Temporal Horizons and Strategic Decisions in U.S.–China Relations: Between Instant and Infinite 9780739188286, 9780739188279

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Temporal Horizons and Strategic Decisions in U.S.–China Relations

Temporal Horizons and Strategic Decisions in U.S.–China Relations Between Instant and Infinite Daniel Joseph Tauss

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tauss, Daniel Joseph, 1972– Temporal horizons and strategic decisions in U.S.-China relations : between instant and infinite / Daniel Joseph Tauss. pages cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-8827-9 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-8828-6 (electronic) 1. United States—Foreign relations—China. 2. China—Foreign relations—United States. 3. Taiwan Strait— Strategic aspects. I. Title. E183.8.C5.T357 2015 327.73051—dc23 2015000430 TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Since this book is about time, there are three people to whom I dedicate this book, past present and future: For my mother, whose tireless love and support since my earliest beginnings have been the most important things in allowing me to arrive to where I am; For Emilia, who can be counted on for each moment of every day. She makes every second count, with humor, patience, and love. For Victoria, our future, who represents the limitless possibilities of the years ahead.

He who knoweth the truth is not as good as he who loveth it, and he who loveth it is not as good as he who delighteth in it. Confucius, Analects 6.20, translation as inscribed on the wall of the Philosophy Library at the University of Southern California

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

ix

Preface

xi

Acknowledgments

xiii

Introduction and Overview: Looking to the Horizons, East and West 1 2 3 4

Times and Places: An Introduction to Horizons, Their Use and Their Role in China, America, and Taiwan Vantage Points and Abounding Horizons: Analytical Insights and Interdisciplinary Connections A Narrow Course, the View None Too Clear: The Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, 1995–1996 The Future, Futures, Deals and Dividends: China’s Entry in the World Trade Organization

xv

1 29 75 147

Conclusion: Futures’ Beginning: Concluding Thoughts

201

Bibliography

217

Index

235

About the Author

241

vii

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1 Range of Time Horizons (moving from shortest to longest horizon-distance)

8

Table 2.1 Contrasting Theoretical Responses Under Different Time 66 Horizons Table 3.1 Time Horizons of Each Actor in the 1995–1996 Missile Crisis: Desired Outcomes

86

Table 3.2 Time Horizons in the 1995–1996 Missile Crisis: Tactics and Strategies

126

Table 4.1 Time Horizons Pertaining to the Entry of the PRC and Taiwan to the World Trade Organization

191

ix

Preface

This project adds a new dimension to the study of foreign policy decisionmaking by means of a nuanced method of considering an actor’s perspective on the future. In the process of weighing alternative actions in the area of foreign policy, one of the most important factors influencing a policy choice is the decision maker’s view of time, in particular what “future” is predominant in an actor’s evaluation. I argue that the distance into the future a leader considers most important has a significant impact on how options are weighed, and outcomes valued. Many studies in Political Science and International Relations have looked at the role of time, particularly the role of the past through the use of analogy and historical awareness. To some degree, rational choice theory has allowed the impact of “the shadow of the future” and how it impacts decisions. Other frameworks combining the insight of a number of disciplines, namely Prospect Theory and Construal Theory, have considered how the future is viewed, and what psychological or economic filters have an impact on considering that future. This project builds upon that work by looking at the future as a series of specific discrete horizons, ranging from the immediate to the extremely long term. By contrasting the different perspectives that can be found in the thoughts and words of policy makers, significant differences emerge that greatly add to our understanding of the decision making process. This “time horizon” approach is applied to two of the most defining incidents in contemporary US-China relations. The Taiwan Straits Missile Crises of 1995–1996 and China’s process of admission into the World Trade Organization over the course of the late 1990s are both cases of particular significance to a specific facet of “hard power”; the Straits Crisis has defined the military issues between the two powers, while the entrance into the WTO was primarily in the economic realm. Each situation is a fairly high-tension xi

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Preface

point of interaction between the US and the PRC, with consequences stretching into the future. Because these moments of interaction had immediate implications as well as a variety of longer-term aspects, they are conducive to our methodological approach, which scrutinizes aspects of the decision process in order to evaluate the “horizon” in play in each case. The study has shown some compelling results that indicate that the choice of time horizon can play a significant role in policy outcomes. In addition, the time horizon method can offer increased depth and sensitivity to a wide variety of methodological approaches. In analyzing the process of time horizon selection, conclusions regarding individual, institutional, and cultural contributions are considered. Implications for policy are briefly discussed in the concluding materials.

Acknowledgments

There are many people I would like to thank for their help and support. Starting with the widest horizon, I would like to thank the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations and the Center for International Studies for their resources and support, particularly in the form of the many gifted scholars who were gathered there. I would also like to acknowledge the Center for Asian Democracy at the University of Louisville for its support. In a more particular and immediate horizon are some individuals who were crucial in the development of this project. There is one person who has been most essential—Professor Patrick James of the USC School of International Relations. He has been a source of support and sagacious criticism, provided with impeccable timing. This project could not have happened without him. I would also like to recognize Professors Dan Lynch and Professor Stephen Read, also at USC, for their insights and understanding. Their feedback has greatly strengthened this work. I want to thank Justin Race, Kathryn Tafelski, and the editorial staff at Lexington Press for their patience and support for this project. In a longer horizon, there are two scholars of unparalleled insight who are no longer with us yet have been perpetual sources of inspiration; Hayward Alker and Stephen Toulmin have both brilliantly plumbed the past to inspire our future visions. Finally, I would particularly like to recognize the honorable Winston Lord, former Assistant Secretary of State and ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, for taking the time to share his wisdom and extensive experience on US-Sino relations. It was a true privilege talking with someone whose speeches and writings have been so pivotal in understanding the nuances of such a complex relationship.

xiii

Introduction and Overview Looking to the Horizons, East and West

In the study of International Relations and foreign policy, one of the most basic yet confounding questions is why states, the people within them, make the decisions that they do. Seeking to resolve this obvious and elusive issue has driven much of the theory making process in those fields. Most of the important work to answer this fundamental question centers on theories that seek to explain the primary influences on foreign policy decision-making. Structural factors such as the nature of the international system, domestic and bureaucratic politics have been seen as essential, while other approaches look at the impact of individual personality and cognitive state. Other theories look at the role of culture, or the self-constructing nature of the international system. While many of these approaches are elegant and can explain a great deal about why nations act as they do, there is a vital factor impacting state behavior and policy making that has been neglected, yet can have a dramatic impact on decision outcomes. Understanding it can be particularly important in the context of one of the most significant relationships in contemporary international relations. Though it is not always recognized, one of the most important factors influencing a decision is the decision maker’s view of time, in particular how that view informs the priority of a particular distance in to the future. Looking at the past, thought the use of analogy and considerations of historical awareness, has been dealt with by several insightful scholars, and incorporated into a number of approaches. Related to a view of the past, but more influential in decision-making, is the value a decision maker places on outcomes a particular length of time into the future. The idea of a “horizon,” literally the “bounding circle” of one’s view, is the best way to describe it. xv

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Introduction and Overview

One’s horizon extends in all directions—in reflecting on the lessons of history, one looks to the horizon behind, while in looking ahead, the future is considered. While the use of precedent and historical analogy is not identical to considerations of future outcomes, the degree to which someone looks into the past can reflect on how far into the future that person might think about implications and results. Someone deeply concerned with the grand scope of history is more likely to think about the more sweeping future reverberations of present day decisions. Conversely, an actor fixated on the “here and now” lacks a vision of historical context and long-term repercussion. The idea of “horizon” is particularly apt because it refers to the distance at the limit of vision, the points in all directions after which nothing is seen. Many things can affect one’s literal horizon—geography, weather, the acuity of the observer. In the same way, a decision-maker’s temporal horizon can be affected by many things, including political and value systems, personal experience, use of historical analogy, aversion to risk. The utility of the idea can apply to and augment our understanding of nearly any foreign policy process or event. One area in the study of International Relations that finds a greater incidence of casual appeals to time is USSino relations; this project will attempt to consider the implications of variable time-thinking in this relationship in a more systematic manner. When it comes to a consideration of the decision-making process in USChina relations, generalizations often follow stereotype. The monolithic, totalitarian regime in Beijing, neither bound to election-cycle accountability nor public opinion, can lay plans considering the distant future at minimum risk to their authority. Decision-makers in a democracy, particularly in a system like America’s, with an evenly matched two party system and watchdog press, are constrained to prioritize immediate implications and defer long-term outcomes to later administrations. Careful studies are considerably more reluctant to draw such conclusions, much less judge which types of decisions yield the best outcomes. Despite the challenges of peering into the “black box” of the Chinese decision-making process, a thoughtful look at the people involved, indirect clues and rhetorical strategies can help reveal a much more complex policy process. While parsimony and simple, one-variable explanations might be preferable from the perspective of theory development, the richness of reality can often cloud their crystalline certainty. I am afraid this project will serve to add another layer of complexity, though it will aid in a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding. The intention of this study is to investigate the primary future duration that a decision maker prioritizes when making a critical decision, and what impact that has on the nature of the decision. This includes what outcomes are considered to be the most important, what precedents might be set by the

Introduction and Overview

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decision, and how much time would pass from the actual decision until the most important implications would manifest themselves. The extent of a decision maker’s time horizon can be inferred from an analysis of the discourse pertaining to his or her decisions and outcomes. While there is room for imprecision, as in any study of the decision-making process, there is something working to our advantage. Because there is not much motivation for a leader to hide his or her time horizon, many discussions that refer to specific outcomes and choices imply a particular distance into the future in which that outcome has particular significance. It should therefore be a fruitful source of information that can add a new and powerful dimension to the study of decision making in International Relations. The exploration of time horizons, in a general sense and in the specifics of our cases, will take place over the course of the chapters to come. IMPLICATIONS FOR THIS PROJECT’S HORIZON This study seeks to introduce a relatively neglected concept to the study of International Relations and with it increase our ability to analyze foreign policy decision-making. The idea of a time horizon, by virtue of its relevance to significant events with lasting consequences, has the potential to make a significant contribution to the understanding of important policy decisions, in terms of explanatory as well as prescriptive approaches. By adding a new layer to the factors that influence how options are weighed, it does not interfere with or invalidate other analytical methods, but it can deepen them and serve to point out contradictions that result from ignoring the time horizon concept. Using this approach, the economic and military interactions of the United States and the People’s Republic of China can provide an exceptional amount of theoretical leverage. This is not just due to the global importance of their relations (not to mention the significant role of the Republic of China on Taiwan), but because the nature of the cases provide useful contrast to one another. The US-China relationship will very likely define hard power relations for the coming century, but it also generates pressing issues in the present day. This is a widely held opinion, which means that a variety of time horizons are at play when people consider those nations’ interaction and the prospects for their relationship. In the long run, ignoring the utility of this concept would not only leave our theoretical methodology impoverished, but it might even imperil the stability of the international system through a lack of mutual understanding among the great powers.

Chapter One

Times and Places An Introduction to Horizons, Their Use and Their Role in China, America, and Taiwan

The “time horizon” concept, while often not a primary focus of theoretical approaches in international relations, can be of great utility in better understanding basic concepts at the foundation of almost any study of decisionmaking. There are theorists, often ones who operate in a high degree of abstraction, such as Robert Axelrod, who think a great deal about length of time into the future and outcome. Some of his simulations peer a thousand years into the future, 1 or look tens of thousands of iterations ahead to shed information on strategic choices. 2 His work on lessons for cooperation is profound, but challenging to directly apply to an understanding of particular real-world cases. In discussions of such abstract concepts as “the national interest” or “grand strategy,” looking ahead into the future is of vital importance. There is no agreement on the optimum distance to be used in looking ahead to the future, and different leadership styles would lead to a good deal of variance in that area. The view of the future, the extent of a decision-maker’s time “horizon,” can have a significant impact on policy outcomes. No matter what theoretical approach is used to analyze and predict decisions, it would yield dramatically different predictive and explanatory results depending on the relative values placed on the near and far future outcomes by the decisionmaker. Other causal factors might provide more immediate explanatory power in the analysis of a decision, but theories that neglect the idea that different times are weighted differently run the risk of losing a key aspect of the explanation. 1

2

Chapter 1

The time horizon plays a pivotal role in the outcome of almost any decision, but this project will focus on a particular area in which the stakes of decision are particularly high—the security-related decisions of great powers. My research will look at some security decisions revolving around one of the most important diplomatic interactions on the contemporary world stage—the US-China relationship. For a number of reasons, this relationship and the diverse views of it is a fruitful field from which to draw cases. Not only is it especially conducive to augment our understanding of the time horizon perspective, but since the stakes of US-China relations are so high, and are sure to increase, this new dimension to our ability to explain and understand decisions relating to it is not just useful for political theorists, but for policy-makers as well. This book will look at several pivotal moments in US-China relations from the last decade of the twentieth century, looking to understand the scope of the decision-makers’ time horizon, and how it might have had an impact on the choices and outcomes of the situation. This project will investigate the language of state policies, discussion in the media and in academia, position papers and the actual language of government representatives as they discuss the time-frame influencing the decisions made. The ultimate goal of the research will be to see if there are significant differences in time horizon among the actors, across culture, role, situation, and era, what impact these differences would have on decision-making, and what implications that would have for the ability to anticipate policy in the future. IT’S ABOUT TIME Since this book is so concerned with the role of time in the decision-making process, it might be useful to talk about time itself. When I talk about temporal horizons and looking at the “future,” how can I be sure you as the reader shares my understanding? To truly do a service to the nuanced and sophisticated considerations of what time is and how it interacts with the human cognitive process, a discussion could take up the entire book, or even multiple volumes. I will briefly touch on the variety of ways that time has been interpreted throughout human history and in a variety of disciplines. The consideration of time in this book follows a fairly conventional understanding of the concept, but the highly subjective nature of how it can be interpreted by the human mind is a vital factor in how the future is perceived, and how temporal horizons are selected by the actors. Time can mean many things to people. For most traditional societies, time was seen as part of a cyclical process, in the seasons and movements of the heavens. 3 The development of mechanical devices to measure time “did not arise out of a desire to record the passage of time but rather from the practical

Times and Places

3

monastic demand for accurate determination of the hours when the many religious prayers and offices needed to be recited.” 4 Despite those origins, as time became more commonly measured in a precise way, people became more accustomed to it as a fixed, immutable consistent quantity measuring something completely apart from human experience. In recent modern Western history, for most people, time as a linear, quantifiable concept was taken for granted as a given. Sometimes referred to as “Newtonian Time,” this interpretation paralleled the Newtonian conception of space: homogenous, mathematically continuous, existing apart from the experience of the observer. 5 Marked by the movement of the sun, and other astronomical bodies, then more concretely measured by timepieces of all varieties, until clocks keyed to the vibration of an atom are accurate to less than a second in over 138,000,000 years. 6 This interpretation of time has yielded a variety of powerful insights and benefits. Using a purely abstract mathematical variable in equations describing the physical world is a fundamental basis of classical physics. The ability to synchronize the measurement of time across places allows the collaboration of human enterprise, and cooperation on a global scale. Seeing time as abstractly measurable allows consideration of the minutest fractions of a second after the big bang, to the billions of years remaining to the age of the universe. However, even in purely scientific terms, recent advances have put this conception of time into question. Just as Newtonian mechanics were challenged and transformed through the development of special and general relativity, so too has time become relative. Passing at different paces in different places and at different speeds, it is a pure constant only under constant conditions. Well before the temporal turn in the physical science and mathematical modeling, time’s subjective nature in its relationship with the human experience was raised as a challenge to a pure Newtonian conception. One way to interpret this distinction is in the humanistic division represented by Locke and Kant. “Locke championed the objective and real as the primary determinants of knowledge, and Kant championed the subject and mental . . . Locke placed the environment primarily in charge, whereas Kant placed the mind primarily in charge.” 7 This difference with respect to time illustrates an important divergence from the Newtonian time, exemplified by Locke. “Locke is the representative of the objectivist view of linear time . . . Kant, on the other hand, is representative of the subjectivist view of linear time. For him, time is a ‘subjective condition . . . a form of internal intuition’ which a person naturally and unconsciously uses to structure reality.” 8 The beginning of the twentieth century saw the emergence of the philosophical school of phenomenology, which continued to build upon this subjective nature of time. “If the propositions of the phenomenologists . . . still

4

Chapter 1

have resonance for us today, it is because they tried to analyze perceptions of time as a functions of consciousness and subjectivity, rather than as an absolute.” 9 Constructivist interpretations built on this idea, positing that time and the temporal sense depends on a variety of internal processes. “As solid and autonomous as it sometimes seems, we must constantly build and rebuild the temporal world that surrounds us . . . the temporal aura that envelops us is really a series of fragile constructions, assembled from the haphazard materials that we are able to find in our surroundings and in our consciousness.” 10 It can be affected by one’s culture, gender, personality, age, and state of mind. 11 Ignoring that subjective, malleable, interpretation of temporality is a liability in all number of disciplines: The use of the Newtonian time concept in neoclassical economic modeling greatly undermines the forecasting ability. In such models there is no continuous refinement of future plans and knowledge is not gained in the process of projecting . . . A truly dynamic plan involves revisions and alterations in the course of time. 12

More generally, with an appeal to the social as well the physical sciences, While space and time are themselves “invented” dimensions through which to structure our environment, they have such a grasp on our collective consciousness that they have been elevated to the status of representational reality. This reification has caused considerable problems for the physical scientist who has had to discard this “everyday” form of conception to provide innovative advances in the way the universe can be understood. If it has been a problem for the physicist, it provides an almost impenetrable barrier for the behavioral scientist who has to contend not only with the abstract qualities and relations of space and time, but also with the entrenched belief of individuals of the phenomenological existence and critical independence of these constructs. 13

This relationship between the temporal and the physical goes beyond the commonplace association of “space and time”: It is important not to lose from view the one aspect of human action that is rarely considered in studies of the physical surroundings: the temporal quality of those actions . . . one of the weaknesses of much research within the environmental psychology perspective has been the dearth of attention paid to temporal phenomena. This is quite possibly a weakness it has inherited from its forbearers in personality and social psychology. 14

These philosophically oriented conjectures become the basis of contemporary psychology and economics. The subjective nature of the perception of time, and the myriad ways in which time can be defined, is critical for refining our understanding of how we perceive the world and make decisions

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based upon it. When we talk of “time,” to name but a few, it can include everything from duration of an experience, rhythm and regularity, perspective on one’s place in the scope of history and the future. This brings us to the aspect of time most relevant to this project. While memory is highly suggestible and history dependent on any number of interpretative methods, one of the few things upon which all temporal theories agree is that the past has occurred and the future has not. As one scholar put it, “Of hindsight and foresight, the latter appears as the troublesome perspective. One can explain and understand any old event if the appropriate effort is applied. Prediction, however, is acknowledged to be rather more tricky.” 15 This is the essence of the challenge of decision-making. If we could see the future, our decisions would be much easier. However, they still would not be certainties. Barring psychological dysfunction, we would desire a choice leading to a future outcome to provide the best possible result. With perfect information not just about present circumstances but future ones, our decisions would be much better—but they would not be identical in all cases. With the desire for “good” or “best” outcomes, the question becomes: what outcome? An optimum result for this moment might not be the best one in five minutes, tomorrow, next year, beyond our lifetime, or eons from now. The decision depends on what distance into the future is most important. The decision problem becomes much more complex considering we lack a means to peer into the future, and rarely even have superlative information about the present at our disposal. Even with those added wrinkles to our simplified ideal case, the time horizon question is critical to the decision process. APPROACHING THE HORIZONS, AND HOW TO GET THERE (METHODS) As many analysts of foreign policy have observed, understanding the precise sources of influence on decision-making is not easy. After-the-fact justifications, conflicting motivations, and desire for privacy all contribute to a barrier between the political actor and the scholar. One of the ways to erode that wall is through the judicious selection of cases and an appropriate method of analysis. Especially in this era of rapid new cycles and short attention spans, there are a number of political issues with only immediate or merely shortterm ramifications. Since issues that hold such limited temporal significance are more difficult to consider in terms of longer future horizons, we will look at matters of strategic importance for each state. “Strategy” distinguishes itself from “tactics” in that it concerns itself with plans and considerations of a longer scale, while tactics are more immediate techniques. “Grand Strategy” is often used to describe the most overarching plans, usually of a state,

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on the largest field possible. It is commonplace to see these ideas used in International Relations, as well as security studies. This project will investigate two of the most strategically important moments of the US-China relationship, and analyze the decisions made in the United States and the People’s Republic of China with respect to time horizon, as well as those in Taiwan. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis and the question of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization had both long-reaching as well as immediate critical elements that had diverse implications. This project will look at the time horizons used by decision-makers in each case from the PRC, ROC and the US perspective, for a total of six distinct policy dilemmas. Investigating the view of each state actor through the lenses of five time horizons (see figure 1.1) would mean fifteen stages of analysis by which to illuminate the different functions that the time horizon can play in the decision-making process. While it would be ideal for this project (or any other study of policy analysis) if we could read the minds of decision-makers, this is not an option. We must instead rely on the words they use to express their ideas, to convince and to enlighten. This includes language for public and private consumption, in the heat of debate and reflection well after the fact. 16 While the tension between original intent and what is shared with other people is a constant challenge in discourse analysis, our area of interest should prove somewhat immune to the distortions of personal justification and misleading explanation. Even if a disconnect between real intent and rhetoric exists, a speaker’s choice of which time horizon to emphasize in policy-related discourse will show (at the very least) what horizon the leaders thought was the most important to raise and address in their public comments and policy rationales. One of the great advantages of this topic is that while future horizons as a category have begun to be used in some analytical studies, they are not well known in a formal manner by most policy-makers. While no one wants to be labeled as “short-sighted,” more subtle distinctions among different temporal horizons would not have a particular pejorative connotation, and it has not been something traditionally scrutinized by critics of decisions (except in extreme cases of short-sightedness), so it is less likely that decision makers would be particularly sensitive about sharing their actual values around this issue, or attempt to conceal their motivating time horizon. In the dialogues revolving around decisions and their implications, there are many themes and terms that evoke or favor a particular time horizon. A close reading of the materials that apply to our decisions of interest (see below) will be the best way to proceed. Discourse analysis is a particularly effective way to gain a foothold into an understanding of time horizon and decision-making. Through a close look at the materials surrounding the key security decisions selected for study, it should be possible to extract a sense

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of the perspective on time scale that the various decision-makers had. One of the most effective ways to proceed in this analysis would be through the use of specific language that is directly related to our interest in time horizons. Certain terminology such as “precedent,” “long/short term,” “lasting consequences,” “immediacy,” and their foreign language equivalents, will likely be associated with intentional thinking about time frame. Other language that specifies length of time—month, decade, century—should also point to how far in the future a decision is being considered. Another mode of discourse that evokes temporal horizons is the use of historical analogy. Discussions of what kind of past events are evoked in relevance to the present situation add another dimension to determining the time horizon of the actor. As we noted before, a horizon extends in all directions. Peering through a distance of time does not merely extend to the future; people can look back as well as forward. In rough terms, those with a strong historical awareness are more likely to think further into the future than those who do not consider the long march of time. A speaker’s use of history can be a valuable source of additional information, but it should not be relied on as a direct correlation to a future perspective. Just as a horizon can be obscured by weather or geography and does not always extend the same distance in all directions, actors do not always utilize symmetrical distances in considering the past and future. Someone obsessed with the lessons of Munich in 1938 is not necessarily thinking seventy years ahead, and a Chinese nationalist who praises the “five thousand years of history” is probably not too concerned with the PRC’s particular fate in the year 7000 A.D. This simplified timeline distinguishing different perspectives into the future based on how far their horizon extends may help to clarify what will be looked for in the analysis. It is not exhaustive, and as we will see in studying our cases, incidents transpiring in a particular horizon often have implications in others. But in the most basic sense, it will be helpful in delineating what the limits of each horizon category might be. Instantaneous: The time-frame for a situation involving split-second timing. Often rational decision-making does not happen due to the rapidity of the situation. Instinct and emotion are usually the primary determinants of the outcome. Examples: an argument in which someone loses his or her temper, a battle whose outcome depends on quick reflexes. A shootingoriented video game often emphasizes this horizon. For a neurobiologist, this would mean decisions under the purview of the amygdala rather than the cerebral cortex. Immediate: Primarily concerned with the importance of the current situation with minimal apprehension regarding any future issues or implications. Dealing with the situation at hand is the most important task. Common in crisis situations, in which the situation is perceived to be of such importance

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Figure 1.1. Range of time horizons (moving from shortest to longest horizondistance). While this describes a framework discussing future distance, a similar system could encompass considerations of the past. The most recent moments and events would give way to distant history and the deepest consideration of the human condition and its origins. This might be useful in a variety of circumstances, but it is not as consistently applicable to evaluating decisions and their future implications.

that resolving it takes precedence over later outcomes (or that later outcomes are so dependent on the immediate situation that longer considerations are irrelevant). Also seen in competitive situations such as trade negotiations or conflicts, in which immediate benefits and costs are of primary concern for the people negotiating and deciding them, sometimes at the expense of later interactions. Examples: an immediate military or diplomatic crisis, such as the Cuban Missile or Taiwan Straits Missile Crises. Economic crises, like the Asian financial crisis, can of course have immediate implications and a similar “crisis thinking mode” as with military issues, but the very nature of economic situations necessitates approaches that go beyond immediate resolution, and no matter how critical an economic “meltdown” might be, it does not pose the same threat as an outright war. Playing one hand of poker, like a conflict in the immediate, involves some skill and serious consideration of one’s opponents, but it is over without much time elapsing. Short Term: Some consideration of the immediate results of decisions, but on a limited basis, and within a relatively short time frame. Depending on the nature of the decision, this could most likely mean a matter of weeks or months. This may be more common among lower-level technocrats. In a chess analogy, thinking one or two moves ahead, but not the overall strategy of the game, or playing a few rounds of poker. 17 Examples: consideration of the fallout of trade agreement disagreements or violations, some aspects of the Hainan EP-3 spy plane incident. Intermediate: perhaps the most common for high-level decision-makers, looking down the road to a moderate extent, often affecting the length of the regime duration. Usually measured in months or years, depending on the level of crisis. Analogous to tactical thinking. Examples: the implications of trade agreements as followed, tactical analyses of China’s increasing capability to invade Taiwan by sea. A good checkers player might function on this time horizon. 18 Long Term: Strategic thinking, looking decades into the future, and giving consideration to aspects of the current system that will be changing

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fundamentally. Similar to the “grand strategy” level of military thinking. Examples: plans regarding a nation’s military or production capacity in several decades; US analyses done on the Soviet Union, Japan, China during the cold war and afterwards. A grand master of chess must consider many moves down the road, and the strategies he or she might use in later games against the same opponent. Chiliastic: Concerned with exceptionally long-term historical perspectives. Often too far in the future to grasp the realities of the current situation, or engaged in fanciful and unlikely possibilities. Almost a “science fiction” oriented approach, could be seen as wasteful of critical insight, since many of the assumptions will not be borne out by reality, and many unpredictable developments will emerge. Example: the United States’ strategic position after sea levels have risen significantly, or when human life expectancy has been increased to several centuries. Human beings do not usually play games with such horizons—often they extend beyond the length of one’s life—but this might include the horizons of a game designer who thinks about how new tests of skill will be developed with as yet uninvented technologies, and how they might be played. 19 While there is a clear distinction between the instantaneous and the immediate, for the purposes of this study they will both be considered under the immediate category. The instantaneous horizon is an important category to consider, but very difficult to document and analyze. As even a few moments pass and tempers cool, most leaders would be reluctant to share exactly what they were thinking in the heat of the moment, or even the dispassionate first impressions that none of us would usually share. 20 It is not common for policy makers to speak without forethought and deliberation, and much more so in a setting for public consumption. Examples to the contrary have a tendency to become popular news, with significant career-ending potential. These categories are in some part arbitrary, and upon close engagement with the relevant material we will not always see hard and fast distinctions between proximate horizons. A close reading of the discourse pertaining to a particular situation, and deeply considering the context of those decisions, will yield the greatest insight into the time frame that the decision-makers utilized in the process. For example, an approach that deeply engages with the source material, background and context will yield richer insight into the choice of language and the precise meaning of the referents used. Of course, what we will find will not perfectly correlate with every horizon, as the distinctions being made in this study do not necessarily reflect categories in the minds of the political leadership. Since the very concept of “time horizon” is often not predominant in the minds of the actors, its use in the decision-making process might have to be extracted through indirect analysis rather than direct observation.

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This suggests another methodological approach that may prove effective. It may also be useful to use a deep historical method, or a process tracing approach, looking closely into the material available to develop a detailed narrative of the thoughts and discussions that contributed to the decisions. The more deeply with which we engage the material, the greater the level of detail that can be extracted from the material, and the more accurately the nature of the decision-makers’ future-thinking can be determined. A study of the backgrounds of the primary decision makers leading up to the moment of our cases might be fruitful in terms of understanding what experiences might have had the greatest influence on their actions. Knowledge of the primary inputs in the actors’ character, worldview, style and personality would certainly yield better insight into the basis of how their decisions would be made. This will not always be effective in the case of every decision-maker, and might prove difficult in the case of the PRC leadership, but it can be useful with well-documented decision-makers like President Clinton. Of course, this project will face many of the same challenges with which other foreign policy analysis must grapple. The problem of reliability of sources when it comes to determining motivation is typical and to be expected, as is the difficulty of getting material from a less open state such as the PRC. In working with the American cases, there is a wealth of material, of varying reliability. Contemporary news reports, declassified meeting minutes, after-the-fact memoirs and later recollections, even secondary analysis can all shed light on the thoughts and motivations for the decisions that were made in our cases. But they are not equally available when it will come to investigating the PRC side. The fact of the matter is that we might not be as successful in determining which time horizon is preeminent in looking at the decision-making in our cases from the Chinese perspective because of the quantity and quality of sources, the political and cultural factors that make commenting on one’s decisions a less common phenomenon in China. However, we will be able to make some reasonably well-informed guesses even based on the official rhetoric, which in and of itself does reflect a system of values and priorities with respect to the preferred horizon of interest. The problem of reification is significant as well, as will be discussed in more detail in the case selection section below. Particularly in a project like this one, where the discourse about the implications of decisions will be analyzed, looking at the decision a “state” makes as a single entity can be tempting, but sometimes counter-productive. Many of the individuals responsible for particular decisions in each of our cases had their own unique perspective and therefore likely used a variety of time horizons in their decision-making. Of course, everyone is the result of his or her environment, and sometimes generalizations can be drawn about the shared assumptions and values of a political environment. In the case of the PRC, the distinction will be all the more difficult because of the closed decision-making process,

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and the importance placed on a shared “party line,” without public dissent or deviation. CASE SELECTION Using the US-China relationship as the focus of this study makes sense for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the strategic stakes of the interaction between these states are likely to be the highest of any state-to-state relationship in the coming century. Any theoretical approach that can give traction to increasing our understanding of the situation, and even potentially add predictive power to approaches to the behavior of these states, is of tremendous potential value. Additionally, the choice of these two states to analyze in terms of the time horizon approach makes sense because of the nature of each, how they contrast with each other, but how they are similar as well. Using the United States is a given in any contemporary study of great power decision-making. In addition to the fact that the majority of the foreign policy decision-making literature is about the US, there is a good deal of archive and memoir material available that can provide a level of detail to the decision-making process that is particularly helpful to this project. The PRC does not have those attributes to commend it. The literature on Chinese foreign policy is less extensive, and of course it is difficult to obtain material that sheds light on the deliberations and processes that lead to decisions in the PRC, especially “high stakes” decisions involving security. The Republic of China lies somewhere in between, particularly in the mid-1990s while it made the transition to democracy. However, there are key reasons why using these actors is the best choice in terms of theoretical payoff and potential for policy relevance. The US and the PRC are similar in certain ways that are useful for this study. They are both great powers that see a significant role for themselves in the shape that the international environment will take in the future, in terms of the distribution of power as well as the structure of the international system, and both hope to have a normative impact on that system. They are also both hegemonic-tending states that sometimes see the value in working in coalitions, but are willing to pursue policies without support or approval of the international community when the issue is seen as important. They often operate by working with other states by helping them to become more compatible with their value system. They both see themselves as highly influential powers that often stand against a sometimes hostile international environment that can oppose their vision for an optimum world order. For those reasons, the stakes of decisions, particularly security decisions, are especially high for both states on the world stage. 21

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There are also significant areas in which the states’ differences can prove methodologically useful. When it comes to developing a clearer picture of the role of this time-frame phenomenon in decision-making, the contrast between the PRC and the US is also useful. The relation of each state to history is quite different. While there have been many shifts in dynasty and form of government, many people in China see themselves as part of a three (or even five) thousand year old nation. 22 Whether this is historically accurate is not as important as the way in which it is invoked by leaders in discussing their identity, and how ingrained it is in their decision-making considerations. The United States often sees itself as a society of ideas, a nation of immigrants new to the international scene, but one that wields tremendous impact because of the power of its institutions and values. Length of time on the world stage is not nearly as important as the immediate influence and capacity to impact other states, hopefully for the better. 23 The form of government may also contribute to some difference in timethinking. As an ostensibly socialist state, the People’s Republic of China should be dedicated to longer-scale social progress and a long-term future of economic justice. Marxism is notorious for thinking in long time frames. 24 On the domestic scene, equality among individuals would more likely have been seen prior to economic reforms. The regime is attempting to bring some greater equality to combat the regional economic disparity, and is making some longer-term infrastructure investments to help facilitate that goal. That concept of equality is also a strong element of Chinese critiques about contemporary international relations, and is a key part of Beijing’s vision for the new world order of the twenty-first century. As a representative capitalist democracy, the United States might be expected to look at immediate economic or strategic payoffs, or rewards that would benefit the current administration within the current or for the next election cycle. This will be discussed below in further detail in the section on contributions to time horizon. In the broadest sense, studying the US and China can yield significant methodological leverage. The structural and relational similarities hold constant some of the factors that could impact a study of time horizon influence and blur some of the most important causal relationships. As discussed above, if the level of power and the perceived importance on the international scene between the states were more different, it might contribute to other differences in how the future is viewed. On the other hand, the concrete differences between the US and the PRC, such as their historical awareness and form of government, can shed some significant light on what differences can lead to a different future awareness, and more importantly, how that can affect policy. A good amount of work has been done comparing the sensibilities of Eastern and Western culture, to varying degrees of sophistication and sensitivity. While some of it may be too essentializing or fall into stereotype,

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other works have drawn some interesting conclusions about how time is seen differently, particularly with respect to historical awareness and the place of the society in history, but also with regard to ideas such as teleology, evolution, destiny, and learning from the past. 25 Finally, studying decisions made by these two states individually can contribute to an understanding of the relationship between the two. As Asia, and the PRC in particular, increases its economic and political influence, it is likely that the US-PRC interaction will be the most significant bilateral relationship in international affairs. Developing greater theoretical traction into that relationship will be of great use in future policy decisions. An understanding of the outcomes that are most valued, and in what distance into the future, in relation to the kinds of decisions that are made, can yield significant lessons into what kinds of decisions yield more effective results, both for each state, and in terms of their relationship. In a discussion of the US-PRC relationship, it is impossible to ignore the Republic of China on Taiwan. The ROC is the third actor that will be considered in contrast with the two nuclear powers, and its inclusion will be useful for a number of reasons. While it does not share many of the same characteristics that the United States and the People’s Republic of China do, the island is strongly invested in the development of each state, as well as in the nature and outcome of their relationship. Taiwan is also an integral part of both of our cases (see below), and as a state whose future is dependent on the way Beijing goes, Taipei’s policy-makers often provide a rich range of opinions regarding the future of China and its role in the world. Looking at the ROC will also be useful because of its differences from the two larger states. As a small, recently democratic and rapidly industrialized society, it has its own unique perspective on the present and future. Its identity is very much in flux, and even the question of its Chineseness is debated. But as a potential part of Chinese civilization with its own powerful contributions to make to East Asia, it can provide some very useful considerations of the future in many different horizons. In considering the US, the PRC, and ROC in a study of time horizons, a critical question would be which specific moments in their relationship would be the most politically significant in addition to providing the greatest insight into our theoretical framework. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis and the PRC’s WTO entry are natural candidates that can offer significant theoretical leverage. They are major milestones in terms of how the states interact, defining the nature of both military and economic relations. They were also recognized as significant at the time. They each had shortterm implications (confrontations, negotiation, diplomatic challenges), but it was clear that their long-term consequences and resolution would resonate for years to come.

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The utility of the two incidents studied in this project resides in the fact that they occurred long enough ago to be well-documented, with substantial commentary and the benefit of more than a decade of hindsight and context, but that neither of them has faded in relevance or centrality to the nature of the US-PRC relationship. In fact, when it comes to questions of hard power, these are the two episodes that have fundamentally defined the current conflicts of interest between the two powers (not to mention the vital, but precarious, position of Taipei and its vibrant democracy). The hard power relationship in the form of military interaction revolves around the Taiwan issue. The PRC is committed ideologically (and for internal domestic political reasons) to the eventual return of the island to become a part of greater China, and the United States has made a commitment to protecting the ROC. There has sometimes been some saber-rattling, and strong ideologues on both sides often push the imperative strategic and ethical facets of the issue. But there has been no incident that comes as close to coming to direct military conflict over this issue as the Straits Missile Crisis. Some of the circumstances in ROC, PRC, and US politics have changed since then, but it remains the best lens through which to understand the actors’ perspectives, and what they might consider for the future in a variety of distances. The economic side of hard power, particularly in the competition between the two powers and their future prospects, was defined by the PRC’s entry into the WTO. Certainly earlier moments, such as Deng Xiaoping’s decision to begin privatizing the economy, have had a more fundamental effect on the overall shape of the PRC’s wealth and development. When it comes to the event that has set the terms for the distribution of economic power in the beginning of the twenty-first century, the PRC’s membership in the trade organization, and its attendant discussion, best exemplifies the nature of the relationship and its potential repercussions. As we will see when we look at the case, the moment itself of accession had little of the national attention of the missile crisis; but in the decades to follow, the influence it might have in shaping the course of the coming century has the potential to be much more dramatic. THE VIEWS OF CHINA’S TIME HORIZONS: INTO THE FUTURE The perception of China’s inexorable progress into an ever-improving future can be found in many places, and it has many implications for policy. This is certainly true and measurable with respect to the PRC’s hard power. Even beyond the conflation between economic strength and military power (which will be discussed below), military spending in the PRC itself shows increas-

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ing growth in overall funds spent, as well as a commensurate interest in direct technological advancement from research and development. 26 Considerations of the strategic threat of the PRC by American policymakers motivated and helped shape the nature of US arms sales to the Republic of China. The quantity and sophistication of the technology was often influenced by estimates of the near future threat posed by the PRC, as well as political relations with it. The US military presence in the East Asian theater, both in terms of American troop deployment and the presence of certain kinds of arms systems (like missile defense) is motivated in great part by considerations of Beijing’s rising power. 27 In addition to the direct military evaluations, the link between economic power and military capacity is one of the oldest ideas in International Relations. As Thucydides wrote, “war is not so much a war of arms as a war of money by means whereof arms are useful, especially when it is a war of land men against sea men.” 28 Considering that the economic growth of the PRC in the ten years leading to the mid-1990s showed unrelenting growth, 29 there are clear implications over a long time scale. Nothing is certain, but even when disruptive events transpire, it seems as though China is fairly resilient. A good example is the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which showed Taiwanese vulnerability to economic forces in ways that did not affect the PRC’s economy. 30 Another vital demonstration of the interrelationship between the PRC’s economic and political power has been made possible by the democratization on Taiwan. The years leading up to the straits crisis saw the PRC becoming one of the ROC’s major trading partners, with Taiwanese firms becoming increasingly dependent on PRC investment. With that, the PRC could find itself with increasing influence on powerful ROC businessmen, who in a democratic state are in a position to influence politics and policy makers. This potential for influence and leverage over ROC policy is also directly connected with the perception of ongoing growth in the time horizons considering the PRC, since the factors that make it possible (investment in Taiwan, ROC democratization) are all demonstrably increasing in a consistent manner. Therefore decision-makers in the ROC would be likely to consider long-term choices in the light of rising PRC power and capability. With the strong emphasis on looking into the distant future for resolution of the cross-Strait relationship, we find the interesting (and possibly quite unusual) circumstance that the shorter time horizons in this relationship are limited, neglected, or even intentionally ignored. Many of the short-term actions were intended expressly to keep options open for the future. Because neither the mainland nor Taiwan is currently prepared for reunification, the time frame for resolution is cast into the more distant future. There are a number of factors that make short-term resolution unlikely or even inconceivable.

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Part of the difficulty lies in the historical circumstances in the time leading up to the moment of the crisis. Until the 1980s, the governments of both the ROC and the PRC held constant to a strong ideology of legitimacy. Each regime should be the true government for all of China, including both the mainland and the island. This status quo had its advantages for each side. For the PRC, maintaining these claims keeps its territorial and political goals central in its rhetoric and policy. A lack of a strong independence movement in the ROC meant that the PRC government was not presented with a need to take immediate action to retain its territorial claims; the political reality reflected a situation in which reunification remained an option for a time when both states would be better able to handle the implications. For Taipei, a lack of action provoking the PRC would well serve the interests of stability. Since the international community’s recognition of the PRC as the legitimate regime representing China in the United Nations two decades before, the Republic of China’s status had become more tenuous. The government on Taiwan became more dependent on the direct support of the states willing to have relations with the island despite the PRC’s strongarm tactics. These blows to the ROC’s international recognition and status and the corresponding rise in the PRC’s prospects have meant that a lack of dramatic developments was usually preferable. However, the changes in Taiwan leading up to the straits crisis, and the divergent paths that each state followed since the beginning of the 1990s, meant that new tensions and considerations would have to enter the calculations of the cross-straits relationship. The repeal of martial law and the accompanying burst of democratization spurred new priorities and interests for the people of Taiwan. As freedoms increased, there were increasing concerns on their part regarding their newfound rights and how they might be threatened by PRC involvement in their affairs. The massacre at Tiananmen Square just a few years before and the ensuing repression of political expression fanned the flames of those concerns. Beijing’s resumption of control over Hong Kong in 1997 would become a test case for how the “One China, Two Systems” approach would play out in reality as the central authority of the PRC went about incorporating such a strongly (chaotically) democratic state. The relatively smooth process of Hong Kong’s return did help alleviate some of those concerns about how Taiwan might be treated under a reunification, but it certainly did not alleviate all of them. There were several dramatic differences between the Hong Kong and the Taiwan cases. Most important, Taiwan is on an entirely different scale from Hong Kong, having been in essence an autonomous nation for half a century. Hong Kong had been a dependent colony for one hundred years and the reunification had been on a clearly defined timetable for decades, and the process was highly predictable, with minimal surprise.

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Well aware of (and highly sensitive to) the potential obstacles both external and internal, but also in consideration of its future prospects, the PRC has engaged in a variety of attempts to influence the island’s political system from within and without. The increasing ability of the mainland to exert economic influence has been discussed above, and many of its techniques in those areas depend on a lack of transparency. This is particularly important when bringing factors into play that would influence the ROC electorate. As with many efforts to meddle in democratic political systems, blatant efforts will often backfire as the electorate resents the attempt at manipulation. This takes on a particular dimension when there is the possibility for uncontrolled change. The fear of chaos, of luan (亂), is an important element in Chinese thinking, which traditionally has emphasized harmony as a primary goal. 31 It is important to the majority of actors in both states that the mechanisms of political change not only be unobtrusive, but also gradual in their impact. Why is that so important? Dramatic changes in the ambiguous status quo, anything that might be termed “progress” or “development” by one side, could be seen as negative or even disastrous by influential players on the other. For example, for the “green” independence parties of Taiwan, the island’s declaration of independence as a sovereign state would be a move towards recognizing the reality of the current situation, would allow greater involvement in international organizations, and allow Taiwan to develop as a unique culture further removed from the direct interference of the mainland. However, such a move would be seen by the PRC as an act of internal division and rebellion—or at least Beijing has made it clear to the international community that that is how it would be viewed and treated. And for many in Taiwan, the implications of that perception of threat and the actions it would require are not at all desirable. One of the most impressive things the PRC has done is to set up a strategic environment in which an inherently non-violent action (declaration of sovereignty or even an election considering the question of independence) could have direct violent consequences. Parties on both sides recognize that long-term developments will likely change the situation, though people are often hard pressed to state exactly how these developments will look. In fact, it could even be argued that much of the hope placed on postponing change on the cross-Strait situation is not the result of thoughtfully considered consequences, but rather an act of faith. It could even be described as an example of cognitive dissonance, in which many people embroiled in a tense situation attempt to justify their lack of action and immediate effort with the unjustified—and certainly unproven— hope that the circumstances will be more manageable in the distant future. More benignly, this could also be described as simple procrastination, or a willingness to push the responsibility for difficult situations on to later generations.

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It is not the task of this project to judge the practicality of these positions, but to better understand how their perspective on time impacts them. The main point to keep in mind at this point is that for many, if not the strong majority, the long term trends of development in East Asia will continue and move towards a future in which the irreconcilable difference of outlook can be reconciled. A number of CCP officials, speaking casually and off the record, often suggest that the PRC and ROC of the far future (at least several decades distant) will be much more similar and therefore conducive to reunification. So therefore, for people with that mindset, the best thing is to postpone these outcomes in deference to their visions of the shape of the future. CHINA: THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE A good part of our discussion has been about the simple distance into the future and how that might affect the decision-making process. Considering the future goes well beyond that metric alone. In addition to the extent of the distance into the future, there is also the variety of forms the future may be seen to take. In our chronological voyages and in mapmaking, we do not only look at scale and distance, but terrain and elevation as well. There are also contrasting landscapes when it comes to the form of a time horizon. One of the most common perspectives in looking at the shape that time will take is the view of the future of the PRC. It is often seen as an upward slope. To many pundits concerned about China’s rise and in the standard official perspective of the PRC, the state is traveling a long inevitable road to progress, development, and even superpower status. As with many views of the future, it is often informed by looking backward into the past. A great part of the “Rising China” view comes from recent trends of the years before. The ever present, uninterrupted (though cyclical or fluctuating) economic growth (until fall 2008, though this was not a consideration in the mid-1990s during our cases) points to a smooth line to anyone who equates GDP with national power. While that growth rate was not constant, and was not consistent even across all regions of China, growth in and of itself could be counted on as a given in the PRC political and economic environment. 32 The Beijing regime is very sensitive to the ways in which other political actors, particularly with respect to future potential, view them. Stereotypical thoughts about the idea of “face” notwithstanding, the PRC has engaged in a variety of policies and rhetoric intended to alleviate concerns about a rising Chinese hegemon in East Asia—one that is still evoked in many disputes with other Asian countries. 33 In the context of this anxiety, the PRC has placed great emphasis on the building of Asian and global networks of cooperation—contingent on the increasing power and influence of the PRC.

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These ideas would develop into the more fully fleshed out “harmonious world” and “harmonious society” concepts that will be discussed at length later in this text. But even in the mid-1990s, there were still moves by the PRC towards institutional cooperation and partnerships. 34 However, not everyone agrees on this optimistic view of increasing prosperity and cooperation. There are widespread concerns about the nature of Chinese growth and its implications for the future shape of East Asia, and the world. The literature describing the “China Threat” is extensive. Regardless of the rhetoric of peaceful cooperation, many people outside of the PRC are highly skeptical of the ability of a state, particularly a non-democratic one, to ascend in power and not pose an increasing threat. This is a foundation of the realist approach to international relations, but it can also be seen in schools of thought that look beyond the usual power politics and state interests. For example, much of the literature on Chinese nationalism observes that internal domestic considerations have a strong influence on hostility towards other nations. 35 Within the Chinese world as well, there is dissention and fear of the increasing wealth and power of which the PRC seems assured. One of the greatest concerns for the voices of Chinese dissent is the increase of government control and surveillance. The shape and form of the time horizon vis-àvis state power is still a rapidly changing slope, but not towards higher realms of progress. From their perspective the change is seen in a negative direction—increased governmental surveillance and suppression of dissent through technological advances. The willingness of western companies (such as Google) to work with the PRC belies the power of engagement to bring about liberal evolution, a hope whose advocates were considerably more optimistic in the mid-1990s. The co-option of the middle class, which might in itself indicate a positive contribution towards state stability, the parallel increase of standard of living and the more equitable distribution of resources, 36 while positive in and of themselves, could also point to state tactics with the more sinister goal of obstructing political liberalization. The PRC case can also be subject to great uncertainty, and contingent on a number of factors. With the upward slope of economic development come concerns about increasing inequality between classes and regions, and potentially greater protests. The effective co-optation of the increasing urban middle classes through a higher standard of living, and deflection by many Chinese intellectuals by means of inflaming nationalist pride, will mean a repetition of the Tiananmen protests is not likely. However, it is entirely possible that rural unrest or even a peasant based revolution the kind Mao himself praised might be the unintended consequences of inconsistent growth. 37 It might not be akin to the Tai Ping rebellion in terms of scale, 38 but even minor unrest could require government repression, and with it exposure of the regime’s vulnerabilities, and international embarrassment.

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There are other causes for concern. Instability in North Korea, border disputes with an increasingly nationalistic Russia, global economic slowdowns are all sources of possible “rough terrain” on the relatively smooth incline of the PRC’s time horizon. The fervent nationalism that the PRC has fanned in order to deflect criticism and justify an increasingly hollow and inconsistent ideology could easily boomerang and manifest itself as internal criticism, violent demonstrations, or other varieties of undesirable chaos. And of course, a great source of uncertainty for the shape of the PRC’s future is the question of Taiwan. If we were to engage in the world of counter-factuals, the relationship between the PRC and the ROC might have developed to the point where a Taiwanese declaration of sovereignty as an independent nation might not prove threatening to the PRC, and the PRC might not be in a place where its former promises, and even its legitimacy, would not depend on forcing the ROC to maintain the possibility for reunification. 39 The circumstances being what they are, a Taiwanese move towards independence would be a huge challenge to the credibility and nationalist self-perception of the PRC, and driven by a number of time horizon perspectives, the Beijing regime would work to prevent such a direction. Their strategies, and how the different time horizons have motivated them, will be considered in our case studies. TIME HORIZONS AND AMERICA’S FUTURE While there has been much pontification about the scope and direction of China’s future, there has been comparable thought devoted to the context of America’s past and the shape its future will take, with a wider range of possibilities. As the world’s only superpower and greatest source of political, cultural and economic influence, the fate of the United States is in many ways the fate of the current international system. It is understandable why so many people contemplate the future in store for it, and why passions run so high because of the investment that people put in to different perspectives on that future. The competing views of US prospects are as diverse as any pontifications on the future. Much more commonly than for China, there can be found a range of grim assessments for the nation’s prospects. America is often portrayed as being at a plateau, with the twentieth century seen as the “apogee of US hegemony.” As global relationships become less defined by aspects of “hard power” and the balance of industrial capacity continues to tip towards the developing world, it seems difficult to ignore the signs of the decline of America’s preeminence. This was particularly commonplace after the September 11 attacks, but could also be found in the literature on America’s long term horizons during the mid to late 1990s, the period of our cases. 40

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As other powers increase their own capacities with respect to the US, not only nations but also non-state actors, the emergence of new rivals and threats in the post-Cold War world leaves much more room for uncertainty about the form of America’s future, and its prospects in the longer time horizons. The increase of “disruptive” force, the ability of actors with limited resources to interfere with the orderly functioning of large-scale powers, can also make for particular incidents that can dramatically change the direction of development. 41 The horizon of America’s future is clouded by ambiguity and its dependence on specific circumstances, and it is difficult to look into the far distance with any clarity. Right after the period of our cases, criticism of the “Pax Americana,” “American Empire” and “overreach” point to historical parallels of powerful hegemonic societies past their prime and entering decline. 42 However, the lack of a rosy consensus about the direction of America’s future does not mean that all prospects are bleak. In addition to the many strengths and advantages that the US continues to have on the world stage, 43 there have been repeated instances in the past where the US has defied the prediction of conventional wisdom and recovered in the face of bleak expectations about its future. The 1970s saw recession in the US economy and vulnerability to the whims of OPEC. The 1980s’ military spending excesses and deficit spending, coupled with the prospect of a rising Japan, did not bode well for America’s future either. Scholars like Inoguchi foretold of America’s inevitable decline due to a variety of economic and political factors, citing the pattern of other great world-spanning powers. 44 Yet those predictions were not borne out by reality, and the United States’ position in the mid to late 1990s during the Straits Crisis and the WTO admission process was in many ways advantageous. The Soviet Union was no longer a threat, resources could be moved from military spending as a “peace dividend,” and a new wave of technological innovation spurred a period of growth and surplus. Developments since that time may point again to a more ambiguous direction for the future, but the past has shown us that pessimism is not always justified. Globalization has brought changes, many of whose immediate implications are complicating, to say the least. Terrorism, flight of manufacturing overseas, criticism in the international community, worldwide antiAmericanism and accusations of imperial overreach all detract from the assurance of a particular future direction; but in looking at the past, we can see that previous dire predictions have not been borne out. In a broader sense, even if the zero-sum prospects for America as a nation are not the brightest in the face of international trends, the prospects for America as an idea, a system of values, looked promising. The late 1990s saw an explosion of worldwide connections as the concept of “globalization” captured the popular mind. 45 As obstacles to trade diminished and communi-

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cations technologies improved, the barriers between peoples would fall, and a new worldwide society and economy could develop. The looming challenges of ethnic conflict, economic inequity, environmental degradation could be ameliorated by means of the new “global village,” assisted by means of the institutional rules that would hold the system in place. These rules, the institutions that enforce them, the technology that made it all possible, were predominantly American innovations. It was also hoped that as the peoples of the developing world were exposed to a wealth of new progressive ideas and their leaders would be unable to hide their conduct from the outside world, repressive regimes would have no choice but to liberalize and eventually move towards democracy, the apparent trend of the late twentieth century, exemplified by the transformations of the post-Soviet regimes such as Poland and the Czech Republic. 46 The vision of a future that might see the flourishing and triumph of American ideals might also reveal the vulnerability of American power under such a system—in the long term. Even if one argues that globalization benefits everyone, it does not benefit everyone equally, and those concerned with zero-sum gains might have reason for concern. As global standards of living rise, and the wealth of developing nations increases commensurate with their size and population, the United States’ relative advantages might begin to evaporate. A rising tide might lift all boats, but the smaller vessels might be able to bob higher with the rolling waves. When newly industrializing states can take advantage of the trial and error of the innovation of the developed nations, they can build their technological base more cheaply and easily. Those nations’ growth would be more rapid, and would seek to consume a greater proportion of the world’s resources, take a greater proportion of global trade, and seek a comparable increase in state power in the international system. 47 Assuming there are no radical changes in the US or global economic systems, the fruition of the American-inspired free market system might mean the undoing of American preeminence. From a political perspective, the flourishing of democratic values could also negatively impact the relative power of the United States. Some nations contain populations that could prove more anti-American than their leadership, and a more democratic system in those states could prove challenging for US policy objectives. 48 Additionally, in the global polity that could emerge as the result of democratizing principles, either a forum that gives each country a comparable voice, or one in which influence is proportional with overall population, America’s ability to influence international policy could be formally curtailed. Add this to the potential for a decreased share of the global economic power, and the United States could become like modern-day Greece—widely acknowledged as the original source of some of our most cherished political values, but a shadow of the world-spanning power it once held. 49

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However real these outcomes and concerns might be, they are uncommon in the rhetoric of American policy-makers. This makes sense for a number of reasons. Politicians would be unlikely to point out the vulnerabilities of their policies, particularly in a time horizon well beyond any tenure in which they might still be in power. American leaders would also be loath to discuss the fundamental values that the US has championed, such as democracy and the free market, in negative terms. Not only would that ring hollow in a domestic context, but such worries might be seen as petty by an international audience, in which the American leadership might be seen to be hypocritically more concerned with the preservation of national power than the genuine interest in their ostensible goals for the world system. In addition, the nature of thinking about the longer-term future, as we will see in the next chapter in the discussion of Construal Theory, often entails a greater degree of optimism. The possible risks to American relative power of a liberal world order fade in comparison to the triumphs they might represent—for the realization of worldwide political and economic freedom, American exceptionalism seems a small price to pay. Since that would only be possible in a distant future in any case, and the past dangers to US preeminence often turned out to be false threats, it would not be unreasonable to be confident in pursuing such a vision for the international order. In the time period of our cases, much looked promising for the United States in the immediate future and the shorter horizons, and the reasons for concern in the longer horizon might prove to be non-issues over time. Much of this optimism drove the longer-term horizons in American thinking and policy-making, as we will see in our case studies. TIME HORIZONS AND THE “STATE” OF TAIWAN If the scope of temporal transformation in the PRC reflected a bold sweep upwards, and America had ascended to its apogee, poised to move in a way befitting its future role in the world, then the Republic of China’s future was the most dramatically uncertain. The ROC had undergone its shift from an agrarian to an industrialized economy more fully than the PRC, and more comprehensively, taking place across all societal levels. This transformation did not come from an abrupt shift stemming from a sudden change in central policy, but from the same development process experienced by many other countries in Asia. What change did emerge as the result of a dramatic central decree was the ROC’s process of democratization, which occurred at the same time as the mainland’s economic acceleration. With the death of Chiang Kai-shek and the succession of his son Chiang Ching-kuo to the presidency, liberalization began to transform the repressive state, which had been under the longest

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duration of martial law in history. 50 By the end of his presidency in the late 1980s, opposition parties were legal—and flourishing—allowing the public discussion of alternate views of Taiwan’s history and future. This led to a flowering of diverse perspectives in the public sphere, including the emergence of thoughts on truly disparate paths that the island might take. These run the gamut from continuity of the original KMT doctrine, unwilling to relinquish claims to authority over all of China, 51 to a moderate path of flexible “waiting to see” uncertainty, to a desire for a complete split from the mainland and the culmination of a uniquely Taiwanese identity. Since the political transformations of the 1980s represented such a radical break from the past, it is likely that the memory of that quality of political change over time influenced many Taiwanese in their thoughts for the future. There were severe constraints on Taipei’s freedom of action in the international community and even in domestic policy, but that could change at any moment—after all, it had before. In contrast with the optimism that was widely felt regarding Taiwan’s potential political prospects, the economic outlook was not as sanguine by the time of our second case. While the island’s economic growth and stability had earned it solid credentials as one of the “dragons” of finance and well earned fiscal confidence during the straits crisis, the Asian Economic Crisis took its toll on the island, hampering and even stagnating its growth by the end of the decade. In the same way that the Taiwanese saw the possibility of tectonic shifts in the political order because of their experience in the recent past, so too did they see their once solid economy resting on shakier ground, vulnerable to rapid shifts in both the near and distant horizon. This will be discussed more extensively in the chapter on the WTO case. NOTES 1. Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation, especially Chapters 1 and 6. 2. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. 3. See G. J. Whitrow, What is Time?. 4. Roeckelein, The Concept of Time in Psychology, p. 5. 5. O’Driscoll, et al. Economics of Time and Ignorance, pp. 53–56. 6. Li Ruoxin, Kurt Gibble, and Krzysztof Szymaniec, “Improved accuracy of the NPLCsF2 primary frequency standard: evaluation of distributed cavity phase and microwave lensing frequency shifts.” Metrologia 48:5, October 2011. 7. Slife, Time and Psychological Explanation, p. 59 8. Slife, Ibid., p. 60. 9. Hoffman, Time, p. 65. 10. Friedman, About Time, p. 84. 11. This will be a major consideration in our psychological studies described in the next chapter. For a detailed study into the deeper philosophical implications of time in political theory, see Nathan Widder’s comprehensive and sophisticated Reflections on Time and Politics. 12. Kula, Time Discounting and Future Generations, p. 7.

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13. Hancock, Cognitive Differences in the Ways Men and Women Perceive the Dimension and Duration of Time, p. 153. 14. Canter, “Intention, Meaning, and Structure: Social Action in its Physical Context.” In Ginsburg, et al. Discovery Strategies in the Psychology of Action, p. 184. 15. Fischhoff, “For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight.” In Kahneman, et al., Judgment Under Uncertainty, p. 335. 16. There is a wealth of material in the field of discourse analysis. I refer the reader to such classic texts as Geis’ The Language of Politics, Wilson’s Politically Speaking, as well as the work of Chilton, Wodak, and Menz. 17. The use of game analogies is commonplace in International Relations literature, particularly references to poker. For an application of this metaphor directly to the China–US–Taiwan relationship, see Steve Chan, “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 31, no. 3 (Fall 2004), p. 169ff. 18. I do not mean to insult people who play checkers rather than chess, but it does seem that world-class matches of the two games occur in different time frames. 19. There are many fans of Harry Potter who are eagerly awaiting the day when portable anti-gravity will allow “quidditch” matches to occur. 20. For more on the problems that can come from always speaking one’s mind without taking time to considering the outcome, Moliere’s character Alceste, the title character of his Misanthrope, provides a valuable example. Through his complete lack of tact and concern for the feelings of others, he ends up the victim of a lawsuit and loses his love. He is portrayed as a flawed hero, principled but ultimately self-defeating. His friend Philinte, advocate of a middle path, sensitive to the needs of people living together in society but not obsequiously flattering, ends up with the happier life (and the girl!). 21. Of course, the similarity of the states in those dimensions also suggests another direction for this approach in future studies. It could also prove insightful to contrast the ways that leaders of great to middle power states view the future, since that idea of “stakeholding” would be different. 22. For example, “China: a country with 5,000-year-long civilization.” Section heading on the Chinese government official web portal: http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_20912.htm 23. There are people in the US who evoke earlier political traditions, presenting America as the inheritor of Athenian democracy, Roman public service and virtue, British justice. This is not a common strain in contemporary political discourse, particularly in discussion of China relations, but it is something to keep in mind as an alternative take on the relationship of history to the United States. 24. While Marx himself considered the process of communist revolution to be an impending inevitable result of economic and historical forces in the relatively short term, the implications of his theory extended decades or centuries ahead in their consideration of the emergence of a “workers’ paradise.” Later activists and writers working in the Marxist vein often used similar grand scales in their work, such as Lenin, Mao Zedong, and even contemporary academics, such as Hardt and Negri’s Empire. 25. To run the risk of over-generalization, the overall trend in the comparative literature points to a longer time horizon in the Asian context, and a strong emphasis on shorter range outcomes in the West. This is not surprising considering the length of historical awareness and sense of cultural continuity in Chinese culture, and the emphasis on problem-solving and public opinion that is part of Western, democratic societies. 26. Precise data on military spending by the PRC is notoriously difficult to obtain—many of the figures released do not reflect additional resources and inputs that indirectly support the PLA. China’s interest in certain kinds of military capability—such as a “blue water” navy, amphibious landing capability, and precision munitions, will be discussed at length in the Missile Crisis case. 27. This is not to underestimate the much more direct and immediately dangerous threat of North Korea, of course. However, the presence of a missile defense system in East Asia would be of great tactical value should Beijing’s threats to use military options against Taipei come to

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pass. After all, the primary way that the PRC attempted to influence the ROC during this crisis was through the implicit use of attack by missile. 28. Peloponnesian War, translated by Thomas Hobbes, edited by David Grene, section 1.83, p. 48. I leave it to the reader to decide whether the contrast between land and sea people applies in the contrast between the PRC and ROC, or even the US, as the state with the greater ability to project its power across oceans. 29. While the rate itself did vary in a cyclical fashion, the overall trajectory of growth was always in the upward direction, and even a decrease in the positive growth rate (not a negative rate of growth, mind you) can be construed as improving the “quality” of that growth: “It is true that China’s cyclical growth rate is set to fall. But the reasons usually cited for this are wrong. Moreover, many commentators also fail to see that while headline growth will falter, the quality of this growth will improve, auguring well for China in the long term.” Chi Lo, “China’s Growth: A Quid-Pro-Quo.” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 164, issue 7, Feb. 2001, p. 33. 30. Though part of the PRC’s relative immunity to the fallout from the Asian Economic Crisis was due to the mainland’s state of underdevelopment compared to most hardest-hit states of Asia, a gap that has been closing. The impact of the recent global economic crisis on China reflects this change, and speaks to future vulnerability as well. 31. Concerns about chaos were often cited as the motivation behind the repression of the Tiananmen protests; fear of them accelerating out of control and spurring a Soviet Union-style collapse was fresh in the minds of the CCP, particularly during Gorbachev’s 1989 visit. The desire for harmony can be seen in the more recent appeals to the “Harmonious World” made by Beijing over the last few years. 32. “Chinese economic growth has been rapid and sustained over the past two decades but has varied significantly across regions. . . . We find considerable differences in the sensitivity of provincial growth rates to fluctuations in the national growth rate, with the most sensitive provinces generally having the highest average growth rates. Thus continued increases in the national rate will exacerbate disparities.” Groenewold, Nicolaas, Lee Guoping, Chen Anping. “The Cyclical Behaviour of Regional Growth Rates in China,” Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, vol. 11, issue 1, Jan. 2005, p. 91. 33. The island disputes with a number of countries, the nationalist conflicts with Japan, controversial support and engagement with some of the regimes of greatest concern in Asia, such as Myanmar and North Korea. This is to say nothing about its strong-arm tactics with respect to Taiwan. 34. For more on this trend, particularly with respect to its later development and expansion, see David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29(3), Winter 2004/05, pp. 64–99. 35. Good examples can be found in Gries and Rosen, State and Society in 21st century China, particularly in the articles by Gries, “Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation in China,” pp. 180–194, and Gries and Rosen, “Popular Protest and State Legitimation in 21st Century China,” pp. 1–23. 36. For example, see Luigi Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing,” The China Journal, January 2004, pp. 1–26. 37. Although this is not very likely in itself—the erosion of the strict residency assignment process (the dankou) has meant a large portion of the young rural population has migrated to the cities to find work. This “floating population” is in itself a source of potential instability, but as a perpetual underclass in the urban context they are more manageable by the state than in the countryside. 38. The Taiping rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century saw some 30 million people in rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. Its Christian-influenced ideology was appealing to the lowest segments of Chinese society who formed its primary ranks. 39. There are many ways in which this alternate reality might have come about—an increasingly liberalizing PRC that had not repressed the student protests in Tiananmen, or a China in which the Cultural Revolution had not been as severe. Had Chiang Kai-Shek not insisted on his regime’s entitlement to the mainland and not contributed to the “one China” concept, perhaps had sought to establish an independent Taiwanese state in the 1950s while the

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PRC was still working to consolidate power over the mainland, the PRC might not have been in a position to take effective action, and the US policy toward for the ROC could have proved more unambiguously supportive throughout the Nixon years and beyond. Those possible windows, missed opportunities and fictions are interesting and even instructive to consider, but are not the main stuff of this project (though the alternative paths of time are a definite factor in the consideration of time horizons). 40. The extensive literature on “American Empire” spans a wide range of subject matter and political perspectives. Some of most highly critical work in this field, which includes the work of people like Chalmers Johnson and Noam Chomsky, can be found at the American Empire Project (www.americanempireproject.com). 41. This would be particularly prophetic for the dramatic changes in America’s trajectory after the September 11 attacks. 42. There are a variety of texts in this tradition, such as Hardt and Negri’s Empire, and Paul Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. 43. In addition to its strengths in research and innovation, a number of economic factors point to a solid foundation despite some vulnerabilities. The unquestioned power and advanced technology of its military, its soft power through the popularity of its cultural products, the advantages of geography and the potential contributions of educated classes eager to immigrate are all strengths that will help deal with any challenges. 44. See Takashi Inoguchi, Wars as International Learning, MIT Ph.D dissertation, unpublished. 45. For example, the works of Thomas Friedman, such as The Earth is Flat, exemplify this idea. 46. This also pointed to the risks of removing repression too quickly, as the “ethnic cleansing” that plagued many post-Soviet states could attest. The pace of liberalization would always remain in the minds of the Chinese leadership, as we will discuss. 47. Under a realist interpretation—other theories of International Relations might consider the possibility of a state that would not seek such power. 48. A fear of rampant anti-American sentiment unchecked by political authority has often been a key motivation in US support for authoritative regimes, particularly in the Middle East. 49. The very idea of America’s ultimate success in its long-term objectives facilitating its ultimate downfall sounds like a Greek tragedy—the triumphant children kill their father, the fulfillment of one’s wishes leading to their downfall. 50. The ROC’s martial law officially extended from 1949 until 1987. Certainly other nations have extended similar lengths of oppressive government, other peoples have suffered worse repression under regimes not operating under the official auspices of martial law, and many of the more repressive aspects of the ROC legal system (such as the control over the press and banning of rival political parties) were not removed until after the lifting of martial law. [See Kissinger, On China, p. 471.] However, the fact that government repression in the ROC became enshrined in official policy at the same time that the PRC was founded, and that the dramatic liberalization occurred simultaneously to the stark contrast of the Tiananmen crackdown, serves to highlight the difference in the path the two regimes chose to take. 51. Though this political path would be quickly discarded from the ROC’s political culture, with the claims to authority over the mainland officially abandoned in 1991.

Chapter Two

Vantage Points and Abounding Horizons Analytical Insights and Interdisciplinary Connections

While it seems as though this specific approach to looking at time scale has not been widely utilized in looking at great power decision-making, I do not intend to say that the importance of time has been completely neglected in the field, or that my direction of research is completely novel when it comes to thoughts about decision-making in International Relations. In fact, the number of decisions that have instant outcomes or manifest all consequences immediately is negligible, and this has not been ignored by the literature. In human affairs, the implications of decisions extend into the future. This has definitely been a key aspect of some fields of Political Science. Time always plays a role in the study of politics. Whether it is looking at a case from the past as a subject of analysis, or a consideration of present-day events with regard to the later implications, or long-term conjecture about the future, the use of time cannot be avoided. The question is, how deliberately is it being considered in the study of Political Science and in International Relations, and what work in other fields and disciplines can contribute the most insight to our project? HORIZONS IN (AND) POLITICAL SCIENCE Timely Decisions and Essential Policy Since this project is ultimately a study of decision-making and the influences upon it, it would be useful to consider some of the most relevant aspects of 29

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how the policy process is analyzed. While this study will argue that the time horizon chosen will have a significant impact on the weighing of values and the ultimate decision process and outcome, there are many variables that contribute to the process. Some might even be ultimately inextricable from what might be considered key influences on the selection of time horizon, and as a result, must perhaps be integrated into the basic motivations that drive this important cognitive process. When it comes to distinguishing and analyzing the myriad factors that influence state behavior and the policy-making process, one of the classic works in the field is Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War. 1 His three “images” point to three realms of politics that contribute to the decisionmaking process. His fundamental question was the cause of war, but his system can be applied to a variety of issues in international relations. Waltz’s first “image” refers to the nature of the individual and the corresponding contributions to the violent tendencies that lead to war, and attempts to understand it through the behavioral sciences. This level of analysis is clearly vital in understanding our time horizon concept—this project will utilize a great deal of work in the behavioral sciences, including psychology and economics, to explain how the time horizon functions and why a particular time horizon is favored. The second “image” is the “internal structure of states,” the domestic political environment. This will be articulated in greater detail by later scholars of Political Science. For our purposes, there are a variety of domestic structural sources that will contribute to what future distance is prioritized. I will expand on this immediately below in the discussion of Allison’s work. The third image refers to the international context, specifically its anarchic nature. While certainly more difficult to effectively determine as a source of time horizon thinking, we will see in our studies of the policy-makers that thinking about the nature of the international system is a significant factor in motivating a particular horizon. Waltz, whose ostensible purpose was to unravel and solve the problem of war, often considered the nature of various time frames in his project. “Raising the question of practicability has led to the identification of two constant and pervasive difficulties: the time required for change and the timing of the changes.” 2 Waltz attempts to consider even extremely distant time horizons, though he does not see what might change the circumstances of international relations in that far future. “Of the suggestions here given, it is hard to see how the ones that a government might follow could bring the world peace in the near or in the far-distant future.” 3 To expand on the “first image,” many scholars working in a behaviorist vein considered modes of thinking that lead to decision-making processes that do not conform to the standard rational actor model. Cognitive “short-

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cuts” or “defects” like cybernetic thinking, 4 the operational code, 5 and groupthink 6 come into play under a variety of circumstances, often with a temporal element (insufficient time to fully consider all options, the time pressure of a crisis situation, the restraining rhythm of institutional structure). These will be touched upon in the Psychology section, and during the course of our cases. Another now classic work in the analysis of foreign policy is Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, a study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As in Waltz’s work, possible influences of foreign policy behavior are divided into three distinct areas. His Model I focuses on the “rational actor,” similar to Waltz’s first image, emphasizing the role and action of the single leader and his or her role in a crisis. Model II, the “organizational process,” looks at the “standard operating procedures” 7 of the myriad institutions or groups that make up the apparatus of the state, and how their “business as usual” can affect policy outcomes, often to the detriment of more deliberate or collaborative thinking. We have discussed (and will continue to build upon) the role that time horizons have within an individual’s mind, either using pure rationality or otherwise. As for the second model, organizations would have unique time horizons associated with their own institutional methods and goals, the horizon associated with the preferred results and vision of the organizational mission. Model III is “governmental politics,” distinct from the second model in that it considers the jockeying for position and authority undertaken by political institutions and the people within them. Often referred to as the “bureaucratic politics” model, it attracted a great deal of critical attention at the time, and while it does not possess the same influence it once did in the field of foreign policy analysis, 8 it can provide a valuable source of insight with regard to understanding the policy decision process in a number of cases. Sometimes the time horizons that emerge as the result of this methodological approach would reflect individual preference and vision within a bureaucratic context, while others might better be interpreted as the horizons considered most effective for the success of the organization within the context of interagency conflicts that develop in a regime. Presumably this would reflect a more shallow vision for the future than a selfless institutional goal, but that of course would depend on the mission and procedures of the organization. How might the time horizon model be integrated in these works, and others that seek to clarify the myriad influences on the policy-making process? The individual level interpretations, though often weighted towards the rational actor model, can easily incorporate the idea of time horizon as part (or the product) of the many cognitive theories that work to explain the commonly observed disparity between rational expectations and real world decision-making.

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Some of the more recent work in Foreign Policy Analysis attempts to strengthen the interactions among fields that were previously divided in these analytical models. With respect to the individual level, Crossing psychological and rational choice models of foreign policy analysis generates a neobehavioral model of IR, in which theories from the older behavioral research program and the newer rational choice program form a theoretical alliance . . . This alliance resembles previous developments in economics where classical rational choice models are giving way to a mix of psychological-behavioral and rational choice models to explain the dynamics of economic decision-making . . . the emergence of similar developments in Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations may represent a potential renaissance of the behavioral revolution in political science, i.e., a “new” behavioral movement that combines the positive features of political psychology and rational choice research programs. 9

As for combining the insights of the larger-scale models or images with the functioning of individual decision-making, “[t]he principles of substantive rationality that focus on the external context (domestic and international conditions) of state behavior need to be supplemented with the principles of bounded rationality that focus on the internal source (beliefs, emotions, and motivations) of individual behavior.” 10 This area of cross-fertilization between the levels of analysis is the same place in which the time horizon concept will prove most useful—it is a cognitive process happening within an individual, but external influences play a vital role in shaping it. Beyond the methods that directly approach the question of analyzing foreign policy, there are a number of sub-fields of Political Science and International Relations that have direct application to our attempt to understand the role of time in decision-making. Time for a Game Game theory is a branch of mathematics that has been applied to fields as diverse as economics, computer science, and biology. In political science, it has been used in analyzing domestic politics, and is one of the classic approaches to looking at state-to-state interaction over time. While sometimes less complex than some other theoretical constructions, it is particularly concerned with the progress of time and the consideration of varying distances into the future. Using the basic assumptions of that rational actor model, game theory works to develop models for certain types of interactions in which the abstracted “players” seek to optimize their payoffs in a variety of competitive formats. In addition to idealized games that exits in purely hypothetical circumstances like the classic “prisoner’s dilemma,” game theory also searches for real-life applications of game models to interaction in the

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real world. This could include individuals at the bargaining table, corporations, political candidates, nations in the international arena. The emphasis given to payoff and risk depends on looking at decisions and their later outcomes. While the most basic game models talk about one payoff at one particular moment, more sophisticated models consider later iterations, or relative differences in cost/benefit balances at different times. Robert Axelrod’s work modeling repeated iterations of the basic “prisoner’s dilemma” game pointed to a change in the most effective strategies over time, both for an individual and for the collective system. 11 Hollis and Smith discuss the work done on extending individual events into a longer sequence, in which both past and future are always taken into account. This was a particularly salient feature of modeling during the height of the cold war, in which considerations of nuclear deterrence helped determine the “stakes” for one of the most chilling games in history. 12 It becomes more difficult to expand these models and develop effective predictive or prescriptive methods for realworld interactions. This might not be easy, but it is important. For example, “the paradoxical result [of how game series decompose into a series of oneshot games] . . . may not apply where the series is indefinitely long (meaning not that it is infinitely long but that is does not have a limit known in advance), thus leaving a probability that defections will not be free. The theoretical ground is tricky.” 13 A useful analogy in understanding the importance of time horizon is literal game-playing. For example, in the case of a chess player, the amateur is concerned with learning the rules, making sure that each immediate move does not result in some kind of disastrous outcome, such as losing one’s queen because the player didn’t see that it was in immediate risk of being taken. An intermediate player may be thinking a few moves ahead, anticipating what might result from a move after several moves by the opponent. A more advanced player may be thinking in terms of the overall outcome of the game, and how even the earliest moves would have an impact in the final strategy. A grand master may not think of the individual game, but of how this match fits in with the history of tournaments, series of games, and how the strategy and outcome of this game will affect later games and tournaments. 14 Fight (for) the Future The field of deterrence theory depends on decision-makers considering implications for the future. Without that, no one could be deterred. Time scale enters into this discussion. How far into the future will those consequences be considered, and what factors affect that length of time, are questions that deterrence theorists have grappled with. The concept of precedent-setting, an idea that will play a significant role in the Taiwan Straits case, has been

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developed in this field as well. Deterrence can depend on the kind of precedent that has been set, thereby affecting how actors could potentially be deterred. As Freedman observed in his work on deterrence, “every act of foreign policy has some significance for the creation of expectations of future performance . . . this can have long-term consequences. How one deters now will have an impact on how much one might have to deter in the future.” 15 This future-oriented aspect of precedent is a significant indication of a longer time-scale perspective, and will be a key part of the analysis of the cases. Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? Beyond the use of future thinking in conflict studies, it has also been incorporated into work on cooperation. The idea of the “shadow of the future” is a key aspect of Axelrod’s work (which also could have been placed under game theory as well), when he looks at the factors affecting the decisions actors make with respect to the rewards and liabilities of cooperating. For cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently large shadow. This means the importance of the next encounter between the same two individuals must be great enough to make defection an unprofitable strategy . . . it requires that the players have a large enough chance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance of their next meeting too greatly. 16

A time horizon runs through this metaphorical landscape. The “discounting” Axelrod discusses is primarily dependent on the thoughts of the decisionmaker and the value he or she places on some interaction in the future. This is more systematically approached in the Temporal Discounting Theory used in the fields of Economics and Psychology, which attempts to systematize how decisions are valued (or discounted) through the use of experimental studies. This will be discussed later in this chapter. In a more traditional treatment of cooperation, Kant’s inquiry into “Perpetual Peace” takes both a short and long term view of how states’ decisions and values can be shaped towards a more stable and free international society. 17 In the short term, the nations that make up the world must move towards republican rule, to better represent the will of their citizens. As a result of those domestic changes, the international community will become less prone to war from the hunger for power that individual despots might have. In essence, the ultimate vision Kant had relied on the shorter-term details informing the longer term changes on a greater scale. We will see this hope for international stability and cooperation in some of the chiliastic visions in our case studies.

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Leading to the Future Continuing our consideration of the role of the individual in the decisionmaking process, theories of leadership also analyze leadership styles based on how far into the future individual leaders look. Some approaches to the study of leadership look at the contrasts in how well a leader can read the “spirit of the times.” Some particularly visionary 18 leaders sense the direction in which society will be moving, and act on those future values. Other leaders depend on the whim of the people and their current perspective, which is much less “forward looking.” In a broader sense, the idea of time has been looked at in a variety of ways. The use of the past is a vital aspect of cognitive approaches that focus on the use of analogy, such as Neustadt and May in their Thinking in Time. What kind of historical lessons people choose to use will affect the decision they make regarding future outcomes. The use of history is also considered in constructivist approaches that look at how a state’s identity is developed using particular narratives regarding the past. 19 In a different vein, time has been used in several studies regarding the time constraints on decision-making. Not only have several scholars pursued this idea, but it was identified by Chollet and Goldgeiger as a key direction to expand the work of Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 20 The psychological and economics literature to be discussed has explored that idea extensively. 21 Prospects are Good The concept of Prospect Theory was first presented in an economics journal as the result of a collaboration between an economist and a psychologist, and reflects the interests and approaches of both disciplines. It argues that the “framing” or “editing operations” of the options for a decision, particularly one under risky circumstances, has a significant impact on the selection of a choice. This includes the justification of gambling risks, and the relative gains and losses perceived under different situations. Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 study has influenced a variety of disciplines, and Political Science has taken advantage of its insights in developing a powerful approach to decision-making. Prospect Theory is of particular relevance in the time horizon concept. “The idea of “framing” investigates how options are weighed. In prospect theory, decisions are influenced by how options are first “framed.” In this way, uncertainty in judgment prior to choice plays a crucial role in framing options for subsequent evaluation, or decision making.” 22 This is quite similar to how time horizon theory seeks to understand how an actor’s cognitive priorities serve to influence his or her decisions.

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However, there are key differences that set the time horizon concept apart from how Prospect Theory operates. Prospect theory often seeks to explain decision-making that is problematic, that in some way deviates from perfectly “rationally” informed decisions. This can include excessive risk aversion or risk-taking under different conditions, or being subject to a variety of “biases” that can adversely affect the decision process. The framing process, for example, is one in which information is presented in a certain way that can influence how the decision is seen, and thereby affect the ultimate decision. “Framing tasks fall prey to systematic judgmental biases that are often labeled “judgmental heuristics.” Such biases in judgment can thus substantially affect how options come to be framed.” 23 Prospect Theory, like many approaches that seek to understand how decisions are made, look at situations where the information about the circumstances and the outcomes is incomplete—a situation particularly common in the realm of politics. In contrast, the time horizon approach applies to a wider range of decision-making. As discussed earlier, the selection of a time horizon can impact a decision made under conditions of complete “rationality,” with perfect information. In fact, it is under those (albeit rare) conditions where the decision-maker can carefully consider the ultimate implications of their actions that they might consciously weigh different distances into the future in order to determine an optimum outcome. There is no reason why one’s time horizon cannot be at the foreground of their consideration, and while someone is not always conscious of their influence, careful consideration can always reveal it, whereas the framing process can be completely unrecognized. The framing process as described by Prospect Theory can be seen as a negative influence on decision-making, a means of presenting information in a way that can manipulate the process, often unconsciously. “Once people recognize their failure of invariance, they often agree that their decisions should have been made independent of the framing of the problem. So framing is not necessarily a motivated phenomenon, but can be a purely cognitive occurrence.” 24 One’s selection of time horizon can be unconscious as well, and can certainly impact the nature of the decision through cognitive means. But it does not describe a cognitive malfunction. Any decision must have a time horizon, regardless of the other processes informing it. Prospect Theory presents a compelling alternative to the rational actor hypothesis—the time horizon approach can serve to supplement it. This is not to say that a good understanding of Prospect Theory cannot add depth and richness to the Time Horizon method, and vice versa. Some work on the influences on the framing and weighing of options has direct relevance to how a time horizon choice can impact a decision. The reference point used by the decision-maker can be significant, and time can play a significant role in this process. “The decision weight associated with an event

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will depend primarily on the perceived likelihood of that event.” 25 To connect that to the time horizon concept, likelihood is certainly related to distance into the future, though many other factors contribute as well. Jack Levy, in his work criticizing the assumptions of the rational actor model, demonstrates that under conditions of risk and uncertainty, people make choices based not on purely rational or unbiased calculations, but by considerations based on their perspective. Most fundamental is the fact that people are more sensitive to changes in assets than to net asset levels, to gains and losses from a reference point rather than to levels of wealth and welfare. This reference dependence runs contrary to the postulate of a utility function defined over levels of assets, and it constitutes the central analytic assumption of prospect theory. 26

This can directly apply to the time horizon perspective when one considers the importance of reference in a decision-maker’s perspective. “Individuals are particularly likely to utilize reference points other than their current position in dynamic situations in which there is no stable status quo to serve as an obvious focal point.” 27 This evokes the concept of what Rose McDermott refers to as the “representativeness” heuristic bias, which can include the use of historical analogy, often problematically. 28 The selection of one’s point of reference is vital, and can result in many of the same distortions of decision as discussed in this project: The asymmetry of gains and losses around a reference point means that the way people identify the reference point, and hence how they frame a choice problem, can have a critical effect on their choices. A change in reference point can result in a change in preferences (preference reversal) even if the values and probabilities associated with outcomes remain the same. 29

In a later work specifically looking at time horizons, Levy and Streich consider the decision making process in terms of how the future is perceived imperfectly under prospect theory. With the “declining discount rates over time and hence the continually increasing relative weight given to future payoffs,” 30 their argument is that decisions are often made favoring longer term outcomes, an important consideration in the interpretation of policy selection in our cases. As we will begin to explore in the case studies, the complexities of international politics intervene and render some of the insights from experimental psychology and economic modeling less directly applicable, but they remain some of the theoretical approaches most relevant to the time horizon method.

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Critical Futures A mainstay of political science, the interpretation of how crisis events play out is of great interest to those who study decision-making. This is not just because of the “sexiness” of crisis events and how they can provide a rich source of data, but also because crises are often microcosms of larger relationships, distilled into the frenzy of rapid interactions. The decision-making that takes place in a crisis represents a special case in our investigation of different time horizons. For some, it is easy to become swept up in the immediacy of the situation and neglect longer term concerns, for others the exact opposite is true, a situation in which the decision makers attempt to avoid the unpleasantness of the circumstances before them and lose themselves in further considerations. Allison’s Essence of Decision looks into the details of another missile crisis involving naval confrontations between two nuclear powers over the status of an island, the Cuban Missile Crisis. As discussed earlier, his work served to understand the various lenses through which to understand the policy process and its influences, and bring a new variable to understanding the decision-making process: the role of bureaucratic politics. While there were abundant criticisms of his approach and the minimization of the role of individuals, 31 it can not be denied that Allison gave serious consideration to the nature of how a crisis played a particular role in how decisions are made—in particular, the pressure of a short time frame in which to make decisions, and the high stakes for all interested parties, which can serve to cast the various motivations into higher relief. The aforementioned Thinking in Time by Neustadt and May also looks at that crisis, as well as several others, to get a sense of how time is being used. They emphasize the use of the past through previous experience and historical analogy, but their work also shows how many different things are passing through the minds of the decision-makers. They discuss the limited time that decision-makers have in a crisis situation, and how the analogies from past situations can be brought to bear quickly to frame a current situation in comprehensible terms. This is similar to the idea of an “operational code,” the theory in behavioral politics that considers the “short cuts” that decisionmakers make, based on preconceived ideas about the situation (usually regarding potential allies or opponents) to arrive at decisions with limited time or information. 32 Herek, Janis and Huth’s work on “Decision Making during International Crises” also looks at the process and attempt to determine which of the myriad influences make for good decisions, and which are, in their words, “symptoms of defective decision making.” 33 They develop a systematic approach, which while it is comprehensive, looks more at poor information rather than the factors that might contribute to a variable perspective. Of

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course, not every decision made during a crisis is a poor one, and in fact it can be argued that the elements that contribute to decision-making under crisis conditions can actually help sharpen the decision-making process, even if it means deviating from more typical methods: Crisis decision makers do not have the luxury of waiting to see how decisions play out. Because time is limited, the rational actor model is typically compromised. It becomes difficult to carry out rational calculations. This does not necessarily mean that a bad decision will be made. Sometimes time constraints and pressure can force decision makers to stop and devote full attention to the problem at hand and actually enhance a decision. 34

Haney’s work on crisis decision-making attempts to bring in the importance of political structure to the usual interpretation that the small set of the highest authorities play the greatest role in a crisis. Certainly the nature of a crisis situation would often require the ability to make rapid decisions in a way that only a small decision making group (or individual) can, but Haney argues that institutional factors continue to play a key role: If crises heighten the importance of a small group of leaders—the “ultimate decision unit” . . . —as evidence overwhelmingly suggests they do, then the structure and organization of that group ought to continue to have an impact on the way decision making proceeds within those groups during crises . . . I would suggest that structure not only still matters . . . it is a vital component of decision making during crises. 35

This importance of the structure would perhaps be most significant in the PRC decision making process, which often relies on political structures in its process, though this might also prove the most difficult to concretely demonstrate, due to its closed system. OTHER TIMELY AREAS In addition to the more established mainstays of political theory or foreign policy analysis that contain insights about future thinking, there are a few categories of analysis that roughly conform to our time horizon categories. This is not to say that they represent the same process in a different form, but rather that there are certain concepts already utilized in Political Science, ideas that illustrate thinking in a similar direction, and are capable of arriving at similar conclusions. Of course, all of these topics could be—and have been—the subjects of extensive studies on their own. I am bringing them up not to critique them or enumerate their shortcomings, but to point out the implicit impact that time horizons can have, even in approaches that did not consider them explicitly.

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Decisions and the Media This relationship between decision-makers and the press varies by country, depending on the type of government and its level of transparency, its culture of free expression, tradition of an adversarial press (or lack thereof), the areas of interest to the public, and so on. How an event or dilemma is presented to the public can have significant impact in how it is viewed by decisionmakers, and can sometimes motivate a direct alteration of policy. 36 This observation also leads us to the commonplace criticism of the “media cycle” dominating political decisions. The obsession with the immediate stories of the day can cause shifting of priorities and interest by the political leadership. The specter of poll numbers, hanging over the heads of political leaders considering risky or potentially unpopular decisions, is not conducive to considerations of the longer future horizons of that nation, but rather one’s immediate political prospects. 37 This short term cyclical influence on decision-making is mirrored in another facet of open democracies, as will be discussed immediately below, as well as in our later consideration of regime type and time horizon. “Election Cycle” Decision-Making As the majority of the work of the discipline of Political Science in the United States studies American politics, it is unsurprising that a great deal of attention has been given to the electoral process. With the wealth and detail of US voting data available, those who look at American electoral behavior can perform quantitative analyses in a way that political scientists studying other aspects of political practice can only envy. With such analytical scrutiny on American elections, it is only natural to look at many facets of the process, including the nature of the temporal rhythm that comes with the regular schedule of elections. In studying the role elections play in how decisions are made, it is commonplace to assert that the frequency of the elections makes for a shortsighted regime. With politicians in a perpetual scramble to prepare for their next election, it might be difficult (or counter productive to reelection prospects) to spend extensive time on planning policies that would take longer than an election cycle to implement. Not only might the obsession with the regular need for reelection contribute to a lack of longer-term policy, but it might even contribute to a proliferation of unnecessarily short-term projects, as political leaders work to put their name on projects completed under their tenure for which they might take credit. This assertion might ring true, but it is difficult to support analytically. Comparing political systems and societies is often difficult, especially when looking for the contribution of a single variable to the policy process. The

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closest we might be able to get to isolating that variable would be to find a political environment without a strong party system where term limits were implemented in the absence of other major changes to the system. The “laboratory” of comparative politics has not yet been so kind. If we could study this role, and could determine whether the relationship between electoral process and time horizon holds, this would lead to the possibly paradoxical question: Would term limits motivate a longer term mode of thinking? After all, the freedom from the pressure of working towards their own reelection or on behalf of party loyalty might help a leader think about greater issues for their nation. In a different context, the “lame duck” might be the farthest flier of them all. Strategic Decision-Making A fundamental aspect of military analysis, strategic thinking is distinguished from tactical decision-making. Tactical decisions are made at the level of the battle, while strategy involves considerations on a larger scale, considering victory over an entire war (or longer). Grand strategy looks not just at a particular war conflict, but also at the long-term prospects for a nation and how it plans to achieve its goals in the distant future. Much like the globalizing approaches, the study of grand strategy necessitates a long view. 38 Globalizing Perspectives This is also a broad category, containing a variety of methodological approaches. Constructivist, Marxist, environmental theories all attempt to look beyond the system of state-to-state interaction to consider the deeper structure beyond the press of the immediate. Often their considerations, by virtue of thinking about the breadth of the entire system, cast their view to the distant future. Work on global civil society and the global state must look into the far future, even if beginnings of their subject of interest have started to emerge and develop. These changes take time, and so considerable expanses of time would be an integral part of properly considering such developments. The relationship between long-term futures and optimistic thinking (that we see in Construal Theory) comes into play here. Certainly the traditional economic perspective pioneered by Adam Smith implies that the culmination of the capitalist mode will result in improvement for all—this is the result of many shorter term changes that take time to unfold in each nation, and will take even longer to develop globally, but the ultimate benefits will transpire in the longer term. One review article even asserts that “Adam Smith first recognized, . . . and called attention to the importance of intertemporal choice

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for the wealth of nations,” 39 though concrete evidence for this is not provided. Smith’s rival in economic interpretation also had a similar framework with regard to the scope of time. Karl Marx predicted short- and mediumterm developments in capitalist nations that would eventually lead to global revolution and transformation of the international system to one that provided benefits for the majority that had suffered under earlier systems. Also reflecting Construal Theory, his shorter term horizons had rich levels of detail as to how this transformation would take place, but the longer time frames are somewhat more abstract in terms of how the “dictatorship of the proletariat” would operate, or how the state would “wither away.” More modern commentators who ponder the longer-term fate of the global system do not always share that optimism. Contemporary Marxist critics often lament the power of the state and its ability to plan for and secure longterm control. 40 Certainly those who consider environmental prospects and policy might not have as much reason for optimism either, and it is easy to fall into strongly pessimistic projections for ecological prospects, especially as one looks to the longer horizons in which the disruptive activities of human beings cumulate and interact with one another. 41 OTHER DISCIPLINES, OTHER TIMES This project affords some opportunities to take advantage of the benefits of interdisciplinary work. While the International Relations literature has not utilized the explanatory power of this approach to best effect, there are other disciplines that have deeply investigated the importance of time in decisionmaking. Psychology, Economics, Environmental Studies have all looked at this idea and gained new perspectives. This is not surprising. When it comes to decisions about investing, finance, and the nature of economic payoffs, it is only natural to look at the time frame of the outcome. The same holds true for discussions of environmental decisions, since costs and benefits of short versus long-term impact must be weighed carefully. Psychology can potentially contribute the most to this interdisciplinary dialogue, since it has considered the impact of time perspective on decision-making, both cognitively as well as cross-culturally. 42 Each of these fields already has been used by IR scholars in other areas, and the integration of those disciplines with International Relations with respect to this causal factor can yield some significant insight, particularly when it comes to understanding some of the most important decisions a state can make.

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Psychology The psychological literature has been grappling with the idea of time frame for some time. This is not surprising—the perception of time and considerations of the future are important features of a functioning mental state. Problems in being able to recognize the passage of time, or to make decisions reflecting a comprehension of future implications, are signs of mental illness. That being said, some variance in the view of time exists even for people without any dramatic psychological issues, and some of the common sources of inconsistency can operate in similar ways. There are two branches of study in Psychology (sometimes important subjects of other disciplines as well) that are most relevant to our interest in the relationship of time to decisionmaking: Construal Theory and Temporal Discounting. A Theory to Construe Cognitive theorists such as Trope, Liberman and Carnevale have conducted several experimental studies looking at how the future sense of individuals affects their outlook and decision-making. 43 They pursue research in the area known as “Construal Level Theory,” which looks at how objects of cognition are perceived by the mind, and what intervening factors might influence that perception. This phenomenon exists “for other distance dimensions, including temporal distance from past events, spatial distance, social distance (e.g., self vs. other, in-group vs. out-group, and actual vs. possible identity), and hypothetical versus real events.” 44 This idea that “temporal distance influence individual’s [sic] responses to future events by systematically changing the way they construe those events” 45 and that “these changes determine, at least in part, temporal changes in the value of those events.” 46 This resonates with our time horizon idea, as different time horizons would reflect different goals and strategies as well. People are said to form higher level construals of information about events in the more remote past and future, as well as geographical locations, about more socially distant targets, and about hypothetical or uncertain events. 47 This is building on earlier work in the field—their construal work is an attempt to “provide the basis for a unified theory of what Kurt Lewin . . . called ‘psychological distance.’” 48 The mechanism by which this works is fairly straightforward, even if the exact effects cannot be anticipated flawlessly. “Temporal distance systematically changes people’s mental representations of future events.” More specifically, they “propose that individuals form more abstract representations, or high-level construals, of distant-future events than near-future events.” 49 This principle of abstraction, and the contrast between large-scale outcomes and short-term tactics, will be extremely useful in application to our cases. In

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looking at the long term and chiliastic horizons in our case studies, we will find a much higher degree of abstraction. This is unsurprising considering the nature of politics, in which one can gain fairly good information regarding the present, but must rely on conjecture for the future. This is significantly different from the traditional “rational actor” analysis of behavior, in which people make calculations strictly on the basis of costs and benefits. Another article looking at Temporal Construal shows that their work is being considered in economics as well, including research in behavioral economics . . . [showing] that future outcomes typically undergo discounting at a rate that is steeper than would be justified by purely economic considerations . . . Research on decision making has shown that people often take more risk and feel more confident about the more distant future . . . Research on delay of gratification and self-control has shown that both humans and animals are better able to delay gratification with respect to distant future outcomes than near future outcomes. 50

The experimental studies, while usually based on experiments testing personal preference or small-scale tasks rather than political decisions on behalf of a nation, can still provide some interesting results. More specifically, some of Liberman and Trope’s experimental work indicated “decisions regarding distant future events are likely to be based on relatively central and abstract features of events, whereas decisions regarding near future events are likely to be based on more incidental and concrete features of events.” 51 As we will see in our study of political decision-making, the long term and chiliastic visions often contain abstract idealizations or the occasional worst-case scenario; a leader’s evocation of the distant future bogged down in minutiae would not be likely to serve the inspirational (or admonitory) function for which it was intended. Another clinical study that demonstrated some of the connections between the cognitive process and a person’s literal circumstances investigated the relationship between construal and vision. In this project I often talk of “seeing” the future; the defining metaphor I chose to use is that of a horizon. Interestingly enough, a literal inability to see also causes a construal effect as well. Keeping subjects in darkened places instilled a more abstract method of thinking. Essentially, keeping people in the literal dark had a similar effect to the consideration of things through the murky haze obscuring the future. 52 Perhaps the most important thing to take away from this recent work in Psychology, for the purposes of our study, is the abstraction process with respect to more distant events, and how that affects perception. “As predicted, participants generated more pros and fewer cons toward new . . . procedures, public policies, and personal and interpersonal behaviors that were expected to take place in the more distant future.” 53 We will often see this kind of broad abstraction, and the parallel optimism, in nations’ visions

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of their own future, especially from politicians speaking to their constituents. This effect extends to moral considerations as well. Temporally distant moral questions were seen in more exaggerated terms, idealized or demonized, while events closer in time were often justified in terms of the context. 54 This evokes the “realpolitik” that often informs immediate or short-term diplomacy, and the stronger rhetoric revolving around more distant futures. As Macbeth put it, “Present fears are less than horrible imaginings.” 55 Not to be Discounted—at Present One field which reflects the intersection of psychology and economics is the study of Temporal Discounting. As with Construal Theory, the uncertainty and distance of the future motivates a difference of perception of events near and far. Construal Theory can be applied to a variety of distance in addition to temporal, including physical, cultural, and emotional. Its general principle of distance equating to greater abstraction leads to a different interpretation of choices and outcomes—immediate and near events are seen in more concrete, practical terms, while those at a greater distance are abstracted, often to the point of neglecting details in the consideration of those distant situations. Temporal Discounting, as the name might suggest, primarily applies to the role that different future distances can have on placing values on outcomes—a delayed result is valued less than an immediate one. The earliest work to articulate (and provide a mathematical model of) this concept was Paul Samuelson’s 1937 article on the Discounted Utility model. While he “made no claims on behalf of its descriptive validity, stressing, ‘It is completely arbitrary to assume that the individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of the form envisaged in [the DU model]’ . . . the simplicity and elegance of this formulation was irresistible, and the DU model was rapidly adopted as the framework of choice for analyzing intertemporal decisions.” 56 Samuelson was right to be wary of using such a straightforward formulation in the description of complex cognitive processes. The anticipated “exponential” discounting function was often found to be insufficient to describe the experimental data which often suggested stronger rates of discounting, often referred to as “hyperbolic.” 57 Certainly time appears different from different perspectives. The “discounting” effect, in which gains are valued less in a nonlinear way if they are in the more distant future, is exemplified in experiments that build on the assumption that “the difference between today and tomorrow will seem greater than the difference between a year from now and a year plus one day,” which has been the basis on many studies in experimental psychology. 58 As has been discussed earlier, one of the challenges to developing a purely “rational actor” theory of decision-making is the assignment of value. Much of the work in Temporal Discounting theory has been in the determi-

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nation of discounting functions that can accurately describe the degree to which future distance is related to the change in value of an outcome. This can include punishments as well as rewards, at a variety of levels. The experimental work has shown some interesting relationships between a number of factors and the discount function, some of which might prove relevant in our look at political leadership. Many of these will be discussed below in our consideration of influences on time horizon. History and Sociology As has been alluded to in the discussion of the time horizons involved in looking into the past, the field of history can also yield substantial contributions to this topic. History as a discipline is particularly interested in questions about time, and in its study of past decisions, it is easy in hindsight to consider how far ahead the decision-maker was looking, and how that affected the quality of the outcome. More study of the historical literature would be important to find examples of this approach, not necessarily that of the US or China, though those might prove the most relevant. More specifically, historical sociologists have recognized the importance of history and the relevance of ideas. This of course includes the use of history and historical detail over materialist uniformity and abstraction, but it also points to the use of the cognitive to add depth to such approaches: After the austere theorizing of the 1980s, calls for an historical sociology of international relations that opened up the black box of the state, and that recognizes the causal significance of diverse social forces, were refreshing indeed. Even more refreshing was the apparent willingness of historical sociologists to move beyond the standard litany of material causes, most notably military competition and capitalism, and to credit “fuzzy” variables, such as ideology, with explanatory power. 59

One of the things to note with respect to the time horizon idea is that it bridges the material and the ideational. Obviously the way in which one thinks of the future is a part of the world of ideas, but it is often applied in consideration of material outcomes and methods. The pursuit of “thinking about thinking” can spiral unchecked into empty navel-gazing, but there can be significant benefit to keeping in mind (no pun intended) the idea that human relations are dependent on human cognition. Material studies of human actions are grounded in quantifiable facts and statistics, and can possess great predictive and explanatory power, but it should not be forgotten that the social sciences study human beings, who have only achieved what they have due to their intellect and its activity. The use of the time-horizon concept keeps both in the equation, since it looks at how divergent material calculations are made under different states

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of mind. For example, in a typical analysis of a foreign policy decision using such approaches as rational choice theory, it is common to look primarily at the analysis of benefit and cost that a decision will yield, and how that calculation resulted in the decision. A decision using a more cognitively oriented theory would inquire into the mental state of the decision-maker and explain the policy outcome in mental terms, looking at biases or emotions and what role they played. Time horizon theory combines those two extremes, using mental perspective as a vital determinant of even the most rational and calculating decisions. Futures Studies Besides the more established disciplines we have discussed in terms of their relationship to perspectives on time and their resonance with the time horizon concept, there is an entire field of study that looks at the future in and of itself, contrasting different levels of distance. As one “futurist” observes, “in Futures Studies the short term is considered to range from the present to five years; the medium term from five to ten years (for some authors up to twenty years); and the long term from 20 to 50 years.” 60 A survey of the state of the field challenged a variety of futurists to consider further horizons, but there were some challenges: When answering the questions, “Why do you choose that time interval? Why not go beyond that?”, respondents identified five major impediments to increasing their time horizons: (1) the needs of the client; (2) the ability of the client to relate to the future; (3) the complexity inherent in long-term forecasting; and (4) the perception that longer time horizons would be perceived as science fiction; and (5) forecasts interact with the phenomena forecasted. 61

Because this discipline is so broad, it often surveys a wide range of implications and prospects for the future, well in advance of any practical utility. The needs of practicality drive those futurists employed by the aforementioned “clients,” and this is not dissimilar to the situation of many people working in the formulation of policy, often to the detriment of developing better information to inform a wider range of time horizons. Environmental Studies Before our discussion of economics, it is perhaps appropriate to move to the discipline of environmental studies, since so many of the choices that impact the environment are economic in nature. Nearly every economic decision is a choice among trade-offs. Consumers weigh the value of different ways to spend or save their money, investors choose from among a wide array of possible places to put their capital, with a corresponding variety of pay-offs.

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Making choices that influence the natural world is the same. Build a factory somewhere, bring jobs to a region, make the water and air worse. Burn coal and make acid rain, use nuclear power and create thousands of years of toxic material, dam a river and destroy the natural ecosystem for hundreds of miles. Since those benefits and the costs often occur at different times, the time horizon idea plays a critical role in assessing policies and making decisions. Often decisions in environmental studies are based on woefully incomplete information, particularly when it comes to longer time horizons. The mechanisms of man’s interaction with the natural world are not well understood; the environment is a web of highly complex systems that can produce a plethora of unintended consequences when interfered with. “Because of the uncertainties of the distant future, choosing an appropriate discount rate for impacts spread out over decades or even centuries is a controversial issue.” 62 When it comes to thinking about the relevance of time horizons, the climate change issue is a powerful example. Warnings about the dire consequences of current policy rely on an intermediate time horizon or longer, as the actions taken now would have long-term and persistent effects, and the immediate evidence lacks drama. 63 Time plays a crucial role here. There can be a considerable time lag between emission reductions and their impact on the climate system. Temperature effects may be expected decades after peak emissions of CO2 whereas sea level changes may occur hundreds of years after concentrations have stabilized. This problem is aggravated by the fact that due to the inertia of the socioeconomic system the effect of policies will be delayed, too. This is true of, in particular, the replacement of infrastructure and technology, such as buildings, power stations or transport systems, which can take several decades or more. 64

To return to political questions for a moment, the longest-term horizons often entail environmental questions. To my knowledge, there is only one policy decision currently facing American government whose time horizon must extend into the tens of thousands of years: the fate of its high yield nuclear waste. The construction and maintenance of a storage facility must endure to a time when the material poses less of a dramatic risk—thousands to tens of thousands of years for much of it. 65 Economics It is unsurprising that the field of Economics has a long history of attempting to understand decision-making in the context of time frames. The very nature of the discipline attempts to understand the choices people make with their resources, and what influences those decisions. When people make economic decisions, they weigh various options about cost and benefit. Time plays a

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vital role in that dichotomy—costs often entail sacrifice in the present in order to receive a benefit in the future. That future could be right at the end of an immediate transaction, or an investment payoff years down the road. Even the most straightforward method of interpreting economic decisions, the rational actor model (which is of course seen in political science as well) is meaningless without the use of a time horizon. When it comes to the rational weighing of options for personal benefit, the most basic questions of time must enter into the calculation. An immediate payoff versus one five years away versus a twenty year delay in acquiring benefits will dramatically affect how the choices are viewed, even beyond considerations of compound interest tradeoffs. This is the primary emphasis of the theory of Temporal Discounting, and the reason why it is also a significant methodological direction in Economics as well as in Psychology (see above). The development of accurate discounting functions would be extremely useful for a number of economic applications, including investment and marketing strategies, international trade negotiation, even the determination of optimum interest rates. Prospect theory, also discussed above, was originally a creation of economic theory. More recent work in Economics has sought to build on the conception of the reference point and its influence on decision-making, including the perspective of time-frame. Loewenstein’s work on “frames of mind in intertemporal choice” strongly influenced Streich and Levy’s work, which also considered how the reference point with respect to the future distance has a significant influence on the decision making process. 66 TIME HORIZONS, ECONOMICS, AND SECURITY The case studies used in this project emphasize different elements of security. One has a strong military dimension, while the other is primarily economic. One of the most important contributions that the existing theoretical literature can have for our project is the work that has been done on the connection between the two. The immediate issue at stake in the Taiwan Missile Crisis [as the name would suggest] is hard power in the form of direct military security. Hard power does not merely encompass the military realm, but also the economic, particularly when one looks at more distant time horizons in an attempt to get a wider understanding of the nature of security. As for the debate about China’s WTO accession, economics is the primary way that the invested actors define and determine their states’ security prospects. It is not a recent revelation that a state’s security depends not only on its direct military effectiveness but its economy as well—Thucydides placed great importance on Athens’ economic prowess in his analysis of its wars with Sparta. 67 Scholars of International Relations who try to understand

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long-term prospects for peace and stability in the world of military affairs often look to economic interactions. Emmanuel Kant, one of the first scholars to look at distant time horizons in the ways that nations relate to one another, in his consideration of the way that the “End of History” will be brought about, posits that the self-interest of increasingly intimate economic relations between states will cause them to inevitably act to minimize the impact of unrest and violence, 68 and eventually bring about a state of global civil society, and, as a corollary, world peace. 69 A widespread sentiment of the early twentieth century (before the first world war), as exemplified by Norman Angell’s Great Illusion, was the idea that economic relationships of the advanced, “civilized” societies would assure political stability. 70 Military action becomes unprofitable, in fact economically damaging even to the victors. 71 The cataclysmic wars that would follow exposed the flaws in those assertions, and later scholars would often seek to explain the process of war-making in terms of faulty information or malfunctioning decision-making processes. 72 More recent theories on economic engagement, particularly those in Neoliberal thought and Constructivist methodology, argue that the interactions that come from economic exchanges—trade and cooperation—will contribute to an international system in which military exchanges are increasingly unlikely, eventually unthinkable. Angell’s ideas might have proven naïve in the hindsight provided by the first world war, but the beginning of the twenty-first century seems to support the idea that the most politically and economically developed nations will not put their increasingly intertwined and symbiotic economic relationships to the test with all-out military conflict. The democratic peace argument asserts that two states at a certain level of political development have not gone and will not go to war; a similar argument could be made that the economic state of two nations could make direct military conflict unthinkable. This might seem like a rehashing of the naïve arguments of the late nineteenth century, but the extent to which nations are no longer self-sufficient in their manufacturing and agriculture, and how much of their citizens’ income depends on world trade, far exceeds levels before the first or second world wars. The march of globalization holds many perils, but its promise to make states dependent on one another and upon global trade for their livelihood and ultimately survival may serve to put an end to direct warfare between developed nations, regardless of their political orientation. 73 If this is not yet the case, it can always be anticipated in a more distant time horizon. Time horizons play an important role in such thinking. The time required to bring about a state of economically motivated stability and peace varies depending on the theorist, but few would argue that it would be a short term possibility. Some thinkers, like Kant, even argued that such a change in the human condition would require a fundamental transformation in human na-

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ture, the ability of people to see themselves as part of the human race entire, rather than as members of a nation or people. This cosmopolitanism might be achievable by means of the gradual steps he laid out in his writings, but it would certainly take time. These ideas regarding the interplay between military and economic affairs echoed the mindset behind many aspects of China policy in the United States. Engagement arguments during the early period of the PRC’s opening up in the early 1980s were often grounded in the assertion that increasing cultural and economic ties with the United States and other Western democracies would serve to create an inevitable process of political reform and liberalization. Economic development would mean education, exposure to new ideas and alternate forms of government and societal structure. This “opening” would create a more sophisticated polity aware, of better (i.e., more democratic and capitalist) alternatives, and their increasing sophistication would give them understanding of effective ways of making demands of their government for progress. Ultimately the march of economic, political, and even technological progress would produce an unstoppable, self-enforcing demand for more development in the same direction—a “feedback loop” of liberal economic evolution. The 1990s began to expose the flaws in this assumption as nations (the PRC in particular) began to achieve a certain level of technological and economic development without accompanying political reforms. The hope remains that the process of opening to the world that comes with trade opens up a nation’s people to new ideas, and that communications technologies would allow like-minded people to communicate and eventually spread ideas that will help motivate a more democratic society— perhaps this is something better considered in a more distant time horizon in order to be properly feasible. 74 As a corollary to the argument arguing for the benefits of engagement, the connection between economics and peace would be strengthened further by way of the democratic peace argument. Should open interaction with democratic states serve to liberalize China’s political system to the point that it would be a viable democracy, the central tenet of democratic peace theory would assert that the PRC would not go to war with the United States. While it was thought that open engagement could yield relatively rapid results, no one (particularly after the 1989 suppression of the protestors at Tiananmen) would argue that full-fledged democratization in the PRC would happen any time soon. It would be a process that takes time; democracies need to mature even when the path to political liberalization is not riddled with obstacles. This point begins to reinforce the importance of different time horizons in understanding the context of how China’s membership in the WTO was viewed. Having made the connection between the varieties of hard power and recognizing that our other work on time horizons and military affairs might

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apply to an economic one, it can be useful to look at them separately. While economic power and military security are intimately intertwined, economic relations can be investigated outside of the context of military affairs, if not the broader holistic conception of a nation’s security. In looking at a relationship in primarily military terms, it is often easier to point out the stronger and weaker player, the winners and losers in matters of conflict. In economic relationships the situation is often more complex. Nations rarely have more than one military, 75 while no state has a unified economic interest. 76 A war can have a definite, final victor, 77 but international economic relationships can be an unending series of trade-offs, compromises, and deals that often leave it unclear whether there is a state at an advantage. Zero-sum interpretations notwithstanding, many schools of economic thought argue that everyone “wins” from removing barriers to trade. The idea that “a rising tide lifts all boats” reflects the perception that making economies more integrated, taking advantage of technological advances, and removing inefficiency will allow everyone to benefit (to the same degree, if one takes a literal meaning from the marine aphorism). Economics and Horizons The fact is that any economic development has winners and losers, at least in the short term. Changes to the financial landscape mean that the actors who had been benefiting from inefficiencies, politically motivated subsidies, or downright corruption will be hurt by a development that is an ultimate improvement. Time horizons play a significant role in the way that changes to the economic landscape would be viewed. Reforms aimed at improving an economic system, of the kind discussed above, would entail long term benefits for everyone who is a part of that system. In the short or intermediate term, there are people who feel the sting of those changes, and might to the end of their lives. 78 It is only in the transformation to a more universally beneficial system that everyone is a “winner,” and that might take longer than the course of a lifetime, or at least the length of a career. Slave overseers, blood-letters, switchboard operators and whalers all felt the pain as their roles became obsolete. Some of them moved on to different gainful employment, while others transitioned out of the workforce as their skills were no longer needed. It is easy to argue that we are better off as a society without slavery, having better medical options than leeches, being able to make direct phone calls. The knowledge that progress is being made is little solace for the people who lose their jobs or for their families (if they have that knowledge at all, or even if that perspective is possible in a shorter time horizon). In one sense, the time horizon model of analysis can yield the most directly relevant and quantifiable results when applied to economic deci-

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sions. Economic decision-making is often the ideal for rational decisionmaking models; profit is easily measured and the profitability of competing outcomes is easily compared. 79 Predictions regarding economic outcomes are not part of a perfect science. If they could be, the idea of risk in investment would be obsolete or irrelevant. However, the relationship between finance and the future does mean that effective predictions can sometimes be made. There are many aspects of financial planning, investment and speculation that entail a relatively high degree of certainty about future outcomes. For example, there are varieties of investments that guarantee a particular return on investment. Bonds might lack the glamour of higher-risk volatile stocks or commodities, and their corresponding higher potential for return, but the precise percentage of interest they offer means security, and an option available to those who wish to make economic choices with a high level of precision. 80 Economic decisions for an individual or a family would also be different from future planning on behalf of a business or large corporation. 81 A decision-maker choosing among economic options for an entire nation would inform his or her decision in very different ways from a hired CEO thinking on behalf of his or her shareholders, which in turn would be different from the sole owner-president who does not have to answer to others. In addition to deciding a level of risk and the scale of the investment, a decision-maker making economic choices regarding the future can select which distance into the future he or she would want to get the return on the investment—short term and long term investments entail different strategies. From near-instant “flipping” to building a business that ideally continues indefinitely, the business of business requires serious consideration of time horizons. INFLUENCES ON TIME HORIZON A final consideration before looking at the relevant literature pertaining to the use of time horizons might be a look at the other factors that could have an impact on the time horizon a decision-maker might be most inclined to use. This can never be an exhaustive list, just as one can never completely understand every element that helped to form one’s personality and character. This should be viewed as an acknowledgment that comprehending the decision-making process is a complex business, and many factors are constantly in the process of influencing one another. The choice of a particular time horizon will impact how a situation is viewed; but how that horizon is chosen depends on a number of things as well. As with the contributions to one’s overall character and personality, there are a number of factors that might contribute to a decision-maker’s preferred time horizon, and the manner in which he or she might apply it. 82 This list is

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not intended to be a definitive method for predicting a time perspective. It is not a simple “input-output” process where the mechanism is reduced to a few variables. However, there are certain aspects of a person’s character that would be likely to have a strong impact on the ways that the future and past might be seen and used in making decisions, and they are worthy of discussion. Role in (and Type of) Government As for the type of government, some interesting relationships to time horizon can be seen. It is almost a truism to say that electoral democracies have a short time view; the nature of the electoral cycle encourages policy that yields results (ideally right) before the next election. This might be positive for the political interests of the candidates or their party, but not necessarily in the best interest of the nation. Another factor that might influence the time horizon in a democracy towards the shorter term is the distractibility of the public. Particularly in those states without an official press and a possessing a strong bent towards sensationalism, the news cycle of the media, often assuming (or cultivating) a short attention span can spur an immediacy in the thinking of the general public (and the leaders who attend to them). It is possible that the most long-term thinking type of government is the hereditary monarchy, where the highest ruler has the greatest sway over state policy, would serve for life, and would have the royal descendants continue in the role after. Then again, the intrigues of court, ambitious ministers, the jockeying for predominance among the members of the royal family, might make for an incredibly short term horizon, particularly if one is worried about poisoning at every meal, or overthrow plots around every corner. Even if they use the longest average time horizons, there would also be a number of reasons why monarchies do not make the best decisions over the long run—the danger of some time horizons will be discussed in the conclusions, but I will leave critiquing the monarchy to the political observers of the Enlightenment. As for the role in which one chooses to serve, there could be a dramatic difference between appointed civil servants and elected officials in terms of how they might view the future, and the time frame of the policy choices they make. While this can be seen as a variety of bureaucratic politics, it is also related to personality. The position might shape the person, but the position one is drawn to reflects the kind of person as well. This raises the issue of endogenity. It is entirely possible that those who have a longer-term outlook would be drawn to the kinds of public service most conducive to their horizontal perspective. In looking at each of the possible contributions to time horizon, this is a risk of which we must remain aware.

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Culture and History Cultural explanations can be perilous tools in policy analysis. While culture can have a profound effect on personality, morals, and the ways in which decision choices are valued and weighed, the fact remains that the category of “culture” is so broad that it can sometimes encompass everything, and offer little precision to a generalizing explanation. That being said, in the specific issue of time horizons, it would be irresponsible to ignore this important factor. Anthropologists have studied many human cultures, often finding unique (or at least uncommon) perspectives. Some of those unusual perspectives extend to the very perception of time, from which several scholars—Durkheim is perhaps the best known—have concluded that the perception of time, or even time itself, is a social construct. 83 If that is the case, then one’s culture would not just have a strong impact on the formulation of a time horizon, it would define the very concept itself. In a less metaphysical sense, cultural influences would be very likely to have a significant influence on a person’s view of the future. Some cultures favor long-term planning, and encourage a strong sense of historical continuity in their members. 84 Some of them are known for encouraging education, personal savings, and/or community building. Other societies focus on more immediate issues, often driven by a strong passion for the tangibility of the proximate. An ever-present challenge to cultural interpretations is the difficulty in separating the influence of culture from the role that institutions play, and how they might have influenced one another. In one study of the role of culture in China (and other states), the author presented the problem this way: The problem is of the chicken-and-egg variety: people hold beliefs, attitudes, and values that lead them to create particular institutions (for example, electoral systems); institutions lead people to hold particular beliefs, attitudes, and values; and so on. Implicit in each explanation is an understanding of human motives and behavior which, by itself, is inadequate to the complexity of real life. 85

Societies vary in their degree of collectivity—from highly individualized to the nearly monolithic. Barring the desire to be seen and remembered as a heroic figure throughout the ages (see the section on personality below), 86 it is a possibility that the individual-leaning cultures would be more likely to utilize shorter horizons, while the collective ones would more easily think in terms of the survival and success of their civilization, not just themselves. After all, a literal individualist (if there is such a thing), placing his or her particular life and being above any human society or association, would have

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little interest in the events beyond his or her lifetime. People whose interests and goals are subsumed within the context of a broader society are likely to think beyond their own lives towards the greater longevity of the collective, which can have a much greater span. Another cultural factor is not the inherent quality of the society with respect to time, but the current sense of the civilization in how it views itself—whether it is one in decline or on the rise, a distinction raised above in discussing the US and China’s view of time and its direction. Religion As an aspect of culture, religion also suffers from the risk of overgeneralization and entanglement with other societal contributions to the decision-making process. Another obstacle to its effective use in theory is the difficulty in truly determining someone’s true level of belief—in cultures with a high level of religious identification or homogeneity it is likely that a leader would emphasize or exaggerate his or her religious observance, while in secular societies a strongly religious leader might seek to divert attention from it. Those issues notwithstanding, religion can also be a useful tool in understanding how someone might view the future. It can be clear that someone who takes a religious outlook seriously will have to consider what role the future takes in the theology and overall cosmological worldview of the belief system. For example, an apocalyptic religious perspective will have a dramatic impact on how to look at the future, especially if that religious framework has a relatively short timeline. Talks about the coming “end of days” are not conducive to long-term planning, while religious traditions that think in long terms, multiple lifetimes, or cosmic cycles, might serve to insure that their followers consider events in the distant future well beyond an individual lifetime. Personal Wealth and Prospects for Advancement In many ways it is difficult to generalize about the role of personal wealth in politics. Certainly it is more useful in some systems, a necessity in others, and a result of being a member of some regimes. 87 The question for our study, the ways in which the possession of wealth might impact one’s future horizon, most likely depends on how that wealth was attained, and how it is currently distributed. Someone whose wealth is invested heavily in his or her native country, with an emphasis on long term returns, would likely gravitate towards longer horizons, while someone who enjoys the liquidity of lots of fast cash, or who might even be making investments that assume a national decline, would not focus on the distant horizon. 88

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This then leads to the deeper question of where one’s money came from; inherited versus self-made, manufacturing versus resource extraction versus service or technology. It seems likely that someone who inherited his wealth would also consider the legacy that would be bequeathed to later generations, barring the “prodigal son” effect. One who has obtained his or her wealth from existing resources, like timber or mining, might be more inclined to think about future generations. Or the spirit that drove him or her to exploit them might indicate a mindset that cares little for later consequences. Someone who built his or her wealth from the creation of something new, such as new technology, might be far-thinking with regards to the promise of the future, but also might realize that new innovations will make the distant future so unrecognizable that it is more useful to focus on the shorter term. From this discussion, it seems that it is a considerable challenge to draw definite conclusions about this personal attribute, though it doubtless has an actual impact. As one study put it, “the task of examining the role of wealth uncontaminated by differences in other demographic factors is generally difficult in any age group.” 89 Some of the experimental literature shows some interesting results on this issue. In a study of Temporal Discounting, it was found that delayed rewards were discounted at similar rates by adults of different ages but similar income levels, but at different rates by adults of similar age but different income levels. Specifically, the lower income older adult group showed a greater degree of temporal discounting than did either of the upper income groups, but there were no age differences in discounting between the upper income groups. 90

In the case of that experimental study, income level had a more significant impact than age (see below). In another study that looked at the specific amount of reward and the rate of temporal discounting, it was found that the degree of discounting decreased with the size of the reward. 91 This of course would not be conclusive with regard to drawing conclusions about the political decision-making process. It is perhaps here that the differences between the experimental situations and a political environment are the most dramatic. Many of the experimental studies designed to understand the influences on temporal discounting use hypothetical situations involving rewards of a certain amount of money. When it comes to the process of decision-making on behalf of an entire nation, determining the relative values of a reward is very different than thinking about the amount of cash one might put into one’s pocket. Other considerations similar to wealth that might prove significant motivations for decision-makers could include respect, fame, and the positive judgment of history. These three benefits might even be manifestations of the same thing considered over different time horizons.

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Age There are several reasons why a person’s age might influence his or her preferred time horizon, though it is not clear what direction that influence might be, or if it would be consistent. Younger people, with many years ahead of them, 92 might be more inclined to think in longer time horizons, since they would be more likely to live to see those horizons realized. Work they might do towards the future could have tangible rewards. Youth also (stereotypically) possesses optimism at the infinite realm of possibility ahead. Perhaps this might in part explain the enthusiasm for volunteerism of young adults. 93 On the other hand, it is possible that people in the flush of youth would only think about the present and what it might offer them in terms of immediate satisfaction. Someone who has not lived long does not have a good sense of the true extent of time, or of the scope of history and its relevance to the future (certainly this is one of the critiques of youth made by the mature). Certainly this is the case for the very young. Children are notorious for failing to think ahead and understand the implications of their actions, much less why they would matter in the future. 94 On average, older people have less time left to live, and unless they have a strong reason to consider their legacy (see section on family below), might only care to think about the immediate or short term. The question of one’s perception of time remaining rather than chronological age will be discussed in the section on the influence of health below. This is to say nothing about the cynicism that comes with age, a situation in which people can be so embittered by the setbacks of life that they would not care to think much on their few years left, or even what might happen after. However, there is also the phenomenon in which people without heirs or much direct personal interest in the future can generalize their concern to a greater scale, such as a community, nation, or even the human race. This could happen as the result of a lifetime of accumulated life lessons and wisdom, or rapidly in a transformation of personal priorities coming from the realization of the emptiness and futility of selfish action. 95 Family Certainly other factors can be at play, but it seems likely that someone with a large number of descendants will look at the future differently from someone with no children or grandchildren. Someone who is regularly confronted by the question of his or her legacy would be more likely to think of the future, and work to gain advantage for it. Perhaps people from larger families, even if they do not have immediate descendants of their own, might also be more driven to consider the nature of continuity between generations and to think

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in longer terms. Some psychological studies have shown a relationship between being married and having a long future perspective, but others have found that other demographic variables were much more significant. 96 There are also childless people who can adopt the greater cause of mankind as their legacy, and they can certainly act with a deep consideration for long-term horizons. Mother Teresa, while not a political leader, was someone with no children who worked tirelessly for the long-term betterment of many. Because she is so commonly elevated as an example, she might resonate with people exactly because she is so unusual, and therefore an outlier with respect to her view of the world. Gender There is extensive literature on the role of gender in perception and decisionmaking. Carol Gilligan, in her work, discusses the different way in which women process information and come to decisions. 97 While many of her methods and generalizations are debated, her ultimate conclusion points to a divergence in how the world is viewed based on gender. To fall into the world of stereotype, with women as the ones who traditionally take the role of caregiver and domestic nurturer, it seems as though they would be more likely to think in longer terms in order to assure the family success. With men taking on (and again I am speaking in the grossest stereotypes here) the “hunter-gatherer” roles, in which immediate contestation and short term tactics tend to be most important, perhaps male time horizons might be shorter. 98 Work more specifically on the role of gender in International Relations, such as that of J. Ann Tickner, also seeks to demonstrate different modes of thinking, and divergent policy outcomes, as the result of gender roles. Particularly with regard to military security, but also with respect to major theoretical traditions in IR, including realism, liberalism, and Marxism, this “masculinization” has contributed to particular kinds of practice as well as theory. New “nongendered” conceptions would provide alternative approaches and solutions, 99 and doubtless new horizons. One study on Temporal Discounting and group versus individual decision-making did not find a significant difference until gender was brought into consideration. With that, “males discounted significantly more when discounting for the individual, but females discounted significantly more when discounting for the group.” 100 Health The personal health of a decision-maker can impact their view of time in a variety of ways, just as it would impact the decision-making process more

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broadly. With respect to time horizons, it would seem likely that someone in poor health would view the future quite differently from someone with no health issues. People in constant pain would be more prone to emotional reactions, which tend to be associated with snap decisions (i.e., immediate or short term horizons). There is a distinction between illnesses that cause serious discomfort and are not terminal, and diseases that put a metaphorical clock on the remainder of someone’s life. The latter would likely impact one’s time horizon in the same way that advanced age would, unless one becomes driven to direct effort towards finding the cure for such diseases. An extreme case of the altered time horizon due to health would be the situation in which one has a sharply defined limitation on one’s remaining life. The question “if you had one day to live, what would you do” might be a clichéd attempt to help someone understand their priorities, but it also illustrates the effect that a concrete illustration of altered time horizons might have on decision-making. While some people might assert that they would live out their day like any other, most would pursue a long held dream, or take time for their loved ones, or organize their affairs in a way that people rarely do in an ordinary day. Because the literal horizon of one’s life would be foreshortened, it would serve to shift priorities toward posterity (i.e., the longer horizons beyond one’s existence) or towards the exigencies of the immediate present (the fleeting moments remaining). In this vein, there are several works on time that consider the question of perception of remaining lifespan rather than the more straightforward age. One study on the role of age and income on Temporal Discounting summarizes the tension: older adults appear to be less impulsive and might therefore be expected to weight long-term interests more heavily. However, if they were to take the decreased number of years remaining to them into account, they might be expected to be less influenced by the possible long-term consequences of their decisions. 101

This makes sense, as mere chronological measurement of age fails to take many variables into account. Certainly there is a relationship: Because chronological age is correlated with time left in life, systematic associations between age and time horizons appear, but findings from experimental studies show that when time perspective is manipulated or controlled statistically, many age differences disappear. In short, across many dimensions, older and younger people behave remarkably similarly when time horizons are equated. 102

This relationship between health and decision-making would be difficult to demonstrate quantitatively—many prominent statesmen are reluctant to dis-

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cuss their health problems for fear of being perceived as weak, or of inciting a succession crisis. 103 However, it might be possible to understand policy makers through the perspective of their attitudes regarding the future prospects for their nation instead of their personal lifespan. As Carstensen puts it, “young or old, when people perceive time as finite, they attach greater importance to finding emotional meaning and satisfaction from life and invest fewer resources into gathering information and expanding horizons.” 104 This again points to the relevance of optimism in thinking about the future. With less time remaining, the lack of hope for their longterm future drives desire for more immediate gratification. Conversely, people who think about their place in a longer-term future would be more interested in expanding their horizons, cultivating individual character, perhaps attempting new personal challenges. The experimental work has been done primarily on the individual level, but it might be possible that such considerations would extend to leadership and national policy. A decision-maker who considers the fate of his or her regime a long distance into the future might advocate more innovative policies selected from a broader range of considered possibilities. A common saying in the People’s Republic during Mao Zedong’s tenure was “May Chairman Mao live ten thousand years.” 105 Though many of his policies were disastrous, contributing to famines that killed tens of millions, the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, if nothing else, could certainly be considered creative. 106 Mao’s concept of “perpetual revolution” gives evidence of a temporal horizon that extends to a long future distance, possibly reflecting his Marxist influences, combined with a sense of Chinese exceptionalism in a long-term historical context. Personality and Complex Interactions The series of factors discussed above might seem more like a list of the influences on decision-making in general, whether or not time horizons were included, or even what might contribute to the fundamental nature of one’s character. However, the consideration of the often complex category of “personality” in particular is important because their horizon might in fact be the most effective explanatory tool for looking at the kind of decision-making that invokes state-to-state relations over many decades. This would be particularly true if, as in the case of the US-China relationship, each side sees itself (and the other) as one of the most important actors in international relations for the coming century. After all, as some people (including policy-makers) see it, the course of history is steered by the works of great men making decisions of significance. With the importance placed on the role of the individual in such an interpretation, individual differences can be critical.

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Since the stakes are so high, even if some of the factors influencing time horizon have been captured by other studies in the field, they are worth revisiting. Personality can sometimes be seen as a “catch-all” category for analysis, since nearly any attribute or decision can be chalked up to it. It is beyond the scope of this project to determine the extent to which other factors influence character; that is best left up to developmental psychologists, biologists and philosophers. After all, personality can be seen as an aggregate of the various factors that contribute to one’s psychological outlook—the sum total of the variables that are often the subject of work in experimental Psychology. It can be difficult or even impossible to quantify, especially if the total of the variables exceeds the sum of its parts in this case. Despite all that, it is important to point out that personality can have a significant role in one’s horizon, and attempt to understand how it plays that role. Just as a person’s personality is the result of many factors, so too the way one views the future is correlated with many variables as well. One’s future horizon is not just seen as a result of personality, but a (vital) part of it as well, further clouding the question of causality: Future time perspective has been characterized as a “central” personality trait . . . Theoreticians have argued that this construct is shaped by multiple factors, including “cardinal” personality traits such as conscientiousness and emotional stability . . . culturally-based social norms regarding the perception of time . . . chronological age . . . life stage . . . and perceived proximity to death. Investigations of future time perspective often rely on demographic indicators as proxy variables for the social and intrapsychic forces that structure individuals’ orientation to time. Unfortunately, researchers fail to agree on whether future time perspective is a unitary or multidimensional construct, and opinions also differ on how it should best be operationalized and measured. 107

The results of these scholars’ projects did not point to a single “magic bullet” that can serve to directly explain what causes (or at least is directly correlated with) a particular time sense. What they did find reflected a complex relationship of interrelated factors pertaining to one’s status, in which some combinations show a connection with time sense. 108 Longer future orientations were found among individuals with higher incomes, those who were older, men, and those who were more highly educated . . . More interesting than these main effects, however, was the observed three-way interaction among age, sex, and level of education . . . For men, the relationship between education and future time perspective was stronger for young men than older men . . . Older women were similar to older men in that for both, education was modestly related to future time perspective . . . However, young women were unique in that their educational level was not related to future time perspective. 109

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Beyond this conception of personality as the result of the complex interactions of demographic (and possibly other) variables, there is the idea of “personality types,” a broader aggregate of character attributes that can serve a variety of categorical functions. An example of this approach is Barber’s work on “the Presidential Character,” which attempts to construct cogent personality categories to better understand American executive performance. 110 His “active-passive” and “positive-negative” spectra do not completely capture the complex nature of the political history he attempts to explain, but they can be useful in providing a broad view of the role personality can play in US politics. In addition to Barber’s categories, there are other ways to distinguish among decision-makers. With a better understanding of the role of time horizon, a possible spectrum could be “range of time horizon distance.” With sufficient information, this continuum could in fact be more precise than some of the more subjective categories if we could assign actual time values to each decision-maker. Though as we will see, such assignments would likely have to be divided by issue area. Other personality attributes that might contribute to how a time horizon is defined could include individual preferences and priorities with respect to the opinions of others, and how that is weighed vis-à-vis other types of benefit or gain. Some people, for whatever reasons, are deeply invested in their legacy not because of any children or wealth, but because they are attracted by fame, and dedicated to making a role as a significant person. People with this personality type would be more likely to think in longer horizons, if for no other reason than to consider where their reputation would fall in them. President Clinton, particularly with his late administration’s concern about “legacy,” is a good example of this. It is very difficult to determine what kind of role this type of personality might play in the PRC. There humility is an important virtue, as is working collectively. The temptation of having monumental statues and fifty-foot tall posters of oneself (like Mao and Deng) hung around China must be a strong temptation for some who are so inclined, but they would never admit it. Other personality traits we will consider in our cases would include: one’s temper and quickness to respond to insult; the ability to abstract one’s role to a part of something greater rather than a purely individual one; a simple knack for making good predictions. One variable noted in the Löckenhoff et al. study was the importance of optimism. Although ambient mood was not significantly associated with age, individuals who reported more positive affect before the discounting task were less likely to discount future outcomes . . . this suggests promising pathways for manipulating discounting rates via targeted mood inductions. 111

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The comment regarding “manipulating discounting rates via targeted mood inductions,” while hardly referring to a precise science, points to a possible direction for policy purposes as well, which will be discussed in the conclusion. Ultimately a combination of our personality traits, as well as the other influences discussed above, in the myriad permutations of interaction, will serve to inform the time horizon one prefers. Thinking about these individually will make for more effective considerations of our decision-makers in terms of the ways in which they regard the future in our cases. VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE: HORIZONS AND UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES Perhaps the most important thing to be considered in articulating this timehorizon approach to understanding decision-making is separating it from more conventional approaches to foreign policy analysis. Time horizon may have a dramatic impact on how decisions are evaluated and made, but in looking for causal relationships, it may also be difficult or even impossible to detangle them. That is to say, if some of the more commonly studied influences on decision-making, such as domestic or bureaucratic politics, individual personality, or culture directly affect how decision-makers weigh different time horizons, the study of those factors might not turn out to be so different from a study of this time issue. From a preliminary consideration of the question, I do not believe this will be the case, but certainly aspects of those approaches will have a significant relationship. For example, government type is often looked at as a determinant of the time scale for decisions—leaders in democracies often make decisions based on the election cycle, while autocrats may make decisions based on their remaining lifespan. Personality likely has an influence as well. Some leaders may be seen as “short-sighted” in terms of the implications of their decisions, while there is alternatively the risk of being what Waltz described as “chiliastic,” a millenarian-oriented outlook that peers so far into the future as to render decisions impractical or unreasonable. 112 Pathological tendencies are often associated with misperceiving the implications of the future. The analysis of a decision maker’s time horizon is not a theoretical approach that best functions as a stand-alone theory, single-handedly explaining every facet of how a decision was reached. Rather than comparing this approach on an equal footing with other explanatory theories, I feel that the emphasis on time is something that is most powerful in terms of the depth it can add to existing theories. One of the most interesting aspects of this approach is that with other factors being the same, changing only the deci-

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sion-maker’s perspective as to what time-scale is of greatest significance would yield different outcomes. For example, a standard realist explanation might appeal to the idea of the “national interest.” That interest can come in terms of technological military advantage, international alliances, or economic security. In any of these areas, whether a decision is in the best interest of a state depends on how far into the future of the state the decision maker is considering. Is the decision maker looking at the immediate payoff of a decision, how that decision will immediately affect the perception of the state by allies and enemies, soft power considerations, long term strategic considerations, or the ultimate judgment of history? This evokes the move towards a richer degree of explanation and understanding through what has been termed Behavioral International Relations: One positive aspect of Behavioral IR is its ability to address directly the issue of preference formation. The prominent rational choice paradigm takes preferences as exogenous and then moves on to assess the likelihood of respective outcomes as a product of strategic interaction. Behavioral IR could help us increase our understanding as well as explanation . . . by providing us with an ability to say more about the origins of preferences. 113

Similarly, a bureaucratic politics model would yield differing explanations depending on the perspective of the future of the bureaucratic institution. Would a decision be considered to maximize bureaucratic power and influence if it looks at immediate impact on the organization, the role of the bureaucracy in the national context, or ultimately enhances the importance of the issue in a long-term global context? Domestic politics, at least in democracies, may be strongly determined by the nature of the election cycle, but some leaders most strongly affected by domestic political considerations are thinking several cycles down the road, while others may be just trying to make it through their own term. 114 Looking at week-to-week opinion polls versus the needs of the party, or the domestic political culture in a grander sense, is a reflection of the temporal horizon and would produce different policy outcomes. Autocratic leaders would look to protecting their own rule in the short term, such as daily preventing a revolution or coup, but also would consider the potential for passing their regime intact to a successor, which could take place decades in the future. The chart shown in table 2.1 might give better insight into the relationship between the future perspective approach and a variety of theoretical approaches. In this chart, a fairly standard comparison between alternative explanations is put forth, discussing the differences in primary motivations and predicted outcome.

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Table 2.1. Contrasting Theoretical Responses Under Different Time Horizons.

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NOTES 1. An earlier title for this project was “The Long Waltz and the Quick Step,” which was in part inspired by Waltz’s importance in the field. The idea of a “long waltz” does not merely come from the idea of an extended formalized interplay between two participants, as one might see an interaction like the US-PRC relationship. The fact that a musical phenomenon was chosen to describe a process usually presented in the visual terms of a “horizon” is not unintentional. As a dance, a waltz does not just refer to a piece of music, but the physical actions of many pairs of people; something that can be visually observed by others (and if performed well, can be an elegant interplay of multiple partners interacting with one another in a manner befitting the situation of that moment, as well as the future maneuvers on the dance floor). In much the same way, the “time horizon” concept does not just refer to a process of seeing, but of thinking, maneuvering, and listening to the many levels of future consideration. Just as Dr. Waltz inspired many to more fully consider the complexity of the influences on the decision that lead to war, this project intends to add the “length” of views of the future to those considerations. 2. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 55. 3. Ibid., p. 65. 4. See Steinbruner, John D. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. Princeton, 1974. 5. See George, Alexander L. “The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, 1969, pp. 190–222. 6. See Janis, Irving L. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 7. Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown and Co., 1971, p. 95. 8. “Despite its past popularity, the bureaucratic politics model may be facing intellectual extinction at the hands of a new generation of foreign policy analysts. If that happens, the field will lose a remarkably insightful way of thinking about the “politics” of foreign policy making.” Ripley, Brian. “Cognition, Culture, and Bureaucratic Politics,” in Neack, Hey, and Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, p. 88. 9. Walker, Stephen, Akan Malici, Mark Schafer eds. Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations. Routledge, 2011, pp. 18–19. 10. Ibid., p. 70. 11. See his Evolution of Cooperation and The Complexity of Cooperation. 12. For example, see their discussion of Schelling and other Deterrence theorists, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 132ff. 13. Hollis and Smith. Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 126. 14. For more on the relationship between individual game episodes and longer series of interactions, see Alker, “Beneath Tit-for-Tat: The contest of political economy fairy tales within SPD protocols,” in Rediscoveries and Reformulations. 15. Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence, p. 52. 16. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 174. 17. Section I talks about the aspects of the international system that must be dealt with in order to remove immediate provisions for war (Lewis White Beck translation, in Emmanuel Kant, On History, pp. 85–91), but Kant also discusses the gradual processes that can contribute to peace—“Thus the human race can be gradually be brought closer to a constitution establishing world citizenship.” (p. 103) 18. Note the language of vision entering into discussion of time sense—appropriate for the idea of “horizon.” 19. For example, see Barnett, “Historical Sociology and Constructivism: an Estranged Past, a Federated Future?” in Hobden, Stephen, Historical Sociology of International Relations. 20. In Snyder, Richard, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited). Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 172ff.

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21. For example, see Kocher, Martin G. and Matthias Sutter. “Time is Money-Time Pressure, Incentives, and the Quality of Decision-making,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 61, issue 3, 2005, pp. 375–392. 22. McDermott, Rose. Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy, p. 6. Also see p. 22ff. 23. Ibid., p. 6. 24. Ibid., p. 26. 25. Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47, 1979, pp. 289. 26. Levy, Jack S. “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” Synthese, vol. 135, no. 2, May 2003, p. 216. 27. Levy, Jack S. “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” p. 218. 28. McDermott, Rose. Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy, pp. 6–7. 29. Levy, Jack S. “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” p. 217, citing Kahneman and Tversky. 30. Streich, Philip and Jack S. Levy. “Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 51, No. 2, Apr., 2007, p. 218. 31. As was said in one recent review of the work, “a small cottage industry sprung up to critique the claims and models in Essence.” [Bernstein, Barton J. Review of Essence of Decision by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. Foreign Policy, no. 114 Spring, 1999, p. 122.] Perhaps the most effective critique at the time was Stephen Krasner,’s “Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland).” Foreign Policy, Summer 1972, pp. 159–179. 32. See George, Alexander L. “The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, 1969, pp. 190–222. 33. Herek, Gregory M., Irving L. Janis, and Paul Huth. “Decision Making during International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 31, issue 2, June 1987, pp. 203–226. 34. Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen eds. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp. 25–26. 35. Haney, Patrick. “Structure and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises.” In Neack, Hey, and Haney. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation. Prentice-Hall, 1995, p. 104, his italics. 36. See Strobel, Warren. Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 37. Except in that the emphasis on polling might be a constant reminder to a political figure that popularity is important, but does not just include the surveys of the day, but extends to the longer judgment of history. A sitting president thinking about the evaluation of his or her performance must occasionally consider the polls among academics and policy professionals that compare the success of America’s past presidents, and how they will ultimately fare in them. I will argue later that such a concern with “legacy,” and the longer-term judgment of history, will be a significant motivator (or at least indicator) of a long temporal horizon. 38. For a good introduction to this systematic consideration of the levels of conflict scale, see Raymond Aron’s Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. [Paix et Guerre entre les Nations]. Doubleday, 1966. 39. Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue. “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 40, no. 2, June, 2002, p. 351. 40. See the works of Foucault, or Hardt, and Negri’s Empire. 41. We yet again find ourselves facing the specter of mutual causality. It is entirely possible that the kind of people who run to a more pessimistic bent would be drawn to fields of study that lend themselves to pessimistic outlooks, like environmental politics or repressive control by the state. Perhaps even their bleak outlooks still represent the optimizing function reflected in Construal Theory (see below), and their work might have been even darker without it.

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42. In a sense, the time horizon is a vital part of psychological outlook. The extremes of the time view spectrum (figure 1.1) are in fact seen as psychological disorders. Someone who thinks only of the immediate present, and cannot consider the implications of his or her actions into the future, could be a sociopath, schizophrenic, or have damage to the temporal lobe of the brain. Conversely, someone who cannot grapple with any immediate issues, and thinks only in the broadest possible terms, such as the furthest future, has a perspective consistent with autism or other mental illness that creates an inability to deal with the present. 43. While a broad clinical study of average individuals is not the same consideration of the role of a decision-maker and their particular psychological stresses and influences, the conclusions of their studies can add a useful dimension to the study of political decisions. 44. Trope and Liberman, “Temporal Construal,” Psychological Review, vol. 110, issue 3, July 2003, p. 403. 45. Ibid., p. 403. 46. Ibid., p. 404. 47. The Han Dynasty (approximately two thousand years ago) Chinese text the Shanhaijing (the Classic of Mountains and Seas) reflects a similar perspective. The work, ostensibly a work of geography, provides fairly accurate information about the people, customs, and landscape of central China at the time. As its subject matter expands further and further from the “known world,” the descriptions of the people and animals who inhabit it become increasingly fantastic, to the point where its outermost frontiers on the “edge of the world” are inhabited by creatures who bear less resemblance to human beings and more to birds, fish, and dogs. There are hints of this in Herodotus’ work, but the direct correlation between distance from civilization and peculiarity is not nearly as direct. 48. Trope, Yaacov and Nira Liberman. “Temporal Construal,” p. 404, referring to Lewin, K. Field Theory in Social Science. Harper, 1951. 49. Trope and Liberman, “Temporal Construal,” p. 405. 50. Liberman, Nira, Michael D. Sagristano and Yaacov Trope. “The Effect of Temporal Distance on Level of Mental Construal.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 38, issue 6, November 2002, p. 523. 51. Liberman, Nira and Yaacov Trope. “The Role Of Feasibility and Desirability Considerations in Near and Distant Future Decisions: A Test of Temporal Construal Theory.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 75, no. 1, July 1998, p. 5. 52. Steidle, Anna, Lioba Werth, Eva-Verena Hanke. “You Can’t See Much in the Dark: Darkness Affects Construal Level and Psychological Distance.” Social Psychology, vol. 42, issue 3, 2011, pp. 174–184. 53. Eyal, Tal, Nira Liberman, Yaacov Trope, Eva Walther. “The Pros and Cons of Temporally Near and Distant Action.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 86, issue 6, June 2004, pp. 781–795. 54. Eyal, Tal, Nira Liberman, Yaacov Trope. “Judging Near and Distant Virtue and Vice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 44, issue 4, July 2008, pp. 1204–1209. 55. Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 1, scene 3. With the limited state of Elizabethan experimental psychology, Shakespeare had not been apprised of that positive bias demonstrated in the work on Temporal Construal. On the other hand, if Macbeth had not emphasized the longerterm pros and minimized the cons of his intended plan with regard to Duncan, the drama would have turned out quite differently (it probably would not have been usable subject matter for a play, in fact). 56. Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 40, no. 2, June, 2002, pp. 355–366, citing Samuelson, Paul, “A Note on Measurement of Utility,” Review of Economic Studies 4, 1937, p. 159. 57. There are many studies on this phenomenon. To name but a few, see Loewenstein, George. “Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption.” The Economic Journal 97, 1987, pp. 666–684; Zauberman, Gal, B. Kyu Kim, Selin A. Malkoc, and James R. Bettman. “Discounting Time and Time Discounting: Subjective Time Perception and Intertemporal Preferences.” Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 46, issue 4, Aug. 2009, pp. 543–556; Takahashi, Taiki. “Loss of Self-Control in Intertemporal Choice may be Attributable to Logarithmic Time-

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Perception.” Medical Hypotheses, Volume 65, Issue 4, pp. 691–693; Schweighofer, N, K. Shishida, C. E. Han, Y. Okamoto, S. C. Tanaka, S. Yamawaki, K. Doya. “Humans Can Adopt Optimal Discounting Strategy Under Real-Time Constraints.” PLoS Computational Biology, vol. 2, issue 11, Nov. 2006, pp. 1349–1356. 58. Price, Colin, Time, Discounting, and Value, p. 104. 59. Reus-Smit, “The Idea of History and History with Ideas,” p. 123. 60. Masini, E. B. Why Futures Studies? Grey Seal, London, 1993, p. 32. 61. David J. Brier, “Marking the future: a review of time horizons.” Futures, 2005, vol. 37, issue 8, p. 842. 62. Weisbach, David and Cass R. Sunstein. “Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed.” Working Paper 08–19. Aug 2008, p. 59. Cited in Sprinz, Lempert, and Scheffran, p. 124. 63. In the early years of the last decade, there was an interesting parallel between the arguments to proactively deal with climate change and to intervene in Iraq before it could use weapons of mass destruction. Both cases involved a significant threat, a major risk in not dealing with it, and the importance of taking short-term action to prevent the consequences. Ironically, very few (if any) people advocated pursuing both policies, showing the impact of ideology on time horizons in politics. Perhaps more ironically, both situations have had credibility issues since the early 2000s—WMDs were not found in Iraq after the invasion, and the “Climategate” issue has shown that some environmental researchers have advocated manipulating their data because of the lack of immediate evidence. 64. Sprinz, Detlef F., Robert Lempert, and Jürgen Scheffran. “Methods for Long-Term Environmental Policy Challenges.” Global Environmental Politics, vol. 9, issue 3, August 2009, pp. 123. 65. The lower level material, which would not be stored in the same high-level facility, can retain much of its radioactivity for many hundreds of thousands of years, but it would not pose the same threat if released. 66. Loewenstein, George F. “Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice.” Management Science. vol. 34, no. 2 (Feb., 1988), pp. 200–214. 67. “War is a matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use.” History of the Peloponnesian War 1.83.2, Crawley translation. 68. “nations . . . united because of mutual interest. The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state.” Perpetual Peace, section 368, Lewis White Beck translation, in Emmanuel Kant, On History, p. 114. 69. “The impact of any revolution on all states on our continent, so closely knit together through commerce, will be so obvious that the other states, driven by their own danger but without any legal basis, will offer themselves as arbiters, and thus they will prepare the way for a distant international government for which there is no precedent in world history.” Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, section 28, Lewis White Beck translation, in Emmanuel Kant, On History, p. 23. 70. “The more our commercial system gains in complication, the more does the common prosperity of all of us come to depend upon the reliance which can be placed on the due performance of all contracts. This is the real basis of “prestige,” national and individual; circumstances stronger than ourselves are pushing us, despite what the cynical critics of our commercial civilization may say, towards the unvarying observance of this simple ideal. When we drop back from it—and such relapses occur as we should expect them to occur, especially in those societies which have just emerged from a more or less primitive state—punishment is generally swift and sure.” Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 79. 71. “We are concerned with the case of fully civilized rival nations in fully occupied territory or with civilizations so firmly set that conquest could not sensibly modify their character, and the fact of conquering such territory gives to the conqueror no material advantage which he could not have had without conquest.” Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 52. 72. A good example is Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, especially chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1–65. Also see John Vasquez’s The War Puzzle Revisited, and the Correlates of War Project (available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org), from which Vasquez draws extensively.

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73. Of course, globalization does make violence from less developed, or “failed” states, not to mention non-state actors such as criminal or terrorist organizations, more likely and more potentially devastating in its impact. 74. There is the opposite perspective that forms a darker take on the role of economic engagement. New technologies will make it easier to monitor and suppress dissent, and the new wealth and power that comes to such a state might make it less likely that other nations will be willing to confront it. 75. It could be argued that some countries’ military subdivisions (army, navy, bureaucracy, office corps, new guard, etc.) can have somewhat divergent interests and pursue different goals, but these differences pale in the face of the challenges of direct military conflict, and questions of victory or defeat. Competing military strategies and goals during times of peace are more distinct—consider the debates in US military circles during the Cold War, often representing a wide range of approaches to the Soviet Union. 76. Even centralized command economies contained a variety of internal competing economic interests, though they were often driven by political advantage rather than a profit motive. A Soviet-era joke about the left shoe factory “winning” because it was producing more shoes than the factory making right shoes is an example of this mentality. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, only North Korea has anything approaching a command economy, and its highly atypical economic relations with the rest of the world (primarily based on arms sales, nuclear blackmail and food aid) would have to be an extreme outlier in any study of comparative economy. 77. Treaties can be signed, reparations paid, apologies made, but a realist perspective in the Hobbesian vein would argue that the state of “all against all” would mean that an armistice or a peace treaty are only temporary respites in the perpetual state of conflict—a “war” is not a single incident but a chapter in the ongoing process of international relations. Seeing it in this way would require looking at the situation with a more distant time horizon. 78. Michael Lusztig, in his work on trade liberalization, discusses the rent-seekers who benefit from the inefficiencies of protectionism and how they can be transformed into pro-free market advocates through policies that allow them to benefit from the new system. However, this process can take time depending on the temporal perspective they might have in terms of the process of liberalization, and how they might anticipate where they can best extract benefits for themselves. “Over the short term, rent seekers unable to gauge their international competitiveness may be expected to conform to the predicted behavior of both flexible and inflexible rent seekers. That is, they will lobby for restoration of state-supplied rents and they will restructure operations to compete in world markets. In other words, they will take some time to determine with precision the production point at which they will ultimately settle.” Lusztig, Michael. “The Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders.” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring, 1998), p. 43. 79. Certain variables can cloud the crystal certainty of economic decision-making. For example, many decision-makers would be hesitant to select choices that yield the highest monetary outcome but carry additional costs, such as moral or social burdens. Social stigma or personal guilt might forestall a decision with a greater fiscal outcome. Attempts like the Social Index, to bring in moral considerations to fiscal calculations, have been successful even if they do not offer the highest return on investments, they also offer a payoff and satisfaction that goes beyond simple economic calculations. 80. Though nothing regarding the future is completely certain; even guaranteed investments such as government-backed bonds can prove to be losing propositions should the government collapse, or even if it experiences high levels of inflation which makes the rate of interest insufficient to cover the loss of the bonds’ value. 81. The idea of a family owned business complicates this distinction, of course. For the sake of this discussion, we would normally use the “family” category to refer to a nuclear family, making investments on behalf of personal interests rather than applying them to a functioning business. 82. For a detailed consideration of the relationship between personality theory and time, see Slife, Time and Psychological Explanation, 55–85.

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83. See Gell, Alfred. The Anthropology of Time. Cultural Construction of Temporal Maps and Images. Oxford, 1992. 84. There is a story, possibly apocryphal, in which one of the oldest colleges of Oxford needed timber to replace the four-hundred-year-old main beam over their great hall. It was difficult to find such wood still existing in Great Britain, but they noticed that one of the trees on the grounds of the college met their specifications. In doing more research, it was found that the tree had been planted four centuries earlier specifically so that it could be used when the wood making up the college wore out. 85. Gaenslen, Fritz. “Culture and Decision-Making in China, Japan, Russia and the United States.” World Politics, vol. 39, no. 1, October 1986, p. 81. 86. In his Patterning of Time, Leonard Doob contrasts the saint, “oriented towards . . . the after life” with “the other extreme . . . infants who . . . would praise only the present” (p. 213). 87. Some argue that, in a democracy, wealthy candidates make better politicians because they would be immune to the temptations of interest groups and corruption (some people argued this for Arnold Schwarzenegger and Ross Perot). From the other side, the kind of person who had assiduously worked to accumulate wealth might be more prone to the temptations of increasing it. Perhaps the best candidate is the unambitious person who comes by a great deal of money unwittingly. I refer one to the films Mr. Deeds and Brewster’s Millions for a demonstration of this sentiment (if not the reality). 88. This attribute, like some of the others we have looked at, runs the risk of endogenity. How people choose to distribute their wealth in itself is perhaps another way that illustrates, or even informs, their view of the future. 89. Green, Leonard, Joel Myerson, David Lichtman, Suzanne Rosen, and Astrid Fry. “Temporal Discounting in Choice between Delayed Rewards: The Role of Age and Income.” Psychology and Aging vol. 11, no. 1, winter 1996, p. 83. 90. Green et al., “Temporal Discounting in Choice between Delayed Rewards: The Role of Age and Income,” p. 82. 91. Green, Leonard, Joel Myerson, and Edward Mcfadden. “Rate of Temporal Discounting Decreases With Amount of Reward.” Memory & Cognition, vol. 25, issue 5, Sep. 1997, pp. 715–723. It was found that the decrease leveled off with rewards of about $25,000, but this of course could reflect the average income of the participants in the study—a similar experiment done only on millionaires might yield a different cutoff point. 92. Barring getting hit by a bus or swimming less than thirty minutes after eating. 93. Conversely someone in the cynicism of age might say this is so that youngsters can pad their resumes for college and career. 94. This evokes Kohlberg’s categories of moral development, which do not discuss time, but the broadening of perspective to include larger and more encompassing concepts, starting with the basics of individual reward and punishment in one-on-one relations, and ending with the social contract and ultimately, “universal principles.” See Kohlberg, Lawrence, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development. Harper & Row, 1981. (His developmental framework was first developed in his 1958 doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, “The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10 to 16.”) 95. This could be called the “Ebenezer Scrooge” factor. 96. Padawer, Elizabeth A., Joy M. Jacobs-Lawson, Douglas A. Hershey and David G. Thomas. “Demographic Indicators as Predictors of Future Time Perspective.” Current Psychology, June 2007, vol. 26, issue 2, p. 106. 97. Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice, Harvard Press, 1982. 98. This dichotomy of roles predates the advent of agriculture, which of course requires longer term planning. Since that development happened tens of thousands of years ago, there has been some room for change since then. 99. Tickner, J. Ann. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. Columbia University Press, 1992. 100. Yi, Richard, Leila F. King, Anne E. Carter, Reid D. Landes, Warren K. Bickel. “Intertemporal Decision-Making for a Group.” The Psychological Record, vol. 60, issue 4, Fall 2010, pp. 577–586.

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101. Green et al., “Temporal Discounting in Choice between Delayed Rewards: The Role of Age and Income,” p. 79. 102. Carstensen, “The Influence of a Sense of Time on Human Development.” Science, Jun 30, 2006, p. 1913. One interesting experimental result supporting this conclusion found that “when asked to make the choice after imagining that they just received a telephone call from their physician who told them about a new medical advance that virtually ensures they will live far longer than expected, older peoples’ choices resembled those of younger people.” (p. 1914) 103. This reticence has sometimes escalated to the point that leaders have been completely incapacitated or even dead without any public acknowledgment for days or even weeks. This is particularly egregious in totalitarian states, where the examples of Fidel Castro, Kim Jong-Il, Yuri Andropov, Francisco Franco come to mind, but it can happen in any government— Woodrow Wilson’s final days in office were dramatically affected by his poor health. 104. Carstensen, Laura L. “The Influence of a Sense of Time on Human Development,” p. 1915. 105. 毛主席萬歲. 106. In another example, Nazi Germany often referred to itself as the “Thousand Year Reich.” While there is much to criticize in this evil regime, it could not be argued that it suffered from a lack of innovation in its policies—it certainly tried things that had never been attempted before. 107. Padawer, Elizabeth A., Joy M. Jacobs-Lawson, Douglas A. Hershey and David G. Thomas. “Demographic Indicators as Predictors of Future Time Perspective.” Current Psychology, June 2007, vol. 26, issue 2, p. 103. 108. It is important to make the distinction between correlation and causation in these studies. As Padawer et al. observe (p. 107), “it would be a serious mistake, however, to conclude that these demographic variables were causally linked to time perspective. More likely it is the case that they merely covary with the social forces, environmental constraints, and meaningful life tasks individuals encounter during the course of their lives.” Since this project is primarily interested in the presence of a particular time horizon in a specific decisionmaker, it is less important to explain the “how” as to demonstrate the “what.” 109. Padawer et al., “Demographic Indicators as Predictors of Future Time Perspective,” p. 106. 110. Barber, James David. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 4th ed. Prentice Hall, 1992. 111. Löckenhoff, Corinna E., Ted O’Donoghue, and David Dunning. “Age Differences in Temporal Discounting: The Role of Dispositional Affect and Anticipated Emotions.” Psychology and Aging, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 282. 112. Theory of International Politics, p. 128. 113. James, Patrick, “Behavioral IR: Practical Suggestions.” International Studies Review, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 163. 114. The fact that a discussion of potential US presidential candidates seems to happen increasingly earlier before the end each preceding administration is a sign of this.

Chapter Three

A Narrow Course, the View None Too Clear The Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, 1995–1996

In the study of the US–China relationship, there has been no issue more fraught with the weight of the future than the status—and ultimate fate—of Taiwan. Decisions regarding the relationship of the island to the mainland government often utilize a time frame well beyond the usual considerations involved in other areas of strategic decision-making. One notable feature that marks the unusual role of time horizons in the Taiwan situation is the tremendous range of perspectives that can be found. Considerations of the cross-straits relationship include a variety of time frames, with periods of glacial tension interspersed with moments of immediate crisis. It is therefore unsurprising that there are many temporal filters through which to regard the situation. Beginning with the defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland and the rhetoric revolving around the recapture of the island, there was initially a strong immediacy in the discourse about Taiwan and its fate. Many uneventful years passed while each regime focused on domestic circumstances, with heightened tension periodically returning. Over the years of the PRC-Taiwan relationship, this emphasis on immediate action and consequences gave way to a wider and more complex range of horizons considered by each side in its decision-making. The history of the Taiwan Straits situation is complex and has been shaped by a variety of disparate circumstances, many of which are beyond the scope of this study. Through the lens of the Taiwan case, particularly the missile crisis and its implications, I will look at the impact of the different perspectives on time. This case is particularly useful in the theoretical lever75

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age it can provide because of the kinds of competing temporal horizons that are in play, and how they are used by decision makers. The mid 1990s found the relationship among the primary actors developing in a context of continuity and dramatic change, both of which shed light on how time horizons are considered by the makers of policy. TIME HORIZONS AND THE TAIWAN CASE One of the ways that clearly displays the use of time horizons in looking at Taiwan Strait issues is that a very long shadow of the future is fundamental to the cross-strait relationship. It is striking that, despite the disagreements over outcomes, methods and even the basic way to define the conflict, one of the few things to which all the actors invested in the situation agree is the fact that resolution will take considerable time. Approaches to the cross-straits situation depend on developments that will take time to transpire and mature. More generally, many options for action will not be immediate (dramatic shifts in political parties, nationalistic protest, and other unanticipated changes can occur, and do, in the world of international politics, but the kind of event that would necessitate immediate resolution of the Taiwan question is seen as something to be avoided). A part of that consideration is based on the nature of hard power— military capability and economic relationships in this situation. In military affairs, the capabilities of the PRC are undergoing a transformation, and time is a key factor in their development. One of the most important aspects of the mainland’s power projection is its amphibious assault and deep-water capabilities, which were still limited at the time of the missile crisis. However, they are steadily increasing. As we have seen before, the shape of the future here plays a strong role in affecting how policy options are considered. Studies by the US military project a reasonably predictable timeline for the PRC’s development of its tactical options in the Strait. This is based on a view of the PRC’s future that uses the most common form of time perspective utilized when studying that state, the upwards slope. PAST HORIZONS AND THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS While looking into the future is a necessary part of the making of any decision, the past also plays a significant role in many kinds of considerations. The perspectives on the past by all sides in the 1995–1996 missile crisis are no exception. In addition to “learned lessons” and historical analogies, much of the Taiwan question is based on competing interpretations of history. At the very root of the conflict lie historical questions of sovereignty, precedent and legitimacy.

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One of the basic issues dependent on the past is the question of when (or if) Taiwan was part of China. The long history of the island of Taiwan shows a variety of masters, with often highly ambiguous status. From the Dutch colonial occupation of the seventeenth century to the Ming loyalist rebellions to the Japanese possession after the Sino-Japanese war, there were many cultural, political, and even genetic influences that cast doubt on the pure “Chineseness” of Taiwan. The last 50 years of PRC-ROC relations have a number of characteristics that make clearly defining the situation difficult. After the return of the island colony from Japan at the end of World War II, Taiwan lasted four years as a minor province of the Republic of China. But as the Nationalist cause looked bleak at the end of the 1940s, the island became a refuge for a soon-tobecome exile government. As the Chinese communists consolidated their control over the mainland, the rapid evacuation of the KMT to Taiwan was accompanied by sometimes brutal tactics to assert their control over the island, including some massacres for which the Taiwanese regime took decades to apologize. 1 . The divided governments of the PRC and the ROC began their parallel and mostly separate development. The regimes were similar in some interesting ways, having possessed a strong (even inflexible) ideology, often defined by their relationships with the superpowers of the Cold War. This in itself is a critical subject of Cold War studies, and I cannot attempt to do such a historical survey any kind of justice in this project. 2 The most important point to take away is that the past time landscape of the cross-straits was strongly defined by strategic forces that are no longer in play. The relationship between the US and Taiwan was not always a perfect one, but since the 1950s, it has been one of solidly mutual beneficial support, assured by the asymmetric nature of the relationship. The US assured Taiwan a certain level of protection, including arms sales and the promise of direct military support in case of PRC aggression. Taiwan was in many ways a client to the US, providing political and rhetorical support, as well as coordination in Pacific military affairs. Chiang Kai-shek was not always perfect to work with, but he knew that the survival of his regime was dependent on support from the US, which in turn was dependent on its approval of his behavior. 3 For the US, the positive relationship with Taiwan meant a dependable ally, a stable base of operations in the South China Sea, and a source of fervent anti-communist sentiment in East Asia. The connection between the PRC and the USSR was not always a positive relationship, but exerted a powerful influence in defining the nature of the PRC’s actions. The early ideal vision for communist China was inspired by the Stalinist model of state planning, with a strong emphasis on heavy industry and rural redistribution. In a sense it could be said that the developments of the 1960s and 70s, including the Cultural Revolution, were due to

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the Sino-Soviet split. The relationship between the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union became reactive in nature—the actions of the PRC could be said to be a response to Soviet policies, an attempt to distinguish the PRC as an independent state, rather than a client state to the USSR. It is difficult to determine an exact causal mechanism since the forces driving the Chinese revolutionary movement viewed the Soviet Union as insufficiently radical. 4 The modernization initiatives of the late 1970s and 1980s also depended on a relationship with the Soviet Union, and were increasingly shaped by the PRC’s developing relations with the United States. As the US recognized the PRC as the actual government of mainland China, in part due to a desire to destabilize the USSR, the PRC took full advantage of this new alignment and began a slow, eventually accelerating process of integration in the global community, membership in international organizations, attempts to assert its status as a great power. We will see this even more dramatically in the decade following the cross-Strait crisis. As well as their relationship with the superpowers, another defining element that both Taiwan and the PRC shared was their strong political ideology, with the development of legitimacy over the long term being a key tactical priority. Both shared the conviction that their state was the legitimate government of all of China, and emphasized it in their policies and rhetoric. Each state had an ideologue at its helm, with a larger-than-life cult of personality, and their individual decisions played a significant role in defining the path their nations would take. 5 The recent past (the early 1990s) leading up to the missile crisis also saw a dramatic post-Cold War divergence between Taiwan and the PRC as many of the parallels began to break down. The post-Tiananmen mainland environment brought increased PRC political control (a re-reining in of liberalization and reforms from the late 1980s), while dramatic developments toward open democracy were underway in Taiwan. Neither regime was in a position to handle direct conflict with the other (with any degree of certainty that they would be triumphant), but neither could they renounce their claims to that conflict for internal reasons. This would often mean a relationship marked by strong language, retrenchment into fixed positions, an unstable balance with moments where that stability was lost. The metaphor of a bubbling pot with occasional moments of boiling over and spilling is appropriate. Several analogies might be apt here. One way to look at the shape of the past of the Taiwan context is as periods of uneasy quiet punctuated by moments of drama due to a catalyzing incident. The mechanics of the situation are similar to building a house of cards, or playing a game of jenga, in which one move can destabilize the precarious balance and cause a possible collapse. One could also use the idea of walking on an ice sheet—the lack of traction makes for limited changes or progress in any direction, and it also

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means that a misstep or unpredictable change in the surface can result in dramatic slippage or a painful fall. And every so often the ground becomes more slippery. With this kind of relationship, it is unsurprising that people regard the situation warily, with considerable uncertainty about future developments in the short or long term. As one scholar pointed out, “analysts of the evolution of the People’s Republic of China and of US-PRC-Taiwan relations have observed a tendency for major shifts to occur more or less in ten-year increments.” 6 The punctuations of conflict do not occur with quite that regularity, but there have been several in the baggage that each actor brought to the 1995–1996 case. The US view of its relationship with the PRC over the Taiwan issue has been fraught with ambiguity. The driving influence determining early Taiwan policy was usually not the nature of Taiwan itself, but strategic considerations related to larger scale geopolitical factors during the Cold War. The communist government of the PRC was no ally of the US, but the KMT government now restricted to Taiwan was no freedom-loving democracy, and while his wife was charming and well-liked, Chang Kai-shek was a stubborn and often difficult ally. In addition to geopolitical factors, a variety of groups acting in the US domestic political arena on behalf of Taiwanese (and occasionally mainland) interests formed a “China lobby” that cast its influence throughout the Cold War. After much discussion as to the fate of the island after World War II, it is quite possible that the US would have left Taiwan to fend for itself against the Communists had it not been for the Korean conflict. 7 The later decision to engage the PRC in the international community in the 1970s and limit the ROC’s international recognition was driven by a desire to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and thereby weaken the Soviet Union. The “First Taiwan Strait Crisis” took place not long after the KMT had settled on the island and consolidated its power there. In 1954, attacks on the small island of Jinmen (Quemoy) by the PLA were a source of international tension. Jinmen island was only two miles from the coast of the mainland, and initially heavily fortified and garrisoned by the Nationalists. As one could imagine, it was a fairly provocative presence and a destabilizing influence. The passage of the Far East Resolution by the US was an attempt to return some stability by communicating the reluctance of the US to defend that specific location. The second crisis took place in the summer and fall of 1958, at which time the PRC began regular shelling of Jinmen and Little Jinmen islands. The attacks settled into regular patterns—shelling only on odd numbered days, eventually only on holidays. This is an interesting example of the use of temporal rhythm to send signals, a use of time that will be discussed elsewhere. By the end of 1958, the shelling stopped, and for many decades the relationship between the island and the mainland was tense, but without

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direct military incident. The PRC was involved in a variety of domestic political issues, from five-year plans to the Cultural Revolution to rapprochement to the beginnings of reform. 8 “There was no full-scale international crisis between the PRC and Taiwan for more than three decades. However, the protracted conflict between the two China regimes erupted periodically— usually in the form of a Beijing-perceived threat from Taipei, supported by the US to thwart the PRC’s persistent claim to sovereignty over Taiwan by reactivating the “Two Chinas” policy, which was renounced by the U.S. in 1971.” 9 . This brings us to the 1995–1996 Missile crisis, sometimes called the “Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.” 10 THE CRISIS In the context of the longer view adhered to by all the major parties involved, in which the facts of the case necessitate a great deal of time to achieve resolution, we find a moment of crisis. Crises are by definition strongly time dependent, in which the need for immediacy is perceived (whether it always exists there or not). They by definition require rapid responses, often in the context of limited information. As James and Zhang note, crisis decision making is a process “in which complexity, limited information and time constraints predominate virtually by definition.” 11 Some scholarship has attempted to cast a different light on the nature of the ways that crises are perceived and treated by different actors. A study of “critical international incidents” in the late 1970s discussed the difference between Chinese and western views, though there is a strong element of Marxist ideology that might not be as relevant in more recent Chinese thinking. In the “standard western view,” critical international incidents “have a very short life,” while the “standard Chinese view” sees them “extend over a long time; dealing with such protracted phenomena requires persistent struggle, perseverance, and patience.” 12 To put it another way, “Crises are inevitable and recurrent, and therefore they can be anticipated and planned for. After all, international crises are consequences of long-term economic forces. Crises do not lend themselves to immediate resolution; instead, conflict requires ‘protracted struggle.’” 13 While such distinctions might smack of cultural generalizations and ideological stereotypes, this project will attempt to investigate how time thinking was truly being used during this crisis, which might in turn shed light more broadly on the kinds of thinking and views that these actors have, and add a degree of nuance to our understanding of the differences that exist between them. As we have mentioned already, the cross-straits situation is particularly powerful in showing us the variety and impact of temporal thinking in crisis

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decision-making. In this historic relationship with the possibility of potential resolutions only in the long term future implicit in calculations about outcome and policy-making, we have a moment in which short-term calculations come to have supreme importance. Therefore the Missile Crisis provides us with an exceptional moment in which a wide range of time horizons come into play, and studying this case is of particular value in understanding the nature of time-horizontal thinking. Overview The mid 1990s was a significant time in US-PRC-ROC relations for a number of reasons. As we discussed above, the memory of Tiananmen continued to reverberate freshly in the minds of most observers of the PRC. The regime had been going to great lengths to improve their international image through a variety of tactics, but for many people concerned with democratic development and progress in human rights, the PRC had been using their economic growth as a justification for neglecting domestic liberalization. Whatever attempts might have been made to promote a friendly cooperative image in the international community were seen by some as a “false front” intended to conceal a more sinister program of domestic repression. Meanwhile, Taiwan had been undergoing a dramatic political development to parallel its economic progress, moving from martial law to limited elections to their first democratically elected president, all in under ten years. In the early 1990s, during a period of relative calm in ROC-PRC relations regarding the status of Taiwan, several developments in Taiwanese politics occurred: democratic and identity politics. In the context of dramatic democratic developments and an almost heady atmosphere in which the Taiwanese people were flexing their new-found political expression, a wide range of concerns and passions manifested themselves in diverse ways. An increasingly vocal Taiwanese political faction began to press for Taiwanese independence. These movements began to operate in a political space opened by the move from a one-party system on Taiwan, in which the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) party line defined the limits of political discourse and did not allow for serious consideration of alternatives to the regime’s vision, certainly not for a Taiwanese nation apart from China. As the KMT’s control was relaxed, there was increasing interest in developing formal recognition of the reality of Taiwan’s status by the mid 1990s—a legally as well as functionally independent state, with a unique cultural heritage distinct from that of the mainland. In addition to the independence issue, a variety of political parties and realignments began to develop and shape the Taiwanese political landscape, some of which complicated US-ROC-PRC relations. The traditional KMT, the party of inflexible nationalism, began to divide into different factions

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reflecting the new political reality in Taiwan, both because multiple political parties were allowed, and because the people of Taiwan were interested in participating in potential political visions that they saw as achievable. In the minds of those people, the return of the Republic of China to the helm of mainland governance was not a possibility. Acknowledging that reality, and doing away with the KMT’s insistence on reclaiming dominion over all of China, opens other possibilities. Republic of China rhetoric (the policy of the government on Taiwan coming to gain authority over the mainland) gradually gave way to the “one China” discourse, which was a fundamental element of the Kuomintang party platform. The “one China” concept is a compromise designed to defuse PRC concerns about irreparable Taiwanese independence, by asserting that there is one government of China, and Taiwan is a part of it. This allows room for KMT nationalism but also leaves a diplomatic door open for the PRC to eventually assert control. “One China” language has been part of USChina dialogue since the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, a delicately crafted document designed to accommodate the PRC’s concerns about re-entering the international community without undermining the status of Taiwan. 14 The KMT split into several political parties in the mid-1990s, including moderate elements that wanted to move away from the strong claims over mainland territory, develop internal Taiwanese politics, but not antagonize the PRC by making claims to independence. There are a variety of time horizons at work in these divisions. Some factions, particularly those working to build better relations with, or at least to avoid antagonizing the PRC, are motivated by a short-term horizon—more important is the continuing relative security of Taiwan from attack by the mainland. Others (the heirs of the KMT that took over Taiwan in the late 1940s), motivated by a strong sense of Chinese nationalism, would want to keep the door open for unification in the long term. This would not necessarily be because they loved the current state of mainland politics, but to make sure the people of Taiwan have a chance to accept their legacy as Chinese and be a part of the rising power of China in the twenty-first century. 15 Some advocating a strong independence position would be strongly motivated by the short term—little thought is given to exactly how this political movement would play out in long-term relations with the mainland. Their passion for breaking from the mainland and forging a true Taiwanese state would override other concerns. Other people in the independence movement might be considering the situation from a long-term horizon. The PRC’s power seems to be on an inevitable ascent, and in the future it would be in a better position to threaten the island or directly compel its behavior without fear of international intervention. The majority of Taiwanese were not strongly enthusiastic about cementing ties with the mainland or dramatic independence. 16 For them whatever

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particular ideas they might have regarding Taiwanese identity can be compromised in favor of vague promises of security or progress—it is important to pursue a policy that reflects the real desires and actual nature of the Taiwanese people. Advocating independence was also a way to garner immediate political support—there were doubtless politicians who took advantage of this swelling of enthusiasm for their electoral advantage without much regard for the longer term implications of their policy. This division could be seen as representing a greater influence by a medium term perspective. The beginning of 1995 saw what could be called a fairly optimistic period in PRC-Taiwan relations. Economic ties had never been stronger, as Taiwanese investment and manufacturing moved to the mainland. By 1993, Taiwan was the second largest investor in the mainland economy. 17 In a New Year’s Day address, Jiang Zemin had called for a peaceful resolution to the crossStraits situation. There was even a proclaimed openness to other perspectives. “We do not discriminate against those who are adopting a wait-andsee, a suspicious, or even a negative or antagonistic attitude towards closer cross-straits relations, as we are ready to have contact and interaction with them for increased understanding and greater identity of views.” 18 . In April, Lee Teng-hui made a statement calling for greater economic cooperation between China and Taiwan and establishment of more formal methods for resolving disputes. The steps were positive, but definitely remained uncertain without dramatic tangible headway. Jiang rebuffed offers for a direct leaderto-leader summit at the highest levels of authority. Working-level cross-strait talks were cancelled over disagreement over the agenda to be covered. 19 In the midst of these mixed signals and uncertainty came an invitation by Lee’s alma mater, Cornell University, to deliver a speech. It was the second such invitation extended by the university; a 1994 invitation could not be accepted because the State department did not allow Lee a visa allowing him to travel to the US in anything resembling an official capacity. In fact, during a refueling layover in Hawaii in 1994 (on the way to Central America), Lee was not even permitted to leave the plane. This campus speech would not have been an official state visit and was not at a government institution, but to the PRC, this was precariously close to a state-sanctioned visit, with Lee possessing officially recognized status as a state leader visiting the US. The 1994 visit was successfully blocked by Beijing’s advocacy, and commitments were made by the US (specifically by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on April 7th) that the 1995 visa would not be granted. However, on May 22 a visa was issued for Lee, and while his trip did not have the stamp of an official state visit (Lee was not greeted by any US officials upon his arrival), 20 the PRC interpreted it as a step toward official recognition and took a number of steps in response. Beijing withdrew its

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ambassador from the US, several talks were suspended, and a great deal of rhetoric came from Beijing denouncing the US’ violation of its sovereignty. What transformed this diplomatic incident into a crisis were the military actions taken by the PRC. Beginning in July of 1995, the PLA began a series of missile tests, with impacts less than forty miles away from Taiwanese territory. There were several additional tests before Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan elections, then relative quiet from August to March of 1996, though troops on China’s coast remained mobilized and its rhetoric remained adamant regarding the unacceptability of any steps to recognize Taiwan as a separate political entity. In March of 1996, right before Taiwan’s first fully democratic presidential election, the PRC began another set of missile tests over several weeks— from the 8–15th, 12–20th, 18–25th. Debates among the candidates were often passionate, sometimes personal. One of the most significant issues was the question of relations with the mainland—particularly the question of what path Taiwan would take regarding its independence as a sovereign state. In a heavy-handed attempt to steer the election towards an anti-independence outcome, Beijing began a stream of rhetoric denouncing the elements of Taiwanese society that favored independence and resumed the missile launches—all while making it very clear that it would exercise direct force should independence be declared officially. The missiles were closer to the main island than in the summer of 1995—some impacts were as close as 25 miles from the island, as few as 60 from Taipei. While the overall international response to Beijing’s mobilization was disapproving and critical, the United States was more direct. Washington sent its own military presence into the region. Two aircraft carrier groups, the Nimitz and the Independence, began maneuvers in the Strait itself, the first time such a significant force had entered those waters since the 1970s. In the relative stability and quiet of the first few years after the cold war, these developments stood in stark relief to the optimism many decision makers had regarding the prospects for peace. Two great powers’ flexing of their military might during a moment of dispute was not encouraging for the promise of peaceful diplomacy. That each actor had reserved the right to use force if they felt the circumstances warranted it, was even less so. While in many ways and to many people this situation was not the literal brink of war, certainly the stakes were quite high, and the decision-makers thought long and hard about the repercussions of their actions in the present and into the future. It is not surprising that many of the decisions depended strongly on which time horizon was the predominant consideration.

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Contexts and Horizons of the Actors We will continue with an overview of the time horizons pertaining to the crisis informing each of the actors, consider why a particular horizon might be most appealing to the decision makers in a given context, proceed to discuss how the horizons come into conflict, and then conclude with a discussion of how the horizons had a direct impact in the decision-making in this case. Differences between the states’ international relations, their internal political structure and the nature of their individual leaders will be taken into account in a consideration of how the time horizon model makes a unique contribution to the understanding of the decision-making process in the case. To facilitate the initial comparison, the following chart is included (See table 3.1). It should be noted that this chart is by no means exhaustive or even complete—decisions spanning a number of time-frames can be informed by similar values or goals, and there is often more going on for each length of time into the future than a box in a chart can convey. However, this can be helpful in getting a sense of the broad strokes of what goals are seen as feasible in a particular time frame. More detail on each time horizon with respect to the cross-Strait situation, particularly in the context of the missile crisis, will add depth the chart cannot provide. In addition, the chart emphasizes the differences in goals under each time horizon, but does not indicate which might be favored by the decision-makers involved, nor why that horizon would appear the most appealing. This will be discussed in the body of the case analysis. However, there are some interesting things to note in looking at this overview. While the chart has been intended to provide contrast and highlight differences of interest, there is significant continuity with respect to some state goals—peaceful resolution is a near universal objective (with the possible exception of some hard line or ultra-nationalistic elements). While any regime contains a variety of political perspectives, it is also useful to observe the bifurcated division in the Chinese perspectives, particularly as we look at the longer horizons. There are dramatically competing visions for the fate of Chinese (and Taiwanese) civilization. This is not to say that US policy was the result of a unified voice—far from it—and these divisions in US policy will be discussed in the case specifics below. The greatest discord in the US administration was with respect to short-term practice, while the longer-term hopes were considerably more consistent. Broader visions for the fate of the world system did vary, and will be discussed in the WTO chapter.

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Table 3.1. Time Horizons of Each Actor in the 1995–1996 Missile Crisis: Desired Outcomes.

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In the broadest sense, one of the interesting commonalities in those longer horizons is the slant towards an optimistic perspective. This is unsurprising when we consider the political function that the longer-term goals might serve, but it is also consistent with the considerations of Construal Theory, which posits that the more distant objects lend themselves to a greater degree of abstraction, which makes more difficult activities seem more possible. “Temporal construal . . . suggests that individuals undertake harder activities for the distant future because feasibility receives less weight in distant-future activities. 21 It also allows for the emotional benefits of procrastination, forestalling some of the difficulties in a given context. “People are often free to postpone their decisions until they get close in time to the future situation. They may therefore start thinking about a future situation in terms of their general knowledge and goals and postpone thinking about the more specific, secondary aspects of the situation until later.” 22 This process is exaggerated in increasing distance into the future. “According to CLT [Construal Level Theory], if cons are subordinate to pros, then pros should become more salient as temporal distance from the action increases, whereas cons should become less salient as temporal distance from the action increases.” 23 Some of the reasons how this might directly apply to our cases will be discussed below. Horizons in Beijing’s Decisions and the Crisis In the time leading up to this crisis, the PRC was on uncertain ground in a number of ways. The overall situation for Beijing was fraught with challenges to their long-term prospects, challenges the regime was working hard to anticipate and ultimately prevent. The PRC was aware that it was a time of change for the country—a dramatic economic change, paralleled by a political shift considerably more restrained than in Taiwan. The legacy of Tiananmen still loomed large in the minds of the politically aware public, as well as in the state leaders’. While the way that the 1989 protests were handled and perceived by the international community was far from optimal to the PRC, the original concerns motivating their suppression had not changed. While running the risk of oversimplifying a complex situation, 24 the major factor driving the repression of dissidents in 1989 was the importance of control and stability. The fear of chaos, of luan (亂), drove the decisions in Tiananmen and continued to resonate strongly in informing the decisions the PRC would make. In the midst of dramatic economic developments, with the roles and relative influences of many elements of Chinese society changing, likely for good, the importance of continuity of the PRC leadership was a major element in decision-making. In the more black-and-white perspective of the Wall Street Journal editorial staff, “If there is anything that Beijing

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hates worse than a Taiwan edging toward independence, it is Chinese people embracing democracy. Folks on the mainland might get big ideas.” 25 Stability and harmonious cooperation were cornerstones of traditional Chinese thought, and a nation weary of the uncertainty and self-destruction of the Cultural Revolution would be interested in moving past that to a more predictable future horizon. By the 1990s the young Red Guard and fanatical devotees of Mao has passed into stolid middle-age, living in a society that had little place for their former fervor. Another element of uncertainty in PRC politics was the tensions among leadership factions. Jiang Zemin was the heir apparent from Deng Xiaoping, and was working to shore up his position in anticipation of Deng’s death and any possible power struggles. In particular, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had tremendous power and influence in the mid-1990s; generals were taking advantage of their positions and the new market reforms to reap tremendous fortunes and create power bases that could threaten even the highest political positions of the PRC. Into this anxiety over instability, change, and unpredictability, comes a Taiwan in the midst of a dramatic transformation. Considering that reintegration of Taiwan with the mainland was a long-term priority for Beijing, any developments that might make that eventual process more difficult are to be avoided. The explosion of political expression on Taiwan was a great concern. Not only does it mean a societal environment more likely to be critical of the mainland regime, but it also meant a political system that would be more difficult to integrate into the PRC’s centrally directed system. Political expression and liberalization led to the demonstrations in the Square, and the developments in Taiwan could be seen as changes in the same direction on a statewide scale. How could such a place become part of the nation without upheaval? So what is the PRC to do? And how would the specific time horizon being used impact the decisions? A good place to begin would be to look at the different goals the PRC would have for different time horizons and how the consideration of each would impact calculations and the ultimate decision outcome. US Horizons and the Crisis Much of our discussion of the PRC’s time horizons has been an extrapolation of likely perspectives. The “black box” of PRC decision-making makes it challenging to isolate differences among conflicting points of view; the centralized nature of PRC policy making and the desire to present a unified policy to the outside world mean that we have very little data concerning genuine personal perspectives or reflecting the process of coming to a deci-

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sion; these questions must be considered by looking at outcomes and trying to work backwards. We have the opposite problem in the US case. Analyzing the process by which foreign policy is determined is different for an open democratic state, with an overabundance of sources. There are many points of view striving for acceptance and implementation. There are as many sources of information about those perspectives, from statements by policy makers, conversations with the press, and testimony in government settings, and it is sometimes difficult to ascertain which perspectives are influential, which are earnest, and which are posturing to extremes for the purposes of negotiation and persuasion. It cannot be denied that the mid 1990s was a diverse period of American policy-making. New freedom from the limitations of Cold War thinking meant that a range of policy options were newly available, taking advantage of the “peace dividend” in a rapidly expanding economy. It was a promising time, when new technologies promised to propel the whole world into a new information revolution. Thinking about the long-term future was natural under such conditions. While some thinkers talk about the “end of history,” 26 for some, more on the hawkish side, there was a possible rival emerging to fill the role once held by the Soviet Union: The People’s Republic of China. The brutality of Tiananmen was still fresh in the American mind, but there were a variety of approaches advocated for the “China problem,” and no clear winner. Many members of Congress were reluctant to cooperate with (read: reward) the regime in any substantial way or set any kind of negative precedent, and fervently argued against granting Most Favored Nation Status to China in the yearly debate on the subject. In the most basic terms, these were people strongly motivated by a shorter horizon, interested in dealing with the current facts of the situation rather than longer term prospects for change. Other American politicians believed in the power of engagement, through which a China more open to the world would be exposed to its ideas, have less ability to control its people, and have more of an interest in global stability. This would not be a rapid process, and for the short to medium term the sometimes unpalatable details of the current situation in China would have to be dealt with in a way that expresses American disapproval without invoking too much shame, forcing Chinese defensiveness and indirectly strengthening the hand of the hard line elements. The tensions between these points of view and policy directions will be discussed in the case details, and we will summarize their basic motivations in each time perspective.

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Horizons and Taiwan During the Crisis The ROC case is interesting to study in its own right. In the island’s political culture, we find a mixture of freedom of expression and diverse opinions, similar to what we find in the US case, but political pressures make certain kinds of statements unlikely, even if they represent actual policy-maker opinion. Stuck between the rock and hard place of mainland inflexibility and US domestic political variance, Taipei’s decision-makers find themselves in a position where they must carefully measure the impact of their decisions on several international constituents, not to mention an increasingly passionate domestic public with a taste for their newfound democratic liberties. In overall power and strategic importance, the ROC as a political actor is dwarfed by the relative might of the US and the PRC. However, a number of factors all came together in the mid-1990s to put the island in a position to rock the foundations of East Asian stability. Many of Taipei’s circumstances leading up to and during the crisis are discussed above—the shaky international public opinion status of the PRC over Tiananmen, simultaneously occurring with an improved public image for the ROC for its democratic revolution and economic success. One of the most effective ways Taipei can affect US policy is through its influence on domestic politics. The Republic of China is in the position of many small states—it can possess the ability to wield substantial leverage by impacting important issue areas for larger powers. In the ROC’s case, it can have a particular impact on the world stage through its moves towards (or discourse regarding) independence and the ways in which the powers of the PRC and the US respond. This is not to say that Taipei’s desire to adjust the status quo was driven by a desire to provoke a dramatic international response or to create instability, but rather to bring discussion of the island’s status to a point that better reflects reality, and that might create better potential for productive directions in the future. It is difficult to look at Taiwan as a unitary actor with specific preferences or time horizons, even more so than in looking at the diverse decisionmaking environment of the US. While one can find great variety in American politics, there is generally little difference of opinion about the very nature of the nation and its fundamental status. Since the early 1990s, a dramatic split emerged in Taiwanese politics. Reflecting continuity with the pre-democratic Taiwan, the hardline Kuomintang, predominantly led by ROC leadership that had fled the mainland decades before, still held on to claims of legitimacy over mainland governance. While hardly realistic, this perspective was more justifiable in the face of democratic developments in the ROC and the sinister implications of the Tiananmen incident. Increasingly people were willing to consider that the regime on the island would in fact do a better job in governing all of China. This was not feasible at the moment of the missile

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crisis, nor is it now, but the possibility of convergence between the two political systems did (and still does) exist for the distant future. Interestingly enough, this perspective is both very short term and potentially long term in its temporal outlook. The Republic of China reassuming control over the mainland was not a serious possibility in any “reasonable” length of time—the posturing over issues of legitimate authority was just that. It served an important rhetorical function, and while it was adversarial and inflexible, this perspective was preferable to the PRC state as opposed to a moderate dialogue that involved Taiwanese independence. While the ROC’s resumption of control might be unlikely, the continuing insistence on the unity of China on the part of Taiwan would mean minimum risk of losing a hope of incorporating/joining/absorbing the island. This was a definite example of the PRC using longer time horizons, and anticipating a fairly steady shape of future progress. Interviews conducted with ROC policy elites in the decade after the crisis pointed to this appeal of longer horizons and the maintenance of the status quo in the shorter time frames: One interviewee, in describing the status quo, said that it enjoyed “the beauty of vagueness.” Another phrase encountered—“confusion represents safety”— brings in the positive view of the status quo vis-à-vis security. Others have adopted the notion that the status quo provides for “strategic ambiguity,” laying the foundation and basis for political confidence and security-building mechanisms in the future. 27

Immediate Horizons One of the most important things to note in the time horizons revolving around a crisis is the factors that influence the decision-making process. There are many sources of pressure on the leadership during a crisis, and it is difficult to separate them all. 28 It is almost inevitable to think about what the outcome of the crisis would be under a given set of choices. The very nature of a crisis is such that people want to escape it. Therefore there is always a time horizon that goes beyond the immediate, working to resolve the conditions that led to the crisis. But in a crisis mode, the pressure of the immediate horizon can play a dramatic role. Sometimes crises require split-second decisions. If a decision is made quickly, it does not necessarily mean that it was made using an immediate horizon, but that pressure from the now can impinge on other, more deliberate considerations. As was discussed in our consideration of decision-making under a crisis, the time pressures of the immediate situation sometimes “short circuit” many of the usual processes used to arrive at a policy outcome. This can include the consideration of all available information, the input of larger institutional or

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personal groups, or even the ability to fully weigh options under a rational decision-making process. 29 This disruption of a more “rational” process opens the door to what might be termed “less rational,” or even “irrational” decision-making. This would include the factors perhaps most alien to calculating reason. Emotion is an influence that often has its greatest power in the immediate term. The rush of feelings might fade, yielding to more reasoned calculations about the future. If one does not think past the passions of the moment, in the immediate horizon, one is prone to emotional reactions. Fear and anger are perhaps the strongest emotions that can influence crisis decision-making, and they were the two that frequently came into play in this situation, often from the failure to predict new developments in the situation. One of the interesting things about this Cross-Straits crisis is that each actor was quite surprised by the actions of the others—not just in the scale of the responses, but often that certain paths were taken at all. With an atmosphere of constant surprise in the air, it would follow that the emotions from that surprise, or even shock, would sharply impact decisions. This is consistent with the cognitive theories as well. Construal Level Theory asserts that the most proximate circumstances generate the least abstraction, and therefore inspire consideration with the greatest level of detail. In the immediate circumstances of a crisis, the details are everything. Minor details can be sources of considerable anxiety, and frustration is easily generated by situations that, in the fullness of time (i.e., a further temporal construal level) might not seem like problems at all. The decision-makers in our cases would not directly admit that effect, but it comes through in their words and actions. PRC—Immediate Horizon While the most provocative move and most dramatic escalation in the situation were Beijing’s missile tests and military maneuvers, the PRC was also responding to a surprise. As discussed above, Chinese officials had received assurances just a few days before the granting of Lee’s visa that it would not happen. As Senator Diane Feinstein demonstrated in speech to Congress after the visa issue, there was immediate astonishment on both sides: I was stunned by the intense reaction of the Chinese officials. President Jiang told me that he learned of the decision to allow Lee Teng-hui’s visit by reading it in a newspaper. The Chinese were, in turn, stunned by the insensitivity and lack of communication from the United States on what they saw as a major shift in policy toward their country, particularly since they were assured as late as mid-May that U.S. policy would be to refuse such a visit. 30

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The ROC conducted military exercises of its own the same week the visa announcement was made. 31 After such a “one-two” punch of oppositional and provocative moves, it would not be surprising for the PRC leadership to be influenced by anger and fear, concerned and frustrated by the immediate details of the situation. The rhetoric coming from the PRC and its mouthpieces could be seen as reflecting those feelings, sometimes using rather crude insults or thinly veiled threats. In a speech by China’s Vice Premier Qian Qichen, “some ‘Taiwan Independence’ elements . . . are worthless descendants of the Chinese nation, who have forgotten their ancestors. They should be denounced and spit on by the entire Chinese people.” 32 Fear, on the other hand, would not be something that Beijing would want to show, but certainly the regime’s desire to take strong action was in part a rapid scramble to address the fear of Taiwan’s path diverging too far for eventual reunification. While it is uncommon in the study of the PRC to be able to separate the distinct and contrasting viewpoints regarding sensitive topics, the immediate time frame of this situation is one such case. Based on a number of sources, it appears that Jiang Zemin was originally not a strong advocate for military action himself, but pressure from People’s Liberation Army elements in the government had a strong influence on him, particularly as the support of the PLA would be vital in cementing his hold on power after Deng Xiaoping’s death. The military actions “will please the PLA, which Jiang Zemin has been courting in seeking to consolidate his position for the post-Deng era.” 33 In this aspect of the missile crisis case, other methodological approaches to decision-making fit in well with our approach. The role of institutions and bureaucratic organization can play a significant role in Beijing’s foreign policy process. While difficult to trace precisely due to the opacity of their leadership process, in this case the indirect evidence of PLA involvement clearly points to a significant role in this context. The civilian leadership of the PRC has often had to grapple with maintaining the support of the armed forces; this was particularly true for Jiang, having recently taken the place of Deng Xiaoping, who had considerably better revolutionary credentials. Political interactions on the domestic institutional or bureaucratic level, as in Waltz’s second image and Allison’s models II and III, can make a significant contribution to the policy process. In addition to the role that time horizons can have on the individual level, they can influence the decision-making process beyond it. The PLA factions in the PRC would have their own immediate time horizon and corresponding goals, not just for the nation, but for their personal interests as well. From a “standard operating procedure,” or by the individual level “operational code,” members of the military would be of a mindset in which they would be more willing to use force quickly, 34 but from the perspective of personal interests under the bureaucratic politics model, their

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rapid mobilization served a domestic political purpose in allowing them to increase their relevance and importance to policy-making, thereby retaining more influence. With potential threats to their increasing power from a civilian regime seeking to curb their reach, showing their indispensability in the cross-straits situation would help to maintain their authority and place in the government hierarchy. With a new PRC president working to consolidate his power, in part by curtailing the influence of the PLA, it would be in the interests of the military authorities to take advantage of a perceived crisis by stressing the indispensability of the military, reminding the new leader what he might risk by attempting to undermine a part of the regime that every leader must placate. By means of the military exercises in March, the PRC had an immediate political goal of influencing the ROC’s presidential election. While Lee’s official position opposed independence and was in favor of eventual unification, in some ways he had been sending mixed messages, 35 and was certainly not willing to accede to all mainland demands. Pre-election polling had Lee as the clear favorite, so even if the military exercises could not get another candidate elected, the people’s fear might lower turnout and delegitimize the election. With respect to the election, the military exercises were in fact counterproductive. As Lee said, “Communist China’s military and air and sea exercises not only did not disturb our people’s minds, it further put together the 21 million people’s strength and feeling together.” 36 While that is the kind of statement a politician might make to justify his own position, the opinion polls bear this out. The percentage of people in Taiwan who wanted immediate independence doubled in June of 1995 (from 3% to 6%) and those who wanted eventual reunification dropped 20% in March of 1996 (from 21 to 17%). 37 In other time frames, the impact is less clear and perhaps still to be determined, but it was likely more successful than in the short term blowback. The immediate goals in the summer of 1995 as pertaining to the PRC national interest were less complex. There were many longer-term horizons at work, which we will see later. The exercises and missile tests were a clear example of signaling—sending the message that continuing to move in the direction of independence would result in a forceful response. But this message was intended for the future. Beijing’s ideal immediate goal, which they asked for, was unlikely to be achieved. This included the halting of all lobbying to join international organizations and a stronger commitment to reunification. Beijing could not have thought that the missile tests would bring about an immediate renunciation of Taiwanese statehood. Since the exercises and missile tests took place some time after the presidential visit to the US, the ability of the action to have a direct instantaneous result would be hampered.

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The primary immediate goal of the actions would be to influence the rhetoric of Lee and other presidential candidates regarding the independence issue. But this is less important than the signals intended for later in the future. United States—Immediate Horizon Just as the Chinese leadership was surprised by the granting of Lee’s visa, most people in Washington were shocked by the degree of Beijing’s military exercises. In the immediate temporal horizon of the Taiwan missile crisis, the most important consideration would be to deescalate the crisis—help address the fundamental conflicts if possible, but certainly take whatever action would help decrease the likelihood of the conflict turning from military exercises and posturing into something more serious. According to Winston Lord, former ambassador to China and then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, we “wanted to head off a crisis through miscalculation . . . by being firm, try to make sure we don’t get into trouble and conflict in near term.” 38 Not only does this serve the direct military interests of the United States, but also has a strong domestic political aspect. An administration that allowed a disagreement or skirmish to escalate into something more severe would be judged incompetent in the immediate polls—and by history. This of course points to longer time horizons, but those horizons’ goals implementation and effect could begin almost immediately after the crisis itself—in the short term. However, there are multiple ways of interpreting the best way to stave off escalation. As within the PRC, America’s highest political authority had to grapple with a more conservative faction within his government, dealing with levels of the state apparatus beyond the individual level in dealing with the crisis. The Clinton administration had maintained an intentionally ambiguous policy, leaving specific questions about how to respond to Chinese aggression without a concrete answer. This would allow the US to avoid direct confrontation, thereby empowering hard line elements in the Chinese government, and it would not show complete weakness in acceding to any Chinese demand. Seeking more direct language and action, the Republican dominated Congress pushed more immediate and short-term approaches, criticizing Clinton’s policy of flexible ambiguity in engaging with China. Many of Clinton’s political opponents felt that the lack of a clear policy would serve to embolden the PRC, even approaching to the point of appeasement. This fear of appeasement, a significant concern for many policy makers, drove the criticism that Clinton’s ambiguous policies did not provide flexibility and nuance in working with the PRC, but encourage the regime to flout its agreements and test the limits of the US. The closed doors of Chinese Communist Party deliberation leaves us with little exact idea what the

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PLA hardliners said, but we have a very clear idea of the rhetoric in the US Congress. As one congressman put it, It is true that we must engage the dictators in Beijing. The trouble is that the administration mistakes appeasement for constructive engagement. Time and time again, the administration has ignored Beijing’s violations of MOU’s and international agreements on trade, human rights, and weapons proliferation. This is not constructive engagement. This is appeasement and it is directly responsible for the current crises that we face. If China violates an agreement it must be held accountable. Accountability is constructive engagement. It is appeasement to make excuses when Beijing does not live up to its word. 39

Another member of Congress, in the same session, put it more strongly, with less hope for a successful method of working with the PRC at the current time. “The official policy of this administration has been strategic ambiguity with the Communist dictatorship on the mainland. Ambiguity with dictatorships does not work. If anything is a lesson we should have learned in the past, it is that. The Chinese communists have mistaken our ambiguity for weakness.” 40 This weakness could even lead to the rise of a new empire opposed to American values and contemptuous of American power: the domino theory revisited. Clearly the PRC is attempting to use the threat of invasion to intimidate the people of Taiwan into rejecting President Lee and adopting a docile foreign policy. If the PRC is successful in carrying out this extortion and subverting the democratic process in Taiwan, the United States will only be encouraging further PRC aggression in the region against Japan and the Philippines and we will be severely marginalized as a Pacific power. In short we will have allowed the PRC to establish Asian hegemony. 41

We see here of a form of deterrence in which short-term actions are threatened in order to bring about a medium term horizon. This conforms to the stereotypical expectations of a US operational code regarding the PRC—that Beijing is a tyrannical, bullying regime that best understands the threat of force. In addition to the concern that the president’s path might harm American interests, the “governmental politics” model asserts that members of Congress would argue against the president for their own interests as well. Some Congressmen had significant Taiwanese constituencies, or support from ROC lobbyists, while others cultivated strong human rights credentials. Criticizing the president could serve to earn them points towards reelection, but had little risk in motivating a policy for which they would be held accountable. This evokes Bill Clinton before his election. The Clinton campaign had argued that Bush was too soft on China, but once President Clinton had taken office, his China policy quickly came to closely resemble his predecessor’s.

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As for the “organizational process’ model, there were individuals within the US armed forces that also sought short-term action in the form of strong military signaling. There were quite likely some strong similarities with their PRC counterparts—the American military’s standard operating procedure would be to utilize the strategic resources at their disposal, including a demonstration of naval capability in the region. In terms of bureaucratic interest, facing cuts as a result of the post Cold War “peace dividend,” the US armed forces would be eager to demonstrate their continued importance under the new international strategic environment. Unlike the direct and public criticism that the Congressional opposition was all too willing to provide, advice from the military tended to be delivered behind closed doors. 42 It is extremely likely that it nearly unanimously leaned in the direction of sending a naval intervention. Whether it was this criticism, advocacy from his military, or his own belief that intervention was required to maintain any options with China in the future, the presence of the carrier groups in the Strait gave a hint of what the US would be willing to do if Taiwan were threatened. Even then, Clinton worked to maintain longer-term options through ambiguity. When asked outright by a journalist “how far is the United States prepared to go to defend Taiwan?” Clinton answered “I think it is not helpful for me to say anything that would add to the tensions which already exist in that region . . . in terms of getting into contingent ‘what if’ questions, it’s my belief that the tensions there right now are tough enough already. I don’t think I should contribute to them.” 43 Another foreign policy decision maker expands on that idea: It is prudent generally that you don’t state in advance what you will do in specific situations . . . if we get away from ambiguity and go in either direction, we’re in trouble. If the PRC thinks that we won’t come to the defense of Taiwan in a crunch, it’s going to be aggressive and will press Taiwan. In that case we’re likely to run into a difficult situation and possibly a conflict. On the other hand, if Taiwan thinks that we’re going to come to its defense, no matter what happens, it’s going to be provocative, knowing that it’s going to have a free ride no matter how angry Beijing gets. Therefore, we can’t be precise about what our response would be in a crisis. Having said that, we’ve got to use the right kind of adjectives and send aircraft carriers at the right moments to make clear that it’s dangerous for Beijing to think that it can act aggressively. 44

This illustrates the importance of flexibility and the nuance necessary to balance between the requirements of dealing with the PRC and the ROC, often necessitating careful deliberation. Despite this, when the crisis precipitated, in terms of the actual response and what was required, according to someone present while the decision was being made, it was “quite striking how fast and how unanimous the really important decision was.” 45 This

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included the importance of sending two (rather than just one) carriers to the strait, and the priority placed on stressing the continuity of US policy vis-àvis the one China policy and the commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Though US policy was rapid, it reflected the considerations of Asia experts who had been thinking about the implications of the Straits problems for years. ROC—Immediate Horizon The immediate goal for the ROC during the crisis reflected their relative inflexibility and limited options. The ideal goal during the moments of the missile crisis would have been to conduct their domestic political affairs without interference. In addition to the simple aim of bonding with old classmates, the goal of Lee’s Cornell visit was to increase public awareness of the cause of Taiwan through the visibility of the presidential office, and by that awareness build the island’s standing in the world. Of course, beyond his role as the beloved patron saint of democracy and the crusader for the 21 million unheard voices in the UN, Lee was still a politician, one who was aware that he would be running for his job in a newly open election in the following year. A trip to the US would not only increase his international visibility but also show his domestic constituents that he was an effective leader opening new horizons for the island. Lee received a significant popularity bump from his US visit (up to 82.7%) and a boost in those who would vote for him for president (from 40-50% pre-visit to 61%). 46 Even the potential risks from upsetting the mainland might show him to be a strong leader who would not cave in to pressure. As Examination Yuan President Chiu Chuang-huan put it, Beijing’s attacks on Lee could have a positive effect on his presidential prospects. “The more Beijing criticizes Li the more support Li may get from the public.” 47 Once the military exercises began, particularly the close missile tests leading up to the election (which had been announced in advance), one of the immediate goals of the Taipei leadership was to maintain order in the face of potential panic. “Li called on the public not to panic over Beijing’s military exercises, saying the communist Chinese are only ‘acting.’ Li said the top priority for . . . Taiwan is to stand united, which will provide the nation with the strength it needs to achieve eventual unification with the mainland.” 48 Not only would restraining public anxiety serve to show the PRC that the ROC was not easily intimidated, but it might also serve to minimize the economic impact of the PLA’s missile testing. That was not particularly successful, and the economic impact is one of the ways in which Beijing’s response did show a Republic of China vulnerability, possibly pointing the way to later PRC horizons.

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Short Term Horizons In a crisis like the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, the short horizon plays a vital role. Many of the circumstances did not change dramatically from the immediate term, but the way they would impact the decision-makers would. The decisions here did not have to be made in the heat of battle, requiring moment-to-moment thinking. The slower pace of moving military units and planning exercises meant that decisions took place over days and weeks, not moments. The sweep of emotions like anger and fear could give way to more reasoned calculation. This would include consideration for how the other side would respond, rather than for what feels right at the moment. From the perspective of those less interested in national interest and more concerned with personal advantage, it would also include greater flexibility to present their arguments in a way to maximize political leverage, either for themselves or their organizations. Many of the actors were strongly motivated by the desire to send a message to the other regimes. In the back-and-forth of diplomatic insult, military provocation and public outcry, it would be important to think a step or two ahead, but considering how dramatically the US, PRC, and ROC failed to anticipate each other’s actions, long-term thinking might prove difficult or useless as unpredicted actions made longer term strategies irrelevant. It is difficult to think in concrete long-term horizons when the outcome of the immediate situation is so uncertain. This time frame, perhaps more than in the immediate horizon, is where some of the behaviorist interpretations of decision-making might play a significant explanatory role. Having passed beyond a realm of instantaneous horizons strongly motivated by reflex, emotion, or instinct, more thoughtful consideration of the circumstances might take place, but still under the limited time constraints that come with a crisis situation. Would the best explanations for this time-frame lie in cybernetics, in which the desire for rapid outcomes motivates cognitive shortcuts through “automated” consideration? Or would the operational code prove most useful, where preconceived ideas about opponents (or partners) inspire truncated consideration? In terms of Construal Level Theory, the nature of a crisis situation does not leave much room for the luxury of abstraction—the immediate details of the situation directly face the leaders of each respective state. The optimism that might come from looking at a situation gradually unfolding in the pace of an unhurried process evaporates in the present reality of the press of the moment, and the need for immediate response. 49 As for Temporal Discounting and in Prospect Theory, the cross-Strait crisis was in a realm of potential loss and risk for both major powers, and the predictions of both would suggest a preference for more immediate action. 50 Not taking direct action might be a viable option, but it might seem too much

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like failing to face reality in a critical moment. Meanwhile, the ROC was not in a significant domain of loss (that is, anything more than its usual status) until the PRC’s military exercises. In any case, its policy options were considerably more constrained than those of either the US or the PRC. Therefore, for each nation’s leadership, in addition to the domestic pressure they felt, the process of interaction in the short term often predominated the thinking process. Often the longer horizons never fully left the minds of the decision-makers (as they might have in the immediate term), but the most visible actions taken were intended to most strongly resonate in the short term. PRC—Short-Term Horizon Beijing’s short term foreign policy goals were to push the framing of the unification debate in their favor by sending a message regarding future moves towards independence, and to shift Taiwanese and international policy away from independence support. The PRC’s unwillingness to renounce violence as a possible method for achieving reunification has always been a constant in negotiations with the US and in public statements issued by the regime. In order to achieve its longer-term goals with respect to Taiwan, it was important to the PRC to send this message in the short term. Certainly the exercise made the prospect of military action more concrete. But did the actions make it believable? It appears as though many in Beijing thought so. One of the bits of rhetoric often quoted in US policy circles was something former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles Freeman, was told in China by senior Chinese officials 51 in the winter of 1996 “that China could act militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the United States because American leaders ‘care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,’ a statement that Mr. Freeman characterized as an indirect threat by China to use nuclear weapons against the United States.” 52 According to a Hong Kong source, “one internal PLA research paper said with the Chinese army having developed sophisticated weapons including missiles, the US would think twice before taking on China. ‘China is not Iraq,’ it said, referring to the Gulf crisis in the early 1990s. The paper pointed out that it was unlikely that the US would deploy its forces to Asia and risk American lives in an election year.” 53 Perhaps implicit in this line of reasoning was the view that the domain of loss was considerably greater for the PRC than for the US, and more dramatic action would be understandable (assuming that the functioning of Temporal Discounting or Prospect Theories was a conscious process deliberately applied in decision making and consideration of other actor’s weighing of decisions, which is not usually the case). It also reflects the operational code that PRC decision-makers presumably often share regarding

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the US—that American political leaders emphasize their own selfish interests, without a real concern for such issues as national honor. Presumably the mainland decision-makers did not consider how a political candidate would look if he backed down from a conflict; after all, taking action in the Gulf War initially improved the sitting administration’s popularity in the short term—exactly what would be useful in the context of the 1996 election. To United States policy makers, particularly members of the Republican-dominated Congress, such a threat would not be credible nor deter effectively, particularly not if the US military were to send a clear message that it would intervene. To Taiwanese politicians favoring independence, it was clearly in their political interest to persuade people that such action was not likely. According to Peng Ming-min, the DPP candidate, it was not only in the PRC’s interest to make it believable, but also in the interest of his domestic political opposition that did not favor independence as strongly. “We have been poisoned by Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) propaganda that independence would mean China would attack us. This is baseless.” 54 This brings up the specter of domestic politics and its potential contributions to the decision process vis-à-vis Taiwan. In addition to the conventional military action to the point of invasion, much less occupation, was not feasible, according to military analysts and to politicians. Western analyses of the PRC’s military capability in the mid-1990s, particularly with respect to its capacity to wage an assault by amphibious landing, showed that it did not have the ability to successfully take the island—even if Taipei were unsupported by the US military. This ability would come, as military spending and technology development on the mainland dwarfed that of the ROC. 55 In the meantime, Beijing did have the ability to destroy Taiwan with minimal military cost to itself—the missiles were a clear demonstration of that. But a great part of Taiwan’s value lay in its economy, infrastructure, and educated population. Destroying or significantly damaging those things would more effectively lose the mainland those assets than any kind of independence declaration. And while the regime’s behavior in Hong Kong (and eventually Macau) would intentionally be seen as tests for its ability to absorb other Chinese societies without destroying what makes them worth possessing, after Taiwan, there was no other territory to take on—Taiwan was the ultimate prize. 56 Another element of the PRC’s short horizon could have been the desire to test the waters, so to speak, and gain valuable information about how different players would react. Of course the very nature of testing is not to come to a final resolution in the short term, but to get a better understanding as to how longer-term situations might play out. As one anonymous high ranking Taiwanese military officer put it, “the military actions taken by the US and the Chinese Communists are aimed at ‘slowly escalating the tension’ in order to sound each other out.” 57 Of course, neither state would admit to risking

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direct military conflict merely for testing the other’s resolve. The closest we might see is a comment in a Xinhua editorial: “This policy is not aimed at our countrymen in Taiwan, but at the foreign forces’ interference in China’s reunification.” 58 Regardless of Beijing’s ability or inability to take the island, any kind of full-blown conflict, even an unwinnable one, was undesirable to all sides of this conflict. The PRC’s attempt to show its commitment to the use of force if their expectations of PRC-ROC relations were violated was effective in playing on those fears. Much of the international pressure placed on Taipei not to move in a “provocative” manner was based on fears of military escalation. Many commentators were all too willing to point the finger at Beijing for its reckless willingness to go to the brink of war. It is not clear that the people criticizing the regime always believed that the PRC was truly willing to escalate the conflict, whether it was an attempt to send signals, or even a bluff in order to attain their goals. For some political purposes, it would not matter. There is great rhetorical power in the accusation of bullying and militarism, and people with a certain political perspective can more effectively make a particular argument for a certain kind of US response based on the assumption of Chinese aggression. We will see this in looking at the United States’ horizons. United States—Short Term Horizon In the short term, the United States’ goal was simple: to stop missile testing and build the foundations for more stability to the cross strait situation. The immediate goal of de-escalation would be achieved through short term deterrence, i.e. sending signals through relatively rapid action that PRC pressure on the ROC would receive a US response in kind. This would not just be for the purposes of the short term, but to set up expectations for the future. “I do not believe an invasion or an air or missile attack are likely in 1996, but any future leaders who may emerge in China should be put on notice. Secretary of Defense William Perry has hinted at that possibility, and the presence of a United States aircraft carrier in the international waters between China and Taiwan is a good signal. But hints are not enough.” 59 We see here the same concern about appeasement and weak signals as in the immediate term, but now there is more consideration for the back-and-forth of signals over a period of time. Even if the PRC privately has no intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our ambiguity gives the PRC’s military maneuvers greater credibility. It sends a signal of weakness.” 60 This conforms with the potential US operational code regarding the PRC we discussed earlier—that Beijing would best understand the message of direct force rather than the “weakness” that might come from diplomatic engagement.

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This expectation would be especially important to construct in the short term, as the shadow of PRC military development looms large in the minds of policy makers. As one columnist observed: given the rate at which China is pouring money into its armed forces, the situation may eventually be different. The United States Naval War College conducted computer simulations last year and again this year of battles in Asia between China and the United States in the year 2010. To everyone’s surprise, China defeated the United States in both. It is said that the Central Intelligence Agency recently conducted its own simulation of such a battle, set in the year 2005, and China won that, too . . . 61

Since the PRC actions in the crisis were the military exercises, the military exercises on the part of the US are a clear example of tit-for-tat. In the very short term, it of course took time for the US carrier groups to make it to the Taiwan Strait—but even their mobilization and moving towards the area were signals in their own right. If we were delve into consideration of counterfactuals, there might have been options other than military deterrence by which the PRC could have been convinced that escalation was counterproductive. These could have included diplomatic engagement, the use of economic leverage, pressure from the international community. However, whether those actions would have actually worked, and whether they were possible considering other political factors, is difficult to answer. Contained in Washington’s short and medium goals would be the desire to deter further PRC aggression, but also to restrain ROC moves to antagonize Beijing—to set the limits of the relationship within controllable bounds—much like the PRC’s goals in this time frame, though less slanted towards unification, of course. There would be differences in how those limits would be defined—the US would want the PRC to be deterred or to use moderation in exercising pressure on Taipei. Here we can also see one of the interesting distinctions between the short and intermediate horizons. In the process of testing the opponent’s resolve and sending signals of what one’s potential response would be, if a relatively mild response is too close in time to the attempt at deterrence, it might send a signal of weakness—that they can be easily deterred. In the medium term, it would be completely acceptable for either state to show a willingness to cooperate and work towards stability and understanding—it might prove difficult to do so in the short term, especially in the face of the conservative military faction at home. Whatever short term prospects might be offered, it would be important to have them extend to the medium horizon as well. The PRC could not rapidly restrain itself in the short term, as it would appear to fear US resolution, but that could be a viable intermediate option. The general outcome of the realization of those goals is much the same, but the process

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would appear to be the result of considered national interest instead of external compulsion. ROC—Short Term Horizon In the short term beyond the immediate circumstances of the crisis, Taipei desired a relationship with the mainland that would be peaceful and productive—one that was of mutual benefit. There is nothing particularly surprising about this—most states desire such a situation. However, few regimes have such a dramatic existential threat hanging over their heads, with a nuclear power and one of the world’s rising powers committed to its eventual absorption. In the context of that oppressive force, the best the ROC could hope for was flexibility and keeping its options open for the longer term horizons. The PRC was able to act in a number of ways that could disrupt the normal functioning of the island, even without openly declaring hostilities. The missile tests disrupted Taiwan’s economy and caused widespread anxiety among the population. “Although a military attack is not likely, Chao Yao-tung, national adviser to the president, said he was most concerned about the damage that Beijing’s consistent saber-rattling could do to Taiwan’s economy.” 62 Such economic destabilization would prove less effective if the PRC continually kept the island in a state of siege—people can become acclimated to most circumstances, as the initial shock begins to fade. However, the PRC was certainly in a position to cause instability at a time of their choosing— not an ideal position in which to be. As one anonymous high ranking ROC military officer said, “if Communist China really wants to force Taiwan to hold talks, it does not have to resort to force. All they have to do is stage more missile exercises. All they have to do is suddenly hold another military exercise the moment when Taiwan’s economy regains its momentum and the moment capital starts to flow back to Taiwan. This way, the exercise serves as an economic ‘blockade.’” 63 As Lee himself said, “the drills are also aimed at giving China an advantage over Taiwan in future negotiations.” 64 With that vulnerability in mind, and the short term goals relatively modest, what were Taiwan’s short term options? For the majority of the population that favored neither independence nor unification, the answer would be to make some positive overtures to the mainland without making any commitments and sacrificing flexibility. During and between the missile crises, Lee made several statements making it clear that he was not promoting independence. 65 He also did not come out and commit to the “One Country, Two Systems’ approach that the mainland hoped for Taiwan. The mainland, or pro-mainland commentators, would

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continue to berate him for his ambiguous stance, 66 but it was not enough to invite further nearby missile tests. The pro-independence movement in Taiwan took a different tack for the short term. Their argument is that only by working towards international recognition would the PRC attempts to constrain lose their power. In a DPP policy statement a few years after the crisis, the party stated that “the aim of promoting the entry into international NGOs is to counteract China’s attempt to turn the cross-strait problem into one of China’s internal affairs.” 67 When the DPP would come to power later, they would also confront the challenges of balancing Taiwan’s flexibility with its safety. Intermediate Horizons Strangely enough, the intermediate term might prove to be the least utilized of the horizons in this case. With crisis-oriented thinking predominating the immediate and short term horizons, and the ultimate resolution of the crisis’ root causes lying in long term or chiliastic considerations, intermediate thinking might be less useful. This is also the least glamorous of the horizons, as the excitement of crisis conflict subsides and the satisfaction of fulfillment remains far off. However, there were important things to consider in the intermediate term, and the seeds of a positive outcome and the prevention of future tragedy (whatever it many be for each actor) would be planted in this time frame. For each state, the tactics would be a honing of earlier, less polished attempts to make positive progress. Since the immediate choices of each actor resulted in unanticipated and sometimes excessive reactions, serious consideration was given to the ways that the other would react based on previous behavior and considering future changes in the other state. Essentially the policy choices for the intermediate were short term motivated, but long term in their thinking. PRC—Intermediate Horizon The PRC’s goal in the intermediate horizon was to retain status quo on PRCROC relations, to maintain stability, keep options open, and build on the advantages it possesses that would eventually drive its longer term unification goals. In a sense, the medium-long time horizon is a placeholder; making sure that those longer term goals remain viable and that nothing occurs to make them more difficult to achieve. This reflects the confidence that Beijing’s decision-makers have regarding the PRC’s long term prospects vis-à-vis Taiwan and even the US (which we will look at in Beijing’s long horizon). With a belief in constant growth in both economic and military might, unification will be an easier prospect in

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the future, and the key thing is to make sure this will remain a viable option until then. Considering the relationship by means of the PRC’s longer temporal horizons and their inherent optimism, the regime’s prospects would be increasingly gain-oriented. Therefore, from the perspective of Prospect Theory, it would be less eager to take dramatic action, and would work to ensure an environment in which other actors would be less willing to take such actions as well. As one PRC spokesman stated in the midst of the crisis, “the reunification of China represents an irreversible historical trend, which no forces can possibly block.” 68 It would therefore be vital to send the message that a strong move by Taiwan towards independence would be met with by violence—hence the PRC’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force in resolving the situation. According to Li Jiaquan of the (perhaps ironically named) China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification: the [principle of reunification] will bring about reconciliation between the two sides of the strait, whose people will join hands in cooperation in the endeavor to build the motherland and reinvigorate the Chinese nation; the latter means rejecting reconciliation and family members drawing swords to kill their own flesh and blood, which only saddens out people and gladdens our enemy. It is hoped that the Taiwan authorities place national interest above all else and make a wise choice. 69

However, there is also the unstated belief that other circumstances might eventually occur in the intermediate and long term that would facilitate the reunification with Taiwan. These prospects could include modernization of the PRC’s institutions that would serve to enhance Beijing’s hard power in the form of its economy and military. One of the implications of modernizing institutions is that there is potential for increasing democratic values, which is the ultimate hope of the ROC’s pro-unification public and those in the West who advocate engagement with China. So if that future looks good for the PRC, how would they get there? The optimum way to maintain the possibility of that longer term outcome is in showing a willingness to engage, but on specific terms. Failure to remain within the limits of those terms would result in a highly undesirable escalation of force in the military and diplomatic realms. The PRC sent the message that failure to remain within its expectations regarding the cross-Strait situation would yield a dangerous reaction, and woe to those who do not realize that. According to one Party mouthpiece, “the issue of Taiwan is as explosive as a barrel of gunpowder . . . people playing with fire are conceited and always think they are smart. But water and fire . . . get out of control and destroy those who have been playing with them, much to the players’ surprise.” 70 This warning is directed at the West as well. “Some people in the United States expressed the belief that China will swallow bitter fruit on the

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Taiwan issue—this is a miscalculation. The Chinese people, who have kept on fighting despite all setback for more than one century to defend national independence and national sovereignty, will never yield on the principled issue of safeguarding motherland reunification.” 71 The most important implication of the intermediate perspective is that methods used in the present are justified even if the short-term consequences are relatively negative, as long as the future prospects are secure. To maintain the status quo for the interests of the future, some quantity of instability in the shorter term would be acceptable. For example, the PRC’s military exercise might have hurt Taiwan’s economy, but by edging itself closer to war, Beijing might have hurt its own prospects for foreign investment. Of course, there are limits to the short-term instability that would be logically effective or useful at all. All-out war, or a limited conflict that would permanently disrupt or destroy mainland or Taiwanese society would be self-defeating. One of the key elements of this tactic is a reliance on potential adversaries or even critics backing down when faced with potentially threatening behavior from the PRC. This is by no means guaranteed, and certainly many people invested in the cross-straits conflict advocated a stronger response in order to deter aggressive PRC behavior, as we discussed above. As one China watcher observed, “it is hard not to believe that the present confrontational mode could have been avoided if the U.S. had stood up to China over the Lee visit to Cornell rather than shilly-shallying.” 72 In terms of the actual impact on Taiwan’s election, the results were in fact counter-productive, and the immediate failure could only be justified in a longer time horizon: I think they [the PRC] paid a price for this, and it wasn’t worth it, but the people who would try to defend it would probably be saying “but we reminded Taiwan that we can send their stock market plummeting, we can scare the hell out of them without attacking them.’ . . . I do think that’s the rationalization they must have used in their internal debates because I don’t remember anyone being sacked because of this, and you think they might be . . . they did it primarily to influence the Taiwan elections, which shows how little they understand that people just get pissed off . . . and it’s going to help the very people they oppose . . . so they thought this would help influence the election and of course this had the opposite effect . . . I think they’re more sophisticated today. 73

The idea that the possible blowback would not entail disruptive longer term consequences, and might therefore be worth the potential benefits in terms of later relations, was echoed by PRC military experts, though lacking any form of critique on misunderstanding the possible response. There was a great deal of confidence that the PRC military exercises would have a strong effect but the ultimate result would not prove catastrophic:

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Chapter 3 “No, I don’t think war will take place,” said Yao Wenbing, a senior research fellow of the China Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) . . . “The presence of U.S. warships will not lead to real war. I think it is the usual practice of the United States to have some access (to troubled areas),” Yao told Reuters when asked if the China-Taiwan tension could escalate into war . . . “I think it will be wise for the United States not to interfere in China’s internal affairs. Taiwan is not the protectorate of the United States, this is not a matter for the United States,” Yao said. 74

Yao said the PRC was concerned about whether Taiwan wanted to seek independence from China. “One China with two policies is a possibility but two Chinas is unacceptable,” he added. It is interesting to note that it was stated that it was “unwise’ for the US to “interfere,’ and that certain policy outcomes are “unacceptable,’ but that even a US military presence would not in itself be cause for direct conflict. It is not entirely clear if this confidence comes from faith in the ability of leadership on both sides to defuse the conflict, or whether it might be the result of an implicit understanding that the US would not go so far as to support what Yao describes as “unacceptable,’ leaving only “acceptable’ policy options as possibilities. The other intermediate action that Beijing would take to help guarantee longer term advantage would be to continue to work on limiting the ROC’s international contacts. This would include threatening yet more intense reactions if the island were to be recognized in any international organizations (setting up the expectation of potentially destabilizing results, just as with the military). Another intermediate horizon strategy in line with the above goals would be to persuade the few remaining states that continue to recognize the ROC to begin diplomatic ties with the PRC instead. By the mid-1990s, most of those countries were nations small enough that the positive economic goodwill from one country could represent a significant proportion of their economic well-being. As the mainland’s economic prowess grew, so too would its ability to sway those nations. 75 United States—Intermediate Horizon After the specific concerns of the crisis in the moment begin to recede, the medium term interests of the US would be served by the PRC unambiguously renouncing the use of force in dealing with cross-Straits relations. This has always been a proclaimed goal of US policy, and a frustration that it is not the case. “The possibility of miscalculation leading to war cannot be ruled out as the Beijing government has refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.” 76 Discussions of methods of achieving that goal always show a time horizon that goes beyond the immediate or short term—it is understood that such a change in PRC policy would have to take time. That length of time could

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be the time required for the judicious application of persuasion through political means, or it could be thought that changes in Beijing would make that shift of policy a feasible one. Either way, it would not be happening rapidly, but it might not have to be held off until the very long term future as long as expectations were reasonable. The people of China and the people of Taiwan should resume a high-level dialogue to foster clear understandings and increased cooperation. Enormous progress has been made in economic cooperation and people-to-people contacts and visits on both sides of the Strait. While economic development and people-to-people cooperation are emphasized, political questions are complicated and emotional and their resolution will require a long-term effort. This will involve a trait for which the Chinese people are famous—patience. 77

Of course, the US would actually desire that this happen in the short term, but the nature of US-PRC-ROC relations and the context of each state had made that difficult to consider as a feasible possibility. That feasibility is in part influenced by views of the shape of the future. The expectations that each state actor would have of how it and the other states would develop had cast their shadows on the boundaries for the outcomes of agreements between them. For example, Beijing’s thoughts on its future prospects and situation set limits on what they would consent to in negotiations. As the common PRC view of its future is an inexorable increase of power, it is unsurprising that Beijing would be unwilling to accede to points in the present when it could get a better deal in the future if things continue as they are. In the same way, US perceptions of the future world order also shape the terms of the intermediate agreements in which it would take part. Of course, the method by which the renunciation of force could be facilitated by the US is hotly debated. Policy makers in the US consider a rich variety of approaches, but as we have already seen, China policy is divided. There are those who believe that the best progress happens by means of engagement and cooperation, and influence through engagement and positive relations. There are also those committed to a stronger approach in which troubling PRC policy is met with and challenged by means of a more direct confrontation. Regardless of the approach, US preference for the eventual direction for China would be the same. The most basic intermediate elements of direct interaction with China and Taiwan are similar to the PRC’s attempt to define limits and demonstrate out-of-bounds behavior. In order to move forward in a productive direction, hopefully to the long term point of resolution, the actions that would derail that progress must be stopped. As Craig Thomas, chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, pointed out, not only could that mean US intervention, but also strengthening Taiwan to resist China itself.

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Chapter 3 If the Beijing Government continues in this antagonistic posture, it will only end up shooting itself in the foot. I would remind the Beijing Government that pursuant to the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States can supply defensive military technology to Taiwan. While we have not been predisposed over the last few years to exercise that right, continuing threatening military displays aimed at Taiwan will, I am sure, have an effect on that posture that the PRC will likely not appreciate. 78

There is also the ongoing debate over developing missile defense systems for the East Asian theater, which was particularly compelling in the light of the missile tests. This was seriously considered for the intermediate term, as technical limitations would make it difficult to implement in the short term. This was an issue that the PRC attempted to deter, but there are certain forms of missile defense that would be more difficult for Beijing to dispute, for example shipboard systems. 79 In addition to signaling to Beijing that military intervention is a definite option in protecting Taiwan, some US rhetoric attempts to “hit China where it hurts,” by suggesting that the source and direction of its rising power could be undone if it continues to threaten force. “China’s leaders must know that economic gains will evaporate if continued military threats (or worse) create havoc in East Asia. Beijing’s officials must understand they cannot conduct business as usual with the world if missiles start falling. They also need to know that fear of war is every bit as chilling to investment as the real thing.” 80 In addition to working with the mainland to move in a more peaceful direction, and restraining aggressive behavior through deterrence, pressure in the intermediate term must be applied to Taiwan to make sure they too do not move in too provocative a direction. The United States is not seeking to create new adversaries where none need exist, and we must not be stampeded into adopting policies that are contrary to the U.S. national interest. For example, while we enthusiastically support and congratulate Taiwan’s economic success and democratic progress, the United States is not endorsing the efforts of some Taiwanese politicians to enhance Taiwan’s position in the United Nations and other international organizations which require statehood. Taiwan’s leaders have been—and should continue to be—very careful about such statements. 81

Just as in Beijing’s intermediate horizon, the US position is to restrain ROC diplomatic activity, and set limits on what Taipei might think it could “get away with” and still be able to count on US military support. Unlike the desired outlook for the PRC, Washington would not want to see the ROC going too far in the other direction either, at least not too quickly. Unification of China before the PRC’s political system has undergone further transformation would result in the loss of the fledgling democracy, a precious rarity

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in Asia, and practically unique in the Chinese world. 82 Looking forward to the longer term, it would be very useful to have a “role model” state in the region that might serve to positively influence other states and assist their transition to a democratic system. Republic of China—Intermediate Horizon Looking past the moments of the crisis, the ROC most desired in the intermediate term the ability to develop without external threats; this includes economic and political change, as well as the opportunity to build relations with other states and international organizations. This is an ordinary desire for sovereign states; but in the case of Taiwan, an unlikely hope. As with the US and the PRC, the ROC also sought intermediate term stability in order to get time for the cross-straits relationship to move in their favor. As Lee Teng-Hui discussed in his inaugural speech, achieving stability in the region would allow the time to resolve it. For that stability, a time horizon past the short term, illustrated by “patience’ and “quiet tolerance,’ is vital: We know that it is imperative that peace and stability be maintained in the Asia-Pacific region. More important, we would not like to see the sudden disappearance of the economic growth in mainland China that has been made possible with great difficulty by its openness policy over the years. Patience on the part of the 21.3 million people is not tantamount to cowardice. Because we believe quiet tolerance is the only way to dispel enmity bred by confrontation. We will never negotiate under threat of attack, but we do not fear to negotiate. Our position is that dialogue will lead to the resolution of any issues between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. 83

Taipei’s options were constrained by the US and PRC’s desires to maintain a middle path for the cross-straits situation, but the island, just like the great powers, had the intermediate goal of maintaining flexibility. When asked about his US visit and his thoughts for future US visits, Lee’s answer evinced a rather broad and (perhaps intentionally) ill-defined perspective on the future, not unlike Clinton’s ambiguity. “What will take place in the future depends on the future situation. It is likely that future prospects will be even broader. The situation in the future is quite uncertain. So [words indistinct] depends on the situation at that time.” 84 Without committing to outright independence or unification, Taipei can work to adjust the circumstances to their favor, or at least wait until they might be more advantageous. Part of that would mean, like the US, sending the message to Beijing that excessive interference would result in counterproductive outcomes for the mainland. Wei Yung, convener of the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs Committee,

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said that “once Taiwan is prevented from participating in world affairs, the call for Taiwan independence will grow.” 85 The Taiwanese opposition also acknowledges the need for time to achieve this middle path. At a DPP sponsored panel, Hsu Hui-you, deputy secretary-general of the Straits Exchange Foundation, after saying that relations will move on a “stable and pragmatic course,’ goes on to say “while Beijing insists on its ‘one country, two systems’ policy, Taipei has stuck to a ‘one nation, two areas’ policy . . . the two views are unlikely to change in the short run.” 86 The ROC would continue its efforts to join international organizations, but it would carefully walk that line between extremes in order to be in a better long term position, as we will discuss below. Long Horizons The long view of each state reflects the hopes and fears for the outcomes of their shorter range plans and tactics, and the development of the other actors involved in the cross-Strait relationship. The intermediate policy decisions will have borne their fruit, and the goals for what that fruit might be strongly informed the decisions taken for the shorter horizons. When considering long horizons, the appropriate metaphor switches from the tennis match to the chess game. It is no longer about the back-and-forth of rapid response and momentary anticipation, but deep thinking about relative advantages, strategic position, and the ability to compel your opponent over long periods to achieve your endgame. There were a variety of visions for this long term among and within the states, but the common element was the rise of the PRC. How that rise would happen domestically and in a global context was exactly what the long horizon goals and strategies would be about. As to the specifics, it would prove more difficult to develop concrete strategies based on precise goals. As we have said before, it is difficult to think in concrete long-term horizons when the outcome of the immediate situation is so uncertain. Here we have a good example of Construal Theory in practice—not only do the immediate concrete details of the immediate situation motivate a somewhat pessimistic “crisis mode,’ but the more distant future generates significantly more abstraction, with a corresponding increase of optimism for realizing a beneficial resolution. For that reason, the long horizon motivated general guiding philosophies of conduct rather than exact policy recommendations, with the hope that those broad strokes of policy would lead to a positive outcome. We will see this to an even greater degree in the chiliastic horizon.

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PRC—Long Horizon Assuming their goals in the shorter-term horizons are successful, Beijing’s long term goal is the absorption of Taiwan as part of PRC. As long as the option is not eliminated in the shorter time frames, the eventual culmination of the cross-strait relationship is clear and feasible. The only question is how long this horizon would need to be to make the unification free of conflict and controversy both within the Chinese world and internationally. Exact time estimates are usually challenging to develop and often proved inaccurate, but the inflexibility and strident rhetoric concerning reunification versus independence is intended to keep the options open for that longer term. 87 This idea of keeping options open is reflected in the sense of China’s ongoing process of development and increasing power. With the long-term prospects for reunification looking better, it would be in Beijing’s interests to bide their time and postpone shorter term action in favor of more advantageous circumstances in the longer term. As one scholar puts it in a discussion of deterrence and strategic decision-making regarding the cross-Strait relationship: Whether Beijing acts or waits will likely be determined by its expectation of China’s future growth prospects. As long as its economy continues to expand rapidly and as long as its international status continues to improve, Beijing should be more inclined to wait and accept incremental adjustments of the status quo in its favor. It will put off its full demands until a future time when its bargaining position will be stronger . . . Contrary to the conventional wisdom . . . a growing China actually promises more stability for cross-Strait relations, even if this means that the capability gap between the United States and China is thereby narrowed. Cross-Strait stability, according to this proposition, depends not so much on the current balance of capabilities between the United States and China, but more on Beijing’s assessment of its relative growth prospects in the future. 88

One recurring long-term message was the historical inevitability of reunification, a “destiny’ due to the Chinese people. A few days before Lee’s visa was approved, Vice Premier Qian Qichen, at the fifth annual conference of the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, said that “the reunification of China is an inexorable trend in the development of history. Taiwan has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times, and it is a historical task for all the Chinese people, including the Taiwan compatriots, to reunite the country.” 89 As another PRC commentator said, “China will eventually be reunified. One contemporary great man has said that if China is not reunified in 100 years, it will be in 1,000 years.” 90 In a conversation with Henry Kissinger during the crisis, Jiang also articulated a long-term horizon, and used it as a way to signal that China was not driven by the pressure of the immediate.

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Chapter 3 Another sign that matters would not get out of hand came from Jiang. While the rhetoric on all sides was intense, I asked Jiang whether Mao’s statement that China could wait one hundred years for Taiwan still stood. No, replied Jiang. When I asked in what way not, Jiang responded, “The promise was made twenty-three years ago. Now only seventy-seven years are left.” 91

Did the comment mean that there was a literal clock counting down, as with the return of Hong Kong, or rather a generalization about Beijing’s patience and willingness to wait, as long as the option remains a possibility? While the general meaning is clear, it is interesting to note that in fact Jiang answered the question incorrectly, since waiting seventy-seven years would mean that Mao’s original statement did in fact stand. 92 The shape of Beijing’s long term goal took several forms. While the reabsorption of Taiwan was a given, the nature of that reunification depended on what shape China would take in the long term future. A more liberal perspective, seeing China currently in a transitional stage in the process of change, would hope for the development of Chinese society and institutions to the point that even a fully democratized Taiwan will want to unify with it—that is, as long as the West does not work to undermine the destiny of a unified China. According to Yan Xuetong, deputy director of the Center for China’s Foreign Policy Studies, “it is not totally up to the central government whether there will be hope for peaceful reunification in the next 15 years . . . If the US stops its sales [of arms to Taiwan], the peaceful reunification process will be accelerated. Even if this process can not be completed by 2010, conditions will be more favorable as the gap of the living standards on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will have narrowed.” 93 Before the missile crisis began, in Jiang Zemin’s famous spring festival speech on reunification, the importance of economics in relation to state strength is made clear. In the context of the post Cold War, it would not be in battle that countries triumph, but that their “proper place” would come from the balance sheet. He said that “the current international situation is still complex and volatile, but in general, it is moving towards relaxation. All countries in the world are working out their economic strategies which face the future and taking it as a task of primary importance to increase their overall national strength so as to take up their proper places in the world in the next century.” 94 Li Peng, following up on that speech, further articulated this goal of economic integration. “We shall continue to encourage industrialists and businessmen from Taiwan to invest in the coastal areas or in the hinterland, so as to expand cross-strait economic cooperation on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit.” 95 Vice Premier Qian Qichen (also head of State Council Taiwan Affairs Office), also had something similar to say regarding the long term vision for

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international relations. The competition and rivalry might remain, but the nature of it will be technological and financial: The competition among various countries—particularly among big powers— in terms of comprehensive national strength focused on economy and on science and technology, is on the ascent. This competition . . . is the basic force bringing about changes in the pattern of international relations. The rising or falling destiny of various countries and nations in the next century will be conditioned, to a considerable extent, by the outcome of this competition. 96

For a “hard line’ perspective, representing those who might have more confidence in the way the PRC is currently governed, there would be less concern with Taipei’s consent. That vision for reunification would entail the increase of the PRC’s absolute power relative to the ROC to the point that the island will have no choice but to accede to unification. It might not be in the form of a direct takeover or invasion, but instead to the realization in Taipei that there would be no way to refuse any mainland request. This might be because Beijing holds too much sway over Taiwan’s economic well-being, or because no nation would stand up to mainland aggression. We unsurprisingly do not find rhetoric from PRC leaders articulating that exact plan for the long horizon, but we certainly see language pointing to their willingness to take strong measures. Qian Qichen, a year after his “economic destiny’ speech, said “only by taking resolute and uncompromising measures [jian ding di cuo shi] can we prevent these foreign forces and Taiwan independence from developing, and clear the obstacles to the great cause of the motherland’s reunification.” 97 As for how that might be achieved, it would not just be through economic development, but the military modernization to back it up. Despite Beijing’s assertions that the PLA posed no harm to other powers and was defensive in nature, 98 Chi Haotian, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, told a panel discussion of PLA deputies at the National People’s Congress session right on the eve of the 1996 missile tests that “the Chinese army will beef up modernization efforts in the next 15 years for the national security and reunification of the motherland and so safeguard the country’s economic construction . . . he set the target of . . . catering to the needs of the socialist economic development and hi-tech local wars.” 99 When it comes to these alternative pictures of how China views its long term options and goals, it is clear which one the United States would prefer. United States—Long Term Horizon With regard to a possible conflict with a potential rival, the United States had good reason to be confident in the middle of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War exposed the vulnerabilities of totalitarian repression and the resilience

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and strength that come from an open, vibrant society. With those lessons fresh in the minds of US policy-makers, the hope for a long-term resolution to any conflict with the PRC would inspire a certain kind of long-term strategy. As Construal Theory might predict, the details might be a bit hazy, but the ultimate outcome is clear in broad outline. The United States’ desired long-term horizon outcome for East Asia would be a peaceful, democratic China. With respect to the cross-Strait situation, this new China could either unite with a Taiwan willing to do so, or it could coexist with an independent Taiwanese state and not feel threatened by its existence. This would be highly desirable both in terms of the interests of peace, stability, and economic prosperity, but also in the hope that such a China would be much more likely to cooperate with US initiatives in East Asia, and even worldwide, as a true partner. With the situation as it was in the mid-1990s, (or even as it is now), this would not be going to be happen in the near future. If China becoming a willing partner for liberal international values is not a possibility in the short term, how might it get there in the long run, or is that future even a real possibility? There is no definitive road map for achieving this result. “The process and outcome of China’s transformations are unknown. Much about the Chinese future is unknown.” 100 Making definitive predictions about Beijing’s behavior is a risky proposition, as the surprising outcome of Tiananmen demonstrated, and loomed large in the memories of pundits, politicians, and policy-makers alike. But there is hope about how to help guide Beijing’s development towards such a state, and the motivating idea behind engagement. Reaching out to the PRC, getting it to become integrated and invested in the international system, will make it more likely that it will follow its rules and uphold its values: It is vital that China be engaged in a new security partnership, one that is cooperative rather than confrontational. With more than a fifth of the world’s population, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and an arsenal of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, isolating China is a very dangerous course. Such a partnership suggests that China be encouraged to become an active and responsible party to international organizations, treaties, and regimes. As such, China should be granted an equal say in setting the “rules of the game.” The corollary of this, of course, is that China must agree to abide by those rules. 101

Beyond rule-following, the greater hope for engagement would be to allow democratic values to take root and flourish in China. Of course this would take a great deal of time. For President Clinton, deterring the PRC from aggression in the Strait was not the ultimate goal, but it opened up a space for breathing room to allow the shift without the pressure of a crisis or expan-

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sionist mindset, neither of which is conducive to liberalization. The shortterm intervention would make the long term transformation possible. When China expanded its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, we made clear that any use of force against Taiwan would have grave consequences. The two carrier battle groups we sent to the area helped to defuse a dangerous situation and demonstrated to our allies our commitment to stability and peace in the region. In the long run, we also strengthen security by deepening the roots of democracy in Asia. Democratic nations, after all, are more likely to seek ways to settle conflicts peacefully, to join with us to conquer common threats, to respect the rights of their own people. Democracy and human rights are, I believe, universal human aspirations. We have only to look at South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan; the Cambodians who turned from bullets to ballots to build a democratic future; Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi and other courageous leaders in the area. 102

The engagement process would be a lengthy one, but in the the long term, there is hope for the transformative power of engagement: Because of the profound Chinese transition, American engagement is essential. We are not likely to significantly affect events over the short run, but—by engaging . . . assisting it in alleviating some of its economic and institutional problems—its evolution is more likely to be in directions favorable to peace and stability in the Pacific as well as to American interests. China’s transition is likely to be protracted. . . Even were China to embark a process that we would call democratization, the development would be a lengthy one. 103

Possession of such progressive values might not be sufficient to prevent the PRC from desiring to retake the island, 104 though the hope of the democratic peace argument is a strong motivation to move Beijing’s government in that direction. With the ROC already a functioning democracy, should the mainland parallel that political development, war would not be a likely outcome. Should both states truly value the nature of the democratic process, the unification questions would likely be settled by ballot. Beyond the nature of its government, the influence of economic development also proves useful in reducing the threat of force, as an increasingly powerful and prosperous PRC with more to lose would be reluctant to undermine the source of its power. The nature of the international system might transform to the point that economic wealth so outshines territorial possession and military capability that the PRC as a great power would feel much more confident in its standing in the world, with no need to use the “undoing the past humiliation’ as a way to deflect from internal domestic concerns. This would not just be an argument based on Beijing’s unwillingness to risk its many gains by entering into a conflict with the US, but instead be a

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more fundamental transformation of the PRC’s self perception and the tactics that stem from it. If the power, wealth, and resources of the PRC so dwarf those of the ROC that adding the island to the state would make little difference (or would not be worth the effort), and the issues of nationalism and cultural destiny do not burn at the center of Beijing’s policy-making, the prospects for a peaceful China might be greater. Perhaps the last hope, for the fundamental change in the role of nationalism and historical understanding in China, would have to wait for the chiliastic horizon to transpire. ROC—Long Term Horizon As with the mainland’s long horizons, there are two strains of thought as to how the conflict between the PRC and Taiwan might achieve resolution. As with the US, there is the understanding that it will not be a rapid process. As Lee Teng-hui put it, “the most important issue is that the Kuomintang should proceed with the talks without haste, even if they last for 100 years . . . We are not seeking temporary happiness from the good news carried by newspapers . . . For the true interest of the state and various considerations, we will hold 100 rounds of talks if necessary.” 105 Part of the need for a long time in coming to an answer is the current incompatibility of the systems. According to Chiao Jen-ho, vice chairman and secretary general of the Straits Exchange Foundation, “the current state of systems in the mainland simply cannot attract Taiwan people. In pursuit of the unification of China we should not be driven by eagerness for quick success to achieve nominal unification, but should pursue the long term unification of systems.” 106 In that long term, enough time could allow the mainland and Taiwan to gradually transform one another and arrive at compatibility. As to the precise details that path might take, those can be left to later policy-makers. The abstraction anticipated by Temporal Construal is demonstrated in the nature of the discourse. The ROC Foreign Minister Chien Fu alluded to his vision for the eventual reunification process, in which exposure to the ROC regime would help transform the PRC to something compatible with Taipei’s democratic system. “Cross-strait relations are a big issue. It has been our hope that we can influence the mainland through cross-strait exchanges so that they will change their ways, so that we can participate in international affairs together, and eventually be reunified sometime in the future. The mainland, however, does not share our views.” 107 The ROC long-term horizon is shaped by Beijing’s preference for short term ambiguity about the status of the island. With a tangible threat of PRC military action in the event of a declaration of Taiwanese independence in the intermediate future, the willingness to remain in international limbo serves some elements of domestic politics, but more importantly, preserves

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the safety and relative stability that allow progress and development in both regimes. This is perhaps another example of longer time horizon thinking that in fact neglected the current needs of the immediate present to the detriment of later goals. As will be discussed later, international developments since the missile crisis have moved to blunt Taipei’s ability to utilize effective leverage in the international community to effect their desired outcomes, or even to serve as much of a disruptive influence. Attempts by the island regime to integrate into the international community and simultaneously to recognize the reality of the situation and prospects for Taiwan as a political entity in East Asia function in a precarious balance, but remained a primary strategy in achieving its goals on the longer horizon: For the longer run, Taiwan wanted as much recognition, even if it’s not diplomatic, as an independent economic power, and dignity as a de facto individual nation, and this would help . . . their game, the constant game, was to get as much international space and recognition, and therefore protection from Beijing, as possible. 108

Looking to Taipei’s long horizon, two distinct perspectives can shed light on divergent desires for the longer future for the ROC. The nature of the positive relationship with the PRC hoped for in the intermediate horizon can develop in several ways. Similarly to Beijing’s distinct visions for the future, Taiwanese perspectives reflect different relationships evolving between the island and the mainland. Those elements of Taiwanese society that favor unification with the mainland would desire maximizing the potential for Taiwan’s security and prosperity, which will entail unification when the circumstances are right. Of course, a fundamental part of that security comes from not antagonizing Beijing—and the most important way to assure this is through making no moves towards independence. More vocal and direct in their cries for dramatic change is the pro-independence movement. Their long-term goal would be to have a sovereign Taiwanese state, internationally recognized and coexisting peacefully with China. The PRC may be seen to be developing economically, but concern about its lack of corresponding political development is a foundation of the independence movement. The independence movements want recognition of the ever-increasing reality that Taiwan is not just a de facto separate political entity, but that it has developed culturally in its own unique direction and is therefore no longer part of the Chinese world with respect to its very identity. While both takes on Taiwan’s long-term direction anticipate developments over years and decades, the conflicting approaches often utilize different time horizons with respect to the need for action. The unification camp,

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based on the perception of the PRC’s development, have the luxury of a “wait and see” approach, since the circumstances are likely to be more amenable to reunification as time passes; as for the advocates for independence, the need for direct and more immediate action is palpable. This evokes the predictions of Prospect Theory—those who desire reunification are operating in a gain-oriented realm, and can take fewer risks, while the pro-independence camp might be willing to take on more risks regarding changing the trajectory of the future that does not look to be in their favor. If the PRC’s hard power is waxing, the sooner moves can be made towards independence, the less ability Beijing would have to take decisive action forcibly to stop it. In an interview an anonymous high ranking ROC military officer, said that “if the Chinese Communist troops take advantage of the current situation in the Taiwan Strait to gradually ‘become seaborne’ in the Pacific Ocean, the US will not be able to keep the Chinese Communists in check in the next century.” 109 The time frame of this view is more difficult to generalize, but it seems that the independence-minded actors in ROC politics are often utilizing short-term horizons, since there is often a strong pressure to act quickly for political or moral reasons and with less regard for practical implications. However, this might be a reflection of longer-term thinking, which would view the asymmetry between the PRC and the island as gradually increasing over time, and that, to quote Macbeth, “If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well it were done quickly.” 110 While Beijing could cause a great deal of trouble for Taipei should it declare independence quickly, if it were given more time to strengthen its military and economy, then the ROC would have no hope for the long term. Chiliastic Horizons It might seem strange to think of perspectives on the far distant future as having a strong influence on an immediate crisis situation, but exactly that was transpiring in this Straits Crisis. Short and intermediate considerations were often driven by what the actors saw as the ultimate vision for the fate of East Asia and the world. In some ways this is similar to the long term horizons and their impact on decision-making. Instead of considerations of long term outcomes and deciding on the policies that would achieve (or avoid) them, the chiliastic horizon more broadly influenced the philosophy of action rather than specific aspects of it. The converse might be true as well— leaders might develop a vision for the distant future based on their personal values and beliefs about the nature of the world. Either way, understanding this horizon in the outlook of decision-makers can contribute to a better comprehension of their guiding principles.

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As was mentioned in the introduction to the long horizons, the furthest time horizons also reflect the process of temporal construal, in which the abstraction of more distant situations informs a greater degree of idealization. This often evokes an idealization of the situation, demonstrating the optimal hopes of the decision-makers. PRC—Chiliastic Horizon In contrast with the competitive vision that we see in the long term horizon, there are many examples of Chinese political rhetoric pointing to hopes for a more idealized world, one of peaceful cooperation, of mutual assistance rather than struggle, with many “poles’ of political authority rather than great powers. Of course this is an idealization, but it is a telling attempt to provide an alternate vision to the Western view of the outcome of the globalization progress and the liberal international economic order. The recurring theme is the erosion of the predominance of great powers in favor of a world in which all nations have equal status. Jiang Zemin, at a South Asian leadership summit in Pakistan, said: We are at a crucial moment where a new century will descend on a world undergoing profound historical changes. The trend of multipolarization featuring the rise of the developing countries is rolling on like an irresistible deluge. The pursuit of peace, stability, cooperation and development has become the main theme of our times. However, hegemonism and power politics linger on, numerous contradictions and disputes continue to plague the world, and peace and development remain severely challenged. 111

While this development will be a long time in the making, it is inevitable. “Although the formation of the world’s multipolar pattern is a protracted and complex process, multipolarization has become an irresistible historical trend.” 112 As Li Peng said at a meeting of European leaders, this new system would see the dissolution of the old form of power politics: Fundamentally different from the unequal relations in the colonial years or the confrontational ones in the Cold War period, the new partnership that we are to build should be based on the principles for peaceful co-existence. Asian and European countries, big or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, are all equal members of the international community with equal sovereignty. 113

What would be the characteristics of such a world order? It would not just be a cooperative association of equal sovereign nations, all benefiting each other with trade and technological development. There would be an infusion of Asian values into a world system once dominated by Western ideology:

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The details of the form that such inspiration would take are not articulated and are kept abstract. It would not be Maoism, or a religious wisdom tradition like Buddhism. This vision might refer to a spread of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ or a version of Confucianism compatible with the strategic aims of the regime. The development and success of a unified “Chinese’ civilization, geographically centered in China, culturally and politically ascendant in East Asia, possessing global reach and influence, would be exactly the way to combat Western ascendancy while building its own authority and influence on the new world order. In the rhetoric, Chinese leaders were always careful to say that China did not have aspirations of hegemony; this marks the interference of the West. This intrusion extends to the internal matter of the Taiwan question, and in China’s chiliastic vision, that kind of disrespect would not happen: China has always held that all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all equals, While firmly opposed to such hegemonistic behaviors as infringing on other countries’ sovereignty and interfering in other countries’ internal affairs, China will never seek hegemony for itself. Always respecting other countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, China also hopes that its position of achieving reunification and opposing national dismemberment will be understood and respected by others. 115

United States—Chiliastic Horizon When one is looking so far into the future, the realm of possibility becomes so large that there are always too many alternatives to cover fully. That being said, the American political leadership seemed to utilize one of two predominant chiliastic perspectives. The first, very much a natural extension of the conditions of the present, assumed a continuation of national identity and territorial boundaries, though certainly in a different international context than our contemporary situation. The program of globalization would have produced a world brought closer together through trade and new technologies, learning from each other and overcoming differences, in what Thomas Friedman calls the “Flat Earth.’ The international organizations like the World Trade Organization and the United Nations could serve to transform the “rogue’ nations of the earth into “good citizens,’ playing by the rules of the new international system. Countries would retain their sovereignty, but the benefits of increased global integration would come at the price of re-

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straining some state actions, making for a more predictable and stable environment. Despite the triumph of American liberalism in such a world, American values would undo American predominance. As the less developed nations with low labor costs continue to take advantage of lowered trade barriers to bring prosperity to their people, they would take more business away from the fully industrialized states. America would be safer in such a world, as rabid anti-Americanism breeds in the poverty and ignorance that would become obsolete. However, America would also be weaker, as the relative advantages of other states allow them to catch up to, or even surpass the US in economic power. China would be at the top of the list of those states. After the missile crisis had cooled down, President Clinton was asked about the choice between economics and political values, and in the spirit of global liberalism, he stressed the value of democracy: Mr. Brokaw. “Between the United States and China, what is more important, the economy or democracy?’ . . . The President. Well, I believe over the long run between the United States and China, the thing that’s most important is democracy, because I think the freer the people are the more likely they will be to be responsible partners. . . . I believe they’re more likely to become democratic if they progress economically . . . 116 Clinton’s use of a distant time horizon is consistent with respect to idealistic political goals, if not realpolitik relative power concerns. This resonates with the hopes of engagement, but to a hard power realist, of whom there were many in Beijing, this could be seen as playing into the hands of the PRC leadership that saw economic development as the key to power and influence in the international arena. The choice to protect American political interests by making potentially detrimental trade agreements would make the very long term horizon belong to China. In the chiliastic term, as long as nothing has prevented it earlier, the PRC would be in a prime position to push the unification issue, unless it has truly absorbed the importance of democracy to the point that it would allow the issue to be decided by ballot. Of course, if the voting population on the issue were to include all Chinese, then the opinion of the Taiwanese people would be drowned out by the mainland numbers. The second chiliastic perspective, more radical than the first, reflected the natural outgrowth of the process of globalization to the level of individual identity, an increasingly peaceful society in which nationalism is tempered by cosmopolitan values. 117 This view, much like the Kantian “Perpetual Peace’ argument discussed in an earlier chapter, would suggest that those

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increasing ties of closeness with other nations will lead to a shared sense of humanity that transcends the labels of nationalism. In such a world, the Taiwan issue would not be a concern. State borders would become considerably less important, or even fade away in favor of a global state. The people of the mainland would not feel a nationalist push to reunite with the people of Taiwan, seeing as they would truly empathize with their position. John Donne expressed this idea in his meditation, best known for the phrase “for whom the bell tolls”: No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend’s or of thine own were: any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind . . . by this consideration of another’s danger I take mine own into contemplation . . . 118

One interesting thing to note is that implicitly in both of the chiliastic paths, not much is said specifically about American power, much less its predominance. This is not at all surprising in the more cosmopolitan perspective, which assumes the dissolution of nationalism. However, even in the less dramatic chiliastic horizon, it is difficult to avoid the basic truth of the very long-term future. As said above, many of the relative advantages that have placed the United States in its current position of predominance in global politics and economics are not eternal. If the vision of spreading American values worldwide is successful, many of the attributes that have made the US so successful will ultimately be possessed by the other states of the world. If the American voice were to become a minority voice among many, that bitter pill would be softened by the realization of worldwide democratic ideals. ROC—Chiliastic Horizon As with the PRC, the ROC also has two alternative chiliastic visions—less different on the worldwide scale, but much more different for the fate of the island. As in the PRC options, either unification will happen painlessly, without much fanfare, or it will not. In this case, the second option would refer to a distant future in which unification does not occur at all. For the first, a gradual view of unification, the chiliastic vision would see a mainland China so transformed by its program of modernization that it would be entirely compatible with Taiwan’s institutions and values. As Lee Teng-hui said, “It would be good timing for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to unite again at a time when Mainland China develops itself into a free, democratic society.” 119 A free, democratic, and capitalistic China would offer a great deal to Taiwan—military protection, economic stability and further trade opportunities, the chance to be a part of a great power. If this

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were to happen—and of course this is the big question—then the majority of the Taiwanese people would welcome it. But in the shorter horizons, it would be vital to help guide the process of China’s development carefully over time in order to reach that point. At the Cornell speech for which the infamous visa was issued, Lee said “We in the Republic of China on Taiwan have found that peaceful transformation must take place gradually, and with careful planning.” 120 The other chiliastic vision does not foresee such a happy reunion, though it would not be a cause for concern. China might become a peaceful and democratic state, but those who see themselves as distinctly Taiwanese would want to chart the course of their own destiny as a unique people. Regardless of how nice the mainland has become, Taiwan would go its own way. This was not the majority view during the straits crisis, but since then, and perhaps in part because of the crisis, the way that people identify themselves has changed markedly. The percentage of people identifying themselves as “Taiwanese’ has gone from 25% in 1995 to 44% a decade later, while the number of people seeing themselves as “Chinese’ dropped from 25% to 7%. 121 If those trends continue, the more likely possibility might be the evolution of this unique state. And if the strategy to transform the PRC into a “good citizen’ of the global community is successful, it might happen without incident. Horizons, Plans, and Action We have looked at the horizons of the actors in this situation, and found a variety of goals reflecting the differing time horizons motivating policy makers in each state. The earlier chart (table 3.1) comparing those goals served to summarize the contrasting and sometimes competing desired outcomes. As we have also seen, each horizon was conducive to certain practical tactics or long-term strategies. It might be useful to provide a concrete summary of the various perspectives with respect to the actions (or planned actions) utilized by each actor for a particular horizon (see table 3.2). We can see from table 3.2 that there are not always hard and fast distinctions between preferred or ideal tactics for different horizons. A good policy contains more than one approach, not only to provide redundancy in the system, but to allow for more than one method to achieve success. With states as large and complex as the US and the PRC, and one with a vibrant democracy as disputative as the ROC, it would be surprising if multiple avenues were not being pursued. Therefore this comparison is perhaps not quite so useful to a concrete understanding of decision-making; after all, a state can pursue a variety of tactics simultaneously, and it would be a truly irresponsible leader who fails to consider different approaches to a problem.

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Table 3.2. Time Horizons in the 1995–1996 Missile Crisis: Tactics and Strategies

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While the desired outcome in each horizon would shape the methods used to achieve it, the tactics would also depend on practical issues such as limited resources, feasibility, domestic politics, and so forth—the wide range of influences on decision-making studied in political science. By attempting to draw distinctions among the methods by time horizon, another useful variable can be added to the complex task of explaining policy-making. In addition to looking at the horizons separately, it can also be useful to study the interplay and even the contradictions among them, thereby gaining a better understanding of the way in which a predominant horizon can make a significant impact on the decision-making process. The next section will go on to look at that tension in the state actors. TENSION AMONG THE HORIZONS The discussion of goals in different time frames is a way to clarify the specific outcomes that would be desired depending on how far into the future one looks, and the methods that one might choose to achieve them. Of course, if the goals of each time frame also serve the interests of the goals in other horizons, it would be difficult to determine which time frame, if any, is taking precedence in the decision-making process. However, in many cases the best way to achieve a goal would not contribute to achieving the goals for a different time frame, or might even make them more difficult to achieve. It would be useful to look at the ways in which the different time frame perspectives contradict each other, and thereby determine which time horizons dominate different actors. We can see parallels with other fields in which decisions regarding the future play an important role. As we have discussed before, people engage in financial investment for a greater payoff in the future. One of the first and most important decisions that must be made is to select the time when that payoff is desired. Investment strategies that have immediate returns are quite different from those in long-term portfolios. Optimization of results in a future time frame entails making choices that might make for less ideal outcomes in other time horizons. Temporal Horizon Tension in China The case of China’s strategy with respect to the Taiwan Straits is striking in the way that the options open to it point to different kinds of “payoffs,’ and how engaging in a strategy in pursuit of a specific future goal can make it more difficult to achieve some of the others—even if those goals appear to flow seamlessly into each other as a natural progression. There exists a contradiction among the PRC’s tactics and its goals on different time scales. For example, the blatant and heavy-handed signaling of military exercises

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does not send positive messages to the people of Taiwan about what kind of treatment they would receive under the eventual reunion desired by the mainland government. It might be effective in deterring immediate moves toward independence, but it may constitute “poisoning the well’ in terms of the longer strategy. This is not to say that all actions taken in pursuit of each time horizon goal actually contradict all others. We can see some coherence between the short and medium scale goals: the PRC’s show of military power in order to deter ROC or US moves that could prove to antagonize Beijing. Though ultimately the tactics were likely counterproductive in the short term, swaying the election further in favor of the pro-independence candidate, they might have been more successful in the longer term goal of setting the limits of the cross-Strait relationship by establishing the credible threat of a military response to independence. In the broader sense of Beijing’s actions towards different horizons, some tactics serve a wide range of goals. Actions that serve to build China’s (or any state’s) power and increase the resilience of its institutions have both short and long term benefits. Mainland investment in Taiwanese companies serves to build stronger relations and increases the potential leverage Beijing can have over influential actors in the Taiwan regime. Modernization and development of the PRC’s armed forces allows a wider range of military responses, and serves to make threats more credible. There are always tradeoffs in any allocation of resources, but increasing hard power in any time horizon is helpful to the state—as long as the steps to increase it do not put other actors in a position to want to curtail it. This is part of the contradiction that Beijing faces, especially in its selection of policy options in responding to Taipei. There were various limitations on the responses that Beijing could effectively take. The nationalist fervor that the PRC encouraged in order to deflect criticism away from ideological inconsistency would make a passive or ineffectual response to Taiwanese independence politically dangerous in regard to backlash. In other words, should the regime prove itself weak on an issue that had been presented as vital in terms of Chinese national pride, it would have very little left to recommend it as legitimately deserving to continue in power. At the same time, the international response to Tiananmen could mean a number of things with respect to PRC policy options. The international condemnation over the massacre meant that many of the CCP’s options were unpalatable because they could lead to lack of support, criticism, or even direct opposition from other states or the international community more generally. Or it could mean that if the PRC was already in the proverbial international doghouse for its brutal behavior, the regime might have little to lose by continuing in that vein. Alternatively, in the half-decade since the incident,

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steps had been gradually taken by the international community that might have been perceived by the PRC as a willingness to move past the Tiananmen legacy. This could include the restoration of Most Favored Nation status by the US the year before. This could have meant that options that might have been seen as problematic by the PRC because of their international repercussions would now be seen in the frame of a longer horizon. The PRC’s growth and increasing trade relations meant potential economic benefits other nations would stand to gain by cooperating with Beijing—economic considerations that would eventually (medium term at the longest) overcome any criticism of their political decisions. The official and unofficial statements by the PRC we have looked at can shed some light on how the cross-Strait relationship was viewed, how it was presented, and the nature of the time horizons being considered in decisionmaking with respect to the crisis. For the most part, the official statements issued by the PRC during this period are very similar, adhering to the literal party line on Taiwan’s status. They are rife with concerns about the “splittist’ elements in Taiwanese society and the risk they pose to stability and the appropriate relationship the mainland and island should have. Beijing is critical (one might say defensive) of what it describes as international interference in what they portray as a domestic matter. This does not just include the obvious example of the US naval exercises, but even the criticism from other actors regarding the way that the PRC treats Taiwan. The PRC response is often marked by a strong reaction to any outside attempts at criticism or intervention. This is likely not to be the result of a true sensitivity to immediate circumstances, but the high priority placed on keeping all future options open. This approach is designed to maintain the perception of the inevitability of reunification. A vital part of this perception is the necessity of the unfaltering forward movement of the PRC. The PRC’s commitment to cultivating an image of constant uninterrupted progress and growth is illustrated in this strong concern about any actions or direction in the relationship that might signal a deviation from, or even a pause in, the path of increasing integration. This is the same concern with the form of PRC’s development path that was touched on earlier in the discussion of the shape of China’s future. There are many benefits for the PRC to be perceived in this way by other states. One is that Beijing will be seen as a stable and desirable trading partner. One of the most important is that the perception of the PRC’s rising power will be seen as leading inevitably to reunification with Taiwan, that sense of “historical inevitability’ often mentioned by PRC authorities. One particularly interesting example is a case of a Chinese proverb, or chengyu, used by Jiang Zemin to describe the situation in the midst of the missile crisis, but which drew revision by the collective Chinese leadership afterwards. In discussing the situation, Jiang used an expression that sug-

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gested that some deviation from the constant progress of mainland-Taiwan relations would eventually correct itself. This contradicts the desired image of constant steps toward unification, and suggests a tolerance for deviation from that path which goes against the consistent image the CCP had been working to build. Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian pointed out here yesterday: The foreign news agency report that President Jiang Zemin has used the words “the Sun Shines Again After the Rain’ (雨過天晴) is not precise (確切). He also said: So long as the Taiwan authorities return to the one China stand, and give up or refrain from engaging in activities of splitting the motherland in the world, cross-strait relations will naturally be restored and begin to develop. 122

The use of metaphor sheds more light on Jiang’s time horizon than any direct CCP missive. The fact that it was corrected gives us a window into the debates within the PRC leadership—enough of a dissent to merit a correction and the ensuing attention that it would bring. In speaking through the language of the traditional proverb, the PRC’s highest authority used language that reflected a position utilizing a longer time horizon—the view that things will work out despite challenges along the way. This is consistent with the view of a long term future that the PRC sees for itself and hopes to foster in outside observers, but it also shows the importance that PRC policy-makers place on the shorter term. If only one time frame dominated PRC thinking, then either the chengyu would have been acceptable because of the long-term considerations, or it never would have occurred to Jiang to say it if only short term issues took precedence. Horizonal Interaction and Temporal Tension in US Policy On the US side, the tension between time horizons manifested in several ways, and can be seen more clearly since the opposing viewpoints are visible as opposed to the “black box’ of PRC decision-making. Beyond the tension implicit in emphasizing different time horizons in informing decisions, there are even direct conflicts over the implications of any policy in all time frames. Public debate is a foundation of a representative democracy like the US, and it is unsurprising that a variety of viewpoints can be found, and passions often run high in an issue where the stakes are seen as so pivotal for the future of international relations—an issue like US-PRC relations. The most obvious tension is between the desire to avoid conflict and to maintain strong relations with the rising power. For some policy makers this might mean not antagonizing the PRC on any issue, which would mean minimal confrontation, while for others it would mean maintaining a strong show of support for the ROC, including the willingness to use force. The “avoidance of conflict” is a perfect example of an issue in which the time

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horizon makes a significant impact. The US military presence in the Taiwan Strait certainly caused more short-term tension and created a higher risk of immediate conflict. In an intermediate horizon, it most likely reduced the risk by sending the message that China could not exercise force without repercussions. As Bill Clinton said in a speech to military personnel, “America’s men and women in uniform . . . off the Taiwan Straits, they calmed a rising storm.” 123 Beijing’s “missile diplomacy” was not an indication of immediate invasion but rather a desire to signal possible responses to later outcomes and thereby deter certain decisions due to increased risk; the US action attempted to serve the same function. 124 This is a concrete demonstration of one of the most polarizing issues in American foreign policy—the tension between engagement and confrontation with a state that behaves in ways troubling to the US. The argument is basic—those in favor of engagement believe it is better to work with a state in the hope that the interaction with other states will cause it eventually to develop and improve, either through exposure to progressive ideas and connections to international institutions supporting those values, or by the progressive political change that is often seen to be linked with economic development. 125 Those holding to the other perspective question, the utility of positive treatment of states that clearly do not deserve it based on their current behavior. They are dubious about the value of engagement as a tool for reform, and are concerned that continual rewards for states that do not reform create no incentive for any change that the US would want. Critics of America’s China policy often point to the willingness of US diplomats to give in to Beijing’s negotiating points, and a failure to “stand up’ to PRC despots. The discussion in the US Congress about the granting of a visa for Lee’s visit articulates this position clearly, and illustrates the powerful role that time horizons are playing in the discussion and criticism of the various perspectives, and in the perspectives themselves. As Congressman Ed Royce from California argued: “I would say to any who rationalize and proselytize about trade and ‘future considerations’—and all the arguments so familiar to the advocates of appeasement—I would say to them: listen to the victims of the Chinese . . . ” 126 It is significant to note here that this form of engagement is compared to a pivotal moment in past foreign policy, the Munich agreement of 1938. Past time is used in this rhetoric to evoke the risks of the path the future might take, particularly the risk of a rising China that is increasingly aggressive, repressive, and unchecked by the few powers with the ability to do so. Royce does not go so far as to compare the PRC to Nazi Germany, but he is capable of making a more subtle comparison through time perspectives. The statement made by Congressman Smith in the same hearing used a similar warning about the dangers of working with a currently unsavory actor

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in the hope of future progress, and also used examples from the past to make his point: . . . the question posed by this resolution is simple: Should we insult a faithful and freedom loving ally in order to curry favor with a totalitarian dictatorship? Unfortunately this question has been asked and answered many, many times over the last two decades. Most of the time our government has gotten the answer wrong. First, the American people were told that recognition of the Beijing government and the severance of our diplomatic relations with Taipei was not a question of values but of strategic necessity. Yet, within a few years our new “friends’ in Beijing had largely repaired their rift with Moscow . . . Then we were told that if we would just be tolerant for a few years longer, expanded trade relations with the West would surely create an irresistible demand among the Chinese people for freedom and democracy. Once again our experts guessed wrong. The Chinese people did demand their freedom, and the Communist government did resist. This resistance took the form of brutal murders. Remember Tiananmen Square . . . Now we are told that our mistake was in asking too much, too soon. Too much emphasis on human rights offended their sensibilities, we were told. So the new strategy is the same as to [sic] old one: just be patient with the old darling and send more money; sooner or later they will die. 127

In this speech, we can see contempt for those who believe in the power of engagement; they are ignorant and naïve people who do more harm than good because of expectations that will never bear fruit. We can see a strong link between awareness of the lessons of history and wariness about the risks of future mistakes made through naiveté. Even these arguments, compelling though they are, ignore another key element of tension inherent in using different time horizons, or in any kind of decision that attempts to choose between ends and means. One of the key assumptions in Royce and Smith’s speeches is that collaboration with present day China will not yield future progress, but in fact would hinder it. But what if engagement were to be effective, making democratic development likely or even inevitable in the long run? The sum total of cost and benefit might be in the positive column, but would that justify building supportive relations with state actors that are behaving poorly at the present? Even more fundamental than the question of engagement or isolation is the decision that must be made about one’s limit of compromise. There are few people in politics who absolutely refuse to compromise their principles to any extent; the nature of politics requires accommodation with other points of view. This is more obvious in open democratic states, but even in closed oligarchies, decision-makers, even the dictator, must anticipate how others will respond to his decrees.

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Compromise entails making a decision that yields less-than-optimal results. Decision-makers make compromises because their uncompromised position would not be possible under the immediate circumstances, or because a compromise in the present time will yield benefits towards crossroads of difficult decisions in the future. 128 Showing flexibility to others in the present might lead to accommodations for the US in the future. The engagement compromise illustrates the unique values placed on different time horizons. The decision to take an undesirable short-term action in exchange for a potentially greater benefit in the long term shows how decision-making can depend on the time horizon being favored. There are different ways to interpret the ways that the time horizons are utilized. The US policy makers who advocate taking a “hard line’ with China favor potentially confrontationally destabilizing or even provocative actions in the short term in order to press for longer-term positive developments in the PRC. While risky, the short-term actions under the hard line have a moral consistency—if a state behaves improperly, an appropriate (hopefully corrective) action is warranted. In an examination of the engagement versus the hard line approach, we see that the time horizons are playing different roles; and even within each perspective, there are different mechanisms by which time horizons take precedence and inform the decision-making process. Of course, a variety of factors influence decision-making in this case, as with most others. Study of the different influences on decision-making has been the life’s work of many scholars in foreign policy analysis, and I can only attempt to quickly summarize some of the basic influences and then relate them to the time horizon framework. One of the most basic ideas in the understanding of what motivates decision-making depends on the determination of national interest. For the Taiwan missile crisis case, it rests on the foundation of the newly emerging postcold war environment. This “new world order’ saw increased attention given to human rights and a new role for the US, now the world’s single superpower. The PRC was sometimes seen as the potential new rival to American hegemony, but that threat was some time off. But the decisions in US-PRC relations taken at that time could set the tone for the future of that relationship, for better or worse. The differences in opinion as how to best manage that relationship manifested themselves on the domestic level. A variety of domestic factors influenced the positions that policy makers would take on the question of how to respond to the missile crisis. This is the result of both the standard operating procedures of governmental organizations, as well as the personal interests of bureaucratic politics discussed before. Executive and congressional interests often came into conflict, with members of Congress generally much more outspoken about the defense of the ROC and taking a more proactive and

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immediate approach in dealing with Beijing than the President or the State Department. 129 The Taiwan lobby has had some success in winning strong allies in Congress. Military decision-makers have a strong interest in maintaining military readiness and in identifying potential threats. There is also the impact of individual preferences on decision-making, which also reflects the integration of Waltz’s first and second images, and all three of Allison’s models. Policy-makers including Steve Solarz, Frank Murkowski, and Lee Hamilton all have a strong personal stake in China-Taiwan-US relations, though their preferences might be motivated by a wide range of explanatory variables, including political party, role and status in government, the individual’s stance on human rights and economic development, which in turn might be motivated by connections to economic or institutional interests. Of course, a decision maker’s gravitation towards one perspective or another might even depend on which time horizon he or she prefers. In consideration of the Taiwan Strait case, actors who emphasize shorter term horizons might express preference for immediate cessation of potentially dangerous behavior, whatever path would best lead to that. 130 A decisionmaker more influenced by medium term perspectives would consider the factors that would decrease the risk of conflict based on the current circumstances in Taipei and Beijing, while someone who focuses on longer horizons would consider the changes in preferences in the players and attempt to move their relationship into productive directions with an attempt to anticipate those developments. Pressure from the international community more broadly might, combined with the interest the PRC has shown in working with international institutions and its dedication to the “harmonious world’ concept, have a greater impact as the PRC places increasing value on the opinions of other states. In the interest of being a “good neighbor,’ and in the context of Beijing’s interminable criticism of Japan over its imperialist past, the PRC might place a lower value on keeping its options open in the Taiwan front than on the potential opportunities afforded by the stronger relations in East Asia and beyond. As Winston Lord put it, the tension between horizons created multiple goals, and therefore a complex strategy: You had to think about not only the immediate crisis in heading it off, but going forward how do you preserve both Taiwan’s sense of security and our commitments, and China not overreacting in a negative way so we can preserve the relationship, and finally of course there was the message to our allies generally, specially in Asia but around the world, that when we have defense commitments, we are serious about them and you can count on us. 131

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The long-term goal for the US would be to maintain the ROC’s democratic progress without the PRC feeling threatened by that process. This would depend on fundamental changes in long term preferences of the PRC, so it could not feasibly occur in a shorter time frame, barring a dramatic change in both the Chinese regime and its political culture, which is not conceivable under the most common perspectives of the shape of its future. The radical changes required to achieve the US goal are possible over the long term, if not the short. This preference alteration might come from a number of causes. For example, it could include the PRC rethinking its priorities regarding the need to gain control over Taiwan, or the PRC over time achieving a point of democratic development that would mean the dissolution of any significant political obstacles to unification. These are seen as possibilities in both the PRC and the US, but they will require a great deal of change—the kind of change that does not happen quickly. CONCLUSION The Taiwan Missile Crisis of the mid-1990s points to a number of important considerations of how thinking about time influences policy, particularly in moments of strategic importance when the stakes are seen as especially high. The crisis was in the midst of a significant juncture between a process that will take a great deal of time to resolve—the ultimate relationship between the PRC and ROC—and circumstances that require rapid response. It is a fruitful place to look at how time horizons are influencing policy-making. This study has spent considerable time analyzing the different goals and strategies inherent in disparate time horizons with respect to a variety of decision-makers. Different approaches would be more or less appropriate depending on how they might serve the interests of the goal in that time frame. We saw that actors in each state explained their motivations in terms of different distances into the future, while at the same time perspectives emphasizing different time horizons often caused a tension within the state’s decision-making process. In addition to the rhetoric used to explain policy-making, there are also diverse ways to analyze it. As the project has shown, there is considerable complexity in the factors informing the decision-making process, and the ultimate decisions by each state could be interpreted through many methodological lenses, considering a wide number of variables that might contribute to a policy outcome. That being said, is there a way to determine which future distance is most influential? There is a significant impact that the actors’ time horizons have on their decision-making, which becomes clear when the decision process is divided into more manageable elements. As an aggregate of different areas of

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policy consideration, it might be difficult to extract the exact role of time horizon in the decision-making process. Looking at the case as a whole, the shorter horizons seem to emphasize the crisis nature of the situation, often focusing on the inappropriate behavior of the other state and the need to take a regrettable, but necessary intervening action in order to prevent an uncontrollable escalation. The longer horizons contain both positive and negative elements with respect to resolving the situation in a variety of ways, including diplomatic and military channels, while the longest horizons seem to emphasize the positive, though abstract, potential of the situation. Each state has its unique desired outcomes for a range of time into the future, and the optimum response to the crisis would depend on which outcome was predominant in the decision process. Even within each of the primary actors involved—the US, Taiwan, and mainland China—there are factions that advocate different approaches and have disparate visions for how the PRC-Taiwan relationship will best resolve itself—which was yet another source of tension between perspectives. So which horizons were dominant in this case, and which goals took precedence? As we said, looking at the Missile Crisis as a unified whole can be overwhelming and obscure some of the significant relationships of temporal horizon to policy outcome. When we divide the situation by issue area, some interesting results emerge. From a traditional diplomatic perspective, both the US and the PRC actions were failures, particularly in the short term. The ideal of diplomacy is to prevent the specter of violence from rising. With each nation flexing its military muscle in a blatant attempt to intimidate another state, and potentially risking an escalation that might lead to a major conflict between nuclear powers, this seems to be a failure for the ability of diplomacy to resolve differences though peaceful means. From a longer horizon, the interests of diplomacy were perhaps better served. A show of military force is not equivalent to an actual battle, and with no loss of life and the clear signal sent that provocative actions would be responded to, deterrence is certainly better diplomacy than direct threat. With those initial military demonstrations, the framework for longer run diplomacy had been set, as well as the boundaries to be avoided by each state actor. Looking through the lens of military affairs, the policy choices on both sides were restrained and effective in the short term, though they might have opened the door to greater military questions in the more distant future. In the shorter horizons, the military engagement was a minuscule fraction of what action might have been taken, and it served to prevent political events from getting out of control. Those short-term actions also served to motivate increased military awareness on the longer horizons. The US would work to increase its anti-

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missile capacity, and the PRC would build its naval and amphibious capacities, in great part because of the perceived warnings of the military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait. Technological escalation can sometimes forestall conflict, but it can also invite the use of the new military hardware. The longer horizons might have an increased risk of great power conflict because of the short-term policy choices of this case. 132 So in order to effectively understand what role the time horizons play in this case, it is not just a matter of looking at the horizons in a broad sense, but it is also important to look at the area in which the horizons are being used. In these cases, which issues are predominant? For the PRC, the strong influence of the PLA and the rather undiplomatic rhetoric utilized show a strong emphasis on the military perspective, and therefore a stronger short-term horizon. From the perspective of the US leadership, knowing the kind of president that Bill Clinton was, diplomacy was the priority. The military action was not an end in itself, but rather a means to establish the groundwork for potential progress in the longer-term horizons. Another possible means to gain insight into the actual functioning of time horizons in the state responses is to integrate the temporal horizon method into another theoretical framework. According to Prospect Theory, the military mobilization (or escalation) could be seen as a risk-taking behavior, even if it might be justified in a longer-term framework. Both the PRC and the US were risking severe losses though inaction—the loss of a historically destined part of Chinese territory for the PRC, and the loss of a uniquely democratic ally by the US. Prospect Theory would assert that the drive to take action, even risky action, would trump the frustrations of a passive policy. Looking through the lens of Temporal Discounting, some unpleasant details were dealt with in the short horizon, and the longest time frames seem to share a positive outlook. How exactly we will go from that challenging point “A’ to our desired point “B’ is unclear. The abstraction (perhaps the influence of temporal construals) and the desire to forestall unpleasant processes might help explain why none of the state actors were willing to put in significant effort, make difficult compromise and sacrifice, even losing face in the present to achieve later stability and security. This might even indicate that an excessive emphasis on longer term thinking without the concrete plan of arriving there might be problematic. It also seems that some perspectives on the PRC-ROC relationship on the part of the US were in fact too far-thinking. Long-term implications and the belief in the potential for progress to lead to congruence of interests between the actors may have contributed to a short-term carelessness in the needs of the immediate situation. Idealism about how the other state might react led to surprise when those expectations were not realized. A useful lesson from this case is that it is useful to challenge the idea that longer-term thinking is universally better. We have already noted that there is such a thing as chilias-

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tic thinking, in which horizons are extended so far into the future that no concrete applicable decisions can emerge from that perspective. The chiliastic views we have seen tend to be idealizations based on best-case scenarios, and might serve to cloud the thinking of leader who need to consider the dirtier aspects of the present. Even extending into a long term but feasible time horizon can yield problematic results if it results in neglect for present concerns. It is often the commonplace to criticize political actors for being shortsighted, failing to make difficult decisions for the future because they might carry a current political cost. However, the opposite can also occur— sometimes political actors make less-than-optimal decisions because their commitment to certain future circumstances means a deprivileging or even a dismissal of the short or medium term. A resolution to cross-Strait tension and ambiguity is not in the immediate future. Many things must happen within the political entities involved if the outcome is to be satisfactory to all. In looking at how an immediate crisis leads to thinking decades into the future, and how using different horizons in one’s point of view can lead to different policy choices, we have developed a useful tool for better understanding one of the most divisive political issues of the twenty-first century. As we will discuss in the conclusion chapter, a sophisticated understanding of the time horizons of each actor can help to generate more efficient and effective policy. NOTES 1. The “February 28, or 228, Massacre,” was the killing of 18,000 to 28,000 native Taiwanese in 1947, in an attempt to quash riots protesting the increasingly tight control by Nationalist forces. The Republic of China government did not acknowledge this action until 1992. Holley, David. “Army Killed Thousands in ‘47 Massacre, Taiwan Admits.” Los Angeles Times, February 24, 1992. 2. For some interesting approaches to this complex relationship, see Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line. Cambridge University Press, 2008. 3. Of course, as the US did not have any realistic alternatives with respect to finding an effective anti-PRC ally in East Asia, Chiang could show some flexibility in his behavior and rely on continued US support, as long as he did not openly move towards a communist regime. 4. The origins of radicalism in the PRC in this period have been investigated in a variety of studies, including such works as Contending with Contradictions: China’s Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953–1960 by Mercy Kuo. 5. Here we find a compelling example of the role of individual decision-making in foreign policy. Both Mao and Chiang were prone to making decisions not based on rational calculations of state interest, but they often baffled analysts and historians by their idiosyncratic decisions and selective use of information. This was more pronounced with Mao’s decisions, with his notorious changes of heart and policy direction, but Chiang’s inflexibility of belief also made for some problematic Taiwanese policies. 6. Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.–Taiwan Relations Since 1942, p. 219. 7. Ibid., chapters 2–3. 8. This is of course a gross oversimplification when it comes to understanding forty years of Chinese history. The point here is that the PRC had many things to keep itself busy,

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particularly in terms of consolidating and increasing its own internal power, without needing to worry about what Taiwan was up to. 9. International Crisis Behavior Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/ 10. Though according to the International Crisis Behavior Project, the 1995–1996 missile crisis is the fourth Taiwan Straits Crisis, but the third (in the summer of 1962) was entirely diplomatic and resolved without military engagement. In the “Background” section, the 1995 missile crisis is described as the fifth (though this is likely a typo). See: http://www.cidcm.umd. edu/icb/dataviewer. 11. James, Patrick and Enyu Zhang. “Chinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950–1996.” Foreign Policy Analysis (2005) 1, p. 34. 12. Bobrow, Davis B., Steve Chan, and John A. Kringen. Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case, p. 58. 13. Ibid., p. 58. 14. See Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 125–136. 15. There may also be some racism at work here. Taiwanese society was stratified into “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” categories, depending on people’s heritage and their self-identification. Certainly the “Taiwanese” people are a strong force in the independence movement, and conversely, many of those with stronger links to the mainland would be less eager to see their nation become little more than an insignificant island culture, less than Han Chinese. 16. For more on this, see Sobel, Richard, William-Arthur Haynes, Yu Zheng. “Taiwan Public Opinion Trends, 1992–2008: Exploring Attitudes on Cross-Strait Issues.” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 74, no. 4, Winter 2010. 17. Garver, John W. Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization. University of Washington Press, 1997. 18. Jiang Zemin. “Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland.” Speech given Jan 30, 1995. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24905.htm 19. See the International Crisis Behavior Project, section on the fourth Taiwan Straits Crisis, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/ 20. “The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. Oct. 11, 12, 1995, S. Hrg. 104–330, p. 115. 21. Trope and Liberman, “Temporal Construal.” Psychological Review, vol. 110, issue 3, July 2003, p. 412. 22. Ibid, p. 406. 23. Eyal, Tal, Nira Liberman, Yaacov Trope, Eva Walther. “The Pros and Cons of Temporally Near and Distant Action.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 86, issue 6, June 2004, p. 793. 24. There are many good treatments of the Tiananmen protests and response that look at the causes and motivations in much more detail. For example, see Oksenburg, Michael, Lawrence Sullivan, Marc Lambert’s Beijing Spring 1989: Confrontation and Conflict. 25. “Embarrassing Straits.” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 1996, p. A18. 26. Francis Fukuyama’s work on that idea considered the conclusion of the Cold War to be the possible moment in which ideological or nationalistic conflict, the events of “history,” might come to an end. See Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18. 27. Huang Chin-Hao and Patrick James. “Blue, Green or Aquamarine?: Taiwan and the Status Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations,” p. 18. 28. Many seminal texts in Political Science have worked to understand this. Allison’s Essence of Decision is perhaps the classic of the genre, introducing a variety of categories of influences on the decision-making process. 29. Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen eds. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp. 25–26. 30. “United States-China Relations: A River to Cross.” Congressional Record: September 11, 1995 (Senate), page S13308. 31. Though these had nothing like the scope or threatening proximity of the PRC’s missile tests, they could be interpreted as sending a signal in their own right.

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32. Qian Qichen, “Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace.” Quishi , June 16, 1995. As published in: Daily Report. China, FBIS-CHI-95-129 on 1995-07-06. 33. “Editorial: A Dangerous Game.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong). July 19, 1995. One could interpret the situation as Jiang attempting to play the “good cop” compelled by other forces to take a harder line, but it is unlikely. Such a tactic would portray Jiang as weak and vacillating. It is also unlikely that Jiang would engage in self criticism if it was part of a stratagem: “Japanese newspapers reported yesterday that at a recent Politburo meeting, Mr Jiang had made a self-criticism of his ‘soft attitude towards the US.” Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Army Wants Tougher Jiang Stance on U.S., Taiwan.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong). July 17, 1995. 34. It is also possible that the decision-making process at the highest levels regarding military engagement incorporated some of the dynamics of groupthink, in that a room full of military minds advising the civilian leadership, combined with stereotyped (or operational code) thinking reinforcing one another might have lad to an increased emphasis on the use of force. This could be true for the US as well as the PRC case. However, groupthink is normally associated with cognitive and policy failures. As the discussion of the outcomes with regard to the various time horizons might indicate, it is entirely possible that the precise level of military demonstration was appropriate to the circumstances, especially in setting the terms for future resolution. 35. Lobbying to join the UN in particular was an ambiguous signal, and domestically the Taiwanese people were unsure of exactly where Lee wished to go. See Kang I-lun. “President Li’s Position on Unification Versus Independence Unknown to More than 40 Percent of the Public, According to DPP Survey.” Tzuli Wanpao (Taipei). June 21, 1995. 36. Hung, Alice. “Taiwan calls for China to end tension, thanks U.S.” Reuters, March 20, 1996. 37. Sobel, Richard, William-Arthur Haynes, Yu Zheng. “Taiwan Public Opinion Trends, 1992–2008: Exploring Attitudes on Cross-Strait Issues.” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 74, no. 4, Winter 2010, p. 787. 38. Lord, Winston. Private interview with the author. December 19, 2013. 39. Benjamin Gilman of New York, speaking on the “Sense of Congress Regarding United States Support of Taiwan” [concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 148)]. Congressional Record: March 19, 1996 (House), pp. H2342-3. 40. Dana Rohrabacher of California, speaking on the “Sense of Congress Regarding United States Support of Taiwan,” [concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 148)]. Congressional Record: March 19, 1996 (House), pp. H2344. 41. Peter King of New York. “The United States Must Stand With Taiwan.” Congressional Record: September 14, 1995. Pages E1790-E1791. 42. Learning more about the specific opinions of Clinton’s military advisors would be a particularly fruitful area for further interview research. 43. “Interview With the New Jersey Media in Hackensack,” March 11, 1996. Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton – 1996, p. 418. 44. Lord, Winston. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, April 28, 1998, pp. 613–614. 45. Lord, Winston. Private interview with the author. December 19, 2013. 46. “Poll on Political Effects of Li’s U.S. Trip.” Tzuli Wanpao (Taipei) June 12, 1995. Of course, only 18% of people polled at that time thought the US visit would worsen cross-strait relations. 47. Yang I-feng, “Mainland Criticism To Help Li’s Presidential Bid.” CAN News Service (Taipei.) July 27, 1995. As published in: Daily Report. China, FBIS-CHI-95-145 on 1995-0728. 48. Wang, Flor. “Li Teng-hui Says PRC Military Exercise Only ‘Acting.’” CAN news service (Taipei). March 05, 1996. As published in: Daily Report. China, FBIS-CHI-96-044 on 05 March 1996. 49. While I am using the term “instantaneous’ here, I am using it casually in a short-term horizon context and not in reference to the specific instantaneous time horizon, which I reserve

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to refer to the horizon which occurs so quickly there is little time for rational thought or deliberate decision-making. 50. It is a fundamental assertion of Prospect Theory that operating in a domain of loss motivates more direct and rapid action, but it is also an empirical finding of work in Temporal Discounting as well, though a deviation from a purely consistent “exponential’ model of DU. “In many studies, a substantial proportion of subjects prefer to incur a loss immediately rather than delay it.” Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 40, no. 2, June, 2002, p. 363. More recent work in cognitive biology, using neurological scanning technology, finds that different parts of the brain are activated when considering loss versus gain. “Our results revealed that the lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal areas were activated in discounting both future gains and future losses, but their activations were stronger when discounting losses. Moreover, we found that the insula, thalamus and dorsal striatum were more activated during intertemporal choices involving losses, suggesting that the enhanced sensitivity to losses may be driven by negative emotions.” Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, and Jiang. “Neural Mechanism of Intertemporal Choice: From Discounting Future Gains to Future Losses.” Brain Research, vol. 1261, March 2009, p. 65. 51. “Although Freeman did not disclose who made this threat, others identified the official as Xiong Guangkai, the deputy chief of general staff of the PLA and its chief of military intelligence. Freeman received similar though less specific warnings from other military leaders.” Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, p. 334. 52. Tyler, Patrick E. “As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens.” New York Times, Jan. 24, 1996. 53. “Veterans Urge ‘Tough Posture’ on Taiwan Issue.” South China Sunday Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 10, 1996. 54. Kazer, William. “Taiwan candidate dismisses fears of China attack.” Reuters, March 20, 1996. 55. See “The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. Oct. 11, 12, 1995, S. Hrg. 104–330. 56. This is not entirely true, for those who worry about extreme Chinese expansionism. “If China should turn militaristic and seize Taiwan, that would be only the first acquisition. Mongolia to the north is a likely next target.” Paul Simon, Senator from Illinois. “China, Taiwan, and the United States.” Congressional Record: March 7, 1996 (Senate), p. S1635. 57. Lu Chao-lung, “General Comments on U.S., Cross-Strait Situation” Chung-Kuo ShihPao (Taipei) – March 12, 1996. As published in: FBIS-CHI-96-049 on March 12, 1996. 58. Xinhua commentary, “Artificial Escalation of Hostilities Has Undermined Cross-Strait Relations” June 27, 1996. 59. Paul Simon, Senator from Illinois. “China, Taiwan, and the United States.” Congressional Record: March 7, 1996 (Senate), p. S1635. 60. Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota. “China—Taiwan Developments.” Congressional Record: January 24, 1996 (Senate), p. S338. 61. Kristof, Nicholas D. “The Real Chinese Threat.” From the New York Times magazine, Aug. 27, 1995. Entered into the. Congressional Record in a Senate hearing on Taiwan, May 1, 1995 by Sen Thomas of Wyoming. 62. Chang, Maubo. “Experts Rule Out Possibility of Cross-Strait War.” Taipei CAN News Service. March 4, 1996. As published in: FBIS-CHI-96-043 on March 4, 1996. 63. Lu Chao-lung, “General Comments on U.S., Cross-Strait Situation” Chung-Kuo ShihPao (Taipei) – March 12, 1996. As published in: FBIS-CHI-96-049 on March 12, 1996 64. “Li Teng-hui: PRC Exercises Will Not Stop ‘Democracy’” Kyodo (Tokyo) March 09, 1996. FBIS-CHI-96-048 on March 11, 1996 65. This was continued in later administrations. As Chen Shui-bian said in his inauguration speech on May 20th 2000: “Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-

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called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue.” 66. For example, an article in Xinhua by Tai Hai, “A Two-Man Comic Show Presented by ‘Undisguised Taiwan Independence’ and ‘Disguised Taiwan Independence’ – Commenting on Peng Mingmin’s Recent Words and Deeds,” makes the DPP candidate to represent “Undisguised Taiwan Independence’ while Lee’s policy was “Disguised Taiwan Independence.’ Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, March 7, 1996. 67. Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party. “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century.” Taipei, November 28 1999. Available at: http://taiwandc.org/dpp-pol3.htm. 68. “PRC: More on ‘Victories’ in Struggle Against Taiwan Independence.” Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 1996. Translated in the FBIS China Daily Report: FBIS-CHI-96-083 on 29 April 1996. 69. “Council Members on Speech.” Xinhua Domestic Service (Beijing). February 2, 1995. In: FBIS-CHI-95-023 on February 3, 1995. 70. Bu Wen, “The United States is Playing with Fire.” People’s Daily June 10, 1995. 71. Xinhua news agency (Beijing) commentary, May 25, 1995. Translated in FBIS-CHI95-102 on May 26, 1995. 72. Melloan, George. “Global View: Don’t Give China’s Warhawks Easy Victories.” The Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1996, p. A19. 73. Lord, Winston. Private interview with the author. December 19, 2013. 74. Wannabovorn, Sutin. “Asia defense strategists rule out China-Taiwan war.” March 20, 1996, Reuters. 75. The Republic of China currently has diplomatic relations with 23 nations, having lost 8 and gained 6 since 1990. However, most of the countries gained are among the world’s smallest, including island nations like Palau and Kiribati, and it has lost states like South Korea and Saudi Arabia. 76. Dirk Kempthorne, Senator from Idaho, in “Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the United States is Committed to Military Stability in [sic] Taiwan Strait.” Congressional Record: March 21, 1996 (Senate). p. S2625. 77. Sam Nunn, Senator from Georgia, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in “Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the United States is Committed to Military Stability in [sic] Taiwan Strait.” Congressional Record: March 21, 1996 (Senate). p. S2625. 78. Craig Thomas, Senator of Wyoming, “The PRC’s Missile Tests.” Congressional Record: August 11, 1995 (Senate), p. S12343. 79. For more on this debate, see O’Hanlon, Michael. “Star Wars Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 6 (1999). 80. Frank Murkowski, Alaska Senator, in “Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the United States is Committed to Military Stability in [sic] Taiwan Strait.” Congressional Record: March 21, 1996 (Senate). p S2624. 81. Richard Cox, Senator from California, in “Sense of Congress Regarding United States Support of Taiwan” [concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 148)]. Congressional Record: March 19, 1996 (House), pp. H2342-H2347. 82. The example of Hong Kong is unique, reflecting the colonial legacy of the United Kingdom rather than a self-generated democratic order. 83. Lee Teng-Hui, Inaugural Speech, published in the “Tribute To President Lee Teng-Hui, President of the Republic of China.” Congressional Record: May 23, 1996 (Senate), pp. S5617S5619. 84. News Conference at Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek International Airport. Taipei China Broadcasting Corporation News Network, June 12, 1995. As published in: FBIS-CHI-95-113 on 13 June 1995. 85. Wei Yung, convener of the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs Committee, speaking at the Tokyo New Order forum. Quoted in Victor Lai and Y.C. Tsai, “Mainland Urged To Stop Pressure.” CAN news service (Taipei) June 1, 1995. As published in: Daily Report. China, FBIS-CHI-95-105 on June 1, 1995.

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86. “Official on ‘Pragmatic’ Relations With Mainland.” Taipei CNA news service, March 13, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-048 on March 13, 1995, p. 99. 87. Fifteen years kept coming up as a number in CCP language, regarding China’s power and Taiwan prospects. Perhaps this was because the regime tended to think in five year plans, and there was a central directive to consider that specific time frame, or perhaps because 2010 has a nice ring to it. 88. Chan, Steve. “Prognosticating about Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Implications from Strategic Selection.” World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 1 (Summer 2005), p. 22. 89. Xinhua news agency, 19 May 1995. FBIS-CHI-95-098 on 22 May 1995. 90. He Chong, “Beijing Media Urge To ‘Keep Taiwan by Force.’” Zhongguo Tongxun She (Hong Kong.) July 19, 1995. As published in: FBIS-CHI-95-139 on 1995-07-20. 91. Kissinger, Henry. On China. Penguin Press, 2011, p. 475. 92. This evokes another well-known example of Chinese rhetoric regarding long-term thinking, though likely an apocryphal one. In the early 1970s, the PRC’s premier Zhou Enlai was asked what he thought about the French Revolution. He answered “It’s too early to say.’ Despite the evocative nature of this comment, recent testimony by people present at that exchange asserted that Zhou was in fact referring to the 1968 student protests in France, and not 1789. The fact that this comment was taken otherwise, and that it is an often repeated example of Chinese far thinking, reflects occidental biases more than anything. McGregor, Richard. “Zhou’s cryptic caution lost in translation.” Financial Times online, June 10, 2011. At: http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/74916db6-938d-11e0-922e-00144feab49a.html#axzz2sbIBdA51 93. “China Security Goals Do Not Pose a Threat to World, Analyst Says.” China Daily (Renmin Ribao, Beijing). March 4, 1996. As published in: Daily Report. China, FBIS-CHI-96044 on March 5, 1996 94. Jiang Zemin, “Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland.” January 30, 1995, at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24905.htm 95. “Li Peng Responds To Proposal.” Xinhua News Agency (Beijing). February 04, 1995. As published in: FBIS-CHI-95-024 on February 6, 1995. 96. Qian Qichen, “Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace.” Qiushi , June 16, 1995. As published in: FBIS-CHI-95-129 on July 6, 1995. 97. Qian Qichen, quoted in Ni Siyi, “Qian Qichen’s Remarks on Exercises Near Taiwan.” Xinhua News Agency, March 8, 1996. Published in: FBIS-CHI-96-047 on 08 March 8, 1996. 98. For example, “China Security Goals Do Not Pose a Threat to World, Analyst Says.” China Daily (Renmin Ribao, Beijing). March 04, 1996. As published in: China, FBIS-CHI-96044 on 1996-03-05. 99. “Chi Haotian Comments on Taiwan Issue in NPC Speech.” In Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong). March 9, 1996. As published in: FBIS-CHI-96-048 on March 11, 1996. 100. Sam Nunn, Senator from Georgia, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “The Relationship Between the United States and China.” Congressional Record: February 23, 1996 (Senate), p. S1285. 101. “China: Where Do We Go From Here?” Remarks of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein to World Affairs Council of Los Angeles, April 11, 1996, entered in the Congressional Record: April 22, 1996 (Senate), pp. S3798-S3801. 102. Clinton, William J. “Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council.” May 20, 1996. Public Papers of the Presidents, vol. 1, p. 776. 103. Sam Nunn, Senator from Georgia, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “The Relationship Between the United States and China.” Congressional Record: February 23, 1996 (Senate), p. S1286. 104. For a pessimistic take on a democratic but still aggressive China, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 4. 105. “Li Teng-hui at the KMT’s spring festival party in Taipei, Jan 28, 1995.” China Broadcasting Corporation News Network, Taipei. 106. “Chiao Discusses Mainland’s ‘One China’ Policy,” Lien-Ho Pao (Taipei). July 19, 1995. As published in: Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-95-141 on 1995-07-24. 107. Foreign Minister Chien Fu. “Minister Discusses Future Cross-Strait Ties” Chung-Yang Jih-Pao (Taipei). Jan 09, 1995.

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108. Lord, Winston. Private interview with the author. December 19, 2013. 109. Lu Chao-lung, “General Comments on U.S., Cross-Strait Situation,” Chung-Kuo ShihPao (Taipei) – March 12, 1996. As published in: FBIS-CHI-96-049 on March 12, 1996. 110. Act 1, scene 7. 111. Jiang Zemin, “Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and Good-Neighborly Relations and Endeavoring Towards a Better Tomorrow for All.” Speech at Islamabad, Pakistan, December 2, 1996. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24909.htm 112. Qian Qichen, “Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace.” Qiushi , June 16, 1995. As published in: FBIS-CHI-95-129 on July 6, 1995. 113. Li Peng, “Building a New Asia-Europe Partnership Oriented Towards the 21st Century.” Speech presented at the ASEM Meeting. Bangkok, Thailand, March, 1, 1996. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24946.htm. 114. Li Peng, “Building a New Asia-Europe Partnership Oriented Towards the 21st Century,” speech presented at the ASEM Meeting, March, 1, 1996. 115. Jiang Zemin, “Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and Good-Neighborly Relations and Endeavoring Towards a Better Tomorrow for All.” Speech at Islamabad, Pakistan, December 2, 1996. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24909.htm 116. Clinton, Bill. Interview With Tom Brokaw of MSNBC’s “InterNight.” July 15, 1996. Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton – 1996, Volume 2, page 1125. 117. Though a Realist would not share that perspective, and in fact many of the same thoughts could be found in the international community before the onset of the first World War. 118. Donne, John. Meditation XVII, 1624. 119. Lee Teng-hui, news conference, April 27, 1995. CAN news service, (Taipei). Published in FBIS-CHI-95-082 on April 28, 1995 120. Lee Teng-hui, “Always in My Heart.” Olin lecture at Cornell University, June 9, 1995. Entered in the Senate record by Tom Daschle of South Dakota and in the House by Maurice Hinchey of New York. 121. The percentage of people identifying themselves as “both’ has remained steady in the mid 40s. Sobel, Richard, William-Arthur Haynes, Yu Zheng. “Taiwan Public Opinion Trends, 1992–2008: Exploring Attitudes on Cross-Strait Issues.” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 74, no. 4, Winter 2010, p. 786. 122. “PRC: Spokesman Clarifies Jiang Remark on PRC-Taiwan Ties.” FBIS-CHI-96-074, April 16, 1996, 123. Clinton, William J. “Remarks at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.” December 23, 1996 Public Papers of the Presidents – 1996, volume 2, Page 2233. 124. Whether it was successful is another question, of course, and involves delving into the world of counterfactuals. Would the PRC have taken more aggressive military action if the US had not been present? As we will discuss later, the military resources of the island, though a mere fraction of the mainland’s, seemed to have been adequate, combined with its advantages of geographic defense, to hold out against a conventional invasion. Of course, while the mainland might not have been able to invade and occupy Taiwan, it certainly had the resources to cripple or destroy it with minimal cost to itself, by use of the missiles that were being demonstrated in the crisis—hardly a signal of much subtlety. 125. This can occur by means of self-reformation of the regime to better conform to institutions that are seen as beneficial to the state’s interest, such as economic institutions. It can also be driven by the people of the state, increasingly exposed to progressive values and possessing socioeconomic status that allows them to influence state policy. 126. Ed Royce, representative of California, statement on “Regarding a Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan.” Markup before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. First Session on 104 H. Con. Res. 53, Apr. 5, 1995, p. 8. 127. Lamar Smith, representative of Texas, statement on “Regarding a Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan.” Markup before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. First Session on 104 H. Con. Res. 53, Apr. 5, 1995, pp. 5–6.

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128. For more details on the “shadow of the future” on decision-making, see Axelrod’s The Future of Cooperation. 129. While it may be unsurprising that the government bureaucracies like the Department of State would favor a longer term approach without immediate conflict, it is interesting to note that members of congress, who often have much more career longevity than the president, would be more likely to favor the needs of the short term. Intuitively and in broad generalizations, the conventional wisdom is that policy makers with longer-term careers would be more likely to take a longer term view in their decisions. This requires further scrutiny, and will be given some attention in the conclusion. 130. This could mean accommodation to the PRC at any cost, or it might mean favoring an immediate military response with little consideration for later repercussions. 131. Lord, Winston. Private interview with the author. December 19, 2013. 132. “Sustained increases in defence [sic] spending and new high-tech weaponry now give Beijing leaders ‘an increasing number of credible options to intimidate or actually attack Taiwan’ in the event that Taipei crosses the red lines . . . since the 1996 stand-off between two American carrier battle groups and the Chinese navy, the PLA top brass has pressed for an ever-larger budget to acquire a multi-faceted capacity to deter, deny or complicate the ability of the United States and its allies to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. In the four years after 1996, China more than doubled its military spending, and according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2000 it became the world’s biggest importer of weapons.” Chu Yun-han, “Power Transition and the Making of Beijing’s Policy Toward Taiwan.” The China Quarterly no. 176, December 2003, p. 976.

Chapter Four

The Future, Futures, Deals and Dividends China’s Entry in the World Trade Organization

Five years after the Taiwan Missile Crisis grabbed the world’s attention as an international incident with the potential for both immediate and far-reaching consequences, a less dramatic moment marked another significant milestone in US-China relations. The PRC’s official entry into the World Trade Organization took place in the shadow of the September 11 attacks. Although it was the culmination of years of debate, planning and negotiation, all in the light of consequences for the future for Beijing and for the world, the actual moment garnered little attention as the United States was entangled in the process of responding to a more immediate situation. In the years that followed, the echoes of September 11 continue to reverberate, but the significance of China’s membership in the WTO in the near and distant future has yet to be fully incorporated in our consideration of global events. 1 This chapter will look at the ways that the process and decision of China’s accession into the WTO were viewed through different time horizons by the major state actors involved. Using five horizons (immediate, short, intermediate, long, and chiliastic) expressed in the ideas and policy statements of the US, PRC, and ROC, we will observe a wide range of hopes and fears regarding the implications of a free trade agreement. These diverse perspectives will illustrate the tremendous impact that the choice of time horizon can have in considering the risks and benefits of one decision, one moment, and how they might play out over the years and in the scope of history. A chart summarizing the various positive and negative views of the accession is

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included at the end of the chapter to concretely demonstrate how time horizons can, and must, have a significant impact on decision-making. A DELICATE NEGOTIATION, A LONG ROAD China’s entry into the trade organization was years in the making. The newly formed People’s Republic, more interested in economic revolution than trade with imperialist powers, withdrew from the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade in 1949, just two years after Republican China had joined. The first few decades of the PRC were marked by economic solipsism and minimal international trade. Even when the PRC was given Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations, solid economic relations were not its priority, though “China almost certainly could have gotten in [to the GATT at that point] very quickly.” 2 The People’s Republic under the leadership of Mao Zedong did not have much interest in global capitalism—he was more concerned with the transformation of his motherland into a revolutionary paradise. The Cultural Revolution did not have much interest in the production of goods for export; self-sufficiency was a much higher priority. It was only with the beginnings of privatization and individual incentives pioneered by Deng Xiaoping that international trade could even be seriously considered. In July of 1986, when the PRC expressed a formal request to rejoin the GATT under the auspices of the membership lapsed from 1949, 3 much of the hesitancy from the international community came from uncertainty about where Beijing’s changes would take it. Did the future hold a continuation of personal incentive, opening of markets and politics, or a volatile and unpredictable loose cannon on the world stage? Those questions would continue to haunt the deliberations regarding China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. The World Trade Organization is the direct successor and natural outgrowth of the GATT, though the requirements for entry, and the binding nature of the trade commitments, set it apart. The PRC was not one of the founding nations, nor was it in on early discussions helping to shape a trade regime designed to lower barriers, offer a means of arbitrating trade disputes, and transform nations’ domestic obstacles to free and efficient trade. When those discussions were occurring, its economy was still for the most part centrally planned, and it was deeply distrustful of interference from the international community. By the time the WTO was getting ready to operate, Beijing was beginning to think that being part of the trade organization would be of significant value, and its political philosophy and economic operation were considerably closer to the expectations of the organization. WTO membership could also help serve as a stabilizing influence in the event of fiscal crises, and the 1997 crisis would become an important factor

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motivating the PRC’s interesting in becoming part of international economic cooperative institutions. 4 The first stirrings of interest in joining the World Trade Organization began in the PRC in the early 1990s—even before the WTO officially opened for business. There were a number of reasons motivating this desire. “One reason China originally pushed to join in the early 1990s was so that it would count as a founding member of the WTO, which opened its doors at the beginning of 1995. Besides providing a chance to shape a new trade round, WTO membership would shield China from unilateral trade sanctions.” 5 Another was the interest in revising its image in the international community. The Tiananmen massacre was still a recent memory in the rest of the world, and concerns about its heavy-handed repression and inflexibility were subjects of concern for states in their relations with the PRC. Joining an organization dedicated to international trade and cooperation could serve to show other countries that Beijing is eager to be a part of the community of nations, an enthusiastic partner for building a stronger field of connections. Beyond this eagerness to be a good member, it would also serve to show China’s strength. Since WTO membership required a certain level of development and modernization, joining would also show that China was beginning to return to its overdue great power status. Another reason the PRC was interested in being part of the WTO was to free itself from a rather unpleasant annual ordeal and public embarrassment. Earlier economic-political interactions between the US and the PRC often revolved around the question of Most Favored Nation status (later called Normal Trade Relations)—the absence of unusual, often punitive, barriers to trade. Renewal was debated yearly in Congress, and granting it to the PRC was often a tool of political leverage, for both domestic and international consumption. Members of Congress would use the debates as an opportunity to express their concerns about the Chinese government, particularly in the matters of human rights, its Taiwan and Tibet policies, sometimes arms sales to countries unfriendly to the US. Clearly decision-makers in the PRC would be eager to remove this yearly thorn in their collective sides. Not only were economic concessions solicited by US policy-makers, but the MFN debate was often used as an opportunity for congressmen and senators to point out Beijing’s poor human rights record with respect to political dissidents, and to expand the discussion of topics the PRC government would be eager to avoid, such as its Tibet policy. This was embarrassing for Beijing in a number of ways. Having to bear the unending moralizing criticism of a foreign power was one thing; being dependent on that power’s good graces to facilitate the PRC’s growth and eventual strengthening was another. The MFN approval process was costly to the PRC in terms of prestige, of “face,” 6 making the PRC look weak and subservient. The MFN debate was certainly politicized; nearly every state, including Iran

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and Iraq, was in the Normal Trade Relations column. To give a sense of the extent to which Normal Trade Relations are granted by the United States, in 2000, the year Congress decided to grant the NTR to China, the only countries not to have NTR were Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Serbia, Montenegro, and Vietnam. We can see the functioning of a “non-rational” decision-making process at work here. The criteria for MFN status are not equally applied standards, but the result of politics at the domestic level. One of the basic principles of WTO membership is that relationships between member states cannot include a yearly process to approve normal trade relations. Aware of the United States’ overall desire for the PRC’s entry into the trade organization (more on that below), it took advantage of the membership and approval process to do away with this political ordeal: While China has indicated that, for political reasons, a congressional vote on PNTR [Permanent Normal Trade Relations] is a prerequisite for China’s accession to the WTO, this need not be the case legally. Congress could decide not to extend PNTR and forgo . . . the trade-liberalizing benefits and marketaccess concessions that China will be granting to other countries . . . China needs only two-thirds of the WTO members to support its entry. 7

Such a deal, with China gaining the benefits of membership and the United States not taking advantage of China’s concessions did not appeal to US policy makers, and the Permanent Normal Trade Relations bill was signed into law in October 2000—just a year before China was to enter the organization. The unpleasantness of the Most Favored Nation debates was not the only reason China wished to enter the WTO. Joining international organizations of all kinds became a priority for the PRC in the 1990s for a number of reasons. In addition to making the PRC more visibly cooperative in a way that would help efface the memory of Tiananmen in the minds of the international community, the Beijing leadership was eager to block Taiwan’s ability to join them and thereby get some recognition towards being seen as an independent state. With the PRC as a member already, preventing ROC membership would be considerably easier. Finally, trade was becoming a more important part of the mainland’s relations with the rest of the world. This would not just be a means of applying leverage on other states, but in simplest terms a source of profit, and therefore power in its international relations. This connection between security and economics was discussed in the preceding chapter, but it is important to keep it in mind when considering how states act in the interest of increasing their power.

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CHINA AND THE WTO: TIME HORIZONS CONVERGING Reflecting those different perspectives regarding time horizons and economic development, the PRC has had a variety of motivations for joining the trade organization. Immediate status and political advantage (both foreign and domestic), short term economic reform, intermediate term stability, long term growth and prosperity are all important incentives, though by no means the only ones. The United States’ take on the potential benefits was similar, though its concerns about the drawbacks of the PRC’s membership were quite different. WTO ENTRY IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM As discussed above, the PRC’s entry into the WTO had been the result of years of negotiations and lobbying. The extensive debate in the US, the international community, and in Chinese domestic quarters touched on a variety of topics and spanned a variety of time horizons. Unlike the Taiwan missile situation of the mid 1990s, there was no crisis aspect to the debate or the formal entry itself. For some actors heavily invested in the outcome of the entry dialogues, the stakes were enormously high, and the WTO process might have taken on some aspects of a crisis. However, there were none of the hallmarks of an actual crisis—no impending danger, no need for immediate action, and the process was certainly not an unanticipated situation. Since China’s WTO entry was not a crisis, the immediate term decisions did not revolve around rapidly planned reflexive responses, or actions taken out of anger or with limited information. However, there were circumstances that had an impact in an immediate time frame. While the predominant features of the WTO entry process are economic in nature, many aspects of the immediate time horizon are not. Because the accession process is the result of a negotiation between representative groups from each state, the dynamics of this case are significantly different from the Missile Crisis. Instead of the need for rapid policy responses that are conducive to individual or small group thinking, the agreements here can be the result of deliberate, often painstaking negotiations resulting from the input of many interested parties. This would not just include the contributions of the members of the negotiating teams representing each state, but also domestic constituents working to have their interests represented in the negotiations, the classic “two-level game” scenario. 8 Joining the World Trade Organization does not require an entry fee or provide a signing bonus. The exact moment of signing the membership documents and its accompanying ceremony are less measurably financial and more subjective in their dimension. New trade policies are put into place, but

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their time frame is usually over several years to allow a smooth implementation. One of the most clear-cut aspects of the immediate horizon of WTO membership is the status it confers, and the advantages bestowed on the specific interests who stand the most to gain from the details of the agreement. 9 This does not just include the standing in the international community of the PRC as a nation, now able to stand among the other world powers as an equal. The individual politicians involved in the ceremony, though the representatives of larger political bodies, earned status from being part of the document signing and photo opportunities. Perhaps more important than that glory (at least to the majority of the relevant leadership) are the more tangible benefits that are conferred immediately on membership. Some of them have to do with the removal of policies undesirable to the state as a whole, others are of use on a domestic level. The instantaneous moment of membership locks in a commitment to adhere to a variety of trade policies with implications for the future. Those binding aspects of membership commit the state to follow a certain course of action in its internal development. For the decision-makers who wanted movement in that direction, being able to point to the WTO obligations is a useful way to subdue domestic opposition. The US and the Immediate Term Horizon The reality of the September 11 attacks dramatically changed the way that the PRC was viewed in the United States. Until that point, the conservative press had been putting the PRC in the role of America’s next global rival— not as glaringly threatening as the Soviet Union in terms of ideology or direct military capacity, but as a rising power. Viewed through the lens of a distant time horizon, the PRC was in fact more of a threat. The USSR fell through its own internal vulnerabilities—the inefficiencies of centralized planning, imperial overextension, clunky, heavy-handed methods of ideological control. The People’s Republic of China had scrutinized the lessons of the Soviet Union’s failure in order to avoid the chaos that can come with a transition to a freer market. For those who had true faith in the power of liberal capitalism to triumph over the internal contradictions of totalitarian socialism, America’s triumph over the Soviets was inevitable. 10 To some the PRC would seem a more insidious opponent—careful, subtle, waxing in power and full of potential for future growth. Allowing it to join the World Trade Organization would remove some of the few obstacles to that inexorable process. Membership in the WTO would completely remove the possibility of using MFN/PNTR status as leverage against any Chinese misdeeds. The transformations to China’s economy would make it more efficient (and therefore more of a threat), preventing other nations from protecting themselves against an onslaught of cheap Chinese goods—WTO

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membership would increase China’s opportunities to enhance its strength at America’s expense. 11 September 11 radically changed the context of how the PRC was viewed. Instead of being the next rival great power in global politics, Beijing could be seen as a cooperative participant in the international economic order, interested in playing by its rules (if more aggressively than the United States.) The PRC even had its own Islamic fundamentalist problem—Uyghur separatists in the western provinces—and had suffered some terrorist attacks of its own. 12 In the years leading up to September 2001, the majority of articles in the conservative press on international threats were about rising China. That looming threat faded in the background for years afterward, and the moment of China’s entry into the WTO received little fanfare in the midst of a tangible international crisis from another quarter. If anything, China’s entry into the trade organization would take on a new meaning to those fearful of threats to American hegemony. The PRC’s act of signing the documents showed that it was invested in preserving the international system that al Qaeda seemed eager to disrupt. The risks to the United States posed by the PRC remained significant, but those were longer term issues—nothing that could not wait as America dealt with its current crisis. America’s instantaneous time horizon regarding Beijing was obstructed by the immediate crisis of Islamic fundamentalism—it would be extraordinarily difficult to consider the moment of China’s WTO entry without distraction. To extend the horizon metaphor, the pressing demands of that present moment loomed too large to allow intense scrutiny of other immediate details, but the further future could still be considered. It was as though decision-makers were standing in a dark thicket, but if they were so inclined, they could look beyond the brambles to the clearer hills beyond. However, that distant view would not help in navigating the tangled underbrush to pass through it. There was another instantaneous moment of decision-making in US policy pertaining to the implications of trade with China, one that involved the confluence of many time horizons, and was not obscured by the immediacy of the September 11 attacks. The decision to grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR, also known as Most Favored Nation status until the year before) was a first step to the US’ approval of China’s WTO entry. When the Senate voted to approve PNTR in September of 2000, the permanent status would not come in to effect until the PRC joined the WTO. While it was not identical to WTO membership, many of the issues of granting PNTR evoked the same concerns and discussions. The debates surrounding the granting of the permanent status invoke a variety of time horizons in their arguments, and will be discussed below. With respect to immediate time horizons, the Permanent Normal Trade Relations issue had two primary features. One, discussed above, is that grant-

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ing the permanent status would remove a potential tool to impact Chinese behavior in the form of the renewal process. Of course this had implications that would extend to later horizons, but granting the status, and removing that leverage, would be instantaneous. The other would be the consideration of what might happen if trade relations were hindered or suspended by a failure to renew NTR. Much of the discussion regarding trade relations between the US and the PRC revolved around deficit issues, foreign investment in China, and the politics of opening to the world. Each of these is of great importance—and each of them depends on looking ahead some distance into the future. The immediate time horizon would include one important aspect for American politics: continuing normal trade relations would not cause any radical immediate changes, but failing to renew them would. This would cause a variety of disruptions to the economic order. Investments are by definition over a period of time—resources are put in, and there is a return over time. 13 Stability in the economic environment is important for making investment decisions, and failing to renew NTR would certainly disrupt that stability. One advocate for PNTR even observes that the annual process of renewal causes uncertainty and therefore disruption in the immediate horizon: Much of the U.S. business community is very anxious to have greater certainty in their business dealings with China. The annual MFN renewal is both time consuming for business and creates significant commercial uncertainty as to the nature of the relationship that will exist month to month. From a strictly commercial perspective, the establishment of permanent MFN status obviously makes the lives of U.S. companies who export or invest in China much easier. 14

Another immediate horizon consideration of the trade relations status does not pertain to the inputs of production, but the products. Inexpensive goods from abroad can hurt a nation’s domestic industries, but they are beneficial in that they are less expensive. An increase in tariffs would add to the expense of everyday items, raising the cost of living and especially hurting the poor: Trade with China . . . enhances the affordability of clothing and many household items, thereby making a substantial contribution to the standard of living of all Americans, particularly those in lower income categories. Failure to renew NTR would exact the highest toll on low-income families, resulting in an increased tax burden of about 1 to 2 percent of their annual income, almost $300 a year. 15

Another immediate outcome of breaking off the normal trade relations would be to offend and anger the Beijing leadership (and the population), strength-

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ening anti-American sentiment in the PRC. As President Clinton put in one of his many speeches advocating for the permanent NTR, Because the economic case for PNTR is so strong, the Chinese will see a rejection as a strategic decision by the United States to turn from cooperation to confrontation, to deal with China as an adversary. That would undercut the reform-minded leaders who signed this agreement with us and strengthen the hand of hardliners who believe cooperating with the United States is a mistake. 16

This is an effective rhetorical tactic—tacitly admitting that there are significant concerns with the mainland regime, but that not working with their state would strengthen those negative elements. In the immediate horizon, approving PNTR cuts off potential hostility, and in the longer term will help strengthen the positive forces of reform. PRC and the Immediate Term Horizon Despite the lack of international attention, the moment of WTO entry was extremely significant for the PRC. The immediate (and short term) economic costs would be high, but the political benefits would be significant. Being a member of the World Trade Organization is something commensurate with being a modern, progressive state; it is a stepping stone to becoming a great power. For the PRC statesmen involved in the entry negotiations and in the membership process itself, there was substantial status that comes with being a part of China’s “maturity” on the world stage. WTO membership made Beijing immune from the humiliating threat of punitive trade sanctions to which the state had been vulnerable. The United States Senate’s approval of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations the year before protected the PRC from continued criticism by American congressmen. While US policy makers would doubtless find a platform from which to critique the mainland regime, the annual congressional discussion regarding MFN was a structured and public forum in which China-bashing flourished. The PRC would be happy to see that done away with as China’s trade status became bindingly permanent. Removal of the MFN debate embarrassment in the US Congress was a strong incentive for China to seek WTO membership, and the process of arranging bilateral agreements with many of the WTO’s most influential members meant that the PRC was able to build diplomatic relations with a variety of partners around the world. The goodwill it generated in its various trade concessions might not translate to immediate fiscal gain, but it would provide a level of guanxi 17 in some of its most significant diplomatic relationships, which can be useful in later economic issues—or political ones. 18

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ROC and the Immediate Term Horizon While Taipei’s economic and political system was far more in line with the expectations and requirements of WTO entry, mainland China lobbied to block the island’s entry until it could be admitted first. Taiwan, as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” also known as “Chinese Taipei,” was admitted in October of 2001, within a month of the PRC’s membership. To the mainland the ideal outcome would be to keep the ROC from joining altogether, in line with its general policy of preventing Taiwan from joining any international organizations and thereby increasing its standing in the international community and recognition as independent in any tangible way. The rather unwieldy name of the entity under which Taiwan will participate suggests some of the complex maneuvering required to mollify the mainland in its admission and also spread the opportunities of the organization to as many qualified members as possible, in the spirit of its mission. Certainly the ROC leadership would have preferred a less cumbersome (and blatantly subordinate) designation like “Taiwan,” “Republic of China,” “Taiwanese China,” a name that might suggest the possibility of a distinct and independent Taiwanese regime, or even a state. Despite the fact that the ROC’s entry was dependent on the PRC’s (and therefore emphasized its subsidiary position), there are many positive aspects of WTO entry for Taipei—including the PRC’s admission, even beyond the fact that it was a prerequisite to ROC membership. These benefits might be more likely to adhere to the shorter time horizons, but Taiwan’s circumstances at the end of the twentieth century did not often provide its decisionmakers with the luxury of being able to forsake the immediate situation in favor of long term planning. One of the most obvious benefits of WTO admission, commensurate with the nature of the trade organization, is economic. The Republic of China’s economy, once dubbed an “Asian Dragon” due to its strength and rate of growth, suffered considerably more than the PRC’s during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. The ROC rate of GDP growth in the 1990s was less dramatic than the PRC’s—its economy, while modernizing and shifting to high-tech manufacturing, did not have the same radical transformation that Beijing’s market reforms brought in the same time period. After showing dramatic (but erratic) growth in the 1960s and 1970s 19 that comes with its economic shift, the ROC saw high rates of growth in the early 1990s, but a flattening of those numbers as the decade wore on, hovering at 5% or lower after the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis. By the time WTO entry was being cemented for both the ROC and the PRC, there was even a dip into negative growth in the late half of 2000. 20 The ROC economy was in an uneven process of recovery by 2001, but the PRC’s resilience, continuing rate of growth and expansion into economic

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sectors formerly dominated by the eastern side of the Taiwan Strait served to dim Taipei’s star as a leading economy of East Asia. WTO entry would mean a shot in the arm to its prospects for trade, and immediate recognition of its status as a player on the world economic stage. If the reality of the situation dictated that a potential competitor in the form of the PRC would have to be admitted in order for Taipei to gain access to the economic advantages of WTO membership, it was a small price to pay—in the immediate present and the short term. Membership in international organizations (and therefore status as a separate political entity) has been a priority of the ROC, but the PRC’s program of lobbying to block its entry to such organizations had been successful overall. Being a “Separate Customs Territory” was a far cry from recognition as a sovereign state, but membership in the WTO as a distinct entity would allow Taiwan to negotiate with other states—even the PRC—as a peer (if not an equal). As the Democratic People’s Party said in their 1999 White Paper, Upon the completion of the US-China talks regarding China’s entry into the WTO, Taiwan’s chance for accession will be realized soon. This would be the largest international organization of which Taiwan is a member. Although the WTO is an economic entity, almost all of its members are important members of the UN. Thus, the WTO would be an important venue for Taiwan’s global participation. 21

This points to the other immediate implication of the WTO admission of Taiwan and the PRC. Beyond the purely economic framework is a structure for political association. In its provisions for negotiation and mediation between members, the WTO creates a political space in which Taiwan and the mainland can interact beyond the context of an “internal domestic” conversation, as the PRC would ideally like to frame it. This potential for interaction would not come into play in the immediate term, and its implications for mainland-Taiwan relations would have to be considered in the longer time horizons. However, the potential for those future prospects would certainly color the Taiwanese instantaneous understanding of its WTO membership. In studying the immediate and short-term time horizons that would be used by Taiwanese decision-makers, it is important to consider Taiwan’s strategic position and how that might affect their view of the future. Due to its relationship with the mainland, Taiwan is often in the position of having to respond to crisis-like situations in the immediate horizon. The Missile Crisis was a good example, but this also includes lower-level conflicts in which the island regime finds itself scrambling to quickly respond to the fallout from mainland political posturing. Taiwan’s Democratic People’s Party pointed out this short-sighted nature of reactive politics in critiquing their more established KMT rivals. In 1999, as the opposition party, the DPP

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published their “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century,” in which they observe: The diplomatic hardships of Taiwan have in part resulted from the following mistakes: 1. The direction of Taiwan’s foreign policy has been determined by cross-Strait interaction. Thus the implementation of our diplomacy has often fallen unwittingly into a reactive pattern, merely responding to Chinese actions. This is a zero-sum game, or a meaningless competition over the number of formal diplomatic partners. 2. The process of making Taiwan’s foreign policy has been usually dominated by passive reaction to international forces; it has lacked a proactive ability to identify and analyze future international trends. 3. Taiwan’s foreign policy has overemphasized short-term results, while neglecting the importance of long-term management. 22 Of course, it is always easy to criticize the party in power by pointing out how short-sighted it is, but when the DPP gained power in 2000, their policy of working to join international organizations and towards recognition as a distinct political entity, while not a radical shift from the KMT, certainly seemed to be aimed at a distance in the future. WTO MEMBERSHIP IN THE SHORT TERM Once we pass the instantaneous moment of WTO admission and look to the short term horizon, we can begin to see how the economic and domestic political aspects play an important role. To run the risk of overgeneralization, it seems that the US got the better deal economically, while the PRC stood to gain more politically in the short term. It is difficult to separate the short and intermediate time frames in this case—some details of China’s WTO entry took place immediately, while others had a timetable taking place over several years. In order to get approval from the current members, new entrants to the WTO make a series of bilateral agreements with each major nation (or grouping, such as the European Union). We can look at the specifics of the US-PRC bilateral agreement to understand the economic details, though there are political aspects that transcend the clauses on tariffs and foreign investment. The dynamics of the shorter temporal horizons can be better understood by using some of the insights pertaining to time from Psychology and Political Science. Temporal Discounting Theory would assert that the shorter-term gains would be valued more highly than later rewards. We can see this operating in both the US and the PRC sides, though in different issue areas.

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As with the Strait crisis, the policy decisions coming from Washington and Beijing are produced by the use of time horizons applied to specific areas of international relations. The short-term benefits, highly valued under temporal discounting, might outweigh the potential liabilities in other issue areas in the decision-makers’ longer horizons. PRC—Short Term Horizon Perhaps the most striking aspect of the US-PRC bilateral agreement is how many economic concessions Beijing made in order to get US approval. This is not too surprising when considered as a requirement to join a trade regime designed to lower barriers to trade—the PRC was considerably more protectionist than the US in its general trade policies. Political stability through the protection of agricultural labor and inefficient government industries was more important than the maximization of profit. The PRC leadership was acutely aware of the risk posed by the millions who earn their living in roles that a freer market would make redundant or obsolete. Such a group of disaffected people, should they organize in protest against the state that failed to protect their well-being, could be a real threat to PRC stability. That concern was a driving force for making many of the features gradual, taking place over years rather than immediately, giving the country more time to adjust and find alternatives for those who would lose their livelihood in the midst of the reforms. Quite clearly, China’s costs [of joining the WTO] will be much greater than those of the United States. Despite 20 years of reform, China still has far to go to redress the problems caused by decades of following inefficient socialist policies. It should also be noted that the social instability in China caused by unemployment poses risks to the regime, one still dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. It is widely cited, and acknowledged by Chinese government officials, that some 35 percent of China’s 140 million workers in state and collective enterprises are superfluous and that urban areas will need to absorb some 150 million agricultural workers who will be seeking work in urban areas. Undoubtedly, this will create potential for social, perhaps even political, instability. 23

Another facet of Chinese society that was impacted by WTO entry in the short term concerned foreign investment and ownership. Nativist elements were deeply concerned with foreign corporations infiltrating the economy though competition with domestic industry and the ownership of firms in the PRC. Many of the details of the agreement still put a cap at foreign ownership at fifty percent of most industries, though that level is often an increase over pre-WTO limits.

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It would appear that the cost-benefit balance for the PRC’s WTO entry in the short horizon of economic prospects is on the negative side, making sacrifices that will hopefully yield longer-term payoffs. So with these losses and ensuing risks to PRC stability, are there any economic benefits in the short run? One of the most important figures to the Beijing leadership, and to the world financial community, when looking at the PRC, is its rate of economic growth. This figure, while not an infallible measure of a nation’s economic strength or resilience—or even its future prospects—is certainly a good preliminary measure, and a reliable statistic in gauging the level of interest for foreign investment. It can also be a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that investors would be more likely to put their money in a successfully growing economy, and that investment leads to more growth. It can be argued that the eagerness to join the trade organization is based on maintaining this growth: The essential reason that China wanted to become a WTO member lies in the hard reality of its economic situation . . . In 1990, 29.8 percent of China’s gross domestic product was dependent on trade; in 2000, this trade dependence was 43.9 percent. Half of China’s economic growth depends on trade, foreign corporations contribute 50 percent to exports, and close to 18 percent of state tax revenue is from foreign corporations . . . In short, China’s economic growth depends greatly on foreign capital, specifically on FDI [foreign direct investment]. So the Chinese government pushed for WTO membership in order to accelerate the marketization of China’s economy through “forceful” opening. 24

Continuing that argument regarding the “forceful” aspect of the reforms that must be made, some scholars argue that there are domestic political reasons rather than international economic ones: Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongyi recognize that WTO membership will lock in reforms and guard against backsliding in a range of areas from tariff levels to competition policy to government procurement. The requirements of WTO membership will also accelerate reforms by forcing China to do more than it might otherwise do. It will be harder for domestic opponents to fight changes that are required to bring the country into compliance with WTO regulations. 25

Echoing this idea, though putting it in a more politically sensitive manner, Liu Guangxi, executive vice-director of the China’s WTO Research Institute, said that “in the short term, WTO membership is expected to deepen China’s reforms by further opening the domestic market.” 26 Essentially the Chinese leadership willingly put itself into a two-level game, locking out a variety of retrograde domestic policy options by obligating the nation to prior commitments and international authorities. This might

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not be received in a completely positive manner by everyone involved. “Indeed, the very act of reforming its domestic system using external sources— an unusual phenomenon in China’s history—may be considered an encroachment on China’s spirit and Chinese values.” 27 However much some Chinese might be invested in the status quo and preserving their own privileges and perquisites, it is easier for a leadership interested in change to point to these external sources and blame them for the necessity of reforms. In essence, the WTO and its requirements can serve as a “bad cop” that PRC officials can point to should the transition to a freer market prove difficult for some. And of course, those people—the ones most invested in a state-owned and controlled economy in the PRC—would be the ones who would be most persuaded by blaming foreigners for causing woes in China. The short-term rewards lie in the political arena rather than the economic realm. When it comes to the economic details, clearly China does not gain much in the short term, making many concessions in opening its borders to imports and foreign ownership. As will be discussed below in the US perspective on the short-term implications of the PRC’s WTO entry, the economic benefits are portrayed as a strongly favoring American interests. The political benefits, particularly to the reform-minded leader whose internal position is not entirely secure, would serve to trump the economic losses. This might not reflect a pure “rational” calculation on behalf of national interest, but rather the motivation of choices made under the demands of domestic political maneuvering. Such a conclusion would be near impossible to demonstrate concretely by looking at PRC policy-makers, much less Jiang himself, but this take on the motivations behind this process is widely shared, and is consistent with our cognitive and political theories. Looking through the lens of Construal Theory, the short-term specifics of the accession agreement are concretely detailed—there was a great deal of legislation from Beijing to work towards WTO compliance—while the more distant implications are often left to vague generalities and hopes for the future, as we will see below. United States—Short Term Horizon As mentioned above, the PRC gave more than it got in terms of economic concessions in the bilateral agreement. They offered a wide range of appealing opportunities to American industries, in both markets and investment. China is often seen as a land of over a billion potential customers, increasingly wealthy (though unevenly so) and eager to consume. With its potential for continued growth and societal transformation, China could become the ultimate market. There were many obstacles to taking full advantage of that customer base; the bilateral agreement addressed a number of them, and WTO membership would make the PRC subject to arbitration should it insti-

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gate others. For the companies primarily interested in selling their products, WTO entry would mean that Beijing would be lowering its trade barriers for a full range of products from automobiles to foodstuffs to insurance. For those firms interested in sending their capital overseas or moving production to China without losing operational control, the strict limits on foreign ownership would be eliminated. Many of the concessions Beijing made in order to get US support for WTO entry were of significant benefit to US companies in the short to intermediate term. One aspect of PRC reforms included the loosening of restrictions on foreign ownership of Chinese companies. Another included significant expansion of the ability of foreign companies to operate in the PRC (for example, the insurance industry, which had only been allowed to operate in Guangzhou and Shanghai, could now operate anywhere in the PRC). 28 Considering the fears of many American companies regarding Chinese competition, the advantageous policies of the bilateral agreement are a tempting feature, and the greater ability to be a part of Chinese industry might serve to reduce fears of a foreign power coming to dominate the economy. If foreigners can own half of those companies, those in a position to make such investments would see them as less of an alien threat. If they are not beating them, they certainly have the chance to join them. Beyond direct foreign investment (which often requires a time horizon that looks beyond the short term), many American companies were worried about the facts of US-China trade at the moment. One of the most glaring was the trade deficit. With the explosion of export production since Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms began to sweep China, and the trade barriers it had put in place to protect domestic agriculture and manufacturing, the USChina trade balance had been rapidly shifting toward Beijing, a strong talking point for critics of Clinton and pro-China politicians in Washington. “At the beginning of the 1990s the total volume of U.S. trade with mainland China was still only half of American trade with Taiwan. By the end of the decade U.S. China trade had quadrupled, and Chinese exports to the United States had increased sevenfold.” 29 Regardless of the long term implication, the short term trade imbalance would be helped by the details of the WTO entry agreement. President Clinton put it this way, in trying to build enthusiasm for approving permanent NTR (and then WTO membership) by praising the deal’s short-term benefits: Now, it’s important to recognize that whatever you think the long-term consequences are, the sort-term consequences are all running in our favor, because today we have a very large trade deficit with China, and they have very large tariffs and other barriers to our doing business with them. What this does is, they take down a lot of their barriers to trade and investment with America in return for membership in the World Trade Organization, which puts them in the global trading system and requires them to follow certain rules and gives

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us some way to appeal if they don’t follow those rules. But what they get is membership in the club. What they give us are membership dues. That’s the way you have to look at this. And the access, on purely economic terms, is, I think, quite impressive. 30

It is interesting to note that Clinton takes the time to observe that the long term implications of China’s WTO entry are less certain and therefore more debatable, but that the short-term implications are all to the benefit of the US, particularly with respect to economic advantage. This includes the trade balance as well as the mechanisms for redress that the WTO provides. The “membership dues” are immediate and short-term economic costs. As the president observed a few weeks earlier, there is nothing being given up economically (at least considering the shorter horizon.) “This vote by Congress is on an agreement that lowers no American trade barriers, lowers no American tariffs, grants no greater access to China to any part of the American economy—nothing, zip, zilch, nada, zero. [Laughter] On the other hand, Chinese tariffs will fall by more than half over 5 years in every sector, from telecommunications to automobiles, to agriculture.” 31 As to how that membership in “the club” will benefit the PRC, little is said. Clinton and other policy makers argue many longer-term political benefits to that membership, as we will see below, but when it comes to discussing the economic outcomes, they focus on the short term concrete details. By means of a Temporal Discounting model, it is clear that President Clinton is emphasizing the immediate and short-term gains, and valuing them more highly than longer-term liabilities. In the economic area, the US gets a number of concessions that will yield quick payoffs to American firms and in the overall trade balance. These gains are not persistent, and in fact the longer economic prospects do not look as promising—as we will discuss below; in order to maintain a positive outlook in longer horizons, US policymakers shift issue areas to international politics. Beyond the overall trade balance between the two nations, many individual financial interests were served by the specifics of the agreement. New markets and inexpensive manufacturing opportunities were opened up to American firms. Few mainstream analysts of US domestic policy would argue that private corporations control American foreign policy; however, few would argue that they have no impact, particularly in issues under the purview of Congress, such as budget approval and trade agreements. Individual members of Congress (primarily the Senate, when it comes to international agreements) might have a particular industry in their districts employing a significant number of people, or they might have a close relationship with a campaign donor in a particular field that would benefit from a particular trade policy. 32

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The lure of China as a market of over a billion customers is difficult to resist. Its rate of economic growth throughout the 1990s pointed to the potential for a wealthier, more diversified economy. It is very easy for a business enterprise to think of how their fortunes might change if they could get a percentage of China’s people to purchase just one of their products. In terms of foreign investment and the expansion of production facilities, the PRC’s labor costs and “flexible” environmental policies would be hard to resist. The PRC policy strategy that allowed domestic reforms to be locked in and difficult to undo is also of potential benefit to US interests as a whole. From an economic perspective, fewer possible domestic reform directions mean a more predictable PRC. Trends might be anticipated with greater accuracy, making for more effective marketing and investment. Politically, the risk of unrest at the level of the populace (inspired by unemployment and economic inequality) is offset by the greater stability (or at least more limited reform options) available to the upper echelons of PRC leadership. A Beijing leadership not needing to constantly consolidate their internal power might be in a better position to focus on other issues requiring attention—hopefully the ones that will make the PRC a more stable and effective partner in world affairs. This would help secure the reforms in the short term and help build on beneficial reforms in the more distant future. As then Secretary of State Albright reflected in her memoir: By entering the WTO, China committed to free itself from the “House that Mao Built,” including state-run enterprises, central planning institutes, massive agricultural communes, and parasitic bureaucracies. The result should lead to more technological innovation, more use of the internet, more frequent contact with foreigners, and more institutions and associations free from Communist Party control . . . The millions of Chinese who are now learning to think for themselves economically will almost certainly be more likely than their parents to think for themselves politically . . . Knowledge, once it begins to be disseminated freely, is hard to fence back in. 33

Politically, a Chinese state more enmeshed in the web of world trade will be less eager to disrupt it, either in terms of domestic unrest or in international affairs. Ideally, the more the PRC benefits from being part of the WTO, the less likely we would be to see an organized political effort from the upper echelons of its leadership to weaken partner states. The comparative advantages and eventual relative gains the PRC would derive from closer trade would not be seen in the short horizon, but the promise of them might serve to keep it more cooperative in the short term. In the context of a zero-sum analysis of the short-term horizon, the PRC’s WTO entry would not be seen by US policy makers strictly in the light of the bilateral relationship, but as part of the web of global economic relations. It was not just about the United States’ relationship with the PRC, but how the

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other nations of the world work with China as well. For many American politicians, China’s WTO entry is inevitable—even in a relatively short term. To attempt to block that process would yield nothing but comparative advantage to the other nations that make effective trade agreements with the entering PRC. It could be said that the quest for short-term benefits was driven by a longer-term fatalism. As President Clinton said in one of his speeches in support of Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China, “China will join the WTO regardless of what we decide to do. The decision before Congress is whether the United States will receive the same trade benefits from China as will our trade competitors.” 34 As Madeleine Albright put it, “unless we [extended the same trade status accorded to other nations], our competitors would gain easier access to China’s markets while we did not. Economically, this was a simple choice for the administration, but the approach had to be approved by Congress and politically it was a hot potato.” 35 The “hot potato” aspects of the political decision will be seen when we consider longer time horizons. ROC—Short Term Horizon The opening to trade and lowering of barriers between economies that the WTO represents is a double-edged sword for Taipei. Certainly WTO membership has many economic benefits (especially ones that would be fleshed out over time), and the ability to take advantage of the organization’s dispute settlement framework will make for more opportunities for the ROC to interact with other nations as an equal. The PRC had become one of the primary sources of investment in Taiwanese industry, and the membership of both the PRC and the ROC in the trade organization would help increase those ties, and make sure the incoming capital would remain stable. With its economy weakened from the Asian Financial Crisis and the island’s rate of growth reduced to a fraction of its former glory, anything to help open the barriers to trade and investment would be welcomed. But that boost to the economy would not be instantaneous, and as with the PRC, there would be some growing pains. DPP Chairman Lin Yi-hsiung, in December 1999 observes that this transition would be rocky in the short term, as many industries feel the strain of new competition, but a vital step for the longer horizon: There is no doubt that the lifting of current limitations on direct trade with China will have consequences, whether positive or negative, on Taiwan’s domestic economy. From a purely economic standpoint, obviously there will be a competition for capital, as more Taiwanese investors shift their operations and capital into China. Then there will be pressure on Taiwan’s traditional manufacturing and agricultural sectors, as low-cost Chinese products dominate a comparative advantage. However, these economic consequences are not nec-

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The risk of lowering trade barriers could also become a political liability as the ROC could easily become overly dependent on its most logical trading partner, the PRC. Ever since the beginnings of economic reform and growth on the mainland, some members of the leadership in Taipei were concerned that increasing ties could eventually threaten prospects for independence— not just in the sense of political sovereignty, but freedom from interference in internal matters (i.e., economic ones). There were attempts to slow this process: Since trade links were forged in the late 1980s, Taiwan’s leaders have tried to ensure that the island’s economy would not become too dependent on the mainland. Under its “go slow, be patient” policy, Taiwan prohibited investments of more that $50 million in a single project (though businessmen regularly circumvented this ban, by routing investments through Hong Kong or another offshore location) and prohibited investment altogether in some areas. 37

These measures were not particularly effective. Because of the convenient distance, identical language, and family connections, Taiwanese investment in mainland enterprises was a natural fit. Economic ties were rapidly accelerating by the end of the 1990s, and the membership of both in the WTO would only continue that process, and in fact undermine a variety of legal obstacles intended to slow them. Some of those obstacles were originally crafted by the PRC, reflecting fears of excessive exposure of PRC citizens to destabilizing ideas from Taiwan. 38 By the time of the WTO accession, such restrictions were intentionally abandoned, even though Taipei had the option to preserve them: At the accession to the WTO in January 2001, the DPP government decided not to invoke the GATT/WTO’s opt-out provision, which permits new members a one-time-only option upon accession to preclude any existing member from the application of GATT/WTO rules. The decision, while well anticipated by all parties concerned, now obliges Taipei to lift the import ban on a wide range of mainland products, putting Taiwan’s 50-year trade sanctions against the mainland to a conclusive end. 39

As with the US’ take on the economic dimensions, the short-term infusion of investment and trade is hard to resist, but it leaves longer-term implications considerably more abstract, or even completely uncertain, particularly once we bring political considerations into the mix.

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For example, Beijing’s awareness of the power of its economic influence can make for more confidence in their relations (and therefore greater indirect leverage, but less risk of outright conflict), though the fruit of that influence would ripen over a longer time horizon. WTO ACCESSION AND THE INTERMEDIATE TERM The intermediate term horizon, looking ahead a number of years into the future after China’s entry into the WTO, is easy to quantify but difficult to clearly distinguish from the shorter and longer horizons around it. Many elements of China’s admission concessions would take place over several years. Within a decade, all of the commitments will be implemented and the implications of the agreement will be better understood. Since most of this has come to pass as of the writing of this document, it is important to look at the perspectives of this time frame at the time of admission, rather than using the benefit of hindsight to argue how accurate predictions have been. Beyond the economic details, the intermediate horizon is one in which the beginnings of the political implications are considered. They would clearly extend into a longer time frame to play out fully, but in discussions and debates about its admission to the World Trade Organization, China’s domestic political reform, relations with Taiwan and the US are all factors as decision-makers consider what the intermediate time horizon has in store. PRC—WTO Entry Seen in the Intermediate Term Horizon In some ways, it is difficult, or even arbitrary, to distinguish between the short and intermediate term aspects of Beijing’s WTO entry. Many details of the bilateral agreement are designed to occur over a period of time, commonly in the five year range, to ease the transition and allow businesses and individuals time to adjust. For the PRC, the intermediate term is perhaps the biggest test of the wisdom of entering the WTO. The longer term, for better or worse, will have absorbed the stress of transition and allowed an outcome to develop. The ideal outcome would entail increased international and domestic prosperity, efficiency without the loss of government authority, and international political standing commensurate with the country’s economic might. All of these would be goals of long term thinking as well, but if the challenges resulting from WTO entry are not resolved effectively in the intermediate term, they would not be an issue for the long term. The potential for domestic unrest due to the economic reform was seen as a strong possibility. A variety of government-subsidized institutions will be phased out as a result of WTO entry requirements. Many of them were inefficient or redundant, but they provided a large number of people their livelihood. The hope would be that the employment opportunities afforded

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by the growth of new enterprises and foreign investments will absorb most of the people made redundant. In essence, the intermediate time horizon for the PRC would seem to be one in which change would be at a minimum. The transition period of WTO entry should have passed, and the domestic issues would ideally be stabilized. It would be desired that the momentum of economic growth and development that the PRC had experienced during the previous decade should continue predictably without dramatic change. As for how that might happen, or how to deal with unanticipated developments, we can already see some of the abstraction that Construal Theory anticipates for longer temporal distance. As Jiang Zemin said in 2001, speaking before a meeting of high-level members of the international business world: Opening-up to the outside world is a major decision China has made to advance its modernization drive and also its long-term basic state policy . . . .The next five to ten years will be a crucial period for China’s economic and social development. China will keep a sustained, rapid and sound economic growth. The blueprint has already been drawn for the development in the next five years. According to the program, continued efforts will be made to promote economic growth and social progress, with development as the main theme, restructuring the key link, reform, opening-up and technological advancement the driving force, and higher living standards the ultimate goal. 40

Of course, this would be exactly what investors would be interested in hearing—that the path Beijing would take over the next few years would be “business as usual,” in support of continued “rapid and sound economic growth”—precisely the economic climate in which people would be interested in investing. In addition to economic stability and anticipation of growth, PRC officials also pointed out the commitment to contributing to—or assuring—a stable political environment. In an address by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to a meeting of other Asian foreign ministers, The biggest contribution China makes to regional peace and security is its own stability and development. Over the past year, China has sustained economic growth and deepened reform, and its people have been living and working in peace and contentment. It is expected that China will keep an average annual growth rate of 7% of its GDP by 2010 . . . China’s policy on Asia-Pacific security focuses on the long-term national strategic interests. Of the primary importance is to safeguard state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security. In the meantime, in order to serve the fundamental task of economic development, we must work to ensure a peaceful international environment, especially a sound surrounding environment. Therefore, China’s policy on Asia-Pacific security is committed to the mainte-

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nance of peace and stability and the promotion of prosperity and progress in the Asia-Pacific region . . . 41

It is useful to observe the different time horizons at work in this speech. To serve “the long-term national strategic interests,” “the primary importance is to safeguard” the state, its overall security both domestic (territorial integrity) and international (state sovereignty). In the shorter term [note the use of the term meantime], the “work to ensure a peaceful international environment” goes on “in order to serve the fundamental task of economic development.” With that fundamental economic development taking place, the PRC regime would be able to address some of its domestic challenges, shore up its authority, and be in a better position to deal with external threats. A more developed economy, as long as that development is not too uneven, 42 would strengthen its authority by legitimating its rule, give it more economic power with which to influence other nations, and increase its ability to develop and purchase more advanced military technology. These goals would not be presented in such terms by the PRC leadership, but the idealistic longer-term visions for a better world would be well-served by such intermediate realist tactics. Another possible motivating factor for the trade agreement in the intermediate term is the achievement of greater equality in the balance of trade with the US. Obviously any state would prefer to be selling more to another state than buying, but there is a risk if the difference in trade is too severe; it gives significant power to the purchasing nation. Continuing trade as usual will continue to benefit the creditor nation, but the debtor state has the tool of threats to cut trade relations. The state that has been profiting the most would have the most to lose, particularly in a situation like the US-PRC trade relationship, in which 40% of China’s exports go to the US, while only 2% of America’s exports go to the PRC (as of 1996). 43 Increasing US exports to the PRC will benefit a variety of American industries, but it will also increase the damage that a trade war with Beijing would inflict on those industries. The WTO is designed not only to help ease trade barriers, but to prevent such trade wars as well—exactly what the PRC would want secured in the intermediate term, as well as in the long term. United States—WTO Entry Seen in the Intermediate Term Horizon The short to intermediate time horizons are those in which the outcomes will be the most directly appealing to US business interests and the policy makers who heed them. As the terms of the bilateral agreement take effect, China’s markets become more open to American business interests. US-based corporations are afforded richer investment and partnership opportunities. Copyright and intellectual property rights will be enforced more diligently (if they

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had been at all before). It could be said that the terms of China’s WTO accession that were most appealing in the immediate horizon would come to fruition in the short to intermediate time frame. Of course, there would be liabilities to the new arrangement. Some domestic American industries will be made even more vulnerable to Chinese production cost advantages with the teeth removed from protective tariffs. Some companies can be truly global in their outlook, able to expand production and markets abroad. It is those firms that are well-placed to take advantage of freer trade worldwide. There are other enterprises that would not be able to reap the same benefits—and those were often the ones not nearly as effective at large-scale lobbying for their interests. The promise of globalization would mean many opportunities coming to the developing world: new jobs, a higher standard of living, exposure to progressive ideas and democracy. From a zero-sum perspective, an increase in wealth of one state often entails a relative weakening of another (especially in purely economic terms). Even beyond that zero-sum consideration, as resources are not infinite, widespread expansion of the economies of the developing world might mean less growth for fully industrialized states. This might imply an eventual weakening of American predominance, particularly in economic (and perhaps eventually military) affairs—and that was a definite concern for many policy-makers as the distinct issue areas that comprise the WTO decision-process are considered together. For many other decisionmakers, especially those of a cosmopolitan globalist perspective, the best way to assure the security of the United States was to guide and encourage the trend of globalization. It would be politics and ideology, rather than hard power military and economic considerations, that would best advance American interests. Understanding the intermediate horizon pertaining to the WTO admission question in political terms is more ambiguous than using a fiscal framework. As the potential economic gains become less certain in the intermediate horizon (and longer), those who support the PRC’s accession will begin to emphasize the political gains. According to the economic argument for peaceful relations we discussed above in the context of a variety of International Relations theories, after a number of years Beijing’s membership in the WTO should make for a more stable state, one more committed to the stability and success of the entire global trading system. The first few years of membership would have meant a variety of domestic reforms to accommodate the organization’s requirements, and having made the sacrifices and invested the effort, the PRC would be less likely to unravel the progress made in that direction than it might have been earlier in the process. Once down the road, it is harder to turn back. As President Clinton put it, “bringing China into the WTO doesn’t guarantee that it will choose political reform. But accelerating the progress, the process

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of economic change, will force China to confront that choice sooner, and it will make the imperative for the right choice stronger.” 44 As the newlyelected President Bush pointed out following the PRC’s WTO entry, echoing his predecessor’s thoughts on the political windfall: I am confident that China’s entry into the WTO will bring other benefits to China beyond the expected economic benefits. WTO membership, for example, will require China to strengthen the rule of law and introduce certain civil reforms, such as the publication of rules. In the long run, an open, rules-based Chinese economy will be an important underpinning for Chinese democratic reforms. 45

Another classic argument for political and economic engagement is the exposure it provides problematic regimes to beneficial ideas. The less that people’s livelihood depends on the central Party apparatus, the more opportunities they would have to see other ideological alternatives. As Senator Lieberman said in a hearing on WTO admission, “China’s economic and political reforms are becoming more, not less consistent with America’s core values. . . . the Communist Party’s ability to control and monitor the social, political, and economic lives of individual Chinese citizens has diminished substantially. So the movement in China, thanks in good measure to trade and economic growth, is in our direction.” 46 A key feature of being a WTO member is having the ability to utilize its dispute settlement function in cases of disagreement between member states. A trade conflict between the US and the PRC that might have led to an impasse and a protracted escalation of tension could now be resolved by a third party, without either power looking as though it has “backed down.” Essentially possible sources of conflict now have a “safety valve” by which the pressure of opposition can be released. One (or both) of the states might not appreciate the outcome of the settlement, but the knowledge that the outcome is binding on a WTO member makes dwelling on alternatives or other recourses impractical. “WTO rules and dispute settlement procedures would provide a more effective means to enforce China’s market access commitments and adherence to WTO obligations.” 47 Essentially, it makes it much easier for the nations involved to “move on,” and thereby ease the political strain on the trade aspects of international diplomacy. From the US perspective, as was observed earlier, it seems that the PRC’s entry into the WTO would have a variety of economic benefits in the short horizon, and several political ones if one looks more optimistically further into the future. With respect to political liberalization, internal reform, and increasing incentives not to disrupt the global economic order, PRC membership in the WTO could bear all of that fruit even in the not-too-distant future (the intermediate horizon). But for other US policy makers, another aspect of China’s admission to the WTO (and the prior establishment of Permanent

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Normal Trade Relations) would not have much to do with China itself, but could adversely impact American security in the years to come. Their contributions to the domestic political debate would make for additional complications for the leadership, expanding the realm of debate beyond the unitary state actor or individual cognitive level—domestic politics, and the time horizons playing a key role in them, matter too. For the US to positively support Beijing’s admission to the WTO would send out an instantaneous message to the rest of the world, but the implications would be carried over to the years following the decision. It is not just a question of how the US-PRC bilateral relationship would be impacted, but what kind of precedent would be set by the agreement. This includes the basic details of the accession agreement and how other developing nations might expect to be admitted. “It is also important to understand that WTO accession terms for China will possibly serve as a precedent for accession negotiations for Russia, Vietnam and other economies that are still in transition to market economies.” 48 The precedent issue goes beyond trade agreements. Because of the significant human rights and proliferation issues regarding the PRC regime, there is the concern that cooperatively working with and assisting the PRC can be seen as “rewarding” their negative behavior, even offering support out of fear of further negative behavior. There is another word for this: appeasement. Appeasement is a term that often comes up in the arguments of those critiquing the mainland regime and those US policy makers who would work with them: Again, what are we scared of? Why are we just walking around all the time concerned about hampering our relationship with China? We keep talking about engagement at the expense of appeasement. I say to all Members of Congress, that in China workers attempting to organize unions in China today do not just face opposition from companies, they end up in jail, in forced labor camps. Is that the kind of policy you want to condone by going ahead and appeasing China? 49

This appeasement, of course, sends a message to the PRC regime that their behavior will be ignored, or even rewarded. When such a precedent is established, it could then bear poisoned fruit in the intermediate future (and later). When other instances of disagreeable behavior emerge, the US has abandoned its ability to confront them. Beijing would be aware of this, as would other states pursuing undesirable courses of action. If we reward China with MFN status, we are telling them that political persecution and forced labor are okay as long as they do not appear on the 6 o’clock news. That is not right, and we need to stand up and take a stand against it.

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If we do not fight for fairness and freedom in human rights, it will not happen. If we do not take a stand for people like Zhou Guoquiang [a labor advocate and defense lawyer for many prosecuted activists, who by 1998 had been imprisoned for four years], what message are we sending to the rest of the world? 50

That “message to the rest of the world” is not just that the US doesn’t care; it would be that it wouldn’t act against other such states as well. This could have serious consequences for American diplomatic efforts to compel positive behavior in other despotic regimes. In the more distant future, if the US sought to motivate better state behavior through confrontation instead of appeasement, the lesson of the PRC’s WTO admission would fade—but in this intermediate horizon, it could motivate some highly undesirable state behavior. ROC—WTO Entry Seen in the Intermediate Term Horizon After the status of joining the trade organization fades and the immediate influx of capital begins to stabilize, what would be the implications for Taipei? By far the most important issues for the people of Taiwan were the economy and their personal economic well being. 51 ROC policy makers, much like their American counterparts, would have to achieve a measure of domestic fiscal benefit if they are to be seen as successful and keep their jobs through the next election. Economically, WTO membership is a definite asset to the day-to-day functioning of a nation’s economy. As we discussed in the immediate and short term time horizons, the lowering of protectionist barriers would cause some challenges to the competitiveness of a variety of Taiwanese industries but would open new markets almost immediately—an outcome strongly appealing to a state rife with fears of growth stagnation. Many of the limitations of foreign ownership that US businesses found burdensome in the PRC also applied to Taiwanese financial interests. Many of the same concerns motivated this instance of PRC protectionism as that against the United States, but it was also in line with the systematic barriers to direct interaction that the mainland had put in place over the preceding decades. This was paralleled with Taiwanese laws limiting investment in the mainland as well. While limits on communication and travel were not prohibited by WTO membership, the limits on trade were. “Under the WTO Agreement, Taiwan’s ban on direct trade with China stands in direct opposition to Article I of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the policy must be revised before it is allowed to join the trade group.” Teng Chen-hua, the vice chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, said in a 2000 interview that “the WTO’s rules wouldn’t regulate transport and communication links with China, but the ban on direct trade

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would have to be revised in line with WTO regulations.” 52 The people of Taiwan consistently wanted a gradual level of reform; they desired some action and movement, but it was clear they did not want the links to open up too quickly: Despite the increasing cross-Strait tensions since 1996, the majority of the Taiwanese people have preferred a modest liberalization of cross-Strait economic interaction . . . The portion of the Taiwanese people who supported conditionally opening direct flights to and from the mainland remained above 70% between 1997 and early 2008. Less than 15% of survey respondents, in contrast, supported rapid liberalization during this period. Only 2–3% of the population has opposed any further liberalization of cross-Strait transportation. 53

Looking further down the road, in the intermediate horizon and beyond, the regular rhythm of financial dealings begins to fade and the deeper implications begin to emerge. Many of the concerns that the US would face considering the longer term of the PRC’s entry would loom large for the ROC, though the implications would be more rapid and dramatic. With the relative advantages that the PRC would possess vis-à-vis labor and material costs, the PRC would be poised to dominate the economy of East Asia. Since the PRC’s proportion of the East Asian economy is significantly larger than its share of world trade, the ROC’s vulnerability would manifest itself more quickly—and more dramatically—as the mainland become more solidly integrated in the economic order that the WTO works to foster. The development of global economics might allow increasing benefits for all, but relative power and the ability to compel others through financial leverage is a zerosum situation. The prospects for the decade following WTO entry would suggest a ROC much more at the mercy of Beijing’s interests. “Mainland China has rapidly evolved into Taiwan’s largest export market, an indispensable manufacturing platform for its export-oriented sector, its single most important source of trade surplus and the top recipient of the island’s outbound capital flows.” 54 While the ROC might have less ability to resist PRC economic influence, an intermediate time horizon seeing the rise of a PRC corporate juggernaut might also see a more militarily secure ROC. While politics and economics cannot be entirely disentangled, outside the realm of economic relations, the prospects for peaceful diplomacy seem to be strengthened by the membership of both entities in the World Trade Organization. Beyond the question of economic pressure that the mainland might apply to an increasingly dependent Taiwan, and the relative imbalance of strength and capacity that is likely to increase in the years following WTO entry, Taiwan would be safer in a tangible way.

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As the PRC has an increasing stake in world trade, it would have a greater interest in making sure that the international system is stable and free from open conflict. As President Clinton put it as he was trying to build support for Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China, the PRC “will have a strong interest in working with other people and cooperating with other people. They will have a strong disincentive not to have trouble with Taiwan, even though there’s a lot of tension between the two of them.” 55 This security might not be eternal; the trajectory of changes through the longer term might point to different kinds of control over time. It’s no surprise that Taiwan’s President elect Chen strongly supports China’s membership in the WTO and wants us to grant PNTR. He understands the importance of the stability that will come from good U.S.-China relations and China’s membership in the WTO. If both Beijing and Taiwan are in the WTO, it will increase their interdependence and, therefore, the cost to Beijing of confrontation. If China is shut out, tensions in the Taiwan Strait will likely rise. Our ability to ease them will diminish. 56

The intermediate term would begin to see the fruits of this integration, mutual dependence and commitment to East Asian stability. As with the intermediate horizon for the US, the political and economic areas begin to shift in their balance as the decreasing economic prospects can be compensated for by the possibility of gaining increased political stability and military security. WTO MEMBERSHIP IN THE LONG TERM It might seem a truism to say that the further one looks into the future, the more difficult it is to see what the outcome will be. In military affairs, economics, or diplomacy, it becomes difficult to anticipate the radical changes that would transform the landscape and overturn straightforward predictions. Projections based on current trends often serve effectively in the short run, but unanticipated developments in technology, the political landscape, or even in popular taste are more likely to occur over longer lengths of time, and a truly radical shift, while rarer, certainly has a greater chance of appearing with more time in which to do so. That being said, there seem to be various facts about the PRC that will shape its development in the context of membership in the World Trade Organization. Many of them were considered in the discussion of the shorter time horizons, but it is often the long-term implications that are predominant in the strategic thinking of policy-makers and business magnates alike. While the short term saw an economic advantage for the US and more of a political benefit for the PRC, the long term would seem to have the opposite result. American long-term political goals would be well-served, as would Beijing’s

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economic strategy, by the entry of China into the WTO. Some of the PRC political agenda would also be advanced as a result of this economic progress, particularly in terms of the prospects for the Taiwan issue. To take a view commensurate with the longer horizon, the US would hope for the realization of globalization and the liberal international economic order, while the PRC would seek a change in the direction of global trends, or even a transformation of the expectations and ideals of late twentieth-century development. As the transformative aspects of trade agreements and global commerce become mundane features of the status quo, what would remain? How would things be different? And perhaps most important, what would be taken for granted? In other words, past the short and intermediate horizons, what would be next for the US, the PRC, and Taiwan after all of them have been part of the World Trade Organization for many years? When it comes to considering the longer horizons, one useful method of analysis entails moving beyond the calculation of benefits in various issue areas to an emphasis on individual-level decision-making. While it might be harder to identify in the PRC leadership, it seems as though the personal preference of leaders in Washington and in Beijing plays a significant role in how the long and chiliastic horizons are viewed. PRC—Long Term Horizon Looking at this case through the long time horizon, it seems as though Beijing is in a position to take good advantage of the benefits of becoming deeply integrated into the global economic system. Many of these advantages, taken in absolute terms, are sobering for those concerned about China’s rise. For those worried about China’s power relative to the United States, it seems as though there is even more bad news. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, when China was entering the WTO, the projections based on the trends of the time spoke to formidable long-term prospects for the nation. The PRC saw growth rates of almost 10% throughout the 1990s, well beyond any industrialized state, and absorbed the impact of the Asian financial crisis with considerably less damage to its economy than most of its neighbors. 57 The population was continuing to grow, but increasing middle-class wealth and the one child policy were working together to stabilize it. The burgeoning population would mean labor would continue to be inexpensive and attract foreign investment, yet (ideally) not provide the excessive underemployment that might lead to unrest or insurrection. The increasing and unevenly distributed wealth and education of the nation would mean a significant workforce for all levels of employment, from well-trained technical and professional positions to inexpensive manual labor of all kinds. Average income even at the lowest levels

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had been on the rise as well, hopefully ensuring that the majority of the population would be committed to stability and satisfied with the status quo, while continuing to work hard in their aspirations for social mobility. 58 As long as the international situation was stable and domestic growth could be maintained and the standard of living rose across classes (even if not consistently), the PRC leadership could be confident that they could retain their authority. Certainly the twin goals of internal development and external tranquility were the primary goals of the regime. As Premier Zhu Rongyi said in a statement at the 10+3 international summit, We will work hard to restructure our economy, actively implement the strategies of “revitalizing the country through science and education” and “sustainable development”, and accelerate the development of the western part of China. At the same time, we will relentlessly press ahead with our marketoriented economic reform and speed up institutional innovation. Despite difficulties on the road to progress, we have the confidence, and the capability, to ensure a sustained, rapid and sound development of the Chinese economy. A stable and more developed China is a major contribution to peace and development of this region and the world at large. 59

This speech shows the emphasis on economic development and stability, the attempt to bring more investment to less developed areas of the PRC, and the “confidence” that it will proceed at a strong pace, over a long period of time. And in achieving the goals of a stronger and more secure China, East Asia, and the whole world would benefit. This is some long term thinking indeed. Of course, an “accelerated development” of western China would also mean a greater governmental presence in areas that often resisted Beijing’s authority, including Xinjiang and Tibet. This would not just mean expanding greater control over the PRC’s hinterlands in an eastern “manifest destiny,” but would also eventually serve to weaken a long-term threat to the regime, in the form of potential secessionist movements and international support for them. Through another perspective looking through the long-term horizon, many of these sources of strength can be potential liabilities. A large workforce willing to work at low wages can be a boon to the economy, but also a potential source of resentment and instability. The social stratification which provides a diverse workforce at all skill levels can also be a source of weakness and future risk. One problem with which the People’s Republic grapples today (and at the time of the accession to the WTO), and which seems to have no ready resolution, is the inequality that runs counter to its founding principles. Free-market reforms and economic development have created an upper class whose wealth comes from investing and ownership, and a middle class whose occupations are far removed from the land-working peasantry that was the foundation of Mao’s (not to mention Confucius’) vision for

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Chinese society. Those who were raised on the Maoist ideal of perpetual revolution and the quest for social equality are already a fairly mature group; the future will see their ranks thin and their energy diminish. The traditional Chinese veneration for the elderly, already changing with modernization, will be likely to change further as the distribution of ages shifts. This will likely have more implications for a time horizon that goes beyond the long term. As for the distant reaches of PRC territory, there are regions that bristle at the unequal benefits of market reforms, and the coastal cities that flourish while inland rural areas suffer the lack of institutional and investor interest. Greater attention from Beijing might serve to help more evenly distribute the wealth and mollify many of the frustrated, but the attempt to bring “accelerated development” to regions with significant independence movements can also pose risks to the regime. An approach that is too heavy-handed could serve to increase anti-CCP sentiment and bring more unwanted international attention. As market reforms shift more fiscal decision-making into private hands, the state might be unable to effectively move capital in the way that a centrally planned economy might. Public speeches made by the PRC leadership do not often contain the same detail or diversity of opinion that we see in US political discourse, but we can find some interesting revelations about the long-term horizons of Jiang Zemin as he discusses possible visions for the future on the eve of WTO accession. A few years before the then current members saw the PRC’s WTO accession as viable, Jiang discussed his vision for the new century as a shift from the trajectory of the past: In my view, if the political resurgence of the developing countries is viewed as a major feature of the international evolution in the second half of the 20th century, then their economic revitalization will be a key hallmark of the new world pattern in the 21st century . . . the revitalization of the developing countries will bring about a sound underpinning for the world pattern of multipolarization, provide conditions favorable to the establishment of a fair and rational new international economic order, and offer stronger safeguards to lasting world peace. In short, the growing economic prosperity of the developing countries will contribute significantly to the advancement of the human society. 60

The call for “multipolarization” is an implicit response to American predominance, the defining characteristic of the political landscape in 1995. The decolonization and non-aligned movements of the cold war period in which many nations of the “global south” first became independent and organized, could develop into viable economic rivals to Western predominance. “A fair and rational new international economic order” in which resources and economic power are better distributed, is equated with “the advancement of . . .

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human society.” Essentially, a strong China shaping the global economy is good for mankind. A few years later, and just a few weeks away from WTO accession, Jiang fleshes out the possible long-term directions for international economics: There are two possible development scenarios for the process of economic globalization and trade liberalization. If the process moves along a rational track, it may not only allocate world resources more effectively and fairly and expand the productive forces of all countries, but also promote the establishment of a global multilateral trading system and of a new, just and rational international economic order to the benefit of people of all countries. But if it should be allowed to proceed along an irrational way, it may aggravate the uneven distribution of world resources and an unbalanced economic development, widen the gap between the North and the South, sharpen the polarization between the rich and the poor and cause further environmental degradation. 61

The reference to environmental degradation rings hollow coming from China’s highest political authority, as might the emphasis on equitable distribution of wealth, neither of which is a strong point in PRC policy. This emphasizes the tension that we often see in Beijing rhetoric between its ideals for the international community and the domestic situation on the individual level. Even if the equitable distribution of wealth and the environmental situation had suffered under the PRC’s development, the domestic strength that development brings would allow it to work for those goals globally. In another speech he called for a more democratic international society as well. “The development of the world is unbalanced or even inharmonious. . . . The goal of realizing democracy in international relations is far from being attained.” 62 It is unsurprising that Beijing would seek democracy at the international level, particularly if that democratic system is based on the number of people each state represents. As the most populous nation in the world, China would be well placed to attain considerably more international influence under such an arrangement. Depending on how cynical you might be, this could be a quest for world domination, or the hard and honest attempt to bring the benefits of “market socialism” to the rest of the world, such as better resource distribution and a greater voice for the developing world. We will see that many of these same long-term goals are also desired by US policy makers, even if the their final form would not be identical. There is an additional facet in Jiang’s decision-making process that might be of relevance in looking at the PRC’s long-term horizons. In addition to wanting a pivotal place for China on the world stage, contributing to the grand design for a better world, Jiang himself might be interested in staking out a place for himself in the pages of history. Establishing a long-term

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personal legacy and gaining the positive judgment of posterity are considerable factors in Clinton’s decision-making process, and they might be for Jiang as well. Would Jiang, like Clinton, be concerned or even obsessed with questions of legacy and historical judgment? There might not be direct evidence of this facet of his personality, not just due to the opaque policymaking process in Beijing, but also to the fact that he operates in a culture that values modesty. Nevertheless, some scholars draw this conclusion. In discussion of the transition from Jiang to Hu Jintao, Jiang held on to Taiwanrelated responsibilities after handing over nearly everything else. Chu argues that this is due to “Jiang’s determination not to end his political career with a sour note on cross-Strait relations; by fighting for his place in history, Jiang will inadvertently be holding this hot potato for Hu for extra few years.” 63 Perhaps, therefore, Jiang’s long term consideration of the WTO admission process and its implications for cross-Strait relations might also be serving this personal interest. We will see something similar when considering Bill Clinton’s chiliastic horizons. United States—Long Term Horizon The long term effects of the PRC’s entry into the WTO mean a variety of things to the United States. One of the most salient is the possibility of an increasingly open, efficient and wealthy China—a potential global rival as well as partner. Such a state, with an increased economic strength and building on its vast population, would be well poised to garner a larger share of world trade—likely at the United States’ expense. With increased financial resources, such a Chinese state would also have the potential for expanded military prowess, in terms of capacity and power projection. This vision for the US-China relationship has captured the popular mind, spurring a variety of articles, books, lectures, and talking heads who warn about the economic trends that will make the United States a dependent debtor to the Chinese leviathan. The other side of that coin is that such a powerful state would be more committed to maintaining the status quo in which it has flourished. The hope among policy makers would be that such a state would be more stable, more invested in the success of the international economic order, and possessed of less ability to control its citizens’ access to the wealth of ideas worldwide. As it becomes more integrated in that system, the PRC might attempt to transform it to values more of its liking, but it will in turn be transformed by the necessity of having to function within it. The real story in China is one of slow and steady progress toward open markets and individual empowerment. Two decades ago virtually every aspect of Chinese society was under state control. Today over half of China’s output is generated by private enterprise. Eighty-five percent of China’s workers are employed in the private sector. The development of a strong, vibrant private

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sector, particularly in southern China, continues to draw power away from Beijing . . . If we look at the big picture, we will see a policy of engagement that is slowly and steadily working to liberalize China economically and expose the Chinese to Western values. 64

For those concerned with American power and security, this ascendant China is a mixed blessing at best. The United States has played a pivotal role in establishing and developing the current international financial system, setting up the rules that not only foster the free market and global exchange, but also create a system that supports democratic institutionalism. This system works to the advantage of the United States not only because of the benefits from free trade, but also in developing a structure that supports the development of liberal, technologically developed states. These states would (ideally) be more committed to the maintenance of the system, and less likely to threaten the US through outright military confrontation. The PRC might become a rival peer whose power eventually outstrips that of the US, but in a system that emphasizes victory on the balance sheet rather than the battlefield. This is the potential price to be paid for the shorter-term economic benefits, the need to “settle up” at the end of the night. The shorter horizons, when considering the positive aspects of the WTO admission, emphasized the fiscal gains, and glossed over the risks to American predominance as other nations exercise their relative economic advantages under a global free market. In order to remain sanguine about the WTO question in the longer horizons, the emphasis is shifted to political issues and the possibility for progress in that area. However, that positive outcome is not a certainty in the political area either. The future holds an infinite realm of possibilities, but to the policy-makers on the eve of the twenty-first century, there were two broad categories into which China’s government and society might fall. If the economic trends point to inevitable growth and potential dominance, the direction of China’s political structure is considerably less certain. Optimists heady with the promise of globalization were quick to trumpet the possibilities of integrated economies, increased rewards that no despot could put at risk through direct conflict, the promise of new communications technologies that would mean that no one’s access to new ideas could be obstructed. Tyrants could no longer act in secrecy when recording and transmission devices become widespread. As Howard Lange, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, put it: The recent history of Asia shows that over time, economic development leads to growth of an educated and aware middle class and of a civil society. This in turn leads to democracy, and this is the path we want to encourage China to travel. Trade, the principal focus of this hearing, is an important area where China’s integration into international institutions, especially the WTO, and

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The generalization that impoverished societies were easier to control was touted by those who paired economic with political development—a common trope until China began to prove a stubborn exception. 66 This points to another possibility for China’s future, a less bright one. Economic development and progress might make for opportunities for political liberalization, but also for repression. New wealth and technologies could allow a repressive Chinese state to increase its hold over the population through the development of surveillance technologies and the application of economic compulsion. A wealthier population might be more sophisticated, with a greater exposure to Western ideals and democratic ideology, but its people would also have more to lose should the state decide to apply pressure on them or their families. Some policy makers take a more cosmopolitan (in the Kantian sense) view, arguing that American predominance is harmful to US interests. A “hyperpower” United States, significantly more powerful than all other states, represents an unnatural condition in world affairs, and America becomes a target for all those frustrated with the nature of the international system. From a realist zero-sum perspective, an egalitarian democracy of states might reflect deeper American values, but could harm immediate US strategic interests. The new cosmopolitans are more concerned with the liberal internationalist spirit in a broader sense, being willing to minimize the interests of their nation in favor of a broader global state in which America is but one voice. In order to bring about such a system, American predominance must be challenged by an actor with comparable power. The PRC, should WTO membership pay off in the way that its leadership might hope, could serve in that role. President Clinton, on the signing of Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China, took time to point out what he saw as the long-term economic benefits, but to him, much more important was a long-term future in which the PRC and the US can cooperate in a more globalized world stage: I do think this is a good economic deal for America. I think it will increase our exports and, over the long run, will strengthen our economic position in the world. But I think, by far, the most important reason to ratify this agreement is the potential it gives us to build a safer, more integrated world . . . It gives all of us the chance to meet the common threats of the future together as free and interdependent people. 67

Another arena in which PRC entry could prove detrimental to US interests does not pertain to China directly. Many of the outspoken critics of working with or accommodating the PRC pointed to the risks of that policy in terms

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of long-term US interests with respect to precedent. This precedent issue was discussed in the intermediate term, but the implications could extend to the longer term, particularly if the vision for a multipolar international environment comes to fruition. If the lesson from the precedent set by the WTO agreement teaches other nations that the US will make deals with states regardless of behavior if its economic viability is on the line, then US interests will be more vulnerable as American predominance fades. As other countries’ economic might develops commensurate with their population, the United States will not be in a position to dictate the terms of the international economic order. If those other states act in an illiberal fashion, repressing their people and rearing them on anti-democratic sentiment, the ultimate values that the free trade agreements and international organizations sought to foster could prove their own undoing. Military or economic concerns aside, decision makers on the US side also considered other long-term implications of China’s integration into the world economy. In a 1995 meeting with Jiang Zemin, President Clinton raised a number of pressing subjects, then brought up an concern that did not serve to address a current crisis or immediate issue. Instead, it reflected a worry regarding a long time horizon. There was only one area in which Clinton considered China to be a threat to the national security of the United States . . . “You are growing China into a wealthy economy . . . it’s not your fault, but if you don’t find a way to do it better than the rich countries before you, then you will ruin the planet.” 68

A comment like this could also serve a number of functions beyond its apparent content. Whether he voiced such a concern to diffuse tension from the immediate pressures of the day and deflect from shades of international competition, or whether environmental concern were truly paramount in his mind, it is clear that issues on the long (or even chiliastic) horizon are playing a role in his thinking. ROC—Long Term Horizon Many of the elements that impact the ROC’s long-term time horizon have already been alluded to. The hope to revive a sluggish economy, inspire stability in its uncertain relations with the mainland, and provide a platform to aid in international communication (with the possibility of recognition as a peer) were all considerations in terms of the possible future consequences of WTO entry. For the people of Taiwan, one of the most challenging concerns about the long-term future is the uncertainty about its relationship with the PRC. For the citizens of most nations, long-term horizons are rife with uncertainty as the more predictable day-to-day aspects of life give way to the greater sweep of history, and the changes that come from them. Few people

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could have envisioned the shape their society would take a few decades down the road, particularly in the turbulent twentieth century. Using those dramatic lessons from history as an example of what to expect, people might be reluctant to make definitive predictions about their nation in the long term. This is especially true for the residents of Taiwan, for whom uncertainty is at the very foundation of their status in the world. As was discussed in the Taiwan Straits Crisis chapter, the long-term horizon contains a wide variety of possibilities for Taiwan, ranging from a sovereign nation recognized by the global community to a subservient province of the PRC. With both states as members of the World Trade Organization, the likelihood of some outcomes becomes greater than it might otherwise have been. As the PRC further develops its economy, its relative advantages vis-à-vis the ROC will increase. The size and scope of its economy will begin to dwarf the island’s, and it could easily afford to develop and build (or purchase) all the military hardware it would need to stage an invasion and occupation of the island, making the prospect of a destructive missile attack unnecessary. If the trends of cross-straits investment continue, PRC interests will have an increasingly large stake in the Taiwanese economy. Money does not always mean a directly corresponding level of political power, but in a democratic system like the Republic of China, business interests have the ability to exert significant influence on the political process. Whatever one’s concerns about ideological suppression, there are many economic interests that would be well served by closer ties with the mainland, and security in knowing that Taipei would not be working to upset them. With many domestic elements of the ROC’s political landscape dependent on mainland economic support, there would be a strong faction in ROC politics agitating for stability and cooperation with the PRC, even in a fully flourishing democracy. Beijing could also use its economic influence on other states to help compel the desired behavior from the island regime. Arms sales to the ROC, for example, often a sticking point in US-PRC relations, could be implicitly tied with economic cooperation or unusually lucrative trade deals. As the PRC becomes a greater purchaser of some American goods under the WTO, it will have more leverage with regard to the kind of customer it will be. 69 On the other hand, this might prove an opportunity for Taiwan’s independence-minded population as well. As the PRC becomes more invested in the international economic system, and its growth and economic power depend on a stable global environment, it might become less inclined to take direct military action even in the face of provocative moves to sovereignty. Beijing made it clear in 1995–1996 that it would not balk at using armed force to restrain its “rogue province.” Should there be an outright declaration of independence by Taiwan at the present time (not likely with the current ROC leadership), a military strike from Beijing would not be a certainty, but it would not be off the table. Several decades from now, if the PRC’s economy

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grows to dominate the international economic system and many of its most powerful citizens draw their wealth and influence from a stable geopolitical environment, would it be as eager to disrupt an order at the base of its power? While that hope for peaceful relations seems to be the major influence in current Taiwanese politics, other more pessimistic voices had a different take on the long-term horizon. Taiwan’s Democratic People’s Party sought to bring about a longer-term vision for the island’s foreign policy, emphasizing the shortsighted nature of reactive politics. It is useful to repeat here the section on long-term thinking in the DPP’s “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century,” discussed in the section on the ROC’s immediate time horizon, to consider what some Taiwanese policy-makers are trying to achieve by changing their horizons: The diplomatic hardships of Taiwan have in part resulted from the following mistakes: 4. The direction of Taiwan’s foreign policy has been determined by crossStrait interaction. Thus the implementation of our diplomacy has often fallen unwittingly into a reactive pattern, merely responding to Chinese actions. This is a zero-sum game, or a meaningless competition over the number of formal diplomatic partners. 5. The process of making Taiwan’s foreign policy has been usually dominated by passive reaction to international forces; it has lacked a proactive ability to identify and analyze future international trends. 6. Taiwan’s foreign policy has overemphasized short-term results, while neglecting the importance of long-term management. 70 So much of Taiwan’s status was relegated to an afterthought of the way that Beijing chose to frame the situation (i.e., how much of an issue they would choose to make things). Looking through the long horizon, that has a greater potential to change than in the short term. One US congressman, lamenting that Taiwanese WTO accession was dependent on the PRC’s, revealed the often-thought sentiment that the tension across the straits would be resolved in the long term, in Beijing’s favor. “It seems to me that that argument could have been raised with President Jiang while he was here, that we’re going forward now with WTO accession for Taiwan, another Province of China, and maybe in another century they will be reunited with the mainland.” 71 The alternative to resolving the conflict over the island’s status, hoped for by the Taiwanese independence movement, was that the Republic of China would be allowed to go its own way by the PRC, and establish its status as a fully independent nation. While this seems difficult to imagine now, if the idealized vision that US policy-makers had for the transformation of the PRC comes to pass, then a liberalized, enlightened state with so much economic influence in the island might not see much of a difference between political labels, and accept a sovereign Taiwan. Of course, a similar optimism might

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see the economic transformation of the mainland, accelerated by WTO membership, become so politically similar to what currently exists in Taiwan, that the island would happily rejoin the mainland because the tangible benefits would far outstrip the minor political differences. THE CHILIASTIC HORIZON As has been discussed in an earlier chapter, the chiliastic horizon is perhaps the most difficult to understand, both in terms of what can be expected in it, and how it can be identified in decision making. Certainly any policy maker would be ridiculed if he or she admitted that the primary consideration of his or her political strategy was what would happen a century from now, but many statesmen think seriously about their place in history, and how their work would help shape events to come. As with the chiliastic horizon from the missile crisis case, we also see the predictions of Construal Theory being borne out: There is increased abstraction, optimism, and the belief that difficult problems are solvable, even if the details as to how that would happen are left undefined. United States—Chiliastic Prospects Looking to the far future, there are a number of major implications of the PRC’s WTO admission, some of which will not be foreseen until the events transpire. There are a few significant directions of the US-PRC relationship that might be anticipated. Perhaps the greatest concern of US policy-makers and business interests is that Beijing’s WTO membership will make it a more effective economic power, forcing efficiencies that complement the other advantages it possesses. There are also concerns about the PRC’s relative gains at America’s expense in the less distant future, but the ultimate outcome of this relative advantage will come to fruition in a more distant time frame. One aspect of the chiliastic horizon as compared to the long term is the possible transcending of shorter-term issues. Questions about relative advantage might fade in significance as the global economy fully integrates, and individual nation-state concerns pass into irrelevance. Considered from that perspective, zero-sum questions might not be as important as the fruition of a cosmopolitan perspective, in which people are citizens of the world first, and everyone benefits from the interconnectedness of a world economy. American interests as they are defined now might not have much relevance in such a world, but they might be the natural outgrowth of the liberal economic order in its ideal form. Particularly for those policy makers uncomfortable with US preeminence, WTO membership for China could be exactly what can help realize this vision of the far future.

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President Clinton, in many ways the symbol and rallying-point of protrade policy, was very concerned with the long-term legacy of his presidency and the part that Beijing’s WTO membership would play in it. In the late 1990s, to a politician with a cosmopolitan 72 perspective like President Clinton, the PRC’s WTO entry was desirable from every time perspective. The shorter terms offered economic gains, political capital, prospects for security, and a legacy for his presidential accomplishments. Over time, increased wealth for the Chinese, in relative as well as absolute terms, would represent a more even distribution of the world’s wealth. Greater economic global justice, a good in itself, would lead to increased security. In the longer term, a rising China could serve as a counterweight to American preeminence. A sitting American president would never make an argument in terms of reducing US power for the greater good, but many of Clinton’s later efforts suggest a strongly globalist vision not too dissimilar from the idealistic “multipolar” world hoped for by Jiang Zemin. In the longto-chiliastic horizon, President Clinton was very much aware of his place in history, and a success in implementing an agreement that could eventually transform the international environment could win him a place as the statesman who brought about the first steps to a new century of peace and prosperity for East Asia, and hopefully all the nations of the world. 73 It was clear Clinton thought in broad historical strokes: If you look at the whole sweep of American history, at critical periods, we’ve always been willing to redefine our responsibilities as a nation: First in ways that brought us together as a People . . . and second, in ways that recognized our unique responsibilities first to our neighbors and then to those across the globe as we became more and more blessed . . . And this country has never had a better chance to shape the world of the future for our children. And if we can’t do it . . . we’ll never be able to explain it to our children and our grandchildren, and this place will not be nearly as happy a place to be for the next several years. But if we do it, one more time we will say, we kept faith in our time with America’s eternal march. 74

There is of course a darker take on the same series of developments. An ideal chiliastic outcome in the opinion of many current PRC leaders might be a sinister future for the United States. China might transcend a middle/long term role of cooperative partner in commerce and global stability, and surpass the US as its star rises, eventually helping to bring about a world order in which American values wane in the face of a more potent and wealthy Chinese civilization. We do not see much discussion of this, as the rosy considerations that come from distant temporal construal predominate in the dialogue.

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PRC—Chiliastic Prospects In the PRC’s distant future, there is substantial promise intertwined with substantial risk. The ideal vision for a fully realized Chinese great power is not beyond the realm of possibility. The PRC has been implementing a number of strategies that will yield intermediate term gains, but might serve to build to a significant chiliastic payout. Many analysts of Chinese policy look to its eagerness to support international organizations and multilateral cooperation, in contrast to an American hegemony. Should the global community develop into a more level playing field, Beijing will be well placed to develop into a flourishing model for Asian (or even world) civilization beyond the western democratic ideal. Looking at the intermediate term would show the PRC as the most likely and effective foil to US power and dominance. Should that happen and the PRC manages to solve its most severe internal issues and effectively build its international stature, it would open the way to a more distant world civilization strongly influenced—perhaps even dominated by—Chinese leadership. The one-child policy will have significant implications for the PRC’s demographics. The ranks of the elderly will swell relative to the younger generation. The ultimate fate of the policy is uncertain, and its weakening or repeal could create a “generation trench,” in which there are smaller families of a certain age. This could have dramatic effects as that generation ages and medical care continues to increase in sophistication and expense. As the last pre-one child generation ages, it will create a burden on the PRC economy as those people leave the workforce and are cared for by a smaller group of descendants. Japan’s recent “graying” as its population ages points to a potential similar issue for the PRC in the long term. Part of the hope of WTO entry is that that membership will drive efficiency and eventual strength that can provide a level of resiliency to absorb the challenges of demographics. Conversely, the overall benefits of privatization and free markets might serve to challenge the original low expectations of people as they grow older. Traditional Chinese society had a special place for the elderly for a number of reasons, many of which will no longer apply over time. Originally the eldest Chinese generation had few demands, and were cared for by a large group of descendants. Without extensive geriatric care, there were few very old people, and many younger ones to care for them. The drawbacks of having limited resources were compensated for by high status, even reverence. This is not likely to be the fate of China’s elderly in the future, and could be the source of considerable anxiety for those without solid financial resources. Another issue with the potential to transform Chinese (and world) society on the distant horizon is related to technological developments, though WTO entry might not have much of an impact on them. Biotechnology has the

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potential to exacerbate class differences as the Chinese peasantry is forced to turn to twenty-first century versions of what the writer Lu Xun referred to as “Chinese cannibalism.” 75 Instead of people being metaphorically consumed by a system that devours their labor, impoverished Chinese citizens will have the chance to be more literally harvested for profit. Transplant technology, the market for newborn infants, medical testing and its need for human subjects have already put China’s poorest people in a position to have their bodies used by those with more money. 76 This might be the case regardless of whether China had joined the WTO, but combined with the possibilities of economic inequality that might be exacerbated by WTO membership, the severity of the impact of biotechnology might be more severe. When it comes to the lessons of history and the desire for a lasting legacy, the members of the Chinese leadership were perhaps not as glory-seeking as the American president (though this is not necessarily so, as we suggested in the section on the long horizon), but they were very aware of their place in a very long sweep of historical events—a culture spanning millennia instead of centuries. Looking in this temporal horizon, and the resilience of Chinese civilization in the face of repeated existential threats, it is unsurprising to find a strongly optimistic position regarding China’s chiliastic potential, even if the details of how that might transpire are absent. Not only could China work to transform the international community to better reflect the values of equality and democracy, but perhaps even the fundamental basis of those values could take on more of a Chinese character. As China’s economic influence and commensurate power increases, so too would the influence of its ideas. There is no exact understanding of what shape that might take, but the revival of interest in uniquely Chinese philosophies like Confucianism might point not just to an interest in the past, but serious consideration for the future. 77 ROC—Chiliastic Prospects In the view of those more concerned with practical well-being, strong moves toward Taiwanese independence are dangerous and provocative, and the ideal outcome would be a long term or chiliastic China so transformed by its relations with the liberal international economic order that it becomes indistinguishable from Taiwan in economy and in political order. Under those conditions, they would think it unlikely that anyone would oppose the prospects for a unified China. Of course, this is difficult to see as feasible in anything but the very distant future—the very essence of a chiliastic horizon. This has also been discussed under the long horizon for Taiwan, but perhaps it is better considered in the chiliastic, particularly if the developmental process is primarily considered to be occurring in the absence of a dramatic or catalyzing incident. Such a process of willing reunification could

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also happen in less time as the result of an external political shock, such as the emergence of a mutual enemy (such as a rearmed imperialist Japan). Besides a willing union with the mainland, the opposite trajectory for Taiwanese independence is also a possibility. This is not limited to a proclamation that enrages the PRC regime—in the chiliastic horizon, Taiwan and China could be so dramatically transformed that each state goes its separate way, without hard feelings, because they no longer recognize much common ground between the two societies. Again, this is difficult to imagine at this point with the current trajectory of China’s economic development and political positions, but the chiliastic horizon is the one in which we can see possibilities that could not happen without radical change, and the time for them to happen. SUMMARY OF THE HORIZONS As we have discussed before, drawing some of the distinctions among horizons is an arbitrary process. When does short become intermediate, and intermediate long? Sometimes the difference is not based on the passage of time so much as the rapidity of change in a particular economic or political system. It might be helpful at this point to provide a visual representation of the various perspectives by time horizon and actor, including the positive and negative views of the WTO accession. In contrast with the charts shown in chapter 3 (tables 3.1 and 3.2), the WTO case revolved around making a specific decision—whether or not to support China’s entry into the organization. The Missile Crisis, on the other hand, could entail a wide variety of responses without clear-cut distinctions. While the crisis chart focuses more on the outlooks that the actors would have and their ideal outcomes, this chart can contain consideration of the specific alternatives. Therefore each entry contains both positive and negative considerations for the different time horizons. It is useful to note that there is some “bleed-through” in which some of the views of the accession are quite similar in adjoining boxes. However, as the distance between the horizons increases, one can see that the hopes and fears become dissimilar, and they bear little relationship to one another with a wide enough distance of time separating them. This is of significant utility when it comes to understanding the motivating factors in how a situation is understood by policy-makers, and how decisions are made based upon that understanding. (See table 4.1.)

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Table 4.1. Time Horizons Pertaining to the Entry of the PRC and Taiwan to the World Trade Organization.

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CONCLUSION China’s entry into the WTO was a moment in time, but was also the result of years of negotiation. This negotiation did not take place only between one state and an international organization. Not only were there a number of bilateral negotiations between the PRC and her major trading partners, but there were many internal dialogues on the domestic level, arguments in Washington as well as in Beijing over the question of whether joining was the right thing to do. Many of those arguments depended on a particular time horizon, as befits the various time distances that can be seen in the ways that economic decisions are made. Despite the debates, negotiation, and hand wringing that accompanied the discussion of China’s WTO entry, it was often seen (or at least presented) as an inevitable result of the march of globalization and economic progress. While there are many members of the World Trade Organization, the two most important actors in the process of China’s admission were the United States and the PRC itself. Each state had different goals and expectations regarding the membership, but some similarities in the time horizon of each actor shows some commonalities in terms of how the situation is viewed in different time frames. The immediate term looked at issues of status and political leverage, as well as promises for economic gains, either short (US) or intermediate (PRC). The short term was concerned with the implementation of the commitments of Beijing’s entry, and the benefits that would accrue, either to business or Chinese domestic political interests. The intermediate term would emphasize economic growth, both in absolute and relative terms, and its implications for the bilateral relationship and in the international community. Longer-term time horizons could look at the ways in which the nature of global politics would be transformed by the changes wrought by China’s membership, and how technological and demographic shifts might ultimately make shorter term interests and predictions irrelevant. It is perhaps here that a consideration of the individual policy makers might prove most useful. This case has shown the significant influence that President Clinton had upon the framing of the discussion pertaining to WTO accession, and considering the time horizons most important to him can provide some explanatory power regarding this case. Bill Clinton seemed to be strongly motivated by the allure of the distant temporal horizon. Some of that was certainly the reflection of the zeitgeist of the last decade of the twentieth century. Works like Fukuyama’s “End of History” pointed to a culmination of the political and doctrinal struggles of many centuries, and new technologies like the internet promised to revolutionize how people communicated, shared knowledge, and did business. While other contemporary works like Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” might point to new conflicts in the less distant horizon, for those with a more

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optimist bent, even those conflicts might point to new opportunities for the United States to lead the world to a more promising world order. Clinton would be eager to be seen by history as the leader who ushered in that era. It is a greater challenge to develop a critical understanding of individual motives in the PRC, but it is worth considering. In a nation in which images of venerated leaders hang from grandiose public venues and in humble homes alike, it is difficult to imagine that the desire for a positive judgment by history is not a motivating factor. Without considering distinct areas of policy, developing a clear understanding of the predominant time horizons is difficult. As we have explored throughout the case, there are compelling reasons for a variety of state actions in a number of time horizons. The US and PRC policy decisions can be justified in the immediate through the chiliastic horizons. If that is the case, how can one understand which horizon is most influential in the decisionmaking process? When we look specifically at one area of policy, it is easier to see which horizons are playing a dominant role for our decision-makers. To go beyond the role of individual personality, as with our interpretation of the missile crisis, it can be useful to look at the different issue areas to better understand the influence of particular time horizons. In this case, the most useful areas for policy consideration would be the political and the economic. Looking strictly at economics from the US and the ROC perspectives, the shorter horizons offered economic rewards, which would be particularly appealing under the conception of Temporal Discounting. The longer horizons posed considerably greater economic risk, but those threatening possibilities did not have a significant place in the discourse. The exact shape those economic threats might have was abstracted, consistent with Temporal Construal theory. When it came to thinking about the WTO accession process in economic terms, it is clear that the shorter horizons predominated. In thinking about longer horizons, the issue areas for Washington and Taipei would shift to political and security issues. The internal reforms that Beijing must undergo in order to become a part of the trade organization had the potential to, over the longer term, transform the PRC into an enthusiastic member of the international community, committed to its stability and reluctant to provoke any risk to the system from which it benefits. The PRC might become one of the most powerful economic entities in that order, if not the most powerful, but it would not use that power to violate the precepts underlying the system, including the commitment to democracy and the free market. Taken in a long view, economic subservience might not be too high a price to pay for the assurance of those values. Looking at the most influential horizons in the PRC decision-making process, we can see a reversal of the US/ROC issue division. In economic terms, the short horizons pose a sacrifice to be made in order to pave the way

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for greater longer-term gains. Much of the PRC rhetoric regarding the more distant horizons emphasizes development, prosperity, and the place due to China in the international order. As for the political and security implications for the PRC, the shorter term offers domestic political advantages for the leadership committed to securing continued irrevocable reform. These domestic developments will pave the way for the longer-term economic benefits, which can also lead to political advantage as well. In the PRC perspective, as the arguments all seem to come back to economics, and it is in the long horizon that the economic benefits begin to pay off, it seems clear the longer horizon is predominant overall in this case. China’s membership in the World Trade organization will have many more years of repercussions in the future, promising to shape the nature of international relations in the twenty-first century and the landscape of the global economy. The possibilities can range from a flourishing global system with a diversity of successful political visions to a highly competitive arena in which states seize on ways to get the better of one another. Looking at the situation through the lenses of different distances into the future shows not only how decision-making can be impacted by the diversity of perspectives, but also by considerations of the relative importance of political and economic options. As to the accuracy of those predictions and a preferred (or most effective) time horizon to use, the future will again be our guide, since ultimately, “only time will tell.” NOTES 1. While this study usually uses “PRC” to refer to the mainland regime rather than the less precise (and sometimes controversial) “China,” since the WTO admission applies to both the PRC and Taiwan, I felt that the use of the generally encompassing term “China” could be used in this chapter when referring to the WTO accession of both entities. 2. Panitchpakdi, Supachai and Mark L. Clifford, China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing World Trade. Wiley and Sons, 2002, p. 87. 3. The PRC already had formal observer status to the GATT as of 1984, but this did not entail the obligations—or benefits—of full membership. 4. Though this is perhaps more directly relevant to Beijing’s interest in regional organization, a topic beyond the scope of this study. For more on this topic, see Cai, Kevin G. “Chinese Changing Perspective on the Development of an East Asian Free Trade Area.” Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 4, Summer 2004, pp. 584–599. 5. Panitchpakdi and Clifford, China and the WTO, p. 79. 6. The Chinese concept mianzi (面子), often translated “face,” holds a wider variety of meanings than the English translation. Suffice it to say that the yearly process of MFN approval and the requisite “China bashing” that occurred in the US Congress was shameful to the PRC government, and was definitely a situation they would want to put to an end. 7. Groombridge, Mark A. “China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: Costs and Benefits.” In Carpenter, Galen and Dorn eds. China’s Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat? Cato Institute, 2000, p. 167. 8. See Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 427–460.

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9. This does not necessarily refer to a direct bribe or “quid pro quo,” but a leader can take credit for advocating on behalf of a particular interest group, and the benefit, intangible or otherwise, might accrue immediately. 10. That is, barring a disastrous military conflict that might destroy both superpowers. 11. A good summary of the battle lines between the advocates for engagement and the critics of appeasement, and their trends before September 11 can be found in Ted Carpenter’s “Confusion and Stereotypes: U.S. Policy toward the PRC at the Dawn of the 21st Century”: A struggle is now under way between those who want to perpetuate the cooperative U.S.Chinese relationship of the 1970s and 1980s (with a few modest modifications) and those who see China as a repressive dictatorship and an emerging adversary of the United States and, therefore, favor a more hardline approach in dealing with the PRC. The most prominent members of the first faction are the Clinton administration, representatives of the American business community with its multi-billiondollar economic stake in friendly relations with China, and strategic analysts who fear that a confrontational policy will needlessly create an enemy for the United States. The second faction includes many ideological conservatives (who are repulsed by Beijing’s brutal treatment of political and religious dissidents and see China as an embryonic military superpower), liberal human rights activists, and economic nationalists who are upset about the flood of low-cost goods from the PRC into the American market. It is increasingly apparent that the first faction is experiencing a slow but inexorable decline in strength while the second faction grows stronger and bolder. If those trends do not change, it is likely that there will be a crisis in America’s relations with the PRC as advocates of a containment strategy—treating China as Washington treated the Soviet Union during the Cold War—wrest control of policy from proponents of the status quo. Advocates of engagement will not likely prevail over the long term if the debate is framed (as is now largely the case) as a choice between appeasing Beijing to preserve the profits of American corporations and standing up for fundamental American values. Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Confusion and Stereotypes: U.S. Policy toward the PRC at the Dawn of the 21st Century.” In Carpenter, Ted Galen and James A. Dorn eds. China’s Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat? Cato Institute, 2000, pp. 68–69. 12. The Beijing bus bombings of the late 1990s did not approach the complexity and impact of the al-Qaeda airplane attacks of 2001, but they were touted as a symbol of the threat that separatist elements could pose to the PRC, and brought up as a reason for joint cause with the United States. 13. Some investments do take place over a relatively short time frame, but the closest thing to instantaneous horizon investment would be going to Las Vegas. There is a reason that shaky or suspect investments are often called “get-rich-quick schemes.” 14. “The Future of United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, November 4, 1997. Serial 105–72, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1999, p. 95. This document can also be found at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105hhrg52839/pdf/CHRG-105hhrg52839.pdf 15. Bill Archer, Texas Congressman. “Disapproval of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for China.” July 22, 1998 (House), p. H6083. 16. 36 WCPD 791—“Statement on Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China” Compilation of Presidential Documents. Statements by the President. Tuesday, April 11, 2000. 17. Guanxi 關係 refers to a connection, a relationship that entails a level of mutual entailed benefit through good relations without a necessarily specific indebtedness. It is extremely important in Chinese personal as well as business culture, and often one of the most difficult aspects for foreigners to grasp when entering Asian business relationships. 18. Support on any issue pertaining to Taiwan comes to mind immediately, but this is not articulated directly in any of the agreements; it would more likely be applied in terms of asking

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fellow nations to allow internal issues to be solved internally, and not to support an actor interested in disturbing the stability (and profitability) of international relationships. 19. Often over 10%, sometimes exceeding 15%, but dropping into negative numbers briefly during the mid 70s. See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/taiwan/gdp-growth. 20. See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/taiwan/gdp-growth. 21. Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party. “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century.” Taipei, November 28 1999. Available at: http://taiwandc.org/dpp-pol3.htm 22. Taiwan DPP. “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century,” http://taiwandc. org/dpp-pol3.htm. 23. Groombridge, Mark A. “China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: Costs and Benefits.” In Carpenter, Galen and Dorn eds. China’s Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat?, p. 171. 24. Kokubun, Ryosei. “Globalizing China: The Challenges and the Opportunities.” In Kokubun, Ryosei and Wang Jisi eds. Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order. Japan Center for International Exchange, Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p. 23. 25. Panitchpakdi and Clifford, China and the WTO, p. 33. 26. Xiao Meng, “Call for more WTO research.” China Daily, May 22, 2001. 27. Kokubun, Ryosei. “Globalizing China: The Challenges and the Opportunities,” p. 24. 28. White House Office of Public Liaison, Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, November 17, 1999, http://www.uschina.org. 29. Kissinger, On China, p. 480, citing Lampton, David M. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations, 1989–2000. University of California Press, 2001, pp. 379–80. 30. 36 WCPD 1092-3, “Opening Remarks at a Roundtable Discussion on Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China.” Compilation of Presidential Documents. Addresses and Remarks. Friday, May 12, 2000. 31. 36 WCPD 709—Remarks at a Democratic Leadership Council Conference in San Jose, California. Compilation of Presidential Documents. Addresses and Remarks. Monday, April 3, 2000. 32. Agriculture, for example, is an industry for which some representatives to Congress would advocate strongly, and is one in which both short term and long term prospects would be well served by lowering trade barriers with China. As Congressman Cal Dooley (of California) said in a debate on MFN, “With 1.2 billion people and limited arable land, China must rely on imports to satisfy its demand for food. USDA estimates that two-thirds of the future growth in U.S. farm exports will be in Asia and 50 percent of that increase will come from China alone. Again, this policy of constructive engagement is clearly in the interest of the U.S. farmers.” Debate on “Disapproval of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment For China,” Congressional Record: July 22, 1998 (House), Page H6081. 33. Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, p 435. 34. 36 WCPD 791—“Statement on Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China.” Compilation of Presidential Documents. Statements by the President. Tuesday, April 11, 2000. 35. Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, p. 432. 36. Lin Yi-hsiung. “Engagement with China—a DPP View.” Speech given at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, December 1, 1999. Available at: http://taiwandc.org/ nws-9943.htm 37. Panitchpakdi and Clifford, China and the WTO, p. 120. 38. The decade preceding China’s WTO entry saw the gradual erosion of political and bureaucratic barriers such as the lack of direct air travel, telephone, and postal links. This was facilitated by the return of Hong Kong to the mainland regime, as it already had those direct relations with Taiwan. Not all of these barriers to the movement of people and ideas have been removed, but increasing investment and new communications technologies have made those remaining considerably less relevant. 39. Chu Yun-han, “Power Transition and the Making of Beijing’s Policy Toward Taiwan.” The China Quarterly, no. 176, December 2003, p. 977. 40. Jiang Zemin, keynote speech at the dinner for the opening of the Fortune Global Forum 2001 in Hong Kong, May 10, 2001. Text at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25025. htm

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41. Tang Jiaxuan at the 8th Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum. Hanoi, 25 July 2001. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25038.htm. 42. Increasing wealth disparity can be a significant cause of resentment and instability, particularly for a state which bases its ideology on the ideal of socialist equality. For more on this, see Chen, Shaohua and Yan Wang. “China’s Growth and Poverty Reduction—Trends Between 1990 and 1999.” The World Bank Development Research Group Policy Research Working Paper, 2001. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/research/2001/07/1552067/ chinas-growth-poverty-reduction-trends-between-1990-1999. 43. “In a Trade War, China Takes the Bigger Hit.” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1996. 44. 36 WCPD 487—Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Compilation of Presidential Documents. Addresses and Remarks. Wednesday, March 8, 2000, p. 491. 45. Bush, George W. Statement on the Ministerial Decision to Admit the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan Into the World Trade Organization.” Compilation of Presidential Documents, 37 WCPD 1648, Sunday, November 11, 2001. Compilation of Presidential Documents. Statements by the President. Sunday, November 11, 2001. 46. “The Future of United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, November 4, 1997. Serial 105–72, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1999, p. 135. Also available at: http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105hhrg52839/pdf/CHRG-105hhrg52839.pdf 47. “The Future of United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization,” p. 8. 48. “The Future of United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, November 4, 1997. Serial 105–72, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1999, p. 133. Also available at: http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105hhrg52839/pdf/CHRG-105hhrg52839.pdf 49. Clifford Stearns, Florida Congressman. “Disapproval of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for China.” Congressional Record: July 22, 1998 (House), p. H6087. 50. David Bonior, Michigan congressman, Disapproval of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for China. Congressional Record: July 22, 1998 (House), Page H6085. 51. A November 19-December 17, 2001 poll asking people “Thinking of all the issues presently confronting your country, which one do you feel should receive the greatest attention from your country’s leaders?” resulted in 14% answering “the economy,” and 37% answering “jobs/unemployment.” Ipsos Reid Poll, Feb. 20, 2002. See http://poll.orspub.com 52. Dobson, Richard “Beijing unlikely to use links to force ‘one China.’” Taipei Times, July 04, 2000, p. 1. Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/07/04/ 0000042450. 53. Sobel, Richard, William-Arthur Haynes, Yu Zheng. “Taiwan Public Opinion Trends, 1992–2008: Exploring Attitudes on Cross-Strait Issues.” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 74, no. 4, Winter 2010, p. 803. 54. Chu Yun-han, “Power Transition and the Making of Beijing’s Policy Toward Taiwan.” The China Quarterly, no. 176, December 2003, p. 977. 55. Clinton, William J. “Opening Remarks at a Roundtable Discussion on Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China.” Compilation of Presidential Documents. Addresses and Remarks, 36– WCPD 1093. Friday, May 12, 2000. 56. Clinton, William J. “Statement on Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China.” Compilation of Presidential Documents. Statements by the President, 36—WCPD 791 Tuesday, April 11, 2000. 57. Its growth rate slowed during the late 1990s, dropping below 10% to as low as 7% in 1997, but that level of growth is still impressive, and the levels rebounded a few years later. China’s GDP growth rate, while not the only indicator of economic strength, can give a good sense of the pace of its economy in the years leading up to its WTO entry. From 1992 to 1997 (the year of the Asian Financial Crisis), its growth was always higher than 8%, peaking as high

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as 14%. Even after the AEC, it hovered between 7-8%. See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ china/gdp-growth, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China, website: www.stats.gov.cn 58. For more on this, see Chen, Shaohua and Yan Wang. “China’s Growth and Poverty Reduction—Trends Between 1990 and 1999.” The World Bank Development Research Group Policy Research Working Paper, 2001. At: http://www.worldbank.org/research/2001/07/ 1552067/chinas-growth-poverty-reduction-trends-between-1990-1999. 59. Zhu Rongji. “Strengthening East Asian Cooperation and Promoting Common Development.” Statement at the 5th 10+3 Summit. Bandar Seri Begawan, November 5, 2001. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25044.htm 60. Jiang Zemin, Speech at the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting, November 19, 1995. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24907.htm 61. Jiang Zemin, “Striving for Development and Prosperity Through Cooperation,” Speech at the APEC CEO Summit, August 10, 2001. At: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/ t25042.htm 62. Jiang Zemin, speech at the Third ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, May 25, 2001. At: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25028.htm 63. Chu Yun-han, “Power Transition and the Making of Beijing’s Policy Toward Taiwan.” The China Quarterly no. 176, December 2003, p. 967. 64. Jim Kolbe, Arizona Congressman. Debate on “Disapproval of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment For China,” Congressional Record: July 22, 1998 (House), Page H6084. 65. Howard Lange, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, speaking at “The Future of United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, November 4, 1997. Serial 105–72, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1999. Also available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105hhrg52839/pdf/CHRG-105hhrg52839.pdf 66. The past ten years since the PRC’s WTO admission have seen continued economic development with a minimum of parallel political liberalization. In 2011, it was more difficult to be sanguine about the PRC’s prospects for democratization than in 2001. It is important to keep in mind that stronger optimism of the late 1990s when considering the decision-making process surrounding China policy. If it is difficult to see these events without the hindsight of the past decade, bear in mind that the debate around the PRC’s WTO entry took place in a climate barely a decade after the massacre at Tiananmen, and each year had seen dramatic changes in China’s economy and infrastructure. That constant stream of radical change could be seen as pointing to tremendous opportunities to transform the Chinese ideological landscape at the opening of the 21st century. 67. Clinton, William. “Remarks on Signing Legislation on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China,” Compilation of Presidential Documents 36 WCPD 2419, October 10, 2000. 68. Branch, Taylor. The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President, p. 305. 69. Though outright trade wars are something the WTO seeks to prevent, certainly the terms of some agreements can be more positive or negative, depending on the nature of the negotiations. 70. Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party. “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century.” Taipei, November 28, 1999. Available at: http://taiwandc.org/dpp-pol3.htm 71. Phil Crane, Illinois congressman [and Chair of the Subcommittee]. “The Future of United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, November 4, 1997. Serial 105–72, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1999, 43. Also available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-105hhrg52839/pdf/CHRG-105hhrg52839.pdf 72. I again use this in the Kantian sense, representing a global solidarist outlook, and not a comment on any level of cultural refinement. For all his admirable qualities, an urbane sophistication is not the first thing that comes to mind for a president famous for his McDonald’s runs. 73. Some interesting parallels with Nixon could be drawn here. Struggling with an embattled domestic scandal, history has often judged him quite positively with respect to his international accomplishments, particularly his work in bringing China into the international commu-

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nity. Certainly Clinton would be interested in establishing such a legacy for himself, to help brighten an image tarnished with his own issues of honesty, obstruction of justice, and abuse of presidential power. 74. Clinton, William. J. “Remarks on Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status for China.” Compilation of Presidential Documents 36 WCPD 1036, Tuesday, May 9, 2000. 75. See his “Diary of A Madman,” available in a wide number of translations of the short story collection A Call to Arms (1922). 76. The underground transplant organ market, while the subject of urban legends of nightclub kidney-theft, is a real and documented issue in China. Executed prisoners are routinely harvested for their usable parts (if not the whole bodies, to which the increasingly popular exhibitions of preserved bodies can attest). Adoption of Asian babies by Western families is often presented as helping children escape poverty and subjugation, but some portion of the substantial “adoption fees” go to profit those engaged in a form of human trafficking. The recorded statistics on these issues are understandably limited, but there is no reason why these issues will not continue, particularly the ones that would serve to add value to the bourgeoning fields of medicine in which those possessing resources can extend their lives at the expense of those who do not. 77. The work of modern Confucian scholars like Tu Weiming are well known, and have even been utilized by leaders seeking to add a deeper cultural dimension to their regimes. See Daniel Bell’s China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society.

Conclusion Futures’ Beginning: Concluding Thoughts

It has been over ten years since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and almost two decades since the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis. The process of decision-making at the time can now be considered with a decade or more of hindsight. The long-term implications will take time to emerge, but already we have moved beyond the short-term horizons that were used by the American, Chinese, and Taiwanese decision-makers in our case studies. Some of their hopes, and fears, have been manifested, while others were empty hopes—at least in this length of time. In order to better appreciate how the US–China–Taiwan relationship has arrived at its current form, clarify the intentions and behavior of each state, and develop a framework for better communication and mutual understanding, this project has introduced a new methodological approach to decisionmaking. This formalized time horizon concept offers a level of nuance and systematization that other analyses of time perspective do not offer. This is not to say that every conclusion of a study using temporal horizons would be radically different, but as discussed in the final section of chapter 2, it can often help produce new (or unexpected) conclusions. Considering that the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China will likely be the defining feature of international relations in the twenty-first century, a project that looks at pivotal interactions in military and economic affairs at the close of the twentieth has much to offer. This study began with an introduction to the time horizon concept, and how it can help to answer the persistent challenge of comprehending the decision-making process. The overview laid out and established the expectations and direction of the work, and concluded with a warning to ignore this 201

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contribution at the theorists’ peril. Was this warning justified? After establishing the principles and framework in the second chapter, to facilitate the application to our time horizons, I elaborated the six part structure of my horizons of interest. As I mentioned above, no study of which I am aware directs very much attention to the distinctions between lengths of time used in considering policies and outcomes. This provides considerable methodological leverage in observing otherwise unnoticeable perception shifts and differences in process. Every case-based study, no matter how comprehensive, always makes a deliberate choice in terms of what to study, and thereby excludes a variety of other phenomena and actors. My selections were no different, but in looking at two great powers, one rising and one predominant, and one middle range society in a state of existential flux, I have covered a considerable range of state types in a small and significantly intertwined set. In selecting my cases, I did not simply choose a military and an economic event to illustrate the high-stakes decisions considered in different realms of hard power; these two cases have served to define the terms of the interaction between the US and China for the coming decades. They are not just important as individually significant events, but because of the trajectory they initiate and exemplify, into the far-reaching future. In the closing section of the second chapter, I attempt to anticipate the perceptions of that far future by considering how the “trajectory” and past lessons of precedent inform considerations of the direction in which it is moving, and at what pace. Other studies have yielded significant insight into the use of the past to consider the future, but the use of the specific time horizons can show that an emphasis on the recent past would inspire a radically different view of future prospects than a longer historical perspective. The awareness of both is captured effectively through the symmetry of the horizon idea. The second chapter casts a wide theoretical net; in looking at many disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, as well as diverse approaches from within Political Science and International Relations, the literature review reflects the many ways to utilize time in considering human behavior and cognition. Methods like construal (level) theory and prospect theory often aim to do much the same thing as the time horizon concept. The psychological experimental research is limited in its direct applicability to our work because it is not conducted on gainfully employed political leaders, making decisions with real stakes or costs. 1 Prospect theory has been extensively applied to political science and IR, but its reliance on formulas sometimes obscures the difficulties in ever applying the copious formulas they provide to a real situation. This will be revisited in the last notes to this chapter.

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The section attempting to systematize the “influences on horizon” does nothing dramatically different from other methodical studies of the factors that contribute to the decision-making process, but it does give the reader a better sense of the challenges faced in providing a consistent result in tracing the origins of a time horizon selection (or any number of other character traits). The final section of the third chapter is perhaps one of the most important in demonstrating the theoretical contribution of the time horizon concept. A variety of methodological approaches can yield different, if not opposite, results with the addition of nothing more than a time horizon refinement. As the concept can be integrated into most theories without altering their fundamental assumptions, it adds value and insight without being disruptive or argumentative—the perfect theoretical companion. As said above, the choices of case in this study seem to offer a solid combination of methodological robustness and relevance to issues of major global significance. The consideration of the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis is successful in providing a rich level of rhetorical data, less vulnerable to many of the sources of distortion to which public discourse is prone. The analysis of the horizon categories within each state actor yielded consistent, though sometimes surprising, results: the discourse pertaining to a given time horizon showed a different sense of the situation and preferred outcomes than others, though not always in the direction one might have thought. The tension between the horizons, summarized at the end of the chapter, demonstrates the tangible impact that the horizons can have in understanding a practical situation in international relations—dramatic evidence of the importance of this theory. The interplay in the missile crisis between using short term tactics for longer term flexibility, and long term conceptions to mobilize shorter term action, is a fascinating study in how the distinct horizons do not exist in isolation, but act upon one another. As opposed to the case of WTO accession, the missile crisis had a definite end, though the tension it exemplified remains constantly beneath all interactions between Taiwan and the mainland. The contribution of a new dimension in understanding and possibly even anticipating aspects of such a tense and potentially explosive situation is of great value for policy makers and all those who work for international peace or democracy. As for the World Trade Organization process, some of the horizon details were almost the opposite of the first case, allowing for greater methodological diversity. During the uproar over the Cornell visit, first free elections, and military exercises, no one believed that the ultimate schism between the ROC and PRC would be resolved quickly—therefore there were some definite limits on what the short term posed. In the WTO case, unlike the Strait crisis, the short term details were often uncertain and hotly debated, while the

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ultimate outcome—the PRC’s accession—was considered a fairly forgone conclusion. In the WTO chapter, I observed that the longer, more methodical horizons were often considerably more influential than in the missile crisis case. The dichotomy between the two actors is striking: Beijing’s long term interests are primarily economic, while their short term interests are political. American policy makers touted the economic benefits of the immediate and short terms, while revealing their hopes for long-term political transformation. This is not just a situation in which actors view a situation differently because of unique interests; after all, each state has economic and political considerations, merely in different time frames. This is powerful evidence that the time horizon is a potent tool in clarifying contrasts when analyzing state motivations and behavior. All this being said, the project has much to offer in and of itself, but also in potential contributions to other fields within and outside Political Science and International Relations. Even outside the academy, the time horizon concept can provide some useful tools for work in a variety of disciplines and private sector projects, as well as in the halls of power. This includes the broad theoretical approach as well as its application to our cases. While the WTO accession is complete, economic cooperation and competition remains a constant on the international scene. While the Taiwan Missile Crisis is over, and the future for Taiwan relations appears to have less potential for generating direct confrontation, there is a situation developing as of the publication of this book that reflects many of the same impulses and temporal horizons at play. SHORT HORIZON RISK, INTERMEDIATE INTIMIDATION, LONG HORIZON REDEFINITION Since the missile crisis, the dynamics of the PRC-ROC relationship have changed, in part due to the outcomes of our other case, the WTO entry of both governments. With lowered economic barriers, increasing trade relations and investment, Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence on the mainland has served to soften calls for outright independence, both for fear of upsetting its largest trading partner and promoting instability in its vulnerable economy. While many circumstances between Beijing and Taipei point to a decreasing likelihood of another Taiwan Straits missile crisis, many of the same policy influences that motivated the PRC’s missile testing seem to remain, and have manifested themselves in a different target. In November of 2013, seeking to solidify its claims to disputed islands in the East China Sea, Beijing unilaterally announced that it was establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone in that area, requiring all foreign aircraft to

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notify the PRC before entry. The zone extended far past the PRC’s borders, and was considered highly provocative. In addition to widespread international concern over the policy, the US immediately sent a number of B-52 bombers into the zone without notification, and reiterated its defense commitments to Japan. Beijing did not escalate militarily, choosing not to respond in a direct or immediate manner. There are a striking number of similarities to the Taiwan straits crisis. In an attempt to send a signal regarding the seriousness of its intentions regarding disputed territories, the PRC strengthened the resolve of the interested parties and alienated the international community, causing particular concern among its Asian neighbors. For a nation that had been working to cultivate an image of working for a “harmonious world” and striving to set the tone for regional cooperation in East Asia, such a move can undo years of soft power efforts. The Zone was particularly directed at Japan (the primary disputant for the islands), but drew criticism from Asian nations with supposedly stronger relations with the PRC. “The Chinese action also stirred the first official negative comments about China in South Korea since President Park Geun-hye took office this year and forged a closer relationship with Beijing.” 2 Unlike the missile testing, establishment of the ADIZ does not seem to have a concrete long-term deterrence benefit that could serve to justify potentially risky behavior, i.e., keeping the options open for reunification. Instead, it appears that longer horizon goals were more broadly framed in terms of pushing the limits of acceptable behavior in the region, with an eye towards solidifying claims on disputed territories and establishing the PRC as the dominant power in the region. Just as with the Missile Crisis, this could also be seen as s justification for a shorter time horizon misstep. As with the missile crisis, a new and somewhat unproved leader (in this case, Xi Jinping) sought to illustrate his ability to take a firm stance on challenges to the PRC’s sovereignty and international reputation. This might have been intended to answer domestic challenges to authority than its apparent international component. These challenges would come from both hard-line elements in the PRC government, including ranking members in the PLA, as well as the groundswell of public nationalism eager to assert China’s power in Asia and worldwide. The best way to satisfy their concerns? Face short term criticism in exchange for accommodation on the longer horizon. As one informed China watcher observed: [According to] Xi, who I am sure ordered this . . . Whatever short term blowback we get on this, it’s worth it for the incremental pushing of the envelope and asserting our claims and standing up as a great power, going after territory and resources over the over the long run and influence in the

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Apropos of our earlier discussion regarding the importance of looking back to temporal horizons of the past, again we see echoes of historical events playing out on the present stage. The situation is not identical, as China’s capabilities have increased in relation to the other actors, but again Beijing’s miscalculating attempt to present an assertive face to the international community proves counterproductive and provokes a humbling response that might only be justified in the longer horizons. As the Honorable Winston Lord described the situation: China in terms of relative power is much a stronger position, obviously, militarily, as well economically and specifically the kinds of stuff they need. Having said that, they are still at a disadvantage versus not only us but Japan and others, in terms of both maritime and air stuff. So that’s one thing. Secondly, this is not as provocative as lobbing missiles around Taiwan, but it is very provocative . . . they didn’t consult anybody, which we have done in the past, and Japan and South Korea have done when we’ve done this . . . it’s all the more important when it’s obviously a sensitive time generally and specifically over this space . . . They’re saying everybody has to identify themselves when they go through this whether or not they’re coming into Chinese territory. So they’ve redefined identification zones, they’ve done it unilaterally, without consulting or notifying anybody except for maybe South Korea half an hour ahead of time. And in the current context of all the tensions in the Senkakus and the South China sea and so on it’s really quite provocative. And it’s again they shoot themselves in the foot. Now even [Korea and Japan are] pissed off, you’ve given Abe the excuse and the political heft to raise his military budget and change his constitution by citing the Chinese provocations. You’re driving ASEAN and others toward the United States and Japan, and it’s costing us all our goodwill . . . and this really screwed things up, versus those who say “look, that’s a short term price, getting to your thesis, and over the long run this incremental pushing of the envelopes to assert our claims, to get respect as a power, to get our hands on resources on the long run, it’s worth it, whatever price we pay in the short run.” 4

Such rationalizations might even prove true in a longer temporal horizon, but those outcomes might have been achieved in a less confrontational way, in a manner that might not have so colored the perspectives of other nations with respect to the PRC’s intentions and methods. Potential alternatives might have emerged from more careful thinking about how exactly the specific horizons can play out and manifest themselves in the future. In addition, temporal horizons might inform political discourse, both on the domestic level and internationally, to help achieve desirable goals more effectively in a number of time frames.

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How to Make Friends and Influence Policy (with Time Horizons to spare) The majority of this work has been devoted to understanding how time horizons have had an impact on the decision-making process in some important events in the US-PRC relationship. We have looked at some of the difficulties in isolating the horizons from the other elements in how decisions are made, but the fact remains that horizons play a vital role in informing the philosophies and policies in each state. Beyond seeing them in the ideas and words of political leaders, and developing another variable in the analysis of foreign policy, how can the time horizon concept be useful? I would argue that ultimately an understanding of time horizon can make for improved recommendations for policy, and new techniques for diplomatic engagement. Decisions made by other states, such as the PRC, may be more comprehensible and predictable if the nature of the time scale being used by decision-makers is understood by US policy makers. If, as I argue, the timeframe used by the decision-maker has a significant impact on decision outcomes holding constant many of the other standard explanatory variables, there is significant potential to influence foreign policy decisions through careful articulation of, and persuasion vis-à-vis, the most beneficial (or at least appealing) horizon. It is much more likely that a leader can be persuaded to change his or her thoughts on what time frame to use than to fundamentally adapt his or her personality, domestic situation, cultural background, etc. The time horizon-centered persuasion could be the “secret weapon” that can tip the balance in difficult negotiations. In particular, since the US-PRC relationship will likely define the shape of International Relations in the coming century, anything that focuses on those states, and decisions affecting their relationship, will be of particular importance. In this case, an understanding of how the future is seen and used in decisions can go far beyond the use of analogical reasoning using the past by itself. As one future-oriented scholar pointed out, “‘Learning’ from history is of practical import only insofar as it influences later formulation of policy options and policy choices in contexts that must inevitably differ from the source of ‘lessons’ on which it is based.” 5 SEEING THE FUTURE BY . . . LOOKING AT THE FUTURE: HORIZONS AND PREDICTIVE FRAMEWORKS As with many approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis, the use of temporal horizons can yield some effective clues to explanations of behavior and choice selection, but it cannot provide an effective method for anticipating future behavior. Such a technique has long been the “holy grail” for behav-

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ioral psychologists, political scientists, and policy practitioners. As we have discussed above, there are a number of personal attributes that might help explain why a certain time horizon is preferred in making decisions. These attributes, such as age, gender, personality type, status, have already been used to great effect in other analytical methods in and of themselves. So why would adding the additional layer of time horizons be useful? Ideally theories are parsimonious, and developing a system of greater complexity with additional variables seems counter-productive. I would argue that the time horizon method can prove a useful shortcut in looking at policy preference, particularly with respect to prediction. It might not be able to serve as an infallible crystal ball, but a good understanding of a decision-maker’s temporal horizon (obtained by analyzing his or her previous decisions, discourse, and values) can be quite useful in anticipating the policy choice that would appeal to him or her. As mentioned above, this is also helpful in persuasion, but should the advocacy not prove successful, knowing the relevant horizon would help explain why. Horizons for China Watchers Looking at, studying, and commenting on the US-China relationship has become a booming industry. As the trajectory of the PRC’s economy continues and Americans become more concerned about their domestic well being, there is considerable fear on the US side, and waxing confidence on the part of the Chinese. The majority of these feelings are based on looking into the future. Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the PRC’s economy has moved from something comparable to that of Italy, barely one tenth that of the US, to one in third place, after only the US and the combined European Union. 6 With the largest labor force, greatest current account balance, investment rate, reserves of foreign exchange and gold, 7 and since 2008 the largest foreign holder of American debt, 8 it is not surprising that China kindles avarice in the hearts of investors, and fear in nationalists of other great powers. The investment rate mentioned above is particularly significant. Not only does China have a 47.8% rate of investing, the highest percentage worldwide, but the only countries with anything approaching that rate have much smaller economies. The next-ranked large economy is fifteenth-ranked India, at 32%. 9 That source does not indicate what kind of investments these are (short term, long term, commercial, infrastructural, high tech or heavy manufacturing, etc.) but clearly people in China are thinking about the future. An analysis of the different ways to think about the future has been a major goal of this work. One assumption that will be challenged below is the idea that longer planning is better planning. Shorter horizons can sometimes have advantages with respect to rapidly changing or unpredictable contexts.

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In this case, however, it seems clear that the desire for shorter-term outcomes produces less effective results. The reality of many of China’s investment choices reflects the emphasis of a particular time horizon. A significant proportion of PRC domestic investments emphasize urban physical capital improvement over human investment and education, suggesting a short-sighted perspective prioritizing easier, more rapid gains at the expense of more challenging, uncertain, and ultimately more productive choices that might serve the greater interests of national growth, stabilization, and long-term prosperity. 10 Sometimes the sheer force of size and numbers can mislead one from the flexibility that comes with a more nimble society and economy. As one article on China’s long-term shortcomings vis-à-vis the US, puts it, “the metaphors of elephants and gazelles come to mind.” 11 Many of the best-selling books bemoaning the new dynamics of the USChina relationship take the US to task for not planning sufficiently, and crediting Beijing for its long-term thinking. As we have been observing in this study, a wide range of time horizons can be found in each regime, and there are many factors that influence which one takes precedence. The visions of the PRC’s future discussed in chapter 1 become recursively selffulfilling; the PRC makes strong investments into its future, and it feels its future prospects are good, so it feels positively about investing more, etc. But what about the short term? What about now? Using a less distant time horizon, the looming China threat seems to vanish, at least in terms of politics and diplomacy. The foreign policy analysts who look at the current facts of the China relationship, and its immediate prospects, are considerably more sanguine. They point to Beijing’s interest in joining international organizations, cooperation in negotiations with North Korea, eagerness to point out the benefits of global consensus and multilateral cooperation. The current gap in military and economic capacity is significant (though diminishing). The fact is that the strength and potency of the long horizon makes the immediate facts on the ground almost impossible to take on their own terms. During the time of our cases, it was even more so. In the mid-1990s, China was a middle range power—but one whose longer horizons dominated how it was perceived, as well as its self-perception. Stereotypes, Horizons, and Optimum Outcomes We have discussed some of the stereotypical perceptions regarding the ability to “think ahead” in Eastern and Western civilizations. The idea is that of the “timeless,” “patient” Chinese with their “inscrutable” sources of wisdom, who possess a harmonious relationship with the future. Meanwhile, the conflicted, unbalanced, constantly driven people of Western civilization (partic-

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ularly Americans), out of balance with nature and themselves, seek petty short-term gain that is ultimately devoid of spiritual value. Is there any truth to these claims? No serious students of comparative politics (or any discipline) would assert that people from China have a mystical connection to the great balance of Time, and no one familiar with Chinese environmental policies can claim that they are in harmony with nature. However, there are attributes of the mainland political system that might be conducive to a longer horizon, and might help to explain the investment rates we have been discussing. Certainly high-level cadres in China do not have to worry about being elected (or reelected) to their positions. They do, however, need to adhere to party doctrine, particularly with respect to highly sensitive matters like the status of Taiwan and relations with the United States, if they want to keep (or elevate) their position. This pressure can constrain a time horizon just as much as democratic politics. That stereotypical view of the longer Chinese perspective might have some roots in fact. Certainly people have a strong awareness of the length of their own history, and they are often willing to bring it up, both in PRC and in ROC rhetoric. As Lee Teng-Hui discussed in his inaugural speech, After five thousand years the Chinese are still going strong solely because they derive sustenance from an excellent culture. Under the strong impact of Western civilization since the mid-19th century, Chinese culture has gone through tribulations and shocks giving rise to a sharp decline in national confidence. Bearing this in mind, I have never stopped thinking about cultural regeneration. I am hoping that the people of Taiwan will nurture a new life culture as well as a broad and long-sighted view of life. 12

And in Jiang Zemin’s Taiwan reunification speech: The splendid culture of five thousand years created by the sons and daughters of all ethnic groups of China has become ties keeping the entire Chinese people close at heart and constitutes an important basis for the peaceful reunification of the motherland. People on both sides of the Taiwan Straits should inherit and carry forward the fine traditions of the Chinese culture. 13

Obviously nothing comparable can be found in American political discourse. Even references to the founding fathers have dropped dramatically in frequency since the bicentennial. Contemporary political discourse often refers to the Second World War (in reference to terrorism especially), and more recently and depressingly, the Great Depression. Even the Teapot Dome scandal, in which economic skullduggery cost the central government revenue, does not get much in the way of analogy these days.

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So how would this extended sense of time lead to good policy? The question of best outcomes is one of the most important considerations for policy-makers. As we have seen in our cases, longer term perspectives are not always the most effective, practical, or ultimately beneficial, and a culture that leans towards longer horizons because of an affinity with their self perception (or for a host of other reasons) is not guaranteed to make the best decisions. Horizons and Defective Thinking, or the Problems with Planning According to conventional wisdom and proverb, thinking and planning further ahead in the future is a good thing. “A stitch in time saves nine,” “Look before you leap,” and we all know who ended up getting the worm. Certainly living purely in the now can be hazardous (if not downright fatal), but that does not imply that the opposite take will yield a better life. Sometimes planning ahead can be the wrong move, especially if one assumes a steady progression into the future. For example, those who heavily invested in fiber optic technology and ethernet retrofitting were planning for the future, poised to take advantage of the promise of new technologies. Many of these people who found to their dismay that the technology leapfrogged directly into wireless connectivity. 14 The PRC is often praised for its strategic thinking in securing energy sources for the coming decades. However, a chiliastic horizon might anticipate a transformation in energy production rendering these titanic efforts irrelevant at best, and destabilizing and costing Beijing good will at worst. A nation in the 1890s that stockpiled a strategic resource like whale oil might have been considered far thinking as well. In determining one’s optimum horizon, it is vital to consider the direction, what we called the “shape” of the future, in order to make productive and beneficial policy choices. Old or incomplete data can cause completely counterproductive results, even with intentions of forethought and sacrifice. It is a truism to say that our information about the future—and even the present—is less than perfect. Sometimes making rigid plans based on current information, even with the intention of thinking ahead, can prove self-defeating. One cannot help but think of the “Disco Stu” character on “The Simpsons,” who, in trying to sell franchises in his dancing school, pointed out that “disco record sales were up 400% for the year 1976 . . . If these trends continue . . . [exuberant] Ayyy!” 15 Another quote from the same source suggests the difficulties of truly knowing the future, and what lessons to take from the past. When asked to clean the basement and get rid of the old calendars and TV Guides, Homer replied “Are you mad, woman? You never

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know when an old calendar might come in handy. Sure, it’s not 1985 now, but who knows what tomorrow will bring?” 16 The Woody Allen film Sleeper also satirizes those who adhere too strictly to the doctrines of the moment: Dr. Melik: This morning for breakfast he requested something called “wheat germ, organic honey and tiger’s milk.” Dr. Aragon: [chuckling] Oh, yes. Those are the charmed substances that some years ago were thought to contain life-preserving properties. Dr. Melik: You mean there was no deep fat? No steak or cream pies or . . . hot fudge? Dr. Aragon: Those were thought to be unhealthy . . . precisely the opposite of what we now know to be true. Dr. Melik: Incredible. Life has imitated art over the past several years as the near panic about sodium content in food included a recent proposal to ban salt in all cooking in New York City; a recent large-scale study showed that high sodium levels are likely to be harmless to the vast majority of the population. One could always argue that with better information, planning ahead for the long term is the right thing to do. This is certainly true with perfect information. However, that is in relatively limited supply. It would be illadvised to completely ignore the longer term horizons because every piece of information is imperfect, or to get a job removing asbestos because you think the health risk will be proved fallacious, or to get that tattoo across your chest at three in the morning because you’re not thinking about the next day. But always to forsake the short term for potential longer-term benefit is not merely cold calculation, it is joyless and can eliminate what makes life worth living—if that is so, why bother extending it? In hearing Aesop’s fable about the “Ant and the Grasshopper,” one is supposed to emulate the industrious ant, who lives past the summer, but I can’t help but think that living a long life with (or as) this ant doesn’t sound like the most appealing prospect. Recalling’s Steve Chan’s “elephant and gazelle” image to describe the contrast between the nimble, information technology oriented US and the Soviet-style massive economy of the PRC, but it is far easier to take down a highly stressed gazelle than a stolid elephant. Sometimes the gazelle can even die of heart failure without a predator nearby; this might bring to mind the possibilities of a developed western economy experiencing crisis not from an external source, but from the vulnerabilities within its own system, like speculation on risky real estate loans.

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When it comes to the question of convincing people by using time horizons, that goal can sometimes be achieved by the presentation of similar material in a manner that resonates with the preferred horizon of the listener. This, as we discussed before, can be a genuine method of categorizing information in a way most helpful to someone seeking to make optimum policy choices. It can also be a way to mislead by taking advantage of one’s time horizon preference. The Zhuangzi, the third century BCE Daoist classic, contains the story of the monkey keeper and the absurdity of those who are obsessed with time without considering the larger issues: A monkey keeper handing out nuts said, “Three every morning and four every evening [for you].” The monkeys were all in a rage. “All right,” he said, “four every morning and three every evening [for you].” The monkeys were all delighted. Without anything being missed out either in name or in substance, their pleasure and anger were put to use.” 17

The Long Term Horizons for Our Horizons Originally this idea emerged from thinking about how to study the moral content of decisions. One of the major obstacles to that project was the fact that nearly every decision can be justified in moral terms, as long as you use a time frame that fits in with your justification. Stalin’s purges were in service of creating the greater good of the workers’ paradise, and any number of atrocities can be claimed to be for ultimately moral purposes. There are other perspectives that do not allow timeframe to enter into moral evaluation at all; some Quakers and Buddhists, for example, do not approve of violence under any circumstances, no matter how much future evil might be prevented by a violent action. This evokes a potential normative aspect to work in this direction. While much of this project has used the time horizon idea with respect to materialist outcomes and goals, the fact is that norms and values can play a key role in determining which time horizon is used, and as construal theory indicates, the time frame may in fact determine the nature of moral judgment of decisions. 18 Considering the nature of temporal horizons and how it affects important decisions leads to two fundamental questions regarding the future: How can we think about time in a way that produces the best outcomes? Can we even determine best outcomes, since it would depend on our time perspective? This is a difficult problem, to say the least. The challenge in evaluating decision-making becomes dramatically increased with the addition of temporal factors. “From a practical point of view . . . a serious attempt to extend a decision problem in time typically involves a significant increase in the number of action variables and in the complexity in the space of strategies.” 19 It is beyond the scope of this immediate project to answer these questions

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precisely, if they can be answered in that way at all. 20 However, my research, and its application to cases of strategic importance, has pointed to some interesting directions, and provides a valuable theoretical addition for many approaches to looking at decisions and outcomes in International Relations. Thinking about it by means of a longer horizon, this approach can have the potential to deepen—and lengthen—our understanding of the decisions made by great powers, and how they might be improved. NOTES 1. However, if a confederation of impoverished graduate students were ever to form their own country, the data we would have on their psychological outlook and preferences will be astounding. 2. Perlez, Jane. “After Challenges, China Appears to Backpedal on Air Zone.” New York Times, November 27, 2013. 3. Lord, Winston. Interview with the author, December 19, 2013. 4. Ibid. 5. Bennett, James. “Data Stories: Learning about Learning from the U.S. Experience in Vietnam.” in Sylvan and Chan eds., Foreign Policy Decision Making, p. 229. 6. International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, Gross Domestic Product Data for 2000-1. At: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2000/02/data/ngdpd_a. csv 7. Kissinger, On China¸ p. 480. 8. CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ch.html 9. CIA World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2185rank.html?countryName=China&countryCode=ch®ionCode= eas&rank=1#ch 10. See Heckman, James J. “China’s Human Capital Investment.” China Economic Review, vol. 16, issue 1, 2005, pp. 50–70. 11. Chan, Steve. “Is There A Power Transition Between the U.S. and China? The Different Faces of National Power.” Asian Survey, vol. xlv, no. 5, September/October 2005, p. 700. 12. Lee Teng-Hui, Inaugural Speech, published in the “Tribute To President Lee Teng-Hui, President of the Republic of China.” Congressional Record: May 23, 1996 (Senate), pages S5617-S5619. 13. Jiang Zemin, “Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland.” January 30, 1995. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24905.htm 14. This evokes the advantage that newly industrializing countries have in competing against established fully-industrialized nations. Taking advantage of previous technical innovation, the less developed states can construct the newest, most efficient technology, while older nations cannot tear down their aging infrastructure every time something new comes around (though this appears to be the philosophy behind computers and cell phones . . .) 15. The Simpsons, “The Twisted World of Marge Simpson.” January 19, 1997. 16. The Simpsons, “Bart Gets an Elephant.” March 31, 1994. This also points to the levels of nuance that one should consider in informing one’s horizons. It will never be 1985 again (barring a new calindrical measuring system), so the statement sounds ridiculous. However, the pattern of days in each month matches up again every so often. In fact, Homer could have used this calendar again in 1991, 2002, and 2013, to name a few. 17. Zhuangzi, A.C. Graham translation, p. 54, with personal modifications. 18. Eyal, Liberman, and Trope. “Judging Near and Distant Virtue and Vice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 44, issue 4, July 2008, pp. 1204–1209. 19. Radner, Roy. “Mathematical Specifications of Goals for Decision Problems.” In Shelley and Bryan editors, Human Judgments and Optimality, p. 210.

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20. Beyond the usual challenges in considering the entirety of a decision qualitatively, one could represent an attempt to systematically calculate the holistic benefit of a decision over all time frames. If one had the ability to calculate the benefit of a decision in a particular time horizon, one could provide the sum total of benefits over all horizons. In addition to the benefit (b), the calculation would also have to include a time distortion factor (τ), which would represent the impact that a given decision would have with respect to other time frames. It would have to include things like the frustration from delay, the loss of immediate payoffs to achieve longer-term accrual, the limitations of having less flexible policy options over time, etc. A large value would result in a smaller benefit in a given horizon. Finally, the sum would also have to include a variable factor (v), which would represent circumstances specific to a particular time horizon but does not represent a factor constantly present over time. This could include a onetime unpredictable event like a famine or terrorist attack, or a periodic but not consistently present event like an election. The sum benefit of a given decision could be presented thus:

With this calculation, one could compare the aggregate benefits that come from a given decision in all time frames. Of course, the real difficulty here is to actually be able to put a numerical value on something like the “total benefit” of a decision, even in one time horizon, since there are many arbitrary, subjective, or intangible facets of any decision, especially when considering it for the benefit of an entire nation, or even the human race. To extend this to an even more impractical extreme, if one wanted to use more than our six time horizons, and could calculate the benefit and time distortion factors in increasingly smaller demarcations of time out to an infinite time or, since considering a decision out to infinity seems impractical, an arbitrarily determined distance in the future (a), the benefit of a decision could be represented by the integral function, taking the benefit and the time distortion values and representing them as functions over time (t):

This would not work perfectly as the v factor is not a continuous function, and therefore could not properly be integrated. If this was the most glaring challenge in applying this formula, the project might be conceivable in the long-term horizon. As it stands now, only the most chiliastic theorist could consider such calculation a possibility. Certainly rational choice modeling can be an effective tool for analysis and informing policy under a variety of conditions, but when one begins to consider the rich complexity of the articulated time horizon model, it is clear that our qualitative approach has been the appropriate choice.

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Index

228 Massacre. See February 28 Massacre ADIZ. See Air Defense Identification Zone Afghanistan, 149 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), 204 Albright, Madeline, 164 Allen, Woody, 212 Allison, Graham, 30, 31, 38, 93, 134 American Empire, 21, 124, 182 analogy, historical, xv, 7, 35, 37, 38, 76, 78, 131, 153, 207 Angell, Norman, 50 anthropology, 55 appeasement, 131, 172–173, 182 arms sales, PRC to foreign powers, 149 arms sales, US to Taiwan, 15, 114, 184 ASEAN, 206 Asian Financial Crisis, 15, 148, 156, 165 Axelrod, Robert, 1, 32, 34 Barber, James David, 63 behaviorism, 30, 32, 64, 99 Buddhism, 122 bureaucratic politics, 31, 64, 65, 66, 67n8, 93, 133 Burma, 117 Bush, George W., 170–171 Cambodia, 117 Chao Yao-tung, 104

Chen Shui-bian, 141n65, 175 chengyu. See proverb chess, 8, 25n18, 33 Chi Haotian, 115 Chiang Ching-kuo, 23 Chiang Kai-shek, 23, 26n39, 77, 79, 138n3, 138n5 Chien Fu, 118 Chinese civilization, 85, 86, 119, 122, 125, 126, 160, 187, 189, 190, 191, 209, 210 Chiu Chuang-huan, 98 Christopher, Warren, 83 civil society, global. See international society Clinton, William Jefferson, 10, 63, 95, 96–97, 111, 116, 123, 130, 137, 154–155, 162–163, 164, 170, 175, 179, 182–183, 187, 192–193 cognitive biology, 141n50 Cold War, 77, 89, 115, 152 Confucius, Confucianism, 122, 125, 126, 177, 188, 189, 199n77 construal level theory. See Construal Theory Construal Theory, xi, 23, 43, 68n41, 87, 92, 99, 112, 115, 118, 121, 137, 161, 168, 186, 187, 193, 202 constructivism, 3, 35, 41, 50 Cornell, Lee Teng-hui visit to, 83, 98, 107, 111, 113, 124, 131, 203

235

236 cosmopolitanism, 50, 123–124, 125, 126, 170, 182, 186 crisis and decision-making, 7, 38, 80, 91, 151, 157 cross-strait relations, 16 Cuba, 149 Cuban Missile Crisis, 7, 38 Cultural Revolution, 77, 79, 88, 148 culture, as influence on decision making, xi, 12, 80 cybernetic thinking, 30 decision making, xi, xv, xvii, 29 decision making and the media, 40 democracy, 11, 16, 22, 40, 98, 130 democratic peace, 50, 51, 117 Democratic People’s Party (DPP), 101, 105, 112, 157, 165, 166, 185 democratization in Taiwan, 11, 14, 15, 21, 23, 78, 81, 88, 90, 110, 114, 117, 135 democratization in the PRC, 85, 86, 106, 116, 123, 124, 135, 181, 190, 191 Deng Xiaoping, 14, 63, 88, 93, 118, 148, 162 deterrence, 33, 85, 86, 96, 103, 107, 110, 127, 130, 136 discounting, temporal. See temporal discounting discourse analysis, xvi, xvii, 6 Donne, John, 124 DPP. See Democratic People’s Party Durkheim, Emile, 55 economic crisis, Asian. See Asian Financial Crisis economic growth, 22 economics, xi, 12, 14, 34, 41, 42, 44, 48, 49, 50 election cycle, 40–41, 54 emotion, 7, 92, 99 end of history, 49, 56, 89, 139n26, 192 engagement, 51, 89, 116–117, 123, 131, 132–133 environmental theory. See time and environment equality, 12 Far East Resolution, 79 February 28 Massacre, 138n1

Index Feinstein, Diane, 92 filters, perceptual. See perceptual filters financial crisis, Asian. See Asian Financial Crisis first Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis. See Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, first. foreign policy, xv foreign policy analysis, 11, 29, 31, 32, 133 Freeman, Charles, 100 French revolution, 143n92 Friedman, Thomas, 122 Fukuyama, Francis, 192 future, shadow of the, 34 Futures Studies, 47 game theory, 32–33 game, two-level, 151, 160 games, 7–9, 33, 78, 116, 119 GATT. See General Agreement of Tariff and Trade General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT), 148, 166, 173, 194n3 Gilligan, Carol, 59 global society, global civil society. See international society globalization, 71n73, 122–123, 123, 165, 170, 175, 181, 186 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 26n31 grand strategy, 1, 5, 41 Greece, 22, 25n23 Greek tragedy, 27n49 groupthink, 30, 140n34 Guomindang. See Kuomintang Hamilton, Lee, 134 Han Dynasty, 69n47 hard power, xi, xvii, 14, 51, 76, 106, 119, 125, 126 harmonious world, 18, 121, 134, 168–169, 179, 187, 205 Harry Potter, 25n19 Herodotus, 69n47 historical analogy. See analogy history, xv, 7, 35, 46, 58, 132, 206 history and national narrative, 12, 61, 113, 117, 137, 210 history, judgment of, 63, 64, 68n37, 179, 187, 189, 192, 198n73 Hong Kong, 16, 101, 114, 166

Index horizons, literal, xv, 44, 153 horizons, temporal, xv Hu Jintao, 179 human rights, 81, 96, 132, 133–134, 149 Huntington, Samuel, 192 Independence (US carrier group), 84, 102, 117 independence, Taiwan, 16, 17, 20, 23, 81, 82–83, 85, 86, 91, 93–94, 105, 110, 119, 128, 185, 189–190, 204 international organizations and cooperation, 18, 108, 111, 119, 125, 126, 131, 150, 157, 158, 181, 188 international society, 41, 49, 81, 103, 121–122, 125, 134, 178–179, 184, 188, 190, 191 investment, cross Strait, 15, 128, 165, 166, 173, 184, 190, 191, 204 investment, foreign in PRC, 107, 110, 153–154, 159–160, 162, 164, 169, 173, 176, 177, 190, 191 investment, personal decisions, 48–49, 52–53, 71n79, 127, 195n13 Iraq, 70n63, 100–101, 149 Japan, 21, 77, 96, 134, 188, 189, 204–205, 206 Jiang Zemin, 83, 88, 93, 113, 114, 121, 129–130, 140n33, 161, 168, 178–179, 183, 185, 187, 210 Jinmen, 79 judgment of history. See history, judgment of

237

Lenin, Vladimir, 25n24 Li Denghui. See Lee Teng-hui Li Peng, 114, 121 liberalism, 50, 59, 65, 66, 70n68 Lin Yi-hsiung, 165 Locke, John, 3 Lord, Winston, xiii, 95, 134, 206 Lu Xun, 188 luan (chaos), 87 Macau, 101 Macbeth, 45, 120 Mao Tse-tung. See Mao Zedong Mao Zedong, 25n24, 61, 63, 88, 114, 122, 138n5, 148, 177 Marx, Karl, 25n24, 42 Marxism, 41, 59, 61, 80 media. See decision making and the media MFN. See Most Favored Nation Status Missile Crisis. See Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis missile defense, 15, 25n27, 110, 136 Moliere, 25n20 Mongolia, 141n56 Montenegro, 149 Most Favored Nation Status (MFN), 89, 128, 149–150, 152, 153–155, 162, 171, 172, 175, 182, 190, 191 Mother Teresa, 59 Munich Agreement, 131 Murkowski, Frank, 134

Kant, Emmanuel, 3, 34, 49, 50, 123, 182, 190, 191, 198n72 Kissinger, Henry, 113 KMT. See Kuomintang, Kohlberg, Lawrence, 72n94 Korean War, 75 Kuomintang (KMT), 23, 77, 79, 81–82, 90, 101, 118, 157, 158

national interest, 1, 64, 133 nationalism in PRC, 19, 20, 101, 106, 128, 205 nationalism in Taiwan, 82, 85, 86, 106 Nazism, 73n106, 131 neoliberalism, 50, 65, 66 Newton, Isaac. See time and Newton Nixon, Richard, 26n39, 198n72 Normal Trade Relations. See Most Favored Nation Status North Korea, 20, 25n27, 71n76, 149, 209

Lange, Howard, 181 Laos, 149 leadership theory, 35 Lee Teng-hui, 83, 92, 93–94, 98–99, 104, 111, 118, 124, 210

objective time,. See time and objectivity one child policy, 176, 188 One China policy, 82, 97, 177 one country, two systems, 104, 108, 112 operational code, 30, 38, 93, 96, 140n34

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Index

optimization. See also time horizons and optimization, 5 Park Geun-hye, 205 peace dividend, 89, 97 Peng Ming-min, 101 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 88, 93, 100–101, 103, 115, 136–137, 205 perceptual filters, xi, 14 Permanent Normal Trade Relations. See Most Favored Nation Status Perry, William, 102 phenomenology, 3, 4 Philippines, 96, 117 PLA. See People’s Liberation Army PNTR. See Most Favored Nation Status poker, 7–8 power, hard. See hard power power, soft. See soft power prisoner’s dilemma, 32, 34 process tracing, 10 Prospect Theory, xi, 35–37, 49, 99, 100, 105, 119, 137, 141n50, 202 proverb (chengyu), 130, 211, 212 psychology, xi, 4, 34, 42–45, 62 Qian Qichen, 93, 113, 114, 115 Quemoy (Island). See Jinmen rational actor, 31, 36, 45, 161 rational choice theory, 32, 44 rationality, 32, 92 realism, 19, 59, 64, 65, 66, 71n77, 123, 169 reification, 10 reunification. See unification, PRC-ROC rising China, 18, 82, 105, 108, 112–113, 115, 117, 129, 168, 176, 180, 188–189 Royce, Ed, 131 Russia.. See also USSR, 20, 21, 172 second Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis. See Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, second. security, 5, 49 September 11th attacks, 20, 27n41, 147, 152–153, 195n11 Serbia, 149 shadow of the future. See future, shadow of the Shanghai Communiqué, 82

Shanhaijing, 69n47 The Simpsons, 211 Sino-Soviet split, 77, 132 Smith, Adam, 41 socialism with Chinese characteristics, 122 sociology, 46 soft power, 64, 134 Solarz, Steve, 134 solidarism, 50, 65, 66 South Korea, 117, 205, 206 Soviet Union.. See also Russia, 71n76, 77–78, 89, 132, 152 Stalin, Joseph, 77 Strait Missile Crisis. See Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis strategic ambiguity, 91, 96, 97, 102, 111, 125, 126 strategy, 5, 41 strategy, grand. See grand strategy subjective time. See time and subjectivity Suu Kyi, Aung San, 117 tactics, 5, 41, 125 Taiping rebellion, 26n38 Tai-p’ing. See Taiping rebellion Taiwanese independence. See independence, Taiwan Taiwan lobby, 79, 96, 134 Taiwan Relations Act, 110 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, xi, 7, 14, 49, 75–138, 151, 157, 190, 203 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, first., 79 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, second., 79 Taiwan, elections in, 84, 85, 86, 105, 107 Taiwanese identity, 125, 139n15 Tang Jiaxuan, 168 telelogy, 12 temporal construal. See construal theory temporal discounting, 34, 45, 57, 59, 60, 99, 100, 137, 141n50, 158, 163, 193 Teng Chen-hua, 173 textual analysis, 2, 6, 9–10 Thomas, Craig, 109 Thucydides, 15, 49 Tiananmen, 19, 26n39, 27n50, 51, 78, 81, 87–88, 89, 90, 128, 132, 149, 150, 198n66 Tibet, 149, 177 time, xv, 2

Index

239

time and environment, 41, 42, 47, 183; mathematics, physics, 2; Newton, 2, 4; objectivity, 3; psychology, 2; subjectivity, 3; traditional culture, 2, 55 time horizons, xi, 1, 201 time horizon categories, 7 time horizons: age, 58, 62; and culture, 62; and diplomacy, persuasion, 207; and economics, 56; and family, 58; and gender, 59, 62; and health, 59; and institutions, 55, 93; and internal tension, 127–135; and miscalculation, 211–213; and morality, 213; and optimization, 213; and preference, xvii, 6, 49; and personality, 54, 61, 69n42; and political status, 54, 65, 134; and prediction, 207–208; and religion, 56; and the unexpected, 64 Tu Weiming, 199n77 Two China policy, 79, 82, 90 two-level game. See game, two-level

US–China relations, xvi, xvii, 2, 6, 11, 13, 61, 75, 134, 155, 171, 175, 180, 192, 195n11, 201, 207, 210 USSR. See Soviet Union Uyghur (separatism), 153, 177, 195n12

unification, PRC-ROC, 15, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119–120, 124–125, 129, 135, 185, 189 United Nations (UN), 16, 98, 116, 122, 125, 126, 148, 157

Xi Jinping, 205

Vietnam, 149, 172 visa, Lee Teng-hui. See Cornell, Lee Tenghui visit to vision, 44 Waltz, Kenneth, 30, 64, 67n1, 93, 134 Wei Yung, 111 World Trade Organization, 122, 148 World Trade Organization, China’s accession to, xi, 14, 49, 51, 147–194, 203 World Trade Organization, Taiwan’s accession to, 156–158, 165–167, 173–175, 183–185, 189, 190, 191 WTO. See World Trade Organization

Zhou Enlai, 143n92 Zhou Guoquiang, 173 Zhu Rongyi, 177 Zhuangzi, 213

About the Author

Daniel Tauss has a long-standing interest in interdisciplinary approaches to understanding international relations and cross-cultural interactions. Temporal Horizons and Strategic Decisions in US–China Relations: Between Instant and Infinite represents his use of social science methodology in understanding and anticipating political challenges in East-West relations. He also uses humanistic strategies, and is currently studying the liberal roots of classical Chinese political thought, and its potential to inspire native Asian democratic alternatives to Western political forms. He did his undergraduate work at Yale, has master’s degrees in Asian Studies and Philosophy from The University of Hawai’i and the University of Cambridge, and recently completed his doctorate in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California. He has served as the Director of the International Residential College at USC, and Dean of Branford College at Yale. He has recently held the position of scholar-in-residence at the Center for Asian Democracy at the University of Louisville, and he is beginning work with the Progressive Confucianism Project. He lives in Cincinnati with his wife Emilia, daughter Victoria, their beagle Spud, and their round tabby cat who, following the Confucian “Rectification of Names,” is named Marble.

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