. 3. All financial contributions were to be used in equal proportion by Sardinia and Austria. 4. The league was to be formed for ten years only. 5. Sardinia demanded a better frontier against France. 82 After this experience, Metternich's faith in Sardinia's friendship was slightly shaken, and a few months later he suspiciously alluded to the Sardinian kingdom as " the Prussia of the S o u t h . " 8 3 Yet, the plan for a federation seemed too valuable to be given up immediately. Only in the 1820's, after repeated failures to reach an agreement, did Austria abandon the idea.84 The police-league plan represents an obvious parallel to the German confederation. In both cases, Metternich tried to find a form of organization which would assure Austria of a dominant position, and which would prevent, at the same time, political unrest in an area containing many independent, small and weak states. If Austria was less hesitant to organize Ger81 Ibid., p. 58 ; and Bianchi. Storia Documentata della diplomazia Europea in Italia, I, 364, Oct. ri, 1814, p. 441, March 19, 1817, Turin. 82 Grossmann, " Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes," op. cit., Ρ· 59· 83 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822, p. 141, Dec. 1815. Metternich's remark to Stewart. 84 Grossmann, " Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes," op. cit., pp. 61-75·

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many at the Congress of Vienna than she was in the case of Italy, this can be ascribed to a few differences between the German and Italian situations. In theory at least, the German states had been more closely united than the Italian states. T h e project for German federal union was in a sense a recasting of the old imperial frame into a new form. It was also easier for Austria, as a great German power, to promote federation in Germany than in Italy. In addition, if Austria had refused to have anything to do with projects for German union, Prussia probably would have united northern Germany under her leadership, 85 and Prussia constituted a stronger rival for Austria than any of the Italian states. For these reasons it w a s more imperative to work for a German federation than for an Italian one. Still, the objective for Austria was identical in both cases. The league was to prevent national union instead of promoting it. Since Congressional negotiations about a federation tended to give the nationalists a chance to come forth into the limelight, Metternich preferred to handle the Italian league plan, which was less urgent, and more difficult to manage than its German counterpart, as a private Austrian undertaking. N o Italian committee was to complicate matters. Consequently, the treaties with Sicily and Tuscany which heralded the official beginning of the federation project, were made three days after the signing of the Final Act of the Congress, and the offer to Sardinia was delayed up to that moment. Not only historians, but contemporaries and colleagues of Metternich, have criticized Austria's Italian policy, even from the Austrian point of view, because she suppressed the nationalist unification movement instead of leading it. 8 · They believe that the mere preservation of the Italian kingdom created by Napoleon, would have aroused such enthusiasm among the Italians that Emperor Francis could easily have 85 See above, p. 60, P a r t I. 86 Lemmi, La Restaurazione Austriaca a Milano nel 1814, pp. 500-502, April 7, 1815, M i l a n ; Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 745, Dec. 26, 1814; I I , 20, Jan. 7, 1815.

ΙΘ8

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become " the true sovereign of all I t a l y . " 8 7 Metternich, in their opinion, failed not only to make friends of the Italians, but by destroying the Italian kingdom and dissolving the army, he succeeded in making enemies. 88 The problem raised by this criticism is similar to the question of Austria's relative advantage or disadvantage in accepting or rejecting the German crown. In both instances, she refused to base her rule on any kind of nationalist symbolism. Possibly, this was a double mistake. But Metternich deemed all encouragement to nationalism an equivalent to political suicide for the Habsburg empire. Moreover, Murat's enterprise had proved that the Italian nationalists were very definitely in the minority, and there seemed to be no reason to support and flatter a party which advocated Austria's decline. Nevertheless, one must distinguish between the policy which was correct or at least defensible during the Vienna Congress, and the policy which Austria pursued later on the basis of the Vienna settlement. T h e agreements concerning Italian nationalism which were reached at Vienna, were intended to be inflexible, and that was their greatest weakness. They strongly resemble an anti-revolutionary conspiracy, and show that Metternich did not believe history could move in a direction of which he disapproved, as long as Austria's police was on guard. FRANCE

Although the French government had no sympathy whatsoever with the Italian nationalist movement, its political aims in Italy were not primarily directed toward a stifling of the movement, as were those of Austria. F o r France, the destruction of Italian nationalism was merely the logical accompaniment of other more important political objectives. T o attain these, Talleyrand utilized Austria's dread of nationalism to bridge the gaps between French and Austrian policy. 87 Ibid., I I , 144-145, Feb. 5, 1815. 88 Ibid.

THE

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The Instructions Talleyrand had prepared as a guide for French policy at the Congress of Vienna disclose the very great importance France attached to the Italian settlement. Indeed, among the many political arrangements that were to be discussed, the Italian questions seem to have worried Louis X V I I I above all others. 89 As stated in the Instructions, France's objectives in Italy were twofold : first, that " no opportunity should be left to Austria to acquire for one of the princes of her house, that is to say for herself, the estates of the king of Sardinia " ; and second, " that Naples should be restored to Ferdinand I V . " 90 Concerning the point about Sardinia, France suspected that Austria would use once more her long successful policy of marriage alliances in an attempt to dominate all of Italy. Neither King Victor Emmanuel, nor his brother Charles Felix had any male heirs. Victor Emmanuel's daughter, Maria Beatrix, was married to Francis I V of Modena, one of the Austrian archdukes. Although succession of a daughter was prohibited by Salic law, France feared a complication. It was known that Victor Emmanuel and Charles Albert, his nearest male relative, were not on the best of terms, and according to political rumors there was a possibility that the law might be altered in favor of Maria Beatrix. 91 Having an incomplete insight into the policies of both Austria and Sardinia, a modification of the law seemed all the more probable to France, because it could be observed that the two governments cooperated admirably well during the Paris-Vienna period. For reasons of political balance, France was absolutely opposed to a further increase of Austrian power in Italy. The 89 Talleyrand, Memoirs,

II, 183.

90 Ibid. 91 Srbik, Metternich, I, 208 f. For England this was a subordinate point. See: Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 535, Jan. 13, 1815, London. Bathurst to Wellington : " The king of Sardinia has an only daughter, married to Archduke Francis. The succession is likely to be disputed between her and her uncle, unless previously arranged. It was Lord Castlereagh's intention to bring it before Congress. Has he done s o ? "

IIO

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French delegate therefore intended to convince Austria that such an increase was against her interests, and that Sardinia should remain independent and be strengthened. 92 If Austria would dominate all of Italy, he argued, the Italian independence movement would be promoted, for " once united in a body, Italy, by whatever right she belonged to Austria, would escape h e r ; not sooner or later, but in a very few years, perhaps in a few months, and Austria would have acquired her only to lose her." 9 8 On the other hand, if Italy were " divided into non-confederate states, she would not be susceptible to a real, but only to a relative, independence, which consists in submitting not to one influence only but to several." 9 4 T h e French government was quite correct in assuming that Austria wanted to rule the entire Italian peninsula. Still, the attempt to include Sardinia in the Austrian " system " was not made by pressing for an alteration in the inheritance laws of the House of Savoy, but through a federation proposal for all of Italy after the termination of the Congress. Fortunately for France, the federation never came into being, and the Sardinian succession was regulated by the Congress of Vienna " f r o m male to male by order of primogeniture in the two branches of the House." 9 5 T h e Congress also agreed to the incorporation of Genoa which strengthened the Sardinian kingdom, and was approved by France as a further balance against Austria. 9 8 In the Neapolitan negotiations, Talleyrand also utilized the nationalist danger to forge a link between French and Austrian policy. T h e removal of Murat was of capital importance to Louis X V I I I because Murat barred the throne to a legitimate 92 Talleyrand, Memoirs, 93 Ibid.,

II, 150, 176-177.

pp. 173-174·

94 Ibid., p. 174. 95 Angeberg, III, 1423, June 9, 1815. 96 Talleyrand, Memoirs.

II, 177.

T H E C O N G R E S S AND I T A L I A N

NATIONALISM

III

Bourbon ruler.97 The French crown had been returned to King Louis on the basis of the theory that the Bourbons were the legitimate sovereigns of France. As long as this principle was not recognized for Ferdinand I V at Naples, Louis felt insecure. He knew that the Allies had been ready for a long time to conclude peace with Napoleon and to forget the Bourbon dynasty.98 When the Vienna assembly met, the cement of legitimacy had not yet hardened under the newly repaired French throne, and the possibility of Murat's recognition by the Congress as King of Naples seemed to Louis X V I I I a direct challenge to his own royal rights. Another reason against Murat's presence at Naples was given by Louis personally when he urged his plenipotentiary " never to lose sight of the fact that if there exists a resource for Bonaparte it is in Italy, and through Murat. Therefore, delenda est Cartago." 99 Metternich's sphinx-like attitude toward Naples exasperated Talleyrand. He exerted himself to solve the enigma by observing Metternich as closely as possible, and it was with a feeling of satisfaction that he reported to his court at the beginning of November how " the embarrassment of Prince Metternich was very plain when we were on the subject of Naples. It must be attributed to the fear with which the public spirit inspires him, as well as to the dislike the Italians have for Austrian domination, and to the influence Murat exercises over the Jacobins of Italy, particularly over those of the former Kingdom of Italy." 100 In the process of proving to his colleagues that Murat represented an obvious menace to the peace of Europe, the French delegate compared the German and Italian nationalist movements. Both, he stressed, were revolutionary manifestations. In Germany, Prussia was leading the revolution, and in Italy, 97 Ibid., pp. 118-124, 175. 98Angeberg, I, 109 ff. Congress of Chatillon, Feb. 17-March 9, 1814. 99 Talleyrand, Memoirs,

II, 358, Dec. 10, 1814, Paris.

100 Ibid., p. 297, Nov. 26, 1814.

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Murat. Hence to enact the principle of legitimacy in favor of the king of Saxony and Ferdinand of Sicily, was the only way to stop the revolution. In a note to Castlereagh, Talleyrand defended his case with passion : The Revolution has not ended. What should be done to terminate it? The principle of legitimacy must triumph without restriction, the king and the kingdom of Saxony must be preserved, and the kingdom of Naples must be returned to its legitimate sovereign. Without this the Revolution would subsist.... The Treaty of Paris and the work of the Congress would only have suspended it. There would be an armistice, but no real peace.101 When Talleyrand had obtained no positive results by the end of December, Louis X V I I I himself impatiently approached Metternich on the subject of Naples. One of his ministers was sent to the Austrian ambassador in Paris, and the latter informed Metternich of the content of their conversation : . . . Italy will never be firmly in Austria's hands, the minister told me emphatically, and Louis XVIII will never be safe on his throne, as long as Murat gives shelter to the discontented of all countries, and could in twice twenty-four hours place his brother-in-law at their head. We know . . . that he is the supporter of the discontented elements in Italy and France. Please inform Prince Metternich that the King addresses himself to him directly to recommend the cause of justice and legitimacy," and that there would be " no sacrifice which the King would not make with pleasure in order to remove Murat from Naples.102 When Murat, through his own recknessness, practically restored Naples to Ferdinand IV, Talleyrand described this event as consecrating " anew by a striking instance the prin101 Angeberg, II, 570-571, Dec. 26, 1814. 102 Weil, Le revirement de la politique autrichienne . . . , pp. 398-399, Dec. 23, 1814, Paris. Bombelles to Metternich.

T H E CONGRESS A N D I T A L I A N N A T I O N A L I S M

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loa

ciple of legitimacy." F o r France, a unified state, possessing no Italian land, Italian nationalism was not a direct danger. The French government did not have to worry about the presence of nationalism inside France, and, unlike Austria, did not condemn the nationalist principle in itself.104 Nationalism was regarded as menace only when it appeared as a political instrument in the hands of a foreign power and could be directed against France. Talleyrand did not oppose Murat primarily because of his alliance with the unification idea which was Metternich's chief objection to him. In the opinion of the French government the deciding factor against Murat was that he belonged to the Bonaparte dynasty. That, far more than his association with Italian nationalism, made him a Revolutionary in the eyes of Louis X V I I I . Murat's association with Italian nationalism even proved a rather fortunate circumstance for France, because it rendered Austria willing to destroy King Louis' Carthage. ENGLAND

In England there were two main streams of opinion on the subject of Italian nationalism: that of the conservative government, and that of the liberal Whigs. The British government did not regard the Italian unification movement as a direct peril to the British empire, but opposed it mainly because it interfered with the plans of the Foreign Minister for establishing a durable equilibrium on the continent. Both of Castlereagh's alternative plans for European balance required that there should be an alliance between Austria and Great Britain, and that Austria should expand in Italy. 105 These two 103 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 213. 104 Unless Talleyrand referred to the dangers of the Revolution meaning all the new political, social, and economic ideas together, for political purposes, he distinguished between democratic ideas and nationalism, while Metternich thought of both as jacobinism. See above, pp. 68-69. 105 See above, p. 73.

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prerequisites excluded any official support of Italian nationalism on the part of England. The Whigs registered their disapproval of this official policy throughout the period of the Congress of Vienna. Their information and knowledge of Italian politics was meager, but they were enthusiastically in favor of the Italian independence movement, and unanimously condemned Austrian rule in Italy. 106 Aside from being very emotional about Italian national independence, they championed with equal fervor the cause of Genoese independence against incorporation into Sardinia-Piedmont. 107 The two Italian problems which aroused particular interest in England were the fate of Genoa and the ownership of Naples. Concerning Genoa, the disagreement was complete and unbridgeable. The Whigs were intent upon maintaining Genoa independent, and the Tories believed in fortifying Sardinia. 108 Neither side seemed to see that Italian nationalism was involved in the settlement. The Whigs constantly referred to Italian unification and Genoese independence in one breath, as if no opposition existed between the two ideas, and Castlereagh never thought of advocating union between Genoa and Sardinia-Piedmont for the sake of Italian unification. H e sponsored the annexation for the sake of European equilibrium. 109 In part the attitude of both Whigs and Tories can be understood as a result of the transitional political atmosphere of the time. The Genoese, for example, thought of themselves as a nation without attaching much importance 106 Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, X X I X , 730-735, Feb. 13, 1815, p. 946 ff., Feb. 21, 1615. Sir Robert Wilson, Private Diary, II, 367-368, May 9, 1814, p. 370, May 13, 1814, p. 371, May 18, 1814, Milan. Gallavresi, " La rivoluzione lombarda del 1814 e la politica inglese," op. cit., pp. 97-166, passim. Especially noteworthy is a letter from Lord Bentinck to Castlereagh, pp. 140-141, May 1, 1814, Genoa. 107 Ibid. 108 Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, X X I X & X X X . See especially debates of Feb. 13 and Feb. 21 and March 20, 1815. 109 Castlereagh, Memoirs

and Correspondence,

I, 36, March 20, 1815.

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II5

110

to the Italian nationality. In part both Whigs and Tories failed to think deeply or logically about the entire political significance of the course they were advocating. During the negotiations dealing with Genoa, Castlereagh was able to disregard the cleavage in Parliament and English public opinion, because his decisions did not depend upon British financial aid, and did not involve the risk of war. At the very beginning of the Congress he agreed formally to the annexation. 111 Defending this act against Whig criticism, he stated that The powers assembled in Congress at Vienna decided wisely with respect to Europe, and rightly with respect to Genoa; . . . in fact, it was a resolution calculated to conduce to the happiness of the Genoese, and to the general welfare and security of Europe. It was held to be a point of so much importance to Europe, that I have no objection to state that the union of Genoa and Piedmont was looked upon as a matter determined by the allied powers before they quitted Paris. 112 It was Castlereagh's sincere opinion that through fortifying Sardinia, Italy would be more secure against French invasions. 118 Peace in Italy was a prerequisite of peace in Europe, 110 Angeberg, II, 511, Dec. io, 1814, pp. 569-570, Dec. 26, 1814, Genoa. See also the letters written by the Genoese delegate, Pareto, to Lord Castlereagh. Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, XXX, 396-398, May l i and May 18, 1814, Paris. The following passage from the May 18th letter is typical of Genoese political opinion : " . . . it is not always the extent which forms the power of states : true power consists in union, concord, and national spirit.—This spirit certainly could not exist in the amalgamation of two peoples, Genoese and Piedmontese, divided by their character, their habits, and by an invincible antipathy—the fruit of two centuries of political quarrels. Vain would be the attempt to make them one nation." 111 Angeberg, II, 434-427, Nov. 13, 1814. 112 Castlereagh, Memoirs (Italics mine.) 113 Ibid., p. 44.

and Correspondence,

I, 36, March 20, 1815.

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VIENNA

and therefore the solution could be upheld as sound and beneficial. Furthermore, although Castlereagh also stressed before the House of Commons that England herself would have profited if Genoa had remained " an insulated commercial republic," 114 but that England "had sacrificed her interests for the sake of general security," 1 1 5 the end of Genoa's independence did not seriously affect any m a j o r British interests. T h e decision was of such nature that a British foreign minister w h o believed in a policy of solidarity with the continental powers, and whose country was victorious, safe, and satiated, could pursue without incurring the risk of appearing positively unpatriotic. In the case of Naples it was more difficult for Castlereagh to demonstrate why Europe would benefit if Murat were replaced by a stupid, vindictive, reactionary Bourbon king. For the British delegate this problem was especially complicated, because war could have been the result of any action against Murat, and the majority of Englishmen did not deem the restoration of Naples worth a penny or a drop of blood. W h i g and T o r y sentiment often flowed together on this issue. Most Englishmen considered the return of the Bourbons to Naples as re-establishing French influence in southern Italy, a consequence they were glad to avoid. T h e W h i g s had the additional complaint that Britain was breaking her word in opposing Murat, since they considered Bentinck's pro-nationalist Italian declarations as having been fully authorized. They charged in the House of Commons that Italian prisoners were enrolled in the British army "with the express promise that they would have to contend for the independence of Italy. E v e n the particular man [sic] was named w h o was to be placed at the head of Italy as an independent nation "116 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, X X I X , 946, Feb. 31, 1815.

THE

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II7

The government, and Lord Castlereagh in particular, were accused of being a party to " the dismemberment of Italy." 117 Castlereagh in Vienna received one note after another from Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister, warning him not to take any action against Murat which might involve the risk of armed intervention. 118 As negotiations proceeded, Liverpool's letters became more and more insistent on that point, and shortly before Castlereagh was expected to return to London, the Prime Minister assured him that after a stay of less than three days in that city he would be thoroughly convinced of the absolute impracticability of our engaging in military operations for the purpose of driving Murat from the throne of Naples. The truth in that the country is at this moment peace-mad. Many of our best friends think of nothing but the reduction of taxes and low establishments.... After such a contest for twenty years, one must Jet people taste something of the blessings of peace, before one can expect fairly to screw them up to a war spirit, even in a just cause.119 Castlereagh, who had become thoroughly convinced in Vienna that Murat's presence at Naples constituted a serious threat to the Austrian empire, was intent upon his removal. 120 The British delegate did not feel the same anxiety as Metternich over the nationalist problem, yet he understood Metternich's position in this case. Moreover, Castlereagh's own conservatism made the realization of Austria's wishes appear rather desirable to him. 117 Ibid., p. 737, Feb. 13, 1815. 118 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 497, Dec. 23, 1814, p. 550, Jan. 27, 1815. T o Wellington Liverpool wrote similarly, pp. 517-518, Dec. 31, 1814, London. Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, X, pp. 243244, Jan. π , 1815, London. 119 Wellington, London.

Supplementary

Despatches,

IX,

573,

Feb.

20,

1815,

120 Ibid., pp. 488-489, Dec. 18, 1814, Memorandum concerning Murat.

Il8

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During the spring of 1 8 1 4 upon learning of Bentinck's different proclamations, Castlereagh had complained to Liverpool that Lord Bentinck was " intolerably prone to W h i g revolution everywhere," and that " his mismanagement [had] at least doubled all the natural dangers of Murat's rascality H e [Bentinck] seems bent upon throwing all Italy loose. This might be well as against France, but against Austria and the king of Sardinia, with all the new constitutions which now menace the world with fresh convulsions, it is most absurd." 121 T h e phraseology of the complaint is noteworthy because it reveals the difference between Castlereagh's and Metternich's conservatism. Characteristically the British foreign minister used the expression " W h i g revolution " where Metternich would have spoken of jacobinism. The latter was a more serious problem for the Austrian diplomat than the " absurd " ideas of the W h i g s were for Castlereagh. A liberal parliamentary opposition, liberal ideas, nationalist aspirations, were for the British delegate a normal, though disturbing, part of political life. Castlereagh could not think of imprisoning the opposition. Metternich was not only thinking of it, but used that method very frequently for the sake of peace and order. Since Castlereagh did not consider the Italians ready for a national constitution, 122 and since he wanted to protect Austria, he was willing to follow Metternich's lead in all matters of Italian policy. Only English public opinion blocked the way. Lord Bentinck, according to orders, ceased to make statements in favor of Italian independence, and in October 1814, after a complaint of the Austrian government, all British officials in Italy were once more instructed " to entertain no relations with all those who might show a tendency contrary to the Austrian government," and to uphold " Austrian prin121 Ibid., p. 64, May 5, 1814, Paris. 122 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, I, i8, May 7, 1814, Paris. Castlereagh to Bentinck, p. 34, March 20, 1815, London.

THE

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123

ciples by all the means at their disposal." Yet English tourists in Italy continued to express their opinions freely, 124 and England itself remained divided on the issue. At the Congress of Vienna the Duke of Campo-Chiario, Murat's representative, attempted to win Castlereagh as ally, and hinted in a private discussion that Murat's means of resistance would be " very formidable " if he were " driven to appeal to the Italian spirit." 125 The British delegate was forced to be entirely neutral in all official discussions, and Gentz observed correctly that Castlereagh seemed " to walk on eggs " whenever the subject of Naples was mentioned. 126 Talleyrand, who had done his very best to enlighten the British delegation about the importance of legitimacy, concluded in a disappointed tone that it was " a principle which touches them but very slightly. It is the man they detest in Murat, more than the usurper." 127 Without detesting Murat, and despite his official neutrality, Castlereagh went as far as he could in the preparations for Murat's overthrow. Immediately after the first interview with Campo-Chiario, he wrote to the English envoy at Naples, asking him " to procure correct information as to the internal state of the kingdom of Naples; the extent of the force capable of being brought forward, and the presumable disposition of the nation of being placed under the old family, if solemnly assured by the Allies against a vindictive system." 128 Furthermore, Castlereagh seems to have decided, in conjunction with Metternich, that once written proof of Murat's treacherous intentions toward the Allies had been 123 Lemmi, La Restaurazione Austriaca a Milano, p. 448, Oct. 12, 1814. Metternich to Bellegarde. 124 Ibid, and Lemmi, " Gioacchino Murat e le aspirazione unitarie nel 1815," op. cit., p. 186. 125 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, Χ, 145, Oct. 2, 1814. 126 Metternich, Mémoires, II, 500-501, Feb. 12, 1815. 127 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 46, Feb. 15, 1815. 128 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, X, 146, Oct. 2, 1814.

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assembled, one could take measures against him with a good conscience and a minimum of risk. Both statesmen were convinced that such proof could be found. 129 On his return voyage to London, the British minister, though still unable to commit his own government, acted as Metternich's personal messenger in Paris, and informed Louis X V I I I that Austria would actively assist in restoring the king of Sicily at Naples. 180 At the same time, Castlereagh wrote to his successor at the Congress a letter containing the following remark : " You will perceive by the enclosed that the difficulties in England upon the point of Naples are still serious, but I consider the possibility of a concert with Austria as placing the question upon wholly new grounds." 131 Castlereagh's persuasive powers might have failed, if Napoleon had not escaped from Elba. A few days after this unexpected event, Castlereagh again wrote to Wellington, this time from London, that there was no longer any obstacle to Ferdinand's restoration as king of Naples : " The intelligence received from your Grace of Murat's recent conduct, coupled with Bonaparte's descent in France, has removed all remaining scruples on the part of the British government. They consider that Murat has forfeited every claim, and that there is no safety, especially for Austria, while he is at Naples. They are therefore prepared to enter into a concert for his removal." 182 Italian nationalism only played an indirect part in the decision, through the British government's final appreciation of the danger which the nationalist movement, headed by Murat, represented for Austria. A week later, when Castlereagh defended his Italian policy before Parliament, he denied that the Allies had ever had the 129 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, 497, Dec. 23, 1814, London. Liverpool to Castlereagh, p. 526, Jan. 4, 1815. Castlereagh to Liverpool. 130 Ibid., p. 583, Feb. 28, 1815. Castlereagh to Wellington, Paris. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid., p. 592, March 12, 1815.

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121

plan to establish an independent Italy, and asserted that the Italians had every reason to be thankful to the great powers for freeing them from the yoke of Bonaparte, especially since they " did not raise an arm in their own cause." 133 Most important of all, the British foreign minister stressed that "no man acquainted with the state of Europe, either now, or at any former period, could support for a moment, with any show of reason, the position that our alliance with Austria admitted of the possibility of maintaining Italy independent as a separate k i n g d o m . " 1 3 4 In Castlereagh's opinion the continent could not come to rest, unless Great Britain and Austria cooperated to establish a certain balance of power scheme in which an independent Italy had no function, and would probably prove a disturbing factor. SUMMARY

The cause of Italian national unification was faced with three different kinds of opposition in 1814-15. First, the majority of the Italian people was either uninterested or opposed to nationalist theories. Secondly, the general political apathy which followed twenty years of war and excitement barred the w a y to a successful nationalist crusade. And thirdly, the opinions and resulting actions of Austria, France, and England during the Vienna conferences were designed to stifle the Italian nationalist movement. It was neither blindness, nor ignorance, nor indifference, which led the three governments to disregard the wishes of the Italian nationalists. Their decisions were guided by more or less logical political calculations, and by fear of varying degrees of intensity. The formation of a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom under Austrian rule, the restoration of Tuscany to Archduke Ferdinand, the restoration of Modena to Archduke Francis, and the return of most of the former Church posses133 Castlereagh, Memoirs 134 Ibid., P. 35.

and Correspondence,

I, 34, M a r c h 20, 1815.

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135

sions into the hands of the Pope, were all intended to some extent as barriers to the march of jacobinism. Austria's desires dominated the decisions, and for Austria the growth of Italian nationalism implied the decline of the Habsburg empire. Metternich was aided in his policy by Talleyrand and Castlereagh because for the French delegate the necessity of defending the principle of legitimacy coincided with the necessity of removing the leader of Italian nationalism from Naples, while the British delegate regarded AngloAustrian cooperation and Austrian expansion in Italy as cornerstones of European peace. The annexation of Genoa by Sardinia-Piedmont, which Metternich considered an investment against Italian nationalism, was approved by Talleyrand as an insurance against Italian unification under Austria, and by Castlereagh as a means of shielding Italy against France. The Congress of Vienna had hardly ended when the Österreichische Beobachter, the most important Viennese newspaper, dropped its column headed Italy,1" and at once celebrated and reflected the triumph of Metternich's policy by naming henceforth only the individual Italian states. 135 Angeberg, III, 1424-1428, Final Act. June 9, 1815. See also the Austrian imperial declaration on the formation of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, pp. 1045-1047, April 7, 1815. 136 Helfert, Kaiser Frans I von Österreich, first time on June 13, 1815.

p. 254. This happened the

CHAPTER II THE CONGRESS AND POLISH NATIONALISM INTRODUCTION

THE problem of Poland facing the Congress of Vienna differed from the two previous cases in one important respect. Less than half a century before the Vienna assembly met, Poland had been an independent kingdom, ranking third in size and fourth in population among the states of Europe. 1 The establishment of a Polish state would therefore not have introduced something radically new into the European political system, but could be accounted, on the contrary, as an act of restoration, if the diplomats so desired. Among the Polish nobility there was great unanimity of thought on the question of their political resurrection. Almost all contemporary reports, whether given by Poles or by allied statesmen, or by the many persons who were observed and questioned by the Austrian secret police, testify that the majority of Poles became enthusiastic at the mere mentioning of a kingdom of Poland. 2 The reports agree that it was relatively unimportant to the Poles who would help them to re1 R. H. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Cambridge, 1915, pp. 2526. The book contains an excellent historical introduction.—Useful material on the years just preceding the Congress of Vienna is also contained in: Baron de Bignon, Souvenirs d'un Diplomate, Paris, 1864; Les Mémoires du Prince Adam Csartoryski, ed. by Ch. Mazade, Paris, 1887, 2 vols. ; L. Chodzko, Histoire des Légions Polonaises en Italie, 2nd ed., Paris, 1829, 2 vols. ; A. Mansuy, Jérôme Napoléon et la Pologne en 1812, Paris, 1930 ; M. von Oginski, Denkwürdigkeiten über Polen und die Polen, Leipzig, 1827 ; Memoirs of the Countess Potocka, Tr. by L. Strachey, N e w York, 1900; Rüther, Napoleon und die Polen, Hamburg, 1901. 2 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 45, Aug. 3, 18114, p. 128, Sept. 27, 1814, p. 222, Oct. 5, 1814, pp. 356-357. Oct. 22, 1814. References to " the Poles " in contemporary reports generally designate the Polish nobility. ' N o sizeable Polish middle class existed, and the peasants had nothing to say.

123

124

THE ATTITUDE

OF T H E

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build an independent Polish state, so long as a political Poland again came into existence. 8 D u r i n g the war it had seemed at first as if Napoleon might re-establish Poland as a political entity. In 1806 the hopes of the Poles had risen high when the French emperor took a step in the desired direction and created the grand-duchy of W a r s a w from Prussia's Polish provinces. F o r the first time since the partition of 1795 a small part of Poland existed again. T h e grand-duchy of W a r s a w was not independent, since Napoleon was its protector, but to many Poles its establishment was a promise of the future resurrection of Poland as an independent state. Their hopes were intensified in 1809 when, after the defeat of Austria, the grand-duchy was enlarged with Austria's Polish territory. Although the Polish nobility had no sympathy whatever with the principles of the Code Napoleon, and did not feel the slightest enthusiasm at the thought of liberating their serfs, 4 they were willing to acquiesce in almost anything which seemed to promote the resurrection of their country. 8 Napoleon himself deemed the duchy of W a r s a w conveniently located as an eastern outpost, and Polish soldiers a useful addition to the army which was to conquer all of Europe. Y e t even during the period of French expansion when victory after victory heightened the prestige and the glory of the French emperor, a small group of Poles had staked their hopes on Russia. Leading among them was Prince

Adam

Czartoryski, a member of one of Poland's oldest and most distinguished families. T h e alliance between this family and Russia was not new. Czartoryski's uncle, Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, the last king of Poland, had been one of the 3 Ibid., p. 126, Sept. 27, 1814 ; M. Handelsman, Instructions et Dépêches des Résidents de France à Varsovie, Cracow, 1914, 2 vols., II, 427, March 21, 1813, Cracow. 4 Ibid., I, 308, April 8, 1811, Warsaw. 5 Oginski, Denkwürdigkeiten, p. 270; Bignon, Souvenirs, p. 214.

THE

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POLISH

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I25

favorites of Catherine the Great.® Stanislas A u g u s t u s had not possessed the strength to protect Poland from Catherine's greediness, but his nephew, Prince A d a m , believed that through the friendship between himself and the Russian tsar Poland might be rebuilt. T h e Tsar's education through the liberal L a Harpe, his idealistic leanings, his desire to be magnanimous, all contributed to raise the expectations of the patriotic Polish prince, and encouraged him to submit plans for Poland's liberation to the T s a r . F o r a brief time, f r o m 1805 to 1806, Czartoryski was Alexander's foreign minister. D u r i n g this year, while Napoleon was planning to erect the grand-duchy of W a r s a w , the Prince addressed a memorandum to the T s a r which was entitled: " O n the Necessity of reestablishing Poland to forestall B o n a p a r t e . " 7 T h e argument of the memorandum was that Russia, instead of letting Napoleon make use of Poland against her, should turn Poland against Napoleon. A s a first measure the T s a r should proclaim himself king of an independent Polish state. Since Russia possessed the lion's share of partitioned Poland such a step was entirely possible. Czartoryski reasoned that such a proclamation would not only create military advantages for Russia, but great political ones, because it would be much more difficult for Napoleon to invade Russia through a pro-Russian Poland. T h e memorandum then proceeded to calm any Russian worries that Alexander's proclamation of Poland's independence might lead to the separation of Poland from the Russian empire : This separation would only be apparent, not real. The crown of Poland would be irrevocably united to the throne of Russia ; and the Empire would gain the remainder of Poland at the same time N o doubt in order to produce the desired effect of inflaming the enthusiasm of the Poles, it would β Czartoryski, Mémoires, I, see introduction. Stanislas Augustus was also an uncle of the famous Polish general, Joseph Poniatowski, who fought under Napoleon for Poland's liberation. 7 Ibid., II, 148, Dec. 5, 1806, St. Petersburg.

I2Ó

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF V I E N N A

be necessary to give them a government in conformity with their wishes and their ancient laws.... But these benefits would render the bond between the Empire and the Polish nation stronger and more indissoluble. The more a nation is governed in conformity with its wishes, its character, and its habits, the more devoted it is to its rulers.8 Czartoryski, in this document, reveals himself not merely as a Polish patriot, but as a clever politician. The Tsar was not ready to break with Napoleon at that time, and did not accept Czartoryski's scheme, but his Polish friend continued none the less to remind him that to undertake the liberation of Poland would be an act of double value: " equally magnanimous and politic." ® Five years later Alexander declared himself ready and eager to become Poland's liberator. 10 Czartoryski's enthusiasm, Napoleon's policy, strategic calculations, and Alexander's vanity, all played a part in persuading him to act in the interest of Polish patriotism. To understand Alexander's decisions before, during, and after the Congress of Vienna, it is indispensable to know that the Tsar loved to think of himself as the heroic savior of Europe, a knight in shining armor, the leader of a moral revolution. It was at times his sincere wish to correct past misdeeds through his generous and benevolent influence, in fact to lift the whole of European politics to a higher plane. But confronted by any difficulties or differences of opinion he became vacillating. In 1811 the first item on the Tsar's heroic agenda was by necessity the defeat of Napoleon. Alexander now agreed with Prince Adam that this undertaking would be very much facilitated if the Poles were willing to join Russia also in that part of Poland which had not been occupied by Russia previously. Announcing to Czartoryski his intention to liberate 8 ibid., pp. IS3-I54, Dec. 5, 1806. 9 Ibid., p. 150, Dec. 5, 1806. 10 Ibid., pp. 271-273, Czartoryski.

Jan. 31,

ιβιι,

St.

Petersburg,

Alexander

to

T H E CONGRESS AND

POLISH

NATIONALISM

I2J

Poland, Alexander stated that " being reinforced by 50,000 P o l e s . . . . and by 50,000 Prussians who could then also join me without running a risk, I could advance to the Oder without striking a blow." 1 1 Y e t during the war no attempt was made to create a Polish kingdom. Instead, Alexander deemed it convenient to promise a small piece of Western Poland to Prussia, with which he entered into alliance in February 1813. 12 In June of that same year, the Russo-Prussian alliance was enlarged to include Austria, and the three powers agreed in the Treaty of Reichenbach that the grand-duchy of Warsaw, the only section of Poland which did not belong to one of them at this moment, was to be distributed between them at the end of the war. 18 In 1814, when the Allies were victorious, Alexander's thoughts returned to the liberation of Poland, and amidst the celebration of the victory in Paris he announced that it was his firm intention to become the constitutional king of a regenerated Polish state. 14 There were several possible approaches to the Polish question in 1814. One was to recognize the natural or historic right of the Poles to an independent nation-state, and to reestablish their political existence within the frontiers of 1772; 1793, or at least 1809, the year when the Napoleonic grandduchy of Warsaw reached its largest territorial extent. Such a solution would have been the most desirable from the Polish viewpoint. Another possibility was to disregard nationalist aspirations completely, and to divide the duchy of Warsaw once more among Russia, Austria, and Prussia, as had been provided by the Treaty of Reichenbach. A third possible solution was 11 Ibid., p. 374. 12 Angeberg, I, 1, Feb. 16/28, 1813, Kalish. 13 F. Martens, Recueil des Traités et Conventions Conclus par la Russie et les Puissances Étrangères, St. Petersburg, 1876, III, 1808-1615, p. 107, June 19-July ι, 1813, Reichenbach. 14Gentz, Oesterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen, Memorandum, Aug. 18, 1814, Potocka, Memoirs, p. 227.

pp. 391-392.

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T H E ATTITUDE OF T H E CONGRESS OF V I E N N A

the creation of a Polish kingdom composed of the duchy of Warsaw and Russia's Polish provinces, and linked to Russia by personal union. This scheme represented a compromise between the two others, and involved a limited recognition of the principle of nationality. It was this last plan which Alexander proposed at Paris and later at the Congress of Vienna. RUSSIA

The Russian government, and the Russian nobility in general, were alarmed over the Tsar's plan to transform Russian Poland, together with the duchy of Warsaw, into a separate state, and to govern it under a constitution. Court circles at St. Petersburg feared to lose Poland through this method, and objected to the introduction of constitutional government into a section of the Empire. 18 Despite Russian opposition, the Tsar had appointed Czartoryski as his chief adviser on Polish affairs, and appeared in Vienna with the best intentions to become Poland's liberator and to satisfy Russian interests at the same time. 18 At first, Alexander seemed to recognize no obstacles to his project. H e welcomed the Poles gathered in Vienna in a most charming manner. A Polish lady, who upon being introduced to him, presented herself as a Russian subject, was told by Alexander : " You are not my subject. The Poles are my compatriots. W e are but one nation ; we have the same language, the same habits, the same interests." 17 All objections that were raised against the Tsar's Polish policy by the assembled diplomats who dreaded that the very substantial increase to Russia's European territory would render Russia's strength in Europe dangerous, and that the establishment of a Polish kingdom would stir up trouble in Austria's and Prussia's 15Bignon, Souvenirs, p. 324, Jan. 1, 1813. Alexander to Czartoryski. Weil, Des dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 8, June 25, 1814. De Maistre, Correspondance Diplomatique, II, 40-41, Jan. 21-Fefo. 2, 1815. 16 Gentz, Dépêches inédites, I, 106, Sept. 28, 1814. 17 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, I, 534, Nov. 15, 1814.

T H E CONGRESS AND POLISH

NATIONALISM

I2Ç

Polish provinces, were answered by the Tsar with two kinds of arguments. The first was brief and decisive. " I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw," he said, " let them drive me out if they can ! " 18 The second argument was based upon Alexander's " moral duty." 19 " If it were merely a question of territory," he explained to Castlereagh, " he would yield without a struggle, but it involved the happiness of the Poles, and the people would never forgive his ceding them." 20 According to the Tsar, apprehension concerning the effects of an enflamed Polish nationalism was entirely superfluous. On the contrary, the erection of a Polish kingdom was the safest means to calm Polish agitation and to conciliate all interests. 21 In a memorandum which visibly bears Czartoryski's imprint, Alexander asserted that no force in existence was better suited to guarantee universal peace in Europe, than " this power of cohesion that is derived from the attachment of a people for its native soil, and from the feeling of happiness." 22 As negotiations proceeded, the Tsar's plan for Poland's liberation underwent a considerable transformation, and lost a good deal of its initial glamor. It proved to be impossible to combine Russian interests with any kind of moral duty toward the Poles. The Tsar was forced to recall that it was no trifling matter to incur the displeasure of the Russian nobility. The assassination of his father constituted the most recent expression of their dissatisfaction with a head of state. Torn between two kinds of interests and two different loyalties, 18 Talleyrand, Memoirs,

II, 277, Oct. 25, 1814. To Louis XVIII.

19 Webster, England and the Polish-Saxon Problem at the Congress of Vienna, Royal Historical Society Transactions, London, 1913, 3rd series, VII, 75-76, Oct. 1814. Expression used by Castlereagh. 20 Ibid. 21 Angeberg, II, 357, Oct. 30, 1814, Alexander to Castlereagh. 22 Ibid., p. 798, Jan. 19, 1815.

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Alexander wavered back and forth. The split was so evident and so deep, that it could be felt daily by all those who came into contact with him. T o Austria's secret police, Alexander's behavior toward his subordinates served as a kind of barometer of the changing political currents within the Russian delegation. They observed for example that Baron Anstett, a member of the Tsar's diplomatic staff, was ignored by Alexander from September until the end of October, because he had asserted that the Tsar was doing more for the Poles than for the Russians. 23 Then followed a few days of harmony, but all through November Anstett was made to feel that he was still in disgrace. 24 By December there were signs that Alexander was ready to forgive, and in January Baron Anstett was back in favor. 26 The Anstett affair was one example among many of a conflict which appeared insoluble. The Tsar became weary of it, and embarked upon a policy of concessions to Russia.2® He gave up the idea of joining Russia's Polish lands with the duchy of Warsaw. The Duchy alone was to be established as a Polish kingdom. 27 In addition, Alexander named his brother, Grand-duke Constantine, to the post of military governor over the duchy of Warsaw. 2 8 Constantine shared none of his brother's liberal enthusiasm, but agreed with the political views 23 Weil, Les dessous du Congris de Vienne, I, 109, September 25, 1814, 343, Oct. 20, 1814, p. 433. Oct. 29, 1814. 2ilbid.,

pp. 512-515. Nov. 12, 1814, p. 712, Dec. 22, 1814.

25 Ibid., II, 5, Jan. 5, 1815. 26Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 321, Nov. 17, 1814. Alexander to Talleyrand: " I desired at Paris the restoration of Poland, and you approved of it. I desire it still, as a man, and as always being faithful to liberal ideas, which I will never abandon. But in my position, the desire I have as a man cannot guide me as sovereign. Perhaps the day will come when Poland again will be set upon a footing of complete independence. At present it cannot be thought of." 27 Metternich, Mémoires,

II, 487, Feb. 12, 1815.

28Gentz, Briefe von und an Friedrich

Gents, III, 297, April 25, 1814.

THE

CONGRESS

AND

POLISH

NATIONALISM

I3I

nobility. 29

prevalent among the Russian T h e Poles were acquainted with his opinions, and already a long time before the Congress of Vienna, Czartoryski had been afraid that Constantine might be installed as ruler over Poland. 80 T h e Grand-duke's appointment was part and parcel of Alexander's impossible attempt to please the party of Constantine as well as the fellow-countrymen of Czartoryski. But the Tsar did not want to abandon the plan for a Polish kingdom entirely after having promised so much. Poland would have hated him, and Europe would have laughed at him. H e was forced to grope his way to a solution that would save his face, and permit him to remain Tsar of all the Russias. Finally, on May 3rd, 1815, the birthday of Poland's reformed constitution of 1791, Alexander succeeded in concluding treaties with Austria and Prussia which settled the Polish question among the three powers. A few weeks later, he proclaimed an outline of the constitution he intended t o grant Poland. T h e frontiers of the Kingdom were fixed as those of the Napoleonic duchy of W a r s a w , with the exception of some districts that had been returned to Austria and Prussia. 8 1 Russian Poland remained separate. T h e town of Cracow, situated just outside of the new Polish state, between Austrian and Prussian territory, was to be a free city. W h e n Austria had claimed this town for herself, the T s a r had insisted on keeping Cracow neutral, as it was the town in which the Polish kings were buried. 82 The economic unity of ancient Poland was restored in principle by provisions establishing free navigation on all Polish rivers within the frontiers of 1772, and permitting free circulation of goods within the same area. 33 29 Potocka, Memoirs,

p. 235.

30 Bignon, Souvenirs,

pp. 319-320.

31 Angeberg, III, 1224-1226, May 25, 1815. 32 Webster, British reagh to Liverpool.

Diplomacy

1S13-1815,

3 3 A n g e b e r g , III, 1151-1152, May 3, 1815.

p. 259, Dec. 17, 1814. Castle-

I32

THE

ATTITUDE

OF T H E

CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

T h e economic measures, like most of the political ones, were to remain a dead letter. T h e new kingdom of Poland was described in the Constitutional Charter as " irrevocably united to the Russian empire,"

34

and belonging t o " the E m p e r o r of all the Russias

and his heirs and successors in perpetuity."

3S

Further, the

Constitution determined that all public offices, civil as well as military, were t o be occupied exclusively by Poles, 3 ® and that Polish was to be the official language of the Kingdom. 3 7 In order to balance this, another article provided that all executive and military authority, including the high command of the army, was to be in the hands of the T s a r of Russia, 3 8 and during the latter's absence from the K i n g d o m , in the hands of his representative, 3 ® article

granting

then the Grand-duke

national

representation

to

Constantine. the

new

An state,

through a government consisting of a Diet composed of two chambers and the K i n g , 4 0 was, in conjunction with the other provisions, almost meaningless. Czartoryski was deeply disappointed with the results of his efforts, 4 1 but his friend, the T s a r , was far from being content. 4 2 In J a n u a r y Alexander had regretfully informed Castlereagh that it was impossible to revive in its entirety " t h a t ancient political system in E u r o p e of which the independence of Poland formed

p a r t , . . . . " and

that recognition of this

fact

" had

34 Ibid., IV, 1650, Nov. 15/27, 1815. The Constitutional Charter as Published. Also see II, 1389, Jure 9, 1815. Final Act. 35 Ibid., III, 1399 and IV, 1650. 36 Ibid., IV, 1652. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., p. 1653. 39 Ibid., p. 1654. 40 Ibid., pp. 1653-1654. 41 Weil, Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne, II, 518, April 29, 1815. Czartoryski to Anstett. 42 Ibid., I, 639. Dec. 4, 1814-

THE

CONGRESS AND

POLISH

NATIONALISM

I33

necessarily limited the solicitude of His Imperial Majesty toward the Polish nation." 48 Yet to inform the Poles themselves of this limited solicitude was most disagreeable. Alexander's proclamation from Vienna, announcing the establishment of a Polish kingdom, consisted alternately of apologies for having failed to keep his promises, and of praises honoring the Polish nation. From the moment of victory, the proclamation stated, it had been Alexander's wish to re-establish the independence of nations on the basis of just, liberal, and moderate ideas. According to these principles he had worked to re-establish the independence of Poland. Unfortunately it had not been possible to consult solely the interest of the Poles in a matter which affected so many interests and the balance of power in Europe. 44 The brave Polish nation, however, had not been forgotten Poles, we love to admire the greatness of soul, and the sensibility and firmness which distinguish your national character, and shone forth so brightly in your effort to resurrect the political existence of your fatherland which you love above everything.... Poles, new links will unite you to a generous people, which, through ancient relations, and by a valor worthy of your own, and through the common bond of Slav nations, is ready to admit you to a fraternity that will be dear and useful to both peoples. A wise constitution and an unalterable union will attach you to the destiny of a great monarchy which is too extended to require aggrandizement, and to a government which will never have other political rules than those of impartial justice and generous ideas. From now on, your patriotism, enlightened by experience, and guided by gratefulness, will have an instrument and a goal capable of absorbing all your efforts in national institutions . . . 43 Kluber, IX, 45, Jan. 19, 1815. 44 Angeberg, III, 1224, May 25, 1815.

134

T H E

ATTITUDE

OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

Poles ! It was not possible to regulate your future and all that belongs to your national happiness in another fashion. It was necessary to preserve a fatherland for you which was neither an object of jealousy nor one of fear to your neighbors, nor one of war to Europe. Such were the desires of the friends of humanity, and such had to be the goal of an enlightened p o l i c y . . . 4 5 T h e Poles received the T s a r ' s declaration with reserve. A Polish countess, related to Czartoryski, and deeply interested in the political events of her day, has described in her diary how the decisions made at Vienna reached the Polish capital, and how Alexander himself, returning from the Congress, entered W a r s a w to be honored as king. T h e account is of double interest, because it shows Alexander's policy within Warsaw, and the attitude of Warsaw toward the Russian tsar. According to her description, the messenger from Vienna, bearing the news of Alexander's assumption of the Polish crown, reached W a r s a w toward evening. The civil representative of the Tsar, a M r . Novosilzoff, " who took the initiative in everything," decided that the most striking manner of making the announcement public, " would be to exclaim in the auditorium of the theater during the intermission : ' Long live the king of Poland! ' " 4 6 " F r o m anybody else," the Countess continued, " this mode of announcing an event of such great moment, would justly have been thought a kind of epigram, for there was certainly comedy in all this affair. But it was not supposed that the imperial commissary was perpetrating a bad joke. S o the thing was done in that way, and as there were a number of people in the parterre who were suborned, and still more who were dupes, the shouts and the applause became frantic. But the boxes remained cold and silent! None of the persons who influenced opinion joined forth in the noisy demonstration which burst forth from different places in the 45 Ibid., pp. 1224-1226, May 25, 1815. 46 Potocka, Memoirs, p. 234.

T H E CONGRESS AND POLISH

NATIONALISM

I35

parterre. Mr. Novosilzoff fussed in vain, shot encouragement from his squinting eyes, dispensed smiles and handshakes;— everyone quickly resumed silence " 47 A n d , the Countess added : " A representative government, like the one operating in England, was at that moment Alexander's hobby. H e played at Constitution-making as little girls play at being a lady." 48 A harsh final estimate ; yet there was some truth in it. A l e x ander's interest in either Polish nationalism or constitutional government, was definitely superficial. T h e T s a r was wellmeaning, inclined toward idealism, and vain, a combination which made him eager to experiment with the liberal theories preached by his teacher L a Harpe, and his friend Czartoryski. On the other hand, Alexander was completely unprepared to encounter or surmount any obstacles to his liberal design. A l though he continued to play the double role of Polish liberator and Russian tsar throughout the period of the Congress of Vienna, he capitulated in reality to Russian wishes. Czartoryski, who had been sent to W a r s a w in May, begged the Tsar in every letter to fulfill the promises of the Constitution, to separate the civil from the military government, to dismiss the Grand-duke Constantine, who disregarded the Constitution, to appoint a Polish general as head of the Polish army, and to draw a frontier between Poland and Russia. 4 9 T h e letters were written in vain. Alexander only stopped briefly at W a r s a w on his return journey to St. Petersburg. But he appeared there in the role of the liberator. Countess Potocka, who was one of the spectators, described how Alexander arrived, escorted by a whole staff of Polish generals. The Tsar wore a Polish military uniform, and as sole decoration, Poland's emblem, a white 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., p. 235. 49 Czartoryski, Mémoires, II, 331-332, 335-336, 337-339. 347-348, June, July, October 1815, Warsaw.

Iß6

THE

A T T I T U D E OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

eagle. 5 0 L o o k i n g at Alexander on that day, an astute observer would perhaps have seen him as Czartoryski's lively cousin did. " It looked," she wrote, " as though, striving to make us forget that he was ruling other peoples, he wished to instill into us as much confidence as affection. H i s insinuating manners, the gentle and benevolent expression of his face, touched everyone . . . . I believe, on that day, Alexander, carried away by the outburst of sentiments which his presence

evoked,

imagined a free and independent Poland, where he could have found a home and faithful s u b j e c t s . "

61

PRUSSIA

Alexander's plan t o create a Polish kingdom was opposed with more or less vehemence by all other great powers assembled at Vienna. T h e two main objections were that it gave too much power to Russia, and that its nationalist tendency might contaminate the inhabitants of Prussia's and Austria's Polish provinces. 5 2 Since K i n g Frederick William of Prussia had been promised S a x o n y in return for giving up his claims to the duchy of W a r s a w , he generally refrained from criticizing Russian expansion. Y e t Prussia still possessed some Polish land, and the Prussian government dreaded that the granting of a separate Polish constitution would encourage the Poles living within the Polish kingdom to win back all the land which had formerly belonged to them. T o dissuade Alexander from his project, they warned Russia that eventually the Poles might be strong enough t o throw off Russian domination itself. 53 Another Prussian memorandum proposed that the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian governments should each administer their Polish provinces in a paternal spirit, in 50Potocka, Memoirs, p. 238. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., p. 232, and Angeberg, II, 407, Nov. 7, 1814. Hardenberg Memorandum. 53 Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, IX, 149. Mem. Aug. 20, 1814.

THE

CONGRESS AND P O L I S H

NATIONALISM

I37

order to convince the inhabitants that they formed part of the Russian, Austrian, or Prussian family. 5 4 T h i s was deemed more reasonable than to nourish " vague hopes for future changes." 5 8 I n fact, amazing as it might seem, the very nationalist Prussian delegation showed no understanding whatsoever for the idealist version of Alexander's scheme. Humboldt seemed to have forgotten all his learned statements on the subject of German nationalism when Polish nationalism was under discussion. It apparently never occurred to him or to Hardenberg that the Poles could feel for Poland what Germans felt for Germany. T h e essentially egocentric and egoistic character of nationalism itself is strikingly illustrated in their reaction. Humboldt ridiculed a Russian proposal that the Poles should keep their flag, a white eagle, under Russian, Prussian, and Austrian rule, and sarcastically termed the suggestion " a delightful idea." 6 6 H e continued to explain that he disliked the entire tendency of these gentlemen [the T s a r and those who cooperate with him] to make the Poles into a nation under three rulers, which for them always has a political meaning, not just a human one. Fortunately, I had nothing to do with the entire b u s i n e s s . . . except that I was able to prevent an article about the rights of nationality which went much too far. 8 7 T h e same diplomats who asked Europe t o recognize the right of their own nationality t o an independent unified state, the same men who counted with such optimism on the future triumph of German nationalism, 8 8 lost all prophetic abilities 54 Angeberg, II, 8oi, Jan. 30, 1815. 55 Ibid. 56 Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen, IV, 550, May 12, 1815. 57 Ibid. 58 Baron vom Stein was no exception in this respect, although he was less vehement than Humboldt on the subject of Polish nationalism. He did not consider the Poles ready for self-government, and expected that a

138

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF V I E N N A

when they turned their look toward Poland. AUSTRIA

Austria's reactions to Alexander's nationalist proposals was entirely consistent with her attitude toward German and Italian nationalism. But over the Polish problem, Metternich and Alexander became open foes. The Austrian chancellor, who was acquainted with the Tsar's changing moods, had hoped that in the interval between the Paris conference and the Congress of Vienna, the Tsar's enthusiasm for progressive ideas would cool off at St. Petersburg.5® This hope was disappointed. Altogether, the prospect of losing Galicia to a nationalist Polish kingdom, to increase thereby the territorial extent of the Russian empire, and to sanction in addition the Russo-Prussian deal about Saxony, was more than disagreeable for Austria. Metternich had stated from the beginning of negotiations that he did not intend to fight a war over the Polish question, 60 yet as the months slipped by he came closer to this solution than he had anticipated. The entanglement of German and Polish affairs made Metternich particularly anxious to find an acceptable solution, and in a few private discussions with the Russian tsar, he attempted to convince Alexander of the unreasonableness of the latter's most cherished ideas. The result was a final, very stormy interview which upset the Tsar so severely, that, according separate Polish constitution would encourage a process of nationalist fermentation in Eastern Europe, harming Prussia, Austria, and perhaps even Russia. As an alternative he proposed to turn over the provincial administration of the Russian-occupied part of Poland to the Poles themselves, in order to give them an opportunity to develop their moral and intellectual faculties. Stein, Briefwechsel, V, 60-63, Oct. 6, 1814. Mem. for the Russian cabinet, and Mem. for Hardenberg; pp. 72-73, Oct. 1814, Mem. for Hardenberg. 59 Gentz, Oesterreichs Mem. Aug. 18, 1814.

Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen,

pp. 393, 398.

60 Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, IX, 146. Mem. Aug. 18, 1814.

THE

CONGRESS

AND

POLISH

NATIONALISM

I39

to Metternich's account, Alexander was thinking of a duel.· 1 Although the Congress was spared this spectacle, the two statesmen were not on speaking terms for four whole months. During that period, the Austrian government proposed all sorts of alternatives to the Russian scheme. They thought of the possibility of restoring Poland to its pre-partition status of 1772, a solution which would have entailed sacrifices for themselves and Prussia, but would at least have prevented the outbreak of wars and revolutions for Polish independence.*3 Another advantage of this plan would have been that Prussia could no longer have asked for compensations in Germany for the Polish territory she had sacrificed, because Russia and Austria would have sacrificed as much and more. But to this alternative Alexander could and would not agree. 63 One of Metternich's final and most desperate suggestions, was the creation of three Polish kingdoms to prevent Russia from having the sole advantage of nationalist propaganda. H e had even thought of names for the three states. Russia's part was to be called Kingdom of North-Poland, Austria's, Kingdom of South-Poland, and the king of Prussia was invited to choose a correspondingly convenient name for his share.®4 But Metternich's ingenuity did not suffice to circumvent the Tsar's stubbornness. When Napoleon landed in France, and unity among the Allies became once more of primary importance, Alexander graciously pardoned Metternich βδ and got his own way. Seen in retrospect, the Austrian chancellor need not have dreaded Polish nationalism as a tool of Russian policy. Russian opinion condemned and prevented its use. 61 Fr. v. Jettel, " Die polnische Frage auf dem Wiener Kongress," Deutsche Revue, Stuttgart, 1917, 42. Jahrgang, I, 70, Metternich, Mémoires,

ι, 326-327. 63 Gentz, Oesterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen, p. 389. Mem. Aug. 18, 1814. 63 Ibid. 61 Angeberg, II, 381, Nov. 2, 1814. 65 Jettel, " Die polnische Frage auf dem Wiener Kongress," op. cit., p. 76.

I40

THE

A T T I T U D E OF T H E C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

FRANCE

Talleyrand was not strongly opposed to Polish nationalism. H e objected to Alexander's plan because the French government expected that the establishment of a Polish kingdom under Russian protection would result in turning over all of Poland to Russia. 6 6 France had declared herself ready to support Austria by force of arms if necessary, in order to preserve the balance of power in Eastern Europe. 6 7 T h e idea of re-establishing the Poland of 1772 did not please the French representative. H e asserted that Polish history contained sufficient proof that no strong government could exist in Poland, and that the country " restored to independence, would be inevitably delivered to anarchy." 68 A s a buffer state between Russia and Central Europe, Poland therefore seemed useless. 08 A further reason for the French delegation to oppose Polish unification was their belief that Austria and Prussia would ask to be compensated for the Polish territory they sacrificed, and that Prussia would then become stronger in Germany, and Austria in Italy. 7 0 Talleyrand's solution for the Polish problem was the complete partition of the country among Russia, Prussia, and A u s t r i a — a return to the status quo of 1795. Despite this wish, the French representative did not advocate the death of the Polish national movement. " B y remaining divided," he predicted generously, Poland will not be annihilated constitute a political society, They will no longer have the have the same language. Thus strongest and most durable

forever; if the Poles no longer they will always be a family. same fatherland, but they will they will remain united by the of all links. Under foreign

66 Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, 180, Instructions.

67 Ibid., pp. 184-185. GS Ibid., p. 179.

69 Ibid., pp. 184-185. 70 Ibid., p. 180.

T H E CONGRESS A N D

POLISH

NATIONALISM

domination, they will arrive at the virile age not been able to reach during nine centuries and the moment when they attain it will not of their emancipation, when they will all same center. 71

I4I

which they have of independence, be far from that converge to the

This estimate of the importance of Polish nationalism shows again that Talleyrand did not condemn nationalism as a theory. He feared it solely as an instrument in the hands of one of France's rivals. ENGLAND

With the exception of the most conservative British opinion which was ready to sanction the complete disappearance of a Polish state, the British public, led in this matter by the Whigs, insisted on a measure permitting the re-establishment of Poland. 72 Under these circumstances, it would have been exceedingly difficult for Castlereagh to oppose the idea of Polish unity. The only course that was open to him, apart from supporting Alexander, was to work for the resurrection of Poland as it had existed before the partitions. As can be imagined, the British delegate was vehemently opposed to Alexander's plan which so clearly upset the precious balance of power. 73 In Castlereagh's opinion, the Tsar's Polish policy was nothing but a shameless desire for expansion, covered up by a lot of moralistic talk. 74 The Whigs, who were imperfectly informed of the negotiations in Vienna, and took the Tsar's utterances at face value, became terribly excited about " the rumor " that Alexander's " benevolent 71 Ibid., pp. 180-181. 72 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX, pp. 342-344, Oct. 14, 1814, London. Liverpool to Castlereagh. 73 Webster, England and the Polish-Saxon Problem, pp. 75-76, Oct. 1814 ; British Diplomacy 1813-1815, pp. 197-198, Oct. 2, 1814. Castlereagh to Liverpool. 74 Ibid., pp. 267, 269, Oct. 4, 1814. Mem. by Castlereagh.

142

T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E

C O N G R E S S OF

VIENNA

views " had been opposed by Castlereagh. 75 They declared that the Poles had at least as much right to independence as the Italians, the Genoese, and the Saxons.7® During a very lively session in the House of Commons, their spokesman stated that, in this age, " free nations could not be sold and transferred like beasts of burthen," 77 and he warned Lord Castlereagh about acting against " the spirit of the times," and " the honor " of Great Britain. 78 From Castlereagh's reports to Lord Liverpool, it is evident that the British plenipotentiary was not sentimentally interested in protecting Polish nationalism, but that he advocated the absolute independence of Poland, in order to prevent a further advance of Russia in Europe. 79 The Tsar and Castlereagh disliked each other, and the former considered the British foreign minister cold and pedantic.80 This was not surprising in view of Castlereagh's recurring pedantic inquiries as to how the Tsar distinguished between his moral duty toward the Poles inside the duchy of Warsaw, and toward those outside of it, and why, being so eager to improve the situation of the Poles, Alexander could not act according to a generous and liberal principle, "instead of shaping two-thirds of them into a formidable military instrument in the hands of a single power." 8 1 75 Hansard, The Parliamentary X X X , 272, March 20, 1814.

Debates,

X X I X , 554, Nov. 28,

1814;

76 Ibid., X X I X , 561, Nov. 26, 1814; p. 698, Feb. 9, 1815; X X X , 554. March 20, 1815. 77 Ibid., X X I X , p. 554, Nov. 28, 1814. 78 Ibid., p. 559. 79Angeberg, I I , 267-269, Oct. 4i 1814. Mem. by Castlereagh. Webster, England and the Polish-Saxon Problem, p. 73, Oct. 2, 1814, Castlereagh to Liverpool. 80 Gentz, Oesterreichs 12, 1815.

Teilnahme

an den Befreiungskriegen,

81 Angeberg, II, p. 269, Oct. 4, 1814.

p. 499, Feb.

THE

CONGRESS AND POLISH

NATIONALISM

I43

T h o u g h Alexander could decide the fate of Poland without consulting Great Britain, he attempted to defend himself against Castlereagh's insinuations. 82 There was an exchange of several rather bitter memoranda on the subject which led to no practical result. All Castlereagh could do before leaving Vienna, was to summarize, in a note to the Congress, Britain's concern for the welfare of Poland. 88 In March 1815, when it was already evident that Alexander would annex the duchy of W a r s a w as a Polish kingdom to the Russian empire, Britain's foreign minister calmly stated before Parliament that the whole of Poland would be ruled " upon a system of liberality befitting the spirit of the times," and that it had been decided at Vienna " to promote by all possible means the welfare of this most unfortunate section of Europe, and to establish in the country a system by which the Poles shall be governed as Poles, with the rights and privileges that ought to belong to them." 84 Castlereagh's words were intended to convince the British public that the mission with which he had been charged was accomplished. It is true that he had tried to re-establish Poland's independence, and it is equally true that the Tsar had been eager to " liberate " Poland. Y e t neither of them had been successful, and both knew it. SUMMARY

W h e n the Congress of Vienna ended, the destiny of Poland rested in the hands of three different governments, all of which were unhampered by any commitments that could not be interpreted in their favor. A n article of the Final A c t stated 8 2 Ibid., p. 352, Oct. 30, 1814. Alexander to Castlereagh : " . . . T h e purity of m y intentions makes me strong; if I insist on the order of things I want t o establish in Poland, it is because I carry in m y conscience the intimate conviction that I am acting for the general interest even more than for m y personal one. T h i s moral p o l i c y . . . will be appreciated by nations which welcome everything that is disinterested and benevolent." 83 Angeberg, II, 795, Jan. 12, 1815. 84 Castlereagh, Memoirs London.

and Correspondence,

I, 52-53, March 30, 1815,

144

T H E

ATTITUDE

OF T H E

CONGRESS

OF

VIENNA

literally : " The Poles, subjects respectively of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, will obtain national representation and national institutions adapted to the kind of political existence each of the three governments to which they belong will judge useful and correct to grant them." 86 In contrast to their decisions concerning the Germans and the Italians, the members of the Congress admitted with greater or lesser reluctance that the Poles had some justification for demanding a government of their own. But the political strategy of the delegates was not primarily influenced by an appreciation of the right of the Polish nationality to an independent existence. Prussia only sanctioned the Tsar's plan because she desired Saxony. In no way did the Prussian delegates approve of Alexander's ideas. If the Austrian government had the fleeting thought of re-establishing the whole of Poland as it had existed in 1772, the reason for it was that Metternich regarded such a solution as the only possibility of restraining Russia's dangerous advance in Europe. Metternichs proposal to create three Polish kingdoms was another version of the same idea. Russia had to be prevented from employing Polish nationalism to acquire Austrian and Prussian Poland in addition to her own, already much too large, share. The fervent declarations of the British delegation in favor of an independent Poland' must be attributed in some measure to liberal sentiment in England, but chiefly they were the result of Lord Castlereagh's calculation that a truly free and independent Poland would help to balance Eastern and Western Europe. Talleyrand, who did not believe Poland would be strong enough to act as a buffer state, frankly advocated complete partition of the duchy of W a r s a w . T h e resulting continental equilibrium, he expected, would leave France sufficient freedom to assert herself. It is obvious that, as a rule, it was not so much apprehension of Polish nationalism as fear of its usefulness as a political instrument, which guided the negotiations. 85 Angeberg, i l l , 1389-1390, June 9, 1815.

THE

CONGKESS

AND

POLISH

NATIONALISM

I45

The only person at the Congress whose policy toward Poland was not quite as coldly calculated, was Alexander I. He was in an excellent position to incorporate the duchy oí Warsaw into the Russian empire without transforming it into a Polish kingdom. If he had disregarded Czartoryski's advice and listened to Russian opinion, there would have been far less opposition to him at the Congress of Vienna. Nevertheless, Alexander insisted upon the fictitious maintenance of nationalist principles, though he compromised them right and left in practice. He found it impossible to abandon the project of becoming Poland's savior, and he experienced some genuine feeling of compassion for the Polish people. What he lacked, was force to translate the Polish dream into reality. In fact he did not even make a great effort to distinguish between the two, and the ensuing policy reached a high note of hypocrisy. Together the Congressional delegates achieved what has sometimes been called the fourth partition of Poland. Although a Polish kingdom existed again in the summer of 1 8 1 5 , its very existence was not real but a fiction. No frontier was drawn between the new kingdom and the rest of Russia.

CONCLUSION THE historian is spared many of the difficulties constantly facing politicians. Foresight is not one of the talents required of him. N o one expects him to be a prophet. T h e historian's task is to look backward, to reconstruct the events of the past, to analyze anterior difficulties, to describe previous deeds, and to criticize former politicians. Y e t he, too, is handicapped, because his hindsight is imperfect and too easily influenced by his present environment and by current conditions. Depending on his convictions, he will lament that the harmony of the Middle Ages was destroyed by Renaissance and Reformation, or he will welcome both Renaissance and Reformation as the salvation from the darkness of the Middle Ages. Some historians have deplored the outbreak of the French Revolution, but most modern historians, while regretting the revolutionary excesses, represent the Revolution and the ideas it propagated as a natural and rather praiseworthy turn of modern history. The idea of nationalism has received a similar treatment. Nourished and carried by the Revolution, the nationalist theory has become one of the strongest forces of our times. In the world of today, the existence of nationalism is so self-evident, and its influence so immense, that it is sometimes difficult to realize in retrospect that its success was not obvious from the moment the idea was born, or even after the impetus it had received through the Napoleonic wars. A further difficulty for the modern historian is the fact that the sentiment of patriotism, which is a component of modern nationalism, is a feeling which has existed in different forms long before modern nationalism came to life, and is a natural and worthy sentiment. It is easily understandable, therefore, that the nationalists of 1814, who attempted to create fatherlands for themselves in the form of national states appeared to a number of historians, in retrospect, as martyrs whose most noble endeavor was frustrated by a group of frivolous, backward men, who failed to comprehend 146

CONCLUSION

I47

the new forces present in Europe. Y e t the nationalists of 1814, although often inspired by genuine patriotic feeling, were motivated in addition, exactly like their opponents, by thoughts of political aggrandizement, power, and security. A m o n g the delegates from the German states, the strongest promoters of the nationalist principle were the Prussians. Next to Austria the largest and most powerful German state, populated almost exclusively by a German-speaking population, Prussia had everything to gain from the adoption of German nationalism among the surrounding " Germanies." The imperial crown, represented by the House of Habsburg, seemed unnecessary to Prussia as a symbol of German unity. Instead, the Prussian government expected that Austria, hampered by its rule over many different nationalities, would not be able to keep pace with them. T h e Prussians, in short, were eager to serve G e r m a n y — i n the position of leaders. T h e motives of all other delegates who favored German nationalism were just as clear. For the mediatized princes, nationalism was a means to rise, from the humiliating position of Bavarian or S a x o n subjects, to a more estimable rank in a mighty German empire. F o r the lesser German princes and the free city governments, a federated Germany was the answer to many of their special problems. They needed protection, and partly for this reason nationalism appealed to them. But, if one of the larger German states assumed the role of protector singlehanded, or forced them through its greater might to execute all its wishes, they feared for their independence. In addition, the idea of a united German empire contained a great sentimental appeal. Ancient German legends, the glitter and pomp of the imperial hierarchy, all contributed to enhance the desire to build a German fatherland to which one would be proud to belong. If one looks at the entire group of German supporters of German nationalism several characteristics are striking. First of all, their adoption of the nationalist principle was not complete. With the exception of a man like Stein who stood above any

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separate, local interests, they were national patriots only as long as the common German end harmonized with their individual wishes. Even in Prussia, where this agreement of interest existed to a very large extent, it is evident from the statements of the Prussian delegates that they too expected Prussia to benefit from the erection of a German state. Consequently, all the German delegates at the Congress, however sincerely some of them were devoted to the ideal of a unified Germany, still thought and felt much of the time as Prussians, or as Hanoverians, or even as imperial knights, before thinking and feeling as Germans. Secondly, the pro-nationalist German diplomats differed in their national aims. While the Prussians attached no great importance to the resurrection of a German empire, all others welcomed the idea. One might have expected that Austria's strict refusal to take the German crown would smooth over the differences between the Prussian diplomats and the others. This, however, did not happen because " the little ones," as Humboldt called them, feared Prussian predominance. A third characteristic common to the nationalist German delegates was their conservatism. T h e mediatized princes and the many tiny German courts connected the nationalist idea with a belief in an aristocratic hierarchy. T h e Prussians shied away from any proposals which tended to give a larger amount of political freedom to their own or any German subjects. It is true that they hoped to win the people for German nationalism wherever they had difficulties in convincing the princes of its advantages; but in practice, they did not advocate a liberal policy in order to spread the nationalist doctrine. Finally, it is interesting, though not surprising, to notice that the representatives of the cause of German nationalism showed no sympathy for any nationalist movement except their own. Prussia, as one of the great European powers, would have had a chance to back either the Italian or the Polish nationalist movement, but she opposed both. The nationalist theory had

CONCLUSION

I49

its greatest powers of attraction if it could be combined with state ends. Although the situation of the Italian nationalists was not quite the same as that of the Germans, one can detect similar motives in their policy and similar obstacles in their way. T h e y had no chance to work together on a federation project, yet the mere suggestion of such an idea found no favor with t w o of the strongest powers of the Italian peninsula: the Papacy and K i n g Victor Emmanuel of Piedmont. The spirit of independence was still reigning in almost all Italian states. Genoa proclaimed it loudly. In Lombardy and Naples, where the nationalist current was stronger than in any other part of Italy, local patriotism still rivaled nationalism. Murat, the hero of the Italian nationalists, was not an Italian by birth, and had not been a nationalist as long as Napoleon was firmly established as ruler of France. Nowhere perhaps is self-interest more clearly connected with the adoption of a nationalist policy than in Murat's case during the Congress of Vienna. Distrustful of the promises of the Austrian government to leave him in possession of Naples, he decided, in the adventurous mood which characterized all his undertakings, to proclaim Italy's independence. His hope to find followers among all those who were discontented with the re-establishment of the pre-revolutionary governments was disappointed, because he considerably overestimated the discontent as well as the nationalist enthusiasm. Altogether it appears clear that the Italian as well as the German representatives of the nationalist principle were weak not only because they were in a minority, but because they were disunited. Their nationalism could not draw them together sufficiently, since it contained too many anti-nationalist elements. Ironically enough, the Poles, the one people which was more united in its desire for an independent national state than either the Italians or the Germans, were the group least

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able to exert any kind of political pressure at the Congress of Vienna. It is true that the Congress on the whole was less opposed to a united independent Polish state than to a united Germany or Italy, but the fate of Poland depended mainly upon the goodwill of the Russian emperor, the influence of the Russian nobility, and the persuasive talents of Prince Adam Czartoryski. In the ensuing conflict between the wishes of Poland and the demands of Russia, the Tsar's generous sentiments for the Polish nation weakened considerably. Although a Polish kingdom was erected at the Congress of Vienna, its limits comprised only a part of Russian Poland, and it was independent in name only. The Russian tsar distinguished himself among all those supporting some kind of nationalism at Vienna, by being the only statesman who showed an interest in several nationalist movements. H e was a weak support for the nationalist cause, since his feeling for it was not deeply rooted, but his policy shows that nationalism as an abstract principle, unconnected with any particular people, was recognized not alone in the camp of its opponents. The Congressional opponents of the nationalist idea were motivated like its proponents by mixed aims. Thoughts of political power and security strongly influenced their behavior, and they too were not entirely devoid of idealism. In general they had a great desire for stability in domestic as well as foreign affairs, a very strong hope for peace, and a belief in European cooperation to attain their ends. The Austrian empire, the most formidable of the opponents, had judged it wise during the wars against Napoleon, to appeal to its many peoples to fight not merely for the preservation of the Habsburg empire, but to flatter their national patriotism, sometimes going as far as promising national independence, in order to nullify any advantages Napoleon's propaganda might have over the purely dynastic type of approach. This war-time policy was adopted as an emergency

CONCLUSION

I5I

measure, and abandoned immediately after the signing of the peace. From then on, the Austrian government embarked upon a course of preventive measures against the recurrence of a people's uprising against their ruler, and a renewal of the years of war and bloodshed. For the Austrian government, the nationalist doctrine was clearly connected with everything revolutionary, especially with the redoutable doctrine of people's rights. This doctrine, in conjunction with nationalism, was expected to lead in the course of time to the political and social dissolution of the Habsburg empire. Hence Metternich's very determined battle at the Congress of Vienna to stifle all nationalist aspirations, and to fetter those states which appeared as protagonists of the " jacobin idea." Austria's most valuable aide in this undertaking was the political mentality of the smaller states who jealously guarded their political independence against impairment by the larger ones. Austria's determination to do a thorough job in the eradication of jacobinism was so excessive that it led to an inflexible autocratic conservatism which is especially evident in the treaties concluded with the German and Italian states. It is entirely comprehensible that Metternich rejected nationalism as a means of drawing the loyalty of any people toward the House of Habsburg, and that he tried to insulate the Empire against nationalist infiltration; yet his attempt to forestall every change in the political system he was building, eventually proved futile and harmful. The French opposition to nationalism was as well-founded as Austria's. Although France was a unified country and did not have to fear an internal split-up into different nations, she regarded nationalism in other countries as a threat to her political safety. She was least opposed to the unification of Poland which was not a direct strategic menace for her. The question of Poland's independence seemed also less important compared to the possibility that Russia might eventually swallow all of Poland, while promising the Poles complete

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unification. German nationalism, on the other hand, was dreaded as a military danger, since France feared that Prussia would succeed in uniting Germany by this means, and then turn to attack France. Italian nationalism was opposed by the French for two reasons. Italian unification under Austria was thought to render Austria too powerful in comparison with France. The other possibility which preoccupied the French delegate, was Italian unification under the leadership of the illegitimate occupant of the Neapolitan throne. This had to be prevented at all costs, since it would have signified the establishment of a revolutionary government in Italy, and would have led, in all probability, to the second fall of the Bourbon dynasty in France. Neither France nor Austria can be accused of misunderstanding or misinterpreting or disregarding the nationalist movement. The problem was of immense importance to them ; it influenced most of their political maneuvres, and they foresaw a number of its ultimate consequences. Their deliberations even show a very clear recognition of the value of nationalism as a political instrument. England's attitude toward nationalism differed somewhat from this pattern. National unity, greater strategic security, and a more progressive governmental system rendered nationalism much less problematic, even for as conservative a government as that of Liverpool and Castlereagh. In his German policy, Castlereagh disregarded nationalism entirely, and in his Italian policy he followed the Austrian lead as far as English public opinion permitted. If he encouraged nationalism in Poland, he followed a course which was in accord with the desires of the more liberal element in English society, and was designed to stop Russian expansion. Castlereagh's goal at the Congress of Vienna was simply European balance. Of course, he realized that Murat might upset the peace in Italy with the aid of propaganda for unification, and that Alexander could do the same in Poland. But in his preoccupation with an equilibrium of states, he failed

CONCLUSION

I53

on the whole to reckon with nationalism as a force that had to be dealt with in one way or another to " stabilize the balance." The development of modern nationalism stirred the Congress of Vienna greatly, although it rejected the nationalist principle. The flavor of eighteenth century Europe, with its monarchical tradition, its cosmopolitan culture, and its local patriotism, permeated the thoughts of the friends as well as those of the enemies of the nationalist idea. It was stronger among the enemies of nationalism than it was among its supporters, but the dividing line was indistinct. As a whole, the Congress of Vienna, without comprehending fully the value of nationalism as an ideal, recognized its value as an instrument of power.

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INDEX Alexander I, of Russia, 24, 44, 45, 46, si, 94. I25-M5. ISO Alliance treaty of January 3, 181S (Austria, England, France), 32, 6 1 , 75 Ancien régime, 10, 80-81 Anstett, Baron von, 130 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 20 Austria, 5, 20-21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 3 1 , 4a. 44, 45, 46, 47. 48. So, 5363, 74, 7«. 85, 87, 88 (treaty with Murat), 90-94, 9 6 - 1 0 8 , 109, n o , 113,

117,

120-122,

131,

144, 147, 150. i'5i, 152

138-139,

Baden, 63, 6 5 - 6 6 , 7 8 Bavaria, 28, 4 3 , 49, 57, 6 3 - 6 4 , 66, 7 8 Beauharnais, Eugene, 33, 86, 87, 94 Bellegarde, 87, 88, 97, 99, 103 Bentinck, Lord William, 88, 89, 92, 118

Bibl, Victor, 7 Campo-Chiario, Duke of, 94, 1 0 1 , 1 1 9 Capo d'Istria, Count, 45 Carbonari, 86, 99 Cariati, Duke of, 94 Carl-August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, 38, 79 Castlereagh, 4 1 , 7 0 - 7 6 , 89, 1 1 4 - 1 2 1 , 141-144, 152, ι S3 Catherine, Grandduchess of Oldenburg (sister of Alexander I ) , 46, 63

Charles Albert (18I31-1849 King of Sardinia), 109 Charles Felix (brother of Victor Emanuel I of Sardinia), 109 Committee of Five, 6 Consalvi, Cardinal, 93-94, 97, 1014 Constantine, Grandduke (brother of Alexander I, of Russia), 130, 131, 132, 135 Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 4 4 - 4 5 , 124-126,128,

129, 1 3 1 ,

132,

135, 145

Dalberg, Duke of, 66 De Maistre, Count Joseph, 91-92 Denmark, 76 England, 5, 24, 41*43, 7 0 - 7 6 , 88, 9 1 , 92, 96, 109, H3-I2H, 141-143, 152, 153 Enlightenment, 10

Ferdinand I, of Two Sicilies, IV of Naples, 11, 86, 88, 90, 100, 103, 109, M I ,

ΙΊ2

Ferdinand III, Grandduke of Tuscany, 104, 121 Final Act, 6, 7 7 , 103, 107, 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 Foscolo, Ugo, 99 France, 6, 27, 32, 35, 49, 61, 62, 6670, 7 5 , 7 7 , 9 1 , 96, 140-141, 1 5 1 - 1 5 2

108-113,

121,

Francis I, of Austria, 26, 53, 58, 60, 76, 77-7β, 90, 97, 103, 104 Francis IV, Duke of Modena, 109, 121 Frederick August I, of Saxony, 33, 48, 7«, ri2 Frederick William III, of Prussia, 23-24, 34, 46, 76, 1136 Free Masons, 86 French Revolution, 7, 10, 44, 55 Gagern, Freiherr von, 3 8 - 3 9 , 40, 50, 79 Genoa, 89, 92, 94, n o , 114, 115, 116 Gentz, Friedrich von, 5 5 - 5 6 , 57, 60, 72 German Committee, 28, 36, 38, 39, 8 40, 4 1 , S - 59k 65, 76 German Confederation, 7, 25, 35, 36, 39, 40, 57-58, 59, 76, 77, 78 German federal constitution, 27, 76, 77 German federal diet, 27, 33, 47 Gersdorff, Freiherr von, 38 Gigli, Guido, 8 Görres, Joseph, 1 9 - 2 0 , 4 9 Hack, Baron von, 65 Hager, Baron von, 23, 99 Hanover, 28, 39, 41-44, 57, 75 Hardenberg, Prince von, 213, 25, 31, 3 2 , 3 3 , 52, 60, 6 1 , 1 3 7 ,

144

Hardenberg, Count, 41, 42 Holstein, 76 Holy Roman Empire, 11, 37, 40, 76 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 2 3 - 3 5 , 3 7 , 50, 5 2 , 59, ( a , 78, 79, 94, 95, 137, 144 Italy, 5, 8, 151, 152

10,

11,

27,

85-122,

149,

Italy, kingdom of, 86, 87, 90, 107 Jacobinism, 55, 113, 118, 151 163

IÓ4

INDEX

Kalish, treaty of (1813), 47, 127 Labrador, Count, 95-96 La Harpe, 44, 125, i35 Lamprecht, Karl, 8 Legitimacy, principle of, 67, 68, i n , 122 Liverpool, Lord, 71, 117, 118, 152 Lombardy, duchy of, 85, 90, 96, 97, 98, 99. 103, 149 Lombardy-Venetia, 121-122 Louis X V I I I , of France, 67, 100,109, 110, HI, 112, 113 Low Countries. See Netherlands Lucca, 94 Luxemburg, 39, 40, 76. See Netherlands Maria Beatrix (daughter of Victor Emanuel of Sardinia), 109 Mediatized princes, 26-27, 52, 69, 80, 1417, 148 Metternich, 2β, 29, 31, 32, 53-63, 66, 67. 77. 78,89, 90-91,96-98, ιοο-ιοι, 103-108, π ι , Π2, ri7, ιι8, 119, 122, 139, 144. 151 Modena, 85, 94» 121 Mongelas, Count, 63 Münster, Count, 39, 41-44. 79 Murat, Joachim, 11, 86, 87, treaty with Austria, 88,90-91, 95, 99,100102, 108, 110-F13, rió, 119, 120,149 Naples, 86, 88, 90, 91, 96, 99-103,109, in-112, ri6, 119, 149 Napoleon, 11, 28-29, 33, 34, 36, 42, 45. 47; opinions about, 55, 67, 85, 86, 88, 102, i n , 124, 125, 126, 139 Nationalism, definition of, 9 Netherlands (Low Countries), 39, 41, 44. TO. 76 Nicolson, Harold, 7 Novosilzoff, 134-135 Nugent, General, 87 Orange-Nassau, House of, 39, 42 Papacy, 149 Papal states, n , 86, 88, 121 Paris Peace Conference, 5 Paris, treaty of (1814), 5, 19, 54, 68, 70, 85, 92, 93, 96 Parma, 95 Patriotism, 7, 9, 146 Piedmont, 11,86,92, 99. See Sardinia

Poland, 5,11-12, 29,123-145, 150,151 Pope, 104, 105, 122 Potniatowski, Stanislas Augustus, 124-125 Prussia, 5, 20-21, 23-36, 40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 49. 50, 57. 5ft 60, 61, 62, 6β, 69, 75, 7β, 79, 8o, 92, 94, 107, I'll, 131. 136-138, 144, 147. 148 Rechberg, Count, 63 Reichenbach, treaty of (1813), 127 Rheinischer Merkur, 20, 30-31, 32, 48, 64, 69 Rimini proclamation, 102, 103 Russia, 5, 24, 44-51, 94, 124, 136, 137, 142, 144, 145. 150 Saint-Marsan, Count, 94, 97, 105 Sardinia, n , 86, 91-92, 101, 105, 106, 109, 114-115. See Piedmont Savoy, county, 92 Savoy, House of, 11, 86, n o Saxon question, 28-33, 46, 49-5°, 6061, 68, 71-72, 73-74, 77. 138 Saxe-Weimar, 38, 79 Schwarzenberg, Prince von, 61 Secret Societies. See Carbonari, Free Masons, Tugenbund Sicily, π, 86, 94, 103-104, 105, 107. See Naples Sorel, Albert, 7 Spain, 95-96 Srbik, Heinrich, Ritter von, 8 Stein, Baron vom, 20-33, 44, 45, 4751, 52, 62, 64, 66, 79, 137-138, 147148 Talleyrand, 6, 66-70, 72-73, 77, 80, 108-113, Π9, 140-141, 144 Treitschke, Heinrich von, 6, 8 Tugenbund, 30 Tuscany, 85, 86, 94, 104, 105, 107, 121 Venice, 85, 90, 97-98. See Lombardy and Lombardy-Venetia Victor Emanuel I, of Sardinia, 91-92, 97, 104, 106, 109, 149 Ward, A. W., 8 Webster, Charles K., 8 Wellington, Duke of, 71, 72, ior-102 Winzingerode, Count, 64-65 Wrede, Prince, 63-64 Württemberg, 28, 43, 49, 63-66, 78