The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1962-1973: From Frondizi’s Fall to the Peronist Restoration 9780804743686

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The Army and Politics in Argentina

1962-1973

Robert A. Potash

The Army & Politics in Argentina

1962-1973 From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration

Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1996

Source of photographs: Archivo General de Ia Naci6n, Buenos Aires, and La Naci6n

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1996 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

CIP data are at the end of the book Stanford U nivcrsity Press publications are distributed exclusively by Stanford University Press within the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Central America; they are distributed exclusively by Cambridge University Press throughout the rest of the world.

For my grandsons

Daniel and Graham Arrick

Preface

This volume completes the detailed examination of the Argentine Army and its political role that was initiated in The Army & Politics in Argentina, Igz8-1945: Yrigoyen to Peron and continued in The Army & Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Peron to Frondizi. It was not my intention to continue the project beyond the second volume, but in 1981 on the occasion of the appearance of that volume in its Argentine edition, the late Lieut. General (Ret.) Benjamin Rattenbach made me an offer that I felt I could not refuse, namely that he would give me a copy of his unpublished "Political and Military Recollections," which otherwise were not to be revealed until the year zooo, provided that I committed myself in writing to produce a third volume. In view of this offer and in the belief that I might be able to get access to significant collections of papers in the hands of other prominent personalities, I agreed. At that time, with the events of the Pcronist Restoration still fresh in mind, with the military regime known as the Proceso still in power, and with the need for considerable time to pass to make possible the kind of research that underlay the previous volumes, I made the decision to end the present volume with the close in 1973 of the seven-year military regime known as the Argentine Revolution. I leave it to other and younger scholars to explore the momentous and often violent events of the subsequent decade that led to what one hopes is the permanent establishment of the stable and authentic democratic government that the country failed to achieve in 1973. Like the previous volumes, this one does not attempt to offer a

viii

Preface

comprehensive history of the period. Moreover, since the military exercised power directly or indirectly for all but :33 months of the eleven years covered by the volume, emphasis will be given to intramilitary factors that had implications for public policies rather than to the social and economic milieu. This volume differs from its predecessors in still another way, for it covers a period that I was able to observe personally as a result of a series of research trips in 1961-62, 1965, 1967, 1970, 1971, and 1973, while I was working on the earlier volumes. This experience gave me a feeling for certain events that I could not have obtained otherwise. Yet, as I later learned from interviewing the various personalities who held the presidency or served in key military posts during the eleven-year period, and even more importantly from examining the unpublished sources to which I had access, my initial understanding ofthose events turned out to be incomplete. The discussion of events in this volume may seem overly detailed, but the purpose is to correct the record for those like myself who, because they lived through those times, thought they understood them. The individuals in Argentina and the United States who have helped me in the course of researching and preparing this volume are too numerous to mention. Those who consented to be interviewed are listed in the bibliography; those who provided me with documents from their own or other private sources are mentioned in the notes. I would like, however, to acknowledge certain individuals without whose cooperation and assistance this volume would not have been possible. First, I want to express my deepest appreciation for the courage and kindness of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Alejandro A. Lanusse in allowing me to examine his extensive private archive without any restriction. This collection of materials, accumulated during a lengthy career that included service as Army Commander-in-Chief and President of the Nation, proved invaluable for this study. I also want to make special note of the help provided by the late General Tomas Sanchez de Bustamante. For many years, I turned to him to arrange for me to meet with whatever politician, labor leader, or military man I wanted to interview in connection with this study, and he always came through. Similarly, I owe a debt of gratitude to General (Ret.) Eduardo Castro Sanchez and the late Ing. Salvador San Martin, not only for the data they provided from their files, but also for enabling me to secure other important interviews. Also for their kind assistance in a variety of ways, I would like to make

Preface

ix

special mention of the late Dr. Roberto Etchepareborda and to thank Drs. Oscar Puiggr6s, Rodolfo Martinez, Carlos Floria, Alberto Rodriguez Galan, Ricardo Yofre, Guillermo Capdevila, Enrique Zuleta Alvarez, and Generals (Ret.) Roberto Arredondo and Jose T. Goyret. Naturally, none of these individuals bears any responsibility for the judgments or opinions expressed in the book. This is an appropriate place to express my appreciation to the staff of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst Library and especially to the Latin American Bibliographer, Dr. Pauline Collins; to the staffs of the Argentine Army's Direcci6n de Estudios Hist6ricas, Escuela Superior de Guerra, and Cfrculo Militar; also to Sr. Fernando Garda Cambeiro, for his friendship and professional assistance over many years in providing needed Argentine publications. I also want to thank my former students Drs. Celso Rodriguez, James Buchanan, Paul Goodwin, and Jeffrey Cole for various types of assistance over the years, and my most recent student, Dr. Norma Gonzd 10/10/62" Commander, V Corps Commander, III Corps Commander, IV Corps I nspctor General, Logistics Director General, Personnel Transferred to CinC 10/62, awaiting ret. Director Getwral, Administration Hetired 10/10/62' Under Secretary of the Armv Commander, I Corps Commander, 7th Inf. Div. Commander, 4th Inf. Div.

SOURCES: Boletin Reseruulo de la Secretaria de Guerra; Boletin PUblico de !a Secreta ria de Guerra; (Juit?n es quien; La Prenw. uFor full names and other pt'rsonal data, including original branch of ser\'icc, see Table 1. 1}Somc otlicers were reassigned several times between April 1 and Decemher 15; thf' data in this column refer to their most recent assignment. "Relieved after the Poggi-Rauch confrontation of Aprilzo-21; part of the group that had f(m·ed the oustt-·r of President Frondizi. dRelieved by General Labayru on August 23 after he was recalled from retirement and named Chief of Staff; one month later his recall was voided and most of the changes lw had ordered were ('(>llntermanded. "Forced into retirement hy the Azul faction after their victory in September 1 ~jf)z.

been overthrown, the opportunity to put them into effect seemed to be at hand. But it was first necessary to get agreement on the form of the new government. 8 8"Plan Martijena, Marzo 8 de 1962, Confidencial." I am indebted to Ing. Salvador San Martin for providing me with his copy of the original. On the collaboration of Gens. 1\Llrtijena, Reyes and Ttirolo and the contacts with Navy admirals, see document entitled "Mar-Abr 1962," entry for 22/z3 March, in the Lanusse Archive. This is a detailed chronology of events with attached annexes covering the period March 20 to April 21.

10

The Guido Interlude

Even before the public was aware that President Frondizi had been deposed, a group of senior military, led by Generals Martijena and Reyes and Admirals Palma and Sanchez Sa:iiuclo, met to plan for the establishment of a provisional military junta that would govern with a civilian cabinet; they had even prepared a list of prospective cabinet members and communicated it informally to the President of the Supreme Court. 9 But the decision to set up a junta required the assent of the three Commanders-in-Chief, General Raul Poggi, Admiral Agustin Penas, and Brigadier Cayo Alsina, and none of these officers was eager to assume the presidency. After all, the previous morning each one had made a pledge to the others not to seek the presidency for himself, and had entered into a written understanding that should it be necessary to oust Frondizi "the new government will be civilian." 10 1\Ioreovcr, in his telegram to all Army units at 10:25 A.M. of March 29 informing them of the removal of the President, Army Commander-in-Chief Raul Poggi stressed adherence to the constitution: "We seek the Constitution, we attach ourselves to it as the only means of salvation for all Argentines. We Argentine officers of today believe in civilian government. \Ve look to it for everything, and it is for that reason that we criticized a process that was becoming dangerous for democracy and for the common good. In taking the decision to bring about the ouster of the president, we believe that we are saving the constitution ami reviving faith in its principles. "ll Given the forcible removal of President Frondizi, the military concept of adherence to the constitution inevitably took on a special meaning. But something of a civilian constitutional order could be salvaged if the law governing the filling of a vacated presidency were to be observed. This meant, given the fact that there was no Vice-President, that the vacancy should he filled by the President of the Senate, Dr. Jose Marfa Guido. This diminutive UCRI senator from Rio Negro Province was thus thrust by accident into the forefront of the political crisis. A Frondizi loyalist, he had publicly announced on March 28 that under no circumstances would he assume the presidency. Moreover, \vhen the three Commanders-in-Chief shortly after midnight and a few hours 9fnterview with Dr. Julio Oyhanarte, July 24. 1986. 10 Potash [wo], pp. 370-371; also interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Raul Poggi. May 29. 1970; and Adms. (Ret.) Jorge Palma, Apr. 3. 1970, and Juan C. Bassi, Mav 5. 1970. 11 "Radioelectrica Militar. Jefejer A Todos los Comandos. Unidades y Organismos del Ejercito, Nro. 5744, Fecha 29/3/62. Hora 10,25 Urgente." Lanusse Archive.

The Guido Interlude

11

before they acted to depose Frondizi, visited Guido in his Senate office to determine his willingness to take the office, he declined to give a direct answer, insisting instead that Frondizi was still the President. Subsequent to this meeting, in the hope that legalista forces at Campo de Mayo might still take action to defend Frondizi, and concerned that his own person might be used against the man to whom he owed his loyalty, Dr. Guido deliberately dropped out of sight. It was not until noon of March 29 that he reappeared. 12 With the presidency now vacant for almost eight hours, the three Commanders-in-Chief around 11 A.M. on March 29 met in the first of a series of meetings to consider the alternatives. Even as they met, civilian advisors to General Armando P. Martijena, the leading Army proponent of a military junta, gathered in the Army Building to draft the texts of a series of decrees. They proposed, once the junta was installed, to declare martial law throughout the country, dissolve the Congress, intervene all provincial and municipal governments, and nullify the elections of March 18. r..toreover, in keeping with the version of the Martijena Plan that was drawn up by these same advisors three weeks before, these steps would he followed by the arrest of key trade union leaders, and the dissolution of the CGT (General Confederation of Labor). 13 That these drastic measures remained on paper, and did not become an immediate reality, was due directly to the efforts of a group of civilians who worked with their military allies to forestall the installation of a military jt;nta. Operating within se\ere time constraints, and against the pressure exerted by Admirals Palma and Sanchez Saiiudo and the Martijena group, they sought to preserve the essence of a 12Inteniew with Dr. Jose 1\1. Guido, March 1, 1975; also Guido interview with Felix Luna published under the title "En Memoria de Guido," Todo es Historia, No. 99 (Aug. 1975), p. 12. An alternate version of what took place in Guido's Senate Office is provided by the then Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Brig. Cayo Alsina. According to his account, Cuido indicated a willingness to accept the oflice provided Frondizi consented; and that around 2;50 A.M., Brig. Rojas Silveyra and Adm. Clement returucd from Olivos with Frondizi's alternatives for a solution to the crisis that included having Guido assume the Presidency. Interview with Brigadier (Ret.) Cayo Alsina, Mar. 27, 1987- I am indebted to him for providing a copy of a document entitkcl "Texto de las alternativas, propuestas por cl Dr Frondizi, de pufio y letra del Brigadier Rojas Silveyra 29/3/62."' I3The handwritten drafts for the initial deerees were prepared hy lng. San Martin and Dr. Angel Corti, and are in my possession; the proposed labor control measures, including a prohibition of strikes in public serviees, are set forth in the Plan Martijena, pp. 2021 and Anexo II.

12

The Guido Interlude

civilian administration. Their principal hope was to persuade Dr. Guido to overcome his sense of loyalty to the detained Dr. Frondizi. But it was necessary also to convince the Justices of the Supreme Court that, given the alternatives, it was appropriate to swear in a new president, even though the previous incumbent had neither resigned nor left the country. Participating in the dramatic events that prevented the establishment of a military junta, and led to the installation of Dr. Guido as President of the Argentine Nation, were a number of individuals including congressmen, cabinet members, even law clerks. The most crucial roles, however, were played by four men: Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, Minister of Defense; Dr. Julio Oyhanartc, Justice of the Supreme Court; Brigadier Cayo Alsina, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; and Dr. Arturo Frondizi himself. Dr. Frondizi's contribution demonstrated once again his great capacity to subordinate feelings and emotions to political necessities. Resisting any temptation, if indeed he felt any, to indulge in self-pity, he wanted to send word to Guido to put aside sentiment and assume the presidency. Not having direct contact with Guido, he asked Defense Minister Martinez, the last cabinet minister to see him at the Olivos presidential residence before his transfer to !vlartin Garcia, to agree "to try, by whatever means, to get Guido to assume the government." Martinez consented, even though he himself was not an UClU member, and had never had any personal contact with the Rio Negro scnator. 14 In the atmosphere of wild rumors and great confusion that characterized the next several hours, Defense Minister Martinez worked to carry out this mission. At a meeting with other cabinet ministers at the Ministry of Agriculture, it was agreed that he and Foreign Minister Etchepareborda would try to persuade the three Commanders-in-Chief to accept a constitutional solution to the crisis. 15 A meeting was arranged for 2 P.M. at the Defense Ministry, but only Air Force Commander Alsina appeared. Shortly thereafter, Alsina received a phone call from Admiral Penas who said that he and General Poggi, convinced of the need to take some action to fill the void, wished to issue a communique announcing the establishment of a proYisional military 14Jnterview with Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, Nov. 2, 198.3. 15Roberto Etchepareborda, "Un Poco de Historia," unpublished ms. written in 196.3. The solution the cabinet members wanted was the illusory one of the "Plan Martinez" which the Navy had already rejected. See Potash [ 100], pp . .369-.370.

The Guido Interlude

13

junta until a president could be sworn in. After hearing the text of the communique read over the phone, Alsina, with Martinez coaching him from the side, insisted that he needed three hours' time to consult his brigadiers before giving his consent. By this ruse, f())" Alsina did not need to consult his subordinates, the Air Force Commander avoided the immediate installation of a junta, and gave Martinez until5 P.M. to try to complete his mission. 16 The events that followed could well serve as the scenario for a suspense drama in which the principal civilian players were Dr. Jose Guido, Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, and Dr. Julio Oyhanarte, the main scenes being the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Casa Rosada (Government House), in that order. At the Congress, where the legislators were in a state of extreme agitation over the recent events, Dr. Guido appeared around 2:,30 P.M. to find Rodolfo Martinez waiting for himY What happened then is not entirely clear. According to Martinez, he launched at once into a vigorous appeal to Guido, stating that he was carrying out Dr. Frondizi's explicit instructions, that it was Guido's obligation to take charge of the government, and that he would be betraying his duty if he did not do so. Guido, in his recollections, makes no mention of these remarks, and indeed states that it was only much later that he learned that Frondizi had entrusted Martinez with the task of convincing him. Both men agree that Guido invited the Defense Minister to his Senate office together with the UCRI congressional leadership, and that Martinez then outlined the situation and the need for a prompt decision to avoid a military government. Guido then asked each of the congressional leaders for his advice. House Speaker Federico Monjardin, House Majority Leader Gomez Machado, and Senate Majority Leader Alfredo Garcia, who was also the national head of the UCRI party, unanimously recommended that Guido assume the office; at the same time they advised him to resign from the party, and warned him that not only would he be called a traitor, but, even worse, they would not be able to defend him. However, having received assurances of parliamentary support, Guido finally announced that he was ready to l6Rodolfo Martinez interview; also interview with Brig. (Ret.) Cayo Alsina. 17Etcheparcborda, "Un Poco de Historia." Even before Guido's arrival, Etchepareborda, who was first vice-president of the UCRI, had been explaining the situation and the potential solution to a group of senators and party leaders. Several of them had already been contacted hv Supreme Court Justice Dr. Julio Oyhanarte to urge Guido to assume the presidency as the only means of avoiding a military regime. Oyhanarte interview.

14

The Guido Interlude

assume the presidency. 18 It was, according to Martinez, an emotional moment that brought tears to the eyes of those present. Guido proceeded to write out his resignation from the party and to dispatch a formal message to the Supreme Court asking that the oath of office be administered to him under the terms of article 75 of the Constitution and of the 1868lawof succession known as the "ley de acefalia." The text of the message had already been prepared by a Martinez associate, Dr. Alberto Gordillo Gomez, who now carried it in person to the Court to convey the sense of urgency that existed. 19 The power to decide whether a military junta or a civilian president would govern Argentina now rested with the Supreme Court. From a juridical point of view the members had a problem with the applicability of the ley de acefalfa to the present situation. No precedent existed for swearing in a new chief executive when the previous incumbent was still alive, and had neither resigned nor voluntarily abandoned his post. Nevertheless, what confronted the court was a major political question, not a juridical issue; it was not a question of Frondizi versus someone else, but rather of trying to save part of the constitutional system, including the courts and the Congress, or seeing them destroyed under a military regime. This was the kind of argument that Dr. Julio Oyhanarte, the youngest member of the Court and a Frondizi appointee, presented to his fellow justices in trying to persuade them to administer the oath to Guido. It was an argument that succeeded. Within a matter of minutes after Dr. Gordillo Gomez arrived to deliver the message from the Senate President, the justices unanimously agreed to receive Dr. Guido and swear him in as President. 20 The actual oath taking took place just after 5 P.M. in a Supreme Court chamber devoid of onlookers except for Guido's private secretary. 21 So 18 According to Guido's recollections in 1975, he first proposed that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court be asked to assume the presidency, but the word from the Court was that this was impossible in the absence of a signed resignation from Frondizi. Neither Oyhanarte nor Martinez makes mention of any such proposal. 19 According to Martinez, Gordillo handed the message to Justice Pedro Aberastury, who was called out of a "do-not-disturb" session by his law clerk, Guillermo Walter Klein Jr. According to Oyhanarte, it was he who came out to talk to Gordillo and who then informed his judicial colleagues that they had only five minutes to decide on Guido's request. That controversy continues over who played what role at this critical juncture is evident from the letter by Dr. Alberto Gordillo Gomez to Magdalena Ruiz Guifiazu of May 22, 1g8g, taking issue with Dr. Oyhanarte's account as given that day on her radio program. I am indebted to Dr. Martinez for providing me with a copy of this letter. 20Qyhanarte interview. 21 Martinez had advised Guido to go alone, or with a single person, and to avoid any public display lest some troops on the street take a notion to interfere. However, Martinez

The Guido Interlude

hurried were the proceedings that when Dr. Guido approached the justices, the document (acta) that was to serve as the official record of the event was still not prepared, nor was a bible available on which to swear. Instead, at the suggestion of Dr. Oyhanarte, Guido took the oath on the copy of the Constitution the justices used in their regular sessions, a gesture symbolizing the special significance of the brief ceremony. 22 Meanwhile, at the Casa Rosada, an atmosphere of tension had been building up over the past hour. Even before Dr. Guido had departed for the oath taking, Defense Minister ~lartfnez, receiYing word at the Senate that the three Commanders-in-Chief were anxious to talk with him, rushed back to his office. What is noteworthy here is that even though they had deposed a president, they still treated Martinez as their hierarchical superior, and were reluctant to act \Yithout consulting him. Of the three officers, it was General Poggi who expressed the greatest concern over the continuing vacancy in the presidency, and insisted that it was necessary to take action. Dr. Martinez, for his part, voiced his confidence that Dr. Guido would fill the office, and that therefore there was no real problem. For the next 40 minutes the Defense Minister, talking in generalities, conducted a filibuster until he was summoned to the phone to learn from Dr. Gordillo Gomez at the Supreme Court that the oath had been taken, that the acta had been signed. 23 The country now had a President, but how long would he last? Would the military accept as successor to Dr. Frondizi a man who had until recently been a loyal member of the administration team? Here one has to differentiate the reactions of the Commanders-in-Chieffrom those of the officers who had been pushing f(>r a total change. None of the Commanders was politically ambitious; their actions thus far had been dictated by their desire to maintain the unity of their respective forces, even as they served as spokesmen for the concerns voiced by their subordinates. To be sure, their immediate reaction when the Defense Minister broke the news of the swearing-in ceremony was one of shock; also states that he telephoned Gen. (Ret.) Pedro Aramburu, asking him to join Guido at the ceremony and thus lend his prestige and authority to "a solution that is going to need all the support it can get." Aramburu, however, replied that he had reasons for not attending. Rodolfo Martinez interview. 220yhanarte interview. 2.1Rodolfo Martinez interview.

16

The Guido Interlude

Admiral Penas rushed back to Navy headquarters and put his forces on alert; General Poggi had his troops secure the Casa Rosada; even Brigadier Cayo Alsina expressed displeasure. Their underlying concern, however, was not over frustrated ambition but the fact that they had failed to get the prior commitments from Guido that their respective forces wanted, and the impact this might have on their ability to control their subordinates. Nevertheless, despite the continued pressures exerted by certain Army and Navy officers for a complete takeover, all three Commanders were still prepared to negotiate an agreement with Dr. Guido. 24 The next twelve hours witnessed the eflort to work out such an agreement. The first step was to enable Dr. Guido to move from the Senate to the troop-dominated Casa Rosada. With personal guarantees given by General Poggi and Brigadier Alsina for his safety, Dr. Guido rode without protection the fifteen blocks from the Senate to the Casa Rosada, nodded to the guards at the entry, and took the elevator to the presidential level. Greeting the three Commanders who were waiting in the outer office, he invited them to follow him and to take seats around the table as he sat clown in the President's chair. In all of this, Dr. Guido conducted himself with a mixture of affability and professional ease that was to serve him in good stead, not only in the questioning to which he was now subjected, but in the weeks and months ahead."'" From the record of the discussions it is clear that General Poggi, although complaining about what he called Guido's failure to deal in straightforward fashion with the Army, was still willing to accept him as President. The Navy Commander, however, wanted assurances about the juridical significance of the oath that Guido had taken, and for this purpose called on the help of a consultant, Dr. Alejandro Lastra, head of the Buenos Aires Bar Association, to interrogate him. In what he later referred to humorously as his oral "examination," the new President accepted the proposition that Dr. Frondizi"s ouster was definitive, and that his own assumption of the presidency was predicated on this fact, 24Jbid.; also interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Raul Poggi, and Adm. (Het.) Agustin Penas, May 21, 1970. Poggi's actions gave rise to erroneous reports that he had been planning to take the presidential oath himself. Admiral Penas has denied this, and so has the Escribano General, Dr. Jorge Garrido. He was present in the Defense Ministry with the Commanders and he insists that he was never asked to prepare an acta either for Poggi or for a junta militar to assume power. Interview with Dr. Jorge Garrido, July 21, 1971. 2.5 Rodolfo Martinez interview; Poggi interview; Alsina interview.

The Guido Interlude

17

not on the constitutional provision for temporary replacement when a President was absent from the Capital. This point having been clarified, the Navy Commander insisted, and Dr. Guido and the other Commanders agreed, that it should be embodied in an official communication to the Supreme Court. 26 The discussion now focused on the specific measures that the three Commanders presented on behalf of their respective forces. These called essentially for the reinstitution of the anti-Peronist legislation of the pre- Frondizi years, the intervention of all provinces, reform of the electoral system, antistrike legislation, modification of the law of acefalia, and nullification of the March 18 elections. Although the three Commanders consistently addressed Dr. Guido as "Se!wr Presidcnte" and the atmosphere around the table became increasingly relaxed, it was clear that a refusal on Dr. Guido's part would mean the termination of his brief presidency. Dr. Guido's response, therefore, was to accept the proposed steps in principle, but to urge that a date for new general elections be set; then, on the basis of the calendar, to decide which of the specific measures should be taken up first. He proposed that the Congress be summoned immediately into special session and requested to repeal the 1958legislation abrogating the 1956 anti-Peronist legislation, to enact the proportional representation bill that had already passed the Senate, and to nullifY the December 1961 and March 1962 election. After a lengthy discussion, in which Dr. Guido's position was supported by the arguments of Defense Minister Martinez and Senator Perez Aznar, while a lawyer, Dr. Manuel Ordonez, argued the military's case for implementing all their requests, the Air Force Secretary, Brigadier Rojas Silveyra, proposed a compromise in the form of a draft statement. The terms of this compromise were then embodied in the three articles of an acta secreta to which Dr. Guido and the three Commanders-in-Chief affixed their signatures. 27 26"Presidencia de Ia Naci6n Argentina a Excelentfsima Corte, Buenos Aires, 29 de marzo de 1962," MS, Penas Archive; "Transcripci6n de Ia grabaci6n efectuada durante Ia reunion mantenida por el dodor D. Jose Maria Guido y los senores Comandantes en Jefe de las tres armas el dia 29 de marzo, a las 19,00 horas aproximadamente," primcra parte, pp. 1-12, MS, Lockhart Archive. I am indebted to Adm. Penas and NaYy Capt. (Ret.) Eduardo Lockhart for allowing me to make copies of these documents. 27 For this part of the meeting, which resumed around 10 P.M. after a recess of several hours, Dr. Ord611ez, a Christian Democratic Party (PDC) leader and legal counsel to the newspaper La Pren.m, was present as advisor to the Navy; Senator Perez Aznar as advisor to Dr. Guido, and Brig. Rojas Silveyra, the recently resigned Air Foree Secretary, as advisor to Cayo Alsina. "Transcripci6n de Ia grabaci6n," segunda parte, pp. 1-26: interview with Brig. (Ret.) Jorge Rojas Silveyra, May 12, 1970.

18

The Guido Interlude

The first article recapitulated the essence of the separate communication to the Supreme Court, namely that Dr. Guido had assumed the presidency of the Republic in definitive form to fill the vacancy caused by the de facto ouster of the previous president, and that it was on that basis that he had taken the oath before the Supreme Court. In the second article Dr. Guido declared that "in view of existing circumstances and in order to guarantee the public peace and assure the exercise of democratic norms of government," it is absolutely necessary to adopt the following five measures: nullification of the March 18 elections; establishment of norms to provide for the "proscription of communism, Peronism and every totalitarian form of government" and to disqualify from office any candidates who hold these ideas or who have sought the support of such groups; modification of the ley de acefalfa with respect to the timing of elections; proportional representation; revision of the trade union statute so as to guarantee workers freedom to organize, prevent political activity by unions, and assure that their funds are used exclusively for trade union purposes. In the final article, the Commanders-in-Chief stated that "they accept the obligations set forth above and by virtue of the same, and inspired by the high interests of the country, they accept Dr. JOSE MARIA GUIDO as President of the Republic." 28 It is interesting to note, given the insistence of the armed forces Commanders on having a formal document drawn up, that this acta, dated March 29 but actually signed around 4 A.l\1. of March 30, did not specify a timetable for carrying out the stipulated measures; neither did it differentiate between the actions to he submitted to Congress and those to be accomplished by executive decree. Nor was anything explicit said about ordering the intervention of the provinces. President Guido was thus given some latitude on how to operate, but at the same time he was made aware that each of the armed f()rces was appointing a "technical advisor" to watch over the implementation of measures in which they were interested. From the very start, this was to be an administration in which the military asserted the right to co-govern with the civilian president. 29 However, to demonstrate to the Argentine people, to the members of 28£ am indebted to Adm. (Ret.) Jorge Palma for providing me with a photocopy of this acta, complete with signatures. 29"Transcripci6n de Ia grabaci6n," segunda parte, pp. 25-26.

The Guido Interlude

19

the armed forces, and to the world at large that a legitimate government had been established, it was agreed to hold a public installation of Dr. Guido. Accordingly, shortly after noon on March ,)O, in the White Hall (Salon Blanco) of Government House in the presence of the memhers of the Supreme Court, the armed forces chief~. and members of the cabinet, Dr. Guido received from the hands of the Escribano General, Dr. Jorge Garrido, the presidential sash and baton that were the symbols of the supreme authority he was assuming. Bnt neither the presence of the military and civilian dignitaries at the ceremony, nor the wording of the formal acta that Dr. Garrido drew up, nor the message that Foreign Minister Etchepareborda sent to friendly governments via Argentine embassies abroad, could disguise the t~1ct that this was not the normal inauguration of a civilian administration. 30 Not only was President Guido expected to consult with the military leaders before making key appointments and decisions, but the military leaders themselves, before giving advice, had to consider the reactions of their own subordinates. In the Army, especially, the internal divisions were such that it took a careful balancing act for the current Commander to remain in control. General Poggi could not ignore the fact that many of his generals would have preferred a military regime, and that even after they had been overruled, a group of disgruntled colonels tried to persuade General Martijena to lead a coup. But if Martijena and his fellow hard-liners were hesitant to ad at this time, they were determined to control the new government from behind the scenes.·11 The earliest demonstration of this was in the formation of the new cabinet. Dr. Guido was presented with lists of civilian names, from which he was expected to make his choices. 32 Although he was able to 30 Escribanfa General del Gobierno. Acta de juramenta de asuncion del man do presidencial por el Doctor Jose Marfa Guido, Buenos Aires, marzo 30 de 1962; Cancillcria. Circular Telegnifico No. 21, Europa, 30-3-62. I am indebted to the late Dr. Roherto Etchepareborda for providin,g me with copies of these documents. 31 On the negative reactions of certain Army officers to the Guido assumption of power, interviews with lng. Salvador San Martin and Dr. Julio Oyhanarte; also the chronology "Mar-Abr 1962" cited above in note 8. For his part Gen. Poggi, once the agreement was reached with Guido, radioed all Army units "to put down their arms and their passions ... and to withdraw to their barrat:ks." Radioelectrica Militar. Nro 10055, Feeha 30-2-62, flora 0440, Urgente. Lanusse Archive. Here and elsewhere in quotations throughout the book, ellipsis dots at the beginning and end of passages have been omitted in accordance with the editorial policy of Stanford University Press. 32La Prensa, Apr. 1, 1962, published a list that may or may not have coincided with the names submitted to Guido; Ing. San Martin and his colleagues prepared their own list. Salvador San Martin Archive.

zo

The Guido Interlude

retain five of the men who had served in the coalition cabinet formed in Frondizi's last days in office, Guido's first cabinet was a mixture of wellknown independents, Christian Democrats, and conservatives, with no one from his former party, the UCRI.' 33 The procedure for selecting the armed forces secretaries followed a slightly different course. As had become customary since 1955, each military service selected its own cabinet representative. In the case of the Navy and Air Force, this was readily solved, since the previous incumbents, Admiral (Ret.) Gaston Clement and Brigadier (Ret.) Jorge Rojas Silveyra respectively, were persuaded by their colleagues to set aside any feelings of impropriety and continue to serve. 34 No such solution was available in the Army, where relations between the former Secretary, General (Ret.) Rosendo Fraga, and the Commander-in-Chief, General Poggi, had deteriorated during the recent crisis. In these circumstances, Dr. Guido offered the post of Army Secretary to General Poggi, but he preferred to remain in his present, more powerful, post of Commander-in-Chief. Poggi did suggest two possible candidates for the Army Secretariat, and President Guido offered the post to one of these, General (Ret.) Marino Carreras.'35 But why General Carreras and why not Major General (Ret.) Carlos Kelso, the other name suggested by Poggi? Kelso was a highly respected senior officer, now in his early 7o's, an opponent of Peron as early as 1944. and a f(Jrrner cavalryman. General Carreras, however, had the special attribute of being dose to Admiral Penas, the Navy Commander, and also, apparently, had received the endorsement of ex-President Aramburu. President Guido offered the post to General Carreras in the :l3The holdovers were Drs. Miguel Sussini, Oscar Pniggros, and Tiburcio Padilla in the Ministries of Education and Justice, Labor and Social Security, and Social Assistance and Public Health respectively, Ing. Pedro Petriz in Public Works and Services, and Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, who moved over from Defense to the Interior Ministrv. Dr. Mariano Drago was named Foreign Minister and Ing. Ernesto Lanusse, a cousi'n of the Army colonel, was named to the Defense .\1inistry after Dr. Adolfo Lanl1s, the chief re his public demand for Carreras's resignation, General Rauch, with the help of Agriculture Secretary Cesar Urien, entered the Olivos presidential residence for a secret meeting with Dr. Guido. Whether it was the President or the Cavalry Commander who took the initiative to set up the meeting is not clear, but it does seem certain that Rauch outlined a plan of action that would reduce the military pressure on Dr. Guido. Specifically, he proposed that the President go on thte air no earlin than 6 P.M. on Friday to announce that he was reorganizing the cabinet, that he had accepted the resignation of General Carreras and was naming Air Force Secretary Rojas Silveyra as acting Army Secretary, and that he was relieving General Poggi as Army Commander-in-Chief. Rauch proposed that he himself be named later as interim replacement for Poggi.49 What Dr. Guido said in response cannot be established with certainty, but General Rauch went off in the heliefthat he had the assent of 47''Reunion de Gabinete," undated but apparently Aprilzo, MS, Lockhart Archive. Pinedo had already adopted a series of stringent monetary and financial measures. For a published report of his resignation, and those of Secretary of Tndustry and !\lining, Salvador San Martin. and Commerce Secretary Jorge Oria, see La Pre11sa, Apr. 21, 1962. 4H Present at the meeting with Aramburu were Ccns. Carlos Can> and Juan C:. Ongania, as well as the then Lt. Col. Tomas Sanchez de Bustamante. Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Sanchez de Bustamante, May 5, 1970. 49"Mar-Abr 6z," entry for Thursday, Apr. 19; Guido interview, To avoid detection by Navy personnel assigned to guard the President, Ccneral Rauch entered the Olivos residence disguised as l!rien's chaufleur.

26

The Guido Interlude

the President. That night Rauch met with a group of superior officers to work out the details of their operation, and to secure the support of other troop commanders. A communique was drafted explaining that the goal of the movement was to place the Army under leadership that would allow the government freedom of action; and field-grade personnel assigned to the War Academy were dispatched as liaison officers to cavalry and infantry divisions in the interior. 50 Although it was the Campo de Mayo garrison, and especially its armored units, that provided the military muscle for the Rauch rebellion, the heart of his operation was at the War Academy, the training school for general staff officers. It was Colonel Alejandro Lanusse, the Acting Director, with the help of other colonels assigned to the Academy, who provided staff support and encouragement to General Rauch. And, indeed, the War Academy became his military command post when General Poggi's determination to resist ouster led to troop deployments in various parts of the city. It is interesting to note that in the confrontation many officers assigned to the Army General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and other Army bureaus deserted their posts and rallied at the War Academy, as did a number of civilians including exInterior Minister Martinez. 51 Whatever commitment President Guido may have made to General Rauch, he found himself under great pressure not to comply with the original plan. When Army Secretary Carreras presented his resignation on the night ofAprilzo, Guido named the Defense Minister as interim replacement rather than Rojas Silveyra. Moreover, the President began to have serious reservations about naming Rauch as Commander-inChief, perhaps because of the opposition of the Defense Minister and the Navy. Instead, he came up with the substitute proposal of naming Rauch as Army Secretary. Rauch accepted the appointment only to learn that General Poggi refused to acknowledge his authority and was deploying units of the National Gendarmery and First Infantry Division to create a defensive position at the Army Building and to seize control of radio networks. Rauch's response, around 5 A.M. of April 21, was to order the movement of armored division troops from their bases at 50Communiqu? dated Buenos Aires April 20, 1962 with typed signature of Enrique Rauch, copy in Lanusse Archive; "Mar-Abr 62,., entries for night 19/20 and 20 April. 51 Ibid., entry for night April2o/ 21. The civilians present included Mariano Grondona, who had served as Martinez's undersecretary, Agriculture Secretary Urien, and UCRI leader Ricardo Gonzalez. La Prensa, Apr. 22, 1962.

The Guido Interlude

27

Campo de Mayo and Magdalena to the outskirts of the Federal Capital; subsequently tank and artillery regiments moved into the city to take up positions at the Grenadier regimental barracks near the War Academy.sz For the next several hours, while the city was gripped in an atmosphere of tension and confusion, Dr. Guido from the Olivos residence struggled to find a peaceful resolution to the armed confrontation. To gain time, he twice postponed the hour set for General Rauch to take the oath as Army Secretary, contending that this was necessary to enable all active duty generals in the country to come to Buenos Aires for a meeting. To Rauch's staff at the War Academy, however, the delays were viewed as a maneuver arranged by Poggi supporters in the presidential circle to try to reduce Rauch's strength within the Army. And, indeed, at a meeting held at the Navy Building attended by Defense Minister Lanusse, Navy Secretary Clement, Air Secretary Rojas Silveyra, and General Poggi, the Defense Minister asked Rojas Silveyra whether the Air Force would be willing to repress the rebellious forces of General Rauch. His answer was a categorical negative. At about the same time, the head of Army personnel, General Ardanaz, acting as an unofficial mediator on behalf of several generals already gathered at the Army Building, came out to the War Academy to obtain Rauch's terms for a negotiated settlement. Rauch's response, embodied in a five-point written statement, was very specific: the removal of General Poggi as Commander-in-Chief; the selection of a new Army Secretary, to be proposed by Rauch from among the generals, retired or active, who had sided with him; Rauch's desire to stay on as Commander of the Cavalry Corps; authorization f(>r the generals who were assembling in Buenos Aires for the meeting called by the President to visit Rauch at his War Academy command post; and, finally, insistence that his troops should remain in the streets of the Capital until the new Army Secretary took the oath of office ..5.> The settlement finally reaehed early in the afternoon of April 21 conformed in several respects to General Rauch's wishes. Summoned to .52"Mar-Abr 62," entries for night April 20/21 and April 21, Lanusse Archive. The movement of the 10th Armored Cavalry Regiment into the city was made despite Dr. Guido's appeal to both sides to hold their positions. Sanchez de Bustamante interview, May 5, 1970. 53"Bases mfnimas para poder establecer el dialogo," MS, Lanusse Archive; also "MarAbr 62," entry for April 21.

zB

The Guido Interlude

Olivos around noon, he was asked by the President to release him ti·om his earlier promise to appoint Rauch as Army Secretary. Rauch willingly did so, and was assured that Poggi would be removed as Commanderin-Chief by the new Army Secretary. Following this conversation, Rauch, who was accompanied by Colonel Lanusse, was escorted to another room where three friends of the President, all UCRI legislators, solicited suggestions for the post of Army Secretary. Rauch mentioned the names of three retired generals in order of preference: Juan B. Loza, Eduardo Senorans, and Bernardino Labayru. Shortly thereafter, General Rauch and Colonel Lanusse were ushered into the presence of President Guido, who informed them that he was going to designate General Loza as the new Army Secretary. One final matter remained to be transacted. According to Colonel Lanusse's eyewitness account, Dr. Guido addressed Rauch with these words: "General Poggi has asked me to intercede with you so that he can have the opportunity to request the new Secretary to relieve him rather than be removed involuntarily. Do you have any objection, General, if the matter is resolved this way?" To which General Rauch replied: "No, Mr. President, I have no objection; it seems to me that it is a more ethical procedure and therefore more suitable. I have no wish to be cruel to anyone." On this note of gentlemanly conduct Rauch concluded his armed rebellion. 54 A few hours later, with the swearing in of the new Army Secretary and the withdrawal to their barracks of the Army units that had been deployed in the street, the Easter Week military confrontation came to an end without a shot having been fired. What did it accomplish? \Vithin the Army, it repeated an unfortunate precedent of rebellion without punishment. To be sure, General Rauch placed his retirement at the disposal of the new Army Secretary, but General (Ret.) Loza did not process it; rather, he kept General Rauch on unassigned status until July, and then placed him on special leave status that enabled him to remain on active duty. For General Poggi, however, and four other generals who had been closely associated with him, the future meant only complete retirement. The vacancies thus created might have perS4Jbid. Guido also requested of Rauch a prompt withdrawal of his troops to their barracks, and was promised that they would withdraw after being fed. However, the commander of the 10th Armored Cavalry Hegiment remained with his troops at the Grenadier barracks for another 4R hours until Poggi was in fact relieved. Sanchez de Bustamante interview, May 5, 1990.

The Guido Interlude

zg

mitted an extensive shuffiing of commands, but Secretary Loza avoided anything resembling a wholesale purge of the officers against whom the legalistas had launched their movement. Indeed, in order to prevent the post of Commander-in-Chief from becoming too closely associated with either faction, he retained the post in his own hands. This was announced initially as an interim arrangement, but it remained in force as long as Loza served as Army Secretary. 55 But what was the impact of the Rauch rebellion on the policies followed by the Guido government? In the short term, it had little impact, for Secretary Loza was too absorbed with internal Army matters to oppose the Navy's demand for full implementation of the :March 29 acta, a demand it accompanied with the concentration of war vessels in the Rio de la Plata estuary. Moreover, the angry reaction of many congressional deputies to the confusing military episodes made it impossible for President Guido to obtain their cooperation for measures that would have postponed the seating of the Peronist deputies-elect. In these circumstances, Guido terminated the special session of Congress, and agreed to sign the two controversial decrees that the Acting Interior Minister, Ing. Lanusse, had prepared. The first, issued on April 23, nullified all provincial and municipal elections that had taken place since the previous December, and ordered the intervention of the fifteen provinces not already under national control; the second, on April 25, nullified the congressional elections of December 17 and March 18. 56 Convinced that he had no alternative now hut to adopt at least the appearance of a hard-liner, the President announced to the cabinet on April25 that his "political plan can be summed up in a few words. To the limits of my ability I will not consent to a single Peronist occupying a public or elective post at whatever level, municipal, provincial or national." At the same time, however, Dr. Guido ratified his basic commitment not to remain in the presidency a day longer than the expired 55Boletin Militar Publico de Ia Secretaria de Guerra (hereafter abbreviated BPSG) [21], No. 3263-3267, Apr. 23 to May 11, 1962; Boletin Militar Reservado de la Secretaria de Guerra (hereafter abbreviated BRSG) [22], No. 3953. 'VIay 7, 1962. For Rauch's special leave, BPSG No. 3281, July 26, 1962. Retired in addition to Poggi were Maj. Gens. Sosa, Yornet, and Spirito and Brig. Gen. Landa. But the commanders of the I Corps, Gen. Mallei, and the First Motorized Infantry Division, Gen. Artuso, were retained in their strategic Palermo-based posts. La Prensa, Apr. 24, 1962. 56 Navy Secretary Clement released to the press the terms oftbe secret acta of Mar. 29. See La Prensa, Apr. 23, 1962; on the fleet maneuvers, ibid., April26, 1962.

30

The Guido Interlude

term ofhis ousted predecessor. He did so by signing a decree that called fc>r new presidential elections to take place no later than October 27, 1963, with the new authorities to assume office on May 1, 1964- 57 In the three months that followed the resolution of the Easter Week crisis, President Guido was free to devote his attention to nonmilitary problems. The reorganization of the cabinet, the appointment of provincial interventors, the decision on what to do about the regular session of Congress, and the adoption of measures governing political parties and electoral procedures wer~ the chief items on the political agenda. At the cabinet meeting of April 25, the President asked for resignations, and over the next week proceeded to appoint new ministers to all portfolios except Education and Justice, and Social Assistance and Public Health. In an effort to soften the opposition of the UCRP, he appointed two longtime Radicals, Dr. Jorge Walter Perkins and Dr. Jose Luis Cantilo, to the Interior and Defense Ministries respectively. These were his own choices, and they apparently met with no resistance from the military secretaries. For the post of Foreign Minister he accepted the suggestion of the Navy and appointed Dr. Bonifacio del Carril; to the post of Economy Minister he named a candidate put forth by the Army, lng. Alvaro Alsogaray. The brother of a cavalry general, Alsogaray had served in that post under Dr. Frondizi until1g61. 58 Although the new cabinet was more homogeneous than its predecessor, achieving a consensus on the appropriate course of action to take on the major political issues was not easy. The task of decision making was complicated by the fact that the government was confronting an economic as well as a political crisis. Dwindling tax revenues and foreign exchange reserves forced it to adopt emergency measures. Economy Minister Alsogaray's solution was to stretch out the payment of salaries to all government workers and to postpone pension payments to all retirees. including military personnel, while he sought new funds through tax increases and emergency loans. Naturally, the affected groups, and they included almost all sectors of society, observed the government's actions with great concern. 59 57The quoted words are from "Reuni6n de Gabinete, 25 de abril de 1962," Lockhart Archive; for the texts of Decrees Nos. :3534 of Apr. 23, and 3657 and 365il of Apr. 25, 1962, see Anales de La legislaci6n argentina. [1], X-XIIA, 356-359. 58"Reuni6n de Gabinete, 25 de abril de 1962," MS, Lockhart Archive; Guido interview; La Prensa, May 2, 4, 1962. The new Minister of Public Works and Services was Ing. Julio Criveli. 59 La Prensa, May 16, 1962.

The Guido Interlude

31

It was in such an atmosphere that the President and his cabinet confronted the problem of what to do with the Congress. Its preparatory session was now scheduled for May 22, and the Peronist deputieselect were determined to participate. To complicate matters, the UCRP national convention, despite the presence in the Cabinet of two of its affiliates, voted not to collaborate with the Guido government, and announced its support for the incorporation into the Chamber of Deputies of all deputies elected on March 18. 60 Within the policy-making inner circle of the cabinet, consisting of the three military secretaries and the Ministers oflnterior, Defense, Economy, and Foreign Relations, the debate on the congressional issue brought differences of outlook to the surface. Foreign Minister Bonifacio del Carril, strongly supported by Navy Secretary Clement, and to some extent by Air Secretary Rojas Silveyra and Economy Minister Alsogaray, advocated making a clear break with the past; his proposal was to dissolve the Congress outright, place all political parties in a state of assembly, and adopt whatever measures were needed to reorganize the country's political forces prior to a return to constitutional government. Interior Minister Perkins for his part did not strenuously oppose this approach, but he wanted assurances that the abandonment of what remained of institutional legality would not open the gates to dictatorial excesses. In the face of what seemed like a growing military-civilian Cabinet consensus on a policy to which he was personally opposed, President Guido resorted to a dramatic argument. The proposed course of action, he pointed out, represented an effort to restore the situation to what it had been in September 1955; this, he conceded, was a plausible objective, but it could only be carried out by men free of all suspicion. Since he was a party to the political situation they were trying to correct, he was ethically compromised, and should step out. "I have felt all along this process that the crisis of confidence that provoked President Frondizi's fall applies also to me and therefore I believe myself disqualified from implementing a governmental task as important as the one proposed. I therefore announce to you that I am going to submit my resignation to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. "61 The President's remarks achieved their intended effect, for the immediate reaction of those present was to urge him to reconsider. They !lOLa Prensa, May 14, 1962. 61 "Reunion

de Gabinete Reducido,

17

de mayo de 1962," MS, Lockhart Archive.

32

The Guido Interlude

pointed out that his resignation would increase the risk of public disorders and a renewal of conflicts within the Army, and they expressed full confidence in his integrity and ability to carry out the proposed program. Dr. Guido thereupon agreed not to resign, but called instead for reconsideration of the issues at another meeting of the inner cabinet. 62 The result of the new deliberations was a consensus not to dissolve the Congress but to declare it in recess until the Chamber of Deputies could be reconstituted. A decree to this effect was drawn up, together with one calling for the reorganization of all political parties, and both were approved at a meeting of the entire cabinet. 6·3 Simultaneously with the publication of these decrees, a lengthy policy statement was issued that tried to explain the goals of the current authorities to the public. They disavowed any dictatorial intentions, and insisted on the de jure character of the government; moreover, they proclaimed that its fundamental objective was to assure the "full and normal functioning of the constitutional regime in force in the Republic."64 To this end, the policy statement declared that new elections for the Chamber of Deputies would be held on March 31, 1963, and that presidential and provincial elections, already announced for October 27, 1963, might be advanced if circumstances permitted. The statement also made the usual pledge that the members of the government would abstain from political activity, and would observe strict neutrality vis-a-vis the political parties. At the same time, however, the statement associated the government with the values of the Liberating Revolution that had tried to stamp out Peronism; and it announced that a new political party statute would be issued, one that would prohibit the activities of parties or movements that upheld dictatorships, past or present, and would forbid the diversion of trade union funds and other resources to political party activities. r;s The political party statute that was anticipated in this policy declaration of May 20 took more than two months to produce. In part the delay was caused by cabinet disagreements over specific points, as for exam62Jbid. 63"Reuni6n de Gabinete Reducido, 18 de mayo de 1962"; "Acuerdo de Ministros, 19 de mayo de 1962," MSS, Lockhart Archive. 64The published text of the "Declaraci6n Politica" is given in La Prensa, May 21, 1962, pp. 1, 5· The quoted words are fi·om the conclusions printed on page 565Jbid.

The Guido Interlude

33

ple the procedures for regulating the selection of party officials and candidates; but it was also caused by the diversion of cabinet energies to other problems. The net effect, however, was to create an impression of a government adrift, uncertain of its orientation. 66 This impression was strengthened when Interior Minister Perkins, unhappy with the continued uncertain status of the Congress, and upset at arrests carried out without his knowledge by the military-run Secretariat of State Intelligence (SID E), presented his resignation on June 25. til Dr. Guido turned to another UCRP member, Dr. Carlos Adrogue, to replace Perkins and it was he who assumed the task of consulting with political party leaders and preparing the draft of the party statute and related decrees that were finally promulgated on July 24. bH An analysis of the provisions of this statute reveals its restrictive and regulatory character. It established detailed procedures for parties to acquire and maintain legal status, and for the selection of both party officers and candidates in elections; it excluded from party membership those who could not write or had no legitimate occupation, those who were supporters of Communism or any other totalitarian movement, and those who were active members of the armed forces or the police. Excluded both from holding party posts and from nomination as party candidates in general elections were several categories of individuals, including managers of enterprises doing business ~ith the government, officials of trade unions and business associations, and military men until two years . after their retirement from active service. 69 While this statute was to prove too restrictive to survive future shifts in the political winds, two other decrees issued on July 24 were to become a permanent part of the Argentine political scene. The first established a system of federal electoral courts to resolve disputes £iti''Reuni6n de Gabinete Reducido, 28 de mayo, 4, 11, 18 y 26 de junio 1962"; "Acuerdo General de Ministros, 29 de junio de 1962," MSS. Lockhart Archive. An issue that absorbed much of the inner cabinet's attention was how to respond to complaints that the government had failed to investigate charges of corruption in oiilcial agencies and banks. The cabinet finally decided on June 29 to create a special commission to receive and investigate the charges. 67 La Prensa, June 2fi, 1962, has extensive coverage on the Perkins resignation and the appointment of his successor. 66Thc details of the forthcoming statute were discussed at a series of inner cabinet meetings prior to its presentation to a meeting of the entire cabinet. "Reunion de Gabinete Reducido, 2. 13, 16, 19 y 23 de julio de 1962"; "Acuerdo General de Ministros, 24 de julio de 1962," MSS, Lockhart Archive. For the text of Decrees l\;os. 7162, 7163, 71fi4 and 7165. see Anales [1], XXII-A, 586-6oo. 69Decree No. 7162, ibid.

34

The Guido Interlude

arising out of the enforcement oflegislation governing elections and the activities of political parties; the other reintroduced the system of proportional representation that had been used in the constitutional convention election of 1957, and applied it now to the selection of presidential electors, national deputies, and senators from the Federal Capital. 70 With the issuance of the above decrees, plus another that restored a 1956 ban on the dissemination of Peronist propaganda, 71 President Guido apparently believed that conditions were now favorable for accelerating the process of restoring full constitutional government. U nfortunately, his ability to concentrate on this goal was unexpectedly interrupted by a new intra-Army crisis. Once again, as in the previous April, a sector of the Army rebelled against the Army Secretary. In this instance, it was the anti-integrationists who took the initiative, in an effort to regain control of the institution. The timing of the movement suggests that the precipitating factor was the favorable treatment that Army Secretary Loza continued to give to General Rauch. It will be recalled that after the April military crisis, Rauch was allowed to remain on active duty, unlike General Poggi and other officers who had supported him. Subsequently, a group of ten generals brought charges of improper conduct against General Rauch before a Tribunal of Honor. The three members of this body, all retired generals but appointed by the Army Secretary, ruled that General Rauch had acted honorably and should not suffer any penalty. Thereupon, Secretary Loza announced his intention of assigning Rauch, currently on leave status, to a military command. The reaction to these events was not long in coming. On August 8, Major General Federico Toranzo Montero, the head of the Army's IV Corps, demanded the resignation of Secretary Loza, and in an unprecedented move, proclaimed himself Army Commander-in-Chief. He did so on the grounds that as the ranking major general he was the legitimate successor to the post that Loza had been occupying improperly on a prolonged interim basis, together with the secretaryship. 72 Toranzo Montero was joined in his defiance of Secretary Loza by the 70Decrees Nos. 716.3 and 7164, ibid. 71 Decree No. 7165, ibid. Its intent was to give full effect to Decree No. 4161/56, which had been adopted by the military government in 1956 and abrogated by Law 14,444 during the Frondizi administration. 72Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Federico Toranzo Montero, Mar. 5, 1970; La Prensa, May 2 and Aug. 7 provide details on the Honor Tribunal and Loza's announcement.

The Guido Interlude

35

commander of the Palermo-based First Motorized Division in the Federal Capital, by the commander of the Cordoba-based Fourth Infantry Division, and by officers of various other units. In these circumstances, and after an unsuccessful effort to install a new commander at the Palermo division, General Loza submitted his resignation, as did his undersecretary. President Guido was thus confronted once again with the challenge of finding an Army Secretary who could restore order within the force and provide support to the government. The task of identifying possible candidates was entrusted to Defense Minister Jose Luis Cantilo, who was named acting Army Secretary, and who in turn asked General Julio Alsogaray to assist him as acting undersecretary. Initially, Dr. Cantilo considered the possibility of having an active duty general serve as Army Secretary, but he had to abandon the idea when he discovered that every general he considered for the post was identified with one or the other of the contending factions. In fact, so irreconcilable were their viewpoints, he had to give up the idea of convening all the generals in one place for fear that they might come to blows. Dr. Cantilo then resorted to an unprecedented civilian procedure for solving a military problem: the generals were interviewed individually and each was asked to vote for his preferred candidate. After talking with all but one of the generals, and despite receiving contradictory advice, he recommended to the President that he appoint General (Ret.) Eduardo Seiiorans. 73 Seiiorans, an engineering officer, had played an active role in the 1955 movement that overthrew Peron, but in the subsequent politicomilitary divisions, he had sided with General Lonardi, who was later ousted from the presidency and replaced by General Aramhuru. Although Seiiorans was viewed as a nationalist, in terms of the liberal versus nationalist labels that were applied to military men after 1955, he was highly respected as a professional officer and as a disciplinarian. It was probably the latter qualities, together with the endorsement given by Foreign Minister Bonifi1eio del Carril, that persuaded President Guido to appoint him Army Secretary. 71 73 La Prensa, Aug. g, 1962, gives extensive eoverage to the military crisis. For Dr. Cantilo's efforts, "'Reuni6n de Gabinete Reducido, 10 de agosto de 1962," MS, Lockhart Archive. Gen. (Ret.) Sdiorans was unaware that his appointment was the result of a vote and would not have accepted it had he known. Interview, with Gen. (Ret.) Eduardo Seriorans, Apr. 8, 1987. 74 Del Carril, possibly at the suggestion of other nationalist officers, had floated the name of Senorans at a luncheon at the Cavalry School at Campo de Mayo and found a

36

The Guido Interlude

The appointment of General (Ret.) Seiiorans, however, did notresolve the military crisis. General Toranzo Montero, who was now in Buenos Aires, refused to recognize the authority of the new Secretary, and from the Palermo headquarters of the First Motorized Division issued a communique in which he designated himself as ''Commanderin-Chief of the Army of Operations." While Toranzo Montero supporters in the Army Building physically prevented General Seiiorans from gaining access to the third-floor office of the Secretary, units of the motorized division took up battle positions at La Matanza in the outskirts of the Capital. Seiiorans reacted to these events by declaring Toranzo Montero to be a rebel, and by establishing his O\vn command post at the \Var Academy; moreover, he proceeded to work out plans at Campo de Mayo with Cavalry Corps Commander General Juan C. Onganfa, and with other generals who had pledged their support to him, for deploying armored division units against the rebel forces. 75 Army Secretary Seiiorans took these steps in the belief that he would be supported by President Guido and the cabinet. Indeed, even before he had accepted the appointment, he had explained to the President in a lengthy conversation how he proposed to restore discipline in the Army, and the President had agreed. Moreover, in a meeting of the cabinet held just after he took the oath of office, he restated his views on the importance of upholding the principle of authority, and received generalized approval for the proposition that if a unit rebelled and refused an ultimatum to lay down its arms, it would be repressed. Brigadier Rojas Silveyra and Ing. Alsogaray were outspoken in their endorsement of the Seiiorans approach. The only dissent came from Navy Secretary Clement, who stated that the Navy was opposed to any movement of troops. ;r; But now that reality rather than a hypothetical situation confronted them, the mood of the President and the cabinet changed. Summoned to a postmidnight meeting at the Olivos residence, General Seiiorans found that the support he had counted on for the adoption of firm posith·e reaction. Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Tomas Sanchez de Bustamante, May 11, 1970·

75Interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Eduardo Seiiorans, Mar. 10, 1977 and Apr. 8, 191l7; also Sanchez de Bustamante interview, May 11, 1970; La Prensa, Aug. 11, 12, 1962. 76 Seiiorans interview Apr. 8, 1987;· "Reunion de Gabinete Reducido. 10 agosto de 1962," MS, Lockhart Archive. This cabinet meeting began at 16.35 hours, a half~ hour after Seiiorans \Vas S\vorn in.

The Guido Interlude

37

measures had evaporated. Interior Minister Adrogue and Navy Secretary Clement were now forthright in their opposition, and indeed the Navy, displaying its sympathy for the anti-Senorans forces, had already ordered its personnel to block the routes that the Campo de Mayo tanks would have to take to get into the Capital. To be sure, Air Secretary Rojas Silveyra and Economy Minister Alsogaray still supported the Senorans approach, but General (Ret.) Pedro Maristany, the Secretary of Communications, who had been asked to attend the meeting presumably because he was the only other Army man in the cabinet, expressed deep concern about the possibility of bloodshed. The Army Secretary for his part discounted this possibility in the belief that the rebel forces would surrender when they saw the tank units approach. President Guido, however, yielding to the arguments for a soft approach, finally made his decision: to call for a truce and to invite the "dissident chief," General Toranzo Montero, to come to the Olivos residence. Secretary Senorans, viewing the truce call as "equivalent to negotiating with the Army faction that was in open rebellion," and as the "absolute negation of the principles that underlav his assignment, .. resigned on the spot. He had served as Army Secretary for only ten hours, establishing a record for minimum time in office that has yet to be surpassed. 77 While the rival Army forces as well as Navy units maintained their positions in the streets, the Olivos residence throughout the early morning hours of August 11 witnessed a series of triangular consultations between President Guido and two groups of officers representing the competing sides. General Toranzo Montero, for his part, urged the appointment as Army Secretary of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Arturo Ossorio Arana, a man who had served in that post under President Aramburu. Dr. Guido refused, knowing that Ossorio Arana was a hardliner who had been a plotter against President Frondizi. The President's task was to find a retired officer acceptable to both sides. This was finally achieved when the representatives of each side, gathered in separate rooms at the Olivos residence, coincided in proposing General Jose Octavio Cornejo Saravia, a retired artillery officer. The legalistas in putting forth his name believed that he would share their outlook; after all, he had been one of the sixteen generals, including General Loza, TlSeiiorans interview, Apr. 8, 1987; the quoted words are from the statement he distributed after presenting his resignation. See La Prensa, Aug. 12, 1962.

38

The Guido Interlude

who had been purged as "nationalists" by Ossorio Arana in November 1956. Toranzo Montero, for his part, found Cornejo Saravia acceptable because he had recently shown coolness to Loza, refusing his offer of an appointment to head the Secretariat of State Intelligence, and seemed likely to sympathize with the viewpoint of the anti-integrationist faction.78 Events were to demonstrate that the latter perception of the new Army Secretary was the more accurate. Indeed, Cornejo Saravia candidly told the President, when he was summoned to Olivos to be offered the post, that he did not agree with the government's goal of holding elections, and that in fact he favored a long-term dictatorship. Dr. Guido's reply, according to his later recollections, was: "General, you are here because your name is a guarantee of the union of the two sectors of the Army, at least it seems to be so, and [for me] to offer you the post, not to talk politics. I propose to you, and I have no difficulty with this, that within two weeks, after you have come to grips with the realities of the important position you are going to occupy, we continue the conversation about a ten-year dictatorship. But for now, do me the favor and accept, because you are the solution, and we cannot continue losing time." 79 The appointment of General (Ret.) Cornejo Saravia as Army Secretary produced a momentary calming of the situation as troops returned to their barracks. However, the situation within the Army continued to be delicate and, despite the new Secretary's belief that he was promoting the union of the officer corps, some of his earliest decisions had an unsettling effect. Much to the surprise of everyone, including General Toranzo Montero, who expected to be named Commander-in-Chief, Cornejo recalled retired Brigadier General Juan C. Lorio to active duty, named him to that post, and in violation of Army peacetime regulations, promoted him to the grade of major general. Moreover, when the new Secretary's first choice for Chief-of-Staff, General Carlos Turolo, pre78Toranzo Montero interview; La Prensa, Aug. 12, 1962. According to the press account, the participants in the three-way negotiations were Gens. Toranzo Montero and Franklin Rawson, and Cols. Tizado and Guerin on one side, and Gens. Ardanaz, Peralta, Alsogaray, and Col. Lanusse on the other. The negotiators consulted with their respective associates before consenting to the appointment. For example, the "legalista" acting commander of the Ninth Division at Comodoro Rivadavia was consulted by telephone. Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Jorge F. Von Stecher, Mar. 20, 1987. 79Guido interview.

The Guido Interlude

39

cipitated a storm of protest from the legalistas who denounced him as a rebel, he recalled another retired officer, Brigadier General Bernardino Labayru, named him to that post, and promoted him to major general. 80 As a new member of the inner cabinet, Secretary Cornejo argued that his task of unifying the Army would be fi1eilitated if the government were viewed within the military as an effective body, something he contended was not the case. To this end he urged the adoption of tangible measures such as the dissolution of the Congress, suspending the authority oflabor leaders, and taking control of the CGT building. His enthusiasm for blunt actions, however, was not shared by Economy Minister Alsogaray, who saw no point to exacerbating relations with labor, and who argued that the total disappearance of Congress as an institution would be viewed as evidence of a further inroad of the military in a government that claimed to be constitutional. President Guido also opposed the dissolution of Congress, but for different reasons, not all of which he disclosed to the members of the cabinet. 81 As a professional politician for over 30 years, Dr. Guido was a firm believer in the need to analyze the political options carefully before making irremediable decisions. That the existing Congress, truncated as it was, might still play a useful role in the transition to a non-Peronist elected government, was a possibility he wanted to hold open. Accordingly, he asked technicians in the Interior Ministry to prepare an analysis of the likely distribution of congressional scats if an election were held on the basis of the recently adopted proportional representation system, and on the assumption that the parties would retain the share of the vote they had received in the last election. The study showed that what were called the "pro-Peronist" parties would win enough seats, 12 in the Senate and 68 in the Chamber, to deny a quorum to the Legislative Assembly or joint session, which had the constitutional function of declaring the winner in the presidential and vice-presidential race. If, however, the deputies and senators with unexpired terms in the existing Congress remained in office, and the elections under the new system were limited to the vacancies caused by the nullification of the last elections, the Legislative Assembly could 80Toranzo Montero interview; BPSG Nos. :32S4 and :3287, Aug. 1y6z; for an account of the opposition to the T6rolo appointment, see La Prensa, Aug. 15, 1962. 81 "Reunion de Gabinete Reducido, 16 de agosto de 1y6z," MS, Lockhart Archive.

40

The Guido Interlude

meet without a problem, and neither chamber would be under the control of pro-Peronist parties. 82 With the results of this study in hand, President Guido argued that what was needed was not the dissolution but the freezing of the Congress. What he did not explain to the members of the inner cabinet, however, at least not in any recorded meeting, was his plan to use the existing Congress to assure the early election of a presidential candidate who could bring stability to the country. The specific candidate he had in mind was General (Ret.) Pedro E. Aramburu, who had served as de facto President from 1955 to 1958, and who had come to be regarded by some ofhis countrymen, in and out of uniform, as a national reserve, as an "Argentine De Gaulle." Dr. Guido's idea was to convoke an election just for the presidency and to hold it very soon. Given the use of the proportional representation system, it was almost certain that no candidate would receive a clear majority of the electoral college. The final choice would then be made by the Legislative Assembly, the joint session of the existing chambers, where the UCRI Senators and Deputies still held the majority. Even before making an approach to General Aramburu, Dr. Guido cleared the idea with Dr. Frondizi in his place of confinement, and received his approval. This meant that the UCRI would serve as the principal vehicle for the electoral contest. HJ To act as liaison with General Aramburu, Guido turned to his exInterior Minister, Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, who arranged for a face-to-face meeting between the two men at his home on the night of August zo. According to Dr. Martinez's recollections, Dr. Guido explained the proposal to General Aramburu who, after asking a few questions, and getting assurance about Dr. Frondizi's attitude, gave his consent. It was agreed that Aramburu would work with his own political circles, Dr. Guido with the forces of the UCRI, and Dr. Martinez with other political forces such as the Catholic and nationalist groups that had cooperated with the UCRI in the past. 84 82"Reuni6n de Gabinete Reducido, 16 y 20 de agosto, 5 de septiembre de 1962"; "Composici6n politiea de Ia Honorable Camara de Diputados de Ia Naci6n y de las legislaturas provinciales formulado sobre Ia base de los ultimos resultados electorales, con aplicaci6n del sistema proporcional-metodo D'Hondt-siempre que no sea incompatible con normas constituci6nales en vigencia," Ministerio del Interior, Panorama Institucional y Politico de Ia Republica [s]. I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Eduardo Castro Sanchez for providing me with a copy of this 47-page study. &3 Interview with Dr. Rodolf() Martinez. 84Jbid.

The Guido Interlude

41

It was not easy to sell the idea of an Aramburu candidacy to nationalist political leaders, who still resented his role in the events that preceded and followed the ouster of President Lonardi in 1955. For example, Commodore (Ret.) Juan Jose Giiiraldes agreed, but only with the greatest reluctance, to support Aramburu; in contrast, Dr. Mario Amadeo, despite every argument presented to him, insisted that if there were any possibility of voting for another candidate, he would do so. 85 It proved much easier, or so it seemed, to get support from certain Peronist leaders. Dr. Martfnez met with labor leader Augusto Vandor and political figure Dr. Alberto Iturbe, who constituted, together with Dr. Raul Matera, Peron's official delegates to his movement in Argentina. Martinez argued that it was not a matter of sacrificing personal or ideological preferences out of admiration for Aramburu, but of realizing that Aramburu was the only instrument available on the current political scene for resolving the Argentine institutional crisis. Only his candidacy could put an end to a totally anomalous situation "in which military sectors, which have not defined where they want to take the country, are maintaining a status quo which has no perspective and no development." Martinez explained the mechanics of the plan to make Aramburu president, and invited the two leaders to associate themselves with the enterprise. Their response, according to Martinez's account, was positive, hut on the condition that the Peronists had their own legally recognized political party. Vandor explained that they wanted to participate in the recovery of republican institutions in a way that would assure the success of the operation, and not create any risk or irritation; that they would not ask for positions in proportion to their voting contribution, such as the vice-presidency or key governorships, but would be content with the governorship of some small provinces; and in future congressional elections they would support candidates in common agreement with the presidential candidate. It is not clear from the Martinez account whether Vandor and lturbe indicated that theirs was only a tentative commitment, subject to the approval of the exiled Juan Peron. 86 General Aramhuru, for his part, demonstrated a willingness to go at least partway to accommodate the Peronist leaders' conditions. In remarks made to journalists on August 22, he attacked the political pro8.'5 Ibid.:

also interview with Dr. Oscar Puiggr6s, Aug. 12, 1gll6. with Dr. Rodolfo Martinez.

8h Interview

42

The Guido Interlude

scriptions that had been included in the recently adopted statute for political parties: "\Vhcn Dr. Frondizi's government submitted to Congress the bill to establish proportional representation, one of the basic reasons was that the adoption of this system was indispensable for the pacification of the Republic. The new statute, in maintaining political proscriptions, fails to fulfill that lofty objective. As far back as 1959 I stated publicly that with a system of proportional representation and the regulation of democratic political parties, we should not accept methods and proscriptions which invalidate popular representation." In the same press conference General Aramburu emphasized the need for the reconciliation of all Argentines and, without saying so directly, called for early elections. "We must do everything possible for the Nation to have a constitutional solution without delay. I firmly believe that we are mature enough to create an organic democracy by guiding the country definitively within the law. It is only necessary to obtain a government that is capable of assuring stability for six years, one which carries out a generous policy inspired by the good of the people and capable of uniting it through responsible and constructive work for its benefit." 87 Within a matter of days, the Guido scheme to have General (Ret.) Aramburu chosen President in an election that would be resolved by the existing Congress took on considerable momentum. But in less than two weeks the scheme collapsed like a house of canis. The fatal blow to its implementation was prepared in the recently changed Army leadership and took the f(mn of a detailed list of measures (a "cartilla") that President Guido was asked to implement. The "cartilla," which was presented to Guido by the three military secretaries, called for 32 decisions of a political, economic, social, and administrative nature. First on the list was the dissolution of the Congress, the very body that Dr. Guido needed to assure Aramburu's selection as president. 88 Even before the 32-point "cartilla" was submitted to Dr. Guido, General Aramburu had learned of its existence from his own sources, and had contacted Dr. Martinez to tell the President that failure to adopt the measures could mean his removal. When Martfnez pointed 87 La Prensa, August 23, 1962, p. 4· 81l "Memorial de los Secretarios Militares Elevado a! Exrno Presidente de Ia Nacion eon Ia CARTILLA de los 32 Puntos (4 Set 62)." The text is included in Seeretaria de Guerra, Comando en Jefe del Ejercito, Estado Mayor General del Ejt'rcito, "Antecedentes sobre los acontecimientos de septiembre de 1962", MS, Castro Sanchez Archive.

The Guido Interlude

43

out to Aramburu that in a sense he was the target of the "cartilla," and therefore had to defend the Congress or else abandon his presidential candidacy, his response was that he could do nothing, that the military were already decided. Dr. Guido also saw the "cartilla'' as directed against his plan for an Aramburu candidacy, and made a final attempt to salvage it. Summoning General Bernardino Labayru, the recently appointed Army Chief-of-Staff and supposedly a friend of Aramburu, the President explained that the Congress should not be dissolved, for it was needed to make Aramburu President of the Nation. Labayru's reply, according to what Guido later told Dr. Martinez, was that Aramburu should not be involved, for he was the country's last reserve, and that there were other younger officers who could be tapped for the post. Dr. Guido was left with the clear impression that Labayru's own ambitions had undermined the election scheme. 89 With the presentation of the "cartilla," President Guido found his room for maneuver ever more restricted. In fact, within the inner cabinet the balance had swung further in favor of hard-line measures 'with the appointment on August 30 of Dr. Adolfo Lamis as Minister of Defense, replacing Dr. Cantilo who had resigned two weeks before, worn out by the military squabbles. A member of the editorial board of La Prensa, Dr. Lantis stood closer to the viewpoint of the Navy and hard-line Army officers than did his predecessor. 90 But even in the face of the rigidly anti-Peronist views that characterized most members of the current inner cabinet, Dr. Guido still tried to salvage something of his own political agenda. This was demonstrated in the inner cabinet meeting of September 5, when the 32-point "cartilla'' was the main subject of discussion. Once again the chief proponent of firm, clear-cut measures was Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia, supported by Navy Secretary Clement and, this time, by all the civilian ministers except lng. Alsogaray. And once again, citing the vote analysis study he had had made, President Guido reminded them of the risks involved in dissolving the Congress and holding a simultaneous election for all public offices. Taking issue with the optimism expressed by Interior Minister Adrogue and Navy Minis89Interview with Dr. Rodolfo Martinez. 90For Dr. Cantilo's resignation, see La Prensa, Aug. 14-15, 1962; for Dr Lanus' appointment, see ibid., Aug. 28-30, 1962. It will be recalled that he had turned down the post when it was first offered on March 30 at the suggestion of hard-line officers. See note 33·

44

The Guido Interlude

ter Clement that the strict application of the political party statute would prevent a Peronist resurgence, Dr. Guido insisted that there were no guarantees. Air Secretary Rojas Silveyra, for his part, supported him on this point, observing that even "with the Statute you either have to accept the vote of the Peronist rank-and-file or you would have to shoot two million persons." 91 President Guido tried to allay the concerns about his own intentions that Cornejo Saravia implied were the basis of the military demands for dissolving the Congress and other items in the "cartilla." "You should remember," Dr. Guido told the cabinet, "that a constitutional government has the strength that comes from the backing of the voters; a de facto government has the backing of the armed forces; the government of the [acefalia]law that we represent has no backing." Guido then went on to "clarify to General Cornejo Saravia, who has only recently joined the government that in assuming this difficult post I resigned from my party and I did so in the conviction of the necessity imposed by the present circumstances. I ask him, therefore, to transmit to his force the absolute confidence that I am playing fair, and that I am not defending my fellow party members in the Congress because I don't have any." 92 The President's arguments, however, could not overcome the pressure for immediate action on the Congress. Even his stated willingness to sign a decree dissolving the Congress after the political parties had completed their reorganization process was not accepted. Finally, he yielded but on condition that simultaneously with the decree of dissolution, a summons for new congressional elections on a specific date would be issued. The members of the inner cabinet agreed, and left it to the President to draft the text of the decree. Thus, on September 6, the Argentine public learned that what remained of the existing Congress was totally dissolved, but they were also informed that the voters would be called upon to elect an entirely new legislature on October 27, 1963. President Guido, whose basic goal had always been to restore the constitutional order, could take some satisfaction from the fact that the three military secretaries, together with other cabinet members, had for the first time since he assumed the presidency affixed their signatures to a decree convoking elections for a date that was certain. 93 9l"Reuni6n de Gabinete Reducido, 5 de septiembre de 1962," MS, Lockhart Papers. The quoted words are on p. 16. 92Jbid., p. 14· 93Jbid., pp. 17-18; Decree No 9204, Sept. 6, 1962, Anales [1], XXII-A, 684.

The Guido Interlude

45

The dissolution of the Congress was of course only one of a series of measures that the civilians and military associated with the antiintegrationist forces wanted the government to adopt. In the economic and social policy sphere, these measures had been set forth in the Martijena Plan, the implementation of which had been frustrated earlier in the year by the failure to set up the military junta. Now, however, with the Army under control of the anti-integrationist group, the time seemed ripe for enacting sweeping changes that would liberalize the economy and reduce the power of labor. Already on September 1, arguing the need to demonstrate governmental firmness in the face of a postal strike, Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia, Defense Minister Adolfo Lantis, Interior Minister Adrogue, and the Navy and Air Force Secretaries met, and without informing Economy Minister Alsogaray in whose jurisdiction the matter lay, decided to adopt a broad antistrike measure. The resulting decree, which President Guido signed on September 3, prohibited all general strikes, established compulsory arbitration in all labor disputes, and banned outright any strike in the public services sector. 94 In the clays that followed, General Martijena convoked a series of meetings of civilian economists and military representatives at the Military Industries Building in Belgrano to draft other legislation. Two proposals that received nearly unanimous support from the participants dealt respectively with the petroleum industry and with the trade unions. It was agreed to seek the abrogation of the petroleum contracts the Frondizi government had entered into with private companies (which incidentally had made the country nearly self-suflicient in petroleum production), and to replace them with a system of Venezuelastyle concessions. It was also agreed to seek the repeal of the basic trade union statute that had been adopted under Frondizi, and to replace it with one offered by the Navy that would place severe limitations on the power of trade union leaders. 95 94Decree No 8946, Sept. 3, 1962, ibid., pp. 672-675. The background to the decision and Alsogaray's complaints at being excluded from the discussions are set forth in "Reunion de Gabinctc Reducido, .3 de septiembre de 1962," pp. 2-7. The ban on public service sector strikes was one of the specific measures proposed in the Plan Martijena; see note 1.3. 95 Salvador San Martin, El poder rnilitar y la naci6n, [ llO], 198.3, pp. 269-270. The author, who was one of the participants in the meetings, disagreed with the advisability of these two measures.

46

The Guido Interlude

The implementation of these and other proposals envisaged in the Martijena Plan was prevented, however, by the outbreak of a new round in the intra-Army factional struggle, one that gave rise to a new terminology to identify the contending sides. Employing the traditional terms used in war games to differentiate friendly forces from the enemy, the legalistas called themselves the Azules (Blues) and applied the psychologically less attractive term Colorados (Reds) to their rivals. It might be noted that had it been the anti-integrationists who had taken the initiative, the designations would have been reversed. As it was, the terms Azules and Colorados gained ready acceptance and have even been used somewhat anachronistically to describe prior military confrontations going back to 1955. 96 \Vas the Azul uprising of September 18 directly related to the activities of the Martijena conclave as one of its participants, Salvador San Martin, later claimed?97 Was it motivated by the desire to prevent the petroleum and trade union measures cited above from being carried out? The evidence suggests that this was, at most, a subordinate consideration, and that the basic motives are to be found in the continuing internal struggle for control of the Army. Indeed, the origins of the Azul uprising can be found in a series of developments that occurred between the resignation of General Sefiorans as Army Secretary on August 11 and the actual outbreak on September 18. The first of these occurred immediately after Sci-lOrans went out to Campo de Mayo to advise the forces there of his decision to resign, and to release them from any sense of obligation to him. In the interval between that event and the appointment, hours later, of General (Ret.) Cornejo Saravia as his successor, Campo de Mayo was the scene of discussions in which Cavalry Corps Commander General Ongania and First Armored Division Commander General Carlos A. Caro took part, and to which the Combat Commander of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier Gilberto Oliva, was invited. Oliva offered the support of his force to the legalistas should they undertake to oust their rivals and restore discipline in the Army. In the uncertain atmosphere that prevailed at that moment, with the troops of both sides in hattie-ready condition, with a bridge at Lujan having been blown up, and with no 96Jnterviews with Gen. (Ret.) Manuel Laprida, Nov. 23, 1983, and Col. (Ret.) R.6mulo Menendez, Apr. 7, 1987. 97 San Martin, [ 110], pp. 269-270.

The Guido Interlude

47

one seemingly in charge, General Caro argued for taking over direct control of the government as the only way to prevent anarchy. His proposal was supported by certain officers, including Air Force Brigadier Oliva, but it was opposed by the colonels at the Cavalry School led by Colonel Lanusse, who viewed it as dangerous to take on political responsibilities with a divided Army. In any event, the appointment of Cornejo Saravia as Army Secretary, and his decision to name General Caro as his Undersecretary, eased the immediate crisis. The real significance of the Campo de Mayo discussions, however, was that it laid a basis for future cooperation between Army cavalry leaders and powerful Air Force officers. 9 R \,Yithin a matter of days, however, it hecame apparent that the crisis had not really been resolved, and that the new Army Secretary stood much closer to the anti-integrationists than to the legalistas. Apart from his actions in the inner cabinet on social and political issues, which may or may not have been reported accurately in military circles, Cornejo Saravia's handling of military matters aroused deep resentment in the ranks of the legalistas. His decision to retain General Federico Toranzo Montero as IV Corps commander despite the latter's overt acts of insubordination, his appointment to key Army posts of other officers who had taken part in acts of indiscipline, and his removal or transfer fi·om their commands of a number oflegalista officers, all contributed to a growing sense of frustration. The first steps in the creation of what was to become known as the Azul Command were taken at the end of August by a number of colonels, most of them from the cavalry, who had been complaining to one another when they got together socially about what they perceived as a clear attempt to set up a dictatorship by the Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia and his key appointees Generals Lorio and Labayru. Colonel Roberto Arredondo, an artillery officer and director of the Army Mechanics School, reacting to this concern, drafted a statement "El peligro de la dictadura," which he circulated in mimeographed form to his friends in the Army. A group of colonels, including Manuel Laprida, Alcides Lopez Aufranc, Julio E. Aguirre, and Jose R. Herrera, began to meet with other officers at the Campo de Mayo Cavalry School. The director of this school was Colonel Alejandro Lanusse. Out of these meetings, at which the Campo de Mayo Garrison Commander, !JK Interview

with Gen. Tomas

S~lnchez

de Bustamante, May

11, 1~72.

48

The Guido Interlude

General Julio Alsogaray, was also present, came the decision to establish a clandestine general staff which they called the "estado mayor de trabajo legalista." General Alsogaray served as its first chief of staff, with Colonels Lanusse, Jaime Toscano, and Julio Hang in charge of the intelligence, operations and logistics departments respectively.~~ It was this group of officers that decided to invite General Juan C. Onganfa to assume the command of their gestating movement. Onganfa had recently issued a memorandum sharply critical of Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia for adopting policies that did not reflect the attitude of the officer corps, policies that he said increased divisiveness, lowered discipline, and allowed the Navy and National Gendarmery to intervene in internal Army problems. As a result of this memorandum, which received wide press coverage, General Onganfa was relieved of command of the Cavalry Corps and was at home without assignment when he received and accepted the invitation to become the commander of the Azul movement. 100 In their initial assessment of their own strength and that of their opponents, the Azul general staff realized that they controlled relatively few combat units. Their main strength was at Campo de Mayo, where most of the troop and school units were in Azul hands, the chief exception being the Noncommissioned Officers School. In the Capital they could count on the Army Mechanics School and the Grenadier Regiment, and at Magdalena in the province of Buenos Aires on the 8th Armored Regiment. The other line units in and around the Capital were controlled by Colorados, although individual officers assigned to them were believed to be sympathetic to the Azules. In the interior of the country the Colorados controlled most of the infantry units and the Azules controlled most of the cavalry regiments. The orientation of many officers, however, was unclear and would probably be determined, it was felt, by the course of events. It was for this reason that the Azul staff devised a strategy of escalation beginning with minor gestures 99Jnterviews with Gens. (Ret.) Manuel Laprida and Roberto Arredondo, May 13, 18, 1970. Col. Manuel Iridbar eventually replaced Gen. Alsogaray as chief of the clandestin general staff. Other officers who took an active part in the work of this staff included Cols. Gustavo Martinez Zuviria, Manuel Ceretti, Roberto Levingston, Jorge Von Stecher, Mariano de Nevares, Julio Aguirre, Manuel Laprida, and Lt. Col. Francisco Laprida. 100 La Prensa, Aug. 29, 1962, carries the text of the Ongania memorandum; interview with Cen. (Ret.) Manuel Laprida, Nov. 23, 1983.

The Guido Interlude

49

and culminating in the outright repudiation of the authority of Generals Cornejo Saravia, Lorio, and Labayru. The Campo de Mayo base would be sealed off, and the Colorado leadership would be confronted with the challenge of recovering control of the base. It was a strategy designed to appeal to officers who valued professionalism above politics, who wanted to see order restored in the Army, and who favored the prompt return via elections to full constitutional government. 101 The first major step in the Azules' campaign to broaden their support in the officer corps was the preparation of a document that would clearly differentiate their goals from those of their rivals. Entitled "Objetivos y resoluci6n del ejercito-memorandum Campo de Mayo," and dated September 13, 1962, it accused the generals currently in control of the Army of working with a group of admirals and politicians "to seize power and establish a military government for several years." The document charged them with keeping President Guido encircled so as to limit his freedom of action, with preventing the implementation of existing economic and social policies so as to increase tensions, and with destroying the essence of the Army so as to make it ineffective. Arrayed against these generals, the document asserted, was the "true Army, the Army that wants to be commanded by military professionals and not by groups of military politicians; the Army that wants to be an Army and not an aggregation of armed bands; the Army in which military laws and regulations are respected and applied without discriminations; the Army of justice, the basis of discipline; the Army that is the guardian of the Constitution and the laws; the Army that serves and protects the Nation and does not judge it or subjugate it." The document went on to pledge Campo de ~Iayo to the support of Dr. Guido and to assure him the necessary freedom of action to enable him to fulfill the promise to restore constitutional government as soon as possible. It also warned that Campo de Mayo would take immediate action against any indication of intent on the part of the "group that advocates the dictatorship" to postpone the announced elections or to 101 Interviews with Gens. Arredondo and Laprida, May 13, 1R, 1970. For a critical assessment of conditions in the Army and an appeal for the early restoration of full constitutional government and the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control, see the lecture given at a dinner attended by 40 retired officers by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Benjamin Rattenhach, Aug. 23, 1962. The text is included in "Antecedentes sobre los aconteeimicntos de septiembrc de 1962," pp. 2-6 (see note HH).

so

The Guido Interlude

fail to advance the date should circumstances permit, or to use the freedom of action presupposed by the dissolution of the Congress to change the rules governing the presidential succession. 102 In adopting as their major political objectives the maintenance of Dr. Guido in the presidency and the strengthening ofhis authority, the Azul leadership was acting on the assumption that the President would support their institutional objective of gaining control of the Army high command. Indeed, they had received some assurance to this effect as a result of an exchange of messages between Generals Onganfa and Alsogaray on the one hand and the President on the other. This exchange was carried out during the week of September g to 15 via a civilian intermediary, ex-Interior Minister Dr. Rodolfo Martinez. Knowing of his easy access to the President, the two generals had approached him to explain to Dr. Guido their desire to restructure the Army, subordinate it to civilian control, and press for rapid return to constitutional order. To this end, they wanted the President to oust General Lorio as Commander-in-Chief and name General Ongania in his place. Aware that this would also require the ouster of both the Army Secretary and the Minister of Defense and generate considerable tension, the Azul generals expressed their confidence that they had the strength to control the situation. President Guido's reply, conveyed through Dr. Martinez, was that he was not now in a position to do what they asked, but that if they had the power that they claimed, let them demonstrate it; when he saw it demonstrated, he would be on their side, for theirs was the one that best served the interests of the country. Dr. Guido, in short, by promising to cooperate at an appropriate time was encouraging the Azul generals to take the initiative. 103 This was an initiative they were already prepared to take. Indeed, even before Generals Ongania and Alsogaray met a second time with Dr. Martinez to receive the President's reply, the Azul command had decided on the latter part of the week beginning September 16 as the appropriate time frame for launching their movement for the ouster of Generals Lorio and Labayru. In preparation for what was to come, the commanders and chiefs of staff of major cavalry units in the entire l02For the text, see ibid., pp. 11-14, or Clarin, Sept. 13, 1962. The other daily newspapers refrained from publishing the memorandum. For further background on its preparation, sec A. A. Lanusse, Protagonista y testigo [38], 1989, pp. 162-163. 10.3 Interview with Dr. Rodolfo .Martinez.

The Guido Interlude

51

country gathered on Saturday, September 15, at Campo de Mayo, ostensibly to participate in a ceremony commemorating the seventh anniversary of the Liberating Hevohition. The principal address at the ceremony was given by Colonel Lanusse, director of the Cavalry School, who denounced those "who use the name of the Liberating Revolution for political purposes, and who display an intransigence and sectarianism that was never in the spirit of those who were the authentic revolutionaries." His concluding words contained a warning of things to come: "This simple ceremony is our homage to those who made possible the return to liberty. To care for it and maintain it is our mission, and we will know how to carry that mission out." 101 The original plan developed by the Azul command, as noted above, envisaged a passive rebellion. The authority of the Army leadership would be challenged from Campo de Mayo which would be made secure against attack, but it was not intended that the Azul forces would move aggressively. The time selected for launching the challenge was brought forward by the decision of Generals Lorio and Labayru on September 17 to replace the Azul commander of the Army Mechanics School, Colonel Hoberto Arredondo, with an officer loyal to themselves. The loss of this powerful, and strategically located, unit persuaded the Azul command that there was no time to lose. On the morning of September 1S, General Carlos Peralta, one of the most senior cavalry generals on active duty, presented himself to the Army Secretary and, accompanied by Generals Pascual Pistarini and Julio Alsogaray, delivered a demand on behalf of the Azul officers that he dismiss Generals Lorio and Labayru and send them back to retirement. Cornejo Saravia's response was to order the simultaneous ouster of Generals Pistarini and Alsogaray as Cavalry Corps and the Campo de 1-layo commanders respectively, and to order by radiogram the ouster of other generals who had endorsed their stand. None of these officers was placed under detention, however, and all of them retained control of their commands in defiance of the orders. 10 " With General Onganfa establishing his command post at the Logistics School in Campo de Mayo, this institution now became the focal point 104 Ibid.; for the Lanusse speech, "Antecedentes sobre los acontecimientos de septiembre de 196z,'" p. 15. For excerpts, see Lanussc, [38], pp. 163-165. !05The 1Senerals involved, apart from Juan C. Ongania, were: Carlos Peralta, Pascual Pistarini, Julio Alsogaray, Osiris Villegas, Julio M. Sueldo, and Carlos Uriondo. Interview with Gen. Sanchez de Bustamante, May 11, 1970; Clarin, Sept. 19, 1987.

52

The Guido Interlude

of an elaborate effort to gain the adherence of undecided officers and win the support of public opinion. Through direct contacts with journalists and through the facilities of the one radio network whose power supply could not be cut off by the government, Azul officers with the help of civilian advisors engaged in an effective campaign of psychological warfare. In a barrage of communiques that were broadcast and rebroadcast, the Azttlcs depicted themselves as the upholders of military professionalism and champions of constitutional government, while portraying their rivals as politicians in uniform who preferred dictatorial rule to the holding of elections. The Azul objectives, as set forth in the communiques, repeated key sections of the September 13 Campo de Mayo memorandum: "National Goal: To maintain and strengthen the current ExecutiYe Power and assure it the necessary and sufficient freedom of action as it undertakes to fulfill the promises made to the people of the Nation to restore the Constitution to effect in the shortest period of time. Military Coal: To struggle to reimplant Justice and Discipline, respect for Military Laws and Regulations, and their enforcement without any class of discriminations."Ior; But did this rhetoric reflect the true objectives of the Azul leadership? Did it not conceal an ulterior motive, that of eventually taking over direct control of the government? Given the role that many of these same officers were to play four years later in the military takeover of 1966, it is legitimate to ask about the sincerity of their stated objectives in 1962. The evidence suggests that they had no desire at that time to assume control of the government, provided that their goal of gaining control of the Army was achieved. It is true that the Azul leadership debated the alternative of carrying out a revolution. The arguments presented in favor of such a drastic move stressed the support that could be expected from the Navy and Air Force, the likelihood of union with their Colorado rivals, the possibility of reaching agreement on the bases for future elections, and the justification for the use of troops that such a cause would provide. Nevertheless, neither the Azul command nor I06Quoted from Communique No. 2. In all, some 150 commHniqHes were issued beginning in the earlv hours of September 19 and continuing until September 23. Radio Belgrano (L. R. 3l was the principal vehicle f(>r transmitting the Azul statements. On the role of civilians in preparing slogans and other material for use by the Azules in their "psychological action," see Antonio E. Castello, La democracia inestable, [132], vol. 2, pp. 142-150. I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Castro Sc\nchez for providing me with a complete file of the communiques.

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53

General Onganfa accepted the idea, and the basic objectives remained those cited above. 107 It was recognized by some of the participants, however, that once the confrontation was initiated, events might lead the Azules against their wishes to take control of the government, and that therefore some preliminary planning should be carried out. Indeed, this concern was embodied in an unpublished internal statement that defined the national objective in the following terms: "To implement the political plan, adapted to current circumstances, with the calendar that has already been signed and approved by the three military secretaries, for the purpose of achieving as rapidly as possible the return to a constitutional regime, but to anticipate the possibility of having to take control of the government with a political plan that has specific and definite time frames." 108 But when General Onganfa proposed to his fellow generals at Campo de Mayo that they give thought to the measures that might have to be taken if the government fell, he ran into resistance. General Pistarini, for example, responded that if the goal was to oust the government, Onganfa should not count on him. The Azul commander insisted that all that he had in mind was contingency planning. In fact, no such planning was undertaken, possibly for fear that it would give rise to misinterpretation, but more likely because the energies and attention of the Azul leadership were concentrated on the frequently changing military situation. 109 The first full day of the Azul-Colorado confrontation witnessed the deployment of combat troop units, primarily those of the First Motorized and Second Infantry Divisions, which were loyal to Generals Lorio and Labayru. On the other side, the 8th Tank Hegiment, normally based at Magdalena south of La Plata, began its march to Campo de Mayo to link up with other clements of the First Armored Division to which it belonged. But as night fell no actual clashes had taken place; rather, the day had been devoted to readying the pieces of a military chess game. The only battle was the battle of communiques, with each side claiming the loyalty of specific military units and trying to win the support of the undecided. 107Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Jorge Von Stecher and memorandum entitled "Aiio 1962" presented to me on Feb. 7. 1984. 108 I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Sanchez de Bustamante for providing me with a copy of this document. 109Interview with Sanchez de Bustamante, August 5, 1985; also Von Stecher memorandum "Aiio 1gfiz."

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The Guido Interlude

However, the effort of the Azul command to maintain its posture of loyalty to Dr. Guido, while rebelling against the Army leadership, became increasingly difficult as a result of the response of the government. At a cabinet meeting, Dr. Guido was urged by Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia to summon General Onganfa into his presence, and in his presidential capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to order Onganfa to give up his stance and accept the orders of Cornejo Saravia, as conveyed through General Lorio, on pain of being declared in rebellion. Dr. Guido proposed that he combine this step with a summons of all active duty generals to a meeting to thrash out once and for all the dissension within the Army; other cabinet members, however, sided with Cornejo Saravia in insisting that it was first necessary to call Onganfa to account. Persuaded that the summons to Onganfa was a way of avoiding bloodshed, Dr. Guido agreed, but he insisted that the Azul commander should be given full guarantees for his person as had been done with General Toranzo Montero during the August crisis .no The meeting between President Guido, who was accompanied by Defense Minister Lantis and the three military secretaries, and General Onganfa took place that afternoon at SAO P.M. It proved to be very brief. The President, after explaining the serious damage that the repeated military crises had been inflicting on the country both at home and abroad, and after announcing that he was taking personal responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces for finding a solution to the problem, proceeded to order Onganfa to give up his opposition and accept the authority of the Army Secretary and Army Commander-in-Chief. \Vhen Onganfa tried to explain the reasons for his position he was cut off by Defense Minister Lantis, who told him that he had been summoned to receive a direct order from the President, not to question his actions. Dr. Guido closed the meeting by telling General Onganfa: "You now have the order; I expect a categorical reply before 9 P.M. "m The Azul command was now confronted with a difficult choice. To reject the order meant accepting the status of rebels, which contradicted their public posture of loyalty to Dr. Guido; but to accept it llO"Reunion de Gabinete Reducido, 19 de septiembre de 1962," MS, Lockhart Archive. This was the first of three meetings fin· which minutes were kept. No time is listed for this meeting, but it apparently was the one that began at 1 P.M. III"Reunion Realizada el1g de Septiembre de 1962 17.40 hs.," MS, Lockhart Archive.

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55

meant abandoning their objective of gaining control of the Army. However, bearing in mind their earlier exchange of messages with the President, they could still hope that he would cooperate with them if they gained the upper hand in the military chess game. Accordingly, General Onganfa telephoned the President shortly after 9 P.M. to state that the troop movements during the day had placed his own forces in a situation where they could be attacked, and that he therefore could not obey the order. At the same time he repeated the Azul demand for the dismissal of generals Lorio and Labayru, while restating the Azul pledge of support for Dr. Guido.II 2 The unanimous reaction of the members of the inner cabinet to whom Dr. Guido conveyed this conversation was to regard it as a flat rejection of the President's order, and to propose a firm response. Navy Secretary Clement and Air Secretary Rojas Silveyra joined Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia in urging that the Plan Conintes, the standard procedure for combatting domestic insurrection, be put into effect and that a joint command he created under General Lorio to direct the repression. Dr. Guido, while insisting that the door he left open for the continuation of unofficial efforts to avoid a confrontation, agreed to sign the appropriate decrees, but with a very significant proviso: that no order to open fire against the Azul forces should be given without his personal consent. And although armed clashes between the contending forces did take place over the next three days, at no time did the President authorize the use of weapons by General Lorio's forces. This placed them in the uneasy situation of having to disobey the authority they claimed to be upholding if they acted aggressively against the Azules. 113 Although the military balance on the night of September 19 appeared to favor the Colorado forces that responded to Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia and Generals Lorio and Labayru, a major shift occurred early the next day when the Air Force combat command, despite the position adopted in the cabinet by Air Force Secretary Rojas Silveyra, announced that it would take no part in the repression of the Azul movement. Indeed, there were strong indications that Air Force pilots might even provide air support for Azul ground forces. Within the Army itself defections in favor of the Azul command began to take place. The Army ll2"Reunion de Gabinete Reducido ... 19 de scptiembre de 1962 a 20.55 hs," MS, Lockhart Archive. 113 Ibid.; on the difficulties created for Gen. Lorio, see "Reunion de Cabin etc Reducido, 20 de septiembre de 1962," MS, Lockhart Archive.

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Undersecretary, General Caro, charging that Generals Lorio and Labayru were inviting Navy intervention in the Army's problems, resigned his post and went out to Campo de Mayo; in Salta, General Rauch, who was there on leave, took control of the garrison in the name of the Azul command while in Rosario a rival Azul headquarters was set up in the II Corps. 114 With the likelihood of armed clashes increasing, efforts to find a peaceful settlement intensified. Early on the morning of September 20, leaders of business associations made contact with Army leaders on both sides, to urge a negotiated settlement of their differences. In the belief that a deal might be struck by having officers on both sides agree to retire hom active service, Dr. Guido invited General Onganfa to the Olivos residence for further talks. Even before the Azul commander arrived. Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia explained to fellow cabinet members the essence of his negotiating stance in the impending talks: "They will ask for Lorio, and I will demand that Onganfa go." 115 No reliable record exists of what transpired at the hour-long Olivos meeting, but at its conclusion the Azul commander returned to Campo de Mayo without anything having been decided. However, a new attempt at mediation was initiated almost immediately. Economic Minister Alsogaray, who had rushed back from the United States, where he had been attending the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings, took on the task of trying to avoid bloodshed by going out to Campo de Mayo, where his brother General .Julio Alsogaray was a key Azul commander, and offering to serve as a direct intermediary with the President. 1 H; As a result of these efforts, Dr. Guido was able to get both sides to accept a two-hour truce beginning at 11:15 P.l\1. on September 20, during which time he made a dramatic new attempt to effect a settlement of the Azul-Colorado quarrel. Once again General Onganfa was summoned to the Olivos residence. After a private conversation with the President, he was ushered into the study where the Army Secre114Jbid.; La Prensa, Sept. 21, 1962. General Caro's resignation was given wide dissemination through Communique No 41 issued by Campo do ~!avo. IJ.S"Heunion de Gabinctc Reducido, 20 de septiembrc de 1962". !!fiLa Naci6n, Sept. 21. 1962, provides a chronology of the comings and goings. General Ongania arrived at Olivos at 12:35 P.M. and departed at 2:15P.M. For a partisan account that seems to confuse what took place at this midday meeting with what took place in a second meeting aftt>r midnight, see the open letter by Dr. Ado II(> Lam'tS published in La Naci6n, Oct. 9, 1962.

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tary, General Cornejo Saravia, and his two military cabinet colleagues, Admiral Clement and Brigadier Rojas Silveyra, were gathered. Dr. Guido then entered the study with a piece of paper in his hand, and after asking the officers to take their seats, he proceeded to read to them his letter of resignation addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In this letter he cited the military situation, his unwillingness to assume the responsibility before history for shedding blood, and, given his inability to avoid this, his decision to resign as president. Placing the letter on a table, he left the room, but not before stating: "Gentlemen, that is my resignation from the office of President of the Republic; I leave it to you to resolve this situation and I remind you that you have the country and history to think about. You gentlemen must decide."' 117 For the next hour and a half, the four military men analyzed the critical situation confronting them and finally came to an agreement on steps that could resolve the military conflict. Dr. Guido, as well as the civilian members of the inner cabinet who had been waiting in another room, were asked to join them. Army Secretary Cornejo Saravia, speaking on behalf of all the officers present, explained the solution they had agreed to, and requested the President to withdraw his resignation. Dr. Guido, after asking for and obtaining General Onganfa's endorsement of the solution described by the Army Secretary, took back his resignation.118 But what was the solution they had agreed to? Unf(>rtunately, no written record, no acta, exists to establish the exact nature of the agreement; and given the fact that it fell apart in a matter of hours, the entire episode has been shrouded in controversy. The official communique, which was drafted, apparently, by Dr. Guido aml Economy Minister Alsogaray after the other ministers departed, stated that Cornejo Saravia had submitted his resignation as Army Secretary, and that Generals Lorio and Labayru were to he deactivated at their own request; no mention was made, however, of replacements or retirements on the Azul side. The text of this communique, which was issued at 4:50 A.M. on September 21, gave the impression of a complete victory for the Azul objectives, but it is hard to believe that the Army Secretary had not insisted on the retirement of General Onganfa, as he had mentioned earlier in the day, and possibly that of other Azul leaders to compensate 117Intcrview with Dr. Guido. llHJhid.

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for the sacrifice of his own position and that of the two Colorado generals. 119 A probably more accurate version of what transpired at the Olivos meeting was published a few weeks later bv Cornejo Saravia himself. In an open letter to the press he described the agreement reached with General Ongania as f()llows: that on the side of the Colorados, he would resign as Secretary of the Army, Generals Lorio and Labayru would be deactivated, and appropriate measures would be taken against other superior officers; that on the Azul side, the superior oHlcers who were responsible for the rebellion, beginning with General Ongania, would be relieved of their posts and retired. In his open letter, Cornejo Saravia complained that the official eommuniqu{> had omitted this part of the agreement. Moreover, he contended, he and General Ongania had also agreed to order their respective forces not to open fire, nor to carry out any operations. and to remain where they were during the night preparatory to returning to their barracks the next clay. But, he complained, only his troops obeyed, while those on the other side used the time to improve their positions. 120 Whatever purpose the President hoped to achieve through issuing a truncated version of the late-night agreement, and this will be discussed below, the net result was to abort its implementation. Generals Lorio and Labayru refused to accept their deactivation, and continued to direct the operation of the Colorado fre a limited election was out of the question. On the other hand, his reading of Argentine history convinced him that the solution lay in doing what Argentines had done so often in the past after a military confrontation: hand political power over to the triumphant general. With the precedents of Cornelio Saavedra, Juan Manuel de Rosas, Justo J. Urquiza, Bartolome Mitre, and Julio Roca in mind, Martinez believed that the logical candidate for the presidency was General Juan Carlos Onganfa. As the leader of the military forces that fought to assure the holding of elections, Martinez reasoned, his appeal to the mass of voters would be 26La Pren~a. Oct. 17, 1962. 27Interview with Dr. Rodolfo Martinez. 28Jbid. Martinez wcalled that General Onganfa had told him that he would stand beside him if he announced a call for general elections. See also Primera Plana, Nov. 13, 1962, p. 2.

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so great that he could win the presidency regardless of how Peron reacted. Thus an Onganfa candidacy could serve to break down the hypnotic control that the exiled leader exercised over the mass of voters. 2;J The Interior Minister, as will he shown below, was able to win support for his thesis in certain civilian circles; his biggest problem came from within the Azul leadership. Certain officers, and this was especially true of such powerful figures as Colonels Lanusse and Lopez Aufranc, were opposed to a military candidate from their own ranks; to accept this would be to admit that their goal in ousting their Colorado rivals was not institutional reform but political power. Influenced by the concept ofhonor inculcated in them as officers, and reluctant to be seen as self-serving hypocrites, they ruled out an Ongania candidacy. Dr. Martinez, as a civilian, did not appreciate the depth of feeling underlying their attitude, and ascribed it to a lack of political experience, to an inability to differentiate the possible from the impossible. In his view, Ongania's candidacy was the only one that would enable the government to fulfill the contradictory commitments embodied in Communique No. 150, and he was determined to convert that candidacy into a reality, despite the resistance he would encounter. 30 But what of General Ongania himself? What was his reaction to the idea of running for the presidency? Interior Minister Martinez had an opportunity to broach the idea to the Army Commander in a private meeting at his home in mid-October. Onganfa's response was to question his own capacity to serve in the presidency in the light ofhis limited political experience, and to suggest General Aramburu instead. \Vhen Martinez pointed out the obstacles to an Aramburu \ictory in an open election, Ongania had no comment. The conversation between the two ended inconclusively, but what gave Martinez hope was that General Ongania did not categorically reject the possibility of a candidacy. 31 To cite an example from American politics, he did not adopt the stance of General Sherman who, when approached by politicians to agree to seek 29Jbid.; also interview with Gen. (Ret.) ;\Immel Laprida, Nov. 23, 1983. 30Rodolfo ~lartincz interview; interview with Gen. (Hct.) Alejandro A. Lanusse, Aug. 2:3. 197.3: on Col. Alcides Lopez Aufranc's attitude toward military candidates in generaL see Primera Plana, C\/ov. 20, 1962, p. 5· For an Air Force officer's view that an Onganfa candidacy was completely out of the question. interview with Brig. (Ret.) Eduardo .\lcLoughlin, Jan. 17, 1984. 31 Rodolfo Martinez interview.

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the presidential nomination of their party, flatly refused, stating that he would not run if nominated, and would not serve if elected. Dr. Martinez did not personally pursue the matter again, but at his request Colonel Manuel Laprida, who was serving as political advisor to the Secretary of War and whose friendship with Onganfa went back over 25 years, raised the candidacy issue with the Army Commander on several occasions. In one lengthy conversation held in the Commanderin-Chief's office, Onganfa, when pressed by his old friend, conceded that under the proper circumstances he would like to be president; but said that what he wanted to do was to serve two years as Army Commander, to retire and spend the next two years studying national problems, and then devote the next two years to campaigning to be president. Laprida pointed out that no one could anticipate what the circumstances would be in six years, but that Onganfa had an excellent opportunity to win the elections that were to be held within six months. Nevertheless, even to his old friend, Colonel Laprida, Onganfa refused to give any positive sign of interest. Dr. Martinez was thus left with the challenge of preparing the ground for a difficult national election without any assurance that his preferred candidate would actually run. 32 The internal differences within the government and the military over the scope of the future elections, and over the promised political party statute, were finally resolved after a series of tense meetings, in which the military authorities conveyed the views of their respective services. The decision, as announced by the Interior Minister on November 19, was to hold general elections for all legislative and executive posts at both the national and provincial levels on June 16, 1963. The text of the political party statute that was released at the same time, while far less proscriptive than the one it replaced, still contained several strongly anti-Peronist provisions, including a reaffirmation of the 1955 legislation outlawing the Peronist Party. As a result of last minute military proposals, the statute went further in establishing requirements for party legalization than either the authors of the original draft or the Interior Minister would have preferred. Even so, it left open the possibility for Peronists who would agree to the conditions, set forth in the statute, to organize a new party and seek recognition. It would :32 Laprida

interview.

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be up to the electoral courts to decide whether they deserved legal status. 33 Between the November 19 announcement and the actual issuance of the decree legally convoking the elections, second thoughts began to take place in influential quarters about the holding of provincial elections. In at least seven provinces, the constitutions would have to be reformed to permit the use of proportional representation to select governors or legislatures; this would require a separate set of elections in those provinces. Given this complication, friends of Aramburu pressed for the recall of the Frondizista Senate, a move that would preclude the need to hold elections for provincial legislatures. Even President Guido was reported to be urging the postponement of the gubernatorial elections to a date subsequent to the installation of the national authorities. Nevertheless, military insistence on holding general elections remained firm, and on January 14, 1963, the long-awaited electoral summons was promulgated. Citing the continuing institutional crisis and the obligation to restore the republican form of government at all levels, the decree-law called for simultaneous elections for national and provincial authorities on Sunday, June 23, and simply suspended for this election those provincial constitutions that did not allow the use of proportional representation. 34 The issuance of the convocatory decree and the prospect of elections in five months gave new immediacy to two related questions: Under what conditions would Peronists be allowed to take part in the electoral process? and What would be their role in the formation of an electoral front or coalition that might compete in the June election? It was generally assumed that under proportional representation no single party could secure enough electoral college votes to win the presidency and that political logic would dictate the organization of coalitions. Indeed, for several weeks, the press had been speculating about different combinations. The one that generated greatest interest was a 33La Prensa, Nov. 20, 1962; Decree-Law No. 12,530, Nov. 19, 1962, contains the text of the statute. For an analysis of key differences with Decree-Law No. 7, 162, July 24, 1962, and also of some of the last-minute changes made to the final draft, see Embassy BA Airgram A-751, Nov. 24, 1962; for military involvement in the process that led to the adoption of the statute, see "Estatuto de los partidos politicos: a) antecedentes de su gesti6n b) consideraciones sobre su contenido" MS, Castro Sanchez Archive. 34Primera Plana, Dec. 25, 1962, p. 4; Jan. 1, 1963, p. 2; Jan. 8, 1963, p. 2. The general elections were convoked by Decree-Law No. 260, which was countersigned by the three Military Secretaries as well as by the Ministers oflnterior and Defense.

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proposed ']rente nacionaly popular" (national and popular front) that would bring together the followers of the two deposed presidents, Juan Peron and Arturo Frondizi, as well as minor parties such as the Popular Conservatives and Christian Democrats. 35 Aware that die-hard opponents would try to use the Peronist participation issue as the focus of a psychological campaign to erode military support for holding the elections, Army Secretary Rattenbach initiated a countercampaign of his own. Through direct talks with key generals and through confidential bulletins distributed to unit commanders, he sought to explain the political decisions adopted hy the government. In a presentation to a meeting of generals the day after the convocatory decree was signed, the Secretary analyzed the unfolding political process, and set forth his view that, despite alarmist predictions made about a Peronist electoral victory, the Army must stand firm in its commitment to see representative democracy restored. He pointed out that with a proportional representation system in effect, it was natural for political coalitions or fronts to be formed, that this was a normal practice in democratic countries, and that in the present circumstances in Argentina the Justicialistas would be a major force in one of those coalitions. "The Army and its commanders," he went on to state, "must prepare themselves to resist the psychological impact that will result from the presence of an important number of legislators of justieialista tendency not only in the national congress and in the provincial legislatures, but also among the electors of the electoral colleges and in municipal bodies." Acceptance of this reality was essential to the preservation of an organized country, and "'this judgment must be transmitted sincerely and honestly to subordinate commanders; they must be taught that it is logical and desirable if we want to avoid having a large part of the justicialistas shift leftward toward Communism." Having offered this prognosis about the composition of future electoral college, legislative, and municipal bodies, Secretary Hattenbach expressed confidence that a different situation would prevail as regards the Presidency of the Nation and the more important governorships. 36 35A major promoter of the idea of a national and popular front was Comm. (Rd.) Juan Jose Guiraldes. See his letter to Primera Plana, Dec. 4, 1gl':i2, pp. 61-62 . .36The full text of the Army Secretary"s remarks to the January 15, 1963, meeting of generals is found in a document entitled "Asuntos Politicos,"" a copy of which was provided by Gen. (Ret.) Castro Sanchez; for excerpts and additional information about the meeting, sec Primera Plana, Jan. 22, 1963, pp. 2-3, and Feb. 12, 1963, p. 3· The Lanusse Archive

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Guido and the Military

What lay behind this assurance that Peronist candidates would not seek the presidency or the governorships of major provinces? The answer is to be found in the conversations that Minister of Interior Martinez had been holding with various Peronist leaders, and basically with Augusto Vandor and Alberto Iturbe who, together with Haul Matera, constituted the recognized leadership of the Peronist movement in the country. Martinez had explained to them his belief that the conntry's best interests would be served through the formation of a broad coalition of parties that could support the presidential candidacy of a nonparty figure, and he invited their participation. They were ready to accept, subject to Peron's approval, and agreed to participate in the coalition through the already existing U ni6n Popular Party, which would be reorganized to satisfY the requirements of the recently enacted statute. It was part of the informal understanding between Martinez and the Peronist leaders that their party would not contest the governorships of the five major provinces, and moreover that they would try to avoid actions that might alienate military support for the elections. 37 The steps taken by Dr. Martinez to promote the formation of a political front that would include the UCRI, the Peronists, and other parties, and the endorsement of his efforts by Army Secretary Rattenbach, did not fail to arouse uneasiness in the ranks of certain Azul officers. The best evidence of this can be seen in a confidential intelligence report that the chief of the Campo de Mayo garrison and commander of the First Armored Division, the recently promoted Brigadier General Lanusse, circulated among his key subordinates. Referring to a distinction that the Army Secretary, in a press conference, had recently made bctweenjusticialism, which he described as a movement of the poorest Argentines, whose sons were continuously conscripted and who deserved respect, and Peronism, which he defined as the disastrous regime overthrown in 1955 that the Army never wished to see again, the Campo de Mayo document asked: "How can one be sure that the present justicialism will not convert itself once in contains copies of the confidential "Boletfn Reservado del Ejercito," [zz], Nos. 1-3, signed by Rattenbach and issued Feb. 16, z8 and Mar. 18, 1963. 37Rodolfo Martinez interview; also interview with Dr. Mariano Grondona, June 10, 1986. According to Dr. Rodolfo Tecera del Franco (interview, Apr. 13, 1g8g), who as nominal head of the Uni6n Popular was also a party to the talks, Peron went along with the idea of participating in the elections, but warned his followers to expect a trap.

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power into Peronism? How is it possible, if justieialism has no ties to Pcronism, as the Secretary of the Army insists, that its leaders maintain contact and carry out the orders of the fugitive ex-dictator in Madrid?" Referring to the Secretary's efforts to explain recent events, the same report asked: "Would it not be useful to issue clarifications so that no one could conclude that the Army took a benevolent view toward the artificial creation of fronts with the Peronists? And would it not be possible for other sectors to coalesce that arc not dependent on the will of Frondizi, Peron and Frigerio?" 38 This last query was tantamount to suggesting that the UCRP should be the nucleus of a political coalition, and, indeed, this was the direction that General Lanusse wanted the government to follow. Dr. Martinez, in fact, did explore the possibility of bringing that party into a broad coalition that would embrace all political parties, although he personally doubted that the U CRP would join together with the Frondizistas or the Peronists. It was because he believed that General Ongania might be more inclined to accept the candidacy of such a coalition ifrente grande) that Dr. Martinez was willing to pursue the idea with UCRP leaders. According to Dr. Martinez's recollections, two significant meetings took place. The first, which was initiated by two UCRP political bosses from the Capital, Julian Saneerni Gimenez and Francisco Rabanal, was attended by the Undersecretary, Mariano Grondona. From this meeting Dr. Martinez received an analysis of the intraparty bctors within the UCHP that would militate against any decision to join the front. Basically, it was the strength of the virulently anti-Peronist wing of the party, led by such men as Arturo Mathov, Silvano Santander, and Ernesto Sammartino, with their strong ties to the defeated Colorado military faction, that was the main obstacle. According to the analysis, were Dr. Balbfn to join in a broad coalition with followers of Peron and Frondizi, and support the candidacy of the very general who had defeated the Colorados, he would run the risk of repudiation by many leaders of his party. The party would split, and most of its supporters would vote for an independent Radical Party presidential candidate rather than the coalition candidate, leaving Balbin's leadership in shambles. 39 .38Comando Divison Blindado. "Parte de Inteligencia Mensual, Mcs Febrero de 1963"' (prepared Feh. 12, 1963, and signed by Alejandro Agustin Lanusse). MS, Lanusse Archive. :Ju Hodolfo Martinez interview.

8z

Guido and the Military

Dr. Martinez found convincing support in this analysis for his prior assumption that the UCRP would not agree to join in a "frente grande." Nevertheless, when UCRP leader Dr. Jose Luis Cantilo, some time later, invited the Interior Minister to a meeting at his home with Dr. Balbin and other UCRP leaders, Dr. Martinez was very pleased to participate. What transpired in this meeting is, however, the subject of controversy. No written record of the conversation has survived, and therefore the only sources for what was said are the differing recollections of the host, Dr. Cantilo, and the then Interior Minister. According to Martinez, Dr. Balbin asked him to explain the role he envisaged for the UCRP in the political front that was in the process of formation, and in the anticipated election. Martinez set forth two alternatives: either the UCRP would join in the front, in which case it would be the party with the greatest weight, or else it would be the principal opposition party. Martinez explained his view that only a broad coalition could give the next president popular support; however, not having had any commitment from General Ongania, he carefully refrained from mentioning his name as the likely candidate. Dr. Balbin, in turn, made it plain that the UCRP as a political party could not join in the proposed front. When asked then by the Interior Minister what solution he could offer for the situation confronting the country, Balbfn replied (as recalled by Dr. Martinez): "the solution we could study would be to postpone the elections for five years and constitute a cabinet of national union, with all parties." Martinez's immediate rejoinder was that if the parties could agree on entering a coalition cabinet, they ought to be able to enter into an electoral coalition. He went on to point out that the Army would regard suspension of the elections as a betrayal of its promise to the people, and its current leadership would be swept out. To back up his point, Martinez called on General Julio Alsogaray, the Army Undersecretary, whom he had asked to accompany him to the meeting. Alsogaray was in total agreement that a postponement was unthinkable. This is the Martinez version. 40 Dr. Cantilo's recollection of what transpired at this meeting is quite different. To begin with, it was one of a series held at his home with members of different parties and Dr. Martinez. General Alsogaray's presence, moreover, was the result of a prior conversation between Dr. Cantilo and the Army Commander-in-Chief: who wanted Alsogaray 40Jbid.

Guido and the Military

83

there to keep a check on the Interior Minister. Furthermore, Dr. ~Iartfnez's presentation, according to Dr. Cantilo, was vague and unconvincing; the political leaders who attended did not understand his plan, and none of them, neither those of the UCRP. the National Federation of Center Parties, nor the Democratic Socialists, wanted to join in a coalition with the UCRI and the Peronists. Finally, as to Dr. Balbfn proposing a five-year moratorium on elections, Cantilo never heard this mentioned at the meeting in question, and doesn't believe it. The Radical Party, he insisted, wanted elections. 41 But how deeply committed was Dr. Balbfn personally to the holding of elections? Given the fact that the Interior Minister was promoting an electoral coalition that resembled the victorious alliance of 1958, the chances of a UCRP victory if the election took place were not very great. To be sure, the UCRP National Committee proceeded on March 10 to name its presidential ticket, subject to subsequent ratification by party members, but Dr. Balbfn did not allow his name to be pnt forth. Instead, that body selected a Cordoba physician-politician, Dr. Arturo Illia, as the presidential nominee and Dr. Carlos Perette, a lawyer from Entre Rios, as his running mate. 42 Why was Dr. Balbfn, the most prestigious figure in the UCRP, reluctant to be its standard bearer? A widely accepted explanation is that he did not expect the UCRP to win; having twi1. I, pp. 2:32-233. 121] bid., pp. 232-2:33; see also James Rowe, The Argentine Election of 196.3, [ 154]; f()f eon temporary coverage of the negotiations that preceded the electoral college vote, see La Naci6n, July 20-Aug. 1, 1963.

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unusual conditions eighteen months before. Although he had had to walk a tightrope in dealing with the contending military factions, and had been forced to consent to many measures that were personally distasteful, he could take satisfaction in the end result. For not only was constitutional government reestablished, but neither General Ongania nor any other military man would be holding the presidency; the next administration would be controlled by civilian politicians. 122 For General Ongania and the officers who made up the Army leadership, the UCRP success was a mixed victory, one that left many questions unanswered. As Azules, they could take satisfaction in the fact that the promised elections had been held, and that a Peronist return had been prevented. But with Peronist leaders denouncing the results as illegitimate, the reintegration of the mass of Peronist voters into the political process was still only partially accomplished. Moreover, the fact that the UCRP would control the executive power raised other concerns. Members of that party had been closely identified with the defeated Colorado officers, most of them now in enforced retirement and eager to return to active duty. What would happen to the Azuldominated command structure under a UCRP government? Moreover, the problem of competing aspirations and expectations would have to be faced. Could a viable relationship be developed between a highly ideological political party that had been out of power fr a future government. Nevertheless, the fact that the General Staff was producing detailed studies on problems of economic and social development, as well as on international relations issues, seems to have had the effect, intended or not, of enhancing the selfimage of Army officers and persuading them that they had the capacity for solving national problems. 30 Certainly the revised curriculum introduced in 1964 in the Army's Center of Higher Studies or "Colonels Course" was directed at giving the recently promoted colonels, from whom the future generals would be selected, experience in analyzing issues transcending the military sphere. General Juan Enrique Guglialmelli, the Director of the Center and the War Academy, influenced by his own graduate study experi29Intcrviews with Gen. (Ret.) Shaw and Col. (Ret.) Colombo. 30Interviews with Col. (Het.) Colombo and Gen. (Ret.) Lopez Aufranc, Aug. 15, 1985. For an insider's explanation of why and how Army staff officers assumed the task of defining national ohjedi\'es, see Mario Orsolini, Ejercito argentino y crecimiento uacional. [g6].

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ences while stationed in Washington, required the colonels to take seminar courses in which they read extensively in social science literature and produced research papers on such topics as world economic problems, the southern cone, and the relations of the Argentine Army to its national community. The readings and papers associated with these seminars would inevitably lead to discussions of contemporary problems, and probably played a part in shaping the participants' attitudes toward the lilia government. General Guglialmelli himself was a firm believer that the military had a significant role to play in promoting the nation's social and economic development, although in his public statements he was careful to specifY that "respect for the :'-lational Constitution and the legally and legitimately constituted authority" was a basic Army objective.'ll This expression of support for civilian government was by no means the personal view of just one superior officer; it was the official and frequently repeated position of the Army. Perhaps the most detailed, and certainly the most authoritative, exposition of this position was that set forth in August 1964 when General Onganfa addressed the V Conference of American Armies at West Point, New York. Known thereafter as the West Point address, it defined as one of the missions of the armed forces the upholding of the Constitution, and it characterized the forces themselves as the "strong arm of the Constitution."32 However, in analyzing the nature of the obedience owed by the military, the \Vest Point address specifically noted that it was mved to the Constitution and the laws, not to the men or political parties who happened to he exercising power. The duty of rendering such obedience would cease to be an absolute requirement if the exercise oflegal authority were so abused as to violate the basic principles of a republican system of government or to carry out exotic ideologies, if there were a violent breakdown in the independence of the branches of govern31Centro de Altos Estudios. Curso de Comneles, [23] (1964, 1965). The present writer had the opportunity to visit the Center in 1965, and was consulted by the Director in regard to the seminar bibliographies. For Cen. Guglialmelli's views on the missions of the Army, see his "Iniciacion de los Cursos de 1964 en Ia Escuela Superior de Guerra y Centro de Altos Estudios," Hevista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra XLII, No. 352 (1964). pp. 152-158. 32The official text of the speech was published as "Palabras pronunciadas por el Com andante en Jefe del Ejercito el dia 6 de agosto de 1964 en West Point (EE. UU.) .... " BPSG No. ,3411, Sept. 10, 1964, 749-762. The section of tlw speech devoted to "las fuerzas armadas y Ia autoridad constituida" is on pages 753-758.

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ment, or if constitutional prerogatives were used to completely wipe out the rights and freedoms of the citizens. Under such circumstances, "the military establishment at the service of the Constitution cannot passively nor blindly follow established authority." 33 This assertion of the military's right to withdraw its obedience was based on a novel argument derived from traditional liberal sources: that a people has the right to overthrow a government that is despotic and destructive of their basic rights. Citing both the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the West Point address went on to state that because an unarmed people cannot act on its own, the right to replace an abusive government "is transferred to those institutions that have been empowered by them to bear arms and have been assigned the mission of effectively upholding the Constitution."34 This part of the address seems to have been intended as a retrospective justification of the 1955 revolt against Peron. For that reason the text was careful to differentiate the exceptional circumstances that could justify military action from mere disagreement with particular policies or leadership style. In language reflecting a sensitivity to the kinds of complaints that had been made against the Illia administration, the West Point address stated: "It would be criminal for the armed forces to destroy the constitutional order in our country because of the government's errors in administering state afl~1irs, no matter how serious they may appear. In a democracy, the only remedy for mistakes made by government leaders is through the votes of those who disagree .... As long as a government, no matter how inept, acts in conformity to the general principles contained in the Constitution, they [the armed forces] will have to support its authority."' 5 The West Point address thus set h>rth a general philosophy that called on the armed forces to support democratic governments, while reserving for themselves the right to oust a regime they deemed despotic. Aware, however, that relations between the democratic Illia government and the military suffered from misunderstandings and mutual suspicions, General Onganfa concluded the address with words of advice to the civilian authorities: "The wisest course of action for govern756-757. 757-758. 35Jbid., 758. 33 I bid., 34[ bid.,

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ment leaders to follow to assure a truly apolitical attitude on the part of the armed forces is to allow them to participate in the great national dialogue over the execution of general policies, and to prevent the military from becoming isolated." 36 Given the fact that the Argentine military would turn against the Illia administration less than two years after General Onganfa delivered this address, one is tempted to ask whether it had any real significance as a statement of Army views, or whether it was simply an exercise in the rhetoric of hypocrisy. Part of the answer lies in events to be treated in the next chapter, but another part may be found by assessing the attitude of those who actually drafted the address. General Onganfa himself had relatively little to do with the preparation of the text. It was Army Secretary Avalos who had received the original invitation to go to the United States, and who had directed his staff to prepare a suitable address. On learning that other countries were sending their Army commanders, not their cabinet ministers, Avalos suggested to General Onganfa that he should be the Argentine representative, and when he agreed Avalos gave him the draft address to do with as he pleased. Onganfa turned to the General Staff to work on the address, and the task was undertaken by General Osiris Villegas. There were thus two separate sources for the West Point address, and the final text amalgamated ideas in such a manner that each group of officers would later claim it as their own. Although it is not possible to establish the authorship of specific paragraphs, it is of significance to note that when the constitutionalist principles embodied in the West Point address were put to the acid test in June 1g66, it was the Army Secretariat contributors who would remain true to them; the General Staff officers, in contrast, would join the movement against the civilian president. For the officers in the Army Secretariat, and for a substantial number of other serving officers, the concepts set forth in the West Point address had a meaning and a value transcending mere rhetoric. 37 36 Ibid., 762. The final section of the BPSG text (759-763) bore the title "Las fuerzas armadas y Ia comunidad nacional'" and omits several paragraphs of "Closing Remarks." These are found in the English language version that was prepared at West Point, from which the English translations used in the English edition of this book were taken. 37 According to Gens. (Ret.) Castro Sanchez, Arredondo and Manuel Laprida, the principal authors were a judge advocate officer (auditor), Maj. Perez Acebo, and the then Col. Roberto Arredondo. According to Gens. (Ret.) Osiris Villegas and Julio Alsogaray, the former was the chief author. Indeed, in an interview General Villegas told me "I prepared that speech from the first letter to the last." When I asked Gen. (Ret.) Ongania about the authorship of the address he described it as a "joint effort."

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Throughout 1964, however, the prevailing view, both within the General Staff and in the military as a whole, was one of opposition to any interruption in the constitutional order. It is true that there were individual officers, of whom General Rauch was the most prominent, who were urging a military takeover. Rauch hoped to find support in the Navy and also among Army officers unhappy with the existing command structure, but his efforts were rebuffed. 38 Of greater long-term significance was the initiative taken by a key Azul officer, the Director of the National Gendarmery General Julio Alsogaray. Convinced that sooner or later the lilia government would collapse, Alsogaray proposed to General Onganfa in September 1964 that the Army should begin to think about the future since, to use his expression, "it is not possible to start looking for cabinet ministers at dawn." Ongania rejected the idea out of hand; it was his belief that the situation might improve, and he told Alsogaray not even to speak of such things. 39 Despite the continued desire of most military men to maintain the constitutional government, at the beginning of 1965 they were beginning to experience a sense of uneasiness over the government's handling of nonmilitary problems. To some extent, this was the natural reaction of men conditioned to respect energetic and decisive leadership, and to regard its absence, or seeming absence, with deep concern. But to a considerable degree, military opinion was also affected by civilian reactions and by the deliberate efforts on the part of certain sectors to depict the government in the most negative terms. This was especially true with regard to its handling of economic and social problems. 40 The Illia government had inherited an economy in deep depression, with personal consumption and per capita GOP at the lowest levels in a decade, and with open unemployment in the Greater Buenos Aires area close to 9 percent of the active population. The government's response was to engage in expansionist monetary, fiscal, and wage policies. At the same time, its concern lest the rapid economic expansion bring on a balance of payments crisis led it to reimpose exchange controls. Taxes on 38Primera Plana, June 23, 1964, p. 8 . .39Interviewwith Gen. (Ret.) Alsogaray, Aug. 6, 1973. 40The then Col. lvlanucl Laprida probably summed up the attitude of many officers in a handwritten statement he prepared early in 1965, which set forth two premises: first, that the government was weak and inefficient, and that it ran great risk of failing if it didn't change; second, that it was necessary to exhaust every possibility of support for the government, to help in every way to modifY its orientation, and to safeguard the continuity of institutions. MS, Laprida Archive.

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the rural sector and upper income groups were increased and congressional approval was sought and obtained to institute a range of administrative controls, including price-fixing, to assure supplies of consumer essentials. Although these policies, and the coincidence of excellent harvests, resulted in an increase in real GDP of about 8 percent in 1964, and held the inflation rate for the year to under 26 percent, business and financial sectors resented what they regarded as excessive interventionism on the part of the Illia administrationY This resentment derived in part from the fact that the government failed to give private-sector leaders an opportunity to be heard in the policy-making process. President IIlia in his inaugural address had promised that employers and workers would be consulted in the development of a long-range plan to achieve self-sustained economic growth and a more just distribution of wealth. 42 The task of preparing this plan was assigned to the National Development Council (CONADE), a body created in 1961 but which was now reorganized and strengthened, with representation given to the Defense Ministry and with the appointment of a staff of trained economists. The CONADE staff, however, immersed themselves in the technical aspects of preparing a five-year plan, and made little effort to seek out the opinions of conservative, internationally minded, private sector groups. 43 Unable to exert an effective influence on economic policy-making for the short or long term, these groups came to the conclusion that their own interests and those of the nation were being sacrificed. In their discontent they depicted the Illia administration as the instrument of a minority party, one that was trying to broaden its political support through the reckless adoption of populist and nationalist measures. President Illia's insistence on honoring his party's campaign pledge to nullifY the Frondizi government's oil contracts, despite the fact that they had brought the country close to self-sufficiency, and his administration's quarrels with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were taken as shocking proof of the government's hostility to the 41 R.

D. Mallon and

J.

V. Sourrouille, Economic Policymaking in a Conflict Society,

[164]. pp. z6-z8. 42Illia's inaugural address may be found in Presidentes ante el Congreso [186]. pp. 5575· For his pledge to do nothing by surprise (an undoubted reference to President Frondizi's tactics in the petroleum field), and to consult the business community, see pp. 61-62. 43 Gary Wynia, Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy making in a Divided Society [174]. p. ug.

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international financial community, and of its blind disregard for what these private sector groups construed as the national interest. 44 The Illia government's handling of labor relations also became a source of deep concern in both civilian and military circles. Given the Peronist dominance of most of the labor movement, especially of the industrial unions, and given the refusal of the most powerful Peronist labor leaders to concede the legitimacy of the Illia government, its relations with the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) were bound to be difficult. Complicating the situation was the fact that the officials brought into the Labor Ministry by its new head Fernando Sola did not have a good working relationship with Peronist trade unionists. With some justification, the latter considered that these officials were trying to use their authority to promote the influence of the "independent" trade union leaders who vied with the Peronists for control of the CGT. Thus, even though the Illia government's policies resulted in a substantial increase in real wages of industrial workers and in a significant lowering of unemployment during 1964, and even though it accepted CGT demands for representation on the public boards created by Congress to control consumer goods prices and to fix minimum wage rates, the administration was unable to appease the politically motivated Peronist labor leaders. 45 A critical stage in the relationship arose when the CGT Central Committee, under pressure from the Peronist trade union leaders of the group known as the "62 Organizations," ordered union members to occupy their work sites. This was presented as one more phase of what they called a continuing "Plan de Lucha" (Battle Plan) to redeem workers' rights. In a series of waves starting in mid-May and ending in late June, workers took physical possession of several thousand factories or establishments. For the most part these occupations were peaceful and care was taken not to destroy property, but all work stopped and managerial personnel were often detained against their will. The individual occupations lasted for half a day or the amount of time it took for a court order to be served on the workers to abandon the premises. 44Jbid., pp. 120-121; Mallon and Sourrouille [164], p. 28. 45Jbid., p. 27, for data on unemployment; for changes in real wages and shares ofGDP, see Lorenzo J. Sigaut, Acerca de la distribuci6n y niveles de ingreso en la argentina, 19501972 [172], passim. On the attitude of Peronist leaders to the Illia government, Primera Plana, Sept. 29, 1964, pp. 5, 8, 9; interview with Juan J. Taccone; and Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peron ism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976 [162], p. 175·

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Usually, they dispersed without delay, but occasionally the police had to break through locked gates. Even though there was little physical damage, production schedules were interrupted, and the managers were left with the sensation of having been deprived of control of their property as well as of their personal liberty. Moreover, they had to face the possibility that they would undergo a repetition of the experience, since the CGT announced its intention of ordering new occupations. In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that many voices were raised demanding that the government act to prevent further occupations, and to punish those responsible for violating the rights of persons and property. 46 The lilia administration's reaction to the Plan de Lucha, however, was very low-key. Despite demands for vigorous action ranging from government intervention of the CGT to the imposition of a state of siege, and despite proposals that the government utilize the armed forces to put down the labor occupations, the President was opposed to any deviation from normal government procedures. Moreover, he was anxious to avoid any step that would place an antilabor stigma on his administration and thus undermine its efforts to attract worker support in the next elections. Using the armed forces was especially undesirable, partly because it would repeat historical precedents most Radicals wanted to avoid, and partly because it could give the military leverage to pressure the government on other policy matters and thus circumscribe its freedom of action. 47 Accordingly, the President decided to rely entirely on court injunctions, in the belief that workers would soon lose their enthusiasm for the occupations and the losses of pay they entailed. The government did bring a criminal action in the federal court against the CGT leaders who had ordered the occupations, and eventually ll9 labor leaders were tried and given jail sentences. Even before the sentences were im46 Detailed coverage of CGT "Plan de lucha" pronouncements, the factory seizures, and the demands for government action may be found in La Naci6n from early May to the end of June 1964- The CGT claimed that 11,000 establishments were occupied by 3,9oo,ooo workers between the first one on May 18 and the last one on June 28. The government admitted to occupations of only 2,361 establishments. For a recent study that finds the CGT figures grossly exaggerated, see James W. McGuire, "Peronism without Peron: Unions in Argentine Politics, 1965-66," [179], pp. 200-209. 47Primera Plana, June 2, 1964, p. 4· The first Radical Party president, Hipolito Yrigoyen, had turned to the Army to repress labor disturbances on several occasions, a fact that party members would like to forget.

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posed, however, independent union leaders who had initially supported the Plan de Lucha disassociated themselves from what they saw as the increasingly antigovernment political objectives pursued by the Peronist leaders, and resigned their positions on the CGT board. The occupations themselves petered out in late June, but the entire episode, far from enhancing the reputation of the government for resolving a difficult problem in a calm and nonviolent fashion, served in the eyes of many Argentines, civilian and military, as proof of its lack of authority, weakness, and indecision. 48 The duel between the Illia government and the Peronist labor leaders did not cease with the end of the occupations. The CCT, now under the total domination of the 62 Organizations, served more and more as an instrument for promoting Peronist political objectives. The key figure in the 62 Organizations was Augusto Vandor, the head of the powerful metalworkers' union and one of the most astute and independentminded Peronist labor bosses. His personal objective seems to have been to create a political movement under trade union control that could deal directly with other political and social f(>rces, while paying little more than lip service to Per{m. Vandor did not exclude the possibility of pursuing an electoral route to power, but he was a pragmatist, not an ideologue, and he had to contend with hard-line trade union rivals like Andres Framini who favored more violent solutions and were constantly maneuvering to undermine his position. Thus, although Vandor worked to organize a new Justicialista Party that could qualify for legal status, he was not averse to joining with the hard-liners in provocative tactics designed to discredit the Illia administration. The purpose seems to have been to force the government into the dilemma of having to choose between adopting harsh measures that would arouse the ire of ordinary workers, or taking a soft line that would undermine its credibility in the eyes of military, propertied, and middle class sectors. 49 The Plan de Lucha, for example, had the dual purpose of demonstrating labor's ability to wrest concessions from the government, while at the same time weakening its public image and encouraging speculation about a coup. The Peronist decision to use French President De Gaulle's visit to Argentina in October to harass and embarrass the 48Santiago Senen Gonzalez, El sindicalisnw despues de Pen5n, [171j, pp. 61-62; also daily press cited in note 46. 49Danicl James, [l6z], pp. 161-186 and 194-199. provides the best analysis ofVandor's ideas, goals and tactics.

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government was another example of deliberate provocation. More serious, however, because of its potential for driving a wedge between the government and the military, was the well-publicized campaign to bring Peron back to Argentina from his Spanish exile. Organized by a five-person committee that included Vandor and Framini, "Operacion Retorno," as it was called, kept the country in a state of uncertainty for weeks, and again generated rumors of a coup. 50 The administration carefully refrained from taking a public position on the issue of Peron's return, as part of its tactic of not antagonizing the ordinary Peronist voter, but it paid a price in terms of increasing uneasiness in military circles. In late October, however, an understanding was reportedly reached with the government of Uruguay to deny Peron a visa, and similar arrangements seem to have been made with other neighboring countries to prevent him from carrying out his promised return in 1964- Who took the initiative to make these arrangements, whether it was the Foreign Ministry or the Army leadership itself, is still not clear. In any case, when Peron and his entourage finally left Madrid and landed in Rio de Janeiro on December 2, Brazilian authorities detained him and sent him back to Spain on the same plane. 51 The frustration of Operacion Retorno did not put an end to laborinspired efforts to challenge the Illia administration. In the ensuing weeks a number of violent incidents took place in Greater Buenos Aires, followed by a CGT-ordered nationwide general strike. Once again the objective seems to have been to create an atmosphere that would justifY a military coup. But whereas no one had stepped forth in similar moments of tension over the past several months, this time General (Ret.) Enrique Rauch felt that the time was ripe to press his own agenda for changes in the Army high command. With the support of Colorado elements and their UCRP sympathizers, including some in the government, Rauch distributed a series of denunciations to members of the armed forces and to the press. He charged that a docile military leadership was allowing the country to be taken over by the 50 Embassy BA Telegram 618, Oct. 30, 1964, reports on the government's handling of Peronist provocations; Primera Plana, Nov. 17, 1964, pp. 6, 10-12; Nov. 24, pp. 6-7, notes the military reactions to the proposed return. 51 Embassy BA Telegram 618; La Naci6n Dec. 3, 1964 and Primera Plana, Dec. 8, 1964, pp. 8-10~ Dr. Ricardo Illia, who served as his brother's secretary, insists that President IIlia did not want to do anything to prevent Peron from returning, and had nothing to do with the actions taken in Brazil. Interview, Quito, Ecuador, Mar. 29, 1989.

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same corrupt elements he had attacked as Interior Minister the year before, and he contended that the Army restructuring plan, as well as the year-end promotions and assignments, were designed to promote the interests of these elements. 52 Although Rauch's main goal was to effect the ouster of General Onganfa and the top Army leadership, he is reported to have explored both with a number of troop commanders and with trade union leaders the kind of support he could expect if he were to lead a movement against the government itself. When he found that he could not count on any significant military support from the active ranks, Rauch dropped out of sight-hut not before creating a difficult dilemma for President Illia. On December 18 Rauch met for lunch in Rosario with General Carlos Rosas, the II Corps commander known to be a critic of the reorganization plan. Despite an Army advisory circulated the next day calling for any information on Rauch's whereabouts, General Rosas for some reason was slow to report the luncheon meeting. This raised the suspicion among the Azul generals that Rosas, who was the most senior major general on the rank list, was involved in a maneuver to replace the Commander-in-Chief. 53 Apparently at the urging of these generals, Onganfa decided to remove Rosas as II Corps commander and so informed Army Secretary Avalos and Defense Minister Suly that he retired because the Illia government had shown a total lack of consideration fi>r him as Commander-in-Chic{ and had \·iolated the basic principles of a hierarchical organization. Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Ongania. He took the same position with the then Col. Laprida, whom he tried to discourage from accepting Castro Sanchez's offer of the Undersecretary post (Laprida interview), and publicly in an interview published in Confirmado, Nov. 25, 1965, p. 10.

Chapter 4

The Golpe Militar of June 27-28, 1966

The eight months that lay between General Onganfa's retirement in November 1965 and the military coup that took place the following June constituted an unusual period in Argentine history. This would be the fifth time since 1930 that the armed forces ousted an elected president, but whereas the previous takeovers had been characterized by a high degree of last minute improvisation, or in some cases confusion as to who would assume control, the 1966 ouster of President Illia was the culmination of a prolonged period of discussion and planning. Few Argentines could have been taken totally by surprise, either by the action of the armed forces, or by the installation of General (Ret.) Juan Carlos Ongania to head the successor government. Indeed, ever since mid-1965, certain periodicals had been engaging in a deliberate campaign to discredit the Radical Party administration, and to encourage the military to remove it. In article after article, the newly established popular weekly C onfirmado tried to convince its readers that a coup was inevitable and that the only real question was when it would take place. Another weekly, Primera Plana, went so far as to conduct a public opinion poll on the desirability of a coup, publishing the results on the very day of the military takeover. 1 I The magazine Confirmado repeatedly puhlished articles that made a coup seem inevitable. See, f(>r example, "La rcvoluci6n que an uncia Giiiraldcs, ··Aug. 26, 1~)65; the Mariano Montemayor essay Mar. 10, 1966; and the cover feature entitled "2Que piensa EE. UU del golpe?" Mar. 24, 1966. The cover of the June 28, 1966, issue ofPrimera Plana displayed a picture of Army tanks and the words "~Quienes (silno) qniercn el golpe?" ["Who (yes/no) want the coup'?"] The Illia government tried to punish Confirmado by withdrawing official advertising; s~ee letter Edwin \lartin to William Krieg, U.S. Department of State, dated Buenos Aires. Mar. 31, 1966, POL 2 Arg.

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Another contrast with the past was the extent to which different sectors of civilian society participated in the process that culminated in the collapse of the elected government. Some civilians were actively involved in providing the military plotters with ideas for reorganizing the structure of government, or with specific domestic and foreign policy proposals. Other civilian sectors, by engaging in obstructionist tactics in the Congress or by promoting strikes that paralyzed the public services, helped to create an atmosphere that would permit the military to view themselves as defenders and promoters of the puhlic interest in contrast to an inept civilian administration. Still others, the vast majority, played a more passive role, indiflf~rcntly observing the process, and doing nothing to discourage it. But while certain Argentines in and out of uniform were devoting their energies to promoting the downfall of the civilian government, others, including a number of military men, were trying just as hard to find ways of enabling it to survive and complete its term. In order to place the activities of each group in proper perspective, this chapter will first examine the period from November 1965 to late May 1966 before attempting to reconstruct the events of the final weeks that led to the ouster of the Illia administration. An immediate question arises concerning the role of the then recently retired General Ongania in the period from November 1965 to May 1966. He and his supporters have always contended that he took no part in the plotting of the coup; that it was the leaders of the armed forces who carried it out; and that it was they who called on him to assume the government because of his demonstrated capacities ofleadership, his personal honesty, and the great prestige he enjoyed among all classes of Argentines. All this is true if one limits the question to the military aspects of the coup and the reasons why he was chosen to assume the presidency. Unlike General (Ret.) Jose F. Uriburu in 1930, General Arturo Rawson in 194:3, or General (Ret.) Eduardo Lonardi in 1955, Ongania did not don his uniform and march with the troops against the incumbent regime. It was General Pistarini, the officer who succeeded Onganfa as Army Commander-in-Chief, who issued the orders that launched the movement on June 27, 1966, and who, together with his Navy and Air Foree counterparts, formally invited him the next day to take over the government. 2 2Interviewwith Gen. (Ret.) Eduardo Seiionins, Apr. 8, 1987. Seiiorans endorsed what Gen. Onganfa had told me (interview, Jan. 19, 1984), namely that he did not take an active

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But what was Ongania's contribution to the creation of a climate of military opinion such as would encourage active officers to turn their backs on the constitutional government? An examination of his statements and actions in the weeks and months that followed his retirement suggests that he was anything but a disinterested observer. Almost immediately after retiring, he gave an interview to Confinnado that quoted him in a manner that denigrated both the former Army Secretary, General (Ret.) Ignacio Avalos, and his successor, General Eduardo Castro Sanchez. "The Executive Power," he was reported to have said, "has betrayed the ethical principles that are essential to the Institution when it appointed as Secretary of the Army the Undersecretary of the man who departed after having lowered the prestige of the Institution by requesting the removal of the Commander-in-Chief." When requested by Army Secretary Castro Sanchez to ratifY or correct the statement as published, Ongania replied that while he did not use those precise words, they did interpret his feelings and therefore he was not going to correct them. 3 The reason why the Army Secretary asked Ongania to confirm or correct the statement was that ex-Secretary Avalos had requested the formation of an Honor Court (Tribunal de Honor) to determine whether the published words constituted a punishable affront to his honor. Even though Ongania in effect confirmed the statement, and despite the fact that it was the Secretary's f(1rmer boss who was the aggrieved party, Castro Sanchez was wary of the consequences if he authorized the formation of the Tribunal de Honor. A judgment for either officer might so inflame military opinion as to undermine his own capacity to preserve the unity of the Army. The upshot was that after allowing a few weeks to pass, he decided to turn down Avalos's request and so informed both parties. 4 But General (Ret.) Ongania was not disposed to let the matter rest role in the planning of the movement against the government and that he dia not intervene in its overthrow. 3Confirmado, Nov. 25, 1965, p. 10; Letter, Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa to the Secretary of War, Dec. (undated) 1965, MS, Castro SCmchez Archive. 4Letter, Brig. Gcn (RE) Ignacio Avalos to the Secretary of War, Nov. z6, 1965 (Objeto: Solicitar Formacion de Tribunal de Honor), MS copy, Avalos Archive; Letter Brig. Gen. Eduardo Castro Sanchez, Secretary of War, to Brig. Gen. (RE) Ignacio Avalos, Dec. 21, 1965; same to Lt. Gen. (RE) Juan Carlos Ongania, Dec. 21, 1965, MSS copies, Castro Sanchez Archive. I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Robc·rto Arredondo and to the widow of Gen. Avalos for making available his papers cited above.

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there. In a letter to the Army Secretary, he complained that the "circumstance of a brigadier general questioning the conduct of a lieutenant general just after the latter had completed the greatest and most honorable assignment to which an Argentine soldier could aspire, constitutes personally a very grave situation." He went on to charge that the Secretary's decision and the delay in notifYing him of it deprived him of the opportunity to defend his injured hierarchy and showed a lack of proper consideration. 5 General Castro Sanchez responded in a letter that was firm but respectful. He pointed out to General Onganfa that under the regulations governing matters submitted to a Tribunal de Honor, the military grade of the parties was not relevant; that it was not Onganfa's conduct but his published declaration that Avalos had questioned, and furthermore, that deciding problems of this sort was "the exclusive prerogative of the Secretary of the Army, who has to consider multiple factors without any time limit other than what is required by the complexity of the matter." Castro Sanchez went on to assert that his decisions would always be inspired by the highest principles of justice, and concluded his letter by stating that "only with the clear acceptance of these decisions will we see discipline guaranteed for the good of the Institution and the country, just as you demanded in the sphere of your responsibilities during your service as Army Commander-in-Chief."6 General Onganfa was still not willing to let the matter rest and responded with a letter that not only questioned the Army Secretary's motives in handling the case as he did, but insinuated that Castro Sanchez lacked the stature to maintain discipline within the Army. Referring to the final words of the Secretary's letter, Onganfa wrote: "I have never believed in those guarantees but rather in the ones that derive from the legitimate and authentic authority of those who have to create or sustain that discipline, precisely because it is a safeguard against the negativism or lack of caution that I have always felt to be present in your attitude." 7 5 Letter, Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa to Secretary of War, Dec. 24, 1965, MS (handwritten), Castro Sanchez Archive. Onganfa had a legitimate complaint, since Army regulations stipulated a 48-hour period for deciding whether or not to proceed with a request for an Honor Court. 6Letter, Brig. Gen. Eduardo Castro Sanchez, Secretary ofWar, to Lt. Gen. (RE) Juan Carlos Onganfa, Dec. 31, 1965, MS copy, Castro Sanchez Archive. 7 Letter, Lt. Gen. (RE) Juan Carlos Onganfa to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1966, MS (handwritten), Castro Sanchez Archive.

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Although this correspondence was conducted in private, the polemical tone adopted by Onganfa appears to have pursued an objective that transcended the release of injured feelings. He was well aware that a Secretary of the Army had discretionary power to impose sanctions on officers, active or retired, who showed disrespect for higher authority. \Vas Onganfa trying to provoke Secretary Castro Sanchez into placing him under house arrest or ordering his confinement at a military installation, knowing the impact this would have on a public that believed his retirement to have been deliberately contrived? This question cannot be answered here with certainty. What is clear is that no action was taken against General Onganfa. President Illia, seeking to avoid any further commotion, refused to authorize his new Army Secretary to place Onganfa under arrest. Castro Sanchez, with some misgivings, closed the case despite having received a legal opinion that the ex-Army Commander had indeed committed an infraction that merited punishment. In a memorandum to the files, the Army Secretary rationalized that the imposition of a penalty might do more harm than good to his ability to preserve discipline and maintain his own authority and prestige. 8 In the weeks and months that followed his epistolary polemic with the Army Secretary, General (Ret.) Onganfa was careful to avoid any overt confrontation with the authorities. His public image was that of a patriot soldier who, despite shabby treatment, had become a quiet observer of the passing scene. In fact, he was in frequent contact with the Army general who was coordinating the preparatory work for the military takeover; he also designated two retired officer friends to be his eyes and ears at the meetings of civilians involved in planning for the future government; in the later stages, he received a stream of visitors in his home, individuals interested in becoming a part of the postcoup government. Although he carefully refrained from any activity that could be construed as actual plotting, and directed his personal representatives at the meetings held in other places to observe but not to participate in the discussions, Onganfa was well aware that he was the intended beneficiary of all these activities. Had he \vi shed to do so, but 8Jnterview with Cen. (Ret.) Castro Sanchez, opinion as well as the mf'morandum to the files, the provisions of the Code of Military justice officers, see Law 14,029, art. 108, subsection sc, 19, 88.

Dec. 12, 1983: f(Jr the text of the legal see MSS, Castro Sanchez Archive. For that applied to statements by retired and arts. 663 and 665, Anales [1], XI-A,

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clearly he did not, he could have used his great personal prestige to discourage those military men and civilians who were directly involved in planning for the overthrow of the government. Thus his acts of omission and commission made him less of an observer and more of a silent partner in the conspiratorial enterprise than he was willing to admit to others, or perhaps even to himself. 9 The key active-duty officer in the planning for the demise of the Illia government was General Julio Alsogaray, a cavalry officer and brother of the politician-economist Alvaro Alsogaray. General Alsogaray's assignment as of January 1966 was commander ofl Corps, a post that gave him control over all Army forces in the Greater Buenos Aires area. But over and above his official duties, General Alsogaray served as the chief liaison between other active-duty officers and Ongania; it was Alsogaray who transmitted the policy studies that General Fonseca and other members of the General Staff received from civilians; it was Alsogaray, moreover, who kept the ex-Army Commander-in-Chief informed of the meetings with lawyers and businessmen that took place at his Palermo Barracks headquarters or at the house of his brother Alvaro; it was Alsogaray who brought various civilians, including businessmen, to meet Ongania at his Belgrano residence on O'Higgins Street. 10 In carrying out these various activities General Alsogaray acted with the knowledge and consent of the new Commander-in-Chief, General Pascual Pistarini. 11 Indeed, it was at his request that General Alsogaray convened meetings where officers and civilians could exchange ideas about the structure of the future government and the policy goals it should pursue. In one of the earliest of such meetings, in late April or early May, the discussion focussed on a position paper (aide-memoire) that had been prepared by Alvaro Alsogaray. This paper argued that the 9Interviews with Gens. (Ret.) Julio Alsogaray, Aug. 6, 1973; Eduardo Sei\onins; and Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez, June 23, 1986. According to Sei\orans, he and another retiree, Gen. (Ret.) Francisco lmaz, were asked by Ongania around January 1966 to attend meetings and report to him what was said, but not to speak out. Other participants in these meetings claim that they did speak out to present Gen. Ongania's views on particular issues. The conclusions about his overall role in the process that led to the military takeover are my own. !Olnterviews with Gens. (Ret.) Alsogaray and Lanusse, Aug. 23, 1973, and Dec. 15, 1983. llArmy Secretary Castro Sanchez had passed over Salas Martinez, the senior major general on the rank list, and had recommended Pistarini to succeed Onganfa, in the belief that he would be easier to deal with. Pistarini was not regarded as particularly close to Onganfa. From the Army Secretary's viewpoint, the choice proved to be a mistake. Interview with Castro Sanchez.

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existing political institutions and practices were in large part the cause of the continuing crisis, and could not serve as the basis for reconstructing the country. For this reason, the anticipated military takeover should not be provisional in character; rather it should be undertaken "with the criteria of a true revolution" that would replace the men, institutions, and practices responsible for the crisis with a new model of representative democracy that would "assure fundamental individual rights, chiefly through an independent judiciary." 12 The structure of the future government as envisaged in this document would differentiate the "holding and exercise of power," which would be in the hands of the armed forces, from the "exercise of government," which would be entrusted to a governing team. This team would consist of a president, a minister of the armed forces, a minister of foreign relations, and a minister of government, all to be selected by the armed forces. The minister of government in this scheme would function as a prime minister, with responsibility for all matters save those relating to foreign affairs or the armed forces themselves. He would have the authority to nominate candidates for all other cabinet-level positions, both in the economic area and in the interior ministry, with its control of the police and relations with the provinces. The justification presented for this all-powerful minister of government was that he would be the one responsible in the public eye for the acts of the government, and as such could be replaced without affecting the stability of the regime. He would function like a fuse in an electric circuit, thus protecting both the president and the armed forces from the inevitable deterioration suffered by those who exercise the powers of government. 13 It did not take too much imagination for those who saw this document 12Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Alsogaray and interview with Gen. (Ret.) Jorge Von Stecher, Jan. 30, 1984; also "Ayuda Memoria," 1\IS, Von Stecher Archive. This ten-page document consisted of four parts: 1. "Motivaciones, justificaciones y alcances;" 2. "Estructura y organizaci6n;" 3· "Fines y objetivos de Ia Revoluci6n" (left blank); 4· "Doctrina, polfticas y programas," (of which only the socioeconomic section was spelled out). Although the document was unsigned, Gen. Alsogaray confirmed to me on June 20, 1984, that the ideas it contained were those of his brother, Alvaro; as further indication of authorship, the typing of this document resembles that of Ing. Alvaro Alsogaray's 19621963 press releases, several of which arc in my possession. I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Jorge Von Stecher, not only for making this document available to me, but also for providing me with additional data in a memorandum entitled "Sucesos de Junio de 1966." In 1966, Gen. Von Stecher was the commander of the X Infantry Brigade; his immediate superior was Gen. Julio Alsogaray. 13 Part 2 of the document cited in note 12.

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(especially its market-oriented economic policy provisions) to reach the conclusion that Alvaro Alsogaray envisioned himself as the Prime Minister serving under a President Onganfa who would reign more than he would rule. However, this was hardly the kind of government that either civilians or military men with nationalistic views wanted to see replace the Illia administration. Thus, even as General Alsogaray was working to build support among fellow officers for the eventual takeover, other individuals with their own agendas were meeting and making their own plans for the future government. A key personality among these individuals was Dr. Mario Amadeo, a well-known public figure who was the founding member of a recently formed nationalist society known as "El Ateneo de la Rept1blica." He had been a cabinet minister in the short-lived regime of General Lonardi in 1955, and was subsequently associated with the Frondizi administration. At meetings attended by civilians like Dr. Mariano Astigueta and Dr. Mario Diaz Colodrero, and by military men like Air Force Brigadier Carlos Rey and Army General Eduardo "Bacha'' Uriburu, Dr. Amadeo set forth his case for a coup. He argued that the Radical government, like any elected government, was inevitably run by mediocrities, and that the only way for Argentina's true governing class to rise to positions of power was to establish a definitive military regime that would invite outstanding civilians to form the government. Dr. Amadeo and the other civilians present obviously thought of themselves as members of that true governing class. 14 It is not possible to establish with certainty the iuentities of all the individuals who in one way or another tried to influence General (Ret.) Onganfa's thinking about a future military-based regime. It is clear that General Alsogaray was not the only one with access to him, and that the ex-Commander-in-Chief met with an array of individuals, civilian and military, with whom he talked about the nation's problems while carefully avoiding any mention of a coup. A case in point is Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez, head of the nationalist discussion group El Ateneo de la Republica, a lawyer, professor and former ambassador, with whom Onganfa discussed foreign policy and education issues. As to his mili14Jnterview with Air Force Brigadier (Ret.) Carlos Rey, July I;J, 19il4. During this interview, Brig. Hey read from a previously prepared memorandum which he turned over to me and which will be cited hereafter as the Rey Memorandum. The arguments presented by Dr. Amadeo bear a striking resemblance to those used by nationalist intellectuals prior to the 1930 coup against Radical Party President Yrigoyen.

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tary contacts, one may speculate that General (Ret.) Onganfa listened attentively to two older retired generals, Eduardo Senorans and Francisco lmaz, who had been his professors at the Military Academy, and whom he asked (as mentioned in note g) to be his representatives at the meetings convened by General Alsogaray. Two other retired officers whom he saw frequently, his academy classmates General Hector Repetto and Colonel Eugenio Schettini, were also in a position to exert some influence. An active-duty general in whom he seems to have had great confidence was Mario Fonseca, the Chief of Intelligence on the General Staff. It was at Fonseca's home that Onganfa met with prominent nationalist advocates of a military takeover. The net effect of these various contacts appears to have been to convince him, if indeed he needed convincing, not to accept the plans and proposals of the Alsogaray brothers without substantial modification. 15 Even as the meetings to discuss the structure and goals of the future military government were taking place, the discontent of various sectors with the Illia administration was deepening. The economy, which had grown substantially in its first two years despite its critics, was showing signs of weakness in the final months of 1965. Inflationary pressures, fed by reliance on printing presses to cover the increasing deficits of state-run enterprises, threatened to get out of hand. Industrial production, especially in the automobile, farm machinery, and metallurgical industries, had declined sharply. Unemployment in most metropolitan areas in the first quarter of 1g66 was far above the low levels that had been achieved before October 1965. Furthermore, the state-owned petroleum industry, to many Argentines the symbol of their independence, was showing increasing inability to keep pace with domestic consumption requirements. 16 In the Chamber of Deputies, where the administration lacked its own majority, its budget proposal for calendar year 1g66 was held hostage to partisan maneuvering. Not until May did the Chamber take up the budget, and then it rejected the administration bill in favor of one submitted by opposition parties. Differences between the Senate and I5Interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Alsogaray and Dr. Costa Mendez. Present at the dinner in Gen. Fonseca's home, in addition to the host and Gen. (Ret.) Ongania, were Drs. Mario Amadeo, Bonifacio Lastra, Nicanor Costa Mendez, and Gen. Eduardo Uriburu. 16Mallon and Sourrouille [164], pp. 27-29; see La Prensa, April 26, 1966, for a summary of the Banco Central report on the economic situation for the first quarter of 1966. According to official figures, crude oil production in the first quarter was 6. 5 percent above that of the previous year but crude oil imports had jumped by 64.9 percent.

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the Chamber, however, prevented the enactment of a budget law for as long as Dr. Illia remained in office. The effects of this situation were felt in the government's inability to lay its hands on additional tax revenues, and in its consequent difficulties in meeting public-sector employees' demands for wage increases to keep pace with the rising cost of living. The result was a series of strikes by garbage, hospital, postal, and transport workers that made life both difficult and unpleasant for many Buenos Aires residents. Meanwhile, in the interior province of Tucuman, where sugar workers had not been paid for two seasons, conditions threatened to deteriorate into social violenceY Although it was in large part the spokesmen of business interests who sought out the military to register complaints about the IIlia government, at the close of 1965 Peronist labor leaders were also trying to narrow the gulf that had separated them from the Army leadership over the past decade. Private meetings between individual labor leaders and individual high-ranking oflicers became an increasing phenomenon, sometimes at the invitation of the military, sometimes at the initiative of the labor spokesmen. 18 The eagerness of these labor leaders to converse with Army officers was undoubtedly linked to their own perception that a military takeover was in the ofling, and to their desire to protect or advance their own interests and those of their unions should this take place. Not all Peronist labor leaders, however, viewed the prospect of a coup with the same aspirations. Some, like Jose Alonso, Secretary-General of the CGT until his ouster by the Vandoristas in February 1966, actively welcomed the idea of a military takeover. In Alonso's view, the country's problems could never be resolved through political-party-based electoral mechanisms; the necessary structural changes could only come about through a revolution initiated by the military. He envisioned a corporativist restructuring of the state in which labor would play a major role together with the military, the Church, and economic interest groups. In l7The original budget message was not submitted to Congress until the end of O.ctober, too late to be taken up in the regular session. The Chamber of Deputies, although summoned into spt>cial session, postponed consideration of the hmlget until late Mav 1966, despite a special message by the ExecutiYe Power warning of the harmful effects of the delay(see the Apri111, 1966, statement signed by the Presicknt, Economy Minister, and Secretary of Finance, in Diputados, [;3], 1965, X, 7502-7506), and despite an effort by the Defense Minister to lobby the congressional leadership (see La Prensa, April15-16, 1966). 18 Primera Plana, Jan. 4, 1966, p. 16, and Jan. 11, p. 8; Confirmado, Dee. 16, 1965, pp. 14-15,

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contrast, Augusto Vandor, who had established a personal, if temporary, control over much of the Peronist union and political apparatus within the country, was anxious to preserve the electoral route to eventual political power. His conversations with military men (and those of his closest collaborators) seem to have been directed at defining the acceptable limits for Peronist participation in the next elections. Failing this, the Vandorista alternative goal seems to have been to obtain assurances that a future military government would treat the Peronist unions more sympathetically than did the Illia administration. 19 Indeed, a major motivating factor in the efforts of these labor leaders to seek a rapprochement with Army officers could well have been the Radical government's deliberate attempt to split the Peronist movement by trying to undermine Vandor's position. The first steps in this direction were taken in October 1965 by the Interior and Labor Ministries. Interior Minister Palmero, aware that the exiled Juan Peron was unhappy with Vandor's growing independence, allowed his wife, Isabel Martinez de Peron, to enter the country on October 11, and despite the laws against Peron engaging in political activity, permitted her to travel around the country as her husband's agent, to meet with local Peronist politicians and union leaders. Isabel's initial efforts to wean away these local leaders met with little success, but by the following March antiVandorista union leaders, including Jose Alonso and Andres Framini, were able to form a rival group to the Vandor-dominated "6z" organization. Meanwhile, in the Chamber of Deputies, 21 of the 45 members who had originally comprised the Justicialista bloc under the leadership ofVandor's lieutenant, Paulino Niembro, broke away to form a separate anti-Vandor bloc. 20 The measures taken by the Labor Ministry were also designed at least in part for political ends, and aimed at undermining the financial and organizational sources of Peronist strength. The first step was an October 1965 decree announcing severe penalties for trade unions that used membership dues for partisan political activities. To demonstrate that it meant business, the Ministry proceeded to take away the legal status (personeria gremial), and hence the right to engage in collective bar19McGuire, "Peronism without Peron", [qg], pp. 222-224. For a contemporary publication that reflected the Alonso outlook, see Confederaci6n General del Trabajo, La C G Ten marcha. Hacia el cambia de estructuras, [159]. 20McGuire, [179], pp. 259-263.

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gammg, of a union that had recently come under Vandorista control after years in Communist hands. 21 Despite labor protests against these measures, the government let it be known that it was preparing a second and more f~u--reaching step, namely to regulate the application of Law 14,555, the basic statute governing the operation of trade unions. The original statute, enacted in 1959 when the Frondizi government was still courting the support of Peronist labor leaders, had enabled them to consolidate their control over key national unions. The regulatory decree the Illia government issued on February 11, 1g66, was ostensibly aimed at assuring internal democracy within the unions, but an equally important goal was to prevent Peronist leaders using the unions for partisan political ends. The decree undertook to strengthen rank-and-file union members at the expense of the existing leadership by requiring the reorganization of centralized national unions into federations of local unions, and by requiring a secret vote of the membership before any union could engage in a strike or other direct action. Moreover, to guarantee the honesty of union elections and to assure the appropriate use of union funds, the regulatory decree spelled out the specific procedures that had to be followed in each area, and authorized Labor Ministry officials to enforce them. Furthermore, in what was potentially the most serious threat to the current leadership of all national unions, the decree permitted disaffected workers to disaffiliate from an existing union and seek recognition as a separate entity. 22 Although the timing of the regulatory decree coincided with the splitting up of Peronist trade union leaders into pro- and anti-Vandorista factions, both sides reacted sharply to what they correctlv perceived as a threat to their power base. While the union leaders called strikes to protest the measure, the Peronist deputies in the Congress, both those associated with Vandor's aspiration for a locally controlled Justicialist Party and those who accepted Peron's orders as transmitted by Isabel, denounced the regulatory decree as unconstitutional, and warned of serious consequences. The Peronists in Congress were joined by Frondizistas, UCRI, and Christian Democratic deputies in warning the government that it was bringing the country to the edge of an abyss. 21Decree No. go8o, Oct. 18, 1965, Anales, [1], XXV-C, 204.3; Conjirmado, Oct. 21, 1965, pp. 12-1.3 22Dccrce No. 969, Feb. 11, 1966, Anales, [1], XXVI-A, 90-97.

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More than one deputy charged that the administration, having already tried to divide the armed forces, was now deliberately seeking to destroy worker unity. 2 :3 This attempt to show that the Army and the Peronist-dominated labor movement were the common targets of hostile government policies came at a time of increasing contacts between labor leaders and highranking Army officers. Indeed, less than a week after opposition deputies heatedly demanded that the government revoke the regulatory decree, the Light and Power Union (Sindicato de Luz y Fuerza) invited former Army Commander-in-Chief, General (Ret.) Ongania, current Commander General Pistarini, Army Secretary General Castro Sanchez, and a number of other military men, to a reception at its headquarters. The stated purpose was to honor Colonel Jorge Leal and the other members of a recently completed joint military expedition he had led to the South Pole. Ongania sent a sympathetic telegram explaining his inability to attend; however, the presence of General Lanusse, who attended on behalf of Pistarini, of General Juan Carlos Uriburu who represented the Army Secretary, and of other officers like Colonel Roberto Levingston, seemed to symbolize a kind of rapprochement between the Army and labor, or at least with the Vandorista faction, which was present in full force. 24 Whatever conclusions UCRP leaders may have drawn from this unusual affair, the Vanclorista labor leaders were apparently still not completely committed to the idea that a coup was the best way to protect their personal and institutional interests. There is evidence that they still hoped to persuade General Ongania to accept the leadership of a "national movement" that would include the Peronists, and would seek to gain power through the electoral process. Using the good offices of 2.3See remarks by deputies Hector Gomez Machado, Carlos A. Juarez, Juan A. Luco, and Roque Natiello in Diputados, [:3], 1965, X, 6652, 665:3, 6655, 6617, and 6724 (sessions of March g-12, 1966). Gomez Machado was the head of the MID or Frondizista bloc, which was allied to the Peronists in their heated opposition. The Christian Democratic deputies were also critical of the regulatory decree, but were less inflammatory in their rhetoric. 24 For coverage ami photographs of the reception, see the Luz y Fuerza publication Dinamis, XXII, No. 12 (Apr. 4, 1966), pp. 9-14; also Primera Plana, \lar. 22, 1966, p. g. No Navy or Air Force personnel attended, despite the efforts to invite them hy businessman Cao Saravia, who chaired the committee that organizt'd the afbir. Luz y Fuerza leader Juan J. Taccone insisted that there was no talk at the reception of destabilizing the government. and that its significance was "to recreate the presence of the worker movement with progressive military men like General Leal." Interview, Dec. 26, 198:3.

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Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, they made an overture to Ongania in April1g66, offering to let him select their candidate for the governorship of Buenos Aires province in the 1967 elections, and promising to support him for the presidency in 1g6g. Ongania told Martinez that he would think about the offer and get back to him later; he never did. When Martinez saw Vandor some ten days later and reported the lack of results, the labor boss told him that he and his colleagues were under pressure from their "military friends" to destabilize the Illia government. 25 Over the next several weeks, in part through the efforts of the officer assigned by General Alsogaray to persuade them, the leaders of the "62 organizations" finally agreed to give their support to the overthrow of the Illia government. This became known beyond a doubt when Vandor and other labor leaders, at a gathering to which the Army Undersecretary was invited at the home of a businessman Cao Saravia, tried to persuade General Laprida to join the leadership of the coup. Rejecting their arguments, General Laprida warned the labor leaders that they were deluding themselves if they thought they would get a share of power in a military-based regime. 26 Nevertheless, these union leaders had persuaded themselves that no good would come to them from the continuation of the Illia government, and that perhaps their support for a coup might result in a pact with the military sector. Such a pact, they reasoned, might lead to a popular revolution that the Army would carry out in alliance with the working class, or alternatively to an early electoral process in which the Peronists would be free to participate and win public offices. 27 Time would prove that fantasy rather than realism characterized such calculations. The month of March confronted the Illia administration with a series of challenges that tested its abilities and raised new questions about its 25 Interview with Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, Nov. 14, 1983. The approach to Onganfa was a logical follow-up to earlier efforts by Vandorista leaders to work out a solution to the 1967 electoral problem through negotiations with the Army. A Justicialista deputy was reported to have said after hearing Paulino Niembro's account of a conversation with Army Undersecretary Laprida, that if you wanted to speak with the Army, you had to talk with Onganfa. Confirnwdo, Dec. 16, 1965, pp. 14-15. 26Interviewwith Gen. (Ret.) Manuel Laprida, Nov. 23, 1983. His recollection was that the officer assigned to talking with labor leaders and securing their support was a certain Col. Jorge A. Gonzalez. Gonzalez, a Cavalry officer, was serving in the General Staff as deputy head of Jefatura VI (Research and Planning). Another officer who had opportunities to meet and talk with labor leaders at social gatherings was Gen. Mario Fonseca, the General Staff's Chief of Intelligence. Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Fonseca, Jan. 16, 1984. 27Interview with Juan J. Taccone.

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future. vVith floods ravaging the northeast, with Tucurmin experiencing repeated outbursts of violence, with labor stoppages disrupting telephone, surface transport, airline and postal services, with a nationwide teachers' strike paralyzing the schools, and with the U nivcrsity of Buenos Aires the scene of clashes between the police and left-wing students, the daily press gave the impression of a country on the edge of anarchy. To make matters worse, despite the assurances of Interior Minister Palmero that there was no cause for alarm, rumors of an impending military takeover circulated with greater intensity than at any time since the Dominican crisis in May 1965. 28 It was in this atmosphere that the legalist officers in the Army Secretariat undertook steps they hoped would enhance the capacity of the government to survive. Convinced that most military men wanted to preserve the constitutional order, that only a minority were actively pressing for a coup, they tried to promote greater personal contact between President IIlia and military leaders. On March 11, Army Secretary Castro Sanchez hosted a dinner at his Campo de Mayo residence for the President and the leadership of the three armed forces. The purpose was to provide an opportunity for the President to explain his policies, and to give the military a chanee to voice their concerns. The occasion, however, did little to enhance the President's image, especially since some of the guests promptly leaked highly subjective accounts of the affair to antigovernment media. zu Nevertheless, Army Secretary Castro Sanchez and Undersecretary Laprida did not abandon their efforts to strengthen the legalista outlook within the Army. Aware from various indicators that certain units might be preparing for a coup, they decided to issue a communique. partly to reassure the general public, but also to embarrass the "golpistas" (couppromoters). Carefully drafted by General Laprida, the April1 communique used phrases taken from General Ongania's West Point speech 28The "Calidosc6pio Politico" column in La Naci6n, Mar. 24, 1966, observed that the accumulation of unresolved matters was creating a threat to stability, that a part of the country was looking to armed forces leadership, and that this was the signal that "thrces and tried to find a way to reconcile their differences. After two days of discussions on June 14-15, they seemingly reached agreement on a plan to deal with "the present situation of national emergency." The plan embodied five principal elements: to strengthen Army unity on the basis of common objectives and procedures; to establish lines of action for the Army Secretary to pursue with the Executive Power so as to get it to adopt the measures needed to gain support for its continuation; to formulate alternate plans should the Secretary's efforts fail and the armed forces have to assume power; to coordinate closely with Navy and Air Force; and to establish the board or junta of major generals as the only working group that both the Army Secretary and the Commander-in-Chief would resort to on these matters. The document setting forth these principles went on to stipulate specific policy objectives Villegas, Dec. 21, 1983. General Hure's doubts about Onganias presidential qualifications were expressed, according to Caro, at the meeting of major generals on June 15, 1966. Brig. (Ret.) Ezequiel Martinez contended (interview Mar. 30, 1987) that neither the Air Force Commander-in-Chief nor any oft he top combat commandns participated in the planning of the coup. and that there was little enthusiasm in the Air Force for an Ongania presidency. 56Jnterviews with Gens. (Ret.) Miguel A. Viviani H.ossi, June 11, 1986; Roberto Arredondo, Nov. 16, 1983; Eduardo Castro Sanchez; and Augusto Alemanzor, June 20, 1986. Viviani Rossi commanded the Artillery School in Cordoba in 1966 and insisted that both he and Gen. Hure were supporters of the constitutional government. Alemanzor, who was assigned to the 101 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group at the Ciudadela in 1966, stated that the Group Commander, Lt. Col. Buasso, and other officers stood ready to defend the government. At Palermo, according to Castro Sr periodic evaluations of the Secretary's progress, and for the adoption of steps "to create the image of authentic respect between the government and the armed forces." 57 The terms of the June 15 agreement placed the Army Secretary in the delicate role of serving at one and the same time as a cabinet member of a civilian government and as the agent of an Army leadership that was requiring the government to adopt measures that departed sharply from existing policies. Despite the risk of having his actions misunderstood, General Castro Sanchez welcomed the agreement. Apparently he saw in it the last chance to save the government without disrupting the unity of the Army. Should his efforts fail to obtain the required policy changes, he felt he still had an honorable course of action: he would resign his post as Secretary and allow events to take their course, but not become a party to a military takeover. General Pistarini also gave his approval to the June 15 agreement as Army Commander-in-Chief. In a directive issued that clay, he requested that the Secretary notify the Executive Power as soon as possible that the Army expected it "to place in evidence a suitable disposition to carry out the changes that have been deemed necessary."' He also called for the major generals to meet again on Friday, June 24, to hear a report from the Army Secretary, and to decide whether or not to ratify the present agreement. 58 The results of the June 1 5 meeting were viewed differently in different quarters. General Caro, the loyalist II Corps Commander, emerged 57"Plan de accion del ejercito a desarrollar ante la presente situacion de emergencia nacional,'' 1\IS, Laprida Archive. This is a two-page, unsigned hut apparently authentic copy of the original acta. 5~ For a copy of the Pistarini directive, see "El Coman dante en Jefe del Ejercito adopta la siguiente resoluci6n," MS, Laprida Archive. For the meetings themselves, interview with Gen. (Ret.) Carlos Caro.

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from the session with a feeling of optimism. After all, the golpista generals had put their signatures on the acta that contained the terms of agreement. General Lopez, however, was far more cynical, and in the privacy of an elevator told Caro that the other generals could sign their names soo times, he still did not trust them. Caro retained his optimism, however, and when President IIlia during his visit to Rosario to attend the June 20 Flag Day ceremonies, asked him whether he felt a coup was coming, his answer was no but that the government would have to take certain steps. 59 Sharing in the belief that there was no immediate threat to the government was the U.S. Ambassador, Edwin Martin. J\lartin had not concealed his support for the constitutional regime, and in private gatherings with Argentine businessmen, lawyers, and military men, many of whom favored a military takeover, he tried to point out the damaging consequences that could follow. After learning through public and private sources of the June 14-15 decisions, he cabled Washington that night that "it now seems clear that military will give government period of time to produce concrete results." Consequently, he felt it safe to leave Argentina for the United States, and did so the next day, with the result that he was away from Buenos Aires when the coup finally came. 60 Possibly most hopeful of all, now that the top Army brass had agreed to give the Illia presidency a new lease on life, was the Army Secretary himself. General Castro Sanchez was still convinced that the survival of the constitutional government was worth working for, and that the overwhelming majority of the officers of the three armed services wanted it to continue. By pure coincidence, only a few hours after the major generals had signed the acta, Castro Sanchez had an opportunity to defend his position against no less a polemicist than ex-President Frondizi. A severe critic of the Illia administration, Frondizi in his public remarks had never actually advocated its overthrow, although his demand for revolutionary changes in the economic structure could be interpreted in that manner. On the evening of June 15 at a private dinner gathering, he took issue with the Army Secretary about the 59Caro interview. 60Embassy BA Telegram 1908, June 15, 1966. On Ambassador Martin's efforts to persuade members of the elite not to support a coup, interview with Dr. Hodolfo Martinez. Martinez, a coup supporter, felt that this was all to the good since no one could then say that the coup was "made in the U.S."

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value of preserving legality. He described the lllia government as totally inept and insisted that only a revolution could bring about the needed development. Moreover, he contended that the armed forces were unanimously behind a coup, and that Castro Sanchez by his actions was dividing the Army. The Army Secretary naturally rejected these contentions, as well as Dr. Frondizi's advice that he should resign his post and join in the coup. If nothing else, the evening's discussion made it plain that powerful civilian forces were still trying to pressure the military into action. 61 The meeting of the junta of major generals that convened on the morning of June 24 reinforced the Army Secretary's belief that a solution to the crisis might still be worked out. The major generals ratified the acta that had been adopted at their previous meeting and accepted by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Secretary. Moreover, at the latter's suggestion, solemn pledges were exchanged; Castro Sanchez promised that the government would not make any surprise replacements in the high command, and Pistarini and the major generals pledged their honor not to move against the government. Castro Sanchez made it plain, however, that if his efforts to bring about the desired changes were unsuccessful, he would resign, and not oppose the military takeover. 62 At the morning meeting, the major generals heard the Army Secretary report on the difficulties he faced in dealing with the government because of sensationalist stories in the press and the leaking of secret documents. The junta agreed that he alone should conduct the operation of seeking the changes, and that it should be portrayed not as an ultimatum, but as advice requested by the Minister of Defense; they 61 Interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Castro Sgation of visiting U.S. congressmen. After Illia's ouster, Castro Sanchez issued a statement defending himself against a charge by Gen. Pistarini that he had violated a promise not to have any contact with politicians. In this statement. the ex-Army Secretary did not make an issue of the erroneous June 23 date ascribed to the meeting at Caro's house, but rather used it to argue that since it preceded the exchange of pledges on the morning ofJ unc 24, the alleged meeting could not constitute a violation of any pledge. See "El cx-Secretario di6 a conocer una nota," La Nacinn, June 30, 1966, p. 18.

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little option but to give belated endorsement to his decision. But why did Pistarini act as he did? Was he really concerned that he was about to be replaced as Commander-in-Chief? He was undoubtedly aware that the President had rejected advice to remove him after his egregious May 29 address. Was Dr. Illia any more likely to act now that a modus operandi for meeting military demands had been worked out? It would seem that Pistarini had other reasons for his decision, but given his consistent refusal to discuss it even years after the episode, one may only speculate about those reasons. Perhaps it was the pressure of the golpista generals who surrounded him, perhaps it was increasing tension in his relations with the Army Secretary, perhaps it was a desire to put an end to the uncertainty and give General Onganfa the opportunity to begin the task for which he had been preparing himself. 76 Whatever the reasons, on the morning of June 27, General Pistarini ordered General Caro, who had returned over the weekend to his Rosario command, to report to Army headquarters in Buenos Aires. On his arrival at 5 P.M., he was relieved of his command and placed under arrest on the grounds that he had not requested permission of his superior before "participating in a meeting of a political nature. " 77 But it was clear to astute observers that this was not simply a disciplinary action. The removal of General Caro from his command left the II Corps in the hands of a coup supporter, General Jaime Toscano. The most powerful military force that might have been deployed against the coup was thus neutralized. The path was now free to launch the movement against the Illia government. 78 Shortly after 5 P.M., Army telephones conveyed marching orders to the previously instructed corps, divisional, and regimental commanders. Within a matter of hours, control was established over the nation's communication facilities while troop units moved to take up their assigned positions. 79 No shots were fired; there was no opposition from 76 Pistarini and Ongania did not have a close relationship; however, Col. (Ret.) Schettini was a good friend of both and may well have conveyed to Pistarini that Ongania was eager to be installed in the presidency by a certain date. One version I have heard, but cannot confirm, is that Ongania wanted to assume the office prior to July 9 so that he could preside over the 15oth anniversary celebration of Argentina's declaration of independence. Only Pistarini knows the real reasons for deciding to launch the movement on June 27, but he has been reluctant to talk about them. 77 La Prensa, June 28, 1966; Embassy BA Telegram 1974, June 27, 1966. 78 In tervicw with Gen. (Hct.) Laprida. When Laprida learned from his aide around 11 A.M. that General Caro had been summoned, he advised the Army Secretary to inform Dr. Illia that the revolution had begun, and that he was no longer President. 79Interview with Gens. (Ret.) Von Stecher and Villegas.

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legalista officers. The latter had waited in vain for orders to defend the government, but by June 27 they could only choose between sitting on the sidelines or joining fellow officers in carrying out the coup. Ho At 10 P.M. on June 27, General Pistarini issued a communique announcing that the Army no longer recognized the authority of General Castro Sanchez as Army Secretary, and stressing the need for unity within the frce. 81 It was only now that President Illia bestirred himself to defend his government. He signed an order removing Pistarini and naming himself as interim Army Commander-in-Chief, and he issued an appeal to all three armed forces to take the necessary steps to preserve the constitutional government. Moreover, he authorized Castro Sanchez, who had come to Government House to present his resignation, to telephone the commanders of the II and III Corps to see where they stood. But it was of course too late. Like his UCRI predecessor when confronted with a similar situation four years before, President Illia had wanted to avoid bloodshed and had refused to authorize military action while it was still possible. As in Dr. Frondizi's case, his last-minute steps seem to have been more a gesture aimed at his political supporters than a real effort to defend his government. 82 Yet in his final hours as President, Dr. Illia conducted himself with a dignity, courage, and eloquence that aflected even his opponents. Indeed, it might he said that nothing in his presidency was more impressive than the manner in which he left it. But then again he had had a long time to prepare himself. As early as November 196;3, after the death of President Kennedy, Illia had had a long discussion with the Chief of the Military Household about presidents who did not finish their terms. After asking Navy Captain Milia what Martin Garcia Island was like, he set forth his own idea of how a president should conduct himself when he was being ousted. According to Milia, he carried out to the letter in June 1966 the course of conduct that he had described three years before. 83 Throughout the night of June 27-28, President Illia remained in his BOJnterview with Gen. (Ret.) Viviani Rossi. the Pistarini communique, see La Pren.m, June zS, 1966. 82For Dr. Illia's belated efforts to find Army support, interviews with Gens. (Bet.) Castro Sanchez and Laprida. I am indebted to Dr. Zavala Ortiz f(n a photocopy of Dr. Illia's signed order removing Pistarini and appointing himself as Army Commander-inChief. For the comparison with Frondizi's actions in 1962, see Potash, [ 100], p. 376. 83Jntervicw with Adm. (Ret.) Fernando Milia, Apr. g, 1987. 81 For

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Government House office surrounded by cabinet members and other officials. When General Alsogaray, accompanied by Colonel Luis Perlinger, eventually appeared at 5:20 A.M., and on behalf of the armed forces requested that he leave the office, Dr. Illia denounced him as a rebel general, "a usurper who takes advantage of the force of arms and of the soldiers of the Constitution in order to wield force against that very Constitution and the Law." When Alsogaray again invited him to leave so as to avoid acts of violence, President Illia renewed his denunciation. "What violence are you talking about? Violence has been unleashed by you in the Republic; I have advocated peace and concord among the Argentines throughout the country. I have assured freedom all over the country, and you have refused to uphold my exhortations. You have nothing in common with the Army of San Martin and Belgrano, you have caused great harm to our country and will continue to do so by such behavior. The country will always blame you for this usurpation, and I even doubt that your own conscience will justifY your action." After further exchanges, Dr. Illia ordered General Alsogaray to withdraw, and he did so accompanied by the Chief of the Military Household. Around 6 A.M., Colonel Luis Perlinger and a group of Army officers again entered the presidential office. The Colonel announced that in the name of the armed forces he had come to tell Dr. Illia that he had been dismissed from office; but again the President held firm and the officers withdrew. Finally, just before T30 A.M., Colonel Perlinger returned with police from the riot squad and ordered the premises cleared. Dr. Illia, with his dignity and his conscience both intact, and still surrounded by collaborators and friends, walked out of Government House for the last time, to assume once again the life of a private citizen. 84 According to President Illia's personal code, he had acted properly, but once again a constitutional government had fallen. Through failing to act energetically when action was possible, he had allowed a small group of officers in key positions to embark the Army on a political 84The source for what transpired in the President's office between 5:20 A.M. and roughly 7:50A.M. is a memorandum that was prepared later by various eyewitnesses and called "acta recuerdo." I am indebted to Dr. Zavala Ortiz for providing me with a copy. Given the fact that these eyewitnesses were mostly government officials and UCRP leaders, it is possible that a certain amount of poetic license entered into the reconstruction of the verbal exchanges. For an English translation of the "acta recuerdo", see enclosure two to Embassy BA Airgram A-234, Sept. 25, 1966.

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venture. But acts of omission on the part of Dr. lilia were not the cause of the military takeover. The reasons are to be found in the unresolved problems inherited from the past, and in the state of mind of many Argentines, civilian and military, whose faith in democracy as practiced in their country over the last decade had deteriorated. They had come to question whether an elective system under current conditions could fulfill either their individual hopes for a decent life or their collective aspirations for Argentine national greatness. Influenced by a carefully crafted media campaign, they had come to the conclusion that a military man in the person of General (Ret.) Juan Carlos Onganfa could do what others had been unable to do, that he could lead the country into a new era of domestic peace, economic growth, and international prestige. In some ways General Onganfa himself had been a target of that campaign and eventually, in response to the encouragement and flattery of not always disinterested individuals, he came to see himself in the role of political savior that others projected for him. Thus, instead of adhering to his earlier persona as the general of the Constitution, and to his earlier goal of seeking the presidency through the electoral process, he accepted the overtures of those who proposed to overthrow the lilia government and install him as dictator. The events of June 27-28 meant that the time had now come for him to demonstrate that he was in fact endowed with the political skills that others had ascribed to him, and that he possessed the combination of wisdom, judgment, and good fortune needed to solve the nation's problems and keep his countrymen eontcnt." 3 8.5[n commenting on his own role in the creation of the Ongania myth, Mariano Grondona observed years later: "Because everyone at that time, myself included, helped create a kind of myth about Ongania, in which we ourselves needed to believe at that time. We needed to believe that someone existed [who could solve the country's problems.] For example, in Primera Plana I contributed to the creation of a myth; later the poor man was unable to fulfill the very role we had imagined for him." Interview, June 10, lgll6.

Chapter 5

General Onganfa and the "Argentine Revolution": The Early Stages

The news that a revolutionary military junta had seized power from the Illia government produced few demonstrations either of elation or concern on the part of most Argentine citizens. The likelihood of a coup that would entrust the presidency to General (Ret.) Juan Carlos Onganfa had been the subject of so much media comment over the past eight months that the actual ouster of the civilian government seemed like an anticlimax. But although the reaction of the general public was restrained, many Argentines felt a sense of relief that Dr. Illia was no longer in office, and looked forward optimistically to having the former Commander-in-Chief take charge of the nation's destiny. Others, however, with a scepticism born of previous experience, waited to be shown what this popular but politically untried military leader would do. For the moment, however, it was the pronouncements of the selfproclaimed Revolutionary Junta of the three armed forces Commanders-in-Chief that drew the public's attention. Their initial message, issued on the morning of June 28, explained that it had been necessary to set aside the "formal legality" of a civilian government that had "defrauded the hopes of the people" through its inefficiency and pursuit of partisan interest. In its place they promised to establish a government that would bring about the modernization and transformation needed to assure national unity and promote general well-being. To this end they announced the removal from office of the President and VicePresident, the members of the Supreme Court, and the Governors and Vice-Governors of the provinces. They also dissolved the Congress, the

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provincial legislatures, and all political parties. Nothing was said, however, about the trade union organizations, on whose support the new government apparently would hope to count. The Junta's initial message did state that a "revolutionary statute" would be issued that would take precedence over the Constitution, and concluded with the announcement that General Juan Carlos Onganfa would assume the presidency of the new government. 1 The Junta members, Generall'istarini, Admiral Varela, and Air Force Brigadier Alvarez, once the above message was read aloud by a military aide, paid a call at General Ongania's Belgrano home to make the formal offer of the presidential post. This visit had been specificallv requested hy Ongania as a means of demonstrating that it was the armed forces and not he who had ousted President Illia. In reality, the visit was a ceremonial gesture for public consumption, for there was no question of Onganfa's acceptance. Indeed, he had been in close touch with the three Commanders in the hours before lilia's ouster was accomplished, and he now insisted that his own aides should have an opportunity to re\'ise two of the basic documents that had been previously prepared for issuance over the Junta's signatures. 2 These documents, drafted originally under the watchful eye of General Julio Alsogaray, consisted of the "Acta of the Revolution" and three numbered annexes: one, the "Message of the Revolutionary Junta to the Argentine People," that was discussed above; two, the "Statute of the Argentine Revolution;" and three, the "Political Objectives (Goals of the Revolution)." The Acta, which was not released until after the first two annexes were made public, embodied in legal language the decisions that were announced for the most part in the initial message of the three Armed Force Commanders: to create the Junta, sweep out existing authorities, offer the presidency to General Onganfa, and, interestingly enough, to dissolve itself the moment he took the oath of office. l The text of the "Mensaje de Ia Junta Revolucionaria a! Pueblo Argentino" (l\lessage of the Revolutionary Junta to the Argentine People) was published in La Naci6n and other daily papers on June zg, 1966. 2 For the importancP assigned to having the three Commanders come to Onganfa's Bclgrano home, interviews with Gens. (Ret.) Juan C. Onganfa, Jan. 19, 1984, and Eduardo Seiiorans, Apr. 8, 1987. One of those said to have played a key role in revising the documents was the nationalist ideologue Marcelo Sanchez Soromlo. The aide who read the Junta's message was the then Major Ramon Camps, later to become a notorious figure in Argentine affairs of the 197o's and 198o's.

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It was the Statute, in many ways the most important of the documents, and Annex 3, the statement of the revolution's goals, that revealed the nuances introduced by Ongania's men. 3 On the debatable premise that the Junta, by virtue of its physical control of the country, possessed constituent authority, the Statute of the Revolution suspended the separation of powers as established by the Constitution. Instead, it concentrated both executive and legislative functions in the person designated President of the Argentine Nation, and authorized him to name the provincial governors; they in turn would exercise both the executive and legislative powers described by their respective constitutions. The Statute also provided that the new judges named to the Supreme Court should swear an oath that would give priority to its provisions over those of the Constitution. The new centralized government was authorized to issue laws altering the size and functions of the cabinet, and to create temporary or permanent bodies to advise it on the exercise of its legislative powers. The Statute, moreover, placed no time limit on the President's tenure in office although it did provide that in the case of his death or incapacity the armed forces Commanders-in-Chief would name a successor. 4 Although the text of the Statute as issued on June 29 did not differ in its basic provisions from the draft version that had been put together earlier in the month, it did differ in tone. Whereas the earlier version mentioned in several places the goal of achieving an authentic democracy, and anticipated an eventual Congressional review of the government's legislative enactments by referring to them as "decree-laws," the Statute as published omitted any reference to democracy and designated its enactments as "laws." In short what had been conceived by many of its original promoters as a necessary but limited interruption of constitutional government, one that would last at most the six years of an elected presidency, was transformed into a regime that, in the terms JThe official texts of the Acta and Annexes 1 and 2 were published in the Boletin Oficial, July 8, 1g66; the text of Annex .3 in the Boletin Oficial, July 19, 1966. La Naci6n published the text of the Statute on June .30, and Annex .3 on July 14, 1966, the day after its release. 4The statute also stipulated that the government would respect all existing international commitments, that the judges named to the Supreme Court and lower tribunals would enjoy the guarantees set forth in article g6 of the Constitution, and that the Interior Minister would serve as head of the Executive Power whenever the President left the country.

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of its charter, was enigmatic about its ultimate political orientation, and silent on its possible duration. 5 The revolutionary document that underwent the greatest changes at the hands of Ongania's men was the one that was supposed to define the goals of the revolution. The fact that Annex 3 to the Acta did not appear until two weeks after the Junta was dissolved suggests the depth of the disagreement between the original drafters of the document and Onganfa's aides. 6 As finally published, the text of Annex 3 was much shorter than the earlier version, and while it repeated many of its points, they were rearranged so as to give a different emphasis. Thus, for example, where the earlier definition of the general goal began with the words "to restore an authentic representative democracy," the text as published began with the words "to consolidate spiritual and moral values." The word democracy was buried in a long paragraph that gave greater immediacy to scientific and cultural advances and to better labor relations. 7 The most significant changes, however, came in the section devoted to economic policy objectives. Here it was the monetarist and market economy emphasis that Alvaro Alsogaray had been able to incorporate into the earlier draft that Ongania's advisors wanted to tone clown. The result, after difficult discussions in which General Julio Alsogaray, now serving as interim Secretary-General of the Presidency, tried to defend his brother's ideas, was a compromise. It was agreed to divide the original draft into two documents, one to be issued 0\ er the signatures of the three Commanders-in-Chief as the delayed Annex 3, the other to appear separately over Onganfa's name. As finally published, Annex 3 contained less than a fourth of the original text; it omitted the earlier call for the "rejection of collectivist formulas" and the "establishment as rapidly as possible of a market economy with a social sense," and 5 I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Jorge Von Stecher for providing me with the drafts of the various documents that had been prepared earlier in June. My observations are based on a paragraph-by-paragraph comparison of the draft of Annex 2 with the published text. For the tacit assumption of a masimum six-year duration for the revolutionary government, interview with General (Ret.) Von Stecher, Jan. 30, 1984. fi"Acta-Anexo 3: Ohjetivos Politicos, I. Ohjetivo General," 1\!S, Vo11 Stt>cher Archiw; Acta de la Revoluciiln Argentina Anexo .3. Ohjetivos Politicos, I. Objetivo general, as printed in Boletin infonrwtivo. Anales cU' Legislaciiln Argentina [z], ~XVI, No. 17 (Agosto 15 de 1966), p. 3· 7Jhid.

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stressed instead the need for a great economic expansion. It also incorporated new paragraphs on labor and welfare policies that stressed the importance of trade unions and the need for improving social security, health, and housing conditions. In short, it was the promise of a paternalistic government that would concern itself with social as well as economic issues, and not the image of a free-enterprise, businessoriented, regime that the document tried to convey. 8 The paternalistic image was one that General Onganfa himself was comfortable with as he assumed his new responsibilities on June zg, 1966. Both his military career and his Catholic religious outlook had taught him to be concerned with the welfare of his troops and, by extension, of the lower classes of society. And, indeed, his choice of Jorge Salimei, a Catholic businessman, to be Economy Minister and Enrique Martinez Paz as Interior Minister seems to have reflected the belief that shared values were more important than prior governmental experience or familiarity with the personalities and practices of the international financial community. At least in filling the post of Foreign Minister, he found in Nicanor Costa Mendez a man who combined extensive experience in the field of international relations and diplomacy with a moderate Catholic nationalist outlook that fitted in with his own inclinations. 9 It would be wrong to assume, however, that in considering men for positions in the government, Onganfa subjected their social philosophies to systematic scrutiny. He was not, after all, a man of ideas himself; his understanding of public affairs was derived from his experience as a military commander, and was not the result of extensive reading. As a junior officer, he had shown more interest in working with troops and in playing polo than in study; although he was chosen to 8The first three and one-quarter pages of the draft constituted, when revised, the published text of Annex 3; the balance of the original sixteen-page (legal size) document was issued on July 13 under the title "Polfticas del Gobierno" and signed by Ongania. According to Gen. (Ret.) Julio Alsogaray (interview Aug. 16, 1973), the revisions were the work of Ongania's initial appointees, Economy Minister Salimei, Interior Minister Martinez Paz, and Secretary of State Intelligence Gen. (Ret.) Eduardo Seiiorans. 90ngania was one of a number of Argentine officers who had been participating in religious retreats known as "Cursos de Cristianidad." Introduced into Argentina by Spanish priests, "cursillisrrw" stressed the relationship of Christian doctrine to the challenges of contemporary life. Salimei, Martinez Paz, Interior Undersecretary Jose M. Saravia, Jr., and Secretary of State Intelligence Gen. (Ret.) Eduardo Seiiorans, were all "cursillistas." Interviews with Nicanor Costa Mendez, June 23, 1986, and Mariano Grondona, June 10, 1986; also Primera Plana, July 12, 1966, p. 14·

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attend the War Academy, he did not complete the general staff officer course. Nevertheless, his self-discipline, dedication, and hard work, his sense of authority and austerity of manner, in short his natural abilities as a leader, won for him the advancements to general's grade. It was these qualities plus good fortune that put him in the position to become a national figure when he led the Azul faction to victory in 1962 and restored unity to the Army over the next three years. In the course of his military career he had learned to rely on the work of able staffs, on an intuitive feeling about his fellow officers, and ultimately on his fund of common sense to make decisions. As President, however, he now had to deal with a broader variety of people, a wider array of conflicting interests, and a greater diversity and complexity of problems than he had ever confronted in his earlier career. 10 In appearance, despite the fact that he was only of moderate stature, Ongania exuded an air of authority. His seriousness of expression, his forthright manner of public address, even the bristling mustache that covered his upper lip, all contributed to create the image of a leader, of a man of strength. His sense of personal dignity, however, was evidently stronger than his sense of humor. This was evidenced by his action, a few weeks after taking office, in banning the magazine of a well-known cartoonist who seized on the mustache to portray him as a walrus. 11 In contrast with his stern public image, Onganfa in person was much more affable, at least to his civilian collaborators. In individual meetings with cabinet members or other officials, his practice was to listen carefully to what they presented. He did not like to respond to questions and rarely offered his own opinion; indeed, he would often remain silent in the face of questions, leaving his interlocutor to restate his argument or abandon the eflort without learning precisely what was in the President's mind. Perhaps it was lack of political experience or, more likely, awareness of his own limitations that induced him to follow this procedure. In any event, it was not long behJre the press commented on his "celebrated silences." 12 Although in the first few days of his administration military personnel 10 See above, Chapter 1, for the role of a group of eolonels in Ongania's emergence and success as commander of the victorious Azul faction. II The cartoonist was Landru, who had played on the physical attributes of previous presidents in the pages ofTia Vicenta, without ever suffering any penalty. Primera Plana, July 5, 1966, p. 13. 12Primcra Plana, July 26, 1966, p. Ill; Confirnuulo, July 28, 1966, p. 20.

zoo

Ongarzfa and the ..Argentine Revolution"

served in a variety of posts at the national, provincial, and municipal levels, Onganfa was anxious to draw a line between the active-duty military and his government. He made this plain in his remarks at the annual armed forces banquet on July 6, and in his directive that required officers holding government posts to resume their military assignments by the end ofJuly or else request retirement from the armed forces. The few exceptions to this rule applied to positions that were designated as military in character: Chief of the Federal Police, the post which Major General Mario Fonseca assumed the very evening of the coup; Secretary of the National Security Council (CONASE), the creation of which was still pending and to which Major General Osiris Villegas would be appointed at the end of the year; and one or two positions that were linked to the Military Household (Casa Militar). Ong;anfa, however, had no hesitation in appointing retired military men to key government posts. Indeed, among his earliest appointments were General (Ret.) Eduardo Sefiorans as Secretary of State Intelligence and General (Ret.) Francisco Imaz as Governor of Buenos Aires Province. He also named his old friend, General (Ret.) Hector Repetto to take over as Secretary-General of the Presidency, replacing General Julio Alsogaray, who went back to the command of I Corps, and he appointed another old friend, Colonel (Ret.) Eugenio Schettini, to be Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires. I:l Although President Onganfa moved quickly to appoint a new team of judges for the Supreme Court, a task that the Junta had assigned to itself but failed to complete in its brief existence, he demonstrated little urgency in filling the numerous cabinet-level positions or in selecting the remaining provincial governors. His slowness in making these appointments has been taken as evidence that the timing of the June 2728 coup had taken him by surprise. But other explanations for the delay may lie in his unwillingness to be pressured into quick decisions by the various sectors that had supported the coup and wanted a share of the spoils, and by his own desire not to be saddled with too many interim appointees when his highest priority was to reorganize the administra13 Juan Carlos Ongania, Discurso del Presidente de Ia Naci6n en Ia Comida de Camaraderia de las Fuerzas Armadas . .. 6 de julio de 1g66 [ll], interview with Cen. (Ret.) Julio Alsogaray. See the daily press for the appointments of the named ollicers. An officer who served the President, first as press secretary then in other capacities, after the July 30 deadline was Lt. CoL Luis Premoli. For his designation as a member of the staff of the Casa Militar, see BHSG [zzl, No. 4135, Aug. ll, 1966.

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tive structure and mechanisms of the government. In any event, in his inaugural message and again in his first press conference on August 4, he stressed the magnitude of the problems that confronted his government and urged the Argentine people to be patient and not expect immediate solutions. For many Argentines, however, the delays in appointments, and the absence of positive measures in the first weeks of its existence, raised questions about how truly revolutionary this selfdesignated "Government of the Argentine Revolution" would ever become. 14 In anticipation of the actual restructuring of the Executive Power, and perhaps to give a sense of movement, Onganfa at different times issued detailed statements of the government's long- and short-term objectives. The first, distributed on July 13 under the title "Policies of the National Government," was an elaboration of the goals set forth in Annex 3· Subtitled "General Courses of Action Designed to Achieve the Political Objectives Established in Annex 3 of the Acta of the Argentine Revolution," the text in fact embodied sections of the original Jraft of Annex 3 that had been omitted from the published version. Interestingly enough, the July 13 statement gave a prominent place, second in a list of ten domestic political goals, to "elaborating the necessary bases for reestablishing a representative democracy which corrects the preexisting political deformities."I.5 The fact that the U.S. government had not yet recognized the Onganfa regime may explain the newfound importance assigned to this objective. Having received that recognition on July 18, the government felt free in future announcements to restate its priorities. In the "Directive for the Planning and Development of Government Action" that the President issued on August 4, the seven-point section Jcvoted to domestic politics demoted to last place the "political reordering so that the country could resume the path of representative democracy." Much more importance was assigned to combating the extremisms that threatened Argentina's western and Christian way of 14 For the appointment of the judges, see La Naci6n, July 2, 1966. The size of the Supreme Court was reduced to five judges from the seven that had comprised it since Frnndizi's presidency. For Ongania's initial message, see La Naci6n. Julv 1, 1966; for his first press conference, sec its issue of Aug. 5, 1966. l5La Naci6n, July 14, 1966. This document together with Annex :3 was distributed in leaflet form by the Presidency in 1966. I am indebted to Gen. (Ret.) Tomas A. Sanchez de Bustamante for providing me with a copy.

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life, to encouraging citizens to participate in public life by getting involved in community-level organizations, and to increasing the population through selective immigration. It was also deemed important to have legislation to strengthen spiritual unity and moral consolidation, to enforce respect for authority, property, and the rights of others, and to inculcate in the citizenry the principle that they have obligations to the community as well as individual rights.lfj The August 4 directive also announced to the public that the government envisaged a two-stage process of planning and execution for the transformation of the country, designed to change the values and attitudes of the citizenry, eliminate the obstacles to economic growth, and promote the development of neglected areas of the eountry, especially Patagonia. In the first stage, which would extend to the end of 1967, an institutional reorganization process would be undertaken, to be followed by the preparation of a detailed national development and security plan. The second stage, which would begin in 1968, would witness the implementation of that plan. The key agency for preparing this plan would be a reorganized National Development Council (CONADE), which would coordinate its activities with a military-run National Security Council (CONASE). Nothing was said about the detailed plans that had already been prepared over the past several years by the Army General Staff's Jefatura VI and, in fact, President Onganfa simply ignored thern. 17 The reorganization process that President Onganfa fdt was necessary to achieve his goals was initiated by a series oflaws that appeared at the end of September and the beginning of October. The first of these restructured the national cabinet. In place of the traditional eight ministries, the cabinet would now consist of five: Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy and Labor, Defense, and Social Welfare, with the functions that had formerly been conducted by the other ministries now assigned to secretariats. Thus the Interior Ministry, whose political functions were subsumed under a newly designated Secretariat of Government, was given control of the Secretariats of Education, Justice, and Communications and the Ministry of Economy and Labor added the SecreHi Presidencia

de Ia Naci6n, Planeamiento y desarrollo de Ia acci6n del Gobierno.

Directiva [10], pp.

20-21.

17Jhid., pp. H-16, 36-:37; interview with Col. (Ret.) R6mulo E. Colombo, Aug. 13, tgSs.

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tariats of Labor, Public Works, and Agriculture to the several already under its jurisdiction. For its part, the newly designated Ministry of Social Welfare was to coordinate the activities of the Secretariats of Housing, Public Health, Social Security, and a Secretariat of Community Promotion and Assistance, still to be organized. Under the new arrangement the Ministers were to be responsible for the broad formulation of policies, but the day-to-day operation of the various sectors was to be left to the Secretaries. Another innovation was the elimination of the three armed forces' Secretariats, and the assignment of their functions to their respective Commanders-in-Chief. As a result, these Commanders acquired sub-cabinet status and no longer had to deal with the Minister of Defense through another layer of authority. However, until the end of 1g66 Ongania refrained from filling this post. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez was designated interim Defense Minister, an arrangement that allowed the President to deal directly with the Commanders-in-Chief on issues that interested him. 18 The second in the series of laws affecting the structure and functions of the government established "the national system of planning and action for development." This law spelled out in detail the role of the President and other key officials at the cabinet, provincial, and municipallevels in the planning process. Under the direction of the President, the National Council of Development (CONADE) was designated as the principal agency charged with carrying out the planning functions. The Council was to have its own Secretariat as well as regional development offices; this Secretariat in cooperation, as noted earlier, with the Secretariat of the National Security Council, had the task of devising the policies and strategies that would be embodied in the long-range development plan. 19 The third major piece of legislation was the national defense statute issued on October 10. This law, which replaced legislation dating from the late 194o's, linked security to development. It set forth what was called the "national system of planning and action for security" and defined the structure and functions of the key presidential agencies in the defense setup. These agencies were the National Security Council (CONASE), the Military Committee, and the National Intelligence l8Law 16,g56 (Ley de ministerios), Sept. 23, 1966. 19 Law 16,964 (Sistema nacional de planeamiento y acci6n para el desarrollo), Sept. 30,

1966.

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Ongania and the ''Argentine Revolution"

Center. The National Security Council, consisting of the President, the cabinet ministers, and the three military Commanders-in-Chief as permanent members, with other cabinet-level officials sitting in as needed, was to engage in long-range strategic planning and have its own secretariat. The Military Committee, made up of the President, the Defense Minister, and the three Commanders-in-Chief, was to plan military strategy and conduct strategic military operations with the support of a joint general staff. The law also provided for a Junta of Commanders-inChief to supervise that joint staff, and serve as principal military advisors to the National Security Council. 20 The national defense statute of October 1966 defined national security as the situation in which the vital interests of the nation were protected from significant interferences or disturbances, and national defense as the combination of measures the State adopts to achieve national security. By linking security to development, the statute assigned to the CONASE Secretariat a substantial policy planning role for areas transcending the strictly military sphere. Military viewpoints could thus influence policy choices on domestic social, economic, and cultural matters as well as those related to international relations. Moreover the statute, anticipating the possibility of domestic disturbances or natural disasters, explicitly authorized the use of the armed forces to restore internal order, and provided for military control of emergency zones in the areas affected. 21 Having thus acknowledged that the armed forces had a legitimate role in shaping the plans for Argentina's future as well as in combating threats to domestic order, President Onganfa was determined, nevertheless, to maintain an arm's-length relationship between those forces and the day-to-day conduct of his government. He was ill-disposed to accept advice from the military leadership, and he instructed his collaborators not to receive requests or suggestions from any member of the armed forces on active duty. 22 Ironically, except in the sphere of development planning, his attitude toward military involvement in non20Law 16,970 (Ley de defensa nacional), Oct. 10, 1966, articles 7-27. 21Jbid., articles 2, 3, 13, 43· Gen. (Ret.) Osiris Villegas, in describing the tasks of

CONASE, stated that "this was also a kind of check on governmental actions." Interview, Dec. 21, 1983. 22Interviews with Drs. Nicanor Costa Mendez, June 23, 1986; Mario Diaz Colodrero, June 13, 1986; and Prof. Carlos M. Gelly y Obes, July 12, 1984. These men served, respectively, as the Foreign Minister, Secretary of Government, and Secretary of Education in the restructured cabinet.

Onganfa and the "Argentine Revolution"

205

military issues was not unlike that of his civilian predecessor, Dr. Illia. 23 Moreover, in his own eyes and those of other supporters of the regime, this was not even a military government. It owed its origin, to be sure, to an act of force; but because active-duty military were excluded from most posts and because it claimed to enjoy public support, as evidenced by the fact that it did not need to resort to declaring a state of siege, it was viewed as something distinct, something akin to a civilian regime. 24 But even if this was not a military regime in the classic sense, military attitudes could and did influence the substance of policy-making on certain nonmilitary issues. The most notorious example of this was the July 29 decision to eliminate the autonomy of the University of Buenos Aires and the other state universities. For a long time military men had viewed the politicized situation in the University of Buenos Aires with deep misgivings. The actions of leftist student groups over the years, groups that on occasion had seized buildings, disrupted lectures, or otherwise manifested their sympathy for Fidel Castro and opposition to U.S. policies in Latin America and Vietnam, had led these military to view the University as little more than a nest of communists whose eradication required drastic action. Nevertheless, over the first few weeks of the Ongania government, several of its well-known civilian supporters contested the view that communists controlled the University, and warned that any intervention could destroy the University. They urged instead that an effort be made to reorganize the institution with the cooperation of the many professors and students who were eager to curb the disruptions by extremist groups, and to improve the atmosphere for teaching and research. 2" 2:1 For a comment on this similarity, and a warninf\ of the dangers inherent in treating the military in this manner, see Primera Plana, Oct. 18, 1966, p. 13. 24The view that this was not a military government was held both by insiders like Dr. Dfaz Colodrero and by military men like Gen. Alsogaray. Dr. Eduardo Hoca in a lecture given in 1978 would even declare: '"It seems clear to me that General Ongania acted as a constitutional president, not within the Constitution of 1853, but of a constitution that was unwritten but applied in practice, one that was not electoral but republican, which Argentina had been testing since 1930. It was one that, although it periodically ignored elections, fundamentally assured to the Argentines respect for the essential rights and guarantees that arc in the National Constitution." From a lecture hv Dr. Roca to the Colegio de Abogados of the City of Huenos Aires, Nov. 1, 1978, entitled "Historia del Estado dr several weeks. Eventually it appointed a commission to draw up a new regime for the universities, but months passed without any resolution of the university situation. For a review of that situation as of January 1967, with statistics on resignations and comments on the Hight of scientists, see Primera Plana, Jan. 3, 1967, pp. 23-25. 32Confirmado, Oct. 6, 1966, p. 18.

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Ongania and the "Argentine Rctoolution"

Aware of the rising tide of criticism, Ongania com·ened a meeting on October 4 of the sixteen top officers of the three armed services, to enable Economy Minister Salimei to explain and defend his policies. Shortly thereafter, Labor Secretary Jose Tamhoranea, whose actions in favoring the Alonso trade union faction at the expense of the Vandoristas had come under military criticism. submitted his resignation. In choosing a replacement Onganfa was reported to have accepted an Army suggestion that he appoint Rubens San Sebastian, an experienced bureau chief in the Labor Secretariat, as its new head. According to another published source, it was San Sehastir approval at a session of the National Development Council (CONADE) chaired by President Ongania, it is notable that Army Commander Lanusse and Navy Commander Cnavi, as well as the Ministers of Defense and Social vVelfare, registered their total opposition, and the proposal was returned f;:>r revision.18 17Embassy BA Airgram A-236, "Political Highlights-April1g6g," May 26, 1g6g. 18 La Naci6n, Fe h. 10, 1g6g, disclosed the main lines of Astigucta's educational reform bill; criticisms of the proposal can be found in La Naci6n, Feb. 17, 26, and Mar. 12. The March 12 issue reported Cardinal Ottaviani's comment in Rome that the proposal had nothing to do with the spirit of the Ecumenical Council Vatican II. For an account of the CONADE meeting, see the issue of March 7·

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The Ongania Presidency

Even as the Education Secretary was polarizing opinion by his efforts to change the public schools, his appointed university administrators were creating waves of their own. At the University of Buenos Aires, Rector Devoto's insistence on launching a major institutional change, the departmentalization of the colleges (facultades ), without consulting their respective cleans, created an atmosphere of dissension and led to the resignation of the Law School dean. Within several of the colleges themselves, the manner in which the deans handled professorial appointments generated charges that ideological considerations were taking precedence over merit. The most notorious instance was in the Law School, where the new clean appointed by the Education Secretary, Dr. Juan Luqui, refiJsed to renew the tenure of Dr. Ambrosio Gioja, a world renowned scholar of legal philosophy and a highly popular professor, but confirmed the appointments of other less distinguished professors. It was widely believed, and with good reason, that the authorities wanted Gioja out because he did not share their philosophic viewsthey regarded him as a positivist and an atheist-and because he attracted so many disciples. The "Gioja Case" came to symbolize the government's attitude toward academic freedom, with the result that a number of other law school professors who had been candidates for reappointment withdrew their names. 19 Once again an Army General Staff report, this one prepared shortly after the decision on Dr. Gioja beeame known, warned about the likelihood of student disorders. Whether it ever reached authorities outside the Army cannot be determined. The report lamented the lack of a coherent university policy on the national level and the delays in the process of restoring autonomy in individual universities. It pointed out the failure of the authorities to resolve legitimate student grievances l9La Naci6n, Feb. 7, 1969, for the resignation of Dean Abel Fleitas of the Law School; ibid., Mar. 1, 1969, for the controversy in the Dental School over professorial appointments; ibid., Apr. 10, 1969, for resignations in the Law School. On Dean Luqui's decision not to give automatic renewal to Dr. Gioja, see two typed statements, Apr. 5, 1969, in the Lanusse Archive. The first is a report of a conversation between a titular professor of the Law School and Interior Minister Borda on March 19, in which Borda denied that he or the Education Secretarv was a party to the Gioja episode, but at the same time explained why it was of interest to the government that Gioja "who teaches a philosophy different from ours" should not remain in his post. The second is an explanation of why Dr. Jose M. Saravia, (Jr.) withdrew from the competition for a sociology chair at the Law School and resigned his post as titular professor. Although neither statement is signed, internal evidence suggests that Dr. Saravia may well have been the author of both.

The Ongania Presidency

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such as the high cost of textbooks, the inadequacy of financial aid, overcrowded classrooms, and inconvenient examination schedules. Although the student sector, divided as it was into rival groups, was calm at present, this was a situation, the report pointed out, that could not be expected to last. Uncoordinated actions on the part of the educational or university authorities could provide a pretext or motive that could unify student groups and "provoke a chain reaction that would be very difficult to control. " 20 The accuracy of this analysis received dramatic confirmation in the month of May. A decision by the controversial rector of the National University of the Northeast, Dr. Carlos Walker, to privatize the university's dining hall, a budget reduction move which imposed higher food prices on students, sparked protests in the cities of Corrientes and Resistencia. The fatal shooting by police of a Corrientes student on May 15 ignited student demonstrations in other university cities. Rosario was the scene of a confrontation between students and police that produced another student fatality, and this led to further clashes. On the night of May 21, with at least moral support from trade unionists, rioting students in Rosario carried out a series of organized assaults, seizing control of some twenty blocks of the city, and forcing the police to withdraw. The commander of the Rosario-based II Army Corps, General Roberto Fonseca, thereupon sought and obtained authorization from his superiors to place the city under military control. President Onganfa signed a decree declaring Rosario to be an emergency zone under the provisions of the national defense statute, and authorized a military court to mete out summary punishment to violators of the peace. The military presence quickly restored order; and despite a general strike that was called by the two CGTs for May 23, the city was free of further violent incidents. Emergency rule ended on May 28, with a total of only three people sentenced by the military court, and the city resumed its normal life. 21 The events in Rosario, however, proved to be but the forerunner of a 20Comando en Jcfe del Ejercito. "~Iemorandum, Buenos Aires, de Marzo de 1969, AI Subjefe "/\'de Ia Jefatura V. Asunto: Problema Universitario y Estudiantil." MS, Lanusse Archive. 21La Prensa, May 14-29, 1g6g. Rector Walker was disliked, among other reasons, because he commuted to his university post from Buenos Aires. Professors at both the Resistencia and Corrientes branches of the university denounced his handling of the student protests and demanded his resignation.

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The Ongania Presidency

much more serious eruption involving thousands of individuals in the interior city of Cordoba on May zg. These events were the culmination of a nearly month-long series of protests by trade unions, student groups, and others against the policies and decisions of the provincial and national authorities. Early in the month, the drivers in the recently restructured Cordoba bus system went on strike over the failure to concede seniority rights. This strike demonstrated that Atilio Lopez, the secretary general of transport workers union (UTA), had the capacity to paralyze Cordoba's system of public transportation. Some ten days later, it was the powerful automobile workers union, SMATA, that gave vent to its discontent. At stake was a g. 5 percent loss in wages that the workers anticipated from a new law signed by General Ongania on May 12. This law established a standard workweek for the entire country, abolishing provincial legislation that for years had given workers an extra four hours' pay for Saturday afternoons they did not work. 22 As if tensions were not already high, when 3000 SMATA workers convened in an indoor sports club on May 14 to adopt a position vis-a-vis the new legislation, the provincial police chief declared it an illegal assembly. The police used tear gas and other forcible measures to disperse the workers who scattered through the city breaking shop windows. The net effect of this repressive action by the provincial government was to convert a trade union issue into a political one, and to condition the rank-and-file auto workers to accept their leaders' call for a 48-hour strike on May 15. That same day, because of their own unresolved grievances, bus drivers and metallurgical workers also initiated 48-hour strikes. The next day, with other unions joining in, Cordoba was the scene of a highly effective but orderly general strike. Clearly, the Cordoba labor movement had acquired a new confidence in its capacity to mobilize its members to pressure the government. 23 Compounding the situation for the Cordoba authorities was the 22La Prensa, May 6, 1969, for the bus drivers' strike; Law 18,204 of May 12, 1969, established the "regimen de descanso sernanal uniforme" (the uniform weekly rest regulation). On the significance of the transport strike, interview on July 6, 1990, with Dr. Lucio Garzon Maceda, legal advisor to SMATA and UTA in the period under study. 23Jnterview with Dr. Garzon Maceda; La Prensa, May 15-17, 1969. The bus drivers were still seeking recognition of seniority rights; the metallurgical workers were trying to get their employers to obey a recent resolution of the Labor Secretary requiring Cordoba employers to apply the same wage scale as in Greater Buenos Aires. An industrywide agreement with the Metal Workers Union (UOM) in 1966 had abolished the standing practice of regional differences (quitas zonales), but employers in Cordoba were reluctant to comply.

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growth of student militancy in the aftermath of the student h1talitics in Corrientes and Rosario. A climate of tension began to grip the city as of May 19. Although security measures were tightened and the police prohibited public processions, groups of students managed to display their anger daily by smashing street lights or stoning police vehicles. On May 24, they defied the police by barricading the student quarter near the Hospital de Clinicas, cutting electric cables, and starting fires. The police fought a pitched battle with the students for several hours, using tear gas and warning shots before they were able to recover control of the area. It was a foretaste on a limited scale of what was to take place five days later, when aggressive students and militant workers took to the streets in defiance of the authority of the province and its appointed governor. 24 But it was not just students and workers who viewed Governor Carlos Caballero with hostility. Many ordinary citizens, rnemhers or supporters of the banned political parties whether Peronists, Radicals, or Socialists, also resented his rule. This was especially true of the Radicals, who had been in control of the province before 1966, and who regarded both President Onganfa and his appointed governor as interlopers. Moreover, many conservatives had come to dislike Caballero in part because of specific measures such as his land tax, or because they were suspicious of his ultimate goals. His image in the province was that of an extreme nationalist committed to the construction of a corporativist regime; indeed, he was the first governor to implement Interior Minister Borda's plan f(Jr establishing an economic-social advisory council at the provincial level. But even groups that were disposed initially to take part in the C6rdoba Council resented the authoritarian manner in which the Governor controlled its operations. Thus, for all of Borda's hope that Caballero's efforts would serve as a model for other provinces, as of May 1969 the Governor had become a highly unpopular figure within his own province. 25 The violent events that occurred in C6rdoba on May 29 were to have 24 La Prensa, May 20-25, 1969, covers the student protests. 25For Dr. Borda's confidence in Governor Caballero, our interview of June 2fi, 1990; on the latter's limited support within the province, interviews with Dr. Aldo Jose Cima and Dr. Garzon Maceda, both on July 6, 1990. The Cordoba newspaper, La Voz del Interior, was highly critical of Governor Caballero on ideologicctl grounds, as were agricultural interests. For a summary of specific complaints, see Embassv BA Airgrams A-102, t.lar. 16, and A-161, Apr. 21, 1969.

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The Ongania Presidency

a profound impact on the Onganfa regime. Ironically, neither the trade union leaders who planned the original demonstration nor the authorities concerned with maintaining order anticipated the extent to which the ordinary populace would take part or the amount of property destruction that would take place. Stated in other terms, the events that came to be known as the "Cordobazo" were not the result of a planned conspiracy by professional revolutionaries to overthrow the government; rather they were the partly anticipated, partly unforeseen outcome of a number of factors: the organizing efforts of labor and student leaders, the encouragement of certain politicians and Catholic priests; the spontaneous involvement of a number of people \vho gave vent to their personal fi-ustrations; the involvement, to be sure, of an undetermined number of prof(~ssional agitators; and the failure of the authorities, both provincial and national, to take timely measures to defuse the situation. The planning of labor's role in the May 29 disturbances was the work of three local trade union leaders, the Peronists Elpidio Torres of SMATA and Atilio Lopez of UTA, and the independent Agustin Tosco of Luz y Fuerza. Neither of the two national CGTs, both of which had decided to call a general strike on May 30, nor their regional counterparts, were involved in the planning of the May 29 movement. Rather than initiate a strike at midnight as was the usual practice, the union leaders decided on a daytime action to assure maximum participation of the thousands of automobile workers employed in the outskirts of the city. The plan was to have them assemble at the factory sites at 10 A.M. and march to the center of the city, where they would be joined by other workers and by students in a massive demonstration. The coordination with the students was to be arranged by Tosco, whose militancy and political independence had enabled him to establish good relations with university students. Indeed, his union had given assistance to student groups in their earlier protests against the authorities. 26 The primary purpose of the planned demonstration, insofar as the SMATA and UTA leaders were concerned, was to mount a dramatic 26 For the planning details, interview with Dr. Garzon Maccda; for the decision by the two national central union organizations, the CGT Azopardo and the CGT Paseo Colon, to call a 24-hour strike on May 30, see La Prensa, May 27. 196C). According to Garzon Maceda, although the document calling for the May 29 strike was signed hy the Secretaries of the two Cordoba CGTs as well as by an independent trade union leader, these men played only minor roles in the actual planning.

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protest against those government policies that affected labor, such as the continuing wage freeze and the recent weekend work and pay legislation; the incidental purpose was to show contempt for Caballero. In the case ofTosco's union and of the students, the aim seems to have been more directly political: to weaken Onganfa's image by undennining his governor. In any event, the labor organizers of the May 29 protest made no secret of their intentions, and it was a matter of public knowledge that something big was being planned for that Thursday. In their planning they took it for granted that the police might try to disrupt the march of the 3,ooo-4,ooo automobile workers, and therefore, recalling the clashes at the indoor sports arena on May 14, they equipped themselves with slingshots and metal projectilesY But in spite of the fact that they had thus armed themselves, the leaders assumed that security forces would still maintain a presence in the center of the city; they did not anticipate the early withdrawal of the police from the streets, nor the assaults on public and private property that would follow. These leaders also considered the possibility that they might be arrested and charged with conducting an illegal strike for political ends, but they never assumed that they would be charged with organizing an insurrection. Accordingly, Torres and Tosco remained in their respective union offices rather than go underground as subversives might have done. Events were soon to invalidate both sets of assumptions. ZK But how did the highest government authorities view the situation in Cordoba prior to May zg and what did they decide to do about it? The answers must be sought in the kind of information reaching them and in the mind-sets of three men whose decisions affected the course of events, President Onganfa, Governor Caballero, and the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Lanusse. According to two individuals who held high posts at that time, word had been received about the impending disturbance well bet3re it happened. General (Ret.) Seiiorans, then head of SIDE, recalls having 27 On the aims of the different labor leaders, interview with Dr. Garzon Maceda. On public knowledge about the impending demonstration, interview with Dr. Rodolfo Martinez, July 12, 1990. The document announcing the strike for May 29 was issued on May 27, and the press was alerted in advance to cover the initiation of the march at the IKA plant. But even bef(lre this, word was reaching the government via various channels to expect a violent disturbance on May 29. What was unclear before the fact, however, was its actual dimensions. 28Interview with Dr. Garzon Maceda.

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The Ongrmia Presidency

been informed around May 15 by the SIDE regional chief in Cordoba, who had a reliable source in a trade union, that Cordoba would be shaken by acts of violence on Army Day, ~lay zg. Interior Minister Borda, for his part, recalls that eight or ten days bef()re that date Governor Caballero had come to Buenos Aires and presented a detailed report of the plans for what he called a "Bogotazito." Independent corroboration that Borda had such information comes from Dr. Dardo Perez Guilhou, then Rector of the University of the Cuyo in Mendoza, who recalls having been at Interior Minister Borda's house and hearing the Rector of the University of Cordoba state that "the thing is being prepared, it's going to break out within eight days." 29 Both General Sei\orans and Dr. Borda reported their infd Cornicelli if he had any suggestions for the post of Economy Minister. Presumably he was asking the same question of others. A few months later, according to the recollections of ex-Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez, he and Krieger Vasena were asked by General Lopez Aufranc whether they would be interested in joining the government again. 71 70Cornicclli Notes, Nov. 19, 1909. See also the December 8 entry, which records that Lanusse had conveyed his determination to resist any effort to oust him to the Navy Commander, Adm. Gnavia, who supported this decision. 71Cornicelli Notes, Nov. 19 and Dec. 8, 1969; "Salida Politica," (a two-page preliminary draft in Cornicelli's handwriting), MS, Lanusse Archive; Lanusse h7l. pp. 67-69. Dr. Costa Mendez (interview June 23, 1986), recalls the Lopez Aufranc inquiry as having been made during a trip on the Army Commander's vaeht in February or March 1970. Neither he nor Krieger Vasena expressed any interest. Given the negative feelings in the

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Although Dr. Costa Mendez viewed the inquiry as evidence of a plan to oust Onganfa, it was by no means clear that General Lanusse and his advisors regarded this as the only solution. Thought was being given to a power-sharing arrangement in which Onganfa would remain as President, while a prime minister appointed by the three military Commanders would preside over the cabinet, subject to their recall ifhe lost their confidence. This idea, which was spelled out in a private memorandum submitted to General Lopez Aufranc in November, resembled the governmental structure that Alvaro Alsogaray had proposed in the weeks before the June 1966 takeover, presumably with himself in mind for the prime minister's post. ""Jow, however, there were other interested candidates. 72 General (Ret.) Juan Enrique Guglialmelli, an Army intellectual well known for his "desarrollista" (developmentalist) views, expressed an interest in the prime ministership when he heard about the idea. Founder and director, since his retirement, ofEstrategia, an influential journal devoted to international and strategic studies, Guglialmelli tried to maintain a cooperative relationship with Lanusse and his personal staff. He met frequently with Colonel Cornieelli, supplying him with data on economic and international relations themes for use in speeches prepared for the Army Commander, and offering to publish articles in Estrategia on issues that would be of interest to the Army. 7:J A severe critic of the economic policies followed both by Krieger Vasena and his successor, Dagnino Pastore, Guglialmelli cooperated with General Lanusse at this time apparently in the hope of seeing those policies replaced by an economic program more in keeping with his own views. Thus, in January 1970, at a time when elements interested in promoting an immediate breach between the President and the Army Commander-in-Chief were circulating rumors that the latter's December 29 "Orientation" addressed to Army generals was the preparatory order for Ongania's overthrow, Guglialmelli, with Lanusse's consent, leaked selected portions of the speech to the editor of Confirmado. 74 Army about Krieger Vasena's activities during and after his service in the government, it seems strange that he would have been approached to return to the cabinet. 72For the Alsogaray proposal see above. Chapter 4- Cornicelli Notes, Nov. 19, 1969. 73Cornicelli t\otcs, Nov. 2, 8, 23, 1g6g; Feb. 23, Apr. 13, 1970. Guglialmelli expressed his interest to Cornicelli in an informal conversation on November 23; on Aprilg he told him that he felt the time had come for a showdown, and that Lanusse should take control through a prime minister. 74Cornicelli Notes, Jan. 8, 1970.

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The resulting article that appeared in its January 14 issue not only showed that Lanusse had reaffirmed the Army's "continuing collaboration with the government through the normal channels of command and in all aspects established by the law" but, quoting at length the economic portions of his address, depicted him as the advocate of a "Christian, social, and humanist" developmentalism. The Confirmado article noted that Lanusse's address anticipated an increase in violence as activists, including some of those who had been amnestied, would try to exploit unresolved social problems. It was therefore natural, the article observed, that the Army would play a more active role in 1970, but this did not mean that there would be differences with the Preslident. "Ongania," it insisted, "has sufficient cards in his hand to maintain the revolutionary leadership. The division between the Army and the government is only a nostalgic aspiration of the opposition." 7.5 In the light ofOngania's ouster from the presidency five months later, this benign view of the Army-government relationship might seem utterly unrealistic, or deliberately misleading. Nevertheless, an examination of that relationship as it evolved over the intervening period suggests that Ongania's downfall was not inevitable. He did have "cards in his hand" that might have led to a different result had he been disposed to compromise with his critics. But in the last analysis, Ongania's determination to remain true to his perception of reality, and to his convictions about the needs of the country, alienated the support he needed to remain in office. And yet for a period that extended from early March to late May, it seemed as if the President were trying to reach a modus vivendi with the Army leadership. Contributing to a marked improvement in Ongania's personal relations with Lanusse was on the one hand his approval of the latter's February 27 address at the Military Academy, and on the other hand the changes he proceeded to make in his immediate staff. Although not ready to replace the cabinet ministers whose acts of commission and omission had made them targets of military criticism, he did shake up the presidential office. He accepted the resignation of Roberto Roth, the energetic and controversial Undersecretary for Legal and Technical Affairs, who had drafted many of his speeches, and who had clashed frequently with cabinet members; and he replaced the Secretary-General of the Presidency, his old friend General (Ret.) Re75Conjirmado, Jan. 14, 1970, p. 16.

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petto, whose management style had tended to isolate the President, and perhaps influence his perception of political realities. The appointment to that post of General (Ret.) Juan Iavfcoli, who had served as Army Chief of Staff until his retirement in 1g68, was greeted in Army circles and by General Lanusse himself as a positive step, one that would make for a smoother relationship between the Army and the government. 76 A third change that also seemed likely to enhance that relationship took place in mid-April. General (Ret.) Seiiorans, the head of State Intelligence (SIDE), resigned after a stormy CONASE meeting in which the Chief of the Federal Police criticized the effectiveness of the intelligence services in combating the rising tide of subversive activities. Seiiorans defended the operations of his agency, but when the President failed to support him in the debate he submitted his resignation. Chosen to replace Seiiorans was General Gustavo Martinez Zuvirfa, a "nationalist" officer like his predecessor, but with a major difference. He was an academy classmate of General Lanusse, who regarded him as a good and loyal friend, despite their ideological differences. Indeed, Lanusse had retained him as head of the strategically located I Corps for the past two years. To be sure, the President also regarded ~lartfnez Zuvirfa as a friend, but there was a subtle difference in the nature of the two friendships that reflected the differences in the personalities. Onganfa was never able to bring himself to tutear (use personal, informal address to) his military friends whereas r..lartfnez Zuvirfa and Lanusse had been on a nickname basis for years. 77 The apparent rapprochement between the President and the Army Commander-in-Chief was not regarded with universal enthusiasm in all Army circles. The same Lanusse address at the Military Academy that found favor in the President's eyes was subjected to diverse kinds of criticism fi·om active and retired officers. In this address Lanusse had stated that since the Army had "gestated and initiated the Argentine Revolution," he as Commander-in-Chief felt an obligation to be "a 76For Lanusse's account ofOngania's praise for his February 27 speech. '"asi habia que hablar a! Ejercito" (""this was the way you had to speak to the Army'"), and for the reactions to the Iavfcoli appointment, Cornieelli Notes, Mar. 3, 1970. The U.S. Embassy reported the staff changes in Airgrams A-66, Feb. 19, and A-99, Mar. 12, 1970. 77Intcrview with Gen. (Ret.) Seiiorans. On Ongania.'s friendship with Martinez Zuvirfa, interview with Dr. Guillermo Borda. On Lanusse's friendship with Martinez Zuvirfa, Cornicelli Notes, Feb. 11, 26, 1970.

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permanent actor in its process and not a mere spectator." Taking issue with this approach was at least one general, the commander of a cavalry brigade, who wrote that the position of"actor" placed the Army within the process, but with no capacity to influence it in all its aspects. Instead, he argued, the Army's position should be that of a "director, external to the process with primary responsibility for its success, with the appropriate means to adopt final decisions affecting the totality of the process." In particular, he stressed the need for the Army to develop its position on the political future, and after coordinating that position with the other armed forces, to try to reach an understanding with the President on integrating political aims and economic goals into the longrange development plan that was under study. •s Also critical of the speech, but for different reasons, was General (Ret.) Guglialmelli. In blunt comments made directly to Lanusse he described the speech as an endorsement of existing economic policy and claimed that this was upsetting to the officer corps. Guglialmelli would later enunciate his own firm views on the role of the armed forces in the revolutionary process in an article that appeared in Estrategia, an article that anticipated the open rejection of the Onganfa government by "desarrollistas" like ex-President Frondizi. 79 From still another quarter a group of political figures fi·om traditional parties, together with a number of retired officers, were hoping for signs of deterioration rather than improvement in the OnganfaLanusse relationship. Calling themselves the Movement for Republican Affirmation (MAR), the group had formed the previous December to support the idea of having ex-President Pedro E. Aramburu replace Ongania as a provisional president to direct the process of restoring constitutional government. As head of a military government in 1958, General (Ret.) Aramburu had established his credibility by honoring his promise to hold elections and turn over power to a civilian successor. As a consequence, he enjoyed considerable support among middle-class Argentines for his personal integrity and democratic commitment. But he was hardly the filVorite of"nationalists," who still resented his role in 78 For the text of Lanusse's address, "Palabras Pronunciadas por el CJF. al Personal Militar Superior en Actividad en el Area del Cdo II MM el271700 Feb 70", MS, Lanusse Archive. For the critique by the II Cavalry Brigade commander, Cornice IIi ;\/otes, Mar. 4. 1970. and "Posicion del Ejercito en Ia RA," MS, Lanussc Arehive. 79Cornicelli Notes, Mar. 4, 19, 1970; Juan E. Guglialmelli, "Responsabilidad de las Fuerzas Armadas enla Revoluci6n Nacional," Estrategia Aiio 1, No.4, pp. 8-17.

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ousting President Lonardi in 1955, nor of Peronists who remembered him as the head of a military government that had excluded them from the political process, and executed Peronist rebels. 80 The campaign to promote Aramburu as a democratic replacement for Ongania began in the final months of 1969. The former president gave a number of interviews designed to project a new image, one that could appeal to sectors beyond his established constituency. Even as he criticized the Ongania government, he made it plain that he was not a doctrinaire liberal on economic issues, that he favored free elections with Peronist participation, and that if he were provisional president and they won in honest elections, he would turn over power to them. Early in 1970, while he was in France visiting family, a rumor began to circulate that he had met with a Peron intermediary and was in contact with the exiled leader. Whether there was any substance to this rumor has never been established but the belief that the two former presidents were in some kind of contact was very much in the air. What is clear is that a movement was under way to create the impression of broad support for an Aramburu succession. 81 While Radicals, Peronists, and other party leaders, and perhaps even some "nationalists," began to assess from the perspective of their own interests the pluses and minuses of having an Aramburu provisional presidency in place of a regime that maintained its silence about the political future, the key to any presidential substitution lay in persuading the military, and specifically the Army, to support the idea. But here there was a dramatic gap between expectation and reality. Although a number of supporters of the Aramburu project, including retired military men, had come to believe that General Lanusse himself was in their camp, there was no real basis for this belief. Not since April1963, when Aramburu angered Lanusse by adopting a neutral stance vis-a-vis the Colorado uprising against the Azul-supported Guido government, had there been any contact between the two men. Regardless of what BOOn the formation of the MAR, Confirmado, Dec. 24, 1969, pp. 14-15. interviews Aramburu gave to Los Principios of C6rdoba and Amilisis of Dec. 2, 1g6g, are analyzed in Embassy BA Airgram A-6g6, Dec. 25, 1g6g. On the alleged Paris contact with Ricardo Rojo, Confirmado, Feb. 11, 1970, p. 13. For an alleged exchange of letters between Aramburu and Per6n via Lisbon, interview with Dr. Klappenhach who claims to have learned this from Basilio Serrano, who became Argentine ambassador to Portugal in 1971. As an indication of the Aramburu "boom," I recall seeing in April or May 1970 the slogan "Aramburu-Uni6n Nacional" painted on a wall. The term "union nacional" was apparently intended to appeal to nationalists and Peronists, for whom the term "union democnitica," the name of the anti-Per6n coalition of 1945-46, was anathema. 81 The

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others thought, the Army Commander's moves were unrelated to the Aramburu project. And indeed, President Onganfa himself gave so little credence to the possibility of an Army-based conspiracy in support of Aramburu that he made no effort to place the ex-president's movements under close observation. 82 The increased cordiality that characterized the President's treatment of the Army Commander-in-Chief set the stage for renewed effiJrts to bring about major change in the personnel and policies of the Cabinet. Ironically, it was officers known to be close to Onganfa, who had sided with him against Lanusse in the earlier months of tension, who now urged the Army Commander to take the initiative. On April16, Colonel (Ret.) Donovan Bare visited General Lanusse and set forth his worry that the government was facing a crisis worse than that provoked by the outbreaks of violence the previous May. This time the crisis was within the government itself; it was projecting an image of self-destrucltion as shown by recent events. In a period of little more than a week, the Secretary of Agriculture resigned over policy differences with the Economy Minister and proceeded to attack him publicly in the press; the Secretary of State Intelligence resigned after the Federal Police Chief attacked the intelligence services; the Governor of Cordoba was ousted and took his differences with the Interior Minister to the press; and the government's philosophy of community participation suffered a blow when cattle producers withdrew from the Advisory Council on Agricultural Policy. 83 82"El Nuevo Aramburu," Periscopio, Feb. 17, 1970, pp. 10-12, speculates about politicians' attitudes toward a possible change in the presidency. For indications of contacts between retired officers across the Peronist-anti-Peronist divide, and optimism about Aramburu's prospects, interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Bernadino Labayru (May 14, 1970), and Navy Capt. (Ret.) Aldo Molinari (May 15, 1970). In our Dec. 15, 1983, interview, Gen. Lanusse told me that only after he left office in 1973 did he learn that people like retired Adm. Robbio Pacheco were convinced he was working for Aramburu. Lanusse's comment: "the person most uninformed of that was I." As to the government's lack of concern about Aramburu's activities, Ongania in his April17, 1984, Memorandum to me, wrote: "We had no public information about the political activities of Gen. Aramburu. The government's intelligence operations had not picked up indications at its level that indicated the advisability of maintaining watch over the activities of the general in that direction." 83 Even before Donovan Bare approached Lanusse, Col. Juan Buasso, Director of Protocol in Government House and a man close to the President, had expressed to Cornicelli his enthusiasm over the reconstitution of the "marriage" between Ongania and Lanusse, and his belief that the time had come to "clean out go percent of the Cabinet." Cornicelli Notes, March 4, 1970. For Donovan Bare's conversation with Lanusse, "Posicion Politica del Colonel (RE) Donovan Bare. Sintesis de sus manifestaciones al CJE el16 Abr 70," MS, Lanusse Archive.

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Bare conceded that President Onganfa might be able to patch things up and create the appearance of order and authority, but unfortunately this would not prevent a new crisis and the government without any support would collapse all by itself. What Bare proposed was to take advantage of the present crisis atmosphere to effect the replacement of the entire cabinet but not of the three Commanders-in-Chief. A totally new cabinet, provided the replacements had the necessary qualifications for their posts, could arouse new expectations and thus provide time for the principal task of achieving the goals of the Revolution. Bare put it to Lanusse that immediate action was needed, and that Lanusse was the best one to initiate it. With all due respect, it was necessary to present the concerns to the President "so as to obtain a decision that would allow General Onganfa to conduct the process effectively, satisfy the needs of the country and increase the prestige of the Commandersin-Chief. " 84 \Vhile it is unclear whether Bare had talked to Onganfa in advance of approaching the Army Commander-in-Chief, from other evidence there is little doubt that the President was trying to send signals that he wanted a cordial relationship with Lanusse. In a direct conversation the day before the Bare approach, Onganfa had conceded to Lanusse that he had made mistakes in handling the Cordoba situation, and as a sign of goodwill invited him to accompany him on a ceremonial visit to the interior city of Rio Cuarto. Perhaps more significant, when Onganfa made his offer of the SIDE post to General Martinez Zuviria, he tried to ease the latter's concern about the possibility of being caught in a cross fire between his two friends. According to what Martinez Zuvirfa later told Lanusse, Onganfa had assured him that as President he would no longer have any fights with Lanusse. s.s These various conversations led the Army Commander-in-Chief to wonder whether the President was now prepared to accept his advice, to "venir al pie'' (come to heel) as the expression went. Although some 84Ibid. Donovan Bare, at Lanusse's request, submitted his ideas in writing. They are contained in a five-page memorandum dated April 16, 1970, the day before they were submitted. and include the suggestion that a person like Felipe Tami as Minister of Economy would give the country confidence. MS, Lanusse Archive, all(! Cornicelli Notes, Apr. 17, 1970. 85 "Sintesis de Ia conversaci6n mantenida el17iiV /70 entre A.A. L., G.'\IZ y JMS," MS, Lanusse Archive.

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of Lanusse's friends were sceptical about Onganfa's intentions, and others felt that Lanusse would end up losing prestige in military eyes by getting too close to the President, the Army Commander-in--Chief decided to operate on the assumption that Onganfa was sincere in wanting to work out their differences. To this end, he assured Martinez Zuvirfa that he himself had made no decision to overthrow Onganfa, and that it could be useful to have him serving close to the President as the head of SIDE. Moreover, in a move to prevent a recurrence ofbad feelings, Lanusse refused to allow the head of the Cavalry OHicers' Association, General (Ret.) Hector Solanas Pacheco, to deliver the speech he had prepared for Cavalry Day, a speech that was highly critical of the government. 86 The first real attempt by Lanusse to probe the President's state of mind came on April 28 when the Army Commander presented Onganfa with an analysis of the current climate of opinion in the country and specifically within the Army. This analysis, embodied in an 11-page report that Lanusse read aloud to the President, pointed to the growing campaign of criticism directed against the government and against the President himself. As evidence of this campaign the report took note of the dramatic denunciation of the government, just one week before, by Arturo Frondizi, who had hitherto been one of its supporters. He also mentioned the personal attack on the President by ex-President Illia and the criticism by the newspapermen's association ofOnganfa's recent statements about truth in reporting. The main thrust of the presentation, however, was to set forth the principal accusations against the government, and to show the unsettling effect they were having on public and military opinion. In the field of domestic policy, the report cited the failure of the Interior Ministry to project an image of the Revolution that would create a consensus among important sectors of the population. It linked this failure to the evident desire of many Argentines for a political plan that would assure a democratic outcome, a plan that could generate new expectations, and attract the younger generation that felt frustrated in its political aspirations. The report 8 6 Ibid. and Cornicelli Notes, Apr. 18, 1970. Neither Dr. Jose Manuel Saravia nor Gen. (Ret.) Guglialmelli were happy at the rapprochement between Lanusse and the President. On Lanusse's personally painful decision to prohibit the address of his old cavalry mentor, Gen. (Ret.) Solanas Pacheco, Cornicelli Notes, Apr. 22, 23, 1970.

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cited as another irritating factor the actions of antidemocratic elements, and the exaggerated influence they claimed to exercise within the government. This raised doubts about the government's ultimate intentions, doubts that the President's frequent statements had not been able to allay. 87 In the economic field, the Lanusse presentation pointed to the recent resignation of the Secretary of Agriculture over the issue of restrictions on meat consumption and the support he subsequently received both from the press and various agricultural sectors, which were attacking the government's economic policy. The claim here was that the Economy Ministry was favoring the foreign-owned packing plants over the cattle owners. Indeed, it was argued that a recent rise in bankruptcies of small and medium firms and the growth in the number and size of foreign banks were evidence of an antinational orientation on the part of that Ministry. Critics of its policy were also citing the recent increase in the cost of living as proof that its stabilization policy was a failure. Last but not least in the allegations against the economic policy-makers, the Lanusse report cited the rumors that had been multiplying recently about corruption in high places in connection with contracts for major public works projects. 88 General Lanusse devoted a separate section of the report to the impact of the campaign of criticism on Army officers at all levels. Rightly or wrongly, they were receiving the impression that almost all sectors of Argentine opinion were now opposed to the government. While insisting that the unity of the Army and its commitment to the authorities remained intact, he pointed to a list of factors that were causing Army personnel to feel uneasy: the apparent loss of momentum in the revolutionary process; the delays observed in the completion of works essential to the goal of national development; the government's silence in the face of the campaign of criticism, especially in regard to charges of corruption; the inefficiency of high public officials, both civilian and retired military; the alleged links of certain officials and ex-officials to foreign business interests; the fear that circumstances or the activities of certain sectors were working to interrupt the revolutionary process before its basic objectives could be achieved; the social tensions caused 87"Situaci6n," !\IS, Lanusse Archive, pp. 1-5. 88[ bid. , pp. 6-7.

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by the difficult situation that certain popular sectors were experiencing; and finally the fear that ineptness in the handling of public affairs could play into the hands of extremist groups working to repeat the violent actions of the previous May. 89 In focusing on the various sources of uneasiness, civilian and military, General Lanusse was careful not to claim they were all true but to stress their unsettling impact, and therefore the need for action. "To remain indifferent," the paper concluded, "could result in the impairment of the Government and of the Commanders-in-Chief with unpredictable consequences for the normal continuation of the process."' For this reason, Lanusse proposed that there should be a careful analysis of the allegations so as to be able to refute them where possible, or where they proved justified, to take remedial action. He further proposed that on the basis of the results and other considerations that might be of interest, the President should give a talk to a meeting of generals, brigadiers, and admirals similar to the one that took place the previous September.90 General Lanusse came away from this April 28 meeting with the impression that the President, although heatedly rejecting many of the allegations, had accepted the intent of the document in good grace. A seeming indication of his receptivity to the concerns expressed by Lanusse was Ongania's agreement in principle to the proposal that he meet with the senior officers of the three military services. However, Ongania felt no urgency in convening such a meeting and indeed 30 days were to pass before he met with the high command of the Army in what was planned as the first of three separate meetings with senior officers. In the interim, he was receiving advice from other quarters. General (Ret.) Benjamin Rattenbach, who had had only limited contact with Ongania since their parting of the ways in 1963, was so alarmed by the growth of opposition to the government that he sought an audience with the President to urge the necessity of providing the public with a 89Jbid., pp. 8-10. 90 Ibid., p. 11. It is worth noting that the entire report was drafted by Col. Comicclli on Lanusse's instructions in a single day when the latter's audience with the President was advanced from May 5 to Aprilz8. Comicelli Notes, Apr. 27, 1970. Years later Gen. (Ret.) Lanusse cited this accomplishment to me as an indication of his aide's outstanding abilities. Although he was in a subordinate position, Cornicelli clearly was a man who possessed intellectual and political skills of a high order, as well as a capacity for hard work.

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safety valve to let off pressure. As he noted later in his memoirs, he made concrete suggestions for opening channels for the public to take part in policy debates, but Onganfa took no action. 81 General Lanusse, however, was still hopeful that the President would react positively to the concerns he had presented to him on Aprilz8. On May 11, Lanusse had an audience with Onganfa, in which he planned to discuss a possible date and format for the proposed meeting with the Army high command. Their conversation instead ranged over a variety of topics including the sensitive one of how they saw their respective futures. Although the President apparently gave no hint of how long he planned to stay in office, he did state that if he were to die or resign out of fatigue, he would expect the Junta of Commanders-in-Chief to resume power. General Lanusse, for his part, indicated an intention to remain as Army Commander-in-Chief until 1973. His reasoning was that only by then would Ongania be able to find a general with the appropriate professional and personal attributes to assume the task of controlling the Army. Ongania offered no objection, and one may assume that they were thinking in terms of a cavalryman to maintain the uninterrupted control that generals from that branch had maintained since Onganfa himself had taken command in 1962. 92 From this conversation, one might conclude that the rebuilding of mutual trust between President and Army Commander had reached the stage when they could confidently assume that they would be serving in their respective posts for another three years. But was this the case? The premise underlying General Lanusse's attitude seems to have been that Onganfa would have no choice but to bend to the pressures for policy changes. But was the President indeed persuaded that he had to make concessions to the demand fl>r a political opening in order to survive? The next few weeks would provide the answer. In the meantime, the arrangements for the President's meeting with the Army high command went forward. On May 14, the Army submitted a memorandum to him setting forth possible topics for discussion. This document actually presented nothing new; it simply reproduced in a different format the issues that General Lanusse had raised on 91 On Lanusse's guarded optimism after the meeting with Ongania, Cornicelli Notes, Apr. 28, 1970, and Lanussc's letter to Gen. Roberto Levingston, ~lay 7, 1970, copy, Lanusse Archive. Levingston was Argentina's military attache in Washington. On Battenbach's efh>rts, see his Recuerdos, pp. 165-167. 92Cornicclli Notes, May 10, 11, 1970.

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Aprilz8. On May 19, the President and the Army Commander-in-Chief fixed the date, place, and modalities of the meeting. It would take place at the Olivos Residence on the morning of May 27; it would take the form of an exchange of questions and answers; and to create an atmosphere conducive to a free exchange, everyone would come dressed in civilian clothes rather than in uniform. 93 But what precisely did General Lanusse expect to see as the outcome of this meeting? There is good reason to believe that he still expected the President to react positively to the Army's analysis of the situation, and to change the orientation of the government in the direction of welcoming public debate on issues related to an eventual-restoration of an elected government. Two clues provide an insight into Lanusse's thinking on the day before the Olivos gathering. One is a memorandum he asked Cornicelli to prepare, outlining steps that could be taken to overcome the "dangerous division between the mass of the citizenry on the one side and the government and the military institutions that sustain and support it, on the other side." Lanusse's original intention was to hand this new memorandum to the President just prior to the meeting, but his advisors persuaded him not to add anything to what he had already discussed with him. The other clue lies in Lanusse's reaction to the news obtained from the Undersecretary of Defense, Enrique Gilardi Novaro, later that same day, that the President had directed his cabinet ministers to present him with ideas for a political plan. Cornicelli's comment in his notes was concise but indicative: "It was a bombshell; Lanusse was happy." 94 The contrast between this mood and the one that emerged after the next day's Olivos meeting could not have been greater. Again to quote from Cornicelli's telegraphic-style notes: "Meeting of the command group with the President. The result could not be worse. Never have I observed so unfavorable a reaction on the part of the generals." 95 What had happened? Clearly, the President in his remarks to his audience revealed that he did not share the concerns that General Lanusse had expressed in the memoranda of April z8 and May 14, or 93 Memorandum addressed to "Excelentfsimo Senor Presidentiotes, June 3, 1970. 21 Ibid.

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Guglialmelli, those who would have the power of decision chose not to use it until absolutely necessary. First, they wanted to determine whether there was any chance, however slim, of reaching a compromise with the incumbent president. 22 The moment of truth for the future relations of Onganfa with the armed forces Commanders-in-Chief came on the afternoon of June 5, when the latter sought an audience with the President to present to him the results of their collective thinking. An "acta'' had been drawn up at the close of their June 4 meeting to set forth their ideas. According to the text, all three Commanders were in agreement on the necessity for the government to devise a political plan as defined by military terminology; the Army and Navy Commanders were also in agreement on the urgent need to begin this task although the Air Force Commander, Brigadier Carlos Hey, was less convinced of the urgency. All three were also in agreement that the national government, in the process of elaborating this plan, should not exclude the possibility of consulting representative figures from the different sectors of national life, except representatives of the former political parties. On the issue of informing the public of the government's intention to initiate the process of developing the plan, the Junta left this for consultation with the President, since it was a responsibility that belonged to him. 2 '3 Although, in order to get agreement, the wording of the acta toned down the ideas that General Lanusse had put forth in the June 2 CONASE meeting, it still retained the core concept of committing the government to opening up the political stage. President Onganfa's reaction, however, when the three Commanders-in-Chief presented him with the document at s:oo P.M. on June 5, was a flat rejection of its conclusions, and an order to restudy the matter. The conversation became increasingly heated when Lanusse, referring to the Olivos presentation and citing Defense Minister Caceres Monie as his authority, criticized Onganfa's political ideas as corporativist. The President reproached Lanusse for his remarks, and before the meeting ended reminded his visitors who was in charge. As Brigadier Hey later recalled it, Onganfa stated: "I am the government." General Lanusse reported 22The chief proponent of having Lanusse assume the presidency was Francisco Manrique, a onetime naval officer and newspaper publisher. 23 "Presiclencia de Ia Naci6n Junta de C:omandantes en Jefe. Acta de Reunion Especial, Buenos Aires, 4 de junio de 1970." MS, Lanusse Archive.

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the President's remarks somewhat differently: "The Commanders-inChief appointed me but they cannot change me. Even if they should go so far as to request my resignation, who knows whether I would resign." Onganfa's written account of what he said is less explicit, but he concedes that his exchanges with Lanusse were conducted "in an unusual tone, one surely capable of leading the Commander-in-Chief Ito the conviction, given the precedent of June 1969, that the President intended to remove him from his post." 24 The current of tension between the President and the Commandersin-Chief, especially General Lanusse, could not fail to carry over to the previously scheduled CONASE meeting that began immediately after, at 5:;30 P.M. The principal agenda item was the consideration of a 163point statement of national policies that had been in preparation for a matter of weeks. Drafted hy the CONADE and CONASE staffs, the original version had excluded references to the field of politics. Criticisms by the Justice Minister had led to changes that gave the text a less authoritarian and more democratic tone. Even so, it was not unti!l after the May 27 Olivos meeting that the words "political parties" and "parliament'' were included in the document, but as a supplement to the sectoral representation scheme that was central to Onganfa's thinking, and which he had tried to explain to the Army generals on t-.fay 27. 2" Sensitive to the charge of corporativism, Onganfa devoted a part of the CONASE meeting to a lengthy restatement of the scheme he had presented at Olivos, and challenged anyone to say that it had any connection with political corporativism. After a considerable silence, General Lanusse suggested that the lawyers present give their opinions. Education Minister Perez Guilhou, speaking (he said) as a former professor of political theory, denied that it was corporativist; Justice Minister Etchebarne, who had been responsible for the recent changes in the Statement of National Policies, took a different tack by questioning the practicality of Onganfa's ideas, and the time it would take to implement them; Defense Minister Caceres l\Ionie, for his part, refrained from calling the scheme corporativist, but stressed that it was 24 Interview with Brig. (Ret.) Carlos Rey, July 1:3, 1984; Cornicelli Notes, Julie 5, 1970; Lanusse [37], pp. 107-8; Onganfa Memorandum, p. 1425 I am indebted to Dr. Mariano Cast ex for providing me with a copy of the final version of the "Politicas Nacionales" document. For information on the earlier versions, see the statements of Justice Minister Etchebarne and Defense Minister Giceres Monie as summarized in Cornicelli Notes, June 6, 1970.

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not m the Argentine tradition. He observed that a sectoral system excluded too many individuals, and that only through political parties could the mass of independent citizens participate. At this point, General Lanusse, seconded by Admiral Gnavi, raised the issue of the political plan that the Junta de Comandantes had recommended. Ongania's response was that the national policies statement, which he now regarded as approved, was the government's political plan. As to the proposals made hy the Commanders, they would he implemented only when a consensus existed, and this might require another ten years. 26 At the conclusion of this meeting it must have been clear to General Lanusse that nothing was to be gained from further efforts to reason with the President; his opposition to any kind of political move that involved dealing with politicians was unyielding. Still, the Army Commander's initial inclination was to take no action until after he returned from a scheduled inspection trip to the III Corps in Cordoba on June g. Urged, however, by Colonel Cornicelli not to delay lest the President use the intervening time to launch a preemptive move that would undercut his position, Lanusse decided to convene a strategy meeting at his Campo de Mayo residence for the next afternoon, Saturday, June 6. Present at this gathering were several members of the Army General Staff, including Generals Lopez Aufranc and Betti, Colonel Cornicelli, Justice Minister Etchebarne, Defense Minister Oiceres Monie, Dr. Jose Manuel Saravia Jr., and possibly others. This Saturday meeting provided an opportunity f(Jr General Lanusse and the two cabinet ministers to explain to the others what had taken place in the CONASE meeting of the night before. Their consensus was that the President's ideas were unrealistic, and that the country could not wait for the institutional changes he wanted to carry out. General Lanusse, insisting that the Army could not afford to gamble everything on Ongania achieving his goals, summed up his own position in the following words: "In June 1966, we issued a blank check to Onganfa; in June 1970, he should not retain it. Wittingly or unwittingly, General Ongania is trying to obtain a new blank check." 27 The final decision to move against Onganfa was made later that night, when General Lanusse and Admiral Gnavi had an opportunity to meet after attending the wedding of a general's daughter in Bella Vista. 26Jhid.; Lanusse [37], pp. wg-no: Ongania Memorandum, p. 14. 27 Cornicelli

Notes, June 5, 6, 1970.

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Although they had been unable to get Air Force Commander Hey to commit himself to joining them, they went ahead with a plan of action for Monday, June 8. Under the plan, Admiral Gnavi would hold a meeting of Navy admirals early in the morning, explain the situation to them, and cancel the 11:00 A.M. meeting the admirals were scheduled to have with the President as the Navy counterpart to the May 27 Olivos meeting with the generals. Instead, in his role as Chairman of the Junta de Comandantes, Gnavi would summon that body into special session to adopt the necessary measures. 28 In anticipation of the impending confrontation with the President, General Lanusse asked Colonel Cornicelli on Sunday afternoon to prepare the draft of an explanatory message for distribution Ito the Army, and to transmit his instructions for the major generals commanding the three most important Army corps, together with two other major generals, to be at the Army Building for a meeting on Monday morning. At g:oo A.M., prior to leaving for the Junta de Comandantes session at the Estado Mayor Conjunto (Joint General Staff) office across the street in the Defense Ministry building, General Lanusse briefed the group of generals on the events of the last few days that had led to his decision to take action. The major generals present unanimously . supported his view that it was "not possible, acceptable, or healthy for the Army and the country" to have a president who did the opposite of what the armed forces were advising, and that Onganfa had to go. With the endorsement of his position by the key corps commanders, Lanusse could feel confident that he had the necessary strength to confront the President and reasonably certain that the Army would not split in the process. 29 28Cornicelli Notes, June 7, 1970; interview with Adm. (Ret.) Pedro Gnavi, June 12, 1984; interview with Brig. (Ret.) Rey. In a 35-page memorandum which he gave me (hereafter cited as Rev Memorandum), the former Air Force Commander reconstructed the episode as follows~ "On Saturdav [June 6], he [Lanusse] sent an emissary to me at the Ezeiza residence to sound out my position; he was a mutual friend, Dr. Mario de Campo. I listened to him attentively, we had a friendly talk, but I maintained the enigma of my position." 29Cornicelli Notes, June 7, 1970; the quoted words are from an interview with Gen. (Ret.) Lanusse, Aug. 24, 1973; "Sfntesis de 6rdenes rereign influence over the economy. Many Radicals, while differing in their assessment of his motivations and views, could not forget his role in President Illia's ouster in 1g66. Clearly, if General Lanussc were to be able to achieve his goals, he would have to win the cooperation of many of these elements, and he able to neutralize the opposition of others. 2 But what were his goals? Rhetoric aside, his basic objective was to supervise a transition from the existing military regime to an elected government that could come to power with the endorsement of an electoral majority, and yet be one that the Army leadership would be comfortable in supporting. General Lanusse had concluded that a military regime without popular support offered no solution to the country's problems, that its best interests lay in the establishment of a stable, efficient, democratic government, and that the time was ripe for putting an end to the political hatreds that had contributed to the instability of the past. The challenge General Lanusse confronted was a complicated one, but with his Army support and his extensive contacts among civilians. he seemed confident that he could create a climate in which the armed forces, the political parties, the labor unions, and business interests would agree on the need and on the procedures for restoring constitutional government. Although General Lanusse had been urged by fellow generals to assume the Presidency on his own, he made the decision, one he later regretted. to share power with the :"-Javy and Air Force Commandersin-Chief. Under the provisions of an amendment to the Acta of the Revolution, the Junta de Comandantes assumed control of the government, and the title and duties of President of the Nation went to the Junta chairman, in this case General Lanusse. Since the chairmanship rotated every two years, it was understood that Air Force Commander Rey would replace Lanusse as chairman and President in 1973· The Acta entrusted the President with the exercise of both executive and legislative authority, but in matters regarded as important, he had to get the consent of at least one of the other two Junta members. In practice, 2 Beeause of his high public profile, Lanusse was one of the most stereotyped figures of his day. To the views mentioned in the text may be added those of the extreme lf'ft, who saw him not only as a conservative but as an agent of £i>rcign (i.e .. U.S.) imperialism. Lanusse's ideas about restoring civilian government were related to the concept of the Gran Acuerdo Nacional, which will be analyzed below.

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Lanusse tried to work by consensus, but it was at the expense of considerable delay in reaching decisions. This was true not only in matters of proposed legislation, when it was necessary to reconcile the recommendations coming from each of the three armed forces' general staffs, hut even in the making of appointments, since each military service regarded certain posts, particularly provincial governorships, as a kind of patrimony that it controlled. Thus, even when it became clear that a provincial governor proved to be ineffective, or was out of step with Lanusse's policies, the President could not easily replace him, especially if he were a retired Air Force or Navy officer. 3 President Lanusse, however, encountered no difficulty with his Junta colleagues in making his initial, and most significant, cabinet appointment, that of Dr. Arturo Mor Roig to he Interior Minister. Despite the fact that he belonged to the UCRP, the very party that the armed forces had ousted in 1966, an Army General Staff study recommended Mor Roig's appointment in the light of his political skills, his personal integrity, and his clear vision of the need for political reconciliation. The main obstacle to Mor Roig's appointment came in fact from his own political party. Sensitive to the electoral defeat that the UCRP had suffered in 1958 after having been closely associated with the Aramhuru military government, and aware of the opposition he faced within his own party, UCRP leader Ricardo Balbin refused to authorize Mor Roig's designation to the ministerial post. This problem was overcome, however, when the members of the Hora del Pueblo, the multiparty association that Mor Roig had helped create, met and unanimously urged his appointment as the best way to guarantee the opening of the political process. When Jorge Paladino, as the Peronist or Justicialista representative on the Hora del Pueblo, personally urged the !\lor Roig appointment, Balbfn yielded and gave up his opposition. The former Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies now felt free to accept the ministerial appointment, and f()rmally resigned from the UCRP so as to take up his new duties without any party ties. 4 3 Interviews with G{•ns. (Ret.) Lanusse Dec. 15, 1983, and Sanchez de Bustamante Ang. 5, 1985; Acta de Ia Revoluci(m Argentina, amendments to articks 1, 5, and 10 of the Estatuto de Ia Hcvolnci6n Argentina, Mar. 26. 19:-1. in Boletin Informativo. Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina [2], 1971, No. 12, p. 13. Also "Aetas de Ia Junta de Comandantes en Jefe en Funci6n de Gobierno, No. 1-39, 23 de marzo-30 diciembre 1971; 1-49, 4 de enero-29 de diciembre, 1972; 1-17, 4 de enero-8 de mayo, 1973," MSS. (Hereafter cited as AJCJ, number and date.) 4 "\!emorandum, Buenos Aires, 23 de marzo de 1971. Asunto: \'cntajas y dr the time being most of the cabinet officials who had served under Levingston were asked to stay on. Apart from Mor Roig's appointment, the most notable changes were the return of two men who had been ousted by Levingston; Francisco Manrique was appointed to the Social Welfare Ministry, and Rubens San Sebastian to the Labor Secretariat. Two months later, however, responding to pressures from the trade unions on the one hand, and from agricultural organizations on the other, the Junta de Comandantes decided to elevate the secretariats that dealt with those sectors to the status of ministries. What had been the Ministry of Economy and Labor was now dissolved, and its other secretariats were combined to constitute the Ministry of Treasury and Finance and the Ministry oflndustry, Commerce, and Mining. The reorganization had the result of placing directly on the President the burden of receiving competing policy proposals, and of trying to decide on a viable economic course. It was a perplexing task, which neither General Lanusse nor his military colleagues were prepared by prior training to carry out successfully. 6 In General Lanusse's outlook, however, economic issues were of Archive; interviews with Dr. Enrique Vanoli, Aug. 12, 1985; Dr. Hicardo Yofre. Aug . .=;, 1985; and Sr. Jorge Paladino, Feb. 8, 1984. Vanoli was secretary of the UCRP executive committee, and a close associate ofBalbin; Yofre was son-in-law ofMor Roig's close friend, Jose Luis Cantilo, and joined Mor Roig as an advisor in the Interior Mini~try. 5Jnterviews with Yofre and Paladino. 6AJCJ, No. 1, Mar. 23, 1971; La Naci6n, Mar. 27, Apr. 19, 21, 22 and May 27. 1971; Law 19,064, May 21-i, 1971.

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secondary importance and always subordinate to the fulfillment of his political program, the program that he and Interior tvlinister Mor Roig called the "Gran Acuerdo Nacional" (CAN). What did the President and his Minister mean by the CAN? Critics of Lanussc have charged that it was little more than a scheme to facilitate his election to a constitutional presidency. This allegation will be examined in detail below, but suffice it to say here that in the eyes of both Lanusse and Mor Roig, the CAN had less to do with personal political ambitions than with what they saw as the patriotic objective of trying to achieve domestic peace, and the establishment of a stable democratic regime in a country that had enjoyed neither for the past four decades. That these may have been illusory goals, given the circumstances that prevailed at the time, and the obstades that had to be dealt with, should not serve to deny the sincerity with which they pursued those goals. Had they succeeded, Argentina might have been spared the political and economic chaos, and the tragic violence, that engulfed the country in the vears that followed. It was Mor Roig's belief that the country had reached the end of a historical period, that the political breakdowns of recent decades demonstrated that the time had come for change, and that a simple return to the pre-1g66 situation would be a mistake. Rather, he saw in the Lanusse leadership of the military government an opportunity to lay the basis fmbership, holding internal elections, adopting dt>clarations of principles and partv charters, and securing official recognition by the courts.

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also compensate him for the things he had lost. Paladino, however, saw a major obstacle in Jose Lopez Rega and his influence over the Peron household, and suggested to a Lanusse aide that the only way to guarantee a solution was to send someone to remove him from the scene. 27 President Lanusse had declined to follow this suggestion, but he did decide that the time was now ripe to establish a direct conduit to Peron through the appointment of a new Madrid ambassador. The man selected for this task was a retired Air Force Brigadier, Jorge Rojas Silveyra, who had served as Air Force Secretary under Presidents Frondizi and Guido. His well-known role as an anti-Peron conspirator prior to 1955, it was felt, would help deflect military criticism of his mission. Rojas Silveyra also possessed another asset, an informality of manner and speech that might enable him to establish a good relationship with Peron. zk Bef(n·e leaving for Madrid on July 5, Rojas Silveyra discussed his mission with the Junta de Comandantes and received detailed instructicms. He was to maintain complete secrecy about his contacts with Peron, not even informing other members of the Embassy; he was to meet with Peron in private residences to make detection difficult, and he was to report exclusively to the President and the Junta via the Foreign Minister and the Joint General Staff Chief. The purpose of Rojas Silveyra's mission as stated in the instructions was to provide the Junta with information about Peron's thinking, his possible future actions, and his aims, both political and personal. However, in anticipation of possible negotiations, the instructions listed conditions that Peron would be asked to fulfill, and specified concessions the government might be willing to offer him. Peron would be asked to do the following; to repudiate, publicly and definitively, terrorism and the guerrillas, and to disassociate his movement from all subversive activity; to support the government's political plan, if not completely, at least in its fundamental aspects; to accept that minority parties have rights that should be respected in a democratic system; to allow his 27Interviews with Gen. (Ret.) Sanchez de Bustamante and Jorge Paladino; Lanussc [38], p. 2lJ7 28 Rojas Silveyra, like LanussP, had been sentenced to prison f()r his role in th30 hs," MS, Lanusse Archive. This one-page document summarized Peron's latest statements as telephoned by a Dr. De Campo in Madrid to Brig. Martinez and relayed by him to Lannsse at Army Headquarters on May 23.

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cause of alarm; he felt that the government had a reasonable chance to gain the support of the Radicals and other parties, and even to exploit the divisions within the Justicialista movement to counter any Peron move. In any event, Mor Roig felt that until July 31 the best comse of action would be to make it crystal clear to Peron that he could not be President, but if he still persisted after that date, to find a way of avoiding an outright government veto of his candidacy. 116 The Army Corps commanders with whom General Lanusse met on May 23 were far less confident than the Interior Minister about the government's capacity to limit Peron's influence over the political process. Their primary concern, however, related to the state of mind of their subordinates. Many members of the officer corps had become restless as they observed the supposedly rival Justicialista sectors all calling for Peron's electioll, while the government's plans for avoiding this, whether through negotiation or proscription, remained cloaked in ambiguity. Indeed, one corps commander warned that unless the government made a decision within the next 6o days, he might be faced with a disciplinary or morale problem he would find difficult to control. It was his recommendation, moreover, that if the government decided to send a representative to negotiate with Peron, it should do so openly and not covertly, for word would certainly get out. 117 The major generals were in agreement that a Peron presidential candidacy would put the election in jeopardy, because of the opposition of the armed forces and a good part of the citizenry. The problem, however, was how to prevent it, and on this there was no agreement. One general proposed a direct notification to Peron that he could not be a candidate, to be backed up if necessary by the issuance of a decree; another argued for a requirement to be included in the forthcoming election law that presidential candidates must be residents in Argentina for a continuous period prior to the general elections. Of course no one could guarantee that Peron would choose to remain away. Several of the generals, however, voiced concern that younger officers might view either a direct ban or a legal barrier to a Peron candidacy as a violation of the government's repeated promise of "fair play" in the political process. In response, Mor Roig argued that the concept of htir play presup116"Reuni6n de mandos," May 23, 1972, MS, Lanusse Archive. This is a 74-pag;e transcription of the tape made of the meeting;. 117 Ibid. The commander in question was General Lopez Aufranc.

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posed the existence of rules of the game, that one of the basic rules of the CAN was that there would be no "leap into the void" (sal to al vacio ), and that a Peron candidacy would violate this rule because it would revive the confrontations of the past, the very elimination of which was a central aim of the CAN. 11 R Whether or not the generals felt that their subordinates would be persuaded by this reasoning, they did agree with the Interior Minister that the prevention of a Peron candidacy should not be a unilateral government decision; rather it should be sought through a combined effort of the government, the armed forces, and important political party sectors. The generals also reacted positively to a Mor Roig idea for a political alternative, should the government fail to win the necessary political party support for the CAN. This was to go over the heads of the party leaders, and conduct a plebiscite in which the electorate would be asked to choose between a "peacefully agreed-upon solution for the establishment of democratic institutions or an indefinite dictatorship of unknown orientation." Mor Roig was convinced, and the generals enthusiastically agreed, that the people would vote overwhelmingly for a solution that would plaee the future of the republic above the interests of individual parties. Under the existing political calendar, Mor Roig pointed out, a decision on a plebiscite need not be made until late October. Until then, the government should be doing everything possible to persuade the various political forces to join in the CAN . 119 Lanusse's May 31 San Nicolas address was of course directed to those political forces. The response of their leaders, however, was a deafening silence. Only one well-known figure, Leopoldo Bravo, a member of the Hora del Pueblo, agreed to meet with President Lanusse, and he was criticized for it by his fellow members. One reason f(>r this silence was the fact that the process of electing party officials was still under way. In the case of the Radical Party, Dr. Ricardo Balbfn, who privately seems to have agreed with Mor Roig on the need f(>r an aeuerdo, did not want l!BJbid. It was Army Chief of Staff General Herrera who proposed the idea of a residence requirement for presidential candidates. but several of the generals doubted it would prevent Per6n Ji·om running. 119 Ibid . .\1or Roig's May 8, 1972, political assessment, cited in note 113, contained the original plebiscite proposal; he read the passage including the quoted words to the meeting of generals on May 23. Under the political calendar, parties had to nominate their candidates by December 25; by announcing a plebiscite in October and holding it in :'1/ovember. there would still he time to reach agreement on a program and a CAN candidate.

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to provide his party rivals with a divisive issue that could complicate his reelection as party head, or influence the meetings of its national committee and national convention scheduled for June 17-20. 120 From the viewpoint of President Lanusse and Interior Minister Mor Roig, the cooperation of the Radical Party was an essential part of their strategy. If the UCR agreed to participate in the CAN, other smaller parties would follow and Peron would have to weigh the risk of being isolated if he continued to oppose it. Moreover, the government would be in a stronger position to attract the neo-Peronists, and other moderate elements within the Justicialista camp, who were eager for the chance to gain public offices. Conceivably, if the CAN were a going concern, it might even be possible to win the political support, or at least the neutrality, of certain trade union leaders in return for concessions within the power of the government to grant. 121 Apparently, it was calculations of this sort that led Lanusse to clarifY the message contained in his San Nicolas address, a message that had given rise to contradictory interpretations in civilian political circles. Indeed, one UCR leader viewed the address as the launching of Lanusse's presidential candidacy; another political figure, a member of the Hora del Pueblo, saw in its forthright tone evidence that the a:rmed forces were determined to impose their own candidate. In any event, Lanusse and Mor Roig used the occasion of a full cabinet meeting on June 14, three days before the newly elected UCR National Committee was to convene, to clear the air. For his part, the Interior Minister endorsed the San Nicolas speech, and expressed the hope that the political parties would view the CAN as a necessity for the country, not an imposition of the armed forces, and that the parties would present concrete proposals. Much more sensational were the remarks of General Lanusse. In a prepared statement that he could be certain would be leaked to the news media, he announced that he had no desire to run for the presidency. The reasons he gave for this decision repeated points he had mentioned else,vhere, namely that apart from personal and l20Confirmado, June 13, 1972, pp. 8-10. Mor Roig, in his remarks to the generals on Mav 23, referred to a recent conversation in which Dr. lhlbin accepted the Interior Minister's analysis of the country's problems, and his contention that no one political party could solve them and it was therefore necessary also to involve labor, employers, and the armed forces. 121 For a discussion of the political alternatives that government strategists were considering, see Cvnfirmado, June 6, 1972, pp. 10-1:3.

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bmily considerations, it would not be healthy f(>r the image of the country, and hence of the armed forces, for him to become the constitutional president. But he offered other reasons that were directed to the leaders of political parties, especially those of the UCR: that he wanted to eliminate any appearance of "continuismo," and remove all doubts about the government's commitment to "fair play"; and furthermore, that there were many Argentines with better qualifications for the presidency. President Lanusse, however, did not rule out the possibility of circumstances arising in which he would be offered a candidacy and he would accept, but he promised that neither he nor any member of his cabinet would be the creator of those circumstances. 122 A f(:w days after the media disseminated these remarks, Dr. Balbfn was reelected President of the UCR.National Committee by a comfortable margin, but it was clear from the decisions of the UCR National Convention that he would have serious problems if he were to come out openly in support of an acuerdo. Antigovernment and antimilitary sentiment remained widespread within the UCR, especially among the newer and younger affiliates. In Balbfn's own province of Buenos Aires, a young lawyer, Raul Alfonsfn, had garnered over 40 percent of the votes in the party primary, and his supporters had tried to install him as the national leader in place of the elderly Balbfn. Their eflorts were premature, but a decade later Alfonsfn would occupy that post and be catapulted into the presidency. In 1972, however, his supporters together with hard-line Cordoba delegates, who still resented President lilia's ouster by the military six years before, were numerous enough to shape the political resolutions adopted by the Convention. These made it plain that the Party was determined to preserve its individual identity and its intransigent mystique; moreover, the decision to require a twothirds vote to nominate a presidential ticket made it all but impossible that the Convention would ever endorse a nonparty candidate. Nevertheless, if the Hora del Pueblo were to put forth Dr. Balbfn as the presidential candidate of an acuerdo, it was not inconceivable that the 122For the ways politicians interpreted the San :-.lieolas speech, see Confirmado. June 1:3, 1972, p. 6; for Mor Roig's statements at the June 14 cabinet meeting, see La Naci6n, June 15, 1972; the text of Lanusse's carefully preparecl statement was not clistributed to the press, which explains the tentative accounts that appeared in the newspapers on June 15. La Opinion published what it claimed was the entire text on June 16, and a very usefi.•l analysis by Osvaldo Tcherskasi on June 17, 1972.

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UCR Convention could find the necessary votes to endorse a vicepresidential candidate from outside the UCR. 123 If the government's prospects for obtaining Radical Party support for the CAN thus remained doubtful, but not necessarily hopeless, its relations with the other major political force were even more unpredictable. The information reaching it from the Peronist or Justicialista camp seemed to convey contradictory messages. For example, in a June 15 handwritten letter addressed to Jose Rucci that came to the government's attention, and which it took very seriously, Peron informed the CGT Secretary-General that the time was fast approaching for launching a battle plan against the government. In this letter, alluding to the mass demonstration that restored him to power in 1945, he mentioned the possibility of "a new October q, but national, something like an 'argentinazo.' We'll see how they will be able to face that." 124 Yet that same day, June 15, Peronist economist Dr. Alfredo G6mez Morales, recently returned from Madrid, met secretly with President Lanusse. Gomez Morales told him that Peron was convinced that the Peronists should not try to govern the country alone, and that there was need for dialogue to produce an agreement. This was Gomez Morales· belief also, and he told the President that he and another Peronist economist, Antonio Cafiero, were organizing a team of economists to prepare policy papers for use in planning for the future government. A few days later, Gomez Morales had a long talk with General Fernando Dubra of the Army General StaH~ partly about Peron, but chiefly about economic problems. 12·5 Over the next several days, a number of Justicialista personalities were in touch with high-ranking Army officers. On June 19, just prior to his departure for Madrid, Dr. Hector Campora, Perrt to present the Air Force in a different light fi·om the other military services, see "Discurso del Comandantc en Jefc de Ia Fuerza Aerea-Evaluacion," MS, Lanusse Archive: for the resolution of the controversy, see AJCJ. No. 28/72, Aug. 11, 197211 Confirrruulo, Aug. 15, 1972, pp. 8ff; La Naci6n, Aug. 12, 1972.

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ment signed by Per(m and himself, dated August 15, that attacked the "Armed Forces and the clique that headed them" for acting in behalf of interests "that are not precisely those of the Fatherland" and for "serving the interests of the 'economic-financial power' linked to the dependency scheme." The GAN, the document went on, was a failure because it tried to reconcile the perpetuation of those interests with an agreement with the political parties, and this was an historical impossibility. Peron was presenting his candidacy as a guarantee against those interests, and he called on the "responsible majority sectors" to agree on a process of national reconstruction that would achieve the promised institutionalization with or without the participation of the armed forces. 12 After reading this document, Campora announced that Peron had made the irreversible decision to return to the country. The timing of the return would be left to the tactical (in-country) leadership and it would decide when the appropriate conditions existed. In the meantime, Campora announced the formation of two committees, one to assure Peron's personal safety, the other to foster the idea of the return. Whether in fact Peron's decision as revealed at this time was irreversible is open to question, hut it was Campora who would become the most effective agent of the return, mobilizing mass support for it in Argentina and working to overcome any hesitations on the part of the exiled leader. 13 Perhaps it was only a coincidence, but the same August 15 on which Peron issued his denunciation of the military government witnessed the first of a series of explosive events that further weakened President Lanusse's efforts at national conciliation, and demonstrated to the public the high cost of politically related violence. The first blow to the government's prestige was the seizure by its inmates of the Rawson penitentiary in southern Patagonia and the escape of six key ERP, FAR, and Montonero leaders. Considered to be impregnable, the Rawson 12 La Naci6n, Aug. 22, 1972, contains excerpts from the document, which was entitled ''To the People and the Armed Forces." The full text can be found in Tom:is Eloy Martinez, La pasiun segt1n Trelew [148], pp. go~g2. 13 La Naci6n, Aug. 22. 1972; Campara's crucial role in promoting the return of Peron is stressed in Jorge Luis BC'rnetti, El peronisrrw de Ia victoria [ 126 I, pp. 46. 73· For Campora's claim that Peron had assigned him the task of preparing for the return when he was first appointed to replace Paladino as personal delegate in November 1971, see Hector Campora. El mandnto de Peron [2g].

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institution housed more than 160 guerrillas or terrorists, some of them awaiting trial, others serving out sentences. The concentration of so large a number of extremists was the result of a decision that Rawson's remote location and proximity to military installations would make it less vulnerable to external assault than prisons located close to population centers. The experience of the Villa Urquiza prison in Tucuman, where an ERP attack the previous September killed five guards and freed sixteen ERP and two FAR prisoners, was a case in point. It was believed, moreover, that imprisonment at Rawson would prevent what had happened in the Federal Capital, where ERP leader Roberto.Santucho from his jail cell in the Villa Devoto prison had been able to mastermind the kidnapping of Fiat executive Oberdan Sallustro. Santucho was one of many prisoners who in the course of 1972 were transferred to the greater security of the Rawson institution. 14 The events of August 15, however, proved that even this prison was vulnerable. Perhaps because of its geographiC remoteness, perhaps because the nearby military units were prepared to cope with an external assault, the prison authorities gave the prisoners considerable latitude to mingle with one another, and thus plan the uprising. Apparently, two other escape plans were considered and discarded before the adoption of the one that was implemented on August 15. With one or more guns smuggled into the prison, apparently with the cooperation of a prison guard who had been won over with a bribe and/ or a threat to his family, the extremists were able to subdue their immediate jailors. Then, donning their jailors' uniforms, they proceeded step by step to take control of the rest of the institution, and cut off the alarm system that connected the prison with external security forces. Only at a post near the exit of the main building did the guards become suspicious; in the ensuing gunfire, the militants killed one guard and wounded another. All this took place without arousing the suspicion of a so-man antiguerrilla Army unit located 400 meters away or the police patrols that passed outside the prison walls. 15 14 Two official accounts of the Rawson episode exist, one by Joint General Staff Chief Adm. Quijada (see La Naci6n, Aug. 26, 1972), the other by V Corps Commander Gen. Ceretti (ibid., Sept. 14, 1972). For a brief summary that points out the irony ofSantucho's escape in view of his having been held first at Villa Urquiza and then at Villa Devoto, see Embassy BA Telegram 5143, Aug. 16, 1972. I5Quijada Report. Perhaps because the prison was under Army jurisdiction, Adm. Quijada did not hesitate to criticize the laxness of the prison authorities in allowing conditions that facilitated the prisoner uprising and escape attempt.

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The weakest part of the escape plan, as it turned out, involved the transfer of the guerrillas to the Trelew airport, some 25 kilometers distant, where they expected to hijack an Austral jet scheduled to depart for Buenos Aires at 7:05P.M. By prearrangement, three trucks, a pickup, and an automobile were to approach the outer wall of the prison at a certain time and enter it in response to a signal. For some reason, perhaps because the operation had taken longer than planned, the trucks and the pickup were nowhere to be seen when the 116 prisoners lined up in the patio ready to leave. The six top leaders of the prison breakout, a group that included Roberto Santucho of the ERP, Marcos Osatinsky of the FAR, and Fernando Vaca Narvaja of the Montoneros, thereupon crowded into the one waiting automobile and drove to the airport. A second group of nineteen extremists, who had been selected beforehand for their ideological commitment and military training, were eventually able to get to the airport in taxis summoned from the center of Rawson. 16 Arriving at the Trelew airport at T 15, the group of six were able to board the Austral plane despite the fact that it had already taxied to the end of the runway. Four armed accomplices who had boarded the flight at a prior stop held the plane until the six could get aboard, and forced the pilot to fly to Chile. The other nineteen, arriving too late to get aboard, seized control of the terminal, in the hope of hijacking an Argentine Airlines plane that was scheduled to arrive shortly. By this time, however, the alarm had been spread, and from the control tower of the nearby naval air base at Almirante Zar, the plane was directed to overfly Trelew and proceed to Viedma. Meanwhile, a marine infantry unit was brought up to surround the Trelew terminal, but because of the presence within it of civilians held as hostages by the extremists, the commander of the unit decided not to launch an assault. Eventually, in the presence of a federal judge, a defense lawyer, a doctor, and journalists, the nineteen surrendered but not before denouncing the military government and defending their right to use violence against it. 17 The guerrillas wanted to be returned to the Rawson prison, but at the hour in question it was still in the hands of rebellious inmates. The nineteen were taken instead to the Almirante Zar naval air base, where I6Ceretti Report; Martinez [ 148]. pp. 64-65. The other three escapees were Enrique Gorrianin Merlo (ERP), Roberto Quieta (FAR), and Domingo Menna (ERP). 17 Martinez [148]. pp. 67-74.

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they were confined, two or three to a cell, in the base lockup under the watchful eye of armed navy personnel. For the next five days they were kept in the lockup and underwent interrogation. A federal judge sought to establish their respective roles in the Rawson uprising, and witnesses were brought in to identifY those responsible for the killing of the Rawson guard. The highly disciplined militants, however, provided little information to their interrogators. 18 In the early morning hours of August 22, the event took place that was to reverberate throughout the country and generate an historical controversy that has still not been fully resolved. The bare facts are that the nineteen inmates were ordered to form a double line outside their cells for a periodic inspection; shortly thereafter, gunfire broke out and when it was over thirteen of the inmates were dead and six wounded, three of whom subsequently died of their wounds. According to the official account prepared by Admiral Hermes Quijada, the Chief of the Joint General Staff, who flew down to Trelew later that day, one of the prisoners, Mariano Pujadas, had grabbed the inspecting officer, Navy Corvette Captain Sosa, seized his weapon and fired in the direction of the armed guards who controlled the exit, while the other prisoners surged forward in an escape attempt. The other guards opened fire with their automatic weapons and the casualties were the unfortunate result. 19 This official account, which was released on Friday, August 25, was greeted at the time with widespread scepticism, for to many the shootings seemed to be a cold-blooded massacre, an instance of the phenomenon known in other Latin American countries as the ley fuga (shot while trying to escape). The U.S. Embassy, in commenting on the episode, expressed the view that it was an overreaction on the part of edgy security personnel to prevent a repeat of the Rawson escape. At the same time the Embassy noted that there was a strong impression in the general public that the incident was a staged affair. This impression was given some substance when a group of lawyers, who regularly defended accused extremists, issued a statement challenging the official account, and distributed testimonies of the three survivors. Each of the three denied that any escape had been planned or attempted; they 18 Ibid .. pp. 94-95; Adm. Quijada"s official account of the events at the Almirante Zar base in the period August 15-22 is part of the report cited in note 14. 19Jbid.

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denied that Pujadas had seized Captain Sosa's weapon. In their view it was an unprovoked massacre, as evidenced by the fact that, when they sought to avoid the bullets by jumping back into their cells, they were followed by guards who continued to shoot at them. They owed their survival, they claimed, to the fact that the guards thought they were dead, and to the arrival of other naval personnel who forced a halt in the shooting. 20 But if the Trelew killings were a deliberately staged affair, who was responsible? Was it the officer in charge of the base prison, Captain Sosa, goaded by the recalcitrance of the prisoners, and perhaps acting under the influence of alcohol, who gave the orders? Or was he acting under instructions from above? Commentators known for their hostility to the military regime have contended that the decision was made in Buenos Aires. Eloy Martinez, writing in 1973, rejected the idea that Sosa acted on his own, noting that Sosa was never punished by his Navy superiors and was even rewarded with an overseas study assignment. The most likely explanation in Martinez's view was that the Admiralty came up with the idea of the shooting as a coup de grace against the guerrillas, and that the Junta de Comandantes gave their approval. Commenting on the matter a few years later, Eduardo Duhalde, a Peronist lawyer who had defended guerrillas, argued that the Rawson escape had been a bitter blow for Lanusse and the armed forces; it demonstrated their vulnerability, and had been a hard blow to the principle of military authority, and that this was the reason for the massacre. "It was a reply, taken and decided at the level of Commanders-in-Chief and in no way the madness of a Navy Captain." 21 Martinez suggested that the decision was prohahly taken at the Junta meeting on the afternoon of August 21, after the Foreign Minister had reported that the Chilean government was unwilling to extradite the ten fugitives who had hijacked the Austral plane. The agenda for that 20Embassy BA Telegrams 525.3 and 5.307, Aug. 22, 28, 1972, and Airgram A-472, Sept. 18, 1972. This airgram forwarded the text of a purported press conference held on September 8 by six defense attorneys for the three survivors, and the purported individual testimonies of Maria Antonia Berger, Ricardo Rene Hairlar and Alberto \figuel Camps. The Embassy noted that the statements had receivf'rl widt> distribution locally and wonlcl "confirm to many the widely-held public impression that the escape attempt was a staged af!air." Martinez [148], pp. 18.3-197, reproduces the same materials. 21!\lartinez [ q8], pp. 1 04-105; Duhalde's words were part of an inteJTicw gin·n in exile that appeared in Alejandro Dorrego and Victoria Azurduy, eds. El caso argentino. H ablan ws protagonistas [.32], p. 259.

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meeting indicates that the Rawson escape was one of the topics to be discussed. Unfortunately, the minutes for that part of the meeting were to be drawn up by the Chief of the Joint General Staff, Admiral Quijada, and they have not come to light. The next day, the Junta heard his report on the Trelew events, but once again he was charged with drawing up the minutes and they too are unavailable. Until such documents appear, it will not be possible to establish beyond doubt the Junta's responsibility, if any, for the Trelew episode. The role of the three Commanders-in-Chief, or for that matter of other officials in the intelligence or security organizations, can only remain a matter of conjecture. 22 General Lanusse has always insisted on the accuracy of Admiral Quijada's report, with its description of an escape attempt at the naval air base. But to use a question that was frequently asked about President Nixon during the Watergate hearings, what did General Lanusse know about the Trelew killings and when did he know it? According to his remarks to the high command a few days later, he was first made aware of the incident by a telephone call on August 22. To quote his words, "A major, whose name I don't recall, telephoned [my aide] Lieutenant Colonel Marque. Lieutenant ~olonel Marque informed me and I phoned Admiral Quijada. The information instead of coming up from below went down from above. I had serious doubts, I say here, about what had happened. Admiral Quijada, General Daneri, Colonel Santiago, and I don't know who else went there. The information that Admiral Quijada brought us was close enough to what was said on Friday [August 25] and reflected exactly what had happened." 23 From this statement it is clear that Lanusse relied on Navy sources for his information and that he accepted their account of the events. But even if he had any doubts as to its accuracy, circumstances would have compelled him to endorse it. To do otherwise would have further armed 22Martinez [148], p. 105; AJCJ, No. 30l72, Aug. 21, 1972, and No. 31l72, Aug. 22, 1972. In a manuscript memoir given to me in July 1984, Air Force Brig. (Ret.) Rey described the Trelew episode as "an atrocious accident caused by the tension and fear and excess of zeal on the part of the Security. There was no premeditation. The Junta ordered an investigation which clearly established the accidental character of the event." 2.3"8va Reunion de Altos Mandos," 28 Aug. 1972, MS, Lanusse Archive. In his 1977 memoir [37], pp. 296-299, Lanusse adheres to his earlier view of the Trelew episode, but provides details on his unsuccessful efforts to have the local forces act promptly to recover control of the Rawson prison; this, he feels, would have averted the transfer of the nineteen prisoners to a military base that lacked the facilities for handling them.

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the enemies of the government, and also generated tensions with the Navy; moreover, given the state of his relations with the Air Force, the stability of his government could have been affected. As mentioned earlier in this volume, the preservation of armed forces unity was a continuing concern to Lanusse; and just as he had swallowed Rey's recent verbal assault, he had to be prepared to support, and if need be cover up for, the Navy's actions. Apparently concerned that the Hawson jail break and the Trelew slaughter might convey a sense of official weakness and confusion, and lead to an intensification of antigovernment, antimilitary activities, the Junta de Comandantes moved quickly to adopt countermeasures. Meeting on the evening of August 22, it decided to promulgate legislation that would make it a crime to publish or disseminate statements issued by the guerrilla groups. It also took steps to control the content of radio and television news programs, especially when referring to the Rawson and Trelew episodes, and to insure that the burials of the victims should not give rise to demonstrations. The Junta also decided to adopt a more rigorous policy toward persons who violated the antisubversive and antiterrorist provisions of the Penal Code. Individuals who publicly defended guerrilla activities, or who denigrated the armed forces, would be subject to legal proceedings and placed in detention. But even where legal proof was lacking, individuals both civilian and military who were strongly suspected of subversive activity were also to be detained and held under the state-of-siege authority. 24 The Junta's preoccupation with repressive measures did not prevent it from giving the final touches to the constitutional reform proposal that had been on its agenda for several sessions. The original draft as prepared by the Interior Ministry had undergone several transformations as a consequence of the criticisms received from various sources, most recently from the Supreme Court whose opinion had been belatedly requested. The result was a decision to define the changes as provisional in nature, subject to revocation by a fiJture constitutional conven24AJCJ, No. ,31/;-2. Aug. 22. 1972. Laws 19,797 and 19,79il, both approved at this time, were intemlccl to deny the use of the press and electronic media to the guerrillas and their sympathizers. Law 19,798, known as the Le11 Naciunal de Telecomunicaciones, provided for heavy military representation on the Comite Federal de Hadiodifusi6n, the body created to regulate the content of all radio and tt>leYision programs. The Junta at this session also gave thought to transferring the Federal Police from the civilian-led Interior Ministry to a military body, but postponed a decision until after further study of the matter.

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tion, and to promulgate them, not in the form of a law, hut as an addition to the Statute of the Revolution. This was done to meet objections of the Court to the dangerous precedent of using a simple law to amend the Constitution. 2 " President Lanussc announced the amendments in a nationwide address the night of August 24. The provisions closely resembled the drafts that had been circulated earlier. The president and vice-president were to be elected directly by majority vote for a four-year term and be eligible for a single reelection. A future law would decide the procedure if no candidate won an absolute majority. Senators and deputies were also to be elected directly for four-year terms, and be eligible for reelection without limitation. There were now to be three senators instead of two from each province and the Federal Capital. Other provisions for the reform removed the limitation on the number of cabinet ministers, authorized the houses of Congress to meet in regular session without requiring a summons by the Executive Branch, changed the quorum rules, and established procedures for assuring the enactment of budget and other bills deemed vital by the Executive. Each of these provisions was designed to correct problems that had beset previous constitutional governments. 26 President Lanusse used the occasion of the August 24 address to restate his commitment to the institutionalization process, despite extremist violence and despite Peron. He also tried to drive a wedge between Justicialista Party members and Peron by ascribing the latter's decision to remain in Spain to a lack of interest in democracy and constitutional normalization, and by stating that the J usticialistas would be free to take power if voted in by the people. The ultimate futility of the effort to separate party from leader was foreshadowed the next day, when the mere rumor that Peron had boarded a plane at an airport near Biarritz led 1,000 ofhis followers to flock to Ezeiza airport to wait in vain f(lr his return. As of that day, August 25, under the existing rules, both ex-General Peron and General Lanusse became ineligible to run for the presidency, but neither lost interest in trying to shape the evolving political process, and the political chess game was to continue. 27 25AJCJ, 'lo. 29/72, Aug. 15, 16, 21, 1972; AJCJ No. :3o/72, Aug. 21, 1972; AJCJ No. 31/72, Aug. 22, HJ7226La Naci6n, Aug. 25, 1972; Boletin informativo. Analcs de legislaci6n [z], l\io. 26, 1972. 27 La Naci6n, Aug. 25, 1972; Confirmado, Aug. 29, 1972, pp. ;--8, on the Peronist crowd at Ezeiza.

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The assumptions that underlay the next moves of both men, while seemingly realistic, eventually proved to be mistaken. Peron was convinced that the promised elections would never be held, or ifthev were, they would be so controlled as to deny a victory to his fr>llowers. Lanussc for his part \Vas convinced that Peron had no intention of returning to Argentina, but would continue to try to disrupt the government's political program, either by encouraging a military coup, or by ordering his followers to abstain from the elections. Peron's strategy did in fact aim at replacing the Lanusse government with one that would be more open to Peronist electoral ambitions. Whether Peron went so far as to endorse a specific coup attempt is another rces." It identified the enemy f(>rces as: imperialism with its multiple facets, which constituted the true enemy; the oligarchy, which was the domestic collaborator of imperialism; the "Liberal State" and its institutions through which the oligarchy and imperialism exercised their power; and the "Liberal Army," in its dual role as a military party and an occupation force. Clearly the intent was to make officers, especially younger ones, question where their loyalties ought to lie and to undermine their support for the regime. It is not too surprising then that the government decided to confiscate the Primera Plana issue that dealt with the Trelew episode, or that it ordered the magazine to cease publication a few weeks later. 31 (pueblazos), see lt>ttcr, Governor of Santa FC• to the Minister of Interior. Aug. 30, 1972, t\IS, Lanusse Archive. 30Primera Plana, Sept. 5, 1972, p. 5; AJCJ, No. 31i72, Aug. 22, 1972. One of the decisions reached by the Junta at this meeting was: "To negotiate with the Spanish Government a new status h>r Juan Domingo Peron's continued stay (permanencia) in Spain, to be applied after August 25, 1972." During the meeting, President Lanusse suggested that Rev might undertake this task during his trip to Europe. 31 "Carta de Situaci(m," Primera Plana, Julv 4, 18, 25, Aug. 29, Sept. 5, 12, 1972. The identifications of the "enemv" and the "fricndlv and allied forces" were set forth in the July 25 issue, p. 5· The a~onymous author ~f these reports was a member of the Justicialista Movement's Superior Council, Alfredo Julian Licastro, a former Army officer who had been accused of disseminating Peronist ideas at the Military Academy and forced into retirement in 1971. The confiscated issue of Prirnera Plana was No. 500, Aug. 29; the magazine ceased publication with No. 503, Sept. 19, 1972.

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An assessment of the political situation that was prepared in the Army General Staff as of August 28 assigned considerable weight to the likelihood of Peronist efforts to subvert the government over the next two months. Awareness of the historic significance of the October 17 date to the Peronists, and its potential use as a catalyst for a Peronist uprising, was one of the elements that entered into the estimate. But the two-month time frame also reflected the belief that the issuance of the convocatoria (legal summons for elections), currently promised for no later than October 31, would create a new situation in which the Pcronists as well as other political forces would have to focus their attention on internal party matters, especially the selection of candidates. Based on this analysis, a military staff memorandum submitted to General Lanusse early in September proposed that the way to prevent an escalation of subversive activity over the next two months was to advance the dates for convoking the elections and registering candidates, but to leave untouched the dates for the actual election and transfer of power. 32 It was apparently reasoning of this sort, and specifically the desire to negate the possibility of a coup, that led to the decision, announced by Interior Minister Mor Roig on September 1, that the government would issue the convocatoria, not at the end of the next month, but on October 1. But before this could be done it was necessary to resolve the differences that had developed within the Coordinating Committee for the Political Plan (CCPP) and the armed forces over some aspects of the new election system that was to go into effect. On September 26, the Junta de Comandantes took up the alternative proposals presented by the CCPP for electing the president and members of the Chamber of Deputies. After a lengthy discussion in which the Air Force Commander supported one approach while the Army and Navy Commanders endorsed the Interior Minister's recommendation, the Junta as a whole adopted the latter position. 33 Signed into law on October 2, the new system provided for the direct election of a president and vice-president running together on a single 32The assessment was prepared by the Deputy Chief of StaH· for Intelligence and presented at the August 21> meeting of the high command. Set> "Conc!.tsiones sohre Ia evolud6n de Ia situac:i6n politica-suhversiva," MS, Lanussc Archive. For the proposal to advance the opening of the party primary season, see "Mcmorando sohre aprcciaci6n proceso politico" ,'.1S, Lanusse Archive. 33La Naci6n, Sept 2, 1971; AJCJ No. 35/72, Sept 26, 1972. The Air Force position favored a simple runoff between the top two presidential tickets, and the assignment of Chamber of Deputies seats to the top three parties on a 60-30-10 percent basis.

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ticket. However, in a provision aimed at preventing a minority president, the law provided for a runoff election if no one party, confederation, or alliance obtained an absolute majority of the votes cast. The runoff' would be limited to the two top parties provided that together they received at least two-thirds of the valid votes cast. Otherwise, the parties receiving at least 15 percent of the votes could also participate by forming a joint ticket with one another or with one of the top two parties. Party conventions would have to approve the common platform and candidates of the joint ticket, but in every case the presidential candidate had to be a person who ran for that office in the first round. 34 The Congress was also to be elected directly by the voters of each province and the Federal Capital. In the case of the Senate, each recognized party, confederation, or alliance, was to nominate a slate of two candidates f()r the three vacancies allocated to each province and the Federal Capital. If no party obtained an absolute majority, a runoff election would be required. The victorious party would get two Senate seats while the third would go to the candidate whose name appeared first on the slate of the runner-up party. In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the number of seats assigned to each province and the Federal Capital was to be based on population, with one seat for every 135,000 inhabitants or major fraction. Voters would choose from among rival slates, and the parties would receive seats in proportion to their share of the total vote cast in the province, after the elimination of blank votes and the votes of parties receiving less than 8 percent of the total. This provision was designed to promote the presence in the Chamber of a limited number of parties, and to discourage political fi·agmentation. 3.5 \Vi thin a few days after the enactment of the electoral law, a draft of the convocatory law was circulated to representatives of the various political parties for comment. Issued without significant change on October 17, this law advanced the date of the simultaneous presidential, senatorial, and chamber elections from March 25 to March 11, thus permitting a runoff election on April 8 should it be needed. The law specified the number of deputies to be elected from each province and the Federal Capital, and fixed December 11 and 21 respectively as the final date for notifying the authorities of the formation of party alliances, and of the names of candidates for the various offices. 36 34 Law 19,862, articles 1-7. The text was published in La Naci6n, Oct. :3. 1972. 3.'5 Law 19,862, articles 8-17. 36 Law 19,895, Oct. 17, 1972. La Naci6n, Oct. 7, 1972, had already published the new date for the election and the dates for formalizing candidacies and electoral fi·onts.

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A separate law issued three days later called for the election of provincial and municipal officials on the same March 11, and set forth the guidelines for the respective convocatory laws that each incumbent provincial chief executive was to issue. Noteworthy was the requirement of an absolute majority in the gubernatorial contests, with a runoff if needed to choose between the top two candidates, and the selection of provincial senators and deputies by proportional representation in the same way that national deputies were to be chosen.'17 The government's effort to maintain the political initiative, as reflected in the measures discussed above, had its parallel in the economic policy review it undertook early in September. President Lanusse was well aware of the sharp differences that existed, not only within civilian society, but among the military services themselves. In recommendations submitted early in September, the Navy once again expressed its opposition to any expansion of state-run enterprises, and its preference for private investment and private initiative. The Army on the other hand recommended that the government "adapt the essence of its economic policy to the postulates of the majority forces of the country" or in other words to the programs advocated hv the Justicialista and Radical Parties.'lH Anxious for the support such an approach might generate for his political program, President Lanusse was quick to show interest in the document issued jointly on September 7 by the CGT, the central labor organization, and the CGE, a pro-Peronist businessmen's association. The document started with the assertion that economic and social prostration, as manifested in the sharp fall in salaries, the decline of economic activity, and increased unemployment, was a threat to social peace and therefore to a political future free from violence. The document went on to list a series of ideas for restructuring the economy in the areas of banking, exports, land use, and industrial developr:nent. The proposals of most immediate interest, however, related to trade union concerns and those of the small and medium Argentine-owned enterprises represented in the CGE. The document called for an immediate and substantial wage increase, the resumption of collective bar37 Law

1g,gos, Oct. 20, 1972. 3BThe Lanusse Archive contains two documents, both hearing the handwritten notation "os Set 72." The one marked "Armada" is entitled "Apreciaei6n sohre Ia situaei6n politico-econ6mico del pais"; the other, marked "Ejercito" is missing two parts and begins: "III. Cursos De Acei6n." The quoted words comprise the first recommendation of its economic section.

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gaining, and a housing construction program. It also called for steps to provide small and medium businesses with greater credit at lower cost, and for government actions to enforce "buy Argentine" laws, discourage the circulation of confiscated contraband goods, and prevent the sale of Argentine-owned enterprises to foreign investors. 39 The day after the document was issued, Lanusse ordered his aides to study it with a view to determining which of the proposed measures could be adopted immediately, which might be applied later after further study, and which were in conflict with the government's stated goals, or undesirable for the economy as a whole. The President followed this up by inviting the heads of the CGT and the CGE, Jose Rucci and Jose Ber Gelbard, to the Olivos residence, where he formally received a copy of the document and described it in glowing terms as the fulfillment of a "fervent government aspiration: the joining of sectors to reach agreements that will surely and firmly permit the solution to the problems that confront the country." In short, it was the closest thing yet to his idea of a national accord. While not committing himself immediately to taking specific steps, Lanusse stressed that his goal was to have the country governed by rnajorities, and that his aim was to adopt economic and social measures that would be compatible with those of the future government. At the same time, he reminded his listeners that in the search for solutions the interests of minorities could not be ignored. 40 Not surprisingly, the leaders of other business groups, including the Industrial Union, the Rural Society, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Stock Exchange, requested and obtained an audience with the President. They presented him with a document of their own, which also stressed the need to reduce unemployment, maintain salaries, avoid recession, and slow the inflation. However, they contended that the CGT-CG E proposal for a wage increase would do nothing to preserve real wages and would only lead to further inflation, recession, and unemployment. The deterioration of the economy, they insisted, was due to a statist and inflationary policy; the solution lay not in repeating mistakes but in the creative capacity of private activity. 41 39La Pren~a. Sept. 8, 1972. 40"Presidente de la Naci6n Argentina a S. E. el Senor Secretario de Planeamiento y Aeci6n de Gobierno Brigadier Mayor Dn Ezequiel A. Martinez, k de scptiembre de 1972," and "Reunion del Presidente de Ia Naci6n con Representantes de Ia Confederaci6n General de Trabajo y de Ia Confederaci6n General Econ6mica, Realizada en Ia Residencia Presidencial de Olivos 9 de seticmbre de 1972," MSS, Lanusse Archive. 41 La Naci6n, Sept. 11, 1972.

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On September 20 President Lanusse in a nationwide address announced the decisions that had been reached by the Junta as a result of the economic policy review. Many of the measures he described were in direct response to proposals put forth in the various sections of the CGT-CGE document. Some of these measures were little more than promises of future action; others were more concrete. In regard to labor, he announced that a 12 percent emergency increase in wages and allowances would go into effect on October 1. At the same time, collective bargaining committees would be activated to begin negotiations on the contracts for wages and other issues that would take effect on January 1, 1973. President Lanusse also announced the creation of a National Housing Fund, with representatives of labor, management, and government to serve on its board, as a way to contribute to the reactivation of the economy, create jobs, and help solve the housing shortage. The aim was to construct 35,000 houses in addition to those currently in the construction or planning stage, and to provide 1oo,ooo new jobs. Financing of the Fund was to come from a new tax on cattle sales and a onetime tax on urban real estate, both to go into effect on October 1, and from a payroll tax to begin the next January. With respect to the concerns of businessmen, President Lanusse prom bed to take action within the next 45 days to provide a special line of credit at low interest for small businesses, to increase the lending capacity of official hanks in the interior, and to take a number of other steps that had been specified in the CGT-CGE document with regard to credit policies, tax reforms, exports, industrial policy, and agricultural policy. In concluding his address, President Lanusse called on the representatives of labor and business organizations to engage in permanent dialogue with the government economic team as the way to assure social peace,_ to promote economic growth and a better distribution of wealth, and to contribute to the process of institutionalization. 42 In this, as in earlier addresses, the President made it plain that he was still seeking to promote an agreement with the majority parties over a program and a candidate, and to avoid what he called the jump into a void that would follow from an electoral contest without a prior agreement. The major problem from his perspective, however, was the uncertainty that surrounded Peron's intentions. Was he going to return to Argentina before year's end as he had declared, and if so for what purpose? Throughout September, the President received a series 42La Naci6n, Sept.

21, 1972.

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of reports and intelligence analyses that sought to anticipate Peron's moves. A report prepared as of September 22 downplayed the threat of a Per6n-inspired coup and focused instead on two other possible courses of action: that the Justicialista leader might order his followers to abstain from the elections, thus compromising their legitimacy; or that he might agree to the elections and convert the Frente Cfvico (FRECILI~A) into an electoral alliance. Without ruling out the first alternative, this report concluded that the electoral scenario was the more likely. In this context it was felt that Peron would maintain his own candidacy for as long as possible so as to preserve the unity of the Justicialista movement, that only if and when the courts rejected a constitutional challenge to the August 25 residence requirement would he consider designating another candidate, and that he would hold off doing so until just before the deadline for registering candidates. As to the identity of that candidate, the analysis concluded that Peron was more likely to endorse a Frente Cfvico leader than a member of his own party. But this, like other efforts to anticipate Pedm's moves, was admittedly speculative. Indeed, as an earlier report had stated, "it is useful to remember for subsequent analysis that if JDP said what he really thinks and did what he specifically says, he would cease to be JDP."41 It was in an atmosphere characterized by such uncertainty that President Lanusse and his fellow Junta members were confi·onted with a Peron proposal calling on the armed f(Jrces to join with the Justicialista movement in an agreement for national reconstruction, on the basis of a 10-point program appended to the proposaL Peron had sent the signed document containing the proposal to Dr. Campara via a Dr. Frenkel, who turned it over to him, together with instructions on how to proceed, on September 26. On September 29 Campora requested a meeting with the Junta de Comandantes to present the proposal; it was the Secretary of the Junta, Brigadier tvlartfnez, however, who was directed to meet with him on October 4 to accept the document. 44 43"Asunto: Probable proceder de JDP," nos. 6, 7, 9 and unnumbered (possibly no. 8) entitled "Analisis". MSS, Lanusse Archive. The quoted words are from no. 6, Sept. J.'3, 1972. These reports were produced on plain paper and do not indicate the office of origin. It is interesting to note that a Peronist situation analysis drawn up ln· Antonio Cafiero and Carlos Funes on September 26, 1972. ascribed to the militarv govcmment the intention of f(Jrcing; the Justicialistas to abstain from the elections. I am indebted to Dr. Cafiero for providing a copy of this document. 44La Naci6n, Sept. 30, Oct. 1 ("Semana politica"\ and 5, 1972.

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There is good reason to believe that even before C of various Peronists toward Peron's return and to a November 5 conversation Lanusse had with Cafiero at Olivos. Cafiero in a December 7, 1972, letter to President Lanusse complained that the document made him appear as something less than a loyal Peronist (MS, Lanusse Archive). In a recent communication Dr. Cafiero insists that he nver was Peron's chosen candidate, but that as a result of the praise directed at him by Peron at his

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But given Peron's penchant for operating in multiple directions at the same time, Campora may have seemed the ideal candidate for either of two scenarios. As a loyal, unpretentious follower, he was not likely to threaten Peron's control of the Justicialista movement, and his election to the presidency would be tantamount to restoring Peron to power. But Peron had still not abandoned the idea afforcing the ouster ofLanusse. To be sure, he had seen to it that the CGT held no demonstrations, and that guerrilla activities were put on hold while he was in Argentina acting as an agent of peace. But Peron had been informed by Vicente Solano Lima that the Army leadership regarded Campora as unacceptable. The role of the Campora candidacy in the alternate scenario would thus be to precipitate a crisis that could generate support for ousting the government. If the authorities proceeded to veto his candidacy, Peron would have justification for ordering his followers to withdraw from the electoral process, and for appealing for revolutionary solidarity against the Lanusse government. 86 With the end of Peron's 28-day stay in Argentina, it became clear that the mutual suspicion and hostility that characterized his relations with the military hierarchy had changed hardly at all, and that no movement toward rapprochement had taken place. Neither General Lanusse nor the Junta as a whole invited Peron for a face-to-face conversation; Peron for his part made no effort to seek such a meeting. To be sure, General Lanusse in his public references to Peron had been careful to avoid inflammatory rhetoric, and even conceded that his return was a positive development, in that it permitted the Argentine people to demonstrate their maturity. Peron, however, went out of his way to needle Lanusse and the Army leadership when, in the course of the only press conference he held during his stay, he pointed out that he had the honor to be a citizen of Paraguay (he had arrived on a Paraguayan passport) and a general in its Army, "the most glorious in the entire continent." General October 6 press conference announcing the "ten points" and his being photographed at Peron's side, many people were misled into believing that he was. Cafiero claims that Lanusse deliberately distorted his remarks at their Olivos interview so as to "kill" a candidacy of his that did not exist. (FAXED Message, Aug. 6, 1993). What has yet to be established is who was responsible for leaking the text ofLanusse's November 11 remarks, since this would normally have been a classified document. 86"Entrevista con Peron;" interview with Dr. Vicente Solano Lima, Dec. 13, 1983; see also Wayne Smith [181], p. 440. For an explanation of the process leading to Campara's selection that insists that Peron was completely committed to the election route, see Bernetti [126], pp. 57-60.

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Lanusse reacted by disseminating an immediate message to all Army commands repudiating the "insult," and by announcing after Peron left the country that only as an Argentine citizen on an Argentine passport would he he allowed to return. 87 It now must have been clear to General Lanusse that, as an instrument for achieving a preelectoral agreement that could assure the armed forces of its role in the next government, the Gran Acuerdo idea was dead. The failure of most of the fifteen recognized national parties to respond to the proposed "bases for a program of conciliation and national union agreement," that Interior Minister Mor Roig had sent them in mid-November, was the final straw. It was in these circumstances that a group of provincial party leaders led by Leopolda Bravo of San Juan, Francisco Gabrielli of Mendoza, and Guillermo Belgrano Rawson of San Luis, offered to organize an electoral alliance if the armed forces would designate an active-duty officer to be its presidential candidate. The officer they had in mind was Brigadier Ezequiel Martinez, who had b:~en serving in the dual posts of Secretary of the Junta de Comandantes and, in the Presidency, as Secretary for Government Planning and Action. ~ 8 The prospect of a Martinez candidacy to be sponsored by an alliance of provincial parties generated a variety of reactions in political, governmental, and military circles. Francisco Manrique, seeing it as a threat to his own electoral prospects, was the first to denounce it publicly, calling it a desperate maneuver directed by Mor Roig to help the Radicals. Ironically, the Coordinating Committee on the Political Plan (CCPP) that Mor Roig chaired was less than enthusiastic about the idea. In a December 5 report prepared for the Junta, the CCPP stated that if the Martinez candidacy became a reality, "it would place the armed forces in an awkward position, since it would imply exchanging its non-neutrality in the pursuit of the acuerdo for a partisan position vis-a-vis the election."89 87 For Peron's press conference, La Naci6n, Nov. 26, 1971; filf Lanusse's statement that Peron could not return as a Paraguayan citizen, ibid., Dec. 23, 1972. 88 For the text of the "Bases," see La Naci6n, Nov. 16, 1972; the responses submitted by the Bloquista party of San Juan and three other minor parties are in the Lanusse Archive. The background that led to the formation of the alliance and the rer insisting on the Martinez candidacy after the Air Force and Navy turned against it ("Hcuni6n de

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Underlying this belief were two related assumptions that General Lanusse and Dr. ~lor Roig still adhered to when they initially approached Martinez about the candidacy: first, that the Peronists would fail to receive the so percent of the votes required to win in the first round; and second, that what was to become the Republican Alliance would attract enough votes from independents, conservatives, neoPeronists, and other elements to achieve the 15 percent of the votes required for participation in the second round. If these assumptions proved valid, the Alliance would be in a position to try to make a deal with the Radicals, or even the Peronists, on terms that would assure the armed forces an acceptable role in the next government. 92 It was not long before reality overtook the illusions that had accompanied the original plans for the Republican Alliance. The anticipated support from independent and provincial parties was sharply reduc:ed when several of the neo-Peronist leaders, pressured by their rank-andfile, joined the FREJULI, while other parties, like the Progressive Democrats, ended up in Manrique's Federalist Alliance. Even the hope of using the Republican Alliance's vic:e-presidential nomination as a carrot to attract support from Peronist political and labor elements alienated by the Campora nomination went amiss. In the end, it was Leopolda Bravo himself who was chosen to be Martinez's running mate. 93 Brigadier Martinez, who had disagreed from the first with Mor Roig' s insistence that the Peronist vote would not exceed :37 percent and that the new alliance would achieve the necessary 15 percent, found after his first trip to the interior that his own pessimism was fully justified. The Peronist presence was everywhere, his own supporters few, a clear Altos Mandos," t8 Die. 1972). For the view that Lanusse was trying to take votes from Manrique, interview with Gen. (Ret.) Jost' H. Villareal, Aug. 8, 191l:;. 92"Reuni6n de Altos ~Ianclos," 18 Die. 1972; interview with Brig. (1:\et.) Martinez. After the campaign began, Mor Roig told him that he should support the Radicals in the second ronneL Lanusse, however, told him that the Radicals could not win even through error, and that the agreement had to be with the Peronists. Martinez told me that he never really understood what the purpose of his adventure was, but that he undertook it as a gesture against a Peronist victory. 83The vice-presidential post was offtered lo and rejected by Jorge Paladino (interview Feb. 8, 1984), and Bemardo Bas (interview with Lucio Garzon Maceda, Nov. 29, 1991); a move urged by Angel '"Cholo" Peco, a Lanusse allv and head of the news vendors' union, to give the post to Labor Undersecretary Villaveiran and thus get CGT support, ran into opposition from the provincial forces within the Alliance (interview with Ricardo Yofre). For Peron's ability to force reluctant CGT labor leaders to fall into line behind the Campora candidacy, see Embassy l:lA Telegram 227, Jan. 11, 1973.

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indication of what was to come. After a month on the campaign trail he sought out Mor Roig, who now conceded his mistake and suggested the dissolution of the Republican Alliance. But Martinez refiised, in view of the numbers of people who had already committed themselves to his campaign and to the congressional contests associated with it. 94 With the beginning of the election campaign in earnest in January 1973, it was now clear to both General Lanusse and Interior Minister Mor Roig that the political realities differed considerably from the conditions they had anticipated when they launched the political process some twenty months before. Instead of the consolidation of the country's political forces into four or five groups, nine candidates were seeking the presidency, and dozens of parties were competing for congressional, senatorial, provincial, and municipal oflices. 9'5 But what was more serious, the expectation that the political party statute enacted in June 1971 would insure the observance of democratic procedures in the choice of party oflicials and party candidates for public oflice, proved illusory. This was most evident in the Justicialista Party, where adherence to the concept of verticality had enabled Peron to impose Campora as its presidential candidate, and where Juan Aha! Medina, the Peronist youth leader and party general secretary, played a principal role in selecting candidates for 3,6oo other national, provincial, and municipal offices. In several provinces where party members tried to choose their own candidates, the national authorities inter94InterYiew with Brig. (Ret.) Martinez. He recalled how Mor Roig, in tlwir initial seven-hour conversation about his candidacy around December 1, co11ntered his scepticism with the words: "Brigadier, you as a brigadier cannot haYe an opinion so definitive and contrarY to mine for I have been a politician since I was born." Despite this, Martinez retained a deep ad111iration for Mor Roig as a person and a politician. Mor Hoig's role in promoting the Martinez candidacy is the subject of controversy. Ricardo Yofre insists that Mor Roig personally disagreed with it but did not obstruct it. Yet it was Mor Roig who on December 5 proposed a ten-day extension of the December 11 deadline for registering alliances, a move that would have greatly assisted the gestating Republican Alliance. The Junta, with the Navy and Air Force Commanders voting against it, did not adopt the proposal at that time; on December 26, however, it did approve an extension of the period for registering candidates to January 2, and the deadline for parties to adhere to the candidates of existing alliances to January 15. "Reuni6n de Altos Mandos," 18 Die. 1972; AJCJ, No. 44l72. Dec. s. No. 47l72, Dec. 26, 1972. 95 In addition to the UCR, FREJULI, Alianza Popular, Alianza Federalista. and Alianza Republicana presidential tickets that have been mentioned in the text. thc other four wert>: Julio C:hamizo and Haul Ondarts for the conservatiYe Nut>\·a Fuerza; America Ghioldi and Rene Balestra f(>r the Partido Socialista Dem6crata; Juan Carlos Coral and Nora Seiappone fi>r the Partido Socialista de Trabajadores; and Jorge Ahelardo Ramos and Jorge Silvetti f(x the Frente Izquierda Popular.

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vened to impose their own choices. Violence or the threat of violence was a factor in persuading certain sectors of the party to join behind the official candidates. 96 It was not just internal developments within the Justicialista Party that troubled President Lanusse, it was the realization that he had been unable to fulfill the prerequisites for holding the elections that he had set forth when he sought armed forces support for his program. There was now little prospect that any of the major political parties would voluntarily enter into a public agreement with the armed forces that would preserve their hierarchical autonomy, assure them of a cabinet presence in the future government, and assign them a major role in domestic security. Indeed, the campaign strategy of both the Justicialistas and the Radicals involved denouncing the military government rather than each other, as the most effective way of winning the votes of the several million young people who had never cast ballots before. Peron himself was particularly virulent in his criticism of the military authorities, even as he justified the violence of guerrilla groups, violence that in recent weeks had included the holding of several foreign businessmen for ransom, and the assassination of a Navy admiral. 97 General Lanusse's reiterated promise to himself and to his military colleagues that there would be neither a "return to the past" nor a ".iump into the void" was also threatened by events. Campora's declaration to the thousands assembled at his opening rally that "ifl am in the government, the general [Peron] will be in power" raised the specter that the unthinkable might become a reality if, as seemed increasingly likely, the Campora-Solano Lima ticket were to attract substantially more than the 40 percent of the vote that observers had believed to be its upper limit. But a Campora victory could mean not only the rell6The crudest example was in Buenos Aires Province, where the Justicialista Party nominated an ultranationalist, Manuel de Anchorena, for governor and a labor leader. Luis Guerrero, for vice-governor, only to have the decisions overturned by the Consejo Superior of the national party. A few days later, Guerrero was wounded in an assassination attempt by Peronist extremists. See Embassy BA Airgram A-24, Jan. 10, 1973. For the role that fear played in discouraging discontented labor leaders from defying Peron's wishes, see Embassy BA Telegram 227, Jan. 11, 1973. On Aha! \1cdina's role in the selection of candidates, """Mario Diament, "Bahia Juan Abal Mcdiua," Siete Dias, No. il22, Mar. 8, 198:3 97"Summary of Extremist Activity, Oet. 1-Dec. 31, 1972." Embassy BA Airgram A-53, Jan. 31, 1973; "Abrasive Statements ofC.impora and Peron," Embassy BA Telegram 490, Jan. 22, 1973; Airgram A-62, Feb. 5, 1973. On January 17, the Argentine government brought charges against Peron for public incitement to collective violence.

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habilitation of the aging Peron, but the presence in or close to positions of power, of elements thirsting for vengeance against the military and pressing for radical changes in the organization and role of the military institutions. 98 President Lanusse gave overt expression to his increasing pessimism about the political scene initially in a December 29 talk that was otherwise devoted to celebrating the military government's proudest public works achievement, the start-up of the Choc6n hydroelectric plant. Lanusse's complaint that the political parties had chosen candidates identified with failed regimes of the past, and were irresponsibly refusing to talk terms with the armed forces, suggested to some observers that a drastic policy shift was in the offing. However, it was not until he went on leave to the Chapadmalal summer chalet (January 7-22) that Lanusse gave serious thought to postponing the announced election. 99 The idea he was contemplating involved replacing the general elections called for March 11 with a staggered arrangement that would begin with the election of municipal officials. This would be followed at two-month intervals, first by provincial and then by congressional elections; the voting for a president would thus be postponed for at least six months. The rationale for such an arrangement was that it would enable party members to choose their candidates instead of having them named from above. But for the moment this was just an idea; the practical question was how the armed forces and the people as a whole would react to the interruption of the scheduled elections. 100 General Lanusse soon found out that the idea had little support in the circles that counted. Interior Minister Mor Roig, who visited him at Chapadmalal on January 17, agreed that the existing process was doing harm to the country but he insisted that changing it at this date would do even greater damage. It was the military reaction, however, that gave Lanusse pause. In an unusual step, the V Corps Commander, General Jorge Carcagno, on January 8 addressed a formal letter to the 98"Acto del Frente Justicialista de Liberaci6n (FREJULI) en la localidad honaerense de San Andres de Giles, del dia 21 ene 73," MS, Lanusse Archive. This report reproduced the speeches given at the rally, including a taped one from Peron. Also reproduced are the texts of refrains that youthful extremists shouted out during the rally such as: "Cinco a uno, nova a quedar uno (five for one, not one will remain);" or "Duro, duro, duro, aqui estan los Montoneros que mataron Aramhuru (Brutal, brutal, brutal, we are the Montoneros who killed Aramburu)," or "Ya van a ver, ya van a ver, cuando venguemos a los muertos de Trelew" (You soon will see, you soon will see, when we avenge the Trelew killings). 99 For the text of the Choc6n speech, La Naci6n, Dec. 30, 1972. lOOinterview with Gen. (Ret.) Lanusse, Aug. 23-24, 1973.

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Army Commander-in-Chief. The letter stressed the importance of fulfilling the armed forces' pledge to restore the country's political institutions within the promised time, and warned of the dire consequences that would follow from a contrary decision, not only in terms of civilian reactions, but in the divisive effects it would have on the military themselves. 101 Although Lanusse might have been tempted to discount General Carcagno's letter as coming from an infantry officer with populist ideas, he could hardly ignore the attitude of his longtime friend and cavalry comrade, General Lopez Aufranc, the Army Chief of Staff. Lopez Aufranc's position was that the military's electoral pledge had to he carried out inexorably; that a failure to hold the elections, or a refusal to turn over the government should the Peronists win, would lead to a violent confrontation. A dictatorship was not the answer, he pointed out, since dictatorships succeed only when they physically eliminate their adversaries. "Are we," he asked, "also going to employ the execution wall like the Stalins, the Maos, the Castros or the Stroessners? How long and how many are we going to shoot? I would like to know what would happen in Argentina after the fourth or fifth execution." General Lopez Aufranc, in rejecting brutal dictatorship as a viable alternative, was in fact restating the position that General Lanusse himself had taken when he launched the political process in March 1971. 102 In contrast to Lanusse's current pessimism about the consequences of a Peronist victory, General Lopez Aufranc expressed confidence that his fellow Argentines had matured politically, and that Peron's followers would not create situations unacceptable to the military if they assumed power. Offering some support for this conclusion was the conversation that I Corps Commander General Sanchez de Bustamante had with Vicente Solano Lima, Campora's running mate, and which he reported to Lanusse. Solano Lima gave assurances that the FREJULI ticket was determined to respect the structure and norms of the armed forces, and this would apply to the designation of the top commander of each military service.l03 101 Ibid.; letter from Maj. Gen. Jorge R. Carcagno to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Bahia Blanca, Jan. 8, 1973, MS, Lanusse Archive. Carcagno may alreadv have known that if the Peronists won the election he would be appointed to succeed Lanusse as Army Commander-in-Chief, but it seems unlikely. See note 103. 102 "Sfntesis de las Palabras Pronunciadas por cl Sr. Jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejercito, Gral Div D. Alcides Lopez Aufranc, en Ia E.S.G. cl 16-1-73," MS, Lanusse Archive. 103Jhid.; note fi·mn Gen. Tomas Sanchez de Bustamante to Lt. Gen. Alejandro A. Lanussc, Jan. 17, 1973, MS, Lanusse Archive. Solano Lima told Sanchez de Bustamante

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Given his inability to win the support of his closest Army friends for interrupting the ongoing election process, it is not surprising that Lanusse for a time considered resigning from the Presidency. But backing out in the face of difficulties was not in keeping with his character. He decided rather to convene a face-to-face meeting with the Army's major generals when he returned from his leave, to see if a consensus could be reached on how to proceed from this point on. J04 The meeting of the Army high command on the morning of January 24 as well as the Junta session that convened that afternoon took place in an atmosphere of mounting tension and amidst speculation by political observers that a major change was afoot. Some wondered if President Lanusse would resign; others expected the Peronists to he proscribed; still others anticipated the outright cancellation of the elections. In fact, none of these things came about. Whatever hope General Lanusse may still have had of finding support for cancelling the election was dispelled in the lengthy discussions of that day. His fellow Army officers agreed with him that the political campaign had taken on a disquieting tone, that the participants in FREJULI rallies were openly condoning the assassination of military men, while the spokesmen of supposedly democratic sectors, whether out of intimidation or expectation of political advantage, refrained from criticizing Peron and the Justicialistas. It was the consensus of the Army major generals, however, as it proved to be that of the Navy admirals and Air Force brigadiers, that it was too late to halt the election process, that the point of no return had been passed. \Vhat they wanted to see, however, was vigorous enforcement of the laws that made it a crime to encourage or condone violence, and penalized those who publicly insulted the armed forces. 10·s But it was not just the rhetorical excesses of the campaign that that C:impora and he were thinking of Gen. LOpez Aufranc for the top Army post. S~inchez de Bustamante did not mention the name in his note, but did so orally after Lanusse returned. See AJCJ No. 3/73, Jan. 31, 1973· 104 Brig. (Ret.) Ezequiel Martinez told me that he visited Lanusse at Chapadmalal on Jan. 20 and advised him that if he really didn't want the Peronists to win the election. he should find a way to stop it; Lanusse's reply, as he recalled it, was: "\Vhat do you want mt' to do, Brigadier, if even my closest frit'nds consider me as gone and don't accept anything I say?" 105"Political situation reaching critical point," Embassy tlA Telegram 561, Jan. 24, 1973; "Reunion de Mandos," Jan. 24, 1973, MS, Lanusse Archive; AJCJ No. 2/73, Jan. 24, 1973·

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worried General Lanusse; he feared that a Justicialista victory might place extremists in positions of power, from which they would try to transform the armed forces, purge the courts, and threaten the rights and liberties of citizens who disagreed with them. Here again, the major generals differed from General Lanusse's apocalyptic view of the future, but they unanimously endorsed the statement of principles he presented as a guide to the conduct of the armed forces. 10h The Junta de Comandantes later that day adopted the essence of this statement as its own and issued a declaration that came to be known as the "five points." Point one gave assurances of the Junta's "unbreakable" intention of continuing the political process and respecting the results of the elections, hut demanded that the participants in the process obey the Constitution and the relevant laws; point two was a commitment to support republican institutions and genuine democracy in the future; point three called for the independence and nonremovability of the judiciary as the guarantee of constitutional rights, principles, and declarations; point four rejected indiscriminate amnesties f()r those who had been sentenced or were being tried for crimes related to subversion and terrorism; point five called for the armed forces to share in the responsibilities of the next government, especially in the areas of defense and internal security, by the appointment to the cabinet of military ministers chosen by the next president from among the senior-grade officers on active dutv in each service. 107 In issuing this declaration, the Junta announced that studies were under way to give legal implementation to its provisions, and indeed it devoted a good part of its next session to discussing how this could be achieved. It soon became clear, however, that only in regard to the second part of point one, the enforcement oflaws relating to the political campaign, was it possible to undertake legal procedures. Once the election results were accepted, there was no way that the Junta could legally bind the future government to adhere to the other points enunciated in the document. The only alternative route would be for the armed forces to exert pressure on the new government, or in the last resort carry out another coup. But this was precisely the kind of action that President Lanusse regarded as an unfortunate aspect of the past that should not recur. Indeed, he warned his colleagues that an attempt 106 "Reunion de Mandos," Jan. 24, 1973. 107 AJCJ :-.Jo. 2/73; La Naci6n, Jan. 25, 1973·

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by the military to return to power after May 25 would be very dangerous both for the country and for the armed forces. 10" Having initiated the electoral process in the belief that it would give rise to a stable, democratic, government and having overseen the growth of massive support for the elections in both civilian and military circles, Lanusse now seemed to be, in the words of a newspaper columnist, the "prisoner of his own policy."' But he was not prepared by temperament to adopt an attitude of passivity to what he saw as a threat to the country's future; rather he pushed for the vigorous enforcement of existing legislation that penalized the incitement or condoning of violence. On January 31, the Junta approved a directive that called on public officials at all levels, including the military, to be on the alert for violations of those laws by political parties, and to submit the evidence to the Justice Minister. For his part, the Minister, Dr. Gervasio Colombres, instructed federal prosecutors throughout the country to initiate criminal proceedings against individuals where the evidence warranted. But even more significant f(Jr its political implications, was his action turning over to the Federal Attorney assigned to the Electoral Court materials that could serve as the basis for seeking the dissolution of the FREJULI under the provisions of Law 19,102 (the statute that governed the operations of political parties). 109 The news of such steps created concern, not only in political circles outside the government but within the Interior Ministry and among certain officers in the Army General Staff, over the possibility that President Lanusse was seriously contemplating the exclusion of the FREJULI candidates from the election. Aware that the Junta was planning a further discussion of the enforcement measures in its afternoon session of February 6, Interior Minister Mor Roig submitted to President Lanusse earlier that day a memorandum that argued vehemently against pursuing the dissolution of the FREJULI. Such a step, he contended, would deviate from the principle of reasonableness that had governed earlier decisions with respect to the Campora candidacy. Moreover, in the eyes of public opinion, domestic and foreign, it would be seen as an arbitrary political decision, even if it arose out of a judicial 108Jbid.; AJCJ No ..3/73, Jan. 31, and No. 4/73, Feb. 6, 197;3. Naci6n ("Semana Politica''), Jan. 28. 1973; AJCJ No. 3/7:3; also annex 3 to this acta entitled "Directiva de Ia Junta de Comandantes en Jefe No 1/73 (Para asegurar el cumplimiento del prop6sito de Ia J.C.J. de sostener Ia continuidad del proceso politico)." This directive was drafted by the Joint General Staff and signed by all three Commanders. 109 La

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4il9

ruling. Mor Roig saw no alternative but for the government to comply with the promises it had made and carry through with the process; to do otherwise, he contended, would be a grave mistake with consequences that no one could foresee. 110 The Junta session of February 6 did in E1et review the status of the enforcement measures, but it was the Justice Minister, not the Interior Minister, whose voice was heard. Mor Roig remained mostly silent during the discussion, having been asked by a presidential military aide just before the meeting not to bring up the issues he had raised in his memorandum. As a consequence, the policy to proceed with those measures, including the effort to deprive the FREJULI of its legal status, remained unchanged. The only new departme was a Junta decision that Peron should not be allowed to reenter the country until after May 25. m The announcement on February 6 that the Federal Attorney had actually initiated a suit in the Electoral Court charging the FREJU LI and its affiliates with constitutional violations, conveyed the impression that General Lanusse was now intent on barring the Peronists, and generated almost universal condemnation from the political parties. But whether that was his real intention, or whether he was trying to throw the FREJULI campaign off stride, as Peronist leaders themselves wanted to believe, remained in doubt. Clearly, he felt very strongly that there was nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in enforcing the laws, and in his own mind there was a distinction between barring the Peronists by government decree and referring the issue to the courts. Indeed, as he said to a meeting of generals on February 7, "if I had already made the decision to eliminate the so-called FHEJULI from the electoral process, I would have done it and not referred it to the courts, because it is for [such steps] that we are a Revolutionary Government." 112 llOMinisterio del Interior. "Apreciacion de la Actualidad Politica al6 de Febrero/7:3," MS, Lanusse Archive. A staff study submitted the previous day outlined the probable consequences of proscribing the Justicialista Party by each of three routes: government decree, court ruling, or voluntary abstention. It concluded that the first alternative would lead the UCR and other parties to boycott the election; however it held out little hope that the courts would move swiftly, or ultimately decide in the government's favor. "Asunto: Annos Aires province, 384ff Azules, 47-55. 58-61, 63, 74n, 26m; unease over Peronist electoral participation, 7 4, So, Ss, 9of; oppose a military candidate, 76; relations with President Illia, 117, 121, 125, 14S-49 Azul y Blanco, 23411 Bahia Blanca, 181 Balbin, Dr. Ricardo; and the 1963 elections, 81-84; and the Illia govemment, 120, 141; resumes political activity, 28g; and the Hora del Pueblo, 328; relations with Lanusse, 330, 331n, 362, 381, 422ff, 440; relations with Peron, :328, 473-74; presidential candidate, 470, 494 Baldrich, Lt. Col. Fernando A., :386 Balestra, Hene, 482n Ban eo Central, 211, 222 Banco de Ia Naci(m, 212, 338f Barbieri, Gen. Arturo E., 382 Bare, Col. Donovan, 277-78, Bas, Dr. Bernardo, 107, 340, 34311, 346f, 35lll Bassi, Dr. Hicardo, 12411 Bauer, Dr. Conrado, 218 Beg;nis, Dr. Silvestre, 1uf Belgrano Rawson, Dr. Guillermo, 367n, 479 Belle Ville, Cordoba Province, 187 Benitez, Antonio, 461 Bcrg;er, Maria Antonia, 445n Betti, Gen. Luis, 300, 436 Bignone, Gen. Reynalclo, 510 Blanco, Dr. Eugenio, 120 Blanco, Gen. Jose E., 4, R Bogotazito, 250 Bonet, Aclm. Sadi, 70 Borda, Dr. Guillermo; as Interior Minister, 211, 212n, 223, 229-32, 255; pro-

Index poses economic-social coundls and participationism, z;)6, 238, 247: eonfi-onts political violence, 243, 250f,253n Bortot, Brigadier Huberto, 498 Botet, Dr, Luis, 216n Bravo, Dr. Leopolda, 32Sn, 38l!l, 422, 479ff Brazil, 14on Bringas Nunez, Dr. Leonidas, 325 Brito Lima, Alberto, 402 Bruno Quijano, Dr. Ismael, 189n, 392, 395, 396 Buasso, Gen. Juan A., 181n, 277n Buchanan, James, 28gn Buenos Aires Bar Association, 16 Buenos Aires province, 97, 120, 143, 187, 316 Builders Association (Camara de Construccion), 224n Bunge y Born, 33Sf Caballero, Dr. Carlos, 238, 247-52 passim, 253n Caballero, Dr. Edgardo, 178 Caballero, Gen, Tomas, 340 Cabanillas, Col. Hector, 377ff Cacciatore, Brigadier Osvaldo, 72, 315 Caceres, CoL Gustavo A., 383n Caceres Monie, Gen. Jorge, 355n, 357f, 371, 391, 407n, 411, 428n Caceres 1\lonie, Dr. Jose R., Defense Minister, 256, 2g8fl: 302n, 310, ;314, 320-22,408 Caeiro, Dr. Luis, 176n Cafiero, Dr. Antonio, .'3SI, 368, 425, 456n, 45711, 461n, 477 Cairo, Comodoro Martin, 125 Camara de Construccion, 224n Camara Federal en lo Penal (Federal Criminal Court), 389-90, 415n Campo, Dr. Mario del, 301 Campo de Mayo, zsff, 36, 46-53 passim, 8o, 86, 95f, 181, 242; Communique No. 150, 52, 7.3f, go, 103; l\o. 187, 103; No, zoo, 103 Campora, Dr. Hector: as Peron's delegate, 397, 402f, 425, 427, 441, 456-61; as organizer of Peron's return, 462, 467f, 471, 473; as Justicialista presidential candidate, 477f, 483f, 492-95 passim; as president-elect, 497-502; inauguration and initial decisions, 5047; mentioned, 413f, 440 Camps, Alberto M., 445!1 Camps, Major Ramon, 195n

531

Camus, Eloy, 374n Cantilo, Dr. Jose Luis: as Def(·nsc Minister, 30, 35, 43, 65; relations with Interior Minster Martinez, 82-83; contacts with military men, 186, 330, 331n, 341, 342n Cao Saravia, Cesar, 168n, 16g Capital Federal, 34, l15 Capuano Martinez, Carlos R., 293n, 319 Carcagno, Gen, Jorge, 370, 382, 398n, 436n, 4>4f, 505f. so6n Caro, Armando, 187 Caro, Gen. Carlos, 5, 9, zsn, 46f,. 56, 141, 154: opposes anti-Illia coup, 175f, 180, 18zf, 187-go; mentioned, 243 Carreras, Gen. Marino, 20-26 passim Carril, Dr. Bonifacio del, 3of, 35, 35n Cartilla de los 32 puntas, 42-43 Casa de Gohierno, see Casa Rosada Casale, Carlos, 401l Casa Militar (Military Household), 200, 303-6 passim Casa Rosada, 13, 1sf: 224n. See also Government House Castex, Dr. Mariano, 213f, 235n, z86u, :304n, 305f Castillo, Dr. Ramon, 146 Castro, Fidel, 205 Castro Sanchez, Gen. Eduardo: as Army Undersecretary, 127, 151-54; as Army Secretary, 158-6o, 161n, 168; efforts to ward off anti-Illia coup, 170-7:3, 175, 17gn, 182-85, 188; resignation, 189n, 191 Catan, Gen. Eduardo, 18m, 398n, 436n, sosn Catholic Church, uo, Zllll, 371 Catholic groups, 40 Catholic University of Cordoba, 251 Cavali, Adolfo, 323 Cavalry: predominance among general of~ ficers, 6n; Cavalry Corps, 25, 27, 36, 46, 48, 51, 130; Cavalry School, 35n, 47; role in Azul command, so-s1, 6o; officers association, 2 79; loss of predominance, so6 Cavalry Day, 279 CCPP (Political Plan Coordinating Committee), 367, 373, 437, 440, 451f, 459, 479; mentioned, 41711, 46on, 461 Central Bank, zu, 222 Centro de Altos Estudios (Center of Higher Learning), 131, 236 CERE (Special Army Reorganization Committee), 129-30

532

Index

Ceretti, Gen. Manuel A., 48n, 2il4, ,355n, 407n CGE (General Economic Confederation), 344· 405, 409, 453 CGT (General Confederation of Labor): under Guido, 11, 92; under Illia, 13740, 145, 165; under Onganfa, 221fl~ 229, 239, 248, 284; moves toward unification, 262n, 267, 327; under Levingston, 328, 351, 353; relations with Lanusse government, 368, 378, 384, 386, 405, 411, 432f, 453; and the Frente Cfvico, 409 -internal divisions: CGT de los Argentinas, 229; CGT Pasco Colon, 239n, 241, 260, 26m, 262; CGT Azopardo, 260, 262, 262n Chamber of Commerce, 454 Chamber of Deputies: under Guido, 22, 31f, 39; under IIlia, l19, 128, 143, 1641f, 165n; new electoral system, 452 Chamizo, Julio, 482n Chapadmalal, 484 Chescotta, Gen. Oscar, 301n Chile, 443 Chilecito, La Rioja Province, 149n Choc6n, 484 Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 17n, 20, 79, 87, 114, 167, 168n Christian Revolutionary Party, 476 Ciudadela, 181n, 187 Civic Front, see Frente Cfvico Civilians and military coups, 157, 508, 510 Clarin, 226, 338, 384n Clement, Adm. Gaston, Navy Secretary: and accession of Guido, 11n, 20, 27; role in intra-Army disputes, 29n, 31, 36t 43f, 55, 57, 61; replaced, 61, 64 Coda, Adm. Carlos G., 385n, 431, 440, 461, 466, 503, 504f Codigo de Ia Justicia Militar (Military Justice Code), 128, r6on C6digo Penal (Criminal Code), 125n, 128 Colegio Militar, see Military Academy Columbia, 144, 270, 407 Colombo, Col. Romulo, 214n, 395n Colombrcs, Dr. Gervasio, 488f Colorados, 48-49, 53-61, 67-68, 81, 9193; and the Illia administration, 117, 121f, 125, 140; oppose Campora installation, 496 Comision Especial de Recstructuracion de Ejercito (CERE), 129-30

Comite Federal de Hadiodifusion, 447n Commerce Minister, 408 Communications, Army, 6, 181n Communism, fear of, 18, 33, 79 Communists, 167, 329 Comrnunitarianism, 237f Comodoro Rivadavia, 232 CONACYT (National Council of Science and Technology), 237 CONADE (National Development Council), 136, 2o2f, 237, 243, 256, 299, 315, 325, 327 CONASE (National Security Council): creation and initial operation, 200-204 passim, 209, 214, 221, 23311; confronts threats of violence and public unrest, 25on, 251f, 274, 296-300 passim, 352, 35311 Concepcion, Dr. Alfredo, 392n Confederaci6n General de Trabajo, see CGT Conferences of American Armies, 132, 152 Confirmado: and promotion of the antiIllia coup, 146, 15of, 156, 158, 175, 189; under Ongania, 207, 216, 236, 2SOn, 272f Congress: under Guido, 13-18 passim, 22ff, 29-33 passim, 39-44 passim, so, 75; and the Illia administration, 125, 143, 145, 157, 167f; mentioned 187, 452, 507 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologfa, see CONACYT Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, see CONADE Consejo Nacional de Ia Seguridad, see CONASE Consejo Superior Justicialista, see Justicialista Superior Council Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas, see Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Consigli, Dr. Carlos, 256 Conspiracies, 91-93, 135, 383-1>5 Constitution of 1853, 171, 2o5n, 263, 270 Contfn, Dr. Carlos, 176 Coordinating Committee for the Political Plan, see CCPP Coral, Juan Carlos, 482n Cordes, Gen. Ernesto B., 4, 8 Cordini, Gen. Juan C., 3n, 4, 8, 107 Cordoba, 72n, 83, 118, 130, 143, 178, 353n, 427; conditions under Onganfa,

Index 238, 24on, 241, 246f; the "Cordobazo," 247-55, 260, 269, 290; unrest under Levingston, 340, 345-51; the "viborazo," 351-52 Cordon Aguirre, Brigadier Arturo, Interior Minister, 325, 329, 335n, 338ff Cornejo Saravia, Gen. Jose 0., Army Secretary, 37-39, 43-49, 51, 54-58, 6o, 68n Cornicelli, Col. Francisco, 262n, 265n; secretary-aide to General Lanusse, 270-72 passim, 277n, 28m, 283, 287, 292n, 300; role in the crisis with Ongania, 301-2; contacts with political and labor leaders, 331, 341n, 344n; advisor on relations with Levingston, 348; conversation in Madrid with Peron, 370-73, 378, 431; mentioned, 430 Corrientes, 245, 247, 251 Corti, Dr. Angel, 11n Corvahin, Ernesto, 173n Costa Gavras, 290 Costa Mendez, Dr. Nicanor, 163, 164n; as Foreign Minister, 198, 203, 2o8n, 210, 212, 232, 255, 27lf Costa Rica, 144 Council of Admirals (Consejo de Almirantes), 64, 69f, 353 Coups, 86, 171, 176-77, 384-87, 449, 508. See also Conspiracies Criveli, lng. Julio, Public Works Minister, 30n Cr6nica, 290 Cruz del Eje, 118 Cuba, 71 "Cursillismo," 198n Dagnino Pastore, Dr. Jose M., Economy Minister, 256, 272 Daneri, Gen. Edgardo, 446 Death Squadrons (Esquadrones de Ia Muerte), 391 Declaration of National Policies, 299f, 314 Decree 969/66, see Trade union legislation Defense Ministers, 12f, 2on, 30, 43, 65, 120, 211, 218, 256, 408 De Gaulle, Charles, 40, 139, 218, 236f Della Croce, Gen. Ernesto F., 436n Deltec, 338 De Marchi, Gen. Juan, 221, 301n, 340 Democratic Party, 347 Democratic Socialist Party, 7, 83, 116, 482n

533

Developmentalists (Desarrollolistas), 226, 273 DeVoto, Dr. Raul, 216n, 244 Diament, Mario, 412n Diaz, Gen. Jose M., 264, 436n Diaz Colodrero, Dr. Mario, 163, 205n, 2o8n, 229-32, 235n, 258 Diaz de Vivar, Gen. Meliton, 5, 9 Diaz Loza, Lt. Col. Florentino, 386 DGFM (Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares), 7, 353 Di Rocco, Antonio, 408 Documents of the Revolution, see Acta de Ia Revolucion Domingorena, Horacia, 336n Dominican Republic, 144f, 146n, 170 Drago, Dr. Mariano, 2on Dubra, Gen. Fernando, 315, 341n, 342, 425, 429, 436, 505n Duhalde, Dr. Eduardo, 445 Economic-Social Council, 393, 458 Economy Ministers: under Guido, 20, 24, 30, 107; under IIlia, 120; under Ongania, 198, 211, 256; under Levingston, 315, 325. See also Finance Ministers Education Ministers, 2on, 65, 107, 120, 256 Eighth Tank Regiment, 48, 53, 59f, 86, 96,99 Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army), see ERP Elections: of 1962, 1; of 1963, 44, nf, 112, 115-16, 119; of 1965, 143; of April 1966 (Mendoza), 173n; of 1973, 495-96 Elizondo, Gen. Fernando, 4, 8 Encuentrode los Argentinas, 329,405,473 Engineers, branch of the Army, 6n Entre Rios, 83, 181 ERP, 388f, 409f, 441ff, 497, 500, 502-3 Escuela Mecanica del Ejercito, see Army Mechanics School Escuela Superior de Guerra, see War Academy Estado Mayor Conjunto (also called Estado Mayor Coordinador), 301 Estado Mayor General del Ejercito (EMGE), see Army General Staff Estevez, Adm. Adolfo, 64, 68, 172n Estol, Gen. Raul, 4, 8 Estrategia, 272, 275, 315 Etchebarne, Dr. Conrado, 252, 258, 299f, 310

534

Index

Etcheparcborcla, Dr. Roberto, 13n, 19 Ezeiza, 448 Facultacles, see Universities Fait, Gen. Rat•l E., 4, 8 FAL (Armed Forces of Liberation), 388 FAP (Peronist Armed Forces), 388, 410 FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces), 389, .391, 441ff, 492 Fautario, Brigadier Hector L., 505 Federaci6n Agraria Argentina, 380 Federal Criminal Court, 389-90, 415n Federal Electoral Court, 33-34 Federal Police, 125, 200, 251-52, 293, 294n, 318-19, 352, 447n Federation of Center Parties, 83, u6 Fernandez Gil, Guillermo, :336n Fermindez Mendy, Julio, 336n Ferrando. Dr. Miguel A., 120 Ferrer, Dr. Aldo: as Minister of Public Works, 315; as Economy ~Hnistcr, 325-29 passim, 336ff Fiat factories, 346, 409 Fifth Army Corp, 97n, 100, 176n, 181, 265n Fifth Infantry Brigade, 264 Fifth Infantry Regiment, 97, 100 Fillol, Tomas, 21on Filloy, Juan, 265n Finance Ministers, 363, 408 Fiol, Juan, 124n Firmencch, Mario E., 293n. 294n, 295n, 319f First Armored Cavalry Brigade, 130 First Armored Cavalrv Division, 46, 53, 8o First Army Corp, 29n, 161, 174n, 181, 274. 469 First Artillerv Group, 187 First Motorized Infantry Division, 26, 29n, 35f, 53, 130 Five Point Document, The, 490-91 Flax (cartoonist), 142n Fleitas, Dr. Abel, 244n Flouret, Gen. Emiliano, 340, 388n Fluixa, Emilio, 188 Fonrouge, Alberto, 474n Fonseca, Gen. Mario: as Army Intelligence Chief, 147, 161, 164, 169n, 172n, 189; as Federal Police Chief under Onganfa, 200, 206, 2o7n, 261n, 294n Fonseca. Gen. Roberto, 245, 301n Foreign Ministers: under Guido, 12, 19,

20n, 30, 65, 107; under lllia, 120; during the "Argentine Revolution," 198, 256, 316 Foreign Press Assocoation, 2.30 Formosa province, .385 Fourth Airborne Brigade, 1:3 Fourth Army Corp, 34, 47 Fourth Infantry Division, 35 Fraga, Gen. Rosendo, 4, 8, 20, 184n Framini, Andres, 89, 139f, 166 Franco, General Francisco, 237n, 287 FRECILINA, see Frente Cfvico de Ia Liberaci6n Nacional FREJULI, 476, 481, 488f, 494f, 503 Frenkel, Dr., 456 Frente Cf\·ico de Ia Liberaci6n Nacional (National Liberation Civic Front), 405, 409, 412, 435-37 passim, 456, 470f Frente de lzquierda Popular, 482n Frente Justicialista de Liberaci6n (Justicialist Liberation Front), see FREJULI Frente !\ acional y Popular, 79. 81, 84, 110-14 ]Jassim Frigerio, Rogelio, 81, 226, 310, 403 Frischknecht, Federico, 217 Frondizi, Dr. Arturo: overthrow and detention, 1ff, 6-10 passim, 16, 21, 85n; and his policies, 45. 59n, 123, 136. 167, 186; and the accession and policies of Guido, 11-14 passim, 22, 31, 40, 72, 75; and the Frente Nacional y Popular, 79, 81, 84. 87, 110, u:l: relations with President Illia, 167, 183f, 191; with Onganfa, 226, 275. 279: with Levingston, 326-27, .329; with Lanusse, .384; with Per6n and the Justicialista front, 409, 4:35· 476; mentioned, 15, 25, ,30, .37, 42, 63L 16:3. 377 Frugoli, Amadeo, .339 Fuerza Aerea, see Air Force Fucrzas Armadas, see Armed Forces Fuerzas Armadas de Ia Liberaci6n, 3.38 Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas, 388, 410 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, see FAR Funes, Carlos, 456n GabriC'lli, Dr. Francisco, 410, 479 Galimberti, Rodolfo, 402, 411, 499-500 Galtieri, Gen. Leopoldo, 67n, 509 CAN, see Gran Acuerdo Nacional GANA, 84 Gancedo, Dr. Julio. 58n Garay, F., .3.3111

Index Garcia, Alfredo, 13 Garcia, Daniel, Minister of Commerce, 408 Garcia, Col. Jose L. 383n Garcia, Col. Manuel, 386 Garcia Olano, Ing. Emesto, Secretary of Housing, 2o8n Garin, province of llucnos Aires, 318, 320 Garrido, Dr. Jorge, 16n, 19 Garzon Maceda, Felix, 1S9 Garzon Maceda, Lucio, 253n Garzoni, Adm. Carlos, Navy Secretary, 70, 85ff, 93, 97, 102 Gascon, Col. Carlos, 383n Gaspar Campos (Peron's residence), 469. 472, 475n Celbard, Jose Ber, 344n, 349n, 409n, 440, 454, 457 Gelly y Obes, Carlos J\l., 2o6n Gelsi, Dr. Celestino, 329, 338f Gendarmeria Nacional, see National Gendarmery General Confederation of Labor, see CGT General Directorate of Military Manufactures, 7, 353 Chioldi, Americo, 122, 4S2n Gilardi Novaro, Dr. Enrique, 283, 32124 passim, 339 Gioja, Dr. Ambrosio, 244 Cirelli, Alfredo, 408 Gnavi, Adm. Pedro: Navy Commanderin-Chief, 243, 251, 271n, 2g6, 300.303, 308, 310-11, 323n; relations with Levingston, 342ll', 355f. 358; differences with Navy officers, 385, 415n "Golpistas," see Anti-integrationists Gomez Machado, Dr. Hector, 13, 110f, 168n Gomez Morales, Dr. Alfredo, 363, 392n, 425 Gonzalez, Gen. Fausto, 50;3n Gonzalez, Col. Jorge A.. 169n Gonzalez, Ricardo, 26n Goodwin, Paul, 289n Gordillo Gomez, Dr. Alberto, 14f "Gorillas," see Anti-integrationists Gorriaran Merlo, Enrique, 44.3 Gorriti, Esteban. 336n Government House, 19, 95, 187, 191f, :3o4ff, 381. See also Casa Rosada Gran Acuerdo Nacional (Great National Accord), 344, 34S, 364, 366, 379-83 passim, 39:l; viewed by military, 398ff, 405, 426; key aspects, 400, 416, 419,

535

422; efforts to implement, 414, 420, 433· 435. 437 Gran Acuerdo Nacional Argentino see GANA Green, Navy Captain Enrique H., 217 Grenadiers, see San Martin Grenadier Regiment Grondona, Dr. Mariano, 26n, 65, 73f, 81, 103n, 110n; and Ongania, 184n, 193, 2o5n Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 125, 135f. 224f, 242 Grunwaldt, Adm. Enrique, 93, 98 Guardia de Infanterfa (Police Riot Squad), 207n Guerin, Col. Robero A., 31ln Guerrero, Luis, 48311 Guerrillas, 388f, 4o9ff, 508. See also Political violence; Terrorism Guevara, Col. Juan F., 68n, 270 Guglialmelli, Gen. Juan Enrique: as Army division commander, 67n, 97n; as director of the War Academy, 131 f; relations with Army Commander-inChief, 272-73. 275, 279n, 297f, 310; with Levingston, 315, 325, 327; mentioned, 145n, 233, 387n Guido, Dr. Jose Maria: assumes presidency, 10-19; cabinet selections, 1gff; and the Martinez political plan,. 22, 24, 29; the April 1962 military conJiontation, 25-28; reorganizes cabinet, 30:3.3; the military confrontation of August 1962, 34-38; political strategy and military pressures, :39-45; and the AzulColorado confrontation of September 1962, so, 54-61, 63; personal traits, 62-6:3, 64n; cabinet renewal and election plans, 65, 73, 78, 85, 89, 90n; the Air Force crisis of December 1962, 7173; and the military revolt of April 1963, 99, 101; the Rauch episode and cabinet changes, 104-8; and the elections of July 1~)fi:J, 116-17, 124; meets with President Levingston, 326; mentioned 49. 59n, 72n, 377 Guido Blanco, Gen. Carlos, 180 Giiiraldes, Comodoro Juan J., 41, 171n Haidar, Ricardo H., 445n Hang, Col. Julio, 48 Hartung, Adm. Teodoro, 65n, 92n Herrera, Gen. Jose H., 47- 302n, 355n, 357n, 370; as Army Chief of Staff, 382, 397, 407n. 422n, 426f, 428f, 436

536

Index

Hidalgo Sola, Dr. Hector, 393 Honor Court, see Tribunal de Honor Hora del Pueblo (Hour of the People): origins and relations with President Levingston, 3Z7-30, 331, 333; relations with President Lanusse, 36zf, 38of, 39z-93, 397, 4zz, 437; and Juan Peron, 405, 435, 473; mentioned, 457n Hueyo, Dr. Horacio, 153n Hure, Gen. Nicolas, 97n, 1z9, 18of, zo9n lavfcoli, Gen. Juan N., 5, 9, 176n, 180, Z33, Z74

IKA (Kaiser Industries of Argentina), Z49n IIlia, Dr. Arturo: and the presidential election of 1963, 8Jf, u6, ll9; personal traits, u8-19; selects ministers and military service secretaries, 1zo-z3; military policies, 1zz-z7, 130, 173; and internal security, 1z7-z9, 130-31; economic policies, 135-37, 164; relations with trade unions, 137-40, 165-68; relations with General Onganfa, 141-4z, 143-46 passim, 15off, 160; relations with loyal generals, 170-7Z; and the gestating coup, 153, 174ff, 183-90 passim; ouster, 191-94; mentioned, 64n, Z79, 3Z6, 377 IIlia, Dr. Ricardo, 140n Imaz, Gen. Francisco, 161n, 164, zoo; as Interior Minister, z57-58, z6on, z64n Imbaud, Carlos, 340n Industrial Union, 454 Infantry, 6n Insaurralde, Judge, 86 Institute for a Market Social Economy, Z1Z

Interior Ministers: under Guido, z1, 30, 33, 65, 104, 107; under IIlia, 1zo; under Onganfa, 198, zu, z57; under Levingston, 315, 3z5; under Lanusse, 36Z

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 56, 136, Z4Z Intransigent Party, 476 !pres Corbat, Brigadier Ali, 367n lricfbar, Gen. Manuel, 48n, z17, 339 Isabelita, see Peron, Marfa Estela Martinez de Italy, 409 Iturbe, Alberto, 41, So, 85f, 88, 1u, ll5 Joint General Staff, 301 Juarez, Carlos A., 168n

Junfn de los Andes, 377 Junta de Comandantes en Jefe (JCJ): statutory authority, zo4, Z33, z8z, z96; role in the replacement of Gen. Onganfa, Z97, z98-3o6; assumption of power and selection of successor, 30714; role in designation of cabinet ministers and governors, 314-16, 3z5; relations with President Levingston, 317, 3z4, 34z-43, 344, 350-51, 35z, 368; and governmental structure, 361ff, 431-3z, 436; political strategy, 366-67, 374, 384, 399-400, 431, 447-51 passim, 465-66; confronts economic problems, 387-88, 455; relations with Peron in Madrid, 375-76, 4u; and terrorism, 389-91, 445-47; and the ten-point initiative, 456, 46on; and Peron's return, 450, 46of, 463, 467-7z, 474-75; final stage of the electoral process, 493-94, 497; and the five-points, 487-89; dealing with President-elect Campora, 498-501; withdrawal from power, 50Z4

Junta Revolucionaria of June 1966, 19497, zoo Junta Superior de Calificaciones, see Army Evaluations Board Justicialista Liberation Front, see FREJULI Justicialista Party, issue of legal status, 139, 14z, 166f; recognition and relations with Lanusse regime, 40z, 4zof, 4Z5, 4Z7, 440, 448, 460; selection of candidates and election campaign of 1973, 477, 48Z-83 Justicialistas, 79, 1qf, 3z3, 3z8, 363. See also Peronists Justicialist Superior Council, 1ll, 373, 40Z, 4ll Justo, President Agustin, 154n, 309 Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth Organization), 40Z, 435, 449, 479, 499 Kelso, Gen. Carlos, zo Kennedy, President John F., 71, 1z6, 191 Kissinger, Henry, 395 Klappenbach, Dr. Jorge, z76n Klein, Dr. Guillermo W., Jr., 14n Kolungia, Adm. Carlos, Navy Secretary, 64, 65n, 68ff, 1oz Krieger Vasena, Dr. Adalbert: named Economy Minister, Z10-ll, z1z; economic and labor policies, z18-zo, ZZ4z8, z38-4o, Z4Z; opposes economic-

Index social council idea, 223, 236; resignation, 255-56; contacted about future cabinet role, 271; mentioned, 272, 315 Labanca, Gen. Eduardo, 263-64, 383 Labayru, Gen. Bernardino: as Army Chief of Staff, 3n, 39, 43, 47-61 passim; and the Aramburu case, 294n, 319; mentioned, 28, 490n Labayru, GPn. Cecilio, 4, 8 La Boca, 59 Labor Ministers or Secretaries, 2on, 107, 120, 208, 218, 327, 363 La Calera, Province of Cordoba, 293n, 318 La Matanza, Buenos Aires Province, 36 La Naci6n, 2o6n, 417 Landa, Gen. Edgar]., 4, 8, 29n Landru (cartoonist), 6:3, 199n Lanus, Dr. Adolfo, Defense Minister, 43, 45, 54, 6of; mentioned 20n Lanusse, General Alejandro A.: and the military confrontations of 1962, 6, 26, 28, 38n, 47f, 51; political issues related to the 1963 elections, 76, 8of, 89, 111; relations with the Illia government, 12lll, 147C 152-5:3, 168; role in preparation of the 1966 coup, 172-74, 179f, 187; as Army Commander-in-Chief, 2:32-33,264, 26gff, 343,382, 436;responses to civil disorders and political violence, 241-42, 251. 253n, :348, 391, 410f; political views, 24:3, 273, 292, 320, 344, 350; relations with President Onganfa. 255-6o, 265f, 272-8:3 passim, 291; and General Aramburu, 276, 277n, 294t 318f; rupture with Onganfa, 286, 296-307; selection of new president, 308-14; relations with President Levingston, 317, 323-26 passim, :32935 passim; contacts with civilians, 33031, 333, 34off; target of nationalist critics, 337-38; confrontation with Levingston, 354-59: as President of the Nation, 361f; personal traits and public image, 360-61; his efforts to form anational unity cabinet, 363, :392-93, 407f; and the idea of the Creal National Accord (CAN), 364-67, 414; contacts with trade unionists, 368-6g, 416-17; and the Cornicelli mission to Madrid, 37071, 374; contacts with Peron, .375-79, 4oof, 4o.3f, 429; relations with the Hora del Pueblo, 380-81, 384, .392-93; and the issue of his "candidacy," 393-99

537

passim, 415-16, 424, 4.32-33; target of conspiracies, .383-87 passim; , 362-63, 369, 397; arranges Cornicelli-Per6n interview, :370-72; and the accord idea, 373-76 passim, :379, 381; relations with Lanusse, 38m, 392-93; mentioned, 379n, 402, 4771l Palermo Army Base, 2gn, 35f, 95, 1;30, 161, 181n Palma, Adm. Jorge, 10-11, 68f, g6-g8 Palmero, Dr. Juan, Interior Minister, 120, 122, 14JII, 166, 170 Pannullo, Gen. Rabel. sosn Paraguay, 478 Parana garrison, 457 Parellada, Dr. Erncsto, Industry and Mining Minister, 408 Parodi, Delia, 115 Parque Chacabuco, 59 Parque Lezama, 59 Partido Bloquista de San Juan, 479n Partido Conservador Popular (PCP), see Popular Conservative Party Partido de Ia Union Popular, see Union Popular Party Partido Dem6crata Cristiano (PDC), see Christian Democratic Party

541

Partido Dem6crata de Mendoza, 480 Partido Dem6crata Progresista (PDP), see Progressive Democratic Party Partido Intransigente, 476 Partido Justicialista, see Justicialista Party Partido Radical, see Radical Party; UCRP Partido Revolucionario Cristiano, 476 Partido Socialista de los Trahajadores, 482n Partido Socialista Democrata, see Democratic Socialist Party Pastor, Dr. Reynaldo, 104 Patagonia, 202 Patricios Regiment, 18m Paz, Dr. Eduardo, 110-11, :38m PCP, see Popular Conservative Party PDC, see Christian Democratic Party Peco, Angel "Cholo," 481n Penas, Adm. Agustin, 10-16 passim, 20, 6g, 70n Pentagon, 127 People's Hevolutionary Army, see ERP Peralta, Gen. Carlos A., 4, 8, :38n, 51 Pereira, Brigadier Juan, Air Force Secretary, 64, 71, 72n, 7.'3 Perctte, Dr. Carlos, Vice President, 83, 122, 141, 173, 11l7 Pereyra Murray, Adm. Victor, 367n Perez, Gen. Aniceto A., 5, g Perez Acebo, Major, 134n Perez Aznar, Dr. Ataulfo, 17 Perez Companc, Carlos, 110 Perez Guilhou, Dr. Dardo, 216n, ~~so, 256, 294n, 295n, 299, .1t'7n Perkins, Dr. Jorge Walter, :3of, 33 Perlingcr, Col. Luis, 192 Peron, Evita (Maria Eva Duarte de), 3686g, 3?6-?g, :384 Peron, Isabelita (Maria Estela Martinez de), 166, 379, 427, 507-8 Peron, Juan D.: and the Guido regime's election strategy, 41, 79fT: 87, go; the 1963 electoral front, uof, llS; and the lllia government, qo; treatment of would-be successors, 166, 173, "'21ln, 262; rumors of fading health, 28g; and President Levingston, 322, 326, 328, :336n; ambivalence toward President Lanusse's acuerdo policy, 363, 373-74, :380, 383-84, 397-404 passim; the Cornicelli interview, 370-73; relations with Ambassador Rojas Silveyra, 377-79, 404; attitude toward political violence and Peronist extremists, 402, 410-11, 435. 497' soo; political strategy vis-

542

Index

Peron, Juan D. (cont.) a-vis Lanusse's policies, 403-5, 414, 420, 425-26; the Sapag mission, 40813 passim; named Justicialista Party presidential candidate, 427; launches offensive against Lanusse, 430, 441, 449-50; prospects for his candidacy, 433, 437, 450n, 455( 475; indecision about returning to Argentina, 441, 461-62; his ten point initiative, 45661; temporary return from exile, 46670; political contacts and selection of Dr. Campara as presidential candidate, 472-74, 477-78, 483; final return, third presidency, and death, 507; mentioned, 1, 20, 35, 154n, 276, 412, 427 Peronist Armed Forces, 388, 410 Peronist labor leaders, ug, 137, 139, 165ff, 220, 23gn, 267f, 416. See also CGT and individuals by name Peronist Party, see Peronists Pcronists: in aftermath of Frondizi's ouster, 1, 21ff, 29, 31; prospects for electoral participation, 41, 73-83 passim, 18#; role in 1965 elections, 143; activities of deputies, 168n, 188n, 189; the Mendoza election of 1966, 173; the Hora del Pueblo and relations with Levingston, 327ff, 332, 336; and the Lanusse government, 360, :365, 373, 380, 393, 449-50; reorganization of leadership, 402; mentioned, 6, 18, 84n, 247, 276n. See also Justicialista Party; Union Popular Party Peronist Youth, see Juventud Peronista Perren, lng. Gabriel, Agriculture Secretary, 65n Perren, Adm. Jorge, 172, 189 Personerfa gremial, 166, 432f Perteagudo, Enrique, 461 Petracca, Roberto, Social Welfare Minister, 2o8n, 211 Petriz, Ing. Pedro, 2on Picca, Gen. Juan B., 4, 8, 23 Pilar, province of Buenos Aires, 389 Pinedo, Dr. Federico, Economy Minister, 20n, 22, 24f Pistarini, Gen. Pascual: commands cavalry units, 4. 9, 51. 53: as Army Commander-in-Chief~ 157, 161, 168; and the movement to oust President IIlia, 174-78, 182-91 passim; member of Revolutionary Junta, 195; difficulties with President Onganfa, 208-9

Pivovarov, Yuri, 291n Plan Conintes, 55 Plan de lucha, 137-39, 221-22, 328. See also CGT Plan Europa, 227, 265n Plan Martijena, 7, 9n, lln, 45f, 92 Plan Martinez, 12n Plaza Constituci6n, 59 Plaza del Congreso, 187 Plaza de Mayo, 187 Plaza Velez Sarsfield, 351f Poggi, Gen. Raul A.: as Army Commander-in-Chief, 3n, 4, 8; role in Guido's accession to presidency, 10-20 passim; and the Martinez political plan, 24: confrontation with legalistas, 2528, 2gn; mentioned, 2411, 34, 18411 Political Parties Statute, :32-33, 86, 8;n, 341-42, 373-74. 419, 482 Political violence, 242-43, 2gof, 329 Pomar, Dr. Juan, 33111 Pomar, Col. Manuel H., 357, 43111 Popular Christian Party, 476 Popular Conservative Party (PCP), 79, 88, 110-15 passim, 328n, 4 76 Popular Federalist Alliance, see Alianza Federalista Popular Revolutionary Alliance, 476,482n Porta, Col. Jorge, 305n Prehisch. Dr. Raul, 407-8 Premoli, Col. Luis: speech writer and assistant to Gen. Ongania, 174, 179; as presidential press secretary, 200n, 261, 262n; and Ongania's ouster, 305, 307n Prensa Confidencial, 234n Plimera Plana: and the 1966 coup, 146, 156, 184, 193; banned by Onganfa government, 264, 265n; as Peronist organ, 450 Proccso de H.eorganizacion N acional, 508-10 Progressive Democratic Party, 116, 179, 32811, 476, 481 Publics Works and Services Ministers, 20n, 30ll, 120, 315 Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, 93-100 passim Pugliese, Dr. Juan, 393 Puigr6ss, Dr. Oscar, 2on, 178-79 Pujadas, Mariano, 444-45 Pujol Ricci, Gen. Pedro A., 4, 8 Punto Indio Naval Airbase, 96, 99, 310 Quieto, Roberto, 443n

Index Quijada, Adm. Hermes, 442n, 444, 446, soo Rabanal, Francisco, 81 Radical Party (Union Cfvica Radical): contacts with Gen. Lannsse, 33of, 341; relations with President Levingston, 332, 336; attitude toward President Lanusse and the CAN policy, 361, 365, 380, 392-93, 401, 422-25 passim, 440; economic program, 453; the party primary, 460; the selection of presidential candidate, 474, 476, 482n; and the March 1973 election, 483, 495· See also UCRP Radio Belgrano, 52 Radio Rivadavia, 302 Railwaymen's union, 221 Ramirez, Gen. Pedro, 309 Hamos, Jorge Abelardo, 482n Ramus, Carlos Gustavo, 293n, 319 Rattenbach, Col. Augusto B., 383n Rattenhach, Gen. Benjamin: Army Secretary under Guido, 61, 64-70 passim; supports political plan of Interior Minister Martinez, 74f, 79f, 86, 89; meets with Dr. Illia, 84; negotiates for surrender of rebel Navy. 97-99; and the Rauch episode, 104, ro6; relations with Gen. Onganfa, 99, 107-8, 281-82; mentioned, s8n, 123, 149 Ratti, Luis, 328n Rauch, Gen. Enrique: confrontations with Gens. Poggi and Toranzo Montero, 25-29, 34, 56; as Interior Minister, 104-9 passim; critic and opponent of Army Commander-in-Chief Ongania, 122, 13on, 135, 14of; under detention, 24;3, :387n; mentioned, 4, 8, 6zn Rawson. Gen. Franklin, 4, 7, 38n Pawson Paz, Dr. Manuel, 38m Rawson Penitentiary, 441-46, 502 Real, Dr. Pedro, 212 Rebellions: April 2, 1963, 93-100: October 9. 1971, 384-87. See also Military confrontations Reeonquista Air Base, 94 Remorino, Dr. Jeronimo, 328 Repetto, Gen. Hector A.: named Army Secretary, ro8; relations with Gen. Onganfa, 151, 164; Secretary General of the Ongania presidency, zoo, 213, 233n, 273-74; mentioned, 4, 8 Republican Alliance, see Alianza Republicana

543

Resistencia, 245 Revista de Ia Escuela Superior de Guerra, :382n Revolucion Argentina, see Argentine Revolution Revolutionary Armed Forces, see FAR Rey, Brigadier Carlos, Air Force Commander-in-Chief: role in the ouster of President Onganfa, 298, 301-5 passim; the selection of Gen. Levingston and his ministers, 308-15 passim; relations with President Levingston, 336, 353, :358; as member of the Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, :361, 397, 400, 431, 446n; attitude toward Gen. Lanusse and his policies, 420, 4:36, 4,39-40, 450, 465-66, 480; farewell address, 503; and installation of Dr. Campora, sos: mentioned, 163, 323 Reyes, Gen. Juan C., 4, 7f, 9n, 10 Rial, Adm. Arturo, 91, 93 Riobo, Gen. Alberto A., 4, 8 Rio Colorado, 97 Rio Cuarto, Cordoba Province, 265n, 278 Rio de Janeiro, 140, 146 Rio Gallegos, 72, 385 Rio Negro province, 10 Rio Santiago Naval Base, 93, 95 Rios Ereii6, Major Hector, 331 Rivera, Col. Horacio, 357 Rivolta, Navy Captain Antonio, 65n, 68f, t)l, 490n Robbio Pacheco, Adm. Mario, 27711 Robledo, Dr. Antonio, 505 Roca, Dr. Eduardo, 205n Roca, President Julio, 75 Roccatagliata, Gen. Alberto, 355n, 388n, 40711 Rodriguez, Col. Manuel, 154n Rodriguez Galan, Dr. Alberto, Education and Justice Minister, 65, 107 Rogers, William, Secretary of State, 395n Rojas, Adm. Isaac F., 68, 91, 92n Rojas Silveyra, Brigadier Jorge, Air Foree Secretary: and role in Guido's accession to the presidency, 1m, 17; as Secretary under Guido, zo, 25ff, 31, 36f, 44, 5557 passim, 61, 64; Ambassador to Spain and to Peron, 375-77; the return of Evita's body, 378-79; contacts with Peron, 4o2ff, 409, 411-12, 430 Rojo, Dr. Ricardo, 276n Romanelli, Brigadier Mario, 187 Romero, Julio, 46.311

544

Index

Rosario: student and worker unrest in, 245, 247, 251, 262n; assassination ofii Army Corps Commander in, 410; mentioned, 56, 141, 175, 1S:3, 187, 190 Rosas, Gen. Carlos, 4, S, 122, 130n, 141 Rosas, Juan \I anne\ de, 75 Roth, Dr. Roberto, 213, 215U, 235n, 273, 307n, 338n Rouquie, Alain, 289n Rubinstein, Juan C., 328n Rucci, Jose, General Secretary of the CGT, 327, 344n, 346n, 368, 404; and Peron's return, 417, 425f, 454, 471; target of assassination attempt, 492 Rufino, Province of Santa Fe, 176, 176n Ruiz Guiiiaz1i, 1-.lagrla\ena, 14n Ruiz Palacios, Major, 102 Rural Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina), 454 Saavedra, Cornelio, 75 Sabarots, Nan Captain Santiago, 96 Sabato, Arturo, 105n Sabato, Ernesto, 105n Sabino Navarro, Jose, 293n Saint-Jean, Gen. Iberico, 382, 428, 491n Salas, Brigadier Ricardo, 303 Salas Martinez, Gen. Guillermo, 3n, 4. 8, 16111 Salimei, Jorge, Economy and Labor Minister, 178, 198, 207-9, 218, 220 Sallustro, Oherdan, 409-10, 442 Salta Province, 56, 127-28 Sammartino, Dr. Ernesto, l:h Sancerni Gimenez, Julian, 81 Sanchez, Gen. Juan C., :3o8, 311n, 337, 407n, 410-11 Sanchez, Victoria, 338n Sanchez, \Valdemar, 291T1 Sanchez Almeira, Gen. Guillermo, 29111, 302n Sanchez de Bustamante, Gen. Tomas: as regimental commander and Azul officer, 25n, 58-59; as supporter of President Lanusse's policies, 367, 382; as major general and member of Army high command, 395n, 398n, 407n, 428n, 431n, 432n, 436n, 458; conversations with Peronist labor leaders, 417, 425-26; contacts with Drs. Campara and Solano Lima, 485; retires, 505 Sanchez Lahoz, Gen. Eliocloro, 251, 252n, 301n Sanchez Saiiudo, Adm. Carlos A., 10-11, 68-69, 91, 93

Sanchez Sorondo, Marcelo, 1.95n San Juan 13loquista Party, 47911, 480 San Luis Popular Movement, 480 San Martin, lng. Salvador, 11n, 1gn, 25n, 4Sn, 46 San Martin Grenadit>r Hegiment, 27, 28n, 48, 59, 95n, 103, 303, 305 San Nicolas, Province of Buenos Aires, 418f, 422f San Sebastian, Rubens, Secretary of Labor, 208, 218, 220n, 223, 363 Santa Fe Province, 181 Santander, Silvana, 81 Santia!(o, Col. Fernando H., 383n, 446 Santucho, Roberto, 442-43 Sapag, Dr. Elias, 408-14 passim, 430 Saravia, Cao, 168n, 169 Saravia, Dr. Jose, Jr., 1g8n, 206, 244n, 279n, 300 Scasso, Gen. Horacia, 4, g Schettini, Col. Eugenio, 164, q8, 190n, 200, 217 Sciapone, Nora, 482n Scottish Rite Masonic Order, 91 Sea Fleet (Fiota de Mar), 97-98 Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, 385-86 Second Army Corps, 56, 13on, 141, 175, 181, 1gof, 245, 337, 410f Second Infantry Division, 53, 59, 130 Second Infantry Regiment, 130, 253n Second Mountain Artillery Group, 95 Secretariat for Community Development and Assistance (SEPAC), 216n Secretariat of Propaganda and Tourism, 216

Secretariat of State Intelligence (Secretaria de Inf(mnaciones del Estado), see SIDE Seiser, Jorge, 328n, :381I1 Senate, 39, 128-zg, 145n, 452 Sefiorans, Gen. Eduardo, Army Secretary, 28, 35-37, 46; as Gen. Ongania's representative, 157n, 16m, 164, 178n; as head of SIDE, 198n, 213, 249-51, 258, 274 Serrano, Basilio, 276n Seru Garda, Alberto, 173n, 188 Setubal, Province of Santa Fe, 24m Seventh Infantry Regiment, 187 Shaw, Gen. Jorge A., 5. 9, gon, 147 SIDE, and the Guido government, 33, 104, 106; and the Illia govcrmn