The Army Of The Future 0837175259

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T H E ARMY O F T H E F U T U RE By G ENERAL CHARLES D E GAULLE

Foreword by WALTER MILLIS

GREENWOOD PRESS. PUBLISHERS W EST P O R T , C O N N E C T IC U T

L ib rary of Congress Cataloging in Publication D ata

G a u lle , C h a rle s d e . P r e s , F r a n c e , 1 8 9 0-1970. The army o f t h e f u t u r e . T r a n s l a t i o n o f V ers I 'a r m e e d e m e t i e r . R e p r in t o f t h e 19i^l e d . p u b lis h e d by L i p p i n c o t t , P h ila d e lp h ia . 1. F r a n c e - - D e f e n s e s . 2 . F ra n c e . Armee. I. T itle . UA700.G52 1976 5 5 5 .3 7it-5925 ISBN 0 - 8 5 7 1 - 7525 - 9

C O PYR I G H T , 1 9 4 1 , B Y

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY C opyright © 1969 by Mrs. Vyvyan B. Holland. All rights reserved. Originally published in 1941 b y J . B. L ip p in co tt C om pany, Philadelphia. R eprinted by arrangem ent w ith J . B. L ip p in co tt C om pany. R eprinted from a copy in the collections o f the B rooklyn Public Library. R eprinted in 1976 by G reenw ood Press A division o f Congressional In fo rm atio n Service, Inc. 88 Post Road West, W estport, C onnecticut 06881 Library o f Congress catalog card n u m b er 74-5925 ISBN 0-8371-7525-9 Printed in the U nited States o f Am erica 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

CONTENTS

FOREW ORD BY W ALTER M ILLIS

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PA RT I. PR O TECTIO N

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PART II. T E C H N IQ U E PART III. POLICY

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45

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71

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PART IV. CO M PO SITIO N

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PART V. E M P L O Y M E N T

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PART VI. T H E H IG H C O M M A N D

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123 155

F O RE W O RD B y W a l t e r M i U is T

h is

is

t h e

n o w

f a m o u s

l it t l e

b o o k

b y

a

F ren c h oflEcer on the principles o f w h ic h the F re n c h did not ac t— w hile the Germ ans did. I t was origin ally published in 1934. H it ler, at t h at time, had barely consolidated his power over G er m a n y, and the great N a z i onslaugh t u pon the post-w ar w orld had not ye t begu n; the Italians had n ot yet invaded E t h iop ia; the League o f N atio ns still lived ; F ra n ce was still the greatest m ilit ary pow er on earth, and the au thor o f this book was still a co m p ara tively little k n ow n ar m y cap tain , a teacher at the m ilitary college o f St. C y r . B u t the **army o f the fu t u re ,” as C ap tain de G au lle described it, was w it h in six years to be an ar m y in terrible fa c t— an ar m y created b y N a z i G er m a n y instead o f b y the F ren ch , and lau nched upon F ran ce to her destruc tion. Pou ring in a torren t o f fire ou t o f L u xe m b u rg and the A rden nes, precisely as D e G aulle had fo re seen, i t was to strike fo r “ the sources o f the O ise, the w orst fla w ,” as he had called it, “ in o u r fra il defenses” ; and begin ning w it h th at p araly z ing 7

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blow was to crush the w hole power o f F ran ce in a six weeks’ cam paign. T h ere is a m elancholy in ter est n ow in observing the acc u racy o f D e G au lle’s analysis, in co m paring his im agin ary mechanized divisions— m oving a hundred miles a day, always m an euvering to " a t t a c k fro m behind,” the leading units em ployed " t o break th rough and to push on towards the fin al objectives as rap id ly as possible,” u t iliz ing a irc ra f t as " n o t o n ly auxiliaries b u t indis pensable comrades in arms” — w it h the actual ar mored colu m n and d ive bom ber teams w h ic h six years later were to sweep in just this w a y across the face o f north ern F ran ce and Flanders. B u t this book o f C ap tain de G aulle has a m uch greater im portance to-d ay than t h a t m erely o f a prediction fro m w h ic h others were to profit, o f a neglected w ar n ing fo r w h ic h events were to su pply a terrible justification . T h e obscure captain o f 19 34 is n ow the leader o f Free F ran ce, the m an w ho snatched hope, en ergy and resolution ou t o f the vast w rec k , w ho raised the ban ner as others were let ting it fa l l and w ho m ay y e t p lay a large role in the fa te o f his co u n try and the world. T h e book b rillia n tly etches the q u ality o f m ind w h ich he brings to the task. H is record sufficien tly demon strates his capacities as a man o f action: the book shows th at he combines w it h them in tellectual powers to w h ich w e are, perhaps, too little accus tomed in our ow n m ih tary men. H ere are that pre-

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cision and lu c id ity o f though t, th at ab ility to grasp the problem o f modern w ar as a whole, backed b y a real sense o f the past, a real k now ledge o f m ilitary h istory and even a genuine literary grace, w h ic h are the glo ry o f the F ren c h m ilitary tradition. H ere is the type o f F ren c h oflEcer w h ic h sustained the co m m on p re-w ar belief th at the F ren ch staff was in co m parably the best in the world. T h e fa c t th at there were too fe w o f the type in F ran ce and that the belief was u nfou n ded does not alter the tru t h that it is in tellectual powers o f this order, i t is the ab ility to th in k in these terms, w h ic h are demanded fo r success in modern w a r or modern defense. A n d therein lies the fin al im portance o f D e G au lle’s analysis. T h e F ren c h did not read i t ; there is m uch reason w h y A m ericans should do so. F o r it was not sim ply an exposition o f the tactical powers o f the armored division; it was a plea fo r the adop tion o f a basically altered m ilitary policy, a policy fou n ded upon the n ew powers o f the ta n k and trac tor, b u t in clu d ing m uch more than this in its scope. T h e title in the original F ren ch editions was " T o w a r d the C areer A r m y ” ; the fu n dam en tal ar gu m en t was that the social and economic conditions o f con tem porary life, the tem per o f the age and the political aims o f modern states, no less than the rapid m echanization o f the actual instru m en ts o f w ar, all combined to in dicate a retu rn , to the idea o f the long-service, fu lly-eq u ip ped, exp er t ly trained

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professional ar m y as the first line and basic element in national defense. T h e h uge civilia n mass arm y, in trod uced in N apoleon ic times and reach ing its highest poin t in the enormous slaughters o f 19 14 19 18 , would remain as a second line, both in de fense and in follow ing u p and occ u pying the grou n d tak en in an offensive (an d so, in fa c t , it has remained in the G erm an m ili t ary sc h e m e); b u t as the p ri m ary instru m en t o f m ilitary pow er i t was already an anachronism. Essen tially clu m sy, slow and w astefu l on the battlefield, i t had even deeper in heren t defects. T h e difficulties o f train ing i t in time o f peace, the bad compromises forced b y the at tem p t to fi t short-service civilians to the in tricate modern weapons, its ten dency to com pel inertia, conservatism and u n im agin ative rou tine upon the higher com m and— these things, as D e G aulle notes them, are not the least in teresting aspects o f his analysis, n or were t h ey w it h ou t their effect in bringing about the fin al catastrophe o f France. T h e y are m atters o f im portance to A m ericans, as the U n ited States n ow sets ou t to create an arm y fro m the begiim ing. T h is co u n try is starting w it h an almost clean slate. T h e k in d o f pattern w h ich it adopts, the k in d o f ideas w h ic h govern in the high com m and and in the p u blic at large, the general conception o f the proper structu re and fu n c tio n o f our n ew ar m y and o f its relationship to the social and econom ic as well as strategic com plex in w hich

FOREW ORD

II

i t is set, w ill make an immense difference. D e G au lle was w r i t i n g about F ran ce in 19 3 4 ; and the pat tern w h ic h he discerned can not be ex ac t ly a p plied to the problems o f the U n ited States. B u t on ly w it h a real u n derstanding o f the ch aracter o f the problem— such an u n derstanding as his terse and lu cid chapters convey— can A m ericans hope to su c ceed in their great defense effort.

Pa

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PR O T EC T I O N

"O ld clay made fo r sorrow . ” —

A lber t

Sa m a in

I A s LO O K IN G AT A PORTRAIT SUGGESTS T H E IM P R E S sion o f the su bject’s destiny to the observer, so the m ap o f F ran ce tells our ow n fortu n e. T h e body o f the co u n try has in its cen tre a citadel, a forbid d ing mass o f age-old mountains, flan ked b y the table lands o f Provence, Lim ousin, and B u rgu n d y; and, all around, vast slopes, fo r the most p ar t difficult o f access to anyone a t tac k ing them fro m the outside and split b y the gorges o f the Saone, the Rh o n e and the G aron ne, barred b y the walls o f the Ju r a A lps and the Pyrenees or else p lu nging in the distance in to the E nglish C han nel, the A t la n t ic , or the M ed i terran ean; b u t in the N ort h east, there is a terrible breach between the essential basins o f the Seine and o f the Loire and G erm an territory. T h e Rh in e, w h ic h nature m ean t the G auls to have as their bou n dary and their protection, has h ard ly touched F ran ce before it leaves her and lays her open to attac k . I t is true th at the Vosges set up a w ide ram part, bu t it is one w h ic h can be turned b y the gap at B e lfo r t or b y the salt marshes. I t is true t h at the slopes o f the Moselle and those o f the Meuse, resting at one end on the Lorrain e tableland and at the I?

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Other on the A rden nes, fo r m appreciable b u t not v e ry deep obstacles, w h ic h a slight error, surprise, or neglect would be suflEcient to lose, and w h ic h would become vulnerable fro m the rear w it h the first w it h d raw al in H ain a u t or in Flanders. F or, in these lo w -ly i n g plains, there is neither w a ll nor ditch upon w h ich to base resistance: there are no lines o f dom inating heights, no rivers ru n n ing p ar allel to the fro n t . W orse still, the lie o f the land there appears specially designed to facilitate in vasion b y m ultiple pen etrating routes, the valleys o f the Meuse, o f the Sam bre, o f the Scheldt, o f the Scarpe, and o f the Lys, in w h ic h valleys, rivers, roads and railw ays seem eager to guide the enemy. A w k w a r d as it is in relief, the northeast fro n tier is not less aw k w ard because o f its salient o u t line. T h e adversary w ho strikes sim ultaneously in Flanders, in the A rden nes, in Lorraine, in A lsace and at the gates o f B u rgu n d y, is delivering co n verg ing blows. I f he succeeds at one poin t, he shatters the whole system o f the F ren c h defence. T h e first fo rw ard steps take him to the Seine, the A u b e, the M arne, the A isne and the O ise, fro m w h ich he has then o n ly to fo llo w the easiest o f paths to strike at her heart, Paris, w h ich is at the confluence o f these rivers. T h is breach in the ram parts is the age-old w ea k ness o f the cou n try. T h rough it, Ro m a n G au l saw the Barbarians h u rl themselves upon her wealth. I t

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was there that the M o n arc h y struggled to resist the pressure o f the H o ly Ro m a n E m pire. T h ere, Louis X I V defended his power against the combined forces o f E urope. T h e Revolu tio n all b u t came to gr ie f there. N apoleon succum bed there. I n 1870, disaster and shame advanced along the same road. I n this fa tal passage-way we recen tly buried oneth ird o f our you ng men. Q uite apart fro m w ar crises, w it h w h at a heavy load has the possession o f this w eak fro n tier burdened F ran ce! H o w m an y projects have proved abortive, how m a n y hopes have been shattered, how m a n y en ter prises brough t to nothing, all fo r w a n t o f a good hedge around the estate! T h e com m and o f the sea has been lost, ou r expansion has been m ortgaged, w e have made alliances fo r w h ich we p ay too dearly, we have to subm it to extortion and have been forced to abandon positions, and the people themselves, ceaselessly obsessed by the same threat, are in a constant state o f uneasiness, division and irritation. Besides, this chronic danger becomes greater as time goes on. F or Paris to be where she is no doubt m attered little to a C arolingian. People liv in g under the C apets took a more serious view o f the situa tion. U n der the V alois, th ey though t o f little else. U n d er the Bourbons it became intolerable. N i n e teen t h-cen tury F ran ce endured its crush ing slavery. T h in k o f it d uring the G rea t W a r! W h at w ill it be

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lik e to-m orrow? T h ere are b u t a hundred and t w e n ty-five miles between Paris and the fro n t ier, six days’ m arch, three hours b y m otor-car, an hour b y aeroplane. A single reverse at the sources o f the O ise, and the Lo u vre is w it h in gu n range. A n d how is the role o f Paris to be defined, unless, w it h V a le ry, as prodigious and peculiar to itself? T h is agglom era tion, w h ic h is scarcely five miles across, controls the whole existence o f the nation. O u t o f every seven F rench m en, one lives there and the other six de pend upon w h at people t h in k there and w h at t h ey do there. D octrin es, pow er, reputations, fashions, m oney, the fr u its o f the soil, the products o f indus t r y , flow in to it and are redistribu ted b y the c u r rents o f though t, o f opinion and o f transport, o f w h ich the capital is the focus. Its w elfare or its d o w n fall are v e r y n early com mensurate w it h the health or ru in o f the State itself. E ac h time Paris was taken d u ring the last ce n t u ry, F ren c h resistance cru m bled w it h in an hour. O u r national defence is essentially t h at o f Paris. A ga i n , a large p ar t o f the necessities o f our exist ence is fou n d concen trated quite close to the worst p ar t o f our fro n tier. T h is was not always so. P ro vence, A q u itain e, the valleys o f the Saone, and o f the Rhone and the ban ks o f the Loire successively held this position in for m er times. B u t at the present day, the w orld is machine-made. O f the coal p ro duced b y F ran ce, tw o-t h irds comes ou t o f the earth

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at Lens or at V alenciennes. O u r ric h iron ores come fro m L o n gw y, Briey, N a n c y . T h e small am ou n t o f oil t h at we can ex t rac t gushes fro m the soil o f A lsace. O f one hundred and f i f t y blast furn aces, one hundred and t w e n ty are situated in Lorrain e or in C ham pagne. N o r t h o f the Seine valley, nineten ths o f F ren c h cloth and fo u r-fif t h s o f F rench woollen goods are w oven . O n the ban ks o f t h at river the greater p art o f our chem ical products, all our m otor-cars, all ou r a irc raft, are m an ufactu red. In Brie, Beauce, Flanders, and A rto is, are our best cornfields; ou r sugar-beet is in P icard y and in Ilede-F rance. T h e Paris basin provides a livelihood fo r fiftee n m illion F rench m en, those w ho produce the most and w ho ow n tw o-t h irds o f the c o u n t ry’s wealth. A gain , h ard ly has one crossed the Belgian fro n t ier when one is in the cen tre o f the industrial d istrict o f Ro u b aix, o f the mines o f D e n ain - A n z in or o f the Meuse forges. I t is bu t a d ay’s m arch fro m Sierc k to the T h ion ville blast furnaces. F ro m G e r m an y, Pechelbron n is w it h in gu nfire and Stras bourg is w it h in rifle fire. T h ere are no steps leading up to our treasures. Such geographical disadvantages are peculiar to F rance. T h e sea protects E nglan d, A m erica, and Jap a n . T h e immense arc o f the A lps preven ts access to I t a ly on all sides. D istance makes Russia im preg nable. T h e Pyrenees and, beyond them, great rugged stretches o f territory, defend Spain. H o w

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distan t and scattered are the active centres o f the G erm an E m p ire: the R u h r, the H a r z M ou n tains, Saxon y, Silesia! T o reach them, we have first to cross the obstacle presented b y a range o f slaty mountains, n arrow valleys, precipitous slopes, and deep forests, forb id d ing and m isty, tortuous and treacherous. N o one has ever been able to cross the R h in e and invade G erm an territory. T h e land i t self figh ts against the invader w it h all its acciden tal features. I f the invader takes the Southern route, t w e n t y m ou n tain ranges, Bavarian , H essian, W est phalian, Suabian, F ran con ian , T h u ringia n and Saxon , ru n n ing in all directions, conspire to co n fuse him. B u t i f he marches in the N o r t h , the nu m bers o f rivers c u t t i n g across his route, o f fens, o f bogs, sand-wastes and swam ps, spread in defi n itely over the cou n tryside, sadly w ear ou t his strengt h and his courage. T h a t is the old story o f V arus, o f Soubise, and o f M oreau; and the cause o f F oc h ’s supreme hesitation. I n the five hours* fligh t b y the Berlln-Paris air rou te, the traveler sees, m arked ou t on the soil, the safeguards o f G er m a n y and the weaknesses o f F ran ce. O n leaving the ban ks o f the Spree he can, d u ring his long enforced leisure over tw o hundred and f i f t y miles as fa r as the Meuse, p ic k out the moats in the shape o f the Elbe, the A ller, the Leine, the W eser, and the Rh in e, w h ich protect the cap i tal o f the G erm an State f a r and near; he can con-

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tem plate the fortresses o f the H a r z , H essian, R o t h haar, and E ife l m ou n tains w it h w h ic h nature has endowed the Germ ans. Su d den ly the land flattens ou t, grows gen tler and more hum an. T h ere are no longer an y m ou n tains or gorges or precipices. W e have arrived in F ra n ce! H a r d ly is the fro n t ier crossed than this basin-shaped territory w h ic h dips towards its cen tre, those con verging rivers, railw ays and roads, this suburban aspect w h ic h the co u n t ry assumes so rap id ly, m ake one feel th at Paris is quite close. A n d here at once w e see the p ublic buildings, warehouses and factories, the foc us o f a thousand arteries, ill-guarded b y low hills, bordered b y easily penetrated woods, w it h ou t a n y fortificatio ns, a close, coveted and easy p rey!

II T

h e

p o l ic y

o f

a

st a t e

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s a id

n a po l e o n

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is

d e

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cided b y 'ts geograp hy. F ran ce has, th rough the cen turies, sought b y d iplom acy the protection w h ich n^iture has denied her. O thers have been able to concen trate on the dom ination o f the seas, the exploitation o f distan t lands and o f free outlets, the u n iting o f a scattered race; b u t w h at haunts us most is the sa fe ty o f our ow n hexagonal territory. A l l the schemes prepared and treaties concluded b y F ran ce d u ring the past thousand years have had as their object the establishment o f a political system w h ic h should preven t our enemies fro m molesting us. T h an ks to these constan tly renewed efforts, we have, indeed, survived, bu t we are now more than ever b ereft o f guarantees. I t is true t h at the last invasion fro m E nglan d was more than a ce n t u ry ago. A f t e r so m a n y en coun ters, Lon don and Paris have settled their d i f ferences. I n retu rn fo r the ac k now ledgm en t o f British m aritim e suprem acy, w e are allowed to cou n t on E nglish n eu trality, w h ic h m ay t u rn th at n e u trality in to an alliance fo r m u tual interest. N o doubt, our Spanish quarrels have faded in to the distan t past also. F o r tw o hundred years M adrid, 22

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c u t off fro m the G erm ans, f a r aw ay fro m the N etherlan ds, troubled b y separatisms, first ruined b y its empire, then decaying th rough h aving lost it, placed u n til yesterday u n der the Bourbon scep tre, has been carefu l not to d raw the sword against us excep t in case o f legitim ate self-defence. N o doubt, also, the frien dsh ip o f the Swiss, fostered b y all ou r adm inistrations and especially precious t o day, bars the e n t ry via B u rgu n d y and the Rhon e valley. N o doubt, lastly, aft er h aving so often a t tem pted to negotiate w it h I t a ly, w e have at least been able to achieve our national u n i ty in the Southeast and to persuade Pied m on t, u n til recen tly the door-keeper o f the A lps, to deliver up the keys o f ou r mountains. B u t in I t a ly herself a great State has arisen whose fever fo r expansion has driven her in to nightmares o f empire. O u r wealth tem pts this nation, w h ic h is encouraged in its covetousness b y the threat w it h w h ich the feeblest o f our fron tiers is menaced b y the strongest o f ou r neighbours. F or, between G auls and T eu tons alternate v i c tories have solved nothing and fu lfilled nothing. A t times, exhausted b y w ar, the tw o nations seem to be reconciled, in the w a y t h at to t tering wrestlers lean against one another fo r support. B u t, as soon as t h ey recover, each resumes his w a tc h u pon his adversary. Such instability is in the nature o f things. T h ere is no geographic obstacle to keep the t w o races apart. T h e perpetual osmosis that has re-

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suited fro m this has certain ly had the effect o f m u l t ip lyin g reciprocal influences, b u t it also makes any lim it to the field o f action p u rely arb itrary. W h er ever it passes, the F ra n co-G er m a n fro n t ier is an open wou n d. F ro m w h atever poin t it blows, the w in d w h ich sweeps it is laden w i t h u lterior m o tives. C o n flic ting tem peraments fa n this bitterness. I t is n ot as though each underrated the value o f the other and did not dream fro m time to time o f the great things t h ey could do together. B u t their reac tions are so d ifferen t th at t h ey keep the tw o nations in a constan t state o f distrust o f each other. T h is F ren ch m an , w ho has so m uch order in his m ind and so little in his acts, this logician w ho doubts every th ing, this lackadaisical hard w or k er, this stay-a thome colonizer, this enthusiast about A lexan drines, tail-coats and p u blic gardens, w ho, nevertheless, sings com ic songs, goes about in sloppy clothes and strews the grass w it h lit ter, this C olbert colleague o f Louvois, this Jaco b i n shouting **Long live the E m p e ro r!” , this politician w ho form s the " U n io n Sacree,” this m an defeated at C h arleroi w ho a t tacks on the M arne, in short, this fic k le, u ncertain, co n trad ic tory nation, how could the T eu to n sy m path ize w it h it, understand it, or trust it? A n d , conversely, we feel uneasy about G er m a n y, a force o f the nature to w h ic h she clings so closely, a b u n dle o f p o w erfu l ye t h a z y instincts, born artists

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w it h ou t any taste, tech nicians w ho remain feu dal, bellicose fathers o f fam ilies, w it h restaurants w h ich are temples, factories in the m idst o f forests. G ot h ic palaces fo r lavatories, oppressors w h o w a n t to be loved, separatists w ho are slavishly obedient, c a r pet-k n igh ts w ho make themselves sick w hen t h ey have had too m uch beer, a road w h ich Siegfried the Lim ousin sees as epic in the m orn ing, rom an tic to wards m idday, w arlik e in the evening, a sublime and livid ocean fro m w h ic h the net draws ou t a ju m ble o f monsters and treasures, a cathedral whose m an y coloured nave— an assembly o f noble arches filled w it h harmonious tones— organizes, in sy m phonic harm ony fo r the senses, fo r the m in d, fo r the soul, the emotion and ligh t and religion o f the world, bu t whose transept is dark and echoes w it h low m utterings. F or centuries our rulers succeeded in lim iting the dangers o f the East b y a traditional policy w h ich k ep t our neighbours apart. W hether F ran ce em ployed arms to roll back the fro n tier, pleading In t u r n the righ ts o f inheritance, the law o f the stronger, the protection o f others or lib er ty, or w hether she possessed in Lorraine, on the Rh in e, or in H ollan d, a nu m ber o f sym pathizers or o f peo ple bound together b y com mon interest, or whether she exploited the T eu to n ten dency towards the clan, towards separate grouping, towards p ar t ic u larism, or whether she concluded balancing alli-

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ances behind their backs, she was, u n til co m para t ive ly recen t times, able to preven t G er m a n y fro m ever bringing her whole w eigh t to bear upon her. B u t this classic game o f chess in w h ic h , b y co m bining force w it h in trigue, we held the f u r y o f the T eu tons at bay, has been sw ept fro m the board. Gone are the Protestan t Princes w ho braved C harles V , the Suleimans let loose on V ien n a, G ustavus A dolp h us to aid Rich elieu, the venal Prin ceBishops, alliances to be upset, the C on federation o f the Rh in e, rivalries between H apsb u rgs and H ohenzollerns, an d secret ambitions o f W ittelsbachs. U n ited G erm an y, favou red b y our illusions, ce mented b y our disasters, consolidated b y our haste to lim it the results o f our recen t v ic t o ry o f 19 18 , has p u t the colossus in a position to h u rl itself upon the W est in a single instantaneous bound. N o t , in deed, w it h ou t m a n y in ternal vexations. I t is ir k some fo r a Bavarian to accept Prussian domination, fo r a Rhenish C at holic to live under the au t hority o f Protestan t officials, fo r a H a m b u rg m erchan t to sub m it to the same regime as a small Pomeranian squire. I n spite o f appearances, all these regions, parties, powers and associations seethe w it h a thou sand d ivergen t inclinations. B u t it is just this threat o f an arc hy th at eggs on the G erm an E m p ire to u n dertake great enterprises. Its continued u n ity de pends upon outside expansion and great designs, w h ich alone in the eyes o f the Germ ans ju s t ify the

PR O TEC TIO N

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sacrifices t h ey m ake fo r them. Bism arc k u n der stood this at first; w hen he seemed to fo rge t it, a yo u n g em peror turned him ou t, w it h the approval o f everyone. T o-d ay, the Reic h follows along the same lines. W ho can doubt th at a fresh crisis w ill once more draw the Germ ans towards Paris? B y w h at road do we imagine th at the m ain part o f their ar m y w ill t r y to m ake its w ay? I t is a fa c t t h at tw o hostile masses usually go the shortest w ay about a t tac k ing one another. T h e line w h ic h joins th eir cen tre o f gra v i t y m arks the direction o f their p rin cip al efforts. I n the time o f the G erm an i, a pastoral and h u n ting people, most o f the pop ula tion lived in the N or t h er n plains. W h en the Ro m a n E m p ire became too feeble to hold the R h in e, in vasion started th rough C ologne and b y the coast. F ollow ing this flat co u n try, there was no fear o f an ambuscade o f the G auls, chariots could be driven along w it h ou t exhausting the oxen on the upgrades, and the sluggish rivers were easily forded. I t was on the Scheldt th at the F ran ks assembled. L a ter the G erm ans, h aving become an agric u lt u ral people, grouped themselves on the c h al k y uplands and the clay-soil valleys o f the middle lands— Suabian, F ran con ian , H essian, and Saxon, w h ich form ed the heart o f the E m pire. T h e D iet, sit ting at Ratisbon, and the throne o f the H apsburgs, raised at V ien n a, gave their blessing to this state o f affairs, and G e r man eyes and weapons were directed towards L or-

28

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raine, B u rgu n d y, F ran c h e-C o m te. W hen F ran ce wan ted to crush G er m a n y, or vice-versa, it was in Bavaria, F ran con ia, Baden, Saxo n y or else in L o r raine, A lsace, C h am pagn e that t h ey m et most often . T h e decisive battles bore the names o f F re i b urg, Blen heim , Rossbach, C refeld , V a l m y, W issem bourg, H ohenlin den, U l m , Je n a, Leip z ig, G ravelo t te; the N etherlan ds on ly became the p r i n cipal theatre o f operations i f the E m perors wished to join hands w it h their E nglish, D u tc h , or Swiss allies. T h en the battlefields became Sain t- Q uen tin , D enain, W attign ies, W aterloo. B u t, in the past f i f t y years, G er m a n y has become an in dustrial, com m ercial and m aritim e nation. W estphalian coal, H a r z M ou n tain ores, and the great ports on the river estuaries, have at tracted the labouring masses to the plains o f the N o r t h . T o day, o n ly one G erm an in three lives south o f the line Breslau-Leip z ig-C assel-C ologn e, and south o f this there are b u t ten tow ns o f more than r 00,000 in habitan ts ou t o f t h irty-eigh t in the whole empire. Berlin has raised itself to the ran k o f economic and in tellectual, as well as political, capital. F or the greater nu m ber o f Germ ans, the road to F ran ce lies th rough Belgiu m in the fo r m o f the Berlin-Paris railw ay. T h e fam ous Schlieffen plan was based on n ew and dom in ating circumstances. W h at n eu tral i t y trea ty could have diverted towards N a n c y a n a tion the mass o f w h ic h was strain ing towards

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C harleroi? T h e same destiny m ay be played ou t to m orrow. C arried along b y the force o f c ifc u m stances, their direction dictated to them b y their railways, eight ou t o f eleven o f the prin cipal o f w h ich arrive at the fro n t ier N o r t h o f T h ionville, invited b y the level roads o f W estphalia and F la n ders and b y the numberless canals o f the R u h r and o f the N etherlan ds, at tracted towards A n t w erp and Calais by the instinct o f keeping an eye on E nglan d, determined to strike us to the heart b y the shortest and easiest path, w ill not the Germ ans take as their m ain direction the sources o f the O ise, the worst flaw in our fra il defences? I n other words, the protection o f F ran ce on her most dangerous fro n tier depends upon Belgiu m . I f a solid A rden nes and L uxe m bou rg barrier be raised against G e r m any, we are assured o f time and space in w hich to act. B u t i f the E m peror O tho, C harles V , Prin ce Eugene, C ob u rg, Bliich er and vo n K l u c k , as mas ters o f the Meuse bridges, are able to m ake their battlefield on Flemish or W alloon territory, w e see ourselves condemned to long and exhausting ca m paigns. N o w , although this Belgian co u n try, w it h ou t depth and w it h ou t redoubts, this people o f tw o separate races and tw o rival languages, this new and suspicious State, has proved herself able to p lay an heroic p art, how m an y reasons m ay some day preven t her fro m co m m it ting herself com pletely,

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alone, in the fo re fro n t o f the battle? W it h o u t im agin ing t h at the in trigues o f F erran d, C o u n t o f F lan ders, should ever be revived, w it h ou t even sup posing t h at invaded Belgiu m m igh t wish to ap p ly the Leopold plan, leave the w a y clear and arm on ly A n t w e r p , it is n ot certain t h at she m ust in every case accep t the risk w it h ou t more reservations and calculations than A lb e r t I did in her name. I n any case, let us not w a i t fo r her to tire herself out in protec ting us. I t is true th at F ran ce, disappointed b y the old political system, is seeking, in a n ew in ternational order o f things, the sec u rity she used to jSind in her tradition al methods o f procedure. T h e dream o f F ra n ce is, pre-em in en tly, t h a t o f an organised w orld, w here the strictness o f the la w , the mod erateness o f desires and the u b iq u ity o f the police would guaran tee peace fo r all and allow everyone to live his ow n life. T ire d as w e are o f adventures, w ell provided fo r in lan d and factories, overloaded w it h colonies, ou r interests become confused w it h this hope. O u r love o f universal systems, w h ich en abled us to bear, successively, Ro m a n au t h ority, the gospel o f classic laws and revolu tio n ary principles, and perhaps also a partic u lar ten den cy to open the door to n ew methods, m ust be taken into accoun t. A thousand p rac tical or noble reasons make F ran ce to-d ay the Penelope o f in ternational w or k . F rom this comes the n etw or k o f pacts, protocols and gen-

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era! acts w h ic h she is t ry i n g to wea /e around the world. H en ce, in relation to others, especially the more restless, comes this at tem p t to appease every one w h ic h she calls *the E uropean sp irit.’ H ence, also, w it h most o f our politicians, comes the wish to tu r n the people against pagean try and strongarm methods. M eanw hile, tim e passes and it does not seem as though all these efforts have helped to m ake F ran ce more secure. N o doubt, by ta k ing advan tage o f the credit con ferred on our idealism t h rough v ic t o ry, and o f the personal t ac t o f our statesmen, helped b y a certain A nglo-Saxo n p iety, it has at times been able to give the statue an appearance o f life. B u t, first and forem ost, there is nothing legal nor effica cious to oppose to violence. I n vie w o f certain ab stract assertions and promises, the con tin uance o f vested interests and w a tc h fu l ambitions becomes unreasonable. T h is liberal u n derstanding o f w h ich we are so prodigal is n ot reciprocated. T h e egotism o f n a tions becomes more and more stubborn. E ac h n a tion retires w it h in herself. T h e world resounds w it h cries o f: “ T h e harm th at has been caused me, the injustice th at has been done to me, the territory w h ich should be returned to m e!” A n d at the v e ry time w hen we declare th at w ar should be outlawed and affect to efface the power o f the sword fro m H isto ry and even its com m em orative medals, in

32

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O th e r p l a c e s f o r c e is a c c l a i m e d , t h e n o s t a l g i a o f d a n g e r is p r o c l a i m e d a s g o o d a n d n e c e s s a r y , a r m a m e n t s a r e in s is t e d u p o n a n d m e n a r e f o r m e d in t o m i l i t i a , a r m ie s , a n d s t o r m - t r o o p s . W h e r e , t h e n , w ill th e t o r r e n t s t o p ?

Ill Is T H IS PO O RLY-PRO TECTED N A T IO N , T H E N , AT least on her guard? Does she seem capable o f ge t ting the best ou t o f her w ar machine at a mom ent's notice? C an she strike in real earnest fro m the o u t set? T w e n t y centuries answer. N o! F ran ce, in a hundred conflicts, has proved herself able to m ake tremendous efforts; b u t t h ey were at first bad ly organized, ill-assorted and ou t o f p ro portion to the even tual results. N o doubt, the fusion o f several p o w erfu l races in the most favou rable circu mstances has created a 'rare and precious h arm on y' in our people. A cou n t r y o f mild climate, where every region possesses its ow n p artic u lar characteristics, com plem en ting those o f its neighbours, w here the basins drained b y divergen t rivers o f differen t ch aracter co m m u nicate w it h each other b y easy passes, a land o f harmonious horizons, o f p le n tifu l products, and varied in con tour, F ran ce has im prin ted on the men w ho live there her ow n stam p, m ak ing a bal anced whole ou t o f their differences and welding their many-sidedness in to u n ity. F listo ry herself lent her aid. T h e Ro m an conquest, b y givin g the peoples o f G au l the same language, the same laws 33

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and C h rist ia n ity and b y m a k ing them accep t a single m orality, and later the m on arch y, w h ich was a force fo r u n i ty, increased the com m on bond w h ic h withstood so m an y efforts to break i t up. So, th roughou t the ages, we see F ra n ce reac ting in times o f trial w it h extrem e vigo u r, reconstructing herself w hen she la y in pieces, rising again w hen she was considered dead, in short, p u t t in g up, against the w orst m isfortu nes, an am az ing resist ance and e n ergy; and she is strengthened b y the obscure feeling th at she possesses these qualities. B u t the easy exchange o f though t and sentiment among articu late people w h ere everyt h ing comes fro m the cen tre, is bound to have as a reaction the f a c t t h at com m on impressions are fic k le. T h is is a featu re o f the nervous m ak e-u p com m on to crowds and one w h ic h C xsa r himself noticed: " G a llo r u m subit ac repen tina consilia.” E n thusiasm and w ea k ness, equally precipitous, p le n ty o f passion b u t lit tle constan cy in our schemes, is our case. W hen w e are surprised b y danger, we accept it enthusias tically, bu t w it h ou t preparation. A t a n y rate, we bring no cohesion to bear upon the question. E v e ry F rench m an is too concerned fo r his ow n independ ence. Before co m m it ting himself, he considers the m at ter c arefu lly, acts in unison w it h others on ly w hen he believes it to be expedien t, and reserves his ju dgm en t w it h regard to the h ierarchy. A m o ng us, solidarity and discipline have a q u ality o f hesi-

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ta n cy, reserve and instability w h ich make com mon action uneven and aw k w ard . M oreover, w hen these doctrinal people meet fresh trials, th ey bristle w it h principles. T h eir eyes being blin dfolded, t h ey strike at e m p ty air, rush aimlessly hither and th ither, and h url themselves h eroically against bric k walls. T h en , discomfited bu t compensated b y their pride, th ey fin d themselves face to face w it h reality and tear aside its veils. T h en t h ey embrace it, dominate it, penetrate it, and ex trac t fro m it all the fru its o f vic tory. W e have, o f course, seen some o f our affairs su c cessfu lly decided fro m the v e ry outset. O tho had h ardly set foo t on F rench soil when he had to fly on the n igh t o f the battle o f Bouvines. T h e F la n ders and F ran c h e-C o m te cam paigns, d u ring the W ar o f D evolu tion, were models o f foresigh t. T h e ru m bling echo o f the th u n der w it h w h ic h N a p o leon overt h rew his adversaries is still to be heard. H ow ever, o f the great conflicts in w h ich our des t i n y was at stake, how m an y started calam itously! H o w m any absurd defeats has that evil genius cost us w h ich, at C r e c y and Poitiers, made us, faced by the E nglish archers and can non, confide our cause to the naive weapons o f C h iva lry, w h ic h drew the V alois in to the c ra z y Italian wars when we were already menaced b y the lengthening shadow o f C harles V , w h ich flu ng the F ran ce o f the 'R igh ts o f M an’ in to the struggle against E urope at the

36

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w orst mom en t o f our m ilitary disorganization, w h ic h lulled N apoleon w it h the dream o f N a t io n alities w h ile Prussia was sharpening her sword, and w h ic h , before 19 14 , blinded the ru ling political school w it h pacifist illusions! I t is, o f course, v e ry fine and v e ry pleasant to discover, in ou r extre m ity, L e G ra n d F erre, Jo a n o f A r c or D u G uesclin, to co n trive so well aft er Sain t- Q u en tin as to drive Philip I I fro m Paris, to be victorious at D enain w hen everyt h ing seemed lost, to frigh te n the al ready triu m p h an t Prussians at V a l m y, to strike again aft er Sedan w it h the mere stu m p o f a sword, to w in as i f b y a m iracle the battle o f the M arne. N evertheless, these escapes fro m the brin k o f the abyss do not, on the whole, offset the large nu m ber o f initial errors w h ich make H isto ry echo w it h the agon iz ing cries o f our ch iefs: the grim orders o f the d ay o f Jo ffr e and G allien i; G a m bet ta’s ad ju ra tio n: " L i f t up yo u r h earts!” ; D a n to n ’s o u t c ry: " T h e co u n try is in danger” ; the sad u tterance of Louis X I V : " T h e re is no happiness in our age!” ; F ran cis Ts sorrow: " A l l is lost save h o n o u r!” ; the M aid’s tears over " o u r piteous con dition” ; the de spair o f Philip V I in fligh t: " O p e n the door! I t is the w retch ed k ing o f F ra n c e!”

IV G

a p in g

w id e

o pe n

,

e x p o s in g

h e r

d e f e n c e l e s s

body to blows, deprived o f all respite and all refuge, where, then, can our co u n try fin d her laten t p ro tection excep t in arms? T h e sword is not o n ly the last argu m en t in her quarrels; it is also the on ly th ing th at makes up fo r her weakness. E very t h i n g th at is ill-adapted in her territory, absurd in her political system, infirm in her ch aracter has, in the last resort, noth ing to offset it b u t the w arlik e arts, the skill o f her troops, the sufferings o f her sol diers. A n d that is peculiar to our ow n cou n try. T h e power o f the U n ited States can grow ou t o f all proportion to its m ilit ary im portan ce; lost wars do not compromise the fu t u re o f Russia; I t a ly came in to being in the course o f numerous reverses; bu t fo r us, our greatness or our d o w n fall depends di rec t ly on the for t u n e o f battles. B y v ir t u e o f her physical and m en tal m ak e-u p, F ran ce m ust either be well-arm ed or not armed at all. T h is is a harsh law w h ich is perpetually at loggerheads w it h our idealism and our independent character, w h ich gives our national existence a curiously tortured aspect, w h ich constrained M az arin , w ho disdained soldiers, to create the R o ya l A r m y , led Sa i n t-Just 37

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into Strategy, Gambetta to the Ministry for War, Rochefort into political intrigue and reserved for Clemenceau, at the end of his career, the enthu siasm of the generals. T h e same conditions th at fro m age to age co m pel us, w hether we lik e it or not, to be a m ilitary nation, impose a perm anen t ch aracter on the initial system o f our defences. Since the n atu re o f things ordains that, in order fo r us to figh t, we can not afford a m om en t’s delay, th at w e can not afford to retire even h a lf a dozen miles, and th at a single lost battle means Paris p u t to fire and sword, our de fen ce m ust be instantaneous. O th er countries, w hen t h ey are threatened, can take tim e to close their doors, to sound the alarm, to m ake the bull o f U ri and the cow o f U n terw ald en bellow, and to call up their first and second reserves; w e have no such leisure. Especially as the T eu to n adversary, a m e thodical organizer, excels in delivering extrem ely violen t onslaughts fro m the outset. F rederic k the G rea t’s tactics, the mass w arfare originated b y M olt k e, the t u r n in g m ovem en t visualized b y Schlieffen, are so m an y thunderbolts. O nce w ar was declared, h ard ly was the in k d ry on the procla m a tions, than F ran ce learned th at B ru nsw ic k was de bouch ing in to C ham pagne, th at M ac M ahon and Froissard were defeated, and th at “ fro m the Somme to the Vosges the situation was u nchanged.” N o w a days, G er m a n y is ceaselessly m arshalling the means

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at her disposal w it h a vie w to rapid invasion, A certain portion o f our ow n troops m ust always be on the alert and capable o f deploying its whole force at the first shock o f at tac k . A gain , this vangu ard, upon w h ich all depends, can not hope, in support o f its effort, to fin d an y o f those accidents o f w h ich nature is so prodigal else w here: a T hermopylae in w h ich to ambuscade itself, mountains fo r guerilla w arfare, inundations w it h w h ich to drow n the enemy, a parched sum mer, a rain y season, 'G en eral W in ter.’ W e figh t our deci sive battles in clear weather and in wide plains crossed b y roads in good state o f repair. O u r as sailants, com ing up under cover o f the forests o f the Rh in e, o f the Moselle and o f the A rden nes, find an easily penetrable cou n tryside through w h ic h to debouch, and it is a simple task fo r them to choose their place and time. T h e defenders, i f t h ey remain inactive, fin d themselves surprised, im mobilized and ou tflan ked; and thus you have V illeroi defeated at Ram illies or Bazaine blocked in M et z. I f , on the other hand, th ey take an active role and are mobile and en terprising, as the D u k e o f L u xe m bou rg at Fleurus or N apoleon in 18 14 , t h ey go w here they wish to, shelter at a m om en t’s notice, and take the in itiative themselves. T h is is the on ly sensible a t t i tude to adopt towards the G erm an, w ho, u n equalled in carrying out plans he has prepared, loses his grip as soon as he is attacked in a w a y he does

40

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not expec t, and shows an aw kwardness in adapting himself to unforeseen circu mstances t h at explains V a l m y, Je n a, and the M arne. I t is therefore b y manoeuvring th at F ran ce is protected. N o w this perpetual state o f alert, rapid and secret m ovem en t and the im mediate convergence o f all efforts, de mand h igh ly trained troops. T h e C om m ittee o f Pu blic Sa fe t y m igh t w ell punish the generals o f 17 9 3 , b u t to w in at W attign ies t h ey had to w ait u n til the northern divisions had acquired some sort o f cohesion. I f one on ly looked at the m ap, one m igh t expec t everyt h ing fro m A m a d e’s group op erating on von K l u c k ’s flan k a ft e r C harleroi. I n poin t o f fa c t , w h at did th ey get ou t o f these still unconsolidated units? It is true that at all times France has tried to ob scure the breaches in her frontiers by fortifications. She is still doing the same. In the main, the same evidence by turns inspired Vauban, Gouvion-SalntCyr, Sere de Rivieres, Painleve and Maginot. One cannot value too highly the aid to resistance which permanent works are able to furnish. But these fortifications, quite apart from the fact that they must be given adequate garrisons, are very limited in depth. Besides, they leave the whole of the north ern region exposed. And how can one foresee the effects that would be produced on the defenders by modern methods of attack, aircraft, super heavy tanks and poisonous gases? Moreover, one

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must take into consideration the possibilities of sur render. For, of all the trials of war, the hardest, on the whole, is reserved for beleaguered troops. The impression of finding oneself surrounded by assailants, the horrible feeling of isolation, the fact of having to live with one’s wounded, the con tinual drain on one’s strength which cannot be re newed, very soon undermine the morale of troops. And when to such shocks, suffered at the begin ning of a campaign, are added those of one’s bap tism of fire, one needs extraordinary cohesion to resist them. Hence, of course, the supreme glory with which popular instinct surrounds the valiant defenders of strongholds. But hence also, of course, the complete surrenders which are the constant fate of indifferent garrisons. If Bayard and his faithful troops at Mezieres, Massena’s men at Genoa and Rapp’s 'old sweats’ at Danzig— all tried and chosen soldiers—rendered admirable service, can we blind ourselves to the fact that in other times the crowd ing together in fortresses of hastily formed units had, as its chief result, the effect of filling the en emy’s camps with prisoners and the Courts of En quiry with their leaders? To build our defence solely on the resistance of fortifications manned by novices would be absurd. How, then, are we to compensate for all that is usually unsound and awkward in the initial actions of the French, except by building up a special body

4

^

T H E ARM Y O F T H E F U T U R E

of men firmly welded together? The qualities of a specially picked force can offset the effect of those errors of foresight, those illusions about themselves and about others, sharing this moral and material confusion which so often marks our encounters with reality. Method, the habit of not being aston ished at anything, indeed that sort of isolation which long custom makes a sort of second nature to picked troops, those are the antidotes to our in ternal poisons. Behind vigilant arms the unrealities of politics admit of fewer perils. In military hon our, there is a breakwater which does not yield to confusions of opinion. Thanks to the self-sacrifice of faithful servants, the nation will be able to avail itself, perhaps, of the respite necessary for recuper ation. So one can crown one’s king, form a Teague of Public Welfare,’ enrol volunteers, organize na tional defence or change the 'X V II plan,’ without risking the cries of "Everyone for himself!” and "W e are betrayed” of a bad start. So, bad condi tions in the initial defence of a country bring in their wake perfectly definite consequences. Geo graphically suited for invasion, exposed to surprise attacks by the tendencies of our own national char acter as well as by those of our neighbours, we can not confine ourselves to hasty defences and discon nected formations in order to resist the initial shock. The moment has come when, to our mass of re serves and of recruits (the principal element of na-

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tional defence, bu t one w h ich is slow to mobilize and clu msy to set going, and whose giga n tic effort can on ly be used in the last degree o f danger) we must add a manoeuvring instru m en t w h ich is capa ble o f ac ting w it h ou t delay, that is to say, one w hich is perm anen t in its force, coherent, broken to battle. W it h ou t a professional ar m y there can be no F rench defence.

Pa

r t

II

TEC H N I Q U E

ff

It is thus! .

, .**— H

egel

( b e f o r e th e m o u n t a in s )

I H

e l pf u l

p r ii n o

a t

a l i.

t im e s

,

a i

pr e s i n t

m i'

machi ne controls our Jest i ny. C er t ai n ly, f ro m the dawn o f history it had relieved the toil o f our fellowmcn. Raisi ng or draggi ng heavy loads, crushi ng grai n, prepari tig raw materials, it played its part in the labourer’s task; and yet wi t hou t setting him free. Its slow power could on ly be laboriously e x ploited. T h e lever, the pulley, the mill or the press all demanded strai ni ng muscles and the sweat of the brow to wor k them. T h e pri mi t ive motions o f which it was the extension and the amplification, had still to be carried out. T hroughou t the ages, neither the part it played nor its for m were modi fied. Bu t the last ce n t ury radically changed the rela tions between human beings and their mechani / ed servants. B y applyi ng enormous mot ive power, by perfect i ng their organs, by accelerati ng their r hyt h m, we found means o f savi ng ourselves a tliousand physical efforts. Machi nes which clothe us, war m us, give us light, transport us, jircpare our food, help us to build and to c u l l i val c the ground and to reproduce our ibnughls, our voices and our likenesses, have transformed the conditions 47

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of life more profoundly in a hundred years than six thousand years were able to do. But at the same time, we have become dependent upon them. The product of all these wheels is the criterion in the distribution of tasks, of ambitions and of profits! In this way, the machine governs the life of our contemporaries in all its departments. It imprints its haste and its thraldom on them, gathers them together or disperses them, whistles them up or sends them away. It imposes itself on science as a subject upon which to theorise or as an instrument for experimentation. A rt itself, in the jerky mod ern music, sculpture and literature, reflects the tremor of pistons and connecting-rods. Our sport and our desires are all haunted by motors. N ot, indeed far from it, that this slavery para lyses the capacity for invention in our race. For, if the employment of machinery sweeps away au tomatism of movement, on the other hand it makes technique more complex and competition keener. The Taylorian system implies the existence of the inventor and the specialist. It is by no means true that the mass of products thrown at the people by industry drowns their taste for creation; in fact, it seems to excite it. The fact that furniture is turned out to a fixed pattern does not perhaps de prive the individual of the originality he formerly possessed, but it gives rise, in the most modest home, to a sense of arrangement which our fore-

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fathers never experienced. The trades which give women quantities of commonplace woven mate rial instead of the rare and magnificent silks of former days, induce in them a very modern desire to be smart and original in making the material up. A t the present time, one can drive forty horses at sixty miles an hour with one hand, but traffic de mands of everyone, including the police, triumphs of ingenuity. While mechanization has directed the activity of mankind in this new channel, military methods have also received the same impress. But not with out setbacks, for in affairs of war, experimentation is sporadic. However, from crisis to crisis, equip ment ever more powerful has been incorporated into armies. The results which a century ago many soldiers in concert achieved with difficulty are now speedily accomplished by a few perfected machines. At the Pyramids, a battalion square fired two thou sand bullets a minute. That is now the work of three machine-guns and their range is ten times longer. In order to put her about, the Bucentatire needed three hundred sailors to manipulate her sails; the Lorraine does the same thing with one man at the tiller, and another at the auxiliary motor. A single aeroplane in an hour can pick out more of the enemy than all the cavalry of Murat was able to do in a whole day. And while twenty despatch-riders were not enough to lead Grouchy

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to W aterloo, nowadays the movements o f armies and fleets are instan taneously directed b y wireless. B u t, in their tu r n , b y m ak ing such fu ll use o f m aterial equipm en t, soldiers are apt to fa ll under its dom ination. N eit h er their b ravery nor their skill can an y longer achieve an yt h ing excep t as fu n ctions o f the equipm en t w h ich t h ey set in m o tion. I t is no longer a m atter o f m ak ing the enemy feel the strength o f one’s arm, b u t o f m an ipulating a tube, a box, or a flyw heel. F or m erly, troops were bodies o f men lin ked one w it h another, organized so as to assure the best possible co-ordination o f muscle and h eart; to-d ay, t h ey are machines acting in con ju n ction , and crews form ed to serve them. I f it happens th at the instru m en ts around w h ich action is gravita t in g should falter, im m ediately m ilitary power is t h row n ou t o f gear. Ju s t as a f a c to ry is paralysed b y the failu re o f its electric c u r ren t, so a ba t tery whose observation station is de stroyed is silenced. A n d one sees the divisional co m mander, when his wires are cu t, as helpless as a financier w it h ou t a telephone. B y being riveted so closely to the uncertainties o f m aterial equipm en t, m ilitary technique, like life, has become more com plex and dependent on c ir cumstances. I n for m er times, it was lim ited to set ting in m otion a fe w weapons, vessels and vehicles; now it involves an immense nu m ber o f objects. T h e lance and the sword, and later the cannon and

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the musket, were enough for ma ny centuries to settle the fate o f (he world. A l exa n d er’s pierci ng sight, l l a n n i b a rs single eye, N apol eon’s spy-glass revealed the essential l eat i i resol the battlefield. l>y means o f trumpets, ol stentorian voices, o f banners and standard-bcareis, and, in the last resort, o f the k i ng’s whi t e plume itself, armies mai m'uvred in o r derly lashion. N o w the i n f a n t ry needs fifteen d i f ferent weapons, the art illery sixty-eigh t models, and the engineers sixteen categories o f units. I he balloon, the aeroplane, gas, tanks, have taken their place in this system. T h e least action can not take place wi t hou t range-fi nders, photographs, plans and compasses. Tlierc can be no sat isfactory liaison wi t hou t a net wor k o f wires, o f light-beams and of wireless communicat ion. In proport ion as the precision of so many i n struments increases, so their successful handli ng becomes more attended wi t h risk. T h e machi negu n can, in a f e w seconds, cast a hail o f bullets into a narrow area; its elficiency is t herefore cither terrible or negligible accortling to the w ay it has been aimed. I Vom his aeroplane, the observer can see clearly the action In all its details; but i f he makes a mistake, what consequences will ensue! A miraculous set of orders will make a submari ne sul>mcrge, but a control ti nned at the wrong mo ment will send the vessel to the bottom. I'i nally, the interdependence ol machines has now become

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great that it is impossible usefully to employ any one except in conjunction with others. The old soldier loaded his weapon, aimed it, fired it at the order, and was not concerned with anything fu r ther. But to make the most of a machine-gun, it is not enough to set it up, load it and fire it. One must, in addition, take advantage of the terrain, make use of camouflage, march, lie in wait, over come night conditions, measure distances, exchange code signals with one’s neighbours, make use on occasion of field glasses, of compasses, of maps, carry a gas-mask, handle a shovel, a pick, a sickle, an axe and adapt oneself constantly to changing circumstances. The army, down to the most insig nificant of its members, is subject to the law of progress, in virtue of which every accomplishment which increases the power of men at the same time increases their labour. Will the world call a halt to this frantic evolu tion? There is nothing to suggest it; on the con trary. Doubtless, an evolution so rapid does not proceed without some friction and resistance; all man’s conservative instincts execrate it. Thousands of employers, of workers and of economists resent the unceasing progress of machinery. Many soldiers of all ranks regret the changes brought about in the machines to which they have become accustomed. International conferences, like parliaments, re-echo with speeches at large directed against develop ments in the engines of war. But what happens?

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N o t h in g can w ithstan d the spirit o f the times. T h a t fix i t y o f conditions w h ich our fathers k n ew , in vir t u e o f w h ich a bourgeois o f 1 830 used fo r shel ter, fo r cloth ing, fo r vehicles, fo r ligh ting and heat ing, and fo r the post, objects quite similar to those used by his gran d fat h er, can h ard ly be imagined by the present generation, fo r w hom houses, clothes, vehicles, electric ligh t, radiators, gramophones, are ou t o f date fro m one day to the n ext. T h e same t h ing is true o f m ilitary matters. A l ready the power o f weapons differs rad ically fro m th at o f the last w ar. T h e firing cap acity o f a co m p a n y o f F ren ch i n fa n t ry has at least doubled since 1 91 8. W h at sort o f showing would the types of a irc ra ft w h ich won them the v ic t o ry make to-d ay? C an one com pare the battleships o f Ju t la n d w it h the new D u n k e rqu e? N o t h in g less than a feeling o f glory preven ts us fro m laugh ing at the sigh t o f the taxis o f the M arne. T h e developments o f w ire less telegrap hy are m ak ing all other means o f co m m u n ication obsolete. M odern conditions o f m ilitary action demand, therefore, constan tly increasing tech nical skill fro m figh ting men. T h e equipm en t, w h ich the force o f events has in troduced in to the ran ks, demands the g if t , the taste, the habit o f serving it. T h is is a co n sequence o f evolution, ineluctable in the same w ay as the disappearance o f candles or the end o f su n dials. T h e era o f picked soldiers and selected crews has arrived.

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mechanization naturally comes into violent con flict with conceptions formerly imposed by very different conditions, and finds itself surrounded by rules, conceptions and ideas, and military institu tions which are, in some part, contradictory to it. The notion of quantity, taken, willy-nilly, as the basis of the organization and of the art of war since the end of the eighteenth century, supported by passionate political theories, hallowed by being so often put to the test, still dominates opinion, and, in consequence, everything else. Without doubt, the Ancien Regime, reacting in everything against the confusion of the Middle Ages, was able to put force upon a more reasonable basis, and pursue with reduced material a carefully calculated policy. But it was necessary for Revolutionary France to raise masses of conscripts, since the doctrine she preached raised against her a coalition of the whole of Eu rope. And Napoleon, in order to dominate the Con tinent, was very careful not to decry conscription, which provided him with so many men so cheaply. When the Prussia of Bismarck and De Roon wanted to achieve hegemony, she had recourse to the same 54

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system. As a result, the majority of nations, terri fied by these upheavals, organized themselves in such a way that all able-bodied citizens had to serve in peace-time and fight in war-time. In addition, this tax of time, and, in the last resort, of blood, accorded so well with the egalitarian tendencies of the old world that it took on the firm and strong character of democratic principles. "Shoulder the knapsack!” for all and sundry— there was some thing in this that appealed to the general passion for levelling. Thus, the tension which followed the Treaty of Frankfurt led the Continental nations to conscript whole classes and to accumulate reserves. It was a costly conception, certainly, and an emergency conception, but it was, after all, quite suitable as soon as citizens consented to do military service during three years of their youth and when arma ment consisted of a single type of portable weapon and a single kind of gun. It was just at the time when the magazine rifle and buffer-recoil gun re duced the work of shooting to extreme simplicity. Instruction itself was also extremely simple, and followed the same course from year to year. Army units, rigid and homogeneous, seemed extremely well adapted to a struggle which it was thought would be decided by the momentum and shock of masses. T o tell the truth, this rage for numerical

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Strength did not preven t q u ality fro m developing its power. I t was b y fusion w it h the rem nan ts o f the 'old corps’ th at the cohorts o f the Revolu tio n fou n d their equilibriu m a ft e r m an y costly illusions. T h e G ra n d A r m y , w h ich fro m U l m to F riedlan d rou ted all its opponents, was composed essentially o f 'old sweats.’ W hen subsequently flocks o f re cru its, selected at random and hastily trained, came in and swam ped the veterans, this solidity disap peared and the best conceived manoeuvres failed in execution. Lo n g-ter m service, applied b y F ran ce fro m i 8 i 8 to 1870 , gave her the best soldiers she has ever had. T h e arm y o f A fr ic a , o f the C rim ea, o f I t a ly, abounded in w arlik e qualities. A lt h o ugh incom petence at the top brough t it to a deplorable end, the ran k-an d-file, the poor ran k-an d-file, was, up to the very end, prodigal in the measure o f its valour. D u ri n g those three absurd weeks o f A ugust 1870 , it killed or wounded 58,000 Germ ans, while its ow n losses were o n ly 49,000 men. W hen its leaders surrendered its arms, it w as itself in tact. H a r d ly had it emerged fro m the prisons o f the enem y than it fou n d enough loya lty to raise the barricades o f the C om m u n e and save the State. E ve n in the gloom y hecatombs to w h ich the exc lu sive system o f nations-in-arms led d u ring the G reat W ar, the su periority o f good troops was abu n d a n tly clear. H o w else is one to explain the p ro longed success o f the G erm an armies against so

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m an y differen t opponents? F o r the 1,700,000 deaths w h ich t h ey coun ted in all, the G erm ans, better trained than anyone else, killed 3,200,000 enemies; fo r the 7^0,000 prisoners w h ich th ey lost, they took 1,900,000. T h e w ell-in form ed u n der stand w h at differences exist even in the same arm y between differen t units. W itnesses o f the final en gagements have not forgo t te n those proud picked troops, broken to every test, w ho in every action led the 'm ain effo r t.’ N evertheless, w h atever weakening o f the rigid principle o f n u m erical strength so m an y lessons should have brough t about, once the w ar was over, that principle resumed its absolute sw ay. Broad ly justified by vic to ry, sweeping and simple in its b r u tality, offering, in addition, the advan tage o f h av ing in the long ru n overcom e set habits, it alone presided at the reforging o f our m ilitary instit u tions. B y virtu e o f laws passed relating to the sub ject, the F rench field forces were form ed b y the com bination o f vast quantities o f m aterial and mobilized masses. B u t, as time passes, the inconveniences o f the sys tem begin to show themselves. M ilitary d u ty seems to the F rench masses more burdensome than ever. W h at was c h eerfu lly accepted a short time ago, under the threat o f im m inent danger, becomes ir k some when v ic t o ry is obtained. W it h ou t ta k ing in to accou n t that, as a reaction against the recen t

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abuse of arms, whatever has to do with battles arouses the opposition of the multitude. And then, life flows rapidly along, and the time that is snatched from it to be spent in barracks seems for the most part cruelly unproductive. As always, these elementary tendencies assume the shape of doctrines which are the meat and drink of those who vie with each other for public favour. On the pretext that in our age it is the whole nation which fights, some are anxious to deny that strictly mili tary formations have any value. By the mere fact of its rising, the people will possess power, address and courage. And therefore, to assemble permanent bodies of troops, to distract citizens from their work and their surroundings, to inculcate into them anything, whatever it may be, which is dif ferent from the ordinary process of life, would be useless, even dangerous. Soon, someone will set up as a principle that the less military training a na tion has had, the better it fights, as Emile acquired learning through not having studied. And so a blind impulse impels our legislators to reduce more and more the duration of active serv ice. In the course of a decade, it has been cut down from three years to a single year. There is already talk of eight months, as a step towards six months or four. But who will believe that recruits passing by double shift each year into the regiments, even if they contrive by miracles of zeal to be taught the

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use o f their weapons, w ill be made in to w a r tech n i cians? I n the t w e n t y-fo u r weeks, to w h ich in fa c t the instruction o f each soldier is reduced, when allowance is made fo r the time wasted in calling-u p and release, holidays, leaves, sickness, san itary meas ures, fatigues, su pply, m ain tenance services, it is asked o f the i n fa n t ry to train m achine-gu n ners, riflemen, bombers, ligh t-in fa n try m e n , au xiliary en gineers, pioneers, observers, signallers, drivers, tele phonists, wireless operators, to make them as fa r as possible interchangeable, and to accustom them to concerted action, w hen it requires as m uch trouble to for m , ou t o f selected individuals, a mere fo o t ball team. G roups, always provisional, w h ich, once dispersed, are reunited w it h difficu lty, like a pac k o f cards con tin uously shuffled and m ixed up— this, in tru t h , is how our bodies o f troops are consti tuted, Instead o f the extrem e finish w h ich a m eth odised com bination o f activities could ex trac t fro m a perfected machine, there are on ly hasty sketches. A n d since, on the other hand, the trained body o f ex-service non-com missioned officers succeeds in keeping out o f the ran ks o f the reserves, our m o bilized units can not acquire the collective skill de manded b y m aterial equipm en t excep t a ft e r long and increasing waste o f time. O ne has on ly to see, piled up in the stores, the mass o f arms, tools, appliances, vehicles, m unitions and gadgets, intended fo r a n y one train ing-u n it.

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and to measure against it in the mind the flock of men without experience or cohesion, who from one day to the next would have to make use of them, to estimate what wastage of men and of material the sudden test of fire would bring about. This latent opposition between mechanization and the exclusive system of numerical strength cannot fail to interfere with the conception of the correct employment of various arms. Military art finds itself placed in an equivocal position. The doctrines of war are following, in fact— as is natu ral— the same current which has taken possession of the age and impregnated it with mechanization. To renew the ancient processes of manoeuvre, thanks to all that modern engines possess in the way of power, of precision and of speed, is the task of the tacticians of our day. From the point of view of art, there is there a field of research great in it self, and one which could have far-reaching re sults. In it, also, the mind would have the satisfac tion of impressing on military action the industrial and scientific stamp which is characteristic of the present day. Meanwhile, so much effort rests on the postulate that one can obtain adequate results from personnel. It is true that this is a touching faith, because of the willingness that it shows to neglect part of the real for the sake of what one desires, and to desire the ideal. But it is a dangerous faith, in that it impels one, in the sphere of the art of

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w ar, to erect theoretical structures w h ic h lac k fou n dations. A n d so one freq u e n t ly sees those in com m and in d ulging in tactical exercises w h ic h are unsuited to the instru m en t w h ic h w ill have to p u t them in to practice, while, fo r their p ar t, the ran kan d-file m ake efforts w h ic h are useless, ow ing to lac k o f time to acquire the tech nical sk ill and the firm ness o f purpose necessary to manoeuvre in the w a y that is expected o f them. I t is like a rash horse m an claim ing to get all the fine points o f horse manship ou t o f a decrepit old screw. A m o n g all the reasons w h ich go to explain the u n dercurren t o f uneasiness w h ic h flows through the ar m y to-d ay, this discord between the task to be fu lfilled and the m ilitary system in force is c er ta in ly the ch ief. F ro m top to bottom o f the ladder, everyon e lives u n der the impression t h at he has to solve a baffling problem. T h e high com m and would, at the begin ning o f a conflict, have to handle armies slow in form ation , w hen the geographical, political, economic and moral conditions peculiar to F ra n ce deprive it o f any m argin or an y allowance fo r delay and impose on it a strategy o f m ovem en t and speed. T h e instructors, w ho spin a sort o f Penelope’s web, han ding on, fro m train ing-grou n d to train inggrou n d, their elusive charges, are broken-hearted at seeing their men go w hen t h ey have h ard ly got to k n ow them. T h e reserve o f officers are given , fo r lac k o f troops, theoretical instruction as to how to

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com m and them were t h ey, b y some chance, ever to have a n y u n der them. T h e soldiers themselves, w ho never get ou t o f the phase o f apprenticeship, w ho are jostled about among t w e n t y differen t tasks, and bewildered b y so m an y instruments whose effectiveness is ruined b y their aw kwardness, fin d d u ring their m ilitary service or their period ical calling-u p just time enough to learn in w h at consists that w h ic h , in order to do it w ell, t h ey ough t to k n ow p erfec t ly. T h e arm y, groan ing, en velops itself in pretence. W it h w h at can the taste fo r w h at is precise, finished and c a refu lly work ed ou t, w h ich animates ou r specialized and sporting generation, nourish itself, in a body condemned to perpetual approxim ations? One cannot be unaware of the fact that such lack of equilibrium compromises the prestige of the science of arms in public opinion. Force, in order to maintain its place, must possess a certain char acter of self-assurance. Standing firmly on his feet the Colossus is imposing, but if he totters he is merely pathetic. An intelligent public sees all the weakness of its troops spread out before its eyes: effective strength often derisory, because it has to be distributed over a large number of units and nuclei of war formations; the perpetual dispersal of men and material and, as a fatal consequence, dreary uniforms, cheerless buildings, mean and wretched turn-outs. The mass of people feel that

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there is something inadequate in the ran ks. I n the dreary atmosphere surrou n ding its efforts, the ar m y loses some o f its glamour. I t is true th at though the prin cipal n u m erical strength still stands in the w a y o f basic reforms, on the other hand, specialization is succeeding in grad u ally pen etrating in to the stronghold to some exten t. Behind the decor o f institutions, necessity is doing its w or k . W e see that the principle o f q u al ity, as opposed to that o f q u a n tity, is nowadays gain ing grou n d in m an y branches o f the forces. O f every tw o members o f the crew o f a F ren ch warship, one at least has adopted the n a vy as his career. A n d the other is doing his service in the n avy because o f his profession in civil life. T h e A ir F orce, excep t in certain p u rely m anual capacities, consists en tirely o f men w ho have dedicated their lives to it. O u r overseas troops are exclusively co m posed o f long-service men. I t is good to hear in G eneva as in Paris, the M inisters o f M arine, A ir and the Colonies reject as absurd fo r their depart ments the mere idea o f short-term service. T h e whole police forces o f the State and o f the great cities are perm anen tly in their profession. E ve n the fire-brigade, fo r m erly simple-minded m ilitiam en, are n ow everyw here becom ing bands o f tech n i cians. A n d i f we still cling, fo r territorial defence, to the notion o f con tingen ts th at have been dis charged w it h the rough corners barely smoothed

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nearer to the fro n t , m oving lorries, tractors and ligh t cars w h erever the roads enabled it to do so. N evertheless, ow ing to its visibility, its noise and its vu ln erab ility, it did n ot ye t dare en ter the co m bat and remained an instru m en t o f supply. A n d then suddenly i t becomes armoured. C r a w l ing along on its caterpillars, c arry i n g ligh t gu ns and m achine-gu ns, it advances in to the fro n t line, clim bs over mounds and ditches, and beats dow n trenches and barbed-w ire entanglements. H o w ever falteri n g and aw k w ard it m ay have appeared at first, the ta n k com pletely upset the science o f t a c tics. T h ro ugh the ta n k was reborn the art o f su r prise, to w h ic h it added the relentlessness o f m a ch in ery. T h ro ugh it the art o f manoeuvring was re stored in detail, since it could deliver either a fro n tal or a flan k a t tac k u n der fire, m ove and fire at the same tim e, and advance in an y direction. T h rough it, above all, detachments o f figh t ing men recovered the mobile protection w h ich t h ey appeared to have lost fo r ever. A n d this is all the more true because the tan ks w h ich are already in service, or are sh ortly to be brough t in to service, have le f t fa r behind the p ri m itive form s in w h ic h t h ey first appeared. M odern tan ks each hold fro m three to fifteen men, w ho can not be reached behind their arm our by a n y t h ing less than direct hits b y large or medium shells, and th ey career about the battlefield at a surprising

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speed, firing in all directions. T h eir crews are p ro tected fro m gas in their h erm etically sealed b loc k houses, t h ey can conceal their movem en ts behind smoke-screens and t h ey are in touch b y wireless w it h the rear, w it h other tan ks in their neighbour hood and w it h a ir c r a f t; t h ey are indeed the aristo cra ts o f w ar, freed fro m the fetters w h ic h shackle the i n fa n t ry. N o t th at t h ey avoid danger, bu t th ey do indeed avoid the defects o f soldiers in the open exposed to shells and bullets. F or this, as m uch as fo r its pow er, the ta n k becomes the c h ief element o f manoeuvre and th erefore its personnel has to be v e ry c a refu lly selected. I f Pyrrh us chose his ele phan t-keepers w it h such care and D arius the drivers o f his scythe-w heeled chariots, i f the whole social system o f the M iddle A ges conspired to m ake the horsemen the strongest and most sk ilfu l figh t ers, how m uch more im portan t w ill it soon be fo r the lan d battleships to have crews specially re cruited and trained to combined action? T h us evolution, insofar as one owes i t to m ech anization, gives back to q u ality, as opposed to q u a n tity, the im portance w h ic h it had at one time lost. I t is an indisputable fa c t t h at fro m n o w on w ard, on the sea, on land and in the air, a care f u l ly chosen personnel, get ting the most ou t o f ex trem ely p o w erfu l and varied m aterial, possesses tre mendous su periority over more or less confused masses. " W e shall see,*’ according to Pau l V a le ry,

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'*the developm en t o f u n dertak ings b y a fe w chosen men, ac ting in crews and prod ucing, in a fe w m o ments or in an hour, the most shattering results in the most u nexpected places.’’ N o doubt this ad van tage w ill be b u t tem porary. W h en once the crow d allows itself to be organized, and to be in structed w it h all the precision w h ic h m ach in ery exacts, in short, w h en it ceases to be a crow d , spe cialized elements w ill grad u ally lose their relative power. B u t, in the delay w h ic h drags ou t more and more in a w id er and w id er field o f action, and as the com plication and scope o f methods o f w arfare increase, the professionals, in their ships, their air c r a f t and their tan ks, are certain to prevail.

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P O LICY

"L et us not claim that we can change the nature of th in g s **— E p i c t e t u s

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Other, as we know, the fagade of principles appar ently remains intact, because the mass of people are reluctant to relinquish ideas once they have ac quired them, and most specialists cling to recog nized ideas. This does not prevent the conditions from which 'total war’ grew from gradually dis appearing and making way for others. There are good reasons for believing that a war starting to morrow would only be remotely connected, at the beginning, with the premature attack of mobilized masses. A n d , first ly, the phobia o f destruction, b y w h ich the nations were fo r such a long time tain ted, has lost its virulence. T h e endurance o f terrible trials shows the nations their v i t a li t y and demonstrates to them th at the w orst vicissitudes are not sufficient to destroy t h at ch aracteristic m aterial, and that specific p ar t o f the past and o f the fu t u re w h ich are the essence o f each one o f them. E ve n those w ho had, in the past, lost their independence, find themselves as m uch alive as ever. C a to cried ou t in the Senate th at C arth age m ust be destroyed. F ran ce in 1793 was in danger o f being dismembered. I n 19 14 , F ra n ce fo ugh t to avoid annihilation. B u t w ho believes nowadays th at w ar, w h atever the result o f i t m igh t be, could w ipe ou t ' O ld E ngla n d ,’ k ill 'E ter n al F ra n ce,’ or even erase I t a ly fro m the map? A c t u a lly , as tim e goes on, the nations become more and more consolidated. D e m ocratic institu-

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tions, instruction , and above all, the con tin ual r a cial and social m ixing due to fresh activities and com m u nications, give the nations a deeper co n sciousness o f themselves. C ertain m aterial and m oral subjections, w h ic h for m erly made political over-lordsh ip possible, have disappeared. I t is true th at some States still keep the rem nan ts o f other races in their possession, bu t o n ly amid a thousand diflSculties. T hese minorities fin d protec ting b u l w ar ks in the vote in m oney, in T ra d e U n ions and in the Press and t h ey are helped fro m w it h ou t b y in n u m erable leagues, schools, mandates and sub scriptions. W h a t real and lasting p rofit could be gained at the present d ay b y disproportionate a n nexations w h en one has no longer either divine righ t, vassalage, serfdom . D iets to corru p t, clerics to t e r r ify , or n ob ility to seduce, noth ing indeed bu t violence to bin d the in habitan ts to the E m pire? T h e w orld has become crystalliz ed aft er intense dis turbances. T h e fiercest o f men t ry i n g to disrupt it would on ly smash their teeth against it! A t an y rate, is it possible to derive great material benefits fro m v ic to ry, such as those o f w h ic h im perialists dream? W hile fro m conference to c o n fe r ence the m irage o f plans, agreements, conditions o f paym en t, reparations, debts, wages, annuities, f o r feits and net balances was being dissipated, i t was realized th at in ternational w arfare leads to the de stru c tio n o f p rop erty fo r w h ich no compensation

7

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was possible and t h at to insist upon paym en t o f indem nities equivalen t to the am ou n t expended leads to disastrous upheavals. O n the whole, the u b iq u ity o f wealth, the over lap p ing o f interests and the in filtratio n o f ideas have created am ong the nations an interdependence w h ich compels them to lim it their ambitions. Does this mean t h at nations no longer desire ex pansion? F ar fro m it. B u t their ambitions, however bru tal t h ey m ay be in for m , are certain ly lim ited. A sort o f concen tration on the objective in view is produced in ambitious men. T h e y claim the A n schluss, the Saar, the D alm atian coast or a piece o f T ra nsylva n ia n territory, b u t t h ey reserve the righ t to m ake fu r t h er claims w hen these are obtained, at the same time ta k ing care not to m ake exaggerated demands. U n d er the spate o f in vec tive w h ich covers these demands, one can detect how anxious t h ey are to remain w it h in the bounds o f possibility and not to set the whole w orld b y the ears. T h e y also take great care, in quite good fait h , not to lay claim to an yt h ing save in the name o f justice and n ot to threaten anyone w it h ou t in vo k ing peace at the top o f their voices. T h is sort o f precau tion in the choice o f political aims is bound to be reflected in the subsequent for m w h ic h the conflict w ill take. Surrou nded b y dis ap proving neutrals, flan ked b y suspicious allies, it is d o u b tfu l w hether the aggressors w ou ld w a n t

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fr a n k ly to w age unrestricted w arfare fo r the sake o f seizing a provin ce or a colony. B u t in fu t u re the logical method o f procedure w ou ld be to seize the coveted prize as s w i f t ly as possible, thus offering the adversary the alternatives either o f resigning h imself to the f a i l acccrtnpU, or o f assuming the risk and odium o f a w ar o f exterm ination. I n a n y case, it seems as though the ambitious nations were ge t t i n g together. Perhaps, even, the act o f violence w ill be com m itted w it h ou t either o f the contestants h aving declared a state o f w ar, so as to give general h ypocrisy a chance and to avoid ju ristic co m plica tions w h ic h tend to embarrass diplom atic relations. O f course, this does not mean that clashes be tw een armed nations w ill not take place in fu t u re. A f t e r the recen t hecatombs it is difficult fo r one to imagine a w ar w aged th roughou t b y a fe w spe cialized troops. Because one side m ay have gained an initial advan tage, it does not fo llo w th at the other m ust im m ediately capitulate. W ere it to do so, the vic tor, encouraged b y his easy success, would no doubt wish to fo llo w up his advan tage. Because M anch uria gave in too q u ic k ly, the enemy were tem pted to invade Jeh ol, the loss o f w h ic h , in its tu rn , l e f t Pek in open. A f t e r an initial reverse, a nation w o r t h y o f the name would w a n t to retu rn to the charge, d raw ing on its poten tial resources fo r the additional strength it needed. M oreover,

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modern methods o f w arfare, w hether in the hands o f specialists or not, have a disastrous effect not o n ly on the com batan ts b u t also on the c ivil pop u lation. C ruisers m ak ing t h ir ty-five k nots and sub marines w h ic h can travel fiftee n thousand miles fro m base to base, soon convulse the lives o f the people and ru in im port trade. A i r raids, h eavy shells fro m long-range guns, and poison gases k ill thou sands o f ord in ary people and destroy a n y am oun t o f property. T h is results in elem en tary reactions am ong the masses. A s people’s passions rise, in p ro portion to the am ou n t o f suffering t h ey have to bear, we m ust cou n t upon the nations yielding once more to the desire to en ter the lists. B u t, even w h ile preparing themselves fo r the w orst, the v ic tors would first t r y to c u t the G ordian k n ot b y a single blow. O ne sees, then, how the professional arm y, ready to m arch anyw here at a n y mom en t, capable, than ks to the in ternal com bustion engine, o f reaching the battlefield in a fe w hours, able to produce every effect o f surprise or destruction t h at it can furn ish fro m the m aterial at its disposal, in short, co n structed in all its com ponen t parts w it h a view to obtaining the most com plete and the sw iftest local results, is in accordance w it h modern political con ditions. T h ere is a grim relationship between the properties o f speed, power and concen tration

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w h ic h modern weapons co n fer upon a w ell-train ed m ilitary elite, and the ten dency o f nations to lim it the objects o f dispute in order to be able to seize them as rap id ly as possible and at the least possible cost.

II A

n d y e t o u r o w n c o u n t r y do es n o t c o n t e m

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plate a n y expansion, nor does she desire an yt h ing b u t to keep w h at she has got. Stra ngely enough, however, this conception o f her destiny entails cer tain dangers. F or it is a moot poin t w hether some great national dream is not necessary to a nation to keep it active and united. T h e clash o f ideas, o f pas sions and o f opposing interests, in w h ich the exist ence o f a State consists, is in danger o f becom ing in tolerable in the long ru n unless the citizens h ar bour a com m on hope w h ic h lessens the breaches between them and binds them together in devotion to the com mon cause. T h e desire fo r the Rh in e, in herited fro m the G auls, helped a great deal in the form atio n and m ain tenance o f F ren c h u n ity. T h e rage o f ou r forefat h ers against the treaties o f 1 8 15 cou n terbalanced fo r fo r t y years the p u blic discord caused b y so m a n y riots and revolutions. T h e though t o f the loss o f A lsace hovered above the political and social struggles o f the T h ird Rep u blic. A n d i f the mass o f people in our co u n try seem to d ay to have lost the feeling o f the general interest, this can largely be attribu ted to lac k o f foreign ambitions. 80

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B u t even i f w e were h en ceforw ard to renounce all expansion, the force o f events, the accu m ulated w eigh t o f h istory, w ou ld preclude us fro m isola tion. O u r fu t u re stra tegy can no more lim it itself to the stric t defence o f our t erri to ry than ou r pol ic y can be confined to w a tc h ing over our fron tiers. W hether we like it or not we fo r m p ar t o f a cer tain established order o f things, whose elements are in ex tricab ly in terwoven. W h a t happens, fo r in stance, to C e n tral and Eastern E urope, to D e n m ar k , to Belgiu m , to the Saar or to Sw it z erlan d affects us substan tially. A gain , we have signed trea ties, subscribed to pacts, give n u n dertakings, and adopted an attitu de w h ic h , once again, confirms this interdependence. W it h how m uch blood and tears did w e p ay fo r the error o f the Second E m p ire w h ic h allowed Sadowa to happen w it h ou t p u t t i n g an ar m y on the Rh in e! U n d er th reat o f fin d ing ourselves here, there and everyw h ere faced w it h fa ils accomplis, and o f being one d ay alone, w it h ou t allies or frien ds, surrounded b y the scorn o f the w orld and faced b y adversaries strengthened b y their successes, we m ust be ready to take action outside our ow n co u n try, at a n y mom en t and in a n y even tuality. H o w can this be done in practice i f , in order to u n dertake an yt h ing at all, w e have to mobilize our reserves? I n the present state o f the w orld the very tren d o f our destiny leads us to m ake use o f an

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ever-ready instru m en t o f in terven tion fo r purposes o f active assistance. T h e n o n ly shall w e have the ar m y o f our poUcy. I t is true that w e t r y to consolidate this d u ty o f protection in a u n iversal or at least a E uropean system. T o combine the perm anen t interest o f F ran ce w it h a great h u m an ideal would be a great, and at the same time, a v e ry profitable achieve m en t! F or the union o f nations to guaran tee the good o f each one w ou ld result in the transposition o f a specifically F ren c h objective in to the in ter national scheme. So we m ust u nreservedly approve, fro m the poin t o f view o f our co u n try alone, o f all definite engagements, supported b y our ow n representatives, w h ic h tend to organize m u t u al as sistance. B u t how can w e realize this u n iversal order, this reciprocal respect o f righ ts and fron tiers, this m u tual aid o f all in the defence o f each, w it h ou t the co-operation, i f on ly static, o f force? Just ice w h ich does n ot bear a sword beside its scales soon falls in to ridicule. Besides, F ran ce has always recom mended the form atio n o f an in ternational policeforce composed o f con tingen ts fro m various cou n tries. A n d o f w h at could this force be composed, excep t o f professional soldiers? O ne can not imagine G overn m en ts calling up conscripts and reserves to go and separate Ja p a n and C hina, to occ u py the C haco, or to eject the racist militias fro m A ustria

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or the Saar. O n the other hand, one can w ell im agine th at these professional con tingen ts, assembled and moved about according to preconceived plans, and possessing sufficient m ili t ary tem per to be w ill ing to figh t w it h ou t concern ing themselves about motives, would seize a disputed territory, erect a barrier between the con testan ts and see to it that order was re-established. I n short, t h ey would bring to the maintenance o f order an element o f physical force w h ic h would certain ly be more efficacious than a n y nu m ber o f appeals. So the professional soldier becomes the necessary guarantee o f all great hu m an hopes. A f t e r all, even i f one could conceive o f F ran ce deliberately losing interest in other nations and re t irin g w it h in her ow n fron tiers, abandoning the w orld to the m ercy o f w ild ly ambitious men, and, fro m the heigh t o f her ram parts, look ing on at the massacre o f the innocents in the plains, even p u rely domestic reasons would com pel her to gather some o f her children in to professional troops. O u r n a tional existence has become that o f an em pire, and, as time goes on, this character becomes accen tuated. T h e thousand bonds between the M other C o u n t ry and her overseas possessions are constan tly m u lt i p lying. N o t o n ly because the task o f developing the colonies calls fo r more and more en ergy on the p art o f F ran ce, bu t also because the restrictions on in ternational exchange, a dom inating fac to r o f the

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age, d aily increase the im portance o f fin d ing fresh m ark ets in our econom ic life. B u t, w hile u n der our segis w ealth, instruction and lib er ty abound, w e can see the grow t h there o f ideas, passions and interests, the obvious aim o f w h ic h is the end o f our dom ina tion. O f course, i f we are enabled to pursue our w o r k to the poin t o f progress at w h ich rulers ac quire wisdom and the masses become loyal, we shall see populations, w h ich are restless at present, sin cerely accep t the union. B u t u n t il th at time, we m ust remain masters, at the risk o f losing ev e ry th ing. I t stands to reason t h at a m ilitary system in w h ic h the p u rely F ren c h troops are m erely bands o f recru its, orga n ically incapable o f going to figh t overseas, is quite inadequate fo r the tasks w h ich m ay lie before us. A lt h o ugh the devotion o f a u x iliary troops is an almost in tac t treasure, it would be, h en ceforw ard, im politic to m ake them the sole source o f our au t h ority. F ran ce would be i m p ru den t to rely en tirely on n ative troops to p ro tec t the empire in A lgiers, w h ich reverberates to all the ru m blings o f Islam, and in In do-C h in a, w h ic h re acts to every disturbance in Asia. F ro m the d ay u pon w h ic h a force shall be created o f m en o f our o w n cou n try, w h o are professional soldiers and, in consequence, men prepared to go on distan t ca m paigns, quite u ncon nected w it h politics, and fro m

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the d ay upon w h ic h , fro m time to tim e, w e can parade some o f our w ell-train ed troops in c a refu lly selected regions, fro m t h at d ay w e shall be suffi c ie n tly guarded against danger to render it im m e d iately less probable.

Ill So, T H E T E N D E N C IE S O F T H E WORLD, T H E C O N D Itions o f an in ternational organization o f peace, at all events our ow n d u ty o f assisting the w ea k and m ain tain ing order in the E m p ire, all com bine to com pel us to create professional troops. O ne m igh t be astonished th at F ran ce has not already done so, did one not k n ow how p o w erfu l are the prejudices against it. A b ove all, it m ust be recognized th at the m ilit ary laws applied since Versailles to our p ri n cipal adversary, assured us, u n til quite recen tly, o f such a grea t ly superior strength that it seemed su perfluous to m o d ify our institutions. E veryo n e was aware, o f course, th at this state o f affairs could on ly be tem porary, and t h at G erm an y, created b y arms and eager to bear them again, would one d ay de mand an end to the restrain ts p u t upon her. B u t certain politicians hoped then to preven t the u n bridled r iv a lry o f force, b y m a k ing a n ew agree ment. H av i n g established eq u ality at a v e ry low level, definite guarantees o f security and con trol would have preven ted an y aggression. T h is effort at lim itation seems decidedly co m promised. Besides, in a system based on the p rin c i ple o f short-tim e service, it is con fron ted tech ni86

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cally w it h almost u nsurm ou n table obstacles. W it h the exclusive system o f masses, real w a r strength ac t u ally consists m uch less in the peace effectives, the stock and calibres o f guns and m achine-gu ns, or the n u m ber o f a irc ra f t th at can be described as m ilitary, than in the n u m ber o f men capable o f being incorporated, industrial poten tial, perm anen t air strength and morale o f the people, elements w h ich, in practice, can not be reduced to an y co m m on measure. A n d , indeed, apart fro m assurances o f sw if t and thorough assistance on the p art o f our other neighbours, this system o f so-called equ ality w ou ld have m erely meant G erm an superiority. T hese disadvantages, it is true, are held to be t r i fling b y some people, w h o are persuaded that the prin ciple o f short-term service, especially suited fo r the defensive, has the definite virt u e o f fa v o u r ing peace, w hile the professional ar m y leads go v ern m ents to aggression because it p ar t ic u larly ex cels in at tac k . I f one takes th at to mean t h at the State w h ich possesses a Reichsw eh r w ill always have the in itiative against a neighbouring State w h ic h has o n ly a m ilitia, the assertion is irrefu table. B u t to conclude positively th at the system o f profes sional troops is, o f itself, more sanguin ary than that o f mass levies would be sim ply absurd. A l l lac k o f skill is m erely relative. Does it fo llo w that because an ar m y is unskilled therefore one m ust refrain fro m sending it in to at tac k? D id the volun teers

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and the pressed m en o f the Revolu t io n hesitate to fling themselves upon th eir enemies? N o rival troops have ever been k n ow n to a t tac k each other so fu rio usly as the im provised forces o f the N o r t h and South d u ring the A m erica n C iv il W ar. Bis m arc k and M olt k e u n dertook three great wars w it h troops composed o f conscripts and reservists. A n d we k n o w w it h w h a t enthusiasm the u n tried A m e r i can A r m y attack ed in the A rgo n n e and in C h a m pagne. A n d again, the same popular instincts w h ich in time o f peace induce politicians to hope fo r the best, urge them to insist upon ta k ing the oflFensive w hen w ar has been declared and rouses their pas sions. I t is on such occasions t h at Sa i n t-Ju st says to Jo u r d a n : " T o the w in d w it h p ru d e n ce!” , that G a m bet ta compels d ’A u relle to advance against his w ill, t h at Bria n d substitutes N ivelle fo r the te m poriz ing Jo ffre. T o tell the tru t h , the application o f the prin ciple o f the armed nation, furn ish ing inexhaustible resources, leads to the squandering o f them and, moreover, m ultiplies those kinds o f losses w h ic h are, in battle, the toll paid b y inexperience. O n the other hand, the professional arm y, lim ited in numbers and difficult to replace, compels econ omy. Louis X I V and F red eric k paid in men less fo r all their wars together than fe ll in the F ren ch R e v olution. C h a n z y saw more m en die in three months on the Loire than C on de saw in his whole career. T h e whole total o f lives and p rop erty destroyed b y

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our battles fro m Jo a n o f A r c to Rocham beau did not reach the m elancholy total o f w h at the G rea t W ar cost us. So t h at i f evolu tion, w h ic h gives professional armies a grow ing superiority, is to end in the more or less com plete substitu tion o f w ell-regulated en gagements fo r the fren z ied clashes o f armed masses, it would be a priceless boon fo r the h u m an race. W ar is, perhaps, in the general a c t iv i ty o f men, an ineluctable element, just as m uch as birt h and death; it m ay be that it is the disturbance neces sary to destruction and renewal, the ploughshare in the soil, the axe on the tree, the bat tering-ra m against the w all, bu t it is none the less true t h at its horrors depend, v e ry largely, on the dimensions one gives to it. O n the whole, no for m o f battle is more sanguinary than th at o f nations-in-arms.

IV B e t h a t a s i t m a y , t h e e m p i r e is r u s h i n g headlong in to armaments. I n the w a y things are shaping, our advan tage becomes the supreme law. A n y t h i n g, therefore, th at can increase the relative im portance o f q u ality is to the direct advan tage o f F ran ce. F or, i f in for m er days i t was to our i n terest to inaugurate the clashes o f great masses o f men, nowadays it is along another path t h at we m ust d irect hostilities. W e were the first, it is true, to make n u m erical strength the fou n dation o f our m ilit ary institutions, at the end o f the X V I I I t h ce n t u ry, and w e resisted the w hole o f E urope fo r t w e n ty-five years b y sheer w eigh t o f m an-pow er. B u t at th at time the population o f F ran ce was as great as that o f A ustria, Prussia and E nglan d to gether, and the co u n try was wealthier and more cen tralized than a n y other n atio n; so she had the best o f reasons fo r w aging battle on the basis o f numbers. A c t u a lly , we were figh t ing tw o to one at Jem m apes; at W attign ies we swam ped the N e t h er lands, the Rh in e, I t a ly and the V en dee by a w ave o f fourteen arm ies; and at Leip z ig w e faced the allied armies w it h effective soldiers equal in n u m bers to all o f theirs together. E ve n though this su90

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p eriority grad u ally disappeared in the course o f the last ce n t u ry, we retained the m em ory o f it. H ence the deep-rooted illusion on the p ar t o f our politi cians th at legions dug out o f the earth, w hen neces sary, can repair a n y errors and neglect. H en ce the p ar t ia lity o f soldiers fo r prodigal tactics, w h ich, in defiance o f all reason, still inspired us in 1 91 4 . T o day, alas! our co u n try is the least populated o f all the great powers. F or every F ren ch m an between the ages o f t w e n ty and t h ir ty there are t w o G e r mans, t w o Italians and five Russians. N o doubt our relative position im proves as the b irt h-ra te o f the others tends to come dow n to our ow n modest level. N o doubt also, our N o r t h A fr ic a n and Colonial troops afford us valuable aid, provided th at we take the proper steps to safeguard them b y imperial com m unications, the good-w ill o f this or that neighbour and an incontestible au t h ority over our subjects. I t is none the less certain t h at fu t u re F ren c h victories w ill no longer be those o f big b a t talions. This is all the more so because the yield of our industry, however important it may be, and how ever varied and well balanced, in no way assures us of numerical superiority of arms. We are rich in iron ores, we have excellent modern machinery, suf ficient transport, good seaports, and we have at our disposal quantities of skilled and hard-working labour and a valuable technical personnel, so that

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we are, certain ly, capable o f provid ing our armies w it h p o w e rfu l w a r m aterial. B u t w e are poor in coal, we have no oil, copper or z in c and therefore, though w ell equipped fo r moderate prod uction, we could never surpass the mass prod uction o f G erm an h eavy in d ustry. A s fo r m etallu rgy, G er m a n y p ro duces t w ice as m uch steel and fo u r times as m uch m etallurgic coke as w e do norm ally. She makes seven times as m uch m ach inery. A s regards the basic materials fo r the m a n u fac t u re o f propellan ts and high explosives, fo u r times as m uch ben zol, ten times as m uch cellulose and tw elve times as m uch n itrate are produced b y the great G erm an en ter prises as issue fro m our ow n factories. A prod u c tion o f syn thetic organ ic colouring m atters, at least treble th at o f ours, assures ou r rivals o f a great ad van tage in the fu t u re su p p ly o f w ar gases. M ore over, w e m ay presume t h at we shall leave the in i tiative in starting a w ar to the enemy. T h ere is noth ing to show us th at we shall again have the su pport o f the w hole w orld w h ich enabled us to get the u pper hand at the end o f the last struggle. E ve n i f we were to t h row in to the battle as m an y units as are opposed to us, it is b y no means certain th at we shall be able, throughou t the cam paign, to p u t in to the field gu n fo r gu n and w eigh t o f am m u n ition fo r w eigh t o f am m unition. I n the com petition o f w ar industries we are not the best en dowed.

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Since we are unable to predominate either in numbers or in material, have we at any rate a natu ral aptitude for mass action which would make up for insufficiency of power? It does not seem as though the spirit of discipline, the taste for being herded together, the capacity for acting in waves, in which consist the massive strength of hordes, has been given to us to any large extent. Other people like following the leader, living in compact groups, doing just like everyone else. That is not our spirit. We do not like the strict order which is acceptable to large flocks. Our processions march in confusion, we dislike one-way streets, we are incapable of singing properly in chorus. O f course, we sometimes have to obey orders. It sometimes even happens that national passion or the flame of a great talent inspires us with an astonishing feroc ity as regards our adversaries or ourselves. This is a marvellous reserve of strength which bids us hope even in the most unhappy circumstances but will never make regular provision for the future. More over, the recent abuse of arms has developed in our people an anti-war psychosis which is being carried to excess. Doctrines, pictures and allegories lav ishly spread about, try to exorcise the phantoms of war. Even the past, so profusely battle-scarred, is suspect. And while this depression increases the gaps in

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our war cohesion, all around us ambitious nations are reinforcing their natural inclinations towards enlistment with a pohcy of public spirit. The edu cation of children, the sporting training of youth, the formation of adults into groups, and above all a deliberately induced psychology of respect and obedience, inculcate into citizens everything that may make them likely to stand up to the test. Thus the masses, their national passions fanned to white heat, sheltered from speeches and pictures which might weaken their resolutions, permanently sub jected to the system of rank, cheering their leaders and wearing uniforms, are ready to slip straight from peace into war, without any transition period. O f course, we must not prophesy from these attitudes the way in which nations will react when the time comes. It is one thing to brave death from a distance and to assert one’s rights at the top of one’s voice, but it is quite another thing to make all the sacrifices of which man is capable in the full misery of war. And as for our momentarily exaggerated pacificism, what will it amount to when the moment arrives? Probably little enough. We have been accumulating the vast capital of warlike capacity for centuries, and this cannot be very seriously broken into by a few years of neu rasthenia. Under the disheartening surface a pow erful stream stiU flows. Moreover, having seen the

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U nion S acree in 1 9 1 4 take the place o f the b it ter est quarrels o f w h ich the co u n try has ever been the object, we k n o w that the national instinct, when aroused by danger, soon sweeps aw ay sophistry, as a w ave dissipates the foam on the sea. B u t in battle it is not suflBcient to rally in the face o f the enemy. O ne has to drain to the b it ter dregs all the sur prises o f the first clash o f arms, the anguish o f re verses, agonies o f pain, the e n vy, rage and co n tem p t aroused b y the hideousness o f crises. T h a t is w hen the seeds o f despair begin to be sown. I t is expedien t that F ran ce, w hile still doing w h at is necessary to train crowds to figh t crow ds, should have another string to her bow. A c t u a lly , everyt h ing shows t h at she is predes tined to shine in the realm o f q u ality. O u r cou n t r y w it h her tinted sk y, her varied con tours, her fertile soil, our fields fu ll o f fine corn and vines and livestock, our in d ustry o f artistic objects, finished products and lu x u ry articles, our gifts o f in itiative, adaptation and self-respect make us, above all others, a race created fo r brillian t deeds and picked bodies o f specialists. Independence o f tasks, co operation o f ingen u ity, that com petition o f skill in the use o f adaptable machines, w h ic h w ill, in the fu t u re, require figh ting by professionals, are n a t u rally suited to the aptitudes o f our best brains. T h e same causes that give us so m an y experts in delicate

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w o r k w ill also favo u r us in the series o f tech nical exploits w h ic h to-m orrow w ill give the v ic t o ry to specialized troops. I t wotild appear th at D estin y, in opening ou t this fresh path, desires once more to serve the fortu n es o f F rance.

Pa

r t

IV

C O MP OSITI O N H O W?

is by no means enough to possess qualities; one m ust have system**— L a R o c h e f o u c a u l d "7 /

I A W E A P O N FO R REPRESSIVE AN D PR EV EN TIV E A c tion— that is w h at we have to provide fo r ourselves. A weapon w h ic h can exert fro m the v e r y outset extrem e strength, and can hold the enemy in a state o f chronic surprise. T h e in ternal com bustion en gine gives the means o f satisfying these conditions o f ruthlessness and o f suddenness, since it w ill take w h atever is required where it is needed and w it h all speed; provided, o f course, th at it is well han dled. T o-m o rro w the professional ar m y w ill move en tirely on caterpillar wheels. E v e ry element o f troops and services w ill make its w a y across m ou n tains and valleys on the appropriate vehicles. N o t a man, not a gu n, not a shell, not a piece o f bread, w ill be transported in an y other w ay. A large fo r m ation, strik ing cam p at daybreak, w ill be a h u n dred miles aw ay by nigh t. I t w ill need no more than one hour to come fro m a distance o f ten miles, and across an y kind o f co u n try, and take up its battle position against the enemy, or to disappear, in break ing off con tact, ou t o f range o f fire and fieldglasses. B u t this speed would be o f lit tle value i f it could not be reinforced b y such power o f fire and 99

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assault th at the r h y t h m o f battle synchronized w it h t h at o f m ovem en t. W h a t would be the use o f m ov ing fro m place to place so rap id ly behind the scenes o f the battlefield, o n ly to find oneself subsequently im mobilized? B u t modern tech nique can solve th at problem , than ks to the armoured car. B y pursuing this ever-w iden ing path, the stabilization o f fro n ts b y picked troops, w h ic h warped the last w ar fro m the poin t o f view o f m ilitary art, and, as a conse quence, in the subsequent accou n ts o f losses and results, w ill be avoided. Six divisions o f the line com pletely motorized and 'caterp illared,’ and p a r t ly armoured, w ill co n stitu te an arm y suitable fo r carryi n g through a cam paign. I t w ill be an organism whose fro n t, depth and means o f protection and su p p ly w ill allow it to operate independently. E ac h one o f the six larger units w ill, furt h erm ore, be provided w it h all th at it needs in the w a y o f weapons and su p p ly services to c a rry on the battle fro m begin ning to end, even i f it is encircled b y others. O ne m ay p ic tu re as follows the com position o f each division: A h eavily armoured brigade, m oving across co u n try as fast as a horse at the gallop, armed w it h 500 guns o f medium calibre, 400 smaller pieces, and 600 m achine-gu ns, crossing ditches three yards wide, clim bing mounds t h ir ty feet high, felling 40year-old trees, k n oc k ing dow n walls tw elve bricks wide, crush ing all obstacles, barriers and hedge-

CO M PO SITIO N

lOI

rows— this is w h at in d ustry to-d ay can provide fo r every professional division. T h is brigade o f tw o regimen ts, one o f h eavy tan ks, the other o f m e diu m tan ks, w it h a reconnaissance battalion o f very fast ligh t machines, provided w it h im proved equ ip m en t fo r liaison, observation and field w o r k , will constitute the principal echelon o f the larger u n it. A brigade o f i n fa n t ry consisting o f tw o regi ments o f i n fa n t ry and one battalion o f riflemen, armed w it h 40 au xiliary pieces, the same nu m ber o f a n ti-ta n k guns, 600 ligh t and h eavy m achinegu ns, provided w it h special tools fo r q u ic k ly d ig ging trenches and shelters, equipped, as to clothes, painted sheets, trellises, etc., in such a w a y as to offer to the sight, and thus to attacks, o n ly u n rec ognizable objects, w ill be devoted to the task o f occu pying, m opping up and organ iz ing the terri t o ry w h ich the terrible bu t tem porary pow er o f the tan ks w ill have v ir t u a lly secured. T h e mobile, b u t on the whole haphazard and short-range fire w h ich w ill be operated in concert b y the tan ks and the i n fa n t ry, m ust be covered, fro m as fa r aw ay as possible, b y another m uch more accurate system o f fire. T h is is the task o f the artillery, w h ic h w ill have at its disposal, in the division, all the various types o f gu n necessary fo r the preparation o f a t tacks, fo r direct support, fo r distant or close p ro tection, and fo r cou n ter-bat tery w ork . T w o artil lery regiments, one consisting o f h eavy, short guns,

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the Other o f ligh ter long-range pieces, w ill fo r m another strong u n it, com pleted b y an a n t i-a irc raft grou p, and capable o f discharging lo o tons o f p ro jectiles in a quarter o f an hour, to a depth o f six miles beyond the b a t t le-fro n t. T h e division, consisting o f three com plem en tary brigades, rein forced b y a battalion o f engineers to deal w it h crossings and a battalion o f co m m u n ica tion troops, w ill have at its disposal a reconnaissance grou p fo r scou ting purposes. T h is la t ter w ill be composed o f v e ry fast w h ippet tan ks, o f troops brough t up in their train fo r figh t i n g on foo t, and o f ligh t vehicles fo r distant liaison; the whole de signed to get in to touch w it h the enemy, to hold a fro n t tem porarily, to cover a flan k fo r the time being, to cover a retreat. A erial units, not intended fo r casual tasks at anyone's behest, b u t h aving a definite mission o f keeping a single, specific general co nstan tly i n form ed, and always su pporting the same comrades in battle and lengthen ing the effective range o f fa m iliar artillery, w ill be the eyes o f the m ain u n it. N evertheless, in spite o f the speed, the pro tec tion, the wide dispersal afforded to the figh ting troops b y m otor-vehicles, armed and caterpillared, the mass and the conspicuousness o f troops so co n stitu ted w ill remain considerable. T h e size o f the machines, their noise and their trac ks w ill be such that, w it h ou t precautions, the

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enemy w ill have ample w arn ing o f their approach. B u t it is o f param ou n t im portance that he should be taken b y surprise. T h erefore, m ethodical ca m ouflage m ust be p u t in to effect. T h is art, as old as w ar, and one w h ich, since the last conflict, has been made use o f in m an y desultory w ays, m ust become an essential element o f manoeuvre, as im portan t as gu nfire or m obility. It is impossible to exaggerate the results w h ich can be achieved in this respect b y research and discipline. I n particu lar, the choice o f disguise fo r figh ting men and equipm en t accord ing to the colour o f the cou n tryside, the creation o f false landscapes and the alteration o f the colours o f objects considered w it h regard to distance, posi tion and ligh t are on ly at their crudest begin ning. W h at about silence, p ar t ic u larly t h at o f m otorengines, w h ich could be obtained, i f it was at all desired, b y the adequate construction o f the m a chines? W h at, especially, about smoke-screens, clouds and fogs, whose size, thickness and placing can be adapted to circumstances as required? B u t to make oneself invisible and inaudible is not enough. T h ere still remains the question o f deceiv ing the enemy b y means o f false road indications, sham columns on the m arch, deceptive earth works and ligh ting effects, artificial noises, misleading wireless messages. E ach division w ill possess a ca m ouflage battalion, specialising in these things, and provided w it h the necessary means o f deceiving the

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enem y b y sim ulating the presence o f a large u n it. A ligh t division w ill be attached to the ensemble form ed b y the six divisions o f the line, fo r scou ting purposes and to preven t surprise; this w ill be o f the same general typ e as the others, b u t provided w it h faster and consequen tly more ligh t ly ar m oured machines, ligh t artillery, and w it h more mobile i n fa n t ry, since t h ey w ill not be armed w it h the same nu m ber o f i n fa n t ry guns. F in ally, there w ill be the general reserves consisting o f a brigade o f v e ry h eavy tan ks capable o f a t tac k ing perm a nen t fortificatio ns, a brigade o f art illery o f very h eavy calibre, a regim en t o f engineers, a regim en t o f signallers, a camouflage regim en t, a regim en t o f reconnaissance a irc raft, a regim en t o f riflemen and the usual su p p ly services. T hese w ill com plete the ar m y o f shock-troops. A s com pared w it h the total n u m ber o f troops th at F ra n ce sent in to action in the mon th o f A u gust 19 14 , this ar m y w ill possess a firin g capacity three times larger, n early ten times its speed and an im m easurably greater degree o f protection. W hen one adds th at the whole w ill norm ally oper ate on one ten th o f its fro n t and th at the p rofes sional soldiers get enormously increased results fro m their equipm en t, one can gather some idea o f the power w h ic h the professional ar m y o f to-m orrow w ill be able to wield.

II T

h is

t e r r ib l e

m e c h a n iz e d

sy s t em

of

fir e, of

shock, o f speed, and o f camouflage, needs, fo r its operation, 100,000 men. T h a t is, b y the w ay, the effective strength o f the Reichswehr. I t is, sign ifi ca n tly, the strength o f the professional forces o f the U .S. A . and o f M etropolitan E nglan d. I t is, fin ally— a n o tew ort h y fa c t— the m inim u m o f the perm anen t force w h ich, ever since H e n ri I V , the govern m en ts o f F ran ce have believed m ust be maintained. T hese men w ill be you ng. M ili t ary train ing, more strenuous and more varied than ever, de mands a great suppleness o f muscle and o f mind. I f the tasks w h ich the professional ar m y w ill have to accom plish require wisdom and foret h ough t in the H igh C om m an d— fo r one m ust be carefu l i f one has on ly a lim ited capital— t h ey im p ly, fo r those w ho have to c a rry them ou t, the qualities o f you t h— love o f danger and lac k o f ties. T hese p ro fessional troops m ust have nothing to bind them: neither habits, interest, nor fa m ily ties. O n the other hand, professional soldiers m ust serve long enough to consolidate their tech nical and m ental equipm en t, b u t not beyond the mo105

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m en t w hen skill becomes routine. F o r those en rolled fo r t w e n ty years’ service, six years w ill be enough to go through the course. A f t e r that, v e t erans w hile still in their f u l l vigo u r, th ey w ill f u r nish the active cadre fo r reserves and recruits. C ertain people, it is true, doubt w hether it w ill be possible to fin d in F ran ce, in our day, so great a n u m ber o f professional soldiers, am ou n ting per haps, on an average, to 15,0 0 0 a year. I t m ust be ad m itted th at past experience gives some weigh t to this objection, i f one thin ks o f the difficulties experienced before the G rea t W a r in recru iting professional N .C . O .s. I n t h at easy age, when our citizens dreamed on ly o f being independent landed proprietors or o f retiring on a pension, the con strain t, the p overty, and the uprooting imposed on 'the wretched soldiery’ haunted p u blic opinion. I t seemed at th at time, t r u ly, to be sheer bravado to enlist in the arm y, to drill vo lu n tarily on the parade grou n d, to accept exile and hardship in advance. I t was not, certain ly, th at the w ar machine had ceased to impress the masses b y its atmosphere o f gran deur w h ic h affects almost everyone, nor that, aft er so m uch m isery, people did not recognize how neces sary it was to be strong. B u t, even w hile shedding tears at the parades on J u l y 14 t h , w hile singing D eroulede’s Soldiers^ Songs, w h ile shouting " V iv e B o u la n ger!” the people heaped sarcasm on the N .C . O .s and sometimes even blows. T h e most in-

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dulgen t were ready to see in G en eral Bourn, C o lo nel Ra m ollot, Sergean t- M ajor F lic k and Sapper C am em bert, the ridiculous bu t real types o f the dotards o f all ran ks. I n fa c t , the m ilitary plan t m ust have had tremendous v i t a li t y to have su r vived in so u n favou rable an atmosphere. O n the other hand, this p la n t has a distinct chance o f t h rivin g am ong modern tendencies. W h at the m ilitary class has lost in the w a y o f p u b lic appeal and official credit, it is rap id ly regain ing, and th at ten fold, b y in d irect methods, or, as one says at billiards, “ off the cushion.” In fa c t , the conditions, and consequen tly the customs o f life, are tra nsferring to groups the duties, au t h ority and favou rs w h ich recen tly were the prerogatives o f the in dividual, o f his righ ts, and o f his independ ence; and soon the law itself w ill fo llo w suit, A society w h ich form s itself in to unions, accepts plen ary powers, works in sh ifts at fixed rates, to a stereotyped model, and wan ts one-price clothes, tariffs and schools, is no longer inconsistent w it h massed troops, stric t discipline, confinem en t to bar racks and u n iforms. T h e com petition, the haste and the crow d ing w h ich m ar k our age, impose on all precisely that compulsion w h ic h is laid on the troops. Ju s t as the soldier is co nstan tly subjected to the restrictions o f m ilitary regulations, so no one is to-d ay his ow n master. F urth erm ore, w hen one sees in d ustry T ayloriz ed , economy regulated and

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opinions regimen ted, one is inclined to th in k that the m ilitary type o f organization is in process o f becom ing sym bolic o f the N e w A ge. I n a n y case, the profession has lost the strange and anachronistic aspect w h ich isolated it and paralysed it among its contemporaries. E n th usiastic yo u ng m en can now be attracted in to the ran ks, provided th at the arm y is based upon those characteristics w h ic h dom inate the present generation. F irst o f all, service in the professional ar m y w ill offer f u l l satisfaction to the taste fo r fine m ach in ery. Leave to others m achine-gu ns w h ic h jam , w or n -o u t gu ns, ridiculous vehicles, telephones re paired a hundred times, questionable aeroplanes, crippled tan ks! T h a t alone, one m ay be certain, w ill a t trac t volun teers. In a co m m u n ity w h ic h is t h row ing itself w holeheartedly in to m ach inery, specialists, w hether m ilitary or civil, either w o r k listlessly or p u t fo r t h prodigies o f sk ill, according to w hether t h ey have to tin k er w it h in differen t tools or are em ploying the v e r y latest for m o f equipm en t. T h e fa c t that our N a v y has launched, d u ring the past fiftee n years, the finest types o f ship, has had more effect on the q u ality o f its per sonnel than an y am oun t o f posters could have done. T h e increase in confidence the Italia n air force has d raw n fro m the faultless perform an ce o f Balbo's seaplanes is incalculable. T h e professional arm y, a model fa c t o ry w it h its thousands o f machines o f

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precision and speed, all b ea u t ifu lly geared and h an dled b y experts, can not fa il to excite the interest o f the you ng. I t w ill give them, besides, th at kind o f prestige w h ic h choice m ach in ery con fers upon those w ho serve it. M odern w ar, like economic life, u nquestionably implies increasing specialization. T h e fa c t th at the figh ter m ust be trained to fu lfil a p artic u lar f u n c tion w it h great acc u racy m ay seem to involve a certain m onotony in his training. B u t th at is on ly so in appearance, fo r in battle no one can do a n y t h ing efficien tly w it h ou t w or k ing in w it h m an y others, w it h whose duties he has to be fam iliar. T o m orrow , the good i n fa n try m a n w ill be, no doubt, an accurate m arksm an— w it h several types o f weapon— bu t he w ill also be observer, pioneer, sig naller, wireless-operator, m otor-car d river, gu n ner and camouflage expert. T h e train ing o f p rofes sional soldiers w ill be as differen t in its varie ty fro m the drill o f F rederic k the G rea t or the 'schools’ o f the old system, as the life o f the chauffeur, d riving his p o w erfu l car along u n fa m iliar roads, differs fro m the dreary toil o f the galley-slave. F urth erm ore, the flame o f the sporting spirit m ust be applied to the train ing o f troops. W e m ust p u t to good use the eager strength and skill exerted in so m an y fields o f ac t iv i ty, the desire to excel w h ich is so dear to the you ng, the fam e w it h w h ich p ublic opinion endows cham pions; in short, the

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immense expen diture o f en ergy and enthusiasm allocated b y our era to p hysical effort and com pe tition. Essen tially, nothing lends itself better to the taste fo r sport than a m ilitary career. T h ere is no single m ilitary operation w h ic h does n ot call fo r skill, energy, and self-con trol. T h ere is no single w arlik e action w h ich is n ot a collective test and does n ot demand the concerted action o f w elltrained teams. T o obtain better and better results fro m tools, means o f transport, o f signalling, or o f observation, to strive to become a crac k m arksm an, an exceptional driver, a first-class cam ouflage e x pert, are the n ew impulses w h ich w ill get the best out o f professional soldiers. N o doubt, m ilitary methods w ill have to change as a result. T h e impersonal mass system o f train ing, w h ic h is the on ly one suited to the elements furn ished by com pulsory service, is useless fo r v o l unteers. Instead o f su m m ary com pulsion, co m peti tion m ust be in troduced. Ro u tin e prom otion w ill be replaced b y periodical com petitions whose re sults w ill establish reputations and regulate awards. F o r the easy-going and vague system o f good be h aviour in the ran ks and o f sa tisfac tory w or k at the top, m ust be substituted a system o f com petitions, challenges, and prize-lists. A n d so, than ks to sport ing com petitive pride, the most modern m otive powers w ill be brough t to bear upon m ilitary train ing.

CO M PO SITIO N

III

Pascal summed up the condition o f hu m an be ings in three words, 'in constan cy, boredom, a n x iety,* and he prophesied the passion fo r travel w h ich would seize them as soon as means o f transport enabled them to move q u ic k ly fro m place to place. T o leave home, to escape fro m one’s fa m iliar en viron m en t, to seek a new object in life beyond the horizon, t h at is w h at we w a n t nowadays. Perhaps it is an illusion. C learly, the profession o f arms can su p p ly this w a n t as no other can. F o r crac k troops are o n ly trained in vary i n g types o f cou n try. P ro fessional soldiers would never be able to accom m o date themselves to b arrac k -life, drill endlessly car ried out on the same polygon , long route marches, never varied, life in fixed cam ps, in short all the n arrow m onotony in w h ich fro m year to year the train ing o f conscripts drags itself out. B u t being constan tly on the move, taken fro m plain to m ou n tain, fro m forest to sea, p erfor m ing even m inor exercises under unaccustom ed conditions, k ep t on the alert b y the u nexpected nature o f slopes or coverts, halting-places or routes, these professional travellers would at once have their passion fo r travel satisfied and be trained to adapt themselves to changing circumstances. T hese master troops, well fed and clothed, care free celibates, a source o f e n vy on accou n t o f all the flywheels, cylin ders and range-fin ders th ey will have at their disposal, ranging the co u n try fro m

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A p r il to N ove m ber and to u ring F ran ce w h ile on manoeuvres, w ill be easily recruited. I t is impossible to exaggerate the degree o f tech nical perfection to w h ich volu n teers can attain. I t is true that F ran ce has m a n y times in her h istory used p rofes sional armies, bu t these were, excep t fo r small sec tions, recruited b y legal com pulsion or form ed o f mercenaries. T h eir ardour was damped either b y the dull 'm isery o f u n w an ted discipline’— the worst, according to Barres— or b y the laten t desire to give noth ing excep t in proportion to their meagre p ay. A t bottom , rage at h aving d raw n the w ro ng n u m ber in the conscription d raw , eagerness to retu rn to their fields and their w ives, or regret fo r their impulsiveness in volu n teering, did not p re dispose them fo r acts o f great devotion. Y e t i f the properties o f arms could make o f these men the heroes o f F on ten oy, o f Constan tinople, o f Sebas topol, w h at covJd not be made to-m orrow o f 100,000 picked lads, ranged behind the banners o f their ow n free choice?

Ill N

one

t h e

l ess,

t h e

h a rm ony

be t w een

t h e

spirit o f our age and a m ilitary career w ill not in an y w ay remove fro m the profession o f arms all its necessary severity and hardship. T h e arm y o f to m orrow w ill also have its *holy wou n ds.’ Its men w ill experience the rigours o f servitude, the ir k someness o f gregarious life, the stu p id ity o f appear ing to be strange creatures w hom people turn aside to stare at. T h ey w ill have no love, no home o f their ow n. T h ey w ill in evitably be exposed to bodily hardship, to fatigu e, to privations and to bad weather. T h ey w ill be the first to be killed in w ar, and in greatest numbers. I t is well th at it should be so. A soldier is form ed by the trials he has to undergo. V alo u r is not given to troops like flavour to fru its excep t by going against nature. B u t the professional arm y w ill certain ly give its soldiers one impulse o f strength and compensation fo r their sacrifices, nam ely, the m ilitary spirit. T h e m ilitary spirit, indeed, confers on the fig h t ers gathered under its asgis the highest degree o f power. O ther passions or appetites m ay m om en tar ily provoke the enthusiasm o f crowds. B u t no power can be established excep t b y the taste for 113

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livin g together, the desire fo r com mon action and the eagerness to efface oneself fo r the good o f the co m m u n ity w h ich is the life o f this rugged spirit. T h is is all the more so since this spirit is not on ly the bond w h ic h welds battalions in to com pact units, bu t is also a pride o f q u ality b y means o f w h ich the w orst m isfortu nes assume an ideal aspect. F o r this tyra n t, w h ic h distorts each in divid ual the better to fashion the whole, distributes rewards w h ich are never lost. T h e gran deur o f undaunted troops and the m agnificence o f tattered armies en noble those it oppresses. I n it consist the illusions o f the conscrip t, the honour o f the seasoned soldier, the tears shed on the last d ay o f service; and it smooths the path o f d u ty. C om pan ion o f lone o u t post, witness o f du m b suffering, m ourner at h u m ble tombs, its soft rays gild the most obscure sacri fices. Such is the pow er o f this leaven o f collective en ergy that it remains eternal and universal. T h e same bin ding power w h ic h welded the Ro m an legions together was to reappear among the E n g lish archers o f C r e c y , as also among the Prussian Grenadiers at Leu th en and the F ren c h troops at V erd u n . T h e most differen t armies constitu te, by their co m m u n ity o f instin ct and o f tradition, the truest T n tern ation al.’ I n it there is a store o f moral capital w h ich no nation can reject w it h ou t fo rge t ting itself. A n d so, excep t in moments o f madness

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w hen th ey are p aving the w a y fo r their ow n d ow n fa ll, nations, as a m atter o f principle, c u lt iva te the m ilitary spirit, as th ey do th at o f the fa m ily, o f labour, and o f t h rift . E ve n w hen an upheaval o f ideas or o f institutions deflects them fro m it fo r a time, they return to it sooner or later. So one sees the C onven tion praising the qualities o f soldiers fo r w hom the C onstituen t A ssem bly had noth ing bu t insults and threats; the opponents o f the E m pire, w hen they become leaders o f the Rep u b lic, fo r m ing sound regiments, when bu t lately t h ey called fo r " a n arm y w h ich was not an ar m y” ; and the Soviets m ak ing every effort to resurrect the Russian A r m y , after having corru p ted and destroyed it. C learly, the professional ar m y offers the field most suited to the m ilitary spirit. B u t something m ust still be done fo r this conglom eration o f aims and emotions to make it a practical force in w ar. H u m an passions, so long as th ey remain ill-defined, accomplish nothing methodical, and so nothing effective. T h e y have to be crystalliz ed in w elldefined circumstances. T h a t is w h y there is always something local about patriotism , every religion builds its temples, and the c u lt o f arms demands esprit de corps. A n d , indeed, all th at the in dividual soldier gives o f himself to the m ilitary system, and all that he derives fro m it in dreams, cares and am bitions, are contained in quite small m ilitary units. T h e arm y in general is an e n t ity so vast that its

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members can h ard ly visualize it as such. B u t the regim en t can be seen, can be measured, can be understood. A m an has his ow n place there. H e can be recognized there am ong others. O f a soldier, the first th ing one says is " H e is in such and such a regim en t.’ ’ M oreover, the emotional side o f the profession finds something to feed upon in this o r gan ic grouping. T h e desire w h ic h is fe l t b y the weak, mediocre, transien t in divid ual to participate in the power, the greatness, the permanence and the splendour o f a fam ous regimen t is exciting and satisfying. In addition, the aesthetic ch aracter o f m ilitary affairs w h ich appeals most stro ngly to the senses, is most clearly seen b y the soldier in the regim en t: impressive spectacles in w h ich he is al lowed to take part, t h rilling symbols w h ic h he is privileged to see and to touch, stirring bugle-calls, and m usic in w h ich sings a soul w it h w h ich his ow n mingles. F urth erm ore, tradition has always allocated to each corps its ow n peculiar characteristics. B u t w h at was fou n d b y experience to be a good thing in the old armies, is demanded as an im perative necessity by modern needs. T h e presence o f good feeling in a regim en t becomes increasingly im por tan t fro m d ay to day, fro m the m ilitary poin t o f view. F or, as the danger and the desperation o f figh ters on the battlefield increase, moral cohesion becomes m ore and more im portan t. A chain o f

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Steel could keep the G allic hordes literally bound together. T h e whole d u ty o f F red eric k ’s battalions lay in being p erfec t ly drilled, keeping their ran ks, carryi n g out movements in con cert and firing at the word o f com mand. T h e F re n c h Revolu tio n added collective enthusiasm to this. T h e n came advancing b y sections, deploym en t b y bands o f skirmishers or b y lines o f guns, a procedure w h ich was carried on even d uring the last w ar. U p till then, liaison, although o f course it involved p rev i ous agreement o f minds and wills, remained essen tially on the p hysical level between men w ho could see each other, hear each other, touch each other. A ll th at was needed was gestures and calls. B u t to m orrow each grou p w ill figh t alone bu t w ill n ever theless do noth ing w it h o u t the distant help o f its comrades b y means o f impassive messages, secret codes and impersonal time-tables. T h e appeal o f innumerable C hevaliers d ’Assas to A u vergn e will be expressed b y the conven tional dots and dashes o f the Morse code. I t is true that modern equ ip m en t makes possible, tec h n ically speaking, this concen tration o f scattered units. B u t it does not preven t m an fro m rem aining the fou n dation o f the w hole: so th at tech nical evolu tion demands more m ilitary solidarity than ever. I n the midst o f the ce n trifugal forces unloosed b y battle, no u n it w ill remain cohesive unless its bonds have been long

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forged b y regim en tal l ife : m u tual un derstanding, com mon habits, 'the honour o f the sh ip / T h e professional ar m y w ill be bu ilt up o f bodies o f troops. T h is w ill be not on ly in a m an ner o f speaking, or as an ad m inistrative means o f dis trib u ting individuals, b u t as the result o f an in flexible system. I t is a m at ter o f m ilitary p olicy to proceed to organization, to the application o f p ri n ciples, to the system atization o f em ploym en t in such a w a y that the corps acquire the strongest characteristics o f permanence and origin ality. T h ere m ust be no more transfers fo r reasons o f 'personal convenience,’ no more de-baptized units, con tingen ts d rafted fro m one regim en t to another, hussars turned in to dragoons, riflemen changed in to troops o f the line. N o more aiguillettes changed fro m green to red, altered pen nants and regim en tal colours exchanged at the Invalides. A w a y w it h cen tral and prin cipal sections, distant detachments, u n k n ow n speciaKsts, and men seconded fo r d u ty w ho never rejoin their units. A w a y w it h train ing carried out in a thousand centres, schools and p la toons, teachers com ing fro m outside, u n its made up o f bits and pieces. Instead o f the ran ks being co n tin u ally broken up, o f the continuous stream o f effectives and o f the kaleidoscope o f leaders and comrades, real regiments w ill be created. C onstan t in their composition, in their rites and symbols, re newed Im perceptibly b y the arrival or departure o f

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n ew elements in v e ry small numbers, always u n ited in barrac ks as w ell as on cam paign, t h ey w ill lead th at in tim ate l ife and assume those m arked ch arac teristics fro m w h ich develops collective fello w feeling. O nce esprit de corps has been created, it m ust be trained. T h e spirit o f em ulation w ill provide a means to do this. Sporting r iva lry, as organized be tween soldiers, w ill on ly have to be transform ed in to regim en tal com petition. I m p orta n t meetings w ill take place periodically, this time n ot between in divid ual champions bu t between whole corps. In a chosen stretch o f co u n try, in accordance w it h a previously w ork ed-ou t plan, each in its tu rn and in the presence o f all the others w ill have to bring into action its figh t ing organization in co-operation w it h the others. T h e nu m ber o f bullets and shells th at hit the targets, the degree o f camouflage achieved, the q u ality o f organ ization w or k , the nu m ber o f objectives discovered b y observation, the adequacy o f signalling and the w or k in g o f su p p ly colum ns, w ill be the measure o f success, the whole operation being con trolled b y a j u r y m ak ing use o f cameras, chronometers and microphones. T h is comparison, made w it h the utm ost care, w ill do more fo r the cohesion o f units than all routine orders p u t together. B y the aw ard to the winners o f banners, special places in reviews, parades, billet ing and even in the grading o f p ay to the win ners.

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the spirit o f enthusiasm and cohesion w ill be fos tered in each regim en t. I n addition, i f regional re cru it in g is em ployed and local pride is joined to m ilitary em ulation, the whole population can be roused to enthusiasm b y these m ilitary co m peti tions, W hen one sees w h at the m eeting o f tw o sporting teams means in our tow ns and villages, one can well see how best to make esprU de corps echo through the land. W hile, however, the cohesion o f the division m ust be cu ltivated ch iefly w it h in the regim en t, the division itself m ust also have its ow n peculiar c h ar acter in peace-time. E ve r since G u ib ert conceived the idea o f dividing the ar m y in to great sections, in terchangeable, provided w it h all that was needed to figh t as an isolated u n it, the logic o f battle has never ceased to accen tuate the prom inence o f the division. T h is is the inevitable effect o f the develop m en t o f weapons, w h ich constan tly rein force the interdependence o f the various arms, just as m ech anization co n tin u ally urges in d ustry towards cen tralization. B u t as soon as it becomes eviden t that no one arm can do an yt h ing w it h ou t the others, that no success can be attained unless it is consoli dated by the i n fa n t ry, that a foot-soldier can not m ove a lim b w it h ou t the su pport o f tan ks and guns, that everyone is blin d unless aeroplanes see things fo r him, that he is paralysed w it h ou t signals and powerless i f he is deprived o f his au xiliary serv-

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ices, then the organism whose fu n c t io n it is to co m bine these diverse elements m ust first be v e ry care f u l ly trained. I t is not enough th at there should be somewhere a com m ander and a general staff, that their various tasks are mapped out and that fro m time to time one u n it makes co n tac t w it h another. T h e division m ust live its ow n life. Form ed o f trained troops, it w ill be able to practise the higher branches o f m ilitary art. T h e various arms w ill be made to train together, not on ly by means o f co n versations over the m ap or in the field, bu t in fa c t , and in detail. Large form ations united fo r several weeks each year, organized exac t ly as th ey would be on cam paign, w ill cover each region in tu rn in their manoeuvres. Six divisions consisting o f a specified nu m ber o f bodies o f troops, all com plete and on a perm anen t basis, w ill be the backbone o f the professional arm y. T h is ar m y w ill be composed o f 100,000 volun teers, you ng and specially selected, capable o f m oving at great speed b y means o f mechanical transport and possessing p o w erfu l modern weapons. T h is great body o f men w ill be inspired b y the m ilitary spirit. A n d w e shall see how fa r m ilitary art and the strength w h ich are the honour o f the profession o f arms can progress b y the use o f technique and in a system based on selection and quality.

Pa

r t

V

E M PL O YM E N T

"Beyond doubt life is only a m ovem ent o f matter. >1 M a e t e r l in c k

I F a ced

w it h

t h e

unkno w n

fu t u r e

,

t h e

human mind seeks a refuge, and usually believes it has fou n d it in w h at has already happened. Ju s t as the politician consults precedents or the jurist custom, so the soldier endeavours to ex trac t fro m the deeds accomplished yesterday the rules w h ich should guide him in the acts o f to-m orrow . I f he himself has not had the fort u n e to figh t, he puts his questions to history. I f he has made w ar, he co n sults his memory. O ne sees the arm y o f to-d ay co n stru c ting its doctrines, its plans and its systems in accordance w it h the vagaries o f the last war. T h is eagerness to rely on the past in order to p ic ture the fu t u re certain ly possesses some advantages. A p a r t fro m the fa c t that it is natural and instin c tive it agrees w it h the conception, w h ich finds so m uch justification in other fields, o f the co n tin u ity o f human affairs and their con tin ual repetition. M oreover, all artists, and p artic u larly those in the m ilitary sphere, derive m uch benefit in their t ra i n ing fro m stu dying the masters and masterpieces, fo r there is something contagious about m agn ifi cence. Y e t this co n for m ity m ust not become e x clusive, nor this im itation servile. N o one can be 125

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sure th at a fu t u re conflict w ill resemble, even re m otely, the ones w h ic h we have already seen. T h erefore, w hen one is considering the e m ploy m en t o f a picked arm y, speedy, p o w erfu l and w ellprotected, it is necessary, as a m at ter o f principle, and even though i t demands a m en tal effort, to abandon the use o f conceptions w h ich were applied to mass efforts d u ring the last w ar. I n particu lar, the co n t in u ity o f fro n ts, the delays necessary fo r m ak ing preparations, the im possibility o f develop ing local successes, all o f w h ich are ideas w h ich the force o f events imposed as the basis o f the tactics o f n u m erical strength, can have no value. O n the other hand, independent enterprises, surprise, t a k ing advan tage o f conditions, are all in p erfec t ac cordance w it h the ch aracter o f the n ew instru ment. I f one w an ts at all costs to discover analogies w it h the events o f the past, one m ust seek them, n ot in the slow developments o f the last w ar, b u t rat h er in the operations o f the great cava lry o f olden days. Indeed, armies lik e those o f 19 14 , slow in their marches and their deployments, recon noitring on ly short distances, bound closely to their lines o f co m m u n ication, were unable to expose either their flanks or their rear. Stra tegically their colum ns and tac t ica lly their chains o f rifles or lines o f guns were designed to operate in one direction on ly. I f th ey were threatened b y defeat or reverse, t h ey had no

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Other resource t h an a precipitate retreat. Indeed, one saw i t happen to both sides. A s a result, each section was obliged to m ain tain solid co n tac t w it h its neighbours. T h e rigid ity o f the whole, and, as a consequence, the maintenance o f the line, be came indispensable. T o w age battle 'in combined strengt h’ was the stric t axiom. T h ere would have been no rest fo r the opposing forces had n ot their w ings rested on impassable obstacles— Sw it z erlan d and the sea. Consolidation o f the com batan ts in fortified positions did not change, bu t rather rein forced, the principle o f the con tinuous fro n t. I f a local offen sive succeeded in break ing through, all the efforts o f the defenders were devoted to re-establishing themselves shoulder to shoulder. H i n gi n g, bracing, welding, w arp ing, strategic w it h d raw al, these were the m aster words o f m ilitary art. M ean w hile the at tac k er, w ho b y his v e ry success had u ncovered his defences, slowed dow n his speed the fu r t h er he advanced, and spoke o n ly o f p ivo ting, shortening the line, w iden ing breaches, encirclem en t, recip ro cal support. U p to the last shot fired, the oppo nents form ed t w o flexible, b u t never broken, lines. F oc h’s gesture o f ham m ering w i t h his fist on an im agin ary enem y line, in order to m ake pockets in it, accu rately reproduced the fo r m taken b y m ilitary action o f the period. T h e corps o f the fu t u re w ill n ot be bound b y

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these lim itations. Possessing, than ks to its engines and caterpillars, extrem e suppleness, able to come in to the open as well as to disappear w it h great speed, freed fro m the necessity o f obtain ing its sup plies fro m fixed points, in short, capable o f m ov ing its position, its direction, and its dispositions almost instan taneously, it w ill be able to con d uct operations lasting some considerable time quite i n dependen tly. A n d , fro m the v e ry outset, it is d u r ing the phase w hen the belligerents are m arshalling their m aterial and preparing themselves fo r the first assault th at the task o f the professional ar m y w ill begin. T h e initial advan tage, w h ich ow ing to its composition it w ill possess over all other fo r m a tions, w ill make it possible fo r it to gain im portan t victories d uring the early days o f a conflict. A s a m atter o f fa c t , the idea o f seizing territory, so widespread d uring previous centuries, had lost its im portance in the minds o f F ren ch strategists before the last w ar. T h e fa c t th at Louis X I V , fo r exam ple, had suddenly occupied Flanders d uring the W ar o f D evolu tion and F ran c h e-C o m te d uring the w ar w it h H ollan d, and had on the whole done w ell out o f this; that F rederic k the G rea t had seized Silesia w it h ou t a n y preamble, and had not le f t it d uring seven years o f w a r; th at N apoleon had made it a rule to c a rry the w ar in to the enem y’s co u n try w it h ou t delay^— these lessons seemed to the leading school o f though t to be more or less out o f

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date. N a t u r a lly , th ey w an ted to take the offensive, and indeed o n ly the offensive; b u t on ly as a m at ter o f prin ciple, and w it h ou t at tach ing m uch im por tance to the n atio n ality o f the region w h ic h would be its theatre. E very t h i n g depended on w in n ing the battle, no m at ter where it took place. I t seemed st ric t ly logical to allow the Germ ans to reach Brus sels, or to accept the necessity o f w it h d raw ing to the Low er Seine in order to hold a more strategic line. Perhaps this state o f m ind was the main rea son fo r the coolness shown b y the H igh C om m an d d uring the periods o f crisis. B u t, in the end, we paid dearly enough fo r it. T h e am oun t o f destruction caused by w ar, the repercussions on p ublic opinion o f invasion or co n quest, the fa c t o f being in possession o f territory w hen one is negotiating, the role th at certain re gions can p lay in the struggle through their re sources or their position, have restored the utm ost im portance to the occupation o f territory. T o lose T h io n ville and B riey would be to surrender h a lf our steel production. T o accept a te m porary w i t h d raw al fro m Strasbourg w ou ld mean th at we should have to raze it to the grou n d in order to retake it. I f the Germans cross the Meuse, the battle is brough t to the gates o f Lille. I f t h ey capture A n t w erp and instal their aeroplanes and submarines there, our com m unications w it h E nglan d become seriously affected. H o w can we keep the passage

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open between M arseilles and A f r i c a i f C orsica is snatched fro m us? A n d w h at com m unications could w e keep up w it h our allies o f C e n tral and Eastern E urope i f T u n isia were to slip ou t o f our hands? O n the other hand, i f we were to get pos session o f the Saar valley, i t would give us 10,000,000 tons o f coal a year. W ere we to reach the Sw ab ian D an u be we w ou ld be c u t t i n g A ustria oflf fro m G er m a n y. B y debouching on the M ain, we would spur the C zechs in to action. B y seizing T reves and the E ife l plateau w e would cover at the same time Lorrain e, Belgiu m and L uxe m b u rg. W hoever holds D iisseldorf, paralyses the R u h r. I f Lyons is threatened across Swiss territory, its de fence is at G eneva. W hoever controls Sardinia is in the best position to dominate the W estern M editer ranean. F u rt h erm ore, fro m an in trinsically m ilitary poin t o f view , preven tive in terven tion m ay have a considerable effect on the development o f opera tions. I n passing fro m a state o f peace to a state o f w ar, mass armies go through a period o f crisis. H o w ever m uch care has been taken in preparations fo r m obilization, however m ethodically i t m ay be carried th rough, it nevertheless involves general upheaval. A l l the tim e th at the calling up o f re servists, the distribu tion o f immense quan tities o f equipm en t, and the numberless movements and m anipulations w h ic h these operations involve are

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ta k ing place, the slightest unrest is fra u g h t w it h danger. T h e same is true o f the transport needed fo r the concen tration o f troops. F o r whole weeks, trains, convoys and ships fo llo w each other in su c cession in accordance w it h c a refu lly w or k ed-ou t timetables, and in conditions o f interdependence w h ic h m ake the system v e ry vulnerable. O ne has o n ly to t h in k o f the w a y in w h ic h the smallest de tails are mapped ou t, to realize the consequences t h at m ay result fro m some unforeseen h itch. In addition, u n its pour in to crow ded debarkationzones fo r transport and fo r supplies w h ic h are co n cen trated there, and so make the period o f m obili zation even more precarious. C overing elements are there to do their d u ty, o f course. B u t even t h ey are incom plete and scattered, and can not be strong enough everyw h ere to preven t concen trated and prem editated attacks. T h a t is w h y the wise M olt k e, w ho reckoned on the rapid advance o f our veterans, decided that in th at eve n tu ality the G erm an co n cen tration should take place on the righ t ban k o f the Rh in e. T h e fa c t t h at our best troops were rooted to the spot b y the hesitation o f the H igh C om m an d and b y a thousand absurd delays does not alter the fa c t th at w e m igh t have fo ugh t the first battle at M ain z. F in ally, how is it possible to leave ou t o f accou n t the impression th at can be made on units w h ic h are n ot in w ar form ation b y dangers w h ich suddenly

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appear in the most t e r r ify i n g and im m inen t form ? T h e men w ho, in A ugust 19 14 , fou n d themselves subjected to a hail o f bullets and the blast o f big shells, suffered a k in d o f m oral an nihilation. A l l the resolution, illusions and b ravery w it h w h ich th ey had armed themselves cru m pled up in a t w i n k ling, leaving them terrified among the shrieking wou n ded and the rigid corpses o f the dead. W hen, to-d ay, the historian tries to explain in cold blood the confusion o f this first clash o f arms, the calm ness o f some people, the disappearance o f these and the pan ic o f those, he m ust first t r y to imagine the state o f stupor in to w h ic h these confiden t people w ere plu nged by this disruption. L a ter on, the fresh d rafts did not have to face the horrors o f battle in such a b ru tal man ner. M ixed w it h well-seasoned comrades, and pen etrating grad u ally in to the area over w h ic h death hovered, t h ey did not as a rule have to u ndergo the same shocks. B u t although peo ple grew used to these things b y degrees during fo u r years o f w ar, it m ust not be forgo t te n w h at an ordeal th ey were at the beginning. I t has been fou n d b y experience th at the revelation o f fire in flicted on u nsteady troops can have v e ry serious consequences; and everyt h ing demands t h at the shock troops, provided w it h the more p o w erfu l and surprising engines o f w ar, should take advantage o f them w it h ou t losing a moment. The action of picked troops, which are ready to

EM PLO YM ENT

1 3 3

Strike at the v e ry first hour, in co-operation w it h the A ir F orce, and, i f necessary, the F leet, and w h ich are capable o f operating alone on the fro n t and to a depth o f six ty miles, w ill adapt itself ad van tageously to the general and m ilitary conditions w h ic h w ill make possession and in itiative the tru m p cards in fu t u re conflicts. T h e y w ill be able to pass in a single bound fro m peace to w ar, cap tu re v a lu able spoils, and spread confusion am ong the enem y d u ring his m obilization period. T h e ir objectives w ill, o f course, be lim ited b y the means w h ich w ill have to achieve them. I t w ill not be a question o f destroying, b y this initial a t tac k , all the forces o f the enemy, bu t one o f get ting in the first blow. I n modern conflicts, w here everyt h ing has its percus sions and repercussions, it is w ell to show one’s de term ination and to spread anguish beyond the fro n tier at the first op port u n ity. W e ourselves already bear o n ly too deeply the scars o f invasion.

II Be

in g

in d e p e n d e n t

in

it s

m o v e m e n t s

,

t h e

professional ar m y w ill be all the more able to strike u n expectedly. W h ether it is operating on its ow n accou n t, or for m ing p art o f a larger form atio n , in a general conflict, the blows th at it w ill deliver w ill be both sudden and violen t. B y this means, there w ill be reborn the surprise at tac k , w h ic h has always been the criterion o f leaders, and w h ich the last w ar banished fro m battle because every a t tac k had to be c a re fu lly prepared. I t was necessary, at that tim e, fo r a n y a t tac k at all, t h a t the grou n d should be c a re fu lly organized fro m the poin t o f vie w o f waves o f a t tac k and reserve positions, th at all kinds o f com m unications should be established, gu n-e m placem ents bu ilt, stores brough t up to strength, com m and posts chosen, signalling systems arranged and men and guns taken across the trench system. M oreover, w h a t an enormous am oun t o f time and trouble it took to get these foo t soldiers in to the line on a six-m ile fro n t w it h all their arms, am m u nition, rations, tools and accessories, stu m bling at every step over the broken grou n d, and under ceaseless fire. I t was necessary, therefore, to spend several days in destroying the enemy positions b y 134

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artillery fire, before launching assault-troops into the open against an entrenched enemy. During the final months, it is true, the fact that the offensive took place on the whole front, the lessons of past experience, the enormous quantity of artillery of all kinds accumulated in all sectors, and above all the appearance of tanks, which in large measure supplanted artillery preparation, made it possible to launch attacks before the enemy could put himself on his guard. All the same, to the very end of the drama, the unexpected was the exception. Tomorrow, it will be the usual procedure of a picked band, organized and equipped to that end. I n fa c t , caterpillar-veh icles m oving across any type o f co u n try w ill q u ic k ly transport to the poin t o f action everyt h ing necessary fo r the a t tac k , in stead o f it being brough t in driblets b y fa tigu e p ar ties, on the backs o f animals, b y roads, trac ks, saps and com m u nication trenches. Six days were re quired to bring up the 10,000 tons o f m aterial needed fo r battle b y a D ivision in 19 17 . T h e same task w ill be carried out in a single n igh t b y a D iv i sion o f the n ew type. F urth erm ore, close con tact w it h the en em y’s position b y troops about to at tac k w ill no longer be o f an y more im portance w hen the storm ing echelon is composed o f armoured vehicles. T hese, k ep t concealed ou t o f range o f the more in tense'fire, w ill on ly come up to the fro n t line at the last m om en t, u n der cover o f n igh t or

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artificial fog. F in ally, since th ey themselves w ill c a r ry form idable artillery and w ill be designed to crush system atic defences, t h ey w ill readily dispense w it h previous destruction o f the enem y positions. T h e defence w ill have none o f the indications, w h ic h fo r m erly showed th at an at tac k was im m i nen t, and w ill remain in ignorance u n til the v e ry hour w hen the armoured vehicles break in to his lines. Surprise, the old queen o f the art o f w ar, w h ic h was consigned to the rubbish heap so long as pow er lacked speed, w ill fin d a n ew instru m en t, and in consequence w ill recover its power. B u t surprise m ust be organized. N o t on ly b y means o f secrecy, observed in conversation, orders and reports b y those w h o prepare plans and make decisions, and b y the concealm en t o f preparations, b u t also under cover o f a t h ic k veil o f m ake-be lieve. I n our age, w hen a thousand m isch ief-m akers are m ixed up in our affairs, w hen honour is less per suasive than m oney, w hen the Press is ever on the h u n t fo r in form ation , w hen no enterprise can be carried on w it h ou t telephones, wireless and ty p e w riters, when all figures have to be deciphered, it is almost impossible to preven t in form ation reach ing the enemy. B u t, none the less, one m ay confuse him. I f one is w illing to hoodwin k one’s ow n cam p deliberately, to mislead the v e ry people one intends to em ploy, or b y clever artifice to use all the means w h ich are now available to each side fo r discover-

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1 3 7

ing w h at the other is doing, in order to spread m is leading rumours, one can hide reality behind false hood. T h a t is how T hem istocles used the Persian spies to provo k e the a t tac k at Salamis. C er tai n ly it is a cruel ordeal fo r the m an w ho has to do the job to be k ep t in ignorance o f his objective u n til the last m inute. T o bear it, he needs all the backgrou n d o f the m ih tary virtues. H ere is another reason w h y massed nations would fin d it difficult to accustom themselves to such a system. B u t to picked troops, trained to resignation, their leaders can promise rest w hen t h ey intend them to figh t, can deny a n y in ten tion o f offensive w hen it is already decided upon, announce a m arch in to A lsace w hen their goal is really Flanders. N on e the less, however great a fa c u l t y picked troops m ay have fo r carryi n g ou t u n an ticipated orders, certain preparations w ill still have to be made. O n the fro n t , the enemy is on the alert. T h ere, it w ill not be sufficient to disguise men and m aterial. C u n n ing m ust be used in order to make him believe th at one is where one is not, th at one w an ts something quite differen t fro m w h at one does. I n the areas chosen fo r action, active cam ou flage m ust be used; specialist units w ill m ethodi cally lay false trails. T h e eyes o f the enem y m ust be confused b y the appearance o f bridges, tracks, railways, b y im itation terraces, batteries and ob servation points, b y make-believe colum ns, convoys

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and troop concentrations. H is ears m ust be deceived b y the noise o f m oving vehicles, explosions, and the roar o f engines. H is m ind m ust be distracted b y wireless masts in action, b y signals he can in tercept, conversations he can overhear. W hole sectors m ust be hidden b y smoke-screens, in order to present the appearance o f false attacks. A sense o f u n certain ty w h ic h is v e ry w earing fo r the H igh C om m an d, the troops o f the line, and the reserves, m ust invade the opposing cam p. M eanw hile, the shock troops, whose elements have been k ep t scattered u n til the last m om en t, w ill take up their positions in a single n igh t, in order to lau nch the a t tac k at daw n. E ac h D ivision establishes its base, w hile the i n fa n t ry sets up its guns and m achine-guns. I n the rear, the artillery takes up its positions, organized, as a result o f using guns firing at all angles, less fo r the purpose o f f i r ing profusely in to n arrow areas at partic u lar ob jectives, than fo r in terven tion aft er the a t tac k is launched. Its first d u ty is to la y dow n a barrage rou n d the tan ks. T h is m ust be v e ry wide and v e ry elastic, as the tan ks move q u ic k ly, and, on the other hand, the enem y guns capable o f at tac k ing them are disposed not in line bu t like pieces on a chessboard. I n addition, the artillery m ust be pre pared to concen trate a great volu m e o f fire w h er ever it is needed, at any moment, so as to dominate rap id ly an y p art o f the battlefield w h ich m ay be

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threatened. I n other words, flexib ility becomes the ru le fo r a weapon w h ich b u t recen tly proceeded ch iefly in accordance w it h pre-arranged plans. T h e grou p ing o f i n fa n t ry and o f artillery, the allotm en t o f duties, the laying out o f lines o f fire and the b a t t ery positions, are all liable to con tin ual change. Some distance to the rear, the tan ks are for m ing up fo r battle. T h e y are n orm ally arranged in three echelons. F irst come the ligh t machines w h ich w ill m ake the first co n tac t w it h the enemy. T h en comes the battle echelon, w h ich is made up o f medium and h eavy tan ks, and whose fro n t and depth de pend on the n ature o f the operation and the esti mated resistance. F in ally, the reserve echelon, de signed fo r relief or fo r follow ing up successes. E ac h echelon is itself made up o f successive sections. O n the average, the a t tac k ing force o f the D ivision covers an area about five miles wide in clu d ing in tervals, the elements being more or less dense along the fro n t , according to the object o f the operation. T h e whole consists o f five or six waves o f tan ks, o f w h ic h the strongest is generally the leading battle echelon. E ve n i f the ar m y on ly consists o f fo u r D ivisions, 2,000 tan ks, on a fro n t o f t w e n ty miles, can go in to action at the same time. Suddenly, these monsters start off. T h e ligh t tan ks go rap id ly forw ard to make co n tac t w it h the enemy. T h eir d u ty is to determine the position and nature o f the first resistance, to find out and to in-

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dicate the most favou rab le routes, to camouflage difficult passages b y smoke-screens, in short, to recon noitre fo r and to cover u p the c h ief body o f the tan ks. T h e n w hen these tasks are carried through, the small tan ks w ill leave the fro n t , and ta k e up their position on the flanks fo r observation or in the rear to m ain tain com m u n ication. A t each lull, t h ey resume their task o f reconnaissance in the van. B u t now the battle echelon takes u p the figh t in its turn. T h e large groups w h ic h constitu te it m ove across the grou n d, not in line, b u t in independent sections, manoeuvring as circu mstances dictate. T h eir line o f advance is, fo r the most p art, at a definite angle to the enem y fro n t , in order to meet resistance obliquely, and to be free to change their direction m a n y times in the course o f the battle. T hese flexible units m ach in e-gu n the su rface o f the grou n d, reserving their gu n -fire fo r special objec tives w h ic h t h ey t r y to wipe ou t b y ta k ing them in the rear. E ac h manoeuvre consists essentially o f turns made b y the at tac k er in order to a t tac k fro m behind, w hile the artillery covers the operation b y means o f fire distributed all rou nd the area where the action is ta k ing place and b y sending ou t smoke-screens to conceal those tan ks w h ic h have to stay in one place. A t the same time, measures m ust be taken to en sure th at progress is not u n d u ly hindered b y slow

EM PLO YM EN T

I 41

m opping-u p. T h e leading elements m ust therefore be used to break t h rough and to push on towards the final objective as p ro m p t ly as possible. T h eir su pporting units w ill finish off w h at t h ey have be gu n. I f t h ey are not enough fo r this purpose, their reserves w ill do w h at is necessary. I n the last resort, the i n fa n t ry w ill help in this. I n short, i f the enemy pu ts up a determined resistance, the at tac k er w ill soon appear in the fo r m o f groups o f tan ks figu ring in great depth, w hile the first w ave w ill have co n tin ued its advance and the art illery w ill have taken w it h in its field o f fire not on ly the ou ter edge o f this whole field o f com bat, b u t also certain blocks o f territory in the back areas w h ich have already been passed by. I n proportion as the tan ks produce their effect, so the i n fa n t ry advances. Sometimes this is done on caterpillar-vehicles. Sometimes t h ey m ake their w a y on foo t. I n a n y case, th eir task is to take pos session o f captured grou n d. T h is task is carried out b y occu pying successive positions, protected in depth w it h machines and m achine-gu ns, rap id ly brough t in to action. F req u e n tly, t h ey w ill have to reduce rem nan ts o f resistance b y means o f ap pro priate manoeuvres and b y the fire o f their au xiliary guns. Sometimes, their lines w ill serve as support and as relief, especially i f the enemy, h aving got w in d o f the surprise, has also been able to bring up armoured units at the proper time and place.

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and to lau nch cou n ter-attac ks. I t Is obvious that the occu pation w ill be made n ot on continuous lines, b u t b y strong detachments grouped rou nd the i n fa n t ry’s machines, disposed at in tervals and at some distance fro m each other, b u t in such a w a y that t h ey are ready to give m u tual support. A l l these actions, n a tu rally, are carried ou t u n der a camouflage o f artificial fogs. T oget h er w it h the foot-soldiers, the artillery ad vances. T h an ks to caterp illar wheels, t h ey can push their advance as f a r as t h ey wish. F or them, there is an end o f ta k ing u p position en tnasse, w h ich, d u ring the last w ar, was rendered necessary b y the d ifficu lty o f covering shell-torn grou n d, the in flexib ility o f organ ization, and the slowness o f sup plies. I f it is le f t alone, a grou p o f artillery can leave its emplacements and take up positions five miles fu r t h er on a fe w m inutes later. O n the other hand, the speeding up o f battle w ill not allow the art illery to proceed in the old w ay, to share ou t their tasks once fo r all at the begin ning o f an u n dertak ing, to divide the enemy territory in to li m ited fields o f action, to w o r k ou t their fire m athe m a tically, as t h ey were able to do in the days o f stabilized fro n ts. O n the co n trary, as soon as the enem y position has been attack ed, they w ill have to d irect their fire in accordance w it h rap id ly de velop ing events. I n other words, the artillery m ust keep in close touch w i t h the battle-echelon, not

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o n ly b y observation and liaison parties, b u t also in com plete units, w it h weapons, i f not w it h baggage. T h e artillery also becomes a mass m ovem en t, whose in divid ual sections take up the positions best suited fo r action, and w ho fire fro m all angles at objec tives w h ic h are almost con tin uously on the move. Provided, in addition, w it h a n ti-ta n k weapons and m achine-gu ns, the artillery protects itself by its o w n means. Instead o f im m obility, m ap-firing, and cen traliz ation , it m ust now learn direct observa tion and initiative. A battle o f this sort im mensely increases the im portance o f the role o f a irc raft. M otorized units m ust have speedy in form ation and be protected as w id ely as possible. T h e most adequate support is, therefore, t h at w h ic h comes fro m the air. F or troops w h o proceed b y surprise and speed, aero planes w ill be, in everyt h ing, not on ly auxiliaries b u t indispensable comrades in arms. I n order that, at a m om en t’s notice, tan ks m ay be in a position to manoeuvre w here th ey are needed, guns m ay concen trate their fire on the necessary points, and reserves m ay be moved up to the righ t spot, n ot h ing is so usefu l as the aeroplane w h ic h discovers the enem y f a r off, rap id ly signals the position o f objectives, and equally rap id ly indicates the posi tion o f frie n d ly troops. W e are at the poin t where the aeroplane w ill be the H igh C o m m an d’s real means o f m ak ing, fro m time to time, personal

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reconnaissance o f the situation, and ligh t machines, capable o f lan ding anyw here, w ill have to be at tached to the General Staff. I n addition, grou n d troops, especially armoured units, w ill receive va lu able aid fro m a irc ra f t w it h regard to their cam ou flage. Smoke-screens spread fro m the air can hide in a f e w m inutes vast areas o f grou n d, w hile the noise o f flyin g machines w ill cover t h at o f ca ter p illar vehicles. B u t especially b y strik ing o f its ow n accord on visible targets, the A i r F orce becomes, p a r excellence, the arm whose ligh t n ing effects combine best w it h the principles o f strategic w i t h draw al and the exploitation o f large mechanized form ations. In versely, co-operation w it h the assault troops w ill demand fro m the squadrons b rief and concen trated operations, w h ich are best adapted to the n ature o f the A i r arm. W hen the a irc ra ft have to lin k their efforts w it h those o f men whose rate o f progress is a cra w l, and have to operate d ay after day, relieving each other in the same sector, the risks m u lt ip ly as time passes and terrib ly com plicate their task; the en em y’s reactions in p ursuing them, and in bringing up special artillery, the changes in the atmosphere, the damage to machines and the fa tigu e o f the personnel increase. B y con trast, if t h ey can assemble suddenly, and operate in great nu m ber fo r a short space o f time, their results w ill be tenfold. O n the other hand, their protection be-

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comes correspon dingly easier, fo r, although it is im possible to retain perm anen t m astery o f the air in a sector w here the enemy has time to take cou n ter measures, it is, however, possible to seize it u n ex pected ly at one poin t, at a chosen instan t. T h e t a c tics o f the n ew ar m y, operating b y short and u n expected attacks, w ill respond v e ry w ell to the pre rogatives and the services o f its air fighters. T h us the battle develops, a tangle o f actions co n ducted w it h great speed, each one o f w h ic h de mands the participation o f elements divided in to m an y small sections. I t is clear that, in spite o f the qualities o f the personnel, this flexib ility can not be realized w it h ou t a rapid and accurate system o f signalling. I f one had to stick to the old procedure, that is to say to the installation o f wires, the erec tion o f telegraph posts and transm itters, agreed codes and signals, and chains o f breathless orderlies, then the same difficulties w h ich attend the laying ou t o f the telephone, the exchange o f Morse mes sages and the dispatch o f orderlies, would result in the same slow ing-dow n in the tempo o f battle. B u t progress, at the same time as it has in troduced speed in to the em ploym en t o f engines o f w ar, p ro vides the means o f lin k ing them together in the necessary w ay. Rad io-telegrap h y has reached the point w here people w ill be able to converse upon an unlim ited nu m ber o f sets sim ultaneously w i t h out in terfering w it h each other. T h e selectivity o f

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T H E A RM Y O F T H E F U T U R E

certain sets makes them accessible on ly to waves o f a precise length, and allows those w ho wish to co m m u n icate to get in to touch w it h each other w i t h ou t searching, and to isolate themselves fro m other transmissions. I n addition, there are means o f p ro vid ing th at there shall be no in trusion or i n t erfer ence on the specific w avelengt h o f a certain set. T o-m o rro w , the m ajority o f com m unications w ill be b y the spoken word. A t an y distance, at any m om en t, fro m a ta n k , a car, an aeroplane, the cor ner o f a w all, the foo t o f a tree, the voice o f the leader w ill m ake k n ow n to his subordinates, to his equals, to his superiors, w h at he is ordering and w h at he asks, as easily as, in olden days, the shouts o f the cen turion. I t can be imagined w h at coher ence this procedure w ill bestow on operations, de spite the rapid m ovem en t o f men and machines. N evertheless, despite these facilities, the incidents o f the battle m ust not be allowed to break the order o f the attackers. A f t e r some hours, certain groups o f tan ks have passed the others, the i n fa n t ry follows w it h diflSculty, the artillery needs readjust m en t, the reinforcem en ts have gone astray, the sup plies are seeking their destination. T h e units thus separated m ust be brough t t o gether again. T h e principle objective o f the ar m y has th erefore been chosen so as to allow this re grouping. A ccord in g to the type o f operation, the estimated degree o f resistance, and the nature o f

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14 7

the terrain, it has been fixed at a poin t more or less distan t fro m the poin t o f departure, on an average about t h ir ty miles aw ay. T h a t is, in fa c t , the dis tance necessary to be able to deploy the m ain body o f the arm y, w it h a view to flan k action against the neighbouring co u n try, a freq u en t method o f ta k ing advan tage o f successes. T h a t is also the depth favou rable to air operations, w hen it is a question o f detailed observations protected b y figh ting air c r a f t . T h e armoured units in possession o f the ob jec tive recon noitre in all directions b y means o f ligh t machines in a smoke-screen. Behind this screen, in fa n try m e n and guns occ u py the co n quered territory. A f t e r th at, the tan ks take up w aiting positions towards the rear, w here t h ey get ready fo r fresh efforts. I f there is no u rge n cy about pushing forw ard , t h ey aw ait n igh tfall in order to com plete their re-form ation , and, in this case, u n til n igh tfall, protective clouds conceal part o f the b a t tlefield fro m the eyes o f the enemy.

Ill Bu

t

o f t e n

,

w h e n

su c c ess

h a s

b e e n

g a in e d

,

one m ust make haste to gather its fru its. Leaving the objective w h ic h has been attained, the p rofes sional ar m y w ill push on in to the zone in w h ich lies the spoils o f w ar. 'E xp lo ita t io n ’ w ill become a reality, whereas d u ring the last w ar it was on ly a dream. I t is true th at d uring the recen t battles, offensives, b y sheer w eigh t o f men, did m ake a break through. I n fro n t o f the at tac k er there opened up the road to great victories, those w h ich, b y their profou n d effects and rapid extension, th rew the enemy in to general confusion, just as the break ing o f a p illar m ay bring dow n a cathedral in ruins. T hose F rench m en w ho, on M ay 9th, 1 9 15 , pushed through to V i m y , w ho on J u l y is t and 8th, 1 91 6 , pierced b y a single thrust the G erm an posi tions south o f the Som me, and w ho, on A ugust 9th, 1 91 8 , on the A n cre, com pletely broke the en e m y; and those G erm ans w ho, on F eb ru ary 23 rd, 1 91 6 , before V erd u n , fou n d nothing in fro n t o f them b u t a dislocated defence, w ho on M arch 24th, 1 91 8 , saw the E nglish le f t broken, and w h o ten weeks later carried the C hem in des D ames and passed C h a teau- T h ierry, could believe that the de148

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cisive hour had struck, when the advance would go on accelerating, when any boldness could be permitted, when the enemy was paralysed in will and would abandon himself to his fate. But these victors lacked the means of getting full value from their success. How was it possible to drive the infantry any further when they were lost, footsore, and decimated, when the guns could not follow them, nor the reinforcements catch them up, and when even orders failed to come through? And as for the cavalry, which was incapable of crossing this shell-torn ground, badly equipped for battle, infinitely vulnerable, its dreams of a triumphal progress were shattered at the first barbed-wire entanglement commanded by machine-guns. To-morrow, the fact of the existence of a picked body organized for pursuit will change everything. When one thinks of the weakness of ordinary formations as soon as they are attacked on the flank or in the rear, of the importance of certain vital parts of the organization and of the centralization of command, one can estimate what overwhelming effects could be obtained by the irruption of an armoured force pouring out fire in the rear of an army in modern defence grouping. The enemy’s communications will be the most common objective of such manoeuvres. This is an ancient precept, but it has been rejuvenated by a system of war which demands enormous equipment for the slight-

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est skirmish, and w h ich makes the life o f armies dependent on w h at can be obtained fro m the cou n t ry . T h e M almaison offensive, to take on ly one ex ample, required the transportation o f 500,000 tons, the load o f 1,000 trains or 100,000 heavy lorries. I t follows th at i f the great road and rail arteries can be c u t in several places, the figh ting organism w ill be choked. I f the voie sacree had been broken, the loss o f V erd u n and its arm y would have been cer tain. I f the G erm an cava lry had succeeded, in Sep tember 1 9 1 5 , in reaching M olodetch no, the ju n c tion o f the railw ay w h ich saved the Russians en gaged on the west o f the Pripet marshes, the latter would have been faced w it h disaster. W h at u t ter confusion would have arisen among the G erm an troops i f the A rm istice had not preven ted the lau nch ing o f our Lorraine offensive plan ned fo r N ove m ber 14t h, 1 918. I f the R h in e bridges, t o wards C oblen z and fu r t h er south, had been seized in the rear o f the exhausted and defeated arm y, w h at a giga n tic Sedan would have made its m ark in h istory! In the conflicts of the future, after each break through on a front, troops will rapidly move round far in the rear of the enemy, strike at his sensitive points, throw his whole system into confusion. In this way, there will be restored that strategical extension of tactical gains which could not be obtained by Joffre or Falkenhayn, nor by Hinden-

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burg or Foch, for lack of appropriate means, but which, in olden days, constituted the supreme end, and, as it were, the nobility of the art of war. For, if war is, in essence, destructive, the ideal of those who wage it remains, none the less, economy, the least massacre for the greatest result, a combination of forces making use of death, suffering, and terror in order to attain the goal as quickly as possible and so put an end to all three. In addition, the aptitude for independent action, for surprise, for making the most of successes, with which the motor endows professional armies on land, will work in very well with the properties, which will in the future be essential, of fighter aircraft. It is impossible to doubt, indeed, that air squadrons, capable of operating at a distance, possessing hghtning speed, manoeuvring in three dimensions, and striking vertical blows, which are the most impressive of all, must play a central part in the war of the future. But, up to now, they have lacked a complement on the ground. For the effects produced by bombing aircraft, terrible as they are, have something static about them. The flying machine itself cannot draw any advantage from its power. It is true that the ruins it leaves in its wake, the chronic terror it produces, have, in the long run, a serious effect on the enemy, but these are indirect. Like artillery, of which it is, in the final

15^

T H E A RM Y O F T H E F U T U R E

analysis, the development, aircraft can destroy, but cannot compel, cannot conquer, cannot occupy. So long as there did not exist on the ground any force capable of acting in unison with the air-fleet, the latter had the choice of two inadequate modes of operation. It could either limit its action to the field within which it could help the land army, or it could act in isolation and contribute nothing, except indirectly, to the collective result. This was the fate of air-bombing during the last war. It was the same on both sides. At one time, aircraft would be used behind the enemy front at near-by points, when its activities fell far short of its possibilities. At other times, it carried out raids on distant important objectives, industrial centres, ports and junctions, when it produced great but imponderable results. From their expeditions over Paris or Cologne, aeroplanes or dirigibles came back, certain of having spread death and fire; but no advance towards the frontiers to be crossed or the territory to be occupied followed these massacres or destructions. There was no visible correspondence between these episodes and the slow efforts of those who conquered or defended the soil— the soil which is the real object of war, since it is there that men live. But as soon as extended raids on land became possible once more, the problem of continuity between the war in the sky and the war on land was

EM PLO YM ENT

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fully and completely solved. It was possible to take immediate advantage of the material and moral destruction produced by aircraft. To throw out of order work in the Ruhr Basin by vertical bombardment will affect the total means of war at Germany’s disposal, as it did before. But, in addition, an army capable of long-range enterprises will take advantage of it to rush there. The cutting of the Rhine bridges at Coblenz and at Mainz, when there is fighting round Metz, is useful, it is true, in any conditions. But what importance it would take on if guns and machine-guns were to appear on the banks of the river! In short, there will be someone to pick up, at the foot of the tree, the fruits that fall as a result of shaking it. Inversely, the action of the aerial troops will extend that of the attackers. A fruitful path lies open for 'combined operations,’ which grammarians and committees to-day discuss in vain. The last war saw the power of machinery reach an unheard-of degree, but it was brutal and unsubtle. By adding to it speed, in the hands of a select body of men, the future will restore to it some of its former character.

Pa

r t

VI

TPiE H IG H C O M M A N D

ff

To rub the sleep out o f your eyes^ — ^Ri c h e p e n

I T

h e

c h a n g e s

in

t h e

u se

o f

f o r c e

m o d if y

t h e

training of the High Command. N ot, to be sure, in its principles, for to lead men in battle, whether they are armed with a sword or are in charge of a modern tank, the task of the leader is always to weigh up the circumstances, to make decisions and to give orders and then, once the action has been launched, to reassess from time to time the system of the means at his disposal, which are continuously being modified by circumstances. Whatever the time and place, there is a sort of philosophy of command, as unchangeable as human nature, which is the true lesson of military history. When Charles XII wept at the recital of Alexander’s exploits, when Bonaparte pored over Frederick the Great’s campaigns, when Foch taught Napoleon’s methods, it was because they were impregnated by the feeling of this permanence. To rise above oneself in order to dominate others and thereby events, is an effort which does not vary in its essentials. But its procedure does change radically. Actually, as long as battle was no more than a muscular action of men and horses, the skill of the leader lay in keeping his forces in such a relation 157

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to the enemy, the battlefield and the sun, that their actions of cut, thrust and parry should be as far as possible eflScacious and simultaneous. And since the severity of the blows struck by an army depended on its resoluteness—since fear paralyses the body and courage strengthens it— the leadership was bound to instil in its subordinates the psychological enthusiasm which increases the vigour of attack. Further, since the battle took place at short range, between men who were standing close together, every leader, even the greatest, had a direct view over the whole field of the engagement. In other words, he could give his orders without needing intermediaries and could by his presence afiect the conduct of the fighters. Tactics depended on the eye, prestige on the impressions produced. Hannibal won his victories by his observations and his example. The appearance of firearms threw the art of war, which had not changed its form since the dawn of history, into a state of chronic evolution. The development of muskets, rifles, guns has gone on constantly. But these machines were no longer simply the extension of human limbs, as the sword or the lance had been. They possessed, independent of the skill and courage of soldiers, intrinsic qualities which one had to know how to use, and they demanded services which could not be neglected. Their range, their scope, their rate of fire, and their

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supply, became the essential elements in the choice of formations, battlefields and times. Moreover, as intervals and distances become larger with the radius of action of weapons, and as troops found themselves forced to conceal themselves under cover, the leader, in consequence, was less easily able to see what was happening in his zone. Thus, the technical conditions relative to equipment assumed increasing importance while, on the other hand, the chief’s direct action on the man who was carrying out his orders decreased from battle to battle. The best generals were those whose orders obtained the best results from firearms. Since they could not be seen by all, they set themselves to create great zeal in the ranks, and, for decisive attacks, they appeared in person at appropriate times and places. Such were Conde, Hoche, Napoleon. Meanwhile, the last war raised to the highest point the predominance of material elements. N o courage could prevail against a hail of bullets or an artillery barrage. The power acquired by weapons demanded that each enterprise should strictly conform to numerical conditions. A strict evaluation of precision, range, weight, and speed was the basis of plans. That is why the most resolute leaders, those who said *'all the same” and "at all costs” were of no use whatever unless there had first been put into position a certain number of guns of a fixed calibre, supplied with so many rounds, with

i6o

T H E A RM Y O F T H E F U T U R E

their method of employ laid down by timetables, range tables and calculating machines, all carefully co-ordinated. And, since all these calculations involved the collaboration of numerous specialists, the plan of battle was in fact the product of the labours of the General Staff. In addition, with rare exceptions, this bureaucracy of battle could carry through its movements at its ease, in view of the ponderousness of everything. It is true that responsibility rested solely on the leaders, and that sufficed for their merit as for their glory— but the effort of conceiving ideas was made by them less as a flash of their inspiration than as the result of the detailed proposals of their assistants. Finally, the extension of fronts and of depth, the compulsory entrenchment of combatants in the ground, and also, it has to be admitted, the attractiveness of established headquarters, deprived the leaders, in the upper ranks, of contact with the rank-and-file. In battle, the chief’s eye saw hardly anything except the map. How many thousands of men died without having seen their generals! In short, everything combined to give the High Command a remote, collective, anonymous character, which forced into the shade genius and sensibility. It is certain that in the future the handling of units made up of motor-vehicles will bear very deeply the impress of technique. The limits of what is possible, useful or absurd will be more rigid than

T H E H IG H CO M M A N D

l6 l

ever in systems of force whose necessities are dictated by material equipment. The capabilities of machines cannot be increased, their needs cannot be reduced. The margin of imponderability which was allowed to commanders who could count on the devotion of soldiers to supplement their shortage of equipment will have to be eliminated from the reckoning henceforward. The army of Sambre-etMeuse marched without bread or boots, the Grand Army covered in ten days the twenty stages from Boulogne to Mainz. To-morrow, fighting engines will stop the moment they have used their last drop of petrol and will refuse to go faster than their construction allows. On the other hand, the complexity of their organisms will demand higher and higher technical ability among those who have to look after them. It used to be said that the leader could not act efficiently without becoming part of his men. In the future, it will be said that he is worth nothing if the knowledge of what can or cannot be got out of his equipment has not become second nature to him. It is true that he will not need to have in mind the detailed information which is the task of the engineer, but he will certainly need to have a feeling for mechanical combinations. However, if the perfection of machines cannot fail to accentuate the technical character of war, at the same time, by a curious reaction, it will re-

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introduce into the practice of leadership certain conditions of speed and initiative which will once again restore the conspicuousness of personality. Indeed, leaders of all ranks will have to make judgments and decisions with an extreme promptitude which will exclude the possibility of councils and delays. In a few moments they will have to weigh up circumstances, come to decisions, and give their orders. N o doubt, forethought and preparation, in order to reduce danger, will remain possible and indeed essential. But once an action has been engaged, it will most frequently take such sudden turns that the interventions of the High Command will have to be made very rapidly. There will be no more manoeuvres worked out in advance, or attacks directed like a ballet, such as there were in the Great War. There will be an end to the abrupt breaking off of contact between direction and execution which zero-hour regularly brought about. There will be an end to underground dugouts, where the commander, tormented by anxiety, waited by his oil lamp while four officers co-ordinated for him doubtful information. In its place, there will be continual improvisation. The rapid improvisation of mobile units, leaders eager to see what is going on, covering the field of battle, or flying over the whole zone. In short, personal and immediate action will be established as a principle for all ranks of command.

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Such a revolu tion in the m an ner o f leading troops w ill have consequences w h ic h are not ex clusively o f an in tellectual order. W h ile the leader*s m en tal task w ill have to follow a n ew rh yt h m , his moral effort w ill equally become greater and more im portan t. I n an ar m y whose la w is autonomous action, the com m ander w ill have to m ake a n u m ber o f decisions w h ich were spared him in the w ar o f yesterday. I t w ill no longer be possible to lim it oneself to the literal carrying ou t o f orders, to co n sult higher au t h ority before acting, to make one’s attitude co n for m w it h that o f one’s neighbours. I n itiative, w h ic h was extolled in regulations bu t m istrusted in orders, w ill again become sovereign. C h aracter, respected at the bottom bu t feared at the top, w ill recover all its glo ry on the battlefield. F u rt h er, the reciprocal fa m iliarity between the ran k-an d-file and its leaders, w h ich the mass sys tem im paired, w ill be reborn. W it h w h at could the fleeting hordes, w ho filled the gaps in the ran ks aft er each slaugh ter, nourish their sentiments fo r generals w hom th ey h ard ly ever saw and w ho sent them to their death b y typ ew rit te n messages? N o doubt, goodw ill and discipline made certain o f obe dience. B u t between the men w ho, fro m so fa r aw ay and such a height, gave the directions, and those whose bodies form ed the lines and points on the maps, there was nothing to recall in the least the fa m iliar relationship w h ich pervaded ancient

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armies. T h ere w ere no more hoplites eager fo r a glance fro m A lexan der, legionaries d ying fo r Csesar, veterans weeping over the body o f T uren n e, 'old sweats' cryi n g, " L o n g live the E m p eror,” troopers acclaim ing C a n robert’s plumes. T h is clear respect, this flame o f devotion, w h ic h gave the H igh C om m an d a brigh t halo, w here are t h ey to be fou n d among 't h e dull mass’ o f good cattle, o f w h ic h D rago m iroff spoke? B y con trast, w h at a position w ill be held among professional troops, rooted in the m ilitary order b y ideals and habit, b y great leaders w hom th ey w ill have the op port u n ity and the desire to k n o w ! A n d , inversely, w h at sup port, perhaps even w h at secret compulsion, w ill the leaders possess in a prestige first acquired among their subordinates! T h is reciprocal influence w ill become still more profou n d as the fo r m o f battle brings soldiers and generals closer together. T h e lat ter, seeking in ad van ce the personal impressions w h ic h t h ey w ill need fo r com m and, w ill be constan tly seen b y their troops. T h e effect o f presence, w h ich d u ring the most gloom y o f wars the most ardent o f our leaders could not exert, w ill be restored b y the m otor and the flying machine. Instead o f the leaders being tied to their bridgehead, as for m erly— because i t was the fu n c t io n o f v ita l com m unications— t h ey w ill be at the head o f their troops, literally, not m erely figu ra t ively. A t the same time, the dangers to be

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ru n , and the honour o f their exam ple, w ill increase fo r them. T h e effects w h ich were produced on the figh t ing men o f other days b y the appearance under fire o f C on de, b y the golden u n ifor m o f M u ra t, by the standard o f M ac M ahon, w ill beyond doubt be reproduced at the sight o f the car or the aeroplane o f the com mander. A n d i f the fu t u re casualty lists begin, as in for m er times, b y long lists o f generals, it m ay be so m uch the better fo r that comradeship o f arms w h ich, more than stars or stripes, remains the most noble jewel o f the m ilitary crow n .

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result o f long and hard w ork . N o doubt, there en ters in to it the variable influence o f genius. N o doubt there m ust be taken in to accou n t the more or less conscious stock o f qualities and traditions accu m ulated b y the A r m y . B u t d u ring the fe w days w hen, tw ice or thrice in a ce n t u ry, the des t i n y o f the people is played out on the field o f bat tle, the ju dgm en t, the attitude, and the au t h ority o f leaders depend more than an yt h ing else on the in tellectual and moral reflexes w hich t h ey have ac quired d uring their whole career. In m an y periods d uring the past, w hen w ars f o l lowed hard upon each other, the train ing o f leaders was carried ou t b y p rac tical experience, and th ey were chosen b y ordeal. D u ri n g his whole grow n -u p life, Bayard on ly spent three years w it h ou t d ra w ing his sword. C a tin at took p art in tw e n ty-eigh t cam paigns. D avo u t spent tw e n ty-t h ree years in figh ting. W h at need was there in these conditions to organize the instruction o f fu t u re generals? W ar itself took charge o f the m atter, as it also showed up the deserving and provided them w it h fa v o u r able opportu nities fo r p roving their m erit. A train166

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ing so empirical might lead, at times, to that in activity of mind which is the result of over-addic tion to a profession. The generals might perhaps have been more efficient if they had been occasion ally relieved from the immediate demands of their office, and had worked out in general terms the many lessons which they picked up piecemeal. But what of it? Action, a jealous mistress, absorbed their zeal and consumed their leisure! In our time, w ar has become so huge that on ly rarely do nations have recourse to it. O n the other hand, radical differences distinguish each conflict fro m its predecessor. I n other words, in the period between tw o trials o f strength the leaders lack the test o f experience in their w or k and th ey are not chosen fo r the results th ey have achieved in battles. B u t since it is none the less necessary that they should be trained and should be distinguished in their profession, th eory has to provide the lessons and guide their selection. T h a t is w here the danger begins. I t is true that the foresigh t o f a M olt k e created, in peace-tim e, a General Sta lf p erfec t ly capable o f carrying out the task w h ich awaited it. N o r can one deny that before 1 9 1 4 F ran ce had prepared a H igh C om m an d o f real value. T h is does not disprove the fa c t that norm ally, d uring the years o f theoretical w or k w it h ou t practical ap p li cation, a thousand u n favourable influences lead the heads o f the A r m y astray. A n d thus it is that early

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battles are f u l l o f mistakes in leadership and bring in to the lim eligh t qualities and defects t h a t have remained concealed u n t il then. I t is true t h at the A r m y o f to-day,, h aving, d u r ing the last w ar, gauged the capabilities o f the H igh C om m an d and realized the cost o f inefiSciency, c a r ries ou t a tremendous professional labour in all its branches. Besides the schools properly so-called, there are In numerable courses o f lectures, terms o f probation, centres, cycles, instruction al periods, w h ic h periodically bring together officers o f all ran ks. T h e train ing o f cadres is being carried out more and more. I t is impossible to keep cou n t o f the com m ittees fo r st u d y and research. T h e m ili t a ry career is the on ly one w h ic h imposes on its members, fro m the highest to the lowest, the task o f perpetu ally im p roving its acquired k nowledge. A n d the astonished p u blic sees generals grow n old in the Service h u rryin g off to lectures, clu tc h ing u n der their arms the paraphernalia o f the student. Y e t , i f one considers the basis o f this ac t iv ity, one realizes th at a n xie ty fo r the fu t u re does yield some w h at to respect fo r the past. T h e m ilitary caste, w h ic h has absorbed some terrible lessons, seems to have a ten dency to give its chosen leaders the train ing designed fo r action in circumstances similar to those th rough w h ic h it has just passed. A great deal o f labour aims at train ing every m an to p lay his p art in a cen tralized system and to co n for m to

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rigid rules, the w hole t h ing codified in accordance w it h the model o f the events o f 1 9 1 8 . C ertain ly, this produces rem arkable u n i ty and m an y good qualities. B u t the renewal o f doctrines as methods o f m ak ing w ar change, and the inclination o f ideas to fo llo w the evolu tion o f things— w h ic h have brough t about victories in every age— fin d con di tions fa r fro m favou rab le in this rigid ity. I t is strik ing to note th at the periods o f h istory, in w h ich the H igh C om m an d, taken as a whole, gave p roof o f the highest qualities, have also been those in w h ich the p u rely didactic order o f things exercised the least influence on it. T h e great gen erals o f an tiq u ity, w h o tell us o f their exploits, never refer to an y lessons t h ey have received. In the A nabasis o f X enop hon, or the Com m en taries o f C ^sar, there is not the least allusion to principles, bu t on ly the description o f circu mstances and deci sions. W hence did G ustavus-A dolp h us, Prince Eugene, L uxe m bou rg and M aurice o f Saxo n y draw their inspiration i f not fro m their ow n talen t? T h e constellation o f generals w ho achieved so m an y suc cesses d uring the Revolu tio n and the E m p ire did n ot even possess stan ding orders. I t is a rem arkable fa c t th at those leaders in the G rea t W a r w ho showed the greatest capab ility had, in earlier days, evinced notorious independence o f official doc trines. N o doubt, all o f them possessed a k nowledge o f the means at their disposal and also the ability

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to fa ll bac k on in tu ition w h ich comes fro m experi ence. B u t the creative spark, w h ich con tin ually flashed fo r t h , did n ot come to them fro m a code. T h ey owed the genesis o f their actions to them selves alone. I n order to prepare com manders to lead troops com pletely differen t fro m the h eavy masses o f the G rea t W ar, a change m ust be made in the method o f train ing leaders. T h is method, instead o f d ra w ing its inspiration ch iefly fro m the acquired k n o w l edge systematized in a body o f doctrine b y wellsupervised professional lecturers, w ill have to take the developm ent o f person ality fo r its law . T h is does n ot mean, o f course, that train ing m ust en courage recklessness or exalt arbitrariness. M ilitary action, w h atever its for m , consists in the first place o f the st u d y o f the elements o f the problem, and this requires a discipline o f m ind w h ich excludes fa n tasy. I n addition, the means at disposal have fixed properties, respect fo r w h ic h in their case is an inflexible condition. F in ally, every w arlik e u n dertak ing proceeds fro m a mission w h ich is not chosen and can not be discussed. B u t the syntheses w h ic h fo llo w this analysis, instead o f being sug gested b y a p rio ri criteria, should be sought b y the leader nowhere b u t w it h in himself. T o exercise im agination, ju dgm en t, and decision, not in a certain direction, b u t fo r their ow n sake and w it h no other

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aim than to make them strong and free, w ill be the philosophy o f the train ing o f leaders. A t the same time, in spite o f possessing depth o f reflection, competence in synthesis, and sureness o f ju dgm en t, w it h ou t w h ich professional k nowledge would be worthless, those w ho have the germ o f leadership would develop it badly i f t h ey applied themselves solely to m ilitary subjects. Pow er o f m ind implies a versatility that one does not obtain through exclusive practice o f one’s profession, fo r the same reason that one finds it difficult to en ter tain oneself in the bosom o f one’s fa m ily. T h e real school o f leadership is therefore general cu lture. T h rough it the m ind learns to act in ord erly fash ion, to distinguish the essential fro m the trivial, to recognize developments and causes o f in terference, in short, to educate itself to a level w here the whole can be appreciated w it h ou t prejudice to the shades o f difference w it h in it. T h ere has been no illustrious captain w h o did not possess taste and a feeling fo r the heritage o f the hu m an mind. A t the root o f A lexa n d er’s victories one w ill always fin d A ristotle. M en, however, in the ar m y as elsewhere, are not fashioned solely b y train ing. L ife sets its m ark upon them. T o take the in itiative in action would be com pletely meaningless, i f the whole o f m ilitary existence tended to sterilize it. I t m ust be agreed th at the system o f leadership and ad m inistration applied to the troops and services does not conduce

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to autonomous action. A crush ing cen tralization weighs on the whole and on its com ponen t parts. Countless tex t books co n tin u ally added to, m odi fied, and revised, keep every ra n k , up to the h igh est, in n arrow leading-strings. A mass o f u n der gro w t h w herein to take cover, en trench m en t against responsibility, are not on ly open to, bu t imposed upon, leaders o f all ran ks. I f it is officially proclaimed th at t h ey are expected to produce r e sults, then in fa c t , w h at is demanded is the stric t observation o f the regulations in force. B u t, b y becom ing too comp H cated, the law becomes se lf co n trad ic tory. N o h u m an power could sa tisfy at once all the prescriptions o f the various regulations. T h a t is w h y au t h ority, whose demands stifle free action, is not even able to act as a protection. A n d , w h ile it crushes enthusiasm and emasculates c h ar acter, it loses its prestige little b y little th rough ex cessive in terven tion. N o doubt, a mass m ili t ary system can, i f neces sary, accom modate itself to the vigo u r o f such an organization. I f one is dealing w it h a formless mass su m m arily and provision ally, this levelling to medi o c ri ty is, a ft e r all, supportable. B u t a professional ar m y, designed fo r rapid action, needs a differen t leaven. I n order to secure distinguishing c h aracter istics fo r m ilitary form ations, the leaders m ust stam p their ow n images on them. T h ey m ust be allowed the righ t to do that. T o f ix the aim to be

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achieved, to excite the spirit o f em ulation, and to judge the results, is the task o f superior au t h ority w it h regard to each u n it. B u t as to the m an ner o f doing it, let each marl be master in his ow n house! T h e on ly route w h ich w ill lead to the spirit o f enterprise is decen tralization. W h atever m ay be the effect, on the value o f leaders, o f more liberal train ing and w ider au ton om y, the essential t h ing w ill rem ain, as always, the personal hidden efforts o f those w h o aspire to co m mand. F or, i f the im parting o f instruction and daily routine suffice to fashion most o f our fello w creatures, the more p o w erfu l o f them fo r m them selves. D estined to leave th eir impress, rather than to receive one, t h ey build up in the secrecy o f their inner life the stru c tu re o f their feelings, o f their ideas, o f their w ill. T h a t is w h y, in the tragic hours when the storm sweeps aw ay conventions and cus toms, th ey alone stand up, and are therefore neces sary. N o t h in g is o f more im portance to the State than to produce in its reserve o f officers these ex ceptional men w ho w ill be its fin al resource. B u t the strain o f existence involved b y such preparation carries w it h it i 1 ord in ary times small rewards and great trials. T h e depth, the singu larity, the self-sufficiency o f a m an made fo r great deeds is not popular excep t in critical times. A lt h ough w hen in con tact w it h him one is conscious o f a superiority w h ich compels respect, he is seldom

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made, rivalries and jealousies w h ic h create opposi tion to the disturbance o f equilibriu m . I t has to be added, inciden tally, th at this prudence is in some measure justified b y attacks delivered fro m outside. T h e m ilitary code o f the co u n try, on accou n t o f the expen diture it involves, its inevitable u n pop u larity, and its characteristic o f answering to fu t u re and deferred needs, is a chosen object o f at tac k b y politicians bidding fo r popular favo u r. Since the in novations proposed u n der cover o f noisy rhetoric usually have a weaken ing effect, it is on ly too easy to understand the m istrust o f the men w ho have to deal w it h it. F o r these men, w ho can be de scribed as 'experts,’ are k ep t at a distance and sub jected to abuse w h ile measures o f preparation are being discussed, b u t fin d themselves none the less responsible fo r the w arlik e events w h ich are the consequence. T h e whole world k nows the name o f the leader w h o was u n lu c k y in the at tac k on the fro n tiers and afterw ards victorious on the M arne. B u t w h o could list the numerous ministers, jo u r nalists, theoreticians, orators and publicists, whose ephemeral acts were scattered in a thousand meet ings, docu men ts and discussion, and covered b y p rac t ically anonymous votes and were ye t o f so m uch im portance fo r the overhauling o f and for filling the gaps in our m ilitary system? V arious reasons, then, some perm anen t and some acciden tal, make the A r m y feel apprehensive with

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regard to great reforms. A s a consequence, such reforms are never, in the ord in ary w ay, p u t in to effect through the in itiative o f the organ ization i t self. T h e chronicles tell us o f the anger o f the old bands w h ich were broken up b y C harles V I I to m ake w ay fo r perm anen t troops. W hen Louvois created the regular ar m y, he had to overcom e m uch opposition fro m the reserve o f officers. T h e join t system w h ic h C ar n o t imposed at first pleased neither the troops o f the line nor the volunteers. T h e system o f 1 81 8 , due to G o u v io n -Sa i n t-C yr, received little support fro m the soldiers o f the E m pire. I n 18 67, the plan o f M arshal N iel, w ho aimed at for m ing reserves, met w it h opposition fro m the M ilitary Com mission. I t was M onsieur T h iers, in person, w ho presided over the reorgan ization o f 1872. In order to bring into being the professional army, and in order that that army should be pro vided with the material and with the new spirit without which it will never be more than a willo’-the-wisp, a leader will have to appear whose judgment is independent, whose orders are irre sistible, and who is well thought of by public opin ion. He must be in the service of only the State, free from prejudices, disdaining patronage. He must be firmly committed to his task, absorbed in far-reaching plans, well-informed about the men and things to be dealt with. He must be a leader