Temporality and Eternity: Nine Perspectives on God and Time 9783110698190, 9783110698008

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Temporality and Eternity

Temporality and Eternity Nine Perspectives on God and Time Edited by Marcus Schmücker, Michael T. Williams and Florian Fischer

ISBN 978-3-11-069800-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-069819-0 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-069824-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2021942344 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Preface This volume is the result of the international workshop “God and Time II” held in Vienna on 17 and 18 August 2018 at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. “God and Time” is a series of workshops organized by the Society for Philosophy of Time (SPoT). At the first workshop of this series, held on 12 August 2017 at the International Center for Philosophy, NRW at the University of Bonn, Dr. Marcus Schmücker, the organizer of “God and Time II”, and Dr. Florian Fischer together with Dr. Johannes Grössl, organizers of “God and Time I”, realized the importance of opening the horizon beyond European traditions of philosophy and theology to include a wider range of traditions and also non-European thinkers. As this volume shows, not only did this enrich the discourse on the topic greatly, it also provided perspectives that were substantially deeper than expected. Financial support for the 2018 workshop came in part from the Austrian Science Fund project “Religion and Reason in Vedānta of Medieval India” (FWF P30622-G-24) and in part from the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-202

Contents Preface

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Marcus Schmücker Introduction 1 Florian Fischer, Johannes Grössl Temporal and timeless deity 9 R.T. Mullins From divine timemaker to divine watchmaker

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Daniel Saudek Time’s arrow, relativity and God’s eternity: From the limitedness of creatures to the asymmetric structure of the worldline 57 Ze’ev Strauss God, the grandfather of time: Time and the absolute in the thought of Philo of Alexandria 71 Jon Hoover The Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyyah on God, creation and time

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Michael Schulz Historical eternity: The approaches of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar 105 Marcus Schmücker On the relation between God and time in the later theistic Vedānta of Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Veṅkaṭanātha 123 Michael T. Williams Analytic philosophy of time in Early Modern India

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Masamichi Sakai Non-persistence in time: A Buddhist account of intrinsic nature Contributors

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Authors/Persons Works Key-terms

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Introduction There are few topics in religious thought as fascinating as the relationship between God and time – a relationship that challenges the seemingly insurmountable contrast between God’s eternity and world’s temporality. The discourse in recent years on the concept of God as related to a philosophy of time has brought forth numerous publications, an indication of lively interest in this topic. What the current discussion has lacked, is an account of how nonEuropean traditions deal with this topic. If this were demonstrated, it is likely that this interest would intensify. Thus, the inclusion of such traditions is not only desirable, it is essential. On one hand, this is the aim of the present volume. On the other hand, however, its wider aim is not simply to juxtapose individual traditions and their different points of view, but to open cross references in order to bring widely divergent traditions into conversation with each other, doing this not only across geographical distance, but also temporal. This is a new way to view the topic of God and time, one that until now has not been undertaken in this form. Despite the diversity of religious traditions, it is astonishing how over centuries, indeed millennia, so many have focused on the topic of God and time. This is reflected in the remarkably long list of thinkers who, within their individual traditions, have dealt intensively with the problem of God and time. Indeed, we must admit that the subject is so wide-ranging that it can hardly be presented here in any form that might be considered comprehensive. Nonetheless, this presentation of nine perspectives can be seen as a first step. What on first appearance may look like a miscellaneous collection of contributions about different places, epochs and religions in fact reveals that the question of how eternity and temporality relate to one another has been an unremitting problem in theological and philosophical traditions, whether in general or in relation to specific questions. In this volume, this is displayed most clearly in those contributions that examine thinkers who dealt with the example of creation. Without creation there would be no world. Moreover, without creation God would also become a meaningless concept. And yet the existence of a world origination as well decay presupposes time. Thus, despite the obvious contradiction of God and time, there must be a relation between eternity and temporality – a relationship that must be discovered and reflected upon again and again. Marcus Schmücker, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstr. 11-13, 1020 Vienna, Austria https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-001

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The first two contributions, by Florian Fischer and Johannes Grössl, and by R.T. Mullins, introduce the reader to the philosophy of time in general, as well as to the most important interpretations of the difference between God and time. To open, Fischer and Grössl provide a philosophical background and present the terminology used in the philosophy of time. Here, the reader is introduced to the idea of various times: does only one time exist, or is there more than one? They first offer the solutions as found in various theories, including presentism, eternalism, growing blockers and moving spotlighters. Next they outline the relevant discussions on change over time, with an overview given of positions such as persistence, perdurantism, exdurantism, and endurantism. They also discuss other views in this context, including indexicalism, copularism, and relationalism. Debates on persistence through time and the metaphysical status of the nature of time are of particular importance in this regard. The problem of whether one can assume change in God or not is dealt with against the background of discussions on views about God’s mutability, referred to as divine temporalism, and about God’s timelessness, that is, divine eternalism. To conclude, the two authors present a special account of the relationship between God and time: process ontology and process theology. As the most current position, this is an attempt to connect timeless God with temporal things. As an alternative to the aporetic discussion of whether God changes when he creates, offered here is the concept that God always creates. The authors mention not only the most important positions on this (Whitehead, Hartshorne, Bergson), but also discuss other positions such as social trinitarianism. What was introduced as one position among many in the first chapter is discussed in more detail in the next, by R.T. Mullins. He considers the topic “God and time” to have been addressed incorrectly by several authors: the difficult question of what time actually is has led to a number of controversial answers. Mullins provides critical arguments against various views of God’s creation of time, as well as the view that time is to be identified with God. A second important question in his chapter is whether God is responsible for the existence of time. Here, he discusses three options, providing different arguments against all of them, whereupon he develops the concept of time as an attribute of God. Mullins explains that a crucial point for creationists, who range from Augustine to William Lane Craig and Thomas Jay Oord, is their view that God creates time in the sense that God creates change. What can be criticized is the interrelation between change and time, which leads to the aporetic question that if God, when creating, causes change, how is it that he himself does not change when he creates? Mullins points out that in the creationist view, it is impossible to bridge the gap between change and eternity/immutability. God cannot change before time changes, not even in the moment before creation. The creationist argument finds

Introduction

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itself in a vicious circle, because change and time are identified with one another. But is there an alternative to the argument that time only exists if change exists? After briefly touching on the idea of concomitance, Mullins introduces a third option, the view of identification of time with God. This solution was offered by both Nicole Oresme and Thomas F. Torrance. Time can exist without change and it can be an attribute of God. But was there time before creation? Mullins offers the following view: If God has created a universe with uniform laws of nature and consistent change, God has not created time. Instead, God has created a succession of moments within a metrical form. The chapter by Daniel Saudek also considers certain classical problems regarding the relationship between God and time, namely, the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents, and Kretzmann’s dilemma of the incompatibility between the omniscience and immutability of God. These matters are examined in light of the theory of relativity. The author argues that the best way to think of time in the context of relativity theory is in terms of a local model of time, in which there is no global passage of time. To this end, he provides a derivation of temporal ordering (“before”), of the quantification of temporal duration, and of time’s asymmetric, arrow-like structure, i.e. the difference between the fixed past and the open future. This derivation is based on the atemporal notion of the set of states of an object. Time is thus “attached” to objects, and is therefore local rather than global. Based on this model, the afore-mentioned problems become greatly simplified, and can even be considered to dissolve. After these overviews of analytic and systematic approaches to the subject of God and time, we turn to historical approaches, first to the influential Jewish theologian Philo of Alexandria (first century CE). Also here the subject of God and time was a crucial one, whereby this thinker discussed the topic using his own terminology and offered various solutions. Ze’ev Strauss presents the thoughts of Philo of Alexandria. This most prominent Jewish thinker of the first century CE, tried to reconcile Platonic and Stoic theories of time with biblical text by means of allegorical exegesis. His metaphysical conception of time plays a key role in his non-temporal understanding of the creation account and of Jewish tradition as a whole. What theory of time does he ultimately uphold? And which philosophical arguments does he put forward in favor of his view? In the present article, Strauss shows how Philo links God with time by drawing on anthropomorphic perceptions. He highlights the crucial influence of the conception of the transcendent absolute on his metaphysical treatment of time. Furthermore, he investigates Philo’s application of the concept of the ‘new’ to God and the Jewish faith, thus identifying an intimate connection between the theme of God’s asymmetric relation to time and His spirited discourse with mankind’s rational souls.

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Coming to the second monotheistic tradition in this historical overview, the next chapter by Jon Hoover deals with God and time as found in the Islamic theology of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328). Before introducing Taymiyyah’s views on God and time, Hoover prepares the theological background of the leading question: How can a God who, according to the vision of the Qurʾān, is the ruler of the universe and beyond time be considered to create time without becoming temporal? Three relevant directions of kalām theology participated in this debate: Muʿtazilī, Ašʿarī and Māturīdī kalām, plus the philosophers Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rušd, who argued against the kalām view. Hoover reconstructs the relevant stages of the debates between these groups, following them to the discussions about how to define the world, a question much discussed but perhaps never solved. Is the world eternal or did it originate temporally? The main view is to connect temporal change with the eternal nature of God. The world depends on God, but probably not vice versa. At this point, Hoover introduces the view of Ibn Taymiyyah, who teaches that God would be imperfect if he did not unceasingly create. The main opponent of Ibn Taymiyyah in this question was Ašʿarī kalām, defending ar-Rāzī’s view that the world has an origin in time. In contrast, Ibn Taymiyyah defines God’s creation as perpetual (dāʾim). It is for this reason that nothing other than God himself is eternal. Timeless eternity would make God inactive. To create eternally means that from eternity, he has been creating one thing after another. It becomes apparent that the view of a timeless God who stops and starts to create cannot solve the contradiction between eternity and temporality. From these views, Hoover then arrives at Ibn Taymiyyah’s next thesis: while God can do things in a personal sequence, he does not see the deeds of human beings before they are completed. Moreover, Hoover demonstrates that Ibn Taymiyyah introduces a distinction between God’s continuous creativity and concrete created things. Nothing that God creates is eternal. Each created thing has a beginning in time, but God’s creative activity has no beginning and no end. Temporality and eternity can be connected because God’s creation is from eternity; in his creation God performs, by means of his will and power, successive voluntary acts. These do not relativize him, but subsist in his eternal essence. If one looks at these two contributions once again under the aspect of the importance of time, one realizes that while reflecting on time as either different from or identical to the conception of God, an image of God develops. The next chapter also makes it clear that thinking about time played a role in the religious philosophical understanding of “historical eternity.” In addition to the main question of how God’s absoluteness can be preserved in the face of the temporality of time or the world, a further question is how a concept of God can survive in the face of inevitable temporality.

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For Michael Schulz, the expression “historical eternity” seems to be a contradiction: something is either temporal-historical or eternal, but not both. It is exactly this expression, however, that must be explained in the religions of revelation such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. All these traditions believe in an eternal God within time. Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar set themselves to the task of explaining this by resorting to the philosophy of Christianity of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In a trialogue between these three thinkers, Schulz compares their thinking and unfolds how they developed concepts of the relationality between eternity and history. For Hegel, eternity in time means God’s self-recognition in time and otherness in human beings. But God remains absolute in his triadically self-determining subjectivity. While for Hegel eternity is present in time, for Pannenberg eternity is only present in the mode of anticipation as future eschatological verification. Paradoxically this implies that God depends more on time and history. Pannenberg thus adopts Hegel’s concept of true infinity and combines it with the idea of God’s self-determination: God can decide to have himself determined by otherness, namely, by the world and history. In this way, eternity can also be in history and God can reveal himself in human nature. For Pannenberg, God’s relationship to the world must be based upon a difference within God. God’s relationship to the world is a relation to a divine otherness, the Son. Only an inner divine difference and otherness explains the possibility of God’s relating himself to other things. Although the other chapters of this volume have shown how time stands in opposition to God’s eternity, Schulz points out that for Pannenberg, also an external Other can belong to God’s self-determination. The next theologian, Urs von Balthasar, asks what God gains from the world without God first becoming God through the world. The divine ruse of reason of which Hegel speaks, however, seems to say exactly this: God is not God without the world. Balthasar responds with a theology of the Trinity that allows us to accept characteristics of the finite, such as origin and future, to be a form of time, passivity and receptivity in God (generatio passiva, spiratio passiva). The eternal God, who can thus manifest himself in temporal eternity, could be understood as a consequence of divine inner gratuitousness, in which divine persons represent past, present and future. Inner divine difference is an expression of divine love aimed not at itself, but rather at the other for its own sake. Thus going beyond Hegel’s contribution, Pannenberg and Balthasar conceive inner-divine difference as a relational event capable of temporality. The last three chapters in this volume present this topic from the perspective of traditions in South Asia, with the next two chapters discussing the question of God and time as found in the works of two medieval Indian theologians and the last examining an Indian Buddhist theory of time. The first chapter of

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this group, written by Marcus Schmücker, examines how the conception of God depended on the idea of the continuous flowing of time. At roughly the same time as Ibn Taymiyyah was writing, theologians from two theistic traditions of Vedānta in India were developing monotheistic systems. Madhva, the thirteenth-century founder of Dvaita Vedānta, and Veṅkaṭanātha, a thirteenth/ fourteenth century theologian who represented the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition of Vedānta, both discussed the relationship between God and time at length. Madhva and his commentator Jayatīrtha applied a concept of God in which God is able, with his inconceivable potency (acintyaśakti), to manifest temporal determinations in the eternal flow of time so that the special time of creation (sṛṣṭikāla) can start. Thereby the concept of will is strongly emphasized, which seems to eliminate the need for an explanation of God’s reference to the present. Madhva and Jayatīrtha are therefore two theologians who can certainly be regarded as representatives of a divine eternalism. The second author, Veṅkaṭanātha, bases his thinking on a concept of substance (dravya). He considers God’s knowledge in relation to time as the relationship between two substances. Considering God’s knowledge to be a substance that can have temporal properties without being relativized in its eternal nature is the basic idea developed by Veṅkaṭanātha. This also guides his explanations of divine will, which on the one hand is eternal, but on the other hand carries temporal determinations. Therefore, it is obvious that he is a representative of a divine temporalism, albeit a differentiated one. However, Schmücker’s contribution does not only pursue the difficult relation of eternity and temporality, but further seeks to answer the question of why Indian theologians arrived at the thesis that time, which originally had in India a destructive aspect, has to agree with a concept of God. In the next chapter, Michael T. Williams follows the topic of God and time to India during the sixteenth century, which was a time of intense public debate and innovative discussion among India’s various philosophical traditions. Williams’ contribution explores the philosophy of time in this period through the works of three philosophers who wrote in Sanskrit: Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Vyāsatīrtha. All three were realist philosophers who defended their ideas against anti-realist philosophers from the Advaita tradition of Vedānta, and yet they had very different ideas about time and its relationship to space and God. Mahādeva defended the classical Vaiśeṣika theory of time, according to which time is one of nine distinct substances. Time, according to this theory, is a singular entity, although it appears to be divided into smaller units due to the motion of physical objects. Raghunātha, a more radical Bengali Navya-Naiyāyika, rejected this classical picture and argued that space and time are simply identical with God. He also rejected the classical idea that time is calibrated by motion,

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instead arguing that we need to accept an entirely different category of being to explain how time appears to be divided into discrete units. Williams contrasts both of these perspectives with the ideas of the theologian Vyāsatīrtha. Vyāsatīrtha belonged to the school of philosophy/theology in South India known as the “Mādhva” school of Vedānta, whose founder Madhva was already mentioned in the preceding chapter. Vyāsatīrtha argues that space and time are distinct substances, but ones that nevertheless exist in a state of permanent dependence on God. One of Vyāsatīrtha’s contributions to his school’s thought about time lies in his attempt to use conceptual analysis to show that space and time must be infinite/unbounded substances. Masamichi Sakai’s contribution, which concludes the volume, goes historically back nearly another thousand years in the history of Indian philosophy to the medieval Indian Buddhist logician/epistemologist Dharmakīrti (fl. c. sixth/ seventh century) and his successor Dharmottara. Not only were both significant regarding the concept of temporally interpreted change, but they also challenged the concept of eternity and thus were opponents of the Indian theistic traditions’ assertions of an eternally existing God. While the first contribution of this volume by Fischer and Grössl introduced the most important positions of a philosophy of time, Sakai’s chapter shows how these positions can be enriched but also disputed if confronted by thinkers such as Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. In his presentation and characterization of the Buddhist theory of momentariness as advocated by Dharmakīrti, Sakai places the Buddhist theory of momentariness into the argumentative framework of contemporary metaphysics, methodologically giving this chapter an interdisciplinary character. In fact, the method the author uses to fulfill the aim of his chapter is well taken due to the fact that among contemporary metaphysicians, there are some who concur with early Buddhist philosophers in saying that ordinary objects exist only for an instant. Sakai begins his discussion with the important question of how one and the same object can have two different properties that are contradictory. He discusses various attempts at solutions in analytical philosophy, the first being the assumption of time-indexed properties, the second, the theory of adverbialism or endurantism. A third option involves perdurantism and stage theory. Sakai presents the main features of these theories trying to explain that the same thing can have different and even opposing properties over time. According to Dharmakīrti’s view, having two different properties also implies two different things, with his criticism directed against the assumption of intrinsic properties. The concept of dependence is different from this. Finally, Sakai compares Buddhist momentariness to stage theory and perdurantism. In the Buddhist position, at any given moment there is a different object with different properties. In contrast

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to stage theory, which leaves open whether moments or stages have extensions, Sakai shows that the Buddhist position does not allow this. The goal of this position is not to explain how something continues in the transition from one moment to the next, but how things pass away. Thus the volume concludes, having presented nine perspectives on temporality and eternity as this pertains to God and time. In retrospect, they can be summarized as follows: The presentation of this topic begins with two contributions from the perspective of analytical philosophy, continues with the example of the Jewish theologian Philo of Alexandria, and finally ends with the Muslim medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyyah. How Christian Protestant theology deals with this topic was explained using the example of Pannenberg’s and Balthasar’s reception of Hegel. Three contributions on the South Asian region, two on theistic traditions of Vedānta and one on the position of Buddhism, conclude the volume. But it is certain that the further afield one looks at this topic, with its copious facets in religious thought over the ages and around the world, the more questions will arise, and ideas and concepts on this topic will be offered.

Florian Fischer, Johannes Grössl

Temporal and timeless deity Introduction This article aims to give an introduction to the debate within Christianity on the relationship between God and time. While we believe it worthwhile to concern oneself also with other religions and their take on this relationship – as this volume is aiming to do – we focus here on the debate regarding the Christian understanding. Nonetheless, when appropriate we will refer to other chapters of this volume dealing with non-Christian traditions. As it turns out, Christian and non-Christian debates about God and time often focus on very similar questions, and more often than one might prima facie suspect, come up with similar answers to the question. However, it is remarkable how much temporal distance sometimes lies between the historical situations in which these answers have been brought forth.1

A tour through the contemporary metaphysics of time In this section, we will provide a rough overview of the metaphysics of time in contemporary philosophy. As this article is chiefly concerned with the relationship between God and time, we will not examine the various philosophical debates about time in detail, but rather will only introduce the different positions and how these have been formulated.2

1 E.g., the chapter by Sakai in this volume shows that Indian-Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 CE / mid. 6th cent. CE), whose theory of time is known as “momentariness,” answers the question of how things can change their properties over time without contradiction in a way quite similar to the so-called stage theory that is discussed in contemporary metaphysics. Here, stage theory is discussed under the label “exdurantism”; see the overview of contemporary metaphysics of time below. 2 For a more detailed overview of contemporary metaphysics of time, see, e.g., Callender 2013, Miller/Baron 2018, or Wyller 2016. Florian Fischer, Philosophisches Seminar, University of Siegen, Adolf-Reichwein-Str. 2, 57068 Siegen, Germany Johannes Grössl, Lehrstuhl für Fundamentaltheologie und vergleichende Religionswissenschaft, University of Würzburg, Bibrastraße 14, 97070 Würzburg, Germany https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-002

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Current debates about the philosophy of time have focused on three different yet connected issues: firstly, the nature of time; secondly, persistence through time; and thirdly, whether time is tensed or tenseless. We will mainly be concerned with the first two debates in the context of this paper.3 Regarding the first, we follow Ryan Mullins, who argues that we need a clear grasp of the metaphysical status of time before we can give an account of the relation between God and time.4 However, we believe that in addition to this, the debate on persistence also has to be considered in the context of God and time. Only if we have an account of how humans persist through time can we assess arguments regarding God’s personal interaction with human beings. This section thus will give an overview of contemporary accounts regarding the nature of time and persistence. One of the main focal points of the contemporary debate on the nature of time is whether times other than the present exist. The two extreme positions are presentism and eternalism: presentists hold that only the present exists; eternalists think that past and future times are equally real. In addition to presentists and eternalists, there are growing blockers, who believe that every time up until the present exists – the world is like a growing block. Finally, moving spotlighters agree with eternalists that past and future are real. The difference is that they add another feature: there is always one moment that is ontologically singled out as the present moment. Before we discuss these positions in detail, let us first point out that different formulations are used in the debate: sometimes people talk about “times” and sometimes about “objects.” So, for example, presentism can be either formulated as the claim that only present objects exist, or that only the present time exists. One might think that nothing hinges on this, but philosophers have come up with sophisticated accounts of time. With the times/object distinction, we can devise a non-standard form of presentism that we might call object-presentism. Object-presentism says that while other times than the present exist, there are no non-present objects. Existence would then be time-relative, according to object-

3 This debate is positioned between the philosophy of language and metaphysics (see Fischer 2016). The question is whether linguistic features such as tense and aspect of sentences, as well as temporal adverbs like “now,” are features of how we represent reality, or are features of reality itself (cf. Fine 2006: 1). For an extended survey of tensed and tenseless theories, see Craig 2000a and Craig 2000b. 4 Mullins 2016: 13. See also the chapter by Saudek in this volume. He goes even one step further in arguing that our understanding of the relation between God and time depends on our understanding of the ontology of time, which in turn depends on our understanding of physics, especially relativity theory. He argues that some of the traditional problems regarding God and time simply dissolve if we take the lessons of relativity theory into account.

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presentism, in the sense that it changes over time which objects exist. But all times – past, present and future – exist. So, at least theoretically, differentiating between times and objects allows for greater variety of views within the debate about the nature of time. Most often, however, the two formulations can be used interchangeably. Let us now explicate these different positions in somewhat greater detail. Adopting the times-formulation, presentism is the doctrine that only the present (time) is real. A presentist, thus, thinks that the future and the past are not real. But of course, a presentist does not believe that there were no past times and, unless they are no-futurists,5 that there will be no future. Quite to the contrary! They subscribe to the opposite. But they stick to their present tense: the past exists no longer and the future not yet. We can also use the object-formulation to state presentism: Only present objects exist. Also, in this formulation the presentist will claim that past and future objects do not exist. Rather, past objects have existed and future objects will – God willing – exist. While dinosaurs do not exist for the presentists, there is no reason for them to deny that traces of them might still be around. In short, it is possible for a presentist to be a paleontologist. The extreme opposite position of presentism is eternalism. An eternalist holds that past and future times or objects exist. Note that to differentiate eternalism from presentism we only need past or future entities to exist. In a minimal way, eternalism can be formulated as the doctrine that non-present entities exist. The good thing about describing eternalism this way is that even at the first or last moment of time, it is possible to distinguish between presentism and eternalism. The requirement that both past and future entities exist would be too strong. At the first moment, the only non-present entities are future entities, while at the last moment there are only past non-present entities. But of course, this only holds for the first and the last moment of time – if there is a first and/or last moment of time, that is. At all other times, eternalism can simply be seen as the claim that past and future entities exists. Thus, the claim that non-present entities exist is enough to distinguish presentism from eternalism – even at the beginning or end of time. Presentists deny this claim, while eternalists endorse it.6 But although this claim is sufficient for

5 The term “no-futurism” was first coined in Button 2006. Here it just means that the present moment is not the end of time. 6 Michael Rea (Rea 2003: 247) defines 4-dimensionalism as the negation of presentism and thus as the claim that not only the present exists. Accordingly, both the growing block view and (whole block) eternalism are variants of 4-dimensionalism.

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the distinction between presentism and eternalism, eternalists might still have qualms with it – or they should have. Eternalists (should) claim that “all times are equally real.” Using this formulation, the eternalist does not condescend to the presentist’s way of framing the debate. For the eternalist, no moment is ontologically special, so the eternalist fundamental principle should not be formulated in terms of the present moment.7 The eternalist will likely object to the claim that the term “present” has more than a perspectival meaning. For him, it is likely just a temporal location of no ontological significance. In this regard the contemporary debate about the nature of time is de facto a debate about whether other times than the present exist. The eternalist can and should reject this formulation. To be most neutral, one might say that it is a debate about how many times exists. The eternalist would say that there are more than one, while the presentist says it is only ever one. They both agree that all times exist. They disagree about how many these are. Note that this discussion only concerns how the ontological core assumption of eternalism should be formulated. Eternalists have no problem with designating a moment of time as epistemologically special. This is precisely what happens if “present” is taken to denote a (purely epistemic) perspective. Eternalism is often motivated by modern physics, which apparently does not assign a different status to different times. For example, the fundamental laws of physics are time-symmetric8 and thus do not distinguish the future from the past. On top of that, the special theory of relativity (STR) is thought to be incompatible with presentism. Since the first formulation of this argument by Hilary Putnam,9 it has been repeated in various versions and convinced many to adopt eternalism. The argument from STR captures the debate between eternalists and presentists in a nutshell. Presentism is said to be closer to our everyday intuitions but in conflict with modern physics. And as always in philosophy, both claims have been challenged.10

7 This corresponds to what Marcello Oreste Fiocco calls “ontological homogeneuity”, i.e. “that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status” (Fiocco 2010). 8 Cf. Albert 2000, chap. 1. 9 Putnam 1967. Very roughly, the argument goes like this: As there is no unique foliation of spacetime into consecutive “nows” in SRT, there is no objective moment wich could be the absolute present. 10 For example, Lisa Leininger challenges the intuitiveness of presentism (Leininger 2015) and Cord Friebe argues that actually the presentist can make more sense of the Gödel solutions to the Einstein equations in the context of the general theory of relativity than the eternalist (Friebe 2012). The chapter by Saudek in this volume develops a local theory of time that can be understood as a proposal for how to have it both ways.

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Before we move on to the more marginal views of the growing block and moving spotlight theories, let us mention another distinction in the formulations of theories about the nature of time. Some say that according to eternalism, non-present entities exist,11 while others say that they are real.12 We have been switching between both formulations so far. But like the distinction between “times” and “objects,” the distinction between “real” and “exist” allows for more elbowroom within the debate. For example, a presentist might claim that while only present objects exist, past and future objects are still real.13 In this way (s)he could honor the difference between Donald Trump and John F. Kennedy and also the difference between Kennedy and Sparkles the unicorn: Trump exists, while Kennedy does not (he exists no longer), yet Kennedy is real while Sparkles is not (sadly, neither has existed nor will exist). Summing up, we have several formulation distinctions for the ontological core of the debate on the nature of time. The debate can be said to be either about objects or times, and these can either be said to be real or to exist. Further, we have discussed the difference between saying that past and future times are real and saying that all times are equally real. Presentists claim that only present objects exist or are real, or that only the present exists or is real. Eternalists claim that all times or objects are equally real or exist on a par. Sticking to times, we can use a quantitive formulation to sum up the central disagreement. Eternalists believe that more than one time exists or is real; presentists believe that (always) only one time exists. This is enough to state the difference, but of course not enough for a positive account of these positions. The claim of the eternalist, of course, is not that only two times exist. For him all times exist. But this would not be enough to differentiate him from the presentist, because the presentist also claims that all times exist. The presentist just thinks that there is only ever one time. We write “only ever” because the presentist does not believe that there is just one unchanging moment of time. So what about the future generation of still unborn humans, one might ask? Do they exist? Are they real? Thoughts like this hint at a trend in our conception of time. While it feels okay to grant some kind of reality to past entities – after all traces of them are still around – we are more reluctant when it comes to future entities. This might be because we think that there is not one (possible)

11 E.g. Sider 1999. 12 E.g. Markosian 2014. 13 Arguably, Lucretius might have held this view. For an analysis of the ontology and epistemology of time in Lucretius, see Zinn 2016.

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future, but many. We might be indeterminists.14 We might also think that this is because the future is not real. We might believe that reality is growing as time passes. Usually, indeterminists deny the claim that there is one future because they think there is more than one, while there are other philosophers who deny this claim because they think there is less than one. Philosophers who defend the so-called growing block theory of time (GBT) famously deny the existence of the future, while they accept the existence of the past. As can easily be seen, this characterization distinguishes GBT from presentism and eternalism. The existence of the past distinguishes GBT from presentism and the denial of the future distinguishes it from eternalism. Or to express the same point positively: GBT agrees with eternalism that past entities exist or are real, and GBT agrees with presentism that future entities do not exist or are not real. Before we go on with the systematic characterization of GBT, one historical remark is in order. GBT was put forward by C.D. Broad in 1923. Prior to that, Broad had held an eternalist position,15 but then changed his mind. Emily Thomas has argued16 that this shift in Broad’s position was influenced by his study of Samuel Alexander‘s Space, Time, and Deity.17 Thomas further argues that GBT was first articulated, if not defended, by Alexander. If this is correct, then GBT was developed in the context of the debate about God and time. As we have seen, GBT “accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all.”18 Now, of course, this is not supposed to mean that there is only one static block – just as presentism is not the doctrine of there being only one static moment. But then how is GBT dynamic? Consider an event that is present and then becomes past. According to Broad, it does not lose any of its relations to other events. However, it gains new relations that it could not have had before. For example, it gains the relation of being earlier than a now present event. This is how the block grows: fresh slices of existence are constantly added to the total history of the world.19 This growing of the block is possible because, quite contrary to eternalism, GBT accepts becoming as a fundamental ontological feature.20 14 This is the idea behind so-called branching spacetime. For the original formulation of branching spacetime, see Belnap 1992; for further developments, see Müller 2002 and Rumberg 2016. 15 Broad 1921. 16 Thomas 2019. 17 Alexander 1920. 18 Broad 1923: 66. 19 Cf. Broad 1923: 66. 20 According to Broad himself becoming is the most fundamental kind of change and other kinds of changes, like objects changing their properties or past events moving more and more into the distant past, are reduced to it.

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Broad believes that the sum of total existence is always increasing and this gives us the direction of time. Take two moments. One of them will include the total sum of the history of the other but also something more. The moment with the bigger total sum is later than the other moment. Following this rationale, the present is the edge of existence. It does not stand in any special relation to other events. It is rather defined through the lack thereof. There is nothing to which it has the relation of precedence. And this “there is nothing” is taken literally. Broad discusses another view about the nature of time in his book Scientific Thought, a view that today is known as the moving spotlight theory (MST). In contrast to GBT, according to MST the complete history of the world exists eternally. It settles all events in their temporal ordering with the relations “earlier” and “later.” On top of this, we have the present. This moves, to use Broad’s own metaphor, like a “spot of light from a policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the fronts of the houses in a street.”21 MST combines the temporal ordering of eternalism and the temporal becoming of presentism. Broad himself dismissed MST, but recently it has found a new champions in Ross Cameron22 and Daniel Deasy. Deasy, using Williamsonlanguage,23 characterizes it “as the conjunction of two theses: permanentism, the thesis that everything exists forever, and the A-theory, the thesis that there is an absolute, objective present time.”24 Both GBT and MST can be seen as hybrid views standing between eternalism and presentism. Presentism takes the direction of time as its ontological basis, while eternalism takes temporal order as this basis. MST straightforwardly combines both, as we have seen. And GBT sides with presentism in taking temporal becoming as its ontological basis, but sides with eternalism regarding the status of the past. A theory that accepts presentness as its ontological basis is often called an A-theory, while a theory which denies that the present is in any way ontologically special is called a B-theory.25 If we now also call a theory according to which existence is time-relative “dynamic” and one where this is not the case “static,”26 we can sort the four views about the nature of time in a matrix:

21 Broad 1927: 59. 22 Cameron 2015. 23 Cf. Williamson 2013, chap. 1. 24 Deasy 2015: 2073. 25 The labels “A-theory” and “B-theory” go back to McTaggart, see McTaggart 1908. For an extended analysis of McTaggart’s paper, see Ingthorsson 2016. 26 Cf. Friebe 23: 43. Please note, that Friebe’s distinction between dynamic and static theories only considers whether what exists depends on time or not. This is why MST, although it has an explicitly dynamic element – namely the name-giving spotlight – is listed as a static theory.

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Static

Dynamic

A-theory

Moving spotlight

Presentism

B-theory

Eternalism

Growing block

Persistence Another debate within the philosophy of time is important for this article, namely, the debate about persistence. Persistence is the phenomenon of entities existing through time. When they change during their temporal existence, they exemplify incompatible properties. Take a mood lamp that changes from green to red: being completely green is incompatible with being completely red, yet it is the same mood lamp that has both properties. The contemporary debate about persistence is de facto a debate about change: it revolves around the question of how to conceptualize persistence without letting the incompatibility of the properties involved in a change succumb to being a contradiction. In a nutshell, the contemporary debate about persistence can be characterized helpfully, if imperfectly, as a continuing attempt to avoid the looming contradiction in the context of change over time. The different accounts within the debate about persistence agree that (S1) must be denied:27 (S1) One object has incompatible properties in the same way. But they disagree about which part to deny. There are different ways to negate (S1): One can negate either “one object,” or “incompatible properties,” or “in the same way.” For example, you might think that “incompatible properties” must be negated, because you hold that the properties involved are not incompatible, or because you think that there are no properties involved at all.28 However, avoiding the contradiction is not enough to give an account of change. As has been stated by David Hugh Mellor, “change needs identity as

27 An exception is Graham Priest. Priest holds a doctrine called “dialetheism,” which accepts true contradictions in the world. Priest believes that change is a prime example of a true contradiction in the empirical world, because, according to him, in the moment of change an object has both properties (cf. Priest 2006, chap. 12). So, for example, our mood lamp changing from green to red would first be green, then green and red, and then red. For a discussion of Priest’s account of change, see Strobach 1998, part II, chap. 3. 28 For a more in-depth discussion of the debate about persistence, see Fischer 2017.

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well as difference.”29 This is because change must be distinguished from exchange. It is an entirely different situation when a red bike is painted black (change) or when the same model is bought in black (exchange). There must be an entity persisting through the change. This is what Mellor calls identity, but it is perhaps better called continuity. As not all accounts accept strict identity over time, a more neutral term like continuity is to be preferred. Within the rise of the new metaphysics, the question of persistence was formulated anew by David Lewis.30 Until today, Lewis’s way of detailing the problem and the answers he provides form the basis for the debate about persistence. The accounts discussed in this debate can be broadly divided into two camps: perdurantistic and endurantistic solutions. Perdurantists believe that at each moment there exists but a temporal part of a larger four-dimensional object. These different temporal parts in turn can have different properties. Consider our mood lamp again, which changes from green to red. Following the perdurantist, one temporal part of it has the property of being green and another, different temporal part has the property of being red. It is unproblematic for different entities to have incompatible properties. By taking temporal parts to be the primary property bearers, perdurantism avoids the looming contradiction. In a way, perdurantism can be understood as putting a time-index on the object. It is one temporal part, tp1, which is green, G(), and another one, tp2, which is red, R(). Thus, the whole situation can be depicted as: G(tp1) ∧ R(tp2). A special version of perdurantism is called exdurantism,31 which takes the three-dimensional bearers of ordinary properties to be temporal stages rather than temporal parts.32 These stages are not parts of a persisting four-dimensional whole. Instead, they are related via the counterpart relation. Exdurantism hence adopts the this-worldly analogue of Lewis’s account of modality. The exdurantistic solution can be depicted as follows: G(st1) ∧ R(st2). Endurantism sides with the everyday intuition that objects are threedimensional. Endurantistic objects persist by being multi-located in spacetime.33 There are several ways for an endurantist to avoid the contradiction potentially involved in change. One would be to put a time-index on the properties. This is often called indexicalism.34 The persisting object o (our mood lamp) is green-t1, G1(),

29 Mellor 1998: 89. 30 Lewis 1986: 202. 31 Balashov 2007: 84. 32 Benovsky 2006: 91. 33 Lewis 2002: 2. 34 van Inwagen 1990.

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and red-t2, R2() and, since o is neither green simpliciter nor red simpliciter, no contradiction arises.35 The indexicalistic solution thus is: G1(o) ∧ R2(o). The problem with indexicalism becomes evident when one considers a case of stability. Imagine the mood lamp stays green. According to the indexicalist, the mood lamp always exemplifies a different property: green-t1, green-t2, greent3 and so on. This is far too much change for stability. Thus, indexicalism is often discarded, although it successfully avoids the contradiction lurking in change. Other possible endurantistic solutions are to time-index the copula,36 copularism, or to add a temporal adverb,37 adverbialism. The term “adverbialism” is often used as an umbrella term for both versions, but we prefer to have the conceptual resources to distinguish between them. Adverbialism and copularism are considered the strongest variants of endurantism. The copularistic solution can be depicted as: o is-t1 G and o is-t2 R; and the adverbialistic one as: o is t1-ly G and o is t2-ly R. None of these variants coincides with Lewis’s characterization of endurantism. According to him, endurantism depicts green and red as disguised relations.38 Call this alleged solution to the problem of persistence relationalism. The mood lamp stands in the relation G( , ) to one space-time-point, t1, and in the relation R( , ) to another space-time-point, t2: G(o, t1) ∧ R(o, t2). As we have seen, a theory of change – and thus an account of persistence – needs to include more than just a contradiction-free way of accounting for difference. Also, an account of what we have called continuity needs to be given. Classical perdurantism ensures continuity via the parthood relation. If two temporal parts are parts of the same four-dimensional object, a persistence phenomenon occurs.39 The other variant of perdurantism, exdurantism, connects the different temporal stages of one persistence phenomenon via the counterpart relation. Exdurantists deny trans-temporal identity.40 Hence, strict identity over time cannot be the continuity-maker. For the exdurantist, it is the counterpart-relation that differentiates change from exchange. All endurantistic accounts of persistence mentioned above (indexicalism, relationalism, copularism and adverbialism) do not fiddle with the notion of

35 Friebe 2012: 130. 36 Johnston 1987: 129. 37 Haslanger 1989. 38 Cf. Lewis 1986: 204. 39 However, according to Ted Sider, perdurantistic persistence is a case of strict identity; cf. Sider 2000b: 54. 40 As already pointed out above, exdurantism is quite similar to the Buddhist theory of momentariness in this regard. For more on this, see the chapter by Sakai in this volume.

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objects. For all of them, objects are three-dimensional: just as our everyday intuition tells us. It follows that for all these variants, multi-location is the continuity-maker. Summing up, we have seen that the focus of the contemporary debate about persistence is conceptualizing change in a non-contradictory way. Nearly everybody agrees that time somehow prevents change from leading to an object having incompatible properties. But, to put it bluntly, the different accounts disagree about where to put the time-index in order to avoid the contradiction. Now that we have laid out the philosophical landscape in the metaphysics of time, we can proceed to the relationship between God and time. The different philosophical accounts of the nature of time and persistence are brought together with their theistic counterparts. As we will see, the position one holds regarding the nature of time and persistence has a great impact on the position one holds – or can hold – regarding God and time.

The relationship between God and time There is no definition or description of the Divine that is shared by all religious traditions. Even within individual religious traditions, various concepts of God are discussed. Within Christian theology, the paradigms of classical theism and personal theism defend many respectively contradicting attributes of God:41 While classical theists presume that God is timeless, impassible, immutable and non-receptive, personal theists think of God as temporal, passible, mutable and relational. Variants of these paradigms can be found in other monotheistic religions, too.42 What do theists mean when they claim that God is in time, or that God is outside time? It is clear that the concept “time” is not used here univocally as physical time, since physical space and time are (at least according to most models of the God–world relation) thought of as created by God. A common argument by defendants of divine timelessness is that, because time is part of creation, God himself cannot be in time. However, proponents of divine temporality usually do not claim that God is inside physical time, but that God is “in his own time” or “meta-time.” According to Aristotle, time is defined as a measure of change;43

41 Cf. Schärtl 2016. 42 The chapter in this volume by Hoover presents a discussion about temporal vs. timeless God within the Islamic tradition. 43 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV 11, 219b1; 220b32: time (chronos) is a measure (arithmos) of change (kinesis).

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thus, if God is mutable in some way, He must also be temporal. If God changes, for example by freely creating a world, there is a state in God before creation and a state in God after creation. Divine temporalists44 claim that God is mutable and God’s time is a measure of change in God. Most temporalists are sempiternalists, which means that they claim that God is sempiternal, i.e. without beginning or end. Divine temporalists are often motivated by their assumption that God is a person very similar to what we know a person to be. The Oxford philosopher John Lucas writes: “[I]f we are to characterise God at all, we must say that He is personal, and if personal then temporal, and if temporal then in some sense in time, not outside it.”45 Since he defines the univocal core of personality as having consciousness and being able to act intentionally, he concludes that “time is an inevitable concomitant of consciousness”.46 Believers often have an intuitive view of God as relational, especially when they think that God hears and sometimes even answers their prayers. As another motivation, most proponents of open theism (a prominent school of divine temporality) assume that moral responsibility of persons requires libertarian free will, which again requires an open future, which is assumedly not compatible with a timeless God.47 Of course, there have been many attempts in theology to reconcile divine, timeless omniscience and human freedom; however, it is still disputed whether these attempts have been successful.48 Divine eternalism49 claims that God is outside of time or timeless. Accordingly, there cannot be any change in God. Historically, this position is based on an argument by Plato, who claimed that change can only be for the better or for the worse, and since God, as a perfect being, can neither change for the better nor for the worse, God cannot change.50 Divine eternalists usually define God’s personality in a more analogous way than divine temporalists do, and charge proponents of the opposite view with anthropomorphism, which means portraying God too much in the image of human beings. Especially liberal theologians, who want to rule out divine interventionism, often recur to divine timelessness to

44 Famous proponents of divine temporalism include Hasker (1989), Swinburne (1993) and Mullins (2016). 45 Lucas 1989: 213. 46 Lucas 1973: 30. 47 Cf. Pinnock 2001 and Rhoda 2011. 48 Cf. Hasker 1989, Flint 1998, and Zagzebski 1991. 49 Famous proponents of divine eternalism include Leftow 1991, Rogers 1996, and Helm 1988. 50 Cf. Mullins 2016: 48.

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give a reason for why God cannot intervene in time, work miracles or answer prayers. Finally, many divine eternalists claim that philosophical eternalism (a static B-Theory) is strongly supported by science, and that philosophical eternalism implies theistic eternalism; however, both implications are disputed, especially the first, because, it is argued, the epistemological inaccessibility of a privileged reference frame in STR does not necessitate its ontological absence.51 It is not obvious that a theory of God’s temporality or timelessness must always coincide with philosophical presentism or, respectively, eternalism. While open theists defend both theistic presentism and philosophical presentism, most theistic eternalists (i.e. proponents of divine timelessness) also defend philosophical eternalism (i.e. a block universe). However, there are philosophers and theologians who try to defend different combinations. Some theistic eternalists defend an A-theory of time, claiming that God receives the information of all contingent events happening in the universe all at once, although they are not happening simultaneously and our future is, from our perspective, truly open.52 While classical Thomists believe that there cannot be any real relation between the timeless Deity and temporal creation, modern eternalists often claim that God’s knowledge, maybe even his emotional states (“God is suffering with us”) partially depend on creation. The problem with this is that it is hard to reconcile the views that God eternally and freely creates the world and that he eternally (and thus simultaneously to his creation) receives information about everything that happens in his creation. To illustrate this, one can ask whether the “timeless” God is logically located at the “beginning” or at the “end” of creation. Theoretically, one can also defend a fourth possible combination: that God’s existence is best described by presentism, while our physical world is static.53 God can change in his time, so there is a succession of deliberating, creating, acting, reacting, and receiving information. But God does not have to change every time the world changes. He could build in all of his reactions to creaturely events into natural laws as contingency plans.54 All of these discussions require an optimistic view regarding our ability to discuss God’s nature. Many proponents of divine timelessness do not literally claim that God is outside of time, but stand in the tradition of negative theology: God cannot be attributed anything positively.55 We can only – if at all – discuss

51 52 53 54 55

Cf. Zimmerman 2011: 163–244. Cf. Stump/Kretzmann 1981, and Zagzebski 2011. A view close to this position is defended in Padgett 2001. Cf. Collins 2011: 172, and Grössl 2014. Cf. Louth 2012.

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God’s effects in creation or his revelation, but not his essence or his attributes. These skeptical views are important for reminding those who engage in philosophical theology that their views on God and his relation to creation are always limited and preliminary, because there is no “outside” view of this relation. However, most thinkers working in an analytic tradition would respond to such a skeptical view that there are different concepts of God which need to be discussed, and that there are criteria such as consistence, coherence, ontological scarcity and explanatory power which can be used to show why certain concepts of God are more or less adequate, or likely to give a satisfactory description of reality. Here one can see methodological similarities to the metaphysics of time. The discussion regarding identity through time is also quite relevant for theology. Divine temporalists usually reject the divine eternalists’ argument from simplicity, using an endurantist ontology for God. Traditionally, God is regarded as simple,56 i.e. having no parts or division within Him. A temporal God, the divine eternalist argues, would have temporal parts, which is why God must be atemporal. But this argument only works if a perdurantist ontology is presupposed, and perdurantism is usually rejected by presentists. God is wholly there now, just as we are as human persons; neither He nor we have temporal parts. Open theists specify that God is immutable regarding certain essential attributes which constitute his identity through time (such as necessary existence or moral perfection); God only changes regarding his accidental attributes.57 Lastly, theistic presentism can assist philosophical presentism in solving certain widely discussed problems. Truths about past facts can be grounded in God’s memory of the past;58 truths about non-contingent future facts and possibilia can be grounded in God’s ability to predict future histories from exactly knowing the present state of the universe and natural laws He created. One can regard this as a theistically and ontologically scarcer version of Lucrecianism.

Process ontology and process theology: A perfect match? In this section, we take a closer look at the process-theoretical account of the relationship between God and time. Following the methodology of this article,

56 Cf. Aquinas 2000. 57 Cf. Pinnock 2001: 6. 58 Cf. Rhoda 2009.

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we will first introduce process philosophy. As we have seen, we must be careful not to consider the respective theological and philosophical positions to be identical just because they carry the same name. Nevertheless, process philosophy and process theology intuitively seem a perfect match. Moreover, process thought seems a promising contender for describing the relationship between God and time. Historically, the intuitive harmony between process philosophy and process theology is supported by the fact that both theories go back to the same philosophers. Very roughly, the line of descendants goes from Henri Bergson59 through Alfred North Whitehead60 to Charles Hartshorne.61 A good way to understand process philosophy is to see which conceptions of the world it rejects. The ontological opponent, if you want to call it that, of process philosophy is thing ontology. As the name suggests, according to thing ontology, at the bottom of reality there are things. More specifically, these things are in some sense concrete and static. This is the conception of the world that is most often tacitly taken for granted, and it is rarely called into question. It might seem logically possible to have both things and processes, but de facto the representatives of both debates agree that their views are mutually exclusive: either you are a process ontologist or you are a thing ontologist. Because of this, process philosophy is not just another contender within the aforementioned debates. Already from its ontological basis, it is a radical departure from the other conceptions discussed so far.62 One of the central doctrines of process philosophy – if not the central doctrine – is the idea that fundamental entities are processes, not things. This, of course, is not to deny that objects exist. They are just ontologically not the primary facet. Process philosophers are typically reductionists regarding objects, not eliminativists. For example, Henri Bergson, the father of modern process philosophy, holds that objects are abstractions from processes.63 The world is a complex process and we (with regard to everyday conceptions and science)

59 Bergson 1998. 60 Whitehead 1929. 61 Hartshorne 1971. 62 This does not mean that process thought is not intuitive. Quite to the contrary, we are acquainted with process phenomena. We are just trained not to take them ontologically seriously. This is not to mean that process thought is at odds with the other philosophical positions mentioned so far. Actually, as we will discuss below, process philosophers are often sympathetic towards A-theories or, even stronger, process philosophy might turn out to be an A-theory. But the details of this discussion would go beyond the scope of this article. 63 Cf. Lawlor/Moulard 2016.

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abstract many features away to mark off relatively stable systems as objects. Bergson thus thinks that objects are in a certain way mind-dependent, giving an evolutionary explanation of this capacity to abstract away complexity and distinguish relatively stable systems. We as humans need to act in the world and to plan our actions; this becomes easier, or perhaps even possible, if we track “objects.”64 This evolutionary conception not only adds an objective aspect to Bergson’s account of “objects” or “things” – if our conception did not correspond to the objective world, we would have no evolutionary benefit through it – it also explains why thing ontology is so widespread and so hardwired to our ordinary conception of the world. But it would be an anthropocentric fallacy to conclude that the world itself is made up of things. Process philosophy claims that the world is fundamentally changing, or that fundamentally the world is change.65 Bergson has pointed out that even the apparently most stable of our everyday objects undergo changes all the time. These changes might be small, and thus we can speak of relatively stable systems, but a table, for example, is not an unchanging eternal entity. Process philosophy takes these insights ontologically seriously. It sees changes as being real and nature as being essentially dynamic. The principle of becoming is often taken to be central to process ontology.66 Both of these features – that change is real and that becoming is ontologically fundamental – are also central to the A-theory.67 Besides its opening up new possibilities in philosophy of science, also in metaphysics, novel accounts have emerged using process thought. Regarding the nature of time, a process version of presentism suggests itself, since both theories take becoming to be the most important and fundamental ontological feature. Instead of instantaneous moments, such an account might need moments with temporal extension – a spacious present, so to say. In this way it can account for the current world state as a complex process.

64 Cf. Bergson 1998: 12. 65 Anne Sophie Meincke even claims that processes are essentially change and thus, what needs explanation is stability; cf. Meincke 2018b. 66 Cf. Bergson 1999. 67 There is one caveat however. We cannot go into the details here, but following Bergson’s interpretation of time, the B-theoretic structure of time must be considered as mind-dependent (cf. Deppe 2016). It might be that the best way to understand Bergson is that he is neither an Anor a B-theorist, since the entire distinction might be mind-dependent for him. Still, Bergson certainly favors objective becoming and tends towards what is today called the A-theory.

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And finally, a process account of persistence has recently been developed.68 According to produrantism, processes are the persisting entities, while abstractions are the primary property bearers. This very sketchy characterization is already sufficient to suggest how produrantism might be able to account for persistence: while abstractions at the different times are ontologically dependent on the underlying process, they are not identical to each other. Produrantism thus avoids the looming contradiction. Now that we have this in place, we come to the question of how the debate about God and time can benefit from process thought. It was already Whitehead who discussed the theological implications of his ontology in his book Process and Reality.69 Although his concept of God is often wrongly identified with the personal God of open theism, he claims that God himself has a primordial and a consequent nature, the first being timeless, the second being in some way temporal and involved in creation.70 The process theologian Charles Hartshorne, a student of Whitehead, has described this as the dipolar nature of God: In some aspects, God is timeless, in other aspects, He is temporal.71 According to Klaus Müller,72 the first pole involves God’s self-identity as the timeless aspects of Him, while the second pole involves the growth of His knowledge of the world as something that develops and changes and thus describes the temporal aspects of God. Where Whitehead and Hartshorne differ from Bergson and other trailblazers in process thought is the idea that changes are not arbitrary, but guided by the principle of increasing complexity. Even before Whitehead, the Catholic theologian and transcendental Thomist Maurice Blondel tried to integrate this idea into Christian theology.73 Whitehead explicates this idea, saying that God is the timeless accident of creativity.74 Why timeless? Because the principle that guides the temporal evolution of processes cannot be itself a temporal process. Theistic cosmopsychists would go even further and say that God as the mind of the cosmos constitutes the (proto-) mental properties of the smallest bits of

68 Fischer 2017. 69 Whitehead 1929. 70 Cf. Padgett 1992: 139: “In his primordial nature God is timeless, the ‘non-temporal actual entity’ […]. In his consequent nature, God receives the best of the world into himself. The consequent nature is conscious, while the primordial nature is unconscious; […].” 71 Hartshorne extends the idea of a dipolar nature of God by distinguishing between the (timeless) “abstract essence” and the (temporal) “concrete states” of God. Cf. Griffin 2000: 6. 72 Müller 2012: 12. 73 See Hirschberger 1949–1952, vol. II, chapter 2, section 1a. 74 Cf. Whitehead 1929: 7.

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matter and guides physical reality to the evolvement of life and the emergence of consciousness.75 The challenge for process thought, similar to classical theism, is to show how a timeless mind-making principle can be itself a mind or a person. One possibility is to regard the a-personal God as the constitutive mindmaking principle, and the personal God as an emergent mind that results from its relation to creation. This is how one can make sense of Whitehead’s famous notion, “It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.”76 Similar ideas were introduced by Linda Zagzebski,77 namely, that the timeless God in some sense (at least regarding to his timeless knowledge) depends on creation. Can an eternal God be simultaneously the origin or creator of the world and dependent on creation? Process theologians deal with this problem usually by rejecting the notion of creatio ex nihilo, i.e. the assumption that God freely created the world. Either the world exists as eternal as God is, or it emerges necessarily from God’s nature (a logical or metaphysical dependence, but not an agent-causal one). According to modern process thinkers like Thomas Jay Oord,78 God cannot not create, because his loving nature necessitates a creation; however, God still has some freedom to choose what kind of world to create and how to best guide it to a certain end. This idea can already be found in Hartshorne, who wrote, “God requires a world, but not the world.”79 There are great benefits for Christian theologians to adopt such a view: If God is personal, and if personhood requires relationality, He must either be more than one person in itself (social trinitarianism) or be necessarily related to creation. Social trinitarianism is problematic for many reasons and often rejected as tri-theism, not only by other monotheistic religions.80 If God’s personhood is constituted by his relation to created persons, He cannot be thought of as a (whether one or three) person(s) without creation. The primordial nature of God is thus only a timeless guiding, mind-making principle, while the consequent nature of God is a person who is essentially related to creation and thus is personal. Maybe the strange-sounding assumption of William Craig (who does not identify as a process theist) can be interpreted this way: he claims

75 Cf. Nagasawa/Wager 2016. Hartshorne called this view “synecological panpsychism”: the view that it is the mind of the cosmos that constitutes protomental properties of matter. 76 Whitehead 1929: 348. 77 Zagzebski 2011. 78 See Oord 2015 and Oord 2019. 79 Müller 2017: 17. 80 Cf. von Stosch 2017: chap. 5 and 7.

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that God, independent of creation, is timeless, but in his relation to creation, is temporal.81 More work should be done that explores possibilities for reconciling the notion of a timeless Deity with the notion of a temporal one. When two paradigms struggle with each other for centuries without coming close to a winner, often a new paradigm needs to be introduced that encompasses the old ones by resolving apparent contradictions. Such a view could also have some explanatory advantages regarding philosophical and theological problems that have not yet been satisfactorily solved. Analytic theology is often accused of defending a natural-kind-essentialism. For example, God has an idea of “humanity” eternally in his mind and creates the world using his providence so that this idea is realized. In a process view, even God’s timeless ideas depend on contingent, sometimes even random events happening in spacetime. Similar to Aristotle’s conceptualism, this is a middle position between Platonic idealism and nominalism: Concepts depend on individual entities, but as a result exist independently of these individual entities, being kept eternally “in God’s mind.” There are even contemporary attempts to reformulate the theistic idea of resurrection or eternal life as an eternal existence in God’s timeless mind or memory.82

Conclusion In this article, we have discussed the relationship between God and time. To do so we have first given an overview of the philosophical debate about time, because one must understand time in order to investigate God’s relation to it. We have introduced the different philosophical accounts of the nature of time: presentism and eternalism, as well as the minority positions growing block theory and moving spotlight theory. In addition, we have introduced the different philosophical accounts of persistence through time. These fall into two camps: endurantistic and perdurantistic solutions. Then we have discussed the theological positions of Divine temporalism and Divine eternalism. In this context, we have made clear that a theory of God’s temporality or timelessness need not coincide with philosophical presentism or, respectively, eternalism. Finally, we turned to process philosophy and theology. Process thought constitutes a radical departure from the rest of the debate, as it rejects the (often implicit) assumption of “things”

81 Cf. Craig 2001b. 82 Cf. Turner 2018 and Remenyi 2016: 161f.; 290.

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as the ontological basis. However, a process conception of God and time might hold the possibility of reconciling the notion of a timeless Deity with the notion of a temporal one.

Bibliography David Z. Albert, Time and Chance. Harvard: Harvard University Press 2000. Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity. London: Macmillan & Co 1920. Thomas Aquinas, “A Classic Defence of Divine Simplicity”. In: B. Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, 549–564. Aristotle, Physics, Volume I: Books 1–4, translated by P. H. Wicksteed, F. M. Cornford, Loeb Classical Library, No. 228. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1957. Yuri Balashov, Defining ,Exdurance’ [Philosophical Studies 133]. 2007, 143–149. Nuel Belnap, Branching Spacetime. [Synthese n.n.]. 1992, 385–434. Jiri Benovsky, Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos Verlag 2006. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications 1998. Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe. Manchester: Clinamen Press 1999. Charlie Dunbar Broad, “Time”. In: J. Hastings et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, Vol. 12. Edinburgh and New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1921. Charlie Dunbar Broad, Scientific Thought. London: Kegan Paul 1927 (second edition) [1923]. Tim Button, There’s no Time like the Present. [Analysis 66(2)]. 2006, 130–135. Craig Callender, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013. Ross P. Cameron, The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015. Robin Collins, “Prayer and Open Theism: A Participatory, Co-Creator Model”. In: W. Hasker et al. (eds.), God in an Open Universe. Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism. Eugene: Pickwick Publications 2011, 161–186. William Lane Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 2000a. William Lane Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 2000b. William Lane Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 2001a. William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time. Wheaton: Crossway Books 2001b. Daniel Deasy, The moving spotlight theory. [Philosophical Studies 172(8)]. 2015, 2073–2089. Sonja Deppe, The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-theorists). [New Developments in Philosophy of Time, Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 30(2)]. 2016, 107–124. John Dupré, Processes of Life: Essays in Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. Kit Fine, The Reality of Tense. [Synthese 150(3)]. 2006, 399–414.

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Kristie Miller and Baron, Sam, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time, Cambridge: Polity Press 2018. Ryan Mullins, The End of Timeless God. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. Thomas Müller. “Branching space-time, modal logic and the counterfactual conditional”. In: T. Placek (ed.), Non-locality and Modality, Dordrecht: Kluwer [NATO science series: Sub-series 2, Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, 64)]. 2002, 273–292. Klaus Müller, „Gott: Totus intra, totus exra. Über Charles Hartshornes Transformation des Theismus“. In: K. Müller and J. Enxing (eds.), Perfect Changes. Die Religionsphilosophie Charles Hartshornes. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet 2012, 11–24. Klaus Müller, “Change as Chance for Faith and Church. Philosophical-theological Topics”. In: M. Kuhn (ed.), Development needs Change – How can Change be achieved?. Bonn 2017, 18–33 (http://www.kaad.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Conference-Ghana2015_Development-Needs-Change.pdf). Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager, “Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism”. In: G. Brüntrup, L. Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, 113–129. Thomas J. Oord, The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity Press 2015. Thomas J. Oord, God Can’t: How to Believe in God and Love after Tragedy, Abuse, and Other Evils. Grasmere: SacraSage Press 2019. Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time. London: Palgrave Macmillan 1992. Alan G. Padgett, “Eternity as Relative Timelessness”. In: G. E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views. Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity Press 2001, 92–110. Clark Pinnock, Most Moved Mover. A Theology of God’s Openness. Carlisle: Paternoster 2001. Graham Priest, In Contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press 20062. Hilary Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry. [Journal of Philosophy 64]. 1967, 240–247. Matthias Remenyi, Auferstehung denken. Anwege, Grenzen und Modelle personaleschatologischer Theoriebildung. Freiburg: Herder 2016. Michael Rea, “Four-Dimensionalism”. In: M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, 246–80. Alan R. Rhoda, Presentism, Truthmakers, and God. [Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90(1)]. 2009, 41–62. Alan R. Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness of the Future”. In: W. Hasker et al. (eds.), God in an Open Universe. Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism. Eugene: Pickwick Publications 2011, 69–93. Katherine Rogers, Omniscience, Eternity, and Freedom. [International Philosophical Quarterly 36(4)]. 1996, 399–412. Antje Rumberg, Transition Semantics for Branching Spacetime. [Journal of Logic, Language and Information 25(1)]. 2016, 77–108. Thomas Schärtl, “Introduction”. In: T. Schärtl and T. Marschler (eds.), Rethinking the Concept of a personal God: Classical Theism, Personal Theism, and Alternative Concepts of God. Münster: Aschendorff 2016, 3–27. Ted Sider, Presentism and Ontological Commitment. [Journal of Philosophy 96]. 1999, 325–347. Ted Sider, The stage view and temporary intrinsics. [Analysis 60(1)]. 2000, 84–88. Ted Sider, Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000.

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Niko Strobach, The Moment of Change – A systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, Eternity. [Journal of Philosophy 78]. 1981, 429–458. Richard Swinburne, “God and Time”. In: E. Stump (ed.), Reasoned Faith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993, 204–222. Emily Thomas, The Roots of C. D. Broad’s Growing Block Theory of Time. [Mind 128]. 2019, 527–549. James Turner, On the Resurrection of the Death: A New Metaphysics of Afterlife for Christian Thought. London: Routledge 2018. Peter van Inwagen, Four-dimensional objects. [Noûs 24(2)]. 1990, 245–255. Klaus von Stosch, Trinität. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 2017. Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. In: D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, (eds.). Gifford Lectures 1927–28. Timothy Williamson, Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013. Truls Wyller, Was ist Zeit? Ein Essay. Ditzingen: Reclam 2016. Linda Zagzebski. The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. New York: Oxford University Press 1991. Linda Zagzebski, “Eternity and Fatalism”. In: C. Tapp and E. Runggaldier (eds.), God, Eternity, and Time. Farnham: Ashgate 2011, 64–80. Dean Zimmerman, “Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold”. In: C. Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 163–244. Pamela Zinn, Lucretius on Time and its Perspection. [Kriterion, Journal of Philosophy 30(2)]. 2016, 125–151.

R.T. Mullins

From divine timemaker to divine watchmaker Introduction Marcello Oreste Fiocco complains that contemporary philosophy of time does not attempt to answer the fundamental question, “what is time?” Most debates in the philosophy of time focus on different kinds of issues about the direction of time, tensed vs. tenseless theories, what moments of time exist, and so on. As Fiocco observes, it is not clear what any of these debates are actually about until we have an answer to the fundamental question.1 If we don’t know what time is, then we cannot be certain that these other debates are actually about time. Within Christian theology and philosophy of religion, it is widely held that God creates time. There are some thinkers, like Richard Swinburne and Alan Padgett, who deny that God creates time. These thinkers claim that God is somehow ontologically responsible for the existence of time, even though God does not create time. An even smaller number of thinkers in the Christian tradition claim that time is not created because it is an aspect of God’s nature. Thinkers like Nicole Oresme, Henry More, Samuel Clarke, and Isaac Newton seemed to have held this view. What we have before us are two important questions for this volume. First, what is time? Second, in what way is God responsible for the existence of time? In this paper, I shall seek to address both questions. My aim is not to argue that God is timeless or temporal. Instead, my aim is to survey some of the conceptual landscape for understanding the different ways God can be understood as responsible for the existence of time, and then developing my own version of time as an attribute of God. I believe that there are at least three options for understanding how God is responsible for the existence of time. First, the Creationist option, which says that God creates time. Second, the Concomitance view, which claims that time is a necessary concomitant of God’s existence and nature. Third, the Identification view. This view says that time is to be identified with God in some way.

1 Fiocco 2017: 45. R.T. Mullins, Helsinki Collegium, University of Helsinki, Fabrianinkatu 24, 00014 Helsinki, Finland https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-003

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Perhaps as an attribute or mode of God, or possibly by strict identity. Since I have explored the Concomitance view in detail in previous publications, I shall have little to say on this position here.2 For this essay, I shall focus solely on the Creationist and Identification views. Given my expertise in Christian theology, I shall focus my discussion on Christian thinkers. However, throughout the discussion, I shall note thinkers outside of Christianity that fit within the conceptual landscape that I am developing. Before laying out this conceptual landscape, I need to lay down a few different concepts within the philosophy of time, divine timelessness, and divine temporality.

Setting the stage As a way of setting the stage, I must make a few different distinctions. First, a note about the ontology of time. Then a few remarks on God, creation, and worldactualization. Within the philosophy of time, there are various debates over the ontology of time, or over what moments of time exist. Some philosophers affirm a view called presentism, which says that only the present moment of time exists. On presentism, past moments of time no longer exist, and future moments of time do not yet exist. This can be contrasted with other views such as the growing block and eternalism. On the growing block, past and present moments of time exist, but future moments do not exist. On eternalism, all moments of time exist. One might be tempted to say that on eternalism the past, present, and future exist, but this is somewhat inaccurate. This is because eternalism entails that there is no objective present moment of time. On an eternalist ontology, all moments of time simply do exist, and they stand in earlier-than and later-than relations. It is possible to have something like eternalism and affirm an objective present. There is a view called the moving spotlight, which affirms that all moments of time exist, yet there is something special about the present moment which moves like a spotlight along the series of moments.3 For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume presentism. Anyone is free to adjust the discussion of this paper according to her own preferred ontology of time. One can even add a hypertime into the mix if she feels so inclined. A

2 Mullins 2014. 3 Cf. Cameron 2015.

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hypertime is a kind of series that contains moments of time. For example, one could affirm a hyper-presentist ontology of hypertime that contains an eternalist ontology of time. Alternatively, one could affirm a hyper-growing block ontology of hypertime that contains a presentist ontology of time.4 I, however, shall be ignoring hypertime as it would significantly complicate the discussion. Before moving on, it is worth noting that I have not given an answer to the fundamental question, “what is time?” Affirming a position on the ontology of time does not tell one what time is. An answer to that question will be dealt with later. For the purposes of this paper, I shall take God to be a perfect being, or the greatest conceivable being of which none greater can be conceived. As I understand this, God is a necessarily existent being who possesses certain essential properties such as maximal power, maximal knowledge, maximal goodness, and freedom.5 God’s existence and perfection are in no way dependent upon anything ad extra to God. This is usually stated in terms of the divine attributes of aseity and self-sufficiency. Many theists wish to add a further claim to these two divine attributes. They wish to claim that God is the ultimate source of existence and perfection such that God is responsible in some sense for the existence of anything else apart from Himself. For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume this as well. All Christian theists affirm that God is an eternal being. To say that God is eternal is to say that God exists without beginning and without end. This follows from the necessary existence of God. A being that necessarily exists does not begin to exist, nor cease to exist. However, traditional theists have wanted to say more than that God is merely eternal. Traditional theists have maintained that God is timeless. God is timeless if and only if God necessarily exists without beginning, without end, without succession, without temporal location, and without temporal extension. Historically, Christian theists have affirmed presentism. When traditional theists claimed that God is timeless, they would often describe God as existing as a whole in an eternal now or a timeless present. This timeless present is said to lack a before and after.6 This can be contrasted with more contemporary theists who claim that God is temporal. Divine temporalists affirm that God is an eternal being – God exists without beginning and without end. Yet divine temporalists affirm that God has succession in His life as well as temporal location and extension. However, there

4 Cf. Hudson 2014; Lebens/Goldschmidt 2017. 5 Cf. Nagasawa 2017. 6 Mullins 2016, chapters 3–5.

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is debate among divine temporalists about how to best understand this claim. Some temporalists affirm that God necessarily has succession in His life. Other temporalists say that God only has succession in His life after His act of creation. Most temporalists affirm presentism, though not all do. Of the divine temporalists who affirm presentism, they will typically say that God exists in the same present moment as we do. This is because whatever exists, exists at the present. The present moment exhausts all of reality. When God creates things, God is making things exist at the present. This raises the question, what is a creation? In order to answer this question, I must make a distinction between worlds and universes, and a distinction between world-actualization and creation. As I understand it, a possible world is a maximally consistent proposition that is best captured by modal logic. Such propositions express the entire way things could be. A maximally consistent proposition will contain an ontological inventory of all things that exist within a world, and the relations that obtain between those objects. This proposition will also include the entire history of a world’s timeline, if that particular world contains time. The actual world is a maximally consistent proposition that expresses the entire way things are. Worlds are distinct from universes. A universe is a smaller domain within a world, or a subset of what a possible world describes. A universe is a collection of contingently existent beings who are spatiotemporally related to one another. This is why one finds theists talking about a possible world where God exists without any universe of any sort, or a possible world in which God exists with a universe. As I shall discuss below, theists of different stripes disagree over whether or not God can exist without a universe. With this distinction between worlds and universes in hand, I can turn to the difference between world-actualization and creation. Creation occurs when God freely causes some contingent thing to exist. For my purposes, I shall primarily focus on creation as God causing a universe to exist, though it is logically possible that God create a single contingent being instead of an entire universe. According to Klaas J. Kraay, world-actualization is different from creation. World-actualization need not involve any causal activity on God’s part because the mere existence of God entails world-actualization.7 To state this in other terms, the mere existence of God entails that there is an entire way that things are – i.e. God exists with a particular nature. Allow me to clarify a point before moving forward. That there is a world of some sort is necessary because God necessarily exists, and world-actualization simply follows from the way things are. However, this does not entail that a universe

7 Kraay 2015: 4–5.

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necessarily exists because the existence of a universe depends upon the voluntary exercise of God’s power. A creation occurs when God voluntarily exercises His power to cause a universe to exist. I wish to make one final remark about moments of time before moving forward. As we shall see in due course, there are different answers to the question “what is time?” Each answer seems to assume some kind of relationship between time and moments of time. These relationships will be explored later, but for now it must be stated what a moment of time is. According to Fiocco, a moment is what accounts for how things can be in incompatible ways. At one moment, things are a particular way, and then things are different at the next moment.8 One might try to capture this notion by saying that a moment is the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. It seems as if moments of time have built within them the potential to be related to other moments in earlier-than and later-than relations. However, it seems like more needs to be said to get clear on what a moment is. Some philosophers say that we should take moments of time to be analogous to modality instead of analogous to space. In light of this, moments are sometimes taken to be sets of nearly maximal propositions, or proposition-like entities, so they are even smaller domains within worlds than universes.9 Moments are merely a slice of a world, or segments of a world. Yet, this point needs to be clarified in order to properly distinguish moments from worlds. What is the difference between worlds and moments? What is the difference between maximal and nearly maximal sets of propositions? The difference is over the scope of these propositions, and over the ordering relations between these sets of propositions. There are several ways to develop this distinction, but I shall briefly note two ways related to tenseless and tensed logic. In both views, the scope of worlds is much larger than the scope of moments. The difference between the views is over which is the best temporal logic to use to capture temporal claims. On the first view, worlds are maximal propositions best captured by modal logic, and moments are nearly maximal propositions best captured by tenseless logic. On the second view, worlds are maximal propositions best captured by modal logic, and moments are nearly maximal propositions best captured by tensed logic.10

8 Fiocco 2017: 56. 9 Byerly 2014: 77. 10 Meyer 2013: 59–60. It is worth mentioning that Meyer rejects presentism in favour of eternalism. It is possible to be an eternalist and affirm that a tensed logic captures the fundamental nature of temporal reality.

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On the first view, one could be a presentist and committed to a tenseless system of logic as the best way to capture temporal propositions. A tenseless proposition is a proposition that describes how things are, or could be, at a moment without reference to the past, present, or future. An example of a tenseless proposition is: “Sam sits on Arthur’s Seat at 2:00 pm on 12 December, 2018”. On this view, tenseless propositions can be ordered by primitive earlier-than and later-than relations.11 On this approach, one takes a nearly maximal proposition, or a moment, to be a tenseless description of how things are or could be, but this tenseless proposition lacks a description of the earlier-than or laterthan relations between itself and other moments. This is because moments are not essentially ordered. The ordering of moments into earlier-than relations is a contingent matter of fact.12 On this view, a maximal proposition, or a world, is a complete description of tenseless propositions that are ordered by earlier-than relations.13 On the second view, one could be a presentist and committed to a tensed system of logic as the best way to capture temporal propositions. A tensed proposition is one that describes how things are, or could be, at a moment with reference to the past, present, or future. An example of a tensed proposition is: “Sam is sitting on Arthur’s Seat”. The “is” in this proposition refers to the present, or what is happening now. On this view, tensed propositions can be ordered by primitive earlier-than relations, but this view also includes other primitive notions such as the tensed operators like it was the case and it will be the case.14 On this approach, one takes a nearly maximal proposition, or a moment, to be a tensed description of how things are or could be, but this tensed proposition lacks a description of the earlier-than relations between itself and other moments. This view, like the previous one, can say that the ordering of moments into earlier-than relations is a contingent matter of fact. On this view, a maximal proposition, or a world, is a complete description of tensed propositions that are ordered by earlier-than relations and tensed operators. With these distinctions and definitions in hand, I now turn to consider different accounts of God’s relation to time.

11 Crisp 2007: 130. 12 Byerly 2014: 27. 13 This assumes, of course, that such a world contains moments of time. A possible world without time has no need for tenseless propositions because such a world has no temporal reality to describe. In this case, as with other possible worlds, this maximal proposition is best captured by modal logic. 14 Meyer 2013: 39.

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The divine timemaker: The creationist option Creationism is one possible view about how God is responsible for the existence of time. Recall that creation involves God freely causing a contingent entity to exist. So the creationist is saying that God freely causes time to exist. Most creationist that I am aware of claim that God is responsible for the existence of time by creating time with the universe. This view can be found in Christian thinkers like Augustine and William Lane Craig. I believe that it is also found in the thought of Thomas Jay Oord. Before moving forward, it is worth noting that Augustine affirms divine timelessness whereas Craig and Oord affirm divine temporality. In the discussion below, I shall explain where these thinkers agree and disagree. As it turns out, they agree on quite a bit. All agree that presentism is true. Augustine and Craig agree that God exists in a timeless state of affairs without the universe. Oord, however, denies that God ever exists without a universe. All agree that God creates time in the sense that God creates change. This is because the underlying commitment of all creationists is that time exists if and only if change occurs, and such change can only be brought about by God’s causal activity.

Augustine In this subsection, I shall focus on the thought of Augustine. As stated before, I am focusing on Christian thought, yet I wish to mention other thinkers who share similar views. Within Jewish thought, Philo of Alexandria seems to be quite close to Augustine’s view on God, time, and creation.15 With that said, I turn to the Augustinian understanding of creationism. The Augustinian creationist does not really answer the fundamental question of “what is time?” As Augustine famously admits, he doesn’t know what time is.16 Yet Augustine is deeply committed to presentism, and feels like he can address questions about the structure of time, its measurement, and so forth without an answer to the fundamental question “what is time.”17 So one might be tempted to say that we don’t really need an answer to what time is. Let’s consider this view further. Even though the creationist does not seem to give a direct answer to the fundamental question, she does offer an answer to the conditions for the existence

15 See Ze’ev Strauss’ chapter in this volume. 16 Augustine, The Confessions, Book 11.14.17. 17 Augustine, The Confessions, Book 11 is dedicated to these issues.

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of time. Even though Augustine doesn’t know what time is, he says he feels confident that if nothing passed away, there would be no past. If nothing were approaching, he says there would be no future. If nothing existed, he says there would be no present time. As he explains, time must involve a flow of things coming into existence and of things passing out of existence. If the present moment did not contain this flow towards non-existence, Augustine thinks time would be indistinguishable from God’s timeless present.18 Further, Augustine thinks that time cannot exist without some creature existing.19 Why? For Augustine, God is timeless and immutable. God is immutable if God cannot change intrinsically or extrinsically.20 Only created things are capable of change. Hence, Augustine thinks that time cannot exist unless there are mutable and changing things that exist. Augustine explains as follows: There could have been no time had not a creature been made whose movement would effect some change. It is because the parts of this motion and change cannot be simultaneous, since one part must follow another, that, in these shorter or longer intervals of duration, time begins. Now, since God, in whose eternity there is absolutely no change, is the Creator and Ruler of time, I do not see how we can say that He created the world after a space of time had elapsed unless we admit, also, that previously some creature had existed whose movements would mark the course of time.21

For context, what we have here in this passage is Augustine addressing a puzzle about God’s prior existence that he seeks to answer in several of his writings. Augustine, like many theists, affirms that there is a state of affairs where God exists without creation. This is an entailment from the fact that God does not begin to exist, and the fact that the universe does begin to exist.22 For Augustine, this gives rise to several difficult questions. For example, why didn’t God create the universe sooner? Also, does God change when God creates? For Augustine, the answer to the first question relies on divine timelessness and the conditions for the existence of time. Given that time cannot exist without creatures who undergo change, there can be no time prior to the existence of the universe. Why didn’t God create sooner? For Augustine, there is no sooner because there is no time in the precreation state of affairs where God exists without the universe.

18 Augustine, The Confessions, Book 11.14.17. 19 Augustine, The Confessions, Book 11.30.40. 20 Augustine, The Trinity, Book V.4.17. 21 Augustine, The City of God, Book XI.6. 22 Augustine, The City of God, Book XII.; cf. John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith I.7.; Boethius, On the Catholic Faith; Pink 1975: 9.

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Augustine’s view runs into a problem when trying to answer the second question – does God change when He creates. Augustine claims that God does not change when God creates. This is quite puzzling, and the classical theistic tradition has spent a great deal of attention trying to solve a series of problems that arise from a timeless God creating a temporal universe. In what follows, I shall briefly note three problems. First problem: it would seem that in the act of creation, God goes from not creating to creating. That would appear to be a change in God. In reply, Augustinians claim that God does not change because God is eternally creating in the sense that God never begins to create. Second problem: if God is eternally creating, then it seems that creation should be co-eternal with God. In reply, Augustinians claim that God ordains that the universe should not come to exist co-eternally with God. They say that whatever has a beginning cannot be co-eternal with a God who lacks a beginning. In response to this, various philosophers through the ages say that they have lost their intuitive grasp on what “eternally creating” means in the Augustinian case. In contrast, the pagan philosopher Proclus has God eternally creating, which entails that God is co-eternal with a creation.23 That seems to be a more intuitive understanding of “eternally creating” than the Augustinian position. Third problem: it would seem that even if God is “eternally creating,” God would still undergo a change once creation comes into existence. This is because God exists alone, and then God exists in a causal relation to a universe that did not have prior existence. In reply, Augustinians deny that God is really related to creation.24 To say that God is not really related to creation is a complicated matter. I have addressed it elsewhere.25 Here, I shall simply note that it is less than intuitive for a Christian theist to say that the omnipresent God who causally sustains the universe in existence is not really related to the universe. Further, it is worth noting that this Augustinian move runs counter to a fairly intuitive causal principle. The causal principle can be stated like this: there can be no cases in which one thing causes a change in a second thing without that first thing itself undergoing a change. Graham Oppy argues that this causal principle is intuitively obvious, and can be defended by empirical generalization.26 The Augustinian claim that an immutable and timeless God causes a change without God changing violates this intuitive causal principle.

23 24 25 26

For discussion of Proclus’ argument, see John Philoponus 2004: 42, 50, and 64. Augustine, The Trinity, Book V.4.17. Mullins 2016: 117–126. Oppy 2017: 641–650.

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In this paper, I am not claiming that these problems for the Augustinian are unsurmountable. I am simply pointing out the kind of problems that the Augustinian position has to address so that readers can better evaluate each view.

William Lane Craig Imagine that you find these Augustinian moves counterintuitive, yet you are still wanting to remain a creationist. You might be in luck. William Lane Craig takes a similar approach to time, but denies some of the counterintuitive claims of the Augustinian. In particular, Craig denies that God is immutable, and affirms that God is really related to the universe. For Craig, God exists in a timeless state of affairs without creation.27 Craig agrees with Augustine that time cannot exist without actual change.28 Craig also agrees that time begins to exist at the moment of creation.29 This is why God’s precreation phase is a timeless phase for Craig. Prior to the act of creation, God is not undergoing any change. As Craig explains, “there is nothing to make time exist in the changeless state of God’s existing sans creation.”30 However, Craig thinks that God can undergo change if God freely exercises His power.31 Once God creates, God undergoes change and becomes temporal. According to Craig, “God exists timelessly sans creation and temporally from the moment of creation.”32 Craig’s position has caused some philosophers to be a bit baffled. Craig says that God is causally, but not temporally, prior to the universe. He says that this is because causes can be simultaneous with their effects. As Craig understands things, God’s act of creation is simultaneous with the origination of the universe, thus making it the case that God does not exist temporally before the beginning of the universe.33 Many critics have questioned the coherence of this claim, but it is difficult to pinpoint what the problem is. It is difficult to pinpoint the problem because it is difficult to figure out what it means for God’s timeless phase of existence to be causally, but not temporally, prior to God’s temporal phase of existence. As

27 Craig 2001: 56–57. 28 Craig 2001: 272–274. 29 Craig 2001: 186. 30 Craig 2001: 272. 31 Craig 2001: 60. 32 Craig 2001: 273. 33 Craig 2001: 276.

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Paul Helm remarks, Craig is oddly silent on offering a deeper explanation of this view. According to Helm, “This explanatory silence is a rare act of philosophical self-denial on the part of a philosopher who is usually not short of positive reasons to support a philosophical position that he holds.”34 In an effort to shed some light on this claim, it is important to note that Craig takes time to be a relation between actual events.35 This is crucial for Craig’s argument against Richard Swinburne, who affirms that God exists temporally before creation. On Swinburne’s view, God exists in a temporal moment prior to creation. In this precreation moment, God is not undergoing any change.36 In fact, no changes are taking place in this precreation moment. In Craig’s mind, there is no good reason to call this precreation moment temporal. In the absence of actual change, Craig thinks this moment must be timeless. As Craig explains, “The only possible reason we could have for calling such a state temporal is that temporal states of affairs come after it.” He says that this would require a sort of backward causation whereby the first event causes time to exist before it.37 Personally, I find this a bit confusing. I gather the thought is something like this: Craig-Style Claim: Time exists if and only if actual change occurs. No changes occur until God creates, so no time exists until God creates. The act of creation marks the first event, or the first moment of time. Since no change occurred prior to the first event, there can be no time prior to the first event. Here is one problem with this relational theory of time. I find it counterintuitive to say that time exists if and only if change exists. This is counterintuitive because change does not occur at a moment of time. Instead, change occurs over a series of moments. Recall that a moment is the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise later. A change is things being one way at a particular moment, and then being different at the next moment. If time exists iff change exists, then it would seem that time cannot exist without there being a series of moments. This has a weird entailment – there is no time at the first moment because there is no change at the first moment. Consider a possible scenario. Say that time began at the Big Bang, and the point of singularity is the first moment of time. No change occurs at this first moment. This first moment has a point of singularity that could go bang, but it is not going bang. The bang occurs over a series of subsequent moments as the universe expands from this point of singularity. Since no change occurs at this

34 35 36 37

Helm 2010: 222. Craig 2001: 153. Swinburne 2016: 230–231. Craig 2001: 159.

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first moment, this first moment is not temporal. Why? Because time exists if and only if change exists, and there is no change at the first moment. That sounds counterintuitive to say the least. Surely time must exist at the first moment of time. On Craig’s view, this first moment doesn’t count as a moment of time unless it is followed by a series of later temporal states. The only possible reason we could have for calling the Big Bang a temporal state is if it is followed by later temporal states. But, by Craig’s reasoning, that would involve us in a sort of backward causation where the occurrence of later temporal states causes the first moment to be temporal.38 Hence, I take this view to be counterintuitive. I think the ultimate problem here is that the creationist view has not offered us an answer to the fundamental question, “what is time?”. Notice that Craig talks of temporal states and events being the things that explain what time is. It seems like Craig is making temporal states and events more fundamental than time because temporal events account for the existence of time. But if one doesn’t know what time is, it seems difficult to say that a particular state or event is temporal. We might have a vicious circularity here in the creationists understanding of time.39 But again, I am not seeking to offer unsurmountable objections. I am merely seeking to layout possible problems that each view has so that readers can better evaluate each view.

Thomas Jay Oord Imagine that you are still not ready to give up the creationist view. Perhaps you find Craig’s view implausible because you don’t know what it means for God to exist timeless sans creation, but temporal with creation. Yet, you are still committed to the claim that God causes time to exist, and that time exists iff change occurs. Yet, you want something that overcomes some of the pitfalls of Augustine and Craig. You might be in luck. Within Christian thought, Thomas Jay Oord offers an account that might offer more satisfactory answers. Alternatively, within Islamic thought, one might consider the theology of Ibn Taymiyyah.40 Oord claims that time exists if and only if change occurs. He claims that he can not understand time without change.41 On his view, God is eternally creating

38 Craig 2001: 236. 39 Meyer 2013: 7–20, (chapter 2). 40 See John Hoover’s chapter in this volume. 41 Personal correspondence.

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which entails that God always exists with a universe of some sort. Unlike Augustine and Craig, Oord denies that God ever exists without a universe. This is because Oord believes that divine love entails that God must always be creating beings with freedom.42 Oord avoids the unintuitive Augustinian claim that God is eternally creating yet is not co-eternal with creation. Oord also avoids the counterintuitive claim from Craig that God is timeless and then temporal. Oord’s view is also compatible with the Oppy principle that there can be no causes without changes. So it seems like Oord’s view has quite a bit going for it. With regards to time, Oord is so far doing better than Augustine and Craig. However, Oord might run into two different problems. First, one might find it intuitive that a basic causal principle is that all efficient causes are temporally prior to their effects.43 If you affirm this causal principle, Oord’s position becomes counterintuitive. If causes are always prior to their effects, then there must be a state of affairs where God exists without creation. If God freely causes a universe to exist, then God must exist temporally prior to the universe. But on Oord’s view, God never exists without a universe of some sort. Thus, Oord’s view violates this basic causal principle. Another potential problem for Oord’s view is that it runs afoul of our intuitions about infinity. If you think that it is impossible to traverse an infinite series of moments, then you will need to reject Oord’s view. This is because Oord’s view denies that God ever began to create. God is always creating, which seems to suggest that God has been creating for an actual infinite series of moments.44

The concomitance view As I noted at the beginning of this paper, there is a view about God’s relationship to time which denies that God creates time, and yet affirms that God is ontologically responsible for the existence of time. Within Christianity, this view is usually called the Oxford school of divine temporality, as its primary defenders are various contemporary thinkers that have some connection with the University of Oxford. For example, thinkers like J.R. Lucas, Richard Swinburne, and Alan Padgett. These thinkers claim that time exists if and only if change is possible. Further, the Oxford school affirms that time is a necessary concomitant of

42 Oord 2015, chapter 7.; Cf. Oord 2010. 43 Swinburne 1994: 81–90. 44 This is an objection that Oord hopes to address in forthcoming work.

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God’s being. This is because, on their view, God exists with freedom and power, and thus God can possibly change.45 Since I have offered an exploration and defense of this view elsewhere, I shall have no more to say about it here.46 I shall simply note that one might be able to find a similar concomitance view within Indian philosophy. In particular, in the thought of Veṅkaṭanātha.47

The divine watchmaker: The identification view I wish to turn my attention to another view that denies that time is created. This view says that time can be identified with God in some way. One might say that time is an aspect of God’s being or nature. Perhaps it is an attribute or a mode of God. Alternatively, one might say that God is strictly identical to time if she endorses divine simplicity. Within Christianity, this view is often associated with thinkers like Henry More, Samuel Clarke, and Isaac Newton.48 However, there are other thinkers within Christianity who fall in this camp such as the medieval French philosopher Nicole Oresme, and the Scottish theologian T.F. Torrance. Within Indian philosophy, one can find an Identification view in thinkers like Raghunātha Śiromani.49 As with previous sections in this paper, I shall stay focused on Christian thinkers. Within Christian thought, the Identification view is somewhat underdeveloped. The earliest version that I am aware of dates back to the late 14th Century, with the philosopher Nicole Oresme. He claims that space is God’s attribute of immensity, and that duration is the eternity of God.50 For Oresme, the duration of God is necessarily without beginning, without end, and without succession.51 Thus, God is timeless. Oresme claims that the duration of God contains the duration (life span) of all other things that exist over a succession of moments. Yet, he maintains that one ought not to say that God is time, even though he admits that it would be fitting to do so. The reason is not entirely clear why one cannot say that God is time, but I think it is something like this. We typically

45 Padgett 2001: 168–9. Also, Padgett 2011. 46 Mullins 2014. 47 See Marcus Schmücker’s paper in this volume. 48 For a detailed discussion, see Thomas 2018. 49 See Michael Williams’ paper in this volume. 50 Oresme 1968: 177. 51 Oresme 1968: 163–165.

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associate time with the finite succession of the universe, but Oresme says the successionless duration of God exists before the universe began to exist.52 T.F. Torrance also seems to hold to an identification view. He makes various remarks about God and time over the course of his writings, yet it is difficult to sort out any systematic views. Torrance suggests that one can distinguish between God’s time and the time of creation. God’s time is uncreated, whereas the time associated with creation is created. According to Torrance, created time is defined by its contingency, whereas uncreated time is the eternal life of God defined by His divine nature. So far, this sounds a bit similar to the views of Oresme. Unlike Oresme, Torrance makes it clear that God does have succession in His life subsequent to the act of creation. For instance, God was not always the creator of the universe, nor was God the Son always incarnate. According to Torrance, these are new moments in the life of God.53 Whereas Oresme affirms divine timelessness, Torrance is here affirming divine temporality.

How is God time? In an effort to draw some of these themes together, I shall sketch a possible way for a Christian to understand the Identification view in terms of divine temporality. This view says that God exists without beginning and without end. It affirms that God has succession in His life subsequent to the act of creation, though not prior to the act of creation. Unlike the Creationist view, the Identification version of divine temporality rejects a relational theory of time. Instead, it holds to an absolute theory of time. There are several ways to articulate an absolute theory of time, but one of the main underlying beliefs is that time can exist without change. This view maintains that time is an aspect of God’s being like an essential attribute or mode. How can time be an attribute of God? In order to understand this claim, it is worth recalling the distinctions from above between worlds and universes, and between world-actualization and creation. In order to develop the Identification view, the divine temporalist needs to make a further distinction between time and moments of time. Fiocco says that time is a natured entity that makes change possible.54 This is a statement about what time is fundamentally, and thus should be distinct

52 Oresme 1968: 271. 53 Torrance 2002: 50. 54 Fiocco 2017: 55.

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from different features of reality that we often associate with time, such as moments. According to Fiocco, moments explain how things can be in incompatible ways. A moment is the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. As I mentioned before, moments are sometimes taken to be nearly maximal propositions, or proposition-like entities, so they are even smaller domains within worlds than universes. Moments are merely a slice of a world, or a segment of a world. As Fiocco understands things, time is the ontological source of moments, and time is what orders the moments.55 I find Fiocco’s distinction between time and moments intuitive, but I cannot help but feel like there has to be more to the story about the metaphysics of time. One reason for this is that many philosophers affirm that the particular ordering of moments is a contingent state of affairs.56 One might complain that Fiocco’s account of time is too sparse to explain why a particular ordering of moments occurs. One will want to know more about this natured entity that makes change possible. I think that divine temporality can supplement this metaphysical story about time. The temporalist can say that God plays the roles of time that Fiocco has identified. In this way, the temporalist can say that time is properly attributable to God. I state the roles of time more clearly: Time is (i) a natured entity that makes change possible, (ii) the ontological source of moments, and (iii) that which orders the moments.

How can God play the role of time? With regards to role (i), the temporalist says that God is a natured entity that necessarily exists and necessarily has freedom and omnipotence. Given the existence and nature of God, change is possible. Without the exercise of God’s freedom, nothing would or could change in the world. Therefore, a temporalist can say that God is time, or that time is an attribute of God. God is a natured being that makes change possible. With regards to role (ii), the existence and nature of God serves as the ontological source of moments. Recall that a moment is a way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. In the precreation state, God exists, so there is a way things are. In the precreation state, God has free will, so things could be subsequently otherwise. Thus, a moment exists. Again, the precreation moment is the moment where God exists without any universe because God has not freely exercised His power. This view seems to entail that which moment is first in a time series is necessary. No matter what way history unfolds, this precreation moment has to be the first moment. No matter what God freely decides to

55 Fiocco 2017: 58. 56 Byerly 2014: 78.

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do, there must first be this precreation moment where God exists without a universe of any sort. A moment of time is just the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. God does not create a first moment. The first moment is a necessary concomitant of God’s existence because God is one way, but could be subsequently otherwise. God does not create this moment because it is not the sort of thing that can be created. This is similar to the claim made earlier that God cannot create a world because He simply does actualize a world. With regards to role (iii), a temporalist can say that the exercise of God’s freedom explains the ordering of moments.57 That there is a moment of time of some sort is necessary relative to the existence and nature of God, and how God freely exercises His power. What we sometimes call a time series is a particular ordering of moments. The order of the time series is contingent upon what God freely does with His power. Once God freely exercises His power to create a particular universe, God brings about the second moment. As God freely sustains the universe in existence, God brings about the existence of a series of moments. The temporalist now has a way of explaining how God can satisfy all three roles of time. Thus, it seems like one can properly attribute time of God. However, there are other things to consider for this view in contrast to the Creationist views described above.

Does God change when he creates? Recall a question that Augustine sought to address. When God creates, does He change? Augustine answered no, but the divine temporalist says yes. When God creates the universe, that marks a new moment in the life of God. In the precreation state, God can freely choose to create a universe if He wants and enter into covenantal relations with His creatures if He so desires. Upon creating the universe, God brings about intrinsic and extrinsic change in His life. God’s life undergoes succession when God freely performs the act of causing the universe to exist.

Is precreation time really time? One might notice some similarities between the Identification view and the Creationist view. Much like Augustine and Craig, this version of the Identification

57 For details of such an account, see Byerly 2014.

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view affirms the claim that there is a state of affairs where God exists without creation. What makes this version of the Identification view unique is that it denies that this state of affairs is timeless.58 Since the Identification view affirms the absolute theory of time, they will say that time can exist without change. The Creationist will call into question the intelligibility of precreation time. She will say that without change, there can be no time.59 This might be begging the question because the Identification view rejects the relational theory of time. But I can say a bit more about why I don’t find this objection worrisome. The temporalist who affirms the Identification view says that this precreation moment is a moment that lacks a beginning, but that does come to an end when God freely creates the universe. During this first moment, no change is taking place. The lack of change is what calls some theologians to doubt that it is truly temporal. They will ask how this is any different from a timeless state of affairs.60 I reply that the differences are quite stark. To start, recall what it means to be timeless. To say that God is timeless is to say that God necessarily lacks a beginning, an end, succession, temporal location, and temporal extension. A timeless state of affairs necessarily cannot be any other way. This is different from the Identification temporalist understanding of God’s precreation moment. In this precreation moment, God exists without beginning, without end, and without succession. Yet notice that God does not necessarily exist without succession. This is because God could change by freely performing some action. On divine temporality, God’s precreation moment can be otherwise because God is free and powerful. Further, notice that God does not exist without temporal location. This precreation moment is a temporal location. Thus, there are two differences between divine timelessness and this temporal precreation moment: the possibility of succession, and actual temporal location. That should be enough to show the differences between timeless existence and a temporal precreation moment. However, one might say that this precreation moment still looks like a timeless moment because there are no changes taking place. Is this a problem for the Identification version of divine temporality? I say no. This is because no changes occur at a moment. Change is always over a series of moments. Thus, the lack of change in the precreation moment is not indicative of timelessness because no change can occur at a moment.

58 Swinburne 2016: 230–231. 59 Thanks to Thomas Jay Oord for bringing this objection to me. 60 Craig 2001: 235.

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This particular objection does not have in mind the distinction between time and moments. Thus, it fails to cause problems for the Identification version of divine temporality. Time is that which makes change possible. A moment is the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. An actual change is things being one way at one moment, and then being another way at a subsequent moment.

Why didn’t God create sooner? Recall another question that Augustine sought to address. Why didn’t God create sooner? Much like Augustine and Craig, the Identification temporalist can say that there is no such thing as “sooner.” However, the Identification temporalist has different reasons for affirming why there is no sooner. For Augustine and Craig, there is no sooner prior to creation because there is no time prior to creation. For the Identification temporalist, there is no sooner prior to creation because there is no definite amount of time that has passed prior to the first moment of creation. Allow me to explain. The Identification temporalist can deny that time essentially has an intrinsic metric. She might say that a metric is an accidental feature of a series of moments, depending on what kind of universe God creates. However, she will maintain that a metric is not an essential intrinsic feature of time nor of the first moment. As such, there is no fact of the matter as to how long the first moment of time lasts. How can she maintain this position? The Identification temporalist can give three reasons to support her position. First, this precreation moment never began to exist. Without an initial boundary, it is impossible to say how long this moment has lasted. There is no initial boundary by which one can start a measurement. Again, a moment is the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. In the precreation moment, God simply exists without any change, and without any universe. God has not yet exercised His freedom and power to create a universe and subsequent moments. Second, due to a lack of change in this precreation moment, there is no way to develop a clock in order to measure the length of time. The inability to develop a clock rests on the claim that there is nothing to measure – i.e. the lack of change. Without any change, there simply is no measurement to make. Thus, there simply is no fact of the matter as to how long this precreation moment lasts. Third, in order to develop a clock, there needs to be more than mere change. There must also be consistent change. Without consistent change, one cannot develop a clock in order to create a measurement of a series of moments. An

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Identification temporalist might say that a series of moments cannot be measured unless there are laws of nature that provide a uniform periodic process by which one can develop a metric. In the absence of laws of nature, a series of moments can have a topology. This means that moments can be earlier and later than each other. However, the series of moments will lack an intrinsic metric because there is nothing in the world to create consistent change. As such, there is no truth to statements about the length of temporal intervals in the absence of uniform laws of nature.61 In light of this, the Identification temporalist can say that God exists in unmetricated time prior to His free act of creating the universe. Prior to creation, God exists at a moment where there is no change of any sort. Thus, there is no way to measure the initial precreation moment. Moreover, there is no fact of the matter as to how long God existed before He freely created the universe.

Doesn’t time have a beginning? A Creationist like Augustine or Craig will most likely not be happy with the Identification view at this point. They might want to continue to call into question the temporality of this precreation moment. Perhaps Augustine or Craig will argue that time has to have a beginning. Why should one think a thing like that? To be sure, most moments have a beginning, but it is not obvious that all moments have to have a beginning. If Augustine and Craig are willing to say that God’s timeless present exists without beginning, then I can see no obvious reason why they can’t allow a temporal present to exist without beginning as well. Again, a moment is simply the way things are but could be subsequently otherwise. Nothing about moments per se entails that they begin to exist. The beginning of a moment depends on various factors such as its place in a time series, and the structure of that time series. An Identification version of divine temporality can say that any moment after the first moment must begin to exist. This is because the way the world is at later moments began to be different from the way things were. This is not true of the first moment because the first moment never began to be that way. At this point, a Creationist like Craig will most likely wonder how the Identification view is compatible with the kalām cosmological argument. The kalām cosmological argument says that whatever begins to exist must have a cause for

61 Swinburne 1993: 208–9; see also Lucas 1973: 311.

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its existence. The universe began to exist. Thus, the universe has a cause for its existence.62 Notice that nothing about this argument obviously implies that time began to exist. In order to establish that time began to exist, one must bring in further assumptions about the nature of time that the Identification view rejects, like collapsing the distinction between time and moments. I see no reason for collapsing the distinction between time and moments. As far as I can tell, the Identification version of divine temporality is compatible with the kalām argument. The Identification view says that God and time do not begin to exist because time is an essential attribute of God. Further, she says the first moment of time does not begin to exist. So far, the Identification view is in agreement with the kalām argument. The Identification view also affirms that the second moment of time begins to exist, and that this second moment of time is caused to exist by the free exercise of God’s causal power. Again, that seems compatible with the kalām argument. One might worry about a particular argument brought up in discussions of the kalām argument related to infinity. In debates over the kalām argument, it is often argued that it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite number of past moments.63 One may recall that Oord’s view might face this problem because Oord claims that God has always been creating, which sounds like God has been creating in the infinite past. The Identification view, however, avoids this problem because she does not claim that God has in fact traversed an infinite number of moments. Recall that the Identification temporalist claims that God’s precreation moment is a single moment without any definite length. So nothing within the Identification version of divine temporality seems to run afoul of the kalām cosmological argument. Thus, nothing so far demands that time must begin to exist.

God, the direction of time, and causation Many philosophers of time wish to say that time intrinsically has a direction – forward. Typically, the direction of time is said to be closely related to the direction of causation. How can this be? This is difficult to grasp. On some analyses of the direction of time, it is causation that gives time its direction. Causation is said to go in one direction because it is an asymmetrical relation. Causes give

62 Craig 2012: 101. 63 Craig and Sinclair 2012: 103–125.

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rise to effects. Causes come before their effects. But notice that the direction of causation seems inextricably bound with the direction of time. Causes come before their effects. It seems difficult to make sense of causes having a direction without presupposing a direction of time. One might think that it is hopeless to offer an analysis of the direction of time in terms of causation being more fundamental. The two concepts seem to be distinct, yet completely tangled up together.64 Where do we go from here? My suggestion is that time is necessarily disposed to move in one direction, but that time does not necessarily actualize this direction. Causation can explain the actualization of the direction of time. Causation cannot explain the direction of time simpliciter since the very notion of a causal direction is bound up with time having a direction. However, causation can explain the actualization of time’s direction. Can the Identification version of divine temporality shed any light on this issue? By making time an attribute of God, the Identification temporalist might say that she has a more natural way of understanding this relationship between the direction of time and causation. The direction of time is grounded in the will of God. God has the capacity to exercise His causal powers in order to bring about various states of affairs. When God exercises His power, He undergoes a change. God goes from not exercising His power to exercising His power. Another way to think about this is that God goes from not acting to acting. The ability to do this is what grounds the direction of time. The exercise of this ability is what actualizes the direction of time. In the pre-creation state, time has the potential to go forward. However, there are no changes taking place, and so nothing is moving forward in any meaningful sense. Since God has free will, He does not have to perform any actions. Hence, why the actualization of time’s direction is not necessary. God is one way, but could be subsequently otherwise. God does not have to be otherwise. Once God freely performs an action, He is actualizing the direction of time by bringing about the next moment of time. All subsequent acts of sustaining the universe ground all subsequent moments of time. To further get into this account of time’s direction, consider a once popular thought experiment within the Identification school. Imagine that God were to stop sustaining the universe in existence. For some reason, God decides to let the universe cease to exist. In this moment, only God would exist. There would be an initial boundary for this moment. This moment would begin to exist once God is the only thing in existence. Would there be any subsequent moments of

64 Harrington 2015: 205; Cf. Swinburne 2016: 156–163.

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time? There will be no subsequent moments of time unless God freely brings them about. In this moment, there is a way things are but could be subsequently otherwise later. In this moment, God exists without a universe, but He could freely cause another universe to exist. Would time still have a direction? It would seem that time would have the intrinsic disposition to have a direction, and the only direction is moving forward. However, this disposition would not be actualized in this state of affairs.

Conclusion In this discussion, I have offered a close examination of two ways of explaining what time is, and how God is responsible for the existence of time. The Creationist claims that God is the timemaker, whereas the Identification view that I have articulated believes that God is merely a watchmaker. When God creates a universe with uniform laws of nature and consistent change, God does not create time. Instead, God creates a succession of moments with a metric.

Bibliography Augustine, Confessions. Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 2019. Augustine, The Trinity. Translated by Edmund Hill. Hyde Park: New City Press 1991. Augustine, The City of God. Translation by Marcus Dods. New York: Double Day 1958. Boethius, “On the Catholic Faith”. In: Theological Tractates. Translated by H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1609. T. Ryan Byerly, “God Knows the Future by Ordering the Times”. In: Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, 22–48. T. Ryan Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence. [Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2014]. New York: Bloomsbury Academic 2014. Ross P. Cameron, The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015. William Lane Craig, God, Time, and Eternity: The Coherence of Theism II: Eternity. London: Kluwer Academic Publisher 2001. William Lane Craig, “Response to Critics”. In: Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press 2001, 175–186. William Lane Craig, “Omnitemporality”. In: Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press 2001, 129–160. William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time. Wheaton: Crossway Books 2001.

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William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, “The Kalām Cosmological Argument”. In: William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Malden: Blackwell Publishing 2012, 101–201. Thomas P. Crisp, Presentism and the Grounding Objection. [Nous 41]. 2007, 90–103. John of Damascus, “On the Orthodox Faith”. In: A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Volume 9. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.). Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1898. Marcello Oreste Fiocco, What is Time?. [Manuscrito 40]. 2017, 43–65. James Harrington, Time: A Philosophical Introduction. London: Bloombury 2015. Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press 20102. Hud Hudson, The Fall and Hypertime. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014. Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives. London: Routledge 2015. Samuel Lebens and Tyron Goldschmidt, The Promise of a New Past. [Philosophers’ Imprint 17]. 2017. J.R. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space. London: William Clowes & Sons Limited 1973. Ulrich Meyer, The Nature of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013. R.T. Mullins, Doing Hard Time: Is God the Prisoner of the Oldest Dimension. [Journal of Analytic Theology 2]. 2014, 160–185. R. T. Mullins, The End of the Timeless God. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. Yujin Nagasawa, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017. Graham Oppy, Divine Causation. [Topoi 36]. 2017, 641–650. Thomas Jay Oord, The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. Downers Grove: IVP Academic 2015. Thomas Jay Oord, The Nature of Love: A Theology. Danvers: Chalice Press 2010. Nicole Oresme; Albert D. Menut and Alexander J. Denomy (trs.), Le Livre du Ciel et du Monde. London: The University of Wisconsin Press 1968. Alan G. Padgett, “Response to William Lane Craig”. In: Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.), God and Time: Four Views. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press 2001, 165–169. Alan G. Padgett, “The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered”. In: Christian Tapp and Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), God, Eternity, and Time. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company 2011, 117–126. John Philoponus, Against Proclus. On the Eternity of the World 1–5. Translated by Michael Share. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 2004. A.W. Pink, The Attributes of God. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House 1975. Richard Swinburne, “God and Time”. In: Eleonore Stump (ed.), Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann. London: Cornell University Press 1993, 204–222. Richard Swinburne, The Christian God. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994. Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 20162. Emily Thomas, Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018. Thomas F. Torrance, Theological and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers 2002.

Daniel Saudek

Time’s arrow, relativity and God’s eternity: From the limitedness of creatures to the asymmetric structure of the worldline Introduction How we think about the relationship between God and time depends on the ontology of time we presuppose. But the latter is affected in a crucial way by theoretical physics, in particular by the theory of relativity. Hence, a plausible account of the relationship between God and time needs to take relativity theory into account. In this article, we will first consider some of the classical problems on God and time which have been posed in both Western and Eastern thought. Next, some of the key points of how the theory of relativity has changed our understanding of time will be highlighted. This discussion will lead us to a new way of thinking about time and the theory of relativity that lies beyond the classical models of the “block universe” and a universal passage of time as advocated by the A-theory: the theory of time’s arrow whereby the passage of time is indeed a real phenomenon, but a local rather than global one. Finally, the problems described in section (1) will be reconsidered. It will turn out that they become dramatically simplified in light of the theory of relativity and a local theory of time.

God and time: Some classical problems The history of philosophy features a whole family of problems concerning the relationship between God and time. Among the most well known of these is the perennially discussed dilemma of divine foreknowledge and future contingents, in particular a person’s free choice: If God knows what I will do tomorrow, how can I be free? It may seem to me that the future is “open” in the sense that it depends, at least in part, on my free choices between alternatives. But God, as an omniscient being – so the objection goes – already now knows what I will choose, thereby ruling out any other alternatives. Hence, there cannot be free choice after all. This is the problem that vexed the late Roman philosopher Boethius,

Daniel Saudek, Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen, Offenbacher Landstr. 224, 60599 Frankfurt a. M., Germany https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-004

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who discusses it at length in books IV and V of his Consolatio Philosophiae, written while in prison. The movement of open theism, which denies that God knows the future in order to protect the possibility of free choice, is a wellknown contemporary response to the problem.1 But problems about God and time also arise independently of the issue of future contingents and free choice. A particularly salient one has been posed by Norman Kretzmann: How can God know what time it is now without being subject to change? But if God is subject to change, how can he be a perfect being?2 Indian thought on time, characterized largely by substantivalist accounts of it, wrestled with the problem of whether time is a reality independent from God (as in the classical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition), a dependent entity existing alongside God (as in the thought of Veṅkaṭanātha), or as an aspect of God (Raghunātha).3 The common denominator of these problems arising in both Western and Eastern thought is that time, as a fundamental, universal and all-pervading aspect of reality, clashes in various ways with the eternal and omniscient God as the foundation of reality.

Time and relativity theory The theory of relativity is of central importance for the relationship between God and time because it undermines the notion of a universal time. It does so by abolishing an absolute, global past-present-future distinction, a “global now.” Recall, first, the distinction between spacelike, timelike, and lightlike-separated events which features in both special and general relativity: Put simply, two events are spacelike-separated if an electromagnetic wave (or anything else traveling at the speed of light) does not have enough time to overcome the spatial separation between them. If the converse is true, they are timelike-separated. If they are neither – i.e. if only an influence having the speed of light can connect the two events – they are lightlike-separated. Next, consider the relation of “nowness” between two events occurring in different places, for example by imagining that “now,” in the moment during which you are reading these lines, the sun – eight light minutes away – suddenly gets a red spot. These two events, according to the above, are spacelike-separated. The reason why relativity abolishes the notion of an absolute, global relation of “nowness” between events is simple:

1 Pinnock 1994. 2 Kretzmann 1966: 409. 3 See the contributions by Marcus Schmücker and Michael Williams in this volume.

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3.

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For any two spacelike-separated events: if they are “now” absolutely, then they are simultaneous absolutely. But special and general relativity theory show that no two spacelike-separated events are simultaneous absolutely. Rather, their order depends on the frame of reference chosen.4 Therefore, no two spacelike-separated events are “now” absolutely.

Geometrically, this means that we cannot define, in a non-arbitrary way, a “cut” in spacetime that would define “now” and that would separate the past from the future as a “glowing advancing edge.” For the same reason, there can be no frame-independent foliation of spacetime into hypersurfaces containing “the universe at time t.” Attempts to identify a privileged frame of reference, and with it, true, absolute simultaneity and “nowness,” are always beset with the question: why is this particular frame of reference privileged over others? In this sense, they are analogous to (hypothetical) attempts to define an absolute “downward” direction independent of the gravitational fields of local objects. This situation has given rise to a large amount of literature on the relationship between time and the theory of relativity. Although this cannot be discussed here in detail,5 roughly, we can distinguish two families of models: The first is the “block universe.” On it, the theory of relativity shows that there is no ontologically robust division between past and future. From this, many block-universe theorists have concluded that the future is not “open” as it seems to be. Rather, future events are “just there” (Arthur Eddington6), so that everything is, as Olivier Costa de Beauregard put it, “written”.7 In a similar vein, Wim Rietdijk and Hilary Putnam have developed by now classical arguments on which the geometry of spacetime leads to a universal determinism encompassing all events.8 This does not mean that all block-universe theorists are determinists, but the common denominator is that the asymmetric structure of time is not a real feature of the world. Within the other family of views, which I call “cosmic A-theory,” there is an absolute, global past-present-future distinction in spite of the theory of relativity. There are therefore also privileged relations of simultaneity over and above the structure of relativistic spacetime. Cosmic A-theorists – who include,

4 5 6 7 8

See any textbook on relativity theory, e.g. Taylor & Wheeler 1992. Mould 1994. For an in-depth overview of the subject, see e.g. Dorato 1995. Eddington 1920: 46–7. Frazer 1981: 429–430. Rietdijk 1966; Putnam 1967.

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among others, Roberto M. Unger and Lee Smolin,9 William L. Craig,10 and Dean W. Zimmerman11 – have advanced several proposals for identifying, in physical terms, the necessary privileged frame of reference. The block universe model thus has the virtue of squaring well with the results of spacetime physics, but it fails to account for the asymmetry between past and future that is so obvious to us as agents in spacetime. The converse is true for cosmic A-theory, which saves the phenomena of the passage of time, but to this end needs to posit physically implausible privileged frames of reference.

The local model of the arrow of time From the above, it can be seen that there is a need for a model of time that accounts for the past-present-future distinction and for time’s passage, but without privileged relations of simultaneity between spacelike-separated events. This can be done, I claim, through a local model in which time is not a property of the world as a whole, but rather is defined in terms of a substance to which it is attached, so to speak. This model needs to account for three properties of time familiar from everyday experience: 1. temporal precedence, i.e. the relation “before,” and with it, the closely related concept of change; 2. the metric properties of time, i.e. the fact that events are not only ordered in terms of “before,” but that, in addition, the duration between them can be measured and compared; 3. time’s asymmetric structure or “arrow,” meaning that time moves unidirectionally from a fixed, unchangeable past into an open future, unlike space that allows moving back and forth. These properties of time can be derived non-circularly from simple assumptions about substances and causation, as outlined in the following.12

Deriving “before” and change In order to derive the notion of “before,” note first that any substance can be associated with a set of its possible states. The moon, for example, can exist in a state in which it bears a particular crater, a human footprint, a puddle of water, all of these, some combination of these, or none of these. Generally, for any substance S,

9 Unger/Smolin 2015. 10 Craig 2001. 11 Zimmerman 2013: 163–246. 12 For a more technical derivation, see Saudek 2020.

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there are intrinsic properties p such that S-with-p and S-without-p are states of S. We can also associate with a substance the set of all of its actually existing states, as opposed to merely possible ones. In either case, the notion of such a set does not presuppose a temporal order. Furthermore, we note that a substance has such different states only insofar as it is subject to causal interactions, either with its surroundings, or among its own parts. The intrinsic properties p characterizing these states can therefore be viewed as records of causal interactions, so that I will henceforth employ the variable r for them. By the same token, any substance S can be viewed as a recorder of causal interactions. To see how we get from a non-ordered set of states of a substance to an ordered one, consider, as an example, the moon being bombarded by meteorites that produce craters in it. Suppose that “Alice” and “Fred” are two such craters. Suppose also that we are given photographs of different states of the moon: one where both Alice and Fred are on the moon, one with neither, and one with just Fred. Which is the correct before-ordering of these states? We note that there is a state of the moon with Fred but without Alice, a state with both, but no state with only Alice. This enables us to conclude that, probably, the state with only Fred is before the one with Fred and Alice, so that the causal interaction event which produced Fred is likely to have occurred before the one which produced Alice. Note that, to arrive at this judgment, we employ an existence asymmetry which characterizes the set of states of the moon: the situation would be symmetric if there were a state of the moon containing only Alice, but without Fred. We do not need a primitive temporal notion of “before” in order to verify this existence asymmetry. For example, if we are given a stack of photos of states of the moon, we can do so regardless of the order in which the photos happen to be shuffled. However, in the case of the moon, we cannot be certain that the hypothesized before-ordering is indeed true: for example, it is also possible that the state with both craters was before the one with only Fred, whereupon Alice was deleted. Nevertheless, we can use the aforementioned existence asymmetry to arrive at a definition of “before.” This is possible by introducing the concept of an “ideal recorder,” which idealizes the recording property that every substance has:13

13 In my “Beyond A-theory and the Block Universe” (Saudek: 2020) I called this an “amended” recorder, whereas the concept of the “ideal recorder” involved an additional step.

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D.1 An ideal recorder is a substance I such that causal interactions do nothing other than produce records in I. An important consequence of this definition is that causal interactions do not affect records which are in I. Substances such as cameras, or human brains, make good – but not perfect – ideal recorders insofar as they not only allow recording, but also protect records in them from being affected by causal interactions. Given an ideal recorder I, we can define the relation “before” between its states. Let x be a causal interaction in which I is involved, and let rx be the record of this interaction in I. Then: D.2 For any two distinct causal interactions x and y, ry is “before” rx for I if and only if the following two states of I exist: a state with ry and without rx, and a state with ry and rx. Note that, unlike in the case of the moon considered above, the existence asymmetry corresponds with certainty to the before-order known from everyday experience. This is because the criterion defining the ideal recorder precludes records, to use everyday language, from becoming “deleted.” However, this criterion itself does not use such temporal language, nor does it make reference to earlier or later states of I. Therefore, this criterion is able to account for the everyday notion of “before” without circularly employing any notion of temporal succession in the definiens. Note also that the proposed definition of “before” requires only two states of I rather than explicit quantification over all of them. This is because, by definition of the ideal recorder, given the two states of I mentioned above, there cannot be a state of it containing only rx without ry. By a simple extension, we can use the above before-ordering of records of causal interaction events to arrive at a before-ordering of the interactions themselves. This is done by defining: D.3 For any x and y, y is before x for I if and only if ry is before rx for I. Having defined “before,” it is now possible to give an account of the notion of change in a substance: Let I be an ideal recorder and B some substance. Suppose that B exists in a state in which it has some property p and another state in which it does not. I can be influenced causally by B and can therefore bear records corresponding to B-with-p and B-without-p. An example of this is a camera recording an object whose states are marked by different colors. Given this, we can define the following: D.4 A substance B changes if and only if there is some property p of B such that either B-without-p is before B-with-p for I, or B-with-p is before B-without-p for I, where I is an ideal recorder.

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The before-order of B’s states for I can be established by inspecting I’s states with their different records of B, and applying the definition of “before” to these states. We can then say “B acquires p for I” for the first of the two cases in (D.4), and that “B loses p for I” in the second one. Thus, the definition of change of a substance as I propose it requires that there also be a recording substance, since such a substance is the basis of a before-order. Note however that the order of B’s states is a relativistic invariant. That is, this order as recorded by I must also be that recorded by any other ideal recorder. This is because B cannot travel faster than light, so that an event “B has p” cannot be spacelike-separated from an event “B does not have p”. In other words, both events are part of B’s worldline and must therefore be timelike, or at the most, lightlike-separated, so that their order is independent of the frame of reference. It is worth pointing out that understanding temporal succession and change in terms of the states of a recording object corresponds to everyday experience. To illustrate this, suppose that a person learns football as a child and Japanese as a teenager. The person’s judgment of whether she learnt football or Japanese first is not arrived at by a direct experience of the past, which is impossible. Rather, this is done by accessing present records in the memory, a point made by Saint Augustine concerning the similar problem of temporal measurement.14 If the person is able to tell that there is a state of herself knowing football but no Japanese, and another state with knowledge of both, she can judge that she knew football before Japanese. By giving this example, I do not mean that a conscious entity is necessary in order to define “before” or change, but rather that defining the two in the way proposed above is able to account for the before-order known from experience. In addition, the fact that we are not perfectly ideal recorders accounts for the familiar phenomenon that gaps in the records of our biography sometimes prevent us from being able to carry out the comparison of our states which would be required to establish their before-order. Finally, some readers may object that the very notion of “causal interaction” presupposes that of “before” rather than explaining it. But a close analysis of causal interactions, as has been undertaken for example by Stephen Mumford and Rani L. Anjum for the case of colliding billiard balls, shows that what we call “earlier” and “later” states are not part of the interactions themselves. Rather, the causation is simultaneous.15 Furthermore, everyday causal interactions, such as mechanical and chemical ones, are mediated by the electromagnetic

14 Confessiones, XIII, 27: “In te, anime meus, tempora metior . . . affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in te faciunt et, cum illae praeterierint, manet, ipsam metior praesentem.” 15 Mumford/Anjum 2011, chapter 5.

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interaction. But the physics of this interaction does not require any underlying temporal asymmetry.16 It is true that we cannot imagine two distinct states of a system without a lapse of time between them. But this is because we make temporal judgments by comparing such states using the records in our memory, and therefore cannot imagine causal interactions independently of temporal succession, not because the physics of causal interactions would itself require such succession.17

Deriving time’s metric properties The existence of a before-ordering of states or events does not by itself mean that quantification of an interval between two of them is possible. This is clear by considering the example of dreams, where we have temporal succession, but not quantification thereof. Quantification is based on counting, which in turn is based on the concept of different tokens of a particular type of entity, as was pointed out by Wittgenstein.18 An account of time in terms of recording will therefore employ different instances of a particular type of record, which I will call r*. Then, a recorder can have states with different numbers of r*. Also, for an ideal recorder, the ordering of its states in terms of these numbers increases monotonically with the succession given by its before-ordering, i.e. for two states I’ and I~ of an ideal recorder, if I’ is before I~, then the number of r* in I~ is greater than or equal to the number of r* in I’. Furthermore, the number of r* contained in I can be interpreted as a local natural temporal parameter t. From it, a rational parameter can be derived by subdividing t further by means of an additional counting mechanism, based on some type of record other than r*, in I. Of course, we can, in a next step, also derive a real parameter from this if we wish to do so, but it must be borne in mind that this can only be done in thought, because nonrational real values of t cannot correspond to physical states of I. For example, we can establish a local natural temporal parameter by recording and counting, say, sunsets, and fractions thereof by doing the same with pendulum swings, but no such process can yield a non-rational real value. In any case, independently of the degree of fine graining we choose, t can be identified with “time”,

16 Wheeler/Feynman 1945: 157–161. 17 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see section 5.1 of “Beyond A-theory and the Block Universe” (2020). 18 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.1272.

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so that t’s values indicate what time it is locally. Since time so understood is based on records in a recording object, it is, on my account, a local phenomenon “attached” to such an object. Moreover, if the recorder is not ideal, then it is also possible to establish such a local time parameter t. The number of records r in such a recorder will then tend to increase monotonically with t, but is not guaranteed to do so, as we can see in non-ideal recorders such as ourselves. Given the above, we can identify states of I using local time, t, and write them correspondingly as It. This also allows any record r in I to be indexed temporally, by defining as follows: D.5 For an ideal recorder I, for any record r in I, and for any local time t of I: if t is the least index of I such that r is in It, then r = rt. In other words, a record r is given the time index t of the earliest state of I in which r is.

Deriving time’s arrow Having given an account of “before,” change, and local time measurement, it now remains to explain why time is an “arrow,” i.e. why it moves unidirectionally from a fixed, determinate past into an open future. To do so, I will make an epistemic assumption: from records in a recording object, it is possible to conclude truth values of propositions. Of course, the records do not themselves directly imply such propositions. Rather, the latter are arrived at through inference by using a certain set of rules that allow such conclusions to be drawn. I will call this set V, from the German “Verfahren” (procedure). For example, from a particular imprint on the surface of the earth, we can conclude, based on our background knowledge, that a meteorite struck, a dinosaur walked past, or such like. The above assumption may at first sight seem daring. But it must be borne in mind that, arguably, all our knowledge of the external world is based on drawing inferences from material records contained in objects such as brains, the surface of the earth, books, digital storage systems, and so on. Thus, without an assumption such as the above, we would land in an all-encompassing skepticism. Now, let R be a set of records contained in an ideal recorder I, and let PR be the set containing all propositions, and only them, that can be derived from R using the inference rules in V. But, from definition (D.5), for each local time t of I, there is a set Rt containing records rt. This set includes the record corresponding to the local time count, and in addition it may also include other records rt. We can then derive a set of propositions Pt by applying the rules in V to Rt. If Rt

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is empty apart from the record corresponding to the local time count, we may conclude that “nothing happened” at local time t. Next, consider It0, i.e. I in its state corresponding to some local time t0. For t < t0, there is a set Rt consisting of records rt which are in It0. Then, for each such time, there is also a set of propositions Pt. On the other hand, consider local times t such that t > t0. It0 contains no records corresponding to these times, and hence, there is no set Pt for them. We may also say that local times t < t0 are occupied by Pt -sets, whereas local times t > t0 are not. From this, it follows that the propositional content for t < t0 is fixed and unchangeable. For suppose that we wish to change it. This would mean either adding some proposition, call it pt+, to Pt, or taking away some proposition, call it pt-, from it. But both are impossible: Pt contains all and only the propositions which can be inferred from Rt and V, and so adding pt+ would mean that pt+ both is and is not true. Likewise, pt- can be inferred from Rt and V, and therefore cannot not be true. The notion of changing the past is therefore contradictory. This corresponds to everyday experience: we cannot bring about that what happened didn’t, nor that something additional happened which did not. Now, no such argument applies for t > t0, because It0 does not contain records for such times, and hence, there is no set of propositions Pt occupying them. There is therefore nothing contradictory about the concept of influencing the propositional content of the local future. The above argument also precludes the possibility of revisiting the past, since doing so would open the possibility of influencing it causally, which is contradictory. Hence, time cannot move backwards, but only forwards, if it moves anywhere at all. This, I submit, accounts for its unidirectional, arrow-like character. Note also that the entropy of a local system increases, with overwhelming probability, as local time increases, simply because there are more causal interactions. But, unlike assumed by many physicists, on my account, the increase of entropy is a symptom, not the cause of the passage of time. This can also be seen by noticing that it is not contradictory for entropy to decrease with the passage of time; this is only overwhelmingly unlikely. In contrast, the notion of changing the past is indeed contradictory. The local model of the arrow of time can be pictured by imagining the timeline of an ideal recorder in a state It0. If times t < t0 are drawn below the point t0, and times t > t0 above it, then the former are occupied by Pt-sets, whereas the propositional content of the latter branches away at every value of t. A local timeline thus resembles the plant known as the horsetail (equisetum). Spacetime as a whole can then be pictured as a collection of infinitely many such horsetails, each having a “cut” between the fixed past and the open future, i.e.

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the local now. Of course, picturing spacetime in this way should not mislead us into thinking that the local nows are simultaneous with each other. In sum, I submit that neither a global passage of time, valid for the entire universe, nor relations of simultaneity between spacelike-separated events are needed in order to account for the way we experience time. Also, a global lapse of time is not a precondition of change, as Kurt Gödel thought.19 But this does not mean that our experience of time is illusory. Rather, I propose that “before,” change, time measurement and time’s arrow can be accounted for on the basis of substances, the records in them, and causal interactions. The claim is not that notions such as “substance,” “record,” or “causal interaction” are ontologically fundamental – it may well be that each of them can be accounted for in terms of notions which are still more fundamental – but that they provide the foundation for the passage of time.

Consequences of the local model of time for philosophical theology We can now revisit the classical problems on God and time, as presented in section (1) above, in the light of relativity theory and the local theory of time. Norman Kretzmann’s dilemma on whether God can know what time it is without changing is a profound one. Whether it could have been solved in the days before the theory of relativity, I am not sure. However, given relativity the problem essentially dissolves, because there simply is no changing fact about what time it is for God to know. This is because such a fact would consist in which states of affairs obtain now, what the state of the universe is now, which events are happening now, or similar. But such concepts are meaningful only if absolute simultaneity is presupposed, which it was by and large in pre-relativistic days, and still often is even in contemporary discussions on God and time. Something similar can be said of the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents. In my view, the problem was solved satisfactorily also in pre-relativistic times when global simultaneity was assumed. Thus, in the Consolatio Philosophiae, the personified Lady Philosophy convinces Boethius that foreknowledge does not amount to predetermination, and that the impression that it does is due to a confusion between the necessitas consequentiae and the necessitas consequentis. Boethius has difficulties getting his head around this, but in the end accepts. But whether or not these answers are satisfactory, the

19 Gödel 1990.

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problem today is much simpler: It simply makes no sense to say that God knows the future “already now,” because there is no global now for God to be in and from which to see into the future. The problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents therefore dissolves for the same reason that Kretzmann’s does. God, I propose, simply knows all events, including those at a future point of our worldline. But the statement that God knows these events “already now” is based on an unwarranted extrapolation of these temporal concepts from a local level, where they are fully justified, to reality as a whole. All this should not, of course, be taken to mean that there are no problems concerning the relationship between God and creatures. There are difficult problems concerning the relationship between primary and secondary causality, in particular regarding the free agency of persons.20 But these problems are causal, not temporal. Finally, I would like to sketch how the ontological relationship between God and time might present itself on the local model of time that I have proposed. On it, time is based on different states of recording objects. God, on the other hand, cannot exist in different states for reasons pointed out already by Plato:21 If this were the case, then one state would have some positive property that another does not. At least one of them would therefore lack a positive property. But God, as the basis of the existence of all other beings, cannot lack any positive property, and so the state which does so cannot be God. Thus, God can be subject neither to change nor time, but rather must be eternal by his very nature. On the other hand, to be limited is a necessary but not sufficient condition for existing in different states, and hence for being part of a before-ordering and for undergoing change. A before-ordering, in turn, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a local time count, as well as for the existence of worldlines with an asymmetric temporal structure. Thus, since limited beings depend in their existence on God, so do “before,” change, and time’s arrow.

Bibliography Aquinas, Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, Editio Leonina Manualis. Rome: Desclée and C. Herder, newly edited by Jacob Wood, 2012. Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones, http://www.augustinus.it/latino/confessioni/index2.htm.

20 See Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, LXX and LXIII. Clarke 1973. 21 The Republic, 381.

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Boethius, Consolatio Philosophiae, Rudolf Peiper (ed.). Leipzig: Teuber 1871. William N. Clarke, “A New Look at the Immutability of God”. In: Robert J. Roth (ed.), God Knowable and Unknowable. New York: Fordham University Press 1973, 43–72. William L. Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001. Olivier C. De Beauregard, “Time in Relativity Theory: Arguments for a Philosophy of Being”. In: Julius T. Fraser (ed.), The Voices of Time, 2nd edition. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press 1981, 417–433. Mauro Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming. Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice: Bologna 1995. Arthur Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1920. Kurt Gödel, “A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy.” In: Solomon Feferman et al. (eds.), Kurt Gödel – Collected Works. Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990, 202–207. Norman Kretzmann, Omniscience and Immutability. [The Journal of Philosophy 63 (14)]. 1966, 409–421. Richard A. Mould, Basic Relativity. New York: Springer 1994. Stephen Mumford and Rani L. Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011. Clark H. Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker and David Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press 1994. Plato, The Republic. Translated by John L. Davies and David J. Vaughan. London and New York: Macmillan 1892. Hilary Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry. [The Journal of Philosophy 64(8)]. 1967, 240–247. Wim Rietdijk, A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity. [Philosophy of Science 33(4)]. 1966, 341–344. Daniel Saudek, Beyond A-theory and the Block Universe: A Non-Circular Derivation of ‘Before,’ Change, and the Local Arrow of Time. [Kriterion 34:1]. 2020, 21–48. Edwin F. Taylor and John A. Wheeler, Spacetime Physics, 2nd ed. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company 1992. Roberto M. Unger and Lee Smolin, The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time: A Proposal in Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015. John A. Wheeler and Richard P. Feynman, Interaction with the Absorber as the Mechanism of Radiation. [Reviews of Modern Physics 17(2–3)]. 1945, 157–161. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In: Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe. Volume I. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1995. Dean W. Zimmerman, “Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold”. In: Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, 163–246.

Ze’ev Strauss

God, the grandfather of time: Time and the absolute in the thought of Philo of Alexandria Introduction The concept of time constitutes one of the most perplexing aspects of the philosophy of the Jewish exegete Philo of Alexandria (c. 15 BCE–c. 50 CE). The confusion is the result of time’s ambiguous treatment in Philo’s thought: On the one hand, due to its pivotal function in the constant corporeal processes of genesis and destruction, time is treated as separate from the Godly sphere altogether. On the other hand, time is the main metaphysical theme of Philo’s non-literal treatment of the most significant philosophical section of Jewish Scripture: the account of creation.1 In the following article, I will argue that Philo’s ambivalence about time is a source of tension that must be resolved if one wishes to understand his philosophical undertaking. My argument involves three main steps: First, I will show how Philo leverages the notion of time to establish God’s absoluteness and transcendence. Time and its ostensible structure of totality within the empirical realm represent an important worldly medium for God, through which His unfathomable, supreme Being can be conveyed ex negativo. It will be demonstrated that God’s non-temporal eternal Being enables Him to noetically interact with righteous souls. This relationship not only frees these pious individuals from the contingency of temporal reality, but also frees Mosaic faith as a whole therefrom, which is built upon this immediate living discourse with the Divine, thus being rendered a tradition predicated on irrefutable eternal precepts. Subsequently, I will point to the fact that Philo, in some instances, does explain God in terms of time, primarily

1 Ekaterina Matusova has recently persuasively argued that Philo’s speculative exegesis of the creation account in De opificio mundi “is congruent with the history of allegorical interpretation of the type of text to which Gen 1 belongs” (Matusova 2019: 66; cf. ibid. 94: “While not being written in the same manner from a formal point of view as the Allegorical commentary, this treatise fulfills all the requirements of the genre of allegory”). For a different view on this treatise’s overall place and genre as part of the ‘Exposition of the Law’ within Philo’s corpus, see Runia 2001, PACS 1: 1–8; Sterling 2012: 63–69; idem 2018: 32, 37–39, 44; Niehoff 2019: 109, 293, 295–298. Ze’ev Strauss, Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, University of Hamburg, Schlüterstr. 51, 20146 Hamburg, Germany https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-005

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through his use of the anthropomorphic metaphor of God as the grandfather of time, as well as the Platonic idea of pure presence. I conclude by arguing that the idea of time in Philo’s philosophy cannot simply be dismissed as a byproduct of the building blocks of the physical world, space, and movement. Rather, in Philonic thought, time is an ontologically proper phenomenon in its own right.

God’s timeless Hexameron On reading Philo’s allegorical interpretation of the Hexameron in his De opificio mundi, one is directly confronted with the text’s counterintuitive core statement: The scriptural depiction of God’s creative activity as having taken place over six days in fact has nothing to do with an actual length of time. Instead, the different days of creation signify an innate order (τάξις), an order that resulted from one simultaneous act. This in turn presupposes the underlying concept of a number (ἀριθμός): He [sc. Moses] says that the cosmos was fashioned in six days, not because the maker was in need of a length of time – for God surely did everything at the same time [ἅμα γὰρ πάντα δρᾶν εἰκὸς θεόν], not only in giving commands but also in his thinking –, but because things that come into existence required order [ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ τοῖς γινομένοις ἔδει τάξεως]. Number is inherent in order [τάξει δὲ ἀριθμὸς οἰκεῖον], and by the laws of nature the most generative of numbers is the six.2

Two main theological difficulties seem to have prompted Philo to dissociate God’s creative activity from the notion of duration that emerges from the temporal terminology used in the creation account. The first is God’s anthropomorphic portrayal, essentially that of a human laborer who worked for a certain length of time (six days) until fatigue sets in. Closely linked to this problem is the implication that God is dependent upon time for the execution of His plans or that His creative productivity is subordinate to time’s predetermined logic.

2 Opif. 13: Philo of Alexandria 2001, PACS 1: 49. Cf. Leg. 1.2. For further insightful analysis of these central Philonic themes, see Sterling 1992: 33–35, 40; Winston 1985: 24–25, 47–49; Runia 2001, PACS 1: 22, 125; O’Brien 2015: 57–67.

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Time, a derivative of a derivative The way Philo goes about his argument is not merely by dissociating time from God’s creative activity, as well as by ontologically depreciating time’s very nature: When he says that in (the) beginning God made the heaven and the earth, he does not take the (term) beginning [τὴν ἀρχὴν], as some people think, in a temporal sense. For there was no time before the cosmos, but rather it either came into existence together with the cosmos or after it. Time began either simultaneously with the world or after it. When we consider that time is the extension of the cosmos’ movement [διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεώς ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος], and that there could not be any movement earlier than the thing that moves but must necessarily be established either later or at the same time, then we must necessarily conclude that time too is either the same age as the cosmos or younger than it. To venture to affirm that it is older is unphilosophical. If beginning in the present context is not taken in the temporal sense, it is likely that its use indicates beginning in the numerical sense, so that the expression in (the) beginning he made is equivalent to he first made the heaven.3

Employing the Stoic definition of time as “measured space determined by the world’s movement”4 Philo prioritizes not only the cosmos over time. He approaches its most fundamental aspect, movement (κίνησις), upon which time is causally predicated, in the same way.5 As a result, he does not regard time as a direct product of God’s creation, but thinks of it as a derivative of a derivative of it: of space (χώρα) and of its movement. This perspective enables Philo to push back against any temporally bounded concept of God and His unlimited creative actuality. Furthermore, this explanatory model that regards time as “younger” than the cosmos is in point of fact Platonic.6 In several instances, Philo subscribes to the Platonic definition of time as a movable image of eternity

3 Opif. 26–27: Runia 2001, PACS 1: 52 (emphasis in original). For further elaborate elucidations of this theme, see Wolfson 1962: 1:320–321. Runia 2001, PACS 1: 112, 124–127, 157–159, 161–162, 171; Rudavsky 2018: 142–143; Cohen-Yashar 1973: 226; Leisegang 1913: 14; Bormann 1955: 32; Kaiser 2015: 178–179; Sterling 1992: 17; Montes-Peral 1987: 83. 4 As Runia, who follows Wolfson (1962: 1:319) in this point, claims, Philo’s employment of the Stoic definition of time is “merely a restatement in formal language of the Platonic (and Mosaic) conceptions of time” (Runia 1986: 217). 5 For an explanation of this definition of time, see Lauer 1958: 39–41; Whittaker 1971: 38–39; Kaiser 2015: 179; Wolfson 1962: 1:319–320. 6 Runia 1986: 216; Kaiser 2015: 179 (“Damit aber endet er statt bei den Stoikern bei Platon, der Tim.38b6–c6 erklärt hatte, dass die Zeit zugleich mit dem Himmel entstanden sei”); Sterling 1992: 23.

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(εἰκὼ κινητόν . . . αἰῶνος, Tim. 37d5) as outlined in Timaeus 37d–38c.7 From this point of view, time is not even thought of as a phenomenon unto itself, but rather as the imitation of such a phenomenon – that of eternity (Tim. 38a7) – which has the ontological effect of relegating time to the status of a mere copy or reflection.8

Reintroducing time into the account of creation Although Philo makes use of the laws of allegory (ἀλληγορίας κανόνες / νόμοι) to disconnect the concept of time from the literal meaning of the creation account, that literal meaning does resurface in another context. In §165 of Quis rerum divinarum heres sit – where Philo depicts the formative activity of the λόγος τομεύς as a series of dichotomous ‘divisions,’ a model that he uses to prove Moses’ love of equality9 – he assigns a pivotal symbolic importance to time, but does so by taking the creation story in its literal, temporal sense: “Again the three days before the sun’s creation are equal in number to the three which followed it [. . .], the whole six being divided by equality to express time and eternity [ἑξάδος τμηθείσης ἰσότητι πρὸς αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου δήλωσιν]. For God dedicated the three before the sun to eternity, and the three after it to time, which is a copy of eternity.”10 David Runia has already pointed out the problematic aspect of this reading of Philo, if one wishes to account for his non-literal understanding of the Hexameron: “Exegetically the thought is neatly contrived, but philosophically it is not very informative, especially if we recall that for Philo the days are meant only didactically, not literally.”11 As Runia subsequently notes, the reason why Philo insisted on evoking the theme of time in this context lies simply in the fact that both Genesis 1:14 and Tim. 37e–38e12 teleologically link the motion of the heavenly spheres to the provision of

7 For further elaborations on this theme, see Wolfson 1962: 1:321; Charles Vergeer 2018: 217; Rudavsky 2018: 137–138, 142–143; Sterling 1992: 15–41; Colson, Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes) [henceforth denoted as PLCL] 1929–1962: 484; Cohen-Yashar 1973: 225–226; Leisegang 1913: 14; Tzamalikos 1991: 557; Lauer 1958: 41–42. 8 See Her. 165 (χρόνῳ . . . ὅς ἐστι μίμημα αἰῶνος). 9 For a more elaborate analysis of the Philonic concept of λόγος τομεύς, see O’Brien 2015: 43–56. 10 PLCL 3:365. 11 Runia 1986: 221. Also see Lauer 1958: 42–43. 12 See Tim. 42d5. For further analysis, see Runia 1986: 215–216.

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objective lengths of time.13 Of course, Philo’s distinction between αἰών and χρόνος, its imitation, is also found in the passage at hand. However, the mere fact that the latter three days of the creation account symbolize the concept of time indicates its ongoing significant for Philo’s philosophical understanding of the creation process.

The ‘new,’ divine providence and God’s interaction with human souls God’s absoluteness and transcendence are inextricably linked with the concept of time in Philo’s thought. Time as a phenomenon, usually in connection with the concept of totality, is one of Philo’s favorite ideas, one he uses to reinforce God’s nature as an absolute, eternal Being.14 This fact is conceded by Montes-Peral in his extensive section on Philo’s approach towards Divine transcendence (“Die Entfaltung des philonischen Ansatzes über die göttliche Transzendenz”): “Gott ist Seiendes und Urgrund. Als permanentes Seiendes ist Gott mit der Eigenschaft der Ewigkeit ausgestattet. Als Urgrund ist er auch mit der Zeit verbunden. Der Urgrund ist auch der Schöpfer der Zeit. [. . .] Die Schöpfung ist Zeit, Gott ist Ewigkeit.”15 This element of Philo’s doctrine of God is also bound up with his ideas about His intelligible interaction with humans. It is God’s time-transcending, ever-present Being which renders it possible for human consciousness to extricate itself from a time-constrained, perpetually shifting reality into an elevated non-temporal Divine realm. Thus, Philo can convey Mosaic faith in non-temporal terms, as overcoming time by means of immediate access to a noetic dialog with the Divine. Two passages illustrate this clearly: De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 76 and De posteritate Caini 14. The divergent translation of ʾaviv (fresh heads of grain) as part of the offering of First Fruits (πρωτογένημα / minḥat bikkurim) as ‘νέα’ (the new) in the LXX is the jumping-off point for Philo’s allegorical reading of Lev. 2:14 in Sacr. 76. In this exegesis, he describes God’s time-transcending essence as constantly bringing forth new thoughts in one’s mind, something that is of particular

13 Runia 1986: 221 (“Once again, however, we see how firmly Philo associates time with the heavenly bodies, following the lead of both Moses and Plato”); idem 2001, PACS 1: 209; Leisegang 1913: 13; Wolfson 1962: 1:319–320. 14 For an extensive analysis of the issue of time with respect to God’s transcendence, see Montes-Peral’s informative section “Nur das Seiende ist ewig” (Montes-Peral 1987: 115–121). 15 Montes-Peral 1987: 115.

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importance to those who cling to old traditions and myths without bothering to ascertain whether they are fictitious or worth believing in: The new is for the following reason. To those who cling to the old-world days with their fabled past and have not realized the instantaneous and timeless power of God [ταχεῖαν δὲ καὶ ἄχρονον θεοῦ δύναμιν], it is a lesson bidding them accept ideas that are new and fresh and in the vigour of youth. It bids them feed no more on effete fables, which the long course of the ages has handed down for the deception of mortal kind, and thus be filled with false opinions, but rather receive in full and generous measure new, fresh, blessed thoughts from the ever ageless God [ἀεὶ ἀγήρω [. . .] θεοῦ]. So shall they be schooled to understand that with Him nothing is ancient, nothing at all past, but all is in its birth and existence timeless [ἀλλὰ γινόμενόν τε ἀχρόνως καὶ ὑφεστηκός].16

In this passage, God’s permanent Being is depicted – in three separate ways, by means of the via negationis – as specifically transcending the category of time altogether. Interestingly, it is exactly this transcendence of God relative to time that enables Philo to link him to the metaphysical notion of ‘the new,’ which is in turn linked with God’s perpetual interaction with the rational souls of mankind.17 This notion is then contrasted with the concept of ‘the old,’ representing time in general. Thus, the Alexandrian is able to portray Mosaic faith as a tradition that, instead of resting solely on the dogmatic transmission of ancient opinions, depends on the immediate and unceasing spirited discourse of the absolute God with His righteous believers.18 This entire portrayal, in which time is relativized for the sake of reemphasizing God’s absolute nature, is clearly grounded in Plato’s understanding of the ἀίδιος οὐσία (eternal being) in 37e6–8, the only entity to whom the present tense is applicable.19 This idea exposes yet another significant element of Philo’s understanding of the relationship between God and time: God’s all-seeing eyes and power of providence do not operate within the sphere of time, but outside of it. This is precisely what enables God to overcome the constraints of

16 Sacr. 76 [PLCL 2:151]. For further elaborations on this allegorical reading, see Amir 1997: 208–209, fn. 116. Cf. Lauer’s and Whittaker’s analysis of a similar Philonic passage (Fug. 57 [PLCL 5:41]: “Now ‘to-day’ is the limitless age that never comes to an end; for periods of months and years, and of lengths of time generally, are notions of men arising from the high importance which they have attached to number. But the absolutely correct name for ‘endless age’ is ‘to-day.’ For the sun never changes, but is always the same, going now above, now below, the earth; and through it day and night, the measures of endless age, are distinguished”) 1958: 46; Whittaker 1971: 40–44. 17 See, for example, Gig. 52–54. 18 See Whittaker 1971: 44 (“Here the outdatedness of inherited tradition is contrasted with the freshness and immediacy of the knowledge which derives from God”). 19 See Runia 1986: 220.

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the immanent realm and provide human souls with eternal truths to replace the time-dependent traditions of old.20 In a similar fashion, in his interpretation of LXX Ex. 20:21b (Μωυσῆς δὲ εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν γνόφον, οὗ ἦν ὁ θεός) in Post. 14, Philo maintains God’s transcendence over time, thus further substantiating His absoluteness. The passage in question reads as follows: So see him enter into the thick darkness where God was (Exod xx. 21), that is into conceptions regarding the Existent Being that belong to the unapproachable region where there are no material forms. For the Cause of all is not in the thick darkness, nor locally in any place at all, but high above both place and time [ἀλλ᾿ ὑπεράνω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου]. For he placed all creation under His control, and is contained by nothing, but transcends all [ἐπιβέβηκε δὲ πᾶσιν]. But though transcending and being beyond what He has made, none the less [He has] filled the universe with Himself [ἐπιβεβηκὼς δὲ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ δημιουργηθέντος ὢν οὐδὲν ἧττον πεπλήρωκε τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ]; for He has caused His powers to extend themselves throughout the Universe to its utmost bounds, and in accordance with the laws of harmony has knit each part to each.21

In this biblical verse, Philo confronts the philosophical difficulty of portraying God in corporeal terms, as an entity that occupies a certain place at a certain time. The manner in which Philo tackles this problem is typical for his mindset: He contends that God, as τὸ τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον, transcends the fundamental categories of place and time, these being mere products of His creative power.22 This contention, however, is still insufficient, in Philo’s view, to articulate the full extent of God’s totality. In light of God’s radical other-worldliness, His totality can hardly be limited to an expression within the physical realm – especially in light of the fact that this realm, and every corporeal phenomenon within it, is in turn dependent on the overarching phenomena of time and space. The solution Philo offers is that God pervades the entirety of the cosmos through the wide array of His intermediary powers. In this way, Philo is able to show that God’s absoluteness is reflected in both the transcendent and the immanent domain, thus prevailing in every respect over the ostensible totality of time.23

20 For Runia’s understanding of this passage, see Runia 2001, PACS 1: 171, 231. Cf. Whittaker 1971: 44. 21 Post. 14 [PLCL 2:335]. See Runia 2001, PACS 1: 133. 22 See Carabine 1995: 207; Montes-Peral 1987: 121; Bormann 1955: 34, 106. 23 See Wolfson 1962: 1:217–224; Runia 2002: 296–299.

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The paternal absolute and his grandson Perhaps the most revealing section on Philo’s use of the concept of time is Quod Deus sit immutabilis 29–32. Proceeding from his premise concerning the omniscience of God, to whom future events are entirely apparent – as opposed to the limited, time-dependent viewpoint of man – Philo clarifies God’s relationship to time through the Platonic fatherhood metaphor applied to the demiurge (Tim. 28c3):24 For a mere man cannot foresee the course of future events, or the judgements of others, but to God as in pure sunlight all things are manifest. For already He has pierced into the recesses of our soul, and what is invisible to others is clear as daylight to His eyes. He employs the forethought and foreknowledge which are virtues peculiarly His own, and suffers nothing to escape His control or pass outside His comprehension. For not even about the future can uncertainty be found with Him, since nothing is uncertain or future to God. No one doubts that the parent must have knowledge of his offspring, the craftsman of his handiwork, the steward of things entrusted to his stewardship. But God is in very truth the father and craftsman and steward of the heaven and the universe and all that is therein. Future events lie shrouded in the darkness of the time that is yet to be at different distances, some near, some far. But God is the maker of time also, for He is the father of time’s father, that is of the universe, and has caused the movements of the one to be the source of the generation of the other. Thus time stands to God in the relation of a grandson. For this universe, since we perceive it by our senses, is the younger son of God. To the elder son, I mean the intelligible universe, He assigned the place of firstborn, and purposed that it should remain in His own keeping. So this younger son, the world of our senses, when set in motion, brought that entity we call time to the brightness of its rising. And thus with God there is no future, since He has made the boundaries of the ages subject to Himself. For God’s life is not a time, but eternity, which is the archetype and pattern of time; and in eternity there is no past nor future, but only present existence.25

Philo’s chief claim in this passage resonates with some of the claims we have already seen him make about God and time: As the artificer of time, God transcends it in all ways, for He has complete knowledge of it and its sequence, since time is deemed as His mere product. To illustrate this point Philo makes use of the Platonic metaphor of God’s fatherhood while at the same time developing it further. If God is to be understood as father or, alternatively, as ἐπίτροπος, both His κόσμοι, including χρόνος as a direct result of their having come

24 For a more detailed analysis of this Platonic metaphor in Philo’s thought, see Runia 1986: 107–111; Kaiser 2014/2015: 304–310. For the theme of God’s omniscience in this passage, see Whittaker 1971: 36–40. 25 PLCL 3:24–25 [Deus 29–32].

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into being, are to be regarded as His offspring (ἔκγονα).26 Philo then further investigates these biological metaphors as they pertain to God’s three creations, each of which represents a particular ontological structure of totality: The κόσμος νοητός is to be thought of as God’s πρεσβύτερος υἱός, the κόσμος αἰσθητός, accordingly, as His νεώτερος υἱός, while time, which is evidently lower in the cosmic hierarchy, represents His υἱωνός.27 The main theme of this metaphorical presentation seems to be Philo’s endeavor to contrast the absoluteness of God with the much less ontologically impressive creation of time, thus strongly relativizing time’s ontological status as a Prinzipiat in its own right. If one wishes to be even more exact, time isn’t even a creation of God but that of the physical cosmos, called πατὴρ χρόνου by Philo for this reason.28 As he argues, along Aristotelian lines, God has endowed the corporeal cosmos with movement, which in turn brought about the sudden γένεσις of time.29 By using the biological metaphor of a filial relationship between God and His creations, Philo intends to highlight their proximity to or remoteness from God. It is against this backdrop that one must understand his assertion about the intelligible cosmos, to which God “assigned the place of firstborn, and purposed that it should remain in His own keeping.”30 The vast gulf between time and the Godly realm – and this is the element Philo aims to pinpoint here – is all the more striking. Another implication of the usage of this fatherhood analogy seems to be that it puts additional emphasis to the all-embracing providential activity of God as πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων, predicated strongly upon the words of the δημιουργός as πατὴρ ἔργων in Tim. 41a–b.31 The point is that Divine Providence, which attaches God to “the world of matter, time, and sensibility,”32 can only ever come about due to God’s transcendent vantage point, a vantage point

26 Cf. Runia’s juxtaposition of Philo to Aëtius, who also draws upon the Platonic metaphoric of fatherhood in a similar fashion: ibid. 2002: 282. 27 For an extensive elucidation of Philo’s biological metaphor of God’s son, see: Martínez 2007: 85–99. Cf. Leisegang 1913: 14: “Denn Gott ist der ‘Großvater der Zeit’. Sein Sohn ist der Kosmos. Durch die Bewegung des Kosmos aber entstand sein Enkel, der Chronos”; MontesPeral 1987: 115–116. 28 Deus 31. 29 Cf. Leg. 1.2. 30 PLCL 3:25–27 [Deus 31]. 31 For Philo’s Platonic conceptualization of Divine Providence, see Runia 1986: 241–242, 494; ibid. 2001, PACS 1: 22; Sterling 1992: 35. 32 Carlos Lévy 2018. For an apt depiction of the tension between the absolute transcendence and providential attribute underlying Philo’s conception of God, see Lévy 2018 (in the section “Negative Theology and Providence”).

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that is external to temporal reality.33 It is important to note at the same time that Philo appears to have modeled his understanding of Divine Providence, which takes an interest in the internal, worldly occurrences that characterize people’s lives, on Stoic philosophy.34 Following this metaphorical depiction, Philo comes to a conclusion, here put in more philosophical terms, about God’s relationship to time. He begins by reaffirming the subordination of time in its entirety (τῷ τὰ τῶν χρόνων ὑπηγμένῳ πέρατα, Deus 32) to the transcendent goals of God as the absolute, who is the measure of all things.35 He then describes God’s noetic life as being utterly unconditioned by time, as uncreated and eternal, perceiving everything solely from the viewpoint of pure uniform presence. Conflating his Jewish notion of God with Plato’s ἀίδιος οὐσία (Tim. 37e6–8),36 Philo aligns his concept of a νοητὸς θεός (Cher. 97) with the notion of αἰών, a paradigm and archetype of time. The description in De mutatione nominum 267, in which Philo allegorically interprets the expression in LXX Gen. 17:21 ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ τῷ ἑτέρῳ (“in the other year”) concerning Isaac’s pending birth, draws on this understanding as well: And by other year he does not mean an interval of time which is measured by the revolutions of sun and moon, but something truly mysterious, strange and new, other than the realm of sight and sense, having its place in the realm of the incorporeal and intelligible, and to it belongs the model and archetype of time, eternity or aeon. The word aeon signifies the life of the world of thought, as time is the life of the perceptible [ὅπερ τὸ χρόνου παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχέτυπον εἴληχεν, αἰῶνα. αἰὼν δὲ ἀναγράφεται τοῦ νοητοῦ βίος κόσμου, ὡς αἰσθητοῦ χρόνος].37

In this passage, however, eternity, as τὸ χρόνου παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχέτυπον is used to signify the life of the intelligible cosmos and not that of God. In so doing, Philo evidently follows (as has been pointed out by Runia) Plato’s characterization of the demiurge’s παράδειγμα as an eternal being.38 We must ask ourselves why, at this juncture, Philo did not make use of his conception of

33 Cf. Whittaker 1971: 40 (“Certainly God exists outside time, for God is the creator of time”). For transcendence in Philo’s thought, see Niehoff 2019: 247–267; Montes-Peral 1987: 1–163. 34 For a thorough elaboration on Stoic elements within Philo’s understanding of Divine Providence, see Niehoff 2019: 87–94, 109–117. Cf. Whittaker 1971: 38–39. 35 See: Congr. 101; Sacr. 59; QG 4.8. Philo most likely borrowed this notion from Plato’s Nom. 716a–c. For a more extensive analysis of Philo’s critical attitude towards Protagoras’ homomensura doctrine and its Platonic reverberations, see Niehoff 2019: 233–236. 36 For a broader analysis, see Runia 1986: 221 (Runia refers in this context to Plato’s Soph. 248e–249a and Aristoteles’ Met. 1072b29–31); Rudavsky 2018, 142. 37 Mut. 267 [PLCL 5:279]. Cf. Opif. 12. 38 Runia 1986: 221. Also see Lauer 1958: 45.

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eternity to illustrate the nature of God’s time-transcending life, but rather used it to depict the life of the noetic cosmos. Possibly Philo was reluctant to tie God too decisively to time’s archetypical model, eternity, since it, too, is ultimately a product of His creative power.39 In the final analysis, Philo, who discusses numerous passages in the LXX dealing with time, in fact does not completely rule out a link between time and God. Only one basic condition must be met: God’s absolute superiority over time must remain uncompromised and should, if possible, be further emphasized. By associating God’s supreme Being with nondurational eternity,40 Philo can – closely following Plato’s Timaeus – sharply contrast the oneness and totality of the Divine Being with time’s dispersed multiplicity, which serves to underline God’s absoluteness. Jens Halfwassen aptly highlights the manner in which the Platonic concept of eternity as unified totality contrasts with that of worldly, multifarious time as a mere empirical succession of πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον: Die Ewigkeit ist höchstes Leben und Fülle des Seins gerade dadurch, daß sie Einheit ist; sie zerteilt sich nicht ins Viele, während die Zeit dadurch ein Vieles ist, daß sie immer in ein Nacheinander von Früher und Später zerfällt und sich so fortwährend selbst verliert. Dagegen ist die Ewigkeit die gesammelte Totalität des Seins in unzerteilter Einheit und Ganzheit, die auf einmal, in einem einzigen, unausgedehnten Ist anwesend ist (38 A).41

Of course, as Runia astutely observes, Philo, who was also strongly influenced by the usage of the word ἀιών in the LXX, might simply have “refused to pin himself down to a rigid terminology with regard to expressions of time.”42

God as absolute time One need not look very far to find a confirmation that Philo was, in principle, willing to connect God with temporal concepts. In fact, in the very same thematic section of Mut. 264, Philo associates the time reference εἰς τὸν καιρὸν

39 Against this backdrop, Leisegang’s unreserved claim that Philo views eternity as God’s attribute seems overly simplistic (Leisegang 1913: 11). 40 For a learned and insightful clarification of Philo’s conception of ‘non-durational eternity,’ which he applies to God and its main philosophical sources, see Whittaker 1971. 41 Halfwassen 2004: 102–103 (emphasis in original). Cf. Leisegang 1913: 11; Montes-Peral 1987: 118, 120–121; Whittaker 1971: 36, 40. 42 Runia 1986: 221. Cf. Whittaker 1971: 33–36. For an extensive, thorough analysis of the impact of the LXX text on Philo’s understanding of the term αἰών, see Keizer 1999: 205–246 (Chap. 5: AIŌN in Philo of Alexandria). Cf. Montes-Peral:1987, 120–121.

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τοῦτον (“at this season”) of the preceding part of LXX Gen. 17:21 – as a translation of the Hebrew la-moʿed ha-zeh – with God, since He himself as the ἀνατολὴ τῶν ὅλων is what is meant by καιρός: What is the season you set before us, Master? Wonder of wonders! Is it not the season which is as no other, which no created being can set forth? For the true season [ὁ γὰρ ἀληθὴς . . . καιρός], the dayspring of the universe, when all is well and seasonable with earth and heaven, and the intermediate natures, both living creatures and plants, can be no other than Himself.43

The sense in which God is to be understood as the ‘true season’ is not merely confined to His role as the creator of the universe, but extends further to cover His providential realm of human souls. In this specific manner, and with additional recourse to Lev. 26:12 (ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ ἔσομαι ὑμῶν θεός), the Alexandrian author interprets Num. 14:9 (ἀφέστηκεν γὰρ ὁ καιρὸς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὁ δὲ κύριος ἐν ἡμῖν) to mean that God, as καιρός, inhabits those human souls that are righteous: “Here he [sc. Moses] acknowledges with hardly any disguise that God is the Season which departs far away from all the impious, but walks in rich and fertile souls.”44 It is certainly no coincidence that in the context of God’s relationship with time, Philo repeatedly refers to the particular idea of God residing in human souls.45 We must bear in mind that Philo’s general aim in presenting these arguments is to reinforce the absolute nature of God’s Being. Through them Philo reveals that God, by virtue of His absoluteness and His power of providence, fills out every single aspect of creation with His Being.46 Even our souls, of which we might think as an exceptionally intimate place, sealed off to anyone but ourselves, can easily and at any given point in time be accessed and entirely comprehended by God.47 In this sense, not only the human soul but also the realm of time becomes a medium through which God’s absolute, eternal Being, the ultimate artificer of all things, can immanently manifest itself.48 Philo’s

43 Mut. 264 [PLCL 5:277]. For an insightful and more thorough analysis of this theme, see Keizer 1999: 218–220. Cf. Kaiser 2015: 178. 44 Mut. 265 [PLCL 5:277–279]. For a more detailed investigation of the motif of God’s noetic revelation within human souls, see Amir 1983: 41–42. 45 Cf. Deus 29; Sacr. 76. 46 For the proximity of Philo’s God, in light of His providential activity, to mankind and the world, see Niehoff 2019: 116–122. 47 Cf. Whittaker 1971: 36–40. 48 Cf. Whittaker 1971: 38 (“that God is endowed with προμήθεια and πρόνοια is not surprising since, as the creator of the universe and in consequence of the whole time-series with is produced by, or identical with, the movement of the universe, He is the originator of the entire causal nexus which constitutes the life-history of the universe”).

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approach here is analogous to his treatment of God’s relationship to space. In Somn. 1.63–64, for example, he identifies the concept of τόπος in LXX Gen. 28:11 with God, providing the following explanation: “There is a third signification, in keeping with which God Himself is called a place, by reason of His containing things, and being contained by nothing whatever, and being a place for all to flee into, and because He is Himself the space which holds Him; for He is that which He Himself has occupied, and naught encloses Him but Himself.”49 Philo accounts for God’s uncreated, eternal, omniscient nature in similar terms when it comes to His relationship to time: God presides over the entire realm of time, subsuming time’s whole noetic archetype within His ever-present consciousness.50

Conclusion Hans Leisegang‘s remark in his German translation of Quod Deus sit immutabilis aptly encapsulates Philo’s rather denigratory attitude towards time: Philos Tendenz, der Zeit (χρόνος) eine möglichst niedrige Stellung anzuweisen, entspringt die Teilung des Wortes ist ein wenig ungünstig aus einer Polemik gegen die Spekulation von der Zeit (χρόνος = Χρόνος = Κρόνος) als dem Urprinzip und der obersten Gottheit.51

This article has shown that precisely this marginalizing tendency in fact represents one of the main metaphysical themes of Philo’s thought. The role of time in Philo’s thought is more intricate than it appears at first glance. The Alexandrian Platonist is not content merely to point out the problematic ontological nature of time, but goes so far as to link God with it. This was done for the sake of reaffirming God’s absoluteness. In point of fact, time is crucial for our understanding of one of the most pivotal endeavors of Philo’s philosophical undertaking: clarifying what the absolute is. In the first part of this article, I alluded to Philo’s counterintuitive exegesis of the account of creation, in which he disconnects time from God’s creative activity. He does this by claiming that the Hexameron actually signifies the nontemporal order intrinsic to God’s intellectual creatio. Furthermore, Philo goes on to emphasize this reading by suggesting that time is contingent upon both space and its subsequent inert movement, which would relegate it to the marginal ontological rank of a derivative of a derivative. Yet, as was subsequently

49 Somn. 1.63 [PLCL 5:329]. 50 Leisegang also seems to make this correlation: Leisegang 1913: 14. 51 Leisegang 1964, PCH 4: 79, fn. 2. Cf. Montes-Peral 1987, Air aus der Suite Nr. 3 in D-Dur.

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shown, Philo uses a back door to reintroduce the theme of time into his speculative reading of the creation account, stating in another passage that the later three days of creation as a whole symbolize time. In this way, the significant role played by time in Philo’s negative theology was underlined. Not only is God not time, but he transcends it in every respect. By way of God’s timelessness, Philo is able to establish that He is absolutely transcendent, and to this end is specifically not subject to worldly processes of creation and destruction in any way. It is this unique feature that facilitates Philo’s surprising connection of God with the notion of the ‘new.’ That is to say, God’s all-embracing uncreated Being can, at any given moment and by transcending ancient traditions and time altogether, communicate teachings of the Jewish faith to the rational souls of His righteous followers. This perspective led us to another thematic connection that Philo likes to stress: God’s transcendence over time and His supernatural ability to commune with human souls. Philo seems to acknowledge the immediate risk of conceiving of God in terms of absolute transcendence and, in so doing, overemphasizing His other-worldliness.52 By implication, this would not only result in Philo’s having cast doubt on God’s absoluteness, but ultimately also on any real possibility of His communicating with the worldly realm of humans. Philo is therefore eager to point out that God is subject to no limitations here, because of His ability to bring time in its entirety under His eternal power. Thus, He can noetically interact with human souls at any given moment and thereby reveal Himself immanently to a human being’s non-corporeal faculty of reason. As the creator of time, God can exploit this medium and just as easily circumvent it altogether. God’s overcoming of time in turn seems to correspond to Philo’s Platonic understanding of Divine Providence as manifesting itself within human souls and confronting them with eternal doctrines. Ultimately, Philo’s vigorous efforts to prove that God transcends time – thereby refuting time’s claim to totality – has in some instances actually had something of a counterproductive effect, by tying God too closely to time. In Deus 31, for example, Philo portrays time as the grandson of God. Of course, he expresses time’s relation to God in this specific order (ὥστε υἱωνοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν πρὸς θεὸν τὸν χρόνον) rather than the converse in order to minimize time’s ontological importance in light of God’s all-encompassing Being. However, when one looks at this biological metaphor from the other side, one might conclude that God has in fact been depicted as embodied through time here – in anthropomorphic language, as time’s grandfather. Yet as Leisegang has noted, this depiction

52 See: Runia 2002: 291–292.

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was likely prompted by the pervasive polytheistic stance of Philo’s day, which assigned the role of ‘father of the universe’ to time as a deity in its own right. Seen from this perspective, Philo has merely intended to appropriate this polytheistic notion of time to further his own, Jewish-monotheistic view of God, with God as the unequivocal absolute deity to whom everything is subjected. Finally, I have suggested that Philo – who on the face of it endeavors to distance time from God’s Being as much as possible – is, in fact, in principle willing to link God with time. This, of course, is done on the condition that God’s absoluteness be left entirely unchallenged and be reaffirmed within the empirical realm. In his allegorical reading of the LXX text (Gen. 17:21), he even goes so far as to identify the term καιρός as a symbol of God’s all-pervading Being, stating that “the true season [. . .] can be no other than Himself.” This direct linking of God with the concept of time is permissible for one reason only: It serves to underpin God’s absoluteness as ‘the dayspring of the universe.’ In the section “Die Begriffe der Zeit und Ewigkeit bei Philon,” Leisegang alludes to this point of view by concluding his argument in the following way: “Hier haben wir einen echten philonischen Gedanken: Die Zeit in direkter Abhängigkeit von Gott! – Alles umfaßt und durchdringt dieser philonische Gott. Sein Werk ist die Zeit, und in ihm selbst ruht der Raum.”53 This, then, is one of the key features of Philo’s theocentric depictions of God as the transcendent absolute. Admittedly, Philo ascribes numerous attributes to God, such as αἴτιον, νοῦς, ποιητής, ψυχή, ἡγεμών, and πατήρ, but he generally qualifies this by adding on ‘of all things.’54 It is in this sense that Philo’s identification of God’s intelligible life with the notion of αἰών can be explained: as eternity, roughly conceptualized by Philo in terms of noetic time, meaning the totality of time condensed to a single, ever-present viewpoint ascribed to God’s purely intelligible modus vivendi. The Philonic God, conceived of through Plato’s ἀίδιος οὐσία and serving as the measure of all things, may also be thought of as absolute time in this way.

53 Leisegang 1913: 14. 54 For Philo’s ‘kataphatic impulses’ in relation to positive terms applied to God, see Carabine 1995: 204–205.

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Bibliography Primary Literature Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes) [denoted as PLCL]. F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker and R. Marcus (trs.), 12 vols. “Loeb Classical Library III”. London: William Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1929–1962. On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses. Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by David T. Runia [denoted as PACS 1]. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 2001. Leopold Cohn, Isaak Heinemann, Maximilian Adler and Willy Theiler, Philo von Alexandrien. Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung [denoted as PCH 4]. Volume 4. Berlin: De Gruyter 1964.

Secondary Literature Yehoshua Amir, “Philon und die jüdische Wirklichkeit seiner Zeit.” In: Y. Aschkenasy and H. Kremers (eds.), Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandrien. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1983, 3–51. Yehoshua Amir (ed. & tr.), Philo of Alexandria. Writings vol. 4.1. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1997. Karl Bormann, “Die Ideen- und Logoslehre Philons von Alexandria. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit H. A. Wolfson”. PhD Diss. Köln 1955. Deirdre Carabine, The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena. [Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs]. Louvain: Peeters Press 1995. Carlos Lévy, “Philo of Alexandria”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Online: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/en tries/philo/ (in the section “Negative Theology and Providence”). Yochanan Cohen-Yashar, “On Time and Eternity in Philo’s Works.” In: Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 6.3.1973, 223–228. Jens Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus. München: Verlag C.H. Beck 2004. Otto Kaiser, “Metapher und Allegorie bei Philon von Alexandrien.” In: The Metaphorical Use of Language in Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature, Markus Witte, Sven Behnke (eds.). Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015, 299–330. Otto Kaiser, Philon von Alexandrien. Denkender Glaube – Eine Einführung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2015. Helena M. Keizer, “Life Time Entirety. A Study of ΑΙΩΝ in Greek Literature and Philosophy, the Septuagint and Philo.” PhD diss., University of Amsterdam 1999. Simon Lauer, Philo’s Concept of Time. [Journal of Jewish Studies 9]. 1958, 39–46. Hans Leisegang, Die Begriffe der Zeit und Ewigkeit im späteren Platonismus. [Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 13.4]. Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1913. Florentino G. Martínez, Divine Sonship at Qumran and in Philo. [SPhiloA 19]. 2007, 85–99. Ekaterina Matusova, Genesis 1–2 in De opificio mundi and Its Exegetical Context. [SPhiloA 31]. 2019, 57–94.

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Maren R. Niehoff, Philon von Alexandria. Eine intellektuelle Biographie. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2019. Luis Angel Montes-Peral, Akataleptos Theos. Der unfassbare Gott. [ALGHJ 16]. Leiden: Brill 1987. Carl S. O’Brien, The Demiurge in Ancient Thought: Secondary Gods and Divine Mediators. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015. Tamar M. Rudavsky, Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages: Science, Rationalism, and Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018. David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato. Leiden: Brill 1986. David T. Runia, “The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology”. In: Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath. [Philosophia Antiqua 89]. Leiden: Brill 2002, 281–316. Gregory E. Sterling, Creatio Temporalis, Aeterna, vel Continua? An Analysis of the Thought of Philo of Alexandria. [SPhiloA 4]. 1992, 15–41. Gregory E. Sterling, ‘Prolific in Expression and Broad in Thought’: Internal References to Philo’s Allegorical Commentary and Exposition of the Law. [Euphrosyne 40]. 2012, 55–76. Gregory E. Sterling, Philo of Alexandria’s Life of Moses: An Introduction to the Exposition of the Law. [SPhiloA 30]. 2018, 31–45. Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen and the Stoic View of Time. [Journal of the History of Ideas 52]. 1991, 535–561. Charles Vergeer, Philosophy in Ancient Rome. A Loss of Wings. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2018. John Whittaker, “God and Time in Philo of Alexandria.” In: God Time Being: Two Studies in the Transcendental Tradition in Greek Philosophy, [SO.S 23]. Oslo: Aedibus Universitetsforlaget 1971, 33–57. David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press 1985. Harry Wolfson, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1962.

Jon Hoover

The Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyyah on God, creation and time [God] created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne was on the water. (Qurʾān 11:7)

Introduction The Islamic tradition, along with the Jewish and Christian traditions, confesses one eternal God who originates a world characterized by time. Like their Jewish and Christian counterparts, Muslim theologians face the question of how this eternal God interacts and intersects with the temporality of the world, which leads them into debate over whether the world is eternal or had a beginning, as well as reflection on the nature of God’s eternity. After briefly surveying classical and medieval Islamic approaches to the question of God, creation, and time, I will give primary attention to the Damascene theologian Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) who takes the unusual step of bridging God’s eternity and the world’s temporality by locating time in the essence of God. This study is an exercise in the history of theology and philosophy that seeks to explore how ideas developed and how they fit together.1

The kalām theologians The three major streams of kalām theology formulated and nurtured the dominant Muslim understanding of God’s relation to the world and time. The Muʿtazilī stream extended from the eighth century to the thirteenth before dying out

1 I am grateful for the support of a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship during the writing of this chapter. Jon Hoover, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Nottingham, University Park, NG7 2RD Nottingham, United Kingdom https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-006

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as a movement in its own right. Twelver and Zaydī Šīʿīs adopted many Muʿtazilī doctrines and have continued the tradition into the present. The Ašʿarī kalām theologians take their name from Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 935), who broke away from the Muʿtazilīs to defend divine predestination and other doctrines. The Māturīdī kalām theologians derive from the central Asian theologian alMāturīdī (d. 944). Ašʿarī and Māturīdī theologies dominated Sunni Islam through the early twentieth century and remain vibrant to the present day. Muʿtazilī, Ašʿarī, and Māturīdī theologians differ over key issues such as human freedom and the origin of evil. However, they share a common foundation in the kalām cosmological proof for the existence of God.2 This proof is now reasonably well known among Christian philosophers of religion thanks to the work of William Lane Craig,3 and it contains within it fundamental kalām assumptions about God, creation, and time. I will outline the basics of the proof as developed in Ašʿarī theological handbooks like the Iqtiṣād by the famous al-Ġazālī (d. 1111).4 The proof may be set out in the form of a categorical syllogism. Major premise: Everything temporally originated (ḥādiṯ) has a cause. Minor premise: The world is temporally originated. Conclusion: The world has a cause, which is God. The Arabic term ḥādiṯ, which I translate “temporally originated,” carries the sense of existing after not having existed. For most kalām theologians, the major premise of the above proof is necessary knowledge, that is, it is undeniable that everything that originates and comes into existence has a cause. This applies to both the seen and the unseen. All things seen within the world require a cause to come into existence. The need of originating events for causes applies to the unseen by analogy. No one saw the beginning of the world as a whole, but if the world in fact originated, it too required a cause to bring it into existence. Most medieval Muslim theologians and philosophers do not cast the principle of causality into serious doubt. They may disagree over the causes of specific things and events, but they agree that everything that originates requires a cause, whether that cause be God or an intermediary.

2 For more extensive discussion of what follows in this and the next section, see Davidson 1987; for briefer surveys, see Shihadeh 2008 and Kukkonen 2018. For general information on kalām theology and other Islamic theological streams, see Schmidtke 2016. 3 Craig 1979. 4 Al-Ghazālī 2013: 27–41.

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The minor premise of the kalām cosmological argument states that the world as a whole was temporally originated. Kalām theologians prove this using the following disjunction: The world must be either temporally originated or eternal. The world is not timelessly eternal. Therefore, the world must be temporally originated. Kalām theologians deploy two main methods to prove that the world is not eternal. One method argues that an eternal world would lead to an infinite regress of events in the world. Following in the train of the sixth century Christian theologian John Philoponus (d. ca. 570) and the Muslim philosopher al-Kindī (d. ca. 870), the kalām theologians argue that an infinite regress is impossible. They assert that it is not possible to traverse an infinite number of past events, nor is it possible to add more events to an infinite number of past events because an infinite by definition cannot be increased. Likewise, one infinite cannot be a multiple of another, as would be the case with different planets revolving eternally at different speeds. All this being impossible, past events and time cannot be infinite, and the world must therefore have had a beginning. The second way of arguing for the temporal origination of the world is from the origination of accidents. This was the approach of especially the early kalām theologians. In the atomistic cosmology of early kalām, the entire world is made up of atoms and accidents. Accidents, like color and motion, inhere in atoms and temporally originate. Atoms combine in turn to form bodies. It is then asserted that any atom or body in which accidents subsist must itself be temporally originated. Therefore, the world as a whole, which is a body, is temporally originated as well. Looking back at the kalām cosmological proof for the existence of God, once it has been proved that the world is temporally originated, it then follows that the world has a cause. Moreover, this cause or originator of the world must be timelessly eternal, always existing without a cause, because, as many theologians further explained, an infinite series of causes is impossible. The cause of the world is of course God. The kalām proof for the existence of God is criticized by philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition. The Aristotelian-Neoplatonist Avicenna (d. 1037, Ibn Sīnā in Arabic) and the more purely Aristotelian Averroes (d. 1198, Ibn Rušd in Arabic) agree with the kalām tradition that an infinite regress of causes is not possible. However, they see no objection to an infinite regress of effects and events, that is, a world extending infinitely into the past, because those past events in fact no longer exist. Only an actual infinite, a bodily existent of infinite size, is impossible, but not an infinite number of past events that have passed out of existence.

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Al-Ġazālī counters that an infinite past would still entail the accumulation of an infinite number of immortal souls that all exist together in the present. Therefore, an actual infinite being impossible, the world must have had a beginning. With such argumentation, the kalām tradition is able to hold on to the doctrine of the origination of the world. However, Averroes, as well as later kalām theologians themselves, reject the proof for the temporal origination of the world from accidents. The fact that temporally originated accidents subsist in an atom or a body does not necessitate that the atom or body be temporally originated as well.

The philosophers Avicenna and Averroes Philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes encounter the same problems as the kalām theologians relating time and God. Both need to bridge between a God who is timelessly eternal and a world of temporality. Avicenna in his Neoplatonism addresses this with a theory of eternal emanation.5 God is the First or the One who is necessarily existent in itself and pure unchanging and timeless simplicity. The First is also perfect generosity, and out of this generosity emanates the First Intellect in timeless eternity. The First does not precede the First Intellect in time but in essence. To preserve the simplicity of the One from plurality, only one thing – the First Intellect – emanates from the One. Avicenna then introduces plurality into the contingent world through a sequence of eternal intellects and souls extending from the First Intellect downward to the tenth intellect or Active Intellect and the sphere of the moon. The Active Intellect then generates the forms and matter of the temporal sublunary world of generation and corruption. The intermediary chain of eternal intellects and souls mediate between the utter simplicity of the unchanging eternal One and the temporal plurality of the region below the moon. As already noted, Avicenna rejects the kalām notion that God originated the world temporally. If the world had had a beginning, he argues, some prior cause would have had to emerge to prompt God to begin creating. A beginning to creation would have required God to change from not creating to creating, which would have entailed imperfection in God before God began creating. Despite this, Avicenna can still speak of God’s willing and choosing to create the world. However, God wills and chooses only in the sense that God knows what emanates from Him. God does not choose among options, and God’s choice does not proceed from the potential to the actual. God is pure actuality, and

5 McGinnis 2010: 149–208.

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emanation is accidental. Emanation is not essential to God’s essence, but it is nonetheless a necessary concomitant of God’s essence. In fact, God in His perfection emanates the world in the best possible way. The First is the cause of the best possible order. Avicenna does not escape criticism. Al-Ġazālī is famous for attacking Avicenna’s emanation metaphysics and for condemning adherence to the world’s eternity as unbelief in his Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa).6 Al-Ġazālī himself bridges between the eternal God and the temporal world by asserting that it is in the very nature of God’s eternal will to choose when the world began, without any kind of real or temporal cause. In no way does the exercise of God’s eternal will introduce change or temporality in God, nor does it compromise God’s perfection. Indeed, a world that is eternal would have no cause because for al-Ġazālī the eternal is by definition causeless. Averroes is well known for having written a refutation of al-Ġazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers.7 Averroes agrees with al-Ġazālī in rejecting Avicenna’s emanation scheme, but he opposes al-Ġazālī by insisting that the perfection of God entails a process of continuous creation. The world in itself is not eternal. If the world were eternal in its essence, it would have no agent. Instead, God perpetually originates created things from pre-existing matter, and God has been creating this matter from eternity. Averroes also provides an analysis of the debate between kalām theology and Avicennan philosophy in his Decisive Treatise (Faṣl al-maqāl).8 According to Averroes, both sides agree that some things originate in time by virtue of an efficient cause. They also agree that there is an eternal existent that did not come into existence in time, nor from something else. In other words, both sides agree on the existence of things in the world that are temporal and on the existence of a timelessly eternal God. They also agree that the world as a whole has a cause. They only thing they differ over is what to call the world. The philosophers call the world eternal, and the kalām theologians call it temporally originated. Averroes goes on to observe that neither Avicennan philosophers nor kalām theologians follow the plain sense (ẓāhir) of the revealed texts. The Qurʾān says that God “is the one Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne was on the water” (Q. 11:7). The plain sense of this text points to the existence of water and God’s throne before the creation of this world in six days. Another Qurʾānic text on God’s creation of the heavens is similar: “[God] rose

6 Al-Ghazālī 1997. 7 Averroes 1954. 8 See Averroes 2001:14–17 for what follows.

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over the heaven when it was smoke, and He said to it and to the earth, ‘Come willingly or unwillingly’. They both said, ‘We come, willingly’” (Q. 41:11). This verse indicates that God created the heavens from smoke that existed beforehand. For Averroes, these texts do not support the kalām view of creation. They instead support Averroes’ own view of continuous creation.

Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī The Ašʿarī theologian Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 1210) lived about the same time as Averroes, but the two were not aware of each other. Ar-Rāzī lived in the eastern Islamic world, mainly in what is today Iran and Afghanistan, while Averroes lived in Andalusia and North Africa. Ar-Rāzī usually defends traditional Ašʿarī positions, but his analysis of the debate over the origin of the world in his late work Sublime Issues (al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya) bears some similarities to that of Averroes. Ar-Rāzī carefully examines both scriptural and rational arguments for and against the eternity of the world. He concludes that the Qurʾān does not support the arguments of either the philosophers or the kalām theologians conclusively. The rational arguments for each side are likewise inconclusive. The only thing certain is that the world depends on God for its existence.9 Throughout the main part of his career, ar-Rāzī affirms the Ašʿarī view that God is timeless and not subject to temporal origination in His essence. However, again in his late work Sublime Issues, he asserts that the Ašʿarīs, the Muʿtazilīs, and the philosophers cannot evade the logical conclusion that temporally originating events subsist in the essence of God. Ar-Rāzī argues for example that this follows from God’s knowledge of particulars in the world. Change in the things that God knows entails change in God’s knowledge, which implies temporality in God. Similarly, God’s acts of intention and will to originate involve temporal origination in God’s essence. Additionally, God’s hearing of speech and seeing of a picture before the speech and picture exist would be impossible. So, God’s hearing and seeing must involve temporal origination in God.10 Such arguments had been made earlier by the Karrāmī religious movement to link God‘s creative activity to the temporality of the world and to oppose the timeless and static God of Māturīdī kalām theology. The Karrāmīs emerged in the ninth century, thrived in present-day Afghanistan and Iran, and died out in

9 İskenderoğlu 2002 analyses the relevant material in ar-Rāzī 1987. See now Hassan 2021, who argues against İskenderoğlu that ar-Rāzī favors the view that the world had a beginning. 10 Ar-Rāzī 1987: II, 106–111.

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the thirteenth century.11 Also, the philosopher Abū Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. ca. 1165) posited temporally originating willings in God’s essence to will events in the world, alongside an eternal divine will to will eternal existents.12 However, neither the Karrāmīs nor ar-Rāzī and Abū Barakāt al-Baġdādī appear to have worked through the implications of temporality in the essence of God as comprehensively as Ibn Taymiyyah does.

Ibn Taymiyyah on continuous creation in the perfection of God Ibn Taymiyyah is best known in recent decades as the main medieval inspiration for radical ǧihādism. This reputation, however, is built on historical anachronism insofar as ǧihādis appropriate his views to their modern-day ends by decontextualizing him.13 That aside, Ibn Taymiyyah wrote more on theology than any other subject. His main competitor was Ašʿarī kalām theology, especially the thought of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. He also wrote a long refutation of the Twelver Šīʿī theologian ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) who adopted largely Muʿtazilī views that contains some of his most sophisticated discussion of God’s creation of the world.14 Additionally, Ibn Taymiyyah interacted with the philosophies of both Avicenna and Averroes.15 Ar-Rāzī had concluded in his Sublime Issues that both scriptural and rational arguments for and against the eternity of the world were inconclusive. Ibn Taymiyyah is unsympathetic to ar-Rāzī’s analysis. He responds that ar-Rāzī got confused between the two major positions because he was not aware of the correct view on creation in the middle, the view supported by both revelation and reason.16 Rather than leave the issue unresolved, Ibn Taymiyyah seeks to reason out a mediating position.

11 On Karrāmī theology, see Zysow 2016: 252–262. 12 Abū al-Barakāt al-Baġdādī 1938–9: III, 157–158, 164, 167, cf. III, 45; see also Marcotte 2011. 13 See further Michot 2006 and 2012; and Hoover, “Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism,” in: Kendall/Khan 2016: 177–203. 14 Ibn Taymiyyah’s view on God’s creation of the world is treated in the first volume of his Minhāğ as-sunnah (cf. Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāğ as-sunnah, 1986). 15 For a general overview of Ibn Taymiyyah’s theology, see Hoover, “Ḥanbalī Theology,” in: Schmidtke 2016: 625–646 (633–641). The following presentation of Ibn Taymiyyah on God, time, and creation is based on Hoover 2004; Hoover 2007: 70–102; and Hoover 2010. 16 For Ibn Taymiyyah’s assessment of ar-Rāzī, see Hoover 2004: 293, 314–318.

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Ibn Taymiyyah agrees with al-Ġazālī and the kalām theologians that eternal objects do not have an agent cause and that created objects come into existence after not having existed. If the world were eternal, it would have no creator. Only God is eternal and unoriginated. This leads Ibn Taymiyyah to reject Avicenna’s scheme of eternal emanation. There is no chain of eternal intellects and souls emanating down from God to the region of generation and decay below the moon. Everything other than God comes into existence after it did not exist. Yet, Ibn Taymiyyah affirms with the philosophers that the perfection of God necessarily entails that God create from eternity to eternity. Against al-Ġazālī and the kalām tradition, God could not have started creating at some arbitrary point in the past without some prior cause emerging to precipitate the change. As Ibn Taymiyyah puts it, “It is impossible that what is impossible, as far as [God] is concerned, should become possible without a cause originating.”17 The kalām theologians make God out to be doing nothing at all prior to creation, and then suddenly God starts creating for no reason. Ibn Taymiyyah also claims that the kalām view of God changing from not creating to creating introduces imperfection into God. A perfect God will always be creating, as indicated by the Qurʾānic verse, “Is He who creates like one who does not create?” (Q. 16:17). Otherwise, God would be like one who does not create. To thread the needle between the kalām theologians and the philosophers’ views on God’s origination of the world, Ibn Taymiyyah distinguishes between God’s continuous creativity on the one hand and the concrete created things that come into existence after not existing on the other. God in His perfection has always been creating one thing or another from eternity. God’s creativity is perpetual (dāʾim). Yet, no one thing that God creates is eternal. Everything comes into existence after not existing. Each created thing has a beginning in time. Putting it differently, as Ibn Taymiyyah himself does, the genus or species of created things is eternal, while no individual created thing is eternal. There has always been one world or another, but no one part of the world is eternal. There is no existent thing eternal alongside God. God is the only eternal existent. Ibn Taymiyyah expresses this as follows: As [God] is Creator of everything, everything other than Him is created and preceded by nonexistence. So, with Him there is nothing eternal by virtue of His eternity. When it is said that He has been creating from eternity, its meaning is that He has been creating one created thing after another from eternity just as He will be creating one created thing after

17 Hoover 2004: 321, quoting from Ibn Taymiyyah 1961–7: XVIII, 233. Note that Ibn Taymiyyah 1961–7 is a modern collection of Ibn Taymiyyah’s works, not a collection assembled by Ibn Taymiyyah himself.

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another to eternity. That which we deny [i.e. eternity], we deny of originating events and movements, one after another. There is nothing in this except an ascription to Him of perpetuity of acting, not [an ascription] of one among the things [He has] done being with Him [eternally] in its concrete entity.18

Ibn Taymiyyah on God’s continuous creation from eternity Ibn Taymiyyah emphasizes that God’s creative activity has no beginning and that there is no beginning to created things in the past. Eternity into the past or pre-eternity (al-azal) has no limit that reason could grasp. Any point in the past will always be preceded by the fullness of pre-eternity. Ibn Taymiyyah illustrates this point with the example of a large number of cities filled with tiny mustard seeds: Even if one posited the existence of cities many times [the number of] the cities of the earth, each city with as much mustard seed as to fill it, and [then] supposed that with each passing of a million years one grain of mustard seed disappeared, all the mustard seed would disappear and pre-eternity would not [yet] have ended. And if one supposed many, many times that, it would [still] not have ended. There is no time that might be posited that is not such that pre-eternity was before it.19

Ibn Taymiyyah argues that his view of God‘s continuous or perpetual creativity is not only the most rational approach to the question. It also coheres best with the plain sense of revelation. The parallels with Averroes here are striking. Ibn Taymiyyah was familiar with the theological writings of Averroes, but it is not yet clear whether he benefited from Averroes directly on this particular point.20 Yet, Ibn Taymiyyah cites the same key Qurʾānic texts that Averroes quoted: “[God] created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His Throne was on the water” (Q. 11:7), and “[God] rose over the heavens when it was smoke, and He said to it and to the earth, ‘Come willingly or unwillingly’. They both said, ‘We come, willingly’” (Q. 41:11). According to Ibn Taymiyyah, God created the heavens and the earth as we now know them in six days while God’s throne was on the

18 Hoover 2004: 326, quoting Ibn Taymiyyah 1961–7: XVIII, 239. 19 Hoover 2004: 325–6, quoting Ibn Taymiyyah 1961–7: XVIII, 238–239. 20 For a survey of modern research (mostly in Arabic) on Ibn Taymiyyah’s relation to Averroes, see Hoover 2018: 473–5.

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water, and God created this present world out of preceding matter and in preceding time. The Qurʾān does not speak of God creating anything out of nothing. Ibn Taymiyyah clarifies that the six days of creation were of different length from that of our days determined by the rising and setting of the sun. This is because, “Those days were measured by the movements of the bodies existent before the creation of the heavens and the earth.”21 Ibn Taymiyyah also supports his view of creation from the statements or ḥadīṯ of the Prophet Muhammad and even the Hebrew Bible. From the ḥadīṯ of the Prophet, he quotes, “God determined the determinations of created things fifty thousand years before He created the heavens and the earth, and His Throne was on the water.”22 With regard to the Bible, Ibn Taymiyyah observes that Genesis 1:1–2 speaks of water covering the earth and the wind blowing over the water at the beginning of the creation of the heavens and the earth.23 To make intellectual space for God’s creation of the world from eternity, Ibn Taymiyyah must reject the two main kalām proofs that the world had a beginning. The first kalām proof states that an atom or a body in which temporally originated accidents subsist is itself temporally originated. Following Averroes and later kalām theologians, Ibn Taymiyyah denies that this is the case. Something in which temporal origination takes place is not necessarily itself temporally originated. With this, Ibn Taymiyyah opens the door to temporality within the essence of the eternal God. The second kalām argument states that the world must have a beginning because an infinite regress of temporally originating events is impossible. Ibn Taymiyyah refutes two key kalām claims against an infinite regress.24 Against the idea that an infinite magnitude cannot be increased, Ibn Taymiyyah explains that an infinite magnitude is by definition not subject to measurement or comparison with other magnitudes. He compares the notion of infinity to multiplicity. The numbers 10, 100, and 1000 are all multiples of ten even though their values differ. In the same manner, one infinite magnitude may appear longer than another infinite magnitude from one perspective, but both remain infinite magnitudes nonetheless. The second key objection against an infinite regress of events states that an infinite cannot be traversed. The Ašʿarī kalām theologian al-Ǧuwaynī (d. 1085)

21 Hoover 2004: 323, quoting Ibn Taymiyyah 1961–7: XVIII, 235. 22 Hoover 2004: 302. The ḥadīṯ is found in the collection of Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Al-Qadar, Ḥiǧāǧ Ādam wa-Mūsā. 23 Hoover 2004: 304. 24 For more detailed discussion of the two arguments that follow, see Hoover 2007: 91–94.

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had said trying to traverse an infinite was like saying to someone, “I will not give you a dirham unless I give you a dinar before it, and I will not give you a dinar unless I give you a dirham before it.” Al-Ǧuwaynī explains that these conditions can never be met, and no dirham or dinar will ever be exchanged. It will only work to say something like “I will not give you a dinar unless I give you a dirham after it.” Ibn Taymiyyah agrees that al-Ǧuwaynī’s latter statement makes sense, but he says that the former statement is irrelevant to an infinite regress because it is framed in the future tense. It would however be possible to say, “I have not given you a dirham unless I have given you a dirham before it,” in which case there would no objection to an infinite regress of dirham exchanges. Thus, for Ibn Taymiyyah, there is no argument against traversing an infinite number of events regressing into the past.

Ibn Taymiyyah on God‘s perpetual activity Parallel to Ibn Taymiyyah’s theology of perpetual creation from eternity is his vision of God’s internal dynamism.25 Ibn Taymiyyah is firmly of the view that nothing can arise without a cause, and he applies this to the activity within God’s essence as well. Here he departs from both kalām theologians and philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes, all of whom maintain that God is timelessly eternal, and he elaborates the notion of temporally originating events subsisting in the essence of God introduced earlier by the Karrāmīs and ar-Rāzī in his Sublime Issues. Both the Ašʿarī and the Muʿtazilī kalām theologians maintain that temporally originating events (ḥawādiṯ) cannot subsist in the essence of God. To support this, early kalām theologians again resort to the idea that something in which temporally originating events subsist must itself be temporally originating. If temporal events subsist in God, God himself would be a temporally originated body, but God is neither temporally originated nor a body. Later kalām theologians are not as impressed with this argument, and they find other ways to defend God’s timelessness. One argument is that temporally originating events in the essence of God entails an infinite regress, which is deemed impossible. So, God’s essence must be timelessly eternal. Beyond this, the Ašʿarīs and the Muʿtazilīs diverge. The Muʿtazilīs say that God’s essential attributes of knowledge, power, will, and the like are just names for

25 This section is based on Hoover 2010.

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God’s essence or modes of God’s being. They have no subsistence in themselves. Otherwise, God would consist of more than one thing, and that would violate God’s unity. For the same reason, God’s attributes of action like speaking and creating do not subsist in God’s essence. God’s speech for example is created outside of God in the messenger who transmits it. This protects God from subjection to temporal origination. The Ašʿarīs in turn accuse the Muʿtazilīs of stripping God of His attributes. God’s attributes of speech, power, will, and the like must be substantives that subsist in God’s essence. They must be real. However, the Ašʿarīs continue, these attributes cannot be temporal because that would entail temporality and change in God. So, God’s essential attributes must be eternal. The Ašʿarīs enumerate seven essential and eternal attributes: knowledge, power, will, life, speech, sight, and hearing. These seven subsist in God’s essence. However, God’s acts do not subsist in God’s essence lest they subject God to temporality. To Ibn Taymiyyah these Ašʿarī and Muʿtazilī attempts to free God of temporally originated events are misguided. Ibn Taymiyyah usually speaks of God’s “voluntary attributes” and “voluntary acts” instead of “temporally originated events” subsisting in God’s essence, but he acknowledges these different terms to be functionally equivalent. By whatever name, he denies that the subsistence of temporal events in the essence of God renders God temporally originated. It also does not introduce change into God, as “change” for God would mean acting out of character, which God does not do. Additionally, and similar to the Ašʿarīs, Ibn Taymiyyah accuses the Muʿtazilīs of disjoining God’s attributes from God’s essence. To take the example of God’s speech, a God who creates speech outside of Himself in a messenger is not doing the speaking. The one in whom the speech subsists is the one speaking. The Muʿtazilīs have thus effectively deprived God of his speech. Ibn Taymiyyah criticizes the Ašʿarīs in turn for severing the link between God’s acts on the one hand and God’s will and power on the other. For the Ašʿarīs, God’s speech is eternal, and so there is no way that God’s will and power, which are also both eternal, can cause acts of speech. By depriving God of causality in His will and power, the Ašʿarīs have also stripped God of his perfection. In appealing to God’s perfection, Ibn Taymiyyah invokes a fundamental principle of his theological method: God is all the more worthy of perfections found in creatures than are the creatures themselves. In the case at hand, someone who can act voluntarily, that is, by will and power, is more perfect than someone who cannot. Since God is all the more worthy of perfections found in humans than are humans themselves, it follows that God also acts by will and power. Likewise, a God who speaks by will and power is more perfect than a God who does not.

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Ibn Taymiyyah also insists that God does things in temporal sequence. It makes no sense to him for a timelessly eternal will to produce something in the world at a particular point in time. When God tells the Prophet Muhammad to tell his people, “‘Perform deeds’. God will see your deeds” (Q. 9:105), this means that God first issues the command to perform deeds. Then, after that command, people perform those deeds. God sees those deeds after they are completed, and not before. A God locked in timeless eternity could never interact with events in proper order. Again, Ibn Taymiyyah explains, such a God would lack perfection.

Conclusion God in Ibn Taymiyyah’s theology acts by means of His will and power with successive voluntary acts that subsist in His essence. As he puts it in one place, [God] has been active from eternity when He willed with acts that subsist in His self by His power and His will one after another . . . . He has been speaking from eternity by His will, and He has been acting from eternity by His will one thing after another.26

With this, Ibn Taymiyyah turns the dominant hierarchy of perfections in medieval Islamic thought on its head. Timeless simplicity no longer stands at the top of the hierarchy, but temporality and voluntary action instead. Ibn Taymiyyah was not without precedents, such as the Karrāmīs and the later ar-Rāzī, but he appears to be the most thorough and consistent in working this position through. Ibn Taymiyyah’s theology of a perpetually dynamic and creative God found a very modest reception in the decades and centuries after him, mostly through its condemnation.27 The modern Salafi movement has done a great deal to revive the theological heritage of Ibn Taymiyyah, but it remains for further research to determine the extent to which Salafis embrace this feature of their master’s theology. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that today’s opponents of Ibn Taymiyyah still see need to condemn this aspect of his thinking.28 Ibn Taymiyyah’s view of God’s essential dynamism also finds parallels in the work of modern Christian theologians and philosophers of religion. In this volume for example Ryan Mullins argues for temporality in God’s being and

26 Hoover 2007: 81, quoting Ibn Taymiyya 1986: I, 147. 27 For a beginning to research on the reception of Ibn Taymiyyah’s view of God and creation, see Adem 2018. 28 See, for example, the footnotes opposing Ibn Taymiyyah in Foudah 2013: 79, 94, 115, 134, 139–140, 148.

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Michael Schulz analyses the character of God’s temporality in the prominent Christian theologians Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Ibn Taymiyyah completely rejects the incarnational impulse that often informs Christian reflection on temporality in God. God for Ibn Taymiyyah does not enter the world in any kind of ontological sense. However, Ibn Taymiyyah shares with these Christian thinkers the desire to synchronize the temporal process of the created world with the internal life of God and to envision an essential generativity in God that arises out of God’s love and perfection.

Bibliography Primary literature Abū al-Barakāt Hibat Allāh ibn ʿAlī ibn Malkā al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-muʿtabar fī al-ḥikma. 3 vols. Hyderabad: Ğamʿiyyat dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuṯmāniyya 1357-8/1938-9. Al-Ghazālī, Al-Ghazālī’s Moderation in Belief. Translated by Aladdin M. Yaqub. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2013. Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Edited and translated by Michael E. Marmura. Provo: Brigham Young University 1997. Averroes, Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory. Edited and translated by Charles E. Butterworth. Provo: Brigham Young University Press 2001. Averroes, Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). Translated by Simon van den Bergh. 2 vols. London: Luzac 1954. Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliyah min al-ʿilm al-ʾilāhī. Edited by Aḥmad Ḥiğāzī asSaqqā. 9 vols. Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī 1407/1987. Ibn Taymiyyah, Mağmūʿ fatāwā Šayḫ al-Islām Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah. Edited by ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim and Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad. 37 vols. Riyadh: Maṭābiʿ ar-Riyāḍ 1961–7. Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāğ as-sunnah an-nabawiyyah fī naqḍ kalām aš-Šīʿah al-Qadariyya. Edited by Muḥammad Rašād Sālim. Riyadh: Ǧāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd al-Islāmiyya 1986.

Secondary literature Rodrigo Adem, Ibn Taymiyya as Avicennan? Fourteenth-Century Cosmological Controversies in Damascus. [The Muslim World 108.1]. 2018, 124–153. William Lane Craig, The Kalām Cosmological Argument. London: Macmillan 1979. Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987. Saʿid Foudah, A Refined Explanation of The Sanusi Creed: The Foundation Proofs. Translated by Suraqah Abdul Aziz. Rotterdam: Sunni Publications, 2013.

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Laura Hassan, In Pursuit of the World’s Creator: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Origins of the Universe in al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya. [Res Philosophica 98.2]. 2021, 233–259. Jon Hoover, Perpetual Creativity in the Perfection of God: Ibn Taymiyyah’s Hadith Commentary on God’s Creation of This World. [Journal of Islamic Studies 15.3]. 2004, 287–329 (open access at https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/15.3.287, last accessed 25 October 2020). Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism. Leiden: Brill 2007. (Open access at https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004158474.i-270, last accessed 25 October 2020). Jon Hoover, “God Acts by His Will and Power: Ibn Taymiyya’s Theology of a Personal God in his Treatise on the Voluntary Attributes”. In: Youssef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed (eds.), Ibn Taymiyya and His Times. Karachi: Oxford University Press 2010, 55–77. Jon Hoover, “Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism”. In: Elisabeth Kendall and Ahmad Khan (eds.), Reclaiming Islamic Tradition: Modern Interpretations of the Classical Heritage. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2016, 177–203. Jon Hoover, “Ḥanbalī Theology”. In: Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, 625–646. Jon Hoover, “Ibn Taymiyya’s use of Ibn Rushd to refute the incorporealism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī”. In: Abdelkader Al-Ghouz (ed.), Islamic Philosophy from the 12th till the 14th Century. Göttingen: V&R unipress, Bonn University Press 2018, 469–491. Taneli Kukkonen, “Eternity”. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam (III), (https://referenceworks.brillon line.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/eternity-COM_26238, last accessed 24. October 2020.) Jon McGinnis, Avicenna. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010. Yahya M. Michot, Ibn Taymiyya: Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule. Oxford: Interface Publications 2006. Yahya M. Michot, Ibn Taymiyya: Against Extremisms. Beirut: Albouraq 2012. Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī”. In: Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer 2011, 10–12. Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. Ayman Shihadeh, “The Existence of God”. In: Tim Winter (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, 197–217. Aron Zysow, “Karrāmiyya”. In: Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, 252–262.

Michael Schulz

Historical eternity: The approaches of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar Introduction Early Christianity, in order to demonstrate the rationality of Christian faith, “Hellenized” the biblical idea of God, whereby it emphasized the attribute “eternity” (which included the aspects of immutability, immobility and impassibility). Eternity was understood as the opposite of finite human reality and temporality (and thus, of mutability, mobility and passibility). But this “Greek” concept of God made it difficult to comprehend and conceptualize God’s activity with regard to creation and history, as is testified by the Holy Scriptures of Israel and Christian Churches. For this reason, a number of theologians of the 20th century found cause to rethink God’s eternity. In their approach, they often refer to the philosophical concepts of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), who attempted to justify a rational understanding of an eternal God’s historicity and temporality. This article will begin by presenting and discussing the thought of the Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928–2014), who applies categories and insights from Hegel‘s Science of Logic and Philosophy of Religion, such the category of true infinity. I will then examine the approach of the Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988), who developed his Christology in his major work Theo-Drama by discussing Hegel‘s philosophical reconstruction of Christianity. He concludes by asking: “What does God gain from the world?”1 His answer attempts a response to Hegel. Both Pannenberg and Balthasar deal with the crucial question: How can a historical eternity be made plausible? How this question is answered is decisive regarding the Christian claim to truth, that is, whether the Jewish-Christian conception of God can be considered consistent.

1 Balthasar 1998: 506. Michael Schulz, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-University Bonn, Department Philosophy and Theory of Religions, Am Hof 1, 53113 Bonn, Germany https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-007

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Hegel’s idea of historical eternity Even a hundred years after the Right Hegelians of the 19th century, theologians continued to draw upon Hegel’s non-standard metaphysics because of the valuable clues it provides regarding how a relationship of reciprocal definition might be conceived between the absolute and the relative, the necessary and the contingent, and the universal and the individual. The Science of Logic, in which Hegel develops these basic concepts of thought, thus presents the foundational theory of a discipline he and Kant created: the philosophy of religion.2 Hegel’s philosophy of religion undertakes to justify philosophically the God of the history of religions and of the Christian faith in incarnation. In the Science of Logic, it becomes clear that concepts considered attributes of the divine in a classical theologia naturalis or a philosophical theology―concepts such as the absolute, necessary, eternal and infinite―can only be understood consistently when not defined by their opposition to the relative, random-contingent, finite and temporal. Oppositions limit, they limit the infinite, the absolute and the necessary, making the infinite something finite, and the absolute and the necessary something relative. Hegel, conversely, diagnoses an absolutization of the relative in cases where the relative is, in effect, seen as having the power to exclude definitively any relation to the absolute. Time, which definitively precludes any relation to the eternal, becomes itself abstract and boundless, an empty, drifting eternity. Thus, the infinite and eternal, as well as the finite and the temporal must be conceived in terms of their relationship to one another. For this reason, Hegel considers the true infinite (wahre Unendliche)3 to be an inclusive category that does not exclude the finite, but rather sets it and includes it as the Other of its own self. The true infinite is, therefore, identical to itself in the finite. In the Notes to Hegel‘s Encyclopedia, it reads: “eternity is”.4 Eternity is present in time and, as presence, the eternal is in time itself. The past and future are still part of the absolute because the absolute, as Hegel’s “Realphilosophie” explains, comes to itself as spirit through both a spatio-temporally structured nature and the spirit’s history. While Aristotle understands God as consummating his eternal life by thinking himself (νόησις νοήσεως), Hegel adds to this understanding the idea of God’s self-determined course through time and history. Although Hegel also puts the Aristotelian concept of God at the end of his encyclopedic exposition

2 Jaeschke 1992: 748–763. 3 Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, 1998: 137–150. 4 Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1986b): 50 (§258): „Die Ewigkeit . . . ist.“

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of God’s self-communication through nature and history,5 this should not be understood as an unimportant factor in this process of self-communication. The opposite is the case. Hegel deciphers the deeper truth of the Aristotelian concept of God, which does not know this self-mediation through nature and history. Now, authentic divine self-mediation includes history.

Pannenberg’s reception of Hegel’s category of true infinity The Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg expressly states that he “follows Hegel” regarding “true infinity”.6 The degree to which Pannenberg conceives of God’s eternity based on the model of Hegel’s true infinity is made clear in the following quote from his Systematic Theology, whose first volume was published in 1988: The thought of eternity that is not simply opposed to time but positively related to it, embracing it in its totality, offers a paradigmatic illustration and actualization of the structure of the true Infinite which is not just opposed to the finite but also embraces the antithesis. On the other hand, the idea of a timeless eternity that is merely opposed to time corresponds to the improper infinite which in its opposition to the finite is defined by it and thereby shows itself to be finite.7

This philosophical-speculative interpretation of eternity and time is seen by Pannenberg as the basic structure of God’s kingship as communicated by Jesus in his pronouncements and symbolic actions: “ . . . the dawning of the eternity of God in time.”8 With Jesus, God’s eternity is coming. That is, Hegel’s concept of true infinity makes the philosophical justification of Jesus’ person and message possible. Although Pannenberg admits that infinity is not a biblical attribute of God, he grants it, in the Hegelian sense, a decisive criteriological function not only within the Christian doctrine of God, but also when judging religious history.9 Likewise, he conceives of the identity of immanent and historical Trinity in line

5 6 7 8 9

Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1986c): 395 (§577). Pannenberg 1990: 36. Pannenberg 2004: 408. Pannenberg 2004: 408. Pannenberg 2004: 394–395, 400–401, 412, 441–442.

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with Hegel and, ultimately, also sees “all of history as the revelation of God.”10 But he finds it “materially mistaken” to label this approach a “theological Hegelianism.”11 Pannenberg sees the difference between his approach and Hegelianism in the futurity of history as a whole, a whole that, however, already took place in the event of Christ’s resurrection. Hegel does not consider this conceptual figure of anticipation. Anticipation implies that the presence of eternity in earthly time is the meaning of Christ’s resurrection, which is pointing to a future in which God’s kingship is completely realized with the universal resurrection of the dead both at and as the end of all time and history.12

Concept, anticipation and representation For Hegel, however, Pannenberg’s idea of anticipation proves a crucial problem of Christianity and Theology. In Hegel’s eyes Pannenberg’s eschatological shift of the true infinity’s complete reality into the future separates human beings of the present from truth, namely, men’s unity with God as seen in the God-man, Christ. This unity is promised only in the future.13 For Hegel, however, eternity in time means grasping the unity with God in thought now, in the present, by recognizing God and knowing that one’s own recognition of God is a way in which God also recognizes himself. A human being’s recognition of God is God’s self-recognition in time and otherness, in human beings. This is Hegel’s philosophical concept and the universal human application of that to which Jesus, as God-human, bears witness in Christianity. It is the truth of religion and the content of philosophy. Because this unity with God is believed to have been an event in the past in Christ, or is hoped for as a future reality for all human beings (visio beatifica), the present remains temporally distanced from the true content of Christianity. Only in worship, when the spirit is elevated to the level of a God or when receiving the Eucharist, is this unity intentionally or symbolically consummated.14 While “God [is] existing as community”15 due to the community’s religious form of representation (Vorstellung) of Christ in the past (Jesus of Nazareth) and future (the eschatological Christ), the community

10 Pannenberg 2004: 229. 11 Pannenberg 2004: 228. 12 Pannenberg 2004: 211, 329–333. 13 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, § 786–787. 14 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 479–480. 15 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 473.

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remains related to its Christological truth while being, at the same time, temporally separated from it. In contrast to Hegel, Pannenberg favors representation (Vorstellung) as the way of grasping truth because it encompasses a temporal component, namely, the possibility of future verification, which the Protestant theologian also considers possible and necessary for God himself and God’s reign.16 While, for Hegel, eternity in time is present thanks to the philosophical concept, for Pannenberg, it is only present in the mode of anticipation, namely in Christ’s resurrection, and, moreover, only when oriented towards its future eschatological verification. Like Karl Popper (1902–1994), Pannenberg is convinced that all cognition in the present must be subject to its future verification or falsification.17 At the same time, every reality must show and verify its being and identity in the face of the future. For this reason, Pannenberg’s main concern is the claim regarding God’s essence “that the events of history in some way bear on the identity of his eternal essence,”18 that is, that God in his divinity, much as he himself is the absolute future of all reality, depends upon time and history.

God’s historical dependence Like Hegel as well as unlike him, Pannenberg (drawing upon the thoughts of Rudolf Bultmann) defines this concept of God more precisely: God is “the alldetermining reality” that autonomously can define itself as being “determined by something else.”19 In the framework of this self-determination of God, time also determines God’s eternity. In his Christology, Pannenberg explains that the end of history is made possible by Jesus’ contingent and temporal human freedom.20 As a human being, Jesus decided that he would let himself be determined by God’s goal of eschatological-eternal life for all. Only together with Jesus’ human freedom, that is, only together with the contingency and temporality of Jesus’ decision to let himself be determined by God’s life-giving love could his own resurrection become real as the anticipation of eternity for all human beings.

16 Pannenberg 1973: 144–177. 17 Pannenberg, 1976: 332–337. 18 Pannenberg 2004: 334. 19 Pannenberg 1976: 302: “ . . . this all-determining power [and reality] is itself determined only by itself and not subject to determination by anything else, unless it determines that it should be determined by something else.” 20 Pannenberg 2004: 312–316.

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Against all relativization or minimization of Jesus’ human freedom by pointing to the divinity of the Son that incarnated himself in Jesus, Pannenberg insists on the validity of the decision of the Third Council of Constantinople held in 680–681 that condemned monotheletism, the teaching which supported the thesis that Jesus’s free human will, his thelema, was absorbed by the divine freedom of the Son. If this were the case, then God would not exist in the Other, the human, in human freedom in identity with himself – then eternity would not be temporally determined. In this sense, Pannenberg admits that Hegel is right when he claims that God’s being-by-himself in the Other of himself finds its highest intensification in a freely self-determining human subject.21 On the other hand, Pannenberg emphasizes the unity of Jesus’ and God’s will, which one could interpret as the deeper truth of monotheletism. This unity is verified by Jesus’ resurrection, which also shows how the human being finds its truth in God’s eternity. Hegel, for his part, showed the plausibility of the idea that the finite can only come to itself and its truth, if it itself is taken up in the infinite. For Hegel, holding on to death, whether conceptually or existentially, that is, on to the idea that death is the end of all things, is a false kind of clutching to and eternalizing the finite. If death were something ultimate and definitive, it would be a non-transcendable absolute, the extreme absolutization of the finite. For this reason, death can only be thought of without contradiction when conceived as the elevation of the finite to the infinite and the temporal to the eternal,22 or as Pannenberg calls it anthropologically, as transformed into resurrection. Thus, for Pannenberg, Jesus’ resurrection does not represent anything miraculous, mythical or fantastic. Instead, he ascribes a philosophically reconstructable plausibility to it. For Hegel, resurrection essentially signifies that the spirit has been sent, a spirit whose aim is to make the unity of the human being with God possible. This can only be realized, however, in philosophical terms, that is, in the Concept which, as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, “annul[s] time”;23 when the notion grasps itself, it supersedes its time character. In contrast to Pannenberg, Hegel does not have an interest in the personal resurrection of humans; in philosophical terms, resurrection consists in the Pentecostal-spiritual unity of humans with God by the Concept.

21 Pannenberg 1982: 302–303. 22 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 169–173. 23 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, §801.

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God’s constitution of history’s wholeness Pannenberg hopes to prove on a scientific-theoretical level that time cannot be wiped out, not even philosophically. Only at the end of history, when history in its entirety has become reality, can its parts, the individual events and incidents, be definitively recognized. Pannenberg introduces the concept of God― “the all-determining reality” (see above, section 5)―as a condition for the unity and wholeness of history to come about at all. Historical events cannot in themselves constitute wholeness; the parts do not bring about the whole, neither does man. For this reason, God is introduced by Pannenberg as a correlate to the wholeness of the world and of history, which, on the one hand, defines God as a temporally and historically transcendent reality; only in this way can God be thought of as being the enabling basis of the whole of history. In the same way, God must also have an effect in the world as the power that bears and makes possible the parts of the whole, the historical events in their being, and thus, God is present in history.

The Trinity as the condition of a historical eternity Ultimately, Pannenberg concludes that God’s relationship to the world “must be based upon a difference within God”:24 God’s relationship to the world is a relation to a divine otherness, the Son. Without further explication, Pannenberg introduces not only the concept of God, but also of the Trinity as being the idea of God that explains how God can be an all-determining reality or true infinity from, how God can be conceived as the basis of knowledge and science. Only an inner-divine difference and otherness explains the possibility of God’s relating himself to other things, to parts and to the wholeness. If inner-divine otherness belongs to God’s self-determination, then and this is the key insight an external Other can belong to God’s self-determination. It then becomes comprehensible that the all-determining reality can also determine itself to be “determined by something else,”25 by others. Only by accepting an inner-divine difference does Pannenberg’s thesis that time and history “in some way bear on” God’s identity26 become understandable.

24 Pannenberg 1990: 144. 25 See note 19. 26 See note 18.

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The decision of God to be determined by other realities, including the temporal, is possible and logical because, in God, the Father, Son and Spirit are dependent on one another while standing in a reciprocal relationship of determination to one another. The Father is not only the origin in God, it is also only through his dependence on the Son that he is himself: his being the Father is determined by the Son. And just as the Son is decisive for the personal identity of the Father, so too is the world’s history decisive for God’s identity.27 In Pannenberg’s estimation, Hegel’s subject-philosophical reconstruction of the Trinity undermines such a relationship of dependence. This is why Hegel neutralized, by means of the concept of a subjectivity that self-defines itself to itself, any dependence of the absolute on time and history. It is with the Trinitarian concept of all-determining reality and true infinity that Pannenberg develops his religious-philosophical concept, namely, “to regard the history of religion as a history of the manifestation of the unity of deity which God himself controls on the path of self-revelation.”28 Along with Friedrich Schleiermacher, who conceived of finite reality as being “‘cut out of’ the infinite,” Pannenberg makes it clear that the human being – recognizing the finite – always moves within the horizon of the infinite.29 Religion arises, Pannenberg argues in line with Schleiermacher, when the infinite is conveyed by something finite, by a particular historical event, that is, when Hegel’s category of true infinity becomes religious experience. This was the case with the exodus from Israel, the resurrection of Jesus, the awakening of the Buddha, and the reception of revelation by Mohammed. Pannenberg interprets the history of religions as a dispute about the interpretation of the original intuition of the infinite, thus also encompassing its atheistic critique.30

Pannenberg’s insights Was Pannenberg successful in finding a rationally convincing classification of eternity and temporality? The answer to this question depends on whether one can understand and accept Hegel’s category of true infinity as specified by the label of God as the all-determining reality. God is temporal-historical because

27 Pannenberg 2004: 311–319. 28 Pannenberg 2004: 149. 29 Schleiermacher 2010: 24: “Everything finite exists only through the determination of its limits, which must, as it were, ‘be cut out of’ the infinite.” Pannenberg 2004: 165. 30 Pannenberg 2004: 164–171; Pannenberg 1990: 36.

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he has, in his eternity, freely determined himself to be such. With this decision, all of history and, in particular, the history of religions becomes the history of God’s manifestation. God is capable of manifesting himself because he appears to himself, relating to himself as the eternal, time-enabling and time-consummating event of the unity of Father, Son and Spirit. Christianity assumes God’s Trinitarian structure based on God’s revelation in Christ, in the event of the incarnation, death and the resurrection of the Son. This possibility of divine temporality can be reconstructed philosophically in the form of an assumption of the inner-divine difference in God’s eternity. A purely philosophical reflection on a difference in God need not advance to the interpersonal of that difference. It may identify this difference as the moment of self-discernment that characterizes the structure of subjectivity. Since a kind of “Ur-drama” (original drama) can be assumed in God on the basis of an interpersonal understanding of this difference, this increases the probability of understanding the God-world-human relationship still more as a dramatic-temporal event. If the difference characterizes God merely as God’s self-reference as an absolute subject, this probability is lower. Thus, Hegel’s position in particular remains ambivalent: everything is included in the concept of the absolute subjectivity of oneself, giving the impression that – despite contrary remarks – the temporaldramatic confrontation between God and man is always already encompassed and determined by the absolute subjectivity. Pannenberg points out the risk of God’s decision to let himself be determined in his eternity by others, by time. This is why Pannenberg insists that the epistemological primacy of representation Vorstellung over concept Begriff is necessary, if one is to take the time of being and truth seriously. The form of the representation of being and truth includes the thought of future verification and even divine identity, while Hegel’s concept precludes such verification and claims it for the present a verification that has already been accomplished. Objections to Pannenberg’s conception have repeatedly claimed that he did not successfully differentiate himself from Hegel, since he ultimately also offers an overview of all of history.31 For this reason, his attempt to conceive of God’s identity as dependent on history is unconvincing. God decided on his identity and revealed it in the resurrection of Jesus. This can no longer be changed by the course of world history. A pragmatic contradiction can be seen in the fact that, while Pannenberg’s approach sought a connection to Karl Popper‘s critical rationalism, it does not name any conditions for identifying falsification. For Popper, this was decisive

31 Schulz 1997: 432–445.

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for the scientificness of a statement. False theological statements and the definitive truth of atheism can only be determined post mortem. This, however, presupposes a post-mortal existence and a God that enables it. Falsification is, thus, only possible under the conditions of its own impossibility.

Hans Urs von Balthasar: The ruse of reason and the God of love Hans Urs von Balthasar, unlike Pannenberg, does not receive fundamental intuitions from Hegel; above all, he does not want to design a system that critics still suspect in Pannenberg’s approach. Balthasar develops his theology, at any rate, in direct confrontation with Hegel. While he values Hegel’s concern for mediating and reconciling God and history and would like to dramatize God and being in a Hegelian sense, in these efforts he nonetheless sees a problem to which he refers with the expression coined by Hegel for interpreting human history: “the ruse of reason” (List der Vernunft).32 Hegel cites divine providence as an example for the ruse of reason. Divine providence allows objects to act with and against one another in such a way that they, unknowingly, serve the higher goal reason has set for itself. This ruse of reason determines Hegel’s system. That is why, in Balthasar’s estimation, the historicity of being and the temporality of God fall by the wayside, regardless of whether Hegel pursued the opposite goal. On the one hand, it is true to say that Hegel’s God bypasses Lessing‘s ugly broad ditch between universally valid rational truths and accidental historical truths, because contingency and chance are integrated by the ruse of reason into the course of God’s self-determination. On the other hand, however, Balthasar argues that Hegel does not take contingency, chance, time and history seriously. It is the subject-theoretical idea of all-encompassing self-determination that integrates all things into itself and dominates all otherness. The self of the absolute does not allow other things to be free, nor does it receive itself from the other in an underivable, free manner. If God, however, is to be determined by time and history, he must also be determinable by underivable events of human freedom. But how is that possible? At the end of his Christology, entitled Theo-Drama, Balthasar asks the question: “What does God gain from the World?”33

32 Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1986a): 365 (§209); Balthasar 1998b: 611–619. 33 Balthasar 1998b: 506–521.

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According to Balthasar, Hegel’s God gains himself from the world that is, the ruse of reason. Balthasar wants to say that God has and receives himself from the world and from time. But he wants to exclude the possibility that the ruse of reason is in charge. In order to respond differently to the question of what God gains from the world, Balthasar claims to base himself on the thinking of the young Hegel during his years in Frankfurt (1797–1801). Under the influence of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), Hegel’s thought oriented itself towards the original intuition of the identity that is itself in unity with non-identity.34 In love, non-identity and otherness are not degraded to the level of objects of a cunning reason, but rather are desired for their own sake. Balthasar draws epistemological consequences from this insight: whoever feels himself or herself wanted and loved will intuitively know that he or she is endangering this love when he or she verifies it according to external criteria. Whoever wants to discover whether the other is faithful by asking common friends or hiring detectives makes it clear that he or she distrusts this love. In doing so, he or she loses the acknowledgement that was bestowed on him or her. Nor can the need for love become an inner criterion of authentic love. For love is free, unfathomable. Only in this way is it necessary, coherent. It provides its own evidence. Its evidence is the aesthetic, as in the case of a miracle of nature or a work of art. A work of art has its own necessity and plausibility; it has no need of being derivable or predictable in any way. This is why God’s turning toward the world cannot be derived from an anthropological need, nor from a need of God, as Balthasar sees Hegel’s concept: Hegel’s God completes himself through world history, he gains himself through it. Love Alone is Credible35 reads the title of a short book in which Balthasar interprets God’s revelation as the through-itself credible event of love. Balthasar thus has only faint praise for proofs of God. Like Pannenberg, he believes that God proves himself: in time, not through general truths of reason, but through God’s historical proof of love, which found its climax on the cross. Balthasar judges non-Christian religions according to the extent to which they concur with the event of divine love, extending themselves towards it or searching for it. Theology, above all, must take this fundamental event of God’s revelation in Christ as its measure.

34 Balthasar 1998b: 564–566. 35 Balthasar 2004.

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Balthasar’s trinitarian claim Doing so has consequences for the doctrine of the Trinity, which serves as Balthasar’s point of departure in answering the question of what God gains from the world. Balthasar’s critique of Hegel is triggered by the fact that Hegel did not conceive of the inner-divine difference in the sense of Anselm of Canterbury‘s (1033–1109) definition of God (aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest), namely, that as divine difference it must be that above and beyond which nothing greater can be thought. What Hegel, however, would argue is that the inner-divine difference can only be seen as a conceptual, ideal, as a “play of love”,36 that gains its reality and seriousness through creation, sin, incarnation and the Pentecostal transmission of the Spirit. For this reason, God’s eternity needs time to consummate itself. It is not without reason that one can read the following sentence in a transcript of Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of religion: Without the world, God is not God.37 In contrast, Balthasar claims to conceive of the inner-divine difference as the proof of divine consummateness such that all seriousness of reality is already given in and with it. Balthasar says of the inner divine difference, which according to Hegel is only of a playful and idealistic quality, that it is full of seriousness: “This divine act that brings forth the Son . . . involves the positing of an absolute, infinite ‘distance’ that can contain and embrace all the other distances that are possible within the world of finitude, including the distance of sin.”38 Balthasar initially sees the serious-real difference in God as enabling the time and space of the creaturely. In the Theo-Drama: The Last Act, Balthasar develops the idea of the “positivity of Time and Space”39 in reference to the immanent Trinity: “Our primal ideas of time and space . . . originate in the coming-to-be (Sich-Ereignen) of the divine processions.” He then goes on to write: “Unless we see eternal being in terms of eternal event, we are condemned to see the form of its duration as a mere nunc stans, which deprives it of everything

36 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 434: “The act of differentiation [in the Trinity] is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture.” 37 Although the statement that “without the world, God is not God” is found only in Heinrich Gustav Hotho’s (1802–1873) freely edited transcript of Hegel’s lectures in 1824, it hyperbolically underlines the advantage and profit that God gains through His creating the world. Walter Jaeschke, “Editorial Introduction,” Brown, Hodgson, Stewart 2007: 44. 38 Balthasar 1994: 323. 39 Balthasar 1998b: 91–95.

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that makes world-time (in all its transience) exciting and delightful.”40 In “the trinitarian process,” Balthasar sees the decisive indication of an understanding of eternity in openness for time: “in the eternal process of being begotten, the Son eternally receives himself from the Father in a presence that includes both his always-having-been and also his eternal future (his eternal ‘coming’) from the Father.”41 In this sense, the Son is the originary image of the creature that receives itself from God and has its future in God. Creaturely time is made possible through the eternal, inner-Trinitarian procession of the Son. Because God is in himself ready consummate presence, origin and future, he does not need creaturely time to consummate his eternity. God is God without the world. But does this not simultaneously preclude that God could gain anything from the history of humanity?

The Trinity of love Similar to Pannenberg, Balthasar sees a solution to this conundrum in the idea of God’s eternal self-determination in favor of the human as a participant in the life of the Trinity. Fundamental here is that Balthasar qualifies the inner-divine procession of the Son and the Spirit from the Father as an act of gratuity, something that appears strange when compared to Hegel’s thought. In the inner-divine processions of the Son and the Spirit, Hegel recognizes religious representation (Vorstellung) similar to what one would conceive of philosophically as an absolute subjectivity setting and grasping itself as such. There is no alternative to this subjectivity’s self-grasping. It results out of necessity. Likewise, theologically speaking, there is no alternative to these inner-divine processions. God cannot, so to speak, decide whether to be a trinity or not. However, Balthasar does not conceive of the necessity with which God is Trinity as the consequence of a subjective structure of God that realizes himself in three moments. Rather, he understands belief in the Trinity as the quintessence of the revelation according to which, as formulated in the First Letter of John, God is agape (1 Joh 4, 8.16). Because God is love, it seems evident that God is Trinitarian reality – a reality of relations.42 God’s love converges with

40 Balthasar 1998b: 91. 41 Balthasar 1998b: 92. 42 Note: The necessity to understand the God of love as Trinity does not arise from a necessity of thought or from the nature of love, but from the self-evident revelation of God which shows him as he is: a life full of relationships between and as Father, Son and Spirit. Since God can

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love’s being gratuitous, as can be seen in human love. Authentic human love comes from freedom, not compulsion. It occurs necessarily freely, necessarily out of grace, not out of obligation. It is free of all purpose and in this way, is of benefit to the other. Applied to an understanding of the inner-divine processions, this means that the Father begets the Son neither to determine himself or to recognize himself in the Son, nor to overcome the original undeterminedness by means of creating difference or differentiating itself. The Father did not beget the Son for his own purposes, determined by the ruse of reason, but rather for the sake of the Son, without any intentions regarding himself yet full of intention regarding the Son.43 Only this gratuitousness of inner-divine love makes it possible for time to be freed and used freely by God’s creation, the human being. “Free time” presupposes an internally free Trinitarian eternity that does not seek its own advantage in creation and redemption.

Participation in the Trinity According to Balthasar, a God free in himself is capable of sharing in his own inner life. He draws upon the thoughts of the Rhine and Spanish mystics, first illustrating this participation with the Christmas sermon of Johannes Tauler (1300–1361): just as God’s Son was born at a certain point in time by Maria, so too can a human bring God into the world in his own time by bearing witness to God and thus helping God be born in others.44 John of the Cross (1542–1591)45 goes a step further. He understands mysticism as the Christian’s gradual spiritual approximation of the Son. Indeed, the mystic, the soul, as John formulates it, is transformada in Christ.46 By being transformada in Christ, the soul, together

be believed as the Trinity, reasons can also be formulated which speak for the plausibility of the Trinity dogma. The relationship richness of love is an important point of reference (see Richard of Saint Victor [1110–1173]: love needs two, perfect love requires three persons). Balthasar 2004: 40–43, 59–62. The fact that God is necessarily Trinitarian (that there is no alternative to begetting of the Son and spiration of the Holy Spirit) verifies the eternal perfection of God’s love as always given and shared. 43 Balthasar 2004: 135–137. 44 Balthasar 1998b: 450–452. 45 Balthasar 1998b: 429–433. 46 De la Cruz 1982: 581: “Oh noche que juntaste / Amado con amada, / amada en el Amado transformada!” Translation: “O night that has united the Lover with his beloved, transforming the Beloved into his Lover”.

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with the Father and the Son, can bring and breathe forth the Holy Spirit; as the Spanish tradition states, unida y transformada en Dios, aspira en Dios a Dios.47 In this way, the Trinitarian God receives himself from the human being and eternity from time, not, however, as the consequence of a dynamic of further determination of divine subjectivity. Instead, God receives himself freely and without intentions from the human person who gives birth in herself to the Son and breathes the Spirit en Dios a Dios, in God and to God. Balthasar answers the question of what God gains from the world and what eternity gains from time based on the notion of gratuitousness: a gift, grace. What does God gain from the word? An additional gift, given to the Son by the Father, but equally a gift made by the Son to the Father, and by the Spirit to both. It is a gift because, through the distinct operations of each of the three Persons, the world acquires an inward share in the divine exchange of life; as a result the world is able to take the divine things it has received from God, together with the gift of being created, and return them to God as a divine gift.48

Historical eternity To summarize, Balthasar tries to make eternity’s capacity for time understandable based on inner-divine difference. So do Hegel and Pannenberg. Along with Hegel during his time in Frankfurt and Pannenberg, Balthasar understands eternity’s capacity for time as the expression of divine love aimed not at itself, but rather primarily at the other for its own sake the other is a goal in and of itself (Selbstzweck). In contrast to Pannenberg, however, Balthasar understands eternity’s capacity for time not as eternity’s self-enacted and self-determined dependence on time, but rather as the consequence of inner-divine gratuitousness in which the divine persons represent past, present and future. In contrast to Pannenberg and Balthasar, Hegel emphasizes the unity of God insofar as he thinks of God as absolute, triadically self-determining subjectivity. But as Pannenberg and Balthasar see it, Hegel only conceives of time as the further determination of eternal self-having. Whoever conceives of innerdivine difference as a relational event capable of temporality, as do Pannenberg and Balthasar, may, according to Hegel, proceed correctly on the level of religious representation (Vorstellung). They will lose, however, the philosophical

47 Balthasar 1998b: 432, quotes John of the Cross, Cantico (version A), stanza 37: “The soul breathes God in God, and this breathing is the breathing of God himself.” 48 Balthasar 1998b: 521.

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grounding on which they stand. And yet Pannenberg feels his theology to be philosophically grounded because he sees the assumption of an inner-divine difference as philosophically comprehensible. He does not see this difference as retained in Hegel’s subject-theoretical reconstruction of the Trinity, which is why time and future are reduced to the strategy of the absolute’s ruse: They must serve the completion of eternity; they never pose a risk to the eternity of God. It is, however, the philosophically older Hegel who equips Pannenberg and Balthasar with the decisive category of true infinity. They use it as an instrument that allows one to conceive rationally of the inner connection of the absolute and time in order to comprehend creation, incarnation and eschatology in relation to God. One thing is certain: through Hegel’s philosophy, the theology of eternity won back time as historical eternity.

Bibliography Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama. Theological Dramatic Theory. IV: The Action. Translated by Graham Harrison. San Francisco: Ignatius 1994. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Apokalypse der deutschen Seele. Studien zu einer Lehre von letzten Haltungen. Der deutsche Idealismus (Bd. 1). Freiburg: Johannes Verlag Einsiedeln 1998. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama. Theological Dramatic Theory. V: The Last Act. Translated by Graham Harrison. San Francisco: Ignatius 1998b. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible. San Francisco: Ignatius Press 2004. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic II: Truth of God. Translated by Adrian J. Walker, San Francisco: Ignatius 2004. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by James Black Baillie. New York: Harper & Row’s Torchbooks’ edition 1967. https://www.marxists.org/ reference/archive/hegel/phindex.htm. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I. In: Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (eds.), Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I. Werke 8. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986a. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II. In: Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (eds.), Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II. Werke 9. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986b. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III. Werke 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986c. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic. Translated by Arnold V. Miller. New York: Humanity Books 1998. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. One-Volume Edition. The Lectures of 1827. Translated by Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson and Jon M. Stewart. Peter C. Hodgson (ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2006.

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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume I: Introduction and the Concept of Religion. Translated by Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson and Jon M. Stewart. Peter C. Hodgson (ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2007. Walter Jaeschke, “Religionsphilosophie”. In: Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 8. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1992, 748–763. Walter Jaeschke, “Editorial Introduction”. In: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume I: Introduction and the Concept of Religion. Translated by Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson, Jon M. Stewart; Peter C. Hodgson (ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2007, 1–88. Juan de la Cruz, Obras Completas. Eulogio Pacho (ed.). Burgos: Editorial Monte Carmelo 1982. Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel”. In: Wolfhart Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom. Translated by R. A. Wilson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press 1973, 144–177. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Francis McDonagh. London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ldt 1976. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1982. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God. Translated by Philip Clayton. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1990. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology I. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. London, New York: T&T Clark International 2004. Friedrich Schleiermacher; Richard Crouter (tr.), On Religion. Speeches to its Cultured Despisers. Cambridge: University Press 2010. Michael Schulz, Sein und Trinität. Systematische Erörterungen zur Religionsphilosophie G.W.F. Hegels im ontologiegeschichtlichen Rückblick auf J. Duns Scotus und I. Kant und die Hegel-Rezeption in der Seinsauslegung und Trinitätstheologie bei W. Pannenberg, E. Jüngel, K. Rahner und H.U. v. Balthasar. St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag 1997.

Marcus Schmücker

On the relation between God and time in the later theistic Vedānta of Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Veṅkaṭanātha Introductory remarks An important aspect of thinking about time in many philosophical and theological traditions, not only in the Occident but also in the East, is time as the source of suffering.1 One suffers under the sequence of time’s constituents “present”, “past” and “future”, a sequence involving nothing other than an irreversible progression towards an inevitable end, driven by the irretrievability of the past. Once we enter life and are subjected to this sequence, we are only able to experience ourselves in a succession of temporal episodes. Our lifetime as a whole, in its temporal sequence, is thus never available to us. Though we experience a present, when we try to grasp it, this present immediately becomes the past. This is another reason why we suffer due to time: our lifetime is perpetually being lost. Thus, facing time, humans are forced to reflect on their own finitude at birth, their inevitable death, and the misery of their existence between these two points in time. Time causes fear of no longer existing in the future, and thus it annihilates our freedom. As a destructive factor in human life, time is related to explanations of unalterable sequences such as the stages of life. Therefore, freedom from fear, that is, freedom from death, which is our non-existence in the future, is an important aspect of religious reality, an aspect inseparably connected to the finitude of human existence. Finitude means that no human being can escape the sequence of the progress of time that directs life to its end. It is the perpetual course of time that causes an awareness of finiteness, in other words, an awareness of being non-eternal. Given

1 Suffering under the dominance of time is taken up in Michael Theunissen’s Negative Theologie der Zeit (1991: 218‒281). Note: I like to express my gratitude to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, who patiently supported me from version to version, to Joseph O’Leary who thoroughly corrected an earlier version, to Michael Williams, who discussed Madhva’s and Jayatirtha’s view on time with me, and finally to Nataliya Yanchevskaya, who provided valuable suggestions and corrections for the final version. Marcus Schmücker, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstr. 11-13, 1020 Vienna, Austria https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-008

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this situation, it makes sense that humanity has designed conceptions of God – and this implies concepts of eternity – that can overcome this constriction of time. Indeed, it would run counter to the notion of God if such a Being were to suffer from a succession of temporal determinations. The temporality and imperfection of human existence are thus compensated by the concept of eternity, an attempt to describe a non-temporal structure that does not expose human beings to the hopeless suffering of passing time. In this essay, I examine two contrasting conceptions of eternity propounded in two traditions of theistic pre-modern medieval India. The first conception is that of an eternity that is timeless. The second understands eternity as being in all times (past, present, future),2 eternity thus characterized as comprising the “fullness of life” in all its times. This non-temporal unity of time is an attribute of God, or is God himself. Here, eternity does not negate the human concept of time, but rather unifies human definitions of time. From this (second) perspective, divine eternity does not entail the exclusion of temporal determinations; rather, past, present and future are all included as being imperishable. The first concept attempts to define eternity in a stricter way, as having no temporal determination at all. Here eternity has nothing in common with the sequence of time; it is completely beyond time. From the viewpoint of suffering due to time, the import of such timeless eternity is its complete triumph over the destructive aspect of time. But then one is left wondering whether God, as a timeless eternal being, can have any knowledge of, or can care for, temporal entities, i.e. human beings. In pre-modern India, discussions of these two concepts of eternity can be found in the texts of various theistic traditions, as in the two theistic Vedānta schools I will examine here. I will show that in these traditions, time, seen as determining the transitory nature of life, was in fact the point of departure for discerning the nature of a God transcending this condition. But before I discuss the two above-mentioned concepts of eternity from the perspective of three Vedānta representatives, Madhva and Jayatīrtha on one side and Veṅkaṭanātha on the other, I will examine why God and time became an important topic in these Vedānta traditions in the first place, as well as how concepts of the relation between God and time then developed.

2 These two concepts of eternity reflect the two concepts in discussions of analytical theology, i.e. divine timelessness and divine temporality; both are applied for example in Melamed 2016: 1; 11: “Eternity as timeless existence, as opposed to eternity as existence in all times”; cf. also Deng 2019: 4.

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Strategies against the suffering caused by time The ambivalence between eternity and the temporality of time – I tend to say the creative and destructive character of time – is certainly one of the reasons it became a topic of discussion in India. While eternity implies unlimited continuity, temporality brings finite life to an end, a step that is uncontrollable and uninterruptable. The oldest text of the Indian tradition, the R̥gveda, does not contain an abstract concept of time (kāla is mentioned only once, in R̥gveda 10.42.9), but it does refer to certain aspects of such a concept. The passing of time is not defined by the suffering it causes, but by the idea of continuity, of constant renewal. This constant renewal, which is supported by ritual activity, is found in several central concepts of the R̥gveda, including the cosmic order (r̥ta)3 by which the universe is upheld. The cosmic order is associated with the idea of a wheel (cakra),4 which, in turn, is associated with different time periods, the most important being the year (saṃvatsara).5 The recurring sequence of the “components of a year”, such as day and night, resembles the movement of a wheel6 that turns endlessly. Such concepts of continuity characterized by infinite repetition might be considered a concept of eternity, or better, eternal sequences. Nevertheless, they also make the ambivalence of time clear, since defining continuity with the certainty of coming time also implies that time vanishes. While this ambivalence does not seem particularly important in the R̥gveda, it is nevertheless apparent in passages describing time not as leading to a new beginning, but to ageing and finally death, as well as in passages referring to natural phenomena such as the dawn (uṣas).7 One’s own finiteness is clear in the face of the simple observation that regular returning not only means renewal, but is also a reflection of time’s potency

3 For a discussion of these terms in the context of time, cf. Yanchevskaya/Witzel 2016: 24‒29. 4 The image of a wheel is also taken up by Veṅkaṭanātha and applied in a theological context. He writes that God’s will, volition and his creation revolve like a wheel (Nyāyasiddhāñjana 393,3: icchāsaṃkalpasr̥ṣṭīnāṃ cakravad, cf. p. 155 in this article). 5 Yanchevskaya/Witzel conclude (2016: 26) “that a relationship of Vedic r̥ta with time and the wheel of time (the wheel of the year in this case) is not accidental. Although we cannot say that r̥ta is time, it is definitely on some older Indo-European level related to time both etymologically and functionally. It organizes the universe, creates a sequence of events, and exerts its power over all living beings.” 6 Cf. Malinar 2002: 30‒32. 7 Cf. R̥gveda 1.124.2 that says that uṣas, the dawn, “diminishes human generations” [praminatī manuṣyā yugāni] and R̥gveda 1.92.10 where she “shortens the lifetime of the mortals” [āminānā martasya . . . āyuḥ]. I follow the translation of Yanchevskaya/Witzel (2016:27).

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for destruction. This is alluded to forcefully in the Vedic Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (7th–6th centuries BCE), where the year is described as follows: The Year, doubtless, is the same as Death; for he [d.i. Parajāpati] it is who, by means of day and night, destroys the life of mortal beings, and then they die: therefore the Year is the same as Death; [. . .] The gods were afraid of this Prajāpati, the Year, Death, the Ender, lest he, by day and night, should reach the end of their life.8

But before I follow this destructive conceptualization of time, let me go one step back. In two hymns (19,53–54)9 of the Atharvaveda (1200–1000 BCE), the next oldest text after the R̥gveda, any mention of the destructive aspect of time is still missing. Time is praised and its omnipotence is clearly expressed. It has gained in importance and become an independent principle: it is expressed as timeless and as temporal. Time is identified not only with what is considered the Highest, such as the Lord of all (sarvasyeśvara) or the Lord of creatures (prajāpati), it is described as something indestructible and “without age” (ajara). Further, time is identified with various central topoi of the R̥gveda: the seers mount time as if it were a horse; time is a horse running with seven rays (saptaraśmi), having a thousand eyes (sahasrākṣa), rich in seed; all beings are the wheels (cakra) of time; time moves with seven wheels and seven naves (nābhi), with immortality (amr̥ta) as its axis (akṣa). The hymn of the Atharvaveda goes on to describe those things that arise from time (kālāt) or are caused by it (kālena).10 It is time that created the earth, and therefore in time are the time modes of past and future, the burning sun, all beings, the eye, the mind, breath, names. Further, time is

8 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10,4,3.1–3: eṣa vai mr̥tyur yat saṃvatsaraḥ. eṣa hi martyānām ahorātrābhyām āyuḥ kṣiṇoty athamriyante tasmād eṣa eva mṛtyuḥ . . . etasmād antakān mr̥tyoḥ saṃvatsarāt prajāpater bibhayāṃ cakrur yad vai no ’yam ahorātrābhyām āyuṣo ’ntaṃ na gaced iti. I quote the translation of Eggeling 1882–1900. 9 For a detailed analysis of verses Atharvaveda 19.53.1–4 see Jurewicz 2018: 200–206. In many passages of her book Jurewicz demonstrates that time as a concept was already present in the R̥gveda and developed in the Atharvaveda. In Jurewicz 2019: 21, she observes a change in the concept of time, which starts to rule over man: “ . . . as charioteers have power over horses harnessed to a chariot, human beings have power over time (conceived in terms of a horse). Now once the concept of chariot is hidden, the possibility to express the man’s power over time is lost.” Concerning the meaning of the wheel according to the Mahābhārata, Jurewicz writes (2019: 22): “ . . . the use of the concept of wheel in reference to time implies the lack of human power over it.” 10 In Yanchevskaya/Witzel (2016: 33), the concept of eternity as described in the R̥gveda is compared to the concept of time in the Atharvaveda, whereby “it is the idea of all-powerful time that creates and regulates the universe. Second a conceptual division of time in two types: one is beyond the world-time-eternity, located in the realm of immortality; another one – transitory, fluid, and cyclic time that ‘flows around the worlds’.”

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connected to principles such as ascetic heat (tapas), the highest (jyeṣṭham), and the brahman itself. One finds no mention of human beings fearing time; on the contrary, all creatures are delighted (nandanti) about time when it arrives (kālena āgatena). The relationship between God and time is anything but balanced here. For the most part the Creator God is superior or equal in rank to time, although in the two hymns about time of the Atharvaveda, time is described as superior to the “Lord of the creatures” (prajāpati). The connection of time with destruction and a final end is followed up only later, in India’s epic literature. In this next step in the development of the ambivalence between God and time, time is described as something that causes vanishing. Its destructive aspect prevails; time no longer supports human beings in the constant renewal of the universe. Here, the destructive function of time as dangerous for every human activity is clearly expressed. If time has no ruler, man has no other prospect than being finite, that is, being subject to the passing of time. A well-known and often repeated description of time in its destructive character is found in the Mahābhārata,11 where “time cooks living beings” (kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni), ripening them like fruit.12 This negative view of time as found in the Mahābhārata was perhaps the reason for attempts to subject time to a supreme God who ruled over time.13 Without simplifying the complex history of concepts of time in Indian traditions, it may be said that various “strategies” were developed to overcome the destructive force of time as the only ruler. For example, one might follow the metaphoric use of the root √pac, “to cook”, “to bake”, “to cause to ripen”. This root, frequently found14 in the Mahābhārata, is however no longer an action of time, but of a

11 The dating of the composition of the Mahābhārata is wide, ranging between the 3rd century BCE and the 3rd century CE. 12 Cf. Mahābhārata 1.1.188; 17.1.3. The description of time as cooking all beings seems to shape the thinking about time deeply. As we will see later in this chapter, Veṅkaṭanātha also quotes this phrase when discussing the relationship between God and time. See also Mahābhārata 12.220.94: anīśasyāpramattasya bhūtāni pacataḥ sadā | anivr̥ttasya kālasya kṣayaṃ prāpto na mucyate. “The one who has gained the destruction of time, which is without Lord, always watchful, cooking beings, constant, will not get released.” 13 Vassilkov (1999: 17–33), in a careful examination of the destructive aspect of time in the Mahābhārata, sees a link between the above two hymns of the Atharvaveda and the negative concept of time in the Mahābhārata; cf. pp.18–21. 14 Cf. Vassilkov’s remark (1999: 22) on the meaning of “cooking”: “The image of Time cooking living beings must have been derived from the reality of a sacrificial rite during which sacrificial cakes (puroḍāśa) were baked for the gods. Following this pattern, time was probably perceived as cooking/baking all living beings who were later to be devoured by Death (Mr̥tyu).”

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Highest being, who by cooking time brings things to maturity. This shift from time being the agent that is cooking to time being cooked by something higher is already seen in the Mahābhārata itself.15 However it is taken up clearly in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (5.5), where the highest God, said to be the matrix of all (viśvayoniḥ), brings to ripeness/cooks the self-nature [inherent nature] (of things) (svabhāvam pacati), and [thereby] all things can come to be that are capable of being brought to ripeness (pācyāṃś ca sarvān pariṇāmayet); he rules over this entire totality as the one, applying all guṇas [distributing all qualities].16

It is therefore no longer time (kāla) that compels the wheel to move17 (cakra, here brahmacakra), but God (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.1). Moreover, God is the one who gives time its time: he is defined (6.2) as the “time of time” (kālakāla-18) while being himself beyond the three times (6.5, paras trikālād). Seeing God as superior to time introduces a number of new concerns regarding the relationship between a time-transcending God and the temporality of time. Moreover, the question of how a unique God is related to time is linked to the question of how human beings, who are subject to the destructive aspect of time, can be guided by such a God and saved by him from finitude. It is not the case, however, that time is now subject to God and thus loses its destructive side completely. Rather, both mentioned aspects of time, destructive and creative, return as united in one God. This becomes particularly clear in passages of the Viṣṇupurāṇa.19 Viṣṇu is the responsible deity who sustains the world, but he is also the cause for its destruction and the period of its dissolution (pralaya) and also for its new creation. Time has here, even if it is equated with Him, creative and destructive power as well. But time’s power is now God’s creative, sustaining and destructive power. Thus, when the thesis of monotheism emerged in various theistic Indian traditions, such as the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava traditions, time, which had long been

15 Cf. Mahābhārata 12.231.25: kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni sarvāṇy evātmanātmani yasmiṃs tu pacyate kālas taṃ na videha kaś cana. “Time cooks all beings by itself in itself, but no one here knows him in whom time is cooked.” 16 ŚU 5.5: yac ca svabhāvam pacati viśvayoniḥ, pācyāṃś ca sarvān pariṇāmayed yaḥ. sarvam etad viśvam adhitiṣṭhat’ eko, guṇāṃś ca sarvān viniyojayed yaḥ. 17 In the Mahābhārata, the wheel causing destruction and creation turns under its own power, without any direction of a divine being; cf. Mahābhārata 1.1.38: evaṃ etad anādyantaṃ bhūtasaṃskārakārakam anādinidhanaṃ loke cakraṃ saṃparivartate. “Thus is this wheel, beginningless and endless, turning in the world, endlessly causing creation and destruction.” 18 I follow here the translation of Oberlies 1998: 100; for the variant kālakara-, “architect of time”, cf. also Olivelle (1998: 430). 19 Cf. Weßler 1995: 208–210; cf. esp. his reference to Viṣṇupurāṇa 1,22,23ff.

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seen as having a destructive character, received not a new meaning, but another weight: Monotheism’s placing a highest Being above time can be understood as an attempt to dispel people’s existential fear of the inescapable progress of time. However, this also provoked debates in the Indian traditions: What happens when time no longer rules, when time, accompanied by a higher Being, is ruled by that Being? And how is the concept of God influenced by the necessity of his having temporal aspects? Various theological and philosophical reasons were brought forward and developed to explain how God rules over time. Indeed, the concept of time being ruled by a highest God involves a radical shift from earlier concepts of time. With regard to human existence, this shift means that people are no longer dependent on time’s destructive factor. But while the consequence of time being ruled by a higher Being is people’s independence from time, it also implies that henceforth they are dependent on God, or, as we shall see, dependent on God’s will (icchā) and his inconceivable potency (acintyaśakti).20 But if God rules over time, human existence is no longer endangered by the course of time; from now on human existence depends completely on the power of one God. Of course, the development of monotheism was not the only possible strategy against time’s destructive power. There were competing strategies. Another was to reduce time to the moment (kṣaṇa), i.e. the smallest unit of time, to prove time’s emptiness, a central tenet in early Indic Buddhist traditions. And still another was the rejection of time in later Advaita Vedānta, whereby time was placed in the realm of unreal ignorance (avidyā).21 Also Kashmir Śaivism

20 Subordinating time to a higher Being is not unique to Indian traditions. We find evidence of this also in other religious traditions, such as in the Islamic understanding of destiny and time in their relationship to God. For this, see the work of Georges Tamer. In particular, he points out that in Islam, the negative understanding of time coincides with the concept of destiny. For this, the term dahr is used – a word that “primarily means the infinite time, which fatefully reigns over human existence. [. . .]. To identify dahr with God ultimately aims to recognize the total scope of time’s ability to act on human life and to transfer its powerful functions to none other than God himself” (Tamer 2008: 200). Tamer describes the subordination of time to God very clearly, as well as the shift to a rather negative understanding of time; cf. especially chapter III, ibid. 205‒206: “While the Arabs earlier did not make a difference between time and fate, now the two are sharply separated. Time is deprived of power, destiny is identified with God’s will. [. . .] Time is now unrestrictedly inferior to God. He is the actual subject in time and history; he sets periods of time and terminal points in absolute freedom and manipulates them according to his will.” [Translation is mine, M.S.]. 21 For the view of Śrīharṣa, Citsukha, and Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī, in which time is placed in the realm of ignorance (avidyā), cf. Duquette/Ramasubramanian 2017: 47‒56. Earlier in the same line of the Advaita tradition is Sureśvara, cf. Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika, verse 147 part 2 (Brahmavalli): kālatryasyāvidyāyāḥ samutthānād ahetutā. (cf. also vers 143). Cf. Vimuktātman’s

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understood time as the cause for a sequence separate from the sphere of pure consciousness.22 In contrast to this emphasis on time as empty or unreal, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition developed strategies in the opposite direction: overcoming the destructive aspect of time by identifying it with timeless eternity. Here, time was understood so strictly as being eternal that it became, paradoxically, “timeless time”,23 within which temporal limits were merely regulatory and thus superimposed conditions (upādhi). As such, time was considered an eternal timeless entity. In further developments, it was even defined as an eternal substance (dravya).24 This indeed influences the concept of a highest God, since God must be equal in rank to such absolute time. It was just this concept of time, as well as, implicitly, this concept of God that was criticized in theistic Vedānta, which developed a theology of God who rules over time while maintaining a relation to the temporal world.

God and time in later theistic Vedānta In the following, I will discuss the positions of two different Vedānta schools against this background. The representatives of the first school are Madhva (1238‒1317) and Jayatīrtha (1345‒1388). Madhva, the founder of the so-called Dvaita Vedānta25 tradition, propounded a dualistic concept in which the world and individual souls are dependent (paratantra) on God, who himself is independent (svatantra) and free from time (kāla). The representative of the second

definition of time as neither sat (i.e. real being) nor asat (i.e. complete inexistent), which again consigns time to the realm of ignorance (avidyā) (cf. Iṣṭasiddhi [first chapter, verses 49–56]); on this, see Schmücker, forthcoming. 22 Cf. Bäumer 1996: 74‒75: “Thus when the movement of breath stands still, Time itself ceases and with it the fragmented knowledge. At that moment pure consciousness shines forth without separation.” 23 This is an expression of Halbfass (1992: 221), used in his discussion of the development of the meaning of time in the Vaiśeṣika. As he states: “In the classical Vaiśeṣika system, time is marginalized and superseded not by being presented as an appearance, but by being raised to the status of an eternal, ‘timeless’ substance.” 24 Duquette/Ramasubramanian (2017: 46) summarize the view of the Naiyāyika concept of time before demonstrating how Śrīharṣa criticizes this position. What becomes clear is the difficult relationship between pure eternality and concrete time. This is expressed in the following wellknown contrast: “Naiyāyikas thus distinguish between two kinds of time: absolute time (mahākāla), which is eternal and of course real; and empirical or ‘conventional’ time (khaṇḍakāla), which arises from the association of absolute time with external limiting conditions.” 25 Or better, as Madhva himself calls his doctrine, tattvavāda (the “doctrine of that-ness”).

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school under consideration, the Viśiṣṭādvaita26 Vedānta tradition, is Veṅkaṭanātha (1268‒1369). In contrast to Dvaita Vedānta’s dualistic concept of God and the world, Veṅkaṭanātha (and his predecessors as well) developed a concept of God being in relational unity with the world. Time (kāla), which is defined as an insentient (acit) substance (dravya), is an essential component of this world. Therefore, like the world itself, time constitutes God’s body (śarīra). The representatives of both schools worshipped the same God, ViṣṇuNārāyaṇa, but some of their views on the theology of this God and the ontology of the world differ. They pondered the same problem – how to explain God’s relation to eternal time at the beginning of creation (sr̥ṣṭi) – and thus they had a common cosmological background: acceptance of a personal creator God who or re-manifests or re-creates the universe after a period of rest, i.e. the time of the dissolution (pralaya) of the universe. Both schools also accepted time as eternal and characterized it as pravāha, “flowing along”, although they differed in their understanding of this term. Therefore for both, during the period of the world’s dissolution, time (kāla) is not dissolved, but is still related to an eternal God who re-creates the world in temporal time, i.e. the specific time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla). In their discussions on how to conceptualize time and God’s relation to it, Madhva and Veṅkaṭanātha had a common opponent, an earlier thinker from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. This opponent has been identified as Udayana (10th cent.). He had taught a concept of God’s dependency on time27: time, in itself, is not split into past, present and future, but rather its division into past, present and future is enabled by the superimposition of limiting conditions (upādhi).28 Common to both Madhva and Veṅkaṭanātha is their view that the most important principle is the will of God (īśvarecchā). According to both, this concept of will is in fact defined as inconceivable power (atarkya-, acintyaśakti).

26 The translation of this term is “the non-duality of qualified/differentiated brahman”. 27 Chemparathy (1972: 148) has pointed out that according to Udayana, God is dependent on time: “As in his creation, Īśvara is dependent here, too, upon factors extraneous to him, especially the particular Time (kālaviśeṣaḥ), which is said to be one hundred Brahmā-years.” Here Chemparathy is refering to Nyāyakusumāñjali 306,1ff. (brahmāṇḍāntaravyavahāro vā kālopādhiḥ | tadavacchinne kāle punaḥ sargaḥ.) Cf. also 1972: 140: “The fact that Īśvara creates the universe according to certain conditions that are beyond his own choice makes his activity dependent (sāpekṣa-). [. . .] the Creator is here reduced to a mere director who, endowed as he is with eternal omniscience, causes the pre-existing causes to start at the appointed time their combining action and directs it until the visible universe comes into being.” 28 Cf. Michael Williams’ chapter in the present volume, where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that time only appears to be divided into smaller fragments due to upādhis is discussed (pp. 178).

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However, their concept of eternity is not the same. They follow, respectively, the two types of eternity mentioned above in the introduction. Veṅkaṭanātha takes eternity to mean that all times exist in God. Time’s constituents of past, present, future can all be known by God without contradiction. In contrast, Madhva’s concept of eternity is based on a concept of God’s timeless eternity from which he creates. According to his view, as well as that of his pupil and commentator Jayatīrtha, such a God is able to manifest particular temporal specifications (viśeṣa) from the eternal flow (pravāha) of time.

God’s rulership over time: An example from the Mādhva school In order to elucidate Madhva’s arguments on God and time, I shall refer to two passages in his Anuvyākhyāna, as well as a passage from his commentary (Anubhāṣya) on the Brahmasūtra; the latter will be analyzed in light of Jayatīrtha’s Tattvaprakāśikā. As mentioned above, common to both Madhva and Veṅkaṭanātha is their criticism of time being divided by means of limiting conditions (upādhi). Madhva takes upādhi as a specification (viśeṣa) of time, and emphasizes the reality of such a determination enabled by God. For him, God does in fact create a real world at a real time. He moreover demonstrates that while time’s flowing along happens in and of itself, this does not imply that time divides or limits itself of its own accord; a specific time in the flow of time (kāle) can only be manifested by God’s inconceivable power (acintyaśakti). In Madhva’s understanding of time as an eternal flowing along (pravāha), this flow is not only related to time, it also characterizes the world in contrast to the highest God.29 He describes the eternal flow of time in particular in the Anuvyākhyāna. Here he explaines that time is one and eternal, but has no specific features.30 Jayatīrtha comments on this in his Nyāyasudhā, stating that time, which is indeed characterized by a specification (viśeṣavān), has the form of

29 Cf. Mesquita 2016: 234: “Whereas Viṣṇu is a steadfast Being outstanding [among; added M.S.] all other finite beings, the finite nature of the world is in continuous flow (pravāhataḥ) since it is the product of transformation (viśvam satyam vaśe viṣṇor nityam eva pravāhataḥ).” 30 Anuvyākhyāna II.3.17 (2,2.162–164): kālapravāha evaiko nityo na tu viśeṣavān. Time is inescapable, as Siauve (1968: 157) remarks: “Il est un écoulement, un flot, pravāha, sans interruption, nirantara. Cette continuité est ici encore signe d’infinité: on ne peut pas plus penser l’absence du temps à l’intérieur de son cours qu’on ne peut la penser au-delà de lui.”

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particular time limits, such as kṣaṇa, i.e. the smallest temporal unit, lava, i.e. two kṣaṇas, etc.31 In general, the discussions during Madhva’s time (and earlier in the NyāyaVaiśeṣika school) concerning creation by a creator-God focused on the question of whether this being is able to produce an effect. When God creates after the time of dissolution (pralaya), it would be incongruous if his creation were a temporal effect within eternity. Therefore the decisive question is how the eternal God, to cause an effect (kārya), can enter a particular time, i.e. the time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla). In Madhva’s concept of time, time, as an eternal flow, has its own dynamics, but he does not attribute causality to time, neither instrumental nor material. He considers time to be revealed only by its units, which are concrete episodes in the flow of time. To present Madhva’s view on the relation between God and time in more detail, I will examine two passages in which he sets himself apart from the NyāyaVaiśeṣika thinkers, in particular Udayana, whose theory of creation starts from the viewpoint of destruction as based on their fundamental thesis that an effect comes out of nothing (ārambhavāda/asatkāryavāda). Madhva criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as being unable to prove, because they accept God’s eternal will (nityecchā), that God creates an effect at the beginning (ārambha) of creation (sr̥ṣṭi). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika understanding, during the period of dissolution (pralaya) the universe is reduced to ultimate constituents, whereby the material world is reduced to its earthly, watery, fiery and airy atoms, which are the ultimate causes characterized by the inherence (samavāyikāraṇa) of material products. Atoms of one substance have to conjoin to form a dyad of atoms (dvyaṇuka); three dyads, constituting a triad of atoms (tryaṇuka), are the first visible product after the period of dissolution (pralaya). The conjunction of these atoms with individual selves has a cause characterized by non-inherence (asamavāyikāraṇa), with the will of God as its efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa).32 During the period of dissolution (pralaya), the atoms of the substances exist

31 Cf. Nyāyasudhā ad Anuvyākhyāna II.3.17: viśeṣavān kṣaṇalavādirūpaḥ. Siauve (1968: 154‒170, esp. 161) discusses various verses of Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna, summarizing the difficulty to define the relation between God and time as follows: “ . . . la difficulté est ici de penser le temps ‘avec’ des spécifications qui le contredisent, et de comprendre comment une réalité éternelle est le support d’instants périssables.” See also ibid., fn. 1: “Si les viśeṣa du temps ne sont pas notre œuvre, il ne reste qu’une possibilité: Dieu seul est capable d’introduire l’instant dans le temps, le périssable dans l’indestructible’.” 32 For a summary of the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation, see chapter four in Kumar 2019: 60‒63.

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together with the other eternal uncaused entities, such as individual selves, the “unseen” (adr̥ṣṭa), i.e. their merits (dharma), demerits (adharma) identified as an invisible force, impressions (saṃskāra), and other eternal entities, such as ether (ākāśa), time (kāla) and space (dik). For Madhva as well as his commentator Jayatīrtha, under these presuppositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, it is difficult to give a rational account of how God initiates the beginning of the creation after the time of dissolution without arriving at an eternal (sadā) effect (kārya) – this on the basis of the finest atoms (paramāṇu), the good and bad deeds of individual souls (adr̥ṣṭa), and time (kāla) being eternal as well. Again, the dilemma is the following: If God’s will is eternal, it cannot design something non-eternal. It therefore cannot produce any temporal effects either. Indeed, how can a temporal effect be produced from eternal time? And if God’s will were non-eternal (anitya), then God would be dependent and thus unable to cause anything. In the following verses of his Anuvyākhyāna, Madhva argues that while God has an eternal will, his dynamic principle is beyond human comprehension due to God’s ability to do everything.33 Madhva outlines the position of his opponent and contrasts it to his own view, in which God’s eternal will can start creation at a specific time. Time, with its specification (viśeṣa), is under the control of God’s (Hari’s) power. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s God cannot effect such divisions in time.34 Because the will of the Supreme Lord is eternal, since atoms always exist, and because the “unseen” (adr̥ṣṭa) and time exist [always], an effect [caused by the eternal will of the Lord] would exist at all times. (2,2.162) For there is no time division in this doctrine [of the Vaiśeṣika], but in our position, [time division] is by Hari’s eternal will, which starts with the creation at a particular time. (2,2.163)

33 Mesquita (2016: 249) picks up the difficult relationship between creation and Viṣṇu by describing it as follows: “The outwardness of the creator additionally results from the fact that the creation arises merely out of Viṣṇu’s wish or desire (icchāmātraṃ prabhoḥ sr̥ṣṭir iti sr̥ṣṭau viniścitāḥ). The further implication of this thesis is that Viṣṇu is absolutely free not only in reference to the point of time of creation but also in reference to creation itself, since His wish (icchā), as far as it goes back to His omnipotence, has no boundaries, i.e. His omnipotence persists upright in the fact that He can execute everything He wishes. Consequently, the almighty Viṣṇu can carry into effect all that may or can be done.” 34 Cf. Sharma’s (2008: 219) explanation of Madhva’s criticism of the Vaiśeṣika concept of upādhis in the chapter on the meaning and nature of creation: “[. . .] This difficulty does not exist for Madhva who accepts natural specifications (svābhāvikaviśeṣas) in time through Viśeṣas, to regulate periodicity of cosmic creation and dissolution at the will of God.”

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And exclusively the specifications of time are eternally under the power of Hari’s will, because the śruti itself [i.e. Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad I.8] states: “Every momentary unit”.35 (2,2.164) Also his speech: “He manifests the power which is named as time,”36 is not a contradic(2,2.165) tion, insofar as time is going by time.37

With the last words of these verses, Madhva is referring to time as eternal flowing along. He emphasizes that time, even if not independent (tadgata, tadādhāra), is based on itself. This is found in the words “time is going by time” (kālasya kālagatvena), and is also expressed in the next verses (2,2.166‒168, cited below): time is “self-indicated” (svoddiṣṭa), or time is “going on its own accord” (svagata, svagatatvena).38 The implication is that the beginningless and endless flow of time runs inevitably and unstoppably as independent and self-given. This happens without the possibility of any human intervention or influence. No human being can cause a temporal determination in the flow of time, which thus rules over all human beings. In reference to God, if time is already there, this implies that only an instrumental cause is necessary, not a material one; it is therefore unnecessary to create time materially. It is remarkable against the background of the given context that Madhva turns to the concept of the inescapable flow of time: It is the fact that time exists that gives God the ability to create or start the creation. The following verses of Madhva can be understood in this way, namely, that God, due to his almighty power, can start the creation, or the time of creation,

35 The full passage of Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad I.8 runs: sarve nimeṣā jajñire vidyutaḥ puruṣād adhi | kalā muhūrtāḥ kāṣṭāś cāhorātrāś ca sarvaśaḥ ||. “All nimeṣa, kalās, muhūrtas, kāṣṭās, days, half-months, months, and seasons, were born from the self-luminous Person. The year was also born from him [. . .].” 36 The quote is from Bhāgavata Purāṇa 3.8.11, where time is defined as śakti (cf. also Siauve 1968: 326). so ’ntaḥ śarīre ’rpitabhūtasūkṣmaḥ kālātmikām śaktim udīrayāṇaḥ uvāsa tasmin salile pade sve, yathānalo dāruṇi ruddhavīryaḥ. 37 Anuvyākhyāna 2,2.162–165: nityecchatvāt pareśasya paramāṇusadātvataḥ | adr̥ṣṭakālayoś caiva bhāvāt kāryaṃ sadā bhavet || 2,2.162 na hi kālavibhedo ’sti tatpakṣe ‘smanmate hareḥ | viśeṣakāla evaitatsr̥ṣṭyādīcchā sadātanī || 2,2.163 viśeṣāś caiva kālasya harer icchāvaśāḥ sadā | sarve nimeṣā iti hi śrutir evāha sādaram || 2,2.164 udīrayati kālākhyaśaktim ity asya vāg api | kālasya kālagatvena na virodho ‘pi kaś cana || 2,2.165 || 38 Cf. Michael Williams’ chapter in the present volume on Vyāsatīrtha’s concept of time being svanirvāhaka, esp. pp 186–187.

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independently, because time itself already exists. This indirectly enables God to create and to manifest temporal specifications in time. Due to the fact that [God’s] will has at all times innumerable particular specifications, God, space, and time are always in and of themselves. (2,2.166) Both (i.e. time and space) depend eternally on God and are directed towards him. In this way, too, the authoritative tradition says about time, in contrast, that time is in fact selfindicated. (2,2.167) Therefore, the Lord perpetually wishes the creation of this [specific] time due to time [itself] going on its own accord, [thinking]: “Then this [specific] time may be.” (2,2.168) It is only due to [God’s] own divine nature that [his] will is this, because the authoritative passage of the śruti says: “This is the [own nature] of God” (Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Kārikā 1.9).39 It has been said before that also the own nature [i.e. of time] depends on (2,2.169) the will of the Highest.40

The reader of these verses may still ask: How exactly is God’s power related to a specification (viśeṣa) in time, and moreover, how is time, which is in and of itself, related to that specification?41 As far as can be said from these verses, for Madhva time exists in and of itself, but to be a particular time, i.e. to have

39 The verse of Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Kārikā 1.9 runs: bhogārthaṃ sr̥ṣṭir ity anye krīḍārtham iti cāpare | devasyaiṣa svabhāvo ’yam āptakāmasya kā spr̥hā ||. “Others say that creation serves for enjoyment and others say that it serves for diversion. This is the own nature of the god; what else could be desired for the one whose desire is [already] fulfilled.” Cf. also verse 1.8 about creation, mere will (icchāmātra) and time. 40 Anuvyākhyāna 2,2.166–2,2.170: asaṅkhyātaviśeṣatvād icchāyā api sarvadā | īśo deśaś ca kālaś ca svagatā eva sarvadā || 2,2.166 || īśādhīnau ca tau nityaṃ tadādhārau ca tadgatau | iti śrutir api prāha kāle svoddiṣṭa eva tu || 2,2.167 || tatkālasr̥ṣṭim evāto vāñchatīśaḥ sadaiva hi | syāt kālaḥ sa tadaiveti kālasya svagatatvataḥ || 2,2.168 || svabhāvād eva hīcchaiṣā devasyaiṣa iti śruteḥ | svabhāvo ’pi pareśecchāvaśa ity uditaḥ purā || 2,2.169 || 41 Cf. Siauve 1968: 163: “Madhva ne précise pas, à notre connaissance la façon dont il conçoit cette ‘création’ des temps et de leurs instants.” Cf. also Mesquita’s remarks on the concept of viśeṣa (2016: 217): “Madhva himself seems to acknowledge that his teaching of viśeṣa is intricate and somehow paradoxical. As a matter of fact, he does not substantiate it by the help of rational argumentation [. . .] but rather appeals [. . .] to the unimaginable miraculous power of Viṣṇu (sarvaṃ cācintyaśaktitvād yujyate parameśvare), which cannot be rationally questioned in depth by human beings ( . . . tasmād ekam anantadhā | vyavahāraṃ viśeṣeṇa dustarkyabalato hareḥ).”

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specifications (viśeṣa), it needs God’s power to become manifest in a distinct manner. Therefore Madhva declares that time, primordial matter, and souls arise (janyā) due to a specification dependent on God (īśādhīnaviśeṣeṇa).42 Jayatīrtha expands on this, explaining that the origin of a specification (viśeṣa) of time is defined as becoming something that did not exist in an earlier time.43 He sees this more precise concept of time to be a production of something that has not become manifest before (abhūtvābhavanam).44 Jayatīrtha excludes two views: He does not believe in the creation of some earlier non-existing time, nor does he believe in the view of a transformation, i.e. an earlier existence of a specification of time, as we will see, is put forward by Veṅkaṭanātha. According to Jayatīrtha, any concretization of how the creation proceeds through the direct will of God and whether it thereby concerns manifestation is not consistent with the doctrine of transformation (pariṇāmavāda), the beginningless sequence of all other subsequent yet different states of one and the same substance. Whatever can come into being is shifted into the power of God.45 And even if such a power causes a manifestation (vyakti) without the help of a body, God’s will is eternal and what he manifests is dependent on him (parādhīna-). In this way Madhva and Jayatīrtha prove that their God is one and the highest: everything depends on him. To clarify how God is related to time due to his power, I will turn now to another passage. The discussion about how God is able to start the creation without a body is found in Madhva’s commentary, the Anubhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra, and is elaborated further in Jayatīrtha‘s sub-commentary thereon, the Tattvaprakāśikā. In five short sentences Madhva comments on Brahmasūtra 2.2.12 (72–73), roughly summarizing his criticism of the Vaiśeṣika account of creation. Then he gives his own view of time: Neither by an eternal nor by a non-eternal will is God able to produce. In order to explain why creation happens at all, Madhva refers to the Vedic God (vaidikeśvara), who has the power to do everything, and thus, also to have a concrete effect. In conclusion, he states that time which is given of its own accord has a specification with which creation initiated by God’s inconceivable potency can begin.

42 Cf. Anuvyākhyāna 2,3.15: īśādhīnaviśeṣeṇa janyā ity eva kīrtitāḥ. 43 Nyāyasudhā ad Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 2,3.17: kālasya tv abhūtvābhavanam apy astīty āśayenāha kāleti. 44 Cf. Siauve’s translation 1968: 163: “production de ce qui n’était pas.” 45 Cf. Anuvyākhyāna 2,3.17a-c: sisr̥kṣutvaviśeṣaṃ tat sākṣād bhagavadicchayā prāptaiva sr̥ṣṭety uditā.

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Jayatīrtha comments on Madhva’s sentences in detail. But before explaining the relationship between God and time, he also criticizes the Vaiśeṣika concept of creation, from which he clearly distances himself. First, Jayatīrtha rejects the Vaiśeṣika account of the eternal will of God because of the absence of any activity of the atoms during the period of the world’s dissolution (pralaya); no effect such as that of a dyad of atoms (dvyaṇuka) can arise after the period of dissolution at another time, i.e. the time of creation. God’s eternal will cannot cause anything simply because there is nothing to be effected during the time phase of the dissolution. And secondly, to accept a non-eternal (anitya) will (icchā) as an instrumental cause is also impossible, because as an effect it would be dependent and therefore could not bring about anything. It is also not possible to accept an earlier will (pūrvecchānimittam) on which a non-eternal will depends as an instrumental cause, because there is no means of knowledge for this (pramāṇābhāvāt). Even under these circumstances, one cannot prove that a dyad of atoms arises from the motion of atoms. Jayatīrtha continues by comparing this to Madhva’s short sentence about time. Like atoms (paramāṇu), time is eternal. But just as there is no movement of the atoms during the period of the world’s dissolution (pralaya), because God with his inconceivable potency (acintyaśakti) is causing no movement then, it is just the same with time: It does not produce any effect during the time period of dissolution, although it exists. But God does not want any effect to be produced. Perhaps to emphasize this important characteristic of his concept of God, Jayatīrtha contrasts God’s potency of the divine will with the simple will (īśvarecchāmātra) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.46 Assuming only such a will, an

46 The argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of mere will (icchāmātra) in the context of God’s creation is also criticized in Mīmāṃsā and by the Pratyabhijñā school. It is interesting to see how their criticism differs from Jayatīrtha’s argument. Cf. Ratié (2011: 409), who summarizes this as follows: “Kumārila et son commentateur Pārthasārathimiśra raillent d’ailleurs la théorie du Nyāya, soulignant que si le Seigneur exerce son pouvoir ‘par la seule vertu de sa volonté’ (icchāmātra), et non, comme le potier, par l’intermédiaire d’un corps, on ne voit guère comment les atomes inconscients pourraient se plier à cette volonté désincarnée.” However, the reason for refuting the icchāmātra is different for Kumārila and the Pratyabhijñā school; as Ratié continues (ibid.): “Comme les mīmāmsaka, les philosophes de la Pratyabhijñā cherchent à mettre en évidence le caractère problématique de la théorie du Nyāya selon laquelle une simple volonté consciente (qu’elle appartienne à un yogin ou au Seigneur) serait capable d’opérer en tant que cause efficiente sur une cause matérielle inconsciente qui demeurerait ontologiquement distincte de la cause efficiente. Cependant, si les deux critiques convergent ici, elles n’ont évidemment pas le même but: pour les premiers, il s’agit de mettre en question la notion même d’un Dieu ou d’un Seigneur créateur de l’univers, tandis que les seconds s’efforcent précisément d’établir l’existence d’un tel Seigneur, mais refusent de le concevoir comme une simple cause efficiente.”

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effect would indeed occur at the time of dissolution (pralaya), because it could not cause nothing to come into being. But what analogous contradiction would arise for time? Consider the specific time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla). It contradicts the creationless phase of the time of dissolution (pralaya). Or, more precisely, to accept the time of creation during the dissolution is contradictory. The time of creation is a specification (viśeṣa) in the eternal flow (pravāha) of time (kāle).47 Jayatīrtha then states that creation (sr̥ṣṭi) and the time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla) presuppose each other. God does not create time at the beginning of the creation, since this would be a contradiction. On the contrary: with his overpowering, inconceivable potency, God ensures that specific time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla) does not arise during the time of dissolution (pralaya). But when God then does begin to create, also due to this potency, the special purpose of time occurs in time (kāle) as the specific time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla). Thus, everything remains dependent on God. Under the condition of his will, the time of creation either does or does not manifest. In this context, Jayatīrtha emphasizes that the time of creation is by no means superimposed, but is natural, i.e. real time (svābhāvikakāla). Also in contrast to the Vaiśeṣika view, the “unseen” (adr̥ṣṭa), i.e. merit and demerit as special qualities of the self, is not something that works on God and causes him to create. Jayatīrtha’s understanding is rather that the “unseen” (adr̥ṣṭa) makes God aware (samudbodha) before the time of creation (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 74,3: “Because we accept before the time of creation a specific awareness referring to the ‘unseen’ which in fact exists”).48 The passage in which Jayatīrtha comments on Madhva’s short sentence on time runs as follows: The mere will of God is not the cause, because the undesirable consequence would occur that an effect arises also during the period of dissolution of the world. All the more so, time [would arise during the period of dissolution]. And one should not say that also [time] exists during the period of dissolution, because [during this period of dissolution] there exists no time of creation as a particular specification of time. And this is not the same case for the other doctrine [i.e. the Vaiṣeśika], because this is possible, insofar as we accept in time (kāle) specifications like the natural time of creation, etc. By the other view [of the opponent], in turn, particular specifications in time are accepted only due to limiting conditions like creation, etc. The intention [for us] is, it is due to the occurrence of a reciprocal precondition [thinking:] Without creation, the time of creation is not possible; without the time of creation, creation is not possible.

47 Cf. the chapter by Michael Williams in this volume, p. 181. 48 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 74,3: asmābhiḥ sr̥ṣṭyādikāle pūrvaṃ saty evādr̥ṣṭe samudbodhaviśeṣāṅgīkārāt.

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[Objection:] The will of God, even if it exists, would be without purpose, if the origin of an effect ceases due to the non-existence of the time of creation. [Our response:] This is not a mistake, because the will of God, even if it is eternal, is accepted in this time [i.e. the time of creation] as a manifestation of a specification, such as being the object for creation. And this is not the same case in the opinion of the opponent, because we accept such specification as having no limiting condition; [but] by the other [school, i.e. the Nyāya-Vaiṣeśika], a dependency on limiting conditions like creation, etc. is accepted.49

From these examples, one can understand how the Mādhva tradition places time under the power of the highest Being. Falling back on God’s potency to be capable of everything (sarvaśakti), which is inconceivable for human thought (acintya), can also be understood as an arbitrary argument to solve the dilemma of eternal and non-eternal – indeed, an arbitrary means for gaining control over time.50 In this case, time is in and of itself. But this does not imply the NyāyaVaiśeṣika view of pure time. The equally important time limitations to start the time of creation depend on God’s potency, which is beyond what human beings can imagine. However, for Jayatīrtha’s argument it is important that God’s potency can avoid any effect (kārya) during the time of the world’s dissolution and cause an effect whenever he wants to create. This possibility overcomes the opposition between an eternal (nitya) and a non-eternal (anitya) will (icchā).

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta view: Veṅkaṭanātha on God’s relation to time Looking at the two concepts of eternity described above, one can say that the God of Madhva and Jayatīrtha creates a timeless eternity from within, with time,

49 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 73,8–74,3: neśvarecchāmātraṃ nimittaṃ yena pralaye ’pi kāryotpattiprasaṅgaḥ. kiṃ tu kālo ’pi. na cāsti pralaye so ’pīti vācyam, kālaviśeṣasya sr̥ṣṭikālasyābhāvāt. na caitad anyamate ’pi samam. asmābhiḥ kāle svābhāvikasr̥ṣṭikāla(tvādi)viśeṣāṇām aṅgīkr̥tatvena tadupapatteḥ. pareṇa punaḥ sr̥ṣṭyādyupādhita eva kālaviśeṣasyāṅgīkr̥tatvāt. sr̥ṣṭim antareṇa sr̥ṣṭikālānupapattiḥ, sr̥ṣṭikālam antareṇa tadanupapattir ity anyonyāśrayāpātād iti bhāvaḥ. nanu satyām apīśvarecchāyāṃ sr̥ṣṭikālābhāvena kāryotpādoparame sā moghā syād iti cet tatrāpy āha. naiṣa doṣaḥ, tatkāla eveśvarecchāyā nityāyā api sr̥ṣṭiviṣayatvādiviśeṣāvirbhāvābhyupagamāt. na cānyamate ’py etat samānam. asmābhis tadviśeṣāṇām anaupādhikatvāṅgīkarāt pareṇa sr̥ṣṭyādyupādhinibandhanatvābhyupagamāt. 50 For Siauve’s remarks on this solution cf. 1968: 326–328 and her remark on Jayatīrtha’s use of acintyaśakti: “Il faut noter cependant qu’ils reconnaissent à Dieu le pouvoir de réaliser les contradictoires, c’est là sa “puissance inconcevable”, acintya-śakti.”

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accepted in its eternal flowing along (pravāha), brought under strict monotheistic control. The other variant of eternity, namely God being understood as existing in all times, is close to the view of Veṅkaṭanātha and the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta tradition. Underlying Madhva’s theology is a concept of independence (svatantra) and dependence (paratantra); a possible equivalent in Veṅkaṭanātha could be the dependence of self-nature (svabhāva), i.e. quality (dharma) or state (avasthā), on its basis, i.e. eternal substance (dravya). But the relation between substance and its specification, namely, states, is also a relationship of dependency. Veṅkaṭanātha, however, uses other words to describe this. While substance and state are inseparable (apr̥thak), they are also strictly distinguished (atyantabhinna) from one another, like the relationship between God and his body (śarīraśarīribhāva). And in the same way that this body and God are inseparable but different, the substance (dravya) time (kāla) is inseparable from its specifications. For Veṅkaṭanātha, time belongs to the body of God, but plays a special role: Time is an eternal substance,51 but not in the sense of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. It is specified in a way that places it on an equal level with God. God and time are not identical, but since they have the same nature, namely, all-pervading (vibhu), it might be suggested that one can be identified with the other. In his Tattvamuktākalāpa Veṅkaṭanātha explains why he subordinates one substance to the other, and examines the question of whether God and time are identical. He has his opponent offer the opinion that perhaps they should not be distinguished from each other. For Veṅkaṭanātha, this is the opportunity to take up the central point of his tradition, namely that God is the Inner Ruler (antaryāmin) of everything different, i.e. his body (śarīra), and therefore also of all-pervading time. While time is not something independent from God, he asserts that having the same properties does not imply their identity. The opponent refers back to Bhagavadgīta (BhG) 11.32, justifying his position with a passage stating that the Lord himself is identical to time, because both have the same qualities: being eternal and being all-pervasive (sarvavibhu). Nevertheless Veṅkaṭanātha responds that time does not have an autonomous existence, but still depends on the Lord.

51 The question of whether time is a substance (dravya) or only a property/specifier (dharma/ viśeṣaṇa) was controversial within Veṅkaṭanātha’s tradition. Defining time as a substance with properties seems to be Veṅkaṭanātha’s particular view and his own interpretation. For Rāmānuja it is not clear whether he considered “time” to be a substance (dravya) or only a means for specification (viśeṣaṇa); on this question, see Schmücker 2018: 49‒53.

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[Opponent:] “I am time” [Bhagavadgīta 11.32]52 – so goes his own song; most trustworthy people say that the Lord is time; he is the cause53 of all, eternal, all-pervasive, Highest. Why [accept] something different? [Our response:] No, because [the Lord] is the Inner Ruler of time, etc. He indeed is glorified [as time]. If however a difference [between God and time] is understood, then the fact that they both have the same properties is not a reason for their unity, because [time] is, like other [things,] different from the Lord, glorified as His manifestation (tadvibhūtiḥ).54

Veṅkaṭanātha’s concept of time, which also underlies his explanations regarding God and time, is quite different from the view of Madhva and Jayatīrtha. Veṅkaṭanātha teaches a concept of eternal substance with temporal states. This means that the substance (dravya) is in its own form (svarūpa) eternal, i.e. timeless, but at the same time non-eternal (anitya) due to its inseparable alternating states, which are specifications of the substance. The same was mentioned by Jayatīrtha (cf. the terms kṣaṇa, lava, etc.). Veṅkaṭanātha therefore attempts to overcome the contradiction that one and the same entity cannot be simultaneously non-eternal and eternal. He does this by arguing that the transformation of eternal substance takes place in a sequence of temporal, non-eternal states. The sequence is without beginning and without end, but can never be separated from the substance itself. According to Veṅkaṭanātha, the imperishability of the world, i.e. God’s body, is guaranteed by the continuity of changing substances, especially the substance time (kāla). He therefore defines time as all-pervading (vibhu).55 As demonstrated by the verse quoted above (Tattvamuktākalāpa 1.66), time is not independent but relies on God as its Inner Ruler (antaryāmin) and is therefore pervaded (vyāpya) by him. While time cannot function independently of God, it is independent from other substances. Veṅkaṭanātha is aware of the

52 The verse of Bhagavadgīta 11.32 ab reads as follows: kālo ’smi lokakṣayakr̥tpravr̥ddho lokān samāhartum iha pravr̥ttaḥ |. “I am the time, the destroyer of the worlds, fully grown. I am here to destroy the worlds.” 53 Cf. the explanation in Sarvārthasiddhi (208,4–6) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 1.66: nityavibhunā paramātmanaiva traikālikasārvatrikasarvavyavahārasiddham abhipretyāha hetur iti. tadatiriktakālakalpanasya nirarthakatvam āha kiṃ pareṇeti. “Having intended that only the eternally pervading highest Self is established in every language use and (human) activity related to three times (and) to every place, he says [in the verse the word] “cause”. For the acceptance of time as something different from him (i.e. the Lord), he says: Why [accept] something as different?” 54 Tattvamuktākalāpa 1.66: kālo ’smīti svagītā, kathayati bhagavān kāla ity āptavaryo hetuḥ sarvasya nityo vibhur api ca paraḥ, kiṃ pareṇeti cet. na, kālāntaryāmitādeḥ. sa khalu samuditaḥ. saṃpratīte tu bhede sādharmyaṃ naikyahetuḥ, sa hi tad itaravad ghoṣitas tadvibhūtiḥ. 55 Cf. the passage dealing with time in Nyāyasiddhāñjana 130,10–131,1, especially verse 14.

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problem that if time is defined as all-pervading (sarvavibhu), it is contradictory to define it as pervaded by another substance. Clarity is found in a short passage of Veṅkaṭanātha’s commentary Sarvārthasiddhi, where he comments on verse 69 in the same chapter of his Tattvamuktākalāpa. Here he deals with the contradiction between the all-pervading Highest Self (ekasya sarvavyāpakatvam) and all-pervading time. Neither of these can be pervaded by something else. The question whether time can be pervaded by something else implies that time is ruled by God. It is therefore not astonishing that Veṅkaṭanātha picks up the above-mentioned metaphorical description of time in the Mahābhārata as cooking all beings (kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni). However, he makes an effort to demonstrate that God pervades time by stating that “cooking all beings” not only expresses the effectiveness of time in the saṃsāric world, but also the role of time in the realm of timeless Vaikuṇṭha heaven. Is there time in Vaikuṇṭha – a timeless place of divine presence? And the pervasion by the Lord is established by a quote like: “He cooks time; no time is there [in the Lord’s eternal manifestation], there is the Lord alone [Mahābhārata 12.25.9]”; there [i.e. in His eternal manifestation] are no modifications which are settled by time, as in the manifestation of primordial matter (triguṇa). That time is the cause of everything, either due to its being the material cause for its own modifications or due to its being the instrumental cause for everything else, is understood by words like: “Time cooks all beings”.56

From this passage, especially the quote of time cooking all beings, one might come to the conclusion that time still has an independent power of its own, independent from God, and that the divine sphere is separate from its influence. But this cannot be the case, because for Veṅkaṭanātha time is under God’s rulership and wherever it is effective, it is pervaded by God. He concludes his discussion of their relation by clearly stating that time is not independent from God: Therefore, since wherever there is time there is in every case the Highest Self, the [Highest Self] pervades time, and this [pervading of time] is also to be observed with reference to His knowledge, which functions as His property.57

56 Sarvārthasiddhi (215,7–9) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 1.69: vyāptiś ca –‘kālaṃ sa pacate tatra na kālas tatra vai prabhuḥ’ ityādibhis siddhā. triguṇavibhūtivatkālapratiniyatavikārās tatra na santīty arthaḥ. svavikārāṇām upādānatayānyeṣāṃ nimittatayā vāsya sarvahetutvaṃ ‘kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni’ ityādibhir gamyate. 57 Sarvārthasiddhi (215,13–14) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 1.69: ato yatra kālas tatra sarvatra paramātmāstīti tasya kālavyāpakatvam idaṃ ca tasya dharmabhūtajñāne ’pi draṣṭavyam.

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If, as Veṅkaṭanātha clearly states, God pervades time, and time, as an allpervading substance, exists eternally, then God pervades time also eternally. Moreover, because time is a constituent of God’s body (śarīra), by which the world consists, they belong inseparably together. But if this pervasion of time even includes God’s qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna)58 – an element that the Mādhva tradition lacks completely, but could find its counterpart in the doctrine of the “observer/witness” (sākṣin) – it must be explained how this knowledge as pervading time can be characterized by different temporal states, i.e. the past, present, and future. Moreover, it must be explained how it can become effective in the world as knowledge, in which these temporal states of the substance time do not exclude each other. The need for explanation is all the more necessary, because God’s qualifying knowledge must be omniscient (sarvajña). Otherwise it could not be divine knowledge. But how do the different times exist in such knowledge without excluding each other? To represent God’s being omniscient (sarvajñatva) with regard to all the effects God can bring forth, his one divine knowledge must encompass different temporal states. What solution does Veṅkaṭanātha offer?

God’s qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna) and its temporal determinations Veṅkaṭanātha describes God’s qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna) in relation to time in detail in verse 76 of the third chapter (nāyakasara) of the Tattvamuktākalāpa, as well as in Veṅkaṭanātha’s auto-commentary thereon, the Sarvārthasiddhi. Here he discusses the different states of God’s knowledge. These states he calls ullekha, “mental conceptualization”,59 which he defines in analogy to the sequence of states (avasthāsantati), i.e. a “sequence of [temporally effected] mental conceptualizations” (ullekhasantati). A relevant point that may explain the relation between God and time more clearly is Veṅkaṭanātha’s view of God’s omniscience (sarvajñatva) in relation to time, which also bears on the framework of creation. Here again the question of the inevitability of time comes to the fore. While time does not have absolute sovereignty, it is nevertheless necessary for God’s renewed manifestation of the world.

58 For a detailed explanation of this term, see Schmücker 2020: 92‒97. 59 The noun ullekha is derived from the root ul-likh-, literally “to scratch”, also “to paint, write, draw in a picture”.

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But this entails a contradiction. To create the world again, God must realize something in the present as well as in the past. For Veṅkaṭanātha the problem is the following: If God’s knowledge is divided into different times, how can it still remain one eternal knowledge? How does it unite different time modes? In his auto-commentary, in the Sarvārthasiddhi, on the Tattvamuktākalāpa, Veṅkaṭanātha first refers to an opponent’s objection that God, who is eternally omniscient, can be the cause of all things, since God’s knowledge and other abilities, such as his will (icchā) or his effort (prayatna) to create, are incapable of effecting the renewed manifestation of the world.60 In support of this position, the opponent points to a contradiction between the temporal modes or phases of an object and God’s one eternal divine knowledge. It is impossible for mental conceptualizations to occur at different times in the one knowledge of God. For the opponent, this is why God can know neither anything in the past, nor anything of the future. According to the opponent’s basic ontological understanding, one and the same base cannot unite vanishing and arising states. Thus he questions whether God, in his omniscience, can really know a future object. And if he does know something in the future, that knowledge would be incorrect, because he would be simultaneously grasping what is present and what is future. Moreover, insofar as God’s knowledge does not rely on the senses, a sequence of different, unlimited conceptualizations would be without any basis. In the verse being commented upon (Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.76), Veṅkaṭanātha is referring to the sequence of mental conceptualizations (ullekhasantati) that create differences (bheda) in God’s knowledge, which means his knowledge is subjected to these temporal conceptualizations. Accordingly, it is not the case that the aikarūpya of God’s knowledge, i.e. its having one and the same form over different times, implies that God can have only a single conceptualization (ekollekha). Veṅkaṭanātha thus demonstrates that there is no contradiction when one and the same form receives different conceptualizations and is also determined by the mutually exclusive temporal states of future, present, and past. This view is challenged by the opponent: For him, a sequence of conceptualizations (ullekha) that implies temporal differences cannot be brought together into a single basis, the one knowledge of God. The critical point is the following: Once a conceptualization (ullekha) is realized, no further conceptualization can follow if knowledge has only one form (aikarūpya). Therefore, no sequence of mental conceptualizations (ullekhasantati) is possible in God’s knowledge. Ac-

60 Cf. Sarvārthasiddhi (463, 5–13) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.76.

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cording to the opponent, if there were a sequence, a past conceptualization would still exist and not cease to exist, even though its present had long since occurred. But as Veṅkaṭanātha wants to prove, in order to be omniscient, God must grasp changes in the state of things by knowing the present state (vartamānāvasthā) as well as the past state (bhūtāvasthā). This means he has to realize many states within his knowledge. Veṅkaṭanātha presents the exchange of arguments between his own view and that of the opponent, who points out a knowledge which is unable to grasp an object that exists in all three temporal forms of time: [Objection]: What is recognized as future becomes [in the course of time] present and then has a form that has passed. Therefore, the mental conceptualization (ullekhaḥ) is distinguished in relation to the [object]. [Our response:] The being of one sort of knowledge (aikarūpyaṃ), which is not created by the senses, might contradict [such a conception]. [Objection:] The knowledge of the future might be an error if the previous mental conceptualization (pracīnollekha) itself, which has passed, [continues] to exist. [Our response:] This is not the case, because the reality of the constantly existing mental conceptualization that is determined by the succession of earlier and later is established.61

How can one divine knowledge, which has only one form, capture a sequence of states (avasthāsantati)? In his response, Veṅkaṭanātha first describes how the three temporal states of an object (avasthātrayavati vastuni) proceed, these corresponding to three temporal mental conceptualizations in God’s knowledge. An object in the future state evokes a concept of future (bhaviṣyatva), and likewise objects in the present and past states evoke the conceptualization of their present and past, respectively. But a prior mental conceptualization (prācīnollekha) of an object cannot remain as being always present. It must be possible to replace it with a new one, since otherwise the temporality, i.e. the object in its different times, cannot be known. At this point Veṅkaṭanātha explains that God’s knowledge has a beginningless sequence of states, a sequence of conceptualizations (ullekha) that is fixed by an “earlier” one which is different from a “later” one. But how does he explain that, although temporal conceptualizations must be different, this difference (bheda) is not contradictory to God’s omniscient knowledge constantly preserving a single form?

61 Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.76: yad bhāvitvena buddhaṃ, bhavati tad, atha cātītarūpaṃ. tad asminn ullekho bhidyate cet, akaraṇajamater aikarūpyaṃ prakupyet. prācīnollekha eva sthitavati tu gate bhāvibuddhir bhramaḥ syāt. maivaṃ, pūrvāparādikramaniyatasadollekhasatyatvasiddheḥ.

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The difference (bheda) between mental conceptualizations (ullekha) in their own time (svakāla) The decisive point in this context is that Veṅkaṭanātha also accepts a self-grounded (svanirvāhaka) difference between earlier and later conceptualizations.62 In contrast to the Madhva school, which identifies difference (bheda) with the own nature (svarūpa) of an object, Veṅkaṭanātha’s basic concept of difference (bheda) reflects the fact that a state (avasthā) or a property (dharma) of a substance are only discernible because they are recognized as being different from each other. This difference is a precondition for temporal time modes such as past, present, and future; it is selfgrounded (svataḥ), because difference cannot be recognized by means of difference; i.e. a difference between two things cannot be known as different (bhinna) yet again. It is not required as a property (dharma) of a substance (dravya), but it is necessary for knowledge of any substance. Therefore it also grounds something else (para).63 Being self-grounded requires that the states of a substance always differ from one another. Thus Veṅkaṭanātha always uses the compound svaparanirvāhaka to characterize that a substance subsists on its own and at the same time in relation to other substances as well, while Madhva only speaks of selfgrounding substances (svanirvāhaka). The difference between the states/properties (avasthā/dharma), and, in our context, between mental conceptualizations (ullekha), does not necessarily amount to mutual exclusion, which would imply the complete non-existence of another state at the same time. Veṅkaṭanātha says that each temporal state (avasthā) has its own time (svakāla)64 due to its difference (bheda) from another state, which again exists in its own time. If one state is not present, like a past or a future state, this does not mean that it is completely non-existent. It exists in its own specific

62 Veṅkaṭanātha uses the compound svaparanirvāhaka for the substance “time” as well as for other substances. 63 Veṅkaṭanātha adds para- to the compound svanirvāhaka, using the expression svaparanirvāhaka several times in his work to characterize that a substance is on its own and at the same time in relation to other substances as well. 64 Cf. Sarvārthasiddhi (638,11–17) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 4.95: “The time of one’s own earlier nonbeing and one’s own later non-being contradict themselves [each other]. The defect of a regress ad infinitum does not occur, because time is independent of another time (kālāntarānapekṣaṇān), inasmuch as it is grounding by itself and for/by others.” svaprāgabhāvasvapradhvaṃsakālau svasya viruddhau. kālasya svaparanirvāhakatvena kālāntarānapekṣaṇān nānavasthādoṣaḥ.

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time, which is different from the state that exists at the present time. Consider the state of a lump of clay (piṇḍāvasthā), which is an earlier state and differs from the later state of being a pot (ghaṭāvasthā). Each state is always present, i.e. existing in its own time and is different from other states in their own time. The difference (bheda) between states in their own times is also what determines that one state can be the condition for the next. For example, this is not only the case for different states of clay (mr̥t) like lump and pot, but also for other substances like God’s knowledge or all-pervading time itself. Just as different states cannot occur simultaneously, it is impossible for two conflicting conceptualizations (ullekha) to occur simultaneously. The difference between these two is realized in the same way: When the next state of an object occurs, the mental conceptualization (ullekha) of God’s knowledge that came into consciousness becomes an earlier one, i.e., a past one. Without any contradiction, God can know things arising and passing away. The temporal sequence (santati/santāna) of an earlier occurring state/property or conceptualization (ullekha) is the reason for the following one; it is therefore without beginning (anādi) and end (ananta). The implied infinite regress is not a fault for Veṅkaṭanātha, it rather affirms that one state follows the next. Also in this context, he uses the term pravāha to describe the beginningless and endless flowing of conceptualizations. And in [such] a sequence of mental conceptualizations (ullekhasantatau), the respective earlier [mental conceptualization] is the reason for the respective following [one]. And because of the lack of beginning of the flow of these [conceptualizations] (tatpravāhānāditvāc), it never happens that [a mental conceptualization] is without a basis (nirmūlatvam) [i.e. without a preceding mental conceptualization]. And an infinite regress of such kind is not a fault.65

If God is aware of something that happened earlier and something that happened later, this does not relativize God’s knowledge, which is eternal in its own nature (svarūpa). The reason for this is exactly Veṅkaṭanātha’s concept of difference (bheda), which enables one mental conceptualization in its own time not to exist during the time of another conceptualization – just as the pot does not yet exist at the time when clay is becoming a pot. Each conceptualization exists in its own specific time (svakāla). Because one conceptualization is the condition for the next in this way, a sequence is possible. On the other hand, for the view that conceptualization has only one form, he says “before” and “after”. The intention is: For every effect is in its own time (svakāle) [in which it is] never non-existent [i.e. transient]. And therefore something is to be assumed as earlier;

65 Sarvārthasiddhi (464,3–4) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.76: hetuś collekhasantatāv uttarottarasya pūrvapūrvaḥ. tatpravāhānāditvāc ca na kadā cin nirmūlatvam. na cedr̥śānavasthā doṣa iti.

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something [other] is to be assumed as later. Thus, in the same way, an effect that has the three (time) modes [future, present, and past] becomes an object [of God’s] knowledge that remains one at all times.66

The phrase that “every effect is in its own time” clearly demonstrates the function of the self-grounding difference, without which one and the same substance could never be characterized by different time modes. Accepting this implies that everything is in its own time, and insofar as all states are separate from each other, there is no contradiction. The fact that states cause each other, building an infinite sequence, presupposes that they are already distinct (bhinna). But without assuming that knowledge has one form and not many, it would not be possible to grasp an object mediated by mental conceptualizations in its temporal duration. Again, God’s knowledge retains its one form. In the following passage Veṅkaṭanātha expresses that there is no contradiction between God’s omniscience and the temporal mental conceptualizations within His one knowledge: In the same way, an object in all its modifications is known at all times by [God’s] omniscient knowledge, whose form corresponds to [the temporal] modifications [of an object].67 Therefore, it is established that [God’s knowledge] is independent from senses and free from any mistake.68

Conceptualizations arise and pass due to the ineluctability of the sequence of times. In God’s knowledge, opposites are not given as relativized, because his mental conceptualizations remain. This again is due to the fundamental concept of difference (bheda). And due to this difference, each is in its own time and therefore retains its existence. We can summarize Veṅkaṭanātha’s view of God’s qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna) and the time dependent mental conceptualizations (ullekha) as follows: Time is characterized as a presence that exists alongside God. It is not viewed from the perspective of its destructive power as the basis of a cycle of permanent suffering. In the final analysis, Veṅkaṭanātha’s concept of

66 Sarvārthasiddhi (464,4–6) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.76: ekarūpollekhapakṣe tv āha – pūrvāpareti. ayaṃ bhāvaḥ – sarvaṃ kāryaṃ svakāle na hi nityāsat. tac ca kiṃ cid apekṣya pūrvaṃ, kiṃ cid apekṣyottaram. tata evaṃ triprakāraṃ kāryaṃ sarvadaikabuddhisamārūḍham. 67 See also Nr̥siṃhadeva’s commentary Ānandadāyinī (172,25–28) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa (2) 3.76: “For the omniscience of God [consists] in being characterized by a knowledge that contains all things, according to its circumstances in their time; otherwise the undesired consequence would occur that [God’s being omniscient] would be false knowledge.” tatkāle yathāvasthitasarvavastuviṣayakajñānavattvam eva hi sarvajñatvaṃ, anyathā bhrāntatvaprasaṅgāt. 68 Sarvārthasiddhi (464,9–10) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.76: evaṃ sarvaprakāraṃ vastu sarvajñabuddhyā yathāvasthitarūpeṇa sarvadaivollikhyata iti karaṇanairapekṣyaṃ viparyāsavirahaś ca sidhyatīti.

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time allows the existence of an omniscient God, a God who causes the world and is in constant relationship with it. Thus in Veṅkaṭanātha’s understanding of God and time, timeless eternity is not accepted. Through the beginningless and endless course of time, God knows everything, because the sequence of change never ends.69 This enables Veṅkaṭanātha to think of a God who is both temporal and eternal. While time does not belong to God’s own eternal nature (svarūpa), it depends on him. And it is on God, time, and difference that everything else relies. This is also the case for the creation from the viewpoint of God’s eternal will.

God’s eternal will and the time of creation In contrast to Madhva’s doctrine of God’s inconceivable potency, Veṅkaṭanātha takes as a basis God’s sequence (santati/santāna) of willing acts (icchā).70 Several questions are important in this context. How is God, in his acts of will, related to time? The above-mentioned rulership of time in the timeless realm of Vaikuṇṭha, as expressed in Mahābhārata 12.25.9 – “No time is there [in the Lord’s eternal manifestation], there is the Lord alone” – is discussed with regard to God’s relation to non-material (aprākr̥ta) entities. Again the question reoccurs: How can one and the same knowledge unite all these differences? Veṅkaṭanātha deals with this problem in his Nyāyasiddhāñjana in the chapter on God (īśvarapariccheda) – analogue to the chapter (nāyakasara) of the Tattvamuktākalāpa cited in part above, which was written earlier. The opponent (maybe another representative from his own Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition) formulates in detail the contradiction between God’s eternal knowledge and the time factors presupposed as necessary differences. He describes how, due to different conditions, knowledge can contract and expand. This should also be the case for God, who like the eternal seers and

69 Another, earlier example of a relation bringing together God’s knowledge with different time phases is found in Bhāsarvajña’s concept of God; this is pointed out in Halbfass 1992: 218‒219: “Entities in all three time phases, not only those in the present, are objects of divine awareness. If something loses its status of being present and becomes a matter of the past it does not therefore abandon its connection with divine cognition (vartamānasvabhāvaṃ hitvāatītabhāvam upagacchan na-īśvarajñānasambandhaṃ jahāti). . . . īśvarajñānasaṃbandha . . . preserves those entities that have elapsed into the past and anticipates those that have not yet arrived and are still ‘in the future’.” 70 The contrast is evident in the following examples; nevertheless, Veṅkaṭanātha uses the term apratarkyaśakti in verse 98 of his Nyāyasiddhāñjana (see below p. 155).

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liberated souls grasps everything, but also has particular states of knowledge, such as temporary will, volition, bliss, etc.71 How can this be accepted? The opponent explains that for souls, knowledge with various states, such as happiness, misery, will (icchā), hate, etc., occurs in transmigration because their knowledge contracts and expands due to karman. He then turns his criticism to the knowledge of God, the seers, and liberated souls as well. Of course, they are free of karman and time (kāla), and thus their knowledge does not contract, but they still have to grasp all entities and, due to this, their knowledge has different states (avasthā). These difficulties are described as follows: God might have [various kinds of] volition (saṃkalpa) causing the unequal modifications of material matter (triguṇa) in accordance with the difference of the operative factor (sahakārin), namely, the karman of the individual self which attains to the condition of fruition. As to the non-material modifications such as the wonderful body, however, how is it possible that the eternal seers, those who are liberated, and God – who are devoid of limiting conditions such as [their] karman and time, and whose knowledge is free of contraction and expansion [due to these limiting conditions] and, [consequently], can grasp all entities – have particular states of knowledge such as temporary will, [temporary] volition, and the [temporary] bliss caused by them?72

In the following, I will present eight verses of Veṅkaṭanātha’s complex response to the above objection. Although one must distinguish between the various forms of God’s knowledge, he describes these differently according to what God knows, or according to what God actively bestows on the individual soul after knowing what has taken place temporally. In these verses, Veṅkaṭanātha elaborates on the will of God. Just as God’s knowledge can have different states and is therefore qualified by these states, in the same way his will can become a particular will (īśvarecchāviśeṣataḥ) that differs according to the particular creation God is starting. Different creations, in fact, deal with different substances to re-

71 In fact Veṅkaṭanātha admits that God has different forms or states, etc. See for example Śatadūṣaṇī 116,13–15 (vāda 22): “And one cannot even prove that the form of God is entirely devoid of all states, because even though God pervades everything, it is difficult to resist that he must have specific states such as connection, separation, etc. of the respective substances, which have many shapes at certain times.” na ceśvararūpasyāpi samastāvasthāśūnyatvaṃ sādhayituṃ śakyam, kādācitkatattanmūrtadravyasaṃyogavibhāgādyavasthāviśeṣāṇāṃ [. . .] viśvavyāpinīśvare ’pi durvāratvāt [. . .]. 72 I follow Mikami’s translation closely. Nyāyasiddhāñjana 391,1–5: īśvarasya vipākadaśāpannajīvakarmākhyasahakāritāratamyād viṣamatriguṇapariṇāmahetavaḥ santu nāma saṃkalpāḥ, aprākr̥avicitradehādipariṇāmeṣu karmakālādyupādhividhurāṇāṃ saṃkocavikāsarahitasamastavastugocaradhiyāṃ muktanityeśvarāṇāṃ kathaṃ kādācitkecchāsaṅkalpatatkr̥tānandādijñānāvasthāviśeṣā ghaṭante?

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manifest their states. The unevenness (vaiṣamya) in God’s will, which reflects God’s different states, is caused by time. The already released (mukta) and the eternally released souls (nityamukta) are also subject to the will of God, even though they are free from karman. They still have desire, will, and divine body. For this there are specifications in God’s knowledge as well. And not only is the karman of living beings based on time (tanmūlāt), but also the three guṇas of primordial matter. The verses take up the conceptualizations (ullekha) of the omniscient God as found in the Tattvamuktākalāpa. In the first verse (91) of the Nyāyasiddhāñjana, quoted below, it is stated that God’s knowledge has different “mental conceptualizations” (ullekha), which implies differences in his knowledge. But these differences enable God to have knowledge of all the “own times” (svakāla) that an object or an individual being can have. In the next verse (92), Veṅkaṭanātha explains that released souls are dependent on God; the two forms of creation, one of the souls (vyaṣṭisr̥ṣṭi) and the other of the insentient world (samaṣṭisr̥ṣṭi), are also dependent on God’s will (verse 93), which differs due to time. In verse 94, Veṅkaṭanātha once again explains the function of time: The states of the substance time are beginningless and endless flowing moments (kṣaṇa), which are the smallest time units. Thus everything starts from this.73 In fact, they are the reason for any inequality in the will of God, which prompts him to create. Also, during the time of dissolution (pralaya), even though time is thought to be a substance and does not vanish, the specific units of time do not exist, but one moment after the other flows on (kṣaṇapravāha). This is how time exists. Thus, with the help of time, God can have a wish that is the cause for his next wish, which results in a sequence of wishes. In this way, God is qualified by time. [Even] the knowledge of the Omniscient gradually acquires different mental conceptualizations (ullekha). If it did not, how [God] could know effects as being in the past, in the future, and in the present, etc. (91)

73 This is already clearly explained in the Sarvārthasiddhi (214,1–5) ad Tattvamuktākalāpa 1.69: “The transformation (pariṇāmaḥ) of time is one that always has the form of moments (kṣaṇarūpa). The division of time of muhūrta, etc. occurs according to the distinction of the increase of the number of moments. [. . .] For every human being, the counting that begins with the year, etc. is also perfectly correct by the beginning of a moment that is assumed. And how in this case would it be possible that a difference occurs due to limiting conditions if one does not accept a difference between moments, etc. by itself?” kṣaṇarūpa eva kālasya sarvadā pariṇāmaḥ; tatsaṃkhyāprakarṣatāratamyān muhūrtādivibhāgaḥ. [. . .] pratipuruṣam iṣṭakṣaṇārambheṇābdādigaṇanāpi yuktaiva. atra ca svataḥ kṣaṇādibhedānabhyupagame katham upādhibhir api bhedaḥ syāt?

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Those who are liberated and the like, though they are free of limiting conditions such as karman, have will, volition, a body, etc., due to the particular will of God. (92) And the will of God differs due to the particular karman in the individual creation (vyaṣṭi) and due to the unevenness of the [three] guṇas in the aggregate creation (samaṣṭi), or rather, due to time causing this [unevenness]. (93) Such a state of time [as causing His will to differ] is due to [time’s] flowing along of moments, etc. Again, this [flowing along] is due to the flow of limiting conditions [for the flowing of moments, e.g. the movement of the sun], or [in the dissolution of the world] (94) due to the preceding [modification of time], such as a moment.74

In the last verse (94), Veṅkaṭanātha speaks of the flow of limiting conditions (upādhipravāhād); as an alternative, he mentions that this stream can also be due to an earlier moment, etc. (pūrvakṣaṇāditaḥ). So far one has the impression that it is time which is determining objects to be created, not God’s own free will. Indeed, it looks as if time is independent and has its own dynamics.75 It is

74 Nyāyasiddhāñjana, verses 91–94 (391,6–392,3): ullekhabhedāḥ kramaśaḥ santi sarvajñasaṃvidi | na cet kāryeṣu bhūtaiṣyadvartamānādidhīḥ katham || 91 || karmādyupādhyabhāve’pi muktādīnāṃ pravartate | icchāsaṃkalpadehādir īśvarecchāviśeṣataḥ || 92 || īśecchāyās tu vaiṣamya vyaṣṭau karmaviśeṣataḥ | samaṣṭau guṇavaiṣamyāt tanmūlāt kālato’pi vā || 93 || kālasya tādr̥śāvasthā kṣaṇādīnāṃ pravāhataḥ | so’py upādhipravāhād vā yad vā pūrvakṣaṇāditaḥ || 94 || 75 Raṅgarāmānuja’s commentary on Veṅkaṭanātha’s Nyāyasiddhāñjana explains this by means of an objection in which it is doubted that God’s will can be the cause of all activity if it is preceded by a moment as its cause. Raṅgarāmānuja’s opponent argues that if the moment and its limiting condition are the reason for God’s will, then God’s will should not be the cause of all effects. But Veṅkaṭanātha’s response is that the cause in relation to each subsequent will is the will provided by an earlier moment or provided by a limiting condition of the earlier moment (Vyākhyā 392,11–13). Raṅgarāmānuja explains Veṅkaṭanātha’s expression “beginningless flowing along” of God’s acts of will also in another passage. Here it is also demonstrated that God manifests nothing without time. If God were to manifest anything without time, no sequence (pūrvapūrvottarottara) of divine acts of will would occur: “The meaning of the beginningsless flowing along is: Each earlier wish [of God] is the cause for each following wish. [. . .] First he wishes in a general way; then he wishes: ‘I would like to accomplish this by an act’; immediately afterwards he creates; in a following moment he desires something else; again he desires that; immediately afterwards he creates it; and again he wishes something else. In such a way, the attainment of an earlier effect is the cause of the flowing along of a later effect.” uttarottarecchāyāṃ pūrvapūrvecchā hetur iti pravāhānādir ity arthaḥ. [. . .] prathamataḥ sāmānyata icchati, tatas tu idaṃ kr̥tyā sādhayāmī(nī?)ti saṃkalpayati, tad anantaraṃ sr̥jati; tad uttarakṣaṇa evānyat kiñ cid icchati, punaḥ tat saṃkalpayati, tad anantaraṃ sr̥jati; punaś cānyad icchati, itiy evaṃ

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an undeniable fact that time flows in moments caused by the (further) flow of limiting conditions (upādhipravāhād), like the movement of the sun. But if the problem of God and time becomes so acute that one must ask whether the will of God or the time for the beginning of creation is to be presupposed, then it is unclear whether God’s acts of independent will are the cause for his creation, or whether the uninterrupted flowing of time is the reason for God’s act of will. Veṅkaṭanātha decides this in favor of God’s act of will. But what reason does he give? How can the will of God be the cause if it is conditioned by time? Time – as mentioned above – is a substance, but it is ultimately to be understood as relying on God as a quality, on whose basis God can act. In this regard it remains just a quality. And God’s will, like his knowledge, remains unaffected by changes of temporal states. Nevertheless the question still is: Can time be the reason for God’s creative activity, or is it God’s will alone?76 How does Veṅkaṭanātha proceed? God’s activity of manifestation takes place as a sequence of wishes/willing acts, of which one act is the cause of the next. It is possible for each act of will to cause the next only because each is provided with an earlier moment (pūrvakṣaṇopahitā). Therefore God can have a series of volitions due to the way the earlier wish causes the one that succeeds it. In the next verse (95), Veṅkaṭanātha states that one act of God’s will can be the cause of the following one by virtue of the flow of time from one moment to the next. Being specified by an earlier moment, which is only earlier because something follows it, the will of God can be the cause for his next act of will: As it is conditioned by the limiting conditions or the preceding [modification of time] such as the moment, the sequence of God’s will can be the cause of each following one. (95)

Finally, how does Veṅkaṭanātha deal with the opponent’s argument concerning God’s will to create non-material things? He answers in the next verses that God does not need any other limiting condition. The sequence is not influenced. The wheel mentioned in verse 97 signifies that God, through his knowledge, is able to cause something with no outer influence. The sprout and seed exemplify this

pūrvakāryasamāptir uttarakāryapravāhahetur [instead of: uttarakārye pravāhahetur] ity evaṃ cakravat pravartanāt bījāṅkuranyāyaḥ (Vyākhyā 393,5–8). This is why Raṅgarāmānuja holds the view that time belongs to God, but God also belongs to time. 76 Cf. Oberhammer 2000: 91–92: “Veṅkaṭanātha [states] that God’s desire to bring forth creation ultimately occurs as a result of time, which is the origin of the state of inequality of the Guṇas, and which thus becomes the instrumental cause of the divine desire. The state of time arises because of the passing of the moments of time, which in turn is made possible by the existence of conditional circumstances or caused by the respective preceding moments of time.” [Translation is mine, M.S.].

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too; earlier and later do not need any support from the outside to develop their own causal dynamics. And [His] will to create the non-material wonderful things does not need any other limiting condition [such as the karman of the individual self], because the flowing is endless [and each preceding will is the cause of each following one]. (96) Or rather, [His] will, [His] volition, and creation revolve like a wheel. So the states of God’s qualifying knowledge should be in the manner of a seed and a sprout. (97)

As if Veṅkaṭanātha would like to withdraw his God from time as well as from all possible influence of the world caused by primordial matter, he points to a characterization of God that completely removes him from everything and brings him close to timeless eternity. Here he approaches Madhva’s expression of the potency of God, which man cannot imagine. But Veṅkaṭanātha’s intention seems to be to withdraw God from all influence, although he remains connected to everything. Let it be accepted, by force [of the authoritative tradition] of the Āgama, that the potency of God is beyond reasoning: God does not need any other operative factor [even including (98) time] at the beginning of each creation.77

Veṅkaṭanātha’s use of Madhva’s word “potency” to underline that God, as the highest authority directing everything, is not an isolated case. He also uses the expression “inconceivable potency” (acintyaśakti) to describe the driving force behind the material transformation of the world (cf. Tattvamuktākalāpa 3.25a: asyaivācintyaśakteḥ akhilajanayituḥ syād upādānabhāvaḥ). “The creator of the entire (world) may be the material cause due to only His inconceivable power”.

77 Nyāyasiddhāñjana, verses 95–98 (392,4–393,3): upādhibhiḥ kṣaṇādyair vā pūrvair upahitatvataḥ | teṣūttareṣu hetuḥ syād icchāsantatir aiśvarī || 95 || aprākr̥tavicitrārthasisr̥kṣā viṣamā tu yā | sā’pi pravāhānāditvāt nopādhyantaram īkṣate || 96 || icchāsaṃkalpasr̥ṣṭīnāṃ cakravad vā pravartanāt | syād īśabuddhyavasthānāṃ tatra bījāṅkukramaḥ || 97 || āgamair aiśvarīṃ śaktim atarkyām upagacchatām | īśasya tattatsr̥ṣṭyādau sahakāryantareṇa kim || 98 ||

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Conclusions Concerning the relationship between God and time, which difficulties and solutions could be pointed out? If, on one hand, too much emphasis is placed on divine eternity, God’s relationship to temporal change is discounted: God would no longer be connected to a changing world. If, on the other hand, there is no eternity and therefore no Being that exists permanently, it becomes difficult to make a claim for continuity without falling back on the notion that human beings are subject to the destructive aspect of time. Thus, examining these two contradictory aspects of time – eternity and temporality – is fundamental for recognizing a God who is related to humans and can take away their fear of destruction by time. But another theological question has been involved, a question that is not only articulated in this article but throughout the present volume. If an eternal God wants something, how does he know what he wants if what he wants is noneternal or temporal? This question makes it necessary to consider how it is possible for God to know what happens in the temporally changing world without being relativized in his eternal being. This question is also related to the dichotomy between eternity and temporality: How can God’s eternal knowledge become temporal and thus related to past, present, and future, especially when he has to create? If one compares these questions with the views of God and time of Madhva and Jayatīrtha, on one side, and Veṅkaṭanātha, on the other, and highlights the differences between them against the background of the understanding of time, it is conspicuous that both Vedānta schools assume the existence of time as an eternal flow. However the thinkers of both schools also agree that time is a presupposition without which God could not initiate creation. They accept the fact that time has always existed together with God. But the representatives of both Vedānta schools may have had in mind the unstoppability, but also the irreversibility of time, which had earlier been the basis for concepts of its destructive power. But in a (mono-)theistic tradition, an explanation must be found for how an all-dominant God can be compatible with such a concept of time. It is remarkable that God’s effectiveness against the flow of time-moments (kṣaṇapravāha) consists precisely in interrupting it by manifesting a kind of specification; the God of the Mādhva tradition brings specifications into the flow of time-moments (kṣaṇapravāha) in a way that no human being would have the ability to do. In contrast, according to Veṅkaṭanātha, the flow of time is already an eternally specified flow of temporal states; it needs no further specification; it is always and already specified. But in the Mādhva tradition, it needs a particular manifestation. For Veṅkaṭanātha, time is a part of God’s body, of which every part (i.e. substances together with their modifying states) qualifies him, leaving God’s eternal essence (svarūpa) without modification.

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God’s power (śakti), in which Madhva, Jayatīrtha and finally Veṅkaṭanātha also take refuge, finds its parallel also in other theologies. Parallels are often drawn with Thomas Aquinas, whose all-powerful God can do everything through his will.78 But there is at least one difference from theologians like Thomas Aquinas. As Jayatīrtha demonstrates, his God also has the power to prevent something that is potentially there. In reference to time, one can say that since time is always there, God also causes the time of creation to not come into being. But to what extent is the specification (viśeṣa) a force in this matter, making time appear as being differentiated? Insofar as time units, like the time of creation (sr̥ṣṭikāla), are always natural (svābhāvika) and not identified as limiting conditions (upādhi), difference between time units is given – neither by itself nor by any human being but only by God. For Veṅkaṭanātha it is only possible for a substance to appear in a special state. And so the different times do not contradict each other, since each temporal state of time exists in its own time (svakāla). This is only possible by assuming difference, which enables things (such as temporal conceptualizations) to always appear in their own time (svakāla). On one hand, Veṅkaṭanātha discusses the eternity of time – a concomitance with the eternity of God. But on the other hand, he discusses the temporality of time, which has a sequence (santāna) of alternating (i.e. earlier, later, etc.) states (avasthā). This, in turn, he links to the qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna) of God and to his eternal will (icchā). For Madhva, in contrast, time is eternal but nevertheless dependent on God; time is also specified by its particular temporal specifications (viśeṣa), which again depend on God’s inconceivable potency. In conclusion, presented below is a table that summarizes and contrasts the most important basic concepts of the two Vedānta schools discussed in this essay.

78 This is expressed clearly yet differently by Thomas Aquinas in De potentia Dei, Questio 3: “God’s power can do more than a natural power. Now a natural power lets a being arise out of what it was before. In this respect, God’s power goes far beyond this: it allows something to arise from nothing. One must insist strictly that God can and does create something from nothing. [. . .] in him lies the origin of the existing as a whole. Therefore, through his activity, God brings forth the existing being in its entirety, without any of it having been there before. For it is he who, as himself, is completely and entirely the principle for the totality of being. For this reason he can let something arise out of nothing; and this activity is called creation.” [translation is mine, M.S.]

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Madhva Jayatīrtha Concepts of God’s will (icchā)

– eternal will (nityecchā) – sequence of will (icchāsantāna) – instrumental cause – instrumental (nimitta-) and (nimittakāraṇa) material cause (upādānakāraṇa) – specifications are due to God’s – in sequence each earlier will of will (viśeṣā …icchāvaśāḥ) God causes a following will – God causes with inconceivable (uttarottarecchāyāṃ potency (acintyaśakti) pūrvapūrvecchā) – God causes with inconceivable potency (apratarkyaśakti) – omniscient (sarvajña) of all times – substance (dravya) – having a sequence of mental conceptualizations (ullekhasantati)

Qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna)

Concepts of time (kāla)

Veṅkaṭanātha

– eternal (nitya), one (eka) flow – substance (dravya) inseparable (pravāha) without specification from the sequence of states (na tu viśeṣavān) – self-grounded and grounding – self-grounded (svanirvāhaka) others, i.e. existing in and of itself, – self-indicated (svodiṣṭa) causing different time limits – going on its own accord (svaparanirvāhaka) (svagata) – flow of kṣaṇa (pravāha) – difference (bheda) between states (avasthā)/mental conceptualizations (ullekha) – God’s manifestation (tadvibhūti) – God is Inner Ruler (antaryāmin) – causing unevenness (vaiṣamya) of the triguṇa, of God’s will

Bibliography Primary sources Anuvyākhyāna, Madhva. Works of Sri Madhwacharya. Sarvamūlagranthāḥ, Prasthānatrayī, saṃpuṭa 1. Ed. by B. Govindacharya. Udipi 1969. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Madhva. Ānandatīrthaviracitaṃ Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam Śrī Jayatīrtha viracita Tattvaprakāśikā sahitam. Ed. by K.T. Pandurangi. Bangalore: Dvaita Vedanta Studies& Research Foundation 2009.

On the relation between God and time in the later theistic Vedānta

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Nyāyakusumāñjali, Udayana. The Nyāya Kusumāñjali of Śrī Udayanāchārya with Four Commentaries. Ed. by Sri Padmaprasāda Upādhyāya and Sri Dhuṇḍirāja Śāstri. [Kāśi Sanskrit Series 30]. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. Iṣṭasiddhi, Vimuktātman. Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman. Sanskrit Text with a preface by Dr. P. K. Sundaram. Madras: Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha 1980. Nyāyasiddhāñjana, Veṅkaṭanātha. Veṅkaṭanāthārya Vedāntadeśika viracitaṃ Nyāyasiddhāñjanam, ed. Śrīnivāsatātācarya, Madras: Ubhayavedāntagranthamālā. Madras 1976. Tattvamuktākalāpa, Veṅkaṭanātha. Srimad Vedanta Desika’s Tattvamuktakalapa and Sarvartha Siddhi with Sanskrit Commentaries. Ed. by Uttamūr Śrīvātsya Vīrarāghavācārya, Madras: Ubhayavedāntagranthamālā 1973. Tattvamuktākalāpa (2), Veṅkaṭanātha. Part Two of Śrīmadveṅkaṭanātha Mahādeśika, with three Commentaries, Sarvārthasiddhi by Śrīmad Veṅkaṭanātha, Ānandadayinā by Nr̥siṃhadeva and Akṣarārtha by Devanāthatātācarya. Ed. by Dr. N. R. Śrīkr̥ṣṇatātācarya. Varanasi: Vijaya Press 1996. Śatadūṣaṇī, Veṅkaṭanātha. Adhikaraṇasārāvalī Śatadūṣaṇī ca. Ed. by Aṇṇaṅgarāchārya. Conjeevaram: Śrīmadvedāntadeśikagranthamālā 1940.

Secondary sources Bettina Bäumer, “Sun, Consciousness and Time: The Way of Time and the Timeless in Kashmir Śaivism”. In: Concepts of Time. Ancient and Modern. New Delhi: Gopson Papers 1996, 73–77. George Chemparathy, An Indian rational Theology. Introduction to Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali. [Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 1]. Wien 1972. Natalja Deng, God and Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019. Jonathan Duquette, Krishnamurti Ramasubramanian, “Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Time”. In: Shyam Wuppuluri and G. Ghirardi (eds.). Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 2017, 43‒60. Julius Eggeling (tr)., Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Sacred Books of the East. Volume 43. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1882–1900. Luis Gonzáles-Reimann, The Mahābhārata and the Yugas. India’s Great Epic Poem and the Hindu System of World Ages. [Asian Thought and Culture 51]. New York: Peter Lang: 2002. Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is. Classical Vaiśeṣika in the History of Indian Ontology. New York: State University of New York Press 1992. Joanna Jurewicz, Fire, Death and Philosophy. History of Ancient Indian Thinking. Delhi: Motilal 2018. Joanna Jurewicz, The wheel of time: How abstract concepts emerge. In: Public Journal of Semiotics 8/2. 2019, 13–28. Shashi Prabha Kumar, Categories, Creation and cognition in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. Heidelberg: Springer 2019. Angelika Malinar, “Zeit und Zeitpunkt in den Upaniṣaden und im Epos“. In: Walter Schweidler (ed.), Zeit. Anfang und Ende – Time: Beginning and End. Ergebnisse und Beiträge des Internationalen Symposiums der Hermann und Marianne Straniak-Stiftung, Weingarten 2002. St. Augustin: Academia Verlag 2002, 29–46.

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Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), Eternity. A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. Roque Mesquita, Studies on Madhva’s Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya. New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan 2016. Mikami (Pdf) Toshihiro Mikami (unpublished), Nyāyasiddhāñjana of Vedāntadeśika. An Annotated Translation, University of Tokyo. Gerhard Oberhammer, Materialien zur Geschichte der Rāmānuja-Schule V. Zur Lehre von der ewigen vibhūti Gottes. [Veröffentlichungen zu den Sprachen und Kulturen Asiens 34 = SbÖAW 684]. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Wissenschaften 2000. Thomas Oberlies, Die Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad: Edition und Übersetzung von Adhyāya IV–VI (Studien zu den “mittleren” Upaniṣads II – 3. Teil). In: Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, 42 (1998), 77–138. Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upanisads. New York: Oxford University Press 1998. Isabelle Ratié, Le Soi et l’Autre. Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la Pratyabhijñā. [Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture 13]. Leiden, Boston: Brill 2011. Marcus Schmücker, “Rāmānuja on Time”. In: Atlantis Press. Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 233; open access article, 49–53. Marcus Schmücker, “Soul and Qualifying Knowledge (Dharmabhūtajñāna) in the Later Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Veṅkaṭanātha”. In: The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Vedānta. Ayon Maharaj (ed.). London: Bloomsbury 2020, 75–104. Marcus Schmücker, Studies in Vimuktātman’s Iṣṭasiddhi (forthcoming). B. N. K. Sharma, Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 2008. Suzanne Siauve, La Doctrine de Madhva. Dvaita-Vedānta. [Publications de l’Institut francais d’Indologie 38]. Pondichéry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram 1968. Walter Schweidler, (ed.), Zeit: Anfang und Ende – Time: Beginning and End. Ergebnisse und Beiträge des Internationalen Symposiums der Hermann und Marianne Straniak-Stiftung, Weingarten 2002. St. Augustin: Academia Verlag 2002. Georges Tamer, Zeit und Gott. Hellenistische Zeitvorstellungen in der altarabischen Dichtung und im Koran. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 2008. Michael Theunissen, Negative Theologie der Zeit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1991. Thomas von Aquin, Über Gottes Vermögen. De potentia Dei. Teilband I. Übersetzt und herausgegeben von Stephan Grotz. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 2009. Yaroslav Vassilkov, Kālavāda (the doctrine of Cyclical Time) in the Mahābhārata and the concept of Heroic Didactics. In: Mary Brockington, Peter Schreiner (eds.), Composing a Tradition. Concepts, Techniques and Relationships. Zagreb: Munshiram Manoharlal 1999, 17–33. Heinz Werner Weßler, Zeit und Geschichte im Viṣṇupurāṇa. Formen ihrer Wahrnehmung und ihrer eschatologischen Bezüge, anhand der Textgestalt dargestellt. [Studia Religiosa Helvetica Series Altera 1]. Bern: Lang Verlag 1995. Nataliya Yanchevskaya, Michael Witzel, “Time and Space in Ancient India: Pre-philosophical Period”. In: Shyam Wuppuluri and G. Ghirardi (eds.). Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 2016, 23–42.

Michael T. Williams

Analytic philosophy of time in Early Modern India Introduction In this chapter, I will focus on philosophical accounts of time written in India in Sanskrit during the sixteenth century. In writing about this subject, I take myself to be implicitly contradicting two common views about Indian philosophy. The first view, which is still widely held among Western philosophers, is that it is for some reason improper to say that there was/is “philosophy” in India at all. The philosopher and Indologist Parimal Patil (2009: 6) summarised this view succinctly when he referred to a “widespread belief that Indian philosophy is too soft, and either is not really philosophy at all or is at best a part of someone else’s philosophical past and therefore irrelevant to us”. After I presented my paper at the conference on which this book is based, some participants voiced surprise that there was rigorous philosophical analysis of time in traditions that were not influenced by European philosophy. It is certain that the philosophers I will talk about here were not influenced by contemporary European philosophical ideas. Nevertheless, their works display a sophisticated analysis of time based on reasoning rooted in our everyday perceptions of the world around us. I will not draw comparisons with Western philosophies in this chapter. However, I hope it will be clear that there is ample scope for constructive engagement between the thought of medieval Indian philosophers and modern philosophical/theological theories of time in the West. The second view this chapter challenges belongs to specialists in Indian philosophy who sometimes tend to believe that the period I am writing about was one characterised by intellectual stagnation and scholastic obscurantism rather than innovative philosophical reflection. The scholar Sheldon Pollock (2001: 407) captured the view of many when he claimed that the work of intellectuals writing broadly during this period displays a “paradoxical combination of something very new in style subserving something very old in substance”. It is fair to say that there is still a widespread perception among those who work on Indian philosophies that nothing much substantially new was said during the sixteenth century or in the centuries that followed it. I hope this chapter

Michael T. Williams, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstr. 11-13, 1020 Vienna, Austria https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-009

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will help to show that this view is mistaken. At least two of the three philosophers I will discuss here presented genuinely new theories about time and its relationship to God. In some cases these philosophers developed old ideas in new directions; in others they completely contradicted received theories about time. The view that philosophers in this period favoured style over substance is closely connected with the view that their work was characterised by a kind of perverse scholastic obscurantism. All of the philosophers I write about in this chapter were influenced by the epistemologist Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (fl. 1325), whose Tattvacintāmaṇi was undoubtedly the most influential work on epistemology written after the decline of Buddhism in India. Gaṅgeśa and his followers developed a new language for philosophical discussion, which was subsequently used by intellectuals in other disciplines, including philosophical Vedānta, ritual science, aesthetics, grammatical-science and so on. Various negative reactions to this new philosophical idiom can be traced through modern literature, and NavyaNyāya has often been portrayed as a philosophically barren exercise in “logic chopping”.1 Undoubtedly, the technical language in which these texts were written is difficult to master and translate directly into other languages, and many people in my field are dismissive of the idea that the contents of these texts can ever be successfully communicated in modern European languages. What I hope to show here is that this need not be the case. These texts are undoubtedly difficult to “translate” in the sense that it is difficult to give them a comprehensible word-forword paraphrase into English. Nevertheless, their contents can be made accessible through careful reconstruction. The philosophical ideas of these traditions are profound and, with effective mediation, they can surely find their place in the modern philosophical world.

1 Ganeri (2011: 248–50) discusses some of these negative appraisals by both European and Indian sources. He argues that their origins lie in the British colonial educational policies of the nineteenth century. He writes: “The origins of this new attitude lie, I think, in the earlier imposition of colonial educational policies, which sought or served to undermine the traditional ṭolbased structures. Clearly a ṭol [a centre of traditional education] could not be portrayed – as the madrasa is today – as a house of religious fundamentalism, and instead the strategy seems to have been to describe their curricula as narrow and irrelevant. [. . .] The enduring notion that the ‘new reason’ philosophers of early modern India were concerned only with logical trivia, with style but not substance, has its beginnings here. It represents another instance of a phenomenon Halbfass has identified: the wish to refuse to India anything which resembles that which nineteenth-century Anglo-European philosophers wanted to ring-fence as definitive of the Anglo-European mind. I have also suggested that the resources of the ‘new reason’ provided material for a powerful intellectual resistance to colonialism, and it is no wonder that they should have actively been undermined”.

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The three philosophers I will discuss in this chapter all wrote at some point in the sixteenth century. All three identified as Brahmins, and they defended, in their own way, the main pillars of Brahminism, particularly the validity and authority of the Veda and the social structures of the four castes and life-stages (caturvarṇāśramadharma). They were also all theists, in that they accepted the existence of some sort of a conscious being who creates and sustains the universe. The first of these, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa (fl. 16002), is considered to be a member of the Navya-Nyāya school of philosophy. We know little about Mahādeva,3 other than the fact that he, together with his son Dinakara (fl. 1635), wrote an influential commentary on what came to be one of the standard textbooks of Navya-Nyāya. In this commentary, which is popularly known as the Dinakarī, Mahādeva presents an analytical account of what I will refer to as the “classical Vaiśeṣika” view of time. He presents a definition of time as a universal cause distinct from God and space, and shows carefully how this definition can be grounded in the analysis of our everyday temporal judgments. The second thinker I will discuss is a rather more radical philosopher named Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (fl. 1510). Like Mahādeva, Raghunātha was a member of the Navya-Nyāya tradition. Along with Gaṅgeśa, he is widely considered to be one of the tradition’s two greatest minds. Raghunātha was a leading commentator on Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi, but he also wrote an independent work on metaphysics known as the “Determination of the Truth about the Categories” (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa). In that work, Raghunātha rejected much of the classical Vaiśeṣika account of time. Most strikingly, Raghunātha argues that the principle of theoretical parsimony compels us to accept that time and space are, in fact, modes of a single entity which he terms “God” (Īśvara). Raghunātha also did away with the idea of the classical Vaiśeṣikas that motion calibrates time into smaller temporal units, and argues that we need to accept an entirely new category of being, the “moment” (kṣaṇa), in order to explain why time appears to be divided into smaller units like hours, days and so on. The final intellectual I will talk about here, Vyāsatīrtha (fl. 1510), came from a different philosophical tradition from that of Mahādeva and Raghunātha. Vyāsatīrtha belonged to a school that originated in the West coast of what is now

2 Unless stated otherwise, all dates for Navya-Nyāya and Advaitin philosophers are drawn from the online version of the bibliography of Karl H. Potter’s Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/ (accessed May 25, 2020). 3 Mahādeva is not to be confused with Mahādeva Puṇatāmakara, whose works have been discussed by modern scholars including Pollock and Ganeri. According to Potter’s Bibliography, he is also distinct from one Mahādeva Bhaṭṭācārya (fl. 1660), who is credited with writing a commentary on the Nyāyasūtras.

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the state of Karnataka. This tradition is today widely known as the “Mādhva” or “Dvaita” (Dualist) tradition of Vedānta. The basic premises of Mādhva philosophy had been developed by a philosopher named Madhva in the fourteenth century. Vyāsatīrtha’s work was inspired by Madhva’s ideas, and by the ideas of Madhva’s leading commentator, Jayatīrtha. Nevertheless, Vyāsatīrtha was an independent-minded philosopher, who creatively adapted the resources of his tradition to develop his own ideas about metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of language. Vyāsatīrtha was undoubtedly his tradition’s leading intellectual during this period, and he was also a major political figure in the Hindu Vijayanagara Empire.4 Despite the 2000 kilometers of distance between Mithila and Vijayanagara, Vyāsatīrtha was deeply familiar with the ideas of the Mithila-based Navya-Naiyāyikas, including not just Gaṅgeśa, but also Gaṅgeśa’s commentators Yajñapati Upādhyāya (fl. 1460) and Jayadeva Pakṣadhara (fl. 1470).5 Despite their philosophical differences, Mādhva Vedānta and Nyāya are, like the majority of Brahmanical traditions, both realist schools in the sense that they accept that the world of our everyday experience exists, and that it exists largely independently of our cognitions of it. Nyāya realism had largely developed in debates with Buddhist philosophers who defended different kinds of anti-realist philosophies. By the time the philosophers who feature in this article were writing, Buddhism had long since disappeared from Indian soil. The main challenge to these realist systems came from within the Brahmanical fold, from philosophers belonging to the Advaita (“Non-dualist”) tradition of Vedānta.6 By the time Raghunātha, Vyāsatīrtha and Mahādeva were writing, the most influential Advaitic philosophical works were Śrī Harṣa‘s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍanakhādya, Ānandabodha’s Nyāyamakaranda and Citsukha‘s Tattvapradīpikā.7 The Advaita Vedāntins were monists and anti-realists about the empirical world. They argued that the everyday world of sensory experience is nothing but an illusion, which is superimposed upon a reality that consists only of pure, self-reflexive consciousness (the brahman of the ancient Upaniṣadic texts). As part of their philosophy, Advaitins like Śrī Harṣa and Citsukha wrote detailed critiques of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist metaphysics and epistemology. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers in the fifteenth century had taken up the challenge of replying to these authors, but

4 See Stoker (2016) for a recent study of Vyāsatīrtha’s influence at the Vijayanagara court. 5 See Williams (2014) for some discussion of Vyāsatīrtha’s Navya-Nyāya influences. 6 See Whaling (1979) for a discussion of Śaṅkara‘s attitude towards Buddhism. See also King (1989) for a discussion of the relationship between Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism based on an analysis of the works of Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda. 7 See Minkowski (2011) for a discussion of Advaitin philosophers during this period.

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it was in fact the Mādhvas and the Viśiṣṭādvaitins who wrote the most detailed critical responses to Advaitin philosophers. The realist philosophers of both the Nyāya and Mādhva traditions often responded critically to Advaitin philosophers when formulating their theories of time and its relationship to God.

Time and space: An analytical account of the Classical Vaiśeṣika view in the work of Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa Mahādeva and Raghunātha are both usually identified as members of the NavyaNyāya tradition of philosophy. Navya-Nyāya philosophy, which is still studied by traditional scholars in India today, is a fusion of what were originally two schools: Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Whereas Nyāya was from the earliest stages concerned primarily with epistemological problems, the classical Vaiśeṣikas specialised in metaphysical analysis. The central goal of Vaiśeṣika philosophers was to defend a comprehensive, category-based theory of reality that accounts for the true judgments human beings can make about the everyday world of their experience. Our true judgments about reality (at least those made in the Sanskrit language) have the potential to reveal to us the structure of reality itself. The goal of metaphysical analysis is to specify how reality must be in order to account for, in the most parsimonious way possible, the factual occurrence and validity of the true judgments made by human beings. According to the classical Vaiśeṣika view of time, our everyday temporal perceptions show us that time is a member of the category they called “substance” (dravya). The category of substance is an eclectic one. It includes atomic matter as well as four pervasive, eternal substances: time, space, the ether and the individual souls/selves. The Vaiśeṣikas also accepted the existence of the “internal faculty” (manas), an atomic substance which helps explain how we can perceive our own mental states. The classical Vaiśeṣika philosophers regard time, along with space, God and the “unseen” (adr̥ṣṭa)8 as a sort of “universal cause”, because all

8 For the use of the term adr̥ṣṭa in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, see Bronkhorst (2004). According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, adr̥ṣṭa is the retributive potency of past deeds stored as a trope (guṇa) in individual souls. Specifically, the “unseen” refers to two kinds of tropes – merit and demerit – which inhere in the souls. God, who is ultimately responsible for dishing out the experiences the individual souls undergo in transmigratory existence, apportions these deserts on the basis of the accrued merit/demerit belonging to the soul in question.

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effects come into being in time. Time is connected to these entities via a special relator called the “temporal relator” (kālika-sambandha). According to the classical theory, time itself is a singular entity, but it appears to be calibrated into smaller units by external “conditioning adjuncts” (upādhis). The classical Vaiśeṣika philosophers believed that these conditioning adjuncts are the motions of material substances. Historically, most Vaiśeṣika philosophers defended this view of time. In the sixteenth century Raghunātha rejected some of the main pillars of this classical account, and denied that time and God are distinct entities. Nevertheless, conservative members of the Navya-Nyāya tradition continued to defend the classical picture. I will begin here by showcasing some of the analytical work on time that is found in the work of Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa.9 Mahādeva wrote the Dinakarī as an advanced commentary on a classic manual of Navya-Nyāya known as the “Pearl-Necklace of Established Positions of Nyāya” (Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī), which itself seems to have been written by Kr̥ṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma (fl. 1570). Kr̥ṣṇadāsa introduces the topic of time with the words: Time is the cause of produced-things; it is considered to be the abode of the worlds.10

9 See Ganeri (2011: 79–81) for a discussion of the scholars who produced the Bhāṣāpariccheda/ Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī and the numerous commentaries written on these texts. Both the Bhāṣāpariccheda and its commentary, the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, were traditionally taken to have been written by a Varanasi-based philosopher known as Viśvanātha Nyāyasiddhānta Pañcānana, who lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. However, modern scholars now widely follow the arguments of D. C. Bhattacharya (1945 and 1948) and accept that that they were written by Kr̥ṣṇadāsa, who was based in Navadvipa in Bengal. The Dinakarī is a commentary on the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī. It is regarded as the combined effort of a scholar named Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and his son, Dinakara Bhaṭṭa. The editions say that the work was begun by Mahādeva and completed by Dinakara. The Varanasi edition of the text seems to indicate that Mahādeva, the father, wrote the Dinakarī up to the chapter of the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī that deals with the means of knowledge known as “comparison” (upamāna), and that Dinakara completed the remainder of the work (see Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 317; see also Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library catalogue, no. 4497). In this case, Mahādeva must have written the portion of the work that deals with time, so I have referred to him as the author of the text here. If Dinakara himself flourished at about 1635, then we might roughly say that Mahādeva flourished at the turn of the seventeenth century. This work of Mahādeva and Dinakara is today primarily studied as an advanced introduction to Navya-Nyāya thought, to be read after the more elementary Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī. The most widely studied commentary on the Dinakarī is Rāmarudra’s (fl. 1670) Rāmarudrī. 10 janyānāṃ janakaḥ kālo jagatām āśrayo mataḥ / (Bhāṣāpariccheda, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 145.) All translations of Sanskrit texts in this chapter are my own.

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Mahādeva will argue that Kr̥ṣṇadāsa is saying two things about time here. The first thing that he says is that time is one of a number of universal causes that Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept (again, the other three are: space, God and the “unseen”). Kr̥ṣṇadāsa also observes here that we seem to have a pre-reflective intuition about time: time, he says, is “regarded as the locus of the worlds”. In what sense is time a cause of all effects? Navya-Nyāya philosophers distinguish between several types of causes. Elsewhere in the Nyāya-siddhāntamuktāvalī, Kr̥ṣṇadāsa gives an account of the nature of causality. The NavyaNaiyāyikas assumed that a cause must always precede its effect. A is a cause of B, Kr̥ṣṇadāsa says, if A invariably occurs before B and the fact that A invariably occurs before B is not conditioned by some factor that is different from B itself.11 Kr̥ṣṇadāsa accepts that there are three different types of cause: the “inherence cause” (samavāyi-kāraṇa), the “non-inherence cause” (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) and the “efficient cause” (nimitta-kāraṇa). These can be explained as follows. Something’s inherence cause is anything that serves as a cause of that thing through the inherence-relator (samavāya). For instance, a piece of cloth inheres in its component parts (the threads that make it up), and the threads are therefore the inherence cause of the cloth in question. A non-inherence cause, on the other hand, is something (usually a trope) that is closely connected with the inherence cause of something. For instance, a non-inherence cause of a piece of cloth is the contact tropes that inhere in the individual threads that in turn serve as the inherence cause of the cloth itself. According to Kr̥ṣṇadāsa, “efficient cause” is a kind of catch-all category; it includes all kinds of causes other than the inherence/non-inherence cause.12

11 anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyatā pūrvavartitā | kāraṇatvaṃ bhavet . . . (Bhāṣāpariccheda, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 80.) “Causeness could be [A’s] occurring invariantly before [B], provided that A is devoid of conditioning by something else”. The specification that the cause must be devoid of “conditioning by something else” (anyathā-siddhi) is designed to exclude factors that may occur invariably prior to an effect, but which should not be considered a true “cause” of that effect. One stock example concerns the case where a stick is used to produce a pot. Here the Navya-Naiyāyikas hold that the stick is indeed an efficient cause of the pot, because potters always make pots using sticks. However, since all sticks have the universal “stickhood”, stickhood also happens to be invariably present before the production of the pot. However, stickhood itself should not strictly be regarded as a “cause” of the pot. For, stickhood only occurs invariably before the pot because it happens to inhere in sticks. So stickhood fails to be a real “cause” as the Navya-Naiyāyikas define the term. See Matilal (1975) for a philosophical discussion of the theory of causation in the Navya-Nyāya school. 12 The Bhāṣāpariccheda gives the following brief description of the different types of causes accepted by the Navya-Naiyāyikas: yatsamavetaṃ kāryaṃ bhavati jñeyaṃ tu samavāyijanakaṃ tat | tatrāsannaṃ janakaṃ dvitīyam ābhyāṃ paraṃ tr̥tīyaṃ syāt || (Bhāṣāpariccheda, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 81.) “That thing in which an effect is inherent should be understood to be the inherence

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So what sort of cause is time? The Navya-Naiyāyikas regarded time as the inherence cause of at least some things. Time, Mahādeva will note, can be the inherence cause of the tropes “conjunction” and “disjunction”; he also takes it that time can be the inherence cause of numbers greater than one.13 However, time clearly cannot be the inherence cause or the non-inherence cause of all effects, so the Navya-Naiyāyikas hold that time is a universal cause by virtue of being an efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) of all effects. Given Kr̥ṣṇadāsa’s definitions, to say that time is the “efficient-cause” of all effects is not to say much more than that it is their cause without being their inherence cause or their non-inherence cause. However, Mahādeva analyses this thought further, and I will now turn to his explanation of Kr̥ṣṇadāsa’s claim that time is a universal cause.

Mahādeva’s analysis of time Mahādeva analyses the claims Kr̥ṣṇadāsa made about time carefully in the Dinakarī. Mahādeva’s argument is a paradigmatic case of how the Vaiśeṣika school proceeds to analyse the various components of the natural world based on ordinary experience. One of the central activities of the Navya-Naiyāyikas is giving “definitions” (lakṣaṇas) by specifying a distinguishing characteristic of some defined term.14 Mahādeva begins his analysis by giving a definition of time which he believes is implicit in Kr̥ṣṇadāsa’s work. I will present a literal translation of the relevant part of the Dinakarī here, before giving a reconstruction of what Mahādeva is saying in plain English: What [the author of the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī] means is that [time] is the efficient cause of all effects. And in this [verse] the defining property of time is: “The causeness15

cause [of that effect]; the cause that is located there [in the inherence cause] should be known as the second [i.e. the non-inherence] cause; [any cause] that is different from both [the inherence and the non-inherence cause] must be the third [i.e. the efficient cause].” 13 See Halbfass (1992: 213–15) for a discussion of how these tropes are connected with time in the thought of the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda. For a discussion of the relationship between time and the theory of number in Navya-Nyāya see Sastri (1951: 91–3). 14 A “definition” (lakṣaṇa) in Navya-Nyāya refers to a “unique characteristic” or “distinguishing property”, that is, a property that distinguishes the defined term (lakṣya) from all other entities. A definition, in other words, is a unique characteristic, one that belongs to the defined term, and to nothing else. For a discussion of the theory of definition in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature see Chakrabarti (1995: 39–61). 15 Here I follow Mahādeva’s commentator Rāmarudra (Rāmarudrī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 146) in interpreting the word nimitta in the definition to mean “cause” in the general sense of

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(nimittatva), by way of being a locus (adhikaraṇa), that is described (nirūpita) by the effectness that is determined (avacchinna) by (a) the temporal relator and (b) effectness”. [One] should understand that[, in this definition,] the expression, “[determined by] the temporal relator” prevents [the definition of time] from applying inappropriately to space, and the expression, “by way of being a locus”, serves to prevent the [definition] from applying inappropriately to both God and the unseen.16

This highly technical definition of time (highlighted in bold) makes use of some typical Navya-Nyāya technical terms. What Mahādeva is claiming is that the distinguishing characteristic of time is that it is a special sort of universal cause. More specifically, time acts as a sort of locus (adhikaraṇa) in which all effects come into being. Mahādeva expresses this by saying that time has the property of being a cause, which property is “described by” the “effectness that is determined by effectness”, i.e. the effectness that is present in all effects.17 So time’s

the term. The term nimitta often means more specifically nimitta-kāraṇa (“efficient cause”). However, as Rāmarudra points out, there is no reason for Mahādeva to use the word in this more specific way in the definition, since he has already specified the causeness in question with the word adhikaraṇatayā (“by way of being the locus”) here. 16 kāryatvāvacchinnaṃ prati nimittakāraṇam ity arthaḥ | atra ca kālikasambandhāvacchinnakāryatvāvacchinnakāryatānirūpitam adhikaraṇatayā nimittatvaṃ kālalakṣaṇam | kālikasambandhāvacchinneti karaṇād diśi, adhikaraṇatayeti karaṇād adr̥ṣṭeśvarayor nātivyāptir iti bodhyam | (Dinakarī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 145–6.) All punctuation found in Sanskrit texts in this chapter is my own. It does not necessarily reflect the punctuation supplied by the editors of the editions I have used. 17 Ingalls (1951), Goekoop (1967), Matilal (1968) and Wada (2007) have all given detailed accounts of the Navya-Nyāya technical language. I will attempt to give a brief overview of Mahādeva’s language in this passage here. According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, if something causes some effect, then the cause has the property “cause-ness” (kāraṇa-tā) and the effect has the property “effectness” (kārya-tā). Ingalls refers to properties such as these as “relational abstracts”. They are abstract properties that appear adventitiously in individuals and connect them to different parts of reality. In itself, a relational abstract like “causeness” is a very vague thing – we naturally ask, what exactly has this instance of causeness? And why? And what is the thing that has the property the cause of? The Navya-Naiyāyikas use two technical terms – nirūpita and avacchinna – to specify the relational abstracts involved in cause/effect relationships. They say that relational abstracts like causeness are always rendered definite – “described” (nirūpita) – by another correlated relational abstract, that is, some case of effectness. So, in Mahādeva’s definition of time, the particular case of causeness that serves as the defining characteristic of time is said to be “described” by a particular property called “effectness”. Mahādeva wants to say that time is a universal cause, that is, that it is an instrumental cause of all effects. To show this, Mahādeva says that the effectness in the definition is determined (avacchinna) by two other things. In Navya-Nyāya terminology, relational abstracts can further be specified by “determiners” (avacchedakas). Relational abstracts like effectness can be determined by two types of entity: relations and properties. The determiningproperty (avacchedaka-dharma) is the property that “restricts”/“determines”/“circumscribes” or confines the realm of individuals in which a relational abstract like effectness is present; it is, as

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causality extends to the whole class of things we can call “effects”. He specifies that time serves as a cause of all effects through a special “temporal relator” (kālikasambandha). The formulation Mahādeva gives here serves to exclude from the scope of the definition the three other entities that are considered universal causes by the Navya-Naiyāyikas (again: space, God and the unseen). All these three do have “causeness that is described by the effectness that is determined by effectness”; all, in other words, are universal causes. However, God and the unseen are not the cause of all effects by virtue of being the locus of these effects (we do not say that “God is the locus of all effects”, or that “the unseen is the locus of the worlds”). Space, on the other hand, is a universal locus in which effects arise, but it is not the cause of effects in general through the temporal-relator specifically. So God, space and the unseen are all excluded from this definition, and, so far as Mahādeva is concerned, this quality belongs exclusively to time. So time, like space, is a kind of “locus” in which all effects are produced. How do we know this? In the next section of the Dinakarī, Mahādeva grounds his definition of time in our everyday judgments that seem to refer to time. He continues to argue as follows: Objection: What is the proof that time is the efficient cause of effects in general? In reply to this they say as follows: Judgments such as “Today there will be a pot” [and] “Tomorrow there will be a piece of cloth” take for their object time insofar as it is the locus of the arising of some effect or other. For, there is the [following] invariant relation: “Whatever is referred to as being the locus of the arising of this or that [effect], is the cause of the arising of this or that effect”. For, the quality of being the cause of the arising of something is invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of that thing [itself]. And when it has been established in this way that some particular time-frame is a cause of some particular effect, it is established that time is a cause of effects in general through the rule that, “When two particular things stand in relation of cause-and-effect [the classes to which they belong also stand in relation of cause-and-effect, unless there is something to rule this out]”.

such, used to indicate universal quantification. Mahādeva’s use of the term here results in the strange expression, “the effectness that is determined by effectness” (kāryatvāvacchinnakāryatā). So the causeness that serves to define time is described by an effectness that is itself determined by effectness; in other words, time is the cause of all effects. (Mahādeva also uses the compound kāryamātra, “effects in general”, to express this; his commentator Rāmarudra uses the equivalent expression kāryasāmānya.) But how is time the cause of all effects? What is the relator through which it is the cause of all effects? Mahādeva expresses this by further specifying the effectness in question with a “determining relator” (avacchedaka-sambandha). This is the special “temporalrelater” (kālika-sambandha). The definition thus states that time is the cause of all effects via the temporal relator.

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Nor should one fall victim to the following doubt of the [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher Udayana-]ācārya:18 “It is not possible for time to be the cause of effects in general. For, since time can be the inherence cause of [tropes including] twoness (dvitva), separateness (pr̥thaktva), contact (saṃyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga), it cannot be [their] efficient cause, which consists [in part] in being different from [the inherence cause].” For, even though [time] is the inherence cause of the effect twoness through the inherence-relator, it is nonetheless the cause of twoness and so on through the temporal relator [also].19

Mahādeva observes in this passage that we have a particular class of everyday judgments that seem to involve time. The first two judgments Mahādeva alludes to seem to show that particular objects in the world come into existence within time. He asks us to entertain the idea that a potter is for some reason anticipating that he will produce a pot at a later point in time. The potter might have the thought: “A pot will come into being later today”. Or, a weaver who is planning to produce a length of cloth might anticipate that, “A piece of cloth will come into being tomorrow”. The point is that both of these judgments predict that a particular effect (some pot or some length of cloth) will come into being at a particular point in time in the future. According to Mahādeva’s analysis, they indicate that time is a sort of locus (adhikaraṇa) in which the effects in question will come into being. Mahādeva notes that we have no reason to doubt that these judgments are true, since they are not known to be contradicted by later experiences, so they form a solid basis for forming a theory of time. Strictly, the judgments Mahādeva has adduced only show us that time is a cause of certain specific effects (the pot/length of cloth these judgments refer to). They do not, in and of themselves, demonstrate that time is the locus of all effects. Mahādeva, however, refers to a principle which the founder of Navya-Nyāya, Gaṅgeśa, cited when he attempted to prove the existence of God as a sort of universal cause. Gaṅgeśa assumed that when we observe that two particular

18 Udayanācārya (fl. 984) was a leading pre-Gaṅgeśa Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher who is taken to have lived in Mithila. See below, fn. 19, for a discussion of the principle of generalisation from particular cause/effect relationships to general ones in Navya-Nyāya. 19 nanu kāryamātraṃ prati kālasya nimittakāraṇatve kiṃ mānam iti ced atrāhuḥ – adya ghaṭo bhaviṣyati, śvaḥ paṭo bhavitety ādipratyayena tattatkāryotpattyadhikaraṇatvena kālo viṣayīkriyate; tattadutpattyadhikaraṇatvena vyavahāraviṣayasya tattadutpattihetutvaniyamāt, tadutpattihetutvasya taddhetutvavyāpyatvāt | evaṃ ca tattatkāryaviśeṣaṃ prati tattatkālaviśeṣasya hetutve siddhe, yadviśeṣayor iti vyāptyā kāryamātre kālasya hetutāsiddhir iti | sā ca hetutā nimittakāraṇataiva | na ca kāryamātre kālasya hetutvaṃ na sambhavati, svasamavetadvitvapr̥thaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaṃ prati kālasya samavāyikāraṇatvena tadbhinnaghaṭitasya nimittakāraṇatvasya tatrābhāvād ity ācāryoktaṃ śaṅkyam; samavāyasambandhena dvitvādikaṃ prati tasya samavāyikāraṇatve ’pi kālikasambandhena dvitvādikāryaṃ prati nimittakāraṇatvasyānāpāyāt | (Dinakarī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 146.)

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things stand in relation to one another as cause and effect, we tend to generalize this relation to the classes to which they belong, provided we are aware of no good reason not to make this generalization.20 So, for Mahādeva, the fact that time is a universal cause is established empirically on the basis of a warranted generalization from a limited set of observations about time. In the verse translated above, Kr̥ṣṇadāsa argues that the idea that time is a container in which effects come into being is reflected in our ordinary judgments about reality. The judgment he expresses is: “Time possesses everything” (kālaḥ sarvavān). Mahādeva takes it that Kr̥ṣṇadāsa points to the existence of this widespread intuition as evidence in favour of his claim that “time is the locus of effects”. But why should we assume that this judgment proves the existence of time as a separate substance? Could we not attribute this quality to space, for instance? Mahādeva argues as follows: “Time is considered to be the locus of the worlds”.21 The idea is that the judgment, “Time possesses everything” establishes that time is the locus of all things. Objection: Let it be that the object of this sort of judgment is, in fact, space. For, if [one] theorises time as a separate entity, then [one is guilty of] postulating an excessive amount of entities; hence time is not established by the judgment[, “Time is the locus of the worlds”] alone. On the contrary, once time has been established through another means of knowledge, [one] postulates that it is the locus of all things on the strength of the judgment in question. With this in mind [Kr̥ṣṇadāsa says in the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī]: “Now” and so on.22

The Vaiśeṣika analysis of the natural world is guided by the principle of “parsimony” (laghutva, literally “lightness”). In this context, parsimony is a criterion for selecting between competing theories: it tells us that we should prefer theories that commit us to numerically fewer entities. So, assuming that we can somehow account for both temporal and spatial judgments by postulating the existence of one substance – space – alone, we should not expand our ontology to include a further substance called “time”.

20 This maxim is alluded to already in the work of Gaṅgeśa. For instance, Gaṅgeśa says in the chapter of the Tattvacintāmaṇi where he tries to prove the existence of God: yadviśeṣayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvas tatsāmānyayor api bādhakaṃ vinā tathātvaniyama iti | (Īśvaravāda, Anumānacintāmaṇi: 50.) See Chakrabarti (1975) for a discussion of this principle. 21 As is common in Sanskrit commentarial texts, Mahādeva frequently quotes from the root text on which he is commenting. Here the quote is from the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī. I have placed such quotes in speech marks throughout my translations. 22 jagatām āśrayo mata iti | kālaḥ sarvavān iti pratītyā sarvādhikaraṇatvena kālasiddhir iti bhāvaḥ | nanv etādr̥śī pratītir digviṣayiṇy evāstu, atiriktakālakalpane gauravād iti na kevalam anayā pratītyā kālaḥ sidhyati, paraṃ tu pramāṇāntareṇa kāle siddhe prakr̥tapratītibalāt sarvādhāratvaṃ kalpyata ity āha – idānīm ity ādinā | (Dinakarī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 146–7.)

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Mahādeva therefore argues in this passage that we can only take the intuition, “Time possesses everything”, to prove that time is a universal container of effects once we know by some other means that time exists as a distinct substance. He therefore notes that a passage in the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī offers a further proof for the existence of time as a separate substance. The passage Mahādeva alludes to here reads as follows: When a judgment such as, “The pot exists now”, or the like takes for its object the motion of the sun, for instance, then a relator that connects the pot etc. with the motion of the sun etc. must be specified; and that relator cannot be contact or [inherence]; hence it must be postulated that time itself constitutes the relator. And so it is correct that [time] is the basis of the judgment [“Time possesses all things”].23

Kr̥ṣṇadāsa here uses judgments of simultaneity to establish the existence of time as a separate substance. The Navya-Naiyāyikas took it that the sun orbits the earth, so the judgment, “Anna is now in the sauna”, for instance, might be taken to index the existence of Anna to a particular phase of the sun’s motion around the earth. So, reasons Kr̥ṣ̥ ṇadāsa, there must be some relator (sambandha) that connects these two separate things. This clearly cannot be contact since the sun and Anna are nowhere near one another. Nor can it be inherence, since Anna clearly does not inhere in the sun. So we need to postulate the existence of a further relator, which, according to Kr̥ṣṇadāsa, is time itself. A final proof that Mahādeva gives for the existence of time is based on judgments we make about temporal sequence. We say, for instance, “The bus arrived before the plane landed”, or “Raghunātha was born before Jayarāma”. The NavyaNaiyāyikas accounted for these judgments by arguing that two tropes – priority (paratva) and posteriority (aparatva) – inhere in substances and motions. The Navya-Naiyāyikas assume that every positive effect must have a non-inherence cause as well as an inherence cause, and they reasoned that the non-inherence cause in this case must be contact with a particular portion of time. This contact trope in turn must have its own locus, and we need to postulate the existence of time to act as that locus.24

23 idānīṃ ghaṭa ity ādipratītiḥ sūryaparispandādikaṃ yadā viṣayīkaroti, tadā sūryaparispandādinā ghaṭādeḥ sambandho vācyaḥ; sa ca sambandhaḥ saṃyogādir na sambhavatīti kāla eva sambandhaghaṭakaḥ kalpyate | itthaṃ ca tasyāśrayatvam eva samyak | (Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 146–7.) 24 Mahādeva explains this argument as follows: jyeṣṭhe paratvapratyayaḥ, kaniṣṭhe ’paratvapratyayaḥ; sa ca paratvāparatvaguṇaviśeṣādhīnaḥ; paratvāparatve ca sāsamavāyikāraṇake, bhāvakāryatvāt | asamavāyikāraṇaṃ ca tayoḥ kālapiṇḍasaṃyoga eveti paratvāparatvayor asamavāyikāraṇasaṃyogāśrayatayā kālasiddhir iti bhāvaḥ | (Dinakarī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 147–8). “[One] experiences the elder as having priority and the younger as having posteriority;

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Motion and the calibration of time The classical Vaiśeṣikas argued, on the basis of the principle of parsimony, that time must be in reality a singular entity, which they referred to as “big-time” (mahā-kāla). However, if time is really just one thing, how do we explain the diversity of the ways in which we refer to it? We talk about time as though it is divided into “minutes”, “seconds”, “moments” and “days”, and so on. If time is really a singular entity, how do we account for these diverse judgments? Mahādeva discusses this problem in the Dinakarī: Objection: If time is just one thing, then [we] could not talk about it in various different ways, as “moments” (kṣaṇa), lavas, kāṣṭhas25 and so on. Nor can it be said [in reply to this objection] that, just as we refer to one and the same pot using the [synonymous] words “pot” (ghaṭa), “pot” (kalaśa) and “pot” (kumbha), so too in the case of [time] is there no contradiction entailed in [referring to time using various different expressions like “moment” and so on]. For, referring to one and the same thing in various incompatible ways is not proper. For, “potness” (ghaṭatva), “potness” (kalaśatva) and so on are not mutually incompatible, whereas momenthood (kṣaṇatva) does stand in contradiction to dayness (dinatva) and [the other divisions of time]. For, no one makes the judgment, “One moment is one day”! With this in mind [Kr̥ ṣ̥ ṇadāsa says in the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī:] “Objection: Of one [time] . . . ”. For, one and the same thing cannot properly be the object of various contradictory statements. “From limiting adjuncts”. And so it is that time, which is [just] a singular thing, has the property of being a moment when it is qualified by some property, and that of being a day when it is qualified by some [other] property, and not by itself. More is implied by [Kr̥ṣṇadāsa’s expression] – one should also understand [from this statement] that conditioning adjuncts of this sort are the objects of discourse about moments [and the other divisions of time], and not big-time (mahākāla) itself.26

and those judgments depend on the particular tropes ‘priority’ and ‘posteriority’; and priority and posteriority must have a non-inherence cause, because [they are] positive effects. And the non-inherence cause [of priority and posteriority] can only be contact with some portion of time; hence time is established as being the locus of the contact tropes that are the non-inherence causes of the tropes priority and posteriority. This is the idea [of what Kr̥ṣnadāsa says in the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī].” 25 For a brief overview of the different units of time accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers see Prasad (1984: 236). The moment (kṣaṇa) is taken to be the smallest temporal unit. All other temporal units are considered multiples of the kṣaṇa. A lava is equal to two kṣaṇas, a kāṣṭhā is equal to seventy-two kṣaṇas and so on. 26 nanu yadi kāla eka eva, tadā kṣaṇalavakāṣṭhādinānāvyavahāras tatra na syāt | na caikasminn eva ghaṭe ghaṭaḥ, kalaśaḥ, kumbha iti vyavahāravad atrāpi kṣaṇādinānāvyavahāre bādhakābhāva iti vācyam | ekasmin viruddhanānāvyavahārāyogāt | na hi ghaṭatvakalaśatvādikaṃ mitho viruddham; kṣaṇatvaṃ dinatvaṃ tu viruddham eva; na hi kṣaṇaṃ dinam iti pratītir astīty āśaṅkate – nanv ekasyeti | samayabhedaḥ – samayabhedavyavahāraḥ; vibhinnavyavahāraviṣaya iti yāvat | ekasmin

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Mahādeva says two important things in this passage. The first is that time in and of itself does not have the properties that denote the various temporal units (momenthood and so on), but only insofar as it is “qualified by”/“combined with” (viśiṣṭa) some property/conditioning adjunct. The second is that it is the conditioning adjuncts themselves that are the objects of expressions like “being a moment” and so on. Our temporal statements do not usually refer to “big-time” directly; they actually refer to the adjuncts that calibrate time into smaller units. So what are these “conditioning adjuncts”? K̥ṣṇadāsa explains as follows: Objection: “Time”, which is singular, cannot be differentiated into smaller units – moments, months, years and so on. With this in mind[, the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda says:] “The moment and so on must be the result of conditioning adjuncts”. Now, even though time is one, owing to the differences between conditioning adjuncts, it can be spoken of in terms of “moments” and so on. Now a conditioning adjunct is one of the following: (1) A motion that is determined by the prior absence of the disjunction that will be produced by that motion itself, or (2) the disjunction that is determined by the previous contact, or (3) the prior absence of the subsequent contact that is determined by the destruction of the previous contact, or (4) the motion that is determined by the subsequent contact.27

Kr̥ṣnadāsa here explains the standard Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of the calibration of time. According to this account it is really motions (kriyā) that serve to make time appear as though it is divided into smaller units. According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, motions constitute a separate category (padārtha) of individuals in reality. The primary function of a motion is to produce/destroy two types of tropes which can inhere in substances: contact (saṃyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga). To understand how Kr̥̥ṣṇadāsa believes that motion can calibrate time, we could take the example of the motion of an apple falling from a tree. The apple is initially in contact with the tree, before it becomes disjoined from it, falls, and makes contact with the ground. According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas every

viruddhanānāvyavahāraviṣayatvābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ | upādhita iti | tathā caikasya kālasya kiṃciddharmaviśiṣṭasya kṣaṇatvam, kiṃciddharmaviśiṣṭasya dinatvam, na tu kevalasyeti bhāvaḥ | idam upalakṣaṇam | tādr̥śopādhīnām eva kṣaṇatvādivyavahāraviṣayatvam, na tu mahākālasyety api draṣṭavyam | (Dinakarī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 148.) 27 nanv ekasya kālasya siddhau kṣaṇadinamāsavarṣādisamayabhedo na syād ity ata āha – kṣaṇādiḥ syād upādhita iti | kālas tv eko ’py upādhibhedāt kṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayaḥ | upādhis tu – svajanyavibhāgaprāgabhāvāvacchinnaṃ karma, pūrvasaṃyogāvacchinnavibhāgo vā, pūrvasaṃyoganāśāvacchinnottarasaṃyogaprāgabhāvo vā, uttarasaṃyogāvacchinnaṃ karma vā | (Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī: 145–6.)

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motion lasts for four moments. The motion of the apple first arises; it then produces a disjunction trope in the apple; it then destroys the previous contact between the apple and the tree; and, finally, it brings about another contact between the apple and the patch of ground. In the fifth moment, the motion ceases to exist. The origination of a motion occupies one moment, and the three events that follow it – separation, loss of prior contact and the production of a new contact trope – occupy each one moment. In the passage just translated, Kr̥ṣṇadāsa gives a technical specification of each of these four stages. The first factor that calibrates time is the motion that is determined by the prior absence of the disjunction that will shortly appear in the apple. (The apple is still very much in contact with the tree, but it is about to fall from it.) The second conditioning adjunct is a disjunction trope that is itself determined by the prior conjunction of the apple with the tree. (The apple has not yet left the tree, but the trope called disjunction is already present in it.) The third conditioning adjunct is the prior absence of the subsequent contact trope (that is, the contact with the target towards which the object is moving), which prior absence is determined by the destruction of the previous contact between the apple and the tree. (The apple has now detached from the tree and is in mid-air, but will shortly make contact with the ground.) The final conditioning adjunct is the motion that is determined by the contact with the target towards which the object was moving. (The apple is now in contact with the ground.) According to Kr̥ṣṇadāsa, each of the four stages of a motion’s existence serve as moments that calibrate time.28

Time, space and deity in Raghunātha Śiromaṇi’s critique of classical Vaiśeṣika In summary, the classical account of time defended by Kr̥ṣṇadāsa and Mahādeva says the following things: – Time is a distinct substance, like atomic matter and the individual selves – Time is one of four universal causes, the other three being space, God and the “unseen”

28 A clear discussion of the Navya-Nyāya theory of motion is found in Kuppuswami Sastri’s Primer of Indian Logic pp. 15–18. He gives a formula for the Navya-Nyāya theory of motion as follows: “Motion, then disjunction, then the destruction of contact with the previous place, then contact with the subsequent place, then the destruction of the motion [itself].” (kriyā, tato vibhāgaḥ, tataḥ pūrvadeśasaṃyoganāśaḥ, tata uttaradeśasaṃyogaḥ, tataḥ kriyānāśaḥ).

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– Time is the cause of all effects by way of being their locus through the temporal relator – Time is really singular, but it appears to be calibrated by motions, which accounts for why we refer to it as being divided into smaller units like days, months and so on The pillars of the classical view of time were not always accepted by philosophers who are associated with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. The twelfth century Vaiśeṣika philosopher Śivāditya, for instance, argued that time, space and the ether are not really different from one another as the classical picture suggests.29 Another example of a dissenting voice is Bhāsarvajña (fl. 950), who argued in his Nyāyabhūṣaṇa against the idea that time and space can be considered universal causes in the same way that God should be.30 The classical theory of time came under renewed attack at the turn of the sixteenth century, when Raghunātha (who may have been influenced by Śivāditya and Bhāsarvajña on this point)31 wrote a short but revolutionary work on Vaiśeṣika metaphysics known as the “Determination of the Truth about the Categories” (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa). In the text, Raghunātha delivered an irreverent critique of the ancient system of categories. While he remained broadly true to the principles of metaphysical analysis that underlie the classical Vaiśeṣika system, Raghunātha delivered a radical critique of many Vaiśeṣika metaphysical theories. Although he retained many of the classical system’s categories, he gave reductive explanations of others, and eliminated many from the system.32 Raghunātha does not challenge the classical theory that time is a substance, nor does he challenge the view that it is a sort of universal cause. However, Raghunātha has two main ideas about time which contradict the classical theory.

29 See Halbfass (1992: 217–18) for a discussion of Śivāditya’s views on this matter. 30 For Bhāsarvajña’s view of space and time, see Halbfass (1992: 218–19). 31 At the end of his Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa, Raghunātha laments that the critical spirit in which he wrote the text had fallen out of vogue among contemporary philosophers, even though it was practised by earlier thinkers. According to his commentator, Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa: 79), Raghunātha has the medieval philosopher Vācaspati Miśra “and so on” (vācaspatimiśrādi) in mind in this remark. However, it is possible that Raghunātha also has in mind here Bhāsarvajña, whose Nyāyabhūṣaṇa contains a critique of many aspects of the classical Vaiśeṣika system of categories, which often runs along similar lines to Raghunātha’s arguments. Raghunātha might also have been influenced by Śivāditya’s views on the subject of time and space. See Williams (2017: 623–4) for a discussion of the opening verses of the Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa. 32 See Williams (2017) for an overview of the different categories that Raghunātha accepts/rejects from the classical Vaiśeṣika system.

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The first is that time and space are nothing but different aspects of a singular, underlying being. Raghunātha refers to this being as Īśvara, a Sanskrit word which is usually translated as “Lord”, “Ruler” or “God”. Raghunātha’s second idea is that motion fails to account for the apparent division of big-time into smaller temporal units. Raghunātha argues that we need to accept the existence of another irreducible category named the “moment” (kṣaṇa), which ultimately serves to lend time the appearance of being calibrated into smaller fragments. At the very beginning of the Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa Raghunātha argues as follows: Of [the categories accepted by the classical Vaiśeṣikas], space and time are nothing but God (Īśvara), since there is no good reason [to theorise that they are distinct from Him]. For, some particular effect [that is, a spatial or temporal judgment,] arises from God insofar as He is combined with some particular cause, just as, according to those who hold the opposing view [that space and time are distinct from God and from each other,] the various kinds of [spatial and temporal] verbal judgments such as “[x is] to the east [of y]” arise from space [and time], which are both singular things.33

So far as Raghunātha is concerned, the underlying scientific principles that guided the classical analysis of time are sound, but the classical school had failed to follow them to their logical conclusion. The classical school argued that space and time are singular entities that appear to be divided into smaller, discrete units by external factors. Why not push this logic further, asks Raghunātha, and accept that space and time are ultimately the same thing conditioned in various different ways by external factors? For Raghunātha, space and time are ultimately the same thing, and that thing is what is called Īśvara or “God”. What exactly is God for Raghunātha? In a verse found at the beginning of the Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa, Raghunātha presents a description of God which, given his arguments in the text that time and space are identical with god, might be taken to invoke the view of the Navya-Naiyāyikas’ enemies, the Advaita Vedāntins. The Advaita Vedāntins were monists and antirealists about the empirical world. They argued that the everyday world revealed by sensory experience is nothing but an illusion, somehow superimposed upon a reality that consists only of pure, self-reflexive consciousness. Raghunātha’s verse reads:

33 tatra dikkālau neśvarād atiricyete, mānābhāvāt | tattannimittaviśeṣasamavadhānavaśād īśvarād eva tattatkāryaviśeṣāṇām upapatteḥ | pareṣām ekaikasmād digāder iva vilakṣaṇānāṃ prācyādivyavahārāṇām | (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa: 1–3.)

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Om! Salutations to the Highest Soul, the perfect one whose bliss and knowledge are complete, who persists while supporting all beings.34

Raghunātha’s description of God in this verse – “whose bliss and knowledge are complete” (akhaṇḍa-ānanda-bodha), “the Highest Soul” (parama-ātman)” – might sound rather close to the Advaitin’s brahman, which is often referred to as “being, consciousness, and bliss” (sat-cid-ānanda). Given that Raghunātha’s teacher Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (fl. 1480) was, at least in his later years, a monist philosopher,35 we might be tempted to assume that Raghunātha himself held monist sympathies. Raghunātha is, however, no crypto-monist. In the Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa he clearly continues to assume a philosophical stance of pluralistic realism. In fact, later in the text, he goes on to introduce a further eight new categories to the list of six he retains from the classical Vaiśeṣika school.36 Nevertheless, for later philosophers both the classical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of time, as well as Raghunātha’s updated theories, were problematic because they seem to open the door to Advaitic philosophical positions. If we accept that time and space are nothing but God limited in various ways, why not accept the doctrine of the Advaita Vedāntins that the individual souls are identical with brahman? The objection that Raghunātha’s arguments could open the door to monistic philosophy was voiced by the eighteenth century philosopher Veṇīdatta, for instance. Let us assume that the principle of parsimony compels us to accept that space and time are nothing but God limited in different ways by external adjuncts, says Veṇīdatta. In that case, why not accept that the multitude of individual souls are, as the Advaitin suggests, just a single consciousness limited in various ways by nescience?37 Raghunātha’s especially rigorous application of the principle of parsimony might be taken to lay the basis for the introduction of characteristically Advaitic philosophical theories into Navya-Nyāya.

34 oṃ namaḥ sarvabhūtāni viṣṭabhya paritiṣṭhate | akhaṇḍānandabodhāya pūrṇāya paramātmane || (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa: 1.) 35 See Ingalls (1951: 9–13) and Potter (1993: 489–90) for details of the life and thought of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. He is said to have written a commentary on an Advaitic work, Lakṣmīdhara’s Nyāyamakaranda. 36 See Williams (2017) for a discussion of these categories. 37 Veṇīdatta elaborates this argument in his Padārthamaṇḍana, p. 2.

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The Mādhva challenge to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of time Raghunātha was not the only realist philosopher in sixteenth century India who challenged the classical Vaiśeṣika account of time. For the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on the ideas of a philosophical theologian named Vyāsatīrtha. Vyāsatīrtha was the leading critic of Advaita philosophy in the sixteenth century, and his works attracted replies from the most renowned Advaitin philosophers of the day. Like the classical Vaiśeṣikas, he was a thoroughgoing realist who accepted the reality of space and time as distinct substances. However, he also rejected the particulars of the classical Vaiśeṣika theory of time.38 According to the classical Vaiśeṣika account of time, time is, like space, an independent substance which is calibrated by an external factor – motion – into smaller temporal units. Vyāsatīrtha, by contrast, emphasised time’s dependence on God, and claimed that it is intrinsically divided into smaller units. Vyāsatīrtha lived in South India largely in what is now the state of Karnataka. He was deeply influenced by the Navya-Nyāya tradition, particularly by Gaṅgeśa work on epistemology, the Tattvacintāmaṇi. Although later philosophers in Vyāsatīrtha’s tradition studied Raghunātha’s works and gave critical responses to them, Vyāsatīrtha himself was clearly not aware of Raghunātha.39 Vyāsatīrtha was a member of the Mādhva tradition of Vedānta, a religious movement and school of theology founded in the thirteenth century by the philosopher Madhva/ Ānandatīrtha. Vyāsatīrtha was an uncompromising critic of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, and a very large part of his philosophical corpus was dedicated to

38 Madhva and Jayatīrtha both clearly developed their ideas about time in a close, critical conversation with classical Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. In his chapter in the present volume, Marcus Schmücker (pp. 132–140) gives a close study of how Madhva and Jayatīrtha both critique the Vaiśeṣika theory that time is only apparently divided into smaller units by upādhis on the grounds that it cannot explain the temporality of God’s act of creation. 39 Mādhva thinkers first showed an awareness of Raghunātha’s ideas in the seventeenth century. Vyāsatīrtha’s commentator Rāghavendra Tīrtha (fl. 1640) was clearly aware of certain aspects of Raghunātha’s ideas in his commentary on Vyāsatīrtha’s Tarkatāṇḍava (see Williams, 2014). The independent-minded Mādhva thinker Satyanāthatīrtha (fl. 1670) showed a deep knowledge of Raghunātha’s arguments about inference and responded to them critically in the Abhinavatāṇḍava. Later Mādhva thinkers also used the ideas of Raghunātha and his followers in Bengal when debating with the Advaitin. For instance, in the eighteenth century, the Varanasi-trained Mādhva philosopher Kr̥ṣṇācārya (fl. 1780) regularly referred to Raghunātha and his commentator Gadādhara Bhaṭṭa when discussing Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments against the Advaitins in the Nyāyāmr̥ta (see his Nyāyāmr̥tamādhurī, passim.)

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refuting their ideas. I will here discuss one of Vyāsatīrtha’s most original contributions to this debate: his arguments to show that space and time must be infinite and unbounded. So how does time relate to God, according to Vyāsatīrtha? Vyāsatīrtha, following Madhva, agrees with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers that time is a substance. However, in his view time is not identical with God as Raghunātha suggests, but nor is it an independent substance as the classical Vaiśeṣika account of time teaches. For Vyāsatīrtha, time is, like the rest of reality, dependent on God.40 This dependency can also be interpreted as a sort of “creation”. In a sense we can say that time is “produced” (Madhva himself had actually used the word janya, literally “to be generated”, in this context), but only to the extent that its intrinsic properties (viśeṣas) are dependent on God. As I discuss shortly, these “intrinsic properties” are nothing but the divisions of time – moments, days and so on. “Creation” in this stretched sense of the term implies eternal dependency rather than the bringing into being of something that previously had no existence. As Vyāsatīrtha, following Madhva, express it, time is “created” or “caused” by God only because it depends upon another (that is, God) in order to obtain these intrinsic modifications. (This is all succinctly expressed in the Sanskrit compound parādhīnaviśeṣāpti–literally “the obtaining of intrinsic properties that depends upon another being”.)41 Unlike the Navya-Naiyāyikas, for whom the calibration of “big-time” (mahākāla) into smaller units depends on external factors (i.e. motions), according to

40 According to Madhva’s commentator, Jayatīrtha, to say that something is “independent” is simply to say that it does not require another being from the point of view of its having an essence, its being an object of knowledge and its possessing practical efficacy. Something is dependent, by contrast, if it does require another being from these points of view. He writes: svarūpapramitipravr̥ttilakṣaṇasattātraividhye parānapekṣaṃ svatantram; parāpekṣam asvatantram | (Tattvasaṅkhyānaṭīkā: 46.) “That which requires another being in respect of the triplicity of existence, comprising essence, knowledge and action, is independent; that which does require another being in that respect is non-independent.” See also Sarma 2003: 52–3 for some discussion of the concepts of dependence/independence in Madhva’s thought. 41 Sharma (1961: 114) explains as follows: “As a Vedāntin believing in the Brahmakāraṇatvavāda [= the doctrine that brahman is the cause] of the entire universe, Madhva seeks to reconcile the essential uncreated nature of space (and other ex hypothesi eternal reals) with the Vedāntic axiom: that everything in the universe is, in some sense, created by Brahman (BS i. i.2) by interpreting the ‘creation’ of eternal substances like space, and time in a Pickwickian sense of “Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti” which will be explained later”. Sharma (1961: 222–32) devotes an entire chapter of his reconstruction of Madhva’s philosophy to explaining the concept of parādhinaviśeṣāpti. See Schmücker’s chapter in this volume, pp. 132–135, for a discussion of how God’s “unimaginable force” (acintyaśakti) is able to manifest divisions in the flow of time according to Madhva.

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Vyāsatīrtha, the division of time into smaller, discrete units is not something that is achieved by any external factor. Time rather possesses intrinsic divisions into smaller units. Vyāsatīrtha explains that these intrinsic attributes of time are nothing but the divisions of time – a moment, half a moment and so on. For Vyāsatīrtha, unlike Raghunātha, there is no “smallest” temporal unit; like space and atomic matter, time is infinitely divisible into smaller parts.42 Their views about the relation between time and its parts also led Vyāsatīrtha and the Mādhvas to classify time as a substance that is both eternal and non-eternal (nitya-anitya). According to the Mādhva philosopher Jayatīrtha, this category encompasses everything that is “not completely unchanging, but not non-eternal either”; it includes not only time but also material nature (prakr̥ti) itself and the class of scriptural texts known as smr̥ti. Jayatīrtha explains that time qualifies for this category because, whereas time itself is eternal in that it has no origin and persists forever, its states (avasthā) such as seconds, milliseconds etc. are clearly impermanent. Jayatīrtha says that time, as such, belong to the type of nitya-anitya entity that in itself neither arises nor passes away, but whose states “come and go”.43 The Mādhvas also disagree fundamentally with the Navya-Naiyāyikas about how we come to know about time. As discussed above, according to Navya-Nyāya philosophers, we can only infer the existence of time as a separate substance

42 Sharma (1961: 219–20) explains this as follows: “The acceptance of intrinsic Viśeṣas in God’s eternal activity as in His other attributes of knowledge and power, as identical with His essence enables Madhva to account for the well-established periodicity of cosmic creation and dissolution without any hitch, by the exercise of His eternal will. Their periodicity cannot be smoothly explained (in other systems) without admitting natural distinctions in time, based purely on Upādhis in terms of time of creation and time of dissolution as suggested by the Vaiśeṣikas. Their explanation involves interdependence, as the Upādhis cannot operate unless there is a prior time of creation or dissolution, independent of them. The Upādhis cannot operate on the distinctions which they themselves have brought into being. This difficulty does not exist for Madhva who accepts natural distinctions (svābhāvikaviśeṣas) in time through Viśeṣas, to regulate the periodicity of cosmic creation and dissolution at the will of God.” 43 yan na sarvathā kūṭastham, nāpy anityam eva, tad ucyate nityānityam | tasya tisro vidhāḥ sambhavanti – utpattimattve sati vināśābhāvaḥ; ekadeśa utpattivināśau, ekadeśinas tadabhāvaḥ, svarūpeṇotpattyādyabhāve ’py avasthāgamāpāyavattvaṃ ceti | (Tattvasaṅkhyānaṭīkā: 211.) “That which is not completely unchanging, but which is neither simply noneternal, is called ‘both-eternal-and-noneternal’. There can be three sorts of [both-eternal-and-non-eternal things] – [that in which there is] the absence of cessation coupled with having-an-origin; [that in which there is] arising and cessation in one place, and the absence of those [two things] in another; and [that which], even though it essentially lacks arising and [cessation], has states that comeand-go.” According to Jayatīrtha, time belongs to the third type of nitya-anitya entity. See also Sarma (2003: 60) for some discussion of this aspect of Mādhva philosophy.

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based on our perceptions of simultaneity and chronological sequence. Mādhva philosophers, on the other hand, believe that we can directly perceive time.44 In the passage of Vyāsatīrtha’s Nyāyāmr̥ta that I have translated below, Vyāsatīrtha restates Madhva’s idea that time and space are directly perceptible by a special faculty called the “witness” (sākṣin). According to Vyāsatīrtha, the witness is simply the essence of the individual self, and it is responsible for directly apprehending internal states such as pleasure and pain, as well as certain external objects. The sākṣin, according to Vyāsatīrtha, is responsible for the perception of bare time and space. Mādhva philosophers based their case for the sākṣin partly on the observation of the phenomenon of deep, dreamless sleep. In this state, they argued, the sākṣin intuits bare time. We know this because everyone has the experience, “I slept deeply for two hours”, after being in such a state. Since the sense-faculties do not function in this state, there can be no inference or perception of time at that point, so there must be another faculty that apprehends this directly. This faculty is the witness, according to Vyāsatīrtha.45

The infinity of space and time in Vyāsatīrtha’s Nyāyāmr̥ta For the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss how Vyāsatīrtha explores one question about time when debating with philosophers from the Advaita tradition of Vedānta. In his Nyāyāmr̥ta, Vyāsatīrtha argued that time and space must be infinite and unbounded. According to the Advaitins, the empirical world is an illusion; only brahman – pure, undifferentiated consciousness – is real. The Advaitins argued that we can infer that the world is a kind of illusion because, unlike brahman, the world is “finite” (paricchinna). Brahman, by contrast, is pure undifferentiated consciousness, which is infinite and unbounded; it can therefore be said to be ultimately real.46 In the chapter of the Nyāyāmr̥ta where he deals with this argument of the Advaitins, Vyāsatīrtha asks what exactly it means to state that the world is “finite”:

44 For Madhva and Jayatīrtha’s defence of the Mādhva position against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of the inference to prove the existence of time, see Sharma (1961: 115–16) and Siauve (1968: 155–7). 45 All of this is discussed by Sharma 1961: 115–16 in his account of time in Mādhva philosophy. 46 The logic of this argument is discussed by Sharma (1994: 79–88) who also gives an explanation of the passage of the Nyāyāmr̥ta I have translated below.

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And is [the empirical world] finite from the point of view of space, time or essence? The first two cannot be the case [i.e. you, the Advaitin, cannot claim that the world is finite from the point of view of space or time]. For, (1) both space that is, the unmanifested ether47 – and time are established as being infinite by (a) the witness that perceives the quality-possessing substance [i.e. space or time]; (b) Vedic passages such as, “Just like the ether, it is omnipresent and eternal”, “In the beginning, son, [this world] was simply what is existent” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1),48 “[When all the desires that rest in one’s heart are abandoned,] then the mortal becomes immortal [and obtains brahman in this world]” (Kaṭha Upaniṣad 6.14), “But when the whole has become [one’s] very self . . . ” (Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.14); and (c) reasoning founded on the observation that we observe effects everywhere and at all times. And the Vedic passage, “[From this very self] did the ether come into being” (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.3.1) refers to the manifested ether [and not the unmanifested ether]. And the fact that there are two ethers has been discussed elsewhere.49

47 Vyāsatīrtha is here referring to the distinctive Mādhva doctrine that space (deśa) is actually a special type of ākāśa, a term which is usually translated as “ether”. The Mādhvas differentiate between two types of ākāśa. The one that is known as “space” (deśa) is the “unmanifested ether” (avyākr̥ta-ākāśa), which is eternal and non-produced. The second (“manifested-ether” [vyākr̥ta-/bhūta-ākāśa]) is an effect resulting from a transformation of matter that is created in every cosmic era. Siauve (1968: 142) describes the distinction between these two types of “space” in Mādhva Vedānta as follows: “Par le terme d’espace, ākāśa, sont désignées selon les mādhva deux réalités différentes. L’une est appelée avyākr̥ta-ākāśa, l’autre, qui est nommée, vyākr̥taākāśa, est identique à l’“espace-element”, un des cinq produits de la matière primordiale, la prakr̥ti. Les termes d’avyākr̥ta et de vyākr̥ta inclineraient à établir une continuité entre les deux “espaces”, dont le premier serait la former “non-manifestée” ou “non-développée” de l’autre. En réalité les mādhva déclarent nettement qui’il y a deux ākāśa, sur la foi des textes dont les uns parlent d’un ākāśa sans former ni couleur, éternel et infini, et les autres de l’élément ākāśa, coloré, et divisé, lequel à une origine. Le premier est l’espace en qui tout existe, et qui est lui-même ‘non-produit’, ‘non-effectué’, avyākr̥ta alors que le second est un effet résultant d’une transformation de la matière. L’opposition n’est donc pas du non-manifesté au manifeste mais du noneffectué à l’effectué: l’avyākr̥ta-ākāśa existe immuablement et éternellment; le bhūta-ākāśa est produit à chaque période cosmique”. 48 This quote is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1. The full passage reads: sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam | tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam; tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata | kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syād iti hovāca | katham asataḥ saj jāyeteti | sat tv eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam | (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1; Olivelle 1998: 246. Olivelle (1998: 247) translates: “In the beginning, son, this world was simply what is existent – one only, without a second. Now, on this point some do say: ‘In the beginning this world was simply what is nonexistent – one only, without a second. And from what is nonexistent was born what is existent. ‘But how can that possibly be?’ he continued. ‘How can what is existent be born from what is nonexistent? On the contrary, son, in the beginning this world was simply what is existent one only, without a second.” 49 See above, fn. 39, for a discussion of the Mādhva doctrine of the ether.

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Moreover [you cannot claim that the world is finite from the point of view of space and time] because (1) it is contradictory to say, “Here there is no space” or “Now there is no time”! Moreover [you cannot claim that the world is finite from the point of view of space and time] because (2) it is similarly contradictory to say that “Brahman exists at some place and at some point in time in the absence of space and time”. Moreover [you cannot claim that the world is finite from the point of view of space and time] because (3) given that the absence of time and space in their own locus is contradictory, there must inevitably be another time and space that serve as the locus for [that] absence. Moreover [you cannot claim that the world is finite from the point of view of space and time on the basis that space and time fail to occur in themselves]. For (4) it is possible that, on the basis of the uncontradicted experiences, “Space is everywhere”, “Time exists always” and “[There was] time previously”, both [space and time] are connected to themselves since they are self-effecting entities, just like the property of “knowability” and so on.50

This passage requires some explanation. Vyāsatīrtha asks: does the Advaitin claim that the world of our senses is finite from the point of view of space or from the point of view of time? Neither of these options are viable, he argues, because perception, reason and scripture all show us that space and time are themselves infinite. Vyāsatīrtha takes it for granted that the witness (sākṣin) perceives the infinitude of space and time. He anticipates, however, that this will not be enough to persuade his Advaitin opponent, so he goes on to adduce a number of passages from the Upaniṣads to show that the Veda itself teaches that space and time are infinite/unbounded. What is philosophically most interesting, however, are Vyāsatīrtha’s attempts to show that the very idea that space and time are finite, or that brahman can somehow exist beyond space and time, are both inherently contradictory. What does it mean to say that space and time are “finite”? Vyāsatīrtha argues that even in attempting to articulate the notion that space and time are somehow bounded/finite, one gets caught up in hopeless contradictions. What can “finitude in space and time” mean, except for something’s failure to exist in 50 paricchinnatvam api deśataḥ, kālato vā, vastuto vā? nādyadvitīyau | . . . avakāśarūpadeśasya kālasya cāparicchinnatvenaiva dharmigrāhiṇā sākṣiṇā; “ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityaḥ”, “sad eva somyedam agre”, “dr̥ṣṭvaiva taṃ mucyate”, “atha martyo ’mr̥to bhavati” “yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt” ity ādiśrutyā; sadā sarvatra kāryadarśanādiyuktyā ca siddheḥ | “ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ” ity ādiśruteś ca bhūtākāśaviṣayatvāt | uktaṃ cākāśadvaitam anyatra | atra deśo nāsti, idānīṃ kālo nāstīty asya vyāhatatvāc ca | brahma kutra cit kadā cid deśaṃ kālaṃ ca vināstīty asyāpi vyāhatatvāc ca | deśakālayoḥ svopādhau niṣedhe virodhenāvirodhāya niṣedhopādhitayā deśakālāntarayor āvaśyakatvāc ca | deśaḥ sarvatrāsti, kālaḥ sadāsti, pūrvaḥ kāla ity abādhitapratītyā tayoḥ svanirvāhakatayā prameyatvādivat svasambandhasambhavāc ca | (Nyāyāmr̥ta: 471.)

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another point in time, and at another location in space? Vyāsatīrtha seems to assume, in other words, that the Advaitin believes that to call time/space “finite” means to say that space fails to exist in another segment of space, and that time fails to exist in another frame of time. If so, Vyāsatīrtha points out that the Advaitin’s claim is simply contradictory. To say, “Now, there is no time” and likewise, “Here, there is no space”, is simply to state a contradiction. The particles “now” (idānīm) and “here” (atra) already bind the negation to an indeterminate spatial and temporal location. The statement subsequently negates this, and it is therefore self-contradictory. Vyāsatīrtha now seems to anticipate an objection to this. According to the objector, the statement, “Time and space are finite” does not mean, “Time and space fail to exist in another time and place”. It means, rather, that brahman exists outside of space and time; that is, that brahman‘s being exceeds space and time. But Vyāsatīrtha argues that this claim is ultimately contradictory. To say that “brahman exists” still requires that we index the existence of brahman spatially and temporally. To say that, “Brahman exists outside of time and space”, implies that brahman somehow exists at some time and somewhere without space and without time. The underlying assumption that Vyāsatīrtha seems to make in both of these arguments is that any statement that places a limit on space and time must itself be indexed spatially and temporally to some location in time and space. If we want to set a limit to the extensions of time and space, we inevitably need to specify that space and time do not exist beyond that limit. However, any statement of this sort must necessarily index the nonexistence of space and time itself spatially and temporally, and hence such a statement is doomed to be contradictory. Vyāsatīrtha here considers a final objection from the Advaitins. Space and time are finite, Vyāsatīrtha’s imagined Advaitin opponent argues, because they fail to occur in every possible locus: they must, after all, be absent from themselves. Under this view, space is “finite” because it fails to exist within itself; similarly, the “finitude” of time consists in its failure to exist within itself. If we were to accept that time somehow exists within itself, his Advaitin opponent objects, there would be the flaw of self-dependency (ātmāśraya), which was a universally accepted logical fallacy among Indian philosophers. In response to this objection, Vyāsatīrtha argues that space and time are “self-relating” (sva-sambandha) entities. Space and time, in other words, somehow exist within themselves. This might sound paradoxical, but Vyāsatīrtha believes there are solid metaphysical grounds for justifying this position. In the Nyāyāymr̥ta he invokes an old conundrum presented by “omnipresent (kevalānvayin) properties”. The Navya-Naiyāyikas held that properties like “knowability” are omnipresent because they are present in every location in reality. For,

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everything according to them can become an object of knowledge.51 This led the Navya-Naiyāyikas to the problem: is the property “knowability” itself knowable? That is, can the property of knowability instantiate itself? The Naiyāyikas generally answered that we have to accept that it can. We can clearly know that there is a property called “knowability”, and we know that it is present in all the individuals to which we ascribe it, so “knowability” must itself have the property of being knowable. Vyāsatīrtha argues that, by analogy to such universal-present properties, time and space can somehow be located within themselves. We seem to have the intuition (due to the sākṣin) that space and time are omnipresent. We must therefore conclude that, like “knowability”, time and space themselves are “self-grounding” or “self-effecting” (svanirvāhaka) entities.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have presented the views on time of three thinkers writing in Sanskrit during the sixteenth century. All three thinkers came from traditions that advocated some kind of pluralistic realism and theism. However, they reached very different conclusions about the nature of time. The first of these thinkers, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, defended the classical Vaiśeṣika view of time as an independent substance which serves as a kind of container for all effects. While his ideas about time might be ancient, Mahādeva’s analysis is expressed in the language of NavyaNyāya. This might make his works challenging to translate into other languages, but it allowed him to defend the ancient Vaiśeṣika concept of time as a substance/ universal cause elegantly and precisely. Raghunātha, on the other hand, presents a radical departure from classical Vaiśeṣika ideas about time. In the course of providing a searching critique of the ancient system of categories that Mahādeva defended, he rejected the view that time is a separate substance, and argued that the principles that guided the scientific analysis of reality in the Navya-Nyāya tradition should lead us to very different conclusions about the nature of time. It is simply more parsimonious

51 This is based on the recognition by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers that certain properties must occur in everything in reality. According to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda, every individual belonging to the different categories has “being, nameability and knowability”. See Perrett (1999) for a discussion of the concept of these “universal-positive” properties. The claim that “everything is knowable” is sometimes taken to be a consequence of God’s omniscience. However, Perrett argues that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers are actually committed to the claim that everything is (potentially) knowable by human beings.

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to argue that time and space are nothing but a single substance, God, conditioned by external adjuncts, than it is to postulate that they are two separate substances existing in their own right. Raghunātha’s views about time made his position look suspiciously close to the monism of the Advaita Vedāntins, and later thinkers like Veṇīdatta grappled with the question of whether Raghunātha’s ideas would lead the Navya-Naiyāyikas headlong into monism. Vyāsatīrtha also defends the idea that time is a substance. However, he has very different views about time’s relationship to God. Time is an eternal substance, but it is not an independent one; it is, like the rest of reality, entirely dependent on God for its continued existence and properties. Vyāsatīrtha’s critical encounter with the Advaitins led him to defend the conclusion that space and time are infinite and unbounded. Besides using scriptural evidence, Vyāsatīrtha used conceptual analysis to show that it is simply contradictory to place limits on space and time. What I hope is clear from this chapter is that Indian philosophers had sophisticated ideas about the nature of time, and that they defended these with philosophical analysis grounded in everyday experience. Moreover, some of the most interesting work on time in Indian philosophy was produced in the sixteenth century, a period which has too often been dismissed as one of intellectual stagnation and obscurantism. While thinkers like Mahādeva continued to defend ancient ideas about time, others, including Raghunātha and Vyāsatīrtha, were unafraid to revise traditional ideas and sometimes reject them completely. Contrary to scholars who have dismissed this period as one which witnessed the triumph of style over substance, the sixteenth century was an exciting one for metaphysical thought in India, and it surely deserves more than it has of yet been paid.

Bibliography Primary literature Anumānacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (Vol. 2), ed. by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa. New Delhi: Navrang, 1988. Anumānacintāmaṇi of Satyanāthatīrtha, ed. by the scholars of the Uttarādimaṭha. Bengaluru: Sudhāmudramaṇḍiram 1988. Nyāyāmr̥tam of Vyāsatīrtha, ed. with the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the Taraṅginī of Vyāsa Rāmācārya, the Kaṇṭakoddhāra of Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, the Prakāśa of Śrīnivāsatīrtha, the Saugandhya of Vanamālī Miśra, the Nyāyakalpalatā of Kūrma Narahari, and the Mādhurī of Mannāri Krishnāchārya, by K. T. Pandurangi. Bengaluru: Vidyādhīśa Snātakottara Saṃskr̥ta Śodhakendraḥ 2014.

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Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha Paṃcānana Bhaṭṭācārya,52 ed. with the Dinakarī of Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa & Dinakara Bhaṭṭa and the Rāmarudrī of Rāmarudra, by Harirama Śukla Sastri. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Prakashan 1989. Padārthamaṇḍana of Veṇīdatta, ed. by Gopala Sastri Nene. Benares: Vidya Vilas Press 1930. Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, ed. by V. P. Dvivedi. Varanasi: Maha Mandalayantralaya 1904. Tattvasaṅkhyānam and Tattvavivekaḥ of Ānandatīrtha [= Madhva], ed. with the Ṭīkā of Jayatīrtha, the Ṭippaṇī of Rāghavendratīrtha, the Ṭippaṇī of Śrīnivāsatīrtha, the Ṭippaṇī of Satyadharmatīrtha, the Ṭippaṇī of Pāṇḍurāṅgi Keśavācārya, and the Ṭippaṇī of Kāśī Ācārya, by L. S. Vadirajacharya. Bengaluru: Dvaita Vedānta Adhyayana Saṃśodhana Pratiṣṭhānam 2013.

Secondary Literature Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, Who Wrote the Bhāṣāpariccheda? [Indian Historical Quarterly 17]. 1945, 241–244. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, More Light on the Authorship of the Bhāṣāpariccheda. [Indian Historical Quarterly 22]. 1948, 144–147. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā. Darbhanga: Mithilā Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning 1958. Johannes Bronkhorst, Some Uses of Dharma in Classical Indian Philosophy. [Journal of Indian Philosophy 32 (5/6)]. 2004, 733–750. Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Universals. [Journal of Indian Philosophy 3/4]. 1975, 363–382. Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, Definition and Induction: A Historical and Comparative Study. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press 1995. Jonardon Ganeri, The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011. Jonardon Ganeri, The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press USA 2017. Cornelius Goekoop, The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi. Reidel: Dordrecht 1967. Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika in the History of Indian Ontology. New York: State University of New York Press 1992. Daniel Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1951. Richard King, “Śūnyatā and Ajāti”: Absolutism and the Philosophies of Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda. [Journal of Indian Philosophy 17(4)]. 1989, 385–405. Bimal K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyāya Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1968.

52 Modern scholars now frequently attribute this work to Kr̥ṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma, not Viśvanātha. See above, fn. 9.

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Bimal K. Matilal, Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. [Philosophy East and West 25(1)]. 1975, 41–48. Christopher Minkowski, Vedānta in early modern history. [South Asian History and Culture 2(2)]. 2011, 205–231. Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upanisads: Annotated Text and Translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998. Parimal G. Patil, Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India. New York: Columbia University Press 2009. R. W. Perrett, Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable? [Philosophy East and West 49(4)]. 1999, 401–414. Sheldon Pollock, New intellectuals in seventeenth-century India. [The Indian Economic & Social History Review 38]. 2001, 3–31. Karl H. Potter, The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (A Demonstration of the Things to Which Words Refer). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1957. Karl H. Potter, (ed.), “Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology”. In: Volume 1 of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977. Karl H. Potter and Bhattacharyya Sibajiban (eds.), Indian Philosophical Analysis: NyāyaVaiśeṣika from Gaṅgeśa to Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Volume 6 of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1993. Hari Shankar Prasad, Time as a Substantive Reality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. [East and West 34 (1/3)]. 1984, 233–266. Deepak Sarma, An Introduction to Mādhva Vedanta. New York: Ashgate 2003. Palamadai Pichumani Subrahmanya Sastri, Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji’s Sarasvatī Mahāl Library Tanjore. Volume XI: Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya & Yoga. Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press 1931. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic. Madras: The Kuppuswami Research Institute 1951. B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma, History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature. From the earliest beginnings to our own times. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1961. B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma, Advaitasiddhi vs. Nyāyāmṛta: An up to date Critical Re-Appraisal. Bangalore: Ānandatīrtha Pratiṣṭhāna 1994. Suzanne Siauve, La Doctrine de Madhva. [Publications de l’Institut francais d’Indologie 38]. Pondichéry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram 1968. Valerie Stoker, Polemics and Patronage in the City of Victory: Vyasatirtha, Hindu Sectarian, and the Sixteenth-Century Vijayanagara Court. California: University of California Press 2016. Wendy Doniger, Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions. California: University of California Press 1980. Toshihiro Wada, The Analytic Method of Navya-Nyāya. London: Brill 2007. Frank Whaling, Śaṅkara and Buddhism. [Journal of Indian Philosophy 7(1)]. 1979, 1–42. Michael Williams, Mādhva Vedānta at the Turn of the Early Modern Period: Vyāsatīrtha and the Navya-Naiyāyikas. [International Journal of Hindu Studies 18/2]. 2014, 119–152. Michael Williams, “Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and the Examination of the Truth about the Categories”. In: Jonardon Ganeri (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press 2017, 623–643.

Masamichi Sakai

Non-persistence in time: A Buddhist account of intrinsic nature Introduction The task assigned to me in this volume is to characterize the influential IndianBuddhist theory of time propounded by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 CE/ mid. 6th cent. CE),1 whose work came to dominate early medieval Buddhist philosophy, an idea also propounded by his successors. This is namely the theory known as momentariness (kṣaṇikatvavāda). The gist of this theory is that everything which exists is exclusively momentary, and thus nothing exists in such a way as to persist in time. In this present article, I approach this concept through questions about the change and identity of things, specifically those questions provided by the argumentative framework of contemporary metaphysics.2 My intention is to thereby help free this intriguing idea of momentariness from the relatively narrow context of Indian philosophy.3 For example, some contemporary metaphysicians concur

1 Because of Dharmakīrti’s decisive impact not only upon Indian Buddhist thought, but also upon Indian philosophy in general, there have been more than a few introductory articles on his work. Among them, Tillemans 2017 and Eltschinger 2010 are most comprehensive. They are recommendable also for readers not specializing in Indian philosophy. 2 Such an approach is already seen in Mortensen 2016. It is, however, incomplete, at least in my view. The present article, written by a historian of Indian Buddhist philosophy and intellectual culture, aims at a more comprehensive and detailed analysis. 3 This approach of mine has been strongly motivated by the following statement of Georges B. J. Dreyfus in his book Recognizing Reality. Dreyfus 1997: 11–12: It seems to me that one of our tasks as students of Asian thought is to present the material we examine so that it gradually becomes integrated into the larger history of ideas. There is a need for presenting non-Western ideas in terms that can be related to the concepts of other cultures. This task is not, however, without problems, for the ‘larger’ scheme through which ‘the history of humankind’ is written is hardly neutral. The ‘history of philosophy’ is

Note: I owe deep gratitude to R.T. Mullins for having given me his reflections on the first version of the present article. His insightful remarks and suggestions enabled me to give it a final polish. Masamichi Sakai, Department of Religious Studies, Kansai University, 3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka 565-8680, Japan https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-010

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with the Buddhist philosophers in saying that ordinary objects – such as bananas, tennis balls, and people – exist only for an instant, and so the special task in the final part of this article (in the section “Stage Theory and Buddhist Momentariness on Extension”) is to discern just how similar these two positions actually are. At the same time, however, I must admit that my approach is risky to the extent that it fails to fully grasp the contextual particularities in which the essential feature of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, for one, might well consist. In the following, as a preliminary (in the section “The Problem of Change and Identity”), I first introduce the various ways in which contemporary metaphysicians deal with the problem of a thing’s change and identity. Then (in the section “Dharmakīrti and His Successors”), I will delineate the Buddhist theory of momentariness and do my best to situate it within the contemporary framework. Finally (the section “Stage Theory and Buddhist Momentariness on Extension”), I will evaluate the Buddhist theory in light of these contemporary competitors.

The problem of change and identity A major challenge confronting contemporary metaphysics is to give a plausible account of a thing’s change without violating “Leibniz’s Law,” which stipulates the indiscernibility of identical things. This can be formulated as follows: “For any two things x and y, if x = y (i.e., if x and y are identical), then x and y have

written from a perspective formed in ancient Greece and developed in Europe and, therefore, is heavily connected with a cultural context from which Asia (not to mention other non-Western cultures) has been largely excluded. Integrating Indian or other cultures to a history written from this perspective is not without danger. For in introducing etic concepts we incur the risk of damaging beyond repair the material we intend to retrieve. [. . .]. Still, it seems to me that the risk has be taken, for the alternative, irrelevance, is hardly desirable. As a Western scholarly community, we cannot avoid using etic concepts in examining the ideas of other cultures. We have to use our own words, with all their history and associations, and face the prospect of transforming the traditions we examine. This risk cannot be escaped and is implied by the increasing cross-cultural dialogue characteristic of the contemporary situation. My deep thanks to Shinya Moriyama for drawing my attention to this statement by Dreyfus.

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all the same properties.”4 For example, suppose that a certain banana is green at time point t(x) and then that it becomes yellow at time point t(y). If one wishes to understand this situation as one in which one and the same banana has changed over time, then this seems to entail accepting two things: On the one hand, one accepts the qualitative difference, namely in color, between the banana at time point t(x) and the banana at time point t(y); and yet on the other hand, one also admits that the green banana and the yellow banana are numerically identical. But in order for those two bananas to be identical, i.e., in order for them to adhere to “Leibniz’s Law,” they must have all the same properties. That is to say, the green banana must somehow have the property of being yellow, and the yellow banana must have the property of being green; and since these two are one and the same item, the single given banana must have both of these properties. But how is it possible for one and the same banana to have these two seemingly contradictory properties? Hence the problem of change and identity. At the risk of overgeneralizing, we can say that contemporary metaphysicians offer three main kinds of explanation.5

Option 1: Time-indexed properties Some thinkers see a solution in attributing the time element to the level of the property. According to this, one and the same banana has two different properties, one of which is the property of being green at time point t(x), the other being the property of being yellow at time point t(y). That is, the two properties of being green and of being yellow are both time-indexed. In this way, one can plausibly claim that one and the same banana has at the same time two opposing properties, since what is qualified by time is not the banana itself, but rather its properties. Thanks to these time-indexed properties, the contradiction can be avoided of the banana being one yet having two colors. In a way, it possesses both colors, this being nothing but a time-indexed property, at any given time.

4 Cf. Wasserman 2006: 49. 5 The sections “Option 1: Time-indexed Properties” to “Options 3a and 3b: Perdurantism and Stage Theory” are based on Hawley 2001, Haslanger 2005, Wasserman 2006, Goswick 2013, and Fischer 2017. As a scholar of intellectual history and of Indian Buddhist philosophy, I find these resources especially helpful for understanding such modern academic philosophies of time.

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Option 2: Adverbialism In a different take, others ascribe the time element to the way one and the same banana instantiates the property of being green or yellow. That is, they interpret the situation in the following way: One and the same banana “t(x)-ly” has the property of being green and “t(y)-ly” has the property of being yellow. In this interpretation, it can be the case that the banana is actually green and not actually (i.e., only potentially) yellow, or vice versa. Namely, the way this banana instantiates the green color and the way it instantiates the yellow color are different. So, in this case, too, there occurs no problem of two actually incompatible properties in one and the same property-bearer at the same time and in the same way, since the respective ways the two properties are actually realized in the banana are different. This theory is appropriately known as adverbialism.

Endurantism The two above-mentioned positions share the assumption that the relevant banana persists by being wholly present at every moment, for example, at both time points t(x) and t(y). That is to say, one and the same banana endures through time, always having, from its beginning, two different properties, the property of being green at time point t(x), and the property of being yellow at time point t(y). Or alternatively, the two different ways in which the banana’s green color and its yellow color are instantiated in it are imprinted in the banana not only at t(x), but also at t(y). Thus, one might even say that on these two positions, the banana as property-bearer is an enduring bare particular that contains all the properties as well as all the information concerning how these properties potentially and actually occur in that property-bearer. We call this view endurantism.6

6 In Sections: Option 1: Time-indexed Properties and Option 2: Adverbialism, I introduce two approaches toward solving the problem of change and identity, both credited to those contemporary metaphysicians who follow endurantism. However, there are also endurantists who, from the beginning, do not see the problem of change and identity as being serious. They are called presentist endurantists. For the theories of presentist endurantism, cf. Benovsky 2009: 302–304. Presentist endurantists base themselves on the ontology of time called presentism, according to which the only time that exists is the present. Stated differently, they see only the present as existing, i.e., as being real. Thus, the past and the future are merely fictitious. A consequence of presentism is that “the only objects that exist are the objects that presently exist and the only properties an object has are the properties it presently has.” Cf. Goswick 2013: 368. In the case of

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Against endurantism, option 3: Temporal parts But there is an altogether different way out. The following is partly motivated by criticism against the above-introduced endurantism that has been posed by David Lewis,7 who himself sides with “perdurantism,” which I will refer to below. The central issue facing the position of endurantism is whether those properties which are related to certain times can be said to be intrinsic properties, properties that, in turn and by definition, objects should have in and of themselves, i.e., independently of anything else.8 As it turns out, this question will be of great importance when we consider the Buddhist theory of momentariness. The notion of an intrinsic property in contemporary metaphysics is often glossed as follows: “F is intrinsic if and only if an object’s being F depends solely on how that object is in and of itself, independently of anything else.”9 For example, when a banana is curved, its property of being curved is not dependent upon anything other than the relevant banana itself. That is to say, the banana is curved in and of itself, or curved simpliciter. The critique of endurantism therefore runs as follows: If the banana’s property of being yellow is indexed in some way to a certain time, namely, the time point t(y), then one cannot say that this property is an intrinsic property that the banana has in and of itself, since the banana is dependent upon the existence of this certain time t(y) in order to have this color. Thus, insofar as one assumes that the yellow color property is

the banana, according to their view, once the banana turns yellow, it no longer has the property of being green. The banana was once green, but it is no more, i.e., is now yellow. Thus there is no problem, that is to say, they take the verb tense seriously. It is not controversial to say that, in a sense, Dharmakīrtian philosophers can be seen as presentist, in contrast to Abhidharma philosophers, who can be said to follow, in a certain sense, eternalism. This is because for Dharmakīrtian philosophers, too, only the present is real. They define something as a real thing when it presently performs its causal roles. (When something is not performing its causal roles yet, it is said to be future; when it finishes performing its causal roles, it is defined as past.) However, they are not endurantist, if I understand correctly, since for them it is the case that what really exist are only momentary present objects. As far as I see, the Buddhist theory of momentariness has no direct relevance to the tense as expressed in sentences. 7 For David Lewis’s arguments against endurantism, see Wasserman 2003. 8 Cf. Wasserman 2003, 414–415. 9 Cf. Wasserman 2003, 414, 423–24. In contemporary metaphysics, “being bent,” which is a shape of something, is often used as a paradigmatic intrinsic property. Being bent is taken to be intrinsic, since the shape of something is independent of what else exists. As for a nonintrinsic or extrinsic property, “being an uncle” is the standard example. Being an uncle is extrinsic, since to be one requires having a niece or nephew, which are in turn different things than the relevant person. Cf. Wasserman 2006: 53.

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an intrinsic one to the banana, which means that the banana is yellow simpliciter, like its curved shape property, the banana’s yellow color property should not be indexed by any time points, including the time point t(y).10 The third option seeks to avoid this kind of objection. Its protagonists think as follows: One and the same banana consists of many different temporal parts, one of which has the property of being green, and another of which has the property of being yellow. In this interpretation, the banana is taken to be a four-dimensional object spread out not only in space, but also in time; these temporal parts are often compared to segments of space-time “worms.” Space-time worms in this theory are divisible along the temporal dimension into shorter and shorter segments, being ultimately composed of instantaneous three-dimensional slices.11 That is, the banana has spatial as well as temporal extension, and it is at one of the banana’s temporal parts, namely that part located at time point t(x), that the property of being green exists, and it is at another temporal part, namely that one located at time point t(y), that the property of being yellow exists. This being the case, there is again no problem of incompatible properties, since the two opposing properties are located in two different temporal parts of one and the same banana. And, importantly, the part of the banana located at time point t(y) can be said to be yellow simpliciter.

Options 3a and 3b: Perdurantism and stage theory Contemporary metaphysicians who support the above-mentioned anti-endurantist critique can be divided into two distinct sub-groups. 1) The first are of the view that the banana “perdures” at each and every instant, i.e., that it exists across different 10 This view of David Lewis’s, that time-indexed properties are extrinsic, has been rejected by some contemporary metaphysicians, including Parsons 2000, MacBride 2001, Hawley 2001, and Wasserman 2003. Wasserman 2003: 414–415 supports Haslanger’s claim that a relational property like being F at t is intrinsic if and only if whether an object is F at t depends solely on how that object is in and of itself at t, independently of anything else. As for MacBride’s criticism against Lewis, cf. Goswick 2013: 370. To me, the problem of time-indexed properties seems to consist in the question of what the relevant property is related to. If a certain property is related only to the property-bearer itself, independently of anything else, then it can be said to be intrinsic; if it is related to anything other than its bearer, then it is judged to be extrinsic. If so, then as long as one thinks of time as being involved in its bearer – it seems impossible to separate ordinary objects from time, because ordinary objects are always located at some point in time – then all time-indexed properties can have the status of an intrinsic property. However, the Buddhists whom we shall discuss below do not support this move. 11 Cf. Wasserman 2006: 52.

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moments by being the sum of its instantaneous temporal parts. This theory is called “perdurantism.” 2) Others are of the view that a given banana exists only for a moment; it does not exist at different times. According to this view, every object exists only for an instant, at which time it has only and exactly those properties relevant to that instant. Therefore, what truly exists of an object is only its current, present, instantaneous part. Such individual parts are called stages, and so, this view is called “stage theory.” Since advocates of stage theory do not identify entities with sums or wholes of temporary parts, they use the very term “stage”, not “part.”12 I will come back to this latter position further below, after examining the Buddhist view. To sum up, all three of the main theories offered by contemporary metaphysics adhere to “Leibniz’s Law.” To do so while giving a plausible account of change means nothing but explaining how it is possible for one and the same thing to have opposing properties over time. With these approaches, and specifically with stage theory in mind, let us now turn to the Buddhist theory of momentariness.

Dharmakīrti and his successors Dharmakīrti and his fellow Buddhist philosophers agree about the basic problem, but they arrive more directly at the different-things solution. That is, according to Dharmakīrti, real contradiction in a single thing is impossible; in particular, if one and the same thing has two contradictory properties, p and q, then we should understand that there exist two different things, x and y, with those respective properties.13 Similarly, Dharmakīrti defines “difference between things” (in Skt.: bhāvānāṃ bhedaḥ) as “the situating of contradictory properties in [them]”/“the connection of contradictory properties to [them]” (in Skt.: viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ14 / viruddhadharmasaṅgaḥ).15

12 Cf. Fischer 2016: 10. 13 Cf. Pramāṇavārttikasvavr̥tti 152, 17–18: na ca viruddhayor ekatra saṃbhavo ’sti; Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 130, 11: virodhinor ekatrāsambhavaḥ; Vādanyāya 34, 1–2: viruddhayoḥ svabhāvayor ekatrāsambhavāt. 14 Ezaki 2004 argues that the Sanskrit word adhyāsa in this context must be derived from the verb adhy-√ās, which means “to sit down,” “to settle upon,” “dwell in,” not from the verb adhy-√as, which means “to attribute or ascribe falsely,” “to superimpose.” Here, I follow Ezaki’s contention. 15 Cf. Pramāṇavārttikasvavr̥tti 20, 21–23: ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca. tau cen na bhedakau, tadā na kasyacit kutaścid bheda ity ekaṃ dravyaṃ viśvaṃ syāt. Tattvasaṃgraha k.1742: viruddhadharmasaṅgaś ca vastūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam | kathañcid anyatheṣṭo ’pi na bhedo nīlapītayoḥ ||. Cf. Ezaki 2004, Steinkellner 2013: 176–177 (n. 338).

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To explain this definition Dharmakīrti’s successors often use the following example: Suppose there is a wheat seed. So long as it sits in a granary, it does not produce a sprout, which means that it has “the property of being incapable” (in Skt.: aśaktatva) of producing a sprout. When, however, it is in a field, then it does produce a sprout, which means that it has “the property of being capable” (in Skt.: śaktatva) of producing a sprout.16 It is not plausible, say the Buddhists, to claim that one and the same wheat seed has both properties of being incapable and capable of producing a sprout. Thus, the seed having the first property and the seed having the second property are two different things.17

Theory of intrinsic properties and/or nature In light of the intercultural character of this paper, I should here mention the fact that, just as some modern metaphysicians like David Lewis do not take a property indexed to a certain time to be an intrinsic property, neither do Dharmakīrtian philosophers. For these Buddhist philosophers, an intrinsic property is that which an entity has independently (in Skt.: nirapekṣayā) of anything other (in Skt.: param) than itself. Moreover, they define those properties that an entity has in this way to be part of its intrinsic nature (in Skt.: svabhāvaḥ).18 According to Dharmakīrti, property F is defined as being an intrinsic nature if and only if it is connected with the mere existence (in Skt.: bhāvamātra-/sattāmātra-anubandhin) of the property-bearer. Stated differently, intrinsic nature is that property which exists as soon as its property-bearer exists, without requiring anything else. In terms

16 “Capable” in English obviously also includes the notion of potential capability. However, for Dharmakīrtian philosophers, to say that x is capable of y only means that x is actually capable of y. On the other hand, if x is incapable of y, then x, as a momentary entity, is never so capable, insofar as this capability or incapability is considered intrinsic to x. For this theory of intrinsicness, cf. Section: Theory of intrinsic properties and/or nature below. 17 Cf. Woo 1999: 215–228. For Dharmakīrtian philosophers, it is of course no problem for one and the same thing to have two merely different properties at the same time, so long as these two are not contradictory. For example, one and the same banana can at the same time have the property of being sweet and the property of being yellow. Taste and color are merely different, not contradictory. For this point, cf. Ezaki 2004: 41–42. 18 In Western philosophy, something’s “(intrinsic) nature” is often conceived of as a kind of collection or bundle of properties. It might therefore seem a bit odd here to describe a single property as “(intrinsic) nature.” Buddhist philosophers use this phrasing to describe a particular way in which an entity comes to have individual properties, namely, when they come to have a property without “depending” on any other entity. For a further explanation of this, see below.

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of causation, property F is an intrinsic nature if and only if the same cause for the property-bearer’s coming into existence is also responsible for F’s existence; no other cause can have this responsibility.19 Thus, in this context, for a thing to have a property independently of anything other than itself means that that thing has that property always (in Skt: sarvakālam), everywhere (in Skt: sarvatra) and inevitably (in Skt: avaśyam), i.e., neither at a specific point in time (in Skt: kadācit), nor in a specific point in space (in Skt: kvacit), nor with any variance. The “anything other than itself” here means auxiliary causes. Without getting into what such auxiliary causes would be, from the temporal point of view, for example, a property’s dependence upon such auxiliaries would imply that that property exists at a specific point in time when those auxiliaries exist; from the spatial point of view, it would imply that the property exists in a specific point in space where those auxiliaries exist; and so on. Moreover, such dependence on auxiliaries rules out the possibility of the property’s existing in a property-bearer necessarily, since whether the property-bearer possesses it or not is exclusively up to those auxiliaries, not up to the property-bearer itself; when those auxiliaries fail to exist, then the property-bearer fails to have the property. Conveniently, then, Dharmakīrtian philosophers provide a neatly complementary definition: An extrinsic property is one that has precisely those three features, i.e., occurring only at a specific point in time, in a specific point in space, and not necessarily.20

What happens to time-indexed properties? It should then be the case for Dharmakīrtian philosophers that any properties which are indexed to a certain point in time do not have the status of an intrinsic property or nature; they are in fact extrinsic. Suppose the banana has the property of being yellow at time point t(y). This means that the banana instantiates the 19 Cf. Pramāṇavārttikasvavr̥tti 4, 1–4: svabhāve bhāvo ’pi bhāvamātrānurodhini || (Pramāṇavārttika 1.2ʹc–d) hetur iti vartate. tādātmyaṃ hy arthasya tanmātrānurodhiny eva nānyātatte. tadbhāve ’bhūtasya paścād bhāvaniyamābhāvāt. kāraṇaṃ kāryavyabhicārāt. 20 For Dharmakīrti’s concept of dependence, cf. Sakai 2018. The Buddhist philosophers’ paradigmatic example of intrinsic nature is the “being bright” (in Skt: prakāśa) of a lamp (in Skt: pradīpa). Another example is a sword’s being made of iron. As for a non-intrinsic property, Dharmakīrti’s favorite example is “being red” (in Skt: rāga) for a white cloth (in Skt: vāsas). Namely, a white cloth is dependent upon a red dye in order to be red. The property of being red exists in a white cloth when and where a red dye exists. Moreover, if a red dye fails to exist, then the cloth’s “being red” also fails to exist. So, the property of being red does not obtain necessarily for a cloth. Of course, the property of being white is intrinsic to a white cloth.

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color yellow at that time. The Buddhist philosophers interpret this as follows: The banana depends on the existence of that point in time in order to be so colored. Moreover, they count the time point t(y) as an auxiliary for the banana’s being so colored, since it is not until this special time point that the banana becomes yellow. For us, thinking of time as an auxiliary is indeed a bit odd, but for these Buddhists, the idea of dependence is more immediately consequential. That is, their notion of dependence is always dependence on an auxiliary. With this theory of dependence in mind, in what follows, I delineate the Buddhist argument against the theory of endurance as implied by time-indexed properties. The textual evidence for the following is an excerpt from a monograph titled Proof of Momentary Perishing (Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi), which is currently available only in its Tibetan translation. This work is by Dharmottara (ca. A.D. 740–800), one of Dharmakīrti‘s most outstanding successors.21 Before I present my English translation of the relevant text excerpt, I will briefly introduce its context. Dharmottara and his opponent are debating about how things perish. The opponent maintains that things perish in dependence on certain causes of perishing, which means that things endure unless and until they encounter such causes. This contradicts the Buddhist theory of momentariness, according to which things perish immediately after their origination, rather than after any amount of time. What follows are the initial assertion by the opponent and Dharmottara’s refutation thereof. Opponent: Things are originated from their own causes in such a way that they depend upon causes for perishing. Therefore, they endure unless they run into these causes for perishing. Dharmottara: This, too, is illogical. This is because, if you take this position, it turns out that things are originated from their causes in such a way that they endure up to the time point when causes for perishing come into contact with them. And, this being the case, it turns out that things are originated in such a way that they require some brief time in order to perish. We should then investigate whether or not, also at that time point when causes for perishing come into contact with them, there still exists in these property-bearers, which had once endured for this brief time, this previous enduring nature of theirs. If yes, then they will have to again endure for some time. This is because even when the brief time terminates, this same nature of enduring for a brief time still exists in them. In this manner, they will have to further endure for a brief time. Therefore, they would just

21 The entry “Dharmottara” by the same author in Brill’s Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Volume Two: Lives. Leiden: Brill, 2019: 173–178 might be helpful for readers; Dharmottara was a disciple of Dharmakīrti as well as an independent thinker.

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never perish. For this very reason, the position you suppose – namely, that things are originated from their causes in such a way that they perish after having endured for a brief time, rather than doing so immediately after their origination – is not logical. That is to say, when the supposed intermediate time, i.e., the supposed time period between a thing’s origination and its perishing, terminates, then there arises again and again the controversy about the nature of enduring for a brief time, and there arises the very same investigation mentioned above. As the result of this same investigation, it turns out that things would just never perish. In this way, you must admit that things would be eternal. Or rather, if you suppose that, at the end of the intermediate time, another nature newly originates, then there arises a controversy about the previous thing, namely: “Is this previous thing eternal, or not eternal?” and this should be investigated. And if the posterior, i.e., the later, newly originating nature has the characteristic of perishing in and of itself, then what is the point of your maintaining a cause or a time for perishing?22

The Dharmakīrtian philosopher thus rebuts the opponent’s view that enduring (in Skt: sthira) objects have time-indexed properties by arguing against the possibility of such properties being in fact instantiated in enduring things. This reductio argument thus seeks to prove the Buddhist theory of momentariness. In what follows, I will try to paraphrase Dharmottara‘s argument above, replacing “the property of perishing” with “the property of being yellow,” so that we can make use of our preferred banana example. Supposing an enduring banana, i.e., one and the same banana that is green at time point t(x) and then yellow at time point t(y), the Buddhists interpret this as meaning that the green banana at time point t(x) has the property of not being yellow until time point t(y) arrives, or in other words, that the green banana at

22 Kṣaṇabhaṇgasiddhi 227,14–228,3: ’di sñam du raṅ gi rgyu dag las ’jig pa’i rgyu la ltos par skye bas na ji srid ’jig pa’i rgyu daṅ ma phrad par de srid du gnas so źe na | de yaṅ mi ’thad de | ’di ltar phyogs ’di la ni dṅos po rnams ’jig pa’i rgyu ñe ba’i dus tshun chad du gnas par rgyus bskyed pa yin no || de lta yin daṅ ’jig pa la dus cuṅ zad ltos par skyes pa yin no || ’jig pa’i rgyu ñe ba na yaṅ dus cuṅ zad gnas pa’i chos can rnams la dus cuṅ zad gnas pa’i sṅar gyi raṅ bźin yod dam ’on te med | gal te yod do źe na ni yaṅ dus cuṅ zad gnas par ’gyur te | dus de rdzogs kyaṅ raṅ bźin de ñid yod pa’i phyir ro || rnam grangs ’dis kyaṅ dus cuṅ zad gnas par ’gyur bas nam yaṅ ’jig par mi ’gyur ro || de ñid kyi phyir dṅos po raṅ gi rgyu las dus cuṅ zad gnas nas ’jig par ’gyur gyi skyes ma thag tu ni ma yin no zhes kun brtags pa gaṅ yin pa de’i phyogs ’di yaṅ mi rigs so || ’di ltar mtshams su gyur pa’i dus rdzogs pa na slar yaṅ dus cuṅ zad gnas pa’i raṅ bzhin la brgal źiṅ brtag pa de ñid gnas pa’i phyir dṅos po nam yaṅ mi ’jig par ’gyur bas tshul ’dis dṅos po rtag par khas blaṅ bar ’gyur ro || ’on te yaṅ dus kyi mtshams kyi mthar thug par raṅ bźin gźan skyes nas de lta na ni sṅar gyi dngos po la ci ’di rtag pa yin nam ’on te mi rtag pa yin źes brgal źiṅ brtag par bya ba yin no || gal te phyis raṅ bźin raṅ ñid ldog pa’i mtshan ñid yin na de la ’jig pa’i rgyu ’am ’jig pa’i dus la bsdad pas ci bya | ’on te mi ’jig pa’i chos ñid yin na de lta na yaṅ de la ’jig pa’i rgyu dag gam ’jig pa’i dus la ltos pas ci yaṅ byar med do ||. For this excerpt, we have Frauwallner’s German translation in Frauwallner 1935: 246–247.

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time point t(x) depends upon a special point in time, t(y), in order to have the color yellow. They argue that this very property of not being yellow until time point t(y) does exist in one and the same banana at time point t(x+1), since time point t(x+1) is certainly included in the period of time up to time point t(y). This being case, then the banana at time point t(x+1) has the property of not being yellow up to time point t(y). And, exactly this must also be the case for the banana at the time points t(x+2), t(x+3), t(x+4) etc. If this is correct, then, even when the time point t(y) has arrived, the banana would still have to have the very same property of not being yellow for the period up to the time point t(y). What is to be concluded as the result of this is that the relevant banana never becomes yellow, instead remaining green forever. After all, what they want to prove is that insofar as one admits that there is a time-quantity between time points t(x) and t(y), then the banana will never become yellow, even at time point t(y). More abstractly speaking, insofar as any properties whatsoever endure – where “endure” means remaining the same for a brief period of time, and importantly, a “period” here has quantity or extension – then its property-bearer would have to remain in these conditions forever.

Proving momentariness However, it is obviously true that we experience the yellow banana at time point t(y). How do the Buddhist philosophers account for this? Although the following description of mine is not directly based on a Dharmakīrtian text, whether Sanskrit original or Tibetan translation, I think it captures the point. Suppose the period of time from time point t(x) to time point t(y) is ten moments. According to the Dharmakīrtian view, at time point t(x+1), the banana will have the property of not being yellow until time point t(y), namely the property of not being yellow for nine moments, and at time point t(x+2), the banana will have the property of not being yellow until time point t(y), namely that of not being yellow for eights moments, and so on, until the time point t(x+9), when the banana has the property of not being yellow for one moment – and then, finally, at time point t(y), the yellow banana occurs. Of course, as seen above, the Buddhist logicians do not find it convincing that one and the same banana has the property of not being yellow for nine moments, that of not being yellow for eight moments, and that of not being yellow for one moment. This is because there is contradiction between these three properties. Thus, it can be concluded that the banana at the time point t(x+1), the banana at the time

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point t(x+2), and the banana at the time point t(x+9) are all different things. That is to say, in each and every moment there exists a different banana with a different property. In this way, the banana’s momentariness is taken to be proved.

Stage theory and buddhist momentariness on extension It is not too controversial to say that stage theory and the Buddhist theory of momentariness basically use the same strategy to solve the problem of contradictory properties.23 To me, the decisive difference between the two positions appears to be whether one agrees that the moments or stages have quantity, or more specifically, extension. Since stage theory is based on the idea of four dimensions, which in turn is based on the analogy of time with space, it seems natural to think that stages have extension. For the perdurantist, this is obvious from the fact that entities are identified as sums of temporary parts. For the stage theorist, however, things are not that simple. Discussing what stages are, Katherine Hawley, one advocate of stage theory, says: “So what are stages like? They are like instants. Stages need to be as fine-grained as possible change, and thus they must be as fine-grained as instants, in order to account for possible change in position.”24 Importantly, for

23 Here, a special emphasis should be put on the fact that stage theory is a theory which is built up in order to give a more plausible, better account of how things persist with contradictory properties. This is in sharp contrast to the Buddhist theory of momentariness, which has no such motivation from the beginning. However, it seems natural for one to think that what stage theory explains is rather incompatible with persistence, since it explains that every object exists directly for only an instant. This kind of objection to stage theory is discussed in Goswick 2013: 379. As far as I understand, a stage theorist dismisses this kind of accusation by relying on temporal counterparts. Cf. Sider 2000: 86, Haslanger 2005: 318–319, Fischer 2016: 10–11, 2017: 158, and Hawley 2018 (section 2). It seems that if the temporal counterpart theory did not work and thus that the stage theorist could not rely on it, there would be no substantial difference between the former and the Buddhist theory of momentariness except the very point of whether one accepts that the moments or stages have extension. This is what I discuss from now on. 24 Hawley 2001: 52, 6–8. See also Hawley 2001: 48, 26–35, which says: “The banana ripens from green to yellow, because earlier things are green and later things are yellow. To account for change, stages and temporal parts must be as fine-grained as change: a material thing must have as many stages or parts as it is in incompatible states during its lifetime. If it were in more incompatible states than it had stages or parts, then at least one of its stages or parts would be in incompatible states without itself having parts or stages, and the problem of

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Hawley, “as fine-grained as possible change” does not necessarily mean that stages have extension. She argues: . . . perdurance theory takes on extra commitments that stage theory need not. Perdurance theory is committed to the existence of sums of temporal parts, for it is these very sums which are supposed to be the ordinary objects of everyday life. But, given that perdurance theorists are also committed to the existence of instantaneous temporal parts, they must therefore explain how instantaneous things can have a sum of finite but extended size, as extensionless instants can make up finite but extended intervals of time. Stage theory can remain neutral here. If it makes sense to think of instantaneous stages as having extended fusions, or sums, then stage theorists can recognize those sums. But, if not, then no problems arise, since, according to stage theory, sums of stages play no significant role in our everyday ontology. Perdurance theorists, on the other hand, must establish the existence of such fusions, for those very fusions are supposed to be familiar objects.25 For perdurance theorists, sums of stages are of primary importance. But for stage theorists, sums of stages are not very interesting objects, for they do not feature in our everyday ontology – it is stages themselves which are bananas, tennis balls, or Goliath. It is, however, open to stage theorists to believe in sums of stages, even though they play no important role in everyday ontology.26

While recognizing the difficulty for instantaneous parts to have a sum of finite but extended size, Hawley insists that stage theory can remain neutral on the question as to whether stages can form a sum or a fusion.27 This gives the impression that stage theory is ambiguous about whether moments or stages have extension.

change would re-emerge. Stages must be as fine-grained as change, which is to say that stages must themselves be unchanging.” 25 Hawley 2001: 52, 20–34. 26 Hawley 2001: 190, 1–7. 27 Loux and Crisp 2017: 226 (with n. 4 on page 248) discuss this problem of temporal extension, arguing that “(a)n intriguing question is whether we can suppose that a temporally extended object like me is an aggregate made up exclusively of instantaneous slices. One might think not. Here, it is tempting to argue that just as we cannot construe three-dimensional solids as made up exclusively of their two dimensional slices (on the grounds that no matter how many two-dimensional slices one ‘stacks up,’ one will never produce a three-dimensional object), so one cannot get a four-dimensional object out of merely three-dimensional parts.” According to Haslanger 2005: 334, one of the many advantages stage theory enjoys over perdurantism is that it does not need to postulate sums of stages over and above the stages themselves. As I will discuss below, however, I think it is unavoidable even for stage theory to engage in this problem of temporal extension, when we think of the ontological aspect of transition between temporal/instantaneous parts or stages.

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On the contrary, the Buddhist proof of momentariness introduced above demonstrates one way in which the Buddhists believe that allowing moments to have extension leads to absurd consequences, and how they therefore believe that moments must be extensionless, i.e., undividable. In fact, Dharmottara defines a moment as follows: “A moment is said to be time devoid of prior and posterior [parts]” (in Skt.: paurvāparyarahitaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇa ucyate),28 or “that time for which it is impossible to establish the previous and later parts is called a moment, time devoid of previous and later parts.”29 This explicitly expresses the view that a moment has no extension. Suppose now again that a banana has the property of being green. Even if this property is momentary, i.e., even if this property exists only for a moment, then the banana must remain green forever, insofar as every moment has extension. This, as we have seen above, is the core Buddhist assertion. As with many arguments based on paradoxes, there obviously may remain some problems to be worked out. What is also obvious, however, is how thoroughly the Buddhists exert themselves in rejecting the notion of enduring as such, even if only for a moment. Their main concern thereby seems to be to give a plausible account of transition from one moment to another, or, stated differently, a plausible account of how things perish rather than one of how things persist. That is, maybe the Buddhist could argue against a perdurantist – and maybe also against a stage theorist – as follows: To accept extension in temporal parts or stages means to accept that those parts or stages are of a self-maintaining, self-extending nature. This being the case, how could they be replaced by subsequent temporal parts or stages? It wouldn’t do to allow new ones to take their place by having the old ones perish in and of themselves, since it is their nature to maintain and extend themselves. On the contrary, for moments to be without extension implies that they would indeed perish in and of themselves without needing any outside forces, so that replacement would be not only possible but also fully necessary. The point is that one cannot explain how things persist unless one gives an account of how each temporal part or stage of which they consist perishes.30

28 Cf. Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā 9,1–2. 29 Cf. Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi 223,7–9: dus gaṅ la sṅa phyi’i rnam par dbye ba rnam par gźag par mi nus pa de ni sṅa phyi’i cha gñis daṅ bral ba skad cig ces bya’o ||. 30 Here again, I want to emphasize that both perdurantism and stage theory are theories for giving a convincing account of how things persist with having contradictory properties. Cf. fn. 23 above. That a temporal part/stage perishes means for a thing consisting of that temporal part/ stage to lose a property existing in that temporal part/stage. By doing so, it is possible for a new temporal part/stage with a contradictory property to that old property to come into existence. If

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Conclusion This kind of argumentation about momentary transition or substitution does not allow stage theorists to remain ambiguous. It also directly defies perdurantism. One might say that this way of arguing the problem is too ontological for perdurantists and stage theorists to take notice of – it is natural for contemporary metaphysicians, in their respect for the methods of analytic philosophy, to try to keep a reasonable distance from overly speculative ontology. However, I am happy to be a little provocative toward perdurantists and stage theorists on behalf of Dharmakīrtian philosophers, if it might help encourage our own intercultural dialogue about the philosophy of time.

Bibliography Primary literature Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, Dharmottara (Tibetan) in: Erich Frauwallner, Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ. Text und Übersetzung. [Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42]. 1935, 217–258. Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti (first chapter) cf. Pramāṇavārttikasvavr̥tti. Pramāṇavārttikasvavr̥tti, Dharmakīrti Raniero Gnoli (ed.), The Pramāṇavārtttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with Autocommentary, Roma 1960. Pramāṇaviniścaya, Dharmakīrti (third chapter). Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapter 3. Critically edited by Pascale Hugon and Toru Tomabechi. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House; Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2011. Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Dharmottara. Masamichi Sakai (ed.): in Sakai 2010. Tattvasaṃgraha, Śāntarakṣita. Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, The Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Śrī Kamalaśīla. [Bauddha Bhāratī I] Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1968. Vādanyāya, Dharmakīrti. Michael Thorsten Much, Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāya. Teil I – SanskritText. Teil II – Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1991.

we can designate this flow as “change,” then, to me it seems vital to perdurantism and stage theory to explain how transition between temporal parts or stages is possible. Maybe there are two possibilities: either a previous temporal part/stage perishes spontaneously, i.e., in and of itself, or it is destroyed by a succeeding temporal part/stage.

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Secondary Literature Jiri Benovsky, Presentism and Persistence. [Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90]. 2009, 291–309. Georges B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality. Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. New York: State University of New York Press 1997. Vincent Eltschinger, Dharmakīrti. [Revue internationale de philosophie 25(3)]. 2010, 397–440. Koji Ezaki, Darumakīruti ni yoru sai no teigi ni tsuite: ‘viruddhadharmādhyāsa’ to ha nani ka (Dharmakīrti’s Definition of Difference: What is viruddhadharmādhyāsa?). [Hikaku Ronrigaku Kenkyū 2]. 2004, 39–46. Florian Fischer, “Persistence Reconsidered: Beyond the endurance/perdurance distinction”. In: Per Hasle, Patrick Rowan Blackburn and Peter Øhrstrøm (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from Prior. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press 2017, 151–166. Erich Frauwallner, Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ. Text und Übersetzung. [Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42]. 1935, 217–258. Dana Lynne Goswick, “Change and Identity over Time”. In: Adrian Bardon and Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. West Sussex: Wiley & Sons 2013, 365–386. Sally Anne Haslanger, “Persistence Through Time.” In: Loux, Michael J., and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysic. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, 315–354. Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist. Oxford: Clarendon, 2001. Kathrine Hawley, “Temporal Parts”. In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/en tries/temporal-parts/. Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge 20174. F. MacBride, Four New Ways to Change Your Shape. [Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79]. 2001, 81–89. Chris Mortensen, “Change and Inconsistency.” In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition). URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/ar chives/win2016/entries/change/ Josh Parsons, Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?. [The Monist 83]. 2000, 399–418. Masamichi Sakai, On Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Contingency/ Dependence,with a Special Focus on vināśa. [Journal of Indian Philosophy 46-3]. 2018, 419–436. Masamichi Sakai, Dharmottaras Erklärung von Dharmakīrtis kṣaṇikatvānumāna: Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā zu Pramāṇaviniścaya 2 vv. 53–55 mit Prosa. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Vienna, Wien. URL=http://othes.univie.ac.at/9623/ Theodore Sider, The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics. [Analysis 60]. 2000, 84–88. Ernst Steinkellner, Dharmakīrtis frühe Logik. Annotierte Übersetzung der logischen Teile von Pramāṇavārttika 1 mit der Vr̥tti II. Introduction, Anmerkungen, Anhänge etc. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 2013. Tom Tillemans, “Dharmakīrti.” In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition). URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/ entries/dharmakiirti/

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Ryan Wasserman, The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics. [Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81]. 2003, 413–419. Ryan Wasserman, The Problem of Change. [Philosophy Compass 1]. 2006, 1–10. Jeson Woo, The Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi-Anvayātmikā: An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Work on Existence and Causal Theory. University of Pennsylvania, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing 1999.

Contributors Florian Fischer, Philosophisches Seminar, University of Siegen, Adolf-Reichwein-Str. 2, 57068 Siegen, Germany. Johannes Grössl, Lehrstuhl für Fundamentaltheologie und vergleichende Religionswissenschaft, University of Würzburg, Sanderring 2, 97070 Würzburg, Germany. Jon Hoover, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. Ryan Mullins, Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, 00014 Helsinki, Fabianinkatu 22, Finland. Masamichi Sakai, Department of Religious Studies, Kansai University, 3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka 565-8680, Japan. Daniel Saudeck, Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen, Offenbacher Landstr. 224, 60599 Frankfurt a. M., Germany. Marcus Schmücker, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstr. 11-13, 1020 Vienna, Austria. Michael Schulz, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Arbeitsbereich Philosophie und Theorie der Religionen, Interdisciplinary America Centre, Am Hof 1, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Ze’ev Strauss, Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, University of Hamburg, Schlüterstr. 51, 20146 Hamburg, Germany. Michael T. Williams, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstr. 11-13, 1020 Vienna, Austria.

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Authors/Persons Ānandabodha 164 Anjum, Rani L. 63 Anselm of Canterbury 116 Aquinas, Thomas 157 Augustine 39, 49, 51–52, 63 Averroes 91 Avicenna 91 Alexander, Samuel 14

Helm, Paul 43 Hlfwassen, Jens 81 Hölderlin, Friedrich 115 Ibn Taymiyyah 44, 89–104 Jayadeva Pakṣadhara 164 Jayatīrtha 124, 130, 132, 137, 164 John of the Cross 118

al-Baġdādī, Abū Barakāt 95 Bergson, Henri 23 Bhāsarvajña 177 Boethius 57 Buddha 112 Beauregard, Olivier Costa de 59 Blondel, Maurice 25 Bultmann, Rudolf 109

Kant, Immanuel 106 Karrāmī 94 al-Kindī 91 Kraay, Klaas J. 36 Kretzmann, Norman 58 Kr̥ṣṇācārya 180

Citsukha 164 Clarke, Samuel 33 Craig, William Lane 26, 39, 42, 60, 90

Leisegang, Hans 83 Lessing 114 Lewis, David 17, 198 Lucas, John 20 Lucas, J.R. 45

Deasy, Daniel 15 Dharmakīrti 191, 197, 200 Dharmottara 200–201, 205 Dinakara 163 Eddington, Arthur 59 Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī 94 Fiocco, Marcello Oreste 37, 48 Gadādhara Bhaṭṭa 180 Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya 162, 171, 180 Gauḍapāda 164 al-Ġazālī 90 Gödel, Kurt 67 al-Ǧuwaynī 98 al-Ḥillī ʿAllāmah 95 Hartshorne, Charles 23, 25 Hawley, Katherine 203, 204 Hegel, Wilhelm Gottfried 105–106, 108–110, 112, 114 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698190-012

Madhva 124, 130–140, 181 Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa 163, 165, 187 Mahādeva Bhaṭṭācārya 163 Mahādeva Puṇatāmakara 163 Matilal, Bimal Krishna 167, 169 Mellor, David Hugh 16 Mohammed 112 More, Henry 33 Müller, Klaus 25 Mullins, R.T. 10, 101 Mumford, Stephen 63 Nāgārjuna 164 Oppy, Graham 41 Oresme, Nicole 33, 46 Padgett, Alan 33, 45 Pañcānana, Viśvanātha 166, 198 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 102, 105, 107 Patil, Parimal 161

212

Authors/Persons

Philo of Alexandria 39 Philoponus, John 91 Plato 20 Pollock, Sheldon 161 Popper, Karl 109, 113 Praśastapāda 168, 187 Proclus 41 Putnam, Hilary 59 Rāghavendra Tīrtha 180 Rāmarudra 166 Rietdijk, Wim 59 Samuel, Alexander 14 Samuel, Clarke 33 Śaṅkara 164 Sārvabhauma, Kr̥ṣṇadāsa 166 Sārvabhauma, Vāsudeva 179 Satyanāthatīrtha 180 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schulz, Michael 102 Śiromani, Raghunātha 46, 58, 163, 166, 180 Śivāditya 177

Smolin, Lee 60 Śrī Harṣa 164 Swinburne, Richard 33, 43, 45 Tauler, Johannes 118 Torrance, T.F. 46 Udayana/Udayanācārya 131, 133, 171 Unger, Roberto M. 60 Veṇīdatta 179 Veṅkaṭanātha 46, 58, 124, 131, 141 von Balthasar, Hans Urs 102, 105 Vyāsatīrtha 163, 180 Whitehead, Alfred North 23, 25 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 64 Yajñapati Upādhyāya 164 Zagzebski, Linda 26 Zimmerman, Dean W. 60

Works Abhinavatāṇḍava 180 Anubhāṣya 137 Anuvyakhyāna 132, 134 Atharvaveda 126–127

Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī 166, 173 Nyāyasudhā 132, 133 Nyāyasūtra 163

Bhagavadgīta 141 Bible 98 Brahmasūtra 132, 137 Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 184

Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa 163, 179 Padārthamaṇḍana 179 Phenomenology of the Spirit 110 Philosophy of Religion 109 Proof of momentary perishing (Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi) 200

Chāndogya Upaniṣad 184 Confessiones 63 Consolatio Philosophiae 58, 67

Qurʾān 93

De opificio mundi 72 Dinakarī 163, 166, 168–175 Encyclopedia 106 Faṣl al-maqāl 93 Iqtiṣād fī al-I`tiqād 90 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 184 Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍanakhādya 164 Kṣaṇabhaṇgasiddhi 201 Mahābhārata 127, 143 Mağmūʿ fatāwā 96–97 Minhāğ as-sunnah 95 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa 177 Nyāyamakaranda 164 Nyāyāmr̥ta 183 Nyāyāmr̥tamādhurī 180

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Rāmarudrī 166, 168 R̥gveda 125 Sarvārthasiddhi 143, 145 Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa 126 Science of Logic 105–106 Sublime Issues (al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya) 94 Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 128 Systematic Theology 170 Tahāfut al-falāsifa 93 Taittirīya Upaniṣad 184 Tarkatāṇḍava 180 Tattvacintāmaṇi 162, 180 Tattvamuktākalāpa 141, 145 Tattvapradīpikā 164 Tattvaprakāśikā 132, 137 Tattvasaṅkhyānaṭīkā 181 Theo-Drama 114 Viṣṇupurāṇa 128

Key-terms Abhidharma 195 abhūtvābhavana “production de ce qui n’ était pas” 137 absolute simultaneity 67 absoluteness 77 acintyaśakti “inconceivable potency” 129, 131, 132, 138, 140, 155, 156 accidents 91 advaita 164 adverbialism 18, 194 agape 117 agency, free 68 ageing 125 ἀίδιος οὐσία (eternal being) 76 αἰών 75, 80, 81 allegory 74 all-pervading (vibhu) 141–142 analysis, metaphysical 165 anticipation 108–109 ārambhavāda, asatkāryavāda 133 archetype, noetic 83 arrow 60 – of time 57, 65 Ašʿarī 90 aspects, timeless 25 atemporal 22 atoms, dyad of (dvyaṇuka) 133, 138 a-theory 21, 59 attributes, divine 35 – essential 99 banana 202 before-ordering 61 beginning (τὴν ἀρχὴν) 73 beginninglessness, of the flow 149 being 179 biblical idea, of God 105 big-time (mahākāla) 181 block universe 59 body (śarīra) 141 brahman 164, 186 Brahmanism 163 B-theory 15

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causation 53, 60, 63 causality 90, 167 – primary and secondary 68 causeness 170 causes, auxiliary 199 change 16, 21, 24, 58, 60 – and identity 191–192 choice, free 57 Christianity 9 Christology 109 conceptualization, earlier/prior mental (prācīnollekha) 144, 146 flow of (ullekhasantati) 144, 150 concomitance view 33 conditions, superimposed conditions (upādhi) 130 – limiting (upādhi) 132ff. consummateness, divine 116 content, propositional 66 copularism 18 Council, third of Constantinople 110 counting 64 cause, efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) 133 – non-inherence cause (asamavāyikāraṇa), inherence cause (samavāyikāraṇa) 167 cosmopsychists, theistic 25 cosmos, noetic 81 creation 22, 36, 71, 181 – (sr̥ṣṭi) 131 continuous 93 creationism 39 creationist 39 creativity, perpetual (dāʾim) 96 creator, of time 84 Christianity, early 105 dawn (uṣas) 125 death 125 deity, timeless 21, 27–28 dependency, eternal 181 dependent (paratantra) 130 determinism 59 difference (bheda) 145, 147–149

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Key-terms

– inner-divine 113 – “between things” (bhāvānāṃ bheda) 197 dilemma, kretzmann’s 67 dissolution (pralaya) of the universe 131 distinction, past-present-future 60 divisions, intrinsic 182 doctrine of transformation (pariṇāmavāda) 137 Drama, original 113 dream 64 duration 60 – successionless of God 47 Dvaita Vedānta 6, 130–131, 164

faith, Christian 105 falsification 109 father of time πατὴρ χρόνου 79 finiteness 125, awareness of 123 finitude 123 – of time 186 flow, of time 135 flowing along (pravāha) 131, 132, 141 foliation, of spacetime 59 foreknowledge, divine 57 frame, privileged of reference 59 future, contingents 57 – open 60

effect (kārya) 42, 45, 54, 91, 111, 133–134, 137, 138–140, 148, 152, 166–174, 177, 184–185, 187 effectness 169 effort (prayatna) 145 emanation 92 empire, Vijayanagara 164 endurantism 17, 194–195 endurantist 22 entities, non-present 13 entropy 66 epistemic 65 epistemology 13, 162, 165, 180 essence, of God 89 eternal 68 eternalism, divine 20–21, 27 – philosophical 21 – theistic 21 eternity 73, 105, 112, 132, 140 – conceptions of 124 eternalism 10–12, 34 eternalist 12, 21, 35 eternity, timeless 92, 130 ether 165 – unmanifested 184 eucharist 108 event 58, 60 events, originating (ḥawādiṯ) 99 exdurantism 17 exdurantist 18 existence asymmetry 61 extension 196, 202–205

γένεσις, of time 79 ǧihādism 95 global now 58 God 20, 67, 89–90, 93–94, 99, 100–101, 162 – creator of everything 96–97 – concept of 105 – “the all-determining reality” 109, 111 – and time 9, 19 – perfect being 35 Godly sphere 71 God-man 108 God’s absolute superiority over time 81 – absoluteness/transcendence 71, 75, 77, 83–84 – anthropomorphic portrayal 72 – causal powers 54 – creative activity 83 – dependency on time 131 – dipolar nature 25 – knowledge 21 – nature of 26 – noetic life of 80 – one eternal divine knowledge 145 – own eternal nature (svarūpa) 150 – perpetual interaction of 76 – power 136 – qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna) 144 – radical other-worldliness 77 – relationship to time 78 – temporal 22 – temporality 27

Key-terms

– three creations 79 – timeless present 40 – time-transcending, ever-present being 75 – time-transcending life 81 – transcendence over time 77, 84 – will 134 – will (icchā) 129, 134 gratuitousness 118, 199 grandfather of time 72 growing blockers 10 ḥadīṯ 98 ḥādiṯ, “temporally originated” 90 hegelianism, theological 108 historicity 105 history, end of 111 horsetail (equisetum) 66 hypertime 35 identification temporalist 51 identification view 33, 47 identity of immanent and historical trinity 107 immobility 105 immortality 126 immutability 105 independent (svatantra) 130 indeterminists 14 indexicalism 17 infinite, true (das wahre Unendliche) infinity 45, 53 true 105–108, 112 inherence-relator (samavāya) 167 Inner ruler (antaryāmin) 141–142 interaction, causal 61 – electromagnetic 64 invariant 63 Īśvara, “God” 131, 163, 178 καιρός 82, 85 kalām – cosmological argument 52 – cosmological proof for the existence of God 90 – theologians 98 Karrāmī 94

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knowability 185, 187 κόσμος αἰσθητός 79 κόσμος νοητός 79 kṣaṇapravāha “flowing along of moments” 152 Leibniz’s Law 192–193 lightlike 63 limited 68 local time 65 locus (adhikaraṇa) 169–171 logic, modal 37 logic, tenseless 37 λόγος τομεύς 74 local model of the arrow of time 60 Lord of everything (sarvasyeśvara) 126 – of creatures (prajāpati) 126 Lucrecianism 22 manifestation (vyakti) 137 – eternal 143 Māturīdī kalām 90 memory 64 measurement, temporal 63 metaphysics, contemporary 191–192, 195, 197 – of time 9, 19 metric 60 – intrinsic 52 model, of the arrow of time 60 moment present 10 – (kṣaṇa) 129 momentariness theory of (kṣaṇikatvavāda) 191, 195, 197, 200–203, 205 monotheism 128–129 monotheletism 110 movement (κίνησις) 73 motion 163, 174 moving spotlight 10, 34 moving spotlight theory 13, 15, 27 Muʿtazilī 90 natural – of God 26 – divine 47

218

Key-terms

– intrinsic 198 – of time 10–13, 24, 27 Navya-Nyāya 162–163 necessitas consequentiae 67 Neoplatonism 92 nitya-anitya “eternal and non-eternal” 182 – νόησις νοήσεως 106 number (ἀριθμός) 72 numbers 64 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 58, 130 object-presentism 10 obscurantism, scholastic 162 omnipresent (kevala-anvayin) properties 186 omniscience (sarvajñatva) of God 144, 149 ontology of time 34 order (τάξις), cosmic (r̥ta) 72, 125 parādhinaviśeṣāpti, “the obtaining of intrinsic properties that depends upon another being” 181 parameter 64 part, temporal 22, 195–197, 204–205 passage of time 67 perception of chronological sequence 183 perceptions of simultaneity 183 perdurance theory 204 perdurantism 195–197, 206 perdurantistic 22, 27 perdurantists 17 perdurance theorists 204 perfection of God 96 permanentism 15 perpetual creativity 97 persistence 10, 16 philosophy, of religion 105 – Indian 161 posteriority (aparatva) 173 potency, inconceivable (acintyaśakti) 129–145, 150 precreation 43, 48, 50 – phase 42 – state 40, 48, 54 – time 50

predetermination 67 pre-eternity (al-azal) 97 present objects 11 – objective 34 – spacious 24 present state (vartamānāvasthā) 22, 146 present, timeless 35 presentism 10–11, 34, 36 philosophical 22 – theistic 22 presentist 13, 22, 35, 38 presentness 15 priority (paratva) 173 process ontologist 23 – ontology 22 – philosophy 23–24, 27 – theologians 26 – theology 22 – thought 23, 27 produrantism 25 properties, intrinsic (viśeṣa) 181 – intrinsic 195, 198–199 – time-indexed 193, 199–201 – universal-present 187 property (dharma) 141, 147 – of “being incapable” (aśaktatva) of producing a sprout 198 – intrinsic as connected with the mere existence (bhāvamātra-/sattāmātraanubandhin) 198 – extrinsic 199 proposition, tenseless 38 propositions 65 providence, divine 75, 84 presence, pure 72 qualifying knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna) 144, 150 quantification 64 quantity 202–203 rational 64 real 64 recorder, ideal 61 records, of causal interaction 61 regress, infinite 91, 150

Key-terms

relationalism 18 relationship between God and his body (śarīraśarīribhāva) 141 relativity, special/general 59 relator, temporal (kālika-sambandha) 166 religions, non-Christian 115 representation (Vorstellung) 108–109 religious 119 resurrection, of Christ 108, 109–110 revisiting, the past 66 ruse, of reason 114 samaṣṭisr̥ṣṭi, “creation of sentient entities” 152 sarvaśakti “power for everything” 40 Śaivism, Kashmir 129 salafi, movement 101 “Selbstzweck” 119 self-dependency (ātmāśraya) 186 self-effecting (svanirvāhaka) entities 187 sempiternalist 20 sense, plain (ẓāhir) sequence (santati/santāna) 150 – of mental conceptualizations (ullekhasantati) 145 – of states (avasthāsantati) 144 simultaneity 60 simultaneous 59, 63 soul, highest (parama-ātman) 179 space 163 – (χώρα) 73 spacelike 63 spacetime 59, 67 specification (viśeṣa) 132, 134, 136–137, 139–140 stage theory 196–197, 203–204 state 60 – (avasthā) 141, 147, 181–182 – temporal 144 substance 60 – (dravya) 141, 165 – eternal 130 self-grounding (svanirvāhaka) 187 substantivalist 58 succession, temporal 64 suffering 125 svatantra, “independent” 141

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temporalism, divine 27 temporalist, divine 20, 22, 35, 47, 49 temporality 105, 112 – divine 39, 47, 54 temporalist 20, 49 theology, systematic 107 theism, open 25, 58 theists, open 22 theologia naturalis 106 theology, philosophical 67, 106 theologians, Christian 26, 101 theology, Christian 19, 25 theory, growing block 13–14, 27, 34, 13–14, 27, 34 – of relativity 58 Thomist 21 time 10 – χρόνος 75 – inevitability of 144 – as the source of suffering 123 – agent 128 – destructive power of 129 – direction of 54 – division of 134 – creation of (sr̥ṣṭikāla) 131, 133, 139 – local theory of 57 – metaphysical status of 10 – moments of 37 – own time (svakāla) 147 – symmetric structure of 59 timelessness, divine 21, 39–40, 27 God’s 84 timelike 63 time-quantity 202 tradition, Islamic 89 transformation 137 transition, momentary 206 Trinity 111, 117 υἱός νεώτερος, υἱός πρεσβύτερος 79 unevenness (vaiṣamya) in God’s will 152 unidirectional 60 unseen/invisible (adr̥ṣṭa) 134, 165, 167, 169–170, 176 Urgrund 75

220

Key-terms

Vaikuṇṭha heaven 143 values, truth 65 Vaiśeṣika, classical 163 Veda 163 Vedānta 130, 164 verification 109 viruddhadharmādhyāsa “the situating of contradictory properties” 197 Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta 131 Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa 128, 131 vyaṣṭisr̥ṣṭi, “creation of insentient entities” 152

wheel (cakra) 125 wholeness, history’s 111 will (icchā) 145 – of God (īśvarecchā) 131 – particular of God (īśvarecchāviśeṣa) 152 – eternal (nityecchā) 133 Williamson-language 15 witness (sākṣin) 183, 185 world-actualization 36 worldline 63 year (saṃvatsara) 125