The 2017 Gulf Crisis : An Interdisciplinary Approach [1st ed.] 9789811587344, 9789811587351

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Gulf Studies 3

Mahjoob Zweiri Md Mizanur Rahman Arwa Kamal Editors

The 2017 Gulf Crisis An Interdisciplinary Approach

Gulf Studies Volume 3

Series Editor Md Mizanur Rahman, Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar

This series is dedicated to serving growing academic interests in the dynamic, complex and strategically important Gulf region, offering a publication platform to scholars in the region and globally. The series takes an interdisciplinary approach to documenting the changes taking place in the Gulf societies, and examines the evolving relationship between the Gulf and other regions. The series advances non‐ Western perspectives in studying the Gulf societies, and their interactions with the rest of the world. The series includes work being done on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely: Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, in addition to Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. The series accepts proposals for monographs, edited volumes and handbooks that provide an understanding of the Gulf societies’ contemporary social, economic, and political landscapes. The series covers a wide range of topics within four broad themes, as follows: Social and Cultural Issues in the Gulf: Demography, migration, citizenship, gender, culture and identity, urbanization, education, new media, unemployment, youth, family, women empowerment, leadership, aging, human rights, sports, Islamic ethics, and Islam and society Politics and Security in the Gulf: Gulf defence and security, the GCC integration, democracy and political reform, Gulf politics and political systems, the GCC’s foreign policy Energy and Economics in the Gulf: The political economy of the Gulf, economic diversification, international investments, international trade, knowledge economy, energy security and geopolitics of energy, renewable energy development, environmental regulations, infrastructure and urban planning, Islamic finance The GCC and the World: The GCC and Iran, the GCC and Africa, the GCC and South Asia, the GCC and East Asia, the GCC and Southeast Asia, and the GCC and Western Powers

More information about this series at https://www.springer.com/series/16417

Mahjoob Zweiri Md Mizanur Rahman Arwa Kamal •

Editors

The 2017 Gulf Crisis An Interdisciplinary Approach

123

•

Editors Mahjoob Zweiri Qatar University Doha, Qatar

Md Mizanur Rahman Qatar University Doha, Qatar

Arwa Kamal Qatar University Doha, Qatar

ISSN 2662-4494 ISSN 2662-4508 (electronic) Gulf Studies ISBN 978-981-15-8734-4 ISBN 978-981-15-8735-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Disclaimer: This is an academic volume, designed to offer an objective understanding of the multifaceted nature of the Gulf crisis. The views expressed in individual chapters of this volume are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors. The editors assume no responsibility of liability for any errors or omissions in the content of individual chapters. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface and Acknowledgements

The political rift that opened between the Gulf countries in 2017 may be considered unique in its nature. In the holy month of Ramadan, without forewarning, three Gulf countries plus Egypt lay siege to Qatar, expelling Qatari citizens from their own territories and banning their citizens from travelling to Qatar, or indeed from expressing any sympathy or support towards that country. This unprecedented act by the Gulf countries, as well as from other states which joined the offensive, created what has come to be known as the Gulf Crisis 2017—although the crisis is ongoing as of writing—and set in motion events which have had serious political, economic, and social consequences. While the dispute created a security dilemma for the region, casting a shadow over the status as well as the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and throwing Gulf relations into turmoil, it was also felt more widely, in view of the fact that the Gulf region has 60% of the world’s oil reserves, so impacting the dynamics of the international community; the regional instability has therefore become a crucial global issue. This volume has thus been produced with the aim of providing a comprehensive understanding of the Gulf Crisis, covering its influence on the economy, politics, security, and society of the Gulf States, and surveying how it impacted domestic, regional, and international relations. Hence the selection of our title, The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Although a number of books and articles have been written about the Gulf Crisis, what is exceptional about the present volume is that it offers wider scope to think about the conflict. The holistic as well as the interdisciplinary nature of the book facilitates viewing matters from different angles, which is prudent as well as practical when studying such multilayered and multifaceted events. This text was a year and a half in the making and has been reviewed carefully by academics renowned in the fields represented therein. The chapters have been authored by knowledgeable and productive scholars from different disciplines, hailing from different academic institutions worldwide. They have all contributed to putting a vast amount of integrated information together in one text. The three editors of the volume are academics in the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University. We hope that this volume will be a valuable reference for researchers and policy experts, and a useful source for scholars, academics, and v

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advanced students in the wider field of social sciences, who desire to ask questions about the causes, consequences, and reality of the Gulf Crisis 2017. We would like to acknowledge the proof-reading assistance of Qatar University Press. Doha, Qatar

Mahjoob Zweiri Md Mizanur Rahman Arwa Kamal

Contents

1

The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mahjoob Zweiri, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Arwa Kamal

Part I 2

3

1

Gulf Security

Underlined Vulnerabilities of the Gulf Region: A New Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mahjoob Zweiri and Betul Dogan-Akkas

21

Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement: Challenging the Regional Status Quo in the Gulf Security Sub-complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin

35

4

Qatar Crisis: GCC States’ Perception of Regional Powers . . . . . . . Noof Rashid ALDosari

5

Transformations of the Gulf Security Landscape After the Gulf Crisis: A Geopolitical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari and Hamad Al-Mohannadi

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6

The Cyber Operation Against Qatar News Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 James Shires

7

Trans-Gulf Resonances: The Central Role of Egypt in the Saudi Dispute Over Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Moisés Garduño García

Part II 8

Threat Perception

Evolving Threat Perceptions and Changing Regional Dynamics in a “Post-GCC” Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Kristian Ulrichsen

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Contents

Popular Sentiments and Elite Threat Perception in the Gulf: Iran in the Public Discourse in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Éva Ádám

10 The GCC, Iraq, and Iran: Perception of Threats Before and After the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Shaikha Majed Al-Moslemani Part III

Developing Strategic Relations and Shifting Political Alliances

11 The Qatar–Iran–Turkey Nexus: Shifts in Political Alliances and Economic Diversification in the Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Robert J. Riggs 12 Look Middle, Look East! The Future of GCC Strategic Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Shareefa Al-Adwani 13 The Malaysia–Qatar Relationship: The Perspective from Malaysia—An Emerging Middle Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Ishtiaq Hossain and Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri Part IV

Foreign Policy Dynamics in a Post-GCC Era

14 Competing Radicalisms: A Comparison of Saudi and Iranian Foreign Policies After 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed Al-Ansari 15 The Gulf Crisis: Turkey’s Soft Power in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Nesibe Hicret Battaloğlu 16 Iran’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy in Response to Regional Crises: The Case of the Blockade Against Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Mehran Haghirian Part V

Qatar’s Economic Strategies in the Face of the Blockade

17 The Gulf Blockade: A Fifth Qatari Economic Stage is Imminent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Moustafa Amin Mohammed Ali 18 To What Extent Has the Sovereign Wealth Fund Assisted Qatar’s Security and Foreign Policy in Resisting the Blockade? . . . . . . . . . 303 Fahad Al-Marri 19 The Role of Qatar Airways in the Economic Development of Qatar: Before and During the Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Catalina Petcu

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Mahjoob Zweiri is the Director of the Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, where he is also an Associate Professor in Contemporary Politics of the Middle East. Before joining Qatar University in 2010, Dr. Zweiri was a Senior Researcher in Middle East Politics and Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. He was also a visiting professor at the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University. From March 2003 to December 2006 he was a Research Fellow and then Director of the Centre for Iranian Studies in the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. Dr. Zweiri has more than 60 publications in the areas of Iran and Contemporary Middle East History and Politics. In addition to Arabic, Dr. Zweiri is fluent in Farsi and English. Md Mizanur Rahman is Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Program, Qatar University. Rahman is a sociologist by training, working on international migration of labour, diaspora, migration policy, and other related fields of migration with a focus on the Gulf states and South and Southeast Asian countries. Arwa Kamal was a research Assistant at the Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University. She earned BA in English Literature from Qatar University and MA in Audiovisual Translation from Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. She was involved in language editing and translation at the Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University. She is currently pursuing Ph.D. program.

Contributors Éva Ádám is an international relations manager and a researcher at the Antall József Knowledge Center in Budapest, Hungary. He is an expert on international relations with a specialization in Arab and Iranian affairs. He holds degrees from the ix

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Corvinus University of Budapest and from Eötvös Loránd University. He is a Ph.D. candidate at Eötvös Loránd University, focusing on the relationship between Islamic legal theory and modern political thought in Tunisia. Moustafa Amin Mohammed Ali is a research scholar at the Gulf Studies program, Qatar University. His areas of research interest include Islamic finance, sovereign funds, and wealth management. He holds an MSc in Islamic Economics and Finance from Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU). Prior to enrolling in Ph.D. studies, Moustafa worked as a research assistant in the Faculty of Islamic studies at HBKU. Moustafa has received several awards for research excellence, some of which culminated in publishing his research on “Educational Readings in the Thoughts of Ibn Taymiyyah.” Shareefa Al-Adwani is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of International Relations and the Director of the Center for Gulf Studies at the American University of Kuwait (AUK). She completed her Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Davis in June 2016, focusing on the two fields of International Relations and Quantitative Methods. She earned her second MA in Political Science from the same university in March 2016. Her current research projects involve (1) the investigation of GCC socio-political phenomena and their changes over time using recently available government data, and (2) the use of various new and existing cross-sectional time-series data to investigate domestic factors in international cooperation, treaties, and agreements. She has written for Kuwait’s RAI Institute for Strategic Studies and Research, earned a grant from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences, and is a member of the Advisory Board for the New Kuwait Public Relations Committee (NKPRC). In her current position at AUK she teaches courses related to Kuwaiti foreign policy, international law and organisations, politics and women in the Middle East, and quantitative methods, and has served as the Acting Chair of the Steering Committee for the Masters in International Relations. Majid Al-Ansari is an Assistant Professor of Political Psychology, and is manager of the Policy Department at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University. He received his Ph.D. and master’s degree in social change from the University of Manchester, his thesis being entitled “A Minority of Citizens: The Effects of Religious, Social and Political Values on Trust in Expatriates in Qatar.” Al-Ansari has previously served at the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with various civil society institutions. His research interests include public opinion surveys, social resources, political and religious values, charity work, and political analysis of domestic and regional issues. He has contributed extensively as a political analyst on different television channels such as Al Jazeera, BBC Arabic, Russia Today, Al Araby TV, and Qatar TV. In addition, Al-Ansari writes weekly political articles for the Qatari daily Al Sharq.

Editors and Contributors

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Noof Rashid Al-Dosari is a research scholar at the University of Essex, Department of Government. She holds a master’s degree in Public Policy from Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar, and has a Bachelor’s degree in English Literature and Linguistic/International Affairs. In her Ph.D. thesis, which deals with Iranian and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign policy discourse, she examines Gulf States’ political discourses and the role of Khalijism in influencing GCC foreign policy-making towards Iran. She is currently on leave to lecture at the Qatar University Department of International Affairs Public Policy Program. She was an associate at the Silatech organization, 2014, and a part-time research assistant in the Research Centre for Islamic Legislation and Ethics, Education City, 2013. Her research interests include: public policymaking, policy studies, institutionalism, government, foreign policy, discourse theory and discourse analysis, political ideology, Iranian political studies, and Arabian Gulf politics. Fahad Al-Marri is a research scholar at the University of Warwick, and Senior Advisor in the President’s Office at Qatar’s Pension Funds, as well as a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Al-Marri holds a master’s degree in Public Administration (MPA). He has published articles in several prestigious journals and made research contributions at international conferences. His latest research paper is “The Impact of the Oil Crisis on Security and Foreign Policy in GCC Countries: Case Studies of Qatar, KSA and UAE,” published with the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). His Ph.D. thesis is titled: “The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in GCC Countries’ Security & Foreign Policy,” and his research interests are: security studies, international relations, foreign policy analysis, Middle Eastern security and foreign policy, sovereign wealth funds, and soft power. Shaikha Majed Al-Moslemani is working as an Administrative Coordinator at Qatar University. Her research concentrates on Gulf issues and international affairs, particularly between Iran and the Gulf region. She started her career as an Academic Adviser in 2013, and has been involved in different research projects involving society, culture, and regional integration in the GCC states. Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari is the Director of the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences at Qatar University. He holds a BA in Sharia and Islamic Studies from Qatar University, and an MA and Ph.D. in Islamic Banking from the International Islamic University, Malaysia, as well as a Ph.D. in Political Science from the same university. He has authored seven books and more than a dozen articles on various topics including Islamic and Sharia studies, political science, and the geopolitics of the Gulf. Nesibe Hicret Battaloğlu is a research scholar at the Middle East Technical University (METU) Area Studies Program. Battaloğlu completed her master’s studies at the Qatar University Gulf Studies program in 2016. Her research interests are the international relations of the Gulf, Iran–GCC relations, and identity and

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foreign policy in the GCC states. Battaloğlu’s most recent publication is titled “Alliances and Regionalism in the Middle East after Arab Uprisings: An Assessment of the Durability and Fragility of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” in Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, edited by Magdalena Karolak and Nermin Allam (Palgrave, 2020). Betül Doğan Akkaş is a Ph.D. candidate at Qatar University Gulf Studies Center, from where she also obtained her MA, with a thesis entitled “Securitization of Qatari Foreign Policy.” She completed her BA in International Relations at Bilkent University. Following her undergraduate studies, she conducted field research in Jenin, Palestine. Her research interests include foreign policymaking, security, and social transformation in the Gulf Countries. Her contributions, mainly focusing on international relations in the Middle East region, have appeared as op-eds, journal articles, and book chapters. Moisés Garduño García is a full-time professor at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary Arab and Islamic Studies from the Autonomous University of Madrid, a master’s degree in Asian and African Studies with a specialization in the Middle East from El Colegio de México, and has a BA in International Relations from UNAM. After conducting postdoctoral research in the Center for Research and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS), Mexico, he served as head of the Department of Asian Languages of the National School of Linguistics, Translation, and Foreign Languages of UNAM. He belongs to the National Research System of Mexico, and he holds certificates in Arabic language from the National School of Translators of Toledo, and in Persian Language Studies from the Dekhoda Institute of the University of Tehran. Mehran Haghirian is a Ph.D. student at Qatar University’s Gulf Studies program and a Graduate Research Assistant at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences. He has a master’s degree in International Affairs from the American University’s School of International Service in Washington, DC, with a research focus on Iran and the Persian Gulf region. Ishtiaq Hossain is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), teaching courses in International Relations while also serving as postgraduate coordinator in the department. He is the editor of Intellectual Discourse, a Scopus-listed flagship journal of the IIUM. Author of nearly 60 articles in indexed journals, as well as books, in 2018 he was recognised as one of the top researchers and postgraduate thesis supervisors in the IIUM. Before joining the IIUM, Dr. Ishtiaq served as a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. He was also a visiting professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and the Department of Politics at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. His latest major research report, published in

Editors and Contributors

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2018, was entitled “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under the Pakatan Harapan Government: The First Hundred Days.” Dr. Ishtiaq Hossain is currently engaged in writing research reports on China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) policy, and is writing a textbook titled Muslim International Organizations. Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Selçuk University and has an MA in Political Science from the University of Missouri-Columbia, where he was a Fulbright scholar. Currently he is an Assistant Professor at Necmettin Erbakan University in Konya. His primary research interests include politics in the Middle East and Africa, international political economy, international security, and human rights and democratisation. Catalina Petcu is a Research Associate at Qatar University. Her research experience extends across a variety of topics, such as communication technologies, political economy, and mental health in Qatar. Her master’s thesis on the economic development of Qatar focused on the aviation industry, and she has published three co-authored chapters on media development and communication. She is currently involved in several projects concerning media in Qatar, culture and economy in the Gulf, and mental health in the non-clinical population of Qatar. Robert J. Riggs is a geopolitical risk analyst and an independent scholar whose primary research focuses on the construction and maintenance of socio-political and religious authority in Arabic-speaking Shi‘i communities the interplay of identity politics and the political economies of the MENA region. He also has published research articles on the history, power, and economics in Ottoman-controlled Najaf (ca. 1500-1920), globalisation’s effects on Shi‘a leadership structures, and the Shi‘a shrine cities of Iraq. He is the founder of Global Intelligence Insights LLC, a firm specialising in cultural and geopolitical risk analysis. James Shires is a Research Fellow with the Cyber Security Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. His research examines cybersecurity in the Middle East, focusing on the interaction between threats to individuals, states, and organisations, new regional dynamics, and cybersecurity expertise. He also holds a DPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, having submitted his thesis on cybersecurity in Egypt and the Gulf states in August 2018. He has won awards for cybersecurity papers from the German Marshall Fund and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds an MSc from Birkbeck College, University of London, and a BA from the University of Cambridge. Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). She received her Ph.D. from IIUM, her master’s degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and her undergraduate degree from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include political Islam, Middle Eastern politics, political parties, and democratisation. Her latest publication is

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entitled “From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A Comparison between Rashid Ghannouchi and Anwar Ibrahim,” in Intellectual Discourse, vol. 26, no. 2 (June 2018). She is currently conducting research entitled “Gender Discrimination among Professionals in the State of Selangor, Malaysia.” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is a Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East. Working across the disciplines of political science, international relations, and international political economy, his research examines the changing position of Persian Gulf states in the global order, as well as the emergence of longer term, nonmilitary challenges to regional security. Between 2006 and 2008 he worked as senior Gulf analyst at the Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, and was co-director of the Kuwait Program on Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States at the London School of Economics from 2008 until 2013. Having published extensively on the Gulf, his books include Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (Columbia University Press, 2011) and Qatar and the Arab Spring (Oxford University Press, 2014). In addition, he is the author of The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914–22 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and The First World War in the Middle East (Hurst & Co, 2014). His most recent books include The Gulf States in International Political Economy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Routledge, 2016). His articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, including Global Policy and the Journal of Arabian Studies, and he consults regularly on Gulf issues for Oxford Analytica and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. He also writes regularly for the Economist Intelligence Unit, openDemocracy, and Foreign Policy, and authors a monthly column for Gulf Business News and Analysis. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen holds a doctorate in history from the University of Cambridge.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 15.1

Fig. 18.1 Fig. 18.2 Fig. 18.3 Fig. 18.4 Fig. 18.5 Fig. 19.1

Illustration of different research approaches to the question of perception in international relations and foreign policy analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Positive perception towards Turkey: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman (Source TESEV polls 2011, 2012, and 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Composition of real GDP by Sector (Source Callen et al. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Economic share of GCC countries (Source Al-Mawali 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ranking: liquified natural gas exporters (Source Krane and Wright 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SWF types and asset allocations (Source IMF 2012) . . . . . . . GCC country allocation of direct investments (Source Boston Consulting Group 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Qatar Airways’ air corridors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 6.1 Table 12.1 Table 12.2

Table 12.3

A 13-point list of demands, presented to Qatar, to resolve the crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia compared to the GCC Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia compared to other GCC Countries (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Suggested search terms on “Qatarileaks” website in English and Arabic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016 Top import and top export destinations for each GCC member (World Bank Data 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016 top import and top export destinations for each GCC member, excluding superpowers and other GCC members (World Bank Data 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016 Top import and top export destinations and amounts for each GCC member, excluding superpowers and other GCC members (World Bank Data 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1

The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Introduction Mahjoob Zweiri, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Arwa Kamal

On 5 June 2017, three member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)— Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain—as well as Egypt, issued a coordinated statement severing all relations with Qatar. This “Quartet” closed their airspaces to the Qatar national airline (Qatar Airways), as well as banning Qatari vessels and vehicles from their territorial waters and lands. The boycott soon became a “Qatar blockade,” as the Quartet closed off access to Qatar, with an embargo on air, sea, and land traffic to and from the peninsula. At the same time, they declared Qatari officials and nationals stationed in their countries persona non grata and ordered them to leave, while calling urgently on their own citizens living in Qatar to return home. Among the countries of the GCC, Oman and Kuwait were the only GCC nations not to break off ties with Qatar: refusing to align with any party, these two countries called for restraint and took initiatives to resolve the crisis (Krieg 2019a; Ulrichsen 2018; Doumar et al. 2017). In prosecuting the blockade, the Quartet accused Qatar of assisting Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, and Islamist fighters in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. They also accused Qatar of supporting terrorist groups and having an overly close relation with Iran, the regional rival of Saudi Arabia, and of using Qatar’s national network Al Jazeera to foment protest, especially during the Arab Spring in 2011 (Al Khalifa 2019; Baabood 2019; Davidson 2019; Doumar et al. 2017). In its initial reaction, Qatar asserted that there was “no legitimate justification” for the blockade, adding that it constituted a “violation of its sovereignty.”1,2 The response by the international community initially was mixed, with global powers generally asserting that this was an internal matter for the GCC (Bakir 2019; Boussois 2019; Kettner 2019). The South China Morning Post quoted analysts as saying the crisis would complicate China’s efforts to reach a free-trade deal with the region (Wong 2017); while Germany’s foreign minister sought to defuse the crisis by M. Zweiri · M. M. Rahman (B) · A. Kamal Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_1

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meeting with his Saudi counterpart.3 There was no doubt, however, that this sudden move by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt had engendered a crisis that not only affected the region but had implications for the entire world.4 The initial six months saw significant efforts by the Qatari Government to resolve the crisis: in an interview with CBS News, the Emir of Qatar said that he would be willing “to walk 10,000 miles toward the brothers, if they walk one meter toward reconciliation.”5 Yet the blockading countries, led by Saudi Arabia, continued to increase the pressure, using their global influence to persuade other countries (mostly third world) to sever relations with Qatar (for a comprehensive analysis, see Quilliam 2019). Yemen, Maldives, Mauritania, Comoros, and the eastern government of Libya led by Khalifa Haftar responded positively to the Saudi request. For a time Senegal did likewise, although it would later restore full relations with Qatar. Jordan, Djibouti, Chad, and Niger chose to downgrade their diplomatic ties with Qatar rather than break off completely. The Quartet also embarked on a campaign across the globe, and in particular in Washington, to damage the image of Qatar.6 The blockade aimed ostensibly to extract concessions from Doha, including the closure of Al Jazeera, curtailing its international influence. A 13-point list of demands was drawn up and presented to Qatar on 22 June 2017, in essence requiring Qatar to do the following: scale down diplomatic and military ties with Iran and shut down the Turkish military base; sever ties with regional ideological organizations (Muslim Brotherhood and others); cease funding to groups and individuals that the Quartet considered terrorists, and hand over their nationals who had fled to Qatar for fear of political persecution; shut down Al Jazeera and other news outlets such as Arabi21, Rassd, and others; stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from the Quartet and stop aligning Qatar’s military, political, social, and economic policies with them; and cease contact with opposition groups in the Quartet (see Table 1.1). Qatar denied the accusations that it supported and financed terrorism, demanding that the Saudi-led bloc present evidence to the contrary; it also refused to shutter the state-sponsored news channel Al Jazeera, citing the right of the freedom of the press. The list prompted Marwan Bishara, senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, to remark “This is clearly not just a question of demands, but an insult.”7 Perhaps realizing that the excessive nature of the 13 demands rendered them in effect superfluous, on 18 July 2017 the Quartet withdrew them in favor of what came to be known as “six broad principles,” by which the Quartet meant: combating extremism and terrorism; prohibiting all acts of incitement which spread and promote hatred and violence; committing fully to the Riyadh Agreement; accepting and following all outcomes of the Arab–Islamic–US summit held in Riyadh in 2017; refraining from interfering in internal affairs of the Quartet; and agreeing to confront all forms of extremism and terrorism that posed a threat to international peace and security (Table 1.1). Qatar also sought international assistance, turning to the Turkish and Iranian governments for their support. Saudi Arabia regards the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is majority Shi’ite, as its main rival in the region, and sees it as a threat to regional stability. Within the context of their long-running rivalry, Iran stands to gain from Saudi Arabia’s ongoing blockade on Qatar. The Saudis and Emiratis, in turn, came to realize that isolating Qatar would not be easy and could ultimately backfire

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Table 1.1 A 13-point list of demands, presented to Qatar, to resolve the crisis 1

Scale down diplomatic ties with Iran and close the Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar, expel members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and cut off military and intelligence cooperation with Iran. Trade and commerce with Iran must comply with US and international sanctions in a manner that does not jeopardise the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council

2

Immediately shut down the Turkish military base, which is currently under construction, and halt military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar

3

Sever ties to all “terrorist, sectarian and ideological organisations,” specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL, al-Qaeda, Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front) and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Formally declare these entities as terror groups as per the list announced by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt, and concur with all future updates of this list

4

Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organisations that have been designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, US and other countries

5

Hand over “terrorist figures,” fugitives and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide any desired information about their residency, movements and finances

6

Shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations

7

End interference in sovereign countries’ internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari citizenship for nationals where such citizenship violates those countries’ laws

8

Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other financial losses caused by Qatar’s policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar

9

Align Qatar’s military, political, social and economic policies with the other Gulf and Arab countries, as well as on economic matters, as per the 2014 agreement reached with Saudi Arabia

10

Cease contact with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. Hand over files detailing Qatar’s prior contact with and support for opposition groups, and submit details of their personal information and the support Qatar has provided them

11

Shut down all news outlets funded directly and indirectly by Qatar, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al Araby Al Jadeed, Mekameleen and Middle East Eye, etc

12

Agree to all the demands within 10 days of list being submitted to Qatar, or the list will become invalid

13

Consent to monthly compliance audits in the first year after agreeing to the demands, followed by quarterly audits in the second year, and annual audits in the following 10 years

Six Broad Principles, presented to Qatar 1

Commitment to combat extremism and terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their financing or the provision of safe havens

2

Prohibiting all acts of incitement and all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred and violence (continued)

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Table 1.1 (continued) 3

Full commitment to Riyadh Agreement 2013, the supplementary agreement, and its executive mechanism for 2014 within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for Arab States

4

Commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-US Summit held in Riyadh in May 2017

5

To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States and from supporting illegal entities

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The responsibility of all States of international community to confront all forms of extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security

Source The Peninsula, Saudi-led block drops the list of 13 demands: now call for six principles, 19 July 2017: retrieved on the 13 January 2020: https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/19/07/2017/ Saudi-led-bloc-drops-the-list-of-13-demands-now-calls-for-six-principles; Al Jazeera, ‘Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis’, 12 July 2017, Al Jazeera News/Qatar, retrieved on 5 Dec 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis170623022133024.html

on them. Meanwhile, the government of Qatar continued to pursue unconditional talks as the means of resolving the crisis, with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani remarking, “[I]t is indeed unfortunate that the ongoing Gulf crisis revealed the failure of the GCC to attain its objectives and meet the aspirations of our Gulf peoples … [H]istory teaches us that crises are destined to pass but their mishandling may linger and leave behind long-lasting repercussions. … [W]e need to solve the problem but the dignity and sovereignty of Qatar come before any considerations.”8 After three years, the Gulf blockade could be seen to have had multiple negative and positive outcomes. While the enmity between the countries involved mounted, Qatar made significant progress towards self-sufficiency. On multiple fronts—food, international relations, trade, and others—it has shown increasing self-reliance. This introductory chapter is accordingly divided into three broad sections: the next section discusses the 2017 Gulf crisis in relation to the animosity and rivalry between Qatar and its neighbors over the last few decades. This is followed by a section on how Qatar has managed the crisis since the early days of the blockade and has emerged as a stronger nation as a consequence. In this context, we focus on the challenges that the Gulf crisis posed to Qatar, and some of the opportunities that Qatar was thereby able to seize. We briefly offer a timeline of the crisis and the major shifts in internal and external affairs. The final section gives an outline of the present volume, with a brief discussion about each of the main parts therein.

The 2017 Gulf Crisis: A Continuity of the Animosity and Rivalry Against Qatar In terms of scope and impact, the 2017 Qatar blockade may be unprecedented; however, in terms of the nature of the intervention and the underlying intentions it

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cannot be said to be anything new—it is simply a continuation of the long-running rivalry between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain on the one hand and Qatar on the other (Gengler 2012; Pradhan 2018; Quilliam 2019; Al-Hashemi 2019; Davidson 2019; Krieg 2019b; Ulrichsen 2019;). We can trace the antecedents of the 2017 Gulf Crisis back to the coup in Qatar in 1996, and the antagonistic relations that have been perpetuated thereafter (Wright 2019; Roberts 2017; Doumar et al. 2017; Ulrichsen 2018). A proper understanding of the blockade, therefore, is quite impossible if we do not review the history of recent decades. Qatar gained its independence from Britain in 1971, and in 1972 Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani became the Emir of Qatar. Qatari foreign policy during his leadership remained essentially within the sphere of Saudi influence. When Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, father of the current ruler, became Emir in 1995, a fundamental change could be perceived in Qatar’s economic and foreign policy. Qatar’s new focus on natural gas set the country on a different path from its predominantly oil-producing neighbors, and it gradually emerged from the Saudi sphere. Under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad, whom Qataris refer to as Father Emir, Qatar accumulated immense wealth, allowing the country to take on many development projects and materialize the Emir’s development vision within a relatively short span of time. Alongside the transformation in the economic sphere, Father Amir implemented ambitious programs designed to transform Qatar into an international power, including conflict resolution and facilitating dialogue between warring factions. Thus, Qatar strengthened its own socio-political foundations while also cementing its international reputation. However, the reign of Sheikh Hamad was not smooth: he immediately had to face two coup attempts, in 1995 and 1996, both of which were foiled, with responsibility at least partly ascribed to Saudi Arabia. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the United States made efforts to reduce the animosity between Qatar and its powerful Gulf neighbors but was not entirely successful. In 2002 Riyadh recalled its ambassador from Doha after complaining about anti-Saudi content on Al Jazeera. However, when the Arab Spring broke out in early 2011, these countries again blamed Al Jazeera for fueling the unrest in the region. According to Kabalan (2018: 35), the 30 June 2013 coup against Mohamed Morsi finally exposed the rift between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, and Qatar. Following a period of heightened tension after the Egyptian coup, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Qatar in early 2014, instigating a diplomatic crisis that endured for nine months. Arguably, it was the Obama Administration which restrained Saudi Arabia and the UAE from taking further action during this tense period. However, Qatar had to opt for reconciliation, allowing a transfer of power from Sheikh Hamad to his son Sheikh Tamim, the current Emir of Qatar. Qatar signed the Riyadh Agreement in November 2014 and the three GCC countries restored relations with Doha (Kabalan 2018: 35). On 23 May 2017, the website Qatar News Agency (QNA) was hacked, and began releasing statements purporting to be by Emir Tamim which hailed Qatar’s relationship with Iran, expressed support for both Hezbollah and Hamas, and suggested that the newly elected President Trump would not last long in office (Kirkpatrick and

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Frenkel 2017). Although the Qatari authorities vehemently denied the authenticity of the statements, the news was disseminated throughout the region by outlets in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Email messages by the Emirati envoy in Washington were subsequently leaked, indicating that the hack had been planned and executed by the UAE with international assistance, but this did nothing to defuse the crisis.9 Less than two weeks after the cyberattack, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, along with Egypt, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar.10 Thus, on 5 June 2017, the current Gulf Crisis began. Despite divergences on the cause of the 2017 diplomatic onslaught on Qatar, there is strong agreement among analysts that the Saudi-led blockading Quartet would not have acted as it did without the implicit, if not explicit, support of President Trump (Cafiero 2019; Kabalan 2018). The night before Trump’s visit to the kingdom, former US defense secretary Robert Gates openly criticized Qatar for supporting Islamists, despite the fact that Qatar hosts the Al-Udeid Camp, the biggest American airbase in the region. Marwan Kabalan argues that the election of Donald Trump in 2016 encouraged Saudi Arabia and the UAE to resume the conflict and bring it to a decisive conclusion, and hence provided the catalyst that sparked the 2017 Gulf Crisis (Kabalan 2018: 35). However, after almost two and a half years of blockade, Qatar’s foreign minister was able to say that he hopes for “progress” in the efforts to resolve the crisis, following talks with Saudi Arabia on 6 December 2019.11 However, the UAE later dismissed any potential to resolve the crisis soon.

Qatar Under the Blockade Since the beginning of the crisis, Qatar has taken significant steps to mitigate the impact of the international blockade. The Qatar Government took various steps to lessen the impact of the blockade on Qatari citizens and resident population.12 Food supplies, a key dependency of Qatar on neighboring countries, were secured through the promotion of self-sufficiency. The emphasis was given to self-production, which was welcomed by many local businesspeople for whom it increased economic opportunities.13 One of the most prominent impacts of the blockade was thus related to food and other basic necessities. The Quartet, in imposing the blockade, had expected that because of over-dependence on other countries for food, Qatar would be placed in extremis. However, within a few days Iran started sending food by plane, which proved vital in weathering the initial stages of the crisis. Over only a few days, five planes of vegetables along with three ships with 350 tons of food were sent by Iran.14 On the economic front, it was expected that the blockade would have a destructive impact on Qatari business. In the first week of the crisis, the Qatar Stock Exchange fell more than seven percent. That first week was marked by chaos and confusion among governments, administrators, political figures, businesses, and migrants.15 The crisis impacted seriously upon the import sector, which fell by nearly 40%. Meanwhile, Qatar Airways, one of the region’s major long-haul carriers, which routinely flies through Saudi airspace, diverted flights through Iranian airspace. Premier UAE

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airlines Etihad and Emirates announced they would suspend flights to Qatar, as did budget carriers Air Arabia and FlyDubai. Bahrain’s Gulf Air and Saudia joined them.16 Further, within six months of the imposition of the blockade the Qatari administration moved towards other sources of economic development. One of these is tourism. Qatar announced a program to allow visa-free entry for citizens of 80 countries, in order to encourage air travel and tourism. Nationals from dozens of countries in Europe and elsewhere—including India, Lebanon, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States—need only present a valid passport to enter Qatar. The liberalization of the visa regime gave Qatar the most liberal border controls in the region.17 One of the important areas of concern was the impact of the blockade on the proposed 2022 football World Cup, slated to be hosted by Qatar. It is important to note that Qatar has invested heavily in football and this investment has reshaped football boundaries globally (Thani and Heenan 2017). Although the crisis cast a dark shadow over the possibility of the games, for the period of the first six months the preparatory constructions were unaffected, and the FIFA President maintained that the Qatar World Cup was not under threat.18 Among the grievances cited by boycotting countries, the Doha official news channel Al Jazeera loomed large. Yet despite the insistence by the Saudi-led coalition that Al Jazeera be closed, during the first six months the news broadcaster flatly refused to be a bargaining point in any of the negotiations to end the blockade. As the Qatari foreign affairs minister insisted, the Al Jazeera Media Network is an “internal affair” and there would be no discussion about its future with nations that were imposing a blockade on Qatar.19 At the same time, the demand for the closure of Al Jazeera was unequivocally condemned by international, regional, and national rights organization (Al Khalifa 2019). Overall, the first six months of the blockade had a lighter impact on Qatar than was expected. In fact, many economic developments were registered in the period. The inauguration of the Hamad Port notably conferred positive benefits for locals as well as the international community, having the potential for direct trade with Turkey, Oman, Pakistan, and India. Qatar’s leadership was also able to generate sympathy from the international community, and in fact bilateral relations with other countries have almost doubled.20 Thus, after the initial confusion, the international community extended more support than it had before. Many countries—France, United States, Russia, Germany, Pakistan, Turkey, and others—expressed a desire for peace in the Gulf,21 while the United Nations urged Gulf countries to “de-escalate the tensions and to engage in direct dialogue”22 and called for “no unilateral steps” following the major diplomatic fallout in the region.23 More interestingly, far from dividing public opinion, the crisis has united Qataris and made Qatar’s relatively young ruler extremely popular. In an illustration of how the crisis has brought Qataris together across tribal, sectarian, or political differences, images of Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani can be seen everywhere, on domestic and commercial buildings, vehicles, street signs, social media posts, etc. (Oruc 2019). It was perhaps in view of these developments that the Saudi foreign minister Adel

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Al Jubeir acerbically remarked: “We must recognise that Qatar emerged from this crisis faster than we expected and succeeded in winning international and regional support in its favour due to our aggressive demands … the situation does not allow any new measures to be taken against Qatar and we should not stop any mediation because closing the door does not serve us.”24 Middle East expert Miroslav Zafirov commented that “one thing is certain—so far, the blockade has failed” (Zafirov 2017: 200). Speaking to Al Jazeera, Saad al-Kaabi, CEO of Qatar Petroleum, went even further, saying “I would like to thank the four countries for their blockade, because it has made Qatar stronger, the people of Qatar stronger, their businesses stronger. We will come out of this much stronger than before.”25 In the next six months of the crisis, from January 2018 till June 2018, we observe an escalation of the tensions between Qatar and the boycotting countries. Prominent efforts were made to demean the Qatari government’s efforts for self-sustainability and empowerment, and there was a significant increase in propaganda against Qatar, with a number of attempts to malign the image of Qatar using fake Twitter accounts and hashtags.26 This period of the crisis also saw significant attempts by the Qatar Government to ease the tension through collective efforts. Qatar urged the UN’s top court to intercede against the UAE which, according to Qatar, had spread a “climate of fear” among Qataris living resident therein, splitting families and causing “substantial pain.” Doha thus appealed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to order emergency measures to lift the restrictions imposed on Qataris in the UAE.27 The support of Iran and Turkey was also sustained in the second six months, a support which was acknowledged by the Emir of Qatar on several occasions.28 Gradually, some countries began to restore their relationships with Qatar, Senegal reinstating its ambassador to Qatar in August 2017 in a bid to encourage a resolution to the crisis.29 And although most of the GCC countries remained opposed to Qatar, Kuwait and Oman took significant steps to resolve the crisis and end the boycott.30 Remarkably, in this period the crisis indirectly enhanced the economic activity in Qatar. During the first year, the national economy of Qatar saw a significant increase: according to the Qatar National Bank, the national current account surplus had widened to 6.4% of GDP, while the financial deficit had also narrowed by the end of the first year of the conflict.31 The fiscal account deficit continued to be a source of worry, but the impact decreased because of higher oil prices. The Ministry of Finance reported that Qatar was estimated to go from a deficit of 1.6% GDP in 2017 to a surplus of 2.8% in 2018, based on the Economic Outlook Brief released by the IMF in May 2018.32 As reported by the IMF, the economic blockade had not had a serious impact on Qatar, and what impact it had was fading. Interestingly, the IMF described the crisis as a catalyst for economic self-reliance by Qatar.33 Overall, Qatar had competently managed growth performance despite the rift with major regional powers.34 At no point in the first year did food become a problem for the Qatari Administration. While Iran and Turkey actively transferred food and other products for local consumption, Greece also offered its agro-tech expertise in support of Qatar’s selfsufficiency plans.35 Sales of Qatari products increased 300% in the first quarter of 2018 compared with the same period in 2017.36 Local dairy companies worked to

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increase their production to cover the needs of the local market, aiming to meet 92% of local demand for milk by the end of the first half of 2018.37 In pursuit of making Qatar self-reliant, local farms had more than doubled their aggregate production.38 Despite the crisis, assets and revenues at Qatar’s Islamic banks had in fact grown over the previous year. The state’s four full-fledged Islamic banks, Qatar Islamic Bank, Masraf Al Rayan, Qatar International Islamic Bank, and Barwa Bank, held a combined 358.6 billion riyals ($96 billion) in assets in the first quarter of 2018, an 8.8% increase from a year earlier. Their focus on Qatar’s domestic market had clearly helped them to withstand the crisis.39 Yet despite the positive outlook for many sectors of the economy, the aviation sector, and in particular Qatar Airways, took a serious hit. Qatar Airways reported a loss of more than $69 m due to the blockade, in what the airline called the “most challenging year in its 20-year history,” recording a 19% decrease in seat occupancy on departure flights.40 The closure of Bahrain’s airspace had been the most critical factor in this decline.41 The war of words in this period did not let up. In response to a comment by the Saudi Crown Prince that the “Gulf crisis is a very, very, very small problem,” the head of the Qatar Media Corporation wrote that although Qatar is geographically a very, very, very small country, it is an independent state and is not led by outsiders; and he commented that there was “a very, very, very big country which is not independent and is being controlled by a very, very, very small emirate.”42 The year 2018 came to an end with another appeal by the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim to the four countries imposing the blockade to hold “unconditional” talks to end what he described as a “flagrant” violation of international law. “The blockade on Qatar has harmed the reputation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the ensuing paralysis has reflected negatively on the council’s aspired role towards regional and global issues,” the Emir said in his speech at the 73rd UN General Assembly.43 Qatar continued to receive mild international support, and the international community took steps to restore peace in the region; France, in particular, had been making sustained attempts to resolve the crisis.44 Chinese diplomats and academics praised the efforts of the Qatar Government: as the Chinese authorities observed, Qatar had acted competently and responsibly in response to the blockade, and its innovative approach had made the country self-reliant and mitigated the worst effects on the Qatari population.45 Yet while the shadow of uncertainty remained, it was decreasing in significance over time as Qatar continued to take steps towards selfreliance. Media coverage declined in the period June to December 2018, and the international discussion now seemed to shift away from the question of whether Qatar supported terrorism, to cover instead matters related to Qatari self-sufficiency and its resilient economic development. After two years of crisis, a decline in media attention and a normalization of the blockade could be observed. The attempts by both Qatar and the international community to bring about a resolution having had no results, discussions of the blockade or the cessation of the crisis dwindled. The boycotting countries maintained their demands and held no fruitful talks, despite the continuous requests by Qatari officials to work out a mutually advantageous way to exit the crisis.46

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At the end of the second year, Qatar officially withdrew its membership of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The breaking news slightly rekindled interest in the issue, since it was thought that the move would again increase the tension in the region.47 Overall, then, it is fair to say that the Qatar crisis seems to have been transformed from a tragedy to an opportunity for the Qatari people. In May 2019, the Swedish envoy to Qatar, Her Excellency Ewa Polano, praised the improvements in food production, noting that Qatar has seen a significant increase in homegrown agricultural products, especially vegetables and fruits, and that precisely because the products are homegrown, prices have also decreased considerably. And alongside food products, she noted, Qatar has become near to 100% self-reliant in the production of milk and dairy products.48 According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2019, Qatar ranked as the second most competitive Arab economy, and globally 29th out of 141 countries. In fact, Qatar moved up one rank from the previous year’s 30th place and this clearly reflects the country’s continued global competitiveness.49 In fact, the end of the second year showed that Qatar had in effect survived the assault on its sovereignty and economy and utilized the opportunity to better position itself on the global stage. In the face of the boycotting countries, the crisis had ironically proved a trigger point for Qatar to become self-sufficient. Thus, it can be said that the crisis has made Qatar stronger and more independent, not only in the areas of food, but also in business partnerships, exports, international relations, and other important international issues.

Structure of the Book This book, the 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach, discusses the Gulf Crisis from a range of different academic perspectives. The overall focus of the book is to document the changes that have occurred on different frontiers in the course of the 2017 crisis, including security, threat perceptions, strategic alliances, foreign relations, and socio-economic conditions. While not unaware of the risk of high ambition, this book sets out to be a key reference for the 2017 Gulf Crisis. It is an outcome of a conference organized in December 2018 in Qatar University by the Gulf Studies Center, which saw presentations and in-depth debates on a wide range of themes ranging from cyber and information security, to the role of media and information technology in aggravating conflicts and creating political cultures, the shifts of alliances in the region, and the long-term economic implications of this crisis for all parties. Above all, the conference sought to offer a holistic understanding of the siege in its political, economic, and social aspects. Reflecting the efforts of that conference, the present volume draws on a range of different disciplines to address the crisis from historical, political, security, societal, and economic perspectives. The book can claim to have unique importance in documenting a Gulf Crisis which differs from any other crisis in the history of the region. In all previous diplomatic rifts, the maximum extent of hostilities has amounted to withdrawing ambassadors

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and closing embassies in the target country. With the international siege, and in pitting neighboring and regional countries against one country, the 2017 Gulf Crisis stands out as a unique historical event which requires detailed analysis. The book can also claim uniqueness through its close temporal proximity to the events it documents. Drawing on a variety of academic frameworks, it is an attempt to set in historical perspective, and provide a deep understanding of, events which were still very much in development at the time of publication. The book is divided into five parts: (I) Gulf security, (II) Threat perception, (III) Developing strategic relations and shifting political alliances, (IV) Foreign policy dynamics in a Post-GCC era, and finally (V) Qatar’s economic strategies in the face of the blockade. Part I is dedicated to Gulf Security, which was being shaken even before the 2017 Gulf Crisis broke. Part I includes six chapters that focus on a new understanding of the vulnerability of the Gulf region, Qatar–Turkey rapprochement, GCC states’ perceptions of regional powers, transformations of the Gulf security landscape, cyber operation, and trans-Gulf resonances. Chapter 2, “Vulnerability of the Gulf Region: A New Understanding,” by Mahjoob Zweiri and Betül Do˘gan Akka¸s, argues that major disagreements and conflicts in the Gulf are affiliated with the Arab Spring and elaborates the Gulf crisis in relation to the ramifications of those uprisings. The paper proposes that the Gulf crisis occurred as a result of the accumulation of conflicting approaches among the GCC states since the Arab Spring. It discusses the GCC countries’ positions on Libya and Bahrain, and then moves on to the ramifications of the Arab Spring, drawing on the examples of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi interventionism, and intra-GCC rivalry. The chapter thus offers a new understanding of the vulnerability of the Gulf region. Chapter 3, “Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement: Challenging the Regional Status Quo in the Gulf Security Sub-Complex,” by Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin, argues that Turkey and Qatar sought to change the regional status quo in order to forge a new regional security order, and to achieve this goal they cemented an alliance based on their respective qualities as military and financial powers. The chapter claims that the transformation in the domestic politics of the Gulf States played a decisive role in shaping the Turkey–Qatar alliance, and contends that the Gulf security sub-complex was reshaped in the wake of the Arab Spring. This chapter discusses the Qatar–Turkey alliance, elaborates the concept of the security complex with specific reference to the Gulf security sub-complex, and points to the implications of the Qatar–Turkey alliance for the regional security sub-complex. Chapter 4, “Qatar Crisis: GCC States’ Perception of Regional Powers,” by Noof Rasid Al-Dosari, sheds light on the role of perceptions in the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis with a focus on the Qatar crisis. Noof Rasid applies discourse theory and analysis to GCC foreign policy making. The chapter explains how actors’ perceptions have an influence on the GCC’s foreign policy decisions. Chapter 5, “Transformations of the Gulf Security Landscape in the Post-Gulf Crisis: A Geopolitical Approach,” by Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari and Hamad bin Ali Al-Mohannadi, examines the shifts in the Gulf security scene following the

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2017 crisis, looking primarily at three waves of security transformations: in the range of security, in security standards, and in the balance of security. This study evaluates and addresses existing problems in the Gulf and concentrates on three transformations that are needed in the Gulf security scene: the transformation from tactical security to strategic security; the transformation from traditional security to geostrategic security; and the transformation from securitization to rational security. The chapter concludes that the costs associated with the crisis are much higher than that of the intra-GCC differences. Chapter 6, “The Cyber Operation against Qatar News Agency,” by James Shires, argues that the Qatar blockade was catalyzed by a novel use of cyber tools—the planting of a fake story about the Qatari Emir HH Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani on the website of Qatar News Agency (QNA), portraying the Emir as expressing support for Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. James Shires describes this operation as an extreme case of what he calls “hack-and-leak operations.” The chapter elaborates how hack-and-leak operations involve both an intrusion into specific digital systems and networks, and an attempt to influence certain audiences through the public release of information. The impact of hack-and-lead operations is analyzed in a tripartite framework focusing on the context, characteristics, and audiences of the QNA operation. Chapter 7, “Trans-Gulf Resonances: The Central Role of Egypt in the Saudi Dispute on Qatar,” by Moisés Garduño García, provides a context to study current relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in order to show the importance that Cairo has for Riyadh’s economic and strategic plans in the Red Sea. The chapter presents the extension of the dynamics of conflict in the Gulf region as a strategy to curb the Iranian influence there. The chapter sheds light on the connections between the Saudi security apparatus and the “deep state” in Egypt, the relations between Cairo and Riyadh in the context of the Syrian conflict, the role of Egypt in the Saudi– Qatar crisis of 2017, and finally the current situation in the Red Sea and the growing strategic importance of Egypt in the new balance of power between Saudi Arabia– UAE–Egypt, on the one hand, whose strategic policies in the Red Sea are closer to Israel; and Qatar, Iran, and Turkey on the other. Part II addresses the changing threat perceptions in the Gulf before and after the crisis, and the changes in political dynamics within the GCC. Part II includes three chapters. Chapter 8, “Evolving Threat Perceptions and Changing Regional Dynamics in a ‘Post-GCC’ Era,” by Kristian Ulrichsen, argues that the blockade of Qatar has widened existing cracks in the Gulf into a chasm, and has generated unintended consequences that risk inflicting generational damage on its political and social fabric. The chapter examines the second-order consequences of the blockade of Qatar, arguing that there is no simple binary division within the Gulf States on any of the regional flashpoints—such as the role of Islamists in domestic political landscapes, political and economic ties with Iran, or complicated relationships between the smaller Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The chapter maps the web of overlapping flashpoints, actors, and interests at stake, and argues that any attempt to impose uniformity risks generating a further backlash both between states and, in the case of the United Arab Emirates, among the seven constituent emirates.

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Chapter 9, “Popular Sentiments and Elite Threat Perception in the Gulf: Iran in the Public Discourse in Saudi Arabia,” by Éva Ádám, identifies two significant developments in Saudi Arabia’s foreign and domestic policies prior to King Salman’s rule and links these developments to the reframing of multiple issues in public and official Saudi discourse: inter alia, American–Saudi, Israeli–Saudi, and Saudi–GCC relations. The chapter argues that the Saudi elite has put a lot of effort into establishing a regime of truth based on Iran’s perceived or real hegemonic intentions. Éva Ádám assesses the development of the Saudi narrative on Iran starting from the founders’ narrative on the Shia and Iran, and concluding with examples of contemporary political discourse. The chapter reports that the Saudi elite and the public have never been so consensual on any issue as they are during King Salman’s era with regards to the Iranian threat. The chapter concludes that this change in the mindset might result in a permanent transformation of the domestic setting, which might contribute to a deterioration of the regional conflicts. Chapter 10, “The GCC, Iraq, and Iran: Perception of Threats Before and After the Crisis,” by Shaikha Majed Al-Moslemani, emphasizes the sources of GCC states’ enduring alliance with the United States, as well as the nature of political relations between the three regional axes: Iraq, Iran, and the GCC. The chapter elaborates how the Gulf crisis has affected the perception of threat in the region. As this section affirms, for as long as Iran is considered a threat, regional unrest will continue. Part III addresses the shifts in political alliances and the developments in strategic relations that have occurred as a result of the crisis. In response to the blockade by the Saudi-led coalition, which involved other countries in the MENA region such as Egypt, of course with the support of the current US administration, Qatar sought to strengthen its relations with Turkey and Iran, especially in sourcing food that it had previously imported from the countries that were now imposing the blockade. Qatar also began to build relations with Asian countries such as Malaysia. These shifts in alliances among the GCC countries challenged the regional status quo in the Gulf, mitigating the effects of the blockade, while at the same time serving to cement the dispute among the GCC countries. Chapter 11, “The Qatar–Iran–Turkey Nexus: Shifts in Political Alliances and Economic Diversifications in the Gulf Crisis,” by Robert Riggs, argues that the emergence of stronger trilateral relations between Qatar, Turkey, and Iran is an unexpected result of the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar. This chapter shows that Qatar’s enhanced trilateral relations with Iran and Turkey has been both a cause and result of the blockade. Chaper 12, “Look Middle, Look East! The Future of GCC Strategic Partnerships,” by Shareefa Al-Adwani, points out that the members of the GCC currently have longterm strategic relations with the superpowers: the United States, China, Russia, and the EU. Al-Adwani argues that the GCC members should foster higher-level relations with other stable states in order to ensure continuity in areas such as diplomacy, trade, and even security. The chapter highlights the importance of forging strategic partnerships between the GCC and other middle power states to realize common GCC goals and to build a stronger negotiating position for the GCC in the long run. Chapter 13, “The Malaysia–Qatar Relationship: The Perspective from Malaysia— An Emerging Middle Power,” by Ishtiaq Hossain and Syaza Farhana Mohamad

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Shukri, argues that Malaysia’s relationship with Qatar should be understood within the context of the foreign policy behavior of an emerging middle power within an international environment, and a domestic context in Malaysia which has also undergone major changes in its political order following the change in leadership in 2018. Since one of the main drivers of the Gulf Crisis is in fact foreign policy, the book dedicates Part IV to discussing the foreign policy goals and challenges of the GCC states. The chapters in this section set out how each Gulf State as well as Iran were exposed to internal and regional developments, such as the Arab Spring, which led them to develop their foreign policies in specific ways. This change in foreign policies and the reluctance to unify around a set of specific goals has created tensions, especially since 2015. This section also records how other countries that have interests in the Gulf region have changed their foreign policy in pursuit of their own benefits. Turkey has sided with Qatar since the blockade was declared, and accordingly its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deteriorated. It has had to modify its foreign policy and to maintain a complex web of relations with the world powers. Turkey, a country that is now focusing on the projection of soft power, will not use hard power unless it considers the need to be extreme. Chapter 14, “Competing Radicalisms: A Comparison of Saudi and Iranian Foreign Policies after 2015,” by Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed Al-Ansari, compares foreign policy dynamics after 2015. The chapter sheds light on how revolutionary ideology in Iran and the ruling Al-Saud family in Saudi Arabia are largely responsible for defining foreign policy priorities and courses of action in the respective states. Chapter 15, “The Gulf Crisis: Turkey’s Soft Power in the Gulf,” by Nesibe Hicret Battalo˘glu, examines Turkey’s soft power policies and impacts in the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states through analytical, normative, ideological, and empirical measures, with a focus on the Gulf crisis and Turkey’s engagement with Qatar. Chapter 16, “Iran’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy in Response to Regional Crises: The Case of the Blockade against Qatar,” by Mehran Haghirian, analyzes Iran’s foreign policy decision-making process with respect to the Persian Gulf region by looking at the level of pragmatism in its approach towards regional crises. Merhan uses the blockade as a case study to examine Iran’s policy shift towards Qatar from mere rivalry to a practical, win–win relationship. The chapter reveals that Iran’s decision to assist Qatar at a critical juncture in the geopolitical environment of the Persian Gulf has shaped the relations between Iran and Qatar. Part V discusses Qatar’s economic strategies in its attempts at facing down the siege. Since the siege cut off the import of goods from the blockading countries, while also stopping businesses and trade, Qatar had to take the necessary measures to ensure a prosperous and sustainable life for its citizens. This section explores the way Qatar met its economic challenges, which later contributed to the development of all the sectors of the country’s economy. Chapter 17, “The Gulf Blockade: A Fifth Qatari Economic Stage is Looming,” by Moustafa Amin Mohammed Ali, explores some of the crucial economic challenges that have contributed not only to the development of Qatar’s economy but also to the emergence of a fifth economic phase. The chapter

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examines the Gulf Crisis from an economic perspective, shedding light on the four phases of Qatar’s economy. Moustafa suggests that Qatar’s economy is embarking on a fifth economic phase, an era that is very likely to trigger fundamental changes to the traditional rentier GCC economic model. Chapter 18, “To What Extent has the Sovereign Wealth Fund Assisted Qatar’s Security and Foreign Policy in Resisting the Blockade?” by Fahad Al-Marri, suggests that the Gulf crisis should be a lesson for Qatar and other countries in the region concerning the need to accumulate emergency funds in sovereign wealth funds to support governments in times of need. Finally, Chapter 19, “The Role of Qatar Airways in the Economic Development of Qatar: Before and During the Gulf Crisis,” by Catalina Petcu, examines the role of Qatar Airways in the economic development of Qatar with a focus on the postcrisis period. Petcu reports that Qatar airways faced challenges in the initial period of the crisis, but later managed to cope with the loss. However, the chapter shows that the greatest contribution of Qatar Airways to the national economy comes from the improved connectivity, which stimulates connections with foreign markets and develops the tourism sector. The long-term goal in putting this volume together has been to reflect on the 2017 Gulf Crisis and to provide an assessment of its political, security, social, and economic aspects. Our goal is to offer the reader the material for a comprehensive understanding of a crisis that cannot be grasped by adopting any one perspective alone. Notes 1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

Gulf crisis: Seven nations cut diplomatic ties to Qatar as rift deepens, Macau Daily Times, June 6, 2017. Retrieved July 26, 2019, from https://macaudailyti mes.com.mo/gulf-crisis-seven-nations-cut-diplomatic-ties-qatar-rift-deepens. html. Al Jazeera, Gulf diplomatic crisis: Qatar’s reaction in full, 5 June 207, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/gulf-diplomatic-crisis-qatar-rea ction-full-170605071246160.html. Al Jazeera English (13 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. Al Jazeera English (13 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. Gulf Times (31 October 2017). Emir ready to go the extra mile for reconciliation. See, UAE led a ‘Demonization Campaign’ Against Qatar, Al Jazeera Documentary, September 19, 2017. Arab States issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis, Al Jazeera, 12 July 2017, retruved on the 18 January 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/ 06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html. Qatar Tribune. 7th November 2018. Crisis will pass, Qatar will prosper. See UAE used Israeli spyware ‘to target Qatari emir, Al Jazeera English, 1st September 2018; and ‘Saudi and UAE created crisis to usurp Qatar’s wealth’ Qatar Tribune English, 20th January 2018.

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10. Divided Gulf pp 1-18, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-136314-6_1. 11. Aljazeera News report, ‘Qatar foreign minister: Gulf crisis has moved from stalemate’, retrieved on the 7th December 2019: https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2019/12/qatar-foreign-minister-gulf-crisis-moved-stalemate-191206192 335553.html. 12. Al Jazeera English (13 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. 13. Al Jazeera English (13 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates, The Peninsula (15 August 2017). Siege helps Qatar gain real political independence; Al Jazeera English (31 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. 14. NDTV. (2017, June 11). Iran Sends 5 Planes Of Vegetables To Qatar Amid Concerns of Shortages. Retrieved August 7, 2019, from NDTV.com website: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-has-sent-5-planes-filled-withfood-supplies-to-qatar-iran-air-1710652; Smith, Reiss (22 June 2017). Qatar news LIVE: Saudi Arabia gives list of demands to Doha—Gulf crisis latest. express.co.uk. 15. The Punch (27 July 2017). Gulf crisis: UAE freezes accounts of Qatar-linked entities. 16. The Gulf News, 6 June 2017, Emirates, ‘Etihad Airways, Air Arabia, Fly Dubai suspend flights to, from Doha’. 17. The Peninsula (15 August 2017). Siege helps Qatar gain real political independence. 18. Al Jazeera English (13 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. 19. Jazeera, A. (2017d, June 13). Al Jazeera off the table in any Gulf crisis talks: FM. Retrieved August 9, 2019, from Aljazeera.com website: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/al-jazeera-table-gulf-crisistalks-fm-170613023203310.html.. 20. Gulf Times (31 December 2017). Qatar defies siege; emerges stronger and respectful among nations. 21. Jazeera, A. (2017d, June 11). US and Russia call for dialogue over Qatar-GCC dispute. Retrieved August 9, 2019, from Aljazeera.com website: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/russia-call-dialogue-qatargcc-dispute-170611132858154.html. 22. US and Russia call for dialogue over Qatar-GCC dispute. Retrieved August 9, 2019, from Aljazeera.com website: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/ russia-call-dialogue-qatar-gcc-dispute-170611132858154.html. 23. Al Jazeera English (28 August 2017). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. 24. Qatar Tribune. 23rd September 2017. Qatar emerged out of the crisis faster than expected. 25. Talk to Al Jazeera—Saad al-Kaabi: The blockade has made Qatar Stronger’, July 22, 2017. 26. The Peninsula (2 February 2018). Propaganda through bots. 27. Agence France Presse (30 June 2018). Qatar urges UN’s top court to end UAE ‘climate of fear’.

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28. Agence France Presse (18 May 2018). Qatar emir thanks Iran for support in Gulf crisis. 29. Tehran Times (6 March 2018). Saudi-led blockade on Qatar falling apart. 30. Al Jazeera English (14 March 2018). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates. 31. The Peninsula, Qatar current account surplus widens to 6.4% of GDP, 17 May 2018, https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/17/05/2018/Qatarcurrent-account-surplus-widens-to-6.4-of-GDP retrieved on the 15 January 2019. 32. Al Jazeera English (18 May 2018). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All latest updates.. 33. Al Jazeera English (7 March 2018). Businesses in Qatar booming since Gulf crisis began. 34. Gulf Times (31 May 2018). Qatar has managed impact of siege: IMF. 35. Gulf Times (30 April 2018). Solution to Gulf crisis must be based on ‘respect to sovereignty’. 36. Al Jazeera English (23 May 2018). Qatar-Gulf crisis: All latest updates. 37. Al Jazeera English (7 June 2018). Gulf crisis one year: Qatar steps up selfsustainability. 38. Yangyuanyong (23 June 2018). Qatar to become self-sufficient in food production amid Saudi-led siege. Xinhua News Agency. 39. PANAPRESS—Pan African News Agency (31 August 2018). Qatari Islamic banks grow despite Gulf crisis: IFSB data. 40. BBC Monitoring Middle East (20 September 2018). Qatar Airways reports $69 m loss amid Gulf boycott. 41. How airspace is distributed in the Gulf. 42. Gulf Times (25 February 2018). ‘Though geographically small, Qatar is still independent’. 43. BBC Monitoring Middle East (26 September 2018). Qatar emir calls for unconditional’ talks to end Gulf crisis. 44. BBC Monitoring Middle East (5 July 2018). Qatari emir to meet French president in Paris. 45. The Peninsula (8 December 2018). Chinese diplomats, academics hail Qatar’s success over siege. 46. Gulf Times (6 January 2019). FM calls for dialogue based on mutual respect to solve Gulf crisis. 47. Voice of America Press Releases and Documents (2 January 2019). Experts Warn Gulf Rift Widening as Qatar Quits OPEC. 48. Qatar Tribune (2 May 2019). Blockade a blessing in disguise for Qatar, feels Swedish envoy. 49. The Peninsular, Qatar, 2nd most competitive Arab economy: WEF report, accessed on the 12 January 2020: https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/ 10/10/2019/Qatar,-2nd-most-competitive-Arab-economy-WEF-report.

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References Al-Hashemi, M.H. (2019). Bitter brethren: Freud’s Narcissism of minor differences and the Gulf divide. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 53–70). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Al Khalifa, H.H. (2019). Aljazeera’s coverage of the qatar crisis on June 5th, 2017: A frame analysis. Global Media Journal, 17(32). Baabood, A. (2019). The future of the GCC amid the Gulf divide. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 161–178). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Bakir, A. (2019). The evolution of Turkey-Qatar relations amid a growing Gulf divide. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 197–217). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Boussois, S. (2019). Iran and Qatar: A forced rapprochement. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 233–250). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Cafiero, G. (2019). The trump factor in the Gulf divide. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 127–144). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Davidson, M.C. (2019). The UAE, Qatar, and the question of political Islam. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 71–91). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Doumar, et al. (2017). Crisis in the Gulf cooperation council: Challenges and prospects. Washington DC.: Arab Center Washington DC, Inc. Gengler, J. (2012). The political costs of Qatar’s western orientation. Middle East Policy, 19(4), 68–76. Kabalan, M. (2018). The Gulf crisis: The US factor. Insight Turkey, 20(2), 33–50. Kettner, J. (2019). Making sense of Europe’s response to the Gulf crisis. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 251–267). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Kirkpatrick, D.D., & Frenkel, S. (2017). Hacking in Qatar highlights a shift toward espionage-forhire. The New York Times, 8. Krieg, A. (Ed.). (2019a). Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Krieg, A. (2019b). The weaponization of narratives amid the Gulf crisis. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 91–108). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Oruc, N. (2019). Hashtag unity: Qatar’s digital nationalism in the Gulf crisis. Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, 12(1), 43–64. Pradhan, P. K. (2018). Qatar crisis and the deepening regional faultline. Strategic Analysis, 42(4), 437–442. Quilliam, N. (2019). The saudi dimension: Understanding the Kingdom’s position in the Gulf crisis. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 109–127). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Roberts, D. B. (2017). Qatar and the UAE: Exploring divergent responses to the Arab Spring. The Middle East Journal, 71(4), 544–562. Thani, S., & Heenan, T. (2017). The ball may be round but football is becoming increasingly Arabic: Oil money and the rise of the new football order. Soccer & Society, 18(7), 1012–1026. Ulrichsen, K. C. (2018). Lessons and legacies of the blockade of Qatar. Insight Turkey, 20(2), 11–20. Ulrichsen, K.C. (2019). Perceptions and divisions in security and defense structures in Arab Gulf States. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 19–36). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Wong, C. (2017). ‘Arab states’ rift with Qatar clouds China’s plans for Gulf free-trade deal’. In South China Morning Post. Retrieved June 6, 2017. Wright, S. (2019). The political economy of the Gulf divide. In A. Krieg (Ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (pp. 145–161). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Zafirov, M. (2017). The Qatar crisis—Why the blockade failed. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 11(2), 191–201.

Part I

Gulf Security

Chapter 2

Underlined Vulnerabilities of the Gulf Region: A New Understanding Mahjoob Zweiri and Betul Dogan-Akkas

The rift between the Gulf States that opened in 2017 has served to intensify centuriesold debates and tensions in the Middle East. The Gulf crisis has also engendered significant diplomatic tensions between GCC countries, resulting in economic sanctions, the closure of intraregional borders, and even the unleashing of new political struggles upon the region. Since the very beginning of the dispute, studies have seen the Gulf crisis as emerging out of the Arab Spring, and in particular the disagreements between GCC countries on the future of these Arab revolts. This chapter takes a similar perspective, examining the Gulf States’ conflicting approaches in relation to the Arab Spring. Our aim here is to rectify the under-theorization of the Gulf, and provide a structure for analyzing the regional conflicts that have deepened in the last three years in response to the Qatar Blockade. These conflicts are explored in relation to the various effects of the Arab Spring. When major disagreements and conflicts in the Gulf are associated with the Arab Spring, an immediate question comes to mind: Is it right to start from the Arab Spring? Although Gulf States are relative latecomers to the realm of international politics, even prior to 2011 they cooperated, disagreed, and engaged in alliances and rivalries. Additionally, given the fact that the history of the Gulf region has witnessed a series of crises, beginning with the early state formation process, we might well ask: What makes the current Gulf crisis unique in comparison to previous crises? In this study, we argue that the Arab Spring rapidly and unexpectedly provoked the Gulf countries to adopt conflicting stances in respect of regional politics. The GCC countries’ disagreements have grown since the Arab Spring revolutions, which in turn has prompted a political earthquake in the Gulf, with far-reaching consequences for M. Zweiri (B) Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] B. Dogan-Akkas Gulf Studies Program, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_2

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both Arab and non-Arab countries within the Middle East. Hence, gaining an insight into the regional ramifications of the Arab Spring can help us to better understand the reasons behind the Gulf crisis. Put differently, this study argues that the current crisis can be seen as an outgrowth of the GCC states’ conflicting approaches in the wake of the Arab Spring. To structure the argument, we investigate the involvement of regional players in the Gulf crisis. The chapter begins by analyzing the GCC countries’ positions as regards Libya and Bahrain, and then considers the impact of the Arab Spring in order to highlight the conflicting approaches of Gulf States, using the examples of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi interventionism, and intra-GCC rivalry.

Honeymoon of the Arab Spring The 13 demands of the Saudi-Emirati-led anti-Qatar bloc speak to the GCC states’ divergence of opinion on key regional issues, which came to surface with the eruption of the crisis. This is especially evident in the demand for Qatar to eliminate its alleged “relations with terrorist organizations,” to pay compensation, to cease its interference in GCC states’ internal affairs, to cut ties with Iran, and to close the Turkish military base. The anti-Qatar bloc has made their disagreements with Qatar very clear (see Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis 2017). In addition, their defining the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, spurred by Egypt’s involvement in the anti-Qatar bloc, highlights the cracks that began to emerge in the fragile unity of the GCC countries following the Arab Spring (Roberts 2017). Before the ramifications of this regional upheaval became evident, in the early period of the Arab Spring the Gulf countries had indeed cooperated (Kamrava 2012; Ulrichsen 2012). From the first day of the Arab revolts, Qatar had supported this wave of change that was sweeping through the authoritarian regimes. From the end of 2010 to 2013, when the Arab Spring started to devolve into violence with the onset of civil war in Syria and the military coup in Egypt, Qatar opted to support anti-regime groups financially, politically, and militarily (Ulrichsen 2014). In doing so, Qatar can be seen as actively intervening in the situations in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. In Bahrain and Libya, Qatar was in line with the GCC: the international intervention in Libya was led by NATO, with the UAE also being part of it (Young 2013). In Bahrain, although Qatar’s intervention was purely symbolic, it took place under the aegis of the GCC and was directed at Bahrain’s political survival (Friedman 2012). Qatar and UAE joined the NATO-led intervention in Libya in March 2011. This was Qatar’s first direct and active military intervention abroad (aside from the symbolic interventions in the 1990–91 Kuwait War and the Bahrain uprising) and was part of a declaration of “Arab solutions to Arab problems,” a policy which emphasizes Qatari regional leadership (Young 2013). In analyzing this event, it is worth recalling Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim’s statement: “Qatar will participate in military action because we believe there must be Arab states undertaking

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this action, because the situation there is intolerable” (Ulrichsen 2014). As clarified by HH Sheikh Hamad in an interview for CNN with Wolf Blitzer, Qatar did not see the opposition group in Libya as illegal or terrorist; rather, it saw them as “freedom fighters.” HH Sheikh Hamad stated that it was for this reason that Qatar sent military and financial aid under UN Security Council Resolution 1973. HH Sheikh Hamad also said in the interview that some military equipment even required training, and, as such, Qatar was provided training to the Libyan opposition in order to defeat Qaddafi’s forces (The Emir of Qatar on arming Libyan rebels 2011). The studies also claim that Qatar helped the opposition to sell Libyan oil (Khatib, 2013; The Military Balance 2016 2016; Ulrichsen 2014). Even before military intervention, Qatar was the trigger behind the Arab League’s demand that the UN instigate a nofly zone over Libya, which is an indication of their political power (Echague 2014). There is insufficient literature, whether academic or official documents, concerning Qatar’s role in Libya; however, reports by the RAND Cooperation and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on the Libya operation provide some details on the intervention. Qatar participated in the Libyan conflict on three levels; first, Qatar sent aircraft (six Mirage fighter jets from Qatar, six F-16 s and six Mirages from the UAE); second, it transported materiel and humanitarian aid to the Libyan opposition; and lastly, it sent special forces to fight and help organize the opposition (The Military Balance 2016 2016; Mueller 2015). In addition to this material support, Al Jazeera played a crucial role in spreading the voice of the opposition, while offering a platform for another small Libyan television channel, broadcast from Doha, to convey the real situation on the ground. In the case of Bahrain, Qatar’s official stance was in support of the Kingdom of Bahrain, sending a symbolic police force to help suppress the rebels (Gulf states send forces to Bahrain following protests 2011; The Military Balance 2016 2016). This was a critical situation for the Gulf monarchies, because any political problem in Bahrain regarding the Al-Khalifa family would have a knock-on effect on other GCC countries. Qatar was in fact supportive of change, and perceived the need for good governance in other Middle Eastern countries; however, when it came to the GCC, the official reaction became a “bandwagon” led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In an attempt to explain Qatar’s official approach to Bahrain and Libya, Ulrichsen (2014) summarizes the reasoning behind the policy changes, stating that “the uprisings in North Africa did not present a material or ideological threat to Qatari interests in the same way that a revolt against a fellow ruling family just 25 miles off Qatar’s western shore did” (Ulrichsen 2014). Therefore, in response to the uprisings in Bahrain, it was crucial for the monarchies of the Gulf to present a common stance against the world and in particular Iran, which was responsible for the unrest. In addition, intervention in Bahrain reflected three dynamics within Qatari political and military security policy. First, as stated earlier, it represented a common GCC stance, whereby Qatar emphasized its ties with the GCC in terms of the political security apparatus. Second, the deployment of Qatari police in Bahrain was an indication of military power, even if such support was merely symbolic. Third, this can

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be defined as de facto nationalism, in other words an instantaneous set of actions intended to prevent any spill-over into other GCC countries (Friedman 2013).

Conflicting Approaches to Regional Politics Amid the new atmosphere of the Arab Spring, the Gulf States’ conflicting approaches to regional politics were shaped by the ramifications of this political earthquake for the GCC countries. In this section we elucidate three key effects of the Arab Spring on Gulf politics: the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood; Saudi interventionism; and intra-GCC rivalry. The reasons and motivations behind the Gulf crisis will become clearer by way of these three cornerstones of antagonism in the GCC. A series of unexpected changes in the Middle East fostered tension between the GCC countries, due in part to the conflicting stances taken by Qatar and some of the GCC countries. This divergence began immediately following the military coup in Egypt, which also coincided with HH Sheikh Tamim’s accession to power. When the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, was elected as president, Qatar made donations to Egypt totaling $5 billion, and planned to invest $18 billion in the country for the next five years (The Associated Press 2013). QInvest, Qatar’s leading investment group, declared that it would purchase a majority stake in Egypt’s biggest investment bank, EFG Hermes (Giglio 2013). As opposed to Qatar’s positive and supportive reaction to an elected Islamist leader, the UAE and Saudi Arabia did not stand behind the idea of democratic governance promoted by political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, when the military coup happened in July 2013, Saudi Arabia cut ties with Morsi, and military cooperation with the Egyptian Armed Forces continued. The largest joint Egyptian–Saudi military action, named Tabouk 3, took place, and joint air forces exercises, named Faisal 10, were also conducted (Saudi Arabia and Egypt carry out joint drills 2014). Although the Saudis were able to develop these relations under Morsi’s governance, when Sisi took power Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE pledged $12 billion in aid to Egypt. Saudi King Abdullah defended the Egyptian military’s violent repression of protestors, defining them as supporters of terrorism, while the Saudi foreign minister announced that additional economic aid would be provided to Egypt since its US aid had been withdrawn (Hearst 2013). Hence, Egypt was the first case to spark intra-GCC tension regarding the ramifications of the Arab Spring for two reasons: the divergent positioning of Arab Gulf States; and the Muslim Brotherhood being a key player in the region.

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Is the Muslim Brotherhood the Fault Line of the GCC? The Qatari role in Egypt reveals its long-term political cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood. When members of the Muslim Brotherhood started to encounter problems in Egypt during the period of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qatar was one of their preferred destinations. Many scholars and supporters, including Yousef Al-Qaradawi, arrived in Doha and started to coordinate their activities from there (Roberts 2017; Ulrichsen 2014). Hence, the fact that Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were supported by Qatari foreign policy after January 25 was not surprising. Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood has given rise to criticism and accusations concerning the state’s foreign policy after the Arab Spring. Initially, Qatari policy towards changes in the authoritarian regimes in the region was interpreted as re-orienting foreign policy towards a more interventionist approach (Roberts 2012). When the coup in Egypt led to a power shift, anti–Muslim Brotherhood approaches in the UAE and Saudi Arabia became more visible. While these countries began to see the movement as a threat to their internal security, Qatar did not share this view of the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the region. The Saudis blame Muslim Brotherhood for supporting Saddam Hussein in 1990, for radicalizing the youth, and for publicly criticizing the regime and Saudi policymaking in Egypt and Syria (Roberts 2017). This contradictory approach triggered a diplomatic crisis, including the withdrawal of Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini ambassadors from Qatar on 5 March 2014, “which is the most vivid example of the backlash against Qatari policies” (Echague 2014). As Echague records, the GCC countries collectively announced that they would “implement a November 2013 agreement not to back anyone threatening the security and stability of the GCC whether as groups or individuals—via direct security work or through political influence,” and would not support “hostile media” (Echague 2014). Following this, in 2014 the Saudi government issued a new terrorism law and the Muslim Brotherhood was officially designated as a terrorist group. The UAE added the Muslim Brotherhood to the list of terrorist organizations in November with its new terror law. The underlying reason for this anti–Muslim Brotherhood stance is rooted in the security of the regime. This transnational and religiously driven group has the power to mobilize people, especially the youth. The Arab Spring, at the very beginning, had visibly enhanced this power. For Arab countries, the crucial thing in the response to the Arab Spring was to provide for regime survival, since these revolts were against the Arabs’ own rulers, not those favored by the West or Israel (Gause 2011). This put transnational organizations at the heart of the risk register for those countries that looked on these activities as a threat to their regimes. However, Qatar was not concerned in this regard, which in turn led to a divergence of its political stance towards the Brotherhood from its GCC counterparts. Since Muslim Brotherhood members were accused of participating in underground anti-regime activities in these states, in addition to their actions in support of democracy in the region, Qatar’s relations with the Muslim Brotherhood can be interpreted in relation to the domestic affairs of the UAE and Saudi Arabia (Al

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Qassemi 2013; Echague 2014). Qatar was also accused of “picking winners” and supporting only Muslim Brotherhood–based solutions in Syria and Egypt, rather than maintaining a neutral stance, due to its long-term relation with the Brotherhood. Al Qassemi (2014) claims that Qatar focused only on backing the Muslim Brotherhood, instead of taking a step back and reshaping its policy in Egypt, which prompted “an annus horribilus for Qatar” (Al Qassemi 2014). As such, the Syrian case became a source of tension between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, reflecting widening disagreements rather than cooperation in policy approaches. However, some scholars (Echague 2014; Roberts 2014) have interpreted the Qatari–Muslim Brotherhood relations as a pragmatic part of the small state’s foreign policy, which might be re-oriented when Qatari priorities change.

Saudi Interventionism in the Region: Yemen The GCC policy towards Yemen has been mired in controversy, and thus may provide a good illustration of the underlying reasons for the tensions between Gulf States. Internal problems in Yemen began in 2004 and continued until 2010, with Houthis revolting against the government in the Northern Saada Province. The initial reason behind Qatar’s involvement in the conflict was its 2007 mediation policy (Barakat 2014). Former Qatari Emir HH Sheikh Hamad went on a state-level visit to Yemen and announced Qatar’s willingness to mediate between disputants, upon an invitation by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. HH Emir Sheikh Hamad added that if the countries ended the war, Qatar would invest in Yemen for reconstruction. Although the concerned parties gathered in Doha twice (in 2007 and in 2010), and reached ceasefires in 2007 and 2010, the Qatari mediation effort in Yemen was less successful and enduring than the one in Lebanon (Barakat 2014). Qatar’s peace support agreements between disputants included providing $300– 500 million in reconstruction assistance for Saada province, securing the release of Yemeni prisoners, granting amnesties, and disarming Houthi rebels. President Saleh wanted control over this foreign aid fund. However, Qataris did not give this power to him as they did not invest the time needed for managing the fund properly. This is one reason for the failure of mediation, and it led to discord between the Qatari and Yemeni governments, reaching a point where Qatar withdrew its promise of financial aid to Saada. After this first era of mediation, Qatar made a second attempt in 2010, but this time Saudis were also present with their military force (Barakat 2014). In Barakat’s (2014) study, Qatar’s role in Yemen is described as follows, quoting the International Crisis Group: “the initiative essentially amounted to throwing money at a problem, hoping it would disappear” (Barakat 2014). Whether this is the real reason for failure, or whether the Saudi intervention was more to blame, Qatar’s diplomacy-oriented policymaking has not been adopted and the process has been conducted with less personal intervention on the part of HH the then Emir Sheikh Hamad. Thus, this prominent example of Saudi interventionism in Qatari political

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strategy and maneuvering in the Middle East began in the mid 2000s and provides us with some useful insights into the dynamics of the current crisis. The 2011 uprisings, part of the larger Arab Spring movement, prompted a second level of Qatari involvement in Yemen. President Saleh was not happy with Qatar’s involvement and declared so publicly, even before the Arab Spring. Saudi Arabia was operating in support of the central government and Saleh’s power in the country; however, this did not prevent the GCC from initiating a Transition Agreement on 23 November 2011, and Saleh left the presidential office (Yemen Transition Agreement 2011 2011). This signified a breaking point in the GCC, because although it looked like a collective decision, it later transpired to have been a Saudi-led agreement, the political process in general, including the coalition, was also Saudi-led (Karim 2017). After the Houthis took control of Sanaa in 20l4, an Arab coalition was formed, consisting of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Sudan, with American logistical support, and on 26 March 2015 Operation Decisive Storm commenced. This operation came about following a request by Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and was followed by Operation Restoring Hope in April 2015, to provide humanitarian aid to the Yemeni locals (Zweiri 2017). There has been little official information released with regard to Qatari opinion on Saudi-led policymaking starting with the 2011 Transition Agreement and followed by the military operation. An exception is Defense Minister Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah’s speech on TRT World after the Gulf Crisis: We are … a member of the GCC and at [the same] time we have our own opinion on how to solve the situation in Yemen. We always believe in dialogue. We always believe in development as the shortest way to solve issues such [as] the one in Yemen. And when people start to find hope, they can forget about extremism. But unfortunately, we find ourselves obliged to join the coalition.

This could be understood as saying that Qatar was supportive of non-military action, but did not depart from the GCC line (Lennie, 2017). The military operation in Yemen has caused some consternation in the international community on account of its highly negative impact on civilians, while also causing significant destruction of historical sites and neighborhoods in Yemen. These humanitarian crises include a wave of food insecurity for almost 18 million people (Yemen conflict: How bad is the humanitarian crisis? 2017) and a cholera epidemic (Asrar 2017). This has put the military operation at the center of criticism. Many articles were published after 5 June holding Qatar responsible for the failure of the military operation in Yemen. These articles blame Qatar for sharing the coalition’s intelligence with Al-Qaida and the Houthis (Al Deen 2017; Arab coalition suspends Qatar’s participation in Yemen 2017; Qatar helped Al Qaida target UAE troops in Yemen: diplomat 2017). In a speech to the BBC, Omar Saif Ghobash, the UAE’s ambassador to Russia, publicly alleged that Qatari intelligence shared information with Al-Qaida in Yemen (Omar Saif Ghobash, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Russia 2017); however, there is no documentary evidence in support of these accusations. In speeches made by HH Emir Sheikh Tamim, including his first speech to the public after the crisis and his second speech at the UN General

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Assembly, allegations of Qatar’s cooperation with terrorist groups are denied (Emir speech in full text: Qatar ready for dialogue but won’t compromise on sovereignty 2017; In Full Text: The speech of Qatar Emir at the opening session of UN General Assembly 2017). Defense Minister Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah states that “we’ve never been inside Yemen by the way; we’ve been defending the border of Saudi … But after the recent aggression on Qatar, they asked us to leave the border of Saudi Arabia, which we did, and all our soldiers are back” (Lennie 2017). The Economist also defines the Qataris’ role in the military coalition in Yemen as “fairly limited,” but adds “nevertheless, [it could] prove distracting and disruptive” (Qatar Crisis Complicates Yemen Civil War 2017). Allegations of Qatari involvement in Yemen are crucial because they seek to use Qatar as a scapegoat for what is happening in Yemen, in terms of both the military failure of the coalition and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. For instance, the Yemeni political analyst Najib Ghallab states that “had it not been for Qatar’s backing of the Houthis, the extremist group would have been destroyed a long time ago,” and blames Qatar for the military failure (How did Qatar back the Houthis in Yemen? 2017). However, Defense Minister Al-Attiyah describes Qatari involvement as symbolic border support, and states that if an investigation committee were to look into the details, it would “find out that we’ve never been engaged in any operation which comes near or in a field of operation where there [are] civilian deaths” (Lennie 2017). In addition to this, the internal conflict in Yemen has been affected by the Gulf crisis, which manifests particular disagreements as regards policymaking in Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Colombo 2017). According to Reuters, when the Gulf crisis erupted, a message of solidarity with Qatar was released from the Yemeni state agency website (El Yaakoubi 2017). Ministers linked to the Islah party were seen as the actors behind this message. The message of support was deleted two hours later and, the next day, the Yemeni government was added to the list of blockading countries. Even inside Islah, the assistant secretary-general Minister of Planning Mohammed al-Saady supported the blockade against Qatar; however, other members of Islah did not follow suit. In addition, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, the head of the Revolutionary Committee of the Houthis, condemned the embargo against Qatar and expressed his support for Qatar while emphasizing its role as a mediator. Hence, this regional rift has concretized divisions, even within the factions of the Yemeni conflict, by forcing them to take sides, all of which makes the prospects of peace seem more distant (Baron 2017; Qatar Crisis Complicates Yemen Civil War 2017). The Saudi–Iranian proxy war in Yemen is seen as part of a “regional cold war,” due to its highly sectarian tone. However, the Qatari stance in Yemen is in support of a diplomatic approach rather than military action, and does not partake of the Saudis’ emphasis on the “Iranian threat agenda.” Moreover, the Saudis were not willing to relinquish their king-maker role in Yemen, which, according to Al Monitor, was damaged when President Hadi visited Doha in July 2013 before heading to Washington, and in light of the catastrophic levels of civilian suffering in the country after the start of the military operation (Al-Muslimi 2013). Saudi policymaking in the region has become more control-oriented since the Arab Spring, where the regime’s

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survival was under threat. This might also explain why Saudi policymaking moved toward the integration of the GCC countries, when they suggested creating a Gulf union in place of a cooperation council after 2011 (Friedman 2013).

Simply an Intra-GCC Rivalry? When considering the Gulf crisis and the impact of the Arab Spring, intra-GCC rivalries are certainly a key part of the picture. The Arab Spring served to reinforce existing rivalries in the GCC, forcing each state to take sides. This is not necessarily done collectively; rather, it reflects and emphasizes state-level interests. So-called regional security complexities, first defined by Buzan et al. (1998), have been applied to the Gulf sub-system by Gause (2010) and Kamrava (2013). Based on this subsystem analysis, the politics of the Gulf has been defined by unique security calculations being made against one another (Wehrey 2013). Tensions in the Middle East after the Arab Spring have been categorized into three blocs: the Iranian-led coalition (Syrian regime, Hezbollah); the group sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood (Turkey, Qatar); and the anti-Muslim Brotherhood or newly emerged anti-Qatar bloc (Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Egypt, and others) (Zweiri 2017). Civil wars in Syria and Yemen, military governance in Egypt, and the current regional rift with Qatar have exacerbated the disagreements between these three blocs. In a similar vein, Abdulla (2014) splits the Arab Gulf States into three groups, depending on their affiliations with the Arab Spring: the most influenced (Oman and Bahrain); the least influenced (Qatar and the UAE); and the partially influenced (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). When these two equations combine, the heterogeneous nature of Arab Gulf States becomes more visible. This is reflected not only in their reactions to this regional change, but also in their balancing, hedging, and deployment of foreign policy. According to Abdulla’s (2014) categorization, both the UAE and Qatar are winners in relation to the Arab Spring. Accordingly, this raises a question: Does this strengthen their rivalry, which erupted amid the Gulf crisis? There is no certain answer to this, but it is undeniable that the Arab Spring made subtle disagreements and rivalries between Gulf States significantly more visible. The Riyadh agreements of 2013 and 2014, which Qatar signed with GCC states, are also examples of intra-GCC tensions which have been in existence—and have at times been erupting—since before the Gulf crisis. These agreements are still not publicly available; however, the Al Arabiya news channel published a couple of pages of the agreements on 10 July 2017. With the help of this leak, several demands made of Qatar and the Riyadh agreements have come to light. In the first Riyadh agreement in 2013, Kuwait was the mediator and was called on to establish “a new phase of fraternal relations” between GCC countries (Exclusive: Documents prove Qatar failed to comply with GCC agreements 2017). In his speech to TRT World, Defense Minister Al-Attiyah mentioned that after HH Emir Sheikh Tamim’s accession to power, his Kuwaiti counterpart called him and relayed Saudi complaints about Qatar, reportedly saying: “Qatar is making trouble in the region and we have

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to come together quickly to solve this issue” (Lennie 2017). In all likelihood, this comment refers to the 2013 Riyadh agreement. According to Al Arabiya, the second phase of the agreement was in November 2014 with the participation of the King of Bahrain, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the Prime Minister of the UAE. The GCC states signed the agreement on the basis of seeking to eliminate the diversity in approaches that arose with the Arab Spring (Exclusive: Documents prove Qatar failed to comply with GCC agreements 2017). This takes us to our main argument here, namely that GCC-level positions are strongly divided, with countries adopting diverse stances in the region, whereas Qatar has been forced to change its position first. “Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood,” the expulsion of all affiliated noncitizens from Qatar, and the promise to not harbor any person with harmful agendas toward GCC security and the legitimate regimes in Yemen and Egypt, were all on the agenda for the agreement. However, all these definitions of “harmful agendas,” the Muslim Brotherhood, and affiliated non-citizens are created by other parties in the agreement excluding Qatar. Hence, there was an extreme tension over these demands between Qatar and its GCC partners. Furthermore, an emphasis on Yemen and Egypt supports our argument that sees these two cases as major cracks in GCC policymaking in the region. When Defense Minister Al-Attiyah was asked about the roots of the current crisis, he remarked clearly that this tension dated back to 1996 (when a Saudi-supported coup attempt was made in Qatar against HH the then Emir Sheikh Hamad), and was renewed in 2013–14 when ambassadors were withdrawn. Furthermore, Al-Attiyah argued that this strain is about “the attitude of the state of Qatar,” rather than the ruling personalities (HH Emir Sheikh Tamim or the Father Emir HH Sheikh Hamad). What constitutes the Qatari attitude, then? In discussions of the impact of the Arab Spring on the Gulf States, a “normalist” perspective would see those states as not immune to the impact of these events, whereas an “exceptionalist” one countenances the possibility of immunity. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla (2014) argues that both of these views can be accommodated in the discussion by saying that “these states are probably revolution resistant, but not political reform resistant,” in spite of how wealthy they are. Qatar and Kuwait did not resist the change in the region and supported these movements and people, as opposed to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, including Bahrain, which chose to support the regional status quo. Hence, this demonstrates the conflicting approaches and rivalries within regional politics, which are underlined by foreign policy preferences after the Arab Spring. Given the unique social and political structure of the Gulf region, the issue of identity politics regarding neo-nationalism also requires some attention. While discussing the disunity of the Gulf States, we can say that transnational identity of being Khaliji (i.e., people of the Arab Peninsula) has been challenged by an emphasis on being Saudi, Emirati, or Qatari. Diwan (2016) calls this a “new nationalism,” which is seen as reflecting “the decline of the power of the welfare state to engender gratitude and loyalty.” With economic changes, demographic timebombs, and the rise of regional conflicts, these oil monarchies have begun to invest more in cultural policies and national identity. Diwan (2016) includes museums, national days, and even military

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operations as part of this phenomenon. Yet this was also the case before the crisis, and this form of micro-nationalism has exerted its power on society through an unexpected rift in the region. Hence, identity politics can be interpreted both as a reason for intra-GCC rivalry and as an outcome of the Gulf crisis. Saudi nationals can thus be proud of their military operation in Yemen against their enemy—Iran—and can hold Qatar responsible for the intervention’s failure. The emphasis on national identities was already heightened prior to the crisis, with national visions and national day celebrations; however, the blockade has revealed an entirely new side to it. Qataris were isolated by their neighbors and left to live under an embargo in the holy month of Ramadan. When HH Emir Sheikh Tamim left the country for the first time after the blockade, his return to Qatar was celebrated with a national parade in the Corniche and a live broadcast on the national TV channel Al-Rayyan. This was just one day after the 87th celebration of the national day in Saudi Arabia, on 23 September 2017. Thus, it is no surprise that new iterations of nationalism in the Gulf countries have contributed to the disunity and the fragile nature of the politics of the region, especially after the Arab Spring.

Where Iran and Turkey Stand in This Regional Complexity Although both the Arab Spring and the Gulf crisis are primarily anchored in the Arab states, both Iran and Turkey—major non-Arab players in the Middle East— have joined the division in the region. Disagreements are evident not just in the Arab context; they also feature across the Middle East in terms of how these states have perceived the Arab Spring and its various ramifications. While Turkey adopted a more pro-change approach, Iran stood with the status quo (Elik 2018). The Arab Spring split these two regional powers; however, both Iran and Turkey were on the list of the 13 demands, which make them part of the Gulf crisis (Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis 2017). This time, neither Iran nor Turkey have yet to choose a side; instead, they have been brought to the crisis due to their positioning in relation to the Arab Spring. Although Iran and Turkey adopted divergent positions during the Arab Spring, neither of them aligned with the direction of the Saudi-led bloc. In other words, while Turkey and Qatar were supportive of change and the policies oriented around the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran backed the status quo alongside an accommodation of a Shia-oriented sectarian policy. This suggests that the Gulf crisis is an after-effect of the Arab Spring not only for Arab states, but also for the non-Arab powers of the Middle East, compelling the latter to become partisan.

Conclusion Surveying the rivalry or disagreement between the GCC states which became manifest with the advent of the Arab Spring, our underlying question was what were

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the roots of these conflicting approaches? In response, we have sought to show that the diverse stances of the Gulf countries have been constructed incrementally and were triggered during the successive ramifications of the Arab Spring. The countries of the Middle East have been faced with devastating situations throughout the twentieth century; yet the GCC states have nevertheless remained in relatively stable positions. The Arab Spring provoked a region-wide rift, encompassing both the Arab and non-Arab powers of the Middle East. What is more, it has still not come to an end. The effects of the Arab Spring continue to be felt in the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the civil war in Yemen, and intra-GCC rivalries. Iran and Turkey are also forcibly joining this crisis in the Gulf, and the processes of fragmentation in the region are overlapping. Since 2011 these divisions in the Middle East have come to penetrate the realm of regional politics, and the GCC countries seem to be affected by this development, with no easy exit from the Gulf crisis on the horizon. The tense relations between the oil monarchies in the Gulf are no longer immune to the divergence of approaches, divided as they are between pro- and anti-Qatar blocs, which could well lead to total disunity in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Yemeni civil war, and GCC-wide rivalries over the scope of the current crisis all demonstrate that the Middle East has yet to move beyond the repercussions of the Arab Spring. In light of this, there is no clear contingency plan for the Gulf.

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Colombo, S. (2017). Foreign policy activism in Saudi Arabia and Oman. Diverging narratives and stances TOWARDS the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts. The International Spectator, 52(2), 54–70. Diwan, K. (2016). Gulf societies in transition: National identity and national projects in the Arab Gulf states. In Workshop Report. Published by The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW). Echague, A. (2014). Emboldened yet vulnerable: The changing foreign policies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Working Paper No. 123, July 2014. FRIDE-European Think Tank for Global Action. El Yaakoubi, A. (2017). Qatar crisis strains Saudi-led Arab alliance in Yemen war. Reuters. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com. Elik, S. (2018). The Arab Spring and Turkish-Iranian Relations. In H. I¸sıksal & O. Göksel (Eds.), Turkey’s relations with the Middle East (pp. 2011–2016). Cham: Springer. The Emir of Qatar on arming Libyan rebels. (2011, April 14). CNN. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/14/the-emir-of-qatar-talks-to-wolf-bli tzer-about-weapons-to-libyan-rebels/. Emir speech in full text: Qatar ready for dialogue but won’t compromise on sovereignty. (2017). The Peninsula Qatar. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com. Exclusive: Documents prove Qatar failed to comply with GCC agreements. (2017). Al Arabiya. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from https://english.alarabiya.net. Friedman, B. (2012). Battle for Bahrain: What one uprising meant for the Gulf states and Iran. World Affairs, 174(6), 74–84. Friedman, B. (2013). The Arab Gulf states: Balancing regional security and domestic political changes. Bustan: The Middle East Book Review, 4(1), 43–56. Gause, F. (2010). The International relations of the Persian Gulf . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gause, F. (2011). Why Middle East studies missed the Arab Spring: The myth of authoritarian stability. Foreign Affairs, 90(4), 81–90. Giglio, M. (2013, April 11). Qatar sends aid money to help Egypt. The Daily Beast. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.thedailybeast.com. Gulf States send forces to Bahrain following protests. (2011). BBC. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12729786. How did Qatar back the Houthis in Yemen? (2017). Egypt Today. Retrieved March 11, 2020, from https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/15264/How-did-Qatar-back-the-Houthis-in-Yemen. Hearst, D. (2013, August 20). Why Saudi Arabia is taking a risk by backing the Egyptian coup. The Guardian. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com. In Full Text: The speech of Qatar Emir at the opening session of UN General Assembly. (2017). The Peninsula. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com. Kamrava, M. (2012). The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution. Orbis, 56(1), 96–104. Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar: Small state, big politics. Cornell University Press. Karim, U. (2017). The evolution of Saudi foreign policy and the role of decision-making processes and actors. The International Spectator, 52(2), 71–88. Khatib, L. (2013). Qatar’s foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism. International Affairs, 89(2), 417–431. Lennie, S. (2017). Qatar’s “so-called brothers” have a long history of meddling. TRT World. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.trtworld.com/. The Military Balance 2016. (2016). International institute for strategic studies (IISS). Retrieved Feb, 2016, from https://www.iiss.org. Mueller, K. P. (2015). Precision and purpose: Airpower in the Libyan civil war. California: Rand Corporation. Omar Saif Ghobash—Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Russia. (2017). BBC. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08y9vfr. Press, Associate. (2013, 08 January). Qatar doubles aid to Egypt. NY Times. Retrieved from http:// www.nytimes.com/.

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Chapter 3

Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement: Challenging the Regional Status Quo in the Gulf Security Sub-complex Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin

With the election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP hereafter)1 and Qatar’s leadership change in 1995, there is no doubt that interactions between Turkey and Qatar have gained pace. The Turkey–Qatar alliance reached a new high after the Arab Spring, with these two countries emerging as two pro-revolutionary states that are disturbing the status quo in the Middle East. The ties established between Turkey and Qatar have continued even after the Arab uprisings: Turkey stood by Qatar during the 2017–18 diplomatic crisis between Qatar and the Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. Similarly, Qatar supported Turkey financially after the devastating currency crisis in August 2018. Moreover, Turkey has established a military base in Qatar, which is of critical significance in the history of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, one can safely argue that Turkey and Qatar have formed an alliance based on their diverse military and economic needs. This analysis argues that Turkey and Qatar sought to change the regional status quo in order to forge a new regional security order. Accordingly, to achieve this goal, Turkey and Qatar cemented an alliance based on their diverse qualities as military and financial powers respectively. Nevertheless, the fundamental cause of the Turkish– Qatari alliance in challenging the regional status quo lies not only in concerns related to their security or power-seeking behavior, but also in certain shared values and common visions based on their ideas and identities. Therefore, it can be claimed that the transformation in the domestic politics of these states played a decisive role in shaping the Turkey–Qatar alliance, which in turn has had a major impact on the regional mosaic in the Middle East. In a nutshell, this paper contends that the Gulf security sub-complex was reshaped in the wake of the Arab uprisings, notably through the emergence of Turkey and Qatar as revisionist states. Accordingly, it 1 In

Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, commonly abbreviated AK Parti or (unofficially) AKP.

M. C. Öz¸sahin (B) Department of International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_3

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can further be maintained that the Gulf security sub-complex acquired a multi-polar configuration with the changing power distribution and arising of new amity–enmity relationships. This paper is divided into several sections: first, the Qatar–Turkey alliance will be analyzed by focusing on the transformation of each country individually; second, the concept of a security complex will be defined with specific reference to the Gulf security sub-complex; and third, the implications of the Qatar–Turkey alliance for the regional security sub-complex will be examined.

Foreign Policy Change and Its Structural Ramifications The Arab Spring created a new security environment, and the regional landscape changed dramatically with the emergence of non-state actors in addition to newly assertive regional powers. Turkey and Qatar were no exceptions as they sought to take advantage of the new international environment emanating from the creative destruction caused by the Arab uprisings. Certainly, the Gulf security sub-complex was dramatically transformed in line with this overall regional change. Nevertheless, in order to understand the transformation in this region, it is imperative to analyze the international system—particularly the postures of the power poles. As a matter of fact, the politics of the Gulf region cannot be fully understood without taking nonregional influences into account. As succinctly noted by Oktav (2011, p. 139), “Gulf security is a sub-regional complex constructed around the position of the United States.” In this regard, the attitude of the United States towards the Middle East is an important parameter that needs to be taken into consideration. This is particularly true as regards Obama’s foreign policy during the Arab Spring, with some theoretical accounts suggesting that his foreign policy strategy must be linked to the isolationist trends within US policy (Metzger, 2011). As Hinnebusch (2014, pp. 54–72) contends in a similar way, it can safely be argued that the United States played the role of gamemaker in the Middle East from the Gulf War up until Obama’s gradual withdrawal from the region. According to Kamrava (2018), rising multi-polarity coupled with the retrenchment of the United States caused further fragmentation in this region. From this perspective, it can be maintained that Turkey and Qatar, as two regional powers, strove to fill the power vacuum after the United States left (Phillips 2017, p. 37). However, despite the structural reasoning described above, one needs to answer the question of why Qatar and Turkey saw the regional change after the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to form an alliance, whereas other regional powers dismissed it altogether. In order to understand these changes, it is imperative to delve into these states’ domestic politics, which enabled their foreign policy revisionism. This means that an actor-specific theory is necessary to account for the foreign policy activism of these two states. In this sense, it should be noted that both Qatar and Turkey underwent a dramatic change that served as the basis of their foreign policy

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activism. While the rise of the JDP in Turkey brought about a more engagementoriented foreign policy encompassing the Middle East, the foreign policy of Qatar’s reformist leader HH Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani adopted a similar line in terms of its active foreign relations. Palmer and Morgan (2011) offer a pertinent account of foreign policy behavior: states either opt to maintain the status quo or to change it with revisionist aspirations. The decision to change or keep the status quo is based on decision makers’ cost–benefit analyses. As they aptly put it, “leaders have to decide whether they want to protect something they like or attempt to bring about a change in some situation to conform more to their preferences” (Palmer and Morgan 2011, p. 2).2 In the cases of Turkey and Qatar, both countries took revisionist positions in the face of the developments that unfolded in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Uprisings (Ba¸skan 2016, p. 35; for Turkey’s revisionism, see Özpek and Demira˘g 2014; Öni¸s 2014). It is obvious that such revisionism has brought about a change in regional affairs.

The Roots of the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf Putting the imperial period aside, the relationship between the Turkish Republic and the Gulf countries has a historical background that goes back to the middle of the 1960s. Until then, prevalent Western-oriented and threat-based elite perceptions had prevented Turkey from engaging in positive relations with the Middle Eastern countries (Altunisik 2005, pp. 173–174; Aydın 2000). From the mid 1960s onwards, Third Worldism gained in popularity amid recurring tensions between the United States and Turkey. During those years, Turkey started to show a considerable interest in the Middle East. Concomitantly, not only did Turkey join the Organization of the Islamic States but also adopted pro-Palestinian politics (Aydin 2000; Balcı 2013, pp. 152–155; Taspinar 2008, pp. 8–9; Özcan 2008, pp. 93–94). Thereafter, the energy crises of the 1970s, which had a devastating impact on Turkey, reinforced its relations with the Gulf states and more specifically with Saudi Arabia (Köni 2012, pp. 100– 101). As well as all of these events, another tumultuous occasion for the region—in addition to the shift in Turkish foreign policy—was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Since then, Iran as a revolutionary power has been considered the ultimate threat to the whole region—not only for Turkey, but also for other Sunni nations of the region (Aras 2001, p. 106). Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Turgut Özal, who served first as premier and later as president of Turkey, had a considerable influence on making foreign policy, and was the one who formed close ties with the Gulf states via his pragmatic foreign policy (Aral 2001). However, relations with the Gulf countries have undergone an ebb and flow ever since. For example, Turkey’s dam-building on the rivers extending into Syria and Iraq has led to anxiety on the parts of the latter, and their revindications 2 For

further refinement of the status quo versus revisionism debate, see (Schweller, 1994).

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were also supported by the Gulf States in regional forums during the 1980s and 1990s (Olson 1997, pp. 169, 176). Another watershed moment in the history of the Middle East was the Gulf War of 1991, which compelled Turkey and other Gulf countries to collaborate with each other as regional allies of the United States (Hale 1992). During the second half of the 1990s, on the other hand, the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, along with his Welfare Party, became visible in Turkish politics as another actor challenging the contours of Turkish foreign policy. However, even after the establishment of the Developing Eight (D-8) national alliance, which was designed to generate economic integration for Muslim countries, the Gulf nations stayed out of this alliance (Aral 2005; Robins 1997; Özkan 2006, pp. 171–176). The rise of the JDP in the new millennium, and its landslide victory in 2002, ushered in a new era in terms of Turkey’s domestic politics and its foreign policy. During this period, Turkey did not only civilize its military-dominated politics in terms of civil–military relationships, but also attained high levels of economic growth during the early years of JDP rule. With respect to its foreign policy, by rejecting traditional foreign policy implying neutrality and detachment, new cadres of Turkish foreign policy-makers opted to envisage Turkey as a “central country.” As one of the architects of Turkish foreign policy, former prime minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu asserts that: In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs. (Davuto˘glu 2008, p. 78).

From this perspective, Turkey under the JDP followed a foreign policy aimed at enhancing relations with its immediate neighbors in addition to broadening its foreign policy horizons to encompass new geographies, including Asia and Africa (Özkan 2011). During this period, Turkey entered into mediation efforts, mended its ties with adjacent countries, and increased its overall trade volume. With regards to the Middle East, there is no doubt that the Gulf region has been a major significant influence on Turkey’s new foreign policy activism. Coupled with the intensification of relations with the Islamic states, the Gulf countries certainly appealed to Turkish decision makers. The main reason why the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries were crucial for Turkey was that Turkey aimed to attract those countries in order to boost their market shares (Hürsoy 2013, pp. 509–516; Karda¸s 2012, p. 2). Therefore, a Turkey–GCC strategic dialogue was established during this period to further the Turkey–Gulf interaction (Aras and Akpınar 2017, p. 3; Ba¸skan 2016, p. 54; Ba¸skan 2011, p. 163; Karda¸s 2012, p. 1). However, during this time, Turkey and the Gulf countries not only established strong economic ties but also engendered relationships which had both diplomatic and security dimensions. For example, there were intense diplomatic exchanges between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the most important of which is undoubtedly King Abdullah’s visit to Istanbul, which resulted in further intensification with respect to diplomatic and security cooperation (Ataman 2012,

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p. 126; Ba¸skan 2016, p. 53; Ba¸skan 2011, p. 163; Hürsoy 2013, p. 510). In addition to bilateral ties, in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium the Gulf countries and Turkey opened communication channels through regional organizations. For instance, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries elected Ekmeleddin ˙Ihsano˘glu of Turkey as its secretary-general in 2005, with the support of the Gulf countries (Kösebalaban 2011, p. 94; Özkan 2006, p. 183). However, Turkey’s intimate relations with the Gulf countries gradually started to deteriorate as a result of the Arab uprisings that began in 2010 and continued for several years afterwards. As Phillips (2017) argued, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey had formed an alliance to topple the Assad regime in Syria in the early stages of uprisings, their collaboration did not last long because of the division emerging between the Qatar–Turkey bloc and the rest of the Gulf monarchies over the Arab Spring and the region’s future. Similar tensions appearing between Turkey and Saudi Arabia influenced the Gulf monarchies after the uprisings subsided. As Ataman (2012 p. 121) pointed out along the same lines, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were not in agreement on “the pace and scope of change” during the Arab Spring. In other words, during the uprisings, while Turkey played the role of a pro-revolutionary democratic state with Muslim rulers, Saudi Arabia showcased an introverted Sharia state that resisted change (Ennis and Momani 2013). However, Turkey’s identification of itself as an “agenda setter” state waned with the unfolding events in the Syrian civil war (Özpek and Demira˘g 2014).3 Congruent with this, it can be advanced that in contrast with its ambitious policy agenda, Turkey has taken a more defensive posture in regional affairs especially after the rising influence of the PYD, the Syrian branch of the Kurdish separatist movement, on its Syrian border (Dalay 2016).

Changing Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Rift Between the Gulf States In order to understand the impetus behind the Turkey–Qatar alliance and its regional implications, it is vital to comprehend Qatar’s internal transformation. Qatar’s foreign policy showed signs of change during the reign of HH Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Nevertheless, the advent of HH Hamad Al-Thani was not welcomed by all regional powers—especially not by Saudi Arabia. Such discontent paved the way for a palace coup allegedly orchestrated by the Saudi government and its regional allies. Thereafter, in order to counterbalance the Saudi influence in the region, Qatar set about to enact an assertive and independent political agenda encompassing remarkable endeavors both in domestic and foreign policy (Abu Sulaib 2017, p. 41; Ba¸skan 2016, p. 41; Roberts 2012, pp. 234–235). The creation of municipal and advisory councils that allowed women to participate were important steps towards partial democratization in domestic politics (Bahry 3 For

a similar emphasis on Turkish Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, see Öni¸s (2014).

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1999). On the other hand, with respect to foreign policy, Qatar, as a country taking advantage of public diplomacy and, in more general terms, soft power sources, has made its foreign policy agenda assertive (Antwi-Boateng 2014; Brannagan and Giulianotti 2018 pp. 1139–1143). There is no doubt that the Doha-based Al Jazeera— dating back to 1996—has been a flagship institution in the Arab World (Ba¸skan 2016, p. 42). As Bianco succinctly stated: Since its establishment in 1996, Al Jazeera was a formidable instrument of region-wide soft power for the Qataris and was perceived as a major headache outside of their control for other rulers in the region, especially to Saudi Arabia, which received intense critical coverage (Bianco 2018, p. 4).

Starting with the rule of HH Emir Hamad, and followed by that of HH Emir Tamim, Qatar has made enormous strides in humanitarian and mediation missions. Qatar has emerged as a neutral mediator for countries in the Middle East such as Yemen, Sudan, and Lebanon (Kamrava 2011). By the same token, Qatar has not hesitated to use its gigantic economic capacity to win people’s hearts and minds in diverse geographies by joining a plethora of humanitarian missions; either providing humanitarian and developmental aid or sometimes via unofficial donations, Qatar has been able to boost its image extensively in the Muslim world (Zureik 2018). Taking all of these factors into consideration, one can safely argue that Qatar has turned into an influential power in the Gulf region over the last decade. Qatar’s foreign policy posture crystallized with the Arab Spring. At that point, Qatar surfaced as an exceptional country in contrast to other regional powers in the sense that it was in full support of the Arab Spring’s democratic agenda. However, Qatar’s capabilities—based on its soft power and its rising regional prestige—were deemed to be threatening by the rest of the Gulf States. More important is that Qatar, as an autonomous power independent of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, has proven to be dangerous for the Saudi-led Arab coalition (Abu Sulaib 2017, p. 41; Roberts 2012, pp. 234–235). In other words, Qatar succeeded in distinguishing itself from the rest of the Gulf countries by promoting a pro–Muslim Brotherhood narrative, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Bahraini ambassadors from Qatar in 2014 (Abu Sulaib 2017, p. 32). Isaac, further details the diplomatic crises of 2014, emphasizing the causes: The Gulf States’ relations with Qatar reached their lowest point when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain decided to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar in March 2014 over its close support for the fallen Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt and outspoken resistance to the newly military-backed regime. Openly, the three GCC members justified the withdrawal of their ambassadors by accusing Qatar of interfering in the internal affairs of other states. There is also no full agreement within the GCC on Syria, as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are frequently reported to be supporting different opposition factions. Apart from the recent case of Egypt, previous disagreements within the GCC have usually involved their different degrees of openness to Iran… (Isaac 2015, pp. 161–162)

Yet another watershed moment between Qatar and its adversaries was the blockade against Qatar. The Qatar blockade, which banned travel in addition to trade, was initiated in 2017 by four states, known as the Quartet—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

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Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain. These four countries made lifting the blockade conditional on Qatar meeting stringent demands, including, but not limited to, shutting down Al Jazeera and a halt to supporting “terrorists”—pointing to the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran (Ulrichsen 2018; Wintour 2017). Despite diplomatic threats, Qatar refused to comply with those demands and started a counter-diplomatic maneuver. Accordingly, with the economic support of Iran and Turkey, Qatar strove to overcome the negative effects of the blockade and returned to its routine (Ulrichsen 2018). Again, Qatar embarked on a public diplomacy campaign to reverse the Quartet’s anti-Qatar rhetoric, which, in turn, successfully neutralized the pro-Quartet media (Hassan 2018). These developments certainly revealed the deep rift between Qatar and the Quartet, which does not seem to have improved as of writing. The blockade crisis, on the other hand, was a test for the Turkey–Qatar relationship, and as such both sides proved their resilience in the face of external threats.

A Framework for Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement In order to understand the parameters of the Turkey–Qatar alliance, one needs to look not only into the material exchanges between countries but also to a common vision emanating from beliefs and identities. This means that overlapping ideas concerning an alternative regional order render such an alliance possible for both states. That is to say, other than security concerns and power-seeking motives, there are other ideological factors that bind these two states. Drawing from Haas’s (2014) theoretical approach, Gause (2017a) argued that there is an “ideological multi-polarity” that shapes the Gulf’s politics, including the alliance patterns among the regional states. Turkey, although not a Gulf country, collaborated with Qatar in its regional policy based on a common vision. During the Arab Spring, both of these countries embraced democratic transitions in the region, mostly under the guidance of the Muslim Brotherhood (Aras and Akpınar 2017, p. 3; Ulrichsen, 2014, pp. 3–4). Both Turkey and Qatar viewed the Arab uprisings as a window for a new security complex. Since both countries desire to increase their influence in their immediate areas, they have adopted more assertive foreign policies that conform with their rising capabilities (Ba¸skan 2016, pp. 83–84; Phillips 2017, p. 37). In other words, each of these countries firmly endorsed the idea that they should pursue a more proactive diplomacy. For both Turkey and Qatar, their (new) foreign policy took its lead from a “geopolitical reasoning” based on altered regional amity–enmity dichotomies (Pala and Aras 2015). Hence both these countries—so diverse in terms of their qualities and capabilities—have collaborated to challenge the Saudi-led hegemony in one of the regional blocs. Compared with the entrenched powers of the Middle East such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Qatar is generally labelled a small power (Cooper and Momani 2011), whereas Turkey is only “a late-comer” or a longtime bystander in the region (Karda¸s 2012, p. 4). However, both of these countries have aimed for a new regional order via the incorporation of their new policy priorities into their foreign relations.

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The above-mentioned change in Turkey’s foreign policy strategy, accompanied by a deeper engagement with regional affairs, included interactions with the GCC countries. However, the positive relationship formed in earlier years with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates soured after the split in opinion over the fate of the region. That is to say, the Saudi-led coalition within the GCC surfaced as an obstacle that harmed Turkey’s grand regional strategy in the wake of the Arab Spring. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) challenged Turkey’s transformative agenda in almost every case. For example, Turkey was confronted by Saudi Arabia after the Egyptian coup in July 2013 due to Turkish political support for the incumbent government in Egypt (Gause 2017a, p. 673). Apart from the common vision based on ideas and bilateral interactions, Turkey has at the same time been relying on power relationships and interests. This means that Qatar, as another anti-status-quo state, has sided with Turkey in order to balance the Saudi–UAE bloc. As the related literature emphasizes, alliances might be based on either a common threat (Walt 1987) or a common interest (Schweller 1994). In the face of all of these challenges, Turkey has been the main supporter of Qatar, not only in economic and political but also in military terms. Although Qatar has long been hosting US bases, the US military presence has not been an ultimate guarantee of security and peace (Ba¸skan 2011, p. 166). Moreover, the unfavorable US attitude in the initial stages of the blockade caught Qatar unawares (Ulrichsen 2018, p. 13). There is no doubt that such an approach forced Qatar to search for alternative security providers (Ba¸skan 2011, pp. 165–167). Both Qatar and Turkey are change-seeking countries, and this coincides with their increasing capabilities. The ambitious foreign policy agendas of these countries necessitate cooperation based on mutual interests. Thus, one can easily argue that another decisive factor which makes the Turkey– Qatar bloc in the Gulf sub-complex possible is the interdependence between these countries. In terms of military power, Turkey is ranked 9th out of 136 countries according to the Global Firepower Index (GFP 2019). Qatar, on the other hand, has been among the top ten wealthiest countries in the global rankings for the last three years. For this reason, it would be accurate to claim that the Turkey–Qatar alliance is based on security provision in exchange for economic benefits. Turkey’s military presence in Qatar, which it aims to increase to 3,000 troops in the near future, is a security guarantee for Qatar (Aras and Akpınar 2017, p. 4), whereas several times Qatar has channeled huge amounts of aid (resulting from its gigantic economic surplus) in order to boost the strained Turkish economy, including during the currency crisis in August 2018 (Al Jazeera 2018).

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The Gulf Security Sub-complex: From Bi-polarity to Multi-polarity Regions are of paramount importance in understanding the perplexities of world politics. Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde introduced the consideration of regions into security studies with their conceptualization of the “regional security complex” (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Buzan et al. 1998). According to Buzan (1983, p. 106), a regional security complex consists of countries in which “their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde thus translate Waltz’s seminal concept of anarchy at the regional level (see Buzan et al. 1998, p. 13). While Buzan and Wæver (2003) identified the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe as separate regions, these are also considered security sub-complexes from which security complexes are formed. The Middle East regional security complex consists of three sub-complexes, which are the Levant, Gulf, and Maghreb sub-complexes (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 190; Erda˘g 2017, p. 13). From a historical perspective, the Gulf security sub-complex was established after the United Kingdom’s retreat from the Gulf in the early 1970s (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 191). From its very beginning, the Gulf sub-regional complex has encapsulated alliances and rivalries, although these have never been stagnant. The Saudi-led Gulf states have constituted a power bloc since the end of the First World War. The GCC emerged as a crystallized alliance of the Gulf countries with the eruption of the Iranian evolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Fawcett 2005, p. 184). Following the revolution in Iran, the Gulf security sub-complex had a bipolar structure consisting of Iran and the anti-Iran Arab states. In this new political environment, the United States became a zealous defender of the Arab monarchies, such that with the end of the Cold War, US insiders counterbalanced Iran and Syria with the Gulf countries and Israel (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 2002, p. 11). Besides this, the inter-Arab tension between Iraq and the Gulf States disappeared with the elimination of Iraq in the first Gulf War, which then further strengthened the area’s bipolarity (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 192). There is no doubt that 9/11 was another watershed moment in terms of its implications for the Gulf region (see Harders 2008). The rising influence of Iran in the region, especially after the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, has been considered a debilitating threat to the GCC countries (Gariup 2008, p. 81). Along these lines, it can be argued that although bilateral relationships have always had their ups and downs, Saudi–Iranian relations became especially strained after 9/11 (Ba¸skan 2016, p. 27). As Oktav (2011, p. 135) emphasized, especially after the removal of Iraq, two poles, Saudi Arabia and Iran, became embroiled in a visible power struggle in the region, which has endured up to the present. As might be understood from the recent history of the Gulf region summarized above, the Gulf security sub-complex is far from static, and indeed has been rather dynamic. In order to see a change in the sub-complex, on the other hand, there must either be a change in the sub-regional balance of power or a change in amity– enmity relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 53). Erda˘g (2017, p. 11) makes the same point by arguing that an internal transition in power distribution, in addition

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to external intervention into a particular state, might alter the setup of a security sub-complex. However, one also needs to acknowledge that regional security orders are not constructs merely relying on the power disparity between states. In addition to power distribution, regional security or sub-security orders are based on norms and values that shape the regional order. From a constructivist point of view, Co¸skun (2016) stresses that regional inclusion and exclusion practices to a large extent underlie the above-mentioned amity–enmity dynamics (see also Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 40). As revisionist states with a new foreign policy vision and diverse capabilities, Turkey and Qatar have emerged as new powers and the Turkey–Qatar alliance has altered the structure of the security sub-complex. However, such an assertive vision has been found alarming by other regional powers in the Gulf with the unfolding of the Arab Spring. In this regard, there is no doubt that the Arab Spring opened a new chapter in the Gulf security sub-complex for a plethora of reasons. Such a change in these states’ visions, emboldened by the Arab uprisings, had regional implications. First, Turkey engaged in Gulf affairs to such an unprecedented extent that it did not hesitate to deploy its military forces to Qatar (Aras and Akpınar 2017, p. 4). Having once been depicted as an insulator state between Europe and the Middle East (Barrinha 2014; Buzan and Diez 1999, p. 187), with the rise of the JDP government Turkey has now assumed an active stance in the Middle East, including on the crisis in the Gulf. In addition to this, as a region consisting mostly of monarchies with authoritarian tendencies, regime security is of paramount importance for most Gulf countries. The Arab uprisings are deemed to have been destabilizing events for most of the countries in the region due to security-based factors (Kamrava 2012, p. 97). The turmoil in the region has given way to the emergence of a new regional order that hinges on conflictual identities. The Sunni–Shia conflict is no doubt one of the main axes of struggle in the region (Byman 2014). However, the complexity of the identity conflict in the region goes beyond Sunni versus Shia; that is to say, there are other sub-sects within the broader category of Sunni Islam, including the division between Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood (Salloukh 2013). For many Gulf monarchies, the Arab uprisings were deemed a threat to their internal stability because the Turkey–Qatar alliance has promoted an Islamism that Gause describes as bottom-up Sunni Islamism based on popular support (Gause 2017b). Consequently, the Gulf security sub-complex recently split into further poles following the Arab uprisings. From its very beginning, since it consisted of nations which were aligned against Iran under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, the GCC was one of the power poles in the Gulf that was regarded as a reflection of Sunni identity (Kamrava 2012, pp. 98–99). Over and above the fact that there are a good number of border disputes among the GCC countries, such division after the Arab Spring was the most serious blow to hopes of further integration of the organization. Once deemed a bipolar regional order consisting of Iran and the GCC led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf security sub-complex further fractured after the Arab Spring and turned into a multi-polar regional structure, i.e., the uprisings caused a rift between the GCC countries that was followed by a spat between Qatar and the rest of the

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Gulf countries. The tension between Qatar and the Gulf monarchies escalated into a full-fledged crisis which resulted in sanctions being placed against Qatar (Isaac 2015, pp. 161–162). As mentioned earlier, Qatar has diverged sharply from Saudi Arabia and the United Allied Emirates as a revisionist country that has allied with Turkey. Another issue that needs to be addressed in order to explicate the current power structure in the Gulf region is the interaction between the Qatar–Turkey coalition and Iran. While for both Turkey and Qatar, foreign relations with Iran have been based on a strategy embodying a certain amount of pragmatism, the Saudi-led coalition has so far perceived Iran as anathema, threatening the Sunni identity itself. Turkish–Iranian relations in this sense can be described as context-dependent and should be analyzed case by case. For instance, contrary to the United States, Turkey is supportive of Iran’s nuclear program as long as it is used for peaceful purposes (Gürzel 2012; Gürzel and Ersoy 2012). On the other hand, Turkey often condemned Iran for getting involved with Syria and siding with the Assad regime. Qatar’s relations with Iran also showed a similar pattern to those of Turkey on several fronts. As Kamrava (2017) argues, Qatar’s foreign policy towards Iran should be understood from the perspective of pragmatism—Qatar strove to find a balance between Iran, the Gulf States, and the United States. However, it must also be noted that especially after the blockade, Qatari– Iranian relations intensified and proceeded in a friendly manner. In a similar manner, Turkish–Iranian relations, which were far from stable after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, took a more cooperative turn in tandem with Turkey’s rising concerns related to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the separatist Kurdish organization, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (see Al Jazeera 2019). In a nutshell, despite the lack of clear enmity between Iran and the Turkey–Qatar alliance, this does not necessarily mean that relations are entirely friendly. That is to say, Iran should be seen as an independent bloc with its own vision in the security sub-complex. As a result, the Qatar–Turkey alliance has paved the way for restricting the sub-complex to three poles: Saudi Arabia and the Emirate-led bloc, the Turkey– Qatar bloc, and Iran. Despite the fact that there are countries such as Kuwait that remain neutral and strive to play a mediator role, the Gulf complex has become sharply polarized with respect to substantive issues after the Arab Spring.

Conclusion This study aims to respond to several questions in an attempt to explain the underlying causes of the Qatar–Turkey coalition. First, it has been argued that both Qatar and Turkey are revisionist powers aiming for regional change in the politics of the Middle East and, more particularly, in the Gulf security sub-complex. The alliance between Turkey and Qatar was founded upon mutual interests in addition to commonalities stemming from shared ideas and identities. Turkey, as a country that has been detached from the Middle East, forayed into the regional politics of the Gulf as

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an ambitious political actor with the rise of the JDP. Both Qatar and Turkey have engaged in diplomacy aimed at changing the regional order by providing unconditional support to the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, the Arab uprisings were seen by both of these states as an unprecedented opportunity for altering authoritarian regimes in favor of democratically elected political Islamists. Moreover, the Qatar–Turkey alliance has been based on the mutual material interests of these two states. This point is important because such a coalition is, at the same time, an alliance of convenience, which allows each state to take advantage of the other’s power and compensate for its weaknesses in order to balance the Saudi-led Arab Gulf states. Whereas Qatar is a carbon-rich country possessing a huge budget surplus, Turkey is one of the leading military powers in the Middle East. In addition to this, this study sheds light on the impact of the anti-status-quo states on the Gulf security structure by embarking on an agent-centric approach. Thus it is argued that such a coalition between Qatar and Turkey has had further ramifications for the Gulf sub-regional complex. The Turkey–Qatar coalition arose as a new bloc against the Saudi-led Arab Gulf states and Iran, which meant that the structure of the Gulf security sub-complex was transformed from a bipolar to a multipolar one.

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Chapter 4

Qatar Crisis: GCC States’ Perception of Regional Powers Noof Rashid ALDosari

In life, generally, we as social actors tend to interpret people’s behavior not only by how they act towards us but also towards themselves. The situation is similar in the field of foreign policymaking. This is because social interaction, like foreign policy, involves both strategic interaction as well as symbolic interaction. As Herbert Blumer notes (1986: 79), human beings “interpret or ‘define’ each other’s actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. Their ‘response’ is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions” (see also Vertzberger 1990). In this vein, words like “reality,” “consciousness,” and “perception” become increasingly important in understanding and analyzing foreign policymaking decisions. Perception in particular is not a simple phenomenon, as there are numerous factors that condition it, such as culture, language, and context. Indeed, in the words of Parmeshwar Haksar, who served as Gandhi’s principal secretary: Perception is a phenomenon that is deeply embedded in the historical consciousness of each country. There is a Chinese way of looking at things, and one would not want to understand what the Chinese are driving at unless one has some idea of the historically-determined perceptions the Chinese have about themselves. I don’t want to vulgarize it, but it is of interest that until 1818 the Chinese had no institution called a Foreign Office. They had an institution called the Great Hall of the Barbarians, where all matter relating to foreigners was dealt with; in fact, the Hall of the Barbarians was the place for the conduct of China’s international relations. I make no comment on this fact. But, there is a way in which a nation expresses itself, its own self-estimate, its position in the world, and its relationship with other countries as an aspect of reality which must be taken into account. (Haksar 1986)

Reality and perception, then, are crucial tools in understanding and questioning the outcomes of foreign policymaking. Has a particular decision been formulated according to the reality on the ground, or according to a perception of what really N. R. ALDosari (B) Department of International Affairs, College of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_4

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exists on the ground? While perception and reality are separate phenomena, we are bound nevertheless to investigate and consider both of them simultaneously in our attempts to interpret the world around us. As Jervis (2017) puts it: logic permits us to distinguish between the “psychological milieu” (the world as the actor sees it) and “the operational milieu” (the world in which the policy will be carried out) and to argue that policies and decisions must be mediated by statement’s goals, calculations, and perceptions.

However, Jervis emphasizes that this is not the only thing that matters in seeking to understand decision-making processes. There are two subsidiary questions that relate to perception which according to Jervis are as follows: “are important differences in policy preferences traceable to differences in decision makers’ perceptions of their environment? And are there important differences between reality and shared or common perceptions?” (Jervis 2017).

Perception and Reality: How Do Leaders’ Perceptions Create Reality? Perception here is defined as “a concept that describes the construction of reality in which an individual makes foreign-policy decisions” (Herrmann 1986). For this reason, it is useful to try to understand how political leaders relate to reality and perception in the context of deciding on their foreign policy. This is especially vital in light of the fact that in the arena of international affairs, some foreign policy decisions are clearly based on false perceptions, with some being so rigid as to be impervious to any changes in the reality on the ground. Hence leaders face a difficult situation because of their incapacity or refusal to retain a close approximation between perception and reality. As such, instead of an approximation, what we have is a relationship between perception and reality, whereby there is a perception of reality while at the same time reality is being shaped by perceptions. According to constructivists, the actions of people in the world are based on their perceptions, while the real objective of the world continuously shapes their perceptions. It may be prudent here to mention the importance of something akin to the word “reality” in the context of international relations. A leader’s perception is shaped by context and in turn that context is shaped by that leader’s perception. In the following I will provide an account of how international relations study the state, and note the importance of context to the leader’s perception of reality. As Jervis (2017) writes: The context of international politics shapes the content of the perceptions of unity and planning. An awareness of the implications of anarchy leads decision-makers to be alert for dangerous plots. If another’s behavior seems innocuous, they will look for a hidden and menacing significance. They see not only plans, but sinister ones. Within society this perspective characterizes the paranoid. But since threats and plots are common in international relations, the perception that others are Machiavellian cannot be easily labeled pathological. It may have been extreme of Metternich (Austrian politician and diplomat,

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1773–1859). when he heard that the Russian ambassador had died, to ask “I wonder why he did that,” but the search for the devious plan believed to lurk behind even the most seemingly spontaneous behavior is neither uncommon nor totally unwarranted.

It is mostly a realist perceptive that supports the role of context in shaping the leader’s perception. Although I do not wish to argue against realism here, it is important to note that in the above passage, Jervis does not mean that leaders do not plan their actions carefully and skillfully; rather he says that their orchestrated actions will be prepared on the basis of a perception of evil plans being made. In what follows, I provide some historical and contemporary examples showing the influence of perception on political leaders’ foreign policymaking decisions. The next section will be divided into two parts: the first concerns the influence of the perception and misperception of reality on leaders’ foreign policymaking decisions; the second is about the role of leaders’ perceptions in creating reality and the consequences of this, which is rarely discussed in the international relations literature. [T]he perceptions and philosophy of key leaders are the most important variables in foreignpolicy decision making; they are even more important than bureaucratic interests, lobbyists in Congress, or environmental pressures of the international system, at least with respect to the Middle East. The basic notion that core perceptions, like images of the opponent, affect policy choices is also the primary idea behind the operational code and other efforts to study the cognitive bases of policy making. (Herrmann 1986)

A salutary story of misperception is represented by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Saddam miscalculated his relationship with the United States of America. He thought that he could negotiate with the United States as an equal, while the United States was in fact pursuing a policy of tilting more towards Iraq. After the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein did not change his misperception; he defined the battle known as “Desert Storm” (in which Iraq lost) as a success for the Iraqi military, because it had been able to confront the advanced American military. Saddam did not know that his misperception of the United States after 1991 would lead to his downfall in 2003. The question is: what was the basis of Saddam’s misperception of his relationship with the United States especially after 1991? The following examples offer some insight into his misperceptions: In late 2002 … in a rare newspaper interview, Saddam argued that he understood the American threat and that it did not frighten him: The US, in its daily attacks and attempts to weaken us and to kill civilians every day with its air missiles and artillery from neighboring countries, made us feel as if we were in a perpetual war since January 1991. So we are ready for war. But Iraq will not, in any way, be like Afghanistan. This does not mean that we are stronger than the US since it has longrange missiles and naval forces, but we have faith in Allah, in our homeland, and in the Iraqi people. Most importantly we also have faith in the Arab nation. We will not turn the war into a picnic for the American or the British soldiers. No way! The land always fights on the side of its owners.

In March 2003, Saddam told his officers, in a publicly reported meeting, that the Iraqis had defeated the British in 1920 despite having inferior weapons because they had

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faith. Today, he said, the officers had the same faith and thus, air force pilots should not be dismayed that their adversaries had better planes, nor should the infantry be concerned about the superior ground forces and equipment of their enemies, for the Iraqis “have faith that your enemy does not have.” (Woods and Stout 2010). This shows that Saddam’s misperception was defined through his definition of faith—not faith in the sense of his religion, Islam, but rather faith in the Ba’athist idea and its military might. After all, Saddam perceived himself as leading the Arab nation, especially after attacking Israel. This example shows how a leader’s misperception of reality can influence their foreign policymaking decisions. But it is not just the (mis)perception of reality that is important in foreign policymaking; reality in itself can be shaped by leaders’ perceptions. In this regard, China’s self-perception today is a prominent example of this phenomenon. The perception of Chinese President Xi Jinping regarding China’s central role in the international system influences the reality on the ground. One can hardly consult any important text on political studies without seeing items about China and the powerful role it plays. To appreciate the extent to which state leaders’ perception of China is influencing the international reality, one ought to look at the shift in some of their foreign policy decisions towards China; it is as if they were Helianthus, bowing to the sun. Furthermore, in its publication of 10 May 2018, Foreign Affairs published an article by Kevin Rudd entitled “How Xi Jinping Views the World: The Core Interests That Shape China’s Behavior.” According to the article: Xi’s worldview places greater emphasis on the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party over the professional apparatus of the state and of communist ideology over policy pragmatism. It is one of Chinese nationalism suffused with a cocktail of economic achievement, political nostalgia, and national grievance together with a new culture of political selfconfidence that represents a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping’s orthodoxy of “hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.” (Rudd 2018).

Another paper, called “How Xi Jinping Sees the World and Why?,” asked how China’s leaders have viewed the international order since 1949 while reflecting on how such a perception might have influenced their interaction with the international community. The article states: “the new ideas of the Xi era reflect massive changes in China’s place in the international system, its economic, political, and military strength, and China’s expectation that the international system would and should accommodate this transformed China” (Bader 2016). At the same time, Xi Jinping’s own perception of the world enables him to have different ideas about the international order and China’s relationship with it. As such, China is becoming a major player, not just as part of the “game” of the international system, but also as one of the key actors that gets to dictate the rules of the game. On the other hand, this increasing power on the world stage prompts the existing superpower, the United States, to be wary of China, since the latter poses a direct challenge to the former’s regional and global role. Xi Jinping’s leadership demonstrates that his perception of the world not only shapes China’s behavior, but also

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shapes the reality on the ground. As such, different states’ or leaders’ perceptions of how best to deal with China lead to them altering their relations with China. Another example is Russia and the way in which Vladimir Putin’s perception is shaping reality. Although Putin’s power as Russia’s president is unchecked inside Russia, it can be challenged by the international community. Leaders of the international community constantly question Putin’s intentions. An important question is always: what will be Russia’s next move? For a long time now, Russia’s perception of itself has shaped the reality of the international system. Winston Churchill once said: “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” While Putin’s perceptions of the international system and Russia in particular shape the reality on the ground, some state leaders think that Russia, as represented in Putin’s leadership, remains a mystery. Furthermore, Putin’s perception of Russia and the international system can be understood through the latest Ukraine crisis, the annexation of Crimea. Putin perceives Russian identity as exceptional, and that, as such, Russia’s exceptionalism can serve as an alternative to Western power. Putin once said that “the breaking up of the Soviet Union is the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the Twentieth Century.” Robert Gates, former US Secretary of Defense, commented that he perceived a deep sense of humiliation in Putin due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which Gates thought he also associated with the Russian Empire (Andiej 2019). Therefore, Putin’s perception of the power of geopolitics always resonates in his foreign policy decisions. In embodying the Russian perception of itself as neither European nor Western, Putin made the country a geopolitical power not just for Eastern and Western Europe, but also for the Middle East. Moreover, to understand Putin, one has to understand Russia’s history. As the Russian poet Fyodor Tyutchev puts it: “Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone. No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness. She stands alone, unique—In Russia, one can only believe” (Kissane 2017). Putin is seen to be a leader who understands the West very well. But the question is: does the West—and especially Donald Trump— understand him? The West explains Putin’s view about the world as anti-Western, and most importantly nationalistic. The West perceives that Putin is not only a leader who is against Western control over the international system, but also one who wants to reinstate the power of the Russian Empire. During his election campaign in 2014, presidential candidate Donald Trump tweeted: “I believe Putin will continue to rebuild the Russian Empire. He has zero respect for Obama or the U.S.!” (CNN 2018). However, once in office, Trump developed a different view of Putin, which meant taking on a different way of approaching Russia. On the one hand, we see that the United States, as represented in Trump’s leadership, does not want to enter into direct conflict with Russia. Indeed, there are various positions taken towards Putin, which explains the disagreements between the different government institutions over how best to deal with Russia. The situation in the Middle East in general, and in Syria in particular, serves as a useful example here. On the other hand, the perception of the rise of the Russian Empire is a persistent fear among EU foreign policymakers. Such fear is evident in the EU’s response to the Greek crisis, which was not solely about the economy, but was shot through with geopolitical ramifications. Europe

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helped Greece largely out of the fear that had they not done so, the country would be supported by Russia and as a result Putin would have an easy entrance into Europe. All the examples above speak to the importance of the “perception of the other” in foreign policymaking. Here, again, it is illuminating to survey how political leaders perceive the world, their beliefs, and their images of others. To this end, Vertzberger (1990) has emphasized the role of cognition in foreign policy decisions, while highlighting the usefulness of examining decision-making and assessing whether and to what extent there is a discrepancy between leaders’ perceptions and reality. Vertzberger restates an argument originally put forward by Jervis, noting that even if two decision-makers are confronted with the same situation, their decisions will be different: “This is often the case because people differ in their perceptions of the world in general and of other actors in particular” (Jervis 2017). He goes on to describe how “our understanding of the actor’s images and beliefs” shapes our expectations about how others will behave. For example, Jervis (2017) writes, “the question about Russian behavior raised by the Cuban missile crisis probably is not ‘what Soviet calculus and risk-taking propensity could explain this bold and dangerous step?’ but, ‘How could they have so badly misestimated the expected American response?’” In the study of international relations and foreign policy analysis, the perception of others has been explored through a range of theories and approaches. Some of the different approaches to the study of perception in international affairs are shown in the illustration below. However, for my case study, I will adopt another approach—one that is seldom discussed in the scholarship on GCC foreign policymaking: namely discourse theory and discourse analysis. I will explain how actors’ perceptions have influenced GCC leaders’ foreign policy decisions. My data will be collected from formal and informal speeches in the media. In what follows, I will set out the rationale behind deploying this methodology after establishing the relevance of using discourse theory in foreign policy analysis (Fig. 4.1).

Perception

Schema

Political psychology

Constructivist

Discourse theory and analysis

Theories of political perception

Political cognition

Realist

The research method

Fig. 4.1 Illustration of different research approaches to the question of perception in international relations and foreign policy analysis

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Because the process of decision-making and its consequences matter, perception becomes an important object of study within international relations and foreign policy analysis. In developing this further, I will focus on two branches of literature in the field of international relations, namely political psychology and constructivism, which have interpreted world politics through the lenses of identity and beliefs. Within the space of a few months in 1989 and 1990, two key texts were published: Vertzberger’s (1990) The World in Their Minds and Nicholas Onuf’s (2012) World of Our Making. These works shared a common premise in seeing international relations as being determined by how decision-makers perceive and construct reality. The former, a work of political psychology, and the latter, a work of constructivism, advanced their respective fields in understanding and elaborating on the (inter)subjective nature of world politics. Furthermore, both psychology and constructivism challenged not only “realism,” which remains to this day the dominant and mainstream way of thinking in international theory, but also rational choice perspectives.

Post-structuralist Discourse Theory and Foreign Policy My aim here is to build upon the literature on post-structuralist discourse theory, while using the discursive approach in foreign policy. I will seek to demonstrate the importance of discourse in understanding how state leaders’ perceptions can influence their foreign policymaking decisions towards their neighboring countries. Discourse will identify that either political language and political cognition shapes perception, or vice versa. For example, Howarth describes “a forest standing in the path of a proposed motorway.” It may simply represent an inconvenient obstacle impeding the rapid implementation of a new road system, or it might be viewed as a site of special interest for scientists and naturalists, or a symbol of the nation’s threatened natural heritage. Whatever the case, its meaning depends on the orders of discourse that constitute its identity and significance. (Howarth 2009)

As such, post-structuralists like Foucault and Derrida have argued that “it is impossible to fix meaning within language. It is always contested, always on the move. While for the structuralist, meaning within the language is much more stable, although it can be changed” (Howarth 2009). Mainstream approaches to foreign policy analysis—focusing on the objective view of state interest, power, and the international system—consider what gives balance or stability to the system, and what potential enemies might threaten this state of affairs. In contrast, discourse theory is interested in the subjective view. In relation to foreign policymaking, this includes the subjective view of political leaders in discursive activities and how these influence foreign policy outcomes. So, an international enemy does not simply exist, but rather is constructed over time. For instance, a post-structuralist would not ask why the United States invaded Panama,

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but rather how Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega went from being a strong, anticommunist leader who merited US support to a drug trafficking thug whose actions warranted an invasion. The enemy did not merely exist; it was socially constructed through specific discourse activities. As Ripley (2017) writes, “discourse helps to produce and prioritize the course of action states take.” In this way, then, discourse theory [b]egins with the assumption that all objects and actions are meaningful and that their meaning is a product of historically specific systems of rules. It thus inquires into the way in which social practices construct and contest the discourses that constitute social reality. These practices are possible because systems of meaning are contingent and can never completely exhaust a social field of meaning. Three basic categories are needed to unpack and elaborate upon this complex set of statements. These are the categories of the discursive, discourse and discourse analysis. (Howarth 2009)

Following Howarth’s lead, it is worth defining these categories. Discursive means that “all objects are objects of discourse,” insofar as “their meaning depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences” (Howarth 2009). Discourses “refer to historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects” (Foucault 1972). Discourse analysis refers to “the process of analyzing signifying practices as discursive forms” (Howarth 2009). In this way, discourse analysis treats “a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’ that enable subjects to experience the world of objects, words, and practices” (Howarth 2009). The significance of discourse theory comes from the power of language in legitimizing and delegitimizing certain foreign policy options. So, the significance of language as a political and social tool for socially constructing our reality is not about how we speak, but about the unique role that language plays in creating discursive structures. It has the capacity to produce and reproduce, to shape and reshape specific meanings, ideas, and identities. Therefore, discursive structures do not just create spaces for defining foreign policy options; they also facilitate discursive spaces, which prompt us to accept certain foreign policy options and reject others. In essence, then, and as Anna Holzscheiter observes, discourse can be defined as “the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, transformed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality” (cited by Ripley 2017). The role that discourse plays in the foreign policy decision-making process is a subtle yet powerful one.

Discourse Analysis and Foreign Policy: Discursive Approach In general, discourse analysis has become the main alternative to the mainstream approaches in foreign policy analysis, like rational choice theory, which is the most dominant theory in international relations. A number of scholars support a discourse

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analysis approach in foreign policy analysis. For example, Daddow (2015), in his article “Interpreting Foreign Policy through Discourse Analysis,” established an interesting argument about the role of a leader’s cognition and beliefs in foreign policymaking. His article explores the difficulty of definitively understanding foreign policymaking. Daddow believes that this ambiguity cannot be solved, because of the problem of policy analysts being inside the decision-making circles. However, such ambiguity can be overcome by accessing political leaders’ beliefs. According to Daddow (2015), this will lead to an increased “emphasis on foreign policy narratives and the links that can be made between those narratives and government foreign policy outputs.”

Discursive Approach David Howarth, who heads up the research program in the Essex School of discourse analysis, describes his work as investigating “the way in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality” (Howarth et al. 2000). Here I utilize the Essex School’s definition of “discursive struggle,” which situates the relation between social actors operating (on the level of discursive positions, collective actors articulating their views from these positions are engaged in a struggle with other positions, sometimes compatible, sometimes competing, and by no means necessarily in line with the positions of ‘executive actors’ [Carta and Morin 2014a]), at the heart of the explanation as well as a challenge of policies. (Diez 2014)

In order to understand the discursive struggle in the Middle East’s foreign policymaking, we need to briefly set out the discursive approach to foreign policymaking. The discursive approach denies the notion of objective analysis, and instead focuses on the subjectivity of actors: the form of knowledge they mobilize, the multiple interpretations they deploy to create meaning and the particular context that individualizes the situations in which these meanings evolve. Discursive approaches thus both attempt to fully comprehend the production of meaning and to analyze the process through which this meaning shapes actions and institutions. (Durnova and Zittoun 2013)

Lastly, the role of the discursive approach in public policy research, in general, is that it [r]efuses to treat discourse as merely one explanatory variable among many others, considering it instead as the key to understanding how actors construct and modify public policies. In this respect, discourse is first and foremost the means by which actors perceive the world, and consequently functions as a way to transform it. Finally, discourse is what actors use to interact with one another, whether in struggle or in the search for common ground. From this perspective, the discourse and study of the multiple social practices in which it takes place—when arguing, expressing conviction, conducting analyses, defining terms, attempting to persuade, negotiating, contesting, and so forth—these approaches not

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N. R. ALDosari only provide a different way of understanding the processes of crafting and transforming policy-making, but also offer different means of investigating the issues of power, legitimacy and governance that are at the foreground of public action. (Durnova and Zittoun 2013)

The Political Discourse of the Qatar Crisis: GCC States, Alliances, and Threat Perceptions Discursive Struggle Drawing from Carta and Morin (2014b), the perception of Arabian Gulf states can be understood via the concept of “discursive struggle,” which stresses that “meaning does not simply exist as given, but has to be fought over and negotiated in discursive practices” (Diez 2014). Discourse, therefore, is not synonymous with structure; rather, discourse comprises the main context for “political articulations (leading to the question of how this context works in constituting meaningful practices),” which in turn is made up of “articulatory practices that not only reproduce but also reshape this context (leading to the question of how the struggles in the process of this reproduction have an impact on the overall discourse)” (Diez 2014). In a broad perspective, the Arabian Gulf states’ leaders now see themselves as representatives of the Arab world. This change happened in the wake of the fall of Saddam Hussein and Egypt’s gradual withdrawal of power from the region. This left an ideological and power vacuum in the region, which prompted Gulf states’ leaders to recalculate their role. Leaders in Arabian Gulf states started to create new perceptions in respect of how they see their new role in the region vis-à-vis Iranian and Turkish regional powers. However, the Gulf states did not totally abandon Arabism; in fact, they legitimized themselves against regional powers and embraced the concept of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi (Arab center of gravity in the region), not only as an instrument for foreign policymaking in the region and international relations, but also as their states’ identity. Although the latter is defined as the Arabian Gulf (Khaliji), this will not suffice to bring the Gulf states to move against or in line with regional and international powers. For this, a broader identity is needed, which shapes how the Gulf states’ leaders see themselves in the world of politics. I next give some examples of different blocs among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and their use of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi after the Arab Spring, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Then, I explain how GCC states perceive regional powers from their subjective position, insofar as they see themselves as “leaders of the Arab world” and how their perceptions have influenced their foreign policymaking, especially after the Qatar Crisis.

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GCC and Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi As well as creating the Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi ideology and attributing different meanings and uses to it, the GCC states joined different regional and international alliances. The Arab Spring revealed that GCC states (and especially each member of the GCC) perceived what the Arab world should look like in their own way. More specifically, they took a view on how to govern the Arab world as its representative and leader, in order to win the so-called Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi. It is important to note that the fight over Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi between GCC members was not simply a matter of titles; it was also an issue of power and leadership: politically, economically, and geopolitically. Some people believe that the Arab national ideology is losing ground, but this may not be applicable if we take a closer look at the different meanings contained within the ideology of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi as a discursive struggle between GCC states. Unfortunately, Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi as a discursive struggle could lead to GCC disintegration, which might bring an end to the Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council. It is worth noting that the Gulf states today want to fill the vacuum of Arabism in the region. In fact, the Gulf states aspire to take on this role by way of ensuring political and economic stability. The economic, as compared to political, influence in the international and regional spheres has allowed them to compete for this leading role. This shift in perception of their power has not just fueled the economy; it has also supported the ideology through which they can seek a greater presence among international relations and form new geostrategic alliances. During and after the Arab Spring, Gulf leaders emphasized their different roles in the international and regional power struggles, especially in light of the uprisings in Egypt and Syria. What the GCC states called Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi was sometimes supportive of the Arab Spring and at other times against it. This can be seen through the clashes between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. Saudi Arabia is seen as a regional power in the Gulf states, with regard to its position among other GCC states. Ulrichsen cites Samuel Huntington’s definition of regional powers as countries that are “preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interests and capabilities globally, as the United States.” In other words, a regional power’s influence has inherent limits and is invariably subordinate to that of great power or superpower. Furthermore, as Maxi Schoeman has noted, a regional power must be able to play a leadership role in maintaining regional security, and it should receive both regional and intra-regional acceptance of its security role. In order to exercise its leadership role effectively, Schoeman argues, a regional power must be capable of playing an active role as a peacemaker or stabilizer, irrespective of the degree of amity or enmity between it and between other states in the region. Similarly, Graham Fuller and John Arquilla define a regional power as a state whose policies significantly impact on the security and well-being of other states in the region. (Ulrichsen 2018: 128)

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This definition of regional power clashed with the idea of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi. Some GCC states do not support the idea of Saudi Arabia acquiring Arab leadership, because for them it threatens to diminish their power both regionally and internationally. The power struggle between GCC states during the Arab Spring is evidence that GCC states do not approve of Saudi Arabia becoming a regional power. There is a contested idea between GCC states of who should be entitled to Arab leadership. This can be illustrated with different examples: the ideological struggle during the Arab Spring resulted from divergent perceptions among GCC states of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi, with some GCC states forming their own ideology of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi. For the first time in the history of the GCC states, the Arab Spring revealed the security threats of GCC states. These security threats are not conventional military threats, but instead are considered as ideological, represented notably in the Muslim Brotherhood. Throughout the Arab Spring, Qatar supported not only the Arab nations rising against Arab dictators, but also the Muslim Brotherhood. This, however, disturbed some Arabian Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, and as such they sought to fight against Qatar through different supportive roles for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring. The Muslim Brotherhood is a powerful 80-year-old Islamist group with a strong history of popular support throughout the region. However, the most critical element that arouses the suspicion among the majority of the GCC states is that the increased power of the Muslim Brotherhood can lead to the politicization of Islam, with unpredictable consequences for the entire Gulf region that may lead to the overthrowing of the Gulf Monarchies. This concern is of great importance to the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. (Khlebnikov 2015)

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain tried to thwart Qatar’s attempt to create for itself a Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi in the region. They tried to curtail a number of Qatari instruments of power in supporting not only the Muslim Brotherhood but also Arab revolutions in general (for example, Qatar’s financial aid to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria). In 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, due to its interference in their internal affairs and the criticism of them that was aired on Al Jazeera. However, one of the things that helped to end this diplomatic crisis was the Islamic State’s advances in Iraq and Syria, which was a regional security and economic threat. This drove the GCC members to come together again to face this challenge.

The Qatar Crisis: Revealing Different GCC Perceptions on Regional Powers While the Arab Spring revealed GCC states’ ideological struggle over Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi, in terms of wanting to control the Arab world the Qatar crisis revealed that alongside such a tectonic shift in the Middle East, there is also a shift

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in the GCC states’ perceptions. This shift showed that each state in the GCC holds a different ideology of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi which entails that each GCC state perceives regional powers (Iran and Turkey) differently. So, how do their different ideologies produce different perceptions of Iran and Turkey, and, therefore, shape their foreign policymaking towards them? Before observing the political discourse of Arabian Gulf states and their shift of regional perceptions, let us briefly explore the role of Turkey and Iran in the region in order to see how this might have shaped GCC states’ perceptions of Turkey and Iran. This will serve as the background or context for the Qatar Crisis. Iran and Turkey have good bilateral cooperation with each other, especially on the energy sector. However, as Larrabee and Nader (2013) note, the degree of cooperation between the two countries should not be exaggerated. Turkey and Iran have historically been, and continue to be, rivals rather than close partners. While they may share interests in certain economic and security concerns, their interests are at odds in many areas across the Middle East. The two states have fundamentally different political identities and ideologies.

What intensified this rivalry was the Arab Spring. The fall of old authoritarian regimes in the region made Iran and Turkey exploit the new order for their own interests in the region. However, because of their divergent political interests, the rivalry between Iran and Turkey is impacting their relationship on a number of issues, like the Syrian revolution and Turkey’s support of the opposition party with regard to Iranian support for the stability of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. Since 1979, as Larrabee and Nader (2013) observe, the secular, Alawite-dominated, Baathist Syrian regime and Iran’s Shi’a theocracy have strongly supported each other. Assad’s downfall would be a serious strategic blow to Iran and could result in the growth of Turkey’s influence. It could also have a demonstration effect on Iran, strengthening internal opposition to the Iranian regime and deepening the current divisions within the Iranian leadership.

Moreover, Iraq has represented a field of international struggle between Iran and Turkey especially after the withdrawal of US troops. Such withdrawal created a power vacuum that Iran sought to fill. The sectarian conflict between the Shi’a and Sunni in Iraq was intensified, which drew Iran and Turkey into opposing sides on the conflict. In addition, the most sensitive issue for Iran and especially Turkey is that of the status of the Kurds. Another key issue is the Palestinian cause, which provides another outlet for the rivalry between Ankara and Tehran. Iran, due to its Islamic regime, saw itself as defending Palestinians against Israel, while aspiring for a position in the Arab and Muslim world; however, President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s support for Palestine was more concrete than Iran’s largely rhetorical support, to the degree that the relationship between Israel and Ankara began to deteriorate. In Iran, Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) together with Khomeinism, serve as the regime’s ideology and the medium for the regime’s foreign policy. By contrast, it could be argued that the role of ideology in Turkey’s foreign policy is more contentious, and that Turkey today is not guided by Kemalism and its foreign

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policy is not driven by ideology, but mainly by self-interest. However, ideas can overlap with interests. As such, it is true to say that: An understanding of a nation’s ideology provides no certain insights into its behavior. By applying the Weberian position to the context of foreign policy, Carlsnaes also arrives at the conclusion that the ideological nature of foreign policy is often contrasted with the notion of interest … but … these are not mutually exclusive but have, on the contrary, coexisted over the years, albeit with a tendency for agencies of interests to contain the agencies of ideology. (ALDosari 2015)

In spite of that, one cannot overlook the fact that in political discourse, there are contested meanings of what counts as an interest. So, how does Turkey define its interest? The position of Dr Ibrahim Kalin, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey, is described as follows: Although AKP policy is often seen as being driven by ideological factors, such as Islamism and New Ottomanism, the primary determinants of Turkish foreign policy actually stem from more practical factors, such as Turkey’s economic demands, its historical ties to its neighbors and its sensitive geopolitical position. Dr. Kalin placed particular emphasis on this last factor, asserting that Turkey’s geographic location at a global crossroads renders the nation susceptible to a whole host of energy and security issues that pertain to the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Central Asian regions. As such, Turkey has no choice but to play an active role in its region. The necessity of this role has significantly shaped Turkey’s foreign policy and its interactions with neighbors. (Middle East Institut 2018)

After briefly viewing the regional power role of Turkey and Iran together, it can be said that they have struggled ideologically in the region. It is worth noting, too, that both countries strive to rule the Muslim world: Sunni power or Shi’i power? They are both heirs to significant and powerful empires in Muslim history—Iran of the Safavid Empire, and Turkey of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, we need to look at the rising power of the small Gulf states and their role in this equation of regional power struggle. A typical observer of the role of Khaliji leaders in the region will conclude that the financial power of Khaliji leaders is the best way to understand how their foreign policy is formulated. Most of the time, commentators overlook how Khailiji leaders perceive Iran and Turkey. If one observes how Khaliji leaders’ foreign policies influence the region, one can conclude that it is not just a matter of financial power that made these leaders the new powers, participating in different regional alliances and thereby shaping a new regional order. The perceptions and, most importantly, the political discourse of Khaliji leaders, are the crucial pillars that shape Khaliji foreign policymaking, with the ideology of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi being the central factor in this regard. The manifestation of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi as an ideological struggle became evident in the Qatar crisis. It is no surprise to see Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain in conflict with Qatar, as there have been historical conflicts in the past between Sheikdoms. However, their struggle at the present time is unique. The Qatar crisis revealed the root cause of conflict between GCC states by showing that each GCC member has different perceptions of the regional powers (Iran and Turkey).

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Thus, the definition of the GCC conflict is no longer related to the material aspect in politics (i.e., financial power); rather, this political struggle can be defined as more ideological and geopolitical in nature. In their ideological struggle over Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi, each GCC state sees that they do not have to share similar views in respect of who is a friend and who is an enemy. This means that while they are all cooperating, there remains a different formula for each state regarding their prescribed ideology when dealing with regional powers like Iran and Turkey. To be more precise, they have different perceptions of regional powers, which serve to complicate the attainment of GCC security alliance. These different perceptions are revealed through their foreign policy discourses, which show that each GCC state has a different relationship with Iran and Turkey. This has complicated the relationships between GCC states and it could be one of the reasons behind the Qatar crisis. On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt led a blockade on Qatar, accusing the country of financing terrorist groups and having close ties with Iran. The blockade raised many questions as to the reliability of Saudi Arabia and UAE security cooperation. Most importantly, the question of whether or not the Qatar crisis will serve to dismantle the Gulf Cooperation Council was raised. The crisis carries some alarming implications for the social stability and regional security of the Arabian Gulf states. It is no wonder that since the advent of the crisis, Kuwait and Oman have had different perspectives on the region, leading them to collaborate and support Qatar in this challenging time. But why? Arabian Gulf states as members of the GCC were never united in their foreign policymaking. This remains the case today. Each state has a different perspective in formulating and implementing their foreign policies, whether at the regional or international level. The Arab Spring stressed this point very clearly. During the Arab Spring, each Gulf state was dealing with the Arab revolution and the toppling of old Arab dictatorships via a distinct foreign policy, instead of acting as a unified GCC bloc. Thus, policy analysts started to categorize each Gulf state according to which ideological or political perspective in the region they were supporting and from which perspective their foreign policies were derived. However, although they have different ideologies, this does not mean that none of them can take the position of the main player; therefore, they need to bargain with regional players like Iran and Turkey. No member of the Gulf state today can speak about an Arab country without mentioning Iran or Turkey. This is especially true of the countries of the Arab revolution—such as Syria and Yemen. Because the Gulf states are increasing their power to shape the new regional order, the significance of collaborating or competing with Iran and Turkey is becoming more vivid. Although political tensions between the Arab Gulf states existed long before the Arab Spring, new political tensions between them have emerged since. The first political tension was the diplomatic crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain in 2014. The main reason behind this diplomatic crisis was Qatar’s independent foreign policy. Besides this, Qatar was acting as a sovereign country, with an independent foreign policy that diverged from that of the Quartet states. In return the latter escalated their hostile relationship with

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Qatar in 2017, resulting in the Saudi-led blockade. They made high-level demands of Qatar, suggesting that if these demands were met, the blockade could be lifted. These demands are: to cease supporting the Muslim Brotherhood; to close down the Al Jazeera network; to shut the Turkish military base in Qatar; and to downsize their relationship with Iran and maintain only diplomatic contact. Qatar’s foreign policy can be described as a mediator in national and international issues. However: Qatar has placed its weight behind different regional actors and alliances than Saudi Arabia and UAE, in particular, the rising Muslim Brotherhood and groups close to it (also through Doha based broadcaster, Al Jazeera). Riyadh and Abu Dhabi regard these actors as security risks. Qatar also expanded relations with neighboring Iran. This was unacceptable to Saudi Arabia in particular, which feels threatened by Iran’s regional policies. (Sailer and Roll 2017)

Qatar’s perception of regional powers such as Iran and Turkey differs from how Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain perceive them. On this basis, the conflict between the Gulf states is not to be solved over the negotiation table, nor discussed implicitly or through a proxy agent. Instead, it is becoming more intense, threatening the cohesion of the GCC. According to the Emir of Kuwait Shaikh Sabah, “the current blockade on Qatar by the Saudi-led alliance risks escalation and could result in the end of the GCC’s 36-year-old alliance” (The New Arab 2017). Moreover, the Qatar crisis revealed that not only does Qatar have a different perception of Iran and Turkey, but so too do Kuwait and Oman. Today, the three Arabian Gulf states—Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—have found that they share some similarities in their perception of Iran and Turkey, while they are implicitly forming their own bloc within the GCC.

The Political Discourse of the Qatar Crisis: Alliance Perception The political discourse of the Qatar crisis reveals the importance of political perceptions in foreign policymaking. This political perception can be sought through the political discourse of Khaliji leaders. I stressed earlier that political discourse is important to analyze, since it is through political language that actors create and recreate their social reality, and shape and reshape new and different meanings of perceptions, ideas, etc., which influence their foreign policy decisions. So let us explore how each state with their different ideologies of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi perceives regional powers. Qatar perceives Turkey as a significant geopolitical ally that can connect Qatar to Europe. Qatar’s cordial relationship with Turkey is an outgrowth of Qatar’s perception that there are key similarities between them. For example, both have the same stand on significant issues such as the Palestinian cause. Moreover, neither country believes in blindly following a certain ideology or dogma in their foreign policymaking, and they both share common values in pursuing their foreign policies in the region. In a Qatari newspaper interview, Erdo˘gan stated:

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We share a common vision on international and regional issues. During my most recent visit to Qatar, my dear brother His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani and I had the opportunity to exchange views on bilateral and regional issues. Relations between Turkey and Qatar will grow deeper in the near future in a way that benefits both countries and the region. In fact, our mutual determination in this regard has raised relations between Turkey and Qatar to an exemplary level. (Qatar Tribune 2018)

Qatar also has the same perception of Turkey. This is projected through the way in which Qatar speaks about Turkey and perceives the Turkish role in the region. Furthermore, “17 summits were held between HH Sheikh Tamim and President Erdo˘gan in the past 41 months, a record in the history of relations between the two countries and perhaps in the history of international relations”; during these summits “more than 40 agreements, memorandums of understanding and cooperation were signed to enhance cooperation between the two sides in various fields, which is also a record in that single period” (Al-Sharq 2018). Indicative of the cooperation between the two states is Turkey’s support for Qatar’s preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Furthermore, the crisis compelled Qatar to implement new foreign policies towards Turkey, marking a shift in Qatar’s foreign policy (for example, the opening of a Turkish military base in Qatar). In November 2017, during a visit to Qatar, Erdo˘gan stressed that he would be supporting Qatar militarily in the Gulf crisis. However, when Erdo˘gan heard of the Saudi-led demand to close the Turkish base, he responded: “the demands on its embattled regional ally Qatar had gone ‘too far.’ What we are talking about here is an attack on the sovereign rights of a state. There cannot be such an attack on countries’ sovereignty rights in international law” (reported in Ozerkan 2018). Erdo˘gan viewed the demand for the withdrawal of Turkish troops as an act of “disrespect to Turkey” (Ozerkan 2018). The building of a Turkish military base in Qatar put the blockading states in a difficult position, with their relationship with Turkey becoming more rigid. When Erdo˘gan offered to establish a military base in Riyadh, the response from Riyadh was simply: “a military base is not needed” (Ozerkan 2018). Iran found in the Qatar crisis a great opportunity to establish a good relationship with an Arab Muslim country. Qatar’s perception of Iran is considerably different from that of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. Qatar never perceives Iran in the way that it perceives Turkey. But it can be said that Qatar’s perception of Iran is similar to its relationship with Iraq, which could be described as “unique.” Before the crisis, Qatar perceived Iran as a friend, but since the onset of the crisis Iran became a new ally to Qatar. Why? Because the crisis forced Qatar to find a new regional friend. And Iran is always on the lookout for such moments. Other than sharing a gas field, the only similarity between the two states in foreign policymaking terms is their wisdom in diplomatic relationships. Qatar perceives Iran as a power balance for regional security of the Arabian Gulf states. As Dudley (2017) writes, it is possible that the trade embargo may have been an attempt to convince Doha to downgrade its ties with Tehran, but it has, in fact, had the opposite effect. In August, Doha restored full diplomatic links with Tehran some 20 months after it had recalled its ambassador from the embassy

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N. R. ALDosari in Tehran. At that time Qatar’s alliance with Saudi Arabia was among the most vital in the region; now the case is opposite.

Both Qatar and Iran knew how to take advantage of the blockade and incorporate it into their relationships. Dudley (2017) describes “the latest sign of the blossoming friendship between Doha and Tehran,” which came on 26 November 2017 when Qatar’s Economy Minister Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al-Thani travelled to the Iranian capital for talks with government ministers on business links between the two countries, including Minister of Industry, Mine and Trade, Mohammad Shariatmadari and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Iran reacted to the blockade on Qatar by criticizing the Gulf states’ inability to establish dialogue, as the Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif labeled the situation as a “dialogue deficit” in the region. Iran’s position in the crisis and its explicit support for Qatar intensified its tricky relationship with the blockading states, especially Saudi Arabia, because of Qatar’s perception of Iran as an ally. Qatar’s foreign policies towards Iran are bolstered by the strong economic activities between the two countries, which have grown sharply and are predicted to grow further. Moreover, the data from the Iran Customs Administration shows that “Iran exported $139 m worth of non-oil goods to Qatar in the seven months to October 22, 2017—a timeframe which covers both pre- and post-boycott periods. That was a 117.5% increase on the same, a year earlier” (Dudley 2017). In addition, this success in economic cooperation “has led to Qatar and Iran opening embassies and meetings of high-level officials. It seems that the relationship will keep improving since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani publicly endorsed strengthening relations with Qatar”; on the other hand, Qatar said that “the restoration of ties expressed its aspiration to strengthen bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in all fields” (Abu-Sirriya 2017). The perception of Iran as a new ally has been proved not just through successful economic cooperation; the new alliance is developing and being strengthened through the political language of the leaders of both countries. HH the Emir Sheikh Tamim also took this opportunity to extend a hand of close cooperation to Germany at the Security Conference in Munich, when he stated: Germany is an especially appropriate venue for a meeting to discuss the present-day global order and the threats to it. A nation that stands for the values of freedom and the rule of law, Germany is also a major pillar for the European Union, seen by many as a bastion of coexistence and trans-national cooperation. (The Peninsula 2018)

The perception of the alliance is undoubtedly influencing Qatar’s foreign policies. HH the Emir Sheikh Tamim, in his Munich speech, said that establishing a new alliance and withdrawing from an old alliance should always be undertaken peacefully, in a way that will not endanger the sovereignty of any state. He also praised Brexit, saying:

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as a body, the EU demonstrates that a union can establish shared security based on mutual interests, even amongst people who tore themselves apart in war. Like it or not, Brexit is an example of a peaceful resolution of differences. No diplomatic ties were cut, and no blood was shed. There is a lesson here for us in the Arab region. (The Peninsula 2018)

Through these statements on Brexit, HH the Emir Sheikh Tamim sent a clear message to the blockading Quartet.

The Saudi-Led Blockade States’ Political Discourse: Threat Perceptions of Iran and Turkey Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain perceive Iran and Turkey mostly as threats to the region and their regimes. The notion of threat perception is commonplace in international relations. Indeed, there is a dedicated approach to the topic called the Threat Perception Theory (TPT), which is a representative of the Rationalist School that strongly favors the objective basis of threats. Furthermore, as Scheerder (2012) describes it, Threat Perception Theory holds that “four factors determine the threat perception of states”: aggregate power, comprising a states’ resources such as population, industrial and military capability; geographic proximity, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those far away; offensive power, states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to be perceived as threats than those that are militarily weak; lastly offensive intentions, states that appear aggressive are more likely to be perceived as threats. (Scheerder 2012)

However, the theory is inadequate when it comes to explaining the dynamics of threats in the twenty-first century as it confines threats solely to the military level. In contrast, the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory (ST), which is a constructivist theory, has some similarities with discourse theory. The theory focuses on a broader conceptualization of threats, seeing the latter as intersubjective and expressed in speech acts. Moreover, the theory maintains that “security is the outcome of a discursive process; threats are not found objectively but are social facts, based on a collective understanding … This collective understanding is constructed through securitizing speech-acts” (Scheerder 2012). Through the political discourse of these states, Iran and Turkey are perceived as a threat. Saudi Arabia as a regional actor and Iran as a regional power exemplify the security dilemma in the region. Bahrain and the UAE perceive that any kind of threat the Saudis would face from Iran, they in turn will face too, as they have a perceived “shared destiny.” The reason behind the Saudi perception is that it sees Iran as its arch enemy in the region. A study shows that Saudi threat perception is influencing its foreign policymaking decisions negatively, as it faces increasingly complex policy dilemmas. To put this in context, it is worth reviewing Saudi Arabia’s past and ongoing threat perception, and here Hartmann (2016) provides useful historical background.

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For Saudi, both Iran and Turkey are regarded as a significant competitor for regional dominance. The United States, by supporting the invasion of Iraq, gave birth to the Arab leaders’ political power vacuum. The Arab Spring resulted in the so-called post-American vacuum, which prompted Saudi, Iran, and Turkey to struggle for regional dominance. Now, a shift in the alliance can be seen between the GCC states and regional powers. This has resulted in powerhouses forming three different blocs: the first bloc consists of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and factions of the Iraqi government; the second bloc, backed by the United States and Israel for being anti-Iran, consists of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain; the third bloc comprises the alliance between Turkey and Qatar. Each bloc has its own ideological convictions and its own perception of the kind of role they need to play in order to secure or have a part in regional dominance. The Saudi bloc is trying to struggle against both Iran and Turkey, which shows that the regional stage after the fall of Saddam, or even after the demise of Syria which is now under the wing of Iran and Russia, is not left entirely devoid of Arab regional power. Saudi Arabia, before the Qatar crisis, sent a message to Iran through its state media. In May 2017, the Kingdom’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that, “we won’t wait for the battle to come to Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran” (Shaker 2018). Such words still resonate in Iran. The Crown Prince’s explicit military threat against Iran shows the direction that Saudi foreign policy is taking. Looking at the Saudi political discourse during and after the Qatar crisis, it is worth noting that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain welcomed Trump’s decision to exit from the Iran nuclear deal. In a tweet, the Saudi ambassador Prince Khalid bin Salman in Washington reiterated the support, saying: As I said before with regards to the deal, we are on autopilot heading towards a mountain. [The] deal has fueled Iran’s malicious expansion driven by its extremist ideology. It provided Iran with a financial windfall that it used to further sectarian strife/chaos in the region. (Karam 2018)

This was not the only political step taken by Saudi, for it also supports regime change in Iran, which in their view only President Trump is capable of undertaking. During the Qatar crisis, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain were upset because Iran, along with Turkey, signed a deal with Qatar to ease the blockade. From this point on, a shift in GCC political discourse on the GCC–Iranian relationship took place. In September 2017, during the Arab League meeting, there was a heated argument between Qatari and Saudi representatives. Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sultan bin Saad al-Muraikhi stated in Arabic that: “Iran Dawlah Sharifah,” meaning that Iran is an “honorable country.” Ahmed al-Qattan, Saudi Arabia’s envoy to the Arab League, replied by saying: [T]o say such a thing is funny! Are you saying that Iran, the one that is planning against the stability of GCC states and planted their spies in different GCC countries like Kuwait and Bahrain, has dignity? Then I congratulate you for this! And soon, God willing, you will regret it. (Al-Arabiya 2017)

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After this tense argument between Saudi and Qatari representatives in the Arab League, GCC political discourse took a turn for the worse. The political discourse of the quadrant states started to stress Iran’s role in Qatari politics by accusing Qatar of being in alliance with Iran, suggesting that since Iran is a Shi’i nationalist state (against Arabism), Qatar, in siding with Iran, is also working against the best interests of the Arab world. The result of the Saudi-led blockade’s perceptions of the threat of Iran and Turkey made it clear that they also perceive Qatar as a threat to the stability of the region and most importantly the GCC, and therefore to the Arabian Gulf states. Since the crisis, Qatar has been defined in the political discourse as a threat. Nonetheless, in their political discourse, the answer to what it might mean for a state to be a threat is not clear. This is because most of the GCC states have political and economic relationships with Iran. There is no contradiction in the claim that the meaning of the Qatari alliance with Iran is a threat and yet has different meanings in the GCC political discourse, and most importantly that there are different political meanings of “threat.” One of these political meanings is that Qatar cannot have its own distinct foreign policy aside from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It could be that the different perceptions and meanings of threat have to do with past political experiences, or it could be that these different meanings and perceptions of what constitutes a threat are invented by the actor’s psyche. So, when it comes to perceiving Iran as a threat, Bahrain and the UAE relay different stories from the same author. Bahrain in the Arab Spring was rescued from the prospect of Iran almost capturing the city of Manamah, while the UAE, whose three islands remain colonized by Iran, can only act aggressively through rhetoric in order to retain economic relationships. In the Qatar crisis, the threat perceptions that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain have of Iran and Turkey are the same. This much is clear from the fact that the 13 demands they put down in order for them to lift the blockade included calling for Qatar to downgrade its ties with Iran to a mere diplomatic level, and also shut down the Turkish military base. While Iran is perceived as a Shi’i threat, Turkey is perceived as a geopolitical threat and as a threat to regime stability in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood. An example of the geopolitical threat is “countering the Iranian/Turkish threat by other bases that are quickly sprouting along the Red Sea. What makes the Turkish-Iranian presence all the more worrying for Saudi Arabia is the lack of US presence in the Red Sea” (Moubayed 2017). Saudi Arabia perceived Turkey’s establishment of a military base in Somalia, a couple of months after having deployed nearly 5,000 troops in Qatar, as a way of assisting Iran in putting pressure on the Saudis. Meanwhile, the threat to regime stability can be overstated through the language of the Saudi Crown Prince. In March 2018, Saudi Prince Mohammad Bin Salman described Turkey as “part of a ‘triangle of evil’ along with Iran and hardline Islamist groups … [T]he Saudi prince also accused Turkey of trying to reinstate the Islamic Caliphate, abolished nearly a century ago when the Ottoman Empire collapsed” (Haaretz News 2018). Ankara, on the other hand, has had to endure a varying degree of friction in its relationship with the countries blockading Qatar. As Karasik and Cafiero (2018) note:

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N. R. ALDosari The GCC member on most tense terms with Turkey is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) ascended to power in 2002, Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Ankara has fluctuated. The bilateral relationship is complicated, as both countries place value on their economic and investment links while viewing each other’s actions in the Middle East as destabilizing. Although the UAE and Saudi Arabia were Turkey’s top two export partners in the GCC in 2014, Abu Dhabi interprets Ankara’s foreign policy as threatening to the UAE and its regional allies’ security. In fact, Abu Dhabi’s suspicion that Ankara sponsors local Muslim Brotherhood offshoots throughout the GCC, and a narrative in Turkey that Abu Dhabi had a hand in last year’s failed coup plot, as well as previous alleged efforts to oust Turkey’s AKP leadership, have fueled friction in Emirati-Turkish relations.

Before and after the Qatar crisis, the rift between Turkey and the UAE became more intense than ever. The UAE was the state that strongly supported the shutting of the Turkish military base in Qatar, whereas other states maintained warm relationships with Turkey after 5 June 2017. Moreover, “Sudan is unquestionably set to become another flashpoint in the crisis between Turkey and the UAE, with Ankara and Khartoum now planning to establish a Turkish port, and a military base on Sudan’s Suakin Island, a former Red Sea port city under Ottoman rule” (Karasik and Cafiero 2018). The UAE’s perception of threat towards Turkey is intensified not only because of the latter’s support for Qatar, but also because Turkey and Iran are cooperating in the military field. The person who represents the political discourse inside the UAE government is Dhahi Khalfan Al-Tamim, former deputy head of Dubai Police and General Security. On his Twitter account, he slammed Turkey for supporting Tehran: “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan incites against Egypt and defends Iran. They don’t go together well” (Shaker 2018). He said in another tweet: “Erdogan is despised among Arabs since he is the enemy of the nation” (Shaker 2018). Yet in addition to this, the UAE’s perception of threat towards Turkey does not encompass completely cutting economic ties. For example, it is notable that “the UAE and Turkey’s state-run Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation signed a deal at the Dubai International Airshow. The agreement mentioned that the $20.2 m agreement will sell Turkish-made MK-82 and MK-84 bombs to the UAE” (Karasik and Cafiero 2018). However, their economic ties are vulnerable because of their perceptions of each other. The UAE tried to convince the United States of the accuracy of its perception of Ankara, and especially of President Erdo˘gan. In May 2017, Abu Dhabi’s Ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, said: “the majority of American citizens failed to understand Turkey and the long-term threat it poses to most of us” (Karasik and Cafiero 2018). Hence, Ankara perceives the UAE as the sole promoter of anti-Erdo˘gan discourse in Washington. Now, the UAE’s perception of the Iranian threat in the region can be understood through the political language of the state’s formal representatives such as the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Anwar Gargash, who tweeted the following: “Iranian leaders should put the internal interest before Tehran’s adventures in the Arab region.” He added: “The interests of the region and Iran lie only in internal construction and development, not in antagonizing the Arab world” (Shaker 2018).

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Furthermore, the tone of the political language towards Iran among formal representatives in the UAE is changing, especially after Iran’s support for Qatar against Gulf states’ blockade. In the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are leading the war against what they see as an Iranian proxy war led by Houthi militants. Dr. Gargash, after his call for global action against Iran, stated: “Riyadh is leading the way in confronting Iranian aggression and greed” (cited in Al Zarooni 2017). In conclusion, the way in which leaders and states perceive international relations plays a crucial role in influencing foreign policymaking decisions. In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate that within GCC foreign policy discourse, there is an ideological struggle around the notion of Markiz AlThuqil AlArabi. This has shown, first, that GCC states have different perceptions of regional powers. As a result, such perceptions have influenced and continue to shape GCC states’ foreign policy and geostrategic alliances with Iran and Turkey. Second, I have argued that each member of the GCC started to take its own line in foreign policymaking, especially towards Iran and Turkey, and that this damaged the cohesion of the GCC and precipitated the crisis in Qatar.

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Chapter 5

Transformations of the Gulf Security Landscape After the Gulf Crisis: A Geopolitical Approach Nayef bin Nahar Al-Shamari and Hamad Al-Mohannadi

The security of the Gulf is not limited to the region surrounding by this all-important body of water itself, but is in fact an integral component of international security, due to many factors and characteristics that compel the international community to pay special attention to this area. The most important of these characteristics are its natural energy resources, and its strategic and central location, being surrounded by marine corridors that are essential to the entire world. As such, the Gulf Crisis is resonating throughout the international community, having become a global concern during its very first phase, soon after the imposition of the blockade, when there was a real possibility of military escalation. Paying particular attention to Gulf security, this paper examines the shifts in the Gulf security scene following the 2017 crisis, looking primarily at three waves of transformation: Transformation in the range of security: from regional security to national security. Transformation in security standards: from the customary standard to legal standards. Transformation in the balance of security: from the state of dominance to competition. Paying particular attention to Gulf security, this paper examines the shifts in the Gulf security scene following the 2017 crisis, looking primarily at three waves of transformation: Transformation in the range of security: from regional security to national security. Transformation in security standards: from the customary standard to legal standards. Transformation in the balance of security: from the state of dominance to competition.

N. N. Al-Shamari (B) Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] H. Al-Mohannadi (Independent) Researcher in Security and International Affairs, Doha, Qatar © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_5

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This study evaluates and addresses existing problems in the Gulf in a scientific manner, concentrating on three further transformations that are needed in the Gulf security scene: the transformation from tactical security to strategic security; the transformation from traditional security to geostrategic security; and the transformation from securitization to rational security. The scope of this paper is limited to the observation of the security scene, and does not seek to cover the various factors of the Gulf Crisis overall. Covering every aspect of the Gulf scene would require a study much larger than we can offer here, since the main characteristic of the Gulf Crisis is that it extends to all areas. And this also reveals a significant strategic flaw, because the instigators of this open-ended crisis, for whatever reason, did not consider that the costs associated with their actions would be much higher than those connected to the existing intra-GCC differences. Due to its inherent complexity, the concept of crisis is hard to explain fully in a single definition. However, a crisis can be defined as an act or activity of human creation that embodies a critical phase in a conflict, or forms a dangerous turning point in the relations between different parties, or between different parties and their surrounding environment (Al Khazandar 2014). This critical moment also determines the future development of these relations—whether towards war or peace. Several researchers have discussed the concept of crisis in the International Relations literature, and some have identified a number of special characteristics of crises that clearly appear in the Gulf Crisis. Among these characteristics are those mentioned by Charles Herman, who argues that a crisis is a situation in which the policy priorities of governments are threatened, in addition to there being limited time for decision-making in the face of unexpected events and developments (Rosenthal et al. 1989). Other researchers, such as Rosenthal et al. (1989), describe a crisis as a dangerous threat to the infrastructure or to the core values and foundational systems of the state-parties involved. This threat is imposed under the additional pressures of limited time and highly ambiguous information, greatly degrading two of the main components required for rational decision-making (Uriel and Charles 1989). An international crisis is conceptualized as the most intense and widespread form of conflict in the international order short of war. An international crisis invariably raises the possibility of the outbreak of war, and the option of military involvement is present in the minds of all parties involved (Al Khazandar 2014). International crises are thus accompanied by increased hostility and heightened chances of military action. This escalation is usually caused by an act or an event such as a verbal or written threat, a political act such as cutting diplomatic ties, an economic embargo such as the prohibition of trade, non-violent military activity such as relocating and preparing military troops, or a hostile act against an allied country (Brecher 1996). The direct connection between the military and security dimensions in international crises is clear. Due to international crises peaking at a point where any further escalation results in war, during such events the security and military sectors are activated to provide early alerts of military actions and possible hostile acts while evaluating points of weakness and strength, in addition to the study of worst-case scenarios and instituting plans to overcome them. There are key differences between traditional military operations and military activity during crises, however (Lai 2004).

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The most important of these characteristics are as follows. Threats and dangers: the fear of war exacerbates the feeling of insecurity created by the crisis, requiring it to be managed in a rational manner. Surprise: a crisis usually occurs as the result of an action that was taken by another party in an unexpected way, similar to what happened in the Gulf Crisis, and this element of surprise creates a state of confusion among citizens and leaders. Limited information and uncertainty: one of the features of a crisis is that information regarding another party’s thought processes and their expected behavior or reactions to various events and developments is limited, unclear, or absent; furthermore, there is limited information regarding the interaction of the different positions of the parties involved, the dimensions of the risks associated with the crisis, the behavior and mentality of the various actors, and the level of influence that they possess. Lack of time: the time allocated for decision-making during a crisis is very limited, and rapid responses are required as regards many different variables. Therefore, there might not be enough time for decision makers to gather all the required information and study all the existing options and alternatives that could help in the decision-making process. This characteristic leads to a reactive posture in which mistakes could occur through decision-making being hampered by misjudgment, a dearth of information, and a lack of time. Complexity and intertwining: a group of internal and external elements regularly interact, leading to great complexity in crisis management; crises are extremely sensitive to such elements, which often leads to a fast escalation—although sometimes to a de-escalation—of the conflict. These distinctive characteristics of crises cause states to diverge from their traditional military operational strategies: although countries usually maintain a certain level of military alertness in case a sudden military intervention is needed, they will usually aim to maneuver using soft power in order to ensure the defeat of the other party (Hane¸s and Andrei 2015). This is evident in the Gulf Crisis, in which a military invasion was always a possibility. Manifestations of such soft power strategies can be seen in the official statements of HH the Emir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, in Washington (Al Jazeera 2017); in what was reported of the efforts by former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to stop a military operation against Qatar (Emmons 2018); and in materials circulating on social media confirming or denying these kinds of escalations.

Transformations in Gulf Security Following the Gulf Crisis The shifts and changes in security measures following the Gulf Crisis can be summarized as three main transformations: 1. transformations in security range; 2. transformations in security standard; 3. transformations in security balance. This section delves into these three transformations in detail.

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Transformations in Security Range: From Regional Security to National Security The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 as a regional security organization in the wake of the Iran–Iraq War to face urgent challenges collectively, especially the threat emanating from Iran. After the end of the Iran–Iraq War, however, a new threat to GCC security emerged, this time from Iraq, following its invasion of Kuwait. As a result, Iraq was moved from the circle of allies to the circle of enemies and was viewed as a direct threat by the GCC member states. Additionally, and especially since the start of the twenty-first century, armed groups in Iraq and the Levant, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, have also challenged the security of the Gulf. These security threats previously came from a source outside the GCC, but during the Gulf Crisis the source of the threat shifted from outside to within. This shift in threat from external to internal has directly caused a radical transformation in the range of security, wherein regional security has been replaced by national security. The security determinants for the Gulf states are no longer regional, but strictly national, and what is categorized as a threat to one Gulf state may not necessarily be categorized as a threat to the others. As a result, every Gulf state has shaped its own security vision in isolation from the security threats of its neighbors. For example, Qatar no longer shapes its security as part of a collective regional security vision; rather, it has forged its own independent vision. As a result of the collapse of the Gulf regional security vision and the shift in the security range from regional to national, it is clear that each country in the Gulf is advancing its national security and stability independently. As another example— illustrating that the Qatari case is not unique—Kuwait also signed military, political, and economic agreements with the Republic of Turkey three months after the start of the Gulf Crisis. This collapse in the concept of regional security in the Gulf and the shift towards giving more importance to national security has forced every Gulf state to redefine its national security components individually, and this can be summarized in three main components—threats: expected military conflicts; dangers: factors that could harm the state at large; and challenges: every activity, whether proposed or resisted by a state, is pursued with the objective of serving that state’s interests. These three components shaping the concept of national security have been radically transformed since the Gulf Crisis—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Qatar, for example, has faced unprecedented challenges in food security, medicine repository, and construction materials, amongst others. These challenges are a direct consequence of the crisis; the state of Qatar had rarely witnessed such issues prior to the intra-GCC row. The same is true with regard to the dangers to national security, where the fear of decreasing foreign investments or the possibility of currency devaluation increased qualitatively as a result of the crisis. These threats were the main justifications for the transformation in Gulf security after the crisis, in addition to the source of the threat no longer coming from

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external sources, but from the core itself, as previously mentioned. This threat is qualitatively more real than the traditional Iranian threat that guided the Gulf states’ military combat doctrine for more than three decades. This became clear after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates started publicly promoting a new Qatari regime and advertising the ways that this alternative regime might be achieved through military power. As a result, the security scene in the Gulf more closely resembled a state of war than a mere exchange of threats between neighboring countries.

The Root Causes of the Collapse of the Gulf Security System To identify the point at which the collapse of the Gulf states’ collective security was initiated, we have to look at developments in the recent history of the region. As such, it is clear that the initial phase of the collapse began with the Arab Spring in 2011. When the Arab uprisings started to spread to all parts of the Arab world, the Gulf states were divided into four groups depending on their stance towards this radical change. Firstly, there was strong rejection: this was embodied by the stance of the United Arab Emirates, which rejected the principle of revolutionary change in Arab political systems. Secondly, neutrality: this was the stance of both the Sultanate of Oman and the State of Kuwait, neither of which issued official statements supporting or opposing the revolutionary movements in the Arab World. Thirdly, unannounced rejection: this was embodied in the stance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which rejected the idea of a revolutionary movement, yet in a manner and with a timing that distinguishes its rejection from that of the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates’ rejection came as a clear announced rejection, while the rejection of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was subtle and not disseminated through official declarations. During the Presidency of Mohamed Morsi, the Saudi government received Morsi and announced their support for him; meanwhile, the hostility between the Egyptian and Emirati authorities was apparent. Furthermore, the government of the United Arab Emirates intervened militarily to support the counter-revolution in Libya, while the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not—until recently—take sides or publicize their preference. This rejection by Saudi Arabia has its roots in the military coups that started in Egypt in 1952, when Saudi Arabia sided with the Egyptian government, and which reached their peak during the reign of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and president Gamal Abdul Naser. Fourthly and finally, strong support: this was the stance of the State of Qatar, which announced its support for the Arab uprisings from the moment that they surfaced. Qatar was the only Gulf nation to release an official statement in support of the Egyptian revolution and the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. These contrasting stances taken by different GCC states regarding the Arab uprisings formed the real starting point for the collapse of the concept of Gulf security, as a collective security vision cannot be established before there is an agreement on what is considered a shared threat and who is identified as an enemy. If an agreement regarding the sources of danger is not reached, then there cannot be a unified security

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vision. What differentiates the Gulf Crisis from the Arab Spring is that the crisis is not a marginal procedural dispute, but in fact a substantive disagreement between members of the same organization and neighboring countries. 1 This substantive dispute is a disagreement over what is considered dangerous, rather than over the manner in which to confront an agreed threat. The member states of the GCC do not agree on the threat emanating from the Arab uprisings and disagree on the ways in which to act—indeed, the GCC states differ in whether they consider the uprisings a threat at all. The same is true with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, as the dispute between the Gulf states is not about how to overcome the threat of the Brotherhood but about whether it is actually considered a threat. These objective differences eliminate any possibility of establishing a common security vision among the Gulf states. This led to the collapse of the formal Gulf security structure in 2014, when some of the GCC states withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. The same course of action was repeated in a more radical manner in 2017, leading to an official shift in focus from regional security to national security. A collective regional security vision does not entail an absolute and totally symmetrical security perception, but rather the existence of a unified framework within which the conceptual differences between the Gulf states are amalgamated. As Al-Marhoon (2007) argues, a regional security system is based on “the agreement among units that commit to a set of agreed criteria, to govern their interrelationships and cooperation.” He also points out that the agreement does not require symmetry, but the establishment of a unified regional security concept: “this does not mean the removal of all differences between political units, but rather to develop an environment that prevents such differences from getting out of control, so that the competitive nature of relations create a formulation with a positive result and not without an outcome.”

Transformations in Security Standards In one of his lectures at the Ibn Khaldon Center at Qatar University, Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Dr. Khalid Al Attiyah (2018) stated that any resumption of Gulf relations must be according to new standards and rules, and that the rules upon which these relations were based previously were no longer valid for the establishment of a new Gulf Cooperation Council. This statement is a reaffirmation of the practical realities which are officially recognized by Qatari officials. The pre–Gulf Crisis rules were based on the overwhelming influence of Saudi Arabia over other Gulf Countries, where Saudi hegemony largely represented common perceptions of regional security concepts. Some Gulf states accepted this due to their respect for the status of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and out of consideration for the nature of the relationships between the Gulf states. This was reflected in the State of Qatar’s delivery of the Syrian dossier to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to guide and lead the efforts in dealing with the Syrian opposition. In

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addition, almost all of the Gulf states agreed with the Saudi estimation of the Yemeni threat, as well as with the use of military intervention to deal with it. However, after the Gulf Crisis everything changed; the mutual respect that the State of Qatar had built in its security cooperation with Saudi Arabia has faded. This became especially evident after Saudi Arabia illustrated its bias while dealing with the Gulf Crisis, starting with the constant threat of military invasion2 and the promotion of people from opposition parties as alternatives to the current Qatari government, and ending with the massive economic war led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in an attempt to bring the Qatari economy to breaking point. The comprehensiveness and moral decline that characterized the Saudi attitude to handling its differences with Qatar made it very unlikely that a new security cooperation between the two countries could be established on previous principles. Security cooperation between states must be based on mutual trust, and if there is no trust there can be no security cooperation. Moreover, security cooperation requires a mutual disclosure of various aspects of the state’s orientations, which requires a significant level of mutual trust. While there might be economic, scientific, or other types of cooperation, there can never be security cooperation if there is no mutual trust. The collapse of mutual trust made it necessary for the Gulf states to seek an alternative basis for the establishment of cooperation. As stated by Minister Al Attiyah (2018), this basis had two essential factors: first, no obligations beyond what is legally required, and second, the parallel adoption of bilateral alliances. These two rules represent the two pillars upon which Qatar has based its engagements with Saudi Arabia since the Gulf Crisis. The first rule is reflected in the way Qatar has abandoned its previous method of classifying threats, security risks, and challenges according to the Saudi classification, as well as its abandonment of the security consensus that had originated in the moral appreciation for the former status of Saudi Arabia. The State of Qatar has limited its relations with Saudi Arabia to the minimal level needed in order to continue as part of the regional security system. The second rule represents the state of mistrust between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This reached its peak during the Gulf Crisis; two months before the crisis, King Salman visited Qatar and stressed the extent of the ties between the two countries. The Qatari foreign minister also visited Saudi Arabia and met with Prince Mohammed bin Salman following the hacking of the news agency and just before the closure of the land border between the two countries. Additionally, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir gave a lecture at the Qatari Foreign Ministry just two weeks before the crisis started, in which he praised Qatari diplomacy. Based on what was reported, the meetings were very friendly and prospects for the expansion of cooperation between the two countries were discussed. All these visits fully assured the Qatari authorities and gave them confidence that Saudi–Qatari relations were heading in an agreeable direction. The crisis thus arose unexpectedly, and diverged from the way that the relationship between the two countries had been tending. This sudden transformation, along with the same level of radicalism continuing for almost two years, contributed to the loss of confidence between the two countries.

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The question that arises is: How can the Qatari leadership trust people who had praised them just days before the crisis, and then suddenly turned and accused them of terrorism, led a campaign to unify the international community against them, and openly declared their desire to overthrow the Qatari regime? The events of the crisis did not leave any common ground for real security cooperation between the two countries. As such, it is expected that the State of Qatar will maintain the bilateral alliances that it has strengthened and expanded with other regional and international partners since the Gulf Crisis began. Therefore, the State of Qatar is proceeding on two parallel tracks, the first being through the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Gulf regional framework, and the second the pursuit of bilateral alliances as well as regional and international cooperation. Consequently, the Gulf Cooperation Council will not be the only framework that establishes the determinants of Qatari security, but rather it is balanced by another framework of bilateral relations between Qatar and its international allies and partners.

Post-crisis Security Pattern Scenarios The resumption of Gulf relations within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council is not impossible; however, what does seem impossible as long as the political leaders remain unchanged is that the post-crisis security arrangement will be similar to the situation before the crisis. There are four scenarios for the security patterns of the era following the Gulf Crisis; these are a continuation of the traditional security patterns discussed by security researchers such as Jones (2011). The first scenario is comprehensive security. This scenario is based on two elements: strategic understanding of the Gulf security threats, and mutual trust that results in an inclusive security cooperation in all respects. Based on what has been mentioned earlier, this scenario is very unlikely. The second scenario is cooperative security. This scenario is based on security cooperation within specific fields, with the goal of strengthening a set of rules for cooperative action against common security threats. The third scenario is coordinated security. This security pattern is less complex than the previous two, because it does not require cooperation in specific areas. Rather, it relies on cooperation to overcome certain passing issues so that each risk or challenge is coordinated independently. The fourth scenario is collective security. This scenario is more closely related to military defense. It is based on cooperative defense between the units of a single system, where an attack on one member equates to an attack on all. There are no strategic impediments to Gulf security that stand in the way of instituting any of the last three scenarios. However, coordinated security is the framework that would most closely preserve the sovereignty of each state over the Gulf security landscape until a change in the political leadership takes place.

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Transformations in Security Balance: From the Logic of Dominance to Competition Among the characteristics of the GCC is the lack of balance between its member states, since it is not based on cooperation between states that are equal or even convergent in their capabilities and geopolitical weight.3 The reason for the lack of even minimal balance among the Gulf states is due to the existence of Saudi Arabia within this system. Saudi Arabia has more geopolitical weight than any other Gulf state, and any interaction between the Gulf states is based on a logic of hegemony rather than cooperation with a rival. Geographically (Table 5.1), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 186 times the size of the State of Qatar, about 2,810 times the size of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 121 times the size of the State of Kuwait, 26 times the size of the United Arab Emirates, 7 times the size of the Sultanate of Oman, and 5 times the size of the other Gulf states combined. In terms of population (Table 5.2), the Saudi people exceed the number of people in Qatar by 12 times, the people of Bahrain 22 times, the people of the United Arab Table 5.1 Area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia compared to the GCC Countries

Table 5.2 Population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia compared to other GCC Countries (2017)

Land area, Saudi Arabia ratio to

Land area (km2 )

Saudi Arabia

1

2.15 million

Bahrain

2,810 times

765

Qatar

186 times

11,571

Kuwait

121 times

17,818

UAE

26 times

83,600

Oman

7 times

309,501

Rest of the GCC combined

5 times

423,255

Population, Saudi Arabia ratio to

Population (m)

Saudi Arabia

1

32.94

Bahrain

22 times

1.493

Qatar

12 times

2.639

Kuwait

8 times

4.137

UAE

3.5 times

9.4

Oman

7 times

Rest of the GCC combined

1.5 times

4.636 22.305

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Emirates 3.5 times, the people of Oman 7 times, the people of Kuwait 8 times, and are equal to 1.5 times the population of the other Gulf states combined. Elements of geography and population are generally no longer as important as they once were, primarily due to tremendous technological developments in the military field that have greatly reduced the significance of these traditional elements. However, they remain important in this case, due to the direct geographical boundaries between the conflicting parties within the Gulf.4 Based on what has already been discussed, then, there was never any balance in the formation of the Gulf security equation, but rather a clear dominance of Saudi Arabia over the Gulf scene. However, after the Gulf Crisis and the shift of Saudi– Qatari relations towards a state of open hostility, there was an essential change in this equation. The Gulf Crisis contributed to the creation of a Turkish military base on GCC territory, which directly impacted Saudi Arabia, forcing it to shift from the position of regional hegemon to that of a competitor. Furthermore, due to its various advantages, this competition naturally tends to favor Turkey. The transformation in the Gulf security balance resulted in Saudi Arabia losing its place as the dominant state in the Gulf. In fact Turkey has now become a contender for this position, or may even have attained it. This shift is considered Saudi Arabia’s biggest strategic loss, turning it from the “leader” of the Gulf region into a “rival” amongst other contenders. The transformation of Saudi Arabia’s regional role is similar to what happened to the United States within the international system during the Cold War. The United States was not the dominant state during the Cold War because the international order was based on a bipolarity which prevented hegemony. In political terms, hegemony means that a single state is capable of threatening the countries within its regional or international scope, without those countries being able to threaten it in return. Accordingly, the existence of the Soviet Union stood in the way of the United States becoming the global hegemon during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States became the only superpower, and was transformed from a rival state to the global hegemon. However, this monolithic polarity collapsed with the rise of several additional poles in the following decade, which has hindered the United States’s efforts at imposing its hegemony worldwide. The same is true of the Saudi position in the Gulf scene, where for a long time it has largely enjoyed hegemony. Before the Gulf Crisis, Saudi Arabia could threaten the other GCC countries, which had no capacity to threaten it in return. After the Gulf Crisis, and with the Turkish presence in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is no longer able to threaten its neighbors in the way it previously did, and has consequently lost its status as the regional hegemon.

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The Implications of the Change in Security Balance for Geopolitics There is no doubt that prior to the Gulf Crisis, the Gulf system was characterized by a unified security logic and as a region had considerable geopolitical weight. This is because the geopolitical weight was not measured in terms of each individual state’s geopolitical power; rather, the geopolitical characteristics of each country extended to the rest of the Gulf states, resulting in the geopolitical weight being determined by a regional standard rather than by the standards of individual countries. However, after the Gulf Crisis and the collapse of the unified Gulf security system, the region’s geopolitical weight has been reduced to operating on a country-bycountry basis, especially in the case of Qatar. This fragmentation and the shift from regional geopolitics to Qatari geopolitics seems, on the face of it, to indicate that the biggest loser is indeed the State of Qatar; due to Saudi geopolitical characteristics continuing to be extended to them, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have not lost much in this transformation. Yet looking at the scene more closely, we find that what seems apparent on the surface is not accurate. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical loss is no less than that of Qatar. While this fact may seem surprising, Qatar’s weaknesses in terms of geopolitical weight are exclusively associated with fixed geopolitical characteristics—such as land area, population, military power, and economy. The country has compensated for weaknesses in these areas, however, by increasing its ties with the Republic of Turkey. Turkey’s strong and diverse presence in Qatar has resulted in the replacement of Saudi geopolitical weight with Turkish geopolitical weight. As for the economic aspect, the State of Qatar has shifted from its reliance on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to alternative channels, despite the extra costs incurred. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has lost access to the most important element of geopolitical weight that the State of Qatar possesses: its soft power resources, which are primarily based in media such as Al Jazeera. Saudi Arabia used to rely on Al Jazeera as the primary means of promoting its war in Yemen and overcoming the difficulties that it faced regionally and internationally. However, following the crisis, the network shifted its reporting and provided insight into every detail of the Saudi political scene, particularly after Saudi Arabia and the Quartet included the closure of Al Jazeera in their list of thirteen demands. Furthermore, Al Jazeera shed light on many different issues in Yemen, which created difficulty for Saudi foreign policy and damaged the country’s reputation. In sum, Qatar was able to overcome its losses by looking for alternative channels for those of its needs—such as food, medicine, and travel corridors—that were previously met by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is still unable to compensate for the loss of the support that it once derived from Qatar’s soft power.

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Implications of the Change in Security Balance for the Balance of Power Many political philosophers see the origin of international relations as lying in conflict, not peace. As a historical political rule, it may be said that war begins at the point at which the balance of power fails. While there is a balance of power in the international system, peace prevails; however, when a state seeks to “dominate” the international system, war comes to the fore (Mingst 2004). In short, these facts confirm two points: firstly, the desire for conflict is a constant feature in international relations, and secondly, the moment of transgression is the very moment that the balance of power collapses. Looking at the number and type of forces in the Gulf scene, especially in Qatari– Saudi relations, we do not find them to be based on a real balance of power between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC countries: the preponderance of power always tends to favor Saudi Arabia. In the past, however, two factors have prevented serious problems caused by this power imbalance. Firstly, there was the American assurance of the security of the Gulf states, especially through the presence of American bases in some Gulf states. Secondly, the nature of the Gulf states’ relations and social fabric was based on a set of values that made military adventures between them difficult. The events of the Gulf Crisis proved that these two factors are no longer operative. The White House, for example, sided with the blockading Quartet at the outset of the crisis, which served as a green light for a possible military attack. The media campaigns occurring in parallel to the military threats aimed at Qatar dispelled any illusions of common social values prevailing among the Gulf states. Given these conditions, the State of Qatar has resorted to other ways to achieve a balance of power: self-construction, and joint construction.

First Model: Self-construction The method of self-construction requires the state to build a military infrastructure parallel to those of its opponents, and to ensure it does not rely on coalitions as the sole mechanism for maintaining its security and stability. The State of Qatar did not consider such a self-construction model before the crisis caused by the withdrawal of ambassadors in 2014; however, it recognized the need for self-security due to indications that it might no longer enjoy a state of integration in the Gulf’s collective security frame. The most prominent factors attesting to its adoption of this model can be seen from a security and military perspective—for example, in the substantial military deals the state has made since the beginning of the diplomatic crisis in 2014. Qatar’s military purchases, along with those of the GCC states, increased over the four years following 2014, and Qatar has acquired a number of C-17 and C-130 strategic air transport aircraft. In addition, ground forces have also been enhanced with modern German weapons (Kettner 2017), a

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Brazilian multiple rocket launcher system (Al Sharq 2016), and American Patriot missile defense systems (Reuters 2014). The navy was also provided with a full naval fleet from Italy (Reuters 2017), along with missiles, ammunition, and light and medium types of weapons. According to reports, Qatar intends to increase the number of aircraft within its air force to ninety-six. These additional aircraft to be added to its current fleet of twelve Mirage-2000s will include American F-15 s (Knecht 2018) and French Rafale (Gulf Times 2019), as well as British Typhoon aircraft (Al Jazeera, December 2017). This is in addition to multiple contracts for the purchase of various helicopters, including offensive and transport helicopters (Al Jazeera 2018). It was also reported that Doha is in the process of establishing a new air base (Tamim Air Base), along with expanding the Al Udeid Air Base, and upgrading the Doha Air Base to a level that will accommodate new aircraft and systems. Qatar will also develop command and control systems with the latest radar, command, and communication systems (Gulf Times 2018). The “National Day March Event,” a military parade which took place six months after the Gulf Crisis broke and is held annually to celebrate Qatar’s national day on December 18, indicates that Qatar’s armed forces have become the first line of defense in Qatar’s national security. Several indirect messages were sent as part of the country’s diplomatic strategy for managing the crisis, as expressed in the following acts: exhibiting Doha’s short-range strategic missiles for the first time (Senear 2018); providing military infantry lines with mixed weapons (American and Russian)5 ; the use of Western (British) step in the marching display, with a switch to Eastern step (Russian and Chinese) during the parade6 ; the participation of internal security forces (police) in special operations teams, to illustrate the efficiency and ability of the State security forces to act as a supporting force in line with their military training; and the participation of the National Service in civil attire, as a reference to civilians who will serve alongside the armed forces to defend Qatar. The main purpose of a military march is customarily to show strength, efficiency, and combat readiness. In the case of Qatar prior to the Gulf Crisis, however, the aim of these presentations was primarily to participate in the National Day celebrations alongside civilians; but after the crisis it was redirected towards showing the state’s readiness to handle any hostile action with flexibility and professionalism. Following this military parade, an Emirati fighter jet crossed into Qatar’s airspace on 21 December 2017 (Financial Tribune 2018). The United Arab Emirates may have done this in order to send a message to Qatar, or perhaps to confirm that it had received the messages sent by Qatar.

Second Model: Joint Construction If a state is unable on its own to achieve a balance of power with its rival, it must form an alliance to achieve that desired balance. The model of joint construction had been the only model that Qatar had explicitly adopted since 1996, due to the geopolitical

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imbalance between Qatar and its neighbors, and because joint construction is less costly, more flexible, and more responsive to change than acting alone. However, after the Gulf Crisis, the situation changed. While the State of Qatar continues to follow the joint construction model, it no longer views this as the sole option and is using the self-construction model in parallel. This political orientation in the country’s defense policy after the crisis is confirmed by Minister of State Dr. Khaled Al Attiyah, who stated that: There are two things we have to do. First, we want to stop calling for an emergency every time the region goes through any crisis, by relying only on the allies, but what we want is to solve anything that happens in the region with them. That is why we are strengthening ourselves. Second, we believe that stability and prosperity need to be sustained. Qatar is a country that seeks peace, development and prosperity, and not war. However, we want a force to protect this stability. (Al Sharq 2018).

Qatar has been active in forming alliances and strengthening its relations since the Gulf Crisis. Perhaps one of the most prominent new orientations is Qatar’s interest in working with Russia. Al Attiyah visited Moscow in August 2017 and expressed Qatar’s interest in purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defense system. During his meeting with the Russian Defense Minister, Al Attiyah revealed that the Emir of Qatar, HH Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, had assigned him to strengthen relations with Russia in the field of military cooperation. The Russian Defense Minister also visited Doha, the first visit of its kind, in October 2017. During this visit, a number of cooperative defense agreements were signed by Russia and Qatar. Some view the Russian–Qatari approach as more political than military in nature, and as a reminder to the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council that Qatar has other options for its alliances should it be pressured any further.

Are These Security Shifts Strategic? Are these transformations strategic, or will they fade as the crisis fades? If we look at the nature of the dispute between the Gulf states—and especially between Saudi Arabia and Qatar—it seems difficult to apply the term “strategy” to such a pattern of disputes; this is due to several factors, including the type of dispute and the common risks.

Type of Dispute The type of dispute between states is determined by the origin of the dispute. If the origin lies in some permanent or long-enduring condition, the dispute can indeed take on strategic dimensions; yet the converse is also true. If we look at the Qatari– Saudi dispute, we do not find it to possess any characteristics of a strategic conflict,

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as it is not a result of ideological variation, existential considerations, or geopolitical controversy. Unlike the Saudi–Iranian conflict, which has its basis in the Iranian regime’s adoption of a revolutionary ideology antithetical to the ruling regimes in the Gulf, the Saudi–Qatari conflict is not ideological. Neither is the Saudi–Qatari dispute an existential matter: Saudi Arabia does not take issue with the existence of Qatar as an entity, unlike the case of Israel, which is different in terms of legitimacy. Nor is the Saudi–Qatari dispute a geopolitical conflict: it is not based on conflicting economic interests or based on territorial disputes. And on the contrary, such geopolitical differences do exist between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, notably regarding the Shaybah oil field and its strategic importance.

Common Risks The nature of the relationship between the Gulf societies and the relative similarities between their political systems generate common threats and dangers to these countries. The Iranian regime, with its revolutionary ideology and expansionist practices, for example, continues to pose a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, despite this threat now being at a reduced level. In terms of these factors, it is thus difficult to say that the Gulf Crisis is a strategic conflict that entails strategic transformations. And to reinforce this conclusion, we might ask: What substantial concessions would Qatar or Saudi Arabia have to make for their relations to return to the way they were before the Gulf Crisis? There are no clear issues, no ideological concessions to be made, and no compromises on wealth resources or border disputes to be sought. There is, nevertheless, a state of mistrust between the parties involved in the Gulf Crisis.

Security Transformations: Ensuring the Continuation of Gulf Collective Security The previous section discussed transformations that reflected directly on the Gulf Crisis. The aim of this chapter, however, is to discuss the transformations that the Gulf states must undergo in order to achieve security in the Gulf and to ensure its stability overall, which is the central goal for all these states—and indeed a strategic necessity, not a superfluous luxury. It is necessary for every state that wants to ensure stability and security to make its regional security its first line of defense. There are thus three predominant transformations under consideration in this chapter. The first is a transformation from tactical to strategic security; the second is from traditional to geostrategic security; and the third is from securitization to rational security. These three transformations will help to ensure the continuation of the Gulf region’s collective security.

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The Transformation from Tactical Security to Strategic Security In this context, tactical security means the type of security that is achieved based on the contingencies of the present situation, without taking into account questions of overall legitimacy. Strategic security, on the other hand, is that which is established based on the legitimacy of security and the security of legitimacy. In other words, this means that a state authority has the right to security but does not enjoy it, but takes actions based on the legitimacy of its claims to it. In many Gulf states, security is based on two axes. The first axis is the possession of tools for control and dominance; the second axis is relations with the West. Through these two axes, the Gulf states control their internal security balance in a tactical manner, based on the logic of force rather than on the force of logic. This logic has not achieved security and stability even for the countries that have been most dependent on it. It is well known that Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was more attached to the West, nominally the United States, than any other country in the Muslim world. It is also known that it was more repressive than any other country, noting in particular the secret police known as SAVAK that was utilized for violent security measures against every populist political movement in Iran. However, when the Iranians rebelled against the Shah in November 1978, the entire Iranian regime collapsed soon after, and Mohammad Reza fled abroad with no one to turn to; neither his relations with the West nor his own security forces could secure the survival of his regime. Thus, the Iranian security apparatus during those times can be defined as more tactical than strategic. The same is true of the Egyptian model. At the start of the Egyptian revolution in January 2011, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down, even though he enjoyed an outstanding relationship with the West and had established a violent and repressive security force. Therefore, any state or regional system that only achieves the two axes—a relationship with the West and the possession of tools for control and dominance—can be said to have security that is merely tactical and not strategic. For tactical security to become strategic security, several factors must be achieved, notably the strengthening of civil society institutions, and the strengthening of demographic security, in which context the fact that large segments of the population comprise expatriate workers poses a threat. However, the primary requirement of strategic security is that the source of security is legitimate in the eyes of society, and this legitimacy stems from the will of the population. Therefore, it is society that confers legitimacy on the source of authority. In the Gulf the issue of legitimacy now varies from state to state, except in countries that have adopted their political system through a direct referendum, and many regimes cannot claim real legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. For this reason, the type of legitimacy that exists in some Gulf states is linked to the conduct of the authority, not to its very existence. Once the authority exercises a behavior that does not have society’s approval, the legitimacy of the authority itself is called into question.

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Therefore, the two aforementioned axes are important in achieving security, but in order for this security to be strategic there must be legitimacy in the source of the authority itself. This requires that there be genuine political representation of the people of the Gulf region such that they may express their aspirations and interests. If this representation takes place internally, then it must be reflected at the regional institutional level, so that there is an entity that embodies the will of society. If the GCC were a real reflection of the will of the Gulf societies, it would be difficult to imagine that a scenario such as the 2017 Gulf Crisis could take place. Geopolitical scientists divide the elements of state power into moral and material elements. The most important of the moral elements leading to the geopolitical weight of a state is the legitimacy of its political system. The Gulf states have used all means at their disposal to promote and market themselves in Western forums, except for the method of relying on the legitimacy of the regime and the existence of popular political representation. For example, in a study conducted by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at the University of Qatar, it was found that “62% of Qatari citizens believe that people’s participation through elected parliaments do not lead to rapid deterioration of political conflicts between countries,” compared to “17% who stated otherwise” (SESRI 2018). Some Gulf states have sought to purchase Western support through huge military and trade deals, and by injecting large sums of money into public relations companies. However, this is a tactical measure which is of no value at the strategic level, as neither the public nor Western governments and parliaments are sufficiently naive or superficial for this to have a significant effect. They understand the nature of the problems and challenges that the region is facing. If we take Israel as a model, we see that the most important factor considered in the West today is that it is the only democratic state in the vicinity of dictatorships. This argument, based on valuesharing, is the one used by American presidents to justify their stance on Israel, regardless of whether they truly believe it. This is not to say that democracy alone is sufficient to gain a state Western protection; but it is one of the strongest forms of soft power internationally, and one of the strongest internal guarantors of security. The events of the coup in Turkey on 15 July 2016 are proof of that. In conclusion, a shift away from tactical security that is based internally on bilateral security controls and externally on a relationship with the United States is not sufficient by itself. Strategic security, as we said, is based on both the legitimacy of security and the security of legitimacy. Legitimacy of security means that the authority responsible for the perception and practice of security possesses political legitimacy in the eyes of society; security of legitimacy means that the legitimacy arising from societal approval—from which political control emanates—must have the power to maintain security and stability.

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The Transformation from Traditional Security to Geostrategic Security The term “geostrategy” is defined in many ways, varying in different contexts, and as Ashrafpour (2010) notes there is no agreement on a definition among academics, theoreticians, and politicians.7 For lack of a better option, the entry in the Oxford political dictionary may as well be utilized: this defines geostrategy as “relating to the strategy required in dealing with geopolitical problems.”8 This definition, albeit circular, offers a starting point for thinking about what we want to deliver regarding this transformation; for greater definitional depth, we may turn to what Saalbach (2017) called Integrated Geostrategy.9 A geostrategic vision is one that includes both fixed elements and morphological variables. It is inclusive of all sustainability requirements: geo-economic, geopolitical, geo-sociological, geomatic, and geo-military10 (Ezati 2003). Such frameworks address elements that are usually overlooked by traditional security, such as food security, medical (health) security, cybersecurity, and the demographic composition and its specific security problems. There is no doubt that such a holistic approach can only be achieved with the availability of two factors. The first is the existence of political institutions that can ensure both quality and continuity of political vision; and the second is the potential for geostrategic planning. The first factor’s necessity lies in the individualistic vision prevailing in the Gulf states, which stands in the way of the establishment of a geostrategic vision—since geostrategic requirements must first be directed towards achieving common interests rather than individual interests. Additionally, there should be continuity in the processes of planning, implementation, and supervision. This can only be achieved within institutions based on these three levels. If these processes are separated in order to achieve the requirement of quality, it is difficult to achieve the requirement of continuity. Regarding the second factor, again, we need to view the Gulf as a unit of geostrategic analysis. The Gulf states—with the relative exception of Saudi Arabia— have no real geostrategic dimension, due to the weakness of the fixed geopolitical factors in their geographic location, area, and population, as well as the morphological aspects of each Gulf state. This weakness leads to recognition of the fact that no Gulf country can have a geostrategic dimension unless it is part of a unified regional system with a common vision. Such a system would see each country participating in its construction, with each complementing the others through their collective possession of all the necessary geostrategic elements, along with their combined high aspirations for the framework’s geopolitical, geo-sociological, geo-economic, geo-military, and geo-informational requirements. Only as a unitary bloc can the Gulf states achieve greater geostrategic security than the countries of surrounding regions. Meanwhile, operating with a national rather than a regional mindset will reduce the geostrategic dimension to a point that will make any Gulf state unable to meet regional challenges, while depriving it of the ability to invest in the geostrategy of the Gulf overall. We are also unable to

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overlook the dilemma of human environmental factors regarding the political units of the Gulf, especially the demographic problem, which is of the greatest concern not only in terms of security, but also in terms of culture and society. Given the current state of fragmentation in the Gulf, and the loss of a unified regional dimension in Qatar’s strategic thinking, we find that most of the Gulf states are confined to “Air Force Theory” as a geopolitical vision. Geopolitical researchers have distinguished three theories that may constitute a framework for the geopolitical vision of any country: Air Force Theory, Maritime Force Theory, and Ground Force Theory. Geopolitical theoreticians differ in the strategic theories they prefer for different states, but Air Force Theory is generally considered to be ideal for all Gulf countries except Saudi Arabia and Oman. However, today no Gulf state can achieve a convergence between the three types of power in a way which constitutes a balance of these forces with respect to the specific regional challenges, unless it is under a unified Gulf system.

The Transformation from Securitization to Rational Security When dealing with the issue of security, the discussion is often directed towards the physical and perceptual definitions of security, rather than towards a rational security structure on which the security of the state is in reality based. Therefore, it can be said with confidence that the basic weakness in the Gulf’s security system is the lack of rational security. The Gulf authorities have no clear ability to deal with security through principled considerations approached with a unified mindset; indeed, they are often fixated on the securitized treatments of what really ought to be considered intellectual affairs. This tends to transform the authority’s remediation efforts from being part of the solution to being part of the problem. Here we can cite an important phrase from a speech by HH the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim: “Narrowing the concept of security is a danger to security itself” (Amiri Diwan 2018). The problem of terrorism is considered central to Gulf security, as the region itself has suffered in its recent history from the actions of terrorist movements, from al-Qaeda in 2005 to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2015, amongst others. In the past three years, a number of young people in the Gulf have joined terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, regardless of their ideological orientation. On the other hand, the Gulf states are an integral part of the US-led coalition against terrorism, which is manifested in various forms, notably the coalition against ISIL. With terrorism a central issue in Gulf security, we still find no crystallization of rational remedies for the cause of terrorism, as if the issue of terrorism is merely random behavior that has no basis in rationality. The GCC countries have not developed any systematic treatments to address the issue of terrorism. Some of the Gulf states have, for example, removed all the Quranic verses that include reference to fighting and jihad from school curriculums in the apparent belief that this will end

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terrorism in the Gulf. Yet a person who does not read the verses on jihad in the school curriculum will read them in the Quran, and those who do not read them in the Quran will hear them from the preacher at the local mosque: a young person from the Gulf will always find a way to come across these verses. What is striking is the fact that the countries that delete the verses of jihad from their curriculum are the same countries that claim that they are proud to embrace Islam. This raises the question: How can one claim to be proud of Islam and at the same time remove its verses because it seemingly supports terrorism? The duplicity of this proposition, along with the randomness and superficiality in the way it is practiced, further provokes the terrorist industry rather than providing remedies to it. The rationale behind terrorism will not be addressed through deleting verses, but by seeking to understand these texts in light of their scriptural and historical context. This way, their correct meanings can be revealed and turned into general knowledge, to prevent the spread of ideological recruitment through Islamic texts. The Sharia laws that are used by terrorist movements are always fragmented and abstracted from their contexts, so as to serve the purpose of those who aim to distort them. Scientific research alone will prove this—not the use of tools of violence through the rampant securitization of society. Therefore, the use of force alone will not work in combating terrorism. The minds that produce these behaviors cannot be controlled through physical violence, but only through a rational method which addresses and convinces minds—because only minds can control minds. At the same time, the security measures adopted by some Gulf countries have not been directed at the issue of terrorism alone, but have also been used against intellectuals, thinkers, university professors, and opinion makers. Some GCC countries have recently witnessed a wide-ranging security campaign aimed at those who simply disagree with the governing authority. This indicates, first, the weakness and fragility of that authority. A rational authority with a correct strategy and mindset does not need to arrest those who disagree with it, because a rational position only requires a valid counter-argument to prove its invalidity. Suppressing and arresting dissenters will not prove the validity or rationality of a position; the resort to securitization only proves that the authorities are incapable of rational engagement. Secondly, this makes it obvious that the range of the security problem is expanding; these detainees have families, relatives, and friends, and consequently the circles of people who fear those authorities become expanded, which makes the relationship between society and authority increasingly based on tension and mistrust. If the Gulf wants to achieve security in the region, therefore, it must move from the logic of “securitization” to the logic of “rational security,” which can be achieved by providing a safe environment for citizens to express their views and oppose opinions with well-thought-out counter arguments.

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Conclusion The current era is a rare moment in the history of the Arab World. The Gulf states, especially Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, were not, in most stages of history, prominent in the Islamic and Arab worlds, but today they are among the leading players. That is why we cannot examine any aspect of the Arab World without incorporating reflections on the differences that exist in the Gulf. There is no doubt that the Gulf Crisis has revealed the great capabilities of the Gulf states to mobilize international opinion through lobbying efforts directed at Western decision-makers. It has also revealed the enormous potential for shaping public opinion by diplomatic means or through public relations companies. However, the question remains: How will the Arab world benefit from these great capabilities? A quick look at the situations in the countries involved in the Arab Spring reveals the extent of the negative impact of the intra-GCC differences on Arab security, as these countries have become arenas of conflict and of proxy wars between Gulf states. This is most evident in Syria and Libya, where the Gulf differences are directly reflected. One hopes that the Gulf states will take advantage of this rare historical opportunity, which has given them the potential and the capability to make them eligible to lead the Islamic world. This is an opportunity to create an attractive Gulf model, not through financial abundance and the possession of media arsenals, but based on solid political and national rights, and a security vision based on a conscious awareness of the importance of Gulf geopolitics. Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

The variation in the type of difference—substantive or procedural—is a central aspect in organizing international and regional cooperation. Therefore, the statutes of the international and regional organizations clearly distinguish between them, and require unanimity on substantive issues, while the majority’s approval is required in procedural matters. See, for example: Charter of the United Nations, Article XXVII, or GCC Charter, Article IX. The statement by Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, the Emir of the State of Kuwait, announced the existence of intentions to attack the State of Qatar at a joint press conference between the Emir of Kuwait and US President Donald Trump. “War ‘stopped’ between Qatar, blockading Arab nations.” Al Jazeera. September 8, 2017. In international relations, states do not define their interests and act towards them on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality, but on the basis of the difference in power. When dealing with another state, a state does not act, in practice, on the basis of equality between states, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, but on the basis of their differences in capabilities and levels of power. Regarding the area and population, see Statistical Center of the GCC States (GCC STAT), https://www.gccstat.org/en.

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5.

The soldiers who took part in the military march carried Russian AK-47 rifles and American M-16 rifles. A state usually adopts a single source of armaments, either Western (American and European) or Eastern (Chinese and Russian), because there are differences between these two sources on many levels, from the quality of the weapon to the unit of measurement used, to the firing path itself. 6. There are two main schools of military marches: the Western School (British), to which Qatar and the other Gulf states belong, and the Eastern School (Russian and Chinese), to which the majority of the communist countries belong. In the Eastern march the soldier’s leg movement is more show-like and powerful. Qatar has always followed the Western march of the British school, in common with most Arab and Western countries. Traditionally, marches are supposed to follow the same pattern throughout. However, in the case of the Qatari military parade, the marchers performed a transition from Western to Eastern style as the soldiers passed in front of HH the Qatari Emir’s platform, as a signal that the Qatari army is characterized by a flexibility to switch between Eastern and Western alternatives, and an ability to alternate between Western and Eastern allies. 7. Academics, theorists, and practitioners of geopolitics have agreed no standard definition for geostrategy. See Ashrafpour, Ashraf, “Geostrategic importance of Persian Gulf.” University of Pune, April 2010, p. 101. 8. Definition of “Geostrategic” by Oxford Lexico Dictionary, https://www.lexico. com/en/definition/geostrategic. 9. Saalbach states that the best definition is the Munich Geopolitical School’s view that geostrategy is a set of knowledge resulting from social and biological dimensions. See Saalbach, Klaus-Peter, “Modern Geostrategy, Methods and Practice,” Universitat Osnabrück Applied Public Policy Analysis Department (Working Paper), December 2, 2017. 10. Ezati argues that the “new concept of geopolitics deals with the relationship between man and the surrounding environment, as the main factor that plays an important role in the political destiny of the state. Environmental factors are a framework for the strategic geopolitical goals of the state.”

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Emmons, A. (2018). Saudi Arabia planned to invade Qatar last summer, Rex Tillerson’s efforts to stop it may have cost him his job. The Intercept. Retrieved March 12, 2017, from https://theint ercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/. Ezati, E. (2003). Geopolitics in the 21st century. Tehran: Sovet Publishing. Ground forces successfully conclude the Nasr 2016 military exercise. (2016). Al Sharq. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.al-sharq.com. Hane¸s, N., & Andrei, A. (2015). Culture as soft power in international relations. In International Conference on Knowledge-Based Organization (Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 32–37). De Gruyter. Herman, C. F. International crisis as situation variable. In Vasques, J. A. (Ed.), Classics of international relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Jones, P. (2011). Towards a regional security regime for the Middle East, issues and options. Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute. Kettner, J. (2017, June 13). Germany and the Qatar crisis. International Policy Digest. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from https://intpolicydigest.org/. Khaled Al Attiyah. (2018). Qatar is keen to develop its defense capabilities and bring prosperity for its citizens. Al Sharq. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from https://www.al-sharq.com.Qatar signs $3.7bn deal to buy military helicopters (March 15 2018). Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com. Knecht, E. (2018, November 26) Qatar expects to receive six F-15 fighter jets from U.S. by March 2021. Reuters. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com. Lai, B. (2004). The effects of different types of military mobilization on the outcome of international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2), 211–229. Mingst, K. (2004). Essentials of international relations (3rd ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. Qatar against the Blockade. (2017). The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI). Retrieved March 15, 2020, from http://www.qu.edu.qa/research/sesri/data-center/qatar-againstblockade. Qatar Informs UN of UAE, Bahrain Airspace Violations. (2018). Financial Tribune. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://financialtribune.com. Qatar Receives First Rafale Jet from France. (2019). Gulf Times. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.gulf-times.com. Qatar seals 5-billion-euro navy vessels deal with Italy. (2017). Reuters. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com/. Qatar signs $8bn Typhoon fighter jet deal with the UK. (2017, December 10). Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com. Qatar to Establish Tamim Airbase. (2018). Gulf Times. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://des ktop.gulf-times.com/. Raytheon wins $2.4 billion contract for Qatar Patriot system. (2014). Reuters. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com/. Rosenthal, U., Charles, M. T., Hart, P. T., Kouzmin, A., & Jarman, A. (1989). From case studies to theory and recommendations: A concluding analysis. In U. Rosenthal, M. T. Charles, & P. T. Hart (Eds.), Coping with crises: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism (pp. 436–472). Springfield: Charles C Thomas, Publisher. Saalbach, K.-P. (2017). Modern geostrategy, methods and practice. Universitat Osnabrück Applied Public Policy Analysis Department (Working Paper). Osnabrück University. Senear, M. (2018). Qatar displays Chinese missile. Arms Control Association. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.armscontrol.org. SESRI. (2018). National Identity Survey, http://www.qu.edu.qa/research/sesri/data-center/Nat ional-Identity-Survey, Qatar University, 2018. Speech by HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Emir of Qatar, at the Doha Forum (2018). Amiri Diwan. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from https://www.diwan.gov.qa. Uriel, R., & Charles, M. (1989). Coping with crises: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

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War ‘stopped’ between Qatar, blockading Arab nations. (2017, September 8). Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com.

Chapter 6

The Cyber Operation Against Qatar News Agency James Shires

Introduction The Qatar crisis was catalyzed by what appeared to be a novel use of cyber tools: the planting of a fake story about the Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani on the website of Qatar News Agency (QNA) in May 2017, portraying him as expressing support for Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. While this operation was a new development in foreign policy tactics in the region, it was not entirely without precedent in international cybersecurity. More specifically, this operation can be seen as an extreme case of what I have called elsewhere “hack-and-leak operations” (Shires 2019a), and the following paragraph is a summary of the more sustained treatment in that article. Hack-and-leak operations (HLO) involve both an intrusion into specific digital systems and networks (hack) and an attempt to influence certain audiences through the public release of information obtained through that intrusion (leak). HLO are mechanisms for delegitimization: ways in which adversaries seek to diminish the legitimacy of their target. Their impact can be analyzed in a tripartite framework. The first dimension is their context, meaning that the political and social context of the operation affects its outcome: for example, in contrast to the liberal, partisan, and antagonistic quality of the US public sphere, in the Gulf repressive cybercrime laws, overt media control, and extensive self-censorship mean that states have different tools to amplify and restrict the leaked information. The second dimension is the technical detail of the operation or its characteristics. These include the infrastructure used to conduct the intrusion, the entry points, the tools and patterns of access, and methods of leaking, as well as the size and format of the data leaked. The third and last dimension of impact for HLO is their audience, as such operations are usually targeted at a particular audience, both locally and internationally. J. Shires (B) Cybersecurity Governance, Institute of Security and Global Affairs, University of Leiden, Turfmarkt 99, 2511 DP The Hague, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_6

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In this chapter, I use this framework to analyze the cyber operation against the Qatar News Agency. The chapter is divided into three sections, focusing in turn on the context, characteristics, and audiences of the QNA operation.

Context The political and social context of the Qatar crisis is covered extensively in this volume. In this section, I first briefly sketch the contours of the crisis, and then provide a more detailed overview of the context of the QNA operation in terms of cyber capabilities in the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The QNA operation took place in the context of wider tensions between Qatar and its neighbors. From a historical perspective, interlaced familial and tribal relations across what is now Qatar and its neighbors have been the source of shared ties and disagreements for hundreds of years (Potter 2014). In the process of British imperial retreat and modern state formation in the early 1970s, these differences crystalized into state borders, as Qatar and Bahrain remained separate from the consolidation of the former Trucial states into the UAE (Zahlan 1998). Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar were especially prominent in the late twentieth century, as alleged coup attempts in the 1990s and 2000s led to the removal of citizenship rights from thousands of Qataris under former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani (Kamrava 2013). Qatar’s independent media policy was a particular source of contention, with state-owned channel Al Jazeera setting a new tone for political coverage of the region and, in the eyes of some scholars, creating a new Arab public sphere (Lynch 2007). Al Jazeera’s coverage appeared to precipitate revolutionary change in the 2011 “Arab Spring” protests in Tunisia and Egypt, leading to its characterization as a threat to the stability of the other Gulf monarchies, some of whom responded violently against domestic protests in 2011 (Ulrichsen 2014; Matthiesen 2013). ˙ sa¯ r) by Bahrain, The central point of the Qatar crisis was the blockade or siege (hi˙ Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the Quartet states) imposed on 5 June 2017, during Ramadan. This blockade (referred to as “sanctions” or “boycott” (qat˙¯ıah, maq¯at˙a a) by the Quartet states) was ostensibly in response to Qatar’s support for terrorism, Iran, and general instability in the region, and a later list of 13 demands issued by the Quartet states made the justification of links to terrorism their central focus. Some media reports suggest that this blockade was intended as a prelude to planned military action against Qatar (Emmons 2018). The speedy approval of a Turkish military base in Qatar two days after the blockade (Solaker and Finn 2017), and reports that Turkish special forces arrived in Qatar even earlier (Turkiyya Bilar¯ab¯ı 2017), lend some support to this theory—at least from the perspective of the Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani. The effect on the domestic politics and economy of Qatar, and on the lives of individuals on both sides of the blockade, was significant, and it also ruptured the GCC as an organization itself (AP News 2017).

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As well as the context of the Qatar crisis, the QNA operation can be put in the context of the use of offensive cyber capabilities in the GCC. Offensive cyber capabilities are technological means for intrusion into external digital networks, and can be used for data deletion, exfiltration, or manipulation. The GCC states have many of the requisite characteristics for the development of sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities. They are rich, with extremely high levels of per capita wealth and government spending due to extractives revenue. Although fluctuations in oil prices and limited economic diversification have led to significant budgetary constraints, defense and security spending remain high and are unlikely to decrease in the near future. The GCC states also have a young, Internet-connected population, with plentiful technological expertise supplied by immigration and highly educated citizens, often trained in top US and UK universities. This provides them with the necessary human capital to develop offensive cyber capabilities. Although there is not a large “hacker” scene from which to draw cyber talent, as is the case in Eastern Europe, there are small communities interested in this area. The GCC states are some of the strongest allies of the United States and Europe in the Middle East, and all have the infrastructure, expertise, and resources to build offensive cyber capabilities, despite extensive variation between them. For example, in 2012 the Washington Post reported that Qatar approached US management and technology consultants Booz Allen Hamilton to build a cyber-operations center to respond offensively to cyber operations by its regional adversaries (Nakashima 2012). According to the Post’s unnamed US national security sources, the request was denied because the US military was reluctant to allow US personnel to staff the center due to the potential negative diplomatic repercussions from their involvement. The GCC states’ use of offensive cyber capabilities follows a broader tendency to restrict dissent and political opposition (for further details, see Shires 2019b). Due to the role of social media in the 2011 Arab Spring, including protests across the GCC, these states introduced or strengthened legislative measures (including so-called “cybercrime” laws) and operational tools (including large-scale monitoring and censorship) to prevent organized opposition. GCC states use offensive cyber tools for targeted surveillance of dissidents, journalists, and activists within and outside state boundaries. These tools have been procured from private companies including Italian company Hacking Team (now renamed), in which a Saudicontrolled company has a significant stake (Franceschi-Bicchierai 2018), German company FinFisher, and Israeli company NSO Group. Furthermore, the UAE has created companies that blur the lines between offensive and defensive cybersecurity protection: UAE company Dark Matter provides cybersecurity solutions to industry and government, and is reportedly involved in large-scale telecoms interception and targeting of individuals, especially opposition activists (Bing and Schectman 2019). Finally, other hack-and-leak operations have occurred in the Gulf before the QNA operation. These include the 2015 release of documents from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Wikileaks in 2015 (Shires 2019a), and the release of customer details from UAE Invest bank and the Qatar National Bank in 2015 and 2016 respectively (Middle East Eye 2016). Further cyber-attacks related to the Gulf crisis continued following the blockade; for example, the Al Jazeera website was targeted

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by distributed denial-of-service attacks on 9 June 2017, shortly after the blockade began (Mascarenhas 2017). Overall, the context of the QNA operation is multifaceted, including broader political tensions, specific developments in the crisis itself, and the development and use of cyber capabilities by all GCC states.

Characteristics The second dimension of hack-and-leak operations are their technical characteristics. Public reporting on such operations provides some of these technical details, although sources are often vague and contradictory on the exact means used in the operation. In this respect, the QNA operation is no exception. This section therefore draws on journalistic accounts of the QNA operation in English and Arabic, which are in turn based on anonymous conversations with individuals involved in the investigation of the incident, as well as press releases and public announcements by senior Qatari officials. Most of these sources were produced in the period immediately after the operation on 23 May 2017. Al Jazeera announced the preliminary results of the investigation on 7 June (Al Jazeera 2017a), while the Qatari Attorney General held a conference on 21 June with further details from a joint investigation with the UK National Crime Agency and US Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Qatari Ministry of Interior provided further details at a press conference on 20 July (ab¯u ˙ hajar 2017; Adly 2017; Salisbury 2017). Initial media responses are drawn from the Middle East Media Research Initiative (MEMRI, 2017). The “hack” and “leak” elements have been treated separately in the following discussion, although they overlap.

The Hack The first stage of the cyber operation was reconnaissance: enumerating the public areas of the QNA servers and seeking vulnerabilities in the webpages hosted on those servers. A Gulf Times report suggests that this reconnaissance activity began on 19 April and was conducted through virtual private networks (VPNs) (Adly 2017). VPNs hide the original IP address of the communication, and so the Qatari investigators acting after the event were likely able only to see the VPN server itself connecting to the QNA website in the server logs, rather than the attacker’s real IP address. Some reports suggest that the IP address used to scan the QNA website on 19 April was located in Russia (Wintour 2017). The next stage of the operation was to gain persistent access to the target networks. This stage reportedly occurred on 22 April, as the attackers “gained access” to part of the QNA website (Salisbury 2017). This suggests that the attacker identified a website vulnerability through their reconnaissance—such as cross-site scripting or SQL injection—which allowed them to manipulate the server itself and to install

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malicious software. This probably provided them with persistent access. At 5:45 on 22 April, according to the investigation, the vulnerability was “shared with another person through Skype from an iPhone with an IP address of one of the siege countries” (Adly 2017). This is interesting, as it suggests that there may have been some form of signals intelligence collection on that iPhone from either the Qatari government or their international partners, because it is unlikely that an internal investigation would have identified specific communications (including time and platform) between attackers unless the hacker downloaded and opened Skype from their position on the QNA network. Alternatively, the vague phrasing may mean the vulnerable page was simply accessed through the Skype app from that iPhone, in which case no information about external communications would have been necessary. The next stage was to escalate privileges and collect information. Although some reports indicate that the attackers had access to the “internal network”—i.e., not just the web server hosting a vulnerable web page—on 22 April (Salisbury 2017), others suggest (and it is more likely that) the attackers were located only on the web server in that initial phase, and then had to move laterally across the network to other servers with more valuable information. There is no indication of how or when they conducted this lateral movement and privilege escalation, other than the end result: the collection of emails and passwords of “all QNA employees” on 28 April. If these credentials were in plaintext (unencrypted) or in an easily decrypted format, then this is a key moment in the hack. It is likely that these credentials included access to QNA systems for those with high-level permissions, such as system administrators; if so, the attacker could then manipulate the network in nearly any way with very little risk of detection, using legitimate credentials. They could also have access to social media credentials (to which I return below). Again, reports suggest that these credentials were shared over Skype with the same device that received the vulnerability details. The attackers reportedly logged in again on 20 May, three days before the leak, to check that their access was still live before the operation. Finally, the Qatari Ministry of Interior press conference suggested that they located the iPhone in the UAE due to not only the IP address, which can be misleading, but also the details of the network (i.e., a UAE mobile carrier) and the type of iPhone itself (Adly 2017). A European phone number was also reportedly identified, but with no indication of where or how it was relevant. It is also worth noting that the attackers are described by these reports as “sophisticated,” “professional,” and as using advanced techniques (tiqniyya ˙ aliyya) (ab¯u hajar 2017). Such language is usually used in the cybersecurity industry to denote state-sponsored attacks, as states are widely perceived to be the most capable attackers. This language also helps to minimize victim responsibility, as if the attackers were sophisticated then the victim could not be at fault for not preventing access.

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The Leak In July 2017, the Washington Post reported that “newly analyzed information gathered by US intelligence agencies” indicated that “senior members of the UAE government” met on 23 May to discuss a planned leak operation against QNA (DeYoung and Nakashima 2017a). The article claimed that the operation was “orchestrated” by the UAE. Further anonymous comments from two “Western officials” to a separate journalist indicated that these meetings were conducted by Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi (Salisbury 2017). These meetings reportedly included both the operation itself and a broader media campaign. On 23 May, the usually low number of visits to the QNA website (in the single digits) increased significantly, with 45 visits in the quarter of an hour from 23:45 to midnight on 24 May. At one minute past midnight, a story was published on the QNA website. Following this publication, there were another 41 visits to the website in the next quarter of an hour from IP addresses located in the UAE. The investigation suggested that Qatari officials were able to identify the individuals who browsed the website in this period as residing in the UAE, although no further details were given (Adly 2017). A different report, based on server logs, suggested that around 80% of visits originated in the UAE (Salisbury 2017). One iPhone user—potentially the same one in the hack—was according to this report the first to access the story and returned to it repeatedly. The story itself centered on comments purportedly made by Emir Sheikh Tamim at a ceremony on 23 May for the graduation of National Guard recruits. These comments included several controversial remarks, including a recognition of the “regional and Islamic prominence of Iran,” and “close ties with both the US and Iran.” It also said that relations between the Trump administration and Qatar were “strained,” and that Qatar had ongoing contacts with both Hamas and Israel (uka˙z 2017). As well as the text, there was also a reported video of the Emir at the ceremony, with text making the same comments on a ticker below the video. According to CNN, a still purporting to be from that video was aired on Saudi-backed Al-Arabiyya (Alkhalisi 2017), as well as on Saudi newspaper Al-Jazira (not the Qatari outlet Al Jazeera) (MEMRI 2017). However, there is no record of the video itself, and Qatari media figures used this absence to support counter-claims of faked content. The fake story was also disseminated by QNA-linked social media accounts, including alleged quotes from the Qatari Foreign Minister accusing Arab nations of a plot and withdrawing ambassadors from Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, in an ironic reversal of the isolation a week later (Gambrell 2017). QNA and the Qatari government quickly stated that the news story was not true, and around an hour after its first appearance it was removed from both the website and social media pages. They said it had been prepared in advance and placed on the website immediately, suggesting prior planning. The Ministry of Interior claimed that responders had “contained” the intrusion by around 3 a.m. on 24 May, and that they had shared information about the leak with counterparts in the countries that the IP addresses were found in (i.e., the UAE, and potentially Russia), but had not received

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any response. This is not unusual for Russia, as many requests for cooperation from the United States have been turned down, with some instances the relevant Russian official being involved in those operations themselves. However, for the UAE this is less common, especially as it claims to have excellent cybersecurity governance and regulatory bodies (Shires 2019b). There were also reports that individuals in Turkey were linked to the operation. In August 2017, Al Jazeera reported the public prosecutor’s comments that he was following the arrest of five individuals in Turkey in connection with the operation (Al Jazeera 2017b). Overall, the technical characteristics of the operation demonstrate how it can be seen as an extreme case of hack-and-leak operations. Such operations begin with unauthorized access to networks, including other typical hostile activity such as credential gathering, and then exploit that access to extract data and leak it to intermediaries (in this case, the iPhones in the UAE that probably directed the operation, and then local media outlets). It is an extreme case because, although the overall structure of a hack-and-leak operation was there, the “leak” itself was entirely fabricated, and attached to images of the Emir that were already publicly available. As I argue elsewhere, the proportion of authentic to fabricated information in HLOs varies significantly, and so the QNA operation is at the far end of this spectrum (Shires 2019a).

Audiences In this section, I examine the impact of the QNA operation on local and international audiences. I use “local” for two reasons: on one hand, it is difficult to disentangle specific domestic media outlets and audiences due to shared media consumption and language. On the other, the distinct discourses in different GCC states and sub-state regions (emirates or provinces) means that media and audiences are not regional in the sense of spanning the GCC as a whole. The term “local” is intended to capture this cross-border phenomenon (e.g., between Saudi Arabia and the UAE), without undue homogenization.

Local Reception The timing of the news coverage in the Quartet states, its continuation after Qatari efforts to communicate that a cyber-operation had occurred, and its portrayal and association with the isolation and demands for lifting the blockade, suggest that local media were a key aspect of the QNA operation. Although they act as intermediaries between those responsible for the operation and its eventual audience (their readership), their actions were not as independent as intermediaries in other HLO cases, such as WikiLeaks. For example, in a quotation to the UK’s Financial Times, one Saudi editor described how officials used a mobile phone messaging group to

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instruct journalists on how to shape coverage and what stories to focus on in the Gulf crisis, including the stories stemming from the QNA operation. In this editor’s words, such instructions “are orders, not suggestions” (Omran 2017). Some media channels even used the technical details of the dissemination of the fabricated story on all the social media accounts of QNA to argue for its authenticity. They claimed that such dissemination was unlikely to be the result of a hack, as the hacker would need administrative access to all these accounts (MEMRI 2017). However, as indicated above, this appears to be in fact what happened, demonstrating how the plausibility of such a claim depends on a lack of knowledge of the characteristics of such operations in the Saudi population. The strategic coordination of local media indicates that the domestic populations of the Gulf States were a key audience for the QNA operation. This is because public opinion—although not directly influential in the selection of government in the manner of democratic states—is nonetheless important for preventing popular opposition to specific actions and inculcating wider governmental legitimacy (Hudson 1979; Murphy 2009). Given the strong social and political cohesion between Qatar and the blockading states—rivalry and earlier confrontations notwithstanding—the imposition of such measures required public justification, especially as it infringed on human rights of those on both sides of the divide. It is important to stress that shaping public opinion through favorable news coverage and censorship of other perspectives is not new in the Gulf or in the Middle East more widely; the novelty here is that the news coverage was an artificial amplification of a separate—and new—foreign policy tool; the hack-and-leak operation. There are three further aspects of the QNA operation that amplified the impact of the fake story for a local audience. First, the operation was followed by the creation of websites designed to disseminate anti-Qatar content, notably “The Qatar Insider” and “Qatarileaks.” The Internet registration records for these sites illustrate how they were linked closely to the immediate aftermath of the QNA operation. Qatarileaks was created on 29 May 2017, and is still active, while The Qatar Insider was created on 14 June 2017 and was not available as of 3 May 2019, with its last publicly accessible archive on 9 March 2019. Both sides used privacy protection services to hide their registration details. The content of these sites clearly supported the position of the Quartet states, highlighting “links between Qatar and extremism and the Muslim Brotherhood,” as well as the detrimental effects of the blockade on Qatar’s economy. Both sites were in English and Arabic, although with significant differences between the two versions. The Arabic version of The Qatar Insider focused more on supposed links with Iran, while the English site promoted links to relevant stories from reputable news organizations like The Guardian and The Atlantic. On Qatarileaks, suggested search terms demonstrate the difference between the English and Arabic versions (as of 3 May 2019), detailed in Table 6.1. Overall, these two sites aimed to promote negative content about Qatar to both local and international audiences through differing content in the English and Arabic versions. Before I examine international audiences in the following sub-section, the role of local social media must also be highlighted. Conventional media and purpose-built propaganda sites were accompanied by extensive social media activity.

6 The Cyber Operation Against Qatar News Agency Table 6.1 Suggested search terms on “Qatarileaks” website in English and Arabic

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English

Arabic

Boycotting Qatar

At any price (mahm¯a k¯ana al-thaman)

Tamim bin Hamad

World cup revealed (m¯undiyy¯al al- a¯ r) Abbottabad documents (with¯a iq ab¯ut ab¯ad) Qatar leaks (tasr¯ıb¯at qat˙ar)

Qatar supports terrorism Qatari ruling family

Some of this was artificial, like the forged tweets around the operation itself and those from the Twitter accounts associated with the two propaganda sites above. The Qatar Insider account was created in June 2017 and tweeted until December 2017, while the Qatarileaks account was created in May 2017 and is still active. Other artificial interventions on social media include the mobilization of automated accounts or “bots” to promote supportive or divisive content. Although an analysis of Twitter immediately after the operation does not exist, and is difficult to reconstruct due to data limitations, Jones has conducted an analysis of bots on 28 May 2017 around an anti-Qatar and Al Jazeera hashtag (Jones 2017a). This analysis showed that many accounts apparently in both Qatar and Saudi Arabia were likely not real users, due to their tweeting pattern and profile details, including creation date, and so their retweets artificially inflated the popularity of the hashtag. Similar inflation may have occurred around earlier hashtags for the QNA operation itself. Overall, social media—and especially Twitter—was a key medium for the QNA operation to reach domestic audiences, and an arena increasingly open to boundary-pushing and manipulation (Jones 2017b).

International Reception The main international audience for the QNA operation was the United States, specifically US President Donald Trump. Trump visited Saudi Arabia from 20 to 22 May 2017, leaving the day before the QNA operation began. His visit, which was his first foreign trip as president, included meetings with all the GCC states, as well as corporate leaders in the region. It notably centered around the opening of the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (i tid¯al or moderation) (Shalhoub 2017), and Trump’s first foreign speech focused on the dangers of terrorism to both the region and the United States. Evidence that Trump was the intended audience of the QNA operation comes mainly from his social media posts immediately after the blockade. On 6 June, the day after the blockade, Trump tweeted that “During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar—look!” (Trump 2017). Just under two hours later, he continued:

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So good to see the Saudi Arabia visit with the King and 50 countries already paying off. They said they would take a hard line on funding extremism, and all reference was pointing to Qatar. Perhaps this will be the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism! (Marcin 2017).

This tweet clearly demonstrates that Trump saw himself as a catalyst for change. It also indicates that the leaders he spoke to—including senior Saudi, Egyptian, and Emirati figures—raised Qatar’s activity with him and potentially a planned response. A later speech by Trump went even further: Nations came together and spoke to me about confronting Qatar over its behavior. We had a decision to make: do we take the easy road or do we finally take a hard but necessary action? … I decided, along with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, our great generals and military people, the time had come to call on Qatar to end its funding [for terrorism] … and its extremist ideology. (DeYoung and Raghavan 2017b).

As discussed above, reports suggest that the UAE approved the QNA operation immediately after Trump’s visit, so it is possible that Trump’s private remarks at the summit were taken as approval (indirect or implicit) of their action. In any case, his endorsement after the blockade highlights how the QNA operation was designed to emphasize exactly those links to terrorism through Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah that Trump focused on in his speech. Of course, Trump’s remarks are not always truthful, and therefore cannot be taken at face value regarding any meetings he had with regional leaders. More importantly, the United States is not a single individual, and Trump especially has diverged from the foreign policy positions of both the legislative bodies of the US government and his own appointed staff. In the Qatar crisis, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson contradicted Trump, stating that “we call on [the Quartet nations] to ease the blockade against Qatar. There are humanitarian consequences to this blockade” (BBC News 2017). This opposition to the blockade reportedly led to strong negative pressure against Tillerson by several US lobbyists close to Trump’s circle, with some reports suggesting it was even the main reason for his dismissal (Emmons 2018), and that the UAE ambassador to the United States knew of his dismissal before it happened (Cohen 2018). Overall, Tillerson’s disagreement shows that the audience of the QNA operation was international, but was not just Trump himself; it was a wider set of partisan foreign policy advisors that were connected to the Quartet states and had influence in the US administration beyond their Gulf policy stance. It should not be forgotten that the QNA operation also had an international audience outside the United States, including politicians in Western Europe and especially the UK. For example, the London-based “Qatar, Global Security and Stability Conference” was held in September 2017 featuring senior UK politicians and Qatari dissidents (McElroy 2017), and focused on the themes of the QNA operation, including links to terrorism and Iran. More widely, both sides of the Gulf split have engaged in extensive lobbying on these and other political issues worldwide (Leathley 2017). The QNA operation therefore had several local and international audiences, and in both cases it effectively communicated a specific message in line with the strategic goals of the Quartet states.

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Conclusion This chapter has examined the QNA operation through three dimensions. The first section placed the QNA operation in the political and social context of the GCC and highlighted a contributing trend of state adoption of offensive cyber capabilities in the region. The second section examined the technical characteristics of the QNA operation, including the intrusion into the QNA networks and the dissemination of the supposedly leaked information due to that intrusion. The third and final section provided a brief overview of the audiences of the QNA operation, with intermediaries in local media organizations and social media influencers communicating the “leaked” material to key decision-makers, including the US President and other sympathetic US political figures. As the immediate pretext for the Qatar crisis, this chapter has argued that the QNA cyber operation deserves close attention. It represents a successful execution of a new foreign policy tactic using offensive cyber tools—that of the “hack-and-leak operation.” More importantly, it set in motion the increasingly divided, antagonistic, and distrustful media environment in the Gulf after the crisis, which shows no sign of abating.

References ˙ ˙ sa¯ r [QNA Hack Ab¯u hajar, M. (2017). Ikhtir¯aq Wik¯alat Al-Anb¯a Al-Qa˙tariyya Min Dawl Al-Hi˙ from the Blockading Countries]. Al-Wa˙tan. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/ EDM3-Q958. Adly, A. (2017). Qatar presents proof of UAE role in QNA website hacking. Gulf-Times. Retrieved March 16, 2020, from https://perma.cc/KFK9-DR3P. Al-Jazeera. (2017a). Qatar reveals preliminary results of QNA hacking probe. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/6VVW-EGFC. ˙ ıq¯at Maa Mutaqal¯ın Biturkiyy¯a Tawarra˙tu¯ Biqar˙sana Al Jazeera. (2017b). Qa˙tar Tut¯abiu Al-Tahq¯ Qan¯a [Qatar Follows the Investigation of Those Arrested in Turkey in Connection with the Qana Hack]. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/ZC7V-ARTD. Alkhalisi, Z. (2017). Qatar ‘fake News’ spat divides Arab media. CNNMoney. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/8ET9-URUP. AP News. (2017). The latest: Kuwait’s Emir quickly ends troubled Gulf summit. AP News. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/3EKJ-CQVS. BBC News. (2017). Nations silent on Qatar blockade plea. BBC News. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/F8QE-F75J. Bing, C., & Schectman, J. (2019). Special report: Inside the UAE’s secret hacking team of U.S.... Reuters. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/8DGA-95EQ. Cohen, R. (2018). The Prince who would remake the world. The New York Times. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/Z2X3-7TMY. DeYoung, K., & Nakashima, E. (2017a). UAE orchestrated hacking of Qatari Government Sites, Sparking Regional Upheaval, According to U.S. Intelligence Officials. Washington Post. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/TJ8D-8ZSE. DeYoung, K., & Raghavan, S (2017b). Trump seems to undercut Tillerson’s remarks on Qatar. Washington Post. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/PU6M-BUJG.

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Emmons, A. (2018). Saudi Arabia planned to invade Qatar last summer. Rex Tillerson’s efforts to stop it may have cost him his job. The Intercept (blog). Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https:// perma.cc. Franceschi-Bicchierai, L. (2018). Hacking team is still alive thanks to a mysterious investor from Saudi Arabia. Motherboard. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/ZR94-TANK. Gambrell, J. (2017). Hack, fake story expose real tensions between Qatar, Gulf. AP NEWS. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/G4JF-BPGN. Hudson, M. C. (1979). Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Jones, M. O. (2017a). Qatar say their official news agency website was hacked. Amanatech, Bahrain Watch. Jones, M. O. (2017b). Hacking, bots and information wars in the Qatar spat. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://perma.cc/M5GD-BLV2. Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar: Small State, Big Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Leathley, E (2017). Qatar spent nearly $5 million on U.S. influence campaigns following its isolation by Saudi coalition. OpenSecrets News. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/8SX6GYHK. Lynch, M. (2007). Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Marcin, T (2017). Trump slammed Qatar on Twitter, but offered the nation ‘Beautiful’ U.S. military equipment just weeks ago. Newsweek. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/B7XKNLSQ. Mascarenhas, H. (2017) Al Jazeera hack: Qatar-based media network hit by ‘systematic and Continual’ hacking attempts. International Business Times UK. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/XB8C-SLP4. Matthiesen, T. (2013). Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. McElroy, D (2017). Qatar opposition exiles and activists voice their concerns at London conference. The National. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/8MXX-P4PF. Middle East Eye. (2016). Qatar National Bank allegedly hacked, data of 1,200 entities leaked. Middle East Eye. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/6TMA-VCDC. MEMRI. (2017). Uproar in the Gulf following alleged statements by Qatari Emir condemning Gulf States, Praising Iran, Hezbollah, Muslim brotherhood and Hamas. Middle East Media Research Institute Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 1315. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma. cc/SUK8-YHDK. Murphy, E. C. (2009). Theorizing ICTs in the Arab world: Informational capitalism and the public sphere. International Studies Quarterly, 53(4), 1131–1153. Nakashima, E. (2012). As cyberwarfare heats up, allies turn to U.S. companies for expertise. Washington Post. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/WNP6-UUS3. Omran, A. A. (2017). Gulf media unleashes war of words with Qatar. Financial Times. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/Q4DE-G8NB. Potter, L. (Ed.). (2014). The Persian Gulf in Modern Times: People, Ports, and History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Salisbury, P. (2017). The fake-news hack that nearly started a war this summer was designed for one man: Donald Trump. Quartz. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/4ZA2-7JZA. Shalhoub, L. (2017, May 22). Global center to combat extremism launched in Riyadh. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://www.arabnews.com/node/1103136/saudi-arabia. Shires, J. (2019). Hack-and-leak operations: Intrusion and influence in the Gulf. Journal of Cyber Policy, 4(2), 235–256. Shires, J. (2019b). Cybersecurity governance in the GCC. In R. Ellis & V. Mohan (Eds.), Rewired: Cybersecurity governance. Wiley-Blackwell. Solaker, G., & Finn, T. (2017). Turkey throws support behind Qatar in rift with Gulf Arabs. Reuters. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc.

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Trump, D. J. (2017). During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of radical ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar - Look! Tweet. @realDonaldTrump (blog). Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/A7TG-ZKTV. ˙ h¯ ˙ ıfa: Hakadh¯a a¯ fshalat Qaw¯at Turkiyya Inqil¯aban al¯a am¯ır Qa˙tar Turkiyya Bil-ar¯ab¯ı. (2017). Sa [Journalist: This Is How Turkish Forces Thwarted a Coup against the Qatari Emir]. Turkiyya Bil- ar¯ab¯ı. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/4RBS-V4NB. Ulrichsen, K. C. (2014). Qatar and the Arab spring. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ˙ ˙ az Al-id¯a Al-umma [Qatar Breaks Ranks.. and uka˙z. (2017). Qa˙tar Tashuqq Al-Saf.. Wa Tanh¯ Sides with Enemies of the People]. uka˙z. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/ AXR4-SN89. Wintour, P (2017). Russian hackers to blame for sparking Qatar crisis, FBI inquiry finds. The Guardian. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://perma.cc/3CFY-ZQ6D. Zahlan, R. S. (1998). The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Ithaca: Ithaca Press.

Chapter 7

Trans-Gulf Resonances: The Central Role of Egypt in the Saudi Dispute Over Qatar Moisés Garduño García

This chapter studies current relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to show the importance of Cairo for Riyadh’s economic and strategic plans in the Red Sea. These plans are presented as an extension of the conflict dynamics in the Gulf region, and as a strategy to curb Iranian influence therein. The paper has four sections: in the first, the role of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi are studied through the connections between the Saudi security apparatus and the so-called deep state in Egypt; in the second, relations between Cairo and Riyadh are addressed in the context of the Syrian conflict and within the framework of pragmatism adopted by the Saudis with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the third section, the role of Egypt in the Saudi–Qatar crisis of 2017 is analyzed from a critical perspective, showing how the Gulf crisis was the concrete scenario in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia strengthened their diplomatic, political, and strategic ties. Finally, the last section discusses the current situation in the Red Sea and the growing strategic importance of Egypt, considering the emergence of a new balance of power in the Red Sea between the SA–UAE–Egypt strategic policies, which are closer to Israel, on the one hand, and Qatar, Iran, and Turkey on the other.

Overthrowing Morsi It is well known that between 2011 and 2015 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (SA–UAE) concentrated on containing the revolutionary wave of the socalled Arab Spring (Roberts 2011). Saudi Arabia led the military branch of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Peninsula Shield Force, and entered Bahrain to M. Garduño García (B) Faculty of Political and Social Science, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_7

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crush the popular revolt in March 2011, sharpening their rhetoric against Iran not only in Manama but also in other locations of the Arab world. In 2012, the electoral victory of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt posed another threat to the interests of SA–UAE in the Red Sea area, especially when representatives of Cairo and Tehran engaged in a process of rapprochement, including the visit of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Cairo, the relaunching of commercial flights between both capitals, and the visit of Mohammed Morsi to Tehran under the framework of the XVI Summit of NonAligned Countries (Morsy 2012). It is important to mention that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE had prohibited political activity by the Muslim Brotherhood in their respective countries since the 1990s, and that the ascent of Mohammed Morsi to power caused major concerns about a reactivation of this group inside Riyadh; this was in contrast to Doha, where the government of Qatar had provided a lucrative, stable, and welcoming platform for the group since the late 1950s.1 In this context, one of the arguments that needs to be deconstructed is the claim that the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi took place exclusively because of his domestic mistakes. Indeed, while it is true that Morsi made crucial mistakes that generated new enemies within domestic politics (such as the retirement of generals Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and Sami Anan, or the arrogation of full powers to himself), the external dimension must be considered in any discussion of the future of Egypt under the command of Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi, since the connection between SA–UAE and the so-called deep state in Egypt had been very close from the beginning of the post-Tahrir Revolution period. Firstly, the alternative project prepared by the Egyptian military and security forces had sought to gain as much legitimacy as possible by playing on the frustrations and criticisms concerning Morsi. It was thus that the armed forces presented themselves as “defenders of the popular will,” and delivered an ultimatum to Morsi signed by General Al-Sisi who was the Minister of Defense at the time. From this perspective, the coup d’état was not a sudden irruption from below, but had been prepared for months in conspiracy between local and foreign factors, and legitimized by the growing anti-Morsi popular protests in Cairo. Some evidence for this claim can be seen, first, in the fact that regular contact between Saudi intelligence and Defense Minister Al-Sisi had been facilitated by his post as military attaché to the Egyptian embassy in Riyadh in 2006–2008, just prior to his being nominated for the leadership of Egyptian military intelligence during Mubarak’s presidency (Pervez 2014). Secondly, several observations may be made on the role played by the former chief of Saudi intelligence services, Bandar Bin Sultan, in the financing of the military coup in Egypt. According to Levinson and Bradley (2013), during the months leading up to the coup against Morsi various meetings were held between senior military officials and government opponents, including Mohamed Al-Baradai, Amr Musa, Hamdeen Sabahy, and Ahmed Ezz, in which the military clearly stated that “they would only 1 How

the rulers of the UAE felt about this scenario is shown by the fact that legal proceedings were instituted against more than 100 people between April 2011 and November 2014. Most of the accused were charged with founding a secret organization affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of toppling the UAE regime (Sailer 2016).

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intervene to overthrow Morsi, if they could mobilize millions of citizens to protest in the streets against the government.” So the emergence of the Tamarrod movement in April 2013, with the stated purpose of obtaining 15 million signatures to demand the presidential elections be brought forward, was in line with the plan devised by the military and its allies in that context. In this sense, it is useful to analyze the Tamarrod protests as a particular combination of coup conspirators on the one hand, and legitimate popular demands on the other. Thirdly, and according to Mesa (2019), the most concrete evidence about the influence of Saudi Arabia in Egypt, and especially the SA–UAE alliance, was not limited to the recognition of and political support for Tamarrod, but also to a decisive financing effort for the new Egyptian interim government that emerged from the military coup. SA–UAE coordinated an initial package of 12 billion dollars, with an addition 5.8 billion in 2014 (Ahram Online 2014). Moreover, in March of the same year, UAE Arabtec company signed an agreement for the construction of one million “affordable houses” in Egypt worth 40 billion dollars (Kerr and Saleh 2014). This project produced almost one million jobs, and assigned a central role to the Egyptian army due to its complex business interests in the country, at a time when Egypt was also receiving funding from the Emirates for the construction of hospitals, schools, and the manufacture of wheat silos, a strategic sector for the Egyptian economy (Fick 2014). The SA–UAE relation with Egypt is a win–win deal. While petrodollars are central for Egypt’s domestic politics, SA–UAE receive political capital and prestige from the Egyptian leadership in the Arab World. To both countries it is essential to preserve channels for exchange and coordination, and to avoid contradictions or disputes that can explode into the open. The priority for these countries in the Middle East is to look for a common space to negotiate their differences (Mesa 2019). An excellent example of the steps taken in favor of increasing bilateral cooperation between Cairo and Riyadh was the “Cairo Declaration” released by President Al-Sisi and then Saudi Defense Minister Mohamed Bin Salman, in July 2015, which set out the following principles: 1. Development of the military cooperation and working towards establishing the Joint Arab Force. 2. Enhancing the cooperation and investment between the two countries in the fields of energy, electricity, and transportation. 3. Achieving economic integration between the two countries and working on making them a key focus of the World Trade movement. 4. Intensifying mutual investments between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, aiming to increase joint projects in both countries. 5. Strengthening cooperation in the fields of politics, culture, and media to jointly counter the dangers of the current regional destabilization. 6. Defining the maritime borders between the two countries. (Ahram Online 2015b)

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Driving Al-Sisi The Cairo Declaration was a response to the signing of the Nuclear Deal between Iran and the P5 + 1 in April 2015.2 The so-called “Iranian threat” was immediately placed on the Egyptian security agenda, knowing that in the Egyptian public sphere a certain degree of “Iranophobia” has been promoted by Arab Gulf countries and Israel since the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Beker 2010). But from the point of view of Iran, despite the current instability in Egypt, there were reasons to believe that the fall of Mohammed Morsi was not due to his failures at all. Firstly, because Al-Sisi would now rule Egypt, which had implications for the Syrian conflict where Bashar Al-Assad was being defended by Russia. Secondly, because Egypt now had an economic dependence on Washington and SA–UAE money, as well as a new alliance with Salafist groups like Salafist Call Group who, far from being enemies of the Egyptian regime, are considered as a cultural and social extension of Saudi Arabia in Cairo. And thirdly, because regional politics in 2015 had reconnected Iran with Hamas in Gaza, an actor which, despite the cruel offensive of July 2014 and the attempt at national unity with Fatah, is seen in Tehran as a key connection in the heart of the Middle East, similar to the role played by Hezbollah in Lebanon. In other words, when Hamas witnessed the overthrow of Morsi, it turned to Iran because of its clear political and economic vulnerability to a potential Saudi–Israel rapprochement. With these geopolitical changes, especially after the signing of the nuclear deal, the dynamics of Iran, Hamas, and Al-Assad, on one side, were set against Egypt’s approaches to Saudi Arabia and Israel on the other. However, during the first year of Al-Sisi’s government, SA–UAE improved relations with the Muslim Brotherhood despite the fact that it had been declared a terrorist group by Egypt in December 2013 (The Guardian 2013), and by Riyadh in March 2014. Although this may seem like a contradiction, the decision might in fact be rather easily understood. According to Sailer (2016: 4), since the new King Salman’s accession, there had been many reports about high-level meetings between the Saudi leadership and top-ranking officials of regional Brotherhood affiliates, such as Rashid al-Ghannouchi (Tunisia), Hammam Saeed (Jordan), and Khaled Meshaal (Hamas). King Salman bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud changed Saudi regional policy by speedily implementing a rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to define a common strategy in Syria. This went hand in hand with a rapprochement with Qatar and Turkey, as well as a slight cooling of relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (Kerr and Khalaf 2015)3 : So far, the highpoint has been Riyadh’s ambassador to Doha inviting the influential Egyptian legal scholar and TV preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi for the occasion of the Saudi national day in October, 2015. In addition, there has been close cooperation with Qatar and Turkey in + 1” refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, UK, and the United States—plus Germany. 3 The new king replaced Crown Prince Muqrin with his nephew, Mohammed bin Nayef, the interior minister, who thus became set to be the first grandson of the kingdom’s founder to take power. Defense minister Mohammed bin Salman was named second in line to the throne. 2 “P5

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Syria since spring, 2015. The military successes of the rebel alliance Jaish al-Fatah, forged by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, brought Bashar al-Assad’s regime close to military defeat in the summer of that year. This rebel alliance includes militias that can be categorized as belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The defeat of the government troops was ultimately prevented by Russia’s military intervention in autumn, 2015. (Sailer 2016: 5)

Despite this, and after the signing of the so-called Alliance Against Terrorism in December 2015, Al-Sisi gave new signals to continue developing a close bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia for the defense of “Arab national security” (De Young 2015). The President also announced that Egyptian forces would prolong their engagement in Yemen in support of the military operation led by Saudi Arabia from January 2015, although these exercises were extended into 2016 when, in an attempt to rationalize Egypt’s military intervention in Yemen, the narrative emerged of the threat from the Houthis when the Yemeni port city of Mocha was captured, just a few kilometers from the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which straddles the strategic international maritime routes through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal (Mohie 2015). The day after the 2015 agreement, King Salman ordered that Saudi investments in Egypt be increased to more than 8 billion dollars, and that Egyptian oil needs be provided for the next five years. At the same time, representatives of Al Azhar writing on the relation between Cairo and Riyadh were describing this approach as “historic,” according to reports (Ahram Online 2015a).

The Qatar–GCC Crisis Regional alliances against terrorism, however, were still directed against Iran: but two moments would alter this dynamic, changing some elements while giving continuity to others. The first was the inauguration of Donald Trump’s presidency in January 2017 and his insistence on Saudi Arabian and Israeli cooperation against Iran. Strong evidence for the importance of this element was his first trip abroad as President of the United States in May 2017, which was to Tel Aviv and Riyadh. The second element was the appointment of Mohammed Bin Salman as Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in June 2017 (Al Jazeera English 2017).4 Very solid contacts were made between Mohammed Bin Salman, Trump, and the powerful Washington lobbies of Israel and United Arab Emirates, as Andreas

4 By

royal decree Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was removed as next in line to the throne and replaced by Mohammed bin Salman. The Saudi Press Agency reported that the new crown prince was also named deputy prime minister and maintained his post as defense minister, while the former crown prince was removed from his post as interior minister.

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Krieg has recently documented (Krieg 2018).5 In addition to the anti-Iran narrative, Mohammed Bin Salman developed a reformist program manifest in his Vision 2030, considering regulations in restricting the powers of the religious police and the removal of the ban on female drivers, as well as an increased presence of women in the workforce. But the most important element in Mohammed Bin Salman’s Vision 2030 was the aim to diversify the Saudi economy through investment in non-oil sectors including technology and tourism. In 2016 he announced plans to list the shares of the state oil company Saudi Aramco, as well as the $500 billion NEOM project, a state industrial, commercial, and tourist metropolis in northwestern Saudi Arabia through which almost 1000 km2 of south Sinai will be developed (Vision 2030 2016). However, according to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Mohammed Bin Salman faced two important obstacles to achieving this project. Initially, he faced a challenge to his own ascendancy: having deposed his cousin Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince, he then placed him under house arrest, freezing his personal bank accounts—daring moves that could have produced a very dangerous enemy to domestic reform. The second obstacle for Bin Salman’s grand strategic reform plan was the direct threat it posed to the prestige and power of the established (and reactionary) Wahhabi clergy in Saudi Arabia (Hirsi Ali 2017). To overcome these obstacles, Bin Salman would not only need support from Trump, Israel, and Egypt, but also called for the support of all the GCC countries, Qatar included, in a united front against Iran. The point of all of this is that Qatar, an important state in the GCC, could not break diplomatic relations with Iran as requested by Saudi Arabia, particularly because Doha and Tehran share the world’s largest natural gas reserve in the Gulf (called North Field in Qatar and South Pars in Iran), which serves as a major area of mutual interest for the two states (Kamrava 2016: 179).6 Moreover, Qatar is an important part of the regional security system not only the Gulf, but also in the whole Middle East, being equally important for the United States and Russia, as Washington depends heavily on Qatar for operational purposes in the region, while Russia shares important interests in the gas sector. These facts gave Qatar a wider margin of independence from Saudi Arabia than any other Arab country in the GCC (Asisian 2018).7 5 Krieg

writes: “Tens of millions of dollars were invested by the UAE to not only buy influence in existing conservative think tanks, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic Council or the Middle East Institute, but also to create its own Arab Gulf States Institute. The proximity of think-tankers to Capitol Hill policymakers completed the circle of Emirati outreach infrastructure into the American heart of power.” 6 In 2011, Iran’s revenues from gas were estimated at 30 million dollars while Qatar’s revenues were estimated at 120 million dollars. 7 The United States has two strategically important bases in Qatar, the Al-Udeid Airbase and Camp AS-Sayliyah: “Al-Udeid is the largest overseas airbase used by the United States and has two active runways capable of handling every aircraft in the U.S. inventory, together with robust fueling and ammunition storage facilities. In addition, the base also houses the forward headquarters of U.S. Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT) and U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) with their advanced command and control infrastructures. This complex has been built up considerably over 14 years, with much of the funding provided by Qatar” (Des Roches 2017).

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The crisis between Qatar and the GCC broke out in May 2017 (Doumar et al. 2017: 7). Saudi Arabia accused Doha of “supporting terrorism,” fragmenting the unity of the Arab countries of the Gulf, and putting at risk the stability of the area as a trade and investment zone. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt (the so-called Arab Quartet) suspended ties with Qatar, announcing a full blockade against Qatar by closing its single land border, and its airspace and seaports. Qatari diplomats were given 48 h to leave the blockading countries while Qatari nationals were asked to return to Doha (Doumar et al. 2017: 7). The criminalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Saudi and Egyptian public spheres was reinstated, and after two weeks of mediation efforts by Kuwait and the United States, the Saudi-led coalition presented Qatar a list of 13 demands that included the scaling-down of diplomatic ties with Iran, the severing of ties and funding to “terrorist” organizations and individuals, shutting down the Al Jazeera news network, among others. According to The Arab Center in Washington, these demands had three main components: (1) closing the Iranian diplomatic mission in Doha; (2) expelling members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and cutting off military and intelligence cooperation with Tehran; and (3) ensuring that trade and commerce with Iran complied with US and international sanctions (Doumar et al. 2017: 8). In short, having played such an outstanding and independent role in the Gulf, and building a national brand through multiple mediation and conflict-resolution efforts such as in Sudan and Lebanon, Doha now had to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The crisis between Qatar and the GCC fostered even closer links between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Their past mutual influence on the one hand, and the pressure on Qatar exerted by the Arab Quartet on the other, strengthened this Arab alliance into a trans-regional alignment, with the consequence that conflict dynamics in the Persian Gulf were extended to the Red Sea. Unlike previous stages, the rapprochement between Riyadh and Cairo now entailed the criminalization of the Muslim Brotherhood and a reconfiguration of authoritarianism in the Middle East after the so-called Arab Spring; thus, in the case of Egypt, Al Sisi’s government has been criticized for its human rights violations, while in the case of Mohammad Bin Salman, the issue of Jamal Khashoggi captured the attention of the United Nations Human Rights Council where 36 countries, including all 28 member states of the continental bloc, called on the Saudis to “release 10 imprisoned activists and cooperate with a United Nations inquiry into the 2018 killing of the journalist at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul” (Tharoor 2019). Additionally, it seems that the conflict with Qatar has led Saudi Arabia to rely more on Egypt to complete the NEOM project, creating a new geopolitical dynamic in the Red Sea area which thus becomes a new vital area for world trade and the security of both nations. In such a scenario, the policy of confrontation in the Gulf becomes replicated in the Red Sea, not only because of the role played by Iran in its connection with the Houthis in Yemen, but also because of the interaction of other countries in that area with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Turkey.

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Egypt, the Red Sea, and Trans-Gulf Politics In April 2016, King Salman and Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi announced an agreement to build a bridge (or causeway) between the two countries. The announcement followed the Egypt–Saudi Arabia agreement on maritime border demarcation, and in 2018 formally marked the islands of Tiran and Sanafir as falling within Saudi regional waters (Haaretz 2018). Israel announced that “it would not object to the islands’ transfer,” as Eglash reported: The two countries (Israel and Saudi Arabia) have no formal ties, but there have been hints of quiet cooperation—or at least a strategic dialogue—over certain issues such as Iranian influence in the region. As analysts pondered the implications for Israel of Saudi control of the two islands—at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, an important shipping route for Israelis and Jordanians—Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon told Israeli reporters that he had received official documentation that Saudi Arabia would continue to allow Israelis freedom of passage in the area. (Eglash 2016)

This information confirmed that Israel had been consulted before the transfer, which was apparently done by Egypt to reward Riyadh for its financial help. According to Azikiwe (2016), it is important to say that the Egyptian decision indicated the existence of a particular foreign policy where the imperatives of Washington and Riyadh took precedence over the liberation of Palestine and the genuine independence of states in North Africa and the Middle East. The fact is that these islands are part of the very same infrastructure project that includes the construction of the King Salman Abdel Aziz Bridge with a value of 4 billion dollars. The main idea of this corridor is the connection of Tabuk to the tourist complex of Sharm Al-Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula, building a direct route to the Gulf of Aqaba and creating plenty of jobs on both sides. This is part of a greater plan by the Egyptian government that intends to repopulate the Sinai Peninsula, and according to the Saudi Bin Ladin Group “to provide an alternative Hajj route, expecting to serve a million passengers and pilgrims annually.”8 In short, this is the model for economic diversification in the post-oil economy followed by many GCC countries. It includes a combination of oil rents and visionary leadership based on Malaysian or Singaporean models, in which attracting international partners, especially from Asia, is a central element to connect businesses to the Asia–Europe maritime trade lane (Calabrese 2018). The reality is that the Red Sea is now a key zone in which the Gulf monarchies’ strategies for economic diversification—for example the idea of “New Gulf Urbanism” (like the NEOM project)—are promoting the construction of post-oil economies based on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and seeking partners for other similar infrastructural projects (Ardemagni 2018). The trade environment, the existence of ports such as Al Lehiah, Do’ab, Massawa, Berbera, Djibuti, Bosasso, Al Salief, Al Hodeida, Al Khokha, and Al Makha, the potential for tourism, multimodal transport, and the existence of around 156 islands, make this place a new and 8 Funding

for the causeway was announced from the Saudi Bin Laden Group, which was reported as “ready” to work for the Egyptian government after the Mursi government took office (Saudi Bin Laden Group 2019).

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valuable—albeit disputed—space. According to Eleonora Ardemagni (2018), these plans are set to enhance Saudi–Egyptian–Jordanian ties, because NEOM and similar projects in the Red Sea are not only business affairs, but are also about geopolitics in a highly unstable area, threatened by the instability in the Sinai and the activities of the Houthi. In the Red Sea, SA–UAE are a new driving force behind a new interventionist foreign policy, as demonstrated by the military operation in Yemen, while, on the other shore of the Gulf, they see Iran seeking economic modernization and recovery after years of international sanctions (Ardemagni 2018; Bernhofen et al. 2013: 25).9 To this boom in the Red Sea, must be added the political and geopolitical interactions among some African states and the dynamics of power among formal and informal groups, elites, and non-state formations, particularly in the islands of the area. If the regional powers of the Middle East, and indeed the international powers, want to invest in trade and strategic security in this region, it will be necessary to invest in military infrastructure and intelligence to care for these investments, which will transform the coastal states into actors with an amount of economic and geopolitical influence not seen in the area since the Suez Crisis, during the Cold War. This could explain, in part, the military intervention in Yemen pursued by Saudi Arabia since 2015. This, then, is why Egypt is central to Saudi plans in this region. Saudi Arabia aspires to control the Red Sea from Suez to Aden, and to compensate for what Mohammed Bin Salman is losing to Iran in the Gulf area. In the face of Qatari dissent, the Al-Sisi administration is a kind of prop to Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian administration upholds every step taken by Mohammed Bin Salman, as the case of the nuclearization program in Riyadh shows—thus Egypt’s president approved an agreement on cooperation “in peaceful uses of nuclear energy” with Saudi Arabia, knowing that Egypt would be part of a nuclear weapons zone in Africa, creating a sense of suspicion equal in magnitude to that produced by Iran in the year 2002 (Egypt Today 2017). The agreement, which was initially signed in April 2016 during a visit to Cairo by King Salman, involves cooperation on nuclear security and exchange of information on nuclear safety (Shay 2018). Other evidence of this support is the signing of another security alliance, known as ETIDAL, on May 2017, supported directly by Trump and King Salman, to “To actively and pro-actively combat, expose, and refute extremist ideology, in cooperation with governments and organizations concerned.”10 On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Egypt, and Bahrain announced they were cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar. In the case of Khashoggi, Egypt reserved its criticism for the role of the media and called for “a thorough investigation of the incident” (Alsaafin and Ilahoum 2018). 9 In

the case of UAE, it is well known that DP World (an Emirati company that is one of the world’s largest maritime firms and directs operations in more than 40 countries) had been making investments in the Horn of Africa since the 90s. It built a large port in Djibouti, and is now working on another in Somaliland, trying to gain a strategic foothold in east Africa to secure commercial and military advantage through ports, despite the risks of exacerbating tensions in the region. 10 See the ETIDAL website, etidal.org/en/about-etidal/, accessed on 20 March 2020.

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On the other hand, it is well known that other countries, such as Turkey, have strengthened alliances with actors in the Red Sea to counterbalance Saudi–Egyptian power. For instance, Turkey signed a series of economic, military, and strategic cooperation mechanisms with Sudan, including the construction of a new airport in Khartoum, 12 cooperation agreements in tourism and security, and the construction of a port on Suakin Island along with a dock for military and civil use (Amin 2018). In August 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov lauded his country’s relationship with Eritrea, and informed the world about Moscow’s plans to build a logistics center there (Solomon 2018).11 In addition, and responding to a growing number of dangerous incidents in the waters around Yemen, Washington expanded its presence in the Red Sea around the Bab el-Mandeb zone, through the destroyer Cole which was operating in the Mediterranean Sea under CENTCOM (Cavas 2017). For its part, Israel and China finalized a plan, initiated in 2012, whereby China built a cargo railway line connecting the port of Eilat in the Red Sea to the ports of Ashdod and Haifa on the Mediterranean coast in Israel. This project aspires to be a shipping alternative to the Suez Canal as far as costs are concerned (Lakhal and Souad 2017: 898). Of course, this dynamic is by no means new: there has always been a strategic component to the various powers’ engagement in the region—even from the Ottoman period, when the British and the French vied for supremacy. However, what is distinctive about the current era is the military technology possessed by the relevant actors, which increases the political and geopolitical tensions among them, with concomitant risk of a military escalation; and similar dangers are faced in other regions such as the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean (Dewaal 2018).12 According to NATO, over 2600 pirate attacks were reported in the area between 2004 and 2011, with ransoms of up to $5.5 million being collected per incident. In total, the overall economic cost of Somali piracy was approximately $6 billion in 2012, down from $7 billion the year before. In response, the international community (including governments, NGOs, and the shipping industry) employed a variety of measures to reduce piracy incidents and bring perpetrators to justice (Hallwood and Miceli 2014). In 2012, one of these measures involved the deployment of between 21 and 30 military vessels in East African counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin (NATO Association of Canada 2014). 11 Lavrov also said that the UNSC sanctions against Eritrea, imposed in 2009 after reports that the country was aiding Somalia’s Al-Shaabab, should be lifted, and praised Eritrea for all that it had done in the name of regional peace over the past few months, in view of its rapidly moving rapprochement with Ethiopia, completely transforming the geopolitical situation. 12 One of the first movers into Red Sea just before the end of the Cold War was Qatar, which sought to position itself as a mediator of choice—hosting peace talks for Darfur, and between Eritrea and Djibouti—and as a key sponsor of civil Islamism. It also used the media outlet Al Jazeera to generate an impact far beyond the country’s small size. Next to move was Turkey. Before the Syrian war began in 2011, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan had a vision of reviving Turkish leadership throughout the lands of the former Ottoman Empire using the soft power of trade, aid, and education. Turkey became the first country to open an embassy in fragile Somalia after its Transitional Federal Government returned and has remained a major supporter of the new government. It is also an active investor in Sudan with plans to open a base at Suakin on the country’s Red Sea coast.

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Conclusion The popular revolts and political changes in Egypt during 2011–14 led to different positions being adopted within the GCC countries, which can explain the nonexistence of a common or unanimous front on this issue. While Qatar, for its part, supported the political tendencies represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and UAE chose to support the so-called deep State in Egypt, in which the military plays a central and strategic role. This support was materialized not only through the granting of voluminous financial aid to the current government of AlSisi, but also through a series of conspiracies coordinated by the intelligence services of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. These factors explain the position of Egypt in the current crisis of GCC, in which Saudi Arabia and UAE are pursuing plans to achieve higher levels of military aid and security from Cairo, so as to contain the rise of Iranian influence in the region. Egypt was part of a Saudi-led military coalition that intervened in Yemen in March 2015, is a central actor in Riyadh’s counter-terrorism strategy through the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (ETIDAL), and is included in the bloc of Arab states that have boycotted Qatar since June 2017. Moreover, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE are undertaking the $500 billion NEOM project. In any case, Egypt shares the Saudi and Emirati goals with respect to curbing the expansionist regional ambitions of Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. While Saudi Arabia and UAE often portray their regional strategy as a reaction to Iran’s expanding regional influence, they have failed to leverage this threat perception into effective regional balancing against Iran in the Gulf, and are now replicating this strategy in the Red Sea area, creating a new complex system of interactions between formal and informal actors. SA–UAE have consistently opposed any kind of accommodation with Iran that might stabilize the regional order, in view of the nuclear deal. The fact is that the Trump administration and Netanyahu’s influence made it almost impossible to implement this strategy, and they will side with Saudi Arabia as long as the flow of investment to Washington persists. Khashoggi’s case is clear evidence for this argument: neither Trump nor Netanyahu (nor Egypt) condemned the murder, and instead used an anti-Brotherhood and anti-Iran narrative to justify Saudi Arabia’s alliances and hegemonic projects not only in the Gulf but also now in the Red Sea. The process of militarization of the Red Sea is a reality, but there is also a softer Saudi strategy expressed through its massive investments and “brand cities” like NEOM, intended to build more spaces for capital reproduction. This is having geopolitical consequences in the Red Sea zone, which is important for the commercial route from the Suez Canal to the Bab al Mandeb Strait. This, then, helps us to understand conflicts such as the Iranian–Saudi conflict in Yemen, the alliance between Riyadh and Cairo and Tel Aviv, and the reaction to this alliance from Qatar, Iran, and Turkey. Finally, the blockade against Qatar, resulting as we have seen from Saudi ambitions within and outside the GCC, has brought Doha closer to Turkey and Iran. This relationship proved beneficial for Ankara and Tehran, which are in direct competition

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with Riyadh and Tel Aviv for power in the Middle East following the military interventions in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon. For now, it is of capital importance to continue to monitor the ways in which new geopolitical realignments develop in the face of a potential terminal crisis in the GCC, the return to power of the Syrian regime, the withdrawal of the United States from Syria, and the development of alliances between Qatar with Turkey and Iran, situated all of these within the framework of Mohammed Bin Salman’s reform program.

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Egypt Today. (2017). Egypt KSA to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear power. Egypt Today. Retrieved March 1, 2019, from https://www.egypttoday.com. Fick, M. (2014). Egypt army extends power by taking charge of gulf aid. Reuters. Retrieved February 22, 2019, from http://www.reuters.com. Haaretz. (2018). Egypt’s top court approves controversial Red Sea Islands transfer to Saudi Arabia. Haaretz. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.haaretz.com. Hallwood, P., & Miceli, T. J. (2014). Enforcing the law: An economic approach to maritime piracy and its control, piracy studies. The Research Portal for Maritime Security. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from http://piracy-studies.org. Hirsi Ali, A. (2017). The plot behind Saudi Arabia’s fight with Qatar. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com. Kamrava, M. (2016). Iran-Qatar relations. In A. Ehteshami, N. Quilliam, & C. Baghat (Ed.), Security and bilateral issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (pp. 167–187). Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Kerr, S., & Khalaf, R. (2015). King Salman speeds up accession of new generation in Saudi shuffle. The Financial Times. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.ft.com. Kerr, S., & Saleh, H. (2014). UAE’s Arabtec signs $40bn housing deal with Egypt’s interim military rulers. The Financial Times. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.ft.com. Krieg, A. (2018). Never mind Russia, the UAE has united with AIPAC to capture Washington. Middle East Eye. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from https://www.middleeasteye.net. Lakhal, S., & Souad, M. H. (2017). The Red-Med Railway Project a serious competitor to the Suez Canal for Cargo containers? Independent Journal of Management & Production, 8(3), 898–917. https://doi.org/10.14807/ijmp.v8i3.619. Levinson, C., & Bardley, M. (2013). In Egypt, the ‘Deep State’ rises again. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 1, 2019, from https://www.wsj.com. Mesa, L. (2019). Egipto y las monarquías del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. Entre tensiones y acuerdos. México: UNAM. Mohie, M. (2015). Why is Egypt participating in operation decisive storm? Mada Masr. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://madamasr.com. Morsy, A (2012). An eager Iran & Hesitant Egypt: Relations before and after the Arab Spring. Muftah. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://muftah.org. NATO Association of Canada. (2014). An overview of Somali piracy. NATO Association of Canada. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from http://natoassociation.ca. Pervez, M. (2014). How Saudi’s planted Sisi in Egypt’s power structure. World Bulletin. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.worldbulletin.net. Roberts, D. (2011). Blame Iran: A dangerous response to Bahraini uprising. The Guardian. Retrieved March 8, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com. Sailer, M. (2016). Changed priorities in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates Rethink their Relationship with Egypt. SWP Comments 8. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved March 3, 2019, from https://www.swpberlin.org. Saudi Bin Laden Group. (2019). King Salman causeway. Saudi Bin Laden Group. Retrieved March 8, 2019, from https://www.protenders.com. Shay, S. (2018). Saudi Arabia and the ‘nuclearization’ of the Middle East. Institute for Policy and Strategy. Institute for Policy and Strategy, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://www.idc.ac. Solomon, S. (2018, September 2). Russia-Eritrea relations grow with planned logistics center. VOA online. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from https://www.voanews.com. Tharoor, I. (2019, March 9). The West’s rebuke of Saudi Arabia won’t change its course. The Washington Times. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com. The Guardian. (2013). Egypt declares MB a terrorist group. The Guardian. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com. Vision 2030. (2016). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://vision2030. gov.sa/en.

Part II

Threat Perception

Chapter 8

Evolving Threat Perceptions and Changing Regional Dynamics in a “Post-GCC” Era Kristian Ulrichsen

Rather than isolating Qatar regionally and internationally, the crisis that began with the blockade of Qatar by four regional states in June 2017 has widened existing cracks in the Gulf into a chasm and has generated unintended consequences that risk inflicting generational damage on its political and social fabric. Like the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the blockade of Qatar is an era-rupturing event that will reverberate through the regional politics and international relations of the Gulf for years to come. The attempt to shoehorn all six Gulf States into a regional straitjacket molded in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has inflicted lasting damage on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and on the flexible inter-relationships that historically existed among its six member-states. Already, in only its second year, the blockade has started to reshape the regional politics and international relations of the Gulf in new and distinct ways. This chapter examines the second-order consequences of the blockade of Qatar. It argues that there is no simple binary division within the Gulf States on any of the regional flashpoints—such as the role of Islamists in domestic political landscapes, political and economic ties with Iran, or complicated relationships between the smaller Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Each separate issue brings different sets of interests to the table and makes it near-impossible in practice to draw a neat dividing line between and among states. The paper maps the web of overlapping flashpoints, actors, and interests at stake, and argues that any attempt to impose uniformity risks generating further backlash both between states and, in the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), among the seven constituent emirates. On the morning of 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt suddenly announced they were cutting all political, economic, and diplomatic ties with Qatar. Although no warning was given, their action took place after thirteen days of a vitriolic campaign of unusual intensity in Saudi and Emirati media and social K. Ulrichsen (B) Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University MS-40, Houston, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_8

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media that portrayed Qatar as a threat to regional stability in multiple, often fanciful ways. The ostensible trigger for the anti-Qatar campaign was the hacking of the Qatar News Agency on the night of 23–24 May 2017, in an act that later was found to have involved Russian hackers working in collaboration with individuals and entities in the UAE (DeYoung and Nakashima 2017). The fact that the hack was followed by a media onslaught that labelled Qatar a supporter of Iran and radical Islamist groups suggested strongly that it was aimed at the Beltway echo chamber in Washington, DC, creating an atmosphere of association of Qatar with radicalism that would resonate with members of the Trump administration, including the president himself, who were pushing heavily on the nebulous issue of “radical Islamist terrorism” (Salisbury 2017). Subsequent leaked communications between two apparent surrogates of the UAE, George Nader and Elliott Broidy, appeared to confirm the existence of an extensive yet under-the-radar public relations and media attempt to damage Qatar’s image in Washington in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the hack (Butler and LoBianco 2018). From the beginning of the blockade it appeared that the Saudi and Emirati move against Qatar was a power-play designed to take advantage of the unique opportunity presented by the presence in office of a US presidential administration that had little prior experience in or position towards the Middle East. Emirati officials were quick to reach out to members of the incoming administration during the transition, and drew close to the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who had been tasked by Trump to assume a portfolio of Middle East issues. As the administration took office in January 2017, Politico reported that Kushner was “in almost constant phone and email contact” with the UAE’s savvy and well-connected ambassador in Washington, DC, Yousef al-Otaiba, and quoted al-Otaiba as recounting that “He [Kushner] did all the asking, and I did all the talking” (Karni 2017). It emerged also that Kushner was in regular WhatsApp communication with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and Saudi Arabia’s then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud in the administration’s early months in office (Worth 2018). Key elements of the Arab-Islamic-American “Riyadh Summit” that Trump attended two days before the hack in May 2017 may also have been coordinated by Kushner on WhatsApp directly with Mohammed bin Salman, cutting out the State Department and institutional channels of decision-making in the process (Henderson 2017). Although President Trump shocked observers by siding initially and very publicly with the Saudis and Emiratis and calling out Qatar by name as a sponsor of radical ideology, the Departments of State and Defense did not share his enthusiasm to pick sides in a dispute that involved three of the United States’s closest regional security partners. The skepticism across government, if not at first within the White House, at the move against Qatar manifested itself within days as Rex Tillerson and James Mattis scrambled to reassure partners and allies alike that the United States was not about to throw Qatar under the bus (Perry 2017). As the weeks passed, US frustration at the decision to launch the blockade became palpable, with the State Department spokeswoman, Heather Nauert, stating publicly on 20 June 2017 that:

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We are mystified that the Gulf States have not released to the public, nor to the Qataris, the details about the claims they are making towards Qatar. The more that time goes by, the more doubt is raised by the actions taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At this point, we are left with one simple question: were the actions really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism? Or were they about the long-simmering grievances between and among the GCC countries? (Anon 2017)

Nauert’s remarks seemed to sting the so-called “Anti-Terror Quartet” into action, as within three days they produced a list of twelve conditions (accompanied by a thirteenth stipulating a ten-day deadline for meeting them) for Qatar to meet.1 The maximalist nature of these demands and the fact they included no room for negotiation or dialogue led many observers to recall the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914 that triggered the chain of events that led to the start of World War One. They also dismayed US officials and even those in Washington, DC seen as closer to the Saudis and Emiratis, such as Mary Beth Long, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush administration, who commented in 2018 that the Quartet “want total capitulation” from Qatar and that “the list of demands is deemed by us to be an infringement on Qatar’s sovereignty and ridiculous—some of them” (Kausch 2018). Moreover, Long articulated the frustrations felt by members of the Trump administration both at the timing of the move against Qatar and the fact that it overshadowed the president’s high-profile summit with regional leaders and went against his call to rally Sunni Arab states to work together with the United States against common challenges from the so-called Islamic State and Iran. The president really wanted to say we had the GCC working against ISIS. Not even 48 h later, the GCC falls apart. And I think there is a real resentment in the administration that “why would you do that on the trip”? Unless there was some critical, time-sensitive issue. Blowing up my announcement of a successful trip. And there has been really no response, no information from the Saudis or the Emiratis on why they did it on the trip. Particularly, because Mohammed bin Zayed was in the White House the week before and didn’t give the administration a heads-up. So there is real anger and frustration there, and legitimately so. (Mary Beth Long quoted in Kausch 2018)

In addition to foreclosing any realistic possibility of dialogue or hope of resolving the grievances articulated by the blockading states, the ferocity of the media and social media campaign as well as the impact of the blockade on families and individuals meant that 5 June 2017 became a major turning-point in the modern history of the Arab Gulf, a “before” and “after” moment akin to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The campaigns against Qatar and its people meant that from the beginning the blockade differed significantly from previous rifts among countries in the GCC, which traditionally had been played out at the political rather than personal level. In 2017, however, the blockading states decreed that Qataris resident in their states must leave within fourteen days, imposed severe travel restrictions and, in 1 Among

the list of conditions were demands that Qatar close down Al Jazeera and other media platforms, close the Turkish military base in the country, scale down ties with Iran, handover “wanted individuals” to the Quartet of states blockading Qatar and pay them reparations and compensation, align political, economic, and security policies with the Saudi-led bloc in the GCC, and agree to compliance audits initially monthly and then annually for a period of twelve years.

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the case of Bahrain and the UAE, criminalized expressions of support or sympathy for Qatar. These measures cast Qatar, Qataris, and anyone associated with Qatar as “others” in a region where tribal and familial ties, to say nothing of commercial connections, have always been linked inextricably across national and political boundaries (Ulrichsen 2018a). Embittered feelings on all sides will complicate attempts to resolve the rift within the Gulf at a people-to-people level, irrespective of whether any official agreement is reached at a state-to-state level, however unlikely that prospect remains at the time of writing in December 2018. The wildly differing interpretations of the two iterations of the Riyadh Agreement signed by Qatar and other GCC states in 2013 and 2014—at which all states made commitments, not only Qatar—offers a sobering illustration of the gulf in positions that continues to divide the antagonists (Kabalan 2018).2 Even were these to be surmounted, however, and a reconciliation at a political level to occur, the memories of the blockade and the vilification of Qatar at the hands of the Quartet media and online social media will be difficult to wash away at the stroke of a pen. For this reason alone, the fallout from the blockade on the social fabric of Gulf societies is as profound as it is likely to be long-lasting, even generational. The blockade therefore has contributed to the reshaping of threat perceptions in the Gulf and between and among Arab Gulf States and their people in ways that will have lasting and likely unanticipated results. The rhetoric and discourse in Saudi Arabia and in Abu Dhabi, in the UAE, is so extreme that Qataris are routinely described in terms hitherto reserved for Iranians, even though commercial relations between the UAE and Iran are deeper and more multifaceted than those between Qatar and Iran (Habibi 2010).3 The GCC itself took shape in three months between February and May 1981 out of defensive concern at the potential spread of regional instability after the Iranian Revolution in 1978–79 and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980. The speedy acceleration of the formation of the regional entity, following years of stalled proposals and disagreements over the shape of any Gulf-wide organization, was testament to the fact that the six Gulf monarchies felt they had a shared threat perception that provided a powerful baseline incentive to come together as a bloc. From its inception, however, the six member-states of the GCC found it rather harder in practice to agree on “big-ticket” items concerning matters of foreign, defense, or security policy involving any pooling of sovereignty, notwithstanding the Emir of Bahrain’s optimistic hailing of the GCC, upon its formation, as a river that would “irrigate the path of the future where it meets with the streams of good and aspires to the coasts of glory” (Miller 2016). Several aspects of the blockade of Qatar have in fact magnified the basic imbalances that have run through the GCC since its inception and were, at best, brushed 2 The

Riyadh Agreement covered commitments by all signatories on issues such as ending media campaigns and interference in domestic affairs as well as safeguarding common interests and stopping support for opposition movements—arguably conditions that Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, rather than Qatar, violated in 2017 (see Kabalan 2018: 24). 3 In 2008, for example, the value of UAE exports to Iran amounted to US$13.2 billion while the value of the aggregate exports from the other five GCC states put together came to US$1.58 billion (Habibi 2010: 5).

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to the side in the hope they would never become a reality. The first, most obvious, imbalance is the disparity in size and conventional power between Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and the five smaller Gulf States, on the other; indeed, as Rory Miller has observed, Saudi Arabia is seven times larger than Oman which itself is bigger than Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE put together (Miller 2016). Moreover, at various points in the twentieth century, the Saudi leadership has directly or indirectly threatened or exhibited expansionist designs upon its neighbors, beginning with a long blockade of Kuwaiti territory between 1921 and 1935, continuing with periodic claims of Saudi loyalty over tribes in Qatar from the 1930s through the 2000s, and including the protracted territorial encroachment on Omani and Abu Dhabi territory during the Buraimi dispute in the 1950s (Toth 2005; Rossiter 2014). In 1963, for example, Sheikh Shakbhut bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the (soon-to-be-deposed) Ruler of Abu Dhabi, cited specifically the threat from Saudi Arabia as the need to create local military units that later became the Abu Dhabi Defense Force (Rossiter 2014). Meanwhile, as late as 1992, Saudi forces were involved in a skirmish on the border with Qatar that left several people dead or injured (Gulf States Newsletter 1992). Concern among the five smaller Gulf States that Saudi Arabia might throw its weight around in the GCC therefore was grounded in empirical reality, especially in Bahrain, which was connected physically to Saudi Arabia in 1986 when the King Fahd Causeway opened. Long before 1000 members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) and 500 military policemen from the UAE crossed the causeway to enter Bahrain in March 2011 to assist the Bahraini government in restoring order after the Pearl Roundabout uprising, observers speculated that the causeway had as much a strategic as a commercial dimension to enable Saudi forces to intervene rapidly in Bahrain should the need develop. During an earlier phase of Bahraini political unrest in the 1990s, for example, the SANG deployed briefly to Bahrain as a show of strength to make it very clear that Shia-led demonstrations would not be allowed to escalate, just as the Saudi Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, visited Manama and declared that the security of Bahrain was indivisible from the security of Saudi Arabia (Fakhro 1997). Numerous tensions and points of friction underlay Gulf politics in the opening decades of the GCC and complicated all efforts to build closer political, and security, as well as economic structures. As early as 1982, just one year after the GCC was formed and while the Iran–Iraq War was raging, Kuwait refused to sign an internal security agreement that would require GCC states to “provide for the exchange of equipment, expertise and training, and for the extradition of criminals and border cooperation” (Kechichian 2014). This foreshadowed the similar reluctance of the Kuwaiti government three decades later, under strong parliamentary pressure, to formally ratify (if not to informally implement) a new iteration of an internal security agreement reached by GCC Interior Ministers in 2012 that contained similar provision for the sharing of intelligence and arrest warrants across Gulf states’ borders (Al-Rasheed 2015). Although a GCC-wide Peninsula Shield Force was eventually set up in 1983 to deal with external threats to security, and two joint military exercises were held in the UAE and then in Saudi Arabia, closer integration remained elusive and impractical

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(Guzansky 2014). In 1986, however, when Kuwaiti territory and shipping came under attack following the Iranian occupation of the Faw Peninsula adjacent to the Iraq– Kuwait border, the GCC denied a Kuwaiti request to station a contingent of GCC forces on Bubiyan Island, just across from the Faw Peninsula, as a collective security deterrent to further attack (Assiri 1990). One reason for the denial, which caused great surprise and consternation in Kuwait, was the lack of consensus among GCC states over which side to back in the Iran–Iraq War, with the UAE especially split between different constituent emirates that supported both of the warring parties, and, like Oman, reluctant to confront Iran directly (Assiri 1990). This refusal led to Kuwait looking to international partners, initially the Soviet Union and later the United States, for maritime security in the “Tanker War” phase of the Iran–Iraq War, which brought international forces into regional security structures for the first time (Nonneman 1997). Doubtless with this memory at least partly in mind, Kuwaiti leaders immediately requested military assistance from the United States, rather than from the GCC, in the opening hours of the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990 (Miller 2016). The opening decade of the twenty-first century saw the focal point of tension within the GCC shift toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which engaged in a series of disputes that belied the subsequent post-2011 realignment in Gulf politics around Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In the decade after 2000, by contrast, the Saudi and Emirati leadership clashed on multiple issues that revolved around the leaders of the UAE wishing to carve greater autonomy for themselves vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia—ironically, one of the charges both countries were later to use against Qatar. Here, the memory of the 1974 boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and the newly formed UAE caused lingering resentment and friction in Abu Dhabi for decades thereafter (Schofield 2011). In 2005, Saudi Arabia blocked plans to create the world’s longest bridge that would have connected the Qatari peninsula with the UAE and allowed both countries to bypass Saudi territory (Al Jazeera Online 2005), while in 2006 the Saudis attempted to halt the construction of an undersea gas pipeline from Ras Laffan in Qatar to Taweelah in Abu Dhabi by claiming—as they did with the bridge—that it crossed through Saudi territorial waters and thus required Saudi consent (Critchlow 2006). Friction between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the mid point of the decade contributed also to the failure of another planned GCC energy initiative. In December 2006, the GCC Supreme Council (of leaders) passed a resolution to launch a joint Arab nuclear program that would be implemented by the six GCC states. The then-Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdulrahman bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, briefed the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, on the GCC-led Arab nuclear proposal in early 2007, and the GCC and IAEA agreed to cooperate on a feasibility study for a regional nuclear power and desalination program (Howard 2007). Just as the idea was gaining traction, however, GCC officials were blindsided in April 2008 when the UAE published its own independent policy plan for nuclear energy, established the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation as an Abu Dhabi–based public entity, and invited bids in 2009 for construction of its first nuclear power plant at Ruwais which is set to begin operation in 2020 (Luomi 2009).

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Most notably for proponents of closer GCC integration, two decades of progress toward economic and monetary union came to a shuddering halt in May 2009 when the UAE, suddenly and without warning, pulled out of the planned GCC single currency a year before it was due to come into operation in 2010. Abu Dhabi had campaigned vigorously to host the headquarters of the new GCC Central Bank and had believed it had secured the support of other GCC members; thus, when the decision was taken to host the bank in Riyadh instead, Emirati officials reacted with visceral anger and, two weeks later, abruptly walked away from the entire project. Their dismay at losing the central bank was magnified by the decision to locate it in Riyadh which reinforced concerns held in Abu Dhabi at the time that the GCC was becoming too Saudi-centric, with the GCC Secretariat also hosted there (Ulrichsen 2016). Even after the cathartic shock of the regional political uprisings in 2011, which extended to Bahrain in the Gulf and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, a lingering mistrust of Saudi intentions undermined attempts to broaden and deepen the GCC and laid bare the latent divisions within the bloc. In May 2011, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia surprised his fellow GCC leaders when he suggested that invitations be extended to Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC in an associational capacity (Hamdan 2011). Although the terms of membership were never entirely made clear, and did not ultimately lead to anything more than an aid package from the GCC to support its two fellow monarchies in the Arab world (Theodoulou 2011), it was followed by a more substantive declaration by King Abdullah, at the annual GCC Summit that happened to take place in Riyadh in December 2011, to move towards “a stage of union in a single entity” (Roberts 2012). Once again, there was little specific detail to flesh out what precisely the king had in mind, and, just as in May 2011 with Jordan and Morocco, it proved far harder to transform rhetoric into reality. Although Saudi Arabia’s longstanding foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal subsequently expanded King Abdullah’s utterance into a set of policy proposals and convened a midyear “Consultative Summit” in Riyadh in May 2012 to consider the GCC union, it ended in embarrassing failure for the hosts as only two other heads of state attended, and the meeting broke up with only a pledge to form a committee to examine the issue. Eighteen months later, in the run-up to the GCC’s December 2013 summit in Kuwait, talk of a move towards a GCC union was revived again, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE asserted their political authority in the aftermath of the coup in Egypt that effectively ended the Arab Spring. On this occasion, too, the lack of consensus within the GCC exposed the deep divisions among member-states, when Yusuf bin Alawi, Oman’s Minister of State Responsible for Foreign Affairs, stated categorically, and in public at the annual Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, that “We are against a union. We will not prevent a union, but if it happens we [Oman] will not be part of it” (Kholaif 2013). What became clear in the years preceding the first iteration of the GCC fracturing over Qatar in 2014 is that any move by other member-states to try and forge closer relations with each other would be resisted by Saudi Arabia, which instead preferred itself at the center of a “hub-and-spoke” system of bilateral relationships. Hence, there was resistance in Riyadh to the attempts by Qatar and the UAE, under ambitious

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younger leaders in the new millennium, to aspire for greater regional autonomy out from under the Saudi shadow. In addition to the above-mentioned opposition to the bridge between Qatar and the UAE, the Saudis also derailed plans to extend the Dolphin gas initiative to Kuwait by insisting that as the pipeline had to cross Saudi territorial waters, their assent to the venture was necessary for it to go ahead (Dargin 2008). And yet, throughout this period, there remained enough of a common ground to ensure that each of the six member-states felt that, on balance, their common interests outweighed bilateral friction, and they were, ultimately, stronger together as a bloc. However, this persisted only so long as there remained an acceptance by GCC members that they were unlikely to agree on every major issue and that the resilience of the GCC lay in its flexibility that left room for members to pursue their own national policies (Koch 2012). What both rounds of the “Qatar crisis”—in 2014 and again from 2017 onwards—have shown is that the attempt to strong-arm states into acting on the basis of a set of policies laid down in Riyadh—and in Abu Dhabi—has meant that the fissures that underlay the surface of GCC politics can no longer simply be accommodated. If pragmatic acceptance of the fact that different states will hold differing positions is not tolerated any longer, the problem for the GCC going forward is that there is no clear or binary division among the states on any aspect of regional contention. There are undoubtedly deep geopolitical divisions that have created great tension in the GCC as they have in the broader Middle East and Arab world. The shock of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the reassertion of authoritarian political control in countries that experienced some of the strongest initial protests continues to reverberate across the region. Having lost control of developments once, in 2011, the “strongmen” of the Middle East appear determined not to do so a second time and seem to have grasped the second chance they were given, by the coup in Egypt in 2013, to recreate the layers of political control in an even more authoritarian and securitized manner than before. Unsurprisingly, it was Saudi Arabia and the UAE, together initially with Kuwait, that extended immediate economic and financial support to the military-led government in Egypt after it seized power and toppled the Muslim Brotherhood presidency of Mohammed Mursi in July 2013 (Peel and Hall 2013). Perhaps inevitably, given its own support for Mursi’s presidency, Qatar found itself in the crosshairs of the aggressive reordering of post–Arab Spring relations by Saudi and Emirati leaders who almost immediately subjected the young new Emir, HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, to pressure to “conform” more closely to the Saudi-led line.4 In the supercharged and polarized atmosphere of post-2013 politics, however, which was worsened many times over when Donald Trump unexpectedly triumphed in the 2016 US presidential election, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi forged ahead with a hyper-hawkish security-centered approach to regional affairs. This has shattered 4 In a television interview with Turkey’s TRT World

in July 2017, Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah, then Qatar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalled that the Saudi-Emirati pressure on Qatar began in July 2013, within weeks of HH Sheikh Tamim becoming Emir and Mohammed Mursi’s toppling in Egypt.

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any regional consensus that once existed and that enabled the GCC to survive for so long as a group of like-minded states with enough in common to overcome their differences on specific issues. The fault-lines in the Gulf are decidedly not clean-cut and the demonstrative effect of the two power-plays against Qatar has been to magnify concerns in other Gulf capitals that they could be next. As Shafeeq Ghabra of Kuwait University, one of the Gulf’s most prolific and discerning public intellectuals, put it, “If they can do this to Qatar, why not to Kuwait and Oman?” (The Economist 2018). And, in truth, the potential for friction goes far beyond the simple Saudi/Abu Dhabi vs. Qatar/Kuwait/Oman binary. Brief examination of three regional flashpoints—sectarian Sunni/Shia tension, relations domestically with the Muslim Brotherhood, and regionally with Iran, illustrate the diversity of responses among the six GCC states and the virtual impossibility of shoehorning any of them into a common position. Whereas in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia there is an antagonistic relationship between the ruling elite and the Shia communities—a majority in Bahrain yet a minority in Saudi Arabia—Kuwait’s Shia communities are, by contrast, largely pro-government in their political outlook. This, in part, stems from a closer historical relationship between the Shia merchant families in Kuwait and the ruling Al-Sabah family, as well as from the legacy of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990–91, when Kuwaiti Shia formed the backbone of many of the resistance networks that emerged during the occupation, thereby “proving” their loyalty at a time of existential threat to Kuwait (Meyer et al. 2007). Kuwait’s Shia communities also rallied around the government after 2008 when sectarian tensions in the country began to increase with the murder of Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh and, after 2011, the blowback from the Syrian Civil War in which prominent Kuwaitis from both sects supported different sides (Azoulay 2013). A similar plethora of views on the Muslim Brotherhood exists across the Gulf. Local affiliates of the Brotherhood have entered the political arena in both Kuwait and in Bahrain, albeit that over time the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the Kuwaiti branch of the Brotherhood, has gravitated toward the political opposition, whereas in Bahrain Al-Minbar National Islamic Society, the Bahraini affiliate, remained a part of the Sunni bedrock of support for the Al-Khalifa ruling family. The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by the Saudi and Emirati authorities, in March 2014, therefore left the Bahraini government in a difficult position, as having already alienated a significant proportion of its Shia population, it could ill-afford to undercut its loyalist Sunni base as well (Hatlani 2014). In Qatar, meanwhile, the local branch of the organization voluntarily wound itself up in 1999, having remained a social rather than a political entity, while in the UAE attitudes toward the Brotherhood and its local affiliate, Al-Islah, differed sharply among the Emirates, with Ras al-Khaimah providing it with material support and leadership up until the death in 2010 of its ruler, Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al Qassemi (Freer 2015). Just as Qatar’s perceived closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood has formed one of the flashpoints with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, so too have its more pragmatic ties with Iran caused tension. Qatar has very real reasons to maintain at least a working

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relationship with Iran, as the largest non-associated gas field in the world straddles the maritime boundary between the two countries. Similar pragmatic reasons are given for Oman’s decision to maintain cooperative bilateral ties with Iran, with Badr bin Hamad Al-bu Said, an Undersecretary at the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telling an audience at Chatham House in London in 2003 that “we try to use our intermediate position between larger powers to reduce the potential for conflict in our immediate neighborhood” (Al-bu Said 2005). Kuwait, too, shared the Omani and Qatari preference for a workable relationship with Tehran over the more confrontational stance favored in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and also Abu Dhabi, where the hawkish position of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was not necessarily shared by the Ruler of Dubai (and Prime Minister of the UAE) Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, who, in calling for the lifting of international sanctions on Iran in January 2014, told the BBC that “we need to give Iran space. Iran is our neighbor and we don’t want any problem” (Kerr 2014). In the months leading up to the blockade of Qatar in June 2017, it was Kuwait and Oman, rather than Qatar, which were at the forefront of a diplomatic initiative to try and improve relations between GCC states and Iran that had deteriorated dangerously in 2016. Kuwait had not joined Saudi Arabia and Bahraini in cutting diplomatic relations with Iran after tensions surged following the execution of Saudi cleric Nimr al-Nimr and the subsequent targeting of Saudi diplomatic sites in Iran in January 2016. Neither was Kuwait heavily involved in the Saudi- and Emirati-led war in Yemen, while in 2014 Kuwait’s Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khalid al-Jarallah, had described the relationship with Iran as “excellent, historical, and developing,” illustrating the strikingly different stance taken by Kuwait as opposed to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi’s confrontation with Tehran (The National 2014). It was not, therefore, a surprise when Kuwait led an initiative to try and defuse tensions in the Gulf at the start of 2017, which began after the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Khaled Al-Sabah visited Tehran and carried with him a letter from HH Emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to President Hasan Rouhani that sought to establish the “basis for dialogue” between the GCC and Iran (Finn 2017). On 7 February 2017, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif responded positively to the meeting with his Kuwaiti counterpart and to the Emir’s letter, stating that Iran was ready for dialogue, and added that “we should aim together for a future that looks different.” President Rouhani then visited both Kuwait and Oman on 15 February 2017, and HH Emir Sabah himself travelled to Muscat a week later to meet with Sultan Qaboos bin Said and discuss ways to rebuild bridges between Iran and Saudi Arabia. During his time in Kuwait, Rouhani had waxed lyrical about the bilateral possibilities with Kuwait, stating that “There are vast potentials for deepening and cementing relations […] that can be tapped for the two nations and the region to benefit from” (Ulrichsen 2017a). Ultimately, however, the opening was overshadowed by the schism within the GCC that erupted with the blockade of Qatar in June 2017 and by the decision of the authorities in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi to jump aboard the Trump administration’s bandwagon in the run-up to and aftermath

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of the Arab–Islamic–American Summit in Riyadh with President Trump (Henderson 2017). With the blockade of Qatar heading towards a third year with no apparent end in sight, and US aspirations for resolving it not having made any headway in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, the standoff in the Gulf looks set to become the “new normal” in regional politics for the foreseeable future. The resignation of retired US General Anthony Zinni in January 2019 after eighteen frustrating months’ service as President Trump’s “envoy” to the Gulf crisis, encapsulated the limited ability of the White House to close the Pandora’s Box they inadvertently had allowed to open in 2017 (Karam 2019). Although the GCC managed to convene its annual summits, which took place in Kuwait City in December 2017 and in Riyadh a year later, each meeting served to reinforce the organization’s growing marginalization in the current state of regional affairs. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE sent foreign ministry representatives to the 2017 summit while Qatar reciprocated in 2018 and the crisis within the GCC was noticeably not on the agenda at each event. Having failed on two occasions in little more than three years to prevent three of its members from turning on a fourth, the GCC has been conspicuously bypassed at every stage of the Gulf crisis, from the conveying of initial grievances to Qatar to the subsequent formulation of conditions and attempts at mediation (Ulrichsen 2017b). What remains of a “Gulf consensus” in regional politics consists now of a ramrod axis that runs between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that is as divisive as the earlier generation that put together the GCC tried to be inclusive. The announcement of the formation of a Saudi–Emirati Coordination Council in December 2017 not only overshadowed the GCC Summit taking place in Kuwait that same day but also visibly represented the new contours of political power in the Gulf. Co-chaired by the Crown Princes of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, the Saudi–Emirati Coordination Council held its first meeting in Jeddah in June 2018, at which the UAE Prime Minister (and Ruler of Dubai) Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum was noticeably absent. Signs of tension within the UAE between Abu Dhabi’s hawkish politics and embrace of Saudi Arabia and at least several of the other Emirates have come close to the surface in recent months, with a son of the Ruler of Fujairah going so far as to claim asylum in Qatar in May 2018 (Kirkpatrick 2018). Dubai’s positioning as the “soft power” hub in the UAE and as an aspirational model for the Arab world more generally has been damaged by the “hard power” projection of Abu Dhabi, while the UAE’s centrality in the blockade of Qatar has hit Dubai’s reputation as a place one could do business without politics or geopolitical considerations getting in the way (Ulrichsen 2018b). It may take many years, if not decades, for the Gulf to recohere after the attempt by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi to force the members of the GCC into a regional geopolitical straitjacket. The resilience of the GCC as the longest-lasting and most successful intergovernmental organization in the Arab world lay precisely in its flexibility that enabled a group of like-minded states to cooperate on issues that mattered and “agree to disagree” in other areas. It will not be easy to recreate that hallmark of success, at least while Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed continue to dominate regional politics; and their age means they can expect to

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continue to do so for the foreseeable future, certainly outlasting the two remaining members of the generation that built the GCC—Emir Sabah of Kuwait and Sultan Qaboos of Oman—who will inevitably depart from the scene at some point.

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Chapter 9

Popular Sentiments and Elite Threat Perception in the Gulf: Iran in the Public Discourse in Saudi Arabia Éva Ádám

Introduction In spite of the many anti-Shia and anti-Iran expressions, propagated mainly by the religious elite, which have permeated popular public discourse since the foundation of Saudi Arabia, and despite the revolution in Iran in 1979, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were improving until the first decade of the new millennium. Although this statement might sound counter-intuitive and contrary to public perception, it indeed corresponds with the regional and domestic political scenes. Both countries had been part of the United States’ regional alliance system for some time, they shared the same enemy (Iraq), and both had become dominant players within the same institutional framework (OPEC). As for the domestic setting, the existence of Shiism locally became pivotal early on for the Wahhabi movement and religious tradition, which applied the anti-Shia and anti-Iran discourse as a tool for the self-preservation of both the religious and the political elite. Saudi–Iranian relations thus had been contingent on both domestic and regional settings and developments. Up until the Arab Spring, and in spite of the many faces of the Iranian government, the Saudi political leadership was able to steer bilateral relations in a positive direction with the prospect of normalizing at least the trade relations between the two countries. The Saudi regime always found opportunities to compromise its official stance of anti-Shiism in order to uphold the stability of the regional status quo. After a power vacuum was created during the Arab Spring, and regional developments provided an opportunity for Iran to extend its hard power capacities in the Levant and Yemen, we see the deterioration of bilateral relations, which became nearly unrepairable due to deep structural changes executed in Saudi Arabia by King Salman and Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman. These new domestic and regional settings suggest that anti-Iran sentiments will dominate the Saudi public discourse, É. Ádám (B) Antall József Knowledge Centre, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_9

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and the Saudi state will capitalize on the public’s rally-round-the-flag posture for the further extension of its hard power capacities, to confront Iran and redefine the regional status quo. Although a direct military conflict with Iran is undesirable from a regional security perspective, the newly unfolding rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia adds to the unpredictability of Saudi foreign policy moves. It is not the Saudi or Iranian foreign policy strategy that will necessitate a military conflict but the day-to-day animosity between the two governments, and their quick, short-term responses are of serious concern. Solutions cannot be found in the absence of both long-term strategies and dialogue. The next generation of Saudi rulers, of whom Muhammad bin Salman is the forerunner, will rule over a population whose majority (as many as 70%) comprises young people (below 30 years of age) (Niblock and Malik 2007) who are highly unskilled and highly loyal to Muhammad bin Salman, whom they consider as a role model. The information ecosystem in Saudi Arabia has changed dramatically due to the penetration of digital and social media into the country, as well as social messaging platforms that have become a part of daily life (Smith Diwan 2017), and the Saudi rulers are now able to address and communicate with the people of their constituencies directly. Saudi Arabia has the highest Twitter penetration in the world as well as the highest per capita consumption of YouTube (Smith Diwan 2017) while leaders, ministries, and individuals close to the government each maintain official or unofficial outreach towards their constituencies. Muhammad bin Salman’s generation grew up in an environment of elite and public discourse informed by the geopolitics of the time, and it is to be expected that they will apply some of those influences to the realities of the new millennium. This is a considerable development both in Saudi politics and Saudi social reality, as previous leaders of the Saudi state could have been considered status quo politicians in both the domestic and foreign domains. In contrast, the older generations of society had been less susceptible to the elite discourse of the 1990s and the first century of the new millennium, which had been mostly dictated by the official religious establishment. This has often been a utilitarian tool in the hands of the ruling family and has rarely mirrored geopolitical and social realities. The Saudi ruling elite is becoming so highly concentrated in this very limited age cohort that the cognitive heuristics of the 1990s are likely to overwhelm the discourse between the elite and the public in the current era. Amongst the many issues raised in the public discourse in Saudi Arabia, there are only two interlinked matters which have attained a high level of consensus amongst the constituencies of the state. These are the sentiment felt against the Shia, both as an abstraction and a national and international minority, and against Iran as a direct object that mobilizes Shiites worldwide. Although there is a clear tendency towards increased anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiment in the elite and public discourse in Saudi Arabia, it does not in itself indicate a substantive change in Saudi domestic and foreign policies. These feelings might remain a mere reflection of changing geopolitical realities. The Saudi state was built on an ideology and by constituencies that embodied anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiments. However, as a result of the dramatically changing geopolitical environment, we might argue that Iran’s hard power projection in the Levant and the Arab Peninsula and the rapprochement between Israel and

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Saudi Arabia will now make anti-Iran sentiment the dominant component of public discourse. This might reach the point at which a direct confrontation with Iran will be widely supported by the public. This, together with the easing of cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia alongside other GCC member states, means it is highly to be expected that Saudi Arabia will also apply and/or uphold its hard power projection in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula to prolong these conflicts, to the point where a direct military conflict with Iran will be nearly inevitable. As a result of my observations, I argue that focusing the political framing on the antiShia and anti-Iran sentiments might become a tool of double utility for the Saudi state. These sentiments can provide for the growing patriotism and nationalism of the Saudi citizens, while the overwhelming presence of these sentiments in elite and popular discourse might support and legitimize Saudi foreign policy decisions. Thus, the cumulative effect of the real and ontological insecurity of Saudi society might lead to growing military assertiveness. Anti-Shia incitement in Saudi media is not a new phenomenon. It is well documented that at times of crisis, and when tensions with the local Shia communities grew—for example, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and during the Shia uprisings in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province before and after 2011—the Saudi media outlets provided a platform for anti-Shia sentiments (Matthiesen 2015a). National-building is a nearly impossible project for any government, and usually we can identify nation theories in multiple versions, both official and unofficial; however, as Kamrava (2011) pointed out: “in one key respect, unofficial nationalism overlaps and agrees with the official version articulated by the state: right or wrong, a sizable portion of the middle classes generally buys into the state’s explanation of the threats posed by foreign (neighborly) conspiracies.” Saudi Arabia’s threat perception and reaction has grown enormously with the deterioration of its close security environment and the retreat of US involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Since the Arab uprisings, the kingdom has tried to initiate military cooperation and alliances on multiple occasions. In 2015, an initiative for a NATO-like defense cooperation between the United States and the Gulf states failed to materialize; however, the same year Saudi Arabia concluded the foundation of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) of Arab and non-Arab states. Just like in any other crisis, the official narrative is that Saudi Arabia has been under attack from both domestic constituencies and neighboring state and sub-state actors. As regional and trans-regional alliances have always proved to be improper foreign policy tools in a disintegrated region, the new Saudi leadership that took over in 2015 has pursued unusually active foreign and military policies that have been underlined by massive traditional and new media campaigns. This does not only include the established channels of traditional media and official statements by the state, but also a growing number of unofficial statements by state-related figures, members of religious communities, laymen and social bots that conduct a strong anti-Iran and anti-Shia campaign through the new media channels. The interconnectivity of the whole society and the whole region enabled the Gulf regimes to project their nationalistic agendas across physical borders, highly affecting each other’s political discourses. Although not a religious conflict by nature, the decades-long religious

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discourse on Shia and Iran provides an enormous public policy tool for the Saudi state’s most recent nation-building process. As Banafsheh Keynoush stated: Religion becomes a powerful tool to advance state decisions in the face of insecurity. Hence, ideology can further the state’s decision-making power. Saudi Arabia more, and Iran to a lesser extent, are incapable of subordinating ideology to rational decision making. They are driven by ideology as opposed to possessing the ability to drive it. (Keynoush 2016: 15).

The basic elements that shape an individual’s perspective and religious inclinations are education—including informal teachings in mosques and in homes— and what it is called “the new media” (Prokop 2003). Therefore, in the following I discuss the development of the Saudi state, its national identity, and how the political discourse developed to its current form, in line with the geopolitical developments of the region.

Saudi Arabia, the Shia, and Iran During Saudi State-Formation After the foundation of the modern Saudi state, the ruling group created a narrative of the state’s history with the intention of eliminating contentious facts and competing interpretations, in order to generate compliance and extend the domination of the ruling group. Alongside this official narrative, public imagination and disenfranchised groups created counter-narratives (Al-Rasheed 2017). This chapter intends to highlight the differences between the widely accepted historical facts and outsider reports, the official narrative of the state regarding the foundation and early history of the peninsula, and finally, the counter-narratives of the Shia, the most disenfranchised group of the Saudi state. All of this will be put in the context of geopolitical developments. Following a chronological order of coexistence, we might distinguish between early Arab–Iranian, Sunni–Shiite, Wahhabi–Shiite, and Saudi–Iranian relations. It should be noted that there are many points of departure according to which we can approach these relations. We can talk about political, social, trade, and religiousdoctrinal relations amongst many other issues. The earliest encounter between Arabs and Iranians occurred when one empire was rising while another was already falling apart. The Arabs successfully conquered the remnants of the Sassanid Empire whose geographical area became one center of gravity in the Arab-Muslim Empire. Until the sixteenth century, when the rulers of Iran distinguished themselves from Ottoman rulers by accepting Shiism as a state religion, it had been only political decentralization and ethnic differences that distinguished Persia from the more central parts of Arabia. Early Sunni–Shiite division was a feature of the centrum of the empire as early (Arab) Shiites settled in the eastern Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen (Keynoush 2016). The modern Saudi official historical narrative states that Shiites living on the eastern shore of the peninsula are foreign invaders who originated

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in Iraq and Iran. This narrative has had certain political goals. It disregards any political settlements outside of Najd in order to legitimize the Al-Saud’s conquests in the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries and validate them as the unifiers of ungoverned territories. However, this official narrative has been challenged by Shiite writers who present the origins of the Shia community in Saudi Arabia as dating back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad (Al-Rasheed 2017). It is also well documented that these territories on the eastern shore had been governed by the Ottomans before the Al-Sauds, and that besides being present in the territory, the Shiites established a developed self-governance system at the times when they enjoyed independence. This counter-narrative clearly defies the ‘unification’ theory of the state and describes these events as ‘conquests’ or rather ‘occupation’ of the territories surrounding the Najd (Al-Rasheed 2017). Contrary to the Persian imperial top-down socio-religious development, the formation of a religious identity on the Arabian Peninsula began through the personal achievements of a popular movement leader, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, whose eighteenth-century religious-social model empowered the Al-Saud clan’s political movement. The articulation of the Wahhabi-Saudi state model was mainly based on anti-imperial sentiments, but it had developed a strong cultural uniqueness and identified cultural ‘others’ as threats to the movement. Amongst these cultural others in the Wahhabi school of thought were the Shia, since the founder of the movement based his collection of doctrines on his personal experiences with Shiism in Persia (Bonacina 2015). This ambiguity in the Wahhabi interpretation of Shia history creates an uncomfortable situation for any cultural dialogue between the Sunni and Shiite populations of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi official narrative on the foundation of the state is also silent on the many challenges the Wahhabi-Saudi movement had to deal with. It narrates the events as a natural flow of history in which the first Saudi state ended the era of chaos on the peninsula in 1744 and unified the territories previously ruled by many tribes. In fact, during the time of the first two Saudi-Wahhabi state formations—thus until the beginning of the twentieth century—the many fiefdoms of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran were struck by the militancy of the Wahhabi movement which was considered by many to be an agent of British sovereignty over the peninsula (Ende 1990). Although it is conventional in scholarly articles to state that the modern Saudi state is built on the pact between the Wahhabi and Saudi founders and is governed by the two families, the reality is much more complicated. In fact, the relationship between the Al-Saud and Al-Shaykh, thus the heirs of Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, respectively, had been turbulent. In the first decades of the twentieth century Abdul Aziz ibn Saud had to limit the Wahhabi militancy which was concentrated in the Ikhwan forces, as he was much more sensitive about diplomatic issues than the puritan members of the Wahhabi movement. Thus, the state-building process and the development of the Wahhabi movement started to drag during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud well understood that in order to preserve his political power and dominance in the peninsula, he had to adhere to the regional status quo. He had to prevent militant Wahhabis from damaging the interests of the great powers, first and foremost that

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of the British Empire. King Abd al-Aziz had struggled to establish and secure the borders of his territory through coopting or coercing the tribal leaders and territories of the peninsula, while in Persia a developed form of nationalism already flourished. As Keynoush (2016: 51) described it: “Persia’s historically expansionist goals, combined with a sense of cultural superiority and strong Shiite identity, led to more false pride, which contributed to Arab fears of its less-than-peaceful intentions. The Arab states’ fledgling status as regional actors then led to exaggerated levels of fear of Persia itself, which was often combined with resentment toward Persians in general.” Thus, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud had a double headache, having to deal with both domestic and foreign insecurities. However, although anti-Shia narratives permeated public discourse, Saudi–Iranian relations had developed pragmatically on the diplomatic level. The Shia of the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed a limited but safe political status next to the privileged Sunni chiefdoms allied with the Al-Saud. As Matthiesen (2015a: 8) put it, The Wahhabi clergy has from the mid-eighteenth century onwards seen Shia Islam as one of its main, if not the main, enemies. While relations between Shia political leaders and individual members of the Saudi ruling family have fluctuated, and have improved at times, the attitudes of the Wahhabi clergy towards Shia Muslims did not change and have remained adversarial. […] The ruling family has tried to position itself as an arbiter between the Wahhabis and the Shia. To the Shia, the ruling family implicitly promised protection from the most extreme Wahhabi demands for the conversion or execution of Shia.

However, in political discourse the Shia had been clearly described from the beginning of the modern Saudi state in terms that signified their exclusion from the main political strata. They were referred to as the nakhawilah (from nakhl or “palm tree”) or olad-sigeh (“children of concubines” in reference to the Shiite practice of concubine marriages) (Keynoush 2016: 35). Thus, although Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud understood the importance of pragmatism regarding political and religious relations (as the leader of Saudi Arabia and the custodian of the two holy sites) and tried to keep Shiite and Iranian relations normal on a diplomatic level, he could not—and probably did not feel compelled to—control the popular public discourse on the Shia and Iran. This was a utilitarian approach, enabling the pursuit of good bilateral relations with Iran on the political level, while allowing the political framing of Shia and Iran on the societal level, and keeping minimal the impact of the latter on the former. The dyadic nature of the state policy led to the establishment of cognitive biases towards the Shia and Iran in Saudi political thinking. However, these biases did not fully permeate the elite political thinking, and created alternative discourses or counter-frames and allowed independent political action until the time of the current generation of Saudi rulers. Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud had to manage many dichotomies and imbalances within his territory, amongst them the hadari–bedouin, Sunni–Shia, Saudi–Ikhwani, and tribal divisions. Basically, the Saudi state was a government limited to the central territory of Najd, which tried to govern the peripheries with a varying degree of success. On the official level, the traditional loyalty decree (bayah) guaranteed the unity of the state; however, the society had been full of political and cultural pressures for a long time.

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Many unresolved issues hindered the establishment of classic state-to-state relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For decades, in fact, Iran hesitated to recognize the suzerainty of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud over his territories in Najd and Hijaz. This was for many reasons, the most direct of which was that Saudi Arabia did not recognize Persia’s claim over Bahrain against the British, while other important issues, like the unilateral decision of Ibn Saud to exclude other nations from the governance of the hajj proceedings and the territory of the haramayn, also hindered friendly relations. However, in the decades following the establishment of Saudi Arabia, Saudi–Iranian diplomatic relations were affected by domestic issues related either to hajj incidents or minorities, rather than by conflicts related to state sovereignty. In 1926, Shiites were attacked by Ikhwan forces during an Ashura ceremony in Makkah, which led Persia to issue a strongly worded condemnation against Wahhabism (Keynoush 2016). Incidents of this kind were recurrent throughout the twentieth century. In 1943, a fight broke out between Iranian pilgrims en route to Makkah and local residents who objected to the Iranian caravan’s morning call for prayers, which bears witness to Imam Ali being the Prophet’s (PBUH) rightful successor. In the same year, an archaic belief that Shiites were responsible for smearing excrement on the Black Stone of the Kaaba—an act of desecration dating to the seventeenth century—led to the execution of a Persian pilgrim, due to his illness being confused with an intentional act against the sanctuary (Keynoush 2016). During the oil era, the Saudi state started to have difficulties accommodating its large Shiite minorities, the most significant of which had settled in the Eastern province where the country’s natural resources are concentrated. In the 1950s, Saudi Shiites employed by Aramco became one of many groups (including Sunnis) advocating for fairer compensation of workers, leading the kingdom to develop suspicions of Iranian interference in the Eastern Province: “A general Saudi apprehension about Iranian Shi‘i was understandable, given Shi‘i clerical efforts to politicize religion across the Gulf region at the height of the anticolonial movement in the Middle East and North Africa” (Keynoush 2016: 69)—and this was an apprehension with which the United States also sympathized. The cultural homogenization policy of the Saudi state, enforcement of the official narrative on the state’s history, and the maintenance of social order had been conducted largely through the religious police, the successor to the Ikhwan forces, which created uniformity in both appearance (clothing) and morality. However, the existence and activism of the Shia community in Saudi Arabia has a very important function for the nationalistic state-building process. Matthiesen (2015a: 1) neatly summarized the utility of the Shia community when he stated that “the stigmatization of Shia Muslims as Saudi Arabia’s internal ‘Others’ fulfills an important function in Saudi religious nationalism. At times of crisis the ‘Shia threat’ is used to rally the rest of the population, most of whom are Sunnis of different persuasions, around the ruling family.” Thus, the mobilization of the Shia during the oil boom era presented both a challenge and an opportunity for the state to fuel the ontological insecurity of Saudi citizens receptive to the official narrative. This utilization of the Shia community for nation-building and the official narrative of Saudi history made the inclusion of the Shiites in the main group of Saudi nationals nearly impossible. The state-building process thus created multiple

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frames regarding the Shia community and Iran. Most importantly, even in the face of societal pressure towards stigmatizing the Shia, the official Saudi state policy always favored consolidating its relations with Iran. However, securitizing the Shia minority proved to be a useful policy for the building of the nation.

The Islamic Revolution in 1979 and its Impact on the Saudi Public Discourse on Iran Since the nineteenth century or earlier, there have been Sunni–Shiite polemics, newspapers, books, and institutions discussing the options, methods, and opportunities for rapprochement (taqrib) between the two religious communities present in the Middle East. These have resulted in some agreement, more disagreement, and many conspiracy theories about the Shiite plan to proselytize and conquer the Middle East (Ende 1990). Wahhabi public discourse and action, however, has represented a constant theme of anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiment in Arab religious and political thought. Nevertheless, political actions committed in Saudi Arabia with relation to the Khomeini regime and the mobilization of the Shia community in Saudi Arabia led to a growing assertiveness on the part of the Saudi regime and the elite on all levels of religiousness in Saudi society. Whereas countries with predominantly Muslim populations might be labelled Muslim, a country with this same attribute that also conducts its businesses on clear Islamist principles, such as the exportation and propagation of its religious doctrines, should be labelled an Islamist country (Nagyné Rózsa 2018). The Saudi state definitely gained awareness and became Islamist following the Iranian revolution. It is noticeable that although the Saudi–Wahhabi political formations, including the modern Saudi state, were founded on a sectarian premise (antagonism towards Shiite, Sufi, and Christian praxis), the relationship between the modern Saudi and Iranian states had been based on the international norms of diplomacy and reached a high degree of normalcy both before and after the Islamic Revolution. The sectarian nature of the Saudi state had been conserved only in some strata of the religious establishment, and while state relations always aimed to achieve normalization, the religious establishment was free to express anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite sentiments against the rawafid (the so-called rejectionists). Until the end of the 1990s, the religious education of the Saudi population, which comprised 10–30% of the whole curriculum, included a huge amount of anti-Shia propaganda and diatribe (Prokop 2003). Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the limited geopolitical threat had been augmented by an ideological threat due to the pan-Islamic appeal of Khomeini’s popular views on the unification of the whole Muslim community. The uprisings by the Shiites of Saudi Arabia after the Iranian Revolution led to greater surveillance over the population, more power-sharing with the religious police, and new constraints on mobility and expression. At the same time, King Fahd sought to bolster the legitimacy of the ruling family by appropriating the power of

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Islam (Okruhlik 2004). This mission was built on the support of the conservative religious establishment. A Saudi scholar described the situation this way: “Islam, of course, has always been empowered and central to life in Saudi Arabia. The difference after 1979 was that only one very particular practice of Islam was empowered” (Okruhlik 2004). Since the 1980s, Saudi rulers have expanded the state’s capacity for religious education. “Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, the Islamic University in Medina, and Umm al Qura University in Mecca continued to grow, even as other programs were cut back. By 1986, more than 16,000 of the kingdom’s 100,000 students were pursuing Islamic Studies. By the early 1990s, one-fourth of all university students were enrolled in religious institutions” (Okruhlik 2004). The religious education contained very simple and clear assumptions about the Shia community, and this simplification of Sunni–Shia antagonism was repeatedly reinforced by prominent Saudi religious figures, amongst them Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, once the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, who declared that “the Shiites have many different sects, each one having a variety of deviations. The most dangerous of them is the Khomeinian Raafidhah Twelver Sect (the official religion of Iran), due to the large number of their missionaries and all the major acts of polytheism found in it …” (Baz n.d.). Although the Islamic Revolution in Iran had great potential for being attractive to the disenfranchised in the Arab world and especially in the monarchies of the Gulf, it enjoyed very limited popularity there. The Islamic Revolution’s pan-Islamic appeal was a direct challenge for the family-led Gulf monarchies. However, anti-Shia sentiment had been deeply implanted in Saudi thinking for so long that Saudis could not give credence to the Iranians who “insulted the first three caliphs” (Keynoush 2016: 109). The threat of revolutionary Iran and its ideologies had been compensated for by the Saudi regime through different measures. Responding to the military threat posed by Iran and Iraq, the Saudi regime strengthened its good relationship with the United States and initiated a regional integration process by becoming one of the founders of the GCC. Participating in the regional balance-of-power politics and invoking the support of a great power guaranteed Saudi Arabia’s physical safety. On the other hand, the Saudi state had already extended its global outreach through generous development programs and direct financial help which had been complemented by religious proselytization (daawa). The level of popularity guaranteed by Saudi benevolence could hardly be matched by Iran’s endeavors to spread its revolution. However, Saudi clerics were encouraged to develop an alternative Islamist discourse to counter the Iranian revolutionary challenge based on the tenets of Wahhabism that supported ruling monarchs (Keynoush 2016). Saudi Arabia’s main concern was always upholding the regional status quo, and therefore it never committed itself to hostile acts against Iran. This was the reason why Saudi Arabia only reluctantly supported Iraq’s war against Iran, and why it only decided to materially support the Iraqi army after several years. Even so, the Saudi leadership was careful not to turn the conflict into a sectarian one, which would have had unforeseen consequences for the Sunni–Shia divide within Saudi Arabia. Despite the Saudi government’s careful consideration, ‘the political and

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religious elites retained stereotyped views of Iran, with even dissident preachers such as Salman Al-Aoun referring to the “cultural pollution” that Persia posed to the Arab heartland’ (Keynoush 2016: 115). As Keynoush points out, even many in the Iranian diplomatic circles were confident in their belief that Saudi foreign policy decisions had been mainly based on ideological conviction, although some of them clearly saw the pragmatist elements in the Saudi elite circle. In the 1990s, and up until the deposition of Saddam Hussein from power, Riyadh and Tehran had a very turbulent relationship which was ultimately based on Iraq’s position as a common enemy. In the end, the Saudi and Iranian governments always found an opportunity to resolve issues related to geopolitics or the pilgrimage. In spite of the continuity in anti-Shia and anti-Iran discourse there was also a continuity, or rather an improvement, in the bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This was mainly due to the personal efforts of Crown Prince and later King Abdullah on the Saudi side, and presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatemi on the Iranian side. The two sides managed to reach a point in their bilateral relations where the two countries had established business relations and agreed to hold regular meetings. In the end, it was the animosity between the United States and Iran, and the American involvement in Middle Eastern geopolitics and peace processes, that hindered the consolidation of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The deposition of Saddam Hussein, and Iran’s growing assertiveness, paired with latter’s ambitions to develop nuclear capacities, led to the current state of affairs.

The Challenges of the New Millennium and the New Generation of Saudi Rulers After Iraq was invaded in 2003, the power vacuum and the reshuffling of politics and ethnic-religious relations within the country posed an opportunity for Iran to extend its soft power capabilities to the Iraqi Shia communities. After 2014 it decided to put its military capacities into Iraq to face the threat posed by the Islamic State terrorist organization. On the other hand, the perseverance of the Assad regime and Hezbollah’s activity in the region both supported Iran’s regional ambitions. This direct geopolitical threat for Saudi Arabia, Iran, and some Sunni Arab states, and the withdrawal of the United States from the region during the Obama administration, demanded action from the Saudi state. Saudi Arabia also had to deal with growing domestic public dissent from Islamic groups who were critical of government policies and the fiscal and economic problems. As a result of the many external and internal pressures, the government, as on many previous occasions, limited the space for public dissent. The events of the Arab Spring demanded strong commitment from the Saudi leadership in order to survive the domino effect of the unfolding political events. In the end, the Saudi regime not only averted domestic dissent but took a leadership position in what experts labelled a “counter-revolution.” In terms of regional politics,

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this assertiveness was manifested not only in Saudi Arabia’s direct and indirect interference in the domestic politics of other Arab countries, but also in the clear anti-Iranian stance and labelling that it started to apply. In its April, 2011 meeting held in Riyadh, the GCC, at Saudi instigation, called on ‘the international community and the Security Council to take the necessary measures to stop flagrant Iranian interference and provocations aimed at sowing discord and destruction’ among GCC states. Condemning what it called Iranian ‘aggression’ against Saudi diplomats in Tehran, the group maintained that it ‘categorically rejects all foreign interference in its affairs … and invites the Iranian regime to stop its provocations’ (Kamrava 2012).

The post–Arab Spring environment in the Middle East has been described as an “imbalance of power” or “disorder” (Lynch 2018) by many experts. Previous assumptions regarding great power involvements have been questioned, regional alliances have been reordered, and after many years of neutrality both Iran and Saudi Arabia have directed their military capacities towards each other. While some experts consider the Saudi–Iranian conflict comparably easier to resolve than for example the Islamist–secularist one (Roos et al. 2018), I argue for the opposite. While it is difficult to prove whether the current state of the imbalance of power in the Middle East is a result of decades of political framing, it is easy to prove that a certain framing in the respective countries does exist, and that it will only exacerbate the deeply rooted conflict and the biased nature of international regional politics. Combining political discourse theory with an analysis of the balance-of-power politics has a very important role which is usually neglected in research. While political analysts might be able to perfectly assess the foreign policies of certain governments and their outcomes in international politics without applying linguistic analysis, they usually neglect the power of political framing and how it differs between generations of political leaders. This is the case with the current and future leadership of Saudi Arabia, which is the first generation of the post-1979 Middle Eastern era to have witnessed a high degree of anti-Iran political propaganda on all levels of the public debate. Muhammad bin Salman’s generation has inherited the political framework incorporated into their school curricula and broadcast on mass media channels. It is the current state of power imbalance in the Middle East that not only substantiates the political framing but renders any kind of pluralistic views a threat to survival. A change in the geopolitical environment and political will are the elements that usually define the framing and reframing processes of certain issues. Identity frames are the most difficult to challenge, as the reframing of these might involve a challenge to one’s self-conception and group affiliation. As Badawi et al. (2012) put it: “Moving from adversarial frames and perspectives into a reflexive approach is a dramatic shift. In the process of articulating antagonistic positions, the focus is on the other, on them, with a strong outward view.” The more one’s identity frame is challenged, the more the response can be expected to be harsh criticism of the challenger, reinforcing affiliations with like-minded individuals and groups, and negatively characterizing outsiders (Kaufman et al. 2017). Reflexivity, which has a strong outward view, is difficult to achieve in an adversarial environment, such as that surrounding the new Middle Eastern antagonism. Since the 1960s or earlier, scholars and policy executives have pointed out the importance of the role that identity plays in sustaining conflicts

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and making them intractable and difficult to resolve. Researchers have demonstrated that “the language of diplomacy and its efforts at reaching compromise between various conflict parties are insufficient to produce sustainable results. Beneath interests, there is identity and its reflection in the mostly unspoken fears, dilemmas, and prejudices …” (Kaufman et al. 2017). Since King Salman and Muhammad bin Salman became the leaders of the present and future generations of Saudi Arabia, they have started to tackle the many unprecedented challenges the country is facing through measures often framed as “liberal” in the international media. However, the fact that economic and social reforms are part of the response to the real and ontological insecurity of the Saudi state is often neglected. This is very much proved by the changing Saudi perception of Iran. A decade ago, Keynoush’s claim had already proved true: “in Saudi Arabia, where foreign policy is developed by a small group of royals, frequent family schisms can influence the kingdom’s position on how real or perceived the Iranian regional threat actually is” (Keynoush 2016: 18). The most important development after 2015, as Professor Madawi al-Rasheed has pointed out, is that King Salman and Muhammad bin Salman have transformed the domestic balance of power between the many fiefdoms of the Al-Saud by grabbing nearly absolute power over the political and military strongholds of the state government (Al-Rasheed 2017). This is a clear sign that Saudi foreign policy decisions will follow the Salmans’ logic in the future. In 2017, Muhammad bin Salman declared that a dialogue with Iran was impossible. He declared that Iran has an expansionist military policy based on an exclusivist ideology and is a supporter of terrorism, and therefore he sees no point in looking for a rapprochement or even opening channels of communication with Iran until it executes structural reforms (Saab 2017). Public opinion survey data obtained from research conducted in the second year of the Arab Spring showed that most Arabs hold broadly negative views of Iran across a number of cultural and political dimensions (Gengler 2017). These results are both related to the historical framing of the Shia and Iran in the case of cultural questions, and are also in line with and representative of the Sunni–Shia divide, especially in the Gulf countries with which Iran’s contemporary policies are concerned (Zogby et al. 2012). Research results from roughly the same period also showed that the Iranian threat is only one component of the Gulf citizens’ ontological threat perception. Other elements include the fall in the price of oil and its economic consequences, and the Western influence and Western penetration into their domestic affairs. In fact, terrorism and especially the Islamic State proved to be the most threatening element (Gengler 2017); however, the changing regional circumstances might result in the threat of Iran soon dominating the ontological insecurity perceptions of Gulf citizens. First, the Islamic State is disappearing from the physical realities of the Middle East and the Saudi state is coping with its economic difficulties, at least on paper. Second, the Saudi state is not only responding to but is also using the technological innovations of the new media. As Mai Yamani (2010) pointed out,

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While globalization is expanding the public space, the Saudi government is attempting simultaneously to shrink it. The kingdom’s rulers continue to use their power and influence to regulate the domestic cultural and political field in order to impose limits on public debate and controversy, taming the effects of globalization by embracing its communications technologies wherever the regime can then set the rules. By supplementing direct and indirect ownership with strict administrative measures, Saudi Arabia continues to have the region’s most controlled media, which are overseen by a censorship committee, comprising representatives from various government ministries, that monitors all local and foreign publications (Yamani 2010).

A global study conducted on social media manipulation concluded that it is prevalent on every societal level in Saudi Arabia from the government to the everyday citizen. In terms of content, social media manipulation usually aims to improve the number of pro-government comments. This activity is conducted by so-called “cyber troop” teams who apply multiple tools and strategies (Bradshaw and Howard 2018). Besides the ability to limit cyberspace and censor material, another tool at the state’s disposal might be the reorientation of public opinion on previously stigmatized issues. One example is the public opinion of Western penetration into the country’s domestic affairs, which was already hotly debated during the British dominance on the Peninsula and after the Kuwait war. While relations with the United Kingdom and the United States have always been the subjects of debate, debating the Saudi–Israeli relationship has long been anathema within both elite and public circles, due to the prioritization of the Palestinian state over other issues. However, the most recent developments show that Israel’s public image in the Gulf is gradually improving, at the same time that the perception of Iran as a threat is growing. Many experts have pointed out that for most of the Sunni Arab regimes Iran poses an immediate threat, while it is already considered anachronistic to speak of a Palestinian state. A short study conducted by an Israel-based online medium pointed out that “Saudi intellectuals, journalists, and writers have increasingly expressed open support for Israel, approving of its policy towards Iran and even calling to normalize relations and make peace with it. This, they say, could put a stop to Iran’s hostile policies, since the perpetuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict serves Iran’s expansionist ambitions. In some cases, these Saudi intellectuals and journalists have also expressed support for Israel in matters pertaining to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict …” (Harel 2018a). While these assumptions might be both exaggerations and the biased opinions of people in favor of an Israeli–Saudi rapprochement, they at least show that the question of normalization of relations between the two countries has become the subject of public debate. The most recent polls conducted in Saudi Arabia on the Palestinian– Israeli settlement concluded that Saudis are divided on the question of whether an alliance should be made between Arab countries and Israel. While almost half of the respondents agreed that if Israel was to end its occupation of Palestinian territories, an alliance would be desirable, half of the respondents ruled out any cooperation with Israel (Zogby et al. 2017). Ultimately, the Saudi government will have a real impact on which direction is more desirable for the country, and, as we can see, it has tools at its disposal to lead the public discourse on the issue. In spite of the division of Saudi citizens on the question of Saudi–Israeli relations, the growing

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perception of the Iranian threat seems to have united Saudi public voices in their anti-Iran and pro-Israel stance. There are a few frequent questions that permeate social media: should Saudi Arabia support Israel or Iran in the event of an Iranian attack on Israel? Should Saudi Arabia make peace with Israel to the detriment of the Palestinian peace process? Should the culture of hatred towards Jews be rooted out of public discourse? Many progressive commentators seem to agree that Saudi Arabia should defend Israel and attack Iran in the event of a military conflict, as Iran is the real military threat. They argue that while Israel only occupies one part of a small Arab state, Iran de facto rules over Damascus, Baghdad, Sanaa, and Beirut. Furthermore, they argue that the Palestinian peace process is a failed project and they should not focus on it while Tehran continues to occupy their territories (Harel 2018b). As for the cultural biases towards Israel, some commentators argue that these should be rooted out from Arab culture and that Saudi Arabia should make unconditional peace with Israel (Harel 2018c). These trends clearly indicate that the subject of Arab–Israeli relations has pivoted from the Palestinian state’s framework towards a geopolitical perspective. It could be argued that religious politics will also have an influence on Saudi– Israeli rapprochement and other reform-related issues. However, it should be noted that state–religious elite relations have been successfully reshuffled as part of the power redistributive policies of the King and the Crown Prince. In the past, economic and social reforms and foreign relations have been the subjects of internal debate between the royal family and members of the religious establishment. This was the case at the time of King Abdullah; however, Muhammad bin Salman has clearly expressed that Saudi religious figures must either follow the reform-minded thinking of the government or they will be punished or isolated. As several examples show, even the most conservative members of the religious establishment can be co-opted (Saab 2017). The Saudi religious landscape is very fragmented: many different groups might be identified. Some of these are apolitical, while others pose a threat to the Saudi royal family. The Saudi support of the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the military takeover of the Morsi government was a divisive issue, on which some Islamists remained quiet while the Muslim Brotherhood–related elements raised their voices. However, issues related to Iran’s hegemonic potential have had a unifying factor. The airstrikes against the Houthis were almost unanimously supported, even by people who had previously been very critical of the ruling family and its handling of the Arab uprisings. Salman al-Awdah, the jailed Muslim Brotherhood–related sahwi scholar, provided his full support for the government’s Yemen incursion. He even gave a religious justification for the killing of the Houthis and reiterated the government’s narrative that Iran was taking over Arab lands and needed to be punished, which made the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen legitimate (Matthiesen 2015b). Muhammad alArifi, another very prominent Saudi cleric with millions of followers on Twitter, also endorsed the campaign: “He sent a message to the Yemenis fighting with the Houthis that they should abandon them in order not to be used by the ‘Safawid’ state” (Matthiesen 2015b: 8). As demonstrated by recent governmental practices, the Saudi rulers apply zero tolerance towards members of the religious opposition, as well as

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towards members of the official religious establishment such as prominent preachers of the two holy mosques in Makkah and Madina. Therefore, anti-Iran sentiments and related issues (such as the Qatar blockade) seem to become the only admissible topics of religious public debate. Under the previous generations of Saudi rulers, clerical figures had a huge impact on the state’s public and foreign policies. However, most recently, their power had become extremely limited, mainly to offering supportive commentary on state policies already executed. As the Iranian government appears to maintain its regional ambitions and the Saudi government capitalizes on this and uses anti-Iran sentiments for its nationbuilding project, the domestic Shia population of Saudi Arabia is becoming further victimized by the state. Although many Shiites interviewed by researchers said they wanted to be accepted, integrated, and trusted by their Sunni peers and leaders, rather than castigated as religious heretics and accused of being a fifth column for Shiitemajority Iran, Shiite dissent in the Eastern Province of the kingdom provoked the Saudi government to accuse some Shiite youths of “working according to a foreign agenda,” an allusion to Iran (Murphy 2013) that led to the collective victimization of the Shiites. Sunni co-citizens of the Saudi Shiites are sometimes suspicious of their real intentions. Reportedly, the idea that Shiites are more loyal to Iran than to their homeland is common among Sunni youths: “I have Shia friends; they are good people. But I hate them when I feel they are more loyal to Iran than to my country,” one of them explained (Murphy 2013). As many Saudi Shiites have at least a spiritual attachment to Iran, which is presented as an untrustworthy aggressor, Saudi Shiites remain the main reason for the ontological insecurity perceptions of the Saudi Sunnis.

Conclusion: The Effects of Regional Dynamics on Domestic Developments—Permanent Transformation? Since the Arab uprisings of the previous decade, it has become common sense to claim that future developments are unpredictable in either the regional or domestic political settings. However, the number and intensity of regional developments point in the direction of the Saudi state and society becoming the subjects of a permanent transformation during and after King Salman’s regime. The presence of the United States in the region, which has been a guarantee of stability for decades, is no longer to be taken for granted. The Palestinian peace process has reached a deadlock and remains a burden for both the United States and the Arab states. There has been unprecedented public debate on the options for an Arab–Israeli rapprochement and recognition of the state of Israel, which has been anathema for decades. The number of unstable states and regimes has grown since 2010, and these countries had been penetrated by Iranian soft and hard capacities. From a Saudi perspective, the Middle East has become a hostile environment. The Saudi public and political discourse has been permeated by anti-Shia sentiments and an anti-Iran narrative was established as early as at the foundation of the modern state. However, there has always been

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a discrepancy in the level of animosity between the rhetoric on the Shia, on Iran, and concrete bilateral relations. The Shia of Saudi Arabia have always had a pariah status in Saudi internal politics, which has affected Saudi–Iranian relations, although not to a degree that hindered the normalization of bilateral relations. The fall of Saddam Hussein, the Assad regime’s loss of power, and the Yemeni civil war had a cumulatively disruptive effect on the regional status quo. As Iran was able to penetrate all of these domains, the Salmans felt compelled to challenge Iran’s aspirations. Subsequently, or as a result of King Salman and Muhammad bin Salman’s aspirations, the Saudi regime had to make adjustments in its domestic settings in order to create a safe environment for their mission against Iran. The forced transformation of elite relations and the state’s control over the public debate have eliminated both the actors and the issues that might create confusion over and threaten the regime’s agenda. As a result, the anti-Shia and anti-Iran rhetoric became the dominant features of public debate. In fact, the Saudi elite and the public have never been so consensual on any issue as they have become during King Salman’s era with regards to the Iranian threat. The lack of American control over regional politics, Iran’s ever more assertive regional projects, and a monolithic Saudi elite which is consensual on the importance of tackling the Iranian threat, might create a dangerous combination. The escalation of the region’s conflicts, at this moment, seems to be inevitable.

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Chapter 10

The GCC, Iraq, and Iran: Perception of Threats Before and After the Crisis Shaikha Majed Al-Moslemani

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have long perceived Iran and Iraq as major threats to their stability and security. Especially in the late 1970s, but also since the 1990s, the behavior of these two countries has led to a breach of trust which caused concern across the region and compelled the Gulf States to deepen an existing alliance with the United States (an extra-regional power) in order to obtain protection. Iraq was the primary aggressor in two regional wars: it began by attacking Iran in 1980, and then invaded Kuwait in 1990. However, Iraq came to be regarded as a primary source of danger only belatedly, since the region had hitherto been preoccupied with the threat posed by the revolutionary Iranian state. The deposing of Saddam Hussain by the United States in 2003 changed the balance of threat in the region. Henceforth, Iraq was hardly seen as a threat at all, whereas Iran once more aroused regional concerns. An Arab–Gulf coalition was formed to fight the Houthi rebels and their ally Iran in Yemen, while the involvement of the GCC in Syria, particularly through Saudi Arabia’s role, intersected with Iran’s involvement in the same theater. These regional threats affected the stability of the Gulf region. The two threats, Iran and Iraq, occupy strategic locations, making them enemies for the long term. Therefore, the GCC states are obliged to seek solutions that enable them to deter and contain the threats themselves, rather than depending on external powers for protection. In recent times, however, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have shown themselves to be incapable of dealing with and facing down the Iranian threat in the region. Yet these issues must be solved soon to avoid future unforeseen consequences, because once the danger reaches a peak it will not be easy to cope with. It is important to understand the sources of the GCC states’ enduring alliance with the United States, as well as the nature of political relations between the three regional axes, Iraq, Iran, and the GCC. This chapter attempts to provide an answer S. M. Al-Moslemani (B) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_10

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to the following questions: how have GCC states perceived Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and how have they perceived Iraq since its invasion of Kuwait in 1990? What sorts of threats do GCC states perceive in Iran and Iraq? And how has the Gulf crisis affected the perception of threat in the region? The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section provides historical background, covering Iran’s occupation of the three Emirati islands and its consequences for GCC stability; the wider danger facing the Gulf during the Iraq–Iran war; Iraq’s threat to Kuwait in 1990; Iran–GCC relations; and the second Gulf War (2003). The second section looks at Iran’s intervention in the case of the Arab Spring, in particular the Bahrain Uprising in 2011 and the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia that ensued. The third section elaborates the perception of threats after the Gulf crisis.

Historical Background Iran, the UAE, and the Case of the Three Islands Ever since the British mandate was established over the Gulf, Iran has claimed title and sovereignty over the islands of Abu-Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Its location overlooking the Strait of Hurmuz (Muˆgtahidz¯ada 1999) permits an occupant of Abu-Musa to control and manage the passage of oil tankers, in addition to imposing limitations on exports and imports. Britain, however, handed them to Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaima. According to the Shah of Iran, “the islands were originally Iranian; nevertheless Britain intervened over our sovereignty and managed to steal the islands. Then it offered them to Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaima which are under its protection” (Al-Nahyan 2014). A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Sharjah and Iran in 1971, which clarified the rights of both states concerning the disputed islands. The agreement consisted of several articles, including that Iran had the right to occupy the north side of Abu-Musa, and had the right to raise its flag over the Iranian military headquarters, while the rest of the island was to be governed by the emirate of Sharjah (Muˆgtahidz¯ada 1999). The ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Khalid Al-Qasimi, approved the terms but claimed he had been threatened by Iran and therefore had been compelled to accept the division of the island. However, Iran claimed that Al-Qasimi accepted the agreement voluntarily without coercion or pressure (Jalinusi and Arayee 2007). From the beginning of the occupation, Iran sought to transform the islands into a small military base in the Gulf. Iran’s occupation of the islands therefore posed a threat to the United Arab Emirates, a much weaker power in comparison to Iran. Even after the declaration of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s military forces continued to arrive in Abu-Musa and Greater Tunb, which during the Iran–Iraq War were used as bases by Iranian naval and armed forces, launching attacks via helicopters and small boats against Gulf oil tankers as well as UAE oil stations. Subsequently, Iran

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established an airstrip to permit an emergency response in case of a sudden external attack, and troops were expanded to 4,000 (Foley 1999). Meanwhile, Iran conducted military maneuvers around the three islands via its air and naval forces (Al-Nahyan 2014). The Iranian military build-up at Abu-Musa was a matter of concern to the UAE (Al-Kaabi and Al-Kaabi 2011), which worked through the GCC to bring the claims of neighboring states against Iran. According to an online article, the UAE and its GCC allies were determined to hold a meeting in 2012 with regard to a visit by Ahmadinejad to Abu-Musa. This visit outraged the UAE, with Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed declaring Ahmadinejad’s visit a violation. Bilaterally, however, the tension with the UAE has another dimension, for in fact the UAE and Iran share commercial ties, being major partners in exports and imports: the total value of goods imported and exported through Dubai to and from Iran in the first nine months of 2011 was estimated at $8.7 billion (Reuters 2012). In occupying the three islands, Iran’s primary aim is to maintain the security of the Strait of Hurmuz, seeking thus to facilitate its exports and to secure oil shipments. Iran recently threatened to close Hurmuz in the face of a standoff with the United States (Johnson 2016), and is capable of initiating attacks against external threats via the islands (Al-Jazeera Centre 2012). In addition, Iran has the capability to plant mines around Hurmuz, maintaining around 200 patrols as well combatants on its coasts ready to begin the laying of mines at any time. In conclusion, despite the UAE initiating several attempts to seek solutions with Iran to stop the conflict, Iran was not eager to participate in negotiations, due to the belief that the islands were originally its own and had been taken unjustifiably by Britain. Iran affirmed its sovereignty over the islands based on its geographical proximity to them, and was willing to wage a war in order to keep them, claiming “the Gulf States should pass a sea of blood if they demanded to return the islands” (New York Times 1992). The unwillingness of Iran to participate in negotiations resulted from its concept of a “Persian Gulf,” since a retreat from the islands would not serve Iran’s geo-political ambitions in the region.

The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) After the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the region faced two internal threats, Iraq and Iran. Iraq, for its part, assumed that the new regime in Iran was a threat to itself and to the Gulf, and initiated a war against Iran in 1980. Various justifications were given for the outbreak of the war: first, there was the dispute over the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway, which President Saddam Hussein believed must remain under his sovereignty: “This Shatt shall again be, as it has been through history, Iraqi and Arab in name and reality” (Ate¸s 2015). Fear of the Iranian Revolution was another key factor. Iraq feared that Iran might launch attacks against Iraq and provoke a revolution. Saddam Hussein, who was also seeking to expand his regional influence, thought that through defeating Iran he

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would increase his status among the Arab leaders, which would enable him to act in a more aggressive manner. Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in order to open the path for the Iraqi Shiites to attain sovereignty over Iraq. The war between the two regional powers destabilized the region’s security. The UAE, therefore, along with the rest of the Gulf States, realized the sole solution to deter the Iranian threat was to side with Iraq, a decision which was in essence forced upon them. The prospect that the Iraqi government should be overthrown was a huge concern for the Gulf, which perceived Iran’s intentions of emerging from the war as the only power in the region. Iran’s political behavior after the Islamic Revolution and during the Iran–Iraq War impelled the Gulf States to accept the United States as a factor for preserving the security of the region (Mansour 2016). Had the political vacuum not been filled by the United States after Britain retreated, the Gulf States would be in a tragic position indeed, due to their inability to protect themselves or to ensure mutual security. The Gulf region thus found itself surrounded by two regional powers, and for two consecutive decades these powers created a regional security gap. During the Iran– Iraq War, due to the rise of the Islamic Republic and Khomeini’s theory of exporting revolution, the GCC considered Iran to be the sole danger. The failure to realize that Iraq was also a threat put the GCC in a difficult situation after the Iran–Iraq War drew to a close.

Iraq’s Threat to Kuwait In the years after the Iran–Iraq War, geographic proximity, aggregate power, and aggressive intentions in addition to offensive capabilities, all contributed to Iraq posing a direct threat to Kuwait and the Gulf. In terms of geography, Kuwait shares a border with Iraq in the north, which facilitated the movement of Iraqi forces in occupying Kuwait. Moreover, Iraq is much greater in size than Kuwait (Janssen 2018), with Kuwait’s small land area permitting the enemy to penetrate easily. The joint borders with Iraq represented an entrance to the Gulf region: with Kuwait as the passageway, Saudi Arabia could be Iraq’s next destination. The intentions of Iraq were to take the Kuwaiti oil and control the OPEC quotas. After the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq’s production of oil had dropped to less than 1 million barrels per day (Clayton 2015); Saddam Hussein’s goal now was to expand production, but this could not be achieved without taking Kuwait’s quotas of 20%, since Iraq was incapable of investing either domestically or externally (Mabro 1994). By seizing Kuwait’s OPEC quota, Iraq would obtain dominance in oil production. The economic concern with oil was not the only factor; there was also a political motive associated with the Kuwaiti regime. Saddam Hussein sought to fulfill his goal of being the leader of the Arabs; and to achieve this objective it was important that the regime of Al-Subah be overthrown. According to the Iraqi foreign minister Tarek Aziz, the intention behind invading Kuwait was to provoke a military coup

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against the royal family and replace the regime (Musallem 1995). By overthrowing the Kuwaiti regime, Iraq had two intentions. First, the fall of Kuwait would entail the fall of the entire Gulf region: the fragile GCC states would give way in the face of Iraq, allowing Saddam Hussein to consolidate his authority in the region. Second, the concept of Arab regional power—the idea of being “the guardian of the Gulf”— had a significant influence on the evolution of Iraq’s hostile decisions. Iraq believed that Kuwait must be protected against Iran, because Kuwait’s population contains a large number of Shiites which Iran might take advantage of to export its revolution (Hassan 1999). Taking its offensive capabilities into consideration, Iraq was vastly superior. The Iraqi army was the strongest army in the region and ranked in fourth place globally (Cordesman 1994). The Iraqi army successfully managed to impose a full occupation of Kuwait within two days, yet in spite of the size and the strength of Iraq’s military forces, they were subsequently incapable of resisting the forces of the international coalition. Pardew (1991) argues that Iraq miscalculated the ability of the US-led coalition, which led to it misperceiving the weakness of its own military. Iraq’s attitude was determined by its assumption that the coalition would be fragile, and that its own small, well-equipped military was advanced enough to overcome the coalition forces. As a result, Saddam Hussein became convinced that the United States would not intervene in the region. Yet although his Republican Guards were adequate for securing Saddam Hussein’s authority within Iraq, they were unable to defend the country from the weight of the US coalition (Pardew 1991). To sum up, Iraq’s military forces failed to defend its occupation of Kuwait. Recapturing Kuwait as Iraq’s 19th province would have been Saddam Hussein’s road to Arab hegemony, but this was not to be.

Iran–GCC Relations During the Iraq invasion, Iran sided with Kuwait and supported UN sanctions against Iraq, demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops. Based on this, Iran–GCC relations entered a new positive phase after the liberation of Kuwait. To boost Iran’s political image with the non-allied Gulf States, Hashemi Rafsanjani articulated three major factors in Iran’s new policy towards the Gulf States. Foremost, Iran’s intention was not to implement changes regarding the political map of the region; rather it sought to sustain the present geography. Further, Iran identified the US presence in the region as a source of balance of power. And, finally, Iran endeavored to restore its relations with the Gulf countries, in particular with Saudi Arabia as the leading regional country (Askari 2013). Iran’s main priority, therefore, was to maintain stable relations with Saudi Arabia; an Iranian newspaper described Rafsanjani’s visit to Saudi in 1998 as intending to establish a joint commission. Economically, the states agreed to settle the price of oil after this had declined to $12 per barrel, and concerning OPEC they increased the quota of 10% (Tehran Times

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1998). Saudi Arabia also guaranteed Rafsanjani that the presence of US bases in its territory did not constitute a threat to Iran’s security. The theory of exporting the revolution was sidelined during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami, as both focused on improving ties with the GCC. With Khatami calling for establishing mutual confidence and avoiding hostility, Saudi Arabia announced at the UN General Assembly in 1998 that Iran was not a threat to the region, but was a positive influence in promoting peace and preventing regional instability (Keynoush 2016). Yet regardless of these improved Iran–GCC relations, Iran still expressed its reservations on the issue of the UAE islands. Although it rejected negotiations, it attempted to form an agreement with the UAE. A declaration by Iran published in 1999 stated that the UAE islands did not constitute a matter of concern in UAE–Iran relations because neither side desired to ruin their relations (Keynoush 2016). Nor were the islands a concern for Saudi Arabia, which had no desire to compromise its reconciliation with Iran, seeing this as a turning point that was in the interests of both states. Thus, Saudi Arabia warned the UAE not to antagonize Iran and encouraged it to accept the Iranian claims. Saudi Arabia and Iran thus both emerged as major powers in the region, and thus their actions are key factors in strengthening regional stability or igniting conflict. Yet in fact each state seeks to occupy the role of sole regional hegemon. In the two regional wars between 1980 and 1990, Saudi Arabia had failed to play the role of a hegemon. The fear of the Iranian Revolution and Saddam Hussein’s aggressive behavior had led Saudi Arabia to abandon the desire for hegemony and instead take steps to secure its national security. Yet despite restoring relations, Saudi and Iranian interests contradict each other. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran had sought to impose its power on the Gulf region and the Arab world, and this implied that Saudi Arabia should fall under the Iranian hegemony. Hence, Riyadh fundamentally believed Iran was engaged in a project of domination and transformation of the region, which could result in the Shiite government of Iran being extended over the holy places of Makkah and Madina. Since the majority of the GCC populations are Sunni, and regardless of the brief period of cordial and stable Iran–GCC relations, matters worsened after Mahmood Ahmadinejad won the elections in 2003 (Al-Dulaimi et al. 2017). And after the definitive arrival of the United States in the region, the role of Saudi Arabia was boosted.

Second Gulf War (2003) The US invasion of Iraq, or the “Second Gulf War,” which took place in 2003 under the banner of the “War on Terrorism,” was the reason for the escalating tensions in Iraq and in the Gulf. The allegations by the United States against Iraq regarding the possession of weapons of mass destruction and links with Al-Qaeda were deemed adequate reasons to overthrow the regime and establish a new government which would serve US interests. However, the failure of the United States to form such a

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government opened the gate for Iran to penetrate Iraq’s domestic affairs, and Iran’s behavior in Iraq henceforth increased the GCC states’ threat perceptions. The 2003 US invasion was a golden opportunity for Iran to ensure that Iraq would not pose a threat to it either now or in the long term. Arguably, then, Iran supported the US invasion precisely in order to limit Iraq’s threat to itself. Iran subsequently established political ties with its Iraqi Shiite allies, of which the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), founded in 1982 in Tehran, is the major ally of Iran; its Badr militia organization received training from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and fought alongside Iran in 1980–88. The GCC perceived the Shiites and their influence in Iraq’s politics as a threat. The perception that the Shiites were a source of danger had increased after 2003 when the Shiites became an ally to the United States (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2011). This created fear among the GCC states because the shift of the US perspective on the Shiites threatened to lead to an empowerment of their role in Baghdad and in the Gulf States. There was an escalation of sectarianism when Iraq was transformed into a Shiite-governed state, since this awakened the sectarian sense of the Shiite communities in the GCC states, especially given that the Shiites in the GCC face government restrictions and are not permitted to occupy sensitive political positions. Iran did indeed hope to enhance the role of Shiites through encouraging them to overthrow their regimes. Thus Iraq’s border with Kuwait entailed that the region now faced two threats. In case of an outbreak of war, Kuwait and the GCC would now also be obliged to engage in a civil war to secure Sunni supremacy. At the same time, religious influence in Iraq is a matter of concern as several Iraqi Shiite cities have become places of worship and now, instead of Makkah, promote the values of Karbala, Najaf, and Samarra.

Iran and the Arab Spring After the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the policies of the United States, the GCC’s “guardian,” were concentrated on assuring the Gulf States of the continuation of US support so as to deter the Iranian threat in the region (Nasur 2016). However, Saudi Arabia, as the leader of the GCC, was determined to control the situation alone. Iranian–Saudi relations worsened after the arrival of the new regime in Iran. Since Saudi Arabia and Bahrain host large Shiite populations, tension escalated due to the apparent Iranian intent to replace the GCC monarchic regimes with government according to Velayat-e Faqih, that is, the central role of clerics in politics. The Iranian– Saudi dispute since 2003 has been punctuated by two key moments: specifically, the Shiite uprising in Bahrain in 2011, and the execution of the Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Al-Nimr. Being the smallest state in the Gulf, and with a population which is approximately 63% Shiite (Zweiri 2013), Bahrain has always been affected by Saudi–Iranian hostility. From Iran’s perspective, Bahrain is a part of Iran, and the Shiites in Bahrain would be glad if the state was annexed. Similar to Tunisia, Egypt, and other Arab

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states, Bahrain was influenced by the so-called Arab Spring. On 14 February 2011 an uprising took place in Bahrain entitled the “Day of Rage,” led by the Shiite majority (Gengler 2016). The revolt was driven by youth protests requesting immediate reform in Bahrain, but the principal opposition groups were divided between the Al-Wefaq Shiite organization and the Al-Haq movement. The youth protestors called for the toppling of the Al-Khalifa regime in order to implement a new political system which would improve Shiite status both politically and socially. However, Al-Wefaq demanded constitutional reform, and instead proposed a conception of Bahrain’s political future based on the “Manama document,” which emphasized giving the Shiites the right to participate in politics (Kinninmont 2012). The Saudi Shiites backed the Bahraini Shiites, claiming that the Shiite nation should not be separated from the Sunnis and so demanding equal rights (Gerges 2016). Saudi Arabia, however, perceived the Bahrain incidents as a sectarian revolution sponsored by Iran (Butler 2011). The assumption resulted from a belief that the Shiites were devoted to Iran and not to their own countries, whereas in fact the Shiites in Bahrain follow Al-Sistani in Najaf (Mishal and Goldberg 2015) rather than endorsing the Velayat-e Faqih. To impose order in Bahrain, and to safeguard the Al-Khalifa ruling family with whom Saudi Arabia shares close relations, military forces were deployed upon the request of Bahrain from the Peninsula Shield Force (Ersoy 2013). The leadership in Bahrain had conceived Iran as a threat even before the Islamic Revolution, due to Iran’s longstanding claims that Bahrain belonged to it (Belfer 2014). The Bahraini regime also blamed Iran for the 1981 coup in Bahrain, and accused the Islamic Front of Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) of attempting to overthrow the government with the support of Iran (Ivanhoe 2012). In addition, sectarianism was a factor that created instability for both states, in particular Saudi Arabia, since the kingdom was concerned in case Shiite political unrest in Bahrain would encourage its own Shiite minority to pursue similar actions against the Al-Saud regime. In contrast to Bahrain, the authorities in Saudi Arabia impose restrictions over their Shiites, forbidding the establishment of Shiite mosques and banning the celebration of their feasts in public; whereas in Bahrain, the Shiites enjoy full rights to perform their religious obligations. The expansion of Iran’s influence in the region was also a major concern, with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia suspecting Iran of backing the uprising, and charging Iran with intervening in the domestic affairs of other states. And it was certainly true that Iranian representatives, media channels, officials, and clerics expressed sympathy with the people in Bahrain; and Tehran viewed this uprising as having major significance for Iran, since it concerned the “oppressed Shiites” (Kinninmont 2012). Yet Iran was in fact cautious in dealing with the issue, despite accusing Saudi Arabia of murdering Shiite protestors. The Iranian government sent two ships to Bahrain to support the dissident Shiites, yet these then turned back on Tehran’s orders. Thus, Iran’s behavior led the Shiites to question the degree of trust they could place in Iran, and to wonder whether Iran would indeed provide support in the event of a confrontation with their governments. The Saudi–Iranian insecurity dilemma thus increased the rivalry between the two states.

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In addition to the issue of external threats, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are concerned for their internal security, and this plays an important role in the states’ foreign policy. This was starkly illustrated by the case of Nimr Al-Nimr, a Saudi Shiite cleric who became a well-known political and religious activist. The Saudi authorities executed Al-Nimr in January 2016, based on several charges, the main one being linked to Saudi fears of potential attempts to foment Shiite unrest in the Eastern province. Al-Nimr was known for being against the regime of Al-Saud, and also characterized himself as an ally of Iran. The Saudi cleric declared his full support for the idea that Iran should intervene in Saudi Arabia to safeguard the Shiites therein. From a Shiite perspective, Al-Nimr was a savior from persecution (Fisher 2016) and a Shiite voice that represented their interests.

Iran and Its Political Intervention in Syria Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Iran and Saudi Arabia have positioned themselves deep in the Syrian crisis. The Arab Spring and the weaknesses it revealed for several states, including Syria, encouraged Iran to penetrate the region’s affairs. Iran’s military intervention in Syria was a consequence of a bilateral military agreement that both states had signed in the early 1980s (Zweiri 2016), and now Iran intervened very effectively via proxies such as Hezbollah and militia groups in Syria, so as to provide support for the continuation of Assad’s regime. The alliance between Assad and Iran caused concerns for Saudi Arabia, which in turn sought to support the Syrian rebels against the Syrian government: the Jaysh al-Islam militia is one of the rebel groups funded by Saudi Arabia. Further examples of Saudi interventions in Syria have been mentioned in recent interviews by Qatar’s former prime minister, Sheik Hamad bin Jassim, who confirmed that Saudi Arabia asked Qatar to intervene to support the Syrian rebellion against the Assad regime (Hamad bin Jassim 2017). Another manner in which Saudi Arabia has sought to back the rebels is through the sponsoring of international conferences, entitled “Friends of Syria,” in Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco. The aim of these initiatives is to strengthen the role of the rebels and to obscure their weakness in the face of Iran and Hezbollah. Omer Kosh, a Syrian researcher, argued that the events in the Arab region have thus increased the degree of confrontation and rivalry between Saudi Arabia and its opponent Iran. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve its domestic stability and block Iran from destabilizing the Gulf, whereas Iran is concerned about its political status and ongoing influence in the Levant and Arab regions following the fall of Assad (Kosh 2013).

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Iran’s Involvement in Yemen: The Closer the Threat, the More Direct It Becomes Regional security from the GCC’s perspective is concentrated on Iran (Mansour 2016). The Houthis in Yemen had not been a threat to Saudi Arabia, despite having clashed with the Saudis in 2009 after attacking the kingdom’s borders. This changed, however, after the Houthis entered into an alliance with Iran, which led to a deepening of Iran’s influence in Yemen. Iran’s support for the Houthis thus influenced Saudi Arabia to declare war in order to prevent the expansion of the Houthis in the region. At the same time, Saudi Arabia instigated deep political reforms: the Saudi war in Yemen was in fact directed at Iran, and at root was a contest over which state would exercise hegemony in Yemen. The intensity of the Iran–Saudi rivalry prompted other Arab and GCC states to take sides in the proxy war in Yemen. The creation of a coalition entitled “Decisive Storm” led by Saudi Arabia in 25 March 2015, in which all the GCC states were involved with the exception of Oman, was intended to contain Iran’s potential expansion in the region. To this end, the Saudis deployed numerous military forces, in the region of 150,000 combatants and 100 fighter jets (Dolgove 2015), to fight the Houthi rebels. Yet the coalition was unsuccessful, and the Houthis successfully expanded their control in Yemen (Popp 2015); hence, the GCC began to provide the Yemeni resistance with military training to prepare them to take part in the war against the Houthis (Schmitz 2017). However, the Saudi effort was again insufficient to prevent the expansion of the Houthis, who again furthered their control over the territory. The Yemeni crisis illustrates the success of Iran in backing the Houthis and preventing the local resistance forces from establishing a new government. The Iran–Saudi proxy certainly has a religious aspect; yet this is overshadowed by the political factor. Both states have key political ambitions in engaging in this war (Cote 2017): dominating a state close to its rival would give Iran a key strategic position in the Gulf region. Yemen is a vital strategic interest for both sides, due to the shared borders with Saudi Arabia. Similar to the situation in Syria, for Iran Yemen is the key to extending its influence in the Gulf, and the Houthi rebels are being used by Iran as a tool to promote its regional hegemony. For Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, the strategic aim is to expand its influence: it assumed that its coalition would facilitate the defeat of the Houthis, and that therefore Yemen would fall under its control. In addition, by working through a coalition, Saudi Arabia is also taking advantage of the GCC states to extend its hegemonic role through their participation in the Yemen theater. It seems that not all the GCC states which joined the coalition did so willingly: in an online article published by Sputnik news, the former minister of foreign affairs Khalid Al-Atia declared that Qatar had in fact been forced to join the coalition. The Middle East analyst Sigurd Neubauer argued that the GCC states had overstated the role of Iran in Yemen and misjudged its level of support for the Houthis. He advised the regional states to desist from exaggerating the threat and instead seek solutions to prevent Yemen from becoming a geopolitical battleground between Iran

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and Saudi (Neubauer 2015). Yet Iran’s intervention via its Houthi proxy, even if indirect, provides an opportunity for Iran to secure a new ally in the Gulf region and so further its goal of hegemony. This threatens to set the region on fire, because it will give Iran an opportunity to implement its concept of extending the revolution to the GCC through encouraging the Shiite populations to seek liberation. Perceiving this threat, Saudi Arabia thus took the decision to get involved in Yemen’s internal affairs, aiming to restore the government of the Yemeni president Abed Rabbou Mansour Hadi.

The Qatar Blockade: Changes in Perception Qatar’s relations with Iran are rather different from those of its GCC neighbors. They could be categorized as a combination of Balancing and Bandwagoning, or in other words are a form of “hedging” (Kamrava 2017). Hedging behavior involves a state simultaneously maintaining two mechanisms with another state, one being a mechanism for opening channels of dialogue, and the other a mechanism for countering that state’s power. Such a stance is often adopted by small states in order to maintain relations with all actors within its region; such states typically desire to avoid making enemies. According to Kamrava (2017), Qatar adapted this strategy in order to maintain positive relations with the countries of the Middle East. On 5 June 2017, notably in the holy month of Ramadan, three GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, as well as Egypt, imposed a blockade on Qatar. This was not simply a diplomatic or verbal act: rather, it took the form of a blockade by air, land, and sea. The incident occurred shortly after the Qatar News Agency (QNA) was hacked and broadcast statements attributed to HH the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani. After later investigation by the CIA, UAE government agencies were subsequently accused of hacking QNA, and evidence to this effect was provided after the revelation of discussions by UAE officials concerning the plan to make the hack. Qatar was consequently accused of supporting and financing terrorism, as well of having unduly close relations with Iran. This prompted US President Trump to declare that Muslim leaders must break off relations with Iran (Walsh 2017). For several days, Qatar suffered significant food shortages due to the blocking of essential imports. In response to this unexpected act, and contrary to the desires expressed by President Trump, Qatar reinforced its political and economic relations with Iran. As regards to politics, Iran–Qatar relations had been somewhat muted. Nevertheless, the relations strengthened after the blockade, and evolved to the level of friendship. Following the blockade, Qatar proclaimed the resumption of its diplomatic mission in Tehran, led by its ambassador Mohammed Al-Hajri. Qatar stated that the withdrawal of its ambassador from Tehran had been an expression of support for Saudi Arabia after the violence against the Saudi embassy in Iran, in retaliation for the execution of Al-Nimr. Qatar’s declaration now affirmed that it had no dispute

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with Iran, as well as indicating that it had the capacity to move forward without its Gulf allies. Iran called upon the boycotting countries to find an immediate solution to end the tension and prevent any escalation. From the Iranian perspective, the pressure placed on Qatar is against international law and totally unacceptable. According to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Qatar and the boycotting countries must get around the table to negotiate a solution for their differences, as continuing conflict is not in the region’s interests. Such support for Qatar might raise questions about Iran’s hidden intentions. Does Iran have a particular objective that it seeks to achieve through aiding Qatar? Or does Iran see this as an opportunity to boost its image in the region? The Qatar–GCC crisis has clear implications concerning regional security, and the 13 demands issued against Qatar by the blockading countries have significant implications for the stability of the council. Bahrain called for a suspension of Qatar’s membership of the GCC if it did not accept the demands; Qatar’s response, however, was to declare that no states have the right to make demands of another which amount to patent interference with its internal affairs. Qatar thus started to perceive the three blockading countries as a threat to its national security, rather than as allies (AlTamimi 2017), and subsequently strengthened its military ties with Turkey. Moreover, the crisis led to a weakening of the effectiveness of the GCC as a mutual defense body, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia announcing the establishment of a joint political and military alliance separate from the other GCC members (Wintour 2017). Since the Council was established for mutual defense to deter common threats, the existence of this new alliance threatens the security of the rest of the GCC. Further, the crisis led to internal division within the Gulf. The Gulf now is split between Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman on the one side, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain on the other. This division threatens regional peace. Before the crisis, the GCC was one single body facing external threats in unison; now the region is threatened by both domestic and external disputes. All of this is of clear benefit to Iran, which might more easily expand its leverage while the region is occupied with its internal conflicts. In addition, this would decrease Saudi Arabia’s role and weaken its efforts at confronting the Iranian influence. Thus, several GCC states, e.g., Kuwait, have cautiously begun to open links with Iran in anticipation of future political developments (Al-Tamimi 2017). Saudi Arabia’s action against Qatar could be seen as a means to secure its regional ambitions. Since emerging as the leader of the GCC, Saudi Arabia has desired to further expand its regional hegemony. Pressuring Qatar to accept its demands is an intimidation tactic designed to scare the rest of the GCC into following the Saudi lead; while Qatar’s rejection of the demands could lead Saudi Arabia to withdraw Qatar’s membership of the GCC, the Arab League, and the Arab-Islamic Alliance (Al-Tamimi 2017). However, Saudi Arabia’s actions may in the end prove to have weakened its hegemony, in particular in view of Qatar’s determination to maintain its independent political position, which has in fact strengthened its role both regionally and globally. In the sequel, a new Qatari–Turkish–Iranian alliance became established in the Gulf. Although Turkish forces had been present on Qatari territory before the crisis,

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ostensibly as a means to improve bilateral relations, the true role of the Turkish base did not become clear until the blockade. According to the Turkish newspaper Ahval, a new military base was to be established in Qatar as a way of asserting military cooperation which in the meantime would also help to enhance political cooperation. In addition, Qatar and Turkey signed several deals to purchase Turkish military equipment estimated to cost US$800 million. For their part, the blockading countries are dead set against Qatari–Turkish cooperation, and accuse Turkey of sponsoring the Muslim Brotherhood—an accusation, incidentally, that was also levelled against Qatar in the list of 13 demands. In the final analysis, the blockade of Qatar seems to emerge as a misstep by the blockading states. Qatar seems to have been the winner in this game, with its position internationally recognized as the strongest and most legitimate. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE sought to oblige Qatar to accept their 13 demands as a condition to end the blockade, regardless of the lack of any evidence to justify their accusations. Moreover, the blockade has proved Qatar’s ability to face regional challenges on its own, while the new alliances with Turkey and Iran confirm that Qatar is willing to establish new relations with states within or outside the region.

Conclusion As this chapter has documented, the GCC states have seen both Iran and Iraq as threats to regional stability. Thus the nature and the sources of the threats surrounding the Gulf region have never been stable, but rather have shifted throughout history based on the vicissitudes of the political environment. The GCC states took a miscalculated decision to strike an alliance with Iraq during the Iraq–Iran war, which had serious consequences for them in 1990. Meanwhile, Iran’s political behavior has been characterized by animosity with the Gulf States. Since the advent of the United States as an external power in the Gulf, it has played a major role in preserving regional security, whereas Iran was excluded from the paradigm of regional security and accused of destabilizing the Gulf States, especially in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini’s denunciations of the GCC monarchs. Geographical factors have been key to relations between Iran, Iraq, and the GCC. The three Gulf wars—the Iraq–Iran war in 1980–88, the Kuwait invasion in 1990, and the US invasion in 2003—in addition to the Arab Spring, engendered concerns that the geographical map would be transformed due to Iran’s rising hegemony in the Arab world. This resulted in rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with both states desiring hegemony and seeking to extend their influence over states that are experiencing internal strife, e.g., Yemen and Syria. Meanwhile, without the anti-Iran alliance (that is to say, the GCC and the United States), the Gulf would not be able to safeguard itself nor mount a defense against Iran. This alliance is therefore a vital factor in the survival of the Gulf region, with the presence of the US bases prohibiting Iran from interfering directly in the GCC states.

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Saudi Arabia and the small weak states that comprise its coalition are incapable of achieving victory over the Houthis in Yemen. The reason for this pertains mainly to their lack of military experience: although the kingdom recently invested heavily in arms and weapons purchased from the United States, these purchases have not been expressed in any positive results because Iran remains superior on the battlefield, and made considerable gains against the Arab coalition through its proxy involvement in the Arab Spring. Not all the Gulf Cooperation Council states, moreover, agree that Iran is the main threat to the region. Oman, for instance, maintained its neutrality even while the other GCC states sided against Iran in the war of 1980. Nor did Oman participate in the coalition initiated by Saudi Arabia against Iran’s proxy in Yemen. And more recently Qatar has followed the exact same path. After the political and economic blockade launched against Qatar by Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in June 2017, Qatar sought to strengthen its political relations with Iran. From the point of view of its neighbors, however, this indicated that Qatar accepted Iranian influence in the Gulf. Taking all the above into account, despite the GCC being nominally a single organization, few of its members share the same positions. Qatar no longer trusts its neighbors, nor does it rely upon them. After the GCC states closed the door on it, Qatar was encouraged to seek alternative allies for support and assistance. Moreover, Qatar might be seeking to secure a new major military alliance as a substitute for America. It is heavily expected that this new ally would be Turkey, as evidenced by the arrival of Turkish military forces in Qatar, in addition to the Turkish political support provided to Qatar during and after the blockade. Turkey appears to be Qatar’s preferred candidate in terms of security. This might lead us to ask whether Iran would in the future agree to form a military alliance with Qatar, given its crucial political and logistical support during the blockade. If this took place, the Gulf would be divided in three: one group comprising Iran, Qatar, and Oman; the second the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain; while Kuwait would maintain its neutrality. Based on the contemporary events, it is clear that the Iran– GCC tension will not be resolved in the near future. The parties are unwilling to sit around the table to seek a mutually beneficial solution, and meanwhile tension and animosity are escalating. What is more, given the historical and geographical facts surveyed in this chapter, even if a solution to the current impasse is reached, the GCC states will always view Iran as a source of suspicion and uncertainty.

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Part III

Developing Strategic Relations and Shifting Political Alliances

Chapter 11

The Qatar–Iran–Turkey Nexus: Shifts in Political Alliances and Economic Diversification in the Gulf Crisis Robert J. Riggs

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981, with six member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) agreeing to form a customs union. This would facilitate greater interstate trade and eliminate tariffs between countries, and allow a stronger economic and social bloc to emerge, which would act as an advocate for the shared interests of these states. Ideally, that customs union was expected to lead to a common military security pact and a mutual currency system, while permitting each member state to retain its unique sovereign identity (Legrenzi 2015). The first decade of the GCC’s journey saw the highest level of interstate trade, which then leveled off in the mid 1990s. Simultaneously, Qatar began to move in a more independent direction after a failed coup to overthrow the Al-Thani ruling family in 1996, which is widely believed to have been supported by Saudi Arabia. Also in 1996, the Al Jazeera satellite news channel was formed with the support of the Qatari royal family. Al Jazeera broadcasts into the homes of millions of Arabic speakers across the Middle East. The effects of Al Jazeera’s messaging, in which the populations of the region were given access to unprecedented levels of information about their governments’ activities as well as tools to criticize their leaderships, have been studied extensively (e.g., Seib 2008). The ripple effects of the breaking of the state monopoly on information produced multiple new understandings about corruption, wealth inequality, and political awareness, and exacerbated pre-existent tensions between Qatar and its fellow GCC member states (Zayani 2005). At the same time, petrochemical reserves, such as oil and natural gas, filled the coffers of the GCC treasuries, allowing for the emergence of new global trade and finance metropolises. In particular, Doha (Qatar) and Dubai (UAE) sprang from the desert to attract investment, and began to reinvest the profits from oil and gas rents into sovereign wealth funds that enabled global investment portfolios of previously R. J. Riggs (B) Geopolitical Risk Analyst, Global Intelligence Insights LLC, Bronx, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_11

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unimagined scope. Large-scale building projects brought millions of migrant workers to the region, predominantly from South Asia, culminating in Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup (Khatib 2013). However, all of this impressive progress came with a price. Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990–91, the GCC has been heavily reliant on the United States for provision of a mutually beneficial security arrangement. The United States leases land for air and naval bases in Qatar and Bahrain, giving it critical strategic positions to protect trade routes crucial to the extraction and export of petrochemicals and to counter Iranian power in the region. The United States has military installations and infrastructures scattered around the Arabian Peninsula, the most important ones being the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia, Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, and Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base. Additionally, the wealth of the GCC states and the accumulated trust they have established with the United States over decades have facilitated massive weapons sales to the GCC. Along with the sale of weapons has come the training of GCC military personnel to use technologically sophisticated equipment (Barakat 2012). What emerged from this confluence of wealth accumulation and defense expenditures was a more robust, even aggressive, engagement of the national armed forces of the GCC member states in regional conflicts. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, the Qatari and UAE air forces in Libya, and the arming of various sides of the Syrian civil war are prime examples of the increasing willingness on the part of GCC governments to use military force as a foreign policy tool (Legrenzi 2015). While the economic growth of the GCC countries has continued, even weathering a recent decline in global oil prices, the terms “cooperation” and “council” have lost relevance as the GCC political and economic unity came to a screeching halt on 5 June 2017 with the Saudi Arabia–UAE–Bahrain–Egypt blockade imposed unilaterally on Qatar. The “shock and awe” strategy has been interpreted as an attempt to precipitate the collapse of the Qatari government, or at least its capitulation to Saudi authority within the GCC. Thirteen demands were presented to Qatar. They included shutting down the Al Jazeera media network, reducing diplomatic relations with Iran, and closing the Turkish military base near Doha. Qatar was also asked to pay reparations for years of alleged damages caused by its policies to the blockading countries (Wintour 2017). Qatar was taken by surprise by the Saudi-led diplomatic offensive and was unprepared for such a major escalation. However, the blockade largely failed to bring down the country and has made Doha much more resilient. Moreover, although it does not appear that the newly militarized GCC states will engage in a protracted military conflict, the new reality resembles a cold war scenario, which two other regional powers—Iran and Turkey—have been more than willing to exploit effectively (Ulrichsen 2014).

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Competition Versus Cooperation in the GCC: Fraught Relationships How have the competing economic and political interests of the contesting parties sparked the conflict within the GCC? Before the blockade was imposed on 5 June 2017, tensions within the GCC had already flared once before. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, claiming that Qatar had not implemented a security pact for “non-interference” in their internal affairs (Black 2014). Doha’s independent foreign policy had irritated both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. However, the lack of sympathy towards their position from the Obama administration prevented both Saudi Arabia and the UAE from taking further actions against Qatar. Doha also opted for reconciliation at that time, with HH the Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani seeking to have a fresh start with his neighbors. Hence, after the Riyadh Agreement was concluded in November 2014, the three GCC countries returned their ambassadors to Doha, and the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain attended the annual GCC summit in the Qatari capital in December 2014 (Aboudi et al. 2014). In fact, when the Saudi-led coalition launched an offensive against the Houthi rebels in Yemen in 2015, Qatar sent troops. In January 2016, Qatar also withdrew its ambassador from Tehran in an act of solidarity with Saudi Arabia, following an attack by angry protesters on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in the aftermath of the execution of Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr by the Saudi authorities. The Qatari government also considered providing financial support for the ailing Bahraini economy. Both the Prime Minister of Bahrain, Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, and the Bahraini Crown Prince, Salman Al-Khalifa, paid separate visits to Doha in February and March 2017, to discuss how Qatar could help in this matter (The Peninsula 2017). However, tensions were still simmering below the surface within the GCC. In November 2015, a group of Qataris, including members of the Al-Thani royal family, entered the Al Muthanna Province of southern Iraq to hunt an exotic bird, and were captured by elements of the Kata’ib Hezbollah Shia militia, which is famously linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (Its leader, General Qasem Soleimani, was killed in a US drone attack in 2020.) This event triggered a crisis in which the Qatari royal family paid a sum that may have been as high as one billion dollars to secure the hostages’ release, which was also conditional on Qatar facilitating an agreement between Iran and Qatar-financed Sunni rebel militias to move the populations of four Syrian towns to either the Idlib province or to areas around Damascus and Latakia (Warrick 2018). The agreement, which was worked out between Iran, Iraq, and Qatar, was finally resolved in March 2017. Qatar’s payments to Shia militias in Iraq angered Saudi Arabia and was one trigger that likely sparked the blockade and diplomatic break between Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Worth 2018). In terms of economic competition, Henni points out that the Gulf gas field, which Qatar calls the North [Dome] Field and Iran calls South Pars, accounts for nearly all of Qatar’s gas production and about 60% of its export revenue. Iran and Qatar hold the world’s second- and third-largest natural gas reserves, respectively,

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behind Russia. Their South Pars/North Field gas field holds an estimated 50.97 trillion cubic meters of in-situ gas and some 50 billion barrels of condensates, according to the International Energy Agency. Qatar joined major international firms to develop the field, becoming the world’s largest exporter of LNG. Meanwhile, Iran’s development of South Pars has been hampered by protracted delays, mainly because of international sanctions. While competition between LNG producers is set to intensify over the next few years as projects come on-stream, such as the ones in Australia, Qatar is set to cement its position as a leading LNG producer. Qatari LNG is viewed as highly competitive, given its track record in gas production and LNG production and exports. (Henni 2018).

In a world that is increasingly moving towards cleaner energy options, Qatar and Iran are well-positioned for a future in which oil plays a smaller role. This is in contrast to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which very much still depend on oil rents to maintain their economies. Additionally, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring protest movements, the then Emir of Qatar HH Sheikh Hamad took a decisive role. Rather than joining Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in opposition to the pan-Arab Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, which had already served as a base for various Islamists in exile, sought to tie itself to this growing force. Similarly, Doha’s backing of rebels in Libya and Syria, where Saudi Arabia also intervened, compounded the suspicion of Qatar’s support for dissident Gulf groups. Simultaneously, Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections shifted the dynamics of the GCC significantly. On 20 May 2017, Trump visited Saudi Arabia as his first destination on his first trip outside the United States after his inauguration ceremony. He then continued on to Israel during the same trip. Just two weeks after his visit, the blockade against Qatar was enacted. Unlike the Obama administration, which had negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and limited its cooperation with the GCC on Syria, Trump’s broad-based support for Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman appears to have been a factor in the decision to aggressively confront Qatar. With a new president in the White House who had indicated his willingness to back them, the leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi decided to resume the conflict with Qatar, with hopes of bringing it to a decisive conclusion.

Doha–Tehran–Ankara: Charting New Regional Arrangements How has the aforementioned diplomatic fragmentation within the GCC affected Qatar’s relations with Iran and Turkey? The governments of both Iran and Turkey, which had previously enjoyed positive trade and diplomatic relations with Qatar, moved very quickly to exploit the new rift within the GCC. For Qatar, the unintended result of the blockade has been a reinvigoration of its partnership with Iran in trade and diplomacy, as well as military cooperation and enhanced trade ties with Turkey. Alongside the enhancement of their bilateral relations with Qatar, the blockade has

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also led Iran and Turkey to put aside their historical rivalry as regional powers and increase their cooperation. In terms of trade, the Saudi-led blockade has been a publicity boost and an economic boon to Iran, which, at the time, was facing increased hostility from the US government, culminating in the withdrawal of Donald Trump from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018 (Landler 2018). Immediately after the blockade was enforced, Iran sent five planes filled with food to Qatar in a highly publicized action that initiated a continual increased flow of goods between Iran and Qatar (Sharafedin and Potter 2017). Turkey, Iran and Qatar recently signed a transportation pact for boosting trilateral trade. Turkey’s Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci and his Qatari counterpart Ahmed bin Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani were in the Iranian capital Tehran in November to sign the agreement with Iran’s Minister of Industries, Mining and Trade Mohammad Shariatmadari. Under the agreement, Iran will be the transit country between Turkey and Qatar. The deal is expected to help accelerate commodity delivery and facilitate trade. “Iran is playing an important role in the transport of goods from Turkey and Azerbaijan to Qatar,” said the Qatari minister in a meeting with Shariatmadari. According to Mohammed bin Mahdi Al Ahbabi, a board member of Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the land route between Turkey and Qatar via Iran reduces the cost of transport of goods by about 80% compared to air cargo. Turkey’s Customs and Trade Minister Bulent Tufenkci said last month that Ankara will accelerate efforts to facilitate transit through Iran, especially to increase trade with Qatar. (Financial Tribune 2018).

Likewise, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has said the country is willing to cooperate with Qatar on construction projects for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, amid a boycott by its Gulf neighbors. The official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that Rouhani spoke with the Qatari Emir, HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, on 26 August 2018: During the call the two discussed business incentives for investors in the two countries, strengthening port and maritime cooperation and establishing a joint shipping line after the boycotting countries closed their ports to goods destined for Qatar. “Iranian companies are ready to cooperate in construction projects in Qatar that will host World Cup 2022,” Rouhani said, according to IRNA. Other topics discussed by the leaders included the US decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose new sanctions. IRNA said Qatar was opposed to the plans and escalation between Iran and the US. Sheikh Tamim expressed a willingness “to develop all-out ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran” and thanked the country for helping Qatar to source food and other goods after the boycott was imposed …. (Gulf Business 2018).

In the first five months of Iranian calendar year 1397 (year starting 21 March 2018), Iranian exporters sent 624,840 tons of goods, valued at $119,437,000, to Qatar. This is an 81.27% rise in exports from Iran to Qatar compared with the same period during the previous year, according to the latest statistics released by the Iran Customs Administration (MEHR News Agency 2018). This continued a trend towards increased trade, first reported in a customs report in June 2018 which stated that Iran had exported 216,585 tons of goods worth $47.666 million to Qatar during the first two months of the current Iranian year (March 21–May 21 2018), showing considerable growth in terms of value. Also, statistics show that the previously stated

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export amount makes up of 1.35% of the total weight and 0.62% of the total value of Iran’s exports in the same period. Accordingly, Qatar now stands as the 20th largest export destination of Iranian goods. These goods include iron, wood products, White Portland cement, vegetables, confectionery items, henna, rose water, fruit, sugar and sugar cubes, bitumen, steel profile tubes, livestock, and other assorted products. In August 2018, Hadi Haqshenas, the deputy head for maritime affairs of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO), announced that Qatari officials intended to increase maritime shipping lines between the two countries: “The Qataris who supplied their goods through Saudi Arabia and the UAE before (the siege and) sanctions have now requested increased maritime shipping between Iran and Qatar to bolster mutual trade” […] He added that the goods which are transited from Turkey and other adjacent countries to Qatar can also use the appropriate shipping lanes at Bushehr port to carry goods to the Qatari ports. “We are now witnessing an eye-catching growth in shipping lines between the Iranian and Qatari ports” […]. (Albawaba Business 2018).

The blockade created a new diplomatic opening for Qatar and Iran. Historically, Qatar had full diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic, but it had withdrawn its ambassador from Tehran in January 2016, following the attacks by angry protestors against the Saudi embassy there in the wake of the execution of Sheikh al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia. However, just eleven weeks after the beginning of the blockade, on 23 August 2017, Qatar restored full diplomatic relations with Iran. “Qatar’s Foreign Ministry announced that it was sending its ambassador back to Tehran after a 20-month hiatus that started in January 2016, when Qatar broke off relations after attacks on two Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran” (Walsh 2017). Although the government of Qatar did not give any explicit reason for this restoration of full diplomatic relations, a flurry of positive news emerged from Iranian media sources during the same time period. In light of the aforementioned improved trade relations between the two countries, one can draw a clear connection between trade and diplomacy. Turkey and Qatar initiated a similar process to strengthen their diplomatic relations in 2014, as detailed on the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Turkey enjoys deep-rooted ties of friendship and fraternity with Qatar and relations between the two countries have been rapidly improving in all fields. While bilateral visits add a major impetus to relations between Turkey and Qatar, both countries also closely coordinate and cooperate on regional issues. (www.mfa.gov.tr, accessed 12 March 2020).

Throughout the first decade of the new millennium, Turkey and Qatar pursued similar foreign policies and aligned their positions on many critical and controversial issues. In doing so, however, they increasingly isolated themselves in the Middle East as states challenging the status quo. This isolation, which became acute in the summer of 2013, led the two countries to forge much stronger relations (Ba¸skan 2016). The Supreme Strategic Committee jointly formed by Turkey and Qatar was established in 2014 as a bilateral mechanism for high-level dialogue and cooperation. The first meeting of this Committee was convened in Doha on 2 December 2015, and its second meeting took place in Trabzon on 18 December 2016 under the cochairmanship of President Erdo˘gan, and HH the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani. The third meeting was held in Doha on 14 November 2017, under

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the same chairmanship. During these meetings, various agreements, protocols and memoranda of understanding were signed, further strengthening Turkey’s relations with Qatar. Over the course of the three meetings, a total of forty agreements were signed. Collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) constitutes another pillar of Turkey’s bilateral relations with Qatar. In this regard, the High Level Strategic Dialogue mechanism existing between Turkey and the GCC also provides a useful platform for Turkey’s cooperation with Qatar on bilateral and regional issues (MFA, n.d.). Therefore, the Turkish–Qatari diplomatic alliance has been born not from the current blockade, but rather from prior military and trade cooperation. In Libya, both Turkey and Qatar have supported the Islamist government of Khalifa Ghwell and the Libya Dawn coalition since 2014 (Mezran and Varvelli 2017). It is likely that the enhanced diplomatic and military cooperation between Turkey and Qatar is related to the statements on the Turkish government’s website quoted above. Turkey has been looking to expand its military presence across the Middle East, and particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea (Middle East Monitor 2018b). In accordance with these plans, Turkey has based troops at the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar since 2014, and increased those numbers in 2017 as the blockade began. Although Saudi Arabia demanded that Turkey withdraw its troops from Qatar, this is unlikely to happen. In October 2018, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Mouloud Jawish Oglu stated, “The Turkish armed forces are deployed in Qatar under the bilateral military and defense cooperation agreement signed between Turkey and Qatar in 2014, long before the Gulf conflict in 2017.” He concluded, “Therefore, there is no connection between the deployment of our military forces and the current Gulf conflict … We believe this request is unrealistic … cooperation in the defense industries is an important aspect of bilateral relations between Qatar and Turkey … strengthens the military capabilities of the Qatari armed forces and contributes to the security and stability of the Gulf region” (Middle East Monitor 2018a). Turkey is a highly energy-dependent country, with nearly no petrochemical resources of its own. Therefore it imports significant percentages of its oil and natural gas energy needs from Iran, Iraq, and Qatar. Beginning in 2008, Turkey made agreements to import Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Qatar, in an attempt to fulfill its increasing energy needs (Martin 2009). In November 2016, the two countries signed a deal to boost economic and political cooperation. Turkish companies have invested an estimated $11.6 billion in Qatar, much of it connected to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and there are ninety-nine Turkish companies operating with Qatari partners (Dogan 2016). The Turkish support for Qatar translated into financial benefits as well. When the US government levied financial sanctions against Turkey in the summer of 2018, Qatar extended a fifteen billion dollar aid package to Turkey: “Qatar pledged to invest $15 billion in Turkey after a lunch in Ankara, Turkey’s capital, between President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan and HH the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad AlThani, representatives of both governments said” (Ewing and Gall 2018). As relations between Turkey and Qatar strengthened, a former senior Iranian diplomat, Nosratollah Tajik, told the press, “It could be predicted from the start that

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Saudi Arabia could not forge unity against Qatar. Kuwait and Oman were the most important Arab players that did not accompany Saudi Arabia [in isolating Qatar]. Saudi Arabia wanted Iran to get involved in this situation, but we were wise and cautious. Not to mention that Saudi Arabia’s actions have also upset Turkey, and we can expect an overlap of interests between Tehran and Ankara” (Jafari 2017). This overlap of shared economic and political interests between Iran and Turkey has grown significantly since the blockade began. Turkey and Iran have a history of cooperation and sometimes economic competition that reaches back to the founders of each modern state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah Pahlavi. The two founders signed a Treaty of Friendship in Tehran on 22 April 1926 that remains in place today, and allows citizens of each country to visit the other without a visa. Ankara has improved its relationship with Tehran through their cooperation in combating the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and its Iranian offshoot, the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). In addition, Ankara and Tehran cooperate on the import and transport of energy through pipelines from Iran. Most importantly for Turkey’s security, it has been active diplomatically and militarily in Baghdad and in northern Iraq (Martin 2009). Turkish–Iranian relations have strengthened significantly since 2017, not least because of the election of Donald Trump—an avowed opponent of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement—as US president. After more than one year of threatening to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA, on 8 May 2018 President Trump officially signed a memorandum in the White House, withdrawing the United States from the agreement and demanding that its allies cease purchasing Iranian oil (Landler 2018). On 24 July 2018, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, publicly resisted the US call to cut oil imports from Iran. “We do not have to adhere to the sanctions imposed on a country by another country. We don’t find the sanctions right either,” Çavu¸so˘glu said in a news conference in Azerbaijan. “We held meetings with the United States in Ankara and told them openly: Turkey gets oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia and Iraq. If I don’t buy from Iran now, where am I supposed to meet that need from?” Turkey depends on imports for almost all of its energy needs. In the first four months of 2018, Turkey bought more than three million tons of crude oil from Iran, almost 55% of its total crude supplies (Kucukgocmen and Gumrukcu 2018). Relations between Qatar, Iran, and Turkey received a boost when, on 2 October 2018, the Saudi Arabian dissident journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, in an apparent assassination alleged to have been directly ordered by the Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammed bin Salman (Barnes 2018). That event has given Qatar, through Al Jazeera’s continuous coverage of the events surrounding Khashoggi’s death, an opportunity to publicly pressure Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, Turkish media outlets allowed a steady flow of leaked intelligence information implicating Saudi Arabia in Khashoggi’s killing, further increasing the pressure. Iran, already a fervent critic of Saudi Arabia, has exploited this event to exacerbate the rift between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, with Iranian censors

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allowing the Iranian media to cover the event extensively (Iranian media see Saudi– Turkey rift 2018). Essentially, the major media outlets of Qatar, Turkey, and Iran have broadcast a common anti-Saudi message.

Conclusion The emergence of stronger trilateral relations between Qatar, Turkey, and Iran indicates an unexpected result of the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar. Iran’s government exhibited its geopolitical pragmatism in exploiting a regional rift within the GCC to strengthen its position vis-à-vis a regional competitor, Saudi Arabia, and shored up geopolitical support for its government in the face of increased tensions with the United States and a tightening sanctions regime. Turkey, which had already been projecting its military and economic power in the region since the early 1990s, took advantage of the blockade to solidify its self-representation as an honest broker in the Middle East. Thus, this chapter shows that Qatar’s enhanced trilateral relations with Iran and Turkey has been both a cause and result of the blockade.

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Chapter 12

Look Middle, Look East! The Future of GCC Strategic Partnerships Shareefa Al-Adwani

Introduction In April 2018, the European Union (EU) concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Japan, intended to deepen the ties between this international organization and its member states, and that particular country outside it. The agreement covers cooperation on a multitude of issues of mutual interest, including energy security, cyber-crime, and climate change, among many others. The first formal strategic partnership initiated by the EU was with South Korea in 2010, and an agreement with Canada soon followed in 2016 (ratified by the European Parliament in 2017). While the EU has called the United States, Russia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa strategic partners, much of the formal negotiations and paperwork behind each of these partnerships is still underway or not yet ratified.1 These regional-organization-level negotiations and agreements are the fruit of the EU’s plans for greater long-term regional stability, particularly as set out in the 2003 European Security Strategy.2 Perhaps this strategy of obtaining strategic partners (or high-level strategic alliances) could be helpful for the long-term stability of other regions, like the Arabian Peninsula. Specifically, a regional organization such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may be the ideal candidate for forging strategic partnerships. The members of the GCC currently have long-term strategic relations with the superpowers: the United States, China, Russia, and the EU. Recently, many of these superpowers have been spending large amounts of their political and financial resources on addressing their own domestic and internal dilemmas, leaving fewer of these resources for the GCC. As such, and particularly during the ongoing 2017 Gulf Crisis and other intra–Arabian Peninsula concerns, GCC members should foster S. Al-Adwani (B) Department of International Relations, College of Arts and Sciences, American University of Kuwait, Salmiya, Kuwait e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_12

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higher-level relations with other stable states in order to ensure continuity in areas such as diplomacy, trade, and even security. With which states should the GCC develop durable strategic partnerships? Which states would be invested in encouraging peaceful political and economic relations with and among GCC members? I advise GCC members to (1) look to middle powers and (2) look east. Specifically, the middle-power countries of South Korea, India, and Japan are all potentially strong allies in the long-term strategic plans of GCC members. In much of the international relations literature, there is substantial evidence supporting the idea that commerce facilitates cooperation between states, and promotes peace and stability. Thus, in order to foster GCC regional stability and long-term strategic growth, there should be a collective interest in developing GCClevel international partners that are invested in all the GCC states. There are existing partners that fit this necessary condition: the top export destinations and import origin states for trade include South Korea, India, and Japan for almost all the GCC states. By developing strategic partnerships with these middle-power countries east of the GCC, I contend that (1) both state-to-state and regional-organization-to-state bilateral political, economic, and even security relations will grow; (2) there will be a shared interest among GCC members and these middle powers to maintain and increase stability and peace in the GCC region; and (3) the long-term partnerships will provide a stronger and more unified “GCC voice” in alignment with key allies for tough future GCC negotiations with superpowers. I first discuss the literature on strategic partnerships and how the various elements of strategic partnerships are associated with greater stability. I then apply the literature to the GCC and, using trade data for GCC members, derive the states which are most likely to have a large stake in GCC regional stability and are thus the most appropriate long-term strategic partners due to interest alignment. From there, I discuss the importance of forging GCC–middle-power-state strategic partnerships to realize common GCC goals (relating to the Vision plans and to a common security architecture) and to build a stronger negotiating position for the GCC in the present and in the future.

Elements of Strategic Partnerships Strategic Partnerships and Strategic Alliances Neither within the international relations literature nor within diplomatic circles does the term “strategic partnership” have a single, clear definition (Mytelka 1991; Kay 2000). In part, this could simply be because the term is not static because strategic partnerships are not static, since partnerships evolve with ongoing negotiations (Blanco 2016).

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While the term “partnership” connotes informality (Wilkins 2008), the existence of the EU’s SPAs, among other partnership agreements, indicates that a strategic partnership may indeed be formal. Yet strategic partnerships are not formal military alliances, which focus on the single-issue area of military commitments between member states vis-à-vis states external to the commitment (Snyder 1997). Instead, strategic partnerships may—and do—address a multiplicity of issues. Holslag (2011) presents five common characteristics of strategic partnerships, providing a useful framework for understanding them. First, he suggests, these partnerships pursue common interests and expectations. Second, partnerships are built for the long term and are goal-driven (Wilkins 2008), in contrast with short-term ad hoc coalitions.3 The third characteristic is that they are often multidimensional, addressing areas such as security, trade, and other political issue areas; and the fourth is that strategic partnerships have a global range. Finally, he notes that without the partnership, the mutual benefits may not be achievable. Strategic partnerships that are between regional organizations and a state are relatively rare. Since the European Security Strategy was passed in 2003, much of the case-study work on strategic partnerships has been conducted on the EU’s partnerships with various states (see Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira 2016, for a comprehensive list). There is little to no literature on other regional bodies such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and their strategic partnerships with single states.4 While Al Shayji (2014a) discusses a GCC–US strategic partnership, he does so by breaking down the strategic partnership into bilateral, state-to-state relationships. Other scholars who focus on these state-to-state bilateral relationships use the term “strategic alliance” to mean “strategic partnership” (Al-Tamimi 2012, 2013; Al Shayji 2014b). As a result, I will be using the terms “strategic alliance” and “strategic partnership” interchangeably. Indeed, the absence of literature on GCC strategic partnerships is due to the fact that the GCC—as a regional unit—lacks formal strategic partnerships with other states.

Interdependence and Stability Trade There is an extensive body of literature on the relationship between trade and enhanced stability between trading partners. The logic behind the trade–stability nexus lies in the costs of war. War can disrupt trade, which can be costly (see Oneal and Russett 2001, for empirical support, and also Bennett and Stam 2000, for a sophisticated and robust test, reaffirmed in Oneal et al. 2003). Thus, states engaged in trade relationships, particularly those which trade extensively, are less likely to enter into a dispute with one another compared to states with relatively fewer trade ties.

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While some realist scholars indicate that a potential for the asymmetric distribution of gains (and thus power) in trade may lead to conflict (Hirschman 1980; Gilpin 1981; Levy 1989; Mearsheimer 1990), other scholars disagree, noting that if the two trading states have expectations of long-term future gains (despite these gains being asymmetrical), trade decreases the likelihood of conflict (Copeland 2014). The studies by Mansfield et al. (1999) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) on the relationship between trade and conflict indicate that Preferential Trade Agreements discourage belligerence among the parties to such agreements. Moreover, Maoz (2009) uses network measures to demonstrate that economic interdependence (sensitivity interdependence) at the monadic, dyadic, and systemic levels dampens conflict. His findings are supported by various robustness tests.

Military Cooperation “Defense diplomacy”—or military cooperation such as exchanges of military personnel, sending training teams from one state to another, arms sales, and military agreements—is a tool used to attain greater stability between states. On its face, if one country assists another militarily, there are low expectations for war between those countries, at least in the short term. In the long term, scholars indicate that defense diplomacy enhances stability between states. Bilaterally, military cooperation is a common stability-enhancing tool used by western states towards their partners (Cottey and Forster 2013). Military cooperation may also work when two states do not always have the best relations, initially: the cautious military cooperation between China and Russia has reduced military tensions between the two states over time (Tsai 2003). Military cooperation within regional organizations has also increased regional stability among its members: defense diplomacy among ASEAN members has increased regional stability (Laksmana 2012), as has NATO’s cooperation with post-communist states, several of which later became members (Cottey and Forster 2013). The defense diplomacy between two regional organizations—the EU and NATO—is highlighted in the 2003 European Security Strategy. There has been less exploration of defense diplomacy between regional organizations and single states in the international relations literature. De Luca (2013) offers an in-depth discussion of France’s military cooperation with GCC states, which was undertaken on a state-to-state bilateral level to enhance stability in the GCC as a region. For De Luca, state-to-state defense diplomacy is associated with “state-toregion” diplomacy. Fürtig (2004) encourages greater cooperation efforts by European states, suggesting that the EU as a unit (rather than as single states) should coordinate with the GCC to a much larger extent.

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Diplomatic/Political Cooperation Some issue areas do not fall neatly into one type of cooperation, and thus “diplomatic cooperation” and “political cooperation” have been used to mean multiple processes and/or are catch-all concepts for multiple-issue areas. Some scholars use the term “political cooperation” to mean cooperation among regional organization members (EU: Salmon 1992; Schneider and Cederman 1994; Harstad 2007, ASEAN: Snitwongse 1998; Cockerham 2010; Wong 2012, GCC: Ryan 1998; Baabood 2003) or expansion of these regional organizations (Smith 1998; Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). For Fürtig (2004), “political cooperation” indicates at least both military and economic cooperation. Other issue areas may include cybersecurity, refugees, human security, education, technology, science, and the environment. When there are multiple issues, “political cooperation” is used by both scholars (Partrick 2011; Antkiewicz and Momani 2009) and policy makers. The European Commission’s own website uses the term “political cooperation” when describing its SPAs, negotiations, and other multiple-issue area agreements with South Korea.5 “Diplomatic cooperation” is similar to “political cooperation” in that it is often used as a catch-all phrase.6 For most scholars, diplomatic cooperation indicates discussions between representatives of states on a multitude of topics, such as security (Medeiros 2005) and trade (Pollins 1989), among others (Sun 2012). The relationship between political/diplomatic cooperation and stability is critical. Global issues such as epidemics, crime, terrorism, refugees, and pollution all require multiple levels of cooperation to solve. Pollins (1989) uses a game-theory model and empirical analyses to indicate that greater diplomatic cooperation increases bilateral trade, thus increasing the stability of relations between states (Antkiewicz and Momani 2009). Medeiros (2005) indicates that diplomatic cooperation is used as a tool to increase the stability of relations between states, or, at minimum, decrease rising tensions (Ikenberry 2011).

Strategic Partnerships and Stability for the GCC The literature, taken collectively, suggests that cooperation and bilateral agreements at the levels of security, trade, and politico-diplomatic exchange—all of which are elements of strategic partnerships—are closely associated with increased/maintained stability between the two actors. These two actors may be states or regional organizations. Studies utilizing network analyses support this claim: states with similar international ties (security, trade, IGO-based political relations) are less likely to be involved in conflict with each other, and states with trade ties and diplomatic ties (IGO-based relations) are also less likely to get involved in conflict (Maoz et al. 2006). Additionally, and as the 2003 European Security Strategy for the EU clarifies, policy-makers agree that SPAs are a priority for current and long-term stability between the regional organization and other states.

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GCC Integration and Stability Indeed, the willingness of states to establish a regional organization for greater integration across issue areas is in itself powerful evidence of the desire to increase or maintain stability within the region. When the Gulf Cooperation Council was founded in 1981, this was done, in part, to collectively counter-balance other states in the region (Khaleq 1999). Efforts and plans to further integrate the GCC countries have been discussed, including the deepening of (1) security ties, such as the 1986 establishment of Desert Shield, the 2000 GCC Joint Defense Agreement (framework for a defense pact), and the 2009 GCC summit agreement to create a joint force; (2) economic ties, such as the 1981 Joint Economic Agreement, the 2003 establishment of a Customs Union (operating as of 2015, according to The Economist), and the 2008 plans for a Common Market and Economic Nationality; and (3) infrastructural ties, including discussions on a common electrical grid, with the energy derived perhaps through peaceful nuclear energy, and the introduction of the states’ various Vision plans.7 These discussions, plans, and agreements for deeper integration of various issue areas and institutions are associated with shared common goals, particularly regional stability (Magen 2006; Regilme 2011). Thus, it may be concluded that: 1. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had and have plans for the GCC’s increased integration, in part for the sake of regional stability. 2. One way for a regional organization to establish regional stability is through strategic partnerships.

Instability and the GCC At this time, both exogenous and endogenous processes and situations threaten the stability of the GCC. Internally, the organization is experiencing a rift between its members with the ongoing 2017 Gulf crisis. In the region, various neighboring states are failing (Yemen), are attempting to re-stabilize (Iraq), or are at negotiation roadblocks with various regional powers and superpowers (Iran). Internationally, previously stable superpower states with which GCC members engage bilaterally on security, trade, and political issues are experiencing their own internal/external struggles. The superpower partner states that are most critical to the region’s security—the United States, China, Russia, and the EU—are spending more of their political and financial resources on addressing their own issues, leaving fewer resources for the GCC. The United States has been spending twice as much as it receives through taxation, increasing the deficit by sixty percent (McGregor 2018); the EU has spent much of its political capital attempting to resolve Brexit with the UK; while Russia’s recent acquisitions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea, along with its politico-military campaigns in Syria, are all costly ventures. China’s slowing

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economic growth and the impact of its trade wars with the US (Hancock 2018), along with holding an estimated one million Uyghurs in re-education camps (Senate Report No. DAV18G88 2018), has been costly for its internal political resources. The preoccupation of the superpowers with these internal and external issues may indicate a level of unreliability and unavailability to the GCC, both in the present and in the future. As such, and particularly during the ongoing Gulf crisis, GCC members should foster relations with other stable states in order to ensure continuity and stability in areas such as diplomacy, trade, and even security. With whom should the GCC—as a regional organization—forge new strategic partnerships? Put simply, the GCC should forge new strategic partnerships with states that have an interest in the region’s stability and that possess the capabilities to achieve that goal. In order to specify which states in particular have this interest, aside from the superpowers, it may be useful to observe with which states GCC members are separately establishing lower-level agreements, particularly trade agreements. Table 12.1 lists the top export destinations and import origins of each GCC member in 2016, just before the 2017 Gulf crisis. All country names are abbreviated using the Correlates of War state abbreviations (2019) and the data is from the World Bank (2019). If trade partners from fellow GCC states and the superpowers are removed from this list, we observe the following, as set out in Table 12.2. In excluding the superpowers and other GCC states, we find Japan, South Korea, and India consistently located in the top five importers and exporters of the GCC states. The only slight exception is Bahrain, for which South Korea is only the sixth largest export destination. This initial ranking of these middle-power states indicates a rough balance of trade between the GCC state and each middle-power state (rather than, for example, evidence of one-sided assistance). Thus, the GCC members all have strong bilateral trade ties with India, Japan, and South Korea, three middlepower states located east of the GCC. Please refer to Table 12.3 for the trade values in USD. Table 12.3 indicates the amount of trade (imports and exports) each GCC state undertakes with each middle-power state. For many of these GCC states, the “balance” of trade is relatively close. States that have roughly equal stakes in the economic success of one another are more likely to have relatively higher stakes in the overall stability and success of their partner state, compared to states that have a very large imbalance of trade8 with one another. Japan and South Korea, in particular, as energy-dependent states, benefit greatly from secure access to energy exporters.9 Moreover, the stability of trade does not only rely on a state’s internal economic success, but also requires its territorial integrity. Put simply, conflict disrupts trade (Anderton and Carter 2001; Hegre et al. 2010). Many studies have indicated that the greatest threat to a state is a neighboring state (Wallensteen 1981; Singer 1990; Vasquez 1995). Singer (1990), using the Correlates of War database, found that over 80% of interstate wars were between neighbors. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) add that populations close in proximity and close in genealogy (like the citizens of the GCC states) are more likely to be involved in a dispute. In sum, immediate threats to GCC stability include both other GCC states and states neighboring GCC states.

USA

UAE

SAU

JPN

IND

AUL

UK

GMY

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

KUW

THI

ETH

QAT

CHN

IND

US

JPN

UAE

SAU

TID Top Import Destinations TED Top Export Destinations

10 ITA

CHN

1

AUL

ITA

ROK

IND

SAU

GMY

JPN

UAE

US

CHN

ITA

ETH

EGY

UAE

SIN

US

JPN

IND

CHN

ROK

ROK

IRN

ITA

GMY

SAU

IND

US

CHN

JPN

UAE

QAT

YEM

IRQ

SAU

US

IND

JPN

ROK

UAE

CHN

ITA

IND

SAU

JPN

GMY

UK

FRN

CHN

UAE

USA

USA

EGY

UK

THI

UAE

SIN

CHN

IND

ROK

JPN

FRN

ITA

IND

UK

ROK

JPN

UAE

GMY

USA

CHN

JOR

SPN

FRN

UAE

SIN

ROK

US

IND

JPN

CHN

MAL

HK

TUR

ROK

SAU

JPN

GMY

IND

USA

CHN

PAK

SIN

ROK

SAU

IRN

OMA

CHN

JPN

SWZ

IND

BAH TID BAH TED KUW TID KUW TED OMA TID OMA TED QAT TID QAT TED SAU TID SAU TED UAE TID UAE TED

Table 12.1 2016 Top import and top export destinations for each GCC member (World Bank Data 2019)

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IND

ETH

THI

MAL

2 IND

3 AUL

4 BRA

5 ROK

TID Top Import Destinations TED Top Export Destinations *Bahrain TED 6th place: ROK

JPN

1 JPN

SIN

EGY

THI

JPN

IND

ROK

AUL

ROK

IND

JPN

THI

ROK

IRN

IND

JPN

YEM

IRQ

IND

JPN

ROK

AUL

TUR

ROK

IND

JPN

THI

SIN

IND

ROK

JPN

BRA

TUR

IND

ROK

JPN

JOR

SIN

ROK

IND

JPN

H.K

TUR

ROK

JPN

IND

ROK

IRN

JPN

SWZ

IND

BAH TID BAH TED* KUW TID KUW TED OMA TID OMA TED QAT TID QAT TED SAU TID SAU TED UAE TID UAE TED

Table 12.2 2016 top import and top export destinations for each GCC member, excluding superpowers and other GCC members (World Bank Data 2019)

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251 M

ROK 237 M

1.49 B

1.98 B

1.66 B

TID Top Import Destinations TED Top Export Destinations *Amounts in USD (B = billion, M = million)

981 M

908 M

JPN

580 M

544 M

IND 2.59 B 576 M

6.51 B

1.36 B

3.81 B

3.87 B 2.1 B

1.59 B

1.22 B 722 M

1.88 B

1.14 B 9.5 B

10.3 B

7.36 B

5.94 B

6.04 B

5.18 B

14.3 B

17.5 B

17.2 B

2.7 B

9.2 B

15.5 B

6.36B

15.7B

18.4B

BAH TID* BAH TED KUW TID KUW TED OMA TID OMA TED QAT TID QAT TED SAU TID SAU TED UAE TID UAE TED

Table 12.3 2016 Top import and top export destinations and amounts for each GCC member, excluding superpowers and other GCC members (World Bank Data 2019)

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The tables and discussion above yield several conclusions: 1. The GCC as a region may count India, Japan, and South Korea—three middlepower states—among its top trading partners. 2. States with a balance of trade with one another have higher stakes in the overall stability and success of their partner state compared to states that have an imbalance of trade with one another. 3. The GCC region’s top trading partners have a stake in the stability of the region and thus a desire to decrease the probability of conflict both within and among the GCC states. 4. One way to enhance the stability of the region is to integrate the GCC further by establishing GCC strategic partners. 5. The best candidates for the GCC’s regional strategic partnership agreements at this time are India, Japan, and South Korea.

Look Middle, Look East! The member states of the GCC should all maintain their established and growing bilateral ties with the superpowers—I do not argue that there should be any large changes to these relationships. In the unstable political climate, if a GCC state were to suddenly invest in deeper political, economic, and military-related ties with one of the superpowers, it may be interpreted as an alignment choice by other superpowers and regional actors. Those actions—while perhaps intended to stabilize the region—may in fact destabilize a GCC state or the GCC region, as the sudden alliance choice may upset the slow-changing power balance among the superpowers. These relationships with superpowers should be maintained and allowed to evolve naturally. Yet the recent political situations in which the superpowers are embroiled have created a need for the GCC to expand its other ties for purposes of stability in trade, security, and political relations. Moreover, with respect to the 2017 Gulf Crisis and with other instabilities in the West Asian region, there is an immediate need for trustworthy, stable partners. The most useful partners to the GCC would be states that have a stake in the stability of the GCC region. In this kind of partnership, an unstable GCC region would upset the partner state’s own interests, and thus the partner would be more likely to take part in actions and agreements to maintain the stability of the region. In part, because the six members of the GCC all have strong trade ties with the middle-power states of India, South Korea, and Japan, located east of the GCC, these three may be the best states with which to forge strategic partnerships.

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Begin with the Visions The GCC–Japan, GCC–India, and GCC–South Korea strategic partnerships may find their foundations in the unified goals of the GCC Vision plans. In general, common goals of the GCC Vision plans include: • • • • • • • • •

Diversification of the economy. Revitalization and expansion of the private sector. Reduction of reliance on the government. Greater government efficiency. Building human capital educated for the future economic sector. Establishing a healthy society through renewed focus on healthcare. Creating infrastructure for new programs, organizations, firms, and processes. Creating infrastructure for communication and transportation. Sustainability, in energy and in environment sectors.

Taken collectively, these Vision plans forecast great state transformations for the GCC, particularly in the economic sectors. The three middle powers have some experience with their own state transformations. Japan’s economy collapsed after World War II, but subsequently grew into one of the largest economies of the world, after the United States and China (Barboza 2010). South Korea’s process of transformation from one of the poorest states in the world to one of the richest has not slowed despite the recent recession in the first decade of the new millennium (Kleiner 2001; Rosser and Rosser 2011). India, one of the world’s largest economies, surpassed China in its economic growth in 2018 (Stacey 2018). Moreover, many of these transformations occurred under a mixed economy, rather than a highly capitalist economy. The GCC states, placing great importance on social welfare, may receive useful governance advice from these middle powers that did not simply mimic Western economic liberalism and privatization, but instead adapted these systems to their own framework. In both state-to-state and GCC-to-state relationships, these middle-power state partners have the potential to provide great economic and political benefit to the GCC region. At the time of writing, there have already been some bilateral negotiations on Vision-related contracts and other agreements between these middle powers and each GCC state. A brief listing of these may be helpful. In the case of Saudi Arabia, 40 contracts related to its Vision plan have been signed with South Korea (Khan 2018). The Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia has encouraged skilled Indian engineers to take advantage of the opportunities in the Vision plan (Arab News 2018). Japan is moving towards a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, outlined in a framework called “Saudi–Japan Vision 2030.” For Bahrain, expansion of ties in trade, infrastructure, and security with South Korea is already underway (Hyun-woo 2017). For Kuwait, lower-level trade and infrastructure agreements with Japan are in alignment with Kuwait’s Vision plan (Peter 2018). South Korea currently has several large contract agreements in Kuwait and has stated, through its ambassador, that its companies may be valuable partners to Kuwait in Kuwait’s future plans

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(Arab Times 2018). Oman and South Korea have plans to sign a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in building “smart cities” in Oman (Times of Oman 2018). Japan and Oman have begun stronger discussion about economic ties and projects (Al-Lawati 2018). South Korean companies operating in Qatar are expected to increase in number to contribute to various aspects of Qatar’s Vision plan (Gulf Times 2018). The UAE and India have underscored their technological and scientific opportunities as they fit into the UAE’s Vision plan (Kapoor 2017). Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan issued a joint statement on deepening their strategic partnership (Joint Statement 2018). South Korea and the UAE recently completed the UAE’s first nuclear reactor, part of the plan for energy diversification (The National 2018). Thus, it may not be too difficult and will be less costly to integrate the current bilateral relationships with these middle powers into one GCC strategic partnership agreement per middle power. A useful example of an integrated plan may be the development of the GCC Interconnection Authority (GCC Power Grid Authority), under whose responsibility both inter- and intra-regional energy trading will take place. The development of this regional body is not only less costly in the long term for GCC states, but may also be a revenue-generating institution (Al-Asaad et al. 2006). In large-scale projects such as these, the middle powers may prove to be valuable in terms of planning, infrastructure, technology, and construction, providing benefits for all state participants.

Collective Security Architecture Establishing a collective security architecture would also be less costly. The GCC has multiple shared security concerns: terrorism, cybersecurity, unstable and failed neighbor states, and the possibility of a nuclear weapon in the region. Currently, responses to regional crises, threats, and concerns are state-centric (and thus very costly) and the strategic and tactical variation in the responses implies disagreement on how to best address concerns. Yet the overall security goals of the GCC are not dissimilar, and thus may prove to be a useful starting point. These goals include: • Maintaining a secure trade route, particularly for energy exports. • Reducing and eliminating the funding of terrorism 1989 FATF.10 • The development of cybersecurity for critical public and private sector institutions (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018). • The stabilization of unstable and failed neighboring states (GCC initiative) (Toumi 2018; KUNA 2003). • The region becoming free from weapons of mass destruction (UNODA 2013). While members of the GCC have consulted with superpowers—both on a state-tostate level and at a regional organization level—on how best to achieve these goals, the negotiations have not yet provided clear and successful solutions. Instead, the middlepower states may provide fresh perspectives on how to achieve these goals through the

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provision of new ideas (planning, strategies, and tactics) and the provision of human, technological, and infrastructural capital. India has outlined its security engagement with GCC members as one that is “non-descriptive, non-intrusive, non-judgmental and not taking sides in intra-regional disputes” (Roy-Chaudry 2018) in its pursuit of joint security goals such as combating cyber-terrorism and terrorist funding. GCC leaders have acknowledged that Japan plays an important role in its trade security (MEI 2015), and South Korea has taken a more active role in the security of the GCC region with discussions on training and weapons trade (Seo 2018). The middlepower states have indicated their willingness and capability to engage the GCC on security- and defense-related issues. By building a collective security architecture in coordination with the middle powers, the GCC could ameliorate security concerns through incrementalism and multilateralism.

Current Partners, Future Benefits Developing these strategic partners now may also offer greater benefits in the future. The results of recent actions by the superpowers towards the GCC have highlighted the GCC’s current weaker bargaining position; from demands for lower oil prices to the GCC members not receiving invitations to the negotiating table for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the GCC has had to endure high pressures and disregard from the superpowers in rapid cycles. Forming strong political partnerships with the middle-power states will enhance the unity, stability, and position of the GCC, and a stronger GCC, along with these new allies, may possess greater bargaining power in its negotiations with superpowers. At the very least, the level of multilateralism provides greater diplomatic legitimacy and may allow for a greater respect for the unified “GCC voice” in international politics.

Conclusion It is already evident in observing the bilateral state-to-state relations and agreements that all six GCC states are willing to forge stronger ties with these three middlepower states. All of these state-to-state ties, be they trade, security, and/or political, are associated with the longer-term stability of the parties involved. I have argued that these state-to-state ties may be taken to another level and formalized for regional stability: the GCC as a regional organization should make an effort to forge regional-organization-to-state strategic partnerships with the middle powers of India, Japan, and South Korea. All three states have economic, security, and political stakes in the GCC, and thus would prove to be trustworthy long-term partners for a stable GCC through those shared interests. The long-term partnerships would yield several benefits to the GCC. First, the GCC states would be unified through aligning their goals and working together to

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fulfill the common Vision plans and security concerns. Secondly, the GCC as a region would benefit from longer-term stability. Finally, the unity and stability of the GCC would enhance the collective bargaining power of the regional organization by framing negotiations as between a regional organization and the negotiating state. Thus, superpowers and other regional actors would bargain with the GCC as a unit—a more powerful negotiating entity than any single GCC state. These findings are important to the policy-making world. For the policy-makers, the discussion underscores and supports much of the strategic partnership rhetoric with evidence from international relations literature. I draw a clear path for GCC members by discussing which states the GCC should conclude SPAs with, on which issues the SPAs should focus, and why the SPAs are beneficial to the GCC as a region both in the medium and in the longer term. Notes 1. 2.

As of November 2018. A document that includes discussion of the EU’s plan for strategic partnerships. See EU Memorandum (2004). 3. See Pierre (2002), for an excellent discussion of coalitions. 4. There exists a general framework for the EU’s “Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East,” but nothing specifically on GCC–EU strategic partnerships, in part because it has been cheap enough for the individual countries on both sides to maintain bilateral relations (Nonneman 2007). 5. See https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/southkorea/. 6. There is a small body of literature that confines diplomatic cooperation to the realm of coordination at the level of diplomats, including the training of diplomats, postings, etc. (Bale 2002). 7. Bahrain Economic Vision 2030, Kuwait Vision 2035, Oman Vision 2040, Qatar National Vision 2030, Saudi Vision 2030, UAE Vision 2021. 8. Such as a trade surplus or a positive balance, or a trade deficit or a negative balance. 9. India also relies on the GCC states for much of its imported energy. 10. The GCC as an organization is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an institution that combats the funding of terrorists.

References Al Shayji, A. (2014a). The GCC-US relationship. ME Policy, 21(3), 60–69. Al Shayji, A. (2014b). Kuwait-US relationship—A small state alliance with a major power. In R. Looney (Ed.), Handbook of US-Middle East relations (pp. 450–464). Abingdon: Routledge. Al-Asaad, H., Al-Mohaisen, A., & Sud, S. (2006). GCC power grid. Retrieved November 12, 2018, from https://www.researchgate.net/.

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Chapter 13

The Malaysia–Qatar Relationship: The Perspective from Malaysia—An Emerging Middle Power Ishtiaq Hossain and Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri

The premise of this study is that Malaysia is an emerging middle power. Malaysia’s relationship with Qatar, therefore, should be understood through the lens of the foreign policy behavior of an emerging middle power within an international environment which is undergoing rapid changes, as well as a domestic context in Malaysia which has also seen major shifts to its political order following the General Election (GE-14) held in May 2018. The GE-14 results ended the 61-year coalition rule of political parties known as the Barisan Nasional (the National Front, BN), in favor of another coalition of political parties popularly known as Pakatan Harapan (the Coalition of Hope, PH). Following the GE-14, in terms of foreign policy Malaysia has mostly continued the previous government’s foreign policy directions; for example, prioritizing relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and the Muslim world. However, it should be noted that, where necessary, the PH government has adjusted its relationship with states like China, Japan, Russia, the Middle Eastern nations, and the United States. The domestic political changes have affected Malaysia’s relations with other countries as a result of the different ideological commitments of the new cohort of leaders. The drive to fight the white-collar corruption associated with some members of the previous government led by Najib Tun Razak, was likely to affect Malaysia’s relationship with countries like China and Saudi Arabia, with whom it has had close ties under Najib. Among many factors, President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy and the US–China trade wars have contributed towards upsetting the liberal world order. The world is now watching the rise of populism in the form of religious extremism, I. Hossain (B) Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] S. F. M. Shukri Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_13

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Islamophobia, and even fascism in various parts of the world. Unfortunately, rather than combating these dangerous ideas, political leaders in Europe and elsewhere now understand very well that populism, not policy, has become the vote-getter. For the sake of winning domestic elections, some countries seek to stir up their citizens at the expense of the delicate balance of the international system. The consequence of these developments is a much more fragile international system and an unstable world order, wherein countries may seek to find political strength in bilateral relations rather than multilateralism. This phenomenon does not augur well for the future of the world. Like other members of the international system, Malaysia has to grapple with this new challenge. The US–China tit-for-tat trade wars have had an especially deleterious impact, slowing down the economy not just in the United States and China but in the rest of the world as well. President Trump’s accusation that China undertook unfair trading practices that have supposedly hurt the American economy is his justification for the United States’ tariffs on US$34 billion worth of Chinese goods in July 2018, following the new tariffs on goods in early 2018 that did not specifically target China. The two countries have attempted negotiations to end the trade wars, but have failed to bring the dispute to a conclusion. On the other hand, future additional tariffs by the United States would mean that all Chinese imports to the United States would be subject to tariffs. As a result of the trade wars, economic growth has seen a dampened outlook and the stock market has been unstable. However, Malaysia is seeing a modest positive impact from its semiconductors manufacturing sector (Subbaraman et al. 2019). Although it is for everyone’s benefit for the trade wars to end, Malaysia might also be able to withstand this challenge by leveraging its relationship with other countries, including Qatar. The chapter is divided into seven sections. The next two sections discuss the justification for the study and offer a definition of an emerging middle power, followed by an analysis of Malaysia’s foreign policy behavior as an emerging middle power. The sections after that provide a brief literature review, a discussion of the contemporary international order, and an account of the domestic political changes and the new foreign policy in Malaysia, which affects Malaysia’s relationship with Qatar. The final section is devoted to a discussion of steps that may be taken to further strengthen Malaysia’s trade and economic relationships with Qatar.

Justification for the Study On 5 June 2017 the ministries of foreign affairs in Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) issued coordinated statements announcing the severing of diplomatic relations with Qatar. Saudi Arabia then shut its land borders with Qatar and, together with three other countries, imposed a land, sea, and air embargo on the Gulf country. This is a fatal blow to the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—one of the most successful regional organizations in the world, and, perhaps most significantly, the most successful regional organization entirely

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composed of Muslim-majority states. This blockade by a group of Muslim-majority states on another Muslim state created ripples across the Islamic world. Other Muslim countries were in a quandary over which side to take, and Malaysia was no exception. Traditionally, Malaysia has always maintained good, friendly relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Although there are many studies on Malaysia’s foreign policy,1 studies on Malaysia’s foreign policy specifically as an emerging middle power are almost non-existent. In particular, nothing exists on Malaysia’s relations as an emerging middle power with the countries of the Middle East, with special reference to Qatar. This study, in that sense, is a pioneering work.

Emerging Middle Powers, and the Foreign Policy Behavior of Malaysia as an Emerging Middle Power The concept of a middle power is not new. For a long time it has been used to describe a wide variety of countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian states, and New Zealand. Critical commentators have viewed middle powers as little more than status-seekers: they are seen as powers that do not qualify for a place in the ranks of the great powers, but which are unwilling to be classified with the “mediocre rest” and seek alternative roles to exercise leadership (Flemes 2007). Malaysia, meanwhile, is considered to be “emerging,” and therefore as not yet having reached the status of a middle power to join the ranks of developed countries. Nevertheless, Malaysia under the new PH leadership is more committed than ever to embracing its role as an emerging middle power. In launching Malaysia’s new foreign policy framework on 18 September 2019 with a theme of “Change in Continuity,” Mahathir introduced a framework that will see Malaysia “participating actively” (The Star Online 2019a, b) especially in areas where Malaysia has traditionally been vocal, such as ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Moreover, Malaysia hopes to take a more active role in influencing the great powers because, as discussed earlier, there is an apparent lack of respect for multilateralism and international agreements in the current international system, with the likes of unilateral sanctions and unilateral revocation of special status by populist governments taking place. By definition, emerging middle powers belong to the developing world. These states may not be as militarily powerful as the great powers, but possess sufficient military and economic capability to be considered key states within their respective regions. Like other actors in the international system, emerging middle powers would also like to influence international relations. They seek to do so by playing the role of a mediator in international disputes. Instead of using military force, emerging middle powers support the settling of international disputes by peaceful means, preferably by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. These states have high regard for international law and norms, but where these laws and norms are violated, middle powers will sometimes support the use of force against the perpetrators—as Malaysia

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did in 1991 when it supported the Security Council in authorizing the use of force to drive Iraqi military forces from Kuwait. The emerging middle powers are also interested in trading. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, Jordaan (2003) argued that a number of new states, which he identified as “emerging middle powers,” had appeared in international affairs. He named the following as belonging to this new category of emerging middle powers: Argentina, Malaysia, and South Africa.2 As an emerging middle power, then, Malaysia’s foreign policy behavior is marked by the following features: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Non-use of military power in solving international disputes. Recourse to the application of international law in solving international disputes. Non-interference in domestic affairs of other countries.3 Developing South–South cooperation, especially developing technical cooperation. 5. Expanding Malaysia’s international trade relationship. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974, Malaysia and Qatar have enjoyed a strong economic and trade relationship, despite the special relationship between the respective leaders of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. In an October 2017 visit to Malaysia, the Emir of Qatar HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani was assured of Putrajaya’s continued good relations with Doha. During the visit, the bilateral ties between the two countries were strengthened with the signing of memoranda of understanding in judicial cooperation, diplomacy, and education. ASEAN, of which Malaysia is a core member, views the blockade of Qatar as a grave threat to its economic interests, rather than as representing a beneficial counter-terrorism measure. Economic ties, therefore, were at the top of the agenda during HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani’s visit to Malaysia. Following the visit, Qatar Airways announced its plan to run direct flights from Qatar to Penang, a famous tourist destination in the northern part of Malaysia. Moreover, Malaysia’s call for calm, and its appeal for international actors to help end the dispute, shows the country’s rising role as an emerging middle power.

Literature Review This brief literature review is divided into two parts. The first part provides a general overview of the literature available on the foreign policies of middle powers and emerging middle powers, while the second part provides an overview of studies on Malaysia’s relations with the Middle East, in particular with Qatar. Despite the fact that the concept of middle power has been widely discussed by scholars of International Relations (Wight 2005),4 some scholars remain skeptical of the concept of emerging middle power (Jordaan 2017). In spite of this skepticism, there is nevertheless a wide range of studies on the foreign policies of emerging middle powers. Scholars such as Öni¸s and Kutlay (2017), Black and Hornsby (2016), Schoeman (2000), Balla (2012) Macdonald and Paltiel (2016), and Lee (2016) have devoted

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attention to studying the foreign policies of a number of states dubbed either “traditional middle powers” or emerging middle powers, such as Australia, Canada, South Africa, Turkey, Portugal, Norway, South Korea, and Sweden. These states are defined as “traditional middle powers” because, as Chapnick (2006) argues, they have intermediate influence in world politics. In other words, these states are powers that are neither small nor great; yet these states do enjoy certain amount of international influence. Economically, Malaysia may not qualify as a “traditional” middle power, but due to its foreign policy, which continues to champion the plight of smaller states regionally and globally, it is fair to consider Malaysia as an emerging middle power. Ping (2005) has written a volume on middle powers and uses Indonesia and Malaysia as comparative case studies to test his proposed hybridization theory. Another relevant work is by Nossal and Stubbs (1997), which argues that even though statistically Malaysia is not a middle power, it is an emerging middle power because it had begun to act as one during Prime Minister Mahathir’s first tenure. They identify two reasons behind Malaysia’s becoming an emerging middle power in the late 1980s: Firstly, other countries looked at Malaysia’s extraordinary growth rate since 1988 with awe, and wished to emulate the success. Secondly, Mahathir played a significant role in becoming the voice for the unheard, with his focus on Malaysia’s foreign policy after reigning in the domestic opposition in the 1980s. As is evident from the abovementioned research, very little work has been done that focuses on Malaysia as an emerging middle power. This paper aims to fill that gap in the literature. A number of academic books and articles have focused on Malaysia’s foreign policy. These works deal with a wide variety of issues, from the role of Islam in the country’s foreign policy to the nature of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and other states, including the Middle East. But no academic studies deal specifically with the Malaysia–Qatar relationship in the way this study seeks to do. Some commentaries have appeared in various magazines and newspapers in both Malaysia and Qatar; however, these cannot be considered academic in nature. Nevertheless, there is one exception to this rule: this is Thaib’s (2019) work on the evolution of Malaysia’s diplomatic relations with West Asian states, with special mention of Qatar. This study contains a wealth of information which is absolutely crucial for this paper.

The Contemporary International Situation What is the nature of the contemporary international situation that both Malaysia and Qatar face? It is well described by a section of a report recently released by the London-based Institute of International and Strategic Studies: In 2018, the fraying of key international and regional institutions, the dissipation of the socalled “rules-based order,” the boldness of China and Russia, the persistence of intractable regional conflicts and the unpredictable leadership of the United States were some of the

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dominant themes in commentary and debate about the international situation (Strategic Survey 2018).

The discord among the G-20 member-states in Buenos Aires, Argentina, clearly indicated that the liberal international order, which had upheld the multilateral trading system in operation since 1947, is under serious threat from the very country that used to champion that cause—the United States. The unstable world order forces a country such as Malaysia to take a more proactive role, and thus has thrust the country into becoming an emerging middle power. The Economist (2017) recently remarked that the rules-based international order that emerged from the wreckage of the Second World War was a huge improvement on any preceding era. It stimulated trade on an unprecedented scale and allowed even relatively small and weak countries to develop their potential without fear of predatory interference. At the heart of that order was an underlying principle that perpetrators of aggressive war should not be rewarded. In particular, any territorial gains which derived from their aggression would not be recognized by the international community as being legitimate. Instead, aggressors should be subjected to punishment—usually economic sanctions. Occasionally, concerted military action approved by the United Nations (UN) forced them to relinquish what they had illegally seized.

Yet the liberal international order is under attack from various quarters. Notably, Donald Trump’s “America First” policy explicitly repudiates it; for the first time since the 1930s, the United States’ voters have elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal internationalism. Trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, environment, torture, and human rights—on all these issues, President Trump has made statements that, if acted upon, would effectively bring to an end America’s role as leader of the liberal world order. Simultaneously, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union (EU), and a myriad other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the long postwar project of building a greater union. The uncertainties of Europe, as the quiet bulwark of the wider liberal international order, have global significance. In 2019 the United Kingdom gained a new prime minister in the person of Boris Johnson; similar to President Trump, Johnson is a man who shoots from the hip. Liberal democracy itself appears to be in retreat as varieties of “new authoritarianism” rise to new salience in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, and Turkey. Across the liberal democratic world, populist, nationalist, and xenophobic strands of “backlash” politics have proliferated (Ikenberry 2018). This is but one indication of the discord in the contemporary international liberal order. Such developments do not help countries like Malaysia and Qatar, whose economies flourish only with a multilateral trading system. The “America First” policy of President Donald Trump has contributed to the current state of uncertainty in international affairs. His refusal to clearly condemn right-wing hate groups has encouraged the development of white supremacist groups in the United States and elsewhere. It can also be argued that such ideas have contributed to the development of right-wing populism in a number of European states and elsewhere. Trump’s strong dislike for multilateralism has led to the renegotiation of NAFTA; in addition, the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has

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created problems for a country like Malaysia. President Trump’s open disdain for and withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Change Treaty pushes countries like Malaysia and Qatar one step closer to the mercy of climate change. Perhaps more serious is his threat to withdraw the United States from the World Trade Organization (WTO). These and many other factors bringing about changes in the contemporary international system need close monitoring and analysis. Besides the ongoing volatility in the West, closer to Qatar the Middle East is also facing a challenging time amid rising geopolitical tension. In the span of a few months, there were exploding tankers and drones being shot down over the Strait of Hurmuz, on top of the resumption of sanctions on Iran. In the early hours of 14 September 2019, the world’s biggest petroleum processing facility, in Saudi Arabia, was attacked by drones. Saudi Arabia has said that the attack would reduce the production of oil to half of its capacity. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack, but US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted on putting the blame on the Iranian government (Denning 2019). On a wider global context, this tension within the region, especially between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, can only be bad news for emerging middle powers. Malaysia condemned the attacks and called for dialogue and diplomacy to ease the tension and to avoid further conflict that might jeopardize peace and stability in the region (Kanna 2019).

Changes in the Domestic Political Context of Malaysia Changes in the domestic political order may leave their imprint on a country’s foreign policy, and Malaysia is no exception to this rule. The slogan Malaysia Baharu, or “New Malaysia,” following the victory of PH in the GE-14, galvanized popular sentiment in Malaysia. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s emphasis on the establishment of rule of law, good governance, fighting corruption, and pursuing the corrupt officials responsible for the infamous 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) financial scandal, received wholehearted support from the people. As mentioned earlier, in terms of foreign policy the new Mahathir-led administration does not diverge too much from the previous administration—while the Najib administration was criticized for favoring Chinese investors coming into the country, the current government has honored deals brokered by the Najib administration. Perhaps it is fair to say that in addition to China, Mahathir has returned to his comfort zone by promoting further ties with Japan.5 Chinese investment into Malaysia has steadily risen since Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. After a trip to China in November 2016, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak returned with over $34 billion in deals largely oriented around infrastructure development (Global Risks Insight 2018). Najib’s return was met with both optimism and concern. The optimism stemmed from the benefits that such infrastructure developments could potentially bring, whereas the concern stemmed from the growing Chinese influence in Malaysia. At the center of these

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investments is the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative, an ambitious plan to increase regional connectivity and enhance Chinese soft power. As part of the initiative, China has been supporting infrastructure development along the old Silk Road between Europe and China as well as in Southeast Asia. The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a $13 billion rail line, is a prime example: financed with an 85% loan from the China Exim Bank, the rail line will connect the prosperous west coast of the Malaysian peninsula and its relatively undeveloped east coast. The line will ultimately run from Port Klang on the west coast of the Malaysian peninsula to Kuantan Port on the east, and then up to the north-eastern corner of Malaysia. The ECRL, however, will have a limited capacity. It is estimated that 53 million tons of cargo will use the ECRL annually by 2040, less than 10% of what currently passes through Singapore. Furthermore, the viability of such a route is limited by the logistics of unloading and reloading cargo in order to use the ECRL. Taking all these facts into consideration, the new PH government initially cancelled the project, but following Prime Minister Mahathir’s visit to China in August 2018, both governments decided instead to postpone the ECRL. As Malhi (2018) argues, these developments indicate that the Malaysian election result is not a sign that the new government will repudiate China, but rather represents a change in the basis on which Malaysia might mount arguments for repudiating debts incurred by former prime minister Najib Razak. Another example of the close relation between Malaysia and China is the development of Iskandar Malaysia as the southern economic growth corridor of the country. Beginning in 2006, the development of Iskandar Malaysia fell under the responsibility of the Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA). The development required foreign investment, and since 2006 the top foreign investors into the region have been from China. Therefore, there were a lot of misleading headlines during the time of ex-prime minister Najib Razak over the increasing number of Chinese investors buying properties in Johor, which would supposedly threaten the racial balance of the country. However, since the change in government this rhetoric has died down, and now it is accepted that if Malaysia is to develop, the government cannot ignore the financial resources offered by China. From 2016 until 2018, RM90.51 billion, or 38% of total cumulative committed investment, has come from foreign investors, with China leading the list. According to the CEO of IRDA, investment in the region has led to the creation of 740,000 jobs. This is in line with the prime minister’s emphasis that Chinese investors should focus on technology transfer and bringing with them new factories that would benefit the people of Johor (Today 2018). Malaysia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia also came under the spotlight during the administration of Najib Razak. The first issue was the alleged involvement of a Saudi company in the 1MDB scandal, in which $4.5 billion were alleged to have been siphoned off. The case is still ongoing in the Malaysian court, but in a twist of events, in October 2018 the then foreign minister of Saudi Arabia Adel Ahmed AlJubeir denied that $673 million had been transferred by a Saudi prince into Najib’s bank account. The second issue was the proposal for the withdrawal of a small contingent of Malaysian troops from the Saudi-sponsored Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMTCC). In 2015, when Saudi Arabia formed the IMTCC under then Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman, Malaysia was caught off-guard by

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its inclusion. Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein maintained that Malaysia would support the initiative but stopped short of committing any military presence to fighting the Houthi rebels in Yemen (BBC 2015). However, in the same year, Prime Minister Najib sent Malaysian troops to the kingdom to assist the evacuation of Malaysian nationals in Yemen. The inclusion of Malaysia into this coalition is a symbolic gesture at the close relationship between Malaysia and the Gulf region. But after PH defeated BN in the 2018 election, the PH government’s Defense Minister Haji Mohamad bin Sabu, commonly known as Mat Sabu, in a 2018 commentary suggesting a potential Malaysian re-alignment of its Middle Eastern relationships, noted that Saudi wrath has been directed “oddly, [at] Turkey, Qatar, and Iran … three countries that have undertaken some modicum of political and economic reforms. Instead of encouraging all sides to work together, Saudi Arabia has gone on an offensive in Yemen, too. Therein the danger posed to Malaysia: if Malaysia is too close to Saudi Arabia, Putrajaya would be asked to choose a side” (Dorsey n.a.). The third issue was Malaysia’s decision not to go ahead with plans to set up the King Salman Centre for International Peace (KSCIP) in Putrajaya—the administrative capital of Malaysia. During King Salman Abdul Aziz’s visit to Malaysia in 2017, Prime Minister Najib announced that the government would allocate 16 hectares of land for this purpose. However, Mat Sabu announced in August 2018 that the center would immediately cease operations and its operations be absorbed into the Malaysian Institute of Defense and Security, further straining the relationship between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.

The State of the Malaysia–Qatar Relationship The state of the Malaysia–Qatar bilateral relationship is good and has withstood the changing nature of the international and regional orders in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The relationship between these two countries has developed due to a number of factors, for example, shared political stability in both countries, economic progress, and their image as progressive Muslim counties relative to other Muslim countries that have a more conservative and fundamentalist view on domestic and foreign policies. Malaysia and Qatar are touted as socially and economically progressive, with vibrant and modern societies that are wholly supportive of growth and development. Thus, Malaysia has attracted a lot of attention from many countries in the Middle East as the gateway to further their investments in Southeast Asia. Qatar is no exception. In 1974, Malaysia and Qatar set up diplomatic relations on the basis of nonresident representation. Following this, the relationship between the two countries developed rapidly, which in 2004 led the two sides to upgrade their diplomatic relationship to resident embassy level. Since then, the relationship between Qatar and Malaysia has been developing steadily at the political, cultural, and more importantly at the economic and trade level. In fact, in 2013, US$5 billion was invested in the Pengerang Integrated Petroleum Complex in Johor by Qatar Holding, which

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is a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority. Furthermore, Qatar Holding acquired companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The attractiveness of Malaysia is helping the country to become an influential emerging middle power that may have the ability to sway decisions by the great powers. The following two reasons account for the steady improvement in the relationship between Malaysia and Qatar. The first reason is explained by Thaib (2019) in the following way: “As an active member in NAM and OIC, both Malaysia and Qatar have enjoyed similarities in views and stand on foreign political issues, especially with their ‘moderate foreign policy’ approach towards providing a peaceful resolution to the conflicting parties in the Muslim world.” The second reason is their mutual interest in expanding their trade and economic linkages. Malaysia needs foreign direct investment, especially now that the government finds itself facing a mountain of debt left behind by the previous administration. Although the current PH government is also looking at Japan as a possible source of investment, Malaysia’s interest in countries like Qatar cannot be overstated, due to the massive financial reserves of the country with assets totaling US$320 billion,6 making it among the wealthiest nations. Qatar, on the other hand, which is facing an economic blockade, would also like to diversify its economic and trade relations with ASEAN states like Malaysia. One of the initiatives taken by the Qatar Financial Centre is to develop a close relationship with Malaysia and Turkey so as to become global hubs in the Islamic finance market (Stott 2018). Due to the blockade, international companies in Dubai have started to pour into Doha so as to reach this isolated Gulf country. These and other factors which contribute to the growing healthy and mutually beneficial trade and economic relationship between the two countries, also stand in need of monitoring and discussion.

Furthering Malaysia’s Economic and Trade Relations with Qatar Total bilateral trade between Malaysia and Qatar in 2017 was valued at US$672.24 million, an increase of 18.6 percent compared to the total trade in 2016 (US$566.62 million). In 2017, Qatar was Malaysia’s 39th largest trading partner, 56th largest export destination, and 34th largest import source. Among major Malaysian exports to Qatar in 2017 were processed foods, machinery, equipment and parts, electrical and electronic products, metal and palm oil, and palm-based agriculture products. The oil and gas industry remained the main import from Qatar for 2017, with total imports valued at US$263.86 million according to Ambassador Fadil. More recently, from January until April 2019 (Q1), trade volume between the two countries was valued at US$130 million (Gulf Times 2019). During that period, Malaysia experienced a 19% increase in exports to Qatar, with jewelry leading the list of export goods. Qatar, on the other hand, continues to export oil to Malaysia. The growth of bilateral trade between Malaysia and Qatar remains promising, with development projects

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under the Qatar National Vision 2030 in addition to the ongoing preparations for the 2022FIFA World Cup. The strong relationship would be manifested further in October 2019 with a Trade and Investment Mission by the Malaysian Minister of International Trade and Industry to Doha, including 40 participants from various economic sectors. It should be emphasized that Doha-based Malaysian development and construction companies continue to participate and increase their operations. Malaysia has shown keen interest in further deepening economic and trade relations with Qatar. The Malaysian government believes that the private sector should play a positive role in developing the Malaysia–Qatar economic and trade relationship. We can say with confidence that Malaysian companies highly welcome the establishment of partnerships with Qatari companies. Like Malaysia, over the years Qatar has also shown keen interest in enhancing co-operation between the countries’ private sectors in the fields of trade, investment, technology and services, and other economic fields. During a visit by the Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) to Doha in June 2019, a board member of the Qatar Chamber, Mohamed bin Ahmed al-Obaidli, stated that Malaysia is considered one of the most important economic destinations for the Gulf country. Qatari businessmen are eager to explore the investment opportunities available in the Malaysian market, and especially in Islamic banking, given Malaysia’s years-long expertise in developing the sector. In addition, private equity from Qatar is expected to invest up to US$3.1 billion in Lahad Datu in the state of Sabah (The Malaysian Reserve 2019), and is looking to fund the development of the Sabah Palm Oil Industry Cluster (POIC), which would be the largest investment in the state. At the end of 2018 there was even a rumor that a Qatari individual was interested in investing in Prime Minister Mahathir’s third national car project (Bernama 2018). Although the project has been awarded to a Malaysian firm, Entrepreneur Development Minister Redzuan Yusof acknowledged that an individual from Qatar is interested in investing US$400 billion worldwide, including in Malaysia, even if not necessarily for the national car project. With the aim of improving ties between the private sectors of both countries, officials of the Qatar Chamber, the Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia (MCCM), and the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (NCCIM) signed agreements on the sidelines of the Malaysia–Qatar Economic Forum in Kuala Lumpur on 16 October 2017. The joint business council will collate the necessary information on the economies of both countries, which will enhance bilateral investments. The council will also submit recommendations on how to develop economic and trade cooperation between the Qatari and Malaysian governments and to encourage businessmen from both countries to participate in exhibitions organized in Qatar or Malaysia. Developing cooperation and increasing Malaysia’s international trade are two signs of the country being an emerging middle power.

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Conclusion Malaysia’s relationship with Qatar is good, although there is room for further cooperation especially in the fields of science, technology, culture, and aviation. The Qatar Development Fund has taken a positive step in this direction with the setting up of the Qatar Charity office in Kuala Lumpur in August 2019, to focus on health, education, and skills training for Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. Besides charitable linkages, private investors in Qatar should also be encouraged to invest more in Malaysia’s health and hospitality sectors. HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Emir and Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, arrived in Malaysia for a working visit on 6 December 2018. It was his second visit to Malaysia, his first having been in October 2017. It was viewed by the Gulf Times (2018) as “a clear expression of the depth of the relationship between the two countries.” Qatar, which is hosting the World Cup in 2022, has given the thumbsup to Malaysia’s economy and welcomes the participation of Malaysian companies in development projects, particularly infrastructure. Besides economy and trade, on which the two nations agree that ties should be increased several notches, Malaysia and Qatar also want to see an end to conflicts in the Muslim world. The Malaysia– Qatar relationship is based on the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty of states, non-interference in internal affairs, and the establishment of the best possible relations between them. In other words, Malaysia is indeed playing a role as an emerging middle power. Our discussions in this paper have shown that Malaysia and Qatar are ready to upgrade their cooperation in various sectors, especially in trade and investment. During his December 2018 visit to Malaysia, Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Thani committed himself to continuing discussions and dialogue in areas of investment and enhancing economic cooperation, including encouraging more Malaysian companies to come to Doha. “We are confident that the Malaysian economy is going to grow, especially with the visions that we have heard from the Prime Minister (Dr. Mahathir Mohamad),” he told reporters after the meetings between the two countries in Putrajaya (New Straits Times 2018). Sheikh Mohammed said that Qatar encouraged Malaysian companies to come to Doha and to participate in the development sector, especially in terms of the infrastructure projects that were ongoing for the upcoming World Cup in 2022, and beyond. Notes 1. Resources on the foreign policy of Malaysia include the following: Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981–2003: Dilemmas of Development (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009); Ishtiaq Hossain, “Foreign Policy,” in Abdul Rashid Moten, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Singapore: Cengage, 2013), pp. 413–452; Muhammad Ben Muda, “Malaysia at 50: Malaysia’s Foreign Policy and the Commonwealth Revisited,” The Round Table, Vol. 97, No. 394, pp. 121–135; Johan Sarvanamuttu, “Malaysia’s Foreign

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4. 5. 6.

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Policy in the Mahathir Period, 1981–1995: An Iconoclast Come to Rule,” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 1 (June, 1996), pp. 1–15; Alan Chong & K. S. Balakrishnan, “Intellectual Iconoclasm as Modernizing Foreign Policy: the Cases of Mahathir bin Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew,” The Pacific Review, https:// doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013496; Sean Foley, “The Orientalizing of the Gulf: The GCC and Southeast Asia,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 2012), pp. 77–87; Khadijah Md. Khalid, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under Najib,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 429–452; ChengChwee Kuik, “Malaysia’s US Policy Under Najib: Structural and Domestic Sources of a Small State’s Strategy,’ Asian Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2013), pp. 143–164. For details, see Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers.”. Perhaps the only exception is the case of the Rohingya crisis. It is no exaggeration to say that Malaysia is the only ASEAN member-state which has consistently criticized Myanmar, a fellow ASEAN-member state, for their inhumane treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority living in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. In an unprecedented move, the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad under the Pakatan Harapan government (2018–2020) admonished Aung San Su Kuyi for remaining silent on the issue. See Martin Wight, Power Politics, (1978); John Hobson, The States and International Relations. Following the historic win by PH in 2018, Mahathir’s first trip abroad was to Japan in June 2018. This is an estimation of assets owned by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) by the US-based Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. The data is available at the website of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, https://www.swfinstitute.org/pro file/598cdaa60124e9fd2d05bc5a, accessed 2 April 2020.

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Black, D. R., & Hornsby, D. J. (2016). South Africa’s bilateral relationships in the evolving foreign policy of an emerging middle power. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 54(2), 151–160. Chapnick, A. (2006). The middle power project: Canada and the founding of the United Nations. International Journal, 61(4), 993–996. Denning, L. (2019). Saudi Arabia drone attack is a strike at oil’s future. Bloomberg. Retrieved March 26, 2020, from https://www.bloomberg.com. Dorsey, J. M. (n.a.). Malaysian-Saudi relations: A lesson in the pitfalls of authoritarianism and autocracy. Medium.com. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://medium.com. Flemes, D. (2007). Emerging middle powers’ soft balancing strategy: State and perspectives of the IBSA dialogue forum (GIGA Research Programme: Violence, Power and Security, No. 57, p. 10). Global Risk Insight. (2018). The impact of Chinese investments in Malaysia. Global Risks Insight. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://globalriskinsights.com/. Gulf Times. (2018). Retrieved January 8, 2019, from https://www.gulf-times.com/story/615224/ Amir-s-visit-to-Malaysia-will-enhance-bilateral-ti. Hobson, J. (2005). The states and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7. Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. Politikon, South African Journal of Political Studies, 30(2), 165–181. Jordaan, E. (2017). The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye? South African Journal of International Affairs, 24(3), 395–412. Kanna, H. K. (2019). Malaysia condemns drone attacks on Saudi’s oil plants. New Straits Times. Retrieved March 26, 2020, from https://www.nst.com.my. Lee, S. J. (Ed.). (2016). Transforming global governance with middle power diplomacy: South Korea’s role in the 21st century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Macdonald, L., & Paltiel, J. (2016). Middle power or muddling power? Canada’s relations with emerging markets. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 22(1), 1–11. Malhi, A. (2018). Race, debt and sovereignty-the ‘China factor’ in Malaysia’s GE 14. The Round Table, 107(6), 717–728. New Straits Times. (2018). Malaysia and Qatar boost cooperation. New Strait Times. Retrieved from January 9, 2019, https://www.nst.com.my/news/government-public-policy/2018/12/437843/mal aysia-and-qatar-boost-cooperation. Nossal, K. R., & Stubbs, R. (1997). Mahathir’s Malaysia: An emerging middle power? In A. F. Cooper (Eds.), Niche diplomacy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Öni¸s, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2017). The dynamics of emerging middle-power influence in regional and global governance: The paradoxical case of Turkey. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(2), 164–183. Ping, J. H. (2005). Middle power statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific. London, UK: Routledge. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) by the US-based Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Retrieved from https://www.swfinstitute.org/profile/598cdaa60124e9fd2d05bc5a. Schoeman, M. (2000). South Africa as an emerging middle power. African Security Review, 9(3), 47–58 (Revise in-text). Stott, M. (2018). Qatar partners Malaysia, Turkey to conquer Islamic finance market. Nikkei Asian Review. Retrieved March 26, 2020 from https://asia.nikkei.com. Strategic Survey. (2018). Prospectives. Strategic Survey, 118(1), 11. Subbaraman, R., Varma, S., & Loo, M. (2019). US-China trade diversion: Who benefits? Nomura. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://www.nomuraconnects.com. Thaib, L. (2019). The evolution of the Malaysian diplomatic relation with West Asia: Special reference to Malaysia-Qatar relations. Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from https://socialscienceresearch.org. The Economist. (2017, September 21). The liberal order of the past 70 years is under threat. The Economist. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com.

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Part IV

Foreign Policy Dynamics in a Post-GCC Era

Chapter 14

Competing Radicalisms: A Comparison of Saudi and Iranian Foreign Policies After 2015 Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed Al-Ansari

On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt initiated a blockade on the state of Qatar. While many justifications were offered for the blockade, the blockading countries, led by Saudi Arabia, focused on Qatar’s relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, the initial falsified statements attributed to HH the Emir of Qatar, which were publicized through a hack of the Qatar National News Agency1 and then used as pretext for the blockade, had heavily focused on praising Iran. Furthermore, when the Saudi-led bloc issued its list of thirteen demands, the first two required that Qatar sever its ties with Iran and Iranianlinked groups in the region such as Hezbollah2 ; and although Qatar maintained that it did not have a special relationship with Iran, Saudi Arabia continued to pressure Qatar to decrease its interactions with the republic. Iran, on the other hand, utilized the rift in the Gulf Cooperation Council to further its foreign policy towards the coastal states of the Gulf and especially Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, pulling them further from the Saudi sphere of influence. The foreign policies of both Iran and Saudi Arabia had shifted significantly in 2015. On 14 July 2015, Iran signed a comprehensive nuclear agreement with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which was widely expected to facilitate Iran’s reentry into the international community.3 Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, had undergone a significant power transition following the death of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz on 23 January 2015. The political costs associated with 1 For more details, see: https://www.trtworld.com/mea/hackers-target-qatar-s-state-owned-newsagency-7246. 2 For more on the demands, see: https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/what-are-the-13-demandsgiven-to-qatar-1.2048118. 3 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5 + 1: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, plus Germany.

M. Zweiri (B) · M. Al-Ansari Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_14

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some of their subsequent decisions have had negative impacts on their foreign policy conduct, national interests, and global image. Whereas Iran’s global engagement efforts initially improved its image around the world, Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen and its ambitious foreign policy arguably damaged the kingdom’s standing within the international community. The application of rational choice theory and the rational actor model can shed light on the role of rationality in the foreign policy decision-making of the two countries. Moreover, comparative analysis of the foreign policy of Iran and Saudi Arabia since 2015 reveals differences in their policies towards regional conflicts, the Trump administration, and their relations with other countries around the world.

Rational Choice Theory and the Rational Actor Model The rational actor model has its roots in Adam Smith’s microeconomic principles, which assess the behavior of the individual in furthering his or her perceived interests by calculating the opportunity costs associated with any particular decision (Monroe 2001). The rational actor model focuses on the “actor,” whereas rational choice theory, as an overarching theoretical framework, looks at the entirety of the decision-making process rather than only the actions themselves. Both processes are important for understanding international affairs and politics; however, their usage is not interchangeable, but depends on the political system that exists in the state under investigation. In Iran and Saudi Arabia, foreign policy decision-making often rests in the hands of a single actor: the leader or the monarch. The process of carrying out the action is handled by various institutional mechanisms responsible for executing and implementing decisions. These institutional mechanisms are more robust in the system of governance in Iran than in Saudi Arabia, but the ways in which they are utilized are often selective, depending on the policy in question. Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate how these two states adhere to or depart from the basic tenets of rationality as defined by these theories. Moreover, any given case offers an opportunity to explore the ways in which self-interests, defining goals, analyses of available information, and cost–benefit calculations of risks and rewards are pursued (Euben 1995). Monroe (1995) argues that seven key assumptions underpin the rational actor model: (1) actors pursue goals; (2) these goals reflect the actors’ perceived selfinterest; (3) behavior results from a process of conscious choice; (4) the individual is the basic actor in society; (5) actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable; (6) in considering options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility; and (7) actors possess extensive information about the available alternatives and the likely consequences of their choices. This model of a “rational actor” matches the processes widely believed to be available in Western democracies: thus, particular issues arise when considering the individuals in power in autocratic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Leaders in the West pursue what they believe will advance their self-interest, but institutional decision-making mechanisms also

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assure the validity and viability of the cost–benefit calculus of any particular action and its implication for national interests. In Iran and Saudi Arabia, however, such “checks” on the leader’s goals are relatively muted or entirely absent. Although some of the principles of the rational actor model may apply, other aspects do not pertain in Iran and Saudi Arabia. The following sections briefly explain the role of rationality in foreign policy decision-making in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The Rationality Factor in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran In the Islamic Republic of Iran, rationality in foreign policy decision-making is formulated differently than rational choice theory would suggest. Since 1979, Iran and its foreign policy have been guided by the principles that shaped the revolution and the Islamic Republic that emerged from it. The revolutionary zeal, the ideology of Khomeini, and the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, as well as the objection to imperial and Western domination, set the framework for Iran’s decision-making principles. These principles run counter to the assumptions of rational choice theory, particularly in terms of the cost–benefit analysis of national interest. As Mortazavi (2004) argues, “Iranians, unlike the United States, do not use a cost–benefit analysis to make decisions.” Especially in the early days of the Islamic Republic, the leadership was first and foremost concerned with restoring a sense of national dignity “at any economic cost.” Mortazavi (2004) explains that the choice to hold fifty-two Americans as hostages had significant economic costs for Iran, thus concluding that “the rational choice model was not used in making its decisions.” Iran’s revolutionary ideology has shaped its foreign policy for some four decades since the Islamic revolution, and the ideology of Khomeini persists even thirty years after his death. As Takeyh (2012) contends, Iran continues to be committed to Khomeini’s worldview. Iran thus differs from other revolutionary states, including China and Vietnam, which eventually evolved beyond the ideology and guidance of revolutionary leaders to fall more in line with the Western-led international system. There is little doubt that Iran is a revisionist revolutionary state keen on challenging the status quo of American domination in global politics and countering its influence in the Middle East. Revisionist powers, according to Combes (2011–12), are fundamentally committed to remodeling the international system to better serve their “own benefit and interests.” These benefits and interests may not follow the principles of rational choice theory; and in Iran’s case the leaders may attempt to advance Iran’s regional and international standing at any cost and without considering the principal tenets of rationality in foreign policy decision-making. In their political language, American policymakers according to Euben (1995) have “long reflected the conviction that fundamentalist Iran is the embodiment of the irrational.” The West sees Iran as “a nation of potential martyrs fueled not by

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rational self-interest, but by ‘fanatical’ subservience to God and primal anti-Western hatreds.” Consider statements by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, insisting that Iranians are “apocalyptic” and arguing against viewing the country’s leaders as rational (Zakaria 2015). Other Israeli officials, such as Moshe Ya’alon, the former defense minister, have also characterized the Iranian government as a “messianic and apocalyptic regime.” On the other hand, scholars such as Barrett (2011) argue that “apocalyptic messianism does not drive Iranian policy” and, in his words, “the driver is the geopolitical situation and how Iran perceives its interests.” Rationality is defined by Iran itself as advancing perceived national interests, with little regard for cost–benefit calculations. For example, General Martin Dempsey, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, views Iran as a “rational actor” when it comes to its calculations on the nuclear issue (Singh 2012). Likewise, another former US general has asserted that Iran is “obviously” a rational actor, arguing that “just because you don’t agree with somebody, doesn’t make them an irrational actor (Gabreyes 2015). This perspective allows for the broadening of rational choice theory, such that all seven attributes set forth by Monroe can be adapted on a case-by-case basis. John Mearsheimer, a notable realist, claims that rational actors are cognizant of their “external environment” and are focused on “how to maximize their prospects for survival” (Mearsheimer 2009). However, he also argues that rational actors in the international system are prone to miscalculations, due to the fact that they are forced to make consequential decisions based on “imperfect information,” or because domestic politics distorts the decision-making calculus of leaders (Mearsheimer 2009). During the transition of power from Khomeini to Khamenei in 1989, a decade after the revolution, Iranian leaders moved away from a purely ideological foreign policy modus operandi towards a more pragmatic and professional approach. While it is true that Iran’s foreign policy is driven by the Supreme Leader alone, particularly so during the leadership of Khomeini, the office of the president has been an important influencer and is the ultimate authority in implementing these policies. Furthermore, the different foreign policy approaches of Iranian presidents can best be explained by a comparative analysis of rationality in the foreign policies of Khatami and Ahmadinejad as well as Ahmadinejad and Rouhani. As Shabani and Rouhi explain, the decision-making process in Iran “resembles a pentagon, rather than a pyramid,” constituting a complex process that incorporates the varying worldviews of the different presidents and the implications of their often dissimilar approaches (Shabani and Rouhi 2013). The costs of Iran’s decisions in the early years of the Islamic Republic included its estrangement from the oft-utilized international frameworks and platforms for political and economic cooperation. Yet in recent years the Islamic Republic has pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy that factors in the tenets of the rational actor model. Even though Iran’s direct involvement in Syria and its indirect interference in Bahrain and Yemen have had severe political and economic repercussions, its pursuit of a nuclear agreement with world powers and direct negotiations with the United States demonstrate a slight shift in its foreign policy decision-making. The economic costs of engaging in Syria were acceptable for Iran’s regime, but the socio-political

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costs of its involvement have seriously damaged its regional and international foreign policy objectives. Thus, as has become clear in the years since the signing of the nuclear agreement, Iran’s regional policies, particularly with regard to Syria, have continued to limit its global engagement efforts and have become key factors in the Trump administration’s policies with regard to Iran.

The Rationality Factor in the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia and Iran were the twin pillars of US policy in the Middle East until 1979. After the Iranian Revolution and its resultant adoption of an anti-American stance, Saudi Arabia was quick to further its standing as the sole US partner in the Gulf. Since then the kingdom has managed to pursue its foreign policy with the strong backing of every US administration, while expanding its relations regionally and globally. The conflict between Iran and the United States, coupled with the vast increase in oil production and revenues from Saudi exports, allowed the kingdom to pursue a largely rational foreign policy for decades with strong support from the United States and other Western governments. Saudi Arabia’s overarching foreign policy doctrine, according to Prince Turki alFaisal, rests on external security and energy security: “external security involves [Saudi] affairs with other nations,” while energy security encompasses “overall energy production policy as it is designed to maintain stable global energy markets.” The prince asserts that “in all these areas Islam is central (Al Faisal 2013).” Beyond this official formulation, Karim argues that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy goals include “expanding regional influence to counter threats against territorial integrity, as well as containing supra-state ideologies that can threaten or question the legitimacy of the Saudi regime” (Karim 2017). Omni-balancing between internal and external threats has been a key guiding policy, and when there is a need “to counter an internal threat, support has been sought from external resources, and if an external threat becomes menacing, internal unity and legitimacy have been used to counter it” (Karim 2017). Domestic and foreign policies are often linked in Saudi Arabia, and the rationality of decision-making must be viewed within this context. Furthermore, foreign policy decision-making is largely a family matter in Saudi Arabia. Faisal bin Abdulaziz served as the Saudi foreign minister from 1930 until 1960, then again from 1962 until 1975, when for the last eleven years he was also the king of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, from 1975 until 2015, the foreign ministry was in the hands of his son, Saud bin Faisal. Thus, for more than eighty years, the foreign ministry of Saudi Arabia was run by a father and son who shaped the country’s international affairs under the direct guidance of the monarch. During the rule of King Faisal, the system of governance was a mix of absolute power of the monarch as well as a variant of power-sharing among his brothers.

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Within this context, the king was “primus inter pares among his brothers and halfbrothers” (Karim 2017). These unique factors require that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy be analyzed using both a leader-centric (or family-centric) model and a reactionary framework with regard to regional events. Combining the two can better explain the rationality (or irrationality) of decision-making within the ruling Al-Saud family. Soon after the Iranian Revolution and the start of the war between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia embarked on its most rational foreign policy quest, forming the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with five of its Arab neighbors in 1981. Although oil prices were significantly lower than in the previous decade, King Fahad, along with other GCC rulers, spent billions supporting Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran, to stop what was widely perceived as Iran’s attempts to export the revolution around the region. Saudi support for Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran was rational and succeeded in stopping Iran from pursuing expansionist policies in the region, but the policy backfired when Saddam Hussein turned against the GCC and invaded Kuwait in 1990. Because self-reliance in defense and security matters was not a viable option for protecting the country against external threats, the invasion of Kuwait was a clear sign that Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries needed to depend heavily on the United States for their internal and external security. As Allen argues, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait “exposed the ineffectiveness of Saudi’s costly defenses and Fahad had to accept American help to the dismay of his critics at home” (Allen 2005). Although the choice to invite American patronage to help protect the country from external threats was rational, the policy came at a heavy cost. Allen states that “the presence of foreign ‘infidels’ on Saudi territory helped turn some Saudis into virulent, anti-monarchist militants (Allen 2005).” This negative outcome can be viewed in tandem with the calculated assistance offered to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979. For Saudi Arabia, the goal was to stop the Soviet Union from supporting Arab and Muslim “progressives” and at the same time win the approval of the United States through a joint partnership supporting the Mujahideen. This action bolstered Saudi Arabia’s soft power as the protector of the faith and burnished Saudi Arabia’s reputation throughout the Islamic world. Yet although the decision to support the Mujahedin was viewed as rational at first, the consequences were dire. Having unintentionally assisted the radicalization of large segments of the fighters, Saudi policy motivated the subsequent actions by Osama bin Laden and extremists alike. The lack of a clear approach to mitigate these issues seriously hampered the country’s internal and external security. A new foreign policy approach was needed. First as crown prince and later as king, Abdullah pursued a more pragmatic and rational foreign policy in reaction to geopolitical shifts in the 1990s as well as the September 11 attacks in the United States. Abdullah believed that “Saudis cannot remain the same while the world changes” (Ataman 2017). Among his initiatives was a new push to engage diplomatically with Iran and move towards resuming and expanding bilateral relations. For example, Abdullah visited Iran in December 1997 as the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, to participate in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit that was held in Tehran—the first official interaction

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between the two countries on Iranian soil. The goal was to advance mutual interests. Following these rational interactions, King Fahad stated during a speech in 1999 that enhancing relations with Iran and strengthening relations with the Islamic Republic was not just in the interest of the Arab states of the Gulf, but also in the interest of the Islamic world at large (Masry 2016). In unison, Khamenei also pushed for expanding cooperative relations with Saudi Arabia. These interactions led to the signing of various agreements between the two countries in 2000, including on security and antiterrorism (Eltahawy 1999). These short-lived engagement efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran were among the most rational foreign policy decisions made by both countries in recent decades; these new policies had the potential to significantly decrease regional tensions as well as alter threat perceptions that entailed heavy economic costs. Yet the continuous regional and international tumult—including the September 11 attacks, the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the Arab uprisings—pulled Iran and Saudi Arabia gradually away from one another. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the reformulation of Saudi regional policies so as to check Iran in its attempts to expand its sphere of influence. In addition, Iran’s backing of Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia’s support for the Mustaghbal party, as opposing groups within Lebanon, had a significant impact on the deterioration of relations between the kingdom and the Islamic Republic. With the start of the Arab uprisings in 2011, King Abdullah was forced to adapt his foreign policy approach to meet the urgent need for stability in the Gulf region. Protests in Bahrain, Oman, and even the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia pushed the king to act. The Saudi government intervened in Bahrain “to save its ally” and demonstrate that “instability in the GCC is a red line for the Saudis” (Karim 2017). In the terms of rationality, the intervention was a well-calculated move that bolstered Saudi Arabia’s internal and external security while also protecting an important neighboring ally. Such boldness inspired the idea that Saudi Arabia could exert its force in other arenas as well, including in Egypt, to support ruling authoritarian governments and inhibit the success of revolutionary movements. When King Salman came to power in 2015, however, he significantly altered the mostly rational decision-making processes established by his predecessors. Salman gave significant powers to his son, Muhammad, first as prince and then as crown prince, as well as to a group of mostly young and inexperienced princes whose wideranging initiatives have drastically altered Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy (Ataman 2017). According to Karim, “Saudi foreign policy is gradually evolving from being cautious and calculated to more assertive and ambitious.” King Salman’s approach “posits the kingdom as the main power defending political interests in the Sunni Arab world” (Karim 2017). This evolution in foreign policy decision-making has seemingly led to more irrational choices than sound and logical ones. This change can be ascribed to the fact that the traditional, more consultative system of decisionmaking, which resulted in a pragmatic, cautious, and non-interventionist foreign policy, is viewed by the current rulership as inefficient and insufficient to address the immediate issues and concerns of the kingdom. Under the rulership of King Salman and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, foreign policy decision-making is now

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more rapid, centralized, and exclusive, leading to an increase in miscalculations and irrational choices (Karim 2017).

Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Policy of Iran and Saudi Arabia Since 2015 In the 1980s and 90s, Iran was widely seen as irrational, whereas Saudi Arabia, in comparison, was viewed as a rational actor in the region. When Iran was expanding its adventurist foreign policy, Saudi Arabia was relatively unobtrusive. While Iran was viewed as a threat to regional security in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia was considered the protector of regional and international security interests. Today, however, these facts have changed. While Iran’s foreign policy has remained more or less the same, only with an increase in the diplomatic and economic measures meant to constructively engage the international community, Saudi Arabia is now regarded as an irrational actor. Adventurism has taken over its foreign policy, and regional and international fears have been raised in response to its destabilizing actions. Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, plus Germany and the European Union, concluded with an agreement in July 2015 that has had a significant impact on the geopolitics in the Gulf, as well as on regional and international relations, and more specifically on Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. The fear that a rapprochement between Iran and the United States will affect the latter’s relationships with its traditional allies and partners, as well as change the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor, has unsettled Saudi Arabia. As Aras and Yorulmazlar (2014) argue, the Iranian–American détente was “perceived by most of the region’s leaders as a major threat to the existing regional power equations.” According to Kusch, other leaders “don’t want Iran as a player in the JCPOA have contributed to rising tensions between Iran and at least three member states of the GCC, most notably Saudi Arabia. On 2 January 2016, while preparations for the implementation of the nuclear agreement were underway in Iran, and at a time when the Islamic Republic was keen on diplomatically engaging the GCC countries in a post-crisis era, Saudi Arabia executed a prominent Shi’a cleric. As Karim argues, this action in Saudi Arabia linked domestic security with foreign policy, because the “Saudi leadership clearly meant to signal that any political attempt to destabilize the Kingdom would be handled with severity regardless of the political repercussions” (Karim 2017). In response, groups of angry protesters ransacked the empty Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in the city of Mashhad (Iran Newspaper 2017). This event led the Saudis cut all diplomatic, commercial, and travel ties with the Islamic Republic and initiate a campaign to convince all regional and international countries to follow suit (Wilkin 2016). Resentment against Iran increased and “generated a fervent backing for the Saudi regime in its endeavor” (Karim 2017).

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Regional Conflicts Saudi Arabia under the de facto leadership of Mohammad bin Salman has embarked on an ambitious, provocative, and assertive quest to change domestic and foreign policies. As the defense minister and deputy crown prince, bin Salman orchestrated the war in Yemen, an undertaking that was at first believed would conclude in a few short weeks, but in fact has been on-going for more than four years. The irrationality of this military engagement can be ascribed to miscalculations that resulted from limited experience and incompetent or non-existent advisors. Within the context of rational choice theory, which emphasizes the mental process and the subjective limitations of an agent’s ability to decide rather than the outcome of the decisionmaking process, bin Salman aimed at achieving relative “satisfaction” rather than at “maximizing utility” (Euben 1995). If a cost–benefit calculus of risks and rewards were weighed and evaluated with respect to the specified goal of protecting the administration of Mansour Hadi, in keeping with the core tenets of the rational actor model, it would have been clear that the choice to go to war had a much lower ranking than any other strategic option. The importance of the internal dynamics between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates should also not be underestimated. That Muhammad bin Salman and Muhammad bin Zayed were effectively the deciding actors in initiating the military campaign soon after the transition of power in Saudi Arabia, proves the relevance of the relationship. The war was supposed to showcase bin Salman as a strong military figure and a protector of Saudi national security; indeed, he banked on this outcome, so took a bold move to combat what was framed as Iranian incursions on Saudi Arabia’s doorstep. Bin Zayed’s role as a brotherly advisor to bin Salman further augmented the crown prince’s image in this regard. The war in Yemen has aggravated economic and financial challenges in Saudi Arabia at a time when oil prices have significantly decreased and the country is implementing a wide-ranging economic diversification strategy as well as infrastructure development plans. One estimate suggests that Saudi Arabia spent US$5 billion in the first twenty months of its Yemen campaign, and the amount continues to grow as the war goes on with no end in sight (Karim 2017). Various scholarly assessments deem the war militarily unwinnable; the only way to end the impasse is to pursue a sound political process through the United Nations. In response to growing domestic pressures and discontents, the Saudi leadership has repeatedly pointed to Iran’s role in the conflict: the war has been portrayed as a Saudi-led campaign against Iran-backed Houthi rebels. This domestic dissatisfaction with the war comes at a time when Saudi Arabia has introduced stringent subsidy cuts, raising rates for utility bills, gasoline, and taxation. Focusing on Iran as a threat allows for the silencing of criticism. Iran and Saudi Arabia have adopted conflicting policies with regard to Yemen and Syria. Whereas Saudi Arabia is actively engaged in the war in Yemen, its involvement in Syria is limited to financial assistance offered to the opposition groups. Iran, on the other hand, is active on the ground in Syria and has been a key figure in protecting

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Bashar Al-Assad’s power; in Yemen, its involvement is limited to providing rhetorical support and widely reported periodic shipments of military equipment (Riedel 2017). While Iranian officials have admitted to providing assistance to the rebels, Iran’s spending is a mere fraction of what Saudi Arabia has invested in Yemen and around the region. At the same time, Iran has been significantly more successful than Saudi Arabia in achieving its foreign policy objectives (Riedel 2017). On the other hand, Iran failed to utilize the large sums of cash it received as part of the nuclear agreement—estimated at between US$32 to 55 billion transferred to the country in cash as well as released from international financial institutions— on domestic infrastructure and development projects (Kessler 2018). Many Iranian critics believe that Iran has spent the new capital on its plans in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as Yemen (Gertz 2018). The domestic discourse has severely threatened internal security, and since December 2017 the country has witnessed growing protests. The primary reason for this domestic as well as international dissatisfaction is the perceived irrationality of Iran’s policy towards Syria, which runs counter to core revolutionary principles that dictate support for the oppressed. Although Iran invoked this principle in its policy towards other Arab uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen, its continuing support for Assad in Syria has called into question its oft-repeated justifications for interfering in regional affairs. Iran’s actions in Syria are undoubtedly tied to its anti-Israel policy. Given that Iran is not able or willing to wage war on Israel, owing to its limited military capacity and fear of engaging the United States in an armed conflict, its maneuverings in Syria are in a sense rational by default. The aforementioned limitations have forced the country to act rationally. Yet the conflict between Iran and Israel has intensified in Syria, particularly since 2017, and has negatively affected the situation. At the same time, Iran’s policies are linked to the fact that the Islamic Republic is not keen to facilitate the return of Syria to the Arab sphere of influence, nor is Iran eager to let go one of the very few Arab allies it has. Iran’s regional policies must also be viewed in tandem with the situation inside Iran. Since 2017, Iran has faced terrorist attacks in Tehran, Khuzestan, and SistanBaluchestan provinces. Given recent (and past) terrorist attacks, the Islamic Republic has been presenting itself as a victim of terrorism—a notion that runs up against the view of Iran, held by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others, as a perpetrator of terrorism. Furthermore, following the terrorist attack in the city of Ahvaz on 22 September 2018, which killed 25 civilians as well as members of Iran’s military and Revolutionary Guards Corps, Iran pointed the finger at the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In a statement following the terror attack, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “this crime is a continuation of the plots of the regional states that are puppets of the United States, and their goal is to create insecurity in our dear country” (Al Jazeera 2018). Iran’s regional actions could be viewed in relation to the rivalry that exists between the country and its regional adversaries across the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, which had vowed to take the war “inside Iran” (Aboudi and Fahmy 2017).

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The United States as a Factor in Foreign Policy Decision Making Iran’s foreign policy has been shaped by an anti-imperialist principle that is often only targeted at the United States, and its influence as well as actions in the region. Iran’s most rational decision in the last decade was its agreement in 2013 to participate in high-level negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program. These discussions complemented and merged with the ongoing, unsuccessful talks between Iran and European countries that had begun in 2002. The possibility that an agreement would alter the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor was as intriguing to the Islamic Republic as it was unnerving for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries. Following the settlement of the nuclear issue with Iran, the United States planned to decrease its role in the Middle East and address growing US concerns in East Asia. Thus President Obama argued in an interview just months after the implementation of the nuclear agreement that Iran and Saudi Arabia “need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace” (Goldberg 2016). Iran was hoping for real change, but this comment was unwelcome to Saudi Arabia and was a primary reason for the deterioration of relations between Riyadh and Washington in the final year of the Obama Administration. Even before the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, it was clear that President Obama’s engagement efforts with Iran would not continue under a Republican successor and that the United States would not abandon its traditional Arab allies in the Gulf. With the announcement of the decision to end US participation in the JCPOA and the re-imposition of sanctions that were lifted as part of the nuclear agreement in May 2018, Donald Trump signaled his intent to prioritize the containing and countering of Iran as the administration’s signature Middle East policy. Ever since, President Trump has repeatedly stated that it needs Saudi Arabia in its endeavor to counter Iran’s actions in the region. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, alienated by Obama’s foreign policy, was keener than ever to take up the offer and join the United States in its efforts to reshape the regional balance of power once again, and shift the US Middle East policy back to the Bush era. Strengthening the relationship with the Trump Administration has been the single most important and notable achievement of bin Salman in particular and Saudi Arabia in general. Regardless of the fact that the relationship is now singlehandedly tied to a non-contracted promise of US$450 billion in arms purchases, the young crown prince managed to keep the Trump Administration’s focus on Iran, while receiving praise and support for almost every single foreign policy action of Saudi Arabia. From the decision to impose the blockade on Qatar, the detainment of prominent Saudi businessmen, to the spat with Canada, the continuing war in Yemen, and the aftermath of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the United States has either amplified its support for Saudi Arabia or stayed silent when many in the international community were expecting a strong response. Donald Trump chose Riyadh as the destination for his first foreign trip, taking part in an Arab–Islamic–American summit that notably excluded Iran. The event, held a

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day after the 19 May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, offered a clear illustration of how the Saudi bet on Donald Trump made rational sense and how Iran’s rational decision to negotiate with the United States had not led to tangible, positive results. The trip signified the importance of Saudi Arabia for the United States. It legitimized the kingdom’s efforts in countering terrorism financing and set in motion a hawkish anti-Iran policy that included the establishment of an Arab NATO-like pact dubbed the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA). Additionally, the Trump Administration has been pushing for the “deal of the century” between the Palestinians and the Israelis and is heavily relying on Saudi Arabia in working towards this goal. By way of expanding relations between Mohammad bin Salman and Jared Kushner, President Trump’s special adviser and son-in-law, the two countries seem to be on the same page with regards to a future deal that will supposedly end the decades-long conflict. Yet this new approach departs from Saudi Arabia’s often back-seat diplomatic maneuverings with regard to Palestine since the 1940s. The deal is not only favorable to Israel with regards to recognizing its claims over Jerusalem, but it also legitimizes the Israeli settlements in the West Bank by offering limited autonomy in areas already under Palestinian control (Filkins 2018). Saudi Arabia is surely seeking to bolster its ties with the Trump Administration—to make sure that US policies in the Middle East do not shift focus from containing Iran, to support bin Salman in his endeavors for reform and future rulership, and to back the Saudi–Emirati position with regard to dealing with the consequences of the Arab Spring. Iran, on the other hand, has pointed to the Saudi position on Palestine to further its credentials as the “protector” of Palestinian interests and showcase its dedication to the cause of Al Quds by organizing various conferences as well as providing rhetorical support in official statements. Additionally, Iran has been using the Palestinian issue to garner support on the streets by attacking the Saudi position. The diverging regional policies continue in other arenas as well. The blockade against Qatar, imposed soon after Trump’s visit to Riyadh, was as unexpected as it was irrational. As Harb (2017) writes, the Saudi–Emirati-led blockade, joined by Bahrain and Egypt, displays a careless disregard “of the basic tenets of rational decision-making and brinkmanship.” The conviction that Qatar would be left with no choice but to adhere to the list of unrealistic demands allowed for the implementation of this irrational decision by the quartet. That the blockade was imposed just days after Trump’s trip to Riyadh further fueled Saudi Arabia’s ill-conceived perception of its actual powers and reach. Not only did the quartet fail to garner support from the international community, but two of the other GCC countries (Kuwait and Oman) did not join the blockade. The irrationality became evident as soon as Qatar was able to secure imports, ensure its security, and garner global support within a relatively short time. Although terminating Turkey’s military presence and curbing diplomatic ties with Iran were among the thirteen demands levied on Qatar, the blockade itself helped strengthen and enhance relations among Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. As Harb (2017) argues, Qatar was asked to “shed whatever independence, sovereignty, and freedom of action it has secured over decades in return for nothing but a dependent relationship that places

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its domestic and foreign policies under the control of its larger neighbors.” It was rational for Qatar to refuse to subjugate itself to the demands by the quartet, and so expose the irrationality of Saudi Arabia’s justifications for such actions. At the same time, Iran’s overnight decision to alter its policies with regard to Qatar, from hostile rivalry to friendly win–win relations, established the Islamic Republic as a rational actor. Iran took advantage of the situation to boost its national interests at no political or economic cost. Rouhani, for example, condemned the quartet for imposing the blockade by calling it an unjust “siege,” and “vowed to stand with Qatar” (Pradhan 2018). In addition, by providing support for Qatar, Iran managed to score points against Saudi Arabia within the GCC context, and even though the official interactions are limited, the situation led to the empowerment of Iran. These developments in the region come to the dismay of Saudi Arabia and have had a significant impact in preventing the kingdom from achieving its stated objectives (Regencia 2017).

International Relations Aside from Qatar, the Saudi government has engaged in a series of shocking, irrational, and unsuccessful foreign policy blunders. The putative detainment of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, in a bid to end Iran’s influence in Lebanon and diminish the role of Hezbollah, brought international attention to Saudi Arabia’s irrational policies and foreign policy approaches. Hariri, a dual Saudi-Lebanese national, traveled to Riyadh in an official capacity; however, reports conclude that he was arrested soon after arriving and forced to videotape a resignation address. Hariri read the speech, but many analysts and international politicians believe the words were not his own. Saudi and American officials have denied cooperation on this matter, but Filkins (2018) asserts that “there were indications that [bin Salman] had coordinated his moves with the Trump Administration, possibly at the summit in Riyadh” and had “received a ‘green light’ to remove Hariri.” Hariri’s detainment prompted serious concerns about the foreign policy conduct of Saudi Arabia. It also fueled domestic unease in the kingdom, because at the same time as the Saudis seemed to be meddling in the affairs of Lebanon, the crown prince instituted a wide-ranging and high-caliber anti-corruption purge involving the arrest of several leading businessmen as well as members of the Al-Saud ruling family. All were imprisoned at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Riyadh. The move was unique in Saudi Arabia’s history. Although the arrest of “corrupt” individuals was widely seen as a positive move in the country and garnered significant domestic support for bin Salman, its audacity and methods challenged most pre-conceived notions of internal dynamics in the kingdom. Whether silencing critics and arresting rivals within the ruling family and business elite, or attempting to subvert the legitimate prime minister of another country, Saudi Arabia has changed its domestic and foreign policies. As Gause (2018) attests, Mohammad bin Salam has “removed the restraints that have made Saudi foreign and

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domestic policy cautious, conservative, and ultimately successful amid the crises of the modern Middle East.” The crown prince further tested the international waters and the patience of Western partners with a move to cut diplomatic ties with Canada over a tweet about human rights and a detained Canadian-Saudi dual national. Saudi Arabia’s anger blew out of proportion when the kingdom forced Saudi citizens, mostly students, to leave the country within a short period of time. While the United States and most other countries remained silent and did not back Canada, this irrational foreign policy decision once again caught the international community by surprise and called attention to the crown prince’s behavior as the de facto ruler of the kingdom. Iran, on the other hand, continues to implement its commitments to the nuclear agreement and has been actively seeking to augment its diplomatic and economic relations with the remaining signatories of the JCPOA as well as a number of other European and Asian countries. Iran rationally calculated the cost and benefits of remaining or withdrawing from the agreement after the Trump Administration’s decision to pull out. Unexpectedly, the Islamic Republic remained committed to its obligations under the agreement, creating tension in relations between the United States and the European signatories to the agreement, and has significantly reduced the impacts of the reimposition of US sanctions. Such policies and approaches by Iran illustrate its change in foreign policy conduct, from being irrational in the early years of the Islamic Republic to becoming a more mature and rational country that has gradually learned the importance of following the tenets of rational choice theory. At the same time, however, Iran’s actions in Syria continue to illustrate the irrational tendencies within its foreign policy decision-making processes. The country has seriously damaged its regional and international image by aiding and assisting the Assad regime. Iran’s policies with regard to Syria have repeatedly shown its double standards against its own principles and have severely hindered the country’s aspirations to be recognized as a friendly regional Islamic power. At the same time, Iran’s alleged terror operations in European capitals in 2017 and 2018 (foiled before their execution) have reminded the international community of its actions in the 1980s when a number of Iranian dissidents were killed on European soil. Such irrational conduct, be it by rogue elements or at the directive of high-ranking officials, are examples of a continuous pattern of wrongful policies that beget heavy economic costs for the country. At the same time, however, these actions have been sidelined by Saudi Arabia’s regional and international actions that have shifted the decades-long focus on the Islamic Republic to a single person in the kingdom. The most striking move by Saudi Arabia was the brutal murder of a Saudi Arabian citizen and an internationally recognized journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, in its consulate in Istanbul. The killing prompted international media organizations and a significant number of European and Asian countries to heavily criticize the country—in some cases, for the first time in decades. Not only did the Saudi government at first denounce any links between the kingdom and the murder, they also denied any knowledge of the incident, pointed to “rogue” actors as perpetrators, and eventually named and arrested eighteen individuals for the murder. Although five officials were dismissed as the results of the investigation surfaced, the widely held belief that the crown prince

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ordered the murder was never proven, thanks in large part to the support by the Trump Administration. At the same time, the international response to Khashoggi’s brutal murder has been widespread and swift. Aside from Saudi’s nominal partners (UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain) and other benefactors of Saudi largesse, almost all countries have condemned the Saudis and the killing. Furthermore, a significant number of international businesses and corporations ended their investment plans in the kingdom and boycotted a high-level economic forum, dubbed “Davos in the Desert,” in 2018. Within the United States there has been more condemnation than quietude or cover-ups. The majority of Democratic leaders in Congress are keen to end US assistance to Saudi Arabia in its war against Yemen, and Republicans like Lindsay Graham and Bob Corker have repeatedly voiced their concerns about bin Salman’s rationality and viability as a partner. The murder of Khashoggi has shaken the stability and durability of the partnership between the Trump Administration and the crown prince. As the former US national security adviser Susan Rice (2018) contends, “this litany of lunacy shows Prince Mohammed is not and can no longer be viewed as a reliable or rational partner of the United States and our allies.” The enumeration of irrational actions by bin Salman illustrates that Saudi Arabia, since 2015 and more so since 2017, has been entrenched in an adventurist foreign policy, with hefty costs for the kingdom at a time when rationality is needed in a country that is yet to implement a wide-ranging economic diversification plan. Khashoggi’s murder follows the crown prince’s ill-advised calculations and repeated irrational actions since he was promoted to the position of crown prince by King Salman. As Ignatius (2018) argues, the killing in Turkey can be understood as part of a larger “power struggle within the Saudi royal family that helped feed the paranoia and recklessness of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.” This latest Saudi debacle has, at the same time, advanced Iran’s interests in the region. As Vakil (2018) argues, “Iran has repeatedly seized on Saudi miscalculations to gain leverage and protect itself from regional isolation,” and the murder of Khashoggi was the latest of these Saudi gifts to the Islamic Republic. The Khashoggi case seemed to prove Iran’s argument that a double standard exists within the international media and the leadership of Western countries with regards to human rights in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Zarif, for example, used Khashoggi’s murder during his speech at the Munich Security Conference on 17 February 2019, arguing that the US and European concern for human rights is a “charade,” especially “considering that the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi did not interrupt Saudi Arabia’s relations with Western countries” (Al-monitor 2019). Iran cannot, however, hide its own abuses behind the misdeeds of other regional countries and faces just criticism from human rights organizations as well European countries for imprisoning environmental activists and women’s rights lawyers, plus arbitrarily detaining dual nationals.

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Conclusion The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has largely determined the foreign policy conduct of both countries. Whereas Iran was seen as an irrational actor in the 1980s and 1990s, Saudi Arabia acted in a mostly rational manner; but since 2015, the opposite has largely been the case. Both countries have often sacrificed national interests in the pursuit of policies that were perceived to weaken the other. This is the case when rational decision-making processes are in the hands of mostly inept and ill-informed leaders or monarchs who fail to factor in the tenets of rational choice theory and the rational actor model. The analysis illustrates the various points of convergence in the focal determinants of policy-making as well as the points of divergence in deducing precise national interest objectives. Furthermore, this chapter sheds light on how revolutionary ideology in Iran and the ruling Al-Saud family in Saudi Arabia are largely responsible for defining foreign policy priorities and courses of action. At the same time, this chapter reveals the many similarities in the conduct of domestic and foreign policies in Iran and Saudi Arabia. From the baseless allegations against individuals linked to activism who have been imprisoned at home, to regional adventurism that has exacerbated the chaos around the Middle East region, and illconceived actions detrimental to the peace and security of the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia have proven to be the leading actors responsible for the instability of the region. The differences in their decision-making calculus and modus operandi have, in large part, distinguished their foreign policy determinants and objectives to the point that it has been rare to view both countries as rational at the same point in time. When Iran is viewed as rational, Saudi Arabia is tagged as the irrational actor, and especially so since 2015. With new developments in the region including the thawing of the blockade against Qatar, the change in US strategy towards confrontation with Iran, and the secret-channel negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it can be argued that the reactionary mindset of the Saudi policy makers has given way in the face of Iranian influence. While the Iranians still face existential threats from US sanctions and popular movements in the Arab world, they have managed to steer the foreign policy struggle with Saudi Arabia and other players in the region in their favor.

References Aboudi, S., & Fahmy, O. (2017). Powerful Saudi prince sees no chance for dialogue with Iran. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-prince-iran/powerful-saudi-pri nce-sees-no-chance-for-dialogue-with-iran-idUSKBN17Y1FK. Al Faisal, T. (2013). Saudi Arabia’s new foreign policy doctrine in the aftermath of the Arab awakening. Address to Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 25, 2013, Retrieved from https://www.belfer center.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/PrinceTHKSPublicLecture.pdf. Al Jazeera. (2018). Iran blames US and Gulf allies for Ahvaz parade attack. Al Jazeera.

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Allen, R. (2005). King Fahd—A Forceful but Flawed Ruler. Financial Times. Al-Monitor. (2019). Zarif’s defense of Iran’s missile program draws praise on social media. AlMonitor. Aras, B., & Yorulmazlar, E. (2014). Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring, Middle East Policy, 21(4), 117. Ataman, M. (2017). Loss of flexibility in Saudi foreign policy. Daily Sabah. Actor Theory and Islamic Fundamentalism. Political Psychology, 16(1), 157. Barrett, R (2011). Iran: Illusion, reality, and interests. McDill, FL: Joint Special Operations University (p. 5). Combes, K. (2011–12). Between Revisionism and Status Quo: China in International Regimes. Polis(Misc), 6, 5. Eltahawy, M. (1999). Khatami takes olive branch to Arab neighbors. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/17/iran. Euben, R. (1995). When worldviews collide: Conflicting assumptions about human behavior held by rational. Filkins, D. (2018). A Saudi prince’s quest to remake the Middle East. The New Yorker. Gabreyes, R. (2015). General Stanley McChrystal says Iran is ‘obviously’ a rational actor. The Huffington Post. Retrieved from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/stanley-mcchrystal-iran_n_728 4630. Gause, G. (2018). Fresh prince: The schemes and dreams of Saudi Arabia’s next king. Foreign Affairs. Gertz, B. (2018). Obama-era cash traced to Iran-backed terrorists. The Washington Times. Retrieved from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb/7/inside-the-ring-obama-eracash-traced-to-iran-back/. Goldberg, J. (2016). The Obama doctrine. The Atlantic. Harb, I. (2017). Absent rationality in the GCC Crisis. D.C.: Arab Center Washington. Ignatius, D. (2018). The Khashoggi killing had roots in a cutthroat Saudi family feud. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/ the-khashoggi-killing-had-roots-in-a-cutthroat-saudi-family-feud/2018/11/27/6d79880c-f17b11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html?utm_term=.78f9f02f4238. Iran Newspaper. (2017). Zarif calls the attack on the Saudi embassy not a mere act of stupidity but treason (2017). Iran Newspaper. Karim, U. (2017). The evolution of saudi foreign policy and the role of decision-making processes and actors. The International Spectator, 52(2), 72. Kessler, G. (2018). President Trump’s claims that democrats gave Iran $150 Billion. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/13/president-tru mps-claim-that-democrats-gave-iran-billion/?utm_term=.575c5eef1963. Masry, S. (2016). Changing the lens: Contemporary Saudi–Iran relations and potential benefits of détente. In M. Warnaar, et al. (Eds.), Iran’s relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common interests over historic rivalry (43 pp.). London: Gerlach Press. Mearsheimer, J. (2009). Reckless states and realism. International Relations, 23, 243–244. Monroe, K. R. (1995). Psychology and rational actor theory. International Society Political Psychology, 16(1), 2. Monroe, K. R. (2001). Paradigm shift: From rational choice to perspective. International Political Science Review, 22(2), 152. Mortazavi, S. (2004). Rational choice theory: A cultural reconsideration. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 28(1), 144. Pradhan, P. K. (2018). Qatar crisis and the deepening regional fault lines. Strategic Analysis, 43(4), 438. Regencia, T. (2017). Qatar-Gulf rift: The Iran factor. Al Jazeera. Rice, S. (2018). A partner we can’t depend on. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www. nytimes.com/2018/10/29/opinion/khashoggi-mbs-saudi-arabia-susan-rice.html.

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Riedel, B. (2017). In Yemen, Iran outsmarts Saudi Arabia Again. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/06/in-yemen-iran-outsmartssaudi-arabia-again/. Shabani, M. A., & Rouhi, M. (2013). Rowhani the decision shaper. The National Interest. Singh, M. (2012). Is the Iranian regime rational? Foreign Policy. Takeyh, R. (2012). All the Ayatollah’s Men. National Interest. Vakil, S. (2018). In Khashoggi fallout, Iran benefits from another Saudi misstep. Chatham House. Wilkin, S. (2016). Saudi Arabia recruits Sunni allies in row with Iran. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-iran-ministry-idUSKBN0UI0HZ20160104. Zakaria, F. (2015). Is Iran rational? The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingto npost.com/opinions/is-iran-rational/2015/04/09/3c2cc5a8-def5-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story. html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.50766e548c78.

Chapter 15

The Gulf Crisis: Turkey’s Soft Power in the Gulf Nesibe Hicret Battalo˘glu

Power in world politics is one of the oldest themes in international relations, and is usually defined with reference to states’ military and economic capabilities. Hard power instruments have been widely used by states as a means of coercion, forcing other states to adopt positions that are more favorable to the coercing power. Yet in recent years other forms of power have gained currency in the arena of international relations. In this respect the term “soft power,” introduced by Joseph Nye (1990), has come to forefront as a means to understand the changing nature of power. In the simplest definition, soft power refers to “getting others to want the outcomes that you want—[to] co-opt people rather than coerce them” (Nye 2004). Given the increasing importance of soft power in world politics, winning hearts and minds has become one of the indispensable policy priorities of Turkey in relation to the Middle Eastern countries. The year 1980 can be considered as a turning point in this regard, as Turkey went through a gigantic transformation domestically, with the post-coup regime in Ankara embracing neo-liberal policies. This massive transformation in Turkey also altered its foreign policy perspectives towards the neighboring Middle East and especially towards the Arabian Gulf states. Since 2003, Turkey has gone through another tremendous transformation both in terms of its domestic politics and its international stance, and the literature on Turkish soft power therefore highlights the relation between this rapid transformation and the increase in Turkey’s soft power. O˘guzlu (2007) argues that several domestic factors have significantly contributed to Turkish soft power, such as the democratic reforms associated with the revival of Turkey’s European Union membership bid in 2004, the change in civilian–military relations, and general matters of de-securitization. Altınay (2008) also addresses the economic dimension, noting that Turkey has achieved a remarkable change since 1980, departing from statist economic policies in favor of a market economy, which has enhanced Turkish soft power by leading to the emergence N. H. Battalo˘glu (B) Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_15

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of a vibrant middle class and civil society which “randomly” engages with the rest of the world. As well as rapid economic development and domestic stability, ˙I¸star Gözaydin (2010) elaborates the role of religion in Turkey’s international relations, noting that Turkey’s relations with its immediate and extended neighborhood (Middle East, Balkans, Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia) are to a certain extent shaped around a shared faith, adding that “religion as soft power gets used by some faith-based transnational actors affiliated with Turkey.” As regards foreign policy orientations and Turkey’s soft power, there is a near consensus among scholars that revitalizing relations with the EU and pursuing an active yet all-inclusive foreign policy during the early years of AKP government increased Turkey’s credibility and attractiveness in the eyes of other countries (Altunı¸sık 2008; O˘guzlu 2007; Gözaydin 2010). On the latter aspect, Altunı¸sık (2008) notes that Turkey has actively engaged in the resolution of problems in the Middle East as a third party, and that Ankara’s main asset in playing this role has been “its position of having good relations with the parties to different conflicts,” which increased its legitimacy (and therefore its soft power) in the eyes of many regional and international actors. This chapter addresses the following research questions: What sources of soft power can Turkey deploy vis-à-vis the GCC states? What are the determinants (motives and motivations) of Turkey’s soft power policies towards the GCC states? How does Turkey exert its soft power on people in the GCC states? This chapter examines the record of Turkey’s soft power policies and impacts within the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) since the 1980s, through the means of analytical, normative, ideological, and empirical measures. The main concepts and theories of soft power are applied and articulated to understand the non-coercive means directed by Turkey towards the Gulf region. The chapter also studies the reflections of Turkish soft power in the six aforementioned countries through reviewing public opinion surveys. Filling a significant gap in the literature, this research thus offers an analysis of the public attitude surveys concerning Turkey, and studies the underlying factors driving such attitudes, in order to draw a broad and comprehensive picture of the soft power policies of this non-Arab regional state.

Turkish Soft Power in the Middle East Context The arena where the application of Turkey’s soft power is most pronounced is the Middle East, and most of the relevant literature focuses on or at least mentions this aspect. Domestic and foreign policy developments in Turkey over the last ten to fifteen years have had significant repercussions for the application of Turkish soft power in Middle Eastern countries, including both its immediate neighbors and others further afield. Altıni¸sik (2008) analyzes Turkey’s significant soft power assets in the Middle East in terms of two factors: first, the domestic reforms at home; second,

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the increasing involvement in regional conflicts as a trusted third party, which has enhanced Turkey’s credibility and attractiveness in the Middle East. On the other hand, Kalın (2011), chief advisor to the Turkish president, highlights that Turkey’s soft power assets in the Middle East go beyond a strong economic performance, democratic reforms, and its active foreign policy in the region. In fact, he asserts, it is grounded in some larger concepts of cultural affinity, historical companionship, geographical proximity, social imagery and how all of these create a sense of belonging. Combine this with a Turkey that is democratic, strong and prosperous, and you have a very different picture of regional dynamics. The old Turkish images of “Arab traitors” and the Arab perception of “Ottoman imperialists” speak very little to the realities of the Arab and Turkish societies today.

Some literature on Turkish soft power in the Middle East context also focuses on Turco-Persian rivalry, again expressed in the form of soft power projection. With Turkey’s rising popularity among Arabs in the region, some parts of the so-called Iranian sphere of influence have fallen into the scope of Turkish soft power. On this issue, Turkish journalist and Middle East expert Cengiz Candar (2009) argued that it was interesting to witness a rapid increase in Turkish influence in neighboring Syria and Iraq, which also have special relations with Iran. The literature, however, tends to focus on Turkish soft power, both in general and in the Middle East in particular, from the supply side. Thus, most of the relevant articles and papers discuss Turkey’s soft power assets in such terms as its domestic transformation and foreign policy steps; the actual influence of Turkey’s soft power on the ground—the demand-side analysis—has been neglected, perhaps because of the extremely limited availability of relevant public opinion surveys, which are one of the most commonly used methods to assess this aspect of soft power. In fact, the study by Çiftçi and Tezcür (2015) presents the first systematic analysis of the public opinion dimension of soft power competition between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the contemporary Middle East; their work uses the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project (GAP) surveys of 2012 and includes the four Arab countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon. Based on their findings, anti-Americanism, religious identity, and to some extent favorable views towards democracy are the main determinants of soft power projections in the region (Çiftçi and Tezcür 2015). As a non-Arab regional power, Turkey has always been an important player in the Middle East, including the Gulf region. The domestic and regional developments since the 1980 military coup in Turkey, however, have been a turning point which significantly affected the nature of relations between Ankara and the Gulf monarchies. In order to present the evolution of Turkey–GCC relations since 1980 and to lay the foundation for a soft power assessment of its relations with GCC states, this section examines the dynamics in Turkey–GCC and covers the relations since the beginning of 1980 to underline more relevant aspects with the main points. Turkey has become more visible in its relations with GCC countries since the moderate Islamist AKP came to power in 2002. Yet there were times in which Ankara made significant efforts to reach out to the Arab Gulf states, especially during the years of Turgut Özal (1983–1993). In fact, Turkey–GCC relations, notably with Saudi

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Arabia, had been facilitated since the beginning of the 1980s for at least three reasons: the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the common threat perception this engendered; the second oil crisis and Turkey’s dependence on Gulf oil; and the substantial economic reforms in Turkey and concomitant need for market expansion. Against this background, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not hesitate in celebrating the coup in Turkey, which was followed by an official visit by the leader of the coup and President Kenan Evren to Kuwait in 1982 and to Saudi Arabia in 1984 (Erhan and Kürkçüo˘glu 2002). In a sense, largely due to the new security dimension, during the 1980s bilateral relations between Turkey and the Arab Gulf states gained the most significant boost they had had since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Mercan 2008). The security threats for the Gulf States stemming from Iranian Revolution, and the war that erupted between Iran and Iraq, consolidated Turkey’s role as a counterbalancing power in the eyes of Arab Gulf states and the United States (Oktav 2015). From an energy and security angle, the oil crisis following the Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War impelled oil-dependent Turkey to seek alternative sources to its main suppliers, Iran and Iraq. As a result, in November 1980 Turkey signed a contract with Texaco, envisioning oil imports from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, although most of the amount was not in the end delivered, as the crisis soon passed (Liel 2001). The economic reform process led by Özal following the 1980 coup was another factor pushing Ankara to seek closer economic relations with the Arab Gulf states. Subsequently, the export-oriented economic policies adopted by Turkey enhanced relations with oil-producing Arab Gulf States, and the number of Turkish construction companies operating in the Gulf increased substantially, as did labor flow to those states from Turkey. By the end of the decade, the number of Turkish workers in Saudi Arabia had reached 150,000, and the value of contracts by Turkish companies in Arab countries jumped from US$1.6 million in 1978 to US$17 billion (US$5 billion in Saudi Arabia alone) in 1988 (Liel 2001). During the 1990s, however, Turkey’s relations with the Gulf monarchies took turns both for the better and for worse. The course of relations over the decade was shaped by two crucial developments: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the growing cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Regarding the first aspect, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Turkey dropped its neutral position in Middle Eastern affairs and supported the US-led international coalition against Iraq. Ankara implemented the embargo on Iraq through closing the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean (Rosenthal 1990). From the perspective of Turkey–GCC relations, Turkey’s support for the liberation of Kuwait had shown goodwill towards the GCC states and economic relations were to a certain extent boosted. The rapprochement between Turkey and Israel in the mid 1990s, however, notably upgrading relations to ambassadorial level and enhancing military cooperation, adversely affected Ankara’s relations with Arab Middle East countries in general and the Gulf states in particular. Indeed, the nature of Turkey–Israeli ties is one of the factors determining Turkey’s popularity in the eyes of many Arabs as well as shaping its relations with the Gulf States. In this respect, while Turkey felt a need for closer cooperation with Israel through the end of the decade and inked series of

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military agreements in 1996, relations with Syria and to lesser extent with other Arab states deteriorated (Eisenstadt 1997). Coupled with Ankara’s efforts to construct a dam on the Euphrates River that reduced the volume of water flow to Syria, Damascus was able to rally some Arab countries including Saudi Arabia against Turkey (Oktav 2015). Through to the end of the decade, Turkey was marginalized in the Arab world due to its close relations with Israel and disagreement over water resources with the neighboring Arab countries. With the turn of the century, the dynamics and determinants of Turkey–GCC relations changed significantly in a time that saw a tectonic shift in the Middle East as well as important domestic changes in Turkey. While the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a balance of power problem in the region, raising fears for both Turkey and the Arab Gulf states, the victory of the moderate Islamist AKP and the rapid economic and political reform process in Turkey transformed Turkey–GCC relations and brought them closer. The Gulf was one of the regions most affected by the shock waves of the 2003 Iraq War, amid a constellation of worries over increasing Iranian influence in Iraq. Given the Iraqi power vacuum, which was likely to lead to Iraq falling into the Iranian sphere of influence, the GCC states have started to seek multilateral cooperation to enhance their security (Yaffe 2004). For Turkey, on the other hand, while post–Cold War dynamics allow Ankara to pursue a more independent foreign policy, the Iraq invasion led to a resurgence of Turkish fears about an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that would directly threaten its domestic security (Altuni¸sik and Martin 2011). The Turkish concerns, and its more autonomous foreign policy objectives, materialized on 1 March 2003 when the Turkish Parliament rejected the deployment of US troops on Turkish soil for a so-called Northern Front for the invasion of Iraq (Bourdeaux and Zaman 2003). Although the parliament’s decision caused a setback in Turkey–US relations, it increased Turkey’s image in the eyes of many Arabs who were against the invasion. The converging security concerns over the scenarios in post-Saddam Iraq facilitated Turkey–GCC cooperation on economic, political, and security matters. In that respect, King Abdullah Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud visited Turkey in 2006, marking an historical moment in relations between the two states—the last visit of a Saudi monarch to Turkey having been by King Faisal in 1966 (Qusti and Khan 2006). Turkey has also emerged as a significant player in bridging between some GCC states and NATO, under the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched in 2004. This initiative has offered all the six GCC states bilateral security cooperation with NATO and its member states, with four GCC members, the exceptions being Saudi Arabia and Oman, having already joined the initiative signed in Istanbul (NATO 2011). However, the turning point in Turkey–GCC relations was the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) in 2008, which laid a multilateral basis through several intergovernmental meetings (Kardas 2012). Through the council Turkey became the primary strategic partner outside the Gulf region and the nature of Turkey–GCC cooperation moved towards political and strategic dialogue (Larrabee 2011).

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Apart from systemic changes, the momentous transformation in Turkish domestic politics is another factor contributing to the flourishing of Turkey–GCC relations, especially in economic aspects. In this regard, Altuni¸sik and Martin (2011) highlight at least three important domestic developments as sources for further Turkish engagement in the Middle East region; first, the AKP government itself, which considers the Middle East to be an important foreign policy area due to its important yet neglected historical and religious ties; second, the political reform process that curbed the role of the military in Turkish politics and shifted the previous threat perceptions; and third, further economic liberalization that was fueled by the religiously conservative so-called Anatolian Tigers, who are eager to do business with the Middle Eastern region (Altuni¸sik and Martin 2011). To sum up, the Sunni-Islamic oriented leadership, the demilitarization of Turkish foreign policy, the de-securitization of Middle East relations, and the empowerment of a vibrant conservative business class, have played a significant role in the enhancement of Turkey–GCC relations. The so-called Arab Spring has created, first and foremost, another change in the regional balance in Middle East. The popular uprisings against the rulers in Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, and Syria caught the neighboring states by surprise and forced them to adopt or re-orient their positions in a very short time (Chubin 2012). Traditionally strong states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria, which had acted as balancing powers, became too weak to exercise their influence vis-a-vis other states in the region. From the GCC states’ perspective, the uprisings also resulted in unwanted changes that were inspired by extremist ideologies such as “political Islamic thought,” “liberal political ideas,” and “sectarianism,” which poses the threat of destabilizing the conservative socio-political structure that has underpinned the Gulf region since the pre-state era (Binhuwaidin 2015). The Arab Spring also posed challenges for Turkey and its policy of “zero problems” with neighbors, which aimed at economic interdependence and more enhanced relations with the Middle Eastern countries based on cultural affinity. Inevitably, the dilemma of ethics versus self-interest shaped Turkish foreign policy during the early stages of the Arab Spring (Onis 2012). Yet, despite facing this dilemma initially, Turkey quickly reoriented its foreign policy towards the Middle East, adopting a more liberal democratic tone in support of popular legitimate uprisings. Despite their diverging interests and policies, Turkey and the GCC states have found common ground for cooperation in the wake of the Arab Spring era, especially in Syria, and as a means to counter Iran (Ataman and Akkaya 2015). Turkey and the GCC states have also been on the same page in fighting against so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. In the international coalition against IS, all six members of the GCC contributed to the fighting through means ranging from hosting US forces to humanitarian aid for those affected, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain joined the airstrikes with their own forces (Drennan 2014). Similarly, Turkey also declared its support for the coalition against IS, with the Turkish Parliament approving the use of military force against IS and hosting foreign troops in order to launch strikes (Fantz and Pearson 2015). In 2015 Turkey and Qatar signed a cooperation agreement, moving a step forward through a strategic partnership which includes military training, cooperation of

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defense industries, joint exercises, and the deployment of military forces by the two countries when necessary (Al-Haj 2015). The special bond between Turkey and Qatar during the AKP era, which is shaped around common political values, was clinched by the decision to establish a Turkish military base in Qatar (Finn 2015). The base gives Turkey a status in Gulf security similar to that of France and the United States. An analysis from the Washington Institute asserts that Turkey’s move in Qatar will make Ankara all the more valuable to its Arab partners, and to an American ally seemingly inclined to share the burden of Gulf security. The new base will also reinforce Qatar’s autonomy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. In addition, it could contribute to the security effort for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, a major and persistently controversial endeavor for Qatar. (Decottignies and Ça˘gaptay 2016)

Motives and Motivations for Turkey’s Soft Power in the GCC In general terms, the motivation of a state to wield soft power is to reach its desired favorable outcome without resort to coercive measures, and instead with the use of co-opting ones. Defining a given state’s motivation for exerting soft power is closely linked to the definition of its national interests (Nye 2004). This section explains the rationale behind Turkey’s use of soft power in the Gulf region, from ideological, economic, and foreign policy perspectives.

Ideological Interests During the 1980s and until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the rigid international system and security concerns surrounding Turkey motivated Ankara to rely more on military arrangements when it came to achieving its interests. Therefore there is little to say about the soft power motivations of Turkey towards the Gulf region from the ideological aspect. However, during the years of Turgut Özal (Prime Minister of Turkey 1983–89, and President of Turkey 1989–93), a new perspective can be highlighted in understanding the ideological dimension of Turkish foreign policy. Ataman (2003) argues that one of the important dimensions of Özalist foreign policy was his inclusive approach to the Muslim and Arab world. In that respect, Turkey pursued low-level relations with Israel until the mid 1990s and became one of the first countries to recognize a Palestinian state in order to build trust with the Arab States (Ye¸silada 1993). According to Hale (1992), developing friendly relations with Arab countries (including the Gulf States) based on trust and cultural/religious ties was an important motivation in Turkish foreign policy under Özal. With the arrival of the AKP government in 2002, the ideological imperatives for wielding soft power in the Gulf became much more apparent. The main component of this new ideology of the Turkish government is the Strategic Depth Doctrine (Stratejik Derinlik) developed by Ahmet Davuto˘glu.

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1

According to the doctrine, the power of a given country is composed of (a) Constant Parameters (CP) of history, geography, population, and culture; (b) Potential Parameters (PP) of economic, technical, and military capabilities; (c) Strategic Mentality (SM); (d) Strategic Planning (SP); and (e) Political Will (PW). This is formulated as the equation Power = (CP + PP) × (SM × SP × PW) (Davutoglu 2001) In his formulation, Davuto˘glu also defines the geographical spheres of influence in which Turkey must be active in order to strengthen its global position: (a) the land basin consisting of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus; (b) the maritime basin comprised of the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Caspian Sea, and the Gulf; (c) the continental basin, including Europe, North Africa, South Asia, and Middle and East Asia. According to Davuto˘glu, the Gulf basin, with which Turkey has historical and cultural ties, is a sphere of influence for Turkish foreign policy and is crucial in “transforming Turkey’s regional influence into a continental one” (Davuto˘glu 2001). It is also important to note that the Strategic Depth doctrine found expression in AKP party programs and election campaigns, and bore important commonalities with Turkish foreign policy in the post–Cold War era (Alpaydın 2010). In a master’s thesis, Alpaydın (2010) analyzes soft power in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government and remarks that “it can be argued that the foreign policy sections of all these documents include the evaluation of the post–Cold War environment made by Davuto˘glu as a basis for the AKP’s projection of Turkish foreign policy.” This is especially true for the AKP 2007 Election Manifesto, when Davuto˘glu was the chief foreign policy advisor to the then Prime Minister Erdo˘gan, which mentions “a multi-dimensional foreign policy based on a well-identified and integrated framework owing to the historical accumulation, geographical and cultural depth, and the strategic location of the country” (AKP Election Manifesto 2007). To achieve this goal, the use of our deterrent/coercive hard power and our soft power with its diplomatic, economic and cultural qualities within a well-coordinated form are an absolute necessity. That is why we embrace a pro-active and dynamic foreign policy method which is principled, balanced, performed in contact with all global and regional actors, based on rational grounds and well-timing. (AKP Election Manifesto 2007)

Therefore, it can be concluded that since the beginning of the new millennium, the new approach developed by Davuto˘glu and articulated in the AKP agenda represents the most important ideological aspect of Turkey’s soft power motivation in its foreign policy towards the Gulf.

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Economic Interests Turkey’s economic interests in the Gulf region can be underlined as another incentive to facilitate relations through soft power. The complementary characters of the Turkish and GCC economies indicate the economic motivations for Ankara’s soft power policies in the Gulf. The complementarity of the Turkish and GCC economies in terms of demand–supply balances in energy, investment, tourism, and export products is clearly one of the motivating factors for Turkey. According to The Oxford Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Group report (2015), the complementarity is based on the lower value-added commodities on each side. The key complementarities lie in the GCC states’ oil and gas resources and foreign exchange surpluses and Turkey’s agricultural and arable land surpluses; and trade and investment in the higher-value-added sectors of construction, manufacturing, transport, real estate, defense, and banking and other services.2 For Turkey, soft power instruments and policies are important to secure more investment and energy deals, to attract more tourists from the Gulf, and expand Turkish exports to GCC states. Economic liberalization since 1980 and Turkey’s emergence as a trading state under AKP rule have enhanced the economic motivations of Ankara for wielding soft power over the GCC states, so as to enhance market diversification for Turkish exports as well as attract FDI inflow from the oil-rich countries. In that regard, Turkish officials, businessmen, and analysts have emphasized the importance of achieving economic targets through soft power means. As reported by the Financial Times, the then finance minister Mehmet Sim¸ ¸ sek underlined Turkey’s “concerted efforts” to enhance ties with GCC countries to increase those countries’ FDI volumes in Turkey, adding, “we have historical and cultural links with the Middle East, and we are now rediscovering them”; Alpaslan Korkmaz, the former head of Turkey’s investment agency, also remarked, “The relationship between Turkey and the Gulf is deepening. We share common values and common interests. In the future we will be a lot more closely integrated with the Arab world” (Wigglesworth and Strauss 2010). Soft power resources such as historical, cultural, and religious ties and shared values are often highlighted by Ankara as a base for further economic cooperation between Turkey and the GCC countries.

Foreign Policy Interests Turkey’s foreign policy objectives towards the GCC states since the 1980s are also important drivers of its expression of soft power in the region. These foreign policy objectives are closely linked with the ideological and economic motivations, although some aspects can be treated as pragmatic interests, independent of the former. It is also important to note here that the foreign policy objectives of states are not static, and have changed in line with significant transformations in the international system

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(the end of Cold War in 1990) and regional developments (Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US invasion of Iraq, and the Arab Spring). Turkey’s foreign policy interests in the Gulf during the 1980s were shaped around security concerns, stemming from a common threat perception towards revolutionary Iran and the regional instability as a result of the Iran–Iraq War (Mercan 2008; Fırat and Kürkçüo˘gl 2001; Oktav 2013); relations between Turkey and the Arab Gulf states thus gained momentum during the 1980s based around shared security concerns. A specific foreign policy motivation for Ankara is difficult to identify here, and thus the use of soft power strategies becomes appropriate. The end of the Cold War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait marked the 1990s as a significant decade in which Turkey recalibrated its foreign policy objectives towards the GCC countries. Turkey assessed the Kuwait invasion as an opportunity to extend its influence through the region, in a new multi-polar world where middle powers have more room for maneuver than before. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait therefore created an opportunity for Ankara to reassert its importance. As we have noted, Turkey took a stance against Iraq, and by breaking its rule of non-interference in the region, showed good will towards the Arab Gulf states (Hale 1992).

Turkey’s Soft Power Policies in the GCC Region Turkey has thus been wielding soft power over the GCC countries through various means, at different times, and with different intended recipients, in order to obtain preferable foreign policy outcomes. Such soft power policies range from public diplomacy to the appealing rhetoric of the key political figures. With the advancement of communication technologies and the increasing importance of media tools, Turkey has also found new avenues for wielding effective soft power policies. Turkey’s efforts since 1980 to generate soft power in the GCC region can be analyzed under three categories: the demonstrative effect, public diplomacy, and foreign policy initiatives.

Demonstrative Effect One of the main aspects of wielding soft power is so-called leading by example. As Nye (2004) argues, the values that governments champion at home and in their foreign policies strongly affect the preferences of others. One should note here, however, that the credible implementation of such values in a country’s own domestic and foreign policies is often key in soft power projection; and that if one country’s claims are perceived as hypocrisy or mere propaganda, the soft power is substantially undermined. Against this background, it can be claimed that during the 1980s Turkey failed to project a domestic and foreign policy model which appealed to people in the Gulf. This claim also supports the core argument that Turkey has emerged as a strong

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soft-powerhouse in the region after achieving the significant domestic, economic, and foreign policy objectives mentioned above, and this at a time when the image of other regional states, especially Iran, had deteriorated in GCC countries. In any case, the demonstrative effect, or in other words “leading by example,” has been an important tool through which Turkey has been able to appeal to people in the region. Turkey emerged from having been perceived during the 1980s as an ineffective democracy, a marginal economic power, a purely secular state, and a pawn in the Western powers’ orbit, to being seen after the ascent of the AKP as a Muslim state with an effective democracy and flourishing economy, as domestically independent, and as an active and assertive player internationally and in the GCC region (Fraihat 2016). On the perception of Turkey in the Arab world during the 1980s and 90s, Bengio and Özcan (2001) note that Arabs had ridiculed Turkish democracy as a farce and a “democracy of tanks.” Further, despite trade liberalization after 1980 and substantial progress in its exports, Turkey failed to sustain economic growth, and since the end of the 1980s the Turkish economy had seen numerous recessions (Ercel 2006). Turkey’s demonstrative effect has gained momentum under the AKP government, in power since 2002. Kiri¸sçi (2011) notes that Turkey’s demonstrative effect is a function of three domestic policy developments: the rise of the “trading state,” making Turkey visible through commerce, investment and trade; the diffusion of Turkey’s democratization experience as a “work in progress”; and the positive image of Turkey’s “new” foreign policy, including the introduction of policies encouraging freer movement of people between Turkey and the Middle East.

Although Kiri¸sçi (2011) is concerned with Turkey’s demonstrative effect within the context of debates about Turkey as a model for the transformation of the Arab Middle East, it is closely linked to Turkey’s soft power in the GCC region overall. Indeed, the literature on Turkey’s soft power addresses the same aspects (O˘guzlu 2007; Altınay 2008; Altuni¸sik 2008). It can be argued that, therefore, Turkey has taken significant and coherent policy steps in the realms of domestic politics, the economy, and foreign policy, which have provided effective and solid foundations for its public diplomacy efforts in the region, and enhanced its soft power.

Public Diplomacy Soft power and public diplomacy are closely linked. As Nye (2008) argues, public diplomacy is an instrument for governments to articulate soft power resources, communicating with and attracting publics in other countries. In this regard, the communication revolution after the Second World War has enabled information to be disseminated to broad publics and “has turned public opinion into an increasing factor in international relations” (Melissen 2005). Therefore, public diplomacy is key for wielding soft power. On the relation between soft power resources and public diplomacy, Nye (2008) writes:

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Public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth. But if the content of a country’s culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that “broadcasts” them cannot produce soft power. It may produce just the opposite.

Against this background, Turkey pursues public diplomacy through broadcasts, cultural events and promotions, social media, and official and non-governmental exchanges, so as to transform its soft power resources into preferable outcomes. As explained earlier, cultural resources are important assets with which Turkey seeks to produce soft power in the region. Turkey therefore focuses on promotion of its culture and language through official channels such as embassies and cultural centers,3 initiating cultural events in the GCC region to enhance its soft power. Ahmet Demirok, former Turkish Ambassador to Doha, said that the Turkish embassies in the Arab Gulf region are playing a crucial role in public diplomacy and cultural promotion. Speaking on cultural activities and government initiatives in Qatar, Ambassador Demirok noted: In cooperation with our Qatari counterparts, we have organized numerous events both in Qatar and Turkey within the scope of Qatar–Turkey Year of Culture 2015. Besides, we opened Yunus Emre Institute in Doha and we have initiated opening of the Turcology department in Qatar University to create affinity between the two societies. Cultural centers’ scope of activities are wide and they are very influential in producing soft power. (Demirok 2016)

Another important mechanism with which to reach out to the publics is broadcasting and other media channels. For the bulk of the time period with which this chapter is considered, it could be argued that Turkey had limited communication channels, given the limitations of mass communication technologies such as satellite TV and Internet in the region until the 1990s. However, with the rising oil income flowing to the Gulf since the 1970s, print and recorded media became very important tools for conveying messages and news. Turkish attempts at conveying messages to the GCC region during the 1980s and 90s were quite limited; but since the establishment of the Office of Public Diplomacy in 2010, however, two main narratives have emerged: one on Turkish identity, economic prosperity, and adherence to democracy, and another on international credibility (Huijgh and Warlick 2016). The changing nature of communication technologies since the beginning of the 1990s, with satellite TV and the widespread use of Internet and social media, has transformed the conditions for the projection of soft power (Nye 2004). It also diffused the sources of information among multiple actors, including but not limited to private companies, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals (Keohane and Nye Jr 2000). Turkey has established satellite channels broadcasting in Arabic to reach an audience in the GCC region on a daily basis.4 Further, social media has become one of the key tools for communicating with the target audience in the region. According to the Arab Social Media Report, GCC countries dominate the ranks of Arab Facebook users as a percentage of their population. Saudi Arabia leads the Arab countries in terms of Twitter users, followed by Kuwait and the UAE (Salem and Mourtada 2012).5 Given that this is the case, prominent Turkish government officials including President Erdo˘gan have official Twitter accounts in English

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and Arabic,6 and are active users of social media with a considerable number of followers across the world, including in the GCC region. Op-ed articles written by prominent political figures can also be highlighted as a way to convey messages to the targeted audience. Third, governments are not the only agents promoting a positive image of a given country. The successes of various Turkish series, which are produced for profit by private companies, are one of the most prominent aspects of soft power and public diplomacy in GCC countries. The themes represented in soap operas—such as a liberal lifestyle, a romanticized past, an idealized Turkey, love affairs, and gender issues—appeal to many people in the Gulf (Huijigh and Warlick 2016). The Turkish government also capitalizes on the popularity of the these series and utilizes them as a means for projecting soft power in the region. In 2008 Turkey’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia was quoted as saying, “Turkish dramas have succeeded in boosting the number of Saudi tourists from 30,000 last summer to 100,000 this year” (Al Tamimi 2012). In a visit to Zayed University in the UAE, former Turkish President Abdullah Gül had a meeting with Emirati students in which they discussed Turkish soap operas. Gül also stressed that Turkish soap operas were the focal point of meetings with officials of the United Arab Emirates (Hürriyet Daily News 2012).

Foreign Policy Initiatives By creating sentiments of gratitude and sympathy, foreign policy initiatives can articulate the soft power currency of benignity between the soft power wielder and its target (Vuving 2009). Foreign policy is also important for a country’s beauty, as Vuving notes: Beauty can come from a country that acts as the agent of a value, a country that is perceived as the avatar of an ideal, a country that champions a cause, or a country that articulates a vision compellingly. When it holds fast on a cause, champions a value, devotes itself to an ideal, compellingly articulates a vision, it gains credibility as a representative, a torch, or a firm supporter and guardian of the cause, the value, the ideal, or the vision. From here comes credibility, legitimacy, and even moral authority.

In that respect, the foreign policy initiatives of Turkey have been important tools to project soft power in the GCC region. The foreign policy initiatives of multilateralism, diplomatic support, and adherence to international norms, as well as resistance, an assertive foreign policy, and the rhetoric of charismatic leaders, have been presented as soft power tools of Turkey in the GCC countries. To start with multilateralism, diplomatic support, and adherence to international norms, the end of the Cold War has enabled Turkey to engage in the region based on such norms. As explained previously, the foreign policy orientations of Turkey under Özal aimed at enhancing relations with the GCC states. Ankara’s stance against Saddam Hussein’s aggression and its support for Kuwait’s territorial integrity can be highlighted as foreign policies that were based on the aforementioned aspects of soft power tools. Condemnation of the invasion, and commitment to UN resolutions and

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the economic embargo on Iraq, showed Turkey’s adherence to international norms and support for multilateralism. Therefore, Turkey articulated benignity in the eyes of GCC states through its foreign policies. In the following years, however, Turkey’s image significantly deteriorated in the Muslim world and in the GCC due to its 1996 military agreement with Israel. The re-securitization of Turkish foreign policy due to its fight with Kurdish separatists and the rapprochement with Israel made it hard for Turkey to project multilateral and peace-promoting foreign policy tools at that time. During a meeting of foreign ministers at the 1997 OIC summit, two resolutions were adopted indirectly criticizing Turkey for its military cooperation with Israel and for its military campaigns into northern Iraq (Hürriyet Daily News 1997). Multilateralism, peace promotion, and mediation in international conflicts have been milestones for Turkish foreign policy tools under AKP leadership, however. In fact, in an article published in Foreign Policy, the then foreign minister Davuto˘glu (2010) addressed the links between such foreign policy methods and Turkey’s soft power, referring to “the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. Although Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, we do not make threats. Instead, Turkish diplomats and politicians have adopted a new language in regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey’s civil-economic power.” Within this framework, Turkey not only maintained its relations with the EU, NATO, and the United States, and had restored its relations with Russia as of 2009, but engaged actively in the Middle East through this new discourse and diplomatic style, exemplified by pre-emptive peace mediations and multilateralism. A number of initiatives can be highlighted here. First, in 2003 Turkey initiated the “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process,” the first meeting of which was held in Istanbul, and which continued until 2009. The main aim was to support the territorial integrity of Iraq and ensure “the participation of those who did not take part in the previous elections, the Sunni Arabs” (Hürriyet 2005); the Turkish initiative was able to bring together many countries neighboring Iraq, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Second, Turkey has also increased its efforts as a trusted third party for mediation in the region. In 2008, Syrian–Israeli talks started in Istanbul, the Turkish Chambers and Commodity Exchange (TOBB) launched an Industry for Peace Initiative between Israel and Palestine, and mediation was attempted between different parties in Lebanon (Altunı¸sık 2008). Third, like former Iranian President Khatami’s “Dialogue among Civilizations,” Turkey supported the initiative of the “Alliance of Civilizations,” which was initially proposed by the then Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero in 2004. Turkey became the co-sponsor of the initiative given its Muslim and democratic character. Turkey’s participation in the initiative is significant for many reasons. First of all, it shows Turkey’s preference for multilateralism over unilateralism and for conciliatory efforts over conflict-seeking ones. Second, it was important for Turkey to annul Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and show that Islam and democracy can be embodied simultaneously. Yet perhaps most importantly, Turkey thereby for the first time became the spokesperson of the Islamic world in a global initiative (Balcı and Mi¸s 2008).

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Apart from benignity, an assertive foreign policy and the rhetoric of political leaders in Turkey are also important in producing soft power in the region, albeit dependent on the regional context. In that respect, resisting Western or any kind of domination, standing against injustices, and championing Muslim causes, have constituted the soft power currency of beauty and contributed to the increased popularity of Turkey in the eyes of many people in the Middle East, including in GCC countries. The post–Cold War environment, and the emergence of a Turkey with solid democratic and economic credentials, has enabled Ankara to pursue a more independent, active, and to some extent more assertive foreign policy under AKP leadership; its foreign policy agenda has changed accordingly. In that sense, Ankara’s foreign policy discourse started to challenge Iran’s monopoly over championing the anti-Western and anti-Israeli Muslim cause. In 2007, then Turkish Prime Minister Erdo˘gan lashed out at the then Israeli President Shimon Peres during a panel on Gaza at the Davos World Economic Forum meeting. Erdo˘gan was quoted as saying, “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill” (Bennhold 2009). In 2010, Israel had raided the Turkish humanitarian aid flotilla Mavi Marmara on its way to Gaza and killed nine Turkish citizens; Ankara had immediately severed its diplomatic relations with Israel. In this sense, Turkey’s uncompromising attitude towards the Palestinian cause as a foreign policy objective had repercussions in the Middle East, increasing Erdo˘gan’s popularity in many Arab capitals (Perry 2010; The Jerusalem Post 2011; Migdalovitz 2010). In 2014, Erdo˘gan also stood against the decision-making structures under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in dealing with the Palestine issue, civilian killings in Iraq and Syria, and the coup in Egypt. In the UN General Assembly meeting, to enthusiastic clapping, Erdo˘gan said, the double standards by the modern world leads to serious and significant distrust … thousands of people dying and we are only speaking about this issue. And not acting on it … We have to address these issues as the UN without any further delay … Let me also say the world is bigger than five. The fact that five permanent members of UNSC have rendered the UN ineffective, despite the situation in the world, cannot be acceptable by global consciousness.7

Concerning foreign policy as a soft power tool, one should note that although the foreign policies and rhetoric of political leaders in Turkey were not directly targeted at the GCC countries, the repercussions of such policies reached mass audiences in the Arab Gulf region thanks to mass communication technologies. Therefore, it would be fair to consider that the foreign policies of Turkey, whether deliberately so or not, are important tools for wielding soft power in the GCC region.

Turkey and the Gulf Crisis It seems that Turkey’s efforts to garner soft power in the Gulf region finally bore fruit, and its positive image increased substantially. According to a 2002 survey by Zogby International, Turkey had been viewed quite unfavorably in the GCC, with 49% of

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Kuwaitis, 64% of Saudis, and 75% of Emiratis expressing negative attitudes towards Ankara (Zogby International 2002). A decade later, however, the picture of Turkey’s image in the region was completely changed. A 2013 survey in all six GCC countries revealed that Turkey has a positive image in the region, with 63% of Kuwaitis, 48% of Bahrainis, 49% of Qataris, 58% of Emiratis, 66% of Omanis, and 71% of Saudis stating that they viewed Turkey favorably (Zogby 2013). Further, on perceptions towards Turkey in the GCC, annual surveys conducted by TESEV (in 2011, 2012, and 2013) show that the positive image of Turkey in the GCC region was prevailing. The 2011 TESEV Ortado˘gu’da Türkiye Algısı (Perceptions toward Turkey in the Middle East) survey revealed that positive attitudes toward Turkey stood at 89% among Saudi respondents and 76% in respondents from five other GCC countries. The survey also showed that positive attitudes towards Turkey had increased in Saudi Arabia from 72% in 2009 to 82% in 2010. Annual polls of perceptions towards Turkey followed in 2012 and 2013: according to the TESEV poll results, positive perceptions of Turkey in Saudi Arabia remained high (77% in 2012 and 76% in 2013), and the majority of respondents in the other GCC countries still had positive perceptions of Turkey despite a considerable decline in 2013 (see Fig. 15.1). The recent Gulf crisis, however, has posed a significant obstacle for Turkey to reach out to the Gulf region through soft power means. In June 2017 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Doha and imposed a land, sea, and air embargo on Qatar. The accusations from the quartet concentrated on Qatar’s “support for terrorism,” friendly relations with Iran, and meddling in their internal affairs. The blockading countries also issued a list of 13 demands, including the shutting of the Turkish military base in Qatar, with a ten-day deadline (Al Jazeera 2017). Qatar rejected the claims and demands. Further, despite facing

Fig. 15.1 Positive perception towards Turkey: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman (Source TESEV polls 2011, 2012, and 2013)

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severe sanctions and an actual physical blockade from the neighboring Gulf States, Doha managed to weather the initial shock waves without surrendering, thanks to its ability to diversify its economic, political, and security partners. Doha was quick to adapt to the “new normal,” that is, functioning well as a small state in isolation (Ulrichsen 2018). Turkey’s initial response to the crisis was to offer even-handed support as a mediator, so that Qatar could find a solution. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavuso˘glu and President Erdo˘gan paid visits to Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in the following weeks seeking a reconciliation. Yet Ankara’s efforts were turned down, with the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash writing on his Twitter account that “The Turkish president’s visit did not carry anything new, and the hasty stand his country had taken made neutrality as the best option for Ankara” (Reuters 2017). Turkey then positioned itself as a major supporter of Doha both politically and materially. President Erdo˘gan denounced the blockade against Qatar as a violation of Islamic values (Al Jazeera 2017), and Ankara offered help in providing food supplies and basic materials to Qatar across the blockade. Within weeks, Turkish exports to Qatar had tripled, reaching $32.5 million with $12.5 million food supplies (Hürriyet Daily News 2017). From a broader geo-political perspective, the recent intra-GCC crisis and the Turkish–Qatari alignment has been the culmination of a series of events unfolding in the Middle East since 2013. The post–Arab Spring political (dis)order in the region has changed the balance of power and sharpened threat perceptions. Whereas the traditional powerhouses in the Middle East have fallen from power, new actors like Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have entered into a competition to shape the future political landscape of the region. Among the various factors in play, the most significant is the different security perceptions towards the role of Islamists, mainly Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, by the Saudi–UAE axis on the one hand and the Turkish–Qatari position on the other, which pits the two Sunni blocs against each other. Turkey and Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in seeking a change in the regional geopolitics has been harshly opposed by “the status-quoist SaudiUAE line, which categorically opposed the overthrow of fellow dictators (Aras and Akpınar 2017). The Gulf Crisis has shown that Turkey has been tilting towards more hard-power policies in the Gulf region in order to meet its geo-political interests. In this respect, Turkey’s uncompromising support for Qatar was supplemented with the building of a Turkish military base in Qatar. In 2014, Turkey and Qatar ratified and agreed to open a Turkish military base in Qatar, Turkey’s first military installation in the Middle East, as an attempt to enhance their already cordial relationships in the military field. Soon after the crisis, Turkey increased its military presence with 250 soldiers under the Qatar–Turkey Combined Joint Force Command. In November 2017 President Erdo˘gan paid a visit to the military base and told Turkish soldiers, “Our expectations are from our heroes in Qatar; you must conquer the hearts of the people of Qatar with our love and respect while performing your military duty with your gun and your heart” (Daily Sabah 2017). According to news reports, Turkey is also extending its

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military presence in Qatar with the construction of a new military base, while the installation of new soldiers is reaching “a drastic figure” (Fırat 2019). From the soft power perspective, its position in the crisis and its military presence in Qatar pose both opportunities and challenges for Turkey as regards pursuing its goals in the Gulf region. According to poll results, Turkey is now wildly popular in Qatar, with 90% of Qataris saying that good ties with Turkey are valuable for Qatar, and 81% declaring that they like Turkey’s current Middle East policy (Pollock 2017). In this sense, through Qatar, Turkey will be able to reach into the Gulf to meet its political, economic, and security ends via soft power policies. On the other hand, the Turkish military presence in the Gulf could sharpen the already febrile threat perceptions towards Turkey in other GCC states, and might ultimately undermine Turkey’s decade-long soft-power efforts and policies designed to garner a brilliant, beautiful, and benign image amongst the Gulf publics. According to a report from the Middle East Monitor, Saudi Arabia launched a campaign encouraging a boycott of Turkey by all means possible, and consequently the number of tourists from the kingdom dropped by over 30% over the first six months of 2019 as compared to the same period in 2018 (Middle East Monitor 2019). Turkey thus seems to face a dilemma between maintaining its position in the Gulf Crisis as against the status quo powers in the Middle East, and enhancing its soft power capabilities so as to reach out to the Gulf region more widely.

Conclusion The overall aim of this chapter was to analyze the role of soft power in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the GCC region in the period since the 1980s. Despite the increasing importance of soft power in international relations, there is currently only a limited—albeit growing—literature on Turkey’s soft power. The conceptual framework devised by Joseph Nye and other scholars has here been revisited to provide a theoretical basis for analyzing various aspects of Turkey’s soft power approach in the GCC region. In this sense, a refined version of the soft power approach that has evolved over the decades since the 1990s has been utilized to answer the research questions posed here. This research, therefore, capitalizes on the notion of power in international relations, the definition of soft power, its sources, tools, and measurement, as well as the role of perceptions in international relations and moreover the limitations of a soft power approach. One of the main findings of this chapter is that soft power is not independent from its context of application; the domestic and regional developments surrounding the soft power wielder and the targeted countries play an important role in both perceptions and soft power projection. The domestic and regional developments after the 1980 military coup in Turkey played an important role in shaping the course of its foreign relations. Further, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a multipolar world system has enabled middle-sized states like Turkey to operate more independently in their foreign policies towards the Gulf region. Regional and

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domestic developments during the 1990s, specifically the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Turkey’s increasing security concerns and consequent rapprochement with Israel, certainly determined the dynamics of the relations with GCC countries. The same is true for the new millennium. The third part of this chapter evaluated the relations between GCC countries and Turkey from the perspective of soft power, amid the domestic and regional adjustments manifest since 1980. The chapter also analyzed the potential resources, currencies, as well as motives and motivations pertaining to Turkey in exerting soft power in the Arab Gulf region. In this sense, academic studies of soft power combined with information gained through personal interviews have been the principle sources utilized. The findings underline that Turkey still has considerable cultural, military, economic, ideological, and political resources, all of which reinforces the utility of Vuving’s (2009) conceptualization of soft power currencies in terms of “brilliance,” “benignity,” and “beauty.” Further, the chapter also surveyed the ideological, economic, and political incentives (motives and motivations) for Turkey to invest in soft power policies in the GCC region. According to available poll results, Turkey’s popularity among the GCC publics has increased substantially compared to the early years of the new millennium. Its profound political and economic transformation, the attractiveness of Turkish popular culture, and its use of this in framing soft power policies since 2005 are important elements for its success in emerging as a respected state in the region. Apart from that, increasing cooperation between Turkey and GCC states on various key international and regional developments also played a role in aiding Turkey’s penetration into the region through soft power means, at least until 2013. The geo-political shift in the Middle East following the Arab Spring has created a new environment for Turkey and Gulf states, to which they are having rapidly to adapt. The divergences among GCC member states and the subsequent crisis within the bloc forced Turkey to recalibrate its soft power projections in the region: the increasingly close relations between Turkey and Qatar in the face of the crisis have since brought the two into an alliance on regional issues, and further enhanced Turkey’s positive image in Qatar. However, as mentioned above, the soft power of a state is highly dependent on the regional and domestic political context in which that state seeks to project influence. The post–Arab Spring dynamics have increased the assertiveness of GCC states and brought the divergences among Gulf States up to the surface. The Gulf Crisis is the most apparent manifestation of this conflict. In this context, Turkey has found itself bound to take a pro-Qatari line, given the convergence of interests between Ankara and Doha. Yet at the same time it seems that, as a consequence, Turkey will find it more difficult to deploy its soft power resources beyond Qatar in the Gulf states more widely. Notes 1. Ahmet Davuto˘glu served as the Chief Advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan from 2003 to 2009, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014, and Prime Minister of Turkey from August 2014 to 2016.

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2. Further details of the complementarity of the Turkish and GCC economies can be found on the website of the Oxford Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum, see “Turkey–GCC Relations: Trends and Outlook,” available at http://www.oxgaps.org/files/turkey-gcc_relations_trends_and_outlook_2015. pdf, accessed 7 April 2020. 3. During personal interviews, Dr. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Dr. Mahdi Ahouie, and Turkish Ambassador to Doha H. E. Ahmet Demirok mentioned that the government sponsors cultural activities as an important mechanism for producing soft power in the GCC countries. 4. Al Alam TV and Al-Kawthar are two Iranian broadcasts in Arabic; TRT Al Arabia is Turkey’s official channel broadcasting in Arabic. 5. For the full report, see http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/UserManag ement/PDF/ASMR%204%20final%20to%20post.pdf. 6. For the Twitter accounts, see https://twitter.com/jzarif, https://twitter.com/ khamenei_ir, https://twitter.com/hassanrouhani, https://twitter.com/a_davutog lu_eng, https://twitter.com/trpresidency?lang=tr. For the Arabic accounts of President Erdo˘gan and Prime Minister Davuto˘glu, see https://twitter.com/rterdogan_ ar?lang=tr, https://twitter.com/DavutogluAr. 7. The full speech of President Erdo˘gan with an English translation can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zghm_cFpYvY.

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Hürriyet Daily News. (1997). Turkey plays down OIC resolutions. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com. Hürriyet Daily News. (2012). Turkish soap operas topic of meeting with Arab officials. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com. Hürriyet Daily News. (2017). Turkish exports to Qatar have tripled from their normal levels since boycotting by Arab countries: Minister. Hürriyet Daily News, 23 June 2017. Kalin, I. (2011). Soft power and public diplomacy in Turkey. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 16(3), 5–23. Karda¸s, S. ¸ (2012). From zero problems to leading the change: Making sense of transformation in Turkey’s regional policy. TEPAV-ILPI Turkey Policy Brief Series, 5(1). Keohane, R. O., & Nye Jr, J. S. (2000). Globalization: What’s new? What’s not?(And so what?). Foreign Policy, 104–119. Kiri¸sçi, K. (2011). Turkey’s “Demonstrative effect” and the transformation of the Middle East. Insight Turkey, 13(2), 33. Larrabee, F. S. (2011). Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Turkish Studies, 12(4), 689–698. Liel, A. (2001). Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and politics. Lynne: Rienner Publishers. Melissen J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The new public diplomacy. Studies in diplomacy and international relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mercan, M. H. (2008). 1964–1984 Arası Türkiye ve ABD”nin Basra Körfezi”ne Yönelik Güvenlik Politikaları (Turkish and American Arabian Gulf security policies from 1964 to 1984). ILEM Yillik, 3(3), 133–151. Migdalovitz, C. (2010, June). Israel’s blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and its aftermath. Library of congress Washington dc congressional research service. NATO. (2011). Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Retrieved April 09, 2020, from http://www. nato.int. Nye, J. S. (1990). Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power. New York: Basic Books. Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs. Nye, J. S. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. O˘guzlu, T. (2007). Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(1), 81–97. Oktav, O. Z. (2013). Arap Baharı ve Türkiye-Körfez Devletleri ˙Ili¸skileri (Arab Spring and TurkeyGulf relations). Ortadogu Analiz, 5(51), 69–78. Oktav, Ö. Z. (2015). Opportunities and challenges in GCC-Turkey relations. In Ö. Z. Oktav & H. S. Ertem (Eds.), GCC-Turkey relations: Dawn of a new era (pp. 29–46). Cambridge: Gulf Research Center Cambridge. Onis, Z. (2012). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between ethics and self-interest. Insight Turkey, 14(3), 45–63. Perry, T. (2010). Israel tension boosts Turkey’s popularity with Arabs. Reuters. Retrieved April 09, 2020, from http://www.reuters.com. Pollock, D. (2017). Survey: Qatari public wants compromise, not Iran’s help. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org. Qusti, R., & Khan, M. (2006). King Abdullah to make historic visit to Turkey. Arab News. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from http://www.arabnews.com. Reuters. (2017). Turkey’s Erdogan ends tour with no sign of Qatar progress. Reuters. 24 July 2017. Rosenthal, A. (1990). Seeks joint action. NY Times. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from http://www. nytimes.com/. Salem, F., & Mourtada, R. (2012). Arab social media report (Rep.). Retrieved March 30, 2020, from Dubai School of Government website: http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/UserManag ement/PDF/ASMR. 4 updated 29 08 12.pdf. The Jerusalem Post. (2011). CNN Arabic readers vote Erdogan ‘Man of the Year’. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from http://www.jpost.com.

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The Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum (OxGAPS). (2015). Turkey-GCC relations: Trends and outlook. Retrieved from https://www.oxgaps.org/files/turkey-gcc_relations_trends_ and_outlook_2015.pdf. Ulrichsen, K. (2018, June 11). How Qatar weathered the Gulf Crisis. Retrieved September 28, 2020, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-06-11/how-qatar-wea thered-gulf-crisis Vuving, A. L. (2009, September). How soft power works: Paper Presented at the Panel “Soft power and smart power”. In American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (03 September 2009), Toronto. Wigglesworth, R., & Strauss, D. (2010). Turkey focuses on Gulf for two-way ties. Financial Times, June 21 2010. Yaffe, M. D. (2004). The Gulf and a New Middle East security system. Middle East Policy, 11(3), 118–130. Ye¸silada, B. (1993). Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. In The political and socioeconomic transformation of Turkey. Westpoint: Praeger. Zogby, J. (2013). Looking at Iran: How 20 Arab and Muslim Nations view Iran and its policies. Zogby Research Services. Zogby International. (2002). Arabs: What they believe and what they value most. Retrieved April 03, 2020, from https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/9767/attachments/original/143 8878620/Arab_Opinion_2002.pdf?1438878620.

Chapter 16

Iran’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy in Response to Regional Crises: The Case of the Blockade Against Qatar Mehran Haghirian

Iran has time and again adapted its foreign policy in response to regional crises and sought to take advantage of disorder to advance its national interests. Looking at Iran’s response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, its maneuvering with regards to Iraq after 2003, and its support for the 2011 uprisings in Bahrain, we can see that the Islamic Republic of Iran has had a varying and often unpredictable reaction to regional upheavals. The blockade that was imposed on Qatar in June 2017 was the latest region-wide crisis to expose the disunity within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and this prompted a pragmatic shift in Iran’s foreign policy. This paper analyzes Iran’s foreign policy decision-making process with respect to the Persian Gulf region by looking at the level of pragmatism in its approach towards regional crises. The blockade is used as a case study to examine Iran’s policy shift towards Qatar, moving from rivalry to a practical and mutually beneficial relationship. By presenting a brief history of the key factors and events that have shaped relations between Iran and Qatar, this paper examines Iran’s decision to assist Qatar at a critical juncture in the changing geopolitical environment of the Persian Gulf. With the objective of assessing the nature and durability of this revived relationship and its impact on regional politics, this paper also delves into the State of Qatar’s postconflict regional approach to enhancing its relations with Iran in order to guarantee the food security of its population, ensure an air-route for its leading international airline, and secure further regional diplomatic support for the country. While severing relations with Iran was among the 13 demands levied on Qatar by the Quartet, the extent of this bilateral relationship was minimal in comparison to some of the other GCC countries.1 It was indeed the blockade itself that propelled Qatar towards enhancing its relations with Iran, and the blockade was thus the primary reason for the changes in the regional status quo with respect to alliances and partnerships between the countries of the Persian Gulf. M. Haghirian (B) Gulf Studies Program, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_16

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Pragmatism in Iranian Foreign Policy Over its history of more than two millennia, Iran has undergone major transformations, and it is continuously evolving its foreign policy approach in accordance with the prevailing political environment in the region. As a country with a strategic and unique geographic position, Iran has been directly or indirectly impacted by many events that have occurred in neighboring countries as well as the dynamics of power and politics within its borders. Since the era of Cyrus the Great in the sixth century BC, Iran has been contemplating the balance between ideology and pragmatism in both its domestic and foreign policies. As Ramazani (2004) asserts, “in every major period of Iranian history the dictate of circumstances has forced Iranian foreign policy-makers to interpret their religious ideology pragmatically in order to advance the state interests.” Westbrook’s definition of pragmatist politicians describes the decision-makers, often leaders, as those who are willing to “settle for a glass half empty when standing on principle threatens to achieve less” (Ralston 2011). He further argues that “pragmatists are concerned above all about practical results.” Unlike classical realists who are focused on a fixed set of state preferences, pragmatists are in a strong sense similar to liberalists who believe that priority should be given to “selecting intelligent means, such as tools for situational problem-solving, and cultivating common-sense approaches, such as consulting best policy-making practices.” When analyzing Iran through this definition of pragmatism, the country’s foreign policy approaches can be divided into three major modi operandi: (1) Ideological, where tenets of pragmatism are relatively absent; (2) Pragmatic, where the pursuit of advancing national interests is paramount; and (3) A mélange of both ideological and pragmatic approaches. The Islamic Republic of Iran, and indeed its foreign policy, has been rooted in an Islamic revolutionary ideology since the 1979 revolution. The objectives and determinants of Iran’s foreign policy were framed in the early days of the revolution with particular reference to Islamic principles and opposition to imperialism and Western interference, as well as Ayatollah Khomeini’s personal views on Iran, Islam, and the world. Thus, Iran dramatically and radically changed in 1979 and surfaced as an ideological state with a strong inclination towards revolutionary and revisionist policies, with pragmatism largely pushed to the back seat in the first decade following the revolution. If a status quo power is defined as a state that aims to “work within the existing international system and not challenge the current order,” revisionist powers can be described as countries primarily concerned with their “own power and prestige above all other considerations” (Combes 2011/2012). According to Combes (2011/2012), revisionist powers seek to “remodel the international system and order” for their “own benefit and interests.” In line with this definition, Zionts (2006) argues that in order to be considered a revisionist power, Iran would have to have been “pursuing a goal of reshaping the regional status quo by meddling with the politics or territorial boundaries of another state.” By this definition, Zionts (2006) contends:

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“Indeed, Iran’s goal was decidedly revisionist,” since Ayatollah Khomeini had reiterated the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy goals during the Iran–Iraq War, for example, when the fight was viewed more as defending Islam rather than seizing territory or advancing national interests. According to Zionts (2006), during the Iran–Iraq War, which largely shaped the Islamic Republic’s regional as well as global foreign policy, “the calculus of realpolitik did not hold in a situation where the ideals of the revolution itself, not a relative increase of security in the international system, were at stake.” A revisionist characterization, however, is insufficient for some scholars who argue that the Islamic Republic should be viewed as a revolutionary country with revolutionary goals and aspirations. In this respect, Tenembaum (2012) asserts that “the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be described as a revisionist power,” since doing so “would hardly reflect the dimensions of its regional objectives or the means it is willing to employ in order to bring them about.” The Islamic Republic inherently has a revolutionary ideological structure in all aspects of governance, and the leaders of Iran have implemented and followed policies in line with this vision. What is important, however, is the varying levels of ideological and revolutionary influence on the different presidents, which have resulted in diverse foreign policies and approaches in international relations. While it is clear that ideology took center stage following the 1979 Revolution and during the ensuing eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, pragmatism has largely prevailed in the past three decades. Through the change in leadership following the passing of Ayatollah Khomeini, there has been a dramatic shift in Iranian policy and decision-making processes. As Posch (2013) contends, the Islamic Republic moved away from “the phase of aggressively ideological or utopian foreign policy,” and since Ayatollah Khamenei and Ayatollah Rafsanjani assumed their respective offices in 1989, “pragmatism, professionalism and national interests have come to the fore,” without ideology being abandoned as “a frame of reference.” The Islamic Republic established a series of ideological red lines that continue to dominate decision-making processes and constrain the implementation of radical changes and reforms. However, as Hunter (2003) argues, upon the realization that the undue and costly “emphasis on achieving vague Islamically oriented ideological goals” rarely served to secure immediate national interests, the Islamic Republic was forced to move towards deideologization. As a result of the changes in the leadership cadre, the maturation of the Islamic Republic’s determinants, objectives, and an understanding of national interests, coupled with the shifting geopolitics of the region, Iran has moved away from expressing a desire to export the revolution and towards aiming for the establishment of strong and durable foreign relations. Many scholars, including Menashri (2007), attest that the early enthusiastic and reactionary policies of the revolution have been replaced by pragmatic considerations following the sobering realities of years in power. While the revolutionary intent dictated the Islamic Republic’s general outward approach, Menashri argues that the “actual realities have often forced a somewhat greater realism” and an emphasis on the interests of the state as opposed to an “ideological crusade.” He goes so far as to say that, with few exceptions, “whenever

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ideological convictions have clashed with the interests of the state—as prescribed by the ruling elite—state interests ultimately have superseded revolutionary dogma in both foreign relations and domestic politics.”

Iran’s Reactions to Regional Crises Iran’s foreign policy towards the GCC and the broader Middle East can be best understood through the events that occurred following the 1979 Revolution. The war between Iran and Iraq that started a year after the establishment of the Islamic Republic greatly influenced its foreign policy formulation, as well as its regional political and security approach. Furthermore, the Iran–Iraq War also strained relations with the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf and continues to be a major influencer of the country’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the GCC countries. The legacy of the Iran–Iraq War has arguably been the dominant force behind Iran’s policies in the three subsequent major regional events: the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein, and to an extent, the uprisings in Bahrain in 2011. However, Iran’s system of governance has both core attributes and flexible elements, which generates distinct approaches towards different regional crises based on established red lines and the leadership styles of different presidents. In other words, while there is an established framework that all leaders of the Islamic Republic observe, there is a wide gap between the approaches of different leaders. The core elements, such as following Islamic principles in policy-making and resisting foreign presence and dominance in the Middle East and across the Muslim world, are strict practices in the Islamic Republic’s international affairs. However, Iran’s foreign policy is increasingly driven by the presidency and the flexibility it allows through the transition of power. One approach to analyzing pragmatism, or lack thereof, in Iran’s regional foreign policy is to look at the abovementioned events following the Iran–Iraq War that dramatically altered the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf. Iran’s actions in response to these regional crises allow for a better understanding of the objectives and determinants of the Islamic Republic’s approach to the blockade that was imposed on Qatar in 2017.

Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 Although the Iran–Iraq War ended on 3 July 1988 without a victor as both countries signed a cease-fire agreement brokered by the United Nations Security Council, Hussein claimed victory for Iraq on behalf of the Arab world.2 This was because Kuwait, along with other GCC partners, the United States, and dozens of other countries, supported Saddam Hussein during the war against the Islamic Republic and provided military and financial assistance to Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s actions after

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the end of the war with Iran, however, illustrated the need to reassess geopolitical strategies and policies for the GCC countries. Hussein’s lack of appreciation for the assistance received from the majority of the GCC states, and his invasion of Kuwait that followed less than two years after the war ended, proved to the GCC countries and the international community that the ruling regime in Iraq could no longer be trusted. Even though he had been a client of the GCC in “balancing against Iran in the 1980s,” Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait “revealed him as a menace” (Alterman 2007). If Iran’s ideological policies had dominated at that time, Iran would have accepted Saddam’s proposal to join Iraq’s invasion instead of adopting a policy of active neutrality. Iran viewed Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait as counter to its interests as the invasion’s success would have bolstered its most important regional adversary, changed the geopolitical landscape of the Persian Gulf, and further damaged Iran’s already-dim relations with the GCC countries. Within this context, Iran pragmatically decided to not directly interfere in the crisis and at the same time maximize its own interests. As such, President Rafsanjani disregarded the proposals for peace and cooperation that were presented by Saddam Hussein, and instead called for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. As Ekhtiari Amiri and Soltani (2011) argue, “Iran’s pragmatic decision in the crisis presented it as [a] rational and responsible actor which changed Iran’s image in the region and the world and paved the way for international cooperation.” Iran’s position during this crisis was “in sharp contrast to its interventionist and adventurist policies of the post-revolution period,” and as Ehteshami (2002) argues, “Tehran’s neutralist and nonaligned stance and support for the UN position throughout, coupled by its condemnation of the invasion, brought the republic substantial kudos.” Thus, the invasion of Kuwait paved the way for a constructively positive new era in relations between Iran and Kuwait specifically, as well as relations between Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf more broadly. With the decision to not interfere in the Persian Gulf War, Ayatollah Rafsanjani managed to lift the shadow of hostility and mistrust that had strained Iran’s relations with the GCC countries in the 1980s. Iran was facing severe economic problems after the end of the Iran–Iraq War and the primary objective of the Rafsanjani administration was the reconstruction of the country. As a pragmatic leader, Rafsanjani proclaimed that “Iran needs to stop making enemies,” and as Molavi (2015) argues he “saw the GCC states not as ripe pawns to be toppled, but as cash-rich investors to entice.” Iran’s position opened the doors for the GCC to recognize the Islamic Republic as a partner in regional security, and as Ekhtiari Amiri and Soltani (2011) explain, in the 1990 Summit in Doha the GCC members “welcomed the prospect of future cooperation and Iranian participation in regional security arrangements” for the first time since the revolution. Ramirez (1994) adds that as part of Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s foreign policy approach to foster economic cooperation with the region as well as the international community, Iran’s “stance toward Saudi Arabia also altered.” For example, to officially begin a new era in relations, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement of cooperation in 1993 to increase economic relations and collaboration as OPEC members. As a result of Iran’s pragmatic approach towards this crisis, its

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bilateral relations with the GCC countries changed from confrontation to constructive cooperation, which led to increased levels of trade, the restoring of direct flight links, and money being allowed to flow more freely across borders.

The Fall of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait forced the recalibration of the regional, political, and security policies of Iran and the GCC countries. With the United States’ military involvement in Iraq that began in 2003, and its subsequent ousting of Saddam Hussein, the security and political dimensions of the Persian Gulf once again drastically changed. According to Molavi (2015), along with the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the 2003 invasion “weakened Iraq” and thereby strengthened “Iran’s relative regional power as it poured resources into shaping post-Saddam Iraq.” Kamrava (2011) adds that “for Iran, the significance of the elimination of a major regional rival, and the subsequent political ascendance of Iraqi Shi‘ites, cannot be over-emphasized.” Following the invasion of Iraq by the United States, Iran was presented with new security challenges as well as with tremendous economic opportunities to pragmatically advance its national interests. In contrast, however, the Islamic Republic’s growing influence in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the accession of a Shiite government into power in Iraq were major points of concern for Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, as Iran’s ideological and religious tendencies once again resurfaced in tandem with its pragmatic approach. Rafsanjani’s pragmatic foreign policy continued during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, which further strengthened bilateral relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Khatami’s approach was viewed as counter to the inherently conservative, revolutionary, and ideological policies of the Islamic Republic and even more prudent and pragmatic than Rafsanjani’s. As a result, there was an increased domestic rivalry for power by factions with differing views on Iran’s economic policies, level of religiosity, and foreign relations. Ansari (2008) writes that “at the very time when Khatami was seeking the desacralization of the state and a concentration of power within the republican organs of government, his ideological enemies were countering with a process of sacralization,” which was expanded dramatically in 2005 with Ahmadinejad’s accession to power. These differing visions within Iran paved the way for the country’s mixed approach towards Iraq after 2003, where ideological and pragmatic policies were implemented in parallel to one another. Particularly looking at the Khatami era, Ramazani (2004) contends that Khatami’s “conciliatory foreign policy” in pursuit of Iran’s national interest “paid off handsomely,” and for example “the improvement in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia was unprecedented, and the rapprochement also helped reduce tensions with Iran’s other neighbors.” Iran’s pragmatic policy towards Iraq after 2003 was evident in that priority was given to advancing national security by ensuring the inability of pro-Saddam Iraqis and members of the Ba’ath party to take power. However, ideologues within the Iranian leadership also advanced their interests of pursuing policies

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that were reminiscent of the early years of the revolution and the urge to export the revolution abroad. Thus, it is best to explain Iran’s reaction to the fall of Saddam as an ideological policy that was coupled with significant elements of pragmatism. The fall of Saddam Hussein, and Iran’s evident, calculated maneuvering in Iraq, was crucially important for the Islamic Republic, for reasons such as concerns over ethnic and sectarian conflicts, the dangers that a fragmented Iraq would pose, the potential for the spillover of insurgent and terrorist activities, and more importantly the presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops within striking distance of Tehran (Kamrava 2011). For these reasons, Kamrava (2011) contends, Iran encouraged “the emergence of a viable, pluralist, and stable central government in Baghdad,” as it “ensures that the country remains intact, that the insurgency is contained, and that the American occupation forces are likely to withdraw from the country sooner rather than later.” However, as Rubin (2009) points out, it was hard for Iraq “to demonstrate to the world that it is free of Iranian influence.” Rubin argues that “Iran’s influence is indisputable,” and that the country that harbored the greatest uncertainty was, and continues to be, Saudi Arabia. Regarding the Maliki administration in Iraq which tilted heavily towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, Prince Turki Al-Faisal explains that Saudi Arabia had “told the United States previously that when it brought a Shiite-dominated government to power,” it handed Iraq to Iran “on a golden plate.” Thus, the differing aspirations for Iraq added to the already complex geo-strategic rivalry between Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, while at the same time significantly advancing Iran’s national and regional interests.

Uprisings in Bahrain in 2011 Iran’s foreign relations and policies once again shifted dramatically with the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections. The Islamic Republic’s ideological, revolutionary, and confrontational policies once again resurfaced, and according to Maloney (2013), “Ahmadinejad’s presidency reversed the trajectory of Iran’s post-war path of moderation and put the revolution back on a collision course with the international community.” As a result, Khatami’s dialogue among civilizations was “replaced by an eventual clash of civilizations”; the pragmatic approach in reforming the country “gave way to growing conservatism,” and the policy of détente was replaced by growing regional and international “tension” (Menashri 2007). Ahmadinejad’s revamping of the domestic and foreign policies of the previous two administrations had a negative impact on Iran’s relations with the GCC countries, and as Molavi (2015) puts it, “the days of détente seemed a distant memory.” What further damaged the Islamic Republic’s relations with the GCC countries was Iran’s support for the uprisings in Bahrain, which further intensified the move from reconciliation to direct hostilities between Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Ostovar (2016) writes that Iranian officials were initially vocally supportive of the Arab uprisings that occurred across the Middle East and North Africa starting

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in December 2010. He adds that “when protests erupted across Bahrain and Egypt, Iran’s leaders cheered the outpouring of discontent as righteous and legitimate.” Furthermore, he recollects that “Iranian officials were particularly vocal regarding Bahrain, where they called on the ruling Sunni Al-Khalifah family to respect popular democracy and the will of the country’s people,” creating a new wave of tensions between Iran and the GCC countries. Due to its revolutionary and ideological nature, the Islamic Republic generally supports the concept of political uprisings against monarchies and countries that are dependent on Western hegemonic powers, or as the constitution declares, “while it completely abstains from any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the struggles of the oppressed for their rights against the oppressors anywhere in the world.”3 Bahraini leaders and their allies in the GCC and the West had a strong belief that Iran was behind the Shiite uprisings in Bahrain, even though the uprising in Bahrain was, according to Ostovar (2016), “a populist, grassroots movement by a marginalized, yet demographic-majority community, seeking greater inclusion and political reform.” As it was a Shiite uprising, however, it “triggered the deeply ingrained fears” of the leaders in some of the GCC states as they viewed “Iran’s hand in the unrest and collectively moved to crush it.” Other scholars, including Fürtig (2013) also believe that the GCC countries “did not only fear the knock on effect of a popular uprising, but also an imminent Iranian victory.” Similar to Ostovar (2016), Fürtig (2013) argues that “the presence of a Shi’a majority in Bahrain gave rise to their suspicions that an insurgent victory would, in fact, constitute a success for Tehran,” increasing the necessity of putting an end to the uprisings. What is clear from Iran’s actions following the uprisings in Bahrain is that the Islamic Republic once again resorted to a purely ideological approach and abandoned its pragmatic foreign policy decision-making calculus. Furthermore, the case of Bahrain illustrates that not all of Iran’s responses to the crises in its immediate region were pragmatic. It exemplifies Iran’s constant struggle in choosing between pragmatic and ideological foreign policy approaches, and the consequences this choice has had on the country’s foreign relations as well as the advancement of its national interests.

Iran’s Reaction to the Blockade Against Qatar Following the imposition of the blockade against Qatar in June 2017, Iran once again chose to approach the crisis in a pragmatic manner. At that time, Iran was once again under heavy pressure from the United States following the Trump administration’s repeated threats to withdraw from the nuclear agreement and the call for establishing a United Arab Front to counter and contain the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, Iran was also isolated by the majority of the GCC countries following the incident at Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad in response to the execution of Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr in January 2016. The blockade presented Iran with a myriad of opportunities to prove and establish itself as a viable partner for Qatar, and at the

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same time to hinder Saudi Arabia and the other members of the blockading Quartet and prevent them from achieving their objectives. Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy, which had a “pragmatist tone” and a “constant emphasis on realism and prudence,” once again released Iran from the dogmatic ideological approach and shifted the country towards moderation and global engagement (Sen 2016). The Rouhani administration not only succeeded in ending Iran’s nuclear portfolio at the UN Security Council, which led to the lifting of international sanctions on Iran, but in doing so, managed once again to reduce Iran’s isolation while fostering unprecedented engagement with the international community. Molavi (2015) argues that President Rouhani “made outreach to the GCC States a priority,” and that his administration “hails from the Rafsanjani camp that believes in pragmatic engagement” with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and “not confrontation.” While Iran managed to alter its hostile relations with European and Asian countries, the growing regional contentions have inhibited the betterment of relations with the GCC countries. The Syrian and Yemeni conflicts are major arenas for confrontation between Iran and some GCC states, and coupled with the shift in regional dynamics arising from the nuclear deal, the Rouhani administration was faced with a soaring level of rancor from some of its Arab neighbors, which inhibited a wide-ranging rapprochement. Indeed, these hostilities also led to the decision by the GCC states to sever or downgrade ties with Iran following the 2016 incident at the Saudi Arabian diplomatic missions in Iran. The blockade and the ensuing crisis in the Persian Gulf presented the Rouhani administration with an opportunity to enhance and expand relations with another member of the GCC in tandem with the growing diplomatic and economic relations with Oman and Kuwait. Rouhani’s pragmatic and opportunistic response to the blockade against Qatar resembles Rafsanjani’s approach to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, and is far away from Ahmadinejad’s policies with regard to the uprisings in Bahrain. The Islamic Republic could have acted in the same ideological manner that it did with regard to the situation in Bahrain in 2011 in order to illustrate its anger towards Qatar over its hosting of an American airbase, support for Saudi Arabia during a period of tensions with Iran, and opposing policies with regard to Syria and elsewhere in the region. However, the pragmatic president in Iran did not consider such an approach and rushed to take advantage of the situation to advance national interests and score points against Saudi Arabia. Unlike the cases of the invasion of Kuwait and the fall of Saddam, and similar to the case of the uprisings in Bahrain, Iran was named as one of the reasons for the crisis. The blockading Quartet levied a list of thirteen demands against Qatar, and top of the list was the curbing of diplomatic ties with Iran by closing its diplomatic missions, expelling members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and cutting off any military cooperation (Wintour 2017). The demands went so far as to dictate that “only trade and commerce with Iran that complies with US and international sanctions will be permitted.” As Clarke (2018) argues, “if the goal is to attenuate Iran, the continued obsession with Qatar is having the opposite effect—it is, naturally, forcing Doha into closer relations with Tehran as a means of mitigating the negative economic consequences of the continued blockade.”

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While severing relations with Iran was among the thirteen demands levied on Qatar by the Quartet, some of the other GCC countries—the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait— have had, and continue to have, far greater economic and diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. It was indeed the blockade that propelled the State of Qatar’s post-conflict regional approach to enhance its relations with Iran in order to guarantee the food security of its population, ensure an air-route for its leading international airline, and secure further regional diplomatic support for the country. In contrast to the expectations of the Quartet, Qatar restored its diplomatic representation in Iran to their pre-2016 level by reinstating its ambassador in Tehran, and the two countries have vowed to substantially increase economic and trading ties (Pradhan 2018). Iran, in addition to Turkey, has been a central actor in post-blockade Qatar. With its close proximity and strategic objectives, Iran acted swiftly following the imposition of the blockade and has guaranteed the importation of key foodstuffs and products into Qatari markets. The blockade “forced Qatar to rely on Iranian airspace and shipping routes,” which has caused a political reshuffling in the region and a blow to the objectives of Saudi Arabia and other blockading countries (Sergie 2018). With the closure of Qatar’s only land border by Saudi Arabia, the only shipping and air routes for Qatar were through the Persian Gulf, and Iran was consequently the only source of entry into the country by both air and sea. Additionally, it is a widely held belief that “Iran stands as the sole victor,” to which statement Michael Greenwald, the former US Treasury attaché to Qatar and Kuwait, attests (Sergie 2018). Iran strongly condemned the imposition of the blockade, calling it an unjust “siege”; it seized the opportunity offered by a divided GCC and “vowed to stand with Qatar” (Pradhan 2018). “Iran has emerged as the primary beneficiary of the intra-GCC rift” and the irrational pressure to implement the list of demands has moved Qatar “closer and closer to Iran with each passing day, since the boycott” (Pradhan 2018). Furthermore, the breakup of the GCC is considered an advantage for the Islamic Republic as it will significantly damage Saudi Arabia’s regional policies and objectives. As Ambassador Mousavian argued in an interview with the author, the most important objective for Iran in assisting Qatar “was to prevent a regime change attempt by Saudi Arabia,” and as “Riyadh has already dominated Bahrain, the measures taken through the blockade could have been attempts to dominate Qatar as the second phase of a broader strategy to dominate all GCC member countries.”4 He further stated that “Iran’s strategy played a key role in saving Qatar and blocking the domino effect of Saudi Arabia’s domination strategy.”5 In addition, and in line with these statements, Cafiero (2017) argues that Iran’s response to the blockade has allowed it “the opportunity to tell Arabs that it is Saudi Arabia, not Iran, that threatens Middle Eastern countries’ sovereignty,” and to advance its image as a non-sectarian regional power.

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Iran and Qatar as Partners? The relationship between Iran and Qatar has one unique feature that has bound the two countries together: the shared gas resources in the Persian Gulf. As a result of this natural resource linkage, both countries have developed strategic partnerships and mostly accommodating relations since the end of the Iran–Iraq War. Interactions between the two have gradually increased, and ever since Khatami’s official trip to Doha in May 1999 relations have mostly been positive, or, if not, at least without hostilities (Eltahawy 1999). As many scholars argue, Qatar’s independent approach in foreign policy, especially since 1996 and more so since 2011, has illustrated its unique standing among the GCC member states. In Guzansky’s (2015) words, Qatar’s foreign policy is “a combination of opportunism, ambition and strategic maneuvering, backed by tremendous economic power and a willingness to use it for political purposes,” which have given its leadership the required confidence to forge its independent approach towards Iran. As the first Iranian leader to attend the event, Ahmadinejad was invited to the GCC summit in Doha on 3 December 2007, where he proposed twelve points for improving brotherly relations and expanding cooperation between the seven countries (Ebtekar 2007). As a result of the increased political exchanges, according to Iran’s former Ambassador to Qatar, Abdullah Sohrabi, Iran and Qatar forged official partnerships in a wider range of areas in 2010, including maritime security cooperation, joint efforts to fight piracy and terrorism, and coordination in countering organized crime, specifically drug trafficking.6 The strategic relations between Iran and Qatar were further strengthened with the election of Hassan Rouhani and the subsequent series of diplomatic engagements between the two countries. The strategic importance of Qatar to President Rouhani’s foreign policy was illustrated in October 2015 when Iran and Qatar signed a security agreement for the stability of the regional waters in the Persian Gulf, as well as when Iran trained Qatari naval forces as part of increased maritime cooperation in the same year. The expansion of ties occurred at a time of intense frictions within the GCC, and at a crucial moment in the region’s history with regard to the successful conclusion of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers, and as such it is illustrative of Qatar’s strategic maneuvering in its regional policies. After the blockade these official agreements expanded, and in April 2018 the two countries signed an agreement to “increase the joint patrolling of their maritime boundary” (Pradhan 2018). Furthermore, as Iran and Turkey are the two major countries that have been assisting the post-blockade food and goods markets in Qatar, the three countries signed a transportation pact in November 2017, to boost trilateral trade and ensure the smooth transfer of Turkish products through Iranian territory (Vakil 2018). The mutually beneficial relations, particularly with respect to the shared gas field between the Islamic Republic and Qatar, have inhibited the escalation of tensions over regional issues, and Qatar’s welcoming of the nuclear deal signified a calculated approach towards Iran’s diplomatic success. Being among the first of the GCC leaders to praise the nuclear deal, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani

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called it a positive and important step at the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2015, and remarked: “I assure that Iran is an important neighboring country, and that cooperation between it and our countries is in the interest of the region.”7 He further claimed that “bilateral relations between Qatar and Iran are growing and evolving steadily on the basis of common interests and good neighborliness,” and added that “there is no dispute concerning bilateral relations between our two countries.”8 While Iran and Qatar have many mutual interests, the Qatari government’s regional policies are often at odds with Iranian interests, including policies with regard to Syria and Hamas (Bianco and Stansfield 2011). Additionally, regardless of whether the likelihood is high or minimal, there remains the possibility that the blockade will cease to exist and Qatar and Saudi Arabia will resume friendly ties. Furthermore, Qatar continues to have a strong strategic partnership with the United States that is currently more important to the sheikhdom than any other factor. These issues could be seen as the primary reasons for the limited official contacts and contracts between the Iran and Qatar after the blockade. However, even though Qatar has strong strategic relations with the United States and shares a land border with Saudi Arabia, with which it has many religious commonalities, it “shares its wealth with Iran” (Seznec 2016). This fact has been a key barrier for confrontation and a solid reason for constructive cooperation between the two countries. Iran holds the largest natural gas reserves in the world. Half of those reserves are situated in the world’s largest gas field, which it shares with Qatar, and which holds an estimated thirty-five trillion cubic meters of Iranian and twenty-four trillion cubic meters of Qatari reserves. (Seznec 2016). While there are no official agreements between Iran and Qatar on the fields, the South Pars/North Dome fields are viewed as a shared interest rather than as a battleground for rivalry. Furthermore, following Doha’s decision to withdraw its membership from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in January 2019 (Colgan 2018) it is expected that Qatar will focus more on expanding its role in the global gas market and growing cooperation between Iran and Qatar in this field is very likely. Iran and Qatar’s shared gas field is an example of energy interdependency in the Persian Gulf. There are operational and proposed gas pipelines from the South Pars/North Dome fields to other GCC countries, Iraq, and across the region. These pipelines can have an enduring impact on bilateral and multilateral relations due to the fact that these countries are in need of sustained gas imports. In addition to satisfying the gas needs of the GCC countries, the long-lasting nature of these pipelines will further bind the countries together and secure long-term cooperation. Qatar’s advancement in the development of the North Dome and its longer experience working with international corporations can be helpful to Iran as it endeavors to develop its fields. Qatar can share its experience with the Islamic Republic to not only ensure the sustainability, security, and safety of the fields but also to profit from the investments and partnerships. Furthermore, as Seznec (2016) proposes, “Qatar could toll Iranian South Pars natural gas into LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) for export worldwide.” On another note, while the new US policies have been successful in limiting Iran’s trade with the UAE—the largest trading partner of Iran within the GCC—after

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the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in 2018, this new situation has allowed Qatar to attract Iranian businesses and act as the possible re-exportation hub for goods destined for Iran. As Vakil (2018) argues, since January 2018, “amid increased tensions with the UAE over banking and trade, Iran has begun to shift such activities to Doha as a replacement for its longstanding Dubai ties.” The expansion of business-to-business ties has become easier with the expansion of Qatar Airways’ flights to multiple cities in Iran, as well as the removal of visa restrictions for Iranian travelers. As the Chief Executive of Qatar Airways, Akbar al-Baker, said in a statement, “these latest launches are further evidence of Qatar Airways’ commitment to Iran, as well as the expansion of our network in this thriving market” (Cornwell 2018). At the strategic level, Iran and Qatar continuously expanded and broadened the scope of their engagements following the 2017 blockade. Iran’s President and the Emir of Qatar spoke several times on the phone and held meetings on the sideline of regional and international summits on a number of occasions. Zarif, for example, made Doha a regular stop following the imposition of the blockade on Qatar, and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also traveled to Iran a number of times. The diplomatic back and forth ultimately led to the first official state visit of Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani to Iran as the Emir of Qatar in January 2020, with the expectation of an official state visit by Rouhani to Doha prior to the end of his term in 2021. Qatar has been prioritizing its diplomatic relations with Iran, more so than ever before the blockade. Qatari leaders have been vocally against the Arab states’ policies with regard to Iran, have been supportive of the JCPOA, and have vowed not to take part in any military action against Iran. Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Khalid al-Attiyah, for example, called for salvaging the JCPOA at a security conference in Singapore in June 2018, arguing that “Everyone should keep holding on to this [agreement],” in addition to also opposing military action against Iran, proclaiming that “In my own judgement, I think the United States is wiser than to enter in a war with Iran” (Associated Press 2018). Al-Attiyah also insisted that “Iran is next door. We should call Iran, put all the files on the table and start to discuss to bring peace rather than war” (Associated Press 2018). Having adopted a policy of engagement and dialogue, Qatar also opposed the statements issued by the emergency summits of the Arab League and the GCC which were held in Saudi Arabia following the attacks in Abqaiq and Khurais in May 2019. While Qatar did condemn the attacks, the Foreign Minister opposed the statements because they “did not refer to a moderate policy to speak with Tehran,” arguing that “they adopted Washington policy toward Iran, rather than a policy that puts neighborhood with Iran into consideration” (Reuters 2019). Just days before the state visit of the Qatari Emir, Qatar’s foreign minister made an unannounced trip to Tehran following the assassination of the Iranian General, Qassem Soleimani. Some media outlets had alleged that the drones that were used for the attack were launched from Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase which hosts the U.S. Air Force, causing a moment of concern for the status of relations between Iran and Qatar (Arab News 2020). This trip, however, was an attempt by Doha to mediate between

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Iran and the United States with the objective of de-escalating a highly sensitive situation in the region. Qatar’s new position as a close partner of both Iran and the United States could have allowed it to foster further support to act as a mediator, however, the underlying intra-GCC issues have, and will continue to, inhibit Doha from reaching the full potential of relations with Iran. While Qatar has benefitted from its pragmatic policy of dialogue with Iran, the “apparent rapprochement between Doha and Tehran against Riyadh, if cemented,” might represent “a casus belli in appearing to confirm Qatar’s intention to conspire with the common enemy” (Bianco and Stansfield 2011). As such, Qatar has been, and will continue to be, cautious in its decision-making calculus towards engaging Iran.

Conclusion While it is difficult to forecast the future of relations between Iran and Qatar, as these countries are located in one of the most unpredictable regions in the world, it can be inferred from past policies and approaches that Iran and Qatar will gradually expand ties without being considered major allies. Primarily because of the sensitivities in neighboring GCC countries, Qatar will continue to have limited official relations with Iran while at the same time attempting to expand ties by testing the waters occasionally and in response to geopolitical events in the region. Iran, on the other hand, is much keener to make the relationship official, to illustrate its non-sectarian and friendly regional policies to other members of the GCC as well as other countries in the region and beyond. Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy, sometimes limited by the approach of ideological presidents and frictions in domestic politics, has broadly and effectively replaced the revolutionary dogmas that were first introduced after the 1979 revolution. Most recently, the case of the blockade against Qatar has clearly illustrated the importance of this shift in foreign policy decision-making. However, as the trend in Iranian politics has shown, it is likely that a more ideological and less pragmatic president will succeed Rouhani following the end of his second term in office in 2021, and the future foreign policy approach of the Islamic Republic remains nebulous. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Islamic Republic seem to have positioned the betterment of relations with the majority of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf at the top of the state’s foreign policy agenda, and it can be inferred that expanding relations with Qatar will continue to be an important endeavor for Iran. Notes 1. The blockading Quartet consists of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt. 2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. 3. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 154. 4. Ambassador Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, Interview by Mehran Haghirian, 2 December 2018.

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5. Ibid. 6. Ambassador Abdullah Sohrabi, Interview by Mehran Haghirian, 21 January 2017. 7. Statement by Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani at the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations, New York, 28 September 2015. 8. Ibid.

References Ahlan Va Sahlan Ya Akhi Ahmadinejad (in Farsi) (2007). Ebtekar, December 4, 2007. Alterman, J. (2007). Iraq and the Gulf States: The balance of fear. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. Ambassador Abdullah Sohrabi. (2017). Interview by Mehran Haghirian, January 21, 2017. Ambassador Seyyed Hossein Mousavian. (2018). Interview by Mehran Haghirian, December 2, 2018. Ansari, A. (2008). Iran under Ahmadinejad: Populism and its malcontents. International Affairs, 84(4), 683–700. Bianco, C., & Stansfield, G. (2011). The intra-GCC crises: Mapping GCC fragmentation after 2011. International Affairs, 94(3), 613–635. Cafiero, G. (2017). Iran’s role in Qatar’s new foreign policy. Al Monitor. Clarke, C. (2018). On an Island: Saudi Arabia’s relentless obsession with Qatar is aiding Iran. Lawfare. Colgan, J. (2018). Qatar will leave OPEC. Here’s what this means. The Washington Post. Combes, K. (2011/2012). Between revisionism and status quo: China in international regimes. University of Leeds Journal of Politics and International Studies, 6. Cornwell, A. (2018). Qatar Airways announces more flights to Iran weeks after U.S. sanctions reimposed on Tehran. Reuters. Ehteshami, A. (2002). The foreign policy of Iran. In Raymond Hinnebusch & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Eds.), The foreign policies of middle east states (pp. 283–309). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Ekhtiari Amiri, R., & Soltani, F. (2011). Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as turning point in Iran-Saudi relations. Journal of Politics and Law, 4(1), 188–194. Eltahawy, M. (1999). Khatami takes olive branch to Arab neighbors. The Guardian. Fürtig, H. (2013). Iran and the Arab Spring: Between expectations and disillusion. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Guzansky, Y. (2015). The Foreign policy tools of small powers: Strategic hedging in the persian gulf. Middle East Policy, 22(1), 112–122. Hunter, S. (2003). Iran’s pragmatic regional policy. International Affairs, 62(2), 133–147. Kamrava, M. (2011) Iranian foreign and security policies in the persian Gulf. In M. Kamrava, (Ed.), The international politics of the persian gulf , (pp. 184–206). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Maloney, S. (2013). Iran surprises itself and the world: A new president may take his country in a new direction. Brookings Institute. Menashri, D. (2007). Iran’s regional policy: Between radicalism and pragmatism. International Affairs, 60(2), 153–167. Molavi, A. (2015). Iran and the Gulf States. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. Ostovar, A. (2016). Sectarian dilemmas in Iranian foreign policy: When strategy and identity politics collide. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Posch, W. (2013) The third world, global Islam, and pragmatism: The making of Iranian foreign policy. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Pradhan, P. K. (2018). Qatar crisis and the deepening regional fault lines. Strategic Analysis, 43(4), 437–442. Qatar says it has reservations about Arab statements on Iran. (2019). Reuters. Qatar won’t be part of any military action against Iran. (2018). Associated Press. Ralston, S. (2011). Pragmatism in international relations: Theory and research. Eidos, 14, 72–105. Ramazani, R. K. (2004). Ideology and pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy. Middle East Journal, 58(4), 549–559. Ramirez, D. (1994). The faithful opposition: Religious resistance to rafsanjani. Harvard International Review, 16(3), 42–75. Rubin, A. (2009). Iraq tries to prove autonomy, and makes inroads. The New York Times. Sen, G. (2016). The prospects of “constructive engagement” in Iran-GCC relations: The levant dimension. In Maaike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara, & Paul Aarts (Eds.), Iran’s relations with the Arab states of the Gulf: Common interests over historic rivalry. London: Gerlach Press. Sergie, M. (2018). Embattled Qatar is rich enough to get by for another 100 years. Bloomberg Business. Seznec, J.-F. (2016). Sharing a pot of gold. Middle East Institute. Statement by HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani at the United Nations General Assembly. New York, United States, September 28, 2015. Tenembaum, Y. (2012). International relations: It’s time to revise how we talk about revisionist powers. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Vakil, S. (2018). Iran and the GCC: Hedging. Chatham House: Pragmatism and Opportunism. Wintour, P. (2017). Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia. The Guardian. Zionts, D. (2006). Revisionism and its variants: Understanding state reactions to foreign policy failure. Security Studies, 15(4), 631–657.

Part V

Qatar’s Economic Strategies in the Face of the Blockade

Chapter 17

The Gulf Blockade: A Fifth Qatari Economic Stage is Imminent Moustafa Amin Mohammed Ali

Certain challenges may unexpectedly play a significant role in saving countries from economic catastrophes, rather than aggravating them. This chapter briefly explores some of the crucial economic challenges that have contributed to the development of Qatar’s economy, particularly in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis and blockade, and the emergence of a new era in the developmental history of Qatar’s economy—a fifth economic phase. This chapter first explores the economic perspective of the Gulf Crisis through conceptualizing the blockade as an economic warfare tool. Second, it throws light on the four previous phases of Qatar’s economy according to the literature on the subject (Alkhater 2016). In its third section, it discusses how Qatar’s economy is embarking on a fifth economic phase—an era that is very likely to trigger fundamental changes to the traditional rentier GCC Economic Model. The primary observations made in this chapter highlight how Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have come into play, helping the state to overcome grave economic vulnerabilities and to take significant steps towards achieving strong economic resilience. This chapter uses generic research methodologies and primary document analysis.

Approaching the Concept of Blockade The widely accepted definition of a blockade, as cited by von Heinegg (2006:10), is as a “belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation.” Rawlinson (1967) highlights the relevance of a status of enmity between the nations involved. Moreover, if such a blockade is solely aimed against the enemy’s economy, “the M. A. M. Ali (B) Gulf Studies Program, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_17

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legality of a blockade has to be judged in the light of the law of economic warfare and of neutrality” (von Heinegg 2006:10). The current blockade, not imposed against a background of war, yet obtaining between countries of the same religion, culture, and language, is unambiguously intended to harm Qatar’s economy, besides demonizing it regionally and globally. This is consistent with contemporary views on blockades as acts of economic warfare, thus highlighting the importance of understanding how such a full-fledged blockade is viewed from an economic perspective. I agree with von Heinegg (2006:1) that blockades as acts of economic warfare are the exception rather than the norm in modern times, since they are normally imposed as an integral part of a military operation. However, a protracted blockade will indeed weaken the enemy’s military, through weakening the economy that sustains and supports it. Although the GCC blockade did not actually include any military actions against Qatar, there is abundant information on plans prepared by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to invade Qatar, seize Doha, and potentially gain access to Qatar’s SWFs. Moreover, multiple reports of potential military action against Qatar were carried by a myriad of reputable international newspapers, without any denial from the US administration, let alone the blockading Quartet. The successful intervention by Rex Tillerson, the former US Secretary of State, which seemingly prevented a military invasion, is perceived to be the reason why he lost his job in the White House (Emmons 2018). Nevertheless, when we survey the air, land, and sea blockade as declared by the Quartet, it is clear that the blockade does not apply to exports of natural gas from Qatar to Dubai, which means that there is still trade occurring between those states. This suggests that the Qatari leadership is willing to leave some doors open in the hope that the dispute may be resolved; or at least, from a practical economic perspective, that it prefers neither to cut off sources of revenue in times of hardship, nor be the cause of Dubai’s inhabitants having to go to sleep after the sun goes down. For a state such as Qatar, given its geographical limitations, depletable reservoirs of natural resources, regional significance, and overdependence for its food security on imports from neighbors, it is unequivocal that its economy might be vulnerable to external shocks. This is especially true in the midst of the current diplomatic rift, which is unprecedented in depth and breadth in the modern history of the Arab countries, let alone the GCC. Importantly, the “carrot and stick” policies that the blockading countries adopted, inviting other countries to join their boycott of Qatar in order to impact its economy, have in fact acted as a stimulus for the investigation of the blockade’s implications for Qatar’s economic sectors. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on Qatar’s economy raises serious concerns about the diplomatic dispute and how it “could weaken confidence and reduce investment and growth, both in Qatar and possibly in other GCC countries as well” (IMF 2017). According to the IMF report, “the direct economic and financial impact of the diplomatic rift between Qatar and some countries in the region has been manageable,” which implies that the blockade has not achieved its main goals. Kamel (2018) underscores that what is happening in the Qatari case patently contradicts the predictions of the mainstream literature (e.g., von Heinegg 2006) on the impact of a blockade—be it economic or military. Not only has the blockade worked in favor of the country under siege, but it has had negative impacts on the Quartet’s own economies; although the effect on

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Saudi Arabia’s economy has been limited, it has clearly had a major impact on the economies of Bahrain and the UAE (Kamel 2018). I tend to believe that another aspect of the blockade may be the projection of power in order to force Qatar back into the mainstream political trajectory of the GCC states. It is important, in this context, to note that it is not my intention to argue that it was solely such motives of power projection that triggered the blockade; nor do I maintain that economic factors were the main motives behind it: rather, there was an accumulation of economic concerns as political disputes piled up. Moreover, AlBaharnat argues that behind the blockade there is also an historical motive, regarding how the UAE in particular views Qatar, namely as the would-be eighth emirate (AlBaharnat 2004). This seems plausible from a counterfactual perspective, since Qatar would have been among the richest emirates of the UAE if the federation initiative had been a success. That said, it is also plausible that relations between Qatar and the UAE are much more intense and complicated compared to their counterpart relations with Saudi Arabia, especially if we bear in mind the special veneration Qatar used to have for Saudi Arabia. I tend to think that one of the main economic factors that could have contributed to the blockade was Qatar’s intent to launch a regional Renminbi clearing center, the first of its kind in the MENA region, its main objective being to “offer RMB clearing and settlement … increase financial connectivity between China, Southwest Asia and the MENA region and increase opportunity to expand trade and investment between China, Qatar and the region” (QCB 2015). This is understood to have aroused the resentment of the UAE at the regional level, as well as fury of the United States. The UAE’s resentment is conspicuously directed towards the Qatar–China clearing hub, which is a fierce competitor to Dubai’s International Financial Center—previously the only such center in the region—as well the expected outcome that Qatar would attract global clients and businesses. Furthermore, Engdahl argues that Washington had a desire to discipline Qatar for its willingness to perform natural gas transactions with China in the latter’s currency, and not in US dollars; this particularly appalled the US administration since Qatar is the world’s largest and leading LNG exporter (Engdahl 2017). This would mean that the anger of the United States regarding the establishment of a Yuan Clearing Center for trading with China—in the heart of the Gulf, which is a major US “petrodollar” generator—is an equally crucial factor in the origins of the blockade. The United States granted Saudi Arabia and the UAE carte blanche to impose a “Saudi-led”—yet UAE-planned-and-triggered—blockade on Qatar, in which Bahrain followed the former and Egypt acted upon the directions of the latter, with the Trump administration’s oversight. Therefore, the argument that the United States made this blockade happen, in an “ugly exploitation of the political disputes between the Gulf states, especially Qatar and KSA, to project its ‘soft power’ on one of its allies but this time through ‘proxy, … Riyadh’, to discipline those not ‘behaving’ according to Washington’s wishes” (Engdahl 2017) has some justification.

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The Development of Qatar’s Economy According to Alkhater’s Classification According to Alkhater (2016), Qatar’s economic development has witnessed four major phases. The following lines provide a brief background of these four stages:

The Pre-Independence Oil Economy: 1949–1971 The year 1949 marked the burgeoning of Qatar’s economy through the exportation of oil, almost three decades after the pearling industry declined. The discovery of oil, and the revenues which later flowed, represented a milestone in the historical record of Qatar’s economy since it facilitated the country’s early steps towards various aspects of modernity. The economy of this pre-independence stage was marked by the introduction of the first government budget, the establishment of the first British bank in Qatar—the Eastern Bank, in 1950—and the creation of the first Qatari national bank in 1965 (Alkhater 2016). However, at this stage it was still too early for the financial sector to be part of the international monetary system, probably due to the existence neither of a national Qatari currency nor a monetary authority, let alone the absolute absence of the capital market (Alkhater 2016).

The Early Post-Independence Oil Economy: 1971–1980 After independence, generous increases in oil revenues in the aftermath of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo quadrupled oil prices and resulted in a brisk progress in the development of Qatar’s economy. This stage of the oil-based economy was marked by introduction of the Riyal, the first national Qatari currency, and the establishment of the Qatar Monetary Agency, “the first sovereign monetary authority in the country’s modern history” (Alkhater 2016). As this was a burgeoning economy, the introduction of a national Qatari currency required some kind of credible monetary policy. Therefore the Qatari Riyal was pegged to the US dollar, using the latter’s own monetary policy to secure Qatar’s economic stability. Consequently, according to Alkhater (2016), although this led to the abrogation of Qatar’s macroeconomic management strategy of controlling its monetary and exchange rate policies, the use of “a one-sided fiscal policy, fiscal spending,” as a “single-tool macroeconomic policy framework worked fairly well for the economy.”

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The Slow Growth Period: 1980s–1990s The 1980s and 1990s stage of economic progress was marked by the sharp decline in oil prices that began in the mid 1980s and continued until the beginning of the 2000s. As just noted, Qatar’s financial sector at this time employed a very limited fiscal toolbox, and the remedies and responses of the Qatari government were represented by “cutbacks in public spending … where the economy basically stabilized on steadylow growth path” (Alkhater 2016). This slow-progress stage overshadowed Qatar’s GDP and trade sector, as well as the entire financial sector.

The Rapid Economic Expansion Period: 2002 to Present (2016)1 The stage up to the present represents the best performance of the Qatari economy in its entire history, due to the unprecedented surge in global oil prices. This happened mainly because of the emergence of multipolar economic powers such as China and India, as the growth of their economies depended on hydrocarbon products. According to Alkhater, the “growth-resource boom driven by higher oil prices and expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry in Qatar” represents a fundamental internal response to the external changes at the global level (Alkhater 2016). In almost a decade, Qatar has emerged as a strong developing economy, with its key indicators reaching unprecedented levels: For instance, Qatar’s nominal GDP reached $212 billion in 2014, a 300-fold increase over its level in 1970, while per capita GDP was, globally, the highest at $93,714 in 2013, 34 times its level in 1970. Exports and imports rose 315- and 199-fold respectively, relative to their levels in 1972. Money supply, domestic credit, total deposits, and the ratio of bank assets to GDP increased by 122, 203, 148, and 3.9 times respectively, relative to their levels in 1978, while government expenditure increased by 21 times relative to its level in 1980. (Alkhater 2016)

In this context, it is notable that the classification of the progress of Qatar’s economy development into four stages is centered around two major factors: (i) the periods before and after independence; and (ii) low and high oil prices. Hence, the classification of the first two stages is centered around independence, whereas the second two stages are centered around how lower prices for oil triggered economic recession and cutbacks in public spending policies, and how rocketing oil prices brought about unprecedented levels of development in all economic sectors. However, it is important in this respect to highlight that the fourth stage of rapid development was to a great extent dependent on revenues from the hydrocarbon sector and the steep rate of development it enabled, and thus was greatly concentrated on the export of hydrocarbon products and investment in the non-tradable sector as represented in construction and real estate, whereas the country was importing everything else in the tradable sector, as represented in goods and services (Alkhater 2016).

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A Fifth Qatari Economic Phase is in the Making Before unravelling the aspects that demonstrate that the Qatari economy is embarking on a new, fifth economic development stage, it is important to briefly throw some light on three concepts relevant to the story of Qatar’s economy under the blockade. These are vulnerability, economic resilience, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs); by reference to these key concepts, we may understand how, under the current blockade, Qatar has not only managed to avoid the multifaceted vulnerabilities which confronted its economy but also managed to turn them into economic resilience.

The Concepts of Vulnerability, Economic Resilience, and SWFs The Concept of Vulnerability There is an extensive literature on the concept of vulnerability from the conceptual and empirical perspectives; this literature emphasizes that states with limited geographical space, i.e., “small states,” are “characterized by higher degrees of economic openness and export concentration” (Briguglio et al. 2008), which results in their “exposure to exogenous shocks, that is, economic vulnerabilities” (Briguglio et al. 2008). Cordina shows “that increased risk can adversely affect economic growth as the negative effects of downside shocks would be commensurately larger than those of positive shocks. The high degree of fluctuations in GDP and in export earnings registered by many small states is considered as one of the manifestations of exposure to exogenous shocks” (Cordina 2004, as cited in Briguglio et al. 2008). Cordina (2004) and Briguglio et al. (2008) conclude that “the economic well-being of nations is more dependent on man-made policies than on inherent vulnerabilities,” and affirm that “adequate policy approaches can be used to successfully overcome the handicaps posed by vulnerability.” Briguglio introduces the “Singapore paradox,” which “refers to the seeming contradiction that a country can be highly exposed to exogenous shocks, rendering it economically vulnerable and yet still manage[] to attain high levels of GDP per capita”. He explains this “in terms of the juxtaposition of economic vulnerability and economic resilience and proposes a methodological approach in this regard.” Through this perspective, he ascribes economic vulnerability to inherent conditions which affect a country’s exposure to external shocks, whereas he associates economic resilience with actions made by policymakers and private economic agents that enable a country to “withstand or recover from the negative effects of shocks. Actions which enable a country to better benefit from positive shocks are also considered to be conducive to economic resilience” (Briguglio et al. 2008). Vulnerability, therefore, is a broad term that has multifaceted environmental, social, geographical, economic, and even cyber-security dimensions. Through each

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of the aforementioned forms, an analysis can be conducted to convey and sustain a specific point of view on several global issues. However, vulnerability can be classified into four major categories: physical, social, environmental, and economic (Bagla 2017). The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) expands the discussion on these four categories. While it sees physical vulnerability as “often determined by aspects such as population density level, the remoteness of a settlement and the site, design and materials used for critical infrastructure and for housing,” it views social vulnerability as “normally linked to the level of well-being of individuals, communities and societies,” and explains environmental vulnerability as “the extent of natural resource depletion and data on resource degradation.” It views economic vulnerability as “the economic status of individuals, communities and nations related both to the possibility of higher proportional losses among the poor when a disaster strikes … lack of economic diversity, and equally, inadequate access to basic socio-economic infrastructure such as communication networks, transport, water, and healthcare facilities” (UNDRR RAED 2011). Economic vulnerabilities include economic dependence on depletable natural resources, overdependence on foreign labor, and border security instabilities, all of which are shared by the six Gulf states. However, Qatar may add several more vulnerabilities of its own, such as overdependence on foreign food product imports for its food security, given the arid nature of its land, and, in particular, being a landlocked area. These two factors played significant roles that are, however, the reverse of what might be expected. First, Qatar’s overdependence on imported food products from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries, through its Abu Samra border with Saudi Arabia, was in part what lured the blockading countries to besiege Qatar, thus closing the frontier in order to damage Qatar’s economy. As a result, however, they awakened Qatar’s latent capabilities and determination towards embarking on a journey to a diversified economy, which the blockading countries never planned for; they certainly did not imagine themselves praising such an outcome, as the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman did, a year and a half after the blockade, and thus acknowledging Qatar’s resilient strong economy. Moreover, from Qatar’s point of view “the main channel through which the blockade hit the Qatari economy has been via trade disruptions since the blockade has made it extremely difficult for Qatar to import goods and materials required for the growth of its economy. Therefore, imports fell by more than 30% y/y in both June and July” (Tuvey 2017). This unequivocally influenced Qatar’s fiscal policies in terms of its expenditures, since it was immediately forced to find alternative food import sources. This incurred exorbitant costs, due to the unexpected and voluminous demand for food imports alone, not to mention other materials fundamental to the economy of a country under a blockade. Qatar’s GDP decreased by 2.1% in 2017 following the blockade (Tuvey 2017), followed by a journey to recovery in 2018, when it increased by 2.6% (IMF 2017), all of which indicates Qatar’s strong ambitions for a resilient and diversified economy.

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The Concept of Economic Resilience Resilience is hard currency in a nation’s economy. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, resilience is “the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.” It is also defined as “the ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape; elasticity.” It is an economic aspect that is required, hailed, and commended by the International Monetary Fund as a national target for any economy (IMF, 2016). In addition, the UNU-WIDER defines economic resilience as “the policy-induced ability of an economy to withstand or recover from the effects of such shocks” (Briguglio et al. 2008). According to this, “the relatively good economic performance of a number of small states is not because, but in spite, of their small size and inherent economic vulnerability” (Briguglio et al. 2008). One of the major areas by which to measure the stance of a nation’s economy is the resilience of its macroeconomic sector. For Qatar, however, as a small yet rich state, the resilience of its economy does not stem from the policy-induced ability of its economic system, as the definition suggests, but rather from its substantial sovereign fund reserves. The blockading Quartet intended to harm Qatar’s banking system, since they were aware that, just like in the other GCC countries’ banking systems, there were considerable concerns over liquidity. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt withdrew funds equivalent to QAR150 billion. The effects of this were obvious following the initiation of the blockade. Had Qatar not been one of the world’s richest countries in terms of its substantial sovereign wealth funds, the withdrawn non-resident deposits would have led to severe damage to—or the total collapse of—its banking sector. To rescue its banking system, and consequently its economy, Qatar injected over US$38.9 billion. Had these large amounts of money not been available, would resilience have remained the main outcome of the Qatari macroeconomic sector’s performance, as per the IMF’s report in 2017 (IMF 2017)? Two years prior to the blockade, Qatar had embarked on a macroeconomic adjustment trajectory, which is still ongoing. This reflects a common understanding and agreement among the macroeconomically-oriented Qatari officials about what resilience means, and how to achieve it, given the surrounding critical challenges. In other words, what can be elicited from the IMF report (2017) is that the Qataris seem to have transitioned from a situation of “the problem of awareness” to “the awareness of the problem.” This understanding has triggered a series of actions directed towards not only achieving economic resilience but also economic diversification. This became obvious in Qatar’s economic decisions in the aftermath of the blockade. The IMF emphasizes that “strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth and the ability to absorb and overcome shocks are fundamental to resilience” (IMF 2017). Although the geo-political situation is demonstrably unshifting, the social, economic, and security repercussions are still unfolding. Qatar’s regional and global diplomatic status, as well as its investments, have proven its soft power projection,

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since its response to the blockade encompassed overcoming the economic implications, furthering its relations with Turkey, and boosting its relations with the United States, thus gaining more ground at the global level and calling Saudi Arabia’s dominance in the Gulf region into question. Qatar’s diplomatic build-up has finally paid off (Rossi 2019).

Sovereign Wealth Funds Within the global investment environment, the term Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) was first coined by Andrew Rozanov to distinguish SWFs from other traditional funds, i.e., public funds and national currency-backing reserve assets. He describes SWFs as “A by-product of national budget surpluses, accumulated over the years due to favorable macroeconomic, trade and fiscal positions, coupled with long term budget planning and spending restraint” (Rozanov 2005; see also Dehman 2017). The United States Department of Treasury gives a narrower definition of SWFs as “Government investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets, and managed separately from official reserves,” further categorizing them into “commodity funds, which are established through commodity exports, either owned or taxed by the government; and non-commodity funds, which are typically established through transfers of assets from official foreign exchange reserves” (Kimmitt 2008). Whereas Rozanov’s definition introduces a sense of protectionism, other definitions convey a meaning of governmental obligations towards future generations. Moreover, both of these definitions tend to reiterate the timeline of the evolution of the SWF concept. Great portions of these SWFs reside in the local banks of the nations that own them. One feature of SWFs that “is unanimously adopted by academics is that they are state-owned investment vehicles” (Dehman 2017). Edwin Truman of the Peterson Institute introduces a distinction between governments operating their SWFs within their own borders, and outside them. In the first situation governments are sovereign, as the operation of the SWF is within their borders; whereas in the second they “are not sovereign in the same sense” (Truman 2008). In the Qatari situation, the SWF operated within Qatar’s borders, thus reaffirming Qatar’s sovereignty both economically and politically. The role of these SWFs in the rescue of Qatar’s economy, through providing internal banks with liquidity and backing the Qatari Riyal in foreign exchange markets, is undeniable. Through SWFs, Qatar managed to overcome a major hit to its banking sector in which all the blockading countries withdrew their deposits abruptly in order to undermine its liquidity and credibility. Thus, the Qatari financial institutions—mainly represented in the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and Qatar Central Bank (QCB)—managed, through SWFs, to inject around 40 billion QAR to maintain the health and reputation of its banking sector.

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Facets of the Forthcoming New Qatari Economic Era In the Gulf states, there has long been a phenomenon that has preceded serious plans for agriculture and economy programs, simply a sort of political crisis, either at the regional or the international level. This phenomenon can be described as “The Gift of a Crisis.” By this I mean that political crises that have economic repercussions have proven to trigger fundamental changes in the GCC region, some of which have proven to be successful, and others not. For instance, in the aftermath of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, and due to fears of a counter embargo by the West, a massive program dedicated to agriculture was launched by the government of Saudi Arabia (Woertz 2014), thus providing substantial subsidies that encouraged the creation of agricultural businesses, amongst which were companies producing dairy products as well as animals, such as Almarai, a leading global dairy and animal producer (Lambert 2017). To give another example, in the aftermath of the shocks to the international food market during the first decade of the new millennium, Qatar initiated several investments, “particularly in Australia, to import some live cattle and compensate their relative lack of a domestic industry” (Lambert 2017). Moreover, the GCC political disputes in 2014 led to the creation of other successful programs under the auspices of Hassad Food, Qatar’s premier investor, which have proven to be a success (Lambert 2017). It can therefore be argued that the deeper the crisis, the greater is the determination to succeed, specifically for affluent countries such as Qatar. The unprecedented Gulf blockade—the worst crisis Qatar has ever confronted—gave the decision-makers in Qatar an understanding of the absolute reality of Qatar’s food insecurity through a shocking real experience, since Qatar depends on its neighbors to provide almost 90% of its food and material imports. Aside from the contingency plans to address the blockade’s repercussions in the first two weeks, there has been a Qatari determination to achieve self-sufficiency, particularly in dairy and animal products, through engaging the private sector, as an initial step towards achieving economic diversification. The blockade has simply quadrupled the acceleration of these self-sufficiency pursuits. An example of excellence in realizing part of these goals is Baladna, a Qatari dairy production company. The company has not only achieved self-sufficiency in dairy products in two years after the blockade, but is now also exporting its products, thus turning Qatar’s vulnerability of dairy insecurity into resilience, and asserting the common aphorism that the blockade has proven to be a blessing, not a curse. In another sphere, Qatar has achieved 100% self-sufficiency in fresh poultry food, with self-sufficient livestock levels reaching 1.75 million animals, 86% self-sufficiency in fish, and levels of vegetables remaining high (Ataullah 2019; Lambert 2017). Nonetheless, of great salience is the sustainability of this initiative from a cost perspective, an area that needs to be explored by case study research. What can be understood from this acceleration in activating the role of the private sector, particularly in the tradables (services and goods), is that it will gradually become the growth engine of Qatar’s economy. To this end, Qatar is working on several reforms in various areas, such as the legislature environment, fiscal and

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financial adjustments, Research, Development, and Innovation (RDI) Infrastructure, free and special economic zones, customs procedures, institutional governance, and Public–Private Partnerships. More importantly, the acceleration that is taking place is happening at a rapid pace in all areas. Therefore, it can be observed that, for instance, the Qatari government’s decision to implement reforms to fuel subsidies, in order to decrease fiscal expenditure and consequently reduce the fiscal deficit, was happening at a gradual pace between the years 2011 and 2016; whereas petrol prices are being increased on a monthly basis starting from 2017. Although the outcome will not be of great benefit to the government’s budget, it represents an initial step towards more fiscal adjustments to come, such as the VAT introduced in 2020 (IMF 2017). It is also observable that when the government of Qatar implements reforms in subsidies, (such as in fuel or medical insurance) they tend to implement them gradually, whereas in the aftermath of the blockade it is noticeable that projects for selfsufficiency or the preparations for the FIFA World Cup 2022 were “simultaneously accelerated.” Hence, the two characteristics, “simultaneous acceleration” and “gradualness” seem to be the norm in such planned subsidy reforms and projects, since the Qatari “government is undertaking a structural reform agenda to broaden the geographical composition of trade and financial transactions, improve the business environment, enhance domestic food production, promote special economic zones (SEZs), and allow majority foreign ownership of companies” (IMF 2017). One of the facets of the impending new Qatari economic era is the creation of the Qatar Research Development and Innovation Council, an initiative that aims to support national research development and innovation strategy and ecosystems. It will also orchestrate RDI activities between government entities, private sector companies, and research and academic institutions across Qatar, in order to “enhance Qatar’s resilience and prosperity through locally empowered and globally connected Research, Development and Innovation” (QRDI 2018). As well as the value that an institution such as the QRDI can create, it is expected to generate thousands of jobs within Qatar, thus boosting the employment sector in the national and international spheres. The institution is also expected to contribute no less than QAR30 billion to Qatar’s annual GDP from its RDI-based activities. In this respect, the QRDI remains an important area to explore for researchers interested in the building blocks of Qatar’s next economic era, an endeavor this research is not intended to cover. According to the Governor of Qatar Central Bank (QCB), the Qatar RMB Center, based in the Qatar Financial Center, is the region’s first RMB clearing center in Doha which creates the necessary platform to realize the full potential of Qatar and the region’s trade relationship with China. It will facilitate greater cross-border RMB investment and financing by businesses, and promote greater trade and economic links between China and the region, paving the way for better financial co-operation and enhancing the preeminence of Qatar as the financial hub in MENA (QCB 2015).

The RMB Center, within six months of its creation, has managed to clear around RMB131 billion (around US$20 billion), thus acting as the first RMB clearance financial hub in the region, as well as being included by the IMF in “the benchmark Special Drawing Rights basket of currencies, joining the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese

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Yen, and British Pound as of October 2016” (Kanady 2015). The annual gradual expansion of the center’s financial transactions helps Qatar in its pursuit of “further diversifying its investor base” (Gulf Times 2019). By the same token, Hamad port, even though operational in December 2016, was officially inaugurated in the aftermath of the 2017 Gulf blockade, specifically in September 2017, and is expected to be completely operational by the advent of 2020. The port is “capable of handling 7.8 million tons of products annually, the bulk of trade which passes through the port consist[ing] of food and building materials” (Davison 2017). The port’s functions are not confined to receiving food and material imports, and it is very likely to act as a potential re-export hub. Surprisingly, two years after the blockade, Hamad port had acquired 28% of the trade volume in the Middle East (Kumar 2018). Thus, apart from emerging as a strong competitor to the UAE’s glitzy ports of Rashid and Jebel Ali, Hamad port will be another building block in the diversification of the economy, since it has the potential to be a regional and global re-export hub. Hence, each of the facets previously mentioned represent signs of a major change that is taking place, whether gradually as in subsidy reforms, or as part of a simultaneous acceleration as in other projects. It is important in this respect to reiterate that such facets of an oncoming new economic era, in the light of what is stated in the literature, suggest that the World Economic Center of Gravity is moving eastward (Alkhater 2016). This can be translated into tangible outcomes when the planning of the economy is in harmony with the requirements of Qatar’s national priorities. It is also salient that each of the facets or signs of a forthcoming new economic stage for Qatar requires separate, case-study-based research in order for the economic dynamics of this era to be identified. Whether this likely fifth economic stage would be better named after the Gulf blockade or otherwise, it is fairly safe to conclude that the blockade made a significant contribution to the acceleration of these economic dynamics. It is also noteworthy that Qatar still needs to consider pegging its currency to a basket of stable currencies, rather than relying on pegging its Riyal to the USD.

Conclusions There was an economic motive behind the blockade, particularly if it is viewed as an “economic warfare tool,” since it was imposed in order to bring Qatar to its knees, or at least bring it back to the mainstream politics of the GCC countries. The impact of the Gulf blockade on Qatar’s economy has two facets, the first of which had sharp but short-term consequences; while the second facet proved to be an absolute reverse of what the blockading countries had planned, triggering a fundamental change in which the Qatari leadership sought to change their economic vulnerabilities into economic resilience. They exploited their SWFs to maintain the liquidity of their banking system lest it should collapse, and gained a better understanding in major areas to achieve Qatar’s food security and self-sufficiency in dairy and poultry products through promoting private-sector engagement in establishing companies such as

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Baladna. They continued gradual reform in fiscal expenditure, namely fuel subsidies, established the Qatar Development Research and Innovation Council (QRDIC) to develop Qatar’s national development research and innovation strategy in order to make Qatar a leading world hub for research and innovation, and planned the launch of a number of simultaneous regional and international initiatives such as Hamad port and the RMB Center, in pursuit of economic diversification. The number of fundamental initiatives launched in the aftermath of the Gulf blockade in 2017 makes it unequivocal that the blockade has triggered the simultaneous acceleration of such national projects. Moreover, the totality of such projects and initiatives implies that there is a new era approaching in the historical record of Qatar’s economy, which is very likely to transform Qatar into a higher-economicstatus country, particularly if reforms in the business regulatory environment quicken their pace. This chapter suggests that researchers interested in the dynamics of Qatar’s economy should separately explore and investigate each of the economic facets in pursuit of a comprehensive coverage of their characteristics. Finally, pegging Qatar’s currency to the USD makes Qatar vulnerable to volatile exchange rates, whereas pegging the Qatari Riyal to a basket of the most stable international currencies boosts its stability. Note 1. Alkhater set out this classification in 2016.

References Al-Baharnat. (2004). The Modern States of the Arabian Gulf “Dowal al-Khalij al-Arabi alHadithat.” Dar Al-Konoz Al-Adabiyyat’. Alkhater, K. (2016). Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies and Sustainable Growth in Qatar. In L. R. M. Evren Tok (Ed.), Policy-making in a transformative state the case of Qatar. London: Springer Nature. Ataullah, S. (2019). Qatar’s livestock sector sees huge growth since 2017. The Peninsula, Qatar. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com. Bagla, P. (Ed.). (2017). Bridging the communication gap in science and technology: Lessons from India. New Delhi: Springer. Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., Farrugia, N., & Vella, S. (2008). Economic vulnerability and resilience concepts and measurements. WIDER Research Paper, No. 2008/55, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki Cordina, G. (2004). Economic vulnerability, resilience and capital formation. In L. Briguglio & E. J. Kisanga (Eds.), Economic vulnerability and resilience of small states. Malta: Islands and Small States Institute and London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Davison, J. (2017). Gulf crisis a “blessing in disguise” for Qatar seaport. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from www.reuters.com. Dehman, N. A. (2017). The evolving strategies of Sovereign wealth funds: Responsible investments and financing development. Rome: Roma Sapienza Foundation. Emmons, A. (2018). Saudi Arabia planned to invade Qatar last summer. Rex Tillerson’s efforts to stop it may have cost him his job. The Intercept. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from https://theinterc ept.com.

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Engdahl, F. W (2017). Washington’s dangerous middle east agenda. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from New Eastern Outlook: https://journal-neo.org. Gulf Times. (2019). QSE looks to lure investments from China, other Asian countries. Gulf Times. Retrieved 25 March 2020 from https://www.gulf-times.com/story. IMF. (2017). IMF team completes a staff visit to Qatar. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from www.imf.org. Kamel, A. (2018). GCC crisis, one year on: What’s the impact on Gulf economies?. Doha: (CTC Al Jazeera Interviewer). Kanady, S. (2015). Qatar RMB centre clears $20bn. The Peninsula, Qatar. Retrieved 30 April 2020 from https://thepeninsulaqatar.com Kimmitt, R. M (2008). In Praise of Foreign Investment: Best practices for the sovereign wealth funds. The International Economy. Kumar, S. (2018). Hamad Port acquires 28% share in Mideast trade. The peninsula, Qatar. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from https://thepeninsulaqatar.com. Lambert, L. A. (2017). A century of Saudi-Qatari food insecurity: Paradigmatic shifts in the geopolitics, economics and sustainability of Gulf States animal agriculture. The Arab World Geographer, 20(4), 261–281. QCB. (2015). Renminbi clearing centre in Qatar to strengthen commercial & economic ties between China and the MENA region. Retrieved 30 March 2020 from Qatar Central Bank http://www. qcb.gov.qa QRDI. (2018). About Qatar research development and innovation. Retrieved 09 April 2020 from QRDI http://qrdi.org.qa/. Rawlinson, J. L. (1967). China’s struggle for naval development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rossi, C. R (2019). Game of thrones: The Qatar crisis, forced expulsions on the Arabian Peninsula. Penn St. Journal of Law & International Affairs, 1(7). Truman E. M. (2008). Do Sovereign wealth funds pose a risk to the United States? Peterson Institute website, 25 February 2008. Tuvey, J. (2017). Mena economics update. Retrieved from Middle East & North Africa economics. Retrieved 30 March 2020 from https://www.capitaleconomics.com. UNDRR ROAS (2011). An overview of environment and disaster risk reduction in the Arab region a community perspective (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction—Regional Office for Arab States (UNDRR ROAS). Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED). Geneva, Switzerland.) von Heinegg, W. H. (2006). Naval Blockage and International Law. In B. A. Elleman & S. C. M. Paine (Eds.), Naval blockades and seapower strategies and seapower. Canada: Routledge. Woertz, E. (2014). Oil for food: The global food crisis and the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 18

To What Extent Has the Sovereign Wealth Fund Assisted Qatar’s Security and Foreign Policy in Resisting the Blockade? Fahad Al-Marri

The blockade of Qatar by its neighbors since June 2017 has divided the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman on one side, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates on the other. The dispute stems from the accusation that Qatar is involved in “detrimental activities including supporting the Muslim Brotherhood which is regarded as an extremist group” (Gordon et al. 2017). With just one day’s notice, an embargo was imposed on Qatar that included closing land and sea routes, the cancellation of flights, the withdrawal of diplomats and the expelling of Qatari nationals. Other actions taken in the blockade include the designation of 59 Qatari nationals as “terrorist supporters,” the prohibition of the screening of Qatar’s Al Jazeera TV network, as well as the UAE banning the showing of sympathy towards Qatar (Gordon et al. 2017). The other Arab country that has joined the three GCC countries in this embargo is Egypt. Despite challenges associated with the embargo and the fact that Qatar Airways has had to re-route its flights to Doha, Qatar has managed to weather the storm, thanks to alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Iran, as well as the use of its Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Although it is currently the wealthiest country in the world on a per capita income basis (Katzman 2017), Qatar is nevertheless a small “vulnerable country situated in the turmoil of the Middle East” (Baabood 2017:1). The country faces an existential geopolitical threat that comes primarily from rivalry with its much larger neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. With its overreliance on its hydrocarbon wealth, Qatar is also vulnerable to shifts in resource prices on the world market, which impact its ability to support its social contract with its citizens. Additionally, the country’s traditional population faces social issues originating from the pace of transformation into a modern society, as well as the cultural friction associated with its large immigrant population (Baabood 2017). Furthermore, regional instability such as the conflicts in Iraq and Syria pose existential threats to Qatar, because they F. Al-Marri (B) Georgetown University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_18

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Fig. 18.1 Composition of real GDP by Sector (Source Callen et al. 2014)

are breeding grounds for militias and terrorists that could threaten the security of the country. Such threats are particularly detrimental for the United States’ military bases in the country as well as for Qatar’s liquefied petroleum gas (LNG) and oil facilities that are the lifeblood of the economy (Hermes 2016). Economic diversification in Qatar, as with the rest of the GCC, is also still limited, with more than 50% of Qatar’s GDP still being derived from mining and utilities (Callen et al. 2014), as can be seen in Fig. 18.1. Hvidt (2013) argues that economic diversification has always been part of the economic plan of the Gulf States, because of their awareness of the finite nature of gas and oil. However, political emphasis on economic diversification has fluctuated with the income being derived from these resources at any given time. Morakabati et al. (2014) agree, and indicate that Qatar, for example, has developed strategies over the years to limit its dependence on its oil and gas reserves, although some of these plans such as the development of tourism as a possible substitute for hydrocarbon exports require further investment. Some of the changes that are required include the creation of a strong distinctive image that includes personal safety for visitors, civil liberty, and political stability, none of which are common in the region. Other challenges for Qatar include effective management of its Vision 2030 agenda, acquiring adequate human resources, and developing an efficient communication strategy (MDPS 2017). Despite these challenges and the current blockade of the country by its neighbors, Qatar has been able to develop resilience in various ways including the formation of the Qatar Investment Authority. This is the primary manager of the country’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, which has grown since 2005 and now provides additional revenue to the national economy (McSparren et al. 2017). England and Kerr (2017) indicate that since the embargo, the Qatari government has been able to return $20 billion of its more than $300 billion SWF onshore to cushion the impact of the embargo. Finance officials in the country argue that the Qatar Investment Authority’s

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deposits are being used to create a ‘buffer’ and provide liquidity to the banking system, after the gas-rich state suffered capital outflows of more than $30 billion (England and Kerr 2017). This tallies with the constructivist explanation of state interest by Finnemore (1996), which indicates that states become what they do, and that there is a social construction of entities that continually evolves with the development of new bureaucracies to manage new tasks. The article provides an analysis of how Qatar has developed resilience through such constructions, especially in using the country’s SWF to withstand the effects of the embargo.

Theoretical Discussion and Qatar’s Blockade Issues In seeking to provide an overview of sanctions, Biersteker (2014:1) indicated that “sanctions in international relations are restrictive economic measures imposed by a state, a group of states or the United Nations Security Council to persuade a target to change its behavior.” The intention is to constrain the target from engaging in activities that are proscribed and violate the norms of international behavior (Biersteker 2014). This tallies with Caruso’s (2003) argument that the purpose of boycotts and embargoes is to deprive a target country of some of the gains that accrue from trade, with the eventual inducement of lower welfare within the target state. Caruso (2003) indicates that the more the target state is integrated into trade relations with the enforcing country, the more exacerbated the effect of the sanction will be. However, it has also been shown that enforcing countries could also be adversely affected, likewise depending on the degree of economic integration (Davis and Engerman 2003). With Saudi Arabia’s economy being the largest among the GCC states (see Fig. 18.2) and exerting an influence across the region’s other economies, as well as the fact that since 1983 the GCC has had a free trade agreement to help reduce trade restrictions between member states (Al-Mawali 2015), the embargo on Qatar was meant to cause considerable economic difficulties that would break the country’s resilience. A variety of reasons have been provided to support the imposition of the blockade, which Qatar has thus far withstood with relative ease. Rivlin and Friedman (2017) indicate that the reasons for the blockade on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt are complex, with some of the explanations being obscure. Some of the reasons given for the blockade include that “Qatar supports Islamist fighting in Syria as well as supporting Hamas in Gaza.” It has also been intimated that Saudi Arabia and others imposing the blockade are opposed to Qatar’s closeness to Iran, and there are reports that Qatar “paid a $1 billion ransom for the release of members of the ruling family who were kidnapped in Iraq” (Rivlin and Friedman 2017). The complexity and obscurity of some of the reasons for the blockade are highlighted by the accusation that Al Jazeera (Qatar’s television network) criticizes all Gulf countries except the Qatari government, and that HH the Emir of Qatar reportedly criticized the Saudis while praising Iran (Roberts 2017; Rivlin and Friedman 2017). The wide-ranging reasons put forward by Qatar’s neighbors for the embargo demonstrate the dynamics among the geopolitical players in

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Fig. 18.2 Economic share of GCC countries (Source Al-Mawali 2015)

the Middle East. This is clearly seen from Davidson’s (2017) analysis of the crisis, in which it is argued that Qatar has been resilient. However, the strategy adopted by Saudi Arabia and others was not only geared towards punishing the country, but also towards ensuring that changes would be brought about in Doha that would support the political narrative being heralded by the Saudi king-in-waiting. Qatar’s resilience has been built over decades, and as Roberts (2017) indicates is based on its traditional and innovative approaches to foreign policy and security; these, supported by other theoretical developments, are now helping it to withstand the effects of the embargo. Cognizant of its small size, Qatar has over the years developed a foreign policy underpinned by hegemonic relationships directed at its security. The United States has played that role most recently, with its US Central Command being based at the Al Udeid Air Base (Roberts 2017). A similar hegemonic approach has been employed since the embargo to ensure that the country does not experience shortages of essentials. In such situations, Qatar allows a dominant international power such as the United States to provide security through association, or a regional power like Iran or Turkey to provide for the passage of essential commodities through a blockade. Kabbani (2017) indicates that after the sudden embargo by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, Qatari residents rushed to stock up on food as well as foreign currency, given that cargo was held up at the Saudi border, UAE ports, and offshore. Yet within just two days, the Qatari government was able to replenish its stocks via alternative sources including Iran, Turkey, and other countries. By appealing to regional powers like Iran and Turkey, Qatar was both being innovative while also using its traditional approach to conflict resolution, foreign policy, and security. The effectiveness of sanctions is seen as the key desired outcome of a policy of embargo, and in this respect some estimates have been produced regarding the material outcomes of sanctions and embargoes. Work by Hufbauer et al. (2007) and

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Morgan et al. (2009) show that only in one-third of cases are sanctions effective. Others have found that the effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions is even lower, at approximately 22% on an average (Biersteker et al. 2013). Such research has sought to distinguish the different purposes of sanctions, including coercion, constraints, and signaling. Biersteker et al. (2013) indicate that UN sanctions that were meant to coerce a target state to change its behavior were typically only effective in 10% of cases. Lacy and Niou (2004) refer to this as the paradox of economic sanctions, indicating that on the most pessimistic views, their effectiveness is as low as 5%. The reason for such a low degree of effectiveness according to Hovi et al. (2005) is that the threat of sanctions is most often more effective than the sanction itself, because the target state’s leaders become determined to show their citizens that they have the ability to keep the country going without the support of those imposing the embargo or sanctions. Additionally, the targeted state could choose to demonstrate that it is diplomatically more mature than the countries imposing sanctions. For example, Kabbani (2017) indicates that the UAE (one of the embargo-imposing countries in the present case) receives 30% of its liquefied natural gas from Qatar; however, Qatar has chosen not to stop the supply of liquefied gas to the UAE. Qatar is aware of the integration of the GCC countries, given not only the cultural but also the economic ties. For example, before the embargo, 40% of Qatar’s food came overland through Saudi Arabia and the remainder came through shipping routes via ports in the UAE. Cross-border investments are also considerable, with the Saudi and UAE banking sectors having made loans to Qatar totaling tens of billions of dollars (Kabbani 2017). With such intense economic and social integration among the GCC countries, an embargo of this kind can have consequences that go beyond those that are intended. Andreas (2005) argues that each implemented policy development has both intended and unintended consequences, with sanctions tending to leave a legacy of criminality. Sanctions and embargoes have also been known to strengthen the rule of authoritarian regimes, and possibly increase rights violations where there is a lack of checks and balances. Biersteker (2010) argues that such authoritarianism is especially pronounced when state agents increase their capacity to monitor suspicious financial transactions. Hernandez-Truyol (2009) provides a classic example of the US embargo of Cuba, which increased the resolve of the authoritarian government and effectively ensured that its ideological purposes were promoted even more vehemently. It must be indicated that despite the high failure rates of sanctions and embargoes, Biersteker (2014) argues that they are important instruments for contemporary global governance, which, when applied in conjunction with policy measures such as threats, legal referrals, and negotiations, can prompt the target to engage with the international community and desist from the proscribed activities. For Qatar, the challenge in negotiating with its neighbors stems from a 13-point list of demands that includes curbing diplomatic relations with Iran and closing its missions, severing ties with “terrorist organizations” and handing over “terrorist figures,” shutting down Al-Jazeera, and closing the Turkish military base, among others (BBC 2017:4). With Turkey and Iran being the two main regional powers that have ensured Qatar can withstand the

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current embargo and meet the needs of its domestic constituents, the likelihood of negotiations is greatly reduced. It would appear that the intention of the embargoing countries is to ensure that Qatar’s sovereignty is eroded and that it becomes a satellite region of one of its neighbors, without the ability to pursue an independent foreign and security policy in the region. Caruso (2003) argues that it is possible to look at economic sanctions from three perspectives: the objectives, the actors involved, and the object of the sanctions. With regards to the objectives, the work of Barber (1979) identifies three categories: primary objectives are concerned with the action, as well as with the behavior of the government of the state against which the embargo or sanction is being imposed; secondary objectives relate to the status, the behavior, as well as the expectations of the governments imposing the sanctions; and tertiary objectives are concerned with the wider international considerations related to the international system as a whole or in part. It can be seen that for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, their primary objectives seem to be to overturn Qatar’s unilateral stance on Shia Iran, whose Sunni neighbors would like to see collectively isolated. Other primary objectives pertain to the complex web of allegations such as support for terrorism, including hosting Hamas leaders, and supporting leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the wider region (Warren 2017). The secondary objectives include showcasing the hegemony of Saudi Arabia in the region, with the UAE and Bahrain following suit because of historical issues, as well as the rise of Qatar to a position of international significance (Ulrichsen 2014). The tertiary objectives include concern about international terrorism and the variety of actors connected with such networks, as well as the rise of Qatar in the international geopolitical system and its economic significance due to the vast LNG deposits that have enabled the country to become the richest in the world on a per capita basis. Ulrichsen (2014:5) indicates that Qatar has been able to adopt an “activist foreign policy and attempt to balance competing interests because of its need to preserve the security of its resources.” It can be seen that the issue of the GCC members’ embargo against Qatar is a complex regional challenge with geopolitical implications. Qatar’s ability to withstand the effects of the sanctions is based on its innovative foreign policy as well as its SWFs. These contributions are analyzed in the following two sections.

Qatar’s Security and Foreign Policy Qatar’s security and foreign policy has changed over the years from the time of its independence as a British protectorate in the Gulf. Qatar’s security and foreign policy was based on the traditional approach of bandwagoning. Given Saudi Arabia’s size, economic clout in the region, and support from the United States, Qatar has usually followed Saudi Arabia’s position in all foreign relations since the country’s independence, engaging in no provocative foreign disputes and concentrating instead on domestic developments (Roberts 2016). Diversion from the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia gradually began from 1985 onwards, as the influence of the previous crown

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prince, HH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, spread among diplomats before his eventual ascendency. HH Sheikh Hamad used the period of low Arab–Persian tensions to improve Doha’s relations with Iran, including striving to build a pipeline from Iran’s Karun Mountains in order to import fresh water for Qatar. These foreign policy actions indicated that Qatar was developing an independent foreign policy, which was controversial because of its refusal to listen to advice from Riyadh. Qatar’s independent foreign and security policy emphasizes multilateral process and unconstrained international co-operation, and demonstrates a philosophy of inclusion (AlAttiyah 2013). Independence has been enabled by Qatar’s vast natural gas reserves and its prudential development over many years. Qatar has the third-largest proven natural gas reserves and, as of 2014, was the second-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, as can be seen in Fig. 18.3. In recent years, Qatar has developed a more activist foreign and security policy with roles in regional conflict resolution, in addition to supporting the US-led coalition in Libya in conjunction with support for Syrian opposition forces, making Qatar atypical of many small states in terms of international relations (Young, 2013). Foreign Minister Al-Attiyah (2013) argues that Qatar’s intervention in Syria was motivated by a desire to protect human life, create a safe humanitarian corridor, and provide humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees. As a microstate, Qatar’s foreign policy is positioned within the realist paradigm of self-preservation, being designed to gain power by aligning with a much larger and more powerful country. While Qatar aligned itself with Saudi Arabia following independence, the country later opted to bandwagon with the United States to create the means of pursuing independent security and foreign policy without being a stooge of Saudi Arabia. Bandwagoning with the United States, along with Qatar’s wealth

Fig. 18.3 Ranking: liquified natural gas exporters (Source Krane and Wright 2014)

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from oil and LNG, has provided the means for the country to form alliances with other countries (Kaussler 2015). Abdullah (2014) argues that after independence in 1971, Qatar generally pursued foreign and security policies in accordance with Saudi Arabia but by the mid 1990s the country began forming an independent policy that better suited its interests. Qatar’s new foreign and security policy not only emphasizes mediation and an activist posture, but is also open to relying on soft power instruments such as humanitarian intervention, economic development, media, education, culture and sports, among others (Abdullah 2014). Qatar’s constitution indicates that its foreign policy comprises principles that coalesce around the strengthening of international peace and security through the encouragement of the peaceful resolution of disputes. It also emphasizes the support of people for self-determination (Wipo 2009). This supports Ulrichsen’s (2014:7) argument that “Qatar’s emergence as an increasingly powerful actor has been facilitated by broader changes to the structure of the international system.” This is primarily because of the acceleration of globalization, which has made it possible for Qatar to use its soft power (Ulrichsen 2011). Qatar’s foreign and security policy has also included carving out a regional niche as a mediator. Qatar’s diplomatic mediation has formed part of its independent and innovative policy, thereby distinguishing itself from its neighbors. Such foreign policy development by Qatar stems from its leadership’s awareness that such moves provide an opportunity to make a statement about autonomy, both at the regional and international level (Gulbrandsen 2010). Speaking in 2007 at the United Nations General Assembly, HH the Emir of Qatar indicated that the world’s conflicts have become too numerous for one power to manage (Janardhan 2011). This was a signal that Qatar was ready to provide leadership in resolving some of the conflicts of the world. Three of the main conflicts that Qatar dedicated substantive resources and time to resolving were Yemen (2008–10), Lebanon (2008) and Darfur in Sudan (2008–10). Qatar also mediated between the Sudanese and Chadians in 2009 as well as between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2010 (Ulrichsen 2017). In addition to these mediations and the push for an independent foreign and security policy, Qatar’s leaders actively engaged various parties during the Arab Spring, in addition to committing substantial financial resources to affect its medium-term outcome. It should be noted that despite its many engagements and mediatory efforts, Qatar experienced significant weakness given the lack of a large professional diplomatic corps that could push forward initial engagement into successful implementation and conclusive agreements (Ulrichsen 2017). In addition to all of these mediatory foreign policies and security initiatives, Qatar continued its self-preservation and bandwagoning policy and had already developed strong ties with the United States represented by the two US bases in the country (Salem and de Zeeuw 2012). Because Qatar lacks some of elements of the classic pyramid of power, notably the inventory of instruments, resources, and capabilities (Hill 2003), it has developed an independent foreign and security policy by developing soft power that provides implicit influence for other states to develop a foreign policy that supports Qatar’s security policy (Barakat and Zyck 2012).

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Sovereign Wealth Fund: Purpose and Investment Qatar’s vast natural gas reserves and its innovative development has made it possible for the country to carve out an independent foreign and security policy that has sometimes led its neighbors to be taken aback. Although not officially part of the foreign and security policy elements of most countries, Perera (2015) argues that the pattern of SWF investment in Western democracies can be linked to their search for security. Like its neighbors, Qatar has been able to accumulate sizeable surpluses during periods of high oil prices. Some surpluses have been invested into SWFs, and the purposes of such funds vary. Steigum (2013) indicates that SWFs have grown rapidly, with various jurisdictions choosing to form their own. Nominal assets under the management of SWFs doubled between 2005 and 2007 and they have been rising ever since (Truman 2010). SWFs are government-owned funds that are invested both inside and outside the country or jurisdiction that owns them. The International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which was established in 2009, states that SWFs are special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the general government for microeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign assets … (IFSWF 2009).

Investing in foreign assets has been seen by SWFs as a way of shoring up against future challenges such as a shortfall in government revenues. Another reason for establishing SWFs from both oil and other resources includes macroeconomic fluctuations (Steigum 2013). The International Monetary Fund has identified five types of SWF according to their intended purposes, and the recent use of at least $20 billion of Qatar’s SWF to ensure that the domestic economic situation was stabilized following the embargo is emblematic of one such type. The five types are as follows: Stabilization funds—these are formed to buffer the country’s budget against possible commodity price volatility as well as external shocks. These SWFs typically have investment horizons that have liquidity objectives that could be compared to central bank reserves. Savings funds—these have the intention of sharing wealth across the generations by transforming non-renewable assets into various financial assets. Usually, their investment portfolios have high risk-return profiles with higher shares allocated to equities and other investments. Development funds—these are specifically established to allocate funds to socio-economic projects that support the development of the country. Pension reserve funds—these are assigned to meeting outflows that are pension-related liabilities on the government balance sheet. Reserve investment corporations—these are intended to offset the negative carry cost that accrues from the holding of large reserves or to earn higher returns on reserves. It should be noted that such funds continue to be counted as reserves for countries that have chosen to pursue such objectives (Al-Hassan et al. 2013). Figure 18.4 illustrates the approximate allocation of SWF resources to various investment portfolios, as indicated by the International Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability Report of 2012. It shows that for stabilization funds, almost 70% goes

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Fig. 18.4 SWF types and asset allocations (Source IMF 2012)

into sovereign fixed income, whereas savings funds invest almost 60% into equities. For pension reserve funds, at least 40% is invested in equities. For most reserve investment funds, at least 66% is invested in equities (IMF 2012). The opaque nature of most SWFs makes it very difficult to be certain what the precise investment strategies and purposes of such investments are (Behrendt 2009), despite the Santiago Principles that are geared towards improving the transparency of SWFs. The objectives and investment decisions of SWFs are dependent on the circumstances of the specific country and may evolve over time. A stabilization fund, for example, may adopt a short-term investment horizon, whereas savings funds would typically have long-term investment horizons. Such investment horizons may also be related to macroeconomic purposes including fiscal policy, monetary policy, and the exchange rate. The reason for this could be withdrawal rules derived from fiscal rules as well as significant fluctuations in fiscal revenues and the investment of SWF resources abroad to help insure against variation in exchange rates (Das et al. 2010). The investment strategies of most SWFs are intended to achieve diversification of portfolios across many asset classes and world regions so as to support risk reduction (Steigum 2013). Additionally, the type of SWF as well as its investment horizon and funding sources affect the strategic asset allocation (Das et al. 2010). Long investment horizons would usually be associated with the ability to assume greater risk, where risk can involve the probability of a loss or underperformance with reference to other assets. Also, long investment horizons usually indicate the ability to invest in illiquid assets that provide the means to accrue the benefit of an illiquidity

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premium (Kunzel et al. 2011). This indicates that assets such as infrastructure, real estate, and private equity may take a longer time to exit without adversely affecting the prices of these assets. SWFs with long-term investment horizons often venture into the former asset classes. On the other hand, investors with short or uncertain investment horizons such as stabilization funds usually have a larger proportion of their holdings in cash portfolios and other relatively liquid assets like bonds that enable them to meet potential unexpected outflows without incurring substantive losses. Qatar returned $20 billion to stabilize its domestic economic situation in the face of the sudden embargo by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt, which was a classic example of how the diversification of SWF investments is strategic in a changing geopolitical environment in which friendly countries can suddenly become belligerent (Hvidt 2013). Such investments must take into consideration debates about SWFs, which Balin (2008) argues are complex and multidimensional. The business and social element of this debate can be seen from the large losses that the world’s SWFs made during the financial crisis of 2008, estimated by Morgan Stanley to be in the range of $500 to $700 billion, but also the prediction that SWFs will continue to grow, reaching $15 trillion by 2015 (Jen and Andreopoulos 2008). Gunes (2016) argues that SWFs can be seen as an expression of the rise of state capitalism with state-owned investment. This supports Hatton and Pistor’s (2012) assertion that SWFs can be used for the maximization of autonomy in the shadow of great powers. Furthermore, SWFs have become political, with some countries still not very forthcoming with data about their investments. The Santiago Principles provided a voluntary code of conduct, referred to as the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, but has remained voluntary. Therefore, some SWFs still lack the transparency required by recipient countries (Behrendt 2009). SWFs and their purchases of strategic assets in the United States and Western Europe have prompted much political debate about their intentions. Indeed, Bahgat (2011) assessed GCC SWFs and indicated that recipient countries (especially the United States and western European nations) viewed them as having a possible alignment with state national interests, a political agenda that goes beyond business. This concurs with Draniceanu’s (2014) argument that SWFs could possibly be foreign policy vehicles. Such debates indicate that SWF investors must begin to ensure that transparency becomes the hallmark of their investment practices, to ensure that the debate about SWFs is not seen from a shadowy perspective. In seeking to provide analysis of the workings of the GCC’s SWFs, Setser and Ziemba (2009) found them generally to be opaque. Over the years, Qatar’s SWF has announced most of its acquisitions and investments, and has grown its portfolio since its formation in 2005.

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Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment According to the Boston Consulting Group, the GCC SWFs are some of the largest in the world and have a tendency towards direct investment including in infrastructure. Three challenges that have been identified concerning GCC SWF investment include seeking to invest using equity instead of debt; favoring investments in mature markets as well as selective emerging markets that provide stable cash flows with limited political and regulatory liability; and requiring an internal return rate of approximately 15% and a minimum equity stake of at least US$50 million (Boston Consulting Group 2012). It can be seen that GCC SWFs invest selectively and that their criteria for return on their investment is quite high. This is the environment in which the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), which manages Qatar’s SWF, operates. Before the establishment of the QIA to invest Qatar’s budget surpluses, Qatar’s Ministry of Finance had a small in-house team responsible for this task. The QIA was founded with the remit of strengthening the country’s economy by diversifying into different asset classes, strategies, and investments (SWFI 2016). The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute indicates that Qatar is one of the fifteen largest SWFs, with $320 billion dollars under investment (SWFI 2017). It should be noted that Qatar’s SWF is believed to manage assets totaling between $320 billion and $345 billion, according to various sources including Kottasová (2017), who indicates that most of Qatar’s global SWF has been invested in various institutions, most notably in Western countries. Bahgat (2011) indicates that the primary objective of the QIA is to pursue revenue diversification for the country. This goal is achieved by the QIA investing its funds in international markets including the United States, the United Kingdom, other European countries, and Asia. Additionally, the QIA invests in Qatar and the wider region in the non-energy sector. The four main areas that the fund focuses on when investing include public equity, real estate, private equity, and investment funds. By 2011, some of the main investments held by Qatar’s SWF included Four Seasons Healthcare in the UK, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), the London Stock Exchange, Sainsburys, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Volkswagen, and the Commercial Bank of China (Bahgat 2011). While it is true that the QIA initiated most of the SWF’s investments in Europe’s mature markets with their stable political and regulatory base, the SWF has also been busy extending its reach into emerging markets in Asia, North America, and Latin America. Saidi (2017) indicates that QIA’s purchase of Singapore’s well-known Asia Square Towers was the largest office transaction in Singapore’s history. Meanwhile, in the United States, the QIA bought 10% of the Empire State Realty Trust and now has an office in Silicon Valley to further grow its investments in the United States. It can be seen that Qatar’s SWF has become a global investor with holdings of both liquid and illiquid assets that not only offer the stability required by its mandate but also provide the means to promote Qatar globally. This shows a forward-thinking country that is building an economy that is “not merely reliant on hydrocarbons or imports of food from other countries, but one

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that seeks to address its own resiliency to future challenges” (McSparren et al. 2017:1). Qatar’s use of its mediation and humanitarian activities (Al-Attiyah 2013), along with its investments in different parts of the world, provide the means to acquire influence. This is comparable to the geopolitical advantages and influences developed by advanced economies such as the United States through their foreign aid programs. Milner and Tingley (2013), based on McKinlay and Little (1978), indicate that foreign aid has geopolitical and strategic purposes depending on the goals of the donor. Qatar’s determination to continue to develop its autonomous foreign and security policy despite the actions of its neighbors is evident in recent announcements concerning continuing new foreign investments by the QIA despite the blockade (Reuters Staff 2017). QIA’s investment pattern (in accordance with most GCC SWFs) has provided the means for its portfolios to be able to achieve resiliency. Approximately 62% of GCC SWF assets are direct investments in developed economies, but the figure for Qatar’s SWF is as high as 92%, as can be seen in Fig. 18.5 which indicates the investment patterns of Qatar Holdings and the QIA. To introduce greater diversity, the QIA and Qatar Holdings have increased their investments in three North African countries. Morocco has received investment totaling $600 million in a luxury housing and tourism complex, while Tunisia has benefitted from several infrastructural projects, especially in real estate and tourism. Finally, Egypt (one of the four countries enforcing the blockade on Qatar) has received real estate investment along the Nile and in the tourist resort of Sharm el-Sheikh. Qatar Holdings has also embarked on joint projects with other SWFs such as the Kuwait Investment Authority to develop tourism in Morocco through Morocco’s Fund for the Development of Tourism (Boston Consulting Group 2012). It should be noted that despite the stance taken by Egypt, Qatar has maintained a policy of positive engagement. Through its investments in these various countries, Qatar has been able to create a web of supporters that are not only necessary for its foreign and security policy but also provide allies in its ongoing economic blockade. With the exception of Egypt,

Fig. 18.5 GCC country allocation of direct investments (Source Boston Consulting Group 2012)

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all other North African countries that have traditionally looked to Saudi Arabia as an Arab leader have refused to support the Qatari blockade, instead calling for dialogue and a diplomatic solution to the problem (Cherif 2017).

Analysis of Reasons for the Sanctions and Blockade of Qatar In seeking to envisage possible scenarios for an outcome to the Qatari blockade and to the challenges that accompany the current situation between the GCC countries, Sailer and Roll (2017) recall that political tension between Qatar and its neighbors has existed since the 1970s in the form of border disputes. This supports Zafirov’s (2017) argument that the Gulf Crisis is not an isolated incident but a product of smoldering tensions. Added to this is the fact that Qatar’s path to an autonomous foreign and security policy has diminished Saudi strategies for hegemony over the Gulf region, and its policies clearly infuriate the Saudi regime, especially the Crown Prince. For a region in which family ties cross national borders, this has led to the pitting of relations against each other in the midst of nationalist themes and vitriolic media coverage (Freer 2017). Egypt followed the lead of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in order to demonstrate its gratitude to these two countries that had supported the July 2013 coup against the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. Jordan, on the other hand, gave only cursory support to the embargo, sufficient to appease the embargoing states. It did not fully break with Qatar, although it downgraded its diplomatic ties and revoked Al Jazeera’s license to operate in Jordan. Bahrain has been obliged to follow Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their blockade of Qatar, given that since the Arab Spring and the support of the Saudis and Emiratis in quelling the Manama uprising, Bahrain has been unable to develop an independent foreign and security policy (Al Jazeera Centre 2017). A small number of other Arab countries have also opted to support the embargo. These included Djibouti and Mauritania, as well as the Riyadh-based Yemeni government and the Emirati-supported Libyan government in Tobruk (Al Jazeera Centre 2017). Caruso (2003) argues that the effectiveness of an embargo is dependent on the role of the interest group in managing the sanctions and ensuring that they work. With most neighboring countries failing to support or only partially supporting the embargo, this effectively provides Qatar with a way out. The complex and convoluted reasons that have been provided for the sanctions (some of which have been outright dispelled) continue to be debated. In the weeks before the embargo was suddenly imposed, Ulrichsen (2017:6) recalls, the website of the Qatar News Agency (QNA) alleged that HH the Emir had stated that Qatar’s relationship with the Trump administration was tense, had described Hamas as “the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” and called Iran “a big power in the stabilization of the region.” Although Qatar reported that the QNA website had been hacked and the information was false, the media (especially in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) began to discredit Doha, despite US investigators indicating that the Russians were behind the hack of the QNA (Jones 2017).

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The convoluted reasons for why Riyadh and its allies embargoed Qatar have been linked to Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law and adviser. Swisher and Grim (2018) indicated that Charles Kushner (Jared’s father) had solicited funds from the Qataris including the finance minister as well as HE Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, Qatar’s former foreign minister. Yet the funding was not forthcoming and Jared, whose brief in the White House includes the Middle East, then provided critical support to Qatar’s neighbors led by Saudi Arabia. It can be seen that in addition to the accusation that “Qatar supports terrorist groups connected to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and forces in the Syrian civil war,” there seem to be other forces at play in the very complex web of reasons why Qatar was embargoed. So far, Qatar has been innovatively resisting the embargo through its foreign and security policy that has ensured it maintains good relations with Iran and Turkey along with other Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries.

Use of Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund to Resist the Blockade In addition to Qatar’s innovative foreign and security policy, the country’s SWF has helped to resist the embargo. Baabood (2017) argues that throughout its history, Qatar has sought to develop its own mode of state and society resilience. While resilience is an opaque concept in the discourse of international relations, it has been used in the context of advancing sustainable development (Perrings 2006), which is an intrinsic element of Qatar Vision 2030. Resilience is also considered to be important in the European Union 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, and its definition covers a wide range of concepts including individuals and entire societies, with facets such as democracy, institutional trust, sustainable development, and the capacity to change (European Commission 2017). Qatar has been following this path of change through its autonomous economic, political, social, foreign, and security policies that are geared towards making the country more individual. This trajectory has seen the monarchs of country looking to transform Qatar from a poor state to a high-income economy, which has the highest per capita income in the world as of 2017, at approximately $130,000 (Statistics Times 2017). This forward-looking vision led to the development of the Qatar Investment Authority in 2005, to ensure that budgetary surpluses can be invested to “cushion against the harmful effects of economic slowdowns” (Baabood 2017:5) as well as for the purpose of economic diversification, which is critical to the future of Qatar’s resilience. It is for this reason that Naser (2016) argues that one of the roles of SWFs in Gulf States is to deliver on strategic socioeconomic objectives. Analysis of the QIA’s SWF investments indicates that the variety of assets in which it has invested have made it easy to quickly transfer some into liquid assets after the embargo was imposed. With more than $300 billion in the SWF, investments have been made in both the domestic and foreign markets. Torchia and Finn (2017) indicate that the portion of Qatar’s SWF that is in foreign bank accounts, tradable bonds, or listed equities that could easily and quickly be liquidated when a need arises, is a state secret,

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although this has raised questions regarding Qatar’s true financial strength. Faced with capital flight from Qatar due to the embargo, the QIA was able to transfer at least US$20 billion to the Finance Ministry to ensure that the country could withstand the impact of the embargo (Torchia and Finn 2017). This tallies with Alkhereiji’s (2017) assertion that Qatar’s SWF has repatriated $20 billion to help ease the effects of the embargo. The finance minister indicated that this transfer was a pre-emptive measure and that it has always created a “buffer” that provides liquidity within the country’s banking system. The smooth transfer of some of Qatar’s SWF to support the economy in the face of the sudden embargo indicates the preparedness of the Qatari system to work in unison to preserve the resilience of the country.

Foreign and Security Policy Implications for Qatar and the GCC By using innovative foreign and security policies to resist the embargo, including its SWF, Qatar’s various alliances have been reshaped by the crisis, while the prospects for further GCC integration and coordination have been fundamentally undermined. The Washington Institute indicates that due to the embargo, Qatar is establishing new trade routes to ensure that it continues to meet the needs of its population. On the first day of the embargo it began using C-17 Globemaster military transport aircraft to import food from Turkey. These airplanes had previously been used to carry troops to Iraq as part of the US-led military effort against Islamic State from the Al Udeid Airbase. With the Turkish government eager to enter the Qatari market, the government suggested that Turkish suppliers take advantage of the crisis in the GCC to increase prices. The Turkish government has also taken advantage of the situation to diplomatically press the Qatari government to select Turkish vendors and to sign long-term agreements. Given Qatar’s dependence on food imports, some of the possible trade routes that Doha could use if the embargo persists for a prolonged period could be sea routes from Turkey to Doha, a land route from Turkey followed by sea to Doha, and a route from Aqaba in Jordan to Doha by sea (Washington Institute 2017). By strategically developing its foreign and security policies in the region and beyond, Qatar has been able to change the course of its challenges to exercise the resilience it has developed over the years. It is in this light that Champion and Sergie (2017) indicate that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’ possible estimation that Qatar would rapidly capitulate in the face of the embargo has proven to be wrong. Qatar’s isolation from the GCC regional organization could push it closer to Turkey and Iran, albeit that with two US bases in the country, its relationship with Iran must be balanced in the face of US hegemony. Collins (2017) argues that a simple look into history would have shown the Saudis and Emirates that embargoes push states into making sudden policy changes that often have unintended consequences, and most often do not work. Without a clear endgame the embargo of Qatar was risky, and past experience teaches that

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embargoed countries usually find a way around the embargo (Hufbauer et al. 2007). This is particularly true when the state against which the embargo has been placed is small, well-resourced, has a small population, and is not necessarily dependent on the countries that are imposing the sanctions (Collins 2017). The economic ramifications for Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also clear, given that Qatar quickly expanded its liquefied natural gas production just after the embargo, thereby demonstrating its systematic importance in the global gas market. Additionally, while the embargoing countries export goods and services to the value of US$5.6 billion to Qatar, they import goods and services to the value of US$5 billion from Qatar (Collins 2017), which thereby indicates that Saudi Arabia and its allies will lose out financially in terms of trade. Carey and Champion (2017) argue that although Saudi Arabia dwarfs Qatar in almost every measure, there are many ways in which the current tussle could end up hurting the Saudis. Qatar’s economic advantage and its relationship with Turkey have both improved in light of the embargo, and some Turkish troops have been deployed onto Qatari soil. Turkish support for Qatar makes a quick win for Saudi Arabia and its allies impossible. Additionally, Carey and Champion (2017) indicate that Qatar’s perception that the Saudis and their allies’ embargo is an attempt at regime change in their country creates even more resistance. The issue of maintaining its sovereignty and identity in the face of Saudi hegemony in the region has driven Qatar to use its economic muscle to ensure that their sovereignty is respected. Trenwith (2017) argues that given the sociocultural dimension of the Gulf, a solution to the problem will require each side to make compromises in a face-saving exercise that provides the means for each side to come out claiming its own kind of victory. Ehteshami and Mohammadi (2017) indicate that Qatar and Saudi Arabia espouse different politics in their dealing with the Middle East and Mediterranean region. From a Saudi perspective, the key concept is that of being the leader of the Muslim world, or Pan-Islamism; whereas Qatar’s politics is one of Pan-Arabism, with an open foreign policy that supports its relationship with various Arab and other countries. Kose and Ulutas (2017) argue that the Qatari embargo and the formation of different alliances in the region makes the Middle East highly vulnerable, exacerbating existing problems such as the wars in Yemen and Syria as well as the ongoing instability in Libya and Iraq, among others. The crisis could also lead to the isolation of the Middle East as the region becomes increasingly polarized. With various countries taking different sides in the Qatari crisis, this splinters the region even more, which could increase political conflict. The security dilemma created by the embargo of Qatar can only be overcome by the region realizing that their interests are tied together and that whatever happens to one country could affect the others.

Conclusion The embargo imposed by Qatar’s neighbors on this small Gulf country is indicative of the ongoing uncertainty in the volatile Middle East. Given that the main actors (Saudi

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Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain) are members of the GCC, more careful consideration should have been given to the situation before such drastic action was taken. The multilayered reasons given by Saudi Arabia and its allies for imposing the embargo on Qatar indicate that smoldering issues have been reignited, including Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as well as the hosting of Hamas leaders and support for opposition forces in Syria. Importantly, these are situations that could have been resolved without the need to impose the embargo. US President Trump quickly declared support for Saudi Arabia and its allies, although given the allegations that the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner’s inability to secure funding from Qatar may have influenced his support for the embargoing countries, questions may be raised about whose interest is being served. With its innovative foreign and security policies, Qatar has been able to use its influence with allies in the region (including the regional powers Iran and Turkey) to ensure that the impact of the embargo on its domestic market, especially for food and essential goods, has been muted. With one of the largest SWFs in the world, Qatar has been able to draw upon these assets to help stabilize the domestic banking market. Thanks to its innovative processes, the country’s SWF has enabled substantive funds to be easily and quickly converted into the liquid assets urgently required in the country. Not only that, but Qatar has expanded its liquefied natural gas production from 77 million tons to 100 million tons, thereby bringing an extra $6 billion into the country. With the second-largest proven deposits of natural gas and with numerous stable customers in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, the country is well prepared to withstand the economic effects of the embargo. The historical failure rate of embargoes also indicates that the solution to the current impasse is a negotiation in which each party would compromise, so as to ensure that a region already facing serious challenges does not have to experience a further crisis.

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Fahad Al-Marri is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Qatar (GU-Q) where he teaches and researches on small states, regional security, intelligence & national security, and political economy. He is the coeditor of Small States Security: Lessons for Qatar (HBKU Press, 2021) and has published widely in scholarly journals and policy outlets as well as the international media. These publications include: “The Impact of the Oil Crisis on Security and Foreign Policy in GCC Countries: Case Studies of Qatar, KSA and UAE” (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2017). A member of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. He has served on several advisory boards for governmental and non-governmental organizations in Qatar and the UK. He is also a senior advisor to the President’s Office at the General Retirement & Social Insurance Authority, Qatar.

Chapter 19

The Role of Qatar Airways in the Economic Development of Qatar: Before and During the Gulf Crisis Catalina Petcu

The aviation sector started to shape the evolution of the Arab Gulf States in the beginning of the twentieth century, when the British Empire and other major powers (Italy, United States) recognized the strategic position of the region in their communications spheres (Williams 1957; Peterson 2000). The Gulf’s location is a pivotal point on the global aviation map, while its natural resources provide the necessary means to support the growth of air transportation. It is not a coincidence that oil was first discovered in 1931 in Bahrain, and one year later the same Gulf state had established the first Arabian international airport (Haji 2016). With Dubai International Airport the busiest airport in the world for international passenger traffic in 2015 (Ulrichsen 2015), and Doha and Abu Dhabi regarded as global super connectors (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010), the aviation sector in the Gulf region has seen a meteoric rise. The factors encouraging the rapid development of the Gulf’s aviation industry are the strategic location, high disposable income, low operating costs, global market liberalization, the absence of a railway network in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and the access to cheap capital (Scourse 2013). Cash reserves from oil and gas assets enabled the governments of the Gulf states to invest heavily in infrastructure and airport development and to fund high rates of airline capacity growth. For instance, Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad have benefited from governmental support via lower fuel costs and lower labor costs (Scourse 2013), and via the construction of highly technologized infrastructure: Hamad International Airport in Doha, Al Maktoum International Airport in Dubai, and Midfield Terminal Complex in Abu Dhabi (Ulrichsen 2015). While the governmental subsidies have been the essential drivers of the aviation industry in the GCC, the region’s states are designing national visions to encourage the growth of the non-oil sector and to strengthen the process of economic diversification. However, the Gulf states have encountered difficulties in turning their C. Petcu (B) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 M. Zweiri et al. (eds.), The 2017 Gulf Crisis, Gulf Studies 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_19

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economies away from hydrocarbons sector, which threatens to be unsustainable due to its volatility, its status as a major source of revenues, and the future depletion of resources. Despite the fact that many scholars suggest that the private sector is the best option to diversify an economy, given the weaknesses of the GCC private sector, few GCC governments are willing to cede their leading role in the economy. Therefore, the Gulf states tend to utilize state-owned enterprises (SOE) as instruments for economic development. The present study restricts its focus to a specific Gulf country, namely Qatar, and examines whether the state-owned aviation company Qatar Airways has the potential to facilitate the process of economic development in Qatar, especially during the ongoing crisis which has restricted connectivity. Hertog (2010) describes the SOEs in the GCC as lucrative and efficient, and therefore an in-depth assessment of this stateowned airline and its role in the process of economic diversification can contribute to an evaluation of the GCC approach in diversifying their economies with a focus on the recent Gulf crisis. The following discussion is divided into five sections. The next two sections provide an overview of the aviation industry in the GCC and the profile of Qatar Airways, followed by a discussion of Qatar Airways from a neoliberal and developmental state perspective. The final section briefly examines the consequences of the Gulf crisis for the aviation industry in Qatar, and the national airline’s strategies to continue its growth.

The GCC Aviation Industry The GCC aviation industry has grown rapidly over recent decades, outpacing other regional markets. The fast ascendance of the Gulf airlines has propelled the region to global attention. The region’s strategic location, abundance of funding, and strong infrastructure are the main drivers behind such meteoric growth. A peculiar characteristic of the GCC is that the aviation industry is largely state-controlled. The rise of the aviation industry worldwide can be summarized via an assessment of its global revenues, which have increased from US$379 billion in 2004 to US$751 billion (1% of global GDP) in 2014 (Al Masah Capital 2015). According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), aviation’s global economic impact is around US$2.4 trillion (3.4% of global GDP), supporting 60 million jobs worldwide. Between 2004 and 2014, the Middle East registered the highest passenger traffic growth in terms of Revenue Passenger Kilometers (RPK) (Al Masah Capital 2015). The traffic growth in the Middle East has a CAGR (compound annual growth rate) of approximately 12% for the period 2011–15, compared to 6% globally (Seifman et al. 2016). In 2015 the Middle East region carried a 5% share of global passenger traffic (El Beyrouty and Tessler 2015). A study released by Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) in 2014 shows that air transport in the Middle East supports 2 million jobs and contributes US$116 billion in GDP for the region. Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad are the Gulf airlines which dominate the Middle East market, accounting for 75% of its total traffic (Seifman et al. 2016).

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The governments of the GCC countries have strongly supported the infrastructure of the industry by heavily investing in airports. The focus on infrastructure arises as part of a plan to promote tourism in the region by attracting more inbound traffic. Overnight tourist arrivals increased by 27% across the region from 2007 to 2013, and a further 92% increase is expected from 2013 to 2024 (El Beyrouty and Tessler 2015). Moreover, each Gulf country is focusing on its own airline. The Qatari government’s commitment to stimulate the aviation sector is exemplified through the withdrawal in 2002 of its 25% share in Gulf Air, based in Bahrain (Ishutkina and Hansman 2009). The State of Qatar decided to augment its focus on the development of the national airline and to direct its resources allocated for the aviation sector only to Qatar Airways. The growth of the aviation sector in the GCC has been supported by the strategic location of the region, connecting the Western world with the Asia-Pacific; by the travel requirements of the large expatriate population (20 million) in the GCC; and by growing urbanization and high per capita income, at an average of US$33,000 for the whole GCC in 2013 (Al Masah Capital 2015). Moreover, the demand for business and leisure travel by air is expected to increase as income levels grow in the GCC (Alpen Capital 2014). The governments have stimulated the aviation sector by investing around US$313 billion in developing airports, with the infrastructure contracts being evaluated at US$45 billion in 2014 alone (Al Masah Capital 2015). Fuel supply, provided at a lower cost than for competitor airlines, has been another driver of aviation development in the Gulf (Alpen Capital 2014). Another factor which has supported aviation growth in the Gulf is cheap foreign labor. The labor policy in the GCC is based on the “contract worker” model, which allows companies to hire foreign employees for a certain period of time in different sectors where the expertise of locals is absent. The nationals of the GCC countries prefer to seek employment in the public sector due to its stability and high income. This has led to the division of the labor market into public versus private and national versus non-national (Al-Waqfi and Al-Faki 2015).

Qatar Airways—Company Profile Qatar Airways Company Q.C.S.C. is the national carrier of Qatar and a part of the Qatar Airways Group, which encompasses the airline and airport operations, aviation and catering services, retail outlets and hotels. The services offered by the airline are airline travel services, corporate travel, advance passenger information, transit accommodation, online check-in, mobile services, and in-flight entertainment services (IDC Research 2016). Qatar Airways was founded in 1994 under the ownership of the Al-Thani royal family, being relaunched as a full-service carrier in 1997 under a new management team, having Mr. Akbar Al-Baker as Group Chief Executive until the present day. The airline began as a 50% state-owned company, the other 50% held by private investors (Ishutkina and Hansman 2009), however, in 2013 the airline became 100%

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state owned. The company is not publicly listed, the only two Gulf carriers which are listed being Air Arabia and Jazeera Airways, both low-cost airlines (Al Masah Capital 2015). Between 2000 and 2008, Qatar Airways was one of the fastest-growing airlines in the world, with a 35% year-on-year growth rate (Ishutkina and Hansman 2009). The airline grew from 4 aircraft in 1997 (El Beyrouty and Tessler 2015) to 250 in 2019, including both passenger and cargo aircraft (Qatar Airways Group 2019). By March 2019, the total number of Qatar Airways Group employees had reached 46,685, of more than 150 nationalities (Qatar Airways Group 2019). Qatar Airways Group includes a variety of companies specially designed to sustain the expansion of the aviation industry within the country. The Group supports the economy by creating job opportunities via outsourcing, however, most of the companies created (except Dhiafatina Hotels, Qatar Distribution Company, and Qatar Executive) operate as service providers for Qatar Airways and Hamad International Airport, without extending towards other economies or other sectors within Qatar. Of these companies, Qatar Airways has the largest number of employees, followed by Qatar Aviation Services and Qatar Duty Free. The airline’s growth is envisioned upon a diversified service mix which incorporates a diverse workforce, a highly technologized fleet with inflight entertainment, and a check-in facility of up to 12 h prior to the flight at Hamad International Airport. Another strength is represented by strong partnership agreements with other airlines (Asiana Airlines, Virgin Atlantic, GOL, Middle East Airlines, etc.), hotels (Marriott, Hilton, Radisson Blu Hotels, Sheraton, Shangri-La, Kempinski, Anantara, Wyndham, etc.), car rentals (Sixt, Hertz, Avis, Europcar, Budget and Rentalcars), banks (Qatar National Bank, Qatar Islamic Bank, Burgan Bank, Housing Bank), and travel services (Ooredoo, Air Miles, My Rewards Points, Qatar Stars League, Qatar Airways Holidays, Joyalukkas Jewellers, Travelling Connect, Columbus Travel Insurance, Al Jaber watches, Chic Outlet Shopping, Booking.com), all of which enhances the global presence already established via more than 150 destinations. As a state-owned airline, Qatar Airways incorporates political and economic national strategies into its performance. The challenges of investment and acquisitions consist in modifying Qatar Airways’ focus towards global expansion; and boosting management bandwidth, as a surplus of competent managers is required to conduct proper supervision of this type of acquisition. Another acquisition driven by sovereign interests is in Indigo LCC India, Asia’s third-largest low-cost carrier. Qatar Airways planned to purchase shares in Indigo via the Qatar Investment Authority (Kotoky and Kamel 2016). Investing in Indigo would bring Qatar Airways economic benefits through exposure to one of the world’s fastest-growing travel markets, Indigo being the only Indian airline which had profit each year during 2009–16 (Kotoky and Kamel 2016). Moreover, it would promote Qatar’s national interest in India, its third source market after UAE and Saudi Arabia before the crisis (CAPA Centre for Aviation 2016). In terms of exports, India is the third country of destination, accounting for 12% of Qatar’s exports (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2016). Purchasing stakes in the most profitable Indian airline would encourage Qatar Airways’ involvement in the air transport activities of India. The open-sky

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policies should be designed according to the needs of each country, respecting the principles of competition and free market.

Qatar Airways from a Neoliberal Perspective Emphasizing the value of free market competition, neoliberalism promotes a flow of trade and capital with minimal state interference. For the neoliberalists, a capitalist economy provides stability. Their proposed policies aim at improving economic performance by restricting the power of the government and of trade unions and implementing an active free market. By imposing lower taxes, companies would have the opportunity to save and invest, while under financial deregulation the market incentives would flourish (Kotz 2015). The case of the GCC states is a peculiar one, however, as the Gulf countries benefit from surplus capital, which is financial and resource-based capital that has to be put into productive use. By necessity, capital formation in Saudi Arabia has been under governmental control until 1980s (Hertog 2012). Most of the Gulf countries decided that the development of new sectors should be done via public enterprises, which have been supported through large initial capital injections, continued concessionary loans, and dedicated infrastructure (Hertog 2012). The privileges offered to SOEs run counter to the concept of free market competition proposed by the neoliberal school. Despite the fact that deregulation and lower taxes are applicable to public enterprises, these policies do not follow the neoliberal practices as they are not implemented for the entire market. This prevents private firms from competing on a level playing field, especially when SOEs tend to dominate entire sectors (Callen et al. 2014). The Gulf states view the public and private sectors from different perspectives. There are certain sectors considered vital for the economy, which require large-scale state investment and the creation of SOEs, such as heavy industry, logistics, and network-based industries; while in real estate, commerce, distribution, and light manufacturing the state allows the involvement of local merchant families (Hertog 2012). The biggest challenge faced by SOEs is that they may not be able to escape the infant industry circuit of protection, neither to generate a higher profit than the injected governmental capital (Kornai 1979) nor to operate independently of their political leaders. As governments tend to protect certain industries, the investigation of the competition appears to be a duty for Western companies which are guided by neoliberal strategies. In the vision of Freiburg neoliberals, a “strong state” acquires power “through self-restraint, through its ability to say ‘no’ to the demands of special interest groups, its ability to credibly commit itself to universal moral principles of the rule of law enshrined in a privilege free economic constitution” (Wohlgemuth 2008). Thus, from the neoliberal perspective, competition becomes the instrument to create benefits for consumers in an ethical and social manner. Open sky agreements appeared as a tool for eliminating governmental restrictions on international route rights, on the type of aircraft that can be operated on specific routes, and on the number of designated airlines (InterVISTAS 2015).

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The company’s skyrocketing advance in the global aviation sector has been questioned by European and American carriers on a competitiveness basis, as well as in view of its alliances. The section provides an analysis of the airline’s fleet, and the aviation infrastructure and taxation system in Qatar, as they are important stimulants in Qatar Airways’ development. As competition is a key component of neoliberal policies, Qatar Airways will be examined by looking at the reports released by American airlines against the Qatari airline, and at Qatar Airways’ documents issued as a reply to the accusations of not respecting the values of competition. Qatar Airways’ financial statements will be intensively utilized in this section as they constitute the primary source of data with regards to the airlines’ economic performance. Qatar’s airport project value is the highest among the Gulf countries, with a governmental investment of US$16 billion, followed by Dubai World Centre (US$8 billion), Dubai International airport (US$7.8 billion), and Abu Dhabi International Airport (US$6.8 billion) (Alpen Capital 2014). In the report of economic statistics in Qatar released by the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, the real GDP growth rate of Qatar stood in the second quarter of 2016 at 2% (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2016). Even with halved oil prices (the oil price dropped to US$35 a barrel in 2016), the GCC governments continued their investment in various projects as an effort to diversify, with Gulf aviation benefitting from government investments of more than US$300 billion in developing airports (Oman Arab Bank 2016). The rapid growth in government spending on infrastructure has led to the strong development of low-value-added sectors such as construction, trade and retail, transport and restaurants (Callen et al. 2014). Hamad International Airport commenced its operations in April 2014, with an initial capacity of 30 million passengers a year. Alongside the project of Hamad International Airport, the project of Aerospace City has been designed to include a business airport for general aviation and helicopters operated by Gulf Helicopters, a military area, an education and research area incorporating a university campus, a business and residential district with a marina, chalets, and swimming pool, an aerospace museum and a theme park (Holland Aerospace and Aviation 2016). The project was launched in 2012, having Qatar Foundation as a prime contractor, the technical assistance being provided by Qatar Petroleum (Holland Aerospace and Aviation 2016). Moreover, the airport infrastructure will be complemented by a maintenance organization specially constructed for Qatar Airways, which will be the largest in the world. The massive expansion by Qatar Airways of its airport infrastructure and fleet is a strategy which aims at facilitating trade, tourism, travel, and logistics. Qatar Airways is embedded in the national plans for development, and thus the aviation industry is one of the vehicles utilized for this purpose. American airlines perceive this phenomenon as a threat to the growth of their own companies, to competition in a free market, and as a violation of the Open Skies Agreements. Delta Airlines, American Airlines, and United Airlines (the Big Three) released a report in 2015 named “Restoring Open Skies: The Need to Address Subsidized Competition from State-Owned Airlines in Qatar and in the UAE.” The report makes public the financial

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statements of Qatar Airways and the UAE airlines (Emirates and Etihad), arguing that huge subsidies have supported the rapid growth of the three airlines and that these subsidies have an adverse distorting impact on the marketplace and on the profitability of the US and third-country airlines. The report posits that Qatar Airways, Etihad, and Emirates do not operate as independent companies, but rather they act as extensions of their governments. Moreover, the three state-owned airlines, due to their huge advantage built on subsidies, are considered to be intending to dominate the US market share and to shift US aviation jobs overseas. According to the “Restoring Open Skies” report (2015), the current fleet of the three Gulf airlines will soon be enhanced with the arrival of a large amount of newly ordered aircraft, and together they will have a greater capacity than the entire US commercial wide-body fleet. The American airlines fear that once these aircraft fly the US routes, they will capture market share from other airlines, especially given that the populations of UAE and Qatar are very small. The Middle East region is considered poised to become one of the world’s fastestgrowing air transport markets. The major airlines of the Gulf, Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad, have followed policies of aggressive route expansion, their business model focusing on transporting passengers between Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas via their hubs (Dresner et al. 2015). The Gulf carriers are well positioned to increase market share in the lucrative long-haul market, as the average flight of Emirates is amongst the largest in the world—2,816 miles, compared to the average length of a Lufthansa flight which is 796 miles (Oxford Analytica 2013). The rise of Gulf airlines as major players in the world air transport business seems to be at the expense of long-haul carriers in the United States, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific. The US airlines claim that Gulf carriers have an unjust competitive advantage, and call for restrictions on the Gulf airlines accessing their markets (Dresner et al. 2015), as, according to Grimme (2011: 333), “market entry for Gulf carriers seems to be easier because they can obtain slots at attractive times.” The advantages of Gulf airlines comprise: airline fleet, innovation in product development, low labor costs, investments in infrastructure, non-dependence on locally generated traffic (Oxford Analytica 2014), tourism development, access to highly liquid Sovereign Wealth Funds (Oxford Analytica 2008), political and economic advantages, partnershipgenerated revenues (e.g. Oneworld alliance), stakes in other airlines (Qatar Airways owns 21.43% of IAG), and operations from airports with lower fees (Oxford Analytica 2015). The traffic growth in the Gulf is envisioned to turn on long-haul international traffic, not on regional traffic. The Australian carrier Qantas has broken a 15-year joint venture with British Airways in favor of a global partnership with Emirates, thus positioning Dubai as Australia’s gateway to Europe (Oxford Analytica 2013). Qatar Airways flies to more than 160 destinations, most of which are in Europe, Africa, South Asia, Asia-Pacific, North America, and South America. This provides evidence that the Qatar Airways strategy is to serve mainly medium- and long-haul destinations, especially after the blockade.

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Compared with the aviation industries of the United States and Europe, which have faced bankruptcy, rising fuel costs, tightening credit conditions, and fewer business passenger flights, the Gulf aviation industry has proven to be stable and strong (Oxford Analytica 2008). The Gulf airlines’ traffic flows that accompany the market have affected the European and the US aviation industry. As an example of how new market entries affect the competitors, Grimme (2011) describes how the entrance of a low-cost airline has led to a fall in market fares, meaning that new entries pose challenges on the local market. European airports saw their connectivity level fall by 5.7% in 2013 due to the emergence of Middle East hubs. Lufthansa and Air France KLM requested the European Commission to withdraw traffic rights from Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad, as they have received government subsidies, seeking a limitation of the Open Skies Agreements with the Gulf Airlines (Oxford Analytica 2015). According to an analysis conducted by Oxford Analytica (2013), the major global airline alliances, Oneworld, SkyTeam, and Star Alliance, initially rejected partnerships with the Gulf airlines, considering that Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad do not meet their requirements due to heavy subsidies. Nevertheless, the global growth of the Gulf airlines has since motivated the alliances to accept them as members (Oxford Analytica 2013). The US airlines remain unsatisfied with the entry of Gulf airlines into their market. They campaign to convince the US government and other important players in the aviation industry that Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad are not adhering to the policies of Open Skies Agreements, as they are building competitive advantage on the grounds of massive capital injections from their governments. The fact that the aviation sector has been treated as an infant industry is indubitable. The status given by being an SOE has conferred on Qatar Airways substantial privileges, partially quantified by the American Big Three. In reply, Qatar Airways claims that the Open Skies Agreement has partnerships with other state-owned companies, which the Big Three did not address. Moreover, it says, the US and European carriers are requiring greater transparency from the Gulf airlines, without taking into consideration that they may be accused of double standards since the European airlines too have been sustained by their governments (Air France, Sabena, Lufthansa, TAP, Olympic) and the US airlines received aid to recover from the consequences of September 11 and have used Chap. 11 protective bankruptcy to avoid collapse (Oxford Analytica 2015). As studies show, the impact of the rise of the Gulf airlines on US fares, on routes to Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Oceana, and on passengers carried, has been negative. Nevertheless, the growth of the GCC airlines is not based only on governmental aid, but also on their location and geographic proximity to high-growth regions such as South Asia (Dresner et al. 2015). Geopolitics acted as a powerful factor in their growth, enhanced by large resources and the capacity of governments to pour capital into their aviation industries.

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Qatar Airways from a Developmental State Perspective The assessment of Qatar Airways using the neoliberal perspective has confirmed the status of the company as a privileged entity, a public player which benefits from governmental support at various levels. In order to assess Qatar Airways from a developmental state perspective, the variables of knowledge, innovation, and connectivity have been selected. Qatar Airways aligned its policies to the Qatar National Vision 2030, and the creation of a knowledge-based economy represents an important pillar in national economic development; a knowledge-based economy also includes innovative processes. Improved connectivity has the potential to lead to other economic processes (knowledge transfer, foreign direct investment), thus it has also been selected as an important variable in defining the role of Qatar Airways in the economic development of Qatar. Knowledge plays an important role in economic development; however, its integration into socioeconomic systems is slow and shows a gradual evolution (Hossain 2013). According to Thierstein et al. (2006), the pillars of a knowledge economy are Advanced Producer Services (APS), High-Tech Industries, and knowledge-creating institutions (universities, research centers). Knowledge is a driver of productivity and economic growth, being directed towards enhancing the role of technology, information, and learning in economic performance. The Knowledge Economy Index designed by World Bank assesses the knowledge economies on four pillars: (a) Economic and Institutional regime, (b) Innovation, (c) Education, and (d) Information and Technology. In terms of a Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE), Qatar is still weak (Thierstein et al. 2015). One of the reasons behind this weakness is represented by the shortage of unskilled and skilled manpower in the GCC countries (Hossain 2013). This is an important factor, as human capital encompasses the skills, intellect, attitudes, and tacit knowledge commanded by employees and management structures. The networks developed by companies’ relational capital can create synergies within the entire value system (Lopes et al. 2016). Due to the shortage of local manpower in the GCC states, 70% of the labor force is constituted by expatriates, a phenomenon which challenges the involvement of the national workforce in the competitive sector (Hossain 2013). As an effort to overcome this challenge, Qatar plans to increase the national workforce and to produce qualified employees via the implementation of the “Qatarization” program. Qatar Airways is embedded in national strategies, and therefore the airline developed the Al-Darb Qatarization Programme in order to generate highly educated workers who will help to transform the economy into a knowledgebased economy. This represents a contribution to Qatar’s development strategy, by increasing the national workforce in technical and professional occupations. Within the class of establishments employing 10 employees or more in the Transport and Communication sector in Qatar, 11,276 employees (out of a total of 59,794) are registered under the occupation of “Specialist and Technicians” (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2015a, b). As a knowledge-based economy entails an increased labor market demand for highly skilled workers, the training

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and education of Qatari nationals represent important factors in its creation. With its rapid growth, the GCC aviation industry would require more than 35,000 new pilots and 50,000 new technical personnel over the next two decades (Al Masah Capital 2015). Knowledge and skilled workers are definitely valuable strategic assets for a country (Hossain 2013). According to Wilson (2012), “it is the accumulation of knowledge, rather than the accumulation of physical capital and the exploitation of natural resources, that is the engine of long-run economic growth.” Research and development (R&D) generates knowledge, university research having significant spillovers in industry. In 2010, Qatar Airways, in partnership with Qatar University, Qatar Science and Technology Park, and Qatari Diar Vinci Construction, started to invest in the Algae Biofuel Project. The research is led by Qatar University’s Center for Sustainable Development and is based on the identification of 98 strains of algae in Qatar and on the classification of each strain for biomass growth potential, resilience to local climatic conditions, and potential as a biofuel feedstock (Qatar Airways Sustainability Report 2016). The first stage of the project was completed in June 2015 and has involved the establishment of indoor laboratories and an outdoor demonstration facility to cultivate, harvest, and analyze large-scale micro-algae production with the potential to apply algae biomass to biofuel production (Qatar Airways Sustainability Report 2016). In addition to this, Qatar Airways invested in California firm Byogy Renewables, which makes jet-fuel from alcohol (Lane 2012). Airbus, British Airways, and Cranfield University (UK) are other entities exploring the growth of algal biomass for aircraft fuel. This shows the expected importance of biofuels in commercial aviation. The Bio Fuel Project in Qatar, later labeled the Algal Technologies Program, not only serves the development of biofuel for aviation, but also develops technologies that can protect the environment by utilizing Qatar’s nonfossil fuel and diversify the economy by capturing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and producing animal feeds locally (algaeindustrymagazine.com 2016). This type of project brings benefits to Qatar at a food security level as well as promoting economic diversification. Innovation represents the conversion of knowledge into benefits which can take the form of new or improved products, processes, or services for commercial or public use (Cutler 2008). Innovation “is a process of continuously generating and applying new ideas, complements and facilitates the knowledge creation and application process, […] is one of the key drivers of economic growth, [and] is essential to the competitiveness and sustainability of an economy” (Wilson 2012). According to the Global Innovation Index 2016, Qatar ranked number 50 in the world among 128 countries with a score of 37.47, and ranked number 3 in the Arab World. According to Hossain (2013), there is poor R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the GCC countries, thus showing that R&D activities are not sufficiently encouraged even though the Gulf countries have high per capita income. Three components have been identified as key for an innovation-driven economy: a common innovation infrastructure, cluster development, and the capacity for entrepreneurship (Khalifa 2012). While the role of the innovation infrastructure is to augment productivity, cluster development (science and engineering workforce,

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access to universities, ICT infrastructure) stimulates innovation, facilitates commercialization, and strengthens the linkages and spillovers across companies and associated institutions (Khalifa 2012). The aviation industry presents cluster characteristics as its industrial chain requires cooperation, stimulating the technology developments of other related industries, while the internal cooperation enhances the sharing of technologies and division of labor (Zhu et al. 2012). The capacity for entrepreneurship includes developing entrepreneurship training, risk capital providers, tax policies encouraging risk capital, infrastructure that promotes access to facilities, incubators and services for startups, policies promoting ease of doing business, and a culture of public recognition of entrepreneurs and awareness of the risks of failure (Khalifa 2012). Innovation lies at the basis of the development of the aviation industry. From the point of view of industry cluster innovation, the performance and competitive advantages of the industry cluster can be improved by the optimization of the value chain as well as technology sharing and diffusion (Zhu et al. 2012). In 2012, Qatar Airways and Thales (the airline’s In-Flight Entertainment and Connectivity French supplier) opened a new technology research, development, and training center located at Qatar Science and Technology Park (MENA Report 2012). The Joint Innovation and Technology Project has been established to develop in-flight entertainment solutions (touch-screen technology, seat-back screens, etc.) for Qatar Airways. As Qatar Airways aims at introducing pioneering products for its passengers, the technological innovation process is a vital element in developing new services that will help attract more customers. Furthermore, Qatar Airways received awards for content innovation at the fourth annual in-flight workshop and awards event at Aircraft Interiors Middle East, held in partnership with F&E Aerospace. Technological progress leads to the development of a more efficient application of operations research, facilitating large-scale optimization and the implementation of strong real-time solutions (Oancea 2015). In terms of innovation, in 2015 Qatar Airways created a new fleet-management system called Total Operations System which “integrates data from multiple sources and produces a holistic view into the airline’s operation, from the global scale to the individual flight level, in order to anticipate and notify operations staff of any potential issue and provide solution options” (Qatar Airways Group Annual Report 2016). The system has a tail assignment optimizer (aircraft are assigned to specific routes according to the route’s operational requirements and aircraft’s capabilities), NOTAM manager (to increase the situational awareness of dispatchers and operations staff), and Flight Watch (offers operations personnel multiple filters, such as weather patterns, flight path routing, and restricted or prohibited air space so that the team of professionals in the airline’s Integrated Operations Center have near-perfect awareness of each airborne flight, and the ability to communicate quickly with the flight deck) (Qatar Airways Group Annual Report 2016). Qatar Airways adds technical innovations to its in-service aircraft before entering the market. The A320 aircraft is enhanced with a Sharklet wingtip device which saves each aircraft up to 900 tons of CO2 per year, while the B777 Performance Improvement Package reduces fuel burn by 0.9% (Qatar Airways Group Annual Report 2016).

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As we have seen, Qatar Airways aligns its strategies with the national vision and with the strategies of its partners, with both Qatar Airways and Airbus focusing on certain similar projects in the aviation market. This consolidates the aviation industry, which is improving its performance by following strategies implemented worldwide. Civil aviation plays an important role in developing networking between nations, additionally contributing to economic growth and development (Lopes et al. 2016). From Qatar Airways’ hub in Doha, the airline has created a global network of more than 160 destinations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Asia-Pacific, North America, and South Asia. Qatar Airways is also a member of Oneworld Alliance. Such strategic alliances, codeshare agreements, and slots represent just a few of the intellectual resources which drive the airline companies by influencing the turnover (Lopes et al. 2016). At another level, the connectivity developed by Qatar Airways through its various destinations can enhance the performance of corporations in the knowledge economy. These corporations split their activities into different units and locate them in places rich in knowledge resources and industrial culture (Dicken 2007), and Qatar Airways can facilitate rapid access to these places. According to a study conducted by Thierstein et al. (2015) on Doha’s connectivity pattern, Doha’s Advanced Producer Services (APS) economy has a strong spatial linkage to major European cities (London, Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, Vienna, Madrid) and to New York (showing the highest gross connectivity from among 20 cities). For high-tech companies, the most connected cities are Singapore, Moscow, Paris, Sao Paulo, and Buenos Aires, the European and the Asian spatial scale being relevant within their value chain processes (Thierstein et al. 2015). The connections created between cities and markets are an important infrastructure asset which enable foreign direct investment (FDI), with business clusters and other spillovers having positive impacts on the productive capacity of the economy (Oxford Economics 2011). Qatar Airways has around 30 routes which connect Qatar to cities of more than 10 million inhabitants, and has increased its daily flights to economically important destinations. Qatar Airways’ presence in the United Kingdom was significantly increased in 2018, “as direct daily services were launched to Cardiff, hence becoming the first Gulf carrier to serve the Welsh capital and opening up options for passengers in the west and south-west of England. Qatar Airways also began direct services to London Gatwick in May, 2018, raising the total number of U.K. gateways to six.; services to Manchester also increased from 16 to 18 per week” (Qatar Airways Annual Report Fiscal 2019). These high frequencies provide high-speed access for business and leisure purposes, bringing benefits to air transport passengers, markets, tourism, and trade. A developed connectivity contributes to the performance of the economy as it benefits productivity in firms outside the aviation sector, offering a rapid access by domestic firms to foreign markets and facilitating the freer movement of investment capital and workers between countries (Oxford Economics 2011). Thus, firms are encouraged to specialize in areas where they have a comparative advantage and to invest outside their home countries. Improved connectivity can also favor inward investment from foreign firms (Oxford Economics 2011).

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The Gulf Crisis and Qatar Airways Since 5 June 2017, the Arab “Quartet” (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) have continued to boycott the State of Qatar. Building on the pretext of a hack of the Qatar News Agency website, the four nations initiated a geopolitical crisis that divided the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and captured the attention of major powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The ongoing crisis has affected not only the parties directly involved, but also the entire Middle Eastern region and the Horn of Africa (Kinninmont 2019). The diplomatic attempts by Saudi Arabia to isolate Qatar in 2014 were not successful, and therefore in 2017 the dispute escalated into blocking Qatar’s only land border as well as its air routes. The closure of land borders and the air traffic disruption were intended to have major consequences for Qatar’s economy and society (Stephens 2017). Such actions were challenging for the Qatari officials, as major adjustments were required to keep the country solvent, sovereign, and open for business (Johnson and Huxham 2017). As the Gulf economy is heavily reliant on transport (Yadav 2017), it is worth investigating how the crisis has affected one of Qatar’s most important economic players, Qatar Airways. With the Quartet cutting off Qatar Airways’ rights to use their airspace, the airline had to re-route over Turkey and Iran, losing 50 flights per day, 18 destinations, and seating capacity, and increasing flight time. This was a substantial challenge for the airline, as Qatar Airways generated an estimated 30% of its revenue from flights within the Gulf (Yadav 2017). Moreover, the impact of air restrictions was even greater since Qatar Airways operated more flights on the affected routes than all other airlines combined (CAPA Centre for Aviation 2017). Prior to the embargo, the ascension of Qatar Airways was measured at an annual growth of 20% (Law 2017). With a rapid fleet expansion consisting of massive orders of new planes (more than 300 aircraft, worth more than US$85 billion still on order), Qatar’s national airline had emerged as a leader in the Gulf aviation market, challenging the United Arab Emirates’ airlines (Emirates and Etihad). Qatar Airways executives regarded the blockade as a maneuver to inhibit the growth of their business, which was posing a serious threat to the Emirati airlines’ market dominance (Law 2017). The immediate impact of the embargo shook Qatar, however, the country proved to be resilient. Losing access to the four boycotting countries, imports and flights were immediately disrupted. According to Kinninmont (2019), Qatar’s imports decreased by 40% in value in June 2017 compared to June 2016. The immediate suspension of 18 destinations from Qatar Airways’ global network caused major disruptions to suppliers working within Qatar (Qatar Airways Sustainability Report 2018); it also led to stranded passengers and separated families, as Qatari residents living in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain were expelled, with exceptions subsequently being implemented for Qataris married to Quartet citizens (Kinninmont 2019). On 5 June the Qatar Airways website was blocked, and passengers were advised to use its Facebook channel in order to make bookings. Thousands of flights were

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rebooked during the day. The airline’s offices in the four countries were locked and 500 Qatar Airways employees were denied access to their work (Law 2017). Their primary goal was to assist passengers and residents stranded by the embargo, and in this respect charter flights operated by other airlines were used to repatriate residents. Qatar Airways Cargo played a vital role in maintaining food, medical, and manufacturing supplies to Qatar, and a new Climate Center was opened in May 2017 to ensure cool storage of the large volume of food imports (Qatar Airways Sustainability Report 2018). Prior to the embargo, around 40% of the country’s food supplies came via the land border with Saudi Arabia. In response to the crisis the airline deployed its 22 air freighters, and through collaboration with Turkey and Iran the threat of severe food shortage was solved within two days of the implementation of blockade (Law 2017). Qatar Airways Cargo imported 4,000 cattle from Australia, Hungary, and the US on 60 flights (Johnson and Huxham 2017), and helped Moutaz al-Khayyat, chairman of Power International Holding, to establish a farm which “provides the residents of Qatar with an important local source of fresh milk and dairy products” (Qatar Airways Sustainability Report 2018). The airline executives pointed out that the crisis had had a negative impact, with Qatar Airways losing 20% of its passenger traffic. Flight duration increased since the sudden measures prohibited Qatar-registered aircraft from overflying the airspace of the Quartet countries. Airspace restrictions reduced the number of Qatar Airways’ air corridors from 18 to 2 (see Fig. 19.1), increasing the distance to numerous destinations. In terms of fuel consumption and emissions, the additional fuel required to reach the destinations increased the CO2 emissions from aviation fuel consumption by 11.3% (in comparison to 2016–17) (Qatar Airways Sustainability Report 2018). Being re-routed over Oman, Iran, and Turkey, flights became longer and thus less attractive for customers. Such a negative consequence compounded the difficulty of making operating profits even before the blockade. Having most of its flights confined to the narrow entry and exit corridor, an extended time in the air, and higher fuel consumption, Qatar Airways headed towards a financial operating loss (Johnson and Huxham 2017). For the fiscal year 2017–18, the airline reported a loss of US$69 million, attributed to the embargo (Deutsche Presse Agentur 2019). The loss mounted

Fig. 19.1 Qatar Airways’ air corridors

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during the following year, with the airline reporting a loss of US$500 million for the fiscal year 2018–19 (Qatar Airways Annual Report Fiscal 2019). Despite the predicted financial loss, however, the company showed business confidence immediately after the embargo, announcing a bold acquisition move of a 49% stake in the Italian airline Meridiana (Law 2017). The airline’s strategy to minimize the effects of the blockade proved to be aligned to the national strategy. In defiance of both the immediate and longer-term negative results of the boycott, Qatar managed to limit the impact on its economy. Being the host of the world’s third largest gas reserves, Qatar secured long-term agreements with powerful nations (China, UK, India); and even the UAE still receives natural gas from Qatar through the Dolphin pipeline (Kinninmont 2019). Hence, the “economic boycott could only marginally harm one of the wealthiest countries in the world” (Lynch 2017). Applying a judicious strategy, “Qatar used gas contracts and Sovereign Wealth Investments to consolidate relationships with various countries all over the world” (Kinninmont 2019). The US and Turkish military presence in Qatar deterred the military threats, while the global reaction to the demand to close Al Jazeera made it difficult for the blockading countries to criticize Qatar’s regime (Lynch 2017). The crisis certainly had economic effects; however, these were not as major as the Quartet expected. According to Johnson and Huxham (2017), Qatar Airways “made up for its lost flights with new ones, the government has created new business partners, and the two together have found new ways to supply its country with essentials like food.” Mass media played an important role in defining the crisis. In an attempt to scope out the international news coverage of Qatar during the diplomatic crisis, Northwestern University in Qatar collaborated with Meltwater (a media monitoring firm) to gather data on Qatar’s coverage between May 21 and September 25 (Northwestern University 2018). After reviewing the articles containing the word “Qatar” in the headline or lead paragraph, the results showed that the key topics of interest that appeared frequently alongside Qatar in leading publications in the UAE, the UK, and the United States were “crisis” (2256), “terror” (1255), “airline/airways” (989), “demands” (772), “Trump” (746), and “bank” (560) (Northwestern University 2018). The UK and the United States primarily referred to the diplomatic event using the term “crisis,” hence suggesting a deep rift with ripple effects across the entire region. On the other hand, the significant effect on daily travel between Doha and Dubai was clearly reflected in the UAE publications, the results on “airline/airways” reflecting the importance of connectivity between the two countries for the Khaleeji population. In response to the blockade and its impact on connectivity, Qatar initiated new shipping links to compensate for the loss of access to the Quartet ports. The costs of the imports through Turkey, Iran, and Oman increased, but by the end of 2017 imports reached pre-crisis levels. Moreover, Qatar signed shipping agreements with China, India, and South Korea, mapping new routes between Doha and their ports (Kinninmont 2019). Qatar Airways took many steps to continue its operations as usual and made adjustments to the deployment of the aircraft previously flying to the blockaded destinations. Within two weeks of the embargo, new destinations to Sohar, Prague,

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and Kyiv were launched, while a certain number of crew and aircraft were leased to British Airways (Qatar Airways Annual Report Fiscal 2018). During the financial year 2017–18, Qatar Airways’ route map was increased by 14 new destinations: Dublin–Republic of Ireland; Nice–France; Skopje–Republic of Macedonia; Sohar– Sultanate of Oman; Prague–Czech Republic; Kyiv–Ukraine; Sarajevo–Bosnia and Herzegovina; Adana–Turkey; Chiang Mai–Kingdom of Thailand; Saint Petersburg– Russian Federation; Pattaya–Kingdom of Thailand; Penang–Malaysia; Canberra– Australia; Thessaloniki–Greece. From the first day of blockade up until 31 March 2019, the airline launched 24 new destinations. However, planned new destinations in West and Central Africa and South America were suspended due to the embargo (Qatar Airways Annual Report Fiscal 2019). As Johnson and Huxham (2017) noted, “Qatar Airways seemed to be doubling down on new destinations to counteract the effects of losing a large portion of their Gulf flights.” Qatar Airways emerged as the first international airline (other than Middle East Airlines) to obtain permission from the Syrian government to overfly Syria, Beirut and Larnaca, two destinations that required significant detours due to the blockade, can now be reached by crossing Syrian airspace (Macheras 2019) and the flight from Beirut to Doha is one hour shorter than the detour which avoided Syria. Not only has it established new routes, but the airline has also invested heavily. In March 2019 it acquired a 25% stake in Moscow’s Vnukovo International Airport. Qatar Airways mainly focused on airlines with strong management and access to healthy markets (Qatar Airways Annual Report Fiscal 2019). In January 2019, the airline announced the purchase of 5% of the total issued share capital of China Southern Airlines. This was added to the existing portfolio of holdings which includes a 49% holding in Air Italy, 21.43% shares in IAG, 10% investment in Latam, and 9.99% in Cathay Pacific (Qatar Airways Annual Report Fiscal 2019). Proactive engagement with partners around the world served as another strategic pillar in the evolution of Qatar Airways. Finding itself in the third year of the airspace blockade, the airline is set to benefit from a sustainable framework for future operations generated by the successful conclusion of the negotiation of a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement between Qatar and the European Union (6 February 2019). Qatar Airways’ aero-political engagements were oriented towards diversifying its markets, and were manifest through delegations to the International Summit in Delhi (September 2018) and the Global Aviation Summit in Mumbai (January 2019), which emphasized the need to access the Indian market; discussions with US officials to preserve flexibility for the airline; and participation in the Africa Aviation Summit in Kigali, Rwanda (February 2019) to change the current hubbing dynamics for Africa (Qatar Airways Annual Report 2019). The diplomatic conflict reiterated the importance of maintaining a diversified portfolio that can sustain any regional disagreements and weather their economic, political, and social consequences. Qatar Airways’ move to purchase stocks in different airlines reflects an intention to diversify and develop defensive techniques should a crisis similar to the blockade arise in the future, particularly in the context of mistrust between GCC partners.

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Conclusion The aviation industry in the Arabian Peninsula has transformed the region into a global hub, the Gulf airlines being propelled into the global market of the aviation industry. This chapter aimed at analyzing one Gulf carrier in order to observe the effects of a state-owned airline on global free markets, and most importantly on its national economy. Neoliberal theory was utilized in order to understand the economic performance of the airline under neoliberal policies. It was concluded that Qatar Airways operates in a privileged environment created by the government of the State of Qatar via the expansion of the airport infrastructure, taxation system, and capital injections in the form of equity. For assessing the growth of the airline within the national vision for economic development, the developmental state theory provided a theoretical background for understanding the role of Qatar Airways in the economy of Qatar. As a flag carrier, the airline internalized the policies of development prescribed by Qatar’s National Vision 2030. Thus, the airline reflected the Qatarization policy by developing a Qatarization Program whose innovative processes focus on environmental development and whose research is conducted in partnership with scientific centers such as the Qatar Science and Technology Park and Qatar University, aligning its progress with the government’s strategies towards the creation of a knowledge-based economy. The greatest contribution of Qatar Airways to the national economy comes from improved connectivity, which stimulates the connection with foreign markets and develops the tourism sector. Moreover, in terms of gross value added, the value added of air transport represents almost half of the value added of the entire Transport and Communication sector. Compared to the contribution to GDP by sectors such as Mining and Quarrying, Construction, and Manufacturing, the Aviation sector’s contribution is still moderate, yet growing. The aviation industry in Qatar is building the capacity to further impact national economic development, while its real contributions are starting to be seen in terms of revenues and generated employment. Qatar is reliant on foreign investment to diversify its economy through boosting its technology and knowledge in the non-oil sectors. The embargo limited the share of regional trade, and hence its diversification strategies were inhibited, especially those linked to regional demand. With the 2022 FIFA World Cup in sight, reconciliation with the blockading countries presents various opportunities for tourism. A comprehensive solution should have a component of economic cooperation that involves a resumption of transport connections, investments, joint energy programs, and tourism initiatives.

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