The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod: From Hellenistic to Roman Frameworks (Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism) 3161456173, 9783161587764, 9783161456176

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Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum herausgegeben von Martin Hengel und Peter Schäfer

25

The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod From Hellenistic to Roman Frameworks by

Israel Shatzman

J . C . B . Möhr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen

Die Deutsche Bibliothek Shatzman,

CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Israel:

The armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod : from Hellenistic to Roman frameworks / by Israel Shatzman. - Tübingen : Mohr, 1991 (Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum ; 25) ISBN 3-16-145617-3 NE: G T

978-3-16-158776-4 Unveränderte eBook-Ausgabe 2019

© 1991 J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) P.O. Box 2040, D-7400 Tübingen. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was typeset by Sam Boyd Enterprise in Singapore, printed by Guide-Druck in Tübingen on non-aging paper by Gebr. Buhl in Ettlingen and bound by Heinr. Koch in Tübingen. ISSN 0721-8753

M E N A H E M STERN IN MEMORIAM

Preface

I became intrigued by the subject of this book in the course of my work on the military confrontation between the Jews and the Romans from the death of Herod to the War of Bar-Kokhva, which I was asked to contribute to Vol. VIII of the series The World History of the Jewish People: U. Rappaport (ed.), Judea and Rome (Masada Publishing Press, 1983, in Hebrew). While working on those chapters, I realized that no comprehensive account had ever been written of the army of Herod, and as for the Hasmonaeans, there existed then only B. Bar-Kochva's book (in Hebrew) on the wars of Judas Maccabaeus; this latter has recently been published in a revised English edition. It could be said that the literary and, more particularly, archaeological evidence was waiting for someone to exploit it. As I envisaged it, the research had to deal with institutions, policies, attitudes and basic problems, and not with tactical analyses of battles, for which the evidence is almost non-existent, at least in my opinion. In addition, various aspects of the security problems and foreign relations of the Hasmonaeans and Herod had to be considered. Broadly speaking, the study I conceived of had t o present how the Jews and their rulers reacted to the political and military superiority of, first, the Seleucid kingdom and, later on, the Roman empire. Occupied by other obligations, however, I was able to publish only one article at the time (Shatzman 1983a). I returned to the subject in 1986/7, when I received a sabbatical leave from my university, which I spent in Oxford. It was there that I completed the main part of the research and writing, enjoying the hospitality of Wolfson College, which elected me as a Visiting Fellow, and the excellent facilities of the Library of the Ashmolean Museum, whose staff were most helpful. The prompt readiness and willingness of a great number of Israeli archaeologists to supply me with information and new evidence and to devote their time to discussions have been extremely valuable and enjoyable. They remained patient even when confronted by inquisitive and provocative queries, which must have been considered impolite, given the fact that the interrogator is, at the most, an amateur in the field of archaeology. For their interest and assistance I wish to record in particular my thanks to Prof. D. Barag, Ms. R. Bar-Nathan, Prof. I. Beit-Arieh, Mr. M. Broshi, Dr. S. Dar, Dr. G. Foerster, Dr. Z. Meshel, Prof. Y. Meshorer, Dr. E. Netzer, and Mrs. R. Sivan.

vili

Preface

I am indebted to Prof. A . Kasher for letting me read his book Jews, Idumaeans, and Ancient Arabs before publication. For putting at my disposal the manuscripts of their forthcoming books, I am grateful to Dr. E. Netzer (Masada III: The Buildings) and to Dr. G. Foerster (Masada IV: Art and Architecture). It is with great pleasure that I express my gratitude to several friends and colleagues who read and commented on drafts of the book or parts of it: Prof. J.C. Greenfield (Chap. I l l ) , Prof. Y. Tsafrir (Chaps. II and V I ) , Prof. F.W. Walbank (Part One), and Professors F. Millar and U. Rappaport (the entire book). Thanks to their advice and criticism I have been able to correct a number of mistakes and slips of the pen and to clarify neglected and obscure points. As usual, they need not be taken as sharing my views. I am alone responsible for the opinions ventured and the interpretations offered, as well as for the remaining errors and shortcomings. In correcting the proofs I had the invaluable assistance of my friend Prof. J. Geiger, who also offered advice on content and style. I am indebted to Dr. Deborah Gera and Dr. J. Price for innumerable suggestions to improve the language. Miss D. Dueck kindly undertook the arduous task of checking the references. Mrs. T. Soffer patiently and skilfully drew the maps. I also wish to acknowledge a grant given by the Research Committee of the Faculty of Humanities of my university for the preparation of the maps. There is one debt which I record with profound feeling of loss. The late Prof. M. Stern showed much interest in the subject, even though he was able to read and comment on the first part of the book alone. His brutal, untimely death has deprived all students of ancient history of a great scholar; I have lost a warm friend and generous counsellor. In many respects and in various ways, direct and indirect, he has left his imprint on this book, which I dedicate to his memory. January 1990 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Israel Shatzman

Contents

Preface

vii

Abbreviations

xi

List of Maps and Plates

xiii

Acknowledgements

xv

Introduction

1

Part One: The Hasmonaean Period

Chapter I: From Guerilla Tactics to Regular Army 1. Weapons and Tactics 2. Strength and Composition of the Hasmonaean Army

11 25

Chapter H: Fortifications 1. The Hellenistic Background 2. Judaea and Idumaea 3. Samaria 4. The Hellenistic Cities 5. Galilee 6. Transjordan 7. Conclusion

36 43 60 72 83 88 94

Chapter EI: Hasmonaeans and Nabataeans 1. Early Times 2. Gaza and the Negev Sector 3. Transjordan

98 109 116

Contents

X

Part Two: The Herodian Period Chapter IV: Herod's Rise to Power 1. The Consequences of the Settlement of Pompeius 2. From Strategos of Galilee to King of Judaea 3. The Reconquest of Judaea by Herod ( 3 9 - 3 0 B.C.E.)

129 138 150

Chapter V: The Herodian Army 1. Composition and Duties 2. Strength and Tactics

170 193

Chapter VI: Fortifications and Garrisons 1. Judaea 2. Idumaea 3. The Coastal Cities 4. Samaria and Galilee 5. Transjordan 6. Conclusion

217 233 246 254 260 265

Chapter VII: Herod and the Nabataeans 1. The Nabataeans in the First Century B.C.E 2. From Friendship to Open War 3. Transjordan 4. The Balance of the Evidence

277 284 291 299

Conclusion

310

Bibliography

317

Indexes

333

Abbreviations

Periodicals are abbreviated as in L'Année philologique, in few cases with slight modifications which will cause no difficulty. The following should be noted: A A SOR ADA] AJ ANRW BASOR Bibl.Arch. BJ BMC C.Ap. CPJ CSEL EAEHL F. Gr..Hist. IGLS ILS JA OS JBL JJS JPOS JQR LCL OGIS PAES PCZ PEFQS PEQ PJB P.Lond. PSI QDAP RB

Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae H. Teraporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research Bib lical A rchaeo logis t Josephus, Bellum Judaicum British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins Josephus, Contra Apionem V. Tcherikover, A. Fuks, M. Stern, Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum, I— 111(1957-62) Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum M. Avi-Yonah (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land, I - I V (1957-78) F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae Joumal of the American Oriental Society Journal of Biblical Literature Joumal of Jewish Studies Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society Jewish Quarterly Review Loeb Classical Library W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae Publications of the Princeton University Archaeological Expeditions to Syria in 1905 and 1909 C.C. Edgar, Zenon Papyri, I - I V (1925-1940) Palestine Exploraton Fund Quarterly Statement Palestine Exploration Quarterly Palästinajahrb uch T.C. Skeat, Greek Papyri in the British Museum, VII (1970) G. Vitelli et alii, Pubblicazioni della Societa Italiana. Papiri greci e latini, IV-VI (1917-1920) Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities of Palestine Revue Biblique

xii

Abbreviations

RE

Real-Enchclopädie

SAB

Sitzungberichte

der Classischen

Altertumswissenschaft

ZDPV

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Palästina - Vereins

der Deutchen Akademie der Wissenschaften zur Berlin

Note also the following: G.R.

Grid reference to the Israel grid of coordinates

H

Hurvat (Hebrew)

Kh.

Khirbet (Arabic)

T. W.

Tel (Hebrew), Tell (Arabic) WddT

List of Maps and Plates

I. Maps 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Seleucid Palestine Sites of Judas Maccabaeus' battles in Judaea and its vicinity Bacchides' fortifications Jerusalem in the Hasmonaean period Judaea in the Hasmonaean period Idumaea in the Hasmonaean period Samaria in the Hasmonaean period The water supply system of Alexandrium The cities of Palestine in the Hasmonaean period Galilee Transjordan in the Hasmonaean period Southern Palestine and Sinai The Herodian territories in north Transjordan. Herod's kingdom after 20 B.C.E Herodian Jerusalem The Jericho area Judaea in the Herodian period The water supply system of Masada Idumaea and the Negev in the Herodian period The coastal cities Herodian Peraea Batanaea, Trachonitis and Auranitis

2 22 39 46 53 57 66 70 78 84 89 99 172 192 219 228 232 235 243 248 262 282

II. Plates (located between pp. 125 and 126) 1. Tel Dor (Dora): Hellenistic tower and wall, looking east 2. Shcar ha- c Amaqim (Gaba): Hellenistic fortlet, looking east 3. Sh c ar ha- 'Amaqim (Gaba): segment of the encircling wall (proteichismal) of the Hellenistic fortlet, looking north 4. Qasr Mansurah: a field tower in Samaria 5. Qasr Kuah: a fortified farmstead in Samaria 6. Jericho: general view of the northern tel of Tulül Abü el-'Aláiq, looking north-east 7. Jericho: wall of the Hasmonaean palace in the northern tel of Tulül Abü el- 'Aláiq

x iv

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Lilt of Maps and Pla tes

Jericho: the southern tel of Tulul Abu el- c Alaiq, looking south Jericho: opus reticulatum, the Herodian palace on the northern bank of WadI Qelt Tell 'Aqaba: the site of Herodian Cyprus, looking west Jebel Qarantal: the site of Doq (Dagon) and of Threx or Taurus, looking north Jerusalem: the south-eastern part of the Temple Mount, looking west from Mount of Olives Jerusalem: the "stitch" in the eastern wall of the Temple Mount Jerusalem: outward face of the First Wall west of the Tower of David Jerusalem: the western side of the Tower of David (Hippicus) Qarn Sartaba: the site of Alexandrium, looking west Alexandrium: wall with two manners of stone dressing Hyrcania: air view, looking east Hyrcania: the aqueduct over the saddle west of the mount, looking east Herodium: air view, looking north-east Herodium: the round tower and the only excavated segment of the concentric walls Herodium: the entrance to one of the water cisterns Herodium, looking south-east Masada: air view, looking south Tel'Uzza: air view, looking south Tel 'Ira: air view, looking north Caesarea: round tower and wall in the northern part of the city, looking west Caesarea: segment of the wall west of the round tower

Acknowledgements The following have kindly supplied me photographs and given me permission to include plates or maps in this book. I am grateful to all of them, and apologize for any inadvertent omissions. Mr. D. Amit: map 8; Prof. I. Beit-Arieh: plates 25, 26; Dr. S. Dar: plates 4, 5; Mr. I. Goldrath: plate 17; Dr. Y. Hirshfeld: plates 10, 11, 18, 27; Dr. E. Netzer: plates 6, 20, 21, 22, 24, map 18; Mr. Y. Naor: plates 2, 3; Prof. E. Stern: plate 1; Prof. Y. Tsafrir: plates 12, 13, 16; Mr. Y. Weinberg: plate 23.

Introduction The rise of the Hasmonaean state, more than four hundred years after the fall of the kingdom of Judah and the destruction of the First Temple, is a phenomenon which calls for explanation from various points of view, including military factors and considerations. At that time the Jewish population of Eretz-Israel (Land of Israel) was concentrated mainly in the relatively small area of Judaea which extended from about Ammaus in the west to the river Jordan in the east and from Beth-Zur in the south to about 15—18 km. north of Jerusalem. Jews also lived in Transjordan (Peraea) and Galilee, and were possibly to be found in a few sites in Idumaea. Since Jews formed a minority in all the last three regions, living1 within a Gentile populaton, only Judaea proper is to be considered a Jewish territory at the beginning of the Hasmonaean period 1 . It is thus remarkable that the Seleucid empire failed to suppress the revolt of such a small-size community, divided initially by fierce internal conflicts, for the Hellenising party in Judaea cooperated actively with the Seleucid regime. With no political organization and seemingly without previous military experience or institutions, the rebels defied the Seleucid authorities and won victories on the battlefield. Great leadership and religious devotion on the one side and various deeply rooted structural, political and personal weaknesses on the other side might serve to explain the success of the Jewish rebels. But in the final analysis it was a military achievement. The first battles won by Judas Maccabaeus, at Beth-Horon and Ammaus and the expedition to Transjordan etc., demonstrate this aspect of the Hasmonaean uprising. Later on, it was mainly military victories which paved the way for the territorial expansion of the Hasmonaean state, an expansion which led to the spread of Judaism over much of the territory of the Land of Israel. This extension of Judaism was the outcome of the conversion of many of the local populations of the conquered regions; those Jews from Judaea proper who migrated to and colonized the newly won territories

1 On the e t h n i c demography of Eretz-Israel at t h e t i m e see t h e a c c o u n t in Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 1 - 2 0 . Throughout this book the term Judaea is used in two senses. One refers to Judaea p r o p e r , as defined in the t e x t , which, however, as an administrative unit, was later e x t e n d e d to include some parts of Samaria and the coastal plain. T h e other means the entire kingdom of t h e Hasm o n a e a n s and Herod. Usually it should be clear f r o m the c o n t e x t what sense is m e a n t , b u t in those cases where ambiguity might be involved I have added ' p r o p e r ' to refer to Judaea in the n a r r o w sense.

2

Introduction

Map 1: Seleucid Palestine

Introduction

3

contributed to this development. Thus it came about that Idumaea, parts of the coastal plain, Samaria, Galilee and Peraea were gradually Judaized. Apparently possessing talent for military affairs, the Hasmonaean rulers adopted an aggressive policy which was quite often combined with clever diplomatic manouevres. For almost a century, as long as they faced the neighbouring Hellenistic kingdoms, mainly the Seleucid epigones, Greek cities and native rulers of the territories closely adjacent to their realm, they proved successful in the expansionist policy, notwithstanding several defeats and setbacks. By a series of wars, in particular successful siege operations, Alexander Jannaeus brought the Hasmonaean state to its maximum territorial expansion, which Alexandra Salome, his widow and heir to the throne, was able to retain and consolidate. Their achievement marked the culminating stage of the Hasmonaean military enterprise. Until the reign of Alexander Jannaeus, the Hasmonaean rulers managed to establish and maintain friendly relations with the Roman empire which, although geographically remote at the beginning of this period, showed interest in the political affairs of the eastern part of the Mediterranean. But the foreign policy of Jannaeus apparently did not win approval at Rome, and the Jewish-Roman alliance was not renewed during his reign 2 . The military edifice he established did not last long after the death of his wife in 67. The internal struggle for power between their sons Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II had already started before the death of Salome and was to set Judaea in turmoil for the next forty years. This struggle involved various opposing parties within Judaean society and in a short time the situation gave an opportunity to foreign powers to intervene in Judaean affairs. It was the Nabataean king Aretas III who was the first to try to take advantage of the fraternal conflict. The Roman intervention in 64, however, completely changed the political setting. The appeal of the Hasmonaean brothers to Pompeius to adjudge their dispute ended with the conquest of Jerusalem by the Roman general in 63 B.C.E. Not only did Pompeius put an end to the independence of the Judaean state established by the first Hasmonaeans, leaving Hyrcanus II to rule the Jews as HighPriest while withholding from him the royal title, but by re-establishing the Greek cities he severely reduced the territory of the Judaean state. But Hyrcanus II was a weak person and his timidity and, probably, vacillations fostered contention for power and influence among his councillors and commanders, Antipater being only the most prominent among them. This situation as well as the renewed attempts of Aristobulus II and his son Alexander to raise rebellion in Judaea prevented the restoration of peace. These very revolts in their turn occasioned more military interven-

2 Rappaport 1968; Stern 1981, 2 8 - 9 .

4

Introduction

tion by the Roman governors of Syria in the fifties: Gabinius, Crassus and, after the latter's death at Carrhae, Cassius. In the wake of the outbreak of the civil war between Caesar and Pompeius in 49 B.C.E. Judaea was necessarily involved in the internal Roman struggle for power between the contending parties, as were other dynasts, cities and provinces in the East. Caesar's victories did not put an end to the struggle for, soon after his departure from the East in 47, a Pompeian supporter, Caecilius Bassus, successfully rose against Sextus Iulius Caesar, the Caesarean governor of the province of Syria. Caesar's murder in 4 4 led to fresh, fervent military activities in the eastern part of the Roman empire, where the tyrannicides sought to build up their forces in view of the imminent encounter with Antonius and Caesar Octavianus. This war ending with the victory of the Triumvirs in the battles of Philippi in October 42, Judaea did not return to normal conditions as, first, the victorious Antonius exacted enormous sums of money from the native populations of the East and t h e n , in the year 40, the Parthians invaded the Roman empire. They swept over Syria and Asia Minor and helped Antigonus, the son of Aristobulus II, in his attempt to gain control of Judaea. The political career of Herod, the son of Antipater, the shrewd minister of Hyrcanus II, began in 47 with his appointment as governor of Galilee. By 40 he and his brother Phasael had managed to become masters of Judaea. As a result of the Parthian invasion he fled from the country and, on his arrival in Rome in the same year, was recognized as king of Judaea by the Roman senate on the proposal of Antonius and Caesar Octavianus. It took Herod almost three years of fighting before he was able to complete the reconquest of Judaea, which he did only with the support of Roman troops, the siege of Jerusalem proving to be the hardest task he had to undertake. Even afterwards he had to take precautions against both the remnants of Hasmonaean opposition to his rule in the country and especially the greed and machinations of Cleopatra VII, who coveted his territories. The intrigues of the Ptolemaic queen entangled him in war with the Nabataean king Malichus but fortunately saved him from taking part personally in the campaign of Actium. Herod succeeded in winning the favour of Caesar Octavianus, who not only confirmed his position as king of Judaea but also enlarged his dominions. Herod's rise to power was due largely to his cunning and adroitness, will-power and ambition, administrative talent and political dexterity; above all he understood, as his father had already discovered, that under the new conditions obtaining in the East after the conquests of Pompeius, all power and authority depended on and emanated from the Roman rulers, and hence that complete loyalty to the Roman government was the key to political success. The task of remaining loyal became complicated and difficult because of the rapid succession of Roman rulers of the East

Introduction

5

in the two turbulent decades between the civil war of 49 and the battle of Actium. Other loyal dynasts and cities of the eastern Roman provinces faced the same problems; not a few paid the highest price for not changing sides at the right moment, for remaining loyal to a lost cause or for collaborating with the Parthians, surely a grave mistake. Not so Herod. He always showed his loyalty to each successive Roman who happened to be in power and convinced the next one that his loyalty would benefit the Roman interests. For loyalty was judged and assessed in concrete terms: the ability of the local dynast to contribute monies, food, provisions, military equipment and troops. It thus appears that Herod's prospects of taking control in Judaea and maintaining his power largely depended on his ability to build up military strength. It appears that a study which encompasses the Hasmonaean and Herodian periods in Judaea, as does the present one, must deal with two distinct sets of political conditions. The Hasmonaean rulers won their achievements within the political framework of the Hellenistic world and, this has to be underlined, during the period of decline of the great Hellenistic powers. This setting had its effects on some of the military features of the Hasmonaean state, which are examined here, as well as on the goals of the foreign policy of Jonathan, Simon and the latter's successors. The political conditions under which Herod had to build up his power differed in a very essential respect. Ambitious and in command of resources not inferior, perhaps even superior to those of the Hasmonaeans, he nonetheless could not allow himself to adopt the expansionist policy of his predecessors on the throne of Judaea. Thus the view that military power was a fundamental condition both for the Hasmonaean and Herodian achievements, clearly not a novelty by itself, merely provides the starting point of this study. To probe the correctness of this claim, or premise, has required a comprehensive investigation of various topics pertinent to the military history of the period in question. It seemed relevant and instructive to document, describe and analyse in detail the structure of the Hasmonaean and Herodian armies, the military installations constructed by these rulers, the security problems they faced and the use they made of their power. For instance, the extent of the adoption of military institutions of the Hellenistic armies by the Hasmonaean rulers is an intriguing and important subject. Something is said on this problem here but, it must be admitted, a satisfactory picture cannot be drawn on the basis of the available evidence. Similarly it is of interest to find out whether the Herodian army employed Hellenistic or Roman tactics. This question, which has some bearing on the development of the Roman army of the imperial period, deserves a detailed examination. In a sense then the investigation of the Hasmonaean and Herodian military institutions might provide an insight into the transition from Hellenistic to Roman influence, or might

6

Introduction

testify to the mixture of these influences. However, first and above all the present study aims at delineating the military resources available to the Hasmonaean rulers and Herod. Their presentation will contribute to some understanding and evaluation, from a military angle, of the victories and political gains of the Hasmonaeans. It will also serve to demonstrate clearly the extent of the political limitations imposed on Herod in the sphere of foreign policy, despite the extensive military potential and actual forces at his disposal and in striking dissimilarity to what had been feasible for the Hasmonaeans. The above-mentioned considerations and aims have dictated the procedure, structure and scope of this study. I start with a somewhat detailed account of the military institutions characteristic of the Hasmonaean state together with an attempt to related them t o political developments. This comprises a discussion of the weapons available to the Jewish rebels at the initial stage and of the tactics they employed then and later, when a regular Hasmonaean army came into being. The strength and composition of the Hasmonaean army naturally belongs in this account, even though the necessary data for their study are meagre and problematic. The importance of these subjects for the understanding of success in war is self-evident and justifies a detailed analysis of the available figures. There follows a comprehensive description, based on the literary sources and the archaeological findings, of the fortifications constructed by the Hasmonaeans. As well as illuminating the comprehension of the security problems of the Jewish state, the emerging picture sheds some light on the means forged to tackle them. The lengthy account of the confrontation between the Hasmonaean state and the Nabataean kingdom needs no more than a short explanation. Excepting the struggle with the Seleucid kings, this was the only military and political confrontation of fundamental importance. The geographic expansion and nature of the Nabataean kingdom have to be carefully studied in order to arrive at a balanced judgement of the security problems this power presented to the Hasmonaean rulers. Only by meticulous scrutiny and strict interpretation of all pieces of evidence pertinent to the subject, even in an indirect way, can a proper assessment of the relations between the Hasmonaeans and the Nabataeans be attained. This comprehensive description, based on the literary sources and the archaeological finds, of the fortifications constructed by the Hasmonaeans. As well as concludes the first part of the study. The second part opens with a somewhat detailed description of the military and political events of the period 6 3 - 3 0 , focusing on the military aspects of Herod's rise to power from his appointment as governor of Galilee in 47 B.C.E. t o the confirmation of his status as royal ruler of Judaea by Augustus after the battle of Actium. The size, structure and nature of Herod's army in the period of the Augustan Principate, as well as

Introduction

7

the military installations he constructed in his realm, are then described and analysed. These are examined in reference to the king's relations with the Jews and Greeks as well as with the Nabataeans. Indeed the intricate relations between Herod and the Nabataeans seemed important enough to constitute the subject of another separate chapter. An overall assessment o f the security problems, military means and political achievements of the Hasmonaeans and Herod closes the study. It mainly aims at presenting and underlining the similarities and differences between the two systems of government elaborated by these rulers.

Part One

The Hasmonaean Period

Chapter I From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

The Hasmonaean revolt in Judaea, coming after a series of power conflicts among the Hellenising Jews in Jerusalem, was precipitated by the religious persecution initiated by King Antiochus IV Epiphanes in 167 B.C.E. and was basically a popular rising of the population of the Jewish countryside against the Hellenising Jews and their Seleucid supporters 1 . That popular, active opposition of the "pious" (hasidim) against Jason and the Hellenising party had started earlier is doubtful and disputed 2 . At any rate, there is no doubt that the rebellion which was later to drive out the Seleucid rule from Judaea started with the forceful and violent Hasmonaean opposition to the attempt to introduce the cult of Zeus in Modein, continued for a while in organized guerilla warfare and developed into regular operations on the battlefield already under Judas Maccabaeus3. Several aspects of this revolt may be singled out for discussion in the context of this study.

1. Weapons and Tactics That the insurgents were poorly equipped and, at least initially, used simple weapons, slings and, to some extent, various missiles, emerges time

1 On the background and sequence of the events that culminated in the Hasmonaean rebellion, much disputed in modern schaolarship, see E. Bickermann, Der Gott der Makkabaer• (1937) passim; Tcherikover 1961, 1 5 2 - 2 0 3 ; Hengel 1974 I, esp. 2 5 7 - 3 0 3 ; Millar 1978; Schiirer 1 9 3 7 - 8 7 I, 1 4 9 - 5 5 . Tcherikover's conclusion that "It was not the revolt which came as a response to the persecution, but the persecution which came as a response to the revolt" iib. 191) seems to indicate the correct nature of the process, even though some of the rebellious activities that he supposes to have preceded the arrival of Apollonius the Mysarch seem doubtful (see next note). Thus Apollonius arrived in Jerusalem after the unsuccessful revolt of Jason. The harsh measures he took against the enemies of Menelaus led Jason's supporters and the Hasidim to flee into the desert. And it was this anachoresis, considered to be a rebellious act, that preceded and in part occasioned the religious persecution. 2 For the view that the 'pious' expelled Jason and resorted to active revolt before the persecution see Tcherikover 1961, 1 8 7 - 8 ; 192; 1 9 6 - 7 . See, however, Hengel 1974 I, 2 8 1 - 2 ; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 153 n. 37. 3 The most detailed military accounts of the first stage of the Hasmonaean wars are Bar-Kochva 1980a; idem 1989. The main ideas are already in Bar-Kochva 1976, 1 7 4 - 2 0 0 . See also the sensible account of Avi-Yonah 1972.

12

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

and again in the sources. Of the internal conflict between the Hellenisers and those Jews who opposed them it is said: Crowds began to riot. They were filled with increasing rage. Lysimachus armed about three thousand men, and struck the first blow, with a certain Auranus, advanced in years and no less in foolishness, as leader. When they became aware of the fact that Lysimachus was about to attack, some picked up stones, others sticks of wood, and others clutched handfuls of cinders that were lying about and hurled them at Lysimachus's men, causing utter confusion. In this way they wounded many of them, felled others to the ground, put all of them to flight, and slew the sacrilegious robber himself near the treasury 4 . Even later, Apollonius, the commander of Coele-Syria whojoined Demetrius II, is quoted as saying to Jonathan: "Why do you set up your authority against us in the mountains? If you set such reliance on your soldiers, come down against us in the plain . . . You will not be able to withstand such cavalry and army in the plain, where there is no stone nor pebble nor place to flee"5. And again: "As soon as it was daybreak, Judah was seen in the plain with three thousand men, although they had neither such armour nor swords as they would have wished" 6 . It appears then that the rebellious Jews suffered from lack of body armour, shields and weapons. They excelled in the use of stones and slings and owed their success to their knowledge of the country where the mountainous terrain did not allow the Seleucid army to take full advantage of its cavalry. It may seem surprising arid even incredible that units of a Hellenistic army could have been defeated by guerilla fighters equipped merely with such weapons. However, the methods of fighting exhibited by the insurgents after Herod's death show that the use of stones, slings and javelins, perhaps improvized ones, was common and effective, and in certain circumstances could have been decisive even against Roman troops. A Roman unit under the command of a centurion was attacked near Ammaus in 4 B.C.E. by the rebellious Jews, who skilfully threw their javelins from a distance without coming to close combat. The Roman losses were severe and apparently the whole unit would have been annihilated but for the 4 IIMacc. 4. 4 0 - 2 (translation by Tedesche 1954). See also IMacc. 2 . 3 6 - 7 . 5 I Macc. 1 0 . 7 0 - 3 (translation by Tedesche 1950). Cf. AJ 1 3 . 8 9 - 9 0 . Bar-Kochva (1980a, 83 n. 12; idem 1989, 77 n. 27) argues that Apollonius' is not an authentic letter. Even if his arguments are correct, this evidence does at least reveal the accepted image of the Hasmonaean revolt. Goldstein (1976, 420) assumes that the author had good access to the content of the letter even though the literary form is his own free composition. 6 I. Macc. 4.6 (translation by Tedesche 1950). There is nothing in this passage to justify the inference that the Jews fought "very like the classic Thracian and Scythian peltasts" (contra Bar-Kochva 1 9 8 9 , 6 8 ) . For the number of J u d a s ' m e n and their poor weapons cf. AJ 12.307 (6,000 is the number given in IIMacc. 8.16). See also IIMacc. 15.11.

Weapons and

Tactics

13

timely support provided by Herodian troops loyal to the Roman government 7 . Similarly, the Jews fought the Romans in Jerusalem about the same time mainly with the use of stones, slings and javelins 8 . Other incidents down to the Jewish revolt of 66 C.E. show that for the Jews of Judaea these were the most common, popular weapons 9 . It thus does not strain credulity to accept that Judas Maccabaeus won his first successes by the skiful use of these weapons, probably taking advantage of his better knowledge of the terrain and surprising the enemy 10 . Judas Maccabaeus was aware of this inferiority in weapons and did try to compensate for it. The first means was obviously to use the weapons captured from the vanquished enemies and there are some allusions to this, e.g.: "that Lysias, heading a strong force, had been put to flight before them; that they had become strong because of the arms, material and such spoil as they took from the armies which they had destroyed" 11 . This, however, was not enough and it may be assumed that after a while the insurgents started acquiring arms from abroad and even producing them themselves. Now the importance of armament for the Hasmonaeans is obvious and needs no further explanation. Yet it is interesting to note that it was important enough to come to the fore in the negotiations between Demetrius I and Jonathan. We are told that "he (i.e. Demetrius I) gave him (i.e. Jonathan) authority to assemble troops, to equip them with arms" 12 . This sounds like a retroactive legitimization of past actions taken by the Hasmonaean brothers. Jonathan indeed proceeded to the manufacture of arms and it seems that thenceforward the problem of armament became less acute 13 . But it was not a merely practical issue. The permission given 7 BJ 2.63; AJ 1 7 . 2 8 2 - 3 . On the use of slings in ancient times see Echols 1950; Korfmann 1973. 8 BJ 2 . 4 7 - 8 ; AJ 1 7 . 2 5 8 - 6 0 . From Josephus' account it appears that the Romans in Jerusalem suffered f r o m stones, slings and arrows, but he mainly underlines the Jewish skill with slings. As regards the use of archers on this occasion, I take it that the reference is to Herodian soldiers who joined the rebels and not to Jews who happened to be in Jerusalem on the occasion of the Pentecost. 9 BJ 1.332; AJ 14.456 (on the 6,000 Jews who used stones and javelins to attack Herod and the Romans near Jericho). See also AJ 1 7 . 2 1 5 - 6 ; BJ 2.11; 225; 406; 4 2 3 ; 526. Bar-Kochva (1989, 68; 72; 74) assumes the existence of archers in Judas' a r m y ; in fact, no Jewish archers of the Hasmonaean army of this stage are mentioned in our sources. 10 Bar-Kochva (1980a, 75 f.; idem 1989, 6 3 - 7 ) argues that on account of their panegyric character and religious-didactic approach, the sources for the Hasmonaean revolt, in particular the author of I. Macc., ignore the tactics used by the Jews as well as their equipment, their aim being to exaggerate the magnitude of the Jewish victory. Yet he concedes (1989, 6 8 - 9 ) that it was only after the occupation of Jerusalem and the purification of the Temple that the Jews improved their weapons and changed their tactics whereas earlier their military equipment had been rather primitive. 11 I Macc. 6.6 (translation by Tedesche 1950). See also I Macc. 7.44; / / Macc. 8.27; 31; 12.27—8; AJ 12.287; 3 5 3 ; 4 1 0 . 12 I Macc. 10.6 (translation by Tedesche 1950); 13.38; 40. 13 I Macc. 1 0 . 2 1 ; / ! . / 13.46: " ( J o n a t h a n ) gathered together a large force and forged a great number of arms".

14

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

to Jonathan to provide arms was part of and concomitant with the recognition of his legal, independent status. This comes out again clearly in Antiochus VII Sidetes' letter to Simon: "I turn over to you the right to make your own stamp for coinage for your country. Jerusalem and the sanctuary shall be free. All the arms you have prepared, and the fortifications you have constructed, which you hold, let them remain yours'" 4 . And it is instructive to note that the surrender of arms was one of Antiochus VII Sidetes' conditions for coming to terms with Simon's son, John Hyrcanus I; it was a practical matter as well as an assertion of the superior authority of the Seleucid king l s . The Hasmonaeans might have gained from the military experience of Jews outside Judaea, but unfortunately the sources provide only scanty relevant evidence. In fact Josephus gives evidence, some of it allegedly on the authority of Hecataeus, that Alexander the Great had already employed Jewish mercenaries 16 . Most of the information about military service of Jews concerns Egypt. There it had already started by the 6th century and continued under Persian rule 17 . The Ptolemaic kings took over this tradition and employed Jews in garrisons and in military settlements in Egypt and Cyrenaica as well 18 . It is this military service in the Macedonian army that gave rise to the description "Macedonian" Jews 19 . In a way the events in Judaea had their effect on Egypt as Onias IV, who fled from Judaea, founded there the Jewish temple of Leontopolis which

14 IMacc. 1 5 . 6 - 7 (translation by Tedesche 1950). 15 AJ 13.246. 16 C. Ap. 1.192; 2 0 0 - 5 ; AJ 11.339. On the passage ascribed to Hecataeus by Josephus (C. Ap. 1 . 1 8 3 - 2 0 4 ) see Stem 1974a, 2 1 - 5 , who gives a brief answer to the arguments raised against the authorship of Hecataeus and a detailed bibliography. See especially H. Levy, "Hekataios von Abdera, n e p i 'IouScuW, ZNTW 31 (1932) 1 1 7 - 3 2 . The case against authenticity was argued again in J.-D. Gauger, "Zitate der jüdischen Apologetik und die Authentizität der Hekataios-Passagen bei Flavius Josephus, und in Ps-Aristeas Brief", JSJ 13 (1982) 6 - 4 6 . 1t would exceed the scope of this study to deal with his arguments. 17 On the origins of the Jewish military settlement at Elephantine see E.C. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Papyri (1953) 4 1 - 8 (a discussion of the evidence and of modern interpretations). That the Jewish settlement at Elephantine dated before the Persian conquest of Egypt is explicitly stated in one of the Aramaic papyri. See A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (1923) no. 30,13. See also the detailed account in B. Porten, Archives from Elephantine (1968) 1 —61. 18 For Egypt see Letter of Aristeas 1 2 - 4 ; 3 5 - 7 ; 1 2 . 7 - 8 ; 4 5 ; C. Ap. 2.44.For Samaritan troops settled in the Thebaid in Egypt by Alexander see AJ 11.345. For a collection of the evidence and discussions see Launey 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 I, 4 4 1 - 5 0 ; II, 1 2 3 2 - 5 ; CPJ I, nos. 1 8 - 3 2 (pp. 1 4 7 - 7 8 ) ; Tcherikover 1963, 3 0 - 4 3 ; Kasher 1978; idem 1985, 3 8 - 4 8 (but the evidence for the existence of separate Jewish units in the 3rd century seems to me tenuous). For Cyrenaica see AJ 1 2 . 7 8; 1 4 . 1 1 4 - 6 ; C. Ap. 2.44. On the origins of the Jewish settlement in Cyrenaica see the lengthy discussion in Applebaum, Jews and Greeks in Ancient Cyrene (1979) 1 3 0 - 8 . 19 Tcherikover 1961, 3 2 2 - 3 ; CPJ I, pp. 1 4 - 1 5 ; II, no. 142; Kasher 1985, 2 8 6 - 7 ; Fraser 1972 I 53; 80.

Weapons and

Tactics

15

was associated with a Jewish military colony 2 0 . Jewish troops and commanders were later to play an important role in Egyptian politics 21 . Of special interest for the Hasmonaean revolt is the evidence about the Tobiad cleruchy in Transjordan. The land of Tobiah and his cleruchs, including cavalrymen, are recorded in several of the Zenon papyri 22 . One papyrus contains a deed of sale of a slave girl contracted in Birta of Amin 259 B.C.E. The witnesses to the monitis (ev [Upra rrj1713.134

9. General mobilization

40,000

I Macc.

1 2 . 4 1 ; AJ

13.188

Stage I 3 , 0 0 0

I Macc.

1 2 . 4 7 ; AJ

13.191

10. T r o o p s a c c o m p a n y i n g

13.91

Jonathan for meeting with Tryphon68

64 BJ 1 . 6 3 - 5 ; AJ 1 3 . 2 7 5 - 8 3 . For the archaeological evidence see Crowfoot et alii 1 9 4 2 - 5 7 I, 2 8 - 3 1 . Some of the breaches mentioned by Crowfoot may have been carried out after the capture of the city, but, unlike him, I see no evidence in Josephus' account that Samaria was starved o u t , and not taken by force. 65 BJ 1 . 8 6 - 7 ; 1 0 3 - 6 ; / ! / 1 3 . 3 5 6 - 6 4 ; 3 9 3 - 8 . See also Chap. II.4 and 6. 66 A comparison of I Macc. 3 . 3 2 - 4 . 2 5 and AJ 1 2 . 2 9 5 - 3 1 2 with IIMacc. 8 . 8 - 1 6 makes clear that b o t h accounts deal with the same battle, the first ascribing the Seleucid senior c o m m a n d to Gorgias the second to Nicanor. •67 Both sources record that initially Judas Maccabaeus had a larger force (IMacc.: 3 , 0 0 0 ; Josephus: 1,000), but according to both authors only 800 men took part in the battle. 68 After the dismissalof the 4 0 , 0 0 0 , Jonathan kept with him 3 , 0 0 0 troops, of whom he sent 2 , 0 0 0 to Galilee and took only 1,00Q men to his fatal meeting with Tryphon in Ptolemais.

26

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Occasion 11. Help sent to Antiochus VII 12. Battle against Cendebaeus 13. General mobilization against Lathyrus',69 14. Battle against Demetrius III Eucaerus

Strength

Army

Reference

2,000 IMacc. 15.26 20,000 IMacc. 16.4 Version A 50,000 AJ 13.337 Version B 80,000 AJ 13.337 Version A: AÄ/1.93; 1,000 cavalry + 8,000 mercenaries + RAJ 13.378 10,000 Jews Version B: 6,200 mercenaries + 20,000 Jews

Can one trust these figures? That the figures ascribed to the Seleucid armies on many of these occasions are highly inflated and absurd have been generally recognized 70 . The question is whether the figures ascribed to the Hasmonaean forces are underestimated, and, if so, to what extent. Two additional details may help in assessing the forces at the disposal of Judas Maccabaeus. Lysimachus is said to have enlisted 3,000 men in his attempt to take control of Judaea in 168, in which he failed as a result of a popular uprising 71 . One thousand troops enabled Jason to capture Jerusalem, but he was soon forced to leave the city and retreated to Transjordan 7 2 . These figures tally well with those ascribed to Judas, in as far as the sources reflect conditions when a few thousand troops were considered as a sufficient force to win the internal struggle in Judaea. The battle of Ammaus was the first one Judas Maccabaeus fought against a royal Seleucid army, which was supported by local forces from Idumaea and from the coastal cities of southern Palestine. If the numbers accorded to the Seleucid army on this occasion are discredited (40,000 infantry and 7,000 or 6,000 cavalry according to one version and 20,000 according to another), as they should be, there is no point in comparing the strength of the contending armies. However, it stands to reason that a surprise attack at dawn on that part of the Seleucid army which remained in the camp enabled Judas to win this campaign with even a smaller number of troops. Thus there is nothing unreasonable in the figures ascribed to the Jewish army on this occasion 73 . Similarly, the numbers ascribed to Lysias' army in his first campaign in Judaea (60,000 infantry 69 Josephus found two different figures for Jannaeus' army on this occasion, the higher one given by Timagenes. 70 See Bar-Kochva 1976, 12ff. and the literature mentioned in 209 n. 11; idem 1989, 4 0 - 7 . 71 IIMacc. 4 . 4 0 - 1 . 72 IIMacc. 5.5. 73 I Macc. '3.39; AJ 12.298; II Macc. 8.9. For the Ammaus campaign see Bar-Kochva 1989, 2 1 9 74.

Strength and Composition

of the Hasmonaean

Army

27

and 5,000 horsemen in one version and 80,000 infantry and thousands of horsemen in another) should be rejected; hence the credibility of the figure ascribed to Judas' army in the battle of Beth-Zur cannot be checked by comparison with the size of he Seleucid army 74 . The figures quoted in the sources show some gradual increase in the numerical strength of the Maccabaean forces in the years 167—163 (3,000/ 6,000; 10,000; 8,000 + 3,000 + ?), and at least in this respect they are consistent and seem reliable. Following the initial success, more people presumably rallied around Judas Maccabaeus. Now the figures for the campaign in Gilead and Galilee(8,000 + 3,000)imply a larger army. Indeed it is explicitly stated that on this occasion part of the Maccabaean forces remained in Judaea and even embarked on an offensive operation, which ended in a disaster with the loss of 2,000 men 7S . The size of the force that remained in Judaea is not stated, but it surely numbered several thousands. Given these numbers and considerations, the total Hasmonaean military manpower at this time may be estimated at least on the order of 20 thousands 76 . The figures for the battles of Adasa and Elasa are, on the other hand, surprisingly low. Compared to the ratio between the Jewish forces and the Seleucid armies on former occasions (e.g., according to the version of I Macc., 47,000 : 3,000 in the Ammaus campaign; 65,000 : 10,000 in the battle of Beth-Zur) there is nothing new in these numbers 77 . However, while the inflated figures of the Seleucid forces on former occasions are patently unreliable, the figures for the battle of Elasa seem trustworthy:

7 4 / M a c c . 4.28; AJ 12.31 3; IIMacc. 11.2; 4. 75 I Macc. 5.20; 5 5 - 6 0 ; AJ 12.332; 3 5 0 - 1 . The version of II Macc. 1 2 . 3 3 - 5 is that the attack against Gorgias was subsequent to and not simultaneous with the expeditions of Simon and Judas to Galilee and Gilead. Even so, this does not contradict the reasonable statement that part of the army stayed in Judaea during these two expeditions. For the chronology see, however, Abel 1949, 441; Bar-Kochva 1989 52 n. 80. 76 Assuming the Hasmonaean brothers would not operate with more than half of the army outside Judaea, Avi-Yonah (1972, 167) inferred that they had altogether 22,000 men at their disposal. Of course one cannot be sure what proportion of the army went abroad on this occasion. The Temple Scroll, probably to be dated in the reign of John Hyrcanus I (Yadin 1983 I, 2 3 0 - 1 , but see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 III 1, 4 1 5 - 7 ) , legislates that no more than half of the men able to serve in the army should be recruited for a defensive war in Eretz-Israel (for text and commentary see Yadin 1983 II, 2 5 9 - 6 5 ) . However, one does not know whether Judas abided by this rule, although it is quite reasonable. Bar-Kochva (1976, 186; 1 9 8 9 , 4 9 - 5 1 ) argues that the maximum casualty rate in battles of the period was 20 % (cf. P. Krentz, "Casualties in Hoplite Battles", GRBS 26 (1985) 1 3 - 2 0 ) , and hence that the 2,000 Jewish dead at Marisa represents a force of at least 10,000. Alexander Jannaeus, though, is reported to have lost 30,000 out of his 50,000 men in the battle against Ptolemy Lathyrus, i.e. 60 % (AJ 13.337; 344). This might be an inflated figure, but I would hesitate to draw a firm conclusion from the number of the Jewish dead in the battle of Marisa, which was a "defeat . . . on an especially large scale" (Bar-Kochva 1976, 270 n. 9). See also N.G.L. Hammond, JHS99(1989) 56-68. 77 Ammaus: 1 Macc. 3 . 3 8 - 9 and 4.1; cf. AJ 12.298; Beth-Zur: I Macc. 4 . 2 9 - 3 0 ; cf. AJ 12.313—4.

28

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

20,000 infantry and 2,000 horsemen are attributed to Bacchides on this occasion 7 8 . Thus one has to assume either that our sources wrongly report substantially reduced numbers for the forces at the disposal of Judas Maccabaeus in these two battles or that, due to whatever reasons, he was indeed unable to rally larger forces around him. The first possibility seems more probable, particularly with regard to the battle of Elasa, but one cannot rule out the second possibility or a combined explanation for the low figures. At any rate, these figures need not be taken as invalidating the credibility of the numbers previously quoted for the Hasmonaean forces 7 9 . The army of Judas Maccabaeus obviously consisted of volunteers, and the numbers reported for the campaigns of 163 B.C.E. seem to reflect an effort to mobilize all manpower available for the simultaneous operations undertaken. Yet the beginning of a standing force may be perceived in the report about the garrisons posted by Judas in Jerusalem and BethZur 8 0 . The distinction between standing forces and general mobilization comes out clearly under Jonathan. To begin with, the continuous wars of Jonathan over a long period must have perforce brought about the creation of a standing army. Surely the garrisoning of forts (Chap. II.2) could not be maintained without such a development. The account of the confrontation with Tryphon is more explicit. Suspecting a major war ahead, Jonathan ordered a general mobilization. When he wrongly decided to trust Tryphon, the bulk of the army was dismissed and only a strong bodyguard followed Jonathan to the fatal meeting with the Syrian general. In view of this development, the 10,000 troops who participated in the battle of Azotus probably comprised the main body of the standing army but perhaps included some troops recruited temporarily for the occasion. Also, the 3,000 men sent to help Demetrius II in Antioch seem to have been a constituent unit of the standing army. Before considering the credibility of the number of troops reported to have been mobilized by Jonathan, another document has to be analysed. In a letter to Jonathan in 152 B.C.E., Demetrius I offered to enlist about 30,000 men for military service in forts outside Judaea. This has been taken to imply that the military manpower available in Judaea at the time total-

78 I Macc. 9.4; AJ 12.422. F o r the credibility of these figures see Bar-Kochva 1 9 7 6 , 1 4 - 5 ; 1 9 8 9 , 4 4 - 5 . No figures are given for Nicanor's a r m y , t h o u g h II Macc. 15.27 reports 35,000 Seleucid dead at the battle of Adasa. 79 Granting the exaggeratedly low figure of the Jewish forces at the battle of Elasa, there is n o way o n e can calculate the true n u m b e r . Hence t h e suggestion of Bar-Kochva ( 1 9 7 6 , 15; 1 9 8 9 , 62) that they n u m b e r e d well over 2 0 , 0 0 0 is pure guesswork, based on his view t h a t the total recruitment potential of Judas Maccabaeus was of this order ( 1 9 7 6 , 1 8 6 - 7 ) . 80 I Macc. 4 . 6 0 ; AJ 12.326.

Strength and Composition of the Hasmonaean Army

29

led well over that number 8 1 . This is an unwarranted and improbble inference. Demetrius' letter was a propagandist measure aimed at showing his goodwill and readiness to promote the interests and position of Jonathan, whose support he wished to gain in view of the imminent struggle against Alexander Balas. In such circumstances he cannot be expected to have suggested a figure based on a realistic evaluation of the Jewish manpower at the time. An analogy may be sought in the Parthian offer to Vespasian to send 40,000 archers against the rebellious Jews 82 . Furthermore, Demetrius' offer is almost twice as much as the highest number (16,000) of mercenaries known to have been ever employed by the Seleucid kings 83 , and this alone should warn us not to accept the number at its face value. Demetrius' proposal, therefore, does not give any corroboration to the numerical strength of the army recruited by Jonathan. The 40,000 troops ascribed to Jonathan in 143 seems rather too high a figure. The largest army Simon is reported to have employed, in the campaign against Cendebaeus, was 20,000. Jonathan's figure approaches the highest number of troops Alexander Jannaeus is said to have used in the campaign against Ptolemy Lathyrus, but the Hasmonaean king had at his disposal far more resources and ruled over a considerably larger territory and a more numerous population. In addition, it seems somewhat unlikely that Tryphon could have assembled a formidable army which would prompt Jonathan to muster such a host. These considerations, however, do not necessarily discredit the figure. If regarded as representing the potential military manpower of Judaea at the time, 40,000 would imply a population of about 170,000 84 . Now even according to a minimalist estimate, the population of Judaea totalled well over such a number85. Thus there is no need to assume that on that occasion Jonathan recruited all available military manpower, which is surely improbable. In sum, then, the author may have exaggerated to show the might of the Has-

81 I Macc. 10.36. For the interpretation see Bar-Kochva 1975, 89; 1976, 186; 1989, 5 3 - 5 , and especially 1977, 1 6 7 - 7 0 ; cf. Applebaum 1989, ll.Bar-Kochva's claim that the letter reveals that Jewish reserve soldiers "were actually on the brink of starvation" has no support whatsoever in the text. Equally unsupported is his inference that the salary proposed was much lower than the usual. These are pure speculations. 82 Suet. Vesp. 6.4. 83 Polyb. 30.25 (Daphne). See the discussion in Bar-Kochva 1 9 7 6 , 4 8 - 5 2 . 84 Citizens of military age (iuniores) are estimated at 23.5% of the total population by. A. Afzelius, Die romische Eroberung Italiens (1942) 1 0 0 - 1 . The percentage of all adult males is estimated at 28% by Brunt 1971, 59 (cf. the table on p. 54). Taking the figure 40,000 at face value, BarKochva infers that the Jewish population of Judaea numbered 400,000 at that time (1989, 5 5 - 7 ) . However, he fails to distinguish between the potential manpower of a given state and the strength of a particular army of that state, the latter being an unreliable index for the calculation of the whole population. 85 Broshi (1979) estimates the maximum size of the population of Eretz-Israel, reached in the 6th century C.E., at about 1 million.

30

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

monaeans, but one need not doubt that Jonathan could have raised 40,000 troops, and that this figure reflects the combined standing army as well as the reserve forces. The highest figure stated for any Hasmonaean army is the 50,000 troops Alexander Jannaeus commanded in his campaign against Ptolemy Lathyrus. The version of 80,000, quoted by Josephus on the authority of Timagenes, must be rejected. It equals the highest figure of any known Hellenistic army, that of Antigonus I in the battle of Ipsus, and exceeds that of the army of Antiochus III, or that of Ptolemy IV in the battle of Raphia in 217B.C.E. 8 6 Besides, it is out of all proportion considering the fact the Ptolemy had at his disposal 30,000 troops in the same campaign 8 7 . Even the low figure of 50,000 seems dubious and may be due to the attempt of Josephus' source to exaggerate the magnitude of the defeat Alexander Jannaeus suffered 8 8 . The only somewhat detailed account of any Hasmonaean army concerns the battle of Alexander Jannaeus against Demetrius III Eucaerus, and even this is made complicated because Josephus gives two different versions. In b o t h versions he states that Jannaeus' army included mercenaries, i.e. foreign troops, as well as Jewish soldiers; in BJ he explicitly mentions cavalry, which he has omitted in the later version. But he may have simply forgotten to mention it, and it is not to be inferred that he has corrected the earlier version. There is no way one can decide which version of the numerical strength is the correct one. But it should be noted that even the higher version, namely 26,200 troops, is far below the figure ascribed to Jannaeus' army against Ptolemy Lathyrus. It could be argued that Jannaeus was handicapped by Jewish internal strife and therefore was not able to recruit a larger army, which he would have been able to raise under normal circumstances. Indeed Josephus reports that after the battle 6,000 Jewish troops changed their mind and joined their defeated king, but others, probably 8,000, continued fighting against him 89 . With the addition of these troops the total Jewish forces in this battle, on both sides, would amount to 34,000. Thus the reported numerical strength of Jannaeus' army against Ptolemy Lathyrus is not made absurd by comparison with these figures. But perhaps the political and

86 On Antigonus I's army ( 7 0 , 0 0 0 infantry and 10,000 cavalry) at Ipsus see Plut. Demetr. 38.3. His opponents had 64,000 infantry and 15,000 calvary, Plut. Demetr. 28.3. For the Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies at Raphia in 217 B.C.E. (62,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 102 elephants against 70,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and 73 elephants respectively) see Polyb. 5.79; cf. 5.65. On this battle see E. Galili, "Raphia, 217 B.C.E. Revisited", SCI 3 (1977) 5 2 - 1 2 6 . 87 AJ 13.333. 88 For the attempt of Josephus' source, probably Nicolaus of Damascus, to distort and belittle the achievements of Jannaeus see Stern 1981, 46 n. 106, idem 1971, 3 9 2 - 3 . 89 BJ 1.93-5; AJ 13.379; 383.

Strength

and Composition

of the Hasmonaean

Army

31

military circumstances were so different that no congruity between the army figures should be expected. The quoted figures show that the Hasmonaean army numbered 20,000 to 50,000 troops on major campaigns in the period from Jonathan to Alexander Jannaeus. Examined from various points of view, these figures seem on the whole probable and trustworthy. However, it is important to understand the meaning of these figures as well as to make clear what kind of an army the Hasmonaeans established; here are pertinent such topics as composition, methods of recruitment, types and training of the troops, social position and origins of officers, etc. Unfortunately, not much can be said about all these. I have already referred to a distinction between standing army and general mobilization (above p. 28), but the notion of standing army needs some clarification. To begin with, it is instructive to quote a passage from the popular decree passed to confirm the legitimacy of Simon's rule in 140: "Simon stood up and fought for his nation, and spent much of his own money in arming his nation's army and giving them wages. He fortified the cities of Judaea and Beth-Zur on the borders of Judaea, where the arms of the enemy were formerly stored, and placed Jewish men there as a garrison" 90 . It may be inferred that regular salary and constant maintenance of a certain number of troops had become established features of the Hasmonaean army by that time. Those troops comprised the various garrisons of the fortresses and citadels distributed in the country (Chap. II), as well as several regular units which were kept in some sites. Although these units are not explicitly recorded in any source, their existence cannot be in doubt in view of the long wars conducted by John Hycranus I and his successors. One such unit must have been the royal bodyguard; it is first recorded explicitly under Aristobulus I 9 1 , but the beginning of such a unit may be detected in the 1,000 troops who accompanied Jonathan to his meeting with Tryphon 92 . The regular units and the garrisons are regarded here as the standing army. Obviously they were professional soldiers, and it stands to reason that they were the better trained and disciplined part of the Hasmonaean army. The standing army consisted only of Jews in the first Hasmonaean generation. It was John Hyrcanus I who first started recruiting foreign mercenaries to his army, apparently soon after his settlement with Antiochus VII Sidetes, which occurred about 134-132 9 3 . Neither the nationality nor the number of these mercenaries are reported. Alexander Jannaeus employed Pisidian, Cilician, Greek and, probably, Thracian mercenaries, 90 IMacc. 1 4 . 3 2 - 3 (translation by Tedesche 1950). See Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 1 9 3 - 4 ; 1989, 2 6 - 7 . 91 BJ 1.73; 75; 7 7 ; / I / 1 3 . 3 0 4 ; 307. 92 IMacc. 12.47; A / 13.191. 93 BJ 1.61; AJ 13.249. For the date see Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 0 2 - 3 , n. 5.

Applebaum

32

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

but avoided Syrians, whom he hated or who hated the Jewish nation 94 Thracians served in many of the Hellenistic armies and there is some evidence for Pisidian mercenaries, for instance in the army of Antiochus III at Magnesia95. Cilicians served in the Seleucid army at Raphia, Magnesia and Daphne 96 ; they are also attested to have served in the Ptolemaic army in Cyprus 97 . Pisidian, Thracian and Cilician mercenaries were known as light-armed soldiers, not as spearmen of the phalanx. Greek mercenaries served both as phalangitai and light-armed troops in the various Hellenistic armies; hence it cannot be decided whether those who served under Jannaeus formed heavy infantry or not; nor do we know their nationality. Aristobulus II, Jannaeus' son, recruited mercenaries from Lebanon, Trachonitis and other principalities adjacent to Judaea 98 . This piece of evidence points to Ituraean and Arab mercenaries, again known as light-armed troops. The nationality of the mercenaries employed by Alexandra Salome (below) is not known. It may be then inferred that foreign, Gentile mercenaries became a constant element of the Hasmonaean standing army from the time of John Hyrcanus I onwards; in this respect, as in several others, the Hasmonaeans adopted the norms of Hellenistic armies, and their army ceased to be purely national. The Hasmonaean army depended to some extent on the mobilization of reserve forces. These may have comprised Jewish settlers who were liable to military service on account of plots of land distributed to them, as, for instance, was the normal Ptolemaic practice. Though plausible, the existence of these settlers is not explicitly recorded, and nothing can be said about their number 99 . But the Hasmonaean rulers very probably regarded it as their prerogative to recruit for short terms Jews capable of military

94 BJ 1.88; AJ 13.374; 378; cf. Hegesippus 1.10.1 (CSEL Vol. LXVI, pp. 1 4 - 5 ) . Josephus does not specify the origin of the Greeks mentioned in the last cited reference. For the plausible suggestion that Jannaeus got his nickname Thracidas on account of his use of Thracian mercenaries as well as his cruelty, see Stern 1960. As Bar-Kochva (1977, 177 n. 2) suggests, "Syrians" here mainly refers to Graeco-Macedonian military settlers and not to native Syrians. 95 See Griffith 1935, 2 5 3 - 4 ; Stem 1960; Liv. 37.40,14; App. Syr. 32. 96 Polyb. 5.79, 3; Liv. 37.40, 13; App. Syr. 32;Polyb. 30.25. 97 OGIS 148; 157. 98 BJ 1 . 1 1 7 ; A / 13.427. 99 See the discussion in Schalit 1969,172 and 704, where no evidence relating to the Hasmonaean realm is cited. Bar-Kochva argues that the Hasmonaean territorial expansion aimed at finding a solution for numerous landless "reserve soldiers", who indeed got plots of land but were unwilling to join the standing army. This development in turn compelled the Hasmonaean rulers to employ foreign mercanaries (1977, 1 6 9 - 7 7 ) . For the reasons explained above (p. 2 8 - 9 ) , I cannot accept Bar-Kochva's claim that Demetrius I's letter indicates the existence of 30,000 poverty-stricken Jews of military age at the time. The economic-demographic explanation is therefore extremely conjectural. However, Bar-Kochva's approach underestimates the religiousnational and personal motives for the Hasmonaean expansion. For a somewhat different analysis see Applebaum 1989, 9 - 2 9 , esp. 1 8 - 9 .

Strength and Composition

of the Hasmonaean

Army

33

service, considered as a civic, national duty. Military service of every physically qualified man was a biblical commandment, and a reference to this civic duty appears in a speech ascribed t o Judas Maccabaeus 100 . Jewish law drew a distinction between service in the case of War of Duty and that in case of War of Choice. No doubt the battles of the first Hasmonaean generation were considered as War of Duty 1 0 1 . However, the growth of the standing army and especially the recruitment of foreign mercenaries probably reduced the conscription of the reserve forces. The breach between John Hyrcanus I and the Pharisees presumably made questionable the advantages to be derived by the conscription of a substantial part of the Jews 1 0 2 . In this respect the lowest point was reached with the civil war in the time of Alexander Jannaeus; military service based on the biblical order was practically out of the question. Reserve forces might be organized in various ways, for instance on a territorial or tribal basis, both of which have serious disadvantages. How mobilization was carried out under the Hasmonaeans is unknown. The War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness (War Rule), one of the writings of the Qumran Community, contains regulations of the military service enjoined on the members of the community. If we understand it correctly, the War Rule envisages the enrolment of the able-bodied men of the tribes in basic units. The conquest of the world is to be achieved in twenty-nine annual campaigns. Every year a different division, consisting of basic units selected from various tribes by "heads of family of the community", is mobilized to carry out the annual campaign. Such a method of service distributes the burden of war evenly and avoids jeopardizing, in case of a disastrous defeat, the entire body of fighting men of one tribe 1 0 3 . Of course it is impossible to decide whether the method resembled, or was in any way connected with the Hasmonaean organization of the conscription of the reserve forces. Still the tribal division described in the War Rule can hardly have corresponded to the social conditions prevailing in Judaea and hence some major differences must have existed. Nevertheless, the War Rule does provide evidence that military service was considered a natural duty of members of the Qumran sect, which strengthens the view that the highest authority of the Jewish State took the same position with regard to Jews living in their realm.

100 SeeDeut. 20.1-9',IMacc. 3.55-6. 101 M. Sotah 8.7: "In a war of duty all go o u t , even a bridegroom f r o m his chamber and a bride from her bridal c a n o p y " . See Yadin 1962, 6 7 - 9 ; Schalit 1969, 170 with n. 88. 102 On the breach between the Pharisees and John Hyrcanus I, see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 1 1 - 4 ; see also ib. II, 3 8 9 - 4 0 3 on the Pharisees and Sadducees. 103 War Rule II 6 - 1 0 ; for this interpretation see Yadin 1962, 7 9 - 8 6 . On the War Rule see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 III, 1, 3 9 8 - 4 0 6 .

34

From Guerilla Tactics to Regular

Army

Josephus gives an instructive piece of evidence concerning Alexandra Salome, Alexander Jannaeus' widow: "Nevertheless the queen took thought for the welfare of the kingdom and recruited a large force of mercenaries and also made her own force twice as large, with the result that she struck terror into the local rulers round her and received hostages from them" 1 0 4 . Josephus obviously refers here to the standing army, comparing it to that of Alexander Jannaeus in his last years. As we have seen, the only specific detailed figures on that king's army are reported in connection with his battle against Demetrius III Eucaerus. In that battle all his mercenaries (9,000 or 6,200) are reported to have perished, which may be an exaggeration. That was in about 88 B.C.E., but Jannaeus soon recovered after 6,000 of the Jews who had supported Demetrius changed their mind and joined him. Demetrius retreated from Judaea and not only was Jannaeus able to crush his Jewish opponents but also to resume, after several years, his wars of expansion. He conquered the territories lost to the Nabataeans during the civil war in Judaea and, true to his warlike career, ended his life while besieging Ragaba 105 . To achieve these gains he must have recruited a large army, at least of the size of the one he fought with against Demetrius III Eucaerus. Given Jannaeus' domestic problems and the loyalty the mercenaries exhibited against Demetrius, his army no doubt continued to include a considerable number of foreign mercenaries. On the basis of these considerations it may be inferred that the standing army of Alexandra Salome numbered some 20,000 Jews and well over 9,000 mercenaries. It would have amounted to 40,000 Jews and well over 6,200 mercenaries according to the second version about the troops Jannaeus commanded in the battle against Demetrius. This seems incredible in view of the available figures concerning the great Hellenistic armies. I therefore suggest to estimate the standing army of Alexandra Salome at about 30,000 strong. Such a figure is corroborated by data concerning Jewish troops and ex-soldiers existing in Judaea in the mid-1 st century B.C.E. (below pp. 1 3 4 - 5 ) . Some conclusions emerge from the evidence quoted above. First, there existed considerable Jewish military manpower which Alexander Jannaeus avoided enlisting, probably because he could not trust them 1 0 6 . Second, even Alexandra Salome regarded foreign mercenaries as a vital element in

104 AJ 13.409 (Marcus' translation in LCL). See also BJ 1.112. 105 F o r Jannaeus' territorial losses due to the Jewish rebellion see AJ 13.382. For the recovery of these territories and the siege of Ragaba see BJ 1.104; AJ 1 3 . 3 9 3 - 8 . Cf. Stern 1981, 4 5 - 6 , and below pp. 1 1 8 - 2 2 . 106 This obviously were compelled tural w o r k and recruitment (ib.

undermines Bar-Kochva's theory (1977, 1 7 6 - 7 ) that the Hasmonaean rulers to recruit foreign mercenaries because the Jews of Judaea preferred agriculwould not volunteer to serve in the standing army. In referring to Salome's 178), he surprisingly ignores the doubling of the Jewish part of the standing

Strength and Composition

of the Hasmonaean

Army

35

her army, either because, having more confidence in the loyalty of mercenaries, she did not wish to rely entirely on Jewish troops,or because certain mercenaries excelled in specific skills, for example as archers. Third, Salome must have had the financial resources required to maintain an army of this numerical strength. Fourth, the scope of the army was of such magnitude as to deter potential foes, notably the Nabataeans, from trying to launch an offensive against the Jewish queen. It is significant that the Nabataean king never tried to regain his lost territories in Transjordan and that it was only after the death of Salome that the struggle between her sons offered him the opportunity to do so 107 .

army, with all its implications, conveying the impression that only mercenaries were recruited. Likewise some of his other claims are untenable. Thus his assumption that those who suffered from the Pharisees' vengeance under Salome were mercenaries is not supported by AJ 13.410—7 (incidentally Diogenes is not necessarily a Gentile name, and Galaestes (AJ 13.424), a rare name indeed, is considered by Schalit (1968, 3) to be a Jew. In P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews,,4 Lexicon of Greek Personal Names I (1987) 106 there is only Galestes (6 persons), but cf. the Athamanian Galestes in Diod. Sic. 33.20; 22). Also, the assertion that mercenaries "were usually concentrated in isolated fortresses on the borders" (ib. 181) is not borne out by the reference to Galaestes or to Digaeus (Syncellus I, 559, ed. D i n d o r f ) . The available information is so scanty that the argumentum e silentio is unreliable. 107 BJ 1 . 1 2 3 - 5 ; / ! / 1 4 . 1 5 - 8 .

Chapter

II

Fortifications

1. The Hellenistic Background The standing army functioned not only as bodyguard, deterrent power and the main force in major battles, but it also garrisoned the forts and inherited the Hellenistic strategic concept that the construction and maintenance of an infrastructure of forts and garrisons were indispensable to ensuring a firm hold over the country against internal uprisings and incursions from outside. The outcome of war was determined not only and incursions from outside. The outcome of war was determined not only by decisive victories in pitched battles but also, to a large extent, by the capacity to defend or capture, as the case might be, fortified castles, citadels and fortresses. These various fortified strongholds could be employed to control a local population, block the advance of an invading army, cut an enemy's lines of communication or serve as centres of resistance against the enemy. The opening stage of the Fourth Syrian War provides several examples which demonstrate the functioning of fortified strongholds. In 221 Antiochus III suffered a setback in his attempt to break through the Ptolemaic forts which blocked his way to the south in the Marsyas valley, between Mt. Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, the main route leading to southern Syria from the north 1 . Two years later, facing almost the same difficulties, he changed his plan and advanced along the coastal, more easily defended road, which was not then guarded by Ptolemaic troops. But as he proceeded along the coast, his advance was checked by his failure to capture Dora 2 . Next year, after Antiochus defeated the Ptolemaic forces guarding the Porphyrion pass, the campaign took on the form of siege operations, in which Antiochus was able to capture or receive the capitulation of a series of cities in Galilee, Transjordan and Samaria 3 . These campaigns illus-

1 Polyb. 5.45, 7 - 4 6 , 5. On the topography see Dussaud 1 9 2 7 , 4 4 ; Wallbank 1 9 5 7 - 7 9 I, 5 7 6 - 8 . See also Huss 1976, 3 1 - 3 . 2 Polyb. 5.61, 6 - 7 ; 66, 1 - 2 . 3 See Polyb. 5.70, 3 - 7 1 , 11. A n t i o c h u s garrisoned Philoteria and Scythopolis, which capitulated, received t h e submission of Pella, Camoun and G e p h r o u n (= E p h r o n of I Macc. 5 . 4 6 ; I Macc. 12.27), captured Mt. T a b o r , Abila, Gadara and Philadelphia, and sent a strong f o r c e t o subdue

The Hellenistic

Background

37

trate how several parts of Coele-Syria were studded with strongholds, some manned by regular units of the Ptolemaic army and others by local militias. Indeed the fortified cities and forts along the Phoenician-Palestinian coast as well as in the inland areas indicate the character of Coele-Syria, from the viewpoint of the Ptolemaic government, as a military buffer zone 4 . After Antiochus III conquered the country in the Fifth Syrian War, he and his successors naturally employed the same means, namely, fortifying and guarding key-positions and enabling local cities to maintain fortifications 5 . Judaea, in the narrow sense of the term, was militarily quite insignificant and it is unlikely that under the Ptolemies any major fortification works were carried out. Indeed only Jerusalem is known from literary sources to have been garrisoned6. It was the Hasmonaean uprising that induced the Seleucids to introduce changes and even then not immediately.

Samaria. Cf. the account of Huss, 1976, 3 8 - 5 2 . For a fortress near Pella that was probably built by Antiochus III on this occasion see McNicoll et alii 1982, 6 5 - 7 . For another fortress see McNicoll etalii 1984, 70; 81. 4 Cf. Rostovtzeff 1941, 3 4 6 - 7 . Fuks (1983, 2 1 - 4 ) suggests that in 2 6 1 - 2 5 8 Ptolemy II established a defensive system, based on Scythopolis, Philoteria and a few other cities, against a Seleucid attack. 5 The Poliorketika of Philo of Byzantium is a first-rate testimony on the importance of city fortifications for holding a region. It instructs the reader how to f o r t i f y , defend and attack a city, and if it was written in connection with the Third Syrian war, as it seems, it alludes to conditions obtaining in Syria, Phoenicia and Palestine. For this view see Lawrence 1979, 7 0 - 1 . For some doubts see A. McNicoll, in Leriche and Treziny 1986, 312. The relevant archaeological finds that are presented to illustrate and explain Philo's work in the commentary of Garlan (1974, 3 2 8 - 4 0 4 ) include hardly any material from these regions. For literary and papyrological evidence see Tcherikover 1937, 4—5; 3 6 - 8 , who claims that "at the time of Zenon all the large cities of Phoenicia and Palestine were protected by Ptolemaic garrisons". Ma'oz (1986, 2 0 - 3 ) suggests that Hippus, Seleucia in Gaulanitis (cf. Schumacher 1888, 1 9 4 - 6 ; 237) and an Antiochia south of t h e H u l a h Lake ("Antiochus' ravine", AJ 13.393), as well as six other sites, were strongholds established by the Seleucids in the early 2nd century to control the east-west roads across Gaulanitis. However, the evidence is inconclusive. See also Hengel 1974 I, 1 4 - 5 , who refers to archaeological finds of fortifications in Samaria, Philoteria, Beth-Zur, Tel 'Arad and 'En-Gedi. Further details will be presented in this chapter. On Greek fortifications see Marsden 1969, Chap. VI; Winter 1971; Garlan 1974, 1 4 8 - 5 3 ; 2 4 4 - 6 9 ; Lawrence 1979; Adam 1982; A. McNicoll, in Leriche and Treziny 1986, 3 0 5 - 1 3 . 6 For a Ptolemaic fort in Beth-Zur see below p. 40 f. The Ptolemaic garrison and fortress in Jerusalem 'are first recorded after the recapture of the city by Scopas ca. 200 B.C.E. See AJ 1 2 . 1 3 2 3; 138. That fortress was obviously occupied by the Seleucids and is probably the one mentioned in II Macc. 4.12; 28; 5.5. According to the commonly held view (e.g. Vincent and Steve 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 I, 193 n. 1; 2 3 2 - 3 ; Bar-Kochva 1980a, 320 with n. 11), it stood north of the Temple on the site of the Persian citadel ( N e h . 2.9; 7.2). Recently Bar-Kochva has argued ( 1 9 8 9 , 4 6 2 5) that the Ptolemaic fortress stood on the south-eastern hill, identifying it with the Seleucid Acta of the Hasmonaean period. Admittedly, there is some difficulty in explaining the reticence of the sources about a northern fortress during the Hasmonaean revolt. But, pace Bar-Kochva, I Macc. 14.36 cannot possibly refer to a fortress built during the Ptolemaic period. Gentiles " w h o made themselves an Acra, from which they issued and polluted around the temple and did a great evil in the holy place" must have been those connected with the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes, that is, a new fortress was built at that time.

38

Fortifications

Only after his crushing victory over Judas Maccabaeus did Bacchides initiate the strategy of constructing a network of forts manned by various forces to establish the Seleucid control of the country: Then he (i.e. Bacchides) returned to Jerusalem. They fortified cities in Judaea, the stronghold in Jericho, Emmaus, Beth-Horon, Bethel, Thamnatha, Pharathon, and Tephon, with high walls and gates and bars. He set a garrison in them to stir up enmity against Israel. He fortified the city of Beth-Zur, Gazara and the citadel. He put troops in them and stores of food 7 . This passage, as well as the parallel account given by Josephus, shows that Bacchides' work consisted of the construction of walls, towers, strong gates and the placing of garrisons. Bacchides, however, need not have started his work ex nihilo, at least not in all the ten towns specifically mentioned. The Seleucid citadel in Jerusalem, the Acra, had been constructed earlier, but its precise location cannot be firmly determined and is much disputed 8 . At any rate, this Seleucid stronghold, dating probably from the time of Antiochus III, was refortified and reinforced with a strong garrison prior to the religious persecution 9 . The garrison consisted of Cypriote and, probably, Mysian troops and others who are called "Macedonian" by Josephus, but seems not to have been a katoikia as is sometimes stated 1 0 . Judas Maccabaeus failed to capture it though this is the only occasion that he is reported to have employed artillery 11 . This siege indeed prompted Lysias to launch his second expedition to Judaea to help the besieged; yet the fortifications and the garrison of the Acra were clearly strong enough to withstand a short-term siege. It appears therefore that Bacchides need have merely strengthened, perhaps to a large extent, the already fortified Seleucid citadel at Jerusalem.

7 IMacc. 9 . 5 0 - 2 (translation by Tedesche 1950). See also AJ 1 3 . 1 5 - 7 . 8 For a detailed discussion and survey of proposed sites for the Acra see Tsafrir 1975. He suggests that the Acra was situated on a hill close to the south-east corner of the Temple area. For a location south of the Temple see Ben-Dov 1981. Both views are rejected by Ben-Zion Luria, The Hasmonaean Kings (1985) 5 5 - 6 5 (in Hebrew), who again locates the Acra north of the Temple area. A strong case for locating it at the City of David has been presented by Dequeker 1985; Bar-Kochva 1989, 4 4 5 - 6 5 . See also Goldstein 1983, 2 1 4 - 9 . 9 See Daniel 11.39; 7 Macc. 1 . 3 3 - 6 ; II Mace. 5 . 2 2 - 6 . For the city walls and the citadel, antedating the arrival of Apollonius, see II Macc. 5 . 5 - 6 , which also reports that Jason's one-thousand troops overpowered the presumably fewer defenders guarding the walls. 10 For Cypriotes see II Macc. 4.29 and note Nicanor the Cypriarch (II Macc. 12.2). Apollonius the Mysarch (II Macc. 5.24) probably indicates a Mysian force. For the "Macedonians" see AJ 12.252. That the troops formed a regular garrison, not a katoikia, that is to say, not a military settlement of people w h o received plots of land and on that account were liable to occasional military service, is argued by Bar-Kochva (1973; 1989, 4 3 8 - 4 4 ) . 11 IMacc. 6.20; A / 12.363. See above p. 24.

The Hellenistic

Background

39

Map 3: Bacchides' fortifications

The literary evidence on Beth-Zur is slightly complicated, but some logical order can be made of it. In his account of Lysias' first expedition Josephus names it a village {home), but later it is referred to as a city (polls). Moreover, in that campaign Lysias was not apparently troubled by any potential Jewish threat from that quarter on his lines of communication 12 . Following his victory over Lysias in 165, Judas fortified the place and installed there a garrison, which could be used against a future menace from the south, Idumaean or Seleucid 13 . Consequently Lysias deemed it necessary to capture the fortress and to garrison it in his second expedition; only then did he venture to proceed towards Jerusalem 14 . Bacchides' work 12 A village: BJ 1.41; AJ 12.313; /Macc. 4 . 2 6 - 3 5 . The notice of IIMacc. 11.5 that Lysias besieged Beth-Zur is probably wrong. See F u n k 1958, 16 n. 8;Goldstein 1976, 2 6 - 9 . A city: AJ 12.367. 13 I Macc. 4.601; 6.62;AJ 12.326. 14 II Macc. 1 3 . 1 9 - 2 2 ; BJ 1.41; AJ 1 2 . 3 6 7 - 7 6 ; / Macc. 6 . 4 8 - 5 0 . On the distorted chronology in I Macc. 6 . 3 1 - 5 0 see Bar-Kochva 1976, 265 n. 3.

40

Fortifications

at Beth-Zur, therefore, consisted of additions to or perhaps of a major reconstruction of the already existing fortifications. The city indeed remained an important Seleucid centre and gave shelter to the Hellenising Jews who were later driven out of Jerusalem 1 5 . In 142 Simon captured it after a heavy siege, expelled the Hellenised population, established there his own garrison and fortified it 16 . Archaeological excavations at Beth-Zur, identified with Khirbet etTubeiqa a few km. north of Hebron, have revealed remains of three phases of a citadel, which was situated in the centre of the city, and of city walls of the Hellenistic period. At first the three phases of the citadel were ascribed to Judas or Lysias, Bacchides and Simon 1 7 . Later the first phase of the citadel was ascribed to the Ptolemaic, or even the Persian period, the second, with which were associated some repairs and reconstruction works of the city walls, to Judas or Lysias, and the third phase as well as repairs to the city walls to Bacchides 18 . It is clear, however, that the distinction between the fortification works carried out in 165, 163, 161 and even 142 cannot be ascertained on the basis of the archaeological finds, notably the coins and the ceramic material. Indeed the archaeological evidence is interpreted according to the known literary sources. Given the nature of the archaeological remains in this case, one cannot rule out the possibility that each of the persons associated with Beth-Zur in this period, namely Judas, Lysias, Bacchides and Simon, did some reconstruction or added fortifications, even if they were not responsible for the main phases of reconstruction evidenced by the archaeological finds. The archaeological evidence, though, indicates the existence of a Ptolemic fortress at Beth-Zur, not known from the literary sources, and supports the literary evidence that Bacchides did not have to start a completely new work of fortification. No literary source reports a Seleucid garrison and fortifications at Gezer prior to Bacchides' activity. A passage in / Macc. might indicate that the fugitives from the battle of Ammaus found refuge at Gezer, on which basis the existence of a Seleucid post there has been supposed 1 9 . Be that as it may, following Bacchides' work Gezer served as a major Seleucid base until its capture by Simon in 142. He expelled the local population, settled Jews there, reinforced the fortifications and built there a residence;

15 16 17 18

I Macc. 10.14; A / 13.42. I Macc. 1 1 . 6 5 - 6 ; 14.33. AJ 1 3 . 1 5 5 - 7 . Sellers and Albright 1931, 1 0 - 1 ; Sellers 1933, 1 1. Watzinger 1 9 3 3 - 3 5 I, 2 4 - 5 ; F u n k 1958, 1 4 - 7 ; idem, in Sellers et alii 1968, 8 - 1 7 ; idem, in EAEHL I, 2 6 3 - 7 . Albright changed his view and later ascribed the first phase of the citadel to the Persian period (1949, 1 5 1 - 2 ) . But see F u n k 1958, 14 n. 5. Cf. Bar-Kochva 1 9 8 9 , 287. 19 I Macc. 4.15. See Goldstein 1976, 265.

The Hellenistic

Background

41

it also served as headquarters for his son J o h n Hyrcanus, whom he appointed as commander of all his forces 2 0 . The archaeological excavations carried out on the site of Gezer gave only slight support for the supposition that a Seleucid fort preceded the garrisoning and fortification of the place by Bacchides. They do, however, provide evidence for two major building phases during the years ca. 1 7 5 - 1 2 5 , which can be reasonably ascribed to Bacchides and Simon respectively 21 . Thus the archaeological material corroborates the literary evidence for the strategic importance Gezer acquired during these years, a development obviously resulting from the new political conditions and due to the city's topographical position near to the old, vital route along the coast and especially near the road leading from the coast to Jerusalem 2 2 . Since the defeated troops of Gorgias did not try to find shelter in Ammaus, it may be inferred that the city was poorly fortified, if at all, and that until then had not been a Seleucid fort. The scanty second-century archaeological finds at the site seem to support such an inference 2 3 . Bethel is not mentioned in literary sources relating to the Hellenistic period prior to Bacchides' work. Archaeological finds at the site of BeitTn, identified with Bethel, show the place to have been fortified and prominent by the time of Alexander the Great. The excavators claim that a second 20 IMacc. 1 3 . 4 3 - 8 ; 14.34; 16.19;BJ 1.50;Cf. BJ 1 . 5 4 - 5 5 ; A / 1 3 . 2 2 8 - 9 . 21 Gezer was extensively excavated by R.A.S. Macalister early in this century (Macalister 1912). The defects of his work were pointed out by Dever 1967, 4 7 - 5 2 . Renewed excavations of the site were carried out in the 1960's and 1970's: Dever 1967, 6 1 - 2 ; Dever et alii 1970, 6 5 - 7 ; 1971, 1 0 8 - 9 ; Dever, in EAEHL II, 4 2 8 - 3 3 . For a full bibliography see Vogel 1974, 3 0 - 2 ; Vogel and Holtzclaw 1982, 3 0 - 1 . Pace Goldstein 1976, 265, the Hellenistic stratum in Field I and Field II is dated by Dever 1967, 6 1 - 2 , to ca. 1 7 5 - 1 2 5 ; it is the comparative ceramic material, found at Tel Mor near Ashdod, which is dated to ca. 175 — 150. The two phases of Hellenistic building in Field II, Strata 2B and 2A (Dever et alii 1971, 1 0 8 - 9 ; 112) may thus refer to the activities of Bacchides and Simon respectively. Stratum I in Field III is confidently ascribed to Simon by Dever (1971, 1 1 8 - 9 ; the building remains of Stratum II are indeed datable to the early 2nd century on ceramic grounds, but Dever ascribes them to Bacchides). Thus there is no clear archaeological support for Goldstein's supposition. For some doubts concerning the attribution of the work in the gate complex, Field III, to the Maccabaean period see Seger 1976, 1 4 2 - 3 , where evidence for Maccabaean building activity in Field VII is presented (the 1972 excavation). For the controversy with regard to the chronology of the early fortifications of Gezer see Dever 1986, the final rebuilding of the Solomonic gate as well as other fortification works in Field II are again attributed to the 2nd century B.C.E. For miqva'ot, Jewish ritual immersion baths, in Gezer see Reich 1981. 22 See the enthusiastic account of H.D. Lance, "Gezer in the Land and in History", Bibl. Arch. 30 (1967) 3 4 - 5 . I. Roll (Eighth Archaeological Conference in Israel (1981) 8, in Hebrew) and M. Fischer et alii (Hadashot Arkheologiot 77 (1981) 3 0 - 1 , in Hebrew) suggested identifying Gezer with Tell Ghaza, situated on the coastal plain about 1. 5 km. from the sea (G.R. 124 1 1506). However, Ghaza has nothing to do with Gezer, and the abundant evidence, particularly the well k n o w n boundary inscriptions, leaves no d o u b t about the location of the HellenisticHasmonaean Gezer at Tel Gezer. 23 SeeAvi-Yonah, in EAEHL lique et son histoire(1932)

II, 3 6 2 - 3 . See also L. -H. Vincent and F. -M. Abel, Emmatis, 2 8 7 - 3 0 3 , esp. 2 8 8 - 9 .

sa basi-

42

Fortifications

phase of Hellenistic occupation started at the end of Antiochus IV's reign identifying it with Bacchides' work. However, the only clear fortification work they associate with him is a tumulus on the ridge north-east of the site, which they consider as a watch tower 2 4 . Jericho is first mentioned in the Seleucid period in connection with Bacchides, to whose work has been attributed the oldest Hellenistic "fortress" excavated at Tulul Abu el-'Alaiq, but this seems to have been disproved by recent excavations 2 S . Beth-Horon was the site of Seron's crushing defeat, and to avoid the dangers involved in marching along the ascent there Lysias decided to attack Judaea from the south. Thus it seems that Bacchides was indeed the first Seleucid commander to fortify and install a garrison in this place 26 . The identity and location of the three remaining places are obscure and controversial. Tepho(n), usually thought to be identical with biblical Tappuah, was probably situated at Sheikh Abu Zered, about 20 km. north of Bethel and 2.5 km. west of the main road from Jerusalem to Shechem. However, according to a view based on one of the Mss. of Josephus, it was really Tekoah, ca. 17 km. south of Jerusalem, and yet some have suggested identifying it with Bethleptepha, ca. 2 4 km. south-west of Jerusalem 2 7 . Thamnatha, i.e. Thamna, has been plausibly located at Khirbet Tibna, ca. 16 km. north-west of Bethel 28 . Pharathon cannot be satisfactorily associated with any one of the proposed sites for its location, e.g. 'Ain Fara, whether identical with biblical Pir'aton or not making no difference 2 9 . Thus, notwithstanding the pre-existence of Seleucid garrisons and fortifications in Jerusalem and Beth-Zur, and possibly at Gezer and Bethel, 24 The site of Beitin was excavated in the 1930's and 1950's. The preliminary conclusions about the two phases of Hellenistic occupation of the site were iterated in the final report. See W.F. Albright, "The First Month of Excavation at Bethel", BASOR 55 (1934) 23; F.W. Albright and J.L. Kelso, The Excavations at Bethel (1934-1960). AASOR 39 (1968) 2; 1 8 - 2 0 ; 3 8 - 9 ; 210; J.L. Kelso, mEASHL I, 193. 25 The identification has been suggested by Kelso and Barakmi 1955, 5 - 7 . For the recent works and the identification of Bacchides' fortress with the Hasmonaean fortress Doq see below p. 51. Jericho is mentioned in a Zenon papyrus (PCZ no. 5 9 0 0 4 , 3). 26 For the defeat of Seron see / Macc. 3, 1 3 - 2 4 . Nor did Gorgias and Bacchides march by the way of Beth-Horon, though Nicanor camped there (IMacc. 7.39). 27 See Abel 1925, 2 0 6 - 7 ; idem, " T a p p u a h " , RB 45 (1936) 1 0 3 - 1 2 . The criticism and alternative suggestions of Avi-Yonah 1966, 5 3 - 4 (Tekoah) and Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 3 6 - 7 (Bethleptepha) seem less convincing; see also Schmitt 1983, 2 6 - 3 0 (and consult the map on p. 21). 28 See Abel 1925, 205; contra Avi-Yonah 1966, 5 3 - 4 ,

but see Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 3 4 - 5 ;

Schmitt 1983, 33. 29 Abel's proposal (1925, 206) to identify it with Far'ata, about 8 km. south-west of Shechem, is unacceptable as it lies deep in Samaria. Avi-Yonah (1966, 53—4, n. 68; cf. Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 3 5 - 6 ) suggested 'Ain Fara, some 10 km. south-east of Bethel, where, however, no archaeological evidence can support the occupation of the site in the Hellenistic period. But see now the discussion of Schmitt 1983, 4 2 - 3 , who suggests a site somewhere between Khirbet Tibna and Sheikh Abu Zered.

Judaea and

Idumaea

43

the available archaeological finds on the whole corroborate the literary evidence in indicating Bacchides as the first to have established a systematic network of forts and garrisons in Judaea. Despite the d o u b t f u l location of three of the forts, it is clear that this network of strongholds, mostly located at topographically well-chosen sites, gave the Seleucid government effective command of the roads leading to Jerusalem from the west, south, east and north 3 0 . Not only did they enable the Seleucids to maintain communications with Jerusalem but they also facilitated their tight control on the local Jewish population as well as containing it within the territory of Judaea proper. In other words, functioning as bases of operations the strongholds served multifarious purposes, defensive and offensive alike. The offensive aspect of a stronghold is exemplified some twenty years later by Cendebaeus' construction and fortification of Kedron: "He built up Kedron, and stationed there cavalry and troops, so that they could go out and conduct raids on the roads of Judaea, as the king ordered" 3 1 .

2. J u d a e a and I d u m a e a As early as Judas Maccabaeus the Hasmonaeans grasped the multipurpose importance of fortresses and their garrisons. Judas built walls with towers around Mount Zion, i.e. the Temple Mount, in Jerusalem and, as has already been noticed, fortified Beth-Zur, which served as a base of operations against Idumaea 3 2 . Jonathan fortified the site of Bethbasi as a place of refuge at the time he was evading the Seleucid forces sent against him 3 3 . Later, having regained the dominant position the Hasmonaeans had lost with the defeat of Judas by Bacchides, he launched upon major works of fortification: "Jonathan took counsel with them (i.e. the elders of the people) to build strongholds in Judaea, and to make the walls of Judaea higher" 3 4 . Most probably this should be understood as referring to two kinds of works: strengthening of existing walls or ramparts in townlets as well as the construction of completely new fortresses 35 . In these works Jonathan was extensively assisted by his brother Simon. It is 30 Cf. Avi-Yonah 1966, 54. On c o n t e m p o r a r y Hellenistic fortresses in Samaria see below pp. 67 f f . 31 IMacc. 1 5 . 3 9 - 4 1 (translation by Tedesche 1950). 32 IMacc. 4 . 6 0 ; AJ 12.326. F o r the identification of M o u n t Zion with the Temple M o u n t see Dequeker 1985, 204. For Beth-Zur see p. 4 0 f. For J u d a s ' operations in Idumaea see I Macc. 5 . 6 5 ; AJ 12.353. That the insurgents possessed f o r t s is assumed in IIMacc. 8.27 and 31. 33 I Macc. 9 . 6 2 ; AJ 13.26. F o r the identification of the site with Khirbet Bet Bassa see Abel 1925, 2 1 1 - 6 . O n Josephus' mistake in identifying Bethbasi with Bethagala see Moeller and Schmitt 1976,42-3. 34 IMacc. 1 2 . 3 5 - 6 (translation by Tedesche 1950); AJ 1 3 . 1 8 1 - 3 . 35 According to one reading of AJ 13.180, Simon made the fortresses of Judaea and Palestine

44

Fortifications

significant that later b o t h Demetrius II and Antiochus VII considered their recognition of Simon's right to possess his strongholds important enough to be explicitly mentioned in their attempts to win his support 3 6 . As well as the right to coin money, to manufacture arms and to hold the High-Priesthood, the maintenance of fortresses and garrisons was envisaged as a practical condition for and symbolical manifestation of Simon's rule over Judaea. As a consequence of Demetrius I's confirmation of Jonathan's HighPriesthood, the foreign garrisons in Judaea evacuated the fortresses with the exception of the Acra, Beth-Zur and Gezer 37 . Presumably the fortresses were now garrisoned by Hasmonaean troops, though certain evidence is lacking. There is no doubt, however, that all the Hasmonaean rulers took care to expand the fortifications of their country and to maintain garrisons. Before I start a detailed survey of their works, it will be useful to present a piece of evidence illuminating the scope of the Hasmonaean activity in this field. It is provided by Josephus in his account of the attempt of Aristobulus II to secure his succession to the throne. He secretly left Jerusalem and in fifteen days was able to gain control of twenty-two fortresses that were commanded by his friends 38 . These did not include all the royal fortresses,notably Hyrcania, Alexandrium, Machaerus, and the Baris, that is, the citadel of Jerusalem 3 9 . The fact that part of the army kept allegiance to Hyrcanus II until the battle of Jericho suggests that several more fortresses had not fallen into the hands of Aristobulus 4 0 . It follows that the Hasmonaean fortresses numbered at least thirty at this time, which also indicates that the expansion of the Hasmonaean state was concomitant with an increase in the number of the fortresses, but with some changes, as will be presently shown.

36 37 38

39

40

secure; according to another, he made Judaea and Palestine secure with fortresses. The first version presupposes existing fortresses, the second new ones. IMacc. 1 3 . 3 7 - 8 ; 1 5 . 5 - 7 . I Macc. 1 0 . 1 3 - 4 ; AJ 13.42. Though Gezer is not explicitly mentioned, the fact that it had to be conquered (above n. 20) strongly suggests that a Seleucid garrison remained there. AJ 13.422; 427. It is strange that A. Schalit rendered ta choria as "places" in his Hebrew translation of 13.427. Josephus uses chorion in the sense of "a fortified place", "a fortress", as, for example, in the application of the term to Hyrcania, Machaerus and Alexandrium in BJ 1.364; AJ 13.417. For this meaning in inscriptions see L. Robert, Gnomon 4 (1970) 5 8 8 - 9 . This is also how most translators understood the term in AJ 13.427: W. Whiston, The Genuine Works of Flavius Josephus (1737) - "strong places"; W. Dindorf, Flavii Josephi Opera (1847) - "loca m u n i t a " ; J. Chamonard, in Th. Reinach (éd.), Oeuvres complètes de Flavius Josèphe (19001932) - "places fortes". The version of BJ 1.117, that Aristobulus took control of all the fortress, should be rejected. It is not iterated in AJ 13.422, and is contradicted by the explicit notice of AJ 13.417 that Hyrcania, Alexandrium and Machaerus had not been delivered to his friends. For the Baris see BJ 1.118, AJ 13.426; 14.5. BJ 1.120; AJ 14.4.

Judaea and

Idumaea

45

To begin with, Jerusalem. Jonathan carried out fortification works which included wall repairs, erection of towers around the Temple Mount and the construction of a wall to contain the garrison of the Acra 41 . His brother Simon is said to have completed the building of the walls of Jerusalem and later, after the conquest of the Acra, to have fortified the Temple Mount 4 2 . The precise meaning of these pieces of information about the fortification works have to be related to the results of the archaeological excavations as well as to another two literary sources; the topography of the city has also to be taken into account. Topographically, the four main features of Jerusalem were the Temple Mount, the south-eastern hill (City of David, Lower City), the south-western hill (Upper City) and the valley separating the first two from the third (Tyropoeon). The inhabited area concentrated in the south-eastern hill until the 2nd century B.C.E. The south-western hill became significantly inhabited only in the second half of the 2nd century 4 3 . If Jerusalem consisted of two separate urban sites, divided by the Tyropoeon, it would be reasonable to suppose that each of them was encompassed by distinct walls; thus far no archaeological finds have been unearthed to validate this supposition, nor does there exist any literary source to support it 44 . In fact, two pieces of information indicate a reverse situation. The second century B.C.E. writer Timochares, who seems to have dealt with the history of Antiochus VII Sidetes, reported that Jerusalem had a circumference of 40 stades and was enclosed on all sides by abrupt ravines 45 . Eusebius has preserved a passage from The Land-Survey of Syria, whose anonymous writer (Xenophon of Lampsacus ?) lived ca. 100 B.C.E.; it reads as follows: "Jerusalem is situated on a high and rough terrain; some parts of the wall are built of hewn stone

41 IMacc. 10.10 — 1; 12.35 -6; A J 1 3 . 1 8 1 - 2 . 42 IMacc. 13.10; 53; AJ 13.202. The fortification of the Temple Mount is not mentioned by Josephus. 43 For the topography see BJ 5 . 1 3 6 - 4 1 , where Josephus wrongly identifies the Upper City with the City of David. See also Vincent and Steve 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 I, 1 - 2 6 ; Avi-Yonah 1968, 1 0 1 - 3 . On the area occupied by the Jews in the 5th century see Simons 1952, 4 3 7 - 5 8 ; Vincent and Steve 1.954-56 I, 2 3 6 - 5 9 ; contra M. Avi-Yonah, "The Walls of Nehemia - A Minimalist View", IEJ 4 (1954) 2 3 9 - 4 8 ; Y. Tsafrir, "The Walls of Jerusalem at the Time of Nehemia", Cathedra 4 (1977) 3 1 - 4 2 (in Hebrew; with extensive bibliography). For the archaeological finds at the south-western hill, including coins, see Avigad 1983, 7 5 - 8 0 ; Ariel 1982, 2 8 3 - 7 ; N. Avigad, "More Evidence on the Judaean Post Exilic Stamps", IEJ 24 (1974) 5 2 - 8 . For the interpretation of these finds see Geva 1985, 2 9 - 3 0 . Tushingham's attempt (1987) to show that the Western Hill west of the Jewish quarter was not occupied before the time of Herod is not cogent (below and n. 59). 44 According to Tushingham (1978, 1 8 7 - 8 ) , "Jerusalem consisted of two independently walled communities, which Josephus called the Upper City and the Lower City", and he suggests that, they were joined across the central valley only by a bridge. However, he has not considered the two literary sources of the 2nd century B.C.E. discussed below (see next two notes). See also Chap. VI. n. 5. 45 Eusebius Pr. Ev. 9.35,1. See Stern 1974a I, 1 3 4 - 6 .

Fortifications

Map 4: Jerusalem in the Hasmonaean period

Judaea and

Idumaea

47

(¿7TO Aitfou Zeorov),

but most of it consists of gravel (and The city has a circumference of 27 stades, and in that place there is a fount from which water sprouts out in abundance" 4 6 . Now, according to Josephus, the circumference of Jerusalem was 33 stades, and at his time the urban area was certainly larger than that of the 2nd century B.C.E. The data given by Timochares are then somewhat exaggerated, but the second source seems to be quite precise. The important point to be emphasized is that both sources envisage the city as having one circumference, and not two distinct urban sites. Their account must be related to the entire city, and not to the eastern or western part alone. In other words, there existed a wall which encircled the Upper City and the Lower City in the second half of the second century. In his account of the fortifications of Jerusalem at the time of the siege of Titus, Josephus describes the most ancient wall, commonly called the First Wall (PI. 14). It encompassed b o t h the Upper City and the Lower City, joining the western portico of the Temple on the one hand and the eastern portico on the other hand; its beginning originated with works of David and Solomon 4 7 . Various remains of this wall along several sections of its course have been discovered in the archaeological works carried out at Jerusalem in the last hundred years. In two sites on the northern section parts of the wall, a tower (9 x 9 m. with 2 . 5 - 3 m. wide wall) and remains of perhaps another tower or of a gate have been excavated. The oldest remains date from the First Temple period, including a gate and a segment of a wall 7 m. wide 48 . Extensive remains of two towers (14.35 x 8.90 m.; 24 x 11 m.) and indications of a tower antedating the Herodian Tower of David as well as remains of the wall have been unearthed and examined in the area of the Citadel of Jerusalem, on the north-western angle of the First Wall. On the basis of the masonry technique, it has been proposed to distinguish two phases of construction of the Hasmonaean period, not taking into account the Herodian phase 49 . Fortification remains, including those of f o u r towers, have been excavated along the western section of the wall, south of the Citadel 50 . Remains of several towers and of the wall have also been discovered at the south-western corner, at Mount Zion, and along the southern section of the wall. One segment of the wall of the Second Temple period is preserved to 4 m. height; one tower has a 13.1 m.

46 Eusebius Pr. Ev. 9.36,1. See Stem 1974a 1 , 1 3 7 - 8 . 47 5.142—5. 48 Avigad 1983, 4 6 - 5 2 (Figs. 2 8 - 3 1 ) ; 6 5 - 7 2 (Figs. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42); Geva 1985, 2 2 - 4 . The dating of these finds is not contested by Tushingham 1987, 1 4 2 - 3 . 49 Johns 1950, 1 2 7 - 4 0 ; Amiran and Eitan 1970; R. Sivan, David's Tower Rediscovered (1983) 1 0 - 9 ; Geva 1983; Sivan and Solar 1984 (distinguishing 6 stages of building); Geva 1985, 2 4 - 6 . 50 Tushingham 1968; idem 1985 I, 2 5 - 7 ; Bahat and Broshi 1972; Broshi 1977 1 1 - 7 (particularly important); Geva 1985, 26.

48

Fortifications

long front, another 14.6 m., and a third 15 m . s l Some remains of fortification works h i g h . o n the eastern slope of the south-eastern hill (City of David) are dated to the Second Temple period and ascribed to the First Wall". The accumulated archaeological findings present vexed problems of interpretation, and many points of detail, some quite important, are disputed and cannot be definitely solved. However, thanks to the research of Johns in the area of the Citadel of Jerusalem, it is widely held that two main phases of fortification works are to be distinguished: early and late Hasmonaean. Geva has recently re-examined the evidence and concluded that the two phases distinguished by Johns are typical of the entire line around the south-western hill, including the two segments excavated in the northern section; in fact Johns himself had identified the architectural features of the two phases in the findings on the southern section of the wall 53 . The masonry features of the phases have been summarized by Geva as follows: "The first phase is characterized by the use of roughly dressed stones laid in courses of headers and built in typically Hellenistic masonry style. The second phase is characterized by the use of ashlars carefully dressed with margins on all four sides and a protruding, rough central boss. This typically Hellenistic masonry was generally laid in alternating courses of headers and stretchers" 5 4 . I shall return to this distinction, but first several other features of the findings have to be underlined. First, Josephus' attribution of the First Wall to the First Temple period has been partly corroborated. Second, the western section seems to have become more fortified than the northern and southern sections. The wall on the western section is about 5—6 m. wide; from the Citadel of Jerusalem southward it was strengthened and widened, mostly on the outer side, at various stages. The wall along the northern and southern sections seems to 51 C . R . Conder, PEFQSt 5 ( 1 8 7 5 ) 7 - 1 0 ; 8 1 - 9 ; R.W. Hamilton, " N o t e on the Excavations of Bishop G o b a t School 1 9 3 3 " , PESQSt 67 ( 1 9 3 5 ) 1 4 1 - 3 ; F . J . Bliss and A.C. Dickie, Excavations of Jerusalem 1894-1897 ( 1 8 9 8 ) 1 - 4 7 ; J o h n s 1950, 1 5 0 - 2 ; Geva 1985, 2 6 - 7 . See also the discussion of the finds in Y. Tsafrir, Zion - the Southwestern Wall and its Place in the Development of the City of Jerusalem in the Byzantine Period Ph.D. Diss. T h e Hebrew University, Jerusalem ( 1 9 7 5 ) 2 0 5 - 2 0 (in Hebrew). 52 Y. Shiloh, Excavations at the City of David, 1 1978-1982 ( 1 9 8 4 ) 2 0 - 1 ; Reich 1987. Cf. K.M. K e n y o n , "Excavations in Jerusalem, 1 9 6 2 " , PEQ 95 ( 1 9 6 3 ) 15; eadem 1967, 1 9 - 2 3 ; 1974, 191-4. 53 Johns 1950, 1 5 0 - 2 . The objection of Tsafrir (1975, 5 0 7 ) ignores the points of J o h n ' s a r g u m e n t , for he does not consider the style differences in the m a s o n r y . This is all the more surprising since Tsafrir himself does accept, at least in this article, masonry style as a chronological criterion. 5 4 Geva 1985, 6 6 * . On the first phase cf. J o h n s 1 2 7 - 8 : "it consists of roughly squared blocks, rock-faced or bearing the circular, fanwise strokes of the q u a r r y m a n ' s pick, the tool used for hewing grooves between blocks in the quarry face; b u t though loosely joined at the sides, the stones are well b e d d e d , hardly less than the height of t h e course and sometimes nearly twice that, in header fashion, and they are laid dry and close. All are of the same kind of chalky limestone."

Judaea and Idumaea

49

have remained narrower, 3—4 m. wide. Third, the different measurements of the towers possibly indicate that each one was built in consideration of the peculiar conditions of its site; but at least several towers gained in time larger dimensions thanks to additions to the original core. All these rectangular towers protrude to some extent from the wall line, a feature typical of many towers of the Hellenistic period 55 . Indeed, the fourth feature to be singled out is the Hellenistic parallels to both the so-called first and second phases. Features typical of the first phase have been noticed at Ptolemais, Samaria, Tel Dor (PI. 1), Beth-Zur (Khirbet et-Tubeiqa), Straton's Tower and Sha'ar ha-'Amaqim (PI. 2): use of rectangular blocks generally laid in headers. Yet the rough square drafted masonry of the Hasmonaean building did not attain the same level of workmanship characteristic of the walls of Greek cities 56 . The two main features of the second phase, alternating courses of headers and stretchers and ashlar blocks dressed with margins on all four sides with a rough central boss, have Hellenistic parallels, including several antedating the Hasmonaean period, but are also known from later periods, even the 2nd century C.E. S7 This last fact, i.e. the continued use of a construction technique over a long period, casts doubts about the attempt to attribute these two styles of masonry to two clearly distinct periods of building: it is unlikely that the transition from the one to the other was abrupt and uniform. Thus, for instance, W110, a segment of a 1.6 m. wide wall at the complex of the Citadel of Jerusalem, has been dated to the second phase, although it is made of field stones 58 . Conversely, ballista balls, arrow heads and sling

55 See Geva 1985, 3 2 - 3 . His inference that the J l s h a p e towers are to be found only on the southern and northern sections is untenable. The features of protruding towers appear on the western section of Geva's own map (1985, 22 Fig. 1) and cf. Ma'oz 1985, 47 Fig. 3. See also Winter 1971, 203 (Fig. 205); Lawrence 1979, 289 Fig. 53; 391 Fig. 86; 3 9 6 - 7 Fig. 87.; Horovitz 1980, 96 Fig. 2; Adam 1982,116 Fig. 80; 1 5 8 - 6 1 Fig. 99, photos 1 9 4 - 7 . 56 Ptolemais: Dothan 1976, 4 1 - 4 with Figs. 44, 46; idem , ' T h e Fortifications of Ptolemais", Qadmoniot 3 4 - 5 (1976) 7 1 - 4 (in Hebrew); Samaria: Crowfoot et alii 1942-57 I, 2 4 - 7 ; 30; 120; Pis. Ill, XXXVI—XXXVIII; Tel Dor: E. Stem 1985, 1 7 8 - 9 (Figs. 4 - 5 ) ; 182 (Fig. 6);iIdem 1987, 1 5 3 - 9 ; Beth-Zur: Sellers 1933, Pis. I I - I V and Figs. 14, 16, 18. Straton's Tower: Raban 1987; idem 1988; Sha'ar ha-'Amaqim: Segal 1989. Cf. Johns 1950, 133-4;Geva 1985, 29. 57 Jericho: Kelso and Baramki 1955, PI. 3; Herodium: Netzer 1981, Fig. 108; Amman: A. Hadidi, in Moorey and Parr 1978, 2 1 6 - 2 1 (PI. XXVa-b); Mount Nebo: V. Corbo, "Scavi archeologici sotto i mosaici della basilica del Monte Nebo", SBF 20 (1970) 278 Fig. 3, on which see Foerster 1981; Sartaba (Alexandrium): Tsafrir and Magen 1984, 28. For Greek masonry see Winter 1971, 8 0 - 9 1 ; Lawrence 1979, 2 3 2 - 4 5 . Note, however, that the Hellenistic parallels cited by Tsafrir (1975, 518—9) do not have precisely the same features of the Hasmonaean masonry. Compare e.g., PI. 13 (right side) with Pis. 14 and 16. On the wide geographical and chronological distribution of the apparently marginal drafting see Laperrousaz 1974; idem 1979. For some reservation about the use of the shape of stones and the manner of dressing in studies of ashlar building techniques see Sharon 1987, 2 1 - 2 . 58 Sivan and Solar 1984, 133.

50

Fortifications

bullets are interpreted by Geva himself to show that a tower built of masonry of the second phase existed at the time of the siege of Antiochus VII Sidetes, about 134. Consequently, it must have been constructed in Simon's time, to whom the first phase is usually ascribed. Besides, it is quite possible that the roughly dressed stones of the so-called first phase were used in the hidden parts of the First Wall, while those of the socalled second phase were employed in the parts exposed to view (PI. 14); in other words, both may have belonged to the same phase of construction 59 . Evidently the masonry style by itself cannot be used as a certain, precise chronological criterion. To conclude. The attribution of the archaeological remains to the fortification works known from the literary sources cannot be precisely determined, but the outlines of the development may be drawn. The literary sources seem to indicate Simon as the one who constructed the First Wall, for his brother is said to have dealt with the fortification of the Temple Mount and the eastern hill only (above p. 45). If so, the earliest parts of the archaeological remains are Simon's rather than Jonathan's work 60 . Be that as it may, this was a very large scale operation which must have taken a considerable time to complete. Political and military considerations and needs may have induced the workers to hasten to finish the task, which might explain the rough features of the masonry. These fortifications withstood the siege of Antiochus VII Sidetes who had, therefore, to resort to a long blockade. Eventually John Hyrcanus asked for peace terms and was compelled to demolish the walls61. Not long afterwards Antiochus' defeat and death in the Parthian war in 129 B.C.E. liberated Hyrcanus, who had to take part in that war, from all his obligations. Neither Josephus nor any other author reports the refortification of Jerusalem by Hyrcanus, although his fortification works are mentioned 62 . 59 For the tower see Geva 1985, 31, w h o refers to Sivan, op. cit. (n. 49). F o r t h e military finds it is better to consult Sivan and Solar 1984, 1 1 2 ; 1 1 4 - 5 . T h e y closely resemble the military finds unearthed by E. Stern at Tel Dor (Stern 1 9 8 7 , 159 n. 21), which are c o n f i d e n t l y ascribed to the siege of that city by A n t i o c h u s VII Sidetes. The finds of Sivan and Solar r e f u t e conclusively the interpretation of the archaeological evidence by Tushingham (1987), unconvincing in any case, w h o apparently was unaware of their existence. T h e possibility t h a t the so-called first phase masonry k n o w n f r o m the segments of the First Wall in the area of the Citadel of Jerusalem was n o t exposed to view was suggested to m e by Mrs. R. Sivan. T h e s t r u c t u r e excavated at Sh'ar ha-'Amaqim, dated to the early 2 n d c e n t u r y , provides an illuminating e x a m p l e of mixed techniques of construction and of stone dressing: one wall built header fashion and a n o t h e r with: headers and stretchers alternating; use of completely dressed stones as well as of stones with smooth margins and a central boss, even in t h e same course. See Pis. 2, 3; Segal 1 9 8 9 . 60 J o n a t h a n : Johns 1950, 135; begun by J o n a t h a n and completed by S i m o n : Avigad 1983, 7 2 ; Geva 1985, 3 1 - 2 . 61 AJ 1 3 . 2 3 6 - 4 2 ; Diod. Sic. 34/5. 1, 1 - 5 ; Porphyry in Eusebius Chron. I p. 255 (ed. Schoene). See Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 0 2 - 4 with nn. 5 - 6 . 62 I Macc. 16.23. The evidence of Agatharchides of Cnidus o n Jerusalem as a strong city p r o b a b l y

Judaea and

Idumaea

51

But there can be no doubt that the Hasmonaean ruler was not slow t o reconstruct the defences of his capital city. The rebuilding of the walls may well be evidenced in the defensive parts built in the masonry style of the second phase, but one should not assume that the defences were all uniform in this respect. Presumably the demolished material of the old walls, which obviously had not been completely rased, was now exploited for the new building. At any rate, the anonymous author on the LandSurvey of Syria quoted above testifies to the mixed character of the walls. However, the archaeological finds indicate that the walls were strengthed by various additions at several points even through the 1st century B.C.E. Owing to these works the defences included the First Wall, the wall of the Temple Mount, the Baris, the wall of the City of David, and probably the Second W a l l " . Some information concerns Jericho (Map 16). Doq, or Dagon, a Hasmonean fortress at Jericho, is attested by the time of Simon's murder by his son-in-law in 135 64 . This fortress is usually located on Mt. Qarantal,(Pl. 11), and it has been proposed to identify it with one of the forts Threx and Taurus, adjacent to Jericho, reported to have been destroyed by Pompeius in 63 6 5 . Doq, which may have been built by Bacchides, could have been occupied by the Hasmonaeans as early as Jonathan. The remains discovered at Tell el-'Aqaba, where later Herod seems to have built the fortress of Cyprus, seem to point to a Hasmonaean fortress at this site (PI. 10). Massive walls indicate the existence of a fortress on the summit of Nuseib el-Aweishiret, north of WadTQelt 6 6 . All three sites are distinguished by their topographical elevation and commanding position over the surrounding area. It thus appears that the archaeological findings point to the existence of three fortresses at Jericho, which may have been the locations of the three fortresses known from the literary sources. However, since Doq might be identified with Taurus or Threx, and since the archaeological evidence is not conclusive, it emerges that there existed two, possibly three Hasmonaean fortresses at Jericho. In addition, there have been unearthed the extensive remains of a Hasmonaean fortified relates to the time of John Hyrcanus I, although his main interest is in the capture of the city by Ptolemy I. See C. Ap. 1.209; AJ 12.6. On Agatharchides see Stem 1974a, 1 0 4 - 9 . 63 For the Baris see BJ 1 . 7 5 ; ^ / 1 3 . 3 0 7 . For the Second Wall see Chap. VI n. 5. 64 IMacc. 1 6 . 1 5 ; B J 1.56; A / 13.230. 65 Strabo 16.2,40. Contrary to what is sometimes stated, Threx and Taurus were hardly watchtowers. It is inconceivable that mere watchtowers would have induced Pompeius to order their destruction. For the location of Doq on Mount Qarantal see Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 7 7 - 8 (with extensive bibliography); add G. Dalman, "Der Qarantana Berg und Dock", PJB 10 (1914) 1 6 - 7 ; Meshel 1978, 4 1 - 4 : 5 3 ; Tsafrir 1982, 122. For the water supply system of Qarantal see Amit 1989b; Garbrecht and Peleg 1989, 1 2 - 4 . 66 On the excavations at Tell el-'Aqaba see Netzer 1975c. Cf. Alt, PJB 21 (1925) 2 4 - 5 ; Meshel 1978, 4 9 - 5 2 ; Tsafrir 1982,123. On Nuseib el-Aweishireh see Meshel 1978, 4 6 - 7 ; cf.Tsafrir 1 9 8 2 , 124.

52

Fortifications

palace at Tulul Abu el 'Alaiq on the north bank of WadI Qelt. At present it seems that the site was first occupied by a central building, 55 x 50 m., which was erected around an internal courtyard. After some time the building was encircled on three sides by a defensive moat, 7 m. wide and 7 m. deep; on the fourth, southern side the building bordered on the escarpment of Wad! Qelt. Later still, new buildings were constructed westwards and eastwards of the tel, partly destroying the moat, which indicates that peaceful conditions prevailed at the time (PI. 6). Who was the first Hasmonaean ruler to occupy the site cannot be established; the three phases noted above presumably spanned the period from Simon or John Hyrcanus I to Alexandra Salome. Two more points need be mentioned. Firstly, near the palace extended a large and prosperous estate; secondly, the site of the palace is not naturally defensible and only barely rises above the adjacent land. It would seem that the site was chosen because of its proximity to the prosperous estate and the potential amenities of the environment. Security was provided by the construction of the two, possibly three forts on the nearby mountains as well as by the fortification of the palace 67 . Simon built and fortified Adida, and later refortified and garrisoned Beth-Zur and Gezer 6 8 . Thus far I have been dealing with sites situated within or close to the borders of Judaea proper. Now, Judas Maccabaeus is credited with a night attack on Joppa 6 9 , but it was Jonathan, acting on behalf of Alexander Balas, who was able to oust the garrison of Demetrius II from Joppa ca. 146 and possibly to maintain some position there 7 0 . Some time later, while Jonathan was still alive, Simon occupied and garrisoned the city and, after his brother's death, expelled the Gentile population from there 71 . Joppa derived its special importance from the fact that its harbour was the best on the Palestinian coast and thus it could be extremely advantageous for the development of the trade of Judaea 7 2 .

67 Kelso (Kelso and Baramki 1955, 7) confidently identifies the Hellenistic fortress in Tulul Abu el-'Alaiq with one of the towers destroyed by Pompeius, but admits that it could have been constructed by one of the Maccabees. According to recent excavations, however, Tulul Abu el-'Alaiq was the site of Hasmonaean, and later Herodian palaces, which should not be identified with any of the forts destroyed by Pompeius. See Z. Meshel, " A New Interpretation of the Finds of Herodian Jericho", Eretz-hrael 11 (1973) 1 9 4 - 6 (in Hebrew with an English summary on p. 28*); Netzer 1975a; 1975b; 1977; cf. G. Foerster and G. Bachi, in EAEHL II, 565. The results of the latest excavations have not been published. I am grateful to Dr. E. Netzer for the information, as well as for instructive guidance at the site. 68 For Beth-Zur and Gezer see p. 4 0 f. with nn. 18 and 20. For Adida see IMacc. 12.38 on which see Abel 1926, 218; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 4 - 6 . 69 II Macc. 1 2 . 3 - 7 . 70 I Macc. 1 0 . 7 5 - 6 . 71 I Macc. 1 2 . 3 3 - 4 ; \3.11',AJ 13.202. 72 See Diod. Sic. 1.31,2; Strabo 16.2,28.

Judaea and

Idumaea

53

The occupation and garrisoning of Joppa marked the expansion of the Hasmonaean state beyond Judaea proper as well as the employment of a fortress for aims not exclusively military. Map 5: Judaea in the Hasmonaean period

< 0 ~

Apollonia'

• • • ^ A ^ A ? ^

/ CV"

feZls

-

AMARIA

The available archaeological evidence at the site of Gezer suggests that the place ceased to function as a fortress in the early 1st century; indeed the tel seems to have become deserted at that time, the population moving off to live in the adjacent plains73. A similar phenomenon can be observed 73 This is the unanimous conclusion of all the excavators. See Macalister 1912 I, XXIII; 4 1 ; Dever 1967, 62; Dever et alii 1970, 28; 6 7 - 8 ; 1971, 1 1 8 - 9 ; 1974, 87; Seger 1976, 144; Dever, in EAEHL II, 4 2 8 - 3 3 . But it should be noted that the conclusion is based on negative evidence and that the precise date of the abandonment of the site cannot be determined. If the occupation ceased "under Roman Aegis", as Seger writes, the Hasmonaean fortress may have been deserted only after Salome's death. If Gezer is referred to in BJ 1.170 and AJ 14.91, it would mean that the town was a seat of one of the synodoi organized by Gabinius. But this is far f r o m certain; see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 268 n. 5.

54

Fortifications

at Beth-Zur, the occupation of which had perhaps ceased even earlier at the turn of the second century 7 4 . It seems sensible to connect this development with the conquest of Idumaea by John Hyrcanus I. Beth-Zur then lost its strategic importance as a border fortress and the same holds true for Gezer, following the conquests of Alexander Jannaeus along the coastal plain. If this line of reasoning is correct, the abandonment of several more fortresses could be assumed, for instance Bethel, Beth-Horon, Ammaus, Thamna, Tephon and Parathon, if indeed Bacchides' forts had been taken over by the first Hasmonaeans. But the evidence from Jericho does not justify an assumption of an overall abandonment of old fortresses. There, as has been shown above (p. 51 f.), there existed at least two forts, Threx and Taurus; and if the early fort Doq is not identical with any of these, it may still have been occupied in the first century. In addition, the Hasmonaeans built at Jericho an extensive, fortified palace. Jericho evidently became an important royal residence that was well guarded 7 5 . The fortress of Adida, too, was still in existence under Alexander Jannaeus 7 6 . Therefore, no assumption may be made whether the old fortresses were abandoned or not. A two-story tower measuring 10 x 9.25 m. has been excavated near modern Giv'at Sha'ul, about 4.5 km. west of the Old City of Jerusalem. Built on a slope, the tower overlooked and guarded a road which in the Roman period was to become an important link between Jerusalem and the coast. Pottery finds and coins date the construction of the tower to the time of Alexander Jannaeus; its occupation lasted until the end of the first century C.E. 7 7 Another fortress along that same road has been excavated at Hurvat Mesad (Kh. el Qasr, G.R. 1552 1359), situated about 16 km. west of Jerusalem. It measures ca. 20 x 15m., with a wall 0 . 8 l m . w i d e ; two small rectangular towers seem to have flanked the entrance to the fortress. The foundations are made of big undressed blocks. On the basis of the coinage and pottery finds, the excavator has suggested dating it to the time of Alexander Jannaeus. This seems to indicate an

74 Sellers and Albright 1931, 12; Sellers 1933, 13; F u n k , in EAEHL I, 267. That the site was abandoned is inferred f r o m the ceramic and numismatic evidence. I regard the Y e h o h a n a n coins f o u n d at Beth-Zur (Sellers 1 9 3 3 , 6 9 - 7 0 ; F u n k 1958, 17 n. 12) as belonging to J o h n Hyrcanus I, not to Hyrcanus II. Coins of H y r c a n u s II would indicate that the site was occupied at least to the mid-first century. Prof. D. Barag is going to publish a recently f o u n d coin h o a r d , which conclusively dates the beginning of the Hasmonaean coinage to J o h n Hyrcanus I. 75 I Macc. 16.15; BJ 1.56; AJ 13.230; Strabo 16.2,40. F o r t h e results of the recent excavations see the references in nn. 66—67. F o r three buildings recently exposed and supposed to have been constructed under Salome see Netzer 1 9 8 2 , w h o proposes t h a t each of these served as a separate residence for the q u e e n , Aristobulus II and H y r c a n u s II. Of course, w i t h o u t w r i t t e n evidence such a suggestion cannot be c o r r o b o r a t e d . 76 AJ 13.392. 77 Tzaferis 1974.

Judaea and Idumaea

55

intention to safeguard this line of communication between Jerusalem and Joppa, and may suggest that some more sites were fortified along this route, for instance at Ammaus 7 8 . Finally, I may mention an interesting building known as Qasr el-Yahud (also named Khirbet el-Yahud or Khirbet Mazin). It is situated on the northern shore of the Dead Sea at G.R. 1920 1211. It measures 23 x 43 m. with walls preserved to the height of 6 m. On one view, this was a fortress, part of a complex of fortifications intended to provide defence to the nearby agricultural areas of 'Ain Feshkha, as well as of Jericho. According to another view, it served as a dry anchorage. The building mainly consists of a large inner yard, measuring 31 x 11 m. and providing room for four boats, with a 18 x 9 m. tower to the north of it. The various finds at the site, as well as the architectural features, are said to point to its construction and occupation in the Hasmonaean period. It must be admitted, however, that without further evidence the suggested comprehensive defensive system is highly conjectural; yet, there is no doubt about the defensive features of the building 79 . Next, Idumaea. If Beth-Zur was really abandoned as a result of the integration of Idumaea in the Hasmonaean state, one could expect the construction of some fortresses in the new territory, but the evidence is remarkably scanty or negative. The Idumaean fort of Oresa is attested in the 40's of the first century B.C.E., yet in all likelihood it dated from the Hasmonaean period 8 0 . The archaeological finds at Tel 'Arad have been variously interpreted. According to the excavator, Y. Aharoni, a casemate wall discovered on the site was constructed in the Israelite period. He ascribed a square tower of approximately 18 x 18 m. to the Hellenistic period and dated its destruction in the second or early first century. In the Herodian period, a new fortress was built atop the ruins. From this chronological reconstruction it would follow that the Hasmonaeans, who seem to have been responsible for the demolition of the Hellenistic fort, never garrisoned the site. However, the use of a special stonecutting technique, unknown from earlier periods, as well as other considerations date the construction of the casemate wall to the Hellenistic period. According to a recent examination of the evidence, at first a 12 x 12 m.

78 See Fischer 1979; 1985a; 1985b. Note, however, that Fischer hesitates about the dating, for he adds that the occupation period lasted from the 2nd half of the second century to the midfirst century (1985a, 426). 79 For the first view see Bar-Adon 1981; for the second, Netzer 1989, 2 2 5 - 7 . The late Bar-Adon did not publish the results of his researches of this area. Perhaps a more definite judgement can be reached when these are presented in detail. 80 BJ 1.266; 294; AJ 14.361; 400. At Khirbet Khuresa, the supposed location of Oresa, only late Roman and Byzantine potsherds were found. See Kochavi 1972, 29 (no. 72); Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 151 (with bibliography).

56

Fortifications

tower, perhaps Hasmonaean, was built of ashlar stones: "in a later phase this tower was in ruins and was covered by the larger square tower, which was combined with a casemate fortress". Pending the publication of the final report, this interpretation of the findings is more convincing, and it seems to point to the occupation of Tel 'Arad by the Hasmonaeans81. At Tel Beer-Sheba three floor levels were discovered in the Hellenistic fort on the site. These levels and the material associated with them indicate three periods of occupations: fourth-third centuries (H3); second century (H2); first century B.C.E. - first century C.E. (HI) 8 2 . The numismatic evidence is somewhat surprising: one Athenian tetradrachm, 18 Ptolemaic coins, three Macedonian, 10 Seleucid, two of Side (Pamphylia), two of John Hyrcanus, 26 early Nabataean (late second/early first century), three from Palestinian cities and three late Roman coins83. As a reflection of the political and military rulers of the site, the coin finds suggest that Tel Beer-Sheba came under Nabataean control in the wake of the disintegration of the Seleucid empire. However, the destruction of the Hellenistic temple at the site, dated by the Nabataean coins to the early first century B.C.E., points to a Jewish conquest of the site84. If the construction of the fort of HI could be established as contemporary with the destruction of the temple, this would suggest an immediate military occupation of the site by the

81 Y. Aharoni and Amiiali 1964, 133 (table); 144; Y. Aharoni, "Excavations at Tel Arad. Preliminary Report on the Second Season, 1963", IEJ 17 (1967) 242; idem, in EAEHL I, 8 7 - 8 ; Aharoni 1981, 8 - 1 0 (the colours of strata III and IV are reversed in the plan). There are some incongruities in Aharoni's reports. Aharoni 1981 speaks of a 20 x 20 m. Hellenistic tower, while EAEHL reports a 12 x 12 m. square tower constructed over a platform of 19 x 19 m. (the same details are given in the Hebrew versions of these works). Stratum IV is dated in the third-second centuries in Aharoni and Amiran 1964, 133, but in the third-first centuries in Aharoni 1981, 9. The destruction of the Hellenistic tower is dated "before the beginning of the Roman period" (i.e. before 63 B.C.E.) in Aharoni and Amiran 1964, 144, but in the second century in EAEHL. Obviously there was no good evidence for a close dating of the tower. For a defence of Aharoni's dating of the casemate wall see Herzog 1987. For the other interpretation see Mazar and Netzer 1986, esp. 88; Ussishkin 1988 (answering Herzog). See also Nylander 1967; Y. Yadin, IEJ 15 (1965)180. 82 Y. Aharoni 1973, 6 - 8 . 83 A Kindler, in Aharoni 1973, 9 0 - 1 . In addition, one unidentified Hellenistic and eight Seleucid coins were found. For a Trajanic coin see V. Fritz, in Aharoni 1973, 8 6 - 7 . Kindler ascribes the Hasmonaean coins to John Hyrcanus I. 84 Y. Aharoni, "Tel Beersheba", IEJ 24 (1974) 271; idem, "Excavations et Tel Beer-Sheba. Preliminary Report of the Fifth and Sixth Seasons, 1973-1974", Tel Aviv 2 (1975) 1 6 3 - 5 . The bizarre view of S. Derfler ("A Hellenistic Figurine from the Hellenistic Temple at Tel BeerSheba", IEJ 31 (1981) 9 7 - 8 ; idem, The Hellenistic Temple at Beersheva, Israel. Ph.D. Diss. University of Minnesota 1984 (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International 8 3 - 9 2 ) , that the major repairs of the temple, dated by coins to sometime after 127, evidence a sanctification of a Jewish temple on the site by the followers of John Hyrcanus, should be dismissed. Kasher (1988, 45, map) apparently thinks that Beer-Sheba was occupied by John Hyrcanus I, but does not explain the reasons for this view. At any rate, he seems to be unaware of the archaeological finds.

Judaea and

Idumaea

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Hasmonaean conqueror. But the excavator of Tel Beer-Sheba dated the bath-house associated with stratum HI to the Early Roman (Herodian) period, implying presumably an interval between destruction and rebuilding. If indeed this was the case, the fort of HI cannot be a Hasmonaean undertaking. The Hasmonaean occupation of Tel Beer-Sheba may then have been short-lived 85 . Map 6: Idumaea in the Hasmonaean period

The two most important cities of Idumaea were Marisa and Adora. Marisa, conquered by John Hyrcanus I, was later restored as a Greek city by Pompeius, and finally destroyed by the Parthians in 40 86 . The archaeological evidence cannot prove or disprove the existence of a Hasmonaean fortress on the site, though the coinage finds do suggest that the

85 Aharoni 1973, 7 n. 5, idem, IEJ 19 ( 1 9 6 9 ) 246; idem, IEJ 22 ( 1 9 7 2 ) 170. 86 On Marisa see BJ 1.63; 156; 269; AJ 1.257; 396; 14.75; 88; 364. For excavations and plans of the walled city see Bliss and Macalister 1902-, 5 2 - 6 1 ; 6 7 - 7 0 and Pis. 1 5 - 1 6 ; Lawrence 1979, 277; 2 8 8 - 9 ; Horowitz 1980.

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Fortifications

place was inhabited under the Hasmonaeans 87 . Adora, too, was conquered by John Hyrancus I, but later Gabinius restored it. Again the archaeological finds do not shed light on the question of a Hasmonaean fortification at the site. Yet Adora was very likely a seat of one of the five synodoi organized by Gabinius and as such must have been inhabited 88 . Finally Masada, a naturally defensible site. Jonathan is credited with the building of the first defences on this formidable rock, but opinions vary as to whether it was Jonathan or Alexander Jannaeus, whose Hebrew name was Jonathan and who was indeed the first Hasmonaean ruler to occupy the site. No defensive remains of the Hasmonaean period have been discovered at Masada, although recently E. Netzer has suggested to identify some buildings as Hasmonaean, but this needs more positive confirmtion 8 9 . It would be too hasty to conclude, on the basis of such evidence, that John Hyrcanus I and his successors did not establish fortifications and garrisons in Idumaea. Several considerations warn against such a conclusion. The conversion of the Idumaeans proved after some time a successful experience but no one, including John Hyrcanus himself, could have foreseen the pace and extent of the process. With the long-term Jewish—Idumaean confrontation in mind, he will have taken some security precautions to ensure the integration of the newly Judaized Idumaeans in the Hasmonaean state. Naturally these would entail garrisoning and fortification works in the region 90 . Secondly, the single fort of Oresa does

87 M. Avi-Yonah (EAEHL III, 7 8 2 - 9 1 ) stresses the number of Hasmonaean coins to argue that the city was not destroyed by the Hasmonaeans. The coin finds are as follows: Ptolemaic - 13; Seleucid - 19; Yehohanan - 25; other - 4 (Bliss and Macalister 1902,68). According to E. Oren ("The Caves of the Palestinian Shephelah", Archaeology 18 (1965) 2 1 8 - 2 4 ) , Jewish names begin to appear in the t o m b inscriptions near Maresha after the Hasmonaean conquest; he also notes a great change in the plan of the city. Unfortunately, he does not substantiate these conclusions by specific details. See also Sshiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 3 - 5 with n. 8; Vogel 1974, 9 1 - 2 ; N. Oren and U. Rappaport, "The Necropolis of Maresha - Beth Govrin", IEJ 34 (1984) 1 1 4 54. See also p. 98. 88 BJ 1.63; 166; AJ 13.257; 14.88; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 5 - 6 . For the archaeological finds see Kochavi 1972, 6 2 - 3 n. 154. For the reorganization of Gabinius see BJ 1 . 1 6 9 - 7 0 ; A H 4 . 9 0 - 1 , where Kanael (1957, 1 0 2 - 3 ) proposes to read Adorois instead of Gadorois or Gadarois of the manuscripts. This is accepted by Avi-Yonah 1966, 84 and Schalit 1969, 32, and though rejected by Schmitt 1975, 55 and Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 60, seems to m e the best solution. 89 BJ 7.285. In 4 . 3 9 9 the work is ascribed to ancient kings. Cf. Avi-Yonah et alii 1957, 1 - 3 . For the fortress see Schalit 1969, 3 4 3 - 4 ; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 3 5 ; T . Ilan,"A Pattern of Historical Error in the Writings of Josephus", Zion 51 (1986) 3 5 7 - 8 (in Hebrew); contra Tsafrir 1982, 1 2 6 - 7 . For a suggestion that several buildings at Masada were constructed by the Hasmonaeans see Netzer 1982, 25; 1989, 2 1 6 - 9 . However, the latest investigations have not corroborated this suggestion (Netzer 1991). 90 On the operations of Judas Maccabaeus against the Idumaeans see I Macc. 4.60; 5 . 6 5 - 7 ; AJ 12.353. See also Avi-Yonah 1966, 37; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 2 with n. 4. For the Judaization

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not make sense from a military point of view. If indeed it dated from the Hasmonaean period this would strongly suggest the existence of some other contemporary forts. Thirdly, Josephus reports that Alexander Jannaeus and his wife Alexandra Salome appointed Antipas, Herod's grandfather, as strategos over Idumaea. This might indicate a military governor of the region, though one cannot be certain about the significance of the title, as the term strategos came to mean civilian and not necessarily military powers in the Hellenistic period 91 . Obviously a governor with military authority must have commanded some troops. Another possibility, not necessarily exclusive, needs to be taken into account. It is likely that the conquest of Idumaea was followed by confiscation of land belonging to the Hellenised population of Marisa and Adora, part of whose inhabitants apparently emigrated to Egypt 92 . If this land was distributed to settlers from Judaea or from Idumaea itself, these may have been counted upon to secure the control of the region. Settled in fortified farms or villages, they might with some form of organized mobilization have acted in a concerted way if the need arose. Such a possibility could be dismissed as mere speculation but for two supporting indications. First, the existence and operation of a system of local militias in Idumaea is known from the time of the First Jewish Revolt against Rome, even though, admittedly, there is no way of telling how old this system was 93 . Second, the existence of fortified farms, some probably of military settlers, is evidenced in parts of Samaria and may serve as an analogy (below). If

of the Idumaeans see BJ 1.63\AJ 1 3 . 2 5 7 - 8 ; 15.254; Strabo 16.2, 34. Ptolemy, Historic Herodis = F. Gr.Hist.ill, B. 199 F1 = Stem 1974a, 356 (no. 146). Some scholars (e.g. Klein 1 9 3 9 , 7 4 - 5 , and particularly Kasher 1988, 46—8) argue that the Idumaeans adopted Judaism of their own free will, and that no force was employed. The question is too large and complicated to be dealt with here, but several points may be pointed out. a) One cannot ignore the historical enmity between the Jews and Idumaeans and especially the wars of the first Hasmonaean generation, b) The case of Costobar shows that there were Idumaeans who opposed the conversion even a hundred years later (AJ 15.255). c) Jewish opposition to forcible conversion seems to have been a later development, d) Strabo indeed does not mention compulsion, neither should he be understood to stress the voluntary character of the conversion, e) If forcible conversion was approved, at least by certain circles in Jewish society, Josephus' and Ptolemy's accounts need not be regarded as distorted and unreliable anti-Hasmonaean propaganda. 0 The presumably favourable conditions for conversion at the time do not mean that compulsion was not employed. The book of Jubilees probably reflects attitudes of part of the Jewish population to the Idumaeans in this period. Cf. Mendels 1987, Chap. VI, esp. 7 5 - 8 1 . That the Idumaeans were in fact Jews (thus M. Kochman, Status and Extent of Judah in the Persian Period. Ph.D. Diss. The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (1980) Chap. VII.4, in Hebrew) seems to me totally unacceptable. 91 AJ 14.10. On the strategos in the Hellenistic world see F. Bilabel, REIVA 1 8 4 - 2 5 2 ; W. Schwahn, in RE Supplb. VI, 1 0 8 1 - 1 1 5 8 . 92 For the view that this emigration resulted from the Jewish conquest see Rappaport 1969. 93 On the mobilization of the Idumaean population for defensive as well as offensive operations see BJ 2 . 6 5 3 - 4 ; 4 . 2 3 3 - 5 ; 5 1 5 - 2 0 .

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then John Hyrcanus I established such a system, he could have dispensed with the need of a network of fortifications, excepting perhaps a few 94 . 3. Samaria The region of Samaria formed a separate administrative unit under the Ptolemies and Seleucids alike, though the precise relations between the region and the city of Samaria cannot be ascertained 95 . Shechem, the chief city of the Samaritans (Cuthites), succumbed to the growing power of John Hyrcanus I, who destroyed it together with the temple on Mount Gerizim in the 110's. The archaeological excavations of recent years have shown that there existed two cities at Shechem in the Hellenistic period, one at Tell Balatah and the other on Mount Gerizim itself. Founded in the late 4th century, the city at Tell Balatah extended over an area of about 6 hectars. It suffered considerable damage in the 190's, probably in connection with the conquest of Palestine by Antiochus III, but habitation on the site continued until the final destruction that took place in the late 2nd century. This city used to be identified with Shechem, the Samaritan city reported by Josephus to have been destroyed by John Hyrcanus I' 6 . However, Y. Magen has recently excavated a city extending

94 Hellenistic p o t t e r y has been observed in some thirty-four sites within the territory of Idumaea in the archaeological survey of 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 . See Kochavi 1972 pp. 5 3 - 4 , no. 96; pp. 5 6 - 6 3 nos. 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 , 1 2 3 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 , 1 4 7 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 4 , 1 6 0 ; p. 68 nos. 1 7 6 , 1 7 8 ; pp. 7 0 - 1 nos. 1 8 8 , 1 8 9 , 1 9 4 ; pp. 7 3 - 4 nos. 2 0 5 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 ; pp. 7 6 - 8 nos. 2 2 2 , 2 2 5 , 2 2 9 , 2 3 1 , 2 3 4 ; pp.8 1 - 2 nos. 2 4 5 , 2 4 8 , 2 4 9 , 2 5 0 ; p. 134 no. 154; p. 141 no. 193. In most cases the precise nature and f u n c t i o n s of the buildings in these sites cannot be determined w i t h o u t f u r t h e r investigations. But even in such a case as R u j m en-Naqa (p. 141 no. 193), which is designated as a fort by the survey team, the presence of potsherds of the Israelite and R o m a n periods makes it difficult to regard it confidently as a f u n c t i o n i n g Hellenistic fortification (or Hasmonaean, considering the Hasmonaean coin f o u n d at the site). Moreover, remains of structures supposed to be fortifications and belonging to o n e period on the basis of a survey may turn o u t to be civilian constructions of another period after they have been excavated. See Shatzman 1 9 8 3 b , 141. T h e above list is given only as an indication of sites possibly occupied in the Hellenistic period. 95 For Apollonius the meridarches of Samaria see I Macc. 3 . 1 0 ; 12.261; 264. On the meris or meridarchia in the Seleucid empire, especially in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, see H. Bengston, Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit II ( 1 9 4 4 ) 24—9. F o r Apollonius the strategos of Samaria, probably identical with the above mentioned person, w h o was defeated by Judas Maccabaeus see AJ 12.287. See also I Macc. 1 0 . 3 0 ; 38; 11.28; Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 1 3 4 - 5 ; Avi-Yonah 1966, 36; 45; 48; Bar-Kochva 1989, 2 0 2 - 3 . 96 AJ 11.340; 1 3 . 2 5 5 - 6 . Scholars used to date the conquest in 128 (e.g. Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 207), b u t there is no d o u b t that some of the conquests r e p o r t e d by Josephus must have been accomplished in later years (Stern 1961, 8 - 9 ; Bar-Kochva 1 9 8 9 , 5 6 0 - 2 ) . For the archaeological excavations at Tell Balatah and an historical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the fate of Shechem in t h e Persian and Hellenistic periods see G.E. Wright, " T h e Samaritans at S h e c h e m " , HThR 25 ( 1 9 6 2 ) 3 5 7 - 6 6 ; idem, Shechem ( 1 9 6 5 ) 1 7 0 - 8 4 ; O.R. Sellers, "Coins of the 1960 Excavation at Shec h e m " , Bibl. Arch. 25 ( 1 9 6 2 ) 8 7 - 9 6 . Accepting the traditional date of 128, Wright and Sellers inferred f r o m the n u m i s m a t i c evidence (coins of Alexander II Zebinas and of Ptolemais) t h a t t h e

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over an area of about 30 hectars on Mount Gerizim. The unearthed remains include, inter alia, dwelling quarters, several segments of the city wall, two towers and a citadel. The pottery and especially the coins show that the city was founded early in the second century and destroyed ca. 114—111. For several reasons and considerations, including the absence of influence of Greek town-planning, Magen identifies this city with Samaritan Shechem. Even more relevant to the present discussion is the discovery of a dwelling quarter of some three hectars west of this city. Unlike the buildings within the city, this quarter was not destroyed by fire. Some 40 coins of John Hyrcanus and two of Alexander Jannaeus were discovered here. It is quite likely that here was the base for the Jewish attack, and that it remained occupied after the capture of the city. In addition, some pieces of evidence (coins, Hellenistic pottery and an aqueduct) indicate that the northern slope of Mount Gerizim was settled to some extent in the 2nd century and continued to be inhabited in the Hasmonaean period. The ethnic identity of the people who lived in these two areas under the Hasmonaean rule escapes us. Still, in view of the long-standing schism between the Jews and the Samaritans, in which the Samaritan temple had played a major role, Mount Gerizim must have been considered a vital and sensitive area. The maintenance of a garrison to prevent any Samaritan attempt to rebuild their temple will have been the most obvious expedient 9 6 3 . About 107, several years before John Hyrcanus died, his sons Aristobulus and Antigonus were able to capture and destroy the strongly fortified Samaria at the end of a year-long siege97. Whether there occurred a resettlement of the site of Samaria in the fifty odd years between the destruction by John Hyrcanus and the Roman restoration is a difficult problem. It is part of the more general question concerning the fate of the Hellenistic cities under the Hasmonaean rule until their restoration by Pompeius and Gabinius, which will be examined later (Chap. II.4). Because of its peculiarities the case of Samaria is better discussed here separately. As if to note i it as an exceptional case, Josephus underlines John Hyrcanus I's hatred of the city of Samaria, the special measures taken to accomplish its efficient demolition and the sale of the population into slavery 98 . Later site was still inhabited after t h e conquest. But surely t h e latest coins indicate the terminus quem for the conquest and destruction of the site.

post

96a See Magen 1986, Idem 1989, Chap. I (supplementing and correcting his previous a c c o u n t ) . Coins of Antiochus VIII and of Ptolemais, the latest p r o b a b l y dated to 115/4 or 1 1 2 / 1 , show t h a t the city was destroyed in t h e late 110's. One coin of J o h n Hyrcanus was f o u n d in the same c o n t e x t of Seleucid coins within the city. 97 BJ 1 . 6 4 - 5 ; AJ 1 3 . 2 7 5 - 8 3 . On the date see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 1 0 n . 22. F o r archaeological evidence on the fortifications as well as t h e destruction associated with the siege and conquest of the city see Reisner et alii 1924 I, 5 0 - 2 ; 5 6 - 8 ; C r o w f o o t et alii 1 9 4 2 - 5 7 I, 2 8 - 3 1 . 98 BJ 1.65; A / 1 3 . 2 7 5 .

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he gives a list of the cities of Syria, Idumaea and Phoenicia held by the Jews about three years before the death of Alexander Jannaeus, ca. 79, which includes Samaria. It might be inferred that Samaria was settled then, but, for reasons explained elsewhere, this is far from certain". Such an inference, however, is borne out by the evidence produced by the excavations conducted on the site of Samaria in 1908—10, and in 1931—3 and 1935. According to K.M. Kenyon, some of the houses excavated may belong to the post-destruction and pre-Gabinian period, though the dating, suggested by pottery finds, is not certain 100 . More positive are the coin finds. The results of the first series of excavations include the following 101 : 1 0 5 - 7 8 B.C.E 78—40 78-40

Alexander Jannaeus Alexander Jannaeus (uncertain) star/anchor

1 7 42

In the second series of excavations, forty-seven coins of Alexander Jannaeus were discovered 102 . More recently the number of Alexander Jannaeus' coins at Samaria has been stated as ninety-seven because all the fifty coins of the first excavations are now considered to belong to this king 103 . It is commonly accepted that the coin finds reflect the changes in the political dominion and occupation periods of the city 104 . It was for this very reason that J.S. Kirkman, who assumed Samaria remained in ruins under Jannaeus, was puzzled by the coin evidence. He therefore suggested that forty-five star/anchor type coins were imitations struck after Alexander Jannaeus' death, and ascribed them to the post-Gabinian period 10S . This is unacceptable. The inhabitants of the restored Greek city would never have used Hasmonaean coins, genuine or imitated. The argument has not convinced numismatists who, as stated above, have now 99 AJ 1 3 . 3 9 5 - 7 . F o r such an inference, based on this list, cf. Stern 1974a, 2 9 3 (Jamnia - " f o u n d a t i o n " ) ; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 62 (Samaria - " o c c u p a t i o n " ) . See below pp. 75 ff. 100 In C r o w f o o t et alii 1 9 4 2 - 5 7 III, 2 8 4 - 5 . 101 Reisner e r a / i i 1924 I, 253. 102 J.S. Kirkman, in C r o w f o o t et alii 1 9 4 2 - 7 5 III, 4 5 ; 5 2 - 3 . 103 Barag and Kedar 1980, 10; Meshorer 1981, 1 5 - 6 ; G u n n e w e g et alii 1 9 8 3 , 115 (counting only the star/anchor coins, i.e. 89 coins). Prof. D. Barag has confirmed to m e in a letter the a t t r i b u - ' tion of all these coins to J a n n a e u s (types 8—11 in Meshorer 1967). The star/anchor coins belong to these types; some were m i n t e d at Jerusalem and others at J o p p a (Kindler 1954). Some of the star/anchor coins have been shown to carry dates of the twentieth and t w e n t y f i f t h years of Jannaeus. See Naveh 1 9 6 8 ; Kindler 1968. 104 Cf. C r o w f o o t et alii 1 9 4 2 - 5 7 III, 5; G u n n e w e g et alii 1983, 7 7 - 8 . 105 In C r o w f o o t et alii 1 9 4 2 - 5 7 III, 48. Kirkman calls these a n c h o r / w h e e l types coins, b u t see Kindler 1954, who discusses a hoard of 851 coins f o u n d at J a f f a in 1949. T h e conjecture of Kirkman (cf. G.F. Hill, BMC Palestine ( 1 9 4 1 ) XIV) that this is a t y p e of coin issued after the time of Jannaeus in imitation of his coins has no support in any finds ( t h u s Barag in his letter, n. 103). F u r t h e r m o r e , it appears t h a t it was t h e J o p p a mint that issued those " w r e t c h e d coins", as Hill called t h e m . See Kindler 1954, 1 8 3 - 5 , w h o w o u l d d a t e t h e m to 9 0 - 8 5 .

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attributed fifty more coins from Samaria to Alexander Jannaeus. Thus the combined evidence indicates the occupation of Samaria under Jannaeus. Yet the resettlement of the site was somewhat limited as can be learnt from Josephus' report of the Roman restoration and the archaeological finds alike.It would not be unreasonable to suppose that the resettlement of Samaria was accompanied by some fortification of the site 106 . Whereas the inhabitants of the city of Samaria were sold into slavery, the Samaritans, all or most, undoubtedly were not enslaved or driven out from the region. Yet John Hyracanus could hardly trust them, and it stands to reason that he and his successors took precautions to secure their control of this population. Excepting one notice, no literary evidence has survived on this question. Josephus reports that John Hyrcanus I hated the people of Samaria, (i.e. the Greek city) "because of the injuries which . . . they had done to the people of Marisa (Marisenoi), who were colonists (apoikoi) and allies of the Jews". Being far away and separated by Judaea, Marisa, the city of Idumaea, makes no sense in this context. Commentators tried to solve the difficulty by assuming a corruption of the text; most suggested another place in the region of Samaria or on its borders 107 . Perhaps the most attractive is Marcus' suggestion that the textual error replaced a word referring to Jewish colonists settled in Samaria after the conquest of Shechem 108 . At any rate, the notice does attest the existence of colonists on the confines of the territory of the city of Samaria a short while before the attack of John Hyrcanus I on the city. Colonization is precisely one of the accepted measures taken in such circumstances for military reasons, even though it might be associated with economic and

106 Pace Meshorer 1981, 1 5 - 6 , the absence of Yehohanan coins from Samaria is perfectly reasonable, considering the fact that the city was conquered about 107 (for the date see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 210) and resettled under Alexander Jannaeus after an indeterminate number of years. For the history of Samaria see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 1 6 0 - 2 ; for archaeological bibliography see Vogel 1974, 7 3 - 5 ; Vogel and Holtzclaw 1982, 7 7 - 8 . See also N. Avigad, in EAEHL IV, 1 0 4 6 - 9 . 107 See Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 134 (with bibliography). Klein (1939, 2 2 3 - 4 ) suggests Marsienoi (i.e. the inhabitants of Marsyas valley in Lebanon), but this is geographically impossible, even more than Marisa in Idumaea. Schalit 1968 1 3 0 - 3 , the most elaborate discussion, refers to the Jews of Arbatta (IMacc. 5.23), which he identifies with Narbatta or Narbachtha, and then assumes that MARICCHNOI was copied instead of MARBAKTHNOI (for the location of Arbatta see A. Zertal, "Kh. el Hammam", IEJ 34 (1984) 52). This is too complicated; besides, John Hyrcanus I was presumably provoked by recent deeds, not events dating back to Judas Maccabaeus' times. A. Alt (Kleine Schriften2 II (1959), 413 n. 5) relates it to Merrous of Eusebius, Onomasticon 128.5 (ed. Klostermann), a view accepted by J.M. Grintz, "Cities of Nabhrakhta", Zion 12 (1947/8) 8 - 9 (in Hebrew), Applebaum (1979/80) 175 and others. 108 See Marcus at AJ 13.275 in LCL edition of Josephus (Vol. VII p. 366 n.a.). He notes the same kind of confusion between Marisa and Samaria in the Mss. of IMacc. 5.66, on which see also Abel 1949, 1 0 6 - 7 ; 442. However, in AJ 13.275 it is not precisely the same confusion (Marisa/ Samaria) since here one has to look for what had stood in the text instead of Marisenoi.

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social aims as well. As will be presently shown, archaeological finds provide some relevant and informative evidence. Thanks to the recently published study of S. Dar of the archaeological remains in western Samaria, three types of structures require attention: field towers, fort-like military farms, and fortified enclosures and forts. The meaning and significance of the evidence is not unequivocal, and Dar admonishes caution in drawing historical conclusions, which he provides as possibilities 109 . Three basic questions arise: a) When were these structures built and for how long were they in use? b) Were they indeed of military character? c) If military, what purpose did they serve? A great number of field towers have been reported in the whole region of Samaria, 962 of which are in western Samaria; of these Dar excavated 45 1 1 0 . On the basis of the pottery unearthed, the construction of the majority of the towers is dated to the third and second centuries B.C.E. Furthermore, the archaeological finds from the excavated towers indicate the continued occupation and functioning of the towers to the first or even the second century C.E. 111 The towers could not serve defensive or any military purposes, nor did they provide suitable conditions for permanent habitation (PI. 4). It is suggested that they were constructed primarily in connection with the production of wine. They could also be used as storage rooms for grapes before marketing, and some were possibly associated with oil production 112 . Dar and Applebaum suppose that each field tower represents a vineyard belonging to the holding of an individual farmer; hence in a given area the towers reflect the number of the families living there 113 . They think that the field tower pattern as well as the settlement pattern of villages with towers indicate the execution of a centralized colonization programme during the Hellenistic period. Having conquered the region, the Hasmonaeans perpetuated the system by distributing the holdings to military and other settlers of their own 114 . Several comments are apposite. It is admitted that the origins of the field towers date from the Iron Age (i.e. First Temple period), and that even in the Hellenistic period the towers were not constructed at one time but over a considerable span of years (third to second centuries). 109 Dar 1986, 15. 110 Dar 1986, 9 2 ; A p p l e b a u m 1986, 258. 111 Dar 1986, 109; 121; A p p l e b a u m 1986, 262. U n f o r t u n a t e l y Dar does n o t specify w h e t h e r the archaeological finds include any material other than potsherds. If this only a m o u n t s t o w h a t is detailed on p. 109 it is very poor indeed. He admits t h a t t h e dating of the p o t t e r y was difficult (ibidem 2 8 3 n. 42) and one would like to k n o w the criteria used to arrive at the " m o r e precise chronological f r a m e " . T h e details given on pp. 1 0 7 - 8 suggest varied periods of o c c u p a t i o n of different towers. 112 Dar 1 9 8 6 , 1 0 9 - 1 3 ; A p p l e b a u m 1986, 258. 113 Dar 1 9 8 6 , 2 4 7 ; A p p l e b a u m 1986, 261. 114 Dar 1986, 1 2 0 - 1 ; 2 4 8 ; A p p l e b a u m 2 5 9 - 6 0 ; i d e m 1989, 1 2 - 3 .

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65

Hence the phenomenon cannot be associated with the only colonization programme attested by the literary sources, namely, the establishment of Samaria, which is attributed either to Alexander the Great or to Perdiccas115. Secondly, as the towers are divided into six groups and as their measures vary,their conforming to one pattern is somewhat questionable 116 . In so far as a pattern is discernible, it may be ascribed to functional and structural reasons, and not necessarily to the work of a central body responsible for the planning and implementation of the colonization programme. Thirdly, granting the possibility that each tower represents a family kleros, the sum total of the supposed settlers in western Samaria is surprisingly low. Even if allowance is made for the complete disappearance of a large number of towers and for the possibility that some have not as yet been discovered, the figure is still low considering the entire area. In other words, the field towers provide only a partial picture of the size of the rural population of Samaria, Hellenistic or Hasmonaean 117 . Fourthly, the size of the plots ascribed to the towers is problematic. On the one hand, it is inferred from conditions obtaining in present and recent times; on the other hand, the figures perforce do not reflect ownership changes that surely took place over the years from the third to the first century B.C.E.: the merging of small plots into larger units or the redistribution of large units to several new settlers 118 . Finally, the nonmilitary character of these towers should be stressed: in no way can they be linked to any defensive system. Their owners, or possessors, may have been under obligation to be recruited for occasional military service, but this is no more than a reasonable conjecture 119 . According to Dar, the fort-like military farms "are located at high points and command observation and visual contact over a considerable range"; "The central structure on every farm . . . was a towerlike building of military strength. In some of them the walls were doubled to a width of 1.15 m., and built of fine dressed masonry"; "The evidence found by survey and excavation tells us that these farms existed in the Hellenistic

115 Cuitius Rufus 4.8; Eusebius, Chron. (ed. Schoene) II, pp. 114 and 118; Syncellus I, 496 (ed. Dindorf). See the discussion in Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 1 6 0 - 1 . The city was demolished by Ptolemy I in 312, but must have been restored, and in any case Ptolemy's undertaking obviously aimed at dismantling the city fortifications and not the rural settlements. 116 For details see Dar 1986, 9 3 - 1 0 2 . 117 It is fair to say that Dar and Applebaum do not state that the number of towers represents the total number of family holdings in Samaria. But as such an implication might arise, it is worthwhile pointing out the fallacy of such an inference. 118 For details of one area see Dar 1986, 2 3 7 - 4 5 . Dar promises a detailed study of this area, where hopefully he will explain, e.g. how the 600 plots measured on the map of the area have been allotted to the supposed 1 7 5 - 2 0 0 families. 119 The existence of field towers in the vicinity of forts, e.g. the fort of Kafr Sur (Dar 1986, 217), is incidental, militarily insignificant.

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and Herodian periods"; "We propose to see the farms here described as the sites of military settlers o f the Hellenistic period, and, in view o f their size, as belonging to officers and commanders." He gives detailed accounts o f three such farmsteads. The one at Qasr Kuah measures 5.59 x 4 . 3 0 m. and is preserved to a height o f 3 . 1 0 m. The one at Khirbet Najar measures 7 . 8 0 x 6 . 8 9 m. (the height is not given). Another building, apparently o f the same quality, measures 4 . 8 0 x 8.00 m. The third farmstead, at Qasr Haramiyyeh, measures 8.50 x 7 . 8 0 m. 1 2 0 Map 7: Samaria in the Hasmonaean period

Given their topographical location and structural features, these farmsteads could give temporary shelter against sudden enemy raids and brigands. Also, they may have been used as posts of observation and signalling. This, however, raises the question whether they were connected to a centrally organized network o f such posts or were used for such purposes merely on a limited, local basis. Dar fails to specify the number o f these farmsteads, but it seems that only a few, perhaps six, have been noticed, all concentrated in the southern part of Samaria; o f these, four were situated in the districts o f Lydda, Ramathaim and Ephraim which

1 2 0 F o r the details and the citations see Dai 1 9 8 6 , 12—5.

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were ceded to Judaea by Demetrius II in 145 121 . Therefore the idea of a network of observation and signalling posts organized by the state cannot be maintained, at least until the existence of such posts in other parts of Samaria is attested by new finds. On the basis of the present evidence, the defensive character of these farmsteads points to their potential use as places of shelter and possibly as local signalling posts. The owners may have been military settlers but, if that was the case, they should be better regarded as belonging to the reserve forces 1 2 2 . Certainly these fort-like farms were not what Josephus referred to in stating that Aristobulus took possession of twenty-two forts. The remains of several forts or fortified enclosures of the Hellenistic period have been located with some probability. On a hill near Kafr Sur an area measuring 25 x 22 m. surrounded by a stone wall is identified by Dar as a fort. The interior buildings have been destroyed and it is only at the southeast corner of the area that the foundations of a tower measuring 6.60 x 2.40 m. are to be seen. Kafr Sur itself, it may be mentioned, possesses natural fortifications which could be easily strengthened. The construction of the fort on this hill was probably determined by its proximity to the nearby north—south highway, which is here crossed by a west—east road. Hellenistic and Early Roman potsherds indicate the occupation periods of the site 123 . Dar suggests that another fort existed on the hill er-Ras near 'Azzun, but this can hardly be accepted. The finds on this hill are evidently so scanty t h a t ' h e does not give any details of them. That 'Azzun might be strategically important is not a sufficient argument, especially as its settlement in the Hellenistic period lacks firm evidence. Neither does its proximity to the fortified farmstead of Qasr Haramiyyeh add weight to the argument 1 2 4 . Much more substantial and important are the remains of the fortified enclosure of Khirbet Firdusi 1 2 5 . This is situated on an acropolis-like hill with a flat top, measuring about 100 x 100 m. Parts of the houses of the ancient settlement on the slopes around the enclosure still exist. Six or seven buildings, covering an area of about 100 x 80 m. at the east

121 Applebaum 1986, 260. For the cessation see / M a c c . 11.34. 122 It is curious to note that while Dar (1986, 15) speaks of "officers", Applebaum (1986, 260) attributes to him the view that they were "ex-officers". 123 Dar 1986, 217. There is some incongruity in the details given by Dar for the location of the f o r t as related to the location of the village. Kafr Sur is situated at G.R. 1563 1835 and the fort at 1569 1834. 124 Dar 1986, 218. Equally unacceptable is the suggestion that there was a Hellenistic fortification at Kafr Jammâl (I.e.). Mere Hellenistic pottery, a good observation position and proximity to roads can indicate no more than a possibility. 125 Dar 1986, 2 1 8 - 2 0 , Fig. 115 and photos 9 9 - 1 0 1 .

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side of the enclosure, and a fortified building, situated at the centre of the site and measuring about 40 x 40 m., are the main buildings. There is evidence for the existence of other structures within the enclosure. The store buildings were flanked by towers, one to the east at the end of the enclosure and a larger one to the west. The construction of this complex is dated to the Hellenistic period on the basis of the pottery finds. Dar thinks that the construction antedated the operations of Bacchides while Applebaum would like to ascribe it to Bacchides himself 126 . Clearly this question cannot be decided without excavation, if at all. A small coin of Alexander Jannaeus was found, apparently on the surface, in the builtup area adjacent to the enclosure 127 . Dar regards the enclosure as a military logistic base perhaps serving as a governmental centre for the collection of taxes as well. Bacchides might have used it, and it is very plausible that the Hasmonaeans took it over. The remains at Khirbet et-Tell, some 4 km. east of Khirbet Firdusi, indicate the existence of a fortress on this site 128 . The identification of the nearby Kafr Haris with the village Arous, recorded by Josephus as belonging to Ptolemy, a high-ranking official in the service of Herod, is highly likely 129 . Not much has remained of the fortress, measuring about 60 x 40 m., which is situated on top of a prominent hill. The encircling walls were about two metres thick. The foundations of a large tower at the north-west part as well as a rock-cut wall separating the fortress from the village to the west are noticeable. Potsherds from the Middle Bronze Age II through the Middle Ages have been reported on the site, but Dar believes that the visible remains of the fort belong to the Hellenistic period. He holds the view that the fort was occupied in the Hasmonaean period and was inherited by Herod, who, as Schalit has proposed, took possession of the property of the Hasmonaeans 130 . The fort is regarded as the military and administrative centre of the large adjacent royal domain. Its location at a major crossroads gave it control of the traffic between Shechem, Samaria and Antipatris. Dar supposes that another fortress existed in Kafr Laqif, but the evidence is not conclusive 131 . That the remains of a structure are locally named el-Buij ("the fort") is not necessarily instructive, as all sorts of buildings can be thus called. The existence of remains of a wall need not be signif-

126 127 128 129

Applebaum 1986, 260. For the types see Meshorer 1967, 119 PI. 2 no. 10. Dai 1 9 8 6 , 2 2 1 - 3 . BJ 2.69; AJ 17.289. See F. -M. Abel, "Sappho et Arous", JPOS 7 (1927) 8 9 - 9 4 . For some reservations see Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 2 3 - 4 . 130 Schalit 1969, 2 5 9 - 9 9 . 131 Dar 1986, 223.

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icant. Likewise a cellar and rock-cut tombs do not necessarily indicate a governmental centre. Still this is an attractive possibility. Khirbet el'Urmeh is situated about 8 km. south south-east of Shechem and only 2 km. west of to-day's Aqraba (G.R. 1805 1728). Located on the northern spur of the summit of Jebel el-'Urmah, this site, about 150 x 75 m., dominates the surrounding area. The three teams who surveyed the site in recent years have all concluded that it served as a fortress. The remains of an encircling wall which have been noticed and examined here include the following: two segments made of unhewn stones and preserved to a height of three courses on the east and north-east; a complex of walls mainly made of stones with marginal dressing and a protruding central boss on the southern side. A heap of stones on the northern side has been suggested as indicating a tower. Three cisterns, with a capacity of 5,000 cubic metres, and an aqueduct ensured the water supply of the occupants of the site. The coin finds consist of one coin of Demetrius II Nicator of the Gaza mint, one of John Hyrcanus I and seven star/anchor coins of Alexander Jannaeus (of the 25th year of his reign). Pottery of the Hellenistic and Roman periods have been found, and the lime plaster of the cisterns (two layers) is dated to the 1st century B.C.E. or later 132 . The suggestion to regard the site as a fortress constructed by the Hasmonaeans and related to the ancient city of Acraba is quite persuasive. The fortress was probably intended to secure control of the nearby Samaritan population, and the need of such control on account of the hostility between the Samaritans and the Jews is exemplified by a Jewish raid on Samaritan villages on the borders of the toparchy of Acraba in the 1st century C.E. 133 . Finally, Alexandrium. Strictly speaking, this fort, as well as Khirbet el'Urmeh, was not in the territory of Samaria, but in the toparchy of Acraba. The area of these two sites had been once in the territory of Seleucid Samaria, and it is better to include these sites in this section rather than in that of Judaea. The identification of Alexandrium, which is first mentioned late in Alexandra Salome's reign, with Qarn Sartaba, a mountain overlooking the Jordan valley, is well-based (PI. 16). The site has recently been excavated in part 134 . It appears that it was seriously damaged in an earthquake, perhaps in the second or the third century C.E., and as a result 132 E.F. Campbell, " T h e Shechem Area Survey", BASOR 190 (1968) 3 8 - 4 0 ; K o c h a v i 1972, p. 168 no. 32, and esp. Eshel and Erlich 1988, For proposals to identify Khirbet el- c Urmeh with biblical Arumah (Judges 9.41) see Guérin 1 8 6 8 - 8 0 V, 21; Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 251 ; B. Mazar, in Encyclopaedia Biblica I, 38 (in Hebrew). 133 BJ 2 . 2 3 2 - 5 . This interpretation is enlarged upon in Eshel and Erlich 1988. 134 See A J 13.417 for the first record of Alexandrium, and Tsafrir and Magen 1984 for the excavations. See also F. -M. Abel, "Exploration de la valee de Jourdain", RB 10 (1913) 2 2 7 - 3 4 ; W.J. Moulton, "A Visit to Qarn Sartabeh", BASOR 62 (1936) 1 5 - 8 ; Ploeger 1955, 1 4 2 - 8 ;

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Map 8: The water supply system of Alexandrium

B

saddle with canal and Inverted syphon

C

Ras Quneitra aqueduct

D

open pool (water reservoir)

E

four cisterns in two levels on the northern slope (1 -4)

F

four cisterns on the eastern slope (5-8)

G

six cisterns in three levels on the southern slope (9-14)

Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 12. The account in the text is based on the report of Tsafrir and Magen, which provides illuminating photographs. For a detailed account of the water installations see Amit 1989a, who supplements Conder and Kitchner 1 8 8 1 - 8 3 II, 3 9 6 - 8 and corrects Tsafrir and Magen about the chronological relationship between the inverted syphon and the canal over the saddle. See also Garbrecht and Peleg 1989, 6 - 1 1 .

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the then extant buildings collapsed and slided eastward. Sartaba is naturally defensible, the only relatively easy access being from the west, where a trench was dug to strengthen the defences. Here a zigzag path, supported by retaining walls, led from the western, lower saddle to the fort on the summit. Rain water was collected from the adjacent plateau and from the plateau west of the saddle (Ras Quneitra). A 192 m.-long inverted syphon and a 187 m.-long canal, built atop a ramp, were constructed over the saddle to connect an aqueduct encircling the Ras Quneitra plateau with five cisterns and a water reservoir located on the northern and southern slopes of Qarn Sartaba. Obviously they were not used contemporaneously, the syphon probably postdating the other, although no absolute chronology can be established. Two additional aqueducts supplied rain water collected from the adjacent plataeu to nine more cisterns, the total capacity of the cisterns amounting to about 4,800 cubic metres. The excavators have discovered various remains of a luxurious, decorated building within the fortified area on the summit. They distinguish between two periods of building: the earlier, Hasmonaean, is characterized by the use of elements of the Doric order; the later, Herodian, is a peristyle in which use was made of vaults. Numerous sherds of Italian wine amphoras were found near the peristyle. The remains of the encircling wall on the summit include one segment nine courses high (PI. 17). It is mainly made of rectangular stones with marginal dressing and a central, rough boss. With few exceptions, the stones are laid in alternating courses of headers and stretchers. The excavators suggest ascribing the encircling wall of the fort to the Hasmonaean period (Jannaeus/Salome). They admit that the masonry style may be found in some Herodian builldings, but maintain that it is more typical of the Hasmonaean-Hellenistic masonry. At present this interpretation is sensible, but only further excavations may firmly corroborate it. At any rate, the findings clearly indicate the character of the site: a palace-fortress. The fortresses at Khirbet Firdusi, near Kafr §ur, near Kafr Haris and at Khirbet el-'Urmeh may well have been on the list of the Hasmonaean fortresses mentioned by Josephus. Possibly there existed a few more. However, as will be shown, the figure given by Josephus can be corroborated and hence does not allow for many more fortresses in Samaria, at least not in the Hasmonaean period. The fortresses near Kafr Sur and Kafr Haris have in common their proximity to local and regional roads and the same holds true of Kafr Laqif, if there was a fort there. Possibly the fortified enclosure of Khirbet Firdusi was not the only one of its kind, viz. a governmental centre. However, the ulterior objectives of the fortresses have yet to be clarified. The supposition that if the farmsteads and fortresses "operated under one command, Samaria became a well fortified zone equally able to with-

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stand local raids and external enemies" is somewhat misleading 135 . It is rather more likely that internal security problems were foremost in the minds of those responsible for the system of fortifications. Considering their features and number alike, the farmsteads were obviously incapable of blocking the advance of a strong army along the ascending roads from the west or along the north—south routes. Fortresses could have presented more serious obstacles, but in point of fact the locations of the fortresses as well as of the fortified farmsteads indicate that they were not primarily intended to ward off external attacks. If that was the intention, there should have been some concentration of fortifications on the confines of Samaria, which is not attested by the available evidence. One factor is still missing. It is not only that there is no evidence for an overall observation and signalling system designed to raise the alarm for the despatching of centrally stationed troops ready to act on such occasions. It is rather improbable to assume that the Seleucids, or previously the Ptolemies, had permanent strong forces kept in Samaria adequate to deal with major invasions. As is well known, the large Seleucid expeditions against Judas Maccabaeus were not sent from Samaria, apparently for this simple reason. The Hasmonaean rulers hardly took the trouble to invest the extensive resources required to build up a defensive network of fortifications protecting this region against invading armies. The basic fact to be borne in mind is that from their point of view Samaria was a recently conquered country. Neither the Samaritans (Cuthites) nor the rural population of the Greek city of Samaria could be trusted. The fortresses, and possibly to some extent the fortified farms, served as a means to control the countryside population and the internal traffic within the region along the main roads; they could also be used as bases of operations in exceptional circumstances. These considerations seem to provide the best explanation for the construction or perpetuation of fortifications by the Hasmonaeans in Samaria 136 .

4. The Hellenistic Cities As early as Judas Maccabaeus, who seems to have made a night attack on Joppa, the Hasmonaeans showed interest in this and other coastal cities. Jonathan and Simon captured Joppa and garrisoned it, expelling the Gentile population (p. 52). Alexander Jannaeus was able to complete the

135 Dar 1986, 2 2 4 . 136 F o r a brief a c c o u n t with bibliography of the schism and hostility between Jews and Samaritans, aggravated b y J o h n Hyrcanus I's destruction of the Gerizim sanctuary, see Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 1 5 - 2 0 .

The Hellenistic Cities

13

conquest of the Hellenistic coastal cities, excepting Ptolemais/Acco and Ascalon. The former withstood his onslaught thanks to the intervention of Ptolemy Lathyrus; the latter was not attacked at all, presumably because of its close links to the Ptolemaic regime with which Jannaeus sought to cultivate good relations 137 . The fate of these and other Hellenistic cities subsequent to their capture by the Hasmonaeans is somewhat obscure. This question has some bearing on the Hasmonaean garrisoning and fortifications system, for it was presumably influenced to a large degree by the ethnic character and religious-cultural leanings of the population living within the Jewish state. It is therefore necessary to make clear, to the extent that this is possible, whether or not the Hellenistic cities were destroyed, and if they were, whether they remained deserted during the Hasmonaean period. Let me start by presenting the available, specific information that appears to be uncontested. In his campaign in Transjordan, Judas Maccabaeus captured and severely damaged several fortified townlets. The inhabitants of Raphon, who sought shelter in the temple of 'Ashthoreth at Karnaim, were annihilated with the destruction of that temple 138 . In his attack on Hebron and the adjacent villages Judas demolished and burnt down their fortifications 139 . Azotus was ravaged by Judas and its altars were demolished; Jonathan set the city on fire and completely destroyed the temple of Dagon including those who took refuge therein 140 . Simon expelled the Gentile population of Joppa, which became Judaized, of Beth-Zur, clearly immediately occupied, and of Gezer, where he settled people who observed the Jewish religious laws 141 . The inhabitants of Scythopolis were expelled or left their city of their own will after its capture by the Jews 142 . At Straton's Tower the expulsion of the Gentile population under Alexander Jannaeus was followed by Jewish settlement 143 . Pella was demolished because its inhabitants would not accept the customs of the Jews, but nothing is reported about their subsequent 137 138 139 140 141

S t e m 1981, 26 - 7 ; 3 3 - 5 . IMacc. 5 . 2 4 - 4 4 ; I I M a c c . 1 2 . 1 0 - 2 8 ; / 4 / 1 2 . 3 3 5 - 4 4 . IMacc. 5.(>5\AJ 12.353. I Macc. 5 . 6 8 ; 1 0 . 8 3 - 4 ; 11.4. J o p p a : above p. 52 with relevant notes. The c a p t u r e of J o p p a by a Seleucid Antiochus, perhaps A n t i o c h u s VII, is implied in AJ 1 3 . 2 6 1 ; 1 4 . 2 4 9 ; (two distinct d o c u m e n t s ; cf. Schürer 1 9 7 3 — 87 I, 204—6). It surely had reverted to Jewish possession, probably already under J o h n Hyrcanus I (cf. Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 6 II, 112; for other interpretations, all concluding t h a t the city came back under Hasmonaean rule already under J o h n Hyrcanus, see Schlatter 1893, 1 - 1 4 ; T . R a j a k , " R o m a n Intervention in a Seleucid Siege of J e r u s a l e m " , GRBS 22 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 6 5 - 8 1 ) . Jewish o c c u p a t i o n under Jannaeus is evidenced by a h o a r d of 8 5 1 of his coins f o u n d there. See Kindler 1954. Gezer: p. 4 0 f. with n. 20; Beth-Zur: p. 4 0 with n. 16. 142 Megilat Ta'anit 10 and the scholium thereto. See Lichtenstein 1 9 3 1 / 2 , 2 8 0 - 2 9 0 ; 328. For the conquest see BJ 1.66; AJ 1 3 . 2 8 0 ; Syncellus I, 5 5 9 (ed. D i n d o r f ) . 143 See below p. 79 with nn. 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 .

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fortunes 1 4 4 . Gadara apparently suffered considerable damage by Jannaeus, otherwise its native Demetrius would n o t have needed to seek Pompeius' special favour to rebuild it, considering the latter's benevolent attitude to the Hellenistic cities 145 . Amathus, too, seems to have been demolished. The conquest of the town is twice reported by Josephus, and only on the second occasion does he mention destruction. Evidently Jannaeus lost it, and hence the destruction looks like an act of vengeance. On the first occasion, however, the town remained intact. By the time of Gabinius it must have been resettled for he chose it as a seat of one of his synodoi1*6. Samaria suffered destruction and its population was enslaved (above p. 61). Gaza was destroyed and the inhabitants were massacred and enslaved 147 . These instances seem to elucidate the policy of the Hasmonaean rulers with regard to the Hellenistic cities. Massacre, destruction and burning down took place under Judas Maccabaeus in campaigns outside Judaea. It should be noted, however, that the targets of Judas' attacks in Judaea were fortifications and n o t cities as such and that elsewhere he was ready to reach a peaceful agreement with a Greek city 1 4 8 . At any rate, at that time there was no intention to seize permanently the towns captured. The same policy is still evidenced in Jonathan's attack on Azotus. A change occurred under Simon, w h o ushered in the new policy while Jonathan was still alive. He aimed at expansion and durable occupation of the new territories won, which could be maintained, so he apparently deemed, by having a reliable population, and that meant Jewish colonization 1 4 9 . A further step was taken by introducing the policy of Judaization, certainly by John Hyrcanus I if not earlier. Normally the population of the captured cities was given the choice to convert to Judaism and remain or, if not converted, to leave. Only in exceptional cases, like those of Samaria and Gaza, did the Hasmonaean rulers resort to severe destruction and enslavement. Emigration of part of the inhabitants, notably the Hellenised, must have taken place in all the cities captured. Jewish settlement in the evacuated cities was probably quite common and, as said before, Judaization was a guideline. But there is n o compelling reason to assume that the subdued cities were all systematically destroyed and left in ruins. The prevailing opinion on this subject has been different, though. With or without the use of condemnatory moralistic terms, the Hasmonaean 144 AJ 13.397. 145 BJ 1.155; A / 14.75. Gadara was subdued after a ten-months of siege: BJ 1.86; A / 13.356. 146 BJ 1.86; 89; AJ 13.356; 374; cf. Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 223. For the Gabinian organization see BJl.no-,AJ 14.91. 147 BJ 1 . 8 7 ; A / 1 3 . 3 5 8 - 6 4 . Gaza was captured after a-one year siege. 148 As the case of Scythopolis shows, the Jewish attacks were not indiscriminate: II Macc. 12.29 31; cf .IMacc. 5 . 5 2 - 3 ; A J 12.348.

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rulers have been viewed as aiming at the total destruction of the Hellenistic cities for cultural, religious, security and even economic reasons: political as well as physical annihilation 1 5 0 . Only a few scholars, notably M. Avi-Yonah and, more recently, S. Applebaum, have expressed the view that most of the Hellenistic cities escaped physical destruction and remained inhabited, or were resettled, under the Hasmonaeans 1 5 1 . The archaeological evidence adduced by Applebaum is particularly valuable because it provides a means of checking the literary information, and there are new finds to add to it. But first several passages of Josephus must be presented in some detail for they have been referred to as supporting the destruction theory. Josephus gives a list of cities, formerly belonging to Syria, Idumaea and Phoenicia, which were under Jewish dominion some three years before the death of Alexander Jannaeus. He specifically names the following: Straton's Tower, Apollonia, Joppa, Jamnia, Azotus, Gaza, Anthedon, Raphia, Rhinocorura, Adora, Marisa, Samaria, Mount Tabor, Scythopolis, Gadara, Seleucia and Gamala in Gaulanitis, Esebon, Medaba and Pella 152 . The question arises whether these cities were ruined or inhabited at the time. In other words: is it a mere recapitulation of cities conquered by the Hasmonaeans, whether demolished or not, or is it a list of inhabited cities under Alexander Jannaeus' dominion about 79 B.C.E.? It is clearly not a list of the conquests of Jannaeus (Marisa, Adora, Samaria and Scythopolis had certainly been conquered earlier), nor is it a description of the territory under his dominion (at least Galilee is missing, not to mention Judaea) 1 5 3 . But Josephus need not be expected to give a precise account. Thus, for example, the Moabite cities cannot be considered on any ac-

149 This is not to deny the possibility that the expansive policy was also prompted by the need to find a living for landless people inside Judaea. 150 Ed. Meyer, Ursprung und Angange des Christentums / / (1921) 2 8 - 9 (the Hasmonaean a robber state); E. Bevan, Jerusalem under the High-Priests (1904) 1 2 7 - 8 ("Where there had been prosperous cities were heaps of ruins. Fields went back to bushwood and roaming bands of marauders had free course in the land"); Crowfoot et alii 1 9 4 2 - 5 7 III, 5 (but Strabo 16.2,27 ff. does not bear out the claim of destruction); A.H.M. Jones, The Greek Gty from Alexander to Constantine (1940) 40; idem 1971, 257 ( " m a n y of these cities have been ruined and their citizens dispersed"); Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 2 8 ("If the captured towns refused to comply, they were razed to the ground. In particular, this was the fate of the large and hitherto prosperous coastal towns and of the Hellenistic cities of Jordan. It was not until the time of the Romans, Pompeius and Gabinius, that these ruined places were rebuilt and helped to a new prosperity."); Rapapport 1980, 269; etc. For a new inscription and summary of the evidence on Phoenician elements in the Hellenistic cities see Isaac 1991 (forthcoming). 151 Avi-Yonah 1966, 74; 76; Applebaum 1975, 6 2 - 4 ; 1980, 1 6 9 - 7 2 . 152 AJ 1 3 . 3 9 5 - 7 . He explicitly refers to more cities but does not name them. For the Moabite cities see below p.90 f. I assume that Gamala, reported to have been conquered in AJ 13.394, should be read instead of Gabala. 153 Contra Schalit 1 9 6 7 , 5 .

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count as cities formerly belonging to Syria, Idumaea or Phoenicia. Three of the cities enumerated (Azotus, Samaria and Gaza) had been destroyed, but he does not mention this here. In fact Josephus singles out only Pella as a city that suffered destruction — because the inhabitants would not accept the Jewish religion. It could be inferred that the other cities were inhabited at that time and that the three aforementioned cities had been resettled since their destruction. But Pella should not have been mentioned at all if settlement of a place at about 79 was the common denominator of the cities on the list. On the whole, therefore, this looks rather like a loose list of former Gentile cities under Alexander Jannaeus' rule about 79. Any one of the cities listed might have been settled partly or extensively, militarily occupied or deserted at that time; these questions simply were not of Josephus' concern at this point of his narrative 154 . As is well known, Pompeius deprived the Jews of the conquered cities of Syria. He rebuilt Gadara to gratify his freedman Demetrius. "He also liberated from their rule all the towns in the interior which they had not already razed to the ground namely Hippus, Scythopolis, Pella, Samaria, Jamnia, Marisa, Azotus, Arethousa, Gaza, Joppa, Dora, Straton's Tower. All these towns he restored to their legitimate inhabitants" 1 5 5 . Here there is no doubt that it is occupied, not desolate cities that are set free. This implies that even such cities as Azotus, Samaria, Gaza and Pella, known to have suffered demolition, had been resettled some time before 63, Pella perhaps after 79, the others possibly earlier. Of the cities enumerated here nine appear in Josephus' list of ca. 79. Four (Hippus, Dium, Arethousa and Dora) are not on that list, but this ought not to cause concern as Josephus explicitly says that at that time there were additional cities of Syria conquered by the Jews. On the other hand, at least six cities of the former list do not appear here: Apollonia, Anthedon, Raphia, Rhinocorura, Adora and Gamala. This might imply that all six were deserted or none was liberated or some were deserted and some were not liberated. But once again one has to reckon with the possibility that Josephus does not give a complete list of the cities set free. Josephus' version in BJ of Gabinius' work not incongruous with his report of Pompeius' reorganization: "Gabinius reorganized the unde'molished cities and rebuilt those that had been destroyed". According to 154 I leave aside t h e question of the sources used by J o s e p h u s to draw the list, which is t o o complicated to deal with here. 155 BJ 1 . 1 5 5 - 7 (Thackerey's translation in LCL). AJ 1 4 . 7 4 - 6 adds Dium. Philoteria, Seleucia in Gaulanitis, Arsinoe (?) and Antiochia (?), all conquered by Alexander J a n n a e u s (see p, 9 0 with nn. 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 and p, 8 0 with n. 194) are n o t m e n t i o n e d and were perhaps among the ruined towns n o t restored by Pompeius. Marcus' translation of x ^ p l c TCJV KAREAKA/IIIEVUV (AJ 14.76; LCL VII, p. 4 8 7 ) is wrong; it should be " a p a r t f r o m those that had been demolished", n o t "in a d d i t i o n " .

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his orders the following cities were peopled: Scythopolis, Gamala, Samaria, Anthedon, Apollonia, Jamnia, Azotus, Raphia, Adora, which should be probably corrected to Dora, and Marisa156. But he does not say whether these ten cities belonged to the category of the ruined cities or to that of those which had not been demolished. The version of AJ is disconcerting, however. Here only destroyed cities are referred to, and the list of the rebuilt cities is almost identical with those enumerated in BJ, omitting Apollonia and Gamala. He also says that these cities "had long been deserted" 157 . Thus the AJ version of Gabinius' work is not only incongruous with the version of BJ but also contradicts Josephus' account of the conditions of the cities in 63. Admittedly, Apollonia, Anthedon, Raphia and Gamala are not mentioned in the 'Pompeian' list, but Scythopolis, Samaria, Jamnia, Marisa, Dora (if the correction is accepted) and Azotus are explicitly mentioned there as existing cities. It seems therefore that the version of AJ, namely that all the cities were in ruins, is an extremely inaccurate generalization. Both versions, however, have in common an emphasis on the repopulating of the cities. Now it should be recalled that Pompeius did not remain long in Judaea, and that it was easier to order the detachment of the Greek cities from the Hasmonaean kingdom than to carry out their colonization. If the cities were inhabited by Jews, Pompeius' orders would no doubt bring about forcible expulsion or voluntary exile of at least part of the Jewish population. This state of affairs is possibly referred to by Josephus, or his source, when describing the aforementioned cities as deserted; in any case, there may be much exaggeration in this report about the desolation of the cities. It appears therefore that the reorganization of the Hellenistic cities by Pompeius and Gabinius meant not so much physical reconstruction but rather ethnic-demographic change and political restoration: the descendants of those who had left or been expelled as well as adherents of Hellenism were given the right to reconstitute the political and cultural institutions of Greek cities. Thus far I have deliberately tried to interpret Josephus' accounts without bringing in evidence from other sources. It is now time to present other available evidence on the individual cities. Archaeological evidence at Tel Dor indicates continued occupation of the city and the use of the forti-

156 BJ 1.165-6. Since Adora was probably one of the capitals of the five Jewish districts organized by Gabinius (Kanael 1957; cf. Schiirer 1973-87 I, 268 n. 5), it could not have been re-established as a Greek city. Excepting P, all the Mss. have Dora in the parallel passage in AJ 14.88. Moreover, Dora was certainly re-established as a Greek city and never returned to Jewish rule, unlike Adora. 157 AJ 14.87. Schiirer ( 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 228 n. 32) does cite AJ 14.75-6 and BJ 1 . 1 5 5 - 6 ; 166, but apparently without paying enough attention to the precise information and the clear incongruity with AJ 14.87.

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Map 9: The cities of Palestine in the Hasmonaean period

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fications during the Hellenistic period through the Early Roman period 158 Eighteen coins of Alexander Jannaeus found on the site of Straton's Tower may indicate Jewish settlement under this king 159 . Moreover, the scholiast onMegillat Ta'anit reports that the conquest of Migdal Zur, which he identifies with Caesarea and hence is speaking of Straton's Tower, was followed by expulsion of the population and by Jewish colonization of the site 160 . Joppa had been probably occupied by Jews since its conquest by Simon, and at any rate was settled by Jews under Alexander Jannaeus as can be learnt from a hoard of coins found there 161 . Strabo stresses the numerous Jewish population of Jamnia. In all likelihood he uses for this information a pre-Herodian source; this must mean that the city had been Judaized under the Hasmonaeans, probably during the reign of John Hyrcanus I 162 . The occupation of Azotus has been evidenced by archaeological finds, coins of Alexander Jananeus and relevant pottery 163 . A chance notice of Josephus shows that Gaza was resettled; he says that Antipas, Herod's grandfather who was made governor of Idumaea by Alexander Jannaeus, cultivated friendly relations with the Gazaeans, the Ascalonites and the neighbouring Arabs. The connection between Gaza and the governor of Idumaea is brought to light later in Herod's appointment of Costobar as governor of Idumaea and Gaza 164 . Coin finds and other material

158 For results of the recent excavations see E. Stern, "Tel Dor, 1980", IEJ 30 (1980) 211; idem, "Tel Dor, 1984", IEJ 35 (1985) 62; E. Stem and I. Sharon, "Tel Dor, 1985", IEJ 36 (1986) 102; Stern 1 9 8 5 , 1 7 8 - 9 ; idem 1 9 8 7 , 1 5 5 - 7 ; idem 1988. 159 H. Hamburger, "Caesarea: Coin-Finds and the History of the City", Bulletin of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society 15 (1950) 80 (in Hebrew). In fact, the private collection of the late H. Hamburger contains more coins of lannaeus whose provenance was probably Caesarea. If the Herodian city incorporated considerable parts of the fortification system and buildings of Straton's Tower (Raban 1987), this would give additional support to the view that the city was not destoyed by Jannaeus. 160 The reference in Megillat Ta'anit 9 is probably not to Straton's Tower, but to Beth-Zur. See Lichtenstein 1931/2, 2 8 1 - 2 , and for the scholium, 328. But there is no doubt that the scholium refers to Straton's Tower. It is indicated that the struggle with that city was a prolonged one. For a discussion see Levine 1974, who deals with various aspects of the Hasmonaean expansion and policy. See also Bar-Kochva 1989, 5 6 5 - 6 . 161 Above p. 73 and n. 141. 162 Strabo 16.2,28. See Avi-Yonah 1966, 6 3 - 4 ; Stern 1974a, 3 9 3 - 3 . Isaac 1991 (forthcoming) presents and discusses new evidence on the ethnic composition and cultural character of the population of Jamnia. 163 M. Dothan and D.N. Friedman, Ashdod I. The First Season of Excavations. 1962. '.Atiqot VII (1967) 27; Dothan 1971, 44 ff. (pottery in Area A); 117 f. (pottery in Area D); 141 f. (pottery in Area G); 207 and 210 f. (4 coins of Alexander Jannaeus). According to Dothan (1971, 22; 65), the dating is based on "well-defined pottery and a few coins from stratified field deposits". The Hasmonaean occupation (Stratum 3 in Area A) started after 114 and continued to the time of Pompeius. Cf. Gunneweg et alii 1983, 79. See also below n. 174. 164 AJ 14.10; 1 5 . 2 5 2 - 6 0 . Strabo 16.2,30 on Gaza as a ruined city could be in error, if the reference is to Alexander Jannaeus as Stern (1974a, 293) suggests. Alternatively, Strabo's source may bave written before the resettlement of Gaza. But Strabo probably refers to Alexander

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indicate Jewish occupation of Marisa after its conquest by John Hyrcanus 165 . The archaeological and numismatic evidence of the Jewish occupation of Samaria has already been presented (pp. 62 ff.). The occupation of Scythopolis is implied by Strabo and suggested by archaeological finds 166 . At Pella archaeological excavations have yielded evidence on the Hasmonaean destruction, but so far no reliable traces of Jewish occupation have been attested 167 . Six coins of John Hyrcanus I were found in archaeological excavations at Gerasa, where a Jewish community is known to have existed in the first century C.E.; perhaps the beginning of the Jewish settlement there went back to the time of Jannaeus 168 . As is well known, Gamala was later a preponderantly Jewish town, which may suggest that the Jewish settlement had started by the early first century B.C.E. 169 At Tel Anafa, situated east of the Hulah Lake (G.R. 2105 2869), a Greek city (probably Arsinoe), sharply declined after ca. 80; the next building phase on the site is dated some time later, in the Early Roman period 170 . Seleucia in Gaulanitis, conquered by Alexander Jannaeus, was later a Jewish town, and the Jewish settlement there most probably started under that king 171 . Philoteria, situated at the outflow of the Jordan from the

the Great. Alexander Jannaeus is referred to by Strabo only in 16.2,40, where there is no doubt about his identity. In all other cases, one should expect Strabo to refer to Alexander the Great if no further qualification is added to the name (see the index in LCL Strabo Vol. VIII, pp. 2 3 0 - 1 ) . As is well known, Gaza was destroyed by Alexander in 332 but was soon resettled (Arr. 2.27,7). Ptolemy I demolished it in 312 when he retreated from Coele-Syria (Diod. Sic. 19. 93,7), but it was resettled again. It is curious that Stern (I.e.) accepts AJ 13.395 as evidence for the resettlement of Jamnia under Alexander Jannaeus; by implication Gaza, too, must have been settled. On the rebuilding of the city under the Romans see Glucker 1987, 38, who regards it possible that the reported destruction by Jannaeus is an exaggeration. While I agree with Fuks (1982) that the conquest of Gaza is to be dated ca. 100, I do not accept his conclusion that what Josephus says about Antipas is a piece of unreliable pro-Herodian propaganda. His argument is circular: Alexander of Strabo is assumed to be Jannaeus; hence Gaza remained in ruins and hence AJ 14.10 is a false testimony. 165 Above p. 57 f. and n. 87. 166 Strabo 16.2,40. For the archaeological finds see below n. 187. Fuks (1983, 6 3 - 4 ) takes the view that Scythopolis had some Jewish population at the time of the Hasmonaean occupation (presumably with reference to II Macc. 12.29—31), who were then joined by new Jewish settlers. 167 R.H. Smith, "Pella of the Decapolis", Archaeology 21 (1968) 1 3 4 - 7 ; McNicoU 1982, 70; 72; 1984, 69. Only one or two Hasmonaean coins have been found. 168 For the coins see A. Bellinger, in Kraeling 1938, 500; Barghouti 1982, 220. For the Jewish community see BJ 2.457; 480. For a denial of the existence of a Hellenistic city before the first century B.C.E. see Pierboson 1 9 8 3 - 8 4 , 1 8 - 2 0 ; 3 0 - 4 . Her scepticism about the available evidence seems to me unjustified. For the accepted view see Kraeling 1938, 2 7 - 3 4 ; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 1 4 9 - 5 0 . See also Applebaum 1975, 63 and n. 194 below. 169 See BJ 1.166; AJ 13.394; Vita 46 etc. For doubts about the true reading of BJ 1.166 see Applebaum 1975, 70 n. 42. 170 For the excavations see Weinberg 1971, 8 6 - 1 0 9 ; S. Herbert, "Tel Anafa, 1978", IEJ 28 (1978) 2 7 1 - 4 ; idem 1979, 6 7 - 8 3 ; idem, ' T e l Anafa, 1979, 1980", IEJ 31 (1981) 1 0 5 - 7 . For a discussion see Fuks 1979/80; cf. Gunneweg et alii 1983, 7 8 - 9 ; 9 1 - 2 . 171 BJ 1.105; 2.574; 4.2; 4; Vita 187; 398; AJ 13.393; 396. It was identified with Sulukiye, about

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Sea of Galilee, is commonly identified with Khirbet el-Kerak. The excavations at the site have shown the existence of a walled town in the Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine periods. An inscription found at a church uncovered at the site suggests the use of the Pompeian era. The archaeological evidence, however, does not make it possible to decide whether the site was occupied or desolate under Jannaeus 172 . Tel Aoheq was the site of Pegae, where a Ptolemaic frontier-guard was stationed in the third century. It is not mentioned in Josephus or in any other literary source relating to the Hasmonaean period. Pegae, however, may well be identical with Arethousa, which is included in the list of the cities restored by Pompeius. Now the archaeological finds at Tel Apheq indicate that a new city was founded there in the third century and developed slowly through the first century, without any serious change or disturbance in the Hippodamic city-plan. A fortress was constructed on top of the acropolis in the second century, of which have survived the western wall, some 20 m. long and more than 1 m. wide, as well as the north-western corner built of ashlar stones laid in the header-stretcher technique. It has been suggested that the fortress was part of the fortifications constructed by Alexander Jannaeus to block the invading army of Antiochus XII; however, if one adheres strictly to the archaeological: evidence, it may well have been constructed earlier. Be that as it may, Tel Apheq was evidently occupied by the Hasmonaeans and not destroyed 172a . Tel Mikhal is a truncated conical hill on the coast, situated 12.5 km. north of Jaffa and 6.5 km. north of the estuary of the Yarkon. Remains of forts of the Hellenistic (two phases, third-second centuries), Hasmonaean and Early Roman periods were unearthed in recent excavations. 11 k m . south-west of the Hulah Lake (Schumacher 1888, 237). F o r another suggestion see Moeller a n d Schmitt 1976, 168. Their d o u b t s , based o n the absence of Hellenistic p o t t e r y (Kochavi 1979, 269), are n o t cogent. See B. Bar-Kochva, " G a m l a in Gaulanitis", ZDPV 92 ( 1 9 7 6 ) 8 2 - 4 ; Ma'oz 1986, 35, w h o reports of the existence of Hellenistic p o t t e r y . 172 F o r the conquest see Syncellus I, 559 (ed. D i n d o r f ) . This t e x t does n o t say that the city was demolished, and Jones ( 1 9 7 1 , 2 5 5 ; 455 n. 399) does n o t substantiate his s t a t e m e n t that it was. F o r a coin h o a r d f r o m the late f o u r t h c e n t u r y B.C.E. see D.C. Baramki, "Coin Hoards f r o m Palestine", QDAP 11 ( 1 9 4 5 ) 8 6 - 9 0 . See E.L. Sukenik, " T h e Ancient City of Philoteria (Beth Y e r a h ) " , JPOS 2 (1922) 1 0 1 - 9 ; B. Maisler et alii, " T h e Excavations at Beth Yerah (Khirbet el-Kerak) 1 9 4 4 - 4 6 " , IE] 2 ( 1 9 5 2 ) 1 6 5 - 7 3 ; 2 1 8 - 2 9 ; P. Bar-Adon, "Sinnabra and Beth Yerah in t h e Light of the Sources and Archaeological F i n d s " , Eretz-Israel 4 ( 1 9 5 6 ) 5 0 - 5 (in Hebrew); R. Hestrin, in EAEHL I, 2 5 3 - 6 2 ; Moeller and Schmitt 1 9 7 6 , 1 6 9 - 7 1 ; Vogel 1974, 2 1 - 2 ; Vogel a n d Holtzclaw 1982, 19. 172a F o r the identification of A r e t h o u s a with Pegae see Avi-Yonah 1966, 146, b u t cf. Moeller and S c h m i t t 1976, 23. The Ptolemaic frontier-guard is m e n t i o n e d in a Zenon papyrus (PSIno. 4 0 6 , 1 . 1 2 ; PCZ no. 5 9 0 0 6 hardly refers to this site and see Tcherikover 1 9 3 7 , 37; 4 0 ) . Later Herod built the city of Antipatris on this site (A. Alt, "Pegai", ZDPV 4 5 ( 1 9 2 2 ) 2 0 - 3 ) . F o r the suggestion to ascribe the fortress to the fortifications of Alexander J a n n a e u s (AJ 13.390) see Y. K a p l a n , The Archaeology and History of Tel Aviv-Jaffa ( 1 9 5 9 ) 8 4 - 6 (in Hebrew). F o r the r e m a i n s of the Hellenistic period see Kochavi 1975, 35; 4 0 ; idem, " T e l A p h e k " , RB 83 ( 1 9 7 6 ) &V,Idem 1989, 13.

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The Hellenistic fort measured about 34 x 24 m., the Hasmonaean 24 x 27 m. and the Roman 35 x 40 m. It should be stated that the plans of the forts are conjectural t o some extent. According to the plans suggested, the walls were some 0.75 m. wide, though an inner wall is reported to be 1.30 m. wide. The walls were apparently made of fieldstones. There are remains of a tower, about 6 x 6 m., in the central courtyard of the Roman fort 1 7 3 . The accumulated evidence shows that many of the cities conquered by the Hasmonaeans were immediately occupied or, if destroyed or deserted at first, were later resettled. Only a few were destroyed and appear to have never been rebuilt. The fate of some is obscure and cannot be ascertained on the strength of the present information. On the whole it appears that: a) the Hasmonaean rulers aimed at the destruction of the Hellenistic cities as political entities and cultural-religious centres; b) that they generally used the conquered cities as sites for Jewish settlement, that is to say, it was not in their interest to bring about the physical destruction of these cities. The occupied Hellenistic cities presented some problems for the Hasmonaeans. If former Gentile inhabitants converted to Judaism and remained in their place of abode, not much confidence could be placed in their allegiance. Moreover, towns without adequate defensive means were easy targets for attacks; the campaigns of Ptolemy Lathyrus, Demetrius III Eucaerus and Antiochus XII proved this was a real eventuality to be reckoned with. In all likelihood, therefore, the Hasmonaeans maintained fortifications in the cities and garrisoned them. On the coast this happened in Joppa and Dora, and probably in Straton's Tower, Jamnia, Azotus and Gaza, towns known to have been settled. Possibly it occurred in some more 1 7 4 . 173 See Herzog et alii 1978; idem 1980; idem 1989, 1 6 5 - 7 4 ; 1 8 8 - 9 4 . Considering the location of the site, it is hardly likely that the Hasmonaean fort was part of the defensive line constructed by Alexander Jannaeus along the Yarkon river (contra Herzog et alii 1 9 8 0 , 1 4 4 - 5 ; idem 1989,174). Herzog and Derfler date the Roman fort to the first half of the first century C.E. However, if the coins of Valerius Gratus and Pontius Pilatus were found above floor level (S. Derfler, in Herzog et alii 1980, 129), the fort may well have been built in Herod's time. For plans and photos of the site and the walls see Herzog, et alii 1980, Figs. 1 2 - 3 , Pis. 29 and 31 ;idem 1989, Figs. 12.2; 12.7. Derfler estimates the Roman fort at 37.5 x 35 m. (Herzog et alii 1989, 188). 174 For the view that Azotus remained in ruins ever since its destruction by Jonathan (/Macc. 10.84; 11.4) see Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 109. For another view, based on Judith 2.28, see Avi-Yonah 1966, 64. See also above n. 163 for the archaeological evidence. For archaeological finds of the Hellenistic period in Apollonia, including coins of Alexander Jannaeus found on the surface, see I. Roll and E. Ayaion, "Apollonia Arsur - A Coastal Town in the Southern Sharon Plain"' Qadmoniot 57 (1982) 1 6 - 7 (in Hebrew), and for the scanty literary evidence, Schürer 1 9 7 3 87 II, 1 1 4 - 5 ; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 21. Archaeological excavations and surveys have not added much to the little that is known on the history of Rhinocorura (Vogel and Holtzclaw 1982, 11, s.v.), El Arish (Moeller and Schmitt, 1976, 160), Raphia (Moeller and Schmitt 1976,

Galilee

83

5. Galilee According to Josephus, the conquest of the Esdraelon valley and Galilee was achieved during the one-year reign of Aristobulus I 1 7 5 . In point of fact, Jonathan had already shown expansionist intentions in that direction by making war in Galilee, and Scythopolis fell while John Hyrcanus was still alive 176 . The inhabitants left the city, which, however, did not remain desolate for long. As will presently be shown, it was fortified and garrisoned 177 . The pre-Hasmonaean population of Galilee was preponderantly Gentile. The conquest was followed by conversion of the local population that preferred to remain there. Though the converted inhabitants were to become devout Jews, it stands to reason that some precautions were taken to secure the control of the newly gained region. In fact, one source reports an Ituraean uprising at a time Alexander Jannaeus was besieging Tyre 178 . Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Ituraeans, who had ruled Galilee until the Hasmonaean conquest, continued to dominate the region of Mount Lebanon on the northern border, the fortification and garrisoning of several sites may have been considered imperative 179 . What then is the available evidence? With the exception of Sepphoris, no important towns existed in Galilee in the early first century. Ptolemy Lathyrus failed in his attempt to capture that city, which indicates that it was fortified and probably defended by royal troops. This inference gains some support from the notice that Antigonus, the last Hasmonaean king, had a garrison stationed in Sepphoris, as well as from a Tannaitic source which seems to relate to the Hasmonaean

1 5 9 - 6 0 ; Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 9 7 - 8 ; not in Vogel) and Anthedon (Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 17; Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 1 0 4 ; n o t in Vogel). 175 BJ 1.76; AJ 1 3 . 3 1 8 - 9 . Josephus' source was Strabo, who took the information f r o m Timagenes. 176 I Macc. 1 1 . 6 7 - 7 4 ; AJ 13.154; 1 5 8 - 6 2 ; Scythopolis: BJ 1.66; AJ 13.280, Cf. Lifshitz 1977, 2 6 9 - 7 0 ; Levine 1974, 64. 177 AJ 13.355: Alexander Jannaeus meets Cleopatra III in Scythopolis. For conflicting interpretations of the fate of Scythopolis see Avi-Yonah 1962b, 130; Lifshitz 1977, 283; Avi-Yonah's position is inconsistent since his reference for Scythopolis as a "deserted" city isAJ 14.88 (16.88 is surely a misprint), but that text alludes to the time of Gabinius and the reference is to several more towns. Avi-Yonah, however, thinks that generally the Greek towns were not destroyed. For the fortifications of Scythopolis see below p. 87 with n. 187. 178 Syncellus I, 559 (ed. Dindorf), ignored by Kasher (1988, 104), who supposes that Alexander Jannaeus maintained good relations with the Ituraeans. 179 On the Ituraeans and Galilee in Hasmonaean times see Dussaud 1927, 1 7 6 - 8 ; Altheim and Stiehl 1964, 3 1 4 - 7 ; 3 5 0 - 3 ; Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 5 6 1 - 7 3 ; II 7 - 1 3 ; Bar-Kochva 1 9 7 7 , 1 9 1 - 4 ; S c h o t t r o f f , 1982; Kasher 1984; 1988, 7 9 - 8 4 . For the wars of Alexander Jannaeus against the Ituraeans and Tyre see Syncellus I, 559 (ed. Dindorf). The theory of Kasher that the Ituraean conversion to Judaism was voluntary is sheer speculation, based mainly on his view that the evidence of Josephus is part of anti-Hasmonaean propaganda. Syncellus, an independent source, speaks of war and subjugation and thus alludes to forcible conversion. Again, this is not to deny that there probably existed favourable conditons for Judaization.

84

Fortifications

Map 10: Galilee

Galilee

85

period. It mentions the old castra (camp) of Sepphoris and the Hakra (citadel) of Gush Halav (Gischala) and Jotapata; all three are included in the category of walled cities 180 . In addition, Josephus reports that Marion of Tyre captured three fortresses in Galilee in 41, obviously on the northern confines of Upper Galilee. These probably dated from the beginning of the Hasmonaean occupation of the region, and must have remained under Jewish control after the settlement of Pompeius in 63 B.C.E. (below Chap. IV. 1). Unfortunately, Josephus does not name these fortresses, which could help to clarify the otherwise unknown precise borderline between the Hasmonaean kingdom and the territories of Tyre and the Ituraean principalities. Still, if the sites recorded in the baraita on the boundaries of Eretz-Israel are correctly identified, and the historical background of this source is rightly interpreted, Jewish settlement and control seem to have extended north of Kadasa and west of Baqa (Peqi'in) to some extent at a certain time in the Hasmonaean period, perhaps as the final result of the wars of Jannaeus. This would mean that, although Jannaeus advanced as far as Tyre itself (above), in the end he had to evacuate part of the territory conquered, and then more stable conditions prevailed during the reign of Salome 181 . Alexander Jannaeus took possession of Gaba, which probably had to be garrisoned for security reasons 182 . If Agaba is to be identified with Gaba, this could provide definite proof for the existence of a Hasmonaean fortress there, but such an identification is extremely problematic 183 . At any

180 AJ 13.338 (Ptolemy Lathyrus); BJ 1.304; AJ 14.414 (Antigonus); M. Arakhin 9.6. On the Tannaitic source, which also mentions Gamala, Gadora, Adida, Ono and Jerusalem as walled cities, see the detailed discussion in S.S. Miller 1984, 2 6 - 4 5 . Ma'oz (1986, 4 2 - 3 ) argues that the list of the walled cities dates from the time of Jannaeus, for he was the Hasmonaean ruler who conquered Gamala. 181 BJ 1 . 2 3 8 - 4 0 ; AJ 1 4 . 2 9 7 - 9 . The baraita on the boundaries of Eretz-Israel, which had o f t e n been discussed on the basis of the literary sources, is now k n o w n f r o m an inscription. See Y. Sussman, "A Halakhic Inscription f r o m the Beth-Shean Valley", Tarbiz 43 (1974) 8 8 - 1 5 8 (in Hebrew with an English summary on pp. V - V I I ) ; idem, "The Boundaries of Eretz-Israel", Tarbiz 45 (1976) 213—57 (in Hebrew with an English summary on pp. II—III). For the location of the sites mentioned in this baraita see Frankel and Finkelstein 1983, who base their study on an archaeological survey. They draw attention to the fact that according to Josephus (BJ 3.39), Baka, Thella (Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 3 3 - 4 ; 9 5 - 6 ) and Meroth (Ilan 1984) marked the borderline of Upper Galilee. It follows that the boundary drawn by the baraita was considerably further north and west than the one described by Josephus; hence the Jewish settlement suffered some setback between the time referred to by the baraita and that of Josephus. The dating of the conditions described by the baraita to the time of Aristobulus I is very d o u b t f u l (contra Ma'oz 1986, 1 6 1 - 3 ) , considering the evidence of Syncellus on the wars of Jannaeus in t h e region. Also, there is no basis for the assertion that Gischala was on the most northern point of Jannaeus' dominion in Upper Galilee. It must be admitted, however, that no chronological precision can be ascribed to such a source. 182 Syncellus I, 559 (ed. Dindorf). Gaba is probably mentioned in Judith 3 . 1 0 - 1 1 . 183 AJ 1 3 . 4 2 2 - 4 . For the identification see Avi-Yonah 1962a, 47. But see below p. 94 with nn. 204-5.

86

Fortifications

rate, Gaba could have been a valuable stronghold in view of Alexander Jannaeus' designs on and relations with Ptolemias. The site of Gaba has been located quite convincingly at Khirbet el-Harthiyeh (Sha'ar ha-'Amaqim). Here have been surveyed remains of walls, foundations of gate towers and features of streets arranged in a grid pattern; the pottery collected dates from the Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine periods. The numismatic and pottery finds unearthed in the recent excavations of a fortlet belonging to the site indicate that it was established at the end of the 3rd century and that its occupation continued to the early 1st century B.C.E. 184 . Remains of a fortress in a site extending over some two hectares were excavated at Romema (Haifa) on Mt. Carmel (G.R. 149 243). Only the foundation courses of the apparently external wall have survived; these courses are built of headers and a stone fill. The pottery found indicates that the fortress was constructed at the end of the 2nd century or the beginning of the first century B.C.E. As suggested by the excavator, the fortress may well have been Hasmonaean, perhaps associated with the attempt of Alexander Jannaeus to take control of the territory of Ptolemais. The site was rebuilt and occupied in the Roman and Byzantine periods; later on a Crusader citadel was constructed on the summit18411. The site of Khirbet el-Tufaniyeh (G.R. 1744 2618), not identified with any place known from literary sources, has been recently surveyed, although it had been reported more than a century ago 18s . It is a walled enclosure, measuring 146 x 32 m. and extending from west to east. Several towers are set alongside the circumference: one on the west, two on the north, one on the east and three or four on the south. Some towers are square, others rectangular, the largest measuring 9 x 12 m. and the smallest 6 x 6.5 m. Their 1.2—2 m. wide walls are made of big fieldstones, but the gates are constructed of ashlar blocks. The enclosure wall is mostly 0.8 m. wide, and only two segments on the south flank approach the quality and width of the towers. The coins found at the site are all Hasmonaean. Because the enclosure is situated on a slope which descends eastwards, the survey team has proposed to regard it as a fort of Ptolemais intended to ward off the Jewish population of Galilee 186 . This is not necessarily so, for the fortified enclosure could have just as well served as a base of opera-

184 See B. Mazar, Gties and Districts of Palestine (1986) 1 1 0 - 2 0 (originally published fa 1945); A. Raban, Archaeological Survey of Israel, Map of Nahalal (1982) pp. 3 - 4 , nos. 4 - 5 'in Hebrew with an English summary on p. X). For the fortlet see Segal 1989. The best treatment of Gaba is Barag 1988, who distinguishes between two cities by that name, one at Tell Abi Shusha and one at Khirbet el-Harthiyeh (contra Schmitt 1987). He leaves open the question t3 which site to relate the Gaba of Syncellus. See also Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 5 3 - 4 . 184aM.W. Prausnitz, "Romema(Haifa)", IEJ 22(1972) 2 4 6 - 7 ; 24(1974) 1 4 2 - 3 . 185 Guerin 1880 VI, 442; Conder and Kitchner 1 8 8 1 - 8 3 1,190. • 186 Frankel and Gazon 1987.

Galilee

87

tions in every direction. At any rate, the coins suggest that it came under Jewish control at some time. It must be admitted though, that only by excavation, if at all, may the functions and history of the site be clarified. Strabo reports that Pompeius destroyed the walls and "haunts of robbers and the treasure-holds of the tyrants," that is to say, the fortresses of the Hasmonaeans. He explicitly mentions among these Scythopolis. His evidence thus confirms that this city was occupied, fortified and garrisoned by the Hasmonaeans, and there is some archaeological evidence, Rhodian jar handles, indicating the occupation of the site in the first quarter of the first century 1 8 7 . In the same passage Strabo mentions the fortress Lysias, which is probably to be identified with the fortress of the Jew Silas in Mount Lebanon k n o w n to have been destroyed by Pompeius 188 . Finally, Alexander Jannaeus is credited with the conquest of Mount Tabor, a fortified place conquered by Antiochus III in the Fourth Syrian War and later refortified by Josephus 1 8 9 . This site, too, may be considered a Hasmonaean stronghold. The evidence, though obviously defective, leaves no doubt about the intention of the Hasmonaean rulers to strengthen their hold on Galilee by the maintenance of strongholds in this region. The precise number and deployment of the fortifications elude us. It seems reasonable to assume that the few important towns were fortified and garrisoned and that there existed several other fortresses, probably located in suitable positions for the control of the countryside and guarding the roads as well as against potential enemies like Ptolemais, Tyre and the Ituraeans.

187 Strabo 16.2,40; Y. L a n d a u and V. Tzaferis, ' T e l I ^ t a b a h , Beth Shean: The Excavations and Hellenistic Jar Handles", IEJ 29 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 1 5 2 - 9 . A p p l e b a u m ( 1 9 7 5 , 70 n. 41) reports a fortress w i t h ' casemate walls on M o u n t Gilbo'a, b u t does n o t give the precise location. It might be t o o distant t o be related to Scythopolis. The same holds true of Avi-Yonah's suggestion ( 1 9 6 2 b , 1 3 0 n. 4 5 ) that a fortress at K a u k a b el-Haua is alluded to. T h e great n u m b e r of t o m b s belonging t o the late Hellenistic or early R o m a n period indicate the settlement of the city in the first half of the first century B.C.E. See F . James, in EAEHL I, 2 1 5 ; 2 1 9 ; 221. 188 Strabo 1 6 . 2 , 4 0 ; AJ 14.40. N o t e t h a t Aristobulus II recruited part of his army in Mt. L e b a n o n ; AJ 13.427. See also Stern 1974a, 292. 189 AJ 13.396; Syncellus I, 5 5 9 (ed. Dindorf). Cf. Polyb. 5 . 7 0 , 6 - 1 2 ; BJ 2 . 5 7 3 . F o r a t o w n ("Phoenician") see Steph. Byz. s.v. Atabyrion. According to Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 4 7 4 , the ancient n a m e is preserved in the site of Khirbet Dabura. F o r t h e later t o w n of Helenoupolis, located at that site, see Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 2 0 5 . See also Moeller and Schmitt 1 9 7 6 , 1 1 1 - 2 (with bibliography); Y. Elitzur, " T h e Meaning of tirl Xo^iouin Poiybius' Writing and its E f f e c t on the Location of the T o w n T a b o r " , SCI 8 - 9 ( 1 9 8 5 / 8 8 ) 7 9 - 8 2 . Overlooking the evidence of Syncellus, Elitzur wrongly claims that M o u n t T a b o r in AJ 13.396 refers to a district and t h a t the t o w n had fallen in perpetual ruin as a result of t h e conquest of A n t i o c h u s III.

Fortifications

88

6. Transjordan As noted above, some evacuation of the Jews living in Transjordan had taken place under Judas Maccabaeus (p. 21). The reports associated with his •operations make clear that the towns and townlets there were more or less fortified. Leaving aside for the moment the confrontation with the Nabataeans, the Jewish expansion in Transjordan under John Hyrcanus I and Alexander Jannaeus mainly took the form of siege operations against fortified cities. Only once is a field battle reported, a sudden attack by Theodorus which surprised Jannaeus and cost him heavy losses. A few years later, when the Jewish king resumed his operations in Galaaditis, Theodorus refrained from meeting him in the open field. Indeed no one there, excepting the Nabataeans, was strong enough to dare a pitched battle, and in such circumstances the only resort left was to trust to walls and fortifications 190 . The conquests started under John Hycanus I who captured Medaba and the otherwise unknown Samaga, which is perhaps to be located at Khirbet Samîk; a more likely location is Ras Siyagha. It was suggested that Esebon, which is listed in the cities possessed by Alexander Jannaeus, was Hyrcanus' conquest 191 . A few years after his accession to the throne, about 101, Jannaeus captured the important and well-fortified city of Gadara as well as Amathus, a fortress and treasure-hold of Theodorus of Philadelphia, usually located at Tell 'Ammata. He apparently failed to hold this fortress at first. Yet ca. 95—94 he managed to subdue the Arabs of Moabitis and Galaaditis and to destroy Amathus, whose ruler Theodorus, frightened by Jannaeus' victories, abandoned the site 192 . After-

190 BJ 1.86; 89; A / 13.356; 374. 191 BJ 1 . 6 2 - 3 ; AJ 1 3 . 2 5 5 - 6 . On Medaba see Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 3 6 - 7 (with bibliography), b u t the d o u b t s are superfluous. F o r Samaga see F. S t r u m m e r , "Samaga = SamTk", JPOS 10 ( 1 9 3 9 ) 2 3 - 6 ; Schallt 1968, 1 0 5 b ; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 164 (but the suggestion to locate it in Samaria is unlikely); Foerster 1981 (Ras Siyagha), and for Esebon Avi-Yonah 1966, 6 4 - 5 . For the view that the f o u r t h nome in I Macc. 11.57 refers to the Jewish Peraea, and hence that the Hasmonaean d o m i n i o n of a district in Transjoardan had started as early as J o n a than, see Avi-Yonah 1966, 56—7. 192 BJ 1 . 8 6 - 9 ; AJ 1 3 . 3 5 6 ; 374. On Gadara see Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 1 3 2 - 3 . On its destruction see above p. 74. F o r archaeological excavations at Gadara see Vogel 1974, 34 (s.v. H a m m a t Gader); Vogel and Holtzclaw 1982, 89 (s.v. U m m Qeis); Avi-Yonah, in EAEHL II, 4 6 9 - 7 . The reports of the recent archaeological excavations (K. Wagner-Lux et alii, ZDPV 94 ( 1 9 7 8 ) 1 3 5 4 4 ; 96 ( 1 9 8 0 ) 4 8 - 5 8 ; 1 5 8 - 6 2 ; 97 ( 1 9 8 1 ) 1 5 3 - 6 1 ; ADAJ 28 ( 1 9 8 4 ) 8 7 - 9 0 ) do n o t shed light on the history of the site in the first half of the first century B.C.E. The excavators deliberately refrain f r o m dealing with the chronology of the occupation of the site b e f o r e completing their work. A m a t h u s is usually identified with the seat of one of the five synodoi organized by Gabinius (BJ 1.170; AJ 14.91), and with the A m m a t h u s of Eusebius, Onomast. 22 (ed. K l o s t e r m a n n ) , a village which was situated south of Pella; hence it is identified at Tell ' A m m a t ä near the J o r d a n . See Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 2 4 2 - 3 1 ; Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 2 1 n. 11. F o r d o u b t s and a suggestion to

Transjordan

Map 11: Transjordan in the Hasmonaean period

89

90

Fortifications

wards, however, Jannaeus' fortunes changed and he suffered a series of reversals as a result of the internal Jewish revolt, instigated by the Pharisees, the confrontation with the Nabataeans and the invasions of Demetrius III Eucaerus and Antiochus XII. He was compelled to give up his conquests in Moabitis and Galaaditis and only about 83, after crushing the Jewish rebels, was he able to renew his expansion in Transjordan. In the last six years of his reign he captured a series of towns from Gaulanitis through Moabitis, and he died while besieging Ragaba, a fortress of Gerasa193. The Transjordan towns under his dominion at the close of his reign included the following: Tel Anafa (Arsinoe?), Antiochia (T. 'Athereth?), Seleucia, Gaulane, Hippus and Gamala in Gaulanitis, Philoteria, Abila, Dium, Pella, Gadara, Gerasa 194 , Esebon, Medaba, Libba (Khirbet libb), Oronaim, Zoara, and a few other towns, like Nabaloth and Arabatha

locating it, i.e. the one conquered and destroyed by Alexander Jannaeus, at a hill near Tell elH a m m a m , about 3 km. f r o m the site of Livias/Julias, see Schmitt 1975, 50—4; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 13 (with bibliography). However, the suggested site lies too far in the south, as the conquest of Amathus is related to that of Gadara, which points to the north site at Tell 'Ammata. For a suggestion to locate it at Tell MghannT, on the north bank of WadI ez-Zerqa, about 6 km. south of Tell 'Ammata, see Mittmann 1987, 51—6. However, the fort at this site was very modest (Gordon 1987, 69; 71), and could hardly serve as the strong-hold mentioned by Josephus. Schmitt (1975, 54—9), however, accepts that the Gabinian Amathus is to be located at Tell 'Ammata. It should be noted that the first series of operations preceded the capture of Gaza, after one year's siege, which took place about 100 (Fuks 1982; contra Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 221). 193 Stern 1981 seems to be the best treatment of Alexander Jannaeus' wars. The chronology should be corrected in view of the corrected date of the conquest of Gaza (Fuks 1982). 194 I take it that Antiochou Pharanx refers to a town, and not to a natural or artificial ravine (contra Kasher 1988, 9 3 - 5 ) . This town is not to be identified with Tel Anafa (cf. Fuks 1979/80, 1 8 0 - 2 ) . For a suggestion to locate it at Mesad 'Athereth, a hill close to the Jordan ravine south of the Hulah lake where Hellenistic potsherds were f o u n d , see Ma'oz 1986, 3 7 - 4 0 . See also Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 8 - 2 0 . The conquest of Gerasa is recorded in BJ 1.104;Essa in the parallel report (AJ 13.393) is usually taken as a corruption for Gerasa (Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 226 n. 25). Jones (1971, 255; 455 n. 399) thought that Alexander Jannaeus failed t o hold Gerasa because later the king died while besieging Ragaba, a fortress of Gerasa. Clearly the inference is not cogent. Thus, to cite one example only, the Romans first conquered Jerusalem in 70 C.E. and only later the nearby Herodium. Schmitt (1975, 5 9 - 6 8 ) argues that Alexander Jannaeus did not conquer Gerasa at all, suggesting the right reading in AJ 13.393 should be *Gergesa, which he takes as an old name of Hippus (Cf. Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 71—2). I am not convinced by his arguments, which involve a fanciful reconstruction of the text of Josephus. Neither am I convinced by the arguments of Mittmann (1987, 5 7 - 9 ) , who thinks that Essa is the right reading, and suggests locating it at Tulul edh-Dhahab on the north bank of WadI ez-Zerqa. Tulul edh-Dhahab was a very modest f o r t , which could not withstand an attack by a regular army, especially one equipped w i t h artillery (Gordon 1987, 67; 71). It is incredible that Theodorus of Philadelphia would have stored his treasures here to save them f r o m Jannaeus, whose army most probably employed artillery (Shatzman 1989). It is worth recalling that 28 lead coins of Jannaeus seem to have been f o u n d here (Barag 1984, 2). That Gerasa was not conquered by Jannaeus, and only surrendered the treasures of Theodoras (thus Gatier 1988, 160), is sheer speculation, which is belied by the explicit words of Josephus: Jannaeus took (XafSojv in AJ, irapa\apf!dvei in BJ) the city.

Transjordan

91

(=Rabbath Moab?), whose names and locations are doubuful and contested because of the corrupt text of Josephus 195 . Abel suggested identifying and locating three o f these place-names in the Negev (Arydda = Naqb el-'Arud, Orybda = Oboda, Alousa = Elusa), whereas Schalit held that all the names refer to sites in Moabitis or more generally in Transjordan. Although there are some flaws in his arguments, Schalit's thesis seems rather convincing, and even Alousa need not be identified with Elusa in the Negev 1 9 6 . These some twenty towns were under Jannaeus by ca. 79. In fact Philadelphia was the only major city in Transjordan that was able to withstand the Hasmonaean expansion. The results of the inquiry into the fate of the Hellenistic cities conquered by the Hasmonaeans (above p. 82) make it plausible to assume that the Transjordan towns remained settled after the conquest. As will be shown in the next chapter (III.3), Transjordan became the bone of contention between the Hasmonaeans and the Nabataeans in the first half of the first century. Alexander Jannaeus and his wife Salome could hardly have missed the importance of towns for the maintenance of their rule over these territories. The Nabataeans never 195 A

comprehensive list is given in AJ

1 3 . 3 9 5 - 7 ; BJ 1 . 1 0 4 - 5 . The list o f Syncellus I, 5 5 8 - 9

(ed. D i n d o r f ) adds Philoteria, Abila, Hippus, and Lian in AJ

that should be corrected to Dian,

13.393, i.e. Dium. Hippus is mentioned in the list o f towns liberated by Pompeius

as (AJ

14.75). Syncellus' source here, Africanus, is thought to have derived the information from a tradition independent of that o f Josephus. See H. Gelzer, Sextus Julius Africanus zantinische

Chronographie

( 1 8 8 0 ) I, 2 5 6 - 8 ;

Schürer

und die by-

1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 2 1 9 - 2 8 . Another list, o f

cities promised by Hyrcanus II to the Nabataean king, is given in AJ 14.18. Both this and that o f AJ

13.397 include, respectively, t w o corrupted passages: oronaidigobasilissaryddalousa

oronaimagelthon.

and

For a discussion and extensive bibliography see Moeller and Schmitt 1976,

1 3 9 - 4 6 . See also the next note. Pella and, probably, the Valley o f the Cilicians (AJ

13.397)

do not belong to the section that deals with the Moabite towns. On the latter see M. Dothan, " T h e Valley o f the Cilicians", Eretz-Israel

2 ( 1 9 5 3 ) 1 6 6 - 9 (in H e b r e w ) ; Moeller and Schmitt

1976, 141; Kasher 1988, 98 n. 161. On

T e l Anafa and Philoteria see above p. 80 f. with nn.

170 and 172. 196 For the suggested identification see A b e l 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 , II, 148. Schalit ( 1 9 7 6 ) argues that the lists in AJ

13.397 and 14.18 consist o f Moabite towns and that Josephus' source used a Septuagint

version o f the prophecies o f Isaiah (ch. 15) and Jeremiah (ch. 4 8 ) concerning M o a b to praise the conquests o f Alexander Jannaeus in that region; hence he reconstructs the place-names in the corrupt

passages o f Josephus (see n. 195) by comparison with those chapters in their

supposed Greek version. He underlines the absence o f any evidence for Jannaeus' activity in the N e g e v as well as the implausibility, on political, economic and military grounds, o f such an undertaking. F o r criticism o f his thesis and some of his reconstructions see W. S c h o t t r o f f , " H o r onaim, N i m r i m , Luhith und der Westrand des 'Landes A t a r o t h ' " , ZDPV Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 3 9 - 4 6 ; L.H. Feldman, Josephus 1980)

and Modern

82 ( 1 9 6 6 ) Scholarship

192-5; ¡1937-

( 1 9 8 4 ) 253; Kasher 1988, 9 7 - 8 . However, the criticism does not a f f e c t Schalit's argu-

ments against the supposed conquest o f the Negev by Alexander Jannaeus. Alousa may well be identical with the Moabite t o w n o f Eluza (Jerome, Com. in Jes. 15.4 = CSEL L X X I I I , p. 177; see Schalit 1967, 2 7 - 8 ) . The objection o f Moeller and Schmitt 1 9 7 6 , 1 4 5 , arguing that the place o f Alousa in the list indicates its location as being outside Moabitis, is not cogent in view o f the corrupted state o f the text. For objections against the identification o f Orybda with Oboda or er-Ruheba and o f A r y d d a with N a q b el- c Arud see Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 4 4 - 5 . Cf. A v i Yonah 1966, 71 and see below p. 121.

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showed any competence or ability to storm cities or capture them by siege operations. The fortification and garrisoning of the Transjordan towns could manifestly serve as a first-rate means, more than elsewhere, against this sort of enemy. Unfortunately positive evidence is poorer for this region than for any other under Hasmonaean dominion. The first piece of evidence to be considered is a passage where Josephus reports the political losses caused to Jannaeus by the Jewish rebels, w h o "at last reduced him to the necessity of surrendering to the king of the Arabs the territory which he conquered in Moab and Galaaditis and the strongholds (choria) therein, in order that he might not aid the Jews in the war against him." Josephus names these strongholds neither here nor in his brief reference to the conquests 1 9 7 . Several of these strongholds may have been identical with some of the Moabite towns mentioned by him later (above p. 90 f.). At any rate, the implication is clear: Jannaeus based his control of the conquered regions Moabitis and Galaaditis on the maintenance of fortified places. An interesting piece of information is provided by Strabo in his report that Pompeius ordered the destruction of the Hasmonaean fortresses in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia 198 . This was in 63, but the construction of these fortresses may well have been undertaken by Jannaeus or, at the latest, by Alexandra Salome. There is some archaeological evidence for a Nabataean presence at Philadelphia, though it mostly post-dates this period 1 9 9 . The city presumably cooperated with the Nabataeans in an attempt to block the Jewish expansion. Hence the Hasmonaean fortresses were probably built as bases of operations either for further advance or merely for containing the enemy within his territory. In either case,their presence posed a threat, which is precisely what is implied in Strabo's report. Another fort mentioned by Strabo in the very same passage is the famous Machaerus, which is also known from Josephus. The construction

197 AJ 13.382 (Marcus' translation in LCL)\ AJ 13.374; BJ 1.89. The last reference does not date the surrender, but it probably occurred after the defeat by the Nabataean king Obodas (BJ 1.90; A / 13.375). 198 Strabo 16.2,40. As the entire passage deals with the demolition of the Hasmonaean fortifications, it is wrong to suggest that these fortresses belonged to Philadelphia itself (contra Gatier 1988, 162 with n. 25). 199 G.L. Hardings, "A Nabataean T o m b at A m m a n " , QDAP 12 ( 1 9 4 6 ) 5 8 - 6 2 ; F. Zayadine, " R e c e n t Excavations o n the Citadel of A m m a n " , ADA] 18 (1973) 25; idem, "Excavations on the Upper Citadel of Amman - Area A, 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 7 " , ADAJ 22 ( 1 9 7 7 / 7 8 ) 28; A. Hadidi, "The Pottery from the R o m a n F o r u m at A m m a n " ADAJ 15 (1970) 13; idem, "Some Bronze Coins f r o m A m m a n " , ADAJ 18 (1973) 5 1 - 3 ; idem, " T h e Excavations of the Roman F o r u m at A m m a n (Philadelphia)", ADAJ 19 (1974) 8 2 - 5 . N o t e that after his retreat from Jerusalem in 64 Aretas III went to Philadelphia (BJ 1.129). Cf. Graf 1986, 790. However, there is nothing in & / 1 . 8 6 9 and AJ 13.356 to justify the inference that Theodorus, the tyrant of Philadelphia,, was a "vassal" of the Nabataeans.(contra Gatier 1 9 8 8 , 1 6 0 ) .

Transjordan

93

of Machaerus is explicitly attributed to Jannaeus 2 0 0 . For the understanding of Jannaeus' intentions, it would be instructive to know whether the construction had preceded or was followed the conquest of Moabitis, but there is no clue to solve this question. The site of Machaerus (Qal'at el-Mishnaqa) was excavated by the Franciscan School of Biblical Studies in 19 7 8—198 1 201 . The excavators have been able to distinguish two main phases of construction: Hasmonaean, which is the work of Alexander Jannaeus, and Herodian. The fort was constructed atop of a hill 700 m. above sea level. It extended over an area of 4,260 square metres on the north-eastern slopes of the hill; bordering and below the fort, a small city extended over an area of about 5,000 square metres. It seems that the Hasmonaean fort was protected by four towers, of which only the measurements of two may be given with certainty: no. 2 — 18 x 11 m.; no. 3 — 1 8 x 14 m. The internal space of tower no. 3 was divided into three rooms (one of 10.30 x 6 m.; two of 10.30 x 3 m.), and its external walls were 1.75 — 2 m. wide. The external walls of tower no. 2, which, too, had internal rooms, were about 1.20—1.40 m. wide. Three long segments of the encircling wall of the fort (G, H and, possibly, L) have been unearthed; they are 1 . 7 5 - 2 m. wide. To judge by the excavated segments of the encircling wall of the city (B, C, D), it was 2.00—2.50 m. wide. At least two towers protected it: tower no. 5 on the north was 1 0 x 8 m., and tower no. 6 was 14 x 10 m. The internal spaces of these towers were divided into three and four rooms respectively; the external walls of these towers were 1.00— 1.20 m. It appears that the bases of all these towers were not solidly constructed, and that the walls were less wide than those of Jerusalem 2 0 2 . The walls of the fort were constructed of courses of more or less square blocks, but without the regularity of the headers pattern or that of the alternating headers and stretchers. Nor can one notice that all the stones were uniformaly dressed with margins and a rough, central boss 203 . Thanks

200 7.171. 201 See Piccirillo 1979; Loffreda 1979a; idem 1979b; idem 1980, and esp. Corbo and Loffreda 1981. For an archaeological survey and a topographical account see Strobel 1974a, 1 3 6 - 4 4 ; idem 1974b. See also Abel 1911, 3 1 - 5 ; Ploeger 1955, 1 5 5 - 7 ; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 135. According to Loffreda (1980, 379), the fort was constructed about 90, but this date is not based on firm archaeological findings. 202 See Corbo and Loffreda 1981, esp. 2 6 4 - 7 4 with Figs. 1 and 2. The measurements of tower no. 4 are given as 9.50 x 13.00 m., but its remains are very scanty indeed. That the walls M and N (Corbo and Loffreda 1981, Tavs. 3 4 - 3 6 , Figs. 1 3 - 1 5 ) were constructed by Aristobulus II in 56 (thus Corbo and Loffreda 1981, 2 6 6 - 7 ) is more than doubtful. Aristobulus had hardly the time to build such walls, if Josephus' account is followed (BJ 1.172—3; 14.96). There is still work to be done at Machaerus, and several points are unclear as yet, notably the dating of the polygonal wall A (Corbo and Loffreda 1981, 2 8 5 - 6 ) . 203 Corbo and Loffreda 1981, 2 8 3 - 5 with Tav. 34, Fig. 13 (T), Tav. 35, Fig. 14 (H), Tav. 36, Fig. 15 (H), Tav. 45, Fig. 24 (B), Tav. 46, Fig. 25. For blocks with a central boss see also Corbo 1980, Tav. 88.

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Fortifications

to the results of these excavations, it is evident that the area of the fort was rather extensive, and that a considerable effort was made to strengthen this naturally defensible site.There is no doubt that Machaerus could serve as a base of operations for offensive and defensive aims alike. It has plausibly been suggested that the fortress Agaba, the first t o join Aristobulus II in his bid for the throne, should be read Ragaba, that is to say, the fortress besieged by Alexander Jannaeus and taken by his widow after his death 2 0 4 . Ragaba was situated in the territory of Gerasa, but its precise location is unknown 2 0 5 . With this the extant information is exhausted. It seems enough to show the extensive use of fortified sites as bases for the control of the country. If the supposition that many of the cities conquered were garrisoned is right, this implies a heavy concentration of Hasmonaean military power in Jransjordan. Yet it is only within the framework of the Nabataean—Hasmonaean conflict that the full implications of the military dispositions in this area can be understood.

7. Conclusion The following were certainly garrisoned, fortified sites during the reign of Salome: Jerusalem (Baris, First Wall,Temple Mount), Masada, Hyrcania, Jericho (Threx, Taurus), Alexandrium, the tower at Giv'at Sha'ul, Hurvat Mesad, the fort of Kafr Sur, Khirbet Firdusi, Khirbet et-Tell near Kafr Haris, Khirbet el-'Urmeh, Scythopolis, Lysias, Adida, Joppa, Dora, Machaerus, the forts near Philadelphia and Agaba ( =Ragaba?). The following were probably fortified and garrisoned: Oresa, Tel 'Arad, Marisa, Adora, Qasr el-Yahud, Mount Gerizim, Samaria, Gaza, Azotus, Jamnia, Arethousa (Pegae), Tel Mikhal, Straton's Tower, Gaba, Romema, Mount Tabor, Sepphoris, Jotapta, Gischala, Khirbet el-Tufaniyeh, Zoara, Libba, Medaba, Esebon, Gerasa, Dium, Abila, Gadara, Hippus, Gaulane, Pella, Gamala and Seleucia. Most of these were civilian settlements equipped with appropriate defensive installations and troops. Several sites had a purely or preponderantly military character: Masada, Hyrcania, Threx, Taurus, Alexandrium, Khirbet Firdusi, the fort at Kafr Sur, Machaerus, Khirbet el-Tufaniyeh and the forts near Philadelphia. Some of these probably served as administrative or logistic centres or were used as treasure-holds. Yet first and foremost

204 R. Marcus ad AJ 13.424 in the LCL edition of Josephus (vol. VII, p. 400 n.d). 205 AJ 13.398; 405. I accept Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 227 n. 26 against the identification with Erga or Ragib. Equally unlikely is the small fort at Tell el-Mrabbä, 1 km. n o r t h of Ragib (contra Mittmann 1987, 6 0 - 3 ; for the site see Gordon 1987, 70). Ragaba should be looked for further to the east. For reasons partly explained in n. 194 I think Gerasa was under Hasmonaean rule 0contra Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 5 7 - 8 ; Schmitt 1975, 5 9 - 6 8 ; Mittmann 1987, 5 6 - 6 0 ) .

Conclusion

95

they were fortresses. The list is patently incomplete. The chance report of the three u n k n o w n forts in Galilee, the reference to the forts connected with Jannaeus' occupation of Moabitis and Galaaditis and excavated towers and fortresses (e.g. at Giv'at Sha'ul) that are never attested in literary sources, all these illustrate the haphazard nature and limited scope of the available information. Equally defective is the information regarding the architectural-constructional aspects of the fortifications; indeed for most of the sites it is nonexistent. There is no literary information, and as regards the archaeological finds, only several, like the tower near Jerusalem or those in Jerusalem and Machaerus, can be ascribed with confidence to the Hasmonaeans. In some cities this is perhaps, at least partly, the result of the Herodian massive construction works carried out on them, even though some Hasmonaean elements have survived 206 . In several sites, for instance Dora and Khirbet Firdusi, the Hasmonaeans probably continued the use of former, Hellenistic fortifications. The features of the Hasmonaean walls and towers of Jerusalem have been described above, as well as the resemblance between them and the masonry dressing at Alexandrium. There are some indications of Hellenistic influence, which perhaps should not be exaggerated. It should be borne in mind that Hellenistic masonry comprised a variety of styles; hence it is more probable than not that the Hasmonaeans borrowed various, different elements, and did not employ features of only one style at any given time. In other words, it is better not to assume that the fortifications were constructed according to one, uniform pattern. At any rate, the limited evidence forbids one from drawing overly sweeping and general conclusions. Perhaps further archaeological digging will bring to light relevant and informative material 2 0 7 . Hasmonaean aims in fortification are clear. Citadels, towers and walls were constructed in cities to provide means against potential and actual enemies from outside as well as to ensure the control of the local population that quite often had only been recently Judaized. It stands to reason that such citadels functioned also as administrative centres for the cities or for their regions as well. Fortresses of various sizes were maintained in the countryside t o control surrounding territory, to enforce law and order and to

206 R e c e n t l y several buildings at Masada, including the so-called Western Palace, have been ascribed to Hasmonaean construction on the basis of architectural comparison with the Hasmonaean palaces at Jericho. See Netzer 1982, 2 5 - 6 , w h o n o t e s and explains the absence of Hasmonaean finds at Masada. However, stratigraphic considerations rule o u t such an ascription (Netzer 1991, forthcoming). 207 On t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of the local, Phoenician, techniques of ashlar construction in Palestine, as evidenced particularly at Tel Dor, see Sharon 1987. Influence of Greek construction styles started in the 3rd century and b e c a m e d o m i n a n t in the 2nd c e n t u r y .

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Fortifications

protect and supervise traffic on nearby roads. Some served as local or regional royal centres, others were merely military installations; all could have been used to block or harass an invading army. Several fortresses were constructed close to the borders of the realm mainly to serve as bases of operations against external enemies, for defensive or offensive purposes. Jerusalem, Machaerus, Alexandrium and Hyrcania stand apart. The first was the capital of the nation and its Bans — the governmental centre of the Hasmonaean rulers. The fortification of the city originated with Judas Maccabaeus and continued under Jonathan and Simon (pp. 43 and 45). Demolished by Antiochus VII Sidetes, the city walls were soon reconstructed by J o h n Hyrcanus I, and probably strengthened by his successors 208 . Thanks to their topographically superior positions, Alexandrium, Hyrcania and Machaerus were easily defensible and with constructed fortifications could become formidable fortresses. Hyrcania was apparently fortified by J o h n Hyrcanus I, Machaerus and Alexandrium by his son Alexander Janneaus. As well for their excellent fortifications as for their isolated location they became the most important treasure and storage-holds of the realm. Significantly they were the only fortresses which Alexandra Salome refused to entrust to the leading persons and army commanders attacked by the Pharisees 209 . Equally instructive is the fact that Pompeius ordered their destruction and that Alexander, Aristobulus II's son, chose them as bases for his revolt 210 . Clearly they were a class apart 2 1 1 . One point should be emphasized. The functions of the fortresses can be determined in general terms only. The lack of precise information about the number, size, location and distribution of the fortresses throughout the country as well as the number and strength of the troops therein would make it rash to conclude that they formed a pre-planned and inter-connnected network of fortifications. The fortresses grew in number over a period of about eighty years during which some were abandoned

2 0 8 IMacc. 16.23; AJ 13.247; Diod. Sic. 3 4 / 5 . 1 , 1 - 5 ; Euseb. Chron. (ed. Schoene) 1,255. 2 0 9 AJ 13.414—7. Cf. BJ 1.114. 2 1 0 Strabo 16.2.40. On Hyrcania see Ploeger 1955, 1 4 8 - 5 1 ; Wright 1 9 6 1 ; M o e l l e r and Schmitt 1976, 1 8 6 - 7 . Following the quelling of Alexander's revolt, Gabinius destroyed the fortress again, BJ 1 . 1 6 7 - 8 ; AJ 14.90. Machaerus and Alexandrium, t o o , were destroyed again by Gabinius, BJ 1 . 1 6 7 - 8 ; A / 1 4 . 9 0 . 211 The category of desert fortresses, which includes Alexandrium, D o q , Cyprus, Hyrcania, Machaerus, Herodium and Masada, is discussed by Tsafrir 1982. T o some e x t e n t , it is misleanding to speak a b o u t such a category, for there was no comprehensive, coordinated system of desert fortresses. T w o forts near Jericho were intended to provide d e f e n c e to the nearby royal palaces and estates, and thus their main f u n c t i o n differed f r o m that- of the o t h e r fortresses. No e f f o r t was m a d e by the Hasmonaeans to f o r t i f y heavily Masada and H e r o d i u m did n o t exist in t h a t period. In fact, even Tsafrir recognizes that Hyrcania, Alexandrium and Machaerus, as well as the other fortresses, were designed to operate independently and n o t in a concerted way. Isolation, topographical advantages and formidable defences f o r m e d c o m m o n characteristics, n o t a comprehensive system.

Conclusion

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but many more added. The gradual expansion of the Hasmonaean territory in different regions makes it unlikely that an overall centralized system was aimed at. It looks rather that basic principles and guidelines were employed to provide solutions and means for local and regional problems. The only time when a reconsideration and assessment of the needs and aims of the fortification system is likely to have taken place, with a view to introducing a coordinated plan, was under Salome. There is no way telling, whether this actually happened and, as indicated above, the available evidence cannot justify a reconstruction of a hypothetical grand strategy.

Addendum The recent excavations and explorations at Tell Sandahanna (ancient Marisa) by Prof. A. Kloner have shed new light on the extent of the settlement. I am grateful to Prof. Kloner for allowing me to publish this short notice of the results of his investigations — as yet unpublished — as well as for taking me on an instructive tour of the site. It now appears that the growing population of the city settled on the slopes of the tel during the third and second centuries and that this lower city extended over an area of some thirty-five hectares. The size of the lower city was thus ten times larger than that of the walled-city on the summit of the tel. The olive oil industry probably contributed more than any other activity to the prosperity of the population. According to Kloner, pigeons, too, played an important part in the agricultural economy of Marisa. Various pottery finds are indicative of foreign trading relations, mainly with the Aegean but also with northern Africa and southern Italy, presumably via Ascalon. To judge by the available ceramic finds, this foreign trade dwindled or ceased altogether shortly after 120. A hoard of twenty-five Seleucid tetradrachms, from the Ascalon mint, was found under the floor of a fine, well-preserved house, evidently belonging to a wealthy family. The latest coins of this hoard are from 113 B.C.E. The combined numismatic and ceramic evidence might be construed to mean that, contrary to Josephus' report, Marisa was conquered by John Hyrcanus in the late 120's and not soon after the death of Antiochus VII Sidetes in 129. Alternatively one might conclude that the local population continued to live for some time under the Hasmonaean rule, and only after a decade or so began to leave the place. Prof. Kloner's forthcoming report will help decide between these two possible interpretations of the evidence.

Chapter III Hasmonaeans and Nabataeans

The decline and disintegration of the Seleucid empire opened the way for the rise of the Hasmonaeans and Nabataeans alike. The Nabataeans were to become the sole permanent neighbouring power of consequence that the rulers of Judaea had to reckon with, and this had its effects on Hasmonaean foreign policy and military dispositions. At first, so it seems, friendly relations prevailed, but later growth of power and territory brought about hostilities and open war. Such a confrontation, it could be argued, was bound to occur sooner or later, given the expansionist tendencies and aims of the antagonists, both trying to utilize to their advantage the political vacuum created by the fall of the Seleucids and (this, too, should be taken into account) the Ptolemaic decline. Even so, there is need of a more precise account of the territories contested, the interests involved, the resources available and the means employed in this conflict. All these form part of the military problems of the Hasmonaeans and hence have to be presented here.

1. Early Times Of somewhat obscure origins, the Nabataeans were to be found in south Transjordan by the late fourth century according to the earliest literary record of them by Diodorus Siculus, who most probably followed the account of Hieronymus of Cardia 1 . The history of Edom in the 6 t h - 4 t h centuries and how the Nabataeans had come to control that country are hardly known and need not be discussed here 2 . The Nabataeans are described as a nomadic people who raised sheep and camels, were engaged in trade, notably in spices, myrrh and frankincense, and exploited bitumen from the Dead Sea. They had a common fortress, a rock which is usually, but by no means universally, identified with Petra 3 ; yet their best protec1 Diod. Sic. 2.48; 1 9 . 9 4 . 1 - 1 0 0 . 2 ; cf. Plut. Demetr. 7.1. Hieronymus is mentioned in Diod. Sic. 19.100,1; on him as the source of Diodorus see Hornblower 1 9 8 1 , 4 7 - 9 ; 1 4 4 - 5 0 . 2 See N. Glueck, Explorations in Eastern Palestine I. AASOR 14 ( 1 9 3 4 ) 83; idem, AASOR 15 ( 1 9 3 5 ) 139; contra Bartlet 1979; Eph c al 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 7 - 8 . 3 Diod. Sic. 2.48.6; 1 9 . 9 4 . 2 - 9 5 ; 97. For the identification see, e.g., Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 5 7 6 ; Roschinski 1980, 134;Bowersock 1983, 13, contra Negev 1976, 1 2 7 - 9 ; 1977, 5 2 7 - 3 0 . The identifi-

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Early Times

tion against enemies was to take refuge in the desert. Procuring the spices and the perfumes from traders in Arabia Felix, they brought these goods down to the sea, which is commonly understood that they exported them to Gaza and Rhinocorura, using a route across the 'Araba and the Negev 4 . The oldest Nabataean inscription yet known was discovered at Elusa, situated on this route, and is dated to the first half of the second century or to the late second century 5 . This literary and epigraphic evidence as well as some meagre archaeological finds form the basis of the common opinion that the Nabataeans expanded to the Negev in the fourth-second centuries. Map 12: Southern Palestine and Sinai "Azotus'

Jerusalem

-Mediterranean Sea •

Hebron

Gaza^

I D U M A E A! JJemme g e e r .Wasada,

7 Rhinocorura-Raphia. *Sheba (el-'Ar,shtzil X Alousa ^ Rehovot

Mampsis

0bo

;/Nessanav i! , * V v Sha-ar J N.Ramon 00 I N E G E V " ^ . M o y e t *Awad ^

*Naqb el-Ärud

^

/petra ^

Clysma

—

main Nabalaean routes secondry and presumed Nabataean routes 20

40

60km

cation is highly likely, but cannot be regarded as certain. Negev's attempt to refute it is hardly convincing; recently (1986b, XV) he has apparently changed his view. On the perfume and spice trade see G.W. Van Beek, "Frankincense and Myrrh in Ancient South Arabia", J AOS 78 (1958) 1 4 1 - 5 2 ; idem, "Frankincense and Myrrh", Bibl. Arch. 23 (1960) 7 0 - 9 5 (with the correction of Pirenne 1961, 101 n. 24); W.W. Mueller, in RE Supplb. 15, 7 0 9 - 6 1 ; Groom 1981. On the exploitation of the bitumen see Hammond 1959. 4 For the desert routes see Strabo 16.2,24; 30 (an account which is not contemporaneous with that of Diodorus);MeshelandTsafrir 1974; 1975;Meshel 1981;Cohen 1982b. 5 Aretas king of the Nabataeans is mentioned in the inscription. He was identified at first with

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Hasmonaeans

and

Nabataeans

The nature and date of the Nabataean penetration into the Negev, however, are not sufficiently clear. If it was solely associated with the spice and perfume trade, it would mean that they used the Negev for transit purposes, occupying perhaps few sites along the route. If this was the case, their hold of the region must have been precarious. Of course they may have tried to find a living for their flocks as well, and if they did so their number would be greater and the areas they roamed about extensive. In default of literary evidence this possibility is extremely difficult to confirm. As a nomadie people they surely lived in tents, which perforce have not left traces. The camps ascribed to them are rare, and their dating (they are said to belong in the "Middle Nabataean period") and indeed attribution to the Nabataeans, though possible, are far from certain 6 . In the Negev the Nabataeans developed their own peculiar pottery only in the second half of the first century B.C.E., even though Nabataean pottery production at Petra had started earlier, at the beginning of the century 7 . Thus there is no way to decide whether the Nabataeans merely established several caravanserais to facilitate their transit trade across the Negev or indeed came to occupy the region in what A. Negev terms the Early Nabataean period 8 .

Aretas II, t h a t is, the late second c e n t u r y . See A.E. Cowley, in C.L. Woolley and T.E. Lawrence, The Wilderness of Zin ( 1 9 1 4 - 1 5 ) 1 4 5 - 7 ; W.F. Albright, " A Biblical Fragment f r o m the Maccabaean Period: The Nash P a p y r u s " , JBL 56 ( 1 9 3 7 ) 1 6 4 - 5 . On palaeographical grounds it was later dated to the third century or first half of the second c e n t u r y ; hence the king was identified with t h e Nabataean king c o m m o n l y called Aretas I. See F.M. Cross, ' T h e Oldest Manuscripts f r o m Q u m r a n " , JBL 74 ( 1 9 5 5 ) 160 n. 25; Starcky 1966, 9 0 4 ; cf. Negev 1977, 5 4 5 - 6 (a p h o t o graph and a drawing of the inscription). F o r t w o inscriptions, one a monogram reading ' 6 m ( " f a t h e r " ) on a jar shoulder, in S o u t h e r n Arabic letters, probably belonging to the third-second century, see G.W. Van B e e k , I E J 22 ( 1 9 7 2 ) 2 4 6 \ i d e m , "Digging up Tell J e m m e h " , Archaeology 36 (1983) 1 2 - 9 . These were f o u n d near Tell J e m m e h , situated close to the road leading to Gaza. For a n o t h e r early Nabataean inscription f r o m southern Syria see below n. 21. See also Y. Shiloh, " S o u t h Arabian Inscriptions f r o m t h e City of David, J e r u s a l e m " , PEQ 119 (1987) 9 - 1 8 . In view of t h e paucity of the epigraphic evidence, t h e validity of the palaeographic criteria for precisely dating the inscriptions may be d o u b t e d . 6 Negev 1982, 119; 1 9 8 6 b , 1 8 - 2 2 ; 2 9 - 3 1 . Negev ( 1 9 8 6 b , 3 2 - 4 5 ) expresses the view t h a t the Nabataeans lived in tents until a f t e r the mid-first century C.E., claiming that the buildings they constructed (Strabo 16.4,21) in w h a t he calls the Middle Nabataean period were for religious, administrative and public purposes only. See, however, Bowersock 1983, 1 6 - 7 . 7 Negev 1982, 119; 1986a, XVII; 1 9 8 6 b , 2 3 - 4 . F o r the beginning of Nabataean p o t t e r y p r o d u c tion at Petra see Parr 1970, 3 6 7 - 7 0 ; 1978, 2 0 3 - 4 (on which see t h e c o m m e n t s of Negev 1 9 8 6 a , XVII). There is nothing in the recent research of ' A m i to j u s t i f y the statement t h a t t h e m a n u facture of the sample g r o u p of p o t t e r y local to Petra (G XV) started at the beginning of t h e second century ( c A m r 1 9 8 7 , 1 9 8 ) . O n t h e Nabataean p o t t e r y see also Schmitt-Korte 1984. 8 Negev 1969, 5; 1976; etc. In his research of t h e Moyet c A w a d - O b o d a section of the Petra-Gaza road, R. Cohen, the only one to have carried o u t excavations, and n o t merely surface explorations of this road, reports p o t t e r y f i n d s and coins that date some buildings at Moyet c A w a d to the 3 r d - 2 n d c e n t u r y . T h e o t h e r sites have n o t yielded such early material. See Cohen 1 9 8 2 a ; 1 9 8 2 b ; 1987. The earliest remains f o u n d at R e h o v o t are "Early R o m a n and painted Nabataean

Early

Times

101

The problem is even more complicated for it is known that other Arabian tribes, notably the Kedarite, partly occupied northern Sinai, the southern coast of Palestine and the region south of Judaea (here with Edomite elements) in the Persian period®. It can be shown that these Arabs took part in the spice trade in the fifth century, and their existence near Gaza at the time of Alexander the Great is recorded by Arrian. Significantly large quantities of frankincense and myrrh were captured by Alexander in Gaza in 332. The penetration into and presence of nomadic Arabs in Egypt in the third century is recorded in the Zenon papyri, which also show Gaza as a centre for the spice trade with Egypt at that time 10 . Nothing is known about the relations between the Nabataeans and these Arabs. One can only speculate as to whether there existed some kind of cooperation based on mutual trading interests or perhaps the Nabataeans ousted, or took control of the other Arabs one way or another at some time 11 . Thus to say that the nomadic Nabataeans occupied the Negev

sherds characteristic of the first century B.C.E. and the f u s t century C . E . " (Y. Tsafrir et alii, Excavations at Rehovot-in-the-Negev. I (1988) 3). 9 I. Rabinowitz, " A r a m a i c Inscriptions of t h e 5th Century B.C.E. f r o m a North-Arab Shrine in E g y p t " , JNES 15 ( 1 9 5 6 ) 1—9; A. Lemaire, " U n n o u v e a u roi Arabe de Qedar dans l'inscription de l'autel ä encens de L a k h i s h " , RB 81 (1974) 6 3 - 7 1 , esp. 6 9 - 7 1 (with detailed bibliography); J. Naveh, in Aharoni 1973, 7 9 - 8 2 ; idem, " T h e Aramaic: Ostraca f r o m Tel Beer Sheba (seasons 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 6 ) " , Tel Aviv 6 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 1 8 2 - 9 8 ; idem, in Aharoni 1981, 1 5 3 - 7 6 ; E p h c a l 1982, 1 9 2 - 2 1 4 (note esp. 200 n. 679). It may be recalled that t h e Lihyanite and t h e Minaean tribes, whose place of a b o d e was central and southern Arabia, t o o k part in the p e r f u m e trade. Some Minaeans reached southern Palestine and Egypt. See F.V. Winnett and W.L. R e e d , Ancient Records from North Arabia ( 1 9 7 0 ) 1 1 7 - 9 ; A.M.A.H. Sayed, "Reconsideration of the Minaean Inscription of Zayd 'il Bin S a y d " , Proc. Sem. Arab. Stud. 14 ( 1 9 8 4 ) 9 3 - 9 . F o r a Minaean and a Gherraean in Delos in the second century see F. Durrbach,, Choix d'inscriptions de Delos ( 1 9 2 1 ) no. 129,207—8;P.Roussel, Delos colonie athenienne ( 1 9 1 6 ) 88 with n. 6. On these and on their relations with the Nabataeans, an obscure and vexed p r o b l e m , see t h e conflicting views of W. Caskel, Das altarabische Königreich Lihyan ( 1 9 5 0 ) , esp. 5 - 1 2 ; 1 8 - 9 ; idem, Lihyan und Lihyanisch ( 1 9 5 4 ) , esp. 2 0 - 1 ; 3 6 - 4 4 ; Altheim and Sticht 1964, 9 3 - 1 0 6 . Cf. Raschke 1978, 6 5 9 (with the relevant notes); G r o o m 1981, 1 7 7 - 8 0 ; 1 8 5 - 7 ; 1 9 8 - 2 0 0 . 10 See E p h c a l 1982, 2 0 6 - 8 , w h o combines Hdt. 3.97,6 (the annual Arabic " g i f t " of 1000 talents of frankincense) with 3.5,1 (the " e m p o r i a on the sea c o a s t " south of Kadystis, i.e. Gaza, belong to the Arabic (king); cf. 3.7; 9 ; 8 8 , 2 ; 91,1); Tcherikover 1 9 3 7 , 2 5 - 7 (the evidence of t h e Z e n o n papyri); Arr. 2 . 2 5 , 4 ; 2 7 , 1 ; Curt. R u f . 4 . 6 , 1 5 ; 30; Plut. Alex. 2 5 . 4 - 5 ( 5 0 0 talents of frankincense and 100 of myrrh sent t o Alexander's t u t o r ) . I think it is wrong to regard the Arabs w h o lived near Gaza and w h o t o o k part in its d e f e n c e against Alexander the Great as Nabataeans 0contra K a m m e r e r 1929, 1 1 4 - 5 ; Altheim and Stiehl 1964, 3 4 - 6 ; Wenning 1987, 1 8 4 ; Kasher 1988, 10, cf. Milik 1982, 2 6 4 o n t h e identity of " A r a b s " in H e r o d o t u s ) . It does n o t take account of the existence of the Qedarite Arabs in this area (see t h e preceding n o t e ) , and it is c o n t r a d i c t e d by the evidence of D i o d o r u s (Hieronymus) that the Nabataeans lived far away f r o m t h a t region. See also Roschinski 1980, 1 3 3 - 4 with n. 23. 11 According to Knauf ( 1 9 8 6 , esp. 8 3 - 4 ) , t h e Nabataeans had originated f r o m a symbiosis between a Qedarite tribe and I d u m a e a n s in E d o m . There is n o real evidence for this t h e o r y , and the interpretation of t h e t w o t e x t s adduced by Knauf to support it is wrong in m y view.

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in the third, or even the second century is more an assumption than a conclusion based on solid, positive evidence 12 . The evidence for the beginning of the Nabataean expansion into and connections with .the regions north of Edom is no less obscure and tantalizing. That they had a foothold in part of Moabitis by the late fourth century is implied in the account of their exploitation of bitumen from the Dead Sea. At that time they defeated the attempt of Antigonus I to make profits for himself from this lucrative industry13. Later, however, the region around the Dead Sea was under the control of the Seleucids, who in all likelihood took it over from the Ptolemies14. The Nabataeans therefore could have carried on their bitumen industry only if they received permission from the political masters of the region. Further evidence for the limited Nabataean presence and influence in Moabitis in the mid-second century will be presently shown.

12 That the Nabataeans occupied the Negev in the Hellenistic period is the common view. See, e.g., Starcky 1966, 904; Hammond 1973, 30; c Amr 1987, 3 - 4 ; Wenning 1987, 1 3 7 - 9 . Scholars had been well aware of the Nabataean presence in the Negev for many years, but it was thanks to N. Glueck (e.g., 1934; 1955a) that more attention was given to this region, which became prominent due to the archaeological work of A. Negev. While stressing the Nabataean presence in this region in the third and second centuries, Negev (1977, 5 2 0 - 3 2 ) expresses the view that there was no significant Nabataean penetration into the region east of the fAraba in the Ptolemaic period. He once claimed that the Nabataeans built Oboda (= c Avdat), Elusa and Nessana in the third century (1966, 94; 1967, 54), but this cannot be maintained if the Nabataeans lived in tents in what he terms the Early Nabataean period (see references in n. 6). As has been shown, the literary and epigraphic evidence cannot prove that the Nabataeans lived in the Negev in this period. And it must be added that the reference to the many Nabataean villages around the Leanitic Gulf (Diod. Sic. 3.43,4; Strabo 16.4,18) has nothing to do with the Negev (cf. Stracky 1966, 905; Negev 1977, 533). The archaeological remains of this period consist of Hellenistic pottery and a few coins from Oboda, Nessana and Moyet c Awad (Negev 1977, 5 4 5 - 9 ; 1986a, 4 - 9 ; 126; Cohen 1982a; 1982b). The dating and interpretation of this pottery are problematic. Three points should be underlined. The life span of the types of pottery discovered is such that, excepting the three stamped Rhodian jar-handles (Negev 1986a, 8 - 9 nos. 3 1 - 3 ) , they may be dated to any time from the third to the first century B.C.E. (according to a recent study of Eastern Terra Sigillata, the group called ETS I, which includes samples from Oboda, is not earlier than the beginning of the second century; eastern Cyprus was the provenience of the clay; see Gunneweg et alii 1983, 89; 9 5 - 1 0 3 ; 1 0 9 - 1 0 ; on this cf. Negev 1986b, XVIII-XIX). Second, there is no evidence for building activity at Nessana and Oboda in the Hellenistic period, which accords well with Negev's later position. Negev (1986a, 17) contests the dating of the finds from Moyet c Awad (Cohen 1982a, 1 6 4 - 5 ; 1982b), though without giving convincing reasons. Third, the identity of the users of this pottery as well as of the caravanserai at Moyet c Awad (Cohen's view) is unknown. In view of this state of the evidence, I cannot follow Negev's conclusion (1986a, XV): "We have very little evidence of the occupation of the Negev in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C.E. Since this area was occupied by nomadic Nabataeans (sic!), the absence of other material remains may quite easily be explained". 13 Diod. Sic. 19.100, 1 - 3 . 14 See K.J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte2 IV,2 (1927) 3 2 6 - 7 , basing his arguments on Diod. Sic. 19.98,1 who states that the Dead Sea was Kara tiear\v rftv oarpaneiav rrj? 'Uovfjaiaq. Cf. Stern 1974a, 1 7 8 - 9 .

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The Nabataean presence in Auranitis, inferred from Zenon papyri, has been recently emphasized by G.W. Bowersock, but on the basis of poor evidence 15 . Nabataeans are indeed mentioned but only on one occasion and certainly not in Auranitis, if one cares to read the relevant papyrus carefully. It is a report sent to Zenon about the quasi-commercial activities of two persons, apparently suppliers of the services of young female slaves in Palestine in 259 16 . Their activities are reported at Pegae, Ammonitis, Ptolemais and Joppa, and then one of them moved to Auranitis. Returning from there he met the Nabataeans, and as a result of commercial or some other controversy with them was imprisoned for seven days 17 . His encounter with these Nabataeans may have taken place not far from Auranitis, as suggested by the first editor of the papyrus, or quite a long distance to the south. The way the report is presented, mentioning one transaction in Joppa in 1.16, another in Auranitis in 1.17 and then the incident with the Nabataeans in 11.20-24, makes it impossible to point to any specific area, except presumably somewhere in Transjordan 18 . However, the phyla ke where the person was detained must have belonged to the Ptolemaic administration, for there can be no doubt that all the transactions occurred within the Ptolemaic territory 19 . In other words, wherever the encounter occurred, the papyrus cannot be construed as referring to Nabataean political expansion in Transjordan. A person named Rabbelus, a name found in the Nabataean onomasticon, is mentioned in another Zenon papyrus of the year 259. It is an account of quantities of flour dispensed to various persons in a period of four months in connection with a journey of a party in various parts of Palestine. The identity, occupation and, in view of the period and areas referred to in the document, location of this Rabbelus and the men associated with him are completely unknown; any attempt to connect him to

15 Bowersock 1983, 1 7 - 8 . 16 Tcherikover 1937, 1 3 - 4 ; 17; 74 n. 10. For a detailed treatment of this document (text, German translation and commentary) see R. Scholl, Sklavereiin den Zenonpapyri (1983) 5 6 - 6 4 . 17 PSI no. 406 11.17—24: Kal eîç Ai)pava aireSrinrjoev / aCofM dr\\vicov âyuv / Kal eXa/Sev pv / KÎKeiôev àvaKâiMTuiv / ovveoKedoaro roiiç Na / fiaralouç . 0otjç •yevonévi)ç /à-nâyerai eiç fuXaxriv /rinépaç f é/i iréSaiç ¿iv. The reading of avaQaraiouç of the papyrus is agreed to be a mistake. 18 G. Vitelli in PSI no. 406, IV, p. 133 (ad 1.17); cf. Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 I, 2 7 4 - 5 \idem, RB 36 (1927) 1 4 6 - 7 ; Starcky 1966, 905; 1985, 167. 19 Tcherikover (1937, 81 n. 56) emphasizes the fact that there is no reference to any city in Syria in the Zenon papyri in order to argue that Zenon and his agents confined their activities to Ptolemaic territory, and hence that Damascus was under Ptolemaic rule. Whether the Nabataeans mentioned in this papyrus were free or subject to the Ptolemaic king he leaves as an open question (ib. 34). Starcky (1966, 904) writes on these Natabaeans: "Ceux-ci vivent donc en marge de l'administration Ptolémaique". This is repeated in Sartre 1985a, 47 with n. 36 (but PCZ no. 59008 has nothing to do with Nabataeans).

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Auranitis, or to any other specific region of Transjordan, would be arbitrary and misleading 20 . Finally, a stele mentioning a "king of the Nabataeans" and inscribed in a script attributed to the third century is said to exis.t in the Museum of Damascus. As it has not been published and as its provenance is unknown, it is impossible to check the dating and assess the significance of the inscription 21 . Given this state of the evidence, the only inference that can be drawn is that some Nabataeans were to be found somewhere in Transjordan in the mid-third century. The next references to Nabataeans are associated with the Maccabaean period. After this failure to re-establish himself in Jerusalem in 168, the former High-Priest Jason fled to Ammonitis and then found refuge for some time with Aretas "the tyrant of the Arabs", who is usually named Aretas I and may have been identical with Aretas "king of the Nabataeans" of the inscription from Elusa 22 . This notice, however, does not elucidate the location of the seat of this Aretas, unless one assumes that as king of the Nabataeans he must have resided at Petra. Certain it is that at this time Ammonitis was not within the sphere of the Nabataean rule 23 . Five years later, Judas Maccabaeus and his brother Jonathan came from Judaea to render succour to the Jews of Galaaditis. After crossing the Jordan , and travelling a "three-day journey in the wilderness" they came across Nabataeans. These received them in a peaceful manner and reported

20 PCZ no. 59004, esp. 1 1 . 2 7 - 9 . For the nature of the document see C.C. Edgar's short account. For the travelling party and its route see Tcherikover 1937, 12; 57—8; 87—8 (n. 97). Pace Bowersock (1983, 18 n. 20), Negev (1977, 530) does not misinterpret this document. For a conjecture about the identity of this Rabbelus see Starcky 1966, 904. 21 Starcky 1985, 1 6 7 - 8 (citing J.T. Milik). It seems to be the same inscription that is dated to the late second century in Starcky 1966, 930. 22 II Macc. 5 . 7 - 8 . The manuscript reading kyuXeta^eiq is contested and some would prefer the correction to e-tKXndeis. See Abel 1949, 351; Habicht 1976, 255 n. 8b; Goldstein 1983, 246; 253; cf. next note. For the identity and status of this Aretas see slightly divergent views in Starcky 1966, 904; Schürer, 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 5 7 6 - 7 ; Bowersock 1983, 1 8 - 9 ; Goldstein 1983, 256. 23 In justifying the emendation in II Macc. 5.8 (see preceding note), Habicht (1976, 225 n. 8b) postulates Nabataean dominion over Ammonitis or even over Transjordan (ib. 262, n. 10a): Antiochus IV and Menelaus accused Jason before Aretas "weil Jason von seinem Territorium aus operiert hatte und dorthin , zurückgekehrt war" (thus also Graf 1986, 788: "At the time of Antiochus IV ( 1 7 5 - 1 6 4 B.C.) Nabataean monarchs controlled the Ammonitis"; cf. Gatier 1988, 161). This view is untenable. Antiochus IV would never have acknowledged Aretas* sovereignty over Ammonitis or Transjordan. In fact, about this time the Seleucid king took control of the principality of Hyrcanus (AJ 1 2 . 2 2 9 - 2 3 6 ; for the date see above p. 20 f. with the literature cited in nn. 45 and 47). The region of Galaaditis was under the command of the Seleucid officer Timotheus (I Macc. 5 . 1 1 - 3 4 ; II Macc. 1 2 . 1 0 - 3 1 ) , who may or may not be identical with Timotheus the "phylarch" of Ammonitis (/ Macc. 5 . 6 - 8 ; see Goldstein 1976, 2 9 6 - 7 ; contra Kasher 1988, 29 n. 14; Bar-Kochva 1989, 513). It follows that either the reading should be kept, admitting an awkward Greek expression (but see Goldstein 1983, 256), or Jason had left Ammonitis and stayed somewhere within the Nabataean territory or actually at Aretas' court.

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to them about the dangerous situation of the Jews in Galaaditis who shut themselves up in the cities of Bosora, Bosor, Alema, Khaspho, Maked and Karnaim. Then Judas turned " b y the way of the wilderness" and took Bosora 24 . Where did this friendly meeting take place and what can be deduced from it about these Nabataeans? Bowersock, allegedly following Starcky, opts for Auranitis, arguing that this is indicated by the three-day march and the information about the Jews in Galaaditis 25 . According to another opinion, the meeting occurred somewhere in eastern Transjordan, at some distance south of Auranitis 2 6 . Geographically, an encounter in Auranitis is highly unlikely if the details of the events are properly considered. Judas probably crossed the Jordan near Jericho or at some point to the north. He would have been obliged to make a long detour of some 1 3 0 - 1 5 0 km. to arrive in Auranitis without passing through Galaaditis (= the region north of Ammonitis), or indeed Bosora (= Bostra) itself, through which region he surely did not travel before his meeting with the Nabataeans 2 7 . But such a journey across such a terrain is probably too long to be made in a three-day march. It should also be recalled that Judas had received an appeal from the Jews of Galaaditis to save them from Timotheus, which indeed started the expedition in the first place. It would make no sense to travel first to Auranitis and then to turn south or southwest to Bosora. It is therefore better to suppose that the encounter with the Nabataeans took place south or south-east of Bostra. This supposition implies that after crossing the Jordan, Judas proceeded east or north-east and met the Nabataeans at some place east or north-east of Philadelphia 28 . Now, Judas was asked to save the Jews of Galaaditis and the Nabataeans supplied him with information on the Jews shut up in the cities of Galaaditis. The cities enumerated (and presumably not all are explicitly named), however, cannot be located in Galaaditis in the narrow sense of this geographical term. Though opinions vary, it appears that most of these cities

24 I Macc. 5 . 2 4 - 8 ; AJ 1 . 2 . 3 3 5 - 6 . F o r the conditions of the Jews in these towns see Goldstein ' 1983,434-6. 25 Bowersock 1983, 19. In fact Starcky (1966, 9 0 5 ) writes that in 163 " J u d a s Maccabee et sa t r o u p e , en route vers le Hauran ( m y italics), r e n c o n t r e n t les N a b a t e e n s " . 26 Abel 1 9 2 3 , 5 1 5 ; 1949, 96; Negev 1977, 5 3 2 ; Goldstein 1976 m a p 7 ; Peters 1978, 3 1 7 ; Fischer 1980, map VIII. 27 Assuming Judas went through A m m o n i t i s , Abel ( 1 9 2 3 , 5 1 5 ) warns us n o t to take literally the description of this part of the j o u r n e y as "in t h e desert". Indeed, whatever t h e r o u t e , it could n o t have been in the desert right a f t e r crossing t h e J o r d a n . 28 Bowersock ( 1 9 8 3 , 18 n. 21) refers to Peters 1977 for an accurate account of the situation in Hawran. However, Peters ( 1 9 7 7 , 264) explicitly writes t h a t J u d a s m e t the Nabataeans "pres u m a b l y north-east of ' A m m a n " , t h o u g h he does state t h a t they gave him i n f o r m a t i o n on the affairs in Auranitis. At any rate, here and elsewhere ( 1 9 7 8 , 3 1 7 - 8 ) Peters attributes the Nabataean expansion and control of WadI Sirhan and Auranitis to t h e post-Maccabaean period. Cf. H a m m o n d 1973, 35.

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and

Nabataeans

should be identified with sites located in southern Batanaea, and perhaps in Gaulanitis or in the south-west of Auranitis 2 9 . The Nabataeans will have known about the conditions prevailing in this "Galaaditis" either because they traded with this region or due to their wandering with their herds in this area. In either case they appear as people one might meet in the desert or on the fringes of the desert, nomadic rather than sedentary and certainly not part of the settled population of these regions of Transjordan 3 0 . The description given by II. Macc, of the expedition of Judas Maccabaeus in Transjordan seems at first sight to contradict the report of I. Macc. on the peaceful meeting with the Nabataeans. Here the Jewish expedition is unexpectedly attacked by a strong force of Arabs (5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry men), but nevertheless scores a victory over them. The defeated Arabs promise to give cattle to the victorious Jews and, after the conclusion of peace, return to their tents 3 1 . The contradiction might be solved by assuming either that one of the versions is false or that these are accounts of two different events that occurred during the same campaign, which implies that each author reported one event while ignoring the other. Usually scholars assume the two accounts describe the same episode and trust the version of II. Macc., but without explaining the contradiction or giving reasons for accepting II Macc.32. The possibility of two separate events is suggested by Bowersock, and three considerations seem to favour it 3 3 : the attackers are called "Arabs" in II Macc. while those who receive Judas in a peaceful manner are explicitly named "Nabataeans" in I Macc. \ Judas trusts the information he receives from the Nabataeans and proceeds to conduct the whole campaign accordingly, which he would hardly have done had they been defeated enemies; there is another report of cordial relations with the Nabataeans close to this time (below). Why the author of I. Macc. ignored the attack of the Arabs is a question that cannot be answered, but it ought not to lead one to take the sceptical view of the authenticity of the

29 See Abel 1923, 5 1 5 - 2 0 ; 1 9 3 2 (reversing his f o r m e r suggestions); 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 I, 2 7 6 ; II 10' 103• 2 4 1 ; 2 8 6 ; 4 1 3 - 4 ; 1949, 9 1 ; 97; Dussaud 1927, 3 2 7 - 3 1 ; 3 3 7 - 9 ; Avi-Yonah 1966, 4 0 - 5 0 ' Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 51 (s.v. Bosor); 8 0 - 1 (s.v. Diathema); 1 2 1 - 2 (s.v. Karnain); 1 3 7 8 (s.v. Mella); 1 6 0 - 2 (s.v. Rhompha)\ 1 9 2 - 3 (s.v. Chaspho); Goldstein 1976, 2 9 8 - 9 . Despite some difficulties, Abel's identifications, excepting Dathema, seem to me highly probable. F o r the problem of t h e location of the Charax of IIMacc. 12.17 see Chap. I n. 47. 30 Abel ( 1 9 2 3 , 5 1 5 ; 1949, 96) regards t h e Nabataeans e n c o u n t e r e d by J u d a s as "caravaniers" 31 II Macc. 1 2 . 1 0 - 1 2 . 32 Abel 1 9 4 9 , 9 6 ; 4 3 5 ; Starcky 1966, 9 0 5 ; Habicht 1976, 2 6 2 n. 10a; Negev 1977, 532- Goldstein 1 9 7 6 , 3 0 0 - 1 ; Peters 1977, 2 6 4 ; Sartre 1985a, 47. To argue, as does Goldstein, t h a t t h e a u t h o r V). There is nothing in the text of Josephus to justify Smallwood's interpretation (1976, 47) that it was Antipater who put his armouries at the disposal of Herod. 1.221-2;/!/14.273-6. AJ 14.275. The text seems to be corrupt; hence it is not clear what duties these officials had. See Schalit 1 9 6 9 , 4 8 n. 166.

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on a geographical, administrative basis, with officials being personally responsible each for the quota allocated to his respective region. The only high ranking official named by Josephus is Malichus. No doubt the sum Hyrcanus paid was the same as that apportioned to Malichus54, which was exactly the same as the one raised by Herod from Galilee. It may be inferred that Malichus was governor of an administrative region approximately as rich and big as Galilee. Now Phasael was the governor of Jerusalem which probably included its territory. Whether that extended over all Judaea, in the narrow sense, one cannot know for sure. No information is provided by Josephus about those who governed the territory of Hyrcanus in Peraea, Samaria and Idumaea. Of these Peraea is probably to be discounted because Malichus' post seems to have been closer to Jerusalem and because there is some evidence showing Antipater acting freely there (below). The name Malichus points to a Nabataean origin, but this does not help much in deciding what region he governed, though by elimination Idumaea is the most likely possibility. This is supported by the fact that after Malichus was killed, his brother managed to take control of several fortresses, notably Masada which seems to indicate the area governed by the deceased 55 . Now Malichus was suspected of plotting against Antipater, who then crossed the Jordan and recruited there an army of Arabs and natives (Jews?) 56 . This obviously excludes Peraea as the region governed by Malichus. It also implies that the latter had a strong force under his command which could not be easily overcome by the troops available to Antipater and Phasael in Jerusalem or in Judaea. Or, perhaps they had no full confidence in these troops in case of an open war against Malichus. It might be significant that Antipater did not turn to Idumaea to raise this army, a fact that indicates Idumaea as the region governed by Malichus.

54 See Schalit 1969, 4 9 - 5 0 with nn. 1 7 4 - 5 . 55 On the name Malichus see Schalit 1969, 7 4 9 - 5 0 . He suggests that Malichus was either a Nabataean mercenary employed by the Hasmonaeans or a Judaized Nabataean. On Malichus' brother see BJ 1.237 ; AJ 14.296. Even if Malichus had been earlier appointed governor of Galilee in the wake of the Gabinian administrative reform, which is a sheer conjecture (Kanael 1957, 103), surely this was not his office after the settlement of Caesar. According to Hahn (1965, 34),. Idumaea had been already a "Familien Oikos" of Antipater. Since it is not mentioned in the reorganization of Gabinius, he infers that it was separated from Judaea and became a "FamilienEigentum" of Herod, for which he had to pay tribute to Antonius. Not only this is based on flimsy.evidence (BJ 1.123 does not show Idumaea to have been in the possession of Antipater), but there is more evidence to indicate that the Antipatrid sway in Idumaea, though extensive, was far from total '(below, p. 163 f.). Furthermore, there is good reason to think that Idumaea was one of the synodoi established by Gabinius. As for App. BC 5.75, whatever view is taken of its significance (see below n. 83), it does not imply that Idumaea became the property of Herod (contra Hahn 1965, 33). • 56 BJ 1.223; A / 14.277: Kai arparov 'Apaffiov dfia xat iyxuipiov avvri&poiiev.

From Strategos of Galilee to King of Judaea

145

After some time a reconciliation was arranged between Antipater and Malichus, but the latter became alarmed by the appointment of Herod as strategos of Coele-Syria and by the military forces given to him by Cassius. He then managed to poison Antipater with the help of the butler of Hyrcanus, in whose house both Malichus and Antipater were entertained 57 . Here Josephus adds: NAI dirXiraq e x c o e evrpeirtfe RA Kara rrjv TTOXLV. T o be sure, Malichus denied having any part in the poisoning. It is more important to note that here Josephus explicitly reports that Malichus commanded soldiers. Indirectly it may be learnt that the news of Antipater's death gave occasion to some riots in Jerusalem, which were put down by Malichus. But it is puzzling, even surprising, that Phasael, the strategos of Jerusalem, was not the one who restored order in Jerusalem. Possibly he was absent from the city. The reaction of Herod and Phasael to the death of their father is instructive. They refrained from starting an open war against Malichus and sought to do away with him by some ruse. Incidentally it is made clear that now Herod had Gentile troops under his command58. Malichus was obviously too powerful; indeed he seems to have become the closest adviser of Hyrcanus. In view of the covert enmity of Antipater's sons, he organized a bodyguard to protect himself59. This war of intrigues, concealed by pretences which in fact deceived no one, was finally ended when Herod contrived to kill Malichus with the aid of Cassius'officers at Tyre60. Clearly much of the story of this struggle for power between Antipater and his sons against Malichus is irrecoverable. Josephus' account is biased in favour of the Antipatrids, which is not surprising considering that his main source was Nicolaus of Damascus, the minister of Herod. Notwithstanding this distortion, several points may be gleaned and underlined. Some regions of the territory of Hyrcanus were governed by officials not subject or related to the Antipatrids. Antipater and his sons were not the only governors within the Hasmonaean state who had troops under their command. Whether Malichus was the governor of Idumaea or came to hold a central post in the government of the country, perhaps after the death of Antipater, he constituted a formidable opponent to the Antipatrids. Three means were important and could be exploited in this internal struggle for power: to win the confidence of the Roman magistrate under whose authority Judaea happened to be, to maintain an army and to attain the cooperation of Hyrcanus.

57 58 59 60

BJ l.224-l\AJ 14.278-81. BJ 1 . 2 2 7 - 9 ; AJ 14.285; 287. BJ 1.227; AJ 14.286. B/1.230-5; A/14.288-93.

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The conditions obtaining in Judaea in these years are illustrated by the events that took place there after the departure of Cassius from Syria in early 42 61 . Josephus writes: "For Helix who had been left behind with an army in Jerusalem marched against Phasael, and the citizens took up arms 62 ". The identity of this Helix, who is called Felix in the Latin version of Josephus, is not clear. The suggestion that he was a commander of a Roman garrison is not entirely satisfactory 63 ; for if so, he must have been appointed by Cassius who supported the Antipatrids, whereas Helix attacked Phasael. It could be counter-argued that at least two other nominees of Cassius, Marion of Tyre and Fabius the governor of Damascus, gave help to undo his arrangements (below). According to another suggestion, Helix was an official acting in the service of Hyrcanus, but this, too, cannot be convincingly proved 64 . Three points, however, can be safely established. Despite being the strategos of Jerusalem, Phasael was not the only official to command troops in the capital. There existed Jews who possessed arms in Jerusalem and who opposed the growing power of the Antipatrids. Hyrcanus was not averse to, probably even supported this rising, for after overcoming Helix Phasael accused the ethnarch of having cooperated with his enemies 65 . The next episode reported by Josephus, which may well have overlapped or been connected with the movement of Helix, is the uprising of Malichus' brother 66 . This person, whose name is unknown, succeeded in taking control of many forts, including Masada which is described as the strongest one: to panton erymnotaton. It stands to reason that these forts had previously been under the command of Malichus, and that after the latter's death his brother was able to rally around himself people loyal to the dead man because of their hatred to those responsible for his murder. But the choria occupied by Malichus' brother should not be envisaged as having formidable fortifications. At that time Masada was "the strongest" on account of its natural topographical position and as yet was not equipped with the type of fortifications Herod was to construct there. Presumably it was garrisoned by a small force which now went over to Malichus' brother. Significantly Phasael did not try to suppress this uprising,

61 BJ 1.236 AJ 14.294. For the date see Marcus ad AJ 14.290. (LCL Josephus, Vol. VII, p. 603 n.e); Broughton 1952, 3 4 3 - 4 . 62 AJ 14.294 (Marcus' translation in LCL). Cf. BJ 1.236. 63 Thus Jones 1938, 36. 64 See Schalit 1969, 5 7 - 8 , where the suggestion of Abel (1952 I, 323 n. 3) that Helix was Malichus' brother is convincingly rejected. 65 1.236-7; A / 1 4 . 2 9 4 - 5 . 66 BJ 1.237; AJ 14.296.The connection is implied in the opening sentence of AJ 14.296. Cf. Schalit 1969, 5 7 - 8 ; Smallwood 1976, 48. Given the vague and laconic nature of the account of Josephus, however, one cannot be sure that Helix and Malichus' brother took concerted action.

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either because he was fully occupied with the restoration of his authority in Jerusalem or because he did not consider his forces adequate to deal with the new opponent. For a while Phasael had to act on his own because Herod fell ill at this time. But when the latter recovered he managed himself to take one by one the fortresses occupied by Malichus' brother, who by an agreement was allowed to depart. This might indicate the small number of the followers of Malichus' brother, and certainly shows the superiority of the army under the command of Herod. Otherwise it cannot be understood how Masada was taken; perhaps this was the occasion for the conclusion of the agreement: Herod agreed to let his opponent go free provided he delivered the fort 67 . Incidentally it can be learnt that Herod did not confine his operations to the regions where he wielded official authority: Galilee, Samaria and Coele-Syria. At the same time Antiogonus, the younger son of Aristobulus II, made a bid for power in Judaea. His claim to rule Judaea had been rejected by Caesar in 47 68 . He was backed now by Ptolemy, son of Mannaeus, the Ituraean ruler of Chalcis, who married his sister Alexandra and at whose court Antigonus had been staying for several years 69 . To safeguard his designs Antigonus tried to win the connivance of Fabius, the Roman official left by Cassius to rule Damascus 70 . It was perhaps in this connection that Herod set out to meet Fabius, though Josephus does not make it sufficiently clear whether he actually met the Roman official, for he was then affected by illness 71 . At any rate, Antigonus felt secure in launching his operation, for which he also got the support of Marion of Tyre, whom Cassius had appointed as ruler of that city. Marion invaded Galilee and succeeded in capturing three fortresses, in which he placed his own garrisons. Unfortunately Josephus does not name these sites, but they were obviously situated on the northern confines of Galilee, close to the territory of Tyre 72 . Herod had apparently failed to defend these sites, which belonged to the region under his control. Josephus, or more accurately

67 Cf. the agreement between Lucilius Bassus and the Jewish defenders of Machaerus to evacuate that fort in 7 2 C.E.: fl/ 7.190 - 2 0 9 . 68 BJ 1 . 1 9 5 — 9 M / 1 4 . 1 4 0 - 3 . 69 BJ 1 . 1 8 5 - 6 ; AJ 14.126. It is the same Ptolemy whose attempts to take control of Damascus were forestalled by Aretas III and later by Alexandra Salome (above pp. 120 and 122). See Buchheim 1960, 1 6 - 7 ; Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 5 6 3 - 5 ; Schottroff 1982, 1 3 3 - 4 ; 1 3 8 - 4 1 . 70 BJ 1 . 2 3 8 - 9 ; AJ 14.297. Against unconvincing suggestions to identify this Fabius see the account in Schalit 1969, 58 n. 18. Directly or indirectly, this Fabius must have been appointed by Cassius. How far extensive his authority was is not clear, but there is no support for the view that he was "Cassius' deputy in Syria" (contra Schalit 1969, 60; Smallwood 1976, 48). 71 AJ 14.295. 72 BJ 1.238; AJ 14.298. Schalit does not give reasons for his suggestion (1969, 6 8 3 - 4 ) to identify them with Baka, Kadasa and Chaboulon (Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 3 3 - 4 ; 1 1 2 - 3 ; 1 9 1 - 2 ) . See also above p\ 85 with n. 181.

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his source Nicolaus of Damascus, reports that Herod managed t o recapture the forts, but this is refuted, at least partly, by later information. All or some of these sites were still controlled by Tyre in 41 when Antonius ordered their return to Hyrcanus 7 3 . But despite all the support given to him, Antigonus failed in his enterprise. Herod defeated his army in a pitched battle, whose location is unknown, and drove him out of the territory of Judaea 7 4 . It emerges that as long as Cassius stayed in Syria the parties hostile to the Antipatrids kept quiet. When Cassius marched his forces for the decisive battle against the triumvirs, they felt that this was the opportunity they had been waiting for to cross swords with Phasael and Herod. It was more than a two-sided political struggle. Hyrcanus will have welcomed those who tried to undermine the ascendancy of Antipater and his sons, but he could not have ignored the menace posed by his nephew Antigonus. The contending parties formed alliances and sought to win the support of neighbouring rulers. Ultimately it was a military struggle, for it was not enough to attain the cooperation of the most powerful player in the whole area, that is to say, the nearby Roman governor. Command of strongholds, supply of arms and maintenance of troops were vital to winning the struggle. The was that was stirred up by the opponents of Herod and Phasael in 42 ended with the victory of the Antipatrids. Indeed it seems that only at this time were they able to take control of all the strongholds in the country and to eliminate their foes from the administration of Hyrcanus. After Antonius, the new Roman ruler of the East following his victory over Cassius and Brutus at Philippi, appointed Phasael and Herod as tetrarchs.of the whole Jewish territory, their dominance seemed well secure for a while 75 . The Parthian invasion and conquest of Syria in 40 caused a real upheaval in the political situation in Judaea. Antigonus procured the support of the Parthian prince Pacorus and the satrap Barzaphrenes for the price of 1,000 talents and 500 women, and was also aided by Lysanias who had inherited the principality of Chalcis on the death of his father Ptolemy, son of Mennaeus 76 . Phasael and Herod were probably taken by surprise

73 AJ 1 4 . 3 1 4 - 2 2 (two letters of A n t o n i u s to Tyre). See Smallwood 1976, 50 n. 17. The language of the letters (see esp. 3 1 7 : et Tiva x^pi-O- 'T pnavov ... vvv '¿xere, air oh ovvai avTt^j) does n o t m a k e it clear w h e t h e r all or only some of the places were still occupied by t h e Tyrians. 74 BJ 1.240; AJ 14.299. According to Josephus, Antigonus did n o t manage to march into the interior (ta akra) of Judaea, which is a vague description. 75 BJ 1 . 2 4 3 - 4 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 2 4 - 6 . F o r the title tetrarch see Cic. Vat. 29; Mil. 7 6 ; Sail. Cat. 20.7; Veil. Pat. 2.51,2, Tac. Ann. 15.25,3. Cf. Buchheim 1960, 115 n. 155; Smallwood 1976, 50 n. 18; K. Regling RE VA, 1 0 8 9 - 9 0 . F o r the settlement of A n t o n i u s see O t t o 1913, 2 3 - 4 ; Schalit 1969,66-7. 76 BJ 1.248 (cf. 2S1)\AJ

14.330-1.

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by this development. Apparently Barzaphrenes had n o trouble in conquering Galilee, but Pacorus was delayed b y the stout resistance of Tyre, and sent a cavalry force to cooperate with Antigonus 7 7 . The only battle reported by Josephus occurred at a place called Drymoi, south of Mount Carmel, but who precisely participated in it is not made clear. It seems that Phasael and Herod reckoned their forces were not strong enough to risk a pitched battle against the Parthian army and preferred to retreat to Jerusalem; it is d o u b t f u l whether they were able to extricate all their forces from the territory they evacuated 7 8 . The Idumaean brothers, however, could not maintain their control even in the capital, which was flooded by Jews from all over the country on account of the festival of the Pentecost. The majority of the Jewish population now in Jerusalem supported Antigonus; Phasael and Herod kept their hold on the Hasmonaean citadel and the walls, but the city itself and the Temple Mount fell in the hands of their enemies after some fighting 79 . Enticed to leave Jerusalem in order to negotiate directly with Barzaphrenes, who was in Galilee, Hyrcanus and Phasael were taken captive by the Parthians 8 0 . Herod refused to rely on the Parthian promises and decided to sneak out of Jerusalem. He managed to make good his escape, taking with him members of his family, his fiancée Mariamme and her mother, servants and the soldiers whom he had in Jerusalem. He headed to Idumaea and there, at Oresa, met his brother Joseph. The number of his entourage was about 10,000; not all of these came from Jerusalem for some rallied from Idumaea to give him support. Herod decided to disperse most of this crowd, whose number amounted to more than 9,000, ordering them to seek refuge in various places in Idumaea. Taking with him only the mercenaries, numbering about 800, and close relatives, Herod proceeded then to Masada 8 1 . The figures reported by Josephus in this narrative are the first explicitly known about the forces at the disposal of Herod. Of the 9,000

77 BJ 1 . 2 4 8 - 9 ; ^ ) / 1 4 . 3 3 2 - 3 . Cf. BJ 1 . 2 5 6 - 7 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 4 2 - 3 . 78 BJ 1.250; AJ 14.334. Cf. Strabo 16.2,27 and see Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 I, 414. Avi-Yonah's suggestion (1966, 145) to locate Drymus, "the big forest of the Sharon", in the small territory of Apollonia (Arsuf) is unlikely. Strabo mentions Crocodilopolis in this^conneetion, which was situated • n o r t h of Caesarea and possibly was located at Tell Mubarak near Nahr ez-Zarqa, identified with Crocodile River (Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 I, 4 7 0 - 1 ; II, 143), or at TeU el-Malät close to the estuary of the river (G.R. 1410 2161, not on t h e r i v e r as stated in Avi-Yonah 1966, 2 9 - 3 0 ) . An extensive oak forest still existed in the area souu. of the springs of this river early in this century, a locality which suits well the combined evidence of Strabo and Josephus. 79 BJ 1.251—3; AJ 1 4 . 3 3 5 - 9 . 80 BJ 1 . 2 5 5 - 6 0 ; A / 1 4 . 3 4 0 - 8 . 81 BJ 1 . 2 6 6 - 7 ; AJ 14. 3 6 1 - 2 . Part of the followers of Herod at Oresa flocked to help from various places in Idumaea, while he was making his way from Jerusalem. It is therefore wrong to assume that Herod had a following of 10,000 when he left Jerusalem (thus Jones 1938, 40). On Oresa see Moeller and Schmitt 1 9 7 6 , 1 5 1 .

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dismissed at Oresa, a considerable part, say several thousands, came from Jerusalem and may be considered as belonging to the standing army of Herod and Phasael. Others were of course volunteers and can be taken as evidence for the extensive influence of the Antipatrid family in Idumaea. The fact that all were told to seek shelter in Idumaea is also indicative of this influence, and may indicate that at least some of those who came from Jerusalem had their origin in Idumaea. The mercenaries were surely of Gentile stock and their number, about 800, is surprisingly low. If some of Herod's troops remained in Galilee and Samaria, unable to follow Herod to Jerusalem because taken by surprise by the Parthian invasion, this could explain the small number of the mercenaries. Trusting the natural defences of Masada, Herod left there his relatives, Mariamme and the mercenaries and set out on a journey to revive his fortunes. Since the Nabataean king Malichus rejected his request for help, Herod boldly set out on the longi way to Rome to attain the support of the rulers of the Roman empire. It was not too difficult for Herod to persuade Antonius and Caesar Octavianus to back him: Antigonus forfeited all hope for Roman recognition when he threw in his lot with the Parthians. A promise of money on the part of Herod helped Antonius to decide in his favour 82 . At a formal meeting of the senate he was appointed king of Judaea at the end of 40 8 3 . The Roman recognition was very important indeed, but it did not suffice; Herod still had to conquer his kingdom.

3. The Reconquest of Judaea by Herod (39—30 B.C.E.) Three years elapsed before Herod was able to enter Jerusalem and establish himself as king of Judaea. It was not enough that his claim to the throne was recognised at Rome. He had to exert all his diplomatic skill in order to win the support of the Roman commanders appointed

82 For an account of the various considerations to support Herod see BJ 1. 2 8 2 - 4 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 7 8 83. Cf. Otto 1913, 28; Schalit 1969, 8 5 - 7 . 83 AJ 1 4 . 3 8 4 - 5 . For the date see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 281 n. 3. The appointment is also recorded in Strabo 16.2,46 (including various inaccuracies); Tac. Hist. 5.9. By this appointment Herod was intended to replace Antigonus as well as Hyrcanus, who had been carried away by the Parthians to Babylonia (BJ 1.273). Hence, the kingdom of Herod must have meant to include the territory of the former ethnarch Hyrcanus. Therefore, when it is said by Appian (BC 5.75) that Antonius appointed Herod tributary king of 'IBoviiaiuiv 6e nal Zayapiuiv, some textual corruption or a mistake on the part of Appian or his source ought t o be assumed. For these reasons I regard as wrong interpretations to the effect that only then, in 39, did Antonius add Samaria and Idumaea to Herod's kingdom. For some discussions, with various interpretations, of this text see Momigliano 1934, 4 1 - 3 ; Jones 1935, 229; Buchheim 1960, 6 6 - 7 ; Schalit 1969, 87 nn. 1 0 5 - 6 ; 1 6 5 - 6 ; E. Gabba, Appiani Bellorum Gvilium Liber Quintus (1970) 129; Smallwood 1976, 55 n. 30.

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to Syria, who cooperated with him only half-heartedly. But he did not rely entirely on the Roman support, however important and helpful it might have been. For the reconquest of Judaea he had to recruit his own new army; this was his first task and almost as vital must have been his attempts to renew his influence in the country and to rally supporters. Needless to say, Herod will not have started the arduous campaign against his enemy Antigonus while the Parthians were still masters of Syria. However, the synchronization of Herod's return to the East with the evacuation of Syria by the Parthians poses a problem which has not been properly assessed or, usually, even noticed; let me then start with the clarification of this point. According to Josephus, Herod stayed at Rome for seven days only, and then sailed back and landed at Ptolemais 84 . Since he left Italy in late December 40 or early January 39, he could have arrived at Ptolemais in February or early March 39, which is assumed by some modern scholars 85 . But Ptolemais is explicitly described as one of the Syrian cities which had cooperated with the Parthians 86 , and it is inconceivable that Herod would have landed there before the Parthians had been defeated and expelled by the Romans. Now P. Ventidius Bassus was appointed by Antonius to command the war against the Parthians after the pact of Brundisium, that is to say in late 40 or, less probably, after the treaty of Misenum, that is, early 39 87 . Ventidius collected his army, marched through Asia Minor and defeated first the Roman renegade Q. Labienus and later the Parthian commander Pharnapates at the Amanus Gates. It stands to reason that only as a result of these defeats was Pacorus forced to retreat from Syria to beyond the Euphrates 88 . Those scholars who apparently have considered the chronology of these campaigns date the victory over Pharnapates in the summer of 39 and the Parthian evacuation in late summer or in the autumn of 3 9 89 . If this dating is accepted, it is difficult to date

84 AJ 14.387; 394. The seven-day stay is not mentioned in the parallel account of BJ\.281 - 9 0 . 1 take it that this stay refers to Herod's sojourn in Rome and not to the time elapsed from the moment he landed at Brundisium until his departure to the East. 85 For this chronology cf. Marcus in LCL Josephus, vol. VII. p. 648 n.a; 657 n.c; Schalit 1969, 89 n. 115 (landing at Ptolemais in February); Smallwood 1976, 56 (landing in the spring of 39). Otto (1913, 29) and Schuirer ( 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 282), among other scholars, do not stop to consider the chronology. The voyage from Italy to Ptolemais lasted less than ten days under favourable conditions, but this was winter time when no favourable conditions were to be expected. Indeed, people normally did not put to sea in this season of the year. For a detailed account of speed and time of voyages in the Mediterranean Sea see L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (1971) 2 8 1 - 9 6 . 86 BJ\.249-, AJ 14.333. 87 The main sources are BJ1.288; AJ 14.392; Plut. Anton. 33.1; App. BC 5.65; Dio 4 8 . 3 9 , 1 - 2 . 88 The main extant narrative is Dio 4 8 . 3 9 , 3 - 4 1 - 4 . 89 Debevoise 1938, 1 1 4 - 6 ; H. Gundel, RE VIIIA, 8 0 7 - 9 . Gardthausen (1891 I, 228; II, 112 n. 23)

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Herod's landing at Ptolemais in February or March 39. There are three possibilities to solve this difficulty: on his way back Herod lingered in Greece or in the Aegean islands for a very long time; the campaigns of Ventidius were very swift indeed and did in fact occur in the early months of 39; the political situation in Syria had changed even before the victories of Ventidius in such a way as to enable Herod to arrive safely at Ptolemais. The third possibility is unlikely for it would have involved taking formidable risks as long as the Parthians were still in the region. The second possibility, however, is implied in Plutarch's account that Antonius was informed about Ventidius' successes "while he was still spending the winter at Athens". This would mean that Ventidius made an extremely strained effort and fought a winter campaign; even so, spring seems the likely time for Herod's landing at Ptolemais 90 , which points to some delay on his return voyage, understandable in view of the military situation in the East. Probably he sailed to Ptolemais from somewhere in the southern coast of Asia Minor as soon as he got news of Ventidius' victories. The victories Ventidius won in early 39 enabled him to take control of Syria and Judaea, but he did nothing to dethrone Antigonus, and for more than one reason. According to Josephus, Ventidius as well as Poppaedius Silo, the officer he left in Judaea, preferred extorting money from Antigonus rather than fighting and destroying the Hasmonaean ruler 91 . Greed on the part of Roman politicians and commanders should cause no surprise and need not be doubted in general 92 . Yet military and security reasons presumably took priority in Ventidius' considerations at that time. His main task was to fight and ward off the Parthians. Despite his victories, Ventidius may well have expected Pacorus to renew the war, which means that he had to concentrate his forces in northern Syria. He could not have allowed himself to be entangled with a long war in Judaea. Antigonus was well entrenched in Jerusalem, a strong fortified city which could not be taken without a protracted siege consuming large forces. Two years later this proved to be the case (below), but any competent commander would come to such a conclusion. Besides, Ventidius takes an untenable position: Herod's return to Palestine was approximately coterminous with Ventidius' departure to Asia, which, so he infers, followed the treaty of Brundisium. Most scholars are content to note that Ventidius defeated Labienus and Pharnapates in 39. See e.g. F. Münzer, RE 23, 259; Buchheim 1960, 7 5 - 6 ; Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 251; 282. 90 Plut. Anton. 33.4. According to Smallwood (1976, 56), "by the time Herod landed at Ptolemais, in the spring of 39, the Parthians had evacuated Syria, and Ventidius had marched into Judaea", i.e. Ventidius had defeated Labienus and Pharnapates. This sequence of events is implied by Buchheim 1960, 75. However, they do not discuss the problems involved in this chronology. 91 BJ 1.289; 291; A / 1 4 . 3 9 2 - 3 ; 395. Cf. Dio 4 8 . 4 1 , 4 - 5 . 92 See the references in n. 23 above. Usually the accusation of bribery is accepted (e.g. Otto 1913, 29; Schalit 1969, 89) but no attempt is made to explain the behaviour of the Roman commanders.

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had to attend t o the business of restoring order and establishing accommodating regimes, from the Roman point of view, in those cities of Syria where the Parthian invasion had caused extensive upheaveals 9 3 . Under these circumstances Ventidius merely marched through Judaea, started some negotiations with Antigonus, who bought him off, and then returned to Syria leaving behind him Silo with some troops 9 4 . It is quite possible that when Herod landed in Ptolemais, Ventidius was still in Judaea and not back in northern Syria; the latter possibility would show Herod to have remained in Asia Minor for a longer period than postulated above 9 5 . Josephus claims that Ventidius marched into Judaea ostensibly ( A o t w ) to bring help t o Joseph, Heiod's brother, who was being besieged by Antigonus in Masada 9 6 . This is d o u b t f u l because it was only later that Ventidius was instructed to render help to Herod (below). At any rate, Josephus leaves no doubt that the siege went on. Nevertheless Herod was not in a position to bring immediate succour to his people there, for he had to build up an army, which must have taken some time 9 7 . Josephus indeed states that after his landing at Ptolemais, Herod recruited a considerable force of foreigners and his countrymen (%eviov re a n a Kai o/ioy3iiXajy);the last term I take to refer to Jews and not necessarily to Idumaeans 9 8 . He was given some help by Ventidius and Poppaedius Silo, who were persuaded to do so by Dellius, apparently an officer sent by Antonius specially for that purpose 9 9 . It is unclear whether Dellius came with Herod in the first place or only after the latter, realizing the refusal of the Roman commanders to support him, asked Antonius to send such an envoy. Be that as it may, Herod first sought to establish his control over Galilee, though there is some exaggeration in the report that almost

93 Only Tyre is said by Josephus to have refused to cooperate with the Parthians; Sidon and Ptolemais are explicitly named as collaborating (BJ 1.249; AJ 14.333). For the disturbances that required the presence of Ventidius see BJ 1.291; AJ 14.395. Aradus refused to open its gates before the Romans, even after they vanquished the Parthians, and was besieged (Dio 48.41, 6). 94 For the narrative of the events see BJ 1 . 2 8 8 - 9 \AJ 1 4 . 3 9 2 - 3 . 95 The sequence of the events presented by Josephus (BJ 1.289—91; AJ 14.393—5) is extremely vague. 96 BJ 1 . 2 8 8 ; A / 14.392. 97 Marcus ( L C L Josephus, vol. VII, p. 657 n.c) infers that Herod "had more than half a year to prepare a force against Antigonus", Here he follows Debevoise in holding that Ventidius was near Jerusalem in late 39, which is untenable in my view. 98 BJ 1.290; AJ 14.394. I do not follow those scholars who regard these as Idumaeans (Otto 1913, 29; Schalit 1969, 89; Smallwood 1976, 56). Idumaea was too far; the term homophylos is normally used by Josephus to refer to Jews (e.g. BJ 1 . 5 - 6 ; 9; 150; AJ 12.395; 13.198; 14.26; 131; see the full list of passages in Rengstorf 1 9 7 3 - 8 3 III, 2 0 9 - 1 0 , where it is stated that the term is "applied only to the Jews"); Herod will have welcome anyone who was ready to enlist (cf. Schalit 1969, 169 n. 84); the natural distinction here is between Jews and foreigners, not between Idumaeans and foreigners. 99 BJ 1.290, AJ 14.394.

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all Galilee went over to him, for he had to conduct several more campaigns to secure his hold over this region 100 . Only then did he turn southward, captured Joppa and proceeded to rescue his besieged relatives in Masada 101 . It was now that the attitude of the local population radically changed: "The country-folk rallied to him, some drawn by old affection for his father, others by his own renown; some in return for benefits conferred by both father and son, but the majority attracted by their expectations from one whose claim to the throne seemed assured; so that by now he had assembled a formidable army" 1 0 2 . In view of the route of Herod's march, the phrase "local population" (epichorioi) obviously alludes to the inhabitants of Idumaea; still the possibility that some people from Judaea proper joined Herod at this time cannot be excluded, as the term may indeed refer to them as well. A little while later, many of the inhabitants of Jerusalem joined him 103 . It should be noted, however, that the majority of those who joined Herod did not volunteer because of past loyalty to his father or to him, but because they sensed they could gain substantially if they supported Herod at that time. In other words, however extensive the Antipatrid influence in Idumaea was, it did not embrace all the population; many or perhaps even the majority remained outside their net of connections. It should also be noted that by that time Herod had already won over to his side the city of Samaria and at least part of the population of the region of Samaria 104 . His forces having thus been augmented, Herod now tried to put Jerusalem under siege, but was compelled to give up the attempt both because Silo refused to press the siege in view of the coming winter (39/38) and, apparently, because Herod's own army was not adequate to conduct on its own the neccesary operations 105 . 1 Some details provided by Josephus make it possible to arrive at a rough estimate of Herod's forces in early 38. Herod appointed his brother Joseph to govern Idumaea assigning him 2,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, for he still suspected there could be an uprising in favour of Antigonus there 106 . He himself went to Galilee, where Antigonus' troops had garrisoned several places, including the city of Sepphoris, and where part of the population still remained loyal to the Hasmonaean king. Herod captured these strongholds 107 , and then sent a force against the enemy who sought refuge

100 BJ 1 . 2 9 0 - 1 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 9 4 - 5 . Cf. Otto 1913, 29; Smallwood 1976, 56. Schalit goes to the opposite extreme in denying any success to this campaign (1969, 90 with nn. 1 1 7 - 8 ) . 101 BJ 2 . 2 9 2 - 4 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 9 6 - 7 ; 400. 102 BJ 1.294 (Thackeray's translation in LCL)\AJ 14.398-9. 103 BJ 1.294; A / 14.400. 104 BJ 1.299; 302, AJ 14.408; 411. For anti-Antipatrid feelings in Idumaea see below p. 163 f. 105 BJ 1 . 2 9 7 - 3 0 2 AJ 1 4 . 4 0 0 - 1 2 . 106 BJ 1 . 3 0 3 ; A / 14.413. 107 BJ 1 . 3 0 3 - 4 ; A / 1 4 . 4 1 3 - 4 .

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at the village of Arbela, identified with Khirbet Irbid, north-west of Tiberias 108 . This force included one unit of cavalry (ile) and three units of infantry {tele). The term telos, as used by Josephus, does not refer to any specific numerical strength or to any special type of soldiers 109 . The other term may have been used with reference to the Romanala and not to the Hellenistic ile110, that is to say, a unit of approximately 500 soldiers. This may indicate the order of magnitude of the infantry units on this occasion. I would suggest that the total forces amounted to about 2,000, though any number between 1,500-2,500 might be as likely. Forty days later Herod followed this advance force with the rest of the army, that is to say, the troops he had at his disposal in Galilee 111 . I take it that this was a far superior force and would estimate its strength as 3,000—5,000. Some support for this estimate may be found in the information that, having destroyed those who tried to hide in the caves of Arbela, Herod marched to Samaria with 3,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. A force of approximately the same strength must have been left in Galilee, even though its commander Ptolemy was killed by insurgents 112 . These details and calculations indicate that the entire army Herod had in Galilee at this time was about 6,000-7,000. He obviously must have had forces in more places, in Samaria, Joppa and Jericho for instance 113 , possibly about 2,000—3,000. Thus the entire forces of Herod, including those assigned to his brother Josephus, appear to have numbered about 10,000-12,000. An army of this strength was too small for the task of conquering Jerusalem. It stands to reason that Herod kept on recruiting soldiers and that his army was increasing. But in the meanwhile he had to apply for Roman support, and indeed Ventidius, acting under instructions from Antonius, sent two legions and 1,000 cavalry commanded by Machaeras. He could allow himself to despatch such a force for in the meanwhile he had completely routed the Parthian army at Gindarus on 9 June 38 114 . The strength of the Roman legions was almost always below standard in this period. Even newly raised legions did not reach the nominal strength; hence it may safely be assumed that the two legions numbered about 8,000 sol-

108 BJ 1.305; AJ 14.415. See Abel 1924, 3 8 0 - 2 ; 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 249; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 22.

109 On the terms used by Josephus to describe the Roman army see Saddington 1982, 4 8 - 5 0 . On telos and tagma see below p. 158. 110 Rengstorf 1 9 7 3 - 8 3 II, 382. See below p. 207. 111 BJ 1.305;/!./ 14.416. 112 BJ 1.314—6; AJ 14.431-2. 113 For the garrison of Jericho see BJ 1.302\AJ 14.411. 114 BJ 1.317; AJ 14.434. On this battle see Debevoise 1938, 1 1 7 - 9 . It was fought on the same day on which M. Crassus had found his death at Carrhae. See Ovid Fasti 6 . 4 6 5 - 6 and cf. Eutrop 7.5.

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diers 1 1 5 . Obviously the Roman force by itself was inadequate to put Jerusalem under siege and the attempt of Machaeras to capture the city by ruse was repulsed by Antigonus 1 1 6 . Enraged by this failure, Machaeras took revenge of all Jews, including supporters of Herod, whom he happened to meet on his march. It now became clear to Herod that this Roman commander would bring him no good, and so he retreated in indignation to Samaria. He then decided to set out for a personal meeting with Antonius, who was besieging Samosata, the capital of Antiochus of Commagene, in order to get adequate forces. While Herod was absent from Judaea, his brother Joseph made a raid on the grain in the vicinity of Jericho. But he fell into an ambush, and he himself and the five Roman cohorts he commanded all perished. These five cohorts amounted to a quarter of the infantry troops which were at the disposal of Machaeras. It is significant that most of the soldiers of these cohorts had been recently recruited from Syria, which reveals the quality of part of the army of Antonius at that time 1 1 7 . Herod proved his valour on his way to Samosata and attained the muchneeded support upon the surrender of that city. Antonius ordered C. Sosius, the recently appointed governor of Syria, to help Herod in the war against Antigonus. Sosius despatched two legions to Judaea at once, and he himself followed with the rest of his army 1 1 8 . On his way back, Herod recruited 800 mercenaries in Mount Lebanon. Taking these mercenaries and one of the Roman legions, he marched to Galilee to quell one more revolt. The insurgents shut themselves up in an unnamed fortress, which Herod was unable to storm, and dispersed only after the arrival of the second Roman legion sent by Sosius 1 1 9 . Herod then marched to Jericho to take vengeance on those who had killed his brother. The enemy amounted to some 6,000 light-armed troops, who occupied commanding positions in the hills overlooking Jericho. These troops effectively hurled javelins and stones at Herod's forces, but refused to fight at close quarters. This manner of fighting gave them advantage over the heavy-armed Roman soldiers, and indeed Herod himself was wounded on this occasion 1 2 0 . It is to be understood that all this time Machaeras was still stationed in the country: a short while after the battle at Jericho Antigonus sent his general Pappus to Samaria to fight this Roman commander 1 2 1 . The Has-

115 For a detailed account see Brunt 1 9 7 1 , 6 8 7 - 9 3 . 116 BJ 1 . 3 1 8 - 9 ; A J 1 4 . 4 3 5 - 6 . 117 BJ 1 . 3 2 3 - 4 ; AJ 1 4 . 4 4 8 - 9 . In the second passage it is said that six cohorts were destroyed, which may imply that Joseph commanded a Jewish unit in addition to the five R o m a n cohorts. 118 BJ 1.327; AJ 14.447. 119 BJ 1.329-30;AJ 14.452-3. 120 BJ 1 . 3 3 2 ; A / 14.456. 121 BJ 1.333; AJ 14.457.

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monaean king apparently reckoned he could check Herod in the environs of Jericho, while his general would attack the Roman officer in Samaria. But the plan miscarried, for Herod marched his army to Samaria. Near the site of Isana he won a decisive victory over Pappus who himself fell in the battle 122 . Herod was now in a position to put Jerusalem under siege, which he soon did in late 38 123 . He started the siege-operations even before the arrival of Sosius, concentrating the main effort in the area north of the Temple Mount, where the topographical features did not give advantage to the besieged, as Pompeius had done in 63. He constructed three lines of earthwork with towers in suitable positions, and while the work was still in progress set off to Samaria to marry his fiancée Mariamme 124 . After the wedding Herod returned to Jerusalem with a large force of infantry and cavalry. The following two accounts of Josephus contain information that may help to calculate the size of the army employed in this siege of Jerusalem: a. After his marriage he returned with a larger force to Jerusalem. Here too he was joined by Sosius with an imposing army of horse and foot, which that general had sent on ahead through the interior, while he himself took the route by Phoenicia. The total strength of the united armies amounted to eleven units {tele) of infantry and six thousand cavalry, not including the Syrian auxiliaries, who formed no inconsiderable contingent. b. After the wedding Sosius, who had sent his forces ahead through the interior, came through Phoenicia, the general himself coming with a large number of horsemen and foot-soldiers. And the king also arrived from Samaria, leading a considerable army in addition to the one he had earlier, there being about thirty housand. All these assembled before the wall of Jerusalem and took up their position at the north wall of the city; they made up an army of eleven units (tele) of foot-soldiers and six thousand mounted men, as well as auxiliaries from Syria 125 .

122 BJ 1 . 3 3 5 - 9 ; AJ 1 4 . 4 5 8 - 6 1 . Isana (not Cana as in BJ) is identified with Burj el-Isäneh, some 24 km. n o r t h of Jerusalem on the road to Shechem. See W.F. Albright, "The Site of Jeshanah", BASOR 9 (1923) 7 - 8 ; Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 283 n. 9; Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 111. No "decisive victory" was won by Herod at Jericho (contra Smallwood 1976, 57). 123 It was in the third year after he had been recognized as king by the Roman senate (December 4 0 , BJ 1.343; AJ 14.465); the storm mentoned after the battle of Isana (BJ 1.339; AJ 14.461; 465) indicates the season of the year. Cf. Smallwood 1976, 566. 124 BJ 1 . 3 4 3 — 4 ; A / 1 4 . 4 6 5 - 7 . 125 BJ 1 . 3 4 5 - 6 (Thackeray's translation in LCL); AJ 1 4 . 4 6 8 - 9 (Marcus' translation in LCL). Thackeray rendered tele as "battalions" and Marcus as "divisions", but for reasons explained below I have changed these to "units".

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Herod's Rise to Power

These two passages present some difficulties. To begin with, telos. This term usually means an army unit, without referring to any particular size. Sometimes it is used in a technical sense to denote an infantry, or cavalry, unit of 2048 soldiers and on occasion to denote the Roman legion 126 . However, the usual Greek term to denote the Roman legion is tagma, and Josephus quite consistently follows this usage. In 124 cases he employs this term to refer to (a) Roman legions of particular provinces or under the command of a certain governor; (b) specific Roman legions, sometimes with their numbers; (c) the Roman legion as a military establishment 127 . Only in a few instances does he employ the term tagma to refer to Roman units other than legions: (a) once to the cohorts of the Vigiles at Rome: (b) three times to auxiliary cohorts stationed in Judaea or Syria; (c) once to a century 128 . However, he normally uses the term speira to refer to auxiliary cohorts 129 . Therefore one should expect him to employ the term tagma whenever he wanted to refer to Roman legions 130 . Altogether Josephus uses the term telos on five occasions only, that is, three times in addition to these two passages; in all these three cases the term refers to units of the Herodian army 131 . It must be concluded that Josephus does not mean to say in these passages that eleven Roman legions assembled to take part in the siege of Jerusalem in 37. The term telos has here the usual meaning of an army unit, from which it follows that it was the entire army, namely the Herodian as well as the Roman contingents, that numbered eleven infantry units. Secondly, what is the meaning of the number "thirty thousand" appearing in the second passage? Three possible interpretations may be submitted: (a) it refers to the army brought by Herod on his return from Samaria; (b) it is the strength of the entire army that took part in the 126 H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. telos, I. 10. 127 Rengstorf 1 9 7 3 - 8 3 IV, 1 5 3 - 4 . Several examples will suffice: (a) BJ 1.157; 219; 327; 2 . 3 6 9 70; 375; 377; 383; 387; AJ 14.48; 79; 18.120; 262; (b) BJ 2.500; 544; 3.8; 233; 310; 4.63; 87; 445; 633; 5.69; 84; 6.68; 7.17; 225; (c) 3.97; 120; 123; 125. Of special interest is BJ 2.577-8: Josephus tries to convey the impression that as commander of Galilee he organized his afmy according to the Roman model with decurions, centurions, tribunes and commanders of tagmata; clearly this must mean the Roman legions. 128 (a) BJ 4.645; (b) BJ 5.244; AJ 19.365; 20.122; (c) AJ 17.282. Note, however, that there is a variant reading and that the term used in the parallel account in BJ 2.63 is lochos. Dindorf (below n. 132) and Feldman (LCL) translate tagmata in AJ 19.365 as "legions". But it is extremely unlikely that Claudius would have ordered to replace the auxiliary forces of Judaea by soldiers of the Roman legions of Syria. No doubt the sense here is of auxiliary cohorts. Cf. Saddington 1982, 49 with n. 104 on p. 210. 129 Rengstorf 1 9 7 3 - 8 3 IV, 3 0 - 1 ¡Saddington 1982, 4 8 - 9 . 130 Of course I ignore those cases where tagma is employed in reference to non-Roman military units (e.g. BJ 1.162; 4.84; 5.304; AJ 13.238; 14.169), to the Jewish sects (e.g. BJ 2.122; 160; 164) or to thé Roman equestrian order (BJ 2.308). 131 BJ 1.305; AJ 14.415; 472 (but lochoi is used in the parallel passage in BJ 1. 349).

The Reconquest

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159

siege, viz. the 11 infantry units, the 6,000 cavalry and the Syrian auxiliary forces; (c) the army brought by Herod from Samaria together with the army brought by Sosius from Syria numbered about 30,000, but the entire army assembled for the siege, namely those troops which had started the siege and the new contingents brought by Herod and Sosius, included 11 infantry units, 6,000 cavalry and Syrian auxiliary forces. According to the commonly held view, the number thirty thousand refers to the army brought by Herod from Samaria, whereas tele means 11 Roman legions that took part in the siege 132 . Several considerations argue against the first two interpretations mentioned above and are congruous with or even support the third interpretation suggested. As has been explained, Herod's army probably numbered about 10,000— 12,000 in early 38. Since then Herod had enlisted 800 mercanaries in Mount Lebanon, probably Ituraeans. As said before, it is highly likely that he kept on increasing the strength of the army, particularly in making preparations for the siege of Jerusalem. Assuming that he added forces equivalent to half or even two thirds of the forces he had had in early 38, which may well be an unrealistic supposition, his army would amount to 16,000— 20,000. Admittedly this is only a conjecture, but it seems incredible that Herod could or would have added more than such a proportion to his existing army, which he had been building up since his return, in the later part of 38. No doubt Herod did not concentrate all his troops at Jerusalem for experience had taught him that other regions, notably Galilee, had to be constantly garrisoned. It is thus inconceivable that he came from

132 See the relevant passages in the translation of J. Hudson, Flavii Josephi Opera (1720); W. Whiston, The Genuine Works of Flavius Josephus (1737; cf. the new edition by R. Shilleto, 1890); W. Dindorf, Flavii Josephi Opera (1847); J. Chamonard in T. Reinach (éd.),Oeuvres completes de Flavius Josèphe ( 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 2 ) ; O. Micheland O. Bauemfeind, Flavius Josephus: De Bello Judaico • Der jiidisehe Krieg ( 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 9 ) . For the translations of Thackeray and Marcus see the above cited passages with n. 125. See also J. Kromayer, Hermes 31 (1886) 71 n. 5; W.W. Tarn, CQ 26 (1932) 76 with n. 6; Jones 1938, 47;Schalit 1969, 96 with n. 144 (11 Roman legions; an Herodian army of at least 30,000 troops; the entire army amounts to at least 100,000): Brunt 1971, 503; A. Pelletier, Josèphe Guerre des Juifs (1975) I, 95 n. 2 (the entire army amounts to at least 100,000); A.N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1 (1984) 303 n. 16; 308 n. 28. For the view that the combined armies of Herod and Sosius numbered 11 legions see Gardthausen 1891 1,1, 239, and esp. Schmitthenner 1958, I, 130; II, 242 n. 26. The latter infers that (a) the army Herod raised himself was at least 30,000 strong; (b) telos is "a term for a unit consisting of, or numbering as many as, a Roman legion, i.e. some 5000"; (c) that Sosius concentrated six legions and Herod five units of a legion strength for the siege of Jerusalem. Brunt (loc. cit.), following Schmitthenner, accepts the possibility that Herod's contingents were called "legions". In my view Gardthausen and Schmitthenner are correct in regarding the figure "eleven" as referring to the total number of the infantry units. But it is less certain that Herod had units of a legion strength at this time; as explained before, telos is a general term for army units regardless of their strength. Of course, in this context one should not think of a very high strength difference between the Herodian and Roman units.

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Samaria with 30,000 troops. Secondly, as has been shown, telos means an army unit, a sort of a generic term, not a Roman legion. By employing this term, Josephus was able to refer to the infantry units of the Herodian army, as well as to the infantry units of the Roman army which here were of course Roman legions. This is most probably the reason why he did not use the term tagma, which is the term he normally employs to denote Roman legions. Thirdly, it is explicitly said in the first passage, and is implied in the second, that "the united armies (ovvadpoiodeiariq Se r??? o\rjq 8vvanecjre d = gladius\ n p i t = iaculum or hasta velitaris\ n m = hasta\ r p j n = pilum\ turris or testudo \ = cohors etc. The most persuasive similarity is that between scutum and p a (magen), the latter's measurements being 2.5 x 1.5 cubits; if this is a 45.8 cm. cubit, as argued by Yadin, this would be very close to the measurements of the scutum1™. However, the details ascribed to p ' s (kidan) might point to a sword which differs from the gladius115. The identification of a {migdal) with testudo is problematic, too. Contrary to what is implied by Yadin; the testudo was formed by ordinary legionaries, not by special units. Hence this is not a truly Roman parallel to migdal, particularly if one takes into account the fact that the soldiers of a migdal are armed with three cubit-longshields and eight cubit-long spears 176 . Even less convincing is the attempt to identify (degel) with cohors. According to Yadin, the first is a unit 1,000 strong. Such a unit may be

171 Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 111,1, 3 9 9 - 4 0 3 . 172 Commentary on Habakkuk 6 . 3 - 5 : " T h e explanation of this is t h a t they sacrifice to their standards and their w e a p o n s of war are the o b j e c t of their religion" ( D u p o n t - S o m m e r 1961, 262). F o r t h e R o m a n practice see e.g. BJ 6.316. O n the identification of the Kittim with the R o m a n s see Yadin 1962, 6 3 - 4 ; Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 III, 4 3 4 - 5 . G. Cohen does n o t address the problem of the Kittim identity in his suggestion t o interpret Commentary on Habakkuk 4 . 1 0 - 1 2 as a reference t o Ptolemy IX L a t h y r u s ( V a n ' t dack et alii 1989, 34). 173 D u p o n t - S o m m e r 1955, 25 - 4 3 ; 1 4 1 - 8 0 ; Yadin 1962, 1 1 4 - 9 7 . 174 Yadin 1962, 1 1 5 - 2 0 . 175 It d e p e n d s largely on the meaning of the " b e l l y " . Contrast the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Yadin 1 9 6 2 , 1 2 6 - 9 and D u p o n t - S o m m e r 1 9 6 1 , 1 7 8 n. 3 176 War Rule 9 . 1 2 - 1 5 . See Yadin 1 9 6 2 , 1 8 7 - 9 .

Strength

dnd

Tactics

213

equated with the praetorian and auxiliary, not the legionary cohorts 1 7 7 . Indeed according to Yadin, the identity between the 'front formation' ( D ' 3 B r i m y n ) and the Roman legion is not complete and does not concern details 178 . But the suggested identification of the 3,000 strong 'front formation', a thize-degel unit, with the Roman legion is untenable. The 3,000 figure of the ' f r o n t formation' is a standard strength; the standard strength of the Roman legion was 5,200 or 6,200. After several campaigns the strength of a Roman legion would decrease considerably; thus the sixth legion was less than 1,000 strong at the battle Zela in 47 1 7 9 . Therefore the argument that the 'front formation' strength was modelled on a 3,000 Roman legion must be rejected. True, the Roman manipular legion comprised 4,200, of which 3,000 were heavy infantry and 1,200 light-armed troops (velites)iS0. But an identification with the manipular army would result in dating the War Rule to the 2nd century B.C.E., which requires a more solid basis 1 8 1 . Thus, for instance, the skirmishing batallions ( o 1 ' J 1 a •> JI i ) are light-armed troops consisting of two battalions of slingers, two battalions armed with darts, one armed with lances and shields and one with swords and shields. On no account can they be identified with the velites of the manipular legion. Conversely, if they followed the model of the auxiliary cohorts, as maintained by Yadin, this would preclude the identification of the ' f r o n t formation' with the Roman manipular legion 1 8 2 . Likewise there are difficulties in accepting the suggested similarity between the cavalry described in the War Rule and the units of the Roman cavalry 183 . On the other hand, one characteristic of the 'front formations' is very significant: these are composite, manoeuvrable units essentially resembling the articulate organization and way of fighting of the legion and not the mass formation of the cumbersome phalanx of the Hellenistic armies 1 8 4 . Considering these pecularities of the work,

177 Yadin 1962, 1 6 1 - 2 ; 1 6 5 - 8 . 178 Yadin 1962, 175. For the strength of the Roman cohorts see Kennedy 1978; idem 1983. There are also some chronological problems, which need not be discussed here. 179 Bell. Al. 69. For a detailed account see Brunt 1971, 689. 180 Polyb. 1.16,2; 3.107,10; 6 . 2 0 , 8 - 9 . See Brunt 1 9 7 1 , 6 7 1 . 181 It is claimed that paleographically the War Rule was composed not later than the first century C.E., and that a more precise dating "depends on the historical identification of the military d a t a " (Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 III, 1 , 4 0 2 - 3 ) . It should be noted that the maniples of the manipular army were not all of equal strength: those of the hastati and principes were 120 strong, those of the triarii 60 strong. Such a structure of course differs from Yadin's suggestion ( 1 9 6 2 , 1 7 5 ) . 182 Yadin 1962, 1 5 8 - 6 2 . 183 Yadin 1962, 1 7 6 - 8 2 . Yadin fails to distinguish between standard strength, which is what War Rule regulates, and actual strength of units in time of war. 184 Yadin (1962, 1 7 0 - 5 ) is' convincing on this point. For attempts to relate the army of the War Rule to Hellenistic armies or the Maccabaean army see J.C. Fevrier, "La tactique hellénistique dans un texte de 'Auin Fashkha", Semítica 1 (1950) 5 3 - 9 ; K.M.T. Atkinson, "The Historical Setting of the Sons of Light and Sons of Darkness" Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 40

214

The Herodian

Army

the tactics and weapons described seem to bear the marks of a mixed, eclectic composition, in respect of the military institutions, including biblical, Roman and imaginative elements. Nonetheless, the work is instructive for the present study. It is remarkable that a dissenting Jewish community envisaged its army as employing weapons and tactics somewhat resembling those obtaining in the Roman army. This testifies to the deep impression the Roman army made on the native population of Judaea; it also makes it all the more probable that Herod based his army on the model of the Roman army, or borrowed various institutions of that army 185 . What is the significance of this conclusion? To begin with, the Roman point of view. Allied kings were regarded as an asset on account of the military support they could contribute to their Roman patrons, or to the Roman army. In point of fact, as early as the Second Punic War the Numidian king Masinissa fought with Scipio Africanus against Carthage, and his' contribution was indeed very significant. Scipio Aemilianus was supported by allied kings in the Numantine War. The practice of raising provincial troops and forces of friendly kings had become the norm by the mid-1st century and persisted through the civil wars of 4 9 - 3 1 . Caesar, Pompeius, Metellus Scipio and Labienus in 4 9 - 4 5 , the Caesarian generals, the Triumvirs and the Liberators M. Brutus, C. Cassius and Decimus Brutus in 44—42, and then Caesar Octavianus and Antonius, all relied considerably on this sort of troops. This was particularly conspicuous in Antonius' army in 31: no less than ten friendly dynasts were personally present at Actium with their troops 186 . These forces were there to complement, not to substitute, the heavy infantry of the Roman legions. The cooperation between the Roman heavy infantry and the allied cavalry and light-armed troops was tactically a top priority. To achieve effective cooperation some preliminary coordination and acquisition of Roman military

(1958) 2 7 2 - 9 7 ; P.R. Davies, 1 QM, The War Scroll from (1977) 5 8 - 6 7 .

Qumran:

Its Structure

and

History

185 Yadin (1962, 176 with n. 1) suggests that, when besieging Jerusalem,Herod h a d a 30,000 strong army organized in 11 legions, that is to say a 3,000 establishment per legion. This, however, is a wrong inference based on BJ 1 . 3 4 5 - 6 ; AJ 1 4 . 4 6 8 - 9 , on which see above pp. 15 7 ff. Still, a 3,000 strong formation in the army of Herod is a likely possibility (above p. 210 f.). Perhaps it is worthwhile mentioning the possibility that the War Rule was influenced by the structure of the Herodian army, which could explain why the similarity with the R o m a n army is only partial. 186 Tarcondimotus of Cilicia, Archelaus of Cappadocia, Philadelphus of Paphlagonia, Lycomedes of Pontus, Mithridates of Commagene, Jamblichus of Emesa, the Galatian Amyntas and Deiotarus, the Thracian Rhoemetalces and Sadalas and the Mauretanian Bocchus are listed by Gardthausen (1891 1,1, 359) who aptly writes: "Wie Agamemnon die Fürsten der Hellenen zum Kampfe gegen Ilien, so versammelte Antonius die Könige des griechischen Orients um sich zum Kampfe gegen R o m " . Herod prepared himself to take part in the campaign, but was prevented by the machinations of Cleopatra (BJ 1 . 3 6 4 ; A / 1 5 . 1 0 8 - 1 1 ) .

Strength and

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215

practices were absolutely necessary. Basic principles of Roman discipline, marching, camping, watching, patrolling, signalling and arraying for battle had to be learnt. We are ill-informed about this aspect of the Romanization of the armies of the allied kings. It stands to reason that any steps taken in this direction will have been welcome by the Roman patrons, if they did not initate them themselves. It is well to recall that this was the embryonic stage in the development of the auxiliary forces of the Roman army. What I am suggesting Herod did in Judaea may well have been regarded as a valuable experiment at Rome. Augustus had only a brief chance to look at the Herodian army on his way to Egypt in 30. But Agrippa was guided by Herod throughout the country in 15. He visited Caesarea, Samaria-Sebaste, Alexandrium, Herodium, Hyrcania and Jerusalem 1 8 7 . He thus had the opportunity to come to know the military installations and army organization from personal experience. The Herodian pattern could then have consolidated the strategic thinking at Rome on two points: for the present, the feasibility of effective coordination between an army of an allied king and the Roman army in case of need; the eventual integration of such an army within the framework of the Roman army in the future. Despite the uncertainties involved, the Herodian army is one of the very few cases which may testify to the development of such a line of thinking. In the event, a part of the Herodian; army, the pagan, not the Jewish troops, was integrated in the Roman army and joined the nucleus of the Roman garrison of Judaea 1 8 8 . To continue, Herod's point of view. For him the existence of a strong army was vital, in the first place for security reasons. These will be dealt with in detail later. Suffice it to say here that these were real, serious and complicated. Ethnically the army had a mixed character. Herod apparently succeeded in conscripting enough Jewish troops, whom he must have reckoned loyal to him, to ensure the bulk of the army remained both Jewish and big enough for his needs. But he did resort to foreign mercenaries and to pagan soldiers from the non-Jewish parts of his kingdom. In this way he dispensed with the need to rely solely on his Jewish troops, nor did he depend entirely on the pagan troops. It is worth while noting, though, that his bodyguard comprised foreigners only, possibly a few Jews as well 189 , as did that of several Roman generals and rulers of the period: Cae-

187 AJ 1 6 . 1 2 - 5 . 188 For all this cf. Saddington 1982, 1 6 7 - 8 ; 1 8 7 - 8 . On the Roman garrison of Judaea and the incorporation of the Sebastenians in it see Momigliano 1934, 6 9 - 7 2 ; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 3 6 3 4. 189 On the four units of bodyguards see above p. 183 f. Note the two somatophylakes who were dismissed and put to death: Jucundus and Tyrannus (AJ 1 6 . 3 1 4 - 2 0 ) .

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Army

sar, Antonius, Decimus Brutus and Augustus 1 9 0 . This was a question of personal security. But the foreign elements, presumably the more professional part of the army, .will have contributed proficiency, and their mere presence may well have fostered emulation. This brings in the second aspect of the functioning of the army from the point of view of Herod. Quite early he discovered the importance of a strong and efficient army as a tool to win the favour of Roman generals. According to Josephus, C. Cassius gave him Roman troops because he expected Herod to repay him in the same coin 1 9 1 . What then could be more profitable than to build u p an army trained, disciplined and structured according to Roman standards? Proud and confident in his achievements, Herod will have reported them to Augustus and Àgrippa. Surely this was the right way to show his usefulness as well as loyalty to the Roman empire.

190 Caesar: Suet. Cues. 3 6 . 1 ; A n t o n i u s : Cic. Phil. 2 . 1 1 2 ; 5 . 1 8 ; Brutus: App. BC 3.97: Augustus: Tac. Ann. 1.24,2; Suet. Aug. 4 9 . 1 ; Dio 5 6 . 2 3 , 4 . 191 BJ 1.225; AJ 14.280.

Chapter Fortifications

and

VI Garrisons

There is much more evidence, both archaeological and literary, about the fortifications of Herod than about those of the Hasmonaeans. Josephus provides detailed descriptions of many of the building enterprises of Herod, and remains of these still exist and have been excavated. Not a few scholars have presented accounts of the Herodian type of building and of its peculiar characteristics. But problems of various sorts still remain and await solution, for despite the relatively abundant information there are gaps in our knowledge, uncertainties and real or apparent contradictions between the literary evidence and the archaeological finds. Something will be said here about the architectural and structural aspects of the Herodian fortifications, but this is not the primary goal of the present inquiry. The investigation will mainly aim at locating the Herodian fortresses and delineating their distribution throughout the country. The constructional characteristics and architectural designs, to the extent that they are known in particular cases, will help in assessing the relative importance and functioning of the individual fortresses. Finally, the findings will serve as a basis, in conjunction with what has emerged about the Herodian army in.the preceding chapter, for a discussion of the security problems of Herod 1 .

1. Judaea Jerusalem took pride of place in Herod's extensive building enterprises, and for good reasons. The long struggle for the conquest of the city was in fact a struggle for the mastery of the country. It served also as proof, if this was needed, of the extreme importance of fortifications for the safety of the city 2 . Dismantled by Pompeius in 63, the refortification of Jerusalem had already started in 47. That Herod and Phasael were not able to maintain their control of the city in 40 need not be considered as

1 On the building enterprises of Herod see Watzinger 1 9 3 3 - 3 5 II, 3 1 - 7 8 ; Abel 1952 I, 3 6 3 - 7 9 ; Schalit 1969, 3 2 8 - 4 0 3 ; Avi-Yonah 1975, 2 5 4 - 6 3 ; Foerster 1976. 2 On the siege and conquest of Jerusalem in 37 see above p. 162 f.

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evidence of the frailty of the fortifications of Jerusalem at that time. With hostile population in the city and crowds of Jews coming on the occasion of the Pentecost, it was impossible to defend the entire circle of the walls and gates. Grossly outnumbered, the Idumaean brothers decided to hold on to the Bans and the nearby northern section of the wall of the city. Hyrcanus and Phasael were soon tempted to open the fatal negotiations with the Parthians, and that put an end to the defence on that occasion 3 . With these reminiscences in mind and lessons probably drawn from the recent conquest of Jerusalem, Herod soon applied himself to the task, of erecting anew on a grand scale the defences of his capital city. The fortification system consisted of three main elements: the walls, the Antonia and three huge towers in conjunction with the adjacent Herodian palace. All three should be assessed in relation to the inhabited area (the Upper City and the Lower City) and the Temple Mount, taking of course into account the topographical features of the city. Only the First Wall encircled both the Upper City and the Lower City. It did not encompass the Temple area, but started in a westward direction at a point a little bit south of the centre of the western wall of the Temple Mount. After turning southward, then eastward and then again northward, giving the encircled area a somewhat rectangular shape, it joined the Temple Mount at its south-eastern corner. The Second Wall, naturally constructed to protect a newly inhabited area, started from a gate at some point on the northern side of the First Wall, went northward and then eastward to join the Antonia. The Herodian palace was erected at the north-western corner of the Upper City, paralleling the western section of the First Wall. The Temple Mount was situated on the north-eastern part of the city and its walls provided the defence on this section. It follows that only in one sector was the city defended by two lines of walls. The two walls had been probably a feature of the city defences prior to the Herodian building. They were damaged in the siege of 37, but it is assumed that although Herod introduced changes in his rebuilding of the fortifications of Jerusalem, in general hefollowed the same lines of defence 5 . 3 BJ to Cf. see

1 . 2 5 1 - 5 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 3 5 - 4 1 . Cf. above p. 149. T h e basileia here must refer to the Baris, n o t the Hasmonaean palace in the Upper city, for Herod and Phasael would n o t have separated. Smallwood 1976, 5 2 with n. 23 and n. 5 below. On the Baris as a Hasmonaean dwelling place BJ 1.75; / I / 13.307.

4 Josephus provides a description of the topography of the city, of the walls, the towers, the Herodian palace, the Temple and the Antonia. See BJ 5 . 1 3 6 - 2 4 7 . F o r the ancient topography see Vincent and Steve 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 I, 1 - 2 6 ; also the succinct, tactically-wise exposition of AviYonah 1968, 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 . 5 AJ 14.476. They are n o t m e n t i o n e d in the parallel passage of BJ 1 . 3 5 0 - 1 . Tushingham ( 1 9 7 8 , 1 8 6 - 8 ) , followed by Maf=oz (19.85, 5 1 - 2 ) , attributes the construction of the Second Wall to Herod. A full answer would require a too lengthy discussion, b u t several points may suffice here, (a) Since the area called " s u b u r b " (proasteia, BJ 1.253; 14.339), where Herod a t t a c k e d

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Map 15: Herodian Jerusalem

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Some of their defensive characteristics are detailed by Josephus in an account that is given in connection with the siege of Titus in 70 C.E., including a description of the Third Wall which was constructed by Agrippa I 6 . The Third Wall was 10 cubits (pecheis) in width, made of stones 20 cubits long and 10 cubits wide and rose to a height of 20 cubits. On top of this it had battlements and bulwarks of two and three cubits high respectively, and thus the total height amounted to 25 cubits. Ninety towers, allegedly set at intervals of 200 cubits, strengthened the defensive qualities of this wall. These towers were 20 cubits in length and breadth, and rose to a height of 20 cubits; they were equipped with broad, spiral staircases and spacious apartments. Josephus does not specify the measurements of the First Wall and the Second Wall. He does say that these walls had 60 and 14 towers respectively, and he might imply that their towers were of the same features as those of the Third Wall. However, M. Avi-Yonah has shown, conclusively I think, that such towers could not have belonged to the wall built by Agrippa I, which that king was not able to complete 7 . Indeed those bulwarks and battlements of the Third Wall were more probably added by the Jews in the First Jewish Revolt 8 . If then this was not pure fantasy on the part of Josephus, the

the enemy in 4 0 , retained t h a t n a m e , by Tushingham's own admission (1978, 1 9 2 - 3 , n. 4 6 ) , when the Second Wall was certainly in existence ( A J 15.410), the reference to it in 4 0 proves nothing regarding the question whether it was walled or unwalled at that time, (b) In no way does the reference to the market-place (agora, BJ 1.251; AJ 14.335) imply w h e t h e r it was situated in a walled or unwalled area in 4 0 (contra Tushingham 1978, 187). (c) Since the basileia held by Herod in 4 0 m u s t have been the Baris (above n. 3), the wall held by Phasael at that time was perforce the Second Wall, (d) Contrary to what Tushingham inferred ( 1 9 7 8 , 188), the excavations of Mazar 1971, 2 5 - 3 4 have shown that the valley west of the T e m p l e Mount had ceased to be used as cemetery long b e f o r e the Hasmonaean period. Herod u n d o u b t e d l y introduced changes and i m p r o v e m e n t s to the Hasmonaean defensive system, but in his discussion of these M a ^ z does n o t pay enough a t t e n t i o n to the refortification carried o u t by Antipater and Hyrcanus II (above p. 131 with n. 8). 6 BJ 1 . 1 4 2 - 5 8 . On t h e walls see Simons 1952, 2 8 2 - 3 4 3 ; Vincent and Steve 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 I, 5 1 145; Avi-Yonah 1968; Smallwood 1976, 5 6 1 - 4 . The course of the Second Wall as well as that of the Third Wall is disputed. For remains of the First Wall, including Hasmonaean towers, between the Temple M o u n t a n d David'sJTower see N. Avigad, 1 9 8 3 , 6 5 - 7 4 . On its western and southern parts see A. Strobel, in O. Benz et alii, Josephus Studien ( 1 9 7 4 ) 3 4 4 - 6 1 ; B. Pixener, "An Essene Quarter o n M o u n t Z i o n " , Studia Hierosolymitana in onore del D.B. Bagatti I ( 1 9 7 6 ) 2 4 7 - 6 4 ; Geva 1985, 5 2 - 4 . For the remains on top of the eastern slope of the City of David see Reich 1987, 1 6 0 - 1 . 7 Avi-Yonah 1968, 1 1 5 - 9 , referring to BJ 2.219; 5.151 - 2 ; AJ 19.236. See also next note. 8 SeeBJ 2.563; 6 4 8 - 9 and cf. 5.515. The point is well taken by Avi-Yonah 1968, 1 1 8 - 9 against P. Vincent's and K.M. K e n y o n ' s interpretations. On the Third Wall see also S. Ben-Arieh and E. Netzer, "Excavations along t h e Third Wall of Jerusalem, 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 4 " , IEJ 24 ( 1 9 7 4 ) 9 7 107; Avi-Yonah, in EAEHL II, 6 0 9 - 1 0 ; P. Benoit, " O u en est la question du "Troisième M u r " ? " , Studia Hierosolymitana in onore del D.B. Bagatti I ( 1 9 7 6 ) 111 - 2 6 ; G. Schnitt, "Die dritte Mauer Jerusalems", ZDPV 97 ( 1 9 8 1 ) 1 5 3 - 7 1 ; E.W. Hamrick, ' T h e F o u r t h North Wall of Jerusalem, a Barrier Wall in the First Century A . D . " , Levant 13 ( 1 9 8 1 ) 2 6 2 - 6 ; idem, in Tushingham 1985,

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only other possibility is to assume that he ascribed to the towers of the Third Wall what were really features of the Herodian walls. Besides, considering the circumstances of the construction of the Third Wall, the walls built by Herod were probably at least equally strong. Of course, some inaccuracy and exaggeration are to be taken into account in these data. This reservation may hold true of Josephus' other figures as well. However, a total rejection of Josephus' account would be out of place. On the whole, therefore, I regard the second possibility, viz. that the towers described are of the Herodian walls, as the more likely 9 . The north-western corner of the First Wall was strengthened by the construction of three exceptionally strong towers named Hippicus, Phasael and Mariamme: friend, brother and wife of the king. All told, Hippicus was 80 cubits high (PI. 15.), with a square, solid, 25-cubit base 30 cubits high, a 20-cubit water reservoir built over it and above this a double ceiling apartment crowned by turrets and battlements. Phasael rose to a height of 90 cubits, made up, from b o t t o m to top, of a 40-cubit solid, cubic base, then a 10-cubit high porticoe with parapets and bulwarks, over the centre of which rose another tower with spacious apartments crowned by battlements and turrets. Mariamme, the third tower, was of smaller dimensions: a 20-cubit solid, cubic base, over which were constructed luxurious dwelling quarters, the total height amounting to 55 cubits. The towers were made of massive, white marble blocks, though the measurements ascribed to them by Josephus are patently exaggerated. Constructed at a site where the First Wall climbed a high hill, the towers obtained a superb commanding position over the entire city and the adjacent areas beyond the walls 1 0 . Built on the site of the Hasmonaean Baris, the Antonia had as its base a 50-cubit high rock, precipitous on three sides and protected on the

2 1 5 - 3 2 ; Ma'oz 1985, 5 3 - 4 . If the Third Wall is n o t to be identified with the partly carried o u t enterprise of Agrippa I to build a new wall, to which latter, t h o u g h , belong the remains at Damascus Gate, b u t is to be considered as the work of the Jewish rebels in the First Jewish Revolt, this would strengthen the argument against the reliability of the magnificent features ascribed by J o s e p h u s to this wall. However, this is an extremely vexed question and all the suggestions o f f e r e d to-date have n o t really solved it satisfactorily. 9 See the r e m a r k s of Geva ( 1 9 8 1 , 5 9 - 6 0 ) on inexact m e a s u r e m e n t s in Josephus. On the unreasonable length of the intervals see Avi-Yonah 1968, 116—7, w h o does n o t , however, raise the possibility of the features being in t r u t h those of t h e Herodian walls. F o r inaccurate, stereotyped features in J o s e p h u s ' architectural descriptions see Foerster 1991, Chap. 4B ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) . 10 BJ 5 . 1 6 1 - 7 1 . On these towers see J o h n s 1950, 1 4 0 - 8 . T h e e x t a n t tower (David's T o w e r ) is p r o b a b l y t o be identified with Hippicus rather than with Phasael. See Simons 1 9 5 2 , 2 6 6 - 7 1 ; Geva 1 9 8 1 (with extensive bibliography); Bahat 1981. BJ 5 . 1 7 2 - 3 proves that all three towers were inserted into the wall. Cf. N.P. Clarke, " T h e F o u r Walls of J e r u s a l e m " PEQ 76 ( 1 9 4 4 ) 2 0 4 - 5 ; Norris 1946 fails to u n d e r m i n e this and see Geva 1981, 6 0 - 1 with n. 24. It follows that this detail should be corrected in the maps of Avi-Yonah ( 1 9 7 5 , 209) and Foerster ( 1 9 7 6 , 979).

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north by a deep fosse. The rock base was covered right from its bottom upwards by a smooth glacis which virtually prevented any attempt to scale i it. An external wall, three cubits high, a proteichisma, encircled the four towers at the corners, three of which rose to the height of 5 0 cubits and the one at the south-east angle to 70 cubits. The latter had a commanding view over the entire Temple area, with two staircases descending to the adjacent two porticoes of the Temple enclosure. Considering the adjacent high ridge on the north, the towers of the Antonia were vital, and effective, for the defence of this vulnerable section of the city. The interior part of the fortress was equipped with various apartments, baths and broad courtyards which served as a military camp. The monumental dimensions which were once ascribed to the Antonia may no longer be maintained; in view of the now more likely precise site of the fortress the measurements were probably 120 x 45 m., still an imposing edifice 11 . It appears that the construction of the walls and of the Antonia started soon after the conquest of Jerusalem in 37. The Antonia had surely been completed before 31, and it has been suggested to date its inauguration to early 34 12 . There is no clue for dating the completing of the construction of the walls. Most probably the three huge towers of the First Wall were already in existence about 29 when Josephus mentions the presence of two garrisons in the city 13 . These towers were built into the city wall, and at that angle of the First Wall Herod built his own palace in about 23. In addition to the protection provided on two sides by the city wall and by those towers, the palace was itself completely encircled by a 30-cubit high wall which was strengthened by ornamental towers set in at equal intervals. It was a magnificent and luxurious building, about 350 x 60 m., but at the same time its construction bestowed on this corner of the city the features of a second imposing fortress 14 . Mention should also be made

11 BJ 5 . 2 3 8 - 4 5 . For the extant remains under the Convent of the Sisters of Zion and the Franciscan Convent of the Flagellation, once ascribed to the Antonia, see Vincent and Steve 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 I 1 9 3 - 2 2 1 ; Marie Aline 1955, 4 7 - 1 4 2 ; B. Bagatti, "Resti romani della flagellazione inGerusalemme", SBF8 ( 1 9 5 7 - 8 ) 3 0 9 - 5 2 ; C. Maurer, "Der Struthionteich und die Burg Antonia", ZDPV 80 (1964) 1 3 7 - 4 9 . P. Benoit has shown, however, that these remains belong to the Hadrianic city of Aelia Capitolina, and that the Herodian fortress should be located south of them. See "L'Antonia d'Herod legrand et le forum oriental d'Aelia Capitolina",//77!/?64 (1971) 1 3 5 - 6 7 , esp. 158ff. See also Avi-Yonah, in EAEHL II, 607. 12 Marie Aline 1955, 2 0 - 1 . 13 AJ 15.247. For the date cf. Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 289. 14 AJ 15.318; BJ 5 . 1 7 6 - 8 2 . For remains of the Herodian palace see R. Amiran and A. Eitan, "Herod's Palace", IEJ 22 (1972) 5 0 - 1 ; Bahat and Broshi 1972 ("the Herodian platform is ca. 350 m. long and 60 m. wide"). The palace was connected with the three towers as can be learnt from the way the besieged Romans and the Jewish rebels managed to retreat to them in 66 and 70 C.E. respectively (BJ 2 . 4 3 8 - 4 0 ; 6 . 3 9 2 - 4 0 0 ) . See also Tushingham 1985, 2 5 - 3 2 ; 4 5 53.

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of the building of the Herodian Temple. The external walls of the Temple enclosure were aligned to the First Wall on the south-eastern angle of the Temple Mount (PI. 13). They formed part of the eastern and northern defence lines of the city and were joined to the Antonia on the north-west angle of the Temple enclosure. Huge blocks were used for building the foundations, 40 cubits long according to Josephus. A considerable number of them still exist and can give credibility to the exceptional effort made by Herod in implementing this prestigious project, though here again Josephus seems to have somewhat erred in his figures 15 . What were the functions and aims of these fortifications? It goes without saying that they were aimed at defending the city against enemies attacking from without. The First Wall, according to Josephus, "owing to the surrounding ravines and the hill above them on which it was reared, was well-nigh impregnable" 16 . Indeed no attempt was ever made to break through or capture the city on the side of this wall in Roman times. The Antonia fortress defended the city at the topographically weakest section of its whole circumference - the northern line between the eastern and western hills. This section was protected, looking from outside, first by the Second Wall and then by the First Wall. It has been suggested that in addition, if equipped with artillery, the Antonia could have given effective cover to the northern side of the Second Wall and Hippicus, Phasael and Mariamme to the western side of that wall 17 . In fact, the Jews fired at the Romans with artillery captured from their adversaries at the beginning of the revolt in 66. Yet in 70 they used these engines from the Third Wall in the first stage of the siege, and only after the Second Wall was breached did they fire from the Antonia 1 8 . Moreover, if the Second Wall extended as far as the Damascus Gate in the present wall and only then turned eastward and after some distance southward, joining the Antonia from the north, which is Avi-Yonah's proposal, then the artillery potential

15 On the Temple see BJ 5 . 1 8 4 - 2 3 7 , an account which is usually compared with the one given in M. Midd. For modern accounts of the Temple enclosure see Hollis 1934, 2 9 - 9 9 ; Simons 1952, 3 4 - 8 1 ; 4 0 9 - 3 6 ; Vincent and Steve 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 II, 5 2 6 - 8 6 ; Schalit 1969, 3 7 2 - 8 0 . For recent excavations'see Mazar 1971, 1 3 - 7 ; idem, "Excavations near the Temple Mount", Qadmoniot 1 9 - 2 0 (1972) 7 4 - 9 0 (in Hebrew); idem, 1978; Avi-Yonah, in EAEHL II, 6 0 4 - 7 . 16 BJ 5.142 (Thackeray's translation in LCL). 17 Norris 1946. 18 BJ 5.267: Simon posts his artillery upon the ramparts; BJ 5 . 2 5 2 - 3 : he controls the Third Wall; BJ 5.347 and 3 5 8 - 9 : John's men fire at the Roman troops from the Antonia after the Second Wall had been captured by the Romans. No explicit mention is made of the use of artillery after the capture of the Third Wall and in the account of the battle for the Second Wall. Josephus describes sorties made by the defenders and "wall battles" (teichomachiai), but this probably refers to slingers, archers and javelin-throwers rather than artillery (BJ 5 . 3 0 3 - 5 ; contra Norris 1946, 31). See, however, BJ 5.359 with Shatzman 1989. On the suggested course of the Second Wall see Avi-Yonah 1 9 6 8 , 1 2 2 - 5 ; contra Tushingham 1 9 7 8 , 1 8 6 - 7 ; Maioz 1 9 8 5 , 5 2 - 3 .

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of the Antonia would be quite limited in relation to an enemy attacking the Second Wall. If the Second Wall followed the above-mentioned course, the Antonia would be of value only after the enemy captured this wall. Perhaps this would explain why the Jewish defenders started firing from the Antonia so late in 70. But Avi-Yonah's reconstruction is by no means certain and the urban development of Jerusalem in the 1st century C.E. may have limited the firing capacity from the Antonia, things being different in Herod's time. On the other hand, as artillery could be employed from platforms on the Second Wall, Herod's engineers may have reckoned that it was not vital that the Antonia should be capable of giving cover to the whole line of the Second Wall. At any rate, the events of 70 clearly show the use of this fortress as an artillery base. It is worthwhile mentioning that there is a piece of evidence for the existence of artillery in another Herodian fortress, which, too, makes it likely that the fortifications of Jerusalem were intended to provide platforms for artillery 1 9 . But the function of the Antonia fortress should be assessed from another point of view. It will be recalled that 60 soldiers of Herod posted to guard the Temple had been burnt to death by Antigonus' men in 40. Presumably there had not existed an easy access between the Baris and the Temple area at that time, which could explain Herod's failure to save his men. This was now rectified by providing stairs leading from the Antonia to the porticoes of the Temple enclosure 2 0 . Indeed whatever defensive importance the Antonia had against a potential enemy from without, this is not the lesson Josephus wishes to convey to his readers: " F o r if the temple lay as a fortress over the city, Antonia dominated the temple, and the occupants of that post (i.e. the south-eastern tower of the Antonia) were the guards of all t h r e e 2 1 " . The command over the Temple enclosure was then the primary object of the Antonia fortress. It could also serve as a fortress by itself, being naturally defensible and artificially fortified on all sides. All three functions are also prominent in the fortification complex at the north-western angle of the First Wall (the Herodian palace, Hippicus, Phasael and Mariamme): command over the city, defence against external enemies, a stronghold easily cut out and defensible from the immediate surroundings 2 2 .

19 Norris discusses in a h y p o t h e t i c a l w a y t h e advantages of t h e use of artillery in the d e f e n c e o f Jerusalem ( 1 9 4 6 , 31). See on M a c h a e r u s beloW'P- 2 6 3 f. a n d a s u m m a r y of evidence and general considerations p p . 2 7 1 f f . 20 BJ 1.251-3] AJ 1 4 . 3 3 5 - 9 . 21 BJ 5.245 ( T h a c k e r a y ' s t r a n s l a t i o n in LCL). 22 T h e c o n t r o v e r s y w h e t h e r the t h r e e t o w e r s were erected t o d e f e n d t h e palace or to s t r e n g t h e n the d e f e n c e of t h e city (Geva 1 9 8 1 , 6 1 n. 24) is s u p e r f l u o u s . T h e palace was built w h e n t h e t o w e r s were already in existence. Still t h e y gave p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e palace w i t h o u t losing their former function.

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An example may be cited for the functioning of these two fortresses other than against an external enemy. In 4 B.C.E. Varus, the Roman governor of Syria, left a legion in Jerusalem as a guard against a possible Jewish uprising. The Jews indeed rose, took control of the Temple enclosure, obviously aiming at the Roman garrison of the Antonia, and attacked the Herodian palace in the Upper City and the hippodrome in the southern part of the city. This last named building is mentioned only on this occasion. Clearly the Roman commander of the legion divided his troops into three forces, one was to operate from the Antonia, one from the Herodian palace and the third was presumably stationed outside the city as a reserve. Against the overwhelming numbers of the insurgents, the Romans were naturally constrained to employ defensive tactics, and towards that end the Antonia and the Herodian palace served them well23. That these two sites should have possessed the features needed for this purpose must have been Herod's concern from the very beginning. As is implied here and explicitly told by Josephus in his description of them, they could accommodate large numbers of troops. If the legion was divided into forces of equal strength, this would result in 1,500-2,000 soldiers stationed in the Antonia and the palace alike. Later a Roman cohort was permanently stationed in the Antonia, and there existed a military camp at the palace14. Now in about 28, on the occasion of Herod falling ill, Alexandra "made an effort to seize control of the fortified places (phrouria) in the city. There were two of these; one (guarded) the city itself, and the other the temple. Whoever was master of these had the whole nation in his power" 25 . These were the Antonia and most probably the towers Hippicus, Phasael and Mariamme, for at that time the palace did not exist as yet. Alexandra failed to get the support of the commanders of the fortresses, one of whom was Herod's cousin Achiab, and was speedily put to death. The conclusions are manifest: Herod continually kept a strong garrison in the city; the garrison was there primarily to quell Jewish uprisings, not to operate against potential foreign enemies. Finally, the question of the supposed enemies the fortifications were intended to ward off. As a simple answer one may say that Herod had no particular enemy in mind when he decided upon the reconstruction of the fortifications of Jerusalem. The walls were to be erected against any potential enemy who might put the city under siege. At that time one could have thought of three possibilities: Jewish rebels; an army of

23 S / 2 . 4 3 - 6 ; / ! / 1 7 . 2 5 4 - 6 5 . 24 For the Roman cohort in the Antonia see BJ 2.224; 5.244; AJ 20.106. See C.H. Kraeling, "The Episode of the Roman Standards at Jerusalem", HThR 35 (1942) 268; for the camp see BJ 2.329. 25 AJ 15.247-8 (Marcus' translation in LCL).

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a neighbouring king; the Romans. The fortifications were clearly stronger than what was needed against Jewish rebels, provided the city was adequately garrisoned, which probably had not been the case in 40. That Jerusalem will have been besieged by any neighbouring ruler seems to have been unlikely, probably not even by the Nabataeans (below Chap. VII). But the Romans cannot be excluded, however surprising this might sound considering Herod's unfailing allegiance to the political masters of the world. It has to be borne in mind that the fortification works were carried out in the 30's when any one with some political experience and sense could have foreseen the imminent resumption of the Roman civil wars. For all his political astuteness Herod might have felt the need for extra security considering the uncertainties prevailing then. And, finally, Cleopatra presented a constant menace which could not be ignored (see below pp. 287 ff.). The massive building and reconstruction of the fortifications of Jerusalem, based to a large extent on Hasmonaean foundations, differed in many respects from the occupation of a Hasmonaean fortlet just 5 km. west of the city. This was a two-storey square tower, 10 x 9.5 m., made of large hewn stones. Only the first storey, consisting of four rooms and a small staircase, was found complete in the excavations, undoubtedly because it was built almost entirely underground. The main entrance led directly to the upper storey of which only some remains are now extant. Originally built in the time of Alexander Jannaeus, the tower was still occupied in the Herodian period as witnessed by the coins and pottery excavated on the site. According to the excavator, "the tower in Giv'at Sha'ul is no doubt part of a military building program, the purpose of which was to strengthen the network of roads both for defence and for the levying of customs on the roads between Jerusalem and the maritime cities to the west" 2 6 . Its location indeed gave the tower a commanding position over a section of an ancient road which connected Jerusalem with the coastal plain, though the dating of this road cannot be established. Because of its proximity to Jerusalem, the tower may also be regarded as an advance post of the capital. It may also be observed that the tower seems to have been taken over as it had been in the Hasmonaean period, without any changes being made in the Herodian period; it was still in use in the 1st century C.E. Another fortlet associated with the same road was excavated at Hurvat Mesad, situated about 16 km. west of Jerusalem. It had originated in a Hasmonaean fort probably built under Alexander Jannaeus, but possibly earlier. According to the excavator, a watch-tower was constructed on the south-eastern angle of the Hasmonaean fort, and the levelled Hasmonaean

26 Tzaferis 1974, 94.

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foundations became a sort of substructure for the Herodian building. The new large complex, extending over about 1,600 square metres, was surrounded by a wall 1.3 m. wide. Very likely then these two posts were part of a Herodian fortification system aimed at guarding the road from Jerusalem to Joppa and the other coastal cities 27 . At present no more Herodian fortifications of this type are known on this road, though similar towers may have been constructed in Judaea and other regions 28 . The continuation of a former Hasmonaean site together with extensive reconstruction works and additions is noticeable at Jericho. Under the Hasmonaeans there had been two or, probably, three forts: Threx and Taurus,- demolished by Pompeius, and Doq 2 9 . Herod had made Jericho a supply base during the war against Antigonus and garrisoned it. Several battles took place in its immediate vicinity, in one of which Herod's brother Joseph was killed and in another Herod himself suffered a wound 30 . The adjacent country was fertile and prosperous, not only on account of the famous balsam plantations; Antonius had bestowed them on the covetous Cleopatra 31 . A pleasant place in winter, the later Hasmonaeans had built some palaces at Jericho. The amenities of the place attracted Herod who took over the palaces; in one of their pools he had Aristobulus, Mariamme's brother, drowned in about 35 3 2 . Last, but not least, nearby Jericho passed a major route leading to Jerusalem. Herod constructed above Jericho a fortress "remarkable for its strength and beauty", which he named Cyprus in honour of his mother 33 . According

27 Fischer 1979; idem 1985a; idem 1985b; idem 1987. The reports are not clear enough, for instance the "chantiers A - E " are not marked on the plan provided (1985, 428; cf. 1987, 1 1 9 22). If the eastern part of the complex of the Herodian period was completely destroyed in the course of the erection of the Byzantine fort, its plan must be extremely conjectural. The attribution of the stones reused in the Byzantine period to one rather than to the other of the former phases is questionable. Finally, it is not explained why the Herodian phase is once considered as a fortified farmstead (1985b) and then as a fortified way station (1987, 127). One may hope that the promised final report will clarify these points. 28 Tzaferis (1974, 88 n. 7) refers to several alleged watch-towers in Judaea (Kochavi 1972, p. 44 no. 27; p. 50 no. 79; p. 55 no 104; p. 56 no. 112; p. 6 6 - 7 no. 169; p. 79 no. 236) and Samaria (Kochavi 1972, p. 189 no. 110). Yet there are quite considerable differences, in measurements, designs and construction, and none of these can firmly be dated to the Herodian period. 29 See Chap. II p. 51 with n. 6 5 - 6 and the bibliography there cited. If Doq is not identical with either Threx or Taurus then there had been 3 Hasmonaean forts adjacent to Jericho. For the demolition of Threx and Taurus see Strabo 16.2,40. 30 Base supply and garrison: BJ 1 . 2 9 9 - 3 0 2 ; AJ 1 4 . 4 0 8 - 1 1 ; death o f , Joseph: BJ 1 . 3 2 3 - 4 ; AJ 1 4 . 4 4 8 - 9 ; Herod is struck by a javelin: BJ 1.332; AJ 14.456. 31 BJ 1.361; AJ 15.92—4. 32 BJ 1.437; AJ 1 5 . 5 3 - 6 . At that time this particular palace seems to have belonged to Alexandra. For the building activities of Herod at Jericho see BJ 1.407. 33 BJ 1.407; 417; 2.484; A / 16.143.

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Map 16: The Jericho area

Judaea

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to the commonly held opinion, it is located at Tell el-'Aqaba and thought to have been preceded by a Hasmonaean building. The site was partly excavated, but no detailed account has so far been published (PI. 10). It has been proposed to identify it with one of the forts destroyed by Pompeius. An aqueduct, apparently Hasmonaean in origin, supplied with rainwater four cisterns located on the eastern slopes of the tel, some 60 m. below the summit. Another aqueduct, ascribed to the Herodian period, brought in water from one of the springs of Wad! Qelt, some 7.25 km. west of the fortress 3 4 . Remains of another fortress have been traced on a hill near Jericho, at Nuseib el-Aweishireh north of WadI Qelt, and tentatively attributed to Herod 3 S . Given the state of the information available at present, it is clear that Jericho was guarded by at least one adjacent fortress, possibly one or two more. Whether the city itself was garrisoned as well is not known. Herodian Jericho is thought to have extended in the areas close to Tulul Abu el-i'Alaiq, north and south of WadTQelt (Pis. 8,9). No remains of walls have been noticed here 3 6 . However, there were surely to be found guards at the palaces. Soon after the death of Herod, which took place at Jericho, his sister Salome and chief ministers Alexas and Ptolemy "gathered the army {to stratiotikon) in the amphitheatre at Jericho". This could not have possibly been the whole Herodian army. Presumably it consisted of units of the royal guard who, one may assume, normally accompanied the king as well as the troops stationed in Jericho and the fortresses nearby. Only later did other units of the army convene for the king's funeral 3 7 . Considering the multiple importance of the place, a considerable number of troops must have been stationed there. Hyrcania differed almost in every respect from the fortress(es) of Jericho. It did not stand on a major road, neither was it situated in a fertile region nor did it offer any amenities (Pis. 18,19). It had originated as a Hasmonaean fortress and for that reason had been destroyed by Pompeius and again by Gabinius. Reconquered by Herod in the late 30's (above p. 167), it was rebuilt and became a major fortress and prison, being isolated and located in the desert. It was one of the three fortresses shown to Agrippa on his visit to Judaea in 15. Those suspected of seditious plans were sent there and put to death, presumably after no more information could be squeezed

34 On the identification of the site with Cyprus and one of the former Hasmonaean forts see Alt, PJB 21 (1925) 2 4 - 5 ; Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 359. Ploeger (1955, 1 6 6 - 7 n. 14) criticizes this chain of identifications. For a report of the digging of the site see E. Netzer, "Cyprus", Qadmoniot 3 0 - 1 (1975) 5 4 - 6 1 (in Hebrew). For the aqueducts see Meshel and Amit 1989; Garbrecht and Peleg 1989, 1 4 - 5 . 35 Abel 1 9 3 3 - 3 8 II, 359. See Meshel 1978, 4 6 - 7 . 36 I am grateful to Dr. E. Netzer for this information, Cf. Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 194 n. 42. 37 BJ 1 . 6 6 6 - 7 0 ; / ! . / 1 7 . 1 9 4 - 6 .

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from them 3 8 . The identification of the site of this fortress with Khirbet el-Mird is commonly accepted, but no proper excavations have been carried out there. Later it was chosen by St. Sabas to build there his monastery in 479. Two aqueducts, the southern about 9 km. long and the northern 1,950 m. long, supplied with rain water fifteen cisterns and two pools located around the fortress. The total capacity of the water reservoirs, including five cisterns cut in the rock on the summit, amounted to about 20,000 cubic m. 39 The isolated site and the topographically defensible qualities of the place were obviously the advantages of Hyrcania from the point of view of Herod and his Hasmonaean predecessors. Herodium was in its entirety an original fortress-palace, or "acropolis", of Herod (Pis. 20,21,22,23). It was built at a distance of 60 stadia south of Jerusalem, to commemorate the victory he had won there over his pursuers in 40. The construction took place in about 23 40 . According to Josephus, it was an artificial hill with the shape of a truncated cone: "At intervals it has round towers, and it has a steep ascent formed of two hundred steps of hewn stone. Within it are costly royal apartments made for security and ornament at the same time" 41 . The site, called Jebel Fureidis and situated about 12 km. south of Jerusalem and 5 km. south-east of Bethlehem, has been extensively excavated. Herod was buried here, but so far his tomb has not been discovered 42 . In association with the palace-fortress a city was built in the surrounding plain, which became a capital of toparchy 43 . Although Josephus' account conveys the impression of the site, it has to be supplemented by some details now known thanks to the finds of the archaeological excavations 44 . The hill over which the palace-fortress is built rises high above the adjacent vicinity offering a panoramic view of the landscape far around. The building complex comprises a circular structure consisting of two massive concentric walls with an outer diameter of 63 m. and an innner diameter of 5 1 m. The interval between these walls is 3.5 m. wide. 38 Agrippa's visit: AJ 16.13; prison and place of execution: AJ 15.366. Antipater was buried there (BJ 1.664; AJ 17.187). For the fate of the fortress in the 50's and 30's see above p. 000 with n. 167 (Chap. IV). 39 See Ploeger 1955, 1 4 8 - 5 1 ; Wright 1961, 1 - 8 ; 1 6 - 8 (an account of the topography and remains of Herodian buildings and graves at El-Mird); Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 1 8 6 - 7 . On the topography, the monastery and the identification of El-Mird with Hyrcania see also A.E. Mader, Oriens Christianus 34 (1937) 2 7 - 5 8 ; 1 9 2 - 2 1 2 . For the water supply system see Patrich 1989; Garbrecht and Peleg 1989, 1 4 - 6 . 40 BJ 1.265; 4 1 9 - 2 1 ; A / 14.360; 1 5 . 3 2 3 - 5 . 41 AJ 15.324 (Marcus' translation in LCL). 42 BJ 1.673; AJ 17.199. For the excavations see Corbo 1963; idem 1967; G. Foerster, in EAEHL II, 5 0 2 - 1 0 ; Netzer 1981. 43 BJ 3.55 ; / 4 / 15.325; Plin. NH 5.70. 44 For a detailed analysis of the architectural features see Netzer 1981, 7 9 - 1 0 1 , who suggests reconstructions of various elements as well as of the entire complex and of the stages of the work. For the water supply installations see Garbrecht and Peleg 1989, 1 7 - 8 .

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Four towers were constructed on the eastern, northern, western and southern points of this circular structure. The eastern tower, the best preserved of the four, is round, 18.2 m. in diameter; the other three are semi-circular. The palace was built within the inner area of this massive fortification. The external face of the circular structure was covered by a mound made of earth and stones, thus giving the whole structure the shape of a tumulus. A covered entrance was formed at the eastern tower. It has been suggested that this was a multi-storeyed tower of the same type as Hippicus, Phasael and Mariamme 4 5 . The unique design, not comparable with any contemporary building in the whole Graeco-Roman world, has some features in common with the Antonia, for instance the four towers and the combination of an inner palace defended by these and by a wall alike. Still, the differences are easily distinguishable: circular shape and semi-round or round towers as against quadrangular shape and square towers. As well as a formidable stronghold, Herodium was thus a magnificent place for recreation, only a short distance from the capital city of the kingdom; one can understand why it was included in the tour schedule of Agrippa. In the First Jewish Revolt it was one of the three major fortresses which remained in Jewish hands even after the fall of Jerusalem 4 6 . The Jewish insurgents occupied it in Bar-Kokhba's revolt as well 47 . It is questionable, though, whether there was any particular military reason for constructing Herodium at this spot, excepting the sentimental attachment of Herod to the place. Some secondary routes passed nearby, but this could have hardly justified the enterprise on purely military grounds. Furthermore, once the decision was made to construct a palace, it was necessarily followed by the construction of fortifications, for no residence of the king could be envisaged without the creation of the means to defend it. In other words, no general strategic conception dictated the erection of a fortress at this point. Yet another consideration has to be taken into account. It has been shown that Herodium replaced Beth-Zur as the capital city of a toparchy in the regional administration of Judaea 4 8 . At the time Herod built Herodium, Beth-Zur had long been in decline 4 9 . A new urban and administrative centre was needed; this was 45 Netzer 1981, 7 9 - 8 3 . Corbo (1967, 74) suggests that the round, massive tower was intended to serve as a shelter of last resort should an enemy capture the complex. Without excluding this possibility, the proximity to the entrance seems to indicate the main reason for the special strengthening of this tower. 46 BJ 7.163. Cf. 4.555. 47 This is known from the Bar-Kokhba's letters which were found in Wadf Murabba'at. See P. Benoit et alii, Les grottes de Murabbtfat (1961) 1 2 4 - 5 ; Y. Yadin, "Expedition D", IEJ 11 (1961) 5 1 - 2 . Archaeological finds, notably coins of Bar-Kokhba, testify to the occupation of Herodium by the rebels. 48 Avi-Yonah 1966, 95;Schalit 1969, 210. 49 Above p. 153 f. with n. 74 and the bibliography there cited.

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provided by Herod's enterprise, which combined a city and a royal palacefortress to protect the king and to guard the city. Map 17: Judaea in the Herodian period

The question may now be raised whether all the capital towns of the toparchies had forts and garrisons. There existed nine such toparchies in Judaea: Jerusalem, Jericho, Herodium, Bethleptepha, Ammaus, Lydda, Thamna, Gophna and Acraba 50 . There were special reasons and circumstances for the fortification and garrisoning of the first three. Of the rest it may be mentioned that Ammaus and Thamna had been made strong-

50 Avi-Yonah 1966, 9 4 - 5 ; Schalit 1969, 2 0 8 - 1 1 ; Schürer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 II, 1 9 0 - 6 . Avi-Yonah argues for the existence of a large, administrative unit, a meris, in the territorial administration of Herod (Judaea proper, Idumaea, Samaria, Galilee and Peraea), each consisting of several toparchies (1966, 98; see also Momigliano 1934, 5 9 - 6 2 ; Stern 1974b, 250).

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holds by Bacchides and Gophna was later garrisoned by Vespasianus 5 1 . Again, the circumstances differed from those obtaining under Herod. On t h e whole, therefore, it cannot be shown by evidence that there existed a system of maintaining garrisons in the capital cities of the toparchies, but such a possibility cannot be dismissed altogether.

2. I d u m a e a As has been shown, the population of Idumaea was divided in its attitude towards Herod and his father. The Antipatrids had certainly wide influence and connections, but there was to be found there a strong opposition, presumably of people loyal to the Hasmonaeans or on account of local feuds of which almost nothing is known (above p. 163 f.). A great number of discharged soldiers settled in Idumaea, which may be considered as one way Herod sought to secure his sway over this region (above p. 182). There is also some evidence for the existence of several forts. T o begin with, Masada. This certainly formed a class apart, in certain respects comparable to Herodium, Alexandrium, Hyrcania and Machaerus, but n o t with any other fortress in Idumaea (PI. 24). The formidable rock had already been occupied under the Hasmonaeans, probably by Alexander Jannaeus rather than by Jonathan 5 2 . Uniquely defensible by nature, Masada seems to have been only slightly, if at all, fortified by the Hasmonaeans. Malichus' brother had taken it in an attempt to contest the supremacy of Antipater's sons, but Herod soon regained it, in all likelihood by an agreement and not by force 5 3 . The 800 troops left there by Herod to defend his family and his fiancée and future mother-in-law had successfully withstood the siege of Antigonus 5 4 . Not a long time after he reconquered Judaea, Herod started on the enormous building project, which must have taken several years to complete. It had probably advanced far by 30, for Herod sent there his mother, sister and all his family before setting out on his way to meet Caesar Octavianus in Rhodes 5 5 . Josephus provides quite a long description of the site and the buildings constructed by Herod, of which several points deserve attention. Masada

51 O n the fortifications of Bacchides see above pp. 3 8 - 4 3 . For Gophna see BJ 5.50. The Roman legion V Macedonica was stationed at Ammaus (BJ 4.445), and is attested by inscriptions (CIL III 6 6 4 7 ; 1 4 1 5 5 , 1 1 ; 1 4 1 5 5 , 1 2 ; cf. H. Landau, "Two inscribed Tombstones", 'Atiqot 11 ( 1 9 7 6 ) 89-90). 52 BJ 7.285. Cf. 4.399. See Schalit 1969, 3 3 3 - 4 ; contra Avi-Yonah et alii 1957, 1 - 3 ; Tsafrir 1982,126-7. 53 BJ 1 . 2 3 7 - 8 ; A / 14.296. See above p. 146. 54 BJ 1.267; 2 8 6 - 7 ; 2 9 3 - 4 ; A J 14.362; 3 9 0 - 1 ; 3 9 9 - 4 0 0 . 55 AJ 15.184.

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was precipitous all around, and only in two places could it be approached: on the east via the so-called snake path which was very perilous, and on the west where the ascent was easier. The top plateau of the rock was encircled by a wall, 12 cubits high and 8 cubits broad, along a circuit of 7 stadia (about 1,300 m.). Thirty seven towers of 50 cubits height stood at intervals along the wall. Apartments were attached t o the encircling wall on the interior. The plateau area was left for cultivation to ensure supplies for the defenders in case they might be cut off from without. A great number of tanks were cut in the rock to ensure supply of water. The place was abundantly stocked with corn, oil, wine, pulse and dates and thus there existed a plentiful food supply for years. The weapons stored were sufficient for 10,000 men, and in addition there were quantities of iron, copper and lead. A magnificent palace was built with a strong wall and four towers which rose to a height of 60 cubits. An imperceptible road connected the palace to the summit of the hill. The approach from the west was blocked by the building of a big tower, 1,000 cubits from the summit 5 6 . Masada was extensively surveyed in the 1950's and a full report of this survey was soon published 5 7 . In the early 1960's it was thoroughly excavated by the late Y. Yadin, who published a preliminary report and a b o o k 5 7 3 . A full report of these excavations is about to be published 5 8 . The results of the survey and of the excavations complete and correct the account of Josephus on many and various points. The architectural design of the sundry buildings is now better understood and several of the various technical problems and puzzles of this huge project have by now been learnt and may be solved. There is no doubt that Josephus' description is not based on a personal visit to the site;" indeed some details in his account may have been derived, directly or indirectely, from the Poliorketika of Philo of Byzantium S 8 a . However, the general picture emerging from'

56 BJ 7 . 2 8 0 - 9 9 . 57 Avi-Yonah et alii 1957 (with references to earlier works). 57a: Yadin 1 9 6 5 ; i d e m 1966. 58 For the final reports see Meshorer 1989 (coins), Yadin and Naveh 1989 (Aramaic and Hebrew inscriptions), Cotton and Geiger 1989 (Latin and Greek documents), Foerster 1991 (art and architecture, forthcoming) and Netzer 1991 (the buildings, forthcoming). Further volumes will include pottery, weapons etc. 5 8aln preparation for siege, Philo o f B y z a n t i u m proposes, among other things, to cultivate vegetables, to stockpile victuals and to store various materials (Poliorketika II). He mentions, inter alia, wheat, barley, peas, beans, wine, oil, arms, iron and bronze. However, many other important items and means specified by Philo are not mentioned by Josephus, and one cannot conclude for certain that the Jewish historian based this part of his description on t h e theoretical treatise of the Greek writer rather than on information he received concerning Masada. On this question see Foerster 1991 (forthcoming) Chap. 4D.

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Map 18: The water supply system of Masada 1 path connecting the upper cisterns with the summit 2 the northern palace 3 path connecting the lower ^ ' " c i s t e r n s with the summit

the great bath-house 5 pool '6 cistern at the top of the Snake path 7 8 " •10

the Snake Path gate the western palace cistern swimmingpool

11 store rooms 12 casemate wall 13 the southern fort 14 tower protecting the water supply system aqueducts

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the reading of Josephus remains the same. I shall single out only a few points: the encircling wall was of the type known as casemate wall; the storage-houses complex encompassed an area of about 2 acres (106 x 91 m.), which should have been sufficient to accommodate the arms and food mentioned by Josephus; the buildings on the plateau and along the encircling wall indicate the capacity to accommodate a great number of troops and household servants in addition to the king, his family and his friends; the palatial building complex on the n o r t h of the rock as well as the two other palaces do present those characteristics of luxury noted by Josephus; twelve cisterns with a capacity of 41,400 cubic m. were discovered on the north-western slopes, as well as two aqueducts and a dam which fed the cisterns from the rain floods of the nearby Wadi Saba (Masada) and Wad! Nimrah (Ben Yair) to the west. A b o u t a dozen cisterns and two open pools, with a capacity of about 7,000 cubic m., were constructed on the summit. It may be recalled that the only serious problem which had really aggravated Herod's men put under siege in 4 0 - 3 9 was the shortage of water. At the eleventh hour an abundant rainfall saved them from resorting t o a desperate attempt at flight 5 9 . The conclusion to be drawn is quite clear: Masada was constructed as a self-contained, enormous fortress, designed to accommodate the king, his entourage and family together with a large household and a strong force. Indeed Josephus concludes his description with the following words: These preparations have, in fact, been made for grave reasons. For it is said that Herod furnished this fortress as a refiige for himself, suspecting a twofold danger: peril on the one hand from the Jewish people, lest they should depose him and restore their former dynasty to power; the greater and more serious from Cleopatra, queen of Egypt. For she never concealed her intention, but was constantly importuning Antony, urging him to slay Herod, and praying him to confer on her the throne of Judaea . . . It was such fears that drove Herod to fortify Masada 60 . Josephus' source is anonymous; probably he found it neither in Herod's memoirs nor in Nicolaus of Damascus' writings. But this need not subtract from its credibility. It is plausible and convincing, and there is no reason to seek other causes and objects. To judge by the results of the archaeological excavations, however, the construction of the fortifications was completed after the downfall of Cleopatra, which points to the internal problem, the Jews, as the more serious and fundamental one. Still, the

59 BJ 1 . 2 8 6 - 7 ; AJ 1 4 . 3 9 0 - 1 . For the water supply system of Masada see Avi-Yonah et alii 1957, 5 4 - 9 with Fig. 3; Netzer 1989a; Garbrecht and Peleg 1989, 1 8 - 9 . 60 BJ 7 . 2 9 9 - 3 0 2 (Thackeray's translation in LCL).

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nature of Masada as a place for refuge is self-evident, and in fact is noted by Josephus on another occasion 6 1 . Given this goal of the fortress, it is a clear and telling indication of the anxieties that troubled Herod then and afterwards. It is highly probable that some of or even all the fortresses occupied by Malichus' brother were in Idumaea, but their identity and location, except Masada, are unknown. They may or may not have included the two other Idumaean fortresses known from Josephus' writings. One was Oresa, where Herod had met his brother Josephus in his flight from Jerusalem in 40. Herod recovered the fortress from his enemies in 39, and it may well have been occupied thereafter, although it is not mentioned any more 6 2 . The second fortress, called Gittha, was fortified by Machaeras after Josephus had been killed. According to BJ it was in Idumaea, while according to AJ it was in Judaea. However, it stands to reason that the revolt referred to by Josephus took place in Idumaea where Herod's brother had been governor. Besides, at that time Judaea was still controlled by Antigonus and a revolt there cannot make sense. The precise site of Gittha is otherwise unknown. Its very construction evidences the opposition to Herod as well as the nature of the fortress: a base to control and subdue the nearby population. Herod's character being what it was, the fortress was probably maintained from then on and not abandoned 6 3 . Herodian Idumaea consisted of two toparchies. One was En-Gedi and the second was called Idumaea. Previously these two toparchies had had Adora and Marisa as their headquarters respectively 64 . Marisa had been destroyed by the Parthians in 40, but some headquarters for the administration of the toparchy must have replaced it, the likely candidate is Beth-Gubrin (later Eleutheropolis) 6 5 . Why Adora had been replaced by En-Gedi is not stated in any source. Either it had declined or En-Gedi had risen to such importance as to justify this change. Once again there is no evidence to clarify the question whether, as capital cities of toparchies, they were

61 BJ 4 . 3 9 9 : "Not far from Jerusalem was a fortress of redoubtable strength, built by the kings of old as a repository for their property and a refuge for their persons during the vicissitudes of war; it was called Masada" (Thackeray's translation in LCL). Netzer 1991 (forthcoming) distinguishes three phases of construction at Masada, the Herodian fortifications belonging to the last one. 62 BJ 1.266; 294-, AJ 1 4 . 3 6 0 - 1 ; 400. 63 BJ 1.326; AJ 14.450. Cf. Otto 1913, 32, MoeUer and Schmitt 1976, 7 4 - 5 , where, however, the fact that Joseph was left by Herod to govern Idumaea is not considered. 64 Avi-Yonah 1966, 96; Schalit 1969, 2 1 0 - 1 . The list of the Herodian toparchies is based on Plin. NH 5.70 and BJ 3 . 5 4 - 5 , assuming these two sources to reflect the administrative organization under Herod. For the division of Idumaea into two toparchies see Schalit 1969, 7 0 9 - 1 0 . 65 Marisa: BJ 1.269; AJ 14.364. Beth-Gubrin: BJ 4.447 (Betabris). Conceding the great prosperity of this city to belong to a later period does n o t disprove the possibility of the town having had some earlier importance (contra Schalit 1969, 210; 710). See also Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 42.

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garrisoned. Possibly there is some evidence for fortifications near EnGedi 66 . However, another phenomenon has now to be presented and examined, viz. that of the fortified townlets and villages. This phenomenon is at least as old as the second century B.C.E. Judas Maccabaeu's had stormed and destroyed several fortified places, including Hebron 67 . The existence of such fortified townlets is explicitely reported in Josephus' account of the invasion of Idumaea by Sex. Cerealis, the legate of the 5th legion, in 68 C.E. 68 : he laid waste what is known as Upper Idumaea; here he carried at the first assault the petty town (as it falsely called itself) of Caphethra (Kaphethra pseudopolichnion) and burnt it to the ground, and then attacked and proceeded to besiege another town called Caphabris. The wall of this place was exceptionally strong and he was anticipating a prolonged delay 69 . How is this to be understood? To this end, two considerations are apposite. First, the phenomenon of the fortified village or townlet was not unique or exclusively Idumaean, but was to be found in Samaria and Galilee as well 70 . Second, since the start of the revolt in 66 C.E. steps had been taken by the Jews to strengthen the fortifications of their settlements. This is reported by Josephus as a general policy and detailed, understandably, only with regard to Galilee 71 . In other words, this type

66 For archaeological finds at Adora see Kochavi 1972, p. 6 2 - 3 no. 154. On En-Gedi see esp. B. Mazar, T. Dothan, I. Dunayevsky, "En-Gedi, The First and Second Seasons of Excavations, 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 2 " , eAtiqot 5 (1966) 1 - 1 0 0 ; EAEHL II, 3 7 0 - 8 0 ; Vogel 1974, 2 8 - 9 ; Vogel and Holtzclaw 1982, 2 7 - 8 . Two fortlets have recently been excavated on the mountain above En-Gedi, for which see A. Ofer and Z. Meshel, Hadashot Arkheoiogiot 88 (1986) 86 (in Hebrew). The first had been constructed in the Israelite period; several coins were discovered here including one from Herod's time. The second, a short distance further, yielded a great number of coins, Seleucid, of Alexander Jannaeus and of Vespasian. To judge by its location, it was a guard and road-station, for two roads have been-observed to pass through the ascent of En-Gedi. 67 See IMacc. 5 . 3 - 5 ; 6 5 ; / / M a c c . 1 4 . 1 5 - 2 3 . 68 For the date see W. Weber, Josephus und Vespasian (1921) 1 5 6 - 7 . The correct, full name is Sex. Vettulenus Cerealis, not Cerealius as is given by Josephus. He was a legatus legionis, not a tribune (contra Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 500). See BJ 3.310; 4.552; 554; 6.131; 237. 69 BJ 4 . 5 5 2 - 3 (Thackeray's translation in LCL). Betabris (Beth-Gubrin), Caphartoba and Hebron (BJ 4.447; 554), too, may have been fortified settlements. 70 Samaria: BJ 2.69; AJ 17.290 (Arous and Sappho); Dar 1986, 2 2 1 - 3 . Galilee: AJ 18.28 (the fortifications, dynamis, of the village Bethsaida are strengthened on its becoming a city). 71 BJ 2.563; 5 7 3 - 5 6 4 8 - 9 ; Vita 1 8 7 - 9 . On the fortification works in Galilee in the time of the First Jewish Revolt see M. Avi-Yonah, "The Missing Fortresses of Flavius Josephus", IEJ 3 (1953) 9 4 - 8 ; M. Har-El, ' T h e Zealots' Fortresses in Galilee", IEJ 22 (1972) 1 2 2 - 3 0 ; BarKochva, "Notes on the Fortresses of Josephus in Galilee", IEJ 24 (1974) 1 0 8 - 1 6 ; D. Barag, "Kefar Ata - The Missing Fortress of Josephus", Eretz-Israel 15 (1981) 3 9 1 - 5 (in Hebrew with an English summary on p. 88*); M. Aviam, "The Location and Function of Josephus' Fortifications in Galilee", Cathedra 28 (1983) 3 3 - 4 6 (in Hebrew).

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of evidence need not be considered as indicating a Herodian strategy to fortify and garrison the townlets of Idumaea in an attempt to create in this region some sort of a fortified military zone on the southern border of the kingdom. This conclusion is stated as a reaction to the apparently accepted theory of M. Gichon, who has put forward arguments and evidence for regarding Idumaea as a special zone of defence organized by Herod, a forerunner of the Roman limes in the Negev which was allegedly established by the Flavians 7 2 . Here only the question of the so-called Herodian Limes will be considered. The case of the Herodian Limes is based on general considerations and analogies, archaeological finds and a very few items of evidence in the writings of Josephus. I shall deal with the two last headings in the following discussion, more or less in a reverse order, reserving the first for the conclusion of this chapter 7 3 . The first passage presented to prove the existence of a system of forts in Idumaea is Josephus' account of the uprising of the veterans. They were confronted by Achiab, Herod's cousin, who preferred to refrain from an engagement in the plain and so fought them from strong points (and TCOU & pvuvoTaroiv

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TT)V ev

TOIQ

ne5 ioiv nai vuidris T-qv \pvoip, EiiXXaioc 6' AVR^J SIT^JKEI r a iroWa; Strabo 16.4,24: EvvePawe SI TOVTO TOV IIEV (3aaiXe'u>c TOV 'O0oSa mi? "0\v ¡FPOVRIIOVTOC TCJV KOIVCIV, xai tidKurm TCJV Kara ir¿Xenov ... airnvra. Si km rf[ TOV eniTponov notovfievov e£ovoia TOV EuXXaiou. Strabo ascribes the failure of the Arabian expedition of Aelius Gallus to the treachery of Syllaeus who participated in it as guide as well as commander of the 1,000 Nabataean force sent by Obodas III ( 1 6 . 4 , 2 3 - 4 ) . 71 Herod's journey to Rome is reported in BJ 1.542—6; AJ 16.90—130. For the dating of this visit to 12 B.C.E. see Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 293 with n. 16. It was during this journey that the people of Trachonitis revolted, as is clearly stated in AJ 16.130, which event is told again in AJ 1 6 . 2 7 1 - 4 . According to Smallwood (1976, 96 n. 128; cf. 101 n. 145), the episode occurred prior to Herod's visit to Rome in 12, for Josephus' narrative is chronologically confused. This is not necessary, at least as regards the relative sequence of events between the visit of Syllaeus to Jerusalem and the revolt of the Trachonitis. In any case, even Smallwood accepts that Syllaeus supported the Trachonites because he bitterly hated Herod as a result of the rejection of the marriage compact. 72 For the whole episode see AJ 1 6 . 2 2 0 - 5 , esp. 224: "This connexion, he said, would not be unprofitable to Herod through his association with the government of Arabia, which was now virtually in his (Syllaeus") hands and by rights should be more s o " (Marcus' translation in LCL).

296

Herod and the Nabataeans

which normally was made to Gentiles wishing to marry Jewish women 73 . Syllaeus regarded it as an insult, and henceforth sought to take revenge of Herod. It was only then that he became Herod's bitter enemy 74 . From their base in the Nabataean territory the brigands then started to raid Judaea and Coele-Syria. This points to the regions of northern Transjordan, that is to say, such cities of the Decapolis as Dium and Abila as well as Batanaea or Gaulanitis were the potential targets of the attacks, not Judaea proper 7S . Herod took revenge by killing the kinsmen of these brigands who stayed behind in Trachonitis, thereby giving the brigands a cause for vendetta. Herod then demanded the surrender of the brigands, which was rejected by Syllaeus who denied they were in the Nabataean territory. Even the intervention of C. Sentius Saturninus, the Roman governor of Syria (10/9—7/6), to bring pressure on Syllaeus was of no avail; indeed the Nabataean minister set out to Rome to plead his case before Augustus. Having attained the permission of Sentius to take military action, Herod invaded the Nabataean territory and captured and demolished Rhaepta, the fort of the brigands76. A Nabataean force that came to the rescue of the brigands was defeated, and in the fight its chief Nakebus, a kinsman of Syllaeus, and twenty five of his men were killed 77 . Herod then evacuated the Nabataean territory and settled 3,000 Idumaeans to guard against the brigands of Trachonitis 78 . But Syllaeus, who was staying in Rome at the time, brought the whole matter before Augustus, convincing him that Herod invaded and devastated the Nabataean kingdom. Augustus' reaction may be taken as revealing a fundamental principle of his policy: a friendly king should not lead his army outside his country under whatever circumstances. Since Herod had done this very thing, Augustus sent him

73 Cf. AJ 20,38-40. See Jones 1938, 93; Smallwood 1976, 96 n. 128. Whatever Herod's true feelings were, he may well have seized the opportunity to show his adherence to Judaism. 74 BJ 1.487. This condensed version gives only the end result of the episode. Cf. Schalit 1969, 599. 75 AJ 16.275. On the meaning of Coele-Syria see the literature cited in Chap. IV n. 40. 76 AJ 16.276-83. The location of Rhaepta, mentioned only here and in 16.288, is not known. See Moeller and Schmitt 1976, 158. Peters (1977, 277) does not give reasons for locating it in Ammonitis. It was in Nabataean territory, and its stands to reason that it was situated not far from the former regions of Zenodorus (Batanaea, Trachonitis, Gaulanitis and Auranitis) and the cities of the Decapolis, which indicates a place in southern Auranitis. Wikgren (LCL Josephus, vol. VIII, 323 n.c) refers to "Erremte", which "was located 25 miles N.N.E. of Pella in Byzantine times"; see also map of Galilee and Surrounding District at the end of that volume. Suggestions to locate it not in Nabataean territory are totally untenable in view of the political consequences of Herod's military operations; contra Dussaud 1927, 339; Abel 1952 I, 389; Kasher 1988,164. 77 AJ 16.284. This figure represents the version of Nicolaus of Damascus (AJ 16.350), whereas Syllaeus claimed that 2,500 men were killed (AJ 16.288). Neither version need be taken to provide the precisely true figure. 78 AJ 16.285. See above p. 173 f. on this military colonization.

Transjordan

297

an extremely harsh letter, and from then on Herod did not dare to act against the Arabs and the brigands of Trachonitis, who resumed their raids upon hearing from Syllaeus of Herod's falling from Augustus' favour 7 9 . Unable to'apply aggressive measures against the Nabataeans and those brigands who acted from the Nabataean territory, Herod then settled Zamaris and his troops in Batanaea against the Trachonites 8 0 . Eventually Herod regained the emperor's good grace through the services o f N i c o l a u s o f Damascus, who managed to present the full circumstances of the war and at the same time revealed Syllaeus' machinations against the Nabataean king Obodas III and his successor Aretas IV. According to Josephus, Augustus condemned Syllaeus to death on that occasion (about 7 B.C.E.), but first he sent him back to pay his debts 8 1 . About a year later Syllaeus returned to Rome and was accused by Antipater, Herod's son, and Aretas IV; his execution probably took place at this time 8 2 . This reconstruction of the events leaves no doubt about the nature of the security problems in these regions of Herod's realm. The main and more serious menace on the maintenance of peaceful conditions, law and order was posed by the local population of Trachonitis. Because of the poverty of the land and the rough nature of the country, the inhabitants of this rocky, rugged region tended to make their living by raiding the lands of their neighbours. Their ways of life and activities belong to the phenomenon termed social banditry, and Herod sought to solve the problem not only by applying military measures but also by changing their ways and sources of living 83 . Basically the Nabataeans had nothing to do with these raids and incursions; as a matter of fact they had an interest in curbing and suppressing them, for the brigands of Trachonitis endangered the commercial routes to Damascus as well as the Nabataean settlements in southern Auranitis. From this point of view, the Nabataean traders and the Nabataean kingdom as an organized state could only have profited from Herod's enforcement of law and order in Trachonitis. A distinction between these fundamental interests on the one hand and the aims and motives of certain Nabataeans on the other hand may therefore be drawn. In the 22/21 phase of hostilities the Nabataean party involved was in a way deceived by Zenodorus and concerned about the loss of its private investment in the possessions of the Ituraean tetrarch. In the later phase of

79 AJ 1 6 . 2 8 6 - 9 3 . Augustus' concern is shown by the question he presented to Herod's men: ei TT)K orparlav 'HpcjSrjt; £ £ ayayoi (2 89). For some speculations about Augustus' motives see Smallwood 1976, 97. 80 AJ 1 7 . 2 3 - 8 . See above pp. 1 7 5 - 8 1 . 81 AJ 1 6 . 3 3 5 - 5 3 . Cf. 1 6 . 2 9 4 - 9 . 82 BJ 1.574—7;-4/ 1 7 . 5 4 - 7 . Only Strabo (16.4,24) reports his execution. 83 AJ 15.346; 1 6 . 2 7 1 - 2 . See above p. 173 with n. 10. On banditry see also Isaac 1984, esp. 1 7 5 - 8 ; Shaw 1984.

298

Herod and the Nabataeans

hostilities, the conflict stemmed from the personal motives and aims of Syllaeus. His pride wounded by the failure to marry Salome, he sought to take revenge of Herod. He probably regarded and exploited these warlike activities as an opportunity to enhance his position and influence within the Nabataean kingdom, his ambition extending now to attain the Nabataean throne. While this constituted a serious threat to the security of the Herodian regions affected, essentially it was ephemeral and limited. Firstly, throughout these few years of conflict, Syllaeus showed his compliance with the rules of behaviour dictated by and inherent in living within the framework of the Roman empire. His chance of winning'the conflict depended above all on his success, or failure, to gain the emperor's favour. Once choosing this strategy, he was debarred from resorting to military activities in the long run. Secondly, as explained above, a prolonged state of war was detrimental to the Nabataean trade and to the economic concerns of the sedentary population in the Nabataean part of Hawran. It emerges that due to the political and economic conditions obtaining in this period, no real conflict of interests evolved between the Nabataean kingdom and the Herodian kingdom over Trachonitis and Auranitis. That this was the case and that these were the true conditions can be learnt from the known military devices implemented by Herod for the long run, viz. the colonization of the Idumaeans and of the Babylonian troopers: they were aimed against the Trachonites, not against the Nabataeans. And it may be added that no fortifications are known, from neither literary sources nor archaeological finds, to have been constructed against the latter. There is almost nothing in Josephus' writings about the relations between the Nabataeans and Herod in the southern sector of Transjordan, the Peraea. Herodian Peraea extended from the territory of Scythopolis on the north to some distance south of Machaerus. On the east it bordered on the territories of Gerasa and Philadelphia, which seem to have maintained their freedom, and of Medaba. The only area where it extended considerably up into the plateau on the east was Esebonitis. Medaba and Rabbathmoab, further to the south, remained in all likelihood under Nabataean control since their surrender by Hyrcanus II to Aretas III. Consequently the two kingdoms had a common border only in the southern part of the Peraea. It may be well to bear in mind that the precise border line between the Herodian territory and that of the Greek cities and of the Nabataean king cannot be established. A reference to Machaerus being chosen as a fortress on account of its proximity to Arabia is made in connection with the description of the Roman siege of the site. Machaerus was probably built at about the time of Herod's confrontation with Malichus I; at that time Herod may well have reckoned that more troubles were to be expected in his relations with the Nabataean kingdom. The massive fortifications, though, were

The Balance of the Evidence

299

hardly needed against the Nabataeans, and in this respect the fortress was to function rather as a place of refuge 84 . The Peraean Herodium was built close to the Nabataean territory, but in this case there is no hint in Josephus' words that the site was fortified on account of this proximity 8 5 . On the other hand, the military colonization of Esebonitis was epi Peraea, that is to say, as a check upon this region, and not epi Arabia 86 . With this the relevant information, literary, and archaeological, is exhausted. After the battle which had taken place near Philadelphia in 30 (above p. 290) the Jewish Peraea sinks to oblivion as far as the Nabataeans are concerned. Although the present known evidence may be defective, there is no reason to assume that Herod built here a defensive line or that Peraea suffered from serious Nabataean raids of which nothing has survived in Josephus' writings.

4. The Balance of the Evidence Several more finds and pieces of evidence have to be presented before an attempt can be made to draw conclusions about the relations between the Herodian kingdom and the Nabataeans. Syllaeus' visit to Herod has already been referred to. Although Josephus does not provide details about the nature of the business which occasioned that visit, he obviously regards it as a normal occurrence which does not call for any special comments, apart of course from the affair between Salome and Syllaeus. Two or three months later Syllaeus paid another visit on account of that business and used that opportunity to propose to Salome 87 . This unspecified business may or may not have been connected with the financial transactions which went on between Herod and the Nabataean king and Syllaeus. These transactions are revealed later, after the outbreak of hostilities, for Herod demanded then not only the surrender of the bandits of Trachonitis but also the " repayment of the debt of sixty talents that he had loaned to Obodas through Syllaeus, for the time-limit had now been reached" 8 8 . Later Nicolaus of Damascus claimed that Herod had given 500 talents as a loan; hence it may be inferred that the sixty talent loan whose repayment was overdue was only one of several loans. Unfortunately Josephus 84 BJ 1.171-2. See above p. 263 f. 85 BJ 1.419; cf. 3.47. See above p. 261 with n. 171. 86 AJ 15.294. For the meaning of epi see above p. 181 with n. 37. Kasher (1988, 1 5 2 - 4 ) suggests tnat Herod established a well organized defence border in the east of Peraea. However, of the nine villages and towns ascribed to this defence line, most are not known from this period or were not located on the border. 87 AJ 16.220—1; 224. 88 AJ 16.279 (Marcus' translation in LCL).

300

Herod and the

Nabataeans

does not specify who precisely borrowed the money. It could have been Syllaeus, the deceased king Obodas III or other leading persons in the Nabataean kingdom 8 9 . Be that as it may, Herod evidently was still making financial transactions with Nabataeans of high standing, as he had done in the past (above p. 286 f.). Incidentally one learns of the property Herod owned in the Nabataean kingdom: grazing land which was rented by apparently important persons; it had probably come to him in inheritance from Cyprus, his Nabataean mother 9 0 . In his description of the suppression of the Jewish revolt by P. Quinctilius Varus in 4 B.C.E., Josephus reports the enmity between Herod and Aretas IV. Because of this enmity Aretas had formed a friendship with the Romans and now sent an auxiliary force to help Varus in this campaign. The Arabian troops burned the village of Arous, probably located at Kafr Haris (above p. 258), which belonged to Herod's minister Ptolemy, because of their hatred of the Jewish king and his friends 9 1 . Josephus does not specify the reasons or occasion for this enmity between the two kings. Aretas had ascended the throne in about 9 B.C.E. Aware of the machinations and intention of Syllaeus to win the Nabataean kingdom, Aretas accused him before Augustus. His envoys cooperated with and were helped in their mission by Nicolaus of Damascus, who represented Herod's interests against Syllaeus 92 . In one respect, then, Herod and Aretas had a common interest, at least for some time. But Aretas may have had cause to fear Herod. He ascended the Nabataean throne without getting the previous permission of Augustus, who was grossly annoyed by this; the Roman emperor regarded it as his right to endorse and arrange the royal succession in friendly kingdoms 9 3 . In his indignation Augustus decided to give Herod the Nabataean kingdom, and he might indeed have done so but for the domestic troubles of Herod. As these troubles made clear that the old king was hardly capable of handling such a task, Augustus finally confirmed and recognized Aretas as king of Nabataea 9 4 . However, Aretas might have known of Augustus'original intention; this was possibly the cause for his hostile attitude towards Herod. Alternatively, some Nabataeans were perhaps still looking for an opportunity to take revenge of the invasion of their country by Herod, in which Nakebus

89 AJ 16.343. That the loan was to Syllaeus ( t h u s Marcus' translation) is only a likely conjecture. 90 AJ 16.291: vojud? re a ? exeivov uLodcjoatievoi 8iaKaTeixov,d^LoM rauratc expCjvro. F o r his. m o t h e r see above p . 2 8 4 f. with nn. 2 5 - 6 . 91 BJ 2 . 6 8 - 9 ; 76; A / 17.287; 2 8 9 - 9 0 ; 296. 9 2 AJ 1 6 . 2 9 5 - 8 ; 3 3 6 - 4 0 . The Arabs w h o cooperated with Nicolaus, delivering to him incriminating letters of Syllaeus, apparently decided t o t h r o w in their l o t with Aretas IV. 93 AJ 1 6 . 2 9 5 - 6 ; 353. Cf. Sands 1908, 1 2 2 - 4 ; Cimma 1976, 3 0 1 - 3 ; 3 0 6 - 7 ; Braund 1 9 8 4 , 26; 139-41. 94 AJ 16.353—5.

The Balance of the

Evidence

301

and other Nabataeans, perhaps leading persons, had been killed. One way or another, the hatred referred to by Josephus was recent and makes the impression of having its origins in a personal feud. Aretas' hatred subsided in time as can be learnt from the marriage of his daughter to Herod Antipas, who succeeded his father Herod in Galilee and Peraea (4 B . C . E . - 3 9 C.E.). Political considerations probably played a part in this engagement, which may have been encouraged by Augustus himself. The marriage lasted a long time until Antipas fell in love with Herodias, daughter of his half-brother Aristobulus and wife of his half-brother Herod. The insulted Nabataean woman escaped to her father, w h o then went to war against Antipas and destroyed his a r m y ' s . But it was not only on account of the disgrace of his daughter that Aretas IV attacked Antipas; in addition, the two had a territorial dispute over Gamalitis, a reading which is probably to be corrected to Galaaditis 96 . All this is not necessarily relevant to the conditions prevailing during Herod's reign. Still, it is significant that Aretas was able to ignore his differences with Herod and let his daughter marry his enemy's son, and that as long as the marriage lasted he kept quiet. An interesting piece of evidence is included by Josephus in his account of Syllaeus' intrigues against Herod. The king had a bodyguard (somatophylax) by the name of Corinthus who, though an Arab by origin, was brought u p in Herod's kingdom. Upon receiving the information that this Corinthus accepted bribes from Syllaeus, Herod had him arrested together with two other Arabs who happened to be staying with him: one a friend of Syllaeus and the other a chief of a tribe (phylarchos)91. It is quite likely that this friend of Syllaeus as well as Corinthus were in fact Nabataeans. The phylarch's place of abode must have been within the Nabataean realm or on its fringes. The significance of this casual piece of

95 AJ 1 8 . 1 0 9 - 1 4 . Suetonius (Aug. 48) reports that Augustus "united the kings with w h o m he was in alliance by m u t u a l ties, and was very ready to propose or favour intermarriages or friendships a m o n g t h e m " (J.C. R o l f e ' s translation in LCL). Cf. Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 342. 96 AJ 18.133. Gamalitis is the reading of the Mss. Since this region belonged to Philip, it has been suggested t o correct it to Gabalitis, a region supposed to have e x t e n d e d south of the Jewish Peraea and Moabitis. Gabalitis' precise location is n o t clear e n o u g h ; see the divergent maps of Avi-Yonah 1962a, 27 (east of the southern half of the Dead Sea); J o n e s 1971, m a p V, between pp. 2 2 6 - 7 (south south-east of the Dead Sea, extending as far as Petra). T h e n a m e is attested in Psalms 83.8; AJ 2.6; 3.40; 9.188; Euseb. Onom. 124.21; B.T. Ktuboth 112a; Yebamoth 46a. At any rate, it is incredible that Antipas would have had a claim on an area south of River Arnon (= W a d i Mujib). Bowersock ( 1 9 8 3 , 6 5 - 8 ) gives reasons for retaining t h e reading of the Mss. Yet Aretas can hardly have g o n e to war a b o u t an area in Gaulanitis, in which Gamala was situated. Galaaditis, a loose term which could have m e a n t south-west Auranitis (Abel 1 9 3 3 38 I, 2 7 6 ; cf. above p. 105 f.), is t h e r e f o r e a b e t t e r solution, although palaeographically this would be m o r e complicated. See also Feldman in LCL Josephus, Vol. IX, p. 80 n.a; Schiirer 1 9 7 3 871 I, 3 5 0 with n. 33. 97 BJ 1.576—7;/!./ 1 7 . 5 5 - 7 .

302

Herod and the Nabataeans

evidence is quite important. Firstly, Herod evidently did not regard an Arabian, or probably even Nabataean origin as a reason to disqualify a person from serving in his guard. Secondly, the coming and going of Arabs, including probably Nabataeans, in Herod's realm, seems to have been a normal occurrence. The economic, relations between the Nabataeans and Judaea have also to be considered, even though very little is explicitly reported in the sources. As incense was used in the Temple, a constant supply of spices was necessary to ensure the performance of the religious services 98 . For this reason alone, there must have been, directly or indirectly, commercial links between Judaea and the Nabataeans. Perfumes and gold were items of trade brought by Arabs to Jerusalem according to the Letter of Aristeas, which is variously dated from the late 3rd century to the early 1st century B.C.E." Josephus writes that "the altar of incense, by the thirteen fragrant spices from sea and from land, both desert and inhabited, with which it was replenished, signified that all things are of God and for God"; also that in 70 C.E., that is to say ^despite the war and the Roman siege, there still existed "a mass of cinnamon and cassia and a multitude of other spices, which they mixed and burnt daily as incense to God" 1 0 0 . It is well to recall that in addition to the official Temple service, private offerings of incense were practised in Judaea even in the Second Temple period 101 . Because of the religious importance of the perfumes and spices, Jews had then an interest in the maintenance of commerce with the Nabataeans, who still dominated the trade in these commodities in Herod's time 1 0 2 . The geographical distribution of the Nabataean painted pottery is mainly confined to Edom, the Negev, Sinai and northern Saudi Arabia 103 . The absence of this typical Nabataean ware from Judaea cannot be taken as proof that the Nabataeans avoided coming into the Herodian territories, for this pottery has been scarcely found even in southern Auranitis, which nonetheless was under Nabataean control. In fact some typical Nabataean sherds were found in Jerusalem 104 . However, the so-called

98 On the import of frankincense in pre-Hellenistic times see Isa. 60.6; Jer. 6.20. 99 Letter to Aristeas 114: "A large amount of spices is brought to the country by the Arabs". For a summary of modern literature on the date of this work see S. Jellicoe, The Septuagint and Modern Study (1968) 2 9 - 5 9 . See also Schiirer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 111,1, 6 7 7 - 8 7 . 100 BJ 5.218; 6.390 (Thackeray's translation in LCL). Seven kinds of spices, including frankincense and myrrh, are mentioned in Jubilees 16.24 101 See L. Finkelstein, The Pharisees3 (1972) 6 5 4 - 6 0 ; J. Milgrom, Encyclopaedia Judaica 2 (1972) 7 6 5 - 7 ; idem, Encyclopaedia Biblica 7 (1976) 1 1 2 - 7 (in Hebrew). For daily commerce in spices see Mark 16.1 \John 19.39. 102 Strabo 16.4,23; Plin. NH 12.63.5; cf. above p. 279 with n. 4. 103 See Glueck 1939, 139; 1942, 3; Parr 1978, 2 0 4 - 5 . 104 For the finds and interpretation of the Nabataean pottery in southern Auranitis see above p. 279 f.

The Balance of the Evidence

303

Pseudo-Nabataean bowls, discovered in the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, are relevant to this dicscussion. These thin-walled bowls, painted in stylized floral patterns, resemble the Nabataean bowls; probably they were made in imitation of the typically Nabataean painted pottery 1 0 5 . Eleven pieces of the Pseudo-Nabataean pottery (nine from Jerusalem and two from Oboda) have been proved by neutron activation analysis to have been manufactured in Jerusalem. The nine pieces from Jerusalem can be dated to the period 6 - 7 0 C.E. 106 The two pieces from Oboda were found in the potter's shop at that site which has been dated to 20 B.C.E.—50 C.E. 107 The significance of this discovery may be far reaching. Firstly, as some of the pieces can be distinguished from the true Nabataean pottery only by laboratory analysis, but not according to stylistic criteria, one has to take into account the possibility that in the past some pottery finds have been wrongly identified as Nabataean 108 . Secondly, the proposal to explain the absence or meagerness of the Nabataean painted pottery outside the aforementioned regions by the assumption that "it did not appeal to the taste of the majority of the inhabitants of contemporary Palestine and Syria" is now untenable 109 .Thirdly, the Nabataean painted pottery must have been sufficiently known and to the taste of the local population of Judaea; so much so that at a certain time someone found it profitable to start manufacturing at Jerusalem vessels made in accordance with the Nabataean models as regards style, designs, and decorations. The earliest known bowls date from 6 - 9 C.E., but an earlier date for the inception of the industry cannot be ruled out. At any rate, the Nabataean fine pottery obviously came to be known previously, that is to say, during Herod's reign, probably due to Nabataeans coming and going in Judaea. Fourthly, the presence of Pseudo-Nabataean sherds at Oboda is to be explained either by local demand for this commodity or, more probably, by the arrival of Jews there who brought with them their vessels. However, the limited amount of the known Pseudo-Nabataean pottery prohibits any attempt to study the phenomenon quantitatively. Still, it does testify to the reciprocal movements of Nabataeans and Jews

105 106 107 108 109

with the literature cited in nn. 6 - 7 . Isolated pieces were found in 'Amman, Jerash (Glueck 1939, 143; 233-4), Tell er-Remith (Parr 1978, 204) and Jerusalem (Johns 1 9 5 0 , 1 4 5 - 6 ) . B. Mazar, "The Excavations in the Old City of Jerusalem", Eretz-lsrael 9 (1969) 1 6 1 - 7 4 (in Hebrew); N. Avigad 1983, 185 with PI. 201. Perlman e/a/ii 1986, 7 7 - 8 2 . Negev 1974,44; Perlman et alii 1986, 83. Perlman et alii 1986, 77: "There is no way of knowing how many other vessels may have been miscast as Nabataean fine ware". Thus Parr 1978, 205. According to Avigad (1983,185), "They (i.e. the Pseudo-Nabataean wares) seem to be a sort of Jewish alternative to the fine Nabataean bowls, which simply did not reach the Jerusalem market in sufficient quantities".

304

Herod and the

Nabataeans

across the political borders of their respective kingdoms for economic and other reasons. The discovery of typically Nabataean architectural elements in several sites of Judaea, including Herodian buildings, is also a reminder of Nabataean influence and connections which crossed the political border. Nabataean capitals, coins and pottery have been found in Masada, a major building project of Herod 1 1 0 . Pseudo-Nabataean pottery has been unearthed at Herodium and Japha 1 1 1 . More Nabataean capitals have been discovered in the so-called Elkias' palace, a fortified building (47 x 37 m.), situated at Khirbet el-Muraq, 12 km. west of Hebron; it has been dated to the late 1st century B.C.E. 112 Finally, Nabataean coins are reported to have been found at Jerusalem and Caesarea 113 . It will be useful to recapitulate under three headings the facts and relevant pieces of information emerging from this survey of the relations between Herod and the Nabataeans: A. Personal Aspects. 1. Close personal ties, involving mutual obligations and services, existed between the Nabataean kings Aretas III and Malichus I and Antipater, who married a Nabataean woman. 2. Herod inherited these ties, but suffered a setback when Malichus rejected his application for help. 3. The marriage of Herod's sister to the powerful Nabataean minister Syllaeus was considered feasible by the parties involved. 4. Personal enmity between Syllaeus and Herod ensued from the miscarriage of the marriage negotiations. 5. Aretas IV nurtured personal enmity against Herod, possibly resulting from Augustus' short-lived intention to attach the Nabataean kingdom to Herod's realm. 6. Despite that enmity Aretas agreed to have his daughter marry Herod's son. 110 According to Avi-Yonah (1975, 2 5 7 - S ) , "One remarkable point about the planning of Masada is the considerable influence of Nabataean art in its overall design. This is also evidenced in such details as the columns and pillars attached to the walls". There is vagueness and exaggeration in this sweeping statement. See, in contrast, J. Patrich, "The Development of the Nabataean Capital", Eretz-Israel 17 (1984) 2 9 1 - 3 0 4 (in Hebrew); Wenning 1987, 135;Foerster 1991 (forthcoming), esp. Chap. III. The earliest Nabataean coins found at Masada are of Aretas IV (Meshorer 1989, 76; 1 2 0 - 1 ) . R. Bar-Nathan will deal with the pottery. 111 See R. Bar-Nathan, in Netzer 1981, 6 2 - 3 ; P I . 7 , 1 - 6 . 112 E. Damati, "Khirbet el-Muraq", IEJ 22 (1972) 173; idem, "Elkia's Palace", in M. Broshi (ed.), Between Herman and Sinai. Memorial to Amnon (1977) 9 3 - 1 1 3 (in Hebrew). 113 Fot Nabataean coins f o u n d in Jerusalem see Ariel 1982, 323. Prof. Y. Meshorer informs me that Nabataean coins which have been f o u n d on the surface at Caesarea are in two private collections in this country. For a survey of Nabataean finds in Judaea and Idumaea see Wenning 1987, 136-7.

The Balance of the

Evidence

305

B. Economic Aspects. 1. Herod owned land in the Nabataean territory. 2. Herod lent moneys to Malichus I, Obodas III and Syllaeus. 3. Spices and perfumes, typical goods of the Nabataean commerce, were consumed by Jews for religious purposes. 4. The Pseudo-Nabataean pottery as well as Nabataean coins, pottery and architectural elements found in Judaea indicate the existence of economic links between Nabataeans and the population living under Herod's rule. 5. The Nabataean trade in spices was still active during Herod's time.

C. Military Aspects. 1. Due to the machinations of Cleopatra, Herod went to war against Malichus I. 2. The activities of the brigands of Trachonitis and the intrigues of Syllaeus goaded Herod into fighting a battle against a Nabataean force. 3. There were probably Arabs in Herod's army, even among his bodyguard. 4. Some forts, were maintained by Herod close to the Nabataean territory: several in the Negev, two in Peraea, but none in Auranitis. 5. No Nabataean forts are known to have existed on the confines of the Herodian borders. 6. Nabataean forts were constructed along the Petra-Oboda-Gaza road. To assess this multifarious and to some extent inconsistent evidence, and to confine it to a meaningful framework, one has to bear in mind a fundamental difference between the two kingdoms. Herod's kingdom was well-organized, centrally ruled and tightly controlled by the king. Geographically wide-spread and difficult to control, the Nabataean kingdom consisted of population partly sedentary and partly nomadic, agricultural and pastoral, urban and tribal. It is not known how effective and powerful the king's sway over this heterogeneous society was, especially over the nomadic tribes. Certainly his authority lagged behind that of Herod, particularly during the reign of the inactive Obodas III. Those who took part in and profited from the international transit commerce — in spices, perfumes, gold, precious stones etc. — had an interest in maintaining peaceful relations with their neighbours and in particular with the Herodian kingdom. This was a necessity, given the control of Herod over the two main arteries of the Nabataean trade: the Petra-Gaza road and the routes in Transjordan leading to Damascus and Phoenicia. The newly developed harbours of Caesarea and Anthedon facilitated export and possibly

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attracted the Nabataean traders 114 . To ensure security and peaceful conditions was therefore in the interest of the king, his associates in the government of the country, the traders, inn-keepers, and caravan people in general, all of whom profited in one way or another from the trade. The alternative was to contest the control of the outlets of the commercial routes. The Nabataeans never tried to attain such a goal by military force during Herod's time. Syllaeus did try to undermine Herod's power — by political means; he failed, and his attempt certainly did not represent those Nabataeans who were interested in the profits accruing from the international trade. In sum, judged from the viewpoint of basic economic considerations, the Nabataean official policy will have tended to arrive at understanding and establishing cooperation with the Herodian kingdom. Of course, in view of the variegated character of Nabataean society, not all circles and groups of that society will have equally felt the need for relations of cooperation. The same policy of cooperation for financial and economic motives prevailed on the other side. Herod had himself a personal interest in peaceful relations: only under such conditions could he have profited from his landed property situated in the Nabataean territory as well as carried on the business of lending moneys to Nabataeans. In addition, the greater the volume of Nabataean goods which passed through his country and harbours, the larger will have been his income from customs, tolls and various fees 115 . Obviously a large number of other people, and not only part of the royal bureaucracy, must have profited by doing business with the Nabataean traders; hence they had an interest in the expansion of their activities, for which the maintenance of peace constituted a basic condition. Furthermore, Jews depended almost exclusively on the Nabataeans for the supply of commodities vital for religious worship. For this reason alone they had a basic interest in cultivating good relations with Nabataean traders. Thus general considerations and some specific evidence indicate the mutual interest of the two parties in promoting economic cooperation. Economic considerations do not always prevail in foreign relations of states. If Herod, or any of the contemporary Nabataean kings for that matter, had aimed at territorial expansion, such aspirations would have outweighed considerations of economic advantages and concern for immediate profits. The fact is that no intention of forcible territorial expansion is known in the case of Herod. This negative evidence gains force and validity by arguments based on positive indications. Throughout his career

114 The importance of the Herodian harbours of Anthedon and Caesarea for the Nabataean trade is emphasized and elaborated by Sidebotham 1986, 7 1 - 3 ; cf. Schalit 1969, 340. 115 See Schalit 1969, 2 9 0 - 8 .

The Balance of the

Evidence

307

Herod almost never took a major political step without consulting and getting the permission, even support of Roman officials. His adherence to this line of policy and his allegiance to his Roman patrons paid dividends. He carried out the was against Malichus I on the specific order of Antonius. When he invaded the Nabataean territory to subdue the brigands of Trachonitis it was only after he had brought his complaints before the Roman governor of Syria and obtained his permission to take such an action. An independent policy of expansion was out of the question in Herod's case, and he would never have used military force against a foreign ruler without having his operations previously endorsed by the Roman authorities. The Nabataean kings adopted the same political attitude. They learnt their lesson that no major aim in the sphere of foreign affairs, let alone territorial expansion, could be independently achieved after the establishment of the Roman province of Syria. If some doubts of Rome's overwhelming supremacy arose as a result of the Parthian invasion of 40, these were soon wiped out by the subsequent crushing victories of the Romans. Malichus I paid, literally, for his error and soon adapted himself to the new political conditions, which entailed strict restriction on any initiative of military activities. His successors followed suit. If Obodas III resented the bestowal of the territories of Zenodorus on Herod, he never really contested it. True, Aretas IV ascended the Nabataean throne without applying for the previous authorization of Augustus. But this was a matter of survival, considering the machinations of Syllaeus, and he did try to appease Augustus and attain his recognition. All the available information shows that Herod and the Nabataean kings alike knew their limitations, and acted accordingly. Territorial aggrandizement could be accomplished only by political means, namely through the Roman emperor - not by the use of military force and wars. These basic facts of economic and political realities normally precluded open wars between the two kingdoms, particularly after the battle of Actium. There was no need to keep the army in a state of constant preparation for the remote contingency of a grand war. In other words, considering the fundamental relations between Herod and the Nabataean kingdom, it was superfluous to construct a defensive system, neither defence in-line close to the border nor defence in-depth, against threats of massive invasions by the Nabataean army. It could be expected that if such a contingency did materialize, there would be sufficient time to mobilize the standing army, which was up to the task. In the event this never happened after 30. Despite the mutual interests, however, personal enmity could and did bring about armed hostilities. This occurred only once, was limited in time and the scope of the operations, and came about as a by-product of Herod's war against the brigands of Trachonitis. Still, the circumstances

308

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Nabataeans

of the case and the procedure of action taken by the two parties provide an instructive illustration of their dependence on the Roman authorities. The last case does show the existence of a serious problem of security from which the two kingdoms suffered alike. Bandits of various sorts were t o be found in the two countries. Josephus reports the special steps taken by Herod to put down the activities of the brigands of Galilee and Trachonitis, probably because of the large scale of the operations involved as well as because in their cases there was a story to tell. He does not record activities of brigands who constituted a menace to traffic along roads, perhaps because there was nothing special about them deserving mention in his narrative, at least not during the reign of Herod. But traders and other wayfarers did need protection. During the governorship of Cumanus ( 4 8 - 5 2 C.E.) a slave of the emperor was attacked and robbed by brigands on the highway leading to Beth-Horon. This time Josephus reports the incident, for during the punitive actions taken by the.governor a copy of the Torah was torn and burnt, which caused a widespread Jewish commotion 1 1 6 . Various texts spanning the first to fourth centuries C.E. testify to the need of safeguarding the roads and the normal means provided to achieve this aim: construction of way-stations, towers and fortlets manned by small detachments 1 1 7 . This general problem of safeguarding communications can explain, at least partly, the construction and upkeeping of the forlets on the Jerusalem-Ammaus road (above p. 226 f.) as well as the forts along the Petra-Gaza road. It has been suggested, with some good arguments, that the latter road was constructed by the Romans, but the question is still o p e n 1 1 8 . However, the suggestion that the road was patrolled by Roman troops is extremely conjectural and, at least to my mind, not very plausible 1 1 9 . Either way, the need to provide protection to 116 BJ 2 . 2 2 8 - 3 1 ; / ! . / 2 0 . 1 1 3 - 7 . 117 AJ 20.5: Ptolemy, a brigand who operated in Idumaea and caused much trouble to the Arabs, that is on the Nabataean border, was executed by Cuspius Fadus, governor of Judaea in 4 4 46 C.E.; B.T. Abodah Zarah 25b: pupils of R. c Akiba met brigands (listim) on the way to Acco/ Ptolemais; Achilles Tatius, Leucippe and Clitophon 3.5,5; 9 , 2 - 3 : brigands operated on the road from Gaza to Pelusium; Wayikra Rabah 30.6 (ed. Margalioth p. 702): "Rabbi Levi said: whoever takes a stolen palm branch may be compared with a bandit who sat on a crossroads and robbed those who passed b y " ( 2 n d - 3 r d centuries?);Euseb. Onom. 25.13 (ed. Klostermann): castellum militum situm . . . ob auxilia viatorum; Midrash Tehilim 10.2 (ed. Buber p. 92) : "Rabbi Hanina said: it happened that the leader of a caravan was on his way. When it began to darken he came to a burgus. The keeper of the burgus said: come inside the burgus, because of the wild beasts and the bandits". For various aspects of the problems of bandits and of safeguarding communications under the Roman empire see M. Amit, "Les moyens de communication et la defense de l'empire romain", La Parola del Passato 102 (1965) 2 0 7 - 2 2 ; Shaw 1984; B. Isaac, "Reflections on the Roman East", in P. Freeman and D.L. Kennedy (eds.), The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East (1986) I, 3 8 3 - 9 5 . 118 Isaac 1980. 119 Isaac 1980, 893 with n. 21 on p. 897. He refers to the Periplus Maris Erythraei 19, which mentions the port and fortress of Leuce Come. There a hekatonarches and some troops were sta-

The Balance of the

Evidence

309

traffic against brigands is evident. The same holds good for the six forts or fortlets in southern Idumaea, all known from archaeological finds: Tel 'Arad, Tel 'Uzza, Tel 'Ira, Tel Beer-Sheba, Tel 'Aro'er and Tell Sharuhen. All these sites were situated close to roads, and the forts or fortlets are to be regarded as aimed at policing these roads. Looked at militarily, these installations do not constitute a line of defence against an invasion of a strong army; as has been shown, they were not supported by forces strong enough to intercept such an invasion. They can hardly be envisaged as points of resistance or bases of operations against raiding parties of nomadic tribes because there is no evidence for the existence of an observation and signalling system in these areas; besides, the small detachments of troops of such small forts cannot have safeguarded the whole region 1 2 0 . At most, the forts could serve as places of shelter for the adjacent population. Also, there are no allusions, let alone clear evidence, to incursions by nomadic tribes in the Herodian period, although the problem is indeed known from other times 1 2 1 . The relations between the Herodian and Nabataean kingdoms being what they were, as this study has shown, there did not exist any compelling reason why Herod should have constructed a defensive system in southern Idumaea against major invasions. It was the interest of the Nabataean kings no less than that of Herod to keep peaceful conditions. Thus the general political considerations, the archaeological finds and the evidence on the nature of the security problems in Judaea all combine to indicate that the function of the known fortifications in southern Idumaea was no more than to protect traffic along the roads. These had nothing to do with the fundamental relations between Herod and the Nabataeans; in other words, there was no closed frontier, either military or economic, between the two kingdoms.

tioned and a 25 per cent d u t y was collected. Isaac's view that this duty has been convincingly shown as Roman and not Nabataean (thus S.J. De Laet, Portorium (1949) 3 0 6 - 8 ) is to optimistic. The title of the commander does not necessarily show him to be a Roman centurion, nor need the form of the tax be Roman. This interpretation was proposed by Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire (1909) II, 151 with n. 1; cf. Raschke 1978, 8 9 2 - 3 nn. 1 3 4 8 - 5 0 . For a different interpretation and the uncertainty concerning the nationality of the officials and troops see Bowersock 1983, 71; Sidebotham 1986, 1 0 6 - 8 ; L. Casson, The Periplus Maris Erythrae (1989) 145. Cf. Schalit 1969, 2 9 3 - 4 . According to. Strabo 16.4,23, the section of the road Leuce Come-Petra was made in safety ( d o y a X u O by the caravans. This was obviously due either to the great number of the people taking part in the caravans, resembling an army as is reported by Strabo, or perhaps thanks to the care of the Nabataean government. One would expect Strabo to note the presence of Roman troops if this had been the case. That Nabataea was made a province for three years ( 3 - 1 B.C.E., Bowersock 1 9 8 3 , 5 4 - 6 ) restson flimsy evidence Finally, the d o u b t s cast by Isaac (1980, 897 n. 2) on the existence of a regular Nabataean army after the intervention of Pompeius in Syria have no force at all, for there is no evidence on the composition and regularity of t h e Nabataean army at any time. 120 For the archaeological finds concerning the six sites and the absence of evidence for an observation and signalling system see above p. 245 f. 121 Cf. Sidebotham 1986, 111-2, contra Bowersock 1971, 2 2 7 - 8 .

Conclusion The Hasmonaeans were driven to create a Jewish state in reaction to a persecution launched by a Hellenistic power; they expanded and consolidated it while borrowing and absorbing administrative institutions, as well as technological methods and material means serviceable to practical needs in everyday life, from the dominant civilization surrounding them. Politically the Hasmonaean state became part of the contending powers in the East during the decline of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms. After the downfall of Antiochus VII Sidetes in his Parthian expedition in 129 B.C.E., John Hyrcanus I, Aristobulus I and Alexander Jannaeus exerted themselves to do everything they could to expand the territorial dimensions of their kingdom. They presumably exploited to the maximum the means at their disposal, and indeed each of them was successful in enlarging the Jewish realm in his turn. Therefore two distinct but partly complementary processes may be discerned in the history of the Hasmonaean state: warring against the Hellenistic powers together with learning to employ all the manifold advantages of Hellenistic civilization, in the broad sense of the term. The one contributed to the destruction of the political framework of the Hellenistic world, the other to the conservation of some forms and features of Hellenism: in architecture, technology, language, historiography etc. In this respect, it is worthwhile to summarize what has emerged in the course of this study about the military aspects of the Hasmonaean state. In the first chapter I have interpreted the meagre available evidence as indicating that Judas Maccabaeus won his first victories by guerilla warfare, and I used the term "popular uprising" to characterize the first stage of the war. The alternative is to accept the view of either M. Hengel or that of B. Kar-Kochva who both assume that Judas was able to profit from Hellenistic military experience: of former Jewish mercenaries living in Judaea or of mercenary Jews from abroad respectively. If my interpretation is right, the Seleucid failure to suppress the revolt is to be explained by the superior military talent and charismatic leadership of Judas Maccabaeus, who took full advantage of his intimate knowledge of the terrain to apply guerilla tactics in daring and surprising attacks on the enemy. Rashness, over-confidence and negligence on the part of the Seleucid commanders seem to have contributed to their defeats. However, over- time elements of Hellenistic warfare were probably introduced

Conclusion

311

into the Hasmonaean army. My impression is that although this development started under Judas Maccabaeus, it became pronounced only under Jonathan, whereas Bar-Kochva ascribes the employment of all elements of Hellenistic tactics to Judas. Unfortunately there is no clear evidence on this point. To my mind at least, the account of the battle of Elasa is too vague and panegyrical, and it is only by a stretch of the imagination that one can see in it features of a phalanx on the Jewish side. The arguments raised in connection with the battle Jonathan fought at Azotus are somewhat better, but here again one has to postulate much to identify marks of phalanx tactics in the Jewish battle formation and fighting 1 . From then on, the historical sources fail us completely on this point: of the battles of the Hasmonaeans, not even one single account has survived which provides details about the battle array of the Jewish army. It is then no more than an assumption that Hellenistic phalanx tactics were employed in Hasmonaean warfare. Yet the alternative would be to assume the Hasmonaeans dispensed with the need to employ heavy infantry, trusting to light-armed troops only, which is unlikely. Considering their readiness to fight regular battles against Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies, it is more probable than not that the Hasmonaeans were able to encounter the phalanx of their enemies with one of their own 2 . Of course, if the Hasmonaeans maintained heavy infantry, as they probably did, they will have trained and organized it on the model of the armies they best knew, viz. the Seleucid or Ptolemaic, not the distant Roman army. Hellenistic influence may be discerned in several other branches of the Hasmonaean army. One manifestation is the employment of mercenaries which started in the second Hasmonaean generation under John Hyrcanus I. The use of artillery and the siege operations also carry marks of Hellenistic influence (above p. 24 f.). How precisely the Jews acquired the technical knowledge and skill in this field is not told anywhere. Possibly foreign experts were hired for this purpose; these will have imparted their special knowledge to Jews assigned to this branch of the army. The third branch is fortifications. Here the Hellenistic influence is noticeable in some forms of masonry, architectural designs and above all in the very concept: the extensive exploitation of fortifications as a means to secure control of the country. In some cases the Hasmonaeans simply took over 1 For the battles of Azotus and Elasa see Bar-Kochva 1975; 1980b. For my reservations see above p. 19 with n. 42. 2 The following may be regarded as regular battles: at the plain of Hazor (/ Macc. 1 1 . 6 7 - 7 4 ; AJ 1 3 . 1 5 8 - 6 2 ) ; against Cendebaeus (I Macc. 1 6 . 4 - 9 ; AJ 1 3 . 2 2 6 - 7 ) ; the first battle against Antiochus Cyzicenus (or Grypus; BJ 1 . 6 4 - 5 ; AJ 13.276-7); against Ptolemy Lathyrus at Asophon (AJ 13.338); against Demetrius III Eucaerus (BJ 1 . 9 3 - 4 ; AJ 1 3 . 3 7 7 - 8 ) . Jonathan obviously intended to fight a regular battle when he mobilized 40,000 troops against Tryphon (I Macc. 12AV,AJ 1 3 . 1 8 8 - 9 ) .

312

Conclusion

sites previously fortified by the Seleucid military authorities: Gezer, BethZur, Joppa, Jericho etc. (above Chap. II. 1 - 2 ) . Of course they might have grasped independently the importance and usefulness of fortifications for security purposes. But the fact is that the Hasmonaeans did not operate in a vacuum, and the vast majority of the fortresses they saw around them had been constructed by Hellenistic powers. In the course of the siege operations conducted against the Greek cities, notably the Acra in Jerusalem, Gezer, Beth-Zur, Samaria and Gaza, they learnt how valuable city fortifications might be militarily and politically. The technical, practical details of the art of fortification must have been brought to light on these occasions. The system of fortifications created by the Hasmonaeans, who enlarged upon what the Seleucids had constructed in the country, served and was related to the goals of their foreign policy as well to internal security conditions. Given the aggressive and, generally speaking, successful expansionist policy, there was no need to construct dense border defences. The Jewish realm was increasing — with an accelerated pace from the time of John Hyrcanus I onwards — and was expected to encompass more and more territories. It would have been sheer waste to construct a preclusive network of fortresses all around under such conditions. Moreover, confident in their powerful army, the Hasmonaeans usually preferred to meet the enemy on the battlefield ; they did not seek shelter behind walls. After 129, the only exception to this rule was the unsuccessful attempt of Jannaeus to block the advance of Antiochus XII by the construction of a fortified line across the coastal plain between Joppa and Capharsaba. However, the conquest of new territories required taking steps to establish control points over the annexed population who could not be trusted, at least for some time after the annexation. Therefore fortifications served mainly three purposes: forts for the internal control over the country; city fortifications to provide shelter for the population until an invading army was repelled or defeated in a regular battle; bases of operations to expand the Hasmonaean territory. A few forts seem to have been especially fortified to serve as royal places of refuge, notably Alexandrium and Hyrcania, and possibly Machaerus and Masada. Considering all the known factors, there was no intention to construct a perimetric defensive system. The transition from the Hasmonaean to the Herodian periods in Judaea coincided with the take-over of the last Hellenistic kingdoms in the East by the Roman empire. Indeed the establishment by Pompeius of direct Roman rule in the eastern Mediterranean resulted in far reaching consequences for all the contending powers in that area. Belonging to the framework of the Roman empire constituted the most important factor which affected the military affairs, aims of foreign policy and security

Conclusion

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problems of Herod. His relations with the Jews presented a second, complex factor he had to reckon and deal with. As a friendly, or client king within the sphere of the Roman empire he had to meet certain obligations and duties. It would be n o exaggeration to say that his survival depended on his ability to maintain order within the confines of his dominions and to prove himself militarily useful to the Roman strategic needs. A friendly king was expected to contribute military aid to the wars of Rome should the occasion arise. Yet there were also limitations: a too powerful friendly king was liable to become suspect to the Roman government and he might lose his position and perhaps his life as well if his authority and military power overstepped the right dimensions. The friendly king had, therefore, to maintain a delicate balance between the military obligations and limitations inherent in his position. It is in the light of this background t h a t the strength of Herod's army and the use he made of it are to be considered. I have estimated the standing army of Herod at 1 6 , 0 0 0 - 2 1 , 0 0 0 troops (above pp. 1 9 3 - 5 ) . This was a strong army; it equalled, for instance, the numerical strength of the four yearly conscripted legions Which were put at the disposal of the Roman consuls since the-fourth century B.C.E. Those four legions formed the normal establishment of the Roman army before the Second Punic War, and theoretically even later. This yearly mobilization of some 18,000 out of a population of over 250,000 citizens did not constitute an undue pressure on the military manpower of the citizen-body in the Roman case 3 , nor should such a strength be reckoned unbearable in the Jewish case 4 . I have given reasons for estimating the standing army of queen Alexandra' Salome at 30,000 at least, a substantially larger number of troops than that of the Herodian army. Her army, be it noted, surpassed considerably that of Jannaeus (above p. 34). This is illuminating for it brings out clearly the difference between the Hasmonaeans and Herod. Had the latter embarked on an expansionist policy, he could have maintained a stronger army, for he evidently lacked neither the financial resources nor the manpower, presumably not the ambition, either. However, whereas the Hasmonaeans, particularly John Hyrcanus I (after 129 B.C.E.) and his sons, were neither confronted nor checked by a big power, Herod was not given free rein in this respect. Still, even with an army at the level kept by him expansionist wars could have been carried out; numerically his army did not differ from that of Alexander Jannaeus, the greatest Hasmonaean warrior. No doubt

3 Brunt 1 9 7 1 , 545. Cf. T. M o m m s e n , Römisches Staatsrecht3 ( 1 8 8 7 ) I, 51; Parker 1928, 13. 4 On the population of Judaea see Broshi 1979. Even according to his estimate (1 million), a minimalist one, the comparison with the p o p u l a t i o n of the Early Republic is cogent.

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Conclusion

he refrained from launching on such a policy for the reasons explained above. But if so, it may be asked whether the number of the troops did not exceed his needs. If military power is defined as the ability of a state "to affect the will and behaviour of other states by armed coercion or the threat of armed coercion" 5 , and if force works by "direct application on the field of battle, or in active (non-combat) deployment" 6 , it may be said that Jannaeus won territorial gains at the expense of other states by the active application of force, and Salome maintained peace by the mere threatening presence of a formidable army, which could be used for coercion at any moment. What about Herod? On the whole internal security problems seem to have been Herod's main concern during the Augustan Principate. For one reason, living within the sphere of the Roman empire hampered the Nabataean kings by the same kind of restraints as Herod. Excepting the short-lived petty war associated with the bandits of Trachonitis, there was no occasion for fighting against the Nabataeans. No other dynasts or states of the East may be conceived as a potential source of menace to the Jewish state. Hence, it is improbable that the maintenance of such a strong army and extensive military installations was mainly ditected against external enemies. For another, from first to last Herod was troubled by widespread hatred of Jews to his rule, and even his bloody victory over Antigonus did not put an end to internal opposition. Various sections of Jewish society continued to oppose him: some apparently were still loyal to the Hasmonaean cause, others were provoked by his ruthless oppressive methods and by various aspects of his policy and administration/and still others could not acquiesce in the rule of the unworthy person who illegally usurped the royal title 7 . According to the direct, specific evidence provided by Josephus, Herod invested enormous resources to control his Jewish subjects and to protect his own person: building of fortifications, construction of cities, establishment of a secret security service and, last but not least, maintenance of the army (above p.204 f.). Of the potential uses of the army, help to Rome, deterrent force against external enemies and suppression of the Jews, the latter seems to have played the dominant role in Herod's considerations. Whether he overdid it or not, the size of the army is to be understood as an indication of the seriousness of the problem from the point of view of Herod. A passage

5 R.E. Osgood and W. Tucker, Force, Order and Justice ( 1 9 6 7 ) 3. 6 Luttwak 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 6 (but the distinction between power and force is problematic). 7 This is n o t to deny that some elements in Jewish society did support Herod and indeed p r o f i t e d f r o m their collaboration. On Jewish society and Herod see Stern, in Avi-Yonah 1975, 1 1 1 - 7 ; idem 1 9 8 2 .

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in The Assumption of Moses, a pseudepigraphic work written after Herod's death, illustrates the image his reign wrought upon the Jewish people: And after them [i.e. the Hasmonaeans] there ruled ruthless king who was not from the priestly family, a terrible man who knew no shame and judged them as they deserved; he cut off their heads with his sword and interred their corpses in remote places so that none would know where they were buried; and he killed old people and showed no mercy on young ones; they suffered bitterly in their country because of their fear of him; and he inflicted severe punishment on them such as the Egyptians had inflicted on them; and he punished them four and thirty years 8 . A brief comparison of Herod's army with the Roman garrison of Judaea in the period 6—66 C.E. is instructive. The Roman garrison consisted of auxiliary forces only. It numbered at least seven and at the most ten units (cohorts and alae), that is to say, 3,500-6,000 men 9 . Evidently it amounted at the most to a third of the size of the Herodian army. This enormous difference may be explained by several reasons. To suppress a general uprising the Roman authorities relied upon the army of Syria: this was done successfully by P. Quinctilius Varus in 4 B.C.E., by C. Petronius in 40 C.E.; Cestius Gallus' failure in 66 resulted in a revision of this policy. For the ordinary, routine business of keeping law and order the several auxiliary units stationed in the province must have been considered sufficient. The Roman concern to minimize costs may have played some role in the decision about the size of the army; but apparently the several units were able to cope with the task assigned to them for more than half a century. This probably testifies to the wider gulf and deeper antagonism between Herod and his Jewish subjects — and perhaps to his over-sensitivity on this score — as compared to the Jewish opposition to Roman rule, although the situation gradually deteriorated and finally culminated in the First Jewish Revolt. In conclusion: the tactics and composition of the armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod bear witness to heavy Greek and Roman influence. From a purely military point of view, each of the two systems was constructed in its turn in response to and by way of borrowing from the military institutions obtaining in the political entities they confronted

8 6 . 2 - 6 , cited by Stern, in Avi-Yonah 1975,115. 9 On the Roman garrison of Judaea see Schurer 1 9 7 3 - 8 7 I, 3 6 2 - 7 (with relevant modern literature); Stern, in Safrai and Stern 1 9 7 4 - 7 6 I, 3 2 6 - 9 . I follow the view of Kennedy (1983) that there existed milliary units before the Flavian period, but I would not allow more than two such units out of the possible ten of Judaea.

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Conclusion

and w o r k e d with, respectively. In the case o f the Hasmonaeans the military was utilized to fight against the foreign political power, in the case o f Herod the army was maintained to attain cooperation w i t h the big foreign power. B o t h the Hasmonaeans and Herod were troubled by internal security problems, the first in a lesser degree and different w a y . T h e pagan communities o f the n e w l y conquered territories, particularly the Hellenised population, constituted an element w h i c h had to be guarded and controlled, at least in the first years after the conquest. Under Jannaeus the rebellious Jews presented a serious challenge to the authority o f the king; once he extinguished the opposition he immediately resumed his wars o f conquest. Herod never succeeded in getting rid o f his opponents and his o w n anxiety. Haunted by fears, he devised and established a comprehensive system o f suppressive measures, including the army, to cope w i t h the problem o f internal security. But it w a s in the sphere o f foreign policy that the Hasmonaeans most differed from Herod. Restricted in the choice o f foreign policy targets, Herod could not use his army as they had done. He had to adjust the strength o f his forces to a size w h i c h was tolerable to R o m e . T o attain the goodwill o f the R o m a n Emperor was a f a c t o r w h i c h overshadowed all other considerations and aims of foreign policy. Nonetheless the army formed an asset in Herod's relations w i t h R o m e : his capacity to contribute troops to the strategic needs o f the empire enhanced his usefulness and position. Therefore, if the army is regarded as a means to attain objects o f foreign policy, b o t h the Hasmonaeans and Herod profited from their armies, but in different ways. The first made active use o f their military to achieve and preserve territorial aggrandizement, the latter maintained an army on a level which helped him to foster strong and profitable links with the Big Power. It is this different e m p l o y m e n t o f the army, perhaps more than anything else, w h i c h demonstrates and reflects the transition o f Judaea from the political framework o f the Hellenistic world to that o f the R o m a n empire.

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General Index

Greek, Hebrew and Latin words are italicized. Romans are generally listed under their cognomina ; in some cases they are entered under the names of their gentes with appropriate cross-references. Abella, 15n Abila, 36n.,90,91n.,94,119,260,266 Abydus, 272n. Achaean League, 198 Achiab, 182n.,193,194,209,225,239-40 acies, 199 Acra, 24,38,44,45; location of, 37n.,38n. Acraba (city and toparchy), 69,232,241,257n., 266 Actium, battle of, 4,5,7,167n.,184,207,214, 289,292,307 Adasa, battle of, figures, 25,27; Seleucid casualties in, 28n. Adida, 54,59; battle of, 120,121,123; fortified by Simon, 52 Adora, 57,59,75,76,77,94,129n.,237,238.; Hasmonaean conquest of, 24,57; restored by Gabinius, 57,58 Aela(Elath), 112,113 Aelia Capitolina, 222n. Aelius Gallus, 183,185,210,279n. Aemilius, see Scaurus Africa, 202 Agaba, 85,94 Agatharchides of Cnidus, 112; on Jerusalem, 50n.; source of Diodorus Siculus, 111 agema, 21 In. agora, 219n. Agrippa I, 179,197,220,221 n.,244,245,254,257 Agrippa II, 179,208,209 Agrippa, M. Vipsanius, 133, 230,231,257,267; and Herod, 187,250,252,293 Agrippium, 252 Ahmadiyye, 179n. 'Ain Fàrâ, 42 'Ain Feshkha, 55 'Akiba, R., 308n. ala(e), 155,201,207,315 Alatrium, 271n. Alba Fucens, 27In.

Albums, 198 Alema, 105 Alaxander the Great, 14,65,198,199,203,204; and Gaza, 7 9 - 8 0 , 1 0 1 Alexander Balas, 23,29,52,108n. Alexander VIII Zebinas, 60n. Alexander Jannaeus, 2,3,25,26n.,27n.,31,34, 54,58,73,75,76,87,106n.,108,138,185,226, 233,240,255,265,278,285,310,312,313, 314,316;and Antiochus XII, 81,119; army of (figures and composition), 2 9 - 3 2 ; and Cleopatra III, 114;coins of, 61,62-3,68,69, 79,82n.,90n.,238n.; conquest of Alousa(?), 115; conquest of the coastal cities, 5 4 , 7 2 3,115,247; defeated by ObodasI, 118, 278, and by Aretas III, 20,278; destruction of Gaza, 109; expansion and losses in Transjordan, 90-2,116,117,118,123,125; extent of his rule in Galilee, 83; and the Jewish rebels,92,118,121,125;andtheHellenistic cities, 73ff., 79,115,119; and Ptolemy IX, 114; sequence of wars, 8 8 - 9 0 ; siege operations, 25,88, siege of Tyre, 83,122, wars and relations with the Nabataeans, 92,114, 115,116-22,125 Alexander (son of Aristobulus II), 3,96,132, 135,136,257 Alexander (son of Herod and Mariamme), 209 Alexandra Salome, 3,32,35,52,54n.,69,92,96, 114,125,131,138;and Aretas III, 1 2 2 - 3 ; army of, 34-5,135,313,314; and embittered army commanders, 122; fortresses of, 94,97 Alexandra (daughter of Aristobulus II), 147, 225,227,257 Alexandria, 129n.,169,279n.,286 Alexandrine War, 283 Alexandrium, 44, 94,95,96,129,136,167n., 209,215,257-8,266,267,270,274,275,312; description and remains of, 6 9 - 7 1

334

General Index

Alexas, 229 Allifa, 271n. Alousa, 91 ; see also Elusa Amathus, 25,74,88-9,250,261,266 'Amman, 49,105n.,120n.,303n. Ammanitis, Ammonitis, 15,17,103,104n.,105, 107 Ammanus Gates, 151 Ammaus, l,12,54,55,185,232,233n.,266; battle of, 1,40, figures, 2S,26,27n.; fortified by Bacchides, 38,41 Amphoras, Rhodian, 16n.,87 (Scythopolis), 102n. (Negev); Italian, 71 (Alexandrium) Amyntas, 169,214n.,292,293 anachoresis, l l n . Anilaeus, 176n. Anthedon, 75,76,77,83n.,109n.,252,266,274, 305; given to Herod by Augustus, 169,247; Hasmonaean conquest of, 25 Antigonus 1,102,123,124;army of, 30 Antigonus (son of John Hyrcanus I), 69 Antigonus (son of Aristobulus II), 4,83,143, 152,153,154,156,157,164,166,190,224, 233,259,283,314¡executed by Antonius, 167; fails to conquer Judaea, 1 4 7 - 8 , 1 5 0 ; light-armed troops of, 156; sister of in Hyrcania, 167; slingers of, 165n.;wins Judaea with Parthian help, 1 4 8 - 9 Anti-Lebanon, 36 Antioch (Syria), 23,28,175 Antiochia (Gaulanitis), 90 Antiochou Pharanx, 90n. Antiochus III, 17,60,87,112n. ,13 On.,180 ; army of, 30,32,198; and Gaza, 110; operations in the Syrian Wars, 3 6 - 7 , 1 0 7 Antiochus IV Epiphanes, l l , 2 0 , 4 2 , 1 0 4 n . ; persecution in Judaea, 37n. Antiochus VI, 24n.,113 Antiochus VII Sidetes, 14,27,31,44,50,96,310; conquest of Joppa (?), 73n.; siege of Jerusalem, 50 Antiochus VIII Grypus, 119 Antiochus IX Cyzicenus, 311n. Antiochus XII, 81,82,90,119,120,121,122-3, 312; coins of, 120 Antiochus Hierax, 17 Antiochus (king of Commagene), 156,284n. Antipas (grandfather of Herod), 79,80n. ; friendly relations with Arabs, 284 ; strategos of Idumaea, 59,138,240 Antipas, Herod (son of Herod), 197,261,288n., 301 Antipater (father of Herod), 3,4,132,133,136, 138n.,140,141,144;business and friendship relations with Aretas I and Malichus 1,125, 2 8 4 - 6 , 3 0 4 ¡fortification of Jerusalem, 163,

219n.; and Idumaea, 144,149-150,154, 175,233;logistic ability, 165;and Malichus, 145,286¡loyalty to Rome and Romans, 138,139,142,143; position of, 138,139; wealth of, 142,285 Antipater (son of Herod), 176n.,197,297 Antipatris, 81 n.,247,251,253,266,267,274 Antistius Vetus, C., 142 Antonia (fortress), 218, 221-2,223,224,225, 231,256,266,273,275 Antonius, M. (consul 99), 113n. Antonius, M., 4,132,143,144n.,148,150,152, 153,155,156,169,185,214,216,237,260; bestows territories upon Cleopatra, 169n., 227,287,288n.; executes Antigonus, 167, and Lysanias, 171,292;and Herod, 168, 276,289; and friendly rulers, 168; size of army in 30, 167n. Apharaema, 13 On.; see also Ephraim Apamea, 142,143,205 Apollonia (Arsuf, Arsur), 75,76,82n.,149n., 247n. Apollonius (commander of Coele-Syria), 12,23 Apollonius (meridarches of Samaria), 60n. Apollonius (the Mysarch), l l n . , 3 8 n . Apollonius (strategos of Samaria), 60n. apraktos 176n. Aqraba, 69 Araba, 266 'Araba, 99,102n. arabarches 278n. Arabia, 101n.,110,111,112,263,277,280,287, 295n.,298,299; Roman province, 281 Arabia Felix, 99 Arabatha, 90 Arabs, 79,88,92,101,104,11 l,186n.,281,284, 286,292,293,302,308n.; in Herod's army, 184,305; horsemen, 202n.; in Trachonitis, 108n.,171,174,190,296; in Transjordan, 106-9,116,119,185n.,264 'Arad, see Tel 'Arad Aradus, 153n. Aramaic-speaking population in Auranitis, 280,291 'Araq el-Emir, 15,16,17,20 Arabatta, 63n. Arbela, 260; battle of, 155,208n. Archelaus (king of Cappadocia), 169,186n., 2'l4n.,292,293 Archelaus (son of Herod), 182,185,193,197, 206,239,288n.; ethnarch, 129n. archers, 13n.,223n.; of Alexander the Great, 294;Babylonian Jews, 1 7 5 - 6 ; Cretan, 201, 204; Herodian, 162,165,195,210; Ituraean, 164, 201; Nabataean, 1 2 3 - 4 ; Peloponnesian, 201; Roman, 200n., 201; Syrian

General Index (mounted), 201; of Trachonitis, 174,193 archon, archontes, 21 Oil.,240,241,252 Aretas I, 99-100,104 Aretas II, lOOn.,109,110,117,277,280,285; aggressive policy of, 1 1 3 - 4 ; coins of, 110, 114 Aretas III, 3,92n.,113n.,114,120,121,123,124, 129,131,138,277,278,281,283,286,298; defeats Alexander Jannaeus, 120; and Alexandra Salome, 122; and Rome, 138 Arelas IV, and Antipas, 301; and Herod, 3 0 0 1,304; and Augustus, 300, 307 Arethousa, 76,81,94 Aristobulus I, 310; bodyguard of, 31; conquers Galilee, 83,85n.; conquers Samaria, 61 Aristobulus II, 3,54n.,67,87n.,93n.,124,125, 131,147,167n.,257,283,284,285; army of, 32 (mercenaries), 131,164 ; bid for power, 44; expedition to Damascus, 1 2 2 - 3 ; Jewish loyalty to, 137,139; revolt of, 132-4,136 Aristobulus (Jonathan, son of Aristobulus II), 2,227 Aristobulus (son of Herod and Mariamme), 209 Aristobulus (son of Herod), 301 armies, see Hasmonaean a., Herodian a., Ptolemaic, a., Roman a., Seleucid a., cavalry, infantry, mercenaries, standing army Arnon, 119,301n. Arous, 68, 178n.,238n.,258,300 Arsinoe (Tel Anafa), 80 Artemidorus, 111 artillery, of Caesar, 201 ; Hasmonaean, 24,38, 311 ; Herodian, 165,224,263-4 (Machaerus) ; operated by Jews, 272n.,273;in the siege of Jerusalem (37 B.C.E.), 162-3,165,(70 C.E.), 223,271-3 Arumah, 69n. Arydda, 91 Ascalon, 73,79,110,247,252n.,267; coins of, 97,242,244 Ashdod, 41n.; see also Azotus Asia Minor, 4,143,151,152,153,184,202, 284n. Asinaeus, 176n. Asophon, battle of, 311n. Assyrians, 109n. ateleia, il S Athenaeus, 123 Athenion, 186n.,290 Athens, 152 'Atil, 280 Atuatuci, 131n. Augustus, Caesar Octavianus, 4,7,129n.,143, 150,166,167,168,169,180n.,184,185n.,

335

191,196,197,207,209,211,214,216,233, 247,254,257,274,276,284,292,296,300; and Aretas IV, 300,304; bestows cities and territories upon Herod, 1 7 0 - 1 , 2 9 1 - 2 , 3 0 7 ; and friendly kings, 292-3,296-7,300,301 ; size of army in the expedition to Egypt, 167n. ; visits Judaea, 215 Aulus Plautinus, see Plautinus Aulus Auranitis, 104,105,106,116,173n.,179,181, 183,260,266,288,296n.,301n.,305; given to Herod, 170,291 ; Nabataeans in 103,109, 117,278,279,280-1,291,293,294,302 Auranus, 12 auxilia, 198 auxiliary troops (Roman), 161,162,201-2, 205,208,215,272-3; pay of, 198 'Avdat, see Oboda Azekah, 19n. Azotus, 75,76,77,79,82,94,197, 247,252,266; battle of, 23,311, figures, 25,28;Hasmonaean conquest of, 24,73,74;military settlers in, 252 c Azzun, 67 Ba c al Shamin, 281 Babba, sons of, 167n. Babylonia, 17,175,176,179 Babylonian Jews in Batanaea, 175-9,193,266, 267,298 Bacchides, 19n.,108; army (figures), 2 7 - 8 ; fortifications of in Judaea, 3 8 - 4 3 , 5 1 , 5 4 , 233 ; and Khirbet Firdusi, 68 Baka, 85 ballista(e), 263,264n.,272 banditry, see brigandage bar is, 16n. Baris (Hasmonaean citadel of Jerusalem), 44, 94,96,149,162,218,219n.,221,224 Bar-Kokhba, 231 barracks, camps, of the Herodian army, 19, 268; in Jerusalem, 225,268 Barzaphrenes, 148,149 basileia, basileion, 218n., 220n.,249,259,267n. Basir, 178 Batanaea, 106,109,116,173n.,191,260,288n„ 296,; given to Herod, 291 ; settlement of Babylonian Jews in, 175-80,183,239,261 Bathyra, 176,177,178 Beer-Sheba, see Tel Beer-Sheba Beitin, 41,42n.; see also Bethel belostaseis, 24n. beniAmari, 108 Besor, 245 Bethagala, 43n. Betharamphtha, 261,266,267 Bethbasi, 43

336

General Index

Bethel, 54; fortified by Bacchides, 3 8 , 4 1 - 2 Beth-Gubrin, 237,266 Beth-Horon, 54,308; battle of, 1,42; fortified by Bacchides, 38,42 Bethlepthepha, 42,232,266 Bethsaida, 238n. Beth-Zur, 1,42,44,79n.,231,312; abandonment of, 54, archaeological excavations at, 40; battle of, 2 5 - 6 (figures), 27; building characteristics, 49; fortified and garrisoned by Bacchides, 3 9 - 4 0 , by Judas Maccabaeus, 28,38,43, by Lysias, 38, and by Simon, 31, 40,52,73 biblical rules concerning war, 24,33 Birath Arba, 15n. Birath Soreqah, 15n. Birta of Ammonitis, 15,16n. birtha, birah, 15 bitumen, 98,102,288 Bithynia, 199 Bocchus, 214n. bodyguards, of Agrippa II, 180; of Aristobulus I, 31; of Augustus, 185n.;of Herod, 1 8 3 - 5 , 210,215; of Jonathan, 28,31 Bosor, 105 Bosora, Bostra, 105,117n.,120n.,280 brigandage, in Cilicia Tracheia, 267,309; in Galilee, 140,210,308; in Idumaea, 267,309; in Trachonitis, 171,173,176,261,293,295, 296,297,308,314 Brundisium, 151,152n. Brutus, Decimus Iunius, 214,216 Brutus, M. Iunius, 148,202,214 building techniques, harbour of Caesarea, 249n.; Herodian, 2 6 8 - 9 ; in Jerusalem, 4 8 9; Roman, 271, see also masonry Burj el-Isâneh, 157n. Busir, 178 Byzantium, 272n. Caecilius Bassus, Q„ 4,142,205 Caesar, C. Iulius, 4,133,138,139,147,165,202, 214,216,251,283; doubles the legionary pay, 196,197; tactics of, 2 3 n . , 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 Caesar, Sextus Iulius, 4,140,142 Caesar Octavianus, see Augustus Caesarea, 79,149n.,215,252n.,253,257n.,266, 267,269n.,270n.,274,304; coins of, 242; Herod's harbour, 187,191,247,249,305 ; Herodian buildings and fortifications, 2 4 7 - 5 1 ; Herodian veterans settled in, 182, 193,239; Jews in, 2 5 0 - 1 Callirrhoe, 264n. Camoun, 36n. Calvinius, Cn. Domitius, 202 Cana, 119

Canatha, 186n.,289,290,294; see also Qanawat Caphabris, 238 Capharsaba, 119,251,312 Caphethra, 238 Cappadocia, 293 Carrhae, battle of, 133,153n.,200 Carthage, Carthagenians, 214,272n. cassis, 199 Cassius Longinus, C., 4,137,143,145,146,147, 148,164,186,205,214,216; army of, 201; imposes tribute on Judaea, 1 4 3 - 4 ; suppresses Jewish revolt, 133,135,141 casualty rate in battles, 27n. cavalry, horsemen, Arabian, 202n.; Babylonian Jews, 1 7 5 - 9 ; Bessian, 201; of Caesar, 23n„ 200; cooperation with phalanx, 204; Dardanian, 201; of friendly rulers, 214;Galatian, 201,202n.; Gallic, 185n., 200,201, 202; German, 200,202; Hasmonaean and Jewish, 8,19n.,26,134; Herodian, 156,161, 165,166,185,194,195,205,208,210,211; Macedonian, 201; Medes, 202n.; Nabataean, 124; Parthian, 202n.; Ptolemaic, 30,137n.; Roman, 155,157,160,161,162,200,201, 213; Seleucid, 12,26,27,30; settlers in Gaba, 180,181; of Simon, 2 2 ; o f Tobiah, 15,20; Thracian, 202n. Cendebaeus, 22,26,29,43,31 In. centurion(s), 158n.,162n.,206,208n.,309n. Cerealis, Sex. Vettulenus, 238,241n. Cestius Gallus, 251,315 Chalcis, 147,148,171n.,287,292n. charax, 2 0 - 1 chiliarchia, 20,203,204,207 chiliarchos, 206,207 chorion, 44n.,92,144,240 Cilicia, 187n.,287,292,293 City of David, 38n„ 45,48,51 civil war(s), 5; Jewish, 3,33,34,241,278 ;Roman, 4 Claudius (Roman emperor), 158n. Cleopatra III Thea, 83n.; intervention of in Judaea, 114 Cleopatra VII, 4,167n.,168,169,171n.,184, 214n.,226,227,237,264n.,284,292; and Herod, 236,287-91,305 cleruchs, 15,17,19 client kings, see friendly kings clipeus, 212 Clysma, 113 coastal cities, 26,169n.; under Herod, Chap. VI. 3 passim Cochba, 174 Coele-Syria, 12,60n.,80n.,142,143n.,145,147, 205,296; meaning of, 141; Ptolemaic strongholds in, 37

General Index cohort(s), 156,162,199,202,205,206,207,211, 212,213,315; in Jerusalem, 225; of Vigiles, 158 colonies, Roman, 180,271 Commagene, 109n.,156 commissariat, see logistics concrete, 269,271. conversion, 1,83; see also Judaization Coptus, 112,279n. Cornelius, see Dolabella, Marcellinus, Scipio Corinthus (Herod's bodyguard), 301 Cosa, 271n. Costobar, 59n.,79,209,210n.,240,252,287n., 288n. Crassus, M. Licinius, 4,133,137,155n.,200 Crocodilopolis, 149 Cumanus, 308 Cuspius Fadus, 308n. Cuthites, 60,72, see also Samaritans Cypriote troops, 38 Cyprus, 32,102n.,287 Cyprus (fortress), 51,96n.,227-9,266,267,270, 274,275; water supply of, 229 Cyprus (Herod's mother), 284,300 Cyrenaica, Jewish settlers in, 14 Cyzicus, 168 Damascius, 280 Damascus, 103n.,108,110,119,120,122,123, 146,147,278,283,297,305 Damascus Gate, 223 Daphne (Syria), 175; Seleucid army at, 29n.,32 Daphne (Egypt), 278n. Dathema, 20n.,106n. David (king of Israel), 4,109n. David's Tower, see Tower of David dayek, 24n. Dead Sea, 98,102,108n.,119,121,241,245,288, 301n. Decapolis, 141,296 Decimus Brutus, see Brutus decurion(s), 158n.,206 degel, 212,213 Deiotarus, 202,214n. Deir esh-Sha c ir, 179n. Dellius, 153 Delos, lOln. Demetrius Poliorcetes, 272n. Demetrius I Soter, 13,28,32n.,44 Demetrius II Nicator, 12,23,25,28,44,67,69, 113 Demetrius III Eucaerus, 26,34,82,90,119,121 n.; war against Alexander Jannaeus, 118,31 In. Demetrius (native of Gadara), 74 D e r ' a , 280

337

Didius, Q., 168 Difla, 149n. Digaeus, 122,139n. Diodorus Siculus, on the Nabataeans, 9 8 - 9 Diogenes, 35n. Dionysias, 280 Diospolis, 186n.,289 Dium, 76,90,91 n.,94,260,283,289,290,296; Hasmonaean conquest of, 25 Dolabella, Cn. Cornelius, 281 Domitius, see Calvinius Doq, 42n.,51,54,96n.,227 Dora, 50n.,76,77-8,82,94,95,129n.,247; building characteristics, 36; in the Fourth Syrian War, 36 doryphoroi, 183,184,193 Dositheus (Jewish commander), 21 Dositheus (Tobiad horseman), 20,21n. Drusium (tower in Caesarea), 250 Drymoi, 149 dynasts, relations with Rome, 5,161; see also friendly kings Dyrrhachium, 201 earthquake(s), 69,290 Eastern Terra Sigillata, 102n. Ecbatana, 179 Edom, 98,101n.,102,108,118,125,277,283, 302 Egypt, 14,59,101,162,166,168,169,215,278, 279,284; eastern maritime trade of, 1 1 1 - 2 , 113 Ekron, 19n. Elasa, battle of, 19n.,25,27-8,311n. Elath, see Aela Elephantine, Jewish military settlement at, 14n. elephants, 30n.,167n.,203n. Eleutheropolis, 237 Eleutherus, 169n. El-Hadid, 120n. El-Hit, 179n. Elkias' palace, 303 Elusa, 91,99,102n.,115; see also Alousa Elyashiv, 17 En-Gedi, 237,238,266,267 eparchos, 208n. Ephraim, 66 Ephron, 36n. epichorioi, 154,163 epimeletes, 138,139,143 epistrategos, 112 epitropos, 139 Eretz-Israel, l,27n.;boundaries of, 85 Esdraelon, 83 Esebon, Esebonitis, 75,88,90,94,116,118,266, 275,298,299; discharged soldiers settled in,

338

General

180,181-2,191,193,239,261 Es-Salt, 261 Essenes, 167 Ethiopia, 18 ethnarch, 1 2 9 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 6 Eudoxus, 112 Euphrates, 151,175 E u m e n e s II, 1 7 8 n . Ezechias, 141 Fabius, 1 4 6 , 1 4 7 Far East, 1 1 0 , 1 1 2 F a r ' a t a , 42n. F e r e n t i n u m , 271 n. First Jewish Revolt, 5 9 , 1 7 5 , 1 7 9 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 1 , 238,240-1,244,245,251,252,259,263,315 First R o m a n Period, 2 4 2 First Wall (Jerusalem), 47,48,5 0 , 5 1 , 9 4 , 1 6 3, 218,220,221,222,223,224 First Temple, 1,47 fortifications, 14; f u n c t i o n s of, 3 6 - 7 , 9 2 , 9 4 - 7 , 223-4,236-7,267,275-6,308-9,311-2; Hasmonaean, 6,31,Chap. II passim, 257, 2 6 5 , 2 7 0 , 3 1 1 - 2 ; Hellenistic, 8 2 , 2 7 1 , 2 7 2 ; Herodian, Chap. VI passim; m e t h o d s of construction, 2 7 0 - 1 ; R o m a n , 8 2 , 2 7 0 - 1 fortified farms, 5 9 , 2 5 8 fortified villages, 1 7 6 , 1 7 7 , 2 3 8 front formation, 213 friendly kings/rulers, 1 6 1 , 1 6 2 , 1 6 8 , 1 6 9 , 1 8 6 , 2 0 2 , 2 8 3 , 2 8 4 , 2 9 6 , 3 1 3 ; armies modelled o n the R o m a n legion, 2 0 1 - 2 ; military contribution to Rome, 2 1 4 - 5 , 3 0 0 Gaba (Judaea), 19n. Gaba (Galilee), 8 5 - 6 , 9 4 , 2 4 7 n . , 2 5 8 - 9 , 2 6 0 , 2 6 1 , 2 6 6 , 2 6 7 , 2 7 5 ; discharged soldiers settled in, 1 8 0 , 1 8 1 , 1 8 2 , 1 9 1 , 1 9 3 , 2 3 9 , 2 5 8 Gabala, Gabalitis, 7 5 n . , 3 0 1 n . Gabara, 266n. Gabinius, A., 4 , 8 3 , 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 4 n . ; destroys Hasmonaean fortresses, 9 6 n . , 1 6 7 n . , 2 2 9 ; expedition t o E g y p t , 165; expedition against the Nabataeans, 2 8 1 - 3 ; r e f o r m of tax collection, 130n.; restoration of Hellenistic cities in Palestine, 5 7 , 7 6 - 7 , 2 5 2 ; suppression of revolts in Judaea, 1 3 2 - 3 Gad, 15n. Gadara, 7 5 , 9 0 , 9 4 , 1 0 9 n . , 1 1 7 n . , 1 9 7 , 2 4 7 n „ 2 5 4 , 2 6 0 , 2 6 1 , 2 6 6 ; conquered b y A n t i o c h u s III, 36n.; given t o Herod, 1 6 9 , 2 9 1 ; Hasmonaean conquest o f , 2 5 , 7 4 , 8 8 ; restored by Pompeius, 7 3 , 7 5 , 2 8 3 Gadora, 2 6 1 , 2 6 6 Gaius Caesar, 2 7 9 n . Galaaditis, 8 8 , 9 0 , 9 2 , 9 5 , 1 0 4 , 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 , 1 0 8 , 1 0 9 ,

Index 1 1 6 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 , 2 7 8 , 3 0 1 ¡ e x t e n t of, 1 0 5 6 Gala(e)stes, 35n. Galatia, 2 0 3 Galatians, 17; in Herod's a r m y , 1 8 3 , 1 8 5 ; horsemen, 201,202n. galea, 199 Galilee, 1 , 3 , 4 , 6 , 3 6 , 7 5 , 7 9 , 9 5 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 0 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , 136,139,141,143,144,147,149,150,154, 155,156,158n.,171,181,206,238,258,261, 2 6 6 , 2 6 7 i 2 7 5 , 2 8 8 n . , 2 9 2 n . , 3 0 1 ; administrative organization of, 232n.; brigands in, 210; e x t e n t of Hasmonaean rule, 85; fortifications in, Chap.II. 5 passim, 1 4 0 , 1 5 4 , 2 5 9 6 0 ; governed b y Herod, 140; Hasmonaean campaigns in, 25,27; Ituraean population in, 8 3 ; o p p o s i t i o n t o Herod, 2 5 9 - 6 0 ; r e c o n quered b y Herod, 1 5 3 - 5 ; u n n a m e d fortresses in, 8 5 , 1 4 7 , 1 5 6 Gallia C o m a t a , 201 Gallus, see Aelius Gamala, 7 5 , 7 6 , 7 7 , 9 0 , 9 4 , 1 7 9 , 2 6 1 , 3 0 1 n . ; Hasm o n a e a n conquest o f , 25 ; Jewish settlement at, 80 Gamalitis, 301 Gaulane, 9 0 , 9 4 , 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 Gaulanitis, 2 0 n . , 7 5 , 9 0 , 1 0 6 , 1 1 7 , 1 7 9 n . , 2 6 0 , 2 6 6 , 2 8 8 n . , 2 9 6 ; g i v e n to Herod, 1 7 1 , 2 9 1 , 2 9 2 n . ; Seleucid strongholds in, 37n. Gauls, in Herod's a r m y , 1 8 3 , 1 8 4 , 1 8 5 , 1 8 9 , 1 9 3 , 2 1 1 ; horsemen, 1 6 1 , 2 0 0 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 n . Gaza, 7 5 , 7 6 , 7 9 , 8 0 n . , 8 2 , 9 4 , 1 0 0 n . , 1 0 1 n . , l 15, 1 9 7 , 2 0 9 , 2 5 2 - 3 , 2 6 6 , 2 8 7 , 2 8 8 , 3 0 8 n . , 3 1 2 ; besieged and destroyed by Alexander Jannaeus, 1 0 9 , 1 1 5 ; coins and mint of, 6 9 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 , 2 4 2 ; g i v e n to Cleopatra, 2 8 7 - 8 ; given t o Herod, 1 6 9 , 2 4 7 ; Hasmonaean conquest o f , 2 4 , 2 5 , 7 4 , 9 0 n . , 2 7 7 ; relations with Nabataeans, 1 0 9 , 1 1 2 n . ; trade in p e r f u m e s and spices, 9 9 , 1 0 1 G e p h r o u n , 36n., see also Ephron Gerasa, 9 0 , 9 4 , 2 6 0 , 2 8 3 , 2 9 8 ; Hasmonaean conquest o f , 2 5 , 1 1 9 ; Jewish settlement in, 80 Germans, in Herod's army, 1 8 3 , 1 8 4 , 1 8 5 , 1 8 8 , 193; h o r s e m e n , 161,200,201 Gezer, Gazara, 1 9 n . , 4 2 , 2 7 1 n . , 3 1 2 ; a b a n d o n m e n t o f , 5 3 , 5 4 ; excavations at, 41n.,53 ; fortified by Bacchides, 38,41, and by S i m o n , 52; Hasmonaean conquest of, 24,40,73; headquarters of J o h n Hyrcanus I, 41 ; miqva^ot in, 4 1 n . ; Seleucid garrison in, 4 4 Gibeon, 19n. Gilead, 2 0 - 1 , 2 7 n . ; Hasmonaean campaigns in, 2 5 , 2 7 ; see also Galaaditis Gindarus, b a t t l e o f , 155 Gischala, 8 5 , 9 4

General Index Gittha, 164,227,266,267 G i v ' a t Sha'ul, tower at, 54,94,95,126,266, 267,269n. gladius, 199,212 Gophna, 232,233,266 Gorgias, 20,25,27n.,41 Giaphon, 279 Gratus, 185,193,209,210 Greece, 152, minting, 130n. Greek cities, 3,109,125,129,298,312; Hasmonaean conquest of, 2 4 - 5 , 186, 278; under Herod, 237,267; and Jews, 1 3 6 , 2 5 0 - 1 , 253; restored by Pompeius and Gabinius, 76-7,131,135,283; see also Hellenistic cities guerilla tactics, 11,12 Gulf of Elath, 277,278n. Gush Halav, see Gischala Habran, 280 Haditha, 120n. Hannibal, 180 Haris, see Kafr Haris Hasdrubal, 180 hasidim, 11 Hasmonaean army, 5,6,18,19,20; duty to serve in, 3 2 - 3 ; figures and manpower, 2 5 - 3 2 , 3 4 , 1 3 2 - 5 ; and Hellenistic tactics, 1 8 - 9 , 2 2 - 3 , 3 1 0 - 1 ; mercenaries in, 26,30,31 —2,34,35n., 311; size of units, 23 - 4 ; see also artillery, cavalry, infantry, standing army Hasmonaeans, l,5,6,13,22,32n.; coinage, 54n.; expansion and foreign policy, 3,32n., 53, 74,75n.,79n.,82,88,277,310; expulsion of Gentile population, 52,72,73,79; revolt, 1, 11,12n., 15,37,310; see also Alexander Jannaeus, Alexandra Salome, Antigonus, Aristobulus I, Aristobulus II, Hasmonaean army, Hyrcanus II, John Hyrcanus I, Jonathan, Judas Maccabaeus, Simon hasta, 212 hastati, 213n. Hatita, 120n. Hawran, 105n.,119n.,123,179n.,280,281,298 Hazor, 31 In. Hebron, 304; attacked by Judas Maccabeaus, 73,238,269n. Hecataeus, 14,17 hegemones, 183n.,195,208 Hejaz, 288n. hekatonarches, 308n. Helenoupolis, 87n. Helix, 146 Hellenisers, 1,11,12,19 Hellenistic armies, 5 , 1 2 , 3 4 , 1 9 8 - 9 , 2 0 3 - 5 ; Jews in, 17; see also artillery, cavalry, in-

339

fantry, phalanx, mercenaries, Ptolemaic army, Seleucid army Hellenistic cities, 61,91, Chap.II.4 passim helepolis, 24 Hermoupolis Magna, 27 8n. Herod, ln.,6,7,12,13n.,59,68,81,133,145,147, 170-1,174,217,275,276,303,316; adminisstration of his kingdom, 177,210,231-3, 237,261n.; allegiance to Romans and Rome, 5,139,142,143,168,186,214-6,226,276, 2 8 4 , 3 0 6 - 7 , 3 1 3 ; and Antonius, 168,276, 289; and Aretas IV, 3 0 0 - 1 ; and Augustus (Octavian), 1 5 0 , 1 6 8 - 9 , 2 9 6 - 7 , 3 0 0 ; b u i l d i n g enterprises of, 1 8 8 , 2 7 3 - 4 ; and Cleopatra, 2 3 6 , 2 8 7 - 9 ; conflict with Nabataeans in Auranitis and Trachonitis, 171,190,293-4, 2 9 7 - 8 ; conspiracies against, 1 8 8 - 9 , 1 9 5 , 2 7 4 - 5 ; death of, 229; financial transactions with Nabataeans, 2 8 6 - 7 , 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ; fortifications of, Chap.VI passim; given Roman troops by Cassius, 143,205,216; governor of Coele-Syria, 141,143,145,164,205, of Galilee, 4,6,139,140,191, and of Samaria, 143; and Greek cities, 7,247,254,276; and Idumaea, 144n.,149-50,154,175,233;journeys to Rome, 150,171,295;king of Judaea, 4,150,157n.,169,287n.; kinship ties with Nabataeans, 2 8 4 - 5 ; and Malichus 1,4,168, 186,286-91,298,304,307; military support to Rome, 142,168,169,205; origins of 138; palaces of, Amathus, 250, Ascalon, 267n., Caesarea, 249, Herodium, 2 3 0 - 1 , 2 5 0 , Jericho, 227,229,250, Jerusalem, 218,222, 225,250, Machaerus, 252,263, Sepphoris, 250,259; regains Galilee, 153-5,156,259; relations with Jews, 7,167,168,225,226, 236—7,276,313,314-5 ; relations with Nabataeans, 7,124n., 186,246,264,276,277, Chap.VII.2-4 passim ; returns from Rome to Judaea, 1 5 1 - 3 (chronology); siege and conquest of Jerusalem, 157—63,166-7; and Syllaeus, 2 9 5 - 8 ; territories and cities given to by Augustus, 1 6 9 , 1 7 0 - 1 , 2 9 1 - 2 ; tetrarch, 148; trial of, 140; war against Antigonus, 1 4 8 - 5 0 , 1 5 3 - 7 ; wealth of, 142, 196-7,286-7 Herod's army, consists mainly of Jews, 1 6 3 - 4 , 186,215; ethnical composition of, 1 8 3 - 5 ; expenditure, 1 9 6 - 9 ; formation, strength and composition in the 40's, 1 4 0 - 1 , 1 4 3 , 1 4 5 , 1 4 9 - 5 0 ; functions of, 314, 316; geographical distribution, 191,268; intelligence service, 1 8 8 - 9 ; logistic department, 1 6 5 - 6 , 188; military settlers, 1 7 1 - 8 2 ; officers of, 2 0 8 - 1 0 ; recruitment, strength and composition in 3 9 - 3 7 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 3 - 5 , 1 5 7 - 9 , 1 6 1 - 5 ,

340

General Index

214; and the Roman army, 2 0 5 - 1 5 ; royal guard, 1 8 3 - 4 ; a n d the Romanauxilia, 198, 215; salary, 190; size of units, 2 1 0 - 1 , 214n.; strength of, 159,188,193-5,313; terms of service, 1 9 0 - 1 ¡weapons of, 210 Herod Antipas, see Antipas, Herod Herodian Limes, 239 Herodian Period, 242 Herodias, 301 Herodium, 90n.,96n.,215,230-3,241,249n„ 250,257n.,264,266,267,269,274,275; building characteristics, 49 Herodium (Peraea), 261,266,267,299 Hieronymus of Cardia, 98 Hierotimus, 113 hipparchia, 204 hipparchos, 208 Hippicus (tower), 221,223,224,225,231,250, 256,263,273,275 Hippus, 37n.,76,90,91n.,94,117n.,197,247n., 266,283; given to Herod, 169,291 homophylos, 153,163 hoplitai, hoplites, 23,165,210 Hulah Lake, 80,90n.,175n. Hurvat Mesad, 54,94,130n.,226-7,266,267 Hurvat Mizbah 246n. Hypsicrates, 133,138n. Hyrcania,44,94,96,129,136,215,229-30,257n., 258,266,267,272,274,275,312; conquered by Herod, 167 ; remains of siege installation at, 167; water supply of, 230 Hyrcanus (son of Joseph the Tobiad), 16,20, 104n.,107 Hyrcanus II, 3,4,44,125,130,138,140,141,143, 144,145,148,218,219n.,251,286,298; and Aretas III, 121,124,130,285; army of, 131, 132-4,137 ; coins of, 130n.,l 37n. ; executed by Herod, 291 ; powers and position after 6 3 , 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 3 7 - 8 , 1 3 9 ; taken prisoner by the Parthians and exiled to Babylonia, 149, 150n.; wealth of, 142 iaculum, 212 Idumaea, 1,3,26,75,76,113n.,116,129,130,136, 144,145,149,160,161,193,209,238,252, 266,267,288,304n.,308n. ; administrative organization of, 232n.; Antipatrid influence in, 144,149-50,154,175,233; archaeological survey of, 60n.; not a defensive zone, 239,246; Hasmonaean influence in, 1 6 3 - 4 , 237; Hasmonaean fortifications in, 5 4 - 6 0 , 143,146; Herodian fortifications in, 2 3 3 46; Herodian settlers in, 182,191,233 ; local militia, 1 7 4 - 5 , 2 4 0 - 2 Idumaeans, 101n.,109n.,153n.; conversion of, 58,59n.; in Herod's army, 163; organization

of in the First Jewish Revolt, 241 ; settled by Herod in Trachonitis, 171-5,193,296, 298 ile, 155,180,204,207 India, 112 infantry, 26,27,28,143,154,155,156,157,159, 162,167n.,204,211 ; heavy, Hasmonaean, 22-3,134,311, Herodian, 162,165,210, of Juba, 203, Roman, 200,201,213,215; light, of Caesar, 23n.,200, Hasmonaean, 23,311, Hellenistic, 204,210, Herodian, 165n.,166, 210, of Juba, 203, Roman, 201,210 Ipsus, battle of, 30 Isana, battle of, 157 Isidorus, 280 Italy, 180 Ituraeans, 85,87,109n.,123,136,147,291; archers, 201 ; conversion of, 83 ; in Herod's army, 156,185,209; mercenaries, 158,164; uprising against Alexander Jannaeus, 83,122 Iulius, see Caesar iuniores, 29n. Jabbok, 20n. Jacimus, 180 Jamblichus, 286 Jamblichus (of Emesa), 214n. Jambri, sons of, 107,116 Jamnia, 62n.,75,76,77,79,80n.,82,94,107n., 197,247,251-2,266 Jannaeus, see Alexander Jannaeus Jason, ll,26,38n.,104,107n. Jason of Cyrene, 107 javelins, javelin throwers, 12,13,23,123,156, 223n.; of Alexander the Great, 204; Herodian, 162,164,210; of Juba, 203n. Jebel Fureidis, 230 Jebel Hawrân, see Hawrân Jerash, 108n.,303n.; see also Gerasa Jericho, 13n.,55,94,96n.,105,155,156,157,160, 164,166n.,184,205,206,231,240,261,266, 267,273,287,288,312; battles at, 44,227; building characteristics, 49; excavations at, 42n.; fortress of Bacchides at, 42; given to Herod, 169; Hasmonaean fortresses and palace at, 51-2,54,227; Herodian fortresses and palaces at, 227-9,250; mentioned in a Zenon papyrus, 42n. Jerusalem, 1,3,4,11,13,16,17,40,41,42,44,54, 90n.,92n.,94,95,96,104,122,124,129,130, 134,139,140,141,142,144,146,149,150, 152,155,156,164,165,176,179,185,186, 205,209,210,215,230,232,237,239,241, 254,266,267-8,273,275,283n.,286,302, 303,312; camp of Herodian troops, 191 ; fortifications demolished by Pompeius, 129,

General Index 217 ; garrisoned by Judas Maccabaeus, 28 ; Hasmonaean fortifications and palace, 4 5 51,96,219n.,218n.; Hasmonaean mint, 62n.; Herod's fortifications and palace, 217-26,250,266 ; hippodrome, 225 ; Lower City, 45,47,163,218; Persian citadel in, 37n.; Ptolemaic garrison and fortress in, 37; rebuilding of walls, 131,163,217,219n.; Roman legion stationed at, 168,195,225; Seleucid fortress and garrison in, 37n.,38; siege of in 37 B.C.E., 1 5 7 - 6 3 , 1 6 6 - 7 ; siege of by Titus, 47,161-2; size of population, 135,215n.; -topography of 45-6,218n.; Upper City 45, 47,218,225 Jewish-Roman alliance, 3 Jews, 1,7,12,245 ; cleruchs, 17,19; conflict with Samaritans, 69,72; evacuation from Transjordan, 21 ; in Galaaditis, 104,105;in Greek cities, 247,250-2; in Herod's army, 164,185,289-90; loyalty to the Hasmonaeans, 137-8,314; "Macedonian", 14; mercenaries, 14,15; opposition to Antipater and Herod, 1 4 6 , 1 6 7 - 8 , 3 1 4 - 5 ; popular weapons of, 1 1 - 3 ; revolts, against Alexander Jannaeus, 90, and after Herod's death, 185,186, 193,225; settlement of in conquered Hellenistic cities, 73,74,79,80,82; use of artillery, 272n.,273 John Hyrcanus I, 14,27n.,31,51n.,52,58,63,74, 79,80,83,118,125,174,240,310,311,312; and Antichus VII Sidetes, 50; coins of, 54n.,56,58n.,60,69,80; conquests of, Idumaea, 54,58,97,113n., Joppa, 73n., Samaria, 61, Shechem, 60-1,72n., in Transjordan, 116 ; fortifications of, 50 - 1 , 9 6 ; headquarters of in Gezer, 41; mercenaries of, 31,32; and the Pharisees, 33; siege operations of, 24-5,88 John (brother of Judas Maccabaeus), 107,108 John of Gischala, 223n. Jonathan, 5,12,13,14,25,31,51,58,88n.,104, 107,108,116,233; army of, 2 8 - 3 0 ; artillery and siege operations, 24; attack on Azotus, 73,74; fortifications of, 43,44,45,50,96; occupies Joppa, 5 2,7 2 ; manufacture of arms, 13,14; official position 23; subdues Gaza, 113, tactics of, 23,311 ; wars in Galilee, 83 Jonathan (Mariamme's brother), 184 Joppa, 75,76,79,82,94,103,119,247,251,253, 266,312; attacked by Judas Maccabaeus, 52, 72; conquered by Antiochus VII Sidetes, 73n., and by Herod, 154,162,169n.,251; given to Herod, 169; Hasmonaean conquests of, 24,52-3,73,155; Hasmonaean mint in, 62n.,73n.

341

Jordan, l,17,80,88n.,104,107,144,289 Jordan valley, 69,257,258 Joseph son of Tobiah, 16 Joseph (brother of Herod), 149,153,154,155, 156,206,211,227,237 Joseph (Salome's husband), 287n. Josephus Flavius, army of in Galilee, 158n„ 206 ; fortifications of in Galilee, 238n. ; inaccurate and obscure descriptions, 220—1, 223,234,275,288n.,289; military terms of, 2 0 7 - 8 ; omissions, 1 2 0 - 2 ; sources of, 30n., 166n.,236,275,288n.; see also Index of Sources Joshua, 19n. Jotapata, 85,94 Juba, 203 Jucundus, 215n. Judaea, 3,4,5,6,11,13,14,18,19,20,21,22,24,26, 27,28,31,32,33,34,37,38,42,52,67,69,74,75, 76,101,114,116,119,120,123,124,138,146, 147,150,151,152,153,156,164,191,197, 208,213,215,230,244,250,255,266,268, 273,283,285,287,296,303,312; economic relations with Nabataeans, 3 0 2 - 4 , 3 0 5 - 6 ; Herodian administration of, 231 - 3 ; imposition of Roman tax, 3,129-30; proper, 1,53, 144,288n.,290;revolts in the 50's, 1 3 2 - 7 ; Roman province of, 273; Roman auxiliary troops in, 158, 215,273,315; size of population, 29; social-economic distress, 131—2, 1 3 5 - 6 ; territory reduced by Pompeius, 3, 129-30 Judaization, 3,74;of Galilee, 83;of the Idumaeans, 58,59, of Joppa, 73,79 Judas Maccabaeus, 1,11,12,13,18,19,23,25,33, 38,42,60n.,74,311; army of, figures, 12n„ 2 5 - 2 8 , composition, 1 8 - 2 2 ; attacks Azotus, 73,107n., and Joppa, 52,72; expeditions to Transjordan, 1,21,27,73,88,105-7, 124n.;explanation of his success, 18,19, 310 ; fortifies Beth-Zur, 3 9 - 4 0 , and Jerusalem, 43,96; and Nabataeans, 104-8,116; operations in Idumaea, 43n.,58n.,73,238; tactics of, 12,13,19,23; weapons of, 1 2 - 3 Kadasa, 85 Kafr Haris, 68,71,94,258,266,300 Hafr Jammâl, 67n. Kafr Laqif, 68,71 Kafr Sur, 65n.,67,71,94,258,266,267 karim, 24n. Karnaim, 73,105 Kaspin, 20 katapeltai, 263n. katoikia, 38 KaUkab el-Haua, 87n.

342

General Index

Kedarite (Arabs), 101 katoikizo, 1 7 2 - 3 Kedron (Seleucid stronghold), 43 Khaspho, 105; see Kapsin Khirbet Bet Bassa, 43n. Khirbet Dabura, 87n. Khirbet el Harthiyeh, 86 Khirbet el-Kerak, 81 Khirbet el-Mird, 230 Khirbet el-Muraq, 304 Khirbet el-Qasr, 54; see also Hurvat Mesad Khirbet el-Tufaniyeh, 8 6 - 7 , 9 4 Khirbet el-*Urmeh, 68,71,94 Khirbet el-Yahud, 54 Khirbet es-§ar, 15n. Khirbet ei-Tell, 68,94,258,266,267 .Khirbet el-Tubeiqa, 40; see also Beth-Zur Khirbet Firdusi, 67-8,71,94,95,258,266,267 Khirbet Irbid, 155 Khirbet Khuresa, 55n. Khirbet Libb, 90 Khirbet Nejar, 66 Khirbet Samlk, 88 Khirbet Tibna, 42 Khispin, see Kaspin kiddan, 212 kittim, 212 kleros, 65 Labienus, Q., 151,152n. Labienus, T., 200n.,214 Lake of Galilee, 143,187 Land of Israel, 1 Laodiceia, 287 Latin League, 180 Leanitic Gulf, 102n. legatus legionis, 208,23 8n. legion(s), 23n.,158,160,162,185,205,207,211, 213; annual expenditure of, 196 - 7 ; model for friendly kings' armies, 2 0 2 - 3 ; number of in the siege of Jerusalem, 159,160,161; recruitment of non-citizens, 202; stationed at Jerusalem, 168,195,161; strength of, 155-6,161 n.,199,213; tactical structure and array for battle, 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 , 2 l l \ A l a u d a , 202;Deiotariana, 202; VMacedonica, 233n., 238; XII Fulminata, 162 legionaries, 165,167n.,210; salary of, 191n.; weapons of, 199 Leja, 173 Leontopolis, 14 Leuce Come, 279n.,308n. libanotika fortia, 112 Libba, 90,94 Libyans, 21 In. Lihyanites, lOln.

Lilybaeum, 272n. limes (Paiaestinae), 239,246n. Livias, 90n.,261 lochagos, 183,208 lochos, 158n., 203,205n. logistics, 165-7,188 Lower City, see Jerusalem Lucilius Bassus, 147n. Luni, 271n. Lycia, 178n. Lycomedes of Pontus, 214n. Lydda, 66,120n.,166,177n.,251,266; toparchy of, 130n.,232 Lydia, 17 Lysanias, 148,171,229 Lysias, 13;campaigns in Judaea, 26-7,38n.,39; fortification work of in Beth-Zur, 40 Lysimachus, 12,26 Maccabaee, see Judas Maccabaeus Macedonia, 130n.,202 Machaeras, 155,156,160,164,206,237 Machaerus, 44,95,96,130,134,136,147n.,167n., 261,266,267,269n.,273,274,275,298,312; Hasmonaean buildings and fortifications, 9 2 - 4 ; Herodian buildings and fortifications, 263-5 magen, 212 Magnesia, battle of, 32 Mahmal, 279 Maked, 105 Malatha, 244n. Malhata, 245 Malichus I, 4,150,168,283,305 ; and Antipater, 2 8 5 - 6 ; and Cleopatra, 2 8 7 - 9 ; sends troops to Caesar, 286, and to Antonius, 2 84 ; war and relations with Herod, 4,168,286-91, 298,304,307 Malichus (commander under Hyrcanus II), 132, 133,144,145,286; his brother, 146-7,233, 237 maniples, manipular legion, 199,213 Marcellinus, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, 281 Marcius, see Philippus Maresha, see Marisa Mariamme, 149,150,157,176,209,257 Mariamme (tower), 221,223,224,225,231,250, 256,263,273,275 Marion of Tyre, .15,146,147,259 Marisa, 75,76,77,79,94,97,129,237;battle of, 20,21,27n.,63 emigration of the Hellenised population, 5S ; excavations at, 57n.,58,98; Hasmonaean conquest of, 24,57 Marsyas (valley), 36,6 3n. Masada, 144,146,147,149,150,154,241,250, 264,266,267-8,269n.,271,272,273,274,

General Index

343

275,276,286,287; besieged by Antigonus, 153,164; functions of, 2 3 6 - 7 ; Herodian buildings and fortifications, 2 3 3 - 6 Masinissa, 214 masonry, 48-50,69,71,81,86,93; ashlar, 56,86, 269n.; Greek, 2 7 1 - 2 ; Hasmonaean, 95; Herodian, 268; see also building techniques Massilia, 272n. mechanai, 24n.,163n.,263n. mechanemata, 163.,263 Medaba, 75,90,94,107,108,118,298; Hasmonaean conquest of, 24,88,116 Medes, 202n.

32,156,159,164 Mount Nebo, 49 Mount Qarantal, 51 ; see also Doq Mount Tabor, 75,87,94,260; conquered by Antiochus III, 36n. Mount Zion, 43,47 Moyet c Awad, 100n.,102n. Murcus, 186 Mushanaf, 281 Mysian troops, in Jerusalem, 38 Mytilene, 293 Myus Harbour, 279n.

Mediterranean, 3,121,187,313;times of voyages in, 151n. Menelaus, 11 mercenaries, 29,31-2,87n.,185;in the Hasmonaean army, 26,30,31-2,34,35n., 124,131, 164; in Herod's army, 140,143,150,156, 164,205,215; Jewish, 14,17,18,310 meridarches, 23 meridarchia, meris, 60n.,209n.,232n. Meroth, 85n. Merrous, 63n. Mesad 'Athereth, 90n. Mesad Zohar, 245 Mesopotamia, 17 Mesudat Thamar, 245 Metellus Scipio, 214 migadl, 212 Migadl Zur, 79 military settlements, settlers, Batanaea, 1 7 5 80;Caesarea, 182,251; Idumaea, 5 9 - 6 0 , 182,239,240;Roman, 180;Samaria, 5 9 , 6 3 7,258 ;Sebaste, 180,181; Trachonitis, 1 7 1 5,183,193,296 Minaeans, 101n.,112n. militia, Coele-Syria, 37; Idumaea, 5 9 - 6 0 , 1 7 4 5,140-2 miqva'ot, 41n. Misenum 151 Mithridates VI, 199 Mithridates of Commagene, 214n. Mithridates of Pergamum, 165n. Moab, Moabitis, 88,90,91,92,93,95,102,108, 109,116,118,121,125,278,285,301n. Moabite towns, 25,75,90-1,129 Modein, 11 Moleatha, 245 Moses, military regulations of, 1 7 - 8 Motha, 119 Mount Carmel, 149 Mount Gerizim, 94,135; Samaritan town and temple on, 60-1,72n. Mount Gilbo c a, 87n.,135 Mount Lebanon, 36,83,185¡mercenaries from,

Nabaloth, 90 Nabataean capitals, 303 Nabataean coins, 109,114n.ll5n.; in Caesarea, 304n.; in Damascus, 120,125; in Gaza,110, 115 ; in Jerash and Philadeophia, 109 ; in Jerusalem, 304; in Masada, 304n.; in Si e 113n.; in Tel Beer-Sheba, 56,108n.; in Tel c Uzza, 242 Nabataean inscriptions, 99,100n.,104,108n., 117n.,278,279,280 Nabataean kingdom, 296,297,298,300,305, 307 ; expansion of, 98,113-4,271 - 8 ; and Rome, 280,283,284; see also Aretas I, Aretas II, Aretas III, Aretas IV, Malichus I, Obodas I, Obodas III Nabataean pottery, 100,108n.,278,279,280, 302-3 Nabataeans, 6,7,34,35,88,91,92,121,226,245, 276; and Alexander Jannaeus, 114,116-22; and Antiochus XII, 119; and the Arabs of Sinai, 101; army of, 1 2 3 - 4 ; and Auranitis, 103,109,117,278,280-1,291,293,294; commercial conflict with the Ptolemies, 1 1 0 - 3 ; and Damascus, 120,122-3,278; economic relations with Judaea, 3 0 2 - 4 , 3 0 5 - 6 ; expansion of in the Negev, 9 9 - 1 0 2 , 277 - 9 , 2 8 4 , in Transjordan, 1 - 2 , 1 0 2 - 9 , 116,117n.,278,279-81,290-1; and Gaza, 109,113,114; and the Hasmonaeans, 1 2 4 - 5 , 136; in Herod's army, 184,185,301 ; industry and trade in bitumen, 98,102,288; and Judas Maccabaeus, 104-8,116;military weaknesses, 91 - 2 ; origins of, 98,101 ; and piracy, 111 - 2 ; relations with Herod, 186, 264,299-300; and Trachonitis, 171 ; see also perfumes and spices Nahr ez-Zarqa, 149 Nakebus, 296,300 Naqb el-'Arud, 91 Narbat(t)a, 63n.,247n. Naveh, 178 navy, of Herod, 186-7,250; Roman, 187

344

General Index

Negev, 91,99,100,101,102n.,l 13n.,115,125, 239,246,277,278,302,305 Nehemiah, 16,17n. Neqarot, 279 Nicanor, 25,42n. Nicanor (the Cypriarch), 38n. Nicolaus of Damascus, 133,138;as source of Josephus Flavius, 30n.,1.45,148,275; in the service of Herod, 297,300 Norba, 27In. Numantine War, 214 Nuseib el-Aweishireh, 51,229 Oboda ( c Avdat), 91,100n.,102n.,278,303 Obodas I, 114n.,l 17,118,120,121,277,278,284 Obodas III, 117n.,279n.,291,293,295,297,305, 307 Olympus ("friend" of Herod), 209 opus incertum, 271 opus quadratum, 271 n. opus reticulatum, 269,271 opus siliceum, 271n. Oresa, 55,58,94,149,150,237,266,267 organa, 163n.,263n. Oronaim, 90 Orybda, 91 Pacorus, 148,149,151,152 palaces, Hasmonaean, Alexandrium, 71 ¡Jericho, 5 1 - 2 , 2 2 7 ; Jerusalem, 218n. palaces, Herodian, Alexandrium, 71 ; Amathus, 250; Caesarea, 2 4 9 - 5 0 ; Herodium, 2 3 0 - 1 , 250; Jericho, 227,229,250; Jerusalem, 222, 225,250; Machaerus, 263,265; Masada, 234, 236,250; Sepphoris, 188n.,250,259 Palestine, 26,37n.,43n.,44n.,101,103,110,115, 271,303 palta, 210 Paneas, 171,291 Pappus, 156,157,165n. parma, 212 Parthia, Parthians, 4,5,57,142,152,167n.,176, 200,208,218,237,283,284,286; archers, 29; horsemen, 202n.; invasion of Syria, 148, 151,152,153,252,307; support of Antigonus, 148-9,150,283 Paulus, 250n. pectorale, 199 Pegae, 81,103,251; see also Arethousa, Tel Apheq 'peitholaus, 132-3,134,138,141 Pella, 75,76,80,88,90,283,296n.; forts at, 36n.; garrisoned by Antiochus III, 36n.; Hasmonaean conquest of, 25,73,119 peltasts, 12n.

Pelusium, 113n., 308n. Peqi c n, 85 Peraea, l,3,88n.,129,132,144,174,181,185, 193,197,239,241,261,266,275,290,291, 299,301,305 ; administrative organization of, 232n.; extent of Herod's rule in, 298 Perdiccas, 65 perfumes and spices, 98-9,101,110,112,279, 288,302,305 Pergamum, 199 Perge, 249n. Perinthus, 27 2n. Petra, 98-9,100,104,108n.,109n.,116,165n., 285,286,301n. petroboloi, 263n. Petronius, C., 315 phalangites, phalanx, 23,32,179n.,203 -4,205, 208n.,210,213,311 Pharathon, 38,42,54 Pharisees, 96; and Alexander Jannaeus, 90,118; and Herod, 167;and John Hyrcanus I, 33, 35n. Pharnaces, 202 Pharnapates, 151,152n. Pharsalus, battle of, 201 Phasael, 4,133,140,146,196,205,217,218,219n., 286; governor of Jerusalem, 139,144,145; taken prisoner by the Parthians, 142,149; tetrarch of Judaea, 148 Phasael (tower), 221,223,224,225,231,250, 256,263,273,275 Phasaelis, 197 Pheroras, 166,196,240,257,261 Philadelphia, 15n.,36n.,91,105,108n.,119,130, 260,283,298,299; Hasmonaean forts nearby, 94; Herod's victories at, 290; and Nabataeans, 92,283 Philadelphus of.Paphlagonia, 214n. philia, 285 Philip II, 204,272 Philip V, 198,272n. Philip (son of Herod), 177,197,288n.,301n. Philip (son of Jacimus), 209 Philippenoi, 258 Philippi, battles at, 4,148 Philo of Byzantium, 37n.,234 Philoteria, 36n.,80-1,90,91n.; fortifications in, 37n. Phoenicia, Phoenicians, 37n.,60n.,75,76,109n., 110,157,305 phroura, 174 Phrygia, 17,177n. phylarchos, 301 pilum, 199,212 Piraeus, 249 piracy, pirates, 131n.,187n.,292

General Index Pir'aton, 42 Plautius, Aulus, 244 Polemo of Pontus, 169 Pompeius Magnus, Cn., 4,51n.,52n.,77,79n., 81,85,86,92,96,115,125,134,138,157,217, 247,277,309n.,312; auxiliary troops of, 201; demolishes Hasmonaean fortresses, 129-31,227,229,230; expedition to Petra, 281; reorganization of Judaea, 1 2 9 - 3 1 , 175n.; restoration of Greek cities, 7 4 , 7 6 7,249n.,253,283 Pontius Pilatus, 82n. Pontus, 169,202 Poppaedius, see Silo population, l,18n.,19,29,175,251-4 Porphyrion pass, 36 Posidonius, 112 praefectus, 141 praefectus praetorum, 208,209 praetorians, 185n. praetorium, 250 principes, 213n. proasteia, 218n. prostates, 291 proteichisma, 222n.,P1.2 Psephinus (tower), 263n. Ptolemaic army, 23,203,204,21 In.,311.; figures and composition in the battle of Raphia, 30, 167n.; mercenaries, 32 Ptolemais (Acco), 25n.,60n.,73,86,87,103,114, 151,152,153,164,169,25 2n.,308n.; besieged by Tigranes I, 123. building characteristics, 49; cooperation with the Parthians, 151, 153n. Ptolemies, 72,102,103,110 Ptolemy I Soter, 51n.,65n.,80n.,l lOn. Ptolemy II Philadelphus, 16n.,37n.,l 11,112n. Ptolemy IV Philopater, 30,167,198 Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, 111,112 Ptolemy IX Lathyrus, 26,29,30,82,83,114, 311n. Ptolemy XII Auletes, 138 Ptolemy of Chalcis, 284n. Ptolemy of Lebanon, 286 Ptolemy son of Menaeus, 120,122,147,148 Ptolemy (brigand), 308n. Ptolemy (Herodian commander), 15S Ptolemy (Herodian minister), 68,229,258,300 publicani, 130o. pugio, 199 pyrgos, 245 Pyrrhus, 272n. Qal'at el-Mishnaqa, 93,264 Qanawat, 281,289; see also Canatha Qarn Sartaba, 69,71,257

345

Qasrawet, 279n. Qasr el-cAbd, 16n. Qasr el-Yahud, 55,94 Qasr Haramiyyeh, 66,67 Qasr Kuah, 66 Qumran Community, 33,164n.,212 Rabbath Ammon, 15n. Rabbath Moab, 91,298 Rabbel I, 120n. Rabbelus, 103,104n.,108n. Ragaba, 25,34,90,94,121 Ragib, 94n. Ramathaim, 66,130n. Raphia, 75,76,77,82n.,109n.,247; battle of, 32, 107,167; Hasmonaean conquest of, 25 Raphon, 73 Ras Quneitra, 70,71 Ras Siyagha, 88 Red Sea, llln.,112,113,284 Rehovot, lOOn. Rhaepta, 171,296 Rhinocorura, 75,76,82n.,247; conquered by Alexander Jannaeus, 115,121,277 Rhodes, 168,233,272n. Rhoemetalces, 214n. ritualized friendship, 285 Roman army, 12,13,168,198-203,205,214n„ 241,270,313; of Judaea, 215,273,315; local recruitment in Syria, 156; model for Herod's army, 2 0 5 - 1 4 ; and Josephus' army, 158n.; of Syria, 179,315; in the siege of Jerusalem in 70 C.E., 1 6 1 - 2 Romans, Rome, 3,4,13,134,136,150,151,164, 171,185,197,226,271,277,283,284,292, 295,296,312,313,314,316;behaviour of generals in provinces, 136,137,152,166; disarmament policy, 131n.;in Judaea, 132; minting policy, 130n. Romena, 86,94 Rosh ha- c Ayin, 251 roads, Ad Dianam-Pelusium, 113; Aela-Clysma, 113; Berenice-Coptus, 279n.; JerichoJerusalem, 227; Jerusalem-Joppa, 5 5 , 2 2 6 7,308; Leuce Come-Petra, 309n.; Moyet c Awad-Oboda, 100n.;Petra-Gaza, 99, 279n.,305,307;Petra-Rhinocorura, 99, 100n.,279 royal guard, 205; of Herod, 183-5,193,194, 210-1,267; of Juba, 185n.; of Ptolemy IV, 185n. Rufus, 185,193,194,209,210 Ruspina, battle of, 200 Sabaeans, 112n. Sabinus, 194,259

346

General Index

Sadalas, 214n. sacrosancta vacatio, 180 Sadducees, 33n. Sahm el-Jaulân, 117n. salary, 190-1,198 Salkhad, 280 Salome, see Alexandra Salome Salome (sister of Herod), 197,229,287n.; and Syllaeus, 295,299,300 Samaga, 24,88 Samaria, 36n.,60,65,72,75,76,77,80,94,129, 154,155,157,158,159,160,161,166n„ 169n.,211,215,249n.,275,312; building characteristics, 49 ; coins of Jannaeus found at, 62, destroyed by John Hyrcanus I, 25, 61,74; Herodian settlement at, 180,181 182,185,191,193,239,254; resettled by Alexander Jannaeus, 6 2 - 3 Samaritis, Samaria, In.,3,36, Chap.I1.3 passim, 129,130,132,136,141,144,147,150,154, 156,178n.,232n.,238,258,266,288n.; field towers in, 6 4 - 5 ; fortified farms in, 6 5 - 7 , 7 1 - 2 ; forts in, 6 7 - 7 2 Samaritans, 60-1,63,130n.; conflict with Jews, 69; in Egypt, 14n. Samosata, 156,164,185,260 San Giovenale, 27In. Sanhédrin, 140,141 Sappho, 178n.,238n. Saturninus, see Sentius Scaurus, M. Aemilius, 137,138,165n.,281,283n., 285 Shechaniah, 17 Scipio Aemilianus, P. Cornelius, 214 Scipio Africanus, P. Cornelius, 214 Scopas, 37n. scutum, 199,212 Scythopolis, 36n.,37n.,75,76,77,83,87,94,130, 298; Hasmonaean conquest of, 73; Jewish settlement at, 80 Sea of Galilee, 81,260 Sebaste, 247n.,252n.,253,261,266,267,269n., 274; Herodian buildings and fortifications in, 2 5 4 - 7 ; see also Samaria Sebastenoi, Sebastenians, 185,186,189,191,193, 194,211,215n.,256 Second Wall (Jerusalem), 51,163,218,219n., 220,223,224,273 Seleucia (Gaulanitis), 37n.,75,80n.,90,94 Seleucid army, 12,13,203,204,311 ; figures, 2 6 - 8 ; mercenaries, 29,32 Seleucid fortresses, in Gaulanitis, 37n.; in Judaea, 24,38-43,312 Seleucus II Callinicus, 17 Sentius Saturninus, C., 171,175,296 Sepphoris, 83,94,259-60,266,267; conquered

by Herod, 154; Herodian arsenal and palace in, 188n.,250,265-6 Seron, 42 Sh'ar ha- c Amaqim, 49,50n.,86,258,279 Shechem, 42,60-1,63,68,157n. Sheikh Abu Zered, 42 Sl c , 117n.,281 sicarii, 241 Sidon, 153n.,169n. Signia, 271n. Silas, 87 Silo, Poppaedius, 152,153,154,165,166 Simon, 5,14,27n.,44,52,74; army of, 2 2 - 3 , 2 9 , artillery of, 24; conquers Beth-Zur, 40,73, Gezer, 4 0 - 1 , 7 3 , and Joppa, 52,72,73,79; fortification works, 31,43n.,45,50,96; manufacture of arms, 14,44; powers of, 44, 129n. Simon son of Gioras, 223n.,241 Sinai, 101,113n.,165n.,166,169,278,302 slings, slingers, ll,12,13,223n.; of Alexander the Great, 204; of Antigonus, 165n.; Herodian, 162,165,210; Roman, 200n.,201; Thracian, 201 ; in War Rule, 213 Soaemius, 209 Sons of Light, army of, 2 1 2 - 3 Solomon (king of Israel), 47 somatophy lakes, 183,184,215n.,301 Sorabitta, 15 Sosipater, 21 Sosius, C., 156,157,159,160 Spain, 202 speira, 203,205,206,207 spices, see perfumes standing army, 23,28,33,34,307; of Alexandra Salome, 3 4 - 5 , 3 1 3 ; functions of, 36; Herodian, 183,185,188,193-5,313 stones, 11,12,13,156,165n. strategia, 203 strategos, 23,179n.,208; of Coele-Syria, 141, 143;ofGalilee, 122,139n.,140;in the Herodian administration, 210n.,254; of Idumaea, 59,240; of Jerusalem, 139,146; of Samaria, 60n.,143 Straton'sTower, 75,76,79,94,247,249;building characteristics, 49; conquered by Alexander Jannaeus, 73; given to Herod, 169 stratopedarches, 208,209 St. Sabas, 230 Sûlukïye (Seleucia in Gaulanitis), 80n. Sur, 179n. Suweida', 280,281n. supply, see logistics Syllaeus, 171n.,307; and Herod, 295-301,304, 305,306 Syncelhis, 83n.,91,119

General Index syngeneis, 175,176n.,182n. synodoi, 53n.,74,88n. Syracuse, 272n. Syria, Syrians, l,4,36,37n.,75,76,103n.,107, 108n.,113,116,118,119,121,122,123,125, 130n. ,133,136,140,146,148,151,152,153, 156,162,166,171,277,284,287,303; in Herod's army, 185; relations'with Jews, 32, 109n.; in the Roman army, 156,157,159, 160,161,181,205; Roman auxiliary troops in, 158; Roman governors of, 4,137,138, 142,150-1,171,194,225,258,278,281,283, 292,296,307; Roman province, 281,283, 307 Syrian Wars,Third, 37n.; Fourth, 36-7,107; Fifth, 37,111,112n. tactics, of Caesar, 23n.,200; of the Hasmonaeans, 5,23,212; Hellenistic, 5,23,203-5, 212; of the Nabataeans, 1 2 3 - 4 ; Roman, 5, 22n.,199-201,211 tagma, 158,160,207 Tamai, see Mesudat Thamar Tappuah, 40 Tarcondimotus, 214n. Tarrichaeae, 133,135,266 Taurus, 51,54,94,129,227 taxes, 130n.,176,177 taxiarchoi, 183,208 Tekoah, 42 Tel Anafa, 80,90 Tel Apheq, 81,251 Tel c Arad, 55-6,94,242,243,246,266,267,309 Tel c Aro c er, 244-5,246,266,309 Tel Beer-Sheba, 5 6 - 7 , 1 1 3 n . , l 15,244,245,266, 267,309; under Nabataean control, 114, 277 Tel Dor, see Dora Tel c Ira, 244,246,266,267,309 Tell Abu Shusha, 86n.,258 Tel c Ammata,88n. Tell Balatah, 60 Tel el- 'Aqaba, 55,229; see also Cyprus (fortress) Tell el-Dafenna, 278n. Tell el-Far c ah, 244 Tell el-Hammam, 90n. Tell el-Kebir, 278 Tell el-Malat, 169n. Tell el-Milh, 245 Tell er-Remith, 303n. Tell esh-Shuqafiyeh, 278 Tell Ghaza, 41 n. TeU Jadur, 261 Tell Jemmeh, lOOn. Tell Mghanni, 90n.

347

Tell Mubarak, 149n. Tell Sharuhen, 244,245,246,266,267,309 Tel Masos, 245 Tel Mikhal, 8 1 - 2 , 9 4 Tel Mor, 4In. Tel c Uzza, 242,245,266,309 telos, 155,157-8,159n.,160,207 temple, of e Ashtoret at Karnaim, 73; of Augustus in Sebaste, 256,257; of Dagon at Azotus, 73; at Leontopolis, 14; on Mount Gerizim, 6 0 - 1 Temple, 37n.,43,47,149,157,162,164,218,219, 222n.,224,225,266,269,274,275,302; building of, 198,273; fortifications of, 45, 51,94,129,223,256, purification of, 13n. Temple Scroll, 27n. Tepho(n), 38,42,54 Terentius, see Varrò testudo, 212 tetrarch, 148,169,170,171n.,240n. tetrarchia, 203 Thamar(a), see Mesudat Thamar Thamna (Judaea), 232,266 Thamna, Thamnata, 38,42,54 Thebaid, 14n. Thella, 85n. Theodorus of Philadelphia, 88,90n.,92n. Third Wall (Jerusalem), 220,221,273 Thracians, in Herod's army, 183,184,185,193; horsemen, 161; mercenaries, 3 1 - 2 Thracidas (nickname of Alexander Jannaeus), 32n. Threx, 51,54,94,129,227 Tiberias, 155,266n. Tiberius (Roman emperor), 187 Tibur, 13 In. Tigranes I, 123 Timagenes, 26n.,30,83n. Timochares, 45 Timotheus (the phylarch), 104n. Timotheus (Seleucid commander), 20,24n., 104n.,105,107 Titus, 6 1 - 2 Tob, 20n. Tobiads, 17,20,21,109; cleruchy of, 15,16n., 17 Tobiah, 15n.,16,17n.,20n. Tobiah (the "Ammonite slave"), 16,17n. toparch, toparchy, 230,231-3,237,241,247n., 260,261n.,266 towers, 47,250,256,270n.; for artillery, 272; in Jerusalem, 220-1,276; polygonal, 249; rectangular, 49,54,86,93; round, 230,231, 249,255; semi-circular, 231; square, 56,86, 244 Tower of David, 47,220n.

348

General Index

Trachonitis, 108n.,260,266,280n.,288n.,292n.; archers of, 174;brigands of, 171,173,176, 261,291,295,297,305,307,314;given to Herod, 170,291 ; Herodian soldiers posted in, 190,191,261,294-7;mercenaries, 32, 164 ; military setters in, 171 -5,183,239, 296; physical conditions, 173 Trajan, 124n.,179n. Transjordan, 1,15,17,20,21,26,34,35,36,73, 103,105,106,113,116,118,119,120,278, 289,305; Hasmonaean fortifications in, Chap.II.6 passim; Herodian fortifications in, Chap.VI.3 passim, triarii, 213 tribunes, military, 158n.,205n.,206,209n. Triumvirs, 4,148,214 Tryphon, 25,28,29,31,31 In. Tulûl Abu el- c Alaiq, 42,52,229 Tulul edh-Dhahab, 90n. Tyrannus, 215n. Tyre, 83,85,87,145,147,148,149,169n.,205n.; opposes the Parthians, 153n. Tyropoeon, 45 Ulatha, 171,291 Ulatha (Syria), 175,176 Upper City, see Jerusalem c Uzza, see Tel'Uzza Valerius Gratus, coins of, 82n.,242 Valley of the Cilicians, 9In. Varro, M. Terentius (governor of Spain), 202 Varro, (M. Terentius, governor of Syria), 175n., 292 Varus, P. Quinctilius, 194,225,300,315 Veii, 271n. velites, 213 Ventidius Bassus, P., 151,152,153,155,283 Vespasian, 29,124,162,233,238n.,241n.,251n., 252 vexillations, 162 Via Maris, 251 Vigiles, 158 villages, see fortified villages

Vipsanius, see Agrippa, M. Vipsanius Volumnius, 209,210 Wadi es-Sir, 15 WadTez-Zerqa, 90n. WadT Mujib, 119,301n. WadT Muraba c at, 231n. WadT Nimrah, 236 WSdlQelt, 51,52,229 WadT Saba, 236 WadT Sirhan, 105n.,117 WadTTumilat, 278 walls, casemate, 56,87n.,236,271; Roman, 271 War of Choice, 33 War of Defence, War of Duty, 27n.,33 War Rule, military regulations in, 33; army of, 212-4 watch-towers, 42,226,227n.,245,266 water supply, at Alexandrium, 7 0 - 1 ; at Cyprus, 229; at Kh.'Urmeh, 69; at Hyrcania, 230; at Machaerus, 263,265; at Masada, 2 3 4 - 6 ; in the Negev, 279; at Mount Qarantal, 51n. weapons, 6,11,12,13,22; of Hellenistic cavalry, 204; of legionaries, 199; of Sons of Light, 212 xenia, xenos, 285,286 xiphoi, 210 Yarkon, 81,82n. Yehohanan, 17,54n.,58n. Zabadaeans, 108 Zabdiel, 108n. Zamaris, 174,261; military settlement of in Batanaea, 175-80,193 Zealots, 241 Zela, battle of, 213 Zenodorus, 169,170,171,292-4,296n.,297,307 Zenon papyri, 15,16,42n.,81n.,101,103,110Zeus, 11 Zeuxis, 17 Zoara, 90,94 Zohar, see Mesad Zohar

Index of Sources

This selective index lists sources discussed or cited, not sources referred to. Appian BC Syr Assumption

5.75 51

144n.;150n. 281

of Moses 6.2-6

315

Cicero 6.1,4 Att. Leg.Agr. 2.71 Phil. 11.33 Commentary

on Habakkuk 212n. 4.10-2 212n. 6.3-5

Diodoius Siculus 3.43,5 19.94,4 19.98,1 20.85,4 Eusebius Pr.Ev.

20 2n. 180 202

Ill 124n. 102n. 264n.

9.30,4 9.35,1 9.36,1

109n. 45 45;47,51

Judith

2.28 3.10-1

82n. 85n.

Iustinus

39.5,5-6

113

1.89 1.90 1.91 1.104 1.117 1.123 1.155-7 1.162 1.165-6 1.170

92n. 117n. 121n. 90n. 44n. 144n. 76 132 76-7 53n.

Josephus BJ

AJ

1.181 1.187-8 1.213 1.225 1.230 1.290 1.294 1.296 1.305 1.335-9 1.348 1.351 1.364 1.400 1.403 1.419 1.672-3 2.11 2.47-8 2.52 2.55 2.291 2.460 2.577-8 3.67-8 3.166-9 4.399 4.552-3 5.40-4 5.142 5.245 7.171-7 7.280-99 7.299-300 12.295-312 12.350-2 13.46 13.179 13.180 13.246 13.269 13.275

284 286n. 141n. 143n. 205n. 154 154 21 On. 207 157 16 3n. 162n.,163n. 167n. 292n. 254 26 In. 183n. 206 13n. 186 239 247n. 25 2n. 158n. 162n. 26 3n. 237n. 238 161n. 223 224 263 233-4 236 25n. 21 n. 13n. 108n. 43n. 14 73n. 63

Index of Sources 13.360 13.365 13.375 13.376 13.382 13.387-9 13.393 13.395 13.395-7 13.397 13.409 13.414 14.10 14.18 14.48 14.74-6 14.81 14.84 14.87 14.91 14.93 14.103 14.120 14.139 14.158 14.163 14.207-9 14.208 14.249 14.277 14.278 14.280 14.291-2 14.294 14.314-22 14.394 14.405 14.408 14.410 14.413 14.415 14.448-9 14.450 14.458-61 14.471 14.473 14.476 14.479 15.72 15.95 15.96 15.106-7 15.109 15.133 15.218 15.247

409 109n. 117n. 121n. 92,118 119n. 90n. 80n. 62 91n. 34 122n. 79n.,284n. 121 281n. 76 n. 285 132n. 77n.,129n. 53n. 134,136 283n. 133 138n. 139n. 142 141 130n. 73n. 144n. 143 205n. 205n. 146 148 153 21 On. 165 205 459n. 207 156n, 164n. 157 166 163n. 163n. 164 168n. 169n. 288n 288n. 168 289n. 302 225

15.254 15.277-95 15.286-7 15.294 15.324 15.346 15.348 15.351-2 15.353 15.366 16.220 16.271-2 16.274 16.285 16.286-93 16.291 16.343 16.390 17.24 17.30 17.198-9 17.215-6 17.258-60 17.266 17.270 17.271 18.28 18.133 19.351-2 20.244 Letter of Aristeas 114

287n. 274-5 185 181 230 173n. 190n. 293-4 190 189 295 173n. 210n. 171 296-7 300n. 300n. 302 175-6 209n. 183 206 13n. 186n.,193 182n.,240 259 178n. 301n. 197n. 129n.

302

IMacc.

3.32-4.25 5.13 5.24-8 5.55-60 6.6 6.31-50 9.14-5 10.6 10.36 10.70-3 11.57 12.35-6 13.43-4 14.32-3 14.36 15.5-6 15.39-41

25n. 20 104-5 21 n. 13 38n. 19n. 13 28-9 12 88n. 43 24 31 37 14 42

IIMacc.

4.40-2 5.5-6 5.7-8 8.8-16

12 38n. 104n. 25 n.

Index of

10.24-34 11.5 12.10-2 12.13 ;17 12.18-20 12.33 12.33-5 12.35 Megilat

Tacanit 9

107n. 38n. 106 20n. 21 21 n. 27n. 20,21 n.

1.11

253n.

Mishnah Arachin Sotah

9.6 8.7

85,261n. 33n.

132 421 422 425

112 179n. 179n. 174n.,179n.

Periplus Maris Erythraei 19 308n. Philo of Byzantium PoUorketika II Plutarch Anton.

33.4 36.2 71.1

PCI

59003 59004 59008

15 n. 104n. 103n.

PSI

406

103

Polybius

1.51,114

107

Strabo

14.5,6 16.2,20 16.2.27 16.2.28 16.2,30 16.2,40 16.2,46 16.4,18 16.4.23 16.4.24

292-3 179,292n. 149n. 79 79n. 80n.,92n. 150n. 110 309n. 279,295

Suetonius Aug. Cues. Vesp.

48 24.2 4.6

300n. 20 2n. 162n.

Syncellus

559

83n.

4.5,6 5.1 5.5

187 161n. 18n.

39

113n.

79

Mela

OGIS

Sources

234

152 288 207

Tacitus Ann. Hist.

Tragus Prol.

Index of Maps Abila, 9,11,13,14,21 Aeraba, 7,14,17 Adasa, 2 Ad Dianam, 12 Adida, 5 Adora, 1,6,9,19 c Ain Fara, 3 Alema, 11 Alexandrium, 7,8,21 Al-Leja, 13,22 Alousa, 6,9,12 Amathus, 9,11,21 Ammanitis, 1,9,11 Ammaus, 2,3,5,17 Anthedon, 9,19,20 Antiochia, 11 Antonia, 15 Antipatris, 14,20 Apharaema, 3 Apollonia, 1,3,5,7,9,14,20 Araba, 10 c Araba, 12 c Aráq el-Emir, 11 Arethousa, 9 Arnon, 1,11,14,21 Ascalon, 1,6,9,14,20 e Atü, 22 Auranitis, 1,11,13,14,22 Azekah,2 Azotus, 2,3,5,9,14,17,20 c Azzun,7 Baris, 4 Baqa, 10 Basir, 13,22 Batanaea, 1,9,11,13,14,22 Beer-Sheba, 14,19 Ben Hinnom Valley, 4,15 Besor Valley, 19 Betharamphtha, 21 Bethbasi, 5 Bethel, 2,3 Beth-Gubrin, 19 Beth-Horon, 2,3,5 Bethlepthepha, 3,5,7 Beth-Zacharia, 2

Beth-Zur, 2,3,5,6 Bezetha,15 Birsama, 19 Bosor, 11 Bostra, 11,13,14,22 Caesarea, 14 Callirrhoe, 21 Cana, 12 Canatha, 13 Ghalcis, 9 City of David, 4 Clysma, 12 Cyprus, 16 Crocodile River, 20 Damascus, 9,11,13,14,22 Dead Sea, 1,2,3,5,6,9,11,17,21 Deir esh-Sha c ir, 13 Der c â, 22 Dium, 9,11,13,14 Dora, 1,9,10,14,20 Drymoi, 20 Edom, 12 Ekron, 2 Elasa, 2 Elath (Aela), 12 El-Hit, 13,22 En-Gedi, 6,14,19,21 Esebon, 9,11,14,21 First WaU, 4,15 Gaba, 9,10,14 Gabalitis, 21 Gadara, 1,9,11,13,14,21 Gadora, 14 Galaaditis, 1,9,11 Galilee, 1,9,10,11,14 Gamala, 9,11,13 Gaulane, 9,11 Gaulanitis, 1,9,13,14 Gaza, 1,6,9,12,14,19,20,21 Gerasa, 9,11,14 Gezer, 2,3,5,9

Index of Maps Gischala, 14 Gophna, 2,17 Gulf of Elath, 12 Gulf of Suez, 12 H. Mesad, 5,17 H. Mizbah, 19 Habrán, 22 Hasmonaaean Palace (Jerusalem), 4 Hebron, 2,3,6,12,19 Herod's Palace (Jeruslaem), 15 Herodium, 14,17 Hoeridum (Peraea), 21 Hippicus (tower), 15 Hippus, 11,13,14 Hulah, 1,10,11 Hyrcania, 5,17,21 Idumaea, 1,2,3,5,6,9,12,14,17 Isana, 17 Ituraeans, 10,11,13 Jabbok, 1,11,14,21 Jamnia, 3,5,9,14,17,20 Jebal Hawran, 13,22 Jericho, 2,3,5,11,14,15,17 jerusalem, 1,2,3,4,5,12,14,17,20 Joppa, 1,3,5,7,9,14,17,20 Jordan, 1,2,3,5,7,10,11,13,14,17,21 Judaea, 1,2,3,5,6,7,9,14,17 Kadasa, 10,14 Kafr Haris, 7 Kafr Laqif, 7 Hafr Sur, 7 Karnaim, 11 Kh. el-Müraq, 19 Kh. el-Tufaniyeh, 10 Kh. et-Tibbane, 3 Kh. Firdusi, 7 Kh. Nejar, 7 Kh. Libb, 11 Kh. Tibna, 3 Kh. c U r m e h , 7 Khaspho, 11 Kidron Valley, 4,15

Mariamme (tower), 15 Marisa, 1,3,6,9 Masada, 6,12,18,19,21 Medaba, 9,11,14,21 Moabitis, 1,9,11 Modein, 2,5 Mount Carmel, 20 Mount Gerizim, 7 Mount Tabor, 1,9,10 Moyet e Awad, 12 Mushannaf, 22

Nabataeans, 6,11,14,21,22 Naqb el- c Arud, 12 Narbatha, 7 Naveh, 13,22 Negev, 12 Nessana, 12, 19 Nuseib el-Aweishireh, 16 Oboda, 12,19 Ophel, 4 Oresa, 6,19 Panium, 1,9,13,14 Paralia, 1 Pegae, 3,5,7 Pella,-1,9,13,14,21 Pelusium, 12 Peraea, 14,21 Petra, 12 Pharathon, 3 Phasael (tower), 15 Phasaelis, 21 Philadelphia, 1,9,11,14,21 Philoteria, 9 Phoenicia, 1,10,14,20 Ptolemais, 1,9,10,14 Qanawat, 22 Qarantal, 16 Qasrawet, 12 Qasr el-Yahud, 5 Qasr Kuah, 7

Leja, see Al-Leja Libba, 9 Litani, 1,10,14 Lower City, 4,14,15 Lydda, 3,5,7,17

Rabbath Moab, 9,11 Ramathaim, 3 Raphia, 6,9,12,20 Raphon,11 Rehovot, 12 Rhinocorura, 9,12 Romema, 10

Machaerus, 11,21 Maked, 11 Mampsis, 12,19

Salkhad, 13,22 Samaga, 11

354 Samaria, Samaritis, 1,2,5,7,9,14,17 Scythopolis, 1,9,10,14 Sea of Galilee, 1,10,11 Sebaste, 14 Second Wall, 4,15 Seleucia (Gaulanitis), 9,11 Sepphoris, 10,14 Shacar Ramon, 12 Shechem, 9 Sheikh Abu Zered, 3 Sl c , 22 Sidon, 9,10 Siloam Pool 4,15 Snake Path, 18 Stiaton's Tower, 9,10 Sur, 13,22 Suweida1, 22 Tarichaeae, 13 Tekoa, 3 Tel Anafa, 9 Tel Apheq, 5 Tel cArad, 6,19 Tel cArocer, 19 Tel Beer-Sheba, 6,12,19 Tel e Ira, 19 TeU el- cAqaba, 16 Tell el-Milh, 19 TeU es-Sultan, 16 TeUJemme, 12 Tell Sharuhen, 19

Index of Mips Tel Masos, 19 Tel Mikhal, 5,20 Tel cUzza, 19 Temple (Jerusalem), 15 Teppho,3 Thamara, 19 Thamna, 3 Thamna (Judaea), 17 Third Wall, 15 Trachonitis, 11,13,14,22 Tulül Abu el- «Alalq, 16 Tyre, 1,9,14 Tyropoeon Valley, 15 Upper City, 4,15 W. el-Mafjir W. Hesa, 1,11,14,21 W.MÜjib, 1,11,14,21 W. Qelt, 16 W. Tumilat, 12 W. Zerqa, 1,11,21 Yarkon, 1,5,20 Yarmuk, 1,11,13 Zered, 1,11,14,21 Zia, 21 Zoara, 9,11 Zohar, 19

Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum Alphabetical Index Beckcr, Hans Jürgen: see Schäfer, Peter Chester, Andrew: Divine Revelation and Divine Titles in the Pentateuchal Targumim. 1986. Volume 14. Cohen, Martin Samuel: The Shicur Qomah: Texts and Recencions. 1985. Volume 9. Grözinger, Karl: Musik und Gesang in der Theologie der frühen jüdischen Literatur. 1982. Volume 3. Halperin, David J.: The Faces of the Chariot. 1988. Volume 16. Herrmann, Klaus: see Schäfer, Peter Kasher, Aryeh: The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt. 1985. Volume 7. - Jews, Idumaeans, and Ancient Arabs. 1988. Volume 18. - Jewsand Hellenistic Cities in Eretz-Israel. 1990. Volume 21. Kuhn, Peter: Offenbarungsstimmen im Antiken Judentum. 1989. Volume 20. Luttikhuizen, Gerard P.: The Revelation of Elchasai. 1985. Volume 8. Mendels, Doron: The Land of Israel as a Political Concept in Hasmonean Literature. 1987. Volume 15. Mutins, Hans Georg von: see Schäfer, Peter Otterbach, Rina: see Schäfer, Peter Prigent, Pierre: Le Judaisme et 1'image. 1990. Volume 24. Reeg, Gottfried (Hrsg): Die Geschichte von den Zehn Märtyrern. 1985. Volume 10. Renner, Lucie: see Schäfer, Peter Rohrbacher-Sticker, Claudia: see Schäfer, Peter Schäfer, Peter: Der Bar-Kokhba-Aufstand. 1981. Volume 1. - Hekhalot-Studien. 1988. Volume 19. Schäfer, Peter (Hrsg): Geniza-Fragmente zur Hekhalot-Literatur. 1984. Volume 6. Schäfer, Peter, Reeg, Gottfried, Herrmann, Klaus, Rohrbacher-Sticker, Claudia, Weyer, Guido (Hrsg): Konkordanz zur Hekhalot-Literatur. Band 1. 1986. Volume 12. Schäfer, Peter, Otterbach, Rina, Reeg, Gottfried, Herrmann, Klaus, Rohrbacher-Sticker, Claudia, Weyer, Guido (Hrsg): Konkordanz zur Hekhalot-Literatur. Band 2. 1988. Volume 13. Schäfer, Peter, Schlüter, Margarete, Mutins, Hans Georg von (Hrsg): Synopse zur HekhalotLiteratur. 1981. Volume 2. Schäfer, Peter, Becker, Hans-Jürgen, Herrmann, Klaus, Rohrbacher-Sticker, Claudia, Siebers, Stefan (Hrsg): Übersetzung der Hekhalot-Literatur. Band 2: §§ 81-334. 1987. Volume 17. Schäfer, Peter, Beckcr, Hans-Jürgen, Herrmann, Klaus, Renner, Lucie, Rohrbacher-Sticker, Claudia, Siebers, Stefan (Hrsg): Übersetzung der Hekhalot-Literatur. Band 3: §§ 335—597. 1989. Volume 22. Schäfer, Peter, Becker, Hans-Jürgen, Herrmann, Klaus, Rohrbacher-Sticker, Claudia, Siebers, Stefan (Hrsg): Übersetzung der Hekhalot-Literatur. Band 4: §§ 598-985. 1991. Volume 29. Schlüter, Margarete: see Schäfer, Peter Schmidt, Francis: Le Testament Grecd'Abraham. 1986. Volume 11. Schwartz, Daniel R.: Agrippa I. 1990. Volume 23 Shatzman, Israel: The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod. 1991. Volume25. Siebers, Stefan: see Schäfer, Peter Swartz, Michael D.: Mystical Prayer in Ancient Judaism. 1991. Volume 28. van Loopik, M. (Übers, u. komm.): The Ways of the Sages and the Way of the World. 1991. Volume 26. Wewers, Gerd A.: Probleme der Bavot-Traktate. 1984. Volume 5. Weyer, Guido: see Schäfer, Peter For a complete catalogue please write to J. C. B. Möhr (Paul Siebeck) P. O. Box 2040 • D-7400 Tubingen