Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual - Oxford Handbooks

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual

Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual   Massimo Durante The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology Edited by Shannon Vallor Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Online Publication Date: Nov 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190851187.013.19

Abstract and Keywords This chapter offers a critical analysis of the current impact of digital technologies on the ontology of the virtual. In particular, it investigates the potential challenges to traditional metaphysics and ontology raised by the ongoing digitization of reality, which promises to increasingly result in the creation of new virtual, augmented, and mixed realities. Such realities have a profound impact both on us and on our world, since they augment, en­ hance, re-engineer, or subject to judgement our experience of reality. It is thus worth re­ flecting on how the real and the virtual currently interact and influence one another, and how they may eventually evolve into a supervening, mixed dimension. Keywords: ontology, virtual, augmented reality, mixed reality, virtual worlds, enhancement, re-engineering, algo­ rithmic counterfactual, experience

… les personnages, les objets, les images, et d’une manière générale tout ce qui constitue la réalité virtuelle du théâtre Antonin Artaud, Le théâtre et son double, 1938, 49.

1. Introduction What is real? What is virtual? In posing these questions, we risk sliding down a rabbit hole. Is the young couple sitting across from me real? How can one possibly doubt it? What about Romeo and Juliet? Are they real, too? Certainly no one would attribute to Romeo and Juliet the same degree of being as they would to this couple, would they? Al­ though we are much more familiar with Romeo and Juliet and have experienced strong emotions on account of their tragic tale, I believe that most of us would nonetheless con­ sider the couple in front of me to be real in a way that Romeo and Juliet are not. And yet the thoughts and feelings we have about Romeo and Juliet are indeed real, are they not? Hence, can something virtual produce real consequences? Is there a definite and un­ equivocal dividing line between what is real and what is virtual? And finally, is there a dif­ Page 1 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual ference between “the virtual” and what we refer to as “virtual reality”? In other words, is there a difference between the virtual in analog reality and the virtual in digital reality? As human beings, we have always dealt with the virtual. Language itself is perhaps the most elemental and powerful instrument for producing virtual reality, in its ability to evoke intangible and non-present entities. As Judea Pearl and Dana McKenzie recently re­ called, referring to Yuval Harari, the main evolutionary asset of human beings is their ability to imagine things that do not exist: I totally agree with Yuval Harari that the depiction of imaginary creatures was a manifestation of a new ability, which he calls the Cognitive Revolution. His proto­ typical example is the Lion Man sculpture [… ]. As a manifestation of our new­ found ability to imagine things that never existed, the Lion Man is the precursor of every philosophical theory, scientific discovery, and technological innovation, from microscopes to airplanes to computers. (Pearl and McKenzie 2018, 34–35) We cooperate effectively with strangers because we believe in things like gods, na­ tions, money and human rights. Yet none of these things exists outside the stories that people invent and tell one another. There are no gods in the universe, no na­ tions, no money and no human rights—except in the common imagination of hu­ man beings. (Harari 2015, 28) Plato’s cave is a celebration of virtual reality.1 The second and third chapters of Hobbes’ Leviathan—the text on which political modernity is built—are respectively devoted to imagination and the train of imagination. The Kantian regulative ideal is a critical in­ stance of reality by virtue of a dimension that is, precisely, only virtual. In short, the virtu­ al existed long before and regardless of any technologically digitized virtual reality. Nevertheless, the evolution of technology—and digitization in particular—has altered this scenario. Digitization forces us to recognize that the virtual has acquired its own indepen­ dent form of reality, namely, virtual reality. The virtual has thus become part of the real and vice versa, as Luciano Floridi has well observed: What matters is not so much moving bits instead of atoms—this is an outdated, communication-based interpretation of information society that owes too much to mass-media sociology—as the far more radical fact that our understanding and conceptualization of the essence and fabric of reality is changing. Indeed, we have begun to accept the virtual as partly real and the real as partly virtual. (Floridi 2014a, 218) With its massive development of software systems, artificial agents, and the algorithmic outsourcing of actions and decisions, digitization also leads us to an even more basic real­ Page 2 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual ization: different epistemic agents—either human or artificial—encounter real and virtual reality at different levels of abstraction, to take up a phrase coined by Floridi (2008). For an artificial agent, which processes data, that which we refer to as virtual reality is the only reality. It is we alone for whom such a reality is virtual. No matter how we define vir­ tual reality, definitions are meaningful only to human beings. In other terms, “As technolo­ gy changes everything, we have a chance to discover that by pushing tech as far as possi­ ble we can rediscover something in ourselves that transcends technology” (Lanier 2017, 55). Seeking endless definitions of the virtual, may thus be futile or perhaps even counterpro­ ductive. What is important to grasp is that, through the virtual, we explore alternative modes of experiencing reality or, better said, we probe the limits of our experience. Fur­ thermore, digitization brings with it a key novelty: the virtual is no longer an epistemic construction that exists exclusively for the benefit of human beings. Virtual reality is not merely populated by objects, states, events, and actions that serve human purposes. Ma­ chines adapt the representation of the world to their own functioning and build up a vir­ tual reality that provides the most suitable environment for their operations. In simple terms, this chapter aims to show that an ontology of the virtual that is indepen­ dent from technology no longer exists. From an epistemic standpoint, different agents en­ counter the different modes of reality they are able to construct. The main challenge to dealing with the issues at stake stems from the conventional, materialist ontological ap­ proach taken to them, or in other words, from attempting to answer the set of questions posed at the start of this chapter as if they were based on some materially identifiable essence or substance. The fallacy lies in considering such questions as “what-questions” as opposed to “what-for questions,” that is, questions that investigate and revolve around purposes, roles, and functions. The next section discusses a more helpful ontological ap­ proach to take.

2. What and What-for Questions When I was asked to write this chapter on the technology and ontology of the virtual, I immediately recalled an important lesson I learned long ago from Jean-François Courtine (1990): Ontology is a modern word. It has little to do with the philosophy of ancient Greece. Modern ontology is distinct from traditional metaphysics. The first occurrences of the term date from the early seventeenth century, first in Jacob Lorhard (1606) and then in Rudolfh Göckel (1613). Its conceptual development owes much to Johannes Clauberg (1647) and its first systematic theorization can be found in Christian Wolff, as Etienne Gilson (1952, 112) correctly pointed out: This text may be held, in the present state of historical knowledge, for the birth certificate of ontology as a science conceived after the pattern of theology, yet rad­ ically distinct from it, since being qua being is held there as indifferent to all its conceivable determinations. There is, Clauberg says, a certain science which en­ visages being inasmuch as it is being, that is, inasmuch as it is understood to have Page 3 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual a certain common nature or degree of being, a degree which is to be found in both corporeal and incorporeal beings, in God and in creatures, in each and every sin­ gular being according to its own mode. Leibniz will later praise Clauberg for such an undertaking, but he will regret that it had not been a more successful one. The very word ‘ontology’ occurs at least once in an undated fragment of Leibniz, and one can expect accidentally to meet it later in various places, but it is not until 1729 that it finally comes into its own with the Ontologia of Christian Wolff. Although it is not the task of the present chapter to provide a full discussion of the notion of ontology itself, there is one important aspect that bears mentioning. Ontology asserts itself in modernity with the precise aim of including in the investigation of what exists— reality or existence—that which is merely intelligible (“intelligible as intelligible” accord­ ing to Clemens Timpler’s formula, 1604): namely, that which is immaterial, incorporeal or nonphysical, alongside that which is material, corporeal and physical. Following Timpler, Lorhard defined ontology as ‘the knowledge of the intelligible by which is intelligible.’ His ontology is hence a description of the world of intelli­ gibles, i.e., the items, concepts, or objects that are understandable or conceivable from a human perspective. The emphasis on the intelligibility of the world is es­ sential in Timpler’s and Lorhard’s ontology. When Lorhard followed Timpler’s lead and adopted this new proposal about the subject matter of metaphysics, or ontol­ ogy, he agreed with the idea that we in formulating ontology are concentrating on the knowledge by means of which we can conceive or understand the world. In this way ontology is seen as a description of the very foundation of scientific activ­ ity as such. (Øhrstrøm, Schärfe, and Uckelman 2008, 76) In short, ontology has always encompassed a constant and profound meditation on the virtual. In this sense, the virtual has been understood in modernity as the benchmark—or epistemological limit—against which the real is measured. Modernity itself has essentially been characterized in epistemological terms. It is epistemology that decides how and which realities can be known: ontology has been consistently defined by the level of knowledge available at each stage of the modern age, and the virtual has accordingly tested the limits of that which can be known through sensible experience. At the peak of its development, the virtual has indeed been included in the predicate of existence, and it has long been possible to speak of a virtual reality, that is to say, the fact that the virtual exists in its own right. For this reason—and for another reason shortly to be explained—it would be rather impractical to devote ourselves to defining what is virtu­ al. Such a definition would require us to be able to accurately distinguish the real from the virtual (i.e., the material from the immaterial, the corporeal from the incorporeal, the physical from the nonphysical), taking into account the entire evolution of the notion of reality across modernity. That would exceed the scope of this text.

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual There is an additional and even more pressing argument for choosing not to frame the on­ tology of the virtual in terms of a what-question. It lies in the changing of the criterion of existence (which is a particular challenge not only to traditional metaphysics but also to modern ontology), as Luciano Floridi has emphasized. In the digital age, the criterion of existence itself has dramatically changed as part of the “dislocation and reassessment of our fundamental nature and role in the universe” (Floridi 2010, 12). As Floridi has point­ ed out: The criterion of existence—what it means for something to exist—is no longer be­ ing actually immutable (the Greeks thought that only that which does not change can be said to exist fully), or being potentially subject to perception (modern phi­ losophy insisted on something being perceivable empirically through the five sens­ es in order to qualify as existing), but being potentially subject to interaction, even if intangible. To be is to be interactable, even if the interaction is only indirect. (Floridi 2010, 12) To be is to be interactable. This leads to an important consequence that is relevant from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. We must revise our long-standing and tradi­ tional epistemological tendency to consider reality in terms of stable and enduring struc­ tures ultimately based on or reducible to the objective existence of a material, corporeal or physical reality. Our reality is increasingly the outcome of information-automated processes, software agents’ behavior, delegated algorithmic decisions, intelligent ambient and smart technologies. However, virtual reality is no longer something we can only per­ ceive and describe. It is primarily something we can interact with. Against this backdrop, the ontological question is no longer: what is virtual reality? The new ontological question is: what is virtual reality for? How can we interact with it? What functions can we at­ tribute to it? How can virtual reality affect our experience of the world? The ontology of the virtual has itself become essentially technological, since what matters today is how we can interact with what we can build. In this perspective, based on interaction, there are at least five constitutive elements of virtual reality: (1) Agents: most actions are no longer the exclusive prerogative of human beings. Artificial agents create their own reality and interact with human agents in virtual environments. (2) Modes of reality: different technologies can generate diverse forms of virtual reality (virtual reality; augmented reality; mixed reality; immersive technologies, etc.), with specific characteristics and problems. (3) Entities: virtual environments are populated by a rich variety of entities. The notion of entity must be understood as a broad category that includes objects; states of the world; events; and actions. (4) Experience: agents can undergo different experiences of virtual reality for different purposes: it is precisely these purposes that ultimately determine the type of experience that character­ izes virtual reality. (5) Consequences: agents interacting with each other in virtual envi­ ronments can produce real consequences. Increasingly crucial areas of study in fields such as law and economics are focusing on the real consequences of virtual action.

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual A full understanding of the relationship between technology and the ontology of the virtu­ al would requires consideration of all five of these elements. Due to practical constraints, while some mention will be made of each, the main focus here will be on just one: experi­ ence.

3. Experience Following a pragmatic approach, the focus here will be on the conceptual lens of experi­ ence. In fact, the core issue seems to lie in the type of experience that different agents engage in through the technological resources offered by virtual reality. The basic classi­ fication proposed here is far from capturing the full complexity of the problem. There are three ways of experiencing reality by means of the virtual: (1) augmentation/enhance­ ment; (2) re-engineering; (3) evaluation/judgement. This classification was inspired by a conceptual scheme outlined by James Moor (1985), to which I have previously made re­ course (Durante 2007, 2010). Moor’s scheme is based on the types of questions that the development of technologies and their application to human tasks raise. This scheme can be summed up as follows. The transformation of reality resulting from technological development is not just quanti­ tative but also qualitative: the computer-based technological evolution not only widens the range of our interrogations, but also modifies the sense of our questioning. In other words, the meaning of a technological change is to be sought not only in the transformed reality (i.e., in virtual reality), but primarily in the transformation of the inquiry through which this reality is explored and cognitively represented. When reflecting upon a partic­ ular activity achieved by means of a computing device, we first ask ourselves (1) how effi­ ciently the computer performs this activity. Then, when the technological application has become part of the performance of such an activity, we ask ourselves (2) what the nature and the value of this activity are. Finally, when the technology has, at least in part, changed the reality to which it applies, we wonder (3) whether this alternative state of the world can be used to reconsider or judge our previous condition. A brief example by Moor can illustrate the point: “For example, for years computers have been used to count votes. Now the election process is becoming highly computerized. Computers can be used to count votes and to make projections about the outcome. [… ] The question is no longer ‘How efficiently do computers count votes in a fair election?’ but ‘What is a fair elec­ tion?’ [… ]. For better or worse, our electoral process is being transformed” (Moor 1985, 271). We are now ready to analyze our three categories of experience, now similarly transformed by virtual reality.

3.1 Augmentation/Enhancement With the first category, we intend to refer to cases in which, through virtual reality, we can extend or enhance our previous experience of reality. In such cases, the effect on ex­ perience is quantitative rather than qualitative. New and further experiences are added to previous ones: the experience of flying a virtual airplane in a virtual world adds to the Page 6 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual experience of flying a real airplane in the real world. However peculiar and unexpected, these experiences do not generally change our understanding of the entity, real or virtual, to which they apply. If we apply Moor’s conceptual scheme, such experiences will lead us to formulate questions about how the entity is implemented, about the characteristics of a different mode of reality, about the way we interact with it, or about the real or virtual consequences of this entity, and so forth; however, they do not cause us to question the nature, meaning or value of the entity itself. This category is the most traditional one and includes the main forms in which virtuality can be technologically implemented: virtual reality (VR); augmented reality (AR); and mixed reality (MR). Virtual reality (VR) is a popular term that has a well-documented history dating back to the mid-1980s. A recent book on the theme was written by Jaron Lanier (2017), the founder of VPL Research, the 1984 start-up that created the first VR commercial prod­ ucts. It contains more than forty definitions of VR, each of which describes a different as­ pect of this complex phenomenon. In a nutshell, there are at least three viewpoints from which to define virtual reality: (1) environment; (2) data; and (3) body. From the viewpoint of environment, VR may be defined as a three-dimensional, computergenerated environment that can be explored and interacted with by a user. The more that users feel as though they are inside, or part of, a 3D computer-generated environment, the more they are immersed in that virtual world. In this sense, “VR replaces the real world altogether” and “places people inside virtual environments, letting them move around in it and interact with it as if it were the real world” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 2). Moreover, VR can develop into, and be seen as, a Virtual World. The latter not only in­ cludes virtual reproduction of real entities but also enables them to evolve and propagate independently, mostly detached from our own reality, as is the case in digital environ­ ments such as Second Life or Entropia Universe, in which “fascinatingly, both endoge­ nously produced economies and social orders” emerged (Bray and Konsynski 2007, 1). From the viewpoint of data, VR may be defined as “an interactive network of information designed to connect data on a digitally created world. This digital world serves as an op­ erating system to facilitate exchanges of information, and functions as a visual platform for applications and devices based on the infinite combination of data elements collected and shared by this virtual operating system” (Drovix 2009, 1). Needless to say, strong pro­ duction, collection, sharing, and recombination of both personal and sensitive data make VR an economically disruptive technology, while raising legal issues of security, privacy and data protection, intellectual property, and safety (Fairfield 2012; Russo and Risch 2018; Thierer and Camp 2017; Lemley and Volokh 2018). From the viewpoint of body, Jaron Lanier has stressed that “the visceral realness of hu­ man presence within an avatar is the most dramatic sensation I have felt in VR. Interac­ tivity is not just a feature or a quality of VR, but the natural empirical process at the core of experience. It is how we know life. It is life” (Lanier 2017, 173). This gives us a further perspective on VR, as Lanier pointed out in an interview, because “The canvas of VR can­ not be the external world—it has to be your body. An example of this is when you create Page 7 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual out-of-body sensations of touch and feel. When you are really changing yourself, that is so much more interesting than watching something in the external world—and it really im­ proves your sensation of reality” (Rubin and Lanier 2017). This is a powerful statement that reminds us that the impact of technology is both extrinsic, towards the world, and in­ trinsic, towards ourselves (Floridi 2014a, 87). Augmented reality (AR) differs technologically and socially from virtual reality: “AR al­ lows digital content to be layered over the real world. Using special glasses or, more com­ monly for now, a smartphone, AR users can see the real world as it actually exists, but with digital images superimposed on the world so that they seem to exist as part of the world. [… ] Our experience of the real world will increasingly be overlaid with informa­ tion and images” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 2). Unlike virtual reality, AR is generally inter­ operable and is aimed more at enabling interactions with other users that may add to physical-world interactions, as with AR games such as Pokémon Go or Ingress. “In other words, AR supplements the natural environment users see around them; it does not com­ pletely replace the natural environment in the way that VR does” (Thierer and Camp 2017, 5). Mixed reality (MR) integrates elements belonging to these two technologies (VR and AR) and mobile computing in the real world. MR draws on the fact that computing power is progressively entrusted to mobile computing that “takes computing out from behind the desk and into the real world” (Fairfield 2012, 64). “The central element of Mixed Reality is the tying of data to an anchor in the real world, be it a person, geographic location, or structure. [… ] One new aspect that Mixed Reality introduces is the combination of mo­ bile computers with geotagged data and the extent to which this combination is a part of everyday life. Through mobile devices, users see data that is tied up to particular places, objects, or people that they encounter. Smartphone technology and miniaturized comput­ ers permit a more mobile and interactive experience with our surroundings” (Fairfield 2012, 63–64). Via smartphones, smart glasses, or smart audio devices, MR applications can show diners review ratings as they walk by a restaurant, or enable soldiers on watch to receive realtime data about passing vehicles. Let us sum up what has been said so far from the standpoint of experience: (1) VR is an experience of data-enriched virtual space; (2) AR is an experience of data-enriched virtual space that overlays real space; (3) MR is an experience of data-enriched real space. These technologies are not so much aimed at overcoming the dichotomy between the real and the virtual but rather aim to deepen it, to experience its possible combinations, and to ex­ ploit its wealth. The ontology of the virtual is thus expanded by its technological imple­ mentation, which allows us to have not only technologically mediated empirical (visceral) interactions but also cognitive experiences of different modes of reality. Accordingly, let us examine what these technologies are mainly intended for. Their appli­ cations are wide-ranging and not just limited to gaming. This sort of technology can be applied in the fields of education (e.g., for documentary purposes); communication (e.g., for news reporting); art (e.g., interactive museums); movies and events (e.g., virtual the­ Page 8 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual ater); job training and system monitoring (e.g., for industrial simulation); healthcare (e.g., for treating post-traumatic stress disorder); engineering and product design (e.g., 3D ren­ derings of objects); social life (e.g., for sex); driving (e.g., AR heads-up windshield dis­ plays); the military (e.g., for combat simulations), and so on. The list is longer than one might expect: “Digi-Capital predicts that AR and VR together will be a $150 billion busi­ ness by 2020, with most of the revenue coming from outside of games” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 10). In all of these cases, technology expands or enhances some of our previous experiences of reality; they allow us to visit a museum in a different way or to see a stage play with 3D effects. They sometimes restore previous experiences, e.g., for people who have physical disabilities. In other instances, they stretch and challenge our habitual attitudes and be­ haviors, such as with an inspiring exercise of “diversity training” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 8), where a business meeting can be held remotely using neutral avatars not de­ fined by gender, age or race, thus minimizing prejudices (although this application may be also interpreted as actually erasing all signs of diversity rather than encouraging re­ spect for diversity). However, in some circumstances, technology may have a re-engineering effect, particular­ ly when the consequences of actions in VR or AR confront us with uncharted problems, such as the hate speech phenomenon in virtual environments. As properly noted in this regard: “VR and AR will also challenge our understanding of what is speech (or, more precisely, communication)—and thus strongly protected by the First Amendment and oth­ er norms—and what is nonspeech conduct that merits regulation” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 79). This leads us to the next category of virtual reality.

3.2 Re-engineering With the second category, we intend to refer to cases in which virtual reality is used to reengineer our former experience of reality (thus generating a new experience of reality). In such cases, the effect on experience is qualitative rather than quantitative. Re-engi­ neering implies some fundamental transformation in the way we experience the world. To carry on with Moor’s scheme, we are dealing with experiences that lead us to consider the nature, meaning and value of the activity to which they apply. The peculiarity of this category consists precisely in the fact that it causes us to rethink the nature, meaning and value of both real and virtual reality. The examples that follow should help illustrate this point. The introduction of virtual currencies—whose earliest prototypes appeared in early Mas­ sively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs), such as Second Life and World of Warcraft— not only forces us to ask what a virtual currency is or to rethink the way in which certain financial transactions can be carried out; it leads us over time to wonder what currency will be like in the near future and what the financial economy will be like when curren­ cies become virtual and financial transactions can be completely outsourced to artificial agents and algorithms (Coeckelbergh 2015). This does not imply, implausibly, that every­ Page 9 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual thing will totally change. Rather, it means that certain activities will at least require a profound change in perspective that needs to be better deciphered and regulated: While governments around the world observe the latest fintech developments, the regulatory approaches, like in the case of many emerging technologies, are no­ tably lagging behind. The new digital economy, with the pace of its technological development, may require fundamental changes in our approach to regulation. In­ stead of ruling ex post, governments need to legislate ex ante, anticipating devel­ opments and preparing the regulatory landscape for robust readiness to meet con­ tinually evolving and accelerating challenges. (Caytas 2017, 4) Consider another suggestive example, taken from the field of law: the case of indecent ex­ posure in virtual spaces. This is a thought-provoking case since it questions what counts as harm. It also raises concerns about the extent of our own “freedom of sensescape” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 63), when immersed in a digital environment (VR, AR, or MR). This requires us to consider why we should restrict things like indecent expo­ sure when we do not restrain images of the same things elsewhere. Is virtual indecent ex­ posure akin to the display of an image (speech) or to the threat of unwanted touching (conduct)? According to Mark Lemley and Eugen Volokh, it very well could be the latter, because “VR and AR, though, are deliberately created to make communicated image and sounds feel like real life. The technologies challenge our perception of the real because they blur the cognitive line between imaginary and physical presence” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 80). In this sense, virtual indecent exposure might be considered in some circumstances as unprotected conduct constituting real harm. What is more important here is the lesson drawn by Lemley and Volokh as to the cognitive line between real and virtual reality: This in turn requires us to think seriously about some distinction we take for granted—between presence and remoteness, between speech and conduct, and between what is real and what is ‘merely’ perceived. If it turns out that the reason we ban indecent exposure is in part about perception and psychic harm rather than physical threat, that might cause us to rethink what it means to be hurt in a way that law cares about. If it turns out that we care about the perpetrator’s in­ tended behavior (and from his subjective perspective, his actual conduct) even in the absence of any harm to the victim, as we do in some but not all attempt law, that suggests a much broader notion of what we would punish if we only knew about it. And that has implications not just for the virtual world but also for the re­ al world. (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 81) It is no coincidence that the two examples given come from the fields of economics and law: they are both strongly institutionalized areas in which the real and the virtual are closely intertwined, and they are both constituted of social facts that are human con­ Page 10 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual structs in a way that physical facts are not. This observation requires further comment. The distinction between these first two categories of experience draws on Philip Brey’s distinction between simulation and ontological reproduction (Brey 2003) and Luciano Floridi’s distinction between augmenting or enhancing technologies and re-engineering technologies (Floridi 2014a, 96–98). Let us briefly clarify this point. First, we agree with Brey’s account of virtual entities: Entities encountered in virtual worlds may be called virtual entities. At first glance, the ontological status of virtual entities is puzzling. [… ] However, virtual entities are not just fictional objects because they often have rich perceptual fea­ tures and, more importantly, they are interactive: they can be manipulated, they respond to our actions and may stand in casual relationship to other entities. So in our everyday ontology, virtual entities seem to have a special place: different from physical entities, but also different from fictitious or imaginary entities (Brey 2003, 276–277). As already noted, interaction is the key conceptual lever with which to assess the ontolog­ ical status of virtual entities. This allows virtual entities to differ from fictitious and imagi­ nary entities. Virtual entities may thus produce and adjust their own reality. Therefore, a virtual world is not just the environment in which we encounter and experience virtual entities but is gradually becoming more of an environment where virtual entities can, at least in part, evolve and develop without our direct determination. Consider for example John McCormick and Adam Nash’s work of art, Reproduction, an artificially evolving per­ formative digital ecology, where there are “evolving virtual entities spawning and repro­ ducing in virtual environments. “[… ] The entities ‘evolve,’ ‘reproduce,’ ‘live,’ and ‘die’ over thousands of generations according to a constantly emergent evolution of those crude parameters that is informed, but not determined, by both their interactions with humans in the material world and with their interactions with each other” (Nash 2015, 22). In his analysis of virtual entities, Brey also introduces a distinction between simulation and ontological reproduction that draws on John Searle’s ontology of the real world (1995):2 It seems, then, that there is a distinction between virtual entities that are accept­ ed as mere simulations of real-world entities, and entities that are accepted as be­ ing, for all purposes, as real as nonvirtual entities. [… ] So virtual versions of realworld entities are either mere simulations, that only have resemblance to realworld entities by their perceptual and interactive features, or ontological repro­ ductions, which have a real-world significance that extends beyond the domain of the virtual environment. [… ] Physical reality and ordinary social reality can usual­ ly only be simulated in virtual environments, whereas institutional reality can in large part be ontologically reproduced in virtual environments

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual (Brey 2003, 277). Although this is an interesting distinction that touches on several important issues, there are two reasons for which we shall depart from it in the rest of this chapter. Firstly, be­ cause we insist on experience, rather than entity, as the key conceptual lever of the ontol­ ogy of virtual reality, and secondly, because we give a different meaning to simulation, as will emerge shortly, as a peculiar form of experience of virtual reality. Our distinction draws more on Floridi’s categorization of augmenting and enhancing technologies as dif­ ferent from re-engineering technologies. Floridi’s categorization is even more radical and far-reaching, since it involves the progressive blurring of the real/virtual dichotomy: The infosphere will not be a virtual environment supported by a genuinely ‘materi­ al’ world. Rather, it will be the world itself that will be increasingly understood in­ formationally, as an expression of the infosphere. [… ] We are changing our every­ day perspective on the ultimate nature of reality from a historical and materialist one, in which physical objects and mechanical processes play a key role, to a hy­ perhistorical and informational one. This shift means that objects and processes are de-physicalized, in the sense that they tend to be seen as support-independent. (Floridi 2014a, 50) In addition to this progressive blurring of the line between the real and the virtual, we will be confronting a less apparent but even more relevant consequence: the need for dif­ ferent epistemic agents to adapt their representation and experience of the world to their own peculiar way of acting and functioning. For example, the main issues regarding the difference between self-driving cars and cars driven by human beings are generally con­ sidered today in terms of moral, legal or technological questions. Obviously, these issues exist and are here to stay. However, the true confrontation is going to be epistemic. It will concern the way in which different agents determine which road to take, which obstacles to recognize and which to overtake, in short, it will concern agents’ knowledge of the re­ ality in which they operate. Who will adapt what representation of the world to whom? Even the legal consequences in the real world will mostly depend on the epistemology with which the agents represent the world and act within it. I must reiterate that for artificial agents, software systems, or algorithms, the reality that is represented in the virtual format is the only reality that exists. One of Floridi’s central claims is that we are likely to gradually adapt our environment to the representations and configurations of the world that are instrumental to the functioning of the computational systems we have created and let loose: You need to adapt the environment to the robot to make sure the latter can inter­ act with it successfully. Likewise, put artificial agents in their digital soup, the In­ ternet, and you will find them happily buzzing. The real difficulty is to cope, like the wasps, with the unpredictable world out there, which may also be full of traps and other collaborative or competing agents.

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual (Floridi 2014a, 136) These first two categories point in a single direction: technologies of the virtual tend to alter our experience of reality. They do so insofar as they expand upon or improve it, as they change its meaning or nature, and finally, as we will see shortly, in what they evalu­ ate or how they judge it, by imagining an alternative version of reality. Let us now turn to this third category: evaluation/judgement.

3.3 Evaluation/Judgement With the third category, I refer to those cases in which, through virtual reality, we can evaluate and judge our former experience of reality from a different perspective. This is made possible through the use of simulations. In the context of virtual reality, the term simulation usually refers to the reproduction of real objects in a virtual format. Here we are using it in a different sense3, to refer specifically to the algorithmic production of counterfactuals. Consider the 2016 movie “Sully” by Clint Eastwood. The plot is based on a true story, al­ though it is of no concern to us here how faithful the story was to reality. The events re­ counted in the film are as follows. In January 2009, US Airways flight 1549 smashed into a flock of geese, three minutes from New York City’s LaGuardia airport. With both en­ gines out, pilot Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger, assisted by co-pilot Jeffrey Skiles, made the decision not to attempt to reach an airport runway. Instead, Sully dead-sticked his Airbus 320 to a landing in the Hudson River, saving the lives of 155 people. Later, the National Transportation Safety Board claimed that several confidential computerized simulations indicated that the plane could have landed safely at the LaGuardia or Teterboro Airports without engines. In the end, Sully managed to prove that the computerized simulations were wrong, and that there were no real alternatives to what he had done. This, however, is not the point. The point is that simulation can be used not only to repro­ duce a real object in a virtual format, as with augmented virtual reality, for training pi­ lots. The simulation is rather used to scrutinize events that have already occurred and to evaluate what could have happened otherwise. A computer simulation is used to produce what we might define as an algorithmic counterfactual, or in other words, a representa­ tion of reality in a virtual world that allows us to assess and judge what has happened in the real world. The algorithmic counterfactual actually works to tell us how the agent should have behaved in reality.4 I have decided to isolate this meaning of simulation and to make it a category in its own right, for it represents, in my view, an area of great potential for the expansion and future development of virtual reality. It is here—in the algorithmic production of counterfactuals —that technology and the ontology of the virtual are likely to be fused. Once again, this is not a completely novel idea: we have always nourished the imagination of alternative and idealistic worlds as a viable criterion of counterfactual judgment. At the same time, how­ ever, the notion has undergone substantial changes. For instance, the virtual reality of an algorithmic counterfactual is profoundly different from a Kantian regulative ideal of rea­ Page 13 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual son. While the former tells us how things could or should have been in the proximate al­ ternative world, the latter only expresses archetypal standards, which can be approximat­ ed but never fully attained. Those regulative ideals or archetypal standards assign a di­ rection to a practice, but do not rule out practices. When one has an idea—a promising idea—it is important to ask whether someone else has already thought of it. That, of course, turned out to be the case here. While I was pleased to have come up with the idea of an algorithmic counterfactual, I then discovered that Judea Pearl and Dana McKenzie (2018) have also recently discussed the algorith­ mization of counterfactuals. While I am worried about the whole chain of problems concerning the use of algorithms5 (from potential cognitive biases that affect the formation of the knowledge base to the lack of transparency of the black box6 of an inference engine, up to the possible discrimi­ natory effects of the algorithmic outcome), Pearl and McKenzie attribute a decisive and beneficial role7 to the outsourcing of algorithmic counterfactuals to thinking machines: Counterfactuals are the building blocks of moral behavior as well as scientific thought. The ability to reflect on one’s past actions and envision alternative sce­ narios is the basis of free will and social responsibility. The algorithmization of counterfactual invites thinking machines to benefit from this ability and partici­ pate in this (until now) uniquely human way of thinking about the world. (Pearl and McKenzie 2018, 10) Pearl and McKenzie are completely aware of the delegation problem (“This brings up a natural question: How much can we trust the computer simulations?” [2018, 295]). What puzzles me about the normative function of algorithmic counterfactuals is that their abili­ ty to predict alternative worlds is mostly based, ultimately, on a static training data set describing the world as it is. The algorithmic what-ifs of the most proximate worlds tend to reaffirm the primacy of the existent in a more or less surreptitious manner. In this way, the virtual is not instrumental to the imagination of different worlds, but rather to the prediction of expected and desired worlds. This raises a serious issue that warrants dis­ cussion in the near future: the ontology of the virtual will primarily be technologically de­ termined by “prediction machines” (Agrawal, Gans, Goldfarb 2018), given that prediction is at the heart of our information societies. Although often unseen, a critical area of devel­ opment in virtual reality is one in which machines and human beings predict behaviors, decisions and other expected results through simulations, through which reality can then be judged and modified. It will increasingly be the case that these predictions will serve as the basis, for example, for recognizing or discarding rights or other prerogatives. Let us now turn our attention from experience to some aspects of the real consequences of virtual reality.

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual

4. Consequences A prominent feature of virtual reality systems is their potential to have consequences in real life. As already noted, fields such as law and economics are privileged areas where it is possible to appraise the real consequences of virtual reality. In virtual environments, we can carry out a series of actions that can have ramifications in real life, such as mak­ ing legally relevant agreements, committing crimes, following rules of conduct, establish­ ing governance, making economic transactions, trading convertible currencies, selling items, paying taxes, and so forth. The interested reader is invited to turn to the extensive literature on the topic. Here we will focus our attention briefly on three general aspects that affect the real consequences of virtual activities: (1) typification; (2) ontological marks; and (3) data.

4.1 Typification The combination of digitization and virtualization has generated not only an increasing process of dephysicalization but also of the typification of people, processes, and objects, as Luciano Floridi has observed: When our ancestors bought a horse, they bought this horse or that horse, not ‘the’ horse. Today, we find it utterly obvious and non-problematic that two cars may be virtually identical and that we are invited to test-drive and buy the model rather the individual ‘incarnation’ of it. We buy the type not the token. […] Quite coher­ ently, we are quickly moving towards a commodification of objects that considers repair as synonymous with replacement. (Floridi 2014a, 57) This means that not only objects or processes but also human beings no longer count as unique and irreplaceable entities but as instances of a type, in which a general rule of substitutability prevails. This process of typification has therefore generated two related consequences, which are particularly relevant with regard to virtual reality: Such a shift in favor of types of objects has led, by way of compensation, to a pri­ oritization of informational branding—a process comparable to the creation of cul­ tural accessories and personal philosophies—and of reappropriation. […] the processes of dephysicalization and typification of individuals as unique and irre­ placeable entities may start eroding our sense of personal identity as well. We may risk behaving like, and conceptualizing ourselves as, mass-produced, anonymous entities among other anonymous entities, exposed to billions of other similar indi­ viduals online. We may conceive each other as bundles of types, from gender to re­ ligion, from family role to working position, from education to social classes. (Floridi 2014a, 57–58)

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual People have begun to conceive of themselves as virtual bundles of selectable, modifiable or improvable properties and characteristics in order to create a unique self-representa­ tion that is appropriate to one’s own expectations or, more often, to social ones: “the di­ alectics of being uniquely like everybody else joins forces with the malleability of the digi­ tal to give rise to the common phenomenon of ‘airbrushing.’ Digital photographs are reg­ ularly and routinely retouched in order to adapt the appearance of portrayed people to unrealistic and misleading stereotypes, with an unhealthy impact on customers’ expecta­ tions, especially teenagers” (Floridi 2014a, 57). The sense of loss or erosion of personal identity is heightened by the fact that, in digital and virtual environments, this is increas­ ingly the result of the chief and growing importance in machine learning of training the models to learn and apply class labels properly, to sort all things in a real or virtual envi­ ronment into the proper class bucket.8 Actual references (i.e., direct experiences) and on­ tological marks (i.e., what signals the difference between real and virtual worlds) are gradually vanishing, raising the second issue which generally affects the consequences of virtual reality.

4.2 Ontological Marks Immersive technologies—which include versions of VR, AR, and MR—are specially de­ signed to mimic reality as closely as possible, so as to blur the line between physical and virtual worlds. Such technologies tend to remove the ontological marks that make users perceive the distinction between the real and the virtual in order to increase the feeling of immersion. Immersive technologies are characterized by problems that generally af­ fect data-intensive virtual technologies. These problems may concern legal issues such as privacy, intellectual property, security, and physical integrity; psychological issues such as isolation, distraction, anxiety, and addiction; and social and moral issues such as aggres­ sion, hate, contempt, and racism. Immersive technologies however may also raise the fol­ lowing issue: But if you see an avatar in a VR world, you are seeing it in a context specially de­ signed to mimic reality as much as possible. When you turn your head, the illusion created by VR is reinforced, not broken. In more advanced VR systems, you might be walking around on a two-dimensional treadmill rather than just sitting in your armchair. Moreover, you will see the avatar not in some special context that you bring up just to see impersonations [… ]. Rather, you might see the avatar in your ordinary ‘travels’ in the VR environment. Even if you logically recognize that the avatar is a pseudonym, it will feel like a person. (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 69) The blurring of the ontological marks of reality, in an immersive technology, can therefore weaken or exclude defenses or justifications for reprehensible actions or attitudes, based on the alleged perception of the difference between the real and the virtual. In other words, the stronger the perception of reality, the more difficult it will be to invoke the vir­ tual dimension of the context as a justification for (the real consequences of) our actions Page 16 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual (consider, for instance, the case in which someone insults or is aggressive towards an avatar that is felt as a real person). What kind of response does this issue evoke, together with the concerns highlighted earlier? What kind of governance of immersive technolo­ gies should we adopt? Adam Thierer and Jonathan Camp have provided some possible answers, highlighting two alternative governance visions that could govern the future of immersive technology: Precautionary principle reasoning refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until developers can demonstrate that the innovations will not cause any harm to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws or traditions. The alternative vision of permissionless innova­ tion refers to the idea that ‘experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if they develop at all, can be ad­ dressed later.’ (Thierer and Camp 2017, 27) Without going into detailed analysis of these alternatives, I agree that: “to make permis­ sionless innovation the basis of public policy toward immersive technology, policymakers should adopt the following 10-part blueprint” (Thierer and Camp 2017, 33), according to which a detailed policy framework9 is elaborated on the basis of the paradigm “educate and empower,” instead of that of “legislate and regulate” (Thierer and Camp 2017, 42). Needless to say, innovative immersive technologies should be examined and discussed at least through the conceptual lens of “pro-ethical design,” which operates at the informa­ tional and not at the structural level of a choice architecture (Floridi 2016). For the sake of brevity, we can say that the ultimate and most essential reason for favoring a more per­ missive attitude is to be found in what has been properly observed by Ithiel de Sola Pool, with reference to the regulation of information markets: Enforcement must be after the fact, not by prior restraint [… ]. Regulation is a last recourse. In a free society, the burden of proof is for the least possible regulation of communication. (de Sola Pool 1983, 231) This being said, some implications of the disappearance of ontological marks may entail normative issues that require some form of regulation. Consider, for instance, the case of Google’s Duplex launch of an AI-based voice that takes on human vocal tics (uptalk, inter­ jection, hesitation, etc.) to produce a seamless, ontologically indistinct experience of a vir­ tual assistant calling on behalf of a real agent. Such mimicry can foster trust in the ser­ vice while simultaneously raising concerns about deception. More broadly, the phenome­ non of synthetic media (synthetic text-to-speech technology, deepfakes, GAN-generated faces, etc.) may raise concerns about the epistemic trust of people in the daily experience Page 17 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual of (less and less perceptibly fake) messages and images, which can generate morally, po­ litically, and legally relevant consequences. This may require synthetic media “water­ marks” that will allow for the distinction between real and fake to be preserved. Finally, let us turn to the third general aspect concerning the real consequences of virtual reality, which regards the fact that virtual reality technologies are data-intensive technologies.

4.3 Data Virtual reality technology, like most information and communication technologies, is based on data: it collects, stores, produces, and shares data. This includes all kinds of da­ ta, including the personal and sensitive. Users immersed in a virtual environment are part of a context that is built entirely of data. Data do not necessarily belong to—or remain at the disposal of—the users who produce them: Our movements and actions in the physical world are increasingly observed, recorded, and tracked. But there are still spaces where we are not followed and acts that are not recorded and searchable. In VR that will likely not be true. Every­ thing we do, we do before an audience—a private company that may well keep and catalog that data, and may have lots of reasons to do so (data mining, security, user convenience, and more). (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 17) This raises a critical issue with several consequences in real life: that is, “the ownership and control of data” (Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb 2018, 174). Private companies—which provide hardware and software resources for VR—record, collect, and store users’ data, with the result that “those private companies will invariably impose terms of use that pur­ port to bind users of the hardware and software. Those terms may disclaim liability for harm. They may assert ownership over the things we create in VR. And they may require us to consent to having information about our conduct in the virtual world recorded and shared” (Lemley and Volokh 2018, 17). Data is needed not only to enhance and develop virtual reality technologies but also and above all to fuel AI systems, machine learning, prediction machines, and to profile users for commercial purposes. Virtual reality may thus become—and partly already has be­ come—a gigantic repository to draw on, in order to mine data-patterns, predict behav­ iors, and understand trends, in order to suggest choices, influence actions, and allocate resources. This reinforces a trend that began with the Internet and has continued with many mobile applications: users have limited contractual powers. While the consensual paradigm based on notice and consent ensures the application of contract law, it hardly protects the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Users of virtual reality technologies cannot follow the entire life-cycle of their own data. Ownership and control over collected data is not the only issue related to data-intensive technology of virtual reality. There is also the significant issue of data reliability. Users of virtual reality technologies have nothing but the data to back up their decisions and ac­ Page 18 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual tions. The data must therefore be as accurate as possible in order to allow users to pru­ dently make decisions and adopt behaviors with potential consequences in real life. Need­ less to say, problems of epistemic trust—regarding which data we can rely on when decid­ ing and acting—also concern the real world. However, in reality, users can rely on direct experience, validation, tangible physical properties, ontological marks, content asserted by epistemic authorities, in short, on filters of reliability, which in virtual reality are more evanescent. While there are many tests for verifying and validating the reliability of VR systems from a technological standpoint, it is still unclear how data accuracy and reliabil­ ity can be granted to users when immersed in virtual environments. However, this prob­ lem is open and will require discussion, since the accuracy and reliability of data are an integral part of the necessary security and safety of virtual environments.

5. Conclusions Digital technology generates the new ontology of the virtual. It is pointless and perhaps even counterproductive to try and draw a line between physical and virtual reality in strict ontological terms, for it is we—through technological innovation—who move and re­ shape that line. It is thus more relevant and fruitful to ask in pragmatic terms how the technology of the virtual modifies the way we experience reality. In doing so, we find that it happens in at least three ways. First of all, the technology of the virtual allows us to expand or improve our experience of reality. This occurs in many ways: by recovering or compensating for a lost capacity; by providing new mental or bodily experiences; or by gaining a novel perception of reality from a totally different point of view. It can also occur to the benefit of our own experi­ ence of physical reality. In this respect, Jaron Lanier is right: “A coarser, simulated reality fosters appreciation of the depth of physical reality in comparison. As VR progresses in the future, human perception will be nurtured by it and will learn to find even more depth in physical reality” (Lanier 2017, 50). Second, the technology of the virtual can affect our experience of reality even more dras­ tically, in modifying and re-engineering the world to which it applies. This alters our un­ derstanding and representation of both reality and ourselves. What is important to grasp in this regard is that we human beings are—as agents—part of that world that technology modifies and re-engineers. This means that we do not merely interact only with different modes of reality (VR, AR, or MR), but also with other epistemic, artificial agents that pro­ duce their own representations of reality, which mingle with ours: mixed reality is not so much a technological platform as an intermingling of the cognitive and the epistemic. Finally, the technology of the virtual can also serve another purpose: that of constructing a counterfactual reality that judges our reality and drives us to amend it. Simulation is thus not limited to enabling us to have new or different experiences of reality, but allows us to compare alternative experiences and to reflect on how reality should have been. This is the case in which the ontology of the virtual—through the algorithmic construction of counterfactuals—acquires a normative function. Despite the heuristic value of counter­ Page 19 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual factual simulation that we recognize, we believe that this normative dimension requires attention, public discussion, and criticism, as in every circumstance in which norms are produced or conveyed outside a deliberative process (Zittrain 2007; Pagallo and Durante 2016). In conclusion, interaction stands out as the ontological criterion of existence and as the main factor of the technological advancement of virtual reality. Hence, we consider the virtual as part of the real and the real as part of the virtual. This tells us something cru­ cial. We no longer merely describe reality and act, accordingly, on the basic of such a de­ scription. We are constantly constructing the reality—whether virtual or real—in which and with which we interact. Since this ability grows out of the interaction process, it is impossible to determine in advance or as an immutable certainty what is to be taken as real and what as virtual. We move, blur and reshape this dividing line. We also cross it and, in so doing, extend our understanding of it as virtuality expands, enhances, re-engi­ neers or subjects to criticism and amendment our own experience of reality.

References Agrawal Ajay, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb. 2018. Prediction Machines: The Simple Eco­ nomics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard: Harvard Business Review Press. Bray, David, and Benn Konsynski. 2007. “Virtual Worlds: Opportunities for Multi-Discipli­ nary Research.” The Data Base for Advances in Information Systems, Special Issue on Vir­ tual Worlds, 38(4): 1–18. Brey, Philip. 2003. “The Social Ontology of Virtual Environments.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Special Invited Issue: John Searle’s Ideas about Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions, 62(1): 269–282. Caytas, Joanna. 2017. “Regulatory Issues and Challenges Presented by Virtual Currencies” (May 30, 2017). Columbia Business Law Review. Available at SSRN: https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2988367. Clauberg, Johannes. 1647. Elementa philosophiae seu Ontosophia. Groningen. Coeckelbergh, Mark. 2015. Moral Machines. Electronic Financial Technologies, Distanc­ ing, and Responsibility in Global Finance. London: Routledge. Courtine, Jean-François. 1990. Suarez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris: PUF. D’agostino, Marcello, and Massimo Durante, eds. 2018. “The Governance of Algorithms.”. Philosophy & Technology, Special issue on the Governance of Algorithms, 31(4): 499–653. De Sola Pool, Ithiel. 1983. Tecnologies of Freedom. Boston: Harvard University Press. Drovix Pascal. 2009. “The Reality of Virtual Reality” (April 19, 2008). Online published (September 15, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1473031.

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual Durante, Massimo. 2007. Il futuro del web: etica, diritto, decentramento. Dalla sussidiari­ età digitale all’economia dell’informazione in rete. Torino: Giappichelli. Durante, Massimo. 2010. “Re-designing the Role of Law in the Information Society: Medi­ ating between the Real and the Virtual.” European Journal of Legal Studies 2(3): 1–18. Fairfield, Joshua. 2012. “Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern Everyday Life.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 27: 55–116. Floridi, Luciano. 2008. “The Method of Levels of Abstraction.” Minds and Machines 18(3): 303–329. Floridi, Luciano. 2010. Information. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Floridi, Luciano, ed. 2014. The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era. Dordrecht: Springer. Floridi, Luciano. 2014a. The Fourth Revolution. On the Impact of Information and Com­ munication Technologies on Our Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Floridi, Luciano. 2014b. “The Latent Nature of Global Information Warfare.” Philosophy & Technology 27: 317–319. Floridi, Luciano. 2016. “Tolerant Paternalism: Pro-ethical Design as a Resolution of the Dilemma of Toleration.” Science and Engineering Ethics 22(6): 1669–1688. Gilson, Etienne. 1952. Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Me­ diaeval Studies. Göckel, Rudolph. 1613. Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur, Marburg (reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1980). Harari, Yuval. 2015. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. New York: HarperCollins. Heim, Michael. 1993. The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heim, Michael. 1998. Virtual Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Koepsell, David. 2000. The Ontology of Cyberspace, Chicago: Open Court. Lanier Jaron. 2017. Dawn of the New Everything: A Journey Through Virtual Reality. New York: Bodley Head. Lemley, Mark, and Eugene Volokh. 2018. “Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality” (February 27, 2018). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 166: 1–82. Lorhard, Jacob. 1606. Ogdoas Scholastica, continens Diagraphen Typicam artium: Gram­ matices (Latinae, Graecae), Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices, Ethices, Physices, Meta­ physices, seu Ontologiae. Sangalli: Apud Georgium Straub. Page 21 of 23

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Technology and the Ontology of the Virtual Wachter Sandra, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell. 2018. “Counterfactual Explana­ tions without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR.” Harvard Jour­ nal of Law & Technology, 31(2): 1–51. Zittrain, Jonathan. 2007. “Perfect Enforcement on Tomorrow’s Internet.” In Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes, edited by Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung, 125–156. London: Hart.

Notes: (1.) For more on this perspective, see Floridi (2014, 238). (2.) On the debate about cyberspace, ontology, and virtual reality between Platonic dual­ ism and Searlean realism see also, respectively, Heim (1993; 1998) and Koepsell (2000). (3.) The potential of virtual reality simulation has also been studied, in order to address implicit racial basis among judges and jurors in the courtroom setting. On this see Sal­ manowitz (2016 and 2018). (4.) In a sense, simulation can show even more than how the agent “should” have be­ haved: it can show how the agent did behave (reasonably, skillfully, responsibly, or not) and how the real world actually was (what possibilities actually existed, what elements of witness testimony to the reality could or could not have occurred in fact). Therefore, algo­ rithmic simulation may be also evidence of the factual. (5.) See D’Agostino and Durante (2018). (6.) See Pasquale (2015). (7.) Furthermore, the role of counterfactuals as a criterion for explaining an automated decision has recently been highlighted by Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell (2018). (8.) Ted Striphas (2015) speaks in an evocative way of “algorithmic culture” to signal that the massive recourse to algorithms does not only affect numerous decision-making processes but also our culture, generating forms of reliance on new ways of representing the reality. (9.) For more on this point, see Thierer (2016).

Massimo Durante

University of Turin, Department of Law

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