Termination of Employment [3 ed.] 9781526524508, 9781526524492, 9781526524515

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Termination of Employment

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Termination of Employment Third Edition

by

Alastair Purdy Solicitor, SC

BLOOMSBURY PROFESSIONAL Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc © Bloomsbury Professional Limited 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any material form (including ­ photocopying or storing it in any medium by electronic means and whether or not transiently or incidentally to some other use of this publication) without the written permission of the copyright owner except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London, EC1N 8TS, England. Applications for the copyright owner’s written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to the publisher. Warning: The doing of an unauthorised act in relation to a copyright work may result in both a civil claim for damages and criminal prosecution. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/opengovernment-licence/version/3) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2023. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN:  PB: 978 1 52652 450 8 ePDF: 978 1 52652 449 2 ePub: 978 1 52652 451 5 Typeset by Compuscript Ltd, Shannon To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsburyprofessional.com. Here you will find extracts, author information, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters

To Jessica.

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Preface

Dear readers, It is with great pleasure and a profound sense of fulfillment that I present to you the third edition of Termination of Employment. This book is the culmination of over three decades of study, personal experience and unwavering commitment to understand, insofar as is possible, the intricacies concerned with and related to the termination of employment in Ireland. As I reflect on my journey through this intricate landscape, it becomes clear that the path to understanding and mastery is a continuous one. With each passing year, the dynamics of the workplace evolve, new laws are passed, new legal precedents emerge and the complexities of the employee-employer relationship deepens. The prominent audience for this book has always been the practitioners, legal professionals, HR specialists, managers and all those who grapple with the multifaceted issues concerning the termination of employment. It is my sincere hope that the knowledge and insights contained within these pages will serve as a valuable resource to your daily work. Whether you are a seasoned expert or just starting out in this field, the aim of the book is to provide you with practical guidance and real world examples that will enhance your ability to navigate the challenges of the termination of employment effectively. In this third edition, you will find updated information that reflects the latest developments and case law examples that illustrate complex scenarios and an overview of what is expected. I have drawn upon my own experiences and those of colleagues as well as the invaluable feedback from readers of the previous editions to create what I hope is a relevant resource for you. I want to express my deep appreciation to my colleagues in the firm of Alastair Purdy  & Co, mentors and fellow practitioners who have supported me throughout my career. Your insights, discussions and shared experiences have enriched my understanding of this subject immeasurably. A special mention in the compilation of this third edition must go to my colleague Robin Hyde, without whom I would have struggled to get this done. A mention must also go to Jessica Purdy, who assisted me greatly with research and in particular with chapter 12. I owe a great deal of thanks to many colleagues in this area but most especially, I would like to thank Brendan Kirwan SC for his insights in respect of the chapter on employment injunctions, whose thoughts and perceptions into this difficult area were invaluable. I also extend my gratitude to my family and in particular, my wife Orla, whose unwavering support has allowed me to dedicate the time and effort required to undertake this work. Lastly I would like to thank Gavin Sheridan CEO and Co-founder of Vizlegal for introducing me to Vizlegal without which the research for this book would have been profoundly more difficult.

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Preface As you delve into the pages of this book, I encourage you to approach it not just as a reference but to use it to inform your decisions, ignite discussions and inspire innovative approaches to the challenges you encounter in this area. Alastair Purdy October 2023

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Contents

Preface�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������vii Table of Cases������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ xvii Table of Statutes���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xliii Table of Statutory Instruments�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������lxiii Table of European Legislation���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� lxvii Chapter 1: The Institutional Framework������������������������������������������������������������������1 Workplace Relations Commission���������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 Public hearings��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2 Rules for Hearings���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Non-statutory rules��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Dismissal of frivolous and vexatious complaints by adjudication officer��������������6 Disposal by written submission only����������������������������������������������������������������������7 Striking out cases that are not pursued��������������������������������������������������������������������8 Process of hearing���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8 Findings�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 Enforcement of WRC decisions����������������������������������������������������������������������������21 Labour Court����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 Role in termination of employment cases�������������������������������������������������������������22 Structure����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 Operational structure���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 Investigation methods�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24 Labour Court Rules�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24 Appeals������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 Labour Court submission��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28 Withdrawal of claims��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28 Enforcement of Labour Court decisions���������������������������������������������������������������28 Circuit Court����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29 High Court�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29 Costs/Fees/Charges/Refunds����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30 Chapter 2: Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005�����������41 Purpose�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������41 Application�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������41 Notice Period���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������42 Continuous Service������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������42 Computable Service�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������43 What Constitutes ‘Pay’?����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������43 Notice to Employers����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������44

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Contents Waiver and Payment in Lieu of Notice������������������������������������������������������������������������44 Calculation of pay in lieu of notice�����������������������������������������������������������������������46 No Entitlement to Notice���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������46 Misconduct������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������46 Constructive dismissal������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������48 Resignation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49 Fixed-term/specified purpose contracts����������������������������������������������������������������50 Retirement�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������50 Incapability and notice������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������51 Lay-off/short-time working�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������51 Minimum Notice and the Payment of Wages Act 1991�����������������������������������������������52 Leave and Minimum Notice����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������53 Annual leave���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������53 Protective leave�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������53 Extending the Notice Period����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������54 Rights and Duties of Employees During the Notice Period����������������������������������������55 Notice must be Specific�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������56 Withdrawal of Notice���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������57 Disputes and Redress���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������57 Disputes�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������57 Redress������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������57 Wrongful Dismissal and Notice�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������58 Minimum Notice and Redundancy������������������������������������������������������������������������������58 Minimum notice in practice����������������������������������������������������������������������������������58 Chapter 3: Unfair Dismissal��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������61 Preliminary Requirements�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62 The complainant must be an employee�����������������������������������������������������������������62 Contract of employment����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62 The contract must be enforceable�������������������������������������������������������������������������75 Continuous service������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������78 Six-month/12-month time limit����������������������������������������������������������������������������81 The complainant must have been dismissed���������������������������������������������������������83 Exclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������90 Persons who have reached normal retirement age������������������������������������������������90 Persons employed by a close relative in a private house or on a farm where both reside���������������������������������������������������������������������������������91 Members of the Defence Forces���������������������������������������������������������������������������91 Members of An Garda Siochána���������������������������������������������������������������������������92 SOLAS trainees and statutory apprentices������������������������������������������������������������92 Employees dismissed during a period of probation or training�����������������������������93 Persons on fixed-term/specified purpose contracts�����������������������������������������������94 Persons covering for persons on protective leave or natal care����������������������������95 Persons covering for persons on adoptive leave���������������������������������������������������95 Persons ordinarily working outside the State��������������������������������������������������������96 Employees dismissed while working for foreign embassies in Ireland����������������98 x

Contents Onus of Proof���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������99 Exceptions where the onus of proof shifts to the employee��������������������������������100 Unfair Dismissals�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������102 Membership of a trade union or involvement in trade union activities��������������102 Strikes and lockouts��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������103 Religious or political opinions����������������������������������������������������������������������������107 Race, colour or sexual orientation�����������������������������������������������������������������������107 Age����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 Pregnancy or connected matters�������������������������������������������������������������������������109 Dismissals contrary to the Adoptive Leave Acts 1995 and 2005������������������������ 110 Membership of the Traveller community������������������������������������������������������������ 110 Civil or criminal proceedings������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 111 Dismissals in Accordance with Acts Other than the Unfair Dismissals Act�������������� 111 Persons reporting child abuse����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 111 Dismissals and the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 111 Dismissals and the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2005��������������������� 111 Dismissals and the Parental Leave Acts 1998 and 2006 and the Carer’s Leave Act 2001���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 115 Dismissals contrary to the National Minimum Wage Act 2000�������������������������� 115 Dismissals contrary to the Standards in Public Office Act 2001������������������������ 115 Dismissals Deemed Not to be Unfair������������������������������������������������������������������������� 115 Capability, competence or qualifications of the employee���������������������������������� 116 Conduct���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������128 Redundancy���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������153 Heat-of-the-moment resignations�����������������������������������������������������������������������156 Constructive Dismissal����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������158 And/or test�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������158 Unequivocal words���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������159 The contract test��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������159 The reasonableness test���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������161 Obligation to utilise the grievance procedure�����������������������������������������������������163 Surveillance of Employees/Use of Private Investigators�������������������������������������������166 Covert cameras����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������166 Covert recording of conversations����������������������������������������������������������������������171 Use of private investigators for employment law and ‘crossover’ with personal injury litigation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������173 Importance of Procedures������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������175 Reasonableness of the Employer’s Decision�������������������������������������������������������������175 Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������176 Compensation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������177 Minimum four weeks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������179 Ability to mitigate loss����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������180 Illness resulting from dismissal���������������������������������������������������������������������������182

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Contents Chapter 4: Fair Procedures and Natural Justice: Investigations and Disciplinary Hearings in the Workplace��������������������������������������������������������185 Procedural Fairness����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 The employer’s disciplinary procedure���������������������������������������������������������������185 Rights to natural and constitutional justice���������������������������������������������������������187 Suspensions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������191 Delay and suspensions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������195 Investigations�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������195 Terms of reference�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������196 Distinction between informal and formal investigations������������������������������������197 Conflation of investigation and disciplinary procedures�������������������������������������198 Independent investigators�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������199 Disciplinary Hearings������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Final written warnings����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Representation�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 Expert witnesses��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������203 Probationary employees��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������203 Appeals����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������205 Chapter 5: Redundancy������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������209 Statutory Definition of ‘Redundancy’������������������������������������������������������������������������209 Entitlement to a Redundancy Payment����������������������������������������������������������������������209 Continuous service���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 211 Insurable employment�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������213 Aged over 16�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������214 Genuine redundancy�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������214 The right to a redundancy lump-sum payment by reason of lay-off or short time (Form RP9)������������������������������������������������������������������������������214 Employees wishing to leave their employment before their notice of proposed dismissal expires������������������������������������������������������������������������216 Disentitlement to a Redundancy Payment�����������������������������������������������������������������217 Alternative work�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������217 Misconduct����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������218 Refusal to take alternative employment��������������������������������������������������������������218 Change of location����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������219 Calculation of Statutory Entitlement�������������������������������������������������������������������������220 Calculation of a week’s pay for purposes of the Act�������������������������������������������220 Reckonable and non-reckonable service�������������������������������������������������������������222 Maternity leave and additional maternity leave for redundancy calculation purposes��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������224 Parental leave for redundancy calculation purposes�������������������������������������������224 Calculating ‘excess days’ in respect of redundancies notified/declared on or after 10 April 2005�������������������������������������������������������������������������������225 Adoptive leave for redundancy calculation purposes�����������������������������������������225 Parent’s leave for redundancy calculation purposes�������������������������������������������225

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Contents Paternity leave for redundancy calculation purposes������������������������������������������225 Carer’s leave for redundancy calculation purposes��������������������������������������������225 Career break leave�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������226 Collective Redundancies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������226 Legislation�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������226 Collective redundancies and insolvency�������������������������������������������������������������227 Consultation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Failure to consult�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������230 Notification to the Minister���������������������������������������������������������������������������������231 Records����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������232 Information and Consultation Act 2006 and redundancies���������������������������������232 Redundancy and Unfair Dismissal�����������������������������������������������������������������������������232 The redundancy must be genuine������������������������������������������������������������������������232 ‘Impersonality requirement’��������������������������������������������������������������������������������234 Reasonableness of the conduct of the employer�������������������������������������������������237 Selection procedure (or criteria)?������������������������������������������������������������������������243 Redundancy and a change of ownership�������������������������������������������������������������253 Practical Considerations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Time limit for claim��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Notification timeline�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Negotiations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������261 Methods of calculating ex gratia redundancy payments�������������������������������������263 Labour Court – what should be discussed����������������������������������������������������������263 Refusal to accept redundancy notice�������������������������������������������������������������������264 Forms������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������265 Chapter 6: Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments�������������������������������������������������������269 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 Taxation of Lump Sums (Excluding Settlements and Awards Payable in Employment Cases)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 Lump-sum payments exempt from tax���������������������������������������������������������������269 Lump-sum payments that qualify for tax relief��������������������������������������������������269 Standard capital superannuation benefit�������������������������������������������������������������272 Subsequent claims�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������273 Taxation of lump sums by employers�����������������������������������������������������������������273 Time limits for claiming tax reliefs���������������������������������������������������������������������273 Taxation Exemption for Settlements and Awards in Employment Cases������������������273 Exemption�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������274 Fire and rehire�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������275 Practical Advice for Employers���������������������������������������������������������������������������������275 Structure of settlements���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������276 Importance of apportionment������������������������������������������������������������������������������277 Tax Treatment of Legal Fees in Employment Cases�������������������������������������������������278 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������279 Appendix I�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������279

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Contents Chapter 7: Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction�����������������������283 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������283 Wrongful Dismissal and Unfair Dismissal����������������������������������������������������������������283 Wrongful Dismissal and the Industrial Relations Acts����������������������������������������������284 The Employment Injunction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285 What is an injunction?�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285 Principles applied by the courts��������������������������������������������������������������������������286 Interlocutory Injunctions in Employment Cases – Their Development��������������������292 When are employment injunctions sought?��������������������������������������������������������294 When will an injunction be granted?������������������������������������������������������������������302 When will an injunction not be granted?������������������������������������������������������������304 Practical Considerations – Proceedings for Injunctive Relief�����������������������������������309 Where there is a statutory remedy�����������������������������������������������������������������������310 Interim injunctions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 311 Interlocutory injunctions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������312 Statutory injunctions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������313 Plenary summons������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������314 Notice of motion�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������317 Grounding affidavit���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������320 Chapter 8: Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������323 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������323 Legislation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������323 Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021��������������������������������������������������������������324 Practical Considerations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������357 Referral forms�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������357 Defending a discrimination claim�����������������������������������������������������������������������357 Awards in discriminatory dismissal claims���������������������������������������������������������359 Employees’ right to certain information�������������������������������������������������������������359 The Circuit Court������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������359 Appeals����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������360 Costs��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������360 Forms�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������361 Form EE2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������361 Form EE3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������366 Form 1 Circuit Court Employment Law Civil Bill���������������������������������������������370 Form 4 Circuit Court Motion on Notice�������������������������������������������������������������371 Form 2 Defence to Circuit Court Civil Bill��������������������������������������������������������373 Chapter 9: Dismissal and Employer Insolvency���������������������������������������������������377 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Effects of Various Types of Insolvency on the Employment Contract����������������������378 Bankruptcy����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Voluntary liquidation�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������379

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Contents Court official liquidation�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������381 Provisional liquidation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������382 Receivership��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������382 Examinership������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������384 Insolvency and Priorities of Debts�����������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Purpose of the Insolvency Act�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������387 Insolvency Legislation�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������388 Date of insolvency����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������389 What employees are covered?�����������������������������������������������������������������������������389 Employee entitlements����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������390 Prerequisites for a valid claim�����������������������������������������������������������������������������390 Relevant date�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������390 Which debts are recoverable?�����������������������������������������������������������������������������391 Payment����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������394 Employer Insolvency in Practice�������������������������������������������������������������������������������394 Employee forms��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������395 Employer forms���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������396 Payment of unpaid contributions to pension schemes����������������������������������������397 Transfer to the Minister of certain rights and remedies��������������������������������������398 Transfer of personal data in relation to insolvent employers in the United Kingdom��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������399 Complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission�����������������������������������������401 Minister’s right to refuse an application�������������������������������������������������������������402 Offences��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������402 Forms������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������403 Chapter10: Protected Disclosures��������������������������������������������������������������������������433 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������433 Relevant legislation���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������433 Understanding Protected Disclosures������������������������������������������������������������������������434 Definition of a ‘protected disclosure’������������������������������������������������������������������434 Definition of ‘relevant information’��������������������������������������������������������������������435 Definition of ‘relevant wrongdoing’��������������������������������������������������������������������435 Definition of a ‘worker’���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������447 Reporting Procedures�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������448 Establishing reporting procedures�����������������������������������������������������������������������448 The process of making a disclosure��������������������������������������������������������������������448 Managing Protected Disclosures��������������������������������������������������������������������������������463 Protections afforded to employees����������������������������������������������������������������������463 Civil claim for tort�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������474 Interim relief�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������475 Civil liability immunity���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Offences���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������479 Compensation in the event of dismissal��������������������������������������������������������������480 Practical Considerations for Employers���������������������������������������������������������������������481

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Contents Chapter 11: Transfer of a Business�������������������������������������������������������������������������483 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������483 Application of the Regulations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������483 Key definitions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 There must be a transfer��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Undertakings or parts of undertakings����������������������������������������������������������������489 Who is covered?��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������490 Employees’ Rights�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������493 Right to information and consultation����������������������������������������������������������������493 Employees’ representatives���������������������������������������������������������������������������������494 Exceptions to the protection of rights in the event of a transfer�������������������������495 Dismissals������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������497 Dismissal by reason of the transfer���������������������������������������������������������������������498 Dismissal for ‘economic, technical or organisational reasons’���������������������������498 Substantial change in working conditions����������������������������������������������������������502 The transfer of a business and redundancy���������������������������������������������������������503 Change of contractor/contracting out������������������������������������������������������������������504 Complaints and Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������508 Appeals����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������509 Injunctive relief���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������510 Practical Considerations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������510 Due diligence������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������510 Human resources audit���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 511 Indemnities and warranties��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 511 Can employees agree changes prior to or at the time of transfer?���������������������� 511 Picketing in the event of a transfer����������������������������������������������������������������������513 Data protection issues�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������513 Draft Letters in the Event of a Transfer���������������������������������������������������������������������514 Draft transferor letter������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������514 Draft transferee letter������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������516 Draft nomination form for employee representatives�����������������������������������������517 Draft letter to staff representative regarding their appointment��������������������������518 Index���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������521

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Table of Cases

A A, Mr v Government Department (DEC-2008-023)�������������������������������������������������8.31 AB v CD [2014] EWHC 1 (QB), [2014] 1 WLUK 13���������������������������������������������7.10 AIB v Diamond [2011] IEHC 505����������������������������������������������������������������������������7.14 AMQ v KJ [2018] IECA 97��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 Abels v The Administrative Board of the Bedrifsvereniging voor de Metaal-Industrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie (Case 135/83) [1985] ECR 469, [1985] 2 WLUK 80, [1987] 2 CMLR 406���������������������������� 11.22 Abdullah v Tesco Ireland plc (UD 1934/2014)���������������������������������������������������������3.76 Abler v Sodexho MM Catering Gesellschaft mbH (Case C-340/01) [2003] ECR I-14023, [2003] 11 WLUK 568, [2006] 2 CMLR 4��������������������� 11.31 Accountant, an v Accountancy Firm (ADJ-00017674)������������������������������������������3.106 Action Health Enterprises Ltd v Michael D’Arcy (ADJ-0014891)�����������������2.08; 3.28 Adan v Embassy of Kenya (UD 2163/2001)������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Adesokan v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 22, [2017] 1 WLUk 405, [2017] ICR 500�����������������������������������������������������������������3.84 Adigun v Equality Tribunal [2015] IESC 91���������������������������������������������������1.12; 3.02 Aer Lingus Teoranta v Labour Court [1990] ILRM 485������������������������������������������1.12 Agnieszka v Sami Swoi Ltd (DEC-2015-016)���������������������������������������������������������8.12 Aidan & Henrietta McGrath Partnership v Anna Monaghan (PD 15/1)�����������������10.35 Ajai v Anne Byrne (UD 449/2004)���������������������������������������������������������������������������5.58 Allen v Independent Newspapers (UD 641/2000)��������������������������������������������������3.106 Allen (Liz) v Independent Newspapers [2002] 13 ELR 84������������������������������������ 3.118 Allied Irish Banks v Lupton (1984) 3 JISSL 107���������������������������������������������������3.105 Almenares (Julian Aberto Rodriguez) v Old Park Catering Ltd (t/a New Park Hotel) (ADJ-00019264)���������������������������������������������������������������1.10 Alstom Ireland Ltd v A Worker (Decision No AD 0765)�����������������������������������������3.83 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, [1975] 2 WLR 316, [1975] 1 All ER 504��������������������������������������������������������������7.07, 7.14 Anderson v Dalkeith Engineering Ltd (in receivership) [1984] 7 WLUK 114, [1985] ICR 66, [1984] IRLR 429���������������������������������������������� 11.25 Anderson v Pringle Scotland Ltd 1998 SLT 754, [1997] 11 WLUK 334, [1998] IRLR 64���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.29 Antovic v Montenegro (Application 70838/13) [2017] 11 WLUK 675�����������������3.109 Anujoks v National Institute of Bioprocessing Research & Training Ltd [2007] 18 ELR 25������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.09 Applicant, an v County Council (DEC-E2010-054)�������������������������������������������������8.31 Arbizu (Claudia) v Eli Lilly (ADJ-00023783)����������������������������������������������������������1.10 Arkins (Karen) v Gno Plas Teoranta Teo (ADJ-00037190)��������������������������������������5.69 xvii

Table of Cases Aryzta Bakeries v Cacs (UDD 1812)���������������������������������������������������������������3.83; 4.30 Asda Stores Ltd v Coughlan (UKEAT/0451/10) [2011] 2 WLUK 432��������������������3.83 Aspden v Webbs Poultry & Meat Group (Holdings) Ltd [1995] 11 WLUK 433, [1996] IRLR 521�����������������������������������������������������������������������3.67 Assico Assembly v Corcoran (EED 033/2003)�������������������������������������������������������� 8.11 Astley v Celtec Ltd (Case C-478/03) [2005] ECR I-4389, [2005] 5 WLUK 696, [2005] 3 CMLR 9���������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.05 Atkinson v Carty [2005] ELR 1�����������������������������������������������������������������������8.40, 8.47 Auto Depot Ltd v Vasile Mateiu (UDD 1954)����������������������������������������������������������1.22 B B, Mr v Metal Processing Co (DEC-2013-196)�������������������������������������������������������8.35 Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] EWCA CIv 174, [2007] 3 WLUK 159, [2007] ICR 1026������������������������������������������������������������������������10.16 Bailey (Margaret) (t/a Finesse Beauty Salon) & Lisa Farrell (HSC/09/23) (Determination HSD/104)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 Balfour Beatty Networks Ltd v Wilax [2005] 11 WLUK 64, [2006] IRLR 258����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.31 Bambrick v Cobley [2006] 1 IRLM 81���������������������������������������������������������������������7.41 Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241���������������������������������������������������������������3.93 Banker, a v Bank (ADJ-00001266)���������������������������������������������������������������������������4.22 Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241���������������������������������������������������������������7.20 Bannon v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1993] 1 WLUK 13, [1993] 1 IR 500������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.29 Baranya (Tibor) v Rosderra Irish Meats Group Ltd [2022] IESC 56��������������������10.12, 10.29, 10.30 Barbulescu v Romania (Application 61496/08) [2017] 9 WLUK 42, [2017] IRLR 1032, [2017] 44 BHRC 17������������������������������������������������������������3.94 Barclay v Glasgow City Council [1983] 1 WLUK 13, [1983] IRLR 313����������������3.25 Bar Person, a v Public House & Restaurant (DJ-00025758)������������������������������������1.05 Barrett v Comr of An Garda Siochana & The Minister for Justice [2023] IECA 112���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.34, 7.35; 10.40 Barrett (Tom) v Department of Defence (EDA 1017)����������������������������������������������8.48 Barry v Newbridge Silverware Ltd (UD 1517/2012)�����������������������������������������������3.44 Barry v Precision Software Ltd (UD 624/2005)�������������������������������������������������������3.94 Barry (Kevin) v Parish Life Ltd (t/a Premier Insurances) (ADJ-00036429)������������5.80 Barry & French v Irish Linen Service Ltd (UD 905 & 906/1986)���������������������������3.85 Base Controller, a v Hackney Cab Co (ADJ-00014591)���������������������������������������� 11.05 Basnet v Elan Pharma (UD 737/2005)�������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.114 Beatty v Bayside Supermarkets (UD 142/1987)�����������������������������������������������������3.106 Beaumont v Muintir na Tire (UD 668/2004)���������������������������������������������������3.96; 5.70 Beck v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [2009] EWCA Civ 619, [2009] 6 WLUK 754, [2019] IRLR 740�����������������������������������������������������������3.109 xviii

Table of Cases Becton Dickinson v Lee (Patrick) [1973] 1 WLUK 637, [1973] IR 1���������������������3.47 Beechside Co Ltd (t/a Park Hotel Kenmare) (LCR 21798)��������������������������������������4.28 Beglan v Scanomat Ireland Ltd (UD 688/2012)�����������������������������������������������������3.106 Berg & Busschers v Besselsen (Joined Cases 144 & 145/1987) [1988] ECR 2559, [1988] 5 WLUK 61, [1989] 3 CMLR 817������ 5.85; 11.09, 11.15 Bergin v Bus Atha Cliath (UD 61/1987)�������������������������������������������������������������������3.81 Bergin v The Galway Clinic [2007] IEHC 386����������������������������������������������7.08, 7.15, 7.16, 7.18 Berriman v Delabole Slate Ltd [1985] 4 WLUK 71, [1985] ICR 546, [1985] IRLR 3052��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.25 Berthold (Rachel) v Google Ireland Ltd (UD 2147/2011)����������������������������������������4.23 Beruyaku (Priscilla) v Canbe Hospitality (ADJ-00031937)�������������������������������������3.16 Betts v Brintel Helicopters Ltd (t/a British International Helicopters); Betts v KLM ERA Helicopters (UK) Ltd [1997] 2 All ER 840, [1997] 3 WLUK 623, [1997] IRLR 361����������������������������������������������������������� 11.34 Bidvest Noonan (ROI) Ltd v Martina Lynch (TUD 203)��������������������������������������� 11.03 Blackrock (Toni & Guy) v Paul O’Neill [2010] EHRR 1����������������������������������������3.60 Blair (Eamonn) v Coverall Courier Services Ltd (UD 1263/2013)��������������������������3.67 Boal v IMED Ireland Ltd (Application 327/1994)���������������������������������������������������3.34 Boland v Phoenix Shannon plc [1997] ELR 113������������������������������������������������������4.17 Bolands Ltd (in receivership) v Ward [1987] IESC 1, [1988] ILRM 392�������2.21, 2.23 Bolger v Showerings (Ireland) Ltd [1990] ELR 184������������������������������������������������3.67 Bolton (Daragh) v Stobart Air UC (in liquidation) (ADJ-00029917)����������������������� 9.11 Botzen v Rotterdamasche Droodok Maatschappij BV (Application 186/83) [1985] ECR 519, [1985] 2 WLUK 70, [1986] 2 CMLR 50������������������������������ 11.13 Boucher v Irish Productivity Centre [1990] ELR 205������������������������������������3.96; 5.75, 5.79, 5.80 Bourton v Narcea & Anglo Irish Beef Processors (AIBP) (UD 186/1994)��������������3.06 Boyle (Zena) v Ely Property Group (DEC E2009-013)�������������������������������������������8.07 Bradley v Kilsheelan Technology International (2 June 2005), HC�������������������������5.80 Bradshaw v Murphy & Cooper Bar & Grill Ltd [2014] IEHC 146��������������������������7.33 Brady v An Post (UD 463/1991)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.85 Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal & Bohemians Football Club [2015] ELR 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.44 Brady v Newman (UD 330/1979)���������������������������������������������������������������������������3.101 Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17, [2015] 1 WLR 1661, [2015] 4 All ER 639��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.14 Bread Salesman, a v Bakery, a (ADJ-00006751)����������������������������������������������������� 2.11 Brennan v St Lukes Home Incorporated (UD 643/1988)�����������������������������������������3.81 Brewster v Burke (1978), HC�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.84 Brewster v Burke & Minister for Labour (1985) 4 JISLL 98����������������������������������� 2.11 Brilly v Scoil Mhuire Community School, Clane, Co Kildare (ADJ-00027798)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.117 British Leyland Cars Ltd v Lewis [1983] 1 WLUK 51, [1983] IRLR 58����������������5.79 Brock v An Post (UD 57/1987)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.78

xix

Table of Cases Brown v McNamara Freight Ltd (UD 745/1987)�����������������������������������������������������3.84 Brown v Rentokil Ltd (Case C-394/96) [1998] ECR I-4185, [1998] 6 WLUK 556, [1998] IRLR 445����������������������������������������������������������������3.52; 8.10 Browne v Consolidated Alumniumn (UD 729/1980)�����������������������������������������������5.73 Buckle v Lee Overlay Partners Ltd (UD 1509/2003)�����������������������������������������������3.39 Bunyan v United Dominions Trust Ltd (UD 66/1980)������������������������������������������� 3.113 Bunyan v United Dominions Trust (Ireland) Ltd [1982] ILRM 404���������������������� 3.115 Burke (Ammi) v Arthur Cox LLP (ADJ-00026883)������������������������������������������������1.21 Bus Drive, a v Bus Operator (ADJ-00004821)���������������������������������������������������������4.12 Bus Eireann v Mr C (ADE/07/EDA 08111)�������������������������������������������������������������8.32 Bus Eireann v SIPTU (PTD 8/2004)������������������������������������������������������������������������3.02 Business Development Manager v Contract Cleaning & Facilities Co (ADJ-00010555)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.101 Buthelezi v Coy Dlamini & Thobeka Dlaminin & The Republic of South Africa [2017] ELR 24�������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Buttimer v Oak Fuel Supermarket Ltd (t/a CostCutter Rathcormac) [2023] IEHC 126�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.14 Byrne v International Contract Cleaners (UD 538/1993)�����������������������������������������3.82 Byrne v PJ Quigley Ltd [1995] ELR 205�����������������������������������������������������������������1.35 Byrne v RHM Food (Ireland) Ltd (UD 69/1979)����������������������������������������3.101, 3.102 Byrne v Telecom Eireann (UD 24/1990)���������������������������������������������������������������� 3.112 Byrne v Trackline Crane Hire Ltd (UD 1099/2002)�������������������������������������������������5.61 Byrne (David) v Stobart (Ireland) Ltd (UD 34/2011)�����������������������������������������������3.46 C CCL Label Ltd v Gerard Byrne (UD 2147/2021)���������������������������������������������������3.105 CG Marine Ltd v Ciaran O’Connor (RPD 1910)������������������������������������������������������5.23 CMA v K [2023] IEHC 96����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.10 Cafferkey v Metrotech Services Ltd (UD 932/1998)������������������������������������3.25, 3.100 Cahill v Teagasc [1996] ELR 215�����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 Cahill (Brian) (t/a Jerpoint Inn) v Helen Greene (RPD 1710)����������������������������������5.86 Calderon v Lootah (UD 1219/2003)�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Calor Teoranta v McCarthy 2008-EDA-089, [2009] IEHC 139�������������������������������8.23 Cambridge & District Cooperative Society Ltd v Ruse [1993] 1 WLUK 623, [1993] IRLR 156�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.22 Campbell v Bank of Ireland Private Banking (DEC-E2-13-046)�����������������������������8.09 Campbell Catering v Rasaq (ED/02/52)�������������������������������������������������������������������8.36 Campus Oil v Minister for Energy (72/83) [1984] ECR 2727, [1984] 7 WLUK 90, [1984] 3 CMLR 544 (1983) 1 IR 88�����������������������������������7.07, 7.08, 7.09, 7.14 Cannon v Noonan Cleaning Ltd & CPS Cleaning Services Ltd [1998] ELR 212������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.30 Caplis v Transdev Ltd (UDD 1932) (ADJ-00012790)���������������������������������� 3.78, 3.110 Caren (James) v Celuplast & Conservatory Roofs Ltd (UD 653/2003)�����������������3.108 xx

Table of Cases Care Worker, a v Care Provider, a (ADJ-00011215)������������������������������������������������2.12 Carolan v Smith & Nephew Southalls (Ireland) Ltd (UD 542/1984)�����������������������3.77 Carroll v Bus Atha Cliath / Dublin Bus [1997] ELR 208�����������������������������������������3.71 Carroll v Bus Atha Cliath / Dublin Bus [2005] 4 IR 184������������������������������������������7.22 Carroll (Kevin) v SR Technics Ireland Ltd (UD 1419/2010)��������������������������������� 11.26 Carpet Weaver v Textile Co (ADJ-00017991)��������������������������������������������������������10.07 Carvill v Irish Industrial Bank Ltd [1986] IR 325���������������������������������������������������� 2.11 Casey (Alan) v Securitas Security Services Ireland (ADJ-00034950)���������������������8.53 Casey (Gary) v Keenan Timber Frames Ltd (ADJ-00041678)�������������������������������3.104 Cassidy v LM Ericsson Ltd (UD 934/2004)�������������������������������������������������������������5.79 Cassidy v Shannon Castle Banquets [2000] ELR 248����������������������������������������������7.18 Castle Brand Ltd (in liquidation), Re [1989] IEHC 53������������������������������������������� 11.22 Cavanagh v Dunnes Stores (UD 820/1994)��������������������������������������������������������������3.84 Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld [2009] 8 WLUK 58, [2010] ICR 325, [2010] IRLR 38������������������������������������10.09 Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc [1984] 1 All ER 225, [1982] 8 WLUK 53���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.14 Celtic Working Platforms Ltd v Mr Cian Carlin (UDD 2264)�������������������������������10.14 Cementation Skanska v Carroll (DWT 30/2003)������������������������������������������������������3.22 Chadwick v Power Supermarkets (UD 340/1983)����������������������������������������������������3.83 Charles (John) v NHS Business Services Authority (UKEAT/0105/15/BA)�����������4.12 Chef, a v Catering Service (ADJ-00006942)������������������������������������������������������������4.20 Chef, a v Pub / Restaurant (ADJ-00008693)������������������������������������������������������������4.28 Chief Constable of Bedfordshire v Graham [2001] 9 WLUK 372, [2002] IRLR 239, [2002] Emp LR 752��������������������������������������������������������������������������8.16 Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed (Restricted Reporting Order); A v B, ex p News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] 6 WLUK 534, [1998] ICR 55, [1998] IRLR 56��������������������������������������������������������������������������8.18 Childcare Worker, a v Childcare Facility (ADJ-00025131)�������������������������������������3.97 Cinders Ltd v Byrne (RPD 1811)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������5.22 Citizens Information Board & John Curtis (HSD 101)��������������������������������������������3.60 Cityjet Designated Activity Co (t/a Cityjet) v Ronan McArdle (RPD 221)�������������1.23 Civil Servant v Government Department (ADJ-0018226)���������������������������������������4.25 Clare County Council v Director of Equality Investigations [2011] IEHC 303������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.15 Clarke v CGI Food Services Ltd [2020] IEHC 368�������������������������������������10.15, 10.38 Clarke v Eley (IMI) Knynock Ltd; Eley (IMI) Kynoch Ltd v Powell [1982] 9 WLUK 79, [1983] ICR 165, [1982] IRLR 482������������������������������������5.79 Cleaner, a v Cleaning Services Provider, a (ADJ-00020785)�����������������������������������2.12 Cleary v TSB Bank (UD 754-1995)�������������������������������������������������������������������������4.27 Coffey v William Connolly & Sons Ltd [2007] IEHC 319��������������������7.08, 7.09, 7.18 Cole v Press O Matrix Ltd (UD 678-1992)��������������������������������������������������������������3.30 Colgan v Boots Ireland (DEC-E201-008)�����������������������������������������������������������������8.27 Collado (Angela Garcia) v Stobart Air (in provisional liquidation) (ADJ-00030110)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Collins, Re [1925] Ch 556, [1925] 5 WLUK 51����������������������������������������������9.03, 9.07 xxi

Table of Cases Collins v Excel Property Services Ltd (RP 27/98)������������������������������������������������� 11.30 Companies Acts 1963-1983, Re (25 March 1995), HC������������������������������������������ 11.22 Company, a v Worker (ADE/09/21)�������������������������������������������������������������������������8.32 Company, a v Worker (ED/04/13)����������������������������������������������������������������������������8.29 Company, a v Worker (EE03/1991)��������������������������������������������������������������������������8.40 Complainant, a v Department Store (DEC-E2002/017)�������������������������������������������8.48 Complainant, a v Respondent (ADJ-0002318)���������������������������������������������������������3.67 Complainant, a v Respondent (ADJ-00002364)�����������������������������������������������������3.101 Complainant, a v Respondent (ADJ-00026835)����������������������������������������������2.04; 3.19 Complainant, a v Respondent (ADJ-00028243)�������������������������������������������������������3.08 Complainant, a v Sports Centre (ADJ-00012455)��������������������������������������������������3.109 Component Distributors (cd Ireland) v Brigid (Beatrice) Burns (TED 1812)����������5.63 Computer Component Co, a v Worker [2002] ELR 124������������������������������������������8.28 Connemara Marble Industries Ltd v Frances Murphy (PDD 206)�������������������������10.14 Connerty (Catherine) v Caffrey Transport Ltd (DEC-E2008-018)���������������������������8.50 Connolly v Ulster Bank Ltd (UD 474/1981)����������������������������������������������������������3.105 Construction Worker, a v Construction Co (DEC-E2008-048)�����������������������8.19, 8.47 Conway v Ulster Bank (UDA 474/1981)����������������������������������������������������������������3.106 Conway (Andre) v Department of Agriculture, Food & Marine (ADJ-00036667) [2020] IEHC 665����������������������������������������������������������1.08; 10.32 Cope Ltd (t/a Cope Galway) v Ms Leigh Bell (UDD 2145)�����������������������������������3.106 Corcoran v Cope Ltd (UD 1105/2011)���������������������������������������������������������������������3.81 Cosgrave v Kavanagh Meat Products Ltd (UD 6/1988)�����������������������������������������3.101 Counihan (Seamus) v Arramara Teoranta (ADJ-00037726)����������������������������������� 3.117 County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal & Pearse Brannigan [2009] IEHC 370������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.15 County of Donegal v Neil Porter [1993] ELR 101���������������������������������������������������3.30 Cousins v Brookes Thomas Ltd (UD 45/1988)��������������������������������������������������������3.78 Coyle v Dun Laoighre Vocational Educational Committee (UD 993/1996)������������3.74 Crawford v Swinton Insurance Brokers Ltd [1989] 10 WLUK 279, [1990] ICR 85, [1990] IRLR 42������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.26 Creche Worker, a v Creche (ADJ-00032972)��������������������������������������������������8.19, 8.20 Credit Analyst v Financial Services Co (ADJ-00026985)����������������������������������������1.10 Crisp v Apple Retail (UK) Ltd 1500258/2001)��������������������������������������������������������3.94 Cronin v RPS Group, Tallaght (UD 2348/2009)����������������������������������������������5.69, 5.75 Cronin v Rachel Dalton Communications Ltd (UD 1143/2008)������������������������������5.56 Crosby & Rooney v Fuss Door Systems Ltd (UD 294/2007)����������������������������������5.77 Crotty v Marriott Radiators Ltd (UD 985/2004)�������������������������������������������������������3.72 Crowe v An Post [2016] ELR 93������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.85 Crown Equipment v Amicus (CD/03/571)�������������������������������������������������������������3.108 Crystal Palace FC Ltd v Kavanagh [2013] EWCA Civ 1410, [2014] 1 All ER 1033, [2013] 11 WLUK 301�������������������������������������������������������������� 11.25 Cudak v Lithuania (Application 15869/02) [2010] 3 WLUK 646, (2010) EHRR 15, 30 BHRC 157������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Culkin v Sligo County Council [2017] IECA 104����������������������������������������������������3.89 Cullen v Kilternan Park Cemetery Ltd [2020] IECC 2�������������������������������������������10.39 xxii

Table of Cases Cullen (Stephen) v Designer Group Engineering Contractors Ltd (ADJ-00031644)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.67 Cunningham v Intel Ireland Ltd [2013] IEHC 207, [2013] ELR 233����������������������3.89 Customer, a v Retail Premises (ADJ-00036307)������������������������������������������������������1.05 Customer Perception Ltd v Leydon (DEE 17/2003)�������������������������������������������������8.27 Customer Service Operator, a v Car Hire Co (ADJ-00019536)�����������������������������3.109 Customer Solutions Agent v Payment Services (ADJ-00027930)���������������������������2.12 D D & T Forkan Construction Ltd v Diamon (RPD 181)��������������������������������������������5.17 DO v National School (UD 181/2007)���������������������������������������������������������������������3.86 Daly v Hanson Industries Ltd (UD 55/1979)������������������������������������������������������������3.96 Daly v Hanson Industries Ltd (UD 719/1986)����������������������������������������������������������5.57 Daniels v County Wexford Community Workshop (New Ross) Ltd [1996] ELR 213���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.61 Darnton v University of Surrey [2002] 12 WLUK 267, [2003] ICR 615, [2003] IRLR 133�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.16 Data Protection Comr v Doolin [2022] IECA 117��������������������������������������������������3.108 Davis v Dublin Institute of Technology (July 2002), HC�����������������������������������������8.37 Davis v Sealink Stena Line Ltd (UD 874/1993)�������������������������������������������������������3.39 Dawkins v Crown Suppliers (PSA) [1993] 1 WLUK 969, [1993] ICR 517, [1993] IRLR 284�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.37 Dawson v Eir Imports Ltd (UD 616/93)�������������������������������������������������������������������5.80 Deadline Direct Ltd (t/a Deadline Couriers) (ADJ-00036160)��������������������������������8.46 Deegan v Minister for Finance [2000] 11 WLR 190������������������������������������������������4.14 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jonge Volwassenen Plus (Case C-177/88) [1990] ECR I-3941, [1990] 11 WLUK 127, [1991] IRLR 27���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.10 Dental Technician v A Dental Laboratory (ADJ-00012025)����������������������������������3.108 De Sousa v Keypack Group (UD 964/2011)������������������������������������������������������������3.70 Devaney v DNT Distribution Co Ltd (UD 412/993)������������������������������������������������3.24 Devaney v Designer Wholesale Flowers Sundries Ltd [1993] IRLR 517�������������� 3.118 Devlin & Leahy v McInerny Construction Ltd (UD 726 & 727/2004)��������������������5.73 Dillon v Board of Management of Catholic University School [2018] IECA 292�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.23 Dinworth v Southern Hotel Board (UD 284/1977)���������������������������������������������������5.59 Dodd v Local Stores (Trading) Ltd [1992] ELR 61��������������������������������������������������9.07 Dogherty v Chairman & Governors of Amwell View School [2006] 9 WLUK 205, [2007] ICR 135, [2007] IRLR 198��������������������������������������������3.109 Doherty v South Dublin County Council [2007] IEHC 4�����������������������������������������7.37 Donegal County Council v Langan (UD 143/1989)�������������������������������������������������3.70 Donnelly v Gleeson (1985) 4 JISLL 109������������������������������������������������9.05, 9.07, 9.08 Donovan v Dunnes Stores (UD 1163/2007)�����������������������������������������������������������3.106 Dooky v Baxter Storey Ireland Ltd (UD 1293/2010)�����������������������������������������������3.04 xxiii

Table of Cases Dorian v Dundalk Golf Club (UD 237/1987)�����������������������������������������������������������5.70 Dougan (Mick) & Clark (Sean) v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.38, 10.39 Dowling v Minister for Finance [2013] 4 IR 576�����������������������������������������������������7.34 Dowling (Eanna) v Cumann na Daoine Aontaithe Teo (UD 545/2007)����������4.08, 4.10 Drogheda Resource Centre v Reilly (UDD 1929)����������������������������������������������������3.88 Drumcondra Childcare Ltd v Agnieszka Szumera (RPD 1814)����������������������5.14, 5.15 Dublin Bus v Osbourne Irabor (UD 68/2021)�������������������������������������������������3.67, 3.70 Dublin City Council v McCarthy (DEC-EE 2001/15)����������������������������������������������8.48 Dublin Corpn v Hardy (UD 571/1983)���������������������������������������������������������������������3.81 Dunbar (Aideen) v Wheelock Fruits Ltd (ADJ-00036819)������������������������������������ 3.116 Dunn v Institute of Cemetery & Crematorium Management (UKEAT/0531/10)������ 8.16 Dunne v Clifford (TE/19/50)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.34 Dunne v Securitas [2017] ELR 132��������������������������������������������������������������������������3.78 Durnin v Building & Engineering Co Ltd (UD 159/1978)���������������������������������������3.64 D’Urso v Ercole Marelli Elettromeccanica Generale Spa (Case C-362/89) [1991] ECR I-4105, [1991] 7 WLUK 328, [1993] 3 CMLR 513��������������������� 11.40 E EG v Society of Actuaries in Ireland [2017] IEHC 392����������������������������������4.25; 7.21 EH v Named Co (t/a A Cab Co, Dublin) (DEC-E2008-048)���������������������������8.45, 8.47 Earley v Health Service Executive [2015] IEHC 520����������������������������������������������7.08 Earley v Health Service Executive [2015] IEHC 841������������������������������������� 7.09, 7.11 Earley (Paul) v Roadbridge Ltd (in liquidation) (ADJ-00040854)��������������������������� 9.11 Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2004] UKHL 35, [2005] 1 AC 503, [2004] IRLR 733����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.118 Easwaran (Dr) v St George’s University of London (EAT 0167/10)����������������������10.15 Egan (Deirdre) v Swancrest Ltd (ADJ-00036637)�������������������������������������������������10.30 Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Ltd v Leibovici [1976] 10 WLUK 79, [1977] ICR 260, [1976] IRLR 376����������������������������������������������������������������������3.70 Electrician, an v Transport Provider (ADJ-00007578)���������������������������������������������3.86 Employee, an v Employer (ADJ-000381)����������������������������������������������������������������3.27 Employee, an v Employer, an (ADJ-0005633)���������������������������������������������������������3.76 Employee, an v Employer (UD 651/2007)���������������������������������������������������������������3.93 Employee, an v Employer (UD 1421/2008)�����������������������������������������������������������3.106 Employee, an v Employer (DEC-E2003-027)����������������������������������������������������������8.45 Employee, an v Food Shop (ADJ-00026126)�����������������������������������������������������������3.03 Employee, an v Government Department (ADJ-00018309)������������������������������������3.10 Employee, an v Medical Device Organisation (ADJ-00034417)�����������������������������1.05 Employee, an v Multinational Retailer (DEC-E2016-021)��������������������������������������3.67 Employer, an v Employee (UD 230/2014)���������������������������������������������������������������3.69 Employer, an v Employee [1995] ELR 139��������������������������������������������������������������8.15 Employer, an v Worker (EEA0413)��������������������������������������������������������������������������8.32 Enterprise Ireland v Andrew Connell (PDD 183)���������������������������������������������������10.35 xxiv

Table of Cases European Paint Importers Ltd v O’Callaghan [2005] IEHC 280�����������������������������7.41 Eversheds Legal Services v De Belin (EAT 0352)���������������������������������������������������8.08 F Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117, [1986] 3 WLR 288, [1986] 1 All ER 617��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.23 Fairbrother v Steifel Laboratories (Ireland) (UD 665/1985)������������������������������������3.90 Farley v Ireland [1997] IESC 60�������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.08 Farm Manager v Farme (ADJ-00017360)����������������������������������������������������������������3.67 Farrell v Minister for Defence (10 July 1984), HC�����������������������������������������4.07, 4.18 Father, a v Clinical Psychologist (ADJ-00036551)��������������������������������������������������1.05 Fay v Tegral Pipes Ltd [2005] IR 261�����������������������������������������������������������������������1.08 Feely v Fresenius Medical Care (UD 758/2008)����������������������������������������������������3.106 Female Employee, a v Candle Production Co (DEC-E2006-035)���������������������������8.49 Female Employee, a v Recruitment Co (DEC-E2008-105)��������������������������������������8.45 Female Teacher v Board of Management of a Secondary School (DEC-E2021-103)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.49 Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali SpA [1985] 3 ILTR 73���������������������7.09, 7.15, 7.26 Field v Irish Canton Printers (DEO 5/1994)�������������������������������������������������������������8.08 Financial Services Union v Gerry Hanna (PDD 201)���������������������������������������������10.33 Fingal County Council v O’Brien (PDD 184)��������������������������������������������������������10.36 Firm of Solicitors, a v Worker [2002] ELR 124�������������������������������������������������������8.22 Fitzgerald (Angela) v BR Marketing Ltd (ADJ-00034655)�������������������������������������5.69 Fitzgerald (Eileen) v HSE South (UD 190/2014)�����������������������������������������������������1.35 Flanagan v MW Wallpaper Specialists Ltd (UD 153, 154, 155 & 156/1989)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.96; 5.57 Flexman v BG Group (2701998/2011, Employment Tribunal)��������������������������������3.94 Flynn v An Post [1987] IR 68��������������������������������������������������������������������������4.14, 4.16 Flynn (Muris) v Ianrod Eireann (ADJ-00030195)�������������������������������������������3.70, 3.86 Flynn (Noel) v Emerald Facilities Services (DEC-E2009-065)�������������������������������8.32 Fogarty v Lufthansa Technik Turbine Shannon Ltd (UD 394/2006)���������������������� 3.110 Folan v Galway Drug Co Ltd (ADJ-00004808)�������������������������������������������������������3.60 Foley v Aer Lingus Group [2001] ELR 193������������������������������������������������������������� 7.11 Foley v Calview Investments Ltd (UD 1228/2003)������������������������������������������������ 3.114 Foley v Mahon & McPhillips Ltd (UD 267/1979)���������������������������������������������������5.73 Foley (Darren) v McLeary’s Restaurant Ltd (ADJ-00030239)��������������������������������3.97 Foreningen at Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S (Case 324/86) [1984] ECR 739, [1988] 2 WLUK 108, [1989] 2 CMLR 517����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.04, 11.09, 11.39 Forman Construction Ltd v Kelly [1977] 1 WLUK 155, [1977] IRLR 468�������������5.70 Forster v Schumann (1) 7 19 IR 240�������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 Francisco Hernandex Vidal SA v Perez (Case C-127/96) [1998] ECR I-8179, [1998] 12 WLUK 215, [1999] IRLR 132��������������������������������������������������������� 11.03 xxv

Table of Cases Frizelle v New Ross Credit Union Ltd [1997] IEHC 137����������������������������������������3.76 Furlong (Anne) v Mackin Travel Ltd (ADJ-00037133)������������������������������������������� 9.11 G GP, a v Public Body (ADJ-00010315)����������������������������������������������������������������������3.12 Gaelschoil Thulach na nOg & Joyce Fitzsimmons-Markey (EET 034)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.19, 1.33, 1.34; 8.17 Gallagher v Eircom Ltd (UD 955/2004)�������������������������������������������������������������������3.86 Galway Mayo Institute of Technology v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2007] IEHC 210����������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.15 Game Retail Ltd v Laws [2014] 11 WLUK 18, [2014] Info TLR 369���������������������3.94 Gearon v Dunnes Stores (UD 367/1988)������������������������������������������������������������������4.08 Geary v Board of Management Rushbrooke National School (UD 931/2006)��������5.78 General Operative, a v Beverage Co (ADJ-00007777, ADJ-00007813, ADJ-00002984)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.15 General Operative, a v Construction Co (ADJ-00016771)���������������������������������������3.24 General Operative, a v Food Company (ADJ-00012100)����������������������������������������1.08 General Operative, a v Fruit Producer (ADJ-00021143)������������������������������������������2.16 Geraghty v Industrial Credit Corpn (UD 396/1989)�������������������������������������������������3.25 Giblin v Irish Life & Permanent plc [2010] IEHC 36�������������������������������������7.09, 7.12 Gillespie (Rosina) v Business Mobile Security Services (t/a Senaca Group) (ADJ-00003243)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.16 Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1997] 1 WLR 1659, [1998] 2 All ER 953, 1998 SC (HL) 27�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.37 Glynn v HSS (t/a Citywest Hotel) (26 February 2010), HC�������������������������������������7.09 Goulding Chemicals v Bolger [1977] IR 211�����������������������������������������������������������5.77 Government Department v Employee (ADE/01/19 Det No 062)��������������������8.10, 8.28 Government of Canada v Employment Appeals Tribunal & Brian Burke [1992] ELR 29�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Governor & Co of the Bank of Ireland v James Reilly [2015] IEHC 241����������������4.14 Graham v ABF [1986] 1 WLUK 167, [1986] IRLR 90��������������������������������������������5.72 Graham v Portroe Stevedores (UD 574/2006)�������������������������������������������������3.85; 4.10 Grant v HM Land Registry [2011] ELR 33�����������������������������������������������������8.19, 8.20 Gray v ISPCA, David Prendeville & Dublin Corpn (UD 5509/84)����������������������� 11.15 Gray v Little Monkeys Playschool (ADJ-00037665)��������������������������������������������� 3.116 Green v Government of the United States of America (UD 289/2014)��������������������3.40 Grenet v Electronic Arts Ireland Ltd [2018] IEHC 786��������������������������������������������7.33 Griffin v Beamish & Crawford (UD 90/1983)����������������������������������������������������������3.83 Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1994] 8 WLUK 115, [1995] IRLR 15������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.18 Guidon v Hugh Farrington & Ushers Island Petrol Station [1993] ELR 98����������� 11.09 Gurr v Office of Public Works [1990] ELR 42���������������������������������������������������������3.71

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Table of Cases H Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1990] ILRM 293, [1990] ELR 49�������������������������������������1.22, 1.40; 2.12 Hall v Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 225, [2000] 4 All ER 787, [2000] 5 WLUK 664��������������������������������������������������������������������3.17 Handyside v Tesco Stores (Ireland) Ltd (UD 256/1984)������������������������������������������3.77 Hanley (Laurence) v Revenue Commissioners 15 TACD 2021����������������������6.22, 6.23 Hanlon v Smiths’ Dolphins Barn Ltd (UD 883/1992)����������������������������������������������3.72 Hannon v First Direct Logistics Ltd [2011] ELR 215����������������������������������������������8.13 Harrington v Irish Nationwide Building Society (2008), HC�����������������������������������4.21 Harris v PV Doyle Hotels (UD 150/1978)����������������������������������������������������������������4.06 Harris & Russell Ltd v Slingsby [1973] 3 All ER 31, [1973] 5 WLUK 72, [1973] ICR 454���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.27 Hartnett v Advance Tyre (t/a Advance Pit Stop) [2013] IEHC 615�����������������4.11; 7.08 Haughey, Re [1971] IR 217��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.28 Hawkins v Atex Group Ltd [2012] 3 WLUK 356, [2012] ICR 1315, [2012] IRLR 807�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.16 Hayden v Sean Quinn Properties Ltd [1994] ELR 45����������������������������������������������3.17 Hays Specialist Recruitment (Holdings) Ltd v Ions [2008] EWHC 745 (Ch), [2008] 4 WLUK 413, [2008] IRLR 904����������������������������������������������������3.94 Health & Fitness Club v Worker (ED/02/59)������������������������������������������������������������8.28 Health & Fitness Club v Worker (EEE/DO-37)��������������������������������������8.30, 8.31, 8.35 Health & Safety Director, a v Company (ADJ-00015311)���������������������������������������3.17 Health Care Assistant v Care Facility (ADJ-00016594)�������������������������������������������3.42 Health Care Worker, a v Care Home (ADJ-00009728)��������������������������������������������1.41 Healy v Corneen Construction Ltd (UD 98/1978)�������������������������������������������������� 3.115 Healy (Megan) v Fit 4 Life Gym Ltd (ADJ-00030571)�������������������������������������������2.08 Heaphy (Anthony) v Health Service Executive (ADJ-00030778)�������������������������10.31 Henderson v Henderson [1843-60] All ER Rep 378, 67 ER 313, (1843) 3 Hare 100�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.89 Henke v Gemeinde Schierke & Verwaltunsgemeinschaft ‘Broken’ (Case C-298/94) [1996] ECR I-4989, [1996] 10 WLUK 198, [1996] IRLR 701����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.14 Hennesy v Ready & Write Shop Ltd (192/1978)������������������������������������������������������3.94 Henry Denny & Sons (Ireland) Ltd v Minister for Social Welfare [1989] IR 34��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.07 Hernandez (Octavio) v Vodafone Ireland Ltd [2013] IEHC 70��������������������������������7.23 Hickey v Eastern Health Board [1991] 1 IR 208, [1990] ELR 177��������5.63, 5.69; 7.28 Hidalgo (Sanchez) v Asociacion de Servicios Aser (Case C-173/96) [1998] ECR-I 8237, [1998] 12 WLUK 214, [2002] ICR 73����������������������������� 11.03 Higgins v Aer Lingus (UD 410/1986)����������������������������������������������������������������������3.90 Higgins v Donnelly Mirrors Ltd (UD 104/1979)����������������������������������������������������3.102 Higgins (Mary) v TSB (DEC-E2010-084)������������������������������������������������������8.17, 8.52 Hill v CA Parsons & Co [1972] Ch 305, [1971] 3 WLR 995, [1971] 3 All ER 1345������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.15 xxvii

Table of Cases Hill v Parsons & Co [1985] 3 ILTR 73���������������������������������������������������������������������7.15 Hogan (Michael) v United Beverages Sales Ltd (14 October 2005), CC�����������������3.07 Hollister v National Farmers Union [1979] 3 WLUK 83, [1979] ICR 542, [1979] IRLR 238�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.27 Hooper v Mary Immaculate College (UD 1167/2006)���������������������������������������������3.36 Hospira v Roper [2013] ELR 263�����������������������������������������������������������������������������5.76 Hotel, a v Worker (EDA 0915)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.53 Housekeeper, a v Employer (ADJ-00021037)����������������������������������������������������������3.22 Howard v University College Cork (2000) ELR 8��������������������������������������������������� 7.11 Howard (Gary) v Ryanair DAC (ADJ-00030903)����������������������������������������������������5.80 Hubbard v McMullen & Gillen (UD 580, 670 & 721/1983)������������������������������������3.80 Humphrey’s v Westwood Fitness Club [2004] ELR 296������������������������������������������8.30 Hurley v Royal Cork Yacht Club [1999] ELR 7�������������������������������������������������������3.96 Hussein v The Labour Court [2012] 2 IR 180����������������������������������������������������������3.04 Hyde & Seek Glasnevin v Jade Byrne-Hoey (PDD 219)���������������������������������������10.35 Hyland Shipping Agencies (2 February 1996), HC������������������������������������������������ 11.34 I Imtiaz Ahmed Ranjha Sky Solicitors v Imtiaz Khan (MWD212)����������������������������1.22 Inboard Transport Co-ordinator v Food Production & Distribution Co (ADJ-00010599)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.15 Industrial Cleaner, an v Industrial Cleaning Co (ADJ-00010547)���������������������������3.14 Irish Aviation Authority v Christopher Reddin (UD D1710)������������������������������������3.69 Irish Bank Resolution Corpn (IBRC) v Browne [2021] IEHC 83����������������������������1.16 Irish County Meats Ltd v Duignan (M1164/94)�������������������������������������������������������5.16 Irish Ferries v McDermott (EDA 1631)��������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 Irish Leathers v Minister for Labour (1986) 5 JISLL 211����������������������������������������2.17 Irish Rail v McKelbey [2019] IESC 79��������������������������������������������������������������������4.25 Irish Shipping Ltd v Nyrne & the Minister for Labour [1987] IR 468���������������������9.07 J J Donoghue Beverages Ltd v Elizabeth Collins (TUD 183/2018)������������������������� 11.15 JVC Europe Ltd v Panisi [2011] IEHC 279, [2012] ELR 70�����������������������������������3.75 James (Professor Kevin) v Cork Institute of Technology (DEC-2010-076)�������������8.52 Jing Xian Li v David L’Estrange (t/a L’Estrange & Co) (UD 2153/2010)���������������3.53 Johnson v Unisys [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518, [2001] 2 All ER 801, [2001] IRLR 279��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.118; 7.29 Jones (Clive) v Cork County Council (ADJ-00028630)����������������������������������������� 11.30 Junk v Kuhnel (Case C-188/03) [2005] ECR I-885, [2005] 1 WLUK 493, [2005] 1 CMLR 42���������������������������������������������������������������������������5.49, 5.87, 5.88, 5.94; 11.19

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Table of Cases K Kane v Dunnes Stores Ltd (UD 1547/2003)�����������������������������������������������������������3.102 Kane v Willstan Racing (Ireland) Group (UD 1263/2008)�������������������������������������3.104 Karshan (Midlands) Ltd (t/a Domino’s Pizza) v Revenue Comrs [2022] IECA 124�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.13 Katiskas v Konstantinidis & Skred (Case C-132/91) [1992] ECR I-6577, [1992] 12 WLUK 292, [1993] IRLR 179��������������������������������������������������������� 11.28 Kavanagh (Michael) v Kilkenny County Council [2008] ELR��������������������������������3.51 Kean v Western Health Board (US 940/1988)����������������������������������������������������������3.25 Keane v Western Health Board (UD 940/1988)�������������������������������������������������������3.25 Keane v Westinghouse Electrical Ireland Ltd (UD 63/1986)�����������������������������������3.81 Kearney v Byrne Wallace [2017] IEHC 713������������������������������������������������������������7.37 Kearney v Tesco (UD 86/2010)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.67 Kearns (Colin Dominic) v Ata Tools (ADJ-00030876)��������������������������������������������5.71 Keating v Bus Eireann (UD 680/2001)���������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Keenan (John) v Iarnrod Eireann (22 January 2010), HC�������������������������������7.15, 7.19 Keenan v Keogh (t/a Mortgage Cabin) (DEC-E2012-015)��������������������������������������8.10 Keenan v Professional Contract Services Ltd (UD 454, 455 & 456/1998)������������ 11.30 Keenan v The Gresham Hotel (UD 4784/1998)�������������������������������������������������������5.59 Keith v Department of Justice & Equality (163/2014)���������������������������������������������3.03 Kelleher v St James’ Hospital Board (UD 59/1977)�������������������������������������������������5.59 Kellog Brown & Root (UK) Ltd v Fitton & Ewer (UKEAT/0205/16/BA)������������3.105 Kelly v Bon Secours [2012] IEHC 21����������������������������������������������������������������������8.44 Kelly v Cavanagh Hiester Ltd (in liquidation) & Dubshad Ltd [1987] CMLR 406�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.22 Kelly v Masterson v Chivers Ireland Ltd (DEC 2011-117)��������������������������������������5.76 Kelly v Power Supermarkets Ltd [1990] 1 ELR 141������������������������������������������������4.04 Kelly v Sanser Ltd (M1343/1983)���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.11 Kelly v University of Dublin Trinity College (DEC-E2013-106)����������������������������8.12 Kenmare Brewhouse Ltd (t/a McCarthy’s Bar & Restaurant) v Ms Ciara O’Leary (TUD 207)���������������������������������������������������������������� 11.17, 11.23 Kennedy (Patrick) v Stresslite Tanks Ltd & Stresslite Floors Ltd (DEC-E2009-078)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.35 Kennedy (Trevor) v Veoilia Transport Ireland (UD 240/2006)��������������������������������3.83 Kenny v Tegral Building Products Ltd (UD 837/2004)��������������������������������������������3.34 Kenny (Anthony) v Bord Na Mona (ADJ-00027832)����������������������������������������������8.23 Keogh (Garry) v JTM Jumpstarters Ltd (UD 1090/2008)��������������������������������������3.106 Kerrigan v Peter Owens Advertising & Marketing Ltd (UD 31/97)���������������3.51; 8.22 Khan v ACCHL Ltd AIM Cash & Carry (ADJ-00029481)��������������������������������������3.44 Kiernan v A-Wear (UD 643/2007)����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.93 Kiernan v Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children (UD 1129/1992)������������������������� 4.11 Kierse v National University of Ireland Galway (UD 219/2000)�����������������������������3.36 Kilraine v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1436, [2018] 6 WLUK 412, [2018] ICR 1850��������������������� 10.09, 10.10, 10.11 Kilsaran Concrete v Vitalie Vet [2016] ELR 237��������������������������������������������3.78; 4.12 xxix

Table of Cases Kingdom of Saudi Arabia v Abraham (EDA 25/2019)���������������������������������������������3.40 Kirwan v Iona National Airways Ltd (UD 156/87)��������������������������������������������������5.80 Kirwan v Mental Health Commission [2012] IEHC 217�����������������������������������������7.37 Kitchen Designer, a v An Interior Design Co (ADJ-00007325)�������������������������������3.25 Klarenberg v Ferrotron Technologies GmbH (Case C-466/07) [2009] ECR I-803, [2009] IRLR 301, [2009] ICR 1263���������������������������������������������� 11.31 Kopke v Germany [2010] ECHR 1725�������������������������������������������������������������������3.108 Kwik-Fit (GB) Ltd v Lineham [1991] 10 WLUK 329, [1992] ICR 183, [1992] IRLR 156����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.25, 3.97 Kylemore Services Group / Home Fare Services Ltd v Terrie Clarke (DEC-E2015-160)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.34 L LW Associates & Lisa Lacey (HSC/08/2) (Determination HSD 085)����������������������3.60 Laboratory Technician, a v Laboratory, a (ADJ-00029180)�������������������������������������2.23 Lally (Emer) v Board of Management of Rosmini Community School [2021] IEHC 810�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.07 Landsorganisationen i Danmark v Ny Molle Kro (Case C-287/86) [1987] ECR 5465, [1987] 12 WLUK 217, [1989] 2 CMLR 468���������������������� 11.09, 11.29 Lang Michener & Fabian, Re (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 685������������������������������������������1.08 Langan v Donegal County Council (UD 143/80)�����������������������������������������������������3.86 Larkin v Irish Coast Guard (UD 700/2015)��������������������������������������������������������������3.03 Law v Irish County Meats (Pig Meats) Ltd [1988] ELR 266�����������������������������������5.15 Lawless v Dublin City Council (UD 335/1989)�������������������������������������������������������3.67 Lee (t/a Peking House) v Fox (ED/01/53)������������������������������������������������������� 8.11, 8.54 Legal Secretary, a v Legal Partnership (ADJ-00018637)�����������������������������������������5.84 Lennon v Bredin (M160/1978)������������������������������������������������������������������������2.11; 3.75 Leonard v Hunt (t/a Willie’s Restaurant) [2004] ELR 14�����������������������������������������1.35 Leopard Security v David Campbell [1997] ELR 227��������������������������������������������� 2.11 Lewis v Squash Ireland Ltd [1983] ILRM 363���������������������������������������������������������3.17 Libert v France (Application 588/13) [2018] ECHR 185���������������������������������������3.108 Lillis v Kiernan (EAT, 22 June 2004)�����������������������������������������������������������������������5.60 Limited Co, a v One Female Employee (EE10/1998)����������������������������������������������8.40 Lingam (Maha) v Health Service Executive [2006] 17 ELR 140����������7.08, 7.18, 7.32 Long v Hanley Group (DEC-E2010-015)�����������������������������������������������������������������8.18 Looney & Co Ltd (UD 843/1984)�������������������������������������������������������������������3.77, 3.94 Lopez Ribalda v Spain (Applications 1873/13 & 8567/13) [2019] 6 WLUK 852, [2020] IRLR 60, (2020) 71 EHRR 7�����������������������������������������3.108 Lorry Drive, a v Transportation Co (ADJ-00020314)����������������������������������������������3.39 Lorry Driver, a v Waste Management Co (ADJ-00024354)�������������������������������������1.22 Loughran v Bellwood Ltd (UD 206/1978)������������������������������������������������������������� 3.112 Loughran v Mullingar Electrical Wholesalers Ltd (UD 1098/2012)������������������������3.93 Loughrey v Dolan [2012] IEHC 578������������������������������������������������������������������������1.08

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Table of Cases Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2009] IEHC 370���������������������������������������������������1.22 Loxley v BAE Systems Land Systems (Munitions & Ordnance) Ltd (EAT, 29 July 2008)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.76 Lynam’s Hotel v Preety Khooyse (RED1929, PWD1935, DWT1929, PDW1934, TED1928, RPD1916, RPD1917) (2 December 2019)���������������������3.04 Lynch (Dermot) v Murney Ltd Pita Pit Ireland (ADJ-00031433)�������������������������� 3.117 Lyons v Grangemore Landscapes Ltd (UD 541/2008)���������������������������������������������5.56 Lyons v Longford & Westmeath Education & Training Board [2018] IEHC 272���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.25; 7.21 M MD v Board of Management of a School [2023] IESCDET 68�������������������������������7.37 McAteer v South Tipperary County Council (DEC-E2014-045)�����������������������������8.21 McCamley v Dublin Bus [2016] 27 ELR 81������������������������������������������������������������8.53 McCarthy v Irish Shipping (US 100/1978)���������������������������������������������������������������4.08 McCarthy v Niscayah Ltd (EDA 1328)��������������������������������������������������������������������8.18 McCarthy (Jacqui) v Dublin Corpn (EE2000/45)�����������������������������������������������������8.45 McCormack v Garda Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489����������������������������������������4.05 McDermott v Kemek Ltd / Irish Industrial Explosives Ltd [1996] ELR 233�����������3.90 McDermott v NEC Semiconductors Ltd (UD 146/2001)�����������������������������������������3.92 McDonnell v Drawing Centre Ltd (UD 715/1993)���������������������������������������������������5.55 McDonnell v Rooney (UD 504/1991)����������������������������������������������������������������������3.73 McEvoy v Avery Dennison Ltd [1992] ELR 172�����������������������������������������������������4.13 McEvoy v Bank of Ireland [2006] IEHC 3���������������������������������������������������������������7.22 McGarrigle v Donegal Sports & Golf Centre Ltd (UD 680/2002)���������������������������4.08 McGarvey (Kerrie) v Intrium Justita (EDA 095)���������������������������������������������5.80; 8.10 McGee v Peamount Hospital (UD 136/1984)�����������������������������������������������������������3.81 McGeehan v Park Developments (UD 950/2008)����������������������������������������������������5.65 McGinn v Board of Management St Anthony’s Boys National School (DEC-E2004-032)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.49 McGloin v Legal Aid Board (DEC-E2009-042)�������������������������������������������������������8.12 McGovern (Arlene) v Ohana Day Care Ltd (ADJ-00035068)��������������������10.15, 10.43 McGowan v Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167��������������������������������������������������������3.109 McGrath & Restrick v Fisher Field Construction & Farm Machines Ltd (UD 927 & 928/1982)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.73 McGowran v Laura ashlet Ltd (UD 741/1988)���������������������������������������������������������3.95 McIlwraith v His Honour Judge Fawsitt [1990] 1 IR 343����������������������������������������1.40 McIllwraith v Setz Filtration (GB) Ltd [1998] ELR 105������������������������������������������3.39 McKelvey v Iarnrod Eireann [2019] IESC 79����������������������������������������������������������7.35 McKenna v DC [2002] 1 IR 72���������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.41 McLoughlin v Setanta Insurance Services Ltd [2011] IEHC 410����������������������������4.29 McLoughlin (Lee) v Paula Smith Charlies Barbers (ADJ-000111948)��������������������8.14 McNamara v An Bord Pleanála (No 2) [1996] IEHC 60����������������������������������������10.38

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Table of Cases McNamara v Lannit (Ireland) Ltd (UD 910/1984)��������������������������������������������������� 4.11 McNamee v Department of Employment Affairs & Social Protection (ADJ-00012254)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.89 McVeigh (Gerard) v Dunnes Stores (ADJ-00036287)�������������������������������������3.86; 4.07 Madden v Brown Thomas & Co Ltd (UD 263/1992)��������������������������������������������� 3.112 Maddy v Duffner Bros Ltd (UD 803/1986)������������������������������������������������������������3.102 Magham v Johnston Pharmaceuticals BV (UD 1127/1985)������������������������������������� 4.11 Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria [2013] ICR 1���������������������3.40 Maher v Kerr’s Tyres Ireland Ltd (ADJ-00037764)����������������������������������������������� 3.116 Mahon v Cummins Graphics Supplies Ltd (UD 673/1989)�������������������������������������3.78 Maja Stanislawska v Jaguar Landrover Ireland (ADJ-00023582)����������������������������8.14 Maliuk v Shellfish De La Mer Ltd (UD 211/2007)��������������������������������������������������4.29 Malone v Burlington Industries (Ireland) Ltd (UD 947/82)�����������������������������������3.107 Manager v Fuel Co (ADJ-00018157)���������������������������������������������������������������������3.109 Manager of an English Language School v Institute of Technology (DUC-2007-019)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.36, 8.45 Manager of a Public House / Restaurant v Public House / Restaurant (ADJ-00016501)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.04 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548, [1983] 2 WLR 620, [1983] IRLR 209�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.37 Marriott v Oxford & District Cooperative Society (No 2) [1979] 1 QB 186, [1969] 3 All ER 1126, [1969] 3 All ER 1126����������������������������������3.103 Marshall v Harland Wolff Ltd & the Secretary of State for Employment [1972] 1 WLR 899, [1972] 2 All ER 715, [1972] IRLR 90��������������������������������3.70 Marshall v Southampton amd South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (No 2) (Case C-271/91) [1994] QB 126, [1993] 3 WLR 1054, [1993] 4 All ER 586��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.56 Martin v Audio Video Services Centre Ltd (UD 617/1991)�������������������������������������3.77 Martin v Dunnes Stores (Enniscorthy) Ltd (UD 571/1988)�������������������������������������3.85 Martin v Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association [1994] ELR 158�������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.32 Martin v Yeoman Aggregates Ltd [1983] IRLR 48�����������������������������������������3.25, 3.97 Maryland v City West Golf & Country Club (UD 1438/2004)������������������������������ 3.118 Matthews v Sandisk International Ltd (UD 331/2010)���������������������������������������������3.44 Matthews Property Management Ltd v Mr Edward Smith (ADJ-00028407)����������1.34 Maybury v Pump Services Ltd & Eldea Ltd (2 May 1990), HC���������������������������� 11.34 Meath, The County Council of the County of v Michael Murray & Rose Murray [2018] 1 IR 189��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.07 Meat Plant Operative v Meat Plant Processor (ADJ-00014739)������������������������������3.82 Mehigan v Dyflin Publications Ltd (UD 582/2001)�������������������������������������������������3.93 Meigar Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios (Case C-438/99) [2001] ECR I-6915, [2001] 10 WLUK 86, [2003] 3 CMLR 4������������������������������������������������������������8.12 Melligan v Karmarton Ltd (UD 101/2008)�������������������������������������������������������������3.104 Merriman v St James’ Hospital (24 November 1986), CC���������������������������������������3.49 Merck Sharp & Dohme v Clonmel Healthcare Ltd [2019] IESC 65������������������������7.14

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Table of Cases Merckz & Neuhuys v Ford Motor Co Belgium SA (Case C-171/94) [1996] ECR I-1253, [1996] 3 WLUK 107, [1996] IRLR 467�������������������������������������� 11.28 Merina (Carmen) v Laurelwood Montessori Ltd (t/a Rathfarnham Daycare) (ADJ-00033079)����������������������������������������������������������10.31, 10.34, 10.36 Merrow Ltd v Bank of Scotland plc [2013] IEHC 130��������������������������������������������9.09 Meskell v Coras Iompair Eireann [1973] IR 121���������������������������������������������3.46; 7.30 Mikkelsen v Danmols Inventar A/S (Case C-105/84) [1985] ECR 2639, [1985] 7 WLUK 184, [1986] 1 CMLR 316������������������������������������������������������ 11.28 Miley v Employment Appeal Tribunal [2016] IESC 20�������������������������������������������1.40 Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, in the matter of; Industrial Yarns Ltd v Leo Greene & Arthur Manley [1984] ILRM 15���������������������5.14, 5.15 Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v Comr of An Garda Siochana [2017] IESC 43��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.11 Minnock v Irish Casing [2007] ELR 229�����������������������������������������������������������������3.96 Mitie Managed Services Ltd v French [2002] 4 WLUK 167, [2002] ICR 1395, [2002] IRLR 521����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.01 Modern Injections Mould Ltd v Price (J) [1976] 4 WLUK 125, [1976] ICR 370, [1976] IRLR 172���������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Moloney v Decon & Sons Ltd [1996] ELR 230�������������������������������������������������������5.57 Moloney v JLF Goodbody Ltd (UD 6/1978)������������������������������������������������������������5.73 Moloney v MJ Clarke & Sons Ltd (DEC-E2010-140)���������������������������������������������8.27 Moody v Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd (UD 473/1980)�����������������������������������������������3.70 Mooney v An Post [1994] ELR 103�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.77 Mooney v Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd (UD 473, 474, 475 & 478/1980)�������������������3.68 Moore v Xnet Informations Systems Ltd [2001] ELR 193��������������������������������������7.29 Morais v Neylon Maintenance Services Ltd (UD 417/2014)�����������������������������������3.04 Moran v Bailey Gibson Ltd (UD 69/1977)���������������������������������������������������������������4.08 Moran v Bloxham Stockbrokers (UD 377/2002)���������������������������������������������������� 11.32 Moran v Citywide Leisure Ltd (UD 1300/2011)������������������������������������������������������3.03 Morgan v Bank of Ireladn Group (DEC-E2008-029)�����������������������������������������������8.17 Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710, [1968] 3 WLR 506, [1968] 3 All ER 452�������������3.47 Morgan v Provost & Fellows of Trinity College Dublin [2003] 3 IR 158���������������7.22 Morris v Smart Bros Ltd (UD 68/1993)����������������������������������������������������������������� 11.15 Morris (Anne) v Limerick Chamber of Commerce (ADJ-00036284)����������������������5.59 Moss Steamship Co Ltd v Whinney [1912] AC 254, [1911] 6 WLUK 58���������������9.09 Mugford v Midland Bank plc [1997] 1 WLUK 321, [1997] iCR 399, [1997] IRLR 208�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.70 Mulcahy v Kelly [1993] ELR 35������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.68 Mulholland v Currabeg Developments Ltd (MN 729/2006 & UD 1105/2006)�������3.20 Mullins v Digital Equipment International (UD 329/1989)�������������������������������������3.92 Mulraney v Group 4 Securitas (Ireland) Ltd (UD 841/1985)�����������������������������������3.95 Murgitroy & Co v Purdy [2005] IEHC 159��������������������������������������������������������������7.23 Murphy v Citizens Information Call Centre (UD 59/2005)��������������������������������������1.35 Murphy v Galway City Council (UD 1446/2005)��������������������������������������������������3.107 Murphy v Tesco Stores (Ireland) Ltd (UD 1241/1983)��������������������������������������������3.95 Murray v LFS & P Enterprises (UD 11/1986)����������������������������������������������������������3.81 xxxiii

Table of Cases Murray v Reilly (UD 3/1978)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.117 Murray & Rooney v ICS Building Society (UD 2271 & 2272/2009)����������������������3.93 Murtagh Properties v Cleary [1972] IR 330�������������������������������������������������������������8.02 Murtagh (Trevor) v TLC Health Services Ltd (UD 1425/2012)�������������������������������4.08 Musgrave Operating Partner Ltd Supervalue v Olwale Noah Olade O’noah (MND 2215)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.11 Mythen v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1990] ELR 1���������������������������������������� 11.22 N NM v Limerick & Clare Education & Training Board [2017] IEHC 588�������4.25; 7.21 Nail Zone Ltd v Worker (EDA 1023)�����������������������������������������������������������������������8.39 Naku v Lithuania (Application 26126/07) [2016] ECHR 973����������������������������������3.40 Named Employee, a v Tesco Ireland (DEC-E2006-031)������������������������������������������8.49 Named Female Employee, a v Named Respondent (DEC-E2003/001)�������������������8.45 Nano Nagle v Daly [2019] IESC 63�������������������������������������������������������������������������8.33 Napier v National Business Agency Ltd [1951] 2 All ER 264, [1951] 6 WLUK 12, 44 R & IT 413�������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.17 Nasheur (Heinz-Peter) v NUI Galway [2018]����������������������������������������������������������4.18 National Museum of Ireland v Minister for Social Protection [2016] IEHC 135������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.12 Nationwide Building Society v Benn (UKEAT/0273/09)�������������������������������������� 11.25 Net Affinity v Conaghan [2012] 3 IR 67������������������������������������������������������������������7.23 Nevin v Plaza Hotel [2002] 13 ELR 177������������������������������������������������������������������8.38 Nolan v Emo Oil Services [2009] 20 ELR 122�����������������������������������������������5.68; 7.31 Nolan v Emo Oil Services [2019] IEHC 15��������������������������������������������������������������7.37 Nolan v Brooks Thomas Ltd (UD 179/1979)�����������������������������������������������������������3.70 Nolan (Tom) v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335���������������������������10.07, 10.08 Nolan Transport (Oaklands) Ltd v Halligan 1994 WJSC-HC 1550, [1994] JIC 2202��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.34 Noonan v Dunnes Stores (UD 1068/1998)���������������������������������������������������������������3.85 Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw [2014] 1 WLUK 571, [2014] ICR 540�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.10 Nurse, a v Hospital (ADJ-00024009)�����������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 Nwosu v Banta Global Turnkey (UD 10/2008)��������������������������������������������������������3.16 O O’Beirne v Dunnes Stores [2003] ELR 279399�����������������������������������������������������3.105 O’Brien v County Dublin Vocational Educational Committee (UD 959/1995)�������3.74 O’Brien v Hayes Specialist Recruitment (Ireland) Ltd (UD 1172/2006)�����������������5.62 O’Brien v Persian Properties (t/a O’Callaghan Hotels) (DEC-E2012-010)������������� 8.11 O’Brien v Professional Contract Cleaners (UD 184/1990)��������������������������������������3.73

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Table of Cases O’Brien (Charlotte) v Deadline Direct Ltd (t/a Deadline Couriers) (ADJ-00036160)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.53 O’Byrne v Newtonheath Ltd (t/a St Patrick’s Athletic Football Club) (December 2005), HC�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.26 O’Byrne (Deirdre) v AIB (DEC-S2013-015)�����������������������������������������������������������8.14 O’Coindealbhain (Inspector of Taxes) v Mooney [1990] 1 IR 422��������������������������3.07 O’Connor v Astra Pumps Ltd (UD 486/1986)����������������������������������������������������������3.86 O’Connor v Power Security Ltd (UD 344/89)����������������������������������������������������������5.58 O’Cuinnegain v Guardian Angels National School (UD 1008/2006)����������������������3.16 O’Domhnaill v Health Service Executive [2011] IEHC 421������������������������������������7.37 O’Donnell (Dudley) v Chief State Solicitor [2003] ELR 268����������������������������������7.27 O’Donnell (Pat) & Co v Denis O’Keefe (EDA 2133)����������������������������������������������8.23 O’Donoghue v South Eastern Health Board [2005] 4 IR 217�������������������������4.14; 7.20 O’Donovan v Over-C Technologies [2020] IEHC 291���������������������������������������������3.96 O’Donovan v Over-C Technologies [2021] IECA 37���������������������������7.32, 7.33; 11.34 Official, an v Trade Union (ADJ-00017540)����������������������������������������������������������10.33 Official Veterinarian, an v Public Body (ADJ-00016854)��������������������������������������10.34 O’Grady v Sodexo Ireland Ltd (ADJ-00029694)�����������������������������������������������������3.51 O’Higgins v University College Dublin [2013] 21 MCA�����������������������������������������1.22 Oijerathi v An Post (UD 1113/2007)������������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 O’Kelly v Xsil Ltd (UD 1086/2011)�������������������������������������������������������������������������5.71 O’Leary v Crosbie (UD 1118/1983)�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.85 O’Leary (Colum) v Eagle Star Life & Pensions (UD 2002)������������������������������������3.93 Olukova v Veolia Transport Dublin Light Rail Ltd (UD 2196/2011)�����������������������3.76 O’Mahony v College of the Most Holy Trinity [1998] ELR 159�����������������������������2.14 O’Mahony v Department of Defence (UD 28/1989)������������������������������������������������3.69 O’Mahony v Examiner Publications (5 November 2010), HC���������������������������������7.31 O’Mahony (Aoife) v PJF Insurances Ltd (UD 933/2010)����������������������������������������3.93 O’Malley (Patricia) v Pallomer Ltd (ADJ-00029863)����������������������������������������������2.17 O’Mara (William) v College Freight Ltd (t/a Target Express Ireland) (UD 1371/2009)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.51 O’Meara v AIBP (Nenagh) Ltd (UD 1099/1993)��������������������������������������������������� 3.117 Omooba v Global Artist & Leicester Theatre Trust (ET 2202946/19)���������������������3.94 O’N v Insurance Co (DEC-E2004-052)�������������������������������������������������������������������8.40 O’Neill v Beaumont Hospital Board [1990] IRLM 149�������������������������������������������3.76 O’Neill v Fr Eugene McCarthy (UD 371/1991)�������������������������������������������������������3.67 O’Neill v RSL (Ireland) Ltd [1990] ELR 31������������������������������������������������������������4.04 O’Neill (Barry) v An Post (ADJ-00029473)�������������������������������������������������������������3.59 O’Neill (Paul) v Toni & Guy Blackrock [2010] 21 ELR 1�������������������������������������10.36 Operations Director v Limited Co, a (ADJ-00025595)������������������������������������������ 3.118 O’Reilly v Pulmann Kellogg Ltd (UD 340/1979)�������������������������������������������2.08; 3.28 Organic Lens Manufacturing v Brian McAllister (UDD 2137)������������������������������ 3.117 O’Rourke v JJ Red Holding Ltd (t/a Dublin City Hotel) (DEC-2010-046)�������������8.27 Orr v Zomax (25 March 2004), HC�����������������������������������������������������������������7.28, 7.29 O’Sullivan v Health Service Executive [2022] IECA 74������������������������������������������7.20 O’Sullivan v Mercy Hospital Cork (3 June 2005), HC�����������������������������������4.19; 7.21 xxxv

Table of Cases O’Sullivan v Siemens Business Services Ltd (DEC-E2006-058)����������������������������8.35 Overpass Ltd (t/a Ocean Property Management) v Clancy (TUD 1713)��������������� 11.30 Owen (Johnathan) v Homedel Trans Direct Ltd (ADJ-00029355)���������������������������3.22 Oy Liikenne v Pekka Liskolarvi & Pentti Juntunen [2001] ECR I-745, [2001] 1 WLUK 583, [2001] 3 CMLR 37�������������������������������������������������������� 11.31 P P v S & Cornwall County Council (Case C-13/94) [1996] ECR I-2143, [1996] 4 WLUK 350, [1996] IRLR 347����������������������������������������������������8.14, 8.19 P Bork International A/S (in liquidation) v Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark [1988] ECR 3057, [1988] 6 WLUK 121, [1989] IRLR 41��������������� 11.24 PMC Painting Contractors Ltd v Ms Patrycja Kwidzinska (TES2123, DWT224, SWT2120, DWT223, DWT221, DWT222)���������������������������������������3.18 Paquay v Societe d’Architectes Hoet + Minne Sprl (Case C-460/06) [2007] ECR-I 8511, [2007] 10 WLUK 254, [2008] 1 CMLR 12�����������������������8.10 Paralegal, a v Company (ADJ-00033884)����������������������������������������������������������������1.05 Parr v Whitbread plc (t/a Threshers Wine Merchants) [1989] 11 WLUK 214, [1990] ICR 427, [1990] IRLR 39������������������������������������������������������������������������3.80 Parsons v Sovereign Bank of Canada [1913] AC 160, [1912] 10 WLUK 1������������9.09 Pearce v David Flynn (UD 833/2006)�������������������������������������������������������������3.85; 4.29 Pedreschi v Burke (UD 591/1999)����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.43 PennWell Publishing (UK) Ltd v Ornstein [2007] EWHC 1570 (QB), [2007] 6 WLUK 359, [2007] IRLR 700�������������������������������������������������������������3.94 Pepper v Tara Mines Ltd (UD 268/1992)�����������������������������������������������������������������3.69 Petkevicius v Goode Concrete Ltd [2014] IEHC 66������������������������������������������������5.15 Phelan v BIC (Ireland) Ltd [1997] ELR 208������������������������������������������������������������7.28 Phelan (Brendan) v Irish School of Motoring (ADJ-00033768)���������������������������� 3.116 Philpott (Dan) v Marymount University Hospital & Hospice Ltd [2015] IECC 1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.07 Phoenix House Ltd v Stockman [2019] 7 WLUK 75, [2019] IRLR 960���������������3.109 Photographer v Media Organisation (ADJ-00027251)���������������������������������������������3.09 Plumber, a v Heating & Plumbing Contractor (ADJ-00015063)����������������������������10.32 Ponisi v JVC Europe Ltd (UD 949/2008)���������������������������������������������3.114; 5.56, 5.72 Power v Health Service Executive [2019] IEHC 462�����������������������������������������������7.37 Power v National Corrugated Products (UD 336/1980)�������������������������������������������3.47 Power v St Paul’s Nursing Home & T & M Cleaning Ltd [1998] ELR 212���������� 11.30 Preece v JD Wetherspoons (ET/2104806/10)�����������������������������������������������������������3.94 Prior v City Plumbers (EAT/0535/11)����������������������������������������������������������������������3.86 Prxevierala (Piotr) v Bedroom Elegance (Sales) Ltd (ADJ-00034374)�������������������3.94 Psychiatrist, a v Health Service Provider (ADJ-00017774)�����������������������������������10.34 Pulse Group v O’Reilly [2006] IEHC 50������������������������������������������������������������������7.23 Pungor v MBCC Foods Ltd (UD 584/2015)������������������������������������������������������������4.30 Purcell & McHugh v Bewley’s Manufacturing Ltd [1990] ELR 68���������������������� 11.25

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Table of Cases Q Quinn v HSS Ltd (UD 11344/2005)�������������������������������������������������������������������������1.35 Quinn v IBRC [2016] 1 IR 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.04 R R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [2020] AC 869, [2017] 3 WLR 409��������������������������������������������������������������������1.41 RE v Praxair MRC SAS (Case C-486/18) [2019] 5 WLUK 86, [2019] 3 CMLR 29, [2020] CEC 244�����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.61 RS Components v Irwin [1974] 1 All ER 41, [1973] 7 WLUK 144, [1973] ICR 535���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.27 Radunović v Montenegro (Application 45197/13) [2016] 10 WLUK 521, (2018) 66 EHRR 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Rahill (Sean) v Agrigear Ltd (ADJ-00031097)��������������������������������������������������������1.15 Rajpal v Robinson, The North Eastern Health Board & The Minister for Health & Children [2005] 3 IR 385��������������������������������������������������������������������7.20 Ranchin (Emmanuel) v Allianz Worldwide Cares SA (UDD 1636)�����������������������3.106 Rankin v Peamount Hospital (UD 107/1983)�����������������������������������������������������������3.84 Rapier Contract Services Ltd v Adina Predut (UDD 186)����������������������������������������5.85 Readymix Concrete v Minister of Pensions & National Insurance [1968] 2 OB 497�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.07 Reardon v St Vincent’s Hospital (UD 74/1979)�������������������������������������������������������3.66 Reddy v Ardbrook Ltd (ADJ-00029419)������������������������������������������������������������������5.67 Redmond Stichting (Dr Sophie) v Bartol (Case C-29/91) [1992] ECR I-3189, [1992] 5 WLUK 208, [1994] 3 CMLR 265����������� 11.04, 11.09, 11.10 Red Salt Frozen Foods Ltd, Re [2006] IEHC 328����������������������������������������������������3.17 Regional Claims Manager v Insurance Co (ADJ-00000680)�����������������������������������3.39 Reid v Roadspeed International (Ireland) Ltd (UD 258/1992)���������������������������������3.81 Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592, [1918] 1 WLUK 56���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 Reilly (Elaine) v Stobart Air Unlimited (in provisional liquidation) (ADJ-00031296)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Retail Employee v Service Station (ADJ-00027527)�����������������������������������������������3.67 Reynolds v Malocco [1999] 2 IR 203�����������������������������������������������������������������������7.14 Richardson v H Williams & Co (UD 17/1979)���������������������������������������������������������3.73 Riordan v Minister for the Environment [2004] IEHC 89����������������������������������������7.13 Robert Graham HYND v David Armstrong & 24 others [2007] CSIH 16���������������5.84 Roche v Richmond Earthworks Ltd (UD 329/97)�������������������������������������������3.96; 5.63 Roche v Salthill Hotel Ltd [1996] ELR 15������������������������������������������������������������� 11.29 Roche v Sealink Stenal Line Ltd [1993] ELR 89�����������������������������������������������������3.39 Rockfon A/S v Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark (Case C-449/93) [1995] ECR I-4291, [1995] 12 WLUK 130, [1996] CEC 224����������������������������5.45 Rogers v Dublin Corpn [1998] ELR 59��������������������������������������������������������������������3.71 xxxvii

Table of Cases Rolls Royce Motor Cars v Price [1993] 1 WLUK 384, [1993] IRLR 204���������������5.79 Rosderra Irish Meats Group Ltd v Baranya (Tibor) (UDD 1917)��������������������������10.28 Rotsart de Herting v J Benoidt (in liquidation) (Case C-305/94) [1996] ECR I-5927, [1996] 11 WLUK 216, [1997] IRLR 127������������������������ 11.05, 11.15, 11.24, 11.40 Rowland v An Post [2017] IESC 20�������������������������������������������������������4.05, 4.18; 7.36 Roy v Wavin Pipes Ltd (UD 119/1983)��������������������������������������������������������������������3.95 Rs 247 Resources Ltd v Bogan Newman�����������������������������������������������������������������1.19 Ruffley v Board of Management of St Anne’s School [2017] IESC 33����������3.72, 3.88 Ryan v A-G [1965] IESC 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.02 Ryan v Dublin Airport Authority (DEC-E2010-059)�����������������������������������������������8.31 Ryan v ESB International Ltd [2013] IEHC 126������������������������������������������������������7.10 Ryan v Slattery (RP 327/2006)������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.26 Ryan (Kathleen) v Socrates Workplace Solutions (ADJ-00035281)������8.46, 8.47, 8.51 Ryanair DAC v Peter Bellew [2019] IEHC 907�������������������������������������������������������7.24 Ryan, Cannon & Kirk Accounting Services Ltd v Violeta Kneite (UDD 1910)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.106 S SPA Therapist v Hotel (ADJ-0022518)��������������������������������������������������������������������3.59 St David’s CBS Secondary School Artan v Siobhan McVeigh (Labour Court, HSD 11)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26, [1998] 3 WLR 936, [1998] 3 All ER 673��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.40 St John’s National School v Akduman (HSC/07/03) (Determination HSD 102)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 St Ledger v Frontline Distributors Ireland Ltd [1995] ELR 160���������������������5.59, 5.61 Sales Assistant, a v Retailer (ADJ-000018048)��������������������������������������������������������3.83 Sales Executive v Sole Trade / New Business (ADJ-00023310)���������������������������� 11.22 Salesforce.com v Leech (EDA1615)������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22 Sales Representative v Motor Co (ADJ-00018955)�������������������������������������������������3.92 Salmon v Glanbia Irelandi DAC (ADJ-00032713)��������������������������������������������������3.76 Sarkatzix Herrero v Instituto Madrileno de las Salud (IMSALUD) (Case C-294/04) [2006] ECR I-1513, [2006] 2 WLUK 344, [2006] 2 CMLR 30���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 Savage (Mark) v University College Dublin (ADJ-00014412)��������������������������������8.21 Scaffolder, a v Scaffolding Company (ADJ-00029869)�������������������������������������������1.05 Schonfield v West Wood Club Ciontarf Ltd (UD 1013/2013)��������������������������������3.106 Schmidt v Spar und Leihkasse der Fruheren Amter Bordesholm, Keil und Cronshagen (Case C-392/92) [1994] ECR I-1311, [1994] 4 WLUK 74, [1995] 2 CMLR 331������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.11, 11.29 School Secretary v National School (ADJ-00004802)���������������������������������������������3.94 School Secretary v Primary School (ADJ-00028138)�������������������������������������������� 3.117 Security Officer, a v Security Co (ADJ-00013565)������������������������������������������������ 11.30 xxxviii

Table of Cases Security Work v Security Co (ADJ-00016496)������������������������������������������������������ 3.116 Senior Sales Executive, a v Car Sales Co (ADJ-00020747)�������������������������������������3.97 Senior Staff Nurse, a v Nursing Home (in liquidation) (ADJ-00027325)����������������8.25 Serdang Ltd (t/a Blarney Hotel & Golf Resort & Pawel Sowinski) (RPA/22/10) (Determination RPD 232)�����������������������������������������������������5.02, 5.51 Serdar Goksel Sen v Specialised Air Products Ltd (ADJ-00043304)�����������������������3.04 Serikovs v Litec Moulding Ltd (UD 525/2015)�������������������������������������������������������3.83 Sharma v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2010] IEHC 178������������������������������������3.20 Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Ltd (UD 858/1999)������������������������������ 3.117 Sheehan v O’Brien v Vintners Federation of Ireland (UD 787/2007)�������������5.65, 5.68 Sheehy v Ryan [2005] IEHC 419�����������������������������������������������������������������������������7.29 Sheehy v Ryan & Moriarty [2008] IESC 14����������������������������������������������������7.18, 7.19 Sheeran v Office of Public Works (DEC-S2004/015)����������������������������������������������8.21 Shelbourne Holdings v Torriam Hotel Operating Co Ltd [2015] 2 IR 52����������������7.08 Shiels v Integrate Ireland Language & Training Ltd [2010] ELR 41��������������������� 11.31 Shinkwin (Charles) v Millett (Donna) (EED 004) (ED 03/33)������������������������2.12; 3.97 Shortt v Data Packaging Ltd [1994] ELR 251����������������������������������������7.15, 7.25, 7.27 Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2020] EWCA Civ 1601, [2020] 11 WLUK 415, [2021] ICR 695������������������������������������������������������������������������10.10 Simpson (Joseph) v Whw Bros Ltd Colossus Casino (ADJ-00029380, ADJ-00029386, ADJ-00029381, ADJ-00029389, ADJ-00029384)�������������������1.23 Sipad Holding DDPO v Popovic (1996) 3 (1) DULJ 15������������������������������������������9.09 Skyrail Oceanic Ltd (t/a Goodmos Tours) v Coleman [1980] 4 WLUK 113, [1980] ICR 596, [1980] IRLR 226����������������������������������������������������������������������8.16 Slaughter Line Operative / Butcher v Meat Processing Co (ADJ-00007300)��������3.109 Slogger Automatic Feeder Co, Re [1915] 1 Ch 478, [1914] 12 WLUK 81�������������9.09 Smith v Trafford Trust [2012] EWHC 3221 (Ch), [2012] 11 WLUK 517, [2013] IRLR 86���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.94 Smith (Philip) v RSA Insurance Ireland Ltd [2015] 5 JUEC 1101���������������������������7.20 Sobhy v Chief Appeals Office [2021] ELR 97���������������������������������������������������������3.04 Sotwal v Geraghty Energy Consultants Ltd (ADJ-00028506)���������������������������������3.70 Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine (UKEAT/0339/10/SM)�������������������������������� 11.25 Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir CV (Case 24/85) [1986] ECR 1119, [1986] 3 WLUK 205, [1986] 2 CMLR 296��������������� 5.84; 11.04, 11.06, 11.29, 11.30 Stamp v McGrath (UD 1243/1983)�����������������������������������������������������������������2.12; 3.28 State of Kuwait v Kanji (UDD 40/2019)������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Stobart (Ireland) Driver Services Ltd v Keith Carroll [2013] IEHC 581�����������������3.84 Stobart Ireland Ltd v Carroll [2013] 24 ELR������������������������������������������������������������3.60 Store, a v Worker (EDA 3/2016)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.53 Store Manager v A Store (ADJ-00020602)���������������������������������������������������������������3.82 Stoskus v Goode Concrete [2007] IEHC 432�����������������������������������������������������������7.08 Structured Finance Management (Ireland) Ltd & Vadym Kakinin (ADJ-000155A)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.77 Student AB v Board of Management of a Secondary School [2019] IEHC 255����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.109 xxxix

Table of Cases Students Union Commercial Services Ltd v Alan Traynor (UDD 1726)�����������������5.68 Suchavadee Foley v Atercin Liffey Ltd (t/a Starbucks Tallaght) (ADJ-00028487)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.53 Sullivan v Department of Education [1998] ELR 217����������������������������������������������2.18 Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11�������������������������������������������������������������4.13, 4.15, 4.16 Sunday Tribune, The, Re [1984] IR 50���������������������������������������������������������������������3.07 Suzen v Zehnacker Gebaudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice (Case C-13/95) [1997] ECR I-1259, [1997] 3 WLUK 234, [1997] 1 CMLR 768������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.03, 11.29, 11.30 Symantec v Leddy & Lyons [2009] IEHC 256����������������������������������������������5.85; 11.28 T TA Hotels Ltd v Khoosye (RPD 16/2019)����������������������������������������������������������������3.04 Tangney v Dell Products [2013] IEHC 622��������������������������������������������������������������5.49 Tara Exploration & Development Co Ltd v Minister for Industry & Commerce [1975] IR 242������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.02 Team Leader, a v Community Development & Employment Programme (ADJ-00009241)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.11 Tele Danmark A/S v Handels- og Kontorfunkitoaermes Forbund i Danmark (Case C-109/00) [2001] ECR I-6993, [2001] 10 WLUK 134, [2002] 1 CMLR 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.12 Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227, [1978] 3 WLR 116, [1978] IRLR 174�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.13 Thompson v Powers Supermarkets Ltd (UD 531/1998)�������������������������������������������3.77 Thompson v SCS Consulting [2001] 9 WLUK 13, [2001] IRLR 801, [2001] Emp LR 1238���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.26 Tierney v An Post [2000] 1 IR 536���������������������������������������������������������������������������3.07 Tiler v Parquet Floors Provider (ADJ-00026571)����������������������������������������������������3.42 Trafford v Sharpe & Fisher (Building Supplies) Ltd [1995] 2 WLUK 70, [1994] IRLR 325�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.69 Trailer Care Holdings Ltd v Healy (DET No EDA 128)������������������������������������������ 8.11 Transport Infrastructure Ireland v Maurice Leahy (EDA 1819)�������������������������������4.18 Travelodge Management Ltd v Sylvia Wach (EDA 1511)���������������������������������������1.22 Tuke v Collite Teoranta [1998] ELR 324�����������������������������������������������������������������3.47 Turner v O’Reilly [2006] IEHC 92������������������������������������������������4.17; 7.18, 7.22, 7.28 Two Complainants v Restaurant [2013] ELR 333����������������������������������������������������8.19 Tyrrell v Brooks Motors Ltd (UD 304/1981)�����������������������������������������������������������5.73 U Upton-Hansen Architects Ltd v Ms X Gyftaki (UKEAT/0278/18/RN)��������������������4.15

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Table of Cases V Vanfleet Transport Ltd v Mark Murphy (25 November 1988), HC��������������������������4.05 Varghese Mathew v Donegal Home Care Ltd Home Instead Senior Care Ltd (ADJ-00036396)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.11 Vaughan v Lewisham Borough Council [2013] EWHC 796 (QB), [2013] 4 WLUK 164, [2013] All ER (D) 80 (Apr)�������������������������������������������3.109 Vaughan v Weighpack [1974] 2 WLUK 14, [1974] ICR 261, [1974] IRLR 105����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.117 Vesey (Justin) v MBNA Ltd (UD 953/2012)������������������������������������������������������������3.77 Victory v Leopardstown Park Hospital (UD 9/1997)�����������������������������������������������3.67 Vita Contex Ltd v Dourellan (UD 1031/1992)������������������������������������������������4.07, 4.22 W Waite v Government Communications Headquarters [1983] 2 AC 714, [1983] 3 WLR 389, [1983] IRLR 341�����������������������������������������������������������������3.30 Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority [2012] IEHC 178, [2012] 2 ILRM 345����7.08, 7.20 Wallace-Hayes v Skolars Hairdressing School Ltd [1991] ELR 108�����������������������3.24 Walker v Bausch & Lomb (UD 179/2008)���������������������������������������������������������������3.93 Wallace (Regina) v Irish Aviation Authority [2012] IEHC 178�����������������������4.14, 4.29 Walls Meat Co Ltd v Selby [1989] ICR 60���������������������������������������������������������������5.70 Walsh v Irish Coast Guard (UD 1137/2013) [2015] ELR 214����������������������������������3.02 Walsh v Econocom Digital Finance Ltd (ADJ-00029093)������������������������������3.96; 5.66 Walsh (Kay (Catherine)) v Beckvalley Ltd (t/a Queally’s Super Valu) (ADJ-00036809)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.109 Walsh (Ray) v Economy (ADJ-00029093)���������������������������������������������������������������5.67 Waltons & Morse v Dorrington [1997] 5 WLUK 363, [1997] IRLR 488��������������3.103 Warehouse General Manager v Transport & Logistics Co (ADJ-00026861)�����������2.23 Warehouse Operative v Discount Retailer (ADJ-00015691)������������������������������������3.82 Waterford Multiport v Faga [1998] ILRM 382���������������������������������������������������������2.23 Waterford Multiport v Fagan [1999] IEHC 158�������������������������������������������������������2.21 Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (Case C-32/93) [1994] QB 718, [1994] 3 WLR 941, [1994] IRLR 482����������������������������������������������������������3.52, 3.54; 8.10 Welder, a v Manufacturing Co (ADJ-00019015)������������������������������������������������������3.97 Western Excavating Ltd (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] QB 761, [1978] 2 WLR 344, [1978] 1 All ER 713������������������������������������������������������������3.99, 3.101 Westman Holdings Ltd v McCormack [1992] 1 IR 151����������������������������������������� 11.40 White v Aluset Ltd (UD 9/1998)������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.46 White v Simon Betson [1992] ELR 120�������������������������������������������������������������������3.46 Whitham v Club 24 Ltd t/a Ventura (ET 1810462/10)���������������������������������������������3.94 Whitwood Chemical Co v Hardiman [1891] 2 Ch 416, [1891] 3 WLUK 1�������������7.04 Williams v Compair Maxim [1982] 1 WLUK 748, [1982] ICR 156, [1982] IRLR 83������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.72, 5.74

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Table of Cases Willoughby v CF Capital plc [2011] EWCA Civ 1115, [2011] 10 WLUK 251, [2011] IRLR 985�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.97 Wilson v St Helens Borough Counci; Baxendale v British Fuels Ltd [1997] 7 WLUK 258, [1997] 3 CMLR 1267, [1997] IRLR 505���������������������� 11.39 Woods v Euro Route Logistics (DEC-E2010)����������������������������������������������������������8.28 Worker, a v Brookfield Leisure Ltd [1994] ELR 79�������������������������������������������������8.19 Worker, a v Engineering Co (DUC-2008-03)�����������������������������������������������������������8.45 Worker, a v Food Manufacturer (DEC-E2010-187)�������������������������������������������������8.27 Worker, a v Hospital [1997] ELR 214���������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.11 Worker, a v Mid Western Health Board [1996] ELR 72�������������������������������������������8.07 Worker, a (Mr Q) v Employer No 1 [2005] ELR 113�����������������������������������������������8.34 Z Zalewski v Adjudication Officer, the Workplace Relations Commision, Ireland & A-G [2021] IESC 24���������������������������������������������������������1.03, 1.11; 3.01 Zhang v Towner Trading (t/a Spar Drimnagh) (DEC-E2008-01)�����������������������������8.36 Zuphen v Kelly Technical Services [2000] 11 ELR 227������������������������������������������3.70

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Table of Statutes

Adoptive Leave Act 1995���������������� 2.20; 3.19, 3.55; 5.35; 6.17; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16(a), (b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 18, 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.38 s 25����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 s 28����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 Adoptive Leave Act 2005��������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19, 3.55 s 18����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.38 s 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 Bankruptcy Act 1988������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.01, 9.02, 9.33 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.01 s 44(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.03 Carer’s Leave Act 2001�����������������������������������������������2.20; 3.19, 3.20; 5.35, 5.42; 6.18 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 15(c)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 s 16(2)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.61 s 27(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.38 s 27(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 Pt 5 (ss 37–42)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.02 Child and Family Agency Act 2013 s 28����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 s 31����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.16 s 31(1)(d)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.16 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.31; 8.15, 8.17 s 102(2)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.15 s 102(2)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.17 Civil Service Regulation Act 1956������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.13 Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act 2005����������������������������������������������������3.01 s 22����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Companies Act 1963�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.02 s 285��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.14 s 314, 315������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 Companies Act 1990 s 170��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09

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Table of Statutes Companies Act 2014�������������������������������������������������������������5.48; 9.01, 9.09, 9.13, 9.33 s 2(9)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 s 202(1)(a)(i)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 202(1)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 202(6)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 207��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 428, 433������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 s 436, 437������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 s 502(2), (4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10 Pt 10 (ss 508–558)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10 s 509(7)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10 s 562��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 Pt 11 Ch 2 (ss 568–577)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.05 s 569��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.05 s 569(1)(d)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.01, 9.05 s 569(1)(e)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.05 s 570�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.01, 9.02 s 573��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.08 s 579��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 580��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 580(2)–(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 585, 586������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 587��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 587(7)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 587(7)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 588��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.04 s 589��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.05 s 589(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.05 s 618(1)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.01, 9.11 s 621(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621(2)(a)(i)–(vi)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9.11 s 621(2)(b), (c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621(2)(d)(i)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621(2)(e)(i), (ii)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621(2)(f)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9.11 s 621(2)(g)(i), (ii)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9.11 s 621(4)–(6)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 621(7)(a), (b)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 674�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 678�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 678(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 949������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Companies (Amendment) Act 1990��������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10

xliv

Table of Statutes Companies (Amendment) Act 2017��������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10 Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Covid-19) Act 2020 s 17���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Competition Act 2002��������������������������������������������������������������������9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 50��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.02 Contractual Obligations (Applicable Law) Act 1991�����������������������������������������������3.39 Conveyancing Act 1881 s 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 Credit Guarantee (Amendment) Act 2016 s 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Criminal Justice Act 2011 s 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.79 Data Protection Act 1988�����������������������������������������������������������������������������3.108; 10.23 Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003������������������������������������������������������3.108; 10.23 Data Protection Act 2018��������������������������������������������������������������������7.06; 10.23; 11.41 s 60(7)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 60(7)(a)–(o)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 128(4)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.06 Defamation Act 2009����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 Defence Act 1954 s 114������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.37 Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006�����������������5.53, 5.54 s 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.59 Employment Agency Act 1971����������������������������������������������������������������������3.06; 11.13 Employment Equality Act 1977��������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.06 Employment Equality Act 1998����������������������������������1.13, 1.26, 1.27; 2.15; 3.66, 3.88, 3.96; 6.17, 6.18; 8.01, 8.03, 8.06, 8.15, 8.16, 8.22, 8.28, 8.34; 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.15 s 2(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.66 s 3(c), (d)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.24 s 4(d)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.67 s 6���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.15; 8.36 s 6(2)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.07 s 6(2)(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.17 s 6(2)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.19 s 6(2)(e)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.21 s 6(2)(f)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.22 s 6(2)(h)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.36 s 6(2)(i)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.38 s 6(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.22 s 6(3)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.22 s 6A����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.09 s 8(6)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.01 s 14A�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.39, 8.51 s 14A(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.41 xlv

Table of Statutes s 14A(2)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.53 s 15�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.41, 8.51 s 15(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.51 s 16�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.66; 8.30 s 16(1)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.32 s 16(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.30, 8.32 s 16(3)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.32 s 16(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.32 s 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.39 s 27����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.09 s 32����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.39 s 34(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 s 34(3)(d)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.76 s 34(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 s 39����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.38 s 74����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.48 s 74(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.48 s 74(2)(a)–(g)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.48 s 76����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.55 s 77(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.89 s 77(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.39 s 82(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.39; 8.56 s 101��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.89 s 101(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.89 s 101(4A)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Employment Equality Act 2004�����������������������������������3.71, 3.96; 8.01, 8.02, 8.03, 8.22 s 9, 13, 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.30 s 29(a), (b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.48 Employment Equality Acts 1989–2004��������������������������������������������������������������������3.90 Employment Equality Acts 1990–2015��������������������������������������������������������������������3.89 Employment Equality Acts 1998–2004�����������������������������������������������������������3.49; 8.48 Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015��������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 77(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 79(6)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 82(1), (3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 103��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021�����������������������1.27, 1.31; 3.50, 3.51; 5.76; 6.18 Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018��������������������������������1.20; 2.01; 3.17 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.20 Employment Permits Act 2003������������������������������������������������������������������������3.04, 3.05 s 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.04 s 2B����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.04 Employment Permits Act 2006������������������������������������������������������������������������3.04; 9.19 Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014����������������������������������������������������������3.04 Equality Act 2004��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.79; 8.39 s 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.39 xlvi

Table of Statutes s 14A(7)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.39 s 21����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.39 s 23�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.76; 8.39 Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015������������������������������2.15; 3.51; 8.23, 8.24 s 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.25 s 2(e)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.27 Equal Status Act 2000�����������������������������������������������������������������������������8.14, 8.21, 8.38 s 39����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.38 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003�������������������������������������������������3.108 art 8��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.108 Family Law Act 1995 s 47����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 Finance Act 2004������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.17 s 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.17 Finance Act 2011������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.04 Finance (Local Property Tax) Act 2012�������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Fines Act 2010 s 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 5(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 8(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 Food Safety Authority of Ireland Act 1998�������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Further Education and Training Act 2013�����������������������������������������������������������������3.34 Garda Síochána Act 2005 s 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.33 Health Act 1970 s 22(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.20 Health Act 2004 s 17����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 s 75����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Higher Education Authority Act 1971��������������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Industrial Relations Act 1946������������������������������������������������������������������3.48; 7.03; 9.23 s 25����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.77 s 32(1)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.40 Pt IV (ss 34–58)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 45(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.40 Industrial Relations Act 1969�������������������������������������1.27, 1.31; 3.48; 7.03; 8.44; 11.32 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.29 s 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.29 s 10(1)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.40 s 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03, 1.28; 8.44 s 13(9)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.45 s 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27; 4.28; 7.03 s 20(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27 s 20(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.31 s 24(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.48 xlvii

Table of Statutes Industrial Relations Act 1976�������������������������������������������������������������������������7.03; 11.32 s 12(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.48 Industrial Relations Act 1990�����������������3.47, 3.111; 4.26; 7.03, 7.06; 9.18, 9.19; 11.32 s 2(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.48 s 11(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.40 s 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.06 s 54(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.40 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 s 13(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.48 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015�������������������������������������������������7.03; 11.32 s 26(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.73 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2019����������������������������������������1.26; 3.33; 11.32 s 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.33 Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004������������9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 Industrial Training Act 1967�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.34 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.34 s 7(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.34 Interpretation Act 2005������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.24, 1.32 Labour Services Act 1987 s 18(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20 Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 s 108��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 s 100(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.14 Local Government Acts 1925–2019�����������������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Local Government Act 2001 s 144��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 s 164��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Local Government Reform Act 2014������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Maternity Protection Act 1994������������������������������������2.20; 3.19, 3.53; 5.35, 5.36; 6.17, 6.18; 8.09; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.53 s 21(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.53 s 23�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.19; 3.53; 5.36; 8.10 s 26(1)(a)–(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.09 s 27(2)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.09 s 38(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Maternity Protection (Amendment) Act 2004�������������������������������2.20; 3.53; 5.35, 5.36 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.36 s 23(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.52 s 24����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 Medical Practitioners Act 2007�������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Merchant Shipping Act 1894������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.02

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Table of Statutes Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973������� 2.01, 2.02, 2.05, 2.08, 2.11, 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.23, 2.25, 2.28; 3.19, 3.28, 3.34, 3.75; 5.16, 5.97; 6.18; 9.07, 9.19 s 1A����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.02 s 2(1)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.15 s 2(2)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.14 s 3(1)(j), (l)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.02 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.08 s 4(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.03 s 6��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2.07, 2.11 s 7(1), (2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.08 s 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.11, 2.18; 3.28, 3.75 s 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 Sch 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.04, 2.05; 3.19 para 1(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.04 para 1(5)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.04 para 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.21 para 7���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.04; 5.03 para 7(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.04 para 8������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.16 para 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.05 Sch 2��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.06, 2.22, 2.26 para 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.22 para 2(a)(i)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.06 para 2(a)(ii)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.06, 2.16 para 2(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.06 para 4���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.06, 2.16 Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 2001�������������������������2.17, 2.28; 3.19; 5.16, 5.97; 6.18 Sch 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 s 147–151������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 Schedule �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.09 National Minimum Wage Act 2000���������� 1.26; 1.41; 3.20; 5.32; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 26�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19, 9.40 s 26(1)(ii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.41 s 29, 35�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19, 9.40 s 36����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.62 s 36(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 National Minimum Wage (Low Pay Commission) Act 2015 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.36 Ombudsman (Defence Forces) Act 2004 s 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.37

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Table of Statutes Organisation of Working Time Act 1997��������������������1.02, 1.26, 1.27; 2.19, 2.20; 3.78, 3.91; 6.18; 9.18, 9.19, 9.28, 9.40, 9.41 s 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 20�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.19, 2.20 s 21–23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 26����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27 s 26(5)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 27(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22 s 33����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.91 s 39�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.22; 3.23 s 39(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.22, 1.23 Parental Leave Act 1998�������������������2.20; 5.35, 5.37; 6.17, 6.18; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 6(1A)(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.37 s 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.37 s 15A(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16(c)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 s 16A(2)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16A(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16A(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.61 s 25(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Parental Leave (Amendment) Act 2006�����������������������������������������������������������6.18; 9.19 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.61 s 15A(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16A(2)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16A(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 Parental Leave (Amendment) Act 2019��������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 15A(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16A(2)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 16A(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 Parent’s Leave and Benefits Act 2019����������������������������������������������������2.20; 5.40; 6.18 s 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 19(2)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 19(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 Paternity Leave and Benefit Act 2016�������������������������������������������������������������2.20, 5.41 s 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 Payment of Wages Act 1991����������������������������������������2.18; 6.18; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.18 s 5(1)(a), (b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.18 Payment of Wages (Amendment) (Tips and Gratuities) Act 2022����������������������������2.01 Pensions Act 1990����������������������������������������������������������������������1.26; 9.29; 10.23; 11.21 s 3(2B)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Pt VII (ss 65–81)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.76 Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2010�������������������������������������������������10.02 l

Table of Statutes Proceeds of Crime Act 1996�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.41 Protected Disclosures Act 2014����������������������������������1.02, 1.08, 1.26, 1.39; 3.20; 6.18; 7.07, 7.42; 10.02, 10.03, 10.04, 10.07 10.08, 10.12, 10.13, 10.14, 10.15, 10.16, 10.17, 10.19, 10.21, 10.22, 10.24, 10.25, 10.27, 10.28, 10.29, 10.31, 10.32, 10.33, 10.38, 10.39, 10.40, 10.41, 10.42, 10.43 s 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.28 s 3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19, 10.32 s 3(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.05, 10.17 s 3(1)(a)(i)(l)–(x)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 s 3(1)(a)(ii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.07 s 5��������������������������������������������������������������������������10.08, 10.10, 10.28, 10.29, 10.35 s 5(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.04, 10.07 s 5(1)(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.17 s 5(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.05, 10.29, 10.30 s 5(2)(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.05, 10.07 s 5(2)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.05 s 5(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06, 10.07, 10.08, 10.29 s 5(3)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 s 5(3)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06, 10.07, 10.08 s 5(3)(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 s 5(3)(d)����������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06, 10.08, 10.29, 10.30 s 5(3)(e)–(g)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 s 5(3)(h)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 s 5(3)(i)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 s 5(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.07 s 5(5)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.07, 10.08 s 5(5A)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.12 s 5(6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.13 s 5(7), (8)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.14 s 5A(1), (2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19 s 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.24 s 6(2)(ba)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.28 s 6(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.18, 10.42 s 6(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.18 s 6(9)(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.18 s 6A���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.18, 10.21 s 6A(1)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.18 s 6A(1)(b), (c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19 s 6A(1)(d)(i)–(iii)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19 s 6A(1)(e)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19, 10.22, 10.24 s 6A(1)(f)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19 s 6A(1)(g)(i)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.18 s 6A(2)(a), (b)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19 s 6A(3), (4)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.19 li

Table of Statutes s 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.20, 10.24, 10.25 s 7(1)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.20 s 7(2A)–(2C)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.20 s 7A�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.20, 10.21, 10.22, 10.25 s 7A(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(1)(b)(i)–(vi)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(1)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22, 10.24 s 7A(1)(c)(i), (ii)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(1)(d)–(g)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(2)–(5)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(5)(a), (b)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(7)(a)–(c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(9), (10)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(11)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 7A(12)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 8�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.20, 10.24 s 8(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.24 s 8(2)(b)(i)–(iii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.24 s 8(3), (4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.24 s 10(a), (b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 10(c)(i)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 10(c)(i)(I), (II)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 10A������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10B�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21, 10.25 s 10B(2), (3), (5)–(7)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10B(8)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10C��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21, 10.25, 10.41 s 10C(1)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10C(2)–(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10C(7)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10C(7)(b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 10C(12)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10C(12)(b)(i)–(iii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10C(15), (16)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21, 10.24, 10.41 s 10D(7)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22, 10.24 s 10E�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21, 10.25 s 10E(1)(c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22, 10.24 s 10F������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10F(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10F(1)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10F(4)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10F(5)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 10F(7), (11)–(14)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.25 s 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27; 10.28, 10.38

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Table of Statutes s 12�������������������������������������������������������������10.31, 10.32, 10.33, 10.34, 10.36, 10.38 s 12(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.32, 10.33 s 12(2), (3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.32 s 12(7A)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.06 s 12(7C)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.32 s 13���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.37, 10.40 s 13(1), (2B)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.37 s 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 s 14(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 s 14A������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.42 s 14A(1)(a)–(e)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.42 s 14A(2)–(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.42 s 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 s 15(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 s 16����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21, 10.41, 10.42 s 16(1)–(5)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 s 16A(1), (2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.41 s 16B������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16B(1)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16B(1)(a)(i)–(iii)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16B(1)(b)(i)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16B(2)–(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16B(6)(b), (c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16B(8)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16C������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.22 s 16C(1), (2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16C(3)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16C(4)(a), (b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16C(5), (6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16C(6)(i), (ii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 16C(8)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 s 17, 18��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.05 Sch 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.113; 10.38 para 1(2), (8)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.38 Sch 2���������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.31, 10.32, 10.33, 10.37 para 1, 2A���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.33 Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022���������������������������6.18; 7.07, 7.42; 10.02, 10.05, 10.12, 10.17, 10.18, 10.20, 10.21, 10.38, 10.41 s 6(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.05 s 6(d)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.12 s 12(7A)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.06 Sch 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.113 Protection for Persons Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998��������������1.02; 3.58; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41; 10.02

liii

Table of Statutes Protection of Employees (Employers Insolvency) Act 1984�����������������9.01, 9.02, 9.12, 9.35, 9.39, 9.40, 9.41, 9.42, 9.43 s 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.15, 9.16 s 1(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.24 s 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.42 s 3(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.15 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.42 s 4(1)(a)–(h)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.13 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 s 6(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.16 s 6(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 6(a)(i)–(xxxii)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 6(4)(a)–(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.23 s 6(8)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.37 s 6(9)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19, 9.20 s 6(9)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.18 s 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 s 7(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.29 s 7(3)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.43 s 7(4)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.29 s 8������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.28 s 8A����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 s 8A(1), (2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 s 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35, 9.36 s 9(1)(a), (b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 9(1A)–(1C), (3), (4), (4A), (4C)�����������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 9(4A)(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.38 s 9(4D)(a), (b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 9A(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.36 s 10�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.33, 9.34 s 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.38 Protection of Employees (Fixed-term Work) Act 2003����������������1.26, 1.27; 3.16; 5.79; 6.18; 7.37; 8.05; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27 Protection of Employees (Part-Time) Work Act 2001���������3.14, 3.21; 5.10, 5.79; 6.18; 8.05; 9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 21����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.52 Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2003�������������������������������������1.26, 1.27 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27 Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012�������������3.06; 5.79; 9.19 s 23(1), (2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.06 Sch 2��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.06 Protection of Employment Act 1977�������������������2.28; 5.44, 5.45, 5.47, 5.48, 5.50, 5.70 s 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.47, 5.50 liv

Table of Statutes s 6(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.45 s 6(7)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.63 s 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.49, 5.50, 5.87 s 9(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.49 s 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.50 s 10(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.52 s 10(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.87 s 11�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.51, 5.52 s 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.52 s 14(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.52 s 18����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.53 Protection of Employment Acts 1977–2000����������������������������������������������������5.45, 5.54 Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007����������������������������������������������������������3.36; 5.02, 5.87 s 13, 21����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.52 s 25(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 s 26����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.47 Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996������������������9.19, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 Public Service Superannuation (Age of Retirement) Act 2018��������������������������������3.30 s 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.30 Public Service Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004���������������������3.30 Railway Safety Act 2005������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.78 Redundancy Payments Act 1967����������������������1.23; 3.34, 3.115; 5.12, 5.24, 5.81, 5.82 s 2(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.05 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02, 5.09, 5.87 s 5A����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.21 s 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02 s 7(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.01, 5.12, 5.57, 5.87 s 7(2)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.58 s 7(2)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.59 s 7(2)(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.60 s 7(2)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.61 s 7(2)(e)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.62 s 7(4)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.07 s 9(4)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.84 s 10�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.18, 5.98 s 10(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.22 s 10(3)(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.22 s 10(3A)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.22; 5.18 s 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02, 5.12, 5.13 s 12����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.14 s 12(1)(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.13 s 12(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.14 s 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.17 s 13(1)–(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.17 s 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.21 lv

Table of Statutes s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20, 5.22, 5.82 s 15(1), (2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20 s 15(2A)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20, 5.82 s 15(2B)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20, 5.28, 5.29 s 15(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20 s 25(2), (2A)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.06 s 32A��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.34 Sch 3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03, 5.24; 9.20, 9.39 para 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03 para 5(iv)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 para 5(b), (c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 para 5A���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03 para 8������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.34 para 8A���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.35, 5.36, 5.39 para 8A(ba)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.41 para 8A(bb)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.40 para 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.04 para 13, 16����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.24 para 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.31 para 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.30 Redundancy Payments Act 1971 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.01 s 10(a)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03 s 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.13, 5.14, 5.20 s 17����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.20 s 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02, 5.03, 5.20, 5.24, 5.82 s 19(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.21 Schedule para 4, 7��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02 Redundancy Payments Act 1979 s 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02 s 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.18, 5.98 s 10�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02, 5.13 s 11�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.28, 5.29 s 17, 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03 Redundancy Payments Act 2003���������������������������������5.04, 5.05, 5.06, 5.10, 5.27, 5.33 s 3(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.05 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.09 s 5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.01, 5.12, 5.57, 5.87 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.04 s 8(b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.06 s 11�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.27, 5.38 s 11(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.34, 5.35 s 12�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03, 5.34, 5.35, 5.37 s 12(a)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.03 s 12(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.43 lvi

Table of Statutes Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–1973����������������������������������������������������������������� 3.115 Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–1990�������������������������������������������������������������������3.34 Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–1991�������������������������������������������������������������������5.50 Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2003��������������������������������������������������������3.115; 5.36 Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2007����������������������������������������2.28; 3.19; 5.85, 5.86 Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2022�������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 Redundancy Payments (Amendment) Act 2022 s 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.34 Residential Tenancies Acts 2004–2019�������������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005�������������������1.02; 3.20, 3.81, 3.84, 3.101; 8.47; 10.07, 10.08, 10.35, 10.43 s 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 s 13�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60, 3.83 s 18����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 s 27�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.27; 3.20, 3.60, 3.84 s 27(1), (2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 s 27(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 s 27(3)(a)–(f)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 s 28(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 s 29����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.60 Sick Leave Act 2022����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20; 3.95 s 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 s 12(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.20 Social Welfare Acts 1981–1993������������������������������������������������������������3.115; 5.10; 9.19 Social Welfare Act 1952 s 39����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.12 Social Welfare Act 1990�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.12 s 28(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.16 Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1981�����������������������������������������������������������������9.23 s 122��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.12 Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993�����������������������������5.02, 5.09, 5.34; 9.15, 9.42 s 24, 39����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.02 Sch 1 para 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.09, 5.10; 9.15 para 4���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.09; 9.15 para 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.09, 5.10; 9.15 Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005��������������������������������������������������������������������3.17 s 13(2)(d)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Social Welfare (Covid-19) (Amendment) Act 2020����������������������������������������������� 3.115 Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004�����������������������������������������������5.76 Social Welfare Law Reform and Pensions Act 2006 s 48����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.42 Standards in Public Office Act 2001 s 5(1), (3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.63

lvii

Table of Statutes Succession Act 1965 Sch 1 Pt 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.13, 9.14 Tax Consolidation Act 1997��������������������������������������������������������������������6.22–6.23; 9.11 s 10�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.18, 6.20 s 112, 113����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.22–6.23 s 123�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.22–6.23 s 123(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 s 192A������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.17; 6.22–6.23 s 192A(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 s 192A(4)(a)(iii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.20 s 192A(4)(b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.20 s 192A(5)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 s 201��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.21, 6.22–6.23 s 484(2)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.18 s 523�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.22–6.23 s 535(2)(a)(iii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.22–6.23 s 613�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.22–6.23 Sch 3��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6.21 Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994����������������������������2.01, 2.02; 3.17; 6.18; 9.18, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 s 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.28 s 6(2)(a)(xv)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 6C����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.28 s 6D(3)(a), (b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.28 s 6E����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.91 Terms of Employment (Information) Act 2014��������������������������������������������������������6.18 Trade Union Act 1941�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.72 Trade Union Act 1971�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.72 Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996����������������������5.54 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977�������������������������������1.02, 1.21, 1.26, 1.27, 1.31; 2.08, 2.11, 2.14, 2.20; 3.01, 3.03, 3.06, 3.14, 3.16, 3.20, 3.21, 3.28, 3.29, 3.34, 3.36, 3.41, 3.50, 3.51, 3.53, 3.58, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.63, 3.65, 3.75, 3.96, 3.115, 3.116; 4.01, 4.23, 4.28; 5.35, 5.57, 5.72, 5.74, 5.87; 7.03, 7.04, 7.31; 9.19, 9.23, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41; 10.28, 10.31, 10.32, 10.37, 10.43 s 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������3.24, 3.28, 3.47, 3.64, 3.98, 3.108 s 1(b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.28 s 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.16; 8.22; 10.28 s 2(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.29 s 2(1)(a)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19; 10.28 s 2(1)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.16, 3.30, 3.36 s 2(1)(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.31 s 2(1)(c)(ii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.108 s 2(1)(f), (g)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.34 lviii

Table of Statutes s 2(1)(h)–(k)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 s 2(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 s 2(2)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 s 2(2)(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.37 s 2(2)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.38 s 2(2A), (2B)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 s 2(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.39 s 2(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19, 3.48 s 2(5)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19, 3.21 s 3(1), (2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.34 s 5(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.48 s 5(2), (2A)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.47, 3.48 s 5(5)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.48 s 6(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������3.41, 3.45, 3.47, 3.96, 3.106; 5.75 s 6(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.45, 3.96 s 6(2)(ba)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.28, 10.30, 10.43 s 6(2)(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.56 s 6(2)(e)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.56 s 6(2)(f)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.52, 3.63, 3.64 s 6(2A), (2B)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 s 6(2C)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.110 s 6(2D)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.28 s 6(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.96; 5.72, 5.74 s 6(3)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.96 s 6(3)(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.96; 5.73, 5.75, 5.77 s 6(4)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.64, 3.66, 3.70, 3.112 s 6(4)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.74 s 6(4)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.75 s 6(4)(c)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.96; 5.55 s 6(4)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.70 s 6(6)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.64, 3.112; 11.23 s 6(7)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.96; 4.02; 5.66, 5.68 s 6(7)(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.01 s 6(7)(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.02, 4.26 s 6D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.30 s 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.113, 3.116 s 7(1)(a), (b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.48, 3.113 s 7(1)(c)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.113 s 7(1)(c)(ii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.116 s 7(1A)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.43 s 7(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.111, 3.115 s 7(2)(c)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.115 s 7(2)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.47, 3.115 s 7(2)(e), (f)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.115 s 7(2A)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.115 lix

Table of Statutes s 7(2B)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.43 s 7(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.115, 3.116 s 8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03; 3.01, 3.17; 10.32 s 8(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.44 s 8(2)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22 s 8(6)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03; 3.01 s 8(10)(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.03 s 8(12)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.17 s 8(13)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.20 s 8(13)(c)(i)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 s 8(13)(c)(ii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.20 s 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.88 s 11(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.30 s 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.112 s 14(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.47 s 14(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.03 s 14(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.112 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.01; 7.01, 7.36 s 16(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.37 s 18�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.11; 3.37 s 62D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20 Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993��������������������������2.14, 2.20; 3.05, 3.16, 3.20, 3.50, 3.51, 3.56, 3.84, 3.96, 3.111; 4.23; 5.35, 5.63, 5.74; 7.03, 7.04, 7.31 s 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.36 s 3(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19, 3.21 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.47 s 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.56 s 5(g)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.63 s 6���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.115 s 6(a)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.116 s 6(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3.115 s 7���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22; 7.03 s 7(d)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.17 s 10�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7.01, 7.36 s 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.06, 3.19; 5.46 s 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.20, 3.30 s 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.19 Value-Added Tax Consolidation Act 2010���������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Vocational Education Act 1930���������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Act 2020������������������������������������������������������������������9.13 Workplace Relations Act 2015��������������������������� 1.01, 1.02, 1.04, 1.07, 1.11, 1.34, 1.36, 1.41; 2.25; 3.22, 3.89; 9.11; 10.20, 10.23; 11.33 s 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.32 lx

Table of Statutes s 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.02 Pt 4 (ss 38–53)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03; 3.01 s 41����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.51, 5.52; 9.36 s 41(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03 s 41(5)(a)(i), (ii)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.11 s 41(6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.15; 2.25; 5.86 s 41(8)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22; 11.32 s 41(13)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.01 s 41(14)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03 s 41(15)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.14 s 41(15)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.14 s 41(16)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.22 s 42����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.08 s 42(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.08 s 42(3)(a), (b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.08 s 42(6)–(8)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.22 s 43�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.116 s 43(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.25 s 43(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.25 s 44�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.41; 2.26; 9.19, 9.36 s 44(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.32 s 44(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.24, 1.31, 1.33, 1.35 s 45����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.19 s 45(1), (3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.38 s 46����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2.26 s 47����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.09 s 47(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.09 s 48����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.10 s 66���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 s 67����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.29 s 71����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.41 s 80(1)(g)(v), (viii), (xii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.17 s 82(3)(a), (c), (d)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 82(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 Sch 2��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.07 Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021����������������������������1.04; 3.01 s 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03 s 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 s 41����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.04 BUNREACHT NA HÉIREANN Constitution of Ireland����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.02 Art 37������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.03 Art 40.3���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.02 lxi

Table of Statutes Art 40.6.1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.46 Art 42A����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.21 UNITED KINGDOM Deeds of Arrangements Act 1887 s 4���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.13, 9.14 Employment Rights Act1996 s 43��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09 s 43B(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09, 10.10 s 43B(1)(a)–(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09 s 43B(1)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09, 10.10 s 43B(1)(e), (f)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09 s 43F������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09 s 43L(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.09 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.16 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877������������������������������������������������������9.09 UNITED STATES Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.02

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Table of Statutory Instruments

Circuit Court Rules Order 53A������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10 Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 (Section 31) (Workplace Relations Commission) (Designation) Order 2020, SI 359/2020�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.16 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Commencement) Order 2010, SI 648/2010���������������������������������������8.17 Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Covid-19) Act 2020 (Commencement) Order 2020, SI 320/2020������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.11 Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 76 – Right to Information) Regulations 1999, SI 321/1999 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������8.55 European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Privacy and Electronic Communications) Regulations 2011, SI 336/2011�����10.23 European Communities (Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency)) Regulations 2005, SI 630/2005���������������������������������������������������������������������������9.12 European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003, SI 131/2003�����������������������������5.81, 5.83; 9.01, 9.26, 9.40, 9.41; 11.01, 11.07, 11.12, 11.19, 11.32, 11.33, 11.35, 11.39, 11.40, 11.42, 11.43 reg 2(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.19 reg 3��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.04, 11.13, 11.29 reg 3(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.02 reg 3(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.10, 11.14 reg 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.84; 11.15 reg 4(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.01, 11.05, 11.15 reg 4(2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.01 reg 4(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.21 reg 5(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.83; 11.23 reg 5(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 5.83; 11.25, 11.26 reg 5(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.83; 11.27 reg 6�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.22, 11.22 reg 7(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.19 reg 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.15, 11.17, 11.34, 11.42 reg 8(4)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.19 reg 8(5), (6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.17 reg 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.27 reg 9(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.39 reg 9(2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.27 reg 9(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.27, 11.39 reg 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.32 lxiii

Table of Statutory Instruments reg 10(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.15 reg 10(5)(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.32 reg 10(5)(c)(i)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.32 reg 10(6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.32 reg 12(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.33 reg 13(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.32 reg 14(1), (3)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.33 European Communities (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2000, SI 488/2000��������������������������������������������������������������������5.44, 5.47, 5.49, 5.50, 5.52, 5.88, 5.96; 9.26, 9.40, 9.41 reg 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.47, 5.50 reg 5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.52 reg 6���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.51 reg 6(4)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.51 European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees’ Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) (Amendment) Regulations 2000, SI 487/2000��������������������� 11.01 European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees’ Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980, SI 306/1980������������ 11.01, 11.15, 11.22, 11.29 reg 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.25 reg 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.25 European Communities (Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 (Amendment) Regulations 1999, SI 386/1999�����������������5.54 European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018, SI 188/2018����10.41 European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations 2022, SI 686/2022������������������������������������������������������������������2.01; 4.28 reg 10�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4.28 Fines Act 2010 (Commencement) Order 2010, SI 662/2010�����������������������������������9.35 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice for Employers and Employees on the Prevention and Resolution of Bullying at Work) Order 2020, SI 674/2020�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.43 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order 2000, SI 146/2000������������3.76; 4.03, 4.06, 4.25, 4.26, 4.28; 7.36; 8.36 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017, SI 600/2017������������������������������������������������������2.15; 8.24 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 2015, SI 464/2015��������������������������������10.02, 10.29 Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2015, SI 448/2015�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.23 Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2020, SI 367/2020������������������������������������������������������������������������10.20, 10.23 Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Section 7(2)) Order 2014, SI 339/2014��������������10.23 Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022 (Commencement) Order 2022, SI 510/2022����������������������������������������������������������������������10.02, 10.05, 10.06, 10.12

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Table of Statutory Instruments Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020, SI 730/2020����������������������������������������������9.34 reg 5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 reg 5(a)–(c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 reg 6, 7�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 197/2003�������������������������������������������9.40, 9.41 Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005, SI 682/2005)��������������������������������������������������������9.25, 9.29, 9.30 reg 4(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.24 reg 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Occupational Pension Scheme) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 1990, SI 121/1990���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.30, 9.42, 9.43 Protection of Employment Order 1996, SI 370/1996�����������5.44, 5.46, 5.49, 5.50, 5.88 art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.45 art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.50 Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968, SI 24/1968�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1.07, 1.22, 1.31 s 13������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.07, 1.11 Rules of the Superior Courts (Companies Act 2014) 2015, SI 255/2015��������9.05, 9.09 Order 74���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.05 Order 74A������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.10 Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations 1977, SI 287/1977������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.117 reg 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.117 Unfair Dismissals (Claims and Appeals) Regulations 1977, SI 286/1977������ 1.07, 1.11 Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Act 2020 (Part 15) (Commencement) Order 2020, SI 688/2020�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.13 Workplace Relations Act 2015 (Fees) Regulations 2015, SI 536/2015��������������������1.41 Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 (Commencement) Order 2021, SI 397/2021�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35 Workplace Relations Act 2015 (Commencement) (No 2) Order 2015, SI 410/2015���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.17; 9.35, 9.36 Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 (Commencement) Order 2021, SI 397/2021�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.35

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Table of European Legislation

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome, 19 June 1980) Art 3, 4, 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.39 European Convention on Human Rights (Rome, 4 November 1950) Art 6��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Art 6(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Art 8����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.94, 3.108, 3.109 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Rome, 25 March 1957) Art 26(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 Art 325��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.06 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and their Property (New York, 2 December 2004)�������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Art 11, 11.2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 REGULATIONS Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.40 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)���������������������������������������3.39 Art 5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.39 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)��������������3.108; 9.34; 10.21, 10.23; 11.41 Art 4(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 Art 5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34; 10.21 Art 5(1)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.108 Art 5(1)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 Art 6(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.41 Art 9(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.34 Art 12–22, 28����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 Art 32���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.41 Art 33, 34����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.21 lxvii

Table of European Legislation DIRECTIVES Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies�����5.45; 11.18 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions���������3.52 Council Directive77/197/EEC on the transfer of undertakings������������������������������ 11.14 Council Directive 92/56/EEC of 24 June 1992 amending Directive 75/129/EEC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.45, 5.46 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.12 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex�������������������������������������������������������������������8.12 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies�����������������������������������5.45 Art 2��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.49 Art 2(1), (2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5.49 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin���������8.02 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation����������������8.02, 8.26 Art 2(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 Art 5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.32 Art 6��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 Art 6(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 Art 17������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.54 Recital 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.23 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses�������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.01, 11.04, 11.09, 11.16, 11.24, 11.29, 11.39 Art 1(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.09 Art 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.15 Art 3(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.15, 11.28 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.02, 8.09 lxviii

Table of European Legislation Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.12, 8.14 Recital 3���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8.14 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer Art 2(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9.13 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with the regard to the ­ processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA��������������������10.21 Directive (EU) 2019/1152/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union Art 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3.35 Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10.02

lxix

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Chapter 1

The Institutional Framework

[1.01]   Prior to 2015, there existed various independent statutory bodies which dealt with claims under employment legislation, depending on what particular claim was being pursued. However, this was greatly simplified by the passing of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, which established the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and allowed a single point of appeal to the Labour Court. That said, there are still some instances where hearings can proceed directly to the Circuit Court. It is essential for practitioners to be able to distinguish between the various bodies and to understand how they operate, on both a statutory and practical basis. This applies equally to those representing claimants and those defending such proceedings. Increasingly, it is a feature of employment law litigation that employers are faced with several claims at once, under various employment law statutes. It is therefore difficult to predict how a claim will actually be heard. Notwithstanding this, once the claim form and/or proceedings have been issued, employers will know how claimants and their representatives intend to proceed. It is then up to employers to plan a strategy to defend such actions. This demands a proper understanding of both the WRC, the Labour Court and the civil courts, and how they function at a practical level.

WORKPLACE RELATIONS COMMISSION [1.02]   The WRC is an independent statutory body which was established on 1 October 2015 under the Workplace Relations Act 2015. It assumed the roles and ­functions previously carried out by the National Employment Rights Authority, the Equality Tribunal, the Labour Relations Commission, the Rights Commissioners Service and the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT). The WRC has responsibility for: (a) promoting the improvement of workplace relations and the maintenance of good workplace relations; (b) promoting and encouraging compliance with relevant enactments; (c) providing guidance in relation to compliance with codes of practice approved under s 20 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015; (d) conducting reviews of, and monitoring developments as regards, workplace relations; (e) conducting or commissioning research into matters pertaining to workplace relations; 1

[1.03]  Termination of Employment (f) providing advice, information and the findings of research conducted by the WRC to joint labour committees and joint industrial councils; (g) advising and apprising the Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment in relation to the application of, and compliance with, relevant enactments; and (h) providing information to members of the public in relation to employment. The core services of the WRC include: (a) the inspection of compliance with employment rights; (b) the provision of information; (c) the processing of employment agency and the protection of young persons’ (employment) licences; and (d) the provision of mediation, conciliation, facilitation and advisory services. In relation to the termination of employment cases, adjudication officers appointed by the WRC hear and deal with such cases. Most are heard under the Unfair Dismissals Act, but dismissal cases can also be heard under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, the Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005, the Protections for Person Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998 and the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, to mention a few.

Public hearings [1.03]   Hearings before an adjudication officer appointed by the WRC to hear a claim take place in public unless the adjudication officer, of their own motion or upon application by or on behalf of a party to the proceedings, determines that due to the existence of special circumstances, the proceedings (or part thereof) should be conducted otherwise than in public (save for any disputes under s 13 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969 (as amended)).1 Prior to the decision in Zalewski v An Adjudication Officer,2 all hearings before adjudication officers were held ‘otherwise than in public’3 and ­decisions by adjudication officers could not identify the parties.4 Zalewski changed this and brought about significant procedural changes in terms of how employment disputes are determined in the WRC. The facts of Zalewski are interesting. Mr Zalewski’s employment was terminated in 2016. After that, he brought an unfair dismissal claim to the WRC. During the hearing, an application was granted to adjourn the hearing in order to allow an absent witness to give evidence at a later stage. Mr Zalewski was then told that an adjudication officer had already decided the matter in favour of the respondent, based upon preliminary written submissions only, and his claim was dismissed without allowing the full hearing to proceed. 1 2 3 4

Section 41(13) of the 2015 Act as amended by s 4 of the 2021 Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021. Zalewski v An Adjudication Officer, the Workplace Relations Commission, Ireland and The Attorney General [2021] IESC 24. Section 41(13) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Section 41(14) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

2

The Institutional Framework  [1.04] Mr Zalewski lodged an appeal to the Labour Court and was simultaneously granted leave to seek judicial review before the High Court. In the High Court, Mr Zalewski argued that the process leading to the WRC’s decision was unconstitutional and that the WRC was administering justice which was outside of its remit. Simons J in the High Court found that the activities of the WRC did not constitute the administration of justice, due to the requirement of enforcement through the District Court. The judicial review application was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, it was held that although the WRC was engaged in the administration of justice, Art 37 of the Constitution expressly grants a power to non-judicial bodies to exercise ‘limited functions and powers of a judicial nature’. However, the Supreme Court, while criticising the lack of an express provision to allow cross-examination in the WRC, held that the following two procedural aspects of the WRC were incompatible and repugnant to the Constitution: (a) the blanket prohibition on WRC hearings being held in public pursuant to s 41(13) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and s 8(6) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended; and (b) the absence of any provision for the administration of an oath or the cross-­ examination of witnesses in the WRC under Part 4 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 or s 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. [1.04]   This case brought about the passing of the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021.5 This Act provided for the eligibility for appointment of adjudication officers, the administration of oaths or affirmations, the conduct of proceedings in public and the publication of decisions by the WRC. It also amended the Workplace Relations Act of 2015 by allowing applications in relation to the enforcement of decisions of adjudication officers to be made on notice. In practice, it is rare for any member of the public to turn up at such hearings. While details of hearings are published in advance (every Thursday showing hearings for the following week) on the WRC’s website, only the case numbers are listed and it is extremely difficult to ascertain who the parties are. One also has to contact the WRC to get a link to the hearing. Given that there is no ‘public’ notice of the hearing, a person would have to be constantly searching the WRC website or be formally notified by one of the parties to be ready in advance either to attend or to log on to a remote hearing. This is dealt with in s 41 of the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, which states: ‘(13) Proceedings under this section shall be conducted in public unless the adjudication officer, of his or her own motion or upon the application by or on behalf of a party to the proceedings, determines that, due to the existence of special circumstances, the proceedings (or part thereof) should be conducted otherwise than in public.’

The procedure for attendance as a member of the public attending a hearing is for the person to turn up at the commencement of the hearing and advise the adjudication 5

Act 29 of 2021.

3

[1.05]  Termination of Employment officer conducting the case of their presence. The adjudication officer will then advise the parties to the hearing of the person’s presence and either party may then make an application, if they wish, to the adjudication officer that special circumstances exist that require some or all of the hearing to be conducted in private. Under the Act, the adjudication officer may decide of their own motion to conduct a hearing in private. The decision as to what constitutes ‘special circumstances’ is solely a decision for the adjudication officer upon application by a party or of their own motion. The legal arguments concerning what constitutes ‘special circumstances’ are conducted in private so as to protect the parties’ positions. Once the adjudication officer has decided on the application for a private hearing, they will advise the member(s) of the public of the decision. The adjudication officer’s decision is final and not subject to appeal. What constitutes ‘special circumstances’ is not defined by the act and may vary by case; but according to a WRC guidance note issued when the Act commenced, examples of special circumstances might include: (a) cases involving a minor;6 (b) circumstances where a party has a disability or medical condition, which they do not wish to be revealed;7 (c) cases involving issues of a sensitive nature such as sexual harassment; (d) cases involving a protected disclosure where there is an issue of the disclosure being made in confidence; and (e) cases which could result in a real risk or harm to a party if the hearing were held in public. The WRC website provides that this list is non-exhaustive. [1.05]  In An Employee v A Medical Device Organisation,8 the respondent made an application for the decision to be anonymised on the basis that, if granted, it would concede that the dismissal was unfair. The respondent grounded the application on the ‘interest of efficiency’, as evidence had already been given which limited the complainant’s loss to four weeks. The adjudication officer in that instance found that the ‘efficiency of hearing’ did not constitute special circumstances. However, upon application by the complainant to anonymise the decision due to health reasons, the adjudication officer found that health reasons constituted special circumstances. In A Bar Person v A Public House and Restaurant,9 the adjudication officer exercised his own discretion due to the sensitivities associated with the nature of the complaint before him – that being sexual harassment – and as a result, the proceedings were held in private. In A Scaffolder v A Scaffolding Company,10 the adjudication officer 6 In

A Father v A Clinical Psychologist ADJ-00036551, the adjudication officer determined that special circumstances existed due to the disclosure of a clinical assessment of a minor. 7 In A Customer v A Retail Premises ADJ-00036307, special circumstances were deemed to have existed due to the complainant’s medical condition of chronic asthma and the fact that he wished for this information to be kept private. 8 An Employee v A Medical Device Organisation ADJ-00034417. 9 A Bar Person v A Public House and Restaurant DJ-00025758. 10 A Scaffolder v Scaffolding Company ADJ-00029869.

4

The Institutional Framework  [1.07] determined that the disclosure of the parties’ names was of ‘no instructional value’, as the case concerned a private family conflict and it was decided that the conflict was ‘best resolved within the confines of the family’. In keeping with the non-exhaustive nature of what constitutes ‘special circumstances’, in A Paralegal v A Company,11 the complainant applied to have the matter anonymised so as to preserve his professional reputation. The complainant outlined that at the time of the hearing, he was a trainee solicitor; he believed the outcome of the case could have an adverse impact on his future employability due to his proximity to employment lawyers and the Law Society, as he frequently reported on cases. Furthermore, the claimant noted that his name was unusual and would be easily identifiable in his field of work. While the adjudication officer did not accept that his proximity to a law firm would compromise him, at the decision-making stage – and due to his submissions on the uniqueness of his name – he took into account the high level of anxiety that the claimant had exhibited at the time of hearing and found that this constituted special circumstances.

RULES FOR HEARINGS [1.06]   ‘The procedures in the investigation and adjudication of employment and equality complaints’ are set out in a document bearing that title published by the WRC in 2015. In unfair dismissal cases, a clear statement setting out the details of the complaint is required from the complainant in all discriminatory and constructive dismissal cases when submitting the complaint. In all other cases of unfair dismissal, a statement is required from the respondent within 21 days of the date of the request from the WRC. If this is not done, the adjudication officer can draw such inferences as they deem appropriate where the relevant information is not presented in a timely manner.

Non-statutory rules [1.07]   Notwithstanding the rules of the WRC on the making of submissions and responding to same, the fact remains that the rules of the WRC are not deemed to be statutory and are therefore not binding on participants. This causes practical difficulties in some instances – particularly in constructive dismissal cases, where the onus of proof rests on the claimant, meaning that a respondent should not have to make any submission until such time as all evidence which will be adduced by the claimant is put before it. The rules regarding the operation of unfair dismissal claims are still governed by the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations, 1968.12 While the Workplace Relations Act 2015 significantly codified and repealed a plethora of legislation,13 the 1968 Regulations – insofar as how unfair dismissal claims are to be conducted – have 11

12 13

A Paralegal v A Company ADJ-00033884. SI 24/1968. See Schedule 2 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

5

[1.08]  Termination of Employment remained unamended since 1977. In accordance with the 1968 Regulations (as amended by the Unfair Dismissals (Claims and Appeals) Regulations, 1977),14 these rules specifically provide that a party to an appeal may: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

make an opening statement; call witnesses; cross-examine any witness called by any other party; give evidence on their own behalf; and address the Tribunal (now the WRC) at the close of the evidence.15.

The fact that these rules still apply is often overlooked by both the WRC and the Labour Court, but there is no basis in statute for either the WRC or the Labour Court to impose any rule other than these in unfair dismissal cases.

Dismissal of frivolous and vexatious complaints by adjudication officer [1.08]   Under s 42 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, an adjudication officer has the power, at any time, to dismiss a complaint or dispute if they are of the opinion that it is frivolous or vexatious. If they so determine, the person can then appeal that decision to the Labour Court within 42 days. The Labour Court has only two options open to it under such appeals: either to affirm the decision of the adjudication officer16 or to annul that decision and refer the complaint to the Director General.17 In A General Operative v A Food Company,18 the adjudication officer, in holding that the claim was frivolous and vexatious, helpfully reviewed and set out the law in this area, referring to Farley v Ireland and Others,19 in which Barron J in the Supreme Court stated the following: ‘So far as the legality of matters is concerned, frivolous and vexatious are legal terms. They are not pejorative in the sense or possible in the sense that Mr. Farley may think they are. It is merely a question of saying that so far as the Plaintiff is concerned if he has no reasonable chance of succeeding then the law says it is frivolous to bring the case.’

Similarly, it may constitute hardship on a defendant to have to defend a case which cannot succeed (ie, which the law calls vexatious). In Fay v Tegral Pipes Limited and Others,20 the Supreme Court again set out the principles which apply, stating: ‘The real purpose of the Courts inherent jurisdiction to dismiss frivolous and vexatious claims was, firstly to ensure that the Courts would be used only for the resolution of disputes and not for lost causes and secondly that parties would not be required to defend proceedings which could not succeed.’

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

SI 286/1977. Section 13 of the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations, 1968. Section 42(3)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Section 42(3)(b) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. A General Operative v A Food Company ADJ-00012100. Farley v Ireland and Others 1997 IESC 60. Fay v Tegral Pipes Limited and Others 2005 IR261.

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The Institutional Framework  [1.09] In Loughrey v Dolan,21 Laffoy J, in relying on the decision of a Canadian High Court in Re Lang Michener and Fabian,22 listed a number of factors which tend to indicate that proceedings may potentially be vexatious in nature and thus amenable to being struck out. These factors, which are deemed to be non-exhaustive, are as follows: (a) The issues in dispute are matters which have already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction (ie, res judicata); (b) It is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or that the action will lead to no possible good, or that no reasonable person could expect to obtain relief; (c) The action is brought for an improper purpose, including harassment and oppression of other parties, as opposed to asserting legitimate legal rights; (d) Issues sought to be litigated tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented; (e) The person instituting the proceedings has failed to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings; or (f) The plaintiff persistently takes unsuccessful appeals against judicial decisions.

These factors were relied upon in Andre Conway v Department of Agriculture Food and Marine.23 Here the case concerned a claim for penalisation under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). The complainant, a veterinary inspector, claimed that he had been penalised for having made a protected disclosure. The respondent made a preliminary application that the complaint was frivolous and vexatious, and should be dismissed in accordance with s 42(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The respondent submitted that the subject matter of the proceedings – a protected disclosure of 17 May 2018 – had already been ventilated before the WRC,24 the Labour Court25 and the High Court.26 The respondent noted that the complainant was seeking to make the same complaints again, and that his complaint was therefore frivolous and vexatious and should be dismissed. In finding in favour of the respondent’s application, the adjudication officer noted that the issue in dispute had already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction (Labour Court decision, upheld by the High Court); therefore, the matter was res judicata. Furthermore, the previous litigated complaint was one that the complainant had sought to roll forward into a subsequent complaint, which was repeated and supplemented and would therefore not succeed.

Disposal by written submission only [1.09]   Section 47 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 allows the Director General of the WRC, where they consider that a complaint presented to them may be dealt with by written submission only, to inform the parties of their intention to deal with it in that

21 22 23 24 25 26

Loughrey v Dolan [2012] IEHC 578. Re Lang Michener and Fabian (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 685. Andre Conway v Department of Agriculture Food and Marine ADJ-00036667. ADJ-00016854. PDD197. [2020] IEHC 665.

7

[1.10]  Termination of Employment manner. However, under s 47(2), a party may object to that within 42 days of having been given notification.

Striking out cases that are not pursued [1.10]   Section 48 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 allows the Director General to strike out complaints where they are satisfied that the complainant has not pursued the complaint within a period of one year. This power is often exercised in circumstances where the complainant fails to communicate or engage with the WRC in furtherance of their complaint or fails to attend the hearing themselves.27

Process of hearing [1.11]   The hearings before an adjudication officer are formal but not adversarial. Each side is given the chance to fully present their case. The Supreme Court held in The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v The Commissioner of An Garda Siochana28 that the process before the EAT (since replaced by the WRC) was an inquisitorial process. Clarke CJ in that case went on to say that: ‘in that context it is also said, correctly so far as it goes, that the procedure before the Tribunal is inquisitorial whereas the procedure before the High Court is adversarial.’ In that vein, the Workplace Relations Act 201529 provides that an adjudication officer shall ‘inquire into the complaint or dispute’. Practitioners should also be mindful of the fact that s 41(5)(a)(ii) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 also provides that an adjudication officer shall: give the parties to the complaint or dispute an opportunity to (i) Be heard by the adjudication officer and (ii) Present to the adjudication officer any evidence relevant to the complaint or dispute.

What all this means in practice has not yet been properly clarified. While the legislation is clear in that the WRC must inquire into the complaint, equally per the legislation, the parties must be given the opportunity to be heard and, in unfair dismissal cases, to make opening and closing statements, cross-examine witnesses and give evidence. These seemingly oxymoronic requirements have led to some practitioners taking a very strict interpretation of how the WRC should run hearings.30 On one hand, this could mean that the WRC (and indeed the Labour Court) is bound to inquire into matters and

27 See Claudia Arbizu v Eli Lilly ADJ-00023783; Julian Aberto Rodriguez Almenares v Old Park Catering 28 29 30

Ltd T/A New Park Hotel ADJ-00019264; Credit Analyst v Financial Services Company ADJ-00026985. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana Supreme Court [2017] IESC 43 at para 7.12. Section 41(5)(a)(i) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. See Richard Grogan, ‘The WRC do not follow procedures’, 8 January 2021 (which was published on his website – unfortunately this website is no longer available).

8

The Institutional Framework  [1.12] really there is nothing much for either complainant or respondent to do; on the other, it could mean that the WRC is entitled to ask questions of each of the parties (inquire) to ensure that they understand the matters before them, but equally that the parties and/or their representatives are entitled to be heard also. Frankly, this seems the more likely intent of the legislation and the case law. Of course, being mindful of the Zalewski31 decision holding that the WRC is involved in the administration of justice, there must be an allowance for the parties to be properly represented and to be allowed to ask questions and probe each other for answers. In practice, the process is adversarial and cross-examination is allowed. This is so because, as referred to previously, the rules for unfair dismissal cases still have to be heard in accordance with s 13 of the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968, which allows for the calling of witnesses and cross-examination.32 In some cases, it is possible to settle disputes between the parties on the day of a hearing, with the assistance of the adjudication officer. This was common practice in previous years but is becoming increasingly less so in present times, as many are fearful of judicial review. It is entirely a matter for the adjudication officer to decide how to conduct a ­hearing. They do not allow mobile phones, tape recorders, cameras or other recording equipment to be used during the course of proceedings. Determining preliminary issues [1.12]   The WRC can rely on Adigun v The Equality Tribunal33 to determine preliminary matters. In this instance, playwright Mr Adigun lodged a case against the Abbey Theatre. The equality officer first had to determine Mr Adigun’s employment status and whether he was an employee. He subsequently issued a decision that the complainant was not an employee and disposed of the matter prior to the substantive matter being heard. As a result, the complainant judicially reviewed the decision. Sheehan J dismissed the claim in the High Court, so Mr Adigun then appealed to the Supreme Court. He also lost his case on appeal. This decision affords the WRC (and by extension the Labour Court) the discretion to deal with preliminary issues concerning jurisdictional matters such as the status of the complainant, time limits and other issues – even where there are no powers under the unfair dismissal legislation – as long as this is done fairly.34 That said, the WRC also published a guidance note in 2017 which states that in the main, hearings will deal with the vast majority of preliminary points by incorporating them into the main body of the hearing, meaning that they will not

31 32

33 34

Zalewski v An Adjudication Officer [2021]IESC 24. Section 18 of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977 provided the Redundancy Appeals Tribunal would be known as the Employment Appeals Tribunal. The Unfair Dismissal (Claims and Appeals) Regulations, 1977, which incorporate s 13 of the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations, 1968, have not been repealed and are therefore the only statutory rules that govern unfair dismissal cases. Adigun v The Equality Tribunal [2015] IESC 91. Also see Aer Lingus Teoranta v Labour Court [1990] ILRM 485.

9

[1.13]  Termination of Employment deal with preliminary applications in isolation and will hear the matter in its entirety prior to issuing a decision.35 In contrast, under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 (as amended), preliminary matters may be investigated and disposed of by the Director General from the outset without having to inquire into the substantive complaint. This may be proposed by either party or by the Director General’s own motion if a question arises as to the entitlement of either party to bring or contest proceedings under the Employment Equality Acts, including: (a) where the complainant has complied with the statutory requirements relating to their referral; (b) where the discrimination or victimisation occurred on or after 18 October 1999 (the date on which the legislation came into force); (c) where the complainant is an employee; and (d) where any other related question of law or fact arises. Documents needed [1.13]   The adjudication officer’s function is to issue decisions based on the facts and evidence presented at the hearing. For this reason, it must be ensured that all relevant information and documentary evidence (eg, witnesses, payslips, letters, emails, meeting minutes) are available for the hearing. First among the documents to be presented is the written submission. In accordance with WRC procedures,36 a submission must set out a clear statement of the facts being relied upon by either party, together with any supporting documentation verifying its position. It is advised by the WRC that this includes a chronology of events and a ‘concise written account of what happened’.37 The parties are also encouraged to refer to relevant case law or relevant areas of law which they intend to rely upon. Currently, parties are expected to file submissions with the WRC ‘as early as possible’, but no later than 15 working days before the scheduled hearing date38. Submissions may be filed by either party electronically to the WRC by way of email.39 However, parties are limited by the size of the submissions that may be filled electronically, which in turn requires either submissions to be divided and sent in parts across two or more emails or a hard copy to be delivered by post to the adjudication service.40

35

36 37 38 39 40

Workplace Relations Commission, Guidance Note for a WRC Adjudication Heading (issued August 2017, workplacerelations.ie). This was updated in July 2021 but the paragraph is repeated – see paragraph 8.2. Rule 5 of the WRC Procedures in the Investigation and Adjudication of Employment Equality Complaints. Rule 7 of the WRC Procedures in the Investigation and Adjudication of Employment Equality Complaints. Rule 7 of the WRC Procedures in the Investigation and Adjudication of Employment Equality Complaints. Submissions and documentary evidence can be delivered to the WRC by way of email to Submissions@ workplacerelations.ie. Adjudication Service, Lansdowne House, Lansdowne Road, Dublin 4, D04 A3A8.

10

The Institutional Framework  [1.15] Representation [1.14]   It is up to the claimant and the employer to decide whether they wish to be represented at an adjudication officer’s hearing. Section 41(15) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 specifically deals with the matter of representation and provides that in proceedings before an adjudication officer, either party may be accompanied and represented by a trade union official; an official of a body that, in the opinion of the adjudication officer, represents the interests of employers; a practising barrister or solicitor; or any other person if the adjudication officer so permits. If someone is under the age of 18, they may be accompanied and represented by their parent or guardian.41 While a practising barrister may act as a representative in WRC proceedings, they are unable to be directly instructed by employers and employees. In accordance with s 100(2) of the Legal Services Regulations Act 2015 (as amended), barristers are prohibited in contentious matters from taking instructions directly from a person who is not a solicitor. In other words, where a matter is in dispute, a barrister may only act as a representative in circumstances where they have taken instructions directly from a solicitor, who in turn has been appointed by the client. Referral of disputes [1.15]   In order to lodge or submit a complaint, a claimant must first complete a WRC complaint form. This form is found on the WRC’s website and, once completed, is submitted and filed electronically. Upon lodgment of the relevant complaint, the complainant will then receive a notification of receipt by way of email soon thereafter. The date on which the form is filed is the date that is relied upon for the purposes of the statutory time limit as provided for under s 41(6) of the 2015 Act. This form is revised routinely by the WRC – the latest version is V14. Much work has gone into perfecting this form and it is relatively easy to complete without assistance. The real issue is in knowing which legislation to pursue a claim under, due to the various dropdown options; therefore, an expert in this area is advisable from the outset to avoid incorrect filings. It should be noted that this is not a statutory form and claimants may still submit their claim in writing to the WRC (although this is not advised). In County Louth VEC v The Equality Tribunal and Pearse Brannigan,42 Justice McGovern said that the Form EE1 is a non-statutory form, was only intended to set out the nature of the complaint in broad outline. Consequently, it is permissible to amend a claim as long as the general nature of the complaint remains the same. In terms of the causes of actions not selected on the complaint form, a lenient approach per Louth VEC continues. This acknowledges that complaint forms are not pleadings within the traditional sense. If a fact is referred to in the written submissions which correlates with a cause of action not selected on the complaint form and the respondent has been afforded an opportunity to deal with this

41 42

Section 41(15)(b) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. County Louth VEC v The Equality Tribunal and Pearse Brannigan [2009] IEHC 370.

11

[1.16]  Termination of Employment in their written submissions, it will generally be allowed to be heard and adjudicated on. Sean Rahill v Agrigear Limited43 shows that the WRC can disregard patently incorrect references to a particular statute, and that it can purposively interpret the content of a complaint form to identify the actual claim being pursued. This authority does not, however, support the proposition that the WRC could identify, of its own volition, a statutory claim that could or should have been brought on the evidence and determine the merits of the claim even when not requested to do so by a complainant. It submitted that this was what the EAT had done, leading to the High Court quashing its determination in Galway Mayo Institute of Technology v Employment Appeals Tribunal,44 in which Charleton J held that: ‘It follows from the foregoing that a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is not entitled to invoke a statutory remedy which no one has sought and in respect of which no one is on notice. For the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of natural justice, however, I would have thought that if any such tribunal does have jurisdiction to give a remedy under a particular Act, then if this remedy is sought in an originating document, for instance by ticking a box giving a choice of remedies, or if it is orally sought to in the course of the hearing, such a tribunal is entitled to make a choice in favour of it. If that happens, parties have to be taken as being aware that in the event that a decision goes a particular way the tribunal may look to a remedy claimed. In that regard, I would regard a written claim or an oral assertion seeking a particular remedy as being sufficient for the due administration of constitutional justice provided the tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of it. If remedies are complex, and a tribunal has rules as to notice in the form of simple originating documents, then it should abide by its own procedures or consider the grant of an adjournment to a genuinely surprised party.’

This approach was also taken in In the matter of Clare County Council v Director of Equality Investigations,45 in which Hedigan J held that: ‘it is clear from the foregoing that because the EEI form is only designed to set out the generality of a complaint, complainants should be allowed to expand on matters not specified in the form, so long as respondents are not taken by surprise, or alternatively given adequate time to answer, there can be no injustice therein.’

Remote hearings [1.16]   Section 31 of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and SI 359/202046 allow all WRC cases to be dealt with remotely, unless a party can demonstrate that holding a remote hearing would not be in the interests of justice or would be a breach of fair procedures. Section 31(1)(d) of the 2015 Act allows the WRC to ‘make such arrangements and to adopt such practice and procedures as are necessary to enable the conduct of a hearing by remote hearing’. Arising out of this, the WRC published guidelines47 as to how one objects to having a hearing dealt with

43 44 45 46 47

Sean Rahill v Agrigear Limited ADJ-00031097. Galway Mayo Institute of Technology v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2007] IEHC 210. Clare County Council v Director of Equality Investigations 2011] IEHC 303. Introduction of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 (Section 31) (Workplace Relations Commissions) (Designation) Order 2020 (SI 359/2020). www.workplacerelations.ie/en/complaints_disputes/adjudication/objections-to-remote-hearings/.

12

The Institutional Framework  [1.16] remotely, which much be read alongside the WRC Policy on Remote Hearings.48 In considering applications for not having a hearing remotely, the WRC has regard to a non-exhaustive set of factors, including: (a) the length of the delay that will likely result if the hearing must be dealt with in person; (b) the capacity and resources of the WRC; (c) the complexity of the case; (d) the personal circumstances of either party or any participant which would include disability or any specific accommodations that they may require to effectively participate in the hearing; (e) considerations such as access to broadband; (f) whether the parties are represented; (g) whether there are any public health travel restrictions; and (h) any specific or exceptional circumstances of a particular case which might present a material risk of unfairness or injustice. If a party is to object, it must do so within five working days of the hearing of the notice and must comply with the WRC’s procedures in relation to the advance provision of written submissions and witness lists. In practice, a very high bar must be met to successfully object to the remote hearing of a matter. This topic was dealt with in In the Matter of the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) v Browne.49 Here the special liquidators to IBRC sought to recover sums allegedly owed by the defendant, a former director of Anglo-Irish Bank (the former name of IBRC) arising from two loan facilities. Mr Browne claimed that he was entitled to rescind the loan agreements due to fraud by IBRC and brought a counterclaim for damages. The case was listed to start in January 2021 in a partially remote hearing, but the Level 5 Covid-19 restrictions which were in place at that time prevented it from commencing. The defendant claimed that he had to give his evidence in person because the court could not assess his credibility via video link. He further argued that it would be difficult for his lawyers to liaise with him; and that only urgent cases should proceed under the President of the High Court’s order which was in place at that time50 (‘President’s notice’), and that his case was not urgent. In rejecting his application, O’Moore J directed that the trial should proceed by way of fully remote hearing and identified the following factors as being relevant: (a) Mr Browne had previously agreed that several important witnesses would give their evidence remotely, which raised the question of why Mr Browne’s evidence could not be given remotely.

48 49 50

www.workplacerelations.ie/en/news-media/workplace_relations_notices/covid-19-update-28-may2021.html. IBRC v Browne [2021] IEHC 83. COVID-19 Notice: High Court Civil Sittings until Further Notice (5 January 2021).

13

[1.17]  Termination of Employment (b) Lawyers can consult fully with their teams in preparation for the examination of witnesses by video link, by phone, by WhatsApp or by the provision of a ­memorandum, and these forms of support are no less effective than a meeting. Indeed, O’Moore J went further and suggested that the fact that the rest of a legal team are not in the same room as the cross-examiner might be beneficial. He went on to say: ‘It may well be that there is an important prompt that needs to be given to counsel, but as I have described this can be done in a remote hearing. Even if the prompt cannot be given, and this is at least as likely to happen when evidence is taken physically, it can often be advantageous for counsel to return to the point after the break in proceedings. In fact, the incidences of helpful notes passed to counsel in the cross examination of a witness can be overwhelmed by the number of barely legible but distracting Post Its placed before the cross examiner at a critical time in the challenging of a witness’s evidence. The absence of such contact with the rest of the team may therefore be as much a help as a hindrance.’

(c) The President’s notice was designed to ensure that most court business that could be safely done would be done during the Covid-19 health restrictions. There was no need for a case to be urgent for it to be held remotely. (d) The remote hearing created exactly the same scenario for both parties. Any disadvantage identified by Mr Browne would also apply to IBRC. (e) The judge went on to state that, based on his own experience, the TrialView Platform51 was one ‘which enables me to assess the evidence’. (f) Lastly, he went on to note that the platform had already been approved by other High Court judges. In practice, therefore, remote hearings are here to stay. To successfully object to a remote hearing, you must show that to proceed either would not be in the interests of justice or would be a breach of fair procedures. Both tests are difficult to meet. [1.17]   Objections to a remote hearing may be made by submitting a request along with any supporting documentation to [email protected]. Applicants must copy in the other party in order to put them on notice of the objection. The WRC has published a non-exhaustive list of factors that will be considered before determining on the matter, as follows: (a) the length of the delay that will likely result if the hearing is to be held in person rather than remotely; (b) the complexity of the case; whether the parties are represented; the number of witnesses required to give evidence; and whether the nature of any disputed evidence is such that fairness and justice require it to be evaluated by the adjudication officer in a face-to-face environment; (c) the personal circumstances of either party or any participant, which would include disability or any specific accommodations that they may require to effectively participate in the hearing (including the use of multiple interpreters or the attendance of a support person); 51

An electronic platform for the conduct of remote hearings.

14

The Institutional Framework  [1.18] (d) the ability of either party to engage in the hearing in a meaningful manner, which would include considerations such as access to broadband and the requisite IT facilities (the WRC may require a sworn statement confirming the status of parties’ IT facilities or other evidence in support of such an objection); and (e) any specific exceptional circumstances in a particular case which might present a material risk of unfairness or injustice. Following receipt of the application, the process is as follows: (a) The WRC will write to the other party notifying them of the application and the reasons furnished. Submitted supporting documentation generally will not be shared with the other party. (b) That party will be given two working days to furnish comments on the application by email. (c) The Adjudication Services will refer the objection to an adjudication officer, who will decide whether the objection to proceeding by way of remote hearing should be upheld or refused. (The adjudication officer who makes the decision in relation to the objection will not generally be involved in the subsequent hearing of the complaint(s).) (d) If the objection to a remote hearing is upheld by the adjudication officer, all parties will subsequently be notified of the outcome in writing to advise them that the hearing has been postponed and will be rescheduled as a face-to-face hearing in due course. (e) Similarly, the parties will be informed, in writing, if the objection is not upheld and the remote hearing arrangements will be affirmed. If the objection to a remote hearing is not upheld and the party objecting is not satisfied with this outcome, the objection can be presented to the adjudication officer (who has been assigned by the Director General of the WRC to inquire into or investigate the complaint(s)) at the opening of the remote hearing. The adjudication officer will decide at that stage whether to proceed with the remote hearing or adjourn and reschedule as a face-to-face hearing. Postponements [1.18]   The WRC has very detailed postponement guidelines.52 Applications for postponements and supporting documentation should be sent to postponements@­ workplacerelations.ie. The guidelines make it clear that the WRC ‘considers all applications for postponement carefully with due regard to the rights of the parties to fair procedures and reasonable expedition in having a scheduled complaint heard’. What this means in practice is that any postponement applications which are not well founded and which do not comply with the procedure will not be granted. The guidelines envisage two ‘postponement processes’. Under Process 1, a postponement will be granted no later than five working days from the date of the hearing

52

At the time of writing, the latest version was published on 1 July 2021.

15

[1.19]  Termination of Employment notification letter, with the written consent of the other party. Under Process 2, where the other party does not consent but there are substantial reasons justifying the postponement and where evidence of these has been furnished within the aforementioned five-day period, a postponement will be granted. Such reasons may include a death notice, evidence of flight bookings, jury duty or similar. A party can appeal a decision not to grant a postponement – this process is paper based and is decided by an adjudication officer. This must be made within two days of the date of the relevant decision refusing the postponement request. Adjournments [1.19]   Any postponement application made on the day of the hearing is referred to as an ‘adjournment’ application. An adjournment application is subject to the ‘exceptional circumstances and substantial reasons’ test. The bar is thus very high. Any such application must set out the reasons why a postponement application was not made in advance instead. The Labour Court, in Rs247 Resources Ltd v Bogdan Newmann, referred to the decision in Gaelscoil Thulach na nOg and Joyce Fitzsimmons-Markey53 to define ‘exceptional’ as: ‘an ordinary familiar English adjective and not a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course or unusual or special or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare; but it cannot be one which is regular or routinely or normally encountered.’

The fact here is that any such application on the day of a hearing must be grounded on exceptional circumstances and not something that might arise in the ordinary course. Witness summons [1.20]   The Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 201854 allows the WRC, upon request, to require witnesses to attend a hearing and produce documentation held in their possession, custody or control. The Act goes on to confirm that any such witnesses will be afforded the same immunities as if they were a witness in High Court litigation. A person to whom such a notice has been given and who fails or refuses to comply with the notice, refuses to give evidence in proceedings to which the notice relates, or fails or refuses to produce any document is guilty of an offence on summary conviction to a Class E fine.55 A Class E fine is a fine not exceeding €500; it is the least significant of fines. In civil proceedings, each party is free to call any witnesses in whatever order they wish. In general, a judge has no right to call witnesses without the consent of the parties,

53 54 55

Gaelscoil Thulach na nOg and Joyce Fitzsimmons-Markey EET034. Section 8(13) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 as amended by s 4 of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018. Section 8(13)(c)(ii)of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 as amended by s 4 of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018.

16

The Institutional Framework  [1.21] although they may do so in cases of civil contempt or childcare proceedings. A judge also has the power to recall a witness previously called by a party.56 Therefore, it is for the parties, and not the judge or decision-maker, to determine which witnesses to call. This seems to be reflected in the wording of s 8(13) of the 1977 Act, which provides that an adjudication officer ‘may’ require the attendance of a witness or the production of documents. The hearing of unfair dismissal claims is evidence based and decided according to the burden of proof. In the event of a conflict of evidence, a party must have direct evidence to counteract the evidence of the other party. In other words, a party can choose what evidence to proffer. [1.21]   While either party to proceedings may wish to make this application, there appears to be no such obligation on the adjudication officer to accede to same. This was demonstrated in Ammi Burke v Arthur Cox LLP.57 Here the complainant argued that the case could not proceed without hearing from two witnesses, whose statements the respondent had relied upon as part of her case. She also claimed that there were various emails between those witnesses that needed to be produced. By way of background, the complainant claimed that she had started work at 8:00 am on 29 March 2019 and had not finished until 2:00 am, because she was left closing a ‘big deal’ on her own while her colleagues were out ‘socialising.’ Following this, she had a ‘two or three minute’ conversation with one of the persons subject to her witness summons, which she claimed gave rise to her termination. It was the complainant’s contention that this person needed to give evidence, and that the email exchange was required to be examined in order to establish her claim for unfair dismissal. In reply, the respondent noted that it was a matter for it to proffer the evidence it wished to present in defence of the claim, and that it was not for the complainant to dictate how it ran its case. Rather, it was for the adjudication officer to determine the weight of the evidenced adduced. Furthermore, the respondent submitted that the complainant could not dictate what evidence the respondent should adduce. The WRC procedures were in aid of the hearing and the course of the hearing is determined by the Unfair Dismissals Act. The witness statements and witness lists were procedural matters in aid of hearings and there was no statutory requirement for either. It was submitted that there was no rationale for any summons to issue. In refusing the witness summons, the adjudication officer noted the following helpful summary: ‘The power to issue a summons in the Unfair Dismissals Act was permissive in nature. I said that the presumption in the Unfair Dismissals Act was that the dismissal was unfair and that the burden of proof was on the employer to show that there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. It was for the respondent to present evidence to dislodge the presumption of unfair dismissal. While the respondent had previously indicated that both Mr Lynch and Ms D’Alton would give evidence, the respondent was now electing that they not now give evidence. I said that the result of this is that where there was direct evidence from the complainant on a point and no direct evidence provided by the respondent, then I had to

56 57

McGrath on Evidence, 3rd edition (2020), at paragraph 3.4. Ammi Burke v Arthur Cox LLP ADJ-00026883.

17

[1.21]  Termination of Employment prefer the evidence of the complainant. I cited the example that Mr Shannon had given an account of the complainant’s conversation with Mr Lynch, but this evidence was hearsay evidence. If the complainant’s account of the conversation with Mr Lynch was different to the description given by Mr Shannon and with no evidence from Mr Lynch, then I had to prefer her account of the conversation. I said that I had reserved my position on the summons for the emails as I wished to first hear evidence from the complainant on the transaction of the 29th March 2019 before deciding whether the summons was required.’

Ultimately, the adjudication officer dismissed the claim due to the ‘refusal by the complainant and her mother to allow to the hearing to proceed’. However, the adjudication officer went on to make the following final comment on the matter: ‘By definition, the adjudication of employment law disputes at the Workplace Relations Commission arises in the field of private law (arising from the contract of employment) and not public law. The role is to decide whether either party A or party B is successful. This is very different from the role of the Court or decision maker in, for example, childcare proceedings (see the example cited in the footnotes to paragraph 3.42 of McGrath on Evidence: AMQ v KJ [2018] IECA 97). A Court’s decision to issue directions per section 47 of the Family Law Act 1995, for example to obtain an independent welfare assessment regarding a child, reflects the court’s role in determining the best interests of the child, in line with the statutory framework and Article 42A of the Constitution. The decision regarding the best interests of a child and whether such an assessment should be made is not centred on whether party A or party B should win, but on the best interests of the child. A decision regarding the best interests of a child is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the determination of an employment law claim, such as unfair dismissal. It is not that an unfair dismissal claim is less important, but that its determination is much more adversarial than inquisitorial. As stated, the decision per the Unfair Dismissals Act is a binary one: was the employee unfairly dismissed or should the claim of unfair dismissal be, itself, dismissed. The “duty to inquire” in section 8(1)(c)(i) of the Act does not alter the essentially adversarial nature of an unfair dismissal claim. It cannot be a pure inquisitorial duty if the only possible outcomes are that the complainant was unfairly dismissed or that their claim is dismissed. The complainant cited WRC adjudication decisions, in particular A Nurse v A Hospital,58 as authority to support her submission that Mr Lynch and Ms D’Alton be summonsed. I consider these authorities below and they do not support the proposition that witnesses on the employer side must be summonsed to give evidence where the employer does not proffer them as witnesses. The power to summons is not a power to require a party to meet a case in a certain way. It is not a power to fill in the gaps in a party’s evidence. Here, the respondent decided to put three witnesses forward and not to call further witnesses. They are entitled to make such a call and so be it, if they do not have direct evidence to contradict any direct evidence the complainant may give … The summons is not a device to fill in the other party’s case. If Mr Lynch did not give evidence of the conversation, the only evidence would be that of the complainant. I said to the complainant that I would have to prefer her evidence as this would be the only direct evidence.’

58

A Nurse v A Hospital ADJ-00024009.

18

The Institutional Framework  [1.22] Incorrect respondent [1.22]   This generally arises where there is confusion about who the employer is, such as where the employee is an agency worker, or where a transfer of an undertaking has occurred and the complainant has failed to take a claim against the correct party. The WRC has no power to join a third party, so what generally happens is that the representatives for the complainant make an application to the WRC under s 41(16) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 to ‘correct any mistake (including omission) of an administrative or clerical nature in a decision’ regarding the dispute, such as the correct registered entity, or under s 39 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 (as amended) to have the correct name of the employer named, so that they may be joined to the proceedings. Section 39(2) of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 allows an adjudication officer, on an application being made, to amend proceedings as set out under that section that do not state correctly the name of the employer concerned or any other material particular. What is clear from this is that an application must be made to the adjudication officer.59 This issue was dealt with in Louth VEC v The Equality Tribunal,60 where the High Court outlined the circumstances in which proceedings before a statutory tribunal could be amended. It held that: ‘if it is permissible in court proceedings to amend pleadings where the justice of the case requires it, then, a fortiori, it should be permissible to amend a claim as set out in a form such as the EE1, so long as the general nature of the complaint (in this case, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation) remains the same.’

In Travelodge Management Limited v Sylvia Wach,61 the Labour Court stated that the ratio of Louth VEC appears to be that the procedures adopted by statutory tribunals in relation to the amendment of non-statutory forms used in the initiation of claims should not be more stringent than those that apply in the ordinary courts. In A Lorry Driver v A Waste Management Company,62 the employer sought to argue that the employee had referred the complaint against the trading name of the business and not the correct entity. The employee contended that the employer was aware of his complaint at all material times and sought leave to amend the name of the employer to that of the correct legal entity by which he was employed. In considering this issue, the WRC referred to the Labour Court case of Auto Depot Limited v Vasile Mateiu.63 In that case, the claimant made an application during the proceedings before the Labour Court to amend the name of the employer from ‘Auto Depot Tyres Ltd’ to ‘Auto Depot Ltd’. The Labour Court allowed the request for the amendment and in doing so, held that: ‘Accordingly, the Court considers the erroneous inclusion of “Auto Depot Tyres Ltd” on the WRC application form to be no more than a technical error. The Court is fully satisfied that

59 60 61 62 63

Imtiaz Ahmed Ranjha Sky Solicitors v Imtiaz Khan MWD212. Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2009] IEHC 370 at para 6.2. Travelodge Management Limited v Sylvia Wach EDA1511. Lorry Driver v A Waste Management Company ADJ-00024354. Auto Depot Limited v Vasile Mateiu UDD1954.

19

[1.23]  Termination of Employment the Respondent’s name can simply be amended on the paperwork to reflect its correct legal title, that of “Auto Depot Ltd”.’

The court then went on to refer to the High Court decision in O’Higgins v University College Dublin & Another,64 where Hogan J held that: ‘Even if the wrong party was, in fact, so named, no prejudice whatever was caused by reason of that error (if, indeed, error it be)’. The court then went on to say that the approach it adopted was in line with the generally accepted principle that statutory tribunals should operate with the minimum degree of procedural formality consistent with the requirements of natural justice. On that point, the decision of the Supreme Court in Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal65 is relevant. Here J stated (obiter) that: ‘this present case indicates a degree of formality and even rigidity, which is somewhat surprising. It is a rather ironic turn in history that this Tribunal which was intended to save people from the ordinary courts would themselves fall into rigidity comparable to that of the common law before it was modified by equity.’66

In finding for the claimant in Lorry Driver v A Waste Management Company,67 the adjudication officer took the following into consideration: (a) The employee had named the trading name of his employer as the employer in the proceedings, as opposed to the actual name of the limited company that employed him; (b) The employer was fully on notice and accepted these proceedings from the outset; (c) No issue concerning the incorrect employer had been notified by the employer to either the employee or the WRC prior to the hearing date; and (d) The correct employer appeared at the hearing with its legal representatives. In all the circumstances, the adjudication officer was satisfied that the correct employer had been pursued in relation to the complaints, and that the misstatement by the employee of his employer’s name on the complaint form represented a technical error. [1.23]   The subsection68 does not give an adjudication officer jurisdiction to substitute their choice of enactment for the enactment under which a complainant has referred a complaint to the WRC for adjudication. This was affirmed in Cityjet Designated Activity Company T/A Cityjet v Ronan McArdle.69 This case, which came before the Labour Court, concerned an appeal by the respondent of the WRC’s decision, in which the adjudication officer had relied on s 39(2) for the purposes of changing the enactment under which the case was originally lodged. In that decision, the adjudication officer awarded €2,453.55 to the complainant, having determined that he was entitled to rely on s ‘39 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997’ for the purposes of his

64 65 66 67 68 69

O’Higgins v University College Dublin & Another [2013] 21 MCA. Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1990] ILRM 293. This case struck out the need to respond on the then T2 form to an application for unfair dismissal within 14 days under the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968 (SI 24/1968). Lorry Driver v A Waste Management Company ADJ-00024354 at 33. s39(2) of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Cityjet Designatied Activity Company t/a Cityjet v Ronan McArdle RPD221.

20

The Institutional Framework  [1.25] complaint, and not the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as the case related to annual leave and not redundancy. In overturning this decision, the Labour Court noted the following: ‘On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the within complaint was misconceived and the Adjudication Officer erred in relying on section 39(2) of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 to decide the matter under an alternative enactment. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and the decision of the Adjudication Officer is set aside.’

Despite the foregoing decision, there have been a number of decisions in which adjudication officers have relied on s 39(2) to change the legislation where the complainant has made an error upon the lodgment of their complaint.70.

Findings [1.24]   Adjudicators on behalf of the WRC issue written legally binding decisions following the hearing. These may be appealed to the Labour Court within 42 days of the date of the decision being issued.71 In accordance with the provisions of the Interpretation Act 2005, the date of the decision is the first day of this 42-day period. Appeals sent by post can be given to the court in the ordinary course of the court’s business and the date of receipt will be recorded using a date stamp annually applied on the day the appeal is received. Appeals submitted by email can be made by up to 12:00 am on the 42nd day; and the date of receipt will be the date and time that are automatically recorded on the email system.

Enforcement of WRC decisions [1.25]   Where a WRC decision is not complied with, it can be enforced in the District Court. Under s 43(1) of the 2015 Act, an application for the enforcement of a WRC decision can be made once 56 days have elapsed. In hearing the case, the District Court may not entertain any evidence other than that which relates to the employer’s non-compliance. Somewhat peculiarly, even though the District Court can only hear evidence relating to non-compliance, it can substitute an order for reinstatement or re-engagement with an order for compensation of up to 104 weeks, ‘having regard to all the circumstances’;72 but as stated, it cannot have regard to ‘all the circumstances’ when dealing with such a narrow enforcement application. Interestingly, this is not the case for the enforcement of Labour Court decisions: the only thing open to the District Court to consider where a decision is being enforced is whether the employee should be paid interest on the

70 71 72

Joseph Simpson et al v Whw Brothers Limited Colossus Casino ADJ-00029380, ADJ-00029386, ADJ-00029381, ADJ-00029389, ADJ-00029384. Rule 1 of the Labour Court Rules, 2022 and s 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Section 43(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

21

[1.26]  Termination of Employment compensation. This could afford employers the opportunity simply to ignore the decision of an adjudication officer and wait for the District Court to substitute any order for reinstatement or re-engagement with a decision for compensation.

LABOUR COURT [1.26]   The Labour Court was established in 1946. The responsibilities and role of the court have been considerably enhanced over the years as a result of the increase in national and European employment legislation. In many instances, the Labour Court operates as an industrial relations forum, hearing both sides in trade disputes and then issuing recommendations setting out its opinion on the dispute and the terms under which it should be settled. While these recommendations are not binding on the parties concerned, the parties are expected to give serious consideration to the court’s recommendations. However, the court’s determinations, inter alia, under the Unfair Dismissals Act, the Employment Equality Act, the Pensions Act, the Organisation of Working Time Act, the National Minimum Wage Act, the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act, the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act and the Protected Disclosures Act are legally binding.

Role in termination of employment cases [1.27]   There are several ways in which a case involving the termination of employment of an individual can come before the Labour Court: (a) Where an adjudication officer has dealt with a dispute concerning the dismissal of an employee under the Industrial Relations Act 1969, the court can hear the appeal of that recommendation. Such appeals are binding when appealed and heard by the court.73 (b) The court can hear appeals of decisions on discriminatory dismissals heard under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021. These decisions by the court are binding. (c) The court can hear appeals of adjudication officers’ decisions under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003. Such determinations by the Labour Court under the Fixed-Term Work Act are also binding, but can be appealed on a point of law to the High Court.74 Section 13 of this Act prohibits the penalisation of fixed-term workers; penalisation in this context includes the termination of employment. Similar provisions protecting employees from penalisation exist under other forms of employment legislation.75 73 74 75

Section 13(9)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1969. Section 15 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003. Section 11 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014; s 27 of the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act, 2005.

22

The Institutional Framework  [1.29] (d) In addition, the Labour Court hears claims on appeal from adjudication officers under the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001. Such determinations by the Labour Court under the Act are also binding but can be appealed on a point of law to the High Court.76 (e) The Labour Court can hear appeals from adjudication officers under the Organisation of Working Time Act. Such appeals, insofar as termination of employment cases are concerned, arise from the penalisation of employees by employers for in good faith opposing any acts which are unlawful under the Act.77 (f) The Labour Court can hear disputes under s 20 of the 1969 Industrial Relations Act. Such disputes can be heard under either s 20(1) or s 20(2). It is more usual for the court to hear disputes under s 20(1), as in this instance only the employee must agree to be bound by the court’s recommendation. In the latter instance, both parties must agree to be bound and hence hearings under this section are rare. (g) The Labour Court can hear appeals from adjudication officers under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, which is where the majority of termination of employment cases arise.

Structure [1.28]   The Labour Court should consist of 13 full-time members, although this varies depending on appointments and retirements. These generally comprise a Chairman, four Deputy Chairmen and eight ordinary members, three of whom are employers’ members and three of whom are workers’ members. The Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen are appointed by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment. The employers’ members are nominated by the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation. The workers’ members are nominated by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. The Labour Court also has a legal adviser, the Registrar, who is appointed by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment.

Operational structure [1.29]   The court operates in four separate divisions. A division is made up of the Chairman or a Deputy Chairman,78 an employers’ member and a workers’ member.79 Hearings are held in Dublin and at several venues throughout the country.

76 77 78

79

Section 15 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003. Section 26 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Members appointed by the Chairman of the Labour Court under s 10 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and, where the context requires, a Deputy Chairman of the Labour Court standing appointed under s 4 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969 while acting as Chairman of a Division of the Court or while exercising a function prescribed by order of the Minister made under s 78 of the 2015 Act. Those persons who stand appointed as workers’ members or employers’ members of the Court under s 10 of the Industrial Relations Act 1946.

23

[1.30]  Termination of Employment

Investigation methods [1.30]   The Labour Court investigates disputes by requiring the parties to provide it with written submissions of their positions in relation to the dispute, and subsequently by holding hearings which both parties attend. The hearings of employment rights issues are now held in public.

Labour Court Rules [1.31]   The Labour Court Rules are made pursuant to s 20(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1946. They comprise six parts. Part I is the requisite part that deals with appeals under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 and the Employment Equality Acts 1998– 2021. The latest iteration of these rules was published on 25 July 2022, revoking and replacing the 2020 Rules. While the rules are made pursuant to statute, they are not statutory rules. In practice, the Labour Court does try to insist on all parties adhering to the rules. The rules provide that the appellant – whether that be the employee or employer – must furnish the Court with a written submission no later than three weeks from the date on which the notice of appeal is delivered to the Court setting out the details of the claim and the factual and legal arguments upon which the appellant intends to rely;80 and to copy in the respondent accordingly.81 The respondent then has three weeks to send a reply submission to the Court. Four copies of both submissions and one soft copy must be furnished to the Court.82 The names of any witnesses and a summary of any evidence that each witness is expected to give should be set out by way of a witness statement. A copy of the witness statement and copies of any documents that they intend to rely upon must also be sent the court. Any documents to be relied upon by the witness should be included as an appendix to the statement.83 While there is no standard format for witness statements in the Labour Court, the rules require that the following details be included: (a) The witness statement should be a summary or outline of the evidence to be given in more detailed form at the hearing. (b) It is sufficient that the witness statement contains a synopsis of the evidence rather than a full verbatim account of what the witness will say at the hearing. (c) The witness’s statement should only include events/incidents/actions that the person providing the evidence directly saw, heard or did. (d) The witness statement should contain precise dates or date ranges (eg, ‘on or about’), on which the referenced events/incidents occurred.84 80 81 82 83 84

Rule 6 of the Labour Court Rules 2022. Rule 7 of the Labour Court Rules 2022. Rule 8 of the Labour Court Rules 2022. Rule 9(g) of the Labour Court Rules 2022. Rules 9(h)(I) to (IV) of the Labour Court Rules 2022 and s 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

24

The Institutional Framework  [1.33] Once the court is in possession of the submissions of both parties, a hearing date for the appeal will be fixed.85 In practice, employers have to be careful in how the rules apply to various cases. For example, in a constructive dismissal case an employer may well want to appeal a decision of an adjudication officer, if they do, under the rules they have to forward their submission to the Labour Court and the complainant will then get a chance to respond to it, even though the onus of proof under the 1977 Act lies with the complainant and they should in all probability present their submission first. Legally, as is the case in the WRC, the hearing of unfair dismissal cases is still governed by the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations, 1968:86 see also 1.07.

Appeals [1.32]   Appeals of an adjudication officer’s decision to the Labour Court should be made on the appropriate form, entitled ‘Employment Rights Appeal Form’, as distinct from the s 13(9) Appeal Form.87 If the appeal is made by letter, it should: (a) quote the reference number of the adjudication officer’s decision; (b) enclose a copy of the adjudication officer’s decision; and (c) briefly state the grounds for the appeal.

An appeal of an adjudication officer’s decision must be received by the Labour Court within 42 days of the date of the decision.88 In accordance with the provisions of the Interpretation Act 2005, the date of the decision is the first day of this 42-day period. Appeals sent by post are date stamped manually on the day the appeal is received. Appeals sent by email can be made by up to 12:00 am on the 42nd day, and the date of receipt will be date and time automatically recorded on the system. Late appeals [1.33]   If an appeal is not made within the requisite 42-day period, an application can be made in writing to the Court to extend the time for bringing an appeal in accordance with s 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.89 The grounds for any such application for an extension of time should form part of the appellant’s written submission. An extension of time will be granted only in ‘exceptional circumstances’. This is a much higher bar to meet than the test of ‘reasonable cause’ which an employee must meet in seeking to extend the time to lodge a complaint with the WRC in the

85 86 87 88 89

Rule 13 of the Labour Court Rules 2022. SI 24/1968. Rule 4 of the Labour Court Rules 2022. Section 44(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Rule 2 of the Labour Court Rules 2022 and s 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

25

[1.34]  Termination of Employment first instance. ‘Exceptional circumstances’ means that the circumstances are exceptional. The Labour Court dealt with this matter in Gaelsocil Thulach na nOg and Joyce Fitzsimons: see [1.19].90 Here it was argued by the appellant’s solicitor that there was a need to secure alternative counsel, and that counsel had to prepare a submission necessary for the appeal. In this case the Court found that there were 13 days remaining available for the appellant’s representative to submit an appeal on time at the point of notification to them of the appellant’s decision to appeal. [1.34]   This matter was also examined in some detail in Mathews Property Management Limited v Mr Edward Smith.91 Here the decision of the adjudication officer was dated 3 March 2021. In accordance with the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, the appeal should have been lodged with the Court within 42 days – that is, by 13 April 2021. The appeal was submitted on 16 April 2021. The complainant stated that he had been unwell on 13 and 14 April 2021, as the frame of his glasses had twisted, and arranged an emergency appointment for 15 April. While the Court noted that the complainant had offered an explanation for the 41st and 42nd days, he had offered no explanation for the previous 40 days. In referring to Dunne v Clifford,92 the Court noted that there must be exceptional circumstances in existence, and that these exceptional circumstances must justify the delay beyond the 42 days. In also referring to Gaelscoil Thulach na nOg and Joyce Fitzsimons Markey93 and Kylemore Services Group/Home Fare Services Ltd v Terrie Clarke,94 the Court stated that it: ‘must first consider if the circumstances relied upon by the applicant can be regarded as exceptional. If it answers that question in the affirmative the Court must then go on to consider if those circumstances operated so as to prevent the applicant from lodging her claim in time’. ‘In all cases of this type, an applicant seeking to be treated as an exceptional case warranting a time extension for lodging an appeal must both explain the delay and offer a justifiable reason for it’. Returning to the facts of the case, the complainant was unable to offer an explanation for the failure to submit his appeal within the first 40 days of the 42-day period. While an explanation of ill health was offered for day 41 and day 42, no medical evidence was provided to support this claim; and even if it had been supplied, it could not explain why an appeal had not been submitted earlier. The Court agreed with the respondent that what happened after day 42 was of no interest to the Court, unless the failure to submit the appeal within the prescribed 42 days was deemed to be justifiable due to ‘exceptional circumstances’.

90 91 92 93 94

Gaelsocil Thulach na nOg and Joyce Fitzsimons EET034. Mathews Property Management Limited v Mr Edward Smith ADJ-00028407, CA-00036404-001. Dunne v Clifford TE/19/50. Gaelscoil Thulach na nOg v Joyce Fitzsimons Markey EET 034. Kylemore Services Group/Home Fare Services Ltd v Terrie Clarke DEC-E2015-160.

26

The Institutional Framework  [1.35] The Court went on to say; ‘Unfortunately for the Complainant, for a party to find themselves to be unwell on two out of 42 days cannot be said to be out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. The Court is not satisfied that exceptional circumstances have been established and, as a result, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the substantive appeal’. [1.35]   Exceptional’ was also defined in Byrne v PJ Quigley Ltd95 as ‘something out of the ordinary’. The Labour Court must therefore be satisfied that the exceptional circumstances prevented the lodging of the claim within the time limit, and that the exceptional circumstances actually occurred within the time limit. See also Quinn v HSS Ltd.96 A three-pronged test was set out in Eileen Fitzgerald v HSE South.97 In reaffirming the standard in Byrne, the Employment Appeals Tribunal stated that it must ask itself the following: (a) Were the exceptional circumstances something out of the ordinary or unusual? (b) Did those circumstances prevent her from lodging a claim? (c) Did the exceptional circumstances exist within the six-month period immediately following the dismissal? In Murphy v Citizens Information Call Centre,98 illness supported by a medical certificate entitled the employee to an extension. On the other hand, in Leonard v Hunt t/a Willie’s Restaurant,99 the EAT refused to grant an extension of time where the claimant had erroneously posted her claim to premises that the EAT had vacated ten years previously. Byrne is important as it indicates that the death of a close family member constitutes exceptional circumstances for the purposes of s 8 of the Act, and will most likely mean that the employee will be allowed an extension of time within which to make a claim. As can be seen, therefore, any applications of this nature will be closely examined and unless medical evidence or some other compelling evidence justifying the delay is adduced to the Court, such applications are doomed to fail. In addition, the burden of proof in establishing the existence of exceptional circumstances rests with the party lodging the appeal. In order to discharge this burden of proof, the appellant must present clear and cogent evidence to support the contention that exceptional circumstances with the meaning of s 44(4) exist. As stated, this is a high bar and one would be best placed not having to argue the point.

95 96 97 98 99

Byrne v PJ Quigley Ltd [1995] ELR 205. Quinn v HSS Ltd UD 11344/2005. Eileen Fitzgerald v HSE South UD190/2014. Murphy v Citizens Information Call Centre UD 59/2005. Leonard v Hunt t/a Willie’s Restaurant [2004] ELR 14.

27

[1.36]  Termination of Employment

Labour Court submission [1.36]   Labour Court Rule 9 specifies that the submission to the Court shall contain the following details: (a) details of the claim under the Act; (b) a concise statement of the factual background to the claim giving rise to the appeal; (c) arguments in support of the case being made by the party making the submission. Any documents/documentary evidence upon which it is intended to reply have to be provided with the submission as appendices; (d) a summary of all legal arguments to be relied upon; (e) full copies of all legal authorities/precedents, appended to the submission; (f) where the appeal is out of time, the grounds upon which an extension of time is sought; and (g) the names of witnesses, if any, whom the party proposes to call to give evidence at the hearing of the appeal and a summary of the evidence that each witness is expected to give (a witness statement), along with copies of any documents that the witness intends to rely on.

Withdrawal of claims [1.37]   Rule 16 of the Labour Court Rules states that an appellant may withdraw their appeal by sending a notice of withdrawal to the Court in writing before the commencement of the hearing of the appeal. Rule 17 states that once the hearing of the appeal has commenced, the appeal may be withdrawn only with leave of the Court. In practice, it is hard to see how the Court could prevent someone from continuing with their appeal or how the Court could make a decision if the appellant no longer wished to proceed.

Enforcement of Labour Court decisions [1.38]   If a Labour Court decision is not complied with, it can be enforced in the District Court. Under s 45(1) of the 2015 Act, an application for enforcement of a WRC decision can be made once 42 days have elapsed. In hearing the case, the District Court may not entertain any evidence other than that which relates to the employer’s non-compliance. Somewhat peculiarly, even though the District Court can only hear evidence relating to non-compliance, it can direct the employer to pay the employee interest on the compensation.100 In enforcement actions for WRC decisions, the District Court has the

100

Section 45(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

28

The Institutional Framework  [1.40] power to change decisions of reinstatement or re-engagement to compensation; but no such power exists for the enforcement of Labour Court decisions.

CIRCUIT COURT [1.39]   The Circuit Court is comprised of the President and 27 ordinary judges. The President of the District Court is ex officio an additional judge of the Circuit Court. The country is divided into eight circuits for the purposes of the Circuit Court, with one judge assigned to each circuit, except in Dublin, where ten judges may be assigned; and in Cork, where there is provision for three judges. There are 26 Circuit Court offices throughout the State, with a County Registrar in charge of the work of each office – albeit that in more recent times, many circuits have operated without a County Registrar, relying on cover from elsewhere. The Circuit Court is a court of limited and local jurisdiction. The Circuit Court sits in venues in each circuit. Sittings vary in length from one day to three weeks and are generally held every two to four months in each venue in the circuit. Dublin and Cork have continual sittings throughout each legal term. In addition to hearing a wide variety of disputes on diverse civil, criminal and family law issues, the Circuit Court has a role in employment disputes. First, the Circuit Court can act as a court of first instance in cases of gender-related dismissals.101 The Circuit Court can also hear cases of wrongful dismissal. With the passing of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, the Circuit Court can hear claims for interim relief under that Act. (This is dealt with in more detail in Ch 10.)

HIGH COURT [1.40]   The High Court is comprised of the President and 25 ordinary judges. The President of the Circuit Court and the Chief Justice are ex officio additional judges of the High Court. In addition to the High Court having full jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions, whether of law or of fact, civil or criminal, its jurisdiction also extends to the question of the validity of any law, having regard to the provisions of the Constitution. It is in this context that the High Court can hear judicial reviews of decisions made by the Labour Court. The High Court also acts as an appeal court from the Circuit Court in civil matters. In this latter context, it can hear appeals of discriminatory dismissal cases on gender grounds that have gone before the Circuit Court. The High Court sits in Dublin to hear original actions. It also sits in several provincial locations (Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford, Sligo, Dundalk, Kilkenny and Ennis) at

101

In gender discrimination cases, only s 77(3) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 allows a claimant to bypass the WRC and the Labour Court and refer the matter directly to the Circuit Court. Section 82(3) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 provides that the award may exceed the normal civil jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

29

[1.41]  Termination of Employment specified times during the year. In the employment field, these are generally constrained to injunctions in respect of dismissal cases.102 Matters coming before the High Court are normally heard and determined by one judge, but the President of the High Court may decide that any cause or matter or any part thereof may be heard by three judges in what is known as a divisional court. An appeal against a Labour Court decision can be instituted in the High Court on a point of law. Interestingly, and somewhat oxymoronically, a decision may at the same time be challenged as unlawful by way of judicial review proceedings. This occurred in Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal.103 Here it was argued by the notice party that relief should not be granted in the High Court, as an alternative appeal had also been invoked. This will ultimately be a decision for the Court itself, which will also take into account the adequacy of the remedy available on the point of appeal. The question of who pays the costs of such application was given great consideration in Miley v Employment Appeal Tribunal.104 The Court in this case ultimately held that as a matter of public policy, and arising from its function, a body such as the WRC or the Labour Court should not be liable for an order for costs in judicial review proceedings where it has not participated in such proceedings and has indicated such a position initially in the judicial proceedings. This may not be the case if the WRC acted with impropriety or mala fides.105

COSTS/FEES/CHARGES/REFUNDS [1.41]   There are no costs payable to either side in hearings before the WRC and/or the Labour Court. Although the Workplace Relations Act 2015 gives the Minister the power to charge fees to employees that wish to take claims against their employer, the UK decision in R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor in 2017106 – where tribunal fees were deemed to be a disproportionate interference with an individual’s rights to justice and therefore illegal – suggests that it is highly unlikely that fees will be introduced in Ireland. However, s 71 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 enables the Minister to provide by regulation for the levying of fees and charges on the users or services to be provided by the WRC or the Labour Court. The Minister introduced the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (Fees) Regulations107 with effect from 26 November 2015. These Regulations prescribe that ‘relevant services’ for the purpose of s 71 of the Act mean any service provided by the Labour Court to an appellant in relation to an appeal under s 44 of the

102 See

Ch 7. Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v EAT [1990] ELR 49. 104 Miley v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2016] IESC] 20. 105 See McIlwraith v His Honour Judge Fawsitt [1990] 1 IR 343. 106 R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. 107 Workplace Relations Act 2015 (Fees) Regulations 2015 SI 536/2015. 103

30

The Institutional Framework  [1.41] Act, by reason of the appellant’s failure or refusal, without reasonable excuse, to attend the first-instance hearing by an adjudication officer of the relevant complaint or dispute. Thus, if a person who has failed to attend at first instance before the WRC wants to appeal to the Labour Court, they must pay of fee of €300 when lodging that appeal. If the Labour Court determines that the person had good cause for failing to attend the first-instance hearing, the fee will be refunded. While there is no express provision under the Workplace Relations Act 2015 for the recovery of fees, there are other limited forms of recovery under other enactments. Under s 26(1)(ii) of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 (as amended), there is scope for adjudication officers to award ‘reasonable expenses of the employee in connection with the dispute’.108 This, however, has largely been limited to travelling expenses and not the costs of retaining representations. In Cosette Secareanu v Carida Foods Ltd,109 the adjudication officer noted that: ‘the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000 allows for incidental expenses to the Complainant. Legal costs do not fall into this category.’ In Clontarf Castle v Sylwia Matijuk,110 the Labour Court awarded the complainant €267.96 in respect of expenses in expenses in connection with the dispute (under the Minimum Wage Act 2000).

108 109 110

A Health Care Worker v A Care Home ADJ-00009728. Cosette Secareanu (Assistant) v Carida Foods Ltd (Diner) ADJ-00007904. Clontarf Castle Limited T/a Clontarf Castle v Sylwia Matijuk MWD1510.

31

[1.41]  Termination of Employment



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ĂƐŝĐ'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ



ϭ͘ ƉƉĞĂůƐŵƵƐƚďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌŽƵƌƚǁŝƚŚŝŶϰϮĚĂLJƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌ’s ĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ͘ dŚĞ ĚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ KĨĨŝĐĞƌͬƐĞƌǀŝĐĞďLJ ĂŶ /ŶƐƉĞĐƚŽƌ ŽĨ Ă ŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞEŽƚŝĐĞǁŝůůĐŽƵŶƚĂƐĚĂLJŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞϰϮĚĂLJƐ͘ƉƉĞĂůƐƐĞŶƚďLJƉŽƐƚĐĂŶďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞ Court in the ordinary course of the Court’s business and the day of receipt will be recorded using Ă ĚĂƚĞƐƚĂŵƉŵĂŶƵĂůůLJĂƉƉůŝĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌĚŝŶĂƌLJĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĂLJƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůŝƐ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ͘ƉƉĞĂůƐƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚďLJĞŵĂŝůĂƚĂƉƉĞĂůƐΛůĂďŽƵƌĐŽƵƌƚ͘ŝĞĐĂŶďĞŵĂĚĞƵƉƚŽϭϮŵŝĚŶŝŐŚƚ ŽŶƚŚĞϰϮŶĚ ĚĂLJĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĂƚĞŽĨƌĞĐĞŝƉƚǁŝůů ďĞƚŚĞĚĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŝŵĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůLJƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ ĞŵĂŝůƐLJƐƚĞŵ͘  Ϯ͘ ůůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƉĞĂů&ŽƌŵƚŚĂƚĂƉƉůLJƚŽLJŽƵƌĂƉƉĞĂůŵƵƐƚďĞĨƵůůLJĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ͘  Ă͘ ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶƐϭ͕Ϯ͕ϰĂŶĚϲŵƵƐƚďĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚĨŽƌĂůůĂƉƉĞĂůƐ͗ ŝ͘ /ĨƚŚĞƉƉĞůůĂŶƚŝƐĂŽŵƉĂŶLJ͕LJŽƵŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶϯ͖ ŝŝ͘ /ĨLJŽƵƌƉƉĞĂůŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚƋƵĂůŝƚLJĐƚƐϭϵϵϴͲϮϬϭϱ͕ LJŽƵŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚdĂďůĞŝŶ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶϰ͖ ŝŝŝ͘ /Ĩ LJŽƵƌƉƉĞĂůŝƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂŶ ƉƉĞĂůŽĨ Ă ŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞEŽƚŝĐĞŽƌ ^ƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ EŽƚŝĐĞ͕LJŽƵŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶϱ;ĂͿŽƌ;ďͿ͘  ď͘ WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚĂůůĨŝĞůĚƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌŵĂƌĞŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌLJŝ͘Ğ͘LJŽƵŵƵƐƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ĞǀĞƌLJƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌŵƚŚĂƚĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽLJŽƵƌĂƉƉĞĂů͘  Đ͘ If “Not Applicable”, “Nil” or “None” is ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ͕ ƉůĞĂƐĞƚLJƉĞŽƌ ǁƌŝƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽŶƚŚĞ&Žƌŵ͘  Ě͘ WůĞĂƐĞƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ůĂďŽƵƌĐŽƵƌƚ͘ŝĞͬĞŶͬĨŽƌŵƐͬĂƉƉĞĂůƐͲĨŽƌŵͬĨŽƌĂƉƉĞĂůƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶϭϯ;ϵͿŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĐƚϭϵϲϵ͘  ϯ͘ tŚĞŶLJŽƵŚĂǀĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚƚŚĞ&Žƌŵ͕ƉůĞĂƐĞĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞ&ŝŶĂů /ŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶϳ͘  WůĞĂƐĞ ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌ ƚŚĂƚ LJŽƵ Dh^d ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ Ă ĐŽƉLJ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ͬ /ŶƐƉĞĐƚor’s ŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞEŽƚŝĐĞͬ,Z^ƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞEŽƚŝĐĞǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚƉƉĞĂů&Žƌŵ͘  ϰ͘ An Appeal Fee of €300 is payable KE>zŝĨLJŽƵĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƌĂƚ Ă ĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŚĞĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ tŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ͘  ϱ͘ WůĞĂƐĞƐĞĞŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŶŽƚĞƐĂƚŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ůĂďŽƵƌĐŽƵƌƚ͘ŝĞͬĞŶͬĨŽƌŵƐͬĞŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚͲƌŝŐŚƚƐͲĂƉƉĞĂůͲ ĨŽƌŵͬĨŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŽƌŵĂŶĚƉĂLJŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƉĞĂů&ĞĞ͕ŝĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ͘ ϭͮW Ă Ő Ğ 

32

The Institutional Framework  [1.41]



’Ž‘›‡–‹‰Š–•’’‡ƒŽ ‘”

^d/KEϭ͗ƉƉĞůůĂŶƚΖƐ ĞƚĂŝůƐ

/ĨLJŽƵĂƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂů͕LJŽƵĂƌĞƚŚĞƉƉĞůůĂŶƚ͘ 

ΎWůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƉĞůůĂŶƚŵƵƐƚďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌ’sĞĐŝƐŝŽŶΎ

/ĨLJŽƵĂƌĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů͕ĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐ͗ dŝƚůĞ͗

DƌͬDƌƐͬDƐ

&ŝƌƐƚŶĂŵĞ;ƐͿ͗



ĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗



^ƵƌŶĂŵĞ͗

  ŝƌĐŽĚĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚEŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗





/ĨĂŽŵƉĂŶLJͬKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐ;ƐĞĞĂůƐŽ^d/KEϯͿ͗ ŽŵƉĂŶLJŶĂŵĞ͗



dƌĂĚŝŶŐŶĂŵĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚŶĂŵĞ͗



ZĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ  KĨĨŝĐĞͬWůĂĐĞŽĨ ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐͬWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů  KĨĨŝĐĞĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗



ŝƌĐŽĚĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚEŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗



ϮͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



33

[1.41]  Termination of Employment

^d/KEϭ͗ƉƉĞůůĂŶƚΖƐ ĞƚĂŝůƐ ;ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚͿ 

tŝůůLJŽƵŚĂǀĞĂZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͍

zĞƐ



EŽ



LJ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐďĞůŽǁ LJŽƵĂƌĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ Ăůů ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŽƚŚŝƐ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůŽŶůLJŐŽƚŽƚŚĞŶĂŵĞĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞďĞůŽǁ͕ŝ͘Ğ͘ĂĐŽƉLJǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞŝƐƐƵĞĚƚŽLJŽƵ͘ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ&ŝƌƐƚ  EĂŵĞ͗

ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ  ^ƵƌŶĂŵĞ͗

EĂŵĞͬKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ͗  ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗

   

ŝƌĐŽĚĞ͗



ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŽŶƚĂĐƚEŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗

ŽLJŽƵƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁŚĞŶĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶŐĂ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌĞdžĂŵƉůĞ͕ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞƌ͍

zĞƐ

 

EŽ



/ĨzĞƐ͕ƉůĞĂƐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ͘ ;ŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƐƚĂĨĨ ŵĂLJďĞŝŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƚŽ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐLJŽƵƌ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐͿ /ĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ, please confirm that the fee of €300 ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉĂŝĚŝĨLJŽƵĚŝĚŶŽƚĂƚƚĞŶĚĂƚƚŚĞ ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ;ƚŝĐŬƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ďŽdžͿ͘

zĞƐ 

EŽ



EŽƚ ƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ



  



ϯͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



34

The Institutional Framework  [1.41]

^d/KEϮ͗ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ’Ɛ ĞƚĂŝůƐ  dŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĞƉĂƌƚLJĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚŽŵƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůŝƐďĞŝŶŐĨŝůĞĚ͘ 



ΎWůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌ’sĞĐŝƐŝŽŶΎ

/ĨƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚŝƐĂŽŵƉĂŶLJͬKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐ͗ EĂŵĞ͗



dƌĂĚŝŶŐŶĂŵĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚŶĂŵĞ͗



ZĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ  KĨĨŝĐĞͬWůĂĐĞŽĨ ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐͬWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů  KĨĨŝĐĞĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗

 

ŝƌĐŽĚĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚEŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗ 



/ĨƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚŝƐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů͕ĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐ͗ dŝƚůĞ͗

DƌͬDƌƐͬDƐ

&ŝƌƐƚŶĂŵĞ;ƐͿ͗



ĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗



^ƵƌŶĂŵĞ͗

   ŝƌĐŽĚĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚEŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗ 

    

 ϰͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



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[1.41]  Termination of Employment

^d/KEϮ͗Respondent’s Details ;ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚͿ 

/ĨLJŽƵĂƌĞĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚǁŝůůŚĂǀĞĂZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͕ĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐ͗ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ&ŝƌƐƚ  EĂŵĞ͗

ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ^ƵƌŶĂŵĞ͗



EĂŵĞͬKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ͗  ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗

    



ŝƌĐŽĚĞ͗



ŽŶƚĂĐƚEŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗





ϱͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



36

The Institutional Framework  [1.41]

^d/KEϯ͗ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŵƉĂŶLJ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ dŚŝƐŝƐŽŶůLJƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝĨƚŚĞƉƉĞůůĂŶƚŝƐĂŽŵƉĂŶLJ͘ 

ZĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ;WzͿEŽ͘



/ƐƚŚŝƐĂ>ŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŽŵƉĂŶLJͬ ĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚ zĞƐ ĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŵƉĂŶLJ ;Ϳ͍



EŽ

/ƐƚŚĞŽŵƉĂŶLJ ŝŶZĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉ Žƌ >ŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ͍



EŽ

zĞƐ





/Ĩz^͕ƉůĞĂƐĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ͗ >ŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŽƌͬZĞĐĞŝǀĞƌEĂŵĞ͗



>ŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŽƌͬZĞĐĞŝǀĞƌĚĚƌĞƐƐ͗

   

ŝƌĐŽĚĞ



ŽŶƚĂĐƚ EŽ͗



ŵĂŝů͗



ϲͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



37

[1.41]  Termination of Employment

^d/KEϰ͗ƉƉĞĂůĞƚĂŝůƐ

/ǁŝƐŚƚŽĂƉƉĞĂůĂĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌ͘ ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ;:ͿEŽ͗



ĂƚĞŽĨĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ͗



 WůĞĂƐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚ ZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞEƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ĞĂĐŚ ĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ LJŽƵǁŝƐŚ ƚŽ ĂƉƉĞĂů͘ tŚĞƚŚĞƌLJŽƵĂƌĞĂƉƉĞĂůŝŶŐŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͕LJŽƵŵƵƐƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƚĂďůĞďĞůŽǁƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨĞĂĐŚ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĞdžĂĐƚůLJĂƐƚŚĞLJĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ͘

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The Institutional Framework  [1.41]

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[1.41]  Termination of Employment

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Chapter 2

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005

PURPOSE [2.01]   The Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 was originally established with the purpose of encouraging and promoting the use of written contracts of employment between employees and employers. This act granted employees the right to request that specific terms and conditions of employment be outlined in writing.1 This function has been in the main replaced with the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 as amended. The main objective of the 1973 Act was to establish the minimum statutory notice periods that both employers and employees must provide before terminating an employment contract.

APPLICATION [2.02]   The Act provides protection to all employers and to most employees. Employees who have worked continuously for the same employer for 13 weeks are covered by the legislation. However, there are certain categories of workers who are excluded from this Act. These include: (a) employees who are normally expected to work for the same employer for fewer than 18 hours a week; (b) members of the employer’s immediate family working in a private dwelling house or on a farm; (c) members of the Defence Forces and the Garda Síochána; (d) persons employed under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894; and (e) civil servants who hold office in the Civil Service of the Government or in the Civil Service of the State.2

1

2

This piece of the legislation has been repealed by the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994, which in turn was later amended by the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2018, the Payment of Wages (Amendemnt) (Tips and Gratuities) Act, 2022 and the European Union (Transaprent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations 2022 (SI 686/2022). Section 1A of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

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[2.03]  Termination of Employment Under the Terms of Employment (Information Act), 1994,3 irrespective of the contract type, an employee’s notice period must be described in the written statement of employment, which must be provided to an employee within one month of commencing employment.4

NOTICE PERIOD [2.03]   The legislation sets out the minimum periods of notice to be observed by both employers and employees on the termination of employment. The amount of notice due to an employee depends on the employee’s length of service. The Act outlines the following minimum notice periods for employees in Ireland: Length of service

Entitlement5

Under 13 weeks

No notice is required

13 weeks to 2 years

1 week

2 years to 5 years

2 weeks

5 years to 10 years

4 weeks

10 years to 15 years

6 weeks

15 years+

8 weeks

Notice must be given directly to the employee concerned in writing. It is not sufficient to give it to their representative, as this not sufficient to discharge the employer’s obligations under the minimum notice legislation. Notice must be specific and unequivocal.

CONTINUOUS SERVICE [2.04]   Rights to notice are dependent upon the length of continuous service.6 An employee’s service is deemed to be continuous unless the employee is dismissed by the employer or leaves employment voluntarily.7 Continuity of service is not broken by: (a) absence due to sickness; (b) strikes or lockouts, lay-off periods or protective leave granted under legislation such maternity leave, paternity leave, parent’s leave and statutory sick leave; (c) dismissals followed by immediate re-employment; or

3 4 5 6 7

Section 3(1)(j) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 3(l) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 4(2) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 1 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 1 1(a) and Schedule 1 1(b) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

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Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.06] (d) transfers of business, unless the employee received and retained a redundancy payment from the transferor at the time of, and by reason of, the transfer.8 Continuity is broken where an employee claims and receives a redundancy payment in respect of lay-off or short time, as they are deemed to have voluntarily left their employment.9 The Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and the Labour Court will generally deal with the question of continuity of employment in terms that are as favourable as possible to the employee.10

COMPUTABLE SERVICE [2.05]   The 1973 Act establishes rules regarding the computation of an employee’s service. When calculating computable service, account is taken of:11 (a) the first 26 weeks of absence due to illness, lay-off or any other absence agreed with the employer (by definition, periods of absence due to illness, lay-off or any other absence agreed with the employer are not computable); (b) periods of leave granted under protective legislation; (c) periods of service with the Defence Forces; (d) periods of lock-out; and (e) periods of absence due to a trade dispute in another business. Civil servants who are moved between departments do not lose their continuity of employment.12 Periods of absence while on strike are not considered. Periods of employment may be continuous but not computable.

WHAT CONSTITUTES ‘PAY’? [2.06]   ‘Pay’ for notice purposes is defined by the Second Schedule of the 1973 Act. Generally, an employee is entitled to be paid by their employer during their normal working hours when they are ‘ready and willing’ to work, even if there is no work available to give the employee.13 In determining what constitutes pay, there are two methods of calculating same: (a) Employment where there are normal working hours: In this instance, pay is calculated by reference to the average rate of pay earned by the employee in respect of any time worked during the 13 weeks preceding the giving of notice.14 8 9

10 11

12 13 14

Schedule 1, s 7 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 1, s 1(5) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. See A Complainant v Respondent, ADJ-00026835. Schedule 1 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 1, s 14 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 2, para 2 (a) (i) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 2, para 2(b) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

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[2.07]  Termination of Employment (b) Employment for which there are no normal working hours: In this instance, pay is calculated as the sum of not less than the average weekly earnings of the employee in the 13 weeks preceding the giving of notice. In both instances, pay includes such overtime as is usually worked.15 Importantly, however, pay is due only if the employee is ready and willing to work.16 This often arises when employees are absent on long-term illness and a decision is taken to terminate their employment. In this instance, although entitled to notice, the employee – because they are unwilling and/or unable to work – will not receive any pay for that notice. See also 2.16.

NOTICE TO EMPLOYERS [2.07]   An employee who has more than 13 weeks’ service with their employer and who wishes to terminate their contract of employment must give at least one week’s notice of termination.17 The required period of notice may be longer than this if provided for in the contract of employment. If this is the case, then the greater contractual period of notice will prevail over the lesser statutory period in respect of both parties. It is therefore the longer period – be it contractual or statutory – that is binding, albeit that the WRC can only deal with claims for statutory notice.

WAIVER AND PAYMENT IN LIEU OF NOTICE [2.08]   Either side may voluntarily waive the right to notice.18 The 1973 Act also allows employees to accept payment in lieu of notice.19 The important word here is ‘accept’. Where payment in lieu of notice is given by the employer and is accepted by the employee, or where there is provision for payment in lieu of notice in the employee’s contract of employment, the date of termination of the contract of employment is the date upon which the employee physically leaves the employment. This is so as the contract will have been determined in accordance with the terms of the contract. The Labour Court considered this matter in Action Health Enterprises Ltd v Michael Darcy.20 The facts of this case are interesting, in that the complainant had been dismissed on a ‘no fault’ basis with a commitment that he would receive payment in lieu of his contractual notice period of three months. The complainant’s solicitors followed this up and payment was received on 17 December 2017.

15 16 17 18 19 20

Section 2(a)(ii) and Schedule 2 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 2(a)(ii) and Sch 2, and Sch 2, para 4 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 6 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 7(1) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 7(1) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Action Health Enterprises Ltd v Michael Darcy UDD2019.

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Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.08] The Labour Court found that the request by the solicitor to action contractual terms approbated or approved the contract, pursuant to its terms, and thus extinguished the complainant’s capacity to rely on s 4 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act to determine the date of dismissal in accordance with the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. The Labour Court went on to say: ‘… the effect of this subsection is that where an employee waives his or her entitlement to notice or accepts payment in lieu of notice, their right to notice under Section 4 is extinguished. Section 7(1) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, provides that nothing in the 1973 Act operates to prevent an employee or employer from waiving his or her right to notice, on any occasion, or from accepting payment in lieu of notice. The term in the complainant’s contract of employment upon which reliance is placed, provides, in effect, that the Respondent has the right to pay the complainant in lieu of notice. That provision reserves to the Respondent the right to terminate the contract without notice and to make payment in lieu thereof. However, for the Complainant to “accept payment in lieu”, there must have been an offer and a free acceptance of that offer. It follows that where the Respondent relies on this provision by simply paying wages in lieu of notice there is no offer, in any meaningful sense and there can be no acceptance. Nevertheless, the facts of this case show that at the time the complainant’s employment was terminated he did not in fact receive payment in lieu of notice. Subsequently his Solicitor, acting on his behalf and instructions, sought payment in lieu of notice and did so in reliance on the relevant provision of the contract …’

Thus, the complainant was found to have approved the contract, in seeking the threemonth payment in lieu of notice, and could not now reprobate or denounce it. He was ultimately found to have insufficient service on which to ground his claim for unfair dismissal. Critically, therefore, if an employee has a term in the contract which allows payment in lieu of notice and accepts that, not just where the employer pays it, the date of dismissal will be the date on which they leave the premises.21 In the alternative, if there is no right to give pay in lieu of notice in the contract, the Labour Court will treat the case as a ‘no notice’ case and will determine the date of termination by adding on the contractual or statutory notice period, whichever is the greater.22 Importantly, the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 deems the date of dismissal to be the date on which notice, had it been given, would have expired. For statutory redundancy purposes, the date of termination of employment is the date on which notice, if given, would have expired.23 The legislation provides that an employee may only ‘accept’ payment in lieu of notice. The Minimum Notice Act 1973 gives no guidance as to what should occur in a situation where payment in lieu of notice is not provided for in the contract of employment and/or where the employee concerned is unwilling to accept payment in lieu of notice

21

See also Megan Healy v Fit 4 Life Gym Ltd ADJ-00030571. O’Reilly v Pulmann Kellogg Ltd UD 340/1979. Section 7(2) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

22 See 23

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[2.09]  Termination of Employment and wishes to work the notice period. Some experts24 suggest that, failing agreement to such an arrangement, the employee is entitled to stay on and work their notice period. The practicalities of this may make the arrangement inoperable, such as if there is no work for the employee and/or if relationships have broken down. In any event, it can be more beneficial for the employee to receive payment in lieu of notice as notice monies may be paid as part of any severance arrangement and are subject to generous tax allowances.25 If, however, there is provision for payment in lieu of notice in the contract of employment, the notice pay – albeit that it is paid in lieu – is subject to taxation in the normal way (see Ch 6).

Calculation of pay in lieu of notice [2.09]   Most people, when they think of pay, automatically think of basic pay. However, as discussed previously (see 2.06), pay for the purpose of payment in lieu of notice must include overtime. When agreeing pay in lieu of notice with an employee, it may be intended to include in the calculation other additional benefits, such as pension payments, car allowances etc. The contract of employment may provide some assistance in this regard. Typically, pay in lieu of notice clauses provide that ‘nothing in this contract shall prohibit the employer from paying the employee in lieu of notice’; or alternatively, they might provide that ‘nothing shall prohibit the employer from making a payment in lieu of notice’. In the latter case, it can be construed that the employer has the right to make a payment in lieu of notice; whereas in the former, it could be construed that ‘paying’ the employee means taking into account their total remuneration. This is an important distinction; where a contract provides for an employer to elect to give a payment in lieu of notice, it will be difficult for an employee to insist on their salary during the notice period.

NO ENTITLEMENT TO NOTICE [2.10]   There are certain circumstances in which an employer is not obliged to give notice.

Misconduct [2.11]   Where an employee is dismissed for reasons relating to misconduct, notice pay is not required to be paid.26 The Act does not define ‘misconduct’; but the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) has previously held that this applies only where the misconduct 24

See Meenan, Working within the Law: A practical guide for employers and employees (2nd edn, Oak Tree Press, 1999). 25 See Ch 6 on Taxation of Lump Sum Payments. 26 Section 8 of the x Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

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Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.11] is of a gross/serious nature.27 Thus, it is not always possible to define or determine what will suffice to justify summary dismissal on the grounds of gross misconduct. The High Court, in Carvill v Irish Industrial Bank Ltd,28 expressed the view that the grounds relied on to justify a dismissal without notice of an employee must be actions or omissions by the employee which are inconsistent with the performance of the express or implied terms of its contract of service. This issue was considered by the WRC in A Bread Salesman v A Bakery.29 In this case, the complainant – a delivery driver for a bakery – was dismissed by the respondent upon the discovery of disparities in the official orders placed by customers and what was placed on their shelves, which was described by a reporting customer as a ‘substantial additional’ amount. The complainant initially denied the fact but, when confronted with the evidence being relied upon, admitted to certain facts of the incident. During the case, the question arose as to whether the complainant had been put on notice that the charge he was facing constituted ‘gross misconduct’. The adjudication officer stated that ‘this was communicated in the context of non-payment of notice’. In concluding that the dismissal was fair, Carvill was relied upon and, more particularly, whether there were grounds to justify the non-payment of notice. The adjudication officer found that the act of diverting property away from the employer, as well as from any form of dishonesty or misuse of such property, constitutes misconduct, provided that ‘there is a loss to the respondent’. The non-payment of notice in this instance was therefore deemed to be justified. In Brewster v Burke and The Minister for Labour,30 the High Court accepted the then UK definition of ‘misconduct’ as follows: ‘It has long been part of our law that a person repudiates the contract of service if he wilfully disobeys the lawful and reasonable order of his master. Such a refusal fully justifies an employer in dismissing an employee summarily.’

It should be borne in mind that this is a 1985 case; the amendment to the Unfair Dismissals Act had yet to be passed, and simply terminating an employee summarily would not be deemed to be reasonable now. In A Team Leader v A Community Development & Employment Programme,31 an adjudication officer, in upholding the dismissal of the complainant to be fair and reasonable, awarded two weeks’ pay in respect of notice under the 1973 Act, finding that the complainant’s conduct did not amount to gross misconduct. In reaching this decision, the adjudication officer noted that: ‘The established jurisprudence in relation to dismissal law in this jurisdiction takes a very restricted view of what constitutes gross misconduct justifying summary dismissal. This is evidenced, for example, by the determination of the Employment Appeals Tribunal in

27 See

28 29 30 31

Kelly v Sanser Ltd M1343/1983; Brewster v Burke and Minister for Labour (1985) 4 JISLL 98; Varghese Mathew v Donegal Home Care Ltd Home Instead Senior Care Ltd ADJ-00036396; Musgrave Operating Partner Limited Supervalue v Olwale Noah Olade O’noah MND2215. Carvill v Irish Industrial Bank Ltd (1986) IR 325. A Bread Salesman v A Bakery ADJ-00006751. Brewster v Burke v Minister for Labour (1985) 4 JISLL 98. ADJ-00009241.

47

[2.12]  Termination of Employment Lennon v Bredin M160/1978 (reproduced at page 315 of Madden and Kerr Unfair Dismissal Cases and Commentary (IBEC, 1996)) wherein the Tribunal states: “Section 8 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 saves an employer from liability for minimum notice where the dismissal is for misconduct. We have always held that this exemption applies only to cases of very bad behaviour of such a kind that no reasonable employer could be expected to tolerate the continuance of the relationship for a minute longer; we believe the legislature had in mind such things as violent assault or larceny or behaviour in the same sort of serious category. If the legislature had intended to exempt an employer from giving notice in such cases where the behaviour fell short of being able to fairly be called by the dirty word ‘misconduct’ we have always felt that they would have said so by adding such words (after the word misconduct) as negligence, slovenly workmanship, bad timekeeping, etc. They did not do so.” In the case of Leopard Security v David Campbell [1997] ELR 227 the EAT stated “The standard …. Which the Tribunal has always applied to the word ‘misconduct’ in section 8 is that the misconduct alleged must be of such a serious nature that the employer would not reasonably be required to keep the employee at work within the workplace even for a short notice period. There is a contrast between the word ‘misconduct’ and the more neutral word ‘conduct’ used in the Unfair Dismissals Act. There have been many cases where the Tribunal has held that the conduct of the employee justified dismissal but did not justify summary dismissal.” Applying the jurisprudence in relation to the definition of “misconduct”, I am satisfied that the complainant’s conduct which is defined as gross misconduct under the respondent’s disciplinary procedures does not in my opinion come within the definition of misconduct as set out in the above jurisprudence. I am satisfied therefore that the complainant is entitled to notice under the Act.’

Constructive dismissal [2.12]   An employee who is constructively dismissed is not entitled to notice or payment in lieu of notice as the employee, and not the employer, ended the contract of employment. The EAT consistently upheld this in such cases.32 The WRC and the Labour Court have also taken similar stances in that regard.33 However, it is entirely possible that an employee claiming constructive dismissal may assert their right to work their notice period. While such a decision may be detrimental to their claim of constructive dismissal, such entitlement cannot be waived by the employer by reason of the employee asserting a claim of constructive dismissal.34 If the employee gives notice of their termination, even in constructive dismissal cases, the termination date will be the date on which that notice expires. Thus, in Shinkwin v Millett,35 the Labour Court held: ‘A resignation is a unilateral act which, if expressed in unambiguous and unconditional terms, brings a contract of employment to an end. The contract cannot be reconstructed by 32 33 34 35

Halal Meat Packers (Ballyhaunis) Ltd v Employment Appeals Tribunal (1990) ELR 49 and Stamp v McGrath UD 1243/1983. A Cleaner v A Cleaning Services Provider ADJ-00020785. Customer Solutions Agent v Payment Services ADJ-00027930. Shinkwin v Millett EED044.

48

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.13] the subsequent unilateral withdrawal of the resignation. Where adequate notice is given, the contract is generally terminated in accordance with its terms and since there is no repudiation the acceptance of the resignation by the employer is not required in order to determine the contract.’

This line of reasoning was followed in A Care Worker v A Care Provider.36 Here the complainant had resigned on 5 April 2017, stating: ‘I hereby tender my resignation with [the respondent] with immediate effect. In line with the notice period my last working day will be the 17th of April 2017.’ If the date of 17 April were taken as the date of leaving, the claim would have been outside the six-month limitation period and thus the complainant would have had to have shown reasonable cause for the delay. Relying on Shinkwin, the adjudication officer held that ‘the employee can give notice to end the employment relationship with the last day of the notice period being the date of dismissal’.

Resignation [2.13]   If an employee voluntarily leaves their job, there is no obligation on the employer to pay notice. Under the 1973 Act, although an employee is obliged to give one week’s notice of resignation,37 this period is usually more extensive in written contracts. If an employee leaves employment immediately without giving any notice, the employer has the legal right to sue the employee for loss arising from the breach. However, this is a moot point, as the practical position often outweighs the reality. Among other things, the cost of issuing proceedings against the employee could exceed the amount due. The employer may also wish to enforce any post-termination restrictions in the contract of employment or protect any confidential information taken by the employee.38 In such circumstances the normal principles of contract law apply – that is, the employer may sue the employee to enforce the rights under the contract of employment. Case law has developed over time to the effect that, despite there being an apparent agreement, the courts may declare a contractual term unenforceable. This will be particularly relevant where there is an unreasonable notice period within a contract of employment. Similar to the concept of restrictive covenants, the courts may view such lengthy notice periods as being overly broad. Often there are two primary reasons for this: (a) Irish citizens have a constitutional right to earn a living and an overly broad notice period would be seen as an interference with that right; and (b) An overly restrictive term is deemed to be an inference with trade and is therefore anti-competitive.

36 37

A Care Worker v A Care Provider ADJ-00011215, 14 March 2019. Section 6 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] IRLS 174.

38 See

49

[2.14]  Termination of Employment Courts also take into account public policy considerations. For example, while an employer may seek specific performance of a contractual term – that is, for an employee to work their notice period – where such a term requires the individual to personally perform a service, the courts often take the view that it would be contrary to public policy to compel the person to perform that services as it would be an infringement of their personal autonomy. The courts rarely (if ever) direct parties to work together if there is evidence that a relationship has broken down.

Fixed-term/specified purpose contracts [2.14]   No notice has to be given on the expiry of a fixed-term/specified purpose contract drawn up in accordance with the terms of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977–2015 – that is, where the contract is in writing and expressly provides that the terms of the Unfair Dismissals Acts will not apply to the termination of the contract by reason only of the expiry of the fixed term/specified purpose; and where it is signed by both parties.39 However, such contracts should always include a general notice/termination clause to provide for the contract to be terminated prior to the expiry of the fixed term/specified purpose; otherwise, the employee may be entitled to payment of the total balance of monies due under the contract. It was confirmed in O’Mahony v College of the Most Holy Trinity40 that a notice period in a fixed-term contract does not exclude the fact that it is a genuine fixed-term contract. Prior to this there was some doubt as to whether the inclusion of a notice period in a fixed-term contract invalidated the fixed-term nature of that contract (see also 2.15 and 8.25 for further discussion on fixed-term contracts and retirement).

Retirement [2.15]   Notice need not be given or payment made in lieu when terminating the employment contract of an employee who has reached retirement age as stated in the contract of employment, the normal retirement age in the employment concerned or the general state retirement age of 66.41 However, best practice is to give notice well in excess of what would otherwise be required under the Minimum Notice Act (eg, three to six months).42 This is especially important in employment where the normal retirement age may be in doubt; in such cases, the notice required under the Minimum Notice Act should, at the very least, be given.

39 40 41 42

Section 2(2)(a) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. O’Mahony v College of the Most Holy Trinity (1998) ELR 159. Section 2(1)(b) of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. SI 600/2017, Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017.

50

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.17] Regard should also be had to the Employment Equality Act 1998, which provides that ‘offering a fixed term contract to a person over the compulsory retirement age for that employment or to a particular class or description of employee in that employment shall not be taken as constituting discrimination on the age ground if: (a) it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and (b) the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’.43 It is important to ensure that any actions taken in this regard are objectively justified by a legitimate aim. This concept is further discussed in Ch 8. Additionally, attention must be paid to the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017 (SI 600/2017), which provides guidance on how employers and employees should handle the situation and outlines the relevant timelines.

Incapability and notice [2.16]   While an employer is obliged to give the appropriate period of notice to the employee on terminating employment on the grounds of incapability44 (under either the minimum notice legislation or the contract of employment), employers are not obliged to pay the employee for the notice period, as pay is due only if the employee is ready and willing to work.45 This also negates any right to payment in lieu of notice. However there are a number of WRC decisions in which this position has not been upheld.46

Lay-off/short-time working [2.17]   An employee who claims and receives a statutory redundancy payment in respect of lay-off or short-time working is deemed to have voluntarily left their employment and therefore is not entitled to notice. This is not the case where the employer terminates the employee’s contract during a period of lay-off or short-time working – see Irish Leathers v Minister for Labour.47 Also see Form RP9 (see Ch 9), which states: ‘An employee who claims and receives a redundancy payment in respect of lay off or short time is deemed to have voluntarily left his/her employment and therefore not entitled to notice under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts, 1973 to 2001.’

43

Section 6 2A (c) of the 1998 Act inserted by s 4 of the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015. This generally arises in the context of long-term absenteeism. 45 Schedule 2, para 4 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. 46 See A General Operative/Picker v A Fruit Producers ADJ-00021143, 30 April 2020. The adjudication officer found that ‘the Complainant’s contract of employment was terminated because of incapability following her continuous absence from work since September 2016. I note that Sec 4 of this Act states, ‘An employer shall, in order to terminate the contract of employment of an employee who has been in his continuous service for a period of thirteen weeks or more, give to that employee a minimum period of notice calculated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. Therefore, I find that the Complainant would have bee [Sic] entitled to minimum notice based on that section unless it is precluded by Sec 8.’ 47 Irish Leathers v Minister for Labour (1986) 5 JISLL 211. 44

51

[2.18]  Termination of Employment This was recently addressed in Patricia O’Malley v Pallomer Limited.48 Here, the complainant was placed on lay-off on 15 March 2020 prior to the commencement of lockdown during the Covid-19 pandemic. The complainant was then made redundant on 10 August 2020. It was the complainant’s contention that she was entitled to be paid her eight weeks’ statutory notice as she had not voluntarily left employment. The adjudication officer noted the following: ‘[I]t is clear that the contract of employment temporarily ceased from the date on which the Complainant was laid off, and re-activated on the date on which she received notice of redundancy.’

MINIMUM NOTICE AND THE PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT 1991 [2.18]   The Payment of Wages Act 1991 governs the payment of wages to an employee by an employer. ‘Wages’ are defined under s 1 as follows: ‘“wages”, in relation to an employee, means any sums payable to the employee by the employer in connection with his employment, including: (a) any fee, bonus or commission, or any holiday, sick or maternity pay, or any other emolument, referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract of employment or otherwise, and (b) any sum payable to the employee upon the termination by the employer of his contract of employment without his having given to the employee the appropriate prior notice of the termination, being a sum paid in lieu of the giving of such notice.’

As such, any payments under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act and/or contractual notice are deemed to be ‘wages’ for the purposes of 1991 Act and employees can pursue claims for unpaid notice under this act. However, this arises only where the termination is by the employer. On the surface, this would seem to preclude a situation where the employee terminates their employment by reason of constructive dismissal. Insofar as what actually constitutes ‘wages’ for the purposes of notice and the Payment of Wages Act, this was dealt with in Sullivan v Department of Education.49 Here the EAT took the word ‘payable’ to mean ‘properly payable’; consequently, it was not simply a matter of what may have been paid from the outset, but rather of all sums to which an employee is properly entitled. Helpfully, per the 1991 Act, an employer is not deemed to have unlawfully made a deduction from an employee’s wages where the deduction or non-payment was permitted by statute50 or contract.51 In other words, where an employee has committed an act of misconduct and is subsequently not paid notice in accordance with s 8 of the 1973 Act, they cannot attempt to recover the sum under the 1991 Act by virtue of this provision.

48 49 50 51

ADJ-00029863. Sullivan v Department of Education [1998] ELR 217. Section 5(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991. Section 5(1)(b) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.

52

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.20]

LEAVE AND MINIMUM NOTICE Annual leave [2.19]   The Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 gives the employer the discretion to decide when annual leave can be taken. If an employee is working their notice period and has either accrued or scheduled annual leave during this time, the annual leave may run simultaneously with their notice period.52

Protective leave [2.20]   Protective leave is provided for in various pieces of employment legislation. Any notice of termination or resignation served during a period of protective leave is deemed to be void and cannot take effect until after the leave period.53 The operative word here is ‘void’. Such protective leave extends to the following: (a) Maternity leave:54 Under the Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004, periods of maternity leave, additional maternity leave, leave to which the father is entitled upon the death of the mother and health and safety leave are protected. Additionally, if an employee’s fixed-term contract expires while they are on maternity leave, they will be considered to still be employed and the last day of their maternity leave will be considered as the new contract’s expiration date, after which the employee’s contract may be terminated.55 (b) Adoptive leave:56 Under the Adoptive Leave Act 1995, akin to maternity leave, termination during a period of adoptive leave or additional adoptive leave or a period of time off to attend certain adoption classes or meetings, is deemed to be void.57 In addition, there are other various forms of protective leave during which termination may constitute penalisation under the respective act, permitting the employee to pursue a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts – although such provisions do not render the termination void in and of itself: (a) Paternity leave: Under the Paternity Leave and Benefit Act, 2016, employees are protected from penalisation – including dismissal – during a period of paternity leave for having exercised their entitlement.58

52 53 54 55 56 57 58

Section 20 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 23 of the Maternity Protection Acts 1994. Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004. Section 10 of the Maternity Protection Acts 1994. Section 6 of the Adoptive Leave Act 1995. Section 16(a) and (b) of the Adoptive Leave Act 1995. Section 20 of the Paternity Leave and Benefit Act, 2016.

53

[2.21]  Termination of Employment (b) Parental leave59 or force majeure leave: Under the Parental Leave Act 1998, employees are protected from penalisation – including dismissal – during a period of parental leave for having exercised their entitlement.60 (c) Parent’s leave:61 Under the Parent’s Leave and Benefits Act, 2019 (as amended), employees are protected from penalisation – including dismissal – during a period of parent’s leave for having exercised their entitlement.62 (d) Sick leave: Under the Sick Leave Act 2022, employees are protected from penalisation – including dismissal – for having exercised their entitlement to statutory sick leave.63 (e) Carer’s leave: Under the Carer’s Leave Act 2001, employees are protected from penalisation – including dismissal – during a period of carer’s leave for having exercised their entitlement.64 (f) Annual leave/public holidays: Under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, employees are protected from penalisation65 – including dismissal, for invoking any right conferred on him or her,66 having in good faith opposed by lawful means an act that is unlawful under the Act,67 giving evidence in any proceedings under the Act,68 or giving notice of his or her intention to do any of the things referred to in the previous paragraphs.69

EXTENDING THE NOTICE PERIOD [2.21]  In Bolands Ltd v Ward,70 the company was in financial difficulties and a receiver was appointed. The receiver decided to serve on each of the employees a notice of termination of employment for the purposes of the Minimum Notice Act and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Before that notice expired, the receiver extended the original notice by one week and similar extensions were given for the next number of weeks. Ultimately the Trade Union representing the employees was informed that the company would close on the 12th of October 1984. About one year later a complaint of inadequate notice was lodged. The Employment Appeals Tribunal held in favour of the

59 60

61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Section 16A of the Parental Leave Acts 1998–2019. Section 16A(2)(a) of the Parental Leave Acts 1998–2019. Under subsection (3) where penalisation constitutes dismissal, an employee may institute proceedings under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). Section 5 of the Parents Leave and Benefit Act 2019. Section 19(2)(a) of the Parents Leave and Benefit Act 2019. Under Subsection (3), where penalisation constitutes dismissal, an employee may institute proceedings under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). Section 12 of the Sick Leave Act 2022. Section 16(2) of the Carer’s Leave Act, 2001. Under Subsection (3), where penalisation constitutes dismissal, an employee may institute proceedings under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). Section 26 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 26 (1)(a), Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 26 (1)(b), Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 26 (1)(c), Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 26 (1)(d), Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Bolands Ltd (In Receivership) v Josephine Ward and Others [1987] IESC 1; [1988] ILRM 392 (30 October 1987).

54

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.22] employees on the ground that, as the first notice of termination of employment was not acted on by the company, each employee was entitled to a further notice of dismissal following the expiry of the first notice, and that the Act was thereby breached. It was conceded in the case that the first notice of termination was not, in the case of any employee, of less than the statutory minimum. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that ‘if those notices had been allowed to run their course, and the receiver had then dismissed the employees on foot of them, he would not have breached the Act’.71 What happened, however, was that before the original notices expired, the receiver extended the periods of the notices by one week. Seven further extensions by one week were subsequently notified by the receiver, each further extension being within the period of the then existing amended notice, so that when employment ceased on 12 October 1984 the original notice of termination had been extended eight times. This meant that each employee got a notice of termination which was eight weeks longer than the period in the original notice, so in each case it was at least eight weeks longer than the statutory minimum. So far from seeking to shrink the minimum period laid down by the Act, the receiver accorded each employee a period of notice well in excess of the statutory entitlement. In overturning the decision of the Employment Appeals Tribunal the Supreme Court found that the receiver satisfied the requirements of the Act where the notice was extended from week to week; and that it was not necessary to serve notice afresh giving the full statutory requirement. This decision was upheld in Waterford Multiport v Fagan.72 The court went on to state that the notices given were not invalidated by virtue of the employer not ensuring that the employees left on the due date, being a certain date, for the purposes of the Act on the expiry of that notice.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF EMPLOYEES DURING THE NOTICE PERIOD [2.22]   Employees working out a notice period are still employed and are entitled to the same rights during the notice period as they enjoyed prior to the notice period.73 They are entitled to all benefits, including holiday leave, sick leave, pension contributions and a company car.74 If here are no normal working hours the employee is entitled to a sum not less than the average weekly earnings of the employee in the thirteen weeks preceding the giving of notice.75 Also, if an employee is given notice in a redundancy situation, they are entitled to reasonable time off to look for work. 71 72 73 74 75

Bolands Ltd (In Receivership) v Josephine Ward and Others [1987] IESC 1; [1988] ILRM 392 (30 October 1987) at para 9. Waterford Multiport v Fagan [1999] IEHC 158 (13 May 1999). Schedule 2 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 2, paragraph 1 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Schedule 2. Paragraph 3 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

55

[2.23]  Termination of Employment Where an employer has given notice of termination to an employee and, during such notice, the employee gives notice in writing to the employer to terminate their contract of employment on an earlier date than the date on which the employer’s notice is due to expire, the employee will still be taken to have be dismissed by the employer and the date of dismissal will be the date on which the employee’s notice expires.76 (For redundancy and notice see paras 5.16, 5.17 & 5.18.)

NOTICE MUST BE SPECIFIC [2.23]   There is no legal requirement that notice be in writing. However, it must be specific with regard to the minimum notice period. The Supreme Court confirmed this point in Bolands Ltd (in receivership) v Josephine Ward.77 (For a fuller discussion of this case see para 2.21) In its decision, the Supreme Court, Henchy J stated that the form of notice is not provided for in the Act of 1973 and is not required to be in writing: ‘The Act is concerned only with the period referred to the notice, and it matters not what form the notice takes so long as it conveys to the employee that it is proposed that he will lose his employment at the end of a period which is expressed or necessarily implied in that notice. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that the notice should be stringently or technically construed as if it were analogous to a notice to quit. If the notice actually given – whether orally or in writing, in one document or in a number of documents – conveys to the employee that at the end of the period expressly or impliedly referred to in the notice or notices it is proposed to terminate his or her employment, the only question normally arising under the Act is whether the period of notice is less than the statutory minimum’.78

Even if notice is given verbally, it should be confirmed in writing. Similarly, if an employee informs an employer verbally that they are resigning, they should be asked to put this in writing. In A Laboratory Technician v A Laboratory,79 the employee complained that he had not received written notice of termination of his employment. Finding in favour of the employer, the adjudication officer held that notice may be issued, even if not in writing, provided that there is no dispute between the parties as to notice being received. In reaching this decision, the adjudication officer had regard to the decision in Ward and Henchy J’s dicta, in which the following cited above.‘ Payment in lieu of notice must also be specific. A sum of money paid to an employee on termination of employment should be accompanied by a clear statement indicating the individual components of the lump sum.

76 77 78 79

Section 10(2) of the Redundancy Payment Acts, 1967. Waterford Multiport v Fagan [1998] ILRM 382. Bolands Ltd (In Receivership) v Josephine Ward and Others [1987] IESC 1; (30 October 1987) at para 12. A Laboratory Technician v A Laboratory ADJ-00029180 April 20 2021 See also Warehouse General Manager v Transport and Logistics Company, ADJ-00026861 July 7 2020.

56

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.26]

WITHDRAWAL OF NOTICE [2.24]   Notice, once given, cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the other party.80 Where there is doubt about the date of notice or whether it was give, this will be construed against the employer and the contra proferendum rule will apply.81 Where there is consent the notice period can be shortened or extended at the discretion of the parties. Unless a contract specifically provides for pay in lieu of notice, technically it will be a breach of contract to enforce same. See also paragraphs 3.27 and 3.28.

DISPUTES AND REDRESS Disputes [2.25]   Under the 1973 Act, any dispute regarding notice may be referred to the WRC. No time limit is laid down by the Acts for such claims; however, this is subject to Schedule 1 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. As such, the time limit under s 41(6) of the 2015 Act applies. In other words, a complaint for non-payment of statutory minimum notice must be presented to the WRC within six months of the alleged date of contravention.

Redress [2.26]   In assessing loss with regard to notice, the WRC will take into account not merely salary/wages, but also all other remuneration, such as commission earnings, regular and rostered overtime and other fringe benefits. The WRC will only award an employee compensation for any loss they sustained due to the employer’s default in failing to give proper notice. However, if the employee was sick or on strike during the notice period, no compensation is payable.82 The only matter that the WRC can deal with is the statutory notice period. It is not within the WRC’s remit to deal with contractual notice periods greater than those provided for under the Act. These, if they arise, must be litigated upon as a breach of contract claim in the civil courts. A determination of the WRC in notice cases may be appealed to the Labour Court83 within 42 days of the adjudication officer’s decision. A further appeal is available on a point of law to the High Court no later than 42 days from service on that party of notice of the decision of the Labour Court.84 80 81 82 83 84

Murphy v Binchy & Sons Ltd UD 243/1978. Stapp v The Shaftsbury Society [1982] IRLR 326. Schedule 2 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 provides that the employee must be ‘ready and willing to work’. Section 44 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Section 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

57

[2.27]  Termination of Employment

WRONGFUL DISMISSAL AND NOTICE [2.27]   An employee who pursues a claim of unlawful dismissal at common law (wrongful dismissal) is asking the court for damages for breach of contract. By definition, this materialises into a claim for contractual notice and the claim is limited to this (see Ch 7).

MINIMUM NOTICE AND REDUNDANCY [2.28]   Notice periods under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005, the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2007 and the Protection of Employment Act 1977 and contractual notice run concurrently. This is somewhat different in case of a collective redundancy. Example Company A wishes to make 200 staff redundant. The following notice must be given: (a) statutory notice due under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005; (b) as this constitutes a collective redundancy (see Ch 5), notice to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment in accordance with the Protection of Employment Act 1977, given at least 30 days prior to the first notice of redundancy; (c) contractual notice in accordance with the various employees’ contracts of employment; and (d) notice in accordance with the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2014. All these ‘notice periods’ can run concurrently after the 30-day consultation period required for a collective redundancy expires. Therefore, an employee with 16 years’ service would be entitled to eight weeks’ notice (presuming their contractual notice did not exceed this); and this eight-week period would begin to run after the 30-day ‘consultation period’ given to the Minister. Presuming there was no collective redundancy, the statutory notice, contractual notice and notice in accordance with the Redundancy Payment Acts 1967–2007 would run concurrently.

Minimum notice in practice Always be specific about the notice period [2.29]   This is one of the main mistakes that employers make. Every employee should be given a letter outlining what their notice period is and what exactly will happen during the notice period. It is also necessary to be specific about the amount of notice pay due; and to ensure that the employee accepts that the sum is in ‘full and final settlement’, acknowledges that the document has been read over and explained to them, and understands and accept the contents (see Ch 3 for draft severance letters).

58

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005  [2.30] Payment in lieu of notice as a bargaining tool [2.30]   It is often beneficial for the employee to take payment in lieu of notice. This is something to bargain with during the termination of an employee if things are going badly and the employee insists on working their notice even though there may be no work for them or the relationship has broken down. If the employee agrees to payment in lieu of notice, and presuming this is not provided for in the contract of employment, this forms part of the severance pay and as such is eligible for the usual tax relief.

59

60

Chapter 3

Unfair Dismissal

[3.01]   The Unfair Dismissals Act was enacted in 1977 and was significantly amended in 1993 and further in 2005 by the Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act 2005, and latterly by the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021. The 1977 Act brought into force for the first time in Irish law a process whereby an employee could pursue a claim of unfair dismissal before a tribunal – the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT). The Act was far-reaching in its inception, in that it introduced into Irish law a method whereby employers could legitimately dismiss an employee provided that they did so fairly, as defined within the Act.1 Claims by employees could be brought before a Rights Commissioner or the EAT within six months of the date of dismissal; in exceptional circumstances (now, with reasonable cause), this could be extended to 12 months (see 3.22). The main advantages of a claim for unfair dismissal over one of wrongful dismissal (see Ch 7) generally lie in time and expense. One of the main aims of those drafting the legislation was to provide an informal forum to address such matters; however, this has largely been forgotten, as the Labour Court – which now hears these cases on appeal from adjudication officers of the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) – now operates in a very legal and process-driven fashion in accordance with the rules of evidence. This has been compounded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Zalewski v Adjudication Officer and WRC, Ireland and the Attorney General,2 where the Supreme Court – while criticising the lack of an express provision to allow cross-examination in the WRC – held that the following were incompatible and repugnant to the Constitution: (a) the blanket prohibition on WRC hearings being held in public pursuant to s 41(13) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and s 8(6) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended; and (b) the absence of any provision for the administration of an oath or the crossexamination of witnesses in the WRC under Part 4 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 or s 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. As a result, in all unfair dismissal cases, this now means that evidence on oath or affirmation is taken, hearings are in public, and cross-examination is allowed.

1 2

Section 15 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Zalewski v Adjudication Officer and WRC, Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24.

61

[3.02]  Termination of Employment

PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS [3.02]   There are certain minimum requirements that employees bringing a claim before the WRC and the Labour Court must satisfy before the claim can be heard. It is often the case that a hearing will involve consideration not only of the substantive issues, but also of preliminary points, such as whether the claim was brought within the six-month time limit. The general tendency of the WRC/Labour Court is to hear all issues, both preliminary and substantive, before making a determination. This speaks to the general principle that all litigation should be disposed of in one set of proceedings and also prevents the WRC/Labour Court from being judicially reviewed. Nonetheless, there are circumstances where a preliminary point should be determined separately from the remainder of the case. In Bus Éireann v SIPTU,3 the Labour Court indicated that this will normally be done where it could lead to ‘considerable savings in both time and expense’, and where the point is a ‘a question of pure law where no evidence was needed and no further information is required’.4

The complainant must be an employee [3.03]   An ‘employee’ is defined under the Act as: ‘an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment and, in relation to redress for a dismissal under this Act, includes, in the death of the employee concerned at any time following the dismissal, his personal representative.’

In the majority of cases, it will be readily evident who the employer is; but confusion may arise where, for example, the employee is working for an agency or where they may appear to be an independent contractor.

Contract of employment [3.04]   In order to qualify for protection under the Unfair Dismissals Act, the worker in question must be an ‘employee’ employed under a ‘contract of employment’. A ‘contract of employment’ is defined in the Act as ‘a contract of service or of apprenticeship, whether it is express or implied and (if it is express) whether it is oral or in writing’.

3 4

Bus Éireann v SIPTU PTD 8/2004, citing O’Higgins CJ in Tara Exploration and Development Co Ltd v Minister for Industry and Commerce [1975] IR 242, 256. See also Adigun v The Equality Tribunal [2015] IESC 91, which held that an equality officer was entitled to determine a preliminary matter – whether the complainant was an employee or not.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.05] Therefore, the claimant must be employed under a contract of employment, whether it be oral or in writing. What constitutes a contract of employment has been the subject of much litigation. Thus: (a) in Walsh v Irish Coast Guard,5 a volunteer was deemed not to be an employee;6 (b) in Moran v Citywide Leisure Limited,7 the EAT held that the claimant, who held 100% of the shares in the respondent company, was not an employee; and (c) in Keith v The Department of Justice and Equality,8 a statutory office holder such as an assistant film classifier was deemed not be an employee. Work permits [3.05]   One of the first cases to deal with this issue was Ojierathi v An Post,9 here the claimant was a foreign national employed by An Post. Having read an article in the weekend paper, the employer commenced an investigation into whether the claimant had a proper work permit such that he was entitled to work in the country. Despite the employer asking for this on numerous occasions, the claimant did not produce it and eventually he was dismissed. Ultimately, the claimant (during the course of the ­hearing at the EAT) received confirmation that he had been granted the right to work in Ireland. However, the EAT said that the only matters it could take into account were those up to the date of his dismissal in October 2007; and as the employee did not have a valid work permit at that point and the matter had been fairly investigated, the claim failed. In Hussein v The Labour Court,10 the High Court ruled that non-EU/EEA nationals working without an employment permit, contrary to s 2 of the Employment Permits Act 2003, have no legal standing to invoke employment protection legislation. Hogan J ruled that their ‘contract of employment’ was void by reason of illegality. This was overturned in the Supreme Court but not for the reasons extolled by Hogan J.11 This line of thinking had previously been adopted by the EAT in Dooky v Baxter Storey Ireland Ltd,12 where the EAT held that there was no valid contract of employment once

5

Walsh v Irish Coast Guard, UD 1137/2013 (reported at [2015] ELR 214). See Also Larkin v Irish Coast Guard UD 700/2015. Moran v Citywide Leisure Ltd UD 1300/2011. See also the decision in An Employee v A Food Shop ADJ-00026126. 8 Keith v Department of Justice and Equality 163/2014. 9 Ojierathi v An Post UD 1113 (2007). 10 Hussein v Labour Court [2012] 2 IR 180. 11 See Hussein v Labour Court [2016] 1 IR 180 – notably here Murray J, in delivering a unanimous judgment, did say that ‘traditional judicial dicta’ as to the enforceability of such contracts might have to be ‘reviewed or nuanced in the light of the modern regulatory environment and applied with the principle of proportionality in mind’ – p 199. 12 Dooky v Baxter Storey UD 1293/2010. 6 7

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[3.05]  Termination of Employment the claimant’s student visa had expired.13 In Morais v Neylon Maintenance Services Limited,14 the EAT applied the decision of Hogan J where the claimant had been working with the respondent since 2008 without a valid work permit. The case of Sobhy v Chief Appeals Officer,15 was one in which the Plaintiff, applied for maternity benefit but was denied it in circumstances where the deciding officer took the view that as it was illegal for her to engage in employment in the State during the period when she did not have a valid work permit, her PAYE and PRSI contributions could not validly afford her entitlement to social welfare payments. In overturning the decision of Heslin J in the High Court, Baker J. in the Supreme Court held that ‘the issue in this appeal, and the exercise of construing the legislation leads me to the view that the Oireachtas did not intend to treat as qualifying contributions those made by a person working under an illegal contract of employment’16  and ‘the statutory provisions, and those enacted to provide limited redress to employees, all proceed on the basis that a contract in breach of the express criminal prohibition is not a contract of service for the purposes of qualifying under the social welfare code, and therefore Ms. Sobhy is not entitled to the benefit of maternity payments under that code’.17 In TA Hotels Limited t/a Lynam’s Hotel v Vireshwarsingh Khoosye and TA Hotels Limited t/a Lynam’s Hotel v Preeti Khoosye,18 the matter was ralso dealt with by the Labour Court. In these cases, the complainants’ visas had expired in 2013 and 2014 respectively. They applied to renew their visas in 2015. However, due to a delay, they were not granted new visas until 2019. They brought a number of claims to the WRC relating to their alleged dismissal in August 2016. The respondent claimed that their contracts had been terminated some months earlier because of their failure to get new work visas. The WRC found in the complainants’ favour and awarded them more than €10,000 in compensation (in addition to their statutory redundancy entitlements) – a decision which the hotel appealed. The Labour Court had initially refused to hear that appeal for want of prosecution where the respondent entity had been struck off the register; however, the Court was compelled to hear it following a successful judicial review challenge to that decision in the High Court. The case turned on the term ‘civil proceedings’ within s 2B of the Employment Permits Acts 2003–2014. Under this provision, the legislation provides a route for migrant employees without valid immigration permits to recover monies owed to them by their employer. The Acts empower such employees (or the Minister for Employment Affairs and Social Protection) to take ‘civil proceedings for an amount of money to recompense the foreign national for such work done or services rendered’.

13 14 15 16 17 18

Also see TA Hotels Limited v Khoosye, RPD 16/2019 where the Labour Court also held that when the claimant’s student visa expired, the contract became tainted with illegality. Morais v Neylon Maintenance Services Limited UD 417/2014. Sobhy v Chief Appeals Officer [2021] IESC 81. Sobhy v Chief Appeals Officer [2021] IESC 81 at para 102. Sobhy v Chief Appeals Officer [2021] IESC 81 at para 129. Lynam’s Hotel v Preeti Khoosye TED1929, PWD1935, DWT1929, DWT1930, PDW1934, TED1928, RPD1916, RPD1917. Dec 2 2019.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.06] The interpretation of the term ‘civil proceedings’ proved critical in the Labour Court’s understanding of the High Court’s ruling in Hussein v Labour Court and the Supreme Court’s decision in Quinn v IBRC.19 In Hussein v Labour Court, the High Court reversed a decision of the Labour Court who made an award to an employee despite the lack of a valid employment permit. Subsequently, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision for procedural reasons unrelated to the substantive issue, concluding that the question of the illegality of the contract between Mr. Younis and his employer was not something which the High Court was entitled to consider as a judicial review application is limited to assessing the decision making powers of the Labour Court to enforce the payment of the award or not. The complainants argued that the Hussein Supreme Court decision meant that immigration status ‘should no longer be permitted to undermine basic employment rights’; and that the Acts contained a defence for an employee who took all such steps as were reasonably open to them to ensure compliance, and to seek monies owed through ‘civil proceedings’. The Labour Court reviewed the previous decisions of the WRC, citing Quinn as the more relevant case instead of Hussein. The Labour Court ruled that the term ‘civil proceedings’ did not include claims made before the Labour Court, as it is not considered a court but a ‘quasi-judicial tribunal’ for statutory employment rights. It found that only the District Court, Circuit Court and High Court had jurisdiction based on the amount of the claim. The Court relied on s 2B of the Acts to provide a common law remedy for the complainants’ contracts, which were found to be void and unenforceable. Consequently, the Labour Court overturned all of the decisions made in favour of the complainants, including redundancy payments, wages, working time and terms of employment claims.20 Employee or agency worker? [3.06]   The Employment Agency Act 1971 regulates employment agencies in this jurisdiction. It does not deal with the rights or status of agency workers. Previously, agency workers were regarded as having a contract of employment with neither the agency nor the end user; however, more recently, the courts have been willing to find that an agency worker was an employee of the end user or client. For unfair dismissal purposes, the 1993 Act extended the scope of who may be considered an employee for the purpose of the Act to include ‘agency temps’.21 These employees are now considered to be employees of the hiring company once they are

19 20 21

Quinn v IBRC [2016] 1 IR 1. Serdar Goksel Sen v Specialised Air Products Limited ADJ-00043304. Section 13 of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993.

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[3.07]  Termination of Employment placed by an employment agency. In Bourton v Narcea and Anglo Irish Beef Processors (AIBP),22 it was held that Narcea was an agency that provided boners to AIBP; and the employee – although employed by Narcea – was deemed to be an employee of AIBP for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Act. The passing of the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012 brought extra protection for agency workers. Section 23(1) of that Act provides that an employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation of an employee for: ‘(a) Invoking any right conferred on him or her by this Act, (b) Having in good faith opposed by lawful means an act that is unlawful under this Act, (c) Making a complaint to a member of the Garda Siochana or the Minister that a provision of this Act has been contravened, or (d) Giving evidence in proceedings under this Act, or (e) Giving notice of his or her intention to do any of the things referred to in the preceding paragraphs.’

Section 23(2) of the Act goes on to provide that: ‘If a penalisation of an employee, in contravention of subsection (1), constitutes a dismissal of the employee within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2007, relief may not be granted to the employee in respect of that penalisation both under Schedule 2 and under those Acts.’

Employee or independent contractor? [3.07]   The tests which are applied by the WRC/Labour Court to establish the status of a claimant are based on the general legal rules which were developed by the courts to distinguish between ‘employees’ and ‘independent contractors’. The question that the WRC/Labour Court must consider is whether the employee is truly working for themselves or for someone else. The contract itself will be examined to determine whether this is the case. In O’Coindealbhain (Inspector of Taxes) v Mooney,23 the High Court, in holding that the claimant was not an employee, noted that the respondent was in business on his own account; that the profit he made was dependent on how he decided to perform the work; and that he was not obliged to provide his own work or skill – all of which were all factors that were inconsistent with a contract of service. In Readymix Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance,24 the court held that a contract of service exists if: (a) ‘A worker provides his own work or skill for payment in performing some service for the employer’; (b) ‘He agrees to be sufficiently subject to the other party’s control to make that other party his employer.’ This is sometimes known as the ‘control test’ which, while still important, has become less so;25 and (c) The other terms of the contract are consistent with it being a contract of service. 22

Bourton v Narcea and Anglo Irish Beef Processors (AIBP) UD 186/1994. O’Coindealbhain (Inspector of Taxes) v Mooney (1990) 1 IR 422. 24 Readymix Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance (1968) 2OB 497. 25 See Re The Sunday Tribune [1984] IR 50. 23

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.08] This is often known as the ‘economic test’. This aspect is the one which, in particular, has led to a widening of the test in recent years. Employees today have more perks and benefits associated with their employment than heretofore, and these will be examined to determine whether they are consistent with being an employee or otherwise. In addition to the above, the test for what constitutes an independent contractor has become the subject of significant litigation and clarity has been provided in this area in several cases. Hogan v United Beverages26 is one such case. Mr Hogan was employed as a driver for United Beverages. He transferred from being an employed driver in 1989, having agreed to a redundancy package. He then bought his own lorry and became an independent contractor for the company. In 2003 the company informed Mr Hogan that his services were no longer required. The case came before Smyth J in the Circuit Court on appeal from the EAT. Smyth J made the following observations: (a) Each case must be examined on its own particular facts. (b) Irrespective of the wording of the contract, the Court will scrutinise the way in which the contract was actually performed; and the fact that the contract describes a person as an independent contractor will not conclusively decide the issue. (c) The issue of control was potentially crucial in this case, as traditionally the power to control a worker was considered by the courts to be indicative of a contract of service rather than a contract for services. Smyth J referred, however, to the different approach taken in Henry Denny,27 in which the court went on to say that the control test ‘does not always provide satisfactory guidance’. Smyth J, in finding that the degree of direction and control exercised by the respondent in this instance was no more than would be normal in a customer-driven business, referred to the fact that the appellant had purchased his own lorry; and the accounts kept by him since 1989 were profit and loss accounts which listed expenses such as wages, printing, light, heat etc. Also in this regard, Smyth J referred to the fact that the appellant was not personally obliged to perform the work and could subcontract it if he so wished. (d) Fair procedures are not relevant where the contract for services has come to an end. Smyth J distinguished this from Tierney,28 in which the Supreme Court had to consider whether a contract for services should be construed as containing an implied term that the respondent was obliged to conduct disciplinary action provided for in the contract in accordance with fair procedures. Smyth J held that in that case, the Court considered the termination of an existing contract; whereas in Hogan, the appellant’s contract had run its full course and it was the failure to renew the contract that was in dispute.

It is clear from the above that the control test has been significantly weakened more recently, and the broader ‘business on your own account’ as outlined in Hogan and Denny is now seen as more appropriate. [3.08]  A Complainant v A Respondent29 was interesting in that it involved a sales manager. Here both parties agreed that the complainant had been employed as an independent contractor for her initial year-long period (2015–2016); but the complainant

26 27 28 29

Michael Hogan v United Beverages Sales Ltd (14 October 2005), CC. Henry Denny and Sons (Ireland) Ltd v Minister for Social Welfare [1989] IR 34, 49. Tierney v An Post [2000] 1 IR 536. A Complainant v A Respondent, ADJ-00028243 – 22 April 2021.

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[3.09]  Termination of Employment argued that this evolved into an employee/employer relationship after 2016–2020, which the respondent denied. There was no written contract between the parties. The complainant submitted monthly invoices; retained an accountant to deal with her tax affairs once she had reached and exceeded the appropriate threshold to register for value added tax (VAT); and charged VAT to the respondent. She worked predominantly remotely from her Cork base. Whereas other senior managers had to seek approval for annual leave in advance, the complainant would only inform the respondent in advance, rather than seeking approval. The complainant argued that she was integrated into the workforce by her inclusion in social work events. However, other senior managers had to undergo a formal appraisal system, including written notes being made and kept as part of the appraisal process; but no paperwork was written for the complainant’s meetings. The respondent commented that if he was taking the complainant on board as an employee as suggested by the complainant that there was nothing to be gained by not including her in the revenue returns, and that she provided her own equipment (laptop) and worked the hours she dictated to the respondent from the outset. The complainant counter-argued that she carried out a range of duties, attended social gatherings, had fixed hours of work and regularly attended scheduled meetings. The adjudication officer held that the complainant was an independent contractor. The elements mentioned above were present during her undisputed year as an independent contractor. There had been no change to the relationship since 2016, except that the respondent informed the complainant that it would no longer pay expenses, but that she would be entitled to a pay-related bonus. This is demonstrative of the fact that the control test is still utilised; but ultimately, the facts of each case must be examined to properly determine the matter. [3.09]   One case in which all the various tests were examined is Photographer v A Media Organisation.30 The complainant commenced work with the respondent in 2003 and was paid a daily rate of €260 upon submission of an invoice, with an allowance of €110 for working away from home. He was also paid for evening overtime and expenses for meals, mileage, parking and accommodation; and his phone bill was paid. When travelling, his flights and accommodation were generally paid for by the respondent. In 2009, the respondent informed the complainant that future invoices would have to be submitted through a limited company, so the complainant set up a limited company to deal with his own tax affairs. There was a consultancy agreement in place between the respondent and the complainant’s limited company which stated that the relationship between the consultant (limited company XYZ) and the respondent was that of a contract for services. It was an express term of the agreement that the complainant was free to work for others; but because the complainant worked Monday to Friday and every second Sunday for the respondent, he never did. The respondent had no knowledge of the complainant’s arrangement with Revenue, but payment was made by the respondent

30

Photographer v A Media Organisation, ADJ 00027251 – 2 March 2021.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.10] to limited company XYZ on foot of its invoices. In examining the various tests in this area, the following was held: (a) Mutuality of obligation did not exist. The consultancy agreement was a commercial contract between the respondent and the limited company. (b) The complainant failed the control test. He received direction from the photographic editor about what stories and events were to be covered, but how he actually carried out the assignments was a matter of his skill. The complainant was not required to attend the respondent’s premises and had no assigned workspace, but he did attend regularly. (c) The complainant also failed the integration test. Under the consultancy agreement, the complainant was free to carry out other work. Photographs were part of the publications produced by the respondent and it obtained those photographs from several sources. Therefore, it could not be said that the complainant’s work was integral. (d) Again, the complainant failed the entrepreneurial test. The complainant had not been issued with a staff number or identity/access card and was not on the respondent’s payroll; and no employee records were maintained by the respondent. Payments for services and photographs were made on foot of invoices from the limited company. The complainant used his own camera equipment, but occasionally used a drone supplied by the respondent, which had paid for the complainant to attend a drone safety course. Email correspondence was sent to the complainant’s company email and not a personal address. The respondent did not grant parental leave. Paid invoices for sick leave did not actually indicate that they were for sick leave. The adjudication officer did note that while contractual documentation that is inconsistent with the day-to-day reality of the working relationship cannot determine the employment status, such documents need careful consideration. (e) Lastly, the adjudication officer noted that while it is well established that a complainant’s tax status may not be the determining factor in deciding whether an employer/employee relationship exists, the statement of loss submitted by the complainant indicated that the complainant was paid a fixed amount each year from the limited company he set up in 2010. In all the circumstances, his case failed. This case is interesting as it shows that the WRC/Labour Court will examine each case on its own merits, but will assess the veracity of the claim against each of the various tests. [3.10]   It does seem that whatever the case might be for private sector employers, it will be extremely hard for public sector employees. Thus, in An Employee v A Government Department,31 the complainant – who was a supervisor – had worked with the respondent for 26 years but did not have a permanent contract of employment. Everything – including the computer system and manuals – was provided by the respondent. It was held that the complainant was not in business on her own 31

An Employee v A Government Department, ADJ-00018309 – 30 October 2019.

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[3.11]  Termination of Employment account; that she was paid a salary determined by the respondent; and that there was no opportunity to make a profit. All of her working conditions were determined by the respondent; the respondent monitored everything that she did on its IT systems; the system was controlled by the respondent; and the complainant was given a password by the respondent to assess the system. Accordingly, it was held that she was an employee. Additionally, in respect of whether an employee is an independent contractor, regard must be had to the Code of Practice for Determining Employment Status.32 This code of practice was first prepared in 2001 by the Employment Status Group set up under the National Agreement – Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, due to concern among the social partners – in particular, the trade union movement – that increasing numbers of workers may be categorised as self-employed when it would be more appropriate for them to have employee status. Due to similar concerns being voiced, particularly in relation to new forms of work, the Code was updated further in 2021 by an interdepartmental working group comprising the Department of Social Protection, the Office of the Revenue Commissioner and the WRC. The aim of the Code is to be of benefit to ‘employers, employees, independent contractors and legal, financial and HR professionals’. It is also aimed at investigators, decision makers and adjudication officers in the Department of Social Protection, the Office of the Revenue Commissioners, the WRC, their respective appeals bodies and the courts. [3.11]   The Code sets out33 the typical characteristics of an employee as someone who: (a) is under the control of another person who directs them as to how, when and where the work is to be carried out; (b) supplies labour only; (c) receives a fixed hourly/weekly/monthly wage; (d) cannot subcontract the work; (e) does not supply materials for the job; (f) does not provide equipment other than the small tools of the trade; (g) is not exposed to personal financial risk in carrying out the work; (h) does not assume any responsibility for investment or management in the business; (i) does not have the opportunity to profit from sound management in the scheduling of engagements or in the performance of tasks arising from the engagements; (j) works set hours or a given number of hours per week or month; (k) works for one person or for one business; (l) receives expense payments to cover subsistence and/or travel expenses; (m) is entitled to sick pay or extra pay for overtime; (n) is obliged to perform work on a regular basis that the employer is obliged to offer to them (this is known as ‘mutuality of obligation’); and (o) has their tax deducted from their wages through the Pay as You Earn (PAYE) system.

32 33

Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status, July 2021. See Section 3 of the Code.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.11] The Code then sets out the typical characteristics of a self-employed person as someone who: (a) owns their own business; (a) is exposed to financial risk by having to bear the cost of making good faulty or substandard work carried out under the contract; (b) assumes responsibility for the investment and management of the enterprise; (c) has the opportunity to profit from sound management in the scheduling and performance of engagements and tasks; (d) has control over what is done, how it is done, when and where it is done and whether they do it personally; (e) is free to hire other people, on their terms, to do the work which has been agreed to be undertaken; (f) can provide the same services to more than one person or business at the same time; (g) provides the materials for the job; (h) provides equipment and machinery necessary for the job, other than the small tools of the trade or equipment which, in an overall context, would not be an indicator of a person in business on their own account; (i) has a fixed place of business where materials, equipment etc can be stored; (j) costs and agrees a price for the job; (k) provides their own insurance cover (eg, public liability cover); (l) controls the hours of work in fulfilling the job obligations; (m) is not obliged to take on specific work offered to them; and (n) is registered for self-assessment tax returns or VAT. Against each of the above, the Code sets out ‘important caveats’ which have to be read in conjunction. This means that even if a person seems to meet all of these criteria, the fact is that every case must be assessed on its own merits and examined in detail. Ultimately, the Code sets out34 the key factors of ‘legal tests’ that have to be considered when deciding whether a worker is an employee or is self-employed. It identifies five main factors: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

mutuality of obligation; substitution; the enterprise test; integration; and control.

The Code goes on to state that none of these factors is determinative on its own; rather, it is necessary to take all of them into account and weigh them up in a rounded way when deciding on the correct employment status of a worker.

34

See Section 7 of the Code.

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[3.12]  Termination of Employment Section 8 of the Code sets out a description of the key factors as follows, and Appendix II provides a more detailed description of the key factors: Key factor

Description

Mutuality of obligation

Whether and to what extent there is an obligation on one party to provide work and on the other party to accept it.

Substitution

Whether and to what extent the worker is allowed to send a substitute in the event that they are unable to do the work themselves and, if applicable, who engages and pays the substitute.

The enterprise test

Whether and to what extent the person who has been engaged to carry out the work is doing so as a person in business on their own account, and has the ability to profit from their own efficiency/entrepreneurial skill or, conversely, runs the risk of suffering a financial loss.

Integration

Whether and to what extent a worker has become an integral part of a business, as opposed to carrying out work that, although done for the business, is peripheral or accessory to it.

Control

Whether and to what extent the person or business paying for the work has control over the worker, including the power to decide what work should be done, as well as when, how and where it should be done.

WRC, Revenue and Scope Section decisions [3.12]   According to the Code, ‘Decisions of Scope Section or the WRC or Revenue are not binding on each other.’35 In other words, the WRC may find that the status of a person is different for the purposes of statutory legislation as distinct from the Scope Section which determines a worker’s taxable status. In A GP v A Public Body,36 the adjudication officer stated: ‘As things stand, the Revenue Commissioners, the Scope section of the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection and the Workplace Relations Commission have their own jurisdiction to determine whether a person is an employee. Where one body has determined this question per their jurisdiction, this is “persuasive authority”. If another body reaches a different conclusion on the employment status question, it must “explain the basis on which they come to a conclusion which differs” from the first determination.’37

Gig economy [3.13]   This modern phenomenon usually involves mobile apps and online platforms that connect labour supply with customer and employer demand in various service industries. Notable examples include ride-hailing apps and food delivery apps. 35 36 37

Section 6 of the Code. A GP v A Public Body ADJ-00010315, 9 May 2019. See also National Museum of Ireland v Minister for Social Protection [2016] IEHC 135.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.14] The explosion of the sector has seen increased focus from legislatures and regulators. In Ireland, the Revenue Commissioners have been quite open that they have had a particular focus on ‘false self-employment’ for several years now.38 The status of this type of worker was addressed in Karshan (Midlands) Limited t/a as Domino’s Pizza v Revenue Commissioners.39   In 2014, the Revenue Commissioners determined that pizza delivery drivers engaged by Domino’s as independent contractors were in fact working as employees, and as a result Domino’s was deemed liable for PAYE and Pay-Related Social Insurance (PRSI) contributions in respect of those drivers. Domino’s considered its drivers as independent contractors based on the contract terms, which included payment per delivery and for promotional activities. The drivers were required to own their vehicles, had no specific schedule or roster, and were responsible for submitting their invoices and keeping records. Although they were allowed to engage substitutes, this was not mandatory; and the only obligation in case of unavailability was to inform Domino’s. The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Domino’s, finding that there was no requirement for ongoing obligations to fulfil the mutuality of obligation for an employment contract. The judge noted that the contract did not obligate drivers to be available for work, and that the lack of any sanction for not attending a shift was indicative of a self-employed arrangement. The Court was critical of the Appeal Commissioner’s previous findings that the requirement for mutuality of obligation was satisfied at the time when the specific shifts were agreed between the parties. The Court of Appeal found that mutuality of obligation is a more onerous commitment; and that simply working specific shifts on a particular rota, without any ongoing obligation, does not fulfil the legal requirement for an enforceable obligation to provide and perform work in an employment relationship. Casual workers [3.14]   The law in this area is complex. Under common law, there has to be mutuality of obligation for an employment relationship to exist – that is, the employer must have an obligation to provide work and the worker must have an obligation to carry it out. What may start out as a casual working relationship with no mutuality of obligation may evolve into a formal employee/employer relationship over time. This may arise where there is a clear pattern of work; where there is a limited pool of people to choose from; where there are repercussions when the employee refuses work; or where the employee is entitled to staff benefits such as sick pay or is subject to the employer’s policies and procedures.

38 See 39

The Future of the Gig Economy: Karshan v Revenue Commissioners, Kevin Bell BL, 27 June 2022. Karshan (Midlands) Limited t/a as Domino’s Pizza v Revenue Commissioners, High Court 2019/31R, Court of Appeal [2022] IECA 124.

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[3.15]  Termination of Employment Employers must also be careful not to let a casual working arrangement where there is not mutuality of obligation transform into a full-time position, as happened in An Industrial Cleaner v An Industrial Cleaning Company.40 Here the complainants contract of employment stipulated that he was employed ‘on a casual basis’. Despite this, the claimant was rostered to work a 40-hour week every week and regularly worked overtime as part of his normal duties. In addition, despite the casual provision set out in his contract, the claimant was contractually bound not to engage in any other form of work without the express permission of the respondent. In the course of his employment, the claimant travelled to care for his parents and was unavailable to attend work. He informed the respondent some 17 days later that he would be available for work again; but the respondent informed this that there was no longer a role available. It was held that the claimant’s working pattern indicated a full-time continuing employment relationship. ‘Unwittingly or not the Respondent had allowed for the casual type of arrangement to transform into a full time permanent one.’ The respondent did not say to the complainant that there were no hours or work available, but instead that it had no ‘position’ and should ‘any suitable vacancies’ arise in the future it would keep the claimant in mind. This effectively dismissed the claimant. The dismissal was deemed unfair because no grounds were given to justify it. Casual workers are specifically dealt with under the Protection of Employees (PartTime Work) Act 2001. Before deciding that a worker has automatic protection under the Unfair Dismissals or Part-Time Work Act, determine first whether there is mutuality of obligation or alternatively whether they are ‘employed under a contract of employment’, in which case the Act applies in any event. Banded working hours [3.15]   Employers should be mindful of the fact that where a contract of employment does not accurately reflect the average hours per week that an employee actually works over a 12-month period, they are entitled to a banded contract, which gives them the right to work an average of the hours in a specified bank for 12 months. There are eight bands covering a certain number of hours per week.41 Fixed-term workers [3.16]   Dismissal of an employee by reason only of the expiry of a fixed-term or specified purpose contract will not be unfair provided that the contract is in writing, is signed by both parties and contains a clause to the effect that the terms of the Unfair

40 41

An Industrial Cleaner v An Industrial Cleaning Company, ADJ-00010547, 14 August 2018. Section 18A of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, as inserted by s 16 of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018, SI 69/2019.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.17] Dismissals Acts 1977–2015 do not apply to it. Therefore, the Act does not apply once three conditions are met: (a) the fixed-term contract is in writing; (b) it is signed by both parties; and (c) the contract contains a specific cause stating that the Act shall not apply to a dismissal consisting only of the expiry of the fixed term. An important word here is ‘only’ – that is, the dismissal must be as a result only of the expiry of the fixed term. Thus, in Nwosu v Banta Global Turnkey,42 even though the fixed-term contract was in compliance with s 2 of the Act and came to an end at its natural time, the EAT, in holding for the claimant determined that the reason the contract terminated was not due to its expiry but rather other reasons: the claimant had been ‘in trouble’ with the employer before and had made an appeal to the Rights Commissioner. An interesting issue which was raised in O’Cuinnegain v Guardian Angels National School43 was whether the Employment Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case where the clause containing the ‘waiver’, in accordance with s 2(2)(b) of the Act, was provided some time after the contract was agreed. The EAT held that: ‘The Claimant submits that to have any effect the waiver “must” be in place “when the contract is entered into”. This is not stated in the Act. The Claimant refers to Redmond’s Dismissal Law in Ireland, however Dr Redmond does not state that the waiver “must be in place when the contract is entered into”. She in fact states that the conditions “should” be satisfied “at the time the contract is made”. Clearly there is no requirement at law that a written contract be in place at the time of commencement of the term of the contract of employment.44 Dr Redmond in her discussion on the waiver clearly states that “any provisions excluding employment rights will be strictly construed”. Section 2(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, as amended, clearly applies to the instant case in that the three criteria established therein are met.’

Bear in mind that to pursue a case under the Fixed Term Workers Act, the person has to actually be a fixed-term worker. Thus, in Priscilla Betuyaku v Canbe Hospitality,45 it was held that because the complainant was at all times on a permanent contract of indefinite duration, she had no claim under the Act.

The contract must be enforceable [3.17]   The next issue that will fall to be considered is whether the contract is enforceable. In general, illegal contracts are unenforceable at law46 (see 3.04). As such, 42

Nwosu v Banta Global Turnkey UD 10/2008. O’Cuinnegain v Guardian Angels National School UD 1008/2006. 44 The law in this area changed with the passing of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, as amended by the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018, which provides that an employer must notify each new employee in writing within five days of commencement of employment of the core terms. 45 Priscilla Betuyaku v Canbe Hospitality ADJ-00031937 CA-00042473-003;. 46 See Hayden v Sean Quinn Properties Ltd [1994] ELR 45 and Lewis v Squash Ireland Ltd [1983] ILRM 363. 43

75

[3.17]  Termination of Employment contracts which are tainted by illegality cannot generally be relied upon to support an unfair dismissal claim. This position, however, was altered by s 7(d) of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993, which provides that an unfairly dismissed claimant shall be entitled to redress under the Unfair Dismissal Acts even if the evidence shows that a term or condition of the contract of employment contravenes the Income Tax or Social Welfare Acts. The 1993 Act introduced two new paragraphs into s 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Section 8(11) provides: ‘Where … a term or condition on the contract of employment concerned contravened any provision of or made under the Income Tax Acts or the [Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005], the employee shall, notwithstanding the contravention, be entitled to redress under this Act in respect of the dismissal.’

It is important to bear in mind that all this paragraph does is allow a person access to redress. This section does not address the effect that illegality has on the contract of employment. Section 8(12) makes it mandatory for the WRC and the Labour Court to refer the matter to the Revenue Commissioners or the Department of Social Protection where it is shown that a term or condition of a contract of employment contravened the Acts.47 Just because a contract is illegal does not necessarily mean that an employee cannot pursue a claim for unfair dismissal, unless the employee actively participated in that illegality, as occurred in A Health and Safety Director v A Company48. Here the employee had an arrangement with her then employer whereby she received part of her wages off the books without the deduction of income tax (she was paid €70,000 and also received €15,000 ‘towards the use of a car, a phone, diesel card, laptop and easy pass car tag’). The adjudication officer held that because of her involvement in the process, the contract was tainted with illegality and refused to entertain the complaint. In this case the adjudication officer quoted the decision in Hayden v Sean Quinn Properties Limited,49 where Baron J set out the position as follows; ‘the defendant is clearly in breach of contract in that the plaintiff’s dismissal was wrongful. However the contract itself was an illegal one. It contained a term designed to lessen the defendant’s liability at the expense of the Revenue, something with which the plaintiff concurred. In Napier v National Business Agency Limited [1951] 2 All ER 264 the facts were almost identical. Part of the plaintiff’s salary purported to be in respect of expenses, which at the best were only minimal. The plaintiff had claimed to have been dismissed wrongfully. He sued for damages. His claim was dismissed upon the grounds that the contract was unlawful and so enforceable. Sir Raymond Evershed said at page 26 it must surely be that, by making an agreement in that form the parties to it were doing that which they must be taken to know would be liable to defeat proper claims of the Inland Revenue and to avoid altogether, or at least postpone, the proper payment of income tax. If that is the right conclusion, it seems to me equally clear … that the agreement must be regarded as contrary to public policy.

47 48 49

Section 8 (12) as Substituted by s 80(1)(g)(v), (viii) and (xii) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, SI 410/ 2015, subject to transitional provisions in subss (1A) and (2). A Health and Safety Director v A Company ADJ-00015311, 12 March 2019. Hayden v Sean Quinn Properties Limited [1994] ELR 45.

76

Unfair Dismissal  [3.18] There is a strong legal obligation placed on all citizens to make true and faithful returns for tax purposes, and, if parties make an agreement which is designed to do the contrary, i.e. to mislead and to delay, it seems to me impossible for this court to enforce that contract at the suit of one party to it.’

The judge then usefully went on to consider whether the fraudulent part of the agreement could be severed and held that it could not. However, a contract which is neither entered into for an illegal purpose nor prohibited by statute can still be enforced unless the employee actively participated in it. The decision in Hall v Woolston Hall Leisure Limited50 was adopted in this jurisdiction by Laffoy J in Re Red Sail Frozen Foods Ltd.51 [3.18]  In PMC Painting Contractors Limited v Ms Patrycja Kwidzinska,52 the respondent submitted that the contract of employment of the appellant was tainted with illegality, and that this made the contract unenforceable. The Court decided to hear the parties in relation to this matter as a preliminary matter. The respondent contended that the appellant was engaged in a fraud upon the Department of Social Welfare and Revenue at times material to the complaint before the Court. The appellant, at a material time, was in receipt of maternity benefit payments from the Department of Social Protection and wages from the respondent, albeit in cash. In its decision finding against the respondent, the Labour Court noted the following: ‘The Court was not provided with detail of the element or elements of the Social Welfare or Revenue codes / regulations / legislation which was or were contended to have been breached. For example, a primary element of the alleged breach of the Revenue code is the assertion by the Respondent that the Appellant was paid in cash.  The Court has not been provided with evidence or clarity as to how receipt by a worker of wages in cash constitutes a breach of any code of the Revenue. Neither has any submission been made to set out where responsibility lies for relevant taxation and related matters and whether the employer in the appeal discharged any such responsibility resting upon it. Similarly, no submission has been made that either the Respondent or the Appellant has been found by either the Department of Social Welfare or the Revenue Commissioners to have breached the Social Welfare or Revenue codes / regulations / legislation at any material time. The Appellant has not disputed that she may have been in breach of social welfare regulations but she has contended, including in oral evidence, that any such breach was not intended by her or known to her and, should it have occurred at any time, resulted from pressure from the Respondent. She has asserted, including in oral evidence, that she had no knowledge of any possible fraud on the Revenue. She submitted, including in oral evidence to the Court, that she had no knowledge of an illegality in the operation or content of her contract of employment at any material time.

50 51 52

Hall v Woolston Hall Leisure Limited [2001] WLR 225 at p 226. Re Red Sail Frozen Foods Ltd [2006] IEHC 328. PMC Painting Contractors Limited v Ms Patrycja Kwidzinska, TED2123; DWT224 DWT2120; DWT223 DWT 221; DWT222, 10 January 2022.

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[3.19]  Termination of Employment In the view of the Court, it is for the party seeking to rely on inherent illegality in a contract of employment or illegality in the performance of an otherwise lawful contract to prove the existence of the illegality and indeed the knowledge of the worker of that illegality and his or her active participation in such illegality.  This Court is not at large to determine by reference to unspecified elements of the Social Welfare or Revenue Codes / regulations / legislation to make determinations as regards illegality in the performance or nature of the Appellant’s contract of employment or indeed to determine liability in respect of any such illegality or breach.’

Continuous service [3.19]   With some exceptions, employees must have 52 weeks’ continuous service with their employer before they can claim unfair dismissal.53 ‘Continuous service’ for the purposes of the unfair dismissals legislation is defined in a number of different laws. Section 2(4) of the 1977 Act provides that: ‘the First Schedule to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 as amended by section 20 of this Act shall apply for the purpose of ascertaining for the purposes of this Act the period of service of an employee and whether that service has been continuous.’

The First Schedule to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2001 therefore contains most of the rules for determining continuity of service. It provides that service is continuous unless an employee is dismissed by their employer or voluntarily leaves their employment. It also provides that continuity is not broken by: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

sickness; strikes or lockouts; layoffs; the dismissal of an employee followed by their immediate re-employment; the dismissal of an employee followed by their re-employment within 26 weeks, if the dismissal was wholly or partly for, or was connected with, the purpose of avoidance of liability under the Act.54 It will be difficult for employers to avoid liability under the Act if the original contract was for a period of greater than 52 weeks or was a general contract of indefinite duration; or (f) the transfer of a business from one person to another, unless the employee received and retained a redundancy payment from the transferor at the time and by reason of the transfer.55 If the employee hands back the redundancy payment, then continuity will be broken.

53

54 55

Section 2(1)(a) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended. See Sarkatzix Herrero v Institiuto Madrileno de las Salud [2006] IRLR 298; continuity for seniority and other contractual purposes runs from the date on which the employee is hired rather than the date on which they take up their duties. Section 2(5) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as inserted by Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993, s 3(c). Schedule 1 of the Minimum Notice Acts 1973–2001, as amended by s 15 of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.19] The Redundancy Payments Acts, the Maternity Protection Act 1994 and the Adoptive Leave Acts 1995 and 2005 also provide that continuity is not broken by: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

service in the reserve defence forces of the State;56 a period of adoptive leave;57 a period of protective leave or natal care, or for breastfeeding;58 a period parental leave or force majeure leave;59 or a period of carer’s leave within the meaning of the Carer’s Leave Act 2001.60

The question of continuous service in respect of an agency worker transitioning to the end user on a full-time basis was addressed in the unique case of A Complainant v A Respondent.61 In this case, the complainant worked for the respondent from 15 November 2018 until 9 June 2019 as an agency worker, after which the complainant left the agency and commenced working for the respondent full time until 10 January 2020, at which time her employment was terminated. The respondent argued that the separate periods of employment could not be considered continuous and relied upon the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, which states that all periods of employment are to be considered continuous unless broken by dismissal or resignation. It argued that in this instance, the complainant had resigned from her agency role in order to take up the full-time role with the respondent. As such, she did not have the requisite service of one year to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal. In response, the complainant relied upon the Unfair Dismissals Amendment Act, 1993 – specifically s 13, which provides that ‘the individual shall be deemed to be an employee employed by the third person under a contract of employment’. Therefore, her service was not broken, as she remained an employee of the respondent; there was only a change in status. This meant that she had more than one year’s service, In his decision, the adjudication officer noted that the role conducted as an agency worker and as a full-time worker was no different, and that the legislative provisions relied on by either party gave no definitive answer as to the particular circumstances of the case. The adjudication officer noted that the complainant had left the agency voluntarily but had not stopped working for the employer, and as such concluded that there was no break in service and deemed the service to be continuous. This decision should be confined to its unique facts. The adjudication officer failed to set out in law the basis for the finding, particularly where the 1973 Act is clear as to when a break of service occurs (ie, voluntary resignation) and does not provide for qualification of this right where the employee is subsequently re-engaged by the end user in a full-time capacity.

56 57 58 59 60 61

Sch 3, para 5(iv) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Sch 3, para 5(b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as substituted by s 28 of the Adoptive Leave Act 1995 (as substituted by s 20 of the Adoptive Leave Act 2005). Sch 3, para 5(c) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as substituted by s 24 of the Maternity Protection (Amendment) Act 2004. Section 16(c) of the Parental Leave Act 1998. Section 15(c) of the Carers Leave Act, 2001. A Complainant v A Respondent ADJ-00026835.

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[3.20]  Termination of Employment Exceptions to the 52-week rule [3.20]   It is well settled that an employee who does not have one year’s continuous service cannot fall within the scope of the Act. If, however, an employee is dismissed by reason of pregnancy and has less than one year’s service, she can choose to pursue a claim under either the unfair dismissals legislation or the equality legislation62 (but not both). In the former case, the burden of proof shifts to the employee to prove that she was dismissed by reason of her pregnancy. (However, if she is incapable of performing her job, the burden of proof rests with the employer.) There are thus significant exceptions to the rule that dismissed employees are precluded from bringing a claim if they have less than one year’s continuous service with the employer who dismissed them, exceptions include: (a) employees dismissed for trade union membership or activity (s 14 of the 1993 Amendment Act); (b) employees dismissed for pregnancy or matters connected therewith;63 (c) employees dismissed for exercising their rights to adoptive leave;64 (d) employees dismissed for exercising their rights to parental or force majeure leave;65 (e) employees dismissed for exercising their rights under the National Minimum Wage Act 2000;66 (f) employees dismissed for exercising their rights under the Carer’s Leave Act;67 or (g) employees dismissed for exercising their rights under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014.68 It used to be considered that those employees pursuing cases under s 27 of the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2005 also had an exception to the one-year rule; but this was settled by the High Court in Sharma & Anor v Employment Appeals Tribunal.69 The claimants alleged that they had been penalised and dismissed within the meaning of s 27 of the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2005. The issue was whether one year’s continuous service was necessary in order to bring a claim of penalisation under the Unfair Dismissal Acts. The Court said that it could not read into the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977 a specific provision lifting the service requirement in circumstances where the 2005 Act was silent on this point. It was up to the legislature to do this. Accordingly, the Court held that the one-year rule applies to penalisation claims under the health and

62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69

Under s 101(4A) of the Employment Equality Act 1988, as amended by s 1 of the Credit Guarantee (Amendment) Act 2016, an employee cannot run both an unfair and discriminatory dismissal case and must choose which to pursue. If they don’t choose, the case will be deemed to have been withdrawn from the relevant date, which is such a date as may be prescribed. Section 6(2A) as inserted by s38(5) of the Maternity Protection Act 1994. Section 25 of the Adoptive Leave Act 1995. Section 6(2B) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended by s 25(2) of the Parental Leave Act 1998. Section 36(2) of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000. Section 6(B) of the Unfair Dismissals Act as inserted by s 27(2) of the Carers Leave Act 2001. Section 6(2D) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Sharma & Anor v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2010] IEHC 178.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.22] safety legislation alleging unfair dismissal. Hedigan J noted in Sharma that there is no service requirement limit on presenting complaints to a rights commissioner under s 28(1) of the 2005 Act. It should further be noted that there is no service requirement in respect of claims taken under s 3(2B) of the Pensions Act 1990. Employers should be particularly mindful of this rule, as the Labour Court will tend to exercise its discretion ‘to the full’ when it comes to claims made by employees in this regard. A case in point is Mulholland v Currabeg Developments Limited.70 Here the claimant was dismissed by the respondent less than two weeks after he had submitted a union membership form to the respondent. The claimant had been employed by the respondent as a scaffolder for just over three months when he was dismissed. While the respondent’s site manager gave evidence that the claimant had been dismissed because there was no more work for him, the EAT stated that the onus was on the respondent to show that the dismissal was fair in all the circumstances. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the EAT held that the respondent did not have a union-tolerant workplace and awarded the claimant €20,000, which was significantly reduced because he had failed to mitigate his loss. How continuity of service is broken [3.21]   Continuity of service is broken by the employee either being dismissed or voluntarily leaving their employment. If an employee receives a redundancy lump-sum payment, their continuity of employment is broken (unless redress by way of reinstatement or re-engagement under the Unfair Dismissals Act has been ordered).71 However, if an employee is dismissed for redundancy before attaining 104 weeks’ continuous service and resumes employment with the same employer within 26 weeks, such employment will be treated as continuous.72 Also, the Unfair Dismissals Act provides that the dismissal of an employee followed by their re-employment by the same employer within 26 weeks will not break their continuity of service if the dismissal was connected with the avoidance of liability under the Act.73 Part-time employees are protected in the same way as full-time employees, as provided for in the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001. (See further discussion in Ch 2).

Six-month/12-month time limit [3.22]   To be valid, a claim must be brought before the WRC within six months of the date of dismissal. The Act provides that this time limit may be extended up

70 71 72 73

Mulholland v Currabeg Developments Limited MN 729/2006 & UD 1105/2006. First Schedule, s 5 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 5(A) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 19(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Section 2(5) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as inserted by s  3(c) of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993.

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[3.22]  Termination of Employment to 12 months from the date of dismissal as long as the WRC is satisfied that there was ‘reasonable cause’ preventing service of the claim within the first six months of the date of dismissal.74 The test to extend the time limit prior to the passing of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 used to be one of ‘exceptional circumstances’, which is a much higher bar than ‘reasonable cause’. Notwithstanding the fact that ‘reasonable cause’ is a much lower bar for complainants to cross than ‘exceptional circumstances’, the Labour Court has ruled that even where a complainant proves ‘reasonable cause’, it should still consider whether in the circumstances it is correct to grant an extension.75 Section 42(8) of the Workplace Relations Acts 2015 (as amended) provides as follows: ‘An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.’

In other words, an adjudication officer may permit the hearing of a complaint if it is submitted within 12 months of the dismissal and reasonable cause exists. The test to be applied in extension of time applications under the Acts is that formulated by the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Michael Moriarity (otherwise referred to as the ‘explain and excuse’ test. Here the Court held: ‘It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time. The length of the delay should be taken into account. A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons. Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time. Here the Court should consider if the respondent has suffered prejudice by the delay and should also consider if the claimant has a good arguable case.’

Subsequently, in Salesforce.com v Leech,76 the Labour Court noted the following: ‘It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the applicant for an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay. 74

Section 8(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as inserted by s 7 of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993. 75 See Cementation Skanska v Moriarityl DWT0340 October 28 2003. 76 Salesforce.com v Leech EDA1615.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.24] Secondly, the onus is on the applicant to establish a causal connection between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time. Thirdly, the Court must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented the complaint in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Hence, if the factors relied upon to explain the delay ceased to operate before the complaint was presented, that may undermine a claim that those factors were the actual cause of the delay.’

Often failure for to demonstrate reasonable cause is by reason of ‘ignorance of the person’s legal rights, as opposed to the facts giving rise to the complaint’.77 In other words, where facts are the operative reason for delay (as distinct from an applicant sitting on their hands in full knowledge of the circumstances and nature of dismissal), an application seeking extension should be granted. The behaviour of the employer will also be considered. Thus, in Johnathan Owen v Homedel Trans Direct Limited,78 where the employer had actively discouraged the complainant from taking a claim and actually threatened him if he were to take a claim, and where the date of dismissal was unclear, the adjudication officer had no qualms in extending the time period. Extension by application to or leave of the WRC [3.23]   Section 39 of the Organisation of Working Time Act allows a ‘relevant ­authority’ – which includes the WRC and the Labour Court – to amend any application for unfair dismissal if the name of the employer on the application is incorrect (see 1.22).

The complainant must have been dismissed [3.24]   It may appear obvious, but before the WRC can examine the fairness or unfairness of a dismissal, the complainant must first prove that they were in fact dismissed. ‘Dismissal’ is defined in Section 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to mean: a. b.

c.

77 78

the termination by his employer of the employee’s contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee; the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether notice of termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been unreasonable for the employee to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer or; the expiration of a contract of employment for a fixed term without it being renewed under the same contract or in a contract for a specified purpose (being a purpose of such kind that the duration of the contract was limited but was, at the time of its making, incapable of precise ascertainment), the cesser of the purpose.

A Housekeeper v An Employer ADJ-00021037. Johnathan Owen v Hemedel Trans Direct Limited ADJ-00029355, 23 August 2012.

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[3.25]  Termination of Employment This list is exhaustive; therefore, dismissal can only occur within one of the three parameters set out above. In general, an employee is dismissed when the employer informs them clearly (regardless of notice) that their contract has been terminated, where the employee terminates it themselves or where a fixed-term contract expired. This is thus very much an objective test. In Devaney v DNT Distribution Company Limited,79 the EAT held that: ‘where words are genuinely ambiguous, what needs to be decided is what the speaker intended. Did the employer mean to bring the contract to an end? In answering this question, what needs to be considered is how a reasonable employee in all the circumstances would have understood the employer’s intention. We find, having regard to the relationship that existed between the parties prior to the termination and the claimant’s evidence that Mr. Tighe often expressed his feelings in very strong language, that the words uttered by Mr. Tighe in an angry mood, did not amount to a dismissal and were never intended as such.’80

In A General Operative v A Construction Company,81 a dispute arose regarding the termination of the complainant’s employment. The complainant alleged that he had been unfairly dismissed following an altercation with one of the directors of the construction company where he was employed. According to the complainant, he felt undermined by a new colleague and reacted by verbally abusing him. The director then spoke with the complainant and the complainant alleged that he was advised to find employment elsewhere. The complainant left the site and did not return. The respondent argued that the complainant was not dismissed but rather resigned because he had secured another job. The respondent further claimed that the complainant had again abused the director, who told him to leave the site and calm down. The respondent relied on an interaction between the complainant and the director’s brother several days later, in which the complainant said that he was not taking orders from ‘a blow-in’ and asked for his dues and paperwork. The director confirmed that he had heard that the complainant had secured a new job. In her decision, the adjudication officer preferred the evidence of the respondent and noted that if the complainant had returned the next day and modified his behaviour, his employment would have continued. The complainant provided no evidence that he had been told not to come back; and the director’s reaction and statement were not sufficient to represent an intention to dismiss. The adjudication officer considered it noteworthy that the complainant had not lodged his WRC complaint until five months after the dismissal, suggesting that he may not have been entirely convinced that he had been dismissed. Resignation [3.25]   Generally, where there are doubts as to whether the employee resigned or not, the benefit of the doubt will be given to the employee. In Kean v Western Health Board,82 79 80 81 82

Devaney v DNT Distribution Company Limited UD 412/993. See also Wallace-Hayes v Skolars Hairdressing School Limited (1991) ELR 108. A General Operative v A Construction Company ADJ-00016771, 21 June 2019. Kean v Western Health Board UD 940/1988.

84

Unfair Dismissal  [3.25] the claimant resigned but attempted to invoke the grievance procedure during her notice period. The Health Service Executive (HSE) had a blanket policy never to reconsider a letter of resignation. The EAT held that this was entirely unreasonable. It is therefore clear that if a complainant considers matters and decides to withdraw or revoke their resignation, there is an obligation on the employer to determine whether such circumstances exist that would confirm whether the resignation by the employee was absolutely intended. In these cases, the employer is obliged to investigate the facts to see whether a reasonable employer in such circumstances would have determined that there was an intention to resign.83 Similarly, in Geraghty v Industrial Credit Corporation,84 the EAT concluded on the evidence that the respondent did not regard the claimant’s resignation at the relevant time as a ‘real resignation’. If an employee resigns in the heat of the moment, the WRC, following in the footsteps of the EAT generally recognises that this may not give rise to a termination of employment. Thus, in Cafferkey v Metrotech Services Limited,85 the EAT held that in the case of an immature employee or a decision taken ‘in the heat of the moment’, ‘idle words [may be] used under emotional stress which the employer knew or ought to have known were not meant to be taken seriously’. There is a duty on employers to take into account the special circumstances of the employee. In Kwik-Fit (GB) Limited v Linehan,86 the following passage is instructive: ‘If words of resignation are unambiguous then prima facie an employer is entitled to treat them as such, but in the field of employment, personalities constitute an important consideration. Words may be spoken or actions expressed in temper or in the heat of the moment or under extreme pressure (being jostled into a decision) and indeed the intellectual makeup of the individual may be relevant (see Barclay [1983] IRLR 313). These we refer to as “special circumstances”. Where special circumstances arise it may be unreasonable for an employer to assume a resignation and to accept it forthwith. A reasonable period of time should be allowed to lapse and if circumstances arise during that period which put the employer on notice that further enquiry is desirable to see whether the resignation was really intended and can properly be assumed, then such enquiry is ignored at the employer’s risk. He runs the risk that ultimately evidence may be forthcoming which indicates that in the “special circumstances” the intention to resign was not the correct interpretation when the facts are judged objectively.’87

In Martin v Yeoman Aggregates Ltd,88 the following finding of the EAT was recited: ‘It is a matter of plain common sense, vital to industrial relations, that either an employer or an employee, should be given an opportunity of recanting from words spoken in the heat of the moment. It could not be accepted, as argued by the appellant, that once clear and unambiguous words are used the contract irreversibly comes to an end so that second thoughts make no difference.’

83 See 84 85 86 87 88

Kwik-Fit-(GB) Limited v Lineham [1992] IR LR 156. Geraghty v Industrial Credit Corporation UD 396/1989. Cafferkey v Metrotech Services Limited UD 932/1998. Kwik-Fit-(GB) Limited v Lineham [1992] IR LR 156 at para 73. Kwik-Fit-(GB) Limited v Lineham [1992] IR LR 156 at para 31. Martin v Yeoman Aggregates Ltd [1983] IRLR 48.

85

[3.26]  Termination of Employment In A Kitchen Designer v An Interior Design Company,89 the complainant was promoted to the role of kitchen designer and sales manager. The complainant claimed that she had been unfairly dismissed on 10 November 2016 during a meeting with a director of the respondent. The respondent disputed this and the claim of dismissal, stating that the complainant had resigned her position during a meeting on 10 November 2016. The respondent claimed that the complainant had resigned upon discovering that the respondent was aware of her illness and personal issues, and therefore wished to leave the business. In evidence, it arose that the complainant had sent a text message to the director querying why she had been informing work colleagues that the complainant had left the business, noting that she loved her job and that she was unwell. She asked for the director to clarify if she had been let go, to which the director stated in a message: ‘I thought you were leaving.’ In reaching her decision, the adjudication officer cited paragraph 21.24 of Redmond on Dismissal Law: ‘When unambiguous words of resignation are used by an employee to an employer, and are so understood by the employer, generally it is safe to conclude that the employee has resigned. However, context is everything. A resignation should not be taken at face value where in the circumstances, there were heated exchanges or where the employee was unwell at the time. The intellectual make-up of the employee may also be relevant.’90

Finding that the complainant had not in fact resigned, the adjudication officer stated: ‘It is concerning that the Respondent, knowing that the Complainant was on sick leave due to stress and exhaustion, noting that she was distraught and ‘clearly incoherent’ at the meeting in question did not allow for a cooling off period and did not follow up on the matter.’ Where dismissal in in doubt [3.26]   As stated above, an employee is generally dismissed where the employer informs them clearly and unequivocally when a contract comes to an end. However, in some instances that might not be clear. Date of dismissal [3.27]   In order to determine the length of an employee’s service, the WRC and the Labour Court must first establish the date of dismissal. This date is important in establishing whether the employee has the requisite continuous service such that the Act applies; it is also important to determine whether the employee has taken the claim within the six-month time limit. Section 1 of Unfair Dismissals Act defines the ‘date of dismissal’ as follows: ‘(a) where prior notice of the termination of the contract of employment is given and it complies with the provisions of that contract and of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, the date on which that notice expires.

89 90

A Kitchen Designer v An Interior Design Company ADJ-00007325, 15 February 2018. A similar approach was taken by the EAT in Keane v Western Health Board (UD940/1988).

86

Unfair Dismissal  [3.27] (b) where either prior notice of such termination is not given or the notice given does not comply with the provisions of the contract of employment or the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, the date on which such a notice would have expired, if it had been given on the date of such termination and had been expressed to expire on the later of the following dates— (i) the earliest date that would be in compliance with the provisions of the contract of employment, (ii) the earliest date that would be in compliance with the provisions of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, (c) where a contract of employment for a fixed term expires without its being renewed under the same contract or, in a contract for a specified purpose (being a purpose of such a kind that the duration of the contract was limited, but was, at the time of its making, incapable of precise ascertainment), there is a cesser of the purpose, the date of the expiry or cesser;

In practice, this means the following: (a) If the employee is dismissed for gross misconduct and no notice is given, the date will be the date of dismissal (ie, the day on which the employee leaves the premises).91 (b) If notice is given, the date of dismissal will be the date on which the notice expires. (c) If a contract provides for a notice period, it will be in breach of that contract to pay in lieu of notice unless the employer reserves the right to do so. If an employer pays in lieu of notice despite there being no payment in lieu of notice clause in the contract, the Labour Court will determine the date of termination by adding on the contractual or statutory notice.92 (d) If there is a payment in lieu of notice clause and the employee accepts same, the date of dismissal will be the date on which the termination takes effect (ie, the day on which the employee leaves the premises). In case of constructive dismissal, notice is not taken into account; the date is thus the day on which the person leaves.93 (See 2.12 for a fuller discussion on this.) In Action Health Enterprises Limited Partnership v Michael D’Arcy,94 the date of dismissal was comprehensively considered. Here the employee began working under a contract of employment on 31 January 2017. According to Clause 10 of the contract, either the employee or the partnership could terminate the employment by giving three months’ prior written notice, or statutory notice if this was longer. If either party provided notice of termination, the partnership could pay the employee the amount of his basic salary entitlement in lieu of notice. On 30 November 2017, the employee was dismissed without cause and was informed that he would receive a payment in lieu of his contractual notice period of three months. The employer’s letter stated that 91

Section 8 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 provides that employer may terminate a contract of employment without notice because of misconduct. 92 O’Reilly v Pullman Kellog UD 340/1979. 93 See Stamp v McGrath UD 1243/1983. 94 Action Health Enterprises Limited Partnership v Michael D’Arcy ADJ-00014891, 24 March 2020.

87

[3.27]  Termination of Employment he would receive the payment within 14 days. However, he received the payment only on 17 December 2017, following a letter from his solicitors. The employee filed an unfair dismissal claim to the WRC and was awarded €45,000. The employer appealed this decision to the Labour Court on the grounds that the employee did not have the necessary 12 months’ service to bring an unfair dismissal claim. The employer argued that nothing in the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 or in the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 prevents an employee from accepting payment in lieu of notice. The issue for the Labour Court to consider was whether the date of dismissal was 30 November 2017 – the date of the letter informing the employee of his payment in lieu of notice and immediate termination – or three months later, when the notice period would have ended. If the date of dismissal was 30 November 2017, the employee would not have had the necessary 12 months’ service to bring a claim under the 1977 Act. If, on the other hand, the date of dismissal was three months later, when the notice period would have ended, the employee would have had the necessary 12 months’ service. The employer argued that the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 specifically permits parties to agree to accept payment in lieu of notice, and accordingly, the date of dismissal for the purposes of the 1977 Act was 30 November 2017. The employer also argued that even if no notice had been given to the employee, s 1(b) of the 1977 states that the earliest date of termination is the date that complies with the provisions of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, which is one week’s statutory notice, giving a date of dismissal of 7 December 2017. However, this would still be insufficient for the employee to bring a claim. The employee argued that the contractual notice provision displaced his entitlement under the 1973 Act. Therefore, the employee was entitled to three months’ notice of termination from 30 November 2017. The solicitor submitted that the payment in lieu of notice did not override the statutory definition of ‘date of dismissal’ for the purposes of the 1977 Act. Therefore, the ‘date of dismissal’ for the purpose of the 1977 Act included the notice period, whether it was worked or not. The Court noted that this case raised a complex question that is still an issue in employment law today. A key consideration was that the payment in lieu was prompted by a letter from the employee’s solicitor requesting payment, which was made on 17 December 2017. The Court noted that the employee did so in reliance on Clause 10 of the contract. The Court held that if the employee relied on the terms of the contract to seek payment in lieu of notice, he could not now seek to reprobate it. Annual Leave and date of Dismissal One important issue that often raises its head in the WRC and the Labour Court regarding both the six-month and the 12-month time limit concerns the part that an employee’s annual leave entitlement has to play when calculating the six or 12 months. It is now well settled that an employee’s holiday entitlement cannot be added to a period of service in order to qualify for statutory unfair dismissal. 88

Unfair Dismissal  [3.28] Appeals [3.28]   Whereas there is no automatic right in the Unfair Dismissals Act and/or in natural justice to an appeal, the EAT and latterly he WRC and the Labour Court have often criticised employers for not having one. Thus, in a Complainant v A Respondent,95 the adjudication officer commented that: ‘an appeal is not just an after-thought or a procedure that must be completed as a matter of course. It is a very important part of the disciplinary process and the greater the sanction that has been imposed, the greater its importance. An appeal allows a dismissed employee the last chance to make their case, highlight any mitigating factors and seek protection for faulty procedure or disproportionality of sanction.’

Regarding an internal appeal, the question then arises as to when termination occurs. In effect, this gives rise to two scenarios: (e) where the appeal is limited to the original decision to dismiss; and (f) where it is a de novo hearing – that is, a fresh look at the facts, the witnesses etc. In the first instance above, the decision to dismiss occurs at the date of the dismissal – see Harris & Russell Limited v Slingsby.96 Where it is a de novo hearing and the contract is silent on whether the employee remains employed until the outcome of the appeal then it could be interpreted that the date of dismissal will be the date of the appeal outcome. In general the date of dismissal occurs with immediate effect pending the outcome of the appeal, unless the contract and/or company handbook specifically states that it is not effective until an appeal has been determined. Thus, if dismissal is confirmed on appeal, it will take effect at the time of the first decision. Further, termination might occur in instances where conditions are imposed on the employee post appeal. That is to say, that rather than dismiss the employees continued employment could be made contingent on the employee accepting various conditions. The question then arises as to what would be the date of dismissal if the employee then refused those conditions. The first question that arises in this regard is whether the employer is entitled to impose the conditions in the first instance. However a failure by an employee to accept new terms can lead to a finding of a fair dismissal.97 Presuming that an employer is entitled to impose condition and that the employee unreasonably refuses then the dismissal will be due to the employees’ refusal to carry out a requirement and the date of the dismissal will be the date that the employer communicates to the employee confirming their refusal and thus their dismissal. This sort of issue was examined by the EAT in O’Neill v Bank of Ireland.98 Here the claimant was dismissed on the 26th of January 1990. The letter communicating his dismissal stated.

95

Complainant v Respondent ADJ-00000381, 12 April 2017. Harris & Russell Limited v Slingsby (1973) ICR 454. 97 See RS Components v Irwin 1973 ICR 535 and Hollister v National Farmers Union 1979 ICR 542. 98 O’Neill v Bank of Ireland [1993] ELR 145. 96

89

[3.29]  Termination of Employment ‘I recommend that the Bank should accept [the employee’s] resignation if submitted within 10 days – failing this, the dismissal decision should stand’. The claimant then sought clarification on a number of issues, but ultimately resigned on the 9th of February 1990, which was accepted by the Bank on the 12th of February 1990. The claimant then raised an issue about a reference and informed that Bank that he was appealing to an independent third party. A dispute then arose as to the date of dismissal. In the end the EAT held that the decision to dismiss was communicated to the claimant on the 26th of January 1990, with an option exercisable by him within 10 days, which on the evidence was not exercised. The EAT took the view therefore that he date of dismissal was 12th of February 1990,which meant the claimant was one day out of time to pursue his claim. See also 4.29. All this points to the fact that it needs to be made clear whether employment continues pending the appeal or not. For an employees failure to appeal see para 4.30.

EXCLUSIONS [3.29]   To pursue a claim under the Act, an employee must not fall within any of the restricted categories.99 The categories of employees who are excluded and/or to whom the Act does not apply are as follows.

Persons who have reached normal retirement age [3.30]   The employee must be under the normal retirement age for employees of ‘the same employer’; otherwise, they are excluded.100 There is no fixed retirement age for employees in this jurisdiction. Employers may fix different retirement ages and contracts of employment may set a mandatory retirement age. The mandatory retirement age in the public sector varies generally in relation to the date the person joined. The Public Service Superannuation (Age of Retirement) Act 2018 provides for an increase in the compulsory retirement age of most standard public servants recruited prior to 1 April 2004 to age 70.101 The Public Services Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 applies to most public servants recruited between 1 April 2004 and 31 December 2012; a member of this group is described under the Act as a ‘new entrant’. Most members in this group have no compulsory retirement age. In order to prove that a normal retirement age exists in the workplace, regard should be had first to the contract of employment. If the contract provides for a specific retirement

99

Section 2(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Section 2(1)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 101 A public servant covered by the Act is termed a ‘relevant public servant’ as defined in s 2 of the Act. 100

90

Unfair Dismissal  [3.32] age, this will then be the ‘normal retirement age’ for the purposes of the Act and any deviation therefrom will be difficult (although not impossible) to argue. Regard should then be had to the actual practice in the employment concerned. If, for example, the contract provided for retirement at age 60, but the practice was that everyone retired at age 65, this may be deemed the ‘normal retirement age’. In Waite v Government Communications Headquarters,102 it was held that although a few people were kept on beyond the normal retirement date, this was not sufficient to alter what was set down in the contract of employment. However, in County of Donegal v Neil Porter,103 the High Court went on to say that forcing employees to retire at age 55 would unilaterally alter the contract of employment unless it could be justified lawfully in another way. In Cole v Press O Matric Ltd,104 the EAT held the dismissal of the claimant to be unfair when the claimant successfully argued that while his employment had ended at 65 years of age, another employee had sought and was given an extension from the time he reached 65 until the following Christmas. Prior to reaching 65, the claimant had requested an extension of six month but was denied. Also note that s 14 of the 1993 Act provides that the exclusion for normal retirement age does not apply to dismissal for trade union membership or activity. See also 8.23.

Persons employed by a close relative in a private house or on a farm where both reside [3.31]   A ‘close relative’ is defined as a spouse, civil partner,105 father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, step-father, step-mother, son daughter, grandson, granddaughter, step-son, step-daughter, brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister.106

Members of the Defence Forces [3.32]   The definition of ‘Defence Forces’ was considered in Martin v Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association107 (PDFORRA). Mr Martin was a warrant officer in the Navy and was seconded to the PDFORRA as its general secretary. He continued to receive his naval pay while on secondment and at times had to wear his uniform. He sought to argue that he was not a member of the Defence Forces while working for the PDFORRA. The EAT found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case, as Mr Martin’s position was so integrated into the Defence Forces that it

102 103 104 105 106 107

Waite v Government Communications Headquarters (1983) IRLR 341. County of Donegal v Neil Porter (1993) ELR 101. Cole v Press O Matrix Ltd UD 678/1992. As defined in the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010. Section 2(1)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Martin v Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association [1995] ELR 158.

91

[3.33]  Termination of Employment was impossible to separate the two. It could equally have arrived at the decision that the termination of the secondment was just that and not a dismissal, and Mr Martin would then have merely reverted to his previous position.

Members of An Garda Siochána [3.33]   While Gardaí cannot take a claim for unfair dismissal, SI No 214/2007 sets out the disciplinary procedures for Gardaí. Section 14 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 (as amended) also provides for the Garda Commissioner to summarily dismiss a Garda not above the rank of inspector. If a Garda is dismissed, they can take now a claim to the WRC under the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2019.108

SOLAS109 trainees and statutory apprentices110 [3.34]   A person engaged under a statutory apprenticeship in an industrial activity within the meaning of the Industrial Training Act 1967111 is covered, except during: (a) the first six months after commencement of the apprenticeship; and (b) the period of one month following completion of the apprenticeship.112 In Kenny v Tegral Building Products Ltd,113 the claimant’s contract was terminated fairly within the one-month period; but he was then re-employed three weeks and three days after termination of his apprenticeship on a fixed-term basis, extended on a weekto-week basis. The EAT regarded this as an anti-avoidance measure and deemed his employment to be continuous. In Boal v IMED,114 the employee had been employed from 1987 to 1993. The evidence showed that the claimant had signed a contract of apprenticeship in 1989; that the apprenticeship had been registered with FÁS; and that the termination had occurred within one month of completion of the apprenticeship. Thus, he was not protected by s 4 of the Act. Besides the Unfair Dismissal Act, other protections for apprentices are set out in the Industrial Training Act 1967, which provides that where apprenticeship rules have been made: ‘A person shall neither dismiss nor suspend a person employed by him as an apprentice save in accordance with the rules.’

108 109 110 111

112 113 114

Section 3 of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2019. SOLAS is the state agency set up under the Further Education and Training Act 2013 tasked with building a world class further education and training sector – see solas.ie. Section 2(1)(f) and 2(1)(g) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. The various activities covered by statutory apprenticeships are addressed in numerous orders. The latest of these is the Industrial Training (Healthcare Industry) Order (SI 760/2020) – see Kerr, Irish Employment Legislation at J-10, 23 July 2021 for a full list of such orders. Section 4 of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977. Kenny v Tegral Building Products Limited UD 837/2004. Boal v IMED Ireland Ltd 327/1994.

92

Unfair Dismissal  [3.35] Rule 7 of the Labour Services Act Apprenticeship Rules 1995 provides as follows: ‘(1) Subject to s 7(2), no employer shall dismiss any apprentice save in strict accordance with the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 and the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 1990. (2) Where it is no longer possible for reasons of redundancy for an employer to continue an apprenticeship the employer shall give written prior notice to An Foras [FÁS] accordingly and shall take all reasonable steps to have his/her obligations under the contract of apprenticeship transferred to another employer.’

Employees dismissed during a period of probation115 or training [3.35]   This applies only if the contract is in writing, and the duration of the probation or training is one year or less and this is stated in the contract.116 It does not apply, for example, where the person’s probationary period is extended beyond 12 months.117 Note that section 10 of the European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations 2022 inserts a new section into the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 which provides that probationary periods shall not exceed 6 months in duration, however on an exceptional basis they may be extended to 12 months but only if it is in the interest of the employee. The probationary period of public servants cannot exceed 12 months118 Also excluded are all employees who are dismissed while undergoing training for the purpose of becoming qualified or registered as a nurse, pharmacist, health inspector, medical laboratory technician, occupational therapist, physiotherapist, speech therapist, radiographer or social worker.119 The following employees are also excluded: (a) persons employed by or under the State who are dismissed by government;120 (b) chief executives of local authorities for the purposes of s 144 of the Local Government Act 2001;121 (c) officers of a vocational education committee established by the Vocational Education Act 1930;122

115

Note that art (1) OF Directive 2019/1152/EU requires member states to ensure that where an employment relationship is subject to a probationary period, that period shall not exceed six months. 116 Section 3(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 117 See Keating v Bus Eireann UD 680/2001. 118 SI 686/2022 European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations 2022. 119 Section 3(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 120 Section 2(1)(h) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as substituted by s 22 of the Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act 2005. 121 Section 2(1)(i) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as substituted by s 164 of the Local Government Act 2001, as amended by the Local Government Reform Act 2014. 122 Section 2(1)(j) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as substituted by s 75 of the Health Act 2004.

93

[3.36]  Termination of Employment (d) the Director General of the HSE for the purposes of s 17 of the Health Act 2004;123 and (e) the chief executive of the Child and Family Agency appointed under s 28 of the Child and Family Agency Act 2013.

Persons on fixed-term/specified purpose contracts [3.36]   A fixed-term contract is one where the dates of commencement and termination are clear on the date it is entered into. A contract for a specified purpose is one where, at the time it was entered into, the duration of the contract was not capable of being ascertained. An example may be where a person is required to fill in for a leave of absence which might be extended or is hired to complete a particular job, such as building a road or a bridge. Where either a fixed-term contract expires because its term has come to an end or a specified purpose contract expires because the task is complete, the Unfair Dismissals Act will not apply if:124 (a) the contract is in writing; (b) the contract has been signed by both parties; and (c) the contract contains a statement that the Act shall not apply to a dismissal consisting only of the expiry of the fixed term or cesser of the aforesaid. In this regard, it is important to remember the following: (a) These conditions must be in place at the time the contract is entered into; (b) Liability is excluded only on the expiry of the term or cesser of the purpose; and (c) Early termination of the contract where the employee has more than 52 weeks’ service may result in an unfair dismissal claim, as the employee will have the requisite service. Sections 2(2)(2A) and 2(2)(2B) of the 1977 Act125 provide extra protection for temporary workers. It was felt that some employers were abusing the use of fixed-term contracts – particularly where contracts of under 52 weeks were being entered into and then issued consecutively. This amendment addresses this scenario. The 1977 Act was initially amended in 1993, by inserting a proviso that where the dismissal consists only of the expiry of the fixed-term contract, and the employee is then re-employed within three months on another fixed-term contract and subsequently dismissed by reason of the expiry of the second or subsequent fixed-term contract, those contracts can be added together and deemed continuous. This section was then re-cast in ss 2(2)(2A) and (2B), as inserted by s 25(2) of the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective

123

Section 2(1)(k) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as inserted by s 75 of the Health Act 2004. Section 2(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 125 Subsections (2A) and 2(B) were inserted by s 25(2) of the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007 and replaced s 3 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993. 124

94

Unfair Dismissal  [3.38] Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007, which made it conditional on the employer entering into the second or subsequent contract in an effort to wholly or partly avoid liability under the act for unfair dismissal. This requires that the re-employment take place within three months of the expiry of the previous contract; the nature of the employment be similar or identical; the employer be the same; and the dismissal consist only of the expiry of the term of the subsequent contract. Importantly, the amendment does not apply if the dismissal occurs within the term of the subsequent contract. This is an example of the law of unintended consequences where, as a result of the amendment, many employees are often given three months off between contracts.126 The matter of successive fixed-term contracts was examined in Cahill v Teagasc.127 Here the claimant, who was a student supervisor in an agricultural college, signed two successive fixed-term contracts. He stated that it was his intention to stay in the role for a number of years. Teagasc attempted to argue that the provisions of the 1993 Act did not apply, as the dismissal resulted from the termination of a fixed-term contract in accordance with s 2(2)(b) of the 1977 Act. The claimant submitted that this did not apply, as it was the intention of Teagasc to avoid liability under the Act. In holding the dismissal to be unfair, the EAT determined that what had started out as an ‘ordinary’ employment relationship had become a ‘fixed-term’ employment.

Persons covering for persons on protective leave or natal care [3.37]   These employees are specifically excluded under s 2(2)(c), as amended, if the employer informs the ‘covering’ employee in writing on commencement of the contract that the employment will terminate on the return to work of the other employee who is on protective leave or natal care absence. ‘Protective leave’ in this instance includes maternity leave, additional maternity leave, father’s leave under s 16(1) and so-called s 18 leave on health and safety grounds.

Persons covering for persons on adoptive leave [3.38]   Section 2(2)(d) provides a further exclusion for employees hired specifically to cover for someone on adoptive leave, again as long as the employer informs the person in writing, on the commencement of the contract, that the contract will terminate on the return of the adopting parent.128

126 See

Kierse v National University of Ireland Galway UD 219/2000, where it was found that the use of successive short-term contracts was not done with the intention of avoiding liability under the Act. See Hooper v Mary Immaculate College UD1167/2006, where it was held that there was such an intention. 127 Cahill v Teagasc [1996] ELR 215. 128 Section 2(2)(d) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 was substituted for the original version (which in itself was inserted by s 23 of the Adoptive Leave Act 1995 and amended by s  27(1) of the Carer’s Leave Act 2001) by s 23 of the Adoptive Leave Act 1995 (as substituted by s 18 of the Adoptive Leave Act 2005). The full stop at the end of the subparagraph appears to be an error.

95

[3.39]  Termination of Employment

Persons ordinarily working outside the State [3.39]   Employees who ordinarily work outside the State under the relevant contract of employment are excluded unless: i. they were ordinarily resident in the State during the term of the contract; or ii. they were domiciled in the State during the term of the contract and the employer:

I. in case the employee was an individual, was ordinarily resident in the State, during the term of the contract, or II. in case the employer was a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons, had its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.129

Given the world we live in today, this section may soon become outmoded. The EAT has previously made comment in this regard.130 In Roche and Ors v Sealink Stena Line Ltd,131 the employer sought to argue that the employees were not ordinarily resident in the State on the basis that it was a British registered company, and further that the employees on the ship were based in Fishguard; their employment contracts were made in the UK; their wages were paid in sterling; they received their redundancy packages from the UK; and although they paid Irish tax, they paid UK national insurance. The employees argued that they were Irish citizens who lived in Ireland; two of them owned their own houses, and two of them lived with their parents. The EAT determined that the employees were ‘ordinarily resident’ in the State during the term of the contracts and accordingly were covered by the Act. In contrast, in Davis v Sealink Stena Line Ltd,132 the EAT held that the mere fact that a person was ordinarily resident in the State during the term of their contract did not entitle them to bring a claim under the Act when their contract was performed outside the State and the proper law governing the contract was a foreign one. Here the claimant lived in Dublin but worked on a ferry between Larne in Northern Ireland and Stranraer in Scotland. He was paid in sterling into a bank account in Belfast; he paid UK national insurance and had tax deducted in the UK; his contract was terminated in the UK; and the ship never docked in the Republic of Ireland. Equally, in A Lorry Driver v A Transportation Company,133 the adjudication officer held that to have jurisdiction over the case, the complainant must habitually carry out his or her work in Ireland; whereas in this instance the complainant resided in Northern Ireland, was paid in sterling and did most of his truck runs in that jurisdiction. In McIlraith v Seitz Filtration (GB) Ltd,134 the employee sought to rely on the Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations135 in seeking to have his case heard in Ireland, despite the fact that the contract had been complied in the UK

129

Section 2(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Buckle v Lee Overlay Partners Ltd UD 1509/2003. Roche and Ors v Sealink Stenal Line Limited [1993] ELR 89. Davis v Sealink Stena Line Ltd, UD874/1993. A Lorry Driver v A Transportation Company ADJ-00020314, 10 June 2020. McIlratih v Seitz Filtration (GB) Ltd [1998] ELR 105. Also known as the Rome Convention.

130 See 131 132 133 134 135

96

Unfair Dismissal  [3.39] and contained a reference to the law of the UK governing termination. The Convention provides that the signatories to a contract may choose the law applicable to the whole or part of the contract, and may select the court that will have jurisdiction over disputes.136 The Convention does, however, include a number of exceptions to the fundamental freedom of choice; and here the employee argued that art 6 applied. Article 6 provides that: ‘1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, in a contract of employment a choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be applicable under paragraph 2 in the absence of choice. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract of employment shall, in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed: (a) by the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract, even if he is temporarily employed in another country; or (b) if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one country, by the law of the country in which the place of business through which he was engaged is situated; unless it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country, in which case the contract shall be governed by the law of that country.’

The EAT first held that it was evident that the claimant had carried out his work in Ireland and could also be considered to be employed in Ireland. Therefore, notwithstanding the wording in the contract, he was entitled to seek relief under the Unfair Dismissals Act in this jurisdiction. However, it went on to state that the employee would also be entitled to invoke art 6 of the Convention, which was brought into force in Ireland by the Contractual Obligations (Applicable Law) Act 1991. While the EAT did deal with the jurisdiction issue, it did not deal with the law to be applied – that is, Irish or English. In A Regional Claims Manager v An Insurance Company,137 the adjudication officer – in relying on the Recast Brussels 1 Regulation,138 which they held trumped the prohibition contained in s 2(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act – determined that the employee was entitled to bring their claim in either the jurisdiction in which they habitually carried out their work or the jurisdiction in which their employer was domiciled. This equally did not deal with the applicable law. The caser of XY v Matrix Shipping Limited139 dealt with an employee who was a senior purser on a ship which travelled between Rosslare, Ireland and Prembroke, Wales. The terms of his employment contract expressly stated that in the event of a dispute, grievance, conflict or arbitration the parties will submit to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus. Having examined Article 19 of Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001140 on the jurisdiction and the recognition an enforcement of judgement 136

Article 3. A Regional Claims Manager v An Insurance Company ADJ-00000680, 12 April 2017. Section 5 of the Regulation 1215/2012/EU of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast). 139 XY v Matrix Shipping Limited DEC-E2018-015 August 10 2018. 140 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of 22 December 2000. 137 138

97

[3.40]  Termination of Employment in civil and commercial matters, the adjudicator was satisfied that the:- ‘“courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated” in Article 19.2 (b) means the place where the Respondent business engaged the Complainant.’ The adjudicator then held that ‘As this was in Ireland, I find that there is jurisdiction to hear the substantive claim’.

Employees dismissed while working for foreign embassies in Ireland [3.40]   The primary case in this regard is Government of Canada v Employment Appeals Tribunal and Brian Burke,141 in which the Supreme Court held that the employment of an embassy chauffeur was within the sphere of governmental or sovereign activity; that the doctrine of restrictive immunity applied; and as such, that the employee had no cause of action against his employer. However, the effect of this decision must be re-evaluated in light of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Cudak v Lithuania.142 Here the applicant was employed as a secretary and switchboard operator in the Polish embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania. She was dismissed and brought civil proceedings requesting compensation. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs successfully argued that the embassy was immune from the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts. The decision by the Vilnius Regional Court to discontinue the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction was upheld by the Supreme Court, which held that the applicant had exercised a ‘public service function’ during her employment with the embassy, and as such that her duties facilitated the exercise by Poland of its sovereign functions. As such, the doctrine of state immunity was applicable. The applicant then complained to the ECtHR, contending that the discontinuance of proceedings violated her right of access to a court pursuant to art 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR ruled unanimously that art 6(1) was applicable and had been breached. It held that there was no evidence before the Lithuanian courts that the applicant’s duties as a switchboard operator and secretary could objectively have been related to the sovereign interests of Poland; and that the mere allegation that the applicant could have accessed certain documents or been privy to confidential telephone conversations in the course of her duties did not suffice. A similar decision was issued in Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria,143 where the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union, held that the principle of customary international law concerning the immunity of states from jurisdiction did not preclude the application of Council Regulation 44/2001 in a dispute in which the employee sought compensation for the termination of his contract of employment where the functions carried out by him did not fall within the exercise of public powers, or where the proceedings were not likely to interfere with the security 141 142 143

Government of Canada v Employment Appeals Tribunal and Brian Burke [1992] ELR 29. Cudak v Lithuania 2010 (51) EHRR 418. Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 2013 ICR 1.

98

Unfair Dismissal  [3.41] interests of the state. This decision was considered by the EAT in this jurisdiction in Adan v Embassy of Kenya,144 in which the EAT awarded a cleaner with the embassy €44,200 in respect of her unfair dismissal. This case was followed by Calderon v Lootah,145 in which an award of €80,000 was made to domestic help employed by the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates. However, these cases have not always been upheld. In Buthelezi v Coy Dlamini and Thobeka Dlaminin and The Republic of South Africa,146 the adjudication officer declined jurisdiction to hear a discriminatory dismissal complaint against the Republic of South Africa, as it felt bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Government of Canada. The EAT also declined jurisdiction – see Green v Government of the United States of America.147 This case contrasts with Radunović v Montenegro,148 in which the ECtHR ruled that security guards at the US embassy in Podgorica were not employed to perform any particular duties in the exercise of government authority; nor were their duties objectively linked to US security interests. The ECtHR thus held that the Montenegro Court’s refusal of jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity was a violation of art 6 of the ECHR.149 It thus seems to be the case that, where there is no exercise of any public powers or government authority, the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be relied upon. In this jurisdiction the Labour Court has held that this was the case in The State of Kuwait v Kanji,150 and in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia v Abraham.151 Both cases involved academic advisers to students in third-level institutions; and in neither case was there any evidence of the complainants employment touching upon the respondent sovereign government.152

ONUS OF PROOF [3.41]   The Act provides153 that all dismissals are deemed ‘unfair’ unless there are substantial grounds that justify the dismissal. In effect, this means that the onus of proving that the dismissal was fair rests with the employer. Consequently, at a hearing of the 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152

153

Adan v. Embassy of Kenya UD 2163/2001. Calderon v Lootah UD 1219/2003. Buthelezi v Coy Dlamini and Thobeka Dlaminin and The Republic of South Africa (2017) ELR 24. Green v Government of the United States of America UD 289/2014. Radunović v Montenegro 2018 66 EHRR 761. See also Naku v Lithuania (26126/07, 8 November 2016). The State of Kuwait v Kanji UDD 40 2019. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia v Abraham EDA 25 2019. The State of Kuwait v Kanji was appealed to the High Court, which overturned the decision and remitted it back to the Labour Court because the Labour Court had failed to set out adequately the reasons as to why it had rejected the evidence on behalf of the State of Kuwait. Barr J was also of the opinion that the Labour Court had erred in law in the test it had applied. Both parties agreed that the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States represented the State’s ‘customary international law’ at that time. Article 11 of the Convention provides that a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a Court from another State in proceedings which relate to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed in whole or in part in the territory of that State. However, art 11.2 provides for a number of exceptions, including when employees have been recruited to perform particular functions ‘in the exercise of government authority’; and Barr J stated that this was the question the Labour Court should have asked itself. Section 6(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

99

[3.42]  Termination of Employment WRC and/or the Labour Court, the employer presents its evidence first. This will not be the case where the fact of dismissal is in dispute or where the claimant is alleging constructive dismissal. In such instances the employee must establish that a dismissal occurred or that the employer’s actions were so severe as to justify the employee terminating their employment (see also 3.98).

Exceptions where the onus of proof shifts to the employee Dismissal in dispute [3.42]   Where the fact of dismissal is in dispute, the onus rests with the employee to prove that they were in fact dismissed. In A Tiler v A Parquet Floors Provider,154 the complainant stated that he had been dismissed while off sick, having reported his illness to the respondent. The respondent argued that the complainant had arrived on site and stated that he would be leaving to go and work on his own with his son. He never provided any medical certificates. It was held that: ‘In circumstances where dismissal is denied by the Respondent there is a significant onus on the Complainant to prove that the employment was terminated without their consent.’ Here it was held that there was no dismissal: ‘The absence of any contact between the Complainant and the Respondent concerning a return to work or the provision of sick certs and the fact that he subsequently did exactly what the Respondent claimed he had said he would do, which was to set up a business with his son, undermine the Complainant’s case that he was in fact dismissed.

In A Health Care Assistant v A Care Facility,155 the complainant was employed by an employment agency and carried out his work as a healthcare assistant in a care facility. The complainant alleged that he had been dismissed by his team leader for poor performance after a number of complaints had been made. It was held that while the complainant had been removed from the care facility, he had been reassigned by the employment agency, albeit with reduced hours. The complainant was thus still in employment and had never been dismissed. Dismissal related to pregnancy [3.43]   The onus of proof also shifts in pregnancy-related dismissals. This matter was fully considered in Pedreschi v Burke.156 Here the claimant submitted that the onus of proof remained on the employer even though she had less than one year’s service. The submission was rejected by the EAT, which held that in such case the claimant bore the onus of proof. The EAT went on to say: ‘the claimant must show the Tribunal that it has jurisdiction in the matter. Where the claimant shows the Tribunal that her dismissal was, on the balance of probabilities, on the grounds of

154

155 156

Tiler v Parquet Floors Provider ADJ-00026571, 10 August 2021. A Health Care Assistant v A Care Facility ADJ-00016594, 2 April 2020. Pedreschi v Burke UD 591/1999.

100

Unfair Dismissal  [3.44] her pregnancy or matters relating thereto, the Tribunal will then assume jurisdiction in the matter. In arriving at the decision as to whether dismissal was on the grounds of pregnancy or matters related thereto, the Tribunal will have regard to the evidence of the employer who will seek to show that the dismissal was justified on substantial grounds, not related to the pregnancy of the employee.’

Premature submission of claim form [3.44]   Needless to say, for a person to claim unfair dismissal, a dismissal must in fact have occurred. Complainants are sometimes premature in submitting their claim forms to the WRC; the question then often arises as to what happens if the person claiming unfair dismissal submits the claim form prior to the dismissal. Thus, in Barry v Newbridge Silverware Ltd,157 the respondent submitted in a preliminary application that the claimant’s unfair dismissal was pre-emptive, as it had been lodged prior to the date of dismissal. The claimant was informed on 10 September 2012 that she was being dismissed for gross misconduct. The termination letter stated that the payroll department had been instructed to pay eight weeks’ basic pay from the date of the letter. The respondent then argued that as the claimant had been paid in lieu of statutory notice, the actual date of termination was in fact 12 November. The claimant argued that she had been summarily dismissed for gross misconduct on 10 September, and that the payment of eight weeks was a ‘goodwill gesture of some sort’. The EAT held that ‘it is long recognised …. and is prescriptively imposed by the legislation that the date of dismissal will be the date on which notice expires (whether notice is imposed by contract or statute)’. The EAT thus held that the date of dismissal was in fact 12 November, and that the claim for unfair dismissal had been lodged too early and ‘in the course of her ongoing employment’. In the circumstances, the EAT held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.158 However, this matter was settled by the High Court decision in Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal and Bohemians Football Club.159 Here the claimant had been employed as a bar manager by Bohemians Football Club. On 16 December 2011, he was dismissed by reason of redundancy. When he asked when the termination of his employment was to occur, he was told, ‘Now.’ No notice was given; nor was a P45 issued. He lodged his claim for unfair dismissal on 23 December citing the date of dismissal as 16 December. At the hearing, the respondent argued that the claimant had in fact taken his claim within the two-week redundancy notice period when he was thus still employed, and as such the EAT did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The EAT found for the employer and confirmed that as the claimant had lodged his claim prior to the date of dismissal, it did not have jurisdiction to hear his case. The matter came before the High Court by way of judicial review. Barrett J quashed the decision of the EAT and held that it did in fact have jurisdiction to hear the case.

157 158 159

Barry v Newbridge Silverware Ltd UD 1517/2012. See the contrasting decision in Matthews v Sandisk International Ltd UD 331/2010. Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal and Bohemians Football Club [2015] ELR1.

101

[3.45]  Termination of Employment Barrett J stressed that the EAT had notice of the claim on the commencement of and throughout the six-month period post-dismissal within which the claimant was permitted to institute proceedings, and found that it would be absurd to find that a claimant should be denied the opportunity to bring a claim for unfair dismissal simply because the adjudicating body had notice of the claim immediately prior to the applicable sixmonth period. Barrett J was also satisfied that his conclusion was in keeping with s 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, which provides that notice must be given within six months ‘beginning from the date of the relevant dismissal’. The High Court held that in circumstances such as in this case, giving notice to the EAT on one date such that it has notice on another date complies with the requirements of the Act. Barrett further noted that prescribed time periods are typically intended to ‘thwart the tardy’ not punish the prompt’ and that Equity aids the vigilant not the indolent”.160 In Khan v ACCHL Limited AIM Cash & Carry,161 the employee took a claim of constructive dismissal and submitted it to the WRC almost six months prior to the date of the alleged constructive dismissal. The adjudication officer noted that the employee had not been dismissed at the time the complaint was lodged. In her decision, the adjudication officer noted that the facts of Brady were distinguished in this instance, as neither party was on notice of the resignation or the dismissal, and therefore found that the lodgment of this complaint to the WRC was premature.

UNFAIR DISMISSALS [3.45]   As stated, the Act presumes that all dismissals are unfair unless there are substantial grounds that justify them. There is thus no situation in which a dismissal can be deemed to be automatically unfair, as s 6(2) begins, ‘Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section’; and s 6(1) deems that every dismissal is unfair for the purposes of the act unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there are substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. Nonetheless, certain reasons for dismissal are deemed unfair.

Membership of a trade union or involvement in trade union activities [3.46]   An employee cannot be dismissed because of trade union membership or because of a proposal that they or another employee become a member of a trade union. However, this applies only where the times at which they engage in such activities are outside their hours of work; or times during their hours of work in which they are permitted, pursuant to the contract of employment between them and their employer, to so engage. That said, the EAT is very conscious of the constitutional right to join a

160 161

Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal and Bohemian Football Club [2015] ELR at para 8. Khan v ACCHL Limited AIM Cash & Carry ADJ-00029481, 20 December 2021.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.47] trade union, and employers would be well advised to be extra cautious if there is any suggestion of trade union activity.162 This matter was considered in Employee v Employer.163 Here the EAT, noting that the employee did not have the requisite 52 weeks’ continuous service, neatly summarised that it was being: ‘asked to assume that the employers knowledge of the fact that the employee had been identified as one of a group of seven (who were using the union to open up negotiations for more favourable rates of pay) of itself had an effect on the outcome of the disciplinary process and … [was] also being asked to determine that the knowledge of membership of a trade union was the main reason for the termination.’

The EAT held that ‘unfortunately’ it could not ‘make a finding that the employer reached its decision based wholly or mainly on the basis of the employee’s membership of the union’. In examining this wording, it is clear that the EAT was somewhat disappointed in having to find as it did. However, it also points to the fact that a complainant is put on full proof as to their case, and must prove that the main reason for their dismissal was due to their trade union activity and not some other action. Thus, in this instance, where the claimant was dismissed for breach of a safety protocol, the EAT was bound to hold that his dismissal did not arise ‘wholly or mainly’ from his trade union activity. In respect of trade union activity, it should also be borne in mind that one of the rights guaranteed by art 40.6.1 of the Constitution is the right to form associations and unions; and that the Supreme Court has ruled, in cases such as Meskell v Cōras Iompair Éireann,164 that this guarantee embraces the right to dissociate. The input of the Constitution is also seen in White v Aluset Limited,165 where the claimant was found to have been unfairly dismissed following his refusal to transfer trade union membership.

Strikes and lockouts Strikes [3.47]   A ‘strike’ is defined in s 1 of the 1977 Act as: ‘the cessation of work by any number or body of employees acting in combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of any number of employees to continue to work for an employer, in consequence of a dispute, done as a means of compelling their employer or any employee or body of employees, or to aid other employees in compelling their employer or any employee or body of employees, to accept or not to accept terms or conditions of or affecting employment.’

162 See

White v Simon Betson [1992] ELR 120. David Byrne v Stobart (Ireland) Limited UD34/2011 and MN34/2011. 164 Meskell v Cōras Iompair Éireann [1973] IR 121. 165 White v Aluset Limited UD 9/1998. 163

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[3.47]  Termination of Employment The reasons for the strike and how it came about – whether lawfully or not – are irrelevant. Nor does it matter what type of strike it is – for example, it could be a ‘go slow’, a work to rule, the ‘blue flu’, a one-day stoppage or a traditional indefinite work stoppage. All types of strike are therefore included in this definition. Technically, if no notice of strike or the intention to strike is given, and striking is not provided for in the contract of employment, a breach of contract occurs. In practice, it is highly improbable that a clause allowing strikes will be expressly provided for in the contract; although an implied right to strike could arise as a result of custom and practice. The question therefore arises as to the status of an employee on strike. In this jurisdiction (following the UK lead), in Becton Dickinson v Lee,166 the Supreme Court endorsed the doctrine of suspension as expressed by Lord Denning in Morgan v Fry.167 This in effect provides that once an employee who intends to strike gives notice of at least the length of notice to terminate their contract, their employment rights and obligations are suspended for the period of the strike. This case arose before the enactment of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act, which provided for a period of seven days’ notice to be given to employers before a strike could lawfully occur. It is unclear whether this seven-day notice period ‘replaces’ the contractual notice period as provided for in Becton Dickinson. Notwithstanding this, the concept itself is a difficult one to grasp. What happens during a strike should the employer wish to dismiss all employees for going on strike, to impose some form of disciplinary action short of dismissal for an act of misconduct while on strike or to suspend an employee pending investigation of an incident while on strike? Does this mean that no sanction can be taken against striking employees? The answer is no. As the employment relationship must continue during any suspension, so too must the range of obligations attaching to the contractual employment relationship. Equally, it is difficult to fathom how this doctrine of suspension could override the common law right of either an employer or employee to terminate the contract of employment. Section 5(2) of the Act goes on to provide that: ‘(2) The dismissal of an employee for taking part in a strike or other industrial action shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal, if– (a) one or more employees of the same employer who took part in the strike or other industrial action were not dismissed for so taking part, or (b) one or more of such employees who were dismissed for so taking part were subsequently permitted to resume their employment on terms and conditions at least as favourable to the employees as those specified in the said paragraph (a) or (b) and the employee was not.’168

This does not mean that if an employer dismisses all people for taking part in the strike, those dismissals will be deemed to be fair. Such dismissals are subject to the general presumption in s 6(1) that all dismissals are unfair. This was also clarified by s 5 2(A) of 166

Becton Dickinson v Lee [1973] IR 1. Morgan v Fry [1968] QB 710. 168 Section  5(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 was substituted in its entirety by s 4 of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993. 167

104

Unfair Dismissal  [3.47] the 1977 Act, inserted by s 26 of the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007, which provides: ‘(2A) Without prejudice to the applicability of any of the provisions of section 6 to the case, where– (a) an employee– (i) is deemed by subsection (1) to have been dismissed by reason of a lock-out, or (ii) is dismissed for taking part in a strike or other industrial action, and (b) none of those who were locked out, or took part in the strike or industrial action, were re-engaged, in determining whether, in those circumstances, the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, shall have regard, for that purpose only, to– (i) the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer or employee in relation to the dismissal, (ii) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer with the procedure referred to in section 14(1), (iii) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer or the employee with provisions of any code of practice referred to in section 7(2)(d), and (iv) whether the parties have adhered to any agreed grievance procedures applicable to the employment in question at the time of the lock-out, strike or industrial action.’

Section (2)(A)169 therefore makes it conclusive that selective dismissals for taking part in a strike or other industrial action are unfair. The wording in this section is interesting insofar as it specifically refers to those who ‘took part’. This could mean that employees who took part and then returned to work before either the strike was finished or the striking employees were dismissed would also have to be dismissed. Notwithstanding this, it is now clear from s  5(2)(A) that the reasonableness of the employer’s actions will be scrutinised if such a dismissal occurs. In Power v National Corrugated Products,170 the employer dismissed 128 employees for participating in a strike (a sit-in). The EAT held that the dismissals were unfair within the legislation. No further clarification was provided on this point and this determination would seem to run contrary to s 5(2). However, what seems probable is that the EAT interpreted the reasonableness of the employer’s dismissal in the same way as it would an individual being dismissed, and as is as now provided for under s 5(2)(A). Notably, this was prior to the introduction of the 1993 Amendment Act and the 2007 Exceptional Collective Redundancies Act, which clearly strengthened this whole area. In this case, the EAT considered that management had made no serious attempts to contact the union during the sit-in and had issued the termination notices prior to having a union meeting. If employees participate in a strike or lockout and are treated less favourably than others who also participated, their dismissal may be deemed to be unfair. Section 4 of 169 170

Section (2)(A) was inserted by s 26 of the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007. Power v National Corrugated Products UD 336/1980.

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[3.48]  Termination of Employment the 1993 Act amended the 1977 Act: while the main act protects an employee against victimisation for being the only person to be dismissed or the only person not to be taken back following a strike or lockout, the 1993 Act extended this to a situation where employees are brought back and then treated less favourably than others who remained in work throughout. The 1993 Act provides not only that better terms and conditions should apply to employees who are taken back after a strike or lockout if they have been afforded to others, but also that reinstatement or re-engagement should be deemed to have commenced on the earliest date on which reinstatement or re-engagement was offered to the majority of other employees who were the subject of the lockout or who took part in the strike or other industrial action.171 Lockouts [3.48]   Section 5(5) of the 1977 Act defines a ‘lockout’ as follows: ‘“[L]ock-out” means an action which, in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946),172 is taken by one or more employers, whether parties to the dispute or not, and which consists of the exclusion of one or more employees from one or more factories, offices or other places of work or of the suspension of work in one or more such places or of the collective, simultaneous or otherwise connected termination or suspension of employment of a group of employees; ‘“the original employer” means, in relation to the employee, the employer who dismissed the employee.’

Section 5(1) of the Act goes on to state that: ‘For the purposes of this Act (other than section 2(4)), the lock-out of an employee shall be deemed to be a dismissal and the dismissal shall be deemed to be an unfair dismissal if, after the termination of the lock-out– (a) the employee was not permitted to resume his employment on terms and conditions at least as favourable to the employee as those specified in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of section 7 of this Act, and (b) one or more other employees in the same employment were so permitted.’

Therefore, this section deems the lockout of an employee to be a dismissal and deems the dismissal unfair if, after the lockout, the employee was not allowed to resume their position on terms and conditions at least as favourable as those of others who were reinstated or re-engaged. This section was significantly amended by the 1993 Act, which replaced in its entirety the previous s 5(1), which did not deem a lockout to be a dismissal. It has now been further amended by s 5(2)(A), which provides that the WRC, in considering whether a dismissal was unfair, must have regard to the reasonableness

171 See 172

Tuke v Coillte Teoranta [1998] ELR 324. Under s 24(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1969, the 1969 Act is to be construed as one with the 1946 Act. Under s 12(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1976, that Act is to be construed as one with the 1946 Act. Under the s 2(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1990, the 1990 Act (other than Part II thereof) and the Industrial Relations Acts of 1946, 1969 and 1976 are to be construed together as one Act. Under s 13(1) of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, that Act and the previous Acts as set out may be cited as the Industrial Relations Acts 1946 to 2001 and shall be construed together as one.

106

Unfair Dismissal  [3.51] or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer or employee to the dismissal, the extent of compliance with any code of practice etc. Therefore, a dismissal will be unfair unless the employer complies with the code of practice; adheres to the grievance procedure, where one exists; adheres to the disciplinary and dismissal procedure; and then behaves reasonably. It is respectfully suggested that in the event of a strike or lockout that adheres to all of the above, dismissal is not only difficult, but inconsistent. It is hard to imagine how an employer dealing with striking workers can possibly afford them the full rights of natural justice. This is particularly so when the issue of trade union recognition is the subject matter of the dispute. All told, dismissals for participating in a strike or lockout are fraught with legal difficulties.

Religious or political opinions [3.49]   It will be deemed unfair if a person is dismissed for religious or political reasons. In Merriman v St James’s Hospital,173 the claimant was dismissed for refusing to bring a crucifix and a candle to a dying patient. Despite this being the practice in the hospital, Clarke J ordered her re-engagement and ordered that she did not have to participate in the practice going forward, essentially allowing the claimant’s terms and conditions to be different from those of her colleagues. Claims under this heading can also be heard under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2004.

Race, colour or sexual orientation [3.50]   Initially, the 1977 Act provided that an employee could not be dismissed because of their race or colour. This was extended under the 1993 Act to include sexual orientation. Claims under this heading can also be heard under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021.

Age [3.51]   The Act provides that an employee cannot be dismissed because of their age. Claims under this heading can in addition be heard under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021. In Kerrigan v Peter Owens Advertising and Marketing Ltd,174 the EAT held that a redundancy based on a number of factors including age was an unfair dismissal.

173 174

Merriman v St James’s Hospital (24 November 1986), CC, Clarke J. Kerrigan v Peter Owens Advertising and Marketing Ltd UD 31/97.

107

[3.51]  Termination of Employment In William O’Mara v College Freight Limited T/A Target Express Ireland,175 two claimants successfully argued that there was no normal retirement age in the company. This was despite the fact that the respondent’s HR manager gave evidence that the custom and practice in the company was for employees to retire at 65, and it was only because of a ‘glitch’ in the computerised HR system that the employees who were the subject of the claim had been overlooked and thus continued working beyond 65. The EAT, having heard all the evidence, concluded that there was no retirement clause in either claimant’s terms and conditions of employment. No policy document was produced to the EAT or given to the claimants. Furthermore, in examining the ‘open drive’ insurance policy which the employer alleged did not permit anyone to drive beyond their 65th birthday, the EAT adduced evidence from an email dated 17 June 2010 stating that there was, in fact, an option to extend the age limit on the policy, subject to an increase in the premium. The EAT held that it was not satisfied that the company had a retirement policy or even a comprehensive custom and practice in relation to retirement. The EAT found both claimants to have been unfairly dismissed and awarded them €33,500 and €19,500 respectively. In Michael Kavanagh v Kilkenny County Council,176 the claimant was a part-time firefighter. When he commenced his employment in 1967, there was no age condition in the general terms of employment; but he claimed he was told he would be ‘in the job’ until age 65. Evidence was given that the claimant’s union had entered into negotiations which culminated in an agreement in 1990 to reduce the retirement age to 60. The EAT held that the claimant had been aware of the 1990 agreement and had consented to it; therefore, there was no unfair dismissal. In O’Grady v Sodexo Ireland Limited,177 the complainant successfully argued that her employment did not terminate by reason of retirement despite there being a mandatory retirement age of 65, as she was able to demonstrate that she had a legitimate expectation that she would be entitled to remain working beyond the retirement age due to the custom and practice of the former owners of the company prior to a transfer of undertaking taking place. In this instance, the adjudication officer held that the respondent could not rely upon the exclusion under the Unfair Dismissals Acts as, despite the respondent having a mandatory retirement age of 65, it had failed to take into consideration the fact the complainant’s rights had transferred to this employment or her right to extend her employment beyond the retirement age. Thus, in considering ‘normal retiring age’, the WRC and the Labour Court will first examine what has been agreed contractually between the parties; and will then examine the custom and practice of the employer and, more particularly, whether this is enforced fairly across the company. If some employees are allowed to work past their contractual retirement age, such contractual terms will be ignored by the WRC. Therefore, it is vital that employers implement compulsory retirement policies; otherwise, they will create a new policy by custom and practice which employees can rely on to retire at an older 175 176 177

William O’Mara v College Freight Limited T/A Target Express Ireland UD 1371/2009. Michael Kavanagh v Kilkenny County Council (2008) ELR. O’Grady v Sodexo Ireland Limited ADJ-00029694, 27 August 2021.

108

Unfair Dismissal  [3.53] age than that specified in the contract of employment. In practice, very few cases are taken under the Unfair Dismissals Act given the passing of the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015, which makes it discriminatory to compulsorily retire someone on the grounds of age unless this is objectively justified.

Pregnancy or connected matters [3.52]   An employee cannot be dismissed by reason of pregnancy or related matters.178 The employee must discharge the onus of proof that she was dismissed by reason of pregnancy. It will be for the employer then to establish that the real reason for dismissal was not pregnancy related. There is a significant amount of law at the EU level regarding pregnancy. One of the most important cases is Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd.179 Here the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (now the Court of Justice of the European Union) held that the dismissal of a pregnant woman could not be justified on the basis that because she was pregnant, she was not capable of carrying out the job for which she was hired – which was in fact to replace another pregnant employee. This decision was bolstered by Brown v Rentokil Ltd,180 where the ECJ held that the dismissal of a woman at any time during her pregnancy for absences due to incapacity for work as a result of a pregnancy-related illness constituted direct discrimination on the grounds of sex. This will often arise during a pregnancy where a woman becomes ill or incapacitated as a result of her pregnancy. Following the Brown decision, any such dismissals will be deemed unfair. This, along with the Equal Treatment Directive,181 led to a significant overhaul of s 6(2)(f) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. The original provided that an employer could justify the dismissal of a pregnant worker on the basis of her performance. Section 6(2)(f) now provides that it is a deemed unfair dismissal to dismiss a woman for pregnancy, attending antenatal classes, giving birth or breastfeeding, or for any matters connected therewith.182 Dismissal and the Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004 [3.53]   In addition to protection as a result of pregnancy, dismissal for pursuing maternity entitlements is also unfair; as is dismissal for exercising the right to any form of protective leave or natal care absence, or to time off from work or a reduction in hours of work for breastfeeding. Employees’ statutory and contractual rights are protected by the Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004. The Act gives very wide protection against the imposition of certain disciplinary measures and against termination of employment during a period of statutory maternity leave or ‘protective leave’. 178

Section 6(2)(f) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd C–32/93 (1994) IRLR 482. 180 Brown v Rentokil Ltd 1998 IRLR 445. 181 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC. 182 Section 6(2(f) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended by s 23(b) of the Maternity Protection (Amendment) Act 2004, SI 652/2004. 179

109

[3.54]  Termination of Employment An employee cannot be in receipt of a disciplinary suspension when she is on maternity leave or ‘protective leave’.183 Notices of termination of employment given during maternity leave and to take effect during maternity leave or after the end of maternity leave are void. These include redundancy notices.184 The wording in the Act is quite specific. It does not refer to ‘notice of dismissal’, but rather to ‘notice of termination of employment’. In other words, this includes notice given either by the employer or by the employee. As such, any notice of resignation given by an employee during maternity leave is void and may not be relied upon.185 The normal obligation to have one year’s continuous employment before coming within the scope of the Unfair Dismissals Act does not apply where it can be shown that the dismissal is due to the employee’s pregnancy, giving birth or breastfeeding, or any matter connected therewith. The Maternity Protection Act is enforced through the Unfair Dismissals Act. In this regard, the Unfair Dismissals Act is extended to provide for the determination of disputes over entitlements under the Maternity Act, as well as alleged unfair dismissal for exercising rights under the Maternity Act. Dismissal/fixed-term contracts and maternity [3.54]   It may sometimes arise that a person who has temporarily replaced another on maternity leave becomes pregnant herself and requires maternity leave prior to the return of the first employee. In such circumstances, Webb186 applies and employers cannot dismiss or cut short the contract merely as a result of the pregnancy.

Dismissals contrary to the Adoptive Leave Acts 1995 and 2005 [3.55]   Dismissal as a result of the exercise or contemplated exercise by an adoptive parent of rights under the Adoptive Leave Acts 1995 and 2005 to adoptive leave or additional adoptive leave, or to a period of time off to attend certain pre-adoption classes or meetings, is deemed unfair.

Membership of the Traveller community [3.56]   The 1993 Act introduced the provision that an employee cannot be dismissed for being a member of the Traveller community. Again, claims can be brought under the unfair dismissals legislation or the employment equality legislation.187

183

‘Protective leave’ is defined under s  21(1) of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 as maternity leave, additional maternity leave, leave for fathers on the death of the mother (s 16 leave), and health and safety leave. 184 See Jing Xian Li v David L’Estrange t/a L’Estrange & Co UD 2153/2010. 185 Section 23 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994. 186 Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd C–32/93 (1994) IRLR 482. 187 Section  6(2)(e) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as inserted by s 5 of the Unfair Dismissal (Amendment) Act 1993.

110

Unfair Dismissal  [3.60]

Civil or criminal proceedings [3.57]   If an employee is dismissed because they issue or threaten to issue civil or criminal proceedings against their employer, such dismissals will be deemed unfair.188 This will also be the case where the employee has made any complaint or statement to the prosecuting authority connected with the case. One should note in this respect the protection afforded to ‘whistleblowers’ by the Competition Authority under its ­‘leniency’ programme. (See Ch 7 regarding protected disclosures).

DISMISSALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACTS OTHER THAN THE UNFAIR DISMISSALS ACT Persons reporting child abuse [3.58]   The Protections for Persons Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998, which came into force on 23 January 1999, provides protection from civil liability to people who report child abuse ‘reasonably and in good faith’ to designated officers of the Health Board or to An Garda Síochána. The main provisions are: (a) the provision of protection to persons who report child abuse from penalisation by their employers; and (b) the creation of an offence of false reporting of child abuse. The avenue of redress for such employees who have been discriminated against or dismissed is by way of complaint to the WRC and the Labour Court. Such employees may not, however, be granted relief both under this Act and under the Unfair Dismissals Act.

Dismissals and the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006 [3.59]   Section 13 of the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006 provides protection for employee representatives against penalisation, which may include dismissal. This protection does not extend to other such employees who are not acting in the capacity of representative189.

Dismissals and the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2005 [3.60]   Section 27 of the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2005 was enacted with a view to protecting employees from any ‘penalisation’ from their employers on 188 189

Section 6(2)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Barry O’Neill v An Post ADJ-00029473; SPA Therapist v Hotel, ADJ-00022518.

111

[3.60]  Termination of Employment foot of them making a complaint regarding health and safety concerns. ‘Penalisation’ includes dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. Claims under this section must be made to the WRC within six months of the date of the alleged contravention and the appeal is to the Labour Court. An adjudication officer, should they find that the complaint is well founded, may instruct the employer to take a specific course of action or award the employee a sum of money that is deemed just and equitable, having regard to the circumstances. This is particularly interesting in that the limit on compensation under the Unfair Dismissals Acts does not seem to apply to dismissals under this Act. Following the initial enactment of s 27 of the Act, claims made under it were mostly successful without, so it seems, having due regard to the actual wording of the legislation. In order to succeed under this section, three elements must be satisfied. First, an employee must have acted in accordance with one of the protected activities set out in s 27(3)(a)–(f) of the 2005 Act. These are as follows: ‘Section 27(3): An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee for– (a) acting in compliance with the relevant statutory provisions, (b) performing any duty or exercising any right under the relevant statutory provisions, (c) making a complaint or representation to his or her safety representative or employer or the Authority as regards any matter relating to safety, health or welfare at work, (d) giving evidence in proceedings in respect of the enforcement of the relevant statutory provisions, (e) bringing a safety representative or an employee designated under section 11 or appointed under section 18 to perform functions under this Act, (f) subject to subsection (6) in circumstances of danger which the employee reasonably believes to be serious and imminent in which he or she could not reasonably have been expected to avert, leaving (or proposing to leave) or while the danger persisted, refusing to return to his or her place of work or any dangerous part of his or her place of work or taking (or proposing to take) appropriate steps to protect himself or herself or other persons from the danger.’

Second, the employee must have suffered detriment within the meaning of s 27(1) or s 27(2) of the 2005 Act. These provide as follows: ‘Section 27(1): Penalisation includes any act or omission by an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer that affects, to his or her detriment, an employee with respect to any term or condition of his or her employment.’ ‘Section 27(2): Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) penalisation includes– (i) suspension, lay off or dismissal (including a dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissal Acts 1977) or the threat of suspension, lay off or dismissals, (ii) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion, (iii) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

112

Unfair Dismissal  [3.60] (iv) imposition of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), (v) coercion or intimidation.’

Third, the employer must have imposed the detriment as a result of the protected activity. One case which succeeded under this section is LW Associates and Lisa Lacey.190 In that case, the employee informed her employer that she was pregnant and requested that a risk assessment be carried out. Such an assessment duly took place: however, due to the employer’s delay in acting on same, the employee lodged an official grievance. The employer then decided that there was a medium to low risk to the employee, and she was placed on health and safety leave. The employee initiated her claim under s 27 and contended that the employer had not properly considered suitable alternative employment or assisted her through the use of certain equipment. It was confirmed that being on health and safety leave was detrimental to the employee both financially and in relation to her career. The Labour Court agreed and duly awarded the employee the sum of €1,000. In Citizens Information Board v John Curtis,191 the employee spoke to management over some minor health and safety issues such as overhead lighting and an air vent. The employer immediately dealt with all concerns. The employee then spoke with his manager about undertaking what he considered to be inappropriate work. On foot of this, he alleged that his duties had been changed and he had lost the facility to work flexitime. The employer claimed that the discussion with the manager which had preceded the amendment of the employee’s duties did not relate to health and safety matters and, in any event, he had not suffered any detriment. The rights commissioner did not uphold the employee’s complaint. On appeal under s 29 of the Act, the Labour Court held that the discussions with the employee’s manager were not of a health and safety nature, and thus anything that flowed from them could not be dealt with under this section. For the sake of completeness, the Court went on to state that the employee had not suffered any detriment under the terms of that section of the Act. A further action, Margaret Bailey T/a Finesse Beauty Salon and Lisa Farrell,192 was appealed from the rights commissioner to the Labour Court by both the employee and the employer. The rights commissioner had found in favour of the employee and awarded the sum of €5,000. In this case, the employee had informed her employer in May 2008 that she was pregnant. It was disputed between the parties as to whether shorter working hours had been sought by the employee at that juncture. In any event, no medical certificate was forwarded to the employer supporting a claim for reduced hours until 16 June 2008; and on 17 June, the employer stated that it would not agree to reduced hours. The Court considered whether the employer’s refusal to accommodate the employee constituted penalisation under s 27. It found that in some

190 191 192

LW Associates and Lisa Lacey HSC/08/2, Determination HSD085. Citizens Information Board and John Curtis (HSD101). Margaret Bailey T/a Finesse Beauty Salon and Lisa Farrell HSC/09/23, Determination HSD/104.

113

[3.60]  Termination of Employment circumstances this could constitute penalisation; but in this case, reduced hours were not agreed for business and economic reasons. The Court found that on the facts before it, it could not hold that the employer’s refusal to accommodate the employee with reduced hours had primarily resulted from a complaint or representation made by the employee about a health and safety issue. It further stated that to be in breach of s 27, the employer would have had to have reached such a conclusion because the employee had made a complaint on matters of health and safety at work, and this was not the case. The Labour Court took a similar position in St John’s National School v Akduman.193 The seminal case in this jurisdiction is Toni & Guy Blackrock v Paul O’Neill.194 In that case, the Labour Court laid down the test that should be applied in deciding the standard of proof required. It stated that the claimant must establish that the penalisation or detriment suffered was imposed because of, or in retaliation for, the employee having taken a protected act. This has become known as the ‘but for’ test – in other words, the claimant would not have suffered the detriment ‘but for’ the fact that they raised a health and safety issue. The issue of raising a health and safety complaint has been interpreted very broadly by the courts. Thus, even the act of requesting a copy of the employer’s bullying and harassment policy may be deemed a protected act.195 In Stobart (Ireland) Driver Services Ltd v Carroll,196 the Labour Court agreed that under s 13 of the Act, an employee has a duty to take reasonable care to protect their own safety, health and welfare, and those of any other person who may be affected by the employee’s acts or omissions at work. Here the employee – a truck driver who believed that he had worked excessive hours (albeit that this was not correct) – was allegedly dismissed because he stated that he was too tired to drive. This was deemed to constitute sufficient evidence that he had raised a health and safety complaint. As there is no limit on the compensation that can be given for penalisation under this section, one would have assumed that there would be many cases with significant awards. This, however, is not so. This may perhaps be due to the fact that the standard of proof required in these cases is very high, and thus only a limited number of cases have been brought. The highest award to date was issued in Folan v Galway Drug Company Limited.197 Here the claimant, who had worked for the respondent as an office manager from May 1992 to 11 July 2016, raised a formal grievance regarding bullying and issues regarding the safety of the work environment. As a direct result, she was summarily dismissed from her employment by letter on 11 July 2016. As it was determined that her termination of employment was directly linked to her having made a formal grievance, she was awarded €159,705.

193

St John’s National School v Akduman HSC/07/03, Determination HSD102. Toni and Guy Blackrock v Paul O’Neill [2010] ERR 1. 195 St. Davids CBS Secondary School Artane v Siobhan McVeigh, Labour Court HSD11. 196 Stobart Ireland Limited v Carroll [2013] 24 ELR. 197 Folan v Galway Drug Company Limited ADJ-00004808. 194

114

Unfair Dismissal  [3.64]

Dismissals and the Parental Leave Acts 1998 and 2006 and the Carer’s Leave Act 2001 [3.61]   Section 16(A)(4) of the Parental Leave Act 1998198 provides that an employee who is entitled to return to work following a period of parental leave but who is not permitted to do so shall be deemed to have been dismissed, and the dismissal shall be deemed to be an unfair dismissal for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Act.199 There is a similar provision in s 16(4) of the Carer’s Leave Act 2001.

Dismissals contrary to the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 [3.62]   Section 36 of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 provides that an employer shall not dismiss an employee for having exercised their rights under the Act, opposed by any lawful means an act that is unlawful under the Act or become entitled in the future to any remuneration greater than the provisions of the Act; and that any such dismissal will be deemed to be unfair for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Act.

Dismissals contrary to the Standards in Public Office Act 2001 [3.63]   Under s 5(3) of the Standards in Public Office Act 2001, where an employer dismisses an employee to whom the Unfair Dismissals Act applies and the dismissal constitutes disciplinary action in contravention of s 5(1) of the 2001 Act in relation to the employee, the dismissal is a dismissal for the purposes of the 1977 Act by virtue of s 6(2)(f) of that Act is deemed to be an unfair dismissal.200

DISMISSALS DEEMED NOT TO BE UNFAIR [3.64]   Section 6(4) of the Act states that: ‘Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following: a)

the capability, competence or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

198

Section 16(A)4 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 was inserted by s 11 of the Parental Leave (Amendment) Act 2006. 199 Note that in Re v Praxair MRC (Case C-486/18), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that where a worker employed full time and for an indefinite duration was dismissed while on part-time parental leave, their compensation must be based on their full-time salary; otherwise, the worker might be discouraged from taking such leave. 200 Please note that the reference to s 6(2)(f) seems to be an error, as that subsection relates to matters concerning the maternity protection legislation.

115

[3.65]  Termination of Employment (b) the conduct of the employee, (c) the redundancy of the employee, and (d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.’

There are a number of important points to note in this definition. First, it is without prejudice to s 1, which provides that all dismissals are unfair. Thus, the onus still rests with the employer to prove that the dismissal fell within the scope of the matters set out in (a) to (d) above, and for no other reason. Second, the concept of deeming dismissals to be fair or unfair, as the case may be, would seem to suggest that once a party proves that the dismissal arises wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters set out therein, the dismissal is then deemed fair or unfair. However, this is not the case. The EAT has taken the view that s 6(4) merely sets out potentially fair reasons. In Durnin v Building & Engineering Co. Ltd,201 the EAT held that: ‘In our opinion, reasons which might justify a dismissal are set out in section 6(4), with a more general area of “justification” in a form of “other substantial grounds” provided for in section 6(6). In any area of “justification’ even where clearly provided for in section 6(4), there is at best only a prima facie “justification” and the substance of such “justification” may be enquired into by the Tribunal which attached the question of fairness to same.’

Capability, competence or qualifications of the employee [3.65]   None of these words is defined in the 1977 Act and they are often used interchangeably by the WRC, the Labour Court and practitioners. Despite this, they have significantly different meanings. Capability [3.66]   Dismissal for capability is deemed not to be unfair where it results ‘wholly or mainly’ from an employee’s capability to perform ‘work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do’.202 ‘Capability’ is generally defined as the inability of the person to fulfil the terms of their contract of employment due to the long-term illness of the person. ‘Incapability’ was defined by the EAT in Reardon v St Vincent’s Hospital203 as ‘long term illness’. That said, incapability can take many guises. It may be that the person is a mere malingerer; or it may be that the person has suffered an injury at work; or the person may have been absent for a long period of time but as a result of a plethora of different ailments. The belief among employers that they cannot dismiss someone if they continue to produce medical certificates is incorrect and an employee’s employment 201 202 203

Durnin v Building & Engineering Co Ltd UD 159/1978. Section 6(4) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Reardon v St Vincent’s Hospital UD 74/1979.

116

Unfair Dismissal  [3.67] may be terminated fairly if their ill health prevents them from performing in their role or attending work on a regular basis. This, of course, is notwithstanding the employer’s obligations under the Employment Equality Act 1998, which obliges employers not to discriminate against employers on the grounds of disability204 and, where appropriate, to provide reasonable accommodation.205 Long-term absence [3.67]   In the case of prolonged periods of absence, employers may be justified in dismissal if: (a) the absence poses actual or potential problems for the employer; and (b) there is no reasonable prospect of an early return to work. It is the second issue above which is the most challenging. There is nothing to prevent an employer from dismissing an employee for long-term absenteeism once it has been established that there is no reasonable date of return to work. Of course, the employer must be satisfied that this has been verified by an expert medical opinion; and where there is a conflict between medical advisers, an independent third-party expert should be called upon.206 The onus of proof lies with the employer, so it will be for the employer to show that it honestly believed that the employee was incapable of fulfilling their duties. Employers can do this by acting on independent medical advice, sharing this advice with the employee before the dismissal and canvassing their opinion. As dismissal for ill health is a ‘no fault’ termination – that is, there is no fault attributed to the employee – employers must be careful before terminating and must in general prove the following: (a) The illness was both the reason and the substantial reason for the dismissal; (b) The employee received fair notice that the question of their capability was being considered; and (c) The employee received an opportunity to put forward their own case. In practice, this means that in the event of an employer receiving a definitive medical report stating that the employee is not fit to work, notwithstanding this, the employee must be put on notice that their dismissal for incapability is being considered; that they have an opportunity to be heard; and that there is a right to appeal any decision to dismiss. The WRC and the Labour Court – like the EAT before it was abolished – are generally sympathetic to employees on long-term absence and great reliance will be put on the available medical evidence. There are a few general rules, as follows: (a) No employer should dismiss without detailed medical evidence. While the decision to dismiss is an employment decision and not a medical one, the employer 204 205 206

Section 2(1) of the Employment Equality Act 1998. Section 16 of the Employment Equality Act 1998. Lawless v Dublin City Council UD 335/1989.

117

[3.67]  Termination of Employment

(b) (c) (d) (e)

(f)

(g)

must make that decision in light of all the circumstances. While the WRC and the Labour Court will place a great deal of reliance on the medical opinion, ultimately it is up to the employer to make the decision.207 Employers are not obliged to create a new job for an ill employee.208 Where dismissal is being contemplated, employers must inform employees clearly, and as early as possible, of that possibility.209 Where there is a dispute about the medical evidence, employers must have the employee examined by their own occupational health specialist.210 Where there is a dispute between medical practitioners, the advice of an occupational health specialist will generally trump that of a general practitioner. However, where such a conflict occurs, it is wise to try to address this. Thus, in An Employee v A Multinational Retailer,211 the complainant was suffering from multiple sclerosis (MS) and attended an occupational health assessment, which made no reference to her MS or some of her symptoms, treatment and medication. The complainant contended that this misrepresented and downplayed her symptoms. The report deemed the complainant stable and fit to return to work. No further plans for review were made. In April 2013, the complainant’s GP certified her as fit to return to light duties. The respondent stated that the complainant could only return to the store bakery, as there was no other alternative role for her. It was held that the respondent had failed to properly address the conflict between the occupational health report and the GP. The adjudication officer held that the respondent’s submission that; ‘its assessment was sacrosanct and took precedence over the later opinion of the GP ‘most unhelpful’. At that stage it would have been reasonable to go back to its Specialist for a further assessment or an independent Specialist’. Where two conflicting opinions are given by occupational health specialists, the opinion of a third should be sought. For example, the employee might engage an occupational health specialist and the employer another; if there is a dispute between them, another independent view should be sought for completeness. For employees nearing retirement, it may be more appropriate to let them retire rather than dismissing them, unless the person is unable to do the work they are required to do.212

207 In

Bolger v Showerings (Ire) Ltd [1990] ELR 184, in light of all the circumstances, Lardner J held that where, because of ill health, there was no dispute between the employer and the employee as to incapacity, it was not necessary for the employer to await the results of medical test before deciding to dismiss the employee. Where there is dispute or uncertainty, a detailed medical opinion will be needed. However, it was held that it was for the employer to show that: (a) ill health was the reason for the dismissal; (b) this was the substantial reason; (c) the employee received fair notice that the question of his dismissal for incapacity was being considered; and (d) the employee was afforded an opportunity of being heard.

See also A Complainant v A Respondent ADJ-00002318. See the more detailed discussion on this in Ch 5. 209 Kearney v Tesco UD86/2010; see also Farm Manager v Farmer, ADJ-00017360. 210 Eamonn Blair v Coverall Courier Services Ltd UD 1263/2013. 211 An Employee v A Multinational Retailer DEC-E2016-021. 212 See Victory v Leopardstown Park Hospital UD 9/1997. 208

118

Unfair Dismissal  [3.69] (h) Care should be taken where the employee is on long-term absence but is availing of a company permanent health scheme.213 (i) Often company handbooks contain detailed absence policies. If this is the case, they must be followed; any termination which is contrary to such policies will be deemed unfair. (j) Where ill health may place an employee or other employees in danger, termination may be deemed fair.214 Every case should be examined on its own merits; and the WRC and the Labour Court will demand extra patience from employers where there is an added complication, such as drug or alcohol addiction. Finally, s 4(d) (ie, the employee is unable to work or continue to work) also applies to those who may not be ill. Thus, in A Retail Employee v A Service Station,215 it was held that this section also applied to an employee whose student visa had expired and who was dismissed in circumstances where the visa entitling the employee to work had not been renewed.216 (For surveillance of employees on long-term absence or monitoring in general, see 3.94, 3.107, 3.108.) Sporadic absence [3.68]   Sporadic absence is significantly more difficult to deal with for employers. To justify a dismissal for sporadic short-term absence, employers will generally have to show that: (a) the employee had a continuing pattern of sporadic absence over a long period of time; (b) it was reasonable to conclude that this sporadic absence would not improve; (c) the continuation of the pattern of sporadic absence was unacceptable; and (d) adequate warnings had been given to the employee as to the consequences of the continuing absence.217 Alcoholism/drug addiction [3.69]   Alcoholism and drug addiction generally manifest themselves in short-term sporadic absence, albeit that sometimes they can result in long-term absence. This is

213

214 215 216

217

Many such schemes stipulate that the person must remain an employee in order to avail of the scheme. Dismissing them in such an instance could be seen as a breach of contract. Indeed, in the UK, there is a contractual right that, except for summary dismissal, employers cannot terminate where their permanent health insurance scheme is dependent on the employee remaining in employment. See Aspden v Webbs Poultry & Meat Group (Holdings) Ltd (1996) IRLR 521. O’Neill v Fr Eugene McCarthy UD 371/1991. Retail Employee v Service Station ADJ-00027527 (6 October 2021). See also Dublin Bus v Irabor UD 68/2021, where a bus driver received a four-year driving disqualification on conviction causing death. Mooney v Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd UD 473, 474, 475 and 478/1980.

119

[3.69]  Termination of Employment not to be confused with dismissal on conduct grounds for alcohol or drug-related use in the workplace, which is a conduct issue to which the WRC and the Labour Court are generally sympathetic. Alcoholism in of itself is not a ground for dismissal or indeed the imposition of any disciplinary action and even where it is raised as mitigation for certain behaviour it might still give rise to a finding of a fair dismissal. Thus in the case of Larkin v Irish Glass218 where the EAT heard evidence that the appellant had a chronic absence record of 9.8%, 20.9%, 17.3%, and 26.4% in the years from 1981 – 82 onwards and despite the appellant giving evidence that he had a drink problem the EAT found that the respondent did not act unreasonably in dismissing him. That said, the thinking has moved on since and the WRC and the Labour Court generally take a lenient view of people with addiction issues, It is important for employers to determine whether an employee suffering from addiction is willing to undergo professional treatment. In that regard, addiction is similar to other illnesses. Should an employee submit to a course of treatment or agree to undergo such a course, the employer is generally obliged to wait and see how that materialises prior to taking any action in respect of the termination of employment. These cases are complex in nature, and employers are often left relying on the opinions of third parties. In An Employer v An Employee219 the WRC determined that the dismissal of the employee was unfair in circumstances where the employer had not made enquiries as it should have done. Therefore, there is an obligation nowadays for employers to take a proactive approach towards alcohol-related problems and inquire into same. In Irish Aviation Authority v Christopher Reddin,220 the Labour Court provided the following guidance to employers when dealing with employees with alcohol or drugrelated problems: ‘The Court is of the view that generally speaking when dealing with an employee who has an alcohol dependency problem, employers should give such employees an opportunity to seek professional treatment before considering dismissal. However, each case must be judged on its merits. Factors such as risk to safety, the level of responsibility the employee has and contact with the public are taken into account when deciding whether or not the penalty of dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses.’

In this case, Mr Reddin had been referred on a number of occasions to an occupational health specialist to understand the nature of his dependency, and the Court referred to this. The Court also noted that there was a clear policy in place which had been agreed with the trade union representing the staff, and which was supported by a protocol on random testing. As such, the Court deemed the dismissal to be fair. Notwithstanding all of the above, where every effort has been made to rehabilitate the employee and addiction is known and remains a problem, it will be deemed not 218 219 220

Larkin v Irish Glasa PLC UD 890/1985. An Employer v An Employee UD 230/2014. Irish Aviation Authority v Christopher Reddin UD D1710.

120

Unfair Dismissal  [3.70] unfair to dismiss. Thus, in Mahony v The Department of Defence,221 the employee had received ten written warnings, had attended nine meetings and had been allowed to return to work after a long bout of absenteeism, provided that he signed a contract undertaking to furnish certificates of his attendance for anti-abuse treatment and attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. While he did this for a while, he lapsed back into periods of alcoholism. The employer then sought further medical advice as to the employee’s problems. The chief medical officer, having seen the medical advice, observed that there was no alternative but to terminate his employment. The EAT determined that it was ‘satisfied that the respondent having regard to the investigation and having taken account of the nature, length and effect of the claimants illness and his prospects for future service acted reasonably’. This case is again demonstrative of the lengths that employers must go to in order to try to rehabilitate employees, discuss all options with them and take appropriate medical advice. Frustration [3.70]   Frustration is an odd concept. It arises where an unforeseen event makes performance of the contract impossible. If a contract is frustrated, it comes to an end and both parties to the contract are released from their obligations. In Zuphen v Kelly Technical Services,222 Murphy J held that: ‘The basis of the doctrine of frustration would appear from the authorities is that there is a supervening event which must be so unexpected and beyond the contemplation of the parties, even as a possibility, that neither party can be said to have accepted the risk of the event taking place when contracting.’

He continued: ‘The court must accordingly operate on a general impression of what the rule in relation to frustration requires. It is for that reason that special importance is necessarily to be given to the occurrence of an unexpected event that, as it were, changes the face of things. It seems to me that this is not the case. It is not hardship or inconvenience or a material loss itself which calls the principles of frustration into play. There must have been such a change in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from that contracted for.’

Murray J went on to hold that: ‘It seems to me to be inappropriate in that circumstance to apply a strict contract law approach to employment disputes. Attempts to so apply tend to obscure the social implications of certain kinds of conduct or events by reducing them to legalistic principles.’

He continued: ‘Indeed, the very commendable attempt by the defendant companies to procure such work for the technicians they had employed is to my mind an indication that a contractual relationship survived which would be inconsistent with the contract being frustrated.’ 221 222

O’Mahony v The Department of Defence UD 28/1989. Zuphen v Kelly Technical Services [2000] 11 ELR 227.

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[3.70]  Termination of Employment In order for the doctrine to be pleaded successfully, there must be some unusual or unexpected event that has rendered things radically different. In the employment context, this means that there is no obligation on the employer to offer work and there is no requirement on the employee to accept that work. Thus, there ceases to be mutuality of obligation. In situations where the employee is ill and can no longer perform the contract for medical reasons, it is still up to the employer to prove that performance of the employee’s obligations under the contract in future would be impossible, or would be something completely or substantially different from that previously undertaken. The seminal case on this is Marshall v Harland & Wolff Ltd and the Secretary of State for Employment.223 Here the Court asked: ‘Was the employee’s incapacity, looked at before the purported dismissal, of such a nature, or did it appear likely to continue for such a period, that further performance of his obligations in the future would either be impossible or would be a thing radically different from that undertaken by him and agreed to be accepted by the employer under the agreed terms of his employment?’

As can be seen from the above, the threshold for the frustration of a contract is very high. The key issue is that the obligations must have become impossible to perform. It will not suffice if the obligations simply have become more difficult, more costly and/or more time consuming. The event in question must also have fallen outside the control of either party and must not have arisen due to a fault on part of the party seeking to rely on frustration. The foreseeability of events is also relevant, as the parties may have anticipated an event but failed to provide a mechanism for dealing with same in the contract. Frustration mostly arises where an employee has suffered a significant injury and is absent for a long period of time. The questions that mostly arise in these cases are: what constitutes a ‘sufficient period’ for the employer to hold open an employee’s job; and when can it no longer be reasonably expected to be keep the absent employee’s post open indefinitely? There is a high bar for employers to successfully plead frustration. Even where it is the case that a contract has been frustrated, the WRC will consider the reasonableness of the employer’s decision to dismiss. Thus, in De Sousa v Keypack Group,224 the employer deemed the employee’s absence to be due to a ‘frustration of contract’ which made the contract inoperable. In this instance, fair procedures were still followed and the employer had medical assessments carried out for the employee to determine whether he could return to work. It was deemed that the employee could not return to work, as he had only been able to attend work for a single day in two years due to a back injury and there were no alternative roles available. The employment was terminated as per s 6(4) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as he was unable to carry out the role for which he had been employed. In this instance, the EAT noted that the employer had behaved prudently and acted reasonably in all the circumstances; and that the contract of employment was ‘frustrated and had become inoperable’. 223 224

Marshall v Harland & Wolff Ltd and the Secretary of State for Employment [1972] IRLR 90 adopted in Nolan v Brooks Thomas Ltd UD 179/1979. De Sousa v Keypack Group UD 964/2011.

122

Unfair Dismissal  [3.70] In Donegal County Council v Langan,225 the EAT adopted the UK decision in Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Limited v Leibovici,226 noting that frustration can only be used very selectively. In interpreting Egg Stores, the EAT added a number of its own factors which will be considered when analysing whether the contract had been frustrated: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

the events of the previous employment; the anticipated duration of the employment; the nature of the job; the nature, length and effect of the illness or disabling event; the need of the employer for the work to be done; whether wages continued to be paid; the actions of the employer in relation to the employment; whether consideration was given to retaining the employee on the books but not in employment; (i) whether the employer discussed with the employee and its trade union the employee’s problems and prospects; (j) whether adequate medical investigation was carried out (eg, the employer should ask its own doctor for reports to establish the medical facts and, if there is conflicting medical evidence, seek an independent source); and (k) whether, in all the circumstances, a reasonable employer could be expected to wait any longer. The final two tests in the above list are possibly the most important, insofar as no dismissal for frustration should take place unless there is a clear medical report indicating that the employee would be unfit to return to work for the foreseeable future. Thus, the clearest evidence is needed. In this instance, the EAT warned that where there is a prospect of recovery for an employee, a lengthy absence does not necessarily frustrate the contract. The doctrine of frustration was considered in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sotwal v Geraghty Energy Consultants Limited.227 The complainant’s fixed-term contract was ended prior to the expiry date due to a decline in income linked to the shutdown during COVID-19. In its defence, the respondent relied upon the doctrine of frustration. Finding against the employer, the adjudication officer held that: ‘While the Employer had the right to lay-off the Complainant it had no contractual right to terminate the contract during the specified fixed period other than for the specified reasons in the contract of employment. The contract does not provide for a situation where there is a reduction in work or a delay in work materialising, to ground a dismissal.’

In Muris Flynn v Ianrod Éireann,228 the adjudication officer determined that the doctrine of frustration could not be relied upon by reason of the employee being imprisoned. Critically, in this instance, the adjudication officer had regard to the fact that the

225

Donegal County Council v Langan UD143/1989. Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Limited v Leibovici [1976 IRLR 376]. 227 Sotwal v Geraghty Energy Consultants Limited ADJ-00028506, 1 February 2023. 228 Muris Flynn v Ianrod Éireann ADJ-00030195, 19 October 2022. 226

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[3.71]  Termination of Employment employer was aware of the complainant’s incarceration for a period of four months prior to its deeming the matter to be frustrated; and throughout this period, the ‘activities of the respondent continued without disruption … while undoubtedly a hardship and an inconvenience for the respondent, it did not result in a requirement for the employment to be terminated.’ See also 3.85. In Dublin Bus v Osbourne Irabor,229 the Labour Court was asked to consider whether a drink-driving ban for four years amounted to frustration of the contract of employment. The respondent submitted that the imposition of a four-year ban was unexpected and was not something that could have been foreseen by either party. In this instance, a clause within the employee’s contract of employment provided that the employee must hold a ‘valid driving licence’ as part of his employment, and that breach of this provision would be treated as gross misconduct and could be subject to disciplinary action. In its findings, the Court held that the matter of frustration did not need to be considered, as the dismissal fell within the ambit of s 6(4)(d), in that the employee’s employment was required to be terminated as his continued employment would be deemed to be a contravention under statute (ie, if he were to drive, he would be in breach of the court-ordered driving ban). In other words, if a contract of employment is terminated because continued employment would contravene a statute or law, the statutory provision of s 6(4) should be examined first, rather than the common law doctrine of frustration being relied upon. Finally, frustration is not appropriate in cases of intermittent absence due to minor ailments – see Moody v Rowntree McIntosh Limited.230 What one can take from all of this is that in most instances in the employment context, employers do not need to rely on the common law doctrine of frustration, as there are other remedies available. If they are to rely on it, there must have been some catastrophic incident that was so unexpected that it completely changed the facts of things. Light duties [3.71]   An additional complication arises when there is a request by the employee and/or their doctor to return to work for ‘light duties’. Before the 2004 Employment Equality Act was introduced, it was well established that there was no obligation for employers to provide ‘light work’ or alternative duties.231 With the enactment of the 2004 Employment Equality Act, discrimination on the basis of disability was introduced for the first time. While it is clear that the ground of disability does not apply where the person is not willing to perform the work or is fully capable of doing the work, if that capability arises from a disability, the issue of providing light duties must be examined with that in mind (see 8.34 for further discussion on this topic).

229 230 231

Dublin Bus v Osbourne Irabor UDD2168. Moody v Rowntree McIntosh Limited UD473/1980. Gurr v Office of Public Works [1990] ELR 42.

124

Unfair Dismissal  [3.72] This issue was extensively examined in Carroll v Dublin Bus.232 Here the plaintiff sought an order requiring that he be permitted to return to work on a route that would facilitate him taking regular breaks, given that he had injured his back. In the course of the case, the defendant sought to rely on Rogers v Dublin Corporation,233 in which it was held that an employer is under no legal obligation to provide alternative work to an employee who is no longer medically fit to perform the duties for which they were originally employed. Clarke J agreed with this proposition but went on to make it subject to two caveats: (a) The first caveat distinguished between the work which the employee was originally employed to do and that which they may now be able to do. Clarke J held that the employee must be reasonably fit to carry out the work for which they were employed, but that an overly technical objection to an employee’s fitness to carry out such duties may disentitle the employer to treat the employee as being unable to do so. In essence, this means that if an employee can convince the court that the work which they were originally employed to do was little different from the work they are now capable of doing, the employer may not be justified in terminating their employment by reason of incapacity. (b) Second, while recognising that no term would be implied into a contract to the effect that an employer is under a duty to provide ‘light duties’ to an otherwise incapacitated employee, this rule may be displaced by an express term in the contract of employment or by custom and practice. Employers can take the following from all of this: (a) There is no obligation to provide light work (in the context of an unfair dismissal case); (b) This presumption may be displaced by an express term in the contract or wellestablished custom and practice; and (c) If the employee can prove that the work they were employed to do is not radically different from that which they are now capable of doing (despite what they are now being asked to do), this may render the termination of employment on the basis of incapacity unfair. To some extent, the matter has moved on since Carroll. The WRC and the Labour Court take the view that the employer must explore all alternatives to dismissal prior to termination, in keeping with the right of employees to fair procedures and natural justice. Illness and litigation [3.72]   An overlap often occurs where a person is on long-term absence and may also have issued proceedings for personal injury. While no one can dispute that complainants have a constitutional right to litigate, this does not take away the employer’s contractual right to investigate the circumstances of the employee’s absence due to illness. This often becomes more complicated where the illness is in dispute – such as in bullying 232 233

Carroll v Dublin Bus [2005] 4 IR 184. Rogers v Dublin Corporation (1998) ELR 59.

125

[3.73]  Termination of Employment and harassment cases, where the employee may be off on stress leave and, equally, the employer may have determined there is no case to answer in relation to a bullying complaint. Thus, in Ruffley and the Board of Management of St Anne’s School,234 the Supreme Court noted the difficulty in approaching personal injury claims where the claimant’s injuries are mental or psychiatric in nature.235 While the obligation on employers to investigate complaints seems reasonable, it often represents a significant burden – particularly where the employee who made the complaint may be off due to long-term illness and may either have been instructed not to assist or be unwilling to assist in any investigation. At the same time, however, there is a corresponding onus on employees. Thus, in Crotty v Marriott Radiators Limited,236 the EAT dismissed the claimant’s case in circumstances where the claimant – who had an ongoing back injury – was not willing to let the EAT view any medical reports prepared for his personal injury claim. Competence [3.73]   While there has always been some difficulty in distinguishing between capability and competence (again, the words are not defined in the Act), ‘competence’ deals with the employee’s ability to do the work. In case of dismissal for incompetence, the test of whether the dismissal is unfair has a number of aspects, as follows: (a) Did the employer honestly believe that the employee was incompetent or unsuitable for the job? (b) Were the grounds for this belief reasonable?237 (c) Before the decision to dismiss was taken, did the employer have an up-to-date assessment of the employee’s performance?238 Competence – or rather, incompetence – is notoriously difficult to prove, involving as it does significant judgement on behalf of managers. The EAT has stressed that incompetence is a very serious charge.239 Dealing with incompetence demands a detailed plan from employers. Rather than proceeding straight to a disciplinary procedure, employers must first set out a detailed performance improvement plan (PIP). The PIP should include structured targets and a detailed review mechanism. The PIP should be clear in the standards that the employee is required to meet; should be set out in writing; should be clearly communicated to the employee; and should also allow for some independent review outside of the employee’s immediate manager in order to afford added objectivity. Only if the employee misses or fails to achieve the agreed targets should a disciplinary procedure be implemented, and then only at the first stage, with the process being repeated until the employee is

234

Ruffley and the Board of Management of St Anne’s School 2017 [IESC] 33. Ruffley and the Board of Management of St Anne’s School 2017 [IESC] 33, para 58. 236 Crotty v Marriott Radiators Limited UD 985 2004. 237 See McDonnell v Rooney UD 504/1991. 238 O’Brien v Professional Contract Cleaners UD/184 1990. 239 See McGrath and Restrick v Fisher Field Construction and Farm Machines Ltd UD 927 and 928/1982. 235

126

Unfair Dismissal  [3.74] dismissed. Where an employer intends to engage in a PIP process, the likely consequences if the employee fails to improve their performance must be communicated to the employee from the outset. As in the case of other dismissals, the issue of reasonableness arises. Here employers will need to demonstrate that: (a) they specified a reasonable timeframe within which the employee could improve; and (b) the work that the employee was given was reasonable and they had time to concentrate on and amend defects. If the employee improves to the satisfaction of the employer and the defect is not repeated, any warning given cannot be relied on in relation to a dismissal for other reasons.240 This issue often arises where an employee who has received a warning for competence then does something else wrong which might constitute misconduct. In such situations, the warnings cannot be parcelled together to bring the employee to the next level of warning. At all stages, the targets set must be reasonable. Where work standards are deemed to be unreasonable, employers may be unable to justify the imposition of the disciplinary procedure, including dismissal for failure to meet them. Thus, in Hanlon v Smiths’ Dolphins Barn Ltd,241 the claimant was a salesman in the respondent’s garage with a target of £600 per month gross profit. He failed to achieve this and was issued with a written warning. His target was then unilaterally increased to £1,000 per months, which he failed to me albeit that he did achieve £913.00 per month. Following this he was given another warning and his target increased to £1,500 per months which he failed to meet. The EAT noted: ‘While we accept that an employer is entitled to set targets for a salesman and to increase such targets, such increases must be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.’ One of the major dilemmas faced by employers is that implementing this process generally falls to middle or senior managers; and often, once it is put in train, there is no way back. Equally, the process often leads to counterclaims of bullying, which may have to be investigated, adding not insignificantly to the time involved. Sometimes the PIP is countered by a personal injury claim for stress-related illness. Ironically, what started out as a well-meaning way to protect employees has evolved into a process that employers deem too time-consuming and costly; thus, it often leads to the premature dismissal of employees by employers in the knowledge that while they may lose an unfair dismissal claim, it is ‘cheaper’ than the alternative. Qualifications [3.74]   Similar to ‘capability’ and ‘competence’, the word ‘qualifications’ is not defined in the Act. However, s  6(4)(a) states that ‘qualifications’ relate ‘wholly or 240 See 241

Richardson v H Williams & Co Ltd UD 17/1979. Hanlon v Smiths Dolphins Barn Ltd UD 883.1992.

127

[3.75]  Termination of Employment mainly’… [to] performing work of the kind which [the employee] was employed by the employer to do’. Clearly, they cover technical and professional qualifications. They do not, however, cover matters such as work permits, as these are not qualifications. Like all other dismissals, dismissals for a lack of qualifications must also be reasonable. Thus, in O’Brien v County Dublin Vocational Educational Committee,242 the claimant was dismissed when he was deemed surplus to requirements after the full-time employee whom he had temporarily replaced resigned and the employer determined that his qualifications did not meet the standards set down by the Department of Education. The EAT found that this constituted unfair dismissal, describing the Department’s requirements as ‘unfair and totally unreasonable’. If the employee’s original qualifications and competence are no longer good enough, the employer must provide the employee with a reasonable opportunity to obtain the necessary qualifications and upskill.243

Conduct [3.75]   Section 6(4)(b) of the Act provides that dismissals for ‘conduct’ are deemed not to be unfair. The use of the word ‘conduct’ can be distinguished here from the use of the word ‘misconduct’ in the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, s 8 of which allows an employer to dismiss an employee without notice for ‘misconduct’. In interpreting the word ‘misconduct’, the EAT has restricted it to serious misconduct or matters such as violence, theft etc at work.244 Thus, the range of conduct envisaged by the 1977 Act is much broader than that envisaged by the 1973 Act. There is no definitive list of the types of conduct which will be adjudged as being so serious as to warrant dismissal. Significant weight will be given to matters such as the level of responsibility; the nature of the work; the experience of the individual; the training provided; company policies and procedures; and the reasonableness of the decision. Much will turn on the procedural aspects: see Ch 4. What constitutes misconduct was examined in some detail in JVC Europe v Panisi,245 in which the High Court set out the legal framework governing conduct-based dismissals, noting: ‘The issue for the tribunal in deciding the matter will be whether the circumstances proven to found the dismissal were such that a reasonable employer would have concluded that there was misconduct and that such misconduct constituted substantial grounds to justify the dismissal.’

242

O’Brien v County Dublin Vocational Educational Committee UD 959/1995. Coyle v Dun Laoighre Vocational Educational Committee UD 993/1996. 244 Lennon v Bredin M160/1978. 245 JVC Europe Ltd v Panisi [2011] IEHC 279, [2012] ELR 70. 243 See

128

Unfair Dismissal  [3.77] Summary dismissal [3.76]   Most contracts of employment and company handbooks detail specific acts which could amount to gross misconduct, and specify that employees can be dismissed summarily or instantly if gross misconduct is determined. The words ‘summary’ and ‘instant’ in such instances should not be read literally, as employers will still be required to carry out an honest and fair investigation into the matter. Thus, in Abdullah v Tesco Ireland plc,246 the EAT held: ‘What is required of the reasonable employer is to show that s/he had a genuine belief based on reasonable grounds, arising from a fair investigation, that the employee was guilty of the alleged misconduct and that the sanction of dismissal was not disproportionate.’

In Frizelle v New Ross Credit Union Ltd,247 the High Court set out a list of premises which employers must establish to ground a decision to dismiss fairly: (f) The complaint must be a bona fide complaint unrelated to any other agenda of the employer;248 (g) Where the complainant is a person or body of intermediate authority, it should state the complaint factually, clearly and fairly, without any innuendo or hidden inference or conclusion; (h) The employee should be interviewed and their version noted and furnished to a deciding authority contemporaneously with the complaint, again without comment; (i) The decision of the deciding authority should be based on the balance of probabilities flowing from the factual evidence and in light of the explanation offered; and (j) The actual decision as to whether a dismissal should follow should be proportionate to the gravity of the complaint, and of the gravity and effect of dismissal on the employee.249 This is reflected in the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures (SI 146/2000), which codified natural justice principles in disciplinary matters. Dishonesty [3.77]   Dishonesty is as broad a category as conduct or misconduct, ranging as it does from minor infractions such as a lack of integrity to major infractions such as theft and fraud.

246

Abdullah v Tesco Ireland plc UD 1934/2014. Frizelle v New Ross Credit Union Ltd [1997] IEHC 137. 248 See O’Neill v Beaumont Hospital Board 1990 IRLM 149, where Finlay J referred to the test of objectivity. 249 See Olukova v Veolia Transport Dublin Light Rail Limited UD 2196/2011, where the Labour Court found that the sanction of dismissal would have been wholly disproportionate even had the allegations raised against the claimant been upheld in a fair and objective disciplinary process. See also Salmon v Glanbia Ireland/ DAC ADJ-00032713; An Employee v AN Employer ADJ-0005633. 247

129

[3.77]  Termination of Employment The employer need not prove the allegations of dishonesty beyond reasonable doubt; what it must do is establish a genuine belief in the guilt of the employee, based on reasonable grounds, following a fair and impartial investigation. This matter was dealt with extensively in Looney & Co Ltd,250 Thompson v Powers Supermarkets Ltd251 and Martin v Audio Video Services Centre Ltd.252 The following general guidelines have emerged from these decisions: (a) A blemish-free record, even if coupled with long service, is unlikely to render an otherwise fair dismissal unfair, as dishonesty is seen as a serious offence. (b) It is not necessarily relevant that the employee themselves did not gain from the offence.253 (c) The value of the goods themselves or the extent of the goods stolen is not necessarily relevant. In Carolan v Smith & Nephew Southalls (Ireland) Ltd,254 the claimant was dismissed for taking an ‘ophthalmic torch’; even though he returned it, the theft was still held to be sufficient to warrant dismissal. The EAT in this instance took particular notice of the ‘strict rule’ in the company handbook, which stated that in case of theft, employees would be ‘liable to instant dismissal’. Therefore, while the value of the goods themselves is not relevant, the dismissal must still comply with the terms of the company disciplinary procedure. (d) The offence may not necessarily be against the employer itself; it could be perpetrated against a supplier or another third party (eg, where an employee stole four loaves of bread from a delivery van).255 (e) Even if an employee is acquitted of a criminal offence, this does not mean that the same offence cannot be relied upon to dismiss the employee fairly. In Mooney v An Post,256 Keane J stated that: ‘the acquittal by the plaintiff in the criminal proceedings did not preclude the defendants from considering whether the circumstances which gave rise to the criminal proceedings were such as to necessitate the plaintiff’s dismissal.’ (f) Other issues that will have a bearing include: (i) (ii) (iii)

whether the employee tried to cover up their actions; whether the employee’s behaviour was deliberate; and the urgency of the investigation by the employer. In this regard, delay can often defeat a dismissal being deemed fair – the logic being that if the matter was so serious, it should have been dealt with expeditiously. It is very important thus that employers deal with such issues in a timely fashion.

The overarching link in all cases of dishonesty is the matter of trust and breach of same. Trust goes to the heart of the employer/employee relationship and is often considered not only when making a decision to terminate, but also in consideration of the employee’s contribution to their own dismissal. Thus, in Structured Finance Management (Ireland) Limited and Vadym Kakinin,257 the Labour Court stated that ‘the decision

250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257

Looney & Co Ltd UD 843/1984. Thompson v Powers Supermarkets Ltd UD 531/1998. Martin v Audio Video Services Centre Ltd UD 617/1991. Hardyside v Tesco Stores (Irl) Ltd UD 256/1984. Carolan v Smith & Nephew Southalls (Ireland) Ltd UD 542 (1984). Handyside v Tesco Stores Ireland Ltd UD 256/1984. Mooney v An Post [1994] ELR 103, 117. Structured Finance Management (Ireland) Limited and Vadym Kakinin ADJ000/155/A.

130

Unfair Dismissal  [3.78] to dismiss and the manner in which it was taken cannot but be considered and unfair dismissal’; but that ‘the Complainant contributed significantly to this outcome through his unreasonable and indefensible behaviour towards his colleagues and towards management’. Ultimately, the Labour Court considered that the ‘bond of trust between the Complainant and the Respondent is so fractured that it would be futile to restore the Complainant to his previous position or the employment with the Respondent’. The high burden of proof in proving dishonesty was set out in Justin Vesey v MBNA Limited.258 Here the EAT found in favour of the claimant, noting that the respondent had gone beyond the initial allegation relating to the employee’s competence: ‘During the disciplinary process the claimant faced allegations of having submitted incorrect action codes, potentially inflating his monthly incentives and breaching trust and integrity. Before the Tribunal, the respondent further accused the respondent of having acted “dishonestly”. It was common case that the claimant submitted incorrect action codes. However, the claimant consistently maintained that no malice was intended and pointed to the fact that his monthly incentives had not in fact been inflated. The claimant also produced documentary evidence of an e-mail which established that he had already voiced concern about the way in which some of his colleagues were operating the action code system and were persistently incorrectly directing accounts back into the dialler. In all of the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal determines that the finding of dishonesty against the claimant was unreasonable and was not supported by evidence. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the claimant was transferred to a new position within the company and he experienced teething problems.’

Employee admission [3.78]   In cases of alleged dishonesty, employers generally have some proof of such dishonesty. This can arise through either the employee who has been challenged about the dishonesty admitting same or the employer obtaining some evidence unknown to the employee which suggests dishonesty on their part. In the ordinary course, once an employee admits to dishonest behaviour, there is no expectation that the employer must run the gamut of what would be normal in such investigations. This is not to say that there should be no such investigation, however, and employers will be expected to afford employees the opportunity to explain themselves and proffer reasons why dismissal should not be considered.259 Where employers have proof of such bad behaviour, they may suspend the employee in the ordinary way and ensure that all evidence to be relied upon is given to the employee before any investigation occurs. This is particularly so where there is closed-circuit television (CCTV) evidence; and such evidence should not be conflated or construed as an employee admission. It is often the case that where an employee admits to a wrongdoing, a more lenient view is taken by the WRC and/or the Labour Court. Indeed, it is generally the case that

258 259

Justin Vesey v MBNA Limited UD953/2012. Kilsaran Concrete v Vitalie Vet [2016] ELR 237; Dunne v Securitas [2017] ELR 132.

131

[3.79]  Termination of Employment tribunals and courts have some admiration for people who ‘fess up’. Thus, in Caplis v Transdev Ireland Limited,260 a Luas tram driver who was deemed a ‘safety critical worker’ within the meaning of the Railway Safety Act 2005 and not permitted to engage in double employment during rest periods, and who had admitted to driving his wife’s taxi (while she was sick) for no reward, was re-engaged following his dismissal as it was deemed by the Labour Court that summary dismissal was not an appropriate sanction in the circumstances. The Court noted that the complainant had admitted his conduct from the outset of the investigation; he (erroneously) believed that driving his wife’s taxi from time to time at the end of her shift did not equate to double jobbing; no actual breach of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 was proven to have resulted from his actions; and he had over 12 years’ service with the respondent with no previous disciplinary issues in that time. Conduct, criminal proceedings and the Gardaí [3.79]   One issue that often arises for employers is what to do if criminal proceedings have been instituted prior to or in the middle of an investigation into the employment law aspects of the matter; or whether, prior to completing an investigation into an employment law matter which is also a criminal offence, the employer should inform the Gardaí. Invariably, the employee may refuse to participate in the employer’s investigation pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. An employee may be acquitted of a criminal offence given the standard of proof required but may be perfectly fairly dismissed for the same offence. If an employer waits until after the criminal trial, it will invariably leave itself open to the accusation that the court acquitted and therefore that it should too. Also, once a criminal investigation begins, invariably the employee will be advised by their solicitor not to say anything that will incriminate them and will claim privilege against self-incrimination.261 Finally, if the Gardaí are investigating, they will be unable to offer any evidence to the WRC if there are pending criminal proceedings and they may be the only party able to adduce evidence. In Brock v An Post,262 the EAT made it clear that where a conviction was handed down, the company was entitled to rely on it notwithstanding claims as ‘to its authenticity’. In light of all of the above, and given the length of time such criminal investigations and proceedings take, it is more practical – presuming it is possible – to conclude any internal investigation first and deal with the employment law aspects prior to involving the Gardaí. If this is not possible, employers are not precluded from relying on the record of the proceedings and the employee will be expected to offer an explanation if they wish to dispute it.263

260

Caplis v Transdev Limited UDD1932. Cousins v Brookes Thomas Ltd UD 45/1988. 262 Brock v An Post UD 57/1987. 263 See Brock v An Post UD 57/1987 and Mahon v Cummins Graphics Supplies Ltd UD 673/1989. 261 See

132

Unfair Dismissal  [3.80] One issue which all employers need to consider carefully is s 19 of Criminal Justice Act 2011. This provides: 19.— (1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he or she has information which he or she knows or believes might be of material assistance in— (a) preventing the commission by any other person of a relevant offence, or (b) securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any other person for a relevant offence, and fails without reasonable excuse to disclose that information as soon as it is practicable to do so to a member of the Garda Síochána. (2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a) on summary conviction, to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both, or (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or both.

This section is written so broadly that it undoubtedly covers crimes committed within the workplace. In an employment context, it compels employers to report the commission of a crime even if that occurred in the workplace. Dishonesty and groups of employees [3.80]   Often it will be difficult to pinpoint exactly who among a number of employees committed an offence. This is not like school, where the teacher can decide to punish all. In such circumstances, employers will have to be seen to have gone to considerable lengths prior to disciplining or dismissing a group of employees. It will be necessary for the employer to call all of them together to outline concerns and ask the perpetrators to desist; and further to explain that in the event that it cannot identify the specific perpetrator or perpetrators, it will be left with no alternative but to dismiss all of them. Even then, the employer must then establish with certainty that the dishonesty occurred and that it was committed by one or all of the group, even though it was not possible to identify whom. A very extensive investigation will have to occur prior to coming to any conclusions. In Hubbard v McMullen and Gillen,264 it was deemed necessary by the employer to dismiss three barmen in a public house to stem losses as a result of pilferage and this was held to be fair. Arising out of this, there seem to be a number of rules, as follows: (a) The offence itself, if attributable to one person, is sufficient to justify dismissal; (b) The employees concerned were first warned as a group and individually as to the consequences of the matter continuing; (c) There was a thorough investigation;

264

Hubbard v McMullen and Gillen UD 580, 670 and 721/1983.

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[3.81]  Termination of Employment (d) As a result of the investigation, the employer was satisfied and reasonably believed that one or more were responsible for the dishonesty. Note that it does not seem sufficient that the employer believed that the loss or dishonesty was down to one person; and (e) As between the members of the group, the employer could not distinguish who was responsible.265 Fighting and general horseplay [3.81]   Practically all company handbooks and contracts of employment that contain a discipline and dismissal procedure provide that violence towards others constitutes gross misconduct, the penalty for which is dismissal without notice. In general, the Labour Court will take a strong stance on violence in the workplace; however, whether dismissal will be held to be fair will be determined by the nature of the offence, the time at which it occurred, the state of mind of the person who is alleged to carry out the offence and whether it was effected on or off the premises. Equally, the nature of the investigation and the reasonableness of the conclusion are paramount. The following are some guidelines: (a) If the offence occurred off the premises, the employer will be required to show that it was work related. In Keane v Westinghouse Electric Ireland Ltd,266 the employee was dismissed following a scuffle between the claimant and his supervisor over the fact that the claimant had been suspended as a result of his supervisor reporting him. The EAT at the time took the view that this was ‘work related’. Contrast this with the decision in Murray v LFS & P Enterprises,267 where it was held that the dismissal of an employee following an altercation at 5:30 am was not the right climate to make ‘an appraisal of the employee’s conduct’. (b) Dismissal as a result of assault on a junior employee by a person in authority will generally be held to be fair.268 (c) Similarly, where the incident involves an alleged assault on a person of diminished capacity, the dismissal is likely to be deemed fair.269 (d) The capacity of the person committing the offence has to be considered. Thus, in Bergin v Bus Atha Cliath,270 the claimant had committed an assault on a fellow employee as a result of a medical problem, and his having asked to be relieved from duty five times during the day was taken into account.

265

Parr v Whitbread plc [1990] IRLR 39. Keane v Westinghouse Electric Ireland Ltd UD 63/1986. 267 Murray v LFS & P Enterprises UD 11/1986. 268 Dublin Corporation v Hardy UD 571/1983. See also Reid v Roadspeed Internation (Ireland) Ltd UD 258/1992, where the EAT stated that: ‘When a person in authority strikes a subordinate it is very difficult, if not impossible, to justify.’ 269 See Mc Gee v Peamount Hospital UD 136/1984. See also Corcoran v Cope Ltd UD1105/2011, where the dismissal of a hostel worker for kicking an inoccent, defenceless homeless man sleeping in an armchair was deemed fair. 270 Bergin v Bus Atha Cliath UD 61/1987. 266

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.83] (e) Horseplay which, although dangerous, does not injure another is generally given a higher tolerance level.271 That said, in light of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and the onus on employers to provide proper protective equipment and train employees in health and safety, coupled with the need for safety statements, the tolerance to such matters may decrease over time. Provocation [3.82]   Where an employee has been provoked, a more lenient attitude may be adopted by the Labour Court. Thus, in Byrne v International Contract Cleaners,272 where the EAT was satisfied that management had been aware that there were problems in the working relationship between the claimant and the co-worker he struck, the dismissal was deemed to be unfair. In A Warehouse Operative v A Discount Retailer,273 the complainant was dismissed for allegedly using racially charged language towards a colleague. The complainant in his response did not deny the statement, but noted that he had been stressed at the time and did not intend to be aggressive; and because he did not know his colleague’s name, he referred to their ethnicity. The adjudication officer found in favour of the employee, agreeing with his evidence that the words used were not intended to be aggressive and that a lesser sanction could have been imposed in the circumstances.274 Attending work under the influence of drink or drugs [3.83]   This is one of the more difficult matters to deal with and in general, a very lenient view is taken by the WRC and the Labour Court on such matters. This is particularly so where alcohol abuse has been a problem over time. Again, many collective agreements, company handbooks and contracts of employment provide that attending work under the influence of drugs or alcohol will constitute gross misconduct, the penalty for which is dismissal without notice. Reference also has to be made to obligations on employees under The Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 20015, s13 (1)(c) which provides that employees submit to any ‘ appropriate, reasonable and proportionate tests for intoxicants by, or under the supervision of, a registered medical practitioner who is a competent person, as my be prescribed. As yet no regulations have been passed to underpin this section of the act. However the Health and Safety Authority did publish an information sheet titled, ‘Intoxicant at Work Information Sheet’ which in a frequently asked questions format attempts

271 See

Brennan v St Lukes Home Incorporated UD 643/1988. Byrne v International Contract Cleaners UD 538/1993. A Warehouse Operative v A Discount Retailer, ADJ-00015691. 274 See also A Store Manager v A Store ADJ-00020602; A Meat Plan Operative v A Meat Plant Processor ADJ-00014739. 272 273

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[3.83]  Termination of Employment to provide guidance to employers and employees in relation to health and safety at work.275 Section 13 sets out the general duties of an employee with regard to health and safety. It includes an obligation to ensure that they are not under the influence of an intoxicant to the extent that they are in ‘such a state as to endanger [their] own safety, health or welfare at work or that of any other person’. ‘Any person’ is not defined and is extremely broad. It can mean a fellow employee or a customer, or indeed a member of the public. The section goes on to provide that if ‘reasonably requested by his or her employer’, an employee must submit to ‘any appropriate, reasonable and proportionate tests for intoxicants by, or under the supervision of, a registered medical practitioner who is a competent person, as may be prescribed’. The section also compels the employee to cooperate with their employer to comply with any ‘relevant statutory provisions’. The first thing to note is that there is a clear difference between alcohol addiction and drugs. The latter is generally defined to mean illegal street drugs, and employers’ policies should reflect this and in general name the illegal drugs which are prohibited. The main difference here is the fact the street drugs are illegal, whereas alcohol is not. In Trevor Kennedy v Veolia Transport Ireland,276 the EAT upheld a dismissal for gross misconduct after Mr Kennedy failed a random workplace alcohol test on a Sunday morning shift. There had been a drug and alcohol policy in place and it had been agreed with the union, although Mr Kennedy never received a copy. The Labour Court took a slightly different view in Alstom Ireland Ltd v A Worker.277 Here the worker had failed a random drugs test even though the quantity of intoxicant found was very low (described as a residue). His union argued that it was of such a low percentage that the test should properly be classified as negative. The employer, however, operated a zerotolerance policy. The court went on to state: ‘The Court is satisfied that the Company acted honestly and reasonably in dealing with what was reported to it as a positive result for a prohibited drug. The worker has at all times denied that he used the drug in question. In the Court’s view, in all the circumstances of this case, there is room for some doubt as to whether the particular result in issue should have been reported as positive or negative. In the light of the conclusion reached earlier in this Decision on the necessity for agreement on the modalities of these tests, and the recommendation that agreed guidelines be now put in place about which there can be no dubiety, the Court is of the view that the worker should be given the benefit of the doubt.’

In Serikovs v Litec Moulding Limited,278 the EAT rejected the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal in circumstances where he had been dismissed on the grounds of gross misconduct when he presented to work intoxicated. In its decision, the EAT accepted the employer’s arguments that it had a duty of care to ensure that the health, safety and welfare of all its employees were not comprised. Significantly, the EAT placed

275

https://www.hsa.ie/eng/publications_and_forms/publications/occupational_health/intoxicants_at_ work_information_sheet_.pdf. 276 Trevor Kennedy v Veolia Transport Ireland UD 240/2006. 277 Alstom Ireland Ltd v A Worker Decision No AD 0765. 278 Serikovs v Litec Moulding Limited UD525/2015.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.83] particular emphasis on the rules contained in the company handbook covering the grounds which gave rise to the dismissal, on the basis that gross misconduct and termination were the likely sanction in such circumstances. In Aryzta Bakeries v Cacs,279 the Labour Court held that the dismissal of the complainant was fair in circumstances where he had turned up for work under the influence of alcohol, even though he denied the same, saying that he had consumed some herbal medicine which included a small amount of alcohol. The Labour Court held that it was entirely reasonable for the shift manager to conclude that the complainant had attended for work under the influence of alcohol; and that even though the complainant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, this did not render the procedure ‘fatally unfair’. The following lessons can be determined from all of the above: (a) Dismissal is not automatically appropriate for alcohol or drug-related offences. (b) A proper policy regarding drugs and alcohol must be in place; employees must be aware of it; and if this extends to random drug and alcohol testing, they should be reminded about it on regular occasions. If there is a union representing the workforce, it should be agreed with them. (c) Each case should be judged on its own merits; and factors such as risks to health and safety,280 the level of responsibility of the employee, the risks involved, contact with members of the public and company policies will all be taken into account.281 (d) Where alcohol abuse has been a consistent problem, dismissal will be deemed to be fair only once the procedures have been exhausted, the employee has been given the opportunity for treatment, and the employee has been put on clear notice that any further offences will result in the termination of their employment.282 In addition to dismissal on the grounds of intoxication being deemed fair and reasonable, it seems that possession of drugs in the workplace will be dealt with in a similar fashion. However, the overarching theme of such case law is that possession of drugs and/or drug paraphernalia is categorised as gross misconduct akin to being intoxicated, within any intoxicants policy. A Sales Assistant v A Retailer283 concerned possession of drugs during the course of employment. Here the adjudication officer relied on the fact that the employer in this instance had a clear policy on possession, which provided for ‘summary dismissal’. In deeming the dismissal to be fair, the adjudication officer noted the following: ‘While the Respondents handbook does cover the use of illegal substances off the company premises as conduct justifying summary dismissal and the allegations included this issue, the core reason for the dismissal of the Complainant was for the possession of an illegal 279

Aryzta Bakeries v Cacs UDD1812. Serikos v Litex Moulding Ltd UD 525/2015, in which the EAT held a dismissal to be fair where the claimant – who had a post of responsibility in a hazardous working environment – had attended work in a state of incapacity while under the influence of alcohol. 281 See Chadwick v Power Supermarkets UD 340/1983. 282 Griffin v Beamish and Crawford UD 90/1983. 283 A Sales Assistant v A Retailer ADJ-00018048, 16 July 2019. 280 See

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[3.84]  Termination of Employment substance on the Respondents premises … The Complainant committed an illegal act which breached company procedures, put the public at potential risk and the sanction for the act was set out in the Respondents written policies of grounds justifying summary dismissal. The bond of trust has been broken between the parties and I find that the Respondent acted within “the bands of reasonableness” in this case and the claim for unfair dismissal is not well founded based on the above.’

In Asda Stores Limited v Coughlan,284 the UK EAT held that: ‘Dismissal for this single act of gross misconduct involving the acquisition and possession of unlawful drugs on the Respondent’s premises plainly and unarguably fell within the range of reasonable responses, there being no suggestion of any procedural failings on the part of the Respondent, notwithstanding the personal mitigation which was advanced on the Claimant’s behalf.’

Gross insubordination/refusal to obey instructions [3.84]   It is reasonable to expect as an employer that employees will obey reasonable and lawful instructions. The High Court in Brewster v Burke285 stated that: ‘It has long been part of our law that a person repudiates the contract of service if he wilfully disobeys the lawful and reasonable orders of his master. Such a refusal justifies an employer in dismissing an employee summarily.’

It is respectfully suggested that whereas the general thrust of this decision is correct, the Labour Court might take an entirely different view on the summary dismissal aspect of this.286 In particular, since the 1993 Amendment Act, there is a substantial focus on fair procedures and it is probable that the Court would demand that an opportunity be given for the employee to consider their refusal prior to being summarily dismissed. It should also be borne in mind that the instruction must be lawful and reasonable; and notwithstanding this, the Court will also consider whether the employee was justified in refusing to obey the instruction. This is arguably a more onerous requirement for senior management. The UK case of Adesokan v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd287 is particularly instructive in this regard. Here the appellant was a regional operations manager with Sainsbury’s. He became aware that a HR business partner with whom he worked had sent what was ultimately described as a ‘wholly inappropriate email’ to five store managers. When the appellant learned about it, he asked the HR business partner to ‘clarify what he meant with the store managers’. In fact, the HR manager did not do this; but the appellant equally did not check that he had done so. The email was then subsequently recirculated as part of a chain of emails; and when the appellant found out about this, he did nothing to remedy the issue. Ultimately, an investigation was carried out; and while it was accepted that

284

Asda Stores Limited v Coughlan UKEAT/0451/10. Brewster v Burke (1978), HC. 286 See Dooley v Great Southern Hotels Ltd where McCracken J states that it could be argued that this case does ‘not represent the law as of today. Dooley v Great Southern Hotels Ltd [2001] IEHC at para 23. 287 Adesokan v Sainsbury Supermarkets Ltd [2017] ICR 500. 285

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.85] the appellant had nothing to do with the offending email, the appellant was nonetheless dismissed on the basis that he had acted with gross negligence amounting to gross misconduct. Mr. Adesokan appealed the decision; however, the UK Court of Appeal upheld the decision to dismiss.288 Also, one has to consider s 27 of the Safety, Health, and Welfare at Work Act 2005, which protects employees who are penalised as a result of raising issues of a health and safety nature or leaving their place of work in order to protect themselves. Thus, in Stobart (Ireland) Driver Services Ltd v Keith Carroll,289 the Labour Court and the High Court on appeal both determined that the dismissal of the claimant truck driver amounted to penalisation under the 2005 Act, as he had refused to work because he was tired and had allegedly worked excessive hours. The following can therefore be determined from this: (a) The refusal by the employee must be unreasonable. (b) If the refusal is in breach of a term of the contract, and the employee is afforded the opportunity to consider their refusal prior to a decision to dismiss being taken and are fully warned as to the consequences of their continued refusal, the dismissal is likely to be upheld.290 (c) The refusal to carry out an illegal act will not be held to be unfair;291 nor will the refusal to carry out an instruction which is in breach of health and safety legislation.292 Crimes outside the workplace [3.85]   It often happens that an employee may commit a crime outside the workplace, which may in some instances result in their incarceration. In such circumstances, is it reasonable for the employer to dismiss the employee with or without notice, or should it hold their job open – and if so, for how long? Similar to other aspects of employment law, this depends on various factors, such as whether the claimant’s criminal conduct renders them unsuitable for employment. In O’Leary v Crosbie,293 where the claimant was convicted of indecent assault and received a 12-month sentence, which was reduced on appeal to a suspended sentence and a fine, the EAT stated that the critical factor is ‘whether or not the claimant’s criminal record was such as to render him unsuitable for his employment with the respondent or unacceptable to other employees’. In this case, the EAT was of the opinion that the onus was not fully discharged. Equally, however, in Barry and French v Irish Linen Service Ltd,294 where the claimants had participated 288 289 290 291 292 293 294

See also Cavanagh v Dunnes Stores UD820/1994. Stobart (Ireland) Driver Services Ltd v Keith Carroll [2013] IEHC 581. Rankin v Peamount Hospital UD 107/1982. Brown v McNamara Freight Ltd UD 745/1987. Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act 2005, s 27. O’Leary v Crosbie UD 1118/1983. Barry and French v Irish Linen Service Ltd UD 905 and 906/1986.

139

[3.85]  Termination of Employment in an attempted robbery in which one of the company’s vehicles was involved, there was deemed to be a clear nexus between the criminal behaviour and the place of work. Clearly, a key factor in such dismissals is the position held by the claimant; and the greater the responsibility attaching to that position, the more likely the ‘bond of trust’ between the employer and employee will have broken down and the greater the probability that dismissal will be held to be fair. Thus, in Noonan v Dunnes Stores,295 where an employee was dismissed following a late-night assault on a garda who she allegedly hit with her umbrella, dismissal was held to be unfair and re-engagement was ordered. In contrast, in another case involving Dunnes Stores the same year, an employee who had burgled an adjoining premises was held to have been fairly dismissed, as the EAT felt he had breached the bond of trust.296 Graham v Portroe Stevedores297 illustrates the danger for employers in this area. Here the EAT awarded the maximum compensation possible of €154,772 after a late-night fracas. The main reason for this seemed not to be the fracas itself, but rather the fact that the HR manager who had witnessed the incident himself had carried out the investigation. In Pearce v David Flynn,298 the claimant – a general operative – was convicted of driving away from a petrol station without paying on ten occasions. The respondent was carrying out ‘snagging work’ at the petrol station at the time. The conviction was reported in the press and a number of senior managers read about it. The matter was discussed between the managing director and the head of HR. Both said that they had lost trust in the claimant. However, there was no formal investigation into the matter and despite the claimant trying to call the managing director, the latter refused to take his calls. While the EAT found that the respondent ‘had substantial grounds for dismissing the Claimant’, the dismissal was found to be procedurally unfair. The EAT gave detailed consideration as to how these cases should be approached in Crowe v An Post.299 Here the EAT went on to say the following: ‘There is considerable uncertainty as to whether an employee’s conviction for a crime committed outside the workplace would entitle the employer to dismiss the employee. In such circumstances the employer would argue that the bond of trust had broken down. The matter is not that straightforward. The basic principle is that usually an employer’s jurisdiction over misconduct of an employee ends at the company gate. A dismissal for misconduct outside the workplace can only be justified where there is sufficient connection between the crime committed and the employee’s work, in such a way that would render the employee unsuitable or capable of damaging the employer’s reputation. The guiding principle with cases involving misconduct outside the workplace is that the employer must be able to show a connection between the misconduct and the company’s operational requirements. As a general rule the employer has no right to institute disciplinary proceedings unless it can be demonstrated that it has some legitimate interest in the conduct of the employee. 295

Noonan v Dunnes Stores UD 1068/1998. Martin v Dunnes Stores (Enniscorthy) Ltd UD 571/1988. 297 Graham v Portroe Stevedores UD 574/2006. 298 Pearce v David Flynn UD 833/2006. 299 Crowe v An Post [2016] ELR 93. 296

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.86] An interest would not normally exist where there is some nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer’s business. The employer has to demonstrate that it has a legitimate interest in the crime committed to the extent that the misconduct is disruptive to the business, employee relations or affects the reputation of the company. The test is: has the out of work conduct of the employee impacted adversely, or can impact adversely on the employer’s business? If it has, then the employer has the right to institute disciplinary proceedings.300 Whether this gives the employer the right to impose sanctions, up to and including dismissal, will depend on the particular circumstances of each case. No two cases are the same and each case must be decided on its own merits.’

In Gerard McVeigh v Dunnes Stores,301 the claimant was dismissed for reasons relating to his ‘integrity’, as the respondent claimed that his arrest and criminal charge outside of employment called into question the company’s reputation and constituted a breach of the respondent’s code of conduct, which accounted for such outside matters. Prior to his dismissal, when asked about the issue, the claimant had informed his employer that his solicitor had advised him not to divulge particulars of the incident. In upholding the dismissal as fair, the adjudication officer noted that: ‘Trust is an essential component of all employer/employee relationships. The respondent had a duty to deal with the incident which was widely reported on 13/07/2021. [sic.] on 04/10/2018. It is clear that the respondent had a policy which dealt with such an eventuality.’

The following can be taken from all of the above: (a) The crime itself must be sufficiently serious, and most probably it must be an indictable offence. (b) There must be a clear connection between the crime and the place of work.302 (c) The crime itself must be sufficient to warrant that the bond of trust between the company and the individual has been broken. (d) The crime must render the person unsuitable for working with the remaining employees. Incarceration of employees [3.86]   Notwithstanding all of the above, what happens when a person is convicted and incarcerated? Must the employer to hold open the job until the person is released? Again, this depends on the nature of the offence and the duration of the sentence. Clearly, the longer the sentence, the less onus there is on the employer to hold open the job. However, a short sentence for a very senior employee could result in dismissal if the bond of trust has broken down. Equally, the employer may not need to hold the job open where the crime makes it impossible for the person to do their job. For example, in O’Connor v Astra Pumps Ltd,303 where the claimant’s driving licence was suspended, the dismissal was found not to be unfair, as the claimant was unable to carry out the job for which he was employed. 300

See also A removal Assistant v A Removals Business ADJ-00013353 March 19 2019. Gerard McVeigh v Dunnes Stores ADJ-00036287, 17 August 2022. 302 The absence of a work nexus was held to be fatal in Brady v An Post UD 463/1991. 303 O’Connor v Astra Pumps Ltd UD 486/1986. 301

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[3.87]  Termination of Employment In Gallagher v Eircom Ltd,304 the EAT held that the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment which prevented the employee from performing his contract of employment was a frustrating event. This was deemed to be the case even where the conviction was quashed on appeal.305 However, these cases may be distinguished from the decision in An Electrician v A Transport Provider.306 Here, following a street fight in June 2016 while on leave, the complainant was arrested, prosecuted and received an eightmonth prison sentence in Paris. This was reduced in October 2016 to 20 weeks. He was informed on 12 September that his employment would be terminated on 14 September. In an examination of the law in this area, the adjudication officer referred to the decision in Prior v City Plumbers,307 which determined that a prison sentence of 12 weeks was insufficient to frustrate the contract; along with the determination in Langan v Donegal County Council,308 which held that a lengthy absence of almost three years due to illness with the prospect of the recovery did not frustrate the contract. Having done so, the adjudication officer determined that the respondent had failed to investigate the length of the sentence, to analyse how the complainant’s absence could be facilitated. The adjudication officer noted that in Gallagher,309 the employee had been imprisoned for eight years and the case did not lay down any broadly applicable rules regarding when the doctrine of frustration applies; nor was there a suggestion in that decision that a term of imprisonment, irrespective of its length, will automatically render the contract frustrated. The adjudication officer found that, on the evidence submitted, the nature of the employment and the alternative options available to the respondent (which included unpaid leave), the eight-month prison sentence reduced to five months was insufficient to frustrate the contract. Thus, similar to all other claims for unfair dismissal, each case in which incarceration arises must be dealt with on its own merits. There is no ‘one size fits all’ formula; but clearly, where very substantial prison sentences are imposed, the doctrine of frustration can be relied upon. It is worth noting that where an employee is deemed to have been unfairly dismissed due to them being imprisoned, any redress awarded will be reduced substantially, the employee, having been deemed to have contributed to their own dismissal.310 Involvement of the Gardaí [3.87]   Where a crime has been committed outside the workplace, the employer will have no control over the pace of the criminal investigation. This does not mean that the employer must cease any internal investigation until such time as the criminal

304

Gallagher v Eircom Ltd UD 955/2004. DO v A National School UD 181/2007 – here the contract has been frustrated by the imposition of a number of terms of imprisonment up to ten years. 306 An Electrician v A Transport Provider ADJ-00007578 (January 2019). 307 Prior v City Plumbers EAT/0535/11. 308 Langan v Donegal County Council UD143/80. 309 Langan v Donegal County Council UD143/80 at 257. 310 Electrician v A Transport Provider ADJ-000-7578; Flynn v Ianrod Eireann ADJ-00030195. 305 See

142

Unfair Dismissal  [3.89] investigation is concluded. This issue was examined in the case of Rogers v An Post.311 Here the Plaintiff was the acting branch manager at Roscommon Post Office when on the 28th of March 2012, he was suspended on full pay by the defendant pending investigation of an allegation that he was responsible for the mistreatment of an item of registered post containing a urine sample from another postal worker that was en route from a member or an Garda Siochana in Roscommon to the Medical Bureau of Road Safety in Dublin for analysis in connection with a suspected drink driving offence. Subsequent to this he was charged with an offence of perverting the course of justice and a trial occurred ultimately where the jury could not reach a verdict and a re-trial was fixed. He remained suspended on full pay throughout this period. After the hung jury the respondent sought to recommence the disciplinary process however the Plaintiffs solicitors objected on the bases that the criminal charge had yet to be determined. On the 10th of April 2014 he sought an injunction restraining the defendant from taking any further steps in the disciplinary process relating to the plaintiff until the determination of the criminal proceedings. In refusing the application Keane J noted that if the injunction was granted that ‘the effective contest between the parties is likely to have been fully decided summarily in favour of the plaintiff’ and that this would ‘effectively preclude the defendant from the opportunity of having its rights determined at a full trial.’ Bullying and/or harassment [3.88]   This area is probably one of the most difficult for employers to deal with. Often such cases are coupled with personal injury cases for injury and stress. Harassment is also an offence under the Employment Equality Act. Because claims of bullying and harassment generally involve intra-employee disputes, such issues more often than not give rise to constructive dismissal claims, as distinct from unfair dismissal claims. Here the same standards of proof are required. Thus, in Drogheda Resource Centre Ltd v Reilly,312 the Labour Court rejected the complainant’s assertion that she had been constructively dismissed and upheld the respondent’s appeal. The Court was satisfied that the claimant had failed to utilise the respondent’s internal procedures to address her complaint that her supervisor had bullied her. However, where such claims are raised and, subsequent to proper investigation, are deemed to be well founded, this can give rise to the imposition of disciplinary action up to and including dismissal.313 Parallel proceedings in personal injury and bullying and harassment cases [3.89]  Cunningham v Intel Ireland Limited314 considered in detail whether parallel proceedings can be taken by an employee who institutes proceedings under the 311

Kevin Rogers v An Post [2014]IEHC 412. Drogheda Resource Centre v Reilly UDD1929 June 10 2019. 313 For bullying claims in general in the workplace, see Ruffley v Board of Management of St Anne’s School [2017] IESC (on appeal from the Court of Appeal [2015] IECA 87). 314 Cunningham v Intel Ireland Limited [2013] IEHC 207, [2013] ELR 233. 312

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[3.89]  Termination of Employment Workplace Relations Act 2015 and also seeks damages for personal injury in a civil claim in the High Court. Here the plaintiff had issued personal injury proceedings against her employer in the High Court, in addition to instituting a claim for genderbased discrimination before the Equality Tribunal (as the case pre-dated the coming into effect of the Workplace Relations Act 2015). The defendant sought to have the High Court proceedings dismissed and in doing so relied, inter alia, on the rule in Henderson v Henderson.315 Cunningham v Intel was subsequently overturned by the decision in Culkin v Sligo County Council & Anor.316 Here the Court of Appeal stated that an individual who has brought an unsuccessful claim for discrimination and harassment under the Employment Equality Acts 1990–2015 is not automatically precluded from proceeding with a personal injury claim to the High Court, even where both claims arise out of the same alleged set of facts. Cunningham relied on the rule in Henderson v Henderson,317 which is often argued before the courts by a party seeking to avoid having to defend multiple separately brought claims arising from the same set of facts. The rule, inter alia, provides that: ‘the Court requires the parties that litigate to bring forward their whole case, and will not, except under special circumstances, permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of the matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have from negligence, inadvertence or even accident, omitted part of their case.’318

The Court in Culkin319 noted that the rule in Henderson v Henderson is not automatically applicable in cases where there is a designated statutory rule of redress for certain aspects of an individual’s case. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the rule in Henderson v Henderson requires that the plaintiff have been able to have brought forward the claim in the second proceedings in the first proceedings. In respect of Mr Culkin’s case, the Court observed: ‘Even if he had wanted to, the plaintiff could not have combined a common law claim for personal injuries along with a statutory claim for discrimination in the one set of proceedings. Just as the Equality Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the common law claim, the High Court had no first instance jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the statutory claim for discrimination or harassment under the 1998 Act.’320

The Court further noted that s 101(2) of the Employment Equality Act states that: ‘where an individual has referred a case to the Director under Section 77 (1) and either a settlement has been reached by mediation or the director has begun an investigation under section 79, the individual:(a) shall not be entitled to recover damages at common law in respect of the case and,

315

Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100. Culkin v Sligo County Council & Anor [2017] IECA 104. Culkin v Sligo County Council & Anor [2017] IECA 104 at 260. 318 As captured in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, pp 114 and 115. 319 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, pp 261. 320 Culkin v Sligo County Council [2017] IECA at para 23. 316 317

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.90] (b) where he or she was dismissed before so referring the case, shall not be entitled to seek re-dress (or to exercise, or to continue to exercise, any other power) under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 1993 in respect of the dismissal,

The Court of Appeal, unlike the High Court, determined that a much narrower interpretation of this section is required. The Court of Appeal stated that the limitation under s 101(2) applies only in respect of common law claims concerning an employer’s failure to comply with an equal remuneration claim or an equality clause. The Court stated: ‘s.101 serves to bar complementary claims for discrimination before the Tribunal and the common law in respect of claims based on failure to comply with an equal remuneration term or an equality clause. But it has no wider meaning and, specifically, it does not bar subsequent personal injuries claims per se where an earlier discrimination claim before the Tribunal has failed.’321

It is thus now the case that defeating a claim of discrimination and harassment in the WRC will not automatically operate to render an employee or former employee from bringing a separate personal injury claim notwithstanding that both claims may arise from the same set of facts. One case in which this came before the WRC is McNamee v The Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection.322 Here, relying on the doctrine of res judicata and citing the doctrine in Henderson v Henderson,323 the WRC found that the ‘respondent was entitled to be a protected party from being harassed by successive actions by the [claimant] and it is not in the public interest to convene successive hearings on the same issue’. Loyalty [3.90]   A breach of loyalty generally occurs in three instances. An employee directly or indirectly competes against their employer One example of a case of indirect competition is Fairbrother v Steifel Laboratories (Ireland),324 where the employee was dismissed following his wife’s actions in promoting the launch of a competitive product. As the employee had been made aware of the likely consequences of his wife’s actions, the dismissal was deemed not to be unfair.325 In Higgins v Aer Lingus,326 the employee was dismissed for his involvement as managing director of a new Irish airline. The general principles of this were laid down in

321 322 323 324 325 326

Culkin v Sligo County Council and Anor [2017] IECA para 34. McNamee v Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection ADJ-00012254. Note that this was appealed and the Labour Court denied the appeal – see EDA1937 21 November 2019. McNamee v Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection ADJ-00012254 at 263. Fairbrother v Steifel Laboratories (Ireland) UD 665/1985. It is respectfully suggested that with the passing of the Employment Equality Acts 1989–2004, this may not be the decision today. Higgins v Aer Lingus UD 410/1986.

145

[3.91]  Termination of Employment McDermott v Kemek Ltd/Irish Industrial Explosives Ltd,327 where the EAT went on to state the following: (a) It is legitimate for an employee to aspire to set up their own business. (b) A person would consider it normal to work in the industry in which they are familiar. (c) It would be contrary to public policy to prevent someone from setting up in competition. (d) However, an employee’s duty of fidelity continues as long as they remain in employment, and there may be a point at which the preparations for the new business become incompatible with continuing to serve the existing employer. (e) If an employer believes that an employee’s actions in pursuit of their ambition have become incompatible, it owes the same duty not to dismiss unfairly as it would in any other type of case. An employee ‘double jobs’ [3.91]   In today’s economy, it is not untypical for some employees to hold separate jobs;328 however, this may impinge on the working relationship, particularly if the employee is working for a competitor. In such circumstances, the employer would need to give a clear warning to the employee. Regard must also be had to the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 provisions on double employment. Note that s 6E of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 now prohibits employers from preventing employees from taking up employment with another employer outside the work schedule established, unless it is incompatible and is proportionate and based on objective grounds.329 An employee breaches confidentiality [3.92]   Often, contracts of employment contain non-disclosure and confidentiality clauses. Nonetheless, accessing confidential information or files may be a breach of loyalty. In Mullins v Digital Equipment International,330 the employee was dismissed for allegedly trying to gain access to the company’s computer control system. The EAT held that the employee had known at all times what he was doing and deemed the dismissal fair. In McDermott v NEC Semiconductors Ireland Ltd,331 the employee was dismissed for allegedly attempting to gain access to privileged data and company computer systems. The employee told the EAT that he had no interest in any confidential information in

327

McDermott v KemekLtd/Irish Industrial Explosives Ltd [1996] ELR 233. Note s 33 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, which prohibits double employment if it exceeds the period for which an employee can lawfully work. 329 Inserted by  reg 1 of the European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations 2022, SI 686/2022. 330 Mullins v Digital Equipment International UD 329/1989. 331 McDermott v NEC Semiconductors Ltd UD146/2001. 328

146

Unfair Dismissal  [3.93] the company and it had never occurred to him that he could be dismissed. The EAT found that the employee was aware that what he was doing was attempting to access confidential files. In A Sales Representative v A Motor Company,332 the complainant admitted to sending work emails and screenshots to his personal email, but said that the information was being used for work purposes and that it had been destroyed. The employer sought proof that the material had been destroyed, but the complainant refused, saying that he was unwilling to allow access by a third party to his emails. Clause 15 of the Company Handbook, titled ‘Confidential Information’, provided: ‘All information which is not in the public domain and has been acquired in the course of your duties and employment with [employer name] must be treated as confidential both during and after termination of your employment.’ The employer also had an email policy, which included a clause stating: ‘Sensitive information regarding clients should only be discussed with the relevant authorised persons within the Organisation …’ Whereas ultimately the adjudication officer found against the respondent for procedural reasons, in reducing the award he noted that the employee emailing an extensive amount of confidential company data to himself was a breach of procedures. Breach of internet and email use policies [3.93]   Meta, Twitter, Instagram and LinkedIn are just some of the many social networking websites operational today. If employees abuse or misuse internet and email facilities in the workplace, this has the potential not only to damage the reputation of the employer, but also to significantly impact on productivity levels in the business. The critical issue here is that all employers must have detailed internet and email policies, which must be applied consistently and fairly to avoid claims for discrimination and unfair dismissal. Due process must further be afforded to an employee against whom a breach is alleged. Thus, in Colum O’Leary v Eagle Star Life and Pensions,333 the plaintiff was dismissed for sending emails around the workplace describing colleagues in derogatory and intimidating terms. The EAT awarded him €21,000 for unfair dismissal, noting that Eagle Star had a policy on emails, but had never indicated that sending an abusive email would be considered gross misconduct leading directly to dismissal. It also criticised the company for neither accepting the plaintiff’s apology nor granting him a right of appeal. A similar determination was reached in Loughran v Mullingar Electrical Wholesalers,334 where an employee was dismissed summarily for alleged gross misconduct for spending too much time on social media sites. The dismissal was deemed to be unfair and she was awarded €7,000.

332 333 334

A Sales Representative v A Motor Company ADJ-00018955. Colum O’Leary v Eagle Star Life and Pensions UD 2002. Loughran v Mullingar Electrical Wholesalers Ltd UD 1098/2012.

147

[3.93]  Termination of Employment In James Mehigan v Dyflin Publications Ltd,335 the claimant was fired after pornographic images were found on his computer. The EAT placed exceptional emphasis on the issue of downloading pornography. It went on to say: ‘Clearly, the Employment Appeals Tribunal or any other third party will be heavily influenced by the existence of a written e-mail and internet policy where the employer reserves the right to dismiss for breaches of the policy. It is unlikely that the use of the internet for unauthorised purposes will amount to a sufficient reason justifying an employer from dismissing an employee without notice in the absence of a clear written statement to this effect in the company’s policy. An exception to this, perhaps, would be a situation where an employee was using the company’s facilities to download obscene pornography from the internet.’

The EAT awarded the plaintiff €2,000 on the grounds that the company had no policy or code of practice in place which explained the consequences of misuse of email/internet. The plaintiff’s dismissal was therefore unfair. Liability will not be confined to the distribution of such material internally. Thus, the sending of pornographic materials to third parties in breach of company policy has been deemed to constitute grounds for fair dismissal.336 While it is critical to have clear policies in place, this in and of itself will not be enough. Employers must also be seen to be implementing those policies. Thus, in Bank of Ireland v Reilly,337 the High Court, in finding the plaintiff’s dismissal unfair, pointed to the fact that his circulation of distasteful, vulgar and juvenile images had been widespread and nothing substantial had been done to put a stop to it.338 A not dissimilar decision was previously issued in Murray and Rooney v ICS Building Society,339 where five bank employees were dismissed for participating in the circulation of pornographic images. Two challenged that decision on the basis that they had not partaken in the distribution of the inappropriate material. The EAT noted that there had been widespread breach of the employer’s email policy to such an extent that the employees had become ‘desanitised’ to the inappropriate nature of the material, and as such held that their dismissal was disproportionate. While having a policy is critical to the defence of such claims, policies must be explained to employees. Thus, in Walker v Bausch & Lomb,340 the EAT held that: ‘The onus was on the respondent company to establish that the dismissal of the claimant was not unfair having regard to the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1997 to 2007. The Tribunal was satisfied on the basis of the evidence that the investigation was both thorough and fair and that the conclusion that the claimant had placed the offending message on the respondent company’s intranet was, on the balance of probabilities, reasonable. The Tribunal was also satisfied that all the crucial evidence collected was given by the respondent to the

335 336 337 338

339 340

Mehigan v Dyflin Publications Ltd UD/582/2001. Employee v Employer US651/2007. Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241. See the Data Protection Commissioner guidelines (www.dataprivacy.ie), where it is clear that access to emails or internet usage should be in response to a specific and reasonable suspicion of inappropriate use of company facilities. Murray and Rooney v ICS Building Society UD2271-2/2009. Walker v Bausch & Lomb UD 179/2008.

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.94] claimant (directly or through his union representatives) throughout the process. The Tribunal did not, however, agree that dismissal was the appropriate sanction arising from the incident. There was no evidence that the internet policy was ever seen by the claimant. Very few staff actually saw the message in question and the matter was very quickly sorted out with the union and with the local media without any damage to the company. Most reasonable employers would have been more disposed to a financial penalty/suspension plus a final warning rather than the ultimate sanction of the dismissal a good employee with 15 years experience. In many respects, the claimant was, unfortunately, the author of his own misfortune. The Tribunal would award compensation in the sum of €6,500.’

Even if policies are clear and explained carefully to employees, employers must treat every case distinctly and with care; and there is an onus that any sanction must be proportionate. The issue of proportionality was dealt with in probably the first case of this nature in Ireland, Kiernan v A-Wear.341 The claimant, describing her manager in a post on the (now defunct) social media site Bebo, said: ‘I hate that f**in c**t. I’m gonna go in 2 here 2 mro and show her all the times I rang in the morning calllin me lierf** cheek!!” The EAT determined that the disciplinary procedures had been fair. It held that while the comments made by the claimant concerning her supervisor were ‘indeed disrespectful, inappropriate and damaging to the employment relationship’, dismissal was disproportionate. However, given the claimant’s contribution to her dismissal, she was awarded €4,000 plus an award of €750 as compensation for her minimum notice. In this case, it should be noted that the claimant did not name the company. In contrast, in Aoife O’Mahony v P.J.F. Insurances,342 disparaging comments were made against a director of the company, who was referred to as ‘a bitch’, and the company itself was referred to by the plaintiff on Facebook. The dismissal was held to be fair. We can learn the following from the above: (a) It is legitimate for an employer to dismiss for breach of its internet or email usage policy. (b) Not only is it necessary to have a detailed policy; this must also be explained to staff. (c) Regardless of the breach of policy, due process must be followed. (d) The decision to dismiss must be proportionate. It appears that a stricter view will be taken where people or companies are named. [3.94]   Most cases regarding access to and use of social media have focused on the ownership of company data and its alleged misuse. This issue was given great consideration in the UK case of PenWell Publishing (UK) Ltd v Ornstein.343 Here the English High Court was tasked with deciding whether an ex-employee should be restrained from using a list of email addresses which he had downloaded from his employer’s Outlook database for use in his new employment, 341 342 343

Kiernan v A-Wear UD643/2007, MN508/2007. Aoife O’Mahony v PJF Insurances Ltd UD933/2010. PennWell Publishing (UK) Ltd v Ornstein [2007] EWHC 1570 (QB), [2007] IRLR 700.

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[3.94]  Termination of Employment which directly competed with his old one. The High Court granted an injunction restraining its use and found that the list was the property of the employer, as it had been held on the employer’s email system. In another UK case, Hays v Ions,344 a former employee of Hays was ordered to hand over details of contacts that he had migrated from his work email address to his personal LinkedIn account. Notably, the judge in this case did not ask the employee to hand over the totality of his LinkedIn contacts to Hays because those contacts could include many persons who had no contact with Hays. This suggests that the judge accepted that the entire LinkedIn account, although originally operated by the employee in the course of his employment, was not material proprietary to Hays.345 Barbulescu v Romania346 concerned a private sector employer which had examined certain messages sent through Yahoo! Messenger that had been sent by its employee in circumstances where this facility had been set up specifically for use in the course of his employment. The employer discovered that the employee had sent intimate and personal messages through the service to his brother and fiancée during working hours, despite explicit prohibitions being placed on the use of the system for personal issues. The employee was dismissed and brought proceedings in Romania in accordance with the Romanian Labour Code, citing breach of art 8 of the ECHR. This case was ultimately appealed to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHr, which overturned the earlier decision of the Chamber. In an 11-to-six decision, the Grand Chamber mainly agreed with the earlier reasoning that an art 8 right to privacy was at issue; and that a balance needed to be struck between competing rights. The Grand Chamber, noting the ‘rapid developments’ in this area, considered that proportionality and procedural guarantees against arbitrariness are essential, but could be met if domestic authorities treated the following factors as relevant: (a) whether the employee had been notified of the possibility that the employer might take measures to monitor correspondence and other communications, and of the implementation of such measures. The notification should normally be clear about the nature of the monitoring and given in advance; (b) the extent of the monitoring by the employer and the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy. The Grand Chamber made a distinction between monitoring the flow of communication and the content of the communication; (c) whether the employer had provided legitimate reasons to justify monitoring the communications and accessing actual content – as monitoring content is more invasive, it requires weightier justification;

344

Hays Specialist Recruitment (Holdings) Ltd. v Ions [2008] EWHC 745. Flexman v BG Group ([2012] Employment Tribunal Case 2701998/2011, 2 October 2012) – the first case of its kind in the UK – an altogether different issue was raised, which related to whether an employee could be dismissed for using LinkedIn to search for job opportunities. While the Tribunal found that Mr Flexman had been constructively dismissed, it did so on procedural grounds and did not specifically address whether merely uploading a CV and ticking the career opportunities box constituted a disciplinary matter. 346 Barbulescu v Romania EctHR Application 61496/08 [2017] ECHR 742. 345 In

150

Unfair Dismissal  [3.94] (d) whether it would have been possible to establish a monitoring system based on less intrusive methods and measures than directly accessing the content of the employee’s communications; (e) the consequences of the monitoring for the employee subjected to it and the issue made by the employer of the results of the monitoring operation – in particular, whether the results were used to achieve the declared aim of the measure; and (f) whether the employee had been provided with adequate safeguards, especially when the employer’s monitoring operations were of an intrusive nature. Such safeguards should in particular ensure that the employer cannot access the actual content of the communications concerned unless the employee has been notified in advance of that eventuality.347 Considering the impact of online comments on a business’s reputation is crucial. The English case of Crisp v Apple Retail348 illustrates this point. The complainant, who was a sales assistant at an Apple Store, was dismissed for posting critical comments about Apple products on his personal Facebook page. He added sarcastic comments that suggested he agreed with customers’ criticisms, which damaged the company’s reputation. The employer argued that the complainant had undergone training that emphasised the importance of the company’s values, and that he had been informed of the company’s social media policy, which prohibited employees from commenting on Apple products or services on their personal websites. The UK Employment Tribunal upheld the dismissal, citing the employer’s emphasis on its image and product quality, which had been adequately communicated to the complainant. The Employment Tribunal also noted that the complainant had not cooperated with the investigation process and showed no remorse.349 However, a different outcome was reached by the WRC in A School Secretary v A National School.350 Here the complainant was a school secretary who had been asked to attend a back-to-work meeting after a period of sick leave. During the meeting, various allegations of misconduct were raised, including a social media post that the complainant had made about her work. The post featured an image from the movie Despicable Me, with the words: ‘Every day at work I wonder if this is going to be the day that I scream “F*** O** You C***” out loud instead of just in my head.’ The complainant argued that the school had no social media policy and had never provided any training on social media, and that the post was on her personal Facebook page. The respondent objected to the offensive language in the post and argued that it was serious enough to justify dismissal, as the secretary was often the ‘face’ of the school. The adjudication officer upheld the complaint, primarily because of flawed procedures. Regarding the social media post, the WRC found that the employer’s reaction had been 347

Barbulescu v Romania EctHR Application 61496/08 [2017] ECHR at para 121 (i)–(vi). Crisp v Apple Retail (UK) Ltd 1500258/2011. 349 See also the 2010 English case of Preece v JD Wetherspoons (ET/2104806/10). 350 A School Secretary v A National School ADJ-00004802. 348

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[3.94]  Termination of Employment disproportionate in the absence of a social media policy. This decision highlights the importance for employers of having clear guidelines on social media use in place. Disciplining an employee for their social media activity can be difficult, especially when company guidelines on what is permissible are unclear. A 2012 case, Smith v Trafford Holding Trust,351 resulted in a demoted employee successfully suing for breach of contract after posting an opinion opposing gay marriage on his personal Facebook page. The High Court upheld the claim, finding the company’s code of conduct provision to be overly restrictive on an employee’s freedom of speech. However, in a more recent decision, Omooba v Global Artist & Leicester Theatre Trust,352 an actor’s contract had been terminated after a Twitter post of hers opposing homosexuality was retweeted. The UK Employment Tribunal upheld the termination, pointing to the commercial reality that the production was bound to suffer due to her views and referring to the negative commentary on Twitter as evidence. This was the first occasion on which a dismissal based on the reaction to a social media post by other users was upheld. The reliance on social media commentary as evidence of damage to a company’s reputation raises questions of whether such commentary can be taken at face value or whether there must be proof of damage caused. A noteworthy exception to this is the decision in Whitham v Club 24.353 In this case, Ms Whitham had shared critical remarks about her employer on her personal Facebook page, which were not excessively offensive. They included a comment: ‘I think I work in a nursery and I do not mean working with plants.’ Her employment was terminated because her comments were considered to have harmed the company’s reputation, although no proof of such harm was presented or obtained. The EAT deemed the dismissal unfair, stating that the employer’s policy on employees’ internet use outside of work hours was too vague. Importantly, the EAT also criticised the employer for assuming that the comments had harmed its parent company without first checking whether they had, and rejected the notion that any damage had been caused. In Piotr Przebierala Bedroom Elegance (Sales) Limited Bespace,354 the complainant had been laid off during for refusing to wear a facemask in or around October 2020. While on layoff, he posted a defamatory comment about the company on Facebook. The adjudication officer deemed that that while the ‘post was certainly inappropriate and merited a serious disciplinary sanction, it was not so defamatory as a standalone offence that it justified dismissing the Complainant on the grounds of gross misconduct’. The difficulty with this decision is that this was an opinion of the adjudication officer; whereas the responsibility of the adjudication officer is to determine the facts against what a reasonable employer in the same position and the same circumstances at that time would have done,355 and to determine whether the employer’s reaction and 351

Smith v Trafford Trust [2012] EWHC 3221 (Ch). See also the UK EAT’s 2014 decision in Game Retail Ltd v Laws UK EAT/0188/14/DA November 3 2014. Omooba v Global Artist & Leicester Theatre Trust ET 2202946/19. 353 Whitham v Club 24 Ltd t/a Ventura ET 1810462/10. 354 Piotr Przebierala v Bedroom Elegance (Sales) Limited Bespace ADJ-00034374, 16 February 2023. 355 See Looney and Co Ltd v Looney UD 843/1984; Hennessy v Ready & Write Shop Ltd 192/1978 and Barry v Precision Software Ltd UD624/2005 [2006] JIEC 1801. 352

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.96] sanction came within the range of responses which a reasonable employer might make. There does not appear to have been such an assessment in this instance. Working while on sick leave [3.95]   The Sick Leave Act, 2022 provides for sick pay for employees for the first time in Ireland. Subject to PRSI contributions, once an employee’s statutory entitlement to sick pay ends, if they require further time off they may qualify for illness benefit from the Department of Social Protection. This is a basic level of protection, but employers often have more generous schemes. Employees who work while on sick leave or who otherwise abuse sick leave will be exposed to the imposition of disciplinary action. However, it must be proven that the activities in which the employee partook while on sick leave were incompatible with the employee being fit for normal duties. There is significant case law in this area, which can be summarised as follows: (a) The WRC and/or the Labour Court will take into consideration the previous sick record and any warnings issued to the employee.356 (b) If the employee is in receipt of pay from the employer, this may add to the offence.357 (c) If the employee either took holiday or played sport while on sick leave, it is likely that dismissal will be held to be fair. For example, in Murphy v Tesco Stores (Ireland) Ltd,358 where the employee was out of the country on holidays, and in Mulraney v Group 4 Securitas (Ireland) Ltd,359 where the claimant had been absent for a back strain but played a football match, the dismissals were deemed fair.

Redundancy360 [3.96]   The Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 provides that the dismissal of an employee by reason of redundancy is not unfair if it results ‘wholly or mainly’ from the redundancy of the employee.361 However, s 6(3)(a)362 provides that a dismissal due to redundancy is deemed to be unfair if the claimant has been unfairly selected. In this regard, there is a two-part test. First, the circumstances constituting the redundancy must have applied equally to one or more other employees in similar employment with the same employer who were not dismissed. Second, either the selection must have been for one of the

356 357 358 359 360 361 362

McGowran v Laura Ashley Ltd UD 741/1988. Roy v Wavin Pipes Ltd UD 119/1983. Murphy v Tesco Stores (Ireland) Ltd UD 1241/1983. Mulraney v Group 4 Securitas (Ireland) Ltd UD 841/1985. A much more comprehensive discussion on this is to be found in Ch 5. Section 6(4)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Section 6(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

153

[3.96]  Termination of Employment reasons set out in s 6(2);363 or the selection must have been unjustifiable in contravention of a procedure relating to redundancy which was established by the employer with the employee, which was agreed with the trade union or which arose by custom and practice, and there must have been no special reasons justifying a departure from that procedure.364 The burden of proving that there were such justifiable circumstances rests with the employer.365 Simply because s 6(4)(c) provides that a dismissal is not unfair if it arises wholly or mainly from a redundancy, this does not necessarily mean that every redundancy dismissal is fair. This section is ‘without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) [of s 6]’. Therefore, the WRC and the Labour Court are still required to have ‘regard to all the circumstances’ in considering whether the dismissal is unfair. Thus, in Daly v Hanson Industries Ltd,366 while the EAT found that there was a ‘redundancy element’ in the dismissal, the dismissal did not result ‘mainly’ from the redundancy itself. The cause of the claimant’s redundancy arose as a result of her having given evidence to a different division of the EAT in the hearing of a claim by the former general manager of the company. After giving her evidence, she was dismissed the following morning. Further, s 6(4)(c) merely means that while redundancy can be an absolute defence to a claim for unfair dismissal, a number of requirements must be met, as follows. First, it must be a genuine redundancy within the meaning of the Act. Thus, in Hurley v Royal Cork Yacht Club,367 the EAT held that a redundancy did not exist. Second, the employer must have behaved reasonably. The High Court has taken the view that as a redundancy is a so-called ‘no-fault’ termination, the issue of fair procedures and natural justice does not arise;368 and necessarily, the reasonableness of the employer’s actions and decision need not be examined.369 The WRC and the Labour Court are constrained by the 1993 Amendment Act, which provides that if they deem it appropriate, the reasonableness of an employer’s conduct is a factor to be considered for all dismissals, including redundancy dismissals. Section 6(7) of the 1977 Act provides that ‘in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had ‘to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal’. Thus, in Beaumont v Muintir na Tire,370 the EAT stated that ‘as a basic principle of natural justice and fairness items as important

363

Section 6(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 deems various dismissals to be unfair, such as dismissal for trade union activity, dismissal on the grounds of age, race, colour, sexual orientation, pregnancy etc. 364 Section 6(3)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 365 See Caladom Limited v Hoard and Kelly Circuit Court (Judge Clarke) 8 November 1985, reproduced in Madden and Kerr, Unfair Dismissal; Cases and Commentary (2nd Edition, 1986), p 422). 366 Daly v Hanson Industries Ltd UD55/1979. 367 Hurley v Royal Cork Yacht Club 1999 ELR 7. 368 See Minnock v Irish Casing [2007] ELR 229, where Clarke J confirmed that ‘an investigation which does not involve any findings is not a matter to which the rules of natural justice apply and is not a matter with which the Court should interfere’. 369 See O’Donovan v Over-C Technologies [2020] IEHC 291 for an explanation of no-fault termination. 370 Beaumont v Muintir na Tíre UD 668/2004.

154

Unfair Dismissal  [3.96] as redundancy should be clearly discussed with the employee’. Whereas one might question the rationale of the EAT’s reference to fairness and natural justice, given the approach of the High Court, the fact remains that the EAT noted the lack of consultation and deemed the dismissal unfair. Also, in Roche v Richmond Earthworks Ltd,371 the EAT held that the ‘failure to hold any selection process or consultation with the claimant rendered the dismissal unfair’. In Walsh v Econocom Digital Finance Limited,372 the adjudication officer held that it was: ‘disrespectful to the complainant to invite him to a meeting with no forewarning of the subject matter, and to announce that his job was redundant. No credible explanation had been given for the decision of the managers not to engage with the complainant to identify a suitable alternative role, or to extend his notice period so that he could find another job. As his manager and colleague (with three years’ service) left the company on enhanced redundancy terms, and, as the managing director indicated that she would have paid more than statutory redundancy if the complainant had asked, it was unfair and inequitable not to exit the complainant on agreed terms thus avoiding this adjudication process.’

The adjudication officer seemed to hold the view that because the complainant’s colleague had received a severance package, this rendered the redundancy unfair. Third, the employer must have a fair and transparent selection process. This requirement must be distinguished from the fact of redundancy where the matter of the role is in question. When selection arises – generally where more than one person fill a role not all roles need to be made redundant then the the process ‘moves’ from one of the role to the person or persons involved. Section 6(3) of the Act provides that a dismissal will be deemed unfair where an employee is selected for redundancy but their selection for dismissal resulted ‘wholly or mainly’ from: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

their membership of a trade union373 or engagement in industrial action; their religious beliefs; threatened or actual civil or criminal proceedings against the employer; their race or colour; their age; their membership of the Traveller community; their pregnancy; or their selection in contravention of an agreed procedure.

Accordingly, if there is no agreed procedure or custom and practice for selecting employees for redundancy, and if the redundancy does not result wholly or mainly from one of the above, the WRC and the Labour Court will consider whether the employer has acted reasonably in all the circumstances. If there is no agreed procedure, there is nothing to prevent employers from ‘constructing’ a so-called ‘redundancy matrix’, against which employees will be measured. This matrix might include such things

371 372

Roche v Richmon Earthworks Ltd UD 329/97. Walsh v Econocom Digital Finance Limited ADJ-00029093. Flanagan v MW Wallpaper Specialists Ltd UD 153, 154, 155, 156/1989.

373 See

155

[3.97]  Termination of Employment as length of service, attendance record, disciplinary record, performance ratings etc. However, this needs to be shared with the employees beforehand and they must have an opportunity to comment on it.374 All other things being equal, the employer will be expected to apply the ‘last in, first out’ principle.375 See also Ch 5.

Heat-of-the-moment resignations [3.97]   Generally, employers will be expected to consider very carefully resignations which occur in the heat of the moment or where special circumstances may exist which account for the resignation. The Labour Court case of Charles Shinkwin and Donna Millett376 (relying on the UK case of Kwik-Fit (GB) Limited v Lineham)377 was an application under the employment equality legislation. In this case, it was held that an employee may withdraw a notice of resignation where special circumstances exist relating to the context in which the decision to resign was taken. The Labour Court stated that: ‘The resignation must be withdrawn within a reasonable time which will probably be quite short. The test of reasonableness is an objective one decided in the circumstances of the case.’ It was held that the respondent’s refusal to allow the complainant to continue in her employment amounted to a dismissal. In Martin v Yeomen Aggregates Ltd,378 it was held by the UK EAT that: ‘It has obviously been contemplated in this Appeal Tribunal and has been contemplated for years that in the heat of the moment words which clear enough standing alone would indicate a dismissal can lose that effect if one looks at the surrounding circumstances. Of course, it must be a question of degree. Of course, you may get a situation in which the change of mind is so late that it is impossible to recover from the dimissory [sic] words expressed in the first place.’

In Willoughby v CF Capital Plc,379 the Court of Appeal in England and Wales held that:  ‘the “special circumstances” exception to which I have referred is one that finds its expression and application in several reported authorities. They are cases in which either the employee has given an oral notice of resignation or (less commonly) in which the employer has given an oral notice of dismissal. The words of the notice so given may, on the face of it, be clear and unambiguous and may take effect according to their apparent terms. Indeed, the general rule is that they will do so. The authorities recognise, however, an exception to that general rule: namely, that the circumstances in which the notice is purportedly given are sufficiently special that it will or may not take such effect. For example, the words of notice may be the

374 See 375 376 377 378 379

Boucher v Irish Productivity Centre [1990] ELR 205. It should be noted that last in, first out could be deemed to be discriminatory and contrary to the Employment Equality Acts 1998 and 2005. This has already been found to be the case in the UK. Charles Shinkwin and Donna Millett ED/03/33. Kwik-Fit (GB) Limited v Lineham [1992] IRLR 156. Martin v Yeoman Aggregates Ltd [1983] IRLR 49. Willoughby v CF Capital Plc [2011] IRLR 985 at para 27.

156

Unfair Dismissal  [3.97] outcome of an acrimonious exchange between employer and employee and may be uttered in the heat of the moment such that there may be a real question as to whether they were really intended to mean what they appeared to say. In such circumstances it will or may be appropriate for the recipient of such a notice to take time before accepting it in order to ascertain whether the notice was in fact intended to terminate the employment.’

The Court went on to state: ‘It is rather in the nature of a cautionary reminder to the recipient of the notice that, before accepting or otherwise acting upon it, the circumstances in which it is given may require him first to satisfy himself that the giver of the notice did in fact really intend what he had apparently said by it. In other words, he must be satisfied that the giver really did intend to give a notice of resignation or dismissal, as the case may be.’380

The Court continued: ‘the true nature of the exception is rather that it is one in which the giver of the notice is afforded the opportunity to satisfy the recipient that he never intended to give it in the first place – that, in effect, his mind was not in tune with his words.’381

In finding for the complainant in Darren Foley v McLeary’s Restaurant Limited,382 the adjudication officer noted that while the above decisions are not binding in this jurisdiction, they are persuasive authorities, applicable to cases such as this. Here the complainant had been terminated following an altercation when he had been accused of taking a cigarette break while he was supposed to be attending his workstation. He alleged that that one of the co-owners, Mr A, ‘exploded’ and said to him that if he didn’t like working there, he should ‘F*** out home then’ and ‘not to bother coming back’. The complainant stated that he had left the premises after the altercation. After that, he went to the premises to request a letter of termination, but the respondent would not let him in.383 In A Childcare Worker v A Childcare Facility,384 following a heated discussion between the complainant and her manager relating to the management of a children’s club, the complainant walked out of the workplace. Prior to this exchange, the complainant had received a phone call from a hospital requesting her attendance for urgent tests. That evening, she contacted the owner to apologise, but the owner failed to answer or to return the call; however, this was denied by the respondent. Several days later, during a call with the owner, it was stated that the employee had resigned from her position for having walked off site. While recognising that the manner in which the complainant had spoken on her final day was unacceptable, the adjudication officer also acknowledged that the complainant had been stressed due to the call from the hospital; that any decision at that point in time had been made in the heat of the moment; and that sufficient

380

Willoughby v CF Capital Plc [2011] IRLR 985 at para 37. Willoughby v CF Capital Plc [2011] IRLR 985 at para 38. 382 Darren Foley v McLeary’s Restaurant Limited ADJ-00030239, 11 January 2022. 383 See also A Welder v A Manufacturing Company ADJ-00019015 and A Senior Sales Executive v A Car Sales Company ADJ-00020747, 2 January 2020. 384 A Childcare Worker v A Childcare Facility ADJ-00025131, 18 March 2020. 381

157

[3.98]  Termination of Employment attempts had been made by the complainant post the interaction to rescind her resignation. In this case, the adjudication officer ordered re-engagement by the respondent. We can take the following from all of the above: (a) If an employee resigns in the heat of the moment, it is not sufficient for the employer merely to accept that resignation as final. (b) If the words of resignation used are ambiguous, they will generally be construed in favour of the employee. (c) Employers should allow a reasonable cooling-off period.

CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL [3.98]   In cases of constructive dismissal, because the employee has terminated their employment, the fact of dismissal is in dispute. The employee goes into evidence first and the onus of proof then lies with them. Section 1 of the 1977 Act defines ‘constructive dismissal’ as: ‘the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer.’

In examining the definition of ‘constructive dismissal’ under the Act, it becomes clear that there are two circumstances which constitute constructive dismissal: (a) where ‘because of the conduct of the employer the employee was or would have been entitled’ to terminate the contract (‘the contract test’); and/or (b) where it would have ‘been reasonable’ for the employee to terminate the contract – that is, the employer may have acted within the terms of the contract but the conduct may have been unreasonable385 (‘the reasonableness test’). These have become known as the ‘two tests’. Whereas it is easy to define these neatly when considering the wording of the Act, the WRC and the Labour Court may not approach the matter as distinctly and either test may be applied. Again, upon examination of the wording, it is clear that the contract test is more stringent, as the breach must go to the root of the contract.

And/or test [3.99]   As is set out in Western Excavating ECC Limited v Sharp,386 the legal test to be applied is an and/or test. First, the adjudication officer must look at the contract 385 386

Note that in the UK, the ‘reasonableness test’ does not exist in law. Western Excavating Ltd ECC Limited v Sharp [1978] IRLR 332.

158

Unfair Dismissal  [3.101] of employment and establish whether there has been a significant breach going to the root of the contract. If the adjudication officer is satisfied that the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intended to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the adjudication officer can determine that the employee is entitled to treat themselves as discharged from any further performance. If the adjudication officer is not satisfied that the contract test has been proven, they are obliged to consider the reasonableness test.

Unequivocal words [3.100]   In general, one would assume that for a person to successfully ground a claim for constructive unfair dismissal, the words supporting the termination of their employment should be unequivocal. This is not always so. Thus, in Cafferkey v Metrotech,387 the EAT noted that there may be exceptions – such as in the case of an immature person or a decision taken in the ‘heat of the moment’, or if ‘idle words’ are used under emotional stress – which the employer knew or ought to have known were not meant to be taken seriously.

The contract test [3.101]   For an employee to rely on the breach of contract test, they must prove that the breach went to the root388 of the contract; or alternatively, that the employer no longer intended to be bound by the main terms of the contract.389 As the latter is somewhat hypothetical, the majority of cases rest on the former. Thus, in Cosgrave v Kavanagh Meat Products Ltd,390 even though the claimant was able to prove that he had worked excessive hours and that he had been exploited in being paid less than the recommended rate for a person of his ‘training and experience’, this was not deemed sufficient for the employee to terminate the contract of employment. This case illustrates the high burden of proof on employees in such cases. This was further reiterated in Complainant v Respondent,391 which dealt with an alleged fundamental breach of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. The adjudication officer found that this breach was not considered ‘substantial enough’ to support a claim for breach of contract, commenting that: ‘Breach of Contract generally focuses on the employee not being paid for wok [sic] carried out. Nothing of this nature occurred in this case.’

387

Cafferkey v Metrotech Services Ltd UD 932/1998. See the seminal case of Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] ICR at 226, where Lord Denning MR went on to say: ‘if the employer is guilty of conduct going to the root of the contract of employment or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance.’ 389 See Byrne v R H M Foods (Ireland) Ltd UD 69/1979. 390 Cosgrave v Kavanagh Meat Products Ltd UD 6/1988. 391 Complainant v Respondent ADJ-00002364, 18 March 2018. 388

159

[3.102]  Termination of Employment While it would be wrong to limit breach of contract to cases where employees are not paid, it does point to the relatively high bar that adjudication officers might apply in such cases. While non-payment of wages generally gives rise to a breach of contract for the purposes of constructive dismissal, in A Business Development Manager v A Contact Cleaning and Facilities Company,392 a lack of transparency regarding commission was deemed insufficient to satisfy this test. In the past, the EAT generally stressed the necessity for ongoing respect and mutual trust in the employer/employee relationship, not only in constructive dismissal cases. Thus, in Brady v Newman,393 it stated that ‘as an employer is entitled to expect his employee to behave in a manner which would preserve his employer’s reasonable trust and confidence in him, so also must the employer behave’. Implied terms in a contract [3.102]   Where an employee relies on the contract test, a detailed examination of the contract will obviously be central to their claim. In this regard, expressed terms are easy to ascertain; however, a difficulty arises when an employee seeks to rely on an implied term of the contract. This notwithstanding, there are various terms which, although not set out expressly in a contract, have been held to be valid implied terms. These include: (a) the right to be provided with a safe place of work;394 (b) the maintenance of mutual trust and confidence;395 and (c) the right to be treated with respect and not to have to endure humiliation and physical violence.396 Delay [3.103]   Should an employee decide to resign and claim constructive dismissal because of either an alleged breach of contract or the unreasonable behaviour of the employer, it is seems apparent that they must decide to leave shortly after the conduct of which they have complained arose. However, a delay of a few weeks is often not fatal – for example, where the conduct complained of arose out of a demotion397 which the employee stated he had never agreed to, but had in fact protested about. In Walton v Morse and Dorrington,398 the employee did not lose her right to claim constructive dismissal in circumstances where she had delayed by a few weeks in order to find alternative employment.

392 393 394 395 396 397 398

A Business Development Manager v A Contact Cleaning and Facilities Company ADJ-00010555. Brady v Newman UD 330/1979. Maddy v Duffner Bros Limited UD 803/86. Kane v Dunnes Stores Limited UD 1547/2003; Byrne v RHM Foods (IRE) Limited UD 69/1979. Higgins v Donnelly Mirrors Limited UD 104/1979. Marriott v Oxford and District Cooperative Society (No. 2) [1970] 1 QB 186, [1969] 3 All ER 1126. Walton and Morse v Dorrington [1977] IRLR 488.

160

Unfair Dismissal  [3.105]

The reasonableness test [3.104]   Even where the employee may not be legally entitled to terminate the contract, if the employer has acted unreasonably, the WRC may still find a constructive dismissal. In such cases, it will examine the conduct of both the employee and the employer. In Kane v Willstan Racing (Ireland) Limited,399 the claimant had informed three senior managers that she felt intimidated and bullied by her new manager. The EAT found that no serious consideration had been given to these matters by any of these persons, and that the claimant was entitled to terminate her contract. In finding for the claimant, the EAT considered the matter of reasonableness and went on to say that: ‘this must be considered with reference to all of the circumstances of the case and especially where there have been changes to the terms, conditions or personality of a workplace which the employee may find difficult to accept.’ In Melligan v Karmarton Limited,400 the EAT found for the employee, a sales executive who pleaded constructive dismissal after his sales targets had been trebled before any bonus would be payable. The EAT said that it was ‘bound to find that the contract of employment and the terms and conditions of his employment were being interfered with to such an extent that he could no longer continue in the workplace’. There is a particularly high bar for complainants to cross in such cases. This was reiterated by the adjudication officer in Gary Casey v Keenan Timber Frames Ltd,401 where he went to on state that: ‘the notion places a high burden of proof on an employee to demonstrate that he or she acted reasonably.’ This is akin to the test in ‘ordinary’ unfair dismissal claims imposed on employers; so whereas there is an obligation on employers to act reasonably, there is an equal onus on employees in constructive dismissal cases. Here the complainant failed in his case, as although he had been treated badly by a particular employee, he had not brought this to the employer’s attention. Variation/mobility clauses [3.105]   Many contracts of employment contain clauses which allow the employer the ‘right’ to transfer employees to other branches/different locations. This is particularly prevalent in retail banking, where banks generally reserve the right to transfer employees between branches. These clauses often read as follows: ‘There are certain responsibilities you have to undertake as part of your role. The company may require you to perform your duties across any of its branches/stores in Ireland on a temporary or permanent basis. You agree to comply with this requirement unless exceptional circumstances prevail.’

399

Kane v Willstan Racing (Ireland) Group UD 1263/2008, MN 1168/2008 and WT. Melligan v Karmarton Limited UD 101/2008, MN 105/2008. 401 Gary Casey v Keenan Timber Frames Ltd ADJ-00041678, 18 May 2023. 400

161

[3.105]  Termination of Employment A clause such as this was examined in the UK case of Kellogg Brown and Root (UK) Limited v Fitton and Ewer.402 Here the company closed two of its UK offices and dismissed two employees who refused to work at the new site. The change would have increased their commute time by 20 to 30 hours per week. Ultimately, the Industrial Tribunal found that the instruction to move was unreasonable and that this was unfair, and that both employees were entitled to a redundancy payment. Similarly, in Connolly v Ulster Bank Limited,403 the claimant disputed a unilaterally imposed transfer made for reasons she could not accept and where she had not been consulted. She also believed it was not reasonable in circumstances where she had an impending marriage to an account holder at the branch where she worked. She argued that she regarded the transfer as effectively making it impossible or unacceptably difficult for her to continue working for the bank. The EAT took the view that the right to transfer under the contract of employment gave the bank ‘no absolute power to transfer’, saying: ‘any concept of absolute power is an illusion.’ Notwithstanding this, the EAT did not find in favour of the claimant and she failed in both the contract and reasonableness test. This matter was also considered by the High Court in Allied Irish Banks v Lupton,404 where Murphy J was not convinced that there was any justification to infer an intention on behalf of either employer or employee, or that the decision to transfer should be subject to the employee’s rights to be heard in respect of the decision generally. However, given the importance of fair procedures and natural justice today, this may no longer be the case. In O’Beirne v Dunnes Stores,405 it was found that the plaintiff had been given no notice of his move from the respondent’s Tallaght store to its Blanchardstown store, and no opportunity to make representations despite making a written request for the reasons for the move. This was found to be unreasonable. In CCL Label Limited v Gerard Byrne,406 the Labour Court considered whether reliance on a variation clause to reconfigure a person’s role constituted a breach of contract. In this case, the complainant’s contract required him to undertake driving duties. His contract contained a provision which permitted the company to assign him other duties as needed. Following the redundancy of his role due to diminished duties, the respondent offered to redeploy the complainant to operate a much larger vehicle for delivery. It was noted that no real substantive argument had been made to the Labour Court that a breach of contract had occurred, and as such, it did not consider the offer of redeployment in this instance to constitute a breach of contract. Before relying solely on a mobility/flexibility clause, employers would be well advised to consult with the employee well in advance and to ensure that the transfer in itself is not unreasonable.

402

Kellogg Brown and Root (UK) Limited v Fitton and Ewer UKEAT/0205/16/BA 2016. Connolly v Ulster Bank Limited UD 474/1981. 404 Allied Irish Banks v Lupton (1984) 3 JISSL 107. 405 O’Beirne v Dunnes Stores [2003] ELR 279. 406 CCL Label Ltd v Gerard Byrne UDD2147, 1 June 2021. 403

162

Unfair Dismissal  [3.106]

Obligation to utilise the grievance procedure [3.106]   While employees are generally expected to invoke or to try to invoke the employer’s grievance procedure in an effort to resolve their grievance before resigning, this may not be so where the case is sufficiently serious. However, in Feely v Fresenius Medical Care,407 the EAT found that there had not been a breach of a significant term of the claimant’s contract (the contract test). The EAT went on to find that the failure to invoke an employer’s grievance procedure or speak to a trusted manager about her concerns was fatal to the constructive dismissal claim. In addition, the EAT found that the employee had not allowed enough time to pass to firmly establish whether her superior’s behaviour towards her was as detrimental to her employment future as she believed. Equally, in Donovan v Dunnes Stores,408 the EAT noted that while a failure to use the grievance procedure is not necessarily fatal in a constructive dismissal case, the omission by the claimant to do this had greatly damaged her case. Added to that, the EAT noted the absence of medical evidence to support her contention that she suffered from work-related stress. In Garry Keogh v JTM Jumpstarters Limited,409 the employee failed on the basis that he had not brought his grievance to the respondent despite the fact that there was no grievance procedure in place. The EAT found that this did not outweigh the claimant’s duty to have attempted all reasonable means within the company to resolve his grievances before resigning. In Emmanuel Ranchin v Allianz Worldwide Cares SA,410 the Labour Court stated that: ‘In constructive dismissal cases the Court must examine the conduct of both parties. In normal circumstances, a complainant who seeks to invoke the reasonableness test in furtherance of such a claim must also act reasonably by providing the employer with an opportunity to address whatever grievance they may have. They must demonstrate that they have pursued their grievance through the procedures laid down in the contract of employment before taking the step to resign.’

The general obligation on the employee to exhaust the company’s internal procedure was set out in McCormack v Dunnes Stores411, as follows:“The notion places a high burden of proof on an employee to demonstrate that he or she acted reasonably and had exhausted all internal procedures formal or otherwise in an attempt to resolve her grievance with his/her employers. The employee would need to demonstrate that the employer’s conduct was so unreasonable as to make the continuation of employment with the particular employer intolerable.”

407

Feely v Fresenius Medical Care UD 758/2008, MN 697/2008. Donovan v Dunnes Stores UD 1163/2007. 409 Garry Keogh v JTM Jumpstarters Limited UD 1090/2008, MN 1000/2008. 410 Emmanuel Ranchin v Allianz Worldwide Cares SA UDD1636. 411 McCormack v Dunnes Stores UD1421/2008. 408

163

[3.106]  Termination of Employment The importance of exhausting the internal grievance processes was also highlighted in Terminal Four Solutions Ltd v Rahman412, UD 898/2011: “Furthermore, it is incumbent on any employee to utilise all internal remedies made available to him unless he can show that said remedies are unfair’. Both the McCormack and Rahman cases were cited with authority in an Employee v An Employee [sic].413 In Beglan v Scanomat Ireland Limited,414 an employee wished to have his grievance referred directly to the rights commissioner, as there was no one within the company to whom he could bring his grievance; but management refused, as they deemed that this was an internal matter. The claimant then felt that he had no option but to resign. The EAT found in favour of the claimant that he had been constructively dismissed. In Schonfield v West Wood Club Clontarf Ltd,415 the claimant had no one to complain to about the conduct of the general manager and therefore resigned. The EAT found that the resignation of the claimant was involuntary and upheld her complaint of constructive dismissal. In Allen v Independent Newspapers,416 the EAT found that the claimant had been constructively dismissed. The claimant had contended that she had been subjected to harassment and bullying, had been isolated at work, and had had her confidence undermined and her health affected to such an extent that she was forced to resign. She raised issues verbally with management and outlined her general feelings of isolation. The EAT found that she had acted reasonably in terminating her employment and it was accepted that a complaint could be processed directly to management rather than using the formal grievance procedure. In Beatty v Bayside Supermarkets,417 in referring to the existence of grievance procedures in a company, the EAT held: ‘The Tribunal considers that it is reasonable to expect that the procedures laid down in such agreements be substantially followed in appropriate cases by employer and employee as the case may be, this is the view expressed and followed by the Tribunal in Conway v Ulster Bank.418 In this case the Tribunal considered that the procedure was not followed by the claimant and that it was unreasonable of him not to do so. Accordingly, we consider that applying the test of reasonableness to the claimant’s resignation he was not constructively dismissed.’

In Ryan, Cannon and Kirk Accounting Services Limited v Violeta Kneite,419 the Labour Court held that, ‘from the evidence tendered by the complainant, the Court has found 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419

Terminal Four Solutions Ltd v Rahman UD 898/2011. Employee v Employee ADJ-00036089, May 22 2023. Beglan v. Scanomat Ireland Limited UD688/2012. Schonfield v West Wood Club Clontarf Ltd UD1013/2013. Allen v Independent Newspapers UD 641/2000. Beatty v Bayside Supermarkets UD142/1987. Conway v Ulster Bank UDA474/1981. Ryan, Cannon and Kirk Accounting Services Limited v Violeta Kneite UDD1910.

164

Unfair Dismissal  [3.106] no evidence to indicate that she made reasonable efforts to address her grievances before resigning’. In this case, the complainant had resigned from her employment due to ‘her lack of trust and confidence in the respondent’s efforts to deal with her complaint of bullying and harassment’. In finding against the complainant, the Labour Court had regard to the fact that the day after her resignation, the respondent had informed her that it was willing to implement the recommendations made in the investigator’s reports so as to alleviate her concerns. The Court viewed the complainant’s rejection of this as unreasonable. In Cope Limited T/a Cope Galway v Ms Leigh Bell,420 the employee submitted that she was aware of the grievance policies of the respondent, but that there was a ‘definite wariness and confusion’ among staff around the procedures for making a complaint and such procedures were not followed by management. She accepted that she had been informed of the procedure in a meeting with management, but she felt discouraged from making a formal complaint under the grievance procedures in place. In finding against the complainant, the Labour Court noted that the fact that she had not sought ‘to ventilate and resolve whatever grievance(s) that she had through the established internal procedures removes the possibility that her subsequent decision to resign could be regarded as a reasonable response to the situation in which she found herself’. In Anthony Martin v Wakely Engineering Limited421 the adjudicator in relying on the Beatty v Bayside Motors422 held ‘that the Complainant’s failure to engage with the Respondent in an effort to resolve his grievance significantly undermines his complaint’. However, it is accepted that in limited circumstances, the requirement to avail of internal procedures may be disregarded by the courts. This high standard is evident in the WRC’s decision in An Accountant v An Accountancy Firm,423 in which the complainant – who was a senior accountant – had a serious altercation with her employer while she was seven months pregnant. This caused her significant distress and fear, as her pregnancy was high risk. In resigning, she stated that the respondent had done nothing to alleviate her heavy workload and that she could not see ‘how the matter could be addressed internally given the Respondent’s position in the company’. In these circumstances, the adjudication officer held that it was reasonable for the complainant, who feared for her safety, to terminate her contract. While the complainant refused an offer from her employer to mediate her concerns, this offer had come some two months after she had tendered her resignation. In summary, there is a very high onus of proof on employees in constructive dismissal cases; and while the WRC and the Labour Court will treat all cases individually, utilisation of the grievance procedure is particularly important for employees.

420

Cope Limited T/a Cope Galway v Ms Leigh Bell UDD2145. Anthony Martin Wakely Engineering Limited ADJ-00034389, July 7 2023. 422 Anthony Martin Wakely Engineering Limited ADJ-00034389 at 417. 423 An Accountant v An Accountancy Firm ADJ-00017674, 24 April 2019. 421

165

[3.107]  Termination of Employment

SURVEILLANCE OF EMPLOYEES/USE OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS [3.107]   Surveillance of employees is generally used where employers suspect that something untoward is occurring; this may range from misuse of internet/email to suspicions of theft. Equally, private investigators are usually used in situations of suspected dishonesty; but they may also be used where an employee is absent due to sickness or where they are suspected of working elsewhere. However, if an employer decides to dismiss an employee following the monitoring of the employee or the use of a private investigator, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the surveillance of either the monitoring equipment or the investigator’s report; the decision must take account of all the circumstances. Thus, in Murphy v Galway City Council,424 a private investigator was hired to observe an employee who was allegedly working elsewhere while on sick leave. The EAT found that the claimant had been unfairly dismissed, as the employer relied solely on the evidence of the private investigator. Equally, while employers may monitor employees, proper procedures must be observed. This, by necessity, involves putting all the evidence before the employee and allowing them a right of response. In instances where an employee is accused of abusing the sick pay scheme or being absent while being able to work, it is not sufficient for employers simply to rely on video or other evidence showing the employee either engaged in other work or involved in some activity which, on the surface, appears to be contradictory to their illness. Employers must be fully satisfied as to whether the employee is medically capable of performing their duties. Thus, in Malone v Burlington Industries (Ireland) Ltd,425 where the employee was seen on a farm while medically certified ill, the EAT held the dismissal to be unfair, as there was a difference between being fit for industrial work for an eight-hour shift and ‘doing a bit’ around a farm or household.

Covert cameras [3.108]   The use of covert cameras in the workplace is a difficult subject. Aside from the privacy issues raised, the ECHR426 protects the right to private and family life.427 In James Caren v Celuplast & Conservatory Roofs Limited,428 the employer had installed video cameras covertly in the storeroom. Subsequently, the managing director viewed video footage which showed the claimant, along with another, loading pallets of

424

Murphy v Galway City Council UD1446/2005. Malone v Burlington Industries (Ireland) Ltd UD 947/82. 426 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 427 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 428 James Caren v Celuplast & Conservatory Roofs Limited UD 653/2003. 425

166

Unfair Dismissal  [3.108] panelling into the back of his delivery truck. The EAT held that the dismissal was fair. The EAT placed significant importance on the procedures undertaken by the employer. Specifically, it referred to the fact that the allegations had been put to the employee and a thorough investigation had been conducted. Of note, however, is that there was no challenge by the claimant as to the admissibility of the videotape evidence. Lopez Ribalda v Spain429 concerned the dismissal of five supermarket employees following the installation of covert cameras. The applicants had been subjected to a video-surveillance measure implemented by their employer in their workplace for a period of ten days, the cameras having been directed towards the supermarket checkout area and its surroundings. Thus, while the applicants had not been individually targeted by the video-surveillance, it was not in dispute that they could have been filmed throughout their working day. The ECtHR held that: ‘ the existence of reasonable suspicion that serious misconduct had been committed and the extent of the losses identified in the case would appear to constitute weighty justification. That was all the more so in a situation where the smooth functioning of a company was endangered not merely by the suspected misbehaviour of one single employee, but rather by the suspicion of concerted action by several employees, as that created a general atmosphere of mistrust in the workplace’.

The Grand Chamber concluded that the national authorities in Spain had not failed to fulfil their positive obligations under art 8 of the ECHR such as to overstep their margin of appreciation and accordingly there had been no violation of the right to privacy. The Grand Chamber was also swayed by the fact that the covert recording was for a limited period of ten days and was therefore not excessive; and that only the supermarket manager, the company’s legal representative and the union representative had viewed the recordings before the applicants themselves had been informed. Given this, the ECtHR came to the view that any intrusion into the applicants’ privacy did not attain a high degree of seriousness. The ECtHR found it notable that unlike in a previous case (Köpke),430 where covert surveillance followed a substantiated suspicion against specific employees, in this case it was aimed at all staff working on the cash registers over weeks without time limits. The ECtHR concluded that the employer should have used alternative methods to safeguard its property, and that the Spanish courts had not properly balanced the applicants’ privacy rights against the employer’s interest in protecting its property. Specifically, the ECtHR believed that the employer should have informed the workers beforehand about the installation of the surveillance system and used methods that had less impact on their privacy. In Libert v France,431 the applicant claimed that his employer had violated his right to privacy by accessing files on his work computer without him being present. Here the applicant had been suspended and, on his reinstatement, discovered that his work 429

Lopez Ribalda C Spain (Applications 1874/13 and 8567/13), ECtHR (Grand Chamber) – referral to Grand Chamber from Third Section of Court – arts 6 and 8 of the ECHR. 430 Kopke v Hermany [2010] ECHR 1725. 431 Libert v France [2018] ECHR 185.

167

[3.108]  Termination of Employment computer had been seized. He was informed that the person who had replaced him during his suspension had alerted his superiors to documents which had caught his attention on the applicant’s work computer. The applicant was dismissed by reason of the items found on the computer. The ECtHR determined that although domestic law allowed the employer to open files stored on the employee’s work computer, the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim of preventing a crime. However, the interference was intended to safeguard the protection of the employer’s rights, ensuring that employees used the computer facilities for work purposes. The Court concluded that the interference did not breach the right to privacy under art 8 of the ECtHR, as French law prohibits employers from surreptitiously opening personal files, and the computer files in this case were not clearly identified as personal. The principles applied by the ECtHR in assessing the limits to the right to a private life under art 8 are similar to the principles contained in the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).432 These decisions make clear that the ECtHR will place a heavy emphasis on the proportionality of measures used to monitor employees and whether such measures pursue a legitimate aim before it will find that a breach of the right to privacy under art 8 of the ECHR has occurred. A Dental Technician v A Dental Laboratory433 involved a dental technician who discovered that she was being recorded at work by a hidden camera pointed at her desk. Upon discovering the hidden camera, the employee became upset and went on sick leave. She subsequently brought her concerns to the attention of her employer, who dismissed the incident as unimportant. Consequently, the employee resigned from her role and submitted a complaint of constructive dismissal to the WRC. The central issue before the adjudication officer was whether it was fair and reasonable for the employee to terminate her employment upon discovering that she had been covertly recorded by her employer. The employee argued that her employer had not acted reasonably by conducting clandestine surveillance on her, which was addressed by the Data Protection Commission and the Article 29 Working Party,434 which specifically required disclosure. With regard to whether such camera use should be permitted, the employee asked the adjudication officer to consider that only one person knew of its existence; only one person operated the camera; it was facing just one employee; it was hidden; and the parties in question were in regular contact during this period. In consideration of those factors, the employee maintained that it was reasonable for her to justify the termination of her employment. The adjudication officer noted that s 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 provides two circumstances in which a resignation will be considered a constructive dismissal. The employer’s conduct must amount to a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment which goes to the root of the contract or shows that the employer no longer intends to

432

Regulation (EU) 2016/679. A Dental Technician v A Dental Laboratory ADJ00012025 (January 29 2019). 434 The Article 29 Working Party was the independent European working party that dealt with issues relating to the protection of privacy and personal data until 25 May 2018, when the GDPR came into being. 433

168

Unfair Dismissal  [3.108] be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract. The employee is then entitled to consider themselves discharged from any further performance. The employer argued that the surveillance camera had been installed for the employee’s safety, as he was nervous about the employee being on her own on the premises. However, the adjudication officer noted that this explanation did not sit well with the employee, and there was a total absence of any reference to questions in relation to intruders or any strange occurrences. The adjudication officer concluded that the employer’s actions, although a one-off, were sufficiently damaging to the relationship of trust to which both parties were entitled; and that there had been a fundamental or repudiatory breach going to the root of the contract, entitling the complainant to resign and claim constructive dismissal. The employee was awarded €5,000 in compensation. In Data Protection Commissioner v Doolin,435 the Court of Appeal considered whether it is acceptable to use CCTV footage originally captured for security purposes in disciplinary investigations. The Court of Appeal decision confirms that employers must clearly notify employees of the purpose of processing CCTV footage in the workplace. If personal data captured in the footage is for security purposes, any further processing must be compatible with that original purpose. The case involved an investigation into a graffiti incident, during which an employee was discovered taking unauthorised breaks. The CCTV policy indicated that the purpose of the system was to prevent crime and promote security. The employee objected to the footage being used to monitor staff and for disciplinary proceedings, since this was not a stated purpose of processing in the policy. Arising from this, the employee made a complaint to the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC). The DPC rejected Mr Doolin’s complaint, finding that the sole purpose for which the CCTV footage had been viewed was to investigate the graffiti incident. The DPC found that this was a legitimate purpose, consisting of ‘a limited viewing of the relevant CCTV footage, without downloading or further processing of any kind’, which was necessary for and did not go beyond the stated purpose. The DPC also determined that while the personal data may subsequently have been used for another purpose (ie, disciplinary proceedings), the CCTV images were not further processed for that purpose. The DPC concluded that the ‘limited viewing’ of Mr Doolin’s images had taken place ‘exclusively for the security purpose for which the images were originally collected and that no contravention of Section 2(1)(c)(ii) occurred’. The employee appealed the decision of the DPC to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, relying on the evidence provided by the DPC. On appeal, the High Court took a different view of the matter. The High Court found that there had been further processing of the CCTV footage, holding that there was no evidence that the disciplinary action had been carried out solely for security purposes,

435

Data Protection Commissioner v Doolin [2022] IECA 117. While that case dealt with the pre-GDPR data protection regime, under the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003, the decision will be instructive in interpreting the purpose limitation principle now contained in art 5(1)(b) of the GDPR.

169

[3.108]  Termination of Employment and that the CCTV footage had been further processed for a ‘distinct and separate purpose’ in the disciplinary action, which was incompatible with the original purpose. Following this, the DPC then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the CCTV footage had been processed twice, and had been further processed when the times of the employee’s entry to and exit from the room were collected for the disciplinary investigation. The Court found that two separate investigations had taken place, and that the latter investigation was not for security purposes. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal stressed the following important points: (a) Notification of the purpose of processing to the data subject is central to fair processing. Personal data should not be treated as being processed fairly unless the data subject has been made aware, at or before the time the data is obtained, of the purpose for the processing. (b) The employee had not been notified that the CCTV footage could be used for disciplinary purposes and could not have reasonably expected that it would be processed for these purposes. (c) The employee’s data had been processed for a purpose other than, and incompatible with, the specified security purpose, and as such the processing was unlawful. This decision is important in respect of all instances of CCTV processing. It is imperative for data controllers to inform individuals whose personal information may be captured by CCTV of all reasons for which the footage may be used, and to ensure that all relevant policies reflect this. Employers should take extra care to include all processing purposes in their data protection policy, data protection notices, CCTV policy and accompanying signs for CCTV cameras. Furthermore, employers should exercise caution when using CCTV footage as evidence in disciplinary proceedings, unless employees were previously informed of this possibility. If employers do use such footage, they should ensure that the subsequent processing of personal data for disciplinary purposes is consistent with the original collection purposes, such as for security purposes. Aside from the employment law aspects, the use of surveillance can also give rise to difficult industrial relations issues. In 2001, management at the Procter & Gamble plant in Nenagh, County Tipperary, were forced to admit that a micro-camera had been placed covertly in a smoke alarm. The decision to install the camera had been taken without any staff consultation. Arising out of this, the company apologised and paid money to a charity nominated by the employees’ union, the Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU). In 2004, notice of strike action was served by SIPTU and the Automotive, General Engineering and Mechanical Operatives’ Union on the National Car Testing Service, allegedly due to the fact that management had begun to use private detectives and hidden cameras to monitor employees. The Labour Court dealt with this issue in Crown Equipment v Amicus/AEEU.436 In this case, the Court recommended that the cameras – which were to be used for process improvement – should be deemed part

436

Crown Equipment v Amicus/AEEU CD/03/571, Recommendation 17568.

170

Unfair Dismissal  [3.109] of normal ongoing change; however, it also recommended that the union be consulted on a draft code of practice on the matter.

Covert recording of conversations [3.109]   Employers should not carry out covert recordings of employees without their consent or knowledge. Nevertheless, instances exist where employees may record conversations with their employers, managers or co-workers in anticipation of a grievance or dispute. The use or taking of covert recordings was objected to in stringent terms by the High Court in Student AB v Board of Management of a Secondary School,437 where Simons J stated that covert recordings constituted material ‘which was improperly obtained’. The ECtHR has indicated on a number of occasions that the covert recording of employees constitutes a considerable intrusion into their private life and as such amounts to a breach of art 8 of the ECHR. In Antovic v Montenegro,438 the ECtHR stated that any reliance on video surveillance – even non-covert – can only be justified if it was: (a) in accordance with the law; (b) to pursue one or more legitimate aims; and (c) necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve such an aim. In that case, the ECtHr found that video surveillance of teaching in auditoriums at a university was not in accordance with the law and therefore was in breach of art 8. In Vaughan v Lewisham Borough Council,439 the UK EAT held that the employment tribunal had been correct to refuse to admit covert recordings, as it was not possible to form any views on the relevance or proportionality of the proposed evidence. It was not enough to assert their centrality to pleaded allegations. The EAT went on to state that the practice of making secret recordings was, ‘to put it no higher, very distasteful’. In Dogherty v Chairman and Governors of Amwell View School,440, it was held that where meeting participants have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality, there is a strong public interest in maintaining privacy. In this case the employee had been a teaching assistant at a school. She had been accused of misconduct, and consequently faced an investigation into her conduct and disciplinary proceedings. The hearings during the proceedings were held in private and resulted in the employee’s dismissal, which was upheld on appeal. The employee had covertly recorded the proceedings and deliberations and brought proceedings before the UK Employment Tribunal, where she sought to admit these recordings. The EAT held that such recordings were private and could not be relied upon, as there was an important public interest in ensuring that the parties to the proceedings followed the rules of privacy.

437

Student AB v Board of Management of a Secondary School [2019] IEHC 255. Antovic v Montenegro 70838/18. 439 Vaughan v Lewisham Borough Council [2013] ALL ER(D) 80(APR). 440 Dogherty v Chairman and Governors of Amwell View School [2007] IRLR 193. 438

171

[3.109]  Termination of Employment In McGowan v Scottish Water,441 the UK EAT refused to admit surveillance undertaken by a private investigator engaged by an employee in circumstances where art 8 rights were engaged but ultimately allowed the recordings in circumstances where there was a suspicion of serious fraud. This indicates the very serious and high level required of a party seeking to rely on covert surveillance. There was a strong presumption, as stated by Lord Johnson in his judgment, of invasion of the right to family life in relation to the covert recording. In CIBC v Beck,442 the UK Court of Appeal stated, in relation to its decision to allow the disclosure of confidential documents, that: ‘relevance is a factor, but not of itself sufficient to warrant making of an order. The document must be of such relevance the disclosure is necessary for the fair disposal of the proceeding. Equally confidentially is no, of itself, sufficient to warrant the refusal or an order and does not render documents immune from disclosure.’443 In Phoenix House Limited v Stockman,444 the UK EAT made a number of useful comments regarding the covert recording of a meeting by an employer or an employee. The EAT held that the purpose of a recording may vary widely, from a highly manipulative employee seeking to entrap the employer to a confused and vulnerable employee seeking to keep a recorded guard against misrepresentation. It was clear in this case that the former applied to the defendant, who was not confused or vulnerable in any manner. The UK EAT also held that it is good employment practice for an employee to state whether it was their intention to record a meeting save in the most pressing of circumstances; and that it will generally amount to misconduct not to do so. The UK EAT held that: ‘This practice allows both sides to consider whether it is desirable to record a meeting, and if so how. It is not always desirable to record a meeting; sometimes it will inhibit the frank exchange of views between experienced representatives and members of management.’

Although employers may raise concerns about privacy and data protection laws, and argue that such recordings should not be admissible in the WRC, the WRC has shown a willingness to accept covert recordings as evidence under specific circumstances, particularly when there is a lack of trust between the parties involved. In A Complainant v A Sports Centre,445 the WRC noted that the complainant had made covert recordings of conversations with some members of staff of the respondent. While this was deemed unacceptable, the WRC did take on board his bona fides, as he stated that he had been trying to protect himself given the breakdown in relations with his manager and a number of unsavoury events which had transpired.

441

McGowan v Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167. CIBC v Beck [2009] EWCA Civ 619 [2019].at para 23. 443 See also Gloucestershire Primary Care Trust v Ms M F Sesay UKEAT/0004/13/MC June 12 2013 and Trentside Manor Care Limited and Others v Mrs Raphael [2022] EAT 37 October 15 2021. 444 Phoenix House Limited v Stockman [2019] IRLR 960. 445 A Complainant v A Sports Centre ADJ-00012455, 13 February 2019. 442

172

Unfair Dismissal  [3.110] In Slaughter Line Operative/Butcher v Meat Processing Company,446 the WRC was provided with CCTV footage by the employer and two audio recordings by the employee at the hearing. The employer’s solicitor heard the audio recordings before they were played to the adjudication officer and strenuously objected to the admissibility of the audio recordings, which he asserted had been made without the knowledge or consent of a company director who had apparently been unaware that the employee was recording their conversations. Despite these objections, the WRC admitted both audio recordings into evidence. In Kay Walsh v Beckvalley Limited,447 the complainant sought to admit four audio recordings which had been covertly taken between 17 May 2019 and 28 August 2019, on the basis that the recordings would corroborate her evidence of a flawed internal investigation. The adjudication officer allowed the audio tapes to be admitted, stating: ‘I explained that the permission was a qualified and guarded admittance as I had been assured that those tapes “constituted the sole application for admissibility of evidence”. I took note that references to (social media/Snapchat) had not been retained. Transcripts of these tapes were to be agreed between the parties and submitted prior to the resumed hearing. I was mindful that the Complainant carried the burden of proof in the case.’

In contrast, in A Customer Service Operator v A Car Hire Company,448 where the complainant had made covert recordings of informal mediation talks after their employment had terminated, the WRC expressed discomfort with the use of covert recordings in an employment relationship, seeing it as a form of entrapment and damaging to mutual trust and confidence. The WRC noted that the respondent had procedures in place for grievances, with comprehensive policies on data protection and consent; and that the complainant had not provided a reason for recording the conversation without consent. Finally, in A Manager v A Fuel Company,449 the respondent provided a comprehensive record of its handling of a workplace dispute, supported by witness statements. However, the complainant attempted to introduce a covert recording of the relevant meetings, which was not permitted due to the WRC’s belief that employment relationships are based on trust and confidence, and that covert taping undermines this. Instead, the WRC permitted evidence from the participants at the meetings with crossexamination allowed.

Use of private investigators for employment law and ‘crossover’ with personal injury litigation [3.110]  The use of private investigation was considered in Fogarty v Lufthansa Technik Turbine Shannon Limited.450 The claimant began his employment as a welder

446

Slaughter Line Operative/Butcher v Meat Processing Company ADJ-00007300, 5 February 2019. Kay (Catherine) Walsh v Beckvalley Limited t/a Queally’s Super Valu ADJ-00036809, 19 April 2022. 448 A Customer Service Operator v A Car Hire Company, ADJ-00019536. 449 A Manager v A Fuel Company, ADJ-00018157. 450 Fogarty v Lufthansa Technik Turbine Shannon Limited UD 394/2006. 447

173

[3.110]  Termination of Employment in the employer’s aircraft facility in 1993. In or around July 2005, he claimed that he had sustained a neck injury while at work. In August 2005, he went on sick leave and availed of the company sick pay scheme. He also subsequently took a personal injury claim for the injury sustained in this incident. The company had concerns about the injuries being reported and put the claimant under surveillance. The claimant returned to work in September 2005, but as he did not present himself with a fitness to return to work certificate, he was sent home. As part of the surveillance of the claimant, the company medical officer concluded that he was clearly able to do heavy physical work without any restriction of neck movement, and that this was contrary to what he had said during his medical examination. As a result, the company wrote to the claimant in December 2005, providing him with various medical reports along with the relevant surveillance information. The claimant was called to a disciplinary meeting. The company decided that the claimant was guilty of gross misconduct and subsequently dismissed him, as the video evidence had confirmed his ability to work while he had claimed he was unfit to work and benefited from the company sick pay scheme at the time. The EAT determined that the company had taken advantage of its investigation of the personal injury claim to effect the dismissal in circumstances where enquiries from the employee had not been adequately answered. The EAT specifically referred to s 6(2)(C) of the Act, which provides that a dismissal shall be unfair if it ‘results wholly or mainly’ from ‘civil proceedings whether actual, threatened or proposed against the employer to which the employee is or will be a party …’ As a result, the EAT determined that the employee had been unfairly dismissed. The Data Protection Commissioners Annual Report for 2009 contained a case study on surveillance. The company which was the subject of the complaint asked a private investigator to survey an employee (a sales representative) without warning him beforehand. The Commission found this to be a breach of the terms and not justified. The Commission went on to state that covert surveillance is difficult to reconcile under the terms of the Act; and that at minimum, there must be strong evidence-based justification for it in the first instance. What can be taken from this is that if you have suspicions as to the activities of an employee, these must be dealt with separately from any personal injury claim. Also, employees should be warned beforehand of the fact that surveillance may be used, and that fair practices – including providing all the data to the employee before taking a decision – must be used. In Michael Caplis v Transev Ireland Limited,451 the WRC permitted the employer to admit into evidence an audio recording that had been taken by a private investigator which was relied on to dismiss the complainant.452

451 452

Michael Caplis v Transev Ireland Limited UDD 1932; ADJ-00012790, 1 July 2019. This case was appealed to the Labour Court and the complainant re-engaged, but the recording is not referred to in the decision of the Labour Court on foot of a disciplinary matter. Michael Caplis v Transev Ireland Limited UDD 193.

174

Unfair Dismissal  [3.112]

IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURES [3.111]   The original Act did not lay down procedures for employers to follow when dismissing employees. Nonetheless, the WRC and the Labour Court over the years have held that the basic rules of fairness and natural justice should apply to every dismissal. These include: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

the right of the employee to a fair hearing; the right of the employee to be informed that a problem exists; the right of the employee to representation; the right of the employee to state their case; and the right of the employee to be presented with the evidence before them and to have an opportunity to examine same and refute same.

The Industrial Relations Act 1990 allowed for the first time for the setting down of codes of practice. The first of these codes – the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order 2000 (SI 146/2000) – provides a template to employers on how to handle disciplinary issues in the workplace. While not legally binding, it is considered by the WRC and the Labour Court to be best practice and employers need to be mindful of it. Also, s 7(2) as amended by the 1993 Act provides that the WRC and Labour Court, in determining the amount of compensation, is required to have regard to: (a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss is attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer; and (b) the extent (if any) of the employer’s compliance or failure to comply with an agreed or established disciplinary procedure.

In relation to the latter, the code of practice established under SI 146/2000 is of particular importance.

REASONABLENESS OF THE EMPLOYER’S DECISION [3.112]   The first question that arises in assessing the fairness or otherwise of a dismissal is the reason or reasons for the dismissal. The reason for dismissal must have existed at the date of dismissal.453 Section 6(6) of the Act provides that the employer must demonstrate that the dismissal ‘resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection 4 or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal’. While the words ‘wholly or mainly’ are not defined in the Act, it may be inferred from the above wording that there must be at least one reason for the dismissal.

453 See

Madden v Brown Thomas & Co Ltd UD 263/1992.

175

[3.113]  Termination of Employment Equally, s 14(4) of the Act states that an employer, if requested, must: ‘… furnish to the employee within 14 days of the request, particulars in writing of the grounds for the dismissal, but in determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal was unfair there may be taken into account any other grounds which are substantial grounds and which would have justified the dismissal.’

Therefore, there is an additional inference in s 14 that there must be grounds for the dismissal. This is not necessarily the case when it comes to the WRC considering what redress to order. Here the WRC can take into account ‘post dismissal’ events. Thus, in Loughran v Bellwood Ltd,454 the EAT recognised the employer’s right to introduce evidence after the dismissal to verify an act of misconduct which formed part of the reason to dismiss. It is vitally important that the person who took the decision to dismiss is present at the hearing. Thus, in Byrne v Telecom Éireann,455 the EAT held that in the absence of evidence from the persons who took the decision to dismiss,456 the employer had failed to discharge the onus of proof.

REMEDIES [3.113]   Section 7 of the Act sets out the remedies open to the WRC, the Labour Court and the civil courts following a finding of unfair dismissal: (a) Section 7(a) provides for reinstatement of the employee in their previous position with effect from the date of dismissal and with the same terms and conditions of employment as before. (b) Section 7(b) provides for re-engagement of the employee in their previous position or in another reasonably suitable position on conditions (including pay) specified by the WRC, the Labour Court and the civil courts. (c) Section 7(c) provides for compensation of up to a maximum of 104 weeks’ remuneration in respect of any financial loss caused to the employee by the unfair dismissal. Where an employee is found to have contributed to their own dismissal, this amount may be reduced to take account of that percentage contribution.457 Where an employee has been dismissed by reason of having raised a protected disclosure, it is open to the employee to seek interim relief by applying to the Circuit Court to obtain an order restraining the dismissal pending the claim of unfair dismissal before the WRC.458 454

Loughran v Bellwood Ltd UD 206/1978. Byrne v Telecom Éireann UD 24/1990. 456 In this instance, it was the board of directors – this case highlights the difficulties where there is collective responsibility. 457 For a definition of what is defined as ‘remuneration’, see Bunyan v United Dominions Trust Ltd UD 66/1980. See also Purdy, ‘Employers beware! Stock options could be considered remuneration when defining compensation in an unfair dismissal case’, Irish Employment Law Journal Volume II, Spring 2005, 17. 458 Schedule 1 of the Protected Disclosures Acts, 2014–2022. 455

176

Unfair Dismissal  [3.115]

Compensation [3.114]   While the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement are possible in practice, the majority of successful claims by employees fall to be dealt with under the compensation heading. In general, the WRC picks a broad approach and requires employers to compensate employees fully if the employer cannot prove the reason for dismissal and that they acted fairly. In this regard, the awards, while they tend to be small, are increasing somewhat. In particular over the last number of years, there have been a significant number of large awards. In Foley v Calview Investments Limited,459 the employee was reinstated from the date of dismissal and the employer was ordered that wages be paid accordingly. The claimant was awarded over €300,000, but this payment constituted back-pay rather than compensation. Similarly, in Basnet v Elan Pharma,460 an award of €195,000 was made.461 In the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v Mr. James Reilly462 the High Court in 2015 ordered the reinstatement of Mr. Reilly despite him having been dismissed in 2009. In Ray Walsh v Econocom463 an award of €120,000 was made for a botched redundancy dismissal. Equally, the value applicable to share options by an employee was accepted by the EAT in the Basnet case.464 Definition of ‘financial loss’ [3.115]   The Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 gives no power to award exemplary damages. ‘Financial loss’ is defined by s 7(3) of the 1977 Act to include: (a) any actual loss; (b) any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal; and (c) the value of any loss or diminution attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 2003, or the value of any loss or diminution in relation to superannuation. Therefore, remuneration includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay. It is clear also that the objective of compensation is to make reparation to the claimant, to fully compensate them for the loss suffered. While it is for the claimant to prove loss, the WRC does not deem it necessary that the precise and detailed proof of every item of loss actually be produced.

459 460 461 462 463 464

Foley v Calview Investments Limited UD 1228/2003. Basnet v Elan Pharma UD 737/2005. See also Ponisi v JVC Europe Ltd UD 949/2008. The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v Mr. James Reilly Noonan J [2015] IEHC 241. Ray Walsh v Econocom ADJ-00029093, 11 January 2022. Ray Walsh v Econocom ADJ-00029093 at 460, For a further discussion on share options, see Purdy, ‘Employers beware! Stock options could be considered remuneration when defining compensation in an unfair dismissal case’, Irish Employment Law Journal Volume II, Spring 2005, 17.

177

[3.115]  Termination of Employment Notwithstanding this, s 7(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended by s 6(b) of the 1993 Act, clarifies the issue of compensation and goes on to state that regard shall be had to: (a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that sub-section was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer; (b) the extent (if any) to which the said financial loss was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee; (c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, their failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid;465 (d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in s 14(1) of the Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to the procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister;466 (e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with s 14, and467 (f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.468

Section 7(2)(A) deals with the calculation of financial loss and states that ‘for the purpose of calculating financial loss: ‘payments to the employee (a) under the Social Welfare Acts 1981 to 1993,469 in respect of any period following the dismissal concerned, or (b) under the Income Tax Acts arising by reason of dismissal shall be disregarded’.

Section 7(3) then deals with financial loss in relation to the employee. ‘Financial loss’ is defined in relation to the dismissal of an employee as including any ‘actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation’. In calculating the loss, the WRC computes loss by taking into account basic pay, average bonuses, average overtime and prospective loss of income, including any reduction in future net earnings and any loss of fringe benefits. Also of note are loss of statutory protection, expenses, pension rights and stock options. All of these are, of course, limited to a maximum of 104 weeks’ loss. The EAT decisions in Bunyan v United Dominions Trust (Ireland) Limited470 and Healy v Cormeen Construction Limited471 are both instructive in this regard. 465 466 467 468 469

470 471

The word ‘and’ was deleted from the end of s 7(2)(c) by s 6 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993. Section 7(2)(d) was inserted by s 6 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act of 1993. Section 7(2)(e) was inserted by s 6 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act of 1993. Section 7(2)(f) was inserted by s 6 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act of 1993. Social Welfare Acts, 1981–1993. This extends to those who received the pandemic unemployment payment, which was provided for under the Social Welfare (Covid-19) (Amendment) Act 2020, which falls under this provision. Bunyan v United Dominions Trust (Ireland) Limited 1982 ILRM 404. Healy v Cormeen Construction Limited M263; UD 98/1978.

178

Unfair Dismissal  [3.116]

Minimum four weeks [3.116]   Section 7(1)(c)(ii) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 provides, in respect of the amount of compensation to be awarded: ‘(ii) if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances.’

This section was introduced by s 6(a) of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993 to provide claimants with a basic financial award in cases where no financial loss was incurred. Such an award is not mandatory and adjudication officers have the discretion to award any amount up to four weeks as is just and equitable.472 In respect of the second half of s 7(1)(c)(ii), some adjudication officers seem to be now adding a sum in relation to this section – that is, attributing unfair dismissals as affecting a person’s redundancy/superannuation. In other words, by unfairly dismissing them, employers are deemed to have deprived complainants of their rights to redundancy and this should be taken into account regardless of the four-week limitation period. Thus, in Maher v Kerrs Tyres Ireland Limited,473 the adjudication officer held: ‘I must also recognise that the Complainant lost her rights under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, as set out in section 7 (3) above, as a result of the termination of her employment and find that she should be compensated for the loss of these entitlements.’ The adjudicator went on to state:‘It is important to note that actual loss, prospective loss and a redundancy entitlement are separate and distinct. Actual and prospective loss is calculated according to loss arising after the (unfair) dismissal. The third category relates to an entirely separate head of loss; that of a lump sum entitlement from accrued service. For clarity, this applies to all unfair dismissals where compensation is to be awarded, and … It arises from the definition of “financial loss” in section 7 and is not related to the grounds for the dismissal Considering all the foregoing, I make an award of €17,500 in respect of the unfair dismissal.’

Contrast this with Aideen Dunbar v Wheelock Fruits Limited,474 where the same adjudication officer as in Kerrs Tyres475 held that: ‘According to the complainant’s evidence, she obtained alternative work very quickly and suffered no financial loss because of her unfair dismissal. Section 7 (1) (c) (ii) of the Acts states that where there is no financial loss, I may award 4 weeks’ pay. Accordingly, I make an award of €1,536 in respect of the unfair dismissal.’

472 See

A Security Worker v A Security Company ADJ-00016496, 19 December 2019. Maher v Kerr’s Tyres Ireland Limited ADJ-00037764. See also Gray v Little Monkeys Playschool ADJ-00037665, 26 October 2022. 474 Aideen Dunbar v Wheelock Fruits Limited ADJ-00036819. 475 Aideen Dunbar v Wheelock Fruits Limited ADJ-00036819 at 435. 473 See

179

[3.117]  Termination of Employment The apparent difference between the rationale in the two cases can perhaps be explained by the fact that in the latter, the complainant in evidence stated that she had suffered no financial loss. Either way, the fact that some adjudication officers are going beyond four weeks’ loss does not appear to be a correct assessment of this section of the Act. This section quite clearly states that compensation, should not exceed in amount ‘4 weeks remuneration’. ‘Remuneration’ is defined as including ‘allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu or in addition to pay’. Further, remuneration in the context of the unfair dismissals legislation is defined under the Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations 1977 and these do not define remuneration as including loss of statutory rights. While the definition of ‘financial loss’ in the Unfair Dismissals Act includes a loss of superannuation or statutory redundancy right, the loss is still limited to 104 weeks’ remuneration. Also, in this regard it should be noted that in enforcing a decision of the WRC under s 43 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, the District Court must calculate any compensation in accordance with the regulations, which limit compensation to pay shift allowances and average overtime.

Ability to mitigate loss [3.117]  In Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Limited,476 the EAT endorsed the view that: ‘a claimant who finds himself out of work should employ a reasonable amount of time each weekday in seeking work … the time that a claimant finds on his hands is not his own, unless he chooses it to be, but rather to be profitably employed in seeking to mitigate his loss.’

In Vaughan v Weighpack,477 the matter of actual loss was assessed. In this decision, the Court took the view that cogent evidence needs to be adduced by a claimant in order to show that financial loss is attributable to the termination by the respondent. The test to be applied in determining whether the employee acted reasonably to mitigate loss is an objective one. In A School Secretary v A Primary School,478 the complainant’s weekly gross salary was €819 and her losses at the date of hearing were circa €50,000. The adjudication officer held that: ‘In a buoyant employment market and having regard to periods of lockdown, a similar administrative role should be obtained in 6-7 months. I award the Complainant €25,000 in compensation arising from being unfairly dismissed inclusive of compensation for statutory rights and notice.’

In Organic Lens Manufacturing v Brian McAllister,479 the Labour Court stated that: ‘while the Complainant could not be said to have demonstrated that he employed part of every single work day to applying for work, he has demonstrated real endeavour in mitigating his 476

Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Limited D858/1999. Vaughan v Weighpack [1974] ICR 261. 478 A School Secretary v A Primary School ADJ-00028138, 8 February 2023. 479 Organic Lens Manufacturing v Brian McAllister UDD2137, 11 May 2021. 477

180

Unfair Dismissal  [3.117] losses by seeking to learn new skills, acquiring work experience and applying for a range of jobs, with eventual success, albeit of a temporary nature.’

In this case the complainant provided evidence of having made 20 job applications. In Dermot Lynch v Murnev Limited Pita Pit Ireland,480 the adjudication officer stated that ‘it is incumbent upon the Complainant to give plausible evidence on mitigation of loss’. In this instance, the complainant provided documents showing 18 applications for employment in the seven-month period of unemployment. The adjudication officer further commented that while COVID-19 had created difficulties in seeking alternative employment, he did not accept that it was a barrier to a complainant seeking to mitigate against his loss, thus reinforcing the high burden associated with the duty. In John (Sean) Brilly v Scoil Mhuire Community School, Clane, Co Kildare,481 the complainant’s solicitor confirmed that his client had submitted five applications following his dismissal between March 2020 and September 2020 (five months). Critically, it was noted that the complainant worked in education and that schools were closed during this period. However, despite this, the adjudication officer found that five applications were not a sufficient effort by him to mitigate his loss. While the complainant’s losses were €50,403.57, the adjudication officer awarded only €20,000. This represented a decrease of nearly 86 per cent due to the complainant’s failure to mitigate his loss. In Seamus Counihan v Arramara Teoranta,482 the employer accepted that the employee (a qualified accountant) had been unfairly dismissed and had not exercised their right to call any witnesses, and that the matter should fall to mitigation to consider the relevant redress. The employer argued that the employee had not proactively mitigated his loss, and that the documentary evidence provided revealed that he had not followed through on an opportunity related to a short-term contract or assignment. In fact, the documentary evidence revealed that the complainant had only begun to seek alternative employment after many months of being unemployed. It was further argued by the employer that, based on the market demand for such roles, the complainant had failed to mitigate his loss. The employee stated that his path to becoming a qualified accountant was difficult and was not the normal route, and meant that his skill set and experiences were not typical. There were also geographical considerations and the requirement to factor in accommodation costs. While his actual loss was about €49,000, the adjudication officer determined that, having regard to a ‘buoyant market’, he should be awarded €35,000. An employee who is ill for the relevant period may face the prospects of winning their case but failing in respect of compensation, as their loss of earnings would be assessed at zero. This is because in such circumstances, the assessment of compensation is based on the claimant’s availability to work.483 Thus, in O’Meara v AIBP (Nenagh) Limited,484 the claimant declared himself at the hearing unable to return to his normal 480

Dermot Lynch v Murnev Limited Pita Pit Ireland ADJ-00031433. Brilly v Scoil Mhuire Community School, Clane, Co Kildare ADJ-00027798. 482 Seamus Counihan v Arramara Teoranta ADJ-00037726. 483 See Murray v Reilly UD 3/1978. 484 O’Meara v AIBP (Nenagh) Limited UD 1099/1993. 481

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[3.118]  Termination of Employment work because of his medical condition. He also stated that had been left with some disability in the long term. The EAT determined that it followed that he had suffered no loss and accordingly he was awarded the minimum four weeks’ remuneration. This case also clarified the figure to be taken for calculating compensation when an employee is working short time. In this regard, it is not the net figure being received by the employee while on short time but the figure they receive in normal working hours. The EAT determined this having considered reg 4 of the Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations 1977, which provides that: ‘… weekly remuneration in respect of the relevant employment shall be his earnings in respect of that employment (including any regular bonus or allowance which does not vary having regard to the amount of work done and any payment in kind) in the latest week before the date of the relevant dismissal in which he worked for the number of hours that was normal for the employment together with, if he was normally required to work overtime in the relevant employment, his average weekly overtime earnings in the relevant employment as determined in accordance with Regulation 5 of these Regulations.’

Illness resulting from dismissal [3.118]   It has always been reasonably clear that if you cannot mitigate your loss because of an illness, there is no loss. However, the situation is somewhat less clear if that illness arises out of an act of the employer. In Maryland v City West Golf and Country Club,485 the EAT, giving consideration to cases such as Eastwood v Magnox486 and Johnson v Unisys,487 concluded that a claim for psychological injuries resulting in financial loss constituted a claim for personal injury at common law; and that it was not properly within its jurisdiction to consider financial loss in such instances. However, in Liz Allen v Independent Newspapers,488 Ms Allen had been unfit for work by reason of illness since her employment had ended. Ms Allen argued successfully at the EAT that her illness was attributable to the fact that it had made her resign from her employment and claim constructive dismissal. As a consequence, she also argued successfully that her illness had led to a financial loss. Significant medical evidence was adduced by both parties and there was a dispute between the parties’ medical experts in relation to both the duration of the illness and its nature. On balance, the EAT accepted the evidence of the claimant’s medical witness as to the diagnosis and prognosis. The EAT ultimately held that the claimant’s financial loss had been contributed to by the conduct of the employer and awarded her 78 weeks’ remuneration. In An Operations Director v A Limited Company,489 which was uncontested, the only matter that fell to be considered was mitigation. Here the complainant gave evidence 485

Maryland v City West Golf and Country Club UD 1438/2004. Eastwood v Magnox [2004] IRLR 733. 487 Johnson v Unisy [2001] IRLR 279. 488 Liz Allen v Independent Newspapers [2002] 13 ELR 84. 489 An Operations Director v A Limited Company ADJ-00025595, 15 May 2020. 486

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Unfair Dismissal  [3.118] that the respondent was the only employer she had ever worked for; that she had never been provided with any form of training to keep her skills up to date; and that, having been subjected to a prolonged campaign of bullying and intimidation, both physical and emotional, she was unable and unfit to re-enter the workforce. In agreeing with the employee, the adjudication officer awarded the complainant 104 weeks’ compensation. This issue is a matter of some debate but there have been several similar UK cases.490

490 See

Devaney v Designer Wholesale Flowers Sundries Limited [1993] IR LR.

183

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Chapter 4

Fair Procedures and Natural Justice: Investigations and Disciplinary Hearings in the Workplace

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS [4.01]   The Unfair Dismissals Act, when it was passed in 1977, came in for stern criticism from some members of the trade union movement, containing as it did (and still does) a mechanism by which employers can fairly dismiss employees. This, of course, is within a particular context – that is, where the dismissal is done fairly. Fairness in employment law rests on a number of factors: (a) whether the employee’s behaviour falls within one of the fair reasons for dismissal as outlined in the Act; (b) whether the employer’s behaviour was reasonable. Reasonableness is ­somewhat subjective and is an important factor in determining whether a dismissal was fair or unfair; and indeed, this is enshrined in the Act.1 It is not a procedural issue per se, although it can be deemed to be unreasonable to breach procedure or ­natural justice; and (c) whether the employer followed fair procedures and natural justice – that is: (i) whether the employer followed the disciplinary procedure as outlined in the contract of employment and/or company handbook; (ii) whether the employer afforded the employee their rights to natural and constitutional justice; and (iii) whether the employer breached any code of practice.

The employer’s disciplinary procedure [4.02]   Under s 6(7) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended, in determining whether a dismissal is unfair, regard will be had to: (a) the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the employer in relation to the dismissal; and

1

Section s 6(7)(a) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

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[4.03]  Termination of Employment (b) the extent of the compliance or failure to comply with the employer’s dismissal procedure or with any code of practice adhered to by the employer. Section 6(7)(b) is the operative section insofar as compliance with procedures is concerned. Notably, the section does not provide that a breach of procedure is unfair; it merely states that regard can be had to the failure to comply with such procedures when reaching a determination. The inference, of course, is that in dismissing an employee, the employer will be expected to follow its own procedures. Typically in Ireland, disciplinary procedures follow a corrective path – that is, they generally start with counselling, then move to verbal, ­written and final written warnings, an opportunity to appeal and ultimately dismissal, with the employee being afforded representation from the verbal warning stage right up to appeal.2 This system, albeit common in Ireland, has significant downsides: (a) It deals with employees whose performance is not improving by imposing increasingly greater sanctions on them. This is hardly corrective. (b) It (in experience) rarely if ever works, and often leads to counterclaims by employees that they are being bullied, harassed or stressed by their employer. (c) Equally, the procedure takes so long to finalise that both employers and employees get stressed about it.3 Regardless of the merits of this system, once it has been inserted in the contract of employment and/or company handbook, it must be adhered to by employers if they are to sustain a case for fair dismissal. Fairness of disciplinary procedures [4.03]   This may seem logical, but even if an employer has detailed disciplinary procedures, those procedures in themselves must be fair. The Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures4 provides a guide in this respect. While the Code is admissible in evidence, it is not binding: ‘Equally employers need to be mindful of s 14(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act which provides that employers must give an employee notice in writing not later than 28 days after entering into a contract of employment the; “procedure which the employer will observe before and for the purpose of dismissing the employee” and under s 14(2) any change in that policy must be notified to the employee within 28 days.’

Universal and consistent application of disciplinary procedures [4.04]   Not only must there be a detailed disciplinary policy; there is also an onus on employers to apply this policy consistently. Difficulties in this area often arise if certain 2

3 4

Note that some practitioners might take issue with this and an alternative view is expressed in Redmond on Dismissal Law by Dr Ryan, who does not advocate representation at the verbal warning stage – see Ryan, Redmond on Dismissal Law (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional, 2017), p 288. Best practice in this area would suggest a more constructive approach. For a discussion on this see Ryan, Redmond on Dismissal Law (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional, 2017), p 289. Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures (SI 146/2000).

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.07] behaviour has been tolerated by employers – for example, one employee ‘clocking in’ or ‘swiping in’ for one another, or laxity around break times. In such circumstances, it is incumbent upon employers to specifically bring it to employees’ attention that its policy has changed and that such behaviour will not be tolerated in future.5 Equally, if one employee has been treated differently for the same offence, dismissal will be deemed to be unfair.6

Rights to natural and constitutional justice [4.05]   Natural justice embodies two basic elements: audi alteram partem, which translates literally as ‘hear the other side’; and nemo iudex in causa sua, which translates as ‘no one should be a judge in their own cause’. Constitutional justice embodies natural justice, but goes beyond it to include other guarantees such as the right to sue for damages and the right to an administrative decision within a reasonable time.7 Over time, the rights to natural and constitutional justice have become intertwined in use and they can now be loosely collated into a number of rules applied by the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and the Labour Court (albeit again loosely) as follows. Employees must be aware of what is expected and the consequences of shortcomings [4.06]   This is stressed in the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures issued by the WRC,8 which goes on to state that: ‘It is important procedures of this kind exist and the purpose, function and terms of such procedures are clearly understood by all concerned.’ Thus, in Harris v PV Doyle Hotels,9 where the claimant was dismissed for drinking on the premises, the dismissal was found to be unfair as the company had not made employees sufficiently aware that this would result in summary dismissal. Employers must primarily determine all allegations against the employee before taking disciplinary action [4.07]   While having clear rules and procedures is necessary, it is vital that those rules are applied to the facts prior to the employer taking disciplinary action10 (see 4.17 on investigations).

5 See

O’Neill v RSL (Ireland) Ltd [1990] ELR 31. Kelly v Power Supermarkets Ltd [1990] 1 ELR 141. 7 See McCormack v Garda Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489; see also Hogan, Whyte, Kenny, Walsh, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (5th edn, Bloomsbury Professional, 2018). 8 Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (Code of Practice) on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order 2000, SI 146/2000. 9 Harris v PV Doyle Hotels UD 150/1978. 10 See Vanfleet Transport Ltd v Mark Murphy (25 November 1988), HC. 6

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[4.08]  Termination of Employment It is important to note that an employee does not have a right to remain silent during the disciplinary process. Thus, in Rowland v An Post,11 Clarke J noted that: ‘A contract of employment or a long term contract such as that with which the Court is concerned in this case will almost inevitably involve a level of confidence and trust. In the context of such a contract it is not appropriate for a party to whom queries relevant to the performance of the contract are addressed to adopt a position which might be characterised as typical of Bart Simpson and demand proof. Rather it is appropriate to address the issues raised as best they can.’12

Equally, if an employee refuses to answer questions, it is up to the employer to draw an inference from that. Thus, in McVeigh v Dunnes Stores,13 the dismissal of an employee for alleged lewd behaviour outside the workplace was deemed fair where the employee refused to explain what had occurred. In gathering all the facts, employers are obliged to interview other employees who may have been present during the alleged offence. Thus, in Vita Contex Limited v Dourellan,14 the EAT held that: ‘A reasonable investigation requires more than merely seeking to confirm suspicions; it must include an inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances and interviewing all relevant employees on these matters.’ Thus, in Lally v Board of Management of Rosmini Community School,15 Butler J stated that the obligation on an employer (in this case the principal of the school) ‘to act fairly in the preparation of a report is not met simply because the employee (here a teacher) will have a right of reply’. Employees must be informed of all of the allegations against them [4.08]   This does not mean that the employer must inform the employee in advance of the first meeting of the purpose of same.16 The employee must also be provided with all relevant documentation and be given an opportunity to defend themselves or provide an explanation.17 Thus, in Gearon v Dunnes Stores Ltd,18 the EAT stated: ‘the right to defend herself and have her arguments and submissions listened to and evaluated by the respondent in relation to the threat to her employment is a right of the claimant and is not the gift of the respondent or this Tribunal … As the right is a fundamental one under natural and constitutional justice; it is not open to this Tribunal to forgive its breach.’

11

Rowland v An Post [2017] IESC 20. See also Farrell v Minister for Defence (10 July 1984), HC. 13 McVeigh v Dunnes Stores ADJ-00036287. 14 Vita Contex Ltd v Dourellan UD 1031/1992. 15 Emer Lally v Board of Management of Rosmini Community School [2021] IEHC 810. 16 See Eanna Dowling v Cumann na Daoine Aontaithe Teo (UD 545/2007), where the EAT held that as suspension was not a disciplinary action, the principles of natural justice did not apply. 17 See Moran v Bailey Gibson Ltd UD 69/1977; McCarthy v Irish Shipping US 100/1978; McGarrigle v Donegal Sports and Golf Centre Ltd UD 680/2002. 18 Gearon v Dunnes Stores Ltd UD 367/1988. 12

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.11] In Trevor Murtagh v TLC Health Services Limited,19 the EAT found the claimant’s dismissal to be unfair, stating that: ‘In every disciplinary process the claimant is entitled to have sight of each and every piece of evidence the respondent has sight of, regardless of the respondent’s views on its evidential value. The claimant is entitled to have sight of it and to use it in his defence however he sees fit. Vital pieces of information were withheld from the claimant at various stages of the process and that is fundamentally unfair and potentially prejudicial.’

Employees are entitled to representation [4.09]   This does not necessarily mean legal representation. Workplace investigations which do not involve legally or factually complex matters do not give rise to right to legal representation on behalf of employees. This entitlement does, however, always amount to the right to have a trade union official or fellow employee present (see also 4.24). The investigation must be carried out in an impartial manner [4.10]  In Eanna Dowling v Cumann na Daoine Aontaithe Teo,20 the decision to dismiss was taken by the employer’s management committee, which consisted of eight members, two of whom had been involved in the investigatory and disciplinary stages of the process. This was held to be unfair and ‘contrary to the concepts of reasonableness and fairness’. Graham v Portroe Stevedores,21 is also instructive in this regard. In this case, the employee was awarded the maximum compensation available to the EAT following a late-night altercation which was investigated by the HR manager, who himself was a witness to the incident. Employees are entitled to question the facts and examine all relevant witnesses [4.11]   If a written fact finding report of the investigation is available, the employee should receive a copy of the report in good time before the disciplinary hearing. Thus, in Magham v Johnson Pharmaceuticals BV,22 the EAT considered that there was a serious and fundamental unfairness in the denial to the claimant of the knowledge of the contents of a report made in relation to her by one of her superiors, and of the recommendation contained in its covering letter that she was not a suitable person to operate the computer. The cross examination of witnesses is probably one of the most difficult issues for employers. In certain circumstances, such as in cases of alleged sexual harassment, allowing one employee to cross-examine another may not be practical, possible or

19 20 21 22

Trevor Murtagh v TLC Health Services Limited UD1425/2012, MN821/2012. Eanna Dowling v Cumann na Daoine Aontaithe Teo UD 545/2007. Graham v Portroe Stevedores UD 574/2006. Magham v Johnston Pharmaceuticals BV UD 1127/1984.

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[4.11]  Termination of Employment advisable. Also, some witnesses may wish to provide information in confidence. In all of this, there are some basic guidelines to follow. First, if practical, the employee should be offered the opportunity to have all witnesses brought to the meeting; the complainants and/or accusers should be named; and the employee should be afforded the right to meet them face to face. This is best practice and preferable wherever possible. However, in Kiernan v Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children,23 the EAT accepted that the employer did not, in the circumstances, have to divulge the name of its witnesses, and said that it was not obliged to do so provided that it outlined the allegations made by them. Second, every effort should be made to allow the employee to cross-examine witnesses. An example of this arose in Harnett v Advance Tyre Company Limited Trading as Advance Pitstop.24 Here Mr Hartnett had been suspended following a complaint from a Mr Wehrmeyer in Germany to the effect that he had been in receipt of ‘secret commission payments’. Ryan J in the High Court observed that the company: ‘would and should have arranged for the plaintiff to have an opportunity in some satisfactory mode of cross examining Mr. Wehrmeyer. His evidence was crucial – it was the only evidence as to the alleged misconduct … There was no way that Mr. Wehrmeyer could avoid some form of cross examination by Mr. Hartnett’s representative.’

Ryan J, in discussing how the cross-examination could have been facilitated, went on to comment: ‘I do not have to decide what facility regarding Mr. Wehrmeyer might have satisfied at the requirement of fair procedures. In other words, if a video link had been arranged, would that have been satisfactory – I would have thought yes, but that does not arise for consideration. Would it have been sufficient to have a conference call? The answer is more doubtful and I would think that the answer is probably no unless there was some other feature that is relevant.’

It can thus be seen that where a very serious sanction such as dismissal is being considered, every effort should be made to facilitate the cross-examination of witnesses. There have been significant technological advances since the Hartnett decision, with Microsoft Teams and Zoom now widely used; and if an employer cannot facilitate a face-to-face meeting, proper consideration should be given to a remote hearing. Third, only in certain very limited circumstances is it appropriate to deny an employee the right to cross-examine witnesses. This will generally arise where there is a need to protect those witnesses either from a medical perspective or from some other threat, such as violence. At all times, this decision must be balanced against the risk of a serious injustice to the employee. In only the most serious of cases should this arise.25 Equally, it should be remembered that all employees should be treated as individuals and what might be appropriate for one may be entirely inappropriate for another.

23 24

Kiernan v Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children UD 1129/1992. Hartnett v Advance Tyre t/a Advance PitStop [2013] IEHC 615. A Worker v A Hospital (1997) ELR 214.

25 See

190

Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.14] Fourth, it is not wise for employers to proceed to dismiss someone based on confidential information. In McNamara v Lannit (Ireland) Ltd,26 the EAT stated: ‘It is most unusual for a Tribunal to accept the word of an employer as to the reliability of its informants when the Tribunal itself has no other evidence of it.’ Thus, it is important to bear in mind that even if witnesses give evidence in confidence to an employer, they will in all probability have to attend as witnesses before the WRC; otherwise, it may be impossible for the employer to prove their case. Employers must not augment allegations during the process of an investigation [4.12]   The fact that the employer must clearly set out the allegations made against the employee from the outset has already been emphasised. This is to ensure that the employee has the opportunity to prepare and present their defence.27 An example of an employer augmenting an allegation during the process of an investigation could be where the employee is uncooperative and the question arises as to whether this should be included as an additional disciplinary measure. Generally, the answer is no.28 However, if matters arise during the course of an investigation which were not clearly set out at the beginning, but which quite clearly impact on the investigation and perhaps go to the root of it, it will be fine to add them.29 Employees have the right to be treated as individuals [4.13]   All individuals have different personalities and characteristics. In some instances, it will be necessary – and indeed desirable – to take account of such characteristics. An employee who is blind will require extra facilities; similarly, an employee who has a disability will need extra time and consideration to explain themselves adequately. In McEvoy v Avery Dennison Limited,30 it was held that an employee’s clinical depression should be taken into account when investigating a disciplinary issue. Consideration should also be shown to foreign nationals, who may require an interpreter in order to ensure they fully understand the process and the allegations being levelled at them.

SUSPENSIONS [4.14]   The suspension of any employee pending investigation should always be with pay. The Irish courts have held that suspension can have a detrimental effect on an employee’s reputation and as such should be imposed only following a full examination of the need for same. If the employee is to be suspended, they should receive a

26

McNamara v Lannit (Ireland) Ltd UD 910/1984. Kilsaran Concrete v Vitali Vet [2016] ELR 237. 28 See A Bus Driver v A Bus Operator ADJ 00004821. 29 See John Charles v NHS Business Services Authority 2015 UK EAT/0105/15/BA. 30 McEvoy v Avery Dennison Ltd [1992] ELR 172. 27 See

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[4.14]  Termination of Employment letter detailing the reasons for the suspension prior to any investigation meeting.31 This should be accompanied by a copy of the disciplinary policy; and the employee should be allowed to make representations in relation to the contemplated suspension before any decision is made. In The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v James Reilly,32 the High Court reinstated Mr Reilly, who was accused of a breach of the bank’s email policy. In the High Court, Noonan J was very critical of the bank and accused it of trying to make an example of Mr Reilly. It was most critical of the decision to suspend him, which Noonan J stated should have been imposed only after ‘full consideration of the necessity for it pending a full investigation.’ In O’Sullivan v HSE,33 in the case of oral submissions by counsel, it was agreed that the appropriate test by which the decision to suspend was to be considered was that set out in Braganza v BP Shipping Limited & Anor34 – a UK Supreme Court case which concerned the terms of a contract of employment and the terms in respect of a death in service benefit in circumstances where payment of such benefit could have been excluded as the employer was of the view that the deceased had died by suicide. Braganza determined that the standard to be met by a decision maker was limited, ‘as a matter of necessary implication by concepts of honesty, good faith and genuineness and the need for absence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, perversity and irrationality’. Relying on Braganza, Dunne J determined35 that where an employee is to be suspended and where discretion is to be exercised: ‘that discretion should be exercised in a manner which is neither arbitrary, capricious or irrational, and further, as was stated in Braganza, it follows that such a decision could be impugned, not only where it was one that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached, but also where the decision-making process had failed to excluded extraneous consideration, or to take account of all obviously relevant ones …’

Dunne J went on to say that; ‘Obviously, a person who is being suspended must be informed of the reason for his suspension (Flynn v An Post [1987] I.R.68). Flynn is also an authority for the proposition that a power of suspension must be viewed as permitting a suspension to continue only for the

31

32 33 34 35

Flynn v An Post [1987] IR 68. See also Deegan v Minister for Finance [2000] 11 ELR 190 at 202, where it was stated that a person is entitled, ‘because of the requirement of natural justice and fair procedures, to be informed of the reasons for his or her suspension so as to enable him or her to make such representations as he or she wishes to make to the suspending authority so that the suspension may be terminated’. Also see Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11 at paragraph 78, where Dunne J stated: ‘Here there is no dispute but that, in general an employer contemplating as step such as placing someone on administrative leave should inform the employee of the reason for that decision and give them an opportunity to respond.’ Further in that paragraph, Dunne J went on to say: ‘thus, where it is clear that a decision to place someone on administrative leave is being contemplated, that person should be so informed and should be afforded the opportunity to make representations as to why that should not occur.’ Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v James Reilly [2015] IEHC 241. O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11 at para 11. Braganza v BP Shipping Limited & Anor [2015] 1 WLR 1661. O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11 at para 87.

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.15] period of time during which would not be reasonably practicable to hold a full hearing into the matter. An open-ended suspension, particularly one without pay, can only be seen as a form of punishment, and a severe one at that. In contrast, a short period of suspension with pay against a clearly defined backdrop of consecutive steps to resolve the disciplinary issue is less likely to warrant the courts’ intervention on the basis that the procedures, or their application, is unfair to the person concerned.36

Dunne J then went on to note that: ‘Thus where it is clear that a decision to place someone on administrative leave is being contemplated, that person should be so informed and should be afforded the opportunity to make representations as to why that should not occur. That is no more than fairness requires. That does not mean the “full panoply” of fair procedures as Noonan J. said in Bank of Ireland v Reilly but it is a basic level of fairness that is required’.37

Suspension – even with pay – is therefore not to be taken lightly, there must be valid reasons for it and the employee must be allowed to make representations as to why they should not be suspended. Thus, in O’Donoghue v South Eastern Health Board,38 Macken J commented that suspension with pay in the case before her was no ‘less serious, onerous or damaging than suspension with pay’.39 In Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority,40 the plaintiff had a clause in her contract which stated: ‘Appeals will be heard by an Authority Manager senior to the manager who decided the outcome of the hearing of the appeal. Disciplinary action will not be taken pending the outcome of the appeal. At the appeal the employee may be accompanied by a staff representative. The outcome of the appeal will be notified to the employee in writing and if it is decided to take disciplinary action it will be taken at this stage.’

The question that the judge had to grapple with was thus whether putting Ms Wallace on administrative leave amounted to disciplinary action. In finding that the plaintiff had established a fair question to be tried in relation to the issue, the judge went on to say that: ‘the very fact of suspension is enough, in this valley of squinting windows, to expose the employee to the decidedly unpleasant prospect of calumny and detraction at the hands of the unforgiving and the uncharitable, not the least in the period of suspension itself.’41

[4.15]   In the UK case of Upton- Hansen Architects Ltd v Ms X Gyftaki,42 the claimant had been constructively dismissed after she returned from a period of alleged unauthorised annual leave and was suspended pending investigation. The UK Employment

36 37 38 39 40 41 42

O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11 at para 70. O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11 at para 78. O’Donoghue v South Eastern Health Board [2005] 4 IR 217. O’Donoghue v South Eastern Health Board [2005] 4 IR 217 at 241. Regina Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority [2012] IEHC 178. Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority [2012] IEHC 178 at para 15. Upton-Hansen Architects Ltd v Ms X Gyftaki UK EAT/0278/18/RN.

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[4.15]  Termination of Employment Tribunal held that the suspension amounted to a breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence. The reason given by her employer was that it was concerned that the claimant might behave inappropriately at work were she not to be suspended. It considered that she was likely to be upset and to set a bad example for junior colleagues. There was also a concern that she might possibly breach any confidentiality obligations. The Employment Tribunal declined to accept these reasons and found that there was no evidence to support the position taken by the directors. On the contrary, they accepted the claimant’s evidence that it was more likely for questions to be asked by her colleagues about her absence than if she returned to work and was advised to keep the matter confidential. The case was appealed to the UK EAT, which determined that the Employment Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the reason for suspension was nothing to do with the employee’s conduct and that this was the element that had caused the breach of trust and confidence. In O’Sullivan v HSE,43 the Supreme Court overturned a previous Court of Appeal decision, determining that there was significant evidence available to allow the Health Service Executive (HSE) to place Prof O’Sullivan on administrative leave. Evidence included allegations of an absence of consent from patients, a lack of ethical approval and the use of non-hospital equipment in the course of a procedure. The Court also held (O’Donnell CJ) that the HSE was entitled to rely on several expert reports it received regarding the allegations against Prof O’Sullivan in recommending that he be placed on administrative leave. He went on to say that the HSE had a ‘bona fide’ view that the behaviour of Prof O’Sullivan gave rise to an immediate and serious risk to the health, welfare and safety of patients or staff, and that he should be suspended; and that this view was not irrational.44 In The Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Burke,45 the High Court, per Owens J, ruled that the school had validly suspended Mr Burke pending the outcome of a disciplinary process because of their concern that if he were permitted to continue teaching, he would engage in a repeat of his behaviour which would be damaging to the school. The judge said that: ‘There is no evidence any relevant matter was not duly considered or any irrelevant matter was considered by the Board in arriving at its decision’.46 Considering what the board knew about Enoch Burke’s actions in the school toward the end of the previous academic year, and his behaviour at the Board, apprehension that he would engage in harmful and disruptive conduct if permitted to teach in the school was rational and reasonable. The Board was entitled to consider that Enoch Burke did not address the issue of how he would behave in the school’.47

43 44 45 46 47

O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11. Note that this was a four-to-one verdict, with a substantial dissenting judgement given by Woulfe J. The Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Burke [2023] IEHC 288. The Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Burke [2023] IEHC 288. The Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Burke [2023] IEHC 288.

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.17]

Delay and suspensions [4.16]  Flynn v An Post48 is an authority for the proposition that the power to suspend someone must be viewed as permitting the suspension to continue only for the period of time for which it would be reasonably practicable to hold a full hearing into the matter. An open-ended suspension – particularly one without pay – can only be deemed a form of punishment and a severe one at that. By contrast, a short period of suspension with pay where there are clearly defined reasons for same against a backdrop of consecutive steps to resolve the disciplinary issue is less likely to warrant intervention from the High Court. In O’Sullivan v HSE,49 a decision was taken by the HSE to suspend Prof O’Sullivan some ten months after the events at the heart of the issue had occurred. This was deemed reasonable as the chief executive (the only person who was authorised to suspend) was first notified by letter of the issue on 1 July 2019. He wrote to Prof O’Sullivan on 17 July 2019 raising the issue of administrative leave and inviting representations as to the proposal to place him on administrative leave; and Prof O’Sullivan was ultimately placed on administrative leave 6 August 2019. What can be taken from all of the above is that there are a limited number of scenarios in which a suspension with pay will be justified, including: (a) (b) (c) (d)

in order to prevent interference with evidence; in order to prevent a repeat of the conduct; in order to protect other employees from the risk of such conduct; and in order to protect the employer’s business or reputation.

In all cases, the suspension should last only for such time as is reasonable to hold a full hearing into the matter. Critically, the discretion to suspend with pay; (a) (b) (c) (d)

must be carried out in good faith; must not be arbitrary capricious or irrational; must be one that any reasonable decision maker could have made; and must be one that takes into account all relevant considerations and excludes all extraneous ones.

INVESTIGATIONS [4.17]   Workplace investigations can arise in many instances; most of these concern complaints of bullying or harassment or disciplinary investigations. The law in relation to this area is detailed, complex and often misleading. In general, the High Court takes 48 49

Flynn v An Post [1987] IR 68. O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11.

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[4.18]  Termination of Employment the view that it will not interfere in the internal workings of a company50 (which clearly includes investigations); yet there are numerous examples of cases where it has done just that.51 At the end of the day, the effect of these decisions is a lack of clearly defined ‘dos and don’ts’, leading to the most basic investigations becoming bogged down with claims from lawyers for procedural fairness, oral hearings coupled with stenographers, demands for lists of witnesses beforehand and the ability to cross-examine such witnesses – a process further complicated when there is a need for confidentiality and speedy resolution. All of this inevitably culminates in the breakdown of the disciplinary process and the matter being compromised by both parties. The fundamental issue that the courts must wrestle with – and that employers must consider – is the applicability of the right to fair procedures and natural justice to the investigation process. Also, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when an investigation ends and when a formal disciplinary hearing commences, as often one naturally evolves into the other. At one end of the scale, it is clear that employers are entitled to ask their employees reasonable questions and to expect to be provided with reasonable answers. At the other end, it is clear that employees are entitled to be fully protected during a formal disciplinary investigation. Therefore, if an employer asks an employee where they were yesterday for the purpose of ascertaining whether an expense sheet that they submitted is correct, and the employee replies ‘Cork’, is this a formal investigation which requires the employee to be put on full notice of their rights to fair procedures and natural justice? Clearly not! However, imagine that the employer then alleges that the employee was in fact in Dublin, but has claimed travelling expenses to and from Cork for the day; and states that in the absence of a reasonable explanation for this, it intends to suspend the employee with pay pending a formal investigation of the matter. Has the employer then strayed into a formal investigation which requires it to afford the employee full rights of natural and constitutional justice?

Terms of reference [4.18]   Critical to most investigations is that there are properly drafted terms of reference. The Labour Court will generally scrutinise any terms of reference to ensure both that they are clear and that they have been adhered to. In Transport Infrastructure Ireland v Maurice Leahy,52 the Labour Court was tasked with considering a submission by the complainant that he had been discriminated against because the independent investigator’s report – which had taken months to complete – was flawed, since the terms of reference did not provide for a potential

50 See

Turner v O’Reilly [2006] IEHC 92, Hedigan J. Boland v Phoenix Shannon plc [1997] ELR 113. Transport Infrastructure Ireland v Maurice Leahy EDA1819.

51 See 52

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.19] outcome of the claim being false and/or vexatious. The respondent had accepted this and invited the complainant to make a submission on this point, but did not allow an appeal of the overall report. The Labour Court, in finding against the complainant, concluded that the complainant had not established facts that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Clearly, had the respondent not mended its hand and allowed the employee to make submissions, it arguably would have discriminated against him. This case is also useful in that it confirms that as long as an accused employee has the opportunity to make submissions in respect of an investigator’s report, an appeal is not necessary. Typically, properly drafted terms of reference will provide that the investigation report will be produced in draft first and the various parties will be allowed to make comment on same prior to same being finalised. This does not mean that the investigator must fundamentally change their report in light of any submissions; but it does mean that the investigator must consider them. If this right of comment is given, it will be difficult for the complainant to challenge any such report.53 Once an investigation has begun, it is difficult to halt it; and – unlike a person who is charged with a criminal offence – an employee does not have the right to remain silent, often known as the ‘Bart Simpson’ defence.54 To do so would necessitate an application for interlocutory relief in the High Court. In Heinz-Peter Nasheur v NUI Galway,55 the Court of Appeal overturned a High Court decision allowing the plaintiff an injunction preventing a workplace bullying investigation because: (a) the investigator had acted for one of the complainants 20 years prior to the investigation; and (b) the investigator had consulted with the complainants and NUI Galway as the employer and not the plaintiff when drafting the terms of reference. In issuing its decision, the Court of Appeal clarified that the level of objective argument required to halt a workplace investigation when a person raises a concern of bias is ‘whether a fair minded observer in possession of all the facts, could have apprehended bias as a result of any aspect of the investigators conduct’. It is therefore an objective test.

Distinction between informal and formal investigations [4.19]  In O’Sullivan v Mercy Hospital Cork,56 Clarke J made the distinction between, on the one hand, an entirely informal investigation carried out by an employer for the

53 54 55 56

Transport Infrastructure Ireland v Maurice Leahy EDA1819. The ‘Bart Simpson defence’ was first referred to by Clarke J in Rowland v An Post [2017] IESC 20, and built on the previous case of Farrell v Minister for Defence (10 July 1984), HC, Murphy J. Heinz-Peter Nasheur v NUI Galway, 2018, IECA. O’Sullivan v Mercy Hospital Cork (3 June 2005), HC, Clarke J.

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[4.20]  Termination of Employment purposes of ascertaining whether there might be a basis for initiating a disciplinary procedure, which does not purport to reach conclusions other than perhaps to determine that a disciplinary procedure should be instigated; and on the other hand, statutory schemes which require a decision of a particular body as to the existence of a prima facie case as a prerequisite to formal disciplinary proceedings. Clearly, in the former case, there is no right to fair procedures and natural justice; whereas in the latter case, there is. While this clarification is welcome, the lines are seldom that distinct, particularly in private sector employment. We can take from the above that: (a) in the case of an informal investigation, there is no requirement to afford the full rights to natural justice; (b) when commencing an investigation, it is best to make it clear that the initial investigation is merely a fact-finding exercise and nothing more, and that no conclusions will be reached other than to establish the facts and determine whether disciplinary proceedings should be instigated; and (c) if the investigation is finalised and it is concluded that disciplinary proceedings should be initiated, the employee should be put on notice of their right to representation, fair procedures etc.

Conflation of investigation and disciplinary procedures [4.20]   Given the difficulty sometimes in distinguishing between when an investigation starts and finishes, and when a disciplinary hearing starts, it is important that there is no conflation of the investigation with the disciplinary hearing. Thus, in A Chef v A Catering Service,57 in finding the dismissal unfair, the adjudication officer went on to hold that: ‘The difficulty with the approach of the disciplinary process was that it did not first consider whether a disciplinary breach or breaches had occurred and how serious any such breaches were. It took the breaches identified in the investigation as disciplinary breaches and then, explicitly, only considered the issue of sanction. At the adjudication, the respondent pointed to the respondent disciplinary policy to suggest where the breaches might fit in. This did not occur during the disciplinary process. This leads to a finding that the complainant’s dismissal was unfair. Such a breach is not a technical breach as it involves the conflation of the investigation and the disciplinary processes.’

The adjudication officer found against the employer because there was no investigation process per se prior to the lengthy and detailed disciplinary hearing, which merely considered whether a disciplinary breach or breaches had occurred and how serious they were.

57

A Chef v A Catering Service ADJ-00006942, 14 June 2018.

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.21]

Independent investigators [4.21]   Quite an industry has grown up around independent workplace investigations. The reasons for this are varied; but in particular, para 98 of the Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work prepared by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC)58 provides that, in investigating a complaint: ‘Those carrying out the investigation should not be connected with the allegation in any way. It is preferable that at least two people should investigate a complaint but it is acknowledged that this may not always be practicable. Such an investigation team should, as far as practicable, have gender balance and ideally should seek to ensure diversity. All of those on the investigation team should have received appropriate training. Every effort should be made to resolve the complaint promptly. External assistance may be necessary in some circumstances to ensure impartiality, objectivity and fairness. Where the accused person objects to the person(s) appointed to investigate the complaint, such objection should be given proper consideration.’

While this code only refers to harassment and sexual harassment, it does somewhat set the standard by which workplace investigations should be run. Equally, in practically every organisation, small or large, the only way to ensure absolute independence and to ensure no connection with the allegation in an investigation is to appoint an external person. This has obvious advantages; but often, these are met with substantial, generally financial, disadvantages, as these investigations take considerable time and expense. While in general, it is not necessary to appoint an outside investigator, in some circumstances this will be inevitable. The question of whether the employee who is the subject matter of the investigation can object to the person appointed by the company was the subject matter of an ­application for interlocutory relief in Harrington v Irish Nationwide Building Society.59 Here, Mr Harrington had been suspended by the building society for alleged irregularities. The society appointed a person to carry out the investigation. Mr Harrington objected on the basis that he should have an input into the choice of investigator. The court found against him. It is clear from this that unless it can be shown that the investigator is biased (which in itself could give rise to a claim for defamation if proven incorrect), there is no basis for an employee to insist that they have input into the choice of investigator. This should, however, be contrasted with the situation that prevails for HSE workers. The Disciplinary Procedure for Employees of the HSE agreed in January 2007 specifically provides that an ‘investigation will be conducted by person(s) who are acceptable to both sides’. 58 59

Established in 2014, the IHREC absorbed the functions of the Equality Authority and the Irish Human Rights Commission. Harrington v Irish Nationwide Building Society (2008), HC.

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[4.22]  Termination of Employment

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS [4.22]   Disciplinary hearings are to some extent more straightforward than investigations, as it is clear that the employee concerned is entitled to the full rights to natural justice. However, the WRC and the Labour Court will scrutinise the process to ensure that it meets the requisite standard; and this is a high standard, as can be seen from A Banker v A Bank.60 Here the adjudication officer ordered the bank to reinstate the employee, who had previously been dismissed for dishonesty and theft, and for serious and persistent neglect of instructions. The adjudication officer found that there were serious procedural flaws in the disciplinary process that had resulted in the complainant’s dismissal, including the following: (a) No interview notes from the investigation had been shared with the employee. (b) Certain key witnesses had not been interviewed61 (c) The investigation report made no reference to fraud, dishonesty or theft, and any dismissal based on an investigation report that made no reference to the reason for dismissal should not have led to the employee’s dismissal. (d) The employee had objected to the fact that he was expected to give evidence during the process in response to allegations, yet he was not permitted to crossexamine the persons behind the allegations. (e) The adjudication officer also questioned the employer as to why there were other cases in which preferential rates had been applied to accounts (the employee in this instance was accused of applying a preferential rate to his parents’ account), and the witnesses could not explain that position. The adjudication officer further pointed out the lack of documentation produced by the bank regarding the application of the preferential rates.

Final written warnings [4.23]   Prior to taking the decision to dismiss, employers must consider what other options are open to them. There has been increased focus on this by the Labour Court in recent years, as exemplified by Dillon v The Board of Management of Catholic University School.62 Here Mr Dillon had been employed by the school from 1992 to 2017. He was issued with a final written warning for allegedly calling a student by ‘an unpleasant and offensive name’. He sought leave for judicial review of the decision, which was denied in the High Court; but he successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal emphasised the very serious nature of a final written warning for an employee. Bermingham P stated: ‘I accept the argument that the fact that such a warning was placed on the file could, in certain circumstances, have long

60 61 62

A Banker v A Bank ADJ 00001266, April 2018. Typically, if an incident occurs in a workplace and there were other employees present, the employer must interview them as part of its investigation – see Vita Cortex Limited v Dourellan UD 1031/1992. Dillon v The Board of Management of Catholic University School (2018) IECA 292.

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.25] term effects. I would also have a concern that if it became established that once a warning period had expired that the issue was moot and not amenable to review, that might serve to encourage early resorts to litigation which is the last thing that I would want to see.’ Bermingham J also went on to say; ‘I also have a concern about categorising a final written warning as de minimus. In my view, issuing a final warning should be a matter of great moment; it should not happy lightly and cannot properly be regarded as a “trifle”.’ The failure of employers to consider a lesser option than dismissal was emphasised in Rachel Berthold v Google Ireland Limited.63 Here the EAT, in finding against the respondent, stated: ‘There was no evidence given that the respondent considered any other option other than termination e.g. demotion. Furthermore the Tribunal is not satisfied that fair procedures were used and therefore it is procedurally unfair. In consideration of the evidence over three days and submissions made by both parties the Tribunal finds that the claimant was unfairly dismissed and her claim succeeds and the Tribunal awards her compensation of €110,000.00 under the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 to 2007.’

Representation [4.24]   It is a fundamental right of all employees to be afforded representation during the disciplinary process. Any denial of this right will lead to a finding of unfair dismissal. Legal representation [4.25]   The issue of legal representation is complicated. Whereas SI 146/2000 – Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order, 2000 makes it clear that it does not contemplate legal representation, many employers are inclined to proceed on that basis regardless. However, it is clear from a number of decisions of the courts that workplace investigations need not involve legal representatives unless the issues being investigated are particularly complex from a legal and factual point of view. In Lyons v Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board,64 it was initially thought that the effect of this decision was that employees were entitled to legal representation and the full rights to fair procedures and natural justice (including crossexamination of witnesses) during both the investigation and the disciplinary stage. However other judgments – such as EG v The Society of Actuaries in Ireland65 and

63 64 65

Rachel Berthold v Google Ireland Limited UD2147/2011, MN2174/2011. Lyons v Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272. EG v Society of Actuaries in Ireland [2017] IEHC 392.

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[4.25]  Termination of Employment NM v Limerick and Clare Education and Training Board66 – suggest that Lyons is something of an outlier; and that once there is no finding of fact against an employee and where they are allowed an oral hearing at the disciplinary stage that this satisfies the right to fair procedures. The matter of legal representation was to all extents and purposes settled by the Supreme Court in its determination Irish Rail v McKelvey.67 Here the Supreme Court emphasised that employees who are the subject of internal inquiries will not normally be entitled to be legally represented, and that such a right will arise only in exceptional cases which involve issues of a factual or legal complexity which could not be adequately addressed without the assistance of lawyers. This is the test against which the WRC now measure such claims. Thus, in A Civil Servant v A Government Department,68 the adjudication officer, in finding that the employee was not entitled to legal representation, went on to say: ‘It is clear from this decision that a disciplinary process is not rendered unfair by a refusal to allow an employee legal representation in the conduct of the disciplinary hearing or investigation. Such a requirement could only arise in exceptional cases involving issues of factual or legal complexity which could not be adequately addressed without the assistance of a lawyer. I do not believe that this was the case in the Complainant’s instance. The Complainant did not deny or dispute the events in question. He signed the contemporaneous notes of the Customs Official at the time of event. He confirmed the events at the meetings on 8th January 2018 and 17th January 2018. I also note that the Complainant was not denied legal representation at the appeal hearing. Rather, his legal representative was not available to attend the hearing on a scheduled day.’

While the case law in this area was somewhat unsettled and slightly contradictory for many years, it is now more or less settled. What practitioners can now take from all this is that if a process is clear and uncomplicated, it will not be rendered unfair on the grounds of a refusal to allow legal representation. However, the fact that McKelvey has clarified this matter is not to be taken as carte blanche to reject a request for legal representation in all instances. Certainly, McKelvey sets a high bar; but where the case is complicated, both on the facts and legally, consideration must be given to allowing legal representation – certainly at the disciplinary and appeal stages. There are also a few practical issues which bear consideration – not least the following: (a) Should an employer allow a legal representation attend then it may be difficult for the employee to subsequently argue procedural defects, if this was not raised by their representative. (b) Whatever representative attends, they are there merely to represent the employee. They cannot answer questions on the employee’s behalf.

66 67 68

NM v Limerick and Clare Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 588. Irish Rail v McKelvey [2019] IESC 79. A Civil Servant v A Government Department ADJ-00018226, 16 May 2019.

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.28] Trade union representation [4.26]   A somewhat more difficult decision in non-union companies is whether to allow a trade union official to represent an employee. The problem here lies in the Industrial Relations Act 1990 Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures.69 Paragraph 5 of the Code provides that: ‘for the purposes of this Code of Practice, “employee representative” includes a colleague of the employee’s choice and a registered trade union but not any other person or body unconnected with the enterprise.’ Note that the wording of this section states ‘and a registered trade union’; it does not say ‘may’ – it is quite specific. Paragraph 6 of the Code provides that the employee concerned must be ‘given the opportunity to avail of the right to be represented during the procedure’. Therefore, if the employee wishes to be represented by a trade union official and the company is non-union, on a strict reading of the Code of Practice, to deny the employee the right to be so represented would amount to a breach of the Code. Although the Code is non-binding, it should be remembered that s 6(7)(b) of the 1977 Act provides that in determining whether a dismissal is fair or unfair, the WRC may have regard to ‘the extent (if any)’ to which the employer has complied with any code of practice. Generally, as a compromise, in non-union companies such representation is allowed, but all meetings occur off the premises.

Expert witnesses [4.27]   From time to time during an investigation, it may be necessary to introduce expert witnesses. Such instances may arise where, for example, a technical expert is required to assess a person’s handwriting. In such circumstances, the employee who is the subject of the investigation should be given full access to the expert and their report, and allowed to comment on it. A difficulty often arises in such circumstances if the employee engages their own alternative expert. This often happens in long-term absence cases, where two doctors may disagree as to the long-term prognosis of a patient. While in such cases the opinion of a third medical expert is generally required, this may not be the case for other expert witnesses. Thus, in Cleary v TSB Bank,70 where there was some disagreement between two handwriting experts, the EAT upheld the bank’s decision to dismiss.

Probationary employees [4.28]   The European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations became law on 16 December 2022 and now govern the duration of

69 70

Industrial Relations Act 1990 Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures (SI 146/2000). Cleary v TSB Bank 754/1995.

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[4.28]  Termination of Employment probation periods.71 The Regulations apply to all employees in Ireland with more than four weeks’ consecutive service who work for more than an average of four hours per week. The Regulations limit the duration of probationary periods to six months for private sector employees and 12 months for public servants. Also, an employer can only extend a probationary period on an ‘exceptional basis’, and only in the interests of the employee.72 The Regulations have introduced a new focus on probationary employees. One question that often arises is whether employers must show equal deference, insofar as natural justice and fair procedures apply, to employees on probation. The answer to this lies in the contractual clause on probation. One of two scenarios will therefore apply: (a) There is a probationary clause, in which case the employer must adhere to that; or (b) There is no probationary clause, in which case the terms of the disciplinary procedure will apply.

In either case, if the employer moves to dismiss contrary to the probationary clause or the disciplinary procedure respectively, a breach of contract will arise. Technically, the employee may seek to injunct the employer. For this reason, the terms of both the probationary clause and the contract are vital. At all times, there should be a ‘no-fault’ termination clause in the contract which allows the employer to terminate the contract with notice or pay in lieu thereof. This is critical – particularly for probationary employees, as it may not always be practical to conduct a protracted investigation which might in itself bring the employee over the one-year threshold necessary to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal. Equally, however, probationary employees still have access to the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Act73 and the Labour Court has always insisted that such employees are entitled to fair procedures and natural justice. While such appeals are nonbinding on employers, the publicity surrounding them can be potentially embarrassing. In Beechside Company Limited t/a Park Hotel Kenmare,74 the Labour Court found that the former general manager of the Park Hotel in Kenmare had been unfairly dismissed while on probation and recommended that he be paid €90,000 in compensation. The former employee claimed that he had been dismissed without warning after being called to a meeting with the managing director of the hotel, who informed him that things were not working out. While the Labour Court accepted that employers have the right not to retain employees during probation, it stated that ‘this can only be carried out where the employer adheres strictly to natural justice and fair procedures’. The Court concluded that the hotel had not applied fair procedures, as: (a) the former general manager had not been provided with details of any performance issues; (b) no warning had been given that his employment was in jeopardy; 71 72 73 74

The European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations (SI 686/2022). Section 10 of the Regulations amended s 6 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 by inserting a new s 6D3(a) and (b) after s 6C. Section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969. Beechside Company Limited t/a Park Hotel Kenmare ILCR Recommendation Number LCR21798.

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Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.29] (c) he had not been afforded the right to representation; (d) he had not been provided with the reasons for his dismissal; and (e) he had not been afforded an opportunity to reply. While under the Regulations75 probationary periods cannot be extended beyond 12 months, if they are, the fact remains that the employee has the protection of the Unfair Dismissals Act.76

Appeals [4.29]   The Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures77 provides that there is an obligation on employers to make available ‘an internal appeals mechanism’. The problem for employers generally arises in setting the appeal hearing. Clearly, the person hearing the appeal should not have been party to the previous disciplinary sanction or dismissal. For most employers, this poses a great difficulty, as invariably the only person authorised to dismiss an employee is either the managing director, the chief executive, the head of HR or some other senior executive. Even in large companies, it would be highly unusual for the chief executive or the senior management team not to know or hear – even informally – about the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of an employee. The fact is thus that the insistence on someone impartial hearing an appeal in most companies is farcical. That said, employers are left with a dilemma. If the employer does not allow an appeal, even though there is no automatic right in natural justice to an appeal, this will be argued to be a breach of the Code of Practice; and regardless of the right or otherwise, it is often accepted as a breach of fair procedures. One case which illustrates the associated pitfalls for employers is Maliuk v Shellfish De La Mer Limited.78 Here the claimant, who had been employed by the respondent since 2003, received a verbal warning regarding his performance in May 2006. There was no disciplinary hearing and when he asked if he could appeal, he was told he could not. On 10 November 2006, the claimant was suspended with pay pending the outcome of an investigation after a meeting with the respondent. He was given a final written warning on 15 November. He was not informed of a right of appeal. Following this, the claimant was notified on 16 and 21 November of two complaints made by two female employees. This was so even though the complaints had been made the previous October and no reference to them had been made at the previous meeting on 10 November. As a result, the claimant was suspended with pay and dismissed by way of letter on 28 November. Again, he was not informed of a right of appeal against the dismissal. The EAT, in finding the dismissal unfair, said it was satisfied that fair procedures ‘were not invoked by the Respondent’.79 75 76 77 78 79

Beechside Company Limited t/a Park Hotel Kenmare, at 55. A Chef v A Pub/Restaurant ADJ 00008693, 15 February 2018. Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures (SI 146/2000). Maliuk v Shellfish De La Mer Limited UD 211/2007. See also Pearce v David Flynn Limited UD 833/2006.

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[4.30]  Termination of Employment Practically, the best advice would seem to be as follows: (a) If there is no possible person internally who can hear the appeal, afford the employee an independent external person to hear it. (b) If there is someone internally who can hear the appeal, ensure that they have had no previous dealing whatsoever in the matter. If necessary and if possible, appoint someone from another division, plant or location to hear the appeal. Employers must also be very mindful when hearing appeals as to what the status of the employee will be between the date of dismissal and the date of the appeal. Generally speaking, employees who are terminated will be taken off payroll; but this might not always be so. Thus, in Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority,80 (see para 4.14) the plaintiff had a clause in her contract which stated: ‘Appeals will be heard by an Authority Manager senior to the manager who decided the outcome of the hearing of the appeal. Disciplinary action will not be taken pending the outcome of the appeal. At the appeal the employee may be accompanied by a staff representative. The outcome of the appeal will be notified to the employee in writing and if it is decided to take disciplinary action it will be taken at this stage.’

The question that the judge had to grapple with was thus whether putting Ms Wallace on administrative leave amounted to disciplinary action. In finding that the plaintiff had established a fair question to be tried in relation to the issue, the judge went on to say that: He went on to refer to the decision in McLoughlin v Setanta Insurance Services Limited,81 where Laffoy J stated that: ‘damages can never be an adequate remedy where (as here) there is a real prospect of reputational damage to the parties seeking the injunction.’ Thus, employers must be aware that where there is a particular contractual term prohibiting any form of disciplinary action prior to an appeal being heard, even if that is a ‘holding suspension’, they must not deviate from the contract of employment. Failure to appeal [4.30]  In Pungor v MBCC Foods Ltd,82 the EAT determined that the employee had an ‘obligation’ to exhaust the internal disciplinary and appeal procedures prior to lodging an unfair dismissal claim. In this case the employee had been dismissed for abusing a loyalty card scheme and lodged unfair dismissal proceedings without ever exercising her internal right to appeal. The EAT stated as follows: ‘The [employee] … was afforded the right of appeal, which she did not avail of. The [employee] has an obligation to exhaust the internal disciplinary process prior to seeking to enforce her rights externally. She has not satisfied her obligation and did not adduce any evidence that might justify her decision not to exhaust the internal process.’

80 81 82

Regina Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority [2012] IEHC 178. McLoughlin v Setanta Insurance Services Limited [2011] IEHC 410. Pungor v MBCC Foods Ltd UD584/2015.

206

Fair Procedures and Natural Justice  [4.30] This position was also endorsed by the Labour Court in Aryzta v Vilnis Cacs.83 While the complainant’s failure to exercise his internal right of appeal was not the only reason he lost his case, the Court went on to state: ‘The Court also finds that there is an obligation on the Claimant to exhaust available internal procedures and that the Claimant failed to do so. For the reasons stated above and taking account of the failure of the Claimant to exercise his right of internal appeal, the Court finds that the Claimant was not unfairly dismissed.’

83

Aryzta v Vilnis Cacs UDD1812, 19 February 2018.

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Chapter 5

Redundancy

STATUTORY DEFINITION OF ‘REDUNDANCY’ [5.01]   The statutory definition of ‘redundancy’ is outlined in s 7(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended by s 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971 and s 5 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003). It provides that: ‘An employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to: (a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or (c) the fact that their employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before their dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or (d) the fact that their employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before their dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or (e) the fact that their employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before their dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.’

It is noteworthy that the definition of what constitutes a redundancy is extremely broad.

ENTITLEMENT TO A REDUNDANCY PAYMENT [5.02]   There are certain criteria that must be met before employees are entitled to a redundancy payment. This does not mean that an employee cannot be made redundant – and genuinely so – before this; it merely means that they will not be entitled to a ­statutory payment. The criteria are as follows: (a) They must have at least two years’ continuous service (104 weeks);1 1

Section 7 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by Schedule, para 7 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971.

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[5.02]  Termination of Employment (b) They must be in employment which is insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 1993 or have been in such employment for a period of two years prior to their dismissal;2 (c) They must be over the age of 16;3 and (d) They must have been made redundant as a result of a genuine redundancy situation. Additionally, employees who meet the above criteria may be entitled to claim a ­redundancy payment by reason of lay-off or short-time working if such is imposed by their employer.4 Section 24 of the Act provides that: ‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an employee shall not be entitled to a lump sum unless before the end of the period of 52 weeks beginning on the date of dismissal or the date of termination of employment— (a) the payment has been agreed and paid, or (b) the employee has made a claim for the payment by notice in writing given to the employer, or (c) a question as to the right of the employee to the payment, or as to the amount of the payment, has been referred to the Director General under section 39. (2A) Where an employee who fails to make a claim for a lump sum within the period of 52 weeks mentioned in subsection (1) (as amended) makes such a claim before the end of the period of 104 weeks beginning on the date of dismissal or the date of termination of employment, the adjudication officer, if he/she is satisfied that the employee would have been entitled to the lump sum and that the failure was due to a reasonable cause, may declare the employee to be entitled to the lump sum and the employee shall thereupon become so entitled.’

In summary, this means that if an employee is not paid a lump sum within a 52-week period, but the lump sum is paid within a period of 104 weeks from the date of termination, the adjudication officer – if satisfied that there was reasonable cause – may declare that the employee was entitled to a statutory payment. This matter was examined in detail in Serdang Limited t/a Blarney Hotel & Golf Resort and Pawel Sowinski.5 It was agreed by the parties that the complainant had been made redundant on 17 March 2020. The complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) on 19 May 2021. It was submitted by the respondent that the claim was statute barred. The complainant stated that he had moved address and had received no notification of his redundancy. He submitted that he first came to understand the date of his redundancy when the respondent confirmed this fact to the adjudication officer

2 3

4 5

Section 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by Schedule, para 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Note that the Protection of Employees (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007 repealed s 5 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979, thereby removing the previous upper age limit of 66. Section 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971 and s 10 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979. Serdang Limited t/a Blarney Hotel & Golf Resort and Pawel Sowinski RPA/22/10 Detemination RPD232, 16 March 2023.

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Redundancy  [5.03] at the hearing of his complaint by the WRC. Despite finding that it was the duty of the complainant to notify the respondent of his change of address, and that the respondent had made ‘every reasonable effort to properly notify the complainant of the termination of his employment by reason of redundancy’, the Labour Court concluded that ‘on the balance of probability, the complainant was not aware of the fact or date of his redundancy until some considerable time after its occurrence’; and that he had shown that his failure to make his complaint in time ‘was due to reasonable cause in that he had no knowledge which could have grounded an understanding on his behalf of the time limits applicable’.

Continuous service [5.03]   Employment will generally be regarded as continuous unless it has been terminated by the dismissal of the employee or the employee has voluntarily left their employment.6 Under Schedule 3 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 and s 10(a) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971, there has always been what is sometimes referred to as a ‘presumption of continuity of employment’. This was strengthened by s 12 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003 in respect of redundancies notified/declared on or after 10 April 2005. Section 12(a) refers to a number of interruptions to an employee’s service and states that continuity of employment is not broken by the matters referred to. These include: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)

sickness; lay-off; holidays; service in the reserve defence forces of the State; leave authorised by the employer (eg, a career break); adoptive leave; leave under the maternity protection legislation; parental leave; force majeure leave; carer’s leave; and absence from work because of a lock-out by the employer or because of ­participation by the employee in a strike.

Additionally, para 5A of Schedule 3 of the 1967 Act, as inserted by s 19 of the 1971 Act, provides that a dismissal by reason of redundancy before an employee has completed 104 weeks of service followed by the re-employment of the employee within a 26-week period does not break continuity of service. No reference is made to any time limit on periods of sick leave absence or absence due to lay-off – or indeed due to any other reasons – for continuity of employment purposes. 6

Schedule 3, para 3 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971; ss 17, 23 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979.

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[5.04]  Termination of Employment Continuity is broken where an employee claims and receives a redundancy payment in respect of lay-off or short time, as they are deemed to have voluntarily left their employment.7 Workers on fixed-term/specified purpose contracts [5.04]   Fixed-term/specified purpose contracts arise where an employee is hired for a particular term/purpose. The Redundancy Payments Act 2003 safeguards the right to redundancy of a worker employed under a ‘specified purpose’ contract where the exact duration of the contract was limited, but was, at the time of its making, incapable of precise ascertainment.8 Employment agencies [5.05]   Under the Redundancy Payments Act 2003, employees employed through employment agencies are covered for redundancy. Where the employment agency pays the wages of the employee, it is responsible for making the statutory redundancy payment.9 Employees commencing work abroad [5.06]   Under the Redundancy Payments Act 2003, employees who start work in a company abroad, work there for some time and are then transferred to the company or an associated company in Ireland and who work here for at least two years before being made redundant will have all of their service counted in calculating their statutory redundancy entitlements. The reverse is also the case: employees who start working in Ireland but are then posted abroad, and who subsequently return to Ireland and are then made redundant, are given full credit for all their service for redundancy purposes.10 Apprentices [5.07]   Redundancy payments will not be payable where an employee is dismissed within one month of the end of their apprenticeship. If, however, an employer retains the services of an employee for more than one month after completion of their apprenticeship, the period of apprenticeship will count in calculating any redundancy payments in respect of that employee in the future. An apprentice whose employment terminates by reason of redundancy during the period of their apprenticeship will qualify for a redundancy lump-sum payment if they 7 8 9 10

Schedule 1, s 7 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. Section 9 (1) (b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 6 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003. Section 2(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 3(c) of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003. Section 8(b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003 inserts a new s (2A) after s 25(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967.

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Redundancy  [5.10] meet the usual requirements for entitlement – that is, if they are between the ages of 16 and 66 and have at least two years’ service etc.11 Seasonal workers [5.08]   In the case of workers who are laid off for an average period of more than 12 weeks per year prior to redundancy, the provisions relating to lay-off will not apply until the end of that average period. In the case of a seasonal worker, therefore, there will normally be no question of redundancy until the usual commencement time of their seasonal work. If they are not then re-employed, it is only then that the question of redundancy will arise.

Insurable employment [5.09]   Employees must be in employment which is fully insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993, except where the employment concerned is an excepted employment by virtue of para 2, 4 or 5 of Pt II of the First Schedule to that Act.12 This in effect means that employees will be entitled to a redundancy payment even where the employment is of a casual nature; where the employee is employed by a prescribed relative of the employed person; where the employment concerned is not the employee’s principal means of livelihood; or where the employment is of ‘inconsiderable extent’. The question of insurability is decided by the Department of Social Protection in accordance with the rules and appeals procedures provided for in the Social Welfare Acts. Part-time workers [5.10]   The Redundancy Payments Act 2003 secured the rights of part-time workers to a statutory redundancy payment by amending the insurability requirements for redundancy to bring them into line with the Social Welfare Acts and the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001. This is in line with the provision of the 2001 Act that part-time employees cannot be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable full-time employees in relation to conditions of employment. In particular, there is recognition for the rights of workers to statutory redundancy in: (a) ‘casual employment’;13 (b) ‘subsidiary employment’, where a person depends on another employment for their livelihood;14 and (c) ‘employment of inconsiderable extent’15 (ie, with a very low wage). 11

12 13 14 15

Section 7(4) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Section 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003. Schedule 1, Pt 2, para 2 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993. See Schedule 1, Pt 2, para 2 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993. See Schedule 1, Pt 2, para 5 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993.

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[5.11]  Termination of Employment

Aged over 16 [5.11]   To qualify for a redundancy payment, employees must be over 16 years of age.

Genuine redundancy [5.12]   A genuine redundancy exists where the work no longer exists and the person is not replaced. The emphasis is on the job and not the person. This ‘impersonal’ requirement is endorsed by the amendment of s 7(2) of the 1967 Act by s 5 of the 2003 Act, which inserts additional wording into the 1967 Act to reiterate this fact.

The right to a redundancy lump-sum payment by reason of lay-off or short time (Form RP9) [5.13]   ‘Lay-off’ and ‘short time’ are defined in s 11 of the 1967 Act as amended by s 10 of the 1979 Act. A lay-off occurs where the services of an employee are not required because of a lack of work to be carried out by that employee, if the employer gives notice to the employee beforehand that the break in employment is temporary in nature (Redundancy Form RP9 may be used for this purpose). If an employer fails to give notice of lay-off, it is open to the employee to claim a statutory redundancy payment. Short time occurs when there is a reduction in the amount of work available, leading to a reduction in weekly earnings to less than half the normal weekly earnings or a reduction in the hours worked to less than half the normal weekly working hours. Here again, employers must give notice that the short time is of a temporary nature, as failure to do so will leave open the possibility of a claim for a redundancy payment from the affected employees. Where an employee has been laid off, kept on short time or a mixture of both either for four consecutive weeks or for a broken series of six weeks within a 13-week period, the employee may claim a redundancy payment.16 The employee must serve a written notice stating that they intend to claim redundancy by reason of lay-off or short time (again, a Form RP9 can be used for this purpose); or alternatively, they must give notice in writing to the employer terminating their contract of employment (Form RP9 may also be used for this purpose). Employees can wait for longer than the periods mentioned to serve either of the notices. However, if the lay-off or short time stops and they do decide to claim, they must serve

16

Section 12(1)(a) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971.

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Redundancy  [5.15] notice of their intention to do so no later than four weeks after the lay-off or short time ceases. Thereafter, they are debarred from claiming a payment in respect of that particular period of lay-off or short time.17 [5.14]  Drumcondra Childcare Limited v Agnieszka Szumera18 is instructive in this regard. Here the claimant was placed on temporary lay-off from 25 August 2017 until 1 January 2018. After a period of four weeks on temporary lay-off, she wrote to the respondent terminating her employment with effect from 1 January 2018. The adjudication officer in the WRC initially dismissed her case on the basis that the relevant provisions of the Redundancy Payments Acts – ss 11 and 12 – specifically provide that the employee must give notice of their intention to claim redundancy in respect of the lay-off or short time.19 The Labour Court on appeal determined that the claim fell ‘squarely within the meaning of section 12(2) of the Act. The letter sent by the Complainant to the Respondent informing the latter, after she had been on a period of enforced lay-off of longer than four weeks, is to be deemed – in accordance with section 12(2) of the Act – “to be a notice of intention to claim [a redundancy lump sum payment]”. This claim was not subsequently defeated by the Respondent within the meaning of section 13 of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court determines that the Complainant’s claim for a statutory redundancy lump sum under the Act is well-founded’. The Labour Court in finding in favour of the complainant, relied on the case of, In the Matter of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 Industrial Yarns Limited v Leo Greene and Arthur Manley,20 in which Costello J (as he was then) stated: ‘the s12 procedures were amended by s 11 of the 1971 Act. After the employer has served the s.11 notice of lay-off, the employee can now serve one of the two notices; either (a) a notice of intention to claim redundancy payment or (b) a notice terminating his contract (which is deemed to be a notice to claim redundancy payment.) He cannot serve both.’

Thus, it must be taken that an employee who resigns during a period of lay-off or short time has served a notice to claim a redundancy payment. Entitlement of employers to lay off employees [5.15]   There is another interesting aspect to the Drumcondra Childcare case.21 Here the adjudication officer quoted Law v Irish Country Meats (Pig Meats) Limited,22 which held that unless there is an express or implied term permitting the lay-off without pay,

17 18 19 20 21 22

Section 12(1)(b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Drumcondra Childcare Limited and Agnieszka Szumera RPD1814, 5 November 2018. ADJ-00012935, 25 July 2018. In the Matter of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 Industrial Yarns Limited v Leo Greene and Arthur Manley [1984] ILRM 15 at 20. In the Matter of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 Industrial Yarns Limited v Leo Greene and Arthur Manley at 16. Law v Irish Country Meats (Pig Meats) Limited 1988 ELR 266.

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[5.16]  Termination of Employment this will constitute a breach of the employee’s contract of employment.23 It is important, therefore, that all contracts of employment contain lay-off and short-time clauses. Redundancy payment and notice [5.16]   An employee who claims and receives a redundancy payment due to lay-off or short time is deemed to have voluntarily left their employment and as such is not entitled to notice under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2001. In such cases, it is the employee who is terminating the contract. Consequently, they are not entitled to notice.24 Employer’s right to give counter-notice when redundancy by way of lay-off or short-time working is claimed [5.17]   Employers may also serve counter-notice on an employee claiming a redundancy payment by reason of lay-off or short time.25 The counter-notice must be given within seven days of service of notice by the employee on the employer claiming a redundancy payment; and the employer must offer the affected employee not less than 13 weeks’ unbroken employment, starting within four weeks of the employee serving notice. The counter-notice by the employer must indicate that any claim for a redundancy payment by the employee will be contested.26 Again, redundancy Form RP9 may be used for this purpose. If, however, an unsatisfactory situation from the employee’s point of view persists after the employer has given counter-notice, with four more consecutive weeks of lay-off or short time from their date of notice to claim redundancy, the employee becomes eligible for redundancy.27 If an employee complies with their obligations and issues a Form RP9 claiming redundancy, the employer must comply strictly with the seven-day time limit to issue counter-notice. Thus, in D & T Forkan Construction Limited v Diamond,28 the Labour Court determined that it had no discretion where the employee had fulfilled his obligations under the Act but the ‘respondent failed to do so’, issuing counter-notice outside the seven-day limit.

Employees wishing to leave their employment before their notice of proposed dismissal expires [5.18]   An employee can give the employer notice in writing of their intention to terminate their contract of employment before their notice of redundancy expires). 23

An implied term would include custom and practice, as set out in Petkevicius v Goode Concrete Limited [2014] IEHC 66. Irish Country Meats Ltd v Duignan M1164/94. Section 13 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Section 13(1) and (2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Section 13(3) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. D & T Forkan Construction Limited v Diamond RPD181.

24 See 25 26 27 28

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Redundancy  [5.20] Part 1 of Form RP6 is used for this purpose. Employers may, however, issue the employee with a counter-notice in writing, requesting them to withdraw their notice and to continue in employment until the original date of notice expires. Employers should use Form RP6 (Part 2 of the form) for this purpose. If the employee unreasonably refuses to comply with this counter-notice, the employer can then contest liability to pay a redundancy payment.29 If the employer agrees to the employee’s request to leave early, it can indicate its consent by using Part 3 of Form RP6. This involves the employer giving the employee consent to alter their proposed date of termination of employment so as to bring that new date within what is referred to as ‘the obligatory period of notice’. The date of dismissal then becomes the date on which the employee’s notice expires.30

DISENTITLEMENT TO A REDUNDANCY PAYMENT [5.19]   In certain circumstances, an employee who meets the criteria for a redundancy payment may not in fact be entitled to receive one.

Alternative work [5.20]   In certain circumstances, an offer of alternative employment from the employer will bar an employee from a redundancy payment:31 (a) An employee whose contract is terminated and immediately renewed or who is immediately re-engaged will be taken not to have been dismissed and will not be entitled to a redundancy payment if the provisions of the renewed or new contract do not differ from those of the previous contract and if the employee accepts.32 (b) An employer may give an offer in writing to an employee to have their contract renewed or to be re-engaged under a new contract on terms different from those of the previous contract. If the new or renewed contract takes effect within four weeks of the end of the previous contract and the employee accepts it, they will not be taken to have been dismissed or be eligible for a redundancy payment.33 (c) If an employer offers an employee the opportunity to have their contract renewed or to be re-engaged under a new contract on terms which do not differ from those

29 30 31 32 33

Section 10 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 9 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979. Section 10(3A) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 9 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979. Section 15 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Section 15(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Section 15(2) Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971.

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[5.21]  Termination of Employment of their previous contract and the renewal or re-engagement would take effect on the date of dismissal, but the employee unreasonably refuses the offer, they will not be entitled to a redundancy payment.34 (d) An employee whose job is no longer available and who is offered alternative work by their employer may take up this work for a trial period of not more than four weeks and then refuse the offer. In this instance, the temporary acceptance shall not prejudice any plea by such employee that refusal of the offer was reasonable.35 (e) An employee may also temporarily accept a substantial reduction in their remuneration or hours of work. If such reduction is not less than half their normal working hours or remuneration (eg, a three- or four-day week), such temporary acceptance for a period not exceeding 52 weeks shall not be taken to be an acceptance by them of an offer of suitable employment and they will still be able to claim a redundancy payment.36 Employees who are entitled to a weekly payment and unreasonably refuse suitable employment offered or approved by FÁS ‘shall be disqualified from receiving any further weekly payments’.37

Misconduct [5.21]   Section 14 of the 1967 Act provides that an employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment if they are dismissed by reason of their conduct and the employer is entitled to so dismiss them because of such conduct.

Refusal to take alternative employment [5.22]   This matter was examined at length by the Labour Court in Cinders Limited v Byrne.38 The facts here were that the complainant was informed by the respondent on 4 September 2017 that the shop in which she worked was to close. She was offered alternative employment in two concession stores of the respondent, which she rejected on the basis that she had worked for 20 years in a boutique-style store. She was also offered employed in a boutique-style store on Wicklow Street, but also declined this on the basis that she thought it was trading so poorly that it was likely to close down. 34 35 36 37

38

Section 15(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Section 15(2A) Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Section 15(2B) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Section 15(3) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 was entirely substituted by s 19(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971, and its reference to the Employment Service altered to a reference to the National Manpower Service. Section 18(4) of the Labour Services Act 1987 references that the National Manpower Service in any Act of the Oireachtas is to be construed as a reference to An Foras Aiseanna Saothair. Also, the last four words of the section were substituted for the words ‘a weekly payment for a period not exceeding six weeks’ by s 17 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Cinders Limited v Byrne RPD1811 August 8 2018.

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Redundancy  [5.23] The Court considered s 15 of the Acts and noted that it was essentially required to address two matters: (a) the suitability of the offers of alternative employment made by Ms Flood (a ­Director of the respondent) on behalf of the respondent to the complainant; and (b) whether the complainant’s decision to refuse each of those offers was reasonable in all the circumstances. In addressing the first of these issues, the Court applied the test as set out in the UK Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) case of Cambridge & District Co-operative Society Ltd v Ruse,39 as the UK has a similarly worded provision. Here, the UK EAT stated that the question of ‘suitability of employment is an objective matter, whereas the reasonableness of the employee’s refusal depends on factors personal to him and is a subjective matter to be considered from the employee’s point of view’. The Court determined that, from an objective perspective, the respondent satisfied the first leg of the test outlined by the EAT in Cambridge. Turning to the second issue, the Court accepted that the change to work in a concession store as opposed to a standalone shop – which was what the employee had previously been doing for the respondent for some 20 years – was a ‘change of such magnitude, when considered from the Complainant’s subjective perspective, that the Court has to find that her refusal to accept either the Blanchardstown or Stephen’s Green option was not unreasonable’. However, the Court found that the complainant’s refusal to accept the offer of employment in the standalone Wicklow Street shop was unreasonable.

Change of location [5.23]   One of the sine qua nons of every unfair dismissal case is that it must be examined on its own merits. This is no more evident than where companies move location: for example, what might be a reasonable commute for someone with a company car may be an impossible commute for someone who previously lived beside the workplace and must now take one or more buses to get to work. This is illustrated by CG Marine Limited v Ciaran O’Connor.40 Here the complainant – who had been absent on sick leave from May 2017 until 22 May 2018 – returned to find that his job had moved from Bandon to Cork (some 29 kilometres away). The Labour Court, in determining that the complainant had constructively dismissed himself, found that his conduct was: ‘a reasonable response to the employer’s unilateral decision to relocate his job from Bandon to Cork. There was no job available for the Complainant in his established place of work. The alternative offered to him would have necessitated an unreasonable additional daily commute for him. In all the circumstances, the Court, therefore, finds that the Complainant is entitled to a statutory redundancy payment.’ 39 40

Cambridge & District Co-operative Society Ltd v Ruse [1993] IRLR 156. CG Marine Limited v Ciaran O’Connor RPD1910, 8 July 2019.

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[5.24]  Termination of Employment

CALCULATION OF STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT Calculation of a week’s pay for purposes of the Act [5.24]   A week’s pay for the purposes of the Act is defined as gross weekly wage plus average regular overtime plus benefits in kind.41 The total figure is then taken to be the weekly pay for redundancy calculation purposes. For calculation of a week’s pay, the legislation effectively defines two separate types of workers: time-based workers, whose pay does not vary in relation to the amount of work they do; and piece-rate workers, whose pay depends on the amount of work they do.42 However, there are also other circumstances that require careful consideration in calculating a week’s pay, such as when employees are job sharing, working part-time etc. Full-time employees on a fixed wage or salary [5.25]   This is the work pattern found in most cases – that is, a fixed wage or salary. Here the employee’s wages do not vary in relation to the amount of work done. A week’s pay in this instance means earnings for the normal weekly working hours at the date the employee was declared redundant – that is, the date on which notice of proposed dismissal was given. This figure includes any regular bonus or allowance which does not vary in relation to the amount of work done, along with any benefits in kind normally received by the employee. Where an employee is normally expected to work overtime, their average weekly overtime earnings will be taken into account in determining their week’s pay for redundancy purposes. To establish the amount of overtime earnings applicable, add up the total amount of overtime earnings in 26 weeks ending 13 weeks before the date on which the employee was declared redundant and divide this amount by 26. Piece-rate workers [5.26]   A ‘piece-rate’ worker is defined as an employee whose pay depends on the amount of work they carry out – that is, they are paid wholly or partly by piece rates, bonuses or commissions etc related to output. There is a special formula for calculating this amount, based on normal weekly working hours, as follows: (a) The total number of hours worked by the employee in the 26 weeks ending 13 weeks before the date on which the employee was declared redundant is calculated first. (Any week or weeks during this 26-week period in which the employee did not work will not be taken into account; the most recent week or weeks counting backwards, before the 26-week period, will be taken into account instead.) 41 42

Schedule 3 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. Schedule 3, paras 13 and 16 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971.

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Redundancy  [5.29] (b) All the pay earned in this 26-week period is added up. This should be adjusted to take into account any late changes in rates of pay which came into operation in the 13 weeks before the employee was declared redundant. (c) The employee’s average hourly rate of pay is then calculated by simply dividing the total pay as at (b) above by the total number of hours as at (a) above. (d) Finally, the weekly pay is established by multiplying this average hourly rate by the number of normal weekly working hours of the employee at the date on which they were declared redundant (ie, the date on which notice of redundancy was given). Employees on short-time working [5.27]   The Redundancy Payments Act 2003 clarified this issue in respect of those on short-time working by providing that the gross wage for calculation of a redundancy lump sum is based on a full week’s pay.43 Where redundancy is claimed on the basis of lay-off or short time (Form RP9), the date of termination of employment is taken to be the date on which the employee applies for redundancy. Job-sharers [5.28]   Where a person decides to job-share, their job-sharing pay rather than their previous full-time pay is used for redundancy calculation purposes.44 Employees on reduced working hours [5.29]   When a person is put on reduced working hours by their employer (eg, a three-day week or a four-day week – as opposed to short time, which is a two-day week), the redundancy entitlement is calculated on the basis of a full week, provided that the employee was put on reduced hours in the 52 weeks before being made redundant. If they were made redundant after the first year of reduced working hours and it is clear that the employee fully accepted the reduced working hours as being their normal working week, then the employee is deemed to have accepted the reduced hours as their normal week. In this situation, the gross pay for redundancy purposes is based on the reduced working hours. On the other hand, if the employee never accepted the reduced working hours as their ‘normal’ hours and constantly requested to be put back on full-time working, they could then be deemed not to have accepted their reduced hours as ‘normal’. In these circumstances, redundancy entitlement should be calculated at the full-time rate of pay.

43 44

Section 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003. Section 15(2B) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979.

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[5.30]  Termination of Employment Where an employee makes a request to be placed on reduced working hours for their own reasons and the employer agrees, the redundancy entitlement is automatically based on the reduced hours.45 Employees with no normal working hours [5.30]   Where an employee has no normal working hours, their average weekly pay will be taken to be the average weekly pay including any bonus, pay allowance or commission over the period of 52 weeks during which they were working before the date on which they were declared redundant.46 Shift workers [5.31]   An employee who is employed on shift work and whose pay varies according to the shift on which they work will be taken to be an employee who is paid wholly or partly by piece rates.47 Minimum wage [5.32]   The minimum rates of pay laid down in the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 (as amended) should always be taken into account when calculating a statutory redundancy lump sum.

Reckonable and non-reckonable service [5.33]   Even though an employee may have the requisite continuous service, it does not necessarily hold that all that service will be reckonable for redundancy calculation purposes. The 2003 Act significantly altered the method of calculation of reckonable and non-reckonable service. Non-reckonable service [5.34]   During the three-year period ending with the date of termination of employment for redundancies notified/declared on or after 10 April 2005 (ie, the date on which s 12 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003 came into operation), the following are all non-reckonable for redundancy calculation purposes:48 (a) absence in excess of 52 consecutive weeks by reason of an occupational accident or disease within the meaning of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993 – the first 52 weeks are therefore fully reckonable; 45 46 47 48

Section 15(2B) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1979. Schedule 3, para 20 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Schedule 3, para 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Schedule 3, para 8 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11(b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003.

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Redundancy  [5.35] (b) absence in excess of 26 consecutive weeks by reason of any illness not referred to in subparagraph (a) – the first 26 weeks are therefore fully reckonable; (c) absence by reason of lay-off by the employer; or (d) absence from work by reason of a strike in the business or industry in which the employee concerned is employed. Non-reckonable service for redundancy calculation purposes in respect of all redundancies from 10 April 2005 now applies only to the last three years of service. Before that date, non-reckonable service did not exist as a concept. The exact wording used in s 12 is very clear: ‘During, and only during the 3 year period ending with the date of termination of employment, none of the following absences shall be allowable as reckonable service …’ While lay-off within the three-year period referred to above (ending on the date of termination of employment) is non-reckonable, absence due to short-time working is fully reckonable (for a definition of ‘short-time working’). Employees who were unable to accrue reckonable service due to lay-offs caused by the Covid-19 public health restrictions may be entitled to a Covid-19 Related Lay-off Payment. This payment is made from the Social Insurance Fund in respect of periods of lay-off due to Covid-19, where the employee was subsequently made redundant. In essence, a person received a State-funded payment at the end of the employment as if they had not been laid off during the specific Covid-19 related period. The amount that an eligible worker receives depends on the length of time for which they were placed on lay-off due to Covid-19. The pay is calculated based on existing statutory provisions and the maximum amount to which any one employee is entitled is €2,268.49 Reckonable service [5.35]   The following are regarded as reckonable service:50 (a) a week falling within a period of continuous employment during any part of which the employee is actually at work; (b) absence from work due to sickness, holidays or with the employer’s permission (subject to the 52-week and 26-week rule (see (a) at 5.34 above)); (c) absence from work because of a lock-out; or (d) periods of service during which continuity is preserved in any case of redress by way of reinstatement or re-engagement under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977–2001. The following allowable absences are specifically referred to in s 12 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003, which came into operation on 10 April 2005 with respect to

49

50

Entitlement runs during the period beginning on 13 March 2020 and ends on 31 January 2025. Section 32A of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 as inserted by s 2 of the Redundancy Payments (Amendment) Act 2022. Schedule 3, para 8A of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 11(b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003.

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[5.36]  Termination of Employment redundancies notified/declared as and from that date (maternity leave, adoptive leave, parental leave and carer’s leave were already reckonable before that date): (a) absence from work while on adoptive leave under the Adoptive Leave Act 1995 (as amended) – increased from 14 weeks to 16 weeks from 19 November 2004; (b) absence from work while on additional maternity leave (maternity leave under the Maternity Protection Act 1994 was itself already allowable in the pre-10 April 2005 period), protective leave or natal care absence within the meaning of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 (amended by the Maternity Protection (Amendment) Act 2004); (c) absence from work while on parental leave or force majeure leave within the meaning of the Parental Leave Act 1998; (d) absence from work while on carer’s leave within the meaning of the Carer’s Leave Act 2001; and (e) any absences not mentioned under (a) to (e) above but authorised by the employer (eg, a career break).

Maternity leave and additional maternity leave for redundancy calculation purposes [5.36]   An employee cannot be given notice of redundancy while on maternity leave or additional maternity leave.51 Thus, the date of an employee’s dismissal or termination of employment in a redundancy situation under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2003 is deemed to be the date of the employee’s expected return to work as notified to her employer (or its successor) under the maternity protection legislation. Additional maternity leave of 16 weeks, protective leave and natal care absence within the meaning of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 and the Maternity Protection (Amendment) Act 2004 are all reckonable for redundancy calculation purposes.52 Regarding employees who are declared redundant on or after 10 April 2005, there is no question of any maternity leave or additional maternity leave being non-reckonable in the period prior to the last three years of service, ending on the date of termination of employment. Thus, all periods of absence due to maternity or additional maternity leave arising before the last three years of employment are fully reckonable for such employees.

Parental leave for redundancy calculation purposes [5.37]   For statutory redundancy calculation purposes, parental leave – which at present is 26 weeks53 – is fully reckonable under the Parental Leave Act 1998. This has been reinforced under s 12 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003 in respect of redundancies notified/declared since 10 April 2005, with specific provision being made 51 52 53

Section 23 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994, as amended by s 15 of the Maternity Protection (Amendment) Act 2004. Schedule 3, para 8A of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Section 6(1A)(b) of the Parental Leave Act 1998.

224

Redundancy  [5.42] whereby parental leave and force majeure leave54 within the meaning of the Parental Leave Act 1998 are fully reckonable for statutory redundancy purposes.

Calculating ‘excess days’ in respect of redundancies notified/declared on or after 10 April 2005 [5.38]   All ‘excess’ days are credited as a proportion of a year.55 For example, 103 days give the employee an extra 28.22% of a year’s service, on top of whatever number of full years they have worked for. The simple formula used in this situation for calculating the proportion of a year to be credited to the employee is 103 divided by 365 = .2822, or in percentage terms = 28.22%.

Adoptive leave for redundancy calculation purposes [5.39]   Twenty-four weeks of absence due to adoptive leave and 16 weeks of additional adoptive leave are fully reckonable for redundancy calculation purposes.56

Parent’s leave for redundancy calculation purposes [5.40]   A period during which, in accordance with the Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act 2019, an employee was absent from work while on parent’s leave or transferred parent’s leave within the meaning of that Act is fully reckonable for redundancy ­calculation purposes.57

Paternity leave for redundancy calculation purposes [5.41]   A period during which, in accordance with the Paternity Leave and Benefit Act 2016, an employee was absent from work while on paternity leave or transferred paternity leave within the meaning of that Act is fully reckonable for redundancy calculation purposes.58

Carer’s leave for redundancy calculation purposes [5.42]   Under the Carer’s Leave Act 2001, there is a maximum period of reckonable service of 104 weeks in respect of any one care recipient.59 Again, regarding all 54 55 56 57 58 59

See s 13 of the Parental Leave Act 1998. Section 11 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003. Schedule 3, para 8A of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Schedule 38A(bb) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Schedule 3 8A(ba) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. This was extended from 65 weeks to 104 weeks by s 48 of the Social Welfare Reform of Pensions Act 2006.

225

[5.43]  Termination of Employment redundancies notified since 10 April 2005, the three-year rule of confining any nonreckonable service to the three years ending on the date of termination also applies to carer’s leave. Before that three-year period, all carer’s leave is fully reckonable.

Career break leave [5.43]   Under s 12(b) of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003, any absences outside of the usual type of absences due to maternity leave, additional maternity leave, parental leave, adoptive leave, carer’s leave etc ‘but authorised by the employer’ are fully reckonable, even during the last three years of employment. The most common form of this type of leave is a career break. Regarding such absences occurring before 10 April 2005, the position was that the first 13 weeks in any 52-week period were reckonable.

COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES Legislation [5.44]   The Protection of Employment Act 1977, as amended by the Protection of Employment Order 1996 (SI 370/1996) and the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000), stipulates the procedures to be followed before giving effect to collective redundancies. The purpose of the 1977–2000 Acts is to place an onus on the employer, in the event of collective redundancies, to consult with employees and their representatives and to notify the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment at least 30 days before any dismissals take effect. Protection of Employment Act 1977 [5.45]   The Protection of Employment Act 1977 brought Directive 75/129/EEC60 into law in Ireland. The Act defines a ‘collective redundancy’ in s 6(1) as amended by s 5 of SI 370/1996 as follows: ‘where in any period of 30 consecutive days the number of such dismissals is (a) at least five in an establishment61 normally employing more than twenty and less than fifty employees; (b) at least ten in an establishment normally employing at least fifty but less than one hundred employees;

60

61

Council Directive 75/129 EEC of 17 February 1975 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States relating to Collective Redundancies (OJ [1975] L48/29). This was in turn amended by Directive 92/56/EEC OJ [1992] L245/3, which catered for the increasing transnationalisation of companies with decisions affecting employees in a member state. Both Directive 75/129 and Directive 92/56 were later consolidated and repealed by Council Directive 98/59/EC OJ [1988] L255/16. As to what counts as an establishment, see Rockfon Case C-449/93, [1995] ECR I-4291, in which the European Court of Justice held that the term must be given a Community meaning and interpreted it as the unit to which the workers made redundant were assigned to carry out their duties.

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Redundancy  [5.48] (c) at least ten per cent. of the number of employees in an establishment normally employing at least on hundred but less than three hundred employees; and (d) at least thirty in an establishment normally employing three hundred or more employees.’

The Protection of Employment Acts 1977–2000 do not apply to establishments employing fewer than 21 people. The Directive applies to all employees with a contract for service. This means that all employees, regardless of whether they are entitled to a redundancy payment or not, count for the purposes of the above section. Protection of Employment Order 1996 [5.46]   The Protection of Employment Order 1996 (SI 370/1996) enacted the provisions of Directive 92/56/EEC into Irish law. The order added to the category of persons covered by the law on collective redundancies by providing that persons are deemed to be employees under the same deeming provisions contained in s 13 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993. This means that agency workers are ‘counted’ for the purposes of the Act. Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 [5.47]   The Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000) amend the 1977 Act further by expanding on the definition of ‘employee representative’ and providing that in the absence of same, a person or persons should be chosen (under an arrangement put in place by the employer) by such employees as are affected from among their number to represent them in negotiations with the employer.62

Collective redundancies and insolvency [5.48]   The Irish government recently approved63 the drafting of the ‘Plan of Action on Collective Redundancies following the introduction of the Insolvency Bill 2023’. Principally, the Bill will seek to add new protections for employees in a collective redundancy – particularly, but not exclusively, where the collective redundancies result from an employer’s insolvency. The overall goal of the legislation is to enhance and add protections for employees and amend existing legislation, including the Protection of Employment Act 1977 and the Companies Act 2014.64 The primary objectives of the new proposals are to introduce greater transparency in the collective redundancy process insofar as it relates to employees of insolvent businesses;

62 63 64

Section 2(1) of the Protection on Employment Act 1977, as inserted by reg 3 of the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000). 8 May 2023. The Bill also provides for the establishment of a new statutory Employment Law Review Group to advise the Minister on all aspects of employment and redundancy law.

227

[5.49]  Termination of Employment and to provide an avenue of complaint by employees whose employers are not complying with their collective redundancy obligations. More specifically: (a) liquidators will be required to go through the full information and consultation process with employees; (b) where the collective redundancies arise because of the insolvency of an employer’s business, the Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment will have to be informed at least 30 days in advance of the first redundancy taking effect; (c) liquidators may be prosecuted and fined for not complying with their obligations under the collective redundancy legislation; (d) a fine of up to €5,000 will be imposed on an employer that fails to enter initial consultations with employees ahead of collective redundancies; and (e) where employees are made redundant before the expiry of the 30-day period, they will be able to make a complaint to the WRC.

Consultation [5.49]   Where collective redundancies arise, art 2(1) of EC Directive 98/59/EC imposes an obligation on employers to begin consultations with the workers’ representatives ‘in good time’ if they are ‘contemplating collective redundancies’; such consultation must also be ‘with a view to reaching agreement’.65 This definition raises a number of queries for employers – for example, in relation to the meaning of, inter alia, ‘contemplating’, ‘in good time’ and consulting ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) case of Junk v Kunhel66 clarified these points. In Junk v Kunhel, the ECJ held that ‘contemplating collective redundancies’ refers to a situation where an employer has drawn up a ‘project’, and to that end it corresponds with a situation in which no decision has yet been taken. By contrast, notification to a worker that their contract of employment has been terminated is the expression of a decision to sever the employment relationship. In this context, the ECJ held that the terms used by the EU legislature indicate that the obligations to consult and to notify arise prior to any decision by an employer to terminate contracts of employment. Furthermore, the ECJ went on to hold that as consultation is provided for by art 2(2) of the Directive, ‘with a view to reaching agreement’, this imposes an obligation to negotiate. The ECJ concluded that the ‘effectiveness of such an obligation would be compromised if an employer was entitled to terminate contracts of employment during the course of the procedure or even at the beginning thereof’. Accordingly, a contract may only be terminated after the conclusion of the consultation procedure – that is, after the employer has complied with the obligations set out in art 2. 65

66

Article 2(1) of EC Directive 98/59/EC is transposed into Irish law by s 9(1) of the Protection on Employment Act 1977, as amended by the Protection of Employment Order 1996 (SI 370/1996) and the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000). Junk v Kunhel (Case C–188/03).

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Redundancy  [5.50] Moreover, consultations/negotiations should commence at the earliest opportunity, but in any event at least 30 days before the first dismissal takes effect. Tangney & Others v Dell67 is instructive in this regard. Here Mr Tangney and others argued that their employer (Dell) had breached the terms of s 9 of the 1977 Act. On 8 January 2009, the appellant and others received a written communication from their employer furnishing them with information concerning rationalisation and restructuring in the Limerick facility. On the same date, a staff meeting was held and the employees were briefed by senior managers. The employees argued that what had happened on 8 January constituted a notice of dismissal and accordingly any consultation that came post that was too late to be effective. In the High Court, Bermingham J looked specifically at what had occurred after 8 January and noted that: ‘Further support for the view that what emerged on 8th January, 2009, was not the communication of a finalised decision is to be found in the text of the letter of 8th January itself. The letter contains a specific statement that the content of the letter is for information purposes only and does not constitute contractual terms or conditions. The section on *Leaving Dates* refers to estimated ranges of leaving dates associated with individual production lines. Again, the section on severance payments refers to estimated severance payments and stresses that the calculations set out are estimates only. However, I do acknowledge that the letter contains a significant amount of detail and certainly does not suggest that the employer has an open mind, or that the employees are being provided with a blank sheet. However, it seems to me one has to recognise that a communication couched in generalities would be of little assistance to employees, and would likely be not well received.’68

For employers, this means that: (a) a strategic decision to make staff redundant does not necessarily trigger the need to consult; (b) to ensure that an employer does not fall foul of the need to negotiate ‘in good time’, consultations must be meaningful; and – as can been seen from Tangney & Others v Dell69 – if the consultations lead to changes in the terms of the package or the numbers to be made redundant, this will be evidence of consulting before any decision is finally made; (c) arising out of the above, it is clear that consultations must start before any decision is made; (d) consultation in the context in which the Directive is written imposes an obligation to negotiate; and (e) no contracts can be terminated until after the consultation process has finished. [5.50]   The 1977 Act defines an ‘employee representative’ as meaning a trade union, staff association or excepted body with which it has been the practice of the employer to conduct collective bargaining negotiations.70 In the absence of a trade union, staff

67 68 69 70

Tangney & Others v Dell Products [2013] IEHC 622. Tangney & Others v Dell Products at 26. Tangney & Others v Dell Products at 59 and 60. Section 2(1) of the Protection on Employment Act 1977, as amended by reg 3 of the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000).

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[5.51]  Termination of Employment association or excepted body, the EC (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2000 require an employer to put in place an arrangement whereby employees may nominate a person or persons to represent them in negotiations with their employer. Consultations/negotiations with employee representatives must cover:71 (a) the possibility of avoiding the proposed redundancies, reducing the number of employees to be made redundant or redeploying or retraining employees; and (b) the basis on which it will be decided which particular employees will be made redundant. Employers are obliged to provide all information relevant to the proposed collective redundancies in writing to employee representatives, including the following:72 (a) the reasons for the proposed redundancies; (b) the number and descriptions or categories of employees whom it is proposed to make redundant; (c) the number of employees, and descriptions or categories of employees, normally employed; (d) the period during which it is proposed to effect the proposed redundancies; (e) the criteria proposed for the selection of the workers to be made redundant; and (f) the method for calculating any redundancy payment other than those methods set out in the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–1991.

Failure to consult [5.51]   Where an employer fails to engage in the consultation process, an employee, trade union, staff association or excepted body may refer a complaint to the WRC73 within six months of the alleged contravention (for reasonable cause,74 this period may be extended by a further six months). The decision of an adjudication officer of the WRC may: (a) declare that the complaint is or, as the case may be, is not well founded; (b) require the employer to comply with the provisions of the Act; and (c) require the employer to pay the employee compensation not exceeding four weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment. An adjudication officer’s decision may be appealed to the Labour Court within six weeks of the date on which it is communicated to the relevant parties.75 Failure to 71 72 73 74 75

Section 9 of the Protection on Employment Act 1977, as amended by the Protection of Employment Order 1996 (SI 370/1996) and the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000). Section 10 of the Protection on Employment Act 1977, as amended by art 9 of the Protection of Employment Order 1996 (SI 370/1996). Regulation 6 of the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000) and s 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. For a definition of reasonable cause, see Serdang Limited t/a Blarney Hotel & Golf Resort and Pawel Sowinski RPA/22/10 Adj-00033512 CA-00044233-001 Determination RPD232, 16 March 2023. Regulation 6(4)(b) of the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000) and s 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

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Redundancy  [5.52] comply with the consultation process is also an offence under the Act. If prosecuted by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, an employer may be liable on summary conviction to a fine of €5,000 per offence.76

Notification to the Minister [5.52]   In addition to the consultation procedures outlined, employers must notify the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment in writing of the collective redundancy situation at the earliest opportunity and in any event at least 30 days before the first dismissal takes effect77 (see draft letter at [5.96]). Certain particulars must be specified in the notification, including: (a) the name and address of the employer, indicating whether it is a sole trader, a partnership or a company; (b) the address of the establishment where the collective redundancies are proposed; (c) the total number of persons normally employed at that establishment; (d) the number and description or categories of employees whom it is proposed to make redundant; (e) the period during which the collective redundancies are proposed to be effected; (f) the reasons for the proposed redundancies; (g) the names and addresses of the employee representatives consulted about the proposed redundancies; and (h) the date on which those consultations commenced and the progress achieved to date of notification. The Minister must also be supplied with a copy of all information given to employee representatives.78 The employer may be requested to enter into additional consultations with the Minister or an authorised officer in order to seek solutions to the problems posed by the proposed redundancies. Employee representatives must be given a copy of the information supplied to the Minister.79 Where an employer fails to comply with the notification process, it is guilty of an offence and will be liable to a fine not exceeding €5,000.80 While statutory notice due to employees may run concurrently with the 30-day notice to the Minister, no redundancies can take effect during that time. Where collective redundancies are effected by an employer before the expiry of the 30-day period, the employer will be guilty of an offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding €250,000.81 76 77 78 79 80

81

Section 11 of the Protection of Employment Act 1977, as amended and s 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000) and s 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Section 10(1) of the Protection of Employment Act 1977. Section 12 of the Protection of Employment Act 1977. Section 13 of the Protection of Employment Act 1977, as amended by reg 5 of the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000), and s 13 of the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007. Section 14(2) of the Protection of Employment Act 1977, as amended by s 21 of the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001 and s 13 of the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007.

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[5.53]  Termination of Employment

Records [5.53]   An employer is obliged to keep all necessary records to show that the Act is being complied with. The records must be retained for at least three years.82

Information and Consultation Act 2006 and redundancies [5.54]   In addition to the requirements under the Protection of Employment Acts 1977–2000 to consult with employees ‘with a view to agreement’, there is a requirement under the Information and Consultation Act83 to consult with employees (which may be with a view to agreement in some instances) on changes affecting their contract of employment. Failure to comply again leaves employers exposed to the possibility of fines. There are also obligations on multinational companies under the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 and the European Communities (Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 (Amendment) Regulations 1999, if requested by the requisite number of employees to set up European works councils to inform and consult with their employees on a range of issues.

REDUNDANCY AND UNFAIR DISMISSAL [5.55]   Section 6(4)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 provides that a dismissal is not unfair if it results wholly or mainly from the redundancy of the employee. Redundancy is therefore an absolute defence to a claim for unfair dismissal, provided that the employee has been fairly selected for redundancy. However, employers are put on strict proof of this.84 The Labour Court is extremely vigilant in scrutinising unfair dismissal ‘defence’ claims on the basis of redundancy by employers and strict adherence by employers to the statutory definition of ‘redundancy’ is required if a successful defence is to be mounted. See also 3.96.

The redundancy must be genuine [5.56]   The first hurdle that employers must cross in defending an unfair dismissal claim relating to redundancy is that the redundancy was genuine. Accordingly, it is necessary to come prepared with facts and figures to prove that a redundancy existed. What is required here is evidence that a redundancy situation existed; to prove this, the employer will need more than just a statement from a senior manager. Facts and figures will be required demonstrating matters such as a reduction

82 83 84

Section 18 of the Protection on Employment Act 1977. The Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006. See McDonnell v The Drawing Centre Limited UD 715/1993.

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Redundancy  [5.56] in turnover, profit and loss figures, loss of customers etc and their direct effect on the company. Independent financial advice would also be helpful. It is very clear that every case will be scrutinised in order to determine whether a genuine redundancy existed at the date of termination. In Lyons v Grangemore Landscapes Limited,85 the claimant was employed by the respondent as a quantity surveyor. Due to financial difficulties, the claimant was dismissed by reason of redundancy on 7 January 2008. Thereafter, the company employed an engineer in June 2008 to manage specific ‘muck-shifting’ jobs in Cork. This new employee had identical qualifications to the claimant. The claimant was not considered for this position. The main question considered by the EAT was whether the claimant’s position was genuinely redundant. While the EAT was significantly swayed by the fact that no consideration was given to the possibility of redeploying the claimant, emphasis was placed on the fact that the new employee – who had identical qualifications to the claimant – had been employed ‘within a few weeks’ of the claimant’s dismissal. All told, the EAT was not satisfied that a genuine redundancy situation had arisen and was further satisfied that the claimant could have carried out the work of the new employee. In Cronin v Rachel Dalton Communications Limited,86 the claimant held a senior position in the respondent’s public relations (PR) agency. Problems began to develop regarding his performance, which led to the employee receiving a verbal warning. As things deteriorated and the last of the employee’s clients actually dispensed with the employee’s services, the employer decided to close his division. At the EAT hearing, the employee produced an email from a consultant engaged by the employer which had been sent to the employee prior to his dismissal stating that the employer did not have adequate dismissal procedures in place to dismiss the employee fairly, but that redundancy may be a possibility. The EAT held that the dismissal by reason of redundancy was a sham used to circumvent the disciplinary procedure. In Ponisi v JVC Europe Ltd,87 Mr Ponisi was the general manager of JVC in Ireland. Because of a downturn in the industry, his employer decided to restructure the company, making his position redundant. The employer created a new role of sales manager for Ireland. Despite Mr Ponisi88 being consulted on and encouraged to apply for the post, he felt that the role was exactly the same as that which he had held and refused to apply. The EAT, while accepting that there was a need for redundancies in the company, determined that the role of sales manager was effectively the same position as general manager, but at a much lower salary. These cases demonstrate the requirement for a genuine redundancy to exist. To assist in this process, a full discussion on the need for redundancies should have initially occurred; and notes should be available to assist at the WRC should they be required.

85 86 87 88

Lyons v Grangemore Landscapes Limited UD 541/2008. Cronin v Rachel Dalton Communications Limited UD 1143/2008. Ponisi v JVC Europe Ltd UD 949/08. The spelling of his name changed from Ponisi in the EAT to Panisi in the High Court appeal; hence there is some confusion over the correct spelling of his name.

233

[5.57]  Termination of Employment

‘Impersonality requirement’ [5.57]   The second hurdle that employers must cross is to prove that the redundancy, while being fair, related not the person, but to the job or function. While recognising that the 1977 Act provides absolute immunity to employers for unfair dismissal once the dismissal results ‘wholly or mainly’ from the redundancy of the employee, it is an essential feature of the redundancy that it is the function that is made redundant, not the employee – that is, that there be an element of impersonality about the dismissal. In Moloney v Decon & Sons Ltd,89 one of the reasons given by the employer for the redundancy was the ‘claimant’s personality’. It was held not to be a valid redundancy. In Daly v Hanson Industries,90 where an employee was dismissed on the morning that she had given evidence before the EAT in the hearing of a claim by the previous general manager, the EAT determined that while there was a redundancy element to the dismissal, it was not in fact due to redundancy but because of the fact that she had given evidence before the EAT. In Flanagan v MW Wallpaper Specialists Limited,91 the claimants alleged that they were dismissed for trade union activity rather than redundancy. While the EAT accepted that,‘At least some of the evidence’ adduced before the Tribunal points this being so’, there was an inescapable conclusion that the particular branch of the respondent had been totally closed down. This impersonality requirement was strengthened by s 5 of the Redundancy Payments Act 2003, which amended s 7(2) of the 1967 Act by making it clear that the selection of an employee for redundancy must be ‘for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned’. This points again to the fact that employers must be extremely vigilant and ensure that all redundancies are in fact redundancies. Section 7(2) of the 1967 Act sets out five genuine reasons for redundancy, as outlined in the following paragraphs. Change in purpose or place of business [5.58]   The first situation in which redundancy arises is stated in s 7(2)(a) of the 1967 Act: ‘The fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purpose of which the employee was employed by him or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed.’

This provision covers dismissals resulting from changes in the business purpose, the closure of a particular part of the business or the intent to close the business where the employee was employed. In O’Connor v Power Security Limited,92 the employer had three employees who worked as security guards. The claimant worked in the Grafton Court Arcade and the other two

89 90 91 92

Moloney v Decon & Sons Ltd [1996] ELR 230. Daly v Hanson Industries Ltd UD719/1986. Flanagan v MW Wallpaper Specialists Ltd UD153, 154, 155, 156/1989. O’Connor v Power Security Limited UD 344/89.

234

Redundancy  [5.59] were employed in the Powerscourt Town Centre and the William Elliot Centre. When the respondent sold the Grafton Court Arcade, the claimant was made redundant. Here the EAT determined that a redundancy situation existed once the respondent had sold its interest in the Grafton Court Arcade, as the place of business had changed. Reduction in the requirements of the business [5.59]   The second situation in which redundancy arises is stated in s 7(2)(b) of the 1967 Act: ‘the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.’ In Ajai v Anne Byrne,93 the claimants were employed as supervisors to manage the respondent’s hostel which assisted the emergency service of the immigration service at the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform of Dublin City Council, North Eastern Health Board. The claimants were made redundant when the number of clients arriving at the hostel began to decrease dramatically and the hostel had to close. The EAT held that there was a genuine redundancy. This concerns dismissals resulting from a downward change in business requirements that results in employees having either less work or no work of a particular kind. This envisages a situation where the volume of work that an employer has to distribute has reduced either substantially or completely. In such cases, either all or some of the employees engaged in the work become surplus to the requirements of the business, and accordingly are redundant. It is noteworthy that an upward change in the volume of work will not give rise to a redundancy under the statutory definition.94 The wording of the section is also important, in that it envisages a situation where an employer expects the work to cease or diminish; thus, employers are not required to wait until the actual change occurs. In Keenan v The Gresham Hotel,95 the EAT held that where the redundancy is due to an expected diminution in the requirements of the business, such diminution: ‘must be expected to occur at or within a very short time after the time of the alleged redundancy as otherwise an employer who merely expects that his requirements for employees to do work of a particular kind may diminish at some distant time in the futurecould greatly reduce the redundancy entitlements of such employees by serving R 21 forms on them prematurely.’

It has also been held that part-time work is of a different kind from on-call work;96 and that day work is of a different kind from night work.97

93

Ajai v Anne Byrne UD 449/2004. St. Ledger v Frontline Distributors Ireland Limited (1995) ELR 160; see also Anne Morris v Limerick Chamber of Commerce ADJ-00036284, 7 March 2023. Keenan v The Gresham Hotel UD4784/1998. Kelleher v St James’s Hospital Board UD59/1977. Dinworth v Southern Hotel Board UD284/1977.

94 See 95 96 97

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[5.60]  Termination of Employment Diminution in the number of employees [5.60]   The third situation in which redundancy arises is stated in s 7(2)(c) of the 1967 Act: ‘The fact that the employer has decided carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before their dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise.’

This section does not relate to the business closing; rather, it envisages a situation where an employer reorganises the work such that fewer employees are required to carry out that work. This often arises because of improved productivity through mechanisation or various technical advances. Thus, in Lillis v Kiernan,98 the EAT held that where the former general manager of the respondent’s pig farming business was made redundant after the respondent decided to redistribute his function among other managers of the business, this was a genuine redundancy situation. Change in work method [5.61]   The fourth situation in which redundancy arises is stated in s 7(2)(d) of the 1967 Act: ‘The fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforth be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.’

This provision relates to a situation where the work remains but the way or manner in which it is done changes. Thus, in Byrne v Trackline Crane Hire Limited,99 the employee was informed that the crane which he had been hired to operate was no longer profitable, and that it would take an excessive amount of time to retrain him to operate other cranes; as a consequence, his role was redundant. The EAT determined that there was a genuine redundancy and held that the employee’s position no longer existed, as the most substantial portion of his employment with the company had been to drive one particular type of crane, which had to be sold. Thus, while the work of a crane driver remained, the method in which it was carried out had changed and the claimant was not trained for that. The issue of qualifications was dealt with in Daniels v County Wexford Community Workshop (New Ross) Limited.100 Here the respondent was advised by a consultant to appoint a manager with a third-level qualification which the claimant did not possess. The respondent then offered the claimant an alternative position on the same terms and conditions of employment, which was refused. The EAT held that this was a valid redundancy on the qualification ground. Thus, while the work remained, the claimant was not sufficiently qualified to carry it out.

98 99

100

EAT, 22 June 2004. Byrne v Trackline Crane Hire Ltd UD1099/2002. Daniels v County Wexford Community Workshop (New Ross) Limited 1996 ELR 213.

236

Redundancy  [5.63] In St Ledger v Frontline Distributors,101 where an employee had been replaced by another employee based on ability rather than training, the EAT held this to be unfair, as ability is not the same as training; it was irrelevant that the replacement was better able to do the work previously done by the claimant. Change in work [5.62]   The fifth situation in which redundancy arises is stated in s 7(2)(e) of the 1967 Act: ‘The fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforth be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.’

This provision relates to a change in the nature of the job. Thus, in O’Brien v Hayes Specialist Recruitment (Ireland) Limited,102 where the claimant’s job as a credit controller was amalgamated with the customer relationship manager position, the EAT rejected the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal on the basis that a genuine redundancy existed.

Reasonableness of the conduct of the employer [5.63]   The third hurdle that must be crossed by employers is to prove that their conduct was reasonable when coming to the decision to make the person redundant. Prior to the enactment of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993, it had been held in Hickey v Eastern Health Board103 that the rules of natural justice do not apply where a dismissal results from redundancy. In this case, the Supreme Court held that since the appellant had not been dismissed for any fault or any failure to perform her duties properly, the rules of natural justice which are relevant to the dismissal of a person for misconduct did not apply to her case. However, the 1993 Act provides that the reasonableness of an employer’s conduct is now an essential factor to be considered in the context of all dismissals, including redundancy dismissals.104 It is clear that the WRC and the Labour Court will require employers to act reasonably in the context of redundancy dismissals.105 Indeed, it is clear from the decision of the Labour Court in Component Distributors (cd Ireland) Ltd v Brigid (Beatrice) Burns106 that while an employer ‘is entitled to restructure its business and reduce its workforce if necessary’, this right is ‘not unfettered’ and will be balanced against the requirement to act reasonably in relation to the job-holder.

101

St Ledger v Frontline Distributors Ltd [1995] ELR 160. O’Brien v Hayes Specialist Recruitment (Ireland) Limited UD1172/2006. Hickey v Eastern Health Board [1991] 1 IR 208; [1990] ELR 177. 104 Section 6(7) of the Protection on Employment Act 1977, as inserted by s 5(g) of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993. 105 See Roche v Richmond Earthworks Ltd UD 329/97. 106 Component Distributors (cd Ireland) Ltd v Brigid (Beatrice) Burns TED 1812, 8 October 2018. 102 103

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[5.64]  Termination of Employment What is behaving reasonably? [5.64]   In behaving reasonably, the sorts of steps required from employers before moving to dismiss an employee or employees by reason of redundancy are as follows. Alternatives to redundancy [5.65]   Rather than immediately concluding that there should be redundancies, employers must first consider the alternatives. Options such as short-time working, lay-off, early retirement, natural wastage, redeployment and alternative working arrangements should be thought through and the reasons as to why they may not be feasible documented, so that the WRC and the Labour Court can see at a future date that the employer did not simply opt for redundancy to the detriment of the employee. In unionised companies, where redundancies are subject to collective bargaining, the usual initial reaction of the trade union is to reject the need for redundancies in total. The purpose of this is to make the employer aware that they would prefer alternatives to their members losing their jobs; and in the alternative, that any redundancy package will be difficult to negotiate and expensive. Once these negotiations begin, it is vital that those acting on the employer’s behalf present a unified front; preparation on the alternatives to redundancy will help in this regard. There have been numerous interesting cases on this topic, some of which are hard to rationalise. In McGeehan v Park Developments,107 the eight claimants were employed by the respondent as plasterers at various sites in the Dublin area. The employees were employed directly by the company, with some having over 20 years of service. In 2006, with the construction sector booming, it was difficult to recruit direct labour and in January 2007 subcontracting began on a complex of 173 apartments. Due to the subsequent downturn in the economy, the company had to reduce its workforce. The employees were made redundant and received their statutory redundancy payment and payment in lieu of notice. At the time of the redundancy, the employer continued to engage subcontractors to complete work on other sites. The employer argued that it had to make the employees redundant as it could not breach its contract with the subcontractors. The EAT stated that the onus was on the company to establish that ‘work was no longer being carried on at the workplace’. It stated that this was clearly not the case, as the company had demand for plastering work long after the employees had been made redundant – specifically the work being carried out by the subcontractors. The EAT noted that the company had given no consideration to temporary lay-off or short-time working options, or to the option of renegotiating the contracts with the subcontractors. The EAT found that the employees had been unfairly selected for redundancy and thus unfairly dismissed. In this case, the EAT noted that when considering redundancy, the onus is on the company to establish that work is no longer being carried on at the ‘workplace’. 107

McGeehan and Others v Park Developments UD950/2008.

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Redundancy  [5.66] Equally, it found that no consideration had been given to the alternatives to redundancy; and while there is no actual legislative requirement that work is no longer being carried out at the ‘workplace’ it seems that the EAT has ‘imposed’ this requirement. This is not unusual – for example, in Sheehan and O’Brien v Vintners Federation of Ireland108 the EAT stated that the employer should have considered alternative suggestions to redundancy proffered by the employees. This again is an extra ‘imposition’ that has been placed on employers through case law. [5.66]   In the more recent case of Walsh v Econcom,109 Mr Walsh submitted that, in breach of his entitlement to full and fair procedures, he had not been informed in advance of the purpose of a meeting at which he was told that his position was redundant. He had not been consulted about the decision and Econocom had not explored possible alternatives to avoid the redundancy of his role. Econocom justified the ‘truncated’ redundancy process on the basis that the wrapping up of the sales division of the company’s Irish branch with no suitable alternatives made the redundancy ‘unavoidable’. It argued that consultation in the particular circumstances would have been an ‘utterly futile exercise’, and that such a protracted process would have caused “unnecessary stress and uncertainty in circumstances where the outcome of the process was inevitable’. While the adjudication officer accepted that this was a genuine redundancy scenario, she rejected Econocom’s assertion that it was not obliged to carry out a fair, objective and impartial redundancy process because it regarded the redundancy as unavoidable. The adjudication officer relied on s 6(7) of the Unfair Dismissals Act requiring her to have regard to the reasonableness of the conduct of the employer during a dismissal process, and found that in the context of a redundancy, ‘engagement with the employee is the cornerstone of reasonable treatment’. The adjudication officer emphasised that in every case of redundancy – even where the business is closing down – employees have the right to expect fair procedures. In particular, employees have the right: (a) (b) (c) (d)

to notice; to be represented at meetings; to respond to the employer’s decision to make the job redundant; and to an appeal.

The adjudication officer found that Mr Walsh had been afforded none of these basic principles of fair procedures. In addition, she described as ‘disrespectful’ the failure of Econocom to consult Mr Walsh on the redundancy or to explore alternative roles within other branches of the business in different jurisdictions. She expressly commented: ‘Who knows what might have emerged from a discussion with the complainant about an alternative to redundancy.’ In finding that Econocom had offered no credible explanation for these failures, she made a significant compensation award of one year’s salary (€120,000) to Mr Walsh.

108 109

Sheehan and O’Brien v Vintners Federation of Ireland UD787/2007. Walsh v Econocom Digital Finance Ltd ADJ-00029093.

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[5.67]  Termination of Employment [5.67]   A similar award was given in Reddy v Ardbook Limited.110 Mr Reddy was informed in April 2020 that his general manager position was being terminated on the grounds of redundancy. During the hearing, the respondent accepted, that it had failed to advise Mr Reddy that his role was ‘at risk’ of redundancy, to consult on the redundancy and to give him a right of appeal. The adjudication officer was very critical of the respondent, in that Mr. Reddy) had no prior knowledge of his impending redundancy and he was given no opportunity to have other options considered in a meaningful way’, The adjudicator also noted that the ‘Complainant was not offered any appeal against this decision’. The adjudication officer ultimately found that the ‘fundamental right of the complainant to fair procedures was totally absent in this case’. In Stephen Cullen v Designer Group Engineering Contractors Limited,111 the adjudication officer held that the respondent’s refusal to offer alternative employment where it had decided to change the parameters of the job for which the complainant was recruited was unfair. The adjudication officer went on to state: ‘In the context of the complaint under consideration, in circumstances where recruitment was ongoing, rather than dismissing the complainant (or any other worker), some ingenuity could have been applied to identifying a role where he could have been productive.’

The adjudication officer took a very dim view of the fact that no effort had been made to keep the complainant in employment or to redeploy him, going on to state: ‘In a company of the size and calibre of the respondent’s, I find it difficult to understand why this did not happen, and it seems to me that the reason must have been personal and subjective, rather than a need to reduce the workforce by one. In October 2020, the respondent was not seeking to reduce its workforce and, at that time, there were seven or eight vacancies. The HR Director concluded that the complainant wasn’t suitable for any of these jobs; however, I find myself asking the question that he asked in his own evidence, why didn’t they try him out? He may or may not have proved suitable for a different role, but it is my view that, as a person with a qualification and experience in construction, working in a construction-related company, it was incumbent on the employer to offer him a chance to try out an alternative job. Even if, in October 2020, there was no exact match for his skills, the company was busy at that time and a job could have been found for him on a temporary basis until something more suitable emerged.’112

[5.68]   The Labour Court decision in Students Union Commercial Services Limited v Alan Traynor113 is an important precedent concerning the obligation of an employer to consider an alternative to redundancy. Mr Traynor was a chef who worked in a bar on a college campus. Accepting that the redundancy of his role was necessary, the Labour Court found that – even in the context of financial losses – the respondent had a duty to identify a role for him in one of its other business units. Finding that his dismissal

110

Reddy v Ardbrook Limited ADJ-00029419. Stephen Cullen v Designer Group Engineering Contractors Limited ADJ-00031644, 9 September 2021. 112 Here the complainant was awarded €42,250, which represented six months’ gross loss, as he had obtained another job after six months. He thus received his full loss. Notably, this is the same adjudication officer who heard Ray Walsh v Econocom ADJ-00029093. 113 Students Union Commercial Services Limited and Alan Traynor UDD1726. 111

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Redundancy  [5.69] was unfair, the Court referred to the 1993 decision in Mulcahy v Kelly,114 where it was held that: ‘Notwithstanding that the claimant’s selection for redundancy was not in contravention of a procedure or an established custom and practice of the employment relating to redundancy, there is an obligation on an employer to look at all employees as possible candidates for redundancy.’

The Court stated that this means finding alternative work in the organisation, even if that results in the dismissal of another employee with shorter service. In Modern Injections Moulds Ltd v Price,115 it was held that an employer must provide all relevant information regarding a proposed alternative role to the employee for them to consider. It should be noted that redundancy in itself was traditionally seen as being outside the normal industrial relations rules of engagement. Equally, the High Court, in treating redundancy as a ‘no-fault’ termination, deemed in the main that the rules of natural justice do not apply,116 thus negating the requirement to consider alternatives etc. However, the WRC and the Labour Court, per the Sheehan and O’Brien case,117 will take a different view and will rely on s 6(7) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended), which states that: ‘In determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the rights commissioner, the Tribunal or the Circuit Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so … to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal.’

Thus, the term ‘reasonableness’ has been extended to include ‘considering all the alternatives’. Consultation [5.69]   Aside from the mandatory requirement in a collective redundancy to consult/ negotiate with an employee representative or, where none is available, with the employees directly, employers should be aware that failure to consult can lead to a finding of unfair dismissal.118 Thus, while strictly speaking in accordance with the decision in Hickey v Eastern Health Board119 employers may not be bound by the actual rules of natural justice, consultation must take place. In Karen Arkins v Gno Plas Teoranta Teo,120 the complainant had been employed as a bookkeeper for two days a week for a period of three years, during which she had

114

Mulcahy v Kelly [1993] ELR 35. Modern Injections Mould Limited v Price [1976] ICR 370. Nolan v Emo Oil (2009) 20 ELR 122. 117 Sheehan and O’Brien v Vintners Federation of Ireland UD787/2007 at 108. 118 See Trafford v Sharpe and Fisher (Building Supplies) Ltd [1994] IRLR 325. 119 Hickey v Eastern Health Board [1991] 1 IR 208; [1990] ELR 177. 120 Karen Arkins v Gno Plas Teoranta Teo ADJ00037190, 27 February 2023. 115 116

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[5.70]  Termination of Employment taken maternity leave. Her role was outsourced to the respondent’s auditor, and she was informed by telephone that her role was being outsourced. The following day a letter was issued to her which stated: ‘Dear Karen, The company has decided to make your position redundant and to outsource the work week commencing 23rd. Thank you for your co-operation over the past few years. Yours truly …’

It was accepted that no consultation had taken place and that no procedure had been followed. In finding the dismissal unfair, the adjudication officer held that because of its nature, a redundancy: ‘must involve some level of consultation and prior notice, a fair selection process and the consideration of alternatives etc. While these requirements will vary from case to case, they place an obligation on an employer to conduct the process with what might be described in non-legal terms as some degree of respect and courtesy which was entirely lacking here.’

In Angela Fitzgerald v BR Marketing Limited,121 the complainant submitted that the respondent had failed to engage in any meaningful consultation with her. The adjudication officer concluded on the facts presented that the consultation was inadequate and thus was an unfair dismissal. In Cronin v RPS Group, Tallaght,122 the EAT determined, inter alia, that while a genuine redundancy situation existed, the employer had not acted reasonably, as it failed to give the complainant ‘the opportunity to make representations on her own behalf in respect of those criteria’. Breaches of the collective redundancy legislation and fairness [5.70]   A failure to consult with employee representatives does not of itself mean that a dismissal is unfair.123 Similarly, consultation with trade unions does not preclude consultations with individuals.124 Thus, in Beaumont v Muintir na Tíre,125 the EAT stated that ‘as a basic principle of natural justice and fairness, items as important as redundancy should be clearly discussed with the employee’. In Mugford v Midland Bank plc, the UK EAT suggested three propositions for the guidance of employment tribunals in such circumstances: (a) If there is no consultation with trade unions or individuals when redundancies are contemplated, a dismissal will normally be unfair, unless a reasonable employer would have concluded that consultation would be an utterly futile exercise. (b) Consultation with a trade union does not of itself release the employer from an obligation to consult with the individuals concerned.

121

Angela Fitzgerald v BR Marketing Limited ADJ-00034655, 19 January 2023. Cronin v RPS Group, Tallaght UD 2348/2009. 123 Forman Construction Ltd v Kelly [1977] IRLR 468. 124 Walls Meat Co Ltd v Selby [1989] ICR 60. 125 Beaumont v Muintir na Tíre UD688/2004. 122

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Redundancy  [5.72] (c) It will be a question of fact and degree for the employment tribunal to consider whether such consultations as had taken place were so inadequate as to render a dismissal unfair. The lack of consultation by itself does not automatically lead to a finding of unfairness. In this jurisdiction, it has been deemed relevant in a number of cases that the Protection of Employment Act 1977 had not been followed.126 Remedies [5.71]   It must at all times be remembered that a redundancy is a ‘no-fault’ termination. In other words, there is no fault laid at the door of the employee. Thus, it cannot be argued that it would be unfair to reinstate an employee as the bond of trust has broken.127 Reinstatement will therefore be considered in such cases as the employee will not have contributed to their dismissal. Thus, it is evident from the case law that the WRC is willing to reinstate employees who have been unfairly dismissed by way of a purported redundancy. In Colin Dominic Kearns v Ata Tools,128 the adjudication officer found that: ‘Allowing for the circumstances of this case it would be unjust not to reinstate as the conduct of the employer in this case has created the wrong and in all the circumstances the interests of justice so require.’ In O’Kelly v Xsil Ltd,129 reinstatement was considered the most appropriate redress where the employer failed to produce documentary evidence of the downturn in the company’s finances that necessitated the redundancy of the employee in question.

Selection procedure (or criteria)? [5.72]   The final hurdle that employers must cross is to prove that the person or persons were fairly selected for redundancy. In addition to exploring the alternatives to redundancy and then consulting with employees, employers are therefore also obliged to act reasonably in selecting those employees to be made redundant. The first point to remember here is the impersonality requirement demanded by the legislation – that is, it is the position that is made redundant, not the employee. Thus, the selection criteria relied upon by the respondent employer cannot be subjective or personal;130 and a criterion should be able to be independently verified.131 Where a redundancy arises, those employees to be made redundant are those whose positions

126 See 127 128 129 130 131

Dorian v Dundalk Golf Club UD 237/1987. Unless an employer can draw attention to something that the employee did but which only came to light post the dismissal. Colin Dominic Kearns v Ata Tools ADJ-00030876, December 2021. O’Kelly v Xsil Limited UD 1086/2011. Graham v ABF [1986] IRLR 90; Panisi v JVC Europe Ltd [2012] ELR 70. Williams v Comp Air Maxim [1982] IRLR 83.

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[5.73]  Termination of Employment are redundant. If there is a need to make several employees redundant from the same or similar positions, the employer must select one or more employees from the body or group affected. In this instance, the employer is under a general obligation to select fairly in accordance with s 6(3) of the 1977 Unfair Dismissals Act, which provides as follows: ‘Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, if an employee was dismissed due to redundancy, but the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more other employees in similar employment with the same employer who have not been dismissed and either(a) the selection of the employee for dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified at subsection (2) of this section or another matter that would not be a ground justifying dismissal; or (b) he was selected for dismissal in contravention of a procedure (being a procedure has been agreed upon by or on behalf of the employer and by the employee or a trade union or an excepted body under the Trade Union Acts 1941 and 1971, representing him, or has been established by the custom and practice of the employment concerned) relating to redundancy and there were no special reasons justifying a departure from that procedure, then dismissal shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act, to be an Unfair Dismissal.

In summary, this means that an employee can bring a claim for unfair dismissal if their selection for redundancy: (a) is based on unfair reasons such as those prohibited by the 1977 Unfair Dismissals Act (ie, trade union activity or membership of a trade union, pregnancy, colour, age, race, sexual orientation, membership of the Traveller community); or (b) is in contravention of an agreed procedure or custom and practice within the company and there was no special reason to depart from this procedure. [5.73]   An agreed procedure exists where there is a formal arrangement between the employer and the employee(s) or trade union or an excepted body132 which stipulates the selection procedure to be used in the event of a redundancy situation arising. The agreement must be a formal one. Thus, in Browne v Consolidated Aluminium,133 a comment by a senior manager to the effect that ‘junior staff’ would be selected for redundancy first was held not to be a formal agreement. However, where a formal agreement exists, the selection criteria can be changed only if the employer can justify it. This does not mean that another criterion cannot be emphasised; but employers must demonstrate that it was reasonable to take this into account (see the UK case of Tyrrell v Brooks Motors Ltd).134 A formal arrangement need not be written down; and employers must be careful that one does not arise by virtue of custom and practice, as in the absence of a formal

132 133 134

For a definition of ‘excepted body; see s 26(b) of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015. Browne v Consolidated Aluminium UD729/1980. Tyrrell v Brooks Motors Ltd UD 304/1981.

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Redundancy  [5.74] procedure, the WRC and the Labour Court will look at the custom and practice within the company. In this instance, however, the onus rests with the employee to demonstrate that their selection for redundancy was in contravention of traditional custom and practice within the firm. A single precedent will be insufficient proof of this; the procedure must be sufficiently well established, known and clear such that it would form an implied term of any agreed procedure.135 If there is an agreed procedure which arises formally or by custom and practice, this can be departed from only where there is a special reason for doing so.136 Custom and practice will vary between industries and sometimes across sites. In Devlin and Leahy v McInerney Construction Ltd,137 the EAT found that the respondent had operated a ‘last in, first out’ policy on a site-by-site basis and the policy had been objectively applied. The Unfair Dismissals Acts allow an employer to depart from the formally agreed selection procedure or custom and practice where it can show a special reason for doing so. This is merely a defence. It does not prohibit an employee from taking a claim to the WRC citing unfair selection. What it allows, however, is an opportunity for employers to retain an employee while making another employee employed in similar circumstances redundant. The reasons must be justifiable and reasonable. Thus, selecting an employee because they were off sick has been held not to be a valid reason to justify a departure from last in, first out.138 Choosing a selection procedure [5.74]   The first time that redundancies are to be effected in an organisation requires some thought, as any selection procedure that is chosen could set a precedent for future redundancies. As such, any consequent alteration in the selection procedure for future redundancies could be deemed to be contrary to the previously agreed selection method and, as a consequence, held to be an unfair dismissal per s 6(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977–2001. As neither the redundancy legislation nor the unfair dismissal legislation sets out the criteria to be followed by employers in selecting employees to be made redundant, this is a matter of choice for individual employers. Employers must be aware that anything that is not a so-called ‘voluntary redundancy’ will come under close scrutiny. The seminal case in respect of selection is Williams and Others v Compare Maxam.139 Here a number of employees were dismissed when the employer decided to cut labour costs to keep the business viable. Team leaders were asked to decide whom to retain in the interests of the business. They had no particular redundancy criteria, but instead

135

Moloney v JLF Goodbody Ltd UD 6/1978. Section 6(3)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 137 Devlin and Leahy v McInerney Construction Ltd UD 726 and UD 727/2004. 138 Foley v Mahon & McPhilips Ltd UD 267/1979. 139 Williams and Others v Compare Maxam [1982] ICR 156. 136

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[5.75]  Termination of Employment chose on personal preference, and the union was never consulted. In determining that the dismissals were unfair, the UK EAT held that when an employer is considering making redundancies, it cannot cherry-pick the employees that it wishes to retain. Instead, it must apply proper redundancy criteria from which the employees who are to be put at risk of redundancy are selected. The UK EAT then set out five key principles which should be adhered to in selecting employees for redundancy: (a) Early warning: The employer should give as much warning as possible about the redundancies so as to enable the union and the employees to inform themselves of the relevant facts and consider alternative solutions and, if necessary, find alternative employment in the undertaking or elsewhere. (b) Consultation with the union: If there is a union, the employer should ensure that there is consultation with the union. This is to determine the best way that the desired management results can be achieved. The employer together with the union should seek to agree the selection criteria that will be used. (c) Fair selection criteria: If there is no union, the employer should attempt to establish criteria for selection which do not depend solely upon the opinion of the person making the selection. These criteria should be able to be judged against things such as attendance record, efficiency, disciplinary record, experience etc. (d) Fair selection in accordance with criteria: Once the employer has decided upon the fair selection criteria, it must then ensure that the selection is made in accordance with these criteria (and, if there is a union, consider any recommendations that it makes as to the selections). (e) Consideration of alternative employment: The employer should seek to determine whether, instead of making employees redundant, it could offer alternative employment to them instead.

[5.75]  In Boucher v Irish Productivity Centre,140 the employer put forward various criteria to justify the redundancy of Mr Boucher based on skills, income earned, time, versatility and credit for research. The EAT found the selection to be unfair as the criteria had not been shared with the claimant beforehand and thus he was denied the opportunity to make a constructive contribution to the selection process. From an employer’s perspective, the main points to take from Boucher are as follows: (a) The onus rests on the employer to justify the selection process. (b) In the absence of agreement being reached with a trade union under s 6(3)(b) of the 1977 Act, the dismissal will be considered under s 6(1) of the same Act, which deems all dismissals to be unfair unless there were substantial grounds justifying them. (c) The existence of a general redundancy situation does not deny the individual employee the right to be fairly assessed for selection. In Cronin v RPS Group Tallaght,141 the EAT, in finding the dismissal unfair, determined that the respondent had not acted reasonably in failing to advise the ‘claimant of the criteria to be applied for redundancy’. 140 141

Boucher v Irish Productivity Centre [1990] ELR 205. Cronin v RPS Group Tallaght UD2348/2009.

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Redundancy  [5.76] Voluntary redundancy [5.76]   Because of the difficulties in agreeing on a ‘watertight’ selection process, many employers opt to offer voluntary redundancy. Voluntary redundancy occurs when an employer, faced with a situation which requires a reduced workforce, asks for volunteers for redundancy. If they fulfil the normal criteria, the people who then volunteer for redundancy are eligible for statutory redundancy. Employers in this instance invariably pay an enhanced package to entice employees to avail of/volunteer for the package. This has become the most popular way of reducing workforces in Ireland, as it avoids issues such as having to force people out of their employment on a compulsory basis – for example, by a selection matrix or ‘last in, first out’ basis, or some other method. It also allows further flexibility in that employers can ‘tailor’ the package to suit particular groups. As for all redundancies, the issue of impersonality arises; and regardless of the selection criteria, it is vital to bear in mind that there must be a genuine redundancy in the first instance. Invariably, employers may ‘tailor’ their voluntary package to ‘target’ particular groups; and in some instances, this may involve offering generous early retirement packages to those aged 50 (or above). This has been common practice in the past. However, regard must be had to the equality aspects of this practice. Such early retirement packages may involve some form of enhanced pension. Pensions – although not covered by the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021 – are covered instead by Pt VII of the Pensions Act 1990. (This legislation was extensively amended by the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004.) With effect from 5 April 2004, it became unlawful to discriminate directly or indirectly in relation to occupational pensions on any of the nine protected grounds (gender, marital status, family status, race, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation, or membership of the Traveller community). That said, s 34(3)(d) of the Employment Equality Act 1998142 allows an exception to ‘provide different rates of severance to different employees or groups of employees, being rates based on or taking into account the period between the age of an employee on leaving employment and compulsory retirement age’. Therefore, severance packages which directly discriminate on the grounds of age are permitted where they are based on, or where they take into account, the period between the age of an employee on being made redundant and the date of their compulsory retirement age, if this is objectively justified. Thus, in Hospira v Roper & Others,143 the trade union negotiated a package where employees who were close to retirement would be paid the lesser of: (a) the terms of the redundancy package; or (b) the amount of salary which those employees would have earned if they had continued in employment to the normal retirement age of 65.

142 143

As amended by s 23 of the Equality Act 2004. Hospira v Roper & Others [2013] ELR 263.

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[5.76]  Termination of Employment The effect of this was that employees under the age of 62 would have avoided the cap; while those over that age with the same amount of service and the same level of pay would receive more. While the equality officer determined that the employer had complied with the exclusion provided for in s 34(3)(d) of the Employment Equality Act, he nonetheless determined that he was obliged to construe ‘s34(30(d) of the Acts in light of Article 6(10 of the Framework Directive’. He thus held that it was up to the respondent to convince him that the approach of imposing a cap was objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and that the means of achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary. As the respondent proffered little or no evidence in respect of objective justification, he held that the package was discriminatory on the age ground. However, on appeal, the Labour Court overturned this decision and held that s 34(3)(d) in itself encompassed objective justifications for a discriminatory selection process, stating that: ‘[the] underlying rationale for this provision is that workers close to retirement are in a substantially different position than those who have longer periods in which they could have expected to remain in the active labour force and that, as a matter of social and labour market policy, this difference can be legitimately reflected in constructing redundancy packages’.144

A similar arrangement in respect to differences based on age in the calculation of redundancy payments was also upheld by the UK Employment Appeals Tribunal (per Underhill P) in Kraft Food (UK) v Hastie.145 The UK EAT held that a cap on awards made under a redundancy scheme was justified even though it led to direct and indirect age discrimination. The UK EAT considered that the aim of preventing employees who were nearing retirement from receiving a windfall was legitimate – the aim of the scheme being to compensate employees who were made redundant for the loss of earnings which they had a legitimate expectation to receive had their employment continued. The cap was said to be a proportionate means of achieving that objective. In Case C-152/11, Johann Odar v Baxter Deutschland GmbH146 the Court had to consider if a redundancy payments scheme in Germany which differentiated between workers on grounds of age offended against Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC. The Court considered that the arrangements in issue were objectively justified on the basis, inter alia, that they allowed for a fair distribution of limited financial resources as

144

See also Kelly v Masterson v Chivers Ireland Ltd DEC 2011-117, where it was not accepted that business objectives and avoiding windfall payments to employees was either appropriate or necessary. This case goes against the UK case of Loxley v BAE Systems Land Systems (Munitions & Ordnance) Limited (Employment Appeal Tribunal, 29 July 2008), where it was held that if effecting redundancies was a legitimate aim, the employer was entitled to consider the overall cost of that aim in order to achieve the targeted number of redundancies in the cheapest manner possible; and that tapering-off provisions in redundancy packages which reduced the lump sums of employees proportionately as they neared retirement and pension age were permissible, to prevent what they termed as an employee receiving a ‘windfall’. 145 Kraft Food (UK) v Hastie145 [2011] 3 All ER 956, [2010] ICR 1355. 146 Johann Odar v Baxter Deutschland GmbH. (CJEU, Second Chamber, 6 December 2012).

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Redundancy  [5.77] between younger and older workers. In the Court’s view such a consideration is also appropriate in the instant case. A more recent decision of the UK EAT in the case of Gilchrist and Murdie v Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and others147 concerned the UK Civil Service Compensation Scheme in which the respondents conceded that the claimants were treated less favourably on the age ground was held not to discriminate against them as the treatment of the claimant was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Collective agreements and redundancy selection [5.77]   Collective agreements arise where an employer recognises a trade union and engages in collective bargaining to negotiate in relation to terms and conditions of employment, rates of pay, dispute resolution, redundancy terms, selection for redundancy etc. Generally, collective agreements are not legally binding unless they have been registered with the Labour Court as provided for under s 25 of the Industrial Relations Act 1946 (Registered Employment Agreements), or have been expressly written into the contract of employment or deemed to be implied into the contract by custom and practice or acquiescence over time. Thus, terms in collective agreements relating to redundancy (and other working conditions) can become express or implied terms of the contract of employment in some circumstances. The binding nature of unregistered agreements depends on the facts of each case. The consistent factor that must be present for such agreements to be binding is the intention to create legal relations. If an employee wishes to be excluded from the binding nature of such agreements, they must make this absolutely clear to the employer. In such circumstances, it is probable that the collective agreement does not apply to such an individual. This can cause significant problems for trade unions. In circumstances where a trade union has a ‘mandate’ to negotiate on behalf of a group of employees and reaches an agreement on the terms and selection criteria for redundancy, and one or a small number of employees object in such situations, the ‘objecting individuals’ cannot be bound by the majority.148 The question that arises is whether employees are bound by any collective decision taken on their behalf regarding redundancy. In Crosby & Rooney v Fuss Door Systems Limited,149 the first named claimant had been employed for over seven years. On his return from annual leave, he was informed by a colleague that his position had been made redundant. In a subsequent meeting with the managing director, he was told that his position was to be made redundant due to the company experiencing financial difficulties. In the presence of his trade union representative, the claimant asked the

147

Gilchrist and Murdie v Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and others, 2400627/2020. Goulding Chemicals v Bolger [1977] IR 211. Crosby & Rooney v Fuss Door Systems Limited UD 294/2007.

148 See 149

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[5.78]  Termination of Employment managing director why he had been chosen, and the managing director asked him what his skills were and to sign some papers. The claimant refused and the managing director asked him to leave the premises. The second named claimant had been employed for over three years when he was called to a similar meeting with the managing director. The trade union representative was not present and he asked why no one less senior than him was being let go. He then also signed some papers. Arising out of all of the above, it emerged that there had been an agreement between the employer and the trade union that in case of redundancy, ‘last in, first out’ would apply. It was not applied to either of the claimants. The claimants also argued that they had been let go as their minimum entitlement was statutory redundancy; whereas 12 other employees who had come to be employed after the takeover of another business had a collective agreement in place whereby they were entitled to statutory redundancy plus five weeks’ pay for every year of service. The EAT found that the two claimants had been unfairly dismissed. The failure by the respondent to consult with the union on the selection procedure constituted a breach of s 6(3)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, as the last in, first out procedure had not been complied with. [5.78]  In Board of Management Rushbrooke National School v Geary,150 the employer was the board of management of a primary school and the employee was a special needs assistant (SNA) in the school. The employee commenced working as an SNA in September 2002 under a ‘child-specific contract’ for specified purpose, providing for Pupil A. In 2003 she was assigned another pupil (Pupil B); and she was working full time when she signed a second contract for specified purpose in October 2003. In 2005, a review took place on behalf of the Department of Education and Science and it was recommended that the number of SNAs be reduced in the school from seven to five, and that either last in, first out was to apply or, if all the SNAs were employed subject to child-specific contracts, the SNA whose child was deemed to no longer need the service was to be made redundant. Around 14 June 2005, the respondent was informed that Pupil B would no longer need the service; and that Pupil A was to avail of the service only part time and would be catered for by another SNA. Thus, the respondent’s position was to be made redundant on the 31st of August 2005. The respondent argued that an ‘agreement’ of 17 June 2005 negotiated between the Department of Education and Science and IMPACT, which was signed by a senior industrial relations officer of the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) (now the WRC) had been breached when her position was made redundant in the manner it was. The

150

Board of Management Rushbrooke National School v Geary UD 931/2006.

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Redundancy  [5.79] EAT, in finding in favour of the board of management, stated that the board’s decision to select the respondent on the basis that her pupil no longer needed the service was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. It deemed that the agreement from the LRC merely ‘constituted a set of proposals and not an agreement’ per se; therefore, selecting the respondent for redundancy in breach of the conditions set out therein did not constitute a breach of any agreement. It further found that the LRC agreement only became binding when it was accepted and circulated in Circular 0058/06 in June 2006 by the Department. Therefore, the board of management, in following the direction of the Department in June 2005 – although not in accord with the LRC paper of June 2005 – had acted fairly and reasonably, as the LRC paper was not a binding collective agreement at that stage. Each collective agreement will be different in both content and circumstance. Therefore, each must be examined in its own right. At a minimum, there must be an intention for them to be legally binding. ‘Last in, first out’/compulsory redundancy [5.79]   Given the difficulties in arriving at an acceptable and perhaps agreeable selection method, and the disadvantages that arise from voluntary redundancy, the ‘traditional method’ of last in, first out is sometimes used. It is attractive in that it is generally agreeable to trade unions (in the absence of any voluntary package), and is perceived as fair by protecting longer-serving employees. However, the robustness of this method was cast into doubt by the passing of the Equality Act 2004 and the inability to indirectly discriminate on age and gender grounds. Equally, choosing parttime, temporary or fixed-term workers151 is also potentially discriminatory. Under the Protection of Employees (Part Time Work) Act 2001, the Protection of Employees (Fixed Term Work) Act 2003 and the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012, such workers, in respect of their terms and conditions of employment, cannot be treated in a less favourable manner in the absence of objective grounds. It is often the case that collective agreements prescribe last in, first out as being the only method of selection. Even if this is the case, particular circumstances may justify a departure from it; however, any such departure must be seen to be justified in all the circumstances.152 Other methods of selection on a compulsory basis, such as first in, first out, run into the same trouble; and selection methods that rely on other criteria, such as work performance, attendance or cost – as can be seen from Boucher153 – are notoriously difficult to enforce.

151

Clarke v Eley (IMI) Knynoch Ltd; Eley (IMI) Kynoch Ltd v Powell [1982] IRLR 482. Rolls Royce Motor Cars v Price [1993] IRLR 203; BL Cars Ltd v Lewis [1983] IRLR 58 and Cassidy v LM Ericcson Ltd UD 934/2004, where selection on the grounds of technical competency was deemed not unfair. 153 Boucher v Irish Productivity Centre [1990] ELR 205. 152

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[5.80]  Termination of Employment Selection by matrix [5.80]  Notwithstanding Boucher,154 given the difficulties that many employers face with the voluntary and last in, first out schemes – both of which have considerable disadvantages from a HR and, more particularly, skill retention perspective – many employers now operate redundancy matrices. Typically, these set out a number of factors against which employees are measured, with those achieving the ‘worst’ scores selected for redundancy. In general, the WRC and the Labour Court approach such matrices with scepticism. Thus, in Kerrie Mc Garvey v Intrium Justitia,155 the Labour Court (on appeal from the Equality Tribunal) found that the redundancy matrix against which the claimant had been measured was ‘complex, opaque, subjective and open to manipulation’. In Dawson v Eirimports Ltd,156 the claimant was selected on the basis of competence. The EAT held that: ‘The criteria used in the absence of any other procedures were appropriate in the circumstances. The respondent was competent to make the assessment having regard to the small number of staff and his close contact with them. The principles of natural justice did not require the respondent to give the claimant details of his assessment and his not doing so resulted in no injustice.’

In Kirwan v Iona National Airways Ltd,157 the claimant was selected for redundancy due to alleged low productivity. However, this was never addressed with him and he was not advised that it may impact on his future. In Bradley v Kilsheelan Technology International Ltd,158 the EAT held that a secret ballot by staff on the selection criteria had deemed those selection criteria fair. In Kevin Barry v Parish Life Limited trading as Premier Insurances,159 it was held that the respondent had been unable to prove that that it had acted fairly and reasonably, and that the ‘process for redundancy was not fair’ in circumstances where the complainant gave evidence that he could not recall being told that the respondent had ‘compiled a Matrix for the purpose of lay off selection, though one was subsequently provided’. In Gary Howard v Ryanair DAC,160 redundancies arose in Ryanair’s flight operations centre as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. The respondent devised a redundancy selection matrix against which every affected employee was to be evaluated. The selection criteria were length of service, punctuality, attendance and performance (which appeared to be measured as days on which an employee agreed, at short notice, to work a day). The respondent confirmed that it did not consider the option of voluntary redundancy or last in, first out. The complainant was met on 14 May 2020 and was told that

154 155 156 157 158 159 160

Boucher v Irish Productivity Centre [1990] ELR 205. Kerrie Mc Garvey v Intrium Justitia EDA 095. Dawson v Eirimports Ltd UD616/93. Kirwan v Iona National Airways Ltd UD156/87. Bradley v Kilsheelan Technology International Ltd (2 June 2005), HC. Kevin Barry v Parish Life Limited trading as Premier Insurances ADJ-00036429, 20 February 2023. Gary Howard v Ryanair DAC ADJ-00030903, 16 March 2023.

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Redundancy  [5.82] his role was at risk of redundancy. He was also advised of the criterion for the selection matrix and told that there would be a two-week consultation period. He was not, however, given sight of how the matrix was being operated (here there was negative scoring), or told who was to be included in the selection pool and why. While the adjudication officer accepted that the respondent was entitled to ‘set about the restructuring process that it did’, she found that the dismissal was unfair ‘insofar as the Complainant was left in the dark and had no idea how he had become selected from amongst the candidates’. What we can take from all of the above is the following: (a) If you are to use a selection matrix, it must be absolutely transparent. (b) Any selection matrix should be shared with all staff to be affected beforehand and should be fully explained, including the scoring; and comments should be sought on the fairness or otherwise of same. The pool of people should also be identified and shared (albeit that names will have to be redacted for data protection purposes). (c) The matrix should be as objective as possible and subjective criteria should be avoided as far as possible. This often causes difficulty when employers come to consider previous performance ratings – which are often based on ‘loose’ competencies. (d) Just as the selection criteria should be shared, so too should the results – again with names redacted.

Redundancy and a change of ownership [5.81]   Changes in ownership of a business are dealt with under the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 and the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Redundancy Payments Acts [5.82]   Under the 1967 Act, where there is a change of ownership in the business and an employee agrees to renew their contract of employment, redundancy does not arise and the employee’s continuity of service is preserved.161 However, redundancy can arise where the employee, having accepted the renewed contract and having worked for a period of not more than four weeks with the new owner, then decides to leave.162 The matter then falls to be considered by the WRC, which will concentrate on the reasonableness or otherwise of the employee’s refusal.

161

Section 15 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971. 162 Section 15(2A) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as inserted by s 19 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971.

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[5.83]  Termination of Employment Transfer of Undertakings Regulations [5.83]   The European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 preserve continuity of employment in the event of the transfer of a business or the merger of one business with another. The Regulations provide that the transfer of an undertaking does not give rise to the automatic dismissal of the employees employed in that undertaking.163 The Regulations do provide, however, for dismissal for ‘economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce’.164 If employees experience a substantial deterioration in working conditions such that they feel compelled to terminate their contract of employment, the new employer is deemed responsible for that termination and will be liable for any redundancy payments that may arise.165 Dissolution of a partnership, redundancy and the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations [5.84]   The first question that arises here is whether the Regulations apply to partnerships. This matter was given consideration in the UK case of Robert Graham HYND v David Armstrong and 24 Others.166 In this case a solicitor successfully challenged his dismissal due to redundancy on the dissolution of the partnership in which he was employed and argued that he was entitled to the protection of Regulation 4 when the partners established a new firm. The court accepted that the complainant, employed in a partnership, could draw on the Regulations to contest his dismissal – purportedly due to redundancy – and assert his right to transfer. The court accepted that there had been a transfer of undertakings. In A Legal Secretary v A Legal Partnership,167 it was accepted that the partnership of Firm A had been dissolved on 29 April 2018. The complainant was offered and accepted employment with Firm B, a partnership that was comprised of two of the three partners constituting Firm A, on 23 April 2018. The adjudication officer found that while: ‘there was a change in the partners which led to the dissolution of the partnership, the complainant was re-engaged within the time limits necessary to meet the definition of re engagement as set out in section 9 (4) (a) of the Act of 1967 and, thus, remain outside the definition of a dismissal.’

The adjudication officer also noted that the ‘web page which counts her service with Firm B, extends back to her start date with Firm A’.

163 164 165 166 167

Regulation 5(1) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003. Regulation 5(2) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003. Regulation 5(3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003. Robert Graham HYND v (1) David Armstrong and 24 Others [2007] CSIH 16 XA158/04. A Legal Secretary v A Legal Partnership ADJ-00018637, 27 May 2019.

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Redundancy  [5.85] It was also held that what had occurred on 20–23 April 2018 corresponded to the elements set out in Spijkers v Gebr Benedik Abbatoir168 – a frequently relied-upon authority for determining whether a transfer of undertakings occurred: the business was the same before and after the transfer; the intellectual property and goodwill transferred from Firm A to Firm B; as did of the customer and staff. Accordingly, the complainant’s employment was continuing and she was not entitled to a statutory redundancy payment. Refusal to transfer and redundancy [5.85]   In Germany, if an employee refuses to transfer to the new employer, they remain employed by the old business. However, in the UK, the employee will be treated as if they have resigned. The Irish courts had the opportunity to deal with this in Symantec v Leddy and Lyons.169 In November 2006, Symantec transferred part of its business to Corporate Occupier Solutions (Ireland) Ltd. Leddy and Lyons were employed by Symantec at the time of the transfer. Just under a year previously, Leddy and Lyons had been informed about the proposed transfer. On 10 November 2006, both objected to the transfer and chose not to transfer even though the terms and conditions of their employment were to remain unchanged. They were also informed in advance that a failure to transfer would be treated as a resignation from their respective positions. The respondents contended that they had been dismissed by reason of redundancy and claimed to be entitled to redundancy payments under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2007. They also claimed to be entitled to ex-gratia redundancy payments. The EAT found for the two men. In its view, ‘in a transfer of undertaking, the employee is not obliged to accept the new employer’. The EAT adopted the position that an employee has the right to refuse to transfer; and that in refusing to transfer, the employee would remain employed by the transferor (the German position). If the transferor had no alternative position to offer the employee, the position would effectively be redundant and the transferor would be liable for any redundancy payment which may be payable.170 The employer appealed the decision to the High Court. It cited the decision of the ECJ in Berg v Besselen,171 where it was pointed out that the Directive on the Transfer of Undertakings ‘must be interpreted as meaning that after the date of transfer … the transferor is discharged from all obligations arising under the contract of employment, or the employment relationship’. In the High Court ruling given on 28 May 2009, Edwards J stated: ‘The fact that an employee objects to the transfer does not of itself have the effect of negating the transfer. It is just that an employee is not obliged to

168

Spijkers v Gebr Benedik Abbatoir CV (ECJ Case 24/85). v Leddy and Lyons (2009) IEHC 256. See also Rapier Contract Services Limited v Adina Predut UDD185, 16 January 2018, where the complainant refused to transfer and it was held not to be an unfair dismissal. 171 Berg v Besselen [1998] ECR 2559. 169 Symantec 170

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[5.86]  Termination of Employment continue his employment relationship with the transferee.’ The High Court therefore overturned the EAT decision, holding that the refusal of an employee to transfer does not result in the employee being made redundant. Consequently, the employee will not be entitled to any severance payment, statutory or otherwise (ie, the UK approach). (At the time of writing, this is under appeal to the Supreme Court.)

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS Time limit for claim [5.86]   There often appears to be a misunderstanding regarding the time limit to take a claim under the Redundancy Payments Acts. This was clarified by the Labour Court in Brian Cahill t/a Jerpoint Inn v Helen Greene,172 in which the Labour Court pointed out that under s 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, the appropriate limitation period is 52 weeks from the date of termination of employment.

Notification timeline [5.87]   The first thing to do in trying to effect redundancies is to understand the process and what needs to be done. The left-hand in the table below deals with redundancies not falling within the collective redundancy legislation – for example, a one-person redundancy or several redundancies which do not meet the collective redundancy thresholds. The right-hand column deals with those redundancies that fall within the collective redundancy legislation. This is a very brief and short guide to get you started. It should not be seen as definitive in any respect and advice should be taken beforehand. Redundancies (not falling within the collective redundancy legislation)

Collective redundancies

Phase 1. Preparation (decision to effect redundancy(ies) already made)

Phase 1. Preparation (prior to any decision on redundancy(ies) being made)

1. Determine that a genuine redundancy/ ies exists, as you will be put on strict proof of this. Set out clearly the need for the redundancy/ies (eg, fall in sales, reduction in margin, loss of major customer(s), orders etc).

1. Determine that the redundancies are genuine as you will be put on strict proof of this. Set out clearly why the redundancies are necessary (eg, fall in sales, reduction in margin, loss of major customer(s), orders etc). (continued)

172

Brian Cahill t/a Jerpoint Inn v Helen Greene RPD1710, 12 October 2017.

256

Redundancy  [5.87] .

(Continued) Redundancies (not falling within the collective redundancy legislation)

Collective redundancies

2. Determine on what grounds you are making the job(s) redundant, having particular regard to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 7(2) (as amended by s 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971 and s 5 of the 2003 Act).

2. Determine, if redundancies are to be effected, on what grounds the jobs are redundant, having particular regard to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 7(2) (as amended by s 4 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1971 and s 5 of the 2003 Act).

3. Examine the alternatives to redundancy with other members of management (if appropriate) prior to talking to the employee(s) or their representative. Keep a detailed note of your thoughts in this regard.

3. Examine the alternatives to redundancy with other members of management (if appropriate) prior to talking to the employees or their representatives. Keep a detailed note of your thoughts in this regard.

4. Ensure all appropriate members of senior management partake in the above discussion and are fully briefed on why the redundancy/ies are necessary. This will ensure that if any of them are asked in the future, they will be able to inform the person(s) of the reasons in a clear and concise manner. If there are no possible alternatives to redundancy, set out in writing the reasons why, in the opinion of senior management, none of these are possible and ensure that this is kept in a safe place. This is important if any employee makes a claim under the Unfair Dismissals Act.

4. Ensure all appropriate members of senior management partake in the above discussion and are fully briefed on the reasons why the redundancies are necessary. This will ensure that if any of them are asked in the future, they will be able to inform the person(s) of the reasons in a clear and concise manner. If there are no possible alternatives to redundancy, set out the reasons why, in the opinion of senior management, none of these are possible in writing and ensure that this is kept in a safe place. Not only is this important if any person claims unfair dismissal; but it is also vitally important when the redundancy consultations/negotiations get underway. If all senior managers have been involved in the initial preparation and discussion on the alternatives, then they are less likely to make mistakes or contradict one another when the consultations/negotiations start.

5. Prepare a spreadsheet with the proposed employee(s’) name(s), start date(s), notice pay and variations on the proposed package in advance of the redundancy. This will help to crystallise thinking in respect of the financial considerations, and will also assist if consultations/negotiations are required.

5. On the basis that redundancies might occur, prepare a spreadsheet with the proposed employee(s’) names, start dates, notice pay, and variations on the proposed package in advance of the redundancy. This will help to crystallise thinking in respect of the financial considerations, and will also assist when consultations/negotiations begin on the redundancies proper. If every member of management is well prepared beforehand, this will help to prevent mishaps when the consultations/negotiations begin proper. (continued)

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[5.87]  Termination of Employment (Continued) Redundancies (not falling within the collective redundancy legislation)

Collective redundancies

6. Brief any tax, pension, social welfare, financial and outplacement consultants that may be required, or that you might propose offering. Prepare to contact other local employers to determine whether they have vacancies arising or whether they would have interest in any displaced employee(s). Also, make contact with any outside agencies that you may have to brief, such as banks, Enterprise Ireland and PR companies. Whether you brief them before the actual announcement or later is a matter for careful consideration.

6. Brief any tax, pension, social welfare, financial, outplacement, consultants that may be required or that you might propose offering. Prepare to contact other local employers to determine whether they have vacancies arising or whether they would have interest in any displaced employees (clearly, they should not be notified at this juncture). Also make contact with any outside agencies that you may have to brief, such as banks, Enterprise Ireland and PR companies. Whether you brief them before the actual announcement or later is a matter for careful consideration.

7. Determine the method of selection for redundancy (ie, whether it will be voluntary or last in, first out etc) etc and set out in writing the reasons why the method selected is the most appropriate. Of help here is to conduct a careful analysis of the workforce beforehand in order to ‘tailor’ any package to those groups you may wish to see exit. Consideration, however, should be given to the employment equality legislation. Be mindful of any contractual agreements or company/union agreements which may refer to the method of selection to be used in the event of redundancies. Also be mindful of any contractual agreements or company union agreements that may refer to the ‘ex gratia amount’ to be paid in the event of redundancies or any previous precedent that might have to be followed. If selection is to be based on a matrix, examine this in detail and seek input from other managers so that an objective view can be taken.

7. Determine the method of selection for redundancy (ie, whether it will be voluntary, ‘last in, first out etc) and set out in writing the reasons why the method selected is the most appropriate. Of help here is to conduct a careful analysis of the workforce beforehand in order to ‘tailor’ any package to those groups you may wish to see exit. Consideration, however, should be given to the employment equality legislation. Be mindful of any contractual agreements or company/union agreements which may refer to the method of selection to be used in the event of redundancies. Also be mindful of any contractual agreements or company union agreements that may refer to the ‘ex gratia amount’ to be paid in the event of redundancies or any previous precedent that might have to be followed. If selection is to be based on a matrix, examine this in detail and seek input from other managers so that an objective view can be taken.

(continued)

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Redundancy  [5.87] (Continued) Redundancies (not falling within the collective redundancy legislation)

Collective redundancies

Phase 2

Phase 2

Announcement/consultation/ negotiation

Announcement/consultation/ negotiation

8. Talk to the employee(s) to be affected and discuss in detail the alternatives to redundancy and the proposed selection method. If there is more than one redundancy and a matrix is to be used for selection purposes, issue this to them and ask for their opinion and comment. At all times, stress that you are prepared to consider alternatives. Leave at least a week for employee discussions on this to occur and keep a detailed note of any such discussions.

8. Notify your employees that you are contemplating redundancies and that you will be engaging in a negotiation/consultation procedure with their representatives over the coming 30 days. The announcement should be well choreographed beforehand and the dates, times, methods of communication etc should be documented and rehearsed. Remember to make contact with those who may not be present in work on the day of the announcement, such as those on sick leave, carer’s leave, maternity leave, parental leave, etc. A question often arises as to what day to make the announcement. There are various thoughts on this. Some employers suggest a Friday is the best day, as it gives time for people to cool down during the weekend and talk the matter over with their family. Also, there is generally less ‘press activity’ coming into the weekend than in earlier in the week. Others maintain that mid-week is preferable, in that it allows time for managers to reassure people once the announcement has been made. In practice, if there is a complete closure over the weekend, then Friday is preferable; alternatively, I would advocate mid-week. Another point to bear in mind here in the case of unionised employment is whether you should ‘tip off’ the union that the announcement is forthcoming. Clearly, good management practice – not to mention good manners – dictates that your own workforce and in particular those affected should know before any third parties. That said, trade unions do not like surprises; and if an agreement must be concluded with them, you will want to keep them ‘on side’, so to speak. What I have found helpful in the past is, prior to the announcement, to phone the employee representatives to alert them to the fact that a significant announcement will be made, and that you will be in contact with them in due course to discuss the issue. (continued)

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[5.87]  Termination of Employment (Continued) Redundancies (not falling within the collective redundancy legislation)

Collective redundancies

9. Notify the person(s) to be made redundant personally.

9. In non-union companies, arrange for an employee representative to be chosen to represent the employees. How this person is chosen is a matter for each employer to decide.

10. Notify the person(s) formally in writing. Remember that the person(s) may also be entitled to notice pay, so when issuing the RP50, it is advisable to inform them in writing that this notice also applies in respect of any notice entitlement due under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973–2001 or their contract (whichever is longer).

10. Formally notify the employee representative of the fact that you are contemplating collective redundancies.

11. Be mindful of any contractual obligations to employees in respect of selection criteria and/or the ‘ex gratia amount’ to be paid to employees in the event of redundancy occurring.

11. Provide the employee representative with the necessary information (eg, reasons, numbers affected, categories, selection method, ex gratia proposals etc).173 Bear in mind that these must be given in writing; otherwise, it is a breach of the Act. However, they need only be given to the representatives, not to the employees themselves.174 12. At the same time as you notify the employee representative, notify the Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment of the proposed redundancies at least 30 days in advance of the first notice of redundancy being issued175 and send a copy of this note to the employee representative. 13. After the announcement has been made, the negotiations will begin. This negotiation process is discussed in more detail below at [5.88]. (continued)

173

See s 9 of the Protection of Employment Act 1977. See s 10(2) of the Protection of Employment Act 1977. 175 The Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007 amended s 9 of the Protection of Employment Act 1977 by substituting ‘before the first notice of dismissal is given’ for ‘before the first dismissal takes effect’, thus inserting the word ‘notice’. This was to comply with the ruling in Junk v Kuhnel. 174

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Redundancy  [5.88] (Continued) Redundancies (not falling within the collective redundancy legislation)

Collective redundancies

Phase 3 Completion

Phase 3 Completion

13. On the day the employee(s) are due to leave their employment, get them to sign any disclaimers or a note accepting their statutory entitlements. Pay any outstanding monies due and remove them from the payroll.

14. After the conclusion of the consultations/ negotiations, notify those affected by first of all talking to them personally and then notifying them formally in writing.

14. Apply to the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment for the employer’s rebate within six months of the employee(s) receiving their redundancy lump sum. The composite redundancy Form RP50 must be fully completed, signed by the employer and employee, and submitted. It should cover the notice of redundancy, confirmation of receipt of redundancy and the application for the employer’s rebate. Rebate claims can be submitted online at http://www.entemp.ie.

15. On the day the employee(s) are due to leave their employment, get them to sign any disclaimers and pay any outstanding monies due and remove them from the payroll.

Negotiations [5.88]   Most readers will associate negotiations with unionised employments. However, given the collective redundancy legislation and the Junk v Kuhnel decision,176 all employers are obliged to consult with employee representatives with ‘a view to reaching agreement’. Even in non-union companies, and in the absence of a staff association or ‘excepted body’, employers must put in place an arrangement whereby employees nominate a person or persons to represent them in negotiations with their employer. Given this requirement and the previously mentioned Junk177 case, it is clear that regardless of whether employers wish to negotiate on the actual need for redundancies, the legislation and more lately case law oblige them to. Given this, the negotiations must cover:178 (a) the possibility of avoiding the proposed redundancies, reducing the number of employees to be made redundant or the possibility of redeployment or retraining; and 176

Junk v Kunhel (Case C–188/03). Junk v Kunhel (Case C–188/03). 178 Section 9 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended by the Protection of Employment Order (SI 370/1996) and the Protection of Employment Regulations 2000 (SI 488/2000). 177

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[5.89]  Termination of Employment (b) the basis on which it will be decided which particular employees will be made redundant. It is also clear that the negotiations may not be limited merely to the amount of the lump sum. This is where the preparation stage is vital. Although all negotiations vary, as they are very much personality-driven by the employee representative(s) and/or the actual trade union(s), they tend to take the following pattern: (a) Rejection of the need for redundancies by the employee representative/trade union and exploration of alternatives: The main point here is that the employee representative and/or the trade union cannot merely accept the need for redundancies from the outset, as this weakens their position with the other employees/ union members and also lets the employer know that any proposal in respect of an ex gratia payment will be difficult to negotiate and expensive. (b) Negotiation on ex gratia payments: Once the alternatives have been explored and exhausted, the next phase generally takes the form of negotiating on the ex gratia payments. Here it is usually the employer that will have to make the first offer (in practice, it will often have been made from the outset). Usually, the employee representative will maintain a ‘principled’ position of rejecting the need for redundancies while negotiating on the ex gratia payment on a without-prejudice basis. As is usual in all negotiations, but particularly so here, ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. If the ex gratia amount cannot be agreed, it may happen that the employer will have to try to progress the issue in a bid to conclude the negotiations. Remember in this instance that the employee representative/union will be in no rush to finalise matters, so the need to keep the impetus going rests with the employer. Often what may occur is that the employer is left with no alternative but to issue redundancy notices. The normal reaction from employee representatives/ unions is in turn to issue a strike notice; the compromise being that if the employer lifts the redundancy notice, the employee representative(s)/trade union(s) will lift the strike notice. In both union and non-union companies, the negotiations may take some time and may involve the referral of the issue to a third party, such as the Labour Court or an independent mediator. Voluntary redundancy and negotiations [5.89]   The question often arises as to whether employers must negotiate voluntary redundancy packages. After all, this is merely voluntary, and it is company money that will be expended to attract the right candidates; if people don’t want to apply, they don’t have to! That is a reasonable argument; however, where the redundancy is a collective redundancy, the employer is obliged to discuss the basis for the redundancies and the alternatives to same. While this does not mean that the issue of any ex gratia payment must be ‘negotiated’, in practice, once ‘consultations/negotiations’ begin, this will undoubtedly be a key topic. Additionally, there are numerous Labour Court recommendations in which the Labour Court has dealt with, recommended on and increased substantially ‘voluntary’ packages proposed by employers. In essence, how to present such packages and whether to negotiate on them are matters for each individual company to decide upon. 262

Redundancy  [5.94]

Methods of calculating ex gratia redundancy payments Statutory entitlement only [5.90]   This is all that employers are legally obliged to pay. In larger and in particular unionised companies, it may prove difficult to pay the only statutory entitlement, unless there are extenuating circumstances. Weeks’ pay per year of service [5.91]   This is generally the most popular and widely used method. However, the number of weeks varies greatly and is heavily dependent on industry norms, varying from two weeks per year of service to nine. This formula suits employees with short service, but can become extremely expensive for longer-serving employees. Lump-sum payments [5.92]   This formula is most suitable where a smaller number of employees are being made redundant. Multiples of statutory redundancy payments [5.93]   This is increasingly being used by employers as an equitable method of payment. It takes account of employee service but does not generally lead to very expensive payments.

Labour Court – what should be discussed [5.94]   Regardless of whether the redundancy is voluntary, the question arises as to what the Labour Court will deal with when presented with a problem. At one end of the scale is a claim by the employee representative/unions that there is no need for the proposed redundancies; and at the other is the more straightforward issue that the ex gratia payment is insufficient. The Labour Court will deal with whatever is put before it – and, more to the point, with whatever the employer lets it deal with. The first question that the employer must consider is whether the Labour Court should be empowered to deal with the ‘fact’ of redundancy – that is, whether the employer’s decision to effect redundancies is correct. From an employer’s perspective, the only topic for discussion at the Labour Court should be the ex gratia payment. Otherwise, employers will be faced with the prospect of being ‘second guessed’ on their decision to effect redundancies by a third party. That said, the Junk179 case and the collective redundancy legislation have seriously 179

Junk v Kunhel (Case C–188/03).

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[5.95]  Termination of Employment weakened the traditional position of employers not to allow the Labour Court to rule on the issue of the need for redundancies.

Refusal to accept redundancy notice [5.95]   If an employee refuses to accept a notice of redundancy, employers are advised to send the notice to the employee’s home address by registered post. Draft letter to Minister notifying collective redundancies [5.96] Dear Minister I write to inform you that X … Company/Sole Trader/Partnership (as appropriate) located at … will be making … employees redundant from a total workforce of … with effect from … at our … premises [in case the premises is separate from the main office]. Those affected come from the following categories [eg, production operators, technicians, engineers, administration staff etc.] The reason for the redundancies is … [eg, plant closure, plant rationalisation brought about by loss of major contract etc.] The employees are represented by … trade union, or alternatively, we have entered into the process of selecting an employee representative in accordance with the EC (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2000 and … has duly been elected to represent the employees concerned. We have entered into the consultation process and this will be ongoing over the coming weeks. The address of the employee representative(s) is …. Yours sincerely

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Redundancy  [5.97]

Forms RP9 [5.97]    

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         

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    

                       

265

[5.97]  Termination of Employment 

  

 

  

 



          

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 

   



 

                                          

                            

 



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 

  

                  

266

Redundancy  [5.98] RP6 [5.98] 

  



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                                                                                  

                                

267

[5.98]  Termination of Employment 

  

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                                                            

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Chapter 6

Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments

INTRODUCTION [6.01]   ‘Pay’ for tax purposes in general covers all payments made by employers to employees and company directors. All such payments are subject to Pay as You Earn (PAYE) tax, unless they are exempt from tax or the Revenue Commissioners determine otherwise. Lump-sum payments in the event of redundancy or retirement do, however, qualify for special tax treatment; and depending on the circumstances, they may be exempt from tax altogether or may qualify for relief from tax. However, a lump sum paid under the terms of a contract of employment is taxable in full and does not qualify for exemption or relief. Settlements and awards made in employment cases are subject to an exemption from income tax in limited circumstances, as outlined below. Payment of legal fees in such instances can also be exempt from tax once certain conditions are adhered to, as further outlined below.

TAXATION OF LUMP SUMS (EXCLUDING SETTLEMENTS AND AWARDS PAYABLE IN EMPLOYMENT CASES) Lump-sum payments exempt from tax [6.02]   The following lump sums are exempt from income tax:1 (a) statutory redundancy payments; and (b) payments made on account of injury or disability.

Lump-sum payments that qualify for tax relief [6.03]   The following retirement and redundancy payments, although not entirely exempt from tax, qualify for some relief from tax: (a) salary paid in lieu of notice, on redundancy or retirement. Where the contract of employment provides for a payment of this kind on termination of the contract, 1

This is not an exhaustive list and other payments may be eligible.

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[6.04]  Termination of Employment such payment is chargeable to income tax in the normal way without the benefit of the allowable exemptions and reliefs; (b) ex gratia payments or, as the Revenue calls them, ‘non-statutory redundancy payments’. This pertains to amounts payable over and above any statutory redundancy (eg, where an employee receives a lump sum of €40,000, which includes statutory redundancy of €10,000, €30,000 of that €40,000 will be subject to tax relief. The statutory amount of €10,000 is exempt for tax purposes); and (c) all or part of ex gratia payments given in a non-cash form (eg, car, house, renovations, holiday abroad), based on the equivalent cash value of the item received. Available tax relief [6.04]   The higher of the following will be exempt from tax the first time an employee is made redundant: (a) basic exemption (see [6.05]); (b) increased exemption (see [6.09]); and (c) standard capital superannuation benefit (SCSB) (see [6.11]). All of the above are subject to a limit of €200,000. This measure was introduced by the government in the National Recovery Plan for 2011–2014 (see the Finance Act 2011). Thus, any amounts over €200,000 are subject to income tax. Entitlements for an exemption against a lump-sum payment are calculated on an individual basis for married couples, even if they are assessed for tax jointly. Basic exemption [6.05]   The current basic exemption from tax is €10,160 plus €765 for each full year of service. Career breaks [6.06]  Periods during which a person is on a career break are not included for the purpose of determining a full year of service. However, service before and after a career break may be added together. Job sharers [6.07]  Employees who job share are credited with years of service as if they worked full time. Practical application [6.08]    Example Jessica receives a lump sum of €15,000 when she leaves her employment after nine years and  eight months’ service. The basic exemption due to her is €17,045, (ie, €10,160 plus

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Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments  [6.10] [€765 × 9]). Therefore, no tax is due on the lump sum of €15,000, as it is under €17,045. The eight months are ignored, as it is each full year of service that is counted.

Increased exemption [6.09]   Employees who are not members of occupational pension schemes or who choose ‘irrevocably’ to give up their right to receive a lump sum from such a scheme can extend the basic exemption by €10,000. The entitlement for such employees is the basic exemption of €10,160 plus €765 for each full year of service, plus a further €10,000. The only caveat is that the increased exemption can be claimed only if the employee has not made any such claims in the previous ten tax years. Employees who are members of an occupational pension scheme have the increased exemption of €10,000 reduced by the amount of: (a) any tax-free lump sum from the pension scheme to which they may be immediately entitled; or (b) the present-day value, on the date of leaving employment, of any tax-free lump sum which may be receivable from the pension scheme in the future.

If the lump sum from the pension scheme is more than €10,000, the employee is not due the increased exemption. If it is less than €10,000, they are due the increased exemption of €10,000 less the amount of the pension scheme entitlement. Practical application [6.10]   Example 1 Jessica receives a lump sum of €20,000 when she leaves her employment after ten years’ service. She gets €12,000 from her pension scheme. She is only entitled to the basic exemption of €18,410 – that is, €10,160 + [€765 × 10]. The €12,000 she receives from her pension scheme means that the increased exemption does not apply. Example 2 Jessica receives a lump sum of €30,000 when she leaves her employment after ten years. The present-day value of her pension scheme entitlement at 65 years is €4,000. The exemption due to her is €23,810 – that is [€10,160 + €6,000] plus [€765 × 10]. The increased exemption of €10,000 is reduced by the amount paid from the pension scheme – that is, €4,000. Example 3 Jessica receives a lump sum of €30,000 when she leaves her employment after 15 years and six months. She is not a member of a pension scheme. The increased exemption due to her is €31,635 – that is, [€10,160 + €10,000] plus [€765 × 15]. No tax is due on her lump sum of €30,000, as it is under €31,635 and the increased exemption is claimed in full.

271

[6.11]  Termination of Employment

Standard capital superannuation benefit [6.11]   This is a relief given for each year of service. The relief is equal to 1/15th of the average annual pay for the last three years of service before leaving, less any tax-free lump-sum entitlement from the pension scheme. This generally benefits high earners and those with long service. The formula for calculating the SCSB is: A × B – C/15 where: A is the average annual remuneration2 for the last 36 months’ service before termination; B is the number of complete years of service; and C is the value of any tax-free lump sum received/receivable under an approved pension scheme. If an employee has less than three years of paid service with an employer prior to their date of termination, the pay for the last 36 months of paid service is taken into account in arriving at the average for a year. Practical application [6.12]   Example 1 Jessica commenced employment with Company A on 1 January 2001 and left on 31 January 2021 – that is, after 20 full years of service. She received: (a) a retirement lump sum of €65,000 (she had not been made redundant before or received any previous lump sums); and (b) a lump sum of €12,000 from an approved pension scheme. Her pay, including benefits in kind, for the last 36 months before the date of leaving was €100,000. The amount of the lump sum, which is exempt from tax, is the higher of the following: (a) the basic exemption of €25,460 – that is, €10,160 plus [€765 × 20 years]; (b) the increased exemption of €10,000 (not due in this case, as the pension scheme lump sum of €12,000 is greater than €10,000); or (c) SCSB of €32,333 ([€100,000/3 × 20/15] – €12,000). Jessica will get relief of €32,333 against her lump sum of €65,000. The taxable amount of her lump sum is therefore €32,667 [€65,000 – €32,333].

2

Remuneration includes gross salary (before employee contributions to an approved pension scheme) and benefits in kind, less Revenue-agreed flat-rate expenses.

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Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments  [6.17]

Subsequent claims [6.13]   The basic exemption and the SCSB are generally not available against any subsequent lump-sum payments from different employers – that is, they can only be given once against a lump sum from the same employer or associated employer.

Taxation of lump sums by employers [6.14]   Employers are obliged to deduct PAYE on all of the lump sum less the basic exemption or SCSB. This can be done without prior approval from the Revenue. Employers should, however, apply to the Revenue well in advance of the payment date for any increased exemptions due to employees. If the Revenue has not granted approval for the increased exemption at the time of payment, tax must be deducted on the total lump sum less the basic exemption or SCSB. Employees may then apply before the end of four years from the date of payment to their regional Revenue Office for the benefit of the increased exemption. Rate of tax on lump sums [6.15]   The taxable lump-sum payment is regarded as part of an employee’s total income and is taxed accordingly.

Time limits for claiming tax reliefs [6.16]   The time limit for claiming tax relief in respect of lump-sum payments is four years from the end of the year in which the lump-sum payment is treated as income.3

TAXATION EXEMPTION FOR SETTLEMENTS AND AWARDS IN EMPLOYMENT CASES [6.17]   In 2002, the Irish Revenue Commissioners began to tax awards to employees under the Employment Equality Act 1998, the Parental Leave Act 1998, the Adoptive Leave Act 1995 and the Maternity Protection Act 1994. This practice continued up until the enactment of the Finance Act 2004, which came into effect on 4 February 2004. Since then, an exemption from income tax for compensation paid to an employee or former employee has applied in limited circumstances.4

3 4

Prior to 1 January 2005, the time limit was six years. Section 7 of the Finance Act 2004, contained in s192A of the TCA 1997.

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[6.18]  Termination of Employment

Exemption [6.18]   The exemption applies only in the following circumstances: (a) The settlement or award relates to ‘a relevant act’ – put simply, an employment statute which protects employees’ rights and entitlements. A ‘relevant Act’ is an act that contains provisions on the protection of employees’ rights and entitlements, or the obligations of employers towards employees. Such acts include: (1) the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021; (2) the Maternity Protection Act 1994 and 2022; (3) the Parental Leave Act 1998–2019; (4) the Payment of Wages Act 1991; (5) the Terms of Employment Information Acts 1994–2014; (6) the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973–2005; (7) the Protection of Employees (Part-Time) Work Act 2001; (8) the Protection of Employees (Fixed Term) Work Act 2003; (9) the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967–2022; (10) the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997; (11) the Carer’s Leave Act 2001–2020; (12) the Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act 2019; and (13) the Protected Disclosures Act 2014–2022. (b) The compensation is paid in accordance with a decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC), the Labour Court, the Circuit Court or the High Court. (c) The payment is paid in accordance with a settlement arrived at under a mediation process provided for in legislation which contains provisions for protecting the rights of employees – in effect, the Employment Equality Acts. (d) There is a written settlement between persons who are not connected5 which, if made by a relevant authority,6 would have been a bona fide claim; and which, if not settled, would be ‘likely to have been the subject of a recommendation decision or determination by a Relevant Authority’. The amount of any settlement cannot exceed the maximum award possible under a relevant act dealing with employment law by a relevant authority (other than the Circuit Court or High Court).7 5 6

7

‘Not connected’ is defined in s 10 of the Tax Consolidation Act 1997. Section 192A(1) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 defines ‘relevant authority’ as the Rights Commissioner, the Employment Appeals Tribunal, the Labour Court, the Director of Equality Investigations, the Circuit Court or the High Court. Part 07/01/27 of the Revenue’s Updated Tax Manual (March 2023) provides that for an out-of-court settlement to qualify for an exemption under s 192A of the Tax Consolidation Act 1997 (TCA 1997), it must meet the following conditions: (a) The agreement in settlement of claim is evidenced in writing; (b) The original statement of claim by the employee is evidenced in writing; (c) The agreement is not between connected persons as defined in s 10 of the TCA 1997 (eg, employer and relative, employer and director); (d) The claim would have been a bona fide claim under a ‘relevant Act’ had it been made to a ‘relevant authority’ (eg, sufficient grounds for the claim; claim is within the scope of one of the relevant Acts; claim is made within specified time limits, etc); (e) The claim is likely to have been the subject of a recommendation, decision or determination by a relevant authority that a payment be made to the person making the claim; and

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Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments  [6.20] (e) The compensation does not relate to loss of salary or wages or arrears of salary or wages.8 Additionally, payments referred to in ss 123(1) and 484(2)(a) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (TCA 1997) are excluded. These are payments which relate directly to retirement or removal from office. They are therefore taxable. In summary, compensation – not including compensation for loss of earnings arising from such issues as harassment, bullying, maternity, Fixed Term Work Act claims or equality claims under a formal decision, recommendation or determination of a ‘relevant authority’; or arising as a result of a settlement between parties – will be exempt from tax if it does not exceed the limits applicable under the legislation, the agreement is not between ‘connected’ persons and the settlement is set out in writing.

Fire and rehire [6.19]   In March 2023 the Revenue issued eBrief 136/21, which confirms that the Tax and Duty Manual Part 05-05-19 (Payments on Termination of an Office or Employment or Removal from an Office or Employment) has been updated to provide additional clarification on the tax treatment of ‘fire and rehire’ scenarios. The guidance provided in the eBrief indicates that a redundancy will generally be regarded not to have taken place where: (a) there is a ‘fire and rehire’ agreement in place at the time of termination; (b) there is an expectation or understanding by either party that an offer of rehire will be made at some point in the future (irrespective of the terms of such an offer or the length of time between the ‘fire and rehire’); or (c) employees move between companies of the same group – for example, where an employment of subsidiary company A is terminated and is subsequently hired by sister company B. Employers should be very careful in structuring compromise agreements, particularly where a commitment is made to re-hire the employee, even on a consultancy basis.

PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR EMPLOYERS [6.20]   It is vital to ensure that the detailed particulars of any claim are available for inspection by the relevant authority.9 In the absence of such detailed information as is

(f) The payment does not exceed the maximum amount which could have been awarded under relevant legislation by the WRC or the Labour Court as appropriate (eg, a claim made under the Employment Equality Act 1998 for acts of discrimination – the maximum amount cannot exceed a sum calculated as being not greater than 104 weeks’ pay). 8 9

Section 192A(5) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. Section 192A(4)(b) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.

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[6.21]  Termination of Employment set out below, the Revenue will likely treat the whole sum as loss of earnings and tax the full amount accordingly. Furthermore, the obligation to so tax rests with the employer. To ensure that this does not happen, employers should do the following: (a) Get the employee to set out their claim fully in writing (this is important as a statement of claim must be produced for the Revenue Commissioners if they request it. If this is unavailable, the settlement may be subject to tax). (b) Investigate the claim fully and take detailed notes. (c) Decide whether the claim is valid. (d) If the claim is determined to be valid, be satisfied as to whether the claim is likely to succeed. Legal advice is appropriate at this stage and will assist in any discussions with the Revenue at a future date, as the Revenue will demand to know that the claim would have succeeded at the third-party stage. (e) Determine what amount is reasonable to settle the matter. Remember that this cannot exceed any amount that would be awarded by the WRC or the Labour Court. (f) Enter into a written settlement with the employee. Again, remember that the parties cannot be connected within the meaning of s 10 of the TCA 1997 (eg, an individual’s spouse; a relative or the spouse of a relative, of the individual or of the individual’s spouse; bodies corporate connected to the individual). (g) Set out clearly what proportion of the claim relates to compensation for the wrong committed and what proportion relates to loss of earnings (loss of earnings is taxable). (h) Copies of the agreement must be kept for a period of six years from the date of payment, and must be made available for inspection by the Revenue Commissioners.10

Structure of settlements [6.21]   From the employee’s perspective, it is beneficial to have the maximum amount due in any settlement categorised as compensation for the wrong committed rather than loss of earnings. The problem with this from the employer’s perspective is that if the Revenue audits the document subsequently and disputes the structure of the settlement, the Revenue will likely seek payment from the employer concerned, not the employee. Employers would therefore be well advised to take care when structuring any such settlements and not to bend to employees’ wishes to ‘inflate’ the amount due as compensation. Employers should also be aware when settling so-called ‘nuisance claims’, where it is deemed more expedient to settle than to fight the case. In such instances, employers generally settle for more than the case is worth to finalise matters and to ‘move on’ with business. However, any amount over and above what would be considered reasonable is liable to be taxed as loss of earnings. If this arises and it has not already

10

Section 192A(4)(a)(iii) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.

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Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments  [6.23]   been deducted from the agreed settlement, the Revenue could seek repayment from the employer. If the employee wishes to avail of an exemption from income tax payable on a termination payment as provided for in s 201 and Sch 3 of the TCA 1997, they should be asked to get their own tax advice and to confirm to the employer in writing which exemption that they wish to avail of. A form such as that set out in Appendix 1 hereto is adequate for this purpose.

Importance of apportionment [6.22]  An interesting case arose in Laurence Hanley v Revenue Commissioners.11 This was an appeal against a Revenue decision to tax a payment under a compromise agreement entirely to income tax. The employee alleged that, through a series of events, he had been the subject of victimisation, defamation and injury to his professional reputation by his employer. There was engagement between the parties and ultimately a compromise agreement was reached which provided for a payment to be made in the gross amount of €180,000 on termination of employment. The Revenue Commissioners took the position that the entire amount was subject to income tax under s 123 of the TCA 1997 as a payment received on retirement or removal from an office or employment. The taxpayer, while acknowledging that a portion of the payment would be subject to income tax, appealed the Revenue’s position to tax the entire amount on the basis that he believed a significant portion of the payment was exempt. Ultimately, in this instance there was no apportionment expressed in the contract and the Tax Appeals Commissioner (TAC) found that it was clear from the drafting of the agreement (despite there being no express apportionment) that €125,000 was paid to stop the appellant from taking proceedings against the employer in relation to his defamation allegation; and that as such, this was susceptible to tax. [6.23]  In this case, clause 3.2 of the compromise agreement simply stated: ‘The employer agrees to pay and the Employee agrees to accept the sum of €180,000 gross in full and final settlement of all or any claims or entitlements (including the Employee’s claims that he has been defamed and victimised) that the Employee may have howsoever arising out of or in connection with his employment with the Employer or the termination thereof against the Employer its partners, employees, servants or agents, whether at common law, in equity or under statute….

It is evident there was no apportionment of the sum against the various heads of claim. Counsel for the appellant gave an opinion stating: ‘In relation to how the sum of €180,000 is to be apportioned, it is my opinion now that a sum of €80,000 could fairly be apportioned to the settlement of his claim in respect of defamation and injury to his reputation, and that the balance of €100,000 represented a payment in the

11

Laurence Hanley v Revenue Commissioners 15 TACD 2021, 16 September 2021.

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[6.24]  Termination of Employment nature of a severance payment, or otherwise represented remuneration that would be liable to income tax subject to allowances in the ordinary way’. I should also state that I formed this opinion, and had this apportionment in mind at the time of negotiating the settlement, and discussed this with counsel for [the Firm]. It will be noted that the settlement agreement makes express reference to defamation. [The Appellant] had an accrued cause of action which, if successful, would have entitled him to an award of general damages. A payment made in settlement of that cause of action is wholly distinct from any payment in the nature of a severance payment, and the fact that the compromise agreement of [sic] provided for the payment by [the Firm] of a total amount of €180,000 does not change that. It is what gives rise to the present opinion. It is my opinion that [the Appellant’s] claim for defamation or injury to his reputation had, conservatively, a value of €80,000. This arose in time prior to, and is wholly distinct from any cause of action or payment subsequently arising in connection with the termination of his employment. That sum cannot be characterised as a payment made in “in connection with” the termination of [the Appellant’s] employment for the purposes of Section 123 of the TCA 1997 or otherwise.”

The TAC then went on to address the fact that whilst the appellant had an accrued cause of action to sue the Firm. ‘That right was a chose in action and falls within the definition of asset in accordance with TCA s 532, which defines an asset as ‘All forms of property shall be assets for the purposes of the Capital Gains Tax code whether situate in the State or not’. The TAC therefore determined that the sum of €55,000 related to the appellants contractual and statutory entitlement as a consequence of the appellants resignation with the remaining element of the payment, amounting to €125,000, not assessable to income tax but rather to capital gains tax pursuant to s 535(2)(a)(iii) of the TCA 1997. This case highlights the necessity for employers and practitioners, when structuring settlements, to ensure that they are properly drafted and that each head of claim is properly accounted for and set against the requisite amount in the agreement.

TAX TREATMENT OF LEGAL FEES IN EMPLOYMENT CASES [6.24]   In the Tax and Duty Manual Part 07-01-28,12 the Revenue Commissioners state that payment by an employer of legal fees incurred by an employee and/or director in relation to an investigation or disciplinary procedure instigated by the employer will not be subject to income tax, provided that the following conditions are met: (a) The fees must be what are termed ‘legal fees’ (ie, fees due to a member of the legal profession arising from representing the employee or director). (b) The payment on behalf of the employee or director must represent a full or partial discharge of legal fees incurred by the employee only in connection with: (i) an investigation/disciplinary procedure instigated by the employer; (ii) the termination of the employee’s office or employment (eg, to recover compensation for loss of office or employment); or 12

Tax and Duty Manual Part 07-01-28 of December 2021.

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Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments  [6.26]

(iii) an action taken by the employee or director against the employer for breach of employment law by the employer. Legal or other fees incurred on other matters do not qualify for this treatment. (c) The legal fees must be paid directly by the employer to the employee’s/director’s legal representative, after having had sight of the invoice relating to such fees (ie, on sight of the invoice issued to either the employee/director or the employer by the employee’s/director’s legal representative). (d) The payment of legal fees must be made either: (i) under a court order; or (ii) where a court order does not apply, under a specific term of a settlement agreement between the employer and the employee. Employers must be aware of the above and ensure that when settling a case, the following steps are followed: (a) The settlement agreement should contain a term stating that the legal fees will be paid; (b) The agreement should state that the legal fees will be paid to the requisite legal representative; and (c) The payment should be made only upon receipt of an invoice issued to the employee.

Summary [6.25]   Advice should be sought from the Revenue Commissioners if there is any doubt about the taxation of termination payments. The main point for employers to note is that if an employer fails to deduct tax or deducts too little tax, the Revenue will be likely to hold it liable for the amount of income tax or pay-related social insurance incorrectly withheld from the employee.

APPENDIX I [6.26] Employee’s confirmation regarding exemption Option 1 Basic exemption. Pension retained.

By making this selection: •

I understand that only the basic exemption will be applied to the tax treatment of my ex gratia termination payment.

•

I confirm that the aggregate amount of all tax-free payments made to me in respect of any and all ex gratia payments received by me during my lifetime, including the payments made under this Agreement, does not exceed the lifetime limit of €200,000. (continued)

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[6.26]  Termination of Employment (Continued) Employee’s confirmation regarding exemption Option 2 Increased exemption. Pension retained.

Option 3 Increased exemption. Pension waived.

Option 4 Standard Capital Superannuation Benefit (SCSB). Pension retained.

By making this selection: •

I understand that the basic and increased exemptions will be applied to the tax treatment of my ex gratia termination payment.

•

I further understand that the net present value of any pension lump sum to which I am entitled will be deducted from the increased exemption.

•

I have not in the previous ten years claimed relief in excess of the basic exemption.

•

I confirm that the aggregate amount of all tax-free payments made to me in respect of any and all ex gratia payments received by me during my lifetime, including the payments made under this Agreement, does not exceed the lifetime limit of €200,000

By making this selection: •

I understand that the basic and increased exemptions will be applied to the tax treatment of my ex gratia termination payment.

•

I confirm that by ticking this option, I am irrevocably waiving the option to receive a tax-free lump sum from any occupational pension scheme of which I am a member, now or at any point in the future.

•

I have not in the previous ten years claimed relief in excess of the basic tax-free exemption.

•

I confirm that the aggregate amount of all tax-free payments made to me in respect of any and all ex gratia payments received by me during my lifetime, including the payments made under this Agreement, does not exceed the lifetime limit of €200,000.

By making this selection: •

I understand that the Standard Capital Superannuation Benefit (SCSB) will be applied to the tax treatment of my ex gratia termination payment.

•

I further understand that the net present value of any pension lump sum to which I am entitled will be deducted from the SCSB calculation.

•

I confirm that the aggregate amount of all tax-free payments made to me in respect of any and all ex gratia payments received by me during my lifetime, including the payments made under this Agreement, does not exceed the lifetime limit of €200,000. (continued)

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Taxation of Lump-Sum Payments  [6.26] (Continued) Employee’s confirmation regarding exemption Option 5 SCSB. Pension waived.

By making this selection: •

I understand that the Standard Capital Superannuation Benefit (SCSB) will be applied to the tax treatment of my ex gratia termination payment.

•

I confirm that by ticking this option, I am irrevocably waiving the option to receive a tax-free lump sum from any occupational pension scheme of which I am a member, now or at any point in the future.

•

I confirm that the aggregate amount of all tax-free payments made to me in respect of any and all ex gratia payments received by me during my lifetime, including the payments made under this Agreement, does not exceed the lifetime limit of €200,000.

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Chapter 7

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction

INTRODUCTION [7.01]   Wrongful dismissal is an action at common law for breach of contract. It is an alternative remedy to the statutory remedy of unfair dismissal. Applying the general law of contract, the measure of damages is the sum which the employee would have earned but for the dismissal occurring. This in effect limits such claims to the duration of any notice period in the contract of employment. Accordingly, such claims have never been as popular a remedy for dismissed employees as the statutory route. Another mitigating circumstance is the cost involved in taking a claim before the civil courts. However, for some higher-earning executives with perhaps a longer notice period in their contract, it is sometimes chosen in preference to the unfair dismissal route. The action generally is for damages for wrongful dismissal and, in limited and sometimes confusing circumstances (as is explained below), an injunction preventing the dismissal of the employee or reinstatement of the employee, if the dismissal has already occurred.

WRONGFUL DISMISSAL AND UNFAIR DISMISSAL [7.02]   Where the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) has given a recommendation or the Labour Court has begun a hearing under the unfair dismissal legislation, the employee will not be entitled to recover damages at common law for wrongful dismissal in respect of the same dismissal. Also, where a hearing has begun in a civil court for damages for wrongful dismissal, the employee will not be entitled to redress for unfair dismissal in respect of the same dismissal.1

1

Section 15 of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977, as amended by s 10 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993.

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[7.03]  Termination of Employment

WRONGFUL DISMISSAL AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTS [7.03]   An action for wrongful dismissal can also be processed through the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Acts 1946–2015. Unlike under the Unfair Dismissals Act, an employee need not have one year’s continuous service to qualify under this legislation. Employees have two options: (a) Refer the case to the WRC and then, if necessary, on appeal to the Labour Court. The WRC’s recommendation is not binding; however, if the case appealed to the Labour Court, the Labour Court’s recommendation is binding. (b) Alternatively, refer the case directly to the Labour Court under s 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969, in which case the employee is bound by the decision of the Labour Court, but the employer is not. There are no further appeals from the Labour Court under either section. In the first instance, employers can decline to attend the WRC; if they do, they will be advised by the WRC that they can make a direct referral to the Labour Court under s 20. In a s 20 hearing, there is no provision to decline to attend (although there is no obligation to attend); and as stated, the decision is non-binding on the employer. From a tactical perspective, many employers will choose not to attend the WRC. Hence, this course of action generally leads to a referral under s 20. The issue with a s 20 ­hearing is that if an employer does not attend, the chances of getting a favourable outcome are reduced. On the other hand, if an employer does attend, it is perceived to be giving the hearing some credence. Ultimately, the main issue with an unfavourable recommendation following a s 20 hearing by the Labour Court may be the PR consequences, both internally and externally. Tactically, therefore, some consideration should be given to what to do when faced with such a claim. Similar to the issues highlighted above in respect of dual claims for wrongful dismissal at common law and unfair dismissals, legislative limitations also apply to simultaneous proceedings being taken under the Industrial Relations Acts and the Unfair Dismissals Acts. A claimant cannot refer a dispute in relation to a dismissal to the WRC or to the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Acts if a WRC decision has been issued.2 Furthermore, if an adjudication officer has issued a decision or the Labour Court has begun a hearing on a dismissal under the Industrial Relations Acts, the claimant ‘will not be entitled to redress’ under the Unfair Dismissals Acts in respect of the same dismissal. Bear in mind that this does not mean that the employee cannot bring a claim for unfair dismissal. It merely signifies that if the dismissal were held to be unfair, the

2

Section 8(10)(a) of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977, as amended by s 7 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993.

284

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.05] employee would not be entitled to redress – that is, reinstatement, re-engagement or compensation.3

THE EMPLOYMENT INJUNCTION What is an injunction? [7.04]   An injunction is a remedy given by a court to protect a legal right, as distinct from compensating for a breach of that legal right. The objective of the injunction is to maintain the status quo between the parties from the time of grant of the injunction until final disposal of the action. Thus, an injunction can be prohibitory in nature, to restrain the party affected from carrying out certain actions or mandatory4 in nature, to ensure that the party affected does a particular thing or things. The latter category generally encompasses the employment injunction.5 An injunction is also temporary or interlocutory in nature, in that it continues in force only until a further order is made or until the hearing of the action. The employment injunction is most usually the preserve of senior executives, for whom the prospect of waiting months for a WRC hearing and a possible appeal to the Labour Court is unsatisfactory; interim applications before the High Court are extremely quick. The application is also very important for executives who have less than one year’s service and thus do not have a statutory avenue of appeal under the Unfair Dismissals Act. Interim/interlocutory relief [7.05]   Injunctions can be given on an interim or interlocutory basis, or a perpetual basis. Interim injunctions are granted where the matter is extremely urgent. As they are generally given ex parte – that is, with only one of the parties to the action present – they are usually given only for a short period of time until the matter is returned by the court on an interlocutory basis. An interlocutory injunction is generally sought having given notice to the other party and thus both parties are present in court at the same time. It is also temporary in nature and is given to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the action; it lasts until the court makes some further order and in most cases until the trial of the action.

3 4 5

Section 8(10)(b) of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977, as amended by s 7 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993. There is also what is known as a quia timit injunction, which is generally granted when something is threatened or imminent. The distinction between a prohibitory injunction and a mandatory injunction is not always clear. Prohibiting a party to an action from doing something, often means mandating them to do something else – see Whitwood Chemical Company v Hardiman (1891) 2 Ch 416.

285

[7.06]  Termination of Employment More common is a hybrid approach whereby an interim application is brought seeking short service of an interlocutory application. Statutory versus equitable relief [7.06]   Injunctions in the employment context are equitable in nature. This means that, when granted, an injunction will require the employer to act or refrain from acting. However, there are an increasing number of statutory reliefs which now impinge on the employment relationship. For example, the Data Protection Act 2018 allows the court, on hearing a data protection action, to grant relief by way of an injunction;6 the Protected Disclosures Act allows an employee who claims to have suffered penalisation wholly or mainly for having made a protected disclosure to apply to the Circuit Court for interim relief within 21 days immediately following the date of last instance of the penalisation, unless a longer date is allowed by the Court;7 and the Industrial Relations Act 1990 provides very specific grounds restricting the right to injunctions.8 The question thus arises: to what extent do these statutory provisions impinge on equitable relief, such that where statute provides for such relief, there is also a right to equitable relief; and in granting a statutory injunction, must a judge have regard to equitable principles?

Principles applied by the courts [7.07]  American Cyanamid Company v Ethicon Limited9 introduced a three-stage test for the Court when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction. This test was adopted by the Supreme Court in Ireland in Campus Oil v Minister for Energy.10 The three-stage test is as follows: (a) Ascertain whether there is a serious /fair issue to be tried; (b) Ascertain whether damages would be an adequate remedy; and (c) Ascertain where the balance of convenience lies – is it in granting or refusing the injunction? While it is clear that these principles apply where equitable relief is claimed, given the intervention of statute, the question arises: are the same tests to be applied in the case of statutory injunctions? On balance, it would appear not. Thus, in Philpott v Marymount University Hospital and Hospice Limited,11 O’Donoghue J approached the relevant section of the Protected Disclosures Act without making reference to the Campus Oil

6 7

8 9

10 11

Section 128(4)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018. Section 12(7A) of the Protected Disclosures Acts 2014–2022. Note that the wording here specifically provides for interim relief, which appears to envisage a situation where such applications should be made ex parte, although not all interim applications are made ex parte. Section 19 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990. American Cyanamid Company v Ethicon Limited (1975) 1 AER 504. Campus Oil v the Minister for Energy (1983) 1 IR 88. Dan Philpott v Marymount University Hospital and Hospice Limited [2015] IECC 1, 12 June 2015.

286

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.08] guidelines. At the end of his judgment, he stated: ‘This is an interim application for relief akin to injunctive relief, This Court has only to satisfy itself that the beliefs and disclosures were reasonable.’ This approach is consistent with that of McKechnie J in Meath County Council v Murray,12 in which he stated: ‘It is not difficult to understand why this is so, nor is it difficult to identify the features inherent in equitable injunctive relief which are notably absent on the statutory side. To name but a few: neither interest nor harm is a requirement; the sequential approach governing interlocutory injunctions on the equity side, namely, whether there is a fair question to be tried, whether damages will be an adequate remedy, and where the convenience lies, does not feature; no undertaking as to damages is required; the ultimate relief is always an injunction in permanent form; there is a limitation period expressly provided; and, of course, the section serves a public law function. The court therefore cannot approach an application in the same manner as it would were equitable principles in a private law context at issue. Consequently, at the level of principle, whilst the court has power to make both interim and interlocutory orders, that power is not intended to absorb within the section general equitable principles.’

Fair issue to be tried/strong case [7.08]   The employment injunction is in effect a mandatory injunction and the courts are reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage. As such, the normal test that is usually applied – that is, whether there is a serious/fair issue to be tried – is replaced with a much sterner test: there must be a ‘strong’ case. This was re-emphasised by the Supreme Court in Maha Lingam v Health Service Executive13 and reiterated by Clarke J in Bergin v The Galway Clinic Doughiska Ltd.14 Thus, in Stoskus v Goode Concrete,15 Irvine J held that the plaintiff had an ‘arguable’ and ­‘stateable’ case; but on the facts before her, she held that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a strong case and thus refused the injunction.16 The strong case test was clarified in Earley v Health Service Executive,17 where Kennedy J stated that this does not mean that a plaintiff must prove at the interlocutory stage that they would ultimately prevail at the hearing of the action, as such a test would render it difficult to see ‘how any application for an injunction could be successful at the interlocutory stage’. In Shelbourne Holdings, Torriam Hotel Operating Co. Ltd18 and Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority,19 Kelly J and Hogan J respectively referred to the need for the Court

12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

The County Council of the County of Meath v Michael Murray and Rose Murray [2018] 1 IR 189 at 220. Maha Lingam v Health Service Executive (2006) 17 ELR, 140. Bergin v The Galway Clinic [2007] IEHC 386. Stoskus v Goode Concrete (2007) IEHC 432. See also Coffey v William Connolly & Sons Limited [2007] IEHC 319 and Hartnett v Advance Tyre Company Limited [2013] IEHC 615, which also endorsed the strong test. Earley v Health Service Executive [2015] IEHC 520. Shelbourne Holdings, Torriam Hotel Operating Co. Ltd [2015] 2 IR52. Wallace v Irish Aviation Authority [2012] IEHC 178.

287

[7.09]  Termination of Employment to adopt whatever course would carry the least risk of injustice and to avoid the Campus Oil principles being applied in a ‘purely formalistic fashion’. Damages an adequate remedy [7.09]   There are two matters that a Court must consider in determining whether damages would be adequate: (a) whether a plaintiff who succeeds at trial of the action will be adequately compensated for any loss suffered between the hearing of the interlocutory injunction and the trial of the action if an injunction is not granted at the interlocutor stage; and (b) whether a plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages will adequately compensate the defendant should it succeed at trial, in respect of any loss suffered by it due to the injunction being in place pending trial of the action. In the main, the most that a plaintiff can expect to recover in damages is the amount due by way of unpaid notice. Thus, one should assume that the amount of damages should be easily computable in such cases; and consequent to such an assumption, that an injunction to restrain dismissal should be exceptional or rare, as damages should always be an adequate remedy. This line of reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that an employee will be deprived of their livelihood while waiting for trial of the action. This was the factor that Costello J identified as being peculiar to the employment relationship in Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali SPA.20 In that case, Costello J held that in view of the ‘very special circumstances’ before him, he would require the plaintiff to be paid his salary and bonus under the terms of his contract until trial of the action – hence the ‘Fennelly order’. This case, which has been followed by numerous others,21 demonstrates that the courts will not necessarily be bound by the Campus Oil guidelines when it comes to the adequacy of damages. Notwithstanding the above, and in considering whether damages are an adequate remedy, the courts are also mindful of the damage that can be caused to an executive’s reputation having been dismissed. Thus, into the mix are brought several intangible matters, including reputational damage (see 7.11); age and prospect of finding alternative employment;22 loss of status;23 and the impact on family and domestic life.24 [7.10]   The question of how a defendant might recoup any damages on foot of a plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages is something that the courts have seemingly been willing to gloss over to some extent. Clearly, the ability of a plaintiff who is out of job to pay such money if they are unsuccessful at trial should be a matter of concern to most employers. In many cases, such undertakings are in practice worthless. That said, the

20

Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali SPA (1985) 3 ILTR 73. Giblin v Irish Life and Permanent plc (2010) IEHC 36. Anujoks v National Institute of Bioprocessing research and Training Ltd [2007] 18 ELR 25 and Glynn v HSS trading as Citywest Hotel (26 February 2010), HC, Ryan J. Earley v HSE [2015] IEHC 841. Coffey v William Connelly & Sons Limited [2007] IEHC 319.

21 See 22 23 24

288

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.12] courts have been reluctant to entertain such an approach. In Ryan v ESB International Ltd,25 Laffoy J stated: ‘In practice, however that has not deterred the courts from granting interlocutory relief including an order directing continuance of the payment of salary, to a plaintiff employee who is challenging the lawfulness of his dismissal.’

More recently, the High Court has seemed more willing to compare the fate of both parties. Thus, in refusing interlocutory relief in CMA v K,26 Roberts J determined: ‘I believe damages are an adequate remedy in this case if the plaintiff were to succeed at trial. On the other hand, the absence of any undertaking as to damages from the plaintiff may well mean that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the defendant if an injunction was granted compelling them to continue to pay the plaintiff pending trial and the defendant ultimately succeeded at trial.’27

Where damages are an adequate remedy, an injunction will be refused.28 Damage to reputation [7.11]   In granting an interlocutory injunction in Howard v University College Cork,29 O’Donovan J observed that there was no doubt that were the plaintiff to be removed, ‘the public’s perception would be that her role as head of department had been terminated because of misconduct of the kind that has been alleged against her.’ In contrast, in Foley v Aer Lingus Group,30 Carroll J held that damage to reputation is compensatable by an award of damages. In Earley v HSE,31 Kennedy J noted that the reassignment of a senior employee ‘may carry with it a dramatic loss of status within her profession’. Balance of convenience [7.12]   The balance of convenience is a hard concept to grasp. Most employers generally feel that the balance of convenience will lie with them in not granting the injunction; and the opposite applies for employees. In determining where the balance of convenience lies, the court will consider the facts of the case and the relief sought. Thus, in Giblin v Irish Life and Permanent plc,32 Laffoy J said that the balance of convenience had to be determined ‘having regard to the precise form of relief sought by the plaintiff and will bear on the type of relief the Court is prepared to grant’. Thus, a very wide discretion is given to the court when determining where this lies. This is problematic when one comes to advise either an employer or employee. 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Ryan v ESB International Limited [2013] IEHC 126 at paragraph 38. CMA v K [2023] IEHC 96. CMA v K [2023] IEHC 96 at paragraph 36. AB v CD [2014] EWHC 1 (QB). Howard v University College Cork (2000) ELR 8. Foley v Aer Lingus Group (2001) ELR 193. Earley v HSE [2015] IEHC 841. Giblin v Irish Life and Permanent plc (2010) IEHC 36.

289

[7.13]  Termination of Employment Undertaking as to damages [7.13]   In addition to the above, in nearly all applications for an interlocutory injunction, the applicant will be required to give an undertaking as to damages. This in effect protects the position of the respondent by recognising that it would be unfair for a respondent who successfully defends an action at trial to suffer financial loss caused by enforcement of the action. In practice, however, there are very few plaintiffs who, if called upon, could in fact honour their undertaking, as in the main they would be unable to repay the salary received between the interlocutory injunction and the date of trial of the action. This in itself was found not to be a ‘determinative’ factor in the application by Finnegan P in Riordan v Minister for the Environment.33 Practically, when applying for an injunction, the party giving the undertaking as to damages should provide some basic information to the court to demonstrate that they are sufficiently resourced to meet any order for damages. In the employment context, this is most often neither sought by the court nor given. Non-application of Campus Oil [7.14]   The three-stage test set out in Campus Oil is not ‘fixed in stone’. In Cayne v Global Natural Resources Plc,34 May LJ stated that ‘a court must be very careful to apply the relevant passages from Lord Diplock’s familiar speech in the Cyanamid case (on which Campus Oil relies) not as rules but only as guidelines’. This line of reasoning has been followed in this jurisdiction in Reynolds v Malocco,35 where Kelly J stated that the Campus Oil principles had ‘a wide but not universal application’. In particular, he went on to refer to employment cases. The Supreme Court has moved away from the two distinct tests of adequacy of damages and balance of convenience. Thus, in Merck Sharp & Dohme v Clonmel Healthcare Limited,36 the Court expressed the view that in considering the adequacy of damages and the balance of convenience, ‘the preferable approach is to consider adequacy of damages as part of the balance of convenience, or the balance of justice as it is sometimes called’.37 Here O’Donnell J went on to outline the steps which might be followed. ‘(1) ‘First, the court should consider whether, if the plaintiff succeeded at the trial, a permanent injunction might be granted. If not, then it is extremely unlikely that an interlocutory injunction seeking the same relief pending the trial could be granted; (2) The court should then consider if it has been established that there is a fair question to be tried, which may also involve a consideration of whether the case will probably go

33 34 35 36 37

Riordan v Minister for the Environment (2004) IEHC 89. Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc (1984) 1 All ER 225, 237. Reynolds v Malocco (1999) 2 IR 203. Merck Sharp & Dohme v Clonmel Healthcare Limited IESC 65. Merck Sharp & Dohme v Clonmel Healthcare Limited IESC 65 at paragraph 35.

290

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.14]

(3) (4) (5) (6)

(7)

(8)

to trial. In many cases, the straightforward application of the American Cyanamid and Campus Oil approach will yield the correct outcome. However, the qualification of that approach should be kept in mind. Even then, if the claim is of a nature that could be tried, the court, in considering the balance of convenience or balance of justice, should do so with an awareness that cases may not go to trial, and that the presence or absence of an injunction may be a significant tactical benefit; If there is a fair issue to be tried (and it probably will be tried), the court should consider how best the matter should be arranged pending the trial, which involves a consideration of the balance of convenience and the balance of justice; The most important element in that balance is, in most cases, the question of adequacy of damages; In commercial cases where breach of contract is claimed, courts should be robustly sceptical of a claim that damages are not an adequate remedy; Nevertheless, difficulty in assessing damages may be a factor which can be taken account of and lead to the grant of an interlocutory injunction, particularly where the difficulty in calculation and assessment makes it more likely that any damages awarded will not be a precise and perfect remedy. In such cases, it may be just and convenient to grant an interlocutory injunction, even though damages are an available remedy at trial. While the adequacy of damages is the most important component of any assessment of the balance of convenience or balance of justice, a number of other factors may come into play and may properly be considered and weighed in the balance in considering how matters are to be held most fairly pending a trial, and recognising the possibility that there may be no trial; While a structured approach facilitates analysis and, if necessary, review, any application should be approached with a recognition of the essential flexibility of the remedy and the fundamental objective in seeking to minimise injustice, in circumstances where the legal rights of the parties have yet to be determined.’

Thus, the three-stage test in Campus Oil has been greatly expanded upon in this jurisdiction. O’Donnell J made it clear in Merck Sharpe & Dohme that the primary focus in deciding whether or not to grant an injunction has to be to minimise the risk of injustice. In AIB v Diamond,38 Clarke J considered the necessity to minimise the risk of injustice and said: ‘Finally, the balance of convenience is, perhaps, the factor that is most closely and directly associated with the risk of injustice.’39 O ‘Donnell J also emphasised that the consideration of whether or not to grant an injunction should be approached not as a checklist, but as the flexible remedy which an injunction is intended to be. The balance of justice has thus come to the fore in the decision on whether to grant an injunction. Thus, in Buttimer v Oak Fuel Supermarket Limited Trading as CostCutter Rathcormac,40 Dignam J stated: ‘However, I am of the view that the balance of justice does require some relief in order to avoid irredeemable harm to the plaintiff in the event that she is ultimately successful at trial.’41 Dignam J ruled that the respondent could not

38 39 40 41

AIB v Diamond [2011] IEHC 505 at paragraphs 5.1–5.9. AIB v Diamond [2011] IEHC 505 at paragraph 5.7. Buttimer v Oak Fuel Supermarket Ltd Trading as CostCutter Rathcormac [2023] IEHC 126. Buttimer v Oak Fuel Supermarket Ltd Trading as CostCutter Rathcormac [2023] IEHC 126 at paragraph 113.

291

[7.15]  Termination of Employment replace the plaintiff until the trial of the action, but that the plaintiff would not receive her salary in the intervening period.

INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS IN EMPLOYMENT CASES – THEIR DEVELOPMENT [7.15]   The traditional view was that injunctions would not be granted to restrain breaches of contracts of employment. This is because the courts took the view that the employment relationship consisted of a contract of personal service and judges were reluctant to interfere. However, in more recent years, the courts have demonstrated a willingness to entertain such claims and have granted injunctions in cases where they considered ‘special circumstances’ to exist.42 The problem is that the courts have been inconsistent in defining what constitutes ‘special circumstances’. Indeed, in this regard, there is significant variance in the decisions that have emanated from the courts – to such an extent that Charleton J, in completing a paper in an extra-judicial capacity, observed that the case law cited to him in relation to applications for interlocutory employment injunctions seemed ‘to be lacking in clarity’. This uncertainty makes it difficult to advise as to whether an employment injunction will be granted in any given case.43 What is clear, however, is that the courts are reluctant to compel an employer and employee to work together in circumstances where one or other no longer wishes to maintain the working relationship. The issue of trust and confidence between the parties is therefore crucial to whether the court will grant an injunction. In Hill v Parsons and Co Ltd,44 the UK Court of Appeal stated that as personal confidence between the parties continued to exist, one of the main grounds for refusing an injunction – that it is wrong to enforce a contract based on a confidential relationship in the absence of personal confidence – was not applicable. This line of thought was followed in Ireland in Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali Spa and General Underwriting Agencies Ireland Ltd,45 in which the defendant purported to dismiss the plaintiff by reason of redundancy on the grounds of a major downturn in business. The plaintiff claimed that he had been employed on a fixed-term contract for a period of 12 years. Costello J stated that ‘in view of the very special circumstances’ pertaining, he would order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s salary and bonus until trial of the action. The plaintiff had argued successfully that he would be left without a salary to live on, and that his circumstances would be nothing short of desperate. Costello J held that the balance of convenience was in Mr Fennelly’s favour. This case stood as the only example in this jurisdiction of the exception to the rule against specific performance

42 43 44 45

Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali Spa (1985) 3 ILT 73 and Shortt v Data Packaging Limited (1994) ELR 251. This is a view shared by Cox, Corbett and Ryan, Employment Law in Ireland (Clarus Press, 2009) 836. Hill v Parsons and Co Ltd (1972) Ch 305. Hill v Parsons and Co Ltd (1985) 3 ILTR 73.

292

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.16] of contracts of employment until Shortt v Data Packaging Ltd.46 Mr Shortt was the managing director of Data Packaging and was informed by telephone that due to a company restructuring, he was to be made redundant. Later that same day, he received a letter confirming that his employment was being terminated and that he was to vacate his office that evening. Mr Shortt claimed, inter alia, that the directors did not have the power to dismiss him, and that his purported dismissal was a breach of fair procedures. Keane J was satisfied that damages would not be an adequate remedy and held that the balance of convenience was in favour of granting the injunction. This was despite Mr Shortt citing ‘differences’ between himself and his employers. However, in John Keenan v Iarnrod Éireann,47 McMenamin J refused an application by Iarnrod Éireann’s director of human resources, John Keenan, for an interlocutory injunction to allow him to perform his duties – that is, to lift his suspension with pay and to prevent steps being taken to remove him. According to McMenamin J, the level of controversy in the case, in which Mr Keenan had challenged the integrity of the company’s chief executive and chairman, and alleged a cover-up of substantial fraud, meant that there could not exist a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. However, the reality is that employment injunctions have traditionally been perceived as an important bargaining tool. An employee who successfully obtains such an order can approach negotiations in respect of the termination of their employment from a position of considerable strength. This practical aspect is well recognised by the courts. Thus, Clarke J stated in Bergin v The Galway Clinic48 that: ‘[I]t would be somewhat naïve not to surmise that a significant feature of the interlocutory hearing is concerned with both parties attempting to establish the most advantageous position from which to approach the frequently expected negotiations designed to lead to an agreed termination of the Contract of Employment concerned. The employee who has the benefit of an interlocutory injunction can approach such negotiations from a position of strength as can the employer who has successfully resisted an interlocutory application.’

[7.16]   There are a number of common themes running through the High Court and Supreme Court judgments relating to employment injunctions. One is that much judicial effort has been spent in analysing the specific legal parentage from which these equitable reliefs can be drawn. In the evolution of this area of law over the years, it is considered that the standard of proof required for a mandatory injunction is higher than that required for a prohibitory injunction. A second theme is that very few cases in which applications are made for an interlocutory injunction actually proceed to full hearing.49 For practical reasons, the vast majority of cases are compromised between the parties prior to trial. An unhelpful by-product

46 47 48 49

Shortt v Data Packaging Ltd (1994) ELR 251. John Keenan v Iarnrod Éireann (22 January 2010) HC. Bergin v The Galway Clinic [2007] IEHC 386. Again see the comments of Clarke J in Bergin v The Galway Clinic [2007] IEHC 386.

293

[7.17]  Termination of Employment of this is that while there have been many applications for employment injunctions, there have been relatively few detailed judicial considerations in the area and therefore practitioners are left with an incomplete roadmap with which to guide their clients. For all practical purposes, what is being litigated in the employment injunction is a wrongful dismissal. However, many injunctions are sought for steps short of dismissal, as courts can be persuaded that such steps represent the start of a process which, if allowed to continue, would inevitably lead to dismissal.

When are employment injunctions sought?50 [7.17]   Employment injunctions most often arise for three main purposes: (a) to restrain dismissal; (b) to intervene in the process preceding a dismissal disciplinary process; or (c) to enforce post-termination restrictive covenants. Injunction to restrain dismissal [7.18]   Traditionally, judges took the view that in normal circumstances, damages were not only an adequate remedy, but also the appropriate remedy in an employment dispute. In those circumstances, where a breach of contract arose as a result of a dismissal, the sole remedy was for a payment equivalent to the appropriate amount of notice due to the employee. This common law position exists quite apart from any statutory remedies that an aggrieved employee might have under the unfair dismissal or minimum notice legislation. However, it is now more common for employees to have the benefit of well-drafted contracts of employment which often specify the basis upon which their employment can be terminated – for example, incapacity, stated misbehaviour, redundancy etc. In those circumstances, employers may be required to comply with the rules of natural justice and fair procedures. Thus, the contract of employment is the starting point to which judges will turn in determining the appropriate relief to be granted. Of course, contracts vary greatly, from those written with great care and detail to standard offthe-shelf contracts which often are at variance with other terms contained in company handbooks. The Supreme Court considered this issue in Sheehy v Ryan and Moriarty.51 Ms Sheehy was employed as a diocesan secretary for three successive bishops of Kildare and Leighlin. She did not have the benefit of a written contract of employment. In the High Court, Ms Sheehy argued that her employment was permanent and pensionable, and essentially that it could not be terminated until she reached retirement age. 50 51

This section in the main is a reprint of a joint paper given by the author and Mr Killian O’Reilly (solicitor in O’Rourke Reid Solicitors) at the Legal Island annual review of employment law in late 2008. Sheehy v Ryan and Moriarty [2008] IESC 14.

294

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.19] Carroll J held that Ms Sheehy’s contract of employment (ie, the mixture of express oral terms and implied terms which constituted her contract) was capable of being determined on reasonable notice. Importantly, the Supreme Court upheld that view. Geoghogan J slightly qualified that by saying that: ‘it does depend on the contract but in the absence of clear terms to the contrary which are unambiguous and unequivocal, that is clearly the position.’ Interestingly, Sheehy is one of the few cases which went to full trial and it is noteworthy that the plaintiff lost entirely. Is seems likely that in the absence of a written contractual term specifying the basis upon which an employee may be dismissed, under common law an employer remains free to terminate on reasonable notice. However, in cases where the applicant can demonstrate that the purported dismissal is in breach of fair procedures or natural and constitutional justice, the dismissal may be both unlawful and ineffective. This was the position taken by Budd J in Cassidy v Shannon Castle Banquets.52 In Coffey v William Connolly and Sons Limited,53 Edwards J concluded that the plaintiff was effectively looking for a mandatory interlocutory injunction on the basis that the plaintiff was arguing not so much that she had been wrongfully dismissed but rather that she had not been dismissed at all. He felt that it was indisputable that the plaintiff had raised a fair issue to be tried; but found that while she had a stateable case, she had not gone far enough to show that she had a strong case such that she was likely to succeed in her action Accordingly, while Edwards J did not grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant employer from treating Ms Coffey as ‘otherwise than continuing to be employed …’, he did grant interlocutory injunctions restraining publication or announcement giving effect to the purported dismissal and restraining the appointment of any other person to the position held by Ms Coffey. This position was reiterated by Clarke J in Bergin v Galway Clinic Doughiska;54 by Hedigan J in Turner v O’Reilly;55 and by McMenamin J in John Keenan v Iarnrod Éireann.56 In Keenan, while McMenamin J went on to say that Mr Keenan had ‘crossed the threshold of a strong case’, the facts were not like those in Maha Lingham, as the allegations made by the plaintiff ‘were more radical’. Thus, even if one can prove a ‘strong case’, it does not necessarily mean that an injunction will be granted, as every case turns on its own facts. Injuncting the process preceding dismissal [7.19]  Following Sheehy v Ryan, in the absence of a helpful contractual provision, obtaining employment injunctions can be difficult unless the applicant is in a position

52 53 54 55 56

Cassidy v Shannon Castle Banquets [2000] ELR 248. Coffey v William Connolly and Sons Limited [2007] IEHC 319. Bergin v Galway Clinic Doughiska [2007] IEHC 386, Clarke J. Turner v O’Reilly [2006] IEHC 92, Hedigan J. John Keenan v Iarnrod Éireann (22 January 2010), HC, McMenamin J.

295

[7.20]  Termination of Employment to allege some form of inappropriate behaviour and/or breach of fair procedures and natural justice against the employer. This has led to an increase in applications for the courts to become involved at an earlier stage before the dismissal. Injuncting suspensions [7.20]   Until relatively recently, it was the case that employers could suspend employees with pay pending investigation if the right to suspend was included in the contract of employment. More recently, this approach has been replaced by one that requires employers to carefully consider the punitive effects of suspension on the employee. One of the first cases that dealt with this was Rajpal v Robinson and Others.57 Here the North Eastern Health Board, in reliance on s 22(1) of the Health Act 1970, had suspended the applicant without pay. In holding the suspension to be invalid, Hardiman J referred to the ‘drastic consequence of suspension without pay for the applicant’.58 This line of reasoning was also followed in O’Donoghue v South Eastern Health Board,59 in which Macken J stated obiter that suspension with pay is no ‘less serious, onerous or damaging than suspension without pay’. In Bank of Ireland v Reilly,60 the High Court ordered the Bank of Ireland to reinstate a former employee who had been dismissed in 2009 for breach of the company’s email policy on the basis that the decision to dismiss him was disproportionate and unreasonable. In its decision, the High Court was particularly critical of the manner in which the employee had been suspended. In particular, the High Court noted the following: (a) (b) (c) (d)

only three out of five staff under investigation were suspended; it was unclear who had made the decision to suspend; the decision to suspend seemed to be based on second or third-hand information; the branch manager who had suspended the employee did not know the details of the allegations; and (e) there was no evidence that suspension was necessary. The High Court held that the employee was entitled to an explanation of the reason for the suspension. It further held that the suspension had not been imposed to facilitate an investigation, but rather was an expression by the bank of the seriousness of the matter and its resolve to punish those involved. The Court held that this indicated pre-determination. In Philip Smith v RSA Insurance Ireland Limited,61 the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) awarded Mr Smith – the former chief executive of RSA Insurance – compensation of €1.25 million after he brought a case for constructive dismissal. He had been suspended for what RSA described as issues in its claims and finance functions which 57 58 59 60 61

Rajpal v Robinson, The North Eastern Health Board and The Minister for Health and Children [2005] 3 IR 385. Rajpal v Robinson, The North Eastern Health Board and The Minister for Health and Children [2005] 3 IR 385 at 396. O’Donoghue v South Eastern Health Board [2005] 4 IR 217 at 241. Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241. Philip Smith v RSA Insurance Ireland Limited UP1673/2013; [2015] 5 JIEC 1101.

296

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.21] forced the company to inject €262 million of emergency capital into its Irish subsidiary. Following his suspension, Mr Smith resigned, claiming that he had been made the ‘fall guy’ by RSA for the issues. Among other things, the EAT criticised the manner in which Mr Smith had been suspended, in that the suspension had been reported on RTÉ with very little notice to Mr Smith. The EAT held that: ‘suspending the claimant on national television was the equivalent of taking a sledge hammer to his reputation, to his prospects of ever securing employment in this industry again in Ireland, in Europe and very possibly beyond and it sealed his fate with the respondent forever.’

It further held that the public suspension was in fact ‘a dismissal, disguised as a suspension’, and was ‘never acceptable’ (see also 4.14). Considering all of the above, any suspension – even with pay – must be given careful consideration before being effected and should be implemented only in the gravest of circumstances. Thus, even though a consultant doctor had engaged in unauthorised experiments on patients, the Court held in O’Sullivan v HSE62 that suspension was not appropriate, on foot of an expert inquiry which had held similarly. Injuncting the investigation process [7.21]   At the outset, we must make a distinction between investigations which are focused on gathering facts and investigations which may make substantive findings. In simple terms, any investigation which is designed to gather evidence will not be required to adhere to the rules of natural justice, and it will be extremely difficult for an applicant to successfully obtain an injunction at that stage. In broad terms, the court will not intervene unless there is a fundamental flaw in the process which cannot be cured. Thus, in granting an injunction in O’Sullivan v Mercy Hospital Cork Limited,63 Clarke J held that the initial investigative report made such unequivocal findings of fact against the plaintiff that any further inquiry which the hospital proposed would be similarly tainted. It is generally accepted, however, that employees are not entitled to fair procedures at the initial investigation stage, provided that this: (a) is a fact gathering exercise only; and (b) does not result in allegations being upheld or dismissed. However, in Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and Training Board,64 the High Court held that where a complaint is made which could lead to an employee’s dismissal, the employee is entitled to fair procedures at the investigation stage, including the right to legal representation and the right to cross-examine witnesses. That said, Lyons should be read on its own facts. Here the investigator went further than gathering facts and concluded that the employee had actually engaged in bullying. More recent

62 63 64

O’Sullivan v HSE [2022] IECA 74. O’Sullivan v Mercy Hospital Cork Limited (3 June 2005), HC. Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272.

297

[7.22]  Termination of Employment decisions support the position that the right to fair procedures does not apply in full at the investigation stage, if that investigation is limited to a fact-gathering exercise and does not extend to complaints being upheld or rejected. In EG v the Society of Actuaries Ireland,65 the High Court held that where the investigation could result in disciplinary action, the person who is the subject of the investigation should be afforded the full benefit of fair procedures. However, where the investigation is just a fact-finding exercise and the investigator cannot make findings or misconduct or impose sanctions, less formal procedures may be adequate and appropriate. In NM v Limerick and Clare Education and Training Board,66 the Court again distinguished between fact-finding investigations and investigations which go further to make final determinations in respect of allegations. Here the Court noted that the principles of fair procedures apply in the final determination of complaints, and held as a consequence that the applicant was not entitled to cross-examine witnesses at the investigation stage where that consisted only of an information-gathering exercise. Injuncting the disciplinary process [7.22]   The next stage after investigating a complaint of misconduct is to refer it to a disciplinary hearing. As in the case of suspensions, the courts are concerned about the effect of a charge of misconduct on the person’s reputation.67 The timing of when to apply to injunct the disciplinary process needs careful consideration and the courts are often reluctant to intervene. In Turner v O’ Reilly,68 the plaintiff was a legal executive who had worked for a firm of solicitors in County Westmeath for over 11 years. She did not have the benefit of a formal written contract of employment and there was no formal disciplinary procedure in the firm. In February 2008, a dispute arose between her and her employer. Her employer handed her a letter which purported to dismiss her there and then, and which required her resignation by the following Friday. She was directed to leave the office immediately. Importantly, no disciplinary action had been taken against the plaintiff at that stage. Some days later, the employee received a letter from another solicitor in the firm informing her that he had been delegated to conduct an inquiry into certain ­allegations of gross misconduct alleged against her and setting out those allegations in detail. Ms Turner was put on paid suspension and was invited to a disciplinary meeting. She was afforded the opportunity to have representation if she wished. A further letter was sent to her the following day setting out yet more allegations.

65

EG v the Society of Actuaries Ireland [2017] IEHC 392. NM v Limerick and Clare Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 588. 67 See Carroll v Bus Atha Cliath/Dublin Bus [2005] 4 IR 184. 68 Turner v O’Reilly [2006] IEHC 92. 66

298

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.23] Hedigan J found that Ms Turner’s application for an injunction was premature. He declined to injunct the disciplinary procedure even though the initial attempt to dismiss the plaintiff had been ‘entirely improper and made with no regard to fair procedures’. In Morgan v The Provost and Fellows of Trinity College Dublin,69 Kearns J in the High Court refused to restrain the application of the university disciplinary procedure. Here the plaintiff’s complaints were deemed to be premature, as all matters could have been dealt with fairly before a disciplinary panel, which the plaintiff sought to block. Similarly, in McEvoy v Bank of Ireland,70 Laffoy J noted that the plaintiff’s application was premature, as she had two further appeals available to her under the bank’s disciplinary procedure. In Carroll v Bus Atha Cliath/Dublin Bus,71 Clarke J, in refusing to intervene in the disciplinary process, also noted that the courts should be reluctant to intervene in an incomplete disciplinary process, as that recourse ‘might well be had to the courts at many stages in the course of what would otherwise be relatively straightforward and expeditious set of disciplinary proceedings’.72 While the courts are reluctant to intervene in the disciplinary process, they will nonetheless intervene if the process itself or the procedures to be followed were manifestly unfair.73 Post-termination restrictive covenants [7.23]   Restrictive covenants take a number of forms, but they commonly seek to restrict various activities after termination of the employment relationship. Typically, such restrictions include whom the employee can work for post termination; the extent of the duties they can undertake; and the type of clients/customers they can contact. There is no common law basis for such restrictions and the courts have been reluctant to support them. Indeed, judges view them as a restraint on an individual’s ability to earn a living and as anti-competitive. If such clauses are to be enforced through the courts, restrictive covenants must be limited in subject matter, duration and geography. Furthermore, the employer must be able to point to some legitimate proprietary interest in the restriction and to some genuine commercial threat that the employee poses to the employer’s enterprise. If the restrictive trade clauses in a particular employee’s contract are sufficiently well drafted and balanced, it is open to the former employer to seek injunctive relief to enforce those clauses on termination of employment. Furthermore, a former employer may attempt to secure an injunction to prevent the release or publication of confidential information or trade secrets.

69 70 71 72 73

Morgan v The Provost and Fellows of Trinity College Dublin [2003] 3 IR 158. McEvoy v Bank of Ireland [2006] IEHC3. Carroll V Bus Atha Cliath/Dublin Bus [2005] 4 IR 184. Carroll v Bus Atha Cliath/Dublin Bus [2005] 4 IR 184 at 189. Again see Carroll v Bus Atha Cliath/Dublin Bus [2005] 4 IR 184.

299

[7.24]  Termination of Employment In Pulse Group v O’ Reilly,74 Clarke J held that while there were fair issues to be tried on the particular issues raised, damages would be an adequate remedy for any wrong that might be established. He went on to summarise the law in this area, including the relevant UK case of Faccenda Chickens Limited v Fowler.75 He held that: ‘in the absence of an express term in a Contract of Employment, the only enduring obligation on the part of an employee after his employment has ceased is one which precludes the employee from disclosing a trade secret.’ However, in Octavio Hernandez v Vodafone Ireland Limited,76 Laffoy J found that the plaintiff had made out a strong case that damages would not be an adequate remedy in circumstances where, if the restriction in his contract preventing him from taking up employment for three months were enforced, he would be without an income for that period. In Murgitroyd & Company v Purdy77 Clarke CJ held that a restrictive term will not be implemented unless it satisfies both limbs of the following test: (a) The restriction is reasonable between the parties; and (b) The restriction is consistent with the interests of public policy. The facts of Murgitroyd are that the defendant was employed as a patent lawyer under a contract of employment which contained a restriction preventing him from working within the Republic of Ireland for a period of 12 months in competition with the plaintiff. Clarke J concluded on the facts that a geographical restriction based upon the jurisdiction of the Irish State was not unreasonable, having regard to the way in which the business operated in Ireland; and he was also satisfied that the period of 12 months was not unreasonable. However, he found that the result of allowing these restrictions would be the creation of another – a restriction on approaching clients who were not pre-existing clients of the employer from being engaged by the ex-employee – and that this was too restrictive.78 [7.24]  In Ryanair v Bellew,79 the High Court had difficulty in determining whether the restraint that Ryanair sought went further than was necessary for the legitimate protection of its interests. Mr Bellew was the former chief operations officer of the company and had signed a contract which sought to prevent him from working for a competitor in any capacity for a period of 12 months post termination of his employment. Mr Bellew left and took up employment with easyJet. The relevant clause in his contract provided as follows:

74 75 76 77 78 79

Pulse Group v O’ Reilly [2006] IEHC 50. Faccenda Chickens Limited v Fowler [1987] ICH 117. Octavio Hernandez v Vodafone Ireland Limited [2013] IEHC 70. Murgitrody & Company v Purdy [2005] IEHC 159. See also Net Affinity v Conaghan [2012] 3 IR 67. Ryanair DAC v Peter Bellew [2019] IEHC 907.

300

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.24] ‘1. POST TERMINATION RESTRICTIONS 1.1 For a period of 12 months after the termination of your employment you shall not, without the prior written consent of the Company, directly or indirectly in any capacity either on your own behalf or in conjunction with or on behalf of any other Person; a. b.

be employed, engaged, concerned or interested in any capacity in any business wholly or partly in competition with the Company for air passenger services in any market; solicit or entice or endeavour to solicit or entice away from the Company any person who was employed within in [sic] a senior executive, managerial, or technical capacity by the Company.

1.2 If you receive an offer of employment or engagement during your employment with the Company, or before the expiry of the restriction period set out in this clause, you shall give the person or entity making the offer a copy of this clause. 1.3 You hereby acknowledge and agree that the provisions of this clause are separate and severable and that the restrictions therein contained are fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. In the event, however, that any of the restrictions contained in this clause are adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to go beyond what is reasonable, in all the circumstances, for the protection of the legitimate interests of the Company and/ or any associated company but would be adjudged reasonable if any particular restriction or restrictions, or part thereof, were deleted in any manner, then the restrictions in question shall apply with such deletions as may be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction without affecting the remaining provisions thereof. 1.4 No variation of this agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by both you and the Chief Executive Officer. 1.5 This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of Ireland and the courts of Ireland shall have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all disputes arising from or touching upon this Agreement. 1.6 This Agreement contains the whole agreement between the parties hereto relating to the matters provided for in this Agreement and supersedes all previous agreements (if any) between such parties in respect of such matters and each of the parties to this Agreement acknowledges that in agreeing to enter into this Agreement it has not relied on any representations or warranties except for those contained in this agreement. I, Peter Bellew, confirm my understanding and acceptance of the above conditions in full. I acknowledge that my contract of employment is now amended to include the above terms and that all other terms and conditions of my employment remain unchanged.’

In finding that the clause preventing Mr Bellew from working for a period of 12 months was too broad, Allen J held: ‘The other provision of the restraint in this case which troubled me was the prohibition on employment in any business in competition with Ryanair “in any capacity”. It appeared to me that literally construed it would restrain Mr. Bellew from taking up employment with another airline as a pilot or air steward.’80

80

Ryanair v Bellew [2019] IEHC 907 at 195.

301

[7.25]  Termination of Employment He continued: ‘I find that the covenant in this case, properly construed, would prevent the defendant from taking up employment with any European airline, including the legacy carriers, and so goes beyond what the plaintiff has shown to be justified.’81

The key point to note from all of the above is that the courts in general are very reluctant to enforce post-termination restrictions and any such restrictive covenants must be drafted to reflect the specific relationship between the parties to the contract.

When will an injunction be granted? [7.25]   As can be seen, Shortt82 demonstrates the willingness of the courts to consider an employment injunction where there are ‘exceptional or special circumstances’ at play. However, it may be argued that the courts have been inconsistent in defining what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’. Such exceptional factors may arise in a variety of situations and as such the courts may potentially grant injunctions in a variety of situations. Roddy Horan SC, in Issue 1 of the 2005 Employment Law Review, neatly categorised these situations into five distinct areas. Where the termination is in breach of contract [7.26]   These situations generally occur where the employee is dismissed in the absence of contractual notice or a contractual disciplinary process. The main case of note here is Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali Spa,83 in which Mr Fennelly argued that he had a 12-year fixed-term contract. In this instance, the court granted the injunction on the basis that there was a fair issue to be tried, and that mutual trust and confidence still existed between employer and employee. More recently, an interim order restraining St Patrick’s Athletic Football Club from dismissing its chief executive was granted by the High Court.84 The chief executive, Bernard O’Byrne – a former chief executive of the Football Association of Ireland – claimed that he had a two-year contract which could be terminated only for gross misconduct or by mutual consent. What is important here is the bond of mutual trust and confidence; where there is a breakdown of same, it seems unlikely that an injunction will be granted on these grounds.

81 82 83 84

Ryanair v Bellew [2019] IEHC 907 at 209. Shortt v Data Packaging Limited (1994) ELR 251. Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali Spa (1985) 3 ILT 73. O’Byrne v Newtonheath Ltd trading as St Patrick’s Athletic Football Club (December 2005), HC.

302

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.29] Where the dismissal is ultra vires [7.27]   This refers to a situation where the employer is for some reason not empowered to terminate the employee’s contract. Thus, in Dudley O’Donnell v Chief State Solicitor,85 there was an issue as to whether the Chief State Solicitor was empowered to terminate the plaintiff’s employment since this power was, prima facie, reserved by statute to the Attorney General and the Minister for Justice. An interlocutory injunction was granted maintaining the plaintiff in his employment as a temporary solicitor pending trial. Also, in Shortt86 – one of the first cases in the State in which an employment law injunction was granted – the injunction was granted on the basis that there was a fair issue to be tried as to whether the purported dismissal of the plaintiff (who was managing director) was in accordance with the company’s articles of association. Where the termination is in breach of fair procedures [7.28]   The Constitution guarantees to the citizen basic fairness of procedures.87 As such, prior to the dismissal of an employee, the employee must be given a fair hearing, be allowed the right of representation, be presented with the evidence before them and be allowed to respond to same. However, an injunction for breach of fair procedures will be granted only where the employer is alleging misconduct on behalf of the employee, as at common law an employer can terminate employment for any reason provided that adequate notice is given.88 Where the employee is dismissed for other reasons such as redundancy89 (where the conduct of the employee is not in dispute), it is unlikely that an injunction will be granted on this ground only. Equally, even where there is a recognised breach of fair procedures, this does not prevent an employer from ‘mending their hand’ – that is, acknowledging the breach and undertaking to mend the breach. Thus, in Turner v O’Reilly,90 even though there was a clear breach of procedures, the employer was allowed to rectify matters. Where the employee is asserting that there is an absence of grounds justifying dismissal [7.29]   This generally arises where there is an allegation by the employee that the employer has embarked on the dismissal in bad faith and/or that the dismissal is contrived. Most often, this allegation arises where the employer is trying to dismiss the employee by reason of redundancy and the employee is rejecting this as a ‘coverup’. Redundancy is a purely statutory concept and does not discharge a contract of

85

Dudley O’Donnell v Chief State Solicitor (2003) ELR 268. Shortt v Data Packaging Limited (1994) ELR 251. Re Haughey (1971) IR 217, 264. 88 See Phelan v BIC (Ireland) Limited (1997) ELR 208; Hickey v Eastern Health Board (1991) 1 IR 208; and Orr v Zomax (25 March 2004), HC, Carroll J. 89 Hickey v Eastern Health Board (1991) 1 IR 208. 90 Turner v O’Reilly [2006] IEHC 92, Hedigan J. 86 87

303

[7.30]  Termination of Employment employment at common law. However, given that it is a full defence to a claim for unfair dismissal, and as the issue of misconduct does not arise (which negates the need for fair procedures), it is unsurprising that the court finds itself dealing with a significant number of cases in which employees argue that the redundancy was a smokescreen for an otherwise unfair dismissal. The problem is that there are various conflicting judgments in this jurisdiction in which redundancy has been relied upon by employers to justify dismissal. In Orr v Zomax91 Carroll J, in approving Johnson v Unisys Limited,92 stated that ‘the defendant gave notice in accordance with the plaintiff’s contract plus an additional month’; and ‘as there was no allegation that notice was not adequate’ and ‘as the issue of misconduct did not arise’, the injunctions requested had to be denied. Carroll J had also previously stated this view in Sheehy v Ryan.93 However, where the defendant dismisses for a reason other than misconduct and the plaintiff alleges misconduct, the court may find that there is an arguable case for dismissal for misconduct in breach of natural justice and grant an injunction on that basis. Such a situation arose in Moore v Xnet Informations Systems Ltd.94 Also, there is a UK case in which the court granted an interlocutory injunction in a straight redundancy situation – Anderson v Pringle Scotland Ltd.95 Where the dismissal is in breach of a constitutional right [7.30]  In Meskell v Coras Iompair Éireann96 the plaintiff was granted a declaration that his dismissal was a denial and violation of, and an unlawful interference with, his constitutional rights where the defendants were held to have attempted to coerce him into abandoning his constitutional right of disassociation from a trade union.

When will an injunction not be granted? [7.31]   There is a general reluctance on behalf of the courts to grant injunctions in redundancy-based dismissals. In O’Mahony v Examiner Publications (Cork) Limited, Thomas Crosbie Holdings Limited and Thomas Crosbie Printers Limited,97 Laffoy J emphasised this point. In this case the plaintiff had alleged (as is normal in such cases) that the company was attempting to effect a dismissal dressed up as a redundancy. In refusing the order, Laffoy J found that O’Mahony should have sought redress from the EAT pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977–2007. This in effect restated the position that Laffoy J had taken in her judgment in Nolan v Emo Oil Services.98

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Orr v Zomax [2004] IEHC 47, Carroll J. Johnson v Unisys Limited (2001) 2 All ER 801. Sheehy v Ryan [2005] IEHC 419. Moore v Xnet Informations Systems Ltd (2001) ELR 193. Anderson v Pringle Scotland Ltd (1998) IRLR 64. Meskell v Coras Iompair Éireann (1973) IR 121. O’Mahony v Examiner Publications (5 November 2010) HC. Nolan v Emo Oil Services (2009) 20 ELR 122.

304

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.32] Probationary periods [7.32]  In Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited,99 Mr O’ Donovan was dismissed on the grounds of alleged poor performance during his probationary period. The question at issue was whether, in those circumstances, Mr O’Donovan had an implied contractual right to fair procedures in the assessment of his performance during his probationary period. On appeal at the Court of Appeal, Costello J stated: ‘In my judgment, the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the fact that the termination occurred during the probationary period. That is a critical fact in this case. During the period of probation, both parties are – and must be – free to terminate the contract of employment for no reason, or simply because one party forms the view that the intended employment is, for whatever reason, not something with which they wish to continue. Neither party can hold the other to the continuation of the employment against the wishes of the other. I do not accept that a court can imply a right to fair procedures – still less uphold the cause of action for the breach of such an alleged right – in relation to the assessment of an employee’s performance by an employer (other than for misconduct, which does not arise here) during the probationary period, as this would negate the whole purpose of a probationary period. This does not prevent an employer from including a term in the contract which confers rights to fair procedures on the employee, even during the period of probation … In my judgment, Mr O’Donovan could not – and did not – establish that he had a strong case for an injunction restraining the termination of his employment, where this occurred during his probationary period.’100

Costello J also stated that: ‘If an employer has a contractual right – in this case a clear express right – to dismiss an employee on notice without giving any reason, the court cannot imply a term that the dismissal may only take place if fair procedures have been afforded to the employee, save where the employee is dismissed for misconduct.’101

Thus, the Court of Appeal did not accept that a right to fair procedures could be implied during a probationary period (for anything other than misconduct), as to do so would negate the whole purpose of a probationary period. The Court of Appeal cited the principle, endorsed in Maha Lingham,102 that a dismissal by reason of an allegation of misconduct attracts the right to fair procedures, whereas ‘a dismissal in the absence of an allegation of improper conduct does not attract such a right’.103 In this case, the employee’s employment terminated on 7 January 2020 and he initiated proceedings on 29 January 2020 – that is, after his contract had ended. The Court of Appeal stated that: ‘[h]ad he remained in place when he commenced the proceedings he might have obtained an order restraining the termination of his employment, if, for instance, he could show that his

99

Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited [2021] IECA 37. Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited [2021] IECA 37 at para 49. 101 Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited [2021] IECA 37 at para 56. 102 Maha Lingham v Health Service Executive [2005] IEHC 186. 103 Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited [2021] IECA 37 at paragraph 69. 100

305

[7.33]  Termination of Employment employment was about to be terminated for alleged misconduct without affording him fair procedures; but, once his contract was terminated he could not be reinstated to his former position in wrongful dismissal proceedings.’

A further factor which was detrimental to Mr O’Donovan’s case before the Court of Appeal was the fact that he had accepted that the mutual trust and confidence which is required between employer and employee had been irretrievably lost. On this point, Costello J commented: ‘In these circumstances, the courts do not normally grant permanent injunctions restraining the termination of the contract of employment as this would amount to a permanent mandatory injunction to continue a contract of employment in circumstances where such an order would be simply untenable.’104

The Court of Appeal noted that that the High Court judge had acknowledged that, in effect, the employee’s claim was one for damages for wrongful termination of his contract of employment; and stated that damages were therefore an adequate remedy. Because of this, no injunction should have been granted by the High Court. The employer’s appeal was therefore upheld. The Court of Appeal also found, provisionally, that the employer was entitled to an order for costs against the employee in respect of the both the appeal and the hearing in the High Court. While this case serves as a solemn lesson for employees regarding the risk and associated costs in seeking injunctive relief, it also provides clarity around dismissal during probationary periods. In particular, employers can take comfort from the Court’s clear determination that: (a) at common law, ‘an employer can terminate employment for any reason or no reason, provided adequate notice is given. This applies whether or not the dismissal occurs during the probationary period’; and (b) ‘the principles of natural just apply to cases involving dismissal for misconduct but not to termination on other grounds’. No-fault dismissal [7.33]   Aside from Donovan,105 which makes it clear that injunctions will not be granted in cases of alleged poor performance, the courts have shown an unwillingness to grant injunctive relief to restrain so-called ‘no-fault’ dismissals – that is, where misconduct is not alleged. Thus, in Bradshaw v Murphy,106 the High Court refused to grant an injunction to restrain the dismissal of a chef, despite allegations of misconduct which had not been investigated. In Grenet v Electronic Arts Ireland Ltd,107 the High Court granted an injunction where the plaintiff had been dismissed initially for making an inappropriate comment, the

104

Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited [2021] IECA 37 at paragraph 74. Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited and Over-C Limited [2021] IECA 37. 106 Bradshaw v Murphy & Cooper Bar & Grill Limited [2014] IEHC 146. 107 Grenet v Electronic Arts Ireland Limited [2018] IEHC 786.

105

306

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.34] dismissal was subsequently withdrawn and it was claimed that he was then validly terminated on a no-fault basis. Thus, where a process to investigate misconduct has started or where the person has been disciplined for some misconduct, a no-fault termination will not be appropriate. Delay [7.34]   Employment injunctions are heard in the Chancery Court. The Chancery Court is a court of equity which developed separately from the common law courts. Traditionally, courts of equity were presided over by clerics and, in contrast to the common law courts, were prepared to consider the circumstances of cases individually and to impose what they deemed to be a fair and equitable remedy. Remedies which are discretionary are governed by a set of principles, known as ‘maxims’ – one of which is, ‘Delay defeats equity’. Thus, equitable relief, such as an injunction, will often be denied if the applicant does not act promptly. Delay can occur in seeking the injunction in the first instance or in progressing the matter to a final hearing. In Nolan Transport (Oaklands) Ltd v Halligan,108 Keane J stated that: ‘In all cases of this nature where interlocutory relief is sought the courts expect the parties to move with reasonable expedition where they are seeking interlocutory relief because it is of the essence of such relief that if it turns out that it has been wrongly granted one party has suffered an injustice.’

In Dowling v The Minister for Finance,109 Clarke J stated: ‘The factors … which come into play in assessing whether a party has moved with reasonable expedition in applying for an interim or an interlocutory injunction are different, and are governed by much stricter scrutiny, thanthose which apply when the court is considering whether a party has lost all entitlement to bring proceedings at all.’

In Barrett v The Commissioner of An Garda Siochana and the Minister for Justice,110 the appellant sought to argue that the disciplinary process to which he was subject was flawed from the outset; that it was deeply unjust in and of itself; and that it was conceived out of malice and personal animus. He also claimed that the process amounted to victimisation for his having made protected disclosures. The appellant held the position of executive director of human resources and people development. He was the subject of a disciplinary process which commenced in May 2018 and which was expanded by the (then) new Commissioner, Drew Harris, in October 2018. A recommendation was made in December 2020 by the Commissioner to the Minister for Justice that the appellant be dismissed. The appellant had issued proceedings in July 2020 in which he

108

Nolan Transport (Oaklands) Ltd v Halligan 1994 WJSC-HC 1550, [1994] JIC 2202. Dowling v Minister for Finance [2013] 4 IR 576 at para 44. 110 Barrett v The Commissioner of An Garda Siochana and The Minister for Justice [2023] IECA 112. Unapproved decision of the Court of Appeal, 8 May 2023. 109

307

[7.35]  Termination of Employment claimed that the disciplinary process was legally flawed in many respects; but he only sought interlocutory relief for the first time on 30 December 2020, after the recommendation for dismissal had been made. In refusing his application for interlocutory relief, Ni Raifeartaigh J held that, given the logic of the appellant’s own complaints (eg, the process was flawed from the outset etc), the only cure for the process would be its abandonment; yet the appellant had not sought to halt that process or to move with ‘reasonable expedition in the ordinary way’. Ni Raifeartaigh J went on to hold that: ‘his failure to do so, with the result that a significant length of time elapsed, is in my view fatal to the exercise of the court’s discretion in his favour in the matter of interlocutory relief.’111 Premature applications [7.35]  In Rowland v An Post,112 Murphy J dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interlocutory relief on the basis that the relevant process was still at an investigative stage, and that it was therefore premature to seek an injunction. This was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court,113 where it was stated that a court should interview in an ongoing disciplinary process only if it is clear that the process has gone ‘irremediably wrong’, and if it is ‘more or less inevitable that any adverse conclusion reached would be bound to be unsustainable in law’. In McKelvey v Iarnrod Eireann,114 Clarke CJ referred to Rowland115 as authority for the: ‘basic principle … to the effect that courts should be reluctant to intervene while a disciplinary process is ongoing but rather should wait until the process has come to an end and then decide whether the result of that process is sustainable in law.’

However, he added that the judgment in Rowland: ‘also recognises that there may be cases where it is clear that the process has, as it were “gone off the rails” to such an extent that there could be no reasonable prospect that any ultimate determination could be sustainable in law. In such cases it is clear that the court can and should intervene at an interlocutory stage to prevent a process continuing in circumstances where the result of that process will almost certainly be redundant.’

Clarke CJ also pointed out that the halting of a disciplinary process because of the possibility that something might have gone wrong, merely on the basis of an arguable case, would operate to defeat the orderly conduct of employer/employee relations; whereas requiring a process to continue in circumstances where it was almost inevitable that the result would have to be set aside at the end would create a real risk of injustice.

111 112 113 114 115

Barrett v The Commissioner of An Garda Siochana and The Minister for Justice [2023] IECA 112. Unapproved decision of the Court of Appeal, 8 May 2023 at para 4. Rowland v An Post [2017] 1 IR. O’Donnell J, Clarke J and McMenamin JJ. McKelvey v Iarnrod Eireann [2019] IESC 79. McKelvey v Iarnrod Eireann at 114 para 4.3.

308

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.36] Therefore, the High Court will be very reluctant to intervene in procedures once they have started, unless something has gone so wrong that the employee’s contractual rights have been breached or their right to fair procedures has been lost and cannot be corrected. In Barrett,116 Ní Raifeartaigh J helpfully summarised the two principles that can be extracted from Rowland and McKelvey: (a) The court should look at the entirety of the process in question with a view to ascertaining whether the errors of procedure or other legal errors alleged by the employee are capable of being corrected through appropriate measures being taken before the process comes to an end. If they are capable of being rectified, the court should be reluctant to grant the relief sought on grounds of prematurity. (b) However, if the nature of the complaint is such that the defects complained of cannot be cured as the process unfolds, and it is more or less inevitable that any adverse conclusion reached at the end of the process will be bound to be unsustainable in law, prematurity will not be an obstacle to seeking relief while the process is ongoing.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS – PROCEEDINGS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [7.36]   From an employer’s perspective, it is vital that before dismissing an employee, the possibility of the employee seeking an injunction to restrain the dismissal is given careful consideration. At a minimum, the contract of employment – and in particular, any reference to a contractual notice period – requires careful scrutiny. If an injunction is sought and granted, it is important to study the proceedings carefully to determine whether they are framed in such a way as to ensure that the plaintiff will also be entitled to redress for unfair dismissal in respect of the same dismissal.117 If the matter is settled, it is important to ensure that this is in full and final settlement of all claims under both common law and statute, thus preventing the employee from taking an additional claim to the WRC. At a minimum, to avoid an application for injunctive relief, an employer should: (a) follow carefully the disciplinary process outlined in the contract of ­employment and ensure that this is consistent with the code of practice on grievance and disciplinary disputes;118

116

Barrett v The Commissioner of An Garda Siochana and The Minister for Justice [2023] IECA 112. Unapproved decision of the Court of Appeal, 8 May 2023 at para 83. Section 15 of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977, as amended by s 10 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993. 118 SI 146/2000. 117

309

[7.37]  Termination of Employment (b) ensure fair procedures, particularly at the disciplinary hearing, and make a clear distinction between the investigation – which should purely be a fact-finding exercise – and the disciplinary hearing, including appointing different persons to deal with each stage; (c) consider engaging an independent third party to carry out the investigation hearing if it is not possible to appoint separate personnel for each stage of the process; and (d) consider alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

Where there is a statutory remedy [7.37]  In Power v HSE,119 the plaintiff – who had occupied the position of interim chief executive on a series of fixed-term contracts since 2014 – was informed by letter dated 14 November 2018 that his fixed-term appointment as chief executive was to expire on 30 December 2018. The letter stated that his appointment would be extended from 31 December 2018: ‘on a fixed term whole-time basis for the purpose of providing cover for the duration of the time it takes [the Public Appointments Service] to complete the selection process and the successful candidate taking up the CEO position in Saolta University Health Care Group.’

The plaintiff sought interlocutory relief to be kept in his post on salary and to prevent the defendant from progressing the competition to appoint a chief executive until such time as his case was determined by the WRC under the Protection of Employees (Fixed Term Work) Act 2003 as regards whether he was entitled to a contract of indefinite duration. Thus, the High Court was asked to issue interlocutory orders in a case in which, ultimately, it would not be asked to make final orders. In rejecting the plaintiff’s application, Allen J in the High Court, relying on a list of authorities,120 stated: ‘The plaintiff in this case apprehends, for good and sufficient reason, that unless restrained by the court the defendant will proceed with the recruitment process for a new CEO and will fill the position. It seems to me that it does not follow from the fact that the position may have been filled by the time the plaintiff’s case has been determined through the appropriate procedures, that his rights will have been wholly undermined or that such remedy as may be crafted will be ineffective. I can see that if the plaintiff is removed, and someone else is appointed, as CEO of Saolta, difficulties might arise in implementing an award that he should be reinstated but that does not mean that the decision would be of no practical benefit to the plaintiff or that any such decision would have been wholly undermined.’121

119

Power v HSE [2019] IEHC 462. Doherty v South Dublin County Council [2007] IEHC4; Nolan v Emo Oil Ltd [2009] IEHC 15; O’Domhnaill v Health Service Executive [2011] IEHC 421; Kearney v Byrne Wallace [2017] IEHC 713; Kirwan v Mental Health Commission [2012] IEHC 217. 121 Power v HSE [2019] IEHC 462 at paragraph 74. 120

310

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.38] In a very clear decision, Allen J concluded that the High Court had no jurisdiction to make interim or interlocutory orders in cases in which it has no jurisdiction to decide the substance of the dispute.122 More recently, the Supreme Court has allowed an appeal on a leapfrog basis in order to consider whether injunctive relief can be granted where a statutory remedy is available. Whether this will allow a less rigid approach than that taken in Power – which, in reality, limits such applications to those involving an allegation of misconduct added to a breach of fair procedures – remains to be seen.123

Interim injunctions [7.38]   When applying for an interim injunction on an ex parte or interim basis, the plaintiff’s solicitor will have a plenary summons or civil bill as appropriate issued by the Central Office of the High Court or the Circuit Court (see [7.43] for draft plenary summons) and a grounding affidavit (see [7.45]) sworn by the plaintiff containing all information necessary to meet the criteria for granting an injunction, including an undertaking as to damages. These must be accompanied by an ex parte motion docket.124 The ex parte motion docket fulfils the role of the notice of motion at the interlocutory stage. Advance notice of making the application is normally given to the Central Office. This can be done outside normal court hours; if this is the case, the approach is generally made by counsel. While any High Court can hear an application, it is usual in the context of High Court proceedings to bring the application before one of the judges listed to hear either chancery or judicial review matters. At the hearing, the judge will be attended by a registrar; and the solicitor for the plaintiff will hand in the original summons along with a certified copy of the grounding affidavit and the original exhibits. If granted, the interim order will usually apply for a number of days only and a return date will be fixed to be inserted in the notice of motion. It is usual to seek a direction from the court as to how the interim injunction will be communicated to the defendant employer. More often than not, it will be directed to be done by telephone and email, followed by a letter detailing the terms of the order made. As soon as possible thereafter, the summons, motion, grounding affidavit and exhibits – together with the interim order, if it has been issued – will be served on the employer. On the return date set out in the notice of motion, the plaintiff’s application becomes one for an interlocutory injunction, in which the plaintiff seeks a continuation of the order pending full trial of the action.

122

Power v HSE [2019] IEHC 462 at paragraph 78. MD v Board of Management of a School [2023] IESCDET 68; High Court record [2023] 121 JR. 124 See Practice Direction HC59 (which has applied since 19 August 2013) for the suggested form of the docket. Note that there is no requirement or basis for filing an ex parte motion docket in the Central Office in advance of making an application as same is retained by the registrar after making the application. 123 See

311

[7.39]  Termination of Employment Rules relating to interim injunctions [7.39]   Because interim injunctions are generally applied for on an ex parte basis, a number of basic rules apply. These were set out in the UK case of St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S125 and are generally referred to as the ‘triple safeguard’. They are: (a) the duty of full and frank disclosure; (b) a (cross-) undertaking in damages,126 which is required as a matter of course; and (c) the right of the party enjoined to apply to vary or discharge the ex parte order.

Interlocutory injunctions [7.40]   In circumstances that do not demand great urgency, a plaintiff’s solicitor will make an application for an interlocutory injunction as opposed to an interim injunction. Here the plaintiff will have issued a plenary summons/civil bill along with a notice of motion and grounding affidavit setting out the basis for the injunction application – all of which will be served on the defendant employer or its solicitor. Normally, therefore, the following documents will be put before the High Court: (a) an originating summons; (b) a notice of motion; and (c) a grounding affidavit. Full and frank disclosure [7.41]   The importance of full and frank disclosure was dealt with in the case Tate Access Floors Inc Boswell127 wherein the UK Court of Appeal stated: “No rule is better established, and few more important, than the rule (the golden rule) that a plaintiff applying for ex parte relief must disclose to the court all matters relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion whether or not to grant relief before giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. If that duty is not observed by the plaintiff, the court will discharge the ex parte order and may, to mark its displeasure, refuse the plaintiff further inter-partes relief even though the circumstances would otherwise justify the grant of such relief.”

In Bambrick v Cobley,128 Clarke J distinguished between material and non-material facts and identified the test as one of ‘whether objectively speaking the facts could be regarded as material with materiality to be construed in a reasonable and not excessive manner’.129

125

St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673. Generally known in this jurisdiction as the ‘undertaking as to damages’. 127 Brown-Wilkinson VC in Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Boswell [1991] Ch 512 at 532. 128 Bambrick v Cobley [2006] 1 IRLM 81. 129 Bambrick v Cobley [2006] 1 ILRM 81 at 87. 126

312

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.42] In the case of Dardania Holdings Limited v Advanced Life Safety130 which was a case regarding costs in relation to the underlying proceedings the defendant submitted that there was a lack of full and frank disclosure on the part of the plaintiff when seeking, and obtaining, an interim injunction ex parte. Having examined he facts Heslin J determined that it was incontrovertible that an offer was made and that it was of fundamental significance but it was not something that the court was informed about. He found, ‘I am entitled to conclude that there was a deliberate decision made by the plaintiff that the court would not be made aware of this fundamentally relevant issue’.131 Ultimately Heslin J determined that’ ‘For the reason detailed in this ruling, I am entirely satisfied that the plaintiff is not entitled to costs and that the defendant is entitled to its costs, both on the basis of a lack of full and frank disclosure on the part of the plaintiff when it sought and obtained ex parte interim relief and on the merits of the plaintiff’s application for such relief’.132 The fact that interim applications are often prepared in haste, where people are under significant time pressure, was recognised in European Paint Importers Limited v O’Callaghan133 by Peart J, who rejected that there had been a lack of candour.

Statutory injunctions [7.42]   The same procedure applies for statutory injunctions, such as those sought under the Protected Disclosures Act,134 save that the endorsement of claim must set out the statutory origin of the jurisdiction to grant same; as to do otherwise would fail to give effect to the clear intention of the Oireachtas.135

130

Dardania Holdings Limited v Advanced Life Safety (Trading as Advanced Fire Protection) [2021] IEHC 569. 131 Dardania Holdings Limited v Advanced Life Safety (Trading as Advanced Fire Protection) [2021] IEHC 569 at para 35. 132 Dardania Holdings Limited v Advanced Life Safety (Trading as Advanced Fire Protection) [2021] IEHC 569 at para 65. 133 European Paint Importers Limited v O’Callaghan [2005] IEHC 280.. 134 Protected Disclosures Acts 2014–2022. 135 See McKenna v EH [2002] 1 IR 72.

313

[7.43]  Termination of Employment

Plenary summons [7.43] O. 1, r. 2 THE HIGH COURT Record No.: BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant PLENARY SUMMONS To the defendant (Insert name of defendant), of (insert address) in the County of....... This plenary summons requires you to enter an appearance in person or by solicitor in the Central Office, Four Courts, Dublin in the above action within eight days after the summons has been served on you (exclusive of the day of such service). And TAKE NOTICE that if you do not enter an appearance within that time the plaintiff may proceed in this action, and judgment may be given in your absence. BY ORDER, Chief Justice of Ireland, The

day of

two thousand and .....

N.B.—This summons is to be served within twelve calendar months from the date hereof, unless the time for service has been extended by the Court. The defendant may appear hereto by entering an appearance either personally or by solicitor at the Central Office, Four Courts, Dublin.

314

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.43] GENERAL INDORSEMENT OF CLAIM. The plaintiff’s claim is ..... DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES WRONG ALLEGED AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS PARTICULARS OF ACTS CONSTITUTING THE WRONG AND OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO THE COMMISSION OF THE WRONG PARTICULARS OF BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY PARTICULARS OF …. PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES RELIEFS CLAIMS THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS: Signed:

________________ INSERT NAME AND ADDRESS OF SOLICITOR

This summons was issued by the plaintiff ..... who resides at ....... (state address accurately) and is ....., and *whose address for service is ....... *who consents to the service of documents in the proceedings by electronic mail to ....... or, This summons was issued by ......., whose registered place of business is ........, * and who consents to the service of documents in the proceedings by electronic mail to ......, solicitor for the plaintiff, who resides at ..... and is ....... This summons was served by me at ...... on the defendant ....... on .....day the ... day of ..... 20... Indorsed the ... day of .... 20...

__________________________ INSERT NAME AND ADDRESS OF SOLICITOR

315

[7.43]  Termination of Employment THE HIGH COURT. Record No.: BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant PLENARY SUMMONS

INSERT NAME AND ADDRESS OF SOLICITOR

316

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.44]

Notice of motion [7.44] THE HIGH COURT Record No.: (Insert Record No.) BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant

__________________________

NOTICE OF MOTION ____________________________ TAKE NOTICE that on the

day of

2023 at

or as soon as

practicable thereafter, Counsel on behalf of the Defendant/Plaintiff herein will make Application to this Honourable Court sitting at The Four Courts, Dublin 7, for an Order pursuant to Order 31, Rule 21 of the Superior Court Rules on the following terms:1. [Insert term sought] 2. [Insert term sought] 3. [Insert term sought] WHICH SAID APPLICATION will be grounded upon this Notice of Motion, Affidavit of Service thereof, the proceedings issued and served herein when produced, the Affidavit of [Insert name of Solicitor], such further and other oral evidence as may be adduced at the hearing of this application, the nature of the case and the reasons to be offered. Dated [Insert date]

317

[7.44]  Termination of Employment

Signed: _______________________________ [Insert firm and address of Solicitor]

To:

[Insert firm and address of Solicitor]

And To:

The Registrar of the Central Office, Four Courts, Dublin 7.

318

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.44]

THE HIGH COURT Record No.: (Insert Record No.) BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant

NOTICE OF MOTION

(Insert Solicitor firm) (Insert address) (Insert file reference) 319

[7.45]  Termination of Employment

Grounding affidavit [7.45] THE HIGH COURT Record No.: (Insert Record No.) BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant

AFFIDAVIT OF [Insert name of Deponent] I, [Insert name of Solicitor], Solicitor of [Insert Solicitor firm] aged 18 years and upward MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows: 1. I am a Solicitor in the firm of [Insert name of Solicitor], who are on record for the Defendant/Plaintiff in the above-entitled proceedings. I am duly authorised by the Defendant/Plaintiff to make this Affidavit for and on its behalf and I do so from facts within my own knowledge, save where otherwise appears, and where so otherwise appearing, I believe same to be true and accurate in every respect. 2. I beg to refer to a copy of the pleadings had herein, when produced at the hearing of the action. 3. [Insert details] 4. I therefore pray to the Honourable Court for the Orders sought.

___________________________ (Insert name of Deponent) Filed this __________.

day of

SWORN by the said (Insert name of Deponent), this (Insert date) at (Insert address) in the County of ___________before me a Practising Solicitor/Commissioner for Oaths and deponent is known to me or whose identity has been established to me before swearing this Affidavit by the production of passport no.______________ issued on the __________________by the authorities of _________________,which is an authority recognised by the Irish Government, and the Passport contained a photograph. ______________________________________ PRACTISING SOLICITOR/ COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS 2022 by __________________ on behalf of

320

Wrongful Dismissal and the Employment Injunction  [7.45] THE HIGH COURT Record No.: (Insert Record No.) BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant

Exhibit “(Insert initials of Solicitor)” as referred to in the Affidavit of (Insert name of Solicitor)

(Insert date)

__________________________ (Insert name of Deponent)

__________________________ Commissioner for Oaths/ Practising Solicitor

321

[7.45]  Termination of Employment

THE HIGH COURT Record No.: (Insert Record No.) BETWEEN (NAME OF PLAINTIFF) Plaintiff AND (NAME OF DEFENDANT) Defendant

AFFIDAVIT OF (Insert name of Deponent)

(Insert Solicitor firm) (Insert address) (Insert file reference) 322

Chapter 8

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation

INTRODUCTION [8.01]   The legislation governing dismissal on equality grounds is founded on several EU Directives. The main Irish statutes are the 1998 Employment Equality Act and the 2004 Equality Act. Section 8(6)(c) of the 1998 Act provides that an employer shall be taken to have discriminated against an employee in relation to conditions of employment if the employee is afforded less favourable terms on any of the discriminatory grounds outlined in the Act in respect of, inter alia, dismissal and disciplinary measures. Claims for dismissal arising under the Acts often arise on the basis of constructive dismissal, where the employee contends that they were left with no alternative but to resign because of the employer’s discriminatory conduct. However, they can clearly also arise on the basis of straightforward dismissal.

LEGISLATION [8.02]   The Equality Act 2004 implements the provisions of the amended Gender Equal Treatment Framework, the Framework Employment Directive and the Race Directive – that is: (a) Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions [2002] OJL2 69/15; (b) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16; and (c) Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. These Directives take precedence over Irish law, and as such Irish law must be read and interpreted with due regard to their provisions.

323

[8.03]  Termination of Employment Additionally, quite apart from any statutory or common law rights, the Irish Constitution allows an aggrieved employee to seek redress under its terms. While the Constitution does not specifically prohibit sex discrimination or dismissal as a result of same, Article 40.3 provides for certain personal rights as follows: ‘(i) The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. (ii) The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.’

In Ryan v Attorney General,1 Kenny J held that there exist a number of unspecified rights in addition to those specifically mentioned in Article 40.3, which include the right to bodily integrity. In Murtagh Properties v Cleary,2 Kenny J held that the framers of the Constitution intended that men and women were to be regarded as equal, and concluded that a rule that sought to prevent an employer from employing men or women on the ground of sex only was prohibited by the Constitution.

Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021 Purpose [8.03]   The purposes of the Employment Equality Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2004 are to promote equality in the workplace; prohibit discrimination; prohibit harassment and sexual harassment; prohibit victimisation in the event that a person pursues a claim; allow positive action measures to ensure full equality in practice; and require appropriate measures for people with disabilities in relation to access, participation and training in employment. Extent [8.04]   As well as prohibiting discriminatory dismissal, the Acts cover other aspects of employment, including the prevention of discrimination in advertising, access to employment, vocational training, terms and conditions of employment, collective agreements etc. Application [8.05]   The Acts apply to all full-time, part-time and temporary employees, including those in both the public and private sectors; and those employed by vocational training bodies, employment agencies, trade unions and professional and trade bodies. The Acts also apply to those who are self-employed, who are involved in partnerships or who are employed in another person’s home.

1 2

Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IESC 1. Murtagh Properties v Cleary [1972] IR 330.

324

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.08] Equally, the legislation encompasses those workers protected under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 and the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001. Prohibition of discrimination [8.06]   Discrimination and dismissal arising from that discrimination are prohibited on nine specific grounds. This contrasts with the previous 1977 Employment Equality Act (which was repealed by the 1998 Act), which only prohibited discrimination on grounds of sex and marital status. Gender [8.07]   It is prohibited to discriminate against a man, a woman or a transsexual person under s 6(2)(a) of the 1998 Act. (Specific protection is provided for pregnant employees and in relation to maternity leave.) In A Worker v Mid Western Health Board,3 the Labour Court determined that to establish discrimination on gender grounds, a complainant must show that: (a) there has been less favourable treatment; and (b) that treatment arose from the sex of the complainant. Therefore, it is not sufficient just to show that the complainant was treated differently; the treatment must also be less favourable and arise because of their gender. In Boyle v Ely Property Group,4 the employer had previously told the complainant that a man was needed to do her job; and that it needed someone who could ‘handle themselves’ and who would get ‘physical’. The complainant was subsequently dismissed following the appointment of a new employee. The equality officer found that the dismissal had occurred in circumstances amounting to discrimination on the grounds of gender. Male gender-based dismissal [8.08]   There have been no male gender-based dismissal cases in Ireland thus far, albeit that it has been recognised that gender-based discrimination can equally be male based. For example, in Field v Irish Carton Printers,5 the Labour Court held that a male claimant was entitled to the same taxi provisions at times when public transport was not available as were afforded to his female colleagues. In Eversheds Legal Services Ltd v De Belin,6 the UK Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) dealt with a case in which the employer had to make one of two employees redundant. As one of the two was on maternity leave, the employer, in completing

3 4 5 6

A Worker v Mid Western Health Board (1996) ELR 72. Zena Boyle v Ely Property Group DEC – E2009-013. Field v Irish Carton Printers DEO 5/1994. Eversheds Legal Services v De Belin EAT 0352.

325

[8.09]  Termination of Employment its scoring matrix in relation to the time it took fee earners to recover money from clients, gave the female employee on maternity leave the maximum possible score, which ended up being marginally higher than that of her male colleague. The EAT held that the different scoring amounted to unfair treatment and that the claimant had been unfairly dismissed. Dismissal during or after pregnancy [8.09]   Section 6(A) of the Employment Equality Act makes it clear that where a woman is treated less favourably due to her pregnancy, this will constitute unlawful direct discrimination on the grounds of gender. It is also a given that a woman has a right to return to the same or no less favourable job at the end of her period of protective leave. In addition to the Employment Equality Act, the Maternity Protection Act 1994 provides, inter alia, that a woman will be entitled to return to work with her employer in the job which she held immediately before the period of maternity leave and under the contract of employment under which she was employed before the period of maternity leave.7 This section of the act is tempered somewhat by s 27, which allows the employer, where ‘it is not reasonably practicable for the employer or the successor to permit the employee to return to work in accordance with that section, the employee shall, subject to this Part, be entitled to be offered by the employer, the successor or an associated employer suitable alternative work under a new contract of employment’.8 However, the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and the Labour Court will demand a high level of proof from employers that seek to justify returning a woman to a different job post maternity leave. In Campbell v Bank of Ireland Private Banking,9 the complainant, on returning to work, found that her replacement while she had been on maternity leave was continuing to deal with her portfolio of clients. She was given a different portfolio, which she deemed a demotion. The equality officer, in referring to EU Directive 2002/73/EC, noted that: ‘A woman on maternity leave shall be entitled, after the end of her period of maternity leave, to return to her job or to an equivalent post on terms and conditions which are no less favourable to her and to benefit from any improvement in working conditions to which she would be entitled during her absence.’

The equality officer determined that the complainant had been subject to discriminatory treatment on the grounds of gender and awarded her €30,000, which equated to six months’ pay. [8.10]   It is very unwise for an employer to dismiss a pregnant woman for any reason. In O’Brien v Persian Properties t/a O’Callaghan Hotels,10 the Labour Court found that only in the most ‘exceptional’ circumstances not connected with the condition of

7 8 9

10

Sections 26(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Maternity Protection Act 1994. Section 27(2)(a) of the Maternity Protection Act 1994. Campbell v Bank of Ireland Private Banking DEC-E2-13-046. O’Brien v Persian Properties t/a O’Callaghan Hotels DEC-E2012-010.

326

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.11] pregnancy can a woman be dismissed while pregnant. This was also stressed in the earlier case of Assico Assembly v Corcoran,11 where the Labour Court held that: ‘Where an employee is dismissed while pregnant or on maternity leave, both legislation and case law states that the employer must show that the dismissal was on exceptional grounds not associated with her pregnancy and such grounds in the case of dismissal., as a matter of law and in the case of discrimination as a matter of good practice, should be set out in writing.’

Pregnancy-related dismissals, if held to be discriminatory, are treated harshly by the Labour Court.12 Redundancy during maternity leave [8.11]   Section 23 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 provides that any purported termination, notice of purported termination or suspension of an employee during a period of protective leave or natal care is void. (Note that it is not unfair – it is void.) Thus, a woman cannot be dismissed for any reason during her maternity leave. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed this in Paquay,13 where it extended the right not to be made redundant to prohibit employers even from taking steps during the period of protective leave with a view to making a woman redundant on her return. In McGarvey v Intrum Justitia,14 the Labour Court followed the ECJ decision in Brown v Rentokil15 and held that the entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave constitutes a special protected period.16 In Keenan v Keogh t/a Mortgage Cabin,17 the complainant was awarded one year’s pay for being made redundant during her maternity leave. It is clear that women have an unconditional right not to be made redundant during maternity leave, and that this right extends to planning to make a woman redundancy on her return to work. Furthermore, the dismissal of a pregnant woman raises a prima facie case of discrimination; once this is the case, the onus of proof shifts to the employer to prove that the discriminatory treatment did not occur. This can be the case only if: (a) it is proven that the redundancy was for exceptional reasons unconnected with the pregnancy; (b) the reasons were set out in writing.18 (c) the process was objective and transparent, and input from direct line managers was appropriate;19 and (d) good records have been kept.20 11

Assico Assembly v Corcoran EED 033/2003. Lee t/a Peking House v Fox ED/01/53; Trailer Care Holdings Ltd v Healy DET No EDA 128. Paquay v Societe d’architectes Hoet + Minne SPRL ECR 2007-I8511. McGarvey v Intrum Justitia DEC-EW2008-041. Brown v Rentokil [1998] ECR I-1485. See also Webb v EMO Air Cargo(UK) Ltd [1994] C-32/93; and Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum [1991] IRLR 27. Keenan v Keogh t/a Mortgage Cabin DEC-E2012-015. Paquay v Societe d’architectes Hoet + Minne SPRL [2007] ECR 1-18511. McGarvey v Intrum Justitia DEC_E2008-041. Government Department v Employee ADE/01/19 Det No/.062.

12 See 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20

327

[8.12]  Termination of Employment Non-renewal of fixed-term contract during or at the end of maternity leave [8.12]   The ECJ dealt with this matter in Melgar Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios.21 The applicant in this case was employed as a home help under a number of fixed-term contracts with a Spanish local authority. Her employer became aware that she was pregnant and her last fixed-term contract was not renewed or extended. The ECJ found that the non-renewal did not contravene the Pregnant Workers Directive22 as it did not constitute a dismissal. However, the ECJ did find that if the reason that the contract was not renewed was because the employee was pregnant, this might constitute discrimination contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive;23 and whether it did so was for the national court to decide. The ECJ went on to state: ‘Where non-renewal of a fixed term contract is motivated by the worker’s state of pregnancy, it constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex.’ The matter was also dealt with Tele Danmark.24 The claimant in this case was recruited for a period of six months, but her employer was not informed of her pregnancy. The ECJ stated: ‘Since the dismissal of a worker on account of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex, whatever the nature and extent of the economic loss incurred by the employer as a result of her absence because of pregnancy, whether the contract of employment was concluded for a fixed or an indefinite period has no bearing on the discriminatory character of the dismissal. In either case the employee’s inability to perform her contract of employment is due to pregnancy.’

The matter was dealt with in Ireland in McGloin v Legal Aid Board.25 The claimant, who had worked under a series of fixed-term contracts as a clerical officer, became ill with a pregnancy-related illness and had to be hospitalised from 9 February 2006 to 14 March 2006. The claimant’s husband notified her manager of the pregnancy on 23 March 2006. By a letter dated 27 March 2006, the claimant was informed that her contract would not be renewed. The reason stated in the letter was that an officer who was on career break at the time would be returning to resume her duties. The claimant contended that a temporary replacement had been employed by the respondent until the officer concerned resumed her duties in mid-May 2006. Importantly, the letter from the respondent also referred to the number of sick days taken by the claimant. The claimant contended that the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract constituted discriminatory dismissal on the grounds of gender and was due to her pregnancy. In its defence, the respondent contended that it was not apprised of the nature of the claimant’s illness or that it was related to her being pregnant. The respondent also

21 22 23 24 25

Melgar Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios (Case-438/99) [2001] ECR I-6915. Directive 92/85/EEC. Council Directive 97/80/EC ([1998] OJ L14/6) on the burden of proof in case of discrimination based on sex, since repealed by Directive 2006/54/EC (the Recast Directive). Tele Danmark v Handlels of Kontorfunkitoaermes Foorbund (Case C-109/00) [2001]. McGloin v Legal Aid Board DEC–E2009–042.

328

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.12] contended that since the claimant had been employed to cover for the permanent employee, it was not possible to offer the claimant another contract of employment. It also contended that the decision not to renew the claimant’s contract of employment had been made before the respondent had been apprised of her pregnancy, and that therefore the issue of discrimination on the ground of gender did not arise. The equality officer noted that the claimant’s sick leave was a decisive factor in the decision not to renew her contract, even though the respondent had been apprised that most of the sick leave was pregnancy related. There had been a gap of six weeks between the permanent staff member coming back and the claimant’s dismissal. The equality officer was satisfied that the claimant had raised a prima facie case that non-renewal of her fixed-term contract of employment was directly related to her pregnancy, and that the respondent had failed to rebut the presumption. The respondent was unable to adduce evidence in the form of minutes or similar documentation to support its contention that the decision not to renew the fixed-term contract had been made on 13 March, before the respondent had been apprised of the claimant’s pregnancy, and was therefore unrelated to it. The equality officer was persuaded that the non-renewal of the fixed-term contract related to the claimant’s pregnancy by reason of the respondent’s letter of 27 March, which specifically raised the issue of sick leave and had been issued four days following the communication of the claimant’s pregnancy by her husband. The Equality Tribunal, relying on Melgar, awarded the claimant €15,000 and stated: ‘This award takes into account that the respondent is a statutory body, which specialises in legal representation and advice. In so determining I follow the observations of the ECJ in Melgar that “it must therefore be concluded that the provisions of Article 10 of Directive 92/85 impose on Member States, in particular in their capacity of employer, precise obligations which afford them no margin of discretion in their performance”.’

This matter was also dealt with in Kelly v University of Dublin Trinity College,26 where the equality officer found in favour of the respondent in determining that she had not been discriminated against by the failure to renew her contract following a period of maternity leave. Agnieszka v Sami Swoi Limited27 also examined the issue. Here the complainant had been employed by the respondent since June 2012. In October 2012, she informed her employer that she was pregnant. In December, she became unwell and went on certified sick leave until 31 December 2012. On 1 January 2013, she attempted to contact her employer; but the following day, her manager contacted her and informed her that her contract was over and would not be renewed. On taking up the position, the complainant had initially had a three-month contract with an end date of 31 December 2012. She presented evidence that the job had been advertised on 10 January 2013. The equality officer was satisfied that the complainant had established a prima facie case of

26 27

Kelly v University of Dublin Trinity College DEC–E2013–106. DEC-2015-016.

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[8.13]  Termination of Employment discrimination on the grounds of gender and awarded her €10,000. This case is interesting in that the complainant was aware of the end date of her contract and had been advised of it before telling her employer that she was pregnant. Transgender employees [8.13]   This matter was given detailed consideration in Hannon v First Direct Logistics Ltd.28 The complainant was diagnosed with gender-identity disorder in or around 2005 and was a transgender female. She had worked as a man as a business development manager for the company for five years before disclosing to management that she was a transsexual. In December 2006, she met company officials to discuss the workplace implications of a transition to female and was asked to wait a few months to accommodate a new staff member. After changing her name by deed poll in March 2007, she arrived at the office. However, she was told that she would have to work the phones from home under her ‘male identity’ while a new office was being set up. Thereafter, she was advised that she would have to revert to a male identity when meeting clients. She was also forbidden to use the women’s toilet at work. Despite several requests from her to return to the office, she was eventually told that a new employee had been hired and there was no room for her at the office. In March 2007, the complainant had also been approached by the operations manager, who had expressed concerns about her productivity. She was again asked if she would revert to her male identity for another three-month period. Following this, on 19 July 2007, she was told by the company director that he was not happy with her work. She again requested permission to work from the office, but was refused. Thereafter, she left the company, claiming that she had been constructively dismissed. The equality officer found that, ‘requesting that the complainant switch between a male/female identity whenever the respondent felt the need for it – constitutes direct discrimination on gender and disability grounds.’ Accordingly, the equality officer found that the complainant had been discriminated against by her employer on the basis of gender and disability, and awarded her €35,422.71 plus interest. The respondent was also ordered to pay the complainant interest at the Courts Act rate in respect of the period from 20 December 2008 (the date of reference of the claim) and to the date of payment. The equality officer then referred to the European Court of Justice decision in P V S and Cornwall County Council29 which defined Transsexualism as follows: ‘Transsexualism is a recognised medical condition. Transsexualism is treated by a combination of hormone therapy, surgery (in some cases) and ‘real life experience’, that is, living as a member of the other sex. To gain ‘real life experience’ the person must be able to live their life continuously in the other sex without the need to revert to the birth sex. It is clear that for such experience to be relevant and appropriate the person must be able to interact with the society as a whole. This also applies to the workplace and it is clear that these Acts impose an

28 29

Hannon v First Direct Logistics Ltd [2011] ELR 215. P v S and Cornwall County Council (Case C-13/9).

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.14] obligation on an employer to enable a person with a Gender Identity Disorder to allow, within the confines of said workplace, allowing for health and safety, uniform etc. requirements, to accommodate such ‘real life experience.’30

After the complainant had resigned from her employment, she took up alternative employment in late July. However, this fell through a number of weeks later and she subsequently sought to rejoin the respondent. The equality officer noted that while it could be argued that the circumstances implied that the conditions of work could not be found to be too bad if the complainant was willing to return, she did not accept this premise: ‘the fact that the complainant sought to return to work to the respondent company, when this job fell through is not illustrative of anything other than that the complainant did not want to be unemployed.’ [8.14]  In Maja Stanislawska v Jaguar Landrover Ireland,31 despite the complainant having made numerous complaints against the respondent alleging discrimination on the grounds of her (trans)gender, the adjudicator held as follows: ‘Consequently, based on all of the above and taking all the circumstances into consideration, I am satisfied that the Complainant’s dismissal was based on reasonable and well-established grounds of gross misconduct. I am also satisfied that the dismissal was not linked to or influenced by the Complainant’s gender or sexual orientation.’

In contrast, in Lee McLoughlin v Paula Smith Charlies Barbers32 – a case brought under the Equal Status Act – the complainant, a transgender man, attended the respondent’s barber shop and was informed by the barber that: ‘I don’t cut ladies hair.’ The complainant replied that he just wanted a ‘short back and sides’. The barber repeated: ‘we don’t cut ladies hair, I’m sorry.’ The complainant (allegedly) then informed the barber that he was transgender and a trans man. The barber proceeded to shake his head and stated: ‘I am sorry, we can’t cut ladies hair. It’s a contract that we have with another hairdresser around the corner, so if we cut a woman’s hair we will be fined.’ The barber made these comments in front of a number of customers. In finding for the complainant, the adjudication officer noted that discrimination against transgender people was rendered unlawful by the ECJ in P v S and Cornwall County Council33, The adjudication officer also noted that Recital 3 of the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC states that: ‘The Court of Justice has held that the scope of the principle of equal treatment … also applies to discrimination arising from the gender reassignment of a person.’ Deirdre O’Byrne v AIB34 concerned a complainant who was a transgender woman. The complainant had changed her name by deed poll; and in accordance with the declarations given in the deed poll, she had also changed her name on other identifying

30 31 32 33 34

Hannon v First Direct Logistics Ltd DEC–E2011–066, para 4.4. Maja Stanislawska v Jaguar Landrover Ireland ADJ-00023582, 19 October 2020. Lee McLoughlin v Paula Smith Charlies Barbers ADJ-000111948. P v S and Cornwall County Council (Case C-13/9) at 29. Deirdre O’Byrne v AIB, DEC-S2013-015.

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[8.15]  Termination of Employment documents, including her passport. Arising from her complaint against the bank, the equality officer held that the complainant had been discriminated against, and that the respondent had failed to rebut the prima facie case of discriminatory treatment on the grounds of gender raised by the complainant when it refused to allow her to change the name on her bank account. The respondent was ordered to pay the complainant €5,000 to compensate her for the effects of the discriminatory treatment. Civil status 1998 Act35

[8.15]   Section 2 of the defines ‘civil status’ as single, married, separated, divorced, widowed in a civil partnership within the meaning of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 or being a former civil partner in a civil partnership that has ended by death or been dissolved. The 1998 Act for the first time included single persons in the definition of ‘marital status’ (now ‘civil status’). In An Employee v An Employer,36 a female employee had been employed until she resigned upon marriage in 1972. She subsequently worked with the employer from time to time on a temporary basis and eventually applied for a permanent position, but was unsuccessful. The recruitment manager informed her that the reason her application had been unsuccessful was due to her inflexibility with regard to her domestic situation; at this stage she was separated and had two children. She claimed she had been discriminated against because of her sex and/or marital status. The equality officer upheld her complaint, stating that: ‘the status of male candidates or female candidates who did not have the same childcare responsibilities would not have been similarly perceived by the employer as irreconcilable with the capacity to give a commitment to a permanent career position.’

[8.16]   Cases on civil status are rare. One case that is instructive in this is regard is Hawkins v Atex Group Ltd.37 The complainant in this case was married to the chief executive of the respondent company. She had worked for the company for some time as a contractor. It was the respondent’s case that the chairman had told the chief executive that from the end of 2009 he should not employ any member of his family in the business, because of concerns about perceived conflicts of interest and nepotism. The complainant became an employee of the company at the beginning of 2010 and her daughter also became an employee in late 2009. The complainant was subsequently dismissed on the grounds that her employment was in breach of the instruction to the chief executive; her daughter was also dismissed on similar grounds. The complainant’s claim of discrimination under s  3 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 on the grounds that she was married was struck out by an employment judge 35 36 37

Inserted by s 102(2)(a) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, SI 648/2010. An Employer v An Employee (1995) ELR 139. Hawkins v Atex Group Ltd [2012] ICR 1315, [2012] IRLR 807, [2011] UKEAT 0302_11_1303, [2012] Eq LR 397.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.17] on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success. In dismissing her appeal, the judge held: ‘Less favourable treatment on the basis that the complainant is married to a particular person falls within section 3, but only if the ground for the treatment is, specifically, that they are married, rather than only that they are in a close relationship which happens to take the form of marriage.’38

That distinction was also determined in Rosina Gillespie v Business Mobile Security Services t/a Senaca Group.39 Here the complainant alleged that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of civil status, and that the reason for her isolation and ultimate dismissal was by reason of her marriage to her husband. The complainant’s husband was a shareholder and director within the company and at that time was engaged in a commercial dispute with other directors. The complainant argued that the alleged unlawful treatment that she had suffered in the workplace was directly connected to her marriage, and that as a result, the respondent was in breach of the Equality Act by virtue of her civil status. In finding against her, the adjudicator determined; ‘Based on the evidence presented at the hearing I find that the Complainant was employment [sic] by the Respondent since 2013 and that the Respondent was aware of the marriage to her husband. There is no evidence to support that the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of her marriage/civil status. The background to this particular complaint is based on a commercial dispute between her husband and other company directors and not on the fact that she is married to her husband.’

It is clear that to ground a claim on civil status, the reason for termination must relate to that and no other reason. Family status [8.17]   ‘Family status’ is defined as having responsibility for someone else under the age of 18. This necessarily includes the parent of a person under 18 years or the resident primary carer or parent of a person with a disability. A ‘member of the family’ in relation to any person includes: (a) that person’s spouse40 (or civil partner within the meaning of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010); or (b) a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, lineal ancestor or lineal descendant of that person or that person’s spouse (or civil partner within the meaning of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010). A strict interpretation is taken in defining what constitutes discrimination on the ground of family status. This was evident in Gaelscoil Thulach na nÒg v Fitzsimons-Markey,41 38

39 40 41

In reaching this decision, the judge referred to Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman [1980] ICR 596, followed Chief Constable of Bedfordshire v Graham [2002] IRLR 239, and doubted aspects of the reasoning in Dunn v Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium Management (UKEAT/0531/10). Rosina Gillespie v Business Mobile Security Services t/a Senaca Group ADJ-00003243, 10 July 2018. Inserted by  s 102(2)(c) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, SI 648/2010. Gaelscoil Thulach na nÒg v Fitzsimons-Markey EED049.

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[8.18]  Termination of Employment where a school decided to terminate the complainant’s employment as school secretary because it did not want to have the parent of a child in the school employed in that position. It was held that in relying on the family status ground, complainants can compare themselves only with someone who does not have family status;42 claims that compare oneself with someone who has a different form of family status (eg, locus parentis) do not fall within the legislation. Disputes in this area generally arise where employees fail to secure a job or promotion as a result of having a child; or where employers seek to change an employee’s terms and conditions without regard to their family status. In Morgan v Bank of Ireland Group,43 the complainant argued that she had been discriminated against in relation to her application for part-time work because it had been more than five years from her original application to the date that she would have been able to start work in a job-sharing position. The equality officer found that there had been discrimination on the grounds of family status, as the respondent had failed at all three stages to justify the delay in making the part-time position available. However, the Labour Court stated that: ‘it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold that an employer must provide a woman with a facility to job-share in every case in which such a facility is requested and such a result could not have been intended. It is self-evident that such facilities can only be made available within the exigencies of the business.’

Higgins v TSB44 concerned the same issue – that is, whether the complainant had been discriminated against in respect of her four applications for part-time work (both permanent part-time work and an alternative working pattern scheme). In this case, the complainant was able to compare her application (under the alternative work pattern scheme) to a male colleague in the same department. The equality officer held that she had been discriminated against, but on the grounds of gender. [8.18]  Long v Hanley Group45 illustrates the difficulty for employers when they seek to alter an employee’s duties and responsibilities, but the employee is unable to comply due to family circumstances. In this case, prior to commencing employment with the company as a sales manager, the employee had informed it that she was not available for travel due to family commitments. She was assured at interview that this would not cause any issues. Subsequent to her taking up employment, her manager changed and she was then asked and expected to travel frequently in order to generate business. She raised issues with this and sought a copy of the grievance procedure, upon which her employment was terminated and a new employee was recruited shortly thereafter. The equality officer was satisfied that the complainant had been discriminated against on the grounds of family status and awarded her €50,000.

42 43 44 45

Section 6(2)(c) of the Employment Equality Act 1998. Morgan v Bank of Ireland Group DEC-E2008-029. Higgins v TSB DEC-E2010-084. Long v Hanley Group DEC–E2010–015.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.19] In McCarthy v Niscayah Ltd,46 the complainant was held to have established a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to her selection for redundancy. The complainant demonstrated that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of family status on the basis of her parental leave and her complaints about proposed changes to the respondent’s maternity leave policy. It was held that the respondent’s procedures for implementing the complainant’s redundancy had been inadequate and therefore it could not rebut the discrimination claim. Sexual orientation [8.19]   Section 6(2)(d) of the 1998 Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This includes discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual and heterosexual persons. Further, it has been held that discrimination against transsexuals constitutes discrimination on the grounds of sex.47 In A Worker v Brookfield Leisure Ltd,48 the claimant was dismissed from her job following an allegation – which she denied – that she had been seen kissing another woman in the changing rooms of the leisure centre at which she worked. She claimed she had been dismissed because of her sexual orientation. The Labour Court dismissed the claim on the basis that a man would have suffered the same treatment for a similar display of his sexual orientation. However, in A Construction Worker v A Construction Company,49 the Equality Tribunal upheld the complaint of a general operative who complained that he had been subjected to sexual harassment on the grounds of his sexual orientation. He had worked for the respondent from June 1996 until April 2006, and alleged that he had been treated in a discriminatory manner and victimised when his conditions of employment were changed, when he was placed on sick leave and ultimately when he was made redundant. The respondent accepted that some of the incidents had taken place, but denied that the sick leave or redundancy represented less favourable treatment on the basis of the complainant’s sexual orientation or that he had been adversely treated because of his complaints. It has also been held that outing someone against their wishes could constitute harassment.50 In Two Complainants v A Restaurant,51 the complainants were a same-sex couple who worked together in a restaurant and were subjected to comments of a sexual nature in relation to their relationship. The equality officer, in finding that they had both

46

McCarthy v Niscayah Ltd EDA1328. P v S and Cornwall County Council (1996) IRLR 347 and Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed (1998) IRLR 56. A Worker v Brookfield Leisure Ltd (1994) ELR 79. A Construction Worker v A Construction Company DEC-E2008-048. Grant v HM Land Registry [2011] ELR 33; see also A Creche Worker v A Creche ADJ-00032972 4 April 2023, where it was held that when someone was outed at work – even though this was not meant to humiliate the person – and the interaction was witnessed by a supervisor who did not intervene, this constituted harassment. Two Complainants v A Restaurant [2013] ELR 333.

47 See 48 49 50

51

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[8.20]  Termination of Employment been victims of harassment on the grounds of their sexual orientation, expressly held that, ‘It is a duty on employers under the Acts to provide a workplace in which it is safe for lesbians and gay men to be open about their sexuality’. Disclosure of sexual orientation [8.20]  In Grant v HM Land Registry,52 the UK Court of Appeal held that the disclosure of an employee’s sexual orientation did not amount to discrimination and harassment in circumstances where the employee had previously told other colleagues that he was gay. Mr Grant was promoted to a new post in a different office for HM Land Registry. Mr Grant had disclosed that he was gay to colleagues in his old office but did not disclose this information to colleagues in his new office. His new line manager knew that Mr  Grant was gay and mentioned this to Mr  Grant’s new colleagues. Mr Grant alleged that his line manager’s comments were acts of discrimination and harassment. The Court of Appeal found that the line manager’s comments did not have the purpose or effect of violating Mr Grant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him. A key consideration was that Mr Grant had chosen to reveal his sexual orientation to other colleagues. The court also noted that this case was in a different category from the situation where an employee has actually requested that their sexuality be kept secret. In A Creche Worker v A Creche,53 the complainant gave evidence that on 21 October 2021, a work colleague, Ms A, had asked her if she had a boyfriend. The complainant answered that she had no interest in boyfriends; and when pressed by Ms A, she said that she had no interest in men. Another staff member, supervisor Ms B, witnessed the conversation. The complainant had told nobody at work about her sexual orientation and found it very difficult even to tell her parents about it. She contacted her mother to collect her to bring her home because she was terribly upset about what had occurred. At home, she reported the incident by text to her manager, Ms C, whom she met the following day, 22 October 2021. The complainant claimed that Ms C had said to her that if she did not want other members of staff to know about her sexual orientation, then perhaps she should have lied. The complainant also stated that Ms C had said that Ms A was a good person.  The adjudication officer, in finding for the complainant, stated that while he was satisfied that Ms C’s intention was not to humiliate or otherwise hurt the complainant on the day in question, this was not to say that the questions asked by Ms A should be construed as minor examples when they effectively led to the complainant being pressurised into ‘outing’ herself. It is clear in this case that Ms A had not been fully informed of what constitutes harassment by the respondent. Moreover, the non-intervention by the supervisor who had witnessed the interaction clearly exacerbated the distress for the complainant. The adjudicator went on to say, ‘Furthermore, I cannot ignore the fact that the Respondent’s subsequent failures to properly deal with the complaint did not protect the Complainant’. 52 53

Grant v HM Land Registry [2011] ICR 1390. A Creche Worker v A Creche ADJ-00032972, 4 April 2023.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.21] Religious belief [8.21]   Section 6(2)(e) of the 1998 Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. This includes having a different religious belief, a different religious background, a different religious outlook or no religious belief or outlook. In Sheeran v Office of Public Works54 – a case brought under the Equal Status Act 2000 – the claimant, a humanist, objected to hearing the angelus bell sounded from a chapel in Dublin Castle. While he had no objection to bells being rung by religious groups, he felt it was inappropriate for public property to be used for this. The equality officer held that the claimant had not established a prima facia case of discrimination, in that the complainant had not shown that the respondent had treated some religious groups less favourably than others or that ‘the ringing of the angelus bell represents anything other than a minimal intervention into his own lack of religious belief’. Consistently, the issue that arises is whether the claimant has been treated ‘less favourably’ than others. One case in which indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion was argued was McAteer v South Tipperary County Council.55 Here the complainant had been employed by the respondent as a civil engineer between December and July 2010. He was a born-again Christian and was dismissed in 2010 following a number of complaints about him ‘preaching to staff and members of the public during working hours’. He received multiple warnings and attended disciplinary meetings in which he was told not to discuss his religion during working hours or on lunch breaks. He was also compelled to seek professional help to control his compulsion to speak to people about his beliefs, and he attended four counselling sessions. The equality officer found that as the complainant was an evangelical Christian, and as it was one of the fundamental tenets of his religion to share his faith with others, imposing restrictions on him had a greater impact on him as an evangelical Christian than on other people of different religious beliefs or those who had no religion. This led the equality officer to find that the complainant had established a prima facie case of indirect discrimination. The respondent sought to objectively justify the indirect discrimination and, inter alia, argued that the policy was to prevent the complainant from bringing the Council into disrepute; but this was also rejected. A similar argument was made in Mark Savage v University College Dublin.56 Here the complainant was a mature student who had taken two year-long leaves of absence due to his involvement in litigation. He applied for a third year-long leave of absence from the respondent as the litigation was still ongoing. This was refused and he had to withdraw from his studies. The complainant argued that the respondent had discriminated against him by refusing to grant him further leaves of absence that were necessary for him to vindicate his rights, including his religious belief, because as an evangelical Christian he was obliged to preach his religious beliefs and the neutral provision of the 54 55 56

Sheeran v Office of Public Works DEC-S2004/015. McAteer v South Tipperary County Council DEC–E 2014–045. Mark Savage v University College Dublin ADJ-00014412.October 16, 2019.

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[8.22]  Termination of Employment respondent in treating everyone the same limiting the length and number of leaves had a disproportionate impact on him. In rejecting his claim, the adjudication officer noted that the respondent had been unaware of the complainant’s religious beliefs when the decision not to grant him an extension was made; and that it was only one year later, when the complainant had applied for a third leave of absence, that he stated that the litigation was connected to his religious beliefs – by which time the decision had already been made. Age [8.22]   Section 6(2)(f) of the 1998 Act prohibits discrimination on the grounds of age (see also 3.51). The 2004 Act amended the 1998 Act by inserting a new s 6(3) after s 6(2). This section applies to all ages above the maximum age at which a person is statutorily obliged to attend school (presently 16); but an employer may set a minimum age not exceeding 18 years for recruitment to a post. There is no upper limit on what age a person must be in order to bring a claim. Section 6(3)(d) of the 1998 Act amended s 2 of the 1977 Unfair Dismissals Act to remove this. The first age-related dismissal case was A Firm of Solicitors v A Worker,57 in which the Labour Court found that the worker’s dismissal resulted from the employer’s decision to employ a younger person. In Kerrigan v Peter Owens Advertising and Marketing Ltd,58 the EAT likewise held that selection for redundancy on the grounds of age constituted unfair dismissal. The significant difference between discriminatory treatment based on age and that based on other factors, such as disability or religion, is that art  6 of the Framework Equal Treatment Directive59 presents a set of specific circumstances in which agebased discrimination may be justified, such as Member States taking action designed to achieve a legitimate employment policy. Retirement [8.23]   Article 6 of the Framework Employment Directive provides that: ‘1. Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 2. Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that the fixing for occupational social security schemes of ages for admission or entitlement to retirement or invalidity benefits, including the fixing under those schemes of different ages for employees or groups or categories of employees and the use in the context of such schemes or age criteria in actuarial calculations, does not constitute discrimination on the grounds of age, provided this does not result in discrimination of the grounds of sex.’ 57 58 59

A Firm of Solicitors v A Worker (2002) ELR 124. Kerrigan v Peter Owen Advertising and Marketing Ltd UD31/97. Council Directive 2000/78/EC.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.23] The Directive therefore allows Member States (not employers) to provide for different treatment in art 6(1). There is also a reference to retirement ages in the non-binding Recital 14: ‘This Directive shall be without prejudice to national provisions laying down retirement ages.’ The above was wrongly transposed into Irish law by s 34(4) of the Employment Equality Act 1998, which provided that: ‘Without prejudice to subsection (3), it shall not constitute discrimination on the age ground to fix different ages for retirement (whether voluntarily or compulsorily) of employees or any class of employees.’ Whether s  34(4) properly transposed the aims of the Directive regarding retirement ages was the matter of some debate before the passing of the Equality (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 2015. Thus, in Calor Teoranta v McCarth60 y, the Labour Court suggested that the section might not be compatible with EU law. Equally, on appeal to the High Court, Clarke J questioned whether s 34(4), properly interpreted in light of the Directive, provides in all cases an immunity in respect of a discrimination claim where someone retires at contractual retirement age. Ultimately, the 2015 Act changed s 34(4), which now provides: Without prejudice to subsection (3), it shall not constitute discrimination on the age ground to fix different ages for the retirement (whether voluntarily or compulsorily) of employees or any class or description of employees if— (a) it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and (b) the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

Thus, the retirement age must now be objectively justified by reference to a particular aim; and the means of achieving that aim must be appropriate and necessary. In Pat O’Donnell & Co v Denis O’Keefe,61 the Labour Court found that the mandatory retirement age set by the employer was valid. The employer provided evidence that the role was a safety-critical one,62 and the alternative to a mandatory retirement age was to require those employed to undergo medical examinations which could result in their employment coming to an end and could undermine their dignity at work. The Court also noted that the ‘complainant pointed to only one individual who had worked beyond 65 … but did not contradict the respondent’s evidence that the individual transferred out of his role as a service engineer five years before his retirement’. This case can be contrasted with Anthony Kenny v Bord na Mona,63 where the employer was found to have discriminated against the complainant by refusing his request to continue working beyond normal retirement age. The reasons given by the employer related to custom and practice, pension scheme rules, employees’ entitlement to draw down a pension and the rule that all employees retire on their 65th birthday, as distinct from being a legitimate aim of the company and objectively justified. See also 3.30. 60

Calor Teoranta v McCarthy [2009] IEHC 139. Pat O’Donnell & Co v Denis O’Keefe EDA 2133. 62 In Irish Ferries v McDermott EDA1631 it was accepted that setting a retirement age is an objective and legitimate means of protecting the safety of staff. 63 Anthony Kenny v Bord Na Mona ADJ-00027832, 1 October 2021. 61

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[8.24]  Termination of Employment Code of Practice on Longer Working [8.24]   The Code of Practice on Longer Working64 provides guidance on how employers should approach requests by employees to work beyond their contractual retirement age. Such requests should be considered carefully, taking into account matters such as the duration of the extension being sought; whether flexible working options or alternative roles would be suitable; and whether there are any pension or contractual implications for the individual. Where such requests are made, employers should document the reasons for granting or refusing any such request. Employers need to assess requests from comparable employees based on the same objective criteria to ensure that a fair and consistent approach is taken. If the decision is made to refuse a request, the objective grounds for the decision should be set out in writing and communicated to the employee in a meeting; and the employee should be given a right to appeal. The Code provides that requests to work beyond the retirement age can be facilitated by means of a fixed-term contract, as permitted by the Equality Act,65 provided that this can be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and that the means of achieving this aim are appropriate and necessary. Fixed-term contracts post normal retirement age [8.25]   While the Acts allow employers to issue fixed-term contracts to those who wish to work beyond normal retirement age, this also must be objectively justified. This matter was examined in A Senior Staff Nurse v A Nursing Home (In Liquidation).66 Here the adjudicator found that even accepting an employee’s request to work beyond the retirement age by providing a fixed-term contract is not a defence to an age discrimination claim if there is no objective justification for the use of a retirement age, and/or if the retirement age is not an appropriate and necessary means of achieving that aim. Disability [8.26]   There is no definition of ‘disability’ in the Framework Directive. The ECJ has ruled that ‘sickness itself is not enough to qualify as a disability’67 for the purpose of the Directive. ‘Disability’ is defined in s 2 of the act as: (a) the total or partial absence of a person’s bodily or mental functions, including the absence of a part of a person’s body; (b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic disease or illness; 64 65

66 67

SI 600/2017, Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017. The Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015  inserted s 3 c) and (d) into the 1998 Act to provide that it will not constitute discrimination to offer a fixed-term contract to an employee over the compulsory retirement age where this is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. A Senior Staff Nurse v A Nursing Home (in Liquidation) ADJ-00027325, 20 August 2021. Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades [2006] ECR I-0667.

340

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.28] (c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person’s body; (d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction; or (e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person’s thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgement, or which results in disturbed behaviour. The definition includes a disability which exists at present, or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the future or which is imputed to a person. What is not a disability? [8.27]   Despite the clear statement by the ECJ that ‘sickness itself is not enough to qualify as a disability’, the Labour Court stated in Customer Perception Ltd v Leydon that the Irish definition does not require a certain severity of impairment or of functional limitation. This statement set a very broad definition of ‘disability’. That said, there are a number of helpful judgments as to what is not a disability. Thus, an ankle injury was held not to be a disability where a light cage fell on an employee’s ankle and punctured her skin;68 similarly, a one-day illness which cleared up quickly did not satisfy the test.69 Moloney v M J Clarke & Sons Ltd was an interesting case.70 Here the complainant was profoundly deaf (which clearly amounts to a disability); however, he did not complain about this per se, but rather about ‘psychological scarring’. The equality officer stated that: ‘I find that no explanation on how psychological scarring is a disability as defined under the Acts was provided to the Tribunal. Furthermore, no report from a recognised mental health professional to confirm such a diagnosis was produced in evidence … it is therefore the case that no diagnosis of a ‘condition, illness or disease’ was provided to the Tribunal to show that the complainant was disabled within the meaning of s 2(e) of the Acts.’

Finally, in A Worker v A Food Manufacturer,71 nondescript sickness certificates were deemed not to constitute a disability under the Acts. What does constitute a disability? [8.28]   Notwithstanding the above, through case law, ‘disability’ has been defined broadly to include a range of medical conditions, including physical, intellectual, cognitive, learning and emotional disabilities. Alcoholism has also been held to be a disability, even if the person is in recovery. The first disability-related dismissal was A Computer Component Company v A Worker,72 in which the employer had terminated the worker’s employment because she suffered from epilepsy. Epilepsy was held to constitute a disability under the Act and the worker was awarded €19,046.07. 68 69 70 71 72

Colgan v Boots Ireland DEC-E201-008. O’Rourke v JJ red Holding Limited t/a Dublin City Hotel DEC-2010-046. Moloney v M J Clarke & Sons Ltd DEC-E2010-140. A Worker v A Food Manufacturer DEC- E2010-187. A Computer Component Company v A Worker (2002) ELR 124.

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[8.29]  Termination of Employment In A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker,73 the Labour Court held that an employee who suffered from anorexia and bulimia suffered a disability as defined under the 1998 Act. As the employer in this instance made no effort to obtain a prognosis of the complainant’s condition and reached a conclusion on same without the benefit of any form of professional advice or assessment of the risks associated with her condition, and as it did not discuss the situation with her before taking a decision on her future, her dismissal was deemed to be contrary to the Act and she was awarded €13,000 in compensation. In Woods v Euro Route Logistics,74 the respondent employer relied on the fact that the complainant had left on medical advice. The equality officer was satisfied that the respondent had considered the complainant’s disability as an impediment to his continued employment and found that he had been terminated because of his asthma. The equality officer cited with approval A Government Department v An Employee,75 where the Labour Court stated that: ‘[T]he requirement to establish that there was no discrimination whatsoever means that the Court must be alert to the possibility that a person with a disability may suffer discrimination not because they suffer from a disability per se, but they are perceived, because of their disability to be less capable or less dependable than a person without a disability. The Court must always be alert to the possibility of unconscious or inadvertent discrimination and mere denial of a discriminatory motive in the absence of independent corroboration, must be approached with caution.’

The above highlights the necessity for employers, in dealing with disability cases, to ensure that they seek the best possible independent medical advice in relation to the employee’s condition before moving to terminate their employment. Awareness of disability [8.29]  In A Company v A Worker,76 the Labour Court held that for an employer to be able to respond to a disability, it is essential that it is aware both that there is a disability in existence and that there is a problem with work as a consequence. Capability [8.30]   Section 16 of the 1998 Act provides that an employer is not required to recruit, retain, train or promote a person who will not or is not available to carry out the duties of a position, or who will not accept the conditions under which the duties attached to a post are to be performed, or who is not fully competent to carry out the duties concerned. This section was amended by s 9 of the 2004 Act and also applies to employment agencies and other bodies covered by s 13 – that is, employers’ organisations, trade unions and professional bodies.

73 74 75 76

A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker ED/02/59. Woods v Euro Route Logistics DEC-E2010. A Government Department v An Employee ADE/05/19. A Company v A Worker ED/04/13 Determination 051.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.31] The section provides a complete defence to a claim of discrimination on the grounds of disability if the employer can prove that it formed a bona fide belief that the complainant was not fully capable of performing the duties for which they were employed. Employers are obliged, however, to make adequate enquiries to establish the full factual position in relation to an employee’s capacity. This would mean in practice ensuring that there are up-to-date medical reports, including an independent opinion of a medical specialist. In Humphrey’s v Westwood Fitness Club,77 the Court stated: ‘[T]he nature and extent of the enquiries which an employer should make will depend on the circumstances of each case. At a minimum, however, an employer should ensure that he or she is in full possession of all the material facts concerning the employee’s condition and that the employee is given fair notice that the question of his or her dismissal for incapacity is being considered. The employee must also be allowed an opportunity to influence the employer’s decision.’

The Court went on to state that any investigation should follow a two-stage approach. At the first stage, the employer should familiarise itself with all the relevant ­medical data, either from the employee’s doctor or independently. The second stage is to consider what, if any, special treatment or facilities may be available from the employer such that the employee could become fully capable. The cost of such special treatment or facilities must also be considered. This line of reasoning was also followed in A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker.78 The case, which was widely reported, involved the dismissal of a childcare assistant in a crèche. The respondent believed that the employee’s conditions of anorexia and bulimia rendered her unsuitable to work in a childcare facility. The Labour Court had to consider s 16 of the Act and put forward a two-stage approach for considering reasonable accommodation. The Court stated: ‘This section, on which the respondent relies can provide a completed defence to a claim of discrimination on the disability ground if it can be shown that the employer formed the bona fide belief that the complainant is not fully capable, within the meaning of the section, of performing the duties for which they are employed. However, before coming to that view the employer would normally be required to make adequate enquiries so as to establish fully the factual position in relation to the employee’s capacity.’

[8.31]   The nature and extent of the enquiries which an employer should make will depend on the circumstances of each case. At a minimum, however, an employer should ensure that it is in full possession of all the material facts concerning the employee’s condition, and that the employee is given fair notice that the question of their dismissal for incapacity is being considered. The employee must also be allowed an opportunity to influence the employer’s decision. In practical terms, this will normally require a two-stage enquiry, which first looks at the factual position concerning the employee’s capability, including the degree of

77 78

Humphrey’s v Westwood Fitness Club (2004) ELR 296 300. A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker EEE/DO/37.

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[8.31]  Termination of Employment impairment arising from the disability and its likely duration. This will involve reviewing the medical evidence available to the employer, either provided by the employee’s doctors or obtained independently. Second, if it is apparent that the employee is not fully capable, s 16(3) of the Act requires the employer to consider what, if any, special treatment or facilities may be available by which the employee can become fully capable. The section requires that the cost of such special treatment or facilities must also be considered. Here, what constitutes nominal cost will depend on the size of the organisation and its financial resources. Finally, such an enquiry can be regarded as adequate only if the employee concerned is allowed a full opportunity to participate at each level and is allowed to present medical evidence and submissions. In summary, the Labour Court requires that prior to dismissing any employee on the grounds of capability, the employer must: (a) have the employee independently medically examined; (b) if the employee is medically unfit for work, consider what special treatment or facilities may be available by which the employee can become fully capable; and (c) allow the employee to participate fully at each level – this will include discussing what special treatment or facilities may be available and discussing any medical reports and offering such counter-reports as may be available to them. Mr A v A Government Department79 added a further requirement: employers must take a proactive approach. In this case, the court found that the employer had failed to pursue an assessment of the complainant’s situation and an exploration of reasonable accommodation in a proactive fashion. Thus, employers must not only consider all options, but also be proactive in doing so. Of particular importance is that all information and enquiries must be shared with the employee, and they must be allowed to present ‘relevant medical evidence and submissions’. (Note the decision in An Applicant v A County Council,80 where the respondent was criticised for not allowing the complainant the opportunity to comment on medical evidence.) In practice, this often gives rise to acrimonious exchanges, as often the company’s medical practitioner says one thing while the employee’s says another. The best advice in this regard is to ensure that the employee is referred to an occupational health specialist in the first instance; and if there is debate between a specialist hired by the company and one instructed by the employee, it may be necessary to obtain a third opinion. Of note here is the decision in Ryan v Dublin Airport Authority,81 which stated: ‘[I]t is not the place of the Tribunal to assess contradictory medical opinions as I don’t prefer one opinion over another. Rather, it is for me to consider whether the respondent has satisfied the test in A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker.’82

79 80 81 82

Mr A v A Government Department DEC-2008-023. An Applicant v A County Council DEC-E2010-054. Ryan v Dublin Airport Authority DEC-E2010-059. Ryan v Dublin Airport Authority DEC-E2010-059 at 36.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.32] Disability and reasonable accommodation [8.32]   The Framework Directive imposes an obligation on employers to take appropriate measures to enable a person with a disability to access employment, to participate or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden. Section 16(3)(a) of the 1998 Act states that: ‘For the purposes of this Act a person who has a disability is fully competent to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, any duties if the person would be so fully competent and capable on reasonable accommodation (in this subsection referred to as “appropriate measures”) being provided by the person’s employer.’

In A Company v A Worker,83 the Labour Court confirmed this by stating: ‘Article 5 of Directive 2000/78 of the 27th of November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupations, imposes a positive duty on employers to take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment. A similar requirement is now incorporated in section 16(3) of the Act as amended.’

‘Appropriate measures’ are defined in s 16(4) as follows: ‘“appropriate measures” in relation to a person with a disability— (a) means effective and practical measures, where needed in a particular case, to adapt the employer’s place of business to the disability concerned. (b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), includes the adaptation of premises and equipment, patterns of working time, distribution of tasks or the provision of training and integration resources, but (c) does not include any treatment, facility or thing that the person might ordinarily or reasonably provide for himself or herself.’

In An Employer and A Worker,84 the Labour Court defined this as an objective test to be determined by what is reasonable, and which must have regard to all the circumstances of the case. Here the court went on to say that special treatment could mean: (a) considering adjusting the person’s hours, allowing them to work from home or allowing them to undertake certain tasks which others doing similar tasks would be expected to perform; or (b) affording the person with a disability more favourable treatment than someone without a disability. In Bus Éireann v Mr C,85 the Court took the view that the failure of the employer to consider possible alternative positions, despite the Court agreeing that Mr C was unfit for his present position, was a ‘failure to fulfil the duty imposed by s 16(1)(b) of the Act’.

83 84 85

A Company v A Worker ADE/09/21. An Employer v A Worker EEA0413. Bus Éireann v Mr C ADE/07/EDA 08111.

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[8.33]  Termination of Employment In Noel Flynn v Emerald Facilities Services,86 the equality officer found that the complainant was covered by the disability ground in that he suffered from alcoholism; however, the officer was also satisfied that the complainant had never stated this to the respondent or asked for reasonable accommodation to be granted. In those circumstances, the equality officer found that facts had not been established upon which the complainant could rely in asserting that he had suffered a discriminatory dismissal and his complaint failed. [8.33]   The test of reasonable accommodation was dealt with by the Supreme Court in Nano Nagle v Daly,87 where the Court outlined a number of key points: (a) The Supreme Court, in rejecting a notion of the High Court, broadened the scope of an employer’s reasonable accommodation obligation by stating that there is no reason why providing reasonable accommodation should not involve a redistribution of what might be termed core ‘duties’ as well as non-core ‘tasks’. (b) Employers are under a mandatory duty to take all ‘appropriate measures’ unless any measure would constitute a ‘disproportionate burden’. The Supreme Court in particular noted that the test ‘is one of reasonableness and proportionality: an employer cannot be under a duty entirely to re-designate or create a different job to facilitate an employee, as this would almost inevitably impose a disproportionate burden on an employer’. Employers must be able to demonstrate that they have fully considered the matter of reasonable accommodation. (c) The Supreme Court confirmed that employers have no legal obligation to consult employees or to allow them to participate in the process of assessing what is or is not reasonable accommodation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court commented that ‘a wise employer will provide meaningful participation in vindication of his or her duty under the Act’; but an absence of consultation cannot in itself constitute discrimination. This comment, however, should be weighed against the need for employers in this jurisdiction to apply fair procedures and to act reasonably before terminating someone. (d) The Supreme Court confirmed that employers are under a mandatory duty to explore the possibility of obtaining public funding or other assistance when considering all reasonable accommodation which might be put in place. (e) The Supreme Court acknowledged that if an employee is unable to fully undertake the duties of their role, even after being reasonably accommodated, then there is no discrimination at issue. Phased return to work [8.34]  In A Worker (Mr O) v An Employer No 1,88 the Labour Court considered the issue of whether an employer should be obliged to provide an employee with a ‘phased return to work’, and whether failure to allow them to return to work on such a basis (as advised by their doctor) constituted a failure to accommodate their needs by 86 87 88

Noel Flynn v Emerald Facilities Services DEC-E2009-065. Nano Nagle v Daly [2019] IESC 63. A Worker (Mr O) v An Employer No 1 (2005) ELR 113.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.36] providing a special treatment or facilities in accordance with the Employment Equality Act. The Labour Court held that the decision of the company not to provide a phased return to work meant the employee in effect could not return to work, and that this was discriminatory (see also 3.71). Disproportionate burden [8.35]   What constitutes a disproportionate burden on employers is a matter to be determined from the facts of each case.89 In Patrick Kennedy v Stresslite Tanks Ltd & Stresslite Floors Ltd,90 it was held that leaving a person on the books of the company once their sick pay had expired would not have placed a disproportionate burden on the employer. Also, in O’Sullivan and Siemens Business Services Ltd,91 the equality officer held that the provision of an assessment test in an electronic format could in no sense be considered as imposing a disproportionate burden. In Mr B v A Metal Processing Company,92 the claimant suffered from diabetes and was removed from driving duties after a hypoglycaemic attack. The employer then tasked a buddy to accompany him in the truck. However, after some time, redundancies were implemented and the claimant’s buddy had his role terminated. In holding that the claimant had been reasonably accommodated, the equality officer concluded that he had been accommodated until this became a disproportionate burden on the employer. Race [8.36]   Section 6(2)(h) of the 1998 Act defines ‘race’ as encompassing differences ‘in race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins’. The definition of ‘race’ contained in s 6 of the Act is broader than that contained in the Directive, in that nationality is expressly included in the Irish definition, whereas it is not in the Directive. Thus, the Act provides significantly greater scope to claims of discrimination, as a complainant does not have to show a different ethnic or racial origin to prove less favourable treatment. This ‘broad’ definition can be seen in many decisions. Thus, in A Manager of an English Language School v An Institute of Technology,93 the equality officer found that calling the complainant a ‘fiery Latin’ constituted harassment on grounds of race. Zhang v Towner Trading t/a Spar Drimnagh94 highlights the importance for employers of adhering to their own procedures. Here the employee was notified of an allegation of theft and ultimately was dismissed by text message from the respondent. The respondent failed to follow fair procedures, there was no investigation and the employee was denied an opportunity to have representation or prepare a defence to the allegations of

89 See 90 91 92 93 94

A Health and Fitness Club v A Worker EE/DP/37. Kennedy v Stresslite Tanks Ltd & Stresslite Floors Ltd DEC- E2009-078. O’Sullivan and Siemens Business Services Ltd DEC-E2006-058. Mr B v A Metal Processing Company DEC 2013-196. A Manager of an English Language School v An Institute of Technology DUC-2007-019. Zhang v Towner Trading t/a Spar Drimnagh DEC–E2008–01.

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[8.37]  Termination of Employment theft. The equality officer, in citing the Labour Court in Campbell Catering v Rasaq,95 stated: ‘It is clear that many non-national workers encounter special difficulties in employment arising from a lack of knowledge concerning statutory and contractual employment rights together with differences of language and culture. In the case of disciplinary proceedings, employers have a positive duty to ensure that all workers fully understand what is alleged against them, the gravity of the alleged misconduct and their right to mount a full defence, including the right to representation. Special measures may be necessary in the case of nonnational workers to ensure that this obligation is fulfilled and that the accused worker fully appreciates the gravity of the situation and is given appropriate facilities and guidance in making a defence. In such cases, applying the same procedural standards to non-national workers as would be applied to an Irish national could amount to the application of the same rules to different situations and could in itself amount to discrimination.’

The equality officer awarded compensation of €15,000 to Ms Zhang and ordered the employer to issue a disciplinary procedure for all staff that complied with the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures (SI 146/2000). Ethnic origin [8.37]   The question of what constitutes ethnic origins has been the subject of some case law, but not in this jurisdiction. The UK Court of Appeal in Dawkins v Department of the Environment96 deemed that Rastafarians were not a separate ‘racial group’ within the ethnic group of the Afro-Caribbean community. In Mandla v Lee,97 the House of Lords stated that a group may be defined by reference to its ‘ethnic origins’ if it constitutes a separate and distinct community by virtue of characteristics which are commonly associated with common racial origin, and that this term is ‘appreciably wider than strictly racial or biological’. In this jurisdiction, the general approach which is adopted in considering cases of racial discrimination is that laid down by the House of Lords in Glasgow City Council v Zafar.98 That decision was subsequently adopted in this jurisdiction by Quirk J in Davis v Dublin Institute of Technology.99 In Zafar, Lord Browne-Wilkinson pointed out that where there is a difference both in treatment and in race, there is prima facie evidence of discrimination, and it is for the respondent to provide a non-discriminatory explanation. Membership of the Traveller community [8.38]   Section 6(2)(i) of the 1998 Act prohibits discrimination on the basis that a person is a member of the Traveller community. The Act does not contain a definition of the ‘Traveller community’, but this was addressed in the Equal Status Act 2000.100

95

Campbell Catering v Rasaq ED/02/52 Labour Court. Dawkins v Department of the Environment (1993) IRLR 284. Mandla v Lee (1983) IRLR 209. 98 Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1998] 2 All ER 953. 99 Davis v Dublin Institute of Technology 2002/9771 P (July 2002), HC. 100 Section 39 of the Equal Status Act 2000 inserted a definition of ‘Traveller community’ into s 2 of the Employment Equality Act 1998. 96 97

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.40] The first case decided by the Equality Tribunal on traveller employment was Nevin v Plaza Hotel.101 The claimant applied for a job in the hotel and was asked to attend work the following day. The claimant was not offered any more hours after the first day – allegedly because there were insufficient hours, but then also allegedly because of performance issues. There was a debate as to whether there was an actual job offer or whether the first day was a trial. Ultimately the equality officer set great store in a remark that was made by one staff member to the effect that the claimant did not have the same concept of cleaning as other employees; but ‘how could she be expected to, given the way they lived’. An award of €6,348.69 was made and the respondent was instructed to draw up an equal opportunities policy. Sexual harassment and harassment [8.39]   A new s 14A was inserted into the 1998 Act by s 8 of the Equality Act 2004. This was necessary to reflect the common approach taken in the Directives to the treatment of harassment on any of the discriminatory grounds. Consequently, the separate provisions of the 1998 Act in respect of sexual harassment (s 23) and harassment (s 32) were repealed by virtue of ss 14 and 21 of the 2004 Act. ‘Harassment’ and ‘sexual harassment’ are now defined in s 14A(7)(a) as follows: ‘7) (a) In this section— (i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and (ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. (b) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.’

Harassment therefore must relate to one of the discriminatory grounds.102 Sexual harassment or harassment of an employee constitutes discrimination by the employer. It is a defence for the employer to prove that it took reasonably practicable steps to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the employee; or (where relevant) to prevent the employee from being treated differently in the workplace or in the course of employment (and to reverse its effects where this had occurred). Essential characteristics of sexual harassment and harassment [8.40]   The essential characteristic of sexual harassment is that it is unwanted by the recipient. This can arise even where there is a consensual relationship between adults. 101

Nevin v Plaza Hotel [2002] 13 ELR 177. Nail Zone Ltd v A Worker EDA 1023 10 November 2010.

102 See

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[8.41]  Termination of Employment In A Company v A Worker,103 the Labour Court stated that a sexual relationship between consenting adults does not imply that this consent is unlimited as regards either its duration or the acts which may take place between the parties. Furthermore, the harasser need not be an employee of the employer. Indeed, one of the largest awards ever made in Ireland for sexual harassment was handed down by the Circuit Court in Atkinson v Carty.104 Damages amounting to €137,500 (with a deduction of 25 per cent for contributory negligence) were awarded to Ms Atkinson, a legal accountant who had experienced serious sexual harassment from an independent contractor to the firm in which she was employed over a period of seven or eight years. The high level of the award is indicative of the seriousness with which the courts approach this issue. Sexual harassment can also take place outside the workplace, as in A Limited Company v One Female Employee;105 or at a company social event.106 Defence to sexual harassment and harassment (reasonably practicable steps) [8.41]   Section 14A(2) of the 1998 Act provides a defence for employers if they can prove that they took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the person from ‘harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim or to prevent the victim from being treated differently as a result of the harassment occurring and where such harassment occurred it took action to reverse its effect’. Equally s  15, which deals with vicarious liability, provides a defence for employers where they: ‘took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee— (a) from doing that act, or (b) from doing in the course of his or her employment acts of that description.’

‘Reasonably practicable steps’ would include implementing proper procedures, adopting the most up to date code of practice and training employees, as well as refreshing that training. The 2022 Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work published by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Authority, replaced the previous Code published in 2012. Many of the principles set out in the 2012 Code were restated by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC), which produced the 2022 Code. There were, however, a number of notable additions – not least the following: (a) The harassment policy should include a statement encouraging employees to challenge harassment and sexual harassment in the workplace; 103

A Company v A Worker EE03/1991. Atkinson v Carty (2005) ELR 1. A Limited Company v One Female Employee, EE10/1998. 106 O’N v An Insurance Company. DEC-E2004-052. 104 105

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.42] (b) It is recognised that harassment may take place via social media and that this should be reflected in any workplace policy; (c) The Code now stresses the importance of employees respecting the dignity of others in the workplace; and (d) The Code reiterates the necessity for a regular review of the harassment policy by a competent person with the appropriate qualifications. It is clear that where an employer fails to develop and implement a harassment policy and a claim arises, it will be difficult to defend. In An Employee v An Employer,107 the respondent had no policy in place to deal with sexual harassment at the time of the harassment. This was held against it. More instructive perhaps are the equality officer’s comments in relation to the policy that the respondent had put in place by the time of the hearing, where she stated: ‘I am not satisfied as to the adequacy of the one page document (which also deals with bullying) in terms of preventing sexual harassment from occurring in the workplace and in the event that it does occur in providing an appropriate procedure for dealing with a complaint.’

(See also EH v A Named Company Trading as A Cab Company Dublin108 below.) Also, in A Female Employee v A Recruitment Company,109 the employer in this instance had no policy in place. Despite this, it sought to rely on s 15. In the circumstances, the equality officer held that where the employer had no proper policy in place and presented no evidence that it had taken any steps that were reasonably practicable to prevent sexual harassment, it could not avail of the defence. It is evident, therefore, that for a defence to be mounted, appropriate policies must not only be put in place, but must also be detailed and clear. Also, any policy on bullying should be documented separately. Grievance procedure [8.42]   As a bare minimum, every employer must have a basic grievance procedure. This is necessary to ensure that the employee knows where to direct their complaint, what they will expect to happen arising from the complaint, the procedure for carrying out the investigation and what will happen when the investigation ends. It will also ensure that the issue is brought to the employer’s attention, and that the employer has an opportunity to deal with it in a speedy, professional and confidential manner. Of course, there are practical problems in small companies or where the alleged harasser is the person’s boss. If such a procedure is in place and has been brought to the employee’s attention, they are obliged to use it.

107

An Employee v An Employer DEC-E2003-027. EH v A Named Company Trading as A Cab Company Dublin DEC-E2008-048. 109 A Female Employee v A Recruitment Company DEC-E2008-015. 108

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[8.43]  Termination of Employment Adopt codes of practice into detailed policies [8.43]   The fact that an employer may have a basic grievance procedure and has informed employees of it may not in itself be sufficient to successfully defend an action – except perhaps in the smallest of companies; and even then, this will probably not be deemed satisfactory. Regard must be had to the existing codes of practice in this area, and these must be adopted and/or incorporated into existing policies and procedures. The relevant codes include: (a) the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice for Employer and Employees on the Prevention and Resolution of Bullying at Work) Order 2020;110 (b) the Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work;111 and (c) the Code of Practice on Equal Pay.112 Bullying [8.44]   As bullying is seen primarily as a health and safety issue, employers are required to consult with employees and/or their representatives when developing policies. It is also necessary to provide training. The 2020 Code of Practice on Bullying replaced two previous codes. The Code provides an updated definition of ‘bullying’ and – at least as important – defines what does not constitute bullying, such as strongly expressing differences of opinion and constructive feedback. The Code expressly sets out the role of the Health and Safety Authority (HSA)113 and the WRC114 in dealing with complaints. Employees can now report a complaint of bullying to the HSA, which can assess whether the complaint is in fact one that concerns bullying. The HSA has a public-facing phone and email Workplace Contact Unit, where employees who consider themselves to have been bullied can report their issue as a complaint or seek information about the issue. If an employee is unhappy with the actions their employer has taken to address their bullying complaint or with their employer’s handling of the matter, the HSA can assess whether, insofar as is reasonably practicable, the employer’s steps were adequate. If the HSA determines that the employer has failed to act reasonably, it can issue enforcement action. This can range from verbal or written advice to an improvement direction or notice – or even the submission of a file to the Director of Public Prosecution for a decision on whether the employer should be prosecuted for failing to protect the employee(s) concerned from bullying.

110

SI 674/2020. Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, February 2022. 112 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, February 2022. 113 Section 6.1.2 of the Code. 114 Section 6.2 of the Code. 111

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.45] The WRC can provide workplace mediation or employees can refer the matter under the Industrial Relations Act.115 Any such referral will only deal with the conduct of an investigation in terms of fairness and adherence to fair process and procedure. It will not be a hearing of the complaint. A failure to follow the new Code is not an offence in itself; but it is admissible in evidence and may be taken into account by the WRC in any employment claims concerning bullying, or by the courts in any prosecution for breach of health and safety laws relating to bullying.116 Communication and training on company policies [8.45]   It is not sufficient to merely adopt the relevant codes; employers must make employees aware of them, both on an employee’s induction into the workforce and at regular intervals thereafter. It is no defence to have policies in place if employees are not made aware of them and regular training sessions are not provided. In Jacqui McCarthy (claimant) v Dublin Corporation,117 the equality officer, in finding the respondent vicariously liable, stated: ‘[I]n relation to an employer’s vicarious liability for the discriminatory actions of its employees and agents, the existence of a policy on harassment or equality is not sufficient to prevent discrimination without clearly bringing the provisions of the policy to the attention of staff and creating a consciousness on all employees and agents as to what constitutes discrimination.’

Also, if the policy is not adhered to, this will be detrimental to the employer’s case and will be taken into consideration by the WRC in its decision.118 However, if it is, this will be seen in a good light. Thus, in A Manager of an English Language Centre v An Institute of Technology,119 the equality officer found that because the equal opportunities policy was well established and properly applied, the employer was entitled to a defence under s 15. A Worker v An Engineering Company120 points to the need to communicate the policy. Here the complainant – a British national – claimed that he had been subjected to constant harassment because of his nationality. He never made any complaint to his employer but stated that this was because his own supervisor was involved in the harassment. While the defendant had a policy, the equality officer found that it could not invoke the defence under the Act, as it was unable to show how its policy had been disseminated among staff.

115

Section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969. Kelly v Bon Secours [2012] IEHC 21 at para 9.26, where the High Court awarded the plaintiff €60,000 for the effects of bullying. Jacqui McCarthy v Dublin Corporation EE 2000/45. A Named Female Employee v A Named Respondent DEC-E2003/001. Manager of An English Language Centre v An Institute of Technology DEC-E2007-019. A Worker v An Engineering Company DUC-2008-03.

116 See 117 118 119

120

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[8.46]  Termination of Employment Impartial, fair, confidential and speedy investigations [8.46]   It is also vital that any investigation into an alleged complaint be carried out in a fair, speedy and impartial manner. Any such investigation should be carried out in accordance with the rules of natural and constitutional justice. Additionally, where – because of the size of the company, the number of people involved or a degree of partiality on the part of the proposed investigator – it is not possible to carry out a truly independent investigation, employers should consider hiring an external independent person to conduct the investigation. The Labour Court in a number of decisions has referred to this favourably. In Charlotte O’Brien v Deadline Direct Ltd t/a Deadline Couriers,121 where the company accountant had investigated the complaint, the adjudication officer stated that in his view, it would have been more appropriate if ‘instead of their accountant, the Respondent had engaged a professional with considerable experience in carrying out investigations into sexual harassment given the very serious nature of the allegations presented’. In Kathleen Ryan v Socrates Workplace Solutions,122 where the respondent had appointed a director with no previous experience in conducting a case of sexual harassment, the adjudication officer noted that this was ‘clear evidence that they [the respondent] did not appreciate the importance of fair procedures’. The need for proper investigation has been strengthened by the 2022 Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment, which makes it clear that it is preferable that an investigation be conducted by someone ‘not connected with the allegation in any way’, and by ‘at least two people’; that, as far as practicable, it be ‘gender balanced’; that investigators ‘have appropriate training’; and that external assistance be sought where appropriate to ‘ensure impartiality, objectivity and fairness’.123 Compensation for harassment [8.47]   Compensation for harassment tends to be higher than normal. Thus, Atkinson v Carty124 saw the first large award made for sexual harassment. In EH v A Named Company Trading as a Cab Company Dublin125, the employer was found to have subjected the complainant to offensive and humiliating pictures. Additionally, laxatives had been placed in a kettle which she used. There was no policy in place. Finding that the employer was liable for sexual harassment and deeming this to be of a ‘grossly offensive nature’, the Equality Tribunal awarded the maximum compensation of two years’ remuneration and directed the employer to put in place a policy to prevent sexual harassment in accordance with the Code of Practice.

121

Deadline Direct Ltd t/a Deadline Couriers ADJ-00036160, 20 April 2023. Kathleen Ryan v Socrates Workplace Solutions, ADJ-00035281 14 November 2022. 123 Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work 2022 as published by the IHREC at paragraph 98. 124 Atkinson v Carty [2005] ELR 1. 125 EH v A Named Company Trading As a Cab Company Dublin DEC-E2006-026. 122

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.48] In Kathleen Ryan v Socrates Workplace Solutions,126 a lecturer was awarded €64,584 for discrimination and a further €25,000 by way of compensation under the Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 where a colleague, during the course of a lecture, had gone behind the complainant and sexually assaulted her by putting his hands on her hips and pushing his genitals into her. Victimisation [8.48]   It is unlawful for an employer to penalise an employee for taking action to support their rights as provided for in the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2004. ‘Victimisation’ is defined in s 74 of the 1998 Act as amended by s 29(a) and (b) of the 2004 Act. Victimisation occurs where the dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee is a reaction by the employer to: (a) (b) (c) (d)

a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer; any proceedings brought by a complainant; an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant; the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act; (e) an employee having been a witness to any proceedings under these Acts or any such repealed enactment; (f) an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under these Acts or any such repealed enactment; or (g) an employee having given notice or an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. In Tom Barrett v Department of Defence,127 the Labour Court set out the three components which must be present for a claim of victimisation under s 74(2) of the Acts to be made out. It stated that: (i) ‘the Complainant must have taken action of a type referred to at paragraphs (a)-(g) of Section 74(2) – what it terms a “protected act”, (ii) the Complainant must be subjected to adverse treatment by his/her employer and (iii) the adverse treatment must be in reaction to the protected act having been taken by the Complainant’. In A Complainant v A Department Store,128 the equality officer emphasised that ‘victimisation’ is a matter that must be considered ‘very seriously’, and that ‘significant compensation’ should be awarded to successful complainants. Also, in Dublin City Council v McCarthy,129 the Labour Court stated that ‘the victimisation of a person for having in good faith taken a claim under the equality legislation is very serious as it could have the impact of undermining the effectiveness of the legislation and is

126

Kathleen Ryan v Socrates Workplace Solutions ADJ-00035281, 14 November 2022. Tom Barrett v Department of Defence EDA1017. 128 A Complainant v A Department Store DEC-E2002/017. 129 Dublin City Council v McCarthy EDA022. 127

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[8.49]  Termination of Employment completely unacceptable’. The equality officer awarded the complainant €50,000; but on appeal, the Labour Court reduced the award to €25,000. Compensation for victimisation [8.49]   Similar to harassment, compensation for claims of victimisation generally appears to be more generous than that for discrimination. In A Female Employee v A Candle Production Company130 the complainant was awarded €7,000 for discrimination and €10,000 for victimisation. In McGinn v Board of Management St Anthony’s Boys National School,131 the equality officer awarded the maximum of 104 weeks’ pay amounting to €117,362; and an award of 18 months’ salary was made in A Female Teacher v Board of Management of a Secondary School.132 Victimisation post dismissal [8.50]  In Catherine Connerty v Caffrey Transport Limited,133 the complainant had previously been employed with the respondent. After she left, she alleged that two prospective employers had received bad references about her from her former employer. Specific mention was made of an equality case that she had taken against it. The equality officer, while finding that the employee had failed to establish a prima facie claim of discriminatory treatment on grounds of gender, marital status and family status, did determine that she had been victimised by her former employer by it making reference to her equality claim and other employment claims that she had brought against it. She was awarded €15,000 compensation for the stress caused as a result of the victimisation. Vicarious liability [8.51]   Vicarious liability arises when someone is legally responsible for the actions of someone else. Employers are liable for any act of discrimination by an employee in the course of their employment, unless they can prove that they took reasonable steps to prevent the discrimination. This includes any act of discrimination or harassment from third parties such as suppliers, service users or contractors. Section 15 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 deals with vicarious liability and renders an employer liable for the acts of employees done in the course of their employment, whether the acts are done with the employer’s knowledge or consent or not. Thus, in Kathleen Ryan v Socrates Workforce Solutions Ltd,134 where the complainant had been sexually harassed by a colleague, the adjudication officer found that the respondent was vicariously responsible, as it ‘had not taken reasonable steps to prevent the harassment’.

130

A Female Employee v A Candle Production Company DEC-E2006-035. McGinn v Board of Management St Anthony’s Boys National School DEC-E2004-032. 132 A Female Teacher v Board of Management of a Secondary School.DEC-E2021-103. 133 Catherine Connerty v Caffrey Transport Limited DEC-E2008-018. 134 Kathleen Ryan v Socrates Workforce Solutions Ltd ADJ-00035281. 131

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.53] Similar to s 14A, s 15(3) provides that an employer can avoid liability by taking reasonably practicable steps.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS Referral forms [8.52]   Complainants must refer their complaints on Form EE1. This form sets out the broad claim of the complainant. It can be amended at the hearing. Thus, in Professor Kevin James v Cork Institute of Technology,135 the equality officer went on to say: ‘I accept the submission on behalf of the respondent that the Form EE1 was only intended to set out, in broad outline, the nature of the complaint. If it is permissible in court proceedings to amend pleadings, where the justice of the case requires it, then a fortiori, it should be permissible to amend a claim as set out in a form such as the EE1, so long as the general nature of the complaint (in this case discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation) remains the same. What is in issue here is the furnishing of further and better particulars, although, it must be said, in the context of an expanded period of time.’

Also, in Mary Higgins v TSB,136 the initial complaint referred by the complainant was that of indirect discrimination. The equality officer held that despite this, the complainant was entitled to address issues of direct discrimination. In this regard, she went on to say: ‘In EE5/1988 the Equality Officer addressed an argument made by the respondent that as the complainant had only made allegations in respect of direct discrimination she, the Equality Officer, was precluded from looking at indirect discrimination. The Equality Officer accepted the arguments as valid and did not address indirect discrimination. In that regard, and all others, the Labour Court upheld her decision in Determination DEE190. In Siobhan Long and the Labour Court, Mairead Blackhall and Power Supermarkets Ltd Trading as Quinnsworth, 1990 No 58 Judicial Review the High Court ordered that the decisions of the Equality Officer and the Labour Court in so far as the Equality Officer had no jurisdiction to consider the applicant’s allegation under the provisions relating to indirect discrimination, were null and void and it ordered that the matter be remitted to the Equality Officer for reconsideration in that regard. On that basis I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to address direct discrimination even where the only case initially referred by the complainant relates to indirect discrimination.’

Defending a discrimination claim [8.53]   The WRC, the Labour Court and the Circuit Court have roles in relation to claims of discrimination and dismissal arising as a result of that discrimination. All claims (except for gender discrimination claims) must be referred in the first instance

135 136

Professor Kevin James v Cork Institute of Technology DEC-2010-076. Mary Higgins v TSB DEC-E2010-084.

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[8.53]  Termination of Employment to the WRC and then on appeal to the Labour Court. (Optionally, gender discrimination claims can be brought directly before the Circuit Court.) It is a defence for an employer to say that it took ‘such steps as are reasonably practicable … to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which included the victim’.137 In McCamley v Dublin Bus,138   the Labour Court held that though the complainant had been ‘subjected to wholly unacceptable personalised abuse in the course of his employment that no worker should be expected to tolerate’,  liability did not fall to the respondent, as it had taken all ‘reasonably practicable steps’. The respondent had implemented comprehensive policies to prevent all forms of harassment in the workplace. This line of reasoning was also followed in Alan Casey v Securitas Security Services Ireland.139 Here the complainant, who was a member of the Traveller community, complained that he had been subject to racial abuse by a fellow employee, who said to the complainant that ‘he was only a traveller’ and told him to ‘go back to your halting site’. The adjudication officer, in holding that the complainant’s case was not well founded, held that the respondent had acted with ‘due regard to fair procedure and proportionately’. If an employer seeks to rely on the foregoing, its policy will be examined, along with the efforts that were made to explain the policy to employees and any training that occurred. In Charlotte O’Brien v Deadline Ltd t/a Deadline Couriers,140 the adjudication officer, in finding against the employer, found not only that the employee handbook had not been given to the complainant, but also that there was no evidence of any training having been provided before the date of the complainant’s sexual assault. The Labour Court made it clear in A Store v A Worker141 that even if an employer has a sexual harassment policy in place, it is incumbent on the employer to ensure that this is properly understood by the managers responsible for its implementation. Also, in A Hotel v A Worker,142 it was held that employers cannot rely as a defence on actions taken to prevent the reoccurrence of harassment after it has occurred. General training on policies may not be enough. In Suchavadee Foley v Atercin Liffey Unlimited t/a Starbucks Tallaght143 – a case brought under the Equal Status Act – the complainant was awarded €12,000. Here the adjudication officer found that although Starbucks had customer service training and a harassment policy in place, it had not provided sufficient information to staff about the power of drawings and pictures, and about how these are perceived. In this instance, the complainant – who was of Thai-Irish

137 138 139 140 141 142 143

Section 14A(2)(a) of the Employment Equality Act 1988. McCamley v Dublin Bus [2016] 27 ELR 81. Alan Casey v Securitas Security Services Ireland ADJ-00034950, 4 January 2023. Charlotte O’Brien v Deadline Direct Ltd t/a Deadline Couriers ADJ-00036160 April 2023. A Store v A Worker EDA3/2016. A Hotel v A Worker EDA0915. Suchavadee Foley v Atercin Liffey Unlimited t/a Starbucks Tallaght ADJ-00028487, 5 January 2021.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.56] heritage – complained that she had been discriminated against when a Starbucks employee drew an image of a smile and ‘slanty’ eyes on a cup as a way of marking it as the complainant’s. See also para 8.45 Communicating and train employees.

Awards in discriminatory dismissal claims [8.54]   Article 17 of the Framework Directive144 provides that ‘the sanctions, which may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim, must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. Guidance on the quantum in relation to awards for discrimination was given by the Labour Court in Lee t/a Peking House v Fox.145 Here the Court determined that ‘the effects of discrimination are not just financial but also must take account of the distress and indignity suffered as a consequence’.

Employees’ right to certain information [8.55]   Section 76 of the 1998 Act allows any person who believes that they may have experienced discrimination to write to the person who may have discriminated against them asking for certain information which will assist in deciding whether to refer a claim. There is no obligation on employers to reply to such requests; but should the claim proceed, an equality officer may draw such inferences as seem appropriate from the failure to respond or from the provision of inaccurate, misleading or inadequate information. For these reasons, it is always advisable to respond to such requests. Employees should use a standard form of questionnaire. The Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 76 – Right to Information) Regulations 1999146 Form EE2 – also known as a request for information form – is used by the complainant to seek information; while Form EE3 is used by the respondent to reply to the complainant.

The Circuit Court [8.56]   There is no limit to the amount of compensation that may be ordered by the Circuit Court for discriminatory dismissal on the gender ground.

144

Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. 145 Lee t/a Peking House v Fox EED036. 146 SI 321/1999.

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[8.57]  Termination of Employment A complainant who alleges discrimination on the grounds of gender can take a claim to the Circuit Court instead of to the Director of the Equality Tribunal. This provision follows the ECJ decision in Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority (No 2), in which the ECJ held that the cap on potential awards for sex discrimination was inconsistent with the right to an effective judicial process pursuant to art 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive. Thus, where gender discrimination cases are referred to the Circuit Court, there is no ceiling on the award that may be made by the court. Section 82(3) of the 1998 Act provides that the award may exceed the normal civil jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. An action in the Circuit Court is commenced by the issue and service of an Employment Law Civil Bill, Form 1. A defence to the proceedings is made on Form 2.

Appeals [8.57]   Decisions of the Director of the Equality Tribunal (including decisions on time limits and striking out of a claim) may be appealed to the Labour Court no later than 42 days from the date of the decision (not the date on which it was received by the party wishing to appeal). The date of the decision is to be included in the calculation. Where a determination is made by the Labour Court on an appeal, either party may appeal to the High Court on a point of law.

Costs [8.58]  In general, costs are not awarded. Costs in respect of travel and other expenses (except expenses of representatives) can be awarded where a person obstructs or impedes the investigation or appeal.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.59]

FORMS Form EE2 [8.59]  

Form EE.2

Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2004 Section 76: “Right to information” Complainant’s request for information from the respondent Explanatory note: The Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2004 provide at section 76 that : •

where a person thinks they may have been discriminated against, or treated in any other way which is unlawful under the Employment Equality Acts,

•

that person (the “complainant”) may, if they so wish,

•

write to the person or organisation whom they think may have treated them unlawfully, (the “respondent”)

•

asking for relevant information to help them in deciding whether they should refer a case to the Equality Tribunal or to help them in formulating and presenting their case.

This Form EE.2 contains the form prescribed by law1 for a complainant to use in asking for this information. Some types of information are excluded. According to Section 76, information is “relevant” if it is: ¾ information about the respondent’s reasons for doing, or omitting to do, anything relevant ¾ information about any relevant practices or procedures of the respondent ¾ information (other than confidential information, or information about the scale or financial resources of the employer’s business) about the remuneration or treatment of other persons who are in a comparable position to the complainant, ¾ any other information which is not confidential, and which it is reasonable for the complainant to ask for in the circumstances. Confidential information means “any information which relates to a particular individual, which can be identified as so relating, and to the disclosure of which that individual does not agree.” The respondent can reply using Form EE.3, which is prescribed by law for this purpose. (The respondent is not obliged to reply. Section 81 of the Acts provides that if they do not reply, or if their replies are false or misleading, this may be taken 1

See Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 76 – Right to Information) Regulations, 1999, Statutory Instrument no 321 of 1999. Character references are excluded, and special provisions apply to requests for information about interviews by the Civil Service Commissioners, Local Appointments Commissioners, Defence Forces or Garda Siochana: see section 76.

Page 1 of 5

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[8.59]  Termination of Employment Form EE.2 into account in deciding the case.)

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.59] Form EE.2 Employment Equality Acts 1998 and 2004, section 76 Questionnaire of the Complainant To............................................................................................. of............................................................................................. ................................................................................................. .................................................................................................

Name and address of person to be questioned (the Respondent):

Name and address of Complainant:

1.

I................................................................................................ of............................................................................................. ................................................................................................. .................................................................................................

consider that you may have:

Delete the circumstances which do not apply to your complaint.

(a) discriminated against me; (b) dismissed or otherwise penalised me in circumstances amounting to victimisation; (c) failed to provide equal remuneration to me as required by an equal remuneration term; (d) failed to provide equal treatment to me as required by an equality clause under my contract of employment; contrary to the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2004.

Indicate the discriminatory ground(s) which you consider to apply to your complaint. (Tick where appropriate).

2.

Gender ( ) Marital Status ( ) Family Status ( ) Sexual Orientation ( ) Religion ( ) Age ( ) Disability ( ) Race ( ) Traveller Community Ground (

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363

).

[8.59]  Termination of Employment Form EE.2 Outline the circumstances of your complaint including:

3.

(a) in the case of treatment, dates, times and a factual description of the treatment received and of the circumstances leading up to the treatment, or (b) in the case of remuneration, the name(s), job title(s), etc., of person(s) with whom you consider you perform like work (i.e. the same work, similar work or work of equal value). Complete if you wish to give reasons, otherwise delete the word “because”.

4.

I believe that the treatment/circumstances outlined at paragraph 3 of this Questionnaire may have been unlawful because...

This is the first of your questions to the Respondent.

5.

Do you agree that the circumstances outlined at paragraph 3 of this Questionnaire are accurate? If not, in what respect do you disagree, or what is your version of the situation?

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.59] Form EE.2 This is the second of your questions to the Respondent.

6.

Do you accept that your treatment of me, or the rate of remuneration afforded to me, was unlawful, contrary to the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2004? If not: (a) Why not? (b) For what reason did I receive the treatment/remuneration which is the subject of my complaint?

7. Enter here any other questions you wish to ask including any request for other non-confidential material information in respect of other persons who are in a comparable position to you or information which it is reasonable for you to require in the context of your case.

Address to which reply should be sent, if not the same as that at paragraph 1 of this Questionnaire.

8.

Signature of Complainant ......................................................... Date..................................................

Note If there is not sufficient space to request information, please use additional page(s) and sign and date each of them.

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[8.60]  Termination of Employment

Form EE3 [8.60]   Form EE.3

Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2004 Reply to a request for information Explanatory note: • The Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2004 provide at section 76 that: - where a person thinks they may have been discriminated against, or treated in any other way which is unlawful under the Employment Equality Acts, - that person (the “complainant”) may - write to the person or organisation whom they think may have treated them unlawfully, (the “respondent”) - asking for relevant information to help in deciding whether they should refer a case to the Equality Tribunal or to help in formulating and presenting a case. • Form EE.2 contains the form prescribed by law for a complainant to use in asking for such information.

This Form EE.3 is prescribed by law1 as the form for a respondent to use in replying to a request for information.

•

The respondent is not obliged to reply to a request for information.

•

• However, section 81 of the Employment Equality Acts provides that if they do not reply, or if their replies are false or misleading, this may be taken into account in deciding the case. • Some types of information are excluded. According to Section 76, information is relevant if it is: - information about the respondent’s reasons for doing, or omitting to do, anything relevant - information about any relevant practices or procedures of the respondent - information (other than confidential information, or information about the scale or financial resources of the employer’s business) about the remuneration or treatment of other persons who are in a comparable position to the complainant, -any other information which is not confidential, and which it is reasonable for the complainant to ask for in the circumstances. Confidential information means “any information which relates to a particular individual, which can be identified as so relating, and to the disclosure of which that individual does not agree.”

1

See Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 76 – Right to Information) Regulations, 1999, Statutory Instrument no 321 of 1999.

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.60] Form EE.3

Employment Equality Acts 1998 and 2004 – Section 76 Reply by the Respondent

Name and address of Complainant:

To........................................................................................ of .......................................................................................... ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................

Name and address of Respondent:

1 . I.......................................................................................... of ........................................................................................... ............................................................................................ ............................................................................................ hereby acknowledge receipt of the Questionnaire signed by you and dated.................................

Delete sentence at (a) or (b) as appropriate and, if (a) is deleted, complete (b).

2 . (a) I agree that the statement/circumstances outlined in paragraph 3 of the Questionnaire is/are accurate.

(b) I disagree with the statement/circumstances outlined in paragraph 3 of the Questionnaire in that.....

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[8.60]  Termination of Employment Form EE.3

Delete sentence at (a) or (b) as appropriate and, if (a) is deleted, complete one or more of the sentences at (b) (i) and (b) (ii).

3.

(a)

I accept that my treatment of you, or the rate of remuneration afforded to you, was unlawful, contrary to the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2004.

(b)

I dispute that my treatment of you, or the rate of remuneration afforded to you, was unlawful, contrary to the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2004:

(i)

(ii)

My reasons for disputing are....

The reasons why you received the treatment accorded to you or the rate of remuneration afforded to you are as follows....

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Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.60] Form EE.3 Replies to the questions in paragraph 7 of the Questionnaire should be entered here.

4.

Delete this entire sentence if you have answered all of the questions in the Questionnaire.

5.

I have deleted (in whole or in part) the paragraph(s) numbered ........................................................ above, because I am unable / unwilling (delete as appropriate) to reply to those questions for the following reasons-

Signature of Respondent ......................................................... Date ................................................

Notes If there is not sufficient space to enter a reply, please use additional page(s) and sign and date each of them. If a Respondent fails to provide the information sought by the Complainant, or the information provided is false or misleading or is otherwise not such as the Complainant might reasonably require in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2004, the Director of the Equality Tribunal, the Labour Court or the Circuit Court may draw such inferences as seem appropriate in the circumstances.

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[8.61]  Termination of Employment

Form 1 Circuit Court Employment Law Civil Bill [8.61]   AN CHUIRT CHUARDA (THE CIRCUIT COURT) RECORD NO. _________ CIRCUIT

_______

COUNTY OF _______

BETWEEN: ---------------------------------PLAINTIFF AND: ---------------------------------DEFENDANT DEFENCE Delivered on the [insert date] by [insert firm of Solicitors and address] TAKE NOTICE that the Defence of the Defendant to the claim of the Plaintiff made by Ordinary/Equity Civil Bill served on the [insert date] is as follows:-

[Here insert details of the Defence] [Here insert details of Counterclaim and reliefs sought by way of counterclaim, if appropriate]

Dated this ______ day of __________

To: ________________________________ [the Plaintiff or Solicitors for the Plaintiff] And To: The County Registrar

370

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.62]

Form 4 Circuit Court Motion on Notice [8.62]   AN CHUIRT CHUARDA (THE CIRCUIT COURT) RECORD NO. _________ CIRCUIT

_______

COUNTY OF _______

BETWEEN: ---------------------------------PLAINTIFF AND: ---------------------------------DEFENDANT EQUITY/ORDINARY CIVIL BILL You are hereby required within ten days after the service of this Civil Bill upon you, to enter, or cause to be entered, with the County Registrar, at his Office at ___________ an Appearance to answer the claim of _______________ of _____________ the plaintiff herein, as indorsed hereon. AND TAKE NOTICE that, unless you do enter an Appearance, you will be held to have admitted the said claim, and the plaintiff may proceed therein and Judgment may be given against you in your absence without further notice. AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that, if you intend to defend the proceedings on any grounds, you must not only enter an Appearance as aforesaid, but also within ten days after Appearance deliver a Statement in writing showing the nature and grounds of your Defence. The Appearance and Defence may be entered by posting the same to the said Office and by giving copies thereof to the plaintiff or his/her Solicitor by post. Dated this ______ day of __________

Signed __________________________ [Insert name and address of solicitors] To: ________________________________ [Insert Defendant/Solicitors for the Defendant] And To: The County Registrar

371

[8.62]  Termination of Employment INDORSEMENT OF CLAIM [Insert details of the Plaintiff's claim including the basis upon which jurisdiction is claimed] THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS: [Insert reliefs sought by the Plaintiff] THE PERSONAL DETAILS OF THE PLAINTIFF ARE AS FOLLOWS:[Insert Plaintiffs’ personal details]

___________________________________ [Insert Plaintiff/ Solicitors for the Plaintiff]

372

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.63]

Form 2 Defence to Circuit Court Civil Bill [8.63] Record No. AN CHUIRT CHUARDA (THE CIRCUIT COURT) [insert circuit] Circuit

County of [insert county]

IN THE MATTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT 1998–2004 BETWEEN/ [Insert name of Plaintiff] PLAINTIFF -AND-

[Insert name of Defendant] DEFENDANT

DEFENCE DELIVERED ON THE DAY OF 20 BY, SOLICITORS FOR THE DEFENDANT HEREIN.

1. The Plaintiff is put on proof of her employment as a with the Defendant and that she was successful in that position and that she completed her duties diligently and faithfully.

373

[8.63]  Termination of Employment 2. The Plaintiff is put on proof of the express or alternatively the implied terms of her contract of employment. 3. It is denied that the Plaintiff was subjected to sexual harassment, harassment, bullying, discrimination on the grounds of gender and family status by the Defendant their servants or agents and it is denied that the Defendants have been in breach of the Plaintiff’s terms of employment as alleged. 4. It is denied that the Defendants failed to deal adequately or at all with the alleged treatment and any such treatment is denied. 5. It is denied that the Plaintiff was less favourably treated by the Defendants and/or discriminated against and/or that such treatment culminated in the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment on the XXX. 6. It is denied that the Plaintiff was less favourably treated, discriminated against or that the Defendant was in breach of the Plaintiff’s alleged Contract of Employment and/or that the Defendants were in breach of policies or procedures or in breach of statutory duty as alleged or at all. 7. The particulars of unlawful discrimination are denied as if hereunder set forth and individually traversed seriatum. 8. The Defendants will rely on the fact that the Plaintiff was made redundant in. 9. It is denied that the Plaintiff has suffered psychological, physical effects, or that the Plaintiff’s career or reputation has been damaged. 10. It is denied that the Plaintiff has suffered offence, stress, personal injury, anxiety, embarrassment, loss and damage or upset.

374

Discriminatory Dismissal: The Employment Equality Legislation  [8.63] 11. It is denied that the Plaintiff was in breach of the matters set out in paragraphs 11,12, 13, and 14. 12. It is denied that the Plaintiff was dismissed on the, but was in fact made redundant. 13. The Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief claimed. BL Signed:

___________________ ___________________ Solicitors for the Defendant

To:

The County Registrar Circuit Court Office

To:

Solicitors for the Plaintiff

375

376

Chapter 9

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency

INTRODUCTION [9.01]   Under the Companies Act 2014, a company is deemed insolvent if it is proven, inter alia, that it is unable to pay its debts. In determining whether the company is unable to pay its debts, the court will have regard to its contingent and prospective liabilities.1 If the company is unable to pay its debts and is thus insolvent, this has significant consequences for employees. In many instances, employees will be unable to avail of the normal rights available to employees in solvent companies (eg, their rights under the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations).2 Notwithstanding this, there are a number of protections for such employees under the Bankruptcy Act 1988 and the Companies Act 2014 (as amended). Employees whose employers become insolvent are protected as a class of unsecured creditors by virtue of being afforded preferential status in relation to some of their claims where the company is being wound up due to insolvency. Preferential creditors’ claims are paid out of the realised assets of a company in a liquidation after the costs, charges and expenses of the liquidation have been paid.3 Preferential creditors’ claims rank higher in priority than claims of creditors secured by registered floating charges and claims of unsecured creditors. Upon distribution in a winding-up, preferential debts rank equally. If there are insufficient funds with which to pay all preferential creditors, claims abate in equal proportions.4 The justification for giving employees preferential creditor status is based on the fact they are usually wholly financially dependent on their employers. This preferential status affords employees a level of financial protection. Furthermore, employee rights

1

2 3 4

Section 569(1)(d) of the Companies Act 2014. See also s 570, which provides for the relevant tests when determining whether a company is solvent. (1) Cash-flow test: This is a measure of whether a company is capable of meeting its debts as they fall due. Should the company not be capable of this, it is insolvent. This can be proved by a creditor sending a 21-day demand letter; if, following that period, the debt still has not been paid, the company is deemed to be insolvent. (2) Balance-sheet test: This is a test of whether assets are greater than liabilities on the company balance sheet. Should the balancesheet test be passed at a time when the cash-flow test has failed, the directors may have a defence to any charges of reckless trading as the company was, on the face of the company records, solvent. Transfer of Undertakings Regulations (SI 131/2003). Section 617 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 618 of the Companies Act 2014.

377

[9.02]  Termination of Employment are protected by the Insolvency Payments Scheme as provided for in the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Acts 1984–2020. Employees’ preferential debts include wages during in the four months prior to the winding up to a maximum of €3,174; all accrued holiday and sick pay; minimum notice pay; statutory redundancy lump sums; compensation awarded by the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) or the Labour Court in respect of unfair dismissal claims and contributions; and both employer and employee deductions in respect of any pension schemes.5 This, however, is often of little use to employees, as the company being wound up must have sufficient assets to discharge the debts owed and fixed assets are often subject to mortgages or other such fixed charges which rank in preference to preferential creditors.

EFFECTS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF INSOLVENCY ON THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT [9.02]   A company or an employer becomes insolvent when liabilities exceed assets.6 While insolvency has significant and grave implications for the employment contract, the nature of the insolvency generally determines the fate of a person’s employment; and while employees are afforded some protection by virtue of being preferred creditors7 and having recourse to the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984, often it is too late for employees to retrieve anything substantial following a winding up. Equally, although employees have preferential creditor status, protection in this regard extends to the employees only where there are sufficient assets to discharge the debts owed. The key issues for employees when faced with an insolvency are generally their right to redundancy pay; their right to notice pay; their right to payment of outstanding wages and holiday pay; and their right to information and consultation in the event of collective redundancies.

Bankruptcy [9.03]   Bankruptcy arises where the property or assets of an individual who is unable or unwilling to pay their debts is transferred by an order of the court to a trustee to be sold. A person can be declared bankrupt following a petition being issued and the High Court declaring them a bankrupt. In the alternative, a person can declare themselves bankrupt where they are unable to pay their debts and those debts have a value of at least €20,000.

5 6 7

Section 621 of the Companies Act; s 6 of the Bankruptcy Act 1988. Section 570 of the Companies Act 2014 details the circumstances in which a company is insolvent. Bankruptcy Act 1988 and Companies Act 1963 (as amended).

378

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.04] Once a person is adjudicated bankrupt, their property becomes vested in the official assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt.8 The obligations of the official assignee are similar to those of a liquidator of a company. In Re Collins,9 it was deemed that rights arising under an employment contract are not regarded as proprietary for bankruptcy purposes. Where an employment contract is silent (as most are) on what is to occur in the event of a bankruptcy arising, the effect of same on the employment contract is unclear. This might either frustrate the contract or give rise to a claim for unfair dismissal; although in practice, given that the person is bankrupt, it is generally not worthwhile pursuing either option. The employee must then rest on the facts of the actual case; and pending same, bankruptcy may either bring the contract to an end by operation of law, frustrate the contract or constitute an unfair dismissal.

Voluntary liquidation [9.04]   Where a company is solvent (ie, it is in a position to pay its debts), it may still be wound up voluntarily. Equally, however, where insolvent, a voluntary liquidation may also effected. A voluntary liquidation10 can arise by virtue of either: (a) a members’ voluntary winding up; or (b) a creditors’ voluntary liquidation.11 In respect of a members’ voluntary winding up, this process is initiated by the members for their own commercial reasons. It is often used where it is in the best interests of the company to wind up the company following a breakdown in the trust and confidence of its owners. This is done by way of a summary approval procedure (formerly known as the whitewash process).12 This requires a special resolution13 of the members approving the members’ voluntary liquidation, as well as a declaration of solvency and directors’ declaration.14 The declaration of solvency requires that the company be solvent – that is, be in a position to pay its debts and other liabilities within a period not exceeding 12 months after commencement of the winding up.15 Following confirmation of the

8 9

10 11

12 13

14 15

Section 44(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1988. Re Collins 1925 Ch 536. Section 562 of the Companies Act 2014. Sections 585 to 588 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 579 of the Companies Act 2014. In the case of a winding up under s 580 of the Companies Act 2014, an ordinary resolution together with a declaration of solvency will generally suffice. Under ss 202(6) and 580(3) of the Companies Act 2014, key components of both methods relating to a solvent winding up are the declaration of solvency and the passing of the resolution to wind up no later than 30 days after the passing of the resolution to wind up or, in the case of a written resolution, the signing of the resolution by the last member. Section 202(1)(a)(i) and (b)) of the Companies Act 2014; or in accordance with s 579 of the Companies Act 2014. Sections 580(2) and 207 of the Companies Act 2014. The requirements for making a declaration of solvency are set out in ss 207 and 580(2) and (4) (as appropriate). The CRO Form E1 provides guidance in relation to completing the declaration and includes the form of the declaration to be used. Notably, Form E1 (SAP) applies to the Summary Approval Procedure and Form E1(41) applies to the s 580 procedure.

379

[9.04]  Termination of Employment members’ voluntary liquidation, the relevant filings must be made to the Companies Registration Office (CRO).16 Despite its name, a creditors’ voluntary liquidation is not presented by the creditor. Rather, it is where the directors of the company usually recommend to the members that it is no longer able to pay its debts as they fall due and that the company should thus be wound up.17 The creditors cannot instigate this type of liquidation, but they can reject the proposed liquidator and select their own. Following a general meeting resolving that the company is unable to pay its debts,18 a resolution may be passed by the members to wind up the company, including resolving to appoint a liquidator, by way of either a general meeting or an extraordinary general meeting. This meeting of the members must be held prior to the creditors’ meeting. The purpose of the creditors’ meeting is to consider the final position of the company (the ‘statement of affairs’), and to ask questions of the director who is presiding at the meeting19 as to the financial position of the company as set out in the statement of affairs and the circumstances surrounding its failure. Following either procedure, the company is formally dissolved three months after the liquidator files a return (of the final meeting) with the Registrar of Companies. Once the liquidator has discharged all liabilities of which they were aware and made their final account, and the registration in the CRO has been effected, the company is deemed to be dissolved. If an employee’s contract is terminated at the same time as the resolution for voluntary winding up is passed, it will give rise to a case for wrongful dismissal, as the employer will be deemed to have committed a repudiatory breach of the employment contract.20 Where the employee agrees to work subsequent to the resolution being passed, their position is less clear. Thus, in re Forster v Schumann,21 the court stated that the passing of the resolution had the same effect as the making of the winding up order. However, it is not always clear that this is the case.22

16

17 18

19 20 21 22

Form E1 (SAP), a copy of the special resolution to wind up and appoint a liquidator specified on the Form G1. Form E1 will include an independent persons report affirming that the directors’ declaration and the opinion of the auditors under s 207 or 580 are reasonable. If not filed, the members’ voluntary winding up is converted to a creditors’ winding up. The independent persons report must be signed and dated after the declaration of solvency has been signed. The declarations should be received by the CRO within 21 days of the resolution being passed; otherwise, this may render the process void. The resolution must then be published in Iris Oifigiuil within 14 days of the passing of the resolution; if there is a default in publishing this advertisement, the company or any officer can be fined. Section 586 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 587 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 587(7) compels the directors to cause ‘a full statement of the position of the company’s affairs, together with a list of the creditors of the company and the estimated amount of their claim’, to be laid before the creditors’ meeting; and to appoint one of their number to preside at that meeting. It shall be the duty of the director so appointed to attend the creditors’ meeting and preside at it. Section 587(7)(b) of the Companies Act 2014. Reigate v Union Manufacturing Company Limited (1918) 1 KB 592 at 606. Re Forster v Schumann (1) 7 19 lR 240. See Forde, Employment Law (2nd ed, Thomsons Round Hall, 2002) 242.

380

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.06]

Court official liquidation [9.05]   A court official liquidation is made by order of the High Court. If the company is unable to pay its debts, a creditor presents a petition to the High Court to have the company wound up. The court, on hearing the petition, may dismiss, adjourn or grant an order for the company to be wound up and appoint a liquidator.23 This may be petitioned by either the company itself,24 a creditor of the company,25 a contributor to the company or the Director of Corporate Enforcement.26 Presentation of the petition takes place when the petition is filed in the Central Office of the High Court and the registrar allocates a date for the hearing of same, unless a voluntary liquidator has previously been appointed, in which case the liquidation is deemed to have commenced at the date of the passing of the resolution for the winding up of the company.27 In the case of insolvent companies, the usual ground relied upon for the basis of the petition is that the company is ‘unable to pay its debts’;28 although an insolvent company may also be wound up on the basis that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up.29 In Donnelly v Gleeson,30 Hamilton J held that ‘an order for the winding up of a company is notice of discharge to all persons in the employment of the company’. Importantly, Hamilton J also went on refuse an order to have the date of dismissal deemed to be the date on which the petition for winding up the company was presented. Section 589 of the Companies Act 2014 provides that the date of dismissal is the date of presentation of the petition; and the section as it was at the time was actually brought to Hamilton J’s attention in the case. However, he took the more practical view that if he were to adhere to this section,that would run contrary to the employees’ rights to notice. Employees’ rights in the event of a compulsory winding up can be divided between those who are dismissed at the time of the order and those who continue working after the date of the order, as follows. Employees dismissed at the date of the order [9.06]   In this case, employees may be entitled to claim damages for wrongful dismissal, breach of contract and breach of statutory rights. In respect of the latter, it is clear that such employees have the statutory right to minimum notice pay. 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30

Under s 589 (1)n of the 2014 Act, a court liquidation is deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of the petition of the winding up. The company may apply on an ex parte basis for the appointment of a provisional liquidator pending the petition of hearing. See Order 74 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC) (see Rules of the Superior Courts Proceedings under Part 11 of the Companies Act 2014 (Winding-up of Companies): SI 255/2015) in relation to the procedural requirements in respect of a creditor’s petition. Section 569 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 589(2) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 569(1)(d) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 569(1)(e) of the Companies Act 2014. Donnelly v Gleeson (1985) 4 JISLL 109.

381

[9.07]  Termination of Employment Employees who work post the order [9.07]   In this instance, a number of possibilities arise: (a) Employees could be deemed to be merely working their notice. (b) The liquidator can waive the notice of discharge and the employees’ original contracts will be deemed to continue.31 This will normally be specific, in that the liquidator will specifically notify the employees that their contracts are discharged. However, it can also arise by implication. Thus, in Dodd v Local Stores (Trading) Ltd,32 the liquidator did not inform the employees at his appointment, but subsequently terminated all contracts without notice. The employees pursued claims under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, the Employment Appeals Tribunal held that the notice of discharge – normally implicit in the making of the winding up order – had been waived by the liquidator. This does not mean that a short delay between the winding up order and the appointment of the liquidator will be sufficient to argue successfully that the notice of discharge is waived.33 (c) The original contract is terminated by the petition and a new contract comes into existence. In Donnelly v Gleeson,34 Hamilton J indicated that a specific request by the liquidator was necessary to form such a contract; and in Irish Shipping Ltd v Byrne and the Minister for Labour,35 the court refused to imply new contracts in circumstances where the official liquidator had retained the employees for four months after the notice of discharge. Also, in Irish Shipping, the liquidator successfully argued that the employees were not entitled to their minimum notice, as they had been re-employed after their dismissal for longer than their notice period and therefore had suffered no loss.

Provisional liquidation [9.08]   In some instances, the court appoints a provisional liquidator at any time after the presentation of a winding up petition and before the first appointment of a liquidator.36 The purpose of this is to safeguard the assets of the company before an orderly winding up. The appointment of a provisional liquidator does not discharge a contract of employment.37

Receivership [9.09]   Receivership is legal mechanism for the enforcement of a security and the appointment of a receiver is one of the oldest remedies known at law. The principal source of law relating to receivership is contract law. By far the most common method of appointment of a receiver is under the powers contained in a debenture. 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Re Collins (1925) Ch 536. Dodd v Local Stores (Trading) Ltd (1992) ELR 61. Donnelly v Gleeson (1985) 4 JISLL 109. Donnelly v Gleeson (1985) JISLL 109. Irish Shipping Ltd v Byrne and the Minister for Labour (1987) IR 468. Section 573 of the Companies Act 2014. Donnelly v Gleeson (1985) 4 JISLL 109.

382

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.09] A receiver is appointed to a company to realise assets and/or manage the affairs of the company in the hope that the debts outstanding to the debenture holder, which appointed the receiver, can be met. The principal task of a receiver is to secure assets of a company which have been mortgaged or charged in favour of the debenture holder that appointed them and realise those assets so that the secured creditor’s debt is repaid as quickly and efficiently as possible. A receiver is typically appointed to a company by either the debenture holder or the court (equitable jurisdiction). The appointment will generally depend on the terms of the debenture. The company may be solvent at the time. There are two types of receivers: the first has the function of essentially ‘collecting’ income from the property with a view to its subsequent sale; while the second has the function of ‘receiving and managing’ the property, running it as a going concern (ie, a receiver and manager).38 The duties of a receiver are normally set out in the instrument under the terms of which they are appointed.39 The powers and duties of the receiver have also been consolidated under the Companies Act 2014.40 The notice of the appointment41 of a receiver must be filed with the CRO within seven days of the receiver’s appointment and must also be published in Iris Oifigiúil. The debenture holder is primarily responsible for notification of the appointment.42 Where a receiver is appointed on behalf of debenture holders which are secured by a floating charge, a statement of the company’s affairs43 must be submitted to the receiver, who must file a copy of same with the CRO. Where a receiver is appointed, the legal status of the company does not change. As there is no change in the identity of the employer, the appointment does not operate to terminate or change the contract of employment.44 This may be different, however, where the appointment of a receiver runs contrary to retaining the services of an employee. This will generally arise where a receiver in effect carries out the role of the managing director or chief executive. In such instances, it could be argued that the employment is terminated or that a repudiatory breach of contract has occurred. Each case will of course be considered on its own merits. Thus, if

38 39

40 41 42 43 44

Section 2(9) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 428 of the Companies Act 2014. Those restricted from being appointed as receivers include bodies corporate under s 314 of the Companies Act, 1963. See also the restrictions contained in s 315 of the Companies Act, 1963 (as amended by s 170 of the Companies Act 1990). This is now reflected under s 433 of the Companies Act 2014. In The Merrow Ltd v Bank of Scotland Plc & Anor [2013 IEHC 130], it was emphasised that a receiver’s appointment may not be valid unless it is made in strict compliance with the terms of the underlying security documents. Section 437 of the Companies Act 2014. CRO Form E pursuant to s 436 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 436 of the Companies Act 2014. CRO Form E10 pursuant to s 436 of the Companies Act 2014. Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd (1955) Ch 534.

383

[9.10]  Termination of Employment the receiver intends to fully control the company, this may well give rise to termination; but if the receiver intends to exercise control lightly or remotely, this may not be the case. In some instances, a receiver can be appointed by the court.45 When this occurs, the receiver does not act as an agent of the company.46 There is some debate about what impact this has on the contract of employment. Traditionally, it was thought that this would be similar to the appointment of a liquidator and thus the contract of employment would terminate. However, the court in Australia has refused to adhere to this view.47 As such, the matter remains somewhat in flux.

Examinership [9.10]   Examinership allows a company a period of protection from its creditors, within which time the court-appointed examiner endeavours to put together a survival plan. During this period, management stays in day-to-day control of the company and examines the financial situation of the company with the objective of putting together a restructuring plan which will be acceptable to the creditors, and ultimately also to the court. The Companies (Amendment) Act 1990 originally introduced the concept of examinership. It is now governed under Part 10 of the Companies Act 2014.48 This allows a company which is unable or unlikely to be able to pay its debts to apply to the Circuit Court49 or the High Court50 for protection for a period during which no winding up order can be made.51 As the company continues in existence, the appointment of an examiner shall have no effect on the employment contract.

45

46 47 48 49 50 51

This may arise pursuant to a statutory power. Prior to 2009, a receiver could be appointed under s 19 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, now replaced by s 108 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009. There is equitable jurisdiction to appoint a receiver pursuant to the Supreme Court Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877. A receiver may be appointed by the court even where there has been an appointment made by the debenture holder, under the principles enunciated in Re Slogger Automatic Feeder Company [1915] 1 Ch 478. A receiver may be appointed under s 147 of the National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 (the powers of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) receiver being set out in ss 147–151 and in a Schedule to the Act, which refers to the provisions of the Companies Acts being applicable to NAMA receivers), or under the Rules of the Superior Courts. Moss Steamship Company Ltd v Whinney (1912) AC 254. See also Parsons v Several Bank of Canada [1913] AC 160. Sipad Holding DDPO v Popovic (1996) 3(1) DULJ 15, 33. Amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act 2017 (No 13 of 2017), together with Order 74A RSC (Companies Act 2014) 2015 or in the case of CC Order 53A of CCR (Companies Act) 2015. Amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act 2017 (No 13 of 2017), together with Order 74A RSC (Companies Act 2014) 2015 or in the case of CC Order 53A of CCR (Companies Act) 2015. Section 509(7)(a) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 502(2) of the Companies Act 2014. This provides that for a period of 70 days from the date of presentation of the petition, the company shall be deemed to be under the protection of the court. This may be extended by a further 30 days where the examiner delivers a report to the court requesting an extension of time and the court is satisfied to grant it. Furthermore, under s 520(4) of the Companies Act 2014, creditors are prevented from taking enforcement action during this period as they would normally be allowed to do.

384

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.11]

INSOLVENCY AND PRIORITIES OF DEBTS [9.11]   Where a company is in default towards its creditors and unable to pay its debts as they fall due for payment, liquidation may arise. Where a liquidator has been appointed, their role is to take possession of and realise all the assets of the defaulting company and distribute the proceeds of that realisation among the admitted creditors in accordance with the priorities set by law. It is the duty of the liquidator to account for all of the assets that are to be traced and realised for the benefit of creditors, so that creditors are not treated unfairly or unequally as a consequence of actions or transactions perpetrated prior to the liquidator’s appointment. The liquidator has certain powers to set aside preferences, to challenge certain pre-liquidation transactions and to investigate the conduct of directors, officers and others. The liquidator must pursue persons who may be personally liable for debts of the company. Furthermore, it is the function of the liquidator to apply to make an application to the court to restrict the directors of an insolvent company unless excused from doing so by the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement (ODCE). Where the liquidator identifies a deficit, they must refer to the law as to priorities when deciding who should get paid and how much. Generally, all creditors should rank pari passu with each other52 – in other words, all creditors should be treated equally, and the property of a company should be applied on a pro rata basis in satisfaction of its liabilities. During a liquidation, creditors must notify the liquidator of any sums which they claim are due to them and the liquidator will adjudicate the claim. Where necessary, the liquidator may fix a timeframe within which creditors are required to prove their debts. This must be communicated to creditors in writing.53 If a party wants to commence or continue proceedings against a company that has commenced liquidation, it must apply for leave of the court under s 678 of the 2014 Act. However, this does not include any claim to the WRC and/or the Labour Court,54 as any such claim shall be deemed preserved and shall continue accordingly. In practice, where companies have active and ongoing claims against them and have subsequently been placed in liquidation, the claims will proceed nonetheless. While a representative of a company in this situation is not required to attend,55 they are often represented by the liquidator (or a representative of the liquidator), who stands as the respondent in such matters.56 The liquidator at hearing may be required to give evidence under oath.57 In terms of preferential payments which are payable to creditors

52 53 54

55 56 57

Section 618(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 674 of the Companies Act 2014. Section 678(2) of the Companies Act 2014, which transferred functions from the Employment Appeals Tribunal to the Workplace Relations Act 2015 under s 66. Later updated by s 17 of the Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions (Covid-19) Act 2020 (9/2020), SI 320/2020. Daragh Bolton v Stobart Air UC In Liquidation ADJ-00029917; Paul Earley v Roadbridge Ltd (in liquidation) ADJ-00040854. Angela Garcia Collado v Stobart Air (in provisional liquidation) ADJ-00030110; Elaine Reilly v Stobart Air Unlimited (in provisional liquidation) ADJ-00031296. Anne Furlong v Mackin Travel Limited ADJ-00037133.

385

[9.11]  Termination of Employment upon liquidation, these are set out under s 621 of the 2014 Act. The priority of such payments (to all other debts) is as follows: (a) rates and taxes under  the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997,  the Value-Added Tax Consolidation Act 2010 and the Finance (Local Property Tax) Act 2012,58  all of which are deemed payable within the period of 12 months before the relevant date;59 (b) all wages or salary, including commission – whether earned wholly or in part – and salary which is payable for time or for pieces of work of any employee in respect of services rendered to the company during the four months before the relevant date;60 (c) all accrued holiday renumeration becoming payable to any employee on the termination of their employment before or by the effect of the winding up order or resolution;61 (d) all amounts due in respect of contributions which are payable during the 12 months before the relevant date by the company as the employer of any persons under the Social Welfare Acts, as well as all amounts due in respect of contributions which would have been payable under s 13(2)(d) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 by the company as the employer of any persons in respect of renumeration for any period of employment during the 12 months prior to the relevant date (even if such remuneration is paid after the relevant date);62 (e) all amounts due from the company in respect of damages and costs, or liability for damages and costs, payable to a person employed by it in connection with an accident occurring before the relevant date and in the course of the person’s employment with the company (in circumstances where the company is not effectively indemnified by insurers against such damages and costs);63 (f) all sums due to an employee arising under a private sick pay scheme where payment is provided for the employee where they are absent from employment due to ill health;64 and (g) all sums due to an employee at any time by the company pursuant to a scheme in relation to the provision of any superannuation benefits, whether this was in respect of the company’s contribution to that scheme or such contributions were made by the employee to the company having been deducted from their salary.65

58 59

60 61 62

63 64 65

Section 621(2)(a)(i) to (vi) of the Companies Act 2014. Under s 621(1), the ‘relevant date’ means: ‘(a) where the company is ordered to be wound up, the date of the appointment (or first appointment) of a provisional liquidator or, if no such appointment was made, the date of the winding-up order, unless, in either case, the company had commenced to be wound up voluntarily before that date, and (b) where paragraph (a) does not apply, the date of the passing of the resolution for the winding up of the company.’ Section 621(2)(b) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(2)(c) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(2)(d)(i) of the Companies Act 2014. This preferential payment does not arise where the company is being wound up voluntarily merely for the purposes of reconstruction or of amalgamation with another company. Section 621(2)(e)(i) and (ii) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(2)(f) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(2)(g)(i) and (ii) of the Companies Act 2014.

386

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.12] Critically, the priority of payments provided for under s 621(2) of the 2014 Act are in addition to any other enactment for the priority of a particular debt or sum in a winding up. Equally, any payment provided under s 621(2)(b) of the 2014 Act (wages and salary) shall not exceed the amount of €10,000.66 Where a claimant is a farm labourer, and where the worker has entered into a contract for the payment of a portion of their wages in a lump sum at the end of the year of hiring, the farm labourer shall have priority in respect of the whole sum or such part thereof as the court may decide to be due under contract. This amount is proportionate to the time of service up to the relevant date.67 If payment consisting of wages, salary, accrued holiday renumeration, payment for sick leave arising under a private scheme or payment in respect of any superannuation benefit has been advanced by some person for that very purpose, the person who advanced the payment shall, in the winding up process, have priority in respect of the monies advanced ahead of the affected employee.68 All debts provided for under s 621 of the 2014 Act shall rank equally among themselves and be paid in full. However, where the assets are insufficient to meet them, the debts shall be abated in equal proportions.69 In addition, where the assets of the company are insufficient to satisfy the payments owed to general creditors, said debts under s 621 shall have priority over the claims of holders of debentures under a floating charge created by the company and shall be paid accordingly out of any property comprised in or subject to such a charge.70

PURPOSE OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT [9.12]   The Insolvency Act71 provides for the payment of certain outstanding entitlements relating to the pay of an employee where employment has been terminated because of an employer’s insolvency. These payments are made from the Social Insurance Fund.72 This fund was initially called the Redundancy and Employers Insolvency Fund but was renamed the Social Insurance Fund in accordance with the provisions of the Social Welfare Act 1990.73

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

Section 621(4) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(5) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(6) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(7)(a) of the Companies Act 2014. Section 621(7)(b) of the Companies Act 2014. Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984 (as amended by the European Communities (Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Regulations 2005 (SI 630/2005)). As established under  s 39  of the  Social Welfare Act, 1952, and continued in being under  s 122  of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1981. 5/1990.

387

[9.13]  Termination of Employment

INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION [9.13]   An employer is regarded as being insolvent in the following circumstances:74 (a) where the employer has been adjudicated bankrupt; (b) where the employer has petitioned for arrangement or has executed a deed of arrangement within the meaning of s 4 of the Deeds of Arrangements Act 1887; (c) where the employer has died and the estate, being insolvent, is being administered in accordance with the rules set out in Pt 1 of the First Schedule to the Succession Act 1965; (d) where the employer is a company within the meaning of the 2014 Act which has been ordered to be wound up compulsorily; (e) where the employer is a company within the meaning of the section 2 of the Companies Act, 1963 – (i) in case either a receiver is appointed on behalf of the holder of any debenture secured by a floating charge, or possession is taken by or on behalf of such a debenture holder of any property of the company comprised in or subject to the charge, the date of the appointment of the receiver or possession being taken as aforesaid, as may be appropriate, or (ii) in any other case the date which, in relation to the company, is the relevant date within the meaning of section 285 of the Companies Act, 1963 (f) where the employer is a company and either a receiver has been appointed on behalf of the holder of any debenture secured by a floating charge or possession has been taken by or on behalf of the holders of any debentures secured by a floating charge of any property of the company comprised in or subject to the charge; (g) where the employer is an undertaking which is insolvent under the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of another Member State in accordance with Article 2(1) of the Directive,75, and the employees are employed or habitually employed in the State, the date on which the insolvency was established under the laws, the regulations and administrative procedures of that other Member State; and (h) where the employer is insolvent under the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of the UK and the employees concerned are employed or ‘habitually’ employed in the state, the date which the insolvency was established under the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of the UK.76 The important point to note here is that it is not sufficient for employees to prove that their entitlements remain unpaid. Rather, they must prove that the employer has become insolvent.

74 75 76

Section 4(1)(a) to (h) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984 (as amended). ‘Directive’ means Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer. Inserted by s 105 (b) of the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2020 (23/2020), SI 688/2020.

388

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.15]

Date of insolvency [9.14]   Depending on the definition of ‘insolvency’, the date at which an employer is adjudged insolvent varies. The chart below sets out an easy reference point for each variation. Insolvency type

Effective date

The employer has been adjudicated bankrupt

Date of adjudication

The employer has petitioned for arrangement or has executed a deed of arrangement within the meaning of s 4 of the Deeds of Arrangements Act 1887

Date on which the petition was filed

The employer has died and the estate, being insolvent, is being administered in accordance with the rules set out in Part 1 of the First Schedule to the Succession Act 1965

Date of death

The company is ordered to be wound up compulsorily (ie, is in liquidation)

Mostly the date of the appointment of the provisional liquidator77

The company is being voluntarily wound up

Date of passing of the resolution for voluntarily winding the company up

Either a receiver is appointed on behalf of the holder of a debenture secured by a floating charge or possession is taken by or on behalf of the holders of any debentures secured by a floating charge of any property of the company comprised in or subject to the charge

Date of appointment of the receiver or date possession is taken by or on behalf of the debenture holder

What employees are covered? [9.15]   ‘Employees’ are defined as those who have entered into or work under (or, in the case of a contract which has been terminated, worked under) a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour, clerical work or otherwise; whether it is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; and whether it is a contract of service or apprenticeship or otherwise. ‘Employer’ and any reference to employment shall be construed accordingly.78 The Act is deemed to apply to employees who are employed in employment which is insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1993 (ie, generally those employees who pay full Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI)) or would be

77 78

See s 285 of the Companies Act 1963. Section 1 of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984.

389

[9.16]  Termination of Employment insurable but for the fact that the employee’s employment is deemed to be an excepted employment under the 1993 Act.79 The employee must also be between 16 and 66 years of age or, if over 66 years, must be in employment which, but for their age, would be insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Acts.80.

Employee entitlements [9.16]   An employee (referred to as the ‘applicant’ under the Act) may apply to the Minister for the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment on the prescribed form;81 and the Minister shall pay the debts owed, subject to certain limits, out of the Social Insurance Fund.82

Prerequisites for a valid claim [9.17]   Prior to paying any debt, the Minister must be satisfied that: (a) (b) (c) (d)

the applicant is an employee83 as defined within the scope of the Acts; the employer has become insolvent; the date of the insolvency is not prior to 22 October 1983; and on the relevant date, the applicant was entitled to be paid the whole or part of any debt.

Relevant date [9.18]   The relevant date is assessed as follows:84 (a) If the debt is an amount, damages or fine resulting from a successful unfair dismissals or equality claim, the relevant date is the date on which: (i) the employer became insolvent; or (ii) a relevant recommendation, determination, decision, award or order of the court is made, whichever is the later.85 79

80 81 82 83

84 85

Section 3(a) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984 (as amended) defines ‘excepted employment’ as being that provided under paragraph 2,4, or 5 of Part II of the first Schedule to the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1993 (as amended). Section 3(a) and (b) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984 (as amended). Section 6(1) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984 (as amended). As inserted by s 28(b) of the Social Welfare Act, 1990 (5/1990), commenced as per s 31. Section 1 of the Act defines ‘employee’ as meaning a ‘person who has entered into or works under (or, in the case of a contract which has been terminated, worked under) a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour, clerical work or otherwise, is express or implied, oral or in writing, and whether it is a contract of service or apprenticeship or otherwise, and “employer” and any reference to employment shall be construed accordingly’. Section 6(9)(a) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. This also applies to claims under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, the Industrial Relations Acts and the Organisation of Working Time Act – for a full list see s 6(9)(a) of the Act.

390

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.19] (b) In the case of any other debt, the relevant date is the date on which: (i) the employer became insolvent; (ii) the employee’s employment was terminated as a result of the relevant employer’s insolvency, the date on which such employer became insolvent, or the date of such termination, whichever the employee shall decide as regards the debt nominate, or (iii) in any other case, the date on which the employer became insolvent.

Which debts are recoverable?86 [9.19]   The following debts are deemed to arise:87 (a) arrears of normal weekly remuneration – subject to a maximum of eight weeks to which the employee was entitled over the relevant period (the relevant period is defined as the period of 18 months immediately preceding the relevant date); (b) sick pay – any arrears due in respect of a period or periods not exceeding a total of eight weeks under a sick pay scheme which forms part of an employee’s contract of employment. These payments are only for periods during which the employee was unable to fulfil the contract due to ill health and for sick pay to which the employee became entitled during the relevant period. The amount payable is limited to the difference between any disability or injury benefit in addition to any pay-related benefit payable under the Social Welfare Acts and normal weekly remuneration; (c) holiday pay, which is defined as: (i) pay taken in respect of a holiday actually taken; or (ii) any holiday pay which had accrued at the date of termination of the contract of employment; (d) payment in lieu of statutory notice entitlement under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 or an award by the WRC under that 1973 Act; (e) any amount which an employer is required to pay by virtue of a determination by the WRC or the Labour Court under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, the Maternity Protection Act 1994, the Adoptive Leave Act 1995 and the Parental Leave Acts 1998–2006, provided that such determination, recommendation or order was made no earlier than the commencement of the relevant period (ie, 18 months immediately preceding the relevant date which is the date of insolvency or the date of award, whichever is later);88

86 87 88

Section 6(20) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. Section 6(2)(a)(i)–(xxxii) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984 (as amended). Section 6(9) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act, 1984.

391

[9.19]  Termination of Employment (f) any amount which an employer is required to pay under an employment regulation order within the meaning of Part IV of the Industrial Relations Act 1946 (as amended by the Industrial Relations Act 1990);89 (g) any amount which an employer is required to pay under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015 (as amended)90 by virtue of: (i) an award of redress under by the WRC under s 79(6)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts as provided for under s 82(1); (ii) a Labour Court decision under s 44 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (as amended); or (iii) an order of the Circuit Court in accordance with s 77(3) of the Employment Equality Acts as provided for under s 82(3); (h) any arrears of wages, sick pay, holiday pay or damages at common law for wrongful dismissal awarded by a court; (i) any amount which an employer is required to pay by virtue of a decision, determination, award or order under the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 (as amended);91 (j) any arrears of pension contributions; and (k) deductions such as union dues, VHI/BUPA etc, life assurance, etc, made from wages by agreement and not paid over to the relevant authority; and (l) any awards under various employment legislation, including: (i) the Terms of Employment Information Act 1994 (s 6(2)(a)(xv)); (ii) the Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996 (s 6(2)(a)(xvi)); (iii) the Protection for Persons Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998 (s  6(2)(a) (xviii)); (iv) the European Communities (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2000 (s 6(2)(a)(xx)); (v) the Organisation of Working Time Act 1992 (s 6(2)(a)(xviii)); (vi) the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001 (s 6(2)(a)(xix)); (vii) the Competition Act 2002 (s 6(2)(a)(xxiii)); (viii) the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 (s 6(2)(a)(xx)); (ix) SI 131/2003 – European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (s 6(2)(a)(xxii)); (x) the Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (s  6(2)(a) (xxv)); (xi) the Employment Permits Act 2006 (s 6(2)(a)(xxvi)); (xii) the Payment of Wages Act 1991; and (xiii) the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency) Work Act 2012.

89 90 91

This being an amount by reference to which proceedings have been instituted under s 45(1) of that Act. Section 103 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998–2015 (as amended). This includes any amount by reference to which proceedings have been instituted against an employer for an offence under s 35 of the Act; any amount which an employer is required to pay by virtue of a decision by the WRC under s 26 of the Act; or a determination by the Labour Court under s 29 of the Act.

392

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.21] Definition of normal weekly remuneration Time-based employees [9.20]   Section 6(9) of the Protection of Employees’ (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 defines ‘normal weekly remuneration’ as having the same meaning assigned to it as in Sch  3 to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. This defines ‘normal weekly remuneration’ as an employee’s earnings for a normal working week. This includes any regular bonus or allowance which does not vary in relation to the amount of work done. Additionally, any payment in kind normally received by an employee (eg, complimentary canteen, subsidies) must be taken into account. Overtime pay is calculated by calculating the total amount of overtime earnings in the period of 26 weeks which ended 13 weeks before the date of termination of the employee’s employment and dividing that amount by 26. This is then multiplied by the number of weeks for which overtime is outstanding. The total number of weeks payable may not exceed eight. Where normal weekly remuneration and overtime are outstanding for the same period, the amounts outstanding for each week should be combined and the total number of weeks payable may also not exceed eight. Employees whose normal weekly remuneration varies in relation to work done and employees with a shift premium [9.21]   These are employees whose normal weekly remuneration varies in proportion to the amount of work carried out. This could arise by virtue of bonuses, commission, piece rates etc. Normal weekly remuneration is calculated as follows: (a) Calculate the total number of hours worked by the employee in the 26-week period ending 13 weeks before the date on which the employee’s employment was terminated. Any week or weeks during the 26-week period in which the employee did not work will not be taken into account; but the most recent week or weeks counting backwards before the 26-week period can be substituted in lieu of these weeks. Additionally, if the employee worked with different employers during this 26-week period, these weeks can be taken into account if the change in employer did not affect the continuity of employment. (b) The pay to be taken into account will be the pay for all hours worked during the 26-week period, including any variations in the rate of pay which became operative during the 13 weeks before the employment was terminated. (c) The employee’s average hourly rate of pay is calculated by dividing the total pay as at (a) by the total hours as at (b). The weekly pay is then calculated by multiplying this average hourly rate by the number of normal weekly working hours of the employee concerned at the date on which employment was terminated.

393

[9.22]  Termination of Employment Employees with no normal working hours [9.22]   Employees who have no normal working hours have their remuneration (including bonuses, etc) averaged over the last 52 weeks worked to determine their normal weekly wage.

PAYMENT92 [9.23]   A payment will only be made on various conditions, as follows: (a) The amount payable to an employee in respect of any debt which may be calculated with regard to remuneration cannot exceed €600 per week, with effect from 1 January 2005 (€507.90 prior to that date).93 (b) The date on which a recommendation, decision, determination, award or court order was made and which is the subject of a claim under the Acts must not be earlier than 18 months prior to the date of insolvency of the employer concerned. (c) Arrears of normal wages, deductions for union dues, VHI/BUPA, etc, sick pay and holiday pay are limited to a maximum total of eight weeks which arose in the period of 18 months prior to the date of insolvency of the employer concerned. Where an employee’s employment has been terminated as a result of the employer’s insolvency, the date of termination will apply. (d) No payments shall be made in respect of awards arising under the Unfair Dismissals Act, the Employment Equality Acts or any such recommendations, decisions, determinations or court orders, unless any appeal proceedings have been determined or withdrawn, or the period of time for bringing an appeal has expired. (e) An application for arrears due under an employment regulation order cannot be paid unless proceedings have been instituted against the employer concerned for an offence under s 45(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1946. (f) The amount payable for damages at common law awarded by a civil court for wrongful dismissal is subject to a maximum of 104 weeks’ wages. (g) Legal costs are excluded from all court awards.

EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY IN PRACTICE [9.24]   Regulation (1) of the Protection of Employers’ Insolvency (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005 (SI 682/2005) provides the statutory forms which must be used to make a claim under the Act. Once the forms are completed, the employee

92 93

Section 6(4)(c) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. Section 6(4)(a) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984, as amended by SI 696/2004. Under s 6(4)(b), any debt shall not exceed any difference between the amount of any disability benefit or injury benefit payable under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1981 to the employee concerned as regards the period (together with, in either case, the amount of any pay-related benefit payable to such employee under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1981 as regards the period), and the amount of their normal weekly remuneration as regards the period.

394

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.26] gives the form to the ‘relevant officer’, who is the person appointed in connection with the insolvency (eg, the receiver, the liquidator, etc). If there is no relevant officer, the Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment may appoint one (Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984, s 1(1)).

Employee forms Form EIP1 [9.25]   In the case of a claim for outstanding wages, sick pay, holiday pay or minimum notice entitlements, an employee should complete Form EIP1.94 This form should be returned to the relevant officer, being the liquidator or receiver. Payments made under this form are generally subject to income tax and pay-related social insurance deductions. Deductions are made by the relevant officer. Any deductions for union dues or medical insurance which are normally deducted should also be accounted for on this form. In respect of sick pay, any such payment will not exceed the difference between any social welfare benefit payable and gross weekly pay. Form EIP4 [9.26]   This is used for claims arising under various employment laws, including: (a) the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977;95 (b) the common law in respect of unfair or wrongful dismissal; (c) the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2021; (d) the National Minimum Wage Act 2000; (e) the Maternity Protection Act 1994; (f) the Adoptive Leave Act 1995; (g) the Parental Leave Act 1998; (h) the Payment of Wages Act 1991; (i) the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994; (j) the Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996; (k) the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997; (l) the Protections for Persons Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998; (m) the European Communities (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2000; (n) the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001; (o) the Competition Act 2002; (p) the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Time Work) Act 2003; (q) the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003;

94 95

SI 682/2005 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005. SI 682/2005 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005 provides that it is the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1997. This is an error and should read the 1977 Act.

395

[9.27]  Termination of Employment (r) the Industrial Relations Acts 1946, 1969 and 1990 (Registered Employment Agreements or Employment Regulation Orders); and (s) the Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (concerning victimisation awards). The completed application form(s) should be forwarded to the relevant officer. Copies of supporting documents should be enclosed with the form (eg, determination of the WRC or Labour Court).

Employer forms Form EIP3 [9.27]   Form EIP3 is completed by the relevant officer in respect of funds arising from claims akin to those contained under Form EIP4. When completing the form, copies of the following documentation should be provided: (a) notice of the appointment of the liquidator/receiver; and (b) a statement of affairs/accounts. The Regulations provide that initial claims should be accompanied by a copy of the employee’s P45 or written confirmation of their class of insurance. However, the P45 system has been obsolete since 2019.96 Form EIP6 [9.28]   This relates to an application for payment of unpaid contributions to occupational pension scheme or personal savings retirement account (PRSA). Part 1 of this form should be completed by a trustee, administrator or other person competent to act on behalf of the occupational pension scheme or PRSA provider (as appropriate). Part 2 of the form should be completed by the relevant officer. A breakdown of the unpaid contributions in respect of the 12 months prior to the date of insolvency should be attached. Details of the occupational pension scheme (ie, trust deed, deed of adherence) or PRSA should accompany this application form if not previously provided. When completing a Form EIP6 it should be accompanied by a Form EIP7 when a claim is made in respect of unpaid pension scheme or PRSA contributions payable on an employer’s own account under the Social Insurance Fund. After examining an employee’s claim form (either EIP1 or EIP4), the relevant officer must certify the amount which appears to be owed to the employee. This certification is based on the ‘best information available’ to the relevant officer. This certification is given on Form EIP3 in the case of outstanding entitlements other than pension scheme contributions (in the case of pension entitlements, Form EIP6 is used). The completed

96

This detail is now accounted for on the employee’s final pay and relevant deductions on the Revenue’s online system which can be accessed through the Revenue’s myAccount portal.

396

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.30] Form EIP3 or EIP6 as appropriate, together with the original copies of the employee’s applications (Forms EIP1 and EIP4), should be forwarded to the Insolvency Payments Section of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. The Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment upon receipt of the application, will pay the monies owing to the relevant officer unless there are some exceptional reasons for making the payment directly to the applicant. When the payment is made by the relevant officer to the employee, the relevant officer has to inform the Minister in writing that the payment has been made and detail any deductions made in respect of income tax, PRSI etc. The latter deductions have to be forwarded to the Revenue Commissioners. The Minister may also by notice in writing require the employer to furnish him with the relevant information including records kept pursuant to the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997.97

Payment of unpaid contributions to pension schemes98 [9.29]   There is provision in the Acts for the payment of unpaid contributions to an occupational pension scheme which forms part of the contract of employment. ‘Relevant contributions’ are defined in s 7(2) of the Act as those which both the employer and the employee were liable to pay in respect of the employee’s occupational pension scheme during the year prior to the date of insolvency of the employer. An employee’s contribution is payable only when that sum has been deducted from the employee’s pay but was not paid over to the trustees/administrators of the occupational pension scheme. The amount payable in respect of an unpaid employer contribution is the lesser of: (a) the balance of the employer’s contributions remaining unpaid for the period of 12 months ending on the day prior to the date of the employer’s insolvency; or99 (b) the amount certified by an actuary to be necessary for the purpose of meeting the liability of the scheme on dissolution to pay the benefits provided by the scheme. This applies only where the pension scheme provides for such a liability. Forms [9.30]   The Protection of Employees (Employers Insolvency) Occupational Pension Scheme) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 1990 (SI 121/1990) were repealed and replaced by the 2005 Regulations.100 These provide the statutory forms for making such claims. Where an application is submitted for payment of outstanding employer’s

97

Section 8 of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. Section 7(4) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. 99 Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005 (SI 682/2005). 100 SI 682/2005 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005. 98

397

[9.31]  Termination of Employment contributions, the application must be accompanied by an actuarial certificate which must be obtained by the insolvent employer’s representative. Form E1P7 is used for this purpose. Form EIP6 [9.31]   This is the form to be used in the case of an application for payment of amounts deducted from the pay of an employee is respect of their contributions to the scheme which were not paid into the scheme and unpaid contributions of an employer on its own account to an occupational pension scheme. Part I of the form should be completed by the trustees/administrators of the scheme or by a person competent to act on behalf of the scheme. The form should then be forwarded to the insolvent employer’s representative (usually the liquidator or receiver) who is responsible for completing Part II of the form and forwarding it to the Department. Form EIP7 [9.32]   This is the actuarial certificate, which must be completed by the actuary. This must accompany Form EIP6 when a claim in respect of unpaid pension scheme contributions is being made. A copy of the trust deed should also be attached. The actuary must sign the form and give details of their professional qualification in addition to their business name and address. The copy of the scheme submitted with the application should include full current details of the scheme (eg, names and addresses of trustees and administrators, contribution rates and benefit entitlements). Employers’ representatives are obliged to notify the Insolvency Payments Section of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in writing of the making of the payment to the employee as soon as the payment is made. The notification should also specify the amounts (if any) deducted in respect of income tax, PRSI, pension contributions or otherwise. The Department will pay fees from the Social Insurance Fund to employers’ representatives/relevant officers (liquidators, receivers, etc) for the processing of applications under the Act. The fees are payable on a per capita basis for each former employee of an employer.

Transfer to the Minister of certain rights and remedies [9.33]   Section 10 of the Act specifies that where a payment is made from the Social Insurance Fund in respect of any debt payable under the Acts to an employee or, in the case of pension contributions, any amount is paid into the assets of an occupational pension scheme, the rights and remedies of the employee concerned or the applicant in the case of pension contributions in respect of that debt which the employee may have under the Companies Act 2014 (as amended), the rights and remedies of the employee 398

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.34] will be transferred to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment. This signifies that: (a) any claim by the Minister against the assets of an insolvent employer ranks in priority to any other preferential claim of the employees concerned; and (b) in the final winding-up proceedings in liquidations, receiverships, bankruptcies, etc, the Minister becomes a preferential creditor against the assets of the employer in respect of the amount paid, subject to certain statutory limits as provided for under the Companies Acts and bankruptcy legislation. This signifies that the insolvent employer’s debt is not eliminated by the Insolvency Act but merely transfers from the employer to the Social Insurance Fund.

Transfer of personal data in relation to insolvent employers in the United Kingdom [9.34]   A new provision following the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, was provided for under the Act101 so as to allow the Minister to implement regulations to provide for the transfer of ‘personal data’102 and ‘special category data’103 under the General Data Protection Regulations 2016104 where an employer is insolvent under the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of the United Kingdom and the employees concerned are employed or habitually employed in Ireland. Under this provision, such regulations may provide for the transfer of such data and documentation to and from a relevant officer or an actuary or a person performing a similar task105. Any such transfer of data shall be permitted provided that it is necessary for the performance of the functions of a relevant officer, an actuary or a person performing a similar task. The Act goes on to further provide that the Minister should have regard to the important public interest when protecting the interests of employees in the event of insolvency, ensuring a minimum degree of protection – in particular, the payment of employees’ outstanding claims and the need to balance economic and social development.106 101

s8A Protection of Employees (Employers Insolvency) Act 1984. Article 4(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679 provides that ‘personal data’ ‘means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’. 103 Article 9(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679, provides, in relation to ‘special category data’, that the ‘processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’. 104  General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. 105 Section 8A(1) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). 106 Section 8A(2) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). 102

399

[9.34]  Termination of Employment On 8 January 2021, the Minister exercised his powers under s 8A of the Act, making the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020. The 2020 Regulations are deemed to apply where: (a) an employer is deemed insolvent in accordance with the rules and legislation in the United Kingdom; (b) the employees concerned are employed or habitually employed in Ireland; and (c) the Minister receives an application under s 6 and/or 7 of the Act that relates to that employer or those employees and has been made by or behalf of a relevant officer, an actuary or a person performing a similar task. Under the 2020 Regulations, personal data or special category data relating to affected employees may be transferred from the United Kingdom between the Minister and the relevant officer, actuary or person performing a similar task107. This may include any documentation relevant to such data that the Minister deems necessary to carry out their functions under the Act.108 Transfers may occur between the Minister and the relevant officer, actuary or person performing a similar task,109 and vice versa110. When making a request for such data under reg 5 of the 2020 Regulations, the Minister may have regard to ‘data minimisation’. This principle requires that all data processed be ‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed’.111 The use of the word ‘may’ under reg 6 of the 2020 Regulations, with regard to the principle of data minimisation, seems to be at odds with the language contained in art 5 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which uses the word ‘shall’. In other words, under the GDPR, any controller of personal data is required to process such data in accordance with the principle of data minimisation. However, this obligation seems to be discretionary under the 2020 Regulations when transferring data. This notwithstanding, it seems that the 2020 Regulations attempt to limit the extent of the personal data transferred to that which the Minister deems necessary to carry out their functions under the Act.112 Where a minister receives a response under s 10 of the Act, and where the Minister issues a statement of debt to a relevant officer, an actuary or a person performing a similar task, the Minister may transfer as part of the statement of debt: (a) personal data of an employee to whom that debt relates (in whole or in part); and (b) special categories of personal data of an employee to whom that debt relates (in whole or in part). 107

Regulation 5(a) and (b) of SI 730/2020 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020. Regulation 5(c) of SI 730/2020 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020. 109 Regulation 5 of SI 730/2020 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020. 110 Regulation 6 of SI 730/2020 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020. 111 Article 5(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679. 112 Regulations 5 and 7 of SI 730/2020 – Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (Transfer of Personal Data) Regulations 2020. 108

400

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.35] Again, such data may be transferred only where the Minister deems this necessary to perform their functions under the Act.

Complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission [9.35]   Complaints can be made to the WRC by a person:113 (a) to whom the Minister has failed to make a payment; or (b) who alleges that any payment made by the Minister is less than an amount which should have been paid.114 However, complaints (under this Act) can only be made for the following debts: (a) (b) (c) (d)

remuneration; monies due under a sick pay scheme; holiday pay; or outstanding occupational pension scheme contributions115.

Complaints must be presented to the Director General of the WRC for adjudication by an adjudication officer116 within six months of the date of the decision by the Minister in relation to the application to which the complaint relates.117 The adjudication officer, at their discretion, may entertain a complaint if it is presented to the Director General after the expiration of the six-month period, where there is reasonable cause to permit this. However, this discretion to hear the complaint does not extend beyond 12 months from the date of the Minister’s decision.118 Under the Act, the Minister has the power to refer a matter to the WRC for adjudication where they are of the view that doubt exists as to whether the claim is allowable (in whole or in part).119 Under the Act, an adjudication officer may make a declaration which specifies the amount that is payable to the complainant.120 An adjudication officer may also require a person to give evidence in the proceedings in relation to a complaint under the Act under oath or affirmation.121 Proceedings under the Act shall

113

114 115 116 117 118 119

120 121

Section 9 of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended), which was later substituted on 1 October 2015 by s 81(3)(a), (c), (d) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (16/2015), SI 410/2015. Section 9 of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 2005 (SI 682/2005); Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. Section 9(1)(a) and (b) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. Section 9(1A) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Section 9(1B) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Section 9(1C) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Section 9(3) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Section 9(4) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Section 9 (4A) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Inserted (29 July 2021) by s 10 of the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 (29/2021), SI 397/2021. A class B fine means a fine not exceeding €4,000 as provided (4 January 2011) by ss 3 and 5(1) of the Fines Act 2010 (8/2010), SI 662/2010. A class E fine means a fine not exceeding €500 as provided (4 January 2011) by ss 3 and 8(1) of the Fines Act 2010 (8/2010), SI 662/2010.

401

[9.36]  Termination of Employment be conducted in public unless there are special circumstances requiring that the parties names’ be anonymised and the matter be heard in private.122 Appeals [9.36]   Where an adjudication officer has made a declaration under Section 9 of the Act, this shall be treated similarly to any decision of an adjudication officer under s 41 of the 2015 Act, in that any complainant will be entailed to appeal the declaration to the Labour Court under s 44 of the 2015 Act.123

Minister’s right to refuse an application [9.37]   Section 6(8) of the 1984 Act gives a right to the Minister to refuse an application where they are satisfied that there has been a prior agreement between the employer and employee that ‘the whole or any part of the debt would be the subject of an application’ where, at the time of the agreement, the employer had the means to pay all or part of the debt.

Offences [9.38]   Proceedings for an offence may be instituted only with the consent of the Minister.124 All forms used under the Acts are statutory forms. Proceedings may be taken against any person who, in relation to a claim/application under the Acts, gives a statement material to the proceedings which is false and that they know to be false.125 Such person shall be liable on summary conviction to a class B fine and imprisonment for 12 months; or on conviction on indictment to fine not exceeding €100,000 or imprisonment for ten years.

122

Section 9(4C) and (4D) (a) and (b) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended). Section  9A(a) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984 (as amended), as inserted on 1 October 2015 by  s 15 of the National Minimum Wage (Low Pay Commission) Act 2015 (22/2015), commenced by SI 410/2015. 124 Section 14 of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. 125 Section 9(4A)(b) of the Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) Act 1984. 123

402

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.39]

section 6 of the Act applies, the form (EIP4) set out in Part 2 of the Schedule to these Regulations.”,

Forms and

Form EIP1

[9.39]  (b)

substituting the matter in the Schedule for the matter in the Schedule to the Principal Regulations. SCHEDULE PART 1 Form EIP1

Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment EMPLOYEE'S APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT(S) OF WAGES, HOLIDAY PAY, MINIMUM NOTICE AND SICK PAY UNDER THE INSOLVENCY PAYMENTS SCHEME An Roinn Fiontar, Trádála agus Fostaíochta Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts, 1984-2003 NOTE: PLEASE READ NOTES BELOW BEFORE COMPLETING THIS FORM 1.

An employer is regarded as insolvent for the purposes of the Acts if in Liquidation, Receivership, adjudicated bankrupt, etc.

2.

When completed, this Form should be returned to the Relevant Officer.

3.

The Relevant Officer is the person appointed in connection with an employer's Insolvency (e.g., Receiver, Liquidator, etc.).

4.

The maximum period for which arrears are normally payable is 8 weeks. However, for the purposes of calculating arrears, a statutory ceiling on gross weekly wages is applied. The current ceiling is €507.90 per week.

5.

Gross amounts are paid under the Scheme and are subject to Income Tax and PRSI. Deductions for Income Tax, Pay-Related Social Insurance and Occupational Pension Scheme contributions, etc., will be made by the Relevant Officer from payments due to the employees where appropriate.

6.

In relation to a claim for overtime, bonus or commission, please give both the actual amount due and

403

[9.39]  Termination of Employment average amount, calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 . If rates given in Part 4 and Part 5 differ, please explain. 7.

Deductions for union dues, VHI/BUPA, etc. which were made from gross wages and not paid over to the appropriate authority should be inserted in Part 4.

8.

In the case of sick pay, payment will not exceed the difference between any social welfare benefit payable and gross weekly pay.

9.

PLEASE NOTE THAT FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE FORM FULLY MAY RESULT IN DELAY IN MAKING THE PAYMENT

Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

Tel:

(01) 6312121

Davitt House

Fax:

(01) 6313217

65a Adelaide Road

Web:

www.entemp.ie

Dublin 2

Lo-call

1890 220222

Part 1

Your Details

(Please complete in Block Capitals) Figures Employee's PPS No.

Employee's Surname

Employee's First name

Employee's Address

404

Letters

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.39]

Date of Birth

Day

Month

Class of Insurance Please attach copy of P45 if available

Part 2

Employer Details

Name of Employer

Employer's Address

Type of Business(e.g., clothing

405

Year

[9.39]  Termination of Employment manufacturer)

Name of Receiver/Liquidator/Employer Representative

Telephone No. (Including area code)

Part 3

Employment Details

Occupation

Date of Commencement of employment

Day

Month

Year

Date of Termination of employment

Day

Month

Year

Gross Pay

€

Week

€

or

406

Month

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.39] No. of days and hours normally worked per week

Days

Hours

Director

Secretary

Shareholder

If you were a Director, Secretary or Shareholder of the Company, please indicate as appropriate

Part 4

Arrears of Wages Pay

If you are owed wages, overtime, bonus or commission payments, give details in the spaces provided. If wages claim includes “bounced” cheques, please attach cheques. In relation to overtime and commission, please see Note 6. Type (wages, bonus, etc.)

From

To

No. of weeks/days

Gross weekly wage

Day Mth Year Day Mth Year

Average (if required) (See Note 6)

€

Total Arrears of Wages Claimed

€

Amount Due (Actual)

€

€

€

€

€

€

€

€

Deductions from Wages, e.g., Union Dues, VHI/BUPA, etc. Type

From

To

No. of weeks

407

Weekly

Amount Due

[9.39]  Termination of Employment Deduction Day Mth Year Day Mth Year

Total Arrears of Deductions Claimed

Part 5

€

€

€

€

€

€

€

€

€

Arrears of Holiday Pay

From

Day

Mth

To

Year

Day

Annual Leave Entitlement

No. of days

Annual Leave Taken

No. of days

408

Mth

Total no of weeks due (incl. public holidays due) Year

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.39] Public Holidays Due

No. of days

Gross Weekly Pay

€

Arrears of Holiday Pay Claimed

€

Part 6

Minimum Notice

No. of Weeks' Notice Due/Awarded

Gross Weekly Pay

€

Total Amount of Minimum Notice Claimed

€

If claim is in respect of an Employment Appeals Tribunal Award, please attach copy of the Tribunal Award and complete the following:

Day

409

Month

Year

[9.39]  Termination of Employment

Date of Employment Appeals Tribunal Award

Reference Number of Award

Part 7

Arrears due under a Company Sick Pay Scheme

From Day

Weekly amount of Social Welfare Benefit

€

Total amount of Social Welfare Benefit payable during the period

€

Weekly payment by Employer under Sick Pay Scheme (Exclusive of Social Welfare payments)

€

Gross Weekly Pay

€

Mth

To Year

410

Day

Mth

Year

Total no. of weeks due (incl. any public hols. due)

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.40] Total Arrears of Sick Pay Claimed

€

Total Arrears of Sick Pay Claimed

€

I apply for payment due to me under the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts 1984-2003 and declare that I have made no other applications in respect of the amounts shown above. I am aware that my rights and remedies against my employer in respect of these amounts will be transferred to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment when payment has been made. I also declare in respect of the amounts claimed above I apply for payment due to me under the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts 1984-2003 and that I have made no appeal in respect of these amounts and I am not aware, to the best of my knowledge, that declare that I have made no other applications in respect of the amounts shown above. I am aware that my rights these amounts are the subject of appeal by someone else. and remedies against my employer in respect of these amounts will be transferred to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment when payment has been made. I also declare in respect of the amounts claimed above that I have made no appeal in respect of these amounts and I am not aware, to the best of my knowledge, that these amounts are the subject of appeal by someone else. Signature:___________________________________________ Date:________________________________ Signature:___________________________________________ Date:________________________________ WARNING: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM WARNING: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE MAKING A FALSE

STATEMENT Form EIP4126ON THIS FORM

[9.40]  

Department of

PART 2 PART 2

Form EIP4 Form EIP4

Enterprise, Trade Department of and Employment Enterprise, Trade EMPLOYEE'S APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT(S) UNDER THE INSOLVENCY PAYMENTS SCHEME and OFEmployment ENTITLEMENTS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1998, UNFAIR DISMISSALS ACT, 1977 COURT AWARDS IN RESPECT OF UNFAIR OR WRONGFUL DISMISSAL, MATERNITY PROTECTION ACT, 1994, ADOPTIVE LEAVE ACT, 1995 PARENTAL LEAVE ACT, 1998, NATIONAL EMPLOYEE'S APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT(S) UNDER THE INSOLVENCY PAYMENTS SCHEME MINIMUM WAGE ACT, 2000 AND STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGES UNDER AN EMPLOYMENT OF ENTITLEMENTS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1998, UNFAIR DISMISSALS REGULATION ORDER ACT, 1977 COURT AWARDS IN RESPECT OF UNFAIR OR WRONGFUL DISMISSAL, MATERNITY PROTECTION ACT, 1994, ADOPTIVE LEAVE ACT, 1995 PARENTAL LEAVE ACT, 1998, NATIONAL AnAND Roinn Fiontar, Trádála agus Fostaíochta MINIMUM WAGE ACT, 2000 STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGES UNDER AN EMPLOYMENT REGULATION ORDER Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment An Roinn Fiontar, Trádála agus Fostaíochta Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts, 1984-2003 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts, 1984-2003

126

Protection of Employees (Employers Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI 197/2003).

411

[9.40]  Termination of Employment NOTE: PLEASE READ NOTES BELOW BEFORE COMPLETING THIS FORM 1.

An employer is regarded as insolvent for the purposes of the Acts if in Liquidation, Receivership, adjudicated bankrupt, etc.

2.

When completed, this Form should be returned to the Relevant Officer. The Relevant Officer is the person appointed in connection with an employer's insolvency (e.g., Receiver, Liquidator, etc).

3.

A separate Form EIP1 should be completed where payment is being claimed in respect of Arrears of Wages, Sick Pay, Holiday Pay or Minimum Notice.

4.

Claims in respect of statutory minimum wages can only be made in respect of employments covered by an Employment Regulation Order. In case of doubt about the application of an Employment Regulation Order, claimants should contact the Labour Inspectorate Section of this Department.

5.

Please attach a copy of the Recommendation, Determination or Order as appropriate, if available.

6.

PLEASE NOTE THAT FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE FORM FULLY MAY RESULT IN DELAY IN MAKING THE PAYMENT.

Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

Tel:

(01) 6312121

Davitt House

Fax:

(01) 6313217

65a Adelaide Road

Web:

www.entemp.ie

Dublin 2

Lo-call

1890 220222

Part 1

Your Details

(Please complete in Block Capitals) Figures Employee's PPS No.

Employee's Surname

412

Letters

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.40]

Employee's First name

Employee's Address

Date of Birth

Day

Month

Class of Insurance Please attach copy of P45 if available

Part 2

Employer Details

Name of Employer

Employer's Address

413

Year

[9.40]  Termination of Employment

Type of Business(e.g., clothing manufacturer)

Name of Receiver/Liquidator/Employer Representative

Telephone No. (Including area code)

Part 3

Employment Details

Occupation

Date of Commencement of employment

Day

Month

Year

Date of Termination of employment

Day

Month

Year

414

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.40] Gross Pay

€

Week

€

Month

or

No. of days and hours normally worked per week

Days

Hours

Director

Secretary

Shareholder

If you were a Director, Secretary or Shareholder of the Company, please indicate as appropriate

Part 4

Employment Equality Act, 1998

Date Day

Mth

Year

Amount

Equality Officer Decision

€

Mediated Settlement

€

Labour Court Determination

€

Civil Court Award/Order

€

Has an appeal been lodged? Reference No. Yes/No

Note: Please attach copy of decision, mediated settlement, determination or award/order, as appropriate. Date refers to date of decision, settlement, etc.

Part 5

Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, or Court Awards in respect of Unfair or Wrongful Dismissal

415

[9.40]  Termination of Employment

Date

Day

Mth

Year

Amount

Rights Commissioner Recommendation

€

Employment Appeals Tribunal Determination

€

Civil Court Award/Order

€

Reference No.

Has an appeal been lodged? Yes/No

Note: Please attach copy of recommendation, determination, award or order, as appropriate. Date refers to date of recommendation, determination, etc Part 6

Maternity Protection Act, 1994, Adoptive Leave Act, 1995 or Parental Leave Act, 1998

Please tick as appropriate

Maternity Protection Act, 1994

Adoptive Leave Act, 1995

Parental Leave Act, 1998

Date Day

Mth

Year

Rights Commissioner

Amount €

416

Reference No.

Has an appeal been lodged? Yes/No

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.40] Recommendation Employment Appeals Tribunal Determination

€

Civil Court Award/Order

€

Note: Please attach copy of recommendation, determination, or award/order, as appropriate. Date refers to date of recommendation, determination, etc.

Part 7

National Minimum Wage Act, 2000

Note: A claim under this part is not payable unless proceedings against the employer under Section 45 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946 , for the amount involved have been instituted.

Date Day

Mth

Year

Amount

Rights Commissioner Decision

€

Labour Court Determination

€

Civil Court Award/Order

€

Reference No.

Has an appeal been lodged? Yes/No

Note: Please attach copy of decision, determination or award/order, as appropriate. Date refers to date of decision, determination, etc.

Part 8

Statutory Minimum Wages under an Employment Regulation Order

Title of Employment Regulation Order

Have proceedings been instituted against the

Yes

417

No

[9.40]  Termination of Employment employer? (please tick appropriate box)

If Yes, by whom?

In which Court? (If applicable)

From

State the period in respect of which the claim is being made

Day

Mth

To Year

Day

Mth

Year

Total No. of Weeks

Gross Weekly Pay

€

Total Claimed

€

I apply for payment due to me under the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts 1984-2003 and declare that I have made no other applications in respect of the amounts shown above. I am aware that my rights and remedies against my employer in respect of these amounts will be transferred to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment when payment has been made. I also declare in respect of the amounts claimed above that I have made no appeal in respect of these amounts and I am not aware, to the best of my knowledge, that these amounts are the subject of appeal by someone else.

Signature:___________________________________________

418

Date:________________________________

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.41] WARNING: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM WARNING: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE MAKING A FALSE

STATEMENT Form EIP3127ON THIS FORM

[9.41]  

PART 3 PART 3

Department of

Form EIP3 Form EIP3

Department of Enterprise, Trade Enterprise, Trade and Employment and Employment

Insolvency Payments Scheme Insolvency Payments Scheme Acts, 1984-2003 Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency)

APPLICATION RELEVANT OFFICER FOR FUNDS RESPECT OF: ProtectionBY of A Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts,IN 1984-2003 WAGES, HOLIDAY PAY, SICK PAY, MINIMUM NOTICE ENTITLEMENTS/ AWARDS, APPLICATION BY A RELEVANT OFFICER FOR FUNDS IN RESPECT OF: ENTITLEMENTS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1998, UNFAIR DISMISSALS ACT, 1977, COURT AWARDS IN RESPECT OF UNFAIR OR WRONGFUL DISMISSAL, MATERNITY WAGES, HOLIDAY PAY, SICK PAY, MINIMUM NOTICE ENTITLEMENTS/ AWARDS, PROTECTION ACT, 1994, ADOPTIVE LEAVE ACT, 1995, PARENTAL LEAVE ACT, 1998, NATIONAL ENTITLEMENTS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1998, UNFAIR DISMISSALS ACT, MINIMUM WAGE ACT, 2000 AND STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGES UNDER AN EMPLOYMENT 1977, COURT AWARDS IN RESPECT OF UNFAIR OR WRONGFUL DISMISSAL, MATERNITY REGULATION ORDER. PROTECTION ACT, 1994, ADOPTIVE LEAVE ACT, 1995, PARENTAL LEAVE ACT, 1998, NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE ACT, 2000 AND STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGES UNDER AN EMPLOYMENT NOTE: PLEASE READ NOTES BELOW REGULATION BEFORE COMPLETING ORDER. THIS FORM 1. PLEASE When making initial claim to the Insolvency Payments Section on FORM behalf of the former employees of NOTE: READan NOTES BELOW BEFORE COMPLETING THIS an Insolvent Company, copies of the following documentation must be attached: 1.

WhenNotice makingofanappointment initial claimoftoLiquidator/Receiver the Insolvency Payments Section on behalf of the former employees of (a) an Insolvent Company, copies of the following documentation must be attached:

(b) (a)

Statement of Affairs/Accounts Notice of appointment of Liquidator/Receiver

2.

InitialStatement claims forofeach employee should be accompanied by a copy of the employee's P45 or written (b) Affairs/Accounts confirmation of his/her class of insurance.

2. 3.

Initial claims for each employee should be accompanied by a copy of the employee's P45 or written PLEASE NOTE THAT FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE FORM FULLY MAY RESULT IN confirmation of his/her class of insurance. DELAY IN MAKING THE PAYMENT.

3.

PLEASE NOTE THAT FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE FORM FULLY MAY RESULT IN DELAY IN MAKING THE PAYMENT. DETAILS OF INSOLVENT COMPANY DETAILS OF INSOLVENT COMPANY

127

Protection of Employees (Employers Insolvency) (Forms and Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI 197/2003).

419

[9.41]  Termination of Employment Employer's PAYE Registered No.

Figures

Letters

Name of company

Business Address

Nature of Business

PPS No.

Names of Directors and Company Secretary Figures

Date of Insolvency

Day

Letters

Mth

Type of Insolvency

420

% Shareholding

Year

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.41] RELEVANT OFFICER CERTIFICATE Name of Relevant Officer

Name of Company

Business Address

Telephone No. (including area code)

Relevant Officer Tax No.

Figures

Letters

Please attach a schedule of employee entitlements. Annex EIP3(a) attached shows the format required. Please ensure that your schedule is clearly headed by the company name and PAYE No. No. of pages of Annex EIP3(a) attached Declaration To: Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment In connection with the provisions of the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts, 1984-2003, I have accepted and certify, based on the best information available to me, the entitlement of the employees as shown on the attached schedule. I have made no other application in respect of these entitlements. I understand that it may be necessary for you to refer information on the entitlements to the Revenue Commissioners and/or to other Government Departments. I hereby give my consent to the disclosure of such information as is in my possession. I also agree to make available to you such records as may be required for examination. I undertake to distribute the appropriate amounts to the employees concerned from the funds received pursuant to this application. Copies of employee claims are on the relevant forms are attached. I declare that the company is insolvent and that there are no funds available from which the entitlements claimed on the attached schedule can be paid. The Instrument of payment should be drawn in

421

[9.41]  Termination of Employment favour of (Relevant Officer)

Address

Signature of Relevant Officer

Date

Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

Tel:

(01) 6312121

Davitt House

Fax:

(01) 6313217

65a Adelaide Road

Web:

www.entemp.ie

Dublin 2

Lo-call

1890 220222

Schedule of Employee Entitlements Company Name

Form EIP3

PAYE No.

Employee's Name

PPS No.

(a)

(b)

Annex (a)

Total of Total Total Total Deductions Total Arrears of (Union Arrears of Arrears of Minimum Columns (c), (d), Notice Holiday Sick Pay dues, Wages (e), (f) & Pay VHI/BUPA, (g) etc.) (c)

(d)

1. 2.

422

(e)

(f)

(g)

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.41] 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Total

Employee's Name

(h)

€

PPS No. Employment Unfair Maternity National Statutory Total of Equality Dismissals Protection Minimum Minimum Columns (j), (k), Wages Act, 1998 Act, 1977, Act, 1994, Wage Act, Under an (l), (m) & 2000 Adoptive Court (n) Employment Awards in Leave Act, Regulation 1995, respect of Order Unfair or Parental Wrongful Leave Act, 1998 Dismissals (i)

(k)

(j)

1.

423

(l)

(m)

(n)

[9.41]  Termination of Employment 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Total

€

GIVEN under my hand, 22 May 2003 FRANK FAHEY Minister of State at the Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment

424

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.42] EXPLANATORY NOTE (This note is not part of the Instrument and does not purport to be a legal interpretation.) The purpose of these Regulations is to prescribe revised forms and certificates to be used in connection with the submission of claims under Section 6 of the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts, 1984 to 2003. © Government of Ireland. Oireachtas Copyright Material is reproduced with the permission of the Houses of the Oireachtas Accessibility Statement | Privacy Statement | Disclaimer

Form EIP6128 [9.42]   Part 4 FORM EIP6

An Roinn Fiontar, Trádála agus Fostaíochta Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

INSOLVENCY PAYMENTS SCHEME PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES (EMPLOYERS' INSOLVENCY) ACTS 1984-2004 APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT OF UNPAID CONTRIBUTIONS TO OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEME OR PERSONAL SAVINGS RETIREMENT ACCOUNT (PRSA) FORM EIP6: GUIDANCE NOTES 1. Part 1 of this form and the Schedule should be completed by a trustee, administrator or other person competent to act on behalf of the occupational pension scheme or PRSA provider, as appropriate. 2. Part 2 of this form should be completed by the Relevant Officer (liquidator, receiver, etc.). A breakdown of the unpaid contributions in respect of the 12 months prior to the date of insolvency should be attached. 3. Where a claim is being made for unpaid contributions payable on an employer's own account, an actuarial certificate, Form EIP7, should be obtained by the Relevant Officer and attached to the claim. 4. Details of the occupational pension scheme (e.g., a Trust Deed, Deed of Adherence) or PRSA should accompany this application if not already forwarded. 5. The date of insolvency for the purpose of payments under the Insolvency Payments Scheme is defined in Section 4 of the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Acts 1984-2004.

128

Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Occupational Pension Scheme) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 1990 (SI 121/1990).

425

[9.42]  Termination of Employment Insolvency Payments Section Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

Tel:

(01) 6312121

Davitt House

Fax:

(01) 6313217

65a Adelaide Road

Lo-call:

1890 220 222

Dublin 2

Web:

www.entemp.ie

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM

426

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.42]

427

[9.42]  Termination of Employment

428

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.42]

429

[9.42]  Termination of Employment

430

Dismissal and Employer Insolvency  [9.43] Form EIP7129 [9.43]   Part 5 FORM EIP7

An Roinn Fiontar, Trádála agus Fostaíochta Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

INSOLVENCY PAYMENTS SCHEME PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES (EMPLOYERS' INSOLVENCY) ACTS 1984-2004 OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEME ACTUARIAL CERTIFICATE

129

Protection of Employees (Employers’ Insolvency) (Occupational Pension Scheme) (Forms and Procedure) Regulations 1990 (SI 121/1990).

431

[9.43]  Termination of Employment

GIVEN under my hand, 2nd November, 2005, _____________________ Tony Killeen Minister of State at the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment Explanatory Note (This note is not part of the Instrument and does not purport to be a legal interpretation.) The purpose of these Regulations is to prescribe revised forms and certificates to be used in relation to claims under Section 6 and Section 7 of the Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Act 1984 . Copies of these Regulations may be purchased from the Government Publications Sales Office, Sun Alliance House, Molesworth Street, Dublin 2, or through any bookseller. © Government of Ireland. Oireachtas Copyright Material is reproduced with the permission of the Houses of the Oireachtas Accessibility Statement | Privacy Statement | Disclaimer

432

Chapter10

Protected Disclosures

INTRODUCTION [10.01]   Making a protected disclosure, commonly known as ‘whistleblowing’, is a process that allows employees to report wrongdoings in the workplace. In both the public and private sectors, whistleblowing is essential for fostering transparency, accountability and integrity. The law on protected disclosures has undergone substantial changes in recent years, which has enhanced the protection offered to whistleblowers.

Relevant legislation [10.02]   The protected disclosure (whistleblowing) regime, which protects employees from being penalised by their employers, is to be found in several pieces of legislation. The Protected Disclosures Act 20141 (‘2014 Act’), as amended by the Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 20222 (‘2022 Act’), is the primary statute governing protected disclosures in Ireland and provides the legal basis for protecting whistleblowers in the workplace. On 1 January 2023, the 2022 Act came into effect,3 implementing various new specifications provided for under the EU Whistleblowing Directive.4 In addition to the 2014 Act, other various sources of law provide similar protections. Under Section 50 of the 2002 Competition Act, employers are prohibited from penalising employees who report breaches by their employer under s 6 or 7 of that Act. The Protection for Person Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998 protects employees from penalisation for reporting child abuse. For a significant number of companies operating in Ireland which are listed on a US stock exchange, employees are protected from reporting concerns regarding questionable auditing or accounting matters under the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act,5 which was enacted following the so-called ‘Enron scandal’.

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Protected Disclosures Act 2014 as enacted on 8 July 2014. See also the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 2015 (SI 464/2015). Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022, as enacted on 21 July 2022. Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022 (Commencement) Order 2022 (SI 510/2022). Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2020/1503 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 October 2020. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

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[10.03]  Termination of Employment The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act6 also specifically protects employees who disclose wrongdoing in the context of their employment. This includes protection against penalisation (or threats of penalisation) by their employer. Protection includes any act or omission by an employer that affects an employee to their detriment. Part 5 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement Act) 2013 also deals with protected disclosures made to the bank, an officer or employee of the bank or an authorised office, and lays down specific rules for dealing with such disclosures

UNDERSTANDING PROTECTED DISCLOSURES [10.03]   The 2014 Act outlines the parameters of what constitutes a protected disclosure and governs the definition of a ‘protected disclosure’ in Ireland. Understanding protected disclosure requires familiarity with what falls under this definition, as well as the safeguards and processes for making a protected disclosure; the obligations and rights of whistleblowers and employers; and the precautions against retaliation for making a protected disclosure in good faith. In order to deal with a protected disclosure, an employer must first understand the full scope of the definition of a ‘protected disclosure’ and all key aspects thereof. This includes gaining clarity on the legal definition of the ‘relevant information’ that can be disclosed as a protected disclosure and the categories of information that qualify for protection; understanding the types of wrongdoing or illegal activities that are covered; and being aware of any limitations in the legislation, including specific conditions that must be met for a disclosure to be protected, such as the manner of the disclosure, the recipient of the disclosure and the good-faith requirement. Dealing with a protected disclosure also requires keeping abreast of any modifications or revisions to the legal definition of a protected disclosure by consulting pertinent legal sources or instructional materials. In general, it is essential to comprehend what constitutes a protected disclosure to ensure that any disclosure made complies with the relevant legal requirements and qualifies for legal protection.

Definition of a ‘protected disclosure’ [10.04]   Under the 2014 Act, a ‘protected disclosure’ is the disclosure of relevant information by a worker in a manner specified by the 2014 Act.7 Under this definition, an employer should pay special attention to what constitutes ‘relevant information’, who qualifies as a ‘worker’ and what falls under the definition of a ‘relevant wrongdoing’ – all of which is vital to the making of a legally protected disclosure of information.

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Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2010. Section 5(1) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014.

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Protected Disclosures  [10.06]

Definition of ‘relevant information’ [10.05]   Under s 5(2) of the 2014 Act, information is considered ‘relevant information’ if, in the reasonable belief of the worker, it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings; and if it came to the attention of a worker in a work-related context.8 Under the 2022 Act, ‘relevant information’ can include information that came to the attention of a worker in a work-related context, which includes ‘current or past work activities in the public or private sector through which, irrespective of the nature of those activities, persons acquire information concerning a relevant wrong-doing. However, the relevant wrongdoing need not have occurred at the time of the disclosure by the worker.

Definition of ‘relevant wrongdoing’ [10.06]   A disclosure should include one or more relevant wrongdoings in order for this disclosure to be protected. A ‘relevant wrongdoing’, according to the definition set out in s 5(3) of the 2014 Act, includes the following:9 (a) that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services, (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, (f) that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (g) that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross mismanagement, (h) that a breach has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, or (i) that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed or an attempt has been, is being or is likely to be made to conceal or destroy such information.

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Section 5(2)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, as amended by s 6(b) of the Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022 (27/2022) SI 510/2022. Previously, ‘relevant information’ for the purposes of the 2014 Act arose where the information came to the attention of the work in connection with the worker’s employment. This was later updated under the 2022 Act so that the information came to the attention of the worker in a work-related context. Section 5(3)(a) to (i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, (as amended).

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[10.07]  Termination of Employment In respect of s 5(3)(h) of the 2014 Act (as amended), a ‘breach’ is deemed to mean an act or omission that is unlawful and to which one or more of the following subparagraphs applies: (a) public procurement; (b) financial services, products and markets, and the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing; (c) product safety and compliance; (d) transport safety; (e) protection of the environment; (f) radiation protection and nuclear safety; (g) food and feed safety and animal health and welfare; (h) public health; (i) consumer protection; or (j) protection of privacy and personal data, and security of network and information systems.10 In addition to the above, a breach may arise where: (a) the act or omission itself affects the financial interests of the Union as referred to in Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and where further specified in relevant EU measures); or11 (b) the act or omission relates to the internal market as referred to in Article 26(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, including breaches of Union competition and state aid rules, as well as breaches relating to the internal market in relation to acts which breach the rules of corporate tax or to arrangements whose purpose is to obtain a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the applicable corporate tax law; or (c) that defeats the object or purpose of the rules in the Union acts and areas referred to in paragraph (a). Obligation arising under the contract of employment [10.07]   Employers should be mindful of the exception provided under s 5(3)(b) of the 2014 Act. This states that a relevant wrongdoing arises only where it is one other than a legal obligation arising under the contract of employment. In A Carpet Weaver v A Textile Company,12 the complainant claimed to have protection under the 2014 Act as he raised concerns on behalf of the workforce in respect of the proper payment of holiday entitlements. The respondent claimed that the complaint fell within s 5(3)(b) of the 2014 Act, in that it related to matters under the complainant’s contract of employment – that is, entitlements. In assessing the matter, the adjudication officer noted the following: ‘His disclosure was in a representative capacity for the workforce that in his view were not receiving their correct entitlements. It was not confined to his own holiday rights. Use of the 10 11

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Section 3(1)(a)(i)(I) to (x) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, (as amended). Section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, (as amended). A Carpet Weaver v A Textile Company ADJ-00017991, 14 May 2019.

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Protected Disclosures  [10.07] words “the worker” in section 5 (3)13 must be read in its ordinary meaning, that is the worker who is making the disclosure. This section protects an employer from protected disclosures arising from an individual employee who is in a dispute with their employer over their contract. However, it does not protect an employer where one employee speaks on behalf of the workforce and complains about a breach of a legal obligation which effects all of them.’

However, the adjudication officer, in finding against the complainant, noted that the alleged detriment – that is, a warning letter – was not in response to his protected disclosure; rather, the respondent was able to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that it related to underperformance in carpeting weaving. Under s 5(5) of the 2014 Act, a matter is deemed not to constitute a relevant wrongdoing ‘if it is a matter which it is the function of the worker or the worker’s employer to detect, investigate or prosecute and does not consist of or involve an act or omission on the part of the employer’.14 This point was considered at length in Tom Nolan v Fingal County Council,15 an appeal in which the High Court considered whether the Labour Court had erred in law while concluding, in reliance on s 5(5) of the 2014 Act, that the complaint made by the appellant did not constitute a ‘relevant wrongdoing’ within the meaning of s 5(3) of the 2014 Act. Here, the appellant was successful in an internal competition for the post of Acting Grade 7 in or about September 2013. From his appointment and until the matters which were the subject of complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) arose, he was responsible for Traveller housing issues. In the course of 2017 and 2018, the appellant claimed to have been subjected to harassment and intimidation from a number of service users, both at his place of work and outside his place of work, in connection with his work role. These included being approached and threatened – not least being visited at his home. The appellant reported these incidents to his line manager, and it was the appellant’s case that his reporting of these matters constituted a protected disclosure within the meaning of the 2014 Act. In response to the appellant’s report, the respondent transferred him to a different role at a different location. As a consequence of this transfer, the appellant’s position was downgraded to Grade 6, which the respondent referred to as his ‘substantive post’, as he was no longer acting in a Grade 7 position. Upon referring the matter to the WRC, the adjudication officer issued his determination on 14 August 2020. In respect of the protected disclosure claim, he found that the matters reported by the appellant did not amount to protected acts; in those circumstances, he did not have to consider the question of penalisation under the legislation, and accordingly the complaint failed. In the relevant part of the decision, the adjudication officer stated: ‘Upon consideration of the relevant legislation and aforementioned case law, I find that the aforementioned traumatic incidents endured by the Complainant were not committed by the Respondent or its servants or agents but by a third party who were  effectively end users outside of the workplace. I have not been persuaded nor has any evidence been adduced or 13 14 15

This appears to be a typographical error as there is no reference to ‘worker’ in s 5(3). Section 5(5) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, (as amended). Tom Nolan v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335.

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[10.07]  Termination of Employment submitted that satisfied me that protected disclosures can be made in relation to actions by a third party/end user outside of the workplace as in the circumstances of this particular case.’

The matter was then appealed to the Labour Court by the complainant. The Labour Court identified that the primary issue before it was whether the matters raised by the appellant with his employers constituted a protected disclosure. It was only if they did that the Court would then be required to consider the question of penalisation. The Labour Court accepted that the mere fact that an issue is a health and safety issue cannot automatically mean that it is excluded from the protections of the Act. This much is put beyond doubt by the very inclusion of s 5(3)(d) as an express instance of relevant wrongdoing. It is, however, clear from the terms of its decision that the Labour Court relied on the fact that the parties had accepted that the wrongdoings complained of both were a threat to the health and safety of the complainant and had arisen from the position he held within the employer’s organisation. The Labour Court referred to ss 5(1), 5(2)(a), 5(3), 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2014 Act, and concluded that a protected disclosure had not been made in the following terms: ‘It was not disputed before the Court that the incidents reported did not consist or involve an act or omission on the part of the Employer. The position put forward by the Respondent was that they were Health and Safety issues which were unfortunately a hazard of the position the Complainant held and the department he was working in. The Complainant did not dispute that these were health and safety issues. However, it was their position that this did not prevent them from being protected disclosures in  line with the Act. The Court would accept that the mere fact that an issue is a health and safety issue cannot automatically mean that it is excluded from the protections of the Act. However, section 5(5) of the Act does provide that a matter is not a relevant  wrongdoing if it is the function of the Respondent to investigate the wrongdoing. The parties both accepted that the wrongdoings complained of were a threat to the Health and Safety of the Complainant and arose from the position he held within the Respondent’s organisation. This raises the question as to whether these wrongdoings were something that it was the function of the Respondent to investigate. The Court  notes that under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 employers have a duty to provide a safe place and safe system of work as far as is reasonably practicable for their workers. It appears to the Court that in order to meet that duty the Respondent would have to investigate any wrongdoing that threatened the Health and Safety of their workers as happened in this case. That being the case the Court determines that the issues in this case would fall within the parameters of section 5(5) of the Act as a matter  the Respondent is required to investigate and therefore would not be a relevant wrongdoing.’

The Labour Court found that as a result, the employer had a duty to investigate, within the meaning of s 5(5), consequent to its duty to provide a safe place and safe systems of work under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. For this reason, the Labour Court determined that the issues in this case would fall within the parameters of s 5(5) of the Act as a matter which the respondent was required to investigate and thus would not be a relevant wrongdoing. On the basis of the finding that the complaint did not relate to a ‘relevant wrongdoing’ as defined by the Act, the appeal failed. As is clear from the reasoning set out above, the conclusion of the Labour Court flowed directly and exclusively from its interpretation of s 5(5) of the Act. 438

Protected Disclosures  [10.08] It was the appellant’s case before the Labour Court that the matters he reported to his superiors constituted ‘relevant wrongdoings’ as defined in the 2014 Act, and that his report constituted the provision of  ‘relevant information’. It was noted that the appellant did not invoke the internal protected disclosure procedure when making his complaint; but the appellant contended that it nonetheless constituted a protected disclosure. It was further disputed by the respondent that the appellant had made a protected disclosure within the meaning of the 2014 Act because it was contended that none of the complaints related to acts or omissions of the employer or any of its officers or employees. It was argued that the appellant had made no allegations of any nature that the respondent or its personnel had engaged in conduct that constituted any of the listed ‘relevant wrongdoings’. The respondent’s position may be summarised as being that the complaints did not constitute protected disclosures because they were reported under the respondent’s health and safety framework and not the respondent’s protected disclosure policy; and because they did not disclose relevant information in relation to wrongdoing by an employer. [10.08]   In her determination, Phelan J had regard to the Supreme Court decision in Baranya (discussed in further detail below). Phelan J noted that the judgment in Baranya makes clear that the 2014 Act does not differentiate between a grievance and a protected disclosure; and that a protected disclosure can relate to a complaint as to health and safety in the workplace even though these are private matters which are personal to the employee.16 When assessing s 5(5) of the 2014 Act, Phelan J acknowledged that the facts of Baranya and those of this case were different, in that Baranya related to a private employer (as distinct from a public sector role) which did not have a special role in the ‘detection investigation or prosecution of wrongdoing’. However, like the respondent in Baranya, the respondent in Nolan was subject to general duties under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. Phelan J went onto note the following: ‘While I agree that the words “to detect, to investigate or to prosecute” fall to be interpreted disjunctively on a literal approach to the language used, I am not persuaded that Counsel for the Appellant is correct in his submission in reliance on Barayana [sic]. It seems to me that even on the Labour Court’s construction of the s. 5(5) exclusion in this case, that provision would not have applied to exclude the claim in the Barayana [sic] case. This is because if the complaint relates to workplace practices as it did in the Barayana [sic] case, then it would presumably consist of or involve an act or omission on the part of the employer and would therefore fall outside the exclusion in s. 5(5). While the complaint in Barayana [sic] as described in the judgment, appears to have been referrable to “an act or omission on the part of the employer” within the meaning of s. 5(5), the same cannot be said in this case. The acts complained of in this case are third party acts.’17

Phelan J went on to say: ‘It seems to me to be to be wrong to interpret s. 5(3) on the basis that the “relevant wrongdoing” there described relates only to wrongdoing by an employer, recalling that s.5(3)(b)

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Tom Nolan v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335 at para 38. Tom Nolan v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335 at para 41.

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[10.09]  Termination of Employment purports to exclude obligations arising under a contract of employment from the scope of “relevant wrongdoing” while s. 5(3)(d) provides in express for inclusion of the endangerment of the health and safety of any “individual” in a manner which appears to encompass employees and third parties. There is an obvious tension between these two provisions. The first seeking to exclude matters arising under a contract of employment from the scope of relevant wrongdoing and the other which appears clearly to encompass all health and safety matters, although these matters are normally considered to be encompassed within the contract of employment also. This same tension is alluded to by the Supreme Court in Baranya and they resolve the tension by interpreting the application of s. 5 widely.’18

In interpreting the scope of s 5(5), Phelan J explained that it should be construed narrowly. In providing practical insight, she referred to two examples of cases in which s 5(5) arises in finding that the Labour Court had erred in construing the words ‘to detect, to investigate or to prosecute’ as widely embracing general duties within the scope of an employer’s obligation to provide a safe place or safe system of work: (a) Where a member of An Garda Síochána reports wrongdoing by a person outside of An Garda Síochána. Such wrongdoing will not be covered by the 2014 Act where it relates to wrongdoing which is the function of the Gardaí to detect, investigate or prosecute and as the wrongdoing has not been committed by the employer. (b) Another example might be a Revenue inspector who identifies wrongdoing during the course of an audit. A disclosure of relevant information in relation to such wrongdoing would not be a protected disclosure because it is the function of the Revenue to detect, investigate and prosecute revenue wrongdoings. Where the wrongdoing relates to practices within the Gardaí or the Revenue, however, s.5(5) will not serve to exclude from the scope of s. 5(2) relevant information in relation to those practices even though the disclosure is made by a member of An Garda Síochána or a Revenue official.19 In other words, the language of s 5(5) connotes either a public law role or at least an official role pursuant to a particular contractual obligation to detect, investigate or prosecute. Here the respondent had no role in the prosecution of health and safety omissions, as stated by the appellant. To construe this in any other manner would have the effect of s 5 (5) rendering s 5(3) ‘entirely devoid of effect’ because of the general duty of an employer to deal with health and safety matters.20 [10.09]  In Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Limited v Geduld,21 the UK Employment Tribunal discussed the type of communication which would amount to a ‘disclosure’ under the relevant UK legislation. Slade J held: ‘In order to fall within the statutory definition of a protected disclosure, there must be a disclosure of information. There is a distinction between “information” and an “allegation” for the purposes of the Act. The ordinary meaning of giving “information” is conveying

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Tom Nolan v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335 at para 44. Tm Nolan v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335 at para 46. Tom Nolan v Fingal County Council [2022] IEHC 335 at para 47. Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Limited v Geduld [2010] ICR 325.

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Protected Disclosures  [10.09] facts. For example, communicating information about the state of a hospital would be stating that “The wards have not been cleaned for the past two weeks. Yesterday, sharps were left lying around”. However, an allegation about the same subject matter would be “you are not complying with the health and safety requirements”. The natural meaning of the word “disclose” is to reveal something that to someone who does not know it already. However s. 43L(3) provides that “disclosure” for the purpose of s.43 has effect so that “bringing information to a person’s attention” albeit that he is already aware of it is a disclosure of that information. There would [sic] no need for the extended definition of “disclosure” if it were intended by the legislation that “disclosure” should mean no more than “communication”.

Following the above decision, some uncertainty arose in respect of the distinction between ‘allegation’ and ‘information’. This uncertainly was addressed in the UK Court of Appeal decision of Kilraine v Wandsworth London Borough Council,22 in which Sales LJ held that: ‘[Although the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT)] in Cavendish Munro correctly noted at [20] that in section 43F, set out above, the ERA recognises that there can be a distinction between “information” (the word used in section 43B(1)) and an “allegation”, he ruled out a rigid “either/or” distinction existing between a communication which involves the “provision of information”. However, with the benefit of hindsight, I think that it can be said that para. [24] in Cavendish Munro was expressed in a way which has given rise to confusion. The decision of the ET in the present case illustrates this, because the ET seems to have thought that Cavendish Munro supported the proposition that a statement was either “information” (and hence within section 43B(1)) or “an allegation” (and hence outside that provision). It accordingly went wrong in law, and Langstaff J in his judgment had to correct this error. The judgment in Cavendish Munro also tends to lead to such confusion by speaking in [20]-[26] about “information” and “an allegation” as abstract concepts, without tying its decision more closely to the language used in section 43B(1). The question in each case in relation to section 43B(1) (as it stood prior to amendment in 2013) is whether a particular statement or disclosure is a “disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show one or more of the [matters set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f)]”. Grammatically, the word “information” has to be read with the qualifying phrase, “which tends to show [etc]” (as, for example, in the present case, information which tends to show “that a person has failed or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject”). In order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure according to this language, it has to have a sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in subsection (1). The statements in the solicitors’ letter in Cavendish Munro did not meet that standard. Whether an identified statement or disclosure in any particular case does meet that standard will be a matter for evaluative judgment by a tribunal in the light of all the facts of the case. It is a question which is likely to be closely aligned with the other requirement set out in section 43B(1), namely that the worker making the disclosure should have the reasonable belief that

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Kilraine v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2018] ICR 1850.

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[10.10]  Termination of Employment the information he discloses does tend to show one of the listed matters. As explained by Underhill LJ in Chesterton Global at [8], this has both a subjective and an objective element. If the worker subjectively believes that the information he discloses does tend to show one of the listed matters and the statement or disclosure he makes has a sufficient factual content and specificity such that it is capable of tending to show that listed matter, it is likely that his belief will be a reasonable belief.’

[10.10]  The Kilraine decision was also referred to and followed in the UK Court of Appeal decision in Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe.23 As per Bean LJ: ‘We now know from the judgment of Sales LJ in Kilraine that it is erroneous to gloss section 43B(1) of the 1996 Act to create a rigid dichotomy between “information” on the one hand and “allegations” on the other. In order for a communication to be a qualifying disclosure it has to have “sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in subsection (1)”. Whether it does is a matter for the ET’s evaluative judgment.’

The Court of Appeal in Simpson was also asked to consider whether multiple disclosures could be read together in order to assess whether a protected disclosure had been made. The Court – citing the earlier EAT decision in Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw24 – confirmed that it was a matter of fact as to whether two or more communications, read together, could be capable of qualifying as a protected disclosure: ‘Ground 2 – aggregation: This ground complains that the ET failed to look at the composite picture of the disclosures, in particular by considering the application of the statutory test to the communications together. Mr. Reade at one point described the approach taken by the ET as “atomisation of the communications”. He referred us to the decision of the EAT (Slade J sitting alone) in Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw [2014]. This was a case of alleged protected disclosures in a health and safety context, but the principles are the same. At paragraph [22] Slade J said:“… an earlier communication can be read together with a later one as ‘embedded in it’, rendering the later communication a protected disclosure, even if taken on their own they would not fall within section 43B(1)(d). … Accordingly, two communications can, taken together, amount to a protected disclosure. Whether they do is a question of fact.” This is no more than common sense. As Henderson LJ observed in the course of argument, whether two communications are to be read together is generally a question of fact; there is nothing unusual in this respect about the law on protected disclosures … In the present case the question of whether any combination of the 37 communications should be read together is rather arid, since on the findings of the ET none of them amounted to a protected disclosure whether read in isolation or by reference to previous communications. The aggregation issue might have been crucial if the ET had found that some (but not all) of the 37 communications constituted the principal reason, or at any rate a significant reason, for Mr. Neilly’s decision to dismiss the claimant.’

When reviewing the UK authorities, it should be noted that the language contained in the relevant legislative section is almost identical to that contained in s 5 of the 2014

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Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2020] EWCA Civ 1601. Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw [2014] ICR 540.

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Protected Disclosures  [10.12] Act. Both tests look for a ‘disclosure of information’ which the employee reasonably believes tends to show a relevant wrongdoing. The UK authorities have now clarified that although the terms ‘allegation’ and ‘information’ are not mutually exclusive, a communication must still meet the test of containing ‘sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed’. Therefore, in dealing with matters where the communication is in dispute, it is for the WRC and the Labour Court to consider the evidence proffered by witnesses at the hearing and then determine, as a finding of fact, what communication was actually uttered. Once the WRC or the Labour Court has determined what communication was made, it must then consider the quality of the communication and whether the communication contains sufficient factual content and specificity such that it is capable of showing the relevant wrongdoing asserted. Uncertainty of information [10.11]  Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth25 dealt with the question of whether a worker can make a disclosure without establishing the information disclosed with certainty. The requirement that the information ‘tends to show’ a relevant wrongdoing recognises that the worker may have a strong feeling that a wrongdoing has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, but may still lack all of the necessary information to draw a conclusion. In this case, the UK Court of Appeal remarked that it is difficult to discern between information and allegations, and concluded that it is impossible to draw a strict distinction between the two; therefore, the context is crucial. In each circumstance, the issue of whether the material presented has sufficient factual content and detail to indicate that a relevant wrongdoing has been, is being or is likely to be committed must be decided by the tribunal. It is irrelevant whether the relevant wrongdoing occurs in the State or elsewhere; and whether the applicable law is that of the State or another country or territory. Grievances [10.12]   Personal grievances which are about interpersonal conflicts between the reporting person and another worker, or a matter concerning a complaint by a reporting person to, or about, their employer which concerns the worker exclusively, are not included under the definition of a ‘relevant wrongdoing’ according to s 5(5A) of the 2014 Act (as revised by the 2022 Act).26 This arose in Tibor Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Group Limited.27 Here Mr Baranya claimed that he had been dismissed for making a protected disclosure relating to health and safety in the workplace. In its judgment, the Supreme Court noted that the Oireachtas had envisaged that most complaints for which protection would be sought would concern matters of a public

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Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] EWCA Civ 1436. Inserted (1 January 2023) by s 6(d), of the Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022 (27/2022), SI 510/2022. Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Group Ltd [2022] IESC 5.

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[10.13]  Termination of Employment interest, as the main title of the Act provides: ‘An Act to make provision for and in connection with the protection of persons from the taking of action against them in respect of the making of certain disclosures in the public interest (emphasis added) and for connected purposes.’ However, the actual definition of a ‘protected disclosure’ in the 2014 Act extends beyond matters of public interest and could cover complaints in the context of employment which are personal to the person making the disclosure. Hogan J expressed the view that while the initial exclusion appeared to suggest that private complaints by an employee about work conditions fall outside the scope of the Act, the fact that there are also statutory obligations on employers that align with their contractual obligations means that this attempted exclusion was ‘deceptive and, at one level, ineffective’. The judge went on to note that a similar issue had been raised by the UK EAT, and that further legislation had been passed in the UK so that protected disclosures were required to clearly relate to the public interest. As there was no similar legislation in Ireland, it was possible for an employee’s complaint that their health or safety was being endangered by workplace practices to amount to an allegation of relevant wrongdoing, such that it could be considered a protected disclosure. The Oireachtas sought to address this with the insertion of s 5(5A) into the 2014 Act to provide that personal grievances do not fall under the definition of a ‘relevant wrongdoing’.28 This change makes it quite clear that these personal grievances must be dealt with in accordance with the standard internal grievance procedures that a company or organisation has in place, and shall not fall under the remit of the Protected Disclosures Act. Solicitor-client communication [10.13]   Any disclosure of information arising from a communication between a solicitor and client to which a claim for legal privilege can be attached shall not be deemed to constitute a protected disclosure for the purposes of the 2014 Act (as amended).29 However, legal privilege is not absolute and there are some exceptions. For example, if a client seeks legal advice to further a criminal act or fraud, the privilege may not apply. Additionally, communications between a solicitor and client may be subject to disclosure in certain circumstances, such as if a court orders their disclosure or if the client waives their right to privilege. Motivation in making a disclosure [10.14]   Where an employee makes a disclosure of information that is deemed to be a relevant wrongdoing, their motivation in raising the disclosure is irrelevant. In other words, if the worker raises the disclosure in order to protect their own interests, such

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Section 5(5A) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 5(6) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

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Protected Disclosures  [10.15] as preserving their employment, that motivation or self-interest has no relevance when determining whether the protections under the 2014 Act (as amended) apply.30 Equally, where a dispute arises during proceedings as to whether the disclosure meets the threshold, the 2014 Act (as amended) automatically assumes that it is a protected disclosure until the contrary is proved.31 The effect of this provision32 is that the motivation of the person making the disclosure may be raised as a preliminary point in proceedings before the WRC or the Labour Court, with the onus resting on the employee to establish that their disclosure qualifies as a protected disclosure in order for them to avail of the protections under the legislation.33 Statements in passing [10.15]   When communicating a disclosure, in addition to a person’s motivation being irrelevant, at the time of the communication the worker making the disclosure need not be aware that the disclosure itself constitutes a relevant wrongdoing. Moreover, the worker need not use the term ‘protected disclosure’ at the time of the communication. This was outlined by Humphreys J in the High Court decision of Clarke v CGI Food Services Limited & Anor:34 ‘There is no necessity for an individual employee to consider the situation in statutory terms until such time as adverse consequences such as dismissal materialise. Indeed it could be counterproductive to do so. The breakdown of an employment relationship, like that of any relationship, is not necessarily a linear process with entirely logical and rational steps on all sides. There can be vacillation, mixed feelings, false dawns, reconciliations and setbacks; and sometimes it is only after the person picks themselves up off the ground, if even then, that they start to figure out what actually happened. One can make a protected disclosure without invoking the 2014 Act or without using the language of “protected disclosure”. It is often only after the victimisation, dismissal or other adverse consequence arrives that one has to “retrospectively” figure out what really happened and analyse it in the statutory language. There is nothing wrong with that process and it is certainly different from “retrospectively” creating a case from nothing.’

Rather, all that is expected of the worker is that the disclosure of relevant information was made to the employer in the reasonable belief that it tended to show a relevant wrongdoing. The question of whether a statement of opinion or a statement ‘in passing’ amounts to a protected disclosure was addressed in the UK EAT decision of Dr Easwaran v St George’s University of London.35 Here the decision of the Employment

30

Section 5(7) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 5(8) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 5(7) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). 33 See Celtic Working Platforms Ltd v Mr Cian Carlin UDD2264; Connemara Marble Industries Ltd v Frances Murphy PDD206. 34 Clarke v CGI Food Services Limited & Anor [2020] IEHC 368 paras 16 and 17. 35 Dr Easwaran v St George’s University of London EAT 0167/10. 31 32

445

[10.16]  Termination of Employment Tribunal was upheld, where a disclosure of information was differentiated from an ‘unsubstantiated expression of opinion’: ‘We considered whether the Claimant’s claim that he was at risk of contracting “pneumonia etc” amounted to a disclosure of information tending to show that the health and safety of any individual was or had been at risk. The Tribunal found that this statement also amounted to no more than a mere expression of an opinion. In arriving at that decision, we took into consideration that the Claimant was not, at the time he made the statement, in danger of contracting pneumonia, or had reason to believe that he was likely to contract pneumonia from the temperature in the dissecting room. On the Claimant’s own evidence, it would not have been possible for him to contract pneumonia in a properly ventilated environment. We had regard for the Claimant’s reference to the need for protection of staff and students. Similarly, the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant’s claims that the health and safety of staff and students were being endangered constituted an unsubstantiated expression of opinion.’

This was explored in this jurisdiction in Arlene McGovern v Ohana Day Care Limited,36 where the respondent argued that a statement made during a meeting with staff members and the owners of the business constituted an expression of opinion as distinct from a protected disclosure. Here the complainant, at a staff meeting on 10 June 2021, had raised concerns about the child/staff ratio, arrangements for lunch cover and the location of lunches. The adjudication officer, in finding that the complainant had made a protected disclosure, focused on the complainant’s ‘reasonable belief’ at the time of the communication and the manner in which she spoke up – that is, raising a legitimate concern that fell within the ambit of a ‘relevant wrongdoing’. Reasonable belief – subjective or objective test [10.16]   To attract protection under the 2014 Act, an employee must have reasonably believed that the information disclosed tended to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and it must have come to their attention in connection with their employment. What amounts to ‘reasonable belief’ for the purposes of a protected disclosure has been developed in several cases in the UK, including Darnton v University of Surrey.37 Here it was held that the reasonable belief must be based on the facts as understood by the worker. This means that it has both subjective and objective elements. The word ‘belief’ is subjective, but the reasonableness of it must be determined objectively. In Babula v Waltham Forest College,38 the Court of Appeal stated that: ‘Provided his belief (which is invariably subjective) is held by the Tribunal to be objectively reasonable, neither (1) the fact that the belief turns out to be wrong – nor, (2) the fact that the information which the claimant believed to be true (and may indeed be true) does not in law amount to a criminal offence – is, in my judgement sufficient, of itself, to render the belief unreasonable and thus deprive the whistle-blower of the protection afforded by the statute.’

36 37 38

Arlene McGovern v Ohana Day Care Limited ADJ-00035068, 28 April 2023. Darnton v University of Surrey [2003] ICR 615. Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] EWCA Civ 174.

446

Protected Disclosures  [10.17]

Definition of a ‘worker’ [10.17]   Prior to the implementation of the 2022 Act, under the 2014 Act, a ‘worker’ was defined as an individual who was an employee, a contractor or a person on work experience, on a training course or training programme for employment.39 Where a worker raises information that is in connection with their employment in the reasonable belief that it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, the worker will be afforded protection from penalisation as provided for under the 2014 Act.40 The scope of protection has been expanded under the 2022 Act and the definition of a ‘worker’ now includes the following: (a) an individual who is or was an employee, (b) an individual who entered into or works or worked under any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertook to do or perform (whether personally or otherwise) any work or services for another party to the contract for the purposes of that party’s business, (c) an individual who works or worked for a person in circumstances in which— (i) the individual is introduced or supplied to do the work by a third person, and (ii) the terms on which the individual is engaged to do the work are or were in practice substantially determined not by the individual but by the person for whom the individual works or worked, by the third person or by both of them, (d) an individual who is or was provided with work experience pursuant to a training course or programme or with training for employment (or with both) otherwise than under a contract of employment, (e) an individual who is or was a shareholder of an undertaking, (f) an individual who is or was a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of an undertaking, including non-executive members, (g) an individual who is or was a volunteer, (h) an individual who acquires information on a relevant wrongdoing during a recruitment process, (i) an individual who acquires information on a relevant wrongdoing during pre-contractual negotiations (other than a recruitment process referred to in paragraph (h)), and (j) an individual who is deemed to be a worker by virtue of subsection (2)(b), A protected disclosure of relevant information can be made by any person who falls under one of the categories in (a) to (j), in a manner specified by the 2014 Act (as amended).

39 40

Section 3(1) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014. Section 5(1)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014.

447

[10.18]  Termination of Employment

REPORTING PROCEDURES Establishing reporting procedures [10.18]   Following the implementation of the 2022 Act, certain employers with greater than 50 or more employees41 are required to have reporting channels in place by 17 December 2023 that allow for the reporting and follow-up of disclosures made by their workers.42 Larger employers with 249 or more employees (or employers of any size engaged in regulated industries or public bodies) were required to have reporting channels in place in compliance with the 2022 Act as of 1 January 2023. Such channels must be secure and must ensure the confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person and any third party who may be mentioned.43 Employees must be provided with clear and easily accessible information relating to the available channels and procedure.44 Furthermore, the internal reporting channels may be either operated internally by a person or department designated for the purpose of receiving protected disclosures within the organisation or provided externally by a third-party provider authorised by the employer to act on its behalf.45 In today’s business environment, it is essential for employees to have access to internal and external reporting systems to make protected disclosure claims. Several laws and regulations control whistle-blower rights and violating these rules can have substantial legal and reputational repercussions. Employers must proactively build internal reporting systems that motivate staff to file protected disclosure claims to reduce risks and advance a culture of accountability and openness. Employers should be up to date on the legal requirements for developing and executing effective internal reporting systems that protect the rights of employees and defend the organisation’s interests.

The process of making a disclosure Internal reporting procedures [10.19]   Employees who wish to make a protected disclosure must do so in a specific manner outlined in the 2014 Act (as amended). The process in which an employee makes a protected disclosure usually entails the following steps: (a) The employee must be eligible to make the disclosure. An employee who falls under the definition of a ‘worker’ in s 3 of the 2014 Act (as amended), who has a 41

42 43 44 45

Section 6(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). This requirement will remain effective until 17 December 2023. Under s 6(4), this threshold does not apply where the employer is a public body or ‘falls within the scope of the EU acts referred to in Parts I.B and II of the Annex’. Section 6A of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(1)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(1)(g)(i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6(9)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

448

Protected Disclosures  [10.19]

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54

reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing under the 2014 Act (as amended), may make an anonymous report.46 However, the recipient of the disclosure is not obliged under the legislation to accept or follow up on such anonymous reports in accordance with the internal reporting procedure if they consider it not appropriate to do so.47 An employer is required to provide clear information as to the grounds on which anonymous reports are deemed acceptable.48 A report by a worker may be made in writing or verbally.49 Where made verbally, by either telephone or a voice message system, if the worker so requests, a physical meeting with the employer or designated person should be arranged. This meeting must occur within a reasonable period of making the request.50 Following receipt of the disclosure, the designated person authorised to receive such reports shall respond to the worker (otherwise referred to as the ‘reporting person’ under the 2014 Act), acknowledging receipt of the report. This acknowledgement must be within seven days of receipt of the disclosure.51 The designated person must be impartial and be sufficiently competent to follow up on the report received. This may be the same person who received the report in the first instance. The designated person shall maintain communication with the worker. They may, if necessary, request further information from the worker, who in turn may provide feedback to the designated person.52 The designated person is required to provide a ‘diligent’ follow-up, which should involve carrying out an initial assessment so as to determine whether there is prima facie evidence that a relevant wrongdoing occurred.53 Upon doing so, if the designated person forms the view that there is no prima facie evidence grounding the relevant wrongdoing, they may close the matter or refer it to such other agreed procedures applicable to grievances to which the worker has access. The designated person must notify the worker in writing ‘as soon as practicable’ of this decision and the reasons for it. If, however, having conducted the initial assessment, the designated person decides that there is prima facie evidence that a relevant wrongdoing has occurred, appropriate action will be required to be implemented to address the relevant wrongdoing, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the matter concerned. Designated persons are required to provide feedback to the worker within a reasonable period and in any event within three months of the date of the acknowledgement.54 Section 6A(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 5A(2) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended) provides that, a worker who has made a disclosure by way of anonymous report and has been subsequently identified and, in turn, penalised for having made a disclosure shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as having made a protected disclosure and shall be entitled to the same protections. Section 6A(1)(g)(ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(2)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(2)(b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(1)(b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(1)(c) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(1)(d)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(1)(e) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Where no such acknowledgement was sent, this should be within not more than three months from the date of expiry of the period of seven days after the report was made.

449

[10.20]  Termination of Employment (g) The worker may request in writing further requests for feedback at three-month intervals until such time as the matter is deemed closed.55 (h) Where the employing entity is within a group structure consisting of various entities, subsidiaries and/ or affiliates, the reporting channels across the group should be accessible to the worker. Moreover, any information required in relation to the work-related activities within the employing entity or group should also be accessible.56 The recipient of the disclosure [10.20]   There are several ways in which an employee can report a concern. An employee can approach their employer; consult a designated individual; talk to a third party, legal adviser or relevant minister; or go to the Office of the Protected Disclosures Commissioner in Ireland.57 The first step for a whistleblower is to make a protected disclosure to their employer or, if possible, to another responsible party such as a regulator. In this case, all that is required is a reasonable belief that the information disclosed shows or tends to show that a wrongdoing is occurring. However, in accordance with s 7 of the 2014 Act (as amended), protected disclosures may be made to a prescribed person. The external reporting channels and procedures for prescribed persons are captured under s 7A of the 2014 Act (as amended).58 A ‘prescribed person’ is someone whom the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform designates to receive protected disclosures in connection with topics that are under the purview of a specific public entity. An employee may report to one of the prescribed persons listed in the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2020. The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2020 has designated the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission as a prescribed person to receive complaints regarding all matters relating to the duties of the WRC or of the Director General under the Workplace Relations Act 2015. protected disclosure should be made to the WRC in accordance with s 7 of the 2014 Act. If the reporting person genuinely believes that the relevant wrongdoing falls under the description of the matters under the Director General’s jurisdiction (‘WRC functions’), and that the information disclosed and any allegations contained therein are true, the reporting person may make a protected disclosure to the Director General. An employee employed in a public body may report to the relevant Minister in certain circumstances. If all procedures are followed, the public body concerned must then provide information to the worker on any actions taken or to be taken by that public body in relation to the disclosure of information.59 55 56 57 58 59

Section 6A(1)(f) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A(4) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7(1)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7(2B) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 8 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

450

Protected Disclosures  [10.21] A protected disclosure also includes information disclosed to a lawyer, barrister or union representative while seeking legal counsel. Lastly, an employee can report to the new Office of the Protected Disclosures Commissioner. The 2022 Act established this office, which functions as a division of the Office of the Ombudsman. The external reporting channels and procedures for the Commissioner are set out in s 7A of the 2014 Act (as amended).60 Where reports are made by workers to prescribed persons, the Commissioner shall establish and maintain independent and autonomous external reporting channels and procedures for receiving and handling such reports and follows-ups.61 Data protection and record keeping [10.21]   Following the implementation of the 2022 Act, the 2014 Act (as amended) now requires employers to adhere to certain data protection principles and maintain adequate records in respect of disclosures received by them through reporting channels. Under s 16B of the 2014 Act (as amended), rights afforded to data subjects – whether the worker reporting the disclosure or an individual to whom the disclosure concerns – may be restricted62 under the General Data Protection Regulations 2016.63 Any such restriction is permitted only where the restriction is deemed necessary and proportionate to safeguard the important objective of the general public interest, the protection of data subjects and the rights and freedoms of other third parties.64 Furthermore, any such restriction must occur only to such extent as is necessary to prevent and address any attempts to hinder reporting or to impede, frustrate or slow down any follow-up arising from investigations carried out by the employer or attempts to find out the identity of the reporting persons.65 In determining what is deemed to be in the public interest, the 2014 Act (as amended) makes express reference to s 60 (7) of the Data Protection Act 2018.66 This may include the prevention of threats to public security or safety, legal inquiry or investigation, any disciplinary bodies authorised to act by law or any regulatory professions etc.67 Regard must also be had to the intended purposes of the 2014 Act (as amended), so as to give effect to its provisions.

60 61 62 63

64 65 66 67

Section 7(2C) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7(2A) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(1)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. Section 16B(1)(i) and (ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(1)(iii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(1)(b)(i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 60(7)(a) to (o) of the Data Protection Act, 2018.

451

[10.21]  Termination of Employment The restrictions of rights permitted include the following: (a) Article 5 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Employers shall be entitled, where necessary, to restrict data subjects’ rights and data controllers’ obligations, including in accordance with the principles of transparency (ie, the requirement to inform the relevant data subjects of the processing activities); purpose limitation (ie, the disclosed uses for which a data controller may use the personal data); and data minimisation (ie, limitations of the processing to only what is deemed necessary in the circumstances). (b) Articles 12–22 of the GDPR: The employer may restrict the rights of the data subject, including the right to transparent information and communication with regard to the rights of the data subject;68 the information that is to be provided to data subjects when personal data is collected;69 the right to a data subject access request;70 the right to restrict processing;71 the right to erasure;72 and the right to object to processing.73 (c) Article 34 of the GDPR: This concerns the obligation on the employer (data controller) to communicate personal data breaches to the data subjects. This does not include the right to communicate data breaches to the Data Protection Commission.74 The 2014 Act (as amended) goes on to provide that a restriction of the abovementioned rights may be necessary if the exercise of such rights may result in the disclosure of the reporting person, where said person has exercised their right of anonymity under s 16 or where the exercise of such rights may prejudice an effective investigation or follow-up of the relevant wrongdoing.75 When the whilstleblower is informed of the restriction applied, they, as a data subject, should also be informed of their right to lodge a complaint with the Data Protection Commission and to seek a judicial remedy in relation to such restriction.76 The personal data on which the employer relies for the purposes of the follow-up and/ or investigation shall be stored for no longer than is necessary to achieve the general public interest objective.77 The employer must implement certain measures to protect such personal data when processing and/or transferring such data. These can include password-protected documents and encryption.78 Where an employer uses a thirdparty provider to process such disclosures on its behalf, appropriate data controller/ data processing agreements should be put in place in order to satisfy this requirement.79 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Article 12 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 13 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 15 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 18 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 16 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 21 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 33 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Section 16B(2) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(4) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(5) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(6)(c) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Article 28 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016.

452

Protected Disclosures  [10.21] Furthermore, such data may only be disclosed to persons authorised by the relevant person.80 Authority may arise by virtue of a written contractual agreement or by law. Where appropriate, an employer must also adhere to data minimisation by way of anonymisation or pseudonymisation, insofar that this does not inhibit or prejudice the investigation. As an important reminder for employers, where personal data is ‘manifestly’ not relevant to the handling of the report, it should not be collected. If it is accidently collected, the 2014 Act (as amended) requires its deletion without delay.81 In respect of record-keeping obligations, an employer must keep a record of every report made or transmitted under the 2014 Act (as amended).82 A record should also be kept in respect of any anonymous report where the identity of the worker is disclosed and where that person is later penalised for having made the report;83 and this record should be kept for no longer than is necessary and proportionate.84 Where a report is made by telephone or voicemail, subject to the consent of the worker, the designated person should document the oral reporting by recording the conversation between the worker and the designated person in a durable and retrievable form,85 or by maintaining a complete and accurate transcript of the conversation.86 If the report is received through an unrecorded telephone line or unrecorded voicemail system, the designated person should document the oral report in the form of accurate minutes of the conversation.87 If, in either of the foregoing records, the worker discloses their identity, the designated person shall offer the worker the opportunity to check, rectify and agree the content of the record by way of signature of the transcript or minutes.88 A record of the following should also be kept where the worker requests a meeting in person with the designated person:89 (a) the consent of the worker to the retention of complete and accurate minutes of such a meeting in a durable and retrievable format; and (b) a record of the meeting, recorded either by way of an audio recording of the conversation or by accurate minutes of the meeting prepared by a member of staff as appropriately designated. Where the worker has disclosed their identity, they shall be offered the opportunity to check, verify and agree the minutes of the meeting by signing them.90 Employers should be mindful that any records of reports by workers should not be retained for any longer than is necessary and proportionate to comply with the provisions 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Section 16B (6)(b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16B(8) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(1) and (2) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(3)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(3)(b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(4)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(4)(b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(5) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(6) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6A, 7A, 10B, 10C, 10D or 10E of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16C(7)(i) and (ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

453

[10.22]  Termination of Employment of the 2014 Act (as amended).91 In other words, an employer has scope to determine the necessary retention period as long as this is justified. Logically speaking, a person pursing a complaint of penalisation under the 2014 Act (as amended) has no more than 12 months to bring the complaint before the WRC. If no such complaint has been brought, in the absence of any other relevant circumstances, there is no appropriate reason to retain such records beyond this period. However, employers should also be mindful of a worker’s ability to pursue a civil case against the employer for breach of contract, which may be taken within six years of the alleged breach. Again, each report should be assessed in its own context and circumstances when determining the retention period. External reporting channels [10.22]   A worker who wishes to make a protected disclosure through an external reporting channel can do so by reporting to a designated individual, a legal adviser or the relevant minister; or through the Office of the Protected Disclosures Commissioner. All rules to be followed regarding external reporting channels and procedures can be found in s 7A of the 2014 Act (as amended). The general requirements for reporting a protected disclosure externally are as follows: (a) The worker believes that the information in the report and any allegations made therein are substantially true.92 (b) The worker has already made a disclosure of the same information to their employer or other prescribed person but no appropriate action has been taken,93 or reasonably believes that relevant wrongdoing may constitute an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest (ie, risk of irreversible damage);94 or there is a risk of penalisation or a low prospect of the wrongdoing being effectively addressed (eg, due to the destruction or concealment of evidence or a risk of collision between relevant stakeholders).95 (c) A report may be made in writing or verbally. In the case of verbal communication (through either telephone or voice messaging systems), the reporting person, at the request of the prescribed person, may be required to attend a physical meeting within a reasonable period of making the report.96 (d) Once a disclosure has been made through an external channel, the reporting person must receive an acknowledgement in writing that the report has been received within seven days of the date on which the report was made. However, receipt of the report need not be acknowledged if that would jeopardise the reporting person in some way.97

91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Section 16C(8) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10(c)(i). Appropriate action refers to steps taken under s 6A(1)(e), 7A(1)(c), 10C(7)(b), 10D(7)(b) or 10E(1)(c), as the case may be. Section 10(c)(i)(I) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10(c)(i)(II) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(5)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

454

Protected Disclosures  [10.22] (e) There must be a diligent follow-up by the prescribed person, which should include the following: (i) The prescribed person should carry out of initial assessment and, where required, seek further information from the reporting person. The assessment should determine whether there is prima facie evidence of wrongdoing and whether the report falls within the scope of matters for which the prescribed person has responsibility by virtue of the functions conferred on them.98 (ii) Upon conducting the initial assessment, if the prescribed person decides that there is no prima facie evidence of the relevant wrongdoing, they may decide to close the procedure and notify the reporting person in writing as soon as practicable of this decision and the reasons therefor.99 (iii) If, having conducted the initial assessment, the prescribed person decides that there is prima facie evidence of the relevant wrongdoing, but that this wrongdoing is clearly minor and does not require further follow-up, they may decide to close the procedure and notify the reporting person in writing as soon as practicable of the decision and the reasons therefor.100 (iv) Where a worker has made repetitive reports, the prescribed person, having conducted an initial assessment, may close the procedure if the latest report contains no new meaningful information about the relevant wrongdoing. In such circumstances, the worker should be informed in writing, as soon as practicable, of this decision and the reasons therefor.101 (v) If, having conducted an initial assessment, the prescribed person decides that there is prima facie evidence of the relevant wrongdoing and the report concerns matters that fall within the prescribed person’s ambit of responsibility by virtue of their functions conferred under law, the prescribed person may address the relevant wrongdoing, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the matter concerned.102 (vi) If, having carried out an initial assessment, the prescribed person decides that the disclosure concerns matters that do not fall within their ambit of responsibility, they should transmit the report to the appropriate prescribed person or, where there is no such appropriate prescribed person, refer the matter to the Commissioner and notify the worker in writing as soon as practicable of its decision and the reasons therefor.103 (f) Where the procedure has not been closed off and the report has not been transmitted to any other prescribed person or the Commissioner, the worker must be provided with feedback within a reasonable period, being: (i) three months from the date of acknowledgement or six months from the date of acknowledgement where a longer period is required due to the particular nature and complexity of the report;104 or 98 99

100 101 102 103 104

Section 7A(1)(b)(i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(b)(ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(b)(iii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(b)(iv) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(b)(v) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(b)(vi) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(c)(i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

455

[10.22]  Termination of Employment

(ii) where there was no acknowledgement of receipt of the report, three months from the date of expiry of the seven-day period after the report was made or six months from the date of expiry of this seven-day period where a longer period is required due to the particular nature and complexity of the report.105

If it is unlikely that feedback will be provided within three months, the worker should be informed in writing as soon as practicable of the extension of this period.106 (g) The worker may request further feedback at three-month intervals until the procedure is closed.107 (h) Upon conclusion of the investigation, the worker is entitled to receive a copy of the report.108 This shall apply without prejudice to any legal obligations of the prescribed person as regards confidentiality, legal professional privilege, privacy and data protection.109 (i) Where the report relates to a breach, the information in the report should be transmitted as soon as practically possible to the appropriate competent institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union for further investigation.110 Where a report was made by anonymous person, unless otherwise prohibited by law, the report should contain any such necessary modifications so as to ensure the anonymity of the reporting person.111 (j) The reporting person, where necessary, is expected to lawfully and reasonably cooperate with any prescribed person when dealing with the report.112 (k) In circumstances where the prescribed person is in receipt of various reports, they have discretion to deal with those reports on serious relevant wrongdoing as a matter of priority. This discretion is exercised without prejudice to the various timeframes set out above.113 (l) External reporting channels and procedures can be deemed independent and autonomous if they are established and operated in a way that guarantees the accuracy, integrity and confidentiality of the information concerned; that restricts access to it to prescribed individuals and any other staff members duly authorised in that regard; and that enables the long-term storage of records in accordance with the obligations set out under s 16C.114 (m) Prescribed persons should designate one or more members of staff to handle reports; to provide information on the procedures for making a report, receiving a report and providing follow-up on reports made to the prescribed person; and to maintain communication with the reporting person and request more information

105 106 107 108 109 110 111

112 113 114

Section 7A(1)(c)(ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(d) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(e) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(f) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(4) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(1)(g) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(12) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(2) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(5) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

456

Protected Disclosures  [10.23] from that person if necessary.115 Designated staff members should receive training for the purposes of handling reports.116 (n) Prescribed persons should publish, on a website maintained by or on behalf of the prescribed person, the conditions for qualification under the 2014 Act (as amended), including the contact details of the prescribed person to whom a report may be made; the procedures for making reports; the confidentiality regime; the processing of personal data; the follow-up procedure; the remedies for protection against penalisation and availability of advice; the conditions under which reporting persons are protected from incurring liability for a breach of confidentiality; and the contact details for support services.117 (o) External channels and procedures must also be reviewed regularly.118 Reports to a prescribed person [10.23]   The full range of possible prescribed persons can be found under the schedule to the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2020,119 published on 24 September 2020. These are set out in the following table: The Chief Executive of the Adoption Authority of Ireland

All matters relating to the registration of accredited bodies under the Adoption Act 2010.

The Chief Executive of the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland

(a) All matters relating to the licensing by the Authority of the broadcasting sector and the monitoring by the Authority of all licensed services to ensure that licence holders comply with their statutory obligations and the terms of their licences. (b) All matters relating to the development by the Authority of codes and rules in relation to programming and advertising standards on television and radio.

A member of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission

All matters falling within the remit of the Commission relating to the enforcement of consumer protection law, competition law and the review of mergers or acquisitions notified to the Commission.

The Director of Corporate Enforcement

All matters relating to the functions of the Director of Corporate Enforcement under s 949 of the Companies Act 2014. (continued)

115

Section 7A(7)(a), (b) and (c) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 7A(9) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). 117 Section 7A(10) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). 118 Section 7A(11)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). This should be reviewed at least once within three years of the date of publication of information under subsection (11) (a) and at least once in every three-year period after such review. This may be done in consultation with other prescribed persons. 119 The 2020 Order revoked the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Section 7(2)) Order 2014 (SI 339/2014); the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2015 (SI 448/2015); and the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2015 (SI 448/2015). 116

457

[10.23]  Termination of Employment (Continued) The Commissioner for Data Protection in the Data Protection Commission or, where there is more than one such Commissioner, the Chairperson of the Commission

All matters relating to compliance with the Data Protection Acts 1988 to 2018; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 20161 (GDPR); and the European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Privacy and Electronic Communications) Regulations 2011 (SI 336/2011).

The Chief Executive of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland

All matters relating to the regulation, enforcement and monitoring of food safety under the Food Safety Authority of Ireland Act 1998.

A member of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission

All matters relating to the function of the Commission under Par 3 of the Garda Siochana Act 2005 (No. 20 2005)

The Chief Executive of the Health and Safety Authority

All matters associated with legislation enforced by the Health and Safety Authority and accreditation of laboratories, certification bodies and inspection bodies carried out by the Irish National Accreditation Board on behalf of the Health and Safety Authority.

The Chief Executive of the Higher Education Authority

(a) All matters relating to the planning and development of higher education and research in the State. (b) All matters relating to funding for universities and certain institutions of higher education designated under the Higher Education Authority Act 1971.

The Chief Executives of each local authority

All matters relating to the functions of a local authority under the Local Government Acts 1925 to 2019 or any other enactment.

The Chief Executive of the Medical Council

All matters within the functions of the Medical Council relating to the regulation of the medical profession in the State, including the quality of undergraduate education of doctors and of postgraduate training of specialists; the registration of doctors; and disciplinary procedures and guidance on professional standards and ethical conduct, as provided for by the Medical Practitioners Act 2007.

The Pensions Regulator in the Pensions Authority

All matters relating to the monitoring and supervision of the operation of the Pensions Act 1990 (other than investigations by, and decisions of, the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman), including the activities of Personal Retirement Savings Account (PRSA) providers; the provision of PRSA products; the operation of PRSAs; and the issue of guidelines and codes of practice for trustees of occupational pension schemes and providers of PRSAs. (continued)

458

Protected Disclosures  [10.24] (Continued) The Director of the Residential Tenancies Board

All matters, as provided for by the Residential Tenancies Acts 2004–2019, relating to the determination of disputes between landlords and tenants; the investigation and sanctioning of landlords; the operation of the residential tenancies register; and the discharge of the functions of the Residential Tenancies Board.

The Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission

All matters relating to the functions of the Workplace Relations Commission or the Director General under the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

Reports to the relevant Minister [10.24]   A ‘relevant Minister’ is a Minister of the Government with responsibility for the public body concerned in whom functions – whether statutory or otherwise – as regards that public body are vested; or a Minister of State to whom any such function is delegated.120 A worker can make a report to a relevant Minister if the worker is or was employed by a public body and one of the following conditions is met: (a) The worker has made a report in the specified manner121 to a prescribed person but has received no feedback within the specified period;122 or where feedback has been provided, the worker reasonably believes that there has been no follow-up or that the follow-up has been inadequate;123 (b) The worker reasonably believes that the head of the public body concerned is complicit in the relevant wrongdoing;124 or (c) The worker reasonably believes that the relevant wrongdoing may constitute an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest (ie, that there is an emergency situation or a risk of irreversible damage).125 Upon receipt of the report, the relevant minister shall, no later than ten days after receipt, refer the report to the Commissioner. The Minister at this time is not obliged to consider the report or the information or allegations contained therein.126 The report referred to the Commissioner should be then be considered under s 10D of the 2014 Act (as amended). Section 8(4) provides that, ‘Each Minister of the Government shall make, or cause to be made, available, clear and easily accessible information, in such form and manner as the Minister of the Government considers appropriate, including on a website maintained 120 121 122 123 124 125 126

Section 8 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Specified manner under s 6, 7 or 8 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Specified period under s 6A(1)(e),  7A(1)(c),  10C(7)(b),  10D(7)(b)  or  10E(1)(c) of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014 (as amended). Section 8(2)(b)(i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 8(2)(b)(iii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 8(2)(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

459

[10.25]  Termination of Employment by or on behalf of the Minister of the Government concerned, regarding the making of reports in the manner specified in this section to the Minister of the Government or any Minister of State to whom any function vested in that Minister of the Government is delegated’.127 The Office of the Protected Disclosure Commissioner [10.25]   The Protected Disclosure Commissioner is the person who holds the office of Ombudsman (referred to as ‘the Commissioner’ throughout the 2014 Act (as amended)).128 Protected disclosures made to Ministers and to prescribed persons will be received by the Commissioner, who will then transmit them to the appropriate authority. In some cases, such as when no prescribed person or other suitable person can be found, the Commissioner will serve as the report’s final recipient. Two types of reports can be made to the Commissioner, each of which has its own procedure: (a) a report under s 7 ‘(Disclosure to prescribed person)’ of the 2014 Act (as amended);129 or (b) The Commissioner can act as recipient of last resort in respect of certain reports.130 Report under s 7 Reports may be made orally and in writing. If a report is made orally by telephone or voice messaging system, upon the request of the reporting person, a physical meeting with the Commissioner or prescribed person should be arranged within a reasonable period of making the request.131

Recipient last resort The Commissioner shall, within 14 days of the receipt of a report made or transmitted to the Commissioner (or, in exceptional circumstances due to the nature and complexity of such report, within such extended period as the Commissioner deems reasonable in the circumstances): (a) identify the prescribed person whom the Commissioner considers appropriate or such other suitable person whom the Commissioner is of the opinion appears, by reason of their prescribed functions, to be the appropriate recipient of the report and to have the relevant competency to provide feedback and follow-up of the matter; and (b) transmit the report to such prescribed person or other suitable person (as the case may be).132 Where the Commissioner exercises their discretion to extend the timeframe beyond 14 days, they should notify the reporting person in writing as soon as practicable of this decision and the reasons therefor, and of any further extension.133 (continued)

127 128 129 130 131 132 133

Section 8(4) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10A of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10B of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10B(2) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(1)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

460

Protected Disclosures  [10.25] (Continued) Report under s 7

Recipient last resort

The Commissioner shall acknowledge in writing to the reporting person receipt of the report within seven days of receipt, except where the reporting person has explicitly requested otherwise or where the Commissioner reasonably believes that such acknowledgement would jeopardise the protection of the identity of the reporting person.134

The Commissioner will notify the reporting person in writing as soon as practicable of the transmission of the report and the reasons therefor.135

The Commissioner shall designate one or more members of staff (otherwise referred to as ‘designated persons’) to handle the report and provide information on procedures related to the report under s 7.139 Such designated persons shall receive specific training for the purposes of handling such reports.140

Where the Commissioner accepts the handling of the worker’s report, the Commissioner shall be required to comply with the procedure set out in s 10C(7) of the 2014 Act (as amended).141

The Commissioner shall review the external reporting channels and procedures regularly but at least once every 3 years.142.

Where the Commissioner transmits the report to a prescribed person they deem appropriate to review and follow up on the matter, the prescribed person may, not later than seven days after the date of transmission, advise the Commissioner that the report does not fall within their remit (whether statutory or otherwise). The prescribed person must set out reasons for this opinion.143

The Commissioner will also inform the appropriate prescribed person as set out above in writing of their obligations arising under the 2014 Act (as amended).136 Where the Commissioner cannot identify a suitable prescribed person as set out above, the Commissioner shall accept the report and shall notify the worker in writing as soon as practicable of this decision and of the reasons therefor.137 Where the Commissioner refers the report to a suitable person, the relevant procedure is that set out in s 10E of the 2014 Act (as amended).138

This procedure is akin to that provided under s 7A of the 2014 Act (as amended).

(continued) 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142

143

Section 10B(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(2) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(4) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(5) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(16) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10B(5) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10B(6) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(7) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10B(8)(a) and (b) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Reviews should occur three years from the date of the first publication of information under subsection (7) and at least once every three years thereafter. Section 10C(12)(a) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended).

461

[10.25]  Termination of Employment (Continued) Report under s 7

Recipient last resort The Commissioner shall respond within 14 days of receipt of the notification from the prescribed person. In their response, the Commissioner may reject the opinion of the prescribed person, with their decision being final.144 Alternatively, they may accept the opinion and identify another prescribed person they deem appropriate.145 However, if there is no other appropriate prescribed person, the Commissioner shall accept responsibility for the report and inform the reporting person in writing as soon as practicable.146 Once the report is transmitted to a prescribed person, the reporting timeframes are akin to those set out under s 7A of the 2014 Act (as amended).147

The Commissioner is given various powers under s 10F of the 2014 Act (as amended). The purpose of these powers is to ensure diligent follow-up of a report accepted by the Commissioner. Under subsection 10F(1), the Commissioner may require any person to furnish a copy of any information, document or record which the Commissioner deems relevant as part of their investigation or follow-up. In doing so, they may examine and take copies or extracts from such records as the Commissioner deems relevant. Such information, documents or records shall be retained for a reasonable period only.148 In gathering this information, the Commissioner may enter the premises of a person in order to gain control of the relevant documents or information (where necessary).149 The Commissioner may only enter the premises of a person where they have the occupier’s consent or a warrant obtained from a District Court judge.150 The Commissioner also has discretion to pay a relevant person to attend the offices of the Commissioner to furnish information, records or documents required by them.151 If a person fails to

144 145 146 147 148 149 150

151

Section 10C(12)(b)(i) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(12)(b)(ii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(12)(b)(iii) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10C(15) of the of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10F(1)(a) and (b) of the of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10F(4) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10F(5)(a) and (b). Under subsection 10F(7), the procedure for obtaining a warrant is set out. If a judge of the District Court is satisfied on the sworn information of an authorised officer that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that any information or record, book, document or other thing required by the authorised officer for the purposes of performing their functions under this section is held at any premises or dwelling or any part of any premises or dwelling, the judge may issue a warrant authorising the authorised officer – accompanied, if the officer considers necessary, by such other person or member of the Garda Síochána, or both – at any time or times not later than 30 days from the date of issue of the warrant; and, on production if so requested of the warrant, to enter – if need be by reasonable force – the premises or dwelling or part of the premises or dwelling concerned and exercise all or any of the powers conferred on an authorised officer under this section. Section 10F(11) of the of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). This includes sums in respect of travel and subsistence expenses incurred, allowances by way of compensation for loss of their time or any other such amount as determined by the Minister.

462

Protected Disclosures  [10.28] comply with the requests of the Commissioner, the Commissioner may apply to the Circuit Court for an order directing the person to comply with the requirement.152 Anyone who withholds, destroys, conceals or refuses to provide any information, records or documents, who refuses to let the Commissioner enter their premises or who obstructs or hinders the Commissioner (or any authorised officer) shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall be liable, on summary conviction, to a class A fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both; or on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding €50,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or both.153

MANAGING PROTECTED DISCLOSURES [10.26]   Where a person has made a protected disclosure, the employer should be prepared for how to handle this disclosure. Employers should be aware of the protections afforded to employees and the prohibited retaliatory actions that they cannot make once a protected disclosure has been made.

Protections afforded to employees [10.27]   The 2014 Act (as amended) aims to shield workers who come forward with information regarding wrongdoing at work. Employees are afforded a number of protections under the 2014 Act (as amended), including the following. Protection from dismissal [10.28]   Section 11 of the 2014 Act (as amended) protects employees who have made a protected disclosure from having their employment terminated. Where an employee’s contract has been terminated wholly or mainly for having made a protected disclosure, such dismissal shall be deemed to be unfair. Following the implementation of the 2014 Act, an employee may now pursue a complaint to the WRC for unfair dismissal under the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 (as amended)154 where they believe the termination was a response to them having raised a relevant wrongdoing.155 For complaints of this nature, an employee does not require 52 weeks’ continuous service,156 as they are considered exempt under the 1977 Act.157

152 153 154 155 156 157

Section 10F(12) and (13) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 10F(14) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6(2)(ba) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 (as amended). Section 11 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Section 2(1)(a) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 (as amended). Section 6(2D) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 (as amended).

463

[10.29]  Termination of Employment While dismissals of this nature are categorised as ‘deemed unfair dismissals’ under the 1977 Act (as amended), an employee must demonstrate the following: (a) They made a protected disclosure for the purposes of s 5 of the 2014 Act (as amended); (b) They suffered a detriment; and (c) There is a casual link between points (a) and (b). Having satisfied the above, the onus then switches to the employer to prove that the dismissal was fair and that the decision to dismiss was unrelated to any relevant wrongdoing purported to have been raised by the worker. If an employer disputes point (a), the adjudication officer must establish, as a preliminary matter, whether such a communication occurred in the first instance. In the absence of such, a complaint of this nature will fail unless the worker can demonstrate that the dismissal was unfair for other material reasons. In Rosderra Irish Meats Group Limited v Tibor Baranya,158 the Labour Court considered two preliminary points: whether the complainant had one year’s continuous service at the date of his dismissal; and whether the complainant had made a ‘protected disclosure’ as provided for by the Protected Disclosures Act 2014: ‘Preliminary issue In the first instance the Court must establish whether in accordance with the requirements of the Act the Complainant has one year’s continuous service. Should the Court find that the Complainant’s service was continuous then it will hear the complaint in its entirety. Should the court find that the Complainant does not have one year’s continuous service with the Respondent the Court will consider whether he can avail of sections 2 and s6(2)(ba) of the Act.’

The Court, having heard evidence from the complainant and two witnesses of the respondent employer, determined that the complainant did not have one year’s continuous service at the date of his dismissal and furthermore determined that it was not satisfied that the complainant had made a protected disclosure. [10.29]  In Baranya, the complainant had worked for the respondent as a meat processor from 2000 to 2015. The complainant resigned in June 2015, but re-joined the following month for a second period of employment on a 12-week fixed-term contract. The complainant was later dismissed in September of that year. Prior to his dismissal, on or around 15 September, the complainant approached the shift supervisor and asked to be rotated from his current position, known as ‘scoring the back’ – a labour-intensive position on the production line. The complainant was advised that he would be rotated, but that this would take 15 or 20 minutes. During this period, the complainant walked off the production line without permission. This was treated as a matter of gross misconduct and gave rise to the complainant’s dismissal during probation. The complainant was afforded a right to appeal this decision; however, no appeal was submitted either by him or through his trade union representative. It was only after his dismissal, through his solicitors, that the complainant asserted that the issue he had raised on 15 September

158

Rosderra Irish Meats Group Limited v Tibor Baranya UDD1917.

464

Protected Disclosures  [10.29] was a health and safety matter and in turn constituted a protected disclosure. It was the complainant’s belief that he had been dismissed for raising this complaint; while the respondent maintained that he was terminated for effectively walking off the production line and refusing to do the work he was required to do. Mr Baranya initially brought proceedings in the WRC for unfair dismissal arising from making a protected disclosure. The adjudication officer found against the complainant, deeming the complainant to have raised a personal grievance as distinct from a protected disclosure under s 5 of the 2014 Act.159 The complainant then appealed the matter to the Labour Court, which also found that the communication in question did not constitute a protected disclosure because it did not disclose any wrongdoing on the part of the respondent; and also that the communication in question was in fact an expression of a grievance and not a protected disclosure. The Labour Court appears to have been influenced in its finding that this was a grievance by the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on the Protected Disclosure Act 2014) Declaration Order 2015, which states that complaints specific to the worker in relation to ‘duties, terms and conditions of employment, working procedures or working conditions’ are personal grievances which cannot amount to protected disclosures.160 The decision was then appealed to the High Court but was dismissed by O’Regan J, who found that the complainant had failed to establish any error on part of the Labour Court.161 In her reaching her determination, O’Regan held: ‘(1) The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Labour Court misread or misinterpreted s.5 of the 2014 Act by requiring the appellant to state an allegation of a relevant wrongdoing. Section 5(2) defines relevant information as information in the reasonable belief of the worker, tends to show one or more of the relevant wrongdoings. That some information in the relevant communication, must attribute some act or omission, on the part of the respondent, that the appellant might reasonably believe tends to show one or more of the relevant wrongdoings is clearly necessary. In the absence of any asserted act or omission the concept of relevant information is not fulfilled in the instant communication as found by the Labour Court. (2) The Labour Court did not determine that the appellant’s communication was a grievance “rather than” a protected disclosure. It stated that the communication was a grievance and not a protected disclosure. I accept that if the words “rather than” had been included this would possibly demonstrate a view on the part of the Labour Court that a grievance can never be a protected disclosure. (6) The nature of the communication found to have been made by the appellant was that he wanted to change roles as he was in pain. The appellant has not demonstrated any error of law on the part of the Labour Court in not placing significance on the fact that the appellant stated that he sought out the Health and Safety Officer of the respondent. If the appellant had been found to state, as was asserted by him, the cause of his pain was due to the work he had to perform, the appellant would not have been confined to making this assertion to the Health and Safety Officer only, but rather it would appear sufficient to make it to some person for the purposes of drawing the assertion to the attention of his employer. Seeking

159 160 161

Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Limited ADJ-00000108. Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Limited UDD1917. Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Limited [2020] IEHC 56.

465

[10.30]  Termination of Employment out the Health and Safety Officer, having regard to the factual finding of the Labour Court of what the appellant actually said did not transform the appellant’s statement, as found, into a protected disclosure.’

By way of a ‘leapfrog appeal’, the matter was referred to the Supreme Court.162 In its analysis, the Supreme Court examined what constitutes a protected disclosure and whether a complaint relating to health and safety is capable of being a protected disclosure under the 2014 Act. The Supreme Court concluded that the Labour Court had erred in law in its application of the tests which had been applied in arriving at its original decision, and in particular in respect of its reliance on the relevant 2015 Code of Practice, which Hogan J determined ‘was, in at least two material respects, clearly wrong and (unfortunately) quite misleading’. Hogan J went on to state that a communication which relates solely to the employee’s own health and safety may qualify as a ‘protected disclosure’, stating: ‘The point nevertheless is that many complaints made by employees which are entirely personal to them are nonetheless capable of being regarded as protected disclosures for the purposes of the 2014 Act. This is also true of complaints regarding workplace safety under s. 5(3)(d), a point clearly illustrated by the sheer breadth of the language contained in the sub-section: “health or safety of any individual”… “has been, is being or is likely to be endangered.” It is perfectly clear from these words that the complaint does not have to relate to the health or safety of other employees or third parties: a complaint made by an employee that his or her own personal health or safety is endangered by workplace practices is clearly within the remit of the sub-section. Nor does the conduct in question necessarily have to amount to a breach of any legal obligation (although it would generally probably do so): it is sufficient that the employee complains that his or health or safety has been or is being or is likely to be endangered by reason of workplace practices, as this amounts to an allegation of “wrongdoing” on the part of the employer in the extended (and slightly artificial) sense in which that term has been used by s. 5(2) and s. 5(3) of the 2014 Act. It follows that a complaint made by an employee that his or her own personal health was being affected by being required to work in a particular manner or in respect of a particular task can, in principle, amount to a protected disclosure.’163

[10.30]   Hogan J further elaborated on the nature of the complainant’s communication and the relevant tests to be considered by the Labour Court when examining the matter: ‘There remains the question of what Mr. Baranya actually said. It is agreed that he said that he was in pain and that he wished to be assigned another role. Taken in isolation it might be said that such a communication in itself did not amount to a protected disclosure because it did not allege wrongdoing in the sense envisaged by s. 5(3)(d) of the 2014 Act. An employee might, for example, be in pain for any number of reasons which were unconnected with workplace health or safety. A complaint of that particular kind would accordingly not amount to a protected disclosure.

162 163

Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Limited [2021] IESC 77 (Hogan J and Charleton J). Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Limited [2021] IESC 77 (Hogan J and Charleton J) at paras 27 and 28.

466

Protected Disclosures  [10.30] Yet these words cannot be taken purely in isolation, as there was the context of the complaints which had been made by Mr. Baranya in the months which proceeded [sic] his dismissal. Accordingly, on one view of the evidence it might be said that a complaint that he was in pain could only realistically be linked to (an implied) complaint in respect of workplace health and safety, although this would ultimately be a matter for the Labour Court to assess. To my mind no precise form of words is required for this purpose: it would suffice that it was clear from the general context in which the communication had been made that a complaint in relation to workplace health or safety had been made by the worker concerned, either expressly or by necessary implication and that it tended to show that health or safety had been or would be endangered. One should also observe that Mr. Baranya also contends that he said that he was in pain “due to work”, although this is denied in emphatic terms by Rosderra. This is where the role of the fact finder assumes critical importance. Given the dispute as to what was actually said and the precise context in which those words were uttered, it fell to the Labour Court to make very clear findings of fact on these points. The Court was thus obliged to find the primary facts (i.e., what was actually said) and then to draw such conclusions or inferences (which are sometimes described as secondary facts) from those words and their surrounding general context as it thought appropriate. In essence, therefore, the issue for the Labour Court was first to ask what precisely did Mr. Baranya say and, second, to inquire whether, having regard to the general context of the words actually uttered, they amounted to an allegation of “wrongdoing” in the sense of both s. 5(2) and s. 5(3)(d) of the 2014 Act, i.e., did those words expressly or by necessary implication amount to an allegation tending to show that workplace health and safety was or would be endangered, even if that complaint was personal to him. The allegation must, of course, contain such information – however basic, pithy or concise – which, to use the language of s. 5(2) of the 2014 Act, “tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings” on the part of the employer: to adopt the words of Sales LJ regarding a parallel provision in the corresponding UK legislation, the disclosure must have “sufficient factual content and specificity” for this purpose: see Kilraine v. Wandsworth LBC [2018] ICR 1850 at 1861, even if it does merely by necessary implication. If these two questions can be answered in the affirmative – a matter which I again stress is for the Labour Court as fact finder in the first instance and in respect of which I offer no view – then the complaint can be regarded, at least in principle, as a protected disclosure.’164

In other words, Hogan J posed the question to the Labour Court, upon remitting the matter to it, of whether the words actually uttered (having regard to the general context) expressly or by necessary implication amounted to an allegation that tended to show that workplace health and safety was endangered (to include the complainant’s own health). In doing so, if the Labour Court were to decide that there was a protected disclosure, it would then be a matter for that Court to decide on the subsequent question of whether the dismissal was wholly or mainly brought about by virtue of the protected disclosure and was accordingly rendered unfair by reason of the operation of s 6(2)(ba) of the 1977 Act (as inserted by s 11(2) of the 1977 Act).165

164 165

Baranya v Rosderra Irish Meats Limited [2021] IESC 77 (Hogan J and Charleton J) at paras 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44. Paragraph 48 of [2021] IESC 77 (Hogan J).

467

[10.31]  Termination of Employment In Deirdre Egan v Swancrest Ltd,166 the complainant claimed that she had been unfairly dismissed in response to having raised a protected disclosure during the course of her employment. In this case the complainant was employed as a medical secretary and purported to have communicated concerns about the appointment arrangements for medical patients. Upon communicating this to the respondent’s owner, she was alleged to have been terminated that same day. At the hearing, the respondent denied that any such communication had been raised and asked the adjudication officer to make a finding of fact. In preferring the respondent’s evidence, the adjudication officer did not accept that any conversation about a relevant wrongdoing as claimed had actually occurred. In circumstances where the complainant did not have 12 months’ service, her complaint of unfair dismissal failed as she was unable to avail of the exception to the 52 weeks’ service required under s 6D of the 1977 Act (as amended). Protected disclosures and constructive dismissal [10.31]   Penalisation under s 11 can include unfair or constructive dismissal. While the former is conceivably straightforward, insofar as the act of penalisation is the positive step taken by the employer to terminate an employee’s employment, the latter is rare and carries with it – as with all claims of constructive dismissal – a high burden of proof. In order for such a complaint to arise, the worker, having raised a protected disclosure, must have been treated so unreasonably in response to communicating the protected disclosure that they had no alternative but to resign.167 Practitioners should be mindful in cases of constructive dismissal as to how the claim is pleaded on the WRC Complaint Form. Section 12 of the 2014 Act (as amended) deals with acts of penalisation not including dismissal (eg, intimidation or negative performance reviews). While s 11 requires claims for dismissal-related penalisation to be lodged under the 1977 Act (as amended), in a case of constructive dismissal, no positive step taken by the employer to terminate the worker’s employment has occurred; rather, the acts of penalisation are the actions of the employer leading to the resignation of the worker. As such, there is an argument to suggest that a complaint under s 11, and by extension the 1977 Act (as amended), does not cover acts of penalisation as envisaged under s 12 of the 2014 Act (as amended). This was addressed in short by the Labour Court in Infosys Ltd v Tabish Shahid Shaikh,168 in which the Court seemed to distinguish between the types of claims lodged: ‘The Court, repeatedly, outlined to the parties that, given the background, as set out above, the only issues for the Court to consider were whether there had been a Protected Disclosure and, if so, whether there had been a causal link between that and the subsequent dismissal of the Complainant. As the case before the Court was taken under the Unfair Dismissals Act and not the Protected Disclosures Act, allegations of penalisation by the Complainant that were said to have arisen prior to the dismissal were not before the Court for consideration, and

166

Deirdre Egan v Swancrest Ltd ADJ-00036637. Anthony Heaphy v Health Service Executive ADJ-00030778. See also Carmen Merina Laurelwood Montessori Limited trading as Rathfarnham Daycare ADJ-00033079. 168 UDD2259. 167

468

Protected Disclosures  [10.32] were outside the six month cognisable period up to 3 December 2019 in any event, except insofar as they could be evidence relating to the dismissal.’

If the acts of the employer gave rise to a constructive dismissal, the claim in practice must be lodged under the 1977 Act (as amended). However, the 2014 Act (as amended) requires a claim to be lodged under Schedule 2 of the 2014 Act (as amended) where the acts of penalisation were unrelated to dismissal. Protection from penalisation other than dismissal [10.32]  Notwithstanding the protections afforded to whistleblowers in respect of dismissal, other various protections are also provided for under s3 of the 2014 Act (as amended). Employers are prohibited from penalising or threatening penalisation against an employee for having made a protected disclosure. Under the 2014 Act (as amended), the term ‘penalisation’ is defined broadly as including: (a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal; (b) demotion, loss of opportunity for promotion or withholding of promotion; (c) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours; (d) the imposition or administration of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty); (e) coercion, intimidation, harassment or ostracism; (f) discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment; (g) injury, damage or loss; (h) threat of reprisal; (i) withholding of training; (j) a negative performance assessment or employment reference; (k) failure to convert a temporary employment contract into a permanent one, where the worker had a legitimate expectation that they would be offered permanent employment; (l) failure to renew or early termination of a temporary employment contract; (m) harm, including to the worker’s reputation, particularly in social media, or financial loss, including loss of business and loss of income; (n) blacklisting on the basis of a sector or industry-wide informal or formal agreement, which may entail that the person will not, in the future, find employment in the sector or industry; (o) early termination or cancellation of a contract for goods or services; (p) cancellation of a licence or permit; and (q) psychiatric or medical referrals.169 An employee is entitled to pursue a complaint for penalisation in the above circumstances to the WRC. However, a worker is not entitled to claim for dismissal as penalisation under s 12 of the 2014 Act.170 It is clear from the relevant provisions that 169 170

Section 3 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). A Plumber v A Heating and Plumbing Contractor ADJ-00015063.

469

[10.33]  Termination of Employment an employee seeking redress relating to an alleged unfair dismissal arising wholly or mainly from having made a protected disclosure is obliged to refer their complaint to the WRC under s 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts; and that such a claim does not fall within the scope of s 12(1) of the 2014 Act (as amended). It is a defence to a claim for penalisation (other than dismissal) if an employer can establish that the act or omission that is alleged to be penalisation occurred by reason of a justified ground.171 The penalisation will usually be an identifiable act or omission on the part of the employer which affected the employee to their detriment. The word ‘detriment’ is given its ordinary and natural meaning of causing harm or damage.172 Compensation for penalisation [10.33]   Schedule 2 of the 2014 Act (as amended) deals with redress for workers in respect of contraventions arising under s 12 (penalisation other than dismissal). Under this schedule, an adjudication officer may award compensation that is just and equitable having regard to the circumstances. Compensation shall, however, not exceed 260 weeks’ remuneration.173 Where the worker is not yet in receipt of remuneration (ie, pre-employment), they are entitled to compensation of up to €15,000 only. Under this schedule, an adjudication officer or the Labour Court may reduce any award by up to 25 per cent if they determine that the protected disclosure was not the ‘sole or main’ motivation for raising the concern in the first instance.174 Compensation for penalisation (other than dismissal) was considered in An Official v A Trade Union.175 It was accepted by the respondent that the complainant had written to the then General Secretary of the trade union advising them that he wished to make a protected disclosure pursuant to the 2014 Act (as amended). It was argued by the complainant that the respondent had failed to constructively engage with the complainant on the matter, and had no alternative to make disclosures to five prescribed bodies. The alleged detriment in this instance was the Union’s ‘complete failure to engage with their employee in regard to his return to work and purposely excluding him from job opportunities’ after a period of sick leave. In agreeing with the complainant, the adjudication officer awarded him €12,500 in compensation. The matter was then appealed solely on a quantum basis. In upholding the decision of the adjudication officer, the Labour Court noted the following in respect of redress and quantum: ‘The Court has given careful consideration to the extensive submissions made by both parties. The liability of the Respondent in respect of the breaches held to have occurred are not in issue in this appeal and therefore the only matter for consideration is the appropriateness of the quantum of compensation awarded by the Adjudication Officer.

171

Section 12(7C) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Per Hyland J in Conway v Department of Agriculture [2020] IEHC 665. 173 Schedule 2 paragraph 1 of the Protected Disclosures Act (as amended). 174 Schedule 2 paragraph 2A of the Protected Disclosures Act (as amended). 175 An Official v A Trade Union ADJ-00017540. 172

470

Protected Disclosures  [10.34] Counsel for the Complainant submitted that the award was not based on sound reasoning by the Adjudication Officer and that it was not adequate or reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. Whereas Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the award was appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. In making its submission on the redress to be awarded under the Act, Counsel for the Complainant referred to the Von Colson case, where the CJEU made it clear that where a right which is derived from the law of the Community is infringed the sanction for breaches must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and must provide a real deterrent against future infractions. The doctrine of conforming interpretation was first formulated in Von Colson, this requires a national Court to interpret and apply its domestic law in light of the wording and purpose of a Directive so as to achieve the result envisaged by the Directive. This obligation arises by virtue of the transposition of Community Law, however, protected disclosure legislation is national legislation which has not emanated from the EU. Schedule Two of the Act “Redress for Contravention of Section 12(1)”, provides for an award of compensation which is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances. The Court notes that the Complainant’s losses were agreed at €7,540.00 i.e. taking account of payments he received under the Respondent’s Income Continuance Policy of 75% of his salary. Therefore, the Court believes that the amount of compensation awarded by the Adjudication Officer at €12,500.00 was just and equitable having regard to the circumstances of the case.’176

[10.34]  In An Official Veterinarian v A Public Body,177 an adjudication officer awarded €10,000 in compensation, deeming the respondent to have penalised the complainant. The indirect penalisation in this instance was the respondent’s failure to allow the complainant to examine, progress and seek feedback on his protected disclosure (irrespective of whether his concerns were valid). The adjudication officer noted that the respondent had a ‘moral and statutory’ obligation to act in the case. It seems that in case of failure to process a worker’s concerns by way of an appropriate policy in respect of whistleblowing, such omissions may be treated as penalisation; as may any delays in dealing with the concerns of the worker. This was set out in A Psychiatrist v A Health Service Provider.178 Here the complainant was a senior clinician who provided psychiatric care to vulnerable children and young people. The adjudication officer found that it was clear that he had longstanding concerns regarding clinical care, including arising from the psychologist’s work. The complainant had raised several issues over the years, which had been dealt with by a plethora of respondent staff members. In finding in favour of the complainant, the adjudication officer noted that the test for whether an act or omission amounts to detriment is objective. Leaving a protected disclosure in a stalled position for so long and seeking to address key factual conflicts via another process would be detrimental to someone of the complainant’s seniority in circumstances where he had longstanding and widely disseminated concerns. Here the complainant was awarded €4,000 in compensation. 176 177 178

Financial Services Union v Gerry Hanna PDD201. An Official Veterinarian v A Public Body ADJ-00016854. A Psychiatrist v A Health Service Provider ADJ-00017774.

471

[10.35]  Termination of Employment In Carmen Merina v Laurelwood Montessori Limited trading as Rathfarnham Daycare,179 the complainant was qualified in early childcare and raised concerns with her line manager when she tested positive for COVID-19, due to concerns that she may come into contact with people. The complainant maintained that this communication amounted to a protected disclosure, in that she had passed on information that, in her reasonable belief, tended to show relevant wrongdoing on the part of the employer – that is, its non-compliance with COVID-19 procedures which was endangering the health and safety of the complainant and her co-workers. The complainant explained to her manager that she had passed this information on to the Health Service Executive (HSE) tracer. Following this, the complainant received a phone call from her manager, who allegedly took a hostile and unpleasant tone with the complainant and demanded to know ‘word for word’ what information had been passed to the HSE tracer. This was denied by the claimant’s manager, who claimed that the phone call had simply been to check in on the complainant. The line manager then gave evidence that the complainant had accused the respondent of allowing her to get COVID-19; and that concerns had been raised about exposing her husband, who was asthmatic, to the virus. The line manager pushed back on this accusation, noting that the workplace had done everything in accordance with HSE guidance. While the adjudication officer acknowledged the differing accounts, it was noted that the complainant had hung up on her line manager, and that the complainant felt she could be fired after this conversation. On balance, the adjudication officer favoured the claimant’s evidence that she had been criticised for relaying information to the HSE tracer. In or around two weeks after this, the complainant had been contacted by a director of the respondent to confirm that her employment had been terminated. The respondent maintained that this was due to cost measures and a lack of funding from the State at the time of the decision. The adjudication officer agreed with the respondent, in that the director who had communicated the decision to terminate the claimant’s employment had no knowledge of the conversation between the complainant and her line manager, and had a cogent line of evidence to support the reason for dismissal. It is worth noting that when funding came through, the complainant was re-engaged. While finding that the complainant’s dismissal was unrelated to her having raised a protected disclosure, the adjudication officer nonetheless awarded the claimant compensation of €3,000 under s 12 of the 2014 Act (as amended) for the manner in which she had been treated during her phone call with her line manager. [10.35]  In Hyde And Seek Glasnevin v Jade Byrne-Hoey,180 the complainant alleged that she had made a protected disclosure following an altercation with another employee who had acted aggressively. Her concerns related to the safety, health and welfare of herself, her colleagues and the children of the creche in relation to the staff member’s aggression. The day after this incident, the complainant was issued with a written warning, which the respondent claimed related to another incident involving the

179 180

Carmen Merina v Laurelwood Montessori Limited trading as Rathfarnham Daycare ADJ-00033079. PDD218.

472

Protected Disclosures  [10.35] complainant, unrelated to her communication made the day previously. When finding in favour of the complainant, the Court had regard to the lack of documentary evidence from the respondent supporting its assertion as to the reasoning behind the written warning. The respondent also attempted to argue that the warning did not amount to penalisation within the meaning of s 5 of the 2014 Act. In response, the Labour Court held as follows: ‘The Respondent’s representative sought to argue to the Court that the Complainant had not met the requirement to show detriment. However, a letter itself refers to it amounting to an informal warning and goes on to say: “Although not a formal warning, should there be any repeat of this conduct, or indeed any misconduct in general you may be subject to formal disciplinary action.” The letter clearly amounted to a disciplinary penalty within the meaning of the Act. It was an informal warning that had the consequence of ensuring that any form of misconduct, no matter however minor, would henceforth be dealt with through the formal disciplinary process. The Court is satisfied that this penalty was imposed on the Complainant having carried out a protected act and “but for” the protected act no action would have been taken against the Complainant … the informal warning had the effect of fatally undermining the relationship of trust between the Complainant and the Respondent such that the mind of the employer was closed to according the Complainant any latitude when it came to future infractions.’

The WRC awarded the complainant €2,000 in compensation. While the Labour Court found that the complainant had been penalised, it had regard to the fact the complainant had also received compensation under the Safety, Health and Welfare Act 2005 (as amended) in relation to the same set of facts. As such, the Labour Court varied the adjudication officer’s decision and overturned the decision to award compensation. It is worth noting that the complainant also argued that she had been penalised by being temporarily transferred to another creche after making the protected disclosure. The Labour Court disagreed with this suggestion, noting that the complainant had not established how this constituted a detriment where flexibility of this nature was a condition of her contract of employment. When ascertaining whether a person has been penalised, the WRC and the Labour Court have had regard to case law and the ‘but for’ test in relation to penalisation claims under the Safety, Health and Welfare Acts, 2005 (as amended). This was accurately set out in Aidan & Henrietta McGrath Partnership v Anna Monaghan,181 where the Labour Court summarised the test as follows: ‘Thus the detriment giving rise to the complaint must have been incurred because of, or in retaliation for, the Complainant having committed a protected act. This suggests that where there is more than one causal factor in the chain of events leading to the detriment complained of the commission of a protected act must be an operative cause in the sense that “but for” the Complainant having committed the protected act he or she would not have suffered the

181

PD/15/1.

473

[10.36]  Termination of Employment detriment. This involves a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned detriment.’182

In other words, a worker must establish that ‘but for’ having made the protected disclosure, they would not have suffered the detriment alleged. Burden of proof [10.36]   The initial burden of proof is on the complainant to establish the existence of a protected act and a detriment. If and only if the complainant establishes a protected act and a detriment does the burden shift to the respondent to put forward evidence that the detriment suffered was not due to the protected act being the operative cause.183 The decision in Paul O’Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock184 established that the burden of proof rests with the complainant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, both that they committed a protected act and that, having regard to the circumstances, it is apt to infer from subsequent events that the protected act was an operative consideration leading to the detriment imposed. If both limbs are satisfied, the burden shifts to the employer to show, on credible evidence on the balance of probabilities, that the protected act did not influence the detriment imposed. This line of assessment for the purposes of s 12 of the 2014 (as amended) was also applied by the Labour Court in Fingal County Council v O’Brien:185 ‘It follows that a complainant under the Act must demonstrate (i) that they made one or more protected disclosures; (ii) that they suffered a detriment; and (iii) that there is a causal connection between (i) and (ii).’

Civil claim for tort [10.37]   Under s 13 of the 2014 Act (as amended), an alternative remedy is open to a worker. This often arises in the context of a personal injury or breach of contract claim. In respect of the former, the detriment suffered by the worker in such instances is that of the alleged personal injury. In respect of the latter, a breach of contract claim often arises where the worker missed the statutory six-month time limit to bring a claim before the WRC, given that the time limit is six years from the date of the breach in the civil jurisdiction.186 Such workers have the right to bring a right of action in tort against a person who causes detriment to the worker based on them making a protected disclosure. Section 13 is worded so as to allow a claim against an employer or third party that has caused or contributed to the detriment itself. It is a defence to any such action if the defendant can prove that the act or omission that allegedly caused the detriment suffered occurred due a justified ground.187 ‘Justified ground’, however, is not defined under the legislation.

182 183 184 185 186 187

Enterprise Ireland v Andrew Connell PDD183. Carmen Merina Laurelwood Montessori Limited trading as Rathfarnham Daycare ADJ-00033079. Paul O’Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock [2010] 21 ELR 1. Fingal County Council v O’Brien PDD184. Section 13(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act (as amended). Section 13(2B) of the Protected Disclosures Act (as amended).

474

Protected Disclosures  [10.38] It seems to demand that a respondent prove that any detriment suffered by the worker occurred due to matters unrelated to his or her protected disclosure or any bona fide communication in relation to same. A worker is prohibited from pursuing a claim against the same person for redress under the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 (as amended), Schedule 2 of the 2014 Act (as amended) or s 114 of the Defence Act 1954 or s 6 of the Ombudsman (Defence Forces) Act 2004.

Interim relief [10.38]   Relief under the 2014 Act (as amended) is not limited to the statutory limit on compensation or damages by way of a tort action. A worker under the legislation may seek interim relief in circumstances where they form the view that they have been penalised for having made a protected disclosure. Since the implementation of the 2022 Amendment Act, a worker may now seek interim relief where penalisation falls under s 11 (dismissal) or s 12 (penalisation other than dismissal). Thus, theoretically, a worker who is penalised by having been issued a warning can apply to the Circuit Court for interim relief. Workers who come forward with information can ask the Circuit Court for interim relief to stop their dismissal or any further acts of penalisation from occurring. The application for interim relief must be taken within 21 days188 of the date of the last incidence of punishment or within such extended time as the Court may permit. Employees can also ask the Circuit Court for an interim order for continuation of their contract of employment (which clearly would include pay) until the case has been heard.189 Of note is that there is no provision for an employer to recoup any of this money paid in the interim, even if the complainant is unsuccessful in their unfair dismissal claim. Clarke v CGI Food Services Limited190 was the first case in which an interim order made by the Circuit Court was appealed to the High Court. The background to the case is that the plaintiff was working as group financial controller with the defendant. While he was so employed, he raised concerns in relation to financial irregularities and food safety issues. He claimed that as a result of this, he fell out of favour and was marginalised and ignored by senior management, subjected to unnecessary performance reviews, suspended, subjected to a disciplinary hearing and ultimately dismissed. He brought a complaint for unfair dismissal to the WRC and also applied to the Circuit Court pursuant to Schedule 1 to the 2014 Act seeking interim relief. The Circuit Court (Hutton J) granted interim relief requiring, inter alia, the defendant to maintain the plaintiff’s salary pending the hearing of his complaint by the WRC. The defendant appealed to the High Court, arguing that the financial irregularities discovered did not constitute a relevant wrongdoing because it was a function of the plaintiff to detect and investigate 188 189 190

Schedule 1 section 1(2) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. Schedule 1 section 2(8) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 (as amended). Clarke v CGI Food Services Limited [2020] IEHC 368.

475

[10.38]  Termination of Employment such matters, and that the plaintiff was attempting to retrospectively characterise his complaints as protected disclosures. The High Court rejected that argument. The High Court was alive to the necessity to look behind first appearances. As Humphreys J put it, if the real reason for the dismissal of an employee is ‘hidden behind an invented reason … it is the court’s duty to penetrate through the invention rather than to allow it also to infect its own determination’. He said that in considering whether there were substantial grounds for contending that the employee’s dismissal resulted from having made a protected disclosure or whether the alternative basis provided for such dismissal (ie, the alleged performance-related issues) was merely ‘an invention’, relevant factors included: (a) the time at which the performance-related issues were raised; (b) the frequency of performance reviews; (c) whether the employer had adopted the appropriate procedure for dismissal for suboptimal performance; (d) whether the employer had adhered to its proposed disciplinary process; (e) whether the disciplinary process was independent; (f) whether the disciplinary process possessed the hallmarks of a genuine process; and (g) whether evidence was given at trial by those involved in the disciplinary process. Applying this to the facts before him, Humphreys J noted a number of factors: (a) The process seemed to have begun only after the plaintiff had started asking awkward questions by the plaintiff. (b) It became quite relentless with monthly meetings. (c) The plaintiff was summarily dismissed as if guilty of gross misconduct, as opposed to the procedure for dismissal for sub-optimal performance; thus, there was no oral or written warning or final written warning. (d) The proposal to have an independent barrister as chair of the disciplinary hearing was not followed through. (e) The defendants failed to have an independent chair, appointing a person who had already made findings against the plaintiff. (f) There was a lack of affidavits from those involved in the disciplinary meetings. (g) There was a lack of proper teasing out of the issues at the disciplinary meeting as might have been expected if it had been a genuine process; the evidence from the plaintiff’s side was that no questions were asked. (h) The question as to who made the decision to dismiss the plaintiff remained unanswered. In other words, a court dealing with an alleged connection between a protected disclosure and subsequent disciplinary action must be alive to the possibility that there may be motivations on the part of the employer which are hidden and not obvious at first sight. A court should not only look not only for obvious or explicit connections between protected disclosures and subsequent events, but also draw such inferences as may be appropriate from all of the evidence. At the interim stage, this involves doing so to the appropriate standard of proof. 476

Protected Disclosures  [10.39] In Mick Dougan and Sean Clark v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd,191 Comerford J held that in order for the Circuit Court to grant an application for interim relief under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, the test to be applied is: ‘Did the employee have “substantial grounds” for claiming the connection between the dismissal and the protected disclosure? Therefore, it is not necessary for a court to find that an employee was dismissed for making a protected disclosure.’ Comerford J, in determining whether there were substantial grounds, referred to the decision in McNamara v An Bord Pleanála,192 where Carroll J stated:  ‘In order for a ground to be substantial it must be reasonable, it must be arguable, it must be weighty. It must not be trivial or tenuous. However, I am not concerned with trying to ascertain what the eventual result would be. I believe I should go no further than satisfy myself that the grounds are “substantial”. A ground that does not stand any chance of being sustained (for example, where the point has already been decided in another case) could not be said to be substantial.’

Comerford J held that it is not enough that the protected disclosure contributed to the dismissal or was a factor in the employer’s making of the decision; it must go further and have resulted wholly or mainly from the protected disclosure. In ascertaining the test as to whether the dismissal results wholly or mainly from the protected disclosure, Comerford J said:  ‘[the court has] to identify grounds which would allow one to contend that the cause of the dismissal was the protected disclosure and if those grounds identified are going to be grounds that are wholly or mainly responsible for the dismissal, then I have to go a bit further and say they are substantial grounds.’193

Extension of time limit for interim relief [10.39]   The decision in Dougan and Clark194 was referred to in Cullen v Kilternan Park Cemetery Limited.195 Here the Circuit Court considered for the first time an application for an extension of the 21-day time limit for interim relief under the 2014 Act. Mr Cullen was employed as general manager with Kilternan Cemetery Limited from January 2016 until his redundancy in February 2020. He was unhappy with the exit package offered and sought to use the 2014 Act in respect of alleged irregularities on the planning status of the cemetery garden to enhance his negotiating position. However, Mr Cullen’s request for an order extending the time for making the application for interim relief under the 2014 Act was refused. The Court held that he had not shown ‘good reason’ for an extension. He also failed to establish that his protected disclosure was the main reason for his dismissal. Rather, he had attempted to use his protected disclosure ‘as a sword of Damocles over his employer to enhance his negotiating stance’ for a better exit package.196 191 192 193 194 195 196

Mick Dougan and Sean Clark v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210. McNamara v an Bord Pleanála (No 2) [1996] IEHC 60 at para 20. Mick Dougan and Sean Clark v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 at para 214. Mick Dougan and Sean Clark v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 at para 196. Cullen v Kilternan Park Cemetery Limited [2020] IECC 2. Cullen v Kilternan Park Cemetery Limited [2020] IECC 2 at para 33.

477

[10.40]  Termination of Employment Tort and interim relief [10.40]   While the 2014 Act (as amended) provides a mechanism for interim relief in the event of penalisation, there appears to be scope under s 13 (tort action) to also ground an action for interlocutory relief. This was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Barrett v The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others.197 According to Stack J, relief is not limited to an action for damages; and for the purposes of an interlocutory application, the court may intervene given the correct circumstances. In this instance, an application was made in the context of ongoing s 13 proceedings to prevent the defendant from taking any action that would result in the termination of his employment, among other things. First, it was decided whether s 13 could be used to award interlocutory relief in a case, and then what appropriate test should be used. By drawing an analogy with other statutory torts, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was not barred from requesting interlocutory relief solely because the tort was enacted by legislation. Although it was acknowledged that a final decision on the issue would have to wait for determination either at the trial or in some other case, the court was willing to assume that the relief could be given for the purposes of this particular case. Relief was ultimately turned down; but on a subsequent application, a temporary injunction was approved pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Civil liability immunity [10.41]   Under the 2014 Act, a worker who raises a protected disclosure is deemed exempt under s 14. The net effect of this provision means that where a worker, having raised a protected disclosure, causes losses to the employer and/or a third party, proceedings cannot be issued against the reporting person for having communicated the wrongdoing in the first instance. This, however, does not include any defamation action within the meaning of the Defamation Act, 2009.198 Making a protected disclosure does not constitute a criminal offence Under s 15 of the 2014 Act, a defence is provided to workers who are being prosecuted for restricting the disclosure of information where the worker can show that it was their reasonable belief that the disclosure was, or was reasonably believed to be, a protected disclosure at the time of the alleged offence.199 Protection of the identity of the maker of the protected disclosure The identity of the reporting person or any information from which the identity of the reporting person may be deduced may not be disclosed to anyone by a person to whom the report is made or transmitted,200 unless consent was explicitly given or the 197

Barrett v The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others [2023] IECA 112. Section 14(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). 199 Section 15(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). 200 Section 16(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). 198

478

Protected Disclosures  [10.42] person to whom the report was made considers it necessary for the purposes of the receipt or transmission of, or follow-up on, the report as required under the 2014 Act (as amended).201 The identity of the reporting person may also be disclosed if such information is necessary to prevent a serious risk to the security of the State, public health, public safety or the environment, or is otherwise required by law; or if it is deemed necessary and proportionate as part of an investigation or judicial proceedings as part of a person’s defence.202 The reporting person shall be notified in writing if their identity is disclosed to another person prior to their identity being revealed, unless this would jeopardise the effective investigation of the wrongdoing concerned; the prevention of serious risk to the security of the State, public health, public safety or the environment; or the prevention of crime or prosecution of a criminal offence.203 If reports that include trade secrets are submitted or transmitted to a prescribed person, the Commissioner or another appropriate person,204 the prescribed person, the Commissioner or such other appropriate person shall not use or disclose those trade secrets for any purpose other than what is necessitated by the specific report.205 Where a person fails to comply with the requirement to preserve the reporting person’s identity, the worker shall have a right of action in tort against the person that fails to ensure such protection.206 For the duration of any investigation prompted by the report, the identity of any person concerned must be protected by a prescribed person or the Commissioner, or by another suitable person207 to whom a report is transmitted.208 The disclosure of a person’s identity is not prohibited if the prescribed person, the Commissioner or another suitable person reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary for the purposes of the Act; or if the disclosure is otherwise permitted or required by law.209

OFFENCES [10.42]   The 2014 Act (as amended) offers significant safeguards and redress for employees who come forward to expose workplace wrongdoing, as well as for employers that act in good faith to resolve the issues brought up by employees. However, significant penalties may be imposed where an offence is committed. 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209

Section 16 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014, as amended by Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022. Section 16(2) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16(3) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Within the meaning of the European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018 (SI 188/2018). Section 16(4) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16(5) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). That being another suitable person within the meaning of s 10C or 10D of the Protected Disclosures Act (as amended). Section 16A(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 16A(2) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended).

479

[10.43]  Termination of Employment Under the 2014 Act (as amended),210 it is considered an offence where a person: (a) hinders or attempt to hinder a worker in making a report; (b) penalises or threatens to penalise a reporting person, facilitator, third party or legal entity connected with the reporting person; (c) brings vexatious proceedings against any person mentioned in (b); or (e) fails to operate reporting channels and procedures as provided for under s 6(3) of the 2014 Act (as amended).211 A person who commits an offence in respect of the foregoing is liable on summary conviction to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or both); or on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding €250,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years (or both).212 In circumstances where a person breaches the duty of confidentiality regarding the identity of a reporting person under s 16 of the 2014 Act (as amended), a person shall be liable on summary conviction to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or both); or on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding €75,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years (or both).213 Where a person makes a false report that contains any information that they know to be false,214 they shall be liable on summary conviction to a class A fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months (or both); or on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding €100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years (or both).215

Compensation in the event of dismissal [10.43]   In respect of s11 (penalisation by reason of dismissal), redress is provided for under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). Under the 1977 Act, where an employee has been dismissed wholly or mainly for having raised a protected disclosure,216 they shall be entitled to compensation for financial loss suffered which is attributable to the dismissal, as is just and equitable in the circumstances, of up to 260 weeks’ renumeration.217 Where the adjudication officer or the Labour Court forms the view that the investigation of the relevant wrongdoing was not the ‘sole or main’ motivation for making the disclosure, the amount of compensation may be reduced by up to 25 percent if deemed just and equitable.218

210 211

212 213 214 215 216 217 218

Section 14A of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 14A(1)(a) to (e) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 14A(3) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 14A(4) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 14A(2) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 14A(5) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended). Section 6(2)(ba) and s 7(2B) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). Section 7(1A) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). Section 7(2B) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended).

480

Protected Disclosures  [10.44] Practitioners should be mindful of any overlapping claims for penalisation between the 2014 Act (as amended) and the Safety, Health and Welfare Act 2005 (as amended). In such circumstances, where a complainant is awarded redress under one piece of legislation, the WRC and the Labour Court will refrain from awarding compensation for the same set of facts under the other statute. This was addressed in Arlene McGovern v Ohana Day Care Limited.219

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS [10.44]   Employers are required by the 2014 Act (as amended) to safeguard employees who make protected disclosures. In addition to understanding what constitutes a protected disclosure, knowing the steps to take before and after a protected disclosure is made and the compensation and penalties involved, employers should also adhere to the following recommendations: (a) Employers should have a policy in place for handling protected disclosures at work, which is required by law. All employees should have easy access to the policy, and employers should ensure that staff members are aware of it and understand how to make a protected disclosure. (b) Managers and staff should be informed of the whistleblowing policy and made aware of their legal responsibilities. This includes understanding the safeguards offered to employees who make protected disclosures and the repercussions of taking action against them. (c) Employers should take disclosures seriously and conduct timely, thorough investigations into them. Whistleblowers should be safeguarded from reprisal and should not face consequences for making a protected disclosure. (d) Employers must maintain the confidentiality of the identity of the employee who makes the protected disclosure, unless disclosure of such identity is required to investigate a claim or is mandated by law. Employers should take action to protect the privacy both of the whistleblower and of the protected disclosure to the greatest extent practicable. (e) Employers should support whistleblowers. Making a protected disclosure can cause stress and anxiety for the whistleblower. Employers should offer assistance to help the whistleblower deal with any negative consequences from making the disclosure, such as access to counselling services or other support measures. (f) Employers should monitor how the whistleblowing policy is being followed and ensure that all staff members are informed of their legal obligations under the Act. (g) Employers must ensure that any violations of the policy are handled promptly and appropriately. (h) Lastly, and arguably most importantly, employers should try their best to avoid giving workers a reason to make a protected disclosure in the first place.

219

Arlene McGovern v Ohana Day Care Limited ADJ-00035068.

481

482

Chapter 11

Transfer of a Business

INTRODUCTION [11.01]   Employees’ rights in the event of the transfer of a business or part of a business from one employer to another are protected by the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003) – or the ‘Transfer of Undertakings Regulations’, as they are known – which in turn were introduced by Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001.1. The Regulations revoked and replaced the Regulations of 1980 (SI 306/1980) and the amending Regulations of 2000 (SI 487/2000). The Regulations aim to protect the contractual rights of employees in respect of their employment in the event of the transfer to another employer of the business or part of the business in which they are employed. The Regulations provide that the rights and obligations of the original employer (‘the transferor’) arising from an employment contract existing at the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the new employer (‘the transferee’).2 Furthermore, the transferee must continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms as were applicable to the transferor under that agreement until the date of termination or expiry of the agreement or the entry into force of another collective agreement.3

APPLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS [11.02]   Section 3(1) of the Regulations states that: ‘These Regulations shall apply to any transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business from one employer to another employer as a result of a legal transfer (including the assignment or forfeiture of a lease) or merger.’

1 2

3

Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 (OJ No. L. 82 p16 22.03.2001). Regulation 4(1) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003)). The broad nature of this preservation was set out in Mitie Managed Services Ltd. v French [2002] ICR 1395, in that ‘the rights and obligations that transfer with an employee are made up, not only of those obligations that arise from the contract of employment but from the wider circumstances of the “employment relationship”‘. Regulation 4(2) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

483

[11.03]  Termination of Employment Therefore, for the Regulations to apply, there must be a transfer; it must apply to an undertaking, a business or part of a business; it must be from one employer to another; and it must be as a result of a legal transfer or merger.

Key definitions [11.03]   A ‘transfer of undertaking’ occurs when a business or part of a business is taken over by another employer as a result of a merger or transfer. The parties to a transfer of undertaking are: (a) the current employer (‘transferor); and (b) the new employer (‘transferee’). A ‘transfer’ is the transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity. It includes buying, selling, acquiring, outsourcing, leasing and merging. An ‘economic entity’ is an organised group of resources which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity – for example, a group of wage earners who are specifically and permanently assigned to a common task.4 It is a structured and autonomous entity that is capable of being transferred; an agency will not suffice. Thus, in Bidvest Noonan (ROI) Ltd v Martina Lynch,5 the Labour Court held that the provision of 14 healthcare assistants to University Hospital Kerry ‘was more akin to one of making personnel available to the contract-awarding body that a structured and autonomous entity within the undertaking’. In some labour-intensive businesses, a group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis can constitute an economic entity. To be stable, the activity must not be limited to performing one specific works contract.6 This appears to be a reference to a one-off piece of work rather than a single user or customer.

There must be a transfer [11.04]   The Regulations apply only in the event of a transfer. In most instances, a transfer is readily identifiable. However, in some cases it may be difficult to ascertain and may occur without the parties to the transfer being aware that the transaction actually constitutes a transfer within the meaning of the Directive. A transfer must, however, involve a change of employer; if there is no change of employer, the Directive does not apply.7 There must also be a legal transfer from one undertaking to the next (this can involve assignment or forfeiture, or a lease or merger).

4 5 6 7

Hernandez Vidal and Others [1999], IRLR 132; Sanchez Hidalgo [1988], ECR-I8237. Bidvest Noonan (ROI) Ltd v Martina Lynch TUD203 11 December 2020. Suzen v Zehnacker Gebaudereinigung Krankenhausservice (C-13/95). Regulation 3 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

484

Transfer of a Business  [11.04] In  Daddy’s Dance Hall,8 it was held that a transfer of an economic entity occurred where there was no change in the legal ownership but there was a change in who was responsible for the management of the day-to-day business. The case is also authority that the mandatory provisions of the Directive cannot be overridden by agreement between employer and employee. Spijkers9 is one of the earliest cases to deal with the issue of a transfer and is still relevant today. Mr Spijkers worked for a company (Colaris) at its slaughterhouse. Colaris agreed to sell the slaughterhouse together with land, equipment and offices to Benedik CV on 27 December 1982. From that date, Colaris ceased trading and no trading took place until 7 February 1983, when Benedik took over. As a result, there was no goodwill in the business by the time Benedik resumed production. Equally, Benedik did not commence an identical trade to Colaris, but rather a new trade which it started with all the previous employees of Colaris, with the exception of Mr Spijkers and one other, who was too ill to work. Mr Spijkers claimed that there had been a transfer of undertaking, that he should be paid from 27 December 1982 and that Benedik should employ him. The court determined that in order for a business to fall within the definition of a ‘transfer’, the business must retain its ‘identity’.10 The court then set out the factors to be considered in deciding whether a transfer has taken place, as follows: ‘ A transfer of a an undertaking, business or part of a business does not occur, merely because its assets are disposed of. Instead it is necessary to consider, in a case such the present, whether the business was disposed of as a going concern, as would be indicated, inter alia, by the fact that its operation was actually continued or resumed by the new employer, with the same or similar activities.

In order to determine whether those conditions are met, it is necessary to consider all the facts characterizing the transaction in question, including the type of undertaking or business, whether or not the business’s tangible assets, such as buildings and movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of the transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new employer, whether or not its customers are transferred and the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the transfer and the period, if any, for which those activities were suspended. It should be noted, however, that all those circumstances are merely single factors in the overall assessment which must be made and cannot therefore be considered in isolation’.11 Also of note in Spijkers is the relevance of having a ‘gap’ between employers. In Spijkers, this was just over one month.

8

Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S.324/86, [1984] ECR 739. Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir CV (Case C–24/85) (1986) ECR 1119. 10 Also  Redmond Stichting v Bartol Case C-29/91, [1992] ECR 1-3189, where it was held that the decisive criterion is whether the transfer of the unit maintains its identity. 11 Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir CV (Case C–24/85) (1986) ECR 1119 at paragraph 12 and 13. 9

485

[11.05]  Termination of Employment What we can take from this is that every transfer will be looked at on its own merits and for a transfer to occur, the following will be assessed: (a) (b) (c) (d)

whether assets were transferred; whether staff were transferred; whether customers were transferred; and whether the business is similar.

Each of the above cannot be assessed independently. The decision in Spijkers was relied upon in A Manager of a Public House/Restaurant v A Public House/Restaurant.12 Here the adjudication officer held that a transfer had taken place: the business entity, being the pub/restaurant, retained its identity. A change in marketing strategy and an attempt to attract a younger clientele did not alter its identity. The fact that none of the assets (pub and restaurant equipment) were legally owned by the companies was deemed irrelevant; however, the fact that they transferred was deemed relevant. It was also noted that the goodwill of the business in a small rural town transferred to the transferor and three staff members were re-employed. While here the business had been interrupted, it was only for sufficient time to refurbish the premises and reopen under a different brand identity. Date of transfer [11.05]   Regulation 4(1) states that: ‘The transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee.’ This in essence means that after the date of transfer, the obligations all pass to the transferee and the transferor is ‘off the hook’, so to speak. However, what determines the date of transfer? In Astley v Celtec Ltd13 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) defined the date of transfer as: ‘… the date on which responsibility as employer for carrying on the business of the unit transferred moves from the transferor to the transferee. That date is a particular point in time, which cannot be postponed to another date at the will of the transferor or transferee.’

In this case, civil servants had been seconded to a newly formed training and enterprise council for three years, at which point they were offered the opportunity to return to the civil service or stay where they were. The claimants resigned from the civil service and took up employment directly with the training and enterprise council, but the date of the transfer was under debate. The ECJ was asked whether a transfer of undertaking can take place over a period of time, as the claimants contended; or whether there was a particular point in time at which the undertaking transferred. The ECJ ruled that

12 13

A Manager of a Public House/Restaurant v A Public House/Restaurant ADJ00016501 6 December 2018. Astley v Celtec Ltd (Case C–478/03) (2005) IRLR 647.

486

Transfer of a Business  [11.08] the date of transfer is a particular point in time. The only date that qualified was the date on which the employees had originally been seconded. When the case returned to the House of Lords, it was held that, notwithstanding the secondment arrangement, the claimants’ contracts of employment must be deemed to have been handed over to the transferee at the date of transfer. For the purposes of applying the above principle, contracts of employment or employment relationships existing on the date of the transfer between the transferor and the workers assigned to the undertaking transferred are deemed to be handed over from the transferor to the transferee on that date, regardless of what has been agreed between the parties in that respect.14 In practice, it is very important for employers to understand exactly who is ‘within scope’ at the date of transfer. Closure of a business and subsequent resumption [11.06]  Spijkers is also authority for the fact that where a transferor ceases its business and there is a gap in time before the transferee resumes the business, this does not prevent a transfer of an undertaking from occurring. In Spijker, Advocate General Slynn observed that if: ‘[a]fter the sale there is a gap before trading is resumed [this] is a relevant fact but it is not conclusive against there being a transfer within the meaning of the Directive. The transferee may well want to spend time reorganizing or renovating the premises or equipment … the fact that the business is carried on in a different way is not conclusive against there being a transfer – new methods, new machinery, new types of customer are relevant factors but they do not of themselves prevent there being in reality a transfer of a business or undertaking.’

A transfer can therefore occur in several ways, as follows. Sale of shares [11.07]   The Transfer of Undertakings Regulations does not apply in a situation where there is a mere sale of shares. This is because shares in companies invariably change hands frequently and by various amounts, with no effect on employees. Even where a controlling interest in the company passes from one shareholder to another, in practice, this has no effect in law on the employees. Sale of the assets and goodwill of business to a new employer [11.08]   In this instance, the employees will be employed by a new person or company. In other words, where there is a change of employer, the Regulations will apply.

14

See also A Base Controller v A Hackney Cab Company ADJ-00014591; Rotsart de Herting (Case C-305/94) 1997 IRLR 127.

487

[11.09]  Termination of Employment Transfer of ownership by operation of law or indirect means [11.09]   This arises where the ownership of a business changes on the occurrence of some event which does not require the specific agreement of the contracting parties. In other words, a transfer can occur where there is no change in the actual ownership of a business, but responsibility for running and managing the business transfers from one legal entity to another. An example may be the surrender of a lease or franchise. In this instance, the Regulations also apply. Daddy’s Dance Hall15 demonstrates this, as it was held that the Directive could apply where there was no change in the legal ownership of the business, but only a change in the person or body responsible for the management or day-to-day operation of the business. The background to this is that a Mr Tellerup was employed by a catering company which leased restaurants and bars from another company. Its lease was terminated and Daddy’s Dance Hall was appointed to take over. Mr Tellerup was dismissed from the original company but, prior to his notice terminating, was taken on by Daddy’s Dance Hall. However, he was subsequently dismissed by Daddy’s Dance Hall and a dispute arose over his notice. It was held that the Directive applies to a situation where, after the termination of a lease, the owner of the undertaking leases it to a new lessee which continues to run the business. The court held:16 ‘It follows that when the lessee who has the capacity of proprietor of the undertaking at the termination of the lease loses this capacity and a third person acquires it under a new lease concluded with the owner, the resulting operation is capable of falling within the scope of the application of the Directive as defined in Article 1(1). The fact that in such case the transfer takes place in two phases in the sense that as a first step the undertaking is transferred back from the original lessee to the owner who then transfers it to the new lessee, does not exclude the applicability of the Directive as long as the economic entity retains its identity.’

This approach was followed in Landsorganisationen i Danmark v Ny Molle Kro17 and in Berg and Busschers v Besselsen;18 and has been followed in this jurisdiction by the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) in Guidon v Hugh Farrington and Ushers Island Petrol Station.19 Here the claimant had been employed by Local Stores (Trading) Ltd trading as Seven – Eleven, which operated a branch in the petrol station. Seven – Eleven went into receivership and surrendered its lease on 14 June 1991 (a Friday). The claimant returned to work on Monday 17 June to be advised by a Mr Farrington, who had taken over the shop, that her employment was being terminated. The EAT, having regard to Berg and Besselsen, determined that there had been a transfer of undertaking of the Seven – Eleven Shop to Mr Farrington, and that as the dismissal of the claimant was prohibited by the Directive as a result of the transfer, the dismissal was unfair.

15 16 17 18 19

Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S (Case 324/84) (1988) ECR 739. Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S (Case 324/84) (1988) ECR 739. Landsorganisationen i Danmark v Ny Molle Kro (Case 287/86) (1987) ECR 5465. Berg and Busschers v Besselsen (Joined Cases 144 and 145/1987) (1988) ELR 98. Guidon v Hugh Farrington and Ushers Island Petrol Station 1993 ELR 98.

488

Transfer of a Business  [11.11] Another case of note in this regard is Redmond Stitching v Barton.20 Here the Dr Sophie Redmond Foundation leased a building from a local authority in the Netherlands to provide assistance to drug addicts. The local authority also provided funding for the project. However, the local authority subsequently ceased funding the Redmond Foundation and passed the funding to another foundation, called the Sigma Foundation. The lease to the Redmond Foundation also passed to Sigma, as did the clients and some of the staff. Those displaced staff contended that a transfer of an undertaking had taken place within the meaning of the Directive. The ECJ found that the Directive applied and held, inter alia, that: ‘The decisive criterion for establishing whether there is a transfer of an undertaking is whether the unit in question retains its identity after the transfer. In order to ascertain whether or not there is a transfer it is necessary to determine whether the functions performed are in fact carried out or resumed by the new legal entity with the same or similar activities.’

It went on to state that the Directive ‘does not exclude non-profit making bodies’; and that ‘a transfer occurs where a public body terminates a subsidy paid to one legal entity as a result of which the activities of that entity are terminated and transferred to another legal entity with similar terms’.

Undertakings or parts of undertakings [11.10]   The Regulations must apply to undertakings or parts of undertakings, or to a business or part of a business. ‘Undertakings’ are not defined in the Directive or the Regulations. This naturally raises the question as to what an ‘undertaking or part thereof’ actually is. Basically, it can be defined as a business or part of a business which is engaged in economic activity, whether or not this is for profit-making purposes (ie, the undertaking can be either public or private).21 As can be seen from Redmond Stitching v Barton,22 an undertaking can be a not-forprofit organisation. The Directive therefore has a very wide application. Part of an undertaking or business [11.11]   While it is generally straightforward to recognise the transfer of a business, this may not be so when it comes to part of a business or undertaking. The ECJ provided guidance on this issue in Schmidt Spar und Leibkasse der Fruheren amter Bordesholm.23 Ms Schmidt was employed by a bank to carry out cleaning work. The bank decided to contract out this work to a contract cleaning firm. The question then arose as to whether the cleaning work constituted part of the undertaking of the bank.

20 21 22 23

Redmond Stitching v Barton (Case C–29/91) (1992) ECR I–3189. See reg 3(3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Redmond Stitching v Barton (Case C–29/91) (1992) ECR I–3189. Schmidt Spar und Leibkasse der Fruheren amter Bordesholm (Case C–392/92) (1994) ECR I–1311.

489

[11.12]  Termination of Employment The bank claimed that the contract did not come within the scope of the Directive as it did not involve the transfer of an economic unit. The court held: ‘The fact that the activity in question was performed prior to the transfer, by a single employee (is not sufficient) to preclude the application of the Directive. The decisive criterion for establishing whether there is a transfer … is whether the business in question retains its identity … the retention of that identity is indicated inter alia by the actual continuation or resumption by the new employer of the same or similar activities.’

Who is covered? [11.12]   The Regulations cover certain categories of people, as follows. Employees [11.13]   An ‘employee’ is defined in the Regulations as: ‘a person of any age, who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment and references, in relation to an employer, to an employee shall be construed as references to an employee employed by that employer; and for the purposes of these Regulations, a person holding office under, or in the service of, the State (including a civil servant within the meaning of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956 (No 46 of 1956)) shall be deemed to be an employee employed by the State or Government, as the case may be, and an officer or servant of a harbour authority, health board or vocational education committee shall be deemed to be an employee employed by the authority, board or committee, as the case may be.’

‘Employees’ are therefore anyone who enters into or works under a contract of employment. This definition covers those who work under a contract for service. This line of thought is in accordance with the decision of the ECJ in Botzen v Rotterdamasche Droodok Maatschappij BV.24 It also applies to those employed under a contract of apprenticeship and to agency workers covered by the Employment Agency Act 1971.25 Employers [11.14]   ‘Employers’ are defined as those persons ‘with whom the employee has entered into or for whom the employee works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment’. In the case of agency workers, the employer is deemed to be the person who pays the wages of the employee.

24 25

Botzen v Rotterdamasche Droodok Maatschappij BV (1986) 2 CMLR 50. Regulation 3 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

490

Transfer of a Business  [11.15] Employers need not be profit-making bodies and can also include public bodies.26 In Henke v Gemeinde Schierke & Verwaltunsgemeinschaft ‘Broken’,27 the ECJ held that a local authority in Germany was an economic entity and was therefore covered by the Directive (the Directive in this instance being the 1980 Transfer of Undertakings Directive (77/197/EEC), which has since been repealed). Responsibility after the transfer [11.15]  In Berg and Busschers v Besselsen,28 the ECJ held that where Member States have not determined that the transferor and the transferee shall be severally liable after the transfer, art 3(1) must be interpreted as meaning that after the date of a transfer, the transferor is discharged from liability by virtue of the transfer alone. Thus, where the Regulations and/or Directive is breached, liability falls on the transferee. In Rotstart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA (in liquidation),29 the ECJ held: ‘Article 3(1) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that the contracts of employment and employment relationships existing on the date of the transfer of an undertaking, between the transferor and the workers employed in the undertaking transferred, are automatically transferred from the transferor to the transferee by the mere fact of the transfer of the undertaking …’

The Regulations, and in particular reg 4, make it clear that the State chose not to depart from the basic principle in art 3 of the Directive that liability passes from the transferor to the transferee. Regulation 4(1) provides that the transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee. As stated by Kimber and O ‘Doherty: ‘It is important to remember that by virtue of art.3(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC, as of the date of transfer, the transferor’s rights and obligations are automatically transferred by operation of law to the transferee. Thus, post-transfer, the employee must seek their remedy against the transferee and the transferor escapes liability. The Directive itself permits Member States to make the transferor and transferee jointly and severally liable. Irish implementing regulations, however, have not done this.’30

In A General Operative v Beverage Company,31 the employees brought a claim against their former employer, the transferor, for breaching the Regulations. The transferor argued that it was not the correct respondent to the proceedings. The transferor relied on art 3(1) of Directive 2001/23 of 12 March 2001, which provided that all rights and obligations transferred to the transferee on the date of the transfer; and on reg 10(5) of the Regulations, which empowers an adjudication officer to award compensation against ‘an employer’. The transferor submitted that from the date of the transfer, liability 26 27 28 29 30 31

Regulation 3(3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Henke v Gemeinde Schierke & Verwaltunsgemeinschaft ‘Broken’ (1996) IRLR 701. Berg and Busschers v Besselsen (Joined Cases 144 and 145/87) (1988) ECR 2559. Rotstart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA (in liquidation) (Case C–305/94) (1996) ECR I–52927. In an article entitled ‘Transfer of Undertakings – Perspectives from Litigation’, IELJ 2008, 5(2), 56–62. A General Operative v Beverage Company ADJ-00007777; ADJ-00007813; ADJ-00002984.

491

[11.15]  Termination of Employment transferred to the transferee – that is, the transferor was no longer their employer and proceedings should have been brought against the transferee, their new employer. The adjudication officer, in agreeing with the transferor, held the transferor was not the correct party to the proceedings and the case was therefore dismissed on a preliminary point of jurisdiction. The decision of the adjudication officer was upheld on appeal to the Labour Court.32 In Gray v ISPCA, David Prendiville and Dublin Corporation,33 the question of who is responsible for not applying/effecting the transfer was also addressed. The EAT was satisfied that a transfer had occurred between the Irish Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ISPCA) and Mr Prenderville when the ISPCA – the incumbent provider of the dog warden service for Dublin Corporation – failed to retain the contract in a tender process and it passed to Mr Prenderville, who required the employees to apply for a position in the service, which they declined. Mr Prenderville then employed three new dog wardens. The EAT determined that under the Unfair Dismissals Act and the European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees’ Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980, the complainants had been unfairly dismissed by Mr Prendiville, the transferee, and ordered reinstatement. In Morris v Smart Brothers Ltd,34 the transferor dismissed some of the employees in the transferring business by way of redundancy. It was determined that there was no liability on the part of the transferor. A transferee takes over the contracts of employment of all employees in that part of the business that is to be transferred who were employed immediately before the transfer takes place or who would have been employed had they not been unfairly dismissed by reason of the transfer. In J Donoghue Beverages Ltd v Elizabeth Collins,35 the question arose as to who bears responsibility in the event of an alleged breach of reg 8 (information and consultation). The Labour Court stated that: ‘Regulation 8 implies a term into the Complainant’s contract of employment that entitles her to a period of information and consultation through her chosen/elected representatives prior to the occurrence of a transfer within the meaning of the Regulations; Regulation 4(1) provides that any remedy for the failure of her employer as transferor to fulfil its obligations under Regulation 8 can only be sought as against the Transferee.’

A similar position was adopted in An Inboard Transport Co-ordinator v A Food Production and Distribution Company.36 The extent of the liability that falls to the transferee should provide an incentive for employers to have appropriate warranty and indemnity protection against any such failure on the part of the transferor to comply with its statutory obligations.

32 33 34 35 36

A General Operative v Beverage Company TUD183; 184; 185. Gray v ISPCA, David Prendiville and Dublin Corporation UD 5509/84. Morris v Smart Brothers Ltd UD68/1993. J Donoghue Beverages Ltd. v Elizabeth Collins TUD183/2018. Inboard Transport Co-ordinator v Food Production and Distribution Company ADJ-00010599.

492

Transfer of a Business  [11.17]

EMPLOYEES’ RIGHTS [11.16]   As the purpose of the Directive is to protect employees’ terms and conditions of employment in the event of a transfer occurring, the Directive is necessarily clear on the various rights it gives to employees.

Right to information and consultation [11.17]   Both the original and new employer are obliged to inform their respective employees’ representatives of the date of the transfer; the reasons for the transfer; and the legal, social and economic implications of the transfer. This must be done, where reasonably practicable, not later than 30 days before the transfer date, and in any event in good time before the transfer is carried out (or, in the case of the transferee, in good time before the employees are directly affected by the transfer regarding conditions of employment).37 The 30-day rule does not prevent notification from taking place well in advance of the transfer. The right to information and consultation is limited. Regulation 8(5) provides that: ‘Where there are no employees’ representatives in the undertaking or business of the transferor or, as the case may be, in the undertaking or business of the transferee, the transferor or the transferee, as may be appropriate, shall put in place a procedure whereby the employees may choose from among their number a person or persons to represent them (including by means of an election) for the purposes of this Regulation.’

Regulation 8(6) provides: ‘Where, notwithstanding paragraph (5), there are still no representatives of the employees in an undertaking or business concerned (through no fault of the employees), each of the employees concerned must be informed in writing, where reasonably practicable, not later than 30 days before the transfer and, in any event, in good time before the transfer, of the following: (a) the date or proposed date of the transfer; (b) the reasons for the transfer; (c) the legal implications of the transfer for the employee and a summary of any relevant economic and social implications for that employee; and (d) any measures envisaged in relation to the employees.’

Therefore, the right to information and consultation in the main must be given to employee representatives. Where there are no representatives, the employers (either the transferor or transferee as appropriate) must arrange for the employees to choose representatives for this purpose.38

37 38

Regulation 8 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Regulation 8(5) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

493

[11.18]  Termination of Employment If this is still not possible, each of the employees concerned must be informed in writing (note that this does not apply where there are employee representatives), where reasonably practicable, not later than 30 days before the transfer – and in any event in good time before the transfer – of the date of the transfer; the reasons for the transfer; the legal implications of the transfer for the employees; and a summary of any relevant economic and social implications for the employees and any measures envisaged in relation to the employees.39 An example of insufficient information and consultation arose in Kenmare Brewhouse Ltd T/A McCarthy’s Bar and Restaurant v Ms Ciara O’Leary.40 The Labour Court found there to be a breach of reg 8 (information and consultation), as very little interaction had taken place between either the transferor or the transferee and the complainant. This view was reinforced by the lack of written documentation in respect of both the transfer and what the respondent claims was a ‘temporary redundancy’ – which was clarified to be a lay-off. The initial lay-off was by phone; a text message was sent about a month later after a redundancy payment form with a generic email was sent to all staff almost ten weeks after the transfer had occurred. This appears to be the sum total of the engagement by the transferee. While the Labour Court accepted that the transferor did issue a letter to staff prior to the transfer, it was held to have ‘met some but not all of their obligations under Regulation 8’. The Court awarded the maximum compensation, which in respect of a breach of reg 8 is four weeks’ pay. In good time [11.18]   What does ‘in good time’ mean? This matter was considered in the context of the EC Collective Redundancy Directive41 by the UK High Court in Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd,42 where the court stated, inter alia: ‘I cannot see that the Article requires the employer to embark upon the process of consultation at any particular moment, much the less as soon as he can be said to have in mind that collective redundancies may occur. The essential point to my mind is that the consultation must be one where, if they wish to do so, the workers’ representatives can make constructive proposals and have time in which to do so before the relevant dismissal notices are sent out.’

Therefore, ‘in good time’ seems to be defined as allowing the employees’ representatives sufficient time to make constructive proposals.

Employees’ representatives [11.19]   The Regulations define an ‘employee representative’ as a trade union, staff association or excepted body with which it has been the practice of the employer to 39 40 41 42

Regulation 8(6) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Kenmare Brewhouse Ltd T/A McCarthy’s Bar and Restaurant v Ms Ciara O’Leary TUD207. EC Collective Redundancy Directive 75/129/EEC. Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd (1995) IRLR 15.

494

Transfer of a Business  [11.22] conduct collective bargaining negotiations; or in their absence, a person or person chosen by such employees under an arrangement put in place by the employer to represent them in negotiations with the employer.43 This is a broad definition of ‘employee representative’. The status and function of employees’ representatives are protected across a transfer on the same terms and conditions and/or subject to any collective agreement between the employer and the representatives.44 Details of any measures envisaged in relation to the employees must be discussed with the employees’ representatives ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’.45 Bearing in mind the ECJ case of Junk v Kuhnel,46 this requires actual negotiations to take place.

Exceptions to the protection of rights in the event of a transfer [11.20]   Not all rights are protected in the event of a transfer. Pensions exception [11.21]   Employees’ rights to old age, invalidity or survivors’ benefits under supplementary company or inter-company pension schemes outside the Social Welfare Acts are not covered. In effect, such pension rights in place on the date of transfer do not transfer across to the new contract but are protected under the Pensions Acts 1990, where the relevant supplementary company pension scheme is an occupational pension scheme within the meaning of those acts (ie, an approved pension scheme). In relation to unapproved occupational pension schemes, the transferee (new employer) must ‘protect’ the rights of employees in such cases.47 Employer’s insolvency [11.22]   Where the outgoing employer is subject to proceedings in which it could be adjudicated bankrupt or wound up (a company) for reasons of insolvency by order of the High Court, the ‘transfer’ obligations on the part of the employer do not apply.48 Regulation 6 therefore excludes the transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an

43 44 45 46 47 48

Regulation 2(1) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Regulation 7(1) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Regulation 8(4) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Junk v Kuhnel Case C–188/03. Regulation 4(3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Regulation 6 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

495

[11.22]  Termination of Employment undertaking or business where the transferor is the subject of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. The High Court confirmed this in Re Castle Brand Ltd (in liquidation) and Re the Companies Acts 1963–1983.49 However, a voluntary liquidation does not fall within the exclusion of insolvent undertakings from the terms of the Regulations and Directive. In Kelly v Cavanagh Hiester Ltd (in liquidation) and Dubshad Ltd,50 the EAT held: ‘As the liquidation of Hiester Ltd was a voluntary liquidation the Tribunal holds that the … Regulations, SI 306/1980 apply and in this instance there was a transfer of the business to Mr Brian Cavanagh, when Hiester Ltd went into liquidation. Accordingly there was no break in the claimant’s service’.

Here the EAT relied on the ECJ’s decision in HBM Abels v Administrative Board of Bedrijfsvereniging Voor de Metaal- Industrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie.51 In the High Court case of Mythen v Employment Appeals Tribunal,52 Barrington J analysed the views of Advocate General Slynn in Abels53 and took the view that the principle as outlined in Abels could only apply in an enforced liquidation of a bankrupt company, stating:54 ‘It follows that the reasons for not applying the directive to transfers of undertakings taking place in liquidation proceedings are not applicable to proceedings of this kind taking place at an earlier stage.’ In Sales Executive v Sole Trader/New Business,55 the company that the complainant worked for went into voluntary liquidation. The complainant alleged that another economic entity, run by the respondents, had acquired assets, customers and employees of the former company where she worked. Her employment was subsequently terminated by the liquidator by reason of redundancy and her employment did not transfer to the respondents’ new business. The respondents claimed that no transfer had occurred, and that the entity which had begun after the liquidation arose out of necessity for them to earn a living. The new business was not a company and the trading name belonged to the two respondents (husband and wife), and was comparable to a sole trader as the second named respondent was not active in the business. Of particular note was the fact that the complainant and the first respondent had been employed by the company that had gone into liquidation. The respondent never had any proprietary interest in the company or acquired any assets or goodwill of that company. Faced with unemployment, and to secure an income for his family, the respondent contacted former customers of the liquidated company to provide a website maintenance service. About 70 of the 120 customers agreed to use his service.

49 50 51 52

53 54 55

Re the Companies Acts 1963–1983 (25 March 1995), HC Hamilton J. Kelly v Cavanagh Hiester Ltd (in liquidation) and Dubshad Ltd UD 222–224/96. Kelly v Cavanagh Hiester Ltd (in liquidation) and Dubshad Ltd (1987) CMLR 406. Mythen v Employment Appeals Tribunal (1990) ELR 1. Abels v The Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-industrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie (Case 135/83) [1985] ECR 469. Mythen v Employment Appeals Tribunal (1990) ELR 1, 10. Sales Executive v Sole Trade /New Business ADJ-00023310, 23 April 2020.

496

Transfer of a Business  [11.23] In June 2019, the respondent hired a former employee of the liquidated company, who was a website developer. Both the respondent and the former employee worked from their respective homes. At this time, the rebranded name used by the liquidated company was registered by the respondent, as it had not been registered by the liquidated company. No legal transfer of any part of the business of the liquidated company was ever planned, agreed to or implemented between the liquidated company and the respondents. In his determination, the adjudication officer noted the following: ‘The evidence to support the transfer relates to the company rebranding and in turn that name being used by the respondents in their subsequent business activities. However, the facts show that the trading name used by the respondents in their new venture was opportunistic as it was never registered to the company. While the new business has attracted customers previously serviced by the liquidated company, inevitably when a business is insolvent and is liquidated (voluntarily) those customers now present as a business opportunity to a new business player. While two of the three employees remaining at the date of liquidation are engaged in the new venture, the respondent (owner) fulfils a sales executive role and the other employer is the web designer. They did not transfer from the company either before or at liquidation. They both were made redundant. No part of the business had transferred prior to or at the date of liquidation or at the time of the respondents’ commencing trading. The new business has gone on to attract its own customers who never traded with the liquidated entity. … When the company failed as a business entity; a redundant employee began to trade in services that his prior employer had also provided, and he targeted customers of that failed entity. These facts do not constitute a transfer. They describe a response of a redundant employee to start again and to attempt to earn a living- … It is true that there are shared characteristics between the old and the new venture; however, those characteristics do not arise from the transfer and are no different to those that competitors also share. The one unique characteristic relates to a trading name used by the new venture and the company for about 12 months prior to being placed into voluntary liquidation. That fact does not provide a very compelling ground to support the case that a transfer has occurred having regard to what in fact had occurred; a business in existence for five years became insolvent and ceased trading. Out of the ashes one employee who had been made redundant; decided to set up a new business and to trade alongside many others who also provide web services and Apps to small businesses. There are no business premises or office and the respondent works from home as does his sole employee. I determine that no transfer of undertakings occurred between the liquidated company prior to, at the date of liquidation or prior to the respondents’ new venture commencing trading.’

DISMISSALS [11.23]   An employee may not be dismissed by reason of a transfer of undertaking.56 Dismissal connected with a business transfer is categorised as falling under ‘some other

56

Regulation 5(1) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

497

[11.24]  Termination of Employment substantial ground’ as provided for under s 6(6) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. But, as in the case of other dismissals, it is for the employer to prove that the dismissal was fair. In determining the reasonableness of such a decision, the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and the Labour Court will have regard to all circumstances. They will seek to determine whether there was consultation, how that occurred and whether it was adequate.57

Dismissal by reason of the transfer [11.24]   In some instances, it is not uncommon for the purchasers of a business to insist that they take over the business free from all employees. In an effort to circumvent the Directive, this has led some employers to make all employees redundant prior to the transfer and then to sell the business, after which the ‘transferee’ is free to do what it wishes with the business. P Bork International A/S (in liquidation) v Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark58 concerned a situation where the employees had been dismissed and re-engaged by the ‘new employer’ immediately after the transfer. The ECJ held that the workers must be considered as still being employed by the undertaking on the date of the transfer, with the consequent effect that the Regulations/Directive applied to them. The option of making all employees redundant prior to the transfer and then selling the business ‘employee free’ is thus no longer viable for either the transferor or the transferee. Having regard to the automatic transfer of liabilities to the transferee as referred to in Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA,59 the only opportunity that a transferee has to mitigate the cost of any subsequent necessary restructuring costs is to negotiate effective indemnities from the transferor beforehand.

Dismissal for ‘economic, technical or organisational reasons’ [11.25]  Regulation 5 of the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations prohibits the termination of employment in the event of a transfer. The purpose of reg 5 is to ensure that persons employed in a business or part thereof which is being transferred are automatically entitled to continue in employment – thus automatically transferring contracts of employment to the new employer. This, however, is qualified by the provision that ‘nothing in this Regulation shall be construed as prohibiting dismissals for economic, technical or organisational reasons which entail changes in the workforce’ – otherwise referred to as the ‘ETO defence’.60 57 58 59 60

Kenmare Brewhouse Ltd/ t/a McCarthy’s Bar and Restaurant v Clara O’Leary TUD207 17 December 2020. P Bork International A/S (in liquidation) v Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark (1989) IRLR 41. Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA (1997) IRLR 127. Regulation 5(2) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

498

Transfer of a Business  [11.25] In other words, an employer may escape liability for dismissals where there is an ‘economic, technical or organisational’ reason giving rise to the required change. Failure to provide an ETO reason will render any dismissal or change unfair. There is no definition of ‘economic, technical or organisational reasons’ under the Regulations; however, this does not render the ambit of an ETO reason unlimited. In the main, this may be interpreted as falling within the statutory definition of ‘redundancy’61 – that is, valid redundancies that arise as a result of the transfer are allowable. In Anderson v Dalkeith Engineering Ltd (1984),62 where a receiver had previously dismissed employees to make the company more viable to sell, and where the new owners had subsequently rehired some of those previously dismissed employees, the EAT held that those who had not been rehired had not been unfairly dismissed. The effect of this appears to be that if the transferor can show that in order to sell the business it had no option but to dismiss some or all of the workforce, those dismissals will not be deemed unfair. In the UK case of Nationwide Building Society v Benn,63 a number of employees resigned post-transfer and claimed constructive unfair dismissal in response to downgraded responsibilities and less favourable bonus arrangements. The change was deemed to have arisen for ETO reasons due to the employer having a different product range.64 In another UK case, Crystal Palace FC Limited v Kavanagh and others,65 the Court of Appeal held that the transferred employees had been dismissed for an economic reason with the aim of enabling the business to continue to trade. Therefore, the dismissals were not automatically unfair and liability did not transfer to the buyer. In comparison, the Court of Appeal in Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine66 did not uphold an ETO reason because the dismissal was aimed at making the business more attractive to achieve a sale. In this case, the Court of Appeal held the following: ‘For an ETO reason to be available there must be an intention to change the workforce and to continue to conduct the business, as distinct from the purpose of selling it. It is not available in the case of dismissing an employee to enable the administrators to make the business of the Company a more attractive proposition to prospective transferees of a going concern.’

First, it is crucial to remember that this is merely a defence. It does not in itself provide a mechanism for reducing the size of a workforce. Second, it is vital that when seeking to rely on this defence, the ETO reasons must entail ‘changes in the workforce’. This will generally require an alteration to the number of people employed to perform particular tasks, not just a change in their terms and conditions.67 Furthermore, the principal 61 In

Morris v Smart Brothers UD68/1993, the redundancy of the employees post transfer constituted an ETO because the company had ceased trading. 62 Anderson v Dalkeith Engineering Ltd (1984) IRLR 429. 63 Nationwide Building Society v Benn UKEAT/0273/09. 64 Importantly, this case is authority for the position that while the ETO must be connected to the transfer, it need not entail changes in the entirety of the workforce. 65 Crystal Palace FC Limited v Kavanagh and others [2013] EWCA Civ 1410. 66 Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine UKEAT/0339/10/SM. 67 See Berriman v Delabole Slate Ltd (1985) IRLR 3052, 213.

499

[11.26]  Termination of Employment reason for dismissal must be connected to the ETO reason. This was stated in Purcell and McHugh v Bewley’s Manufacturing Ltd.68 In this instance, the claimants were made redundant by the first named respondent on 15 July 1988 after the company ran into difficulties. The business operation was changed and the second named respondent was brought in on a subcontracting basis. The appellants claimed that there had been a transfer of undertakings and that they were protected by art 3 of the 1980 Regulations. The EAT held that a genuine redundancy situation existed and that the claimants had been dismissed by reason of redundancy. The claimants appealed. In dismissing the appeals, Judge O’Malley held that the transfer had been effected by two documents dated 18 July and 1 September 1988 which had been signed after the redundancies had come into force; therefore the transfer – if it was a transfer – had taken place after the termination of the employment. He said there was no contract of employment or employment relationship existing. The judge was satisfied that: ‘even if there was a transfer and they were in some way employed by Bewley’s on that date, I am satisfied that the whole operation by Mr. Campbell was done for the purpose of shedding an uneconomic operation and saving money. He had difficulties with the workforce, which I cannot ignore, and settled these difficulties fairly. It was done for economic, technical and organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce. He was losing 20,000 Irish pounds a month – it was essential to reorganise as far as the bakery was concerned. If the transfer was part of this operation and the dismissals were part of this, it was done for sound economic, technical and organisational reasons. Even if the appellants were within the regulations and the directive, that clause would take them out. However, I do not think the regulations do apply because the appellants were made redundant.’

The judge concluded by saying: ‘it was a genuine redundancy and their contracts terminated on 15th July 1988’. [11.26]  In Thompson v SCS Consulting and Open Text UK,69  receivers were appointed to the first named respondent’s parent company in Canada on 21 December 1998 and it was determined that the second named respondent would purchase the UK-based business of the first named respondent. Two days later, the receivers designated for the UK business informed the prospective purchasers that they proposed to dismiss all of the employees immediately; but the purchasing company (the second named respondent) did not want to lose vital employees, so it was agreed that the appointment of the receivers would be delayed until 29 December, by which date the second named respondent would have identified the employees it wished to retain for the future operation of the business. The agreement provided that before the sale and purchase agreement took effect, the receivers would dismiss the remaining employees at the request of the purchaser as a precondition to the purchaser entering into this agreement on the grounds that they

68 69

Purcell and McHugh v Bewley’s Manufacturing Ltd [1990] ELR 68. Thompson v SCS Consulting and Open Text UK [2001] IRLR 801.

500

Transfer of a Business  [11.26] were not required for the operation of the business, and that it would not be economically viable for the business to continue if the dismissed employees remained in the employ of the vendors. The claimant was not included on the list of employees to remain and was dismissed along with 24 other employees at 11:30 am on 29 December 1998. The business transferred to the second named respondent at 10:30 pm on that same date (11 hours later). The EAT found that the dismissal was for an ETO reason and therefore the employee was not to be treated as automatically unfairly dismissed for a reason connected with the transfer. The claimant appealed. In dismissing the appeal, the EAT found that it was: ‘open to the tribunal to conclude on the facts, as they did, that the business was overstaffed, inefficient and insolvent, and that the only way in which it could be made viable for the future and continued as a going concern was for the workforce to be reduced in size.’

The findings of fact by the EAT that this was not a case of collusion and that, left to their own devices, the receivers would have dismissed all the employees were not challenged. The EAT held that: ‘on the basis of the primary facts it was for the tribunal to reach a factual conclusion as to whether the reason or principal reason for the dismissal of the claimant was an ETO reason; it was open to the tribunal to decide that it was; the tribunal applied the right tests and the correct principles; and (if and insofar as there was an implicit suggestion of perversity) we see no basis on which it could be concluded that the tribunal’s conclusion was perverse.’

Ryan v Slattery70 lends support to the argument that a transfer of undertakings ‘is not a redundancy situation in and of itself.’ In that case the claimant sought redundancy from the transferor – a publican with whom she was employed and who was selling his business. He advised her that redundancy was a matter for the transferee. The EAT did not find that the actions of the transferor in selling his business – even where the complainant claimed that she was not offered a job by the transferee – were grounds to warrant a redundancy. The issue of redundancy based on ETO reasons prior to transfer was considered by the EAT in Kevin Carroll v SR Technics Ireland Ltd.71  This involved the outsourcing of a maintenance department to the transferee. Some employees were transferred but the claimant was not. The respondent argued that the Regulations allowed it to reduce its workforce prior to the transfer as it was overstaffed; and that reg 5(2) protected its decision. It specified the particular qualifications and competencies which it required for the transferred maintenance department. The EAT decided that the respondent was entitled to reduce the workforce should ETO reasons dictate that this should be so, but post-transfer. In that case, the claimant was made redundant on the same day that the other employees transferred. The EAT upheld his complaint and he was reinstated.

70 71

Ryan v Slattery, RP327/2006. Kevin Carroll v SR Technics Ireland Ltd., UD 1419/2010.

501

[11.27]  Termination of Employment In Crawford v Swinton Insurance Brokers Ltd,72 the EAT held that a ‘change in workforce’ could be either a change in the number of employees or a change where some person is engaged in a different occupation. The scope of the defence is therefore limited to the following: (a) The transferee: This may apply, even if the transferee asks the transferor to dismiss at its behest, if it is clear at the time of the request that there is a defence for ETO reasons and that it would be inevitable that after the transfer, the employees’ employment would be terminated. (b) There must be a change in the workforce: This cannot be limited to a change in terms and conditions. It seems there must be an actual change in the workforce. (c) Dismissal can be for economic grounds: The economic grounds relate to the costs of running the business post, and not prior to, the transfer. (d) Dismissal can be for technical grounds: Equally, technical grounds will only apply to dismissals post the transfer. These will relate to the skills necessary to carry out the job, the technical skill of the employees and their abilities – both physical and mental. (e) Dismissal can be for organisational grounds: This again will relate to the organisational needs of the business post transfer. It will consider the need for the business to organise itself in a particular way – whether geographically, departmentally, by product line etc.

Substantial change in working conditions [11.27]   If an employee’s contract of employment is terminated because a transfer involves a substantial change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee, the employer concerned is regarded as having been responsible for the termination.73 This clearly arises in the absence of the ETO defence. Therefore, in order for employers to rely on the ETO defence, they must be able to demonstrate that their decision was a bona fide decision to make the changes; and that they consequently did make changes in the workforce. Thus, where a transferee purchases a business or part of a business and this results in different terms and conditions, the ETO defence does not apply to the harmonisation of terms and conditions. Transferees are therefore left with the problem of trying to manage employees on different terms and conditions, often doing the same or similar jobs. Options then only extend either to red-circling employees or to improving all terms and conditions to the best available. Indeed, reg 9 does not help in this regard. This states that any provision in an agreement which excludes or limits the application of any provision of the Regulations shall be void. Therefore, if a provision in an agreement (even with the employee’s 72 73

Crawford v Swinton Insurance Brokers Ltd (1990) IRLR 42. Regulation 5(3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).

502

Transfer of a Business  [11.28] consent) becomes less favourable to an employee than a similar entitlement conferred by the Regulations, the agreement is deemed to be modified so as not to be less favourable.74 Regulation 9 also provides that nothing in the Regulations shall be construed as prohibiting the inclusion in an agreement of a provision which is more favourable to an employee than any provision in the Regulations.75

The transfer of a business and redundancy [11.28]   The question of what happens an employee who refuses to transfer has been dealt with extensively by the ECJ. In Katiskas v Konstantinidis and Skreb,76 the ECJ held that in the event of a transfer, employees are entitled to object to the transfer; and that what happens to them then is a matter for each member state. In Mikkelsen v Danmols Incentar A/S,77 the ECJ stated:78 ‘The protection which the Directive is intended to guarantee is however redundant where the person concerned decides of his own accord not to continue the employment relationship with the new employer after the transfer. That is the case where the employee in question terminates the employment contract or employment relationship of his own free will with effect from the date of the transfer or where that contract or relationship is terminated with effect from the date of the transfer by virtue of an agreement voluntarily concluded between the worker and transferor or the transferee of the undertaking. In that situation Article 3(1) of the directive does not apply.’

In Merckz and Neuhuys v Ford Motor Company Belgium SA,79 the ECJ stated: ‘Article 3(1) of Directive 77/187 does not preclude an employee employed by the transferor at the date of the transfer of an undertaking from objecting to the transfer to the transferee of the contract of employment or the employment relationship. In such a case it is for the Member States to determine what the fate of the contract or employment relationship with the transferor should be.’

In Symantec v Leddy and Lyons,80 the Irish courts had an opportunity to address this issue. When Symantec sold part of its business to another company, Mr Leddy and Mr Lyons refused to transfer to the purchaser as was their right. The issue was whether the employees had been made redundant and whether they were entitled to their statutory redundancy payment. The EAT held that in refusing to transfer, the employees remained employed by the transferor. If Symantec had no alternative position to offer them, they would be made redundant and Symantec would be liable for that redundancy. 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Regulation 9(2) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Regulation 9(3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Katiskas v Konstantinidis and Skreb (1993) IRLR 179. Mikkelsen v Danmols Incentar A/S (1986) 1 CMLR 316. Mikkelsen v Danmols Incentar A/S (1986) 1 CMLR 316, para 16. Merckz and Neuhuys v Ford Motor Company Belgium SA (1996) IRLR 467. Symantec v Leddy and Lyons (2009) IEHC 256.

503

[11.29]  Termination of Employment However, on appeal, the High Court overturned that decision and held that the refusal of an employee to transfer does not result in the employee being made redundant. As a result, the employees were not entitled to any severance payment statutory or otherwise.81 The High Court has in effect dealt with this in the same manner as it would be treated in the UK. The British Transfer of Undertakings Regulations provide that where an employee objects to a transfer, their contract with the transferor is at an end but they will not be treated as having been dismissed by the transferor.

Change of contractor/contracting out [11.29]   ‘Contracting out’ has long been a feature of Irish business life across all industries, including milk collection in the dairy industry; boners in the meat industry; cleaners in practically every industry; canteen services; and IT services. The question that has bothered the courts in this jurisdiction and across the EU is: what happens when a service that is contracted out changes from one contractor to another, or when an employer who carries out a service decides to contract that out to a separate service provider? In Bannon v Employment Appeals Tribunal,82 the High Court applied Ny Molle Kro83 and Spijkers84 in considering a case that concerned contracting out. Here Barrington J held that there had been a legal transfer of a business or part of the business when the owner of the shopping centre, who employed five security staff, decided to have security duties carried out by an outside security firm on a contract basis. The applicant was given four weeks’ notice of redundancy. The other four security guards received similar notices. The outside security firm employed five men for the purpose, all of whom undertook the same security duties as had previously been performed by the applicant and his four colleagues. The applicant commenced proceedings before the EAT claiming that he had been unfairly dismissed. His claim was disallowed because a majority of the EAT took the view that a transfer of undertakings within the meaning of the European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees’ Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980 did not take place when the employer engaged contract security. This case further demonstrates that an asset transfer is not necessary to satisfy the Regulations. Throughout the mid-1990s, the ECJ took a very broad view on this issue. In Schmidt v Spar und Liehkasse der Fruheren Amter Bordesholm,85 Schmidt was employed to carry out the cleaning in a branch of a bank. The bank decided to contract out the work to a contract cleaning company which was already responsible for cleaning most of its other

81 82 83 84 85

At the time of writing, this is on appeal to the Supreme Court. Bannon v Employment Appeals Tribunal [1993] 1 IR 500; also applied in Roche v Salthill Hotel Limited [1996] ELR 15. Danamrk v Ny Molle Kro Case 287/86. Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir CV (Case C–24/85) (1986) ECR 1119. Schmidt v Spar und Liehkasse der Fruheren Amter Bordesholm 1994 IRLR 302.

504

Transfer of a Business  [11.29] branches. Schmidt refused to transfer and claimed under the Directive. In holding that the Regulations applied, the ECJ determined that ‘where a business carried on its activities by virtue of a licence or contract, a successor acquired that licence or the contract to carry on that work’. The ECJ based its decision, inter alia, on the fact that the cleaning work of the bank was part of the undertaking of the bank. The ECJ now takes a more restrictive view of this issue. In Suzen v Zehnacker Gebaudereinigung Gmbh,86 the ECJ held that not every contract change or transfer of activities is covered by the Regulations. Here the court claimed that: ‘[T]he mere loss of a service contract to a competitor cannot by itself indicate the existence of a transfer within the meaning of the Directive. In those circumstances the service undertaking previously entrusted with the contract does not, on losing a customer, thereby cease fully to exist and a business or part of a business belonging to it cannot be considered to have been transferred to the new awardee of the contract.’

The effect of this decision is that it is not sufficient that there is a transfer of the right to carry on a business; there must be a transfer of ‘significant tangible or intangible assets’ or a transfer of a ‘major part’ of the employees. The Suzen decision caused considerable confusion when it first issued. Many commentators believed that the ECJ had overruled itself. However, in Schmidt, the bank was clearly an economic entity and the cleaning of the bank was part of that entity. That part of the undertaking transferred to the outside cleaning company retained to do the cleaning work, which then took over part of the economic entity; and as such, the employee was assigned to that part of the entity that transferred with the work. In Suzen, the cleaning work was already being done by an outside company; and when the contract between them came to an end, that contract was granted to a new service provider. Thus came the first distinction between contracting out part of a business and changing contractors. This stricter test of what constitutes a transfer is reflected in the Directive87 and indeed in reg 3 of the Irish 2003 Regulations, which provides that: ‘“transfer” means the transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity; “economic entity” means an organised grouping of resources which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity whether or not that activity is for profit or whether it is central or ancillary to another economic or administrative entity.’

Thus, there must be a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity. In the case of most transfers from one contractor to another, this will not be the case; but it may well be the case where a company is contracting out part of its existing economic entity. The ECJ in Suzen also concluded that: ‘the transfer must relate to a stable economic entity whose activity is not limited to performing one specific works contract.’

86 87

Suzen v Zehnacker Gebaudereinigung Gmbh (Case C–13/95). Directive 2001/23/EC (12 March 2001).

505

[11.30]  Termination of Employment [11.30]   A year later, in 1998, the EAT considered the impact of the Suzen findings in Cannon v Noonan Cleaning Limited and CPS Cleaning Services Limited.88 Here the EAT held that there was no transfer of an undertaking when the contract for the cleaning of the Balbriggan Garda Station was lost to CPS Cleaning Limited, as no tangible assets and no employees had been transferred. The chairman noted that the contract to clean the Garda station ‘was only one segment of Noonans business which presumably is nationwide and is now one segment of the new contractor’s operations’. The issue of the transfer of a tangible or an intangible asset was also addressed in Noonan, where it was found that no tangible assets had transferred and the profit to be made from the transfer constituted an intangible asset. The EAT concluded: ‘Also, the possible transfer of the intangible profit margin is not of sufficient significance of itself to be a major factor in the transfer. It follows then that this transfer is not caught by the Directive as it does not constitute a transfer of undertaking.’

That said, the EAT appeared to change the position it adopted in Cannon v Noonan Cleaning Ltd in Keenan v Professional Contract Services Ltd.89 The facts were similar to Noonan, in that Professional Contract Services Ltd took over a cleaning contract at Dublin City University from Grosvenor Cleaning. Here the EAT held ‘that there was a transfer of an undertaking … which was accepted by the respondents’. It seems that in this latter case (a point that was not sufficiently set out in the reasoning of the EAT), there was some confusion as to whether the claimants actually wanted to transfer. Evidently, it might be adduced from the above that this issue is still very much one to be considered per the facts in every separate situation. Also, in Power and Others v St Paul’s Nursing Home and T & M Cleaning Ltd,90 the claimants were employed as cleaners in St Paul’s nursing home. The home decided to contract out the cleaning duties in respect of which the claimants were employed and they were made redundant as a result. St Paul’s then entered into a contract with T & M Cleaning Ltd to carry out the cleaning duties. Cleaning equipment and other ancillary minor assets were transferred to T & M Cleaning Ltd. In holding that the Directive applied, the EAT stated: ‘It is the opinion of this Tribunal that the Directive applies to these particular sets of circumstances and in fact it would be most artificial if it was held that the case was otherwise.’ Suzen was varied in the EAT decision of Collins v Excel Property Services Limited,91 where it was found that the Regulations applied because all the employees had transferred. In A Security Officer v A Security Company,92 the complainant was employed by Company A, which provided security services at concerts, festivals and exhibitions. Company A also had a contract to provide ‘static’ security at a venue in Dublin. In

88 89 90 91 92

Cannon v Noonan Cleaning Limited and CPS Cleaning Services Limited 1998 ELR 212. Keenan v Professional Contract Services Ltd UD 454/455/456/98. Power v St Paul’s Nursing Home and T & M Cleaning Ltd (1998) ELR 212. Collins v Excel Property Services Limited RP 27/98. A Security Officer v A Security Company ADJ-00013565 13 May 2019.

506

Transfer of a Business  [11.31] December 2017, Company A lost the contract for security at the Dublin venue and it was awarded to Company B, the respondent. In this decision, it was confirmed there had been no transfer of tangible assets; the only intangible asset that had transferred was the possible profit from the provision of 168 hours of security at the Dublin venue. Furthermore, out of Company A’s 300 employees, just four were assigned to the contract, one of whom had been absent due to illness for almost a year. In applying the principles in Suzen, where a significant proportion of the workforce does not transfer, the Regulations do not apply. In Overpass Ltd T/A Ocean Property Management v Clancy,93 the Labour Court considered the decision in Spijkers in light of the CJEU decision in Suzen, in which it noted that the CJEU ‘looked at the elements set out in Spijkers, applied them and found that no transfer of tangible assets had taken place’. It then cited the following: ‘The mere fact that the service provided by the old and the new awardees of a contract is similar does not therefore support the conclusion that an economic entity has transferred. An entity cannot be reduced to an activity entrusted to it. Its identity also emerges from other factors such as its work force, management staff, the way in which its work is organised, operational methods or where appropriate the operational resources available to it.’

The Labour Court then considered the following: ‘In the judgment, the ECJ drew a distinction between businesses that are asset-reliant, on the one hand, and those that are labour-intensive, on the other. It found that in certain sectors in which the business is based essentially on the workforce, as in the present case, there can be a transfer within the meaning of the Directive where the group continues to exist after the taking over of an essential part of the workforce by the new awardee of the contract.’

However, the Labour Court continued it deliberations and noted that: ‘No property or tangible assets transferred; There was no transfer of goodwill or other intangible assets; No employees transferred.’ Arising from this, the Court concluded the following: ‘Applying the law, as set out by the aforementioned judgements of the ECJ, to the facts of this case, the Court must come to the conclusion that the economic entity as operated by Gleann Na Rí did not retain its identity within the Respondent organisation. Accordingly, there was no transfer of an undertaking and the Regulations do not apply.’94

[11.31]  In Shiels and others v Integrate Ireland Language & Training Limited,95 the rights commissioner found there had been no transfer where the transfer activities had moved from the first respondent to a number of individual vocational education committees but no property, teaching materials or training aids had transferred. In Klarenberg v Ferrotron,96 the ECJ held that the Directive must be interpreted as applying in a situation where the part of the undertaking or business transferred does not retain its organisational autonomy, provided that the functional link between the

93 94 95 96

Overpass Ltd T/A Ocean Property Management v Clancy TUD1713. See also decision in Clive Jones v Cork County Council, ADJ-00028630 10 January 2022. Shiels and others v Integrate Ireland Language & Training Limited [2010] ELR 41. Case C-466/07 [2009] IRLR 301, [2009] ICR 1263, [2009] EUECJ C-466/07.

507

[11.32]  Termination of Employment various elements of production is preserved and the link enables the transferee to use those elements to pursue an identical or analogous economic activity which is a matter for the national court to determine. In Oy Liikenne v Pekka Liskojarvi,97 the transfer related to a bus service being contracted out. No vehicles or other assets were transferred; only two buses were leased for a period of three months from the transferor while waiting for new buses to be delivered. A number of drivers’ uniforms were also purchased from the alleged transferor. At the time of the transfer, the alleged transferor dismissed 45 of its bus drivers, 33 of whom were subsequently recruited by the alleged transferee under conditions less favourable than those enjoyed with their former employer. The ECJ found that in absence of a transfer of significant assets, the Directive was inapplicable. The Cour affirmed the principles in Suzen, but went on to hold that ‘bus transport cannot be regarded as an activity based essentially on manpower, as it requires substantial plant and equipment’. Therefore, no transfer of an undertaking had occurred and the protection offered by the Directive was avoided. In Abler and Others v Sodexho MM Catering Gesellschaft mbH,98 the transfer related to the contracting out of hospital catering services where the work was to be completed on site with hospital-owned equipment. The ECJ found that while catering was not an activity based essentially on manpower, on the facts, the company to which the catering service was outsourced had taken over control and use of substantial assets – namely the premises, water and energy and small and large equipment. The ECJ considered that a ‘defining feature’ of the case was the requirement to prepare meals on site and thus take over those assets. The distinction between ‘asset-reliant’ and ‘labour-intensive’ was central to the ECJ’s decision. A similar position was adopted in Balfour Beatty Networks Limited v Wilax,99 where plant and equipment were leased by contractors. The EAT rejected the submission that there was no transfer unless the equipment was transferred where it was essential that the undertaking used the equipment.

COMPLAINTS AND REMEDIES [11.32]   An employee may take a complaint to the WRC should an employer contravene its obligations to the employee under the Regulations.100 A claim may also be brought by an employee representative on behalf of an employee, provided

97

Oy Liikenne v Pekka Liskojarvi and Pentti Juntunen [2001] ECR I-745. Abler and Others v Sodexho MM Catering Gesellschaft mbH [2003] ECR I-14023. 99 Balfour Beatty Networks Limited v Wilax [2006] IRLR 258. 100 Regulation 10 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003).The Regulations were repealed and replaced under s 8 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (as amended). 98

508

Transfer of a Business  [11.33] that appropriate consent is received.101 This must be done within six months of the contravention alleged (or within a further six months where the adjudication officer is satisfied that reasonable cause prevented the complaint from being presented within the first six months).102 Employees may bring a complaint claiming that there was a contravention of reg 8 (information and consultation). A complainant can be awarded up to four weeks’ ­remuneration.103 Bear in mind this is per employee, so where there are a substantial number of employees this can amount to a significant sum. Other forms of redress include a declaration requiring an employer to take a specific ‘course of action’.104 In the event of any other contravention, employees may be awarded up to two years’ remuneration. Again, this is per employee, so the sums can be very sizeable. A fine of up to €3,000 and/ or possible imprisonment for up to 12 months on summary conviction can also be imposed where a person ‘wilfully and corruptly makes any statement which is material and which he or she knows to be false’.105 A breach of the Regulations could also give rise to a claim for constructive dismissal106 and/or a referral under the Industrial Relations Acts 1969–2019.

Appeals [11.33]   Appeals lie from a decision of the WRC to the Labour Court (42 days to appeal) and from the Labour Court to the High Court on a point of law only.107 Where an employer fails to carry out or adhere to the decision of the WRC or Labour Court, a complainant may seek to have the decision enforced. The complainant – either by themselves, through their trade union representative or by the relevant minister (where appropriate) – may apply for enforcement to the district court.108

101

Regulation 10(b) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). 102 Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (as amended) replaced the former standard of ‘exceptional circumstances’ under reg 10(6). 103 Regulation 10(5)(c)(i) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). 104 Regulation  10(5) (c)(b) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). 105 Regulation 13(2) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). 106 See Moran v Bloxham Stockbrokers UD 377/2002, where it was held that the employer was at fault in not outlining the terms of the transfer and in failing to guarantee that those terms were commensurate with the terms she enjoyed with the transferor. 107 Regulation 12(2) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). 108 Applicants were previously required to apply to the Circuit Court under reg 14 (1) and (3) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). However, this was later codified with other statute enforcement mechanisms provided for under the Workplace Relations Act 2015 (as amended).

509

[11.34]  Termination of Employment Enforcement of decisions under the Regulations – whether decisions of the WRC or the Labour Court – may be taken by either an employee, trade union or minister (where appropriate)109 may apply to the district court.

Injunctive relief [11.34]   Probably the most effective remedy for an employee is to seek and obtain an injunction preventing the transfer until their rights under reg 8 are adhered to. In Maybury v Pump Services Ltd and Eldea Ltd,110 the plaintiff successfully applied on an ex parte basis to the High Court to restrain his dismissal and to get both parties to the transfer to comply with their obligations under the Regulations against a background where the transferee was unable to give the plaintiff any assurances about his continued employment. (The matter settled at the interlocutory stage.) However, since then, the UK High Court refused to grant injunctive relief in Betts v Brintel Helicopters Ltd; KLM ERA Helicopters (UK) Ltd.111 This concerned the loss of a contract to ferry offshore oil workers by helicopter to and from the oil rigs in the North Sea. The High Court in this instance held that the remedy was by way of an application to the Industrial Tribunal. Also, in Hyland Shipping Agencies,112 the court refused a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to comply with their obligations under the Regulations to inform and consult. In circumstances where complainants have a statutory remedy under the Regulations, it is hard to see how the courts could get around the decision in Donal O’Donovan v Over-C Technology Limited, in which the High Court held that it does not have the jurisdiction to intervene where a statutory remedy exists.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS [11.35]   When faced with a situation in which the Regulations apply, there are a number of practical operational issues that the practitioner should consider and there will undoubtedly be a number of usual questions that will arise.

Due diligence [11.36]   As part of the purchase of any business, the transferee should carry out comprehensive due diligence. This generally focuses on the financial state of the 109

Regulation 14 (1) and (3).European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). 110 Maybury v Pump Services Ltd and Eldea Ltd (2 May 1990), HC. 111 Betts v Brintel Helicopters Ltd; KLM ERA Helicopters (UK) Ltd (1997) IRLR 361. 112 Hyland Shipping Agencies (2 February 1996), HC.

510

Transfer of a Business  [11.39] company and is carried out by the buyer’s accountants. Wider legal due diligence by the transferee’s solicitors will focus, among other things, on the employees’ rights in the event of a transfer of undertaking being applicable and the necessary consequences of same.

Human resources audit [11.37]   Prior to the due diligence process evolving, a comprehensive audit of the target business should be executed. This should involve the preparation of a list of all employees, their rates of pay, benefits and duration of service in a spreadsheet format identifying the particulars of each employee (whether expressed and/or implied terms) (the latter being necessary if redundancies are contemplated); copies of each employee’s contract of employment; and confirmation of any verbally agreed conditions of employment not expressed in written format etc. The buyer should also be mindful of any pension entitlements or the existence of any other benefits arising from their employment. Similarly, an audit of the transferee’s business should be conducted to determine whether there will be a significant duplication of functions and a plan conceived as to how this might be dealt with going forward.

Indemnities and warranties [11.38]   As part of the due diligence process, queries will be raised (and presumably answered) by the transferor, thereby securing representations from the transferor which may be relied upon in the future. As part of these queries, transferees should ensure that they have received written confirmation from the transferor that they have complied with their obligations under reg 8 (information and consultation). Notwithstanding this, a transferee should also seek an indemnity from the transferor against any legal costs of having to defend themselves where, for example, redundancies may need to be effected as a result of the transfer. Alternatively, and more practically, the costs of any redundancies should be determined and perhaps consideration given to providing for the cost of these in the purchase price. However, given the difficulties in measuring the cost of this at the time of the transfer, it is not unusual for the transferee to seek some form of indemnity from the transferor. The transferor, on the other hand, will not wish to provide open-ended indemnities and/or warranties, so these will likely fall to be negotiated between the contracting parties.

Can employees agree changes prior to or at the time of transfer? [11.39]   It is not open to contract out of the Regulations and ‘any provision or agreement, that seeks to limit the application of, to exclude, or which is inconsistent with the 511

[11.39]  Termination of Employment Regulations is void’.113 In other words, an employer is prevented from inserting any contractual clauses that attempt to undermine or exclude the protections afforded to employees under the Regulations. Notwithstanding the preservation of rights as of the transfer date, it is accepted that the transferee reserves the right to make changes in accordance with the needs of the business as and when required. In fact, this is in essence the objective of the information and consultation stages. In other words, it is open for the employees and the transferee to negotiate and agree the proposed changes to their terms and conditions post the transfer date. This assumption, however, is at odds with certain case law on the matter. In Foreninger af Arbejdsledre i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S,114 the ECJ held that an employee cannot agree a change even where it may be advantageous to do so. Also, in two separate UK cases,115 the House of Lords held that the employer is not in a position to negotiate or agree changes with employees unless their contracts are validly terminated within the terms of the Directive and domestic Regulations prior to the transfer. In Wilson v St Helens Borough Council,116 the EAT decided that an employer cannot change the terms and conditions of the employees to their detriment after a transfer even if the employees consent to the change. In reaching this conclusion, reference was made to the decision in Foreningen v Daddy’s Dance Hall,117 in which the ECJ held that: ‘Employees are not entitled to waive the rights conferred on them by the Directive and it is not permissible to diminish these rights even with their consent. This is not affected by the fact that the employee obtains new benefits and compensation for the disadvantages resulting from an amendment to his contract so that, taking the matter as a whole, he is not placed in a worse position than before. Nevertheless, the directive does not preclude alteration in the working relationship agreed between the new proprietor of the undertaking insofar as such an alteration is permitted by the applicable national law in cases other than transfers of undertakings.’

Returning to the decision in Wilson, the EAT stated: ‘It is true that there may be cases where an effective variation of the terms of employment does take place subsequently either by express agreement or by agreement inferred from conduct. Whether there is such a variation depends on the facts of each case. The reason for the variation depends on the facts of the case. The law, surprising though it may be to English legal tradition, is clear. If the operative reason for the variation is the transfer of the undertaking, then the variation will be ineffective. In this case there was no evidence before the tribunal that the reason for the variation, which took place at the time of the transfer, was anything other than the transfer itself. The “economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce” did not alter the fact that the variations took place by

113 114 115 116 117

Regulation 9(1) of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (SI 131/2003). Foreninger af Arbejdsledre i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S (1988) IRLR 315. Wilson v St Helens Borough Council and Meade and Baxendale v British Fuels Ltd (1977) IRLR 505. Wilson v St Helens Borough Council [1996] IRLR 184. Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S 324/86, [1984] ECR 739.

512

Transfer of a Business  [11.41] reason of the transfer at the time of the transfer. There was no subsequent separate agreement varying the terms of employment after the transfer. The subsequent conduct relied on as affirmation was conduct consistent with variations made at the time of and by reason of the transfer. If, as Daddy’s Dance Hall holds, there can be no agreement to vary terms and conditions by reason of the transfer, there cannot be any subsequent effective affirmation of that variation. It remains prohibited by the regulations.’

The EAT concluded, as a result of this, that the Directive as implemented in national law precludes variation in the terms of a contract even where an employee has provided consent in circumstances where it is to the detriment to the employee. That said, these cases preceded Directive No 2001/23/EC and s  9(3) of the 2003 Regulations, which provides that ‘[n]othing in these Regulations shall be construed as prohibiting the inclusion in an agreement of a provision more favourable to an employee than any provision of these Regulations’. This provision would thus appear to override the aforementioned case law.

Picketing in the event of a transfer [11.40]   The issue here is whether the transfer of a trade dispute from the transferor to the transferee is protected by the Regulations. The ECJ held in d’Urso v Ercole Marelli Elettromeccanica Generale Spa118 and Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA (in ­liquidation)119 that picketing by employees of a transferor directed against a transferee must be held to be valid and protected. If the picket was against the transferor itself, the issue of the Regulations does not fall to be considered. In the one Irish case on this topic, Westman Holdings Ltd v McCormack,120 the High Court (upheld by the Supreme Court) granted an interlocutory injunction to the purchaser of a pub to restrain a picket placed by the employees of the former owners. In this instance, the transferor had dismissed his employees and the transferee had failed to offer all the previously displaced workers alternative jobs. As none of the picketing employees had ever been employed by the plaintiff, he successfully argued that he could not constitute their employer within the meaning of s 11(1) of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act. The case went no further and seems to have been fought solely on the basis of the Industrial Relations Act, as distinct from the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations.

Data protection issues [11.41]   An interesting issue arises once the transfer has been announced. Clearly, at this stage, the transferee will want to see exactly what the terms and conditions of employees are. While much of this information may have been given during the

118 119

120

d’Urso v Ercole Marelli Elettromeccanica Generale Spa (1992) IRLR 136. Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA (in liquidation) (1997) IRLR 127. Westman Holdings Ltd v McCormack (1992) 1 IR 151.

513

[11.42]  Termination of Employment due diligence, employers should not share employees’ personal data (eg, names, home addresses, email addresses) without having appropriate regard to the General Data Protection Regulations 2016 and the Data Protection Acts, 2018. Personal data may be shared in circumstances where the processing of data in this manner is necessary for the performance of the contract of employment121 – that is, for the transfer of employment from transferor to transferee. Where a transferor intends to share employee personal data with the transferee, it is prudent to ensure the data is shared securely.122 This may take the form of password-protected documents or secure cloud-sharing portals. It is also prudent to ensure that the data is shared within any heads of terms of transfer and with both parties acknowledging and agreeing to the security of processing. In circumstances where both the transferor and transferee are deemed to be the data controller (ie, where they are each determining the purposes and means of the processing), both parties will be deemed equally liable in the event of a data breach, unless such liability is allocated in another way by way of agreement.

DRAFT LETTERS IN THE EVENT OF A TRANSFER Draft transferor letter [11.42] [INSERT ON LETTERHEAD OF TRANSFEROR] For and on behalf of XYZ Ltd European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 – Draft Letter for [insert name of transferor company] (“Transferor”) Private & Confidential [Insert name] [Insert address] Date: [Insert date] Re: Notification of transfer of undertaking from [insert name of transferor company] and [insert name of transferee company] (“Transfer”) Dear [insert employee name] We refer to the above matter. Transfer of Employment As you are aware, on the [insert date], you were informed upcoming transfer of your employment from [insert name of transferor company] (“Transferor”) to [insert name of transferee company] (“Transferee”).

121 122

Article 6(b) of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016. Article 32 of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016.

514

Transfer of a Business  [11.42] For the purposes of Regulation 8 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (“Regulations”), we are required to inform you of the following information not later than 30 days before the proposed transfer: Date or proposed date of the transfer [insert date of transfer] (“Transfer Date”). Reasons for any transfer [Insert the reasons for the transfer – eg, the business has been sold, a tender has been successful etc.] Legal, economic and social implications for the transfer for the employees Your employment with the Company will transfer to [insert name of transferee] with effect from midnight on the Transfer Date. All your rights and entitlements as an employee of the Company will transfer at midnight on the Transfer Date and [insert name of transferee] is legally obliged to continue to employ you from that date. From the date of transfer, your accrued service with the Company will be deemed to have been with [insert name of transferee] and you are entitled to the same [or no less favourable] terms and conditions of employment as you enjoyed with the Company prior to the transfer. Measures envisaged in relation to the employees Further to our meeting with [insert name of transferee] on [insert date], they have confirmed that they will only be in a position to identify and confirm whether any measures are envisaged in relation to your terms and conditions of employment once you have confirmed your intentions in relation to your contract of employment. Once you have confirmed your intentions to the Company and [insert name of transferee], then arrangements will be made for [insert name of transferee] to consult with you directly [if appropriate] in relation to those measures envisaged with a view to reaching agreement. Terms and Conditions of Employment The Company is of the opinion that the impending Transfer is covered by the Regulations. As a direct result of the Regulations being triggered, we are pleased to inform you that your employment will continue with [insert name of transferee] following completion of the Transfer. Once transferred, the terms of employment you currently hold and enjoy with the Company will generally remain unaltered. In summary, it is our view that your employment with the Transferee taking over control of the business will be continuous, thus protecting your pay, holiday, sickness and all other terms and conditions of your employment and affording you the security that your service has earned under the legislation. Proposed Change(s) (if any) Notwithstanding such, we are writing to notify you that the Transferee [insert details].

515

[11.43]  Termination of Employment Transfer of Employment Details Queries/Questions We would anticipate that you may have a number of questions on the impending Transfer, to which we would like to have the opportunity to give an adequate response. While we note that you will be presented with an opportunity to appoint a staff representative to speak on your behalf, if you wish to deal directly with us, please contact [insert point of contact for the Company]. We would encourage you to raise any concerns or queries you have in this regard at the earliest possible date in order for us to address these issues. For the purpose of completeness, we ask that you sign this letter to demonstrate that you have read and understand the contents of this document. Once completed, we would be much obliged if you could return a physical copy of same to [insert point of contact for the transferor].

___________________

_____________________

Signed on behalf of [insert name of transferor company]

[insert name of employee]

Draft transferee letter [11.43] Private & Confidential [Insert name] [Insert address] Date: [Insert date] Re: Notification of transfer of undertaking from [insert name of transferor company] and [insert name of transferee company] (“Transfer”) Dear [insert employee name] We refer to the above matter.

516

Transfer of a Business  [11.44] We note that on the [insert date], your current employer informed you of the upcoming transfer of your employment from [insert name of transferor company] (“Transferor”) to [insert name of transferee company] (“Transferee”) following [their tender for … /their purchase of the business of … /or whatever the circumstances are] … between the two companies (“Parties”). The Transfer is set to take effect on [insert date of transfer] (“Transfer Date”). Terms and Conditions of Employment The Company is of the opinion that the impending Transfer is covered by the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (“Regulations”). As a direct result of the Regulations being triggered, we are pleased to inform you that your employment will continue with us following completion of the Transfer. Once transferred, the terms of employment you currently hold and enjoy with [insert name of existing company] will generally remain unaltered. Proposed Change(s) (if any) Notwithstanding such, we are writing to notify you that the Company intends to make the following changes [insert details of proposed changes]. Queries/Questions We can appreciate that you may well have further queries regarding the impending transfer and how it will affect you. We also note that you will be presented with an opportunity to appoint a staff representative to speak on your behalf. However, if you wish to deal directly with us, please contact [insert point of contact]. We will endeavour to respond to all queries. In addition to any such queries, we will be liaising with the staff representative, in respect of various matters including, amongst other things, the Transfer, the effect the Transfer on your terms and conditions of employment and the impending change to us. For the purpose of completeness, we ask that you sign this letter to demonstrate that you have read and understand the contents of this document. Once completed, we would be much obliged if you could return a physical copy of same to [insert point of contact for the transferee].

___________________

_____________________

Signed on behalf of [insert name of transferee company]

[insert name of employee]

Draft nomination form for employee representatives [11.44]   I, [insert name], wish to nominate [insert name of nominee] as an employee representative for the Company.

517

[11.45]  Termination of Employment I am employed by [insert name of transferor company] and confirm the person nominated by me is in the same Company as me and has consented to be a candidate. Signed: [insert date] Date: [insert date] You must complete and return this form to [insert name and job title] by [insert date] or your nomination will not be valid.

Draft letter to staff representative regarding their appointment [11.45]  [TO BE PLACED ON THE HEADED NOTEPAPER OF THE EMPLOYER] [Insert name of the elected representative] [Insert address of the elected representative] [Insert date] Dear [insert name] Results of the election for employee representatives Thank you for standing as a candidate for election as an employee representative for the purpose of the information and, where appropriate, consultation process regarding the proposed transfer of your employment from [insert name of transferor company] (“Transferor”) to [insert name of transferee company] (“Transferee”). The election was held on [insert date(s)]. The election is now complete, and the results are in. The results will be communicated to relevant individual employees by email. I am pleased to inform you that you have been elected as an employee representative to represent all the affected employees. The application forms, nomination forms, ballot papers, proxy forms and results of the election will be retained by the Company. You will hold this position until the transfer takes place, which we currently envisage will be around [insert timeframe].

518

Transfer of a Business  [11.45] We will shortly provide you and the other employee representatives with the information that we are required to provide under the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (“Regulations”), namely: (a) the fact of the transfer and the date on which it is proposed to take place; (b) the reasons for the transfer; (c) the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for the affected employees; (d) any measures which the Company envisages taking in relation to employees or, if there are none, that fact; (e) any measures, in connection with the transfer, which the Company envisages [insert name of transferor company] will take in relation to employees who will transfer to [insert name of transferee company] or, if the Company envisages that no such measures will be taken by [insert name of transferee company] that fact. Faithfully, ____________

519

520

Index [all references are to paragraph number] Adjournments Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.19 Arrears of pay insolvency of employer, and, 9.19 Adoptive leave continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 minimum notice periods, and, 2.20 recovery of employment debts in insolvency, and, 9.19 redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 generally, 5.39 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.17 unfair dismissal, and continuous service, 3.19 exclusion of persons covering leave, 3.38 generally, 3.55 Age discrimination Code of Practice on Longer Working, 8.24 fixed term contracts after normal retirement age, 8.25 generally, 8.22 retirement, 8.23–8.25 Age of employee unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.51 redundancy, and, 3.96 Agency workers redundancy, and, 5.05 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.13 unfair dismissal, and, 3.06 Alcoholism unfair dismissal, and, 3.69 Alternative work redundancy, and generally, 5.20 refusal to take, 5.22 And/or test constructive dismissal, and, 3.99 Annual leave collective redundancy, and, 5.77–5.78 minimum notice periods, and, 2.19 Appeals disciplinary hearings, and failure to appeal, 4.30 generally, 4.29

Appeals – contd discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.57 insolvency of employer, and, 9.36 Labour Court, and generally, 1.32 late, 1.33–1.35 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.33 unfair dismissal, and, 3.27 Apprentices recovery of employment debts on insolvency, and, 9.15 redundancy, and, 5.07 retirement, and, 3.30 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.13 unfair dismissal, and, 3.03 Asset sales transfer of undertakings, and, 11.08 Automatically unfair dismissals See also Unfair dismissal adoptive leave, 3.55 age, 3.51 carers leave, 3.61 colour, 3.50 employees’ representatives, 3.59 health and safety, 3.60 introduction, 3.45 issue of civil or criminal proceedings against employer, 3.57 lock-outs, 3.48 national minimum wage, 3.62 parental leave, 3.61 political opinions, 3.49 pregnancy or related matters exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 fixed-term contracts, 3.54 generally, 3.52 Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004, 3.53 race, 3.50 religious opinions, 3.49 reporting child abuse, 3.58 sexual orientation, 3.50 standards in public office, 3.63 strikes, 3.47 trade union activities, 3.46 trade union membership, 3.46 travellers, 3.56

521

Index Awards in employment cases insolvency of employer, and, 9.19 taxation of lump sum payments, and apportionment, 6.22–6.23 exempt payments, 6.18 ‘fire and rehire’, 6.19 introduction, 6.17 practical advice for employers, 6.20 structure, 6.21

Carers leave – contd redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 generally, 5.42 non-reckonable service, 5.34 reckonable service, 5.35 unfair dismissal, and continuous service, 3.19 exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.61 Casual workers banded working hours, 3.15 fixed-term workers, 3.15 redundancy, and, 5.10 unfair dismissal, and, 3.14–3.16 Change of contractors transfer of undertakings, and, 11.29–11.31 Change of ownership redundancy, and dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 introduction, 5.81 legislation, 5.82 refusal to transfer, 5.85 regulations, 5.83 Child abuse unfair dismissal, and, 3.58 Circuit Court discriminatory dismissal, and forms, 8.63–8.64 gender discrimination cases, 8.56 remedies, 8.56 generally, 1.39 Civil proceedings against employer unfair dismissal, and, 3.57 Civil servants minimum notice periods, and computable service, 2.05 generally, 2.02 Claims procedure discriminatory dismissal, and appeals, 8.57 awards, 8.54 Circuit Court, 8.56 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 employee’s right to information, 8.55 gender discrimination cases, 8.56 referral forms, 8.53 insolvency of employer, and payment, 9.23 refusal, 9.37 Collective redundancies changes to contract of employment, and, 5.54 consultation, 5.49–5.50 failure to consult, 5.51

Balance of convenience injunctions, and, 7.12 Bankruptcy See also Insolvency generally, 9.03 Breach of constitutional right injunctions, and, 7.30 Breach of contract constructive dismissal, and, 3.101–3.103 injunctions, and, 7.26 minimum periods of notice, and, 2.26 recovery of employment debts on insolvency, and, 9.05 strikes, and, 3.47 wrongful dismissal, and, 7.01 Breach of fair procedures injunctions, and, 7.28 Bullying codes of practice, and, 8.43 unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 Capability alcoholism, 3.69 disability discrimination, and, 8.30–8.31 drug addiction, 3.69 frustration, 3.70 generally, 3.66 illness, 3.72 light duties, 3.71 litigation, 3.72 long-term absence, 3.67 short-term absence, 3.68 sporadic absence, 3.68 Career breaks redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 generally, 5.43 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.05–6.08 Carers leave continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19

522

Index Collective redundancies – contd insolvency, and, 5.48 introduction, 5.44 legislation, 5.44–5.47 notification to the Minister, 5.52 records, 5.53 Colour of employee unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.50 redundancy, and, 3.96 Compensation compensation ‘financial loss’, 3.115 generally, 3.114 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 introduction, 3.113 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 ‘financial loss’, 3.115 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.32 unfair dismissal, and ‘financial loss’, 3.115 generally, 3.114 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 introduction, 3.113 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 Competence unfair dismissal, and, 3.73 Complaints to WRC insolvency of employer, and, 9.35 Compulsory liquidation See also Insolvency employees dismissed at date of order, 9.06 employees working after the order, 9.07 generally, 9.05 Conduct admission by employee, 3.78 breach of confidentiality, 3.92 bullying generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 competition by employee against employer, 3.90 criminal proceedings against employee in the workplace ‘criminal proceedings’, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87

Conduct – contd criminal proceedings against employee outside the workplace generally, 3.85 incarceration of employees, 3.86 investigation by Gardaí alongside workplace investigation, 3.87 dishonesty admission by employee, 3.78 criminal proceedings, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 drink and drugs, 3.83 email usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 fighting, 3.81 generally, 3.75 gross insubordination, 3.84 harassment generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 horseplay, 3.81 internet usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 loyalty breach of confidentiality, 3.92 competition by employee against employer, 3.90 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 introduction, 3.90 misconduct, and, 3.75 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 provocation, 3.82 refusal to obey instructions, 3.84 social media usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 working whilst on sick leave, 3.95 Constructive dismissal and/or test, 3.99 contract test delay, 3.103 generally, 3.101 implied terms, 3.103 delay, 3.103 generally, 3.98 implied terms in contract, 3.103 minimum notice periods, and, 2.12 mobility clauses, 3.105

523

Index Criminal proceedings employee in the workplace, against admission by employee, 3.78 ‘criminal proceedings’, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 employee outside the workplace, against generally, 3.85 incarceration of employees, 3.86 investigation by Gardaí alongside workplace investigation, 3.87 employee against employer, by generally, 3.57 redundancy, and, 3.96

Constructive dismissal – contd reasonableness test generally, 3.104 mobility clauses, 3.105 variation clauses, 3.105 unequivocal words, 3.100 use of grievance procedure, 3.106 variation clauses, 3.105 Consultation collective redundancy, and, 5.70 minimum periods of notice, and, 2.28 redundancy, and changes affecting contracts of employment, 5.54 failure to consult, 5.51 generally, 5.49–5.50 notification to Minister, 5.52 unreasonable behaviour, 5.69 transfer of undertakings, and employees’ representatives, 11.19 generally, 11.17 in good time, 11.18 unfair dismissal, and, 3.59 voluntary redundancy, and, 5.89 Continuous service minimum notice periods, and, 2.04 redundancy, and apprentices, 5.07 employment agencies, 5.05 fixed-term contracts, 5.04 generally, 5.03 seasonal workers, 5.08 specified purpose contracts, 5.04 working abroad, 5.06 unfair dismissal, and breaks in, 3.21 exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.19 Contract of employment unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.03 work permits, 3.04 Contract test constructive dismissal, and delay, 3.103 generally, 3.101 implied terms, 3.103 Contracting out transfer of undertakings, and, 11.29–11.31 Costs discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.58 Covert cameras unfair dismissal, and, 3.109

Damage to reputation injunctions, and, 7.10 Damages injunctions, and damage to reputation, where, 7.10 generally, 7.09 Data protection email and internet use, and, 3.94 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.41 Date of dismissal unfair dismissal, and, 3.28 Delay constructive dismissal, and, 3.103 Disability taxation of lump sum payments, and exempt payments, 6.02 introduction, 6.01 tax relief, 6.03–6.13 Disability discrimination awareness of disability, 8.29 capability, 8.30–8.31 case law, 8.28 definition, 8.26 disproportionate burden, 8.35 excluded conditions, 8.27 introduction, 8.26 phased return to work, 8.34 reasonable accommodation, and, 8.32–8.33 Disciplinary hearings appeals failure to appeal, 4.30 generally, 4.29 expert witnesses, 4.27 failure to appeal, 4.30 final written warnings, 4.23 introduction, 4.22 legal representation, 4.25 probationary employees, 4.28

524

Index Disciplinary hearings – contd procedural fairness, and consistent application, 4.04 fairness, 4.03 generally, 4.02 universal application, 4.04 representation introduction, 4.24 legal, 4.25 trade union, 4.26 trade union representation, 4.26 written warnings, 4.23 Disciplinary proceedings injunctions, and, 7.22 Discriminatory dismissal age Code of Practice on Longer Working, 8.24 generally, 8.22 retirement, 8.23–8.25 appeals, 8.57 awards, 8.54 bullying, 8.44 Circuit Court forms, 8.63–8.64 gender discrimination cases, 8.56 remedies, 8.56 civil status, 8.15–8.16 claims appeals, 8.57 awards, 8.54 Circuit Court, 8.56 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 employee’s right to information, 8.55 gender discrimination cases, 8.56 referral forms, 8.52 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 disability awareness, 8.29 capability, 8.30–8.31 case law, 8.28 definition, 8.26 disproportionate burden, 8.35 excluded conditions, 8.27 introduction, 8.26 phased return to work, 8.34 reasonable accommodation, and, 8.32–8.33 employee’s right to information, 8.55 ethic origin, 8.37 EU Directives, 8.02 family status, 8.17–8.18 forms Circuit Court, 8.63–8.64 EE2, 8.59

Discriminatory dismissal – contd forms – contd EE3, 8.60 generally, 8.53 gender dismissal during or after pregnancy, 8.09 generally, 8.07 male gender-based dismissal, 8.08 maternity leave, 8.10, 8.12 non-renewal of fixed-term contract during or at end of maternity leave, 8.12 pregnancy-related dismissal, 8.09, 8.11 redundancy during maternity leave, 8.10 transgender employees, 8.13 harassment bullying, 8.44 codes of practice, and, 8.43 communication of policy, 8.45 compensation, 8.47 defence, 8.41 definition, 8.39 essential characteristics, 8.40 fair, impartial, confidential and speedy investigations, 8.46 grievance procedure, and, 8.42 introduction, 8.39 investigations, 8.46 policy, 8.43–8.45 reasonably practicable steps, 8.41–8.46 training as to policy, 8.45 introduction, 8.01 legislation application, 8.05 extent, 8.04 harassment, 8.39–8.41 introduction, 8.02 prohibited grounds, 8.06–8.38 purpose, 8.03 male gender-based dismissal, 8.08 maternity leave non-renewal of fixed-term contract, 8.12 redundancy during, 8.10 marital status, 8.15–8.16 non-renewal of fixed-term contract during or at end of maternity leave, 8.12 practical considerations appeals, 8.57 claims, 8.53–8.56 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 referral forms, 8.53 remedies, 8.56 pregnancy-related dismissal dismissal during or after, 8.09 generally, 8.11

525

Index Dishonesty unfair dismissal, and admission by employee, 3.78 criminal proceedings, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 Dismissal of complaints Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.08 Dispute referral Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.15 Disputes minimum notice periods, and, 2.25 Documentation Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.13 Disposal of complaints Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.09 Drink and drugs unfair dismissal, and, 3.83 Drug addiction unfair dismissal, and, 3.69 Due diligence transfer of undertakings, and human resources audit, 11.37 indemnities, 11.38 introduction, 11.36 warranties, 11.38

Discriminatory dismissal – contd prohibited grounds age, 8.22–8.25 civil status, 8.15–8.16 disability, 8.26–8.35 family status, 8.17–8.18 gender, 8.07–8.14 introduction, 8.06 marital status, 8.15–8.16 race, 8.36–8.37 religious belief, 8.21 sexual orientation, 8.19–8.20 traveller community, 8.38 race definition, 8.36 ethic origin, 8.37 generally, 8.36 traveller community, 8.38 redundancy during maternity leave, 8.10 referral forms, 8.52 religious belief, 8.21 remedies Circuit Court, 8.56 retirement Code of Practice on Longer Working, 8.24 fixed term contracts after normal retirement age, 8.25 generally, 8.23 sexual harassment bullying, 8.44 codes of practice, and, 8.43–8.45 communication of policy, 8.45 compensation, 8.47 defence, 8.41 definition, 8.39 essential characteristics, 8.40 grievance procedure, and, 8.42 introduction, 8.39 investigations, 8.46 policy, 8.43–8.45 reasonably practicable steps, 8.41–8.46 training as to policy, 8.45 sexual orientation disclosure, 8.20 generally, 8.19 transgender employees, 8.13 traveller community, 8.38 vicarious liability, 8.51 victimisation compensation, 8.49 generally, 8.48 post-dismissal, 8.50

Economic, technical or organisational reasons transfer of undertakings, and, 11.25–11.26 Email usage unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 Employees agency workers, and, 3.06 casual workers, and banded working hours, 3.15 fixed-term workers, 3.16 generally, 3.14 independent contractors, and differences between scope decisions, 3.12 generally, 3.07–3.11 gig economy, 3.13 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.13 unfair dismissal, and agency workers, 3.06 casual workers, 3.14–3.16 definition, 3.05 independent contractors, 3.07–3.13 introduction, 3.05 Employees’ representatives transfer of undertakings, and, 11.19 unfair dismissal, and, 3.59

526

Index Employees’ rights and duties minimum notice periods, and, 2.22 transfer of undertakings, and consultation, 11.17–11.19 exceptions, 11.20–11.22 information, 11.17–11.19 insolvency of outgoing employer, 11.22 introduction, 11.16 pensions, 11.21 Employer insolvency appeals, 9.36 arrears of pay, 9.19 awards, settlements and determinations, 9.19 bankruptcy, and, 9.03 collective redundancies, and, 5.48 complaints to WRC, 9.35 compulsory liquidation, and employees dismissed at date of order, 9.06 employees working after the order, 9.07 generally, 9.05 date, 9.14 effect on employment contracts, and bankruptcy, 9.03 compulsory liquidation, 9.05–9.07 examinership, 9.10 introduction, 9.02 provisional liquidation, 9.08 receivership, 9.09 voluntary liquidation, 9.04 employee entitlements introduction, 9.16 payment, 9.23 prerequisites for a valid claim, 9.17 recoverable debts, 9.19–9.22 relevant date, 9.18 employees covered, 9.15 examinership, and, 9.10 forms EIP1, 9.25, 9.39 EIP3, 9.27, 9.41 EIP4, 9.26, 9.40 EIP6, 9.28, 9.42 EIP7, 9.43 employee, 9.25–9.26 employer, 9.27–9.28 unpaid pension contributions, 9.30–9.32 holiday pay, 9.19 introduction, 9.01 legislation generally, 9.13 purpose, 9.12 meaning, 9.13

Employer insolvency – contd normal weekly remuneration no normal working hours, 9.22 shift workers, 9.21 time-based employees, 9.20 offences, 9.38 pay in lieu of statutory notice, 9.19 payment of claims, 9.23 pension contributions, 9.19 practice, in appeals, 9.36 complaints to WRC, 9.35 forms, 9.25–9.28 introduction, 9.24 offences, 9.38 refusal of claims, 9.37 transfer of personal data as to insolvent employers, 9.34 transfer to Minister of certain rights and remedies, 9.33 unpaid pension contributions, 9.29–9.32 preferential debts, 9.01 prerequisites for a valid claim, 9.17 priorities of debts, 9.11 provisional liquidation, and, 9.08 receivership, and, 9.09 recoverable debts generally, 9.19 normal weekly remuneration, 9.20–9.22 refusal of claims, 9.37 relevant date, 9.18 shift workers, 9.21 sick pay, 9.19 time-based employees, 9.20 transfer of certain rights and remedies to Minister, 9.33 transfer of personal data as to insolvent employers, 9.34 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.22 unpaid pension contributions forms, 9.30–9.32 generally, 9.29 recoverable debts, 9.19 voluntary liquidation, and, 9.04 weekly remuneration no normal working hours, 9.22 shift workers, 9.21 time-based employees, 9.20 Employment agency workers redundancy, and, 5.05 unfair dismissal, and, 3.06 Employment Appeals Tribunal generally, 1.02

527

Index Employment equality age Code of Practice on Longer Working, 8.24 generally, 8.22 retirement, 8.23–8.25 appeals, 8.57 awards, 8.54 bullying, 8.44 Circuit Court forms, 8.63–8.64 gender discrimination cases, 8.56 remedies, 8.56 civil status, 8.15–8.16 claims appeals, 8.57 awards, 8.54 Circuit Court, 8.56 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 employee’s right to information, 8.55 gender discrimination cases, 8.56 referral forms, 8.52 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 disability awareness, 8.29 capability, 8.30–8.31 case law, 8.28 definition, 8.26 disproportionate burden, 8.35 excluded conditions, 8.27 introduction, 8.26 phased return to work, 8.34 reasonable accommodation, and, 8.32–8.33 employee’s right to information, 8.55 ethic origin, 8.37 EU Directives, 8.02 family status, 8.17–8.18 forms Circuit Court, 8.63–8.64 EE2, 8.59 EE3, 8.60 generally, 8.52 gender dismissal during or after pregnancy, 8.09 generally, 8.07 male gender-based dismissal, 8.08 maternity leave, 8.10, 8.12 non-renewal of fixed-term contract during or at end of maternity leave, 8.12 pregnancy-related dismissal, 8.09, 8.11 redundancy during maternity leave, 8.10 transgender employees, 8.13

Employment equality – contd harassment bullying, 8.44 codes of practice, and, 8.43–8.45 communication of policy, 8.45 compensation, 8.47 defence, 8.41 definition, 8.39 essential characteristics, 8.40 fair, impartial, confidential and speedy investigations, 8.46 grievance procedure, and, 8.42 introduction, 8.39 investigations, 8.46 policy, 8.43–8.45 reasonably practicable steps, 8.41–8.46 training as to policy, 8.45 introduction, 8.01 legislation application, 8.05 extent, 8.04 harassment, 8.39–8.41 introduction, 8.02 prohibited grounds, 8.06–8.38 purpose, 8.03 male gender-based dismissal, 8.08 maternity leave non-renewal of fixed-term contract, 8.12 redundancy during, 8.10 marital status, 8.15–8.16 non-renewal of fixed-term contract during or at end of maternity leave, 8.12 practical considerations appeals, 8.57 claims, 8.53–8.56 costs, 8.58 defence, 8.53 referral forms, 8.52 remedies, 8.56 pregnancy-related dismissal dismissal during or after, 8.09 generally, 8.11 prohibited grounds age, 8.22–8.25 civil status, 8.15–8.16 disability, 8.26–8.35 family status, 8.17–8.18 gender, 8.07–8.14 introduction, 8.06 marital status, 8.15–8.16 race, 8.36–8.37 religious belief, 8.21 sexual orientation, 8.19–8.20 traveller community, 8.38

528

Index Employment equality – contd race definition, 8.36 ethic origin, 8.37 generally, 8.36 traveller community, 8.38 redundancy during maternity leave, 8.10 referral forms, 8.52 religious belief, 8.21 remedies Circuit Court, 8.56 retirement Code of Practice on Longer Working, 8.24 fixed term contracts after normal retirement age, 8.25 generally, 8.23 sexual harassment bullying, 8.44 codes of practice, and, 8.43–8.45 communication of policy, 8.45 compensation, 8.47 defence, 8.41 definition, 8.39 essential characteristics, 8.40 grievance procedure, and, 8.42 introduction, 8.39 investigations, 8.46 policy, 8.43–8.45 reasonably practicable steps, 8.41–8.46 training as to policy, 8.45 sexual orientation disclosure, 8.20 generally, 8.19 transgender employees, 8.13 traveller community, 8.38 vicarious liability, 8.51 victimisation compensation, 8.49 generally, 8.48 post-dismissal, 8.50 Employment injunctions absence of grounds justifying dismissal, 7.29 adequacy of damages as a remedy damage to reputation, where, 7.10 generally, 7.09 balance of convenience, 7.12 breach of constitutional right, 7.30 breach of contract, 7.26 breach of fair procedures, 7.28 Campus Oil decision, 7.14 circumstances in which sought disciplinary process, 7.22 introduction, 7.17 investigation process, 7.21 pre-dismissal process, 7.19–7.22

Employment injunctions – contd circumstances in which sought – contd restraint of dismissal, 7.18 restrictive covenants, 7.23–7.24 suspensions, 7.20 damage to reputation, 7.11 delay, 7.34 development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 disciplinary process, and, 7.22 dismissal, and, 7.18 equitable vs statutory relief, 7.06 ex parte, 7.05 fair issue to be tried, 7.08 forms grounding affidavit, 7.45 notice of motion, 7.44 plenary summons, 7.43 full and frank disclosure, 7.41 grant assertion by employee of absence of grounds, 7.29 dismissal in breach of constitutional right, 7.30 introduction, 7.25 termination in breach of contract, 7.26 termination in breach of fair procedures, 7.28 ultra vires dismissal, 7.27 grounding affidavit, 7.45 interim injunctions development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 generally, 7.05 procedure, 7.38 interlocutory development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 generally, 7.05 procedure, 7.38 introduction, 7.01 investigation process, during, 7.21 mandatory, 7.05 meaning, 7.05 no-fault dismissal, 7.33 non-application of Campus Oil decision, 7.14 notice of motion, 7.44 plenary summons, 7.43 post-termination restrictive covenants, and, 7.23–7.24 practical considerations full and frank disclosure, 7.41 generally, 7.36 interim injunctions, 7.38 interlocutory injunctions, 7.38–7.41 statutory injunctions, 7.42 statutory remedy, where, 7.37

529

Index Ex gratia payments lump sum payments generally, 5.92 taxation, 6.03 multiples of statutory payment, 5.93 redundancy, and lump sum payments, 5.92 multiples of statutory payment, 5.93 statutory entitlement only, 5.90 weeks’ pay per year of service, 5.91 statutory payments general entitlement, 5.90 multiples, 5.93 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.03 weeks’ pay per year of service, 5.91 Ex parte injunctions See also Injunctions generally, 7.05 Examinership See also Insolvency generally, 9.10 Expert witnesses disciplinary hearings, and, 4.27 Extension of time limits for claims unfair dismissal, and application to or leave of Tribunal, by, 3.23 reasonable cause, for, 3.22

Employment injunctions – contd pre-dismissal process, during disciplinary process, 7.22 introduction, 7.19 investigation process, 7.21 suspensions, 7.20 prematurity, 7.35 principles applied by courts adequacy of damages as a remedy, 7.09–7.10 balance of convenience, 7.12 Campus Oil decision, 7.14 fair issue to be tried, 7.08 introduction, 7.07 reputational damage, 7.11 undertakings as to damages, 7.13 probationary periods, 7.32 prohibitory, 7.05 purpose, 7.05 refusal delay, 7.34 introduction, 7.31 no-fault dismissal, 7.33 prematurity, 7.35 probationary periods, 7.32 relevant circumstances disciplinary process, 7.22 introduction, 7.17 investigation process, 7.21 pre-dismissal process, 7.19–7.22 restraint of dismissal, 7.18 restrictive covenants, 7.23–7.24 suspensions, 7.20 reputational damage, 7.11 restraint of dismissal, and, 7.18 restrictive covenants, and, 7.23–7.24 statutory injunctions, 7.42 statutory remedy, where, 7.37 statutory vs equitable relief, 7.06 suspensions, and, 7.20 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.34 types, 7.05 ultra vires dismissal, 7.27 undertakings as to damages, 7.13 Enforceability unfair dismissal, and, 3.17–3.18 Enforcement of decisions Labour Court, 1.38 Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.25 Equality Tribunal generally, 1.02 Ethic origin discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.37

Failure to consult redundancy, and, 5.51 Failure to pursue complaints Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.10 Fair dismissals See also Unfair dismissal breach of confidentiality, 3.92 bullying generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 capability alcoholism, 3.69 drug addiction, 3.69 frustration, 3.70 generally, 3.65 illness, 3.72 light duties, 3.71 litigation, 3.72 long-term absence, 3.67 short-term absence, 3.68 sporadic absence, 3.68 competence, 3.73 competition by employee against employer, 3.90 conduct bullying, 3.88–3.89 criminal proceedings outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87

530

Index Fair dismissals – contd conduct – contd dishonesty, 3.77–3.80 drink and drugs, 3.83 email usage, 3.93–3.94 fighting, 3.81 generally, 3.75 gross insubordination, 3.84 harassment, 3.88–3.89 horseplay, 3.81 internet usage, 3.93–3.94 loyalty, 3.90–3.92 misconduct, and, 3.75 provocation, 3.82 refusal to obey instructions, 3.84 social networking sites, 3.93–3.94 summary dismissal, 3.76 working whilst on sick leave, 3.95 criminal proceedings against employee in the workplace admission by employee, 3.78 ‘criminal proceedings’, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 criminal proceedings against employee outside the workplace generally, 3.85 incarceration of employees, 3.86 investigation by Gardaí alongside workplace investigation, 3.87 dishonesty admission by employee, 3.78 criminal proceedings, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 drink and drugs, 3.83 email usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 fairness, and See also Fairness disciplinary hearings, 4.22–4.30 investigations, 4.17–4.21 procedural fairness, 4.01–4.13 suspensions, 4.14–4.16 fighting, 3.81 generally, 3.75 gross insubordination, 3.84

Fair dismissals – contd harassment generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 heat-of-the-moment resignations, 3.97 horseplay, 3.81 internet usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 introduction, 3.64 loyalty breach of confidentiality, 3.92 competition by employee against employer, 3.90 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 introduction, 3.90 misconduct, and, 3.75 provocation, 3.82 qualifications, 3.74 redundancy, 3.96 refusal to obey instructions, 3.84 social media usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 summary dismissal, 3.76 working whilst on sick leave, 3.95 Fair issue to be tried injunctions, and, 7.08 Fairness See also Unfair dismissals disciplinary hearings appeals, 4.29–4.30 expert witnesses, 4.27 final written warnings, 4.23 introduction, 4.22 legal representation, 4.25 probationary employees, 4.28 representation, 4.24–4.26 trade union representation, 4.26 disciplinary procedure consistent application, 4.04 fairness, 4.03 generally, 4.02 universal application, 4.04 introduction, 4.01 investigations conflation with disciplinary procedures, 4.20 formal/informal distinction, 4.19 generally, 4.17 impartiality, 4.10 independent investigators, 4.21 terms of reference, 4.18 natural justice awareness of expectations, 4.06 consequences of shortcomings, 4.06

531

Index Fairness – contd natural justice – contd determination of allegations, 4.07 examination of witnesses, 4.11 general right, 4.05 impartiality of investigation, 4.10 information as to allegations, 4.08 introduction, 4.01 non-augmentation of allegations during investigation process, 4.12 questioning the facts, 4.11 representation, 4.09 treatment of employee as individual, 4.13 procedural fairness disciplinary procedure, 4.02–4.04 introduction, 4.01 natural justice, 4.05–4.13 reasonableness, and, 4.01 right to natural justice, 4.05 suspensions delay, 4.16 generally, 4.14–4.15 Family status discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.17–8.18 Father’s leave unfair dismissal, and, 3.37 Fighting unfair dismissal, and, 3.81 Final written warnings disciplinary hearings, and, 4.23 Findings Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.24 ‘Fire and hire’ taxation of lump sum payments, 6.19 Fixed-term contract workers discriminatory dismissal, and after normal retirement age, 8.25 non-renewal during or at end of maternity leave, 8.12 minimum notice periods, and, 2.14 pregnancy related dismissals, and, 3.54 redundancy, and, 5.04 retirement, and, 8.25 unfair dismissal, and date of dismissal, 3.28 dismissal, 3.24 exclusions, 3.36 generally, 3.16 pregnancy or related matters, 3.54 Force majeure leave continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19

Force majeure leave – contd redundancy continuous service, 5.03 generally, 5.35 unfair dismissal continuous service, 5.03 exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 Forms discriminatory dismissal, and Circuit Court, 8.63–8.64 EE2, 8.59 EE3, 8.60 generally, 8.52 injunctions, and grounding affidavit, 7.45 notice of motion, 7.44 plenary summons, 7.43 insolvency of employer, and EIP1, 9.25, 9.39 EIP3, 9.27, 9.41 EIP4, 9.26, 9.40 EIP6, 9.28, 9.42 EIP7, 9.43 employee, 9.25–9.26 employer, 9.27–9.28 unpaid pension contributions, 9.30–9.32 redundancy, and RP6, 5.98 RP9, 5.97 Frivolous and vexatious complaints Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.08 Frustration unfair dismissal, and, 3.70 Gardaí conduct, and, 3.79 unfair dismissal, and, 3.79 Gender discrimination dismissal during or after pregnancy, 8.09 generally, 8.07 male gender-based dismissal, 8.08 maternity leave non-renewal of fixed-term contract, 8.12 redundancy during, 8.10 non-renewal of fixed-term contract during or at end of maternity leave, 8.12 pregnancy-related dismissal dismissal during or after, 8.09 generally, 8.11 redundancy during maternity leave, 8.10 transgender employees, 8.13 Gig economy unfair dismissal, and, 3.13 Grievance procedure constructive dismissal, and, 3.106

532

Index Gross insubordination unfair dismissal, and, 3.84

Holiday pay insolvency of employer, and complaints to WRC, 9.35 employee forms, 9.25 introduction, 9.02 payment, 9.23 recoverable debts, 9.19 Holidays continuous service, and, 5.03 Horseplay unfair dismissal, and, 3.81 Human resources audit transfer of undertakings, and, 11.37

Harassment codes of practice, and, 8.43–8.45 communication of policy, 8.45 compensation, 8.47 defence, 8.41 definition, 8.39 essential characteristics, 8.40 fair, impartial, confidential and speedy investigations, 8.46 grievance procedure, and, 8.42 introduction, 8.39 investigations, 8.46 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 policy, 8.43–8.45 reasonably practicable steps, 8.41–8.46 training as to policy, 8.45 unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 Health and safety minimum notice periods, and, 2.20 unfair dismissal, and exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 exclusion of persons covering leave, 3.37 generally, 3.60 s 18 leave, and, 3.37 Hearings of WRC adjournments, 1.19 determining preliminary issues, 1.12 dismissal of frivolous and vexatious complaints, 1.08 dispute referral, 1.15 documentation at hearings, 1.13 disposal of complaints, 1.09 failure to pursue complaints, 1.10 incorrect respondents, 1.22–1.23 non-statutory rules, 1.07 postponements, 1.18 preliminary issues, 1.12 process, 1.11–1.23 referral of disputes, 1.15 remote hearings, 1.16–1.17 representation, 1.14 rules, 1.06–1.23 striking out complaints, 1.10 witness summonses, 1.20–1.21 written submissions, 1.09 Heat-of-the-moment actions resignation, and, 3.97 High Court generally, 1.40

Implied terms constructive dismissal, and, 3.103 Incapability minimum notice periods, and, 2.16 Income tax taxation, and See also Taxation of lump sums employers, by, 6.14–6.15 exempt payments, 6.02 introduction, 6.01 legal fees in employment cases, 6.24 settlements and awards in employment cases, 6.17, 6.22–6.23 summary, 6.25 tax relief, 6.03–6.13 time limits, 6.16 Incorrect respondents Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.22–1.23 Indemnities transfer of undertakings, and, 11.38 Independent contractors differences between scope decisions, 3.12 generally, 3.07–3.11 gig economy, 3.13 Information rights discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.55 transfer of undertakings, and employees’ representatives, 11.19 generally, 11.17 in good time, 11.18 Injunctions absence of grounds justifying dismissal, 7.29 adequacy of damages as a remedy damage to reputation, where, 7.10 generally, 7.09 balance of convenience, 7.12 breach of constitutional right, 7.30 breach of contract, 7.26 breach of fair procedures, 7.28 Campus Oil decision, 7.14

533

Index Injunctions – contd circumstances in which sought disciplinary process, 7.22 introduction, 7.17 investigation process, 7.21 pre-dismissal process, 7.19–7.22 restraint of dismissal, 7.18 restrictive covenants, 7.23–7.24 suspensions, 7.20 damage to reputation, 7.11 delay, 7.34 development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 disciplinary process, and, 7.22 dismissal, and, 7.18 equitable vs statutory relief, 7.06 ex parte, 7.05 fair issue to be tried, 7.08 full and frank disclosure, 7.41 forms grounding affidavit, 7.45 notice of motion, 7.44 plenary summons, 7.43 grant assertion by employee of absence of grounds, 7.29 dismissal in breach of constitutional right, 7.30 introduction, 7.25 termination in breach of contract, 7.26 termination in breach of fair procedures, 7.28 ultra vires dismissal, 7.27 grounding affidavit, 7.45 interim injunctions development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 generally, 7.05 procedure, 7.38 interlocutory development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 generally, 7.05 procedure, 7.38 introduction, 7.01 investigation process, during, 7.21 mandatory, 7.05 meaning, 7.05 no-fault dismissal, 7.33 non-application of Campus Oil decision, 7.14 notice of motion, 7.44 plenary summons, 7.43 post-termination restrictive covenants, and, 7.23–7.24 practical considerations full and frank disclosure, 7.41 generally, 7.36 grounding affidavit, 7.45 interim injunctions, 7.38

Injunctions – contd practical considerations – contd interlocutory injunctions, 7.38–7.41 notice of motion, 7.44 plenary summons, 7.43 statutory injunctions, 7.42 statutory remedy, where, 7.37 pre-dismissal process, in disciplinary process, 7.22 introduction, 7.19 investigation process, 7.21 restraint of dismissal, 7.18 suspensions, 7.20 prematurity, 7.35 principles applied by courts adequacy of damages as a remedy, 7.09–7.10 balance of convenience, 7.12 Campus Oil decision, 7.14 fair issue to be tried, 7.08 introduction, 7.07 reputational damage, 7.11 undertakings as to damages, 7.13 probationary periods, 7.32 prohibitory, 7.05 purpose, 7.05 refusal delay, 7.34 introduction, 7.31 no-fault dismissal, 7.33 prematurity, 7.35 probationary periods, 7.32 relevant circumstances disciplinary process, 7.22 introduction, 7.17 investigation process, 7.21 pre-dismissal process, 7.19–7.22 restraint of dismissal, 7.18 restrictive covenants, 7.23–7.24 suspensions, 7.20 reputational damage, 7.11 restraint of dismissal, and, 7.18 restrictive covenants, and, 7.23–7.24 statutory injunctions, 7.42 statutory remedy, where, 7.37 statutory vs equitable relief, 7.06 suspensions, and, 7.20 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.34 types, 7.05 ultra vires dismissal, 7.27 undertakings as to damages, 7.13 Insolvency appeals, 9.36 arrears of pay, 9.19 awards, settlements and determinations, 9.19 bankruptcy, and, 9.03

534

Index Insolvency – contd collective redundancies, and, 5.48 complaints to WRC, 9.35 compulsory liquidation, and employees dismissed at date of order, 9.06 employees working after the order, 9.07 generally, 9.05 date, 9.14 effect on employment contracts, and bankruptcy, 9.03 compulsory liquidation, 9.05–9.07 examinership, 9.10 introduction, 9.02 provisional liquidation, 9.08 receivership, 9.09 voluntary liquidation, 9.04 employee entitlements introduction, 9.16 payment, 9.23 prerequisites for a valid claim, 9.17 recoverable debts, 9.19–9.22 relevant date, 9.18 employees covered, 9.15 examinership, and, 9.10 forms EIP1, 9.25, 9.39 EIP3, 9.27, 9.41 EIP4, 9.26, 9.40 EIP6, 9.28, 9.42 EIP7, 9.43 employee, 9.25–9.26 employer, 9.27–9.28 unpaid pension contributions, 9.30–9.32 holiday pay, 9.19 introduction, 9.01 legislation generally, 9.13 purpose, 9.12 meaning, 9.13 normal weekly remuneration no normal working hours, 9.22 shift workers, 9.21 time-based employees, 9.20 offences, 9.38 pay in lieu of statutory notice, 9.19 payment of claims, 9.23 pension contributions, 9.19 practice, in appeals, 9.36 complaints to WRC, 9.35 forms, 9.25–9.28 introduction, 9.24 offences, 9.38 refusal of claims, 9.37

Insolvency – contd practice, in – contd transfer of personal data as to insolvent employers, 9.34 transfer to Minister of certain rights and remedies, 9.33 unpaid pension contributions, 9.29–9.32 preferential debts, 9.01 prerequisites for a valid claim, 9.17 priorities of debts, 9.11 provisional liquidation, and, 9.08 receivership, and, 9.09 recoverable debts generally, 9.19 normal weekly remuneration, 9.20–9.22 refusal of claims, 9.37 relevant date, 9.18 shift workers, 9.21 sick pay, 9.19 time-based employees, 9.20 transfer of certain rights and remedies to Minister, 9.33 transfer of personal data as to insolvent employers, 9.34 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.22 unpaid pension contributions forms, 9.30–9.32 generally, 9.29 recoverable debts, 9.19 voluntary liquidation, and, 9.04 weekly remuneration no normal working hours, 9.22 shift workers, 9.21 time-based employees, 9.20 Institutional framework Circuit Court, 1.39 costs, fees and charges, 1.41 Employment Appeals Tribunal, 1.02 Equality Tribunal, 1.02 High Court, 1.40 introduction, 1.01 Labour Court appeals, 1.32–1.35 costs, fees and charges, 1.41 enforcement of decisions, 1.38 introduction, 1.26 investigation of complaints, 1.30 jurisdiction, 1.26–1.27 late appeals, 1.33–1.35 operational structure, 1.29 procedural rules, 1.31 structure, 1.28–1.29 submissions, 1.36 withdrawal of claims, 1.37

535

Index Institutional framework – contd Labour Relations Commission, 1.02 National Employment Rights Authority, 1.02 Rights Commissioner, 1.02 Workplace Relations Rights Commission adjournments, 1.19 core services, 1.02 costs, fees and charges, 1.41 determining preliminary issues, 1.12 dismissal of frivolous and vexatious complaints, 1.08 dispute referral, 1.15 documentation at hearings, 1.13 disposal of complaints, 1.09 enforcement of decisions, 1.25 establishment, 1.02 failure to pursue complaints, 1.10 findings, 1.24 hearing process, 1.11–1.23 incorrect respondents, 1.22–1.23 non-statutory rules, 1.07 postponements, 1.18 preliminary issues, 1.12 procedural rules, 1.06–1.25 public hearings, 1.03–1.05 referral of disputes, 1.15 remote hearings, 1.16–1.17 representation, 1.14 responsibilities, 1.02 striking out complaints, 1.10 witness summonses, 1.20–1.21 written submissions, 1.09 Insubordination unfair dismissal, and, 3.84 Interim injunctions See also Injunctions development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 generally, 7.05 procedure, 7.38 Interlocutory injunctions See also Injunctions development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 full and frank disclosure, 7.41 generally, 7.05 procedure, 7.39–7.41 Internet usage unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 Investigations fairness, and conflation with disciplinary procedures, 4.20 formal/informal distinction, 4.19 generally, 4.17 impartiality, 4.10

Investigations – contd fairness, and – contd independent investigators, 4.21 terms of reference, 4.18 Labour Court, and, 1.30 Issue of civil or criminal proceedings against employer unfair dismissal, and, 3.57 Job-sharers redundancy, and, 5.28 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.05–6.08 Jurisdiction Labour Court, 1.26–1.27 Labour Court appeals generally, 1.32 late, 1.33–1.35 costs, fees and charges, 1.41 enforcement of decisions, 1.38 introduction, 1.26 investigation of complaints, 1.30 jurisdiction, 1.26–1.27 late appeals, 1.33–1.35 operational structure, 1.29 procedural rules, 1.31 structure, 1.28–1.29 submissions details, 1.36 generally, 1.31 ‘Last in, first out’ redundancy, and, 5.79 Lay-off minimum notice periods, and, 2.17 redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 counter-notice by employer, 5.17 entitlement of employers, 5.15 generally, 5.13–5.14 notices, 5.16 payments, 5.16 unfair dismissal, and, 3.19 Leave minimum notice periods, and adoptive leave, 2.20 annual leave, 2.19 protective leave, 2.20 redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 generally, 5.36 Legal fees in employment cases taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.24 Legal representation disciplinary hearings, and, 4.25

536

Index Light duties unfair dismissal, and, 3.72 Lock-outs continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 unfair dismissal, and, 3.48 Long-term absence unfair dismissal, and, 3.67 Loyalty breach of confidentiality, 3.92 competition by employee against employer, 3.90 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 introduction, 3.90 unfair dismissal, and, 3.90–3.92 Lump sum payments redundancy, and, 5.92 taxation, and See also Taxation of lump sums employers, by, 6.14–6.15 exempt payments, 6.02 introduction, 6.01 legal fees in employment cases, 6.24 settlements and awards in employment cases, 6.17, 6.22–6.23 summary, 6.25 tax relief, 6.03–6.13 time limits, 6.16

Minimum notice periods adoptive leave, 2.20 annual leave, 2.19 application of statutory provisions, 2.02 civil servants, and computable service, 2.05 generally, 2.02 computable service, 2.05 constructive dismissal, and, 2.12 content, 2.23 continuous service, 2.04 disputes, and, 2.25 duration, 2.03 employees’ rights and duties, 2.22 employers, to, 2.07 extension, 2.21 fixed-term contracts, and, 2.14 form and content, 2.23 generally, 2.03 health and safety leave, 2.20 incapability, and, 2.16 lay-off, and, 2.17 leave, and adoptive leave, 2.20 annual leave, 2.19 protective leave, 2.20 loss of entitlement constructive dismissal, 2.12 fixed-term contracts, 2.14 incapability, 2.16 introduction, 2.10 lay-off, 2.17 misconduct, 2.11 resignation, 2.13 retirement, 2.15 short-time working, 2.17 specified purpose contracts, 2.14 maternity leave, 2.20 misconduct, and, 2.11 ‘pay’, 2.06 pay in lieu of notice bargaining tool, as, 2.30 calculation, 2.09 Payment of Wages Act 1991, and, 2.18 practice, in, 2.29–2.31 protective leave, 2.20 purpose, 2.01 redress, and, 2.26 redundancy, and, 2.28 resignation, and, 2.13 retirement, and, 2.15 short-time working, and, 2.17 specified purpose contracts, and, 2.14 ‘wages’, 2.18 waiver, 2.08

Mandatory injunctions See also Injunctions generally, 7.05 Marital status discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.15–8.16 Maternity leave continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 discriminatory dismissal non-renewal of fixed-term contract, 8.12 redundancy during, 8.10 minimum notice periods, and, 2.20 recovery of employment debts in insolvency, and, 9.19 redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 generally, 5.36 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.17 unfair dismissal, and continuous service, 3.19 exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.37 Matrix selection redundancy, and, 5.80

537

Index Minimum notice periods – contd withdrawal, 2.24 wrongful dismissal, and, 2.27 Minimum wage unfair dismissal, and exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.62 Misconduct minimum notice periods, and, 2.11 redundancy, and, 5.21 unfair dismissal, and, 3.75 Mobility clauses constructive dismissal, and, 3.105

Notice periods – contd application of statutory provisions, 2.02 civil servants, and computable service, 2.05 generally, 2.02 computable service, 2.05 constructive dismissal, and, 2.12 content, 2.23 continuous service, 2.04 disputes, and, 2.25 duration, 2.03 employees’ rights and duties, 2.22 employers, to, 2.07 extension, 2.21 fixed-term contracts, and, 2.14 form and content, 2.23 generally, 2.03 health and safety leave, 2.20 incapability, and, 2.16 lay-off, and, 2.17 leave, and adoptive leave, 2.20 annual leave, 2.19 protective leave, 2.20 loss of entitlement constructive dismissal, 2.12 fixed-term contracts, 2.14 incapability, 2.16 introduction, 2.10 lay-off, 2.17 misconduct, 2.11 resignation, 2.13 retirement, 2.15 short-time working, 2.17 specified purpose contracts, 2.14 maternity leave, 2.20 misconduct, and, 2.11 ‘pay’, 2.06 pay in lieu of notice bargaining tool, as, 2.30 calculation, 2.09 Payment of Wages Act 1991, and, 2.18 practice, in, 2.29–2.31 protective leave, 2.20 purpose, 2.01 redress, and, 2.26 redundancy, and, 2.28 resignation, and, 2.13 retirement, and, 2.15 short-time working, and, 2.17 specified purpose contracts, and, 2.14 waiver, 2.08 withdrawal, 2.24 wrongful dismissal, and, 2.27

Natal care continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 unfair dismissal, and continuous service, 3.19 generally, 3.37 National Employment Rights Authority generally, 1.02 National minimum wage unfair dismissal, and exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.62 Natural justice awareness of expectations, 4.06 consequences of shortcomings, 4.06 determination of allegations, 4.07 examination of witnesses, 4.11 general right, 4.05 impartiality of investigation, 4.10 information as to allegations, 4.08 introduction, 4.01 non-augmentation of allegations during investigation process, 4.12 questioning the facts, 4.11 representation, 4.09 treatment of employee as individual, 4.13 Negotiations redundancy, and generally, 5.88 voluntary redundancy, 5.89–5.93 Non-cash receipts taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.03 Non-statutory redundancy payments taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.03 Normal retirement age unfair dismissal, and, 3.30 Notice periods adoptive leave, 2.20 annual leave, 2.19

538

Index Notification collective redundancies, and draft letter to Minister, 5.96 generally, 5.62 timeline, 5.87

Pensions – contd insolvency of employer, and – contd generally, 9.29 recoverable debts, 9.19 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.21 Picketing transfer of undertakings, and, 11.40 Piece-rate workers redundancy, and, 5.26 Political opinions unfair dismissal, and, 3.49 Postponements Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.18 Post-termination restrictive covenants injunctions, and, 7.23–7.24 Preferential debts insolvency of employer, and, 9.01 Pregnancy or related matters discriminatory dismissal, and dismissal during or after, 8.09 generally, 8.11 unfair dismissal, and exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 fixed-term contracts, 3.54 generally, 3.52 Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004, 3.53 redundancy, and, 3.96 Preliminary issues Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.12 Probationary employees disciplinary hearings, and, 4.28 Procedural fairness See also Fairness disciplinary procedure consistent application, 4.04 fairness, 4.03 generally, 4.02 universal application, 4.04 introduction, 4.01 natural justice awareness of expectations, 4.06 consequences of shortcomings, 4.06 determination of allegations, 4.07 examination of witnesses, 4.11 general right, 4.05 impartiality of investigation, 4.10 information as to allegations, 4.08 introduction, 4.01 non-augmentation of allegations during investigation process, 4.12 questioning the facts, 4.11 representation, 4.09 treatment of employee as individual, 4.13 reasonableness, and, 4.01

Offences insolvency of employer, and, 9.38 Onus of proof dismissal in dispute, 3.42 exceptions to general rule, 3.42–3.44 generally, 3.41 pregnancy-related dismissal, 3.43 premature submission of claim form, 3.44 unfair dismissal, and, 3.41–3.44 Operation of law transfer of undertakings, and, 11.09 Parental leave continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 recovery of employment debts in insolvency, and, 9.19 redundancy, and continuous service, 5.03 excess days, 5.38 generally, 5.37 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.17 unfair dismissal, and continuous service, 3.19 generally, 3.61 Parent’s leave redundancy, and, 5.40 Parts of undertakings transfer of undertakings, and, 11.11 Part-time workers redundancy, and, 5.10 Paternity leave redundancy, and, 5.41 ‘Pay’ minimum notice periods, and, 2.06 Pay in lieu of notice insolvency of employer, and, 9.19 minimum notice periods, and bargaining tool, as, 2.30 calculation, 2.09 taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.03 Payment of Wages Act 1991 minimum notice periods, and, 2.18 Pensions insolvency of employer, and forms, 9.30–9.32

539

Index Prohibitory injunctions See also Injunctions generally, 7.05 Protected disclosures civil claim for tort, 10.37 civil liability immunity, 10.41 compensation dismissal, 10.43 penalisation other than dismissal, 10.33–10.35 constructive dismissal, and, 10.31 contractual obligations, 10.07–10.10 data protection, 10.21 definition, 10.04 dismissal, and compensation, 10.43 constructive dismissal, 10.31 general protection, 10.28–10.30 external reporting channels generally, 10.22 Office of the Protected Disclosure Commissioner, 10.25 prescribed persons, 10.23 relevant Minister, 10.24 grievances, 10.12 information uncertainty, 10.11 interim relief extension of time limit, 10.39 generally, 10.38 tort, and, 10.40 internal reporting procedure data protection, 10.21 generally, 10.19 recipient of disclosure, 10.20 record keeping, 10.21 introduction, 10.01 legislation, 10.02 management of introduction, 10.26 protections afforded to employees, 10.27 motivation for making generally, 10.14 reasonable belief, 10.16 statements in passing, 10.15 obligations under employment contract, 10.07–10.10 offences, 10.42 Office of the Protected Disclosure Commissioner, 10.25 ‘prescribed persons’, 10.23 personal grievances, 10.12 penalisation other than dismissal, and compensation, 10.33–10.35 general protection, 10.32 practical considerations, 10.44

Protected disclosures – contd protections afforded to employees burden of proof, 10.36 civil claim for tort, 10.37 civil liability immunity, 10.41 constructive dismissal, from, 10.31 dismissal, from, 10.28–10.30 interim relief, 10.38–10.40 introduction, 10.27 penalisation other than dismissal, from, 10.32–10.35 reasonable belief, 10.16 recipient of disclosure, 10.20 record keeping, 10.21 ‘relevant information’, 10.05 ‘relevant Minister’, 10.24 ‘relevant wrongdoing’, 10.06 reporting procedures establishing, 10.18 external channels, 10.22–10.23 internal process, 10.19–10.21 scope of regime contractual obligations, 10.07–10.10 grievances, 10.12 introduction, 10.03 motivation, 10.14–10.15 ‘protected disclosure’, 10.04 reasonable belief, 10.16 ‘relevant information’, 10.05 ‘relevant wrongdoing’, 10.06 solicitor-client communications, 10.13 uncertainty of information, 10.11 ‘worker’, 10.17 solicitor-client communications, 10.13 statements in passing, 10.15 uncertainty of information, 10.11 ‘worker’, 10.17 Protective leave continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 minimum notice periods, and, 2.20 unfair dismissal, and continuous service, 3.19 exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.37 Provisional liquidation See also Insolvency generally, 9.08 Provocation conduct, and, 3.82 Public hearings Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.03–1.05

540

Index Qualifications unfair dismissal, and, 3.74

Redundancy – contd calculation of ex gratia payments lump sum payments, 5.92 multiples of statutory payment, 5.93 statutory entitlement only, 5.90 weeks’ pay per year of service, 5.91 career break leave, and, 5.43 carer’s leave, and, 5.42 change in ownership, and dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 introduction, 5.81 legislation, 5.82 refusal to transfer, 5.85 regulations, 5.83 change in place of business generally, 5.23 genuine redundancy, and, 5.58 change in purpose of business, 5.58 change in work, 5.62 change in work method, 5.61 change of location generally, 5.23 genuine redundancy, and, 5.58 change of ownership, and dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 introduction, 5.81 legislation, 5.82 refusal to transfer, 5.85 regulations, 5.83 changes to contract of employment, and, 5.54 collective redundancies changes to contract of employment, and, 5.54 consultation, 5.49–5.50 failure to consult, 5.51 insolvency, and, 5.48 introduction, 5.44 legislation, 5.44–5.47 notification to the Minister, 5.52 records, 5.53 consultation failure to consult, 5.51 generally, 5.49–5.50 reasonableness of the conduct of the employer, 5.69 continuous service apprentices, 5.07 employment agencies, 5.05 fixed-term contracts, 5.04 generally, 5.03 seasonal workers, 5.08 specified purpose contracts, 5.04 working abroad, 5.06 definition, 5.01 diminution in number of employees, 5.60

Race discrimination, and definition, 8.36 ethic origin, 8.37 generally, 8.36 traveller community, 8.38 redundancy, and, 3.96 unfair dismissal, and, 3.50 Reasonableness constructive dismissal, and generally, 3.104 mobility clauses, 3.105 variation clauses, 3.105 fairness, and, 4.01 redundancy, and alternatives to redundancy, 5.65–5.68 breaches of collective redundancy legislation, 5.70 consultation, 5.69 introduction, 5.63 reasonable behaviour, 5.64–5.70 unfair dismissal, and, 3.112 Receivership See also Insolvency generally, 9.09 Reckonable service redundancy, and, 5.35 Redress minimum notice periods, and, 2.26 Reduced working hours redundancy, and, 5.29 Redundancy adoptive leave, and, 5.39 aged over 16, 5.11 agency workers, 5.05 alternative work generally, 5.20 refusal to take, 5.22 alternatives to, 5.65–5.68 apprentices, 5.07 breaches of collective redundancy legislation, 5.70 calculation of entitlement adoptive leave, and, 5.39 career break leave, and, 5.43 carer’s leave, and, 5.42 maternity leave, and, 5.36 non-reckonable service, 5.33–5.34 parental leave, and, 5.37–5.38 parent’s leave, and, 5.40 paternity leave, and, 5.41 reckonable service, 5.35 week’s pay, 5.24–5.32

541

Index Redundancy – contd discriminatory dismissal during maternity leave, 8.10 disentitlement alternative work, 5.20 change of location, 5.23 introduction, 5.19 misconduct, 5.21 refusal to take alternative employment, 5.22 dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 employees wishing to leave before notice expires, 5.18 employment agency workers, 5.05 entitlement requirements aged over 16, 5.11 continuous service, 5.03–5.08 employees wishing to leave before notice expires, 5.18 generally, 5.02 genuine redundancy, 5.12 insurable employment, 5.09–5.10 lay-off, 5.13–5.17 short-time, 5.13–5.14 ex gratia payments, 5.90–5.94 failure to consult, 5.51 fixed-term contract workers, 5.04 forms RP6, 5.98 RP9, 5.97 gender discrimination during maternity leave, 8.10 genuine redundancy change in purpose or place of business, 5.58 change in work, 5.62 change in work method, 5.61 diminution in number of employees, 5.60 generally, 5.56 introduction, 5.12 reduction in requirements of business, 5.59 relationship with unfair dismissal, 5.56 impersonality requirement, 5.57 insurable employment generally, 5.09 part-time workers, 5.10 job-sharers, 5.28 ‘last in, first out’, 5.79 lay-off continuous service, 5.03 counter-notice by employer, 5.17 entitlement of employers, 5.15 generally, 5.13–5.14 notices, 5.16 payments, 5.16 lump sum payments, 5.92

Redundancy – contd maternity leave, and discriminatory dismissal, 8.10 generally, 5.36 matrix selection, 5.80 minimum notice periods, and, 2.28 misconduct, 5.21 negotiations generally, 5.88 voluntary redundancy, 5.89–5.93 ‘no-fault’ termination, as, 5.71 no normal working hours, 5.30 non-reckonable service, 5.33–5.34 notification of collective redundancies draft letter to Minister, 5.96 generally, 5.52 parental leave, and excess days, 5.38 generally, 5.37 parent’s leave, and, 5.40 paternity leave, and, 5.41 part-time workers, 5.10 piece-rate workers, 5.26 practical considerations ex gratia payments, 5.90–5.94 negotiations, 5.88–5.94 notification of collective redundancies, 5.96 notification timeline, 5.87 refusal to accept redundancy notice, 5.95 time limits for claims, 5.86 voluntary redundancy, 5.89–5.93 reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the employer alternatives to redundancy, 5.65–5.68 breaches of collective redundancy legislation, 5.70 consultation, 5.69 introduction, 5.63 reasonable behaviour, 5.64–5.70 reckonable service, 5.35 reduced working hours, 5.29 reduction in requirements of business, 5.59 refusal to accept redundancy notice, 5.95 refusal to take alternative employment, 5.22 reinstatement, and, 5.71 remedies, 5.71 RP6, 5.98 RP9, 5.97 seasonal workers, 5.08 selection criteria choice of procedure, 5.74–5.75 collective agreements, 5.77–5.78 generally, 5.72–5.73 ‘last in, first out’, 5.79

542

Index Remedies compensation ‘financial loss’, 3.115 generally, 3.114 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 discriminatory dismissal, and Circuit Court, 8.56 transfer of undertakings, and, 11.32 unfair dismissal, and compensation, 3.114–3.118 ‘financial loss’, 3.115 generally, 3.113 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 Remote hearings Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.16–1.17 Reporting child abuse unfair dismissal, and, 3.58 Representation disciplinary hearings, and introduction, 4.24 legal, 4.25 trade union, 4.26 Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.14 Reserve defence force service continuous service, and, redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 Resignation continuous service, and, 3.19 generally, 3.25 heat-of-the-moment, in, 3.97 minimum notice periods, and, 2.13 unfair dismissal, 3.25 use of grievance procedure, and, 3.106 Restraint of dismissal injunctions, and, 7.18 Restrictive covenants injunctions, and, 7.23–7.24 Retirement discriminatory dismissal, and Code of Practice on Longer Working, 8.24 fixed term contracts after normal retirement age, 8.25 generally, 8.23 minimum notice periods, and, 2.15 unfair dismissal, and, 3.30

Redundancy – contd selection criteria – contd matrix, 5.80 voluntary redundancy, 5.76 shift workers, 5.31 short-time workers generally, 5.13–5.14 week’s pay, and, 5.27 specified purpose contracts workers, 5.04 time limits for claims, 5.86 transfer of undertakings, and dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 generally, 11.28 introduction, 5.81 legislation, 5.82 refusal to transfer, 5.85 regulations, 5.83 unfair dismissal, and generally, 5.55 genuineness of redundancy, 5.56–5.62 impersonality requirement, 5.57 introduction, 3.96 reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the employer, 5.63–5.70 selection criteria, 5.72–5.80 voluntary redundancy calculation of ex gratia payments, 5.90–5.93 negotiations, 5.89 selection criteria, 5.76 week’s pay full-time employees on fixed wage or salary, 5.25 generally, 5.24 job-sharers, 5.28 minimum wage, 5.32 no normal working hours, 5.30 piece-rate workers, 5.26 reduced working hours, 5.29 shift workers, 5.31 short-time working, 5.27 weeks’ pay per year of service, 5.91 working abroad, 5.06 Re-engagement unfair dismissal, and, 3.113 Referrals Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.15 Refusal to accept redundancy notices, and, 5.95 Refusal to obey instructions unfair dismissal, and, 3.84 Reinstatement unfair dismissal, and, 3.113 Religious belief or opinions discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.21 redundancy, and, 3.96 unfair dismissal, and, 3.49

543

Index Sale of assets and goodwill transfer of undertakings, and, 11.08 Sale of shares transfer of undertakings, and, 11.07 Seasonal workers redundancy, and, 5.08 Selection criteria for redundancy choice of procedure, 5.74–5.75 collective agreements, 5.77–5.78 generally, 5.72–5.73 ‘last in, first out’, 5.79 matrix, 5.80 voluntary redundancy, 5.76 Settlements in employment cases insolvency of employer, and, 9.19 taxation of lump sum payments, and apportionment, 6.22–6.23 exempt payments, 6.18 ‘fire and rehire’, 6.19 introduction, 6.17 practical advice for employers, 6.20 structure, 6.21 Sexual harassment codes of practice, and, 8.43–8.45 communication of policy, 8.45 compensation, 8.47 defence, 8.41 definition, 8.39 essential characteristics, 8.40 fair, impartial, confidential and speedy investigations, 8.46 grievance procedure, and, 8.42 introduction, 8.39 investigations, 8.46 policy, 8.43–8.45 reasonably practicable steps, 8.41–8.46 training as to policy, 8.46 Sexual orientation discriminatory dismissal, and disclosure, 8.20 generally, 8.19 unfair dismissal, and, 3.50 Shift workers insolvency of employer, and, 9.21 redundancy, and, 5.31 Short-term absence unfair dismissal, and, 3.68 Short-time working minimum notice periods, and, 2.17 redundancy, and generally, 5.13–5.14 week’s pay, 5.27 Sick pay insolvency of employer, and, 9.19

Sickness continuous service, and redundancy, 5.03 unfair dismissal, 3.19 Social media use unfair dismissal, and generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 Specified purpose contracts minimum notice periods, and, 2.14 redundancy, and, 5.04 unfair dismissal, and date of dismissal, 3.28 dismissal, 3.24 exclusions, 3.36 generally, 3.16 Sporadic absence unfair dismissal, and, 3.68 Standard capital superannuation benefit taxation of lump sum payments, and, 6.11– 6.12 Standards in public office unfair dismissal, and, 3.63 Strikes unfair dismissal, and, 3.47 Striking out complaints Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.10 Submissions Labour Court, and details, 1.36 generally, 1.31 Substantial change in working conditions transfer of undertakings, and, 11.27 Summary dismissal conduct, and, 3.76 Surveillance of employees covert cameras, 3.109 generally, 3.108 private investigators, 3.110 Taxation of lump sums apportionment, 6.22–6.23 awards in employment cases apportionment, 6.22–6.23 exempt payments, 6.18 ‘fire and rehire’, 6.19 introduction, 6.17 practical advice for employers, 6.20 structure, 6.21 career breaks, 6.05–6.08 disability, for exempt payments, 6.02 introduction, 6.01 tax relief, 6.03–6.13

544

Index Trade union membership redundancy, and, 3.96 unfair dismissal, and exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.46 Trade union representation disciplinary hearings, and, 4.26 Transfer of undertakings agreement by employee to changes prior to or at time of transfer, 11.39 appeals, 11.33 application of Regulations definitions, 11.04–11.09 introduction, 11.02 parts of undertakings, 11.11 persons covered, 11.12–11.15 transfer, 11.04–11.09 undertakings, 11.10 asset sales, 11.08 change of contractors, 11.29–11.31 closure of business and later resumption, 11.06 compensation, 11.32 complaints appeals, 11.33 generally, 11.32 injunctive relief, 11.34 remedies, 11.32 time limits, 11.32 consultation rights employees’ representatives, 11.19 generally, 11.17 in good time, 11.18 contracting out, 11.29–11.31 data protection, 11.41 date, 11.05 definition, 11.03 dismissal, and by reason of transfer, 11.24 change of contractors/contracting out, 11.29–11.31 economic, technical or organisational reasons, 11.25–11.26 introduction, 11.23 redundancy, 11.28 substantial change in working conditions, 11.27 dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 draft letters, 11.42–11.45 due diligence human resources audit, 11.37 indemnities, 11.38 introduction, 11.36 warranties, 11.38 ‘economic entity’, 11.03

Taxation of lump sums – contd employers, by generally, 6.14–6.15 rate of tax, 6.14–6.15 ex gratia payments, and, 6.03 exempt payments, 6.02 ‘fire and rehire’, 6.19 injury, for exempt payments, 6.02 introduction, 6.01 tax relief, 6.03–6.13 introduction, 6.01 job sharers, 6.05–6.08 legal fees in employment cases, 6.24 non-cash receipts, and, 6.03 non-statutory redundancy payments, and, 6.03 ‘pay’, 6.01 pay in lieu of notice, and, 6.03 PAYE, 6.01 settlements in employment cases apportionment, 6.22–6.23 exempt payments, 6.18 ‘fire and rehire’, 6.19 introduction, 6.17 practical advice for employers, 6.20 structure, 6.21 standard capital superannuation benefit, 6.11–6.12 statutory redundancy payments, for exempt payments, 6.02 introduction, 6.01 tax relief, 6.03–6.13 subsequent claims, 6.13 summary, 6.25 tax relief basic exemption, 6.05–6.08 career breaks, 6.05–6.08 generally, 6.04 increased exemption, 6.09–6.10 job sharers, 6.05 qualifying payments, 6.03 standard capital superannuation benefit, 6.11–6.12 subsequent claims, 6.13 time limits, 6.16 time limits, 6.16 Time limits for claims unfair dismissal, and extension by application to or leave of Tribunal, 3.23 extension for reasonable cause, 3.22 generally, 3.22 Trade union activities unfair dismissal, and, 3.46

545

Index Transfer of undertakings – contd economic, technical or organisational reasons, 11.25–11.26 employees, 11.13 employees’ representatives, 11.19 employees’ rights consultation, 11.17–11.19 exceptions, 11.20–11.22 information, 11.17–11.19 insolvency of outgoing employer, 11.22 introduction, 11.16 pensions, 11.21 employers, 11.14 exceptions to protection of rights insolvency of outgoing employer, 11.22 introduction, 11.20 pensions, 11.21 human resources audit, 11.37 indemnities, 11.38 indirect means, by, 11.09 information rights employees’ representatives, 11.19 generally, 11.17 in good time, 11.18 injunctive relief, 11.34 insolvency of outgoing employer, 11.22 introduction, 11.01 operation of law, by, 11.09 parts of undertakings, 11.11 pensions, 11.21 persons covered employees, 11.13 employers, 11.14 introduction, 11.12 responsibility after transfer, 11.15 picketing, 11.40 practical considerations agreement by employee to changes prior to or at time of transfer, 11.39 data protection, 11.41 due diligence, 11.36 human resources audit, 11.37 indemnities, 11.38 introduction, 11.35 picketing, 11.40 warranties, 11.38 redundancy, and dissolution of a partnership, 5.84 generally, 11.28 introduction, 5.81 legislation, 5.82 refusal to transfer, 5.85 regulations, 5.83 Regulations, 11.02 remedies, 11.32

Transfer of undertakings – contd responsibility after transfer, 11.15 sale of assets and goodwill to new employer, 11.08 sale of shares, 11.07 substantial change in working conditions, 11.27 transfer closure of business and later resumption, 11.06 date, 11.05 generally, 11.04 indirect means, by, 11.09 introduction, 11.03 operation of law, by, 11.09 sale of assets and goodwill to new employer, 11.08 sale of shares, 11.07 transferees’ responsibility, and, 11.15 undertakings, 11.10 warranties, 11.38 Transgender employees discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.13 Travellers discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.38 redundancy, and, 3.96 unfair dismissal, and, 3.56 Ultra vires dismissal injunctions, and, 7.27 Undertakings as to damages injunctions, and, 7.13 Unfair dismissal adoptive leave continuous service, 3.19 exclusion of persons covering leave, 3.38 generally, 3.55 age generally, 3.51 redundancy, and, 3.96 agency workers, 3.06 alcoholism, 3.69 An Garda Siochána members, 3.33 appeals, 3.27 apprentices, 3.34 automatically unfair dismissals adoptive leave, 3.55 age, 3.51 carers leave, 3.61 colour, 3.50 employees’ representatives, 3.59 health and safety, 3.60 introduction, 3.45 issue of civil or criminal proceedings against employer, 3.57 lock-outs, 3.48

546

Index Unfair dismissal – contd automatically unfair dismissals – contd national minimum wage, 3.62 parental leave, 3.61 political opinions, 3.49 pregnancy or related matters, 3.52–3.54 race, 3.50 religious opinions, 3.49 reporting child abuse, 3.58 sexual orientation, 3.50 standards in public office, 3.63 strikes, 3.47 trade union activities, 3.46 trade union membership, 3.46 travellers, 3.56 banded working hours, 3.15 breach of confidentiality, 3.92 bullying generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 capability alcoholism, 3.69 drug addiction, 3.69 frustration, 3.70 generally, 3.65 illness, 3.72 light duties, 3.71 litigation, 3.72 long-term absence, 3.67 short-term absence, 3.68 sporadic absence, 3.68 carers leave exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.61 casual workers banded working hours, 3.15 fixed-term workers, 3.16 generally, 3.14 child abuse, and, 3.58 civil proceedings against employer, 3.57 colour of employee generally, 3.50 redundancy, and, 3.96 compensation ‘financial loss’, 3.115 generally, 3.114 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 introduction, 3.113 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 competence, 3.73 competition by employee against employer, 3.90

Unfair dismissal – contd conduct bullying, 3.88–3.89 criminal proceedings outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 dishonesty, 3.77–3.80 drink and drugs, 3.83 email usage, 3.93–3.94 fighting, 3.81 generally, 3.75 gross insubordination, 3.84 harassment, 3.88–3.89 horseplay, 3.81 internet usage, 3.93–3.94 loyalty, 3.90–3.92 misconduct, and, 3.75 provocation, 3.82 refusal to obey instructions, 3.84 social media usage, 3.93–3.94 summary dismissal, 3.76 working whilst on sick leave, 3.95 constructive dismissal See also Constructive dismissal and/or test, 3.99 contract test, 3.101–3.103 generally, 3.98 reasonableness test, 3.104–3.105 unequivocal words, 3.100 use of grievance procedure, 3.106 continuous service breaks in, 3.21 exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.19 contract of employment generally, 3.03 work permits, 3.04 covert cameras, 3.109 criminal proceedings against employee in the workplace admission by employee, 3.78 ‘criminal proceedings’, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 criminal proceedings against employee outside the workplace generally, 3.85 incarceration of employees, 3.86 investigation by Gardaí alongside workplace investigation, 3.87 criminal proceedings against employer generally, 3.57 redundancy, and, 3.96 date of dismissal, 3.28

547

Index Unfair dismissal – contd deemed unfair dismissal adoptive leave, 3.55 age, 3.51 carers leave, 3.61 colour, 3.50 employees’ representatives, 3.59 health and safety, 3.60 introduction, 3.45 issue of civil or criminal proceedings against employer, 3.57 lock-outs, 3.48 national minimum wage, 3.62 parental leave, 3.61 political opinions, 3.49 pregnancy or related matters, 3.52–3.54 race, 3.50 religious opinions, 3.49 reporting child abuse, 3.58 sexual orientation, 3.50 standards in public office, 3.63 strikes, 3.47 trade union activities, 3.46 trade union membership, 3.46 travellers, 3.56 defence forces, 3.32 dishonesty admission by employee, 3.78 criminal proceedings, 3.79 generally, 3.77 groups of employees, and, 3.80 involvement of Gardaí, 3.79 outside the workplace, 3.85–3.87 dismissal during probation or training, 3.35 dismissal of complainant appeals, 3.27 date, 3.28 generally, 3.24 in dispute, 3.42 in doubt, 3.26 resignation, 3.25 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 drink and drugs, 3.83 drug addiction, 3.69 email usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 employed by close relative in house or on farm, 3.31 employee agency workers, 3.06 casual workers, 3.14–3.16 definition, 3.05 independent contractors, 3.07–3.13 introduction, 3.05

Unfair dismissal – contd employees’ representatives, 3.59 enforceable contract, 3.17–3.18 exclusions adoptive leave cover, 3.38 An Garda Siochána members, 3.33 apprentices, 3.34 defence forces, 3.32 dismissal during probation or training, 3.35 employed by close relative in house or on farm, 3.31 fixed-term contracts, 3.36 foreign embassy employees, 3.40 Gardai, 3.33 introduction, 3.29 natal care absence cover, 3.37 normal retirement age, 3.30 persons ordinarily working outside the state, 3.39 protective leave cover, 3.37 SOLAS trainees, 3.34 specified purpose contracts, 3.36 extension of time limits for claims application to or leave of Tribunal, 3.23 generally, 3.22 reasonable cause, for, 3.22 fair dismissals capability, 3.65–3.72 competence, 3.73 conduct, 3.75–3.95 fairness, and, 4.01–4.30 heat-of-the-moment resignations, 3.97 introduction, 3.64 qualifications, 3.74 redundancy, 3.96 fairness, and See also Fairness disciplinary hearings, 4.22–4.30 investigations, 4.17–4.21 procedural fairness, 4.01–4.13 suspensions, 4.14–4.16 father’s leave, 3.37 fighting, 3.81 fixed-term contracts date of dismissal, 3.28 dismissal, 3.24 exclusions, 3.36 generally, 3.16 foreign embassy employees, 3.40 frustration, 3.70 Gardai, 3.33 gig economy, 3.13 gross insubordination, 3.84

548

Index Unfair dismissal – contd harassment generally, 3.88 parallel personal injury proceedings, 3.89 health and safety exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 exclusion of persons covering leave, 3.37 generally, 3.60 s 18 leave, and, 3.37 heat-of-the-moment resignations, 3.97 horseplay, 3.81 illness litigation, and, 3.72 independent contractors differences between scope decisions, 3.12 generally, 3.07–3.11 gig economy, 3.13 insubordination, 3.84 internet usage generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 introduction, 3.01 issue of civil or criminal proceedings against employer, 3.57 light duties, 3.71 litigation illness, and, 3.72 lock-outs, 3.48 long-term absence, 3.67 loyalty breach of confidentiality, 3.92 competition by employee against employer, 3.90 ‘double jobs’, 3.91 introduction, 3.90 maternity leave exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.37 misconduct, and, 3.75 natal care absence cover, 3.37 national minimum wage exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.62 normal retirement age, 3.30 onus of proof dismissal in dispute, 3.42 exceptions to general rule, 3.42–3.44 generally, 3.41 pregnancy-related dismissal, 3.43 premature submission of claim form, 3.44 parental leave, 3.61 persons ordinarily working outside the state, 3.39 political opinions, 3.49

Unfair dismissal – contd pregnancy or related matters exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 fixed-term contracts, 3.54 generally, 3.52 Maternity Protection Acts 1994–2004, 3.53 onus of proof, 3.43 redundancy, and, 3.96 preliminary requirements continuous service, 3.19–3.21 contract of employment, 3.03–3.04 employee, 3.05–3.14 enforceable contract, 3.17–3.18 introduction, 3.02 time limits for claims, 3.22–3.23 work permits, 3.04 premature submission of claim form, 3.44 procedures, 3.111 protective leave exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.37 provocation, 3.82 qualifications, 3.74 race generally, 3.50 redundancy, and, 3.96 reasonableness of employer’s decision, 3.112 re-engagement, 3.113 redundancy, and generally, 5.55 genuineness of redundancy, 5.56 impersonality requirement, 5.57 introduction, 3.96 reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the employer, 5.63–5.70 selection criteria, 5.72–5.80 refusal to obey instructions, 3.84 reinstatement, 3.113 religious opinions generally, 3.49 redundancy, and, 3.96 remedies compensation, 3.114–3.118 ‘financial loss’, 3.115 generally, 3.113 illness resulting from dismissal, 3.118 minimum four weeks, 3.116 mitigation of loss, 3.117–3.118 reporting child abuse, 3.58 requirements continuous service, 3.19–3.21 contract of employment, 3.03–3.04 employee, 3.05–3.14 enforceable contract, 3.17–3.18 introduction, 3.02

549

Index Victimisation compensation, 8.49 generally, 8.48 post-dismissal, 8.50 Voluntary liquidation See also Insolvency generally, 9.04 Voluntary redundancy calculation of ex gratia payments lump sum payments, 5.92 multiples of statutory payment, 5.93 statutory entitlement only, 5.90 weeks’ pay per year of service, 5.91 negotiations, 5.89 selection criteria, 5.76

Unfair dismissal – contd requirements – contd time limits for claims, 3.22–3.23 work permits, 3.04 resignation continuous service, and, 3.19 generally, 3.25 heat-of-the-moment, in, 3.97 use of grievance procedure, and, 3.106 retirement, 3.30 sexual orientation, 3.50 short-term absence, 3.68 social media use generally, 3.93 monitoring, 3.94 SOLAS trainees, 3.34 specified purpose contracts date of dismissal, 3.28 dismissal, 3.24 exclusions, 3.36 generally, 3.16 sporadic absence, 3.68 standards in public office, 3.63 strikes, 3.47 summary dismissal, 3.76 surveillance of employees covert cameras, 3.109 generally, 3.108 private investigators, 3.110 suspensions delay, 4.16 generally, 4.14–4.15 time limits for claims extension by application to or leave of Tribunal, 3.23 extension for reasonable cause, 3.22 generally, 3.22 trade union activities, 3.46 trade union membership exceptions to 52-week rule, 3.20 generally, 3.46 redundancy, and, 3.96 travellers generally, 3.56 redundancy, and, 3.96 use of private investigators, 3.110 working outside the state, 3.39 working whilst on sick leave, 3.95 wrongful dismissal, and, 7.02

Wages minimum notice periods, and, 2.18 Waiver minimum notice periods, and, 2.08 Warranties transfer of undertakings, and, 11.38 Week’s pay full-time employees on fixed wage or salary, 5.25 generally, 5.24 job-sharers, 5.28 minimum wage, 5.32 no normal working hours, 5.30 piece-rate workers, 5.26 reduced working hours, 5.29 shift workers, 5.31 short-time working, 5.27 Weeks’ pay redundancy payments, and, 5.91 Whistleblowing civil claim for tort, 10.37 civil liability immunity, 10.41 compensation dismissal, 10.43 penalisation other than dismissal, 10.33–10.35 constructive dismissal, and, 10.31 contractual obligations, 10.07–10.10 data protection, 10.21 definition, 10.04 dismissal, and compensation, 10.43 constructive dismissal, 10.31 general protection, 10.28–10.30 external reporting channels generally, 10.22 Office of the Protected Disclosure Commissioner, 10.25 prescribed persons, 10.23 relevant Minister, 10.24

Variation clauses constructive dismissal, and, 3.105 Vicarious liability discriminatory dismissal, and, 8.51

550

Index Whistleblowing – contd grievances, 10.12 information uncertainty, 10.11 interim relief extension of time limit, 10.39 generally, 10.38 tort, and, 10.40 internal reporting procedure data protection, 10.21 generally, 10.19 recipient of disclosure, 10.20 record keeping, 10.21 introduction, 10.01 legislation, 10.02 management of introduction, 10.26 protections afforded to employees, 10.27 motivation for making generally, 10.14 reasonable belief, 10.16 statements in passing, 10.15 obligations under employment contract, 10.07–10.10 offences, 10.42 Office of the Protected Disclosure Commissioner, 10.25 ‘prescribed persons’, 10.23 personal grievances, 10.12 penalisation other than dismissal, and compensation, 10.33–10.35 general protection, 10.32 practical considerations, 10.44 protections afforded to employees burden of proof, 10.36 civil claim for tort, 10.37 civil liability immunity, 10.41 constructive dismissal, from, 10.31 dismissal, from, 10.28–10.30 interim relief, 10.38–10.40 introduction, 10.27 penalisation other than dismissal, from, 10.32–10.35 reasonable belief, 10.16 recipient of disclosure, 10.20 record keeping, 10.21 ‘relevant information’, 10.05 ‘relevant Minister’, 10.24 ‘relevant wrongdoing’, 10.06 reporting procedures establishing, 10.18 external channels, 10.22–10.23 internal process, 10.19–10.21 scope of regime contractual obligations, 10.07–10.10 grievances, 10.12

Whistleblowing – contd scope of regime – contd introduction, 10.03 motivation, 10.14–10.15 ‘protected disclosure’, 10.04 reasonable belief, 10.16 ‘relevant information’, 10.05 ‘relevant wrongdoing’, 10.06 solicitor-client communications, 10.13 uncertainty of information, 10.11 ‘worker’, 10.17 solicitor-client communications, 10.13 statements in passing, 10.15 uncertainty of information, 10.11 ‘worker’, 10.17 Witness summonses Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.20–1.21 Working abroad redundancy, and, 5.06 Working whilst on sick leave unfair dismissal, and, 3.95 Workplace Relations Rights Commission adjournments, 1.19 core services, 1.02 costs, fees and charges, 1.41 determining preliminary issues, 1.12 dismissal of frivolous and vexatious complaints, 1.08 dispute referral, 1.15 documentation at hearings, 1.13 disposal of complaints, 1.09 enforcement of decisions, 1.25 establishment, 1.02 failure to pursue complaints, 1.10 findings, 1.24 hearing process, 1.11–1.23 incorrect respondents, 1.22–1.23 insolvency of employer, and, 9.35 non-statutory rules, 1.07 postponements, 1.18 preliminary issues, 1.12 procedural rules, 1.06–1.25 public hearings, 1.03–1.05 referral of disputes, 1.15 remote hearings, 1.16–1.17 representation, 1.14 responsibilities, 1.02 striking out complaints, 1.10 witness summonses, 1.20–1.21 written submissions, 1.09 Written submissions Workplace Relations Rights Commission, 1.09

551

Index Wrongful dismissal Industrial Relations Acts, and, 7.03 injunctions, and See also Injunctions development in employment cases, 7.15–7.16 equitable relief, 7.06 forms, 7.43–7.45 grant, 7.25–7.30 interim relief, 7.05

Wrongful dismissal – contd injunctions, and – contd introduction, 7.01–7.03 meaning, 7.04 practical considerations, 7.36–7.42 principles applied by courts, 7.07–7.14 refusal, 7.31–7.35 relevant circumstances, 7.17–7.24 minimum notice periods, and, 2.27 unfair dismissal, and, 7.02

552