The 1848 Revolutions [2 ed.] 0582061067, 9780582061064

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SEM INAR STUDIES IN HISTO RY

The 1848 Revolutions Second Edition

Peter Jones

First published 1991 by Pearson Education Limited Published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X 1 4 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1991, Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part o f this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatm ent may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers m ust always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful o f their own safety and the safety o f others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent o f the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a m atter o f products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation o f any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. ISBN 13: 978-0-582-06106-4 (pbk)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Jones, Peter 1948The 1848 revolutions. - 2nd. ed. - (Seminar studies in history). 1. Europe. Revolutions. 1848 1. Tide II. Series 940.284

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PnMication Data Jones, Peter (Peter S.) The 1848 Revolutions / Peter Jones. - 2nd ed. p. cm. - (Seminar studies in history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-582-06106-7 1. Europe - History - 1848-1849. I. Tide. D 387J66 1991 940'.07 - dc20

Set in 10/11 point Baskerville (Linotron)

II. Series. 90-21531 CIP

C ontents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IN TRO DUCTIO N TO THE SERIES

iv V

Part One: The Background 1 THE OUTBREAK OF REVOLUTION

1

Part Two: The European Transform ation 2 THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALISATION ON THE W ORKING CLASSES

5

3 THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALISATIO N ON THE MIDDLE CLASSES

14

4 POPULATION PRESSURE AND THE C O NDITIO N OF AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY

24

5 THE BREAKDOWN OF TRADITIONAL POLITICAL

6

CONTROL THE CRISIS OF THE 1840s

29 43

Part Three: 1848: T he Year of Revolution 7 FRANCE 8 THE HABSBURG LANDS 9 THE GERMAN LANDS 10 THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

Part Four: Assessments and Consequences

52 66 77

89 98

Part Five: Documents

108

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS GLOSSARY BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

121 123 127 137

Acknowledgem ents

W e are grateful to the following for perm ission to reproduce copy­ right m aterial: M acm illan, L ondon and Basingstoke for extracts from Nations and Empires: Documents in the P olitical H istory o f Europe and On Its Relations With the World Since 1648 by Bridges, Dukes, H argreaves an d Scott; Oxford U niversity Press for an ex tract from a N in eteen th C en tu ry G erm an publication, tran slated by G. A. K ertesz pp. 125—6 o f D oc­ uments in the P olitical H istory o f the European Continent 1815—1939-, George W eidenfeld & Nicolson L td. for extracts from The Rise o f the Working Class by Ju rg e n K uczynski.

iv

Sem inar Studies in H istory

Introduction T h e S em inar Studies series was conceived by P atrick R ichardson, whose experience o f teaching history p ersuaded him of the need for som ething m ore su b stan tial th an a textbook ch a p te r b u t less form id­ able th an the specialised full-length academ ic work. H e was also convinced th a t such studies, alth o u g h lim ited in length, should p ro ­ vide an up -to -d ate an d au th o ritativ e in troduction to the topic un d er discussion as well as a selection o f relevant docum ents and a com ­ prehensive bibliography. Patrick R ichardson died in 1979, b u t by th a t tim e the S em inar Studies series was firm ly established, and it continues to fulfil the role he intended for it. T h is book, like others in the series, is th ere­ fore a living trib u te to a gifted an d original teacher. Note on the System o f References:

A bold n u m b er in ro u n d brackets (5) in the text refers the re ad er to the corresponding en try in the B ibliography section at the end o f the book. A bold n u m b er in sq u are brackets, preceded by ‘doc.’ [doc. 6] refers the read er to the corresponding item in the section of D ocum ents, w hich follows the m ain text. Item s followed by an asterisk * are explained in the Glossary.

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The durability of the regime was also affected in other ways. State finances were in a parlous state and steps were taken to limit the size of the army; the Empire’s international trading position was deteriorating in face of growing competition from the Zollverein states; and in foreign affairs Metternich seemed no longer able to guarantee the co-operation of other states in the suppression of rev­ olutionary activity. Austria had become estranged from Russia after M etternich’s failure to secure a diplomatic marriage between Stephen, the son of the Palatine of Hungary, and the Tsar’s daugh­ ter, Olga. On the home front the Empire seemed unable to grapple with the consequences of economic and social change which were particularly acute in the countryside. The material conditions of the peasantry had undoubtedly been worsening throughout the Vormarz period, especially in Bohemia, northern Hungary, Silesia, Galicia and Transylvania (see above, Chapter 4). This was not just a matter of dealing with peasant protest against the performance of the feudal labour rent, the Robot*, but also a question of meeting the demands of those rural landlords who were increasingly being drawn into market operations. This was especially the case in the Hungarian lands, where Magyar landlords recognised the in­ efficiency of the Robot system and sought its abolition. The Hungar­ ian economic writer Stephen Szechenyi* reckoned that a free man’s labour was three times more productive than that of a peasant per­ forming the Robot as labour rent. Yet such cost-effective claims were lost on the Habsburg state. The most pressing problem that the Habsburgs faced in the Vormarz period was the rising tide of nationalism, not only from the Magyars and Italians, who were to grab centre-stage in 1848, but also from the Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Croatians, Slovaks and Slovenes. The Habsburg response to the nationality question seerns to have been altogether clumsy. This is amply demonstrated in two episodes: the first was the occupation of the free city of Cracow in February 1846 and the subsequent Austrian annexation in Novem­ ber of that year. The Austrian action was intended to be pre-emptive and designed to quell the possibility of an uprising among the Polish subjects of the Empire, but its effect was to isolate Austria inter­ nationally. The city of Cracow had been independent since the Set­ tlement of 1815 and the Habsburg action was condemned by Britain and by the smaller German states. Condemnation by Britain was probably bearable, but the loss of support from the small German 68

The Habsburg Lands

states weakened Austria in the politics of the Bund and depressed Austria’s status relative to Prussia. Thus Austria’s ‘moral credit was weakened everywhere’ (148). Moreover, the annexation of Cracow only exacerbated the nationality problem, as it fuelled a growing resentment among the Poles of Habsburg Galicia. The second epi­ sode that undermined Austria’s international standing and revealed the clumsiness of the Empire was Radetzky’s* unilateral decision to occupy Ferrara in the Papal States in July 1847. Again the motive would seem to have been precautionary: the papal reforms had ex­ cited liberal hopes throughout the Papal States and also in the Habsburg provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and Radetzky thought that a show of force would stem the appetite for reform. As such his move was counter-productive, and it meant that Austria’s claim to be the defender of the existing order had now lost all legiti­ macy (169, 172). The national oppositions grew steadily throughout the Vormarz pe­ riod, but the regime could probably have withstood such discontent if it had not been for the growth of a middle-class liberal opposition in Vienna itself. This opposition made itself felt in the Diet of Lower Austria where the more liberal elements of the lesser nobility began to form links with the middle-class intelligentsia. Middle-class opin­ ion was broadly articulated through such organisations as the Legal-Political Reading Club, the Concordia Society and the Lower Austrian Manufacturers’ Association. Writers such as Franz Schuselka had attacked the political privileges of the Church, while Karl Beidtel sought financial and fiscal reforms. Thus when the news of the Paris revolution reached Vienna there was already a proto-liberal opposition in existence. Further, this opposition gained in confidence when the contents of Kossuth’s speech at the Diet of Pressburg* became known. The speech was translated into German by a Hungarian journalist living in Vienna and quickly distributed by the Legal-Political Reading Club. The middle-class opposition now called itself the ‘party of progress’ and advocated the creation of a responsible government, a broader franchise, reform of the civil service, abolition of censorship, religious toleration, universal edu­ cation and the formation of a citizens’ militia. It is important to recognise that this opposition, under the leadership of Bach* and Lohner, was loyal to the dynasty. It merely wished to reform the system of government and get rid of Metternich (152). The opposi­ tion programme quickly attracted support from all quarters, including the Diet and also the students who were active in mobilis­ ing the workers. 69

1848: The Year o f Revolution

The rapidity of the revolution’s success was remarkable, as the Court quickly assented to the demands of the reformers. On 14 March the Court accepted the idea of setting up a civic guard; censorship was lifted; and the Emperor agreed to the formulation of some kind of constitution. But this latter concession, on the face of it the most important, was in fact rather limited. Thus, although Metternich had been vanquished, the achievements of the revolution in Vienna should not be overemphasised. Significantly, the new government contained representatives of the old order, including Kolowrat* and Ficquelmont*. Outside the capital events were taking a more dramatic turn, es­ pecially in Hungary. After Kossuth’s speech in Pressburg*, and the demonstrations in Budapest which followed it, a liberal government was formed under the premiership of Lajos Batthyany. Apparently, some 20,000 demonstrators had taken to the streets in Budapest but the garrison, made up largely of Italian conscripts, was not used as it was thought to be unreliable (145). The other members of the Hungarian cabinet were Kossuth, Szechenyi*, Deak and Eotvos. The new Hungarian government espoused both national and liberal sentiments, as expressed in the ‘March Laws’ which abolished the Robot* and made provision for the election of a parliament on a re­ stricted property franchise. Knowledge of the Magyar language was to be an essential qualification for any intending candidate in an election [doc. 2d], This meant that the Magyars would effectively dominate the Slavic minorities in the eastern part of the Empire: at the same time they would establish an ascendancy over a substantial number of Romanians. The whole design of the March Laws would seem to have been an attempt by the Magyar nobility and lesser gentry to substitute themselves for the German-Austrian ruling class. They certainly aimed to save the lower nobles from economic decline and ‘consequent political extinction’ (145). Whether the Magyars’ political ambition was so consciously calculated has been questioned, and it may be that they just did not understand the ambitions of the Croatians and Romanians. In this context their programme was less one of ‘conscious aggression . . . than of naive optimism’ (148). Significantly, although there were some Magyars who were not landowners, there were no non-Magyars who owned any sizeable holdings (42). However, the March. Laws were econ­ omically progressive and owed much to the ideas of Szechenyi*. Magyar ambition was also the source of its defeat; for the Hungar­ ian revolution aroused the latent racial antagonisms that existed between the Magyars and Slavic minorities. This was well 70

The Habsburg Lands

recognised by Kolowrat* when he appointed Joseph Jellacic as governor of Croatia on 22 March 1848. Jellacic was ardently anti­ Magyar and he was eventually a prime mover in the suppression of the Magyar revolution. Events in Vienna were now moving rapidly. The Crown had already agreed in April to a constitution which included elected as­ semblies that would share legislative power with the Emperor. But by the summer the students and middle-class intellectuals were be­ ginning to articulate a much more assertive policy, and had found in Dr Adolf Fischhof a dynamic spokesman who headed a revol­ utionary committee. It was at this point that the Court fled to Innsbruck. The revolutionary committee demanded a new ministry and forced the resignation of Pillersdorf, as well as the election of a Constituent Assembly which duly met in mid-July. Its most out­ standing achievement was the abolition of the Robot* — an achievement which was not reversed even during the counter­ revolutionary era of neo-absolutism after the abdication of Ferdinand and the crowning of Franz-Josef. But this achievement also heralded the break-up of the revolutionary forces, for the peasants, who had been facing an acute agrarian crisis since 1845, now became detached from the revolution. Elsewhere the forces of nationalism were still at work. If Magyar nationalism was sufficiently virile to seek to subdue other minorities, this was not the case with Czech nationalism, which was the main­ spring of the revolution in Prague, in the northern part of the Empire. Like the patriotic movement in Italy, the national move­ ment among the Czechs was largely the preserve of an urban intelligentsia. Its leading exponent was Frantisek Palacky, the Czech historian (see above, p. 38). Bohemia, where the majority of the Czechs lived, was a region of developing industry where the entre­ preneurial classes were largely of German-Jewish origin, and in almost all respects the Czechs were in the ‘hands of the Germans’ (151). Germans dominated the bureaucracy, the clergy, business and land. Czech nationalism had its roots, then, in the history of foreign domination. The Czech movement in 1848 had made its first move on 11 March when a meeting of intellectuals took place at the Wenzelsbad inn* and proclaimed a liberal programme - freedom of the press and abolition of the Robot*. The Czech movement was nonetheless limited, if not realistic in its ambition, as even at this early stage the Wenzelsbad Programme expressed a desire to main­ tain a ‘constitutional link between the lands of the Bohemian Crown’ 71

1848: The Year o f Revolution

and the monarchy. The monarchy was petitioned and demands for a constitution and for the recognition of the Czech language in education and administration were accepted. Czech nationalism was only one strand in a more broadly based Slavic movement, which reached its climax in June 1848 when a Pan-Slav Congress was convened in Prague under the chairmanship of Palacky. The earlier Wenzelsbad Programme* now became the basis of Austro-Slavism - the demand that the various Slavic minori­ ties, including the Czechs, should be given a degree of autonomy within the Habsburg Empire. Palacky took the view that had the Austrian Empire not existed then it would have been necessary to invent it in order to protect the Slavic minorities from a predatory Russia [doc. 2c]. His programme, however, was not likely to be ac­ cepted either by the monarchy or by those Germans who lived in Bohemia - according to Engels there were seventeen Germans to every twenty-four Czechs living in the region. More to the point, the Germans formed the core of the urban middle class, while the Czech and other Slavic peoples were largely confined to proletarian and peasant occupations. The indications of German dominance were alrèady far too great to allow any form of true Slavic indepen­ dence. A. J. P. Taylor has criticised Austro-Slavism, saying that it was ‘a programme of timidity’ and that ‘the dynasty was asked to give the Slav peoples the freedom that they were too weak to take for themselves’ (88). This rather harsh comment ignores the reality of power within the monarchy. Perhaps the view that AustroSlavism intended to promote a moderate federalist solution along historical-political lines is m orejust (146). It can be argued that the Slav Congress and the Federalist programme showed the first resist­ ance of Slavic peoples to German or Magyar domination (160). Whatever conclusion is drawn about the significance of Palacky’s programme, the Slav Congress occasioned the first decisive step in carrying out the counter-revolution. A student rising in Prague which overlapped with worker unrest in the city’s cotton mills gave the Imperial Governor of Moravia, Windischgratz, the excuse to bombard the city. The unrest had been growing for some time and stemmed from increasing unemployment in the face of technological innovation. This problem was aggravated by a famine of cotton sup­ plies from America, which could no longer be brought through the port of Trieste since the Habsburgs were blockading it as part of their military campaign against the Italians (148). The relatively easy suppression of the Czech revolution and the subsequent victory

72

The Habsburg Lands

over the Italians at Custozza did much to revive Habsburg confidence. Although the Habsburgs were starting a counter-revolution against the Italians and the Czechs, the monarchy was still prepared to make concessions to the Hungarians. In all essentials the Habsburgs were at first prepared to countenance the March Laws (see above, p. 70 and doc. 2d). Thus on 2 July the Palatine of Hungary, Archduke Stephen, opened the new Hungarian parlia­ ment, which subsequently passed legislation to establish a separate Hungarian army and an independent Hungarian budget. This was virtually complete autonomy and the Habsburgs were now able to capitalise on the latent hostility of the Croatians, Serbs and Romanians towards Magyar nationalism. The monarchy, now re­ covering under the ambitious personality of the Archduchess Sophie*, sent Jellacic, an ardent Croatian, to suppress the revol­ ution. In September his troops entered Hungary. The liberal Count Batthyany resigned and power passed into the hands of the radical, Kossuth, who became a virtual dictator (149). The other liberal members of the cabinet had also given way —Szechenyi* attempted suicide and was committed to an asylum; Esterhazy resigned; and Eotvos fled to Germany. All of Kossuth’s energy was now poured into raising an army to block Jellacic’s advance. At this point it is important to understand how the various revol­ utionary movements became intertwined: news of plans to send part of the Viennese garrison to assist Jellacic was widely rumoured in Vienna. It was this rumour that signalled a demonstration of protest by the student members of the Academic Legion and the workers. Although there was a small element of mutiny in the garrison, the October Days uprising, as it became known, really marked the end of the Vienna revolution. The lynching of Count Latour, one of the members of the cabinet, frightened the Imperial family, who fled to Olmutz, a small town in Moravia. The October Days was the most startling of revolutionary events since it highlighted the polarised situation between the classes. Not only did it herald the departure of the Court; it also frightened moderate liberal politicians who sought to escape from Vienna. The number of refugees has been estimated at 100,000 and practically ‘all members of the bourgeoisie left the city’ (148). Windischgratz now prepared to regain control of the capital. He was given plenipotentiary powers to take whatever actions he thought appropriate. He besieged the city and began a steady bombardment which killed between 3000 and 5000 73

1848: The Year o f Revolution

people (26). The October Days were Vienna’s equivalent of Paris’s June Days. Both indicated a divergence of ideals and expectations and both marked a defeat for the revolution. In Vienna the sup­ pression of the October Days was a real turning-point, since the Viennese bourgeoisie was now firmly on the side of order. On 29 November the burghers of the city presented an address to Windischgratz thanking him for restoring the city and delivering them from the ‘chains of terror-rule’ (148). Once Windischgratz had proclaimed martial law in Vienna the way was open to a complete counter-revolution throughout the Empire. The reaction was implemented by Windischgratz’s brotherin-law, Schwarzenberg, who was appointed prime minister on 21 November 1848. The Constituent Assembly had already re­ treated to Kromeriz during the October scare. It continued its deliberations until March 1849 but it had become ‘quite isolated from the turn of events’ (146) and it was largely ignored by Schwarzenberg’s government. The rejuvenation of the dynasty was now imminent and in December 1848 the Court persuaded the feeble-minded Ferdinand to abdicate. He was succeeded by his nephew, Franz-Josef, who was imbued with the dynastic ideal which was in direct accord with the disposition of Schwarzenberg, who wished to revive monarchical and thence bureaucratic authority. His government included Count Stadion*, as well as Alexander Bach*, who had adopted a distinctly conservative stance in contrast to the heady liberalism of the days of March. The ability to revive dynastic moral authority depended, in part, on the success of the Imperial armies. The Italians were finally de­ feated at Novarra on 23 March 1849, only two weeks after Schwarzenberg had dissolved the assembly at Kromeriz. The Hungarians, however, were proving more difficult to subdue, and any protraction of the war against Hungary was likely to endanger the dynasty’s moral recovery. It was probably this factor that in­ duced Franz-Josef to accept Russian assistance. The Hungarians had already announced their refusal to recognise the monarchy in December 1848, and in January 1849, when Windischgratz’s army occupied Budapest, Kossuth’s government retreated to Debreczen, where Hungary was proclaimed an independent republic. Russian intervention was finally to seal Hungary’s fate and tip the balance in favour of the forces of order. The Tsar may have feared unrest in his own territories - in Galicia or in Russian Poland - but more likely he simply believed it to be his ‘duty to defend the security of the boundaries of Russia entrusted to [him] by God’ (177) and 74

The Habsburg Lands

simply to aid a fellow monarch. He was certainly suggestible to the theory of conspiracy and believed that the Hungarians had the back­ ing of the Poles. Whatever his reasons, Russian troops entered Hungary in June, and on 13 August the Hungarian army, under Gorgey, surrendered at Vilagos. Schwarzenberg now carried out a bloody repression: thir­ teen Hungarian commanders were executed and even the former prime minister, Count Batthyany, was shot. The Austrian com­ mander who succeeded Windischgratz was General Haynau, whose brutal reputation came before him. He was responsible for 114 ex­ ecutions and 2000 imprisonments. Only Venice now remained independent of the authority of the monarchy. The revolution had all but run its course. The liberal phase in the history of the Habsburg Empire had finally spluttered to a halt with the defeat of the Hungarians. Liberal constitutionalism had experienced a short and unsuccessful life. It was easily consumed by more vigorous national rivalries —a desire for Germanic ascendancy over Magyars as well as a GermanicMagyar desire for ascendancy over Slavs. The willingness of the gov­ ernor of Croatia, Jellacic, to pit his forces against the Magyars was of the same order as the Galician peasants’ willingness to suppress the uprising of Polish nobles in 1846. Seen in this light it would appear that the achievements of the revolution were minimal, but there is no doubt that the revolutions of 1848 provided a great im­ petus in the development of the political life of the subject peoples of the Empire (146). Thus the events of 1848 were formative for the Italians in 1859-66 and for the Hungarians in 1867 when both these peoples achieved the essentials of their national political pro­ grammes —the Italians became a united nation and the Hungarians' obtained autonomy within the Empire. In the social sphere the great enduring achievement of the revolution was the emancipation of the peasantry from the Robot*. In the economic sphere the Empire be­ came a single customs union by the abolition of all internal tariff barriers, but the revolution had little effect on the problems of in­ dustry; in particular the grievances of craftsmen and workers were not redressed despite their public appearance in the revolutionary uprisings. In the political-constitutional sphere the achievements of the revolution were negligible, and there is a case for saying that ‘absolutism after 1848 was even more stringent and for a time more effective than before the revolution’ (146). The Kromeriz Constitu­ tion was virtually ignored and all but superseded by the proposals of Stadion*. Equality before the law was now guaranteed, in theory 75

1848: The Year o f Revolution

if not in practice, but overall the power of the monarchy was stronger than ever after 1848, even though the rights of the nationalities —in education and public administration - were nominally recognised. Liberalism’s timidity and ultimate defeat is explained by the fact that the forces arrayed against it were too vigorous. At the same time the link between liberalism and nationalism was now severely weakened. Liberalism, in fact, was giving way to more virulent con­ servative nationalism, of which German hatred of Slavism was the most sinister expression.

76

9

T h e G erm an Lands

In discussing the 1848 revolutions it is not possible to talk of Ger­ many in any coherent sense as a nation, as events followed different patterns in individual states. In Bavaria the agitation against Lola Montez pre-dated the news of the Paris revolution of February. There was a common theme, however, and that was the emergence of the new liberalism. This was as true of the southern German states, like Baden and Bavaria, as it was of the more traditional and reactionary Prussia. In fact it could be said that the acquisition of the Rhineland by Prussia in 1815 was instrumental in dragging Prus­ sia into modern history, because when Frederick William IV capitulated to the revolution in Berlin, he appointed Ludolf Camphausen and David Hansemann, two Rhineland businessmen, to head a liberal administration. Although it was the German liberals who grabbed the headlines in 1848, there were other important groups who were active in the revolution and they should not be overlooked. The liberal movement was essentially, as it was elsewhere in Europe, the product of middle-class ambition, and the German revolutions have been quite rightly explained in terms of a bourgeois demand for ‘proper partici­ pation . . . in the construction of political life’ (127). In those states where the liberal opposition came to power - Baden, Wurttemburg, Darmstadt, Nassau, Kassell, Saxony, Hanover and Prussia — the middle classes were demanding ‘greater freedom of action, legal safe­ guards, political participation . . . and . . . national unity’ (119). This stemmed, primarily, from a lack of political opportunity for the middle classes. In particular, they felt that they were unable to gain public positions within their respective states that were commensur­ ate with their abilities and education. At the same time, the middle classes were exasperated with arbitrary bureaucracy (115), and the formation of a national state seemed to be a way in which their hopes could be realised. In addition to the middle-class liberal thrust there were other social-political forces at work, although historians are far less certain about their exact significance. It should be remembered that in the 1840s some two-thirds of the 77

1848: The Year o f Revolution

German population were still engaged in agriculture. Grievances re­ lated to the land and the remnants of feudal oppression were exacerbated by the problems of overpopulation (see above, Chapter 4). These grievances were especially felt in the Black Forest areas of the Odenwald, Briegau and Mulheim (121). Peasant discontent was not directed towards the same ends as middle-class liberal ac­ tivity, but the violence of the peasant uprisings undoubtedly had an effect in frightening governments. The governments themselves also suffered from severe internal weaknesses and there is a sense in which the revolutions were due ‘not only to the scope and character of the pressures’ coming from below but also to an ‘actual decline in the flexibility, autonomy and morale of the political elites themselves’ (53). Unrest in the towns and cities among workers and artisans was also of some importance, but the precise character of that unrest is more difficult to establish. German workers - artisans and new fac­ tory proletarians —were active in 1848, but their motives and the social and political meanings of their actions were often contradic­ tory. The lamentable catalogue of social misery that was amassed by the Marxist historian, Kuczynski, in the 1930s (27) has left its mark on other historians of that tradition, notably Eric Hobsbawm, who has given a prime role to the working class in the Berlin uprising of March 1848 (23) (see above, Chapter 5, p. 41). This inter­ pretation is very much at odds with that of Stadelmann, who claims that the ‘grievances about working conditions . . . did not remotely play the part that might have been expected from widespread cries of distress for social reform in the 1840s’ (127). However, the danger of social upheaval was certainly recognised by contemporaries in the ruling elite [doc. 3b]. Thus, although the workers were reacting against change and much of the artisan programme was conservative in character, there is, nevertheless, a strong case for saying that ‘social discontent had fired the revolution’ (118). Peasant rioting and the fighting of work­ ers and artisans on the barricades were strong contributory factors in forcing the existing rulers to concede to the demands of the lib­ erals. The fact that the middle-class liberal reform movement and the workers’ movement, with its many disparate and often conflict­ ing strands, eventually diverged, does not lessen the role of the working classes in bringing about the initial concessions of March 1848. The German revolutions seem to have been generated by a mixture of motives that were distinct and separate for different social groups. Peasants were concerned with the removal of their feudal 78

The German Lands

obligations. Artisans wished to retain the protection afforded to them by their traditional guilds which were in the process of being dismantled at the insistence of middle-class liberals. Finally, within the politically conscious layers of the middle class there was the de­ sire to achieve constitutional reform ( 121 ). The first clear manifestation of middle-class liberalism occurred at Mannheim on 27 February, and the usual liberal demands were articulated. This was quickly followed by a meeting of liberals at Heidelberg on 29 February, and on 5 March fifty-one liberals re­ solved to call a pre-parliament or Vorparlament which eventually sat at Frankfurt on 31 March. Its proceedings lasted until 4 April. The Vorparlament resolved that a Constituent Assembly should be elected by ‘independent’ citizens. No doubt the German liberals received reports from Paris, and like their liberal counterparts in Vienna were fearful of what they would have construed as mob rule: ‘It is from Paris that the crowing of the Gallic cock will once more awaken Europe,’ wrote Marx (4). Some states decided on a residence quali­ fication for those intending to vote in the Assembly elections. In Baden, voting was based on a property qualification; artisans, jour­ neymen, farm labourers and domestic servants were excluded from the franchise. Elsewhere, those in receipt of charity or poor relief were disqualified. This was the case in Cologne where 25,000 people (29 per cent of the population) were in receipt of relief (132). So exclusive were the voting qualifications in Cologne and Trier that the labour associations of those towns advocated boycotting the elec­ tions altogether, as a form of protest. This perhaps helps to illustrate the disparate themes which run through the German revolutions, for it was in the Rhineland, and Cologne in particular, that the first cycles of capitalist-style unem­ ployment were being experienced. The situation was essentially similar in Berlin where the Rheberger, a group of unemployed work­ ers, was active in organising demonstrations (121). When the Frankfurt Assembly met in May 1848 it was petitioned by the Berlin workers, under the inspiration of Stephan Born*, for a programme of social reforms including a minimum wage, a maximum working day, rights of association, a progressive income tax, state education, free libraries and the regulation of the apprenticeship system. However, the aspirations of the middle-class liberals who were now gathering at Frankfurt were far removed from the concerns of the Berlin and Cologne workers and artisans. The exclusive voting qualifications under which the elections had been conducted in many of the German states meant that the Assembly was largely 79

1848: The Year o f Revolution

middle-class in character. By far the greatest proportion of those elected were educated men, including some fifty professors and sixty secondary-school teachers, although they were outnumbered by of­ ficials and bureaucrats (132). Only one peasant and four artisans were elected. The Assembly was, in the end, nothing more than a reflection of both the rise of the middle class and more specifically of the discontent of a faction within that class, namely the official element: 68 per cent of the deputies were civil servants or officials and 2.5 per cent were businessmen (132). Clearly, the care with which the ground rules for the elections were designed indicates the wish of the German middle-class politicians to keep the pace of change within bounds, and certainly nothing more than the estab­ lishment of a constitutional monarchy was desired. The election of the Frankfurt Assembly was primarily an exten­ sion of the movement for a more constitutional form of government within the individual states. Thus, although German liberalism was weakly organised before 1848, it had nonetheless already voiced its opinions. For example, Friedrich Flecker and Gustav Struve had instigated a liberal convention at Offenburg in September 1847, and a programme demanding abolition of censorship, trial by jury and the elimination of feudal restrictions was drawn up [doc. 2a], A further convention of liberals met at Heppenheim a month later and put forward a similar programme of liberal demands. But there was no really co-ordinated liberal movement, and there is little evidence that there was any fundamental challenge to monarchy as a form of government from the German middle class in 1848. Only Ludwig of Bavaria lost his throne, and in Prussia it would be fair to say that Frederick William IV created his own difficulties. This is an import­ ant point to bear in mind when considering the reasons for the even­ tual failure of the revolutions. Although there were revolutionary uprisings, demonstrations, meetings and assemblies, as well as the formulation of political programmes, the existing regimes survived - ‘the armies remained loyal and the administrations, despite changes in ministers, functioned without interruption’ (123). In Prussia, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the situation was that the monarchy appeared, temporarily, to embrace the principles of the revolution. Why was this so? Why did one of the most tra­ ditional dynasties of Europe go along with the revolution and accede to its demands? There are at least two explanations. Firstly, the self­ confidence of Prussian absolutism had already been seriously undermined in the previous year. Frederick William had become embroiled in the problems that had emanated from the financing of 80

The German Lands

railway construction. During the 1840s he had been under pressure to find state funds for the building of the Ostbahn, a railway from Berlin into the Junker economic heartlands of east Prussia, which was vital to Junker economic survival. Such an undertaking would have required a substantial state loan, as well as a significant increase in taxation, and not even Prussian absolutism felt strong enough to raise taxation of this order without some representative backing. In 1820, the previous king, Frederick William III, had promised that any increase in the state debt would not be allowed without the ap­ proval of some representative body. Consequently, in 1847 Frederick William IV called a United Diet. Apart from representatives of the aristocracy, there were also bankers, merchants, professional men and provincial mayors. The United Diet put forward a set of classical liberal demands as a bargaining counter to the King’s request to raise taxation. The situation was deadlocked and neither side was prepared to budge. Subsequently the Diet broke up, but the experi­ ence was not lost on the King. Prussian liberalism, by stubbornly opposing the King’s demand for a loan for the Ostbahn, had shown that it was a force to be reckoned with. The second major factor which brought about Frederick William’s ready capitulation in 1848 stemmed from conditions in Berlin. Early in March 1848, 400 work­ ers were dismissed from Borsig’s engineering works. This created a tense situation - tension heightened when news of M etternich’s resignation reached the city on 18 March. Clashes between the pop­ ulace and troops broke out. Frederick William announced his intention to grant reforms, and a crowd gathered in the palace court­ yard, apparently in support of the King. However, troops in the royal household panicked and shots were fired. At this point crafts­ men and workers took to the streets and erected barricades. Frederick William seems to have lost his nerve and decided to throw in his lot with the revolution. He paraded in the streets of Berlin, swathed in the German tricolor, announcing that ‘Prussia merges into Germany.’ The March Days fighting was both victory and defeat for the ad­ vocates of reform. It was victory in the sense that the monarchy had been humiliated, and that Frederick William appointed liberal ministers on 29 March; but it was defeat in that it made the Junkers determined to crush the insurrection and it also persuaded the middle classes of the imminent danger of social revolution, pushing them over to the side of order. Moreover, it encouraged them to limit their political programme to minimal constitutional demands. 81

1848: The Year o f Revolution

This preoccupation with legalities arising from the formation of the Frankfurt Assembly was the major concern of some historians writing in the 1940s (37, 128). Consequently, the activity of artisans and workers has been left to later generations of historians to dem­ onstrate. The revolutions certainly signalled the release of the many pent-up grievances of the working classes. Urban discontent had centred around the grievances of the Handwerker throughout the 1840s. These craftsmen had long enjoyed independent status and were virtual aristocrats within their communities. However, the growth of free-market competition had prompted a number of Ger­ man state governments to abolish many of the protectionist elements of the guild system, as was the case in Prussia in 1845 and in H an­ over in 1847. Handwerker protests had already manifested themselves before 1848 —in the Palatinate in 1832 and in Silesia in 1844 —but it was the revolutionary year that unleashed the grievances of the artisan class. German industry had suffered from problems of overproduction in 1847. The associated collapse of demand was followed by a tight­ ening of credit controls by German banks and this in turn caused a rise in unemployment among factory workers, as well as a squeezing of many independent artisans who lost orders from the factories which they had been supplying. During the winter of 1847 there had already been many outbreaks of rioting and looting; and in Berlin angry workers stormed the palace of the Crown Prince. In Solingen, unemployed cutlers attacked iron foundries, while on the great rivers of the Rhine and the Danube dispossessed boatmen sabotaged steamships (118). This discontent carried on into 1848, and in August Stephan Born* formed the Arbeiterverbruderung, which was the first nationally based workers’ organisation. The significance of these events should not be overestimated as ‘only a minority of the skilled artisans had undertaken sustained political action. Their chief thought had been . . . to extract small improvements in their lives’ (124). To this end workers and artisans formed their own as­ semblies, the two most important meeting in Hamburg and Frankfurt. From the programmes that appeared from these assem­ blies, it is clear that the overriding concern of the artisanate was the growth of factory production and the abolition of the guilds. They certainly wanted to retain their privileged status within the working class as a whole by defending the guild system, but this of course put them at odds with the middle-class liberals who met at Frankfurt (133). In general terms, it would seem that the worker movement was defensive in its impetus, seeking to maintain a world that was 82

The German Lands

under threat as a consequence of the growth of modern methods of factory production. This defensive attitude manifested itself in nu­ merous ways, not only in the programmes of the worker assemblies but also in the anti-Semitic sentiments that were expressed by many sections of the artisanate. A revealing example is provided by the Handwerker of Leipzig: ‘There is no greater enemy of the petty bour­ geoisie and of the labouring classes, no greater enemy of the solidarity of the small trades than these aliens [i.e. Jews], . . . Their heart is the money bag’ (quoted in 133). The Industrial Code* put forward by the Artisan Congress was generally opposed to free enterprise. The Frankfurt Assembly, on the other hand, saw political and economic freedom as inseparable principles. Consequently, it rejected the Industrial Code, and in the long run this may help to explain why the Handwerker welcomed the revival of monarchy in the German states (133). The deliberations of the two liberal middle-class assemblies —the one at Frankfurt and the other at Berlin - still have to be considered. The Frankfurt Assembly was concerned with the formation of a na­ tion state. Three principal solutions were suggested. A minority of deputies demanded the formation of a democratic republic. Others, like Heinrich von Gagern, wanted to retain the essentially federal element of the existing Bund. This view was supported by many of the Catholic representatives, who were suspicious of anything that smacked of Prussian secularism. Finally, there were Prussian conservatives, like von Radowitz*, who were more concerned with the integrity of Prussia than with a united Germany. The Frankfurt Assembly was fraught with division and uncertainty, not only over the form of government - democratic-republican, federal, secular but also over the territorial extent of the new Germany. Should it encompass all the German lands, including those currently in the Habsburg Empire? O r should it only include those states that formed the core of the existing German Bund and exclude German Austria? These political divisions were underpinned by a general fear of social revolution. German Marxist historians have argued that the Frankfurt Assembly aimed to stifle the working-class revolution. The liberals, in their view, eschewed democracy in favour of an alliance with the old dynasties in which the the middle class became a ‘sub­ ordinate partner in an illiberal system of governance’ (136). The Assembly was undoubtedly divided on many fundamental issues, not least the question of the power of the German Emperor or King, and almost half the deputies were in favour of the King possessing 83

1848: The Year o f Revolution

an absolute veto (136). This was hardly typical liberalism in any recognisable western European sense. So, although the Frankfurt liberals espoused general aspects of European liberalism - equality before the law, careers open to talent, inviolability of personal lib­ erty, freedom of the press —they were still wedded to notions of social and political deference. Thus they balked when demands to abolish aristocratic privilege were put forward. ‘The truth is that they were at least as strongly opposed to democracy as they were to the old regime, and their challenge to the latter should not be overstated’ (136). Not only was there little basis for agreement among the Frankfurt deputies; they did not really possess the authority to make their de­ cisions effective. The powers of both assemblies - Frankfurt and Berlin —were never really defined; and the counter-revolution is per­ haps best understood in terms of the fact that the old dynasties ‘reasserted powers which may have been dormant but never surrendered’ (123). This lack of real authority was illustrated in the Polish and Schleswig-Holstein questions. Taking the Polish question first, it should be remembered that at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 Prussia had obtained the Duchy of Posen. Some Prussian liberals believed that Posen should be surrendered in order to facilitate the formation of a Polish state. This was certainly not the view taken by the majority of the Frankfurt liberals, who were more concerned with the 700,000 Germans who lived in the Duchy. The ‘temptation’ (4) of the German liberals to absorb Posen was too great; and on 2 May 1848 the Assembly voted 342 to forty-one in favour of this. It was perhaps one of the few issues on which there was virtual unanimity. Such an ambition stemmed from longestablished assumptions about German cultural superiority in central Europe (175), and, no doubt, from a desire to maintain a buffer between Germany and the real enemy of liberalism - Russia. Effectively, therefore, the Frankfurt Assembly merely supported the traditional aims of Prussian foreign policy. In the case of Schleswig-Holstein, not only was the ineffectiveness of the Frankfurt Assembly demonstrated but so too was the weakness of Prussia in international affairs. The diplomatic detail of the Schleswig-Holstein question is long and complex, but the episode in 1848 displayed the dilemma of the Frankfurt nationalists in respect of national boundaries. The two duchies had long been claimed by the Danish King, while Prussia had always supported the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg. The intention of the King of Denmark, Frederick V II, to absorb the two duchies within the Danish kingdom 84

The German Lands

brought a noisy protest from the Frankfurt liberals. They looked to Prussia to defend the German speakers in the two duchies. Prussia in fact occupied the two provinces between April and May 1848, but this action brought opposition from both Russia and Britain, who feared an extension of Prussian power into the Baltic and North Seas respectively. Prussian acceptance of the armistice at Malmo on 26 August and the withdrawal of General Wrangel’s troops dem­ onstrated the extent to which Prussia was still the junior partner in the alliance which had combined against Napoleon in 1814 and had dictated the terms of the Settlement of 1815. It also showed that the German question was a European ques­ tion, in the sense that a strong Germany in central Europe could affect the balance of power as a whole. At one level Lord Palmer­ ston, the British Foreign Secretary, welcomed the strengthening of Prussia’s role in Germany and central Europe, since she could act as a bulwark against both French and Russian rivalries. But Britain did not wish to see the continent dominated by a Germany that was too strong, lest that restrict Britain in her extra-European role as a world sea-power. Perhaps Russian opposition was more significant, since the Tsar was bitterly opposed to the revolutions and was even­ tually to lend his support to Austria in suppressing the Hungarian uprising. Russian support for Austria was an implicit repudiation of Prussian claims to exert hegemony in Germany. The capitulation of Prussia at Malmo demonstrated the complexity of the German ques­ tion and at the same time estranged the Frankfurt liberals from the Prussian state. The Frankfurt deputies regarded the withdrawal from Schleswig-Holstein as a treacherous betrayal of the German national cause (128). But there was also a sense in which the issue damaged the Frankfurt liberals more than it damaged Prussia, and this is the second major aspect of the crisis: ‘The ill-fated Malmo armistice dealt a very serious blow to the authority of the Frankfurt Parliament’ (111). The episode revealed quite starkly that Frankfurt had no means of conducting an independent foreign policy. Power still lay in Vienna and Berlin, and the Assembly looked to Prussia to conduct foreign policy by proxy on behalf of the nebulous German national movement. The isolation of the Frankfurt Assembly is fur­ ther demonstrated by recalling that only the USA gave it diplomatic recognition. Not even the French Republic could lend its support to Frankfurt over the question of the two duchies. The Schleswig­ Holstein question represents a turning-point in the history of the German revolutions. Prussia’s commitment to German nationalism had never been convincing, any more than Frederick William’s over­ 85

1848: The Year o f Revolution

tures to liberalism. Now Prussia was to move decisively against the revolution. In the same month that Prussia had been forced to accept the armistice at Malmo, the Junkerparlament meeting in Berlin resolved to form a League for King and Country, and declared its open op­ position to the Prussian Assembly which was also meeting in Berlin. By October the King had swung back to a more traditional position and dismissed his liberal ministers. The Berlin Assembly was moved out of the capital to Brandenburg in November, only to be dissolved the following month. The reaction brought about by the new M in­ ister of the Interior, Otto von Manteuffel, marked a revival of monarchical confidence. It also marked the beginning of the end of Prussian liberalism. Prussia’s failure over Schleswig-Holstein had repercussions in Frankfurt. The Assembly had never come to terms with the social problems which had initially activated the workers in March 1848. The workers’ demands for restoration of the guild system, and for compulsory elementary education as well as a progressive income tax, went much too far for the professors and officials of the National Assembly. They had not appreciated the realities of power, believing that solutions lay ‘through discussion and by agreement’ (37). Faced with the politics of confrontation and ultimatum, they froze. Thus a popular demand for refusal to pay income tax in November 1848 was rejected by the Assembly, thereby displaying once again the liberals’ inability to deal with the social question. This failure had been constant, but now, with the débâcle over Schleswig-Holstein, it had spread to the national question as well, with the con­ sequence that the Frankfurt liberals became increasingly politically isolated. The Frankfurt Assembly continued to debate the German Consti­ tution until well into 1849 and eventually, in March, offered the crown of a united Germany to Frederick William IV of Prussia. Al­ though not rejecting the crown outright, the Prussian King claimed that he could not accept it unless with the ‘voluntary assent of the Crowned Princes and the free states’. Frederick William was wedded to tradition, and regarded Prussia as Austria’s junior; it was out of ‘respect for Austria’ (37) that he rejected the crown. This rejection signalled the break-up of the Assembly: the Prussian deputies with­ drew and the Kings of Bavaria, W urttemburg and Saxony refused to recognise the Constitution. The plight of the Frankfurt Assembly was now clear. It had no means of enforcing any of its decisions. Its existence had always been at the mercy of the King of Prussia and 86

The German Lands

the German princes. The forces of reaction were now irrevocably in the ascendant. Frederick William’s involvement was not at end, however. He still believed, with some prompting from von Radowitz*, that it was poss­ ible to achieve a form of unitary German state under Prussian he­ gemony. To this end a meeting was held at Erfurt, attended by representatives from Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover and Saxony. The so-called Erfurt Union met with the approval of the right-wing and centre members of the old Frankfurt Assembly, who declared their support for it at Gotha in June 1850. However, Bavaria declared herself unwilling to sign the ‘Erfurt Treaty’, and Frederick William failed to capitalise on the support of Hanover and Saxony. The fail­ ure of Frederick William to assert Prussian leadership over the smaller German states was also apparent in the matter of Hesse­ Kassel. The Elector of Hesse-Kassel was faced with a recalcitrant local Diet that had refused to vote him taxation. The Elector with­ drew to Frankfurt and appealed to the reconstituted German Diet which Schwarzenberg, the new Austrian Chancellor, had feverishly been attempting to regenerate. The appeal of the Elector was a golden opportunity for Schwarzenberg to reassert Austrian influence in Germany. Troops were mobilised and the rebellion swiftly quelled. The isolation of Prussia was complete, since the Tsar as­ sured Schwarzenberg that if Prussia opposed the action carried out in Hesse-Kassel by Austria and her new-found allies, Bavaria and Wurttemburg, then Russia would be prepared to provide military support for the counter-revolution ( 1 1 1 ). The case of Hesse-Kassel, like that of Schleswig-Holstein, dem­ onstrates the impotence of Prussia in international affairs at this time and the innate conservatism of Frederick William IV. If the pendu­ lum had been swinging in favour of Prussia during the 1840s, it began rapidly swinging back in favour of Austria during 1849 and 1850. By the latter year, with the agreements at Olmutz, Austrian recovery was assured. Prussia accepted the dissolution of the Erfurt Union and agreed to the restoration of the Bund under the terms of the Federal Act of 1815 which reasserted the basis of Austrian pri­ macy in German affairs. Schwarzenberg had won a famous victory and succeeded in virtually putting the clock back. Although later history showed this victory to be temporary, it was nonetheless a humiliating defeat for Prussia and marked the extinction of the flame of liberal nationalism. The revolution failed because there was no common ground among the revolutionaries. On the one hand the artisans, workers 87

1848: The Year o f Revolution

and peasants were untouched by the abstractions of middle-class liberalism. On the other, the German bourgeoisie, petrified by the uprisings of workers in March 1848 and the even more radical outbreaks in Elberfeld and the Rhineland generally in May 1849, gravitated instinctively to the side of property and order (118). The revolution was also unable to produce any leaders of enduring sub­ stance. Almost all those who participated in the assemblies lacked political experience; and before a year was out the ‘“ trees of liberty” planted by them had withered away’ (37). At the same time it should be remembered that there were so many different locations of revolutionary activity - Berlin, Frankfurt, Vienna —that it was extremely difficult for the revolutionaries to co-operate in any con­ certed way. Yet the ultimate reason for the failure of the revolution was that German society was both intensely hierarchical (118) and ‘deeply conservative in structure and outlook’ (111). The middle class was still numerically small and this explains, in part, the ti­ midity of German liberalism. It certainly explains the ease with which the counter-revolution was able to reassert the rule of the princes.

10

T h e Ita lia n Peninsula

The revolutions in Italy began in January 1848. On 3 January the first clashes between the Milanese and the Austrian garrison took place. At Leghorn in Tuscany there was an uprising on 6 January led by the democrats La Cecilia, Fabrizi and Guerazzi*. This was, in fact, the climax of a long period of social and political unrest which had been rumbling from September 1847 onwards (170). Between 12 and 27 January there was an uprising in Palermo, to which Ferdinand II responded on the 29th by granting constitu­ tional concessions. In Tuscany the Grand Duke Leopold issued a constitution and appointed Ridolfi and Serristori, leading liberals, to government posts. Thus, revolution had already made con­ siderable headway on the peninsula even before Louis Philippe abdicated in France. This helps to strengthen the argument that the revolutions were caused by broad-scale factors that were working at a European level and were not dependent, therefore, in every case, on the formative example of the French. There are three main themes to be considered in the Italian rev­ olutions. Firstly, there was the revolution against Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia which escalated into a war involving the other Italian states; secondly, a general demand for a more liberal and in some cases more democratic form of government in individual states; and thirdly, urban craftsmen and workers (and to a lesser extent the profoundly oppressed peasantry) hoped to bring about a social revolution. Taking the social revolution first, it is important to recognise that the Italian economy was experiencing both growth and decay simul­ taneously. The peninsula possessed a relatively large number of urban centres, but apart from Milan and Turin, which had grown quite quickly in the first half of the nineteenth century, the other cities often exhibited the features of economic stagnation and decay. The populations of Venice and Palermo had actually fallen since the Restoration. In almost all Italian cities, whether growing or stag­ nating, economic life was structured around the activities of the petite bourgeoisie. In Genoa in 1838 there were 21,000 masters and 89

1848: The Year o f Revolution

apprentices, together with 64,000 shopkeepers and traders, out of a total of population of 114,000. The upper middle class of merchants and bankers, together with the urban intelligentsia, formed a small but visible elite. For the mass of the city populations, living standards generally declined in the decades after 1810 and the sanitary conditions of Italian cities were recognised as some of the worst in Europe: in Naples in the 1840s the life expectancy of those living in the central districts was only twenty-four years. In 1848 risings seem to have occurred in those cities where there was an acute physical separation between the social elite and the poor. Thus, wherever there was marked social zoning in residence patterns - in Palermo, Venice, Naples and Rome —there were revolutionary outbreaks. In Turin there was no popular uprising in 1848, and this has been attributed to the remarkable social cohesion that existed in the city where rich and poor could be found living in different apartments of the same building (172). Although the urban culture of Italy was extremely well developed, it should also be recognised that, of all the regions of Europe, with the exception of Russia and the Iberian peninsula, it had the largest proportion of its population still employed in agri­ culture. Conditions in agriculture are extremely important for understanding the initial discontents of 1848. Between 1820 and 1870 Italian agriculture endured a long crisis in which the 1840s was one of the most depressed decades. The Italian peasantry were largely untouched by the political programmes of the Risorgimento, but their economic condition encouraged them to acts of disorder, violence, riot and arson. Italian agriculture was strikingly inefficient (14, 173) and it was particularly vulnerable to foreign competition in the years immedi­ ately before 1848. At the same time there was considerable pressure to transform Italy’s basically feudal agricultural system into some­ thing that was much more recognisably capitalist. The most extensive changes had been wrought in the northern states of Pied­ mont, Lombardy and Venetia. But even here the two agricultural systems of feudalism and capitalism co-existed. For example, in the district of Bologna there were about 45,000 day labourers, known as braccianti, who worked for wages. There were also an equal num­ ber of peasant landholders or mezzadri, who were obliged to work a number of contractual days for local landowners. In the north­ western districts of the Dolomites, there was a class of peasant pro­ ducers, known as livello, who worked small plots on long-term leases. The peasants here produced potatoes, cereals and chestnuts as well 90

The Italian Peninsula

as wine, on a largely subsistence basis. In the m ore fertile areas of the V eneto m ore capitalist-style operations w ere carried out, such as the grow ing o f m ulb erry trees for silk p roduction. T h u s even in the developed no rth , there were a m u ltitu d e o f production m odes existing side by side and in some areas there were pockets o f p ro to ­ industry such as dom estic silk m anufacture, often carried o u t by peasant wom en. B ut in alm ost all regions, ag ricu ltu re alone was not strong enough to sustain p easan t life, and tem p o rary seasonal m i­ grations to the tow ns w ere becom ing a norm al p a rt of the p easan t experience. E m ploym ent in the building trades or on the co n struc­ tion o f the M ilan to V enice railw ay becam e an increasingly attractiv e altern ativ e to the m arginal n atu re o f life in the co u n try ­ side. P easan t grievances in L om bardy an d V en etia w ere m anifold resentm ent o f H ab sb u rg conscription and taxation was com pounded by the disastrous harvests o f 1845 and 1846. P easan t d iscontent had in fact been m o u n tin g th ro u g h o u t 1846 an d 1847, b u t H ab sb u rg ad m in istratio n was slow to respond, despite petitions from the V en ­ ice business com m unity to place an em bargo on g rain exports in M arch 1847 (163). T he extent of p riv atio n in the countryside was so great th at w hen the initial ou tb reak s of u n rest exploded a t the beginning of 1848 the peasants descended upon the provincial cities o f u p p er L om bardy, including C om o, M onza, Lecco an d Sondrio. A t M ilan, an A u strian officer in the garrison w rote th at ‘the city was su rro u n d ed by u p ­ roarious peasan ts who cam e ru n n in g in th eir th o u sands, shooting at the soldiers’ (quoted in 153). T h eir action was sp ontaneous an d was m otivated by a desire to drive the H a b sb u rg troops o u t an d to bring an end to H a b sb u rg tax atio n an d conscription (174). T h u s although the u rb a n classes were often the v an g u ard of the original revolution­ ary surge, the peasan ts were quick to come to the aid o f the townspeople. T h is was equally tru e in the south, w here ag ricu ltu re was extrem ely backw ard. In the Palerm o uprising, craftsm en were in the front line b u t p easants were quickly on the scene (172). C onditions in the countryside also rebounded upon the towns. V u ln erability to foreign com petition and org an isatio n al b ack w ard ­ ness m ean t th at ag ricu ltu ral products were subject to violent price fluctuations in u rb a n m arkets. In fact these price fluctuations were some o f the m ost extrem e in E urope. T h e price fluctuations at U d in e m arket w ere over 59 per cent betw een 1841 an d 1850 an d the total price fluctuation o f m aize was over 58 per cent (5), [d o c . 4]. In the Venice m ark et the price o f w heat alm ost doubled betw een 1845 and 1847 and the price o f m aize increased by 77 p er cent (174)

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[doc. 4b]. N atu rally enough there h ad been a n u m b er o f city riots d u rin g the 1840s an d these h ad increased in frequency betw een F eb ­ ru ary an d M arch 1847. T h ere h ad also been outbreaks o f Luddism * in R om e as well as d em ands from the T u scan p easants for a re d u c­ tion in the n u m b er o f th eir co n tractu al lab o u r days (9). B ut p erh ap s the m ost striking feature o f the towns was the grow ing division betw een the bourgeoisie o f m erch an ts an d trad ers on the one han d an d the craftsm en on the other. In L eghorn an uprising of workers was confronted by an essentially petit bourgeois civic gu ard (23); an d in N aples, although the bourgeoisie initially welcomed the uprising since it ad d ed im petus to th eir d em an d s for a constitution, they w ere quick to plead for the form ation o f a civic gu ard , a desire th at was, according to one contem porary, ‘b o rn o f the eternal diffi­ dence o f the ow ner tow ards the n on-ow ner’ (quoted in 172). T h e P apal States, too, experienced outbreaks o f w orker disco n ten t w here there was considerable poverty an d unem ploym ent. C o u n t T erenzio M am ian i’s governm ent, although ap p a ren tly com m itted to the es­ tab lish m en t o f p u blic w orkshops, was u n ab le to fund such projects. C onsequently, the w orkers o f Rom e established a n u m b er o f radical clubs d em an d in g higher taxation as a m eans of tackling poverty. J u s t like m any o f the F rench and G erm an workers, then, the Ita lia n workers an d peasan ts w ere m otivated by a com plex o f econom ic grievances. In the sh o rt ru n , the fact th a t their grievances did not coincide w ith those o f the m iddle classes did not m atter, as all the ‘traditio n al divisions an d parochial jealousies ap p eared to be su b ­ m erged by a general desire to evict the foreigner’ (172). In the long run, how ever, th e gap betw een bourgeois am b itio n a n d workerpeasan t hope was to lead to the d isintegration o f revolutionary unity. T u rn in g now to the question of political d em an d s, there w ere two sep arate b u t overlapping cam paigns. T h ere was d em an d for reform w ithin the in d iv id u al states, com bined w ith a dem an d to expel A us­ tria a n d unite the Ita lia n states. B oth m ovem ents em an ated from the u rb a n intelligentsia, an d w ithin the individual states there were both liberal and d em ocratic m ovem ents. L iberal reform m ovem ents existed in alm ost all the Italian states, b u t especially in the n o rth ern ones, w here there w as a w ell-developed m iddle class w ith e n tre­ p ren eu rial an d com m ercial interests. In L om bardy, the w ritings of C attan eo , a republican, were specifically addressed to the u rb a n bourgeoisie, a n d in P iedm ont the works o f B albo, D ’Azeglio* an d Petitti, all m o d erate reform ers, served to raise the hope o f co n stitu ­ tional reform. T h e asp iratio n s o f the m oderates h ad already received some 92

The Italian Peninsula

encouragem ent w ith the election o f Pope Pius IX in 1846. F or w h a t­ ever reasons Pius IX trod the p a th o f liberal reform w hen he succeeded G regory X V I, an d the effect o f his actions reverb erated th ro u g h o u t the length and b re ad th o f the peninsula. O n becom ing Pope, Pius ap p o in ted the liberal-m inded C ard in al Gizzi as S ecretary o f State. T h e press laws w ere relaxed an d subsequently a C ouncil o f State w ith secu lar representatives was allow ed to share pow er w ith the College o f C ard in als (30). W hen the C ouncil eventually m et in N ovem ber 1847, P ius’s caution ab o u t the forces he h ad in ad v er­ tently unleashed was already becom ing ap p a re n t an d he inform ed the new body th a t the council w ould ‘n o t d etract m inim ally from the sovereignty o f the pontificate’ (quoted in 172). But it was too late. L iberal hopes h ad been raised an d dem ocratic pressures w ere forcing governm ents elsew here on the pen in su la into m aking concessions. T h e dem ocrats had been active th ro u g h o u t the 1830s an d 1840s an d they h ad su p p o rt from every social class, even though th at su p p o rt was, in num erical term s, ra th e r sm all. Now, in the years after 1846, dem ocratic radicals could seek su p p o rt am ong u rb an craftsm en an d bourgeois intellectuals as well as from ru ral peasants in such areas as B asilicata, C alab ria and R o m ag n a (165). T h u s, w hen the Pope m ade his vital concessions, he b ro u g h t ab o u t dem ands for reform s elsew here. In ultra-conservative T u scan y , the m oderate reform ers w ere in dan g er o f losing ‘control o f a situ atio n they them selves h ad created ’ (172). Such was the excitem ent en ­ gendered by this b o u t o f P apal liberalism th a t R adetzky*, com m ander o f the A u strian forces in V enetia, frightened by its im ­ plications, ord ered the occupation o f the city o f F e rra ra even though it lay inside the P ap al States. T h e Pope appealed to C harles A lbert, the K ing o f P iedm ont, for protection. T h e actions o f this enigm atic ru ler are interesting. H e was the last m o n arch on the pen in su la to g ran t a co n stitution an d he was not disposed to accept liberal reform or any d ilution o f his personal pow er. O n the o th er h an d , he was am bitious for P iedm ontese aggran d isem en t and, unlike Frederick W illiam IV o f Prussia, he was p rep ared , ultim ately, to m ake w ar on A ustria. C harles A lb ert’s willingness to confront the A u strian s m ade him , tem porarily, the ch am pion o f the p atrio ts, ju s t as the Pope h ad b e­ come the ch am pion o f the liberals. A t this stage events in L o m b ard y an d V enetia w ere decisive. In M ilan an d V enice it h ad been w orkers and craftsm en who had started the revolution (163, 172), w ith the arsenal w orkers in V enice playing a decisive role (163, 174). T h e leaderships o f these two revolutions were, however, ra th e r

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indecisive. In M ilan, C attan eo , a republican, becam e the leading m em ber o f the revolutionary com m ittee and he h ad , a t first, d o u b ted the w isdom o f fighting the A u strian garrison (30). H e was to be surprised by events, since on 22 M arch R adetzky* decided to evac­ uate the city and w ith d raw his troops to the fortresses o f the Q uadrilateral*. T h e m oderates in M ilan now pressed for Piedmontese intervention, ‘not only ag ain st the A ustrians, b u t ag ain st the violent revolutionary elem ents in their ow n city’ (30). C harles A lbert p re­ varicated an d this w as due, for th e m ost p art, to his conservative n ature, as he did not wish to be identified w ith the revolution. N ev­ ertheless, the pressure o f liberal nationalism , not only in L o m b ard y b u t also from his own m inisters, principally C avour, was so great th at C h arles A lb ert resolved in favour of m ilitary intervention. Even now, how ever, he insisted on the holding of a plebiscite to secure L om bard acceptance o f his leadership (169). T h e L o m b ard m o d er­ ates w ere agreeable an d the plebiscite was duly held on 12 M ay 1848. C a ttan eo and the rep u b lican dem ocrats w ere now com pletely isolated. C attan eo h ad hankered for the form ation o f an in d ep en d en t L om bard rep u b lic th a t w ould eventually becom e a m em ber of a federated Ita lia n state: ‘Italy is physically an d historically federal­ ist,’ he claim ed. H e also believed th at F rench su p p o rt w ould be forthcom ing, b u t he had not reckoned w ith the cau tio n of L am a rtin e and the Provisional G overnm ent in Paris. L am a rtin e had already m ade the non-interventionist position of the Second R epublic clear in his M anifesto to Europe (see above, pp. 5 6 -7 ). T h e plebiscite in L om bardy recorded a m ajority in favour of fusion w ith P iedm ont and accep tan ce o f C harles A lb ert’s leadership. In V enice events h ad already taken a decisive tu rn . W orkers in the arsen al h ad rioted an d killed the p ro prietor, M arinovich, and on 22 M arch D aniele M anin* h ad declared V enice a republic. T h e revolution, initially, seem ed to sweep everything before it, gaining the su p p o rt o f all classes including the clergy; even the B ishop of P ad u a advocated taking up arm s ag ain st the A ustrian s (163). H ow ­ ever, as at M ilan , the governm ent o f the V en etian R epublic was m ade up o f bourgeois m oderates (172). It was not surprising, th ere­ fore, th a t the new V enetian governm ent looked for su p p o rt from P iedm ont, especially once the A ustrians h ad m o u n ted a naval block­ ade ag ain st V enice itself. In P iedm ont C harles A lbert was unen th u siastically associating h im self w ith the natio n al cause for fear th a t the rad ical forces m ight subsum e the revolution or th at the F rench m ight intervene on b eh alf of the L o m b ard s. It was against this background th a t he em barked

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on the m ilitary cam paign against A ustria. T h e w ar tu rn ed o u t to be a disaster, for C harles A lb ert’s arm y was poorly led an d badly supplied (169). M oreover, the political divisions o f Italy becam e ap p aren t as early as A pril w hen the Pope refused to su p p o rt the w ar, and this com pleted the ‘disillusion o f the p atrio ts’ (30). In p artic u la r it discredited G ioberti* and those who had advocated a federalist Italy u n d e r the presidency o f the Pope. T h e P ope’s declaratio n was effectively the first blow for the counter-revolution as it inspired the K ing o f the T w o Sicilies, F erd in an d , to repossess his capital city, N aples, by m ilitary force. H e still accepted the co n stitution b u t he abolished the C ivic G u ard and called his troops back from the n o rth of Italy in o rd e r to begin the reconquest of the island o f Sicily. T h u s even before the first m ajor m ilitary en co u n ter of the w ar at C ustozza in Ju ly 1848, su p p o rt for the w ar o f liberation was breaking up. M eanw hile the A ustrians had begun a recovery. W indischgratz, the H a b sb u rg co m m an d er in B ohem ia, h ad regained control of Prague in J u n e an d this m ade it possible to send reinforcem ents to R adetzky*. T h e consequence o f C h arles A lb ert’s p ro crastin atio n was now to becom e clear. H e had m issed the o p p o rtu n ity to take a d v a n ­ tage o f R ad etzk y ’s w eakened arm y w hilst it was in retreat; now it had been reinforced w ith a fu rth er 30,000 m en. I t should n o t be thought, how ever, th at R adetzky’s suppression o f the L om bardoV enetian revolution and the defeat o f P iedm ont was a one-sided affair. T h e H ab sb u rg s rem ained in a state of u n certain ty , and H u m m elau er, the H a b sb u rg n eg o tiato r w ith B ritain, was still seek­ ing, rig h t up u n til J u n e , to gain B ritain ’s co-operation as a m ediator. H um m elau er, w ith the backing o f the H ab sb u rg C o u rt, suggested the possibility o f some m easure o f au tonom y for L o m b ard y and V enetia (44). B ut the suppression o f the revolt in P rague stiffened the resolve of the H ab sb u rg C ourt, a n d the conciliatory H u m m elau er was replaced by the m uch to ugher W essenberg. By 1 J u ly the C o u rt h ad com e to accep t the need to ‘prosecute the w ar in Italy an d leave its outcom e to be settled in the field’ (148). R adetzky* now engaged the Ita lia n forces along a line from Rivoli to M a n tu a an d after several days o f fighting defeated C harles A lb ert’s arm y a t C ustozza (23—27 J u ly ). T his victory dem o n strated ‘even m ore clearly th an Prague th a t so long as the governm ents could rely on th eir arm ies they could sooner or later m aster the forces of u p h eav al’ (30). R adetzky was now able to m o u n t a com plete counter-revolution in L om bardy. W hen the revolution in M ilan h ad originally eru p te d in J a n u a ry , L o m b ard p easants h ad ru shed to the city in su p p o rt an d were eager to jo in the C ivic G u ard . T h e city

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authorities, largely bourgeois m o derates fearful o f disorder, locked them o u t o f the city. R adetzky* was now able to capitalise on these latent social divisions, a n d on 11 N ovem ber he an n o u n ced th a t the A u strian au th o rities w ould raise an ex trao rd in ary levy from those who h ad actively su p p o rted the revolution, as a kind o f indem nity. This so-called ‘w a r-tax ’ w ould have h ad the effect of exposing the urb an rev o lu tio n ary activists, especially when the m ilitary governor of M ilan, C o u n t W im pffen, g ran ted an am nesty to all those who were b ehaving w ith ‘political p ro p riety ’. T h e revolutionary govern­ m ent o f M ilan was now beginning to lose confidence in face o f the H a b sb u rg counter-revolution. T h e victory o f the H ab sb u rg s at C ustozza did not by any m eans bring the revolution to an end. In d eed , in some q u arte rs the defeat had the effect o f intensifying dem ocratic and rad ical pressure. In G enoa a n d Bologna, especially, su p p o rt for rep u blicanism was still strong, a n d in T u scan y an d the P apal States d em ocratic agitation led to the collapse o f the m o d erate governm ent o f C ap p o n i on 12 O cto b er. T h is m ark ed the ‘first success o f the d em ocrats in b reak ­ ing the m o d erate m onopoly o f political pow er in the m onarchical states’ (1 7 2 ). T h e new rep u b lican governm ent included G uerazzi*, leader o f th e revolutionary m ovem ent in L eghorn w here there had been a m ajo r d em ocratic uprising betw een 25 A ugust an d 4 S eptem ­ ber. In R om e, the assassination o f the m oderate politician Pellegrino Rossi p ersu ad ed the Pope to flee th e city, w hich now fell u n d er the control o f th e dem ocrats. A new provisional governm ent accepted a plan to elect a co n stitu en t assem bly, an d w hen the elections were held in J a n u a ry 1849 the republicans gained an overall m ajority. T he R o m an R epublic was proclaim ed in F eb ru ary 1849. R om e now becam e the centre-stage o f Italian politics. M azzini* had re tu rn ed to the city and the republicans sought to un ite w ith T uscany, b u t G uerazzi* was facing great difficulty in m ain tain in g control o f Florence. R epublicanism was now becom ing increasingly isolated, a n d w ith the defeat o f the Piedm ontese forces a t N o v arra in M arch 1849 the F lo rentine nobility called for the resto ratio n of the G ra n d D uke Leopold. In the south, F e rd in a n d ’s troops h ad re­ occupied P alerm o on 15 M ay 1849. T h e A u strian re-co n q u est was now only a m a tte r o f tim e. T h e possibility o f an A u strian foray into the P apal S tates p ro m p ted Louis N apoleon, P resident o f the F rench R epublic, to act pre-em ptively. I f the N apoleonic legend w as to be revived, th en F ran ce w ould have to overthrow the V ien n a S ettle­ m ent a n d this could p artly be achieved by blocking A u stria on the peninsula. G en eral C avaignac h ad already stationed 3500 F rench

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troops at M arseille in D ecem ber 1848, b u t it was eventually troops under the co m m and o f G eneral O u d in o t th a t w ere d esp atch ed to Rome at the end o f A pril, an d the R om an R epublic was b ro u g h t to an end in J u n e 1849. It has usually been argued th a t Louis N apoleon was guided by a desire to acquire clericalist su p p o rt at hom e by being seen to be the defender o f the papacy (63, 65). W h e th e r this was the case, or w h eth er he feared A u strian ascendancy, is n o t clear, but the effect was decisive: it all b u t drew the cu rta in on th e revol­ u tionary episode. O nly V enice rem ain ed in rep u b lican hands, b u t it h ad been u n d er tight blockade since J u ly 1848. W hen the city cap itu lated on 22 A ugust 1849, th e rad ical phase o f the revolution was at an end. T he V en etians h ad failed because o f the resilience an d ten acity of R adetzky*, an d once G eneral N u g en t h ad regained control of V erona in M ay then the days o f the V enetian R epublic w ere n u m ­ bered. B ut its collapse was not due sim ply to the fact th a t th e forces o f the counter-revolution were so d u rab le. T h e bourgeois m em bers o f M a n in ’s* rep u b lican governm ent were so keen to avoid radical extrem ism th a t they resisted attem p ts to form a com m ittee o f public safety. M an in h im self was too tim id to be an effective leader, and his governm ent d id n othing to alleviate the privations th a t existed in the countryside. T h e abolition o f the salt tax was the only social m easure taken. All the rep u b lican leaders —G uerazzi* in T u scan y , M azzini* in R om e an d M an in in V enice - w ere d em ocratic theorists. All o f them w ere fearful o f m ob rule and they w ere as determ in ed as their predecessors, the liberal constitutionalists, to m ain tain p u b ­ lic o rd er a n d the defence o f property. A com bination o f tim idity and political inexperience p rep ared the gro u n d for th eir failure, a n d in the last reso rt m ilitary pow er provided the coup de grace (30). After his defeat a t N o v arra, C harles A lbert ab d icated from the throne o f P iedm ont. H is successor quickly re-established royal a u ­ thority. T h e n atio n al cause had inspired the nobility a n d th e m iddle classes b u t it h ad failed to cap tu re the im aginations o f th e p easants and the u rb a n artisan s whose identification w ith the revolution had only been a short-lived affair. T hese in h eren t social divisions, com ­ bined w ith the defence o f the status quo by B ritain a n d F rance, enabled the H ab sb u rg s to recover their confidence an d crush the revolution.

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Part Four:

Assessments and Consequences

I f a survey for a political m ap o f E urope h ad been carried o u t in 1845 and then rep eated ten years later it w ould have revealed few differences. N ot surprisingly, therefore, some historians have re­ garded the 1848 revolutions as failures, and have consequently focused th eir atten tio n on finding explanations for their lack o f suc­ cess. T h e general conclusion has been th at the revolutionaries failed to capitalise on th eir o p p ortunities, because they were too idealistic and inexperienced (37, 128). R elated to this general conclusion is the view th a t the 1848 revolutions in some way arrested or retard ed the n a tu ra l course of history. T h is view derives su p p o rt from the fact th a t w ithin tw enty years or so m any o f the aim s o f the revol­ utionaries h ad been realised — Italy and G erm an y were u nited and F rance becam e a republic. T o reg ard the 1848 revolutions as an u n fo rtu n ate episode in an otherw ise uniform m arch tow ards liberal governm ent does not help the stu d en t w ho wishes to u n d ersta n d why the revolutions failed. Some h isto rian s have attrib u te d failure to diffidence and weakness am ong the revolutionaries, an d this has led them to stress the ‘accid en tal’ qu ality o f the revolutions (65). H ad the forces o f o rd er shown m ore d eterm in atio n , h ad Frederick W illiam IV been sane (128), h ad Pius IX been typical o f popes, then events w ould not have conspired to produce revolutions. T h e weakness o f the forces o f order, they argue, served to create a pow er vacuum in w hich the revolutionaries p arad ed w ith th eir flags and the liberal law yers d e­ bated u n til such tim e as conservative forces reasserted them selves. T h ere is m uch in this view since, w ith the exception o f France, B avaria, the P apal States an d T u scany, the existing governm ents were not actu ally deposed. Y et the weakness o f the forces o f o rd er cannot be explained purely in term s o f the frailty o f certain individ­ uals. I f such an ex planation is to be pu rsu ed , then the lim p acceptance o f events by Louis Philippe should be stressed, along w ith the ageing o f M ettern ich an d possibly the arrogance o f Lola M ontez in B avaria. Such explanations hinge too m uch on individ­ uals, an d rely on the notion o f ‘accid en t’. F u rth erm o re, it should be

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pointed out th a t the w eakness o f individual rulers was m irrored in the revolutionary cam p. T h e revolutions did not produce a single politician o f inspired genius, leadership, single-m inded d eterm in a­ tion or ruthless cruelty. T h ere were no Crom w ells, no R obespierres, no Lenins. All this d eb ate is ultim ately unhelpful. A m ore productive line of exam ination m ay be to consider the geographical extent o f the revolutions an d the com m on experiences of the affected area. A use­ ful prelim inary is to establish w hich countries were not affected by the revolutions. G enerally speaking it was those countries on the extrem e fringes o f E urope th at w ere least affected. B ritain was a case in point: ad m itted ly there was a large C h artist d em o n stratio n in London, b u t it was a tam e affair com pared w ith the d eterm ined violence th at h ad m arked the m ovem ent in the early 1840s. In the extrem e east, R ussia was unaffected and even found tim e to suppress revolutionary activity outside her im m ediate territory, in the H a b s­ burg lands an d W allachia. T h e S candinavian countries were unaffected, an d in the south events in Sicily were o f an extrem ely local character. O f the countries least affected, B ritain, a n d to a lesser extent Belgium , w ere very advanced in in d u strial term s; at the o th er extrem e, R ussia was extrem ely backw ard, in fact largely feudal. W ithin the cen tral area o f E urope affected by the revolutions it is probably fair to say th a t F rance, G erm any, n o rth ern Italy and to a lesser extent the H a b sb u rg lands displayed the features o f in ­ du strial progress an d econom ic backw ardness. All these regions were still prone to an ag ricu ltu ral crisis o f the trad itio n al type, nam ely a food shortage. F u rth er, they were becom ing prone to the financial cycles consistent w ith the developm ent o f capitalism which involved o v erproduction problem s. T h e case o f B ritain is instructive here because B ritain had experienced an in d u strial depression be­ tween 1838 an d 1842. T h e co n tin en t did not experience such a crisis until 1846-49 a n d this coincided w ith a food crisis. It was the last tim e th a t E urope was to experience such a catastro p h ic food sh o rt­ age, b u t it was m ade all the m ore serious by a new in d u strial crisis. B ritain ’s econom y, on the o th er h an d , was alread y on the u p tu rn by 1846. O bviously these econom ic difficulties alone do n o t explain the revolutions. Political disco n ten t m ust also have been present. Significantly, b oth B ritain an d Belgium h ad been able to m ake timely concessions to the politically conscious layers o f society - the m iddle classes — im m ediately before 1848 (see above, pp. 18—19). Given the coincidence o f two different types o f econom ic crisis (17), it is necessary to consider the role o f different social classes. In

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Assessments and Consequences

F rance the dissatisfaction of the bourgeoisie w ith the railw ay policies of G u izo t’s* governm ent is clear enough. Elsew here, the d eterm in a­ tion o f the m iddle class, especially in G erm any, to stave off the th rea t of social revolution from the low er classes, was an indication not only o f differing interests b u t also o f the fact th a t the econom ic crisis of 1846—47 affected different classes in different ways. As econom ic privations ab ated , so any cohesion th a t the revolutionaries m ight have h ad began to disintegrate. T his is ab u n d a n tly clear in central E urope, w here the p easan try lost interest in the revolution once the m ore oppressive features o f the feudal system h ad been rem oved. In the H a b sb u rg lands the peasants seem to have rem ained passive when W indischgratz subdued P rague and later besieged V ienna. In L om bardy the p easan try welcomed R ad etzk y ’s* retu rn , pro b ab ly feeling th at the M ilanese liberals h ad done n othing to deal w ith the econom ic problem s of the countryside. In F rance the role o f the p easan try is less clear. A lthough there is m uch to be said for the arg u m en t th at the Second R epublic did nothing for the p easan try except im pose the h ated 45-centim e tax (18), it cannot be said th a t the F rench p easan try stood exclusively on the side o f conservatism an d trad itio n al o rd er as represented by Louis N apoleon. T h e peasan try w ere divided and there was consid­ erable p ea san t resistance to the coup d ’etat o f D ecem ber 1851 (79,

101 ). U ltim ately, the m ost serious social divisions th a t th reaten ed the fabric o f society m anifested them selves in the tow ns an d the cities. T his was clearly dem o n strated in Paris in J u n e 1848 an d in V ienna in O ctober. In the G erm an states too, m iddle-class fears o f the d a n ­ ger o f fu rth er social revolution drove them to policies o f m oderation so th a t at least they m ight ap p e ar to be the legitim ate heirs of the governm ents of the princes. In F rance republicans w ere also inclined to p u rsu e cautious policies and this was exhibited in L am a rtin e’s obsession w ith foreign policy. H e hoped to lay the ghost o f w ar and N apoleonic expansion. T his caution was also revealed in the p ed ­ an tic legalism o f the F ran k fu rt A ssem bly. T h e w orking-class m ove­ m ents and the organisations o f the rad ical left w ere not, a t this time, sufficiently well developed to force social an d political changes in their favour. It is such divisions o f interest, betw een the respectable m iddle class an d the tradesm en on the one h an d an d the craftsm en and w orkers on the other, th at provide the cen tral ex planation of the long-term failure of the revolutions. W hen these revolutions first broke out, the different expectations o f the various social an d polit­ ical groupings did not m atter. As they progressed, however, so the

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different expectations becam e divisive, an d once the cohesion o f the revolutionary groups h ad been im paired the way was open to counter-revolution. T he revolutions failed not ju s t because o f social conflicts. T h ey also failed because o f the policies pursu ed by B ritain an d Russia. B ritish and R ussian opposition to P ru ssia’s attem p ted take-over of Schlesw ig-H olstein helped to discredit P russia in the eyes o f the liberal-nationalists a t F rankfurt. F u rth er, B ritain ’s diffident policies in relation to Italy ultim ately facilitated A u stria’s revival on the pen­ insula. B ritish diplom acy was directed tow ards the m ain ten an ce of the status quo in E urope, a n d in this sense A u stria was B ritain ’s fac­ totum in con tin en tal affairs. P erhaps, too, B ritain could not openly su p p o rt Italian claim s for independence because such action m ight have encouraged Irish nationalism (19, 44). It was ironic, then, th at although the success o f the B ritish m iddle-class reform ers in 1846 h ad encouraged the B anqueteers an d the D ynastic O pposition* in France, B ritish diplom acy was still b en t on the p reservation o f o rd er an d stability in E urope. T h is was the p arad o x of the B ritish position - a socially an d politically advanced state w hich tended to ally itself w ith the forces o f o rd er an d reaction. R u ssia’s position was m ore straightforw ard. H er assistance to A u stria in suppressing the M agyar revolution stem m ed from an unw avering adherence to the principles o f dynasticism and a fear th a t revolution in territories so close to her own frontiers m ight encourage sim ilar m ovem ents am ong her own disaffected subjects, principally the Poles (175,

177). Following on from the reaction ag ain st the revolutions, there grew up in su b sequent decades a m ore successful form of au th o ritaria n governm ent in F rance, P russia an d the H a b sb u rg m onarchy. In F rance N apoleon I I I was able to achieve a degree o f political m an ipulation a n d control th at was all the m ore su rprising since he allowed universal m ale suffrage. T h e use o f a dem ocratic franchise for essentially conservative purposes was in its own way revolution­ ary because, before 1848, those w ho h ad advocated universal suffrage had done so in the belief th a t it would deliver th eir societies from the whim s o f m onarchs and au to crats. O n the o th er h an d , it could be argued th a t the establishm ent o f universal suffrage was one o f the positive gains o f the 1848 revolutions. P erhaps Louis N apoléon was aw are of the need to recognise the d em an d s o f 1848. T h e regim e m ade sure, though, th rough the control o f the prefecture, th a t the first p arliam en t o f the Second E m pire reflected the interests o f the B o n ap artist cause (84). It was not a p u p p et p arliam en t, b u t it was

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not designed to cause too m any difficulties for the E m peror. In P russia the resurgence of m onarchical pow er achieved by Bis­ m arck and W illiam I was never seriously challenged. T h e way in which B ism arck, who was not a m odern politician com m anding the su p p o rt o f a pressu re g roup or a p arty , flouted the p arliam en tary constitution o f Prussia, created dangerous precedents for G erm an history in the tw entieth century. B ism arck was often im p atien t with p arliam en tary w ays, although he was m ost solicitous tow ards m onarchs; he was by inclination and train in g a courtier. N evertheless, like Louis N apoléon, he recognised the value o f the ap p earan ce o f p arliam en tary governm ent so long as conservative p atro n ag e and control w ere retained. B oth regim es revealed som ething th at m ust have been depressing for older generations o f dem ocrats. T h e achievem ent o f p arlia m e n ta ry dem ocracy did not radically change society as h ad been expected. In d eed , b o th G erm an and F rench society retain ed a m arked social h ierarchy despite concessions to political dem ocracy. T h e co n tin u atio n of such social hierarchies a n d th e econom ic inequality on w hich they w ere based was a lesson th a t the m idnineteenth-century generation o f socialists did not forget. In fact, the 1848 revolutions destroyed the idealistic, alm ost m ystical, belief th at universal suffrage w ould bring w ith it social equality. Socialists were already critical o f such a social-political eq u atio n an d they could take som e academ ic satisfaction from the events o f J u n e 1848. T h e 1.848 revolutions m ay have helped to establish a link betw een the social conscience o f intellectuals an d the condition o f the poorer classes. In the case o f socialist intellectuals the 1848 revolutions strengthened th eir belief th at revolution was the scientific an d only logical outcom e o f historical change. F or them , revolution was not, as it was to liberals, blind, illogical, destructive violence. T h u s the 1848 revolutions provided political violence and conflict w ith a new intellectual credence and vitality. If P russia a n d F rance m anaged to establish a new successful a u th o ritarian ism , this was less th an true in the H a b sb u rg Em pire. A dm ittedly the dy n astic ideal had been invested w ith new life in the person o f F ranz-Josef, b u t the revival of the m o narchy in the H a b s­ burg E m pire was not to prove so d u rab le. U ltim ately the H ab sburgs were forced to accede to the d em an d s for a m easure o f H u n g arian autonom y in 1867. N evertheless the tem p o rary revival o f the m on­ archy p u t an end to any liberal notions o f a state th a t united all G erm an-speaking peoples. T his m ay not have been im m ediately a p ­ p aren t, for in the short ru n the H ab sb u rg ascendancy over the

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H ohenzollerns, as dem o n strated at O lm utz, w ould have seem ed to suggest the possibility o f the co n tinuation o f A u strian influence in G erm an affairs. In the long run, however, P russia triu m p h ed over A ustria a t Sadow a in 1866, w ith the result th at A u stria was banished from G erm an affairs forever. T h e victory of P russia at Sadow a was only one event in the political redefinition o f central E urope betw een 1861 an d 1866. It m eant th a t A u stria was excluded from those two areas - the Italian peninsula and the G erm an states —th a t h ad m ade her so pow erful since the S ettlem ent of 1815. C onsequently, in a search to recover lost prestige, the H ab sb u rg s tu rn ed aw ay from central E urope, seeking com pensation instead in the B alkans. E ven­ tually this was to m ean a clash w ith Russia. If, in those states w hich could be regarded as traditio n ally pow ­ erful - F rance, Prussia, A ustria - a m ore successful au th o ritaria n form o f governm ent was established, then the kingdom of Piedm ont persevered w ith constitutional m onarchy. A lthough C harles A lbert had been re lu c tan t to ad o p t constitutional ways, his successor, V ic­ tor E m m anuel II , was m ore ready to accept constitutionalism . T his enabled the Piedm ontese state to accom m odate a grow ing com m er­ cial m iddle class, which in tu rn was able to harn ess P ied m o n t’s econom ic ascendancy to unite the rem ain d er o f the peninsula. In this respect the role of P iedm ont in the unification o f Italy was sim i­ lar to the role played by Prussia in G erm any. T h e sim ilarity does not end there, for in m any ways C avour, the Prim e M in ister o f P ied­ m ont after the fall o f D ’Azeglio*, ap p ro ach ed the problem o f the unification o f Italy in the sam e m an n er th at B ism arck tackled the question in G erm any. B oth recognised the im p o rtan ce o f a m an ip u ­ lation of the b alance o f pow er in E urope in o rd er to achieve specific national ends. C avour realised th at Italian unification could only be achieved with outside help, w hich in the event was to come from F rance. O nly then could A u stria be expelled from the Italian peninsula. From C av o u r’s p o in t o f view this was a m ilitary an d strategic consider­ ation, b u t for the historian it d em onstrates th at the causes o f the 1848 revolutions are to be found not only in deeply em bedded social an d econom ic problem s, or even in political causes p ecu liar to in d i­ vidual states, b u t also in the b ro ad er political question o f the n atu re o f the S ettlem ent o f 1815. G iven th a t the statesm en at V ienna h ad tried to provide a settlem ent for th e whole o f E urope, based on the principle o f legitim ism an d denying the asp iratio n s o f the n atio n ali­ ties, then the 1848 revolutions have an in tern atio n al coherence. T h e liberal n atio n alists who were active im m ediately before 1848 had not

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especially ap p reciated this in tern atio n al dim ension, w ith the poss­ ible exception o f Palacky, whose attem p ts to restrain C zech n atio n ­ alism, w hich was only a stra n d in a m ore general Slav nationalism , were derived from an ap p reciatio n o f the significance o f the balance of power, an d specifically a fear o f R ussian expansion [doc. 2c], T he revolutionaries o f 1848 were u n ab le to change the b alance of pow er an d so th eir political asp iratio n s were placed in a straitjack et th at confined them to aim ing for specific natio n al autonom ies w ith ­ out considering the ways in w hich these new n atio n states w ould relate to one an o th er. In the h ands o f the p o st-1848 g eneration of nationalists, how ever, notably B ism arck and C avour, nationalism was n o th in g if it did not m an ip u late the balance o f power. N ationalism did not fade aw ay after the defeats o f 1848, b u t it did change its style. Before 1848 nationalism , beyond the xenophobia and patriotism created in w ar, was, as a coherent body o f ideas, largely the possession o f an u rb a n m iddle-class intelligentsia. T hey sought to provide a new an d n ational basis for governm ent th a t was estab­ lished by consent betw een the people or the nation on the one hand, and the ruler or rulers on the other. Finding justification for their ideas in history, lite ratu re a n d elite culture, these m iddle-class p ro p ­ agandists h ad en deavoured to produce ratio n al arg u m en ts for a reconstitution o f the governm ents o f E urope on national and liberal principles. A fter 1848, however, nationalism becam e an in stru m en t used by conservative politicians to justify the continuation o f m on­ archical pow er an d to prom ote war. Above all, nationalism proved a powerful force for reconciling the internal class conflicts of the state. Its m ost skilful exponent was Bism arck who, by a series of patriotic wars, dispossessed the intellectuals of their academ ic and rational nationalism , m aking it po p u lar, chauvinistic an d aggressive. T h e n ationalism o f B ism arck was not the nationalism o f M azzini*. T h e new n atio n alism o f central E urope, represented prim arily by G erm an natio n alism a n d to a lesser extent by Ita lia n nationalism , was d istin ctly illiberal. I t was a nationalism th a t becam e overtly racial in ch aracter. A dm ittedly, there had been cases o f xenophobic nationalism before 1848 a n d there h ad also been pseudo-scientific claims for the superiority o f certain racial groups over others. It was not u n til after 1848, however, th a t the scientific arg u m en ts becam e m ore pow erful in their persuasiveness. In 1855 Alfred G obineau had published his w ork on the n a tu ra l inequality of races, and his su b ­ m issions w ere given a deeper cutting edge by the a p p a re n t conclusions o f D arw in ian biology. C onsequently, alth o u g h the d e­ velopm ent was not a sim ple m atter, there arose the view th a t the

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only viable form o f state was one th a t was at least linguistically hom ogeneous if not racially ‘p u re ’. U ltim ately the survival o f the m u ltinational em pires was a t stake, since a reorganisation o f the states o f E u ro p e on a n atio n al basis seem ed, on scientific an d m oral grounds, inevitable. In term s o f p ractical politics, the new racial nationalism engendered a G erm anic h atred of Slavism . An in stan ce of this h atre d was seen m uch later in B ism arck’s policy tow ards the Poles of eastern P russia d u rin g the K u ltu rk a m p f in the 1880s. B ut in the long term the logic o f the new nationalism spelt o u t the g reatest d anger to one g ro u p — E u ro p ean Jew ry . In in tern atio n al term s, n ationalism was to redraw the m ap o f E u ­ rope. T his w ould not have been im m ediately a p p a re n t to a casual observer living in 1850. I t w ould have seem ed th a t the agreem ent a t O lm utz betw een A u stria and P russia had effectively revived the Settlem ent o f 1815 and at the sam e tim e revived the statu s o f A us­ tria. T his was not so. A u stria ’s revival was illusory. T h e survival of the H a b sb u rg m on arch y owed m ore to individuals — R adetzky*, W indischgratz, Schw arzenberg, F ra n z -J o s e f- th an to any revitalis­ ation o f the system o f governm ent. M ore telling was the fact th a t the H ab sb u rg s h ad only m anaged to defeat the H u n g arian s w ith the assistance o f R ussia. C oupled w ith this, it should be rem em bered th at the E u ro p ean governm ents largely accepted the coup d ’état of Louis N apoléon in F rance, w hich m ean t th a t the S ettlem ent o f 1815 h ad been im plicitly rejected (36), [doc. la]. U ltim ately this w ould open the way to the dem ise of the H ab sb u rg Em pire. T he econom ic consequences of the 1848 revolutions are n o t easy to tabulate. E conom ic progress is easy enough to discern, since the tw enty-year period after the revolutions was a tim e o f un p reced en ted economic grow th. T h e early m arks o f expansion w hich had featured in the B ritish an d Belgian econom ies were now extended to F ran ce and the cen tral E u ro p ean countries. Even B ritain, w hich h ad en­ joyed su stain ed grow th before 1848, enjoyed yet g reater econom ic progress in the years after 1820 (23). T h ere is a danger, how ever, in a ttrib u tin g these developm ents directly to the 1848 revolutions. O bviously the breakdow n o f old institutional barriers a n d old custom s facilitated econom ic grow th: for instance, the expansion o f V ienna from 444,000 in h ab itan ts in 1850 to 726,000 in 1880 owed m uch to the im m igration o f people from o th er p arts o f the E m pire. Such m ig ratio n w ould not have been possible b u t for the abolition of feudal restrictions in the year o f revolution. In Prussia, too, the last vestiges o f feudalism were abolished by royal decree in 1850 an d all rem aining dues were tran slated into m oney rents. L arge nu m b ers

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of peasan ts (640,000) w ere able in tim e to buy th eir own plots. In ­ stitutional reform designed to facilitate econom ic developm ent was one o f the stro n g er trends to em erge in the years after 1848. In P ied­ m ont the level of econom ic progress was high, an d this was fostered by the new liberal governm ents o f D ’Azeglio* an d C avour. Even in the K ingdom o f the T w o Sicilies, which rem ained an au to cratic m onarchy, steps were taken to m odernise ag ricu ltu re an d reclaim land (173). O n e thing is clear: the regim es th a t survived the 1848 revolutions were directly aw are o f the need to m odernise th eir a d ­ m inistration, even if they were n o t p repared to accept a d ilution of their trad itio n al forms o f power. T h e expansion o f the E u ro p ean , and indeed, the w orld econom y owed m uch to technological factors th at w ere in d ep en d en t o f the revolutions. T h e technical innovations o f the railw ay an d the tele­ graph enabled a b roadening o f the geographical area over which industrialism could prevail (14, 23). M igration also facilitated this process. M an y E uropeans were already on the move before 1848, as the result o f land h unger and a failure o f the E u ro p ean ag ricultural system , w hich w ere them selves co n trib u to ry to the revolutionary u p ­ heaval. It has been estim ated th a t em igration from E urope had averaged ab o u t 40,000 people p er annum in the years before 1845, w hereas th e ra te ju m p ed to som ething over 200,000 per annum after 1848. M u ch o f this m ovem ent, however, was m ade up o f Irish, B rit­ ish an d S candinavian m igration (14); in o th er w ords, it was m igration from regions th a t did not play a m ajor political role in the events o f 1848. It w ould therefore be very difficult to establish any precise connections betw een the revolutionary upheaval an d the su b ­ sequent p attern o f E u ro p ean m igrations. It m ay well be th at the establishm ent o f strong an d stable gov­ ernm ents in F rance an d Prussia encouraged the grow th o f in d ustry and trade. Louis N apo léo n ’s ascendancy was accom panied by a rise in stock m arket prices, though w hether one was the cause o f the other is im possible to tell. In the years after 1852 Louis N apoleon did follow policies th at w ere conducive to econom ic expansion, and the Second E m pire becam e noted for the em ergence o f new, dynam ic and pushful en trep ren eu rs (77). T h e expansion and consolidation o f in d u strialism en hanced the significance o f the m iddle classes. T hey becam e, in the m ore stable and efficient regim es o f the p o s t-1848 period, the residual legatees of the ancien regime. In L o m bardy th e breaking up o f C h u rch p roperty and the suppression o f old feudal privileges stren g th en ed the grow ­ ing com m ercial m iddle class (173). E ventually the interests o f the

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L om bards an d the Piedm ontese converged in favour o f unity. In the G erm an states the m iddle class, w hich was not as well developed as its co u n terp arts in B ritain an d F rance, becam e increasingly politic­ ally conservative. T h is was p ro b ab ly a direct consequence o f the 1848 revolutions. W h at had h ap p en ed to an underdeveloped m iddle class in the G erm an states in 1848 was th at no sooner h ad it m ade its first incursion into politics th an it faced opposition from the G er­ m an artisan m ovem ent. A lm ost inevitably it becam e reactionary, never having the o p p o rtu n ity to be progressive. T h is had serious im plications for G erm an y ’s later political developm ent. In general, it was the E u ro p ean m iddle classes w hich m ade the m ost significant econom ic an d political gains in the tw enty years after 1848. T h eir ascendancy over o th er classes was m arked, and in w estern a n d cen­ tral E u ro p e they were able, by the end o f the century, to reconcile their ow n econom ic ad vantages w ith the dispossessed classes through various forms o f the n ational-liberal state. O nly in R ussia did this not prove possible, and it was no coincidence th a t it was in R ussia th a t the intellectual assertions o f M arx ’s scientific socialism , which h ad derived so m uch im petus from the events o f 1848, were to find th eir first practical application.

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Part Five:

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docum ents la - c The p olitics o f conservatism and repression (a) A fter the defeat o f Napoleon in 1815 the Great Powers were determined to preserve the territorial Settlement o f Vienna. This meant that it was necessary to suppress all those ‘progressive’ ideas that had inspired the French Revolution. The Vienna Settlement was not, then, ju st a purely territorial arrangement. T he H igh C o n tractin g P arties, having engaged in the w ar w hich has ju s t term in ated , for the purpose o f m ain tain in g inviolably the a r­ rangem ents settled a t Paris last year, for the safety an d in terest of E urope, have ju d g e d it advisable to renew the said engagem ents by the presen t act, and to confirm them as m u tu ally obligatory . . . p articu larly those by w hich N apoleon B o n ap arte an d his fam ily . . . have been for ever excluded from Suprem e Pow er in France, which exclusion the C o n tractin g Powers bind them selves by the presen t act to m ain tain in full vigour, and, should it be necessary, w ith the whole o f th eir forces. A nd as the sam e revolutionary principles which upheld the last crim inal u su rp atio n , m ight again, u n d er o th er forms, convulse F rance, and thereby en d an g er the repose o f o th er States; u n d er these circum stances, the H igh C o n tractin g P arties solem nly ad m ittin g it to be th eir d u ty to redouble th eir w atchfulness for the tran q u illity and interests o f their people, engage, in case so unfor­ tu n ate an event should again occur, to concert am ongst them selves . . . the m easures w hich they m ay ju d g e necessary to be pursu ed for the safety o f th eir respective States, and for the general tran q u illity o f E urope. T h e Q u a d ru p le A lliance, 20 N ovem ber 1815, cited in K ertesz (2), p. 13.

(b) Metternich was the principal defender o f the Vienna Settlement and his anxiety about liberal ideas made him particularly suspicious o f the educated classes. 108

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In all four countries [G erm any, Spain, Italy and France] the agi­ tated classes are principally com posed o f w ealthy m en — real cosm opolitans, securing th eir personal ad v an tag e a t the expense of any o rd er o f things w hatever — p aid State officials, m en of letters, lawyers, an d the individuals charged w ith public education. M ettern ic h ’s Secret M em o ran d u m to A lexander II in D ecem ber 1820, a t the C ongress o f T ro p p a u , cited in Bridges et al. (1), pp. 124-5.

(c) In practical terms Metternich sought to control the activities o f the German universities. T H E U N IV E R S IT Y LAW

1. T h e d u ty of this com m issioner shall be to w atch over the m ost rigorous observation o f the laws and disciplinary regulations; to observe carefully the spirit w ith w hich the professors are guided in the scientific courses, or in the m ethod o f instru ctio n , to give the in stru ctio n a salu tary direction, suited to the future destiny of the students, an d to devote a co n stan t atten tio n to everything w hich m ay tend to the m ain ten an ce of m orality, good o rd e r and decency am ong the youths . . . 2. T h e G overnm ents of the States m em bers o f the confederation reciprocally engage to rem ove from th eir universities . . . the professors and o th er public teachers ag ain st w hom it m ay be proved th at in d ep artin g from their d u ty, in overstepping the bounds o f th eir d u ty, in ab u sing their legitim ate influence over the m inds o f youth, by the pro p ag atio n of pernicious dogm as, hostile to o rd er a n d public tranquillity. T h e C arlsb ad Decrees, 20 S eptem ber 1819, cited in K ertesz (2), pp. 6 7 -9 .

docum ents 2 a - f N ew political ideas (a) Liberalism in the nineteenth century usually demanded a set o f freedoms and a broadening o f the scope o f political participation to include the middle classes. 1. W e d em an d th a t o u r S tate G overnm ents re p u d ia te the C arlsb ad resolutions o f 1819 . . . T hese resolutions violate our inalienable h u m an rights . . .

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2. W e d em an d freedom of the press: we m ust no longer be deprived o f the in alienable right o f the h u m an spirit to publish its th o u g h t w ith o u t m utilation. 3. W e d em an d freedom o f conscience an d of learning . . . 4. W e d em an d th a t the arm y sw ear an o ath to the constitution. 5. W e d em an d personal freedom . T h e police m ust stop its tutelage an d to rtu re o f the citizen. T h e right o f association, h ealth y com ­ m u n ity life . . . the in d iv id u al’s right to move freely in the territo ry o f the G erm an F ath erlan d . . . m ust rem ain u n d is­ tu rb ed in future. T he O ffenburg R esolutions o f the South W est G erm an R adicals, 10 S eptem ber 1847, cited in K ertesz (2), pp. 77-9.

Nationalism (*>) Nationalists in the first h a lf o f the nineteenth century tended to be liberal in outlook. Liberty - Equality - Humanity - Independence - Unity Section 1

Y oung Italy is a brotherhood o f Italian s w ho believe in a law of Progress an d D uty, an d are convinced th at Italy is d estined to be­ come one n atio n . . . T h ey jo in this association in the firm in ten t of consecrating b oth th o u g h t and action to the great aim o f reconsti­ tuting Italy as one ind ep en d en t sovereign n atio n o f free m en and equals. Section 2

By Italy we u n d erstan d : 1, C o n tin en tal an d p en in su lar Italy, b ounded on the n o rth by the u p p er circle o f the Alps, on the south by the sea, on the w est by the m ouths o f the V aro, a n d on the east by T rieste; 2, th e islands proved Italian by the language o f the in h ab itan ts, an d destined, u n d er a special ad m in istrativ e o rg an isa­ tion, to form a p a rt o f the Italian political unity. M azzin i’s In stru ctio n s for the M em bers of Y oung Italy , 1831, cited in K ertesz (2), p. 173.

(c) The most vigorous national movements o f the first h a lf o f the nineteenth century developed in Germany and Italy. Both Germans and Italians could call 110

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upon a ‘great P ast’. The nationalities o f the Habsburg Empire found this more difficult. The timidity o f the Czech national movement may be explained by the lack o f a ‘great P ast’.

I am a C zech o f Slavonic blood, an d w ith all the little I possess and all the little I can do, I have devoted m yself for all tim e to the service of my n ation. T h e n ation is a sm all one, it is true, b u t from time im m em orial it has been a n ation o f itself an d based upon its own strength. Its rulers were from olden times m em bers o f the federation of G erm an Princes, b u t the n ation never regarded itself as p ertain in g to the G erm an n ation, nor th ro u g h o u t all the centuries w as it re­ garded by others as so pertaining. T h e whole union o f th e Czech lands, first w ith the H oly R om an (G erm an) E m pire an d th en with the G erm an C onfederation, was always a m ere dynastic tie o f w hich the C zech n atio n , the C zech estates, scarcely desired to know an y ­ thing an d to w hich they paid no regard . . . T h e whole w orld is well aw are th a t the G erm an E m perors h ad never, in v irtue o f their im perial dignity, the slightest to do w ith the C zech n ation; th at they possessed n eith er legislative, n or ju d icial, n or executive pow er either in B ohem ia or over the Czechs; th at they never h ad the right to raise troops o r any royalties from th at country; th a t B ohem ia together w ith its crow n lands was never considered as p erta in ­ ing to any o f th e one-tim e ten G erm an States; th at ap p u rte n an ce to the Reich S uprem e C o u rt of Ju stic e never applied to it, and so on . . . T he second reason w hich prevents me from taking p a rt in your deliberations is the fact th at, according to all I have so far learned of your aim s an d intentions as publicly proclaim ed, it is y o u r irre­ vocable desire a n d purpose to underm ine A u stria as an in d ep en d en t em pire an d indeed to m ake her im possible for all tim e to com e - an em pire w hose p reservation, integrity and consolidation is, a n d m ust be, a g reat im p o rta n t m atter n o t only for m y ow n n atio n b u t also for the w hole o f E urope . . . You know, gentlem en, w hat Power it is th a t holds the en tire east o f our C o n tin en t. You know th a t this Power, now grow n to vast dim ensions, increases and expands of itself decade by decade in far g reater m easure th an is possible for the countries of the W est. You know th at, secure a t its own centre against practically every attack, it has becom e, an d has for a long tim e been, a m enace to its neigh­ bours; an d th at, alth o u g h it has u n h in d ered access to the N o rth , it is nevertheless, led by n atu ra l instinct, always seeking, an d will con­ tinue to seek, to extend its borders southw ards.

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Frantisek P alacky’s L etter to the C om m ittee o f Fifty o f the F ran k fu rt P arliam ent, 11 A pril 1848, cited in Bridges et al. (1), pp. 136-7.

(d) M agyar nationalism, although apparently liberal, also had ambitions to dominate the minorities o f the eastern part o f the Habsburg Empire. D E M A N D S O F T H E H U N G A R IA N P E O P L E

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

F reedom o f the press; abolition o f censorship. A responsible m inistry w ith its seat in the capital. An an n u a l p arlia m e n t in B udapest. Political an d religious equality before the law. A natio n al g u ard . T axes to be p aid by all. A bolition o f serfdom . J u ry system . E q u ality o f representation. A natio n al bank. T h e m ilitary to take an o ath to the constitution; H u n g a rian sol­ diers not to be statio n ed ab ro ad , foreign soldiers to be rem oved. 11 Political prisoners to be freed. 12 U nion w ith T ran sy lv an ia. [The speaking o f M agyar was to be a qualification fo r all members o f the parliament.]

D em ands o f the F lu n g arian People, 15 M arch 1848, cited in K ertesz (2), pp. 125-6.

Socialism—communism (e) The variety o f opinions subsumed under the heading ‘socialismcommunism’ is enormous. In the nineteenth century both socialists and communists believed that the democratic principles which had inspired the French Republic o f 1792 would never be achieved unless the economic base o f society was changed. C O M M U N IS T M A N IF E S T O

1 A bolition o f pro p erty in land an d application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2 A heavy progressive or g ra d u ated incom e tax. 3 A bolition o f all right o f inheritance. 4 C onfiscation o f the p roperty o f all em igrants and rebels.

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5 C en tralisatio n o f credit in the h ands o f the State, by m eans of a n ational b an k w ith S tate capital and an exclusive m onopoly. 6 C en tralisatio n o f the m eans o f com m unication an d tran sp o rt in the h an d s of the State. 7 E xtension o f factories and instru m en ts o f pro d u ctio n ow ned by the State; the bringing into cultivation o f w aste-lands, an d the im provem ent o f the soil generally in accordance w ith a com m on plan. 8 E qual obligation o f all to work. E stab lish m en t o f in d u strial arm ies, especially for agriculture. 9 C o m bination o f ag ricu ltu re w ith m anufacturing industries; g ra d ­ ual abolition o f the distinction betw een town and country, by a m ore eq u ab le d istrib u tio n o f the p o p ulation over the country. 10 Free ed u catio n for all children in public schools. A bolition of ch ildren’s factory lab o u r in its present form. C o m b in atio n o f ed­ ucation w ith in d u strial production. M anifesto o f the C o m m u n ist P arty, J a n u a ry 1848, cited in M arx and Engels (3), pp. 52 -3 .

(f) It would seem that M arx and Engels used the word ‘communist’ in the Manifesto o f 1848fo r polemical reasons and to distinguish their revolutionary position from that o f other Utopian thinkers. N evertheless, w hen it ap p eared we could not have called it a socialist manifesto. In 1847 two kinds o f people were considered socialists. O n the one h an d w ere the ad h eren ts o f the various u to p ian system s, notably the O w enites in E n g lan d and the Fourierists in F rance, bo th o f whom at th a t d ate h ad already dw indled to m ere sects g rad u ally dying out. O n the other, the m anifold types o f social quacks who w anted to elim in ate social abuses through their various universal panaceas an d all kinds o f patchw ork, w ithout h u rtin g cap ital an d profit in the least. In both cases, people who stood outside the lab o u r m ovem ent an d who looked for su p p o rt ra th e r to the ‘ed u c ated ’ classes. T h e section of the w orking class, how ever, w hich d em an d ed a radical reconstruction o f society, convinced th at m ere political rev­ olutions w ere not enough, then called itself Communist. It was still a rough-hew n, only instinctive, and frequently crude com m unism . E ngels’ Preface to the G erm an edition o f 1890, cited in M arx and Engels (3), pp. 33—4.

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docum ents 3 a -b T he con d ition o f the workers in the years o f crisis The 1830s and 1840s were years o f acute social distress. Middle-class observers became increasingly concerned about the condition o f the poor.

(a) Living conditions o f workers in Lille A succession o f islets sep arated by d ark narrow alleyways; a t the o ther end are sm all yards called courettes w hich serve as sewers and rub b ish -d u m p s. In every season o f the year there is d am p. T h e a p a rtm en t w indow s and the cellar doors all open onto the diseaseridden alleyways, and in the background there are pieces o f iron railing over cess-pits w hich are used day and night as public lav a­ tories. T h e dwellings are ranged ro u n d these plague-spots . . . T h e further the visitor penetrates these little yards, the m ore he is su r­ rounded by a strange th ro n g o f anaem ic, hunch b ack ed and deform ed children w ith death ly pale livid faces, begging for alm s. M ost o f these w retches are alm ost naked an d even the best-cared-for have rags sticking to them . B ut these creatures at least b re ath e fresh air; only in the d epths o f the cellars can one app reciate the agonies o f those w ho can n o t be allowed o u t on account o f th eir age or the cold w eather. F or the m ost p a rt they lie on b are soil, on wisps of rape-straw , on a rough couch o f d ried p otato peelings, on san d or on shavings w hich have been painstakingly collected d u rin g the d ay ’s work. T h e pit in w hich they languish is b are of any fittings; only those w ho are best-off possess a tem p eram en tal stove, a wooden chair an d som e cooking utensils. ‘I m ay not be rich ,’ an old w om an told us, p ointing to her n eighbour lying full-length on the d am p cellar floor, ‘b u t I still have m y bu n d le o f straw , th an k G od!’ M ore th an three th o u san d of o ur fellow-citizens lead this horrifying existence in the Lille cellars. A dolphe B lanqui, Les Classes Ouvrieres en France pendant I ’Ann'ee 1848, Paris, 1849, cited in K uczynski (2 8 ), pp. 9 3 -4 .

(b) I t is worth considering whether a distinct proletarian culture and conscious­ ness was emerging in the years before 1848. The development o f a special ‘revolutionary consciousness’ has a special place fo r the historians o f the left (20, 24, 28, 46). . . . the p ro letarian is aw afe of his situation. T his is why he is fun­ dam entally different from the p au p er, who accepts his fate as a

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divine ord in an ce an d dem ands n o th in g b u t alm s and an idle life. T he p ro letarian realised straig h t aw ay th at he was in a situation which was intolerable an d u n ju st . . . m oreover he was aw are of his strength . . . he saw how the w orld trem bled before him an d this recollection em boldened him ; he w ent so far as to disregard Law and Ju stice. H ith erto p roperty had been a right: he b ran d ed it as robbery. A non., w ritten in M agdeburg, 1884, cited in K uczynski (28), p. 81.

docum ents 4 a -c Bread There is little doubt that the poorest sections o f the population spent a large proportion o f their incomes on starch foods. A n y fluctuation in the prices o f these staple fo o d s w ould have serious repercussions.

(a)

STANDARD OF LIVING DATA (PRICES)

40 35 30 25 20 15 10

E. L abrousse (73).

(b) The agricultural crisis in France originated w ith the potato blight. A t the same time the grain harvests o f 1845 and 1846, particularly in the area o f the Paris basin, were especially poor, causing prices to soar. Ironically, prices were fa llin g by the autumn o f 1847. The relationship between the fo o d crisis and the revolutions is not clear-cut. 115

Documents S T A N D A R D O F L IV IN G D A T A (P R IC E S )

Hamburg (1841 = 100) 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850

Wheat

Rye

Barley

Oats

100.0 136.4 103.1 109.4 89.5 129.6 151.8 134.0 100.0 100.0

100.0 83.3 83.3 72.7 59.5 91.7 120.8 82.7 53.5 53.5

100.0 98.7 105.2 105.2 113.0 115.6 185.7 124.7 103.9 93.5

100.0 86.4 94.9 101.7 91.5 111.9 149.1 110.2 69.5 72.9

Wheat

Rye

100.0 70.9 96.5 108.1 80.8

100.0 82.7 131.7 128.8 69.2

Königsberg (1841-2 = 100)

1841-42 1843-44 1845-46 1847-48 1849-50

Berne (1846 = 100)

1836 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850

Bread

Potatoes

85.0 85.0 100.0 140.0 80.0 75.0 80.0

100.0 136.4 74.5 60.9 65.5

Statistics based on M ulhall (5).

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Venice Wheat

1845 1846 1847 1845 1846 1847

M a ize

100 114.4 196.8 100 163.6 177.3

S tatistics based on P. G insborg (174).

(c) Whatever the precise relationship between food prices and the generation o f unrest, it is clear that when unrest d id break out it w as a shocking experience fo r the respectable classes. T h e cities w ere full of poor begging for bread, an d w ere invaded by great hordes o f peasants, h u m an carcasses w ith sunken eyes, who could h ard ly stagger along w ith the aid of a stick, a n d who pleaded for som ething to eat w ith faint voices and d ead en ed gaze . . . T h e countryside did not present a less terrible or m ournful experience. T h e d estitu te w andered from villa to villa begging for sustenance . . . they eagerly devoured the ears o f corn w hich w ere n o t yet ripe . . . M em oirs o f G uiseppe O livi, P resident o f the D e p artm en t o f Treviso in H a b sb u rg V enetia, cited in G insborg (174).

docum ent 5 The influence o f the clergy The elections f o r the Constituent Assembly in France in A p ril 1848 were the subject o f a great conflict between the republicans and the clergy. The bishops took direct action in trying to influence the election results (80, 86). IN S T R U C T IO N S T O P A R IS H P R IE S T S

W e rem in d you o f your obligation . . . to urge u p o n your p a r­ ishioners the need to fulfil loyally th eir sacred d u ty as voters. We know , d e a r colleague, the p ro p e r confidence they have in you. So help them w ith your good advice at this im p o rta n t ju n ctu re . T each them how they should b oth select their ca n d id a te and exercise

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voting rights. O vercom e their objections. Sweep aw ay their fears. T ake pains to explain to them th a t they are faced w ith the need to reconcile m ajor interests and m ust banish all idea o f p arty p re ju ­ dice. T h ey m ust concern them selves w ith one thing only, nam ely with choosing as th eir representatives m en of recognised integrity who are frankly resolved to set up a R epublic in F rance th a t respects the sacred rights o f religion, liberty, property an d the family . . . Finally, d early beloved colleague, set your parishioners a good exam ple. Go to the polls at the head of your congregation. In stru ctio n s from the B ishop of R ennes to his clergy, cited in Price (6), p. 92.

docum ents 6 a -b The prelude to June (a) Alexis de Tocqueville anticipated the events o f June 1848. In th a t city there w ere a h u n d red th o u san d arm ed w orkm en form ed into regim ents, w ith o u t work an d dying of hunger. Society was cut in two: those who h ad nothing u nited in com m on envy; those who had an y th in g united in com m on terror. T h ere w ere no longer ties of sym pathy linking these two g reat classes, and a struggle was everyw here assum ed to be inevitable soon . . . Alexis de T ocqueville, Recollections, cited in Price (6), pp. 96—7.

(b)

.

.

I have carefully noted the n atu re of these gatherings seen in the street over the last fortnight, of the speeches m ade by the rin g lead ­ ers, an d the fact th a t the m an ufacturers can neith er get the w orkers back into th eir w orkshops, w here there is em ploym ent for them , nor even keep those w ho had rem ained. T his has led m e to the convic­ tion th a t a hostile o rganisation is behind these disorders. T h e alliance is organised by the delegates to the L uxem bourg. R eport o f the Paris Prefect o f Police, 3 J u n e 1848, cited in Price (6), p . 100.

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docum ents 7 a -c June (a) M arx saw the June Days uprising as the climax o f a class conflict. T he Paris workers have been overw helm ed by su p erio r forces; they have not succum bed to them . T hey have been b eaten, b u t it is their enemies who have been vanquished. T h e m o m en tary triu m p h of b rutal violence has been p urchased w ith the destru ctio n o f all the deceptions an d illusions o f the F eb ru ary revolution, w ith the dissolution o f the w hole o f the old rep u b lican p arty , an d w ith the fractu rin g o f the F rench n atio n into two nations, the n atio n of the possessors an d the n atio n of the workers. T h e tricolour republic now bears only one colour, the colour of the defeated, the colour of blood. I t has becom e the red republic. K. M arx, Neue Rheinische Zeitung , cited in F ern b ach (4), pp. 129-30.

(b) De Tocqueville considered that the June Days was a manifestation o f class conflict, but he did not regard it as a legitimate conflict. In tru th it was n o t a political struggle . . . b u t a class struggle, a sort o f ‘Servile W a r’. It stood in the sam e relation to the facts o f the F eb ru ary R evolution as the theory o f socialism stood to its ideas; or ra th e r it sp ran g n atu rally from those ideas, as a son from his m other; and one should not see it only as b ru tal and blind, b u t as a powerful effort o f the w orkers to escape from the necessities o f their condition, which had been d epicted to them as an illegitim ate depression, and by the sw ord to open up a road tow ards th at im ag in ary w ell-being th at h ad been show n to them in the distance as a right. It was this m ixture o f greedy desires an d false theories th at engendered the in ­ surrection an d m ad e it so form idable. T hese poor people h ad been assured th a t the goods o f the w ealthy were in som e way the result o f a theft com m itted ag ain st them selves. T h ey h ad been assured th at inequalities o f fortune were as m uch opposed to m orality a n d the interests o f society as to n atu re. T h is obscure an d m istaken concep­ tion of right, com bined w ith b ru te force, im p arted to it an energy, tenacity a n d stren g th it w ould never have h ad on its own. Alexis de T ocqueville (7), pp. 169—70.

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(c) The nature o f the June conflict is still a source o f debate among modern historians. An examination o f the occupations o f the insurrectionaries has been o f special interest. C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S , BY IN D U S T R Y , O F T H O S E A R R E S T E D F O R P A R T IC IP A T IN G IN T H E J U N E DAYS

Occupational categories

T extiles C lothing L uxury trad es P rinting a n d p a p e r M etal trad es Precious m etal trad e s Food F u rn ish in g a n d tim b e r L eath er C oach build in g C hem icals C oopers and basketm akers B uilding T ra n s p o rt R etail trad e s L iberal a n d financial professions and stu d en ts Soldiers Service a n d o th er w orkers U nknow n TOTAL

Number o f individuals

Percentage o f working population

Percentage married

Median age

344 1044 212 444 1325 239 463 678 168 195 148

3.1 9.3 1.9 3.9 11.8 2.1 4.1 6.0 1.5 1.7 1.3

4.9 17.2 3.5 3.0 2.9 1.9 6.7 4.0 0.6 1.0 0.9

75.0 56.5 84.2 55.6 57.3 72.7 51.3 62.7 56.8 58.0 54.5

36 33 32 31 31 29 32 31 32 32 34

136 2075 529 789

1.2 18.4 4.7 7.0

1.2 6.6 2.1 4.7

67.6 58.7 58.2 67.8

31 32 34 34

326 501

2.9 4.4

13.6 4.5

57.3 60.3

34 31

1640 456

14.6 -

20.6 -

57.6 66.7

35 33

11,722

99.9

99.9

59.6

33

L. H. Lees and C . T illy in (80).

120

Percentage o f total

Chronology of Events

1848 J a n u a ry

12

R evolution in Palerm o, Sicily

F ebruary

24 25

A bdication o f Louis Philippe F irst P roclam ation o f the Provisional G overnm ent in F rance P roclam ation o f the F rench Second R epublic E stab lish m en t o f N atio n al W orkshops

26 27 M arch

5

M eeting

of H eidelberg

L iberals

calls

for

a

Vorparlament

7 13 14--15 15 18 23

L a m a rtin e ’s M anifesto to E urope R esignation o f M etternich F o rm u latio n o f the D em ands o f the H u n g arian s V iolence breaks o u t in Berlin Frederick W illiam IV prom ises reform Piedm ont declares w ar ag ain st the H ab sb u rg s

April

10 23

P russian troops en ter Schlesw ig-H olstein Election o f the C o n stitu en t A ssem bly in F rance

M ay

17

H a b sb u rg Im p erial C o u rt leaves In n sb ru ck M eeting o f the F ran k fu rt Parlament

18

V ien n a

for

June

2 16 23--26

Ju ly

22 23

C o n stitu en t A ssem bly m eets in V ienna R adetzky defeats Italian s at C ustozza

A ugust

26

P russia accepts the arm istice o f M alm o, bringing the w ar over Schlesw ig-H olstein to an end

S eptem ber 11

M eeting o f the Pan-Slav C ongress in P rague W indischgratz bo m b ard s Prague J u n e D ay s’ u p rising in Paris

Jellacic begins invasion o f H u n g ary

121

Chronology o f Events

O ctober

6 31

‘O cto b er D ays’ uprising in V ienna M ilitary occupation of V ien n a by W indischgratz

N ovem ber 21 24

Schw arzenberg becom es H a b sb u rg C hancellor T h e Pope leaves Rom e

D ecem ber

E m p ero r F erd in an d abdicates in favour o f F ran z­ Josef Louis N apoléon elected P resident o f Second R epublic in F rance

2 10

1849 F eb ru ary

9

E stab lish m en t o f R om an R epublic by M azzini

M arch

7

Schw arzenberg dissolves A u strian Assem bly Final defeat o f Italian s a t N o v arra

23

C o n stitu en t

April

3

Frederick W illiam IV rejects F ran k fu rt A ssem bly’s offer of the crow n o f a u n ited G erm any

Ju n e

13

D em onstrations in Paris pro testin g at F rench su p ­ pression o f the R om an R epublic

Ju ly

3

A ugust

F rench troops occupy Rom e

13

H u n g arian s su rren d er

26

P russia establishes E rfu rt U nion

1850 M ay

N ovem ber 29

P russia forced to accept the re-establishm ent o f the G erm an D iet by the ag reem ent o f O lm u tz

1851 D ecem ber

122

2

Louis N apo léo n ’s coup d ’etat overthrow s the F rench Second R epublic

Glossary

M o derate liberal politician from P iedm ont who supported th e idea th a t Italy should be united as a constitutional m onarchy ru led by the K ing o f P iedm ont-S ardinia. Massimo d ’Azeglio

A u strian law yer w ho was a leading m em b er o f the liberal reform m ovem ent in V ien n a before 1848. After the revolution he becam e a m em ber o f S chw arzenberg’s governm ent, becom ing increasingly conservative in his views.

Alexander Bach

F rench socialist who su p p o rted the B an q u et cam paign. From F eb ru ary to M ay 1848 he presided over the L uxem bourg C om m ission w hich was responsible for lab o u r affairs a n d the ad ­ m in istratio n o f th e N ational W orkshops. Following the J u n e up ris­ ing he fled to E ngland. Louis Blanc

F rench socialist revolutionary and professional con­ spirator. H e organised m any secret revolutionary societies and attem p ted an arm ed uprising in 1839.

Auguste Blanqui

G erm an socialist an d lab o u r leader w ho organised a w orkers’ com m ittee in Berlin, w hich later led to the holding o f an all-G erm an w orkers’ congress in A ugust 1848, w hich subsequently set up a G erm an w orkers’ association, b u t its m em bership never exceeded 12,000. Stephan Born

Section o f the F rench C h am b er o f D eputies led by O dilon B arro t who opposed G uizot in the 1840s an d advocated electoral reform . M an y m em bers o f the D ynastic O p p osition were active in the B an q u et cam paign.

Dynastic Opposition

Ludwig Ficquelmont C onservative A u strian aristo crat w ho had served the H ab sb u rg s before 1848 an d who was ap p o in ted Foreign M inister after th e fall of M ettern ich . H e was forced to resign follow­ ing stu d en t d em o n strations in M ay 1848. Vincenzo Gioberti L eading thinker-politician o f the Ita lia n Risorgi­ mento who believed th a t Italy should be united into a federation

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Glossary

under the presidency o f the Pope, b u t w ith the m ilitary protection of Piedm ont. Active rep u b lican -d em o crat in T u scan y who be­ cam e M in ister o f the In terio r in a short-lived rep u b lican governm ent in T u scan y in 1848.

Francesco Guerazzi

F rench conservative politician who was Louis P hilippe’s P rim e M inister, 1840—48. H is stu b b o rn opposition to de­ m ands for electoral reform was a significant cause o f the F ebruary revolution in F rance.

François Guizot

Set o f dem ands p u t forw ard by G erm an workers in 1848, in clu d in g the preservation o f w orker guilds.

Industrial Code

A u strian aristo crat and rival to M ettern ich be­ tween 1835 an d 1848. His m anoeuvrings in the H ab sb u rg C o u rt did m uch to ren d er M ettern ich ineffective in his last years in office and co n trib u ted u ltim ately to the la tte r’s downfall.

Francis Kolowrat

D elivered at the H u n g a ria n Diet in M arch 1848, it attacked the H a b sb u rg m onarchy a n d outlined the case for H u n g a ria n independence. Its su b sequent tran slatio n into G erm an an d p u b licatio n in V ienna reinforced the liberal consti­ tutional m ovem ent in the E m pire.

Kossuth’s speech at Pressburg

E arly form of lab o u r p ro test w hich involved workers sm ashing m achines w hich had m ade them unem ployed. Luddism

V enetian law yer an d republican politician who be­ cam e P resident o f the short-lived V enetian R epublic, 1848—49.

Daniele M anin

Giuseppe M a zzin i Italian rep u b lican nationalist. H e was the m ost im p o rtan t figure before 1848 for articu latin g rep u b lican -n atio n al feeling. H e was involved in m any plots an d unsuccessful uprisings before 1848 a n d established the Y oung Italy m ovem ent in 1831. H e was briefly P resident of the R om an R epublic in M arch 1849. Louis-Mathieu Mole F rench politician o f conservative-m oderate views who h ad been Louis P h ilip p e’s Foreign M in ister in the early 1830s. H e found him self in opposition du rin g the 1840s an d was a b itter o p p o n en t o f G uizot. In F eb ru ary 1848 L ouis Philippe dis­ m issed the la tte r in favour o f M ole in a vain atte m p t to stem the revolutionary tide.

T erm used in 1792—93 to identify those deputies, led by R obespierre, D an to n an d M a ra t, who h ad in stig ated the Montagnards

124

Glossary

form ation o f th e republic. By the m id -nineteenth cen tu ry the term was generally associated w ith the extrem e left o f the republican tradition. Series of public works set up by the p ro ­ visional g o v ernm ent in F ran ce in an attem p t to solve the problem of unem ploym ent. T h e p rogram m e was abolished in J u n e 1848 and contributed to the uprising o f th a t m onth.

National Workshops Scheme

Quadrilateral G ro u p o f four fortresses in n o rth ern Italy - V erona, Peschiera, M a n tu a and L egnano - used by the A u strian arm ies in the w ar ag ain st the Italian s, 1848—49.

E xperienced A u strian soldier who h ad fought against N apoleon. H e becam e com m ander-in-chief of the A u strian garrison in L o m b ard y in 1831. H e defeated the P iedm ontese arm ies at C ustozza in J u ly 1848 an d at N o v arra in M arch 1849.

Jo sef Radetzky

P russian aristo crat and su p p o rter o f K ing F red ­ erick W illiam IV . A lthough he was a conservative he recognised the need to follow enlightened social policies. H e becam e F oreign M in ­ ister o f P russia in 1849.

J o se f von Radow itz

F orm o f feudal lab o u r service perform ed by p easan ts in large p arts o f the H ab sb u rg Em pire. Peasants were expected to perform lab o u r service for their lan dlords for so m any days in the y ear as a kind of rent. It was a source o f considerable resen tm en t am ong the peasants an d its abolition in 1848—49 was bo th a m ajo r achievem ent and a significant cause o f the peasan ts subsequently losing interest in the revolution.

Robot

Henri Saint-Simon F rench econom ic thinker who believed th a t the state could plan an d organise econom ic activity. H is ideas influenced socialists like Louis Blanc, as well as Louis N apoleon, la te r E m peror of France, who used the pow er of the state to p rom ote the grow th o f the F rench economy.

Wife o f A rchduke C harles who was the b ro th er of F erd in an d , E m peror, 1835-48. Sophie was the m o th er o f F ran z­ Jo se f w ho becam e E m peror in 1848, following the ab d ica tio n o f F er­ dinand. She attra c te d su p p o rt from those in the C o u rt w ho opposed M ettern ich in the years im m ediately before 1848, including K olow rat. She w as a d eterm ined w om an who becam e the focal point of counter-revolutionary in terest in 1848—49. Archduchess Sophie

Francis Stadion

A u strian civil servant who becam e M in ister o f the

125

Glossary

In terio r in S ehw arzenberg’s governm ent in N ovem ber 1848. H e was largely responsible for d raftin g the new constitution after 1848 and laying the foundations for a m ore effective ad m in istratio n o f the Em pire. H u n g a rian econom ic th in k er who attack ed H a b s­ burg feudalism . H is ideas on ag ricu ltu ral im provem ent and econom ic liberalism generally did m uch to fuel H u n g a rian n a tio n ­ alism . H e was briefly a m em ber o f K o ssu th ’s in d ep en d en t H u n g arian governm ent.

Stephen Szechenyi

L iberal-m inded French aristo crat who h ad w rit­ ten extensively on the history o f France. H e was a dep u ty in the F rench C h am b er from 1839 to 1848. H e was elected to the C o n stit­ uent A ssem bly in 1848 a n d helped d raft the co n stitution o f the new republic. H e w as briefly Foreign M inister o f the Second R epublic du rin g 1849 b u t resigned in protest at the grow ing au th o ritaria n ism of Louis N apoléon.

Alexis de Tocqueville

Wenzelsbad Meeting H eld on 11 M arch 1848 in the W enzelsbad inn, a hostelry freq uented by liberal and natio n alist politicians in Prague. O n this occasion a tw elve-point p rogram m e was d raw n up co n tain ­ ing the fam iliar liberal d em an d s - freedom o f the press, abolition o f the Robot, etc.

126

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40 R ude, G ., The Crowd in History (W iley, 1966). 41 S tearns, P., European Society in Upheaval: A Social History since 1800 (M acm illan, 1967). 1848 Revolutions (W eidenfeld an d Nicolson,

42 Stearns, P., The 1974).

43 T aylor, A .J . P., Europe: Grandeur and Decline (Penguin, 1967). 44 T aylor, A.J. P., The Struggle f o r M astery in Europe 1848—1918 (O xford U niversity Press, 1954).

45 T hom son, D ., Europe Since Napoleon (L ongm an, 1962). 46 T hom pson, E. P., The M aking o f the English Working Class (G ollancz, 1968).

47 W oodw ard, E. L., Three Studies in European Conservatism: 48

Metternich, Guizot and the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century (C onstable, 1929). W rigley, E. A., Population and History (W eidenfeld an d N icol­

son, 1966). GENERALARTICLES

49 A m m an, P., ‘T h e changing outlines of 1848’, American Histor­ ical Review, lxviii, no. 4 (1962), 938-58.

50 A m m an, P., ‘R evolution: a redefinition’, Political Science Quar­ terly, lxxvii (1962), 36-52.

51 B ergm an, M ., ‘T h e p o tato blight in the N e th e rlan d s’, Inter­ national Review o f Social History, xii (1967), 390—431.

52 Briggs, A., ‘T h e language of class in the n in eteen th cen tu ry ’, 53

54 55 56 57 58 59

in A. Briggs and J . Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History (M ac­ m illan, 1967). Gillis, J . R ., ‘Political decay and the E u ro p ean revolutions 1789-1848’, World Politics, xii (1970), 344-90. H arris, D ., ‘E u ro p ean liberalism in the n in eteen th ce n tu ry ’, American Historical Review, lx, no. 3 (1955), 501—26. L abrousse, E., ‘1848—1830—1789: H ow revolutions are b o rn ’, in C rouzet, F., C h aloner, W . H . an d Stern, W . M . (eds), Essays in European Economic History (E dw ard A rnold, 1969). O ’Boyle, L., ‘T h e m iddle classes in w estern E urope, 1815— 1848’, American Historical Review, lxx, no. 3 (1966), 126—45. O ’Boyle, L., ‘T h e problem o f an excess o f ed u cated m en in w estern E u ro p e 1800—1850’, Journal o f Modern H istory, xlii, no. 4 (1970), 471-95. S tedm an Jo n es, G ., ‘T h e m id-century crisis and the 1848 revolutions’, Theory and Society, xii (1983). Tilly, C ., ‘T h e changing place of collective violence’, in

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The Republican Experiment 1848—52 (C am bridge U niversity Press, 1983). A gulhon, M ., The Republic in the Village: The People o f the Var from the French Revolution to the Second Republic (C am bridge U n i­ versity Press, 1982). A m inzade, R., Class Politics and E arly Industrial Capitalism (U n i­ versity o f New York Press, 1981). B ury, J . P. T ., France 1 8 1 4-1940 (M eth u en , 1962). C hevalier, L., Labouring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris During the First H a l f o f the Nineteenth Century (R outledge, 1973). C o b b an , A., A H istory o f Modern France, Vol. II (P enguin, 1961). C ollingham , H. A. C ., The J u ly Monarchy: A P olitical H istory o f France 1830—48 (L ongm an, 1988). D enholm , A., France in Revolution: 1848 (W iley, 1972). D uveau, G ., 1848: The M aking o f a Revolution (R outledge, 1967). Gossez, R ., Les Ouvriers de Paris (Paris, 1967). H o w arth , T . E. B., Citizen K ing: The L ife o f Louis P hilippe, K ing o f the French (Eyre and Spottisw oode, 1961). J a rd in , A. an d T u d esq , A. J ., Restoration and Reaction 1 8 1 5 -4 8 (C am bridge U niversity Press, 1983). Jo h n so n , D., G uizot: Aspects o f French H istory 1787—1874 (R outledge, 1963). L abrousse, E. (ed.), Aspects de la crise et de la dépression de l ’économie française au milieu du X IX e siècle, 1846—5 2 (Société d ’H istoire de la R évolution, 1956). L am artin e, A., H istory o f the French Revolution o f 1848 (L ondon, 1857). M agraw , R., France 1815—1914: The Bourgeois Century (F o n tan a, 1983). M errim an , J . M ., The Agony o f the Republic: The Repression o f the L eft in Revolutionary France 1848—51 (Yale U niversity Press, 1978). P alm ade, G., French Capitalism in the Nineteenth Century (D avid an d C harles, 1972).

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78 Price, R., A n Economic History o f Modern France 1730—1914 (M ac­ m illan, 1981).

79 Price, R., The French Second Republic: A Social History (B atsford, 1972).

80 Price, R. (ed.), Revolution and Reaction ; see especially L. H. Lees a n d C. Tilly, ‘T h e People o f j u n e ’ (C room H elm , 1975).

81 Sewell, W . H ., Work and Revolution in France: The Language o f Labour from the Old Regime to 1848 (C am b rid g e U niversity Press,

1980). S tearns, P., Paths to Authority: The M iddle Class and the Industrial Labour Force in France 1820—48 (U niversity of Illinois, 1978). 83 Zeldin, T ., France 1848—1945: Politics and Anger (O xford U n i­ versity Press, 1979). 84 Z eldin, T ., The Political System o f Napoleon I I I (M acm illan, 1958). 82

Articles

85 A m m an, P., ‘A jo u rn é e in the m aking: M ay 15, 1 8 4 8 Journal 86

87 88 89

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o f Modern History, xlii, no. 1 (1970), 42—69. A m m an, P., ‘P relude to insurrection: the B an q u et o f the P eople’, French Historical Studies, i, no. 4 (1960), 436—40. A m m an, P., ‘R ecent W ritings on the F rench Second R ep u b lic’, Journal o f Modern History, xxxiv, no. 4 (1962), 409-29. B aughm an, J . J ., ‘T h e F rench B an q u et C am p aig n o f 1847— 48’, Journal o f Modern History, xxxi (1959), 1—15. B ezucha, R. J ., ‘T h e “ p re in d u stria l” w orker m ovem ent: the canuts o f L yons’, in R. J . B ezucha (ed.), Modern European Social History (D. C. H eath , 1972), 93—123. C o bban, A., ‘A dm inistrative pressure in the election o f the F rench C o n stitu en t A ssem bly, A pril 1848’, Bulletin o f the Insti­ tute o f Historical Research (1952), 133-59. C o b b an , A., ‘T h e influence o f the clergy a n d the “ In stitu te u rs P rim aires” in the election o f th e C o n stitu en t A ssem bly, A pril 1848’, English Historical Review, lvii (1942), 334—44. C o b b an , A., ‘T h e m iddle classes in F ran ce 1815-48’, French Historical Studies, v, no. 1 (1967), 41—52. C rouzet, F., ‘F rench econom ic grow th in the n in eteen th cen­ tury reconsidered’, History, lix, no. 196 (1974), 167-79. D u n h am , A. L., ‘U n rest in F ran ce’, Journal o f Economic History, supplem ent viii (1948), 74—84.

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95 Fasel, G ., ‘T h e F rench election of A pril 23, 1848: suggestions for a revision’, French Historical Studies, v (1968), 285-98.

96 Fasel, G ., ‘T h e w rong revolution’, French Historical Studies, viii, no. 4 (1974).

97 Gossez, R ., ‘D iversité des antagonism es sociaux vers le m ilieu d u X IX e siècle’, Revue économique, no. 7 (1956), 439—58.

98 H iggonet, P. and Fliggonet, T ., ‘C lass, co rru p tio n an d politics in the F ren ch C h am b er of D eputies 1846—48’, French Historical Studies, v (1967), 204-24.

99 K oepke, R. L ., ‘T h e failure of p arliam en tary governm ent in F ran ce 1840—48’, European Studies Review, ix (1979).

100 L iebm an, R., ‘R epressive strategies and the w orking class p ro ­ test: Lyons 1848—52’, Social Science History, xi (1980).

101 L oubère, L. A., ‘T h e em ergence of the extrem e left in the

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L ow er L anguedoc, 1848—51: social an d econom ic factors in politics’, American Historical Review, lxxiii, no. 4 (1968), 1019— 51. M cPhee, P., ‘T h e seed tim e of the R epublic: society an d pol­ itics in the P yrenées-O rientales, 1848—51’, Australian Journal o f Political History, xxii, no. 2 (1970), 195—213. M errim an , J. M ., ‘Social conflict in F rance: the Lim oges Rev­ olution o f A pril 27, 1848’, Societas, iv, no. 1 (1974), 21—38. Pinkney, D. H ., ‘T h e m yth of the R evolution o f 1830’, in T . R opp (ed.), Festschrift fo r F. B . A rtz (D uke U niversity Press, 1964). Pinkney, D. H ., ‘A new look at the F rench R evolution of 1830’, Review o f Politics, xxiii (1961), 490—506. Price, R., ‘T echniques o f repression: the control o f po p u lar p ro test in m id -nineteenth century F ran c e’, Historical Journal, xxv (1982). Sewell, W . FI., ‘Social change and the rise o f the w orking class in M arseille’, Past and Present, no. 65 (1974), 75—109. S tearns, P., ‘P attern s o f in d u strial strike activity d u rin g the J u ly M o n arch y ’, American Historical Review, lxx, no. 2 (1965), 371-95. W eber, E ., ‘T h e Second R epublic, politics an d the p e a sa n t’, French Historical Studies, xi ( 1980).

GERMANY

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110 B lackbourn, D. an d Eley, G., The Peculiarities o f German 132

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(O xford U n iversity Press, 1985). C arr, W ., A History o f Germany 1815—1985 (E d w ard A rnold, 1987). C raig, G ., The Politics o f the Prussian Arm y (O xford U niversity Press, 1956). Eyck, F., The Frankfurt Parliament 1848—49 (M acm illan, 1968). Eyck, F. (ed.) The Revolutions o f 1848—49 (O liver a n d Boyd, 1972). Gillis, J . R., The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis 1840—1860 (S tan ­ ford U niversity Press, 1971). H am erow , T ., Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Poli­ tics in Germany 1815—1871 (P rinceton U niversity Press, 1958). H olborn, H ., A History o f Modern Germany 1840—1945 (E yre and Spottisw oode, 1969). M an n , G ., The History o f Germany Since 1789 (C h atto and W indus, 1968). Noyes, P., Organisation and Revolution: Working Class Associations in the German Revolution (P rinceton U niversity Press, 1966). Pinson, K ., Modern Germany: Its History and Civilisation (M ac­ m illan, 1966). R am m , A ., Germany 1789—1918 (M ethuen, 1967). R eichard, R., Crippled from Birth: German Social Democracy 1844­ 1870 (Iow a U niversity Press, 1969). Sheehan, J . J . , German History 1770—1866 (O xford U niversity Press, 1989). Sheehan, J . J . , German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (C hicago U niversity Press, 1978). S tad elm an n , K ., Social and Political History o f the German 1848 Revolution (O hio U niversity Press, 1978). T ay lo r, A .J . P., The Course o f German History (H am ish H am ilto n , 1945). V alen tin , V ., 1848: Chapters o f German History (Allen and U nw in, 1940).

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130 H a h n , E., ‘G erm an p arliam en tary natio n al aim s in 1848-49: a legacy re-assessed’, Central European History , xiii (1980), 287-93. 131 H am erow , T ., ‘H istory and the G erm an R evolution o f 1848’, American Historical Review, lx (1954).

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132 H am erow , T ., ‘T h e elections to the F ran k fu rt P a rliam en t’, Journal o f Modern History, xxxiii, no. 1 (1961), 15—32.

133 H am erow , T ., ‘T h e G erm an artisan m ovem ent 1848—4:9’, Jour­ nal o f Central European A ffairs, xxi (1961), 135-52.

134 L udtke, A., ‘T h e role o f state violence in the period of tra n ­ 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

sition to in d u strial capitalism : the exam ple o f P russia 1815— 48’, Social History, iii (1979). M atth eisen , D. J ., ‘H istory as cu rren t events: recent works on the G erm an revolution o f 1848’, American Historical Review, lxxxiii (1983). M atth eisen , D. J ., ‘L iberal constitutionalism in the F ran k fu rt P arliam en t o f 1848: an in q u iry based on roll-call an aly sis’, Central European History , xii (1979), 124—42. O ’Boyle, L., ‘T h e d em ocratic left in G erm any, 1848 ', Journal o f Modern History, xxxiii, no. 4 (1961), 374—83. O rr, W ., ‘E ast P russia an d the R evolution o f 1848’, Central European History, xiii ( 1980), 303—31. Popiolek, F., ‘ 1848 in Silesia’, Journal o f Central European A ffairs, xxvi (1948), 374-89. S heehan, J . J ., ‘L iberalism an d society in G erm an y 1815—48’, Journal o f Modern History, xlv, no. 4 (1973), 583—604. S horter, E., ‘M iddle-class anxiety in the G erm an revolution of 1848 ', Journal o f Social History (1969), 189—215. T illy, R ., ‘P o p u lar disorders in n in eteen th cen tu ry G erm an y ’, Journal o f Social History (1970), 1—40. Z ucker, S., ‘G erm an w om en and the revolution o f 1848: K a th in k a Z itz-H alein and th e H u m an ia A ssociation’, Central European History, xiii (1980), 237—54.

THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

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144 B arany, G ., Stephen Szechenyi and the Awakening o f Hungarian N a ­ tionalism 1791—1841 (P rinceton U niversity Press, 1968).

145 D eak, I., The Law ful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians 1848—49 (C olum bia U niversity Press, 1979).

146

K a n n , R. A., The M ultinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Empire 1848—1918, 2 vols (C olum bia U n i­ versity Press, 1950).

147 K an n , R. A., A History o f the Habsburg Empire versity o f C alifornia Press, 1974). 148 M acartn ey , C. A., The Habsburg (W eidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).

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M acartn ey , C. A., Hungary: A Short History (E d in b u rg h U n i­ versity Press, 1962). P alm er, A., Metternich: Councillor o f Europe (W eidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972). Pech, S. Z., The Czech Revolution o f 1848 (U niversity o f N orth C aro lin a Press, 1969). R ath , R. J ., The Viennese Revolution o f 1848 (U niversity o f T exas Press, 1957). Sked, A., The Survival o f the Habsburg Empire: Radetzky, the Imperial Arm y and the Class War, 1848 (L ongm an, 1979). T ay lo r, A. J . P., The Habsburg Monarchy (H am ish H am ilto n , 1949). W ard , D ., 1848: The Fall o f Metternich (H am ish H am ilton, 1970).

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156 B arany, G ., ‘T h e Szechenyi p ro b lem ’, Journal o f Central and East European A ffa irs , xx, no. 3 (1960), 251—69.

157 H aw good, J . A., ‘1848 in cen tral Europe: an essay in historical 158 159

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synch ro n isatio n ’, Slavonic and East European Studies Review , xxvi (1948), 314-28. Ivanyi, B. G ., ‘F rom feudalism to capitalism : the econom ic b ack ground to Szechenyi’s reform in H u n g a ry ’, Journal o f Cen­ tral and East European A ffa irs , xx, no. 3 (I960), 270-88. L utz, R. R ., ‘F ath ers an d sons in the V ien n a revolution of 1848’, Journal o f Central European A ffa irs , xxii, no. 2 (1962), 161-73. M acurek, J ., ‘T h e achievem ents o f the Slavonic C ongress’, Slavonic and East European Review, xxvi (1948), 329—40. W agner, F. S., ‘Szechenyi an d the natio n ality problem in the H a b sb u rg E m p ire’, Journal o f Central European A ffairs, xx, no. 3 (1960), 289-311. Zaceck, J . F., ‘Palacky an d his history o f the C zech n a tio n ’, Journal o f Central European A ffairs, xxxiii, no. 4 (1964), 412—23.

ITALY

Books

163 G insborg, P., Daniel M anin and the Venetian Revolution (C am ­ bridge U niversity Press, 1979).

164 H eard er, H ., Italy in the Age o f the Risorgimento (L ongm an, 1983).

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165 Lovett, C ., 166 167 168 169 170 171 172

The Democratic Movement in Italy 1830—76 (H arv ard U niversity Press, 1982). M ack Sm ith, D ., Cavour (W eidenfeld an d Nicolson, 1985). M ack S m ith, D ., Italy: A Modern H istory (U niversity of M ichigan, 1969). M ack Sm ith, D ., The M aking o f Italy 1796—1866 (M acm illan, 1988). M ack Sm ith, D ., Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and the Risorgimento (O xford U niversity Press, 1971). Procacci, G ., H istory o f the Italian People (W eidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970). W hyte, A. J., The Evolution o f Modern Italy (O xford U niversity Press, 1944). Woolf, S., A H istory o f Italy 1700—1860: The Social Constraints o f P olitical Change (M eth u en , 1979).

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173 D em arco, D ., ‘L ’econom ie italienne du nord et d u sud av an t 1’u n ite’, Revue d ’H istoire Economique et Sociale, xxxiv (1956), 369-91. 174 G insborg, P., ‘P easants an d revolutionaries in V enice and the V eneto, 1848’, H istorical Journal, xvii (1974), 503—50. PO L A N D

Books

175 Davies, N .,

The H eart o f Europe: A Short H istory o f Poland

(O xford U niversity Press, 1984). 176 Leslie, R. F., Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland (U niver­ sity o f L ondon Press, 1963). 177 S eton-W atson, H ., The Russian Em pire 1 8 0 1 -1 9 1 7 (O xford U n i­ versity Press, 1967).

136

Index

A griculture, 2 4 -8 , 9 0 -1 , 105-6 A nti-Sem itism , 83, 105 A ristocracy, 26, 27, 81 A rtisans, see W orking class A ustro-Slavism , 7 1 -2 D ’Azeglio, 40, 103, 106 Bach, A lexander, 69, 70 B anqueteers, 1, 33, 48, 5 4 -5 B arrot, O dilon, 32, 33, 53, 55, 64 Belgium , 7, 19, 22, 100 B ism arck, O tto von, 104—5 Blanc, Louis, 2, 8, 37, 50, 56, 59 B lanqui, A uguste, 8, 37 B orn, S tep h an , 79, 82 B ourgeoisie in F rance, 15-17, 20, 22, 32, 33, 4 8 -9 , 56, 61 B ritain, 5, 6, 10, 18, 19, 29, 68, 85, 95, 99, 105 B udapest, 3, 70, C apitalism , 12 C arlsb ad , D ecrees o f (1819), 21, 29, 109-10 C avaignac, Louis, 60, 64, 9 6 -7 C avour, C o u n t C am illo, 32, 103 C ensorship, 110 C h arles A lbert (K ing o f Piedm ont, 1831-49), 9 3 -7 C harles X (K ing o f F rance, 1824-30), 30-1 C h u rch , the, 29, 32, 5 7 -8 , 64 Civil servants, see E ducation C om m unism , see Socialism C onservatism , 2 9 -30, 109-111 C o n stitu e n t A ssem bly (F rance), 5 8 -9 C o rru p tio n in governm ent, 3, 22, 53, 77 D em ocracy, 3 4 -6 , 94, 102 D enm ark, see Schlesw ig-H olstein Q uestion

E d u catio n , 2 0 -1 , 23, 58 Engels, Frederick, 3 6 -7 , 56, 72, F e rd in an d I (H a b sb u rg E m peror, 1835-48), 67, 74 F eudalism , 2 5 -8 , 68, 71, 75, 78, 9 0 -1 , 105 F icquelm ont, L udw ig, 70 F inancial crisis in F ra n c e, 4 7 -9 , 57 Food prices, 4 3 -7 F rance, 1 -2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 2 2 -3 , 25, 29 -3 0 , 4 5 -9 , 50 J u ly M onarchy of, 1 -2, 5 2 -5 P rovisional G o v ern m en t of, 2, 5 6 -8 J u n e D ay s’ uprising, 6 0 -4 F ra n k fu rt A ssem bly, see G erm an y F ran z-Jo sef (H a b sb u rg E m peror, 1848-1918), 74 F rederick W illiam IV (K ing o f P russia, 1840-61), 3, 77, 8 0 -1 , 8 6 -7 F rench R evolution (1789), 5, 26, 29, 34, 57 G erm any, 2 -3 , 9 -1 0 , 11, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, 39, 7 7 -8 8 B aden, 77 B avaria, 3, 77, 80 F rankfurt A ssem bly, 79, 81, 8 3 -5 H esse-K assel, 87 P russia, 3, 8, 9, 12, 17, 26, 39, 41, 77, 79, 8 0 -1 , 8 4 -7 Vorparlament, 79

G ioberti, V incenzo, 40 G ob in eau , A lfred, 105 G uizot, F rançois, 1, 20, 47, 50, 5 3 -5 H a b sb u rg E m pire, 3, 4, 18, 20, 26, 27, 31, 34, 3 8 -4 0 , 44, 49, 50, 6 6 -7 6 95, 96, 100, 102-103 see also Italy: L o m b a rd y and V enetia A ustria, 12, 33, 52, 69, 7 3 -4

137

Index C zechs, 20, 38, 7 1 -2 H u n g a rian s, 39, 40, 7 0 -1 , 73, 74-5 Poles, 27, 35 R om an ian s, 39 V ienna, ‘O c to b er D ay s’ uprising, 7 3 -4 H ecker, F riedrich, 80 H eidelburg, see G erm any: Vorparlament H erzen, A lexander, 60 H esse-K assel, see G erm any In d u strialisa tio n , 6 -1 3 , 16-17, 18-19, 24, 25, 4 7 -9 Italy, 3 5 -6 , 40, 8 9 -9 7 , 104, 105 K ingdom o f the T w o Sicilies, 3, 29, 89 L om bardy, 3, 18, 89, 90, 91, 93—4 M ilan, 3, 18, 36, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96 P apal States, 93, 9 6 -7 P iedm ont, 17, 93, 94, 103 Rom e, 90, 9 6 -7 V enetia, 8, 17, 18, 2 5 -6 , 44, 49, 90, 91, 94, 97 Jellacic, Jo sip , G overnor o f C ro a tia , 73 ‘J u n e D ay s’ uprising, see F rance Junkers , see A ristocracy and G erm any: Prussia K olow rat, C o u n t F rancis, 66, 67 K ossuth, Laios, 4, 39, 40, 69, 70, 74-5 K rom eriz 74, 75-6 L am artin e, A lphonse, 2, 5 6 -7 , 59, 100 L and, 16, 2 5 -8 , 4 3 -6 , 5 7 -8 , 78, 9 0 -1 , 105-6 L edru-R ollin, A lexandre, 34, 35, 56, 58, 63 L iberalism , 11, 21, 3 2 -4 , 69, 70, 71, 7 5 -6 , 77, 79-81, 8 3 -4 , 88, 9 2 -3 Lille, 6, 7 Louis X V I (K in g o f France, 1774-1793), 29, 34 Louis X V I I I (K ing o f France, 1815-24), 30, 31 Louis P hilippe (K ing o f France, 1830-48), 1 , 2, 15, 20, 22, 30, 31, 55 L udw ig I (K ing o f B avaria, 1825—48), 3, 80

138

M agyars, see H a b sb u rg Em pire: H u n g a rian s M an in , D aniele, 94 M a rc h L aw s in H u n g a ry , 70 M arseille, 13, 37, 45, 62 M arx, K a rl, 10-11, 3 6 -7 , 56, 6 0 -2 M azzini, G iuseppe, 36, 40, 96, 97 M e tte rn ich , C lem en t von, 4, 29, 31, 39, 6 6 -9 M iddle class, 14-23, 3 2 -3 , 34, 35, 42, 4 8 -5 0 , 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 71, 74, 79, 8 7 -8 , 92, 100, 106-7 M igration, see P opu latio n M ole, L ouis M a th ie u , 1, 55, 65 M o n arch ism , 29, 3 0 -1 , 86 M ontez, L ola, 3, 77 N apoleon B o n a p arte, 30, 38 N apoléon, L ouis, 6 3 -4 , 65, 97, 102 N ationalism , 3 8 -4 1 , 4 9 -5 0 , 104-5 see also under individual countries

N a tio n a l W orkshops, in F rance, 59, 60 ‘O c to b er D ay s’ uprising, see H a b sb u rg E m pire: V ien n a O lm u tz , T re a ty o f (1850), 87 Palacky, F ran tisek , 20, 38, 40, 7 1 -2 P easants, 2 5 -6 , 27, 58, 64, 65, 72, 75, 78, 9 0 -1 , 105-6 Pius I X (Pope, 1846-78), 42, 93, 96, 99 Polish Q u e stio n , 68—9, 75, 84 P opulation, 2 4 -8 , 4 6 -7 , 62, 105—6 Poverty, see F ood Prices and W orking class: condition o f P rague, see H a b sb u rg E m pire: C zechs P ressburg, D iet of, 69, 70 Prussia, see G e rm an y R adetzky, Josef, 69, 94, 9 5 -7 R adow itz, J o s e f von, 87 R ailw ays, see In d u strialisa tio n R epublicanism , see D em ocracy and F ran ce and Italy Risorgimento, see Italy Robot, in H a b sb u rg E m pire, 26, 68, 71, 75 R om e, see Italy R ussia, 26, 7 4 -5 , 85