The American Civil War (Seminar Studies) [1 ed.] 0367485648, 9780367485641

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The American Civil War

The American Civil War: A Racial Reckoning provides a concise but comprehensive overview of the American Civil War, placing race at the center of the war and Reconstruction experience. The book discusses the sectional crisis and the expansion of slavery into new territories as precipitating events that led many Americans to see slavery as the most important issue facing the nation. Political developments and the military struggle are addressed in detail as well as the dramatic social and political changes that occurred as slavery and plantation societies crumbled. The author addresses the creation of Confederate monuments, the denial of the centrality of slavery in the conflict, and other efforts to redeem and memorialize the Confederacy as key components of the Lost Cause, as well as enduring reminders that the issues of white supremacy and racial inequality have yet to be resolved. Placing the Civil War and Reconstruction into the context of the nation’s continuing struggle for true equality, this text provides students with a thoughtful analysis of the war’s long-term impacts. An array of primary documents supports the text, together with a Chronology, ­ Glossary, and Who’s Who guide to key figures. This book will be of interest to students of the Civil War and those on more general American history courses. Philip D. Dillard is Professor of History at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where he teaches courses in southern history, military history, and the Civil War era. Prior to becoming a professor, he served as an infantry officer in the U.S. Army including assignments in Europe and the Persian Gulf.

Introduction to the series

History is the narrative constructed by historians from traces left by the past. Historical enquiry is often driven by contemporary issues and, in consequence, historical narratives are constantly reconsidered, reconstructed and reshaped. The fact that different historians have different perspectives on issues means that there is often controversy and no universally agreed version of past events. Seminar Studies was designed to bridge the gap between current research and debate, and the broad, popular general surveys that often date rapidly. The volumes in the series are written by historians who are not only familiar with the latest research and current debates concerning their topic, but who have themselves contributed to our understanding of the subject. The books are intended to provide the reader with a clear introduction to a major topic in history. They provide both a narrative of events and a critical analysis of contemporary interpretations. They include the kinds of tools generally omitted from specialist monographs: a chronology of events, a glossary of terms and brief biographies of ‘who’s who’. They also include bibliographical essays in order to guide students to the literature on various aspects of the subject. Students and teachers alike will find that the selection of documents will stimulate the discussion and offer insight into the raw materials used by historians in their attempt to understand the past. Clive Emsley and Gordon Martel Series Editors

The American Civil War A Racial Reckoning

Philip D. Dillard

Cover image: Private Hubbard Pryor before enlistment in 44th U.S. Colored Troops Infantry Regiment (left) and after enlistment (right). Photos from the National Archives. First published 2022 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 Philip D. Dillard The right of Philip D. Dillard to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Dillard, Philip D., author. Title: The American Civil War : a racial reckoning / Philip D. Dillard. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2022. | Series: Seminar studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2021052386 (print) | LCCN 2021052387 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367485641 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367485634 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003041665 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: United States—History—Civil War, 1861–1865. | United States—History—Civil War, 1861–1865—Causes. | Reconstruction (U.S. history, 1865–1877) | United States—Race relations—History— 19th century. | African Americans—History—1863–1877. Classification: LCC E458 .D55 2022 (print) | LCC E458 (ebook) | DDC 973.7/11—dc23/eng/20211109 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021052386 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021052387 ISBN: 978-0-367-48564-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-48563-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-04166-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665 Typeset in Sabon by codeMantra

Contents

List of Figures List of Maps Chronology Who’s Who

vii viii ix xiv

PART I

Analysis and Assessment

1

1

3

Sectional Crisis and Secession The Cotton Kingdom vs. Abolitionism 4 Manifest Destiny and Mexico 8 Kansas and the Expansion of Slavery 11 John Brown and Harpers Ferry 14 Election and Secession 16

2

Great Expectations

19

Upper South Secession 20 Building Armies and Mobilizing Nations 23 Defining National Strategy 26 First Blood: Bull Run 29 Freedom Arrives: Norfolk, Beaufort, and New Orleans 31

3

Dashed Hopes and New Realities Grant’s Drive in the West 34 Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign 40 The Peninsula Campaign 43 Fateful Decisions: Antietam and Emancipation 45 Wartime Reconstruction 49

34

vi

Contents

4

War on the Homefront

51

National Identities 51 Conscription 52 Military Experience 54 Property Rights 54 Taxation 56 Internal Dissent: Copperheads and States’ Rights 57 Women Assume New Duties 58

5

Hard, Earnest War

61

Gettysburg 64 Vicksburg 70

6

The Last Full Measure

74

Overland Campaign in Virginia 75 Atlanta and Visible Progress 80 Ten Months at Petersburg 83 Lincoln’s Defining Moment 86 Fateful Decisions for Jefferson Davis 87 The Final Trumpet Sounds 90

7

Building a New World

92

Presidential vs. Congressional Reconstruction 92 Financial Troubles 95 Changes in the Workplace 97 Public Education 98 Making Freedom Real 100 The Lost Cause Myth 101 PART II

Documents Glossary Guide to Further Reading Index

107 123 126 131

Figures

1.1

The Last Moments of John Brown, 1882–84. Painted by Thomas Hovendon 4.1 The Fort Monroe Doctrine 5.1 Dead soldiers at Little Round Top, Gettysburg, PA 6.1 Battle of the Crater drawing. Alfred R. Waud, artist 6.2 USCT regimental flag 7.1 Freedmen’s Bureau issuing rations 7.2 Richmond ladies receive rations 7.3 Reconstruction legislators

15 55 69 84 85 96 96 103

Maps

2.1 3.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3

Secession map Tennessee map Chancellorsville map 1863 strategy map Gettysburg map Wilderness to Richmond map Battle of Spotsylvania map Atlanta campaign map

20 35 63 64 68 76 78 82

Chronology

1860 6 November

Abraham Lincoln elected president

20 December

Secession of South Carolina

1861 9 January

Secession of Mississippi

10 January

Secession of Florida

11 January

Secession of Alabama

19 January

Secession of Georgia

26 January

Secession of Louisiana

29 January

The State of Kansas is admitted to the Union

1 February

Secession of Texas

4 February

Delegates from seceded states meet at Montgomery, Alabama, to form the Confederate States of America

13 February

Virginia secession convention begins deliberations in Richmond

18 February

Inauguration of Jefferson Davis as Provisional President of the Confederacy

4 March

Inauguration of Abraham Lincoln as president

4 April

Virginia secession convention votes down secession 90–45

12 April

Confederate forces open fire on Fort Sumter. Union forces surrender 34 hours later

15 April

Lincoln calls for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion

17 April

Secession of Virginia

6 May

Secession of Arkansas

x Chronology 20 May

Secession of North Carolina

21 July

First Battle of Bull Run, Virginia Union army: 35,732; casualties, 2,800 Confederate army: 32,000; casualties, 1,982

6 August

Congress passes the First Confiscation Act

28–29 August

Joint Union taskforce captures Hatteras Inlet

7 November

Capture of Hilton Head, Port Royal, and St. Helena Islands, South Carolina

8 November

USS San Jacinto stops the British ship Trent and seizes Confederate diplomats James M. Mason and John Slidell, creating an international incident

1862 6 February

Fort Henry on the Tennessee River surrenders to Union naval forces

8 February

Capture of Roanoke Island, North Carolina by Union forces

16 February

Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River surrenders

22 February

Davis inaugurated as permanent president in Richmond

23 February

Nashville, Tennessee surrenders

7–8 March

Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas

8–9 March

Battle of Hampton Roads, Virginia. An indecisive naval battle, notable as the first battle in which ironclad ships, the CSS Virginia and USS Monitor, fight one another

17 March

Judah P. Benjamin appointed as Confederate Secretary of State

6–7 April

Battle of Shiloh, Tennessee Union army: 63,000 (Grant begins battle with 44,900; 17,900 additional soldiers under Buell arrive the night of April 6); casualties, 13,050 Confederate army: 40,335; casualties, 10,700

14 April

Congress approves the District Emancipation Act, ending slavery in Washington, DC

31 May–1 June

Battle of Seven Pines, Richmond, Virginia Union army: 34,000; casualties, 5,031 Confederate army: 39,000; casualties, 6,134

25 June–1 July

Seven Days’ Battle, Richmond, Virginia Union army: 114,691; casualties, 15,849 Confederate army: 92,000; casualties, 20,100

Chronology  xi 16 July

Congress approves the Second Confiscation Act

22 July

Lincoln announces his plans for the Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet

29–30 August

Second Battle of Bull Run, Virginia Union army: 70,000; casualties, 13,824 Confederate army: 55,000; casualties, 8,353

17 September

Battle of Antietam, Maryland Union army: 87,000; casualties, 12,410 Confederate army: 51,000; casualties, 11,850

22 September

Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation announced

8 October

Battle of Perryville, Kentucky

13 December

Battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia Union army: 130,000; casualties, 12,653 Confederate army: 75,000; casualties, 5,309

31 December–2 January 1863

Battle of Stones River, Tennessee Union army: 42,000; casualties, 13,249 Confederate army: 36,000; casualties, 10,226

1863 1 January

Emancipation Proclamation formally signed and goes into effect

1–4 May

Battle of Chancellorsville, Virginia Union army: 115,000; casualties, 17,000 Confederate army: 60,000; casualties, 13,000

5 May

The arrest of Ohio Peace Democrat Clement Vallandigham by Union army; on 26 May Vallandigham was subsequently banished to the Confederacy

11 June

Vallandigham is nominated as Democratic gubernatorial candidate for Ohio

20 June

State of West Virginia is admitted to the Union

1–3 July

Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania Union army: 86,000; casualties, 23,049 Confederate army: 75,000; casualties, 25,000

4 July

Surrender of Vicksburg, Mississippi

11–13 July

New York City Draft Riots

19–20 September

Battle of Chickamauga, Georgia Union army: 58,000; casualties, 16,170 Confederate army: 66,000; casualties, 18,454

xii Chronology 23–25 November Battle of Chattanooga, Tennessee Union army: 60,000; casualties, 5,825 Confederate army: 40,000; casualties, 6,600 1864 12 April

Fort Pillow Massacre of Tennessee Unionists and Black Union soldiers in Tennessee

5–7 May

Battle of the Wilderness, Virginia Union army: 115,000; casualties, 17,500 Confederate army: 60,000; casualties, 7,500

8–21 May

Battle of Spotsylvania, Virginia Union army: 100,000; casualties, 18,399 Confederate army: 52,000; casualties, 12,687

1–13 June

Battle of Cold Harbor, Virginia Union army: 109,000; casualties, 12,738 Confederate army: 62,000; casualties, 5,287

27 June

Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, Georgia Union army: 16,000; casualties, 3,000 Confederate army: 17,773; casualties, 1,000

22 July

Battle of Atlanta, Georgia Union army: 34,863; casualties, 3,641 Confederate army: 40,438; casualties, 5,500

23 June–12 July

Early’s Washington Raid

30 July

Battle of the Crater, Petersburg, Virginia Union army: 8,500; casualties, 3,798 Confederate army: 6,100; casualties, 1,491

5 August

Naval battle at Mobile Bay, Alabama

Autumn

Lincoln is re-elected Electoral Vote Lincoln McClellan

Popular Vote

212

2,206,938

21

1,803,787

12 October

Death of Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger B. Taney

31 October

State of Nevada is admitted to the Union

15 November

Sherman’s army begins its “March to the Sea”

Chronology  xiii 30 November

Battle of Franklin, Tennessee Union army: 28,000; casualties, 2,326 Confederate army: 39,000; casualties, 6,200

15–16 December

Battle of Nashville, Tennessee Union army: 70,000; casualties, 3,000 Confederate army: 33,000; casualties, 6,000

1865 31 January

Congress passes the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery. Final ratification, 18 December 1865

17 February

The Army of the Tennessee occupies Columbia, South Carolina

19–21 March

Battle of Bentonville, North Carolina

25 March

Confederate attack at Fort Stedman, Petersburg, VA Union army: 14,898; casualties, 3,936 Confederate army: 10,000; casualties, 4,000

2 April

Grant drives Lee from the Petersburg trenches leading to the Confederate evacuation of Richmond Union army: 114,325; casualties, 3,000 Confederate army: 43,000; casualties, 5,000 Confederate munitions center at Selma, Alabama is captured by Union cavalry

9 April

Army of Northern Virginia surrenders at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia

14 April

Lincoln is assassinated by John Wilkes Booth; the president would die on the morning of 15 April

26 April

Joseph E. Johnston’s army surrenders at the Bennett Place outside Durham, North Carolina

4 May

Richard Taylor’s army surrenders in Cintonelle, Alabama (40 miles north of Mobile)

10 May

Union cavalry captures Jefferson Davis near Irwinville, Georgia

2 June

Kirby Smith’s army surrenders at Galveston, Texas

23 June

Brigadier General and Cherokee Chief Stand Watie surrenders at Doaksville near Fort Towson, Oklahoma

6 November

CSS Shenandoah surrenders on the River Mersey, Liverpool, United Kingdom

Who’s Who

Banks, Nathaniel Preston (1816–94) Republican politician and Union general; governor of Massachusetts, 1858–61; appointed major general in 1861. He was defeated by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley campaign in 1862. He was given command of the Department of the Gulf at New Orleans and conducted the successful Port Hudson Campaign in 1863 and the disastrous Red River Campaign in 1864. Barton, Clara (1821–1912) Organizer of civilian medical efforts to aid Union soldiers on major battlefields starting in 1862. Barton followed the example of Florence Nightingale soliciting donations, delivering medical supplies, and improving hospital cleanliness. She provided care in army hospitals and on the battlefield. She founded the American Red Cross in 1881. Beauregard, Pierre Gustave Toutant “P.G.T.” (1818–93)  Confederate general. Confederate commander at the attack on Fort Sumter winning acclaim for his actions. Beauregard commanded the tactical operations at First Bull Run and assumed command of the Army of Mississippi when A.S. Johnston was mortally wounded at Shiloh. President Davis lost faith in Beauregard who subsequently spent much of the war in minor commands. Bell, John (1797–1869) Tennessee Senator; Constitutional Unionist presidential candidate in 1860. Benjamin, Judah P. (1811–1884) Lawyer and U.S. Senator from Louisiana. Benjamin served for short periods as Attorney General and Secretary of War before Davis selected him as Secretary of State. Davis worked closely on not only foreign affairs but also on domestic policy. He was an early and forceful advocate for arming slaves and placing them in the Confederate Army. Bragg, Braxton (1817–76) Prewar army officer and planter; Confederate general. Bragg commanded the Army of Tennessee from June 1862 including the Confederate victory at Chickamauga. After his defeat at Chattanooga in November 1863, he became the military advisor to Jefferson Davis. He was never popular with his soldiers.

Who’s Who  xv Breckinridge, John (1821–75) Vice president of the United States, 1857–61; southern Democratic presidential candidate; Confederate general; Confederate Secretary of War, 1865. Breckinridge, a Kentuckian, commanded a corps at Shiloh, Stone’s River, and Chickamauga. In 1864, he came east and served in the Shenandoah Valley and elsewhere. Brown, John (1800–59) Abolitionist, antislavery guerrilla, terrorist. Brown was prominent in the struggle against slavery in prewar Kansas but achieved national fame for his October 1859 attempt to create a slave insurrection at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. This failed insurrection, as well as his subsequent trial and execution, escalated tensions prior to the 1860 presidential election. Brown, Joseph E. (1821–94) Wartime governor of Georgia. Brown’s political career began in antebellum Georgia, ran through the war, continued into Reconstruction and far beyond, but he is best known as a vigorous advocate of Georgia’s interests and of states’ rights during the war years, and as an opponent of the Davis administration. Buchanan, James (1791–1868)  Democratic president of the United States, 1857–61. Buchanan’s presidency was marred by his inability to deal with the slavery issue, and in particular by his collusion with Roger Brook Taney in the Dred Scott decision. He believed secession was unconstitutional, but he did not think he had the authority to use force to maintain the Union. Buell, Don Carlos (1818–98)  Union general. Commanded the Army of the Ohio at Shiloh and Perryville after which Buell was relieved of command. Burnside, Ambrose (1824–81) Union general who led the Army of the Potomac to defeat at Fredericksburg. He commanded a successful joint army/navy force in eastern North Carolina from September 1861 to April 1862. He led a corps at Antietam in 1862, at Knoxville in 1863, and in the Overland campaign of 1864. Grant relieved him after the Battle of the Crater. Butler, Benjamin (1818–93) Union general and politician. Butler was a prewar Democrat, a Breckinridge supporter in 1860, and later a Radical Republican. His administration of New Orleans was effective, if corrupt, and his designation of runaway slaves at Fort Monroe as ‘contraband of war’ in 1861 helped transform Union policy toward slavery. He helped secure Maryland for the Union in 1861, but he performed poorly at Big Bethel, Bermuda Hundred, and Fort Fisher. Chase, Salmon P. (1808–73)  Politician and presidential aspirant; wartime Secretary of the Treasury; Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1864–1873. Chase effectively financed the war effort, but his overwhelming ambition to be president undermined his position in the cabinet.

xvi  Who’s Who Cleburne, Patrick (1828–64)  Irish immigrant and Confederate general, Cleburne was considered one of the best division commanders in the Army of Tennessee prior to his death in combat at the Battle of Franklin. His advocacy of arming slaves led Confederate leaders to consider him politically dangerous and pass him over for corps command. Crittenden, John J. (1787–1863)  Kentucky Senator. After secession, Crittenden worked for a compromise to reunite the country. After war started, Crittenden advocated policies designed to keep Kentucky and other border states in the Union. Davis, Henry Winter (1817–65)  Maryland Congressman and Radical Republican, best known for the Wade–Davis bill. Davis, Jefferson (1808–89) Confederate president. Prior to the war, Davis served as a Congressman and Senator from Mississippi, a colonel in the Mexican War, and Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce. Davis anticipated a military command but was selected as president of the Confederacy instead. As president, Davis had to centralize and increase national authority in support of the war effort. His administration’s use of conscription, impressment, and direct taxation to support the war effort drew significant criticism from rich planters and states’ rights advocates. Dix, Dorothea (1802–87) Well known as a campaigner for reform of prisons and in the treatment of the mentally ill. In 1861, Dix was appointed superintendent of female nurses in the Union army. Douglas, Stephen (1813–61) Democratic Senator from Illinois; 1860 Northern Democratic presidential candidate. During the 1850s, Douglas was a leading advocate for Popular Sovereignty and other compromise positions on slavery. Douglass, Frederick (1817–95) African American abolitionist. Born a slave, Douglass escaped to freedom in 1838 and became a leading abolitionist orator and author, editing the newspaper the North Star and writing his autobiography, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass. During the war, he advocated for emancipation and against colonization of freed slaves. He also helped raise Union soldiers from the African American community. Early, Jubal (1816–94) Confederate general. Early was more prominent after the war as a Lost Cause spokesman. He served in the Army of Northern Virginia and commanded the Army of the Valley in 1864. Early’s troops threatened Washington, D.C. in July, but he was ultimately defeated by Philip Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah in the fall of 1864. Despite his defeat, he had drawn significant Union forces away from the lines at Petersburg as Lee had intended.

Who’s Who  xvii Ewell, Richard (1817–72)  Career officer; Ewell commanded the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia from Gettysburg to Spotsylvania. He was an excellent division commander who became cautious and unsure in command of a corps. Forrest, Nathan B. (1821–77)  Slave trader, plantation owner, Confederate cavalry leader who led multiple raids in western Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama. Forrest fought well at Shiloh and Chickamauga, but he was most effective operating independently. His troops massacred white Tennessee Unionists and USCT members after the Capture of Fort Pillow in April 1864. Fremont, John (1813–90)  Union general and politician. In 1861, Fremont commanded Union forces in Missouri. Military failures and his unauthorized emancipation of Missouri slaves led to his dismissal. In 1862, Fremont commanded a small army in Virginia in the Valley Campaign, but he achieved no military success. Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–79)  Leading Abolitionist. Garrison edited the Liberator and organized the New England and American AntiSlavery Societies. Gordon, John (1817–72)  Attorney and plantation owner; Gordon served with distinction as a regimental and brigade commander including the defense of Bloody Lane at Antietam. He repeatedly filled gaps in Lee’s lines in the Overland campaign and commanded the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia in the final months of the war. Grant, Ulysses S. (1822–85) Union general. In February 1862, Grant achieved fame by seizing Forts Henry and Donelson in a joint operation that led to Union control of western Tennessee. Henry Halleck and George McClellan attempted to blame him for the high casualties suffered at Shiloh in April 1862. His successful campaign against Vicksburg and his relief of the siege of Chattanooga led to his appointment as general-in-chief. In 1864 and 1865, Grant commanded the U.S. Army while accompanying the Army of the Potomac during the Overland Campaign. Grant clearly understood the need for complementary operations in all theaters of war. Halleck, Henry (1815–72) Union general. Halleck supervised and took credit for the successful campaigns of Grant in the West. Known as “Old Brains” prior to the war, he was appointed general-in-chief in July 1862, but he was not a master strategist. Instead, he turned the office into that of a chiefof-staff, a role that he continued to hold after Grant became his superior. Hill A.P. (1825–65) Career officer; Hill commanded the Third Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia from Gettysburg to Spotsylvania. He was an excellent division commander under Stonewall Jackson, but he struggled as a corps commander.

xviii  Who’s Who Holden, William W. (1818–92) A reluctant secessionist, Holden became the leader of North Carolina’s peace movement and ran unsuccessfully for governor. After the war, Andrew Johnson appointed Holden governor during Reconstruction; he was also elected governor as a Republican in 1868. Hood, John Bell (1831–1879) Confederate general. Hood served in the Army of Northern Virginia, where he was a division commander under Longstreet. Wounded at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, Hood was promoted to corps command in the Army of Tennessee under Joseph E. Johnston in February 1864. Hood conspired to attain Johnston’s position and received the command in July 1864. Hood immediately attacked Sherman’s forces around Atlanta and was soundly defeated. After Sherman captured the city, Hood moved into Tennessee, hoping to lure Sherman into following him. Hood’s army was badly mauled at the Battle of Franklin in November and George Thomas destroyed the Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Nashville (December 1864). Hooker, Joseph (1814–79) Union general. A West Point graduate and a veteran of the Mexican War, Hooker served as both a division and corps commander in the Army of the Potomac before receiving overall command in January 1863. Lee soundly defeated his army at Chancellorsville (1–4 May 1863). Lincoln relieved Hooker during the Gettysburg campaign for not aggressively pursuing Lee. Hooker regained corps command in the Chattanooga campaign. Hunter, David (1802–66) Union general. Hunter is remembered for his poor military record and his strong antislavery views. In 1862, Hunter issued General Order No. 11 intending to abolish slavery in the Department of the South only to have Lincoln countermand his orders. Despite this rebuke, he organized one of the first African American regiments, the First South Carolina, which infuriated congressmen from the border slave states. Jackson, Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ (1824–63) Confederate general. Jackson and his brigade received the nickname ‘Stonewall’ for coolness under fire at the First Battle of Bull Run. Jackson masterfully commanded an 18,000man army in the Shenandoah Valley campaign defeating three uncoordinated Union armies. This success drew 60,000 Union soldiers away from McClellan’s Peninsula campaign. Exhausted from the actions in the Valley, Jackson and his army initially performed poorly in the Seven Days battles. His aggressive tactics and driving will led to success at Second Bull Run, Antietam, and Chancellorsville. Lee and Jackson had a bond that proved crucial to the success of the Army of Northern Virginia. Jackson’s death after Chancellorsville was a loss from which the Army of Northern Virginia never fully recovered.

Who’s Who  xix Johnson, Andrew (1808–75)  Tennessee Unionist; military governor of occupied Tennessee, 1862–65. Johnson was the most prominent southern Unionist and the only Senator from a Confederate state who refused to resign his seat. He proved an effective governor of occupied Tennessee. In 1864, the Republicans, running on the Union ticket, selected him as their vice-presidential candidate. Lincoln’s assassination made him president. Johnson’s political skills did not match those of Lincoln. He quickly ran afoul of Radical Republicans over Reconstruction policy. Johnston, Albert Sydney (1803–62)  Confederate general. Johnston commanded the Army of the West, but his force lost military control of Kentucky and Tennessee in spring 1862 due to Grant and Foote’s capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. He died in combat at Shiloh as his army attempted to recapture the initiative in the West. Johnston, Joseph E. (1807–91)  Confederate general. Joe Johnston was a highly effective tactician, but his feuds with Davis and his failure to take responsibility during the Vicksburg Campaign led to serious criticism. He commanded the Army of Tennessee in the Georgia campaign of 1864, in which his army retreated brilliantly slowing Sherman’s advance toward Atlanta. Davis removed Johnston in July 1864, opting for a more aggressive commander in John Bell Hood who promptly sacrificed his army. Lee, Robert Edward (1807–70) Confederate general. A professional soldier, Lee commanded the Army of Northern Virginia, the most successful Confederate army, from June 1862 until the war’s end. Hoping to keep control of the Mississippi River, Davis attempted to convince Lee in May 1863 to take command of Confederate forces west of the Appalachian Mountains, but he refused to leave the Eastern theater. In February 1865, Davis appointed Lee general-in-chief of all Confederate armies, but Lee remained with the Army of Northern Virginia and never acted as overall commander. After the war, Lee, who had once been superintendent of the US Military Academy, became president of Washington College. Lincoln, Abraham (1809–65) Civil War president of the United States. Lincoln came to the presidency having served one term in Congress in the 1840s and as a veteran of a vigorous but unsuccessful campaign for the Senate. Lincoln deferred to Congress in matters of domestic policy, but he believed in a strong presidency in issues related to the war and Reconstruction. Lincoln’s views on slavery evolved while in office. Initially, he described the nation’s war aim as simply ‘Preserve the Union.’ During his first 18 months in office, he came to understand that the nation did not need to restore the old Union but rather to create a new Union, no longer half slave and half free. This progression is clearly outlined in the Emancipation Proclamation, the Gettysburg Address, and his Second Inaugural Address. In his reelection campaign of 1864, Lincoln was told by

xx  Who’s Who numerous advisors, including the chair of the Republican Party, that he had to renounce emancipation or be replaced as the Republican candidate. Lincoln stoutly refused to budge, arguing that he would be damned in time and eternity if he turned his back on the Black men who had fought for the Union. Clearly, Lincoln grew in the job. Longstreet, James (1821–1904) Confederate general. A career army officer, Longstreet served as a division commander under Joseph E. Johnston and a corps commander under R.E. Lee and Braxton Bragg. He was Lee’s most effective subordinate after the death of Jackson. In May 1863, he turned down the opportunity for command of CSA forces in Tennessee and Mississippi preferring to remain with the Army of Northern Virginia. A postwar Republican officeholder, he became a favorite whipping boy of Jubal Early and other Lost Cause spokesmen. McClellan, George (1826–85)  Union general and Democratic presidential nominee in 1864. After the First Bull Run defeat, Lincoln appointed McClellan commander of the Army of the Potomac and, for seven months, general-in-chief of all Union armies. His Peninsula Campaign started slowly, was conducted too cautiously as he faced a numerically inferior enemy and ended in failure when he retreated from Richmond. After Pope’s defeat at Second Bull Run, McClellan regained command of the Army of the Potomac and defeated Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Unfortunately, he failed to pursue Lee aggressively after the victory at Antietam which led to his relief. McPherson, James B. (1828–64) Union general. McPherson commanded a corps in the Army of the Tennessee under Grant and Sherman and was later promoted to its overall command. He was killed in action near Atlanta, 22 July 1864. He was an outstanding soldier and rising star when he was killed. Meade, George Gordon (1815–72) Union general. Meade served under the various commanders of the Army of the Potomac until appointed to the post himself in the middle of the Gettysburg campaign. Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac well at Gettysburg, but he failed to pursue the beaten enemy aggressively in July. Further, the Mine Run campaign in the fall convinced Lincoln that he could not be the new general-in-chief. Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, but after spring of 1864, Grant effectively directed its actions. Phillips, Wendell (1811–84) Abolitionist and noted wartime critic of Lincoln. Polk, James K. (1795–1849) As president, Polk deliberately provoked a war with Mexico which acquired what is now California, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming, thereby reopening the debate over the expansion of slavery into federal territories.

Who’s Who  xxi Rosecrans, William (1819–98)  Union general. Rosecrans commanded the Army of the Cumberland from its creation in October 1862, through the Battle of Stone’s River and the successful campaign to take Chattanooga. Its defeat at Chickamauga (September 1863) and the Confederate siege of Chattanooga led to his removal. Schofield, John M. (1831–1906)  Union general. Schofield, a career officer, served quite effectively in various capacities during the war, most notably as Union commander at the Battle of Franklin (30 November 1864). Scott, Dred (1795–1858)  Plaintiff in Dred Scott v. Sanford, Scott, born a slave, sued for his freedom first in the Missouri courts and then in the federal courts, arguing that his residence in a free territory had emancipated him. The Dred Scott Case reached the Supreme Court which decided against the plaintiff in 1857. Scott, Winfield (1786–1866) Union general. As the Civil War began, Scott was the commander of the U.S. army, but he soon resigned. His Anaconda Plan, which called for a naval blockade and for splitting the Confederacy by the conquest of the Mississippi River, may be regarded as the basic blueprint for overall Union strategy. Seward, William H. (1801–72) Union Secretary of State. A former governor of New York, a founder of the Republican Party, and a U.S. Senator, Seward entered the cabinet expecting to play prime minister to a figurehead president. Lincoln surprised him with his political skill, judgment, and understanding of people. Seward became a confidant and close friend of the president. Sheridan, Philip H. (1831–88) Union general. A career officer, Sheridan rose from captain to major general during the war. When Grant went east to direct the Army of the Potomac, he brought Sheridan along to command that army’s cavalry. In August 1864, Grant gave Sheridan command of the Army of the Shenandoah with orders to destroy Jubal Early’s Army of the Valley and ensure that Valley farms could not resupply Lee’s Army. At the Battle of Five Forks (1 April 1865), Sheridan’s troops turned the Confederate flank and put R.E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia on the road to Appomattox. Sherman, William Tecumseh (1820–91)  Union general. A prewar army officer, Sherman served much of the war under U.S. Grant, his fortunes rising as his friend’s did. In 1864, when Grant received command of all Union armies, he left Sherman in the West, where Sherman conducted the Atlanta Campaign, the March to the Sea, and the Campaign in the Carolinas. After the war, Sherman became general-in-chief of the U.S. Army, once again serving under Grant who was by that time president.

xxii  Who’s Who Stanton, Edwin (1814–69)  Union Secretary of War, 1862–68. Stanton’s background was legal not military, but his appointment to Lincoln’s Cabinet made him one of the key Union strategic planners as he provided vigorous administration to the War Department. Stephens, Alexander (1812–83)  Confederate vice-president and Congressman from Georgia, Stephens initially opposed secession, but accepted the Confederate vice-presidency. He is best remembered as one of Jefferson Davis’ principal political adversaries. Stephens strongly opposed Confederate conscription, impressment, and direct taxation. Along with William Holden, Stephens was the leading proponent for a Convention of the States to arrange peace. Stevens, Thaddeus (1792–1868) Anti-slavery politician. Elected to Congress in 1848 and remaining there until his death, Stevens was an implacable enemy of slavery. During the Civil War and the postwar period Stevens advocated tough Reconstruction terms, confiscation of rebel property, and civil and political rights for African Americans. Stuart, J.E.B (1833–64) Career officer; Stuart was the cavalry corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. He was particularly effective during the Seven Days battles and at Chancellorsville where he led the Second Corps after Jackson’s death. Sumner, Charles (1811–74) Antislavery Senator from Massachusetts, 1851– 74. Sumner was a leading antislavery voice in Congress in the 1850s. After his ‘Crime against Kansas Speech,’ he was attacked and brutally beaten by Preston Brooks, a congressman from South Carolina. Physical violence between these two congressmen demonstrated that national unity was failing. Sumner was a prominent Radical Republican and the Senate leader in the fight for civil rights legislation. Taney, Roger Brooke (1777–1864)  Democratic politician; Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of the Dred Scott decision. Taney’s Dred Scott decision ruled that African Americans, whether slave or free, had no rights that white people had to respect. Further, he argued that the Congress had no authority to prohibit slavery in any state or territory. This decision encouraged proslavery extremists. Thomas, George H. (1816–70) Union general. Prewar army officer, Thomas served ably under Halleck, Buell, and Rosecrans. The stand of his corps at Chickamauga earned him the nickname ‘the Rock of Chickamauga’ and command of the Army of the Cumberland. That army fought under Grant’s immediate supervision in the Chattanooga Campaign and under Sherman’s in the Atlanta Campaign. He operated independently during Hood’s invasion of Tennessee in 1864. Thomas defeated Hood at the Battle of Nashville in December 1864 and pursued Hood’s army of

Who’s Who  xxiii approximately 36,000 men vigorously for 150 miles. By the time the army reorganized in Tupelo, Mississippi, Hood’s army consisted of six artillery pieces and less than 10,000 men. Tompkins, Sally (1833–1916)  Hospital administrator. Commissioned as a captain in the Confederate Army, Tompkins ran a remarkably effective hospital in Richmond, Virginia. Toombs, Robert (1810–85) Southern politician and Confederate general. As a Senator from Georgia (1852–61), Toombs was a leader in the proslavery, Southern Rights cause. In 1860 and 1861, he advocated for Georgia’s secession. Toombs expected the Confederacy’s presidency but was politically outmaneuvered. He served briefly as the Confederacy’s Secretary of State; became, simultaneously, Confederate general and Confederate Congressman. He resigned from the army in 1863. After the war, Toombs remained ‘unreconstructed,’ never accepting a pardon and retiring from public life. Vance, Zebulon (1830–94)  Confederate colonel; governor of North Carolina, 1862–65. Vance was a strong states’ rights advocate and consistent critic of Davis’ administration policies to include the Tax-in-Kind, Conscription, and Impressment. Wade, Benjamin (1800–78) Republican politician. First a Whig, then a Republican, Wade served as U.S. Senator from Ohio for three terms. Wade advocated tougher Reconstruction terms than did Lincoln and was one of the authors of the Wade–Davis bill (1864) that sought to overturn presidential Reconstruction. Wilmot, David (1814–68) Pennsylvania politician. In 1846, Wilmot, a Democratic representative to Congress, added a proviso to a bill funding the Mexican War that forbade slavery from expanding into any territory acquired by the war. Wilmot’s Proviso became a flashpoint for slavery debates arising from the Mexican War.

Part I

Analysis and Assessment

1

Sectional Crisis and Secession

On 3 June 1907, the Jefferson Davis Memorial was dedicated in Richmond with 150,000 Americans attending the ceremony. Robert E. Lee’s eldest son, General George Washington Custis Lee, led the accompanying parade with thousands of Confederate veterans clad in their old gray uniforms down Monument Avenue and terminated at the equestrian statue erected the month before depicting Confederate cavalry hero J.E.B. Stuart. Along the route the veterans stopped at the 60-foot-tall monument depicting Robert E. Lee that had been erected in 1890. White civic leaders had designed Monument Avenue as a prestigious housing area and a homage to the Confederate leaders who had defended Richmond, the Confederacy, and the institution of slavery. Forty-two years after the Confederacy collapsed, white southerners were attempting to recast the Confederacy as a patriotic enterprise dedicated to the founding principles of 1776. In speeches that day, Jefferson Davis was lauded as a strict constitutionalist ‘dedicated to defending and protecting the rights’ passed down by the founding fathers. In their view, Davis and these veterans were American heroes and not traitors. Editor John Mitchell of the Richmond Planet spoke for many in the African American community: ‘This glorification of States Rights Doctrine- the right of secession, and the honoring of men who represented that cause…will ultimately result in handing down to generations unborn a legacy of treason and blood…it serves to reopen the wound of war’ (Johnson, 2017). Today, many Americans want to remember the American Civil War as one of the defining moments in United States history as it established the centrality of the federal government, confirmed our commitment to equality for all, and thrust us into a modern, industrial age. Unfortunately, this optimistic evaluation fails to recognize that racial equality and justice have not yet been achieved and that many Americans continue to question the value of a strong federal government and modernity. Although Abraham Lincoln was elected 160 years ago, the difficult social, political, and economic issues that tore the nation apart in 1860 have not been solved but rather have only evolved. In this light, combat operations may have ended but the central questions raised by the American Civil War continue to divide the United States. DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-2

4  Analysis and Assessment

The Cotton Kingdom vs. Abolitionism Plantation agriculture dominated the southern economy from the 1620s to the 1860s. John Rolfe’s early experiments with tobacco led to financial success, population growth, and the adoption of a slave-based labor force in the Chesapeake region. While tobacco production brought the first Africans to North America, enslaved men and women were employed as artisans, craftsmen, and house servants as well as farmers. Eli Whitney’s invention of the saw-tooth cotton gin in 1793 dramatically expanded the reach of plantation slavery and altered the course of American history. Whitney’s gin separated short-staple cotton from the seed quickly and easily. Without the gin, a worker could separate five to six pounds of cotton fiber from the sticky green seeds in a day. With a large gin, the same person could separate 1,000 pounds of cotton from the seeds in the same period. Prior to Whitney’s gin, cotton production had been restricted to a long-fiber variety and a very small region along the South Carolina and Georgia coasts. Short-staple cotton which could be produced throughout the Southeast was suddenly viable with Whitney’s invention. Ironically, a labor-saving device dramatically increased the need for slave labor across the entirety of the southeast. Black slaves felt the economic jolt arising from cotton’s growth and the expansion of staple crop agriculture severely as many enslaved people from the Upper South were auctioned to the highest bidder in the large slave markets in Richmond and Alexandria, Virginia and Louisville, Kentucky. Families and friends were ruthlessly separated in order to meet the labor demands from the Cotton South. In 1790, the American slave population had been concentrated in the Chesapeake region where tobacco dominated. In the early nineteenth century, the demand for laborers in the new cotton fields led to the forced migration of approximately 1,000,000 enslaved men and women through the internal slave trade. Despite its steep human costs, cotton was the most important element in the U.S. economy from 1800 to 1840. As railroads became a larger industry after 1840, cotton remained highly profitable and the largest export of the United States (Gates, 2013). The swift growth of the new cotton economy in the South occurred as new industries were opening in the New England states. Federal tariffs on imported goods led entrepreneurs to enter the marketplace and compete with European textile manufacturers. Young single women, often unmarried farm daughters, made up the bulk of the industrial workers. This work required parents to give up control of their daughters and their education, but it provided a significant financial reward to these farm families. Many southerners considered the rise of industrial society a move in the wrong direction. People who did not own their own land and who could not control their own lives, they suggested, were not independent citizens. Many feared that the broad equality, so essential to a democratic government, was at risk. Even so, Americans in the North and the South benefited from the better quality of life produced by an increasingly industrial society.

Sectional Crisis and Secession  5 White southern society consisted of three distinct classes: planters who owned 20 slaves or more; yeoman farmers who owned their own land usually between 100 and 250 acres; and poor whites who did not own their own land or business. While planters held most political positions, they represented about 3 percent of the white population. Yeoman farmers constituted well over 50 percent of the white population in each slave state. At times, yeomen rented or purchased slaves to increase production, but they rarely had the resources to move up into the planter class. Landless whites made up less than 10 percent of the population and were generally considered unreliable by planters and yeomen. Often, yeoman farmers and poor whites have been lumped together in the literature as plain folk. Planters needed the support of plain folk to make slavery work. All whites were required to serve on slave patrols and were given authority to whip or punish enslaved men and women at their discretion. Further, yeomen were expected to vote for planter candidates and support laws meant to limit the economic and social rights of African Americans, slave or free. Relying on white supremacy, planters put forward the idea of a republican brotherhood linking slaveholders with non-slaveholders in ‘the southern way of life.’ This ideology exalted the idea of individual male independence with the key being land ownership. Planters further built upon this foundation by stressing their common bonds through kinship, equality at the ballot box, and the evangelical admonition that all are equal before God. Planters also stressed common problems of all farmers in periods of poor weather or low crop prices. Through such measures, planters prevented plain folk from connecting their lack of success to slavery and managed to persuade many that the slave-based economy was in the best interest of all white men (Harris, 1985). Federal and state constitutions fully supported the concept of slave ownership. White planters carefully crafted these documents to ensure that African Americans remained classified as livestock and not people. This designation ensured that the institution of slavery remained a cheap, stable, and portable labor system. Slaves were routinely sold or moved without regard to their wishes or family connections. Force and the threat of force proved essential for slavery to be successful. Economic interests more than moral factors limited the degree of punishment a slave might face. Fugitive slave laws and the police power of the state combined to make any attempt to reach freedom a very dangerous effort. Under U.S. law, slaves had no rights that white people had to respect. White southerners understood, but never publicly acknowledged, that African American farmers and craftsmen could compete effectively with their white peers if given the opportunity. Slave owners wanted to believe, and often proclaimed, that their slaves were happy with their condition. Planters liked to portray themselves as a paternal figure supervising a plantation family that encompassed White and Black members. As the central father figure, planters often depicted enslaved people as adult-sized children who needed their guidance to thrive. Despite these public assertions, many slaveholders

6  Analysis and Assessment recognized that their Black workers were fundamentally unhappy with their status. Astute planters knew that paternalism was only a convenient fiction that masked the true nature of slavery. Abolitionism first appeared in the United States in the seventeenth century in Quaker and Moravian communities who strongly criticized the immorality of people owning people. More Americans began to consider the morality of slavery as Enlightenment ideas gained wider acceptance in the eighteenth century. As advocates of natural rights for all men, many Enlightenment proponents embraced the irrationality of the institution as a self-evident truth. Even before independence had been won, several northern states led by Pennsylvania had taken steps toward gradual emancipation. State delegations debated extensively how enslaved people should be counted for representation at the Constitutional Convention with the three-fifths compromise being the price paid to win southern support for ratification. Some in the convention accepted the compromise believing that slavery had reached its natural limits and hoped it would soon die out. A number of prominent leaders in the Upper South, including George Washington and Robert Carter, freed tens, and in some cases hundreds, of slaves at or shortly before their death. Such acts and broad popular support for the American Colonization Society suggested slavery might be receding in the U.S. Unfortunately for the nation, new wealth available in the cotton fields in the Southeast arrested this altruistic push. Despite the American Revolution and the War of 1812, the U.S. and Britain moved in concert to limit slavery in the nineteenth century. The United Kingdom ended their participation in the Atlantic slave trade in 1807 and the U.S. followed suit on 1 January 1808. Only South Carolina had reopened the slave trade after the Revolution and no significant southern resistance arose as Thomas Jefferson signed the bill outlawing new slave importations from Africa. Subsequently, the British and U.S. navies worked together to suppress the transatlantic slave trade. During the South American wars for independence, Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín offered freedom to slaves and enlisted slave soldiers in their armies. Thus, by 1825, slavery disappeared throughout Central and South America, leaving slavery alive only in Brazil, the Caribbean, and the U.S. With sugar wealth dwindling, the British ended slavery in their island possessions in 1834 with France ending slavery in their colonies in 1845. The U.S. Congress did not seriously debate the merits of slavery until 1819 when Missouri applied for admission as a slave state. Southern politicians were surprised as northern congressmen argued against the admission of Missouri based on the immorality of slavery. Averting a serious crisis, the Missouri Compromise involved the admission of two states, Missouri and Maine, to keep the number of senators from slave and free states equal. Further, the creation of the 36°30΄ line across the lands attained in the Louisiana Purchase solved the immediate question of where slavery might grow,

Sectional Crisis and Secession  7 but it placed both the North and the South on notice that differences over slavery could no longer be ignored. As sectional tensions increased, the Second Great Awakening led to the formation of anti-slavery societies in the Midwest and New England. Having received threats for his anti-slavery editorials in slaveholding Maryland, William Lloyd Garrison moved to the abolition stronghold of Boston and founded the leading anti-slavery newspaper in the U.S., The Liberator, in 1831. Garrison, Arthur Tappan, and others founded the New England AntiSlavery society the following year and the American Anti-Slavery society in 1833. In newspaper editorials, pamphlets, and public meetings abolitionists consistently denounced slavery for the following reasons: 1) slavery contradicts the ideal of natural rights upon which the United States was founded; 2) slavery stands in direct opposition to the Romantic ideals of self-reliance and individual freedom that have shaped America since Europeans first arrived; 3) slave owners regularly break up slave marriages and slave families for economic reasons; 4) slave masters rely on cruel and inhumane treatment of men, women, and children to enforce their will; and 5) slavery is an outrage against Christian teaching. In light of these grave crimes impacting millions of enslaved Americans, abolitionists asserted that economic issues must be disregarded, and that immediate emancipation must be enacted. Despite dedicated and persuasive leaders like Frederick Douglass, Lyman Beecher, Wendell Phillips, and Sarah and Angelina Grimké, the abolition movement faced high hurdles to success. Cotton culture was thriving as new lands in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi opened in the 1830s. As soil became depleted and yields dropped in the Carolinas, vast new areas of cotton cultivation opened in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas in the 1840s and 1850s. Although prices dropped temporarily in the panics of 1837 and 1857, cotton remained a lucrative crop. White planters considered abolitionist ideology taking hold in the federal government the greatest threat to their continued prosperity. Textile workers and mill owners in New England also recognized the abolition movement as a threat to their wealth. If slavery was suddenly ended, the supply of cheap southern cotton would vanish as well. Of course, planters and industrialists employed racist arguments to justify their economic decisions. Finally, internal divisions within the abolition movement made the path toward emancipation more difficult. When Douglass pointed out that Independence Day meant nothing to a slave and condemned the Constitution as a pro-slavery document, many white abolitionists suggested he had become too extreme. Many white ministers made similar accusations as abolitionists condemned mainline Christian denominations for being too accommodating of their southern brethren. After ten years of failure employing ‘moral suasion’ the abolition movement split in the Schism of 1840. One faction led by Douglass and the Grimké sisters, argued that focusing on the political arena would force out the most dedicated members of the movement: women and African Americans. The other

8  Analysis and Assessment faction asserted that politics was the only way that the movement could succeed. Ultimately, each faction followed their own path at the state and local levels. Proponents of the political approach drew national attention with the formation of the Liberty Party in 1840, the Free Soil Party in 1848, and the Republican Party in 1854.

Manifest Destiny and Mexico Westward expansion often conjures images of a Conestoga wagon, the expanse of the Great Plains, and possibly even American Indian warriors. The Oregon Trail was based in the explorations of Lewis and Clark, but most families heading for Oregon and California did not start their movement west until the panic of 1837 dramatically changed the economic landscape. Two decades earlier, Moses Austin had conducted a booming trade along the Santa Fe Trail with Mexican merchants. These trading efforts led to the establishment of 400 families in modern-day East Texas in 1824 under his son, Stephen F. Austin. Mexico welcomed Austin and these new settlers but required them to become Catholics and to not bring slaves with them. Most of these new Mexican citizens came from the Deep South and hoped to expand cotton cultivation into this new region. Southerners arriving in Texas willingly allowed themselves to be baptized in the Catholic Church, but they refused to end the practice of slavery. Some of them paid lip service to their promise by creating paperwork that declared the African Americans who accompanied them servants for life rather than slaves. Most Texas planters simply ignored Mexican edicts outlawing slavery. In the fall of 1835, tensions between Mexican authorities and the roughly 36,000 Anglo Texans boiled over in a series of military confrontations. The following spring, Sam Houston led the Texans in an arduous but eventually successful campaign to win their independence. Houston immediately approached his old political ally President Andrew Jackson hoping to bring Texas into the United States. Despite strong southern support, Jackson believed that admitting Texas into the Union would destroy the nation along sectional lines. Texas remained an independent republic until 1844 when John Tyler attempted to win reelection by promoting a plan for the United States to annex Texas. Tyler’s idea did not lead to success at the ballot box, but it did lead to the annexation of Texas in March 1845 and the Mexican War. Southerners enthusiastically embraced President James K. Polk’s continental vision and enlisted to fight in the volunteer units that formed and marched off to Mexico in 1846. Jefferson Davis raised one of these volunteer regiments, the Mississippi Rifles, which fought with distinction at Monterrey and Buena Vista. The rapid conquest of California and northern Mexico reinforced the popularity of the effort. Almost 90 percent of the volunteers who fought in Mexico came from slave states and at least some hoped the war would open new lands for the expansion of slavery. Davis,

Sectional Crisis and Secession  9 who became a U.S. senator before the peace treaty had been signed, introduced legislation to that effect. Ulysses S. Grant, who earned two brevet promotions in Mexico, expressed a contrary, northern view of the struggle: ‘The occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed’ (Grant, 1885: 37). Even as the fighting continued, sectional tensions arose over the territories available to the U.S. Pennsylvania Congressman David Wilmot introduced an amendment to a war appropriations bill designed to foil southern hopes: ‘As an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico... neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory’ (Wilmot, 1847). Wilmot’s amendment passed easily in the northern-controlled House of Representatives, but it failed in the evenly divided Senate. This proposal continued to spark fear and distrust between the North and the South long after the war ended. While some leaders may have hoped that time would cool the angry voices, the discovery of gold in California in 1848 ensured that there would be rapid settlement of the new western lands. Struggling to control the new wealth being created in California and the mass movement of settlers to the area, the United States needed to draw new territorial boundaries. Former general and newly elected President Zachary Taylor recommended the immediate admission of California as a free state. Southern leaders refused to consider this proposal because it would break the equal balance between slave and free states in the Senate. Although a slave owner, Taylor thought it absurd to open California to slavery when virtually no slaves had been taken to the gold fields. John C. Calhoun of South Carolina scorned Taylor’s ideas and spoke for many southerners when he declared all had fought and all should profit from the territory gained from Mexico. With tensions mounting, South Carolina and Mississippi called for a convention of all slave states in Nashville in November 1850. Keenly aware that some southern leaders were considering secession, senior statesman Henry Clay of Kentucky proposed a complex compromise consisting of the following: 1) California’s admission as a free state; 2) other areas attained from Mexico being divided into the Territories of New Mexico and Utah where popular sovereignty would eventually determine their slavery status; 3) the slave trade but not slavery ending in Washington, D.C.; and 4) a stringent fugitive slave law being enacted. Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois eventually steered this Compromise of 1850 through Congress, but it failed to meet the hopes or expectations of either northerners or southerners. The Compromise of 1850 convinced most southerners that secession was not immediately needed when they met in Nashville in November. Unfortunately, neither northern nor southern leaders were prepared to make additional concessions to advance national unity. The publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin in 1852 led many northerners who had never joined an abolitionist society to seriously consider the morality of

10  Analysis and Assessment slavery for the first time. Although she had limited direct experience of the South, Stowe movingly portrays the plight of a slave as she describes the travails of a loyal, older slave named Tom who was sold to a slave trader to pay his master’s debts. The reader sees Tom torn from his family and ultimately sold to a brutal man in Louisiana. In a parallel storyline, she recounts Eliza’s attempt to escape to freedom with her child, whom their master had intended to sell. Throughout the novel, Stowe emphasizes the brutal treatment that slaves endured, their heroic efforts to maintain the integrity of their families, and the dehumanizing and immoral impact of slavery on both masters and slaves. Emancipation and Christianity are portrayed as the only ways to address this unrighteous institution. Although a work of fiction, Uncle Tom’s Cabin was taken as a true reflection of slavery by people in the North as contemporary newspapers recounted the capture and sale of a Free Black man from New York, Solomon Northup. The trial of Northup’s captors lent a strong air of veracity to Stowe’s literary portrayal. Painfully aware that tensions were rising in both regions, in 1853, President Franklin Pierce attempted to soothe southern fears by restoring the slave state/free state balance in the Senate by approaching Spain about purchasing Cuba. The president hoped to create two new slave states from the Caribbean island, but neither the Cuban people nor the Spanish government showed any interest in the island becoming a part of the United States. Similar efforts to build a trans-continental railroad from New Orleans to California met with strong northern opposition. In each instance, northern politicians decried the efforts of a Slave Power conspiracy. While white southerners decried their loss of political power in the Senate, northerners strongly resented the new fugitive slave law. Many slaves had escaped to free states north of the Mason–Dixon line and had lived in relative freedom for many years. For instance, Frederick Douglass had lived in Massachusetts and New York since his escape from slavery in 1838 without any serious attempt to force him to return to Maryland. Shortly after the publication of his autobiography, Douglass was convinced to conduct a speaking tour in Ireland and England to avoid capture and an unceremonious return to slavery. While in Europe, English supporters negotiated for and purchased Douglass’ freedom from his former owners, the Auld family. While some escaped slaves became abolitionists like Douglass, many more became hard-working farmers and artisans. Northern communities rebelled as the Black members of their society suddenly found themselves subject to arrest and return to slavery. On 24 May 1854, Anthony Burns, a slave who had escaped from Richmond, was arrested while walking down a street in Boston and taken to the local jail at the request of his former owner, Charles Suttle. Even though the Fugitive Slave Law clearly stated that Burns must be returned to his former master, a large crowd gathered around the courthouse in support of their townsman. The sight of one of their community members being dragged back to slavery brought forth a flood of moral indignation. The federal government sent United States marshals and eventually troops to

Sectional Crisis and Secession  11 ensure that the mob did not liberate Burns. The ensuing confrontation led to the death of one U.S. marshal, but Burns was forced to return to Virginia in June. Under considerable pressure from the South, the Pierce administration wanted to prove that the federal government would protect the property rights of slave holders no matter what the local population thought (Von Frank, 1998). Burns would return from Virginia and Douglass from Europe only after abolitionists purchased them from their former owners. Clearly, no one was happy with the status quo in the 1850s.

Kansas and the Expansion of Slavery While slavery occupied many American minds, normal pork-barrel politics claimed the attention of many in Congress. In both 1852 and 1853, congressmen proposed federal funding for several transcontinental railroad routes. Stephen Douglas of Illinois was determined that the first transcontinental railroad would connect Chicago to Sacramento. Private railroad companies expected to be given federal land grants along the railroad’s right-of-way to help finance construction. To achieve his objective, Douglas needed to organize the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase lands into federal territories. Douglas initially proposed the creation of two free territories named Kansas and Nebraska, but southern opposition immediately arose from Senators David Atchison of Missouri, R.M.T. Hunter of Virginia, and Andrew Butler of South Carolina. Douglas responded by altering his proposal to allow popular sovereignty for the two new territories. Popular sovereignty had proven an acceptable compromise choice to both northerners and southerners in the Compromise of 1850, but Kansas and Nebraska were located in a portion of the Louisiana Purchase designated for free states under the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Thus, Douglas’ decision to include popular sovereignty in the new territories would require the repeal of a previous compromise on slavery. Anti-slavery leaders were outraged by what they termed ‘the breaking of a sacred trust.’ Salmon Chase of Ohio strongly denounced the proposed legislation: We arraign this bill as a gross violation of a sacred pledge; as a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region, immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from our own States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves. (Chase, 1853: 1) Pro-Slavery advocates, like Governor Thomas Bragg of North Carolina, responded in similar passionate tones: ‘The day may come when our Northern brethren will discover that the Southern States intend to be equals in the Union, or independent out of it.’ (Goodwin, 2005: 161) Although Douglas succeeded in winning passage of the Kansas–Nebraska Act in March 1854,

12  Analysis and Assessment moderates paid a high political price to ensure the first transcontinental railroad linked the Midwest to California. Moderate leaders attempted to lower tensions by suggesting that the status quo remained as they projected that Kansas was likely to be a slave state and Nebraska a free state. If politicians hoped that territorial expansion might ease sectional tensions, they were quickly disappointed. Anti- slavery societies sponsored settlers from northern states including large numbers from Ohio and New York while pro-slavery groups pushed west from Missouri and Kentucky. Based on the 1860 census, roughly equal numbers of residents arrived from Ohio and Missouri, but approximately 43,000 came from Midwestern free states while only 18,000 came from border slave states. Interestingly, census takers recorded only two slaves and 625 Free Black men and women residing in Kansas. Despite the small African American population, the question of the future state’s slavery status dominated the settlement of Kansas and led to violence in the new territory and beyond. Sectional violence marked the settlement of Kansas from the very beginning. These settlers produced competing capitals with Free Soilers in Lawrence and pro-slavery men in neighboring Lecompton. On 21 May 1856, so-called ‘Missouri Border Ruffians’ attacked and burned Lawrence. Three days later, John Brown and several accomplices surprised and captured a group of settlers from Missouri at Pottawattamie Creek. Although no slaves were present, Brown elected to execute five men in the settlement with broadswords. While these are two extreme cases, well over 80 men and women lost their lives in Kansas in 1856. Both pro- and anti-slavery communities produced militia organizations and attempted to impose their ideas on the whole of Kansas. The physical confrontation over the future of Kansas was not limited to ill-mannered settlers. On 19 May 1856, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts gave a speech in the Senate entitled ‘The Crime Against Kansas.’ Sumner strongly denounced the southern effort to force slavery into a free area. Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina was singled out for his steadfast support of slavery: Of course he has chosen a mistress to whom he has made his vows, and who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to him; though polluted in the sight of the world, is chaste in his sight—I mean the harlot, Slavery... Let her be impeached in character, or any proposition made to shut her out from the extension of her wantonness, and no extravagance of manner or hardihood of assertion is then too great for this Senator. (Sumner, 1856: 9) On the other side of the capitol, Congressman Preston Brooks of South Carolina was appalled by what he thought was an unprovoked attack upon his cousin. After reading the full text of Sumner’s remarks, Brooks set out to

Sectional Crisis and Secession  13 defend his family’s honor. Brooks approached Sumner during the noon recess on 22 May and boldly stated that Sumner had insulted his family, his state, and his region. Brooks then began to beat Sumner with his cane inflicting serious damage to the northerner’s head and shoulders. The beating concluded only when Brooks’ cane broke over Sumner’s forehead. Preston Brooks immediately resigned his seat in the House of Representatives and returned to South Carolina where his constituents promptly reelected him with many sending canes to replace the one he had broken. Clearly, the future status of Kansas concerned all Americans and not simply those settling on the Great Plains. In 1857, the Supreme Court entered the larger debate over slavery’s expansion. Dred Scott, a slave who belonged to an army officer from Missouri, sued for his freedom based upon his seven years residence in Illinois and Wisconsin. Although unsuccessful in the Missouri state courts, Scott hoped to prove that his residence in territories designated by Congress as free territories had made him a free man. In most instances, the Supreme Court first determines if the plaintiff has standing before the court before it rules on the merits of the case. In this instance, the justices had been looking for an opportunity to make a definitive statement about slavery in the territories and thus elected to rule on the case’s merits before addressing Scott’s status. In a 7–2 decision, Chief Justice Roger Taney asserted that since Scott had willingly returned with his master to Missouri he remained a slave. Drawing upon the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, Constitution, and numerous state statutes, Taney argued that slaves were not and never had been citizens of the United States. Finally, the chief justice struck down the Missouri Compromise that had prohibited slavery in portions of the Louisiana Purchase: It is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory (Finkelman, 2017: 35–6) Most southerners saw Taney’s ruling as a vindication of their understanding of the Constitution. By declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, the Supreme Court effectively prohibited Congress from placing any limits on the expansion of slavery. Although not addressed directly, Taney’s decision strongly implied that popular sovereignty was equally unconstitutional. While the South rejoiced, northern politicians sought in vain to define a compromise path that would be acceptable to both regions. During this uncertain political period, Northern Democrats, Conscience Whigs, and former members of the Know-Nothings came together to form

14  Analysis and Assessment a new political movement that ultimately termed itself the Republican Party. This new group coalesced around the idea that slavery degraded all labor and that the North could remain a land of opportunity only by limiting the expansion of slavery. While some abolitionists joined the new party, most of the rank-and-file members strove first and foremost to keep vast sections of the United States for free white men so that they would not have to compete with black labor. In short, these Republicans absolutely refused to accept the Constitutional interpretation of Taney or the results of the Dred Scott Decision.

John Brown and Harpers Ferry While politicians searched for compromise alternatives, John Brown left Kansas convinced that the time had come for direct action. Brown gathered 21 followers and identified the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, as the location to start a major slave rebellion. In the early hours of 16 October 1859, John Brown and his raiders seized the federal arsenal and the nearly 20,000 weapons inside. Brown’s force killed only one man, a Free Black watchmen, in securing the arsenal. African Americans with Brown went through the town seeking assistance from the local slave population. Unfortunately for the raiders, local Black men and women recognized the long odds against a successful slave revolt and refused to join Brown’s force. Later that afternoon, Colonel Robert E. Lee and 400 Marines arrived in Harpers Ferry and surrounded the firehouse that Brown had fortified. Early on 17  October, Lee and the Marines broke down the firehouse door and captured the abolitionist force. If John Brown is judged on his ability to foment a serious slave rebellion, then he was an absolute failure. If, on the other hand, one judges Brown based on his ability to bring slavery to the fore, then he was incredibly successful. Governor Henry Wise of Virginia arrived in Harpers Ferry to find Brown gravely wounded and unwisely allowed him to speak to the press. Brown made a great martyr: Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my children and with the blood of millions in this slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments, I say, let it be done. (Brown, 1859) Republican leaders quickly attempted to distance themselves from the failed raid, but many in the North saw Brown as a heroic, idealistic figure. Ralph Waldo Emerson declared that Brown had made ‘the gallows as glorious as the cross.’ In sharp contrast, Governor Wise and most white southerners

Sectional Crisis and Secession  15

Figure 1.1 The Last Moments of John Brown, 1882–84. Painted by Thomas Hovendon. Retrieved from the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

saw Brown as a ruthless killer who would have gladly inspired slaves to kill their masters. Numerous letters from the North appealed for clemency, but Virginians took no heed and hung Brown on 2 December 1859. Virginia firebrand Edmund Ruffin gloried in the result: ‘Such a practical exercise of abolition principles is needed to stir the sluggish blood of the South’ (McClure, 2021). In the fall of 1859, the Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida legislatures passed resolutions saying that a Republican victory in the 1860 election would justify immediate secession. The Atlanta Southern Confederacy declared, ‘We regard every man who does not boldly declare that he believes African slavery to be a social, moral, and political blessing an enemy to the institutions of the South’ (McPherson, 1988: 212). Such declarations may have sold many newspapers, but no northern politician could espouse such a statement. John Brown’s raid had driven sectional divisions even deeper than the conflict in Kansas and made 1860 a most perilous presidential year.

16  Analysis and Assessment

Election and Secession In such a super-charged atmosphere, the election of 1860 was bound to be a contentious contest. The Democratic Party met on 23 April 1860 in Charleston, South Carolina, to select their presidential nominee. A fight broke out over the platform with northern delegates seeking a compromise position on the Dred Scott decision and southern delegates looking for a strong endorsement of slavery in the territories. Unable to win the platform fight, southern fire-eater William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama led 50 southern delegates out of the convention hall throwing the convention into confusion. With many of the southerners gone, Stephen Douglas of Illinois, James Guthrie of Kentucky, R.M.T. Hunter of Virginia, and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee competed for the presidential nomination. After 57 ballots, the convention had failed to agree on a nominee and thus adjourned in failure. On 18 June the Democrats met again in Baltimore but once again could not agree. The southern delegates saw little appeal in a moderate Douglas candidacy and promptly walked out again. Shortly thereafter, Stephen Douglas was nominated but he no longer represented a national Democratic Party. Vice President John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky was nominated as a second Democratic presidential candidate by southern delegates in Richmond on 26 June. With the Democratic Party horribly divided, Republican leaders met in Chicago on 16 May to select their nominee. An inclusive platform was quickly adopted which rejected the Dred Scott decision, firmly denounced the expansion of slavery into the territories, and promised homestead legislation for new, white settlers. Senator William Henry Seward of New York was the overwhelming favorite for the nomination, but Salmon Chase of Ohio and Edward Bates of Missouri were expected to press Seward if he faltered. Illinois’ favorite son, Abraham Lincoln, was not considered a serious threat by any of the other candidates. Although he was an elegant speaker, some delegates feared that Seward’s reputation as an abolitionist would seriously harm the party’s chances in the Midwest. Ironically, Chase was far more of an abolitionist than Seward, but his inability to turn a memorable phrase made him seem less radical. Bates suffered from a completely different problem. In the early 1850s, he had supported the All-American or Know-Nothing Party, a choice which made many German Republicans unwilling to consider his nomination. Lincoln’s limited experience in Washington turned to his advantage as he became many delegates’ second choice if their favorite could not win. To the surprise of many, Lincoln became the Republican nominee on the third ballot. While Lincoln conducted his presidential campaign from his home in Springfield, Illinois, Stephen Douglas barnstormed the country attempting to win support in every state. Arriving in Norfolk, Virginia, in August 1860, Douglas presented several unpleasant truths to southerners. Neither the Southern Democrat John C. Breckenridge nor the Constitutional Unionist

Sectional Crisis and Secession  17 John Bell had any chance of winning the presidency. Douglas declared that he was the only alternative to the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln. For Douglas to win support in the North as well as the South, he firmly averred that a compromise position on slavery in the territories must be adopted. He further told them his election was their best hope to maintain slavery where it then existed. Despite a cool reception in Norfolk, Douglas brought this message to large audiences in Richmond, Mobile and other large southern cities. Despite Douglas’ pleading that he alone could win votes in both the North and South, the Northern Democrat received only 16,000 votes in Virginia. Lincoln, who focused on beating Douglas in the free states, never made a serious effort in the South. Southern unwillingness to concede the gains made in the Dred Scott case led directly to the election of Lincoln who had sworn to prevent the further expansion of slavery. Candidate

Electoral Votes

Popular Votes

Abraham Lincoln John C. Breckinridge John Bell Stephen Douglas

180 72 39 12

1,865,908 848,019 590,901 1,380,202

Immediately following Lincoln’s election, southern fire-eaters called for secession. In previous crises, southern states had called for coordinated state action. This strategy limited the influence of revolutionary voices and placed maximum pressure on the federal government to take the situation seriously. This southern approach had restrained the southern rights extremists from South Carolina in the Nullification Crisis and secessionists from Mississippi and South Carolina in 1850. Further, southern moderates had successfully negotiated a compromise tariff in 1832 and a strict fugitive slave law in 1850. Unwilling to allow themselves to be thwarted again, fire-eaters from South Carolina met in a constitutional convention in Charleston on 20  December and immediately agreed upon unilateral secession. Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas quickly followed South Carolina’s lead. Few serious reservations emerged in the Deep South except in Georgia and Texas. In Georgia, the more mountainous northern regions with fewer slaveholders extended the debate for several days but ultimately failed. In Texas, Governor Sam Houston slowed the rush for secession, but large slave owners from the cotton growing regions along the coast eventually carried the day. Meanwhile in Washington, President James Buchanan declared secession illegal, but he refused to use force to keep the South within the Union. Across the Deep South, U.S. military garrisons surrendered installations and equipment to state authorities and headed north. Lincoln quickly grew frustrated with the outgoing administration and with the long wait for

18  Analysis and Assessment his inauguration on 4 March. While the Cotton South had quickly left the Union, the Upper South elected secession conventions but continued to look for alternative ways to guarantee their slave economies within the Union. The Virginia secession convention, like those in other border slave states, was deeply divided with 30 strident secessionists, 70 moderates, and 50 strong unionists. Most of the Union delegates came from the districts west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Border state leaders, led by Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, proposed a series of constitutional amendments intended to reassure the southern states. The proposed compromise included a permanent guarantee of slavery where it already existed, the reestablishment of the 36°30΄ line across the breath of the nation, and a strict limit on congressional legislation on slavery. Virginians John Baldwin, from Staunton, and Alexander H.H. Stuart, another delegate from the Shenandoah Valley, led a delegation that met with Lincoln in a last-ditch attempt to find a peaceful solution to maintain the Union in early April (Lankford, 2021). Unfortunately, all these efforts came to nothing when the Confederate forces in Charleston fired on Fort Sumter.

2

Great Expectations

The first great contest of the American Civil War occurred in early April 1861 as Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis confronted each other over the fate of Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida and Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina. In the waning days of the Buchanan administration, southern state forces had taken possession of almost all Federal installations and equipment as individual states seceded. The main exceptions were these coastal forts which guarded the entrance to major harbors and were not easily accessible by land. Both Lincoln and Davis saw possession of these fortifications as crucial to asserting the legitimacy of their governments. In his inaugural address Lincoln had committed the administration to ‘hold, occupy, and possess the property, and places belonging to the government’ (Lincoln, 1861). Without wanting to fire the first shot, Lincoln placed additional pressure on Davis by informing the governor of South Carolina that he was sending supplies to Fort Sumter, but no new weapons or personnel would be included. After consultation with the Confederate commander in Charleston, P.G.T. Beauregard, Davis made the decision to attack the Union garrison before the resupply vessels could arrive. Davis understood that the Confederacy would be blamed for firing the first shot, but he concluded that acting aggressively would assert the might of the Confederacy and force the eight slave states that had not yet seceded to decide if they were going to join the new nation or fight against it. At 4:30am on 12 April 1861, Confederate guns fired across Charleston Harbor toward the Federal garrison manning Fort Sumter. Ladies and gentlemen clustered on rooftops, craning their necks to see the martial display. The ensuing artillery duel lasted for 34 hours, but only a few had died when the Union troops struck their colors. This opening engagement fitted well with pre-war assumptions about the ease of attaining victory. Even with hostilities begun, few Americans expected a long or bloody conflict. Lincoln’s deft handling of the situation at Fort Sumter allowed the Union to say that they had done everything possible to prevent war and yet kept its commitment to preserve the sovereign rights of the U.S. government.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-3

20  Analysis and Assessment

Upper South Secession On 15 April, Virginia received word of Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers to serve for 90 days to put down the rebellion in the South. Believing that Lincoln was initiating civil war, Governor John Letcher refused to send the three regiments requested from the state, but he did not immediately endorse secession. Behind the scenes, former governor Henry Wise was conspiring to force Letcher’s hand. Even as debate continued in the state’s secession convention on 17 April, Letcher announced that he had ordered the state militia to seal the James River to Union vessels and had sent militia units to seize the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. Several hours later, the secession convention voted 88–55 for secession. Even with the issue decided, delegates from western portions of Virginia refused to support the measure. The Virginia convention pledged themselves to the Confederacy, but many western delegates met later that evening to consider additional options. By mid-June the foundations of the state of West Virginia were being laid at a convention in Wheeling (Lankford, 2007). Lincoln’s call for troops, and Virginia’s subsequent secession, forced all slave states still in the Union to choose sides. Tennesseans had soundly rejected secession in a referendum in February 1861, but Union preparations

Map 2.1 Secession map.

Great Expectations  21 for war quickly changed popular sentiment. Governor Isham Harris refused to answer the call for Union troops, publicly endorsed secession, and opened negotiations with the new Davis administration. As in Virginia, large slaveholders strongly supported this defiant stance, but small farmers in the mountainous eastern portion of Tennessee retained their Unionist leanings. A public referendum in early June formally endorsed Tennessee secession (Whiteaker, 2018). In Arkansas, a secession convention met in March but was controlled by Unionists and Conditional Unionists unwilling to secede unilaterally. Even with clear differences concerning the path forward, Governor Henry Rector spoke for the entire convention when he identified the main issue: ‘They believe slavery is sin, we do not, and there lies the trouble’ (Dougan, 2018). Once Lincoln called for Arkansas troops, the convention reconvened on 6 May and overwhelmingly voted for secession. In North Carolina, yeomen farmers represented a much larger constituency than large planters and thus, in February, the state voted not to hold a secession convention. Despite the people’s aversion to secession, Governor John Ellis also rejected Lincoln’s call for troops: ‘I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina’ (Donald: 1995: 297). Despite lingering reservations in the piedmont and mountain regions, planters from the eastern portions of the state pushed through an ordinance of secession on 20 May. North Carolina would provide tremendous numbers of soldiers for the southern armies, but divisions within the state remained throughout the war. The four remaining slave states, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, were even more reluctant to secede. Delaware voted as a slave state in Congress, but the 1860 census listed fewer than 2,000 enslaved people (1.6 per cent of the population) and the state government never seriously considered secession (Census Bureau, 1860). In contrast, Maryland drew considerable national attention as secession there would leave the U.S. capital surrounded by Confederate states. On 19 April, pro-secession elements took control in Baltimore and precipitated a bloody riot as they attacked the Sixth Massachusetts Infantry Regiment en route to defend Washington. Governor Thomas Hicks and Mayor George Brown deplored the violence but requested Union troops not be sent through the city. Lincoln initially agreed to move troops around the city but quickly became frustrated as Hicks requested neutrality for the state. With secession sentiment rising in Baltimore and Annapolis, Hicks attempted to avert a crisis by calling for the legislature to meet in Frederick where pro-Union sentiment predominated. Far from the secession mobs, the legislature voted against secession 53–13 on 29 April. Hicks described himself as pro-slavery but anti-secession. While this reflected the views of many in the state, it pleased neither the Union nor the Confederate governments. The results were similar in Kentucky and Missouri. In response to Lincoln’s call for volunteers, Governor Beriah Magoffin boldly declared,

22  Analysis and Assessment ‘Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States’ (Donald, 1995: 297). Although Magoffin strongly favored secession, he did not have the legislature behind him. Deeply divided, the state legislature passed a declaration of neutrality on 20 May which both North and South initially respected. Each hoped that Kentucky would eventually bring its resources to support their cause. While politicians squabbled in Frankfort, military units formed to join both the Union and Confederate Armies. As fighting began in the East, Kentuckians registered their views at the ballot box. Pro-Union candidates won large majorities in congressional races in June 1861 and state legislative elections in August 1861. Having lost the elections, pro-slavery Kentuckians created a rump legislature in Russellville and sought Confederate recognition. In Missouri, newly elected governor Claiborne Jackson held strong southern sympathies and attempted to promote secession in the legislature. With Jackson’s support, secessionist militia units seized the Missouri Depot in Liberty which prompted Union officials to remove most weapons from the St. Louis Arsenal to prevent their capture. Pro-slavery militia units acted aggressively in the summer of 1861, but Union troops under Nathaniel Lyon and John C. Fremont forced Jackson and his supporters into exile first in Neosho, Missouri and later Marshall, Texas. While Missouri and Kentucky had representation in both the Union and Confederate congresses, both states retained slavery but remained firmly under Union control (Donald, 1995: 300). The Upper South had not embraced secession with the speed and conviction of the Deep South, but the inclusion of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas made the new Confederacy much stronger. Immediately following Virginia’s secession, Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens arrived in Virginia and began preparations to move the Confederate government to Richmond. Even before Virginians officially ratified the secession vote in May, Confederate officials announced that the Provisional Confederate Congress would convene in the Virginia capital on 20 July 1861. For the next four years, the Confederate Congress and the Virginia legislature would share the same building. By moving from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Stephens hoped to encourage other Upper South states to join the Confederacy. The new southern nation desperately needed the industrial, manpower, and agricultural resources available in the border slave states. Further, the move reflected the South’s quest for legitimacy as it attempted to claim the legacies of George Washington, Patrick Henry, and the southern founding fathers. The statue of George Washington erected on the capitol grounds in Richmond in 1858 overlooked the Confederate Congress as it began its deliberations. This seemed an appropriate nod to the southern virtues to which the Confederacy aspired, and this image of Washington soon graced the Confederate Seal. In 1861, Richmond served as a major tobacco market, produced tremendous quantities of flour, and contained the largest iron and steel works in the American South. The Tredegar Iron Works, then known as Joseph R.

Great Expectations  23 Anderson & Company, sat on the James River and produced advanced ordnance for the military and numerous items for the rapidly growing railroad industry. Anderson had pioneered the practice of having European workmen teach slaves the intricacies of steel production in the 1840s. As his slaves became proficient workers, he turned to an increasingly Black workforce. The Confederacy would need to replicate this success to meet the government’s needs for a long war. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the only similar industrial complex in the South was in Clarksville, Tennessee, and thus vulnerable to an attack from neighboring Kentucky. As the war became a reality, the Tredegar Iron Works would produce many of the Confederacy’s most advanced weapons and served as a model for new industrial ventures. To work in these industrial enterprises, Richmond’s pre-war population consisted of almost 40,000 residents, of whom 2,576 were Free Blacks and almost 12,000 were enslaved men and women. New workers would be needed to develop Richmond’s industrial potential and to answer Confederate calls for more supplies (Dew, 1999). These new workers, along with politicians, government bureaucrats, and military forces, would soon overwhelm the city’s pre-war infrastructure and produce a period of rapid population growth.

Building Armies and Mobilizing Nations With the firing on Fort Sumter and Upper South secession, both Union and Confederate leaders contemplated fielding large military forces to crush their opponents. In 1860, the United States Army consisted of 1,108 officers and 16,367 men spread across the breadth of the continent. Most of these soldiers were assigned to the 179 company sized units located west of the Mississippi River. Eighteen artillery batteries stationed in coastal defenses were the only regular army units east of the Mississippi (Newell, 2014: 51). Service schools provided advanced training in artillery, infantry, and cavalry tactics, but most soldiers learned their trade while posted on the frontier. Apart from the Mexican War, regimental and brigade maneuvers had rarely been conducted. Military historians point to the creation of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1802 as the birth of professionalism in the United States Army. The Academy placed a strong emphasis on discipline, personal honor, and the recognition of individual merit. Under the leadership of Sylvanus Thayer, the curriculum focused on mathematics, engineering, and the military art. Through much of the antebellum era, Dennis Hart Mahan challenged cadets to study the writings of Antoine-Henri Jomini and his distillation of Napoleon’s military prowess. Cadets learned the importance of offensive tactics and placing mass at the ‘decisive point’ on the battlefield. In advanced seminars, Mahan focused on the concept of the decisive battle in which one army is able to attain a smashing victory that forces their opponent to sue for peace as Napoleon did at Austerlitz and Jena. More importantly, the Academy created a set of shared experiences and values

24  Analysis and Assessment that led to a truly professional junior officer corps (Skelton, 1993). In 1860, 75 percent of the 1,098 active-duty officers were graduates of West Point, but only six of 19 regimental colonels and none of the general officers were Academy graduates (Newell, 2014: 52). Clearly, West Point’s influence had not yet reached the upper echelons of the army. Both presidents issued decrees calling for volunteers, but military units were formed almost exclusively at the state level. While drawing on militia weapons and equipment, state officials approached prominent political and business leaders to recruit and organize volunteer regiments. While some of those selected had military experience, many were chosen because of their ability to get citizens to join up. The basic unit of organization was the infantry company or artillery battery commanded by a captain and consisting of approximately 80 to 100 men. Most of these units represented a city or county which created a sense of unity. Ten companies would be organized into a regiment under the command of a colonel. While many volunteer companies selected their leaders by election, senior officers were chosen because of prior military service or professional training at the service academies or at state institutions like The Citadel in South Carolina or Norwich University in Vermont. As southern states began to secede, many army officers resigned their commissions with 296 eventually joining the southern forces. Free from the U.S. Army’s strict seniority system, lieutenants and captains were soon commanding regiments and brigades in the Confederate Army (Newell, 2014: 52). In 1861, the Union Army made the decision to retain the regular army as an elite fighting force rather than splitting it up to provide a cadre of trained soldiers to lead the volunteers who were thronging recruiting offices. After the War of 1812, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun had proposed an expansible army. Under this concept, the regular army would have a larger percentage of officers and non-commissioned officers than needed in peacetime so that when war came, this cadre of trained professionals could quickly take charge of new volunteers and form them into units with trained leaders in place. After initial acceptance, traditional American fears of a standing army had dampened support for Calhoun’s reforms. Thus, in 1860, the U.S. Army did not take full advantage of its small, but tactically sound, officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The Union and Confederate Armies gathered near their respective capitals to train for the coming struggle. Instructors and cadets from the Virginia Military Institute ran an intense training camp for new recruits in Richmond while Norwich cadets trained new units from across New England. New recruits learned basic military discipline, to maneuver in formation, and to deploy artillery and cavalry in controlled settings. Both governments assumed that most new soldiers were capable of effectively using individual weapons. In the 1850s, regular army units had begun to focus on marksmanship training to take full advantage of the increased accuracy of standard issue rifles. The 1853 Enfield rifle and the 1861 Springfield rifles which

Great Expectations  25 were issued in large numbers by early 1862 were capable of accurate fire up to 300 meters. Unfortunately, neither army was willing to commit the time or ammunition necessary to fully train individual soldiers. For this reason, many individuals and units were not as effective and lethal as they could have been. Similarly, few companies or regiments received realistic combat training prior to their first engagement with the enemy. All too quickly, the focus shifted from training to deployment for combat. Experienced veterans who had initially served as training officers, like Thomas J. Jackson of VMI, found themselves being reassigned to command new units taking the field. Both the United States and the Confederate States struggled to fully mobilize their societies for war. The North was far better equipped to produce such a force, as it held a significant ten to one advantage in industrial capacity. Cotton grew in the South, but New England textile factories produced 18 times more finished products than their few southern peers. Many in 1861 did not see the importance of textile production because they refused to believe in a long war. Blankets, uniforms, tents, saddle blankets, socks, and many other woven items would be needed in the tens of millions during the four years of war. Southern industry expanded dramatically during the war, but it could never supply all the products needed. Finally, in 1860, New England hosted most U.S. weapon production facilities including innovation leaders in repeating weapons Samuel Colt & Company and Smith & Wesson who had designed the first modern revolvers and lever action carbines. Despite the disparities, the South had sufficient materials to begin the war. While wives and mothers prepared their loved ones for service, the states drew from militia stocks of uniforms and equipment. While some of these items were dated, they met the immediate needs of most individual soldiers. In initial engagements smoothbore rifles and artillery pieces predominated despite their limited accuracy. The creation of the large armies each nation considered necessary would require many things that the states did not have readily available. An army of 100,000 men needed approximately 2,500 wagons and 35,000 animals. Specialized items like artillery and naval vessels were not immediately available in large numbers and would have to be produced for the fight. In the North, poor management in the War Department caused initial delays, but U.S. industry mobilized its resources to meet enormous government contracts for clothes, camp equipment, weapons, and food. By the middle of 1862, the United States soldier was very well equipped and fed. As the conflict lengthened, the South struggled to keep up with the demands of industrial war. Southern factories and foundries signed government contracts, but the nation’s limited industrial base could not sustain a long war. The South supplemented its armament industries by the importation of almost 900,000 rifles from Europe and numerous large caliber artillery pieces. While rifles were plentiful, durable and effective, pistols and carbines remained hard to find in the South. The northern advantage in overall industrial capacity was further magnified by the strength of its transportation network and the size of its

26  Analysis and Assessment population. The North had the largest rail network in the world and almost two and a half times more rail miles than the South. Most northern rail corridors were designed with a double-track configuration that allowed traffic to move in both directions at the same time. Railroad manager and civil engineer Henry Haupt was recruited in 1862 to further optimize the Union rail network by integrating private rail lines into a coherent national system. Implementation of a standard rail gauge and improved telegraph operations greatly improved performance. Most southern rail corridors consisted of a single-track design which required greater coordination and significantly slowed rail traffic as trains might be stopped on a siding for considerable periods while awaiting passage by higher priority traffic. Although less complex than the northern system, the Confederacy’s 9,000 miles of rails made it the third largest national rail network in the world. Unfortunately, the Confederacy lacked the resources and the leadership to develop a seamless rail network. Both sides encountered difficulties integrating their rail systems, but both would use rail effectively to support their armies. Further complicating the transportation problem, pre-war southern commerce relied extensively on steamboats plying the major rivers of the region. While steamboats provided cheap, efficient transport in peacetime, western rivers flowing into the Mississippi brought southern commerce perilously close to Union forces and offered a tempting target to the U.S. Navy. After the spring of 1862, Union forces severely limited Confederate use of the region’s water networks. Finally, the differences in population posed the largest challenge to Confederate aspirations. The 1860 census conducted counts in 33 states and ten territories and arrived at a total of 31,443,322 Americans including approximately 3,950,000 men and women being held as slaves. The new Confederacy was home to approximately 9,100,000 Americans with just over 3,500,000 of these southerners enslaved. The census further identified the white men of military age (18–45) in the Confederacy at approximately 1,065,000. In contrast, the Union states had approximately 4,562,000 white men of military age available for service. Clearly, the United States had a clear advantage in both population and among men of military age (Census Bureau, 1860: 15). The slave population was the one mitigating factor potentially helping the South. Approximately 1,100,000 enslaved men of military age resided in the South at the beginning of the war. If the Black population continued to work on the plantations producing food crops for the army and the civilian population, a far higher percentage of southern white men would be available to enter the gray ranks. If, on the other hand, large numbers of African Americans deserted the plantations and farms, the Confederate Army would be hard-pressed to continue the struggle.

Defining National Strategy Although he lacked formal military training, Abraham Lincoln was the principal strategist for the Union. Unlike James Buchanan and Jefferson Davis,

Great Expectations  27 Lincoln was a strong, self-sufficient leader who endured the jibes of his political opponents without allowing them to affect his outlook. Lincoln understood the large resource advantages of the United States and the importance of keeping the Union armies in action against the weaker Confederate forces. While Davis hoped to attain independence and protect slavery, Lincoln had only one war aim: preserving the Union. To accomplish that, he knew he must subdue the southern armies and reestablish loyal state governments. While he considered slavery a wedge driving the North and South apart, Lincoln believed making emancipation a major war aim would destroy the unity so necessary to sustain the nation. Lincoln summarized his initial approach to the slavery question in a letter to Horace Greeley in August 1862: ‘My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that’ (Donald, 1995: 368–9). Shortly after writing this letter, Lincoln would add ending slavery as a complementary war aim, but the war always remained primarily about preserving the Union. Like many in the North, Lincoln thought before Bull Run that the southern states had been swept out of the Union by radical fire-eaters who did not represent the will of the people. Working with General-in-Chief of the U.S. Army Winfield Scott, Lincoln devised an initial war plan intended to convince white southerners to return to the Union. Scott proposed a naval blockade of the southern coast to isolate the Confederacy from European markets and the hard currency cotton produced. Without European weapons and supplies to equip the Confederate Army, northern leaders believed the South would quickly collapse. To apply direct pressure, they planned a joint army and navy drive down the Mississippi River to cut the seceded states in two. These strategic initiatives would rely in large part on the efficient use of the U.S. Navy and would demonstrate the vast reach of U.S. military might. As importantly, neither the blockade nor the drive down the Mississippi would entail numerous casualties, directly impact civilians, or involve seizure of private property. Through these indirect approaches, Lincoln and Scott hoped the Anaconda Plan would cripple the Confederate government and lead southern men and women to return to their former loyalty to the United States. Confederate President Jefferson Davis had held a series of positions that qualified him to be the South’s chief strategist. Although a Mississippi planter and senator, Davis was also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, had served as a regimental commander in the Mexican War, and had ably directed the U.S. War Department in the cabinet of Franklin Pierce. These military qualifications prepared him well to be a wartime leader, but Davis would have preferred to be a battlefield commander rather than the Confederate president. At his inaugural address as provisional president on 18 February 1861, Davis attempted to justify

28  Analysis and Assessment southern secession by claiming that the old union had failed to ‘establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessing of Liberty’ as the founders had intended (Crist, 1992: 45–51). Hoping to lay claim to the legacy of the founders, Davis embraced select portions of the Declaration of Independence. He agreed with Jefferson that governments derived their just powers from the consent of the governed, but he made no claims about the equality of all men or about unalienable rights. In fact, the word ‘slavery’ never appeared in his remarks. In this address in Montgomery, Davis failed to make the obvious justification that the Declaration offered: ‘But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.’ Instead, he focused his remarks on the continuity of the state governments within a new confederate system. Although Davis spoke of strict construction of the government’s constitutional powers in his inaugural address, as president he found it necessary to dramatically centralize and increase the power of the Confederate national government in order to conduct the war. States-rights activists would be disappointed in this regard. Davis justified secession in his inaugural address without clearly stating the reason it was necessary. Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens was a bit more candid about the southern cause a month later in his remarks at the Atheneum in Savannah: ‘The new constitution has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—[is] the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution’ (Stephens, 1861: 5). Richmond’s location 100 miles from Washington, D.C. seriously complicated the Confederacy’s strategic situation. The proximity of the two capitals would lead to a series of bloody battles in northern and eastern Virginia. No matter their pre-war sentiments, Virginians could not escape the reality that Union soldiers were massing to invade the state. Like the American founders of 1776, Confederate leaders hoped to attain independence without conducting an offensive war. George Washington and the Continental Army had won their independence without seizing London or destroying the British navy. Similarly, the Confederacy did not need to seize New York or Washington, D.C. to achieve its strategic objectives. Southern leaders hoped to attain independence with a stout perimeter defense; therefore, they rejected the Fabian strategy employed by Washington in the American Revolution. Davis recognized that Union armies could not be allowed to seriously disrupt southern civilians and plantation agriculture for his government to succeed. Union armies could quickly destroy southern industrial and transportation systems if they were allowed to move across the South without significant opposition. This strategic decision meant that the Union would be able to select the time and place for major campaigns,

Great Expectations  29 but Confederate leaders believed southern armies would have sufficient time to rally to meet the threat. Based on the American experience with Britain, Confederate leaders hoped to make the war long and costly and thus discourage northerners from making a sustained effort to recapture the seceded states.

First Blood: Bull Run Colonel Robert E. Lee resigned from the United States Army on 20 April 1861. At the behest of President Lincoln, Francis Blair had offered Lee command of all Union forces two days before, but Lee refused to raise his sword against Virginia. Having failed to attain their first choice, President Lincoln and General-in-Chief Winfield Scott designated talented staff officer Irvin McDowell to command the 35,000 Union troops gathering in Washington. Another 15,000 Union troops under the command of Robert Patterson gathered at the northern end of the Shenandoah Valley threatening to strike into Virginia. As additional Union troops straggled in, Lincoln pushed McDowell to make immediate plans to attack the Confederate capital. The Provisional Confederate Congress was scheduled to hold its first session in Richmond on 20 July, marking the new government’s move to the Upper South. To Lincoln’s chagrin, Union commanders consistently urged patience complaining of poor soldier discipline and a severe lack of training. With his eye on the political realm, Lincoln feared that every day the U.S. forces waited would allow the Confederate Army to gather strength and for the Confederate government to gain legitimacy abroad. In July, with political pressure building and 90-day enlistments beginning to expire, Lincoln directed McDowell to act. McDowell planned a direct drive south from Washington to Richmond with likely engagements at Manassas and Fredericksburg along the way. Union forces starting from D.C. boasted 35,000 soldiers compared to 20,000 Confederate defenders near Manassas Junction. As long as southern commanders were unable to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas, the Union had a significant numerical advantage. Unfortunately for McDowell, it took the Union column three days to advance the 23 miles to Centerville thus allowing southern intelligence assets to accurately report the strength and composition of the advancing force. Once in the vicinity of the southern army, McDowell elected to scout the terrain and Confederate positions himself. His unwillingness to delegate these tasks suggests he lacked confidence in his subordinate commanders and staff officers. McDowell developed a tactically sound plan that a well-trained army could have successfully executed. He envisioned sending 15,000 men on a night march to envelop the Confederate left while the remaining 20,000 Union troops engaged the enemy with artillery fire and limited infantry attacks. Union troops executed the plan to the best of their ability, but they ran into trouble long before the first shot was fired.

30  Analysis and Assessment In Richmond, new regiments arrived from across the South, were formed into brigades, and sent to Manassas Junction where General P.G.T. Beauregard prepared to counter any Union move into northern Virginia. Confederate troops also gathered near Winchester under Joseph E. Johnston. The southern commanders benefited greatly from intelligence provided by civilian supporters. In Washington, Rose Greenhow entertained numerous congressmen and military leaders gathering numerous details of the upcoming campaign. Although Greenhow’s efforts and those of her female accomplices who wove messages into their hair braids provide a romantic tale, Greenhow’s messages complemented numerous reports from cavalry units and Virginia farmers who easily monitored the Union’s three-day march from Washington to Centerville. There, just north of Manassas Junction, Beauregard awaited the Union forces along the steep banks of Bull Run. In the early morning hours of 21 July, McDowell’s men conducted a fivemile night march, crossing Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and approached the Confederate left much later than expected. McDowell had hoped to surprise the southerners at first light, but his poorly trained troops moved slowly in the dark and the first Union soldiers did not reach their attack point until 8:00am. Confederate staff officer Edward Porter Alexander observed the Union column ascending from the stream and alerted the far left brigade commanded by Nathan ‘Shanks’ Evans to turn to face the enemy. Evans immediately wheeled his brigade to the west, taking up a position on Matthews Hill. There he spread his 900 men thinly along a series of cedar fence rows and waited for the Union forces to form for the attack. About 10:00am, the lead elements of 15,000 Union men crested Matthews Hill and came under a withering fire from Evans’ men who were well placed in a reverse slope position approximately 100 meters away. Evans could not hope to defeat the entire Union force but rather intended to delay them in order to allow Beauregard’s other units to reorient to meet McDowell’s main effort. For two hours Evans’ men fought desperately to hold back the blue ranks giving ground grudgingly as they traded space for time. Ultimately, Evans’ men were pushed back against the base of Henry House Hill where the main Confederate force had formed. Shortly after noon, Beauregard’s 20,000 troops faced the full onslaught of McDowell’s divisions as they began to ascend Henry Hill. As the battle was joined, both armies could hear the whistles of trains arriving at Manassas Junction. General Joseph E. Johnston’s army had slipped away from Patterson’s Union force in the Shenandoah Valley and his troops were arriving to reinforce the southern ranks. Beauregard retained direct command of the units on the front lines while Johnston assumed overall command. As new units arrived, Johnston directed these men to Henry Hill where Thomas J. Jackson was forming a main line of defense. Union troops surged up Henry Hill, forcing the Confederate troops steadily back. A hard-pressed South Carolinian, Brigadier General Bernard Bee, bellowed to his dispirited men, ‘There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Rally behind the Virginians!’

Great Expectations  31 (McPherson, 1995: 342). While Bee’s exact words are disputed, it is generally accepted that Bee was frustrated by Jackson’s unwillingness to move forward to support his men. Some Carolinians may have agreed with Bee’s assessment, but Jackson’s troops provided their best hope for continuing the fight. As the forward Confederate units fell back, Jackson used his artillery effectively to break up approaching Union formations. After several hours of back-and-forth action, a blue column emerged from the south at about 4:00pm and each side held their fire, waiting to see who they were. As these fresh troops approached the Union lines, the wind picked up and a Virginia flag unfurled. Colonel Jubal Early and Colonel Arnold Elzey led two brigades dressed in blue Virginia militia uniforms into the fray. With the battle still very much in doubt, these units crashed into the Union flank creating considerable confusion. Seizing the opportunity, Jackson ordered the main Confederate line forward. Before this Confederate onslaught, the Union troops gave way and began a rapid, unorganized retreat from Manassas. Northern expectations of a short, easy war died that night. The Union Army straggled back to Washington in total disorder. Confederate soldiers rounded up numerous prisoners, tons of military supplies, and civilian onlookers who had arrived to watch the end of the rebellion. Johnston met with President Jefferson Davis who had arrived on the field and ultimately decided that they lacked the fresh, organized units needed to pursue the Union men into Washington. Nevertheless, Lincoln spent a sleepless night attempting to understand what had gone wrong and to rally the spirits of others. Despite Scott’s recommendation for the Lincoln family to flee the capital, the president stoutly refused to consider such a cowardly step. Even so, the new administration was badly shaken by the defeat. Neither side had expected the intensity of this first engagement or the approximately 900 killed and 5,000 total casualties. While the Confederate leadership celebrated, Lincoln considered options to mobilize the Union for a long war. The initial steps were taken to stabilize the military situation as he issued a call for an army of three-year volunteers and directed the U.S. Navy to make the blockade of the southern coast effective. At Lincoln’s direction, General George McClellan would arrive shortly in Washington to take command of the new Union force, but it would be many months before he felt his force ready to move south. In contrast, Confederate civilian and military leaders found validation of their organizational efforts in the victory at Bull Run. They made no significant effort to press their advantage or to reorganize their forces for a long war. Most white southerners celebrated the victory, focused on their pre-war pursuits, and hoped the Union would give up its efforts to force the South to return to the Union.

Freedom Arrives: Norfolk, Beaufort, and New Orleans While the Union and Confederate Armies formed, trained, and fought in the summer of 1861, both governments were slow to mobilize for war at sea.

32  Analysis and Assessment The United States Navy was unprepared for war. In 1861, the Union navy consisted of 42 wooden ships, 1,554 officers, and 7,600 men. Another 48 older vessels remained in the inventory, but they had been mothballed and lacked crews. Steam engines appeared on naval vessels starting in the 1820s, but all U.S. Navy vessels continued to use sails as their primary propulsion system as coal was considered an expensive luxury unless the vessel was in actual combat. For most of the Antebellum era, the U.S. Navy focused on defeating pirates in the Mediterranean and in the Caribbean as well as supporting freedom of commerce operations. While Britain and France had experimented with ironclad vessels in the 1850s, American naval engineers had been limited by traditional ideas in the Navy Department. After the tragic explosion on USS Princeton in 1843, John Erickson, the leading American naval architect, refused to work with the U.S. Navy. Although the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis was created in 1845, most instruction for midshipmen continued to take place at sea. The U.S. government announced a naval blockade of the Confederacy on 19 April 1861, but it lacked the ships and men to make it immediately effective. The British government issued a proclamation of neutrality on 13 May which gave belligerent status to the Confederate States which allowed them to contract loans and purchase supplies in neutral countries. Union leaders were frustrated by this decision, but they needed time to organize the effort to restrict southern commerce. Prior to the war, prominent southern leaders had often boasted that European industrial nations could not economically withstand and would not allow anyone to hinder the cotton trade. Senator James Henry Hammond of South Carolina expressed this view most clearly during a speech about Kansas statehood in March 1858: ‘England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is King’ (Hammond, 1858). As the Confederate government formed, some leaders attempted to put King Cotton Diplomacy into effect by limiting cotton exports in 1861. With no clear policy, planters dramatically reduced the amount of cotton planted in 1862 hoping to create scarcity and create pressure on European nations to aid the South. Others, like Judah Benjamin, recognized the need for hard currency to fund weapon purchases and strongly advocated shipping as much cotton to Europe as possible before the blockade tightened (Doyle, 2015: 38–40). Early in the war, European warehouses bulged with southern cotton shipped in previous years and thus the economic impact of a ‘cotton famine’ was avoided. Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles focused the department’s efforts in the summer of 1861 on making the blockade real. In the first year of the war, approximately 90 percent of all southern vessels attempting to run the blockade were successful, but this number would drop dramatically each year. Slow cargo ships were replaced by sleek, fast vessels designed to elude detection. By the end of the war, over 450 of the Union navy’s 671 vessels

Great Expectations  33 were assigned to blockade duty and less than 50 percent of attempts to run the blockade were successful. As the war began, Union Army commanders called for naval support, but the Navy Department expressed little interest in the creation of a brown water navy. River salvage expert James Eads was rebuffed when he approached navy leaders with a plan for armored gunboats, but he found a ready audience in the War Department. Eads soon signed a contract to produce seven ironclad vessels for use along the Mississippi River. The resulting craft were imposing: 175 feet long, 51 feet wide, and had 2.5 inches of iron plate armor. Despite mounting 13 guns, these ironclads had a draft of only six feet. Although technically part of the Union Army, these vessels were commanded by naval officers and would constitute the Western Gunboat Flotilla. Army– Navy cooperation would be an important element in the Union drive down the Mississippi. From June through September 1861 the Blockade Strategy Board met to develop a clear naval strategy for the war. Flag Officer Samuel Du Pont chaired the board and focused discussions on determining key points for naval stations to support blockade operations along the 3,500 miles of Confederate coastline. Union Navy efforts to make the blockade effective led directly to pockets of U.S. control along the coast. On 29 August 1861, Union forces commanded by Commodore Silas Stringham and General Benjamin Butler captured two southern positions on Hatteras Inlet, N.C. with minimal casualties. In September, USS Massachusetts landed troops on Ship Island off the Mississippi coast which provided a land base to support blockade operations of New Orleans and Mobile. On 7 November, Flag Officer Du Pont and General Thomas W. Sherman captured two Confederate forts on Port Royal Sound, in South Carolina. Sam Mitchell, a young enslaved boy, interviewed in the 1930s, recalled hearing the Union guns and thinking it was thunder. He said his mother told him it was not thunder but rather the Yankees coming to bring him freedom (Rose, 1964: 10). Beaufort and Hatteras had been captured to create resupply points for Union blockading ships, but they also quickly became havens for escaped or abandoned slaves. Army/Navy task forces would continue to seize coastal locations through the spring of 1862. These efforts significantly increased the effectiveness of the blockade as patrolling vessels could stay on station longer without needing to return to Union ports for provisions or repairs. While the Union and Confederate Armies continued to train in preparation for major operations, the United States Navy made significant progress as it encircled the Confederacy and significantly restricted its ability to conduct international trade. Naval successes also demonstrated to both White and Black southerners that the Union had significant strengths that the Confederacy could not counter. African Americans clearly understood that the war revolved around slavery and that significant social and political changes were on the horizon.

3

Dashed Hopes and New Realities

22 February 1862 was a day of great celebration in the South. The Confederacy had chosen George Washington’s birthday as its official birthday. In Richmond, Jefferson Davis gave an inaugural address and proclaimed the establishment of the permanent Confederate States government: ‘We are in arms to renew such sacrifices as our fathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty’ (Davis, 1862: 55). On 27 January, Abraham Lincoln had issued General War Order No. 1 in which he declared 22 February as the date for a general advance by all land and naval forces of the United States. Both northern and southern leaders held high hopes for military success in the new year.

Grant’s Drive in the West While Union forces in the east moved slowly, commanders in the west attempted to find new ways to take the fight to the enemy. Ulysses S. Grant presented a plan to department commander Major General Henry Halleck proposing a combined arms operation to strike into Tennessee along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Grant recognized that the Confederate forces in southern Kentucky were stretched quite thin with approximately 170 miles between the main elements at Bowling Green in the east and Columbus in the west. Small southern garrisons protected the Confederate center from two earthen forts 12 miles apart at Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River. Grant’s plan envisioned navy transports landing infantry units near these Confederate installations. Once the infantry advanced on the forts, navy gunboats would bring the enemy under fire from the water. Grant was convinced that these Confederate positions could not withstand a joint assault. Halleck was extremely hesitant to entrust an important operation to Grant. His reputation in the old army as a drunkard, confirmed by his resignation from the regular army in 1854, convinced Halleck that he could not be trusted. After his proposed operation was rejected, Grant turned to Flag Officer (shortly Rear Admiral) Andrew Foote and had him propose the same tactical plan to Halleck. Foote’s proposal coincided with new orders DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-4

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  35 from Lincoln to take the offensive leading Halleck to approve the joint operation on 30 January. Grant’s 15,000 men, organized in two divisions, landed north of Fort Henry on the night of 4–5 February but advanced slowly in bad weather. Although Grant’s men had not yet arrived, shortly after noon on 6 February, Foote commenced the naval bombardment of Fort Henry with seven gunboats including four ironclads. Unfortunately for the defenders, the rain-swollen Tennessee River had flooded the poorly positioned fort and destroyed the garrison’s powder magazine. Further, the southern gunners were able to bring only seven of the fort’s 17 guns to bear against the Union flotilla. Confederate commander Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman gave orders for most of his 3,400 men to march to Fort Donelson, while he attempted to delay the Union capture of Henry to aid their escape. The ironclad USS Essex was one of the few Union casualties of the fight. Grant’s infantry arrived later that afternoon and made plans to advance on Fort Donelson 12 miles away. While Grant attempted to press his advantage on

Map 3.1 Tennessee map.

36  Analysis and Assessment land, Foote sent three timber-clad gunboats approximately 150 miles up the Tennessee River to Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Along the way they destroyed Confederate supplies and bridges. The presence of the U.S. Navy in southern Tennessee, northeastern Mississippi, and northwestern Alabama sent a very clear message that the Union could strike deeply into the Confederate interior when the U.S. army and navy coordinated their efforts (Cooling, 2017). Fort Donelson near Dover, Tennessee had been designed to prevent Union forces from traveling along the Cumberland River to reach the industrial center at Clarksville and the state capital at Nashville. The Confederate commander in the West, Albert Sydney Johnston, attempted to counter the Union success at Fort Henry by reinforcing Fort Donelson. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry moved quickly and delayed the Union advance on Donelson until 13 February. Southern infantry units under the command of Gideon Pillow, John Floyd, and Simon Bolivar Buckner arrived at Donelson raising Confederate strength to over 16,000, thus matching the Union force that had captured Fort Henry. Importantly, the Confederate command structure at Donelson was not well defined which caused confusion throughout the battle. While waiting for Foote’s gunboats to arrive, Grant’s infantry units surrounded the Confederate position and probed the southern lines. The Union ironclads had played a decisive role in the capture of Henry, but the Confederate batteries were much better positioned at Donelson. On the afternoon of 14 February, shells rained down on Foote’s gunboats as they steamed up the Cumberland. The Union guns, even at maximum elevation, could not strike the fort’s batteries with direct fire. After an hour and a half of fighting, the Union gunboats retired having suffered significant damage to four ironclads. Grant now realized that the army would have to take the lead if Donelson was to fall. As Grant devised a new plan, he incorporated 10,000 additional troops that had arrived on transports accompanying the gunboats. Confederate leaders met in a council of war that night with Buckner, Floyd, and Pillow debating courses of action. Ultimately, they agreed that they could not hold their position indefinitely and must attempt to break out. Early the following morning, southern infantry attacked the Union right to open the roads to Nashville. The initial attack went well as Pillow’s troops seized control of the roads south, but Floyd and Buckner hesitated and failed to make their escape. Grant had been meeting with Foote during the morning’s fighting and returned to find his army in disarray and his subordinate commanders squabbling. Rather than retreating, Grant reorganized his units, called for naval gunfire, and ordered his men to attack on both enemy flanks. These bold offensive strokes forced the Confederate troops back into their original positions by nightfall. At noon on 15 February, the Confederates held the upper hand, but Grant’s refusal to accept defeat had turned the tables. When the Confederate commanders met that night, they realized that the Union gunboats and Grant’s reinforced lines could crush them in the morning. Unwilling to surrender, Forrest led his cavalrymen through the Union lines and escaped.

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  37 Floyd and Pillow each resigned their position as commander of Donelson and fled under cover of darkness. Buckner, as the last senior officer, was forced to ask his old friend Grant for terms. Grant penned a harsh but appropriate reply, ‘No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.’ Once Buckner had surrendered his command of over 12,000 men, Grant treated his captives generously, supplying them with food and medical care. The victory at Donelson had immediate consequences for the Union war effort. On 19 February, Foote’s gunboats steamed into Clarksville seizing the town and permanently shuttering one of the most important foundries in the western Confederacy, Whitfield, Bradley & Company. Nashville fell into Union hands on 25 February with Confederate officials unable to destroy the huge stockpiles of military supplies in the city. With the U.S. Navy controlling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, Albert Sidney Johnston had to abandon his positions in Kentucky and western Tennessee and the army fell back approximately 150 miles and began to reorganize in Corinth, Mississippi. Grant’s pursuit of the fleeing southern forces was hindered by Henry Halleck’s and George McClellan’s accusations that Grant was moving too quickly and not keeping them informed. In hindsight, it is clear that public recognition of Grant’s success threatened his superiors. Almost a full month after the victory at Fort Donelson, Grant was allowed to lead his army south arriving in the vicinity of Savannah, Tennessee near the Mississippi border. Johnston’s Army of the West had been pushed out of Tennessee but not decisively defeated. Once Johnston had his forces assembled, he intended to strike Grant and regain the lost territory before he could be reinforced by Don Carlos Buell’s army coming from Nashville. The Confederate plan called for the southern troops to march approximately 25 miles from Corinth to the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River. Johnston envisioned an assault with three corps advancing abreast with one corps following in reserve. Although the plan appeared simple on paper, execution proved quite difficult. The march to the attack point took three days, instead of the expected one day, due to poor roads and abysmal staff planning. Logisticians had issued five days rations prior to departure, but few of the southern soldiers had food to eat on the night before the attack. Despite numerous delays, the Confederate troops burst into northern campsites at first light on 6 April and quickly put many in Sherman’s and Prentiss’ divisions to flight. While a few small unit commanders had sent out patrols and identified enemy in the area, none of the Union units had prepared defensive positions or taken the threat of a Confederate attack seriously. Many officers, Union and Confederate, struggled to control the action on the battlefield on 6 April. Sherman had one of the most challenging days of his military career as his untried troops sprinted for the rear. Sherman rode between his separate brigades encouraging his commanders and attempting to rally his frightened men. Prentiss’ troops fared a bit better as he was able to reorganize his troops in an area with thick timber that came to be

38  Analysis and Assessment known as the Hornet’s Nest. This position afforded the northern men tremendous fields of fire across a flat open pasture that stretched almost a mile. Both commanders gained additional time because Confederate soldiers had been stopped in the Union camps not by bullets but by the smell of frying bacon and brewing coffee. While officers later blamed hungry men for slowing their assault, Confederate leaders also made serious mistakes. Confederate commanders made at least eight attempts to take the Hornet’s Nest by frontal assault rather than bypassing this strongpoint and continuing the attack. Southern leaders lost valuable time and many men in attempts to eliminate resistance at the Hornet’s Nest and the Peach Orchard. In the heat of battle, numerous units became disorganized and intermixed making command and control quite difficult. Even experienced generals made blunders as Johnston rode forward into the thick of battle and became consumed in individual engagements. This mistake was compounded in the early afternoon when Johnston attempted to rally a discouraged unit near the Peach Orchard where he fell mortally wounded. P.G.T. Beauregard assumed command, but he was so far to the rear that he was unable to grasp tactical realities and make timely decisions. Although his actions at Shiloh would be heavily scrutinized in the press and military circles, Grant did almost everything right on the first day of battle. Yes, he and his division commanders had been surprised by the size and ferocity of the Confederate attack. Grant started the day in Savannah coordinating with leading elements of Buell’s approaching army, but he responded immediately to the echo of heavy artillery fire and arrived at Pittsburg Landing about 9:00am. Finding men who had fled from battle at Pittsburg Landing, Grant appointed officers to reform these dispirited men knowing that they would be needed later. As he rode forward, he visited each of his division commanders and assessed the evolving situation. Meeting with Prentiss in the Hornet’s Nest, he asked him to buy as much time as possible for the other divisions to reform and construct a new defensive line. Planning to regain the initiative, he assembled ammunition and stores to resupply the units most heavily engaged. Above all, Grant kept his head. He did not take counsel of his fears but rather set the conditions for success the following day. By the time the fighting had ended on 6 April, the Union lines had been driven back six miles, but they had not been driven into the river. Beauregard thought the battle had been won and sent an optimistic telegram to Richmond: ‘After a severe battle of ten hours, thanks to the Almighty, [we] have gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position’ (McPherson, 1988: 412). Unfortunately for his soldiers, Beauregard made no serious effort to reorganize his units or to resupply his troops with food or ammunition. Instead, he gave orders for his soldiers to sleep on their weapons and attack at first light. In contrast, Grant spent the night setting the conditions for success. Union troops had been driven back toward the assembled supplies at Pittsburg Landing. Cartridge boxes were filled and

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  39 men fed. While thunderstorms raged, Grant had the navy bring up gunboats to shell the Confederate lines, making for a restless night. To some of the southerners it seemed as if the heavens and the Yankees were against them. Throughout the night, soldiers on both sides could hear the whistle of steamboats ferrying Buell’s soldiers across the river to reinforce the Union Army. Two new divisions commanded by Lew Wallace and Bull Nelson were integrated into the Union position. With army headquarters turned into a hospital, Sherman found Grant standing underneath a tree nearby. Sherman felt guilty about his men being routed in the morning. Further, he expected to find Grant dejected by the day’s losses, but he found instead a commander with firm resolve. In his Memoirs, Sherman recorded this meeting as highly encouraging: ‘He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win.’ The Union columns surged forward at first light on 7 April and met a weakened southern force. No reinforcements or fresh supplies had arrived to prepare them for the day’s fighting. Unit integrity had been lost and new Confederate commanders struggled to coordinate combat actions. The stubborn courage of the Confederate soldier significantly slowed but could not stop the fierce northern counterattack. By 5:00pm, Union forces had regained the original forward positions held by Sherman and Prentiss when the battle started. Hoping to break contact, Beauregard left the remnants of Breckenridge’s corps as a delaying force while the main elements of the Confederate Army withdrew to Corinth. Although Grant sent troops to locate the Confederate Army on 8 April, he did not conduct a serious pursuit. Together, the two armies had suffered almost 24,000 casualties during the two-day battle, including 3,500 dead and 16,000 wounded. Such high casualty figures led many to question if the commanders had been competent and the soldiers properly led. As the victors, the Union Army was left to bury the dead and take care of the wounded. This process went on for many weeks. After the fact, many newspapermen as well as Halleck and Buell suggested Grant had squandered a great opportunity, but this assessment was born of hindsight. When Halleck took direct command of the combined army at the end of April, he proceeded quite cautiously advancing only 20 miles in a month as he laid siege to the transportation hub at Corinth. Starting in early February, Ulysses S. Grant and Andrew Foote had conducted a series of combined arms operations that drove the Confederate Army out of Kentucky and out of western and central Tennessee. These aggressive leaders saw the opportunity to unhinge the entire Confederate line and took it. No matter what northern newspapermen said, the bloody battle of Shiloh was a Union victory that confirmed that these northern successes would not be reversed. These were the type of aggressive operations that Lincoln had envisioned when he issued General War Order No. 1. Unfortunately for the Union, no other commander made similar progress. Further,

40  Analysis and Assessment Halleck sidelined Grant until he left the Western Theater in July and as general-in-chief reduced the number of soldiers under Grant’s command. Not only did Halleck misunderstand the importance of this campaign but also misunderstood the very nature of the Civil War. In contrast, Grant had a new appreciation of the war that lay ahead: Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. Donelson and Henry were such victories. But when Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south,... but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest. (Grant, 1885: 218) Ulysses S. Grant was a modern soldier in a period when most military commanders revered Napoleon. Most Americans, including some historians, continue to dismiss his intellect and tactical skill. Following the path laid out by the disciples of the Lost Cause, too many continue to suggest that Grant only won the war due to his personnel and resource advantages rather than acknowledging the strategic vision and tactical superiority of Grant over the southern champion Robert E. Lee.

Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign While General Ulysses S. Grant and Admiral Andrew Foote complied and pushed forcefully into western Tennessee, General-in-Chief George McClellan made no similar advance in Virginia. Under pressure to do something, McClellan put forward a plan to move the Army of the Potomac from Washington to Fort Monroe, Virginia by ship to avoid the Confederate defenses near Manassas. Lincoln astutely noted that this plan would require significant time to develop and might allow the Confederate Army to advance on Washington without opposition. McClellan reluctantly agreed to leave the First Corps under the command of Irwin McDowell in Northern Virginia to protect D.C. In support of McClellan’s main effort, Lincoln directed that Nathaniel P. Banks push south through the Shenandoah Valley and John C. Fremont march from western Virginia into eastern Tennessee. These columns would not only place additional pressure on Confederate resources in Virginia but also would place Union troops in regions that had resisted secession. Lincoln continued to hope that the arrival of Union forces would lead to portions of these states renewing their allegiance to the United States. To counter these movements, President Davis directed his military advisor, Robert E. Lee, to coordinate the efforts of Stonewall Jackson and his 18,000 men in the Valley

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  41 with the main Confederate Army defending Richmond. Davis and Lee hoped Jackson could divert Fremont’s and Banks’ columns from their objectives as well as keep them from uniting with McClellan at Richmond. In April, Lee directed Jackson to design a bold plan to meet Banks and Fremont separately lest he find himself overcome by Union numbers. Jackson immediately embraced this assignment and sought aid from the Valley’s population as he designed his Valley Campaign. While many had resisted secession, the residents of the Shenandoah Valley strongly identified with Virginia and gave little thought to siding with the Union. Most of the Valley residents provided food and shelter for Jackson’s men when they were nearby, but others provided more specialized services. Jedediah Hotchkiss, a schoolteacher from Churchville, served on Jackson’s staff and produced detailed maps that clearly identified mountain passes, river fords, and other key terrain features. Hotchkiss’ maps were crucial to Jackson’s ability to move quickly as he strived to keep just ahead of his Union opponents. Similarly, Belle Boyd from Front Royal served as a spy and provided intelligence concerning Union movements that allowed Jackson to move north with confidence. Even with these advantages, the task assigned to Jackson posed many challenges. Jackson began the Valley Campaign hoping to ‘always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy.’ First, Jackson moved his force out of the Shenandoah Valley to Charlottesville, announced his intention to move by rail to Richmond, and allowed his officers to speak extensively to the press. Individual soldiers were encouraged to write home and inform their families they were headed to Richmond to meet the Yankee threat to the capital. As soon as the letters were posted and the news reports went out by telegraph, Jackson moved back into the Valley at Staunton and ensured that no one would speak to the press again. On 8 May, Jackson joined forces with General Edward ‘Allegheny’ Johnson to defeat the leading elements of Fremont’s forces at the Battle of McDowell. Jackson’s men chased the Union column for over 20 miles and then had Hotchkiss and other staff officers from the area meet with local farmers and request they drop trees and place obstacles in all the passes through the Allegheny Mountains. This effort was so effective that Fremont was unable to find an unblocked route back into the Valley for three weeks. With his western flank secured, Jackson moved rapidly north through Harrisonburg pursuing Banks and hoping to capture his force before he could be reinforced. As Banks fled through New Market and up the Valley Turnpike, Jackson left a token force to trail Banks and shifted east into the Luray Valley to capture the thousand-man Federal garrison at Front Royal. Confederate cavalry scouts working under Turner Ashby had noted such isolated units as targets of opportunity. Nineteen-year-old Belle Boyd rode out of the town multiple times to meet with Ashby’s cavalrymen and to deliver detailed information about Union positions that facilitated the capture of Front Royal on 23 May. Union commanders were surprised that the Confederate force seemed to be able to pursue Banks in strength and also move in force in the Luray Valley. Jackson was benefitting from excellent

42  Analysis and Assessment intelligence and tremendous local support. ‘We can get along without anything but food and ammunition. The road to glory cannot be followed with much baggage,’ the Confederate chieftain opined. Jackson’s apparent lack of interest in logistics did not cause him grief because he had the full support of the Valley’s residents (McPherson, 1988: 456). Jackson chased Banks’ troops through Winchester at the northern end of the Valley on 24 May and seized large quantities of military and medical supplies. The food, ammunition, and medicine captured were badly needed by the Confederate force. Jackson’s supply trains had not been able to keep up. As Banks fled into Pennsylvania, the Confederate force pushed up to the Potomac River and fired artillery rounds at locomotives moving along the Baltimore & Ohio rail line. The B&O not only connected Maryland with the Ohio River Valley but was also the main rail line serving Washington from the west. As an old artilleryman, he knew his gunners would be lucky to hit a train car much less the engine. Even so, Jackson considered the few rounds expended on each train well worth the cost because he knew every passenger and every railroad employee would tell everyone they met in Baltimore or Washington that they had come under rebel fire on their journey. Union newspaper editors decried the military defeats and the apparent threat posed by Jackson’s force with many blaming the administration for the military failures. In this crisis, Lincoln kept his nerve and redirected McDowell’s First Corps from Washington to extinguish the threat in the Shenandoah Valley. Lincoln envisioned bringing Fremont’s force from the west and McDowell’s force from the east together to cut off and destroy Jackson’s much smaller army. Jackson had forced Lincoln to take the threat to the Union capital seriously, thus accomplishing his mission in the Shenandoah Valley. Even before the Union columns began to converge, Jackson’s teamsters were transporting wounded men and captured Union supplies back south. Jackson remained along the Potomac as long as possible before retreating through Winchester and then sped south along the Valley Pike just ahead of his pursuers. Jackson’s men fought a day-long holding action against Fremont at Cross Keys on 8 June before slipping across the swollen south fork of the Shenandoah River at first light the next day. Jackson’s weary men attacked troops from McDowell’s force commanded by James Shields at Port Republic on 9 June and won a hard-fought victory. Unfortunately for the Union, Jackson’s men had destroyed the only remaining bridges in the area and thus Fremont could not effectively aid Shields’ force. To the very end of the campaign, Jackson managed to stay one step ahead of his Union opponents and never allowed them to mass against him. Jackson’s Valley Campaign accomplished everything Lee had hoped it would. Jackson had seized and maintained the initiative as he faced three significant Union forces. Along with his 18,000 soldiers, Jackson had diverted 60,000 Union troops from the Union main effort against Richmond. Southern newspapers lionized Jackson and suggested that he had proven the vast superiority of southern arms. Although executed boldly and with

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  43 outstanding tactical skill, the Valley campaign had shown a number of southern strengths and weaknesses. Confederate soldiers had marched at least 25 miles a day for extended periods and participated in a series of difficult engagements. Many of the men had been inexperienced soldiers at the beginning of the campaign but were now hardened veterans. This valuable experience had come at a high price. By the time the campaign ended, the soldiers were mentally and physically exhausted and many lacked shoes and other key supplies. Southern battlefield success had been facilitated by the local population who consistently offered food and lodging to tired and hungry soldiers. Confederate logistical planning had been a failure in the Valley. Jackson’s supply wagons had been unable to keep up with the rapid pace of the action. Men can be motived by speaking of patriotism and home, but neither of these does much to motivate an army mule. Captured Union supplies and a friendly population had filled these deficiencies. Local guides and spies, in addition to Hotchkiss’ maps, provided valuable intelligence about Union troop movements and ensured the southern troops arrived at key points as quickly as humanly possible. Finally, Jackson’s penchant for secrecy meant subordinate commanders and logisticians had difficulty planning for future movements. Fortunately for Jackson, his Union opponents did not recognize his weaknesses quickly enough to take advantage of them. Despite these shortcomings, Jackson’s rapid movement and daring exploits led to victory and instilled an aura of invincibility in his command.

The Peninsula Campaign While Jackson struck quickly in the Valley, the Union and Confederate forces moved slowly on the Peninsula. McClellan’s forces began unloading from their transports at Fort Monroe, Virginia in early April, but it would be almost a full month before the Union forces were ready to move toward the Confederate capital in force. While the Confederate government impressed slaves to dig extensive defensive fortifications around Richmond and Petersburg, John B. Magruder and a force of 17,000 men conducted extensive deception operations to delay the Union force of 105,000. Magruder’s men built numerous ‘cooking fires’ each night to make their force look larger. They also constructed obvious artillery positions that appeared to bristle with large caliber guns. Southern gunners fired and moved the actual field pieces around regularly in between the ‘quaker guns’ that defended most redoubts. On 5 May, George McClellan finally pushed past the token Confederate force along the Yorktown line. Northern newspapers ridiculed McClellan as they reported that many of the fierce gun emplacements that had delayed the Union force for a month were equipped with logs painted black. Despite this sign of southern weakness, McClellan continued to move slowly, not arriving in the vicinity of Richmond until 24 May. Security expert Allan Pinkerton provided most of the intelligence for the Army of the Potomac. Pinkerton and his operatives gained little cooperation from white

44  Analysis and Assessment Virginians. Repeatedly, white farmers told Pinkerton’s agents of vast Confederate columns moving from daylight to dark in a multitude of directions. Black Virginians willingly offered more accurate information, but their reports of limited southern numbers were usually discounted. The Pinkertons, as well as most military intelligence officers, believed slaves incapable of grasping large numbers or understanding white intentions. Based on these assumptions, McClellan hounded Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton with daily requests demanding more troops to match the 200,000 Confederate troops he believed his command faced. President Davis had also wearied of his commander’s reluctance to attack his opponent. In response to a direct order, on 31 May, Joseph E. Johnston struck McClellan’s army south of the Chickahominy River. The ensuing battle of Seven Pines blocked McClellan’s march on Richmond, but it failed to drive the Federal forces back down the peninsula. Johnston was among the 11,000 casualties suffered in the two-day battle. Robert E. Lee left his position as military advisor to the president and took command of the Army of Northern Virginia the following day. Lee’s appointment pleased McClellan, who described his new opponent as ‘cautious and weak under grave responsibility.’ Unfortunately for the Union, this description better fit its author than it did Lee. Immediately after assuming command, Lee dispatched J.E.B. Stuart to reconnoiter the Union positions outside Richmond for potential weaknesses. The Confederacy’s decision to employ the cavalry as an independent arm rather than parceling out units to individual infantry brigades paid dividends here. Stuart rode around McClellan’s entire army identifying individual unit positions while Union cavalry units participated in an uncoordinated pursuit. On his return, Stuart presented Lee with accurate numbers on the Union force and a clear picture of the Federal positions. Stuart reported that Fitz John Porter’s Fifth Corps was isolated on the north side of the Chickahominy River. Lee devised a plan to attack Porter with over two-thirds of his 87,000 men, but he waited for Jackson’s hardened veterans to arrive from the Valley before beginning his attack. Lee’s army pushed forward with 60,000 men north of the Chickahominy on 26 June. The southern plan called for Jackson to initiate the attack at Mechanicsville at first light, with A.P. Hill’s division following in support. Having marched from the Valley, Jackson’s men moved forward with an unusual slowness. Unfamiliar with the terrain, Jackson’s men got lost and never reached the attack point. At 3:00pm, Hill became frustrated and initiated the attack on Porter’s troops without significant support. This unwise move should have alerted Porter and McClellan to the exposed position of the force north of the river, but McClellan did not adjust his forces. Convinced that Lee had 200,000 men at his disposal, the Union commander may have considered the action a feint to lure men north of the river. Noting no change in the Union position, the following day Hill and Jackson again attempted to coordinate their assaults upon Porter at Gaines Mill. Again, Jackson’s veterans moved slowly and failed to attack with conviction. Late in the day, a brigade in Hill’s Division, commanded by John Bell Hood, broke through the

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  45 Union lines, but Porter was able to salvage the situation and retreat across the Chickahominy with limited losses. Throughout these two days of heavy fighting, Lee’s forces south of the Chickahominy River consisted of only 27,000 men located in the formidable-looking, slave-constructed defensive positions. If McClellan had advanced on these sparsely manned southern lines with the 70,000 men he had in that sector, he could have walked into Richmond with few losses. Unfortunately for the Union, George McClellan steadfastly believed Pinkerton’s estimate that Lee possessed 200,000 men. Belatedly, Lee realized that Stonewall Jackson and his men were exhausted and could not be expected to perform as boldly as they had in the Valley. Throughout the remainder of the Seven Days engagements, the fighting remained bloody but neither commander was able to closely coordinate the actions of individual units to attain a major advantage. Lee concluded he needed to reorganize his general staff and that he must reorganize the Army of Northern Virginia into units larger than divisions to improve command and control. The Union Army of the Potomac had already organized divisions into corps structures, but staff work and poor individual commander performance undermined Union plans. Throughout the campaign, McClellan failed to use his full force and allowed his army to be pushed back from the gates of Richmond. Finally, on the final day of major fighting, McClellan won a one-sided defensive battle at Malvern Hill. Despite this success, McClellan elected to retreat to the James River and prepare to embark the force for Washington rather than renewing his attack on the Confederate capital.

Fateful Decisions: Antietam and Emancipation The defeat on the peninsula forced Lincoln to reassess the Union war effort. In early July, Lincoln visited the Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing. When they met, McClellan presented the president with a letter that attempted to dictate a continued strategy of conciliation of the southern people. In particular, he argued that all southern property, including slaves, must be protected. Lincoln read the letter and accepted it without comment, but his mind was moving in a far different direction. For some time, abolitionists had hoped that Lincoln would move to end slavery, but the president continued to fear that such a step would divide the Union states. Abolitionists like Frederick Douglass and newspaper editor Horace Greeley questioned Lincoln’s courage and condemned the administration’s unwillingness to pursue emancipation. In early July as McClellan waited to be evacuated from Virginia, Lincoln told Secretary of State William Henry Seward and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles that he had decided to emancipate all the slaves in southern hands by proclamation. That evening Welles attempted to make sense of the move in his diary: ‘The slaves were undeniably an element of strength to those who had their service, and we must decide whether that element should be with us or against us.’ On Tuesday, 22 July, Lincoln presented his proposal for an Emancipation Proclamation to the full cabinet. Lincoln stressed the many tasks that slaves had been assigned by the Confederate Army and

46  Analysis and Assessment their importance to the southern economy. While all seemed surprised except Seward and Welles, no one made an immediate objection to the idea. Secretary Seward openly espoused the idea, but he advised Lincoln to wait for a battlefield victory before announcing emancipation. To do so sooner, Seward asserted, would make it look like a measure founded in desperation rather than high moral purpose (Welles, 2014). Lincoln embraced this logic and impatiently waited for an opportunity to issue this proclamation. Southern leaders counted their losses and began to seek new ways to bring the war to a close. Having won significant victories at Seven Days in late June and Second Bull Run in August, Lee sought to set the conditions for a decisive battle. He believed a victory attained on northern soil might lead to foreign recognition of the Confederate government and possibly the capitulation of the Federal government. Many southern people had embraced the Confederate cause because they felt invaded by an aggressive North. Lee hoped to avoid any serious backlash against his move into northern territory by moving into the slave state of Maryland rather than a free state. Jefferson Davis drafted a proclamation for Lee to issue upon his arrival in the state. In the document, Davis asserted that the Confederate Army had come to Maryland ‘to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen’ (Lee, R. 1862: 602). Such a statement might have met a better reception in the slaveholding eastern portions of Maryland. There were few slaves in the western areas near Hagerstown where the southern proclamation was issued. Maryland residents watched the ragged gray ranks move through their communities with curiosity and some ridicule. Despite their victories, the Confederate Army that marched into Maryland lacked not only spit and polish but also shoes and significant numbers. While Lee had suffered significant losses in the summer campaigns, approximately 20,000 southern soldiers refused to cross the Potomac River to participate in an invasion of their fellow countrymen. Clearly, there was far more support for a defensive war to protect southern states than for an offensive war in the North. The Army of Northern Virginia pushed into Maryland on 3 September. In the aftermath of the Seven Days battles, Lee had organized his army into two infantry corps with James ‘Old Pete’ Longstreet and Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson in command. J.E.B. Stuart commanded a third Cavalry Corps. Lee felt considerable confidence in this command team and was looking for a fight. Longstreet’s Corps pushed north to Frederick while Jackson’s Corps laid siege to the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry. Although his main units were separated by many miles, Lee doubted that McClellan would pursue him aggressively. As he told a subordinate, ‘His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations—or he will not think so—for three or four weeks’ (McPherson, 1988: 536). Lee had grown accustomed to McClellan’s caution, but he was not accustomed to fighting in enemy territory. As McClellan followed Lee,

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  47 two Union soldiers discovered a copy of Lee’s Special Order 191, which provided detailed instructions for Confederate movements during the Maryland Campaign. McClellan hesitated briefly, fearing a trap, but on 13 September the Union Army marched toward Sharpsburg to place the Union main body in between Longstreet and Jackson. Lee recognized the danger but refused to head back to Virginia without a fight. Instead, he issued orders for the Confederate Army to converge at Sharpsburg where they would meet the larger Union force. Although elements of both armies arrived on 15 September, the Battle of Antietam began at dawn on the 17th with Joseph Hooker’s I Corps advancing into the Miller cornfield where they encountered Jackson’s Confederate corps. Hooker had given away his intentions the night before when he probed Jackson’s lines, thus alerting the southerners to an imminent attack. Despite the warning, Jackson’s men could hear the Federal troops coming long before they could see them in the tall September corn. Hooker’s men fought aggressively and well as they drove Jackson’s men a mile to the rear before reinforcements under John Bell Hood counterattacked and stabilized the Confederate situation on the northern sector of the field. McClellan had intended to have Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps follow Hooker in the attack, but a stray bullet killed the corps commander, which delayed the XII Corps advance for hours. Jackson repeatedly requested reinforcements, but Lee had already drawn heavily from the Confederate center to shore up Jackson’s lines. Without fresh troops entering the fray, the fighting subsided on the northern end of the battlefield by 9:00am. As the fighting closed in the North, the focus of both armies moved to an area that would become known as Bloody Lane. The southern lines had been significantly weakened in this sector earlier in the day as Lee had repeatedly moved units from this area to shore up Jackson’s lines in the cornfield. Despite these reductions, southern units under D.H. ‘Harvey’ Hill used the deep ruts of an old farm road to their advantage as they repulsed four bayonet attacks by determined northern regiments. Union commanders had chosen to send their units forward with unloaded weapons in the hope that this would prevent them from slowing their advance to return fire before reaching the southern lines. On the fifth attempt Union soldiers made the decision to load their weapons despite their orders. At approximately 1:00pm, the Irish Brigade broke into the Bloody Lane and opened a withering fire down the Confederate line. This heroic assault set the remaining southern soldiers to flight. Lee, himself, organized the soldiers streaming from Bloody Lane into a last-ditch defense in the houses of Sharpsburg. As Confederate artilleryman Edward  Porter Alexander noted, ‘The end of the Confederacy was in sight.’ George McClellan observed the Union success in Bloody Lane, but he hesitated to commit his reserve corps. He asked Fitz John Porter if he was prepared to advance. Porter recommended caution replying that he commanded the last corps of the last army of the Republic. Armies fight such battles and soldiers die to create these types of opportunities. If

48  Analysis and Assessment McClellan had committed Porter’s corps, the Confederate Army would have been cut in two. Either Jackson’s corps or Longstreet’s corps would have been destroyed that day. Unfortunately, George McClellan took counsel of his fears and refused to commit his reserve forces to exploit the breach in the Confederate lines. The Army of Northern Virginia could have and should have been destroyed that day. To the south, Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps attempted to cross Antietam Creek at the stone Rohrbach Bridge. Confederate sharpshooters under political general Robert Toombs commanded the approaches to the bridge, with highly effective rifle fire causing significant casualties. Burnside focused more on capturing the bridge over the creek rather than his objective of taking the high ground on the western side. After three hours of intense fighting, one of Burnside’s units forded the creek and attacked the southern position from the flank and pushed them out easily. By 1:30pm, the IX Corps was poised to march into Sharpsburg. Instead of seizing the opportunity, Burnside delayed his advance to reorganize and resupply his troops. As Burnside finally moved forward at 4:00pm, Confederate General A.P. Hill’s Light Division arrived from Harpers Ferry and immediately attacked the Union column. The successful counterattack by Hill ended the day’s fighting. Confederate lines had been broken at least three times, but each time the Union failed to press their advantage. The next day Lee waited for McClellan to resume the attack, but none came. During the night, the Confederate forces crossed the Potomac River unmolested by Union pursuers. Antietam was a lost tactical opportunity for the North. Almost 5,000 Americans died that day and another 20,000 were casualties, but what had been accomplished? The Union Army had the Confederate forces on the ropes, but they failed to finish them off. George McClellan had won a victory but missed the opportunity of a lifetime. Lincoln once again came to visit the Army of the Potomac in early October. Initially thrilled with reports of McClellan’s success, the President now hoped to inspire McClellan to pursue Lee forcefully, but he was once again disappointed. While General McClellan lacked the ability to finish the task, President Lincoln knew how to make the most of his opportunities. Five days after the Union victory at Antietam, Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation which committed the United States to not only preserving the Union but also to ending slavery. On 1 January 1863, the president kept his promise to his friends and enemies as he signed the actual decree: Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln … by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, … order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free. (Lincoln, 1863)

Dashed Hopes and New Realities  49 For the first time, the U.S. government had offered freedom to its Black countrymen. Some slaves could flee to the North immediately while others had to wait until Union armies approached their areas. In early October, Black recruits began to enlist in the U.S. armed forces but were organized in segregated regiments designated as United States Colored Troops. Before the end of the war, almost one third of all Union soldiers were Black men. Lincoln had taken the opportunity to make a Confederate strength—slave labor—into a potential Union strength. Each time a southern slave left the plantation, it represented a significant loss to the Confederate war effort. If the former slave reached the Union lines safely, he or she could contribute to the Union cause either with their labor or service on the battlefield. The end of slavery would weaken southern resistance as it helped transform slave property into active citizens.

Wartime Reconstruction Efforts to reconstruct the South began almost as quickly as the war itself. Union Navy efforts to make the blockade effective led directly to pockets of U.S. control along the southeastern coast. Union Army occupation of significant portions of Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley also created opportunities for Union leaders and African Americans. The United States was suddenly needing to grapple with the major question of the war: What would a post-emancipation United States look like? Most of the social and political mileposts that had outlined race and class for two centuries were disappearing as the war progressed. The barrier islands of Georgia and the Carolinas were valuable land with large slave populations. When Union forces arrived the white population raced for protection on the mainland, leaving large plantations and the enslaved men and women who lived and worked there. The U.S. Army was unprepared to deal with large numbers of Freedmen and so confirmed abolitionists David Hunter and Rufus Saxton were dispatched to command at Port Royal. Abolitionist groups from New York and New England arrived on the Carolina coast to help educate and care for the newly freed people. Unfortunately, northern abolitionists and Freedmen often had difficulty understanding each other on the Sea Islands. Some of the abolitionists arrived hoping to prove their long-standing contention that free labor was more cost effective than slave labor. To prove their economic point, these abolitionists attempted to organize former slaves to grow Sea Island cotton. The newly freed men and women wanted to grow their own crops for their own sustenance. They had no interest in growing luxuriant cotton for the world market or to prove a white man’s theory. Based on their experiences in slavery, Black Americans were afraid to directly contradict a white man’s edict; therefore, they simply elected not to show up for work in the cotton fields. This led some abolitionists to accuse Black men and women of being dishonest and unwilling to work. Fortunately, abolitionists and Freedmen found common cause in promoting education.

50  Analysis and Assessment As Union armies captured Confederate territory in Tennessee and Louisiana, the military found itself working directly with former slaves. The situation differed greatly from the Sea Islands because the white landowners had not abandoned their plantations prior to the arrival of the Union Army. At times, large Contraband camps or Freedmen’s villages sprang up in close proximity to Union military camps. Ulysses S. Grant assigned his command chaplains as superintendents for the Contraband camps. Officers found themselves helping to negotiate labor contracts and settle disputes between former slaves and former masters. Military officials requested additional resources to meet humanitarian needs of the former slaves. The army supplied rations, clothing, and medicine, but, in return, they expected able-bodied men to serve as teamsters, pioneers, nurses, or cooks. Starting with the Militia Act of 1862, Black men could enlist in the United States Army. Authorization to form combat units consisting of Black men and White officers came with the Emancipation Proclamation. While many rallied to the Union standard, others questioned the intentions of all white men. At Port Royal and in the Mississippi Valley, the United States experimented with two different forms of reconstruction with limited success. Despite McClellan’s failure to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, the Union victory at Antietam was the turning point of the Civil War. First, the Union victory broke a string of Confederate successes in the Eastern Theater and convinced the Army of the Potomac that they could defeat Lee and Jackson. Second, Lee’s defeat in Maryland and Lincoln’s proclamation caused Britain and France to halt plans for recognition of the Confederate States. While Don Doyle makes a convincing argument that Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell’s plan for mediation of the ‘American problem’ were derailed by Giuseppe Garibaldi and republican movements on the continent, the Union victory at Antietam and Lincoln’s subsequent proclamation doomed Confederate diplomatic efforts (Doyle, 2015: 219–29). As the British people began to identify the Union cause with emancipation, any realistic chance for foreign recognition of the Confederacy evaporated. Third, Lincoln redefined the purpose of the war after the Battle of Antietam. Too many people had died to go back to a nation that was half slave and half free. After 18 months of bitter, bloody warfare, Lincoln boldly declared that he did not want to preserve the old union but rather to create a new nation. Emancipation was a key part of this effort. Lincoln and the United States were now committed to creating a new, more perfect Union.

4

War on the Homefront

Union and Confederate Armies marched across southern farms, politicians and generals made bold promises, and families waited anxiously at home as the Civil War raged across Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky in 1861 and 1862. For most wealthy Confederates, the ‘Revolution of 1861’ meant a conservative attempt to prevent change rather than an effort to create a new society founded in a true revolution. By creating their own nation, these leaders hoped to secure their right to own slave property and confirm their dominance of southern society. While regional differences over slavery brought the situation to a crisis, the plantation elite intended to severely limit the power of their new national government. In the antebellum period, wealthy planters believed the United States government had strayed too far from the conservative ideals of the founding fathers and thus had become a threat to the plantation elite. As they contemplated secession and war, the southern leadership doubted the Federal government’s will or ability to compel the southern states to return. Further, they believed they had designed the new Confederate government so that it could not pose a threat to their individual rights, privileges, or prerogatives. The leaders of the Counter-Revolution of 1861 were sadly mistaken.

National Identities National leaders strive to create a shared identity to unite their peoples in wartime. Generally, this involves identification of clear strategic goals and a sense of common purpose. Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis each attempted to blend myth and reality to gain support for their war aims. Most Americans today, including many Civil War historians, assume that the United States had a clearly defined national identity in 1861, but that was simply not true. They assume significant support existed in the North for a strong central government with the authority to intervene in the economy and to mobilize people. While most acknowledge significant divisions over the pace of emancipation, racist attitudes and resistance to social change is often portrayed as only appearing in border slave states that remained in the Union and rural parts of the Midwest. Such interpretations significantly DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-5

52  Analysis and Assessment understate the problems Abraham Lincoln faced as he attempted to unify the northern states. As the U.S. prepared for war, Lincoln refused to heed suggestions from abolitionist colleagues and stressed that ‘Preservation of the Union’ would be the primary war aim of the United States. Jefferson Davis had an even more difficult task as he tried to unite states that had allied themselves to protect slavery and the slave economy by trumpeting the sovereignty of individual states. Davis consistently stressed the Confederacy must gain its independence to secure southern soil and institutions. Most white southerners considered independence and the preservation of slavery as mutually supporting war aims in 1861. Confederate leaders called on the population to volunteer to defend their homes from a northern abolitionist threat. Such appeals resonated well in the opening months of the war, but as casualties mounted and individual and collective rights were abridged in the name of the war effort the popularity of the southern cause waned. The sacrifices demanded by bloody, industrial war reopened a series of unfinished Antebellum debates in the South. Yeoman farmers and poor whites began to seriously question whether their alliance with the planter class had been a wise choice. Such reflections made Davis’ job much more difficult as tensions within southern society increased.

Conscription In the first days of any war many citizens express their resolve and offer to make sacrifices. In 1861 southerners rallied to the Confederate standard and joined the military in large numbers. As the excitement of the first victory at Bull Run subsided, Confederate soldiers settled into the daily routines of military life—training, labor details, waiting, and, every so often, fighting. Many eager volunteers of 1861 counted down the days to their end of service the following year. Unfortunately, not many new recruits arrived in the southern camps that winter, thus causing a crisis for the Confederate leadership. On 16 April 1862, the Confederate Congress passed a conscription bill requiring all able-bodied males between 18 and 35 years of age to complete three years of military service. To maintain civilian society, exemptions were allowed for ministers, teachers, newspaper editors, and local administrative officials. The volunteers of 1861 deeply resented this new law that required them to remain in the army. New men and new armies were essential if the Union armies were to be defeated. In September 1862 the Confederate Congress not only expanded the draft to those from 17 to 45 years of age but also added a new exemption category. The new law provided an exemption for one white man to return to manage their farm or plantation for every 20 slaves they owned. Congress approved the ‘Twenty-Slave Law’ to ensure maximum production as more food was needed for the army and for civilians at home. Despite its stated purpose, most southern soldiers saw this as a clear sign that they were involved in a rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight (Freehling, 2001: 145–6). Sam Watkins spoke for many Confederate soldiers

War on the Homefront  53 who had fought and wanted to return to their families even if they did not have the wealth that 20 slaves represented: ‘It gave us the blues; we wanted twenty negroes’ (Watkins, 1882: 47). While Jefferson Davis and the Confederate leadership saw conscription and the exemptions for owners and overseers as absolutely necessary, many southerners considered it a tyrannical step. Needing men immediately, the Confederacy established local conscript bureau offices in each state. Southern women often ridiculed those rounding up recruits while their husbands and sons served in combat units. Physically fit conscript officials drew the most scorn. Public attitudes toward the draft varied in relation to the person’s proximity to the Union armies. With combat occurring throughout the Commonwealth, Governor John Letcher recognized the acute need for larger armies and for more men on the home front to help protect Virginians from Union forces and the potential of slave revolts. Further from the battlefield, Governor Joe Brown of Georgia, Governor Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, and even Vice President Alexander Stephens considered conscription unwise and unconstitutional. Some angry veterans attempted to avoid remaining in the army by appealing to the courts for a writ of habeas corpus, but state courts consistently ruled conscription laws constitutional and rejected most claims. Conscription and the Twenty-Slave Law created great anger against the Davis administration and revealed growing class divisions in southern society (Lee, 2020). Voluntary enlistments in the Union Army also dropped in the summer of 1862; therefore, the Union also needed to establish a draft. On 3 March 1863, Congress passed the Enrollment Act which established a Provost Marshal General Bureau within the War Department to organize volunteer regiments and to administer a draft if individual regions did not meet recruiting goals. James B. Fry, the head of the new agency, quickly established provost marshal offices in each state and in each congressional district in each state. Fry directed bureau agents to compile a list of all men in their district between the ages of 20 and 45 for potential conscription into military service. State leaders resented Federal officials taking charge of the enlistment process within their states. Individual northern men found the Enrollment Act offensive for other reasons. One provision of the new law allowed any man drafted to pay a $300 commutation fee and thus be excused from service. Many poor men saw this as a form of Federal extortion. Others complained that the provision for substitutes also benefited those who had wealthy families. One historical study suggests that approximately 35 per cent of those drafted agreed to pay the commutation fee and 47 per cent managed to locate and pay for a substitute. Even if these numbers are correct, it does not paint a complete picture. Many men in the nineteenth century considered being forced into military service an ignominious fate. When drafted, they chose to volunteer instead of being forced to serve with other draftees (Weber, 2018: 14–18). In both the North and South conscription was seen as a necessary evil to maintain army strength.

54  Analysis and Assessment

Military Experience Strict military discipline posed another serious challenge to individual rights. Marching back and forth while young VMI and Norwich cadets screamed instructions probably seemed ludicrous to many new soldiers in 1861. Much to their chagrin, they rapidly discovered that sergeant-majors and field-grade officers demanded immediate, unthinking obedience. Most Civil War military units had been formed based on geographic areas. Often, one small town or farming community would form the basis for a military unit. Everyone understood that how bravely they fought would be well known at home. On the battlefield, a strong desire to protect their friends as well as a real fear that failure might follow them forever ensured an upmost effort by most Union and Confederate soldiers. In camp, noncommissioned officers struggled to maintain military standards and employed a series of humiliating punishments to deter rule breakers. White men greatly resented wearing ‘the wooden overcoat’ or being ‘bucked and gagged’ for minor offenses. A man caught sleeping on guard duty or stealing food would find himself publicly bound with a sign around his neck stating his offense. Independent farmers were accustomed to speaking their minds and never expected to suffer public punishment. More serious offenses such as striking an officer, running away from battle, and attempted desertion drew far heavier punishments. Officers would hold a regimental formation to inflict punishment on the worst offenders. A coward might have his head shaved and be drummed out of the unit as his fellows turned their backs on him. Some Confederate commanders employed even more degrading punishments on deserters: ‘A strapping fellow with a big rawhide would make the blood flow and spurt at every lick, the wretch begging and howling like a hound, and then he was branded with a red-hot iron with the letter D’ (Watkins, 1882: 48). Southern white men believed that such treatment was meant for slaves not for free white men. None of them had expected military service would require such a sacrifice of social standing.

Property Rights White southerners faced the very real threat that both the Confederate and Union governments might take their property. In August 1861, the U.S. Congress passed the First Confiscation Act. This legislation authorized Union commanders to seize all forms of property that Confederate authorities employed against the United States as ‘contraband of war.’ Although not intended as an anti-slavery measure, Black Virginians astutely turned their legal status as property to their advantage. When slaves escaped to Union lines, they made sure to say that they had been assigned to work for the Confederate military. General Benjamin Butler, commanding the Union garrison at Fort Monroe, Virginia, welcomed these escapees and began to describe them as ‘Contrabands.’ While far from an emancipation measure,

War on the Homefront  55

Figure 4.1 T he Fort Monroe Doctrine. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–36161.

many Black Virginians soon were supporting the Union war effort directly with their labor. The U.S. Congress would pass a Second Confiscation Act expanding the law the following summer, but the pattern had been set. The Confederate government recognized that military necessity might require southern civilians to surrender their property rights for the good of the nation. Under the Impressment Policy, supply officials accompanying the Confederate armies were authorized to purchase or impress resources needed for the army. If a planter or other property owner refused to sell his or her goods to the military at a government approved price, these supply officials could impress the needed items. The supply officer would catalog the items they ‘impressed’ providing a description of the property and assigning a monetary value. The property owner would receive a copy of the inventory as a form of receipt along with a promise to return their property at some point in the future. As the owner watched their corn, wheat, bacon, horses, and often slaves leaving with the army, many civilians decried impressment as nothing short of legally sanctioned stealing. Unsurprisingly, Confederate impressment was a hated policy. Plantation owners were appalled to discover that a government designed to protect the sanctity of slave property felt empowered to take ownership of their enslaved labor force. While enslaved men wanted to do nothing to help the Confederate cause, they knew that rented, or in this case impressed, slaves received the harshest treatment. Impressed service with the army also meant an extended absence from their families. Finally, if an impressed slave died

56  Analysis and Assessment while working for the army, supply officials would simply impress a replacement. No one would feel the loss directly. In the Antebellum period, the slave master had a direct financial and moral investment in the slave, but the Confederate government had none.

Taxation To finance the struggle, in August 1861, the Confederate government imposed the first federal income tax which they called the Tithe. Based in the biblical idea that all should give 10 percent of their wealth to God, the Confederate government imposed a tax on all property worth more than $500. While most expected the tax to include land, crops, and industries, it also included slave property as well. The United States government had imposed tariffs and states had imposed taxes at intervals, but no direct nation-wide tax had been imposed on the American people prior to the Civil War. While the Union would also resort to direct taxation, southerners recalled and echoed the slogan of the American Revolution: ‘The power to tax is the power to destroy.’ A deep-seated hatred of taxes and adherence to states’ rights ideas made the Tithe very difficult to collect. The problem became so acute in April 1863 that the Confederate government replaced the Tithe with the Tax-in-Kind law. Since property was difficult to enumerate and financial transactions were hard to track in the South, Confederate authorities laid a tax equal to 10 percent on all agricultural products produced in each state. This new tax system was made marginally more palatable by a provision that designated all proceeds to be used to supply the southern armies. Many southerners had agreed to wartime sacrifices in 1861, but no one had expected the price of independence to be so expensive in either lives or treasure. Reeling from the defeat at Bull Run, the U.S. government struggled to find ways to pay for a long war. In August, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1861 which imposed a 3 percent tax on incomes above $800 annually and increased tariff rates on imported goods. These initial steps quickly proved insufficient for the government’s needs and Congress was forced to pass a new Revenue Act in February 1862 which not only created a more progressive tax structure but also authorized $150 million in paper currency. The new greenbacks were supported by faith in the credit of the United States and could not be redeemed for gold or silver. As such, their value rose and fell with Union military fortunes. Eventually, over $450 million in greenbacks would be placed in circulation to finance the Union war effort. Wartime inflation, on top of direct taxation, exacerbated the financial problems facing many Americans. The 1862 Revenue Act also saw the creation of the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the Treasury Department to oversee collection of the new levies. As the war dragged on, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase pushed additional tax measures through Congress as the U.S. national debt rose dramatically. While Chase and his

War on the Homefront  57 successor William Fessenden employed a series of measures to finance the war, they also met the nation’s financial needs and laid the groundwork for a financially sound post-war government.

Internal Dissent: Copperheads and States’ Rights Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 presidential election decisively in the electoral college, but he won only a plurality of popular votes. A significant number of Douglas voters were deeply conservative Midwestern Democrats committed to preserving the Union but who did not want an aggressive war against the South. Republican calls for unity in support of the war effort annoyed many Peace Democrats who saw the Lincoln administration moving too quickly and without congressional approval to raise armies and fund the war (Weber, 2018: 29–33). Conservative or Peace Democrats who opposed administrative initiatives were soon being described as ‘Copperheads’ in the Republican press. In the aftermath of Antietam, Lincoln announced his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation which galvanized Democratic opposition to Lincoln. In early spring 1863, Clement Vallandigham of Ohio spoke out strongly against the Lincoln administration accusing it of unjustly suppressing civil liberties, suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and forcing an emancipation policy on the Union. Vallandigham and Copperhead-aligned newspapers managed to engage a wide northern audience as they put forward a series of anti-war messages including a call to ignore conscription. On 4 May 1863, Union soldiers arrested Vallandigham on the orders of Ambrose Burnside for aiding and abetting the enemy. (Vallandigham, 1872: 256) The subsequent military trial allowed the Copperheads to put Lincoln’s wartime policies: suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, civilian trials before military tribunals, and limitations on the freedom of speech and the press before the public. Unfortunately for the administration, Copperhead contentions resonated with many Americans. These events played out in light of the Democratic Party gaining 28 House seats in the congressional elections for the 38th Congress. To alleviate the impression of authoritarian control, Lincoln had Vallandigham expelled into the Confederacy at the end of May. Jefferson Davis also struggled with charges that his administration had infringed on individual liberties. Davis suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared martial law in multiple locations as Union armies threatened various regions. Many criticized Davis for General John Winder’s enforcement of martial law in Richmond in the spring of 1862. Winder’s heavyhanded enforcement led to the arrest of a number of prominent officials for violations of alcohol and travel restrictions. William Holden and Zebulon Vance of North Carolina and Joseph E. Brown of Georgia won popular support as constant critics of administration policy. These states’ rights advocates railed against impressment of civilian property and slaves, denounced the imposition of military conscription, and demanded the end of direct

58  Analysis and Assessment taxation. These critics repeatedly proclaimed that Davis and his administration had more firmly destroyed public liberties than the United States Congress had ever considered. Most harmful to public morale, Davis’ critics claimed that peace could be achieved through a convention of the states, based on the constitution convention of 1787, that would eliminate both the Union and Confederate governments and restore peace. As with Lincoln, most of Davis’ opponents were quick to offer scathing criticism but offered few feasible proposals to address the country’s problems.

Women Assume New Duties As the men left for the army, women also rallied to the northern and southern causes. Eager to demonstrate their patriotism, Ladies Aid Societies sprang up. These local groups often formed around church congregations and other civic organizations and endeavored to serve the units from their communities. They knitted and sewed, prepared dinners and canned foods, and worried and prayed for their troops. These pursuits did not challenge the gender roles ascribed to them in antebellum America. Unfortunately, the armies occasionally appeared in their front yards and thrust them into new, less comfortable roles. With their husbands away at war, many southern women found themselves in charge of the family farm or plantation. Farmers’ wives had performed key functions in peacetime, but few had been involved in major decisions concerning staple crops. Most did not know when a crop should be planted or how best to tend it. In the first days of the war, husbands and fathers serving in the armies attempted to give specific directions about how the farm should be managed in their absence. Unfortunately, Confederate mail service was slow and unreliable and many requests for guidance went unanswered. On a practical note, handling horses and pushing a plow were arduous tasks reserved for men in the pre-war South. Most women, Black or White, had never attempted to plow a field; this had long been considered a man’s job. Many farm wives became skilled across time, but there was a steep learning curve. If the plantation contained slaves, women found they had to become the master of the plantation. Unfortunately for the new masters, the enslaved workers knew far more about what needed to be done than the plantation mistress did. Many southern women felt their agricultural ignorance acutely. Further, they had to learn to apply the whip. A plantation mistress might have punished an erring house slave in the pre-war period, but white women did not routinely punish field slaves. Powerfully built field slaves, well versed in the rhythms of crop production, posed a particular challenge to the plantation mistress. Some women asked white male relatives or neighbors to discipline rebellious slaves, but such a step further undermined her position as master of the plantation. Despite these difficulties, southern reliance on women to produce agricultural products increased dramatically during the

War on the Homefront  59 war. At the same time, White women became more dependent upon Black slaves even as the slaves became increasingly independent. As the Union Army advanced into southern territory, Confederate women had to choose between staying in their homes and on their farms or becoming a refugee. If women stayed in their homes, they risked being cut off from their sons and husbands fighting with the Confederate forces. It might be weeks or months before the battle lines shifted allowing them to again communicate with their loved ones. Further, they might well find artillery shells raining down upon them like the women of Fredericksburg in December 1862. In almost all cases, combat caused some damage to nearby homes and farms. Even if no gunfire hit their property, crops, livestock, fences, and barns were often destroyed. In most instances, the armies left the battle area shortly after the fighting ended, leaving the civilian population to treat the wounded and bury the dead of both armies. While a few women were killed by direct fire, many more found themselves physically and mentally shaken as battles and their aftermaths claimed their attention. Staying resolutely in one’s home posed many challenges for southern women. In contrast, if women decided to flee before the military confrontation began, they had to carry their most important items with them. Transportation was very limited in the battle areas; therefore, women had to make hard choices about what they needed most for the future. In a best-case scenario, a family might hope to take one wagon of goods with them as they fled away from the battle area. Any item left at home would almost certainly be confiscated by Union soldiers or stolen by neighbors. Civilians could not depend on any item abandoned as the enemy approached to be recovered. Beyond the property loss, female refugees had to find a new home safe from the restless armies. Many hoped to be near their husbands and soon Richmond was overwhelmed by soldiers’ families arriving in the capital. While some followed this path, family members were the most likely destination for refugees. Despite a genuine desire to help, a mother or sister would struggle to provide food and shelter for these new household members. Adding to the problem, refugees rarely arrived at their new homes with a clear plan concerning how they would make ends meet. Necessity forced many women, including almost all refugees, to seek paid employment. This decision came at a high price in social standing: ‘Ladies’ did not work for money. This pre-war assumption fell by the wayside as women from all levels of society worked in a number of new fields. Building upon years of home schooling of their own children, many southern women opened schools. Teaching became a female-dominated profession during the Civil War as women encouraged men to abandon the classroom and join the army. Teaching fit well with the prevailing gender expectations as it built on the nurturing role of the mother. Union and Confederate women made nursing a female profession during the Civil War, which seriously challenged pre-war expectations. Despite the

60  Analysis and Assessment pioneering efforts of Florence Nightingale during the Crimean War, many men naively considered the ability to hold down a man while a limb was amputated the main qualification to be a military nurse. Some Civil War nurses like Clara Barton, Mary Ann ‘Mother’ Bickerdyke, and Kate Cumming arrived at military hospitals in response to patriotic appeals, but most encountered significant resistance from male doctors and government officials. Far more women became nurses having arrived at hospitals to care for a wounded son or husband and ended up staying to help others. With nurses arriving in large numbers, strong female leaders emerged to ensure coordination with the military authorities. Dorothea Dix was appointed superintendent of U.S. Army nurses in June 1861, but she had some unfortunate preconceptions about female nurses as well. Dix attempted to recruit serious, unattractive women over the age of 35 to staff Union hospitals. Unwilling to submit to military regulations, many northern women elected to work for non-governmental agencies like the U.S. Sanitary Commission and the U.S. Christian Commission. Although the Confederacy never designated a superintendent of nurses, Sally Tompkins and Juliet Opie Hopkins won recognition for their leadership in and administration of military hospitals. Their successful efforts led Confederate leaders to create the position of hospital matron with broad duties. Male doctors found many of these women annoying as they insisted on scrubbing bloody floors, changing soiled dressings and linens, and dramatically improving cleanliness in the hospitals. While some men feared that women would lose their delicacy and modesty in this environment, the Union and Confederate governments grudgingly recognized their importance as nurses and hospital matrons. Many women who lacked significant education or simply needed gainful employment sought jobs in factory settings including work in textile mills, food processing facilities, and even munitions factories. These positions exposed women to not only strenuous physical labor but also dangerous chemicals and explosives. In the antebellum period, southern spokesmen had decried the employment of women in factories in the North suggesting that it demonstrated a lack of culture and refinement. During the war, such work helped the cause significantly even as it forced women to accept their new status as a female industrial employee. Both the Union and Confederate governments offered new jobs to women. While some called it welfare for the upper class, women found work in government agencies to include the War, Treasury, and Quartermaster Departments. In these paid positions, women made a significant contribution as they provided for themselves and their children. All of these new female jobs gave patriotic women a place, a purpose, and a diversion from waiting and worrying as the war raged on.

5

Hard, Earnest War

Long before R.E. Lee and U.S. Grant entered West Point’s hallowed halls, instructors at the United States Military Academy proclaimed that decisive battle was the ultimate aim of the military leader. To help attain decisive results, every student was required to learn French and to study the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte. In particular, Napoleon’s successes at Austerlitz and Jena were analyzed to demonstrate that one well-planned and executed military victory could win a war in a single engagement. While some like George McClellan hesitated and faltered in the breach, many like Lee and Grant believed that a decisive victory lay within their grasp. With the Emancipation Proclamation, Abraham Lincoln officially repudiated his former policy of conciliation that had intended to touch few southern civilians directly. Lincoln sought new, stronger leaders to implement his new war aims. In November 1862, Ambrose Burnside replaced McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac and immediately marched into Virginia seeking decisive battle. The new Union commander advanced aggressively upon the city of Fredericksburg but met determined southern resistance. Lee’s troops contested northern attempts to build pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock by occupying homes near the river’s banks. Union artillerymen shelled the city to root out the troops firing on their engineers, but they also endangered the lives of many civilian residents. Ultimately, Burnside’s attempt to seize Fredericksburg failed on 13 December as the Confederate troops punished the Union troops advancing upon Marye’s Heights. While decisive results remained elusive, both sides were now willing to fight a more total war. In April 1863, Burnside’s replacement, Union General Joe Hooker, devised a complex plan to overwhelm the Army of Northern Virginia at Fredericksburg. First, he dispatched 10,000 cavalrymen under George Stoneman on a raid toward Richmond hoping to cause widespread panic. Second, he split the Army of the Potomac in two pieces leaving 40,000 men under John Sedgwick facing Lee at Fredericksburg while the main Union force of 70,000 enveloped Lee’s army from the west. No matter which way Lee faced, Hooker believed he had the southern commander trapped in a vice. This Union plan seemed practical and even efficient as Hooker had a greater DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-6

62  Analysis and Assessment than two to one advantage in men. Unfortunately for the Union, Stoneman’s cavalry quickly bogged down and drew few Confederate troops with them. Virginians did not scurry in panic and no political figures demanded the army’s return to the capital. Rather, southern cavalry alerted Lee to Hooker’s movements and on 1 May Lee disregarded the tactical dictates of Napoleon’s disciples and divided his army of 60,000 in the face of superior Union numbers. Having left 12,000 men at Fredericksburg under Jubal Early, Lee wheeled west with 48,000 men and struck Hooker’s advancing columns as they emerged from the thick woods east of Chancellorsville. Surprised by the ferocity of the Confederate attack, the Union columns faltered and were driven back into the thick second-growth forest which surrounded Chancellorsville and was known as the Wilderness. Lee had seized the initiative from Hooker by correctly identifying Sedgwick’s force as a decoy and by driving the much larger Union force into the thick terrain. In the Wilderness, combat actions would revolve around the limited open areas where units could maneuver and where artillery might prove effective. Stuart conducted a thorough reconnaissance and reported to Lee that the Union left was anchored on the Rapidan and the center was well fortified. Interestingly, Stuart reported that the Union right flank ran along the Orange Turnpike and was hanging in the air. Lee discussed this intelligence with Jackson that evening, and they agreed the Confederate force must be split again. Early on 2 May, Lee dispatched Jackson and 28,000 men around the Union Army to strike its exposed right flank. As Jackson moved west, Lee attacked with two divisions toward Chancellorsville to divert Union attention. Despite this effort, Jackson’s column was detected by Federal troops who alerted Hooker. With no cavalry to confirm the enemy’s intentions, Hooker dismissed these reports as proof that Lee had begun a retreat toward Richmond. Just before 6:00pm Jackson’s gray ranks crashed into the flank of the Union’s XI Corps causing widespread panic. Jackson continued the attack into the night driving the Union force three miles toward Chancellorsville. About 9:00pm, the southern commander stopped the attack to reorganize for a final push. Having ridden forward with several staff officers to inspect the Federal lines, Jackson was struck by two bullets fired by his own men as he returned. Later that evening his left arm would be amputated, but pneumonia and infection would kill him a week later. On 3 May, J.E.B. Stuart assumed command of the Second Corps and continued the attack at Fairview driving the Union forces back to Chancellorsville. On the same day, John Sedgwick’s force finally assaulted the Confederate lines at Fredericksburg. If Sedgwick’s troops had attacked a day or two earlier, Lee’s options would have been constrained as Hooker intended. This Union attack came far too late to have the desired effect; Hooker was beaten and forced to retreat north of the Rappahannock River. Lee and Jackson had conducted a masterful series of actions to counter Hooker’s large numbers and strong tactical plan. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, this remarkable defensive victory did not

M ap 5.1 Chancellorsville map.

Hard, Earnest War  63

64  Analysis and Assessment offer decisive results. Lee now understood that no defensive success would be decisive unless he had the combat power to pursue and destroy his opponent.

Gettysburg Lee’s victory at Chancellorsville had turned back a strong Union thrust into Virginia, but it had not changed the Confederacy’s difficult strategic position. Hooker and Lee’s armies faced each other at Fredericksburg with neither able to destroy their opponent. General William Rosecrans commanded 84,000 Union troops in central Tennessee opposing 60,000 southern men under General Braxton Bragg. Despite entreaties from their presidents, neither commander was eager to open a major campaign. During the winter, Ulysses S. Grant and 60,000 men conducted a series of operations along the Mississippi River against the Confederate strongpoint at Vicksburg. John C. Pemberton commanded 40,000 men at Vicksburg while Joseph E Johnston led 25,000 southern troops in Jackson, Mississippi. Both Confederate commanders answered to Jefferson Davis directly and their actions were poorly coordinated (Cooper, 2001: 409–14, 437–441) As long as the Confederacy controlled Vicksburg, the major railroad link to the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy remained open. European goods flowed freely into neutral

Map 5.2 1863 strategy map.

Hard, Earnest War  65 Mexico, were traded for Confederate cotton at the Texas border, and eventually spread throughout the Confederacy. Morphine, quinine, and other precious items were extremely difficult to attain in the South through other avenues. If Grant were able to take Vicksburg, the Union would control the entire Mississippi River and the Confederacy would be split into two pieces. As importantly, firm Union control of the Mississippi River would be clear evidence of northern progress in the war. Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee met at the Confederate white house during the second week of May and attempted to find a solution to these problems. Davis astutely recognized the dire nature of the threat and proposed to send Lee and a portion of the Army of Northern Virginia to Mississippi. The two leaders calculated that it would take three weeks to transport 20,000 troops and their equipment to Mississippi; therefore, a decision must be made immediately. When Lee resisted the president’s suggestion that he take command in the Western Theater, Davis proposed to send General James Longstreet to Mississippi with his corps from the Army of Northern Virginia to take command of all southern troops west of the Appalachian Mountains. Having suffered the loss of Stonewall Jackson, Lee desperately wanted to retain Longstreet and his men. Lee countered the president’s arguments by suggesting that significantly weakening his army would allow the Union to return to the offensive and might easily capture Richmond. Instead, Lee recommended a plan to march his army into Pennsylvania in search of a decisive battle (Thomas, 1995: 288–9, 306). He strongly argued that a victory on northern soil would convince Abraham Lincoln and the North that they could not win the war. Further, he suggested that a major victory on northern soil might lead to diplomatic recognition by Britain and France. Finally, he suggested that if he could maintain his army in Union territory throughout the summer that the Federal armies in the Western Theater must be withdrawn to counter the Confederate occupation (Cooper, 2001: 435–7). Beginning in the fall of 1861, Lincoln slowly came to understand that the Civil War consisted of one strategic theater rather than multiple theaters. He came to recognize that combat actions in Virginia, in Tennessee, and in Mississippi all impacted each other. Throughout this period, he attempted to identify generals who understood the interrelationship between their actions and those of other commanders in the war. Jefferson Davis was not as strong a strategist as Lincoln, but he did recognize that the loss of the Mississippi River would be a grave disaster. Davis’ conviction that something must be done about the Confederate forces in the West was correct. Unfortunately, Lee was a Virginian first and a Confederate second. In his mind, the safety and security of the Commonwealth could not be separated from the success of the Confederacy. Therefore, he strongly resisted all efforts to shift forces from Virginia. Beyond these parochial concerns, Lee, like many in the North, believed that the war would be won or lost in the Eastern Theater of operations.

66  Analysis and Assessment Having wagered the nation’s fate on a strike into the North, Lee pushed his army through the Shenandoah Valley and into Maryland in mid-June. In the aftermath of Chancellorsville, Lee replaced Stonewall Jackson by dividing the dead hero’s corps into two smaller corps units commanded by Richard ‘Dick’ Ewell and A.P. ‘Powell’ Hill. These new leaders were eager to prove their merits as Ewell pushed his Second Corps toward the Pennsylvania capital of Harrisburg and captured Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Hill and the Third Corps also moved forth energetically as he captured York. Confederate cavalry commanded by J.E.B. Stuart circled behind Hooker’s army and briefly threatened Washington as they moved into Pennsylvania. These aggressive movements led Abraham Lincoln to remove Joe Hooker from command and to appoint George Meade as the new commander of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln clearly instructed Meade that his mission was to attack and destroy Lee’s Army rather than simply protect the nation’s capital. Although Lincoln called out northern militia units from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, and West Virginia to assist the Army of the Potomac, he never considered pulling Union troops from Tennessee or Mississippi (Goodwin, 2005: 530–3). If Lee were to achieve decisive results, he needed to capture or destroy the Army of the Potomac. As Meade advanced into Pennsylvania, Lee recalled his forward elements to concentrate his army. Lee ordered his three corps commanders to move rapidly toward the small crossroads town of Gettysburg where the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia would assemble prior to meeting the Army of the Potomac. A.P. Hill’s corps marched toward Gettysburg early on the morning of 1 July, but they met unexpectedly strong resistance as Union cavalry used a series of ridgelines to delay the southern advance. About three miles from Gettysburg, the Confederate column came under intense fire from John Buford’s dismounted cavalry who delayed Henry Heth’s division for several hours. Contrary to popular belief, Buford’s men were not using Spencer repeating rifles, but instead carried a mix of single-shot breech-loading rifles (Holbrook, 2011). Before Hill’s men could force the cavalry from McPherson’s Ridge, infantry units from the Union I Corps commanded by John Reynolds arrived and quickly reinforced the hardpressed troopers. Unfortunately for the Union, the I Corps commander received a mortal wound shortly after committing his troops. Throughout the day, additional Union and Confederate forces would arrive and join the battle. At the climax of the first day’s fighting, Ewell’s Second Corps drove through the center of Gettysburg and pushed the Union men a half mile south of the town. Lee gave Ewell an order to take the high ground known as Cemetery Hill if practicable. Lee had achieved success with discretionary orders by relying on the aggressiveness and judgment of Longstreet and Jackson. In this instance, new corps commander Dick Ewell proved himself overly cautious, allowing the Union to maintain control of the high ground south of Gettysburg.

Hard, Earnest War  67 The remainder of both the Confederate and Union Armies arrived in the vicinity of Gettysburg during the night. Confederate soldiers had refused to go north into Maryland in 1862, but Lee’s entire army of 77,000 made the march into Pennsylvania. The first day’s fighting had been a Confederate success, but Lee’s men had not inflicted serious damage to the Union Army. Both Lee and Meade looked at their situation and decided that Gettysburg was as good a location as any to fight their opponent. Possession of Gettysburg offered no major advantage to either army; quite simply, it was where the two armies had met each other. Meade arrayed his 90,000 Union men from Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill in the north along Cemetery Ridge facing west until it reached the open expanse of Little Round Top. This alignment provided a coherent defensive position with high ground at both ends. Clearly, Meade expected Lee to attack him. Hoping to achieve decisive results, Lee formulated a complex plan for an attack in echelon to strike the Union left flank near Little Round Top, thus endangering the whole Union position. Once the initial attack was successful, Lee expected his troops to fire down Cemetery Ridge thus aiding the next unit attacking from the west. If all went well, the Union units would fall in sequence like a line of dominos. Unfortunately for the Confederates, things began to go wrong from the outset. Longstreet’s forces moved slowly along Seminary Ridge taking most of the day to reach their attack position. At 4:00pm, the Confederate ranks finally surged forward but found that the Union III Corps under Daniel Sickles had moved unexpectedly forward from Cemetery Ridge settling near the Emmitsburg Road. This unorthodox move angered Meade, but it unknowingly countered Lee’s plan of attack. Individual leadership would prove decisive for both armies. John Bell Hood led two divisions of Longstreet’s First Corps into the attack, but he was cut down by an artillery round that exploded overhead and permanently disabled his left arm. With Hood seriously injured and the Confederate attack proceeding in an unexpected sequence, the second day’s fighting at Gettysburg quickly turned into a slugfest (Thomas, 1995: 296–303) Desperate fights raged across rugged, bloody terrain in the Peach Orchard, the Wheat Field, and the Devil’s Den as the III Corps was pushed back. Meade rushed the Union V Corps to his threatened left flank but still the Confederate men pushed forward. On the far end of the Union line, Army Chief Engineer Gouverneur K. Warren recognized that the advance by Sickles’ III Corps had left key terrain on Little Round Top undefended. Warren located Colonel Strong Vincent’s brigade from V Corps and ordered him to hold the position at all costs. Vincent deployed four infantry regiments on Little Round Top, but most historical attention has focused on the end unit, the 20th Maine and its commander Joshua Chamberlain. Two Alabama regiments under William C. Oates pressed the Confederate attack up Little Round Top and drove deeply into Chamberlain’s position. For three hours the two opponents struggled within 20 yards of each other

68  Analysis and Assessment

Map 5.3 Gettysburg map.

Hard, Earnest War  69 but with neither giving way. As darkness fell, Chamberlain’s men ran out of ammunition and yet he ordered his men to fix bayonets and charge the Confederates below. Surprised by the audacity of their foe, the Confederate force withdrew ending the greatest threat to Little Round Top. While Chamberlain and the men of the 20th Maine performed heroically, these actions would have meant little if the other three regiments in Vincent’s brigade had not performed admirably as well, turning back the bulk of Longstreet’s corps. Many historians and the National Park Service have chosen to tell the complex story of the defense of Little Round Top by focusing on one leader and one unit. This simplified story helps explain a complex military action between numerous units, but it also devalues the efforts of many Union and Confederate soldiers. Robert E. Lee had sent his best soldiers into the fight on 2 July, and they had performed bravely, but they had been unable to unhinge the Union defensive line. Despite the loss of Hood and the disorganized advance, the Confederate Army had come very close to destroying the Union position at Little Round Top. Having failed to attain decisive results on the first two days of fighting, Lee turned to a direct assault on the third day. The Confederate commander believed that Meade had weakened the center of his line to parry southern thrusts on the flanks; therefore, he hoped to punch through the middle. Lee envisioned a brief artillery barrage to disable Union

Figure 5.1 Dead soldiers at Little Round Top, Gettysburg, PA. Photograph by Alexander Gardner. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-B8171–252

70  Analysis and Assessment guns followed by an infantry assault supported by mobile artillery. Longstreet commanded the attack, somewhat incorrectly remembered as Pickett’s Charge, made by three divisions under George Pickett, Isaac Trimble, and James J. Pettigrew. Confederate artillerymen struggled to find the range of the Union guns and fired for almost an hour without silencing the enemy guns. Short of artillery ammunition, Longstreet ordered his 12,000 infantrymen forward but only two Confederate guns moved forward with them. Trimble’s and Pettigrew’s commands took a more direct route toward the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge, and they struck the Union center approximately 20 minutes before Pickett’s Virginians arrived. Determined gray soldiers briefly breached the main Union line, but they were unable to hold their hard-won gains. Lee met his beaten men as they returned from the desperate assault. ‘It is all my fault,’ he told them (Hess, 2021). Having sustained 28,000 casualties across the three-day battle, Lee began his retreat south on 4 July. Lee had driven into Pennsylvania hoping for decisive battle and he had found one, but it had not produced the results he wanted. The Confederate campaign had not caused political upheaval or widespread panic in the North. Further, Lee’s movements had not brought foreign recognition or forced the Union to pull troops from Grant in Mississippi. Despite valiant efforts by Lee’s men, the Army of the Potomac had demonstrated that it could take Lee’s best shot and emerge victorious. From Gettysburg forward, Lee would have to adapt his tactics to the new reality that he lacked the combat power to conduct offensive movements.

Vicksburg Prior to the war, Vicksburg was a town of 4,500 residents set on a high bluff overlooking the Mississippi River. The river at Vicksburg makes a sharp S-turn that forced ships to slow to steerage speed to navigate the passage and thus had become a major river port. The Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad further added to the city’s role as a transportation hub as it brought cotton from across the state for shipment to northern and European textile mills. Early in the Civil War, Confederate authorities lined the bluffs above the river with large caliber artillery pieces to interdict any Union traffic. These defenses had proven effective in May and June 1862 when warships under Admiral David Farragut had failed to subdue the defenders. After the Union Navy captured New Orleans and Memphis in 1862, Vicksburg was the home of the only Confederate rail link across the Mississippi River. On 25 October 1862, Grant assumed command of the Department of Tennessee and began his first attempt to capture Vicksburg. He attempted a twoprong overland campaign with Sherman moving down the Mississippi River and Grant following the path of the Mississippi Central Railroad toward Jackson and ultimately Vicksburg. In early December, Confederate General Earl Van Dorn destroyed Grant’s supply base at Holly Springs forcing the

Hard, Earnest War  71 Union forces to retreat. As the Union troops headed north, Grant’s army fed themselves by raiding southern farms. This experience demonstrated to Grant that vulnerable supply lines were not the only option to feed his army. From January through April 1863, Grant followed a series of five ill-advised directives from Washington that had his men attempt to dig multiple canals and to divert the flow of the river by a series of explosions. As Grant expected, none of these ventures proved effective, but it gave him time to develop a plan in coordination with the navy for a second major offensive against the southern citadel. When Davis and Lee met to discuss Confederate opportunities after Chancellorsville, Grant had already begun his campaign against Vicksburg. On 16 April, and again on 22 April, Admiral David Porter led Union gunboats, empty transports, and supply vessels past the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg under the cover of darkness. Southern gunners fired at the Union vessels, but they were unable to destroy ships that ran directly against the eastern shore. In total, the Union Navy managed to get 14 vessels safely past Vicksburg’s guns but lost one vessel in each attempt. These navy vessels proved essential for Grant’s campaign. Confederate forces in Mississippi matched the Union’s 60,000 men, but Jefferson Davis had failed to clarify the Confederate command structure in the west. In contrast, Grant commanded all Union elements in Mississippi and hoped to exploit the disorganized nature of the southern command. On 1 May, Grant’s troops boarded the navy transports and boldly crossed the Mississippi River south of Vicksburg. Grant inserted his army between the two smaller Confederate forces of Pemberton and Johnston. Despite the Union’s successful river crossing, Confederate leaders thought this campaign doomed to failure due to resource constraints. Building off his previous experience in Mississippi, Grant subsisted off local farms for three weeks until he linked up with navy supply vessels supporting the siege of Vicksburg. On 14 May, Grant drove the Confederate troops out of Jackson and away from Vicksburg. John Pemberton came out of his defensive works and attempted to coordinate with Johnston’s retreating force, but he received no immediate aid. Fighting alone, Pemberton’s force suffered 3,800 casualties in a bloody encounter with Grant at Champions Hill on 16 May. Badly beaten, Pemberton fell back to his positions at Vicksburg and went on the defensive. Grant pressed forward quickly and assaulted the southern lines on 19 and 22 May suffering almost 5,000 casualties. The Union assaults had been aided by naval gunfire and over 220 artillery pieces, but Pemberton’s men fought stubbornly from their earthen fortifications. Grant recognized that these defensive positions could not be easily taken and began siege operations, while requesting reinforcements. Inside Vicksburg the situation became desperate quickly. Pemberton had plenty of ammunition, but he lacked the food needed to feed his army and the civilian population hemmed in with the garrison. Navy gunboats fired into the city most nights and army artillery consistently fired at the outer

72  Analysis and Assessment defenses. Inside the city, people were forced to eat horses, dogs, and finally rats. Even as southern morale collapsed, President Davis repeatedly appealed to Pemberton to hold out while Joe Johnston was directed to organize a force to break the siege. Unfortunately for the defenders, Grant had assigned Sherman to prevent any relief force from reaching the city. Davis realized too late that he had made a serious mistake by not sending a new commander and more troops to Mississippi. On 3 July, Grant and Pemberton met to discuss terms of surrender. Pemberton’s army marched out of Vicksburg surrendering approximately 29,500 men, 170 artillery pieces, and control of the Mississippi River. As soon as the Confederate defenders of Port Hudson heard of Pemberton’s capitulation, they also surrendered. With the Mississippi River once again in United States hands, the Confederacy had been divided into two disconnected pieces. Men, material, and imported goods from Europe could no longer come through Texas to reach the Confederate heartland. Further, Lincoln had found a new breed of hardened generals in Grant, Sherman, and James B. McPherson. Suddenly, the southern Confederacy’s future looked quite grim. On 4 July 1863, Washington, D.C. awoke to the sound of one hundred guns announcing the victory at Gettysburg. Before the echo died that morning, news arrived in the Navy Department that John Pemberton had surrendered his garrison at Vicksburg to U.S. Grant the day before. The twin victories made for tremendous rejoicing in the nation’s capital. All hoped that the end of the war was near. In Richmond, the Confederate leadership called for a National Day of Prayer. Clearly, Davis had erred in allowing Lee to move north rather than ordering him to go to Mississippi to take command in the West. Lee offered the president his resignation, but Davis saw no better alternative to lead the Confederate Army. Instead, they girded their loins for a new, harder struggle. The Richmond Examiner proclaimed the grim southern resolve in an editorial on 28 July 1863: The British ran over every high road of the country; penetrated every neighborhood, plundered every city and town to the Gulf—but lost the game. Their successors in tyranny will lose like them, unless the descendants of those who lived in the ‘times that tried men’s souls’ have infamously degenerated. (Daniel, 1868: 106) Depicting this moment as the Confederate Valley Forge may have helped some, but nothing could hide the Confederate military tragedies of July 1863. Union successes at Vicksburg and Gettysburg in July had been impressive victories, but they did not immediately end the war. Although not a decisive victory like Austerlitz, these twin victories crippled the Confederate armies and set the stage for eventual Union victory. In the immediate aftermath of the Gettysburg and Vicksburg triumphs, Union efforts stalled in all theaters. Robert E. Lee rested and refitted his depleted army unmolested in Central

Hard, Earnest War  73 Virginia, as the Army of the Potomac failed to follow up their success in Pennsylvania aggressively. In the Western Theater, William Rosecrans captured Chattanooga, Tennessee in early September, but he subsequently lost the battle of Chickamauga on 19–20 September. For a brief moment, it looked as if the Confederacy might be able to turn the tide again, but Lincoln sent Grant and Sherman to extinguish the threat. In just over a month, Grant broke the Confederate siege at Chattanooga and defeated the Confederate Army of Tennessee driving it into Georgia. While the Confederacy would fight on into the new year, the Union victories of 1863 would prove to be the keys to final victory.

6

The Last Full Measure

Having achieved success in Mississippi and Tennessee, Grant was selected by Abraham Lincoln to take command of all Union armies in March 1864. Grant promoted William Tecumseh Sherman to his old position as commander of all Union forces in the West. Unlike previous commanders, Grant elected to neither remain in Washington nor take direct command of the Army of the Potomac. Instead, Meade retained command of the main army in the East and Grant co-located his headquarters with Meade. Through this method, Grant could exercise direct supervision over the Army of the Potomac without losing sight of the larger strategic picture. In 1864, there were three main theaters of conflict: East, West, and Trans-Mississippi. Eastern Theater Richmond Western Theater Atlanta Trans-Mississippi Mobile

Meade [Grant] 120,000 Sherman 110,000 Banks 25,000

Lee 64,000 Johnston 60,000 Taylor 15,000

Grant devised his strategic approach to ensure that the efforts in each theater complemented the efforts in all other areas. He did not want the Confederacy to have the freedom to move forces from one theater to another to create a temporary operational advantage. Grant had worked closely with Sherman for two years and had great faith in both his efficiency and his daring. On 4 April, he laid out the 1864 campaign to Sherman, but he did not feel it necessary to give specific guidance: ‘You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources’ (Grant, 1885: 412–13). Grant felt confident that Sherman would press the Confederate forces in the Western Theater as aggressively as possible. In contrast, Grant neither knew Meade nor trusted him to pursue Lee with the necessary resolve: ‘Lee’s army is your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also’ (Grant, 1885: 416). In previous campaigns, the Union objective had been the capture DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-7

The Last Full Measure  75 of Richmond, but Grant understood that the Confederacy would only surrender once Lee’s army was destroyed. With Sherman marching into Georgia and with Meade under his close supervision, Grant felt quite hopeful for victory in the spring campaign. Lincoln had readily approved Grant’s plan, but the president added several supplementary campaigns to Grant’s strategic design. Facing an election campaign later in the year, Lincoln directed Grant to integrate limited campaigns by three political generals, and Lincoln allies, into his grand strategic plan. The president hoped that a significant command for Nathaniel Banks would inspire his fellow abolitionists to vigorously support Lincoln’s reelection. In a similar way, the appointment of German immigrant Franz Sigel was designed to reinforce German support for the Union and the Republican Party. Despite a poor military reputation, Lincoln never forgot Benjamin Butler’s early military efforts in Maryland in 1861. Needing to garner favor with Radical Republicans, the president directed that Butler lead a force in Virginia. Although he knew the limitations of these political generals, Grant dutifully assigned each politician a complementary mission. First, he ordered Banks to embark the Union forces in Louisiana and with help from the navy mount a campaign to seize Mobile, Alabama. If this force of 25,000 could take Mobile, it would materially augment Sherman’s efforts in Georgia. Second, Grant ordered Sigel to march south through the Shenandoah Valley to destroy Confederate supplies and to draw additional strength from Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Finally, Grant directed Butler to move from Fort Monroe up the peninsula between the James and York Rivers and attempt to threaten Richmond and Petersburg as Meade’s army moved south. Grant directed that all offensive operations should commence on 4 May to cause maximum impact. Grant, Sherman, and Butler pushed forward into Confederate territory as planned. Sigel stepped off a couple of days early, on 2 May, heading south through the Shenandoah Valley. This was a minor deviation from Grant’s plan, but the campaign started well in Virginia and in Georgia. Prior to Grant’s appointment as General-in-Chief, Henry Halleck had directed Nathaniel Banks to initiate a joint army/navy operation up the Red River toward Shreveport, Louisiana. Halleck assured Grant that Banks’ force would be available for the spring campaign, but the proposed drive to Mobile failed to materialize. Preoccupied by preparations for the campaigns in Virginia and Georgia, Grant recognized the diversion but was unable to coordinate an attack upon Mobile until August.

Overland Campaign in Virginia Grant rapidly grew frustrated with Meade who moved slowly through the thick terrain west of Fredericksburg. Lee immediately recognized the Union threat and moved to parry the Union thrust before they could exit the densely vegetated area where the Battle of Chancellorsville had been contested the year before. Lee’s men struck the Union column forcefully and

76  Analysis and Assessment

Map 6.1 Wilderness to Richmond map.

The Last Full Measure  77 turned both of its flanks during the three bloody days of fighting in the Wilderness. Many soldiers were shocked by the ferocity of the Confederate attack and by the disinterred bones of their comrades who had died on the same field a year earlier. Many Union soldiers expected Grant to turn tail and return north of the Rapidan River in defeat, but Grant was made of sterner stuff: ‘The greatest enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we [Meade/Grant] passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to them that they had passed through the “beginning of the end” in the battle just fought’ (Grant, 1885: 461). While Grant’s army had suffered 17,000 casualties, his numbers were not significantly diminished in comparison to his opponent. Lee, as the aggressor, had lost 11,000 casualties of the 64,000 he had led into battle including corps commanders James Longstreet and A.P. Hill. The Confederate Army could not long sustain such heavy losses. Grant understood Lee’s difficulties and shaped his efforts to exert maximum pressure. From this first engagement, Grant would allow Lee’s men no rest. There would be significant combat action between the two armies every day until Lee surrendered at Appomattox. From the Wilderness, Grant pushed south toward Spotsylvania Courthouse. As the Confederate troopers arrived at Spotsylvania, they drove off Union cavalry and began to dig earthworks first with bayonets and later with shovels, picks, and axes. At Spotsylvania Confederate soldiers built their defensive positions in the dark and inadvertently created a salient, later nicknamed the Mule Shoe, in the center of the line. Hesitant to give up prepared positions, southern commanders understood the Mule Shoe as a potential weak point but decided to maintain this feature in the six-mile line. At this stage in the war, Lee needed trenches to serve as combat multipliers. From 8 to 20 May, the fighting raged around Spotsylvania and Union commanders became increasingly frustrated that they could not outflank or break through the entrenched Confederate positions. Union Colonel Emory Upton believed that most frontal assaults failed because there were not enough men to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy lines. To test his theory, he selected a location for his attack on the Mule Shoe where the two armies were located within 150 meters of each other. Next, he was given command of 12 regiments of infantry which he organized in three columns and four regiments deep. Upton’s idea was that these 12 regiments would move rapidly toward the enemy lines as one tightly packed column. Casualties were expected to be highest among the three leading regiments. When the attacking columns hit the enemy line, the lead regiment on the right would turn to the right and seal the breach in the enemy lines. Likewise, the lead regiment on the left would turn to the left and seal the breach on the other side. With the enemy line broken, the nine trailing regiments would burst through the breach created by the three leading regiments and exploit confusion behind the main lines. At 6:00pm on 10 May, Upton’s columns breached the Confederate line at Doles’ salient on the Mule Shoe, but none of the Union units

78  Analysis and Assessment ordered to support the attack came to their aid. Eventually, southern troops under John Gordon formed a counterattack that drove Upton and his men back to their own lines. Apparently, no Union commander thought this innovative approach could succeed. When Grant learned of Upton’s success and the failure of surrounding units to support him, the general-in-chief was livid. He immediately ordered George Meade to prepare a corps to attack in a column formation the following morning. It took several hours for Meade to persuade Grant that it would take more than ten hours to prepare for such an assault. Still angry, Grant ensured that at 4:30am on 12 May, Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps attacked the Mule Shoe. Hancock’s column tore a gaping hole in Lee’s lines and captured over 3,000 men and 20 artillery pieces in the opening minutes of the battle. While some Union troops moved boldly forward, many regiments did not know how to exploit their success. Division and brigade commanders were unable to control their units in the fluid situation. Even so, Lee was so alarmed that he personally led a counterattack and refused to retire from the field until his forces were driving the Union troops back. Hand-tohand combat continued at Bloody Angle throughout the entirety of 12 May and well into the morning of the 13th. The fighting finally ended just before dawn when new Confederate trenches that cut off the Mule Shoe salient had been completed. Emory Upton had clearly shown that tactical innovation

Map 6.2 Battle of Spotsylvania map.

The Last Full Measure  79 was possible in the Civil War, but command-and-control techniques then in use were unable to keep up with a rapidly developing situation. During the fighting at Spotsylvania, Lee received word that Lieutenant General J.E.B. Stuart had been killed in the Battle of Yellow Tavern, six miles north of Richmond. Stuart had been the best cavalry commander in the Confederate Army and a protégé of Lee. Although the Confederate cavalry defeated the Union raiders, Stuart’s death would long be felt by southern soldiers. Grant also received troubling news from the west while at Spotsylvania. Reports from Louisiana made it abundantly clear to Grant that his intentions had been foiled and no campaign toward Mobile was forthcoming. Banks had been badly beaten in the Red River Campaign and would not be embarking for Mobile. In the Shenandoah Valley, Franz Sigel’s blue columns met John C. Breckenridge and 5,500 southern troops at New Market on 15 May. At the height of the battle, Breckenridge committed his final reserve, the young cadets of the Virginia Military Institute. These 13–15-year-old soldiers rushed forward gallantly and helped put the blue ranks to flight. As the Union troops moved north out of the Valley, Grant fumed at the incompetence of Sigel and Banks and his own inability to force Lee out of his trenches and into open terrain. Struggling to match the intensity of Grant’s assaults, Lee could take little joy in these successes. He simply ordered Breckenridge to abandon his pursuit of Banks and to report for service with the Army of Northern Virginia as quickly as possible. Lee had to call upon every source to replace his losses. The Overland Campaign reached its climax at Cold Harbor on 3 June. Union delays had given Lee’s soldiers three days to prepare extensive earthworks prior to the Union assault. Lee’s men had built a defense in depth with three lines of trenches and interlocking fields of fire. Some Confederate positions at Cold Harbor included overhead cover and ‘bomb-proofs’ to withstand any artillery barrage. Knowing what lay before them, many Union soldiers wrote their names and hometowns on pieces of paper, placing one card on the front of their shirt and one card on the back. Most of these valiant Union men considered it highly unlikely that they would live through the coming battle. With these cards, they hoped that their families would know what became of them. Unfortunately, these soldiers were correct and approximately 7,000 men fell in the frontal assault on 3 June. In the weeks to come, Union commanders would coin the term Cold Harbor syndrome. Quite simply, from this point forward many Union units refused to conduct frontal assaults against prepared positions. In retrospect, Grant remained convinced that his campaign had a solid foundation. He had pushed Lee’s army to the breaking point, but Grant had not accomplished his primary objectives: ‘First, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field’ (Grant, 1885: 463). Troops under Beauregard had bottled up Butler at Bermuda Hundred and thus he

80  Analysis and Assessment had been unable to threaten Richmond, but Butler had not lost his army. Unfortunately for Grant, each time he moved south, Lee managed to beat him to the next road junction leading to the Confederate capital and his men immediately started building defensive positions. Lee arrived first at Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor thus preventing Grant from getting between the Confederate Army and Richmond. Banks, Sigel, and Butler had performed poorly, but it was Lee who had thwarted Grant and not Union political generals. Although consistently meeting Grant’s challenges, Lee could not retake the initiative. The relatively small size of his army and Grant’s relentless pressure forced Lee to fight from fixed positions. Unless the situation changed dramatically, Lee and the Confederacy had little hope for a military victory. The six weeks of fighting in the Overland Campaign had taken a heavy toll on both the Union and Confederate Armies. Grant had lost 55,000 men and Lee had lost 20,000 men. The sentiments of many Union men were echoed in the New York World on 12 July 1864: ‘Who shall revive the withered hopes that bloomed at the opening of Grant’s campaign?’ (Chernow, 2017: 430).

Atlanta and Visible Progress The American Civil War made Atlanta a major city. In 1836, the Georgia legislature appropriated money for the Western & Atlantic Railroad connecting Chattanooga, Tennessee with the port of Savannah, Georgia. The new city, originally named Terminus, was the location where rail lines met to connect Savannah, Augusta, Macon, Chattanooga, and Montgomery, Alabama. By 1860, approximately 9,500 people lived at this growing transportation center. Confederate authorities found Atlanta a useful location to gather agricultural and industrial products produced in the Deep South for shipment to the armies in Tennessee and Virginia. In addition to supply depots, southern leaders established munitions factories and iron foundries in Atlanta to take advantage of the industrial workforce that had grown up around the railroad yards. As William T. Sherman prepared to march his army into Georgia, Atlanta presented not only a valuable logistical target but also a point that Confederate General Joe Johnston had to defend. Sherman clearly understood Grant’s intent was for him to destroy the Confederate Army of Tennessee, but he also understood that the capture of Atlanta would demonstrate to the northern people that the Union Army was winning the war. Sherman’s army consisted of 110,000 combat-hardened veterans of Grant’s successful campaigns in the West. James McPherson, George Thomas, and John Schofield were talented commanders worthy of independent commands. In contrast, Johnston had less accomplished subordinates in corps commanders William J. Hardee, John Bell Hood, and Joseph Wheeler. Gifted division commander Patrick Cleburne had been passed over for corps command in the winter of 1863 because he had proposed arming slaves

The Last Full Measure  81 for service in the Confederate Army. President Davis recognized Cleburne’s skills but considered him a political liability. Johnston’s army initially consisted of only 47,616 men to repel the advance because Davis refused to believe that the Union could field two 100,000-plus-man armies at the same time (Crist, Williams, and Dillard, 1999: 144–7). Finally, as Sherman moved south in May, Jefferson Davis ordered Leonidas Polk to take his 12,000 men from northern Alabama and reinforce Johnston in Georgia. Sherman’s campaign followed the path of the Western & Atlantic Railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta. The first engagement of the campaign occurred at Rocky Face Ridge where Johnston’s troops had built entrenchments straddling the railroad. As the two armies skirmished along the railroad, McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee swung west and flanked the Confederate position. Sensing the threat, Johnston retreated and entrenched further south at Resaca. This pattern with fighting along the railroad followed by a flanking movement conducted by McPherson would be repeated at Adairsville, New Hope Church, Dallas, and Marietta. Each time Sherman sent McPherson on a flanking maneuver, his army was temporarily vulnerable to a Confederate counterattack. Twice, Hood was ordered to attack either Schofield or Thomas while the Union forces were separated and vulnerable. In each instance, Hood failed to move aggressively enough to destroy a significant piece of the Union force. Some historians have speculated that Hood moved slowly because he was taking laudanum to alleviate pain from his prior wounds. Johnston believed that Hood was angling for army command and did not want him to appear successful. Hood’s letters to the president, calling for a more aggressive posture for the army, support Johnston’s suspicions (Murray and Hsieh, 2016: 423–4, 431). Whatever the case, Sherman consistently forced Johnston’s army to retreat, as both armies became frustrated with the campaign. Sherman complained bitterly about his soldiers’ unwillingness to attack prepared positions: ‘A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to entrench. We are on the offensive, and... must assail and not defend’ (McPherson, 1988: 749). Sherman’s frustrations led to a frontal assault at Kennesaw Mountain on 27 June in which the Union suffered 3,000 casualties in a morning. Many have compared this attack to the disastrous Union assault at Cold Harbor. Southern soldiers were also becoming frustrated with their commanders as they repeatedly fell back rather than risking a major battle. As they retreated, thousands of women and children were being left to the mercy of the Union Army. Sherman’s quartermasters gathered tons of supplies from local farms and plantations to meet the army’s needs and to prevent the Confederate armies from using them in the future. Sherman’s columns also attracted a significant number of African American recruits to the Union cause. While Black men were enrolled in new USCT units, their families were allowed to follow behind the Union columns, but they were not always well cared for. By the middle of July, the Confederate Army of Tennessee had formed a defensive line along Peachtree Creek on the outskirts of Atlanta. Joe

82  Analysis and Assessment

Map 6.3 Atlanta campaign map.

The Last Full Measure  83 Johnston intended to make the Union Army’s effort to capture Atlanta as painful and time consuming as possible. Yes, Johnston had fallen back 100 miles during the 60-day campaign, but he had kept his army intact, avoided sustaining major casualties, and had prevented Sherman from winning a major victory that might have lifted Union morale. Unfortunately for the Confederate commander, his performance failed to meet the expectations of President Davis. Far from the scene of battle, Davis refused to accept that Sherman had significantly more combat power than the Confederate Army and did not understand why Johnston had been unable to defeat Sherman and march north into Tennessee. Hood’s letters describing Johnston’s dogged strategy as too cautious and too defensive matched the president’s preconceptions of his commander (Murray and Hsieh, 2016: 433–5). On 17 July, Davis relieved Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee and appointed John Bell Hood in his place. Three days later, Hood left the safety of Atlanta’s slave-constructed trenches and attacked the Union forces in the Battle of Peachtree Creek. The attacking force struck the Union force after they had crossed the creek but before they could build fighting positions. Despite good timing, Hood was unable to coordinate the attack effectively and the larger Union force pushed back the southern force with relative ease. Two days later in the Battle of Atlanta, Hood suffered a second defeat without seriously harming Sherman’s army. Offensive tactics can be costly as Hood had sustained over 7,500 casualties and no longer had the manpower to defend the city. After these bloody engagements, Sherman settled into a siege of Atlanta. On 31 August, Union forces cut Hood’s last rail connection to the South forcing Hood to abandon the city. On 2 September, the mayor of Atlanta surrendered the city to Sherman, giving Lincoln and the Union the major victory they needed.

Ten Months at Petersburg Ulysses S. Grant did not falter even in the aftermath of Cold Harbor. On 18 June, Grant resolutely pushed south of Richmond and laid siege to the rail and industrial center at Petersburg. This siege would last from 18 June 1864 to 2 April 1865 and would encompass a series of bloody engagements. The Confederate government had used impressed slave labor to construct fortifications during the Peninsula Campaign. In a pattern that would be repeated throughout the Petersburg campaign, each army created a series of forts connected by lines of trenches between the strong points. During the ten-month siege, most Confederate soldiers were required to stay in front line positions due to their low numbers. In contrast, Grant employed only one third of his force in the frontline trenches while another third were used to maneuver against the Confederate flanks. The final third of the Union troops were allowed to rest and train away from the fighting. This rotation system significantly improved morale in the Union Army. Even so, the veterans of Cold Harbor had little appetite for frontal assaults.

84  Analysis and Assessment In late June 1864, soldiers from the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment recognized the opportunity to dig under the Confederate unit across from them. The 48th Pennsylvania was commanded by mining engineer Henry Pleasants and made up of coal miners who were experts at digging long, complex mine shafts. Despite some initial resistance, IX Corps commander Ambrose Burnside approved a plan for the 48th Pennsylvania to dig beneath the southern position at Elliot’s Salient. While the miners dug the shaft, a division consisting of United States Colored Troops under General Edward Ferraro trained to exploit the breach in Confederate lines when the mine exploded. The assignment of Ferraro’s Division represented the first significant use of Black troops in Virginia. Twenty-four hours before the attack was scheduled to begin, Union commanders decided to replace Ferraro’s division with a white unit commanded by James Ledlie. On the morning of 30 July, the ground began to rumble and then to shake and finally the South Carolinians and their artillery pieces were lifted into the air by a violent explosion. Precious time was lost as the Union assault troops inspected the damage rather than rushing into Petersburg. Confederate artillery responded to the Union advance by repeatedly firing grape and canister rounds to limit the Union advance. General Ledlie was not there to lead his men. Rather, he was passed out drunk behind the Union lines convinced that the attack was a suicide mission. The replacement of Ferraro’s trained men and Ledlie’s disreputable conduct made the attack an impossible one.

Figure 6.1 Battle of the Crater drawing. Alfred R. Waud, artist. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–7056.

The Last Full Measure  85 Lee dispatched Brigadier General William Mahone to plug the large hole in the Confederate line. As Mahone advanced toward the crater, he encountered Ferraro’s men who had finally been allowed to join the attack. These Black soldiers had gone forward shouting ‘Remember Fort Pillow,’ the site of a Confederate massacre of Black troops in Tennessee. Expecting to receive no quarter, Ferraro’s men also offered no quarter. As more Confederate units recovered from their surprise, artillery began to rake the crater forcing many Union troops to jump down into the 30-foot-deep pit. Once in the pit, these Union soldiers were unable to see what was coming at them or to

Figure 6.2 USCT regimental flag. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–23096.

86  Analysis and Assessment fire effectively at the enemy. Almost 4,000 Union soldiers become casualties in this unfortunate affair, but the United States Colored Troops acquitted themselves well. From July forward, United States Colored Troops would form a key part of the Army of the Potomac. They would be present at the battles at Globe Tavern, the Weldon Railroad, and Five Forks, all key battles in Grant’s effort to extend and then break Confederate lines. Each time Grant extended his lines, Lee was forced to thin his ranks and to extend his lines also. The United States Colored Troops were a constant reminder that the Union was growing ever stronger even as the Confederate forces weakened. Even so, it was not simply their numbers but rather what the Black soldier stood for that undermined the Confederate effort. Black soldiers carrying rifles in their hands were antithetic to southern slave society. The moment the Black soldier buttoned his uniform coat with the eagle-embossed buttons and buckled the belt with the US logo on it, he was no longer property but rather a citizen. He was not just fighting for his freedom but for his country.

Lincoln’s Defining Moment As the fighting raged in Virginia and Georgia, Abraham Lincoln’s political future hung in the balance. He had been renominated in June by the Republican Party and would run with Tennessee former senator and wartime Governor Andrew Johnson on the Union ticket in November. Lincoln’s political fortunes dropped precipitously as the grim realities of the military campaigns became known that summer. As Lincoln told a confidant, ‘You think I don’t know that I am going to be beaten but I do and unless some great change takes place badly beaten’ (Donald, 1995: 529). Republican leaders begged Lincoln to drop his commitment to emancipation in order to win a second term, but the president would not be moved: There have been men who have proposed to me to return to slavery the black warriors of Port Hudson & Olustee. I should be damned in time & in eternity for so doing. The world shall know that I will keep my faith to friends & enemies, come what will. (McPherson, 1988: 769) Republican officials responded by calling for a second Republican convention to meet in Cincinnati in September to replace Lincoln as their presidential candidate. Lincoln was well aware of these machinations but chose not to publicly address them. Instead, he gathered his military commanders and ordered them to develop detailed plans for an intensive campaign designed to begin the day after he lost the election in November. Lincoln devoutly hoped that he could win the war and firmly establish Black freedom before a Democratic president could be inaugurated.

The Last Full Measure  87 The Democratic Party met in late August 1864 to select their presidential nominee. Anti-war Democrats, known as Copperheads, dominated the meetings which constructed the party platform. These leaders, unpatriotically, reveled in the 90,000 Union casualties that Grant and Sherman had suffered in 1864. While they claimed to be committed to preserving the Union, their overwhelming focus was on ending the war as quickly as possible. Copperhead sentiments were best exemplified in the Vallandigham Plank of the Democratic Platform: After four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war... [we] demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the states, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union. (Peters and Woolley, 1864) Many observers were flabbergasted by the bold, anti-war rhetoric. Unfortunately for the Peace Democrats, they did not have a strong presidential nominee. Ultimately, former general George McClellan won the nomination with the backing of Democrats who supported continuing the war. McClellan agreed to accept the nomination, but he wavered on accepting the platform. He pledged to continue the war until the Union had been restored but not until emancipation had been achieved. McClellan’s unwillingness to advocate for the immediate end to the war caused many Peace Democrats to withdraw their support. Further complicating the party’s position, Sherman drove the Confederate defenders out of Atlanta on 2 September. Lincoln’s assignment of political generals may have helped his political campaign, but it was Grant’s steadfast ally Sherman who made Lincoln’s reelection possible. This Union victory at Atlanta, along with Philip Sheridan’s successes in the Shenandoah Valley, served as tangible proof that the Union was winning the war. Morale immediately rose across the North leading the Republican Party to cancel the convention that had been called to replace Lincoln.

Fateful Decisions for Jefferson Davis In the fall of 1864, the bitter wind of military defeat whipped across the South and caused Confederate leaders to consider revolutionary ideas. In his annual address to the Confederate Congress on 7 November, Jefferson Davis strongly advocated increasing the number of slaves working with the Confederate Army. Black slaves had long served the Confederate forces as pioneers, teamsters, cooks, nurses, and laborers. Davis’ suggestion to increase the numbers would have drawn little notice except that the Confederate president argued that those slaves who served the army faithfully should be rewarded with freedom at the end of the war. Beyond this radical notion,

88  Analysis and Assessment Davis speculated that arming slave soldiers might eventually be necessary for Confederate survival: ‘Should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems no reason to doubt what should then be our decision’ (Davis, 1864: 797–9). With much of the state under Union occupation and Grant laying siege to Petersburg and Richmond, Virginia Governor William Smith declared that military necessity demanded that Virginia support the president’s slave soldier concept: ‘Standing before God and my country, I do not hesitate to say that I would arm such portion of our able-bodied slave population as may be necessary and put them in the field, so as to have them ready for the spring campaign’ (Dillard, 2017: 39). While many Virginians hesitated, newspaper editor Charles Button of Lynchburg boldly entered the fray in November: We should be madmen not to avail ourselves of every means in our power to wage war against the unnatural foe who first seduced and then armed our domestics against us.’ The following month Button argued that it was a simple question: ‘Would we have them to earn their freedom in periling their lives to secure our liberties,’ he asked, ‘or let them join the serried host of the enemy to assist in enslaving free white men.’ (Dillard, 2017: 42–3) While some found such arguments persuasive, other commentators clung to pre-war ideas. In the Rockingham Register, editor John Wartmann declared himself humiliated ‘for our race, … for our consistency, … for the bending of the knee of that proud, chivalrous southern sentiment which has so brightly displayed itself... on hundreds of bloody battle fields’ (Dillard, 2017: 39). Beyond his pride and resolute devotion to white supremacy, Wartmann firmly believed that slaves could not be trusted to fight for the Confederate cause. His slaves had left his home in Harrisonburg to follow the Union Army in the summer of 1864 and he could not envision Black troops faithfully serving the Confederacy: ‘It turns loose with arms in their hands a multitude of ignorant, unthinking creatures whose sympathies are open to the market of every itinerant Yankee’ (Dillard, 2017: 43). The debate over arming slaves continued in this rather theoretical vein until news arrived in Virginia during Christmas week that Sherman’s army had completed its march to the sea and had arrived in triumph in Savannah. As the spring campaign drew nearer, more and more Virginians realized that something must be done to address the Confederate manpower crisis. There were no more white men available to draft and no foreign power expressed any interest in coming to the South’s aid. Although the president and governor had declared their commitment to independence even at the price of slavery, many Virginians were very hesitant to destroy the social and economic order by arming and freeing the male slave population. In February, Robert E. Lee entered the slave soldier debate, ‘I am favorable to the use of our servants in the army... I would hold out to them the certainty of freedom and a

The Last Full Measure  89 home, when they shall have rendered efficient service’ (Dillard, 2017: 105–6). While some Richmond newspapers suggested that this proved that Lee was not a southern gentleman, most Virginians saw this as license to embrace a new southern nation created by the war. Citizens across the Commonwealth gathered to express their views in a series of county meetings. In Roanoke, Virginians met and asserted that independence from the United States was more important than the preservation of slavery: ‘Holding our independence to be paramount... we compromise all differences of opinion and urge... the immediate adoption of some plan to put as many slaves in the army as the Commander-in-Chief may deem necessary’ (Dillard, 2017: 197). The meeting in Augusta County reached a similar conclusion and was representative of many meetings in the Valley: That whilst some of our fellow citizens opposed the arming of our negroes, we are content with the knowledge that we have the sanction of God for using all the means in our power... and if this means of resistance be deemed necessary and available by such men as President Davis and by Gen. Robt. E. Lee, we shall not stop to discuss abstract questions, but will cheerfully give our servants, as we have our sons to our country. (Dillard, 2017: 198) While some might suggest that Augusta County contained few slaves thus making the above statement an empty promise, at the meeting over 7,000 pounds of meat, 135 barrels of flour, and $115,000 in Confederate securities were collected for the war effort (Blair, 1998). Confederate money was not worth much at that point in the war, but the donations of meat and flour in the wake of Sheridan’s burning of the Shenandoah Valley suggest these Virginians were still firmly committed to attaining independence. The Confederate debate over employing Black soldiers came far too late to make a difference on the battlefield. Several regiments of Black troops were recruited into Confederate service in March 1865. Most of these new recruits were found among the male nurses in the Richmond hospitals. The legislation that passed the Confederate Congress failed to free either the potential Black soldiers or their families. Clearly, no one would have volunteered for Confederate service under such terms. Stuck in an unwinnable position, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee devised enlistment regulations requiring the slave’s master to free him before he was allowed to enlist in the Confederate Army. The Confederate debate over arming slaves provides no evidence that Black Virginians supported the Confederate cause; rather, it effectively demonstrates the degree to which white Virginians were transformed by the war. No white Virginian could have envisioned voluntarily ending slavery in the name of Confederate independence in 1861. Yet, in 1865 many, if not most, white Virginians were ready to sacrifice slavery to gain their independence.

90  Analysis and Assessment

The Final Trumpet Sounds The end came quickly for the Army of Northern Virginia. On 25 March, Lee sent forward 10,000 men under John B. Gordon in a daring assault at Fort Stedman. A year before, Gordon had commanded a brigade of approximately 1,500 men. In 1865, Gordon commanded Lee’s Second Corps. The loss of both high-ranking and mid-level officers had significantly weakened the Confederate Army. Every corps and most division commanders had been wounded or killed in the last year of constant fighting. Gordon’s troops managed to seize Fort Stedman, but they were unable to break through the complex defensive lines held by Grant’s men. Bloodied and with no hope for relief, it was only a matter of days before the Confederate troops would have to either surrender or retreat from Petersburg. One week after the attack on Fort Stedman, on 2 April, Lee lost control of the Southside rail line, his last connection to the Deep South. The government and the army were cut off from all possible reinforcement and resupply. The Confederate Army desperately clung to their positions throughout that Sunday afternoon while Jefferson Davis and cabinet officials evacuated the government buildings hoping to establish a new capital somewhere further south. Government officials blew up or torched major industrial facilities and inadvertently set fire to much of the city of Richmond. Early on 3 April, Black Union cavalrymen rode into the city and seized the Confederate white house and capitol building. The following day, Abraham Lincoln accompanied by his son Tad visited the city, walked the streets, and greeted newly freed Black Virginians. In an ironic twist, Lincoln went to the Confederate white house and sat in Davis’ chair. It had taken Lincoln a very long time to achieve his goal of preserving the Union and reestablishing the U.S. government in the South, but the success must have been very sweet. The following Sunday, 9 April 1865, Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. In his final order to his army, Lee directed his men to return to their homes and farms knowing that they had done all they could for their country. In so doing, Lee directly rejected Jefferson Davis’ call for southern soldiers to commence guerrilla operations against the Union troops. Lee returned to Richmond and on his first day at home went to the Provost Marshall Office and signed the amnesty oath. Even in defeat, Lee served as an example for southerners just as he had on the battlefield. In 1861, southern leaders declared the birth of the southern nation: the Confederate States of America. Rich southern planters assumed that they spoke for all southern citizens in this effort. In reality, the ‘Revolution of 1861’ reopened a number of unfinished pre-war debates. White supremacy and slavery had worked to unite rich whites and poor whites for generations, but the sacrifices required by the war seriously strained this relationship. From the beginning, southern civilians fought against the government’s efforts to limit their individual and property rights. Despite accusations that

The Last Full Measure  91 he was repudiating the founding principles of the southern nation, Jefferson Davis attempted to build consensus to support the war effort with all available resources. In his view, conscription, taxation, and impressment were absolutely essential to maintain the war effort, but they led many southerners to ask what exactly the nation hoped to achieve. In particular, planter interests and yeoman interests diverged over conscription, the Twenty-Slave Law, and the debate over arming slaves. Such powerful federal steps led large planters and political fire-eaters to reject the Confederate government even as it strove to achieve the independence such radicals had craved. As the Confederate government grew in power the counter-revolution of 1861 became a true revolution. The American Civil War had changed the South forever.

7

Building a New World

Most of the social and political mileposts that had outlined race and class in American society for two centuries had vanished with the end of the war. What was the status of the newly freed slave? Would Black men and women enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by White citizens of the United States? How could they make freedom real? As for white southerners, what should be done with men who had recently fought against their country? Could their land be redistributed to those citizens who had remained loyal, even African Americans, without violating the Constitution? Should women remain in the new roles they had taken up during the war? Black men and women sought true freedom that they defined as the ability to own their own land, to take care of their families, to educate their children, and to help elect their leaders. Although these requests seem totally reasonable in hindsight, most white southerners felt strongly that providing these rights to the freedmen would destroy their rights. The problems facing the United States would have challenged even the most gifted of statesmen. To the dismay of almost all Americans, Abraham Lincoln had died on the morning of 15 April 1865 and was thus unable to help his reunited but beleaguered country.

Presidential vs. Congressional Reconstruction Abraham Lincoln had attempted to restore Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas to their former status as loyal Union states during the Civil War. From the very beginning of the struggle, Lincoln argued that secession was illegal; therefore, restoration, rather than reconstruction and readmission, was the necessary step for states to reenter the national family. The pardon power of the executive, he believed, was the key constitutional vehicle to restore southern states to their place in the Union rather than the congressional power to admit new states. Under the Ten Percent Plan he proposed in December 1863, Lincoln required returning southern states to accept emancipation, to provide for Black education, and to adopt a new constitution that was republican in form. To individual white southerners, Lincoln offered a pardon to all, except Confederate political and military leaders, when they took a loyalty oath to the Union and swore they would accept emancipation. Confederate DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-8

Building a New World  93 congressmen and government officials, as well as military leaders at the rank of colonel and above, would be required to request a personal pardon from the president. For this process to begin, the state requesting restoration must have had the number of citizens taking the loyalty oath to the Union equal ten per cent of the votes cast in the elections of 1860. Under Lincoln’s wartime outline, the U.S. government stood firm on the requirement that each state must accept emancipation, but it stopped short of demanding full social and political equality for African Americans (Goodwin, 2005: 588–90). Radical Republicans also believed secession was illegal, but they wanted Congress, not the president, to control the restoration process. Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Henry W. Davis of Maryland proposed legislation that required former states in the Confederacy to apply to Congress for admission to the Union, as if they had never been a state. Applicant states also had to amend their state constitutions to ban slavery even though the institution remained legal in the United States. Further, applicant states must demonstrate that 50 percent of the states’ male population had taken an Ironclad Oath saying they had never willingly aided or supported the enemies of the United States. Despite these very tough requirements, both houses of Congress passed this legislation and sent it to the president for signature on 2 July 1864. Charles Sumner spoke for many in Congress when he denounced any form of leniency and declared that it was the duty of Congress to ensure that no rebel State is prematurely restored to its constitutional functions, until … proper safeguards are established, so that loyal citizens, including the new-made freedmen, cannot at any time be molested by evildisposed persons and especially that no man there may be made a slave. (Sumner, 1864) Lincoln understood the sentiments expressed, but he wanted to convince southern states to come back to their former allegiance willingly. He thought the requirements in the Wade–Davis bill would deter rather than encourage southerners to rejoin the Union. This contentious debate foreshadowed the difficulties to come between Andrew Johnson and Radical Republicans in the post-war period. As Lee’s veterans trudged home from Appomattox and Union veterans prepared for the Grand Review in Washington, Andrew Johnson was sworn in as president of the United States. Having only served one month as vice president, Johnson did not merit the respect that victory would have afforded to Lincoln. A former senator and governor from Tennessee, Johnson had an abrasive and inflexible personality rooted in his fear that others looked down upon him due to his lowly origins and poor education. Whereas Lincoln had an expansive idea of the powers of the Federal government, Johnson believed in strict construction of the Constitution and a limited role for the executive. Further, the new president was horrified at the prospect of social and economic upheaval resulting from the end of slavery. Johnson

94  Analysis and Assessment had been a firm Union man throughout the war, but he was no proponent of racial equality. Unprepared for the challenges of Reconstruction, Johnson implemented Lincoln’s lenient Ten Percent Plan across the breadth of the South. Johnson’s only significant modification to Lincoln’s program was the requirement for wealthy planters, those with $20,000 of property recorded in the 1860 census, to apply to the president for an individual pardon. Although this modified version of the Ten Percent Plan seemed a logical choice in Washington, it gained little popular support from Radical Republicans or those who had supported the Confederacy. Crucially, Johnson suggested, but did not stipulate, that each state must repeal the ordinance of secession, repudiate the Confederate debt, and approve the 13th Amendment. Despite the utter destruction of the Confederate Army, white southerners were simply unwilling to concede the sinfulness of slavery and secession. Northern leaders may have seen Confederate debts as immoral obligations, but white southerners believed they had pledged their sacred honor to repay their debts, even those debts incurred in support of the rebellion. In the fall of 1865, white southerners burnished their reputation as unrepentant losers in a number of ways. First, southern voters elected congressional delegations dominated by former Confederate military officers and government officials. No southern state offered political rights to Black men. Second, while strongly encouraged to approve, Mississippi and Texas absolutely refused to ratify the 13th Amendment which ended slavery. Georgia was not much better as it ratified the 13th Amendment with the proviso that slave owners must be compensated for the value of their slave property. Third, no former Confederate state offered a meaningful plan for Black education. Finally, each southern state transformed the pre-war slave code to new Black Codes. Among other things, these new legal codes gave sanction to slave marriages and allowed ‘People of Color’ to sue and be sued in court. On the other hand, it prevented Black men and women from serving on juries or testifying against white people, made breaking a labor contract a felony, and created vagrancy laws that essentially forced Black men and women to work on terms set by white landowners. Criminal punishment often included sale of the felon through the barbaric Convict Lease system. These new Black Codes were specifically designed to limit the economic potential of Freedmen and to buttress the old racial hierarchy. Such outrageous southern defiance produced tremendous anger in the North. Union veterans and politicians demanded the immediate repeal of these racist laws. They argued that the death of Abraham Lincoln and hundreds of thousands of Union soldiers demanded significant change. Specifically, Radical Republicans led by Thaddeus Stevens called for meaningful rights for African Americans, disenfranchisement of white southerners who had aided the Confederacy, and legislation to ensure that the planter class could not rise to power again. The 39th Congress consisted of a far stronger Republican majority and mirrored northern outrage by refusing to seat congressional delegations from former Confederate states. Further, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which defined citizenship at the national

Building a New World  95 level for the first time. Through this measure they attempted to ensure equality before the law for all American citizens. To make these changes permanent, Congress designed the 14th amendment to protect African American rights. It declared all persons born or naturalized in the U.S. as citizens of the United States and of the state where they reside. Further, it guaranteed ‘equal protection of the laws’ and affirmed that citizens could not be deprived of ‘life, liberty or property, without due process of law’. In addition, the 14th Amendment included provisions to ensure Confederate debts could not be paid, to require congressional pardons for major Confederate figures, and to allow for reduced representation in Congress and the electoral college for states that limited Black male voting. The 14th amendment was not fully enforced for almost a century after its ratification, but it remains the legal foundation for civil rights in the United States. President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act and denounced the proposed amendment, but his veto was easily overridden. Moderate Republicans turned their back on Johnson after his opposition to all measures meant to ensure Black equality. Clearly, Congress had taken direct control of Reconstruction.

Financial Troubles New southern state governments found themselves penniless in the summer of 1865. All southern assets had been denominated in Confederate currency that was now worthless. Banks, as well as individuals, found that they suddenly had no savings and no investments. Financial institutions had invested heavily in Confederate and state bonds in support of the war effort. Merchants in the South and abroad could not be paid for items purchased by the states; farmers could not collect payment for crops taken in support of the war; and not even Confederate veterans could hope to collect pensions for wartime service. Much to the South’s chagrin, the Federal government expressly prohibited the payment of any of these debts under the 14th Amendment. These circumstances forced the new state governments to take the highly unpopular step of raising taxes at a time when most southerners lacked the resources to pay them. In the immediate aftermath of Confederate defeat, many urban residents had no food to eat, with the problem particularly acute in Richmond. First the U.S. Army, and later the Freedmen’s Bureau, set up commissaries to distribute food to the needy. Most northern leaders expected the recipients to be former slaves rather than white southerners. James Taylor’s image that appeared in 1866 in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper reflected this expectation (see Figure 7.1). To their dismay, many white families often needed the food assistance as well. With no financial resources beyond land, white southerners struggled to make ends meet. Too ashamed to come themselves, white men sent their wives to collect rations from the Union authorities. Some of these white recipients accepted the food gratefully while others showed ill grace. The image from Harper’s Weekly depicted food distribution in Richmond. The caption read, ‘Don’t you think that Yankee must feel

96  Analysis and Assessment

Figure 7.1 Freedmen’s Bureau issuing rations. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–37861

Figure 7.2 Richmond ladies receive rations. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–116427.

Building a New World  97 like shrinking into his boots before such high-toned Southern ladies as we!’ (see Figure 7.2). Food distribution across the South would continue well into 1867. Financial difficulties would continue to trouble many of its citizens for decades.

Changes in the Workplace The South’s industrial and transportation infrastructure had grown tremendously during the Civil War. While many of these facilities focused on the production of armaments, Confederate authorities had also supported the development of new industries to include the creation of chemical, textile, and food-processing facilities. Further, Confederate leaders had directed manpower and public funding for the creation of many new medical and logistical facilities to support the war effort. These new structures allowed the state to sustain the presence of large armies across the four-year struggle. While some of this industrial structure survived the war, many key pieces did not. Much of the South’s new industrial base had been set ablaze by fleeing Confederates in Richmond or by Union forces as in Atlanta and Columbia. Famously, Joseph Anderson armed his Black workers to prevent the destruction of the Tredegar Iron Works as the Confederate government fled Richmond, but most industrial facilities were destroyed. The development of a cadre of experienced industrial workers was the most tangible result of the Confederacy’s industrial efforts. Military operations and their logistical needs had dramatically increased the traffic on the nation’s transportation networks. Roads and canals suffered most from a lack of maintenance. Confederate authorities used these systems heavily but did little to make repairs. In the post-war period, all states needed to commit significant resources to return these routes to full efficiency, but the problem was most dire in the South. During the war, Confederate leaders had come to rely heavily on the rail network to move men and materials. Iron rails had a normal life span of ten years under normal traffic, but the railroads carried four times as much freight traffic during the war as they had earlier. Philip Sheridan and William T. Sherman and their armies did destroy a number of southern rail lines, but overuse and a shortage of replacement parts destroyed far more miles of track. To energize their economies, southern states needed to rebuild the transportation network. Hard-pressed wartime leaders had embraced direct government participation in the economy, but many southerners questioned if states could and should support private enterprises like railroad, turnpike, and canal firms. As importantly, all questioned how their states could fund such expansive projects. Finally, women had played a key part in the northern and southern war efforts. With large numbers of men away with the army, women had stepped forward and taken new roles as farmers, nurses, teachers, and government workers. Returning veterans quickly resumed their assigned roles as the heads of the household, as the primary farmers, and as the industrial

98  Analysis and Assessment workforce. Many women ceded these positions willingly, but others claimed the right to remain nurses, teachers, and government employees. They knew that they had performed well during the war and believed they had earned the right to earn a living outside the home. From the 1860s, nursing became an almost totally female profession with a number of programs designed to train young women as nurses. Similarly, elementary education came to be considered not only an appropriate avocation but also an essential duty for American women. Some men may have decried these steps, but many others understood that women had proven their worth and were needed to participate in both the public and private spheres.

Public Education As Union-appointed southern governors made plans to apply for readmission to the Union, no state made provision for Black education; thus, infuriating many northern advocates for former enslaved men and women. Although not a priority for President Johnson, this educational endeavor had been strongly encouraged by Abraham Lincoln during the war. Further, Federal District Court Judge John C. Underwood of Virginia argued passionately before Congress for Black men and all women to receive the vote. Further, he argued that freed people all deserved an education. Doubtless thinking of former rebels as well as former slaves, Underwood decreed that suffrage required educated and well-informed voters. He endorsed these calls before Congress in 1866 where he described a recalcitrant white majority in the South still clinging to pre-war ideas about race and strong rebel sentiments. The Republican majority in Congress quickly ensured that Black education became a cornerstone requirement for readmission to the Union. Importantly, white southerners balked at creating universal education for Black residents without providing a similar benefit to White residents; therefore, universal public education began in the South in the late 1860s. Despite the founding fathers’ love of education, southern states had never funded public education. Consequently, the states started from scratch to acquire school buildings, class materials, and a competent cohort of teachers. While states eventually found some monies for purchasing land, local residents were often expected to provide the labor to erect the buildings. Many of these new public schools opened as one-room structures with all ages and skill levels working side by side. Based on a positive experience during the war, most of the people applying to be teachers were women. Students learned to read using the Bible and McGuffey’s Reader as their main texts. Mandatory attendance laws were not immediately instituted so the number of students in class varied with the seasons and the quality of the instruction. Too often, male school superintendents judged female teacher performance by their ability to keep the daily attendance figures high. Adding significantly to the difficulty and expense of creating new schools, all former

Building a New World  99 Confederate states elected to create two systems, one for Black children and one for White children During 1861–2, abolitionist groups sponsored over 60 teachers to come to Union occupied sections of Virginia to open schools for former slaves. These white abolitionists and missionaries were surprised to find Black educators like Mary Chase and Sarah Gray in Alexandria and Mary Peake in Hampton already conducting intense literacy programs. Black students appreciated the opportunity to attain an education since all southern states had made teaching an African American to read and write a serious criminal offense after 1831. The most impactful abolitionists who came to Beaufort, South Carolina were female teachers who took their students’ education and lives seriously. Over 1,000 white teachers came to the South to instruct Black students and help erase the harmful impact of slavery. During the war, Confederate newspapers ridiculed the idea of Black education and unfairly accused female missionaries and teachers of being women of low morals and evil intent. The Freedmen’s Bureau initially funded many new schools in the post-war South. Southern white leaders suspected female teachers of being political emissaries of northern values. In particular, they accused teachers of ‘forcing’ Black students to sing northern war songs and learn about the social equality of the Black and White races (Bartels, 2005: 9). Northern instructors were guilty of teaching newly freed African Americans to read and write, to appreciate the nation’s democratic values, and to value themselves and their communities. These key tenets of American education undermined the fiction of white supremacy that white southerners were trying so desperately to maintain. Teachers would conduct classes for young students in the morning and a second session for teenagers and adults after the workday was finished. Black students were eager to learn, but many expressed the desire for particular types of instruction. Former slaves correctly suspected that they were being cheated out of their earnings through unfair labor contracts or dubious calculations by landowners and merchants. While all students received general instruction on reading and writing, adults sought classes on general mathematics, particularly how to calculate interest, and legal terminology. With fewer than 10 percent of Black men and women able to read in 1860, the task was a monumental one. Most teachers contributed two to three years to the effort, but others like Ellen Murray and Laura Towne at Port Royal, South Carolina dedicated their lives to this mission. Black female instructors slowly took the places of white teachers as northern government and charitable organizations began to leave the South in the early 1870s. Through diligent work by the teachers and a firm conviction in the minds of the students that education was the key to long-term success, tremendous results were achieved. In 1900, approximately 65 percent of Black southerners could read and write. This was one of the most important achievements of Reconstruction.

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Making Freedom Real Black southerners set clear priorities in the immediate aftermath of the war. Long deprived of control of their families, freed men and women not only sought to reconnect with lost family members but also paid significant fees to have their marriages officially recorded. They wanted to ensure that no one could ever legally separate their families. As they looked for work, many freed people refused to take positions where they would be expected to live away from their families. A secure family unit was seen by many former enslaved men and women as one of the greatest benefits of freedom. Second, freed men and women strongly desired their own land. They devoutly believed that they could secure their families and their independence by attaining and diligently working their own land. Black southerners believed they had a claim to the land that they and their ancestors had worked for centuries. In particular, they thought that white men who had fought against the United States had surrendered their rights to citizenship and landownership. Freedmen on Edisto Island made this point eloquently in a letter to President Andrew Johnson: ‘Shall not we who Are freedmen and have always been true to this Union have the same rights as are enjoyed by … those who were Found in rebellion against this good and just Government?’ (Smith, 2013). Many northerners agreed. Unfortunately, Lincoln had interpreted the Constitution to mean that such a forfeiture was unconstitutional. In Article 3, Section 3, the founders stated: ‘The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attained’ (Madison, 1787). Lincoln thought this provision and its English antecedents would prevent permanent confiscation of real estate. The founders had feared that a tyrannical government, like the British crown earlier, might punish children for the sins of the parents. Under this interpretation, landowners, whether traitors or not, could not be forced to surrender their land permanently. Based on this interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, no matter how much blood, sweat, and tears may have fallen on the soil, Freedmen could not win the land they had worked as slaves. Much to the chagrin of white southerners, slave property did not fall under the same provision. With ratification of the 13th Amendment, the Constitution had declared that slavery was unconstitutional; therefore, former slaves were no longer considered legitimate property and thus Article 3 did not allow children to reclaim their parents’ slave property. In short, the Federal government guaranteed freedom to former slaves but was constitutionally unable to redistribute plantation lands to former slaves. White landowners had land, but they had no one to work the fields. Black farmers had their labor, but often they had no land on which to work. Sharecropping was an agreement in which farmers would be allotted a piece of land to plant crops and in return the landowner would receive a percentage of the harvest. If the sharecropper had some equipment or animals, the landowner’s percentage of the harvest would be reduced to as low as 20 percent. If

Building a New World  101 the sharecropper brought nothing but their labor to the deal, the landowner often claimed up to 50 percent of the harvest. Freedmen often preferred this arrangement to working for wages because it offered increased autonomy. Sharecroppers were usually instructed by the landowner which cash crops to plant on a portion of the land, but the sharecropper could choose how and when and what other crops to plant on the remainder of the acreage. While both Black and White farmers became sharecroppers in the South after the war, the system became the most common situation for rural Black farmers. The autonomy offered to sharecroppers was an improvement over slavery, but it was far less than Black farmers wanted. No one thought sharecropping was an ideal solution, but many southerners ultimately discovered that they had no better choice. Reconstruction was a time of great promise and great peril for many southern men and women. Fear, famine, and a vague sense of hope dominated the minds of many. Former slaves rejoiced in their new freedom and sought to cast off the chains of slavery and to establish their independence. White southerners feared that their military defeat would lead to economic ruin and social degradation at the hands of the northern victors. With neither Black nor White southerners prepared to take the lead, the United States laid the foundation for a new South with passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution. In the decades that followed, former slaves and former slave owners developed new expectations for each other even as the South’s society and economy transformed before them.

The Lost Cause Myth Originating in the late nineteenth century, southern white men and women participated in a self-conscious process to rewrite the past in such a way that treason could be seen as patriotism and a war to defend slavery look like a noble effort to defend homes and families. Political leaders, veterans’ groups, and white southern women played major roles in the creation of the Lost Cause mythology. The creation of Confederate monuments, the denial of the centrality of slavery in the conflict, and other efforts to redeem and memorialize the ‘southern cause’ have left a long shadow. These attempts to shape public memory of the Old South, the Civil War, and the Reconstruction Era continue to resonate today in discussions of race and memory in the United States. White southerners stoutly refused to accept that their fathers, sons, and brothers had fought and some died in a war to maintain slavery and ensure white supremacy. In The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government published in 1881, Jefferson Davis argues for the legality of secession and compares the actions of the secessionists of 1861 with the founding fathers of 1776 as both having fought for independence and home rule. When he discusses slavery, he asserts that Black men and women had been civilized and Christianized by their experience as slaves. Very few slaves, he claims,

102  Analysis and Assessment were unhappy or poorly treated. Vice President Alexander Stephens also attempted to revise the historical record with his A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States; Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results published in 1870. In contrast to his ‘Cornerstone Speech’ of 1861, Stephens stressed the constitutional justifications for secession and rejected the suggestion that slavery was central to the southern cause (Coates, 2018: 74). While each was trying to justify their own actions, Davis and Stephens blazed a trail that others would follow. On the military side, Lieutenant General Jubal Early chose to defend the reputation of southern leaders. Early’s direction of the Southern Historical Society allowed him to shape how many saw the military struggle. As he presented the war, the South had not been defeated by braver armies or by more skillful generals but by the industrial might of the United States and by generals who did not care about their soldiers’ lives. Grant appears as a drunkard and a butcher in Early’s accounts, while Lee is portrayed as a Christian gentleman and a military genius in the Southern Historical Society Papers. The resulting myth of virtuous leaders and courageous individual soldiers overwhelmed by more numerous and better equipped units was reflected in popular histories and movie adaptations throughout the twentieth century. These southern-focused accounts may have helped some white southerners more willingly accept personal losses and national defeat, but they deprived the Union and its soldiers of the honor of their hard-fought victory. The second half of the nineteenth century is often described as the Gilded Age when the rich got richer and governments were corrupt. Advocates of the Lost Cause myth often point to government corruption during Reconstruction as the foundation for state debts, high taxes, and economic difficulties. In the late 1860s, Republicans took control of all southern state legislatures and governorships except for Virginia. While contemporaries described these men as Black Republicans, the coalition consisted of Black men, white southerners who joined the Republican Party (Scalawags), and northern men who moved south after the war (Carpetbaggers). This alliance was ridiculed as a gang of ‘thieves, liars, rascals, and cowards,’ but in reality they drew up new state constitutions, expanded women’s rights, rebuilt infrastructure destroyed during the war, and established public school systems. These initiatives had significant costs but that did not mean it was due to corruption. White Democratic politicians created false narratives of graft to justify replacing members of the Republican coalition with white Democrats. This Lost Cause understanding of Reconstruction governments lived well into the twentieth century with popular depictions in The Birth of a Nation and Gone with the Wind. As Union Army units ended occupation of former Confederate states in the 1870s, conservative pro-business Democrats, known as the Redeemers, took control of all southern state governments. Without Federal forces overseeing elections, white landowners intimidated Black farmers and sharecroppers into voting for the preferred white candidate. Northern white citizens had grown weary of fighting for

Building a New World  103

Figure 7.3 Reconstruction legislators. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–102256.

racial equality not only on the battlefields but also in the halls of Congress. Many white Americans found they had more in common with each other than they did with their Black peers. Across time, politicians in both regions decided that national reconciliation was more important than ensuring the rights of all American citizens. As the secret ballot became standard between 1890 and 1900, southern states adopted poll taxes, literacy tests, and property requirements for voting. While white politicians spoke of using these tools to cut out corruption, W.E.B. DuBois argued that white South Carolinians were really worried about the election of honest officials who would listen to the people: ‘If there

104  Analysis and Assessment was one thing that South Carolina feared more than bad Negro government, it was good Negro government’ (Coates, 2018: xiv). New constitutions in Virginia, Alabama, and other southern states produced the impact white politicians desired as the number of Black voters fell from approximately 50 percent to under five per cent of voters in each southern state. Building on successful voter suppression tactics and the Supreme Court ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson of 1896, white southern leaders established segregated societies based on the principle of ‘separate but equal.’ White men and women celebrated their victory in this racial contest by erecting a series of monuments to the heroes of the Lost Cause. Statues of Stonewall Jackson, Jefferson Davis, and Robert E. Lee appeared in prominent public places not only in New Orleans, Louisiana but also in Charleston, West Virginia. The United Daughters of the Confederacy oversaw the design and erection of most of these monuments. The UDC also wrote many textbooks and designed southern catechisms that instilled Lost Cause narratives in southern, white children. Jubal Early, the author of many Lost Cause myths, was selected by the United Confederate Veterans organization to oversee the creation of the Lee Memorial on Monument Avenue in Richmond. Within 20 years, additional monuments dedicated to Confederate heroes J.E.B. Stuart, Stonewall Jackson, and Jefferson Davis would join Lee on the posh tree-lined grand avenue of Richmond. While white Virginians described these monuments as reflections of the South’s glorious history, Black southerners received a very different message. Monuments to Confederate heroes told these southerners that their ancestors and their history did not matter. The Plessy decision and subsequent Jim Crow statutes undermined most of the gains made by African Americans during the Reconstruction era. It would be 58 years before the court reversed the unjust ruling with the Brown v. Board decision of 1954. President Lyndon Johnson negotiated, cajoled, and threatened southern congressmen into supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These key pieces of legislation passed constitutional muster because of the ‘equal protection’ and ‘due process’ clauses in the 14th amendment. Finally, after a century of unfulfilled promises, African Americans were able to enjoy the full fruits of victory in the American Civil War. Unfortunately, neither the constitutional revolution of the Reconstruction era nor the legislative victories of the Civil Rights era produced true racial equality in the United States. Despite all the blood, sweat, and tears, the Lost Cause myth and systemic racism continued into the twenty-first century. At the end of his presidency, Grant foresaw that the issues stemming from the Civil War would continue to plague our nation: If we are to have another contest in the near future of our national existence, I predict that the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon’s, but between patriotism and intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other. (Grant, 1897: 138–9)

Building a New World  105 While fighting on the battlefields ended over 150 years ago, the fight for racial equality continues in Congress, in state houses across the country, and in individual communities and neighborhoods. As the confrontation between Lost Cause ideology and proponents of Black Lives Matter continues, author Ta-Nehisi Coates has challenged African Americans to become more active participants in telling the Civil War story as their story: For black people, there is this—the burden of taking ownership of the Civil War as Our War … Confronted with the realization that the Civil War is the genesis of modern America, in general, and in modern Black America, in particular … we have to become custodians ourselves … We have stories too, ones that do not hinge on erasing other people, or coloring over disrepute. (Coates, 2018: 82) For the United States to move forward as a truly united nation, Black and White Americans must accept a more complex narrative of the Civil War and its meaning for modern America. That the slogan ‘Black Lives Matter’ remains a contentious social and political flashpoint this far removed from the Civil War speaks volumes about the enduring strength of white supremacy and the Lost Cause mythology. While Americans will continue to debate racial questions that sparked the Civil War and have haunted our public discourse since, we must be willing to actively participate in hard discussions about race and prejudice without the assumption that all people will ultimately agree on all issues. As Barack Obama has argued, progress, even incremental progress, is a worthy goal: ‘Better is good. I’ll take better every time, because better is hard. Better may not be as good as the best, but better is surprisingly hard to obtain. And better is actually harder than worse’ (Coates, 2016).

Part II

Documents

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Frederick Douglass’ “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” Mississippi Declaration on Immediate Causes for Secession George McClellan’s Harrison’s Landing Letter The Emancipation Proclamation Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Committee of Freedmen on Edisto Island, South Carolina, to the President

Documents  109

Document 1 Frederick Douglass—‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?’ An excerpt from a speech delivered by Frederick Douglass on 5 July 1852 to the Rochester [New York] Ladies Anti-Slavery Society Fellow citizens, pardon me, and allow me to ask, why am I called upon to speak here today? What have I or those I represent to do with your national independence? Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us? And am I, therefore, called upon to bring our humble offering to the national altar, and to confess the benefits, and express devout gratitude for the blessings resulting from your independence to us? Would to God, both for your sakes and ours, that an affirmative answer could be truthfully returned to these questions. Then would my task be light, and my burden easy and delightful. For who is there so cold that a nation's sympathy could not warm him? Who so obdurate and dead to the claims of gratitude, that would not thankfully acknowledge such priceless benefits? Who so stolid and selfish that would not give his voice to swell the hallelujahs of a nation's jubilee, when the chains of servitude had been torn from his limbs? I am not that man. In a case like that, the dumb might eloquently speak, and the “lame man leap as an hart.” But such is not the state of the case. I say it with a sad sense of disparity between us. I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you this day rejoice are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity, and independence bequeathed by your fathers is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought life and healing to you has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony. Do you mean, citizens, to mock me, by asking me to speak today? If so, there is a parallel to your conduct. And let me warn you, that it is dangerous to copy the example of a nation (Babylon) whose crimes, towering up to heaven, were thrown down by the breath of the Almighty, burying that nation in irrecoverable ruin. Fellow citizens, above your national, tumultuous joy, I hear the mournful wail of millions, whose chains, heavy and grievous yesterday, are today rendered more intolerable by the jubilant shouts that reach them. If I do forget, if I do not remember those bleeding children of sorrow this day, “may my right hand forget her cunning, and may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!” To forget them, to pass lightly over their wrongs and to chime in with the popular theme would be treason most scandalous and shocking, and would make me a reproach before God and the world. My subject, then,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003041665-10

110 Documents fellow citizens, is AMERICAN SLAVERY. I shall see this day and its popular characteristics from the slave’s point of view. Standing here, identified with the American bondman, making his wrongs mine, I do not hesitate to declare, with all my soul, that the character and conduct of this nation never looked blacker to me than on this Fourth of July. Whether we turn to the declarations of the past, or to the professions of the present, the conduct of the nation seems equally hideous and revolting. America is false to the past, false to the present, and solemnly binds herself to be false to the future. Standing with God and the crushed and bleeding slave on this occasion, I will, in the name of humanity, which is outraged, in the name of liberty, which is fettered, in the name of the Constitution and the Bible, which are disregarded and trampled upon, dare to call in question and to denounce, with all the emphasis I can command, everything that serves to perpetuate slavery—the great sin and shame of America! “I will not equivocate—I will not excuse.” I will use the severest language I can command, and yet not one word shall escape me that any man, whose judgment is not blinded by prejudice, or who is not at heart a slave-holder, shall not confess to be right and just. But I fancy I hear some of my audience say it is just in this circumstance that you and your brother Abolitionists fail to make a favorable impression on the public mind. Would you argue more and denounce less, would you persuade more and rebuke less, your cause would be much more likely to succeed. But, I submit, where all is plain there is nothing to be argued. What point in the anti-slavery creed would you have me argue? On what branch of the subject do the people of this country need light? Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it. The slave-holders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government. They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. There are seventy-two crimes in the State of Virginia, which, if committed by a black man (no matter how ignorant he be), subject him to the punishment of death; while only two of these same crimes will subject a white man to like punishment. What is this but the acknowledgment that the slave is a moral, intellectual, and responsible being? The manhood of the slave is conceded. It is admitted in the fact that Southern statute books are covered with enactments, forbidding, under severe fines and penalties, the teaching of the slave to read and write. When you can point to any such laws in reference to the beasts of the field, then I may consent to argue the manhood of the slave. When the dogs in your streets, when the fowls of the air, when the cattle on your hills, when the fish of the sea, and the reptiles that crawl, shall be unable to distinguish the slave from a brute, then I will argue with you that the slave is a man! For the present it is enough to affirm the equal manhood of the Negro race. Is it not astonishing that, while we are plowing, planting, and reaping, using all kinds of mechanical tools, erecting houses, constructing bridges,

Documents  111 building ships, working in metals of brass, iron, copper, silver, and gold; that while we are reading, writing, and ciphering, acting as clerks, merchants, and secretaries, having among us lawyers, doctors, ministers, poets, authors, editors, orators, and teachers; that we are engaged in all the enterprises common to other men—digging gold in California, capturing the whale in the Pacific, feeding sheep and cattle on the hillside, living, moving, acting, thinking, planning, living in families as husbands, wives, and children, and above all, confessing and worshipping the Christian God, and looking hopefully for life and immortality beyond the grave—we are called upon to prove that we are men? Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? That he is the rightful owner of his own body? You have already declared it. Must I argue the wrongfulness of slavery? Is that a question for republicans? Is it to be settled by the rules of logic and argumentation, as a matter beset with great difficulty, involving a doubtful application of the principle of justice, hard to understand? How should I look today in the presence of Americans, dividing and subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom, speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively? To do so would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding. There is not a man beneath the canopy of heaven who does not know that slavery is wrong for him. What! Am I to argue that it is wrong to make men brutes, to rob them of their liberty, to work them without wages, to keep them ignorant of their relations to their fellow men, to beat them with sticks, to flay their flesh with the lash, to load their limbs with irons, to hunt them with dogs, to sell them at auction, to sunder their families, to knock out their teeth, to burn their flesh, to starve them into obedience and submission to their masters? Must I argue that a system thus marked with blood and stained with pollution is wrong? No—I will not. I have better employment for my time and strength than such arguments would imply. What, then, remains to be argued? Is it that slavery is not divine; that God did not establish it; that our doctors of divinity are mistaken? There is blasphemy in the thought. That which is inhuman cannot be divine. Who can reason on such a proposition? They that can, may—I cannot. The time for such argument is past. At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh! had I the ability, and could I reach the nation’s ear, I would today pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke. For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder. We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake. The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; the propriety of the nation must be startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be denounced.

112 Documents What to the American slave is your Fourth of July? I answer, a day that reveals to him more than all other days of the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mock; your prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious parade and solemnity, are to him mere bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy—a thin veil to cover up crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is not a nation of the earth guilty of practices more shocking and bloody than are the people of these United States at this very hour. Go search where you will, roam through all the monarchies and despotisms of the Old World, travel through South America, search out every abuse and when you have found the last, lay your facts by the side of the everyday practices of this nation, and you will say with me that, for revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival. Source: Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. Philip S. Foner (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1999), 188–206.

Document 2 Mississippi Declaration on Immediate Causes for Secession, 9 January 1861 A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the State of Mississippi from the Federal Union. In the momentous step which our State has taken of dissolving its connection with the government of which we so long formed a part, it is but just that we should declare the prominent reasons which have induced our course. Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery—the greatest material interest of the world. Its labor supplies the product which constitutes by far the largest and most important portions of commerce of the earth. These products are peculiar to the climate verging on the tropical regions, and by an imperious law of nature, none but the black race can bear exposure to the tropical sun. These products have become necessities of the world, and a blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and civilization. That blow has been long aimed at the institution, and was at the point of reaching its consummation. There was no choice left us but submission to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution of the Union, whose principles had been subverted to work out our ruin. That we do not overstate the dangers to our institution, a reference to a few facts will sufficiently prove. The hostility to this institution commenced before the adoption of the Constitutionn and was manifested in the well-known Ordinance of 1787, in regard to the Northwestern Territory.

Documents  113 The feeling increased, until, in 1819–20, it deprived the South of more than half the vast territory acquired from France. The same hostility dismembered Texas and seized upon all the territory acquired from Mexico. It has grown until it denies the right of property in slaves, and refuses protection to that right on the high seas, in the Territories, and wherever the government of the United States had jurisdiction. It refuses the admission of new slave States into the Union, and seeks to extinguish it by confining it within its present limits, denying the power of expansion. It tramples the original equality of the South under foot. It has nullified the Fugitive Slave Law in almost every free State in the Union, and has utterly broken the compact which our fathers pledged their faith to maintain. It advocates negro equality, socially and politically, and promotes insurrection and incendiarism in our midst. It has enlisted its press, its pulpit and its schools against us, until the whole popular mind of the North is excited and inflamed with prejudice. It has made combinations and formed associations to carry out its schemes of emancipation in the States and wherever else slavery exists. It seeks not to elevate or to support the slave, but to destroy his present condition without providing a better. It has invaded a State, and invested with the honors of martyrdom the wretch whose purpose was to apply flames to our dwellings, and the weapons of destruction to our lives. It has broken every compact into which it has entered for our security. It has given indubitable evidence of its design to ruin our agriculture, to prostrate our industrial pursuits and to destroy our social system. It knows no relenting or hesitation in its purposes; it stops not in its march of aggression, and leaves us no room to hope for cessation or for pause. It has recently obtained control of the Government, by the prosecution of its unhallowed schemes, and destroyed the last expectation of living together in friendship and brotherhood. Utter subjugation awaits us in the Union, if we should consent longer to remain in it. It is not a matter of choice, but of necessity. We must either submit to degradation, and to the loss of property worth four billions of money, or we must secede from the Union framed by our fathers, to secure this as well as every other species of property. For far less cause than this, our fathers separated from the Crown of England. Our decision is made. We follow their footsteps. We embrace the alternative of separation; and for the reasons here stated, we resolve to maintain our rights with the full consciousness of the justice of our course, and the undoubting belief of our ability to maintain it. Source: The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Yale Law School. Lillian Goldman Law Library. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_missec.asp

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Document 3 George McClellan—Harrison’s Landing Letter, 7 July 1862 Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac Camp near Harrison’s Landing, VA July 7th 1862 Mr. President You have been fully informed, that the Rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our condition as critical and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the state of the rebellion; although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this Army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction or foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every state. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring and supporting such civil and military policy and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency. This rebellion has assumed the character of a War: as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian Civilization. It should not be a War looking to the subjugation of the people of any state, in any event. It should not be, at all, a War upon population; but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the War, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected; subject only to the necessities of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid for or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited; and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by

Documents  115 enactments—Constitutionally made—should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master; except for repressing disorder as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the Act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefore should be recognized. This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular state; thus working manumission in such [a] state—and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also and possibly even in Maryland the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation and numerous Armies; but should be mainly collected into masses and brought to bear upon the Armies of the Confederate States; those Armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a Commander in Chief of the Army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the Nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. I may be on the brink of eternity and as I hope forgiveness from my maker I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love of my country. Very respectfully your obdt svt Geo B McClellan, Maj Genl Comdg Lincoln, Abraham. Abraham Lincoln papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833 to 1916: George B. McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, Monday, Thoughts on political and military affairs. July 7, 1862. Manuscript/Mixed Material. https://www.loc.gov/item/mal1685900/

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Document 4 Abraham Lincoln—The Emancipation Proclamation, 1 January 1863 By the President of the United States of America: A Proclamation. Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: “That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. “That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be, in good faith, represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.” Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days, from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans) Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkley, Accomac, Northampton,

Documents  117 Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth[)], and which excepted parts, are for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. Source: Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863; Presidential Proclamations, 1791–1991; Record Group 11; General Records of the United States Government; National Archives. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=34&page=transcript

Document 5 Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, 4 March 1865 Fellow Countrymen At this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention, and engrosses the enerergies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

118 Documents On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil-war. All dreaded it—all sought to avert it. While the inaugeral address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to  destroy  it without war—seeking to dissole the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern  half  part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war, the magnitude, or the duration, which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the  cause  of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces; but let us judge not that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. “Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!” If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South, this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a Living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope—fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said f[our] three thousand years ago, so still it must be said “the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether” With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to achieve and cherish a lasting peace among ourselves and with the world. To do all which may achieve and

Documents  119 cherish a just, and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with the world. All nations. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address; endorsed by Lincoln, April 10, 1865. Transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois. Available at  Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division ( Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000–02]), http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/ alhtml/alhome.html

Document 6 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, Passed by Congress 13 June 1866 and Ratified 9 July 1868 Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

120 Documents Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. Source: The House Joint Resolution proposing the 14th amendment to the Constitution, June 16, 1866; Enrolled Acts and Resolutions of Congress, 1789–1999; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National Archives. https://www.ourdocuments. gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=43

Document 7 Committee of Freedmen on Edisto Island, South Carolina, to the President, 28 October 1865 Edisto Island S.C. Oct 28th 1865. We the freedmen Of Edisto Island South Carolina have learned From you through Major General O O Howard commissioner of the Freedmans Bureau. with deep sorrow and Painful hearts of the possibility of goverment restoring These lands to the former owners. We are well aware Of the many perplexing and trying questions that burden Your mind. and do therefore pray to god (the preserver Of all. and who has through our Late and beloved President (Lincoln) proclamation and the war made Us A free people) that he may guide you in making Your decisions. and give you that wisdom that Cometh from above to settle these great and Important Questions for the best interests of the country and the Colored race: Here is where secession was born and Nurtured Here is were we have toiled nearly all Our lives as slaves and were treated like dumb Driven cattle, This is our home, we have made These lands what they are. we were the only true and Loyal people that were found in posession of these Lands. we have been always ready to strike for Liberty and humanity yea to fight if needs be To preserve this glorious union. Shall not we who Are freedman and have been always true to this Union have the same rights as are enjoyed by Others? Have we broken any Law of these United States? Have we forfieted our rights of property In Land?—If not then! are not our rights as A free people and good citizens of these United States To be considered before the rights of those who were Found in rebellion against this good and just Goverment (and now being conquered) come (as they Seem) with penitent hearts and beg forgiveness For past offences and

Documents  121 also ask if thier lands Cannot be restored to them are these rebellious Spirits to be reinstated in thier possessions And we who have been abused and oppressed For many long years not to be allowed the Privilige of purchasing land But be subject To the will of these large Land owners? God fobid, Land monopoly is injurious to the advancement of the course of freedom, and if government Does not make some provision by which we as Freedmen can obtain A Homestead, we have Not bettered our condition. We have been encouraged by government to take up these lands in small tracts, receiving Certificates of the same—we have thus far Taken Sixteen thousand (16000) acres of Land here on This Island. We are ready to pay for this land When Government calls for it. and now after What has been done will the good and just government take from us all this right and make us Subject to the will of those who have cheated and Oppressed us for many years God Forbid! We the freedmen of this Island and of the State of South Carolina—Do therefore petition to you as the President of these United States, that some provisions be made by which Every colored man can purchase land. and Hold it as his own. We wish to have A home if It be but A few acres. without some provision is Made our future is sad to look upon. yes our Situation is dangerous. we therefore look to you In this trying hour as A true friend of the poor and Neglected race. for protection and Equal Rights. with the privilege of purchasing A Homestead—A Homestead right here in the Heart of South Carolina. We pray that god will direct your heart in Making such provision for us as freedmen which Will tend to unite these states together stronger Than ever before—May God bless you in the Administration of your duties as the President Of these United States is the humble prayer Of us all.— In behalf of the Freedmen   Henry Bram. Committee Ishmael. Moultrie.   yates. Sampson. Source: Henry Bram et al. to the President of these United States, 28 Oct. 1865, filed as P-27 1865, Letters Received, series 15, Washington Headquarters, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, & Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, National Archives. Each member of the committee signed his own name; the petition appears to be in Bram’s handwriting. An undated endorsement referred the petition to General Howard, “By order of the President.” http://www.freedmen. umd.edu/Edisto%20petitions.htm

Glossary

Abolitionism Abolitionists are distinguished from the American antislavery movements that came before by their demand for an immediate rather than a gradual end to slavery. Abolitionism had many internal divisions, the most important being between William Lloyd Garrison and his followers, who rejected politics and relied on ‘moral suasion,’ and political abolitionists such as those in the Liberty Party. Army Two or more corps. Formally, the largest unit in both the Confederate and Union Armies; however, later in the war generals commanded what are now called army groups. Border slave states The four slave states, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, which never seceded from the Union. Brigade A brigade is generally considered to be four to six regiments of either cavalry or infantry, and was, in theory, commanded by a brigadier general, but in practice was often commanded by the senior colonel. Carpetbagger A pejorative term used during the Reconstruction era for a white northerner who came south to prey upon southern white citizens. It is also used to denote northerners who came south to enroll Black southerners in the Republican Party. Casualties The total of those killed, missing, or wounded. Company Practically speaking, the smallest military unit: usually 80–100 soldiers commanded by a captain. Companies were generally raised in individual cities, towns, and counties. Contrabands Benjamin Butler described fugitive slaves arriving at Fort Monroe, VA as Contrabands based on the terminology in the First Confiscation Act of 1861. It denotes the legal ambiguity of a former slave who has reached Union lines prior to the Emancipation Proclamation. ‘Copperhead’ A derogatory term coined by Radical Republicans for Peace Democrats who resisted Lincoln administration policies like conscription and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Clement Vallandigham of Ohio is the leading figure in this movement. Corps Following the practice and terminology of Napoleon, for most of the war the Union and Confederate Armies organized two or more divisions into corps; a corps included infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.

124

Glossary

In the Union Army, a major general commanded a corps; in the Confederate Army a lieutenant general did. Cotton South The first wave of states that seceded—South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas. Cotton was grown outside the lower South, and not all of the lower South was devoted to cotton culture, but in general cotton South and lower South are used interchangeably. Division A military unit composed of two or more brigades, commanded by major generals in the Confederate Army and by either a brigadier or a major general in the Union Army. Confederate divisions tended to contain more brigades than Union divisions. Electoral college The American people do not directly elect the president. Instead, on a state-by-state basis, they elect members of the electoral college, who then elect the president. Since a state’s electoral vote is distributed not proportionately but under a ‘winner-takes-all’ rule, there can be considerable divergence between a candidate’s popular vote and his electoral vote. For example, in 1864, McClellan won 45 percent of the popular vote but less than 10 percent of the electoral vote. Feint In tactics, a deceptive assault that is intended to distract the enemy from the main effort. Flank; flank attack When a military unit deploys into line, its right and left sides are its flanks; an attack on the flank, as compared to the more dangerous attack on the front of the line, is a flank attack. Free Soil The political doctrine that United States territories should exclude slavery; also the name of a political party. Greenbacks Paper money that was issued by the Union government starting in 1862. So called because one side was printed in green ink. Jim Crow Racial segregation, named after a character in minstrel shows. Militia The military organization of individual states; the president could call upon the states for the use of their militia. Moral suasion Moral persuasion. Garrisonian abolitionists tended to reject law itself as a use of force and initially believed the way to end slavery was through convincing slaveholders that slavery was a sin. They referred to this tactic as ‘moral suasion.’ Operations Efforts to apply military force in a specific theater in support of larger strategic aims; usually seen as a campaign. Planter A landholder owning twenty or more slaves. Popular sovereignty The political doctrine, espoused by Stephen Douglas, that the people of a territory should determine the presence or absence of slavery in that territory; Douglas left it unclear, however, at what point the people could make that decision. Raid As distinct from an invasion, a movement into enemy territory intended not to take and hold territory but to destroy supplies and disrupt the enemy’s plans.

Glossary

125

Scalawag A pejorative term used during the Reconstruction era for a white southerner who joined the Republican Party. Secession The withdrawal of a state from the United States, based on the belief that each state retained its sovereignty when it entered the Union and that the Constitution was a compact among the states rather than the creation of the American people as a whole. Strategy The transformation of the political purpose of the war into militarily attainable aims; a grand scheme to force your enemy to do your will. Tactics Battlefield maneuvers to attain local advantage in support of operational objectives. Whigs In the period of the Second American Party System, the party that formed around opposition to ‘King’ Andrew Jackson; the party that favored government sponsorship of economic development. Yeomen Independent landowners who strove for self-sufficiency although many of them sold some cash crops. While some moved in and out of slave ownership, they never had the resources to purchase many slaves.

Guide to Further Reading

Primary Sources Brown, J. (1859) ‘Address of John Brown to the Virginia Court, When About to Receive the Sentence of Death.’ Boston, MA: C.C. Mead. https://ap.gilderlehrman. org/sites/default/files/content-images/05508.051p1.jpg Census Bureau (1860) Population of the United States in 1860: Delaware. https:// www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/population/1860a-08.pdf Chancellorsville (2013) The Chancellorsville Campaign, January–May 1863. Ed. B.A. Wineman. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/CH03_Battle_of_ Chancellorsville_2_May_1863.jpg Chase, S.P. (1853) Salmon P. Chase Papers: Speeches and Writings, 1849–1868; Speeches; 1853, Apr. 9, Debate in United States Senate. Mss 15610; Box 31; Reel 28. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/ mss156100212/ Crist, L.L. and Dix, M.S. (eds) (1992) The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 7: 1861. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. Crist, L.L., Williams, K.H., and Dillard, P.L. (eds) (1999) The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 10: October 1863–August 1864. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. Daniel, J.M. (1868) The Richmond Examiner During the War: or, The Writings of John M. Daniel. New York, NY: J.M. Daniel. Davis, J. (1862) ‘Jefferson Davis’ Second Inaugural Address.’ Ed. D. Rowland. Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers, and Speeches. New York, NY: AMS Press. Summarized in The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 8, p. 55. https:// jeffersondavis.rice.edu/archives/documents/jefferson-davis-second-inauguraladdress Davis, J. (1864) ‘Annual Address to Congress.’ Official Records, Series 3, Vol. 4, 797–9. Fort Monroe, Virginia (1861) ‘The Fort Monroe Doctrine,’ in American Cartoon Print Filing Series. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (1863) ‘Little Round Top,’ in Civil War Photographs, 1861–1865. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/ resource/cwpb.00878/ Grant, U.S. (1885) The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant. New York, NY: Konecky & Konecky.

Guide to Further Reading

127

Grant, U.S. (1897) ‘President Grant’s Des Moines Address,’ The Annals of Iowa 3, pp. 138–9. https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.2242 Hammond, J.H. (1858) ‘Speech of Hon. James H. Hammond, of South Carolina, On the Admission of Kansas, Under the Lecompton Constitution: Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 4, 1858,’ in Northern Visions of Race, Region, and Reform. America Antiquarian Society Online Resource. https://www. americanantiquarian.org/Freedmen/Manuscripts/cottonisking.html Jefferson, T. (1776) The Declaration of Independence. Washington, D.C.: National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript Lee, R. (1862) Proclamation to the People of Maryland: Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. Series 1, Vol. 19 part 2, 602. Lee, S.M. (2020) ‘Twenty-Slave Law,’ in Encyclopedia Virginia. https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/twenty-slave-law/ https://www.loc.gov/item/2008661634/ Lincoln, A. (1861) ‘First Inaugural Address,’ in The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy. New Haven, CT: Yale Law School. https://avalon. law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp Lincoln, A. (1863) The Emancipation Proclamation. Washington, D.C.: National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/emancipationproclamation/transcript.html Madison, J. (1787) The Constitution of the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript Peters, G. and Woolley, J.T. Democratic Party Platforms, 1864 Democratic Party Platform Online. The American Presidency Project, University of California-Santa Barbara. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273174 ‘Presidential Election of 1860: A Resource Guide,’ in Web Guides. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1860.html Stephens, A.H. (1861) Speech Delivered on the 21st March 1861, in Savannah, known as the ‘Corner stone speech,’ reported in the Savannah Republican, in Henry Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, in Public and Private: With Letters and Speeches, Before, During, and Since the War by Henry Cleveland. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana State Library. https://iowaculture.gov/history/education/ educator-resources/primary-source-sets/civil- war/cornerstone-speech-alexander Sumner, C. (1856) Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner in the Senate of the United States, 19th and 20th May, 1856. Boston, MA: John P. Jewett & Company. https://www. senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/CrimeAgainstKSSpeech.pdf Sumner, C. (1864) Proceedings of Congress; Senate. The Elective Franchise to Persons of African Descent, New York Times, 9 February 1864, p. 1. https://www. nytimes.com/1864/02/09/archives/proceedings-of-congress-senate-the-electivefranchise-to-persons-of.html Vallandigham, J. (1872) A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham, Baltimore, MD: Turnbull Brothers. Watkins, S. (2003) Co. Aytch: A Confederate Memoir of the Civil War. New York: Touchstone Books. Welles, G. (2014) The Civil War Diary of Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy: The Original Manuscript Edition. Ed. W.E. Gienapp and E.L. Gienapp. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

128 Guide to Further Reading Wilmot, D. (1847) ‘Wilmot Proviso,’ Washington, D.C.: National Archives. https:// www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/education/wilmot-polk/wilmotproviso.pdf

Secondary Sources Ashworth, J. (2012) The Republic in Crisis, 1848–1861. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Bartels, V.B. (ed.) (2005) The History of South Carolina Schools. Rock Hill, SC: Center for Educator Recruitment, Retention, and Advancement. https://www. teachercadets.com /uploads/1/7/6/8/17684955/history_of_south_carolina_ schools.pdf Blair, W. (1998) Virginia’s Private War: Feeding Body and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861–1865. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Blight, D.W. (2001) Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Chernow, R. (2017) Grant. New York, NY: Penguin. Coates, T. (2016) ‘‘Better Is Good’: Obama on Reparations, Civil Rights, and the Art of the Possible,’ The Atlantic, December. Coates, T. (2018) We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy. New York, NY: One World. Cooling, B.F. (2017) ‘Fort Henry,’ in Tennessee Encyclopedia. Nashville, TN: Tennessee Historical Society. https://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entries/fort-henry/ Cooper, Jr., W.J. (2001) Jefferson Davis, American. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Dew, C.B. (1999) Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works. 2nd Edition. Richmond, VA: Virginia State Library. Dillard, P.D. (2017) Jefferson Davis’s Final Campaign: Confederate Nationalism and the Fight to Arm Slaves. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press. Donald, D.H. (1995) Lincoln. New York, NY: Touchstone. Dougan, M.B. (2018) ‘Secession Convention,’ in Encyclopedia of Arkansas. https:// encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/secession-convention-6304/ Doyle, D.H. (2015) The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War. New York, NY: Basic Books. Finkelman, P. (2017) Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Brief History with Documents. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Finkelman, P., and Kennon, D.R. (eds) (2018) Civil War Congress and the Creation of Modern America: A Revolution on the Home Front. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Freehling, W.W. (2001) The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Gates, Jr., H.L. (2013) ‘What was the Second Middle Passage?’ America’s Black Holocaust Museum. https://www.abhmuseum.org/what-was-the-2nd-middle-passage/ Goodwin, D.K. (2005) Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Guelzo, A.C. (2012) Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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129

Harris, J.W. (1985) Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society: White Liberty and Black Slavery in Augusta’s Hinterlands. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. Hess, E. and Wolfe, B. (2021) ‘Pickett’s Charge,’ in Encyclopedia Virginia. https:// encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/picketts-charge Holbrook, T. (2011) ‘Weapons at Gettysburg – The Spencer Repeating Rifle.’ Gettysburg National Military Park. ht tps: //npsg n mp.wordpress.com / 2011/09/01/weapons-at-get t ysbu rg-thespencer-repeating-rifle/ Johnson, O. (2017) ‘Complicated History: The Memorial to Robert E. Lee in Richmond,’ in The Uncommon Wealth: Voices from the Library of Virginia. https:// uncommonwealth.virginiamemory.com/blog/2017/07/27/complicated-historythe-memorial-to-robert-e-lee-in-richmond/ Kansapedia (2016) ‘Bleeding Kansas,’ Topeka, KS: Kansas Historical Society. https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/bleeding-kansas/15145 Krick, R.K. (1996) Conquering the Valley: Stonewall Jackson at Port Republic. New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc. Lankford, N.D. (2007) Cry Havoc! The Crooked Road to Civil War, 1861. New York, NY: Viking. Lankford, N.D. (2021) ‘Virginia Convention of 1861,’  in  Encyclopedia Virginia. https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/virginia-convention-of-1861/ Library of Congress. Presidential Election of 1860: A Resource Guide. https://www. loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1860.html Manning, C. (2007) What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War. New York, NY: Vintage Books. Masur, L.P. (2011) The Civil War: A Concise History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. McClure, J (2021) ‘Ruffin, Edmund (1794–1865),’ in Encyclopedia Virginia. https:// encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/ruffin-edmund-1794-1865 McPherson, J.M. (1988) Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: NY: Oxford University Press. Murray, W. and Hsieh, W.W. (2016) A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Newell, C.R. (2014) The Regular Army Before the Civil War: 1845–1860. Center of Military History. https://history.army.mil/html/books/075/75-1/CMH_Pub_75-1.pdf Robertson, J.I. (1997) Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: Macmillan Publishing. Rose, W.L. (1964) Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill Company. Sears, S.W. (1983) Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. Simpson, B.D. (1996) America’s Civil War. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc. Skelton, W.B. (1993) An American Profession of Arms: The Army officer Corps, 1784–1861. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Smith, J.D. (ed.) (2013) ‘From Edisto Island Freedmen to Andrew Johnson, 28 October 1865,’ in A Just and Lasting Peace: A Documentary History of Reconstruction. New York, NY: Signet. Thomas, E.M. (1995) Robert E. Lee: A Biography. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

130

Guide to Further Reading

Thomas, E.M. (2011) The Dogs of War: 1861. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Von Frank, A.J. (1998) Trials of Anthony Burns: Freedom and Slavery in Emerson’s Boston. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walter J. (1999) Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weber, J. (2018) ‘Conscription and the Consolidation of Federal Power,’ in Civil War Congress and the Creation of Modern America: A Revolution on the Home Front. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Whiteaker, L.H. (2018) ‘Civil War,’ in Tennessee Encyclopedia. Nashville, TN: Tennessee Historical Society. http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entries/civil-war/

Index

13th Amendment 101 14th Amendment 101, 104; see also Reconstruction 15th Amendment 101, 102–4; see also Reconstruction abolitionism 4–7, 49–50 African-Americans: desire for land 100–1; disenfranchisement 103–4; education of 98–9; emancipation of 48–9; as enslaved people 4–6, 10–11, 13, 33, 54–5; service in Congress 103–4; slavery 11–12, 58–9; see also United States Colored Troops Alexander, Edward P. 30, 47 Anaconda Plan 27 Antietam Campaign 46–8 Appomattox 90 Ashby, Turner 41 Atlanta Campaign 80–3 Baldwin, John 18 Banks, Nathaniel P. 40–2, 75, 79 Barton, Clara 60 Beaufort, SC 33 Beauregard, P.G.T.: Bull Run 19, 29–31; Shiloh 38–9 Bee, Bernard 30–1 Bell, John 16–17 Benjamin, Judah P. 32, 50 Beriah, Magoffin 21–2 blockade see United States Navy Boyd, Belle 41–2 Bragg, Braxton 64 Bragg, Thomas 11 Breckinridge, John C. 16–17, 79 Brown, John 12, 14–15 Brown, Joseph E. 53, 57–8 Brown Water Navy see Eads, James

Buchanan, James 17–18 Buell, Don C. 37–9 Bull Run, Battle of 29–31 Burns, Anthony 10–11 Burnside, Ambrose 48, 61 Butler, Andrew 11 Butler, Benjamin 33, 75, 79–80 Calhoun, John C. 9 carpetbagger 102 Chamberlain, Joshua 67–9 Chancellorsville, Battle of 61–4 Chase, Salmon P. 11, 16–17 Chickamauga, Battle of 72–3 The Citadel 24 Clay, Henry 9 Cleburne, Patrick 80–3 Coates, Ta-Nehisi 105 Cold Harbor, Battle of 79–80 Compromise of 1850 9–10 Confederate Congress 22 Confederate monuments 3, 104 Confederate Nationalism 87–91 Confiscation Acts 54 conscription 52–3 contraband policy 50, 54–5 Copperheads 57, 86–7 cotton gin see Whitney, Eli Cotton South 4, 17–18 Crater, Battle of the 84–6 Crittenden, John J. 18 Davis, Henry W. 93 Davis, Jefferson: Bull Run 31; collapse of Confederacy 90–1; escape from Richmond 90; Fort Sumter 3, 19; Inaugural Address 28; Lost Cause 101–2; national strategy 27–9, 52, 64–5; opposition to 51, 57–8;

132 Index Proclamation to the People of Maryland 46; relief of Johnston 81–3; slave soldier debate 87–9 Democratic Party Convention of 1860 16–17 Dix, Dorothea 60 Douglas, Stephen 9, 11; and Democratic Party Convention of 1860 16–17 Douglass, Frederick 10 Dred Scott Case 13 Du Pont, Samuel 33 DuBois, W.E.B. 103–4

Harris, Isham 21 Hicks, Thomas 21 Hill A.P.: Antietam 48; Gettysburg 66–70; Seven Days Battle 44–5; Wilderness 75–7 Holden, William W. 57–8 Hood, John Bell: Antietam 47; Atlanta Campaign 80–3; Gettysburg 67–9 Hooker, Joseph 47, 61–4 Hotchkiss, Jedediah 41, 43

Eads, James 33 Early, Jubal 31, 62, 102–3 education 60, 98–9 election of 1860 16–18 election of 1864 86–7 Ellis, John 21 Elzey, Arnold 31 emancipation 45–6, 57 Emancipation Proclamation 48–9 Erickson, John 32 Evans, Nathan 30 Ewell, Richard 66–70

Jackson, Claiborne 22 Jackson, Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’: Antietam 46–8; Bull Run 25, 30–1; Chancellorsville 62–3; death of 65; Valley Campaign 40–3 Jim Crow 104–5 Johnson, Andrew 16, 86, 93–5 Johnson, Edward A. 41 Johnston, Albert Sydney 36–8 Johnston, Joseph E.: Atlanta Campaign 80–3; Bull Run 30–1; relieved of command 81–3; Western strategy 64; wounding of 44, 64 Jomini, Antoine-Henri 23

Farragut, David 70 Foote, Andrew 34–5 Fort Donelson 36–7 Fort Henry 34–6 Fort Pillow Massacre 85 Fort Sumter 18–19 Fredericksburg, Battle of 61 Free Soil Party 8 Freedmen’s Bureau 95–6 Fremont, John C. 22, 40–1, 42 Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 9–10 Garrison, William Lloyd 7–8 Gettysburg, Battle of 66–70 Gordon, John 77–8 Grant, Ulysses S. 8–9; Battle of Shiloh 37–9; Fort Donelson Campaign 36–7; Fort Henry Campaign 34–6; Overland Campaign 75–80; Petersburg 83–6; Union strategy 74–5; Vicksburg 40, 70–2 Greeley, Horace 27 Greenhow, Rose 30 Halleck, Henry 34, 39–40, 75 Hancock, Winfield Scott 75–7 Harpers Ferry 14–15

impressment 55–6

Kansas 11–13 Kansas-Nebraska Act 11–12 Kennesaw Mountain, Battle of 81 Lee, Robert E.: Chancellorsville 61–4; Gettysburg 66–70; loss of Special Order No. 191 47; Overland Campaign 75–80; Peninsula Campaign 14, 43–5; Petersburg 83–6; Pickett’s Charge 69–70; surrender of 90; Western strategy 64–5 Letcher, John 20–1 Lincoln, Abraham: Election of 1860 3, 16–17; Election of 1864 86–7; Emancipation Proclamation 48–9; Fort Sumter 19–20; General War Order No. 1 34; Harrison’s Landing letter 42, 45; McClellan appointment 31; national strategy 26–7, 51–2, 65–6, 74–5 Longstreet, James: Antietam 46–8; Gettysburg 67–70; Western strategy 65; Wilderness 75–7 Lost Cause 40, 101–5 Lyon, Nathaniel 22

Index  133 Magruder, John 43 Mahan, Dennis H. 23–4 Mahone, William 85–6 Manifest Destiny 8–10 McClellan, George: appointment of 31; Election of 1864 87; failure to exploit success 47–8; Peninsula Campaign 43–5 McDowell, Erwin 29–31, 42 McPherson, James B. 80–3 Meade, George G.: Gettysburg 66–70; Pickett’s Charge 69–70; Overland Campaign 75–80 Mexican War 8–9, 23, 27 Missouri Compromise 6–7, 11 Mitchell, John 3 Mobile, AL 75 mobilization 24–6; see also United States Army New Market, Battle of 79 Northup, Solomon 10 Norwich University 24, 54 Obama, Barack 105 Overland Campaign 75–80 Pemberton, John C. 64, 70–3 Peninsula Campaign 40, 42–3 Petersburg, Battle of 83–7 Phillips, Wendell 7–8 Pinkerton, Allan 43–4 Planter Class 5, 51 Polk, James K. 8–9 Polk, Leonidas 81–3 popular sovereignty 9 Port Royal, SC 33 Porter, David 71–3 Reconstruction: Constitutional amendments 94–5; post-war efforts 94–7; wartime efforts 49–50, 92–4; see also carpetbagger; Jim Crow; Scalawag Rector, Henry 21 Republican Party 13–15, 16 Reynolds, John 66 Richmond, VA 22–3 Rosecrans, William 64, 73 Ruffin, Edmund 15 Scalawag 102 Schofield, John M. 80–3

Scott, Dred 13, 16 Scott, Winfield 27, 29 secession 17–18, 20–2 Sedgwick, John 62 Seven Days, Battle of 44–5 Seward, William H. 16, 45–6, 50 Sheridan, Philip H. 97 Sherman, Thomas W. 33 Sherman, William T.: Atlanta Campaign 80–3; Shiloh 37–9; Union strategy 74–5; Vicksburg 71–2 Shiloh, Battle of 37–9 Sickles, Daniel 67 Sigel, Franz 75, 79 slave trade 4 slavery see African-Americans Spotsylvania 77–9 Stanton, Edwin 44 Stephens, Alexander 53, 102 Stevens, Thaddeus 94–5 Stowe, Harriet Beecher 9–10 Stuart, Alexander H.H. 18 Stuart, J.E.B. 44, 62, 79 Sumner, Charles 12 Taney, Roger Brooke 13 taxation 56–7 Thomas, George H. 80–3 Tilghman, Lloyd 35–6 tithe 56 Tompkins, Sally 60 Tredegar Iron Works 22–3, 97 Uncle Tom’s Cabin see Stowe, Harriet Beecher Underwood, John C. 98 United States Army 23–4 United States Colored Troops 81, 84–6 Unites States Military Academy 23–4, 61 United States Navy 27, 31–4 Upton, Emory 77–8 Vallandigham, Clement 57, 87 Vance, Zebulon 53, 57–8 Vicksburg: battle of 70–2; siege of 71–2; surrender of 72–3 Vincent, Strong 67–9 Virginia Military Institute 24–5, 54, 79 Wade, Benjamin 93 Warren, Gouverneur 67–9 Welles, Gideon 32–3, 45–6

134 Index West Point see United States Military Academy Whig Party 13–14 Whitney, Eli 4 Wilderness, Battle of 75–7 Wilmot, David 9 Wise, Henry 14, 20

Women: as farmers 58–9; government employment 60; as nurses 59–60; as paid labor 59–60; post-war employment 97–8; as refugees 59; as teachers 59 Yeoman farmers 5, 21