Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges [1 ed.] 2020050455, 9780367366865, 9780429356469, 9780367710262

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Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen

This book assesses the forces that led to the election of Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016 and re-election in 2020, and provides the first comprehensive treatment of this pivotal period in Taiwan’s politics, policy, and international relations. The Democratic Progressive Party’s victory in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential and legislative elections marked several significant turning points. The third peaceful transition of power between political parties during Taiwan’s democratic era heralded further consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy, and Tsai Ing-wen’s election gave the Republic of China its first female president. Her administration has pursued an ambitious agenda of domestic and foreign policy reforms, and has faced challenges that include steering through economic transitions, addressing contentious issues of social justice, national identity and cultural change, and navigating an external environment defined by an increasingly powerful and hostile China, and a more supportive but less predictable United States. In Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen, leading experts from the US and Taiwan chart the progress and problems of Tsai’s first term and the prospects for Taiwan during her second term and beyond. As a study of a crucial era of politics in Taiwan, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Taiwan studies, Political Science, Law, Economics and International Relations. June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, USA and a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA. She is also the author of China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 10th Edition (Routledge, 2019) and Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun (2017). Jacques deLisle is Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania, USA and Director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA. He is co-editor of Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou (Routledge, 2014) and China’s Global Engagement (2017).

Routledge Research on Taiwan Series Series Editor: Dafydd Fell, SOAS, UK

The Routledge Research on Taiwan Series seeks to publish quality research on all aspects of Taiwan studies. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the books will cover topics such as politics, economic development, culture, society, anthropology and history. This new book series will include the best possible scholarship from the social sciences and the humanities and welcomes submissions from established authors in the field as well as from younger authors. In addition to research monographs and edited volumes general works or textbooks with a broader appeal will be considered. The Series is advised by an international Editorial Board and edited by Dafydd Fell of the Centre of Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies. 34. Literary Representations of “Mainlanders” in Taiwan Becoming Sinophone Phyllis Yu-ting Huang 35. Taiwan’s Green Parties Alternative Politics in Taiwan Dafydd Fell 36. Taiwan’s Economic and Diplomatic Challenges and Opportunities Mariah Thornton, Robert Ash and Dafydd Fell 37. Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen Changes and Challenges Edited by June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Research-on-Taiwan-Series/book-series/ RRTAIWAN

Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen Changes and Challenges

Edited by June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle; individual chapters, the contributors The right of June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques deLisle to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Dreyer, June Teufel, 1939- editor. | deLisle, Jacques, 1961- editor. Title: Taiwan in the era of Tsai Ing-wen : changes and challenges / June Teufel Dreyer, and Jacques deLisle. Description: New York : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge research on Taiwan series | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020050455 | ISBN 9780367366865 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429356469 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Cai, Yingwen. | Taiwan–Politics and government–2000- | Presidents–Taiwan–Election–2016. | Presidents–Taiwan–Election–2020. | Taiwan–Foreign relations–1945- | Min jin dang (Taiwan) Classification: LCC DS799.847 .T356 2021 | DDC 951.24906/12–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020050455 ISBN: 978-0-367-36686-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-71026-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-35646-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

To Alan Luxenburg, for his wise counsel, good humor, and unstinting support for Taiwan-related research and the Asia Program during his near-decade as president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and forty-four years of service at FPRI.

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of contributors 1 Introduction: change, continuity, and challenges for Taiwan in the Tsai era

ix x xii

1

JACQUES DELISLE AND JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

2 Elections and the challenges of governing in Taiwan under Tsai

19

RICHARD C. BUSH

3 Kuomintang agonistes: party politics in the wake of Taiwan’s 2016 and 2020 elections

39

SHELLEY RIGGER

4 Taiwan’s need for new attitudes, aims, and actions to further economic growth

64

POCHIH CHEN

5 Taiwan in international economic relations

84

PETER C.Y. CHOW

6 Constructive build-up of Taiwan’s defense

108

YORK W. CHEN

7 Cross-Strait relations under the Tsai administration

129

L.C. RUSSELL HSIAO AND H.H. MICHAEL HSIAO

8 U.S.-Taiwan relations: continuity and change in a triangular dynamic

161

VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG AND JACQUES DELISLE

9 Taiwan-Japan relations in the Tsai era JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

208

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Contents

10 Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era: adapting old strategies to new circumstances

239

JACQUES DELISLE

11 Taiwan’s culture wars from “re-China-ization” to “Taiwan-ization” and beyond: President Tsai Ing-wen’s cultural policy in long-term perspective

284

FANG-LONG SHIH

Index

312

Illustrations

Figures 5.1 Outward FDI as percentage of gross fixed capital formation in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1990–2016 5.2 The stock of outward FDI as percentage of GDP in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1990–2016 5.3 The Distribution of Outward FDI in China and Other Countries, 1991–2019 5.4 Taiwan Value Added (VA) components of gross exports, 1995 and 2011 5.5 Korea Value Added (VA) components of gross exports, 1995 and 2011

96 97 98 101 101

Tables 2.1 2016 Presidential Elections: Results 2.2 2016 Legislative District Elections: Results 2.3 2016 Legislative Party-Vote Elections: Results

20 21 21

Acknowledgements

The idea for this book grew out of a conference in mid-2016 on the prospects for Tsai Ing-wen and her administration as they came to office. Co-organized by the Asia Program of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (where Jacques deLisle serves as Director of the Asia Program, and where June Teufel Dreyer, Shelley Rigger, and Vincent Wei-cheng Wang are senior fellows) and the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies (which was then directed by Richard Bush), that conference produced a special issue of Orbis (Fall 2016, vol. 60, no. 4) that included articles that were the progenitors of chapters in this volume by Richard Bush, Shelley Rigger, Pochih Chen, Peter Chow, Jacques deLisle, and June Teufel Dreyer. We are grateful to FPRI and Orbis for permission to use portions of those articles in the chapters by those authors included in this book. Because this project has unfolded over a relatively extended and highly eventful period and because the authors address a wide range of subjects from diverse perspectives, the chapters vary in the breadth of their historical sweep and the extent to which they focus on the defining developments of Tsai’s historic first campaign and fundamental policy agenda articulated early in her first term or trace in more detail developments—much more significant for some topics than others— occurring across Tsai’s first term and into her second. This book is also something of a sequel to another book in Routledge’s Research on Taiwan Series, Political Change in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou (2016, edited by Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle). That book considered President Ma and his administration not long after the mid-point of an eight-year tenure, much as this book does for President Tsai and her administration. The issues addressed in this volume are, by design, broader and, by circumstance, somewhat different. Like its predecessor, this book brings together an international group of leading scholars and analysts to consider in depth the agendas and circumstances, and the successes and frustrations, of democratic Taiwan as it grapples with difficult challenges and significant opportunities at home and abroad, and sets those issues in broader historical and analytical contexts. The editors also thank Ann Hart, the managing editor of Orbis, for her indispensable contributions; Ryan McEvoy and Iris Yuqing Zheng, students

Acknowledgements

xi

at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, for their vital contributions as research assistants and in preparing this manuscript for publication; Alexandra de Brauw and Cathryn Henderson at Routledge for shepherding us and this book through the publication process; Dafydd Fell, the editor of this series, for including this book in the series; Rebecca Wise for copyediting; and—last but far from least—our contributing authors for their work and their patience. Jacques deLisle June Teufel Dreyer

Contributors

Richard Bush is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He specializes on the East Asia region, particularly China and Taiwan. He served for nineteen years in the U.S. government, on the staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and member of the National Intelligence Council, and Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, the instrumentality through which the U.S. government conducts substantive relations with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations. At the Brookings Institution from 2002 to 2020, he was a Senior Fellow, Director of the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies, Michael H. Armacost Chair, and Chen-fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He is the author of At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations, 1942–2000; Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait; A War Like No Other: The Truth About China’s Challenge to America (co-authored with Michael O’Hanlon); The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations; Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations; and Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan, and the forthcoming Difficult Dilemmas: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life. Bush received his undergraduate education at Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. Pochih Chen is a Taiwanese economist who served as an economic adviser of President Lee Teng-hui, and as the Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development of the Executive Yuan under President Chen Shui-bian. His major fields of research include international finance and trade, macroeconomics, industrial development, and economic policies between Taiwan and China. He is senior policy adviser to President Tsai Ing-wen, professor emeritus of National Taiwan University, advisor to the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, and Honorable Chairman of Taiwan Think Tank. He received his Ph.D. in economics from National Taiwan University. Peter C.Y. Chow is professor of economics at the City University of New York and the Executive Director of the American Association for Chinese Studies. He was a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic

List of contributors

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Research and a consultant to the World Bank. His major interest is in economic development and trade, with a focus on East Asia. He is the author of Trade: the Engine of Growth in East Asia (co-authored with Mitchell Kellman), China’s Economy after Deng, The US-Taiwan FTA: A Bridge for Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region, Trade and Industrial Development in East Asia. He is the editor of several books, including Taiwan in the Global Economy, Taiwan’s Modernization in Global Perspective, Economic Integration, Democracy and National Security in East Asia, The ‘one China’ Dilemma, National Identity and Economic Interest, Economic Integration Across the Taiwan Strait, U.S. Pivot to Asia and Cross Strait Dynamics: Economic and Security Nexus. Chow is also the author of 50 articles and book chapters. York W. Chen is an assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University. He has twentyfive years in government service in national security fields, including his current post as Deputy Secretary General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, and, earlier, as Senior Advisor and member of the research staff of the NSC, staff of the Vice Minister of Defense office, and staff of a member of the Legislative Yuan. He has been convener of the Defense Policy Advisory Committee of the New Frontier Foundation. He is the author of numerous articles on Taiwan defense and national security issues. He has a Ph.D. from Lancaster University. Jacques deLisle is Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania, and Director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His many articles and book chapters, on Taiwan’s international status and cross-Strait relations, China’s engagement with the international order and international law, U.S.-China relations, domestic legal-institutional change in China, and law and politics in Hong Kong under Chinese rule, and other related issues, have appeared in international affairs journals (including Orbis), Chinese studies journals (including the Journal of Contemporary China), law reviews (including the Administrative Law Review), and edited volumes. He is the co-editor of, and contributor to, After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations, To Get Rich is Glorious: Challenges Facing China’s Economic Reform and Opening at Forty, China's Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China, Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou, and China’s Challenges. He received an A.B. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton, and a J.D. and graduate education in political science from Harvard. June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, Formerly senior Far East specialist at the Library of Congress, she has also served as Asia policy advisor to the Chief of Naval

xiv List of contributors Operations and as commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission established by the U.S. Congress. Her books include Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective, China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (now in its tenth edition). Her research focuses on Chinese domestic and foreign policy, Taiwan studies, and Asia-Pacific Security issues. She is a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a member of International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dreyer received her BA from Wellesley College and her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard. H. H. Michael Hsiao is Adjunct Research Fellow of the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Chair Professor of Hakka Studies, National Central University, and Chairman of the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. He was Professor Sociology at National Taiwan University and National Sun Yat-sen University. He has served as National Policy Advisor (under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian) and Senior Advisor to the President of Taiwan (under Tsai Ing-wen). His research areas include—and his many publications address—middle class, civil society and democracy in Asia, social transition to low carbon society, and comparative Hakka studies in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the State University of New York at Buffalo. L. C. Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as a senior research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, national security fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Penn Kemble fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. Prior to those positions, he was the editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation and a special associate in the International Cooperation Department at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. While in law school, he clerked within the Office of the Chairman at the Federal Communications Commission and the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. He received his J.D. from the Catholic University of America’s Columbus School of Law where he served as the editor-in-chief of the Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology. He received a B.A. in International Studies from the American University’s School of International Service and the University Honors Program. Shelley Rigger is the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College. She is a non-resident fellow of the China Policy Institute at Nottingham University and a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Rigger is the author of Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, and Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse, and a monograph, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and ‘Taiwan Nationalism.’” She has published articles on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the national identity issue in Taiwan-China relations and related

List of contributors

xv

topics. In 2019–20 she was a Fulbright Senior Scholar based in Taipei, where she worked on a study of Taiwan’s contributions to the PRC’s economic take-off and a study of Taiwanese youth. She has been a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University in Taiwan and a visiting professor at Fudan University and Shanghai Jiaotong University. She is also a director of The Taiwan Fund, a closed-end investment fund specializing in Taiwan-listed companies. She has a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and a B.A. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University. Fang-long Shih is a Research Fellow and Co-director of the Taiwan Research Programme at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She specialises in the anthropology of Chinese religious culture with focuses on the family, gender, civil society, and cultural development. Her publications include “Generation of a New Space: A Maiden Temple in the Chinese Religious Culture of Taiwan,” “Generating Power in Taiwan: Nuclear, Political and Religious Power,” and “Taiwanisation Under God Nazha: the Geopolitics of Religious Performance in 21th Century Taiwan.” She co-edited Re-Writing Culture in Taiwan. She contributed chapters on “Women, Religions, and Feminisms” in the New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion, and on “Reading Gender and Religion in East Asia: Family Formations and Cultural Transformations” in the Routledge Handbook of Religions in Asia. Shih uses Taiwan as a point of comparison to build dialogues with places or countries with similar social-scientific issues. She co-edited special issues on Taiwan and Ireland in Comparative Perspective and Taiwan and Hong Kong in Comparative Perspective. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang is Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Adelphi University in New York City. He is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Asia Program. He was formerly Professor of Politics and Dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences at Ithaca College, Associate Dean, School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Political Science at the University of Richmond. He is the author of over eighty scholarly articles and book chapters on Asian political economy, security, international relations, East Asian-Latin American comparative development, Taiwan’s foreign policy and domestic politics, cross-Strait relations, and Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics. His recent publications include “Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Begins Her Second Term amid a Pandemic”, “The Taiwan Relations Act at 40: New Dynamics of an Enduring Framework,” “A ‘Blue Wave’ or a ‘Green Flop’? Making Sense of Taiwan’s 2018 Local Elections,” and “Does Candidate Nomination in Districts Increase Party Votes of Small Parties? Evidence from the 2016 Taiwan Legislative Elections.” He was President of the International Studies Association-South, President of the American Association for Chinese Studies, and Coordinator of the American Political Science Association’s Conference Group on Taiwan Studies. He

xvi

List of contributors

received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, M.A. in International Relations and Asian Studies from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and B.A. in Political Science from National Taiwan University.

1

Introduction: change, continuity, and challenges for Taiwan in the Tsai era Jacques deLisle and June Teufel Dreyer

When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) swept to a lopsided victory in presidential and legislative elections in January 2016, it marked a significant turning point in Taiwan’s politics. The voters chose Tsai Ing-wen as the Republic of China’s first female president—a still-rare event in an Asian polity, and all the more unusual for a woman who (unlike Park Geun-hye in Korea, Corazon Aquino in the Philippines, or Indira Gandhi in India) is not an heir to a political dynasty. With its sixth fully democratic national election, Taiwan’s democracy reached another milestone of consolidation, producing the third peaceful transfer of the office of the presidency across party lines. The election also gave the DPP a majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY) for the first time and, thus, the mandate—and responsibility—that comes with control over both the legislative and executive branches. Four years later, Tsai won a second term with a similar margin, and the DPP retained a diminished LY majority. In the 2020 campaign, Tsai and her team drew sharp contrasts between Taiwan’s robust democracy and civil liberties and the crisis in Hong Kong, where a version of the “One Country, Two Systems” model that China insists must apply to Taiwan was unraveling amid mass protests and Beijing-backed repressive measures by local authorities. Tsai’s and the DPP’s 2016 and 2020 victories stemmed from many factors, some of them under their control, including Tsai’s successful move in 2016 toward the political center on policies toward China, and her adept linking in 2020 of cross-Strait policies (the 1992 Consensus and a one China principle) supported by the KMT with the appalling (to Taiwanese voters) situation in Hong Kong. But Tsai’s and the DPP’s wins also reflected the weaknesses of the other major party. In 2016, the KMT bore the burdens of an unpopular president whose approval ratings were well below 20%, corruption scandals that emerged shortly after Ma Ying-jeou’s 2012 re-election as president, sharp divisions within the party, including between Ma and LY speaker Wang Jin-pyng, and a bungled nomination process for 2016 which led to the ousting and replacement of the party’s presidential candidate mid-campaign. In 2020, the KMT again suffered from problems with candidate selection, turning to a populist who disdained the party establishment, ran an undisciplined campaign, was prone to offensive statements, and struggled to redefine the

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Jacques deLisle and June Teufel Dreyer

party’s cross-Strait policy as public opinion turned sharply against Beijing during the Hong Kong protests. The KMT and its presidential candidates were also dragged down by several other issues, among which economics-related concerns figured prominently. Much of the public was dissatisfied with an economy that was performing poorly by Taiwanese standards in 2016 but voters were happier with an economy that had recovered and was doing well by 2020. There was also growing skepticism toward the deepening of economic ties to China that had occurred when the KMT was in power and that seemed to have created greater external political vulnerability without widely shared domestic economic gains. The last of these concerns was partly reflected in the Sunflower Movement, and the student-led takeover of the LY in 2014, in opposition to the then-impending passage of a government-backed cross-Strait agreement on trade in services— one of the many follow-on agreements to the seminal 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The energized youth vote coming out of the Sunflower Movement in 2016 and reappearing in 2020 helped power both of Tsai’s victories and pointed to ongoing electoral challenges for future KMT candidates who would have to seek support from a generation that saw itself as “naturally independent” (tianran du). Yet, much about the political significance and longer-term implications of the DPP’s victories and the KMT’s losses in 2016 and 2020 (as well as the KMT’s win and the DPP’s loss in the in the 2018 local elections) remains uncertain and rooted in factors deeper than those that immediately drove electoral outcomes. In this volume, Richard C. Bush and Shelley Rigger take up these issues. They address whether recent electoral outcomes, particularly at the national level, reflect more the DPP’s strengths or the KMT’s failures. In evaluating the 2016 elections, Bush identifies DPP strong points: Tsai’s attributes as a candidate (including her appeal to young voters and her authority within the party), the DPP’s well-run campaign (which included voter mobilization), and the victors’ ability to define the issues on which the election was fought. Bush also points to KMT weaknesses: voters’ dissatisfaction after eight years of KMT rule, splits within the KMT (including the feud between Ma and LY speaker Wang Jin-pyng), failure to address rising social movements (including the student-led Sunflower Movement), troubles in picking a presidential candidate (culminating in the belated switch from Hung Hsiu-chu to Eric Chu), loss of control over terms of the policy debate (once Tsai’s pledge to maintain the status quo deprived the KMT of its traditional advantage on cross-Strait issues), falling popularity of KMT policies (especially on cross-Strait and economic issues), and the loss of voters to low turn-out and defections to third-party candidate James Soong. In Bush’s account, China’s familiar strategy of relying on the Taiwanese public’s preference for good relations with Beijing, and warning Taiwan’s voters not to support the DPP, failed in the 2016 environment of growing concern in Taiwan that closer ties with China were more harmful than beneficial to Taiwan. Bush finds both similar and different factors at work in the DPP’s ability to retain power in the 2020 presidential and legislative election, following its

Introduction: Taiwan in the Tsai era

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severe setback in the 2018 city and county elections. In the 2020 cycle, the KMT again suffered from a messy nominating process and internal division, with the populist, anti-establishment Han Kuo-yu emerging as the candidate, and moves by Beijing that greatly strengthened Tsai’s and the DPP’s hand, with Tsai successfully equating the KMT-backed 1992 Consensus with the One Country, Two Systems model—widely rejected in Taiwan— that Xi Jinping reemphasized as his model for Taiwan. Adding to the DPP’s advantage and the KMT’s troubles was the turmoil in Hong Kong over the proposed extradition bill, making the prospect of closer ties with China— and anything resembling the Hong Kong version of One Country, Two Systems—even more unappealing to Taiwanese voters. In Bush’s account, performance matters for electoral prospects among voters who have relatively stable political identities and attitudes. In contrast to the first DPP government under Chen Shui-bian in 2000, Tsai and her team came to power with the advantages of unified government and prior experience in governing. Nonetheless, they soon faced sagging popularity and a serious electoral setback in 2018 that Bush attributes variously to some voters’ dislike of controversial policy changes pushed by the DPP, and to other voters’ frustration with the DPP’s failure to fulfill its policy promises. For Bush, a Taiwanese leader who seeks to keep herself and her party in power needs some success across four overlapping arenas: domestic policy, where Tsai’s first-term record on improving the economy, reforming public sector pensions and the labor standards law, legislating marriage equality, and pursuing transitional justice to address the legacy of the KMT authoritarian era was a mixed success politically; domestic politics, where she managed to keep challenges from the DPP’s “deep green” base in check; relations with the United States, which have been strong and improving under Tsai; and crossStrait relations, where Beijing has been unwilling to engage Tsai, given her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle, and has increased pressure on Taiwan. As this mixed pattern from Tsai’s first term suggests, and as the DPP’s weakened showing in the 2020 LY elections reflects, Bush argues, the DPP’s future success and the KMT’s future failure are far from certain, especially in a context where politically salient public opinion is relatively stable and divided. Looming over Taiwan’s electoral fluctuations, Bush discerns deeper dangers. After setbacks to hoped-for rapid progress in cross-Strait relations during Ma’s second term and two presidential and legislative election wins by Tsai and the DPP, Beijing may have concluded that persuading public sentiment is a lost cause and that displays and exercises of power are the more fruitful strategy. Taiwan’s polarized, zero-sum party politics may leave it illequipped to forge the domestic consensus needed to deal effectively with a more threatening China. Rigger focuses on deep-seated problems in the KMT to explain its defeats in the 2016 and 2020 elections, and to suggest that the KMT may not be able to right itself, at least in the near term. She identifies a long-running

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leadership crisis and more recent difficulties in formulating cross-Strait policies. She traces both problems to the Lee Teng-hui era. In Rigger’s account, the leadership crisis reflects conflict between what she calls “’49ers” (often called “mainlanders”) or waishengren, who came to Taiwan after losing the civil war in China, and “locals” (often called “Taiwanese” or benshengren). After the “local” or “Taiwanese” Lee succeeded mainlander Chiang Ching-kuo and cooperated with James Soong—of mainlander background but with strong ties to local, grassroots politics—the schism seemed manageable. But when Lee marginalized Soong and backed mainlander Lien Chan as his would-be successor, the KMT split and lost a threeway race for the presidency in 2000 to the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian, who would soon receive support from Lee’s new party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union. The urgent tasks of stymying Chen and winning back the presidency papered over the KMT’s divisions for a time, with Lien and Soong even running, unsuccessfully, on a unity ticket. But with Lee and Soong gone from the party, the KMT party center reverted to control by the mainlander elite, while Wang Jin-pyng—speaker of the LY and thus the KMT’s top-ranking politician—emerged as a powerful localist leader. Although the KMT regained the presidency and retained control of the LY in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou’s two terms as president saw spiraling conflict between Ma—associated with the mainlander elite—and Wang. After the Sunflower Movement’s occupation of the legislature stalled a cross-Strait trade in services agreement backed by the Ma government, and a bungled presidential candidate nomination process, the mainlanderdominated KMT lost the presidency and the LY in 2016. In 2020, it appeared that the KMT might manage once again to straddle its internal divide with a surprising presidential candidate: Han Kuo-yu—an unconventional politician of mainlander background but with long-cultivated localist credentials. In the end, the provocative populist Han alienated both wings of the KMT and the party again lost badly. In cross-Strait policy, Rigger argues, Lee had devised a winning formula for the KMT. His Guidelines for National Unification accepted a version of “one China,” asserted Taiwan’s/the ROC’s sovereignty in terms that Beijing could tolerate, and moved away from the Chiang-era non-recognition of the PRC’s existence—thereby opening the door to increased engagement with the mainland, especially in economic affairs. Despite the deterioration in cross-Strait ties later in Lee’s tenure, especially after his characterization of Taiwanmainland relations as a “special type of state-to-state relations,” Lee had laid the foundation for the 1992 Consensus—a term retrospectively coined with reference to a cross-Strait meeting that Lee had instigated, and that became the framework for the rapid cross-Strait rapprochement and domestic political success achieved by the KMT under Ma’s leadership. The problem for the KMT, Rigger argues, is that mounting disappointment with cross-Strait relations and distrust of Beijing and its agenda have turned Taiwanese (especially the younger generation) against the KMT’s approach—all the more so as the DPP under Tsai has adopted a more moderate stance on cross-Strait

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issues. The problem became worse as KMT presidential candidates Hung in 2016 (before her replacement by Chu) and Han in 2020 struggled to articulate a cross-Strait policy that was neither more accommodating toward China than the no-longer-appealing 1992 Consensus, nor disconcertingly unclear or unstable, nor unacceptable to Beijing. Still, Rigger cautions against counting the KMT out. She points to Taiwan’s resilient two-party system, the considerable, if diminished, financial and organizational assets possessed by the KMT, the existence of a capable, if small, cohort of young KMT politicians—including the new chairperson selected in 2020—and supporters who could revive the party, and the lack of ardent support for the DPP among many voters. Economic issues loomed large in Taiwan’s 2016, 2018, and 2020 elections and pose some of the biggest challenges facing Tsai and the DPP-led government. By Taiwan’s standards, economic performance had been sluggish under Ma, and this was part of what drove voters to the DPP in 2016. With the Chinese and global economies growing more slowly and amid increased competition from lower-cost producers abroad, one traditional driver of Taiwan’s economy—exports—held limited potential to spur sustained growth. Economic anxiety among the young, who feared the consequences of a greater opening to the lower-wage behemoth across the Strait, fueled the Sunflower Movement, which boosted the DPP’s electoral fortunes in 2014 and 2016, and gave rise to the new, partly DPP-aligned New Power Party (NPP) (shidai liliang). A principal reason that cross-Strait policy shifted from perennial liability to new-found strength for the DPP by the 2016 election cycle was that the public had grown skeptical of the Ma administration’s claims that deepening integration with mainland China’s economy would bring economic gains to Taiwan that were worth the long-acknowledged political risks. Amid worsening income distribution, income inequality and economic insecurity had become major issues as well. In the 2016 campaign and during the four-year term that followed, Tsai and the DPP moved to address these economic policy issues with initiatives that included pension reform, education reform, improving the social safety net, industrial policy focusing on several technology-intensive sectors, reforms to the financial sector, and foreign trade and investment policy, including rebalancing to reduce dependence on China. In 2018, economic difficulties contributed to the DPP’s serious electoral setback in local elections. The economy was still sluggish, its troubles accentuated by an energy shortage that was partly the product of government policies on nuclear power. Some groups, such as future public-sector pensioners, saw their economic interests at risk from DPP-supported reforms. Other groups were disappointed with slow progress of promised reforms. By 2020, however, a modest economic recovery—aided by the flight back to Taiwan of mainlandbased operations concerned about the escalating U.S.-China trade war—saw Taiwan outperforming its closest comparators, including Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. This likely helped Tsai and the DPP in their successful quest for

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re-election. As Tsai began her second term, however, a new and serious economic issue loomed: the fall-out from COVID-19. By the time of Tsai’s second inaugural, it was clear that Taiwan had handled the pandemic, or, at least, its first wave, extraordinarily well. But the severe downturn in the global economy, especially among advanced industrial countries in Europe and North America, posed new and possibly lasting challenges for Taiwan’s deeply internationally integrated economy, even as it also created new opportunities, including those arising from new imperatives to diversify global supply chains. Although such near-term developments are politically salient, in economics as in politics, the policy challenges and opportunities facing Tsai and the DPP government in its first and second terms have deep roots in long-standing, structural factors. In assessing Taiwan’s troubles and the prospects for effective policy solutions, Pochih Chen frames economic analysis and policy assessment with a long historical view to conclude that Taiwan under Tsai faces several difficult problems stemming from deeply ingrained economic habits ill-suited to current conditions, and from unreasonably high expectations partly born of past success and the complacency it has produced. Chen attributes Taiwan’s stunning gains as a newly industrializing country through the 1980s to its having engaged a relatively open and liberal trading order and thereby benefiting from the forces of international factor price equalization. As one of the relatively few countries to take advantage of open markets in more developed countries, Taiwan reaped gains in national income and development that came from exporting goods in which Taiwanese producers had a comparative advantage. Taiwan enjoyed increases in per capita income generated by trade-driven pressure to equalize the price of labor crossnationally in industries that produce traded goods. This resulted in Taiwanese workers’ wages rising toward developed country levels. In more recent times, however, the same processes have begun to work against Taiwan. As Taiwan became a relatively high-wage country, and as China and other less-developed economies began to compete with Taiwan in the global marketplace, open international trade began to drive down Taiwanese firms’ prices and profits and exerted downward pressure on wages and employment for lower-skilled Taiwanese workers in sectors that produced tradable goods. Finding new sources of growth in national income and wages is now more difficult for Taiwan, requiring the development of higher-valueadded industries, and effective government policies to foster them. This includes promoting knowledge-intensive industries and relying more on nontradable sectors of the economy (including some types of services) that are better insulated from lower-paid foreign competition. While the Tsai administration appears to have grasped some of the issues, it faces several serious obstacles: widespread overestimation of the productivity and international competitiveness of Taiwan’s labor force; ingrained habits of relying on original equipment manufacturing (OEM)—a sector where price competition is fierce and production to buyers’ specification stifles value-creating innovation; reliance on cost-cutting as a response to foreign competition in

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export sectors; poor measurement and incentive structures for research and development; weak entrepreneurship that is further discouraged by outmoded regulation and high costs for land and other factors; and underdeveloped financial institutions that do not adequately transfer savings into investment and that lead to other deleterious effects associated with surplus savings. Integration with the Chinese economy, which began under Lee, grew under Chen, and accelerated under Ma, has compounded these difficulties. The ties to the mainland have led to rapid transfer of lower-end industry across the Strait, and the pattern soon began to spread to higher value-added upstream and downstream sectors. This integration into the international production chain also has made Taiwan more vulnerable to Beijing’s use of the economic leverage it has gained over Taiwan for political ends. Chen concludes that wise government policies—including ones pursued by the Tsai government to foster several higher-tech industries, reform the financial sector to encourage targeted investment, and pursue closer economic ties with the U.S. in a time of greater U.S. wariness toward China—can address some of the most important problems. But it is too soon to address the effect of Tsai’s policies, and success is not assured, given the magnitude of the tasks, the difficulty of overcoming entrenched thinking that sees policies of trade liberalization as the surest path to economic success, the skepticism that inevitably greets (sometimes with justification) ambitious initiatives in state industrial policy, and the new uncertainties introduced by the global economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In her first term, Tsai’s government made only limited progress on these difficult policy fronts. In a similar vein, Peter Chow finds policies on international economic relations to be a possible, but limited and difficult-to-achieve, answer to some of the long-mounting economic difficulties facing Taiwan. Acknowledging the challenges posed by slower global economic growth since the 2008–2009 financial crisis—which offered a preview of the serious economic fallout from COVID-19—and China’s potent and growing ability and inclination to constrain and impede Taiwan’s international economic engagement, Chow identifies several areas that offer significant opportunities, as well as challenges, for Taiwan under the Tsai government. Taiwan can build upon, and exploit, the gains that flow from Taiwan’s having attained membership in the World Trade Organization and major WTO-linked plurilateral agreements and various multilateral economic institutions—such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. But some newly important bodies and accords, such as the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) remain beyond reach. Taiwan can seek to avoid provocation and deterioration in cross-Strait economic relations—and renew the pursuit of ECFA follow-on agreements—to mitigate the possibility that Beijing will use its considerable economic leverage against Taiwan. But this policy is not assured of success given the tough line Beijing has taken toward Tsai’s government, domestic political opposition in Taiwan to greater integration with China, and the

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significant risks that come with highly asymmetrical cross-Strait economic interdependence. Taiwan can pursue bilateral trade and investment pacts (beyond the few small-scale ones achieved so far), primarily with countries in the region and especially with countries that are members of large emerging trading blocs, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Yet Beijing’s posture as a formidable and obdurate gatekeeper limits prospects in this area. Taiwan can seek to deepen its already strong de facto integration—and especially its links to the U.S. and Japan—in the global value chain for high value-added products. On the other hand, this strategy risks encouraging greater migration of even relatively high-end Taiwanese industry to the mainland and might founder on the U.S.’s long-standing unwillingness to move forward with the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Increased bipartisan support in the U.S. for Taiwan during Tsai’s first term, the Tsai administration’s domestically controversial move in August 2020 to lift restrictions on imports of U.S. pork and beef, and hoped-for greater openness to a trade deal from the Biden administration, improved prospects for a bilateral trade agreement. Taiwan could benefit from Tsai’s continuation of the efforts begun under Ma to join the emerging mega-regional trade agreements, such as the RCEP and CPTPP. Here, too, success will not come easily, given Beijing’s opposition (decisive for the RCEP and influential for other accords), the U.S.’s absence (following the Trump Administration’s opt-out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership), and the generally low utilization rates of cumbersome FTAs by member states. Finally, Taiwan might reap some gains in terms of growth and reduced dependence on China from the “new southbound policy” that the Tsai administration has adopted to encourage trade and investment with South and Southeast Asia, albeit with only modest results. In Chow’s assessment, the Tsai administration’s economic statecraft in these areas has adopted a coherent vision for how international integration and globalization can help Taiwan. Where along the spectrum from relative success to relative failure the Tsai government’s efforts fall will greatly affect Taiwan’s economic and political future. Like economic policy, defense policy presents significant challenges, largely rooted in the long-growing asymmetry in hard power across the Taiwan Strait. With China’s large investments in military capacity and modernization, Taiwan is increasingly overmatched and the possibility that the U.S. might be deterred from intervening, at least in some crisis scenarios, has increased, thus expanding the range of options open to China to inflict high costs and damage on Taiwan. Using a metaphor of constructing a building, York Chen assesses three principal aspects of national defense policy that Taiwan needs to address and has at least begun to engage under Tsai, whose initiatives Chen evaluates favorably. First, Chen argues that Taiwan’s national defense requires a “foundation” in social (and governmental) support for and confidence in the armed forces, which has long been tenuous, largely for reasons

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rooted in Taiwan’s complex history of foreign rule and authoritarian militarybacked governance. He finds that this foundation has suffered in recent years amid negative media coverage in Taiwan and Beijing’s mounting pursuit of political warfare to shake Taiwan’s confidence in the sustainability of the status quo. Chen points to Tsai’s high-profile, widely reported visits to military bases, including one in pointed response to a massive Chinese naval parade ordered by Xi Jinping, and moves to strengthen the Taiwanese military’s Political Warfare Bureau as examples of measures to address these problems. Second, there is the question of Taiwan’s defense strategy and its operational concepts—what Chen calls “configuring the floors.” He credits the Tsai government with two innovations: a doctrine of “Resolute Defense, MultiDomain Deterrence”—the sixth formulation in as many decades—that goes beyond rhetorical change to refocus Taiwan’s defense strategy on newly emerging threats from China, including physical attack in a mode other than a straightforward cross-Strait amphibious assault, psychological warfare, and cyber-conflict; and an approach to threat analysis that emphasizes greater survivability of Taiwan’s fighting assets, inter-service cooperation (as part of the Overall Defense Concept), and understanding and influencing the PLA’s thinking and calculations. Chen defends the much-criticized pursuit of expensive basic-force platforms, in part because of the boost they provide to military confidence and social support for procuring more cost-benefit-justified capabilities. Third, Chen uses the long-standing issue of Taiwan’s pursuit of an indigenous defense industry as an example of what he calls “reinforced concrete”—the material that ties together his “foundation” and “floors.” Building an indigenous defense industry has long been a slogan accompanied by only weak results, despite the peril to Taiwan’s security posed by dependence on the sometimes-fickle choices by the U.S. concerning arms sales. Here, Chen sees some progress in Tsai’s declared emphasis on building up an indigenous defense industry and her more concrete, if still modest, steps to seek better operations and management and to improve the institutional environment for defense-related research and development. He points in particular to submarine and fighter jet trainer projects and enhancement of the role and resources of the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology. As these defense policy concerns underscore, Tsai Ing-wen must, like her predecessors, cope with daunting challenges in Taiwan’s external relations. The big issues are enduring ones: how to handle the nettlesome relationship with Taiwan’s important economic partner and existential political threat across the Strait; how to maintain strong ties and trust with Taiwan’s indispensable supporter, the United States; how to build stronger connections with friendly or potentially friendly powers in the region, especially Japan; and how to preserve or enhance Taiwan’s precarious international space despite opposition and pressure from Beijing. With Tsai and the DPP in power, and with U.S.-China relations on a newly volatile and sharply downward-trending trajectory, these familiar issues have presented distinctive challenges and opportunities.

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On cross-Strait relations, Tsai has staked out a position that is accommodating by recent DPP standards but that takes a step back from Ma’s policies of more rapid rapprochement. In response to China’s agenda of unification, Tsai has continued her predecessors’ insistence on her country’s sovereignty, and the indispensability of democratic approval by the people of Taiwan for any change to Taiwan’s status. Tsai has consistently promised to maintain the existing framework for relations with Beijing, and to pursue peace, stability, and development in cross-Strait relations. She has pledged to conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the existing Republic of China constitutional order and the Articles Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland Area (the provisions adopted under President Lee Teng-hui as part of the opening to China in the early 1990s). She has said that she will “respect the historical fact” of the agreements reached and negotiations undertaken between the two sides since 1992. Those themes, set forth in her first inaugural address in 2016, were largely reprised in her second inaugural, although in somewhat less detail and without an express reference to the post-1992 negotiations. References to “peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue” as her conditions for cross-Strait engagement and her pointed and explicit rejection of “the Beijing authorities’ use of ‘one country, two systems’ to downgrade Taiwan and undermine the cross-Strait status quo” showed a harder edge, mirroring the toughened line Beijing had taken toward Taiwan on many (though not all) fronts during Tsai’s first term. Tsai has consistently stopped short of accepting a “One China Principle” or the “1992 Consensus” favored by Ma and demanded by Beijing as a condition for cross-Strait engagement. In her successful 2020 re-election bid, her campaign emphasized an ongoing rejection of the “One China Principle,” which she equated—with help from Xi’s more assertive statements about policy on Taiwan and his hard line toward protests in Hong Kong—with Beijing’s “One Country, Two Systems” model and, in turn, the reality of its implementation in Hong Kong—something the Taiwanese public saw as a profoundly unappealing example of betrayed autonomy, stifled democracy, and compromised rule of law. Shortly after Tsai’s and the DPP’s 2020 election victory, COVID-19 reinforced negative attitudes toward Beijing. China’s initial suppression of information reminded Taiwanese of the SARS crisis of 2003 as the pathogen began to spread to Taiwan. Taiwan’s world-leading success in containing the outbreak, amid China’s continued intransigence in limiting Taiwan’s engagement with the WHO, drew strong criticism in Taiwan that Beijing was playing politics over Taiwan’s status in the midst of a deadly serious pandemic. Beijing responded with countercharges that Taipei and its supporters were the ones who were guilty of politicization, with some of the more strident sources asserting Taiwan was using the crisis to pursue formal independence. After Tsai came to office and especially in the latter half of 2020, Beijing greatly stepped up military activities near Taiwan, ostensibly to quash a growing threat of Taiwanese separatism. Under these circumstances,

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the cold shoulder toward Tsai and the “cold peace” toward Taiwan that marked the beginning of Tsai’s first term have predictably extended into her second term. L.C. Russell Hsiao and H.H. Michael Hsiao detail the twists and turns of Beijing’s moves and Taiwan’s responses during the Tsai presidency. Their account of PRC statements, policies, and actions reveals a mixed “hard/soft” policy. On the hard side are: stepped-up political warfare, including Beijing’s seeking to claim the mantle of the ROC’s founding father Sun Yat-sen; greatly increased pressure on Taiwan’s international space, most notably through supporting switches in diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing, and pressing other states to downgrade Taiwan’s unofficial missions; larger-scale displays of military force by the PLA, through exercises near Taiwan (especially during 2020); replacement of Taiwan hands with international relations generalists in key Taiwan affairs positions; a tougher tone on Taiwan issues— although without any significant change in substantive policy–from Xi Jinping in his speeches at the 19th Party Congress and on the 40th anniversary of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s seminal “Message to Taiwan Compatriots”; and a revival of the notion that Beijing may be contemplating a deadline for unification—reflected in the linkage Xi Jinping suggested between the 2049 centennial of the founding of the PRC and achievement of Xi’s goal of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which would be incomplete without the recovery of ostensibly lost territory. The soft elements have been more limited and include: efforts to sustain what has been dense party-to-party engagement between the CCP and the KMT; sporadic (but soon superseded) official statements that omitted references to the 1992 Consensus; and, most significantly, extension of Beijing’s venerable strategy of promoting economic, social, and cultural ties, including through a set of “31 Measures” and a follow-on “26 Measures” that offer special privileges and material inducements to Taiwanese businesses and individuals to pursue opportunities on the mainland, and perhaps ultimately cast their lot more fully with China. In the Hsiaos’ account, the Tsai administration’s response, although inevitably more restrained than Beijing’s initiatives, also has included relatively hard and soft elements. Examples of the former include: the revamped national defense strategy of “Resolute Defense, Multi-Domain Deterrence,” which focuses on countering increasingly serious and multifaceted Chinese threats; and moves to strengthen indigenous defense industrial capacity and cooperation with foreign defense partners. Examples of the latter include: calls—which have gone unanswered—to find a new and mutually acceptable basis for cross-Strait relations; and continued unilateral assurances that Taiwan will support peace, stability, and continuity in cross-Strait relations. Hsiao and Hsiao conclude that there is likely to be little fundamental change in either side’s approach during Tsai’s remaining time in office. Tsai’s comeback electoral victory in 2020 rested in significant part on her ability to harness concerns in Taiwan about what the crisis in Hong Kong revealed

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about China’s threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, autonomy, and democracy, making a much more accommodating policy toward Beijing unlikely. Tsai’s second inaugural address largely confirmed the cross-Strait policies articulated four years earlier. Beijing largely reaffirmed its existing cross-Strait policies in response to Tsai’s re-election and second inaugural, and has cast the COVID-19 crisis as another source of conflict in cross-Strait relations. With Beijing posing familiar and—especially amid China’s increased shows of force near Taiwan—arguably increasing threats, Taiwan’s relationship with the United States remains an enduringly crucial factor in Taiwan’s security. Developments during Tsai’s successful campaign and early years in office were notably positive. Tsai’s 2015 pre-election trip to Washington and her moderate, pro-status quo positions on cross-Strait relations assuaged many, if not all, of the concerns that marred her visit—and led to an all-but-open endorsement of her opponent—four years earlier during her first, unsuccessful campaign for president. Tsai’s stance on cross-Strait issues was generally welcomed by U.S. officials and analysts who foresaw neither a return to the chronic cross-Strait crises that swirled around what Beijing saw as the provocative “pro-independence” moves of the Chen years, nor a continuation of trends from the Ma presidency, which had begun to raise worries in some quarters that the initially salutary rapprochement in cross-Strait relations might go too far and threaten U.S. interests. The advent of the Trump administration introduced greater uncertainty and instability, most pointedly through the president-elect’s phone call with Tsai, subsequent comments casting doubt on his commitment to the U.S.’s one China policy, and abrupt reaffirmation of that policy to Xi. U.S. policy on Taiwan and cross-Strait issues soon returned to a state of relative normalcy, but with notable increases in U.S. support for Taiwan. U.S. support for Taiwan has been reinforced by the widely shared sense in Washington that Beijing—and its insistence that Tsai accept the 1992 Consensus and One China Principle—is primarily to blame for the downturn in cross-Strait relations. Washington’s policies also have been underpinned by deeper assessments of U.S. interests. These range from traditional security analyses, which increasingly have seen discord and rivalry with China as likely and perhaps inevitable (all the more so amid the rising mutual rancor over responsibility for COVID-19), to a long-standing (if recently unsettled under Trump and potentially revived under Biden) commitment to supporting democratic values, which are robustly manifest in Taiwan’s politics and governance. The Biden presidency is not likely to bring fundamental shifts in U.S. policy on Taiwan-related issues. The fundamentals of U.S. policy, including general support for the cross-Strait status quo and deterring both Taipei and Beijing from provoking a crisis, have been relatively stable for many years. The shift toward more visible U.S. support for Taiwan, including through several acts of Congress since 2016, has been strongly bipartisan. So, too, is the longer-emerging consensus that U.S. policy toward China needs to be tougher and less accommodating than it was during the long era of “constructive

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engagement” that followed the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979. Given the state of the U.S.-China relationship and Beijing’s unrelenting pressure on Taiwan, one significant change in U.S. policy has become more plausible: abandoning the long-standing position of “strategic ambiguity” in favor of a clearer, and more Taiwan-supporting, policy addressing the conditions that would trigger U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait crisis. Vincent Wang and Jacques deLisle analyze the patterns and prospects for U.S.-Taiwan relations during Tsai’s tenure in terms of a long-running dynamic that supports a relatively sanguine view, but that may not persist under contemporary conditions. In their account, changes in U.S.-Taiwan relations in recent decades have followed the sequence of: Taiwan initiates a “first move” toward change in cross-Strait relations in response to democratic politics at home and policies from Beijing, such as Lee’s or Chen’s push in the direction of a more clearly separate Taiwan, or Ma’s move toward rapprochement with the PRC; Beijing makes a “second move” in response, including those precipitating the crisis-ridden relations of the later Lee years and the Chen years and the deepening ties of the Ma years; the U.S. makes a responsive “third move” that seeks to protect U.S. interests, which Washington typically sees as consistent with the cross-Strait status quo, or the status quo ante before disruptive moves by Taiwan or China, and which meant fraught and tension-filled U.S.-Taiwan relations during much of the Chen years but more cooperative and supportive ones during the Ma years. In their assessment, the three-move dynamic was weaker in the Ma years, but some developments during that period suggested what could have happened if Ma had pushed rapprochement much farther and faster, if Beijing had reciprocated, and if the U.S. had faced a possible choice between pressing Taiwan to reverse course, or “(pre-)abandoning” Taiwan. In Wang and deLisle’s account, the two-decade old dynamic may be holding, despite some signs that may point to its erosion and that show what a different dynamic could look like. Tsai’s support for stability and peace in cross-Strait relations was a pointed eschewal of a disruptive first move, and portended limits to the harshness of Beijing’s response to a Taiwanese president not to its liking, and continuity in the positive U.S.-Taiwan relationship that Tsai inherited. Yet, China often has sought to portray Tsai’s policies as inconsistent with maintaining the cross-Strait status quo, and a full-fledged status quo-threatening second move-like gambit that goes beyond the cold peace of Tsai’s first term could be launched by China. Such a move could entail extending measures Beijing has already taken, including increased military operations near Taiwan, a notably increased assault on Taiwan’s international space, and a redoubled insistence that Taiwan be unified in the notindefinite-future on the basis of the “One Country, Two Systems” model that is hated in Taiwan and has been implemented amid spiraling local opposition in Hong Kong. U.S. policy toward Taiwan since Tsai came to office has remained relatively consistent with the positive state of affairs in the Ma era, and is on track to

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continue in its basic substance (amid significant change in methods) under the Biden administration, thus likely foregoing the level of change that would be associated with a third move. Yet, the departure from established norms that characterized U.S. foreign policy under Trump, the increasingly adversarial character of U.S.-PRC relations, the noticeable increase in executive branch and congressional support for Taiwan on issues from arms sales to international space and beyond, and a growing debate—coinciding with a presidential transition—in Washington about whether to move beyond the longstanding doctrine of strategic ambiguity all point to what a more transformative U.S.-driven change in U.S.-Taiwan relations might look like. Wang and deLisle conclude that, if the three-move dynamic is enduring, U.S. policies toward Taiwan in security relations, economic relations, and international cooperation and participation could dissuade Taiwan from making another status quo-disturbing first move and, in turn, deter Beijing from a reactive, crisis-deepening second move. If the old pattern is fraying, many of the same policies fostering stronger U.S.-Taiwan relations still could offer valuable means to ameliorate risks to cross-Strait peace and stability, and U.S. interests. After the United States, Japan has been Taiwan’s most important supporter. June Teufel Dreyer addresses a Japan-Taiwan relationship that is good and may improve further, but that includes some long-standing sources of friction and is likely to remain below the threshold of what Japan believes Beijing will find intolerable. Developments following Tsai’s victory and coming to power have been positive. Tsai had signaled interest in closer ties with a pre-election visit to Japan and, immediately after the election, by appointing DPP heavyweights former premier and presidential candidate Frank Hsieh Chang-ting and former senior official and Chen Shui-bian confidante Chiou Yi-jen to top Japan relations posts. Tokyo reciprocated, issuing warmer-than-usual statements about Taiwan’s elections and the importance of bilateral relations, accepting more embassy-like names for the representative offices that Taiwan and Japan maintain in one another’s capitals, resuming a bilateral security dialogue, and allowing higher-level informal meetings, including one on the sidelines of the annual APEC conference between thenPremier Abe Shintaro and Taiwan’s former premier and elder statesman James Soong. Discussions of closer bilateral cooperation, including in security affairs, emerged in reinvigorated Track 2 talks, with people-to-people ties strengthened as well. Abe’s response to Tsai’s re-election, including in the high-profile context of an address to the Diet, pointed to continuity as Tsai began her second term, although it is not yet clear that they will be continued by Abe’s successor, Suga Yoshihide, whose advisers include the notably proBeijing Nikai Toshihiro. Dreyer argues that, in enhancing ties with Japan, Tsai’s government has been able to build upon history, including: positive popular feelings toward Japan that date from the period of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan (1895– 1945); memories of the support Japan offered to Taiwan during the many

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years when Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo ruled Taiwan, and paradoxically Japan provided a haven for Taiwanese critics of the KMT’s authoritarian regime; the bilateral links forged during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, which had drawn on Lee’s personal history of ties to Japan and been reinforced by Tokyo’s mounting concerns about the implications for Japan’s security of the PRC-initiated cross-Strait missile crisis preceding Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election; and the relatively positive state of bilateral relations during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, when Chen’s “de-Sinification agenda” at home and frosty relations with China were broadly in synch with deepening tensions in Japan-China relations. Still, as Dreyer notes, Tsai did have some repair work to do. Under Ma Ying-jeou, the bilateral relationship had taken a step backward. Ma was dogged by an image that he was “antiJapan”—a perception with roots as far back as Ma’s doctoral dissertation asserting ROC sovereignty over contested islands in the East China Sea and seemingly reaffirmed by his failure to mention Japan in his inaugural address. During Ma’s tenure, bilateral frictions were exacerbated by the missteps of leaders and top officials on both sides. With the DPP in power at least for an eight-year period through 2024, Tsai emphasizing relations with Japan, and Japan’s relationship with China still deeply troubled, Taiwan has had, and taken advantage of, opportunities to forge closer bilateral ties. Nonetheless, progress does not come easily. As Dreyer points out, despite considerable progress and generally positive ties, the Tsai administration must grapple with difficult, long-standing issues, including: disagreements over fishing rights in waters near disputed islands that were only incompletely resolved by an agreement reached during Ma’s presidency; the still-unresolved and until recently fraught question of Japan’s acceptance of responsibility and compensation for comfort women, meaning those Taiwanese who were recruited or forced into service as sex workers for the Japanese military during the Second World War; concerns over food safety—specifically, Taiwan’s refusal to lift bans on imports from areas affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster; and high-stakes trade and investment issues, including Japan’s support for Taiwan’s accession to the TPP and, more recently, the CPTPP, and investment relationships between major Japanese and Taiwanese tech companies, amid concerns of leakage of technology and sensitive information to China; long-simmering—but, with the DPP in power, deemphasized—disputes about territorial sovereignty and maritime rights around the Tiaoyutai/Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and Okinotori; and Japan’s still-uncertain willingness to increase significantly security cooperation, but with Japan reinterpreting the pacifist provision in its constitution and dropping its ban on foreign arms sales being potentially hopeful signs for Taiwan. More fundamentally, Japan’s and Taiwan’s common democratic values, dense and valuable economic ties, deep historical and social connections, ongoing people-to-people ties, growing high-level contacts, and shared concerns about China as a security threat provide sturdy foundations for bilateral relations. But prospects for building a stronger and closer relationship,

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especially at the official level, are limited, primarily by China’s intractable opposition, its alignment with domestic Taiwanese and Japanese critics of close Taiwan-Japan ties, and its growing ability to impose painful consequences on both Taiwan and Japan. Another major concern in Taiwan’s foreign policy, and an assiduously cultivated underpinning for Taiwan’s security, is Taiwan’s participation and stature in the international system—often referred to as Taiwan’s international space. In assessing these issues, Jacques deLisle points to the more challenging environment that Taiwan under Tsai faces, stemming primarily from the Beijing-imposed chill in cross-Strait relations and squeeze of Taiwan’s international space, and secondarily from changes and volatility in U.S. policy under the Trump administration and lingering uncertainty as Biden came to office. He details a six-fold strategy for pursuing and securing international space that Taiwan has long employed and continues to use, with adaptations to new circumstances, under Tsai. The elements of this strategy include: seeking or preserving modest participation in United Nations specialized and affiliated organizations and similar near-universal international institutions such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and INTERPOL; membership or reliable participation in established international economic organizations, such as the WTO, ADB, and APEC; accession to newly emerging and increasingly important regional economic institutions, such as the TPP / CPTPP, RCEP and AIIB; formal diplomatic ties with a shrinking roster of small states, which help Taiwan to tick the box for one element of the traditional legal definition of a state in the international system; robust informal relations with major powers, including most significantly the United States; and cultivating a behavioral profile tracking that of a member in good standing of major, UN-centered treaty regimes that Taiwan has not been permitted to join, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. On these multiple fronts in Taiwan’s struggle for international status and security, deLisle argues, the Tsai government inherited a legacy of limited progress but has suffered significant setbacks. China has rolled back Taiwan’s access to UN-affiliated organizations, denied Taiwan membership in heavily Chinese-influenced nascent regional economic institutions, and poached several of Taipei’s diplomatic allies. Prospects for improvement have been limited as Tsai has moved into her second term—a point underscored by Taiwan’s continued exclusion from the annual World Health Assembly meeting in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic that spread from China to Taiwan and that Taiwan contained expeditiously. Membership in more wellestablished international economic organizations, informal relations with the United States and other powers, and replicating the components of participation in major multilateral treaty regimes have been relative bright

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spots, but these areas too have presented growing difficulties for Taiwan. Taiwan’s relationship with the United States is another relatively positive note, underpinned by the sharp, recently COVID-accelerated, deterioration in U.S.-PRC relations, the low likelihood that the Biden administration will be inclined or able to reverse the bipartisan consensus developed during the last four years favoring stronger support for Taiwan, and the Biden administration’s expressed commitment to reengaging—and possibly regaining influence— with the WHO, the UN Human Rights Commission, and the UNFCCC regime that have been the foci of Taiwan’s quest for international space. During Tsai’s first term and partway into her second term, deLisle concludes, Taiwan continues to be dealt a weak—and in some respects weakening—hand, but persists in playing it well. Finally, Fang-long Shih shifts our focus from the concerns of social science— politics, economics, and international relations—to the concerns of the humanities—culture. As with so much else in Taiwan, policy about culture is highly political and has implications for Taiwan’s international stature. Shih examines Taiwan’s cultural policy under Tsai in the context of Taiwan’s long-running post-1949 culture wars. She traces the evolution in Taiwan’s cultural policy from Chiang Kai-shek’s “re-China-ization” drive to instill Chinese culture and mandarin language among Taiwanese in the period following Japanese colonial rule, through Chiang Ching-kuo’s more Taiwanaccommodating version of cultural policy as Taiwan began its transition toward democracy, to Lee Teng-hui’s shift toward “Taiwanization” and the notion of a “New Taiwanese People” encompassing both benshengren/“Taiwanese” and waishengren/“mainlanders,” to Chen Shui-bian’s more thoroughgoing Taiwanization and de-China-ization, and Ma Ying-jeou’s reversion to a more China-oriented, partly “re-China-ized” cultural policy. For Shih, Tsai’s approach is especially distinctive, moving beyond the traditional dichotomy of Chinese vs. Taiwanese, to frame Taiwan as a “pluricultural settler state” with overlays of indigenous (yuanzhumin), local Taiwanese, Chinese, and various foreign cultural influences. In Shih’s account, Tsai-era cultural policy is explicitly multicultural, deeply bound up with democracy, and linked to a sense of Taiwan’s “natural independence”—a perspective widely held among Taiwan’s younger generation, who have been a key political constituency for Tsai and the DPP. Moreover, the Tsai-era emphasis on Taiwan’s multi-layered and externally influenced culture, and the role of internationally embraced values of democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights in Taiwan’s culture, create opportunities for Taiwan’s cultural industries internationally, and for Taiwan’s soft power and cultural diplomacy. Shih details several policy initiatives and institutional arrangements that the Tsai administration has adopted in pursuit of its cultural policy, and examines some of the early fruits of these efforts. She concludes that, while there are promising early signs, undertakings of the type and ambition that Tsai has pursued require much time to succeed and cannot be judged yet.

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Overall, the contributors to this volume find significant change or potential for change on many fronts in Taiwan during Tsai’s presidency and beyond. But such change is not likely to be transformative. Broad and deep forces favoring continuity, for good and for ill, limit the potential for change, and much of the energy and attention of the Tsai government is inevitably directed to managing difficult challenges, old and new. Tsai’s and the DPP’s victories in 2016 and 2020, straddling the KMT’s win in local elections in 2018, have confirmed the vibrancy of Taiwan’s democracy, laid bare the weaknesses of one of its two major parties, and left open the question of whether party politics have changed fundamentally. Tsai and the DPP-controlled LY govern a country that faces large and closely interlinked policy challenges, ranging from the economy, to social and culture issues, to national defense and external relations. Developments in the global economy, China’s growing international clout and increasingly assertive agenda, and uncertainties about U.S. foreign policy have made matters more difficult for Taiwan, although they also have created some opportunities. Many of the authors of the chapters that comprise this book find that both bold initiatives and deft political stewardship are needed in many aspects of domestic and foreign policy in Taiwan. Although the difficulties are formidable, there are some hopeful signs that Taiwan—long remarkably resilient—may be up to the task of navigating these treacherous waters during the current period of leadership by Tsai and the DPP, and in the longer term.

2

Elections and the challenges of governing in Taiwan under Tsai Richard C. Bush

Before the 2016 elections brought Dr. Tsai Ing-wen to office, 2000 was the only time that Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency of the Republic of China. That year, Chen Shui-bian, a former legislator and Taipei mayor, squeaked a narrow victory in a three-person race with just under 40% of the vote. His closest rival was former Kuomintang (KMT) heavyweight James Soong Chu-yu, who ran as an independent. The ruling KMT maintained control of the Legislative Yuan (LY), and although Chen won re-election in 2004, again by a narrow margin and under suspicious circumstances,1 Taiwan had a divided government for the whole of his eight-year incumbency. One of Chen’s principal officials was Tsai, who served as chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in his first term, and as vice-premier of the Executive Yuan in his second. This author was still chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan in March 2000, and my principal memory of that time was the high anxiety within the U.S. government that Chen’s election could lead to a serious crisis with China. The concern was partly over initiatives that Chen might take, stemming from the aspiration of many in his party for legal independence for Taiwan. To encourage restraint on his part, the Clinton Administration had worked hard in the 30 months before the election to engage Chen and improve communications with his camp. The United States stepped up those efforts after the election. The greater fear, however, was that Beijing might assume that independence was Chen’s goal and take pre-emptive action to block him. That sense of crisis gradually faded, only to re-surface two years later when Chen began undertaking initiatives that alarmed China and caused U.S.-Taiwan relations to sink to their lowest level ever.2 A second memory from the spring of 2000 was how unprepared the DPP was for actually governing an island of 23 million people and managing relations with China. Most in the party had not expected him to win and just 1 2

Shots were fired at Chen and his vice president, Lu Hsiu-lien, as their motorcade moved through Tainan on the day before the election. Who fired the shots and for what reason was never fully clarified to the broad public’s satisfaction. Bush 2005, 57–71.

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hoped that Chen would make an impressive showing. The realization that they would soon have to govern was unsettling to say the least. True, some of the DPP’s leading figures had executive experience at the level of counties and cities, but that was not the same as managing the complex bureaucracies of the central government. Moreover, most of the existing personnel of those agencies were KMT members and lacked a tradition of political neutrality vis-à-vis elected officials and political appointees. The Chen team had only two months to make key personnel decisions, develop a strategy for taking over the bureaucracy, and craft a policy portfolio. They did the best they could under difficult circumstances, but the transition was still ragged. In 2016, the circumstances were very different from those of 2000. It had been obvious for months before the election that Tsai Ing-wen would win a clear majority of the vote, becoming Taiwan’s first female president. In addition, the DPP won a majority of seats in the LY for the first time, creating a total power shift from the more conservative Blue camp to the more progressive Green camp.3 Because of changes in election law to implement 2005 constitutional amendments that synchronized presidential and legislative terms, the transition period between the election and the inauguration was four months instead of two in 2000. Partly because Tsai and many of her colleagues already had central government experience, they executed the transfer of power more smoothly. But the policy challenges in 2016 were arguably more daunting than they had been 16 years earlier, and the shadow of a more powerful China loomed more darkly.

The 2016 election: outcomes There were three candidates in the presidential race: Tsai for the DPP, Eric Chu Li-luan for the KMT, and James Soong as the candidate of his People First Party (PFP). The results were as follows: Table 2.1 2016 Presidential Elections: Results Candidate

Vote Total

Vote Percentage

Tsai Ing-wen Eric Chu James Soong

6,894,744 3,813,365 1,576,861

56.1 30.1 12.8

3

The Blue camp is dominated by the KMT, but includes other, small conservative parties, most notably the People First Party. The DPP dominates the Green camp, which includes the Taiwan Solidarity Union and the New Power Party. Taiwan politicians and commentators distinguish between the “light” and “deep” segments of the two camps. Thus, the “deep Blue” tendency most favors engagement with China, to which the “deep Green” one is most opposed. The “light” tendencies are in between on the political spectrum.

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Tsai won a majority in all the local jurisdictions on Taiwan island. Chu won on the less populated small islands of Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu, where the KMT has always been politically dominant. Even if the conservative Soong had chosen not to contest the race and all his votes had gone to Chu, Tsai still would have won by 13 points. Soong had run not because he thought he had a chance to win, but to create coattails for his party’s candidates in legislative races. In the legislative elections, the DPP won another clear victory. It basically reversed the share of seats that it and the KMT previously controlled. The PFP held its own, and the newly-established New Power Party, which grew out of the Sunflower Movement, replaced the Taiwan Solidarity Union (the party founded by former President Lee Teng-hui in 2001) as the Deep Green party in the LY: Table 2.2 2016 Legislative District Elections: Results

Kuomintang (KMT) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) People First Party (PFP) Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) New Power Party Independents

Old Legislative Yuan

New Legislative Yuan

64 40 3 3 N/A (party founded in 2015) 2

35 68 3 0 5 2

Taiwan voters not only choose among candidates to represent their local geographic district, but they also cast a separate party vote that is then used, through a formula for proportional representation, to select legislators from each party’s ranked national list of candidates. Grouping the major parties according to their general policy approach (Green vs. Blue), the party- vote breakdown was: Table 2.3 2016 Legislative Party-Vote Elections: Results Green Parties

Total Party Votes

Blue Parties

Total Party Votes

DPP New Power Party TSU Total

5,370,953 744,315 305,675 6,410,943

KMT PFP New Party Total

3,280,949 794,838 510,074 4,585,961

Explaining the outcomes The Tsai/DPP victory was clear-cut, but determining why it happened is not as simple. Did the results reflect a relatively transitory shift in the public mood that inevitably would be followed by a swing back to the KMT in a

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later election? Or did they reflect something more fundamental? The answer has important policy implications for both China and the United States. DPP Strength. The DPP did virtually everything right in the 2016 contest. Tsai Ing-wen has a cool charisma, particularly with younger age cohorts—this in spite of the fact that she turned 60 in August 2016. The fact that she had rebuilt the DPP after its 2008 drubbing at the hands of Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT gave her authority within the party, and she corrected some of the problems that surfaced during her unsuccessful campaign to unseat Ma in 2012. Among other things, her campaign’s message discipline was impressive. Mobilization of voters, always one of the DPP’s strong points, was very well executed in 2016. The party helped itself by forging an alliance with the young activists who had formed the Sunflower Movement and taken over the legislature in opposition to the agreement that the Ma administration had concluded with Beijing concerning trade in services. Finally, Tsai gained control of the policy agenda in ways that she had not in 2012. At that time, the KMT was able to point to real economic improvement after the global financial crisis; connect that growth to Ma’s policy of economic engagement with China; and successfully convince the public that this economic interaction would not have occurred without Ma’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus is an understanding reached between Beijing and Taiwan to facilitate semi-official interactions. Each side expressed an association with the principle of “one China,” but left unclear the specific nature of that one China. As president, Ma would define one China to mean the Republic of China, a position that Beijing tolerated but did not agree with. In 2012, a majority of voters agreed that Taiwan had benefitted from cross-Strait economic relations and that Ma’s acceptance of the 1992 consensus was an acceptable concession. In 2016, the DPP was able to control the policy agenda by emphasizing the importance of domestic issues and asserting that cross-Strait economic relations were no longer beneficial to Taiwan. In December 2015, one month before the election, Taiwan’s CommonWealth magazine conducted a poll in which it asked the public about the greatest areas of crisis. Of those responding, 41% said a “weak economy”; 32% said “political infighting”; 12.2% said growing inequality; 11% said “confusion in social values”; and only 8% said the direction of cross-Strait relations. Moreover, 62% said they were worried that Taiwan had become too dependent economically on the mainland.4 KMT Weakness. It takes nothing away from the DPP’s electoral achievement to suggest that the 2016 result was as much a KMT defeat as it was a Tsai/DPP victory. First of all, voters in any democracy eventually become dissatisfied with a party that has long held power. So at least for the presidency, a rotation from the KMT back to the DPP would have happened at some point. Indeed, when the KMT regained the presidency and strengthened its hold over the Legislative Yuan in 2008, its performance was actually better 4

Hsiung 2016.

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than the DPP’s in 2016. Ma Ying-jeou received 58.4% of the presidential vote, compared to Tsai’s 56.1% in 2016. In the 2008 legislative elections, the KMT scored 81 seats, 16 more than the DPP in 2016. Taiwan voters appear not to be immune from a “throw the bums out” psychology. Second, the KMT suffered a significant split going into the election. The party encompasses a northern wing, composed mainly of mainlanders (individuals who came from China after World War II and their descendants) who associate more with the central government, and a southern wing, primarily made up of native Taiwanese who focus more on local government and legislative elections. The KMT does well when it mitigates the differences between the two, in part through the distribution of resources. But this structure came under unexpected strain after 2013, when Ma Ying-jeou tried to purge Wang Jin-pyng, the speaker of the Legislative Yuan and a leader of the southern, Taiwanese wing of the party. Even though the KMT had a majority in the LY, Wang used his speakership to allow the DPP and other minority parties to block or alter the KMT’s agenda and so protect their interests. Wang had been a thorn in Ma’s side, but he overcame the purge attempt and kept his position as speaker and KMT vice-chairman. Consequently, the party went into the election divided. Third, during Ma’s second term the KMT had not coped with the emergence of young activists who skillfully used social media to mount protests in support of various causes. These included historic preservation, the environment, treatment of military conscripts, and, in early 2014, the content of trade agreements with China and the process by which they were approved. The latter issue spawned the Sunflower Movement and the four-week occupation of the Legislative Yuan, which Speaker Wang chose not to end quickly, thus embarrassing President Ma. The DPP was the beneficiary of the rise of these activists. Fourth, the process for picking the KMT’s presidential candidate was messy. In early 2015, it was assumed that Eric Chu, the newly appointed party chairman, would run against Tsai, but he decided against it. No other senior leader of the party stepped forward and so by July 2015, Hung Hsiu-chu, deputy speaker of the legislature, was nominated without opposition. She was a northerner who was even more inclined than Ma Ying-jeou toward engagement with the mainland. She soon alienated the southern wing of the party, which engineered the unceremonious retraction of her nomination in October 2015. Eric Chu was then drafted to replace her. It is impossible to know what would have happened if Chu had decided in early 2015 to run against Tsai, but his performance certainly would have been better than his being drafted to run in November. Finally, the KMT lost control of the policy agenda. As in 2012, its advocates asserted that if Tsai refused to accept the 1992 Consensus, it would lead to a downturn in relations with China. But the public was less receptive to these warnings. For many voters, it was enough for Tsai to pledge to “maintain the status quo” of cross-Strait relations and speak allusively about the 1992 Consensus.

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These five factors combined put the KMT faithful in a very bad mood by election day 2016, creating a sixth factor: low turnout. In the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, the overall turnout was around 75%; in 2016 it was 63.3% . More telling was the absolute number of votes. In 2012, Ma won with 6.89 million votes. In 2016, Eric Chu received only 3.81 million votes, 3.08 million votes or 45% less. A good share of that deficit—perhaps around 40% —went to James Soong, who had defected from the KMT in the late 1990s (albeit with a brief return to the fold to run unsuccessfully for vice president on a KMT-led pan-Blue unity ticket in 2004). Some of the KMT’s expected votes may have gone to Tsai, but probably one million KMT voters simply stayed home. The Other Party. China was not absent from the Taiwan presidential campaign. Its spokespersons did not encourage voters explicitly to cast ballots for Eric Chu, but they might as well have. By stridently insisting that cross-Strait relations would continue as before only if the new president accepted the 1992 Consensus and its “core connotation,” they signaled a preference for the Kuomintang.5 On November 7, 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore and reportedly stressed the importance of Taiwan’s next leader meeting China’s conditions. Comparing those conditions to a “magic compass,” Xi told Ma that, without this “magic compass that calms the sea, the ship of peaceful development will meet with great waves and even suffer total loss.” He also had a more specific warning about the DPP, which Beijing associates with Taiwan independence. He called the Taiwan independence force and its “splittist” activities the greatest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, with the potential to bring “disastrous consequences to the compatriots on the two sides of the Strait.” Beijing’s antipathy toward the DPP, and its calculation that such stark warnings would sway Taiwan’s voters, likely stems from several assumptions about Taiwan’s politics and how voters view China. The first is its belief that there is no fundamental divide between the two sides of the Strait. As Xi said to Ma in their Singapore meeting, “compatriots on the two sides of the Strait are as close as members of the same family [and] when the family is in harmony all will thrive.” Second, Beijing thinks it can mitigate the suspicion and hostility of people on Taiwan, and ultimately achieve its goal of national unification by first undertaking a transitional phase of “peaceful development.” This entails deepening cross-Strait cooperation in a variety of areas, particularly economics, and gradually resolving differences through dialogue and negotiations. Third, Beijing believes that Taiwan society favors the improvement of cross-Strait relations. Beijing has understood that the DPP and its followers opposed convergence with the mainland and recognized that demagogic politicians like Chen Shui-bian might create an adverse current for a while. Yet it also has believed that the island’s mainstream wanted positive relations with China and would eventually lean again to the KMT. 5

Chen, Meng, and Wang 2015.

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For Chinese analysts, in short, the basic balance of sentiment favored the KMT and it would remain Taiwan’s dominant political party and pursue mainland-friendly policies.6 It seemed that this logic was reconfirmed in a poll taken in February 2014 in which 59% of respondents said they preferred the Ma administration’s cross-Strait economic policies while 41% did not (excluding don’t know and no opinion). This result, which seemed plausible given Taiwan’s prior political history, was all the more striking because the DPP was the sponsor of the poll.7 In 2012, Beijing’s threats that electing a DPP government would foster a downturn in cross-Strait relations probably contributed to Ma Ying-jeou’s victory. Yet that same tactic failed in 2016. There was growing public concern that economic relations with the mainland now worked not to Taiwan’s benefit but to its detriment.

Campaigning versus governing The 2016 electoral results indeed reflected a remarkable comeback for the DPP after a disastrous loss in 2008 and a somewhat less expected defeat in 2012. Not only does Tsai Ing-wen sit in the Office of the President, she also is Taiwan’s first female president, a signal event in a society and political system traditionally dominated by men. Moreover, the DPP secured a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan for the first time. Yet, the 2016 election and its intense contest for power were only a prelude to the challenge that awaited the new DPP government in the exercise of that power. As noted at the outset, this was only the second time that the DPP had tried to govern Taiwan on an island-wide basis. Under Chen Shui-bian, the party had hoped to adopt and implement an agenda different from the prior policy approach of the KMT, but it was handicapped from the outset. Chen and his colleagues had no experience in running the central government and lacked the talent to steer the various ministries and agencies in a direction compatible with the party’s goals. Having run against the “black-gold” (corrupt) politics of the KMT, DPP members no doubt hoped that their government would be cleaner, as did the public. But Chen failed to wield his authority as party leader to set high expectations for probity among his political appointees and even his own family members. Subsequent prosecutions created the public impression that when it came to corruption, there was not any real difference between the two parties. On policy, Chen Shui-bian showed some early desire to lead from the center-left and forge consensus with his adversaries, particularly when it came to relations with China. But both the KMT and China had little desire to work with the DPP, so in order to have a chance at re-election Chen soon chose to align with his party’s base and appeal to its more pro-independence sentiments. This worked well enough to earn him re-election in 2004 by the slimmest of margins, but it raised alarm in Beijing 6 7

For insights on this point, see Lin 2016. Tung and Li 2015, 14.

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and Washington that he intended to change the status quo of cross-Strait relations. Also alienated were Taiwan’s swing voters, whose concern about China policy, the economy, and general political instability led them to shift their support to the KMT, which easily regained power in the 2008 elections. In contrast to Chen, Tsai Ing-wen came to the presidency after having served in senior administrative positions and thereby having gained experience in running the Taiwan government within a vibrant, contentious political system and complex external environment. She understood, it seems, the need to be effective across multiple policy areas at the same time. Metaphorically, any president of democratic Taiwan needs to play on four different but interrelated chessboards (policy arenas): domestic politics, domestic policy, relations with China, and relations with the United States. Each of the “games” has its own rules and strategic logic and, making matters quite complex, the play on one board cannot be insulated from that on any other. A move on one board not only alters the play there, but also might move pieces on the other boards. Changes in domestic policy have implications for domestic politics, within the DPP, the KMT, and other smaller parties. Shifts in domestic politics can also affect cross-Strait relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations, and vice versa. Good governance requires a balance of attention and success on all four boards over time. It happens that good trade negotiators are skilled playing on multiple boards at the same time. Since Tsai Ing-wen began her government career as a trade negotiator, she had a presumptive advantage in governing Taiwan. Tsai’s early moves on these four boards were telegraphed in the text of her inaugural address on May 20, 2016. She sought to reassure Beijing that her intentions would not challenge China’s fundamental interests and that cooperative cross-Strait ties should continue. She pledged to deepen relations with the United States, Japan, and Europe. Regarding domestic politics, she vowed to promote a more promising life for young people, who had contributed significantly to her electoral victory, and to be responsive to the wide array of civil society groups that over the past decade had become a dynamic and unpredictable variable in Taiwan’s politics. In particular, she proposed a mechanism to render “transitional justice,” investigating the wrongdoings of the KMT regime during the authoritarian period and eliminating the built-in advantage that the KMT had created for itself in the political system. But the core of Tsai’s speech addressed the challenge of maintaining Taiwan’s competitiveness and middle-class standard of living at a time when the economy had matured, growth had slowed, and society was aging. Among other challenges, the size of the labor pool had shrunk even as the need for social services among older cohorts had grown. Inequality had widened. The education system did not necessarily provide appropriate skills for a 21st-century economy. A sufficient and stable supply of energy resources was increasingly in doubt. The list of domestic policy issues was long but, as Tsai herself asserted, “The people elected a new president and a new government with one single expectation: solving problems.”

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Obviously, setting a domestic policy agenda involves significant political considerations. Even the most technocratic of issues benefits some constituencies and hurts others. For example, there had long been general agreement that the pension system for civil servants and military personnel would run out of money unless reforms were undertaken. The question was how to distribute the burden of restoring solvency: impose it on government retirees through reduced benefits or on younger people still in the work force? Overlaying this potential generational clash was the fact that older members of the civil service and armed forces were more likely to be KMT members. Energy policy has been a source of political contention since at least 2000. On the one hand, there is a clear need to ensure that the island has a sufficient and steady supply of electricity, particularly for the energy-intensive IT sector. The question is what energy mix is optimal. On the other hand, the DPP has generally had a “green” bias in its energy policy and long sought to end Taiwan’s reliance on nuclear power. Understandably, corporations ask where their electricity will come from when Taiwan’s existing nuclear plants reach the end of their lifespans. They are not reassured by DPP promises that a combination of imported liquified natural gas and renewables will fill the gap without having to turn to coal and oil, with their obvious environmental consequences. Trade was another highly political issue, as it is in all countries. Ma Yingjeou won election in 2008 and re-election in 2012 with the argument that a closer, normal economic relationship with China would bolster Taiwan’s prosperity. Thereafter, growing concern in Taiwan that economic dependence on the mainland would result ultimately in political incorporation helped seal Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in 2016. Tsai has believed (as Ma did, actually) that Taiwan needed to expand economic relations with other major trading partners if it were to reduce dependence on China. Her New Southbound Policy, directed towards Southeast and South Asia, was the most concrete initiative in this regard. Yet Taiwan’s most important trading partner—other than China—remains the United States. Taiwan could improve its competitiveness by concluding liberalization agreements with the United States on issues such as investment. Those could further open and deregulate sectors of the Taiwan economy, as Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization accomplished during the last decade. Here, Tsai faced the hardball tactics of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. It will only begin negotiating issues that are of importance to Taiwan after its government carries out past agreements on market-opening for beef and pork. But for Taiwan’s government to do so would stoke the ire of pork farmers and farmers’ associations, important constituencies for the DPP, as well as civil society groups and citizens increasingly worried about food safety. But in late August 2020, and despite these political constraints, President Tsai took the courageous step of complying with USTR’s request. The Trump administration declined to respond in a significant way. Probably the most politicized domestic policy issue, and the one that had the least to do with the twin needs of invigorating the economy and coping with

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the demographic imbalance, was transitional justice. This is not a challenge unique to Taiwan. All formerly authoritarian regimes face demands for justice from those who believe they have been oppressed. And different countries have adopted different degrees of accountability, which determines how far the writ of review will run and how disruptive it will be to contemporary society. It is one thing to open up archives that document the old regime’s incarcerations or executions of its opponents without due process of law. It is another thing for the state to try to calculate and pay compensation to the victims of unjust repression or to their families. It is yet another task to prosecute former members of the old regime who were responsible for that repression. In the case of the KMT on Taiwan, other challenges include the regime’s expropriation of property owned by native Taiwanese, its funding of Party institutions that became part of the Leninist ruling structure (for example, the Youth Corps), and the KMT’s continued ownership of these profit-making entities, whose revenues helped fund political campaigns after democratization. Finally, there is the question of whether symbols of the old regime, particularly statues of President Chiang Kai-shek, should be removed. These questions were highly divisive in Taiwan, particularly between KMT members who believed that, however bad the repression was, their party contributed to Taiwan’s economic success, and diehards of the DPP, whose desire for justice (or vengeance) had festered for decades. KMT leaders argued that the mechanisms created to carry out its transitional justice project were contrary to the rule of law.8 In November 2016, the KMT filed suit in administrative court to challenge the constitutionality of the committee responsible for settling its assets, and in June 2018 the court referred the matter to the Council of Grand Justices for a constitutional interpretation. In August 2020, the Council ruled in favor of the settlement committee on the key provisions of the law that established it. Transitional justice was also a salient issue for China. To the extent that Beijing regarded a strong KMT as a useful check against the DPP, it saw the DPP’s weakening of the KMT (for example, by seizing its financial assets) as removing an obstacle to the pursuit of independence, whether that was the DPP’s motivation or not. In turn, how Tsai played the domestic politics board regarding transitional justice was bound to affect the domestic policy board, based on the incentives and disincentives it created for the KMT to cooperate on pensions and other issues. Tsai’s actions would also affect moves on the cross-Strait board by shaping PRC interpretations of her basic intentions. Still, her administration went ahead. In July 2017, the DPP-dominated legislature passed a law that required political parties to transfer their “ill-gotten gains” to the government. By December it authorized the creation of a commission on transitional justice to compile, based on the archives of the KMT regime, an accurate account of the authoritarian period. The commission was launched at the end of May 2018. 8

United Daily News 2017b.

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Evaluating Tsai’s early performance Generally, how has Tsai Ing-wen fared across the four boards? Undoubtedly, she has done best in maintaining good relations with the United States. Her approach to mainland China has been compatible with U.S. interests, and Washington did not buy Beijing’s argument that she was changing the status quo. In October 2017, in a speech at the Brookings Institution, James Moriarty, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, offered this judgment: “My interactions with President Tsai have reaffirmed my conviction that she is a responsible, pragmatic leader. The United States appreciates her determination to maintain stable cross-Strait ties in the face of increasing pressure from the PRC on a number of fronts.”9 This is not to say that the bilateral relationship was totally stable, but in this instance the disturbance came from the U.S. side. In addition to the new administration’s tough line on trade, President Trump proved to be unpredictable. He excited people in Taiwan momentarily by accepting a congratulatory phone call from Tsai in December 2016, but then quickly aroused fear by suggesting in a television interview that he might use Taiwan policy as leverage to extract concessions from China. That reawakened concern on the island that it might be used as a bargaining chip rather than treated as an issue for its own sake. Over time, the U.S. government gave sufficient assurances that such manipulation would not occur and the anxiety diminished. By nature, however, Trump remained a wild card.10 Halfway through her first term, Tsai’s performance on her core policy agenda was mixed.11 The LY passed civil servant pension reform in June 2017, but the KMT blocked LY action on military pension reform until June 2018, when it was finally approved. The LY also passed a new labor standards law, which was designed to give employers more flexibility on setting hours. But the legislation was subject to multiple changes that complicated the legislative process. The deliberation on and passage of an infrastructure spending bill was similarly messy. A bill to establish marriage equality, an issue important to young voters, ran into significant opposition in the LY, but then the courts ruled on the issue in a manner that was acceptable to Tsai but not to the groups supporting reform. Each of these pieces of legislation also met with public protests by social groups. Tsai’s preferred legislative strategy was to create as broad a coalition as possible for each bill and to address the concerns of various group interests.12 As she sometimes found, however, such an approach runs the risk of alienating all parties and satisfying no one. One point of process seems to have improved during Tsai’s tenure. In earlier administrations, a step in the legislative process allowed for each of 9 10 11 12

“Remarks by AIT Chairman James Moriarty” 2017. For a comprehensive review of Trump administration policy, see Bush 2019. My judgments in this paragraph have benefitted from observations by Shelley Rigger. Batto 2017a.

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the parties with at least seven representatives in the LY to negotiate on an equal basis over the substance of a bill before its final passage. So even if a party held an absolute majority of seats, as the KMT did between 2008 and 2016, that ratio was not reflected during the inter-party consultation. Complicating this bias in favor of small parties and against majority rule was the role of long-term LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, who served as chair of the committee. Although he was a senior leader of the KMT, he did not necessarily side with the Ma administration and KMT caucus during the negotiations. That system has continued during the Tsai administration, but Su Jia-chyuan, who became speaker when the DPP assumed the majority in the LY, has coordinated his actions with the administration and his party more than Wang Jin-pyng did. This party unity has allowed for a slightly more efficient legislative process. When it came to domestic politics, Tsai initially was able to restrain the impulses in the Deep Green camp, even in the face of complaints that she was not being sufficiently aggressive. Early in her administration, the DPP backed a bill to create mechanisms for supervising the negotiation and consideration of cross-Strait agreements, which had become the precondition for negotiation of any new accords. When some DPP legislators sought to introduce the sovereignty issue into the draft bill, President Tsai convinced them to drop the idea. Nor did she acquiesce to the Deep Green forces’ full agenda for transitional justice. When, in December 2017, some in the DPP thought that they had gained the authority to remove symbols of the old regime, like statues of Chiang Kai-shek, she intervened to halt such divisive actions, saying that the purpose of the project was “reconciliation, not confrontation.”13 In spite of these moves—or perhaps because of them—Tsai faced criticism from pro-independence heavyweights. For instance, DPP elder Peng Ming-min charged that a revision to the referendum law that the LY passed in December 2017 did not go far enough, since it forbade referenda on issues concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty. Deep Green columnist Chin Heng-wei criticized the Tsai administration for backtracking on removing symbols of the old KMT regime.14 But the sharpest thorn in Tsai’s side was probably former president Lee Teng-hui, who in the fall of 2017 began promoting the idea of changing the national title from Republic of China to Taiwan and writing a new constitution, steps that Beijing and Washington would regard as highly provocative if Tsai pursued them. Then, in February 2018, Lee Teng-hui threw his support behind a proposal to hold a referendum on Taiwan independence in April 2019. Chen Shui-bian, still under house arrest for corruption, endorsed the initiative by video link.15 Lee Teng-hui’s criticism was particularly significant because it was he, during his second presidential 13 Kuomintang News Network 2017. 14 W. Chen 2017; Peng 2018; Chin 2017. 15 United Daily News 2017a; Central News Agency 2018.

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term (1996–2000), who tapped Tsai as a key adviser and so gave her entrée into policy circles in the first place. As Lee’s former protégé, Tsai was constrained from opposing him publicly. By late 2017, observers in China tended to conclude that Tsai was in a weak position politically and therefore vulnerable to pressure from the Deep Green forces. Their fear, presumably, was that such pressure would lead her to take further actions designed to drum up Taiwanese nationalism and thus provoke Beijing. This view probably underestimates Tsai’s skill at leading her own party. The judgment of Nathan Batto, a political scientist at Academia Sinica, on the balance of power within the DPP at the time was closer to the mark: “Tsai is still the leader of the party. Some of the shine may have come off her leadership, but she is still the unquestioned top dog.”16 If there is any board where Tsai’s play failed to yield results, it is the one concerning China—but not for the reason Beijing would assert. PRC officials had warned long before the January 2016 election that cross-Strait relations would deteriorate if Tsai did not explicitly accept the “1992 Consensus” on one China. Ma had accepted the formulation when he became president in 2008, but undercut the “consensus” by saying that, for him, China was the Republic of China, a position that Beijing was willing to tolerate, probably because it trusted that Ma would not challenge China’s interests. China was clearly not willing to indulge Tsai in the same way. It insisted that her commitment had to be explicit and that it had to cohere with the view that the territory of Taiwan was a part of the state called China. In her inaugural address, Tsai did not reject Beijing’s position but instead addressed the issue in a more ambiguous way. Her approach was clearly an attempt to establish common ground, but it soon became clear that Beijing was unwilling to cooperate. My own view is that the Chinese government actually did not want to coexist productively with Tsai and her administration, in part because it did not want to legitimize the DPP in Taiwan politics. So it set a precondition that it probably knew Tsai could not meet and asserted that she had to allay its mistrust. Tsai, on the other hand, set no preconditions of her own and would have been willing to pursue a two-way trust-building process, but doing so would have required Beijing to acknowledge that Taiwan had reason to mistrust Beijing’s motives, which it was unwilling to do. Moreover, China pursued a series of measures to undermine support for Tsai and squeeze Taiwan. It induced several of the small countries with which the ROC still had formal diplomatic ties to switch their relations to Beijing. It engaged in increasingly aggressive military operations in the air and waters around Taiwan. It threatened that Taiwan companies with operations in China would face consequences if their leaders expressed public support for the DPP. It conducted regular military exercises that were scripted with a Taiwan scenario in mind. And it used money and other means to interfere in Taiwan politics. 16 Batto 2017a.

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Public sentiment Making an assessment of public sentiment is difficult because of the limited tools at our disposal. We rely primarily on public opinion polling on an established set of questions, but some of these polls have less value than others. Some are designed and conducted by organizations that have a stake in the outcome, and so are prone to ask questions that are more likely to generate the desired answers. The goal of other polls is to generate news rather than measure public sentiment as clearly as possible. More reliable in revealing underlying sentiment, I think, are the polls that measure whether respondents see themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or some mixture of both, and surveys on party identification. The result of the Chinese-versus-Taiwanese question is one proxy for sentiment on how Taiwan should address the challenge posed by China. Here the shares of respondents who say that they are Taiwanese and those who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese appear to co-vary inversely. The share of “Taiwanese only” reached an all-time peak of 60.6% in 2014, when anxiety about the risks of Ma Ying-jeou’s cross-Strait policies became especially intense. (That was also the year of the Sunflower Movement). It then dropped gradually to 54.5% in late 2018. Conversely, those who answered “both” fell to an all-time low of 32.5% in 2014 before rising to 38.2% in 2018. This co-variation may reflect that no matter the administration (Blue or Green), it should not deviate too far from centrist policies towards China, but confirming such a phenomenon would be difficult. The terms “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” are not defined nor does the poll explore how circumstances at the time shaped respondents’ choices. What is analytically important is the continuity in how the public defines itself. From 2008 through 2017 (that is, under Ma Ying-jeou and the first 18 months of Tsai Ing-wen), the “Taiwanese” and “both” categories combined stood consistently at about 92% , whereas the share of people who said they were Chinese remained at less than 5%. On party identification, it appears at first glance that the DPP suffered a decline after Tsai became president. The figure in late 2016 was 29.9% and dropped to 20.1% in December 2018. Also, it appeared that the KMT was making a modest comeback, rising from 20.8% in 2016 to 25.4% in 2018. Yet the impression of a close contest between the two parties is misleading. The figure for the DPP was in the low 20s for most years since 2000. The results for 2015 and 2016 (31.2% and 29.9% ) are probably exceptional, reflecting the unusual post-Sunflower Movement circumstances of the time. The KMT’s rise likely reflected a rebound toward long-term norms after the halving of its support from 39.5% in 2011 to 20.8% in 2016. Meanwhile, independents and non-responders reached a 20-year peak of 49.1% in 2017.17 In short, basic political attitudes have been relatively stable throughout the last three presidential administrations. 17 Election Study Center n.d.; Batto 2017b.

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Accurately reading public opinion is obviously important. Equally important for political parties is how effective they are in mobilizing their bases to vote and in swaying independents to their side. Favorable sentiment for the KMT or the DPP does not translate automatically into votes for either party on election day. The KMT lost badly in 2016 not only because public attitudes had swung against it but also because at least some of its traditional supporters voted for James Soong, the other pan-Blue candidate, or simply stayed home. The KMT’s task after its 2016 defeat, therefore, was not only to draw support to its view on what policies would best serve Taiwan’s interest, both domestically and externally (whatever those policies may be), but also to strengthen its organizational capacity to get supporters to the polls. The main tasks of the DPP have been to maintain support for its policies and ensure that it gets the kind of turnout that it mobilized in 2016. Younger voters are particularly critical in this regard.

The 2018 local elections and 2020 national elections Two and half years into her first term, Tsai’s and her party’s political fortunes had declined. The 2018 local elections were a disaster for the DPP. The KMT won 13 jurisdictions and the DPP only six (Ko Wen-je, independent mayor of Taipei, won re-election). The 2018 result was a return almost exactly to the local balance of power that existed after the 2010 elections. Once again, Blue localities were surrounding the Green capital. In addition to the number of localities won or lost, it is useful to look at how many votes in toto each party received: 6.103 million for the KMT and 4.697 million for the DPP. Almost 900,000 people voted for independents. Looking only at the KMT and DPP vote combined, the KMT got 55.48% and the DPP 44.52% . That is about the same ratio as the Blue-Green split in the 2012 presidential election. (That Ko Wen-je, the independent, won a majority in Taipei skews the 2018 ratio in the KMT’s favor, but even setting it aside, the DPP still had a high mountain to climb if it were going to hold on to power at the national level.) Not surprisingly, the results energized the KMT and gave it renewed hope that it could retake both the presidency and the legislature. The DPP was shell-shocked, and for a time all but gave up on the 2020 races. The Deep Green constituency, resentful that Tsai had not used her office to advance their pro-independence agenda, used the defeat to try to displace Tsai as the DPP candidate for 2020. It put forward Lai Ching-te, who had just stepped down as Tsai’s premier, in a failed effort to challenge her for the nomination. The PRC took credit for the KMT victory, claiming that its policies had caused Taiwan voters to see the light. Actually, it was domestic issues that determined the outcome: retirees were angry about pension reforms; young people at the half-measures to advance marriage equality; and lower-income people about tougher environmental emission restrictions on their scooters and small trucks.

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But the late 2018 predictions soon had to be revised, for two basic reasons. The first was the difficulty the KMT had–again–in picking its nominee. The party establishment preferred Eric Chu Li-luan, who had lost to Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. Terry Gou, the head of Foxconn, the IT giant made a serious run for the nomination before bowing out right before the deadline for candidate registration. Ko Wen-je also seriously explored running as an independent but demurred in the end. Sweeping the entire field was a “Han Wave,” powered by the populist charisma of Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu. In contrast to Chu and Gou, he was seen as the candidate of the common people (shumin) and an alternative to the KMT establishment. The other factor was China, in two ways. First, Xi Jinping gave a major speech on Taiwan policy on January 2, 2019 in which he made a full-throated defense of Beijing’s approach to cross-Strait relations and placed special emphasis on the one country, two systems formula for unification. That emphasis disturbed the Taiwan public, which was an odd response, since the formula had never stopped being PRC policy. But Tsai Ing-wen skillfully conflated one country, two systems with the 1992 Consensus, which suddenly put the KMT on the defensive. It had assumed that its endorsement of the Consensus would help it in the 2020 election, given what Ma Ying-jeou had accomplished under it for much of his presidency. Now it had to respond to Tsai’s offensive. Then there was Hong Kong and the turmoil created by the initiative of the government there to enact legislation concerning the rendition of criminal suspects to jurisdictions with which Hong Kong did not have a formal extradition agreement. One of those jurisdictions was China itself, and public fears in Hong Kong that the government would too readily agree to transfer PRC-alleged criminals to its jurisdiction, even though it lacked Hong Kong’s due process of law. That prompted massive demonstrations and a series of violent confrontations between radical members of the opposition and the Hong Kong Police. Riveting televised coverage of the violence was available in Taiwan and shed an increasingly harsh light on the one country, two systems formula. The DPP’s not so subtle–and polemical–warning was that under a KMT government, eventually “today’s Hong Kong is tomorrow’s Taiwan.” In the end, Tsai Ing-wen and her party won easy victories in 2020. She received 57.1% of the vote, which was one percentage point higher than in 2016. The DPP retained an absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan, losing only seven seats. The KMT won three more seats and the Taiwan People’s Party, a new party led by Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, won five seats. Turnout was 75%, nine points higher than in 2016. Having engineered passage of a marriage equality law in 2019, Tsai recaptured the youth vote that had helped ensure her victory in 2016. She was also able to counter Han Kuo-yu’s assertion that he was the champion of the common people and that Tsai was the candidate of uncaring elites. She did that by charging that Han, in his capacity as mayor of Kaohsiung, had performed badly for the common people

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who had elected him, whereas her administration had worked steadily on behalf of all the people of Taiwan.18 In its second term, the Tsai administration faces many of the governance challenges that it faced in its first term. The totals in party-list vote were something of a warning flag for the DPP. It and the KMT each only got about a third of the vote. That suggests that a significant number of voters, after casting their ballots for Tsai in the presidential race voted for smaller parties of varying ideological standpoints in the party-list contest. That is, support for the DPP was not as strong as it was for Tsai Ing-wen in the election. To be sure, most of the smaller parties are more aligned with the DPP on policy matters than they are with the KMT, so Tsai’s governance challenge is not as severe as it would have been had the DPP lost its LY majority. But many of the fraught issues that faced her at the time of her first inauguration— economic competitiveness, energy security, care for the elderly, inequality, and China—also face her in her second term. Her inaugural address reflected that. She dwelt on domestic issues and emphasized continuity. She neither confronted the PRC nor made concessions to it. Addressing those issues well requires good leadership on her part but also good followership from the rest of the political system. That she has stressed the need for greater national unity for more than a year and did so again in her election acceptance speech and inaugural address is no accident.

China’s evaluation of Taiwan politics As Beijing has considered over past decades how to achieve its ultimate goal of the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC, it has always held out the hope that forces on Taiwan would come to cooperate in that endeavor. Chiang Kaishek remained a staunch anti-communist to the end, but the saving grace for Beijing was that he saw himself and Taiwan as Chinese and believed in unification someday. The growth of economic contacts across the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the late 1980s and early 1990s held promise for Beijing that political reconciliation might not be far behind. Taiwan’s democratization and the manipulation of Taiwan nationalism for political purposes by both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were setbacks in Beijing’s eyes. The election of Ma Ying-jeou and his cross-Strait policy agenda fostered optimism in China that the two sides would soon begin to address and resolve the political issues that divided them. It was thought that achieving success on relatively “easy” issues, primarily economic ones, would engender the proper environment for addressing “hard,” mainly political matters. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that the two sides concluded in 2010, which would lead to a free-trade area between them, constituted just such a success. Ma’s willingness to stress “one China” even as he insisted on “different interpretations” gave Beijing hope that unification was a real possibility. 18 Batto 2020.

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But the end of the Ma period and the KMT’s stunning loss in 2016 and its failure to recapture power in 2020 called that strategy into question. Although Ma may have initially been open to political talks with Beijing, by the time Beijing actually pushed for them to begin, the climate had deteriorated. In his 2008 inaugural address, Ma mentioned the possibility of a peace accord, which stimulated no domestic response. When he reiterated the possibility during the 2012 campaign, there was a firestorm of opposition, at which point he backed down, retreating to his earlier formulation of “no independence, no unification, no war.” More fundamentally, he probably realized that public opinion on Taiwan was not ready to support political talks and that basic conceptual hurdles had to be addressed first. The Sunflower Movement’s success in blocking the Service Trade Agreement— a key element of ECFA—and the defeat of the KMT in 2016 and again in 2020 have forced China to consider the possibility that past sentiment on Taiwan in favor of improving relations with Beijing, at least on economics, had actually shifted to skepticism, and that even a KMT return to power would not yield progress towards unification. Beijing might find one or more of Taiwan’s smaller partners useful in blocking what it seeks to avoid (e.g. independence) but not so in gaining what it seeks to achieve (unification). It was long an article of faith in PRC policy that “we place our hope on the Taiwan people,” which probably meant that China placed its hopes on the “right” Taiwan people: those whose goals were not antithetical to Beijing’s. At the Chinese Communist Party’s party congress every five years, the general secretary includes this phrase in the Taiwan section of his work report. In 2017, however, a debate in China emerged among Taiwan scholars over whether the KMT was still an effective instrument of PRC policy. Some observers argued “yes,” but others said “no.”19 For that latter group, the only course was for China to rely on its own power to get its way on Taiwan. In October 2017, when Xi Jinping gave his report to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he tellingly omitted the principle of “placing hope on the Taiwan people,” suggesting that the policy faction that advocated for China to deal with its Taiwan problem “in our own way” had won out. Indeed, Beijing’s reliance on pressure and intimidation since Tsai Ing-wen took office demonstrates what “our own way” looks like. In his January 2019 speech, Xi did return to placing hopes on the Taiwan people, probably because the 2018 election went Beijing’s way. Yet PRC pressure on the Tsai administration and interference in Taiwan’s political system continued through the 2020 election, suggesting that Beijing might not really care who held power in Taiwan. Pressure from Beijing is likely to continue in Tsai’s second term, based on the assumption that what is more effective is the display and exercise of power. 19 Li 2017; Z. Chen 2017. .

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A final thought Democracy is by definition divisive, with differences manifesting through electoral contests and legislative deliberations across party lines. In policy terms, the question of how Taiwan should protect its interests vis-à-vis China is itself an invitation to struggle. Different sectors believe that a particular policy course is good for Taiwan while others disagree. Theoretically, the benefit of a democratic system is that democratic institutions can produce policy outcomes that reflect broad public consensus rather than division and therefore can command broad support. That assumes, however, that mechanisms to foster consensus actually exist and work well. In a system where democratic institutions reinforce the politics of a permanent you-win-I-lose division, solutions to pressing problems are unachievable or, at best, postponed. In Taiwan, the more the KMT and DPP see themselves in a zero-sum game, the harder it is to pass legislation on other policy issues important for Taiwan’s future, raising the qui bono question (who benefits?). If China did not exist, then perhaps Taiwan could muddle through with a divided and polarized political system. But China does exist. It has clear, long-term goals for the island (unification). And increasingly it has tools to exert leverage towards that end (Xi’s “in our own way”). Taiwan, therefore, cannot afford to be complacent about the challenge that an increasingly powerful China poses, nor can it assume that failure to build a broader policy consensus will be without cost. For Taiwan, there would then be only one answer to the qui bono question, and it is not favorable.

References Batto, Nathan. 2017a. “Pension Reform,” Frozen Garlic (blog), June 30, 2017. https:// frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2017/06/30/pension-reform/. Batto, Nathan. 2017b. “The State of (Out of Date) Public Opinion.” Frozen Garlic (blog), September 26, 2017. https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2017/09/26/the-stateof-out-of-date-public-opinion/. Batto, Nathan. 2020. “When Populism Can’t Beat Identity Politics.” New York Times, January 12, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/opinion/taiwan-election-tsaihan-populism.html. Bush, Richard C. 2005. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Bush, Richard C. 2019. “The Trump Administration’s Policies Towards Taiwan.” Brookings Institution. June 5, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/thetrump-administrations-policies-toward-taiwan/. Central News Agency. 2018. “Taiwan Independence Referendum Launched, Backed by Former Presidents.” Taiwan News, February 28, 2018. https://www.taiwannews. com.tw/en/news/3373434. Chen, Binhua, Meng, Na, and Wang, Cong. 2015. “Xi Jinping Meets with Ma Yingjeou, Makes Four-Point Proposal on Consolidating Cross-Strait Ties.” Xinhua (New China News Agency, the official news agency). November 7, 2015. Chen, Wei-han. 2017. “Taiwanese Identity Crucial to Facing Threat.” Taipei Times, October 5, 2017. www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/10/05/2003679745.

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Chen, Zhuqing. 2017. “Guomindang zai Taiwan Fazhan di Lishi Zhuandao yu Zhengze Qishi” (“The Kuomintang’s Historical Change of Course during Taiwan’s Historical Development and Its Revelation for Policy”). Zhongguo Pinglun (China Review), no. 235 (July): 12–18. Chin, Heng-wei. 2017. “The DPP Must Implement the Law.” Taipei Times, December 13, 2017. www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2017/12/13/2003683875. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. n.d. “Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese.” Accessed June 13, 2020. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/intro/ super_pages.php?ID=intro1. Hsiung, Jimmy. 2016. “Ready to Test a New President.” CommonWealth, January 8, 2016. https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=139. Kuomintang News Network. 2017. “Tsai: Transformational Justice is for Reconciliation, Not Confrontation.” December 7, 2017. www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx? type=article&mnum=112&anum=20273. Li, Zhenhuang. 2017. “Guomindang Xin Zhuxi di Renwu yu Tiaozhang” (“The Tasks and Challenges of the New KMT Chair”). Zhongguo Pinglun (China Review), no. 235 (July): 26–29. Lin, Gang. 2016. “Beijing’s New Strategies toward a Changing Taiwan.” Journal of Contemporary China 25 (99): 321–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015. 1104863. Peng, Ming-min. 2018. “Amended Referendum Act Is Still Emasculated.” Taipei Times, January 2, 2018. www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2018/01/02/ 2003685035. “Remarks by AIT Chairman James Moriarty at Brookings Institution.” 2017. American Institute in Taiwan. October 12, 2017. www.ait.org.tw/remarks-ait-chairmanjames-moriarty-brookings-institution/. Tung, Chen-yuan and Hsiao-chuang, Li, eds. 2015. Face-off: The Cross-Straits Futures of Democratic Progressive Party Elites. Taipei: Shibao Chuban (Times Press). United Daily News. 2017a. “Lee Teng-hui Promotes ‘Rectifying National Title and Authoring New Constitution.” September 11, 2017. http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/ page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=19772. United Daily News. 2017b. “Ma: Transformational Justice Statute Violates Principles of ‘Rule of Law.’” December 26, 2017. www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type= article&mnum=112&anum=20392.

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Kuomintang agonistes: party politics in the wake of Taiwan’s 2016 and 2020 elections Shelley Rigger

The 2016 elections that ushered in the Tsai Ing-wen era were a disaster for Taiwan’s long-time ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The loss in itself did not show that the KMT was in crisis. The party expected to lose the presidential election, and it did. Executive turnover after two full terms is typical of democracies, and the KMT’s term-limited incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou, struggled with low approval ratings throughout his second term. But the KMT’s problems went well beyond losing the presidency by 25 percentage points.1 It also lost the legislative majority it had held almost without interruption since the Republic of China government decamped to Taiwan in the late 1940s, falling from 64 seats to 35 in the 113-member body. In the process it lost control of the legislative leadership, which created an opening for major reforms in legislative procedure as well as significant policy changes. The legislative losses extended even to districts once considered safe; the old political map showing a “Blue” (KMT-leaning) north and a “Green” (DPPleaning) south turned into a fat Green doughnut encircling a much-reduced Blue center. In addition to its electoral losses, the KMT also suffered destructive internal fights. Its presidential nominating process was a disaster. Party heavyweights refused to step up to seek the nomination, ceding the field to a candidate—Hung Hsiu-chu—so weak that she had to be replaced just a few months before the election—by Chu Li-luan (Eric Chu). The party’s internal miseries wrought havoc on morale; some KMT incumbents even refused to campaign under the KMT banner. Political scientists concluded that low turnout by Blue voters was a factor in the electoral outcomes. Meanwhile, the policy issue around which the KMT had built its brand for nearly two decades—cross-Strait engagement—lost its magic, stripping the party of its most potent political advantage over its main opponent, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

1

The Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, received 56% of the vote; the KMT’s Eric Chu (Chu Li-lun) got 31% and the People First Party’s; James Soong (Soong Chu-yu) got 13%.

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The result is that a political landscape that gave the KMT an apparently insurmountable advantage as recently as 2008 shifted to one in which the KMT was facing huge obstacles and the DPP was ascendant. This is evidence of a healthy democracy—the rise and fall of party fortunes is a necessary element of democratic governance—but the extent of the KMT’s fall had some observers worried about the future of two-party politics in Taiwan.2 In 2018, it seemed the KMT might recover: buoyed by the extraordinarily popular political outsider Han Kuo-yu’s success in the mayoral election in the DPP stronghold of Kaohsiung, the party won back seven municipal executive posts and raised its vote share by 10 percentage points over its share in the 2016 elections.3 As it turned out, however, the “Han Wave” receded as quickly as it had risen, and hopes of a KMT recovery were premature. The DPP trounced the KMT in the 2020 presidential and legislative elections, with Tsai winning a second term as president and the DPP retaining control of the legislature. Once again, the KMT is facing an existential crisis. What brought the KMT to this juncture? Are the underlying causes of its troubles issues that can be fixed, or is the KMT suffering from a fatal malady? These are the questions animating this chapter. Whether the KMT’s ailment is terminal is impossible to say, but two things can be said: the party has been sick for a long time, and it is taking its medication only sporadically, so a speedy recovery is unlikely. The 2016 and 2020 election results certainly reflect improvements in the DPP’s performance and reputation, and also the rise of third-party movements. Yet, they are less an indication of a sea change in favor of the DPP than evidence of a huge failure by the KMT. What is more, the KMT’s efforts to address its failures have been far from adequate. The party has turned away from some its most selfdestructive decisions, but without significant failures on the DPP’s part, the KMT could find its role further reduced in Tsai’s second term, putting KMT prospects in the 2024 elections in doubt. The KMT’s woes can be attributed to two main factors. First, the KMT suffers from a long-running leadership crisis, one that began in 2000. The crisis originated when the two leaders best able to bring the KMT smoothly into the 21st century—Lee Teng-hui and Soong Chu-yu (James Soong)—departed the KMT after the 2000 election. Lee and Soong were capable of adapting the KMT to a changing society, but their departure left the party in the hands of an elite that lacked that ability. When the party was out of power from 2000 to 2008, its leadership problems were muted by the need to present a united front against the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian. Leadership problems re-emerged after the KMT recovered the presidency, when party elites tried to re-establish control through the presidential office. Ma Ying-jeou was the most popular of the post-2000 KMT leaders and his 2 3

See, for example, Page and Hsu 2016; Han 2016 KMT candidates won 38.6% of the vote in 2016; the party’s municipal executive candidates captured 48.8% in 2018.

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personal appeal propped up the KMT’s electoral performance through the first decade of the new century. But even under Ma’s leadership, the KMT’s apparent success papered over serious weaknesses. During Ma’s presidency the top KMT leadership not only turned away from the electorate; it also turned away from its legislative delegation (for reasons to be discussed later) and its own rank-and-file. This trend eroded the party’s internal coherence and discipline and undermined its popularity. It made the KMT vulnerable to accusations that the party leadership was more interested in cultivating good relations with Beijing than in taking care of Taiwan’s interests. Perhaps most importantly, it set the stage for Han Kuo-yu. A second factor in the KMT’s troubles concerns policy. A key challenge facing all of Taiwan’s political parties is to define a position on cross-Strait relations that can win the affirmation of a majority of voters without transgressing parameters defined by the People’s Republic of China (which has demonstrated a willingness to react in strong and damaging ways to policies that fall outside those parameters) and the United States (which has maintained relatively consistent but sometimes seemingly fragile support for Taiwan). The departure of Lee and Soong forced the KMT to reconstruct its policy toward the mainland. The solution the party arrived at—engagement based on the ’92 Consensus (a term that takes its name from a 1992 meeting in Hong Kong between the two sides’ unofficial bodies for cross-Strait relations and which, in the KMT’s reading, accepts that there is one China but that the mainland and Taiwan have differing interpretations of what “China” means)—met the requirements of the KMT’s domestic constituents and its interlocutors in Beijing and Washington. Meanwhile, the KMT also continued to prioritize a “Republic of China” narrative that—regardless of its intentions—sounded like unification to many Taiwanese. Nonetheless, the KMT’s policy brought stability to the Strait and opportunity to many Taiwanese businesses and individuals. In this context, the party was able to succeed despite its leadership problems. The KMT approach to cross-Strait relations met with intensifying resistance during Ma’s second term (2012–2016). The PRC’s growing power and ambition did not deter Taiwanese from valuing their autonomy, but it did raise questions about the wisdom of unfettered cross-Strait engagement. During Ma’s presidency Beijing and Taipei concluded 23 economic agreements. KMT leaders saw these deals as evidence of their success, but, increasingly, ordinary Taiwanese began to wonder whether the KMT was walking Taiwan into a trap. The result was a series of increasingly forceful demonstrations aimed at slowing the pace of cross-Strait deal-making. By the time the 2016 election battle was in full swing, the ’92 Consensus was no longer a sine qua non for electoral success in Taiwan. But the KMT had little else to campaign on. Whether the ’92 Consensus will someday regain its appeal to Taiwan’s voters rests on how Beijing uses its tactic of asymmetric engagement with Taiwan’s major parties—an approach that has been very much at the forefront since

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Tsai Ing-wen took office—and how Taiwanese voters react to Beijing’s actions.4 Since 2000, the PRC has chosen to treat the KMT as if it were representative of Taiwan as a whole, whether or not it enjoys an electoral mandate. That cooperation enabled many productive developments during the Ma years, from direct flights across the Strait to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and follow-on accords. But Taiwanese citizens worry that economic progress may come at the expense of Taiwan’s long-term interests, including sovereignty and autonomy. For example, in view of the PRC’s refusal to engage the Tsai administration, it is hard not to see the pathbreaking meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping in November 2015 not as the beginning of warmer relations between the two sides, but as a message to Taiwanese to vote for the KMT or else. In 2016 and 2020, Taiwanese voters chose “or else.” At least through the 2020 elections, the KMT’s top leadership remained convinced that engagement with the PRC was the right strategy to preserve Taiwan’s autonomy externally and attract popular support at home. They also believed that the ’92 Consensus was the right formula for enabling that engagement. Even as KMT leaders doubled down on that strategy, the electorate was growing increasingly skeptical about the benefits of engagement and the efficacy of the KMT’s approach. Instead of adjusting the party platform to conform to the mainstream view, the party leadership doubled down on its pro-engagement logic. That approach persisted despite wrenching conflicts among establishment and emerging leaders in the KMT.

Leadership crisis When the KMT transferred its base to Taiwan in the late 1940s after losing the Chinese Civil War, it decided to sink roots in Taiwan’s society. Although the leadership positions remained firmly in the hands of party officials who had moved to Taiwan from the mainland—which I will call “’49ers” (often called waishengren)—the party used local elections to entice native-born Taiwanese, which I will call “locals” (benshengren) to become active in politics at the grassroots level. Those who succeeded in the local elections were recruited for KMT membership, and cooperative local elites received rewards of status, opportunity, and resources. The result was a catch-all party that included members and supporters from all rungs of society and from a wide range of economic sectors: business, agriculture, labor, state employees, and the professions. As time passed and Taiwan democratized, some of those grassroots politicians worked their way into the party’s higher echelons. Strong personal connections and local roots made locals more electable than ’49ers, and electability was an increasingly important factor in KMT politics as the island shifted from single-party authoritarianism to multi-party democracy. 4

Lin 2016, 321–335.

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Anticipating the need to connect the party and government even more strongly to Taiwan’s society as hopes for recovering the mainland dimmed, President Chiang Ching-kuo selected Lee Teng-hui, a local, as his vice president in 1984. When Chiang died in 1988, Lee succeeded him. Lee’s rise to the presidency was a turning point for the KMT. Many in the ’49er elite opposed him; they worried that a local Taiwanese leader would pull the KMT away from its commitment to anti-Communism and unification with the mainland. To secure his position as head of both the state and the party, Lee accelerated the island’s democratic transformation and based his own claim to power on a popular mandate. His reforms split the KMT, dividing it into the Mainstream Faction, which was loyal to Lee, and the traditionalist NonMainstream Faction. Non-Mainstream politicians tried to block Lee from becoming KMT party chair, but (with help from another KMT insider, Soong Chu-yu/James Soong) Lee overcame their resistance. In 1988, he presided over a KMT Party Congress that gave local Taiwanese a majority in the party’s Central Committee. Although he continued to leave room for ’49ers in the leadership, Lee broke the old ’49er elites’ dominance; those who could not bear to see their party taken over by locals quit the KMT to create the hardcore unificationist, and politically marginal, New Party (NP) in 1993. In the early 1990s, Lee and Soong worked together to transfer the KMT onto a new, democratic foundation. Although Soong is a ’49er, he supported Lee’s rise and worked hard to build relationships with locals around the island. In 1994, Soong became the first popularly-elected governor of “Taiwan province,” an anachronistic administrative unit that included all of Taiwan except the cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung. To win the election, Soong had to persuade a majority of Taiwan’s population that he was an acceptable choice. Once he was in office, he deepened his ties to local communities. Legend has it (most probably true) that Soong visited every one of the island’s 309 townships during his term as governor, bearing gifts at every stop. Soong developed an intriguing reputation: he was considered part of the ’49er elite and believed to be more pro-unification than others in the leadership. Yet, he was very much identified with the “localist” (bentu) tendency within the party. He was very popular with grassroots politicians, including the KMT-linked local factions that drove much of the electoral action on the island. Soong was so popular, in fact, that he ran afoul of his mentor, Lee Teng-hui. Lee secured his title as “Mr. Democracy” in 1996 when he won over 50 percent of the vote in Taiwan’s first direct presidential election. In addition to defeating a DPP candidate, Lee also overcame two challengers from the right, both of whom were associated with the KMT’s ’49er elite. Before long, Lee began to marginalize Soong. In 1997, he engineered Soong’s exclusion from the party’s vice chairman list, while promoting Soong’s rival, Lien Chan, to an elevated vice chairman position. Soong fought back and won a seat on the KMT’s Central Standing Committee. Later that year, Soong’s governor’s

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post was eliminated in a reform ostensibly aimed at streamlining the anachronistic and duplicative provincial administration, but which also happened to dethrone Soong Chu-yu. As the 2000 presidential election approached, the KMT wrestled with the question of who would succeed Lee Teng-hui. Soong was an obvious choice: seasoned, popular, and well-spoken, he was one of the very few senior KMT politicians who had experienced the rough-and-tumble of an electoral campaign. His connections with grassroots politicians were another valuable asset for a potential presidential candidate. Early polls showed Soong as a strong favorite, but Lee was pushing a different candidate: Lien Chan. Lee rejected the idea of using a party primary (presumably out of concern that Soong might win), and he eventually was able to engineer Lien’s nomination. There are many rumors purporting to explain why Lee blocked Soong from getting the KMT nomination, ranging from the very plausible (he thought Lien would be more pliable) to the conspiratorial (he really wanted the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, to win). We may never know the real reason, but it is clear that his machinations created enormous ill-will within the KMT. Soong’s supporters were furious at the way he was treated, and they accused Lee of all manner of perfidy. Lee returned their hostility: when the KMT revoked the party membership of legislators who supported Soong, Lee reportedly said, “We must ruthlessly drive them [Soong’s supporters] out.”5 Rather than accept a verdict that might end his career, Soong decided to run an independent presidential campaign, directly challenging the party (and mentor) that had nurtured his career for decades. He announced his intention to run in July 1999; the KMT expelled him in November. Soong was leading in the polls for much of the campaign season, but in December (three months before the voting), the KMT exposed a scandal involving party money that damaged Soong’s reputation as a clean politician. The case hurt both Soong and Lien, because while it linked Soong to the scandal, it also reinforced the perception that the KMT was deeply corrupt. The 2000 presidential election was a disaster for the KMT. With the KMT’s votes split between Soong (37%) and Lien (23%), the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian was able to squeak past with a 39% vote share. As Dorothy Solinger pointed out at the time, the KMT “surely could have remained in power had Soong stayed on board.”6 Emerson Niou and Philip Paolino’s analysis of survey data finds strong support for Solinger’s claim.7 More importantly, though, Niou and Paolino found that “the choice between Soong and Lien was essentially a referendum on Blue-leaning voters’ attitudes toward Lee.”8 An added complication in the 2000 election was the difficulty of voting strategically. Most voters did not prefer Chen, but they were not sure which 5 6 7 8

Copper 2000, 19. Solinger 2001, 30–42. Niou and Paolino 2003, 721–740. Niou and Paolino 2003, 735.

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of their two preferred candidates—Lien or Soong—had a better chance of winning. Between the moratorium on reporting survey results in the campaign’s last ten days and the KMT’s continued insistence that Lien was winning, voters did not know how to align their votes with the candidate with a better chance.9 Despite revisionist history to the contrary, the contemporary record shows that the KMT—including Lee—fought hard for Lien to win. Losing the presidency was bad enough, but even more damaging was how the election split the KMT. Soong peeled away key KMT constituencies, including ’49ers, urban moderates, and local factions in north-central Taiwan, souring their relations with the party center.10 Even worse, both Soong and Lee ended up leaving the KMT. Not long after his expulsion from the KMT, Soong founded a party of his own, the People First Party (PFP). As for Lee Teng-hui, he was not only blamed for the defeat but even accused of having engineered it. He resigned as party chairman—although Wu Yu-shan, one of Taiwan’s most astute political observers, says he waited until Soong created the PFP to make his announcement, lest Soong “attempt to return to the KMT and claim leadership.”11 Not long after, the KMT revoked Lee’s membership. With Soong and Lee gone, Lien Chan became the KMT chair, but it was a pyrrhic victory. As Wu Yu-shan put it, “Lien swiftly took his place and became the leader of a once all-powerful but now demoralized political machine.”12 The departures of Lee and Soong damaged the KMT in many ways, but one that was not evident at the time seems critical today: they left the party in the hands of the ’49er elite.13 Lee and Soong were the KMT leaders most closely associated with the grassroots, localist party. Soong might not have been a Taiwanese, but his ties to the grassroots were strong, and he showed (and continues to show) considerable ideological flexibility. Whether he would have become a leader of the “Taiwanese KMT” is unknowable, but his absence (along with Lee’s) ensured the party center would revert to the ’49er elite. It also opened a spot in the leadership for a new figure around whom the grassroots faction would coalesce. The man who would fill that void—Wang Jin-pyng—was a year into his first term as speaker of the Legislative Yuan when the 2000 presidential election took place. He would hold that post for 16 more years, amassing enormous power in the process. 9 Wu 2001, 40–48. 10 Rigger 2001, 944–959. 11 Wu 2001, 43; In a piece written before the election, Taiwan specialist Jean-Pierre Cabestan predicted that Soong might “rebuild the post-Lee Teng-hui KMT.” Cabestan, 2000 12 Wu 2001, 43 13 Lien is not a ’49er—although he was born on the mainland, his family roots are in Taiwan, making him what Taiwanese call a “half-mountain.” However, he is identified closely with the elite faction in the party.

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Perhaps the most important consequence of Lee and Soong quitting the KMT was to derail the party’s progress toward a more Taiwan-centric policy agenda. The shift in policy was evident almost immediately. Wu detailed the changes:14 [After leaving the KMT], Lee saw the KMT led by Lien Chan tilting toward the unification end of Taiwan’s political spectrum and felt betrayed. The KMT’s tilt mainly had to do with the party’s need to find a political market niche now that the ruling DPP had taken a middle-ofthe-road line. Lee, however, interpreted this as the KMT harking back to its old line under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. With the KMT drifting back toward the line he had worked so hard to cast off, Lee joined several of his staunch KMT allies in a new party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which, says Wu, had “the sole mission of helping President Chen consolidate the government’s nativist line and resist the unification pressure from Beijing.”15 The KMT’s leadership problems were muted during the eight years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. It was easy for KMT politicians of all stripes to unify behind the idea of opposing and obstructing a DPP president. Chen’s victory threatened not only the KMT’s ideological and programmatic goals, but also its ability to provide its grassroots supporters with the spoils they had come to expect. KMT members and politicians needed to stick together to minimize the damage inflicted by a DPP government—and to minimize that government’s duration. Even Soong’s party, the PFP, cooperated closely with the KMT during the Chen era, a development that gave rise to the labels “Blue Camp” for the KMT/PFP/ New Party alliance and “Green Camp” for the DPP and its ally, the TSU. Another factor holding the KMT together during the Chen Administration was the balance of power within the party. The traditionalist elite retained its status at party headquarters: Lien Chan was KMT chair through Chen’s first term, followed by Ma Ying-jeou, another leader affiliated with the ’49er elite. At the same time, though, the KMT’s effective power came from the Blue Camp’s majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY). The LY’s newfound importance for the KMT—as a body in which the party maintained a majority while not holding the presidency, which is to say, the KMT’s main check on the DPP-led executive branch— empowered and emboldened the top KMT legislator, Wang Jin-pyng. Wang, who had risen from the grassroots in southern Taiwan, was the very embodiment of the localist KMT. As long as Chen Shui-bian was in office, KMT headquarters recognized Wang’s central role in blocking Chen. Indeed, he was a crucial link in its political strategy. 14 Wu 2001, 31 15 Wu 2002, 29–38.

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The KMT’s problems were evident in the 2001 legislative elections. It lost 55 seats (ending up with 68), mostly to the PFP (which won 46).16 According to Wu, the KMT suffered because Lee Teng-hui and his TSU shifted the focus of the elections to the national identity issue: “Lee’s stated goal was to capture the left-wing supporters of the KMT, i.e., those in the traditional KMT fold but with a nativist inclination.”17 As it turned out, the TSU’s line was too hard, and it ended up competing mainly with diehard Taiwanese nationalists (Wu’s “nativists”) in the DPP. The DPP upped its seat share from 70 to 87, making it the largest single party in the Legislative Yuan for the first time. Had the PFP not agreed to join a coalition with the KMT, the DPP would have gained the upper hand. At the time, the KMT’s internal problems were so severe that Wu Yu-shan posited that the Taiwanese nationalist wing of the KMT might bolt to the DPP, sending the traditionalists to the PFP and finishing off the KMT.18 The Blue Camp’s legislative majority blocked most of Chen’s initiatives, but it was not able to restore the KMT’s popularity. With the 2004 presidential election looming, the KMT and PFP made an extraordinary compromise: Lien Chan would seek the presidency with Soong as his running mate. The two candidates who had split the vote (and the ruling party) just four years earlier were so desperate to win back the presidency that they swallowed their pride and teamed up. The pride-swallowing was greatest on Soong’s side; after all, he had won nearly twice as many votes as Lien, yet had to accept second place on the joint ticket. Such was the price for breaking up the KMT. And still, they did not win. Chen was re-elected in 2004 by the narrowest of margins, even after the KMT moved significantly toward DPP positions on cross-Strait and identity-related issues. The extreme frustration felt by KMT leaders was evident in their extravagant accusations against Chen, including their months-long campaign to prove he had stolen the election by staging an assassination attempt, an accusation that has never been proven. But if 2004 was a low point for the KMT, it was also a turning point. Barely a year into his second term, Chen’s presidency began to spiral downward, undone by a web of corruption and scandal that distracted the government and sapped the DPP’s morale. With the DPP staggering and pressure building for better relations with the PRC, the 2008 presidential election was the KMT’s to lose.19 Not only was Chen leaving under a huge cloud, but the KMT had a candidate people liked: Ma Ying-jeou. Although Ma was a traditionalist, elite candidate, he represented a new generation of the KMT, and he happily defined himself as a “New Taiwanese”—someone not 16 At the time, the LY had 225 seats. The number of seats was cut to 113 for the 2008 elections. 17 Wu 2002, 36. 18 Wu 2002. 19 In his 2000 campaign Chen Shui-bian promised to improve relations with the PRC, including opening direct transportation links. His efforts failed, however, as Beijing refused to cooperate with his administration.

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born on Taiwan, but completely at home there. On the legislative front, too, the 2008 election benefited the KMT. A new majoritarian electoral system in place for the first time amplified a winning party’s seat share; with just over 50% of the vote, the KMT captured 81 out of 113 legislative seats—a supermajority that everyone assumed would guarantee Ma’s success.20 As it turned out, the KMT’s electoral success in 2008 did not bring an end to its tribulations; instead, it heightened the tension between Ma and Wang Jin-pyng, each of whom represented a distinct KMT constituency and headed a branch of government. The KMT has a long tradition of merging the presidency and the party chairmanship, but Wang decided to challenge Ma for the leadership. The practice emerged at a time when the KMT had a permanent lock on the presidency but Ma and Wang differed over whether it should continue in the democratic era. The result was a contentious battle for the KMT chairmanship in 2005. Ma won the first round, but it was a temporary victory. Ma broke the president-as-chairman norm when he stepped down as party chair in 2007, but coordination between Ma’s government and the party proved so difficult that in October 2009 he resumed the post of party chair. With or without President Ma at the head, the KMT struggled to keep its members unified. The Ma-Wang conflict was the most obvious manifestation of that struggle. It continued in the run-up to the 2008 election, when Wang openly criticized the nominating process that selected Ma. He implied the nominating procedures were unfair, and he suggested that under Ma’s leadership the KMT was hostile to local (non-’49er) politicians. Wang was playing the “national identity card,” but he was also pointing to a real division in the party between those who relied on grassroots political support and the professional party bureaucrats—a division that tracked the local/’49er divide. Competition between Ma and Wang over the presidential nomination threatened to split the party, and commentators speculated that Wang might take a page from Soong’s playbook and run as an independent candidate.21 When Wang did not do so, Ma easily won the general election in 2008 and a second term as president in 2012. Ma may have been president, but Wang was far from powerless. For eight years, despite its massive LY majority, the KMT was unable to smoothly translate its political program into law and effective policy. Wang engineered a complex and unwieldy inter-party negotiation process in the legislature that left government-sponsored bills bogged down. These procedures gave opposition parties a voice in legislation, but they also slowed the legislative process 20 The new electoral system combines three voting formulas. Seventy-three district representatives are elected using first-past-the-post rules; indigenous voters use single, non-transferable voting to elect six indigenous representatives; and 34 atlarge legislators are chosen using a party list proportional system. 21 Mo 2007, 3.

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to a crawl, and sometimes to a stop. And they gave Wang an extraordinary degree of control over the legislative process and output. For six years, tensions built between Ma, who headed both the executive branch and the party headquarters, and Wang, with his legislative powerbase. Ma retreated into a small inner circle of advisors, most of whom were from the party’s traditionalist (and largely ’49er) elite. Meanwhile, Wang established himself as the KMT’s leading grassroots politician—the de facto head of the localist faction. He used his position as speaker to control the legislative spigot, openly challenging the president. Legislation and budget reviews for state-run enterprises languished for months, stymying many of Ma’s priorities. After Ma’s re-election in 2012, he apparently decided to solve the “Wang Jin-pyng problem” once and for all. In 2013, the KMT opened an investigation charging that Wang had improperly interfered in a legal prosecution to protect a DPP legislator. While Wang was not found criminally liable, the KMT expelled him, thereby revoking his right to represent the party and hold the speaker’s chair in the legislature. Wang fought back, and the KMT’s expulsion order was overturned by a court order. The showdown further eroded Ma’s already weak popularity ratings and eliminated any hope of repairing the relationship between the two men and their respective supporters. In the spring of 2014, Wang’s fortunes got a further boost from an unexpected direction. Under Ma, Taiwan and the PRC had negotiated 23 economic agreements. A 24th agreement, the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) would have liberalized the services trade between the two sides. For cross-Strait skeptics, the CSSTA was the last straw. Wang agreed to DPP legislators’ demand for a line-by-line review of the bill, but when DPP legislators slow-walked the process, the committee chair in charge tried to short-circuit the process and bring the agreement to the floor for a vote. Demonstrators opposed to the CSSTA were gathered outside the legislature. When they learned the vote was to happen without the promised review, dozens of protesters rushed into the legislative chamber and occupied it. Ma’s government was at a loss as to how to end the occupation, which dragged on for a month. It was only when Wang intervened and negotiated with the occupiers that the crisis was resolved. To reach that resolution, Wang openly defied Ma by agreeing to protestors’ demands that Ma had rejected. The legislative occupation, or Sunflower Movement, was one in a series of protest movements that exposed an unprecedented degree of distrust between Taiwan’s society and the Ma Administration. As Sunflower Movement leader Chen Wei-ting put it, “The students and civil groups have halted the forced passage of the agreement and demonstrated that Ma’s Administration has lost legitimacy.”22 The November 2014 local elections results support Chen’s characterization: the KMT lost eight of its 14 municipal executive posts, and 22 Tiezzi 2014.

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its vote share fell from 45% in the 2012 legislative district elections to 41% in the municipal executive voting. In short, on the eve of the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, the KMT was in chaos. Its top two elected officials were openly at war with one another, and the number two had the upper hand. Wang was clearly more popular than Ma and most of the party’s other possible nominees, but the KMT’s top leadership was not about to reward the president’s rival—a man they had only recently tried to expel from the party—with a presidential nomination. As it turned out, none of the KMT’s leading lights could see a clear path to the presidency, and when the time came for candidates to enter the race, no one among them stepped forward. After a long and awkward delay, Hung Hsiu-chu, a pro-unification legislator considered far to the right even in the KMT, announced her intention to run. The move, most commentators believed, was more a provocation to others than a sincere attempt to become the nominee. But when the other heavyweights still held back, the party made Hung its nominee faute de mieux, a role she played with conviction but little success for several months. In October 2015, the KMT replaced Hung with Chu Li-luan (Eric Chu), one of the presumptive candidates who had declined to offer himself in the original nominating process. But by the time Chu stepped forward, the damage was done; his campaign began in a hole far too deep to climb out of in three months. The upshot of this history is that between 2000 and 2016 the transformation Lee Teng-hui had engineered—from a KMT of, by, and for the ’49er elite into a party that represented Taiwan’s native-born majority—was reversed. After Lee and Soong left, the grassroots (localist/bentu) faction, which comprised the great majority of KMT politicians and members, was marginalized and excluded from the top leadership. Instead of welcoming Wang Jin-pyng, the grassroots faction’s emerging leader, into its inner circle, the KMT’s top brass had treated him as an adversary. They pushed Wang and his supporters to the side, which demoralized the grassroots and deterred new leaders from stepping forward. Without the cooperation of the legislature, and facing rising opposition from society, the KMT lost both the presidency and its legislative majority in 2016. That failure only intensified the conflict over the leadership and future direction of the party, a conflict that took a surprising turn in the 2017 KMT party leadership elections. The 2017 KMT chairmanship election looked to be another sleepy affair dominated by familiar faces: Hung Hsiu-chu (the incumbent), Hau Lung-pin, and Wu Den-yih. Hau and Wu are veterans with long resumes. Hau is a ’49er and, while Wu is a local, he is very much an establishment figure, with close ties to Ma Ying-jeou. Then, from out of southern Taiwan there emerged a new and unexpected contender: Han Kuo-yu. Han is a ’49er, but he is anything but mainstream. His father joined the ROC army during World War II and followed the KMT to Taiwan. Han was raised in the Taipei suburbs. Despite his ’49er credentials, he is by all accounts

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an outlier in the KMT’s hierarchy: instead of learning English he mastered Hokkien, the language of the Taiwan-born majority; instead of seeking higher education abroad, Han earned an MA at National Chengchi University. His wife is a local from an important political family in Yunlin County; she, her father, and her brother all have served on the Yunlin County Council. Han entered politics in 1990, winning a seat in the Taipei County (now Xinbei City) council. He ran for a legislative seat from the county in 1993 and served three terms, stepping down at the end of 2001. From the beginning of his political career, Han kept one foot on each side of the KMT’s central dividing line. As a ’49er with a military background he enjoyed strong support from the Huang Fu-hsing Party Branch, the KMT’s mobilizing arm for military voters. In the early 1990s he also joined “New KMT Alliance,” a group of KMT legislators opposed to Lee Teng-hui’s localization efforts.23 At the same time, though, Han cultivated good relations with the localist faction. As Jaw Shaw-kong, one of the New KMT Alliance founders put it in a 2019 interview, “Should we call him True Blue? If we look at his time as a legislator, he was speaking for the Huang Fu-hsing Party Branch, he was speaking for the retired military personnel, so he should be True Blue. But he also was close to the localist faction, so it’s hard to say.”24 In the end, Han was not forced to take sides, because as the KMT’s internal battle heated up, Han Kuo-yu stepped away from politics for 17 years. When Han returned as a candidate for the party leadership in 2017, he unsurprisingly failed. However, his 2017 bid positioned him to win the KMT’s nomination for Kaohsiung mayor a year later. The nomination was not seen as much of a prize: no one expected the KMT to recover the position, which the DPP had held for 20 years. Kaohsiung—a huge municipality in southern Taiwan that combines a large rustbelt urban core with an equally large rural and semi-rural periphery—was considered a DPP stronghold, and Han Kuo-yu a sacrificial lamb. Han was anything but a lamb on the campaign trail. From the beginning, he made it clear that he planned to win. He accused two generations of DPP leaders of taking the city for granted. He attacked the previous mayor for mismanaging the city (corruption was implied) and then deserting Kaohsiung to take a post in the presidential office. He made a slew of promises, from improving city services to paying down the city’s debt to bringing new economic activity to the city. Han’s promises were familiar, but the man himself was different from other politicians, including his DPP opponent, who appeared wholly unprepared for Han’s style. In a debate during the mayoral campaign, Chen Chi-mai recited statistics and rolled out policy plans, while Han waved away these “details.” Governing, Han averred, is easy: it’s a matter of figuring out what needs to be 23 Several New KMT Alliance members quit the KMT to found the pro-unification New Party, but Han did not follow them. 24 Quoted in Qian 2019.

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done, whether it’s something small like repairing the fishing piers or something big like growing the economy, and assigning competent people to do it.25 For those who were not persuaded, the KMT campaigned on an even simpler appeal: after 20 years of DPP government, isn’t it time to give someone else a try? What transformed Han from an above-average KMT campaigner to a national phenomenon was his embrace of populism.26 Han did not claim superior knowledge or expertise. On the contrary, he celebrated his unexceptional biography as proof that he and he alone understood ordinary people’s needs and desires. He dismissed elites, DPP and KMT alike, as out-of-touch and selfish, enriching themselves at the expense of the common people. Where other politicians seek votes to elevate themselves and pursue their own interests, Han claimed that his goal was to elevate the common people, to be their voice. Expertise and efficiency, he argued, are no substitute for moral clarity and a true connection to “the people.” Han Kuo-yu’s approach won him enthusiastic support, not only in Kaohsiung but across the island. His rallies attracted huge crowds and his supporters brooked no criticism, especially on social media, where the so-called “Han Fans” became known for aggressively defending their champion. Not only did Han win 54% of the vote in the erstwhile DPP stronghold, but the “Han Wave” also buoyed Han’s fellow KMT candidates, as Taichung’s newly-elected KMT mayor Lu Shiow-yan acknowledged in her acceptance speech.27 The November 2018 elections flipped seven municipal executive seats from DPP to KMT, giving the KMT an overall advantage of 15 to 6 municipalities—as well as a 10% increase in its share of the popular vote over 2016. Han Kuo-yu looked, from the outside at least, like the savior the KMT had been waiting for. The Han Wave reversed the KMT’s electoral slide. It proved that voters were willing to transfer their dissatisfaction with Tsai from surveys to the ballot box. The political momentum was all on the KMT’s side. All the party needed to do to seize back the presidency and the legislative majority was to capitalize on the moment, to continue what Han Kuo-yu had started. That was how it looked from the outside, but insiders knew the party’s problems were too deep to be solved so easily. As he had done early in his career, Han managed to straddle the KMT’s internal divide. He appealed to 25 A Chinese transcript of the debate is available at https://www.ettoday.net/news/ 20181120/1310638.htm. 26 The definition of populism referenced here is from Jans-Werner Mueller, who stresses the populist’s reliance on a moralistic appeal to an (imagined) homogeneous “real people” whose will the populist claims to be uniquely able to represent and defend against a corrupt elite. See Mueller 2015. I am indebted to Nathan Batto for this definition, which he discussed in relation to Han in a blogpost dated December 27, 2019 (https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/). 27 Wang 2018.

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KMT constituencies that normally prefer different candidates: the “iron ballots”—’49ers, civil servants, and military voters—and the rurally-based local factions. In other words, the Han Wave had united KMT voters normally associated with the “establishment” with voters who took their cues from local politicians close to Wang Jin-pyng, while also attracting a large number of “light green” voters—people who normally voted for DPP candidates. Finding a candidate capable of performing that alchemy at the national level would not be easy. The first person to throw his hat in the ring for the KMT’s 2020 nomination was Wang Jin-pyng. Wang had dominated the localist faction for years, and he had played a key role in Han’s rise. With Han occupied with his new job as Kaohsiung mayor, Wang seemed a plausible candidate from the localist camp. To the establishment, however, Wang was anathema. They could not allow the very man who had battled Ma Ying-jeou to a draw to become their presidential nominee. The next two people to enter the race were establishment figures, 2016 presidential nominee Eric Chu Li-luan and party chair Wu Dun-yih. Before long, however, Wu began talking up Han Kuo-yu’s potential, creating a groundswell for the new mayor. Wu then dropped his own bid.28 On April 17, 2019 Taiwan’s richest man, the founder and chairman of Foxconn, Terry Gou (Guo Tai-ming), announced his intention to run. The following week Han Kuo-yu announced that while he was willing to accept a leadership position, he would not participate in a selection process that gave KMT insiders a decisive role. The party accepted Han’s demand, changing the rules to rely solely on public opinion polling. When it became clear that Han would be a candidate, Wang withdrew from the race, his last chance at the presidency spoiled by an upstart he himself had cultivated. For the establishment, Han was only marginally better than Wang: an ambitious neophyte loyal to no one and with no discernible ideology who seemed to think winning the Kaohsiung mayoral election gave him license to take over the party—including dictating the terms of the presidential nomination process. The KMT was in a bind. Momentum is fleeting; the only way to take advantage of the Han Wave was to nominate someone capable of beating Tsai Ing-wen in 2020. But nominating Han himself meant handing the party over to a rogue element who had showed contempt both for the ’49er elite and for the localist faction leader. Moreover, Taiwanese voters have a history of punishing politicians who fail to finish their terms in order to run for higher office,29 and Han had barely started his job as mayor in Kaohsiung. Still, Han Kuo-yu emerged the winner with 45% support in the polls. Gou finished second with 28%, while Chu came in third with 18%. 28 A handful of other candidates also joined the race, but they were never serious contenders. 29 Kaohsiung City voters did this to Mayor Han in June 2020, recalling him by a wide margin with a higher than usual voter turnout.

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The primary helped choose a candidate, but it did nothing to unify the party. All the old fractures were out in the open, along with a new fracture: those who believed a Han Kuo-yu presidency was preferable to four more years under Tsai versus those who believed electing Han would spell the end of the KMT’s ideals. As it turned out, Han Kuo-yu was not the savior the KMT needed. His populist style continued in the presidential race; if anything, it became even more pronounced. Where he once had seemed “folksy” and “plain-spoken” he began to sound profane and undisciplined. He adopted the term “common people” (shumin) to describe his followers, and he embraced his own identity as a shumin. Polling during the campaign revealed his base to consist mainly of older middle- and lower-middle-class voters, hardly a majority. The campaign’s efforts to expand beyond the base, for example to younger voters, were half-hearted and unconvincing. Whatever momentum the Han Wave may have had after 2018 was exhausted by election day, but one thing did carry over: Han’s performance reverberated throughout the KMT. The DPP retained its legislative majority and the KMT picked up only three seats. Since the PFP lost three, the Blue Camp’s net gain was zero. Given the KMT landslide just 13 months earlier, this was a devastating result. Instead of a new direction, the Han Kuo-yu phenomenon turned out to have been a dead end.

The rise and fall of the ’92 consensus Lee Teng-hui’s departure left the KMT in need of many things, including a politically saleable cross-Strait policy. What the party came up with was a policy of active engagement on the framework of the ’92 Consensus. That approach proved highly effective for a long time. It facilitated extensive economic, social, and political interactions across the Strait, especially after the KMT regained power in 2008. But its ability to mobilize domestic support for the KMT’s agenda of cross-Strait engagement has diminished in rough parallel to the emergence of the party’s leadership crisis. Although Lee famously called, after he left the presidency, for Taiwan to become a “normal” country with a new name and flag—positions that were barely distinguishable from those of Taiwan independence activists, Lee as president had been an architect of cross-Strait reconciliation. His vision for unification emphasized peace, negotiation, equality, and democracy, but nonetheless viewed unification as a desirable—if distant—prospect. Gunter Schubert argues persuasively that Lee’s National Unification Guidelines were, in fact, the foundation for the ’92 Consensus.30 The most important breakthrough in the Guidelines—one which enabled all the development of cross-Strait relations that followed—is the abandonment of Taipei’s long-standing claim that the mainland is part of the 30 Schubert 2004, 534–554.

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ROC, in favor of the position that Taiwan and the mainland are both part of China. That move set aside the issue of which of the two Chinese regimes—the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China— represents “China.” By acknowledging the PRC’s existence, Lee made it possible for the two sides to open communications. Although the phrase “’92 Consensus” came later (in 2000), the meeting that phrase refers to took place during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency and at his instigation. That meeting was possible because both sides agreed that each side’s verbal acknowledgement of “one China” would be a sufficient basis on which to proceed. Lee’s best-remembered position on cross-Strait relations is his 1999 description of them as a “special state-to-state relationship.” The PRC rejected that characterization, and its reaction has contributed to Lee’s reputation as a cross-Strait provocateur ever since. In fact, however, in making that statement, Lee was looking for a way to move cross-Strait reconciliation forward without abandoning the ROC’s claim to sovereignty (which also constitutes a claim to sovereignty for Taiwan, as the ROC). Lee’s predecessors, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, insisted so strongly on the ROC that they could not even speak to Beijing. Lee was looking for a way to open communications, but he was not about to surrender to the PRC’s position that the ROC, a sovereign state located on Taiwan, had ceased to exist in 1949. Unfortunately, because the PRC would not endorse this characterization of the relationship, Lee’s special state-to-state formula became a stumbling block. The DPP’s increasing moderation on cross-Strait relations further heightened the need for a new KMT policy. After putting a pro-independence plank into its platform in 1991, the DPP discovered that the stance was an electoral liability. In 1999, it softened its position, adopting a resolution that said, in essence, Taiwan is already independent, under the name “Republic of China.” This put the DPP much closer to the position of Lee’s KMT. During the 2000 presidential campaign, Chen Shui-bian also distinguished himself as the most pro-engagement of the three candidates, emphasizing closer economic ties and looser restrictions on cross-Strait interactions. With Lee gone from the party and the DPP’s Chen in power, the KMT had an even greater need to find a new approach. Regaining forward momentum would require finding a new way to describe the relationship. The approach would need to feel safe and familiar to Taiwan’s voters while also satisfying Beijing’s demand for a break with the Lee Teng-hui era. Li Chenghong explained the KMT’s search for a new policy as an attempt to take advantage of the failure of Chen’s cross-Strait approach (a failure guaranteed by Beijing’s staunch refusal to cooperate with a DPP administration), while at the same time solidifying the KMT’s pro-unification base. Beijing, for its part, cleared the way for the KMT since, as Li puts it, “Under the new leadership, almost dramatically, the KMT and Beijing, long-time rivals, realized

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that they shared a common adversary, namely, the newly elected president Chen Shui-bian and his DPP.”31 Beijing and the KMT arrived at a solution: reify the minimalistic “agreement” that had enabled the 1992 Hong Kong talks—one that would hearken back to the meeting that Lee had helped make happen, but without crediting Lee himself. There was no actual agreement they could point to; instead, they needed to bottle the atmosphere of 1992 and redeploy it. The solution came from long-time KMT cross-Strait policy expert Su Chi. He coined the phrase “’92 Consensus” to summarize the idea that as long as the two sides are willing to call their position a “one China” position, they can have different verbal interpretations of what “one China” means. That clever condensation has allowed Beijing to mean one thing (the ’92 Consensus means there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of it) while Taiwan means another (the ’92 Consensus means there is but one China, but each side has its own version of one China), without requiring the two sides to confront their differences head-on. The ’92 Consensus worked as the basis for relations because both sides needed it. The KMT needed it as a platform on which to build substantive relations with the mainland. Beijing needed it to implement its own policy: peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, leading to unification under the “one country, two systems” model. Peaceful development rested on the logic that Taiwan would be drawn to unification through positive interactions. So, the policy’s success required an arrangement that permitted those interactions. According to Wei Chi-hung, the KMT sent a series of representatives to the mainland in mid-2000 to sell PRC leaders on the idea that the ’92 Consensus could solve the problem. They also reminded Beijing that the alternative to interaction was hostility, which would only help the cause of Taiwan independence. Wei describes how Chien Fu (Frederick Chien), a former ROC foreign minister, made the case for the ’92 Consensus: He said, “I told the mainland leadership that this phenomenon is actually caused by you.” He argued that Taiwanese identities had been on the rise not because Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian had pushed hard for Taiwan independence, but rather because Beijing had monopolized the meaning of one China and excluded Taiwan from the international community. He thus urged Chinese leaders to treat cross-Strait relations as relations between “brothers,” rather than between “father and son.”32 The effort was a success: by mid-summer 2000, PRC scholars and officials had adopted the ’92 Consensus discourse. As Wei comments, “Invented in April, the 1992 consensus began exerting its influence on China in July.”33 31 Li 2005, 41–64. 32 Wei 2016, 67–95. 33 Wei 2016, 82.

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The ’92 Consensus facilitated party-to-party (KMT to Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) communication and all manner of practical initiatives. Still, it was an interim measure for advancing cross-Strait ties, not the basis for unification. When Lien Chan tried to propose confederation as a framework for unification, Beijing rebuffed him.34 The PRC also has not accepted the KMT’s description of the ’92 Consensus as “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” But it has not exactly rejected that KMT view, either. During Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, the ’92 Consensus provided a basis for talks between the KMT and the CCP. Those talks, in turn, set the stage for the swift negotiation and implementation of cross-Strait agreements on a vast range of issues once the KMT recaptured the presidency in 2008. Negotiators from the two sides worked overtime to move forward on issues that had accumulated during the Chen Administration, starting with opening direct transport links between the two sides—a cause Chen had advocated in his 1999 presidential campaign.35 Beginning with direct transit in December 2008 and proceeding through the comprehensive Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010, the two sides went on to sign two dozen major agreements As the 2012 elections approached, Ma Ying-jeou made the ’92 Consensus a centerpiece of his re-election campaign. Thanks to this tacit agreement, he argued, Taiwan had enjoyed four years of peace, stability and prosperity—all of which would be undone if Taiwan elected a president who did not endorse it. Beijing had made the ’92 Consensus a precondition for continuing those positive developments, the benefits of which were evident. Ma also was able to make the case that accepting the ’92 Consensus had cost Taiwan nothing; “one country, different interpretations” was vague enough to cover a multitude of preferences. The DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, lacked a persuasive rejoinder. Her party learned early on that the ’92 Consensus was toxic to its core supporters: when Chen Shui-bian seemed to endorse the consensus in 2000, Tsai, in her capacity as Mainland Affairs Council head, was forced to retract the statement after a backlash from within the DPP. Tsai was determined not to fall foul of such a critical DPP constituency. She insisted the ’92 Consensus was a mirage, an empty slogan cooked up by the KMT to facilitate its end-around the Chen administration. Voters in the general election, however, were skeptical that Tsai could deliver positive cross-Strait relations without accepting the ’92 Consensus, so despite wobbly popularity ratings in his first term, Ma was re-elected by a comfortable margin. During Ma’s second term, the KMT and CCP became increasingly devoted to the ’92 Consensus, the magical lubricant capable of eliminating much of the friction in their relationship. The two parties did their best to ensure Taiwan’s next administration would be equally dedicated. The KMT turned 34 Kan 2013; Schubert 2004, 541. 35 Tien and Tung 2001, 76–84.

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to the only partner it could rely on to provide something that might increase its appeal to voters in the 2016 election: Beijing. Once again, the KMT campaign emphasized engagement enabled by the ’92 Consensus. PRC officials reiterated ad nauseum that the ’92 Consensus was a prerequisite for peaceful relations across the Strait, and their protestations reached fever pitch in the months before the 2016 elections. The unprecedented meeting between Ma and Chinese president Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015 was, according to Alan Romberg, designed to “lock in, to the extent possible, the ‘1992 Consensus’ as the mutually acknowledged basis for promoting stable and productive cross-Strait relations.”36 In spite of all these efforts, however, the ’92 Consensus lost whatever magic it had with the Taiwanese public. Between 2012 and 2016 a series of social movements questioned the notion that deepening cross-Strait interactions served the interests of ordinary Taiwanese. The anti-media monopolization movement called attention to the risks of allowing mainland-linked individuals and groups to buy media businesses on the island. Other protest movements raised questions about inequality and the abuse of power by moneyed interests in Taiwan, many of whom had made their fortunes on the mainland. The Sunflower Movement pulled together many of these concerns in a comprehensive critique of KMT policies that, in the Sunflower activists’ view, put Taiwan’s autonomy and prosperity at risk in order to secure agreements with Beijing that benefited only the wealthy in Taiwan. With the underlying premise of the KMT’s policy—that the best way to secure Taiwan’s future was to enhance cross-Strait interactions—under attack, and Ma’s popularity dwindling into single digits, accepting the ’92 Consensus was no longer a requirement—or even an asset—for a successful presidential campaign. Tsai Ing-wen’s 2016 campaign themes were more skillfully crafted than those she used in 2012, and she came as close to the ’92 Consensus as she could without actually endorsing it.37 Nonetheless, she never did accept it— even under intense pressure from the PRC leadership and her KMT opponents. She was elected anyway. The ’92 Consensus was no longer a powerful enough talisman to keep the KMT in power, and its luster faded even more during Tsai’s first term, as Taiwan continued to thrive despite Beijing’s refusal to engage with Taiwan under DPP rule. At the same time, PRC statements seemed to redefine the ’92 Consensus in ways that made it even less attractive in Taiwan. Immediately after the 2016 election, it seemed that the KMT might be turning further away from mainstream opinion. Instead of reshaping its priorities to fit the expectations of a changing society, it doubled down on 36 Romberg 2016, 5. 37 In her inaugural address, Tsai noted that the 1992 meeting had “arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings,” and that she “respect[s] this historical fact.” The difference between respecting a historical fact and accepting it is infinitesimal, as is the gap between “joint acknowledgements and understandings” and “consensus.”

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its self-marginalizing approach. It elected Hung Hsiu-chu, the erstwhile presidential candidate whose far-right views made it necessary to replace her mid-campaign, to be the party chair. In the end, however, that doubling down did not last long. A year into Tsai’s presidency, political veteran Wu Den-yih—who had served as Ma’s second vice president—defeated Hung’s bid for another term and immediately began overturning her most controversial initiatives. With Wu in the top spot, the KMT backtracked from the strongly proChina position Hung had pushed during her tenure. It revoked a plank recently added to the party platform calling for a cross-Strait peace agreement, which many Taiwanese believe is a step toward unification talks and which Ma had briefly raised but, amid political blowback, quickly abandoned in the run-up to his re-election in 2012. The party also reinstated the KMT’s longstanding interpretation of the ’92 Consensus, which holds that there is but one China, but that the ROC and PRC have differing interpretations of what “one China” means. Wu explained his approach to the Financial Times in May 2018. He endorsed a moderate view of cross-Strait relations, saying, “Of course, we are against Taiwan’s independence, but we don’t think right now is the time to talk about reunification.” His positions are distant from Hung’s, but they are quite similar to those of Ma Ying-jeou—and even Tsai Ing-wen. In the Financial Times interview Wu echoed Ma’s “no unification, no independence, no use of force” formula. Like Ma, Wu supports close economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland, and he is willing to continue KMT-CCP partyto-party talks. He also shares Tsai’s preference for the status quo: “We should spend five, ten, 20 more years just staying in the status quo; no arms, no forces, just communicate [with China] peacefully.” One reason for the ascendance of Wu and his moderate views on cross-Strait issues was the prospect of local elections in 2018 and national elections two years later. With those deadlines looming, the KMT needed a quick turnaround to avoid being sidelined. Beijing surely welcomes the KMT’s ongoing efforts at political revival: it is the only significant party in Taiwan that talks about unification or the idea of one China. Inevitably, though, the party’s efforts to position itself for electoral victory move it away from the PRC’s preferred position. In many ways, the KMT is just returning to policies in place during the Ma administration, but, without Ma himself and with Beijing’s current views on cross-Strait issues, those policies are unlikely to win the endorsement of PRC leaders. Meanwhile, Han Kuo-yu’s vague and inconsistent statements on cross-Strait relations surely must have confused Beijing at least as much as they confused Taiwanese voters. Beijing must hope for a KMT comeback. PRC policy is based on the expectation that a KMT—one dominated by traditionalist elites who are willing to pay lip service, at least, to unification—will remain in power. With the KMT out of power and its traditionalist elite marginalized in

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party and electoral politics, cross-Strait relations may be in for a sustained rough time. In sum, the once-comfy partnership between the KMT and the CCP is unlikely to reappear anytime soon. To experience a real revival, the KMT needs to articulate a vision that truly puts Taiwan first. It needs to offer an alternative to the DPP that pursues goals widely shared by the Taiwanese people but offers different strategies for achieving them. The ’92 Consensus was supposed to fill this role, and for a long time it did. But a critical mass of Taiwanese voters have lost faith in the KMT’s ability to leverage its cooperation with Beijing to secure concrete, meaningful benefits for Taiwan. It remains to be seen whether the PRC leadership can bring itself to offer such benefits to a KMT that, to be successful in Taiwan’s electoral politics, must be less congenial to Beijing than during the heyday of the ’92 Consensus. After its defeat in the 2020 elections the KMT promised reform, but it remains to be seen whether it can deliver.

Conclusion Tsai Ing-wen’s first term began with the KMT wallowing in misery, consumed by its defeat. Two years later it seemed the Han Wave might offer a chance to reverse its decline, but Han Kuo-yu turned out not to be the leader who could unite the KMT’s various factions, delight its base, and excite centrist voters. Instead of consolidating its 2018 victory, the KMT found itself back where it had been four years earlier: searching for a way forward that is true to the party’s past (and to the elders and traditionalists who see themselves as guardians of that past) and at the same time aligned with Taiwan’s future. And once again, the question: can the KMT recover, and overcome its long history of internal conflict and its recent inability to formulate an electorally effective cross-Strait policy, or is the party really finished this time? And once again, the answer is unclear. Established political parties in established two-party systems are resilient. Even declining parties have financial resources, historical legacies, and strong brands that make them attractive vessels for ambitious politicians. It is easier to take over an existing party than to start a new one, and for politicians in a hurry, the broken shell of the KMT may look like a better bet for a speedy rise than waiting for a spot to open in the DPP, or creating a viable third party. Han Kuo-yu’s decision to use the KMT as the vehicle for his rise as presidential contender reflects this logic, and so does the story of Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, who decided to form his own party and missed his chance to run for president in 2020. Those advantages mean we should be wary of predicting the collapse of the KMT, even after two consecutive presidential election defeats. After all, the DPP lost the presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, but it came back strongly in 2016 and 2020. Still, it is fair to consider the KMT damaged property. The KMT that failed so badly in 2016 and 2020 was not the healthy, robust KMT of the late

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1990s, but the fragile, patched-together product of the post-2001 repair job. The KMT no longer has the advantage of being the established ruling party, so joining the KMT is no longer the obvious choice for someone seeking to enter politics the easy way. Nor does the party enjoy the same financial advantage it once had. Holding itself together through the past 20 years has been costly. Its sources of financial support have diminished, and in 2016 the legislature’s freshlyminted DPP majority passed a bill allowing the government to seize the KMT’s “ill-gotten” assets.38 As the party geared up for the November 2018 local elections, observers close to the ground reported that these financial measures were beginning to bite. Six months before the election the KMT party chair told the Financial Times that the party was “facing a very severe situation. Compared with the past we are much, much poorer right now.” One result was the spectacle of local KMT chapters—which once enjoyed lavish funding from the party center—hosting fundraising events for the first time. The 2020 elections brought more of the same. Pulling off yet another recovery will require creativity, imagination, and a willingness to compromise. And the KMT has shown some capacity for rejuvenation. Han Kuo-yu was not the only new face in 2018. In the New Taipei mayoral race the KMT nominated a political newcomer with deep roots in the district, former police official Hou You-yi. Hou’s nomination showed a bit of creativity, as the party looked past the queue of politicians seeking to move up and chose a well-regarded figure from outside the ’49er elite. The election of the relatively youthful Johnny Chiang (he was 48) as the party’s interim chair in March 2020 was another encouraging sign. Under Chiang’s leadership the KMT has gestured toward reform. It debated ways to change the interpretation of the ’92 Consensus to make it more appealing to Taiwanese and tried to shed its reputation as a pro-China party. It also sought to outflank the DPP and Tsai’s government with legislation calling for pursuit of restored formal diplomatic relations with the U.S. and U.S. diplomatic, economic and security support for Taiwan against the threat from China.39 Perhaps most importantly, the KMT’s aging leadership will need to take seriously the biggest threat of all: the party’s vanishing appeal to young Taiwanese. Here, there are some signs of hope, although senior figures such as former president Ma Ying-jeou continue to intervene. Although the DPP has been much more successful in attracting young voters and activists, the younger generation’s enchantment with the DPP is weak (something reflected 38 For decades, the DPP has argued that during its four decades as an authoritarian ruling party the KMT accumulated a vast war chest of money and assets that tilted the electoral playing field in the KMT’s favor. Some assets were appropriated from the Japanese colonial authorities when they departed at the end of World War II; others are the proceeds of KMT-owned businesses—proceeds that, according to the DPP, should have gone to the state, not the KMT. It was these “ill-gotten” assets that the DPP wanted the KMT to surrender. 39 Central News Agency 2020.

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in the large number of young voters supporting third-party candidates in the 2020 legislative elections), and the KMT has a small core of diehard supporters under 40. They have ideas for how to restore the party’s electability. The party’s survival may well rest on whether their voices can be heard soon enough.

References Batto, Nathan. 2019. Blogpost. December 27, 2019. https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/. Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. 2000. “Taiwan in 1999: A Difficult Year for the Island and the Kuomintang.” Asian Survey, Jan/Feb.: 172–180. Central News Agency 2020. “KMT Resolutions Call for Renewed Taiwan-US Diplomatic Relations, Defense Against CCP,” Taiwan News, Oct. 6, 2020, https://www. taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4024401. Copper, John. 2000. “Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics.” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Politics 2000, no. 2: 19. Han, Liam Joel. 2016. “Is the KMT Becoming a Fringe Party?” The Diplomat, May 9, 2016. Kan, Shirley. 2013. “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy.” Congressional Research Service. Li, Chenghong. 2005. “Two-Level Games, Issue Politicization and the Disarray of Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Policy after the 2000 Presidential Election.” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Sept.: 41–64. Lin, Gang. 2016. “Beijing’s New Strategies toward a Changing Taiwan.” Journal of Contemporary China, May: 321–335. Mo, Yan-chih. 2007. “What is Wang Jin-pyng’s Angle in Attacking the KMT?” Taipei Times, April 11. Mueller, Jans-Werner. 2015. “Parsing Populism.” IPPR, October 13, 2015. https://www. ippr.org/juncture/parsing-populism-who-is-and-who-is-not-a-populist-these-days. Niou, Emerson, and Philip Paolino. 2003. “The Rise of the Opposition Party in Taiwan: Explaining Chen Shui-bian’s Victory in the 2000 Presidential Election.” Electoral Studies, 22: 721–740. Page, Jeremy, and Jenny Hsu. 2016. “After Political Loss, Taiwan’s Rich Rulers Now Face Financial One.” Wall Street Journal, January 18. Qian, Yijun. 2019. “Jiehe Bentupai, Fei Lanjun? Hanliu Waiyi Kua Lan-Lu.” TVBS News, September 1. Rigger, Shelley. 2001. “The Democratic Progressive Party in 2000: Obstacles and Opportunities.” The China Quarterly, Dec.: 944–959. Romberg, Alan. 2016. “The ‘1992 Consensus’—Adapting to the Future?” China Leadership Monitor, 49: 5. Schubert, Gunter. 2004. “Taiwan’s Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus.” Asian Survey, July: 534–554. Solinger, Dorothy. 2001. “Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico.” Journal of Democracy, 12: 30–42. Tien, Hung-mao, and Tung Chen-yuan. 2001. “Taiwan in 2010: Mapping for a New Political Landscape and Economic Outlook.” Asian Survey, Jan./Feb.: 76–84. Tiezzi, Shannon. 2014. “Protestors to Leave Taiwan’s Legislature Thursday.” The Diplomat, April 8.

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Wang, Yizhen. 2018. “Sinian Zaidu Cheng Lantian! Taizhong Shizhang Xuanzhan Lu Shiow-yen Dasheng 20 Wan Piao.” Up Media, November 24. https://www.upmedia. mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=52547. Wei, Chi-hung. 2016. “China–Taiwan Relations and the 1992 Consensus, 2000–2008.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Jan.: 67–95. Wu, Yu-shan. 2002. “Taiwan in 2001: Stalemated on All Fronts.” Asian Survey Jan/Feb. 2002: 29–38. Wu, Yu-shan. 2001. “Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer.” Asian Survey Jan-Feb. 2001: 40–48.

4

Taiwan’s need for new attitudes, aims, and actions to further economic growth Pochih Chen

In her first and second inaugural addresses, President Tsai Ing-wen emphasized economic reform and reinvigoration of economic growth as key policy goals. For Taiwan’s government to search effectively for further economic growth, its policymakers need to understand the reasons for Taiwan’s past success and its current limitations. In short, Taiwan was a fast-growing economy in the 20th century, but faced many difficulties after it became a middle and then a high-income country. This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the history of Taiwan’s development before turning to a discussion of the reasons for, and policies for redressing, several challenges Taiwan and Tsai’s government have been facing. In Taiwan’s economic history, the most important factor in the country’s development has been the market mechanism of international factor price equalization. This mechanism caused fast economic growth, as well as more even income distribution, in Taiwan before the 1980s. Seemingly paradoxically, this same mechanism also has reduced the economic growth rate and real wages of Taiwan in recent years. Similar situations likely will happen in other developed countries when developing countries—including China—have larger and more advanced economies and compete with higher income countries. This chapter also considers several challenges that Taiwan is now facing. These challenges include not only phenomena like declining real wages and economic growth rates, but also more fundamental factors and attitudes that lie behind these phenomena. Since these challenges are due primarily to Taiwan’s past success, Taiwan’s experience may offer lessons for other developing countries. The Tsai government needs to understand these causes better so that its policies can be more effective and successful in pursuing its agenda for Taiwan.

A brief history of Taiwan’s economic development Economic development is a complicated phenomenon. Many factors may affect its speed, quality, and direction. The major factors affecting Taiwan’s economic development in the past 120 years are mostly international ones— especially the mechanism of international factor price equalization. Taiwan’s

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economic development is not a miracle, as some claim, but rather a very plausible outcome for developing countries facing similar international opportunities. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul A. Samuelson posited a theorem of international factor price equalization 70 years ago.1 It states that, under certain conditions, the price of production factors, such as the wage rate, will become equal between two countries when the countries have free trade with each other. Another Nobel laureate, Robert Mundell, demonstrated that even without trade, the international movement of even one production factor can equalize the factor prices of two countries.2 Since these theories make some assumptions that may not be true in the real world, the wage rate of different countries may remain unequal. However, the theoretical analysis still can predict that—even if some of the assumed conditions do not hold—the wage rates of two countries, after international trade, will become closer to each other. Taiwan began to experience significant trade with richer countries when the Qing government in China was forced to open several ports for international trade, including two ports in Taiwan in 1860. After Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, Taiwan began to engage in large-scale trade with Japan. In addition, much investment, modern technology, and many educated people entered Taiwan from Japan. Before 1945, the economic relationship between Taiwan and Japan resembled a modern common market. Taiwan could export a variety of products in which Taiwan had a comparative advantage over Japan without paying tariffs. Factor flows between Taiwan and Japan were largely unimpeded. Consequently, income and wage rates in Taiwan rose, drawing closer to those of Japan. The factor price equalization mechanism thus began to contribute to the economic development of Taiwan. In 1937, four decades after Japan occupied Taiwan, per capita income of Taiwan reached roughly 75% of Japan’s. Taiwan’s economic development accelerated after World War II although per capita income levels still have not reached parity with Japan’s today. Taiwan’s post-war economy is considered a miracle by some, but Taiwan’s economic development, before and after the war, was the result of a relatively straightforward international opportunity that replicated and expanded upon the types of economic opportunities Taiwan had enjoyed under Japanese colonial rule. Immediately after World War II, Japan was no longer an open, in effect domestic, market for Taiwan. Instead, China became a domestic market for Taiwan from 1946 until 1949. But since the Chinese economy was less well developed than Taiwan’s, it could not replace Japan as a driver of Taiwan’s development. On the contrary, the civil war in China caused hyperinflation which was exported to Taiwan through a fixed exchange rate, the flow of Chinese currency into Taiwan, and the export or outflow of Taiwan’s products 1 2

Samuelson 1948. Mundell 1957.

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to China. Taiwan transferred significant goods and received hyperinflation and largely worthless Chinese currencies. In 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang regime were defeated in China, an estimated 1.6 to 2 million mainland Chinese moved to Taiwan to escape communist rule, suddenly increasing Taiwan’s population by more than 20% . Most of these people could do little to increase Taiwan’s total production, or productivity, because they lacked capital and land on which to work. Moreover, many of the newly arrived were economically nonproductive government staff and military men. The average production and consumption by Taiwanese thus declined, and the supply of many goods was seriously insufficient. Taiwan was poor and experienced shortages of goods and foreign exchange after World War II and especially after 1949. Fortunately for Taiwan, in 1951, the United States initiated aid to Taiwan, while also helping with national defense. U.S. aid alleviated supply shortages and the lack of foreign exchange and gave Taiwan the means to establish or expand consumer products and import substitution industries. When excess supply appeared in textile industries around 1958, some businesspeople considered turning to exports. But they found that the high tariff they paid for their imported materials made their production costs much higher than those in potential importing countries. Business and government officials agreed upon a tariff rebate policy where textile exporters could receive rebates for the tariff they paid for their imported materials. The tariff rebate policy was gradually extended to other industries and other indirect taxes. Both government and business regarded this policy as an export subsidy. From a theoretical point of view, however, this policy amounted to a liberalization of the export sector. With the tax rebate policy for exports, firms in the export sectors could enjoy costs of imported materials similar to those of their foreign competitors, and naturally would choose to export products in which Taiwan had a comparative advantage. In short, the tax rebate policy enabled the export sector to behave as if it were operating in an open, free market economy even though Taiwan still had very high tariffs and other indirect taxes. Because the wage rate of Taiwan was very low at that time, the comparative advantage of Taiwan was in labor-intensive products. Taiwan businesses exported many kinds of labor-intensive products in accordance with market mechanisms, and thereby launched the post-war export expansion era of Taiwan’s economy. The rapid expansion of exports also benefitted from the import liberalization policy of advanced countries. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) led to significant tariff reductions. A Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which developing countries were allowed to pay lower or no duties on their exports to developed states (thereby giving developing countries a boost to economic growth through privileged access to the markets of more prosperous states), greatly helped Taiwan. Close trade relationships with the high-wage advanced countries unleashed the mechanism of

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international factor price equalization, and wage rates and income in Taiwan (and other NICs that followed the same path) grew rapidly. The rapid rise of wage rates and employment, beginning in the 1960s, gave Taiwan rapid economic growth while simultaneously equalizing income distribution. Government officials took credit for the results, with some justification. Their policies indeed contributed to the adoption of export liberalization and other policies that facilitated international trade and, in turn, growing prosperity. But many policies were the result of market pressure or were accidental rather than the result of conscious government policy. Much of the credit for Taiwan’s success should be accorded to international opportunities and the mechanism of international factor price equalization. Despite the differences in political regimes and economic policies, the four Asian NICs—Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—and other developing countries that followed them in exporting labor-intensive products all experienced rapid growth in national income and wage rates. The government of Taiwan did undertake economic planning and adopted many economic policies. The first four-year national economic plan started in the 1950s, with the plan of that and each subsequent period announcing growth targets for many important products. Statistical analysis shows, however, that the government targets for realized growth rates did not exceed what the simple extension of past growth trends would have predicted, leading to the conclusion that the economic plans and related policies had little effect.3 Hence, the government’s contribution was not as important as officials claimed. Overestimating the contribution of government officials, entrepreneurs, and other people, and a lack of understanding of the importance of the international factor price equalization mechanism led to some difficulties in Taiwan after the 1980s. Overconfident in Taiwan’s—and their own—capabilities, Taiwan’s economic policymakers neglected the importance of the external environment. Consequently, they did not work hard enough to design new development strategies for a changing environment. Before 1980, the four NICs had no rivals in exporting to advanced markets and saw their wage rates rise thanks to the international factor price equalization mechanism. After 1980, China and other developing countries started to imitate the NICs’ export expansion strategy, taking advantage of the fact that their wage rates were much lower than those of the four NICs by the 1980s. The reality that Taiwan’s wage rate might be dragged down by the low wage rate of China and other developing countries was neglected by Taiwan’s government. Hence, Taiwan ignored the new situation for too long and was not prepared for the new challenge. When China and other developing countries joined the global market, Taiwan and other NICs were no longer the lowest-wage countries in competition for world markets. Wages in some developing countries were less 3

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than one-tenth of the NICs’. Through global market competition, the international factor price equalization mechanism began to work to narrow the gap between NICs and the developing countries. Labor-intensive products produced by low-wage workers in the developing countries displaced the products of NICs and other higher income countries. Many producers in the higher income countries were forced, or attracted, by lower wages and lower costs to invest and produce in the new wave of developing countries. Production in these developing countries thus replaced more and more of the NICs’ exports. In U.S. markets, the high labor/low human capitalintensive exports of Taiwan were replaced by goods from China beginning around 1990. By 2006, the value of Taiwan’s exports to the U.S. in this category that came from China reached 97.3% of the remaining export value from Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan lost about half of its original market share.4 Consequently, manufacturing jobs moved to China and other developing countries. Wage rates grew rapidly in those countries, while wages for some workers in Taiwan and other NICs stagnated. The pattern of change that defined economic relationships between the advanced countries and the NICs after the 1960s recurred between the NICs and other developing countries after the 1980s. Moreover, because international flows of capital, technology, and enterprises were much freer after the 1980s than they had been in the 1960s, and because the developing countries that joined the international competition during this later period were much bigger than the NICs, the impact of the factor price equalization mechanism on the NICs was stronger than it had been for the advanced countries in the 1960s. In short, the 1980s were a crucial turning point in Taiwan’s economic development. Before then, national and per capita income in Taiwan could grow almost automatically because the international factor price equalization mechanism was pushing Taiwan’s wage rates up toward those of the advanced countries. After the 1980s, the same mechanism started to work in the opposite direction, pulling Taiwan’s wage rates down toward the rising, but still lower, wage rates of China and other developing countries. This trend would continue unless Taiwan managed to upgrade its industries. Unfortunately, Taiwan’s economic policymakers and businesses did not respond effectively to the new situation and the challenges it posed. Many people in Taiwan were too accustomed to the good old days. Consequently, several difficulties have emerged over the past three decades. Taiwan and its current government must solve these challenges if Taiwan is to enter a new development era with a thriving economy. Some of these challenges and the possible policies for addressing them will be discussed in the following sections. 4

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Avoiding factor price equalization by developing a knowledge-based economy Although Taiwan’s economic development success before the 1980s was primarily due to favorable international opportunities and the international factor price equalization mechanism, many in Taiwan either truly believed, or tried to mislead others, that success was due to the policies of government officials and the capabilities of businesspeople. Today, some Taiwanese continue to praise past leaders while criticizing the current government for economic difficulties that derive largely from past failures of policymaking and changing international conditions. What the government and the businesspeople needed to do, and largely did, before the 1980s was to accept the opportunities presented by the international market, when the lower wage rates in Taiwan could easily make its products competitive. Appropriate foreign exchange rate and tax rates, a degree of trade liberalization, a modest investment in infrastructure, and the export tax rebate policy were sufficient to maintain rapid economic growth. Because Taiwan has not been a low-wage country since the 1980s, it has been losing its competitive advantage in labor-intensive products and has needed to move toward more advanced products. If Taiwan wants to avoid the wagedepressing effects of international factor price equalization mechanisms and achieve higher incomes, it must produce goods that lower income countries are incapable of producing at competitive prices. In other words, Taiwan has needed to develop a knowledge-based economy. But a knowledge-based economy cannot be achieved simply by deregulation and an open-door policy. It needs more advanced education, supporting industries, appropriate infrastructure, and—most importantly—the aspiration and effort of people toward innovation. All of these conditions are much harder to fulfill and require wise government policies. The difficulty of making these kinds of adjustments is why many developing countries have fallen into the so-called middle-income trap and have not been able to grow after they reach a middle-income level. Taiwan’s continued economic success requires that it take steps to avoid this trap, by jettisoning the no-longer-effective polices of the past, understanding the current external environment, and pursuing the necessary direction for the future.

Understanding the overestimation of Taiwan’s productivity Before China and other developing countries joined the global competition, the world export market for manufactured products was dominated by advanced countries and NICs. During this period, the wage rates in this group of countries moved toward equalization near the relatively high levels of the advanced countries. The supply of certain kinds of labor, especially that of less-skilled workers, was relatively scarce, and this meant that such workers enjoyed high wages in the advanced countries. Because

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the population of Taiwan and its peer NICs was less than one-tenth of the population of the advanced countries, less-skilled workers were still a relatively scarce resource in the combined group of advanced countries and NICs. As a result, wage rates in Taiwan rose rapidly before the 1990s. This was often assumed, mistakenly, to be the result of high productivity of labor in Taiwan. When China and other developing countries joined the global competition, the absolute and relative supply of less-skilled labor in the world market increased sharply. Relying on the same economic sectors, the NICs could no longer sustain the high wage rate they enjoyed in the 1990s. Some Taiwanese laborers’ wage rates had risen so high that they exceeded the normal wage rate of similar labor in countries that entered the global competition for export markets after the 1990s. As a result, some laborers in Taiwan lost their jobs because factories moved to China or other developing countries. Some workers kept their jobs but had to accept lower real wages. Today, some young laborers in Taiwan are reluctant to accept wages lower than they expected when they were in school, contributing to the high unemployment rate of young people. Taiwan needs to develop new industries which can offer higher wages. Younger people should be educated or re-educated so that they can achieve higher productivity and, thus, command higher wages. Taiwan first needs to accept that its wage rates in some sectors might be too high by current international standards. Lamenting low wages or high unemployment is no substitute for necessary policy adjustment. Recognizing this situation, President Tsai Ing-wen began to advocate developing the local economy when she first ran for president in 2011. Because the truly “local” economy includes non-tradable goods industries and industries having distinctive local features, it is at least partly insulated from international competition. As a result, the wage rates in these sectors are less affected by wage rates in other countries. If Taiwan can further develop this local economy, some workers who suffered stagnant wages or lost jobs in the tradable goods industries may be able to find higher wage jobs in the local economy. The local economy includes such sectors as the health and elder care industries. Because Taiwan’s population is aging rapidly, services providing care for senior citizens will become more and more important in the coming years. President Tsai correctly emphasized the development of care industries, but the speed of development has thus far not been fast enough. Other sectors of the local economy are even less developed. If the local economy and non-tradable goods industries cannot develop faster, more workers will have to face lower wages. Government announcements of higher wage targets will not solve the problem. If the government wants to set a much higher minimum wage requirement (as it has indicated it does), it must do more to develop other aspects of the local economy as well as new, more knowledge-based industries. Achieving the government’s

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goal for incomes may also require new welfare policies, such as a negative income tax to help workers whose productivity level is such that they cannot find employment at the raised minimum wage level.

Escaping the trap of Taiwan’s past export practice One source of Taiwan’s fast export growth before the 1980s was original equipment manufacturing (OEM). Taiwanese companies manufactured according to the specifications of foreign buyers. After the 1980s, OEM and original design manufacture (ODM) orders for information technology (IT) products became the major categories of Taiwan’s exports. Taiwan garnered significant income, international recognition, and technology. But reliance on these sectors had costs and risks. Orders for many products came from a limited number of buyers, giving them a degree of monopsony power. And competition among Taiwanese producers was severe. The markets, thus, were usually buyers’ markets so that prices—and profits—faced severe downward pressure from buyers. Fearing that they would lose foreign OEM orders, most of the Taiwanese companies were deterred from developing their own brands and products. With manufacturing tailored to demands specified by buyers, their opportunity to research and innovate through gaining experience in design and production was also limited. In addition, because Taiwan’s companies usually were charged with producing only part of a product or occupied only a limited segment of the production chain, they lacked opportunities to develop experience in the research and marketing of a whole product. For a time, Taiwanese companies generally were satisfied with this situation because low profit margins could be offset by a large volume of production and high stock prices. High stock prices, however, did not reflect good economic prospects because Taiwan’s stock market was rather shortsighted and tended to regard rising OEM or ODM orders as trends that would last for many years. The government and even many economists were also satisfied with the growth and structural change of production and exports because the IT products that came to dominate Taiwan’s exports were regarded as hi-tech and thus created an impression that Taiwan’s economy was upgrading rapidly. The success that OEM and ODM exports gave to Taiwan might have reduced the potential for, and efforts to promote, Taiwan’s long-term development. In a globalized economy, OEM and ODM continue to be a major part of international trade, especially the export trade of middle-income countries. Reducing dependence on OEM and ODM significantly is not easy in the short run. If Taiwan fails to make greater efforts to increase the export of products that are invented, designed, or controlled by Taiwanese companies, the value-added rate, profit rate, and wage rate will continue to be depressed by the market power of foreign buyers and competition among producers. The government must overcome the bad habits that Taiwan

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acquired during the period of success driven by OEM and ODM exports. The next sections of this chapter discuss the Taiwan economy’s major “bad habits” and policies to reform them.

Thinking not only of cost-cutting One bad habit of OEM exporters is thinking of profitability in terms of costcutting. The fierce competition for OEM orders, and other export opportunities, led to the development among Taiwanese businesses of an outstanding ability to cut costs. Cost-cutting became a key source of comparative advantage for Taiwan companies. Gradually, many companies came to neglect the possibility of raising product value and, in turn, price in favor of cost-cutting practices, some of which were problematic for the broader society and economy. Some companies achieved cost cutting by abusing their labor forces and the environment, using inputs that were of low quality or even toxic. Social capital, including trust between workers and employers, and the reputation of Taiwan’s products, were compromised. Government policies were also affected by the habit of emphasizing costcutting. Major industrial policy tools used by Taiwan, even during the most recent decade, have included: tax reductions and exemptions, low interest loans, low rents or sales prices for industrial land, low prices for other key inputs including oil, water, and electricity, and increased reliance on lowwage foreign workers. The Ma administration advocated signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries, primarily to eliminate the already quite low foreign tariffs, which is ultimately a variation on the theme of costcutting (in the broad sense of making Taiwan’s exports cheaper for foreign buyers). If the government and businesses in Taiwan do not switch from costcutting to policies that encourage production of new and higher value products, Taiwan will be unable to become a high-income country. Although President Tsai and her government recognize the inadequacy of a policy that relies too much on cost-cutting, they have faced formidable pressure from businesses that still overemphasize cost-cutting. In a 2015 White Paper, a major business association labeled Taiwan a “five deficiency” economy—a term that became a slogan and a tool for businessmen to push for government policies that would continue to prioritize cost-cutting. The five deficiencies defined by the White Paper are: insufficiencies of electricity, water, land, labor, and talented, high-skilled people. The report thus asserted that Taiwan was lacking in all the factors of production except entrepreneurship and capital. But that is not an accurate story. What Taiwan lacks most is entrepreneurship. Because so many existing businesses are not capable of developing new technologies and industries, many of them are not competitive in the world market for higher-value-added and innovative products and therefore cannot pay higher wages to their employees. Consequently, many educated Taiwan citizens have gone abroad to seek better-paying jobs.

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Thus, the problem is not that Taiwan lacks talent generally. Businesses in Taiwan too often cannot pay competitive salaries for talent. Like other countries, Taiwan faces shortfalls of some specific kinds of talent and thus has reason to welcome people with such talents from other countries. But demands from business and other social groups have pushed the government to adopt a much broader liberalization of rules for immigration of skilled people. Without adequate regulation, this liberalization can be abused by businesses to substitute lower-paid skilled foreign workers for domestic ones in order to reduce costs. For less-skilled labor, Taiwan is already highly dependent on foreign workers. Foreign workers account for about 9% of all persons employed in the economy and 15% in the manufacturing sector. These ratios are very high, compared to otherwise similar countries, except for the special case of Singapore, with its uniquely high dependence on foreign workers. The number of foreign workers doubled during the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008– 2016). Yet businesses have continued to ask for more low-wage foreign workers. What they see as a lack of workers in Taiwan is better understood as businesses’ inability to pay higher wages and failure to upgrade Taiwan’s industries. The asserted deficiency of electricity and water is a legitimate issue because Taiwan has had insufficient supplies of electricity and water several times in the past few years. But this is in part because the prices of electricity and water in Taiwan are lower than in most countries, which encourages inefficient use and, in turn, shortages. The per capita electricity consumption of Taiwan in 2016 was 10,632 kWh, while it was only 7,371, 6,602, 6,448, 4,795, 7,319, 7,091, and 8,160 in Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Israel, Switzerland, and Singapore, respectively. The value-added produced by 1 kWh electricity in Taiwan is less than half that of these other developed countries. In other words, although Taiwan has recently faced electricity shortages, they were the result of low productivity rather than inadequate supply. The solution for Taiwan is to raise its productivity in the long run instead of increasing the supply of electricity to satisfy the demand from low-value-added industries. As a country develops, its international comparative advantage changes. Businesses that keep using old technology in existing industries will see their costs rise and will find it difficult to hire labor and other resources at prior wage levels. If businesses are led by entrepreneurs as defined in economics (that is, individuals who create new businesses, bring new products to market, and develop new processes of production, and who bear risks in seeking to earn profits), they can overcome this challenge through innovation. If the businesspeople are merely bosses or non-entrepreneurial capitalists (as is often the case in Taiwan), however, they will press the government to adopt policies that give them access to low-cost resources. If the government does so, the country’s ability to upgrade its industries and to increase its income will be limited.

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Excessive outflow of industries Taiwan’s OEM and ODM exports are industries at risk amid shifting comparative advantage. When China and other developing countries started to join the global competition, Taiwan’s comparative advantage changed. Many labor-intensive industries lost competitiveness. Taiwanese firms in sectors that focus on profitability through cost cutting predictably moved operations to developing countries to reduce costs, or at the request of OEM buyers. As a result, Taiwan experienced a rapid outflow of industries, which reduced Taiwan’s growth momentum. Many Taiwanese companies neglected the possibility of upgrading themselves or developing new products and industries in Taiwan. The rapid appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar that the United States successfully pushed for in 1986, the emergence of a bubble economy in Taiwan, and China’s policies strongly encouraging the migration of Taiwanese companies’ production operations across the Strait all accelerated Taiwanese industries’ outflow and undercut efforts to upgrade or develop new industries in Taiwan. Because currency appreciation, the bubble economy, and trade liberalization also encouraged the rapid growth of service sectors in Taiwan, wage rates and GDP continued to grow rapidly in the later 1980s and the early 1990s despite the outflow of manufacturing jobs. It was, thus, too easy for policymakers and businesses to overlook the danger posed by the outflow of industry. Because the industries that moved out were, initially, mainly labor-intensive industries, and because they needed to import from Taiwan more capitalintensive or skill-intensive inputs, the outflow of industries for a time seemed to encourage positive structural changes in Taiwan. Cooperation with U.S. companies in the personal computer and IT industries also grew, enabling Taiwanese companies to become important exporters of computer and IT products. Taiwan’s industries and exports thus seemed to be upgrading quite successfully.5 Here, again, the apparent success made it too easy to overlook the dangers of an excessive outflow of industries. In the early stages of this outflow, downstream industries moved to China and imported inputs from more upstream industries in Taiwan, in what appeared to be a beneficial division of labor and complementarity between Taiwan and China. This development led to demands for more convenient transportation links and more open investment rules between Taiwan and China. But in this rapidly growing outflow of industries lay perils for Taiwan. The static division of labor between Taiwan and China would lead to dynamic competition because China’s market size and policy interventions would draw to China the upstream industries in Taiwan that had been exporting inputs to China. This resulted in the much-noted hollowing out of industry in Taiwan. This initial outflow, in turn, created further outflow, undermined the cluster effect in Taiwan that had contributed to the island’s economic dynamism, enhanced 5

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the factor price equalization effect between Taiwan and China, raised Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, and increased China’s power and means to threaten Taiwan. Perceiving that the outflow of industry was a danger, President Lee Tenghui adopted a “go slow, be patient” policy in the 1990s to restrict investment into China, and a “go south” policy to encourage replacing investment in China with investment in Southeast Asian countries. In part suffering from poor execution and implementation, these policies failed, and industrial outflow reached significantly damaging levels. President Ma, whether because of ideology, political calculation, or an inadequate understanding of economics, strongly promoted increased economic cooperation with China, while ignoring the costs for Taiwan. He signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which is a kind of limited FTA with China, in 2010. He and his supporters believed that closer links with China and with other economies were the only route to economic success for Taiwan. China, however, persisted in deterring other countries from entering FTAs with Taiwan. China also began to compete with Taiwan’s major industries, including its highly successful semiconductor industries. The so-called red supply chain of China reduced opportunities for companies from Taiwan and other countries. China has supplemented unfair trade and industrial policies with cheap or cost-free access to capital for Chinese firms that seek to merge with and essentially take over foreign companies, or to poach key engineers and managers from foreign companies. Taiwan is one of the principal targets of these moves. By 2014, many in Taiwan, including some important economic policy officials, realized that economic relations between Taiwan and China were competitive rather than, as the Ma government had argued, complementary. The Sunflower Movement of 2015, which arose in opposition to a cross-Strait service trade agreement with China, reflected these economic concerns and their political potency. With a party—the DPP—that was more sympathetic to the Sunflower Movement in power, the challenge for Taiwan’s government under Tsai is to retain remaining industries, rebuild beneficial industry clusters, and develop new, higher-value-added industries so that Taiwan can provide enough employment at higher wage levels and regain momentum for future growth. To pursue this agenda effectively, the Taiwan government also should cooperate closely with other countries to draw attention to China’s unfair policies and to find ways to counteract them.

Promoting research and development Taiwan’s government and business community have been talking about the importance of research and development (R&D) for decades. According to an investigation by the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, however, more than 90% of Taiwan’s R&D has been passive, with the goal of maintaining

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buyers’ OEM and ODM orders rather than seeking to make a breakthrough in technology or create new products. In addition, the metrics Taiwan used for R&D have been flawed. Government policies to encourage R&D long have focused on measuring R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP or business revenue. The government has also used the number of patents obtained as an index of the achievements of R&D. R&D in universities has been evaluated by the number of Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) papers. These are all poor indicators of the contributions of R&D to Taiwan (or humankind). Reliance on such bad measures has increased the risk that a great deal of the R&D budget and researchers’ talents have been used ineffectively. Promoting the type of R&D that is vital to Taiwan’s economic dynamism requires a change in policy. To be a high-income country, Taiwan must be able to produce things which countries of similar or lower levels of development cannot produce. Taiwan must focus more on developing new technology and new products instead of continuing to follow the lead of other countries and trying to produce established products at lower cost. But successful research of the necessary type is not easy to achieve. Government and researchers in Taiwan often target what are popularly, but perhaps incorrectly, identified as the emerging sectors of the future. These ideas often grab the attention of the media and ordinary people. But Taiwan usually cannot win the global competition in these fields because other countries have started R&D earlier, enjoy the benefits of larger scale, and may already have secured crucial patents. As a small country with limited academic capacity, Taiwan often lacks the critical mass of educated and talented people to be competitive in R&D in many advanced fields. Taiwan therefore should focus on areas in which it has a comparative advantage in research or at least in production. Taiwan also should focus on possible new technology and research in sectors that are currently important to Taiwan in order to keep these industries internationally competitive. Taiwan under the Tsai government has not yet done enough to move away from the old path of focusing too much on following the lead set by new technology from other countries.

Encouraging new industries and entrepreneurship If Taiwan could develop robust new industries, the outflow of older industries would not threaten Taiwan’s growth rate and wages. Unfortunately, many of the country’s businesses are so accustomed to OEM and cost-cutting strategies that they have not developed the entrepreneurial skills and mindsets needed to develop new industries. Education in Taiwan has not been conducive to innovation because children are taught to accept the standard answers in textbooks in order to get high grades on examinations for admission to higher education. Other features of Taiwan’s economic environment are not sufficiently friendly for potential innovators. Land prices and rent have become prohibitively high. New industries—especially those in service

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sectors—face restrictions from outdated laws and regulations. Financial sectors often are unable to support innovative new investment because they lack suitable products and the capacity to handle the risks associated with investments in innovation. Because of these shortcomings, net annual investment in Taiwan in the eight years following 2007 was only about 60% of net investment in 2007. New investment and new industries have been inadequate to compensate for the outflow of industries. Hence, both economic growth rates and real wages have declined. To address such problems, the Tsai government has adopted several policies to encourage innovation and new investment. One of these is to establish a national investment company to invest jointly with private sector firms in new or important industries. Drawing on Taiwan’s large pool of savings, this policy may be able to replace the prior tax credit policy as a means to encourage new and innovative industries. The government has been too cautious, however, allocating only about US$200 million to the new national investment company, or less than 0.2% of Taiwan’s annual fixed investment, or 0.1% of the assets of Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, Temasek Holding Private Limited. If the Tsai government cannot significantly increase the funds available to the national investment company, the effect of this policy will be very limited. With the resources to invest in only a small number of initiatives, the fund will not be able to reduce the risk of investment by diversifying across a large number of projects. In addition, the small number of projects means that critics can more easily seize on one or a handful of cases as purported examples of political bias, exploitation of connections, and so on. Consequently, managers of the national investment company are likely to be cautious, and the company will not provide sufficient support to innovative new investments. Another policy of the Tsai government to encourage new industries, innovation, and entrepreneurship is the “Asia∙Silicon Valley” policy. This policy recognizes that new industries need a suitable environment in order to develop, and that Taiwan does not have in place an adequate system of support. The policy aimed to address this problem, but it soon faced misunderstanding and criticism that it was an implausible attempt to create a California-style Silicon Valley in Taiwan. The government then changed the policy’s name to “Asia∙Silicon Valley” (adding a dot), and added a goal of developing internet of things (IoT) industries in Taiwan. The original aim of linking Taiwanese industries to Silicon Valley and thereby tapping into Silicon Valley’s supporting industries was deemphasized. Many mechanisms familiar from Silicon Valley, such as “angel” investors, early stage finance for start-up companies, mentors, incubators, and a culture for innovation, are either insufficient or non-existent in Taiwan, and they cannot be developed in a short time. Although it is part of the Asia Silicon Valley policy, the national investment company lacks the means to provide adequate support to companies in targeted industries. A strategy akin to the Asia Silicon Valley policy thus makes sense: importing these needed but locally unavailable

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services is, in principle, no different from importing components in manufacturing sector in the globalized economy. Since there are many Taiwanese people and Taiwan connections in California’s Silicon Valley, Taiwan should have good prospects for pursuing this type of policy. Tsai’s government also has designated five “new” industries as major targets for development: green energy technology, national defense, biotech pharmaceutical R&D, smart machinery innovation, and IoT. The new agricultural economy and circular economy (meaning sustainable development, in large part through recycling) industries were added to the list to form the so called “5+2” industrial policy. This policy has been criticized by many people, including Morris Chang, founder of the giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) because they believe that government cannot understand the development of industries as well as business leaders do. Although it is a fair criticism that governments do not understand specific products and industries as well as businesses in those industries do, such a sweeping dismissal of industrial policy goes too far. Governments and economists can discern the trend of international comparative advantage better than businesspeople. With their tendency to stick to established industries and to pursue cost-cutting to survive international competition, most of Taiwan’s business leaders have been incapable of foreseeing, much less creating, innovative new sectors. By focusing on a limited number of possible industries of the future, the government can foster new opportunities for business. It can concentrate its efforts on improving key elements of infrastructure and regulations and can thereby improve the investment environment more effectively than by spending a large budget widely without focus. Since Taiwan is a small country, government policies that focus on developing a limited number of new industries can help firms in the private sector to achieve a cluster effect and, in turn, economies of scale in the targeted industries. This type of industrial policy can succeed as long as the government does not intervene to select specific products within targeted industries and does not hinder the development of industries outside the targeted sectors.

Increasing financial intermediation for domestic investment The shortcomings of Taiwan’s financial sector in supporting new industries is part of a broader issue. Because the financial sector has been unable to transfer fully the savings that people deposit into investment funds, total investment over the past several decades has always been lower than total savings in Taiwan. According to macroeconomic theory, this excess savings is equal to the trade surplus. Therefore, insufficient investment has not only led to a lower economic growth rate and lower wages in Taiwan, but also has meant huge trade surpluses and hence strong foreign pressure for currency appreciation in Taiwan. The pressure for currency appreciation, in turn, reduces export competitiveness and willingness to invest in Taiwan. Excess

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savings and trade surpluses also cause excess liquidity in Taiwan. This has fostered speculation in the real estate market and the stock market, and caused still more economic troubles for Taiwan. In the 1990s, Kuo-shu Liang, who later became the governor of Taiwan’s Central Bank, and this author suggested some policies to encourage financial support to domestic investment. However, these policies were not fully realized. During the Ma administration, government policy made matters worse, even encouraging financial actors, including the state pension fund, to invest abroad, and prodding people to hold RMB deposits so that the excess liquidity in the financial sectors could be reduced. But these policies further reduced the willingness to make loans and investments in Taiwan, prompting an increased trade surplus and intensifying vicious circles that bedeviled Taiwan’s economy. The Tsai administration’s Financial Administration Council has declared that helping industries and domestic investment are the major goals of its policies toward the financial sector. The new national investment company is another measure to provide investment to encourage the development of certain industries. If adequate policies are designed and implemented, there should be increased investment, a reduced trade surplus, and encouragement for new industries and entrepreneurship in Taiwan. Success is far from certain: funding allocated to the state investment company is too small; the government has focused too much on financial technology (fintech) for consumer finance and not enough on finance for investment in domestic production industries.

Correcting the myth of trade liberalization Taiwan’s policymakers have relied too heavily on illusory promises of the benefits to be reaped from trade liberalization. Protectionism and import substitution were Taiwan’s major international economic strategies prior to the 1960s. Liberalization of the export sector brought fast growth to Taiwan after 1958, but import protection continued and brought many harmful side effects that lasted for decades. Due to the negative experience of past trade protectionism, U.S. pressure to open Taiwan’s economy, and some economists’ pro laissez-faire writings, many Taiwanese believe that liberalizing international trade and finance is necessary and will bring great benefits to Taiwan. Because President Ma and his supporters were eager to open Taiwan’s door to China, they exacerbated the myth of trade liberalization’s benefits, exaggerating the importance for Taiwan of free trade agreements— especially an FTA with China. They said that Taiwan would be marginalized if it could not sign more FTAs with other countries. They downplayed potential adverse side effects of FTAs and neglected what should have been higher priorities, such as raising productivity and deregulating domestic industries.

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Many international observers and analysts have realized the negative consequences of international trade and financial liberalization and have argued that Taiwan should not rely so heavily on trade liberalization or FTAs. At minimum, polices that emphasize FTAs must be coupled with policies that prepare for the bad side effects and that offer substitutive strategies in case Taiwan is unable to sign FTAs with enough trade partners. Raising the competitiveness, and especially the innovativeness and knowledge-intensiveness of products, is more important than FTA benefits of modest reductions in tariff costs. FTAs do offer collateral benefits that can be more important than tariff reductions: if Taiwan can join FTAs or other trade arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with friendly countries, Taiwan’s people and companies will become more confident about investing for the future, and trade liberalization or FTAs with friendly countries can better link Taiwan in global value chains.

Strengthening international value chains through cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan When China adopted an open door policy and joined the global competition in 1979, it was predictable that many labor-intensive industries would move to China for lower costs. Taiwan was highly affected, for obvious reasons. Taiwan is closer to China than all other higher wage countries not only geographically, but also in language and customs. As many industries from Taiwan moved to China and imported significant inputs and capital goods from Taiwan, Taiwan became very dependent on the Chinese economy. More than 40% of Taiwan’s exports went to China and its Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Despite China’s political hostility to Taiwan, Taiwan’s economic dependence on China is much higher than that of any other major country. This high dependency ratio has had a strong influence in reducing the growth rate of income and wages in Taiwan through the international factor price equalization mechanism. Industrial policies and political intervention on both sides of the Strait can, and do, incentivize Taiwanese companies to invest more heavily in China and thereby hollow out Taiwan’s industries. In addition to this economic impact on Taiwan, China has at times used Taiwan’s economic dependence to coerce Taiwan’s companies and government. China’s ability and will to do so poses significant challenges for the Tsai government’s external economic policies. Because Tsai refused to accept the so-called ’92 consensus (a retroactive recharacterization of negotiations in Singapore that suited Ma’s cross-Strait policies), China reduced the number of tourists travelling to Taiwan, cancelled other economic transactions, and suspended talks on additional cross-Strait economic agreements. China has used similar tactics toward other targets, including South Korea when South Korea deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The risk that economic dependence on China leads Beijing to see itself as empowered

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to force Taiwan—and other countries—to accept its demands gives Taiwan additional, not purely economic, reasons to reduce its economic dependence on China. A policy of reducing economic dependence on China—which is among the goals of Tsai’s economic policies—would not necessarily reduce trade and investment between Taiwan and China. Taiwan could reduce dependence and vulnerability by producing more products that do not compete directly with Chinese products. It could develop new markets outside China. Taiwanese companies could do more to avoid dependence on special privileges given by China. Taiwan and other countries also could cooperate to focus on redressing China’s unfair trade and industrial policies so that China cannot manipulate those policies to punish a country or company it disfavors or wants to control.6 Taiwan should cooperate with other friendly countries to check China’s and others’ aggressive use of unfair policies to displace or hollow out other countries’ industries or exploit foreign firms. Tsai’s government might have an unusually promising opportunity to cooperate with the United States, given the more critical view of China that has taken hold in the United States. Tsai’s government promised to remove the ban on the importation of U.S. pork containing ractopamine in 2020 despite the objections of many people in Taiwan. This action expressed the strong will of Taiwan to have a BTA or similarly strong ties with the United States. The Trump administration raised serious objections and challenges to China’s trade and trade-related polices and emphasized addressing a problem in the United States that is familiar to Taiwan: the loss of manufacturing jobs to lower-cost countries. These U.S. concerns about, and more negative attitude toward, China are not limited to Trump and are likely to persist in the Biden administration. In seeking cooperation with the United States, Taiwan can also benefit from the goodwill it may have won through Hon Hai’s (Foxconn’s) $10 billion investment in Wisconsin—the largest single foreign investment in manufacturing in the U.S. during Trump’s term. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s biggest contract chipmaker, is also going to invest $3.5 billion and set up an advanced factory in Arizona to support the high tech supply chain in U.S. Taiwan’s cooperation could be especially valuable to the United States because Taiwan knows the intricacies of China’s unfair policies better than other countries. Taiwan and the U.S. could cooperate through reasonable business actions and fair-trade policies to rearrange the international supply chain to retain and relocate part of the value chain to the U.S., while allowing Taiwan and others opportunities to cooperate and receive the benefits in other parts of the value chain while playing by fair rules. The COVID-19 crisis— which Taiwan handled quickly and effectively—has increased interest in the U.S. and elsewhere in rearranging global supply chains and reducing dependence on China. 6

Chen 2014.

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National security and national economic security concerns (including protection of intellectual property) give the U.S. and Taiwan shared reasons to limit economic cooperation with, and dependence on, rival or even hostile countries and to preserve critical parts of the global value chain, especially those parts concerning national security, for industries in the homeland or in friendly countries who will neither steal technology nor undermine national security. Cooperation among friendly governments and major companies is essential, and Taiwan could be a most advantageous partner to the U.S. in this endeavor. Such cooperation should become more appealing to the United States as the U.S. has become more worried about the threats dependence on Chinese technology and Chinese acquisition of U.S. technology pose to U.S. national security. Taiwan and the U.S. could build on past cooperation that helped protect U.S. economic interests. Before the 1980s, Japan utilized U.S. innovative technology to develop products, and prevail in competition for international markets for manufactured goods. When U.S. enterprises turned to Taiwan’s manufacturers to provide OEM or ODM services for the newly developed personal computer in the 1980s, the arrangement prevented a possible monopoly for Japan. High-end technology and brand marketing of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) products has remained with US enterprises, while Taiwan’s manufacturers significantly support the top-end production and the supply chain. Through joint efforts of the U.S. and Taiwanese—and other—governments, a fair global value chain can be forged. This can help to consolidate the U.S.’s and Taiwan’s technological development and help to prevent national security and defense from being compromised. Segments of the supply chain that are essential for national security and further industrial development of the U.S., or that provide better opportunities to unemployed or low-wage workers in the U.S., can be relocated back to the U.S. Other links can be left to Taiwan and other countries that not only offer competitive cost and equitable cooperation, but also would neither try to capture the whole value chain with unfair means nor add trapdoors or other features to products that would endanger national security. This kind of cooperation requires a synergy among government, industry, and policy and technology intellectuals. Support from the American and Taiwanese governments, and cooperation with companies from both sides, is crucial. Promising places to start include the ICT sector and national defense industries, where the U.S. and Taiwan already have effective collaboration. Cooperation could then extend to other industries and other reliable countries. Eventually, an alliance might be formed to exclude countries that seek to capture industries or manipulate other states through inequitable policies or coercive measures.

Concluding remarks Taiwan has faced many, often mounting, economic difficulties in the past decades, some of them rooted in Taiwan’s earlier economic success and its

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consequences. Many of these difficulties are interconnected. It is not easy to solve any single problem independently. A variety of measures must be adopted simultaneously. Fortunately, policies to encourage research and development, the development of new industries and entrepreneurship, the reform of financial sectors, and cooperating with the U.S. and others to alter global supply chains offer fundamental remedies for a number of the economic challenges facing Taiwan. In the short run, these aims should be the top priority of Taiwan’s current government. The Tsai government has identified many of the right goals and has articulated promising reforms. However, the tasks are daunting, even the most appropriate policies will take time to succeed, and a comprehensive evaluation of their effects is not yet possible. Some of the government’s choices can be questioned—for example, pushing so fast and being so impatient on some social reforms while being so slow or so cautious in taking steps necessary to pave the way for further economic development. Adjustment in the relative speed and priority of policies could bring greater success in Tsai’s second term and beyond.

References Chen, Pochih, Chi Schive, and Cheng-Chung, Chu. 1994. “Export Structure and Exchange Rage Variation in Taiwan: A Comparison with Japan and the United States.” In Macroecomic Linkage, Saving, Exchange Rages, and Capital Flows, edited by Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, 227–243. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Chen, Pochih. 2008. “The Substitution among the Exports of Taiwan, China, and Other Countries to the United States.” Asian Economic Papers 7, no. 2 (June): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1162/asep.2008.7.2.1. Chen, Pochih. 2014. “ECFA and China’s Strategy to the World.” In Taiwan’s Struggle: Voices of the Taiwanese, edited by Shyu-Tu Lee and Jack F. Williams, 223–231. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Mundell, Robert A. 1957. “International Trade and Factor Mobility.” American Economic Review 47, no. 3 (June): 321–335. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811242. Samuelson, Paul A. 1948. “International Trade and the Equalization of Factor Prices.” Economic Journal 58, no. 230 (June): 163–184. https://doi.org/10.2307/2225933.

5

Taiwan in international economic relations Peter C.Y. Chow

In 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen won re-election in Taiwan in a landslide victory with 57% of the vote, and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) retained control of the legislature. When Tsai first came to power in 2016, she faced a citizenry that had elected her partly in the expectation that she would revitalize Taiwan’s economy, including achieving high growth, low unemployment, equitable distribution of income, affordable housing for working people, food safety, and an improved quality of life. In spite of worldwide admiration and high domestic approval rate for her prompt and effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic (with Taiwan having only 724 confirmed infections, of whom 590 recovered and only seven died by December 10, 2020), Tsai has faced, and continues to face in her second term, a number of challenges and opportunities amid slowing growth in much of the world, and Taiwan’s cumulative exclusion from parts of the international economic order that affect prospects for success in meeting the expectations she has fostered for economic progress. This chapter analyzes how the Tsai administration’s economic statecraft can navigate Taiwan’s difficult international situation to further Taiwan’s economic development and offers a long-term perspective on Taiwan’s economic role in Asia-Pacific regional development. Until the 1990s, Taiwan had been able to overcome the detrimental economic effect of its diplomatic isolation by expanding its trade and investment flows to a wide range of trading partners, with or without official relations. Its economy was able to maintain impressive growth rates with an average of 7.49% in the 1991–95 period, a pace comparable to that of other newly industrialized countries (NICs) in the first half of the 1990s. However, the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the Asia-Pacific region since the 1990s decreased Taiwan’s international economic participation. Unlike Korea, which has signed FTAs with most of its major trading partners, Taiwan has not been able to benefit from a freer trade regime through bilateral or plurilateral trade accords because Beijing has prevented almost all of Taiwan’s trading partners from signing trade accords with Taiwan. The rise of China as a powerhouse of the world economy, and the corresponding increase in China’s political influence has pushed Taiwan to the

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margins of international economic activity and has excluded Taiwan from much of international economic affairs. Taiwan’s economic growth began decelerating in the mid-1990s, dropping from an average of 5.93% in the 1996–2000 period to 4.07% in 2001–2005, 4.38% in 2006–2010, 3.74% in 2011–2015, and 2.76 % in 2016–2019, or just a little bit more than half of what was in 1990–1995. In the past decade or so, the unemployment rate has risen, real wages stagnated, and income distribution, which had been the envy of many developing countries, deteriorated. Many low-skilled workers lost their jobs due to the impact of globalization, which Taiwan cannot escape. The Tsai administration came into office amid great expectations for economic improvement manifested in the voters’ mandate, and at a time of great uncertainty in the world economy. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the growth of world trade was twice as fast as that of the world economy, creating a favorable environment for Taiwan. But, since the crisis, trade has been growing much more slowly. In the year Tsai’s presidency began, trade grew at a rate of only 2.8%, making 2016 the fifth year during which trade increased at roughly the same rate as world GDP, according to the WTO. Taiwan’s exports had been declining in the period preceding Tsai’s first inauguration, from February 2015 to June 2016. This performance was even worse than the export recession triggered by the financial crisis in 2008–2009, and the pandemic in the beginning of 2020. Thus, Taiwan faced an unfavorable world economic outlook which would substantially undermine prospects for growth when Tsai took power and continued into her second term. The Tsai administration thus faced a formidable task in revitalizing Taiwan’s economy in an unfavorable global trading environment. For Taiwan to benefit economically from its interactions with the rest of the world, and to enhance its international visibility politically, President Tsai had at least six challenges and opportunities, each of which will be addressed in this chapter:   

 

building on the economic statecraft that previously had brought participation in the WTO, and plurilateral and multilateral economic arrangements; expanding limited successes in bilateral FTA negotiations, especially with countries that have memberships in multiple emerging trade blocs; continuing the economic gains that Taiwan has made through its functional approach to further deepen the de facto economic integration it has achieved through outward investment and participation in global value chains (GVCs); maintaining peace and stability in cross-Strait relations by adopting a non-provocative posture toward China; pursuing membership in new mega-regional trade blocs to diversify trade and investment flows, so as to mitigate asymmetric dependence on the Chinese market;

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undertaking a “New Southbound Policy” to further integrate Taiwan with economies in South and Southeast Asia.

Collectively, these measures constitute a grand strategy for the Tsai administration to globalize Taiwan’s economy with substantial economic gains and collateral political dividends in terms of Taiwan’s status in the international community.

Participation at the WTO, APEC, and Asian Development Bank Although multilateral trade liberalization collapsed during the Doha Round (2001–present) of WTO trade negotiations, the WTO continues to uphold many of its functions by maintaining generally liberal rules of global trade and by promoting sector-specific and issue-oriented trade liberalization. With its membership in the WTO, Taiwan has been able to benefit from the most favored nation (MFN) principle—which generally requires each WTO member not to discriminate among fellow member trade partners, and which applies to more than half of world trade flows. Taiwan also has joined several sector-specific and issue-oriented trade agreements that have been concluded under the WTO framework. For these trade agreements, the MFN principle applies only to those WTO members who are signatories to the specific agreements. Taiwan has been actively participating in three of these major plurilateral trade agreements since it was admitted to the WTO in January 2001. The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) was initially adopted in 1996 and revised in 2015. With the rapid development of information technology, the 2015 amendment (ITA II) covers more and newer information and computer technology (ICT) products. ITA II required coverage of 90% of global trade before it came into force. Since Taiwan accounts for 7% of ITAcovered trade, its accession was crucial for the trade agreement as well as for Taiwan because, without Taiwan, there was a risk that the agreement would not meet the 90% threshold, as had happened when the original agreement was concluded in December 1996.1 The products covered under ITA II account for approximately 7% of total global trade, or $1.3 trillion annually. ITA II membership will provide a great opportunity for Taiwan’s ICT industry to seamlessly penetrate the world’s major markets, including the European Union (EU), U.S., Japan, Korea, and China. This market access is important for Taiwan. By 2011, the ICT sector accounted for 51% of Taiwan’s total manufactures, 40% of its exports, and 50% of the capitalization of the Taiwan stock market. The expansion of product coverage under ITA II, covers around $90 billion of Taiwan’s exports. Among the products listed in ITA II, 68% of them (136 items) belong to product groups in which Taiwan has a strong 1

World Trade Organization 2017.

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comparative advantage. ITA II enables Taiwan to benefit from a key sectorspecific free trade regime under the WTO, with two-thirds of Taiwan’s exports of ICT products benefitting from zero tariffs in 2016.2 For other ITC product groups, the existing tariffs will be phased out in the next three, five, or seven years. By December 2015, ITA II which was enacted in 81 WTO members covered 97% of the ITA products in world trade. Taiwan joined the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in July 2009. The GPA mandates a coverage schedule by which members establish what categories of government procurement are subject to the GPA’s requirements of a publicized threshold of procurement and sets criteria for open bids from all parties to the agreement. The intent of the GPA is to ensure open, fair, and transparent conditions of competition in government procurement. Because Taiwan is a party to the GPA, Taiwanese suppliers are eligible to join in international bids for those government procurement activities covered by the GPA. Taiwan also has signed the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) adopted by the General Council of the WTO in November 2014 under the Bali Package reached in the previous year. When it signed the TFA in September 2015, Taiwan became the 15th signatory. On February 22, 2017, the TFA entered into force after the required two-thirds of the 164 WTO members signed. The TFA includes provisions on harmonization of rules, access to information, and access to markets. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, when fully implemented, the TFA will generate an additional $1 trillion of world trade. Among these gains, $570 billion will go to developed countries and $475 billion will go to developing countries.3 A report from Chung Hwa Institution for Economic Research (CIER), a government think tank, finds that Taiwan’s benefits from the TFA will include a $3.9 billion increase in GDP and a $3.3 billion growth in exports.4 To reap all of the potential benefits from the TFA and other plurilateral trade agreements, Taiwan needs to reform many of its administrative procedures and much of its regulatory regime and improve its port facilities. These present significant policy challenges for Tsai’s administration. In the foreseeable future, these plurilateral trade agreements and various preferential trading agreements (PTAs) will continue to coexist and may become more coherent if elements common to preferential trade agreements can be multilateralized on a non-discriminatory basis. Roberto Azevêdo, Director General of WTO said that regional trading agreements (RTAs— the principal form of PTAs) “are important for the multilateral trading system–but they cannot substitute [for] it,” because “big issues” such as trade facilitation, financial or telecommunications regulations, and farming 2 3 4

Ministry of Finance, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020. Hufbauer and Schott 2013. The author would like to express gratitude to CIER for its generous sharing of the data.

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and fisheries subsidies “can only be tackled in an efficient manner in the multilateral context through the WTO.”5 In other words, in spite of the proliferation of RTAs, the WTO will continue to play its traditional and important role in promoting a free trade regime globally. Due to China’s opposition, Taiwan has not been able to sign many RTAs. Therefore, it is important for Taiwan to participate actively in all functions of the multilateral trading framework of a still-vital WTO.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Taiwan is a member of APEC under the name “Chinese Taipei”—a designation not of its choosing but the best it could achieve. Although Tsai, like previous presidents of Taiwan, has not been permitted to attend the APEC summit, a presidential surrogate has been able to attend and meet with other national leaders in the summit’s formal functions, continuing a longstanding practice. Taiwan’s chief trade negotiator with the rank of minister without portfolio in the cabinet and its minister of economic affairs have actively participated in all conferences and working groups at the ministerial level at APEC. At APEC’s annual conference, its 21 members address important economic and trade issues, including trade and investment liberalization, regional economic integration (the latter having been the theme in 2012), the resilience of the Asia-Pacific engine of global growth (the theme in 2013), shaping the future through Asia Pacific Partnership (2014), and Building Inclusive Economies, Building a Better World (2015). The 2015 APEC declaration reaffirmed that both the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were pathways to the long-term goal of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). APEC’s membership includes Chile, Mexico, and Peru, the three principal Latin American countries in the Pacific rim. Hence, its membership in APEC enables Taiwan to better extend its international economic activities to Latin America. After President Trump decided to withdraw the U.S. from the TPP, Japan took the lead to negotiate with the remaining partners to conclude a TPP-11 agreement without the U.S., and renamed it the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which was signed on March 8, 2018. Since APEC was an incubator for the TPP, and the CPTPP will invite like-minded members of APEC to apply in its second round of membership expansion, Taiwan’s membership in APEC should help to expedite Taiwan’s entry into one of the two emerging mega-regional trade blocs. CPTPP membership for Taiwan is more likely than membership in the RCEP, in which China is a member and wields much influence, although both are uphill battles for Taiwan. 5

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Taiwan was a founding member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under its official title of Republic of China. As a development bank, ADB provides loans, grants, equity investments, and technical assistance to its members and partners to promote social and economic development in the region. Taiwan’s membership can further its international economic relations in the region. Taiwan remains a member today, giving it a place in what has been the region’s most important multilateral development bank. This, too, has come at a symbolic price exacted by Beijing. When China joined in the ADB in 1986, Taiwan was forced to change its name, first to “Chinese Taipei,” and then “Taipei, China.” Taiwan’s delegates usually attend the ADB annual meetings with an “under protest” sign on their desk to indicate Taiwan’s objection to this slight to Taiwan’s status. In 2013, China initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), issuing a wide invitation to other countries to join. Although Taiwan expressed its aspiration to become a member, Beijing declared that Taiwan’s membership status had to be equivalent to that of Hong Kong. Unless Beijing’s policy changes, Taiwan will not join the AIIB because it is highly unlikely to accept Beijing’s terms, which deny Taiwan’s sovereignty. With the renewed mandate the Tsai administration and the DPP received in the January 2020 elections, Taiwan is very unlikely to change its position on the AIIB or make other concessions that might point toward acquiescing to China’s positions on Taiwan’s status.

Bilateral free trade and/or investment agreements Greater trade liberalization would have beneficial effects for Taiwan’s domestic economy, both static and dynamic. Taiwan has been actively negotiating with many of its trading partners for economic cooperation agreements and FTAs for a long time. Because many countries have been wary of offending China, which very often has pressed other countries not to sign trade agreements with Taiwan, Taiwan has been denied many of the benefits of so-called free trade regimes that have been advanced through the proliferation of FTAs in the region. This is a double blow to Taiwan. Taiwan is not able to benefit directly from trade liberalization through FTAs (the static effects). And Taiwan has not been able to capture the dynamic effect of capital investments that follow from trade liberalization (the dynamic effects). Moreover, Taiwan’s marginalization from regional economic integration has retarded domestic investment and led more and more Taiwanese enterprises to migrate overseas, mainly to China. The psychological impact of this hollowing out syndrome generated the economic malaise in Taiwan that began in the 1990s, even though empirical evidence on the effect of outward FDI on domestic employment is mixed. In these ways, the China factor has created a vicious circle in Taiwan’s international economic relations.

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Free Trade Agreements with ten countries Despite the impediments Beijing has created by blocking many countries from making agreements with Taiwan, Taiwan has had some limited success in signing free trade accords. Before President Tsai assumed office, Taiwan had signed four FTAs with five Latin American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—all formal diplomatic partners of Taiwan at the time), but they accounted for only about 2% of Taiwan’s trade. The FTAs with Panama and El Salvador are still operational, although they cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Panama in June 2017, El Salvador in November 2018). In 2013, Taiwan signed an economic cooperation agreement with New Zealand (ANZTEC) and a trade agreement with Singapore (ASTEP). Under the Tsai administration, Taiwan signed FTAs with three more diplomatic partners: Paraguay in February 2019, and Eswatini and Marshall Islands in May 2019. The trade agreements with countries having formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan (ROC) followed ordinary international norms for such accords. The trade agreements with Singapore and New Zealand were signed under the auspices of the so-called WTO model under which Taiwan is treated as an independent customs territory, rather than a state party to a treaty. Even though the WTO model, which sidesteps issues of Taiwan’s sovereignty, is available, many Southeast Asian countries are still reluctant—because of China’s opposition—to sign trade accords with Taiwan despite substantial Taiwanese investment in those countries. The significance of the trade pacts with New Zealand and Singapore goes far beyond the economic benefits of trade liberalization because both countries have dual membership in the RCEP and the TPP. The two agreements thus may help Taiwan’s bid for membership in the CPTPP and RCEP. Another five countries (Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam) with dual membership in RCEP and the CPTPP are at the top of Taiwan’s priority list of countries with which it seeks partnerships and from which it seeks support as Taiwan attempts to negotiate its membership bids for these two multilateral FTAs. Taiwan also has signed 32 bilateral investment treaties, including two under the Tsai Administration (the Philippines in 2017 and India in 2018). After President Tsai came to power, her administration sought and has received Japan’s support for Taiwan’s CPTPP membership. Tsai also has sought support from members of the U.S. Congress for a bilateral economic partnership agreement. These efforts will continue to be the major international economic policy aims in the second term of the Tsai administration. Economic cooperation with China China has been Taiwan’s largest trading partner since 2004. In 2010, the Ma administration signed the Economic Cooperation and Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China under the special “characteristics of cross-Strait

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relations” rather than the WTO framework. ECFA was followed by numerous related agreements, including a controversial Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in June 2013. ECFA has an early harvest list of commodity trade liberalization that includes “tariff free” treatment for 539 categories of China’s imports from Taiwan and 267 categories of Taiwan’s import from China, effective in 2013. Subsequently, there have been several rounds of negotiations on further liberalization of commodity trade, but none has been concluded. After Tsai became president, Beijing suspended negotiations on any economic agreements. The CSSTA has been at an impasse since the Sunflower Movement protests by students and civic groups in March 2014. Critics complained that the CSSTA lacked transparency, and that there had been insufficient prior consultations with the industries in Taiwan that would be affected, as well as inadequate consideration of the socio-economic costs in Taiwan of liberalizing service trade with the mainland. The Sunflower Movement won acceptance of its demand for the passage of a legislative oversight bill on trade agreements with China as a pre-condition to ratification of the CSSTA. Trade in services is especially controversial in Taiwan because it involves crossborder supply and consumption and freer movement of labor. It thus affects not only traditional trade and investment relations, but also has a more direct and obvious impact on employment and wages, as well as the social-cultural influences that come with significant numbers of people relocating from across the Strait. People who opposed the CSSTA argued that liberalization of services trade with China, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan, would have significant adverse consequences for Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy, whether by increasing economic dependence on the mainland, economic inequality in Taiwan, or the presence of Chinese citizens in Taiwan (or perhaps Taiwanese in China). For members of the younger generation who identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese,” liberalization of service trade with China is unappealing because it will draw Taiwan more into China’s orbit, economically in the short term, but politically in the long term. Another argument against the CSSTA is that, although Taiwan needs to liberalize its service sectors as a matter of national economic self-interest, Taiwan cannot open its market for services preferentially to China, mainly because of the political risks that flow from many of China’s investors being either affiliated with or proxies of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or run by the progeny of high-ranking party cadres. Amid the protests and criticisms, the ratification of the CSSTA has been postponed, at least until the oversight bill mandating monitoring of trade agreements with China is passed by the Legislative Yuan. Cross-Strait policy—beyond specifically economic issues but affecting economic issues—is consistently a controversial and divisive issue among the public in Taiwan, mainly because it is bound up with conflicts over national identity. It has posed difficult choices for the Tsai administration, which must

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accommodate the aspirations of Tsai’s core supporters (especially social and civic groups, and members of the younger generation who consider themselves “natural born” independents) without triggering moves by Beijing that significantly harm Taiwan’s economy and security. Prospects for new crossStrait agreements are dim for Tsai’s second term. Tsai’s overwhelming reelection in 2020, after a campaign in which China’s policy toward autonomy protests in Hong Kong figured prominently, may reinforce the Taiwanese public’s deep disapproval of the “one country, two systems” model that President Xi Jinping insists must apply to Taiwan. There are two immediate economics-related challenges for the Tsai administration in cross-Strait relations. The first is how to deal with Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy (and the international economic opportunities that depend on that autonomy) after China implemented its new national security law in September 2020. Essentially, Taiwan would need to map out a strategy to take advantage of the opportunity to attract some service industries, such as the operations centers of many multinational enterprises, from Hong Kong, even if Taiwan is not poised to replace Hong Kong as a financial center. The second is how to re-structure the global supply chain as the U.S.-China relationship deteriorates and some degree of “decoupling” proceeds. Both are highly anticipated by the Taiwanese public and require delicate statecraft to deal with. Trade and investment with Japan Japan is Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade of $67.22 billion in 2018, and a major source of inward foreign direct investment, totaling $21.04 billion by the end of 2018.6 Japan-Taiwan trade relations have been governed by WTO rules since 2001. The close economic and trade relationship between Taiwan and Japan led to a bilateral investment agreement, signed in 2011. Another Taiwan-Japan bilateral agreement that is less important economically—but perhaps more important politically—is the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, signed in 2013. Under it, Japanese and Taiwanese fishing boats in the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku area “are exempted from the jurisdiction of each other’s law enforcement.” Economically, this helps Taiwan’s fishing industry. Politically, it shows that Japan and Taiwan can set aside claims about sovereignty over the uninhabited islands and pursue resource conservation and common operation of fishing rules. It also reflects Japan’s interest in avoiding cooperation between China and Taiwan over the disputed territory. Since Japan took the lead in negotiations for the CPTPP, the amicable relations between Tokyo and Taipei that have contributed to and been reflected in bilateral economic accords could enhance Taiwan’s opportunity to join the CPTPP. Taiwan’s prospects are complicated by a contentious bilateral trade issue: the import of food products from the four prefectures surrounding 6

Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs 2020.

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the Fukushima area affected by the nuclear disaster that resulted from the earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. Popular concern with food safety has prevented the Tsai administration from lifting a ban on importing food products from the area. The Tsai administration’s dilemma is how to reconcile domestic constituents’ concerns for food safety with Japan’s desire to see the ban lifted. A referendum backed by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) to keep the ban in place until at least November 2020 prevailed during the local elections in November 2018. By the end of a two-year moratorium on the referendum taking legal effect (in November 2020), the Tsai administration has to deal with the expiration of the two-year moratorium before any negotiation for CPTPP membership with Japan. Tokyo has long been anticipating that Taipei would lift its ban on the import of food products from the Fukushima area before the tenth anniversary of the tsunami and nuclear disaster in March 2021. However, the Taiwan government’s decision on this matter may be constrained by the prolonged protest from the opposition KMT against the Tsai government’s lifting the ban of the import of U.S. pork with the additive ractopamine (addressed below). Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) process between the U.S. and Taiwan provides a strategic framework and principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues. Initiated by United States Trade Representative Carla Hills’ visit to Taiwan in 1992, TIFA entered into force in 1994 and became the most important channel for bilateral high-level economic and trade consultations between Taiwan and the United States. In the past decade, progress under TIFA was impeded by controversies over imports of U.S. beef (which have been partially resolved) and U.S. pork (which remain unresolved). The issue has been food safety. The international food safety standard (Codex) sets a maximum residual level of ractopamine (MRL) of 10 parts per billion (PPB) for muscle cuts of beef and pork, which has been accepted by Korea and Japan. This standard has been rejected by Taiwan for pork because of Taiwan’s comparatively high pork consumption. Taiwanese people consume seven times more pork than beef. Per capita consumption of pork in Taiwan is 34 kg annually, as compared to only 15 kg in Japan and 24 kg in Korea. Taiwanese also have a higher rate of consumption of the organs of pigs, which have much higher levels of residual of ractopamine than do muscle cuts. A further inhibiting factor is opposition from Taiwan’s domestic pork farmers, which involves not only the economic issue of trade liberalization but also food safety and was ranked as one of the issues that most concerned the public in the 2016 elections.7 7

This phenomenon was reflected by the fact that the DPP nominated a food nutritionist as the first candidate in the non-district candidates (legislators-at-large) list for the Legislative Yuan in the 2016 elections.

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Although the TIFA process faces difficulties and limits, it did help Taiwan to gain membership in the WTO and to conclude subsequent trade agreements such as the GPA. The Tsai administration hopes that after the pending trade issues, including pork imports, are resolved, TIFA will move forward and lead to a U.S.-Taiwan Economic Partnership Agreement On August 28, 2020, President Tsai declared that her government would lift the ban of U.S. pork with the additive ractopamine on January 1, 2021. This decision provoked a strong protest from the opposition KMT, which boycotted Premier Su Tseng-chang’s briefing to the Legislative Yuan on 12 occasions from the start of the legislative session in September 2020. The KMT and pro-KMT media misrepresented the international code of food safety, which fostered public distrust of pork with ractopamine. However, the KMT did not successfully entice the hog farmers to join in a mass rally because the farmers’ concerns about increased imports were balanced by the new opportunities for exports as a ban due to foot and mouth disease was lifted.8 In addition,, the government set up a NT $10 billion development fund for hog farmers to improve their productivity for export. Hence, hog farmers have had less economic rationale to resist the lifting of the ban on pork imports from the U.S. Few of the U.S.’ trade partners have been enthusiastic about trade deals on the terms offered by the Trump administration. Along with the United Kingdom, in its efforts to adjust to a post-Brexit future, Taiwan is one of the few countries that has expressed interest in a bilateral trade pact with the United States. With her new mandate from the 2020 re-election, Tsai has more latitude to pursue the changes needed in Taiwan to remove the impediments to a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. There has been significant receptivity on the U.S. side; 161 members of Congress from both the Republicans and Democrats, urged U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer to negotiate a Taiwan-U.S. bilateral trade agreement. The U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, which states that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that … the United States Trade Representative should consult with Congress on opportunities for further strengthening bilateral trade and economic relations.” With the transition from the Trump administration to the Biden administration in January 2021, bipartisan support for a U.S.-Taiwan bilateral trade agreement may be more likely, although it may have to wait until the new administration has made progress in addressing domestic problems. The U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership (EPP) Dialogue, inaugurated on November 20, 2020, has built a good foundation for deeper and closer cooperation on “a broad range of economic issues including the Clean Network, 5G networks and telecommunications 8

Progress on eliminating foot and mouth disease among pigs enabled Taiwan to apply to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) for approval to resume pork exports. On June 15, 2020, Taiwan’s petition of resuming exports of pork was formally approved by IOE as expected.

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security, supply chains, investment screening, clean infrastructure cooperation, renewable energy, global health, science and technology, and women’s economic empowerment, education and entrepreneurship.”9 Given that the Biden administration is unlikely to be willing or able to proceed with any FTA very soon, it is more pragmatic for Taiwan to embark on sector-specific trade and technological cooperation agreements with the U.S. If the Biden Administration and Taiwan can take advantage of the apparent realignment of preferences and put longstanding contentious trade issues on the negotiating table, then Tsai will have an opportunity through economic statecraft to play a significant role in reaching the long-sought-after U.S.-Taiwan Bilateral Trade Agreement.

A functional approach to de facto economic integration Inward FDI began flow to Taiwan in 1952. According to the Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2019, FDI stock had reached US $169.12 billion (including $162.73 billion from foreigners, $2.2 billion from China and $4.2 billion from Overseas Chinese) by the end of 2018. Major investments are in finance, insurance, and real estate ($69.40 billion), electronic parts and components ($16.35 billion), wholesale and retail trade ($9.77 billion), and basic metal and fabricated metal manufacturing ($8.50 billion). As economic development proceeded, outbound FDI (OFDI) began to rise. Since the 1985 Plaza Accords on currency appreciation, Taiwan has engaged in extensive OFDI as part of a strategy of augmented comparative advantage. Thus, Taiwan’s international investment flows after the mid-1980s have been bidirectional. As Taiwan lost competitiveness in some international markets due to its rising cost of labor, Taiwanese enterprises invested in lower labor cost countries, first in Southeast Asia in the 1980s and then in China after the government lifted the ban on direct investment in the late 1980s. In general, Taiwan’s inward FDI is greater in technology-intensive sectors while outward FDI is in the more labor-intensive and lower end of high-tech products. Whether measured as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, or by the stock as a percentage of total GDP, Taiwan’s OFDI is well above Korea’s and Japan’s, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. By the end of 2018, the stock of outward FDI was nearly 50% of GDP in Taiwan, compared to under 30% for Japan and Korea. After Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 visit to southern China, which reinvigorated the polices of economic reform and opening to the outside world, more Taiwanese capital flowed to China than to any other country. Concerned about excessive economic dependence on China, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui’s 9

From Inaugural U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue—United States Department of State 2020 at htpp://www.state.gov/inaugural-u-s-taiwaneconomic-prosperity-partnership-dialogue/.

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Figure 5.1 Outward FDI as percentage of gross fixed capital formation in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1990–2016 Source: constructed by the author from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2017.

government adopted a Southbound Policy, advocating the diversification of foreign direct investment to Southeast Asia, but with limited success. The data used here are based on approved investments and understate Taiwan’s OFDI flows, especially those destined for China. After Taiwan lifted limits on capital outflows in the mid-1980s, business firms did not need to seek government approval prior to investing overseas. Tax evasion and the underreporting it entails also lead to outbound investment being understated. Accumulated investment in China was much underreported because it was often funneled through third-party jurisdictions to evade the once-strict limits on Taiwanese direct investment in China. Although publicly available data on direct investment in China was separated from overall outward FDI by the Investment Commission of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs only after 1991, one can find the relative distribution of outward FDI. From Figure 5.3 below, it is evident that OFDI was predominantly destined for China, which accounts for more than half of total outward FDI since 2002 until its recent drop to 39% in 2018. In another indicator of the importance of China as a destination for Taiwanese FDI, reportedly more than 2 million Taishang (Taiwanese businesspeople) now

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Figure 5.2 The stock of outward FDI as percentage of GDP in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1990–2016 Source: constructed by the author from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2017.

reside in China, mostly in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta areas. Taking a five-year average, direct investment in China and Hong Kong accounted for 39.4% in 1991–1995, 40% in 1996–2000, 62.8% in 2001–2005, 70.4% in 2006–2010, 63.4% in 2011–2015, 43.45% in 2016–19 ( 46.5% in the first nine months of 2020). By contrast, direct investment in Southeast Asian countries accounted for 20% in 1991–1995, 10.2% in 1996–2000, 6% in 2001– 2005, 9.2% in 2006–2010, 14.3% in 2011–2015, 18.98% in 2016–19 ( 17.6% in the first 9 months of 2020). The dramatic increase of direct investment in China since the late 1990s was due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 and China’s WTO entry in 2001. Outward FDI to developed countries accounted for much less than to developing countries, with 4.75% to the U.S. in 2011– 2015 but jumping to 4.88 % in 2016–19 (5.8% in the first nine months in 2020). Between 2016 and 2019, there was a significant increase in the share of outward FDI going to Southeast Asia (18.98 % in 2016–2019) with a moderate decline in the percentage bound for China in 2016–19, as shown on the right-hand side

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Figure 5.3 The Distribution of Outward FDI in China and Other Countries, 1991–2019

in Figure 5.3. To some extent, the New Southbound Policy and investment diversification initiatives undertaken by the Tsai administration made modest progress. After the tariff war between the U.S. and China began, outward FDI to China dropped from 44.4% in 2017 to 37.9% in 2019 (as shown in the monthly data).10 A ban on inbound investment from China was lifted after the Ma administration took power in 2008. China’s investment in Taiwan steadily increased from $37.5 million in 2009 to the peak of $334.6 million in 2014, before dropping to $247.63 million in 2016, with a stock totaling $1.69 billion by the end of 2016. Capital flows from China include both direct and portfolio investments. There were 31 completed cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from China/ Hong Kong to Taiwan, worth a total of $811.45 million, during the 2009–2014 period, according to the Security Data Company Platinum database of Thomson Reuters. Some investments from China in high-tech industries have caused great public concern about national security in Taiwan because many investors from China are directly or indirectly associated with state-owned enterprises or connected to high-ranking party and government officials. China’s investments in Taiwan’s tourist industry have been another source of concern. Profits from travel agencies, tour buses and hotels, as well as souvenir shops, 10 Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs 2020.

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have diverted revenues from Chinese tourists to Chinese-invested entities in Taiwan. Public attitudes in Taiwan toward Chinese tourists are mixed. There are no reliable statistical data by which to evaluate how much the local tourist industry benefits from mainland Chinese tourists. The high-tech sector in Taiwan has been affected by expanding ties with China. With Taiwan’s outward FDI predominantly flowing to China, Taiwan’s major ICT products for export are manufactured outside Taiwan, mostly in China, which accounted for 92.2% and 92.8% in 2014 and 2015. This is because the Taiwanese ICT sector, which is heavily engaged in original equipment manufacturing (OEM), faces razor-thin profit margins in the competitive world market of subcontracting manufacturers. Taiwanese firms therefore have sought low labor costs by shifting manufacturing to China. This development has made non-remittance of profits from OFDI a controversial issue in Taiwan. Although the net factor income from abroad in Taiwan’s national income account shifted from negative to positive after 1985 and has been increasing substantially ever since, the gains in gross national income accrue to investor companies and are not shared widely among Taiwanese. In 2016, net income from abroad was about US $16.8 billion, but the remittance to Taiwan was less than 10%. Taiwanese business entrepreneurs have been profiting from investments abroad, but the profits are not repatriated, primarily because Taiwan does not have tax agreements with many host countries and thus Taiwanese multinational corporations (MNCs) would face double taxation, paying host-country taxes and Taiwanese taxes, on repatriated profits. This phenomenon has been linked with the deterioration of income distribution in Taiwan during the period after Taiwan’s outward FDI accelerated. On this front, the Tsai administration faces a threefold challenge: to increase remittances from factor incomes from abroad and to increase investment in domestic industries (other than real estate, which would have the adverse distributional side-effect of making housing more expensive for ordinary Taiwanese); to diversify Taiwan’s outward FDI to mitigate Taiwan’s asymmetrical dependence on China (with a partial solution lying in membership in the TPP or, now, the CPTPP—something both major political parties in Taiwan support); and to develop indigenous innovative industries to create more jobs for domestic labor, enhance real wages, and improve income distribution. During the first term of the Tsai administration, Taiwan’s government identified a “Five Plus Two Industry Innovation Plan,” focusing on bio-tech, defense industries, green energy, the Internet of things (IoT), and precision instruments and machinery, plus the circular economy (recycling used products) and high-value agriculture. This endeavor was integrated into the six core strategic industries reemphasized in Tsai’s second inaugural speech. They are information and digital industries, cybersecurity industry that can integrate with 5G, digital transformation, and national security, biotech and medical technology, national defense and strategic industries, green energy and renewable energy industries, and strategic stockpile industries that can ensure the steady provision of critical supplies. In the long run,

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industrial innovation will need to take the lead if there is to be a new Taiwan miracle. The short-term spillover effect of the U.S.-China trade war benefitted Taiwan’s economy because some American importers transferred their orders to Taiwan. Moreover, the trade war between the U.S. and China drove many Taiwanese enterprises to relocate their production sites from China back to Taiwan and to Southeast Asian countries.11 Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs reported that, by the end of April 2020, this return of operations to Taiwan by Taiwanese enterprises would bring investment of more than $33 billion (NT$1 trillion), which will not only boost domestic investment but also have a significant impact on Taiwan’s place in global trade.

Taiwan in global value chains In the past two decades or so, globalization has shifted the international trade pattern from inter-industry to intra-industry, with trade in inputs dominating trade flows. The development of global supply chains has led to the dramatic rise of trade in intermediate goods in a roundabout process of production across national boundaries. By 2010, trade in intermediate goods accounted for 60% of total world trade volume, and it has increased steadily since then. According to WTO data,12 Taiwan ranked among the top six exporters of intermediate goods, after the EU, China, the U.S., Japan, and Korea, and was the 11th largest importer of intermediate goods in 2014. This indicates how highly integrated Taiwan is with the global economy. The percentage of domestic value added to third countries’ output by Taiwan’s gross exports increased from 15.8% to 24.1% between 1995 and 2011, the most recent data available. The foreign value-added content of Taiwan’s exports increased from 30.6% to 43.5% in the same period. For comparison, Korea saw corresponding increases from 17.1% to 20.5% and from 22.3% to 41.6% over the same periods. With these robust forward and backward linkages in GVCs, Taiwan’s degree of globalization is higher than that of Korea. As a competitive rival to Taiwan in the world market, Korea has enjoyed the advantages of FTAs with the U.S., EU, China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the RCEP and many other trading partners while Taiwan has been limited to a few FTAs with small economies. Nonetheless, Taiwan has achieved a deeper degree of globalization than has Korea. Still, Taiwan’s impressively successful integration into GVCs poses significant challenges for Taiwan. The rise of supply chains from China is one such challenge. Economists in Taiwan used to advocate a vertical division of labor between Taiwan and China to mitigate fierce competition between 11 Chow 2020. 12 World Trade Organization 2020.

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Taiwan Value Added (VA) Components of Gross Exports, 1995 and 2011 60

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Data Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added: Taiwan

Figure 5.4 Taiwan Value Added (VA) components of gross exports, 1995 and 2011 Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added: Taiwan.

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Data Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added: Korea

Figure 5.5 Korea Value Added (VA) components of gross exports, 1995 and 2011 Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added: Korea.

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them. But having absorbed technology from MNCs, including those from Taiwan, China has successfully nurtured its own industries, moving from downstream to upstream industries within the same sector. Instead of being complementary, as had been the premise of the vertical division of labor policy, the two economies have become competitors in global markets. Another aspect of the challenge for Taiwan has been the localization of Taiwanese enterprises in China. After two to three years, these Taiwanese enterprises start to source intermediate products, parts, and components locally in China, instead of importing from Taiwan. Consequently, the vertical division of labor envisioned by the Taiwanese government has been further eroded and investment-induced trade flows have been substantially undercut. The benefit to Taiwan from participating in GVCs can be enhanced—and the challenges mitigated—by policy initiatives to increase Taiwan’s valueadded share. To achieve that goal, Taiwan will need to undergo further technology deepening in Taiwan’s segments of the fragmented production process of GVCs, reducing reliance on subcontracting for OEM. If Taiwan can dominate the production of some strategic components and parts in GVCs, Taiwan will reap gains that go beyond greater profits. The results also will include increased economic interdependence between Taiwan and its many GVC partners, which, in turn, will confer political and strategic benefits on Taiwan through diversification away from dependence on China and by giving these partners a greater stake in Taiwan’s success and viability. The trade conflicts between the U.S. and China offer Taiwan a rare opportunity to reconfigure its role in the global supply chain. The Biden administration policy on coordinating with U.S. allies in dealing with China may also offer an opportunity for Taiwan to enhance its strategic partnership with the U.S. Taiwan’s government must provide adequate infrastructure and differentiated policy incentives to induce Taiwanese enterprises in high-tech industries to reinvest in Taiwan while inducing lower-tech and labor-intensive sectors to relocate production to Southeast Asian countries.

Taiwan’s membership in emerging trade blocs in the Asia-Pacific Region Since there is an ongoing proliferation of FTAs and emerging trade blocs in the region, Taiwan’s prospective membership in them is crucial for its future development. Taiwan’s international economic opportunities, as well as its international political standing, could benefit from membership in three major emerging trade blocs in the Asia-Pacific Region. The costs of exclusion are not high in the near term, but they could mount. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is a single-market arrangement and production base characterized by the free flow of goods, services, and investments, as well as liberalized flows of capital and skills. The AEC became effective on January 1, 2016. It includes the ten ASEAN countries, with their different levels of economic development and degrees of liberalization. AEC has not yet invited outsiders to join.

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The RCEP essentially combines the five existing ASEAN + 1 FTAs (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand) into a single trade pact. RCEP has as its top priority the consolidation of the different rules of origin under the five FTAs. The RCEP is focused more on the liberalization of trade in goods than trade in services, in contrast to the more comprehensive CPTPP. Unlike the CPTPP, which emphasizes high standards of trade liberalization, RCEP focuses more on economic development and cooperation among the developing countries that are its principal member states. Their membership or absence will affect the RCEP’s potential value to Taiwan. On November 15, 2020, all RCEP members signed the trade accord (although India was not among the group). Taiwan’s chances acceding to the RCEP are slim because of China’s opposition. Taiwanese firms already have invested in many RCEP member Southeast Asian countries, mitigating the negative impact of the RCEP on Taiwan. However, because the RCEP will facilitate freer trade between China, Korea and Japan, Taiwan’s trade with those three countries may suffer due to a trade diversion effect. Taiwan’s exclusion from existing FTAs has not been a major hindrance to its trade liberalization to date. The utilization rate of FTA is highly limited in practice. A 2009 survey of firms in several Asian countries, conducted by the Asian Development Bank, found that the utilization rate of FTAs in general is very low.13 Many firms find it more cost-effective to rely simply on MFN rules under the WTO rather than getting the marginal benefit of greater trade liberalization through the burdensome process of complying with diverse rules of origin under different FTAs. Therefore, even if Taiwan cannot sign as many FTAs as other countries have, Taiwan’s trade has not suffered as much from this marginalization as suggested by the conventional wisdom. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s exclusion from FTAs still is costly. CPTPP membership is economically important for Taiwan because the CPTPP member countries accounted for 25% of Taiwan’s total exports in 2015. Joining the CPTPP would enable Taiwan to reduce its trade dependency on China’s market (which accounts for nearly 40% of Taiwan’s total exports if Hong Kong is included). Moreover, the benefits of FTAs are not limited to trade liberalization. FTAs can encourage restructuring of domestic industries in less competitive sectors through the locked-in effect of trade accords, with international commitments functioning as an external force supporting domestic economic restructuring. FTAs can also enhance productivity and increase international competitiveness by facilitating the relocation of capital and labor. This is what then-Prime Minister Abe was trying to do for Japan through his decision to join the original TPP and, later, to lead the creation of the CPTPP. Multiple FTAs also could help Taiwan expand its economic integration from East Asia to the entire Asia Pacific region. Similar concerns had motivated Abe’s support for Japan’s joining the TPP and CPTPP. 13 It was characterized as “spaghetti bowl” or “noodle bowl” in the literature. See Kawai and Wignaraja 2009.

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FTAs can spur needed restructuring of industries and regulatory regimes in Taiwan. The TPP has been called the gold standard of 21st-century economic accords. The CPTPP resembles the original TPP in setting a high bar for trade accords. The CPTPP “froze” only 20 clauses of the original TPP-12, most of which were insisted on by the U.S. Therefore, it still sets a high standard in comparison to other existing trade accords. It includes not only liberalization to zero tariffs on merchandise and services trade (WTO plus), but also environmental and labor standards, intellectual property rights protection, and obligations to reform rules for state-owned enterprises (WTO-extra, or WTO-X) to maintain their competitive neutrality with private corporations, including MNCs. To achieve that goal, the CPTPP also has a chapter on dispute settlement which includes investor-state-dispute settlement (ISDS). If Taiwan can join, the CPTPP will offer a window of opportunity for Taiwan to further integrate with economies in the Asia-Pacific. The degree of economic integration under the CPTPP will be much deeper than that of the RCEP. While the RCEP includes a moderate liberalization of trade and investment (both at and within national borders), the CPTPP’s higher aim of liberalization of trade in services involves a relaxation of restrictions on cross-border flows of capital, information, and technology. CPTPP membership for Taiwan also could ameliorate Taiwan’s growing marginalization from international society. This is among the reasons Taiwan has long expressed its aspiration to join the original TPP and now the CPTPP. This goal has been shared by both of Taiwan’s major political parties. Since the Ma administration, Taiwan’s government has engaged in deregulation in those areas that need to be reformed to be compatible with the requirements of freer trade regimes, including the TPP. President Tsai began actively seeking endorsement of Taiwan’s membership in this trade bloc even before she took the office. The amicable relations between Tokyo and Taipei under Tsai should enhance Taiwan’s prospects for joining the CPTPP when it opens to new members in the near future. Since any trade pact involves a two-level political game, the Tsai administration must deal with the domestic politics of trade, address industrial restructuring and regulatory coherence to meet CPTPP standards, and undertake income redistribution measures to compensate sectors adversely affected by the CPTPP membership and related requirements to accomplish an optimum trade policy.14 In commercial diplomacy, Taiwan needs to use statecraft to seek support from Japan and the other ten CPTPP members. China, though not a member of the CPTPP, will try to block Taiwan’s membership. Several CPTPP members are deterred from endorsing Taiwan’s accession because they are wary of retaliation from Beijing. Hence, there is a bumpy road ahead for Taiwan’s bid 14 Chow advocated that trade liberalization should not just benefit those winners, but also compensate the losers to reach a Pareto optimum under which everybody is better off, and nobody is worse off afterward (Chow 2015).

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for CPTPP membership. As Taiwan pursues CPTPP accession, the Tsai administration will need to have comprehensive plans to address difficult scenarios and map out strategies to address Beijing’s agenda of blocking Taiwan’s bid. Expanding the membership of the trade bloc will benefit all existing trade partners economically and enhance members’ influence in the region as the trade bloc expands; the trade creation effect is more significant for a newly admitted member that (like Taiwan) has few trade accords with existing members of the bloc. Moreover, membership will integrate Taiwan into the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy advocated by the U.S. government. Taiwan can demonstrate the benefits of its membership to others. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model simulation of the CPTPP, with and without Taiwan participating, shows that all CPTPP members will benefit from Taiwan’s membership by increases in GDP, social welfare, and export growth.15 This is because much of the trade flow among CPTPP member countries has already been liberalized under various FTAs whereas Taiwan only has FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore. Admitting Taiwan as a new member of the CPTPP will expand the coverage of the free trade regime to the extensive, but heretofore less liberalized, trade involving Taiwan. Therefore, it is in the economic interest of the incumbent CPTPP members to accept Taiwan as a new member. Since Japan has been leading the CPTPP, it is especially significant for the politics of Taiwan’s bid that Taiwan’s accession to CPTPP will enhance Japan’s total exports, nominal GDP, and social welfare.16 An important goal for the second term of the Tsai administration is to win entry into the CPTPP, which will enable Taiwan to integrate itself more deeply with the economies in the Asia-Pacific region. CPTPP membership would fulfil President Tsai’s aspiration of integrating Taiwan into the global economy including China, rather than integrating with China to become globalized. Tsai’s re-election to a second term in 2020 indicated consolidated support among Taiwanese voters for her agenda.

Conclusion With its WTO membership, Taiwan benefits from the WTO-mandated MFN trading privileges as well as participation in several WTO-centered plurilateral sector-specific and issue-oriented trade agreements. Taiwan’s membership in APEC offers Taiwan significant advantages, including stronger prospects for membership in the CPTPP. But Taiwan still faces costly constraints due to the China factor: Taiwan has been able to sign only a few free trade agreements with a few small states. Therefore, Taiwan has reaped much less economic benefit from FTAs than has Korea. Despite the lack of FTAs, Taiwan’s economic and trade relations with the U.S. and Japan have been increasing steadily through bilateral investment and cooperation agreements. The ECFA with China and its follow-on accords, including the stalled CSSTA, have brought trade liberalization and economic integration across

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the Strait, but have not yet led to negotiation of a full trade pact to expand the liberalization of trade in commodities and trade in services. With a functional approach, Taiwan can benefit from its de facto economic integration through trade, investment, and offshore production. Although burdened by domestic economic policies that have impeded liberalization, Taiwan is highly integrated into global value chains at much higher levels than Korea in both forward and backward linkages. President Tsai’s vision of Taiwan’s path to globalization will mean pushing for membership in the CPTPP and trade accords with other key partners, including the United States and East and Southeast Asian countries. Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP, if achieved, will shape Taiwan’s economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region and the emerging mega-regional trade blocs. It will also enable Taiwan to maintain robust relations with the world’s three largest economies: the U.S., China, and Japan. The New Southbound Policy under Tsai’s administration, if successful, will not only revitalize Taiwan’s trade and investment in ASEAN countries, but also extend to South Asia, and especially India. Taiwan would become more connected to the ASEAN Economic Community and more linked with India, which could become the new elephant to balance Taiwan’s ongoing dependence on the old dragon across the Strait. The New Southbound Policy makes political sense domestically and internationally, as southern Taiwan—a very important political base for the DPP—would benefit tremendously, and Southeast Asian nations and India could use relations with Taiwan to help diversify their economic partnerships and reduce excessive reliance on China. The vision and the statecraft of the Tsai administration in pursuing a grand strategy of globalization will greatly determine Taiwan’s future, not only economically, but also politically. As the Tsai administration entered its second term, the goals it has been pursuing—and should pursue—are expanding Taiwan’s international economic relations with the world and the globalization of Taiwan’s economy.

References Azevêdo, Roberto. 2014. “Regional Trade Agreements ‘Cannot Substitute’ the Multilateral Trading System.” Speech, World Trade Organization Seminar on CrossCutting Issues in Regional Trade Agreements, September 25. https://www.wto.org/ english/news_e/spra_e/spra33_e.htm. Chow, Peter C.Y. 2015. “Is There an Optimum Trade Policy amid the Drive for Globalization?” Paper presentation, National Taiwan University, November 5–6. Chow, Peter C.Y. 2020. “The Spillover Effect of the U.S.-China Trade War on Taiwan’s Economy.” In Vol. 8 of Advances in Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance, edited by Cheng Few Lee and Min-Teh Yu, 213–235. London: Emerald Group Publishing. Chow, Peter C.Y, and Charles Xiao. 2017. “A Dynamic GTAP-FDI Model Simulation on the Impacts of the CPTPP on Taiwan Economy.” Unpublished manuscript.

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Hufbauer, Gary, and Jeffrey Schott. 2013. “Payoff from the World Trade Agenda 2013.” Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://iccwbo.org/ content/uploads/sites/3/2013/04/Payoff-from-the-World-Trade-Agenda-2013.pdf. Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2020. “Statistics.” https:// www.moeaic.gov.tw/english/news_bsAn.jsp. Kawai, Masahiro, and Ganeshan Wignaraja. 2009. “The Asian ‘Noodle Bowl’: Is it Serious for Business?” ABDI Working Paper 136, Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/155991/adbi-wp136.pdf. Ministry of Finance, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2020. “Trade Statistics Database.” http://web02.mof.gov.tw/njswww/webproxy.aspx?sys=100&funid=edefjsptgl. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2017. “Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, Annual.” https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740. United States Department of State. 2020. Inaugural U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue—United States Department of State. htpp://www.state.gov/ inaugural-u-s-taiwan-economic-prosperity-partnership-dialogue/. World Trade Organization. 2017. “20 Years of the Information Technology Agreement: Boosting Trade, Innovation and Digital Connectivity.” Geneva: World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ita20years_2017_full_e.pdf. World Trade Organization. 2020. “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical Profiles.” https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/ countryprofiles_e.htm.

6

Constructive build-up of Taiwan’s defense York W. Chen1

Before President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in May 2016, the rapid rise of China’s military threat and the deterioration of social support for the armed forces in Taiwan were already recognized as vital issues for the future development of Taiwan’s defense. After a round-table discussion about the future of defense reform at the headquarters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2010, then-Chairperson Tsai instructed her staff, “You must think deeper, consider wider, implement together, and achieve faster for making better options better.” Such instructions hit the mark. Conceptually and practically, “defense” is more extensive and complicated than “military.” In facing China’s threat to invade Taiwan, many analysts emphasize a simplified causality: Taiwan should have the necessary military capabilities to defend itself against China’s military strike or coercion. While not discounting the importance of such a military-focused analysis, this chapter addresses more comprehensive defense-related issues. Defense construction, though mainly implemented by the military, cannot achieve the expected results that a more narrowly military perspective expects without societal supports— which are labelled here as the “foundation.” But if the professional viewpoints of the military are neglected, the “floors”—the capacities of the armed forces—that rest even on a strong foundation may yield little more than a bungalow. In the construction process, a comprehensive future vision must be built on “reinforced concrete” that is strong enough to integrate the foundation and the floors. Taiwan’s defense construction is influenced by foreign and domestic elements. The focus of this chapter is mainly on the latter in describing ideas about the interactions among foundation (societal support), floors (military strategy), and reinforced concrete (supporting policies in connecting societal expectations and military needs) in the construction of Taiwan’s defense.

1

This chapter contains no classified material. Many quotations of President Tsai’s statements are from the author’s direct observation as Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), with responsibility for defense issues.

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Regarding the foundation, the gap between society and the military caused by negative memories of the past must be narrowed. In the configuration of floors, the strategic goal has significantly changed from retaking the mainland (before the 1980s) to “maintaining the status quo.” With the military threat from China rapidly rising, some innovative adjustments to force posture and operational defense concepts (ODC) are needed. Together with the specific efforts to overcome the current difficulties or challenges in foundation and floors, Taiwan also requires reinforced concrete to combine the societal expectations and military needs by providing a future vision of defense construction. Before this defense construction project can be undertaken successfully, the architects need to have some understanding about the past and recognize the difficulties that need to be overcome. As one scholar warned, “the absence of historical awareness is not unusual in defense circles. After all, policymakers must focus on the needs of the present. Unfortunately, this focus tends to treat the present as if it were sui generis and thus independent of the past, and immune to history’s interpretation of the past.”2 For President Tsai and her teams, the challenge is to implement the lesson that positive results can be consolidated today and continued in the future only after the difficulties and challenges of the past have been addressed by significantly improved, deeper strategic thinking and strong determination to move toward comprehensive defense construction.

Laying the foundation: societal support Although tactical and operational concepts may vary dramatically due to differences in geography and technology, the basic nature of war does not change. “War is a style of practices in which society unleashes its energy and enacts its interest. It is a behavior, not an essence, a tool not a state, a means not a meaning.”3 War can never be divorced from societal context: it is initiated, executed, and ended in accordance with government and the people’s views about identity, values, and interests. Thus, “strategy is the use of any available instruments, up to and including the threat of force or the use of force, for the ends of policy, in a dialectic of two opposing wills, with the aim of imposing our policy and our will upon the enemy.”4 A sound strategy which aims at winning or not losing in war needs to understand societal elements of countries in conflict. Without such an understanding, strategic misdirection or confusion will occur. A powerful country with a well-equipped and wellprepared military can easily defeat a weaker one on the battlefield, but such “tactical success more likely will be effort wasted if it comprises victory in engagements whose winning contributes not at all positively to the course 2 3 4

Echevarria II 2016, 8. Mansfield 2008, 30. Heuser 2007, 161.

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and outcome of the war at issue.”5 The outcome of the war also depends on societal factors off the battlefield. The most immediate task of President Tsai’s policies for defense construction has been to improve societal support for the military. For many Western analysts, this is not an issue worthy of a president’s attention. But in Taiwan, this is a strategic issue because negative societal views about the military have not been fully overcome, and, more importantly, society is the genuine and lasting target of China’s first strikes. Negative societal views stem from the role and mission of the military in Taiwan’s history. Under the Martial Law Period of 1949–1987, the military was a partisan armed force and served as a tool for violent political repression. Hence, popular hesitation to support the military was once reasonable. But after the roles and missions of the military were transformed along with the rapid democratization of Taiwan, societal distrust did not change because several presidential administrations did not take systematic actions to ameliorate it. If the military does not receive societal support, Taiwan’s national security will be at risk. The civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provides a historical example. In terms of net assessment, the KMT appeared to have sufficient military capabilities to secure the Republic of China (ROC) in power in China by destroying the rebellious CCP. But the CCP successfully undermined the KMT regime’s societal support, through what is now called political warfare, and then went on to destroy the KMT administration’s internal political unity. Finally, the KMT military forces surrendered, betrayed, or were defeated by the CCP’s Red Army, soon to be renamed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The CCP’s political warfare against Taiwan persists with some tactical adjustments and expands to additional areas. Societal support for national defense in Taiwan remains a target that the CCP seeks intermittently, and with varying degrees of intensity, to undermine. This kind of threat is not a new one but is the enduring genuine nature of war. If Taiwan wants to build a strong foundation of societal support for the military, it is important to understand the historical roots of the problem. Before 1945, Taiwanese experienced a fluid history that led to weak societal support for the military. Originally, Taiwan was inhabited by aboriginal peoples. In the 16th century, the Chinese began sailing to the island to escape from, rather than expanding, the control of governments in China. They used the island as a platform for re-export trade, a hideout for criminals, or a refuge for pirates. Before 1945, the Taiwanese experienced five distinctive stages of rule: Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish semi-official companies (1624–1662); a Chinese opposition regime (Zheng Chenggong) which escaped to Taiwan when a new dynasty took power in China (1662–1683); subjection to the central government in China (Qing Dynasty, 1684–1895); an independent Republic 5

Gray 1996, xiv.

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of Formosa (1895 that lasted only a few months); and Japan colonial governance (1895–1945). Except for the short-lived Republic of Formosa, Taiwanese had no role in decision-making about defense, and generally experienced the military as a foreign presence. Only during the later years of Japanese rule were local residents allowed to join the regular forces of the military and to take part in actual combat fighting. During this long period, distinctions of identity and values between the Chinese in Taiwan and the Chinese in mainland China became more and more apparent for at least two reasons. First, through foreign rule and international trade over two and half centuries, many Western and other non-Chinese economic, religious, and cultural features amalgamated with local cultural elements and influences from China in Taiwan. Such mixed societal elements distinguished Taiwan residents from people in mainland China. Second, Taiwanese experienced a long period of poor governance under the rule of the Qing Dynasty. Although some infrastructure, including military barracks, were developed after 1885 when the political status of the island was raised to that of a province, these measures came too late and were not for the protection of Taiwan but rather to garrison the island as a sacrificial outpost for the regime in China. After the Qing government ceded the island to Japan in 1895, the level of political participation for local residents was significantly raised and their Chinese identity substantially declined. As a way to obtain equal political rights with the Japanese, local elites repeatedly suggested applying general conscription to Taiwanese and allowing Taiwanese to join the military as soldiers rather than merely laborers. Finally, Tokyo agreed during the later years of World War II. This was the first time in Taiwan’s history that local residents were allowed to join the regular military forces. Approximately 23,000 Taiwanese were sent to China and fought alongside Japanese troops against the Chinese military. After the end of World War II, the Chinese government took over Taiwan and declared all residents to be under the jurisdiction of the ROC. Some military units were sent to the island for internal security. Many Taiwanese intellectuals expected that the ROC would liberate them from their secondclass citizenship status under Japanese rule. To them, the beginning of ROC governance in Taiwan meant the introduction of the KMT’s revolutionary ideology: Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People (minzu (nationalism), minquan (democracy), and minsheng (people’s welfare)). The expectation of further democratization in Taiwan, following two decades of quasi-democratic development, were unleashed. For many in Taiwan, it was a moment of euphoria and vivid hope.6 However, such dreams soon became nightmares. The Three Principles of the People were never implemented in China, let alone Taiwan. The newly arrived Chinese, dubbed “waishengren” literally “people from outside the province” in Taiwan, were contemptuous of local residents who had previously cooperated, 6

Tseng 2005, chap. 6.

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whether actively or passively, with the Japanese. The KMT’s local government was allowed to confiscate Taiwanese private property, unless the owners could provide evidence of not having collaborated with the Japanese. Many KMT officials and officers acted as if they were victors in a conquered land, and saw these assets as spoils of war. The Taiwanese found themselves being treated as not-quite-Chinese after 1945, having been treated as not-quite-Japanese before 1945. Finally, identity conflict and political distress triggered the February 28 Incident. On the morning of February 27, 1947, officers of the Taiwan Provincial Monopoly Bureau violently arrested a widow in downtown Taipei and confiscated her illegally sold cigarettes. The next day, long-simmering public resentments escalated into a political uprising with severe communal infighting between the Taiwanese and the waishengren communities. After soldiers with machine guns opened fire on a crowd, the conflict spread and the entire island soon fell into chaos. Local elites organized the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee and approached the KMT administration to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis, but the effort did not succeed because the authorities rejected the Committee’s demands for fundamental political reform and remained focused on the then-recent attacks on waishengren. The central government on the mainland sent more troops to Taiwan and unleashed indiscriminate retribution on a much bloodier scale upon the Taiwanese. The military suppressed the February 28 incident swiftly. Most members of February 28 Incident Settlement Committee were sentenced to death. Taiwanese elites, including politicians, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, doctors, journalists, lawyers, and judges were executed. Students and members of militias were likewise massacred. Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Taiwanese were killed.7 After the KMT forces lost the civil war on the mainland and the ROC regime escaped to Taiwan in 1949, it imposed martial law and suspended constitutional provisions of democratic governance. The regime initiated authoritarian militarization, not only to rebuild military capabilities for retaking the mainland but also to consolidate the power of President Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in Taiwan. Chiang re-established a KMT partisan military. Those in the military who were suspected of disloyalty toward Chiang were dismissed, confined, or even executed. In 1950, he also re-established the political commissar system (under the military’s Political Department in 1951, renamed the General Political Warfare Department, GPWD, in 1963). The GPWD staff were de facto KMT cadres in the military. All military officers had to join the KMT before receiving their commissions. To pursue its mission of defending against the CCP’s political warfare, the GPWD held enormous power within the military in Taiwan, including exercising a veto over individual promotions. The military acted as a coercive instrument of political suppression. Non-KMT elites were threatened, spied upon, imprisoned, or tortured by the military. For example, among 11 chairpersons of the DPP before 2016, five had been arrested and imprisoned by the military during the period of KMT authoritarian rule. 7

February 28 Incident Research Team (FIRT) 1993, 262.

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A more important feature of authoritarian militarization was to militarize Taiwan society. The military played a central role in pursuing the KMT’s strategy of social development. Although the percentage of waishengren in Taiwan’s total population increased sharply (rising from 1.8% in 1948 to 8.5% in 1951) as the ROC regime decamped to the island, they were still a small minority. Authoritarian rule with a large role for the military was framed as necessary to pursue the goal of retaking the mainland. After the February 28 Incident, the KMT administration forced Chinese identity on Taiwan society, both through education and the involvement of the military. During the period of martial law, conscription was instituted in Taiwan, not only to serve military needs but also to instil Chinese identity and KMT political values in younger Taiwanese. A military training education system was introduced in 1951. Military officers were sent into universities, academies, and senior high schools not only to train students in basic military skills but also to monitor and suppress anti-KMT or leftist thinking. Furthermore, the GPWD was actively involved in the public media, working to construct Chinese identity in Taiwan, in anticipation of the future reunification of China. This situation began to change after Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang Chingkuo came to power. Under the younger Chiang’s administration political reforms began, although full democratization would come only later. Other political parties were allowed to be established in 1986 and martial law was ended in 1987. When Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, he was succeeded by his Vice President Lee Teng-hui, the first Taiwanese president of the ROC. Lee is perceived by Taiwanese as the godfather of democratization. During his tenure (1988–2000), the constitution was amended to implement democratic reforms. Taiwanese political participation was widened and the previous patterns of authoritarian governance were phased out. The first fully democratic elections of legislators and president were held in 1992 and 1996. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate, won the presidential election and became the first non-KMT president of Taiwan. In 2008, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became president and served for two terms. In 2016, the DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, won and was re-elected in 2020. This alternation in power of the two major parties marked the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy. The political rights and participation that Taiwanese had hoped for in the 1940s had finally arrived. Liberal democracy has replaced the previous hope for the unification of China as the principal political value in Taiwan. With democratization, the transformation of political values, and the passing of the first-generation waishengren, Chinese identity has declined and Taiwanese identity has consolidated in Taiwan. According to public opinion surveys, the portion of the population who identify as “Taiwanese only” rose from 17.6 % in 1992 to 67% in 2020 and the percentage who identify as “Chinese only” declined from 25.5% in 1992 to 2.4% in 2020. Attitudes toward unification have shifted as well. The percentage that is pro-independence grew from 11.1% in 1992 to 35.1% in 2020 while the percentage that is

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pro-unification fell from 20% in 1992 to 7.5% in 2020. The majority support maintaining the status quo, either indefinitely, 23.6%, or deciding later 28.7%, according to 2020 polling.8 This pattern implies that Taiwanese identity is now well consolidated, and that most prefer to maintain the status quo, rather than move to de jure independence (or unification). Patterns of identity combine with partisan politics to create different threat perceptions and views on national security. On one side are those who see China and Taiwan as neighbors. Although geography, culture, and business links make for close ties, the crossStrait status quo of “two houses” should be maintained. Neighbors can be friendly, but they can also be hostile. Hence a stronger wall needs to be built in case hostility arises—that is, Taiwan needs to prepare a defense against an at least potentially hostile China. On the other side are those who identify the PRC and the ROC as belonging to a single family. They live in different rooms of the same house. They may dislike China’s military, and the pressure and efforts at coercion that China undertakes against Taiwan, but they blame cross-Strait troubles partly on the policy choices of the government of Taiwan, They believe a better future for the family could be attained if Taiwan is willing to open the door and embrace a sense of shared interests. Business interests are an enduring and important aspect of the social context for defense and security in Taiwan. The first arrival of Chinese in Taiwan in the 16th century was driven by commercial motivation. Thereafter, most internal conflicts in Taiwan were over trade or natural resource exploitation. Local residents often placed greater emphasis on business interests than on issues of identity. Two examples illustrate this: first, to expand opportunities for trade, Chinese businessmen in Taiwan invited the Dutch and Spanish to colonize Taiwan; second. Taiwan’s economy shifted from agriculture to manufacturing under Japanese colonial rule. By 1937, per capita income in Taiwan reached 75% of the level in Japan.9 The fading of Chinese identity and the rise in prosperity during Japanese rule induced Taiwanese to side with Japan during World War II. U.S. economic assistance, which began in 1949 and ended in 1965, rescued the KMT administration from bankruptcy and later helped to create Taiwan’s “economic miracle.” By 1982, Taiwan’s export volume ranked 14th in the world.10 In that period, Taiwan’s industries were mostly labor-intensive, lowend assembly work, which provided massive job opportunities and, in turn, societal stability. Later, as labor costs rose, Taiwan’s development encountered bottlenecks. To maintain their export markets, many companies closed 8

The source of these data is the Election Study Centre, National Cheng-Chi University, Taiwan. http://etc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php. There are some adjustments from this source in the terms used here relating to political preference: Proindependence=Independence soon + Status quo now, independence later; Not decide yet=Status quo now, decide later + no response; Pro-unification=Unification soon + Status quo now, unification later. 9 Chen 2008, 61. 10 Li and Chen 1987, vol. 1, 40–41, 46–47, 52–53.

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factories in Taiwan and moved production to China in the early 1990s. The decision to invest in China also reflected the KMT’s strategic considerations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eruption of widespread social movements in China in 1989, some in the KMT believed that the CCP regime feared for its survival and therefore would emphasize economic growth, with assistance from Taiwan, leading to political change in China that would more closely resemble Taiwan’s democratic model. Cross-Strait economic collaboration grew quickly and Taiwan’s overseas investment and economic dependence on China dramatically increased. Expectation in Taiwan that the CCP would change was a strategic mistake. Although economic dependence is natural for a free-market economy and political democracy like Taiwan, China systematically exploited Taiwan’s dependence through political warfare to weaken liberal democratic values and to reduce non-Chinese identity in Taiwan—two pillars of Taiwanese societal opposition to unification and societal support for defense of Taiwan. In 2010, Taiwan and China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). For the CCP, it became less costly to buy Taiwan than to invade it. The nature of China’s asymmetric war against Taiwan is to use economic interests to undermine Taiwanese identity and democratic values. This erodes the societal foundation for national security and, thus, the effectiveness of the military floor in Taiwan’s national defense. It is difficult to predict whether these tactics will enable the CCP to achieve its strategic goals, but the negative impact on Taiwan’s defense construction cannot be ignored. Some weaknesses in the foundation were not only left unresolved but also deteriorated during 2008–2016, under the Ma administration. In addition to signing ECFA, President Ma took steps that undermined public confidence in the military. He suspected generals and admirals of offering bribes to secure promotions during the Chen administration, and launched a full-scale, high-profile judicial investigation in April 2009. The media spotlighted some untrue accusations against the military. No one among the 150 senior officers investigated was found to have committed bribery after a one-year investigation. Still, the military’s reputation had been seriously damaged. The situation grew much worse in 2013 after Hung Chung-chiu, a young conscript sergeant, died in detention, raising suspicions of torture. On July 20, 3,000 young people gathered at the gate of Ministry of National Defense (MND) to protest what they denounced as a violation of human rights inside a military camp and an inadequate internal investigation of the incident. Although Ma apologized for Hung’s death on July 24 and the defense minister resigned on July 29, over 100,000 people protested again in front of the Presidential Office Building on August 3. This was the biggest social movement against the military in Taiwan since the February 28 Incident of 1947. At this point, the trust gap between the military and society became very serious. Members of the military were unwilling or afraid to wear their uniforms on the street lest their pictures be taken and they be made the focus of

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derisive comments on social media or in newspapers. This situation may be unimaginable in the capitals of Western countries, but it was true in Taipei before May 2016. These problems gave President Tsai and her administration a sense of urgency in working to repair the military’s damaged image and to shore up the vital foundation of defense construction. One of Tsai’s main methods has been to visit military posts. In the past, the potential significance of a president’s military visits was not fully appreciated. Such visits were often considered to be—and were arranged as—merely routine functions or courtesy calls. President Tsai has taken a more constructive approach. The number of presidential visits reached a historic high, with each visit designed to identify or overcome specific problems in defense construction. To strengthen the foundation in societal support for the military, Tsai’s first efforts as president focused on repairing damaged political-military relations by conveying to the military that the military and the president and her administration were “in the same boat.” Two examples illustrate this effort. In her first military visit as president, Tsai announced to those stationed at Hualien Air Force Base that “the primary issue that concerns me… is to raise the military’s dignity… As the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, from now on, the honor and disgrace of the military are also mine.” Six days later, Tsai went to Suao Naval Base and boarded the newly built Tuo-Jiang class corvette, which set out from port at combat speed. She selected this small vessel because the Tuo-Jiang class is iconic of Taiwan’s indigenous ship-building capacities. She declared a resolute commitment to solidarity between her administration and the military: “I just sailed to the ocean with all of you. I will take actual actions to tell you: we are in the same boat. In the future, we will continue sailing to the ocean all together for building a new navy in the new age.” Tsai’s next steps were to improve relations between the military and society. A few months into her tenure, she sought to encourage civilians to have the sense that they and the military are in the same boat too. Tsai’s administration changed the traditional activities of Military Day (September 3). Previously, the day had been celebrated with routine on-base events. Tsai’s reforms opened the events to the wider public—a move that has helped the military to shed its image as a conservative institution. Now citizens, especially young people, are willing to join in activities. Members of the armed forces also receive privileges or discounts on Military Day from over 10,000 retailers, including McDonald’s. Merchants now see soldiers in uniforms shopping at their stores as good advertisements for their products. These changes reflect the improvement in the military’s image with society in recent years. President Tsai has improved ties and trust with the military in another way as well. She has instructed that the military must not make cosmetic preparations before her visits, so that she can better discern the actual state of affairs and the needs of the military. When Tsai went to the Hu-Kuo

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army base to observe tank training practice in 2017, she also inspected the living quarters at the renowned but aging camp. Observing the shabby facilities, she asked the Defense Minister, “how will the young boys and girls be willing to join the military if they know they will live in such ragged rooms?” Soon thereafter, the MND initiated, at Tsai’s direction, a comprehensive rebuilding program for superior accommodation. The first new quarters were put into use two years later. President Tsai has required that those who sit next to her for meals during military visits are to be lower-ranking staff, not commanders or high-ranking officers, as had previously been the practice. After a 2018 lunchtime talk with a female captain about childcare, she remarked, “If we cannot secure our families, how can people trust us to defend the country?” Tsai directed the MND to provide kindergartens near bases for the children of military families, as well as to serve the needs of economically disadvantaged families in the local communities. The first of these kindergartens opened in 2020. President Tsai’s initiatives, including increased professional bonuses, pension reform, and many other measures for the military, undertook to consolidate political-military and society-military relations. Two cases illustrate the effects. First, rising social support for the military has ameliorated problems that initially beset the all-volunteer system when it replaced the previous conscription system. Although many worried, with good reason, that young people would not be interested in joining the military, recruitment has reached its goals. In the past, many young people joined the military only after officers persuaded them to do so. The situation is improving, and, in the near future, the military will be able to select the best among numerous applicants. Second, Tsai’s administration has undertaken reforms in the role and mission of the Taiwanese military’s Political Warfare Bureau (PWB, previously the GPWD). The lasting ignorance about and disdain toward the PWB were based on at least two reasons: for civilians, the abominable role of the GPWD during the Martial Law Period; and for the military, the fact that those in political warfare units are not soldiers who can shoot guns or fire missiles. After Tsai’s reforms, the PWB’s significance is much better recognized and appreciated. The PWB is now better understood as playing an important role in defending against the CCP’s relentless political warfare. For the military, the PWB is the warrior in defending against the CCP’s first strikes of political warfare every day. Civilians appreciate what the PWB protects and endorse the measures used for their protection. One case exemplifies the performance of the PWB in countering the PRC’s political warfare. PRC President Xi Jinping launched the largest naval parade in PRC history in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Observers saw this as a political message from Beijing in response to the U.S. enactment of the Taiwan Travel Act to allow bilateral visits of senior officials, the U.S. approval to support Taiwan’s submarine program, and Tsai’s then-upcoming visit to Swaziland.

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On April 12, the CCP’s hawkish Global Times released a report declaring that after Xi’s naval parade China would hold another live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait on April 18 against any pro-independence momentum in Taiwan. A propaganda engagement ensued. To neutralize the CCP’s attempted propaganda strike by means of the naval parade, President Tsai visited Suao Naval Base again on April 13. The visit included a field exercise, with the president ordering the rapid response forces into a simulated combat zone. After the Marine Corps and Army troops secured the port as part of the exercise, Tsai boarded the Keelung, a U.S.-made Kidd-class destroyer, and sailed into the mock combat zone with an escort of two minehunters. Within 20 minutes, eight F-16s, six fast missile boats, four corvettes, five frigates, two destroyers, one submarine, and many land-based anti-ship missile mobile launchers simulated a joint strike against the invading fleet. Five hours after the exercise began and one hour after Tsai returned to the presidential office, the PWB released a vivid short film about this exercise, showcasing for the public the Taiwanese military’s capacity to defend against surprise attacks. This mitigated the impact in Taiwan of Xi’s naval parade. The impact was further reduced when local journalists reported that the Global Times’ report was erroneous and a Chinese film of the PRC’s parade drew mockery in Taiwan. Some relevant policy reforms were undertaken during Tsai’s first term but many remained as tasks for her second term. In order to narrow the gap between society and the military, many initiatives to increase civil-military interactions, such as the establishment of military cultural exhibition parks in local urban areas, and the expansion of the military medical system to provide healthcare for both militaries and civilians, are being launched. More importantly, because changes in the military must match societal development, traditional military management needs adjustment. In Tsai’s inaugural address in 2020, the improvement of the military’s internal management culture and procedures is highlighted as one of three vital defense reform issues. As she announced, “today’s young servicemembers have all grown up in a democratic society, and one of our most important missions will be to find ways for them to better utilize their professional skills in line with military needs.”11 The MND is planning comprehensive modifications to strike a balance between the need for military discipline for actual combat and societal expectations for individual liberty.

Configuring the floors: military strategy In 2017, the MND announced a change in Taiwan’s military strategy from “Resolute Defense and Effective Deterrence” to “Resolute Defense, Multi-domain Deterrence.” Although the change may seem to be rhetorical, it marks a significant moment in the long history of the evolution of Taiwan’s military strategy. 11 Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020.

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Taiwan’s military strategy had evolved through six stages before 2017: “Creating Opportunity to Retake the Mainland by Force” (before the 1970s), “Synthesis of Offensive and Defensive” (1970s–1990s), “Defensive Defense” (1990–1995), “Resolute Defense and Effective Deterrence” (1996–2000), “Effective Deterrence and Resolute Defense” (2000–2008), and “Resolute Defense and Effective Deterrence” (again, 2009–2016).12 Despite the similar wording of the last three concepts, there are conceptual distinctions. The essence of “Resolute Defense and Effective Deterrence” under the policy of both the Lee and Ma administrations was deterrence by denial. Taiwan’s strategy was to deter China from military attack by increasing the costs it would suffer. Resolute defense was the means of deterrence. Effective deterrence and resolute defense under the Chen administration was stronger: both deterrence and defense are the means: deterrence is long-range strike capacity against the prepared forces in China and defense is inland counterstrike against China’s forces landing in Taiwan. For the military staff responsible for detailed planning, these notions of strategy are relatively unimportant. What matters more for implementing strategy are questions such as: who is the defense minister or chief of the general staff? What potential battlefields are the operational focus? What are the priorities in weapon procurement? How is the defense budget allocated? The traditional operational concept was army-centric. It was developed in the 1950s and consolidated in the 1980s, with some adjustments thereafter. After the first Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954–1955, Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei proposed the concept of “defense in depth.” According to this concept, Taiwan should prepare a four-layer defense: pressure the enemy when it embarks; strike the enemy in transit; devastate the enemy on the beachheads; and annihilate the enemy from prepared positions.13 Initially, Yu’s idea of defense in depth received little attention because it conflicted with the strategic goal of retaking the mainland by force and because Taiwan’s defense planning relied on U.S. protection under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Yu’s idea became the agenda after U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations and the treaty were terminated. Since then, Taiwan has had to be prepared to defend itself alone. Selecting and prioritizing the layers of Yu’s previous idea became the important issue. The ideas of General Hau Pei-tsun (chief of general staff, 1981–1989, defense minister, 1989–1990, and premier, 1990–1993) were uniquely influential in developing Taiwan’s military strategy. Hau selected Yu’s third and fourth layers as priorities of his operational concept and developed two important elements of strategy to reinforce his army-centric mindset: “Strategic Sustainability” and “Decisive Campaign at the Water’s Edge.” Strategic Sustainability was defined by the MND as “to preserve combat capability, to avoid a premature campaign with the enemy, to wear down the enemy’s combat capability 12 Ministry of National Defense 2004, 1. 13 Yu 1976, 17.

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piecemeal … in order to buy time and direct the strategic situation favorable to us.”14 In order to achieve strategic sustainability, Hau argued the design of the force structure and of military doctrine should be to preserve military strength; to maximize gain by minimizing cost; to avoid becoming committed in a premature decisive campaign; and to select the most advantageous time for a decisive campaign. If war came, Hau believed that the enemy “will assault and destroy our navy and air forces. Therefore, our defense operation should not merely seek temporary or partial success but maintain sustainable combat capability and implement strategic sustainability. We should not use a strategy of earlier decisive engagement. Although the Navy and Air Forces should not be afraid of fighting, the maintenance of sustainable combat capability should be seriously considered.” Hau once told President Chiang Ching-kuo “The most important thing for the operation is to withstand the first strike. The situation will change if we are able to withstand the first strike successfully.” This statement remains a main theme for defense planning in Taiwan. “Decisive Campaign at the Water’s Edge” was the most vital element in Hau’s strategy. The idea was that the most advantageous time to engage the enemy would be when its landing forces reached the beaches. With sufficient air and naval support, the defenders, led by armored forces, would overpower and annihilate the enemy as it attempted to land. Hau’s army-centric preferences in this operational concept were obvious. The air and naval forces had to be well protected from the PLA’s first strike, preserving aircraft and ships as fire support for the army to conduct the decisive ground battle against the enemy. The most significant manifestation of this operational concept was the building of the Jia-Shan air force underground bunker, initiated by Hau when he was chief of the general staff. The bunker, located on the eastern side of Taiwan and connected to the Hualien Air Force Base, can hold some 200 fighters. When war is about to erupt, most of the air force fighter jets will be evacuated and moved into Jia-Shan bunker. Even after Hau was removed from the MND, the key elements of his operational concepts stayed in place, with some slight adjustments. For example, the MND’s National Defense Report for 1996 announced a new military strategy of “Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence” which was presented as a milestone in the development of Taiwan’s military strategy, but the basic operational concept was still shaped by Hau’s concept. The report stated, “If the enemy determines to land at any cost, [we will] annihilate them within our prepared positions piecemeal by destroying them at the water’s edge, guarding the key points, and strong, continuous maneuver strikes. Furthermore, [we will] mobilize the entire population to join the defense for trapping the enemy forces in attrition and winning the final victory.”15 President Chen’s notion moved beyond Hau’s army-centric concept, prioritized Yu’s first layer, and stressed “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory.” 14 Ministry of National Defense 1996b, 2–14. 15 Ministry of National Defense 1996a, 63.

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According to this concept, Taiwan needed more long-range missiles to strike inland targets in China to deter the CCP from sending out invading forces. Although the roles of the air force and navy were thus elevated, Chen’s ideas were not fully implemented because the budget was insufficient for either the necessary research or the production of missiles. Before 2016, no new ideas in the military could escape the confines of Hau’s strategic planning concept. The singular strategic point of the Resolute Defense, Multi-domain Deterrence doctrine of 2017 is multi-domain. After intensive dialectic discussions between President Tsai’s team and the military during the process of drafting the new military strategy, Taiwan broke free from the traditional conceptual framework of force capabilities. The distinctive feature of multi-domain combines all four of Yu’s layers and entails preparing to fight on multiple terrains to protect multiple types of targets. In terms of terrain, multi-domain means moving beyond the traditional focus on a single front in western Taiwan—an approach that is no longer suitable to counter the PLA’s rapidly modernizing military capacities. In Hau’s design, fighter jets and frigates were to evacuate from western bases to eastern ones before or immediately after a PLA first strike, in order to sustain combat power for a decisive battle at Taiwan’s western side. The effectiveness of such a strategy has been seriously reduced because the PLA now has the capability to strike Taiwan rapidly from all directions. The multi-domain strategy expands the frontline not only in terms of direction but also distance. It includes improving defense capacities in the eastern part of Taiwan and developing capacities to prevent the island being encircled and assistance from foreign militaries being blocked. Specific measures which have already been initiated include the submarine program, increases in anti-air and antiship missile units, and the future deployment of 66 newly procured F-16s in eastern Taiwan. Defense-in-depth is now being enhanced though an emphasis on joint operations capabilities. Unlike the approaches before 2016 that mainly focused on individual services’ agendas, the current Overall Defense Concept (ODC) was developed during intensive inter-service discussions led by Yen Teh-fa (Chief of General Staff 2015–2016, and Defense Minister since 2018). Comprehensive improvements in joint operations capabilities have been initiated, such as cooperation among units of different services for multi-layered air defense. In addition, efforts have been undertaken to build joint operations capability between the MND and other ministries: the Coast Guard Administration has built ships with a design similar to the navy’s Tuo-Jiang class corvette which can be converted to fighting ships in a matter of hours to support the navy’s littoral defense. These measures to promote joint operations capability are designed to solve the problem of departmentalism among services that has harmed Taiwan’s defense readiness in the past. In terms of targets, the multi-domain strategy expands the area from traditional fields of combat to include defense of all valuable targets that China might attack. Societal support, cyberspace, and national critical infrastructure

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are the three most important additional domains. Societal support has been addressed through improvement of the PWB and other measures discussed earlier in this chapter. In 2017, acting on President Tsai’s instructions, the MND addressed the cyberspace domain by establishing the Information, Communication, and Electronic Force Command (ICEFCOM) for the military’s frontline of cybersecurity against China’s organized hackers. Although it will take time for the military to create the expected offensive and defensive cyberwarfare capacities, the establishment of the ICEFCOM is an important step, and an advanced one by global standards.16 The significance of national critical infrastructure protection (NCIP) was recognized before 2016, including in the political-military exercise led by the National Security Council (NSC) since 2006, and in the creation in 2007 of the Office of Homeland Security in the Executive Yuan to handle inter-ministerial cooperation in NCIP missions. But progress was limited by a lack of resources and cooperation from relevant ministries. In 2017, the issue began to receive more serious attention. In that year’s political-military exercise, special forces units were sent to test the NCIP effectiveness of two specific sites. After the exercise showed the sites to be highly vulnerable, remedial NCIP actions were taken. Civilian facilities that have roles in supporting military operations are now to receive protection from reserve force units. Under Resolute Defense, Multi-domain Deterrence, the configuration of floors is to increase the credibility of Taiwan’s deterrence in various domains of terrain and targets. Credibility is a matter of perception that can be affected by measures Taiwan can take internally or externally. Internally, if the design for the configuration of floors is focused only on physical assets that raise China’s costs and risk of invasion, but omits concern with the foundation for defense in societal perception, the strategy may fail. Therefore, the architects of Taiwan’s defense strategy must include both military effectiveness and societal perception in their design and implementation. As to societal perception, notwithstanding the success of the measures described earlier in this chapter to improve societal views of and trust in the military, societal support, i.e. the foundation, will be weak if people perceive the military as being too weak to carry out its defense mission. Although society and the military may see themselves as being in the same boat, many passengers will jump out if they think the boat is too fragile to weather the incoming typhoon. The perennial issue of arms procurement illustrates the importance of attending to both military needs and social support. In the military’s professional assessment, an anti-tank missile may have a better cost-benefit ratio than a tank, but, for many civilians, the relative value of missiles will not be appreciated until there is a war. Under Tsai, Taiwan has initiated procurement of some basic force platforms, such as F-16 fighters for the air force, submarines for the navy, and M1A2 tanks for the army. Although some experts 16 International Institute for Strategic Studies 2018, 237.

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criticized these acquisitions as expensive and misguided in terms of their contribution to effective defense, they have increased confidence among the public and in the armed forces that Taiwan’s military capabilities are improving. For this purpose, iconic or symbolic platforms matter. With increased confidence thus secured, the focus can shift to weapons procurements that focus more on combat efficiency but may lack public visibility because the public will be more likely to accept those priorities. The increased procurement of coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM) are a current example. Externally, Taiwan’s defense strategy targets China’s perceptions. The traditional idea that Taiwan must raise China’s costs and risk of invading Taiwan should be maintained. But credible deterrence also benefits from creating uncertainties in China’s perception. Time is the most important variable in China’s calculation in considering military coercion or all-out war against Taiwan. If China believes that Taiwan’s military can resist for an extended period and the Taiwanese have the resolve to sustain resistance, the possibility that foreigners will come to assist Taiwan increases and the chance of a PRC victory declines. Therefore, developing the military capability that can signal to China Taiwan’s ability to prolong the fight against an invading PLA is a high priority in configuring the floors. This imperative has driven Taiwan’s recently accelerated deployment of anti-air and anti-ship missiles, fast attack missile boats, cyber security related systems, and so on. These are a second floor of defense strategy and need to be built together with or immediately after the first floor (the improvement of basic forces). In her 2020 inaugural address. President Tsai announced two foci for future defense reforms. First, after procurements for basic forces, “future combat capacity will emphasize mobility, countermeasures, and non-traditional asymmetrical capabilities. We will also work to strengthen our defense against the threats of cyber warfare, cognitive warfare, and unrestricted warfare to achieve our strategic goal of multidomain deterrence.” Second, reserve and mobilization systems will be strengthened. “We need to enhance the quality of our reserve forces, as well as their weapons, equipment, and training, in order to achieve effective joint operations with our regular forces.” Her idea goes beyond previous conservativism, “We also need to establish a standing interdepartmental system connecting our reserve and mobilization systems.”17 Through the former, the improvement of asymmetrical capabilities in multidomain contests provides more effective deterrence by creating uncertainty in the PRC’s calculations for launching military and paramilitary strikes. The successful implementation of the latter will prolong the time that the PRC needs for conquering Taiwan. Taiwan’s “resolute” defense will increase the possibility of foreign intervention and, thus, the risk to China’s internal stability. The configuration of all these floors reflect a consensus in Taiwan’s military strategy: the focus is not exclusively to kill more invading PLA soldiers but to deter China from sending invading forces by shaking the CCP leaders’ 17 Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020.

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confidence about the effectiveness of their military or quasi-military actions against targets in Taiwan and maximizing the uncertainty in their calculation of the chance for success, the time required to take the island, and the potential international or domestic risks they face. Floors are always expensive. Additional policies must serve as reinforced concrete to bind the foundation (societal support) and the floors (military strategy) together. Appropriate threat perception can persuade the public to recognize that they need to pay the cost for building and maintaining effective floors. President Tsai and her team seek to go farther, to persuade the public to see that the budget for the military is not consumption but investment. If successful, their efforts to link future developments of the military and society in the public mind should mean that the public will want to invest in floor-building.

Pouring the reinforced concrete: creating a comprehensive vision for the future Therefore, many programs that serve as reinforced concrete have been introduced. The most visible one is an apt example: the development of an indigenous defense industry that connects meeting future military needs with development of private companies. Development of an indigenous defense industry has long been a policy goal in Taiwan. It is set forth clearly in the National Defense Act of 1999 and has been a political slogan across several administrations. It emerged after the end of formal diplomatic relations and the security treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan in 1979. Previously, the U.S. had been willing to sell Taiwan advanced weapons. For example, Taiwan obtained F-5 fighters in 1965, 14 years earlier than Singapore. After 1979, although the U.S. promised in the Taiwan Relation Act to continue arms sales, Taiwan began to face obvious difficulties in obtaining required weapons in a timely manner. Taiwan obtained F-16s only in 1998, ten years later than Singapore. Obtaining advanced arms from other countries, such as acquiring the French Mirage-2000 in the 1990s, is now almost impossible due to pressure from an increasingly powerful China. Under Tsai, there has been a blunt acknowledgement of the limits of past policy. Tsai’s forward to Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries (DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 7, issued in October 2014), closes by stating, “The concept of indigenous defense industry has been largely limited to words unaccompanied by actions in the past. Our resolutions and preparations will help to propel Taiwan toward this historic step with confidence and courage.” In September 2015, Tsai identified three core industries as the foci of future development: aviation, shipbuilding, and cybersecurity. Soon after Tsai assumed office as president in 2016, her resolution was exemplified by two related cases: advanced trainers for the air force, and submarines for the navy. Before 2016, the air force had been prepared to buy Italy’s M-346 advanced trainer. This move disappointed local experts who believed they could produce

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an advanced trainer with the required features, but whose expertise was ignored by the MND. In the two decades since the indigenous IDF fighters were produced by the Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC, the governmentsupported leading aviation company), the MND has signed no new contracts to support the continuity of relevant design capacities. Tsai understood that Taiwan’s aviation design capacity would be devastated if these aging experts do not have opportunities to pass on their experience and expertise to younger successors. Based on this consideration, Tsai vetoed M-346 programs immediately after her inauguration in 2016 and appointed retired air force general Feng Shih-kuan (chairman of AIDC 2006–2008) as her first defense minister (2016–2018). The first test flight of the indigenous advanced trainer was successfully executed in 2020. In the shipbuilding industry, Taiwan has the capacity to produce excellent surface ships, such as the Tuo-Jiang corvette, but a submarine program has been considered especially difficult. The difficulty was not only technology, but also the lack of resolve among decision-makers in the MND or the Presidential Office. After efforts to procure submarines from foreign sources repeatedly failed, the MND initiated the indigenous submarine program in the 1990s. The task was assigned to the Chung Shan Institute of Science & Technology (CSIST, the military technology research and design unit within the MND, which was transformed into an executive agency and renamed the NCSIST in 2015) and the CSBC Corporation Taiwan (the governmentsupported leading shipbuilding company). Both committed their efforts and achieved some, although insufficient, progress. In 2001 when the U.S. had agreed to assist Taiwan in obtaining submarines from abroad, the MND abandoned the indigenous program. But domestic political opposition to a special budget for procurement and the difficulties the U.S. encountered in providing Taiwan with diesel submarines that America no longer produced led to another procurement failure, leaving Taiwan with four aging submarines, no near-term prospects for commissioning new ones, and a withering indigenous design capacity. Although an analysis conducted by the MND during the late years of the Ma administration found that the NCIST together with local industries could produce a submarine, the program was not initiated because of concerns that the U.S. would not be willing to provide the necessary technology or equipment. Also impeding an indigenous submarine project was the problem that, even if everything were to go well, it would take at least ten years to build and commission the first boat—a period longer than the maximum eight years in office of a two-term president. After several discussions in 2015, Tsai, then chairperson of the DPP, decided to initiate indigenous production of submarines after she won the presidency in 2016. The author, as one Tsai’s defense policy staff, told her, “even if the program is successful, the first boat will not be commissioned until 2026. As a sincere staff member, I must let you know, even if you are re-elected, you will have to take all the risk of failure, but you may not enjoy the credit for success.” Tsai replied firmly: “It is not important at all to me.

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I shall not allow myself to pass the responsibility to the next president. Can the program succeed if I do nothing and just keep waiting? That is exactly what is important.” With such clear resolution, the indigenous submarine program was initiated soon after Tsai came to office, and foreign contractors have been willing to assist. In April 2018, when the CSBC completed the first design stage on schedule and prepared to move on to the next stage, the U.S. started to provide support for the program including for some critical systems. The project has created 250 jobs at the submarine program office of the CSBC. In her first visit to the office, when being told the average age of CSBC researchers was 34 Tsai said to the team, “You young boys are not only the future of submarine program but also demonstrate the future of Taiwan.” A few days later, the CSBC reported the pace of the program will be increased and promised that the first in-water test will be in 2023, not in 2025 as originally planned. Production of the first submarine was initiated in 2020. Another significant development is the improvement of the NCSIST’s role and functions. Although the NCSIST in the past had successfully developed some advanced weapons, its products generally had been considered for development only after foreign procurement had proved impossible. The military thought the NCSIST had exaggerated the design capacities and that NCSIST products could not be considered reliable because they had not been tested in actual use on the battlefield. The NCSIST once had been perceived as the pride of Taiwanese military technology, but this perception had faded. This negative assessment turned in a positive direction after 2016 after President Tsai’s active efforts to re-establish the connection between the NCSIST and the military. She called for the hastening of the production of missiles—one of the NSIST’s best products—to supply the military’s current needs as well as to make good use of development capacities to fulfill future expectations. President Tsai also elevated Chang Guan-chung and president of the NCSIST to Vice Minister of Defense for Armament in 2017. Such a promotion is unprecedented. With Tsai’s support, another event in 2019 also significantly added to the NCSIST’s momentum: the NCSIST annual budget has significantly increased and reached a historical high. In addition to adequate development, indigenous defense industries require other factors. One is a sound procurement process. Steps have been taken to open the market and reduce the influence of dishonest brokers. A second factor is adequate provision for security. The possible leak of sensitive information to China had led foreign states and companies to hesitate to cooperate with Taiwan defense industries. Measures have been taken to address these concerns as well at NSCIST and other Taiwan defense sector companies. A third factor is mechanisms for effective cooperation with foreign partners. A core mission for the NSCIST, AIDC, and CSBS is to lead their sub-contractors in working with foreign partners, with a long-term goal of transforming the relationship—especially with the U.S.—from one-way assistance to bilateral partnership.

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The development of an indigenous defense industry is one form of reinforced concrete that connects the foundation and the floors. For the foundation, an indigenous defense industry provides more positive interactions between the military and society via commercial contracts, job opportunities, or the application of civilian technological expertise. As a result, the public is more likely to perceive the defense budget as a productive investment for social and economic development. In addition, an indigenous defense industry creates opportunities in Taiwan for technology experts and entrepreneurs, reducing the risk that they will take their skills and capital to pursue opportunities in China. For the configuration of floors, an indigenous defense industry not only keeps fulfilling immediate military needs of the first and second floors while raising local design potential to work together with the military in overcoming the possible difficulties of the third or fourth floors. Therefore, after both the aviation and shipbuilding industries received President Tsai’s support in hastening the fulfillment of the military’s current needs, the expansion of the cybersecurity industry will be a focus during her second term. In her inaugural address of 2020, President Tsai prioritized the cybersecurity industry as the second of six core strategic industries,18 and her administration has initiated many efforts, including instructing relevant bureaus to deploy locally-developed cybersecurity systems and to raise the capacity of cyber warriors in the military with civilian assistance.

Conclusion As a scholar of strategic studies, I understand there is no lasting conclusion in this field. The design and construction of a building may be easier if one can follow a well-established pattern. But difficulties will arise if the architects use a design suited for a building on the plains to construct a building on a hill. Defense construction for Taiwan, facing an evolving challenge from China, requires attention to the multiple aspects of foundation (societal support), floors (military strategy), and reinforced concrete (such as an indigenous defense industry) in the future. Approaches to all aspects of defense construction need to be adjusted dynamically to changing internal situations and possible responses from opponents and friends abroad. Some readers may question the arguments and analyses in this chapter. That is welcome because what Taiwan’s defense construction truly needs, and what President Tsai welcomes and encourages, is more dialogue in the spirit of “think deeper, consider wider, implement together, and achieve faster for making the better options better.”

References Chen, Po-Chih. 2008. “To Choose a Better Road: The Crucial Moment of Taiwan’s Economic Development.” In Across the Universe: Looking back the Road Taiwan 18 Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020.

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Walked, edited by Chen Yu-Chiou. Taipei: National Culture Association (original in Chinese). Echevarria II, Antulio J. 2016. Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy. Carlisle: US Army War College Press. Election Study Centre, National Cheng-Chi University, Taiwan. http://etc.nccu.edu.tw/ course/news.php. February 28 Incident Research Team (FIRT). 1993. “Report of February 28 Incident” (original in Chinese). Gray, Colin S. 1996. Explorations in Strategy. Connecticut: Praeger. Hau, Pei-tsun. 2000. Eight-year Diary as the Chief of General Staff. Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co. (original in Chinese). Heuser, Beatrice. 2007. “Clausewitz’s Ideas of Strategy and Victory.” In Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2018. The Military Balance 2018. London: Routledge. Li, Kwohting, and Muzia Chen. 1987. Introduction of Taiwan’s Economic Development Strategy. Taipei: Linking Publishing (original in Chinese). Liberty Times. 2010. “Chong-Pin Lin warns: Beijing’s New Strategy, to Buy Taiwan Would Be Cheaper Than to Invade it.” June 30. http://news.itn.com.tw/news/politics/ paper/407387/print. Mansfield, Nick. 2008. Theorizing War: From Hobbes to Badious. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China. 1996a. “National Defense Report” (original in Chinese). Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China. 1996b. “The Dictionary of Military Terms of the ROC Armed Force” (original in Chinese). Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China. 2004. “The Evolution of the Conceptual Framework for Operation of Taiwan-Penghu Defense and the Force Posture on Off-shore Islands” (original in Chinese). Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). 2020. “Inauguration of the 15th-term President and Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan).” May 20. http://english.president.gov.tw/Page/548. Tseng, Jianmin, 2005. 1945: Taiwan at the Moment of Dawn. Taipei: Linking Books (original in Chinese). Yu, Ta-wei. 1976. Retreat from the Tachen and Bombardment of Huangchi. Taipei: Ministry of National Defense (original in Chinese).

7

Cross-Strait relations under the Tsai administration L.C. Russell Hsiao and H.H. Michael Hsiao

In her 2016 inaugural address as President of Taiwan (ROC), Tsai Ing-wen declared: The new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the mainland Area, and other relevant legislation. … By existing political foundations … [t]he first element is the fact of the 1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), when there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common ground. This is a historical fact. The second element is the existing Republic of China constitutional order. The third element pertains to the outcomes of over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait. And the fourth relates to the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.1 Zhang Zhijun, the Director of the People’s Republic of China State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office replied, “She [Tsai Ing-wen] did not explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus and its core implications, and made no concrete proposal for ensuring the peaceful and stable growth of cross-Strait relations. Hence, this is an incomplete test answer.”2 As this pair of quotations reflect, the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait is in the eyes of the beholder and the governments on each side of the Strait define it differently. Beijing has tried to impose its definition on Taipei and on the international community through a combination of persuasion and coercion since 1949—with an increasing emphasis on the latter tactic in recent years. Beijing defines the status quo as meaning that Taiwan is a province belonging to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that must be eventually “reunified,” either peaceably or through the use of force, with mainland China under a version of the “one country, two systems” rubric that it has applied to Hong Kong. Taipei defines the status quo as meaning that the Republic of China 1 2

Focus Taiwan 2016. China Daily 2016.

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(Taiwan) is a sovereign and independent state.3 Objectively, the status quo today is that Taiwan enjoys de facto but not de jure independence, meaning that Taipei has sovereign control over the territories that it currently administers but without the formal recognition of most states in the international community. After the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016, Beijing ramped up a multifaceted pressure campaign on the new government to force it to accept its terms for cross-Strait negotiations. Against the backdrop of a continuous rise in Taiwanese identity among the citizenry and civil society, the DPP administration has taken a defensive strategy to resist Beijing’s political and military offensives. As a result, cross-Strait tensions have increased considerably over the past four years and will likely increase in the foreseeable future.

The Tsai administration’s policies toward China When legal scholar and former trade negotiator Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP won landslide victories in Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections in January 2016, many observers predicted the chill in cross-Strait relations. Yet, there also were hints of a cross-Strait political opening when the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Wang Yi, suggested a softening of Beijing’s position on Taiwan. In a speech in Washington, DC in February 2016, Wang did not refer to the so-called “1992 Consensus”—a controversial tacit agreement made between the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that both sides of the Strait belonged to one China. Instead, he focused on the fact that Taiwan’s “own constitution” (tamen ziji xianfa), under which Tsai was elected, provides that Taiwan and the “mainland” belong to one and the same China. Most notably, Wang expressed the hope that Tsai would, “in its own way” (yita ziji de fangshi) accept that constitutional provision.4 A month after Wang’s public statement, however, Beijing fired the first salvo of its renewed diplomatic offensive against Taiwan. In March 2016— even before Tsai delivered her inaugural address—the PRC announced that it was resuming diplomatic relations with the small African nation of Gambia. Banjul broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2013, but Beijing decided to hold off establishing diplomatic relations until it was clear that a DPP administration would be coming back into power. Two months later, on May 20, 2016, Tsai was inaugurated as the first female, and second DPP, president of Taiwan. In her inauguration speech, President Tsai highlighted her administration’s approach to cross-Strait relations, based on three pillars: 1) the Republic of China (ROC) constitution; 2) the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (governing the conduct of legal relations between the two 3 4

Mo 2012. Center for Strategic and International Studies 2016.

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sides); and 3) the historical fact of the 1992 meetings and understandings reached in subsequent negotiations.5 Beijing shrugged off the overture and, as noted above, called it an “incomplete test paper.”6 Despite Tsai’s olive branch, the PRC announced in June 2016 that it was “suspending” high-level government-to-government channels of communications.

Tsai’s 2016 “double ten” speech Despite the official freeze on high-level cross-Strait engagement, President Tsai repeatedly called on Beijing to resume dialogue. In a major policy speech on cross-Strait relations7 in October 2016, Tsai called on Beijing’s leaders “to face up to the reality that the Republic of China exists” and declared that “[t]he two sides of the strait should sit down and talk as soon as possible,” adding that “[a]nything can be included for discussion, as long as it is conducive to the development of cross-strait peace and the welfare of people on both sides.” On the ROC’s 105th National Day, President Tsai delivered a wide-ranging speech8 that focused on the island’s pressing domestic issues (and key elements of her policy agenda), such as youth employment, affordable housing, pension reform, transitional justice, and industrial reform. She then re-emphasized her administration’s desire to maintain the status quo in relations between Taiwan and the PRC and committed to “take proactive and forward-looking measures to promote constructive exchanges and dialogue across the Strait, in order to build a peaceful and stable cross-Strait relationship that endures.” The cross-Strait relations section of the speech was preceded by an extensive discussion of Taiwan’s international space and the government’s regional policy, such as the “New Southbound Policy.” Cross-Strait relations were addressed in the context of regional developments. This may be seen as an effort by the new administration to embed its China policy within a broader regional strategy, in contrast to the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration’s China-centric approach.

Trump-Tsai phone call On December 2, 2016 President-elect Trump accepted a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai. During the ten-minute conversation, she reportedly congratulated Trump on his election victory and exchanged views about the economy and regional issues. Media pundits sounded the alarm that Trump had upended U.S. policy. Beijing lodged a formal diplomatic protest and “solemn representation” with Washington that reiterated the importance of 5 6 7 8

Focus Taiwan 2016. China Daily 2016. Trending Taiwan 2016. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016.

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the One-China policy, and urged the United States to “cautiously, properly handle the Taiwan issue to avoid unnecessary disturbance to Sino-US relations.” Yet, nothing in the United States’ One China policy explicitly prohibits the president-elect from taking a congratulatory call from the democratically elected leader of Taiwan. “New mode” of cross-Strait relations In her second National Day address on October 10, 2017, Tsai again called on the Beijing authorities to consider “new modes” of cross-Strait relations. She reemphasized her administration’s commitment to maintaining the crossStrait status quo based on “four nos”: “Our goodwill will not change, our commitments will not change, we will not revert to the old path of confrontation, and we will not bow to pressure.”9 Marking the 30th anniversary of cross-Strait exchanges, Tsai declared: As we face new circumstances in cross-Strait and regional relations, leaders from both sides should together work to display the political wisdom that has carried U.S. through over the years. We should search for new modes of cross-strait interactions [emphasis added] with determination and patience. This will lay a more solid basis for long-term peace and stability in the cross-Strait relationship.10 In response, the PRC’s State Council spokesman stated: “only by upholding the one-China principle and opposing ‘Taiwan independence,’ can both sides promote communication and cooperation.” The spokesman added that the critical issue is to clarify the “nature of cross-Strait relations” and recognize that “Taiwan and China belong to One China” (Taiwan yu Zhongguo tongshu yige Zhongguo).11 The spokesman’s comments made no reference to the oft-repeated 1992 consensus, which has typically accompanied official PRC statements on cross-Strait relations. But an article on Taiwan policy from the CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan Work Office that was issued during the CCP’s 18th Party Congress and appeared in Qiushi, a bi-monthly periodical published by the Central Party School and the CCP Central Committee, referred to the 1992 consensus a total of ten times.12 The article stated: Peaceful unification, “one country two systems” is the basic principle of our [the CCP’s] solution to the Taiwan issue and the best way to achieve 9 10 11 12

Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017. Xinhuanet 2017a. China News 2017.

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national unification. The national unification we seek is not only unity in form, more importantly, it is in harmonizing the souls of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The key to ensuring peaceful development in cross-Strait relations is to adhere to the 1992 consensus, and opposing Taiwan independence as the common political foundation. The 1992 Consensus embodies the one-China principle, clearly defines the nature of cross-Strait relations, and serves as the anchor of cross-Strait relations.13 Despite speculation that the CCP might have abandoned its insistence that Tsai accept the 1992 consensus, the controversial tacit agreement appears to remain a central tenet of the PRC’s policy towards Taiwan.14

CCP ramps up United Front work and political warfare While the governments in Taipei and Beijing are not talking, the CCP’s United Front and political warfare machinery accelerated influence efforts, cultivating pressure groups composed of sympathetic constituencies in an attempt to sow discord in Taiwan’s democracy and undermine Tsai’s government.15 In addition to lower-intensity activities such as propaganda and disinformation, in an unprecedented and symbolically significant move in November 2016, the PRC officially commemorated the birth of the founder of the KMT and the ROC, Sun Yat-sen. The official ceremony was attended by six of the seven members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. CCP leaders invoked Sun as a symbol of Chinese unity. In his speech, CCP General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping proclaimed that “CCP members are the firmest supporters, most loyal collaborators, and most faithful successors of Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary undertakings.” Implicitly referring to Taiwan, he asserted, “we will never allow anyone, any organization, any party to split off any tract of territory from China anytime, or in any way.” Stirring a great deal of controversy in Taiwan, more than 30 retired military officers from Taiwan reportedly attended the politically charged ceremony. Attendees included former Deputy Commander of the ROC Army Lieutenant General Wu Si-huai. In the same month, the former KMT chairperson and the party’s abandoned 2016 presidential candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu, led a delegation to the PRC to participate in the annual KMT-CCP forum and met with Xi.16

PRC’s campaign against Taiwan’s international space Starting with Gambia, the PRC resumed a full court diplomatic press to squeeze Taiwan’s international space and isolate the Tsai government. Beijing 13 14 15 16

China News 2017. Wan 2017. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2018 Hsiao 2016a.

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has been luring away Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, thereby forcing Taiwan to at least consider the efficacy of re-engaging in checkbook diplomacy; pressuring Taiwan’s non-diplomatic allies to downgrade ties with Taipei; and preventing the Taiwan government’s meaningful participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and Interpol. After Gambia’s shift to Beijing, several others followed: São Tomé and Príncipe (December 2016), Panama (June 2017), the Dominican Republic (May 2018), Burkina Faso (May 2018), El Salvador (August 2018), Solomon Islands (September 2019), and Kiribati (September 2019).17 The switch left Taipei with 15 diplomatic partners, compared to more than 170 that recognize the PRC. Among non-diplomatic allies of Taiwan, Nigeria forced Taipei to move its representative office from the capital. In Dubai, Ecuador, Bahrain, Jordan, the UAE, and Papua New Guinea Taiwan’s trade offices were required to remove any reference to ROC or Taiwan from the name of their de facto embassies.18 Under pressure from Beijing, Taiwan nationals who had been taken into custody for crimes in countries without diplomatic ties with Taipei were extradited to the PRC rather than Taiwan. Beijing also conducted a high-profile and lengthy campaign to pressure international airlines and other corporations to remove any reference suggesting neither Taiwan, Hong Kong, nor Macau are part of China.19 Predictably, in Taiwan there has been a negative turn in public opinion against China’s diplomatic squeeze and pressure campaign against Taiwan and its people.20

PLA steps up military coercion against Taiwan China has stepped up its military exercises around Taiwan. According to the 2017 National Defense Report released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), between August 2016 and December 2017, the MND tracked at least 26 aerial exercises by the Chinese military around Taiwan. Fifteen encircled Taiwan, meaning that military aircraft either entered or exited around the Bashi channel or near the Ryukyu Islands. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) then-maiden aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted four longrange exercises around Taiwan. Two were west of the median-line along the Taiwan Strait, and two took place off the eastern coast of Taiwan. Encircling exercises have become more frequent in recent years, and they have prompted concerns in Taipei about the defense of the island’s eastern flank, which in the past was considered a safe zone due to the relatively limited capabilities of the PLA at that time.21 PLA Air Force (PLAAF) warplanes 17 18 19 20 21

Chung 2019. Hsiao 2019b. Shane 2018. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2020. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017.

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are also deliberately and more frequently flying across the median line in the Taiwan Strait.22 These exercises are consistent with a pattern of increased military activities by the PLA around and beyond Taiwan that have become more visible during the last decade but that have increased in scope and frequency since Tsai Ingwen became president—suggesting a connection with the rise in cross-Strait political tensions. According to former Pentagon official Mark Stokes, now executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, “the PLA has a history of using airpower as an instrument of coercive persuasion against Taiwan. The PLAAF began flights over the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and extended operations to the centerline in 1999” during previous periods of heightened crossStrait tensions. Stokes added that, “diminishing Taiwan’s air space would play into its strategic objectives and claims over disputed territories in the region.”23 Taken in their totality, the substantial increase and greater frequency of exercises may be seen as a form of enhanced coercive diplomacy to compel a change in the status quo. An immediate consequence of China’s military coercion was the Taiwanese public’s increasing concern about Taiwan’s national defense and security capabilities as reflected by a sharp increase in negative perception towards China.24 Another impact was a growing Taiwanese alienation from China.

Taiwan’s defense under Tsai Ing-wen In response to the PLA’s growing military capabilities, President Tsai has adopted the military strategic concept of “resolute defense, multi-domain deterrence” (fangwei gushou, zhongceng xia zu). Taiwan’s MND considers the PLA’s ability to impose a blockade of Taiwan and to seize the outer islands that Taiwan controls to be the primary threats. In the MND’s analysis, joint fire strikes, information operations, and the “Three Warfares” (public opinion, psychological, and legal) pose serious but secondary threats to Taiwan. Facing these threats, Taiwan’s “new military strategy seeks to protect command and control infrastructure, preserve forces, enhance joint countermeasure capabilities, and achieve a multi-layered defense of the Taiwan Strait. Multi-domain deterrence seeks to adopt innovative and asymmetric joint capabilities to deter PRC operations against Taiwan. These multi-domain, innovative, and asymmetric capabilities of deterrence appear to include the following: protection of critical infrastructure, electronic warfare, air defense, long-range fire strike, stealth vessels, mobile missiles, and rapid mining and mine sweeping.”25 22 23 24 25

Global Times 2020. Hsiao 2017d. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2020. McCauley 2017.

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Although the Tsai administration has committed to increasing the country’s defense budget to 3% of GDP, the budget still stood at 2% of GDP, or US$10.5 billion, in 2017. While spending has not reached and is not slated to reach the goal of 3 percent of GDP,26 the reported defense budget for 2021 is expected to grow over 10% to US$15.4 billion27 and detailed defense spending plans through 2025 reportedly are in process.28 By 2025, Taiwan’s annual defense spending is projected to increase by at least 20% or US$ 2.08 billion.29 The planned increases mark a change in commitment from the trajectory under the previous government. Under President Ma Ying-jeou, from 2009 to 2016, defense spending dropped from 3% to 2.1% of GDP.30

Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry Promoting the development of a domestic defense industry has been central to Tsai’s policy agenda. It has been a key part of her new strategy to revitalize Taiwan’s economy through five innovative industries (biotechnology, green technology, smart machinery, the internet of things, and national defense). In its Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 9 (Guofang Zhengce Lanpishu Di Jiu Hao Baogao), the DPP pledged to “utilize an approach combining international cooperation and indigenous production” to build up a next-generation military and direct 70% of added spending toward “indigenous defense research and development.” Investing in Taiwan’s indigenous weapons systems also is designed to lead to arms exports, which generate profit, and create jobs in Taiwan. The DPP has stated that it expects its defense industry to generate U.S. $7–12 billion dollars along with 8,000 new jobs.31 Signs of increased efforts in international defense cooperation include the inaugural Taiwan-United States Defense Business Forum, held in Kaohsiung in May 2018 and featuring many local and international representatives from the defense industry. The forum was part of an attempt to strengthen defense industrial cooperation between the United States and Taiwan in shipbuilding, aerospace development, and information security sectors.32

Changes in Beijing’s personnel for Taiwan policy The most telling changes affecting cross-Strait relations after the election of President Tsai Ing-wen occurred not in Taipei but in Beijing, starting in early 2017. There was a change in leadership at the Institute of Taiwan Studies 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Strong 2017. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/taiwan-increases-defence-budget. Yu and Torode 2018. Yu and Torode 2018. Yu and Torode 2018. Hsiao 2016a; Tseng 2017; Ferry 2016. Yeh 2018.

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(ITS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Science—a unique “research” entity affiliated with the PRC’s intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Zhou Zhihuai, a well-known Taiwan hand in the PRC’s policy community, was replaced by Yang Mingjie. Yang had served as associate dean of the MSS-affiliated China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Yang is not a Taiwan expert like his predecessor. He has specialized in arms control and US-China relations. The shift in expertise appears to represent a change in the PRC’s approach to Taiwan policy as explained later. Senior State Councillor Dai Bingguo took over as chairman of the National Society of Taiwan Studies (NSTS). According to its website, NSTS was formed in 1988 as a non-governmental platform comprising academics, professionals, and organizations researching Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. As a clear indication of its United Front function, which includes influencing “the policies of foreign states toward Chinese ends through means that may be legal, illegal, or exploit gray areas,” the association’s self-description states that it conducts research and organizes academic conferences and exchanges for the purpose of “advancing peaceful development in cross-Strait relations and peaceful unification of the motherland.” Zhang Zhijun’s successor as director of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Liu Jieyi is a career diplomat who served extensively in the PRC’s Mission to the United Nations and other posts in the Foreign Ministry that largely involved North American affairs.33 Overall, the personnel changes in Beijing’s Taiwan policy apparatuses reflect a clear emphasis on expertise in the broader context of international relations, as opposed to the more traditional focus on cross-Strait relations.34 This represents a shift Beijing’s approach to cross-Strait relations from regarding it as purely a domestic and internal matter to one that has become increasingly internationalized.

The cross-Strait status quo after the 19th CCP congress In mid-October 2017, the CCP held its 19th Party Congress. The Congress, convened every five years and reflecting a carefully engineered intra-Party deliberative process, designates the party’s senior leaders and articulates the broad principles that will guide national policymaking over the next five years and beyond. Because gaining control over Taiwan is considered among China’s core interests, policy towards Taiwan is always on the agenda. Xi is the strongest leader to rule the PRC since Deng Xiaoping, who had first proposed the One Country, Two Systems policy that remains Xi’s model for unification with Taiwan. Close observers of cross-Strait relations have been waiting for Xi to make his mark on the country’s policy towards Taiwan since he became CCP general secretary in 2012. Although relations between Taipei and Beijing had thawed in the past decade—epitomized by the meeting 33 Hsiao 2017c. 34 Hsiao 2017c.

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between Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping in Singapore on November 7, 2015—the two sides have struggled to find a new and more sustainable equilibrium with Tsai as president. This is due in large part to Beijing’s refusal to engage in dialogue with the new government, despite Tsai’s repeated entreaties for the resumption of high-level contacts and a new model for talks. In the lead up to the 19th Party Congress, U.S. officials called on all sides to “demonstrate patience, flexibility and creativity” in conducting cross-Strait relations.35 But the gap has persisted between what Tsai has consistently offered36 and Beijing’s continued insistence that Tsai must accept the 1992 Consensus and the PRC’s One China principle as preconditions for the resumption of high-level dialogue and Beijing’s continued assertion that the One Country, Two Systems formula is the model for cross-Strait unification, even though the formula is unacceptable to people in Taiwan and has had serious problems as implemented in Hong Kong.37 Xi’s heavy-handed approach, which includes tough diplomatic, economic, and military measures in dealing with Tsai, might have reflected his need to appear strong ahead of the 19th Party Congress. Any hope that Xi would demonstrate patience, flexibility, or creativity on Taiwan policy in his work report to the 19th Party Congress was dashed by the brief mention of Taiwan. In less than 300 words, in a report of 32,000 Chinese characters, Xi pointedly avowed: We will resolutely uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never tolerate a repeat of the historical tragedy of a divided country. All activities of splitting the motherland will be resolutely opposed by all the Chinese people. We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot. We will never allow any person, any organization, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form.38 These statements do not indicate a new policy per se. Despite some notable differences pointed out by experts that suggest a hardening line,39 Xi’s pronouncements broadly track previous positions taken by his, as well as his predecessors,’ administrations. Xi’s line also resembles approaches that the PRC took toward the previous DPP administration (2000–2008)—approaches that were, from Beijing’s perspective, successful in driving a wedge between Taipei and Washington.40 35 36 37 38 39 40

Taipei Times 2017. Hsiao 2016b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China n.d. Bush 2017. Bush 2017. Bush 2017.

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In the first public statement by a senior Party official at a major cross-Strait forum during the “new era” (xinshiqi) of the Xi administration’s Taiwan policy, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Yu Zhengsheng, spoke at the cross-Strait CEO Summit (CSCS) in Nanjing on November 7, 2017.41 Seven hundred business leaders from Taiwan and China reportedly gathered and signed a total of 29 agreements and memorandums of understanding.42 The participants from Taiwan reportedly included many major business tycoons43 as well as former vice president Vincent Siew.44 In his keynote speech, Yu highlighted four drivers of Taiwan work in this “new era:”45 continue promoting peaceful development and unification in cross-Strait relations; unwavering adherence to the One China principle and the 1992 consensus;46 clearly and resolutely oppose any attempts to split Taiwan (from China) in any form; and enthusiastically strive to execute the important concept of “two sides, one family” (liang’an yi jiaqin).47

Tsai’s response to the 19th CCP congress On October 26, 2017, President Tsai delivered her administration’s response report at a symposium on the 30th anniversary of the commencement of crossStrait exchanges, organized by the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies (Yatai Heping Yanjiu Jijinhui) sponsored by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the cabinet-level agency responsible for implementing the government’s policy towards China.48 Tsai celebrated 30 years of achievements after the opening up of cross-Strait exchanges with Taiwan’s lifting of martial law in 1987 and noted how after the “[Taiwan] government established the Mainland Affairs Council and Straits Exchange Foundation in 1991, and passed the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in 1992, cross-Strait exchanges gradually gained semi-official, and then official status.”49 Tsai again acknowledged the significance of the 1992 meetings, which had launched a series of institutionalized cross-Strait discussions in the 1990s, and contributed to the signing of 23 cross-strait accords between 2008 and 2016. She explicitly reaffirmed that “The DPP government respects these historical facts, and generally accepts all the cross-strait accords that have been signed and ratified by the legislature.”50 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Xinhua 2017. Xinhuanet 2017b. Xinhuanet 2017b. Xinhuanet 2017b. Xinhua 2017; State Council Information Office 2017. State Council Information Office 2017. State Council Information Office 2017. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2017b. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2017c. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2017c.

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In an opinion poll, conducted by MAC between October 27 and 31, 88.6% of respondents supported the idea that leaders in Taiwan and China should find new ways to interact; 76.2% believed that there should be no preconditions to cross-Strait talks; 73.9% believed that Beijing should accept the fact that the ROC is a sovereign country; 64.2% believed that Beijing should stop restricting cross-Strait exchanges and conducting military exercises against Taiwan;51 85.2% advocated broadly maintaining the status quo; and 70.3% supported President Tsai’s principles in cross-Strait relations based on the mantra that “we will not change our goodwill, our commitments, nor will we revert to the old path of confrontation.”52 2018 CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan affairs meeting On February 2–3, 2018, the CCP held its annual Taiwan policy conclave, the Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Meeting (Zhonggong Zhongyang Dui Tai Gongzuo Huiyi), chaired by State Councilor and freshly minted CCP Politburo member Yang Jiechi and attended by TAO Director Zhang Zhijun, Deputy Director (and, later, Zhang’s successor) Liu Jieyi, and other senior members of the party’s Taiwan-policy making apparatus. The meeting was the first major Taiwan policy event held after the 19th CCP National Congress. It was an important indicator of how the Party would implement the guidance laid out by Xi during his Congress work report. New PBSC member and Vice Premier Wang Yang gave the opening remarks, affirming the continuation of Beijing’s two-pronged strategy of using both hard and soft measures against Taiwan. Wang argued that the situation in the Taiwan Strait was becoming more complex and severe and that the Party’s Taiwan work, now and for a period of time, faces challenges and risks.53 Wang, who is the second in command of the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, reportedly stated that, “[w]e [CCP] should remain true to our original aspiration, keep our mission firmly in mind, and fully implement the CCP Central Committee’s decisions and plans [for Taiwan affairs] in a spirit of ‘time and tide wait for no man; seize the day, seize the hour’ [emphasis added].”54 Turning to the “soft” element of the “soft-hard” strategy, Wang stated Beijing’s intentions to: expand cross-Strait economic and cultural cooperation; continue to deepen the development of cross-Strait economic and social integration; gradually give equal treatment to Taiwan nationals studying, starting businesses, working, and living in the PRC; and encourage people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to promote Chinese culture and their “spiritual affinity.”55 For the “hard” component, Wang insisted that the CCP must 51 52 53 54 55

Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2017a. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC 2017a. Li 2018. Hong 2018. Li 2018.

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uphold the “One-China principle” and the “1992 consensus,” and resolutely oppose and contain any form of Taiwan secession.56 As with the 19th Party Congress announcement and other developments in Beijing’s policy towards the Tsai government, the meeting does not indicate a change in the CCP’s specific approaches, much less its broader policy towards Taiwan. It is clear that Beijing will continue its “soft-hard” approach to Taiwan, which will be a combination of enticing Taiwanese youths, businesses,57 and aligned political actors, while continuing to diminish Taiwan’s international space and maintaining the PRC’s coercive military activities.58

Pushing preferential economic measures to entice Taiwan’s youth and businesses On February 28, 2018, the same day that the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA),59 which encourages high-level exchanges between U.S. and Taiwan government officials, the PRC State Council announced 31 new measures60 related to Taiwan. The stated aim is to provide equal— or preferential—treatment for Taiwanese persons and businesses operating in China. More specifically, the goal of these measures is to attract Taiwanese investments in advanced manufacturing, smart machinery, and green manufacturing. These initiatives combine incentives for Taiwanese people to work and study in China, and preferential treatment for businesses and investments from Taiwan in specific sectors targeted by the Chinese government for national development.61 Measures62 relating to the promotion of cross-Strait economic and cultural cooperation (guanyu cujin liangan jingji wenhua jiaoliu hezuo de ruogan cuoshi), issued by the TAO and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), include 12 directed at Taiwanese enterprises, and 19 directed at Taiwanese individuals.63 Overall, the first 12 measures, directed at business interests, lift restrictions on the ability of Taiwanese persons to participate in national R&D projects, provided they receive certification from PRC authorities. The measures remove restrictions on enterprises participating in infrastructure projects in specific sectors and in government procurement contracts, partial ownership of state-owned enterprises, and land use for industrial development. The measures called for continuing the growth of cross-Strait industrial development zones in China’s inland and northeast regions and encouraging participation 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

Li 2018. Hériat 2019. Hsiao 2018a. Martina and Zengerle 2018 Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2018. Kennedy 2015. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2018. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2018.

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of Taiwanese businesses in the “Belt and Road Initiative.” Other measures64 include preferential treatment for Taiwanese agricultural firms, and cooperation between financial institutions and credit reporting agencies in the provision of services. Still other measures include incorporating Taiwan into the PRC’s “Made in China 2025” policy (Zhongguo zhizao 2025)65—an allinclusive industrial policy aimed at moving China’s industrial base up the value chain. Other incentives include generous tax breaks for Taiwanese high-tech corporations, as well as equal intellectual property rights protection for Taiwan-owned legal entities registered in China. The remaining 19 measures targeted the people of Taiwan. They include lifting restrictions on persons from Taiwan becoming licensed in 53 professional and technical occupations, and being eligible for 81 professional qualification examinations. Other measures include allowing Taiwanese to participate in the national “thousand-talents plan” (qianren jihua). Officially known as the Recruitment Program of Global Experts,66 it is a project managed by the CCP Organization Department and designed to cultivate foreign talent to help with the country’s national development goals. The measures include making Taiwanese professionals eligible to apply for state-provided funds for the promotion of science and arts, and participation in joint cultural projects overseas. The measures also include removing limitations on cooperation between Taiwan and PRC entertainment and creative industries, such as restrictions on the number of Taiwanese allowed to work on a Chinese film production, limits to the number of Chinese media productions in Taiwan, removal of application fees, shortening the processing time for cross-Strait TV dramas, and removing impediments to importing books from Taiwan. The measures further called for encouraging Taiwanese people to participate in professional and industrial associations in China; supporting cross-Strait educational and cultural research; offering funds for cross-Strait civic exchanges; and encouraging Taiwanese participation in social welfare projects in China. The measures will permit medical students from Taiwan to take qualification exams to practice medicine in China. Also, some professionals—who have first received certification in the PRC—may be permitted to practice in Taiwan, including doctors and providers of financial services. The measures67 also encourage university-level teachers from Taiwan to teach at Chinese universities, and in general offer services to assist Taiwanese employmentseekers to apply for, and obtain, jobs in China. These thirty-one measures,68 to be implemented by at least 29 ministries, bureaus, and associations in China, are part of the PRC’s broader United 64 65 66 67 68

Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2018. Kennedy 2015. Zweig and Kang 2020. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2018. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2018.

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Front efforts, which Xi Jinping has described as one of the CCP’s “magic weapons.”69 China has accelerated its political influence efforts70 under Xi’s leadership. These endeavors are also consistent with Beijing’s “soft-hard”71 approach to cross-Strait relations. The Xi administration is using both carrots and sticks to entice and to deter, respectively, actions that support or detract from its political objective vis-à-vis Taiwan. Less clear is how these measures might reflect Beijing’s intent to undercut President Tsai’s major policy initiatives. Some analysts argue that they may exacerbate the pressing concern of Taiwan’s brain drain.72 According to analyst J. Michael Cole, “an economic, academic, scientific and creative hollowing-out of Taiwan over a period of time appears to constitute Beijing’s new strategy to resolve the Taiwan “question.”73 Concerns over Taiwan’s brain drain are not a new challenge facing Taiwan’s leaders.74 One possible consideration in the Chinese government’s decision to offer preferential treatment for Taiwanese people and businesses investing in specific sectors in China is the Tsai government’s innovative industries policy and the people-centered approach and economic diversification strategy pursued under the New Southbound Policy. By enticing Taiwanese people and businesses to work and invest more in China, Beijing is attempting to attract people and investments that might otherwise go to the markets targeted under the New Southbound Policy.75 Of course, the Tsai government has felt the pressure from Beijing’s measures targeting Taiwanese youth and businesses and, thus, to make policy moves to provide more effective incentives to keep talent and capital from leaving Taiwan for China and from further hollowing out Taiwan’s economy. On November 4, 2019 Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced an additional 26 preferential measures76 (26 tiao cuoshi). These preferential economic measures, which follow the 31 measures announced in 2018,77 are intended to entice people and businesses from Taiwan to live, work, and do business essentially as Chinese legal persons. As the CCP ratcheted up its propaganda for the new measures, China sailed78 its Type 001A indigenously-built aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait. Taken together, these actions reflect the amplification of the soft-hard strategy laid out by Xi at the 19th Party Congress.79 As the January 11, 2020 presidential and legislative elections in 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Brady 2017. Brady 2017. Hsiao 2018b. Mishkin 2013. Cole 2018 Mishkin 2013. Hsiao 2018c. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. 2019a. Hsiao 2018c. Sun 2019. China Daily 2017.

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Taiwan loomed and the U.S.-China technology war heated up, Beijing was pulling out all the stops to influence the psychology of voters in Taiwan. Of the 26 measures, the first 13 are directed at Taiwan enterprises and include incentives for businesses from Taiwan to operate in China. These measures include provisions that permit Taiwan enterprises to participate in: China’s massive industrial technology and innovation clusters; 5G communication technology research and development, standard setting, product testing, and network construction; circular economy projects; civil aviation industry and services; tourism sectors; and new financial sectors and services. Additional provisions promise Taiwan enterprises: a preferential investment environment; eligibility for financing from local governments; trade remedy and security measures on par with Chinese enterprises; export credit insurance for investment risk reduction; and expedited inspection of imports (from Taiwan) of food, agriculture, and consumer products; and joint industrial standard-setting. Other measures for Taiwan enterprises include the development of youth employment and entrepreneurship demonstration bases, and national-level technology business incubators, university science parks, and national archives. Among the 13 provisions directed at the Taiwanese people, one provision would allow “Taiwan compatriots” (Taiwan tongbao) to seek consular protection and assistance and apply for travel documents at PRC embassies and consulates abroad. Other provisions target various sub-constituencies, for example: allowing Taiwanese farmers to become members of farming cooperatives and apply for certified agricultural infrastructure projects and financial projects; providing benefits for Taiwan persons holding “residence permits” in obtaining mobile phone services, purchasing homes in China, and accessing transportation services; and allowing cultural institutions and professionals from Taiwan to participate in the development and operation of the Cultural and Creative Park in China and to apply for governmentsponsored awards and funding. Moreover, eligible Taiwan persons engaged in professional and technical work in Chinese universities, scientific research institutions, public hospitals, and high-tech enterprises may obtain grades and titles in China equivalent and corresponding to their professional status in Taiwan. There are also measures providing added educational opportunities for the children of Taiwanese businessmen in China and credentials for students and professors teaching there. Measures also provide for expanded enrollment of Taiwanese students and increases in their proportion at institutions in the central and western regions of China. Taiwanese students may apply for various types of scholarships and subsidies to attend Chinese universities. Athletes and sports teams from Taiwan are included in the measures as well. The provisions open national sports competitions and professional leagues in China to Taiwanese athletes, and promise special considerations for the needs of athletes from Taiwan in preparing for the Beijing Winter Olympics 2022 and the Hangzhou Asian Games.

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Of the 26 measures, perhaps the most notable is Article 14, which states: “Taiwan compatriots may seek consular protection and assistance at the embassies and consulates of the People’s Republic of China and apply for travel documents.” By permitting the citizens of Taiwan (ROC) to seek consular assistances at PRC embassies, Beijing may be exploiting a tragic episode in which a Taiwan diplomat committed suicide after public criticisms of his consular office’s perceived lack of support to Taiwan citizens in Osaka during an emergency aid operation at Kansai International Airport. Due in large part to misinformation spread online by both Chinese and Taiwanese sources, Taiwan’s consulate was seen as having fallen short of its PRC counterpart’s efforts. In response to the announcement of the 26 measures, Tsai tweeted: “Beijing’s new 26 measures are part of a greater effort to force a ‘one country, two systems’ model on Taiwan. I want to be very clear: China’s attempts to influence our elections & push U.S. to accept ‘one country, two systems’ will never succeed.”80 The growing U.S.-China technology war further complicates matters for Taiwan as Beijing continues to draw Taiwanese enterprises and persons into China. While the 26 measures and other actions do not represent a departure from past PRC policy, they may reflect the Xi administration’s ongoing intention to try to wait out the Tsai administration–an approach that has since been complicated by her re-election in 2020.

Xi’s Message to Taiwan Compatriots 2019 Shortly after Xi made his “Message to Taiwan Compatriots” (Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu) speech on the 40th anniversary of National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Ye Jianying’s January 1979 speech with the same title, the top brass of the Party’s Taiwan policy apparatuses convened for its annual Taiwan Work Conference (2019 Nian Dui Tai Gongzuo Huiyi). At the work conference, Wang Yang—the fourth-highest ranking CCP official, Politburo Standing Committee member and chairman of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG) —gave opening remarks that underscored major guidance for the Taiwan Work in 2019: Xi Jinping’s new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the spirit of the 19th Party Congress and Xi Jinping’s important exposition on Taiwan work, Xi’s “Message to Taiwan Compatriots.”81 The directives from the meeting were consistent with longstanding policy and reflected a continuation of Xi’s hardening approach to Taiwan under Tsai. Wang instructed cadres to resolutely implement the spirit of Xi’s 40th anniversary speech and the CCP Central Committee’s directives on Taiwan 80 Tsai 2019. 81 Zha 2019.

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policy by steadfastly adhering to the principles of “peaceful unification,” “one country, two systems,” the “one China principle,” and to strive to promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and “peaceful unification.” Wang—who also chairs the Central Leading Small Group on United Front, which has grown increasingly influential under Xi—added that in the past year, the CCP had seized the initiative in the cross-Strait relationship and was leading it in the correct direction. This seems to be a reference to the results of Taiwan’s November 2018 nine-in-one elections that saw the resurgence of the opposition KMT, which advocates a more conciliatory policy towards China. Wang also emphasized that the situation in the Taiwan Strait in 2019 would become more complicated and severe, and that it would be necessary to strengthen the “four senses” (sigi yishi—propriety, justice, honesty, and honor) and the “four self-confidences” (sige zixin—in China’s chosen path, political system, guiding theories, and culture), achieve the “two safeguards” (liang ge weihu—of the core position and leadership of Xi, the Central Committee, and the CCP) that specifically relate to CCP’s policy towards Taiwan to unify thinking and focus work in line with the scientific judgment and major policies and decisions of the Central Committee on the current situation of Taiwan. He also highlighted the importance of adhering to the “1992 Consensus” that reflects the “One China Principle,” and promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Wang added that the Party must resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity and never leave any space for any form of “Taiwan independence” separatist activities. To that end, Wang stressed the importance of deepening cross-Strait integration and development, continuously expanding cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, and the comprehensive implementation of policy measures benefiting Taiwan compatriots. “The party will continue to broaden the channels for cross-Strait youth exchanges, provide more opportunities, and create better conditions for Taiwanese youth to come to China for study, employment, entrepreneurship, and exchanges,” Wang stated.82 Wang’s call reflected the Xi-era policy of intensifying United Front work83 targeting Taiwan (and the rest of the world). There are multiple channels through which the CCP is engaged in United Front efforts against Taiwan. Taiwan-owned businesses in China have long been a targeted interest group. According to an exposé by the media outlet Al Jazeera,84 pro-unification Taiwanese businesses in China may be used to funnel cash to pro-unification groups in Taiwan. Since there are restrictions on capital inflows from the PRC, Taiwanese businesses operating in China that support unification are allegedly receiving Chinese assistance so that they may provide, ostensibly of their own accord, resources to pro-unification groups in Taiwan. 82 Zha 2019. 83 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018. 84 Lee 2018.

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A few days before the January 2019 Taiwan Work Conference, the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (Dalu Quanguo Tai Bao Touzi Qiye Lianyi Hui, ATIEM) held its Lunar New Year networking gala in Beijing.85 TAO director Liu Jieyi, reportedly attended the event and gave a speech that reiterated “Xi’s Five Points” (Xi wu dian) from his 40th anniversary speech. Founded in 2007, ATIEM is a business association consisting of around 300 Taiwanese-funded enterprises and their members in China. The organization acts as a lobbying group for Taiwanese businesses both in China and in Taiwan. At the gala, ATIEM President Wang Pingsheng stated that the results of Taiwan’s nine-in-one election, which the DPP lost badly, had brought hope for the two sides, and supported the fact that the “1992 Consensus” is the trend for cross-Strait peace and development.

Taiwan’s 2020 elections In January 2020, Tsai was re-elected with a margin of 18.5% or 2.65 million votes, giving her and the DPP—which retained its majority in the Legislative Yuan—another four years in power. While Tsai’s victory was resounding, her path to re-election was far from smooth or guaranteed.86 From a traumatizing defeat for her party in the November 2018 local elections (interpreted by observers as a referendum on her administration), to facing a contested primary— unprecedented for an incumbent president in Taiwan—she emerged as the favored candidate to win the 2020 presidential election. Although a split in the opposition coalition, high turnout, especially among young voters, and a relatively strong economy, were important for Tsai’s and the DPP’s victories, a key factor that probably contributed to the outcome was that sovereignty was a focal point of the election. The strong swing in public sentiment towards the importance of sovereignty was likely due to a growing concern among the Taiwanese public of the threats posed by China. Clear manifestations of this threat had come from General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech on the 40th anniversary of the Message to the Taiwan Compatriots, Beijing’s intensifying pressure campaign against Taiwan internationally, and China’s hard-line response to the ongoing Hong Kong protests.87 The Hong Kong crisis during the second half of 2019 was especially significant in increasing Taiwanese voters’ worries about the possible loss of Taiwan’s sovereignty that comes with closer relations with China. For the remainder of Tsai’s second term, most indicators point to the CCP continuing to ratchet up its multi-faceted pressure campaign against Taiwan. Methods include ramped-up efforts to poach Taiwan’s 15 remaining diplomatic partners, expansion of its military activities in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan, and extension of political warfare activities to include economic 85 Hsiao 2019a. 86 News Lens 2020. 87 Culpan 2020.

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measures and a campaign of subversion against Taiwan’s democracy. These activities are not only directed at Taiwan and affect the security of Taiwan but also neighboring countries like Japan and Southeast Asia, as well as the United States. Taipei’s ties with Washington and Tokyo are going to be more crucial over the next four years than they were in the previous four. General Secretary Xi Jinping has specifically tasked the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to complete military reform and modernization by 2035 and to become a world-class military by 2050. The former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff stated: “China probably poses the greatest threat to our nation by about 2025.”88 The threat is all the greater for smaller countries on China’s immediate periphery, such as Taiwan, and Japan as well. Moreover, the CCP’s apparent accelerated efforts to suppress dissent in Hong Kong and bring it completely under its control is a troubling indicator of Xi’s time horizon for unification with Taiwan. The United States signaled support for Taiwan against Beijing’s destabilizing unilateral efforts to change the status quo. Only hours after the 2020 election in Taiwan, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued the following statement: The United States congratulates Dr. Tsai Ing-wen on her re-election in Taiwan’s presidential election. We also congratulate Taiwan for once again demonstrating the strength of its robust democratic system, which— coupled with a free market economy and a vibrant civil society—makes it a model for the Indo-Pacific region and a force for good in the world. The American people and the people on Taiwan are not just partners— we are members of the same community of democracies, bonded by our shared political, economic, and international values. We cherish our constitutionally protected rights and freedoms, nurture private sector-led growth and entrepreneurship, and work to be positive forces in the international community. The United States thanks President Tsai for her leadership in developing a strong partnership with the United States and applauds her commitment to maintaining cross-Strait stability in the face of unrelenting pressure. Under her leadership, we hope Taiwan will continue to serve as a shining example for countries that strive for democracy, prosperity, and a better path for their people.89

CCP policy after Taiwan’s 2020 elections On January 19, 2020, the CCP held its “2020 Taiwan Work Conference” (2020 Nian Dui Tai Gongzuo Huiyi) in Beijing.

88 Browne 2017. 89 Pompeo 2020.

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Wang Yang reprised his role at the previous year’s conference and declared that the CCP should raise the effectiveness of its preferential measures of “benefit Taiwan for the people’s interest” (hui Tai li min), promote more cross-Strait youth exchanges, emphasize the “One-China principle”, and resolutely oppose and contain any forms of Taiwan independence. Wang highlighted the components of the “soft-hard” approach from the 2018 work conference. Wang noted that cross-Strait relations and Taiwan work will become more complicated and severe in 2020, and repeated the main points of his remarks at the 2019 work conference, Most notably, Wang (who as chairman of the CPPCC has significant responsibility for the United Front system) emphasized that it was necessary to improve the effectiveness (shixiao) of measures that “benefit Taiwan for the people’s interests,” improve the institutional arrangements and policy measures to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, deepen cross-Strait integration and development, and ensure the welfare of “Taiwan compatriots.” Highlighting the focus of this approach, Wang noted that it was necessary to vigorously promote cross-Strait youth exchanges and create better conditions for Taiwanese youth to come to China for study, internship, entrepreneurship, and employment. Ignoring the impact of the civil unrest in Hong Kong on Taiwan’s elections, Wang repeated the refrain that it was necessary to learn from Xi Jinping’s important guidance on Taiwan work and implement the policy of “peaceful (re)unification; one country, two systems.” Most analysts expected that Beijing would further harden its approach against Taiwan after the general elections and the work conference did not indicate any substantial change in the CCP’s policy towards Taiwan.90 Xi has been clear that he is unwilling to work with Taipei under Tsai’s rule. As Beijing’s response to the election results through the Xinhua News Agency make clear: “Momentary reversals are but just bubbles left behind by the tides of history … We want to directly warn Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP not to act willfully and rashly because of a temporary fluke.” It appears that Beijing may already have its eye set on 2024. However, the global outbreak of COVID-19, which is widely believed to have originated in Wuhan, has deepened Taiwanese public suspicion toward China’s ability in handling the public health crisis and its rejection of Taiwan’s participation in WHA/WHO global antivirus efforts under its “one China principle.” It is increasingly doubtful that President Tsai and the people of Taiwan would buy further efforts by China to push on unification under this broad rubric.

Tsai’s mainland policy during her second term Winning a decisive re-election as president in January 2020, Tsai Ing-wen garnered a renewed mandate to lead the country and define its mainland 90 Hsiao 2020.

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policy. After an election campaign fueled by growing concerns about malign political interference by Beijing, her victory speech emphasized the need for unity among the political parties in the island-democracy—not only to begin healing the wounds left by a vicious political campaign but to fend off what would surely be a bigger fight ahead. Indeed, President Tsai’s victory speech was not only directed at the country’s electorate; China loomed large in the background of the 2020 elections as Beijing’s saber-rattling and the civil unrest in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (SAR) reverberated like constant political tremors throughout Taiwan. In her speech, President Tsai had a clear message for Beijing: resume official communications, renounce the use of force, do not deny the existence of the Republic of China, and the future must be decided by the people of Taiwan. Specifically, President Tsai stated: I want to once again call upon the Beijing authorities to remind them that peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue are the key to positive crossstrait interactions and long-term stable development. These four words are also the only path to bringing together and benefitting both our two peoples. “Peace” means that China must abandon threats of force against Taiwan. “Parity” means that neither side of the Taiwan Strait should deny the fact of the other’s existence. “Democracy” means that the future of Taiwan must be decided by our country’s 23 million people. “Dialogue” means that we must be able to sit down and discuss the future development of cross-strait relations.91 The four principles (i.e., peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue) form the foundation of the Tsai administration’s cross-Strait policy after the 2020 elections. These principles do not reflect any fundamentally new premises. In fact, President Tsai’s emphasis on “parity” is similar to President Ma Yingjeou’s principle of “mutual non-denial” that he stated in 2008 when elected for his first term. Indeed, as Ma then explained: “mutual recognition [between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait] is not possible, while mutual denial is unnecessary. Therefore, only mutual non-denial can provide space for interaction.”92 Specifically, the position implies that “we will not deny its [China’s] existence but we cannot recognize its sovereignty.”93 The key question now is whether Beijing will show creativity, demonstrate flexibility, and adjust its failed policy and approach to cross-Strait relations. In light of the fact that Beijing had shown Tsai little goodwill during the first four years of her administration, there were no expectations that it would make any further concessions during her second term, much less that Taipei would or should negotiate with Beijing on terms based on Beijing’s 91 Tsai 2020. 92 Taipei Times 2008. 93 Taipei Times 2008.

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“One-China Principle” and its “one country, two systems” corollary. It is in this context that the decision by the U.S. administration to permit the vicepresident elect, Dr. William Lai, to visit DC in a non-official capacity to attend the National Prayer Breakfast and meet with lawmakers and officials was consistent with the U.S. “One-China policy” and a reflection of the growing trust and support for Taiwan in Washington. It should be noted that the vice-president elect is the most senior political figure from Taiwan to be permitted to visit Washington prior to taking office since the switch in diplomatic relations in 1979. While President Tsai has committed to maintaining the “status quo,” in the face of ever-increasing pressure, it may become increasingly difficult for the Tsai administration to continue to chart a pragmatic, consistent, and responsible cross-Strait policy. During Tsai’s second term, a matter that will continue to stir fervent debate in cross-Strait relations is whether Beijing has a timetable for unification (tongyi shijian biao). In July 2017, Zhou Zhihuai94 speaking at an academic conference on cross-Strait relations held in Shanxi, reportedly suggested a 30-year timetable for unification in the context of the CCP’s goal of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing) and “to achieve complete unification of the motherland” (shixian zuguo wanquan tongyi).95 Although Deng Xiaoping had recognized that a unification timetable was premature 40 years ago, the 16th Party Congress report in 2002 (during Jiang Zemin’s tenure) declared that the “Taiwan issue” cannot be postponed indefinitely. In 2013, Xi Jinping reinforced this point during a meeting with the then-vice president of Taiwan, stating that “taking the long view, the longstanding political differences across the Taiwan Strait must eventually be gradually settled.” Xi added that, “it won’t do for [the differences] to be passed along from one generation to the next.”96 Although Xi’s statements do not explicitly indicate that the CCP has a timetable for unification, the notion that indefinite de facto separation is unacceptable has been a consistent thread in the approaches taken by Jiang, Hu Jintao, and Xi. Furthermore, deadlines set by Xi for accomplishing the “Chinese dream” follow the timetable of “two one-hundreds” (liang ge yibai nian) suggest that unification with Taiwan would need to be accomplished before these goals could be reached. The first “one hundred” refers to the centenary of the establishment of the CCP in 2021, by which point the Party should have achieved a “moderate level of prosperity” (xiaokang shuiping). The second “one hundred”97 marks the centenary of the establishment of the PRC in 2049, by which point the Party should accomplish the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This latter deadline has direct relevance for 94 95 96 97

Hsiao 2017a. Hsiao 2017e. Lam 2016. Lam 2016.

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Taiwan. In his remarks98 at the 95th anniversary of the CCP’s establishment in 2016, Xi emphasized that progress in advancing peaceful unification and the completion of the great task of unification are critical for achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Explicitly linking the unification of Taiwan to the goal of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the “China dream” (Zhongguo meng), article 30 of the CCP Regulations on United Front Work (for Trial Implementation) (Zhongguo Gongchandang Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Tiaoli (Shixing)) highlights that the main tasks of United Front work towards Taiwan are, “Following the principle of the Central Government’s guidance on Taiwan, adhering to the One China principle, opposing the separatist activities of ‘Taiwan’s independence,’ and broadly unite Taiwan compatriots, consolidate the political, economic, cultural, and social foundations for deepening the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and complete the great cause of the motherland’s unification in the process of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”99 Zhou Zhihuai’s statement reprising these themes concerning a timetable for unification was made at a significant, high-profile meeting, the “Relations Across the Straits Academic Symposium” (Haixia Liangan Guanxi Xueshu Yantao Hui), held annually since 1991,100 and jointly organized by the National Society of Taiwan Studies, the United Front linked All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (Zhonghua Quanguo Taiwan Tongbao Lianyi Hui), and CASS-ITS. The forum is used as a platform for signaling policy101 on crossStrait issues. At the meeting, former State Councillor and senior statesman, Dai Bingguo made three observations102 concerning what should be done in promoting peaceful development in cross-Strait relations: insist on the “1992 Consensus” and oppose “Taiwan independence” as the political foundation; advance the quality of economic cooperation and thicken cross-Strait common interests; and advance the expansion of cross-Strait exchanges and deepen the development of cross-Strait social integration. In these statements from Chinese leaders and officials responsible for cross-Strait policies, there is much that suggests, although nothing that explicitly endorses, a timetable for “re”unification. And that is a worrisome situation for Taiwan, given that Beijing could at some point declare a nearterm deadline. There is also the question of whether external forces will prevent the Chinese government from operationalizing any timetable it may have. For its part, the U.S. seems to have recognized the gravity of the situation. In his testimony before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 98 99 100 101 102

Xinhuanet 2016. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018. Hsiao 2017b. See, for example, China Daily 2008. Wenhuibao 2017.

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103

June 2016, for example, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson acknowledged that the current status quo may be unsustainable in the long-term. Still, Tillerson stated,104 “[it] is important as we engage with [China] that we are able to fulfill our commitments to Taiwan, which we have every intention of doing … [t]he question is, is the One China’ policy sustainable for the next 50 years? And those are the kind of discussions we’re having. They are extremely complex in many regards.”105 When the 18th session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) convened in Beijing from May 22 to 28, 2020, international media attention was focused on the passage of a draconian national security law for Hong Kong. But the national legislative body—largely seen as a rubber-stamp legislature directly controlled by the ruling CCP—may also have been considering potential modifications to the legal framework of the PRC’s Taiwan policy. In what may have been a response to President Tsai’s inaugural address only the week before, the work report’s deliberate omission of “peaceful” was coupled by the simultaneous omission of reference to the 1992 consensus. This is telling because President Tsai also omitted reference to the 1992 meetings in her second inaugural address after referring to it obliquely (without accepting it) in her first inaugural speech. During her second inaugural address, President Tsai stated succinctly: We will continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This has been our consistent position for maintaining the peaceful and stable status quo in the Taiwan Strait.106 In addition to President Tsai’s refusal to endorse the 1992 Consensus, Beijing’s rhetoric and actions in recent years have made insistence that the 1992 Consensus be the basis for cross-Strait negotiations more untenable. It has become even more unlikely that the two sides will ever resume dialogue on the basis of that tacit agreement between the KMT and the CCP in which the two sides agreed that Taiwan is a part of China with each side free to interpret what “China” meant—especially after CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping essentially redefined the 1992 Consensus as synonymous with Beijing’s “One China Principle” and the “One Country, Two Systems” model in his January 2019 speech.107 According to a report in Wen Wei Po—a pro-Beijing Hong Kong-based media outlet—CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member and NPC chairman 103 104 105 106 107

Zengerle 2017. Zengerle 2017. Hsiao 2017e. Focus Taiwan 2020. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC 2019b.

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Li Zhanshu’s work report of the NPC-Standing Committee did emphasize the standard mantra of striving for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and the One-China Principle (as well as expressing firm opposition to Taiwan independence and separatist forces).108 But the NPC chairman’s remarks were embedded within a section on Ensuring the Full Implementation of the [PRC] Constitution that also addressed the promotion of constitutional review work and work involving Hong Kong and Macao.109 This seemed to echo Xi’s equation of the 1992 Consensus with One Country, Two Systems and the Hong Kong model. Notably, the NPC coincided with the 15th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law (Fan Fenli Guojiafa) that the NPC had passed back in 2005—at the beginning of the second term of the previous DPP administration.110 A forum commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law111 was held the day after the NPC passed the decision to formulate the Hong Kong national security law, and was jointly organized by the CCP Central Committee Taiwan Work Office and the Legal Work Committee of the NPC Standing Committee.112 As 2020 drew to a close, Xi seemed to have abandoned hope that the Taiwan public would accept the PRC’s definition of the one China policy, or that Beijing’s United Front efforts would undermine support for Taiwan’s democracy. Military drills near the island, described as “necessary actions to protect China’s sovereignty,” became more frequent, along with strident declarations that Taiwan is a “sacred and inseparable part of China.”113 Washington, concerned that the status quo across the Strait that the Taiwan Relations Act has pledged to defend, began to take countermeasures that included visits by higher-level officials, arms sales, and the regular passage of warships through the Taiwan Strait. This further provoked Beijing, which construed U.S. moves to preserve the status quo as equivalent to support for Taiwan independence. In mid-September, after a visit by Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach, an outspoken critic of Chinese telecom giant Huawei,114 the Chinese air force began repeated aircraft crossings of the median line between the two sides, which Beijing had never agreed to but had generally respected, signaling that it no longer regarded the line as demarcating a restricted zone.115 Taiwan responded cautiously, saying that while it would not provoke China, neither would it bow to the threat of force. 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

Liu 2020. Liu 2020. Embassy of the PRC in the U.S.A 2005. Wenhuibao 2020. Lai 2020. Reuters 2020. The stated purpose of Krach’s visit was to attend the funeral of former Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui, regarded by Beijing as a proponent of Taiwan independence. 115 Yu 2020.

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Washington continued its pattern of response, as did Beijing. After the 13th passage of a U.S. warship through the Strait in 2020, China sent its newest aircraft carrier, the Shandong on a similar route.

Conclusion: the United States and the future of cross-Strait relations With the precipitous passage of the Hong Kong national security law in June 2020, the PRC signalled that it is prepared to discard its promise of allowing Hong Kong to maintain a high degree of autonomy under the One Country, Two Systems model if and whenever it deems necessary. Given that the formula remains Beijing’s only model for unification with Taiwan, it is all but impossible to restart high-level cross-Strait negotiations in the near-term even if the KMT were to return to power since the proposition of unification under Beijing’s model has no appeal to the Taiwanese public except among fringe pro-unification groups. Indeed, while cross-Strait relations have been in a protracted state of cold peace since Tsai came to office, Beijing’s destabilizing efforts to unilaterally alter the status quo are undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by raising the possibility of military conflict. An action-reaction cycle between the United States and China has evolved—with Taiwan at the center. And the signal from Beijing, with its recalcitrant refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue with Taipei and increasingly frequent military exercises, is that the Chinese leadership is unlikely to engage in good faith dialogue with Taiwan without US counter-pressure. Taiwan would be more susceptible to Beijing’s coercive tactics without the United States to offset China’s multifaceted pressure campaign. China has an absolute military advantage over Taiwan and holds the strategic initiative of whether, when, and in what form to exercise it. The U.S. is Taiwan’s only meaningful bulwark against invasion. Despite frequent bursts of anger at the U.S. for its provocative actions, which seem to indicate that it thinks Washington will support Taiwan, Beijing seeks to undermine confidence in Taiwan that America would back it if an invasion should take place. Consequently, it will be up to the United States and other like-minded partners to counter-balance Beijing’s assertive and coercive behavior and thereby to maintain the status quo.116 It is no exaggeration to say that cross-Strait relations are at their most precarious point since the 1995–1996 third Taiwan Strait crisis; and the U.S.Taiwan relationship is stronger now than it has been since 1979. The former is a function of China’s growing power and its perception that Taiwan is moving farther from its grasp under President Tsai Ing-wen; the latter is a function of wider and increasing recognition in Washington of Taiwan’s geostrategic importance and shared democratic values, growing trust between Washington and Taipei, and a significant shift in the U.S.’ China policy. The United States 116 See the chapter by Vincent Wang and Jacques deLisle in this volume.

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has always played a critical role in maintaining peace and ensuring that military conflict does not break out in the Taiwan Strait. With bipartisan support for Taiwan in the U.S. and widening differences of opinion between China and Taiwan, current cross-Strait tensions are likely to continue and even grow. The role of the United States and other like-minded nations will be even more important going forward.

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Focus Taiwan. 2016.“Full text of President Tsai’s inaugural address.” May 20. http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605200008.aspx. Focus Taiwan. 2020. “Full text of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s second-term inaugural address.” May 20. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005200003. Global Times. 2020. “US, Taiwan Play Tricks, But Futile Strategically: Global Times Editorial.” November 23. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1207801.shtml. Hériat, Alice. 2019. “China Tries to Charm Taiwan,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 7. https://mondediplo.com/2019/05/07china-taiwan. Hong, Chi-chang. 2018. “China’s new approach on Taiwan.” Taipei Times, February 10. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2018/02/10/2003687391/1. Hsiao, Russell. 2016a. “Political Warfare Alert: Reframing Sun Yat-sen in the CCP’s Political Narrative.” Global Taiwan Institute 1, no. 9. http://globaltaiwan.org/2016/ 11/16-gtb-1-9/#RH111616. Hsiao, Russell. 2016b. “Taiwan President Calls on Beijing to Acknowledge the ROC Exists.” Global Taiwan Institute 1, no. 4. http://globaltaiwan.org/2016/10/12-gtb-1-4/. Hsiao, Russell. 2017a. “Changing of the Guard at the CASS-Institute of Taiwan Studies.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 7. http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/02/15-gtb-2-7/# RH021517. Hsiao, Russell. 2017b. “Former State Councilor Becomes Chairman of PRC’s National Society of Taiwan Studies.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 8. http://globaltaiwan.org/ 2017/02/22-gtb-2-8/#RH022217. Hsiao, Russell. 2017c. “Fortnightly Review.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 37. http:// globaltaiwan.org/2017/10/04-gtb-02-37/#RH100417. Hsiao, Russell. 2017d. “PLAAF Significantly Increases Military Exercises around Taiwan in 2017.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 34. http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/08/ 30-gtb-2-34/. Hsiao, Russell. 2017e. “PRC Taiwan Expert Proposes 30-year Timetable for Unification.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 30. http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/08/02-gtb-2-30/# RH080217**. Hsiao, Russell. 2018a. “Fortnightly Review” Global Taiwan Institute 3, no. 3. http:// globaltaiwan.org/2018/02/7-gtb-3-3/#RussellHsiao020718. Hsiao, Russell. 2018b. “Fortnightly Review” Global Taiwan Institute 3, no. 4. http:// globaltaiwan.org/2018/02/21-gtb-3-4/. Hsiao, Russell. 2018c. “Fortnightly Review” Global Taiwan Institute 3, no. 6. http:// globaltaiwan.org/2018/03/vol-3-issue-6/#RussellHsiao032018. Hsiao, Russell. 2019a. “Fortnightly Review” Global Taiwan Institute 4, no. 2, http:// globaltaiwan.org/2019/01/vol-4-issue-2/. Hsiao, Russell. 2020. “Fortnightly Review” Global Taiwan Institute 5, no. 2, http:// globaltaiwan.org/2020/01/vol-5-issue-2/. Hsiao, Sherry. 2019b. “Beijing Pressures Fiji into Renaming Office, MOFA Says,” Taipei Times, August 1, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/08/01/ 2003719711. Kennedy, Scott. 2015. “Made in China 2025.” CSIS, June 1. https://www.csis.org/ analysis/made-china-2025. Lai, Jinhong. 2020. “Dalu Juban Fanfenliefa 15 Zhounian Zuotan Qiangdiao Weifangqi Wulitongyi.” Lianhebao, May 29. https://udn.com/news/story/7331/4598757. Lam, Willy. 2016. “Is 2049 Beijing’s ‘deadline’ for Taking Over Taiwan?” Global Taiwan Institute 1, no. 1. http://globaltaiwan.org/2016/09/21-gtb-1-1/#WillyLam 092116.

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Lee, Lynn. 2018. “Taiwan: Spies, Lies and Cross-straits Ties.” People and Power, September 6. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2018/09/taiwanspies-lies-cross-straits-ties-180906054720310.html. Li, Shuliang. 2018. “Duitang Gongzuo Huiyi Wang Yang Ruanyingjianshi.” China Times, February 3. http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20180203000219-260203. Lin, Adela, and Samson Ellis. 2019. “Taiwan Plans Record Defense Spending as China Threat Increases.” Bloomberg, August 16. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2019-08-16/taiwan-plans-record-defense-spending-as-china-threat-increases. Liu, Ningzhe. 2020. “Zhuanjia: Dalu Shetai Falv huoyou Xilie Dongzuo.” Wenhuibao, May 26. http://news.wenweipo.com/2020/05/26/IN2005260010.htm. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. 2020. “Minzhong dui Dangqian Liangan Guanxi zhi Kanfa’ Minyi Diaocha (March 19–23, 2020).” https://www.mac.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n= 718F4E6181BB749C&s=72169715BAC40B8B. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. 2017a. “Minyi Gaodu Kending Liangan Heping de Zhengce Zhuzhang, Zhichi Shuangfa Busheqianti Jinxing Goutong Duihua.” November 3. https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632& sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=A9A9CBB0C8D68C06. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. 2017b. “President Tsai attends opening of symposium on 30 years of cross-strait exchanges and prospects for the future.” October 26. https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=B7C204243029BC59&sms=29BD1 E466E967AF7&s=A82B91D4966FBD6D. Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. 2017c. “President Tsai Calls on the Ruling Parties of Both Sides to Set Aside the Baggage of History and Engage in Dialogue.” October 26. https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=3783 8322A6DA5E79&s=D9B41688405F1DC0. Martina, Michael, and Patricia Zengerle. 2018. “China angered with U.S.-Taiwan travel bill, adding to tensions.” Reuters, February 28. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-taiwan-china/china-angered-with-u-s-taiwan-travel-bill-adding-to-tensionsidUSKCN1GD3HI. McCauley, Kevin. 2017. “Han Kuang 33: New Strategy, Old Problems.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 23. http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/06/07-gtb-2-23/#KevinMcCauley060717. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2017. “Taiwan National Defense Report 2017. ” https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/02/Taiwan-National-Defense-Report-2017.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. n.d. “A policy of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ on Taiwan.” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_ 665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18027.shtml. Mishkin, Sarah. 2013, “China Causes Taiwan Brain Drain,” Financial Times, March 1–3 https://www.ft.com/content/7bec7f70-8fb1-11e2-9239-00144feabdc0. Mo Yan-chih. 2012. “Ma Defends ‘One ROC, Two Areas,” Taipei Times, June 1, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/06/01/2003534243. News Lens. 2020. “Taiwan 2020 President / Legislature Elections.” https://international. thenewslens.com/interactive/126882. Office of the President, ROC. “President Tsai delivers 2017 National Day Address.” October 10. http://english.president.gov.tw/News/5231. Office of the President, ROC. “President Tsai’s 2016 National Day Address.” October 10. http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=38133&rmid=2355. Pompeo, Michael R. 2020. “On Taiwan’s Election.” U.S. Department of State, January 11. https://www.state.gov/on-taiwans-election/.

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Reuters. 2020. “China Says Military Drills Near Taiwan Were a ‘Necessary Action’.” September 16. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-taiwan/china-saysmilitary-drills-near-taiwan-were-a-necessary-action-idUSKBN2670DG. Ritter Jr., Mario. 2019. “Taiwan Aims to Increase Military Spending.” VOA News, August 20. https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/taiwan-aims-to-increase-militaryspending/5049495.html. Shane, Daniel. 2018. “White House calls China’s warning to airlines ‘Orwellian nonsense.’” CNN Business, May 6. https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/05/news/companies/ white-house-response-china-warning-taiwan/index.html. State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China. 2017. “New Prospects for Cross-Strait Links.” November 7. http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/ 1605402/1605402.htm. Strong, Matthew. 2017. “Taiwan presents defense budget for 2018.” Taiwan News, October 7. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3269913. Sun, Chengwu. 2019. “Tainan 6 Xuanqu Hung Hsiu-chu Tiaozhan Wang Ting-yu Huati Duo.” CNA, November 17. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/201911170031.aspx. Taipei Times. 2017. “Moriarty urges defense spending.” October 14. http://www.taipeitimes. com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/10/14/2003680312. Taipei Times. 2008. “‘Mutual non-denial’ remains, Ma says.” April 6. http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/06/2003408525. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. 2018. “Guanyu Yinfa ‘Guanyu Cujin Liangan Jingji Wenhua Jiaoliu Hezuo de Ruogan Cuoshi’ de Tongzhi.” February 28. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201802/t20180228_11928139.htm. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. 2019a. “‘26 Tiao Cuoshi’ Zhutiao Jiedu.” November 4. http://big5.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201911/t20191104_12214955.htm. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. 2019b. “Xi Jinping zai ‘Gao Taiwan Tongbaoshu’ Fabiao 40 Zhounian Jinianhui shang de Jianghua (Yingwenban).” April 12. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/news/201904/t20190412_12155846.htm. Trending Taiwan. 2016. “Republic of China (Taiwan) President Tsai Ing-wen’s National Day Address 10/10/16.” YouTube video. October 10. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=bxMxMwKxkTE. Tsai, Ing-wen. 2019. “Beijing’s new 26 measures are part of a greater effort to force a “one country, two systems” model on #Taiwan. I want to be very clear: China’s attempts to influence our elections & push us to accept ‘one country, two systems’ will never succeed.” Twitter, November 5. https://twitter.com/iingwen/status/1191624997028057088. Tsai, Ing-wen. 2020. “Inaugural Address of ROC 15th-Term President Tsai Ing-wen.” Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). May 20. https://english.president. gov.tw/News/6004. Tseng, Huan-kai. 2017. “Reassessing Taiwan’s Defense Industrial Policy: Learning from Norway and Singapore.” Global Taiwan Institute 2, no. 3. http://globaltaiwan. org/2017/01/18-gtb-2-3/#HuankaiTseng011817. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2018. “Prepared Testimony of Russell Hsiao Executive Director Global Taiwan Institute Before The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission ‘China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners in Europe and the Asia Pacific.” April 5. https://uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ Hsiao%20-Written%20Statement.pdf. Wan, Ran. 2017. “Guomindang Mafan Dale? Lu Shoudu Buti Jiuergongshi.” DW News, October 12. http://news.dwnews.com/taiwan/big5/news/2017-10-12/60017046. html.

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Wenhuibao. 2017. “Zhang Zhijun: Dalu Fazhan Jinbu Jueding Liangan Zouxiang.” July 25. http://paper.wenweipo.com/2017/07/25/TW1707250001.htm. Wenhuibao. 2020. “Guotaiban: ‘Fanfenlie Guojiafa’ Fahui Zhongyao Zuoyong.” May 31. http://paper.wenweipo.com/2020/05/31/CH2005310006.htm. Woodrow Wilson Center. 2020. “Taiwan’s Evolving Rile in t the Global Order: U.S.Taiwan Relations and Expectations for President Tsai’s Second Term.” May 21. https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/event/taiwans-evolving-role-global-order-us-taiwan-relationsand-expectations-president-tsais. Xinhua. 2017. “Top Political Advisor Calls for Closer Cross-Strait Ties.” November 6. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/06/c_136732269.htm. Xinhuanet. 2016. “Xi Jinping: zai Qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang Chengli 95 Zhounian Dahui shang de Jianghua.” July 1. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/ 2016-07/01/c_1119150660.htm. Xinhuanet. 2017a. “One-China principle key to cross-Strait relations: spokesperson.” October 10. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/10/c_136670109.htm. Xinhuanet. 2017b. “Zijinshan Summit Held in China’s Nanjing.” November 7. http:// www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-11/07/c_136733017_3.htm. Yeh, Joseph. 2018. “Taiwan-U.S. Defense Business Forum focuses on Taiwan’s selfdefense.” Focus Taiwan. May 10. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201805100006.aspx. Yu, Jess Macy, and Greg Torode. 2018. “Taiwan plans to invest in advanced arms as China flexes its muscles.” Reuters. January 11. https://www.reuters.com/article/ustaiwan-defence-spending/taiwan-plans-to-invest-in-advanced-arms-as-china-flexes-itsmuscles-idUSKBN1F00PC. Yu, Matt, Emerson Lim, and William Yen. 2019. “Taiwan jets intercept Chinese war planes in Taiwan Strait (update).” Focus Taiwan. March 31. https://focustaiwan. tw/politics/201903310008. Yu, Zeyuan. 2020. “The Median Line of the Taiwan Strait: No Longer a Boundary for Mainland China.” Think China. September 21. https://www.thinkchina.sg/medianline-taiwan-strait-no-longer-boundary-mainland-china. Zengerle, Patricia. 2017. “Tillerson: U.S. committed to ‘One China’ policy, also Taiwan.” Reuters. June 14. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-tillersonidUSKBN19529H. Zha, Wenye. 2019. “2019 Nian Duitai Gongzuohuiyi zai Jing Zhaokai Wang Yang Chuxi bing Jianghua.” Xinhuanet. January 22. http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/ 2019-01/22/c_1124027404.htm. Zweig, David and Siqin Kang. 2020. “America Challenges China’s National Talent Programs.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws. com/s3fs-public/publication/20505_zweig_AmericaChallenges_v6_FINAL.pdf?bTLm4 WdtG93lAVmxLdlWsgkgeNQDQUAv.

8

U.S.-Taiwan relations: continuity and change in a triangular dynamic Vincent Wei-cheng Wang and Jacques deLisle

Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election presaged good relations between the United States and Taiwan, and the relationship has remained strikingly positive into Tsai’s second term following her re-election in 2020. The reasons include the state of the bilateral relationship that Tsai inherited, Tsai’s positions and behavior as a candidate and then as president, long-standing features of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, a downturn in crossStrait relations for which Washington has blamed Beijing, and dramatically worsening U.S.-China relations. The initial prospect that Donald Trump might upend U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations evolved into a pattern of increased U.S. support for Taiwan. Although a new president in Washington inevitably brings some measure of uncertainty, especially against the background of rising U.S. support for Taiwan during the preceding four years, the Biden administration’s agenda, and the domestic and international political conditions Biden has inherited, suggest that the U.S. is unlikely to initiate unprovoked major changes in Taiwan and crossStrait policies. Nonetheless, U.S.-Taiwan relations face increased uncertainty, compared to the pre-Tsai era, with both peril and promise, in part because of possible changes in what has been a relatively consistent two-decade dynamic in triangular relations.

(Mostly) good beginnings After eight years of relatively smooth and low-key relations with Taiwan during the presidency of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Ma Ying-jeou, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship entered a new phase with the landslide victory of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election. Tsai’s campaign was successful in Taiwan and enjoyed a generally positive reception in Washington largely because she adopted a moderate policy on cross-Strait relations, predicated on maintaining the status quo. On her visit to the United States during an unsuccessful presidential run in December 2011, Tsai had failed to assuage U.S. concerns that her presidency would bring disruption and a return to the pre-Ma pattern of periodic crises in cross-Strait relations and resulting threats to

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U.S. interests. Top U.S. officials disclosed their concerns, which hurt Tsai in her race against an incumbent whose cross-Strait policy was trusted in Washington.1 When Tsai traveled to the U.S. capital a second time as a presidential candidate in 2015, official Washington was less skeptical, at least provisionally persuaded that she did not pose the risks her U.S. interlocutors had perceived four years earlier.2 Some of the difference surely reflected Washington’s perception that she was likely to lose in 2012 but win in 2016. Tsai’s prospects were buoyed by other factors, including: the youth-led Sunflower Movement, which was partly a reaction against a proposed Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) and Ma’s cross-Strait policies more generally; and a botched candidate-selection process that saw the KMT’s unpopular original nominee Hung Hsiu-chu replaced mid-campaign by Eric Chu Li-luan, the initial front-runner who earlier had declined to enter the race. A secondary source of Tsai’s positive 2015–16 reception was the reduced appeal to Washington of a KMT win. Ma’s potential same-party successors did not possess the level of familiarity and confidence, including on cross-Strait issues, that Ma had enjoyed in U.S. policy circles. For some, the prospect that Ma-era cross-Strait rapprochement would proceed much farther under a KMT successor raised the prospect that Taiwan’s relations with Beijing would grow too close and damage U.S. interests.3 Still, the possibility that Tsai would win was not universally well-received in Washington. Some analysts and former officials expressed concern that Tsai would rekindle trouble in cross-Strait relations, given her refusal to accept Beijing’s demand that she adopt the so-called 1992 Consensus4 and the One China Principle, the prospect that Beijing would escalate tensions, and the risk that the U.S. could again become entangled in cross-Strait crises.5 On this view, a Tsai victory risked a second DPP presidency that would repeat the difficulties created by the first, when Chen Shui-bian’s words and deeds contributed, along with Beijing’s policy choices, to deteriorating relations between Taipei and both Beijing and Washington.

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Fifield, Kwong, and Hille 2011. Tsai 2015; Paal 2015; see also Glaser 2016. Lowther 2012; Brookings Institution 2015, 10 (rebutting concerns that Taiwan had “inclined too much toward China”). Ma periodically felt compelled to offer reassurances that rapid progress toward reunification was not on the agenda. See, for example, New York Times 2008; Nylander 2014, Yoo and Wu 2015. Jiuer gongshi (the 1992 Consensus) was a term coined by Su Chi in 2000 to characterize the understanding—including an agreement to disagree—reached between unofficial bodies, with official blessing. Taiwan interprets the consensus as yizhong gebiao (One China, respective interpretations). China defines it as gebiao yizhong (each side affirms the One China principle). Beijing placed increasing emphasis on yizhong, almost never publicly endorsed gebiao. See Su 2003. See, for example, Carpenter 2016; Casey 2016.

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Long-standing dynamics in U.S.-Taiwan relations Both the welcoming and wary assessments of the prospect of a Tsai presidency implicitly assumed the continuation of a pattern in U.S.-Taiwan relations that has been in place since Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the middle 1990s: impetuses for significant change come initially from Taiwan’s moves—rooted in Taiwan’s domestic politics—to alter qualitatively its policy toward China, not from shifts in U.S. policy, and only secondarily from Beijing’s initiatives. In terms of the three dyadic relationships (cross-Strait, U.S.-Taiwan, and U.S.-China), a change originating in Taiwan—the “first move”—triggers a response from Beijing—the “second move.” These moves bring a change in cross-Strait relations, which triggers a U.S. reaction—the “third move”—to protect U.S. interests, usually by trying to preserve relative stability or the cross-Strait status quo, or to restore a status quo ante that had preceded destabilizing moves by Taipei or Beijing. Beginning in 2016, this pattern showed signs of breaking down, although the evidence so far is mixed and not dispositive. On one plausible reading, Tsai’s avowed eschewal of a first move (to change cross-Strait relations) did not preclude moves by Beijing that jeopardized the cross-Strait status quo (as would be consistent with a second move), or statements or actions from Washington signaling possibly significant policy changes—which previously would have come only as a third move. Other readings—some consistent with the persistence of the long-standing three-move dynamic and some not—are also plausible. Although the schematization oversimplifies processes that are complex and iterative, the three-move characterization captures principal features of a dynamic that has held for two decades but may be unraveling. Prologue: the Lee Teng-hui presidency’s final years The three-move pattern has roots early in Taiwan’s democratic era. Significant changes in U.S.-Taiwan relations during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency were partly precipitated by Beijing’s actions. One key example is the cross-Strait missile crisis in the run-up to Taiwan’s first fully democratic presidential election in 1996, which prompted the Clinton administration to dispatch U.S. Navy ships near the Strait and thereby send a newly strong signal of Washington’s support for Taiwan.6 Within Taiwan’s fully democratic period that began with Lee’s final term (1996– 2000), the pattern that would hold for 20 years fully emerged. Reflecting an impetus from Taiwan’s domestic politics, Taiwan made the first move. Democratization had brought national identity and pursuit of international status to the fore in Taiwan’s politics. Lee made a series of high-profile statements, including his 1995 address at Cornell University, that emphasized Taiwan’s democratic accomplishments, distinctive identity, and functional autonomy in ways that appeared, especially to Beijing, to herald a qualitative change in cross-Strait policy. 6

See generally, Tucker 2005; Ross 2000.

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During Lee’s last year in office, his recharacterization of cross-Strait relations as “special state-to-state relations” with some of the characteristics of international relations—and his statement that the ROC had long been sovereign and had no need to declare independence again—brought a fullfledged first move.7 Like later first moves, Lee’s initiative did not occur in a vacuum. It came in the wake of unaccommodating policies and behavior from Beijing—in this case, China’s tepid response to generally conciliatory moves such as Lee’s promulgation of the Guidelines for National Unification and establishment of the National Unification Council, the then-relatively-recent cross-Strait missile crisis, and reports of escalating pressure for Taiwan to accept Beijing’s one-China policy. But, as with later first moves, Lee’s “state-to-state” reformulation constituted an inflection point marking the beginning of a threemove cycle. Beijing responded with a second move that brought a sharp deterioration in cross-Strait relations. Beijing denounced Lee as a “splittist”—a would-be secessionist. It suspended high-level talks, bringing a halt to the dialogue that had begun with a meeting in Hong Kong that yielded what would later be called the 1992 Consensus; moved forward with the 1993 Singapore summit between the heads of the two sides’ semi-official organizations for exchanges— the PRC’s Wang Daohan and Taiwan’s Koo Chen-fu; and continued through a 1998 Koo-Wang meeting in Shanghai. The dialogue would not be resumed until Ma Ying-jeou came to office in 2008. Faced with these developments, the U.S. responded with a third move, taking measures to limit deterioration from the baseline of the pre-first-move—and pre-second-move—status quo in cross-Strait relations. U.S. policy was generally reactive, seeking to temper the stability-rattling moves taken on both sides of the Strait and the Clinton administration’s own, less measured prior policy positions. Earlier Clinton policies had sometimes been more strongly supportive of Lee’s agenda and Taiwan—granting Lee a visa (partly regretted after the fact) for the trip that included Lee’s Cornell speech, and intervening in the cross-Strait missile crisis. At other times, Clinton administration stances had been more accommodating toward Beijing and less supportive of Taiwan, such as Clinton’s embrace, during a 1998 trip to China, of a “Three Noes” policy—no support for Taiwan independence, “one China, one Taiwan” or “two China” solutions, or Taiwan’s membership in states-member-only organizations, such as the United Nations.8 The Chen Shui-bian administration, 2000–2008 Chen Shui-bian became Taiwan’s first president from the historically proindependence DPP, winning the 2000 election with a 40% plurality from a democratic electorate with a growing sense of national identity. Chen would 7 8

See generally, deLisle 2000. Broder 1998; Sutter 1998.

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go on to win re-election with a razor-thin margin four years later. By 2002, Chen began—most famously with his remark that there was “one country on each side” of the Strait (yibian yiguo)—to push aggressively for a more distinctive identity and status for Taiwan. This was a first move, characterized as a “nationbuilding project”9 that sought to qualitatively redefine cross-Strait relations. As during Lee’s presidency, Beijing’s unaccommodating posture toward Chen was an important part of the backstory to the first move by Taiwan. Chen had initially pursued a moderate cross-Strait policy of reassurance known as “Four Noes and One Without” (sibu yimeiyou),10 and floated the idea of an EU-style framework for cross-Strait political integration (tonghe lun). But such overtures fell on deaf ears in Beijing, where the mantra on Taiwan policy was to listen to what Chen said and watch what he did.11 Beijing’s policy turned to increasing pressure on Taiwan by poaching Taipei’s diplomatic partners,12 squeezing Taiwan’s international space, and attempting to universalize the “One China Principle” Beijing had employed for United Nations-affiliated organizations. Mistrusting Chen, Beijing arguably missed an opportunity in 2000–2002 to prevent the ensuing downward spiral in cross-Strait relations,13 and did so again after Chen returned to a relatively moderate tone in his second inaugural address in 2004.14 The Chen administration actively promoted Taiwanese identity in what some called a “de-sinification” (quzhongguohua) campaign, changing textbooks to focus more on a Taiwan narrative (rather than a China narrative), and removing “China” from the names of state-owned enterprises.15 Chen frequently referred to Taiwan’s “sovereignty.” He called for a new constitution and secured more permissive rules for referenda—both of which were widely recognized as tools that could be used to pursue formal independence. In 2006, Chen largely abandoned his “One Without,” announcing that the National 9 Lynch 2004. 10 Chen pledged in his 2000 inauguration speech “four noes” and “one without”— that, provided China has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, his administration would not: declare Taiwanese independence; change the national title from “the Republic of China” to “the Republic of Taiwan”; include the doctrine of special state-to-state relations in the constitution; promote a referendum on Taiwan independence; or abolish the National Unification Council (“NUC”) or the National Unification Guidelines. In 2006, Chen declared that the NUC, which had met only once during his presidency, had “ceased to function.” The full text of Chen’s speech can be found at http://fas.org/news/taiwan/2000/e-05-20-00-8.htm. 11 See, for example, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC 2000 (“We should listen to what the new leader in Taiwan says and watch what he does. We will observe where he will lead cross-Straits relations.”). 12 During Chen’s term, Taiwan lost nine diplomatic allies and gained three. 13 Wang 2004. 14 Chen 2004; see also Chang and Holt 2009, 312. 15 What Beijing condemned as Lee’s and Chen’s “de-sinification” campaigns were a partial reversal of the sinification project undertaken by Chiang Kai-shek during the era of KMT authoritarian rule, when Chiang sought to build Taiwan into a model Chinese province for a to-be-recovered mainland.

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Unification Council had “ceased to function,” although it was not formally abolished. Under Chen, Taiwan sought membership in major international organizations, and membership in the United Nations itself, with Chen ultimately pushing a referendum that would seek membership under the name “Taiwan.” Chen’s foreign policy showed a clear preference for the United States and Japan and adopted—especially to Beijing’s ears—an anti-China tone. While the sequence of decline in cross-Strait relations during this period is, thus, complicated and iterative, the basic pattern is one in which Chen’s moves away from moderation and support for the basic status quo in crossStrait relations constituted a first move that marked a turning point. This was followed by a sharp reaction from Beijing—a second move—and a descent into tension-ridden cross-Strait relations. In response, the U.S. undertook a third move—one that also was somewhat protracted and multi-stage. For Washington, the greatest concern was that Chen would be highly provocative and disruptive, perhaps even proclaiming de jure independence or taking other steps that Beijing would interpret as crossing its red lines, and that this would lead to retaliation by China and, consequently, entangle the United States in a possible cross-Strait military conflict. The U.S. reaction was mainly to put exceptional, relationship-shaking pressure on Taiwan not to fundamentally destabilize cross-Strait relations. An early instance came when U.S. President George W. Bush hosted Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House in 2003 and criticized Chen for seeking unilaterally to change the status quo—something that, Bush added, the U.S. opposed.16 Another example was a change to “transit diplomacy”—whereby the Taiwanese president is permitted, while “transiting” through the United States en route to one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, to engage in an approved set of activities, often including public events and meetings with political leaders, while on U.S. soil. This indicator of the state of U.S.-Taiwan relations trended sharply negative during Chen’s tenure. Chen’s first transit visit, in mid-2001, included a high-profile stop in New York City to receive a human rights award. By the closing years of the Chen administration, the U.S. State Department had placed strict limits on Chen’s transit requests. The options offered were so constraining—for example, transit through Alaska and only for refueling—that Chen declined. During much of Chen’s presidency, the United States and China essentially co-managed the problems posed by Chenled Taiwan. U.S.-Taiwan relations accordingly became difficult and fraught. Taiwan had become the odd man out in the triangular relationship.17 Another example was the U.S. reaction to China’s adoption of a Taiwantargeting Anti-Secession Law, which put Beijing’s long-standing policies— including the asserted right to use force if Taiwan claimed independence—in an especially pointed and formal form, but which also signaled acquiescence in the cross-Strait status quo by foregoing an alternative “reunification law” 16 The White House 2003; Bush 2007. 17 Blumenthal and Schriver 2008.

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and declaring that the impermissible casus belli of Taiwan’s separation from China had not yet occurred.18 The U.S. characterized the law as unhelpful and unwise, but eschewed the level of support for Taiwan that had followed major unprovoked provocative or coercive measures from Beijing.19 At the end of Chen’s presidency, another aspect of the third move by the United States entailed a striking departure from Washington’s usual circumspection about the electoral choices of democratic Taiwan. The Bush administration condemned the referendum that the outgoing Chen administration had put on the 2008 ballot, asking voters to support Taiwan’s seeking to enter the United Nations under the name “Taiwan.”20 Washington explained that its extraordinary statement was warranted because Chen was using Taiwan’s democratic processes in ways that threatened U.S. interests21—interests that included maintaining stability, and avoiding greater crisis, in cross-Strait relations. The Ma Ying-jeou administration, 2008–2016 Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency in a lopsided election with support from a public among whom Taiwanese identity was high and rising, but increasingly decoupled from support for formal independence.22 Ma’s win partly reflected mounting public discontent with problems in cross-Strait relations and, in turn, U.S.-Taiwan relations. He rode to re-election with a large margin four years later, partly on the strength of his successes in improving relations with both Washington and Beijing. Immediately upon taking power, the Ma administration initiated a relatively modest first move, seeking qualitative improvement in cross-Strait relations, as well as repairing U.S.-Taiwan relations. Ma halted Chen’s desinification. Adopting an “ROC” discourse, his administration stressed the ROC’s pivotal role in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the ROC’s sovereignty over disputed landforms in the South and East China Seas on the basis of claims which the PRC largely had adopted. In his first inaugural address,23 Ma declared that his administration’s cross-Strait policy would follow the principle of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” (butong, budu, buwu)—often referred to as the “Three Noes”—and would be based on the so-called 1992 Consensus—interpreted as “one China, respective interpretations” (yizhong gebiao). On the question of Taiwan’s participation in international institutions, Ma’s government adopted a more measured and pragmatic approach than its predecessor. Rather than seeking membership in organizations with high political 18 19 20 21 22 23

deLisle 2007. Cody 2005. Negroponte 2007 (Deputy Secretary of State). Christensen 2007 (Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs). See Rigger 2006. Ma 2008.

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symbolism, including the UN, Taipei shifted to seeking “meaningful participation” or “observer status” in functional and specialized institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), INTERPOL, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To Washington, Ma promised “zero surprises”— a pointed reference to the Chen-era abrupt policy changes that had roiled bilateral relations. Ma’s strategy was summed up in the phrase qinmei, hezhong, youri (closeness with the U.S., peace with China, and friendship with Japan). In a second move, Beijing responded positively and proportionately to Ma’s initiative for improvement in the bilateral relationship. Cross-Strait relations entered an era of rapprochement. The two sides promptly established the “three links” (santong), including direct air travel. With a meeting between Taiwan’s Chiang Ping-kun and the PRC’s Chen Yunlin, the two semi-official exchange bodies set up in the early 1990s—Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)—resumed their dialogue, which had been suspended since 1998. The 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) provided a formal foundation for closer cross-Strait economic ties. Twenty-three followon agreements were reached during the remaining years of Ma’s presidency.24 Beijing engaged the Ma administration under a framework of “peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations and a more accommodating approach to the question of Taiwan’s international space. With Beijing’s acquiescence, Taiwan began participating in the annual World Health Assembly (WHA), the plenary body of the WHO, on an ad hoc basis in 2009. Taiwan was invited to the ICAO Assembly as a special guest in 2013—as with the WHA, under the name “Chinese Taipei.”25 Beijing tacitly observed a “diplomatic truce”—an end to the practice of inducing or permitting members of the ROC’s dwindling cohort of formal diplomatic partners to switch from Taipei to Beijing. The reaction of the United States—the third move—followed suit, bringing a very substantial, if low-key, improvement in U.S.-Taiwan relations from the nadir they had reached under Chen.26 Several years into his presidency, Ma could confidently proclaim, with the concurrence of senior U.S. officials, that U.S.-Taiwan relations were the best they had been since before the severing of formal ties in 1979.27 U.S. officials publicly praised the improvement in crossStrait relations, reflecting Washington’s appreciation for reduced tension in the region, and the resulting alleviation of U.S. concerns about being dragged 24 For a list of these agreements, see http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67145& CtNode=5710&mp=1. 25 deLisle 2009; Yeh 2013. 26 “Obama Statement” 2008; The White House 2015; Thornton 2015 (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). 27 See, for example, Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China 2015; Russel 2014 (Assistant Secretary for East Asian, Pacific Affairs, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

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28

into a crisis or conflict. This improvement was reflected in specific policies that brought noteworthy wins for Taiwan, including: the U.S. granting Taiwan access to the Visa Waiver Program; the resumption of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks after a seven-year hiatus, which had followed a rift over beef imports during the outbreak of mad cow disease in the United States; and new rounds of arms sales and less high-profile forms of defense cooperation.29 The U.S. showed little inclination toward a more ambitious or transformative approach that could have threatened the moderate progress—and moderation—in cross-Strait relations. In the two most prominent Asia policy initiatives of the Obama years, Taiwan was notably consigned to the margins. None of the principal documents defining the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia explicitly addressed the question of Taiwan’s role, and U.S. official statements generally maintained a studied silence on the question.30 The initial membership of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—the economic pillar of the pivot—did not include Taiwan, and Taiwan’s prospects for joining in the relatively near term were poor. On all three sides, moves during Ma’s presidency were relatively measured and reciprocal, but it is plausible that, had Ma pushed a more transformative agenda, the three-move dynamic would have been seen in full force, portending possibly dramatic change. It seems plausible that Beijing would have responded with a zealous pursuit of closer relations, and that the U.S. would have pushed back to preserve or promote something akin to the stable, crisisfree, but not too-rapidly-improving, cross-Strait relationship that came to characterize the Ma era. Ma periodically triggered concerns that he might pursue such a robust first move that would have departed more radically from the pre-Chen and early Ma status quo. Ma’s detractors in Taiwan criticized him for pursuing a China-first policy rather than his purportedly balanced approach of rapprochement with Beijing and reconciliation with the U.S. In the run-up to his 2012 re-election, Ma retreated, in the face of domestic political backlash, from talk of pursuing a cross-Strait peace accord that might lead to talks on political, sovereignty-implicating issues. He backed away by attaching untenable conditions, specifically that a peace agreement must be “necessary” for Taiwan, supported by the public, and subject to legislative oversight.31 At several points, Ma felt compelled to reaffirm his Three Noes policy, and to pledge not to enter talks about unification during his presidency.32 In 2014, Ma’s government suffered a dramatic defeat in the legislature on a key ECFA 28 See Shear 2010. 29 See Campbell 2011 (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs). 30 Clinton 2011; The White House 2011; Donilon 2013 (National Security Advisor). For an analysis of this official silence, see Wang 2015. 31 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2011. 32 See, for example, New York Times 2008; Nylander 2014, Yoo and Wu 2015.

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follow-on agreement. The CSSTA controversy had triggered the Sunflower Movement, which included a dramatic occupation of the legislature by protesters, and which reflected the public’s—and especially the younger generation’s—concern that Taiwan’s growing closeness to the mainland brought excessive costs and risks to Taiwan’s political autonomy, as well as its economic well-being.33 The increasingly evident democratic constraints in Taiwan on deepening cross-Strait relations correlated with limits to Beijing’s positive second move in response to Ma’s initiatives. Over the course of Ma’s presidency, dissatisfaction with the pace of progress in cross-Strait relations and toward unification mounted in China’s Taiwan policy circles, and criticism grew that China was giving Ma too much while getting too little. Under Ma’s strategy, often characterized as “first the easy, then the difficult” (xianyi hounan), the lowhanging fruit of cross-Strait economic cooperation had been harvested, and China sought to move discussions from technical and relatively uncontroversial matters toward more politically sensitive questions. But progress stalled because issues such as military confidence-building measures, Taiwan’s international space, and a cross-Strait peace agreement implicated Taiwan’s sovereignty and security. As Taiwanese critics of Ma’s policies pointed out, Beijing’s purported concessions remained congruent with its unification agenda. China had stuck to its fundamental position concerning Taiwan’s international status and retained extensive veto power over Taiwan’s international participation. Going much farther with Ma-initiated rapprochement might have proved to be a prelude to responses from Beijing—a second move—that would have departed significantly from the status quo and accelerated movement toward unification. Had more status quo-rattling moves been forthcoming from Ma and Beijing, they well could have led to a third move by the U.S. that differed significantly from Washington’s actual policy of generally welcoming substantial but manageable improvement in cross-Strait relations, and signaling expectations for a much-improved—measured against the nadir of the Chen era—but still-circumscribed and low-key U.S.-Taiwan relationship. There are some indications of what the U.S. response might have looked like if Washington had faced much more rapid and thoroughgoing advances in Taiwan-mainland ties. Even the relatively modest changes that did occur in cross-Strait relations led some U.S. officials and think tank analysts to worry that Ma and Beijing were heading in a direction adverse to U.S. interests. Ma’s pursuit of better relations with Beijing coincided with the United States growing increasingly concerned about China’s assertive behavior–especially in the South and East China seas, where Taiwan’s long-standing stance aligned with Beijing and conflicted with rival claimants that were U.S. friends and allies. The familiar but, in policy circles, minority view that the U.S. should “abandon” Taiwan persisted, but it was countered by the re-emergence of 33 See generally, Jones 2017 and Shelley Rigger’s chapter in this volume.

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concern about the opposite worry: Taiwan, increasingly seen again as a strategic asset for Washington in a more adversarial U.S.-China relationship, might “abandon” the United States—a prospect that was sometimes raised to question close defense cooperation and arms sales agreements with Taiwan. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker had asked in 2002, “If Taiwan chooses unification, should the United States care?”34 For many in Washington, the answer remained “yes,” and for some the question had come to seem less speculative. Such considerations suggest that a more status quo-challenging first move by Ma, if reciprocated by a comparable second move from Beijing, might have pushed the U.S. to a third move that could have significantly redefined U.S.-Taiwan relations, whether by offering Taiwan more robust, ally-like support to counteract the centripetal pull of closer ties with Beijing, or by putting pressure on Ma to slow the pace of cross-Strait warming, or—less likely—by “pre-abandoning” a Taiwan that was seen as ineluctably falling into Beijing’s grasp.

Persistence or change in the Tsai era? The three-move dynamic that formed when Taiwan fully democratized and persisted through the mid-2010s may continue through the Tsai Ing-wen administration and beyond. But there are some indications of its possible erosion during Tsai’s presidency. Taiwan In her 2016 campaign, en route to a landslide victory, Tsai appealed to voters— especially younger voters from whose ranks the participants in the Sunflower Movement were drawn—unhappy about an economy that was mediocre by Taiwanese standards, weak job prospects, high levels of inequality, and lack of attention to a range of social justice issues. Many who supported Tsai attributed these problems partly to Ma’s cross-Strait policy and its disappointing or unevenly shared economic gains, and also blamed Ma’s government for Taiwan’s political vulnerabilities that came with economic dependence on the PRC. To win support from median Taiwanese voters and from Washington, Tsai also had to—and did—offer reassurances that she would not upend a relatively stable cross-Strait relationship. After a serious setback for her party in the 2018 local elections, Tsai won re-election with a margin that matched her 2016 victory.35 Her 2020 candidacy was buoyed by a fairly strong economy, the overwhelming support of younger voters from a generation widely characterized as “naturally independent” or “born independent” (tianran du), and the Taiwanese public’s abhorrence at Beijing’s handling of the 2019 Hong 34 Tucker 2002; Bush 2013, 218–220. 35 Bush 2016; Ramzy 2016c; deLisle 2016b.

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Kong protests and Xi Jinping’s insistence that Taiwan be unified under the “one country, two systems” formula that China had first implemented in Hong Kong.36 As candidate and president, Tsai has given extensive and repeated assurances that she would not seek to alter cross-Strait relations, thus foregoing a first move to challenge the basic cross-Strait status quo. Tsai has framed her main priorities as tackling challenging domestic issues, such as revitalizing Taiwan’s economy, undertaking pension reform, improving the social safety net, advancing judicial reform, pressing progressive policies on social issues, and pursuing transitional justice. Cross-Strait and foreign policy issues inevitably have loomed large as well, as they do for all presidents in Taiwan. In her 2016 inaugural address, Tsai emphasized peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, pledging to maintain the status quo and to refrain from provocative actions. Although she declined to accede to Beijing’s demand that she accept the 1992 Consensus and a One China Principle, she acknowledged the “historical fact” that in 1992, SEF and ARATS had “arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings…in a spirit of mutual understanding and…seeking common ground while setting aside differences.” Tsai thereby accorded significance to an event that, through an interpretation offered eight years later by Su Chi (who would later serve as Ma’s Mainland Affairs Council Chairman), became the origin story of the 1992 Consensus. She pledged to conduct cross-Strait relations “in accordance with the ROC Constitution, and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area [the foundational legal framework for cross-Strait opening adopted under Lee], and other relevant legislation.” Tsai thus anchored her mainland policy in long-standing sources of law that are not incompatible with a “one China” idea. She also declared her “respect” for the “historical fact” that “over 20 years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated the status quo and outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain.” She added that “based on such existing realities and political foundations…the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” She referred to these elements, along with the principle of democracy and the will of the people of Taiwan, as the “existing political foundations” for cross-Strait relations. Here, too, Tsai was adopting the language of continuity and stability.37

36 Myers and Horton 2020; Wright 2020; Feng 2020. 37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016a. Tsai’s list of the elements of the “existing political foundations” included: the historical fact of the 1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side of the Strait (SEF and ARATS), when there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common ground; the existing ROC constitutional order; the outcomes of over 20 years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait; and the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.

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In her second inaugural, Tsai focused more heavily on domestic issues, reprising and updating agendas for economic development, reform and revitalization, improving the social safety net, and judicial reform. She set forth several relatively modest proposals for constitutional and institutional reform, and discussed Taiwan’s successful handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite four years of a cold shoulder—or “cold peace”—from Beijing, and notwithstanding the large role that the Hong Kong crisis had played in her campaign, Tsai again pointedly eschewed addressing cross-Strait relations in a way that portended a first move. She characterized her administration as having “made the greatest effort to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” and as remaining “willing to engage in dialogue with China.” She reaffirmed her commitment to “continue to handle cross-Strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.” She reiterated her call for Beijing to engage on the basis of “peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue” and to join her in finding “a way to coexist over the long term and prevent the intensification of antagonism and differences.”38 In office, Tsai has largely stuck to the stance on cross-Strait relations set forth in her two inaugural speeches. In remarks at a symposium on 30 years of cross-Strait exchanges, convened shortly after the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress and Xi’s political report adopting a less accommodating tone on Taiwan issues, Tsai asserted that the DPP had sought progress in relations with Beijing since the Chen years, restated her commitment to peace, stability, and development in cross-Strait relations, and pledged continued good will toward the mainland and no return to the “old path of confrontation.” She characterized the 19th Party Congress as an opportunity for both sides to embrace harmony and moderation and to seek a breakthrough in relations.39 She charged that it was China—through its “unilateral diplomatic offensive and military coercion”—that had “challenged the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”40 In her 2020 National Day speech, Tsai reaffirmed a commitment to cross-Strait stability, calling it a “joint responsibility of both sides,” and said Taiwan sought “meaningful dialogue” with Beijing.41 Notwithstanding complaints from the more fundamentalist wing of her own camp,42 Tsai faced little domestic political pressure to push for major changes in relations with Beijing or to adopt policies that would test Beijing’s red lines. The rising Taiwanese identity and growing skepticism toward closer ties with China that continued from the Ma years did not translate into politically salient enthusiasm for pursuit of independence or other moves to attack the status quo. (An exception was a move by DPP legislators, 38 39 40 41 42

Focus Taiwan 2020a. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017. Focus Taiwan 2018a; Jennings 2019a; Focus Taiwan 2020b. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020. Hsu 2016; Kan 2016.

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including the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, to consider changes to provisions in the ROC constitution concerning the national name, territory, and support for unification—proposals that echoed moves from the Chen era that Beijing had regarded as unacceptably pushing toward formal independence.43) Beijing’s heavy-handed approach to the protests in Hong Kong, its early mishandling of the novel coronavirus outbreak, and its suspected role in disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan’s elections—all of which exacerbated fear and anger toward the PRC in Taiwan—could have given Tsai an impetus to contemplate a first move, but she refrained. Instead, Tsai sought to portray Beijing as making, in essence, an unprovoked second move. In her second inaugural address, for example, she pointedly characterized the one country, two systems model—which Xi pushed with growing stridency for Taiwan—as something that would “undermine the cross-Strait status quo.”44 Tsai also forewent possible opportunities to press Taipei’s remarkably strong relationship with Washington into Beijing-provoking first-move-like gambits. For example, Tsai’s foreign minister rebuffed suggestions that Taiwan was seeking, or should seek, to re-establish formal relations with Washington.45 To be sure, Tsai has not always steered clear of more assertive positions on issues that could roil cross-Strait relations and rile Beijing. For example, on an early visit to Panama, she described herself—in signing an official guestbook—as “President of Taiwan (ROC).” She pursued, and achieved, a mutual upgrading of the names of Taiwan’s and Japan’s embassy-like bodies to nomenclature more closely resembling that used by governments of states that maintain diplomatic relations. Her congratulatory telephone call with thenPresident-elect Trump was widely regarded as designed to elevate Taiwan’s stature with the incoming U.S. administration.46 Fresh off her re-election victory, she reiterated in an interview with the BBC, “We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state…. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China (Taiwan).”47 Beijing has pressed a narrative portraying Tsai and her government as trying to upend the cross-Strait status quo, asserting that Tsai’s refusal to endorse explicitly the 1992 Consensus and One China Principle is a change warranting a policy response from Beijing, and that Tsai and the DPP government are pursuing “soft” independence or independence “in any form or name.”48 Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) criticized Tsai’s second inaugural address as reflecting unilateral moves to undermine the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.49 According to 43 44 45 46

Pan 2020; Hioe 2020. Focus Taiwan 2020a. Xie 2020. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016; Hornung 2018, Landler and Sanger 2016. 47 Sudworth 2020; Chen et al. 2020. 48 K. Li 2017; Xinhua 2017; Cole 2016. 49 Xinhua 2020 (statement of TAO spokesperson Ma Xiaoguang).

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this narrative, Tsai has returned to the de-sinification agenda associated with Chen, through moves that may seem inconsequential, but that Beijing depicts as undermining Taiwan’s sense of Chinese-ness.50 China’s Taiwan policy circles argue that the U.S. has been mistaken in failing to perceive the threat inherent in Tsai’s behavior, and in believing that Tsai’s foregoing an openly pro-independence agenda means that Taiwan is not jeopardizing cross-Strait stability or the status quo.51 The COVID-19 pandemic added another layer to this critique. Chinese sources denounced Taiwan’s “mask diplomacy,” which paralleled Beijing’s offers of personal protective equipment and other assistance to afflicted states, but without political strings attached. They called it a betrayal of the Chinese nation by giving priority to foreigners, and specifically the United States (which issued a joint statement on COVID cooperation with Taiwan). Beijing sources also condemned Tsai’s government for exploiting the pandemic to advance the symbolic gain of Taiwan’s WHO engagement—strongly supported by the United States–and, in turn, a masked agenda of Taiwan independence.52 Such assessments by Chinese sources, if taken seriously, imply that the longstanding pattern of sequential moves still holds. On China’s account, Tsai made a first move to change the status quo in cross-Strait relations. A much tougher policy toward Taiwan, then, would be a conventional second move by Beijing. If, however, one rejects Beijing’s characterizations as implausible and exaggerated, the conventional dynamic holds only if China foregoes big changes in cross-Strait policy in (non)response to an absent first move by Taiwan. China On a plausible reading of Beijing’s approach to cross-Strait policy during Tsai’s first term and into her second, China has forgone the qualitative changes that would be associated with a second move. Often-harsh rhetoric has overlain considerable stability in behavior and basic policy. China’s reaction to Tsai’s inaugural addresses was strong, but relatively measured, dissatisfaction. In 2016, official Chinese responses condescendingly called Tsai’s inaugural speech an “unfinished test paper”53 and repeatedly pressed Tsai to answer—in a way satisfactory to Beijing—the key question of the nature of the relationship between the two sides. Chinese sources—including Xi himself—offered revived or modestly revised terminology from the recent past such as “the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China” or a “one China framework” to supplement the “one China principle” and “1992 Consensus.”54 The communiqué of the 2020 Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee offered a 50 51 52 53 54

Cole 2016; C. Li 2017. This assessment is based on author’s interviews; see also Hass 2020. Everington 2020; Yang 2020b. Xinhua 2016; Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC 2016. Xi 2017 (19th Party Congress Report); Xi 2019; see also Huang 2017, 246–247.

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brief, familiar, and anodyne statement about “promoting the development of peaceful cross-Strait ties and national unification.”55 The TAO responded to Tsai’s second inaugural speech by reasserting the inevitability of unification and China’s determination “not [to] leave any room for separatist activities aimed at ‘Taiwan independence.’”56 Overall, Beijing seemed inclined to wait out Tsai’s tenure, in the hope of a KMT successor who would be more pliable.57 During Tsai’s first term and into her second, the PRC-driven “cold peace” in cross-Strait relations has stopped short of the levels of confrontation that Beijing had adopted toward Chen and Lee. Many of China’s moves to punish Taiwan under Tsai were limited, reversing relatively modest and recent gains by removing some of what China billed as unilateral concessions to Taiwan. These measures included reducing the number of mainland tourists traveling to Taiwan,58 eliminating customs duty concessions and preferential purchase schemes, suspending contacts between SEF and ARATS, and halting interactions between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office. During Tsai’s first term, Beijing added new soft tactics to balance its hard methods, including the “31 Measures” in 2018 and the “26 Measures” in 2019 that offered incentives and accommodating policies to Taiwanese firms and individuals pursuing economic opportunities in the mainland.59 Beginning early in Tsai’s tenure, however, Beijing also took other actions that looked like a second move (or its equivalent). On some assessments, what had initially been characterized as a cold peace began to look like a cold confrontation and even a cold war.60 Even before Tsai was elected, Xi had warned “the earth will move and the mountains will shake” (didong shanyao).61 During Tsai’s first term and into her second, Beijing’s Taiwan affairs officials warned that the near future of cross-Strait relations would be “grim.”62 Although reiterating longstanding positions, Xi’s speech to the 19th Party Congress in 2017 included a newly stern tone toward Taiwan and an explicit linkage between unification and Xi’s core aim of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Xi also omitted boilerplate references to achieving reunification with the support of the people in Taiwan.63 In his speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the seminal 1979 “Message to Taiwan Compatriots,” Xi reprised many of these themes and affirmed that 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 2020. Xinhua 2020; Lee and Blanchard 2020. Bush 2019, 7; Chan 2020. Smith 2016; Sung 2019. Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China 2019; Blanchard 2019. Ramzy 2016b; Lin 2016; Hsu and Kao 2017. Xinhua 2015. Grossman 2016; Panda 2017 (quoting Politburo Standing Committee Member Yu Zhengsheng); Xinhua 2019, (TAO Director Liu Jieyi); Xinhua 2020. 63 Xi 2017; Bush 2017.

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peaceful unification of Taiwan must occur under the “one country, two systems” formula.64 On China’s Constitution Day in December 2020, the TAO issued a cryptic statement about taking “a look at the constitution’s provisions on national unity,” which triggered a flurry of speculative discussion of whether China would move to adopt a “reunification law” targeting Taiwan to “crush” separatism.65 China ended the Ma-era’s so-called diplomatic truce and poached seven of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies during Tsai’s first term, reducing the total to 15. The PRC squeezed Taiwan’s international space by ending the Ma-era practice of Taiwan’s participation in the WHA’s annual meeting, and blocking its resumption even amid the COVID-19 crisis.66 China took other steps to erode Taiwan’s international status—for example, inducing several countries to deport Taiwanese criminal fraud suspects to the PRC.67 During Tsai’s tenure, China has taken more assertive military measures toward Taiwan, sending an aircraft carrier and ancillary ships on missions through the Taiwan Strait,68 dispatching military aircraft to circle Taiwan,69 announcing medium-range missiles targeting Taiwan,70 activating a new civilian aircraft flight path closer to the median line in the Taiwan Strait,71 conducting larger-scale military drills near Taiwan (in part, according to the TAO’s spokesman, to counter the “interference of foreign [i.e., U.S.] forces”), and dispatching PLA air force planes into once-de facto-respected airspace near Taiwan.72 Near the end of Tsai’s first term and the beginning of her second, Chinese defense officials again sharpened rhetoric about Taiwan, with one declaring in a high-profile setting that the PLA would “take all necessary steps to resolutely smash any separatist plots or actions” by Taiwan if “the possibility for peaceful unification is lost.”73 Concerns about China’s escalating military activities near Taiwan in mid- to late 2020 reached a point where China’s state-run China Central Television briefly and controversially characterized a planned (and subsequently cancelled) visit to the mainland by a KMT delegation (headed by the former speaker of the Legislative Yuan) as a move to “sue for peace,” implying the two sides had reached the brink of war.74 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Xi 2019. “National Reunification Law?” 2020. deLisle 2020b. Ramzy 2016a; Whiteman 2016; Associated Press 2017, Republic of China (Taiwan) High Prosecutor’s Office 2018; Strong 2019. See, for example, Forsythe and Buckley 2017; Reuters 2017. Focus Taiwan 2016; Martina and Hamacher 2017. Focus Taiwan 2017. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), Foreign Press Liaison Office 2018; Jennings 2018. “China Says Military Drills” 2020; Yu 2020. Fifield 2020a (quoting Li Zuocheng, Chief of Joint Staff Department and Central Military Commission Member); see also Yeo 2019. Central News Agency 2020a.

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China’s moves to shrink Taiwan’s international space extended to economic affairs. Starting in 2018, Beijing began to wield its formidable market power to press multinational firms doing business in China to designate Taiwan as part of China on their websites and publications. Targeted companies included U.S. and other foreign-based airlines and hotel chains, prompting the Trump administration to call China’s strategy to impose its “political correctness” on non-PRC nationals and businesses “Orwellian nonsense.”75 With the PRC-promoted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) finally being signed by 15 Asian states in November 2020 and the incoming Biden administration unlikely to quickly reverse the Trump administration’s decision to opt out of the TPP, Taiwan continues to face exclusion from the two major regional trade blocs. Taiwan will, thus, remain more vulnerable to Beijing’s political use of its economic leverage (which would be only modestly offset if Taiwan succeeds in its pursuit of a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. under the possibly less trade-skeptical Biden administration). The United States If we see Tsai as having foregone a first move to change cross-Strait relations substantially, and judge Beijing’s toughened policies toward Tsai’s Taiwan as stopping short of what would constitute a full second move, then the longstanding dynamic would remain operative if U.S. policy toward Taiwan and, in turn, U.S.-Taiwan relations remained relatively stable. So, too, if we were to entertain Beijing’s most dire characterizations of Tsai’s policies and behavior (a first move), and assess Beijing’s policies and actions toward Tsai’s Taiwan as heralding a qualitative change in cross-Strait policy and relations (a second move), then the familiar pattern would persist if Washington tried to restore the status quo ante in cross-Strait relations, most likely through a commensurate increase in U.S. support for Taiwan (a third move). On the other hand, the three-move sequence would have come apart if Washington became the disruptive force, sharply upgrading support for Taiwan in the absence of analogous moves by either Taipei or Beijing. The familiar pattern also would have frayed if Washington undertook the equivalent of a third move by qualitatively increasing backing for Taipei in response to Beijing’s equivalent of a second move severely threatening or undermining the status quo despite Taipei not having made a first move.76 The evidence from U.S. policy during Tsai’s first several years in office is mixed, and assessing its significance is all the more complicated given the 75 The White House 2018b. 76 There are, of course, other logical possibilities that would not fit the three-move model, including: a first move by Taiwan, no second move by Beijing, and either a third move or no third move by the U.S.; or no third move by the U.S. despite a second move by Beijing, with or without a first move by Taiwan. Compared to those discussed in the text, these other logical possibilities are less plausible descriptions of developments during Tsai’s presidency.

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chaos and volatility of much Trump-era U.S. foreign policy and the uncertainty over the extent to which the Biden administration would continue or alter Trump’s policies regarding Taiwan. Many signs point toward a basic continuity in U.S.-Taiwan relations. But there also have been elements of increased U.S. support that have broadly mirrored Beijing’s increasingly tough stance toward Taiwan, and that suggest what a possible third move-like upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan relations might look like. This pattern has unfolded across issues ranging from general statements about U.S. relations with Taiwan and policy on Taiwan-related issues, to U.S.-Taiwan security ties, to issues of Taiwan’s diplomatic relations and international space, to interventions in U.S. Taiwan policy by an increasingly assertive Congress. President-elect Trump’s phone call with Tsai in December 2016 raised the possibility that the new administration would qualitatively enhance Taiwan’s status with the United States. After all, no U.S. president-elect had ever taken such a phone call, and reports indicated that it reflected a policy choice influenced by pro-Taiwan or anti-China advisors.77 Trump then appeared to double down in responding to predictable outrage from Beijing.78 He said to Fox News, “I fully understand the ‘one China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”79 He told the Wall Street Journal, “Everything is under negotiation, including One China.”80 Yet any expectation of a fundamental change in Taiwan’s favor in U.S.Taiwan relations was soon tempered by signs of stability or even erosion. In a February 2017 telephone call with Xi, Trump “agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our One China policy.”81 Two months later, Trump told Reuters that he would “certainly want to speak to [Xi] first” before taking another call from Tsai.82 Even before Trump’s retrenchment, unease had grown in Taiwan about the impact of the Trump-Tsai call. Within days, Tsai herself had opined that one telephone call did not represent a fundamental change in policy. Concerns emerged that Trump might be willing to treat Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the context of a larger deal with China to address U.S.-China trade and security concerns—which could bring a striking reduction in U.S. support despite Taiwan having committed to not challenging the status quo in cross-Strait relations.83 Such Trumpian interventions aside, the administration’s engagement with Taiwan in many respects showed basic steadiness. Despite the downward turn in cross-Strait relations that Beijing blames on Tsai, Tsai has never received 77 78 79 80 81

Gearan, Rucker, and Denyer 2016; Yoshino and Ihara 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2016. Bohan and Brunnstrom 2016. Smilowitz 2017. By “our,” Trump was referring to the United States (rather than the U.S. and the PRC). The White House 2017b; Glaser and Viers 2017. 82 Mason, Adler, and Holland 2017. 83 See Lander 2016; Chung 2016; Tiezzi 2017.

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warnings or rebukes akin to those that the U.S. directed at Chen. Instead, Washington has largely held an assertive Beijing responsible. Trump and his team snubbed China’s proffered forgiving characterization of the telephone call with Tsai as a manipulative move by the Taiwanese leader that, in effect, duped the then-president-elect.84 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Chairman James Moriarty described Tsai as pragmatic and innovative in her approach to Beijing and opined that the onus was on Beijing to improve cross-Strait relations.85 Sharing a platform with Tsai in Taipei, a senior State Department official declared the U.S.-Taiwan relationship to be “stable” and “secure.”86 The Trump administration allowed Tsai the opportunities often accorded to her predecessors of high-profile transit stops in the U.S. and the occasions they provide for meeting with prominent U.S. politicians and giving speeches to public audiences.87 The creation of new and much grander consolidated facilities in Taipei for AIT was interpretable as confirmation of Taiwan’s standing with Washington, but stopped short of a transformative upgrade to AIT’s long-standing and robust presence in Taipei and the officially unofficial nature of the relationship. At the same time, there have been indications over the course of Tsai’s presidency of a warming relationship that—especially in the eyes of a wary Beijing—might point to a qualitative shift in U.S.-Taiwan ties, or hint at what that might look like. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement congratulating Tsai on her second inauguration as a democratically elected president of Taiwan was, like his statement on her re-election, from an especially high official, and called Taiwan “a force for good in the world and a reliable partner” for the United States, drawing a sharp rebuke from China.88 In the midst of intense mutual recriminations between the U.S. and China over the COVID-19 pandemic, Washington raised the level of officials visiting Taiwan, dispatching the cabinet-level Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar to commend and highlight Taiwan’s extraordinary success in containing what the Trump administration insisted on calling the “China virus.”89 U.S.Taiwan collaboration on COVID emerged as a new source of solidarity in bilateral relations, as well as a new focal point for Beijing’s umbrage at U.S.Taiwan ties. Joe Biden’s victory in the U.S. 2020 presidential election led to mixed expectations about the trajectory of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Especially against 84 85 86 87 88

See, for example, Dyer and Clover 2016; Gearan, Rucker, and Denyer 2016. Tsao and Chin 2017. Wong 2018 (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State). Horton 2017; Kensaku 2018; Jennings 2019b. Pompeo 2020b; Bloomberg News 2020; Zhao 2020 (Spokesman of the Information Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Pompeo 2020a. 89 The most recent prior visit by a cabinet-level U.S. official—though not one with the title of “Secretary”—was Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy in 2014, whom Biden designated as White House Climate Coordinator for his administration.

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the backdrop of the increased support that Taiwan had enjoyed during Trump’s presidency, some foresaw backsliding toward the pattern of bilateral relations during the Obama administration, in which Biden and much of his Asia policy team had served.90 Relative stability in U.S. Taiwan policy seemed more likely, given the reassuring statements on policy toward Taiwan from Biden (and from his soon-to-be Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken), the bipartisan support for recently strengthened commitments to Taiwan, and the implications for U.S. Taiwan policy of the now-entrenched and Bidenendorsed shift to tougher policies toward China.91 In the security dimension of U.S.-Taiwan relations, a similar pattern has held. There have been many indications of continuity. At the Shangri-La dialogue in 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis reiterated the U.S. commitment to “working with Taiwan,” providing Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)-mandated arms sales, and “stand[ing] for the peaceful resolution of any issues in a manner acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait.”92 Two years later at the same event, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan struck similar notes, echoing his predecessor’s statement that the U.S. rejected coerced resolution of cross-Strait issues, and declaring that the U.S. continued to meet its “obligations” under the TRA to provide Taiwan with defense articles and services and thereby to “empower the people of Taiwan to determine their own future. Biden’s State Department “noted with concern the pattern of ongoing PRC attempts to intimidate” Taiwan, and urged Beijing to “cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure.”93 Other moves pointed toward a strengthening of the security relationship. A senior State Department official visiting Taipei assured the Taiwanese that the U.S. commitment to “bolster Taiwan’s ability to defend its democracy” had “never been stronger.”94 In November 2020, U.S. Navy Admiral and director of intelligence for the Indo-Pacific Command paid an unannounced, post-U.S. election, symbolically important visit to Taiwan.95 The Trump administration also announced substantial arms sales offers and a policy of more regular and routinized arms sales decisions.96 As part of a tougher U.S. policy toward China, the U.S. Navy stepped up operations in the waters and airspace near Taiwan to a pace averaging once 90 Hille 2020; Shih 2020a. 91 Central News Agency 2020b, 2020c; Hernández and Chien 2020; Taiwan Times 2020; “Taiwan Hopes for Close U.S. Cooperation” 2020; Biden 2020a; National Security Agency Review Teams 2020; U.S. Department of State 2021 (declaring “U.S. commitment to Taiwan is rock solid”). The comments from the advisor whom then President-elect Biden would announce as his choice for Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, came in a congratulatory phone call on Biden’s election from Taiwan’s de facto ambassador in Washington, Hsiao Bi-khim—a call that was an echo at a lower echelon of Tsai’s congratulatory call to Trump four years earlier. 92 U.S. Department of Defense 2017b. 93 U.S. Department of Defense 2019; U.S. Department of State 2021. 94 Wong 2018. 95 Griffiths, Browne, and Salama 2020. 96 Harold 2019; Security Cooperation Agency, United States Department of Defense, n.d.

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per month.97 During 2020, U.S. Navy ships made numerous transit passages through the Taiwan Strait—a notable departure from prior practice.98 Where the “pivot” or “rebalance” of the Obama-Ma years had skirted the issue of Taiwan’s role, the Trump administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy was more embracing, although not clearly transformative. With its rhetoric of alignment among democratic states in the region and the widespread perception that it was a China-countering and perhaps China-containment strategy—a view amply underpinned by the December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy’s characterization of the PRC as a Russia-like strategic competitor and revisionist state— the FOIP suggested opportunities for closer U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation.99 The principal FOIP manifesto, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision,” declared, “The U.S. vision and approach in the Indo-Pacific region aligns closely with” the policies of several regional allies and “Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy.”100 In remarks on the 40th anniversary of the TRA, a senior State Department official stated that the U.S. “consider[s] Taiwan’s security as central to the security of the Indo-Pacific.”101 The FOIP policies articulated under Trump and Biden’s stated commitments to renewed cooperation with allies and solidarity among democratic states in the Indo-Pacific region—and Taiwan’s eager embrace of that approach—suggest the possibility of further developments in this vein, further weaving together Taiwan’s strategic and ideational importance to the United States.102 However, the agendas put forth under Trump and by Biden stop far short of restoring the mutual security alliance the U.S. had with Taiwan during the Cold War—a move that clearly would be a qualitative change in that aspect of bilateral relations. U.S. policy on matters of Taiwan’s international space followed a similar trajectory. The U.S. has escalated somewhat its responses to Beijing’s increased poaching of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. After Panama shifted diplomatic ties, and in the wake of Xi’s 19th Party Congress speech striking a tougher tone on Taiwan, official U.S. statements expressed hope that the authorities 97 98 99 100 101

Browne 2018; Johnson 2019; Maizland 2019. Doornbos 2020; “China Says it Tailed U.S. Warship” 2020. The White House 2017a. U.S. Department of State 2019. But see Glaser, Funaiole, and Marston 2019, 29–31. Murphy 2019 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). 102 U.S. Department of State 2021 (Taiwan among the “friends and allies” in the region; US to “deepen[...] ties with democratic Taiwan”); Biden 2020b (although not explicitly mentioning Taiwan, calling for the U.S. to “get tough with China” by forging a “united front of U.S. allies and partners”); National Security Agency Review Teams 2020 (similarly pledging to “build coalitions of like-minded partners and allies” concerned about China to “multiply the impact of our efforts and make those efforts more sustainable”); Davidson 2020 (quoting Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, “like-minded countries need to come together” and “will be stronger together” in the context of possible “rethink[ing] of the strategy for dealing with China”); Reuters 2020 (quoting President Tsai that “democratic friends in the Indo-Pacific” should “discuss a framework to generate sustained and concerted efforts to maintain a strategic order that deters unilateral aggressive actions”); Wang 2019.

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on both sides of the Strait would pursue constructive dialogue and creative, flexible, and patient approaches.103 When Beijing further tightened its diplomatic squeeze on Taiwan, Washington issued a more pointed rebuke, summoning home for “consultation” the U.S. ambassadors to three Latin American countries that severed relations with Taipei, and expressed concern about Beijing’s growing influence in the Western Hemisphere.104 After U.S. lobbying failed to stop Kiribati and Solomon Islands from switching ties to Beijing, Vice President Pence canceled a meeting with the Solomon Islands prime minister and threatened to reconsider aid programs.105 The U.S. also increased its long-running support for Taiwan’s participation in major international organizations, including UN-affiliated specialized agencies. This effort became more high-profile—and therefore, more significant in terms of overall support for Taiwan—in the context of Taiwan’s bid to resume attendance at the WHA annual meeting in 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis.106 The Biden administration’s agenda of reengagement with international institutions portended continuation of such support, with renewed credibility and, perhaps, influence.107 In the face of Beijing’s increased pressure on Taiwan, the U.S. Congress became more active on Taiwan policy during Tsai’s presidency, urging closer ties and stronger support, but ultimately not requiring major changes. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018 called on the President to consider reciprocal port calls by the U.S. and ROC navies.108 The Taiwan Travel Act, adopted in 2018, called on the President to allow higherlevel officials, up to the Secretary level on the U.S. side, to meet with their Taiwan counterparts in either country.109 The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 declared that it is U.S. policy to enforce faithfully all existing commitments to Taiwan—consistent with the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. The same law also implored the President to “conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China” and to “encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act.”110 The NDAAs for 2019, 2020, and 2021 covered much of the same ground and reaffirmed the policies and directives in other recent Taiwan-related legislation. Enacted in 2020, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act reprised key themes from earlier legislation, and called for stronger U.S. efforts 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

Nauert 2017 (State Department Spokesperson); Taipei Times 2017. Taiwan News 2018; Beech 2018. Myers and Horton 2020; Brunnstrom 2019. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2020; Jacobs, Shear, and Wong 2020. See, for example, “Sigh of Relief” 2020; Biden 2020b. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, § 1259(b)(7). Taiwan Travel Act, § 3. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, § 209.

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to support Taiwan’s membership in non-UN-affiliated international organization and participation in UN-affiliated ones (such as the WHO), and to protect and promote Taiwan’s formal diplomatic relationships by using economic, security, and diplomatic carrots and sticks to reward or punish other states for breaking, keeping, or upgrading ties.111 At the end of 2020, the Taiwan Assurance Act reiterated Congress’s position that Taiwan is a vital part of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” urged the U.S. government to conduct regular sales and transfers of defense articles to Taiwan to enable it to develop asymmetric capabilities and to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation or membership in appropriate intergovernmental organizations, and appropriated US$3 million to support activities under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.112 All of these strongly bipartisan measures, especially if implemented by the executive branch, could be interpreted—and would be interpreted in Beijing and Taipei—as indicating a notable increase in U.S.-Taiwan ties and Washington’s support for Taipei. Such measures from Congress departed from the long-standing pattern of bills to enhance Taiwan’s standing or relationship with the U.S. foundering during the legislative process, but these enacted laws still change, and demand, relatively little. They do not give the president any authority that he would not already claim under U.S. law concerning the separation of powers in foreign and military affairs. The laws do not purport to require the president or his subordinates to do much beyond making reports to Congress or conducting policy reviews. Much of their content is a reaffirmation of existing law and policy, or a mere expression of congressional support for more pro-Taiwan policies. The executive branch may choose not to exercise the authority Congress purported to confer or follow Congress’s policy preferences. Such mixed and relatively modest developments in Washington’s Taiwan policies are not likely to produce a qualitative shift in U.S.-Taiwan or trilateral relations. If a transformative change occurs, it is likely to follow a causal pattern that would depart from the three-move dynamic that has characterized the last quarter century. On one hand, actual or perceived declines in U.S. power relative to China or the credibility of U.S. commitments in East Asia would increase the possibility that a move by Beijing threatening the cross-Strait status quo will occur—even in the absence of a triggering first move by Taiwan—and that the U.S. would not counter with a commensurate response to preserve the status quo or restore the status quo ante, or at least that Taiwan would lack confidence that the U.S. would do so. These possibilities have become more plausible. Notwithstanding the FOIP policy, the Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy and its general disdain for allies and multilateralism— following on the George W. Bush-era focus on West Asia and terrorism, and 111 Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, § 4. 112 Taiwan Assurance Act (2019-2020), S.87 —116th Congress (2019–2020).

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what many in East Asia viewed as a disconcertingly hollow Obama-era pivot back to Asia—cast doubt on the stability of traditional U.S. security commitments in the region. The U.S. has sought to assuage such concerns, including through repeated and concerted efforts by senior U.S. foreign policy and national security officials during the Trump years to reassure regional friends and allies. Biden and his foreign policy team have consistently declared that restoring alliances and reassuring allies is a high priority, and that a U.S. return to international leadership and support for allies and likeminded states would be a hallmark of Biden’s foreign policy.113 The challenges posed by doubts about the U.S. role in regional security are especially serious in the context of U.S. Taiwan policy. Taiwan is perennially in a more precarious position in terms of U.S. support than are Washington’s more formal security allies and those whose sovereignty and statehood are not rejected by Beijing. Taiwan is therefore vulnerable to weakened U.S. support for reasons not rooted in any move by Taiwan to alter cross-Strait relations, or Beijing’s response to such a move. On the other hand, the now-fraught and potentially further worsening U.S.-China relationship might lead to qualitatively increased U.S. support for Taiwan and much closer U.S.-Taiwan relations in the absence of a move by Taipei or Beijing that directly seeks, or threatens, a major change in cross-Strait relations. A downward trend in U.S.-PRC relations accelerated rapidly, albeit unevenly, during the Trump presidency, but it has deep roots nearly a decade earlier on the U.S. side in a growing bipartisan turn against the long-standing consensus in favor of “constructive engagement” with China. By early in Trump’s and Tsai’s tenures, the principal U.S. national security strategy document depicted China as a threat and rival on almost every front, and a “trade-plus” war had broken out amid escalating but long-festering tensions over many aspects of economic relations, including investment restrictions, intellectual property protection, high-tech industrial policy, and market access. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence gave a speech that some analysts compared to George Kennan’s anonymous article presaging Washington’s Cold War containment policy toward the Soviet Union.114 By the spring of 2020, Trump, Pompeo, and other senior administration officials—as well as numerous bills introduced in Congress— were blaming China for the impact of COVID-19 in the United States and globally, and demanding that China accept responsibility and make reparations. In both Beijing and Washington, a new cold war seemed increasingly likely.115 Expectations of a shift back toward normalcy and stability in the 113 U.S. Department of Defense 2017a (reporting on a visit by James Mattis to Japan and South Korea); The White House 2017c; Garamone 2019; Biden 2020b; Sanger 2020; U.S. Department of State 2021. 114 U.S.-China Perception Monitor 2017; deLisle and Goldstein 2021; Shepardson 2018; Dollar and Wang 2018; The White House 2018a; Kennan 1947. 115 Kaplan 2019; Tellis 2019, 4–11; deLisle 2020a, Buckley and Myers 2020; Fifield 2020b.

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U.S. approach to China accompanied the arrival of the Biden administration, but the near-universal expectation was that the long-developing shift toward a harder line on China would remain, and that U.S. policy would not revert to the approach of the early years of the Obama-Biden administration or earlier periods. With a more adversarial view of China and tougher policies toward China entrenched in Washington, U.S. support for Taiwan was less vulnerable to arguments that Washington could and should abandon Taiwan (or take steps in that direction) to secure better relations with China. A strongly U.S.-backed Taiwan looked more like a hard power and soft power asset for the United States in a sharpening contest with China. In the words of Biden’s State Department, the U.S. “commitment to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability…within the region.”116 In this context, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and, in turn, U.S.-Taiwan relations could look more like they did in the period preceding Taiwan’s democratization and during the depths of the Cold War, with U.S. policy shaped less by the three-move structure that has prevailed since the 1990s and more by a dynamic that would be troublingly familiar to those who recalled the Strait crises of the 1950s. Actions by one of the two greater powers in the triangular relationship—and not triggered by Taiwan—seemed more likely to be sources of change and instability, and prospects grew both that Beijing would greatly increase pressure on—or coercion of—Taiwan substantially above the levels of Tsai’s first several years in office, and that the U.S. might “play the Taiwan card” or be accused by Beijing of doing so.117

U.S. policy and U.S.-Taiwan relations: toward an agenda for dynamic stability Despite signs that the three-move dynamic may be fraying, it well may endure. Either way, U.S. policies focusing on longstanding and long-term issues and interests can reduce the potential for instability and damage to U.S.-Taiwan relations and U.S. interests. Although deterring Taiwan from making a first move does not seem necessary under current conditions, circumstances could change. U.S. policies that signal continuity in support for Taiwan (although not unconditional support) or the basic cross-Strait status quo can ameliorate risks of a first move by Taiwan, deter Beijing from taking destabilizing steps, and temper concerns raised in many quarters by the U.S.’s tumultuous foreign policy under Trump and the longer-term erosion of the credibility of U.S. commitments and the relative decline of U.S. power. Several important areas of U.S.-Taiwan relations with triangular—that is, PRC-involving— dimensions are relevant. Some—although not all—of these issues promise to be on the agenda for Biden administration policymakers. 116 Rogin 2020; Swanson 2020; Traub 2020; Yang 2020b; U.S. Department of State 2021. 117 See, for example, Shih, Dou, and Gearan 2020; Lynch 2018, Bosco 2018, Zhang and Liu 2019; Swanson, Mozur, and Zhong 2020; Hernández and Chien 2020.

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Security relations A sustained, substantive, and quiet high-level bilateral dialogue would affirm and adjust the long-standing, albeit implicit, U.S.-Taiwan security arrangement that deters China (and that China denounces as interference in its internal affairs). Regular interchanges can reduce strategic uncertainty, provide political reassurance, and achieve closer working relationships. Attentive management can address the ever-present alliance dilemma in international relations: the patron’s fear of entrapment and the client’s fear of abandonment.118 High-level bilateral security dialogues have occurred sparingly and only since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. They are needed in light of China’s growing assertiveness, an increasingly confrontational U.S.-China relationship, lingering (albeit reduced) concerns that Taipei’s policies may upend cross-Strait relations, and increased uncertainties about U.S. commitments in the region. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are an essential element of the security relationship that would benefit from greater predictability. Although the TRA and the Six Assurances mandate that the U.S. provide Taiwan with defensive articles and services based on Taiwan’s needs, and not in consultation with China, arms sales decisions often have been symbolic and politicized on all sides. U.S. concerns about China’s reaction, bureaucratic infighting within the U.S. government, partisan politics in Taiwan, and the penchant to use U.S. arms sales as a barometer of Washington’s commitment to Taiwan have created a convoluted and fraught process. Items have been offered, then long delayed. Systems have become the focus of debates on both sides about whether they serve Taiwan’s defense needs.119 Offers have fallen short of what Taiwan has sought. New items have been delivered only after the PRC has acquired offsetting capabilities. U.S. officials have complained that Taiwan falls short of its goal of devoting three percent of GDP to defense and fails to follow through on acquiring arms that the U.S. offers, at some political cost in its relations with China.120 U.S. measures to assure Taiwan’s capabilities for defending itself would make Taiwan less likely to take, out of desperation, risky cross-Strait stability-shaking moves, and less tempting as a target for coercion by Beijing that could create a cross-Strait crisis and, in turn, threaten U.S. interests. A more regular, less politicized, more professional and pragmatic approach to addressing Taiwan’s defense needs would help to ameliorate these concerns, and there have been some efforts in this direction from the U.S. administration and Congress since Tsai came to office.121 Such an approach is becoming a more pressing imperative as the cross-Strait military balance continues to shift to China’s advantage. In its 118 119 120 121

Synder 1984. See Murray 2018. Grossman, Chase, and Ma 2017. Chung 2018; see also the Taiwan-related provisions in the National Defense Authorization Acts for 2018 and 2019 and the TAIPEI Act, discussed earlier in this chapter.

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absence, there is likely to be greater unpredictability, including due to possible unilateral steps by Taiwan. Whether out of concern with the pattern of U.S. arms sales, or in pursuit of her goal of economic revitalization, Tsai has advocated developing a domestic defense industry as one of several key industries to be promoted.122 Disputes over the South China Sea and, to a lesser extent, the East China Sea pose a distinctive challenge in managing U.S.-Taiwan security relations because they are rare security-related issues where Taipei’s views have aligned more with Beijing and less with Washington and its allies in the region. The South China Sea issue entered a new and more complicated phase shortly after Tsai took office. The 2016 ruling by an international arbitration panel, in a case brought by the Philippines, sweepingly rejected PRC legal arguments that paralleled Taiwan’s long-held positions.123 The Ma administration did not, and politically could not, fully repudiate the controversial nine-dash line that was at the heart of the PRC’s claims and that had its origin in an 11-dash line on an ROC map from 1947. A trip by Ma to Taiping Island (Itu Aba)— controlled by Taiwan since 1947 and the largest island in the contested region—and a Ma administration-supported brief to the arbitral tribunal by some of Taiwan’s leading international lawyers underscored the Taiwan/ROC claim of sovereignty over the island.124 Tsai faced much the same domestic political terrain that Ma did, including pressure not to show softness on territorial claims. Still, she adopted a relatively low-key approach, despite the arbitration panel’s proceedings having belied Taiwan’s precarious international status by not allowing Taiwan to participate in a process that affected its rights and interests, and by referring to Taiwan’s government as “the Taiwan Authority of China.” Although promising to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty and pledging to uphold the ROC constitution and its provision concerning historical or current territories (guyou jiangyu), she declined to visit Taiping Island and avoided mentioning the dashed line. Tsai’s government has built upon initiatives Ma undertook to distance Taipei’s position from Beijing’s, including through Ma’s East and South China Sea “peace initiatives,” which emphasized commitments to international law, open seas norms, and peaceful dispute resolution.125 The Tsai government’s positions have tended toward the most modest reading of the dashed line as a claim only of sovereignty over relevant landforms.126 Tsai’s stance avoided increased friction with Beijing and narrowed the gaps with Washington, which takes no position on questions of sovereignty but does oppose China’s island-building and militarization of marine formations 122 123 124 125

Central News Agency 2016; Keck 2018. deLisle 2017; Williams 2016. Song 2015; deLisle 2016c. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2012. 126 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016b; Lin 2018; Hickey 2018, 75–77; Lim 2020.

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and the threats they pose to the long-stated U.S. interests in open commercial sea lanes and freedom of navigation for the U.S. Navy and others, and the customary international law of the sea. By 2020, the source of possible South China Sea-related instability with implications for Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations was not Taipei, but Beijing (which stepped up PLA Navy and China Maritime Service activities against rival claimant states and their nationals’ activities) or Washington (which increased freedom of navigation operations to push back against China’s expansive claims and increasingly assertive actions).127 Finally and more fundamentally, Washington has reason to reconsider a long-standing tenet of U.S. security policy toward Taiwan. As Beijing has increased pressure on Taiwan in the military/security domain, and as China turns increasingly to more coercive but still gray zone measures (the area between ordinary statecraft and war, including many of the tools of political warfare), Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity may warrant revision or clarification. In the context of China’s increasingly hard-line and intimidating measures toward Taiwan, the enduring U.S. goal of deterring Beijing from aggressive actions that would threaten the status quo, stability, and Taiwan’s security may require a shift to greater strategic precision and the clearer support for Taiwan that a policy of strategic clarity would entail.128 Economic relations Strong and stable economic ties between Taiwan and the United States, and opportunities for Taiwan to expand economic engagement with partners other than the PRC, are important elements of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. They complement U.S.-Taiwan security relations and reduce Beijing’s economic leverage over Taiwan and temptation to use that leverage to political ends. They also serve both sides’ economic interests in their large and complementary trade and investment relationships. This aspect of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has been somewhat adrift in recent years despite Taiwan’s pursuit of improvements. Although facing resistance from within the government and potentially affected interest groups, Tsai and the DPP had bipartisan support for their agenda of continuing the Ma administration’s quest for entry into the U.S.-led TPP when it opened for a second round of accession. TPP membership would link the U.S. and Taiwan in a pact that during the Obama years was often called the economic pillar of the U.S. pivot, or rebalance, to Asia, and that the Obama administration characterized as a “21stcentury trade agreement” critical to U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific, where competing trade agreements had been proliferating (and often led by China).129 127 Santoro 2019; Mastro 2020; Browne 2020. 128 Bush 2019; CSIS Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan 2020, 19–20; Haass and Sacks 2020. 129 See U.S. Trade Representative, n.d.; deLisle 2016a.

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By the time Tsai became president, the TPP was in trouble, stalled in Congress and repudiated by both U.S. major party presidential candidates, and upon taking office Trump quickly fulfilled a campaign promise to suspend U.S. moves to join. Although the Biden administration is more open to trade agreements and more supportive of a rules-based order, prospects for the U.S. joining the mega-regional pact remained dim, and the potential for Washington to facilitate Taiwan’s entry dimmer still. The main channel for efforts to liberalize and deepen economic relations between the United States and Taiwan has again shifted to the long-running TIFA talks. Resumed in 2013 after a six-year hiatus, and fallow again during the early years of the Trump administration, the talks long had made little headway, in part because of an impasse over the import of U.S. pork and beef containing ractopamine.130 The U.S. could respond to the Tsai government’s unilateral concession to lift the long-nettlesome ban (despite domestic opposition over health concerns and the impact on Taiwanese producers) by moving forward rapidly with negotiations for the bilateral trade agreement that Taiwan seeks both for economic gains and for the ballast it would provide in bilateral relations. Under Tsai, Taiwan’s pursuit of the elusive bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. has been accompanied by other efforts to broaden Taiwan’s international economic ties and reduce vulnerability to China, including adopting a “new southbound policy” to diversify trade and investment toward Asian states, courting Tokyo’s support for Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP—the Japan-led reformulation of a U.S.-omitting TPP), continuing a long-running pursuit of bilateral trade agreements in the region that has remained stymied by Beijing’s opposition, and seeking accession to the PRC-led RCEP and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank despite the high probability that Beijing will rebuff Taiwan’s efforts. The impediments to progress—and the potential for backsliding—in closer economic relations between Taiwan and the United States, and between Taiwan and other partners other than China, thus presently come more from the U.S. and the PRC than from Taiwan. International cooperation and participation U.S. support for Taiwan’s international stature and participation is a wellestablished and durable element of U.S.-Taiwan relations that can reduce the risks that follow from Taiwan’s international isolation. Those risks include provocative moves by a besieged and desperate Taipei and increased pressure from an emboldened and perhaps over-confident Beijing. Although conventional discussions portray the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as one of highly asymmetric dependence, U.S. support for a more robust international presence for 130 Focus Taiwan 2018b; Chabot et al. 2019; Tong 2020 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs).

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Taiwan can serve U.S. interests, including: advancing values agendas in U.S. foreign policy; having a like-minded fellow participant at the table; and discouraging moves by Beijing to bully Taiwan that could draw the U.S. into a crisis or conflict. Existing foundations for U.S.-backed, Taiwan-including international cooperation can be developed further. Under the Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF), begun in 2015, the United States and Taiwan conduct training programs for experts from throughout the Asia-Pacific region to build capacity in areas where Taiwan has expertise and accomplishments, including women’s rights, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, democratization, combatting media disinformation (and the threat it poses to democratic processes and addressing COVID-19), global health, the digital economy, and energy security.131 In 2019, the U.S. and Taiwan co-hosted under the GTCF framework a first-ever “Pacific Islands Dialogue” to foster cooperation among “like-minded” partners.132 Under the GCTF framework, the U.S. and Taiwan have expanded areas of cooperation with a growing list of partners.133 State Department official Kurt Tong described the GCTF as “a vehicle for the United States to help showcase Taiwan’s strengths and expertise by addressing global and regional concerns.”134 Showcasing and supporting Taiwan’s positive—and peer—contributions to regional and global public goods, in partnership with the U.S., can strengthen bilateral ties and enhance Taiwan’s international standing without eliciting strong PRC opposition. Although eagerly supported by Taiwan, the approach is still in its infancy and depends on the will and skill of the administrations in Taipei and Washington. Although Beijing has renewed Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHA and nabbed one-third of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies since Tsai came to power, the U.S. has provided crucial support for the Tsai administration’s pursuit of participation in high-profile international organizations and international space more generally135–while stopping short of the provocative and futile efforts of the Chen administration. With Washington’s backing, Taiwan has achieved or maintained membership or participation, often alongside China, in significant international organizations. A still-more-supportive U.S. approach, in the face of Beijing’s increasing efforts to squeeze Taiwan’s international space, could include loosening Washington’s self-imposed restrictions on backing Taiwan. The U.S. could, for example, adopt a more affirmative or pro-active reading of article 4 of the Taiwan Relations Act (“Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or 131 American Institute in Taiwan 2020b; Deaeth 2019; Taiwan Today 2019. 132 U.S. Department of State 2019, 10. 133 For a list of agreements signed under the GCTF aegis, American Institute in Taiwan 2020a. 134 Tong 2016. 135 See Jacques deLisle’s chapter in this volume.

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any other international organization”)—and implement the approach advocated in the TAIPEI Act—while still preserving Clinton’s “Three Noes” and likely not provoking a destabilizing response from Beijing. There have been episodic indications, including during Tsai’s presidency, of what such a U.S. approach might look like, including: the successful support for Taiwan’s access to the WHA in the aftermath of China’s botched response to SARS, and a less successful reprise of the effort in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic; and the provisions in the TAIPEI Act that call for supporting Taiwan’s membership and participation in international organizations, and rewarding states that strengthen or upgrade relations with Taiwan while sanctioning those that harm Taiwan’s security or prosperity.136 Such an approach also would dovetail with, and be strengthened by, the Biden administration’s broader moves to re-engage with international organizations. Finally, the U.S. could do more to emphasize ideational issues as a pillar supporting U.S.-Taiwan relations. Alignment with fellow democracies in the Asian region has long been a feature of U.S. foreign policy—most recently articulated as part of the FOIP policy and also embraced by the Biden administration—that supports stronger U.S.-Taiwan ties. Biden has called for a greater focus on values issues in U.S. foreign policy, and Taiwan’s Foreign Minister—sharpening a theme embraced by Tsai—has called for an alliance among democracies to counter the common threat posed by China.137 In an increasingly ideological conflict between the U.S. and China that some characterize as a new Cold War,138 a democratic Taiwan is on the U.S. side of the ideological divide.

Conclusion Since the beginning of Taiwan’s fully democratic era, U.S.-Taiwan relations at crucial points have been shaped by a three-move dynamic of Taiwan-ChinaU.S. relations. In the later years of Lee’s presidency and during Chen’s presidency, Taiwan made first moves that threatened to alter the status quo— moves driven largely by democratic politics in Taiwan and involving issues of national identity, international status, and frustration with unaccommodating policies from Beijing. China then made second moves ranging from missile tests and conditional threats of force to coercive uses of economic and diplomatic leverage. These, in turn, led to third moves by the United States that sought to preserve the threatened status quo, or to restore a disrupted status quo ante. Such moves ultimately strained U.S.-Taiwan relations. Ma’s presidency brought a mirror image—and somewhat pale reflection— of the earlier dynamic. Its first move was to adopt a conciliatory policy toward Beijing, pursuing progressive rapprochement and deepening engagement. China 136 TAIPEI Act §§ 4–5. 137 Davidson 2020; Reuters 2020. 138 Shambaugh 2020; Myers and Mozur 2020.

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reciprocated with a proportionate second move, and cross-Strait relations notably improved, as reflected in ECFA and follow-on agreements, increased quasi-official and incipient official cross-Strait dialogues, a diplomatic truce, and Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, including the WHA. The third move by the U.S. welcomed and supported Ma’s efforts to improve cross-Strait relations, and repair and strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations—as demonstrated by increased arms sales, statements about the strength of bilateral ties, and clearer support for Taiwan’s increased international participation. Other developments during the Ma administration provided a glimpse of what the three-move dynamic could have looked like if Ma had pursued more transformative change in cross-Strait relations, and if Beijing had reciprocated in kind. The U.S. might have initiated a correspondingly dramatic third move—most likely one that would have threatened to reduce U.S. support for Taiwan, potentially to deter Taiwan’s drawing much closer to China and to preserve the prior status quo in cross-Strait relations, or, failing that, to limit the harm or peril to U.S. interests. During Tsai’s presidency and after, the three-move pattern may well persist, but there are also indications that it may be coming apart and signs of what a different dynamic might look like. But the picture is complex, with several possible scenarios in play. Tsai’s avowed commitment to peace, stability, and continuity in cross-Strait relations and her acceptance of the accumulated understandings of the preceding 20 years and an ROC framework all indicated that Taiwan would forego a first move, yet Beijing has sought to characterize these and other, more critical positions and assertive actions by Tsai as inconsistent with maintaining the cross-Strait status quo and, thus, as constituting a first move. China’s increased diplomatic, economic, and political pressure on Taiwan under Tsai arguably has stopped short of a full-fledged second move (or similarly consequential action), in part because soft policies have been deployed alongside hard ones and in part because there has been considerable consistency with long-held Chinese positions. But Beijing has foreshadowed what a more disruptive and coercive, full-fledged move would look like, with stepped-up demonstrations of military power near Taiwan, more assertive measures to undermine Taiwan’s international space, and sharpened insistence that unification cannot be put off indefinitely and must occur under a “one country, two systems” framework akin to the one implemented in deeply troubled Hong Kong. In this somewhat ambiguous context, U.S. policies toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations mostly have shown signs of continuity, foregoing the type of measures associated with a third move. But there has been foreshadowing of what such a move might look like, including increased U.S. military activities, enhanced defense cooperation and assistance, higher-level visits, stronger backing for Taiwan’s international stature, and pledges of a more robust alliance of democratic states in the Asia-Pacific. Some, but not all, such U.S. steps have been taken in response to second move-like unsettling

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actions by China, and they point to stronger U.S. ties with Taiwan amid a sharper and more ideologically charged U.S. confrontation with China. The cross-Strait balance is shifting in China’s favor. Beijing’s toolkit for coercing Taiwan is evolving and expanding. And the U.S.-China relationship is moving into more intense great power rivalry (even a possible Cold War). In this complicated, uncertain, and changing environment, a U.S. policy that more creatively supports Taiwan and dynamically fosters regional stability is needed to forestall crises in cross-Strait relations and threats to U.S. interests, whether they stem from a recurrence of the familiar three-move cycle or reflect a different, but nonetheless dangerous, new dynamic.

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Taiwan Times. 2020. “US to Continue Support for Taiwan Against China Under Biden.” December 10. https://thetaiwantimes.com/us-to-continue-support-for-taiwanagainst-china-under-biden/7976 12/10/20. Taiwan Today. 2019. “Taiwan, US, Japan Stage GCTF Workshop on Network Security and Technologies.” May 29. https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit= 2,6,10,15,18&post=155874. Taiwan Travel Act. Public Law 115–135. U.S. Statutes at Large 132 (2018): 341–342. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ135/PLAW-115publ135.pdf. Tellis, Ashley J. 2019. “The Return of U.S.-China Strategic Competition.” In U.S.-China Competition for Global Influence, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, 3–43. Seattle and Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/SA_20_Tellis.pdf. Thornton, Susan. 2015. “Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia.” Remarks, Brookings Institution. May 21. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/05/242705.htm. Tiezzi, Shannon. 2017. “Taiwan’s Message to Trump: We’re No ‘Bargaining Chip.’” The Diplomat, January 20. http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/taiwans-message-to-trumpwere-no-bargaining-chip/. Tong, Kurt. 2016. “Taiwan’s International Role and the GCTF.” U.S. Department of State. March 2. https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2016/253915.htm. Tong, Kurt. 2020. “Now Is the Right Time for a Trade Agreement with Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 27. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ now-right-time-trade-agreement-taiwan. Traub, James. 2020. “Biden is Now a China Hawk—with Limits.” Foreign Policy. September 3. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/biden-is-now-a-china-hawk-with-limits/. Tsai, Ing-wen. 2015. “Taiwan Meeting the Challenges Crafting a Model of New Asian Value.” https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/—150603_Tsai_Ing_wen_ transcript.pdf. Tsao, Nadia, and Jonathan Chin. 2017. “Moriarty Hails Tsai on Cross-Strait Links.” Taipei Times, October 6. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 2002. “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly 25 (3) (Summer): 15–28. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, ed. 2005. Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press. U.S. Congress. House. H. Con. Res. 88. (“Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations”). 114th Cong., 2nd Sess. https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hconres88/BILLS-114hconres88rfs.pdf. U.S. Congress. House. 2019. Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019. H.R. 2002, 116th Cong., 1st sess. https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr2002/BILLS-116hr2002rfs.pdf. U.S. Department of Defense. 2017a. “Travels with Jim Mattis.” February. https://www. defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/Travels-with-the-Secretary/0217_mattis1/. U.S. Department of Defense. 2017b. “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue.” June 3. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/ 1201780/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-shangri-la-dialogue/. U.S. Department of Defense. 2019. “Acting Secretary Shanahan’s Remarks at the IISS Shangri-Law Dialogue 2019.” June 1. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/ Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-ladialogue-2019/. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2020. “U.S. Statement on Taiwan’s Participation at the World Health Assembly.” May 19. https://www.hhs.gov/about/

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news/2020/05/19/us-statement-on-taiwan-participation-at-the-world-health-assembly. html. U.S. Department of State. 2019. “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.” November 3. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-andOpen-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf. U.S. Department of State. 2021. “PRC Military Pressure Against Taiwan Threatens Regional Peace and Stability.” January 23. https://www.state.gov/prc-military-pressureagainst-taiwan-threatens-regional-peace-and-stability/. U.S. Trade Representative. n.d. “TPP Full Text.” https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text. U.S.-China Perception Monitor. 2017. “A Timeline of Trump’s and the Trump Administration’s Actions, Statements and Policies on China.” March 13. https://www.uscnpm. org/blog/2017/03/13/a-timeline-of-trumps-actions-statements-and-policies- on-china/. Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng. 2004. “President Chen Shui-bian’s Mainland China Policy: Normalizing or Electioneering the Cross-Strait Impasse?” Cross-Strait and International Affairs Quarterly (July): 103–151. Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng. 2015. “The U.S. Asia Rebalancing and the Taiwan Strait Rapprochement.” Orbis 59 (3) (Summer): 361–379. Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng. 2019. “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific and Taiwan’s Potential Contributions.” Presentation, York University, Toronto. November 15. The White House. 2003. “President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press.” December 9. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2003/12/20031209-2.html. The White House. 2011. “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament.” November 17. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/ 11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament. The White House. 2015. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest.” November 3. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/03/press-briefing-presssecretary-josh-earnest-1132015. The White House. 2017a. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” December. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final12-18-2017-0905.pdf. The White House. 2017b. “Readout of the President’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China.” February 9. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/ readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china. The White House. 2017c. “Vice President Wraps up Busy, Successful Visit to Japan.” April 20. https://jp.usembassy.gov/vp-wraps-up-visit-japan/. The White House. 2018a. “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China.” October 4. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/. The White House. 2018b. “Statement from the Press Secretary on China’s Political Correctness.” May 5. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statementpress-secretary-chinas-political-correctness/. Whiteman, Hilary. 2016. “Taiwan Objects as Malaysia Deports Taiwanese Citizens to China.” CNN. May 2. https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/02/asia/taiwan-malaysia-chinadeportations/index.html. Williams, Robert D. 2016. “Tribunal Issues Landmark Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration.” Lawfare. July 12. https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmarkruling-south-china-sea-arbitration.

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Wong, Alex. 2018. “Remarks.” American Chamber of Commerce, Taipei Hsieh Nien Fan, Taipei, Taiwan, March 21. American Institute in Taiwan. https://www.ait.org. tw/remarks-deputy-assistant-secretary-state-alex-wong-american-chamber-commercetaipei-hsieh-nien-fan/. Wright, Thomas. 2020. “Taiwan Stands Up to Xi.” Brookings Institution. January 17. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/17/taiwan-stands-up-to-xi/. Xi, Jinping. 2017. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Xinhua. October 18. http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. Xi, Jinping. 2019. “Speech Delivered to the Meeting Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Message to Taiwan Compatriots.” China News. January 2. https:// chinanews.co/news/gb/china/2019/01/201901021150.shtml. Xie, Dennis. 2020. “Taiwan Not After Formal US Ties Right Now: Minister.” Taipei Times. September 25. Xinhua. 2015. “General Secretary Xi Jinping Meets KMT Chairman Chu Li-lun.” May 4. http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2015-05/04/c_1115169416.htm. Xinhua. 2016. “Full Text of Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Authorities’ Statement on Cross-Straits Relations.” May 20. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/20/c_ 135375950.htm. Xinhua. 2017. “Gov’t Work Report Reiterates Opposition to ‘Taiwan Independence.’” March 5, 2017. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/05/c_136102929.htm. Xinhua. 2019. “Mainland’s ARATS Pledges to Promote Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations.” May 17. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/17/c_ 138067368.htm. Xinhua. 2020. “China’s Reunification Cannot Be Stopped by Any Force.” BeijingNews. Net. May 20. https://www.beijingnews.net/news/265153470/update-chinas-reunificationcannot-be-stopped-by-any-force-spokesperson. Yang, Sheng. 2020a. “Biden ‘Smoother’ to Deal With.” Global Times. August 19. Yang, Sheng. 2020b. “Taiwan Separatists Use COVID-19 to Poison Cross-Strait Ties.” Global Times. April 8. Yeh, Joseph. 2013. “Taiwan to Attend ICAO Assembly as ‘Invited Guest.’” The China Post. September 14. https://chinapost.nownews.com/20130914-99536. Yeo, Mike. 2019. “Chinese Defense Minister Strikes Defiant Tone at Shangri-La Dialogue.” Defense News. June 3. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/ 2019/06/03/chinese-defense-minister-strikes-defiant-tone-at-shangri-la-dialogue/. Yoo, Jean, and J.R. Wu. 2015. “Exclusive: Unification with China Not on Agenda, Says Taiwan President.” Reuters. October 1. http://www.reuters.com/article/ustaiwan-president-exclusive/exclusive-unification-with-china-not-on-agenda-says-taiwanpresident-idUSKCN0RV3WP20151001. Yoshino, Naoya, and Kensaku Ihara. 2016. “With Trump, Pro-Taiwan Camp Sees Chance to Act.” Nikkei Asian Review. December 14. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ With-Trump-pro-Taiwan-camp-sees-chance-to-act. Yu, Zeyuan. 2020. “The Median Line of the Taiwan Strait: No Longer a Boundary for Mainland China.” Think China. September 21. https://www.thinkchina.sg/medianline-taiwan-strait-no-longer-boundary-mainland-china. Zhang, Hui, and Liu Xuanzun. 2019. “US Playing Taiwan Card Risky.” Global Times. April 1. Zhao, Lijian. 2020. Twitter post. May 20, 6:44 a.m. https://twitter.com/zlj517/status/ 1263057899946942471?s=20.

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Taiwan-Japan relations in the Tsai era June Teufel Dreyer

Under Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, Taiwan-Japan relations, which had deteriorated under her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, recovered quickly. The Tokyo and Taipei governments have sought to use their common democratic values, economic ties, and security interests to enhance cooperation for their mutual benefit. Cautious incremental changes have been in the direction of closer ties. However, in order to minimize friction with China, Tokyo has relied insofar as possible on non-governmental and quasi-governmental working relationships while Taipei and its Japanese supporters press for more formal ties. While welcoming these changes, Taipei has concerns that it may be used as a bargaining chip in Sino-Japanese relations. Taiwan-Japan relations in the Tsai era began in accordance with what at first seemed to be established diplomatic protocol, with Japan’s formal acknowledgement of the election results. Japanese foreign minister Kishida Fumio congratulated Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on their victory in the January 2016 election, stating that “Taiwan is an important partner and a precious friend of Japan. We share basic values and enjoy close economic relationships and people to people exchanges.” Kishida’s statement also praised “the smooth implementation of the election which demonstrates that democracy in Taiwan has deeply taken root…” Relations would be maintained, albeit “on a non-government basis.” Prime Minister Abe Shinzo- followed a few days later, calling Taiwan an old friend. Although at first glance ritualistic and completely innocuous, the statements were in fact fraught with significance: this was the first time since Japan normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1972 that such senior officials had issued congratulatory messages.1 Subsequent statements indicated that these were not to be one-time acknowledgements. Responding to Tsai’s inauguration address statement that Taiwan would deepen its relationships with friendly democracies including the United States, Japan, and Europe, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide called Taiwan “Japan’s key partner and an important friend with which we share fundamental values and have close economic ties and 1

China Post 2016.

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people-to-people exchanges. These will be deepened on the basis of nongovernmental working level relations.”2 And an editorial in Japan’s largest circulation daily, noting the common danger from China, stated that “It is essential for Japan to act closely in concert with the United States and pursue great cooperation with Taiwan.”3 The foreign ministry reiterated its congratulations when Tsai was re-elected president in 2020, repeating Suga’s formula to stay just inside the letter of Beijing’s “one China” policy.4 Tsai reciprocated the desire to develop Taiwan-Japan relations. She had already visited Japan prior to the election, and was rumored to have had talks with Prime Minister Abe while there. Media pointed out the curious coincidence of their being at the same hotel at the same time although, fearful of the Chinese government’s reaction, neither side would confirm that a meeting had taken place. Predictions that Taiwan-Japan relations would become close under her administration seemed confirmed when Tsai chose former premier Frank Hsieh Chang-ting as Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Tokyo. A past presidential candidate himself, Hsieh had studied at Japan’s prestigious Kyoto University, was fluent in Japanese, and had many close contacts in the country. Another high-ranking DPP figure, Chiou I-jen, was named to head the East Asia Relations Commission, a euphemism for the entity in charge of Taiwan-Japan relations. Tokyo media interpreted the appointments as indications that the new government placed more importance on Japan and was distancing itself from China.5 In December, in a development that surprised observers, the Japanese government announced that it was changing the name of its representative office from the largely meaningless Interchange Organization to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association. In addition to more accurately describing its functions, the new name implicitly elevated the two countries to equal status, despite Beijing’s insistence that Taiwan is a province of China. At the unveiling ceremony for the new name plaque, then-JTEA head Numata Mikio described the change as “aimed at taking already close Taiwan-Japan exchanges to the next level”6 and characterized bilateral ties as “at their best.”7 These and other developments did not go unnoticed by the PRC. Responding to the announcement that Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) planned a table top exercise predicated on a military clash between the PRC and Taiwan, with the U.S. military taking part as an observer, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that “the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China. We hope the Japanese side will speak and act cautiously.”8 Beijing’s more nationalistic Global Times said that news of the planned exercise had 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016. Yomiuri Shimbun 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020. NHK World Online 2016. Taiwan Today 2017b. Japan Times 2017a. Kyodo 2017.

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sparked “outrage,” citing an anonymous member of the PRC’s defense ministry’s warning that it would “cause serious damage to Sino-Japanese relations, especially defense relations, and would harm others,” presumably meaning Taiwan and the United States, as well as itself. The real concern, only hinted at by the anonymous defense ministry source, was more explicitly expressed by Hong Kong-based military based analyst Song Zhongping: Japan and Taiwan together would not be strong enough to repel the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). But if the United States were to join them “it would be a serious challenge for the Chinese military.” Nonetheless, he reassured readers, the PLA was prepared.9 Taiwan’s Executive Yuan soon approved a proposal to rename Taiwan’s representative office as well, though delaying the announcement until April, after Trump’s meeting at Mar-a-Lago with Xi Jinping. Presumably hoping to minimize anger in Beijing, the announcement was made via a press release: there was no news conference or ceremony.10 Quietly, the former Taipei Economic and Cultural Office11 in Japan became the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association. While Xi Jinping’s administration has essentially ignored Tsai’s government, it cannot so easily do so with Japan, particularly if it wants to avoid driving Tokyo closer to Washington. Abe has been at pains to soothe Japan’s troubled relations with the PRC. Among other things, Abe had incurred the PRC’s wrath by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine once while in office and sending offerings at regular intervals thereafter.12 Seeking a third term as his party’s president, but bedeviled by a domestic scandal in which he was allegedly involved in a reduced-rate land sale, Abe was particularly eager to revive reciprocal state visits with China. He had viewed the May 2018 visit of Chinese premier Li Keqiang for a commemoration ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship as an opportunity to secure a promise of a visit by CCP General Secretary/PRC President Xi Jinping. This did not happen, presumably because Beijing was waiting until the results of the Japanese election. Li’s address to the commemoration ceremony contained thinly veiled warnings to Japan, including the need to “firmly adhere to the one-China policy” as a pre-condition for cordial relations.13 The Chinese government does not acknowledge that the 9 Yang 2017. 10 Chen and Heatherington 2017. 11 This followed a previous name change in 1992, from the Association of East Asian Relations (AREAR), the name adopted after Tokyo broke relations with Taipei in 1972. 12 The shrine, founded in 1869 to commemorate Japan’s war dead, became anathema to the Chinese government after the spirits of World War II Class A war criminals were enshrined there. Since Japan’s U.S.-influenced constitution imposes a separation between religion and the state, the government’s position is that it cannot order the shrine to remove the Class A war criminals. Shrine authorities maintain that this would be impossible in any case: according to Shinto- doctrine, spirits once enshrined meld with those of other warriors and cannot be removed. 13 Global Times 2018.

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two countries have a different interpretation of the one-China policy and Japan, unlike the American government, has not made an issue of the difference. In the end, Abe won a third term as prime minister and an invitation to visit Beijing. But the promised reciprocal visit by Xi was long delayed, as diplomats for Tokyo and Beijing struggled to reach a mutually satisfactory wording for the standard joint communiqué on such meetings, with references to Taiwan a major topic of discussion,14 and later by the coronavirus pandemic.

Japan-Taiwan relations: the template Early Tsai-era indicators of a closer Japan-Taiwan relationship notwithstanding, many issues remain to be solved, and they will be shaped by a history that is in some ways conducive to close relations. Although Japan relinquished its claim to Taiwan as part of the World War II peace settlement, ties remained close. Tokyo, under American pressure, recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT)-led Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate government of China, and established itself as a major investor in Taiwan’s industries as well as importer of the island’s agricultural products. Tourism and cultural exchanges also thrived. As a result of 50 years under Japanese rule, many Taiwan residents spoke, and speak, Japanese, thus facilitating such interchanges. Both Chiang’s government and Japan’s were strongly anti-communist, providing an additional commonality. For several years after Japan’s surrender in 1945, Japanese troops fought alongside KMT troops against communist forces in China.15 Although Chiang Kai-shek made strenuous efforts to replace Japanese culture with Chinese culture and teach the Taiwanese to speak mandarin, Chiang, who had once been a student at a Japanese military academy, hired Japanese military advisers. Paradoxically, Japan also became a haven for those mostly native-born Taiwanese who opposed what they regarded as the KMT’s occupation of their island. The government of the PRC, having vowed to unify China by force if necessary, watched these developments closely, sometimes arguing that Japan was remilitarizing and meant to retake Taiwan by force, or at others that Japan intended to re-absorb the island. During his 1970 talks with Chinese leaders on how U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations might be normalized, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger found his interlocutors adamant that Taiwan be acknowledged as part of China, and wary of Japanese designs on Taiwan. Kissinger reported that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai seemed at least 14 In establishing formal diplomatic relations in 1972, Japan used the U.S. formula of taking note of the Chinese government’s position that Taiwan is part of China, but not going so far as to say it accepted that position. Since then, the Chinese government has intermittently put pressure on Tokyo to explicitly accept that Taiwan is part of China. 15 Gillin 1967, 285.

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as concerned with Japan taking over the role of defender of Taiwan as he was with Taiwan independence, repeatedly coming back to the theme that, as the United States withdrew from Taiwan, Japan would try to replace it militarily and otherwise. Chinese intelligence sources had informed Zhou that the ultraconservative Sasakawa Ryo-ichi had several times held talks with persons he described as “Chiang gang chieftains” who had close ties with the Taiwan independence movement. Though Zhou’s information about the meeting may well have been correct, it is highly unlikely that the “Chiang gang chieftains” supported Taiwan independence. They were committed to the unification of China, but under a Kuomintang, not a communist government.16 Zhou later added that, after the first “Nixon shock,”17 three Taiwan officials had visited Japan for a “very significant talk” with Prime Minister Satoand his brother, former Prime Minister Kishi.18 On their return, they transmitted a “closely guarded message” to Chiang Kai-shek that the only hope for the Republic of China was to give up all claims to the mainland.19 Whether or not such advice was tendered, the ROC did not give up its claims to the mainland, and the Japanese government did break ties with the ROC. The Japanese statement acknowledged that the government fully understood and respected the Chinese position that Taiwan was part of China, but did not say that it agreed with that position. Beijing’s ongoing, and thus far unsuccessful, attempts to persuade Japan to adopt its version of the one-China principle have been a leitmotif of Sino-Japanese-Taiwan relations ever since. Other signs of continued Taiwan-Japanese ties were evident after the normalization of China-Japan relations. China’s official People’s Daily cited the Japanese journal Gunji Kenkyu (Military Research)’s comment that whoever controlled Taiwan could have a stranglehold on the maritime trade route that maintained Japan’s life, and that its loss would directly endanger the safety of Japan and Korea. In 1978, defense agency head Kanemaru Shin, the eminence grise of Japanese politics at the time, told U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that Taiwan was vital to the defense of Japan and Korea. Under pressure from Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, who was trying to get the Diet’s approval of the controversial Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, Kanemaru dutifully retracted his remarks, but then told a press 16 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) China 1969–1972, 514–558; see also Taylor 2009, 514–515, 566, 602. 17 Meaning the summer 1971 announcement that, without prior consultation with the Japanese government, as treaty obligations required, Washington had secretly been conducting negotiations with Beijing and that Nixon planned to visit there. A second Nixon shock involved measures to force revaluation of currencies, including Japan’s against the dollar. 18 The brothers, whom Beijing regarded as unfriendly, had been adopted into their wives’ families and hence had different surnames. Adding to Beijing’s concerns, both were conservatives from a politically prominent family. The post-World War II Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal had indicted but not convicted Kishi; a third and older brother had been a vice-admiral in the Japanese Imperial Navy. 19 Taylor 2009, 602.

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conference that “what has always been in my mind unwittingly slipped from my mouth.”20 Japan-Taiwan relations continued in substance if not form, irritating the Chinese government. The liaison offices with ambiguous titles—the Japan Interchange Association in Taipei, and the Association of East Asian Relations, later renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Tokyo—performed the services formerly handled by embassies. Groups of Japanese Diet members met with counterparts in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. At first forced to suspend lucrative Taipei-Tokyo flights due to Beijing’s resistance, the government managed to reinstate them by using a domestic airport rather than its international hub. Business connections and tourism continued.

Ties become closer under Lee Teng-hui The Chinese leadership’s concern about Taiwan and Japan’s relationship with Taiwan mounted after the deaths of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 and his son and heir Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Age and intermarriage had begun to blur differences between those who had come from the mainland and native-born Taiwanese, with the new generation being far less interested in “re”joining a China they had never been part of. Chiang Ching-kuo’s successor, Taiwanese Hakka Lee Teng-hui, had received his undergraduate degree from Japan’s prestigious Kyoto University and infuriated Beijing by pointing out, correctly, that he had been a Japanese citizen for the first two decades of his life. Lee appeared to be more comfortable expressing himself in Japanese than mandarin and, though not openly speaking of independence while he was in office, seemed disinclined to pay lip service to pursuit of the ostensibly longshared goal of bringing Taiwan into a “unified” China. During Lee’s presidency, ties between Japan and Taiwan become closer. In 1993, the ban on Japanese language programs was lifted. When cable television arrived, Japanese offerings increased, with most of Taiwan’s popular variety shows following formats borrowed from Japan. Cartoon characters such as Pokémon, Doraemon, and Hello Kitty were watched by millions of Taiwan youngsters, whose parents often clothed them in upscale Japanese kiddie couture from such emporia as Miki House. Affluent adults favored such brands as Rei Kawakubo, Yohji Yamamoto, and Kenzo. A new Taiwanese word, harizu, meaning “Japan mania” came into being, and the headline of a popular magazine warned parents, humorously, that their children were turning into Japanese. Lee used his Japanese ties to further bilateral relations. Though fear of angering Beijing meant that Tokyo would not permit official visits while Lee was president, he was able to use his golfing skills to good advantage, addressing political issues while on the golf course with the numerous Japanese officials 20 Japan Times 1978a; 1978b.

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who shared his passion for the game. Somewhat later, and despite the excellent medical care available in Taiwan, Lee used Japanese medical facilities to treat sundry ailments. In an interview with well-known writer Shiba Ryo-taroin 1994, Lee praised what Japan had done for Taiwan, leading Chinese media to accuse him of “prostrating himself in praise of Japanese rule.” A year later, DPP politician Annette Lu Hsiu-lien hosted an event commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, under which Japan had gained control of Taiwan. Speakers on both sides emphasized the shared history of what they described as two island nations. This deepened suspicions in Beijing that pro-independence forces intended to use Japan to stymie its goal of joining the island to the PRC. In 1996, after a show of force by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait triggered a crisis in cross-Strait and U.S.-PRC relations, Tokyo approached the United States for a closer defense relationship that included the Japanese government’s commitment to help defend the areas around Japan—shu-hen jitai—and refusing the Chinese government’s remonstrations that Taiwan be explicitly excepted. It was later revealed, although never officially confirmed, that the Japanese Defense Agency21 had plans to provide non-combat support to American forces if an armed conflict broke out in the Strait.22 The pro-Taiwan governor of Tokyo visited Taiwan and arranged for emergency aid in the wake of a devastating earthquake in 1999. This infuriated Beijing, which insisted that no international aid could be sent to Taiwan without prior permission from the Chinese government. There were misgivings in both Taiwan and Japan about this closer relationship. Japanese pacifists argued that Article 9 of the country’s constitution precluded becoming involved in a conflict involving two other parties, while the dwindling number of pro-unification mainlanders on Taiwan saw strong Taiwan-Japan relations as further eroding their hopes for a triumphal return to the land of their ancestors. As the PRC became less communist and stronger both economically and militarily, some mainland-born citizens in Taiwan developed a pan-Han identity, even as native-born islanders’ attachment to a separate Taiwan identity strengthened. The split between “Blues,” who were more favorably disposed toward unification with China, albeit under a variety of different scenarios, and typically associated with the KMT, and “Greens,” associated mostly with the DPP, who were more conscious of, and assertive about, their unique Taiwanese identity and therefore more resistant to unification, was to become a defining theme in the island’s politics. Whereas Japanese officials had in the past made common cause with the KMT and its opposition to communism, their sympathies now shifted to the Greens. By 1999, retired Japanese SDF officials and diplomats had begun to visit Taiwan regularly. They provided political and military advice, and arranged for tours of Japanese military bases and ships. Track II meetings took place 21 The Agency has since been raised to ministry status. 22 Blatt 1997.

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involving discussions by Green Taiwanese think tanks and right-of-center Japanese and American think tanks on the theme of how to protect Taiwan from invasion by China. Greens favored the evolution of an informal security arrangement by combining elements of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act. The TRA states Washington’s expectation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means and pledged to supply Taiwan with such defensive arms as necessary to keep a balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait, while the U.S.-Japan treaty pledges Japan to help the U.S. in a confrontation in the waters around Japan, which clearly include Taiwan. Also under discussion was the possibility that the U.S.-Japan treaty could become the cornerstone of a Pacific alliance based on shared democratic values and which therefore Taiwan, but not the PRC, would be eligible to join.

And closer still under Chen Shui-bian’s presidency Beijing’s anxieties about Taiwan-Japan ties increased after the 2000 presidential election victory of Chen Shui-bian—a Taiwan-born and Taiwaneducated lawyer who had participated in pro-independence activities. Chen’s inaugural address, which was well-attended by members of the Japanese parliament, promised not to declare independence as long as China did not seek to invade the country by force. This was an important caveat, given that the Beijing government had repeatedly vowed never to give up the option of invasion despite its preference for a peaceful resolution. Chen’s vice-president, Annette Lu, whom the KMT had once imprisoned for advocacy of independence, had hosted the above-mentioned event to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese treaty that ceded Taiwan to Japan. Quietly, the Japanese government posted the equivalent of a military attaché to its de facto embassy in Taipei. Choosing his words carefully when interviewed, the attaché would say only that he participated in meetings with Taiwanese government and military officials and sent dispatches to Tokyo.23 Tokyo also dispensed advice on cross-Strait relations. The head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council reported on his return from a June 2006 visit to Tokyo that he was warned to be cautious of the united front tactics that Beijing was using.24 Although Chen took several measures that Beijing regarded as unacceptably pro-independence and that produced anxiety in Washington about both Chen’s actions and Beijing’s intentions, signs of strength in TaiwanJapan, and Taiwan-U.S., relations continued. For example, the U.S. and Japanese governments announced their intentions to upgrade to ministerial level a strategic dialogue that previously had been held at vice-ministerial level, explaining that the aim was “to develop common approaches to deal with the tension over the Taiwan Strait and other potential crises in Asia.” 23 Faiola 2006. 24 Chang 2006.

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Strong relations with Japan were a potent, if divisive, issue in Taiwan politics. An incident that epitomized the divide between the Blue and Green camps was the dedication of a memorial to Taiwan aborigines who had died fighting for Japan during World War II. Funded by donations from Japan and inaugurated by Lee Teng-hui, its intended site was a scenic spot favored by Japanese tourists for many years. However, the land belonged to Taipei County, whose magistrate, a KMT member, deemed the monument’s inscription—“the souls of the fallen are hoping that the spirit of Yamato can be restored”— insulting. The monument was demolished, to the annoyance of Greens. The director of the Ethnic Affairs Department, a DPP member, accused the magistrate of trying to revive authoritarian rule and being insensitive to the nostalgia that many people felt for the colonial era.

But deteriorate under Ma Ying-jeou Chen was succeeded by the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou. Born in Hong Kong to a pro-unification mainland family, Ma was seen as anti-Japan—a charge he denied and attributed to DPP slander. Ma had however stated that he did not think that Taiwan should be included in the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.25 Since no responsible member of either the Japanese or the American government had advocated including Taiwan therein (although the idea had been a subject of think tank discussions), Ma’s remark about the treaty seemed gratuitous. In the same remarks, Ma had stated that the KMT favored ultimate unification—an outcome that a U.S.-Japan-Taiwan security alignment might serve to prevent. The remark proved incendiary, and Ma backtracked, stipulating that any move to unify would require the PRC first become a democracy, and reverse the verdict that had branded the pro-democracy Tiananmen demonstration of 1989 as “counterrevolutionary.” Ma’s pre-election visit to Japan, intended to dispel his anti-Japanese image, was stunningly unsuccessful. Among other provocative statements, Ma criticized the Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates the spirits of all the country’s soldiers, including Taiwanese who had fought for Japan, but which is anathema in China. He also urged Japan to take a “broader view of history,” code for further apologies over its conduct, not in its colony of Taiwan but in China, during World War II. Observers commented that these seemed designed to please Beijing rather than Tokyo. Confronted with probing questions in the Diet, Ma gave evasive answers. As he was doing so, Japanese right-wing groups demonstrated outside the Diet, denouncing him for acting as an agent of China and interfering in Japan’s internal affairs.26 With Taiwan about to be hit by a typhoon, Ma cut short his visit, unilaterally pronouncing it a success. In a tacit admission that it had not been, the KMT attempted to make amends, creating a Japanese-language 25 Huang 2006. 26 South China Morning Post 2006.

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version of its official web site and translating major local news stories to send to Diet members and Japanese media via daily emails, saying it would help Japanese gain a better understanding of Taiwan “from an unbiased source.”27 Such efforts did not improve Taiwan’s relations with Japan. Ma’s inaugural address did not mention Japan at all; a source in Taiwan’s foreign ministry revealed that it had been in the original draft but was subsequently deleted. A Japanese official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he had been “infuriated.”28 When, during the following year, Japan’s de facto ambassador to Taipei, Saito- Masaki, stated in a private forum that his government regarded Taiwan’s status as undetermined, Ma reacted angrily, saying that it had been finalized in the 1952 treaty between the ROC and Japan.29 Although Saito-’s comment had merit—Beijing had made abrogation of the 1952 treaty a condition of the 1972 normalization agreement between China and Japan, and Tokyo had complied—he apologized. Ma nonetheless excluded Saitofrom press conferences and other activities, leading him to resign a few months later.30 Ma’s handling of a 2010 visit from Abe Shinzo-, at that time between prime ministerships but nonetheless an important force in Japanese politics, seemed designed to insult. Among other slights, Ma addressed Abe as “deputy prime minister,” and Taiwan’s ministry of foreign affairs refused Abe’s request to schedule a meeting with the head of the DPP. When the DPP invited Abe to dinner, the ministry provided neither a car nor a staff member to accompany him, which would have been normal procedure: Abe took a taxi.31 Taiwan’s premier later decreed that government documents referring to Japanese “rule” be changed to Japanese “occupation.”32 These modifications were later extended to textbooks as well. The changes—along with other changes implying Taiwan was part of China—prompted protests by students and academics; the mayor of one large city replied that his municipality would not adopt the books. The following year, it was Taiwan’s turn to be disrespected by Japan. Taiwan was the largest contributor to relief efforts after the March 11th earthquake-tsunami-nuclear meltdown devastated Japan’s Tohoku area, yet received no public thanks from Japan’s government. According to Japanese news agency Kyodo, the government ran thank you notices in the major newspapers of all countries whose government and citizens had made contributions, except Taiwan.33 In 2012, the coast guards of the two countries fired water cannons at each other, as Taiwan fishing boats approached islands claimed by Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC.34 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Mo 2006. Author’s interview, June 12, 2008. Hsu and Shih 2009. Hirsch 2009; China Times 2009; Hsu 2009a, 2009b. Chao 2010. Taiwan Communiqué 2014; Japan Times 2013. Bosco 2011. Reuters 2012.

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The Ma administration did conclude agreements with Japan, most of them trade-related, A fishing agreement was concluded that sought to reduce frictions over the disputed islands. Direct flights were initiated that connected Taipei’s in-town Songshan airport with the similarly sited Haneda in Tokyo. A consulate-equivalent was opened in Hokkaido, Taiwan’s sixth in Japan and the first new one in many years. And a park commemorating Hattori Yayoi, a Japanese engineer who built an irrigation waterway and reservoir in Taiwan during the pre-World War II period, was dedicated.35

In the Tsai era Numerous substantive issues in Taiwan-Japan relations remained to be resolved, or at least successfully managed, by the Tsai administration, including:      

fisheries disputes acknowledgement of responsibility and compensation for World War II comfort women a ban on food imports from four Japanese prefectures, imposed after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in March 2011 trade negotiations territorial disputes over the islands known as the Tiaoyutai in Taiwan, Diaoyu in China, and Senkaku in Japan defense cooperation

Also sensitive is the level at which these issues are addressed, given the PRC’s opposition to high-level contacts between Tokyo and Taipei. A seventh and relatively non-controversial category is people to people relations. Fisheries disputes An agreement reached during the Ma administration addressed the longrunning Taiwan-Japan fisheries disputes, albeit incompletely. In April 2013, the two sides reached agreement to open an additional 4,530 square kilometer area to Taiwanese and Japanese fishing operations. A joint fishing commission was established to deal with related issues in the region, with officials to meet at least annually. The sovereignty issue was finessed by each side declaring that the agreement would have no effect on its sovereignty claims in the area and its belief that the area’s resources could be shared. Although publicly unacknowledged, a crucial factor that led the hitherto reluctant Japanese side to conclude the agreement is likely to have been China’s belligerent behavior following the Japanese government’s decision to buy land in three of the five disputed islands from their Japanese private owners. Although the purchase was irrelevant to the sovereignty issue, being 35 China Post 2012.

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simply a domestic transfer of title from Japanese private to Japanese government owners, the PRC’s publicly expressed anger led to mass demonstrations in China that included large-scale destruction of Japanese property, a boycott of Japanese products, and threats to “bathe Tokyo in blood.” In this context, the Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement could be interpreted as showing Japan to be a reasonable negotiator, without surrendering Japan’s sovereignty claims, and the Ma administration could use the agreement to rebut claims that it was hostile to Japan. Even so, the Japanese government downplayed the agreement’s status, characterizing it as an agreement between non-governmental the fisheries associations. In contrast, the agreement’s text appears on the website of the ROC Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Although apparently willing to nettle Beijing to a degree, Tokyo thus was able to maintain at least the facade of its one China policy. As implied by the establishment of the joint Taiwan-Japan commission, fisheries-related disputes continue, the difference being that there is now a mechanism in place to manage them. Fishermen from Okinawa have urged their government to exclude a designated area near the disputed islands from the bilateral agreement, while the head of Taiwan’s Suao Fishermen’s Association argued strongly against doing so. There are also ongoing discussions on reclaiming lost fishing equipment. At the close of the March 2016 negotiations, the two sides agreed to maintain the status quo, with the Suao association head proclaiming the negotiations “not entirely satisfactory, though acceptable.” There have been no recent incidents. Comfort women The issue of comfort women has been an intermittent point of friction in Taiwan-Japan relations. According to the Taiwan Women’s Rescue Foundation, about 2,000 Taiwanese women were forced into sexual slavery for Japanese troops during World War II. Of the 58 known to have survived the war, as of late 2020, only two were still living. After Prime Minister Abe apologized to South Korea for its comfort women and pledged to provide a billion yen (U.S. $8.3 million) in compensation, Taiwanese requested similar treatment. Japanese chief cabinet secretary Suga Yoshihide stated that the situations of other countries were “different” from South Korea’s, hinting that his government did not intend to pursue negotiations with Taiwan or other aggrieved states. As a Kuomintang official privately acknowledged,36 Taiwan has little leverage over Japan on this issue. Under Ma’s KMT administration, the government made efforts to publicize the issue. In March 2016, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), Taiwan’s unofficial embassy in Washington, invited members of congress, journalists, and scholars to a special screening of the 36 Personal conversation with author, January 20, 2016.

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documentary film “Song of the Reed” about the lives of the then last six survivors.37 Ma held a ceremony celebrating the first museum dedicated to the comfort women, although it was not scheduled to open until four months after he was to leave office. Traditionally, the DPP, although acknowledging its duty to protect the dignity of the comfort women, did so in a fairly low-key manner. The museum opened after Tsai came to office, and hosted the 2017 annual comfort women film festival.38 The issue remained dormant until August 2018, when the Japanese government protested the erection of a statue commemorating the comfort women outside KMT party headquarters in Tainan City. A month later, a member of a Japanese right-wing organization visited the headquarters to ask that the statue be removed. After being refused, he kicked the statue, leading to his arrest and a demonstration outside the Japanese representative’s office.39 Reflecting the partisan divide over the issue in Taiwan, KMT members of the Legislative Yuan tried to prevent then-Premier Lai from entering the LY chamber to address this and other issues. Lai, having arrived early, was able to speak nonetheless, describing the government’s attitude toward the comfort women as “unchanged.”40 In November 2020, after attracting few visitors, the museum closed, though there are plans to relocate it to a less costly location. The issue has faded from public discourse and seems unlikely to be revived.41 Food imports Taiwan’s restriction of food imports from Japan has been another pre-existing and ongoing irritant in bilateral relations during the period since Tsai came to office. After the tsunami-triggered meltdown of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, Taiwan banned food imports from Fukushima and four neighboring prefectures. In 2015, the Japanese government, using equipment purchased from the United States that showed 99.9% of food products from the area to be safe, requested that the ban be lifted.42 Many Taiwan consumers, already sensitized to the issue of food contaminants due to concern with what they regard as unsafe levels of ractopamine in meat imported from the United States, were not persuaded. The issue is of considerable importance in Japan, where the government, anxious to restore the economies of the affected areas, continually presses for an end to the ban. Sources familiar with the political situation opined that, given the sensitivity of the matter in Taiwan, the Ma administration would leave the issue to Tsai’s government with an eventual decision to allow imports 37 38 39 40 41 42

China Times 2016. Hou 2017; see also Ward 2018, 1–16. Chung 2018b. Lin 2018. China Focus 2020. Taipei Times 2016.

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selectively. This prediction proved accurate. At the end of January 2018, Minister of Health and Welfare Minister Chen Shih-chung announced that “appropriate adjustments” would be made in accordance with international trade regulations, but gave no timetable for doing so.43 One suggested workaround modelled on that of former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-pin with regard to imports of U.S. beef, would be for individual municipalities to lift the ban.44 However, in a referendum backed by the KMT and held in conjunction with Taiwan’s November 2018 local elections, voters overwhelmingly rejected resumption of imports. Negotiations continued into Tsai’s second term, with no resolution as of early 2021. Trade negotiations Trade looms large in relations between Japan and Taiwan under the leadership of veteran international trade negotiator Tsai. Japan is Taiwan’s third largest trading partner, and Taiwan is Japan’s fourth or fifth largest customer. Taiwan typically runs a substantial trade deficit with Japan, with a major factor being that Taiwan’s principal export industries such as information technology, electronics, and automotive rely on components imported from Japan. Japan’s reputation for the quality and safety—apart from concerns about nuclear residue on produce from Fukushima—of its foodstuffs is believed responsible for an overall jump in export sales in the past four years.45 When presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen visited Japan in October 2015, closer economic integration and increased trade were important agenda items. Due to Chinese pressure designed to keep Taiwan isolated diplomatically, Taiwan has found it difficult to obtain membership in many trade pacts, adding the specter of economic exclusion to political isolation. For a nation whose prosperity is heavily dependent on trade, this is a matter of particular concern. Among other initiatives, Taiwan has sought participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—the supra-regional trade-plus accord in which Japan took the lead role after the U.S. opted out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Economic planners in Taiwan were delighted when, at a press conference immediately after the election, Japanese then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga expressed support for Taiwan’s entry into the CPTPP.46 Soon thereafter, a contributor to Japan’s Council on East Asian Community commented that, although Taiwan could not dismiss trade ties with China, it could not stay excessively dependent on the country, and that its relationship with Japan was the key to lessening such 43 Japan Times 2018. 44 Suggestion of Ross Darrell Feingold, September 27, 2018. 45 Kyodo 2016. After President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the TPP, the Japanese government took the lead in efforts to save the pact, and has continued its sponsorship of Taiwan’s membership in an arrangement it wants to make as inclusive as possible. 46 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan 2016.

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dependence.47 Prospects dimmed when Taiwan voters’ decisively rejected resumption of imports from the Fukushima, leading the Japanese government to rethink its support for Taiwan’s bid.48 Membership in the CPTPP makes economic policy and international political sense for Taiwan. It would necessitate broad reforms in the country’s economic structure that would enhance its international competitiveness as well as reduce its excessive reliance on trade with China. Given Taiwan’s prosperous middle class and the popularity of Japanese goods, increasing bilateral trade ties makes good business sense, can be accomplished without high-level governmentto-government agreements, and can help strengthen Taiwan-Japan ties. In 2017, Japan’s giant trading corporation Mitsui in conjunction with one of the country’s large fashion brands, Atré, began developing ekinaka, small shopping centers within railway stations as well as standard malls in Taiwan. Mitsui has also been involved in Taiwan’s high-speed rail projects,49 and a Japanese architect is designing airport terminals in four of Taiwan’s outlying islands.50 Investment goes both ways: the CEO of Taiwan’s precision machinery manufacturer Hiwin Industries Eric Chuo announced plans to acquire a Japanese machinery maker and to build a new factory in Aichi prefecture.51 Tortuous negotiations between Taiwan’s Hon Hai Precision Industries, better known by its trade name of Foxconn, and Japanese electronics giant Sharp, were finally concluded at the end of March 2016. Hon Hai, the world’s largest contract electronics manufacturer, assembles the iPhone and manufactures some of its components, while Sharp, which had been experiencing financial problems, makes the display, the phone’s most expensive component. Under Hon Hai’s aegis, Sharp quickly returned to profitability.52 Consummation of the agreement could be considered a step toward reducing Taiwan’s heavy economic dependence on China, as well as giving Japan added incentive to support Taiwan’s resistance to absorption by the PRC. However, the limits to such gains were made all too clear when, just days after the Tsai’s inauguration, Foxconn announced plans to build another factory in China.53 More broadly, ties between Taiwanese and Japanese businesses, including the aforementioned Hiwin and Mitsui, are impeded by their extensive business dealings with China, as well as with each other—a set of triangular relationships that enables leakages of proprietary technology and corporate strategies to China. There is ongoing concern in the Japanese government about economic ties with high-tech Taiwan firms that have extensive mainland affiliations.54 47 Kodama 2016. 48 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the vote “made it unlikely” that Taiwan’s CPTPP bid would succeed. Lee and Chung 2018. 49 Mitsui & Co. 2017. 50 Wang and Gao 2020. 51 Kuo 2018. 52 Yamazaki and Tomisawa 2017. 53 Wu and Cheng 2016. 54 Asahi 2017.

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Still, connections have continued to grow at the firm-to-firm level and beyond, strengthening overall Taiwan-Japan ties. In 2019, Taiwan’s United Microelectronics, the world’s fourth largest contract manufacturer of semiconductors, acquired a Fujitsu plant in Japan; the Taiwanese industrial computer maker Advantech purchased a subsidiary of Omron; and Panasonic sold its semiconductor business to Taiwan’s Nuvoton Technology.55 A Taiwan-Japan market cooperation committee has been created to coordinate on trade, intellectual property and tariff issues in markets outside Japan and Taiwan,56 even as Japan seeks to participate in China’s Belt and Road trade initiative, from which Taiwan has been excluded. Bilateral trade totaled US$ 67.3 billion in 2019, slightly above the previous year’s seven percent increase. Japan invested $ 22.2 billion dollars in Taiwan, making it the country’s fourth largest investor, while Taiwan companies invested $ 9.22 billion in Japan.57 Disputed islands A long-running despite over who has sovereignty over a small group of islands is the most serious source of chronic friction in Taiwan-Japan relations, and it has continued—albeit at significantly less intensity—into the Tsai years. The dispute is rooted in a tangled history which the parties interpret in sharply conflicting terms. Consistent with its claim to be the legitimate government of China, the ROC has long claimed sovereignty over the Tiaoyutai/ Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, using much the same arguments as the PRC, which sees itself as successor to the ROC as the government of China. They argue that Chinese ships had first discovered the islands, and that, after being ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the islands were administered by Taiwan and therefore should have been returned to China as part of the post-World War II peace settlement. Japan counter-argues that first discovery, which is difficult to prove, is not confirmed by either evidence of occupation of the islands or the placing of such items as plaques, monuments, and lighthouses that could strengthen its claim to the areas. Hence, according to international law, the islands were terra nullius, available for Japan to claim. Moreover, the islands were not included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, having been incorporated into Japan earlier in 1895, with no protest from the Chinese government. Further, in the post-World War II treaty Japan agreed that its territory was to be reduced to the four entities known collectively as the home islands, and “such other islands as may be determined”—a vague provision, potentially including the Tiaoyutai/Diaoyu/Senkaku, to which the ROC (and, for that matter, the PRC) did not object. Neither Taiwan nor China has produced evidence that the islands were administered by Taiwan in the colonial period. The Japanese government contends that they were under 55 Fujino 2019. 56 Yang and Ko 2018. 57 Taiwan Ministry of Economics Bureau of Foreign Trade 2020.

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the jurisdiction of Okinawa prefecture. The U.S. briefly administered the islands during its post-war occupation of Japan, and formally returned them to Japan as part of the reversion of Okinawa. There was no protest from China or Taiwan until an exploration of the area indicated that it might be rich in hydrocarbon resources. Former president of Taiwan Lee Teng-hui, during a visit to Japan in July 2015, agreed that the islands belonged to Japan, reiterating the view in his 2016 book The Remaining Years: My Life Journey and the Road of Taiwan’s Democracy. Although Lee was relatively close to the DPP after the end of his presidency and his expulsion from the KMT58, Tsai –who had herself long been close to Lee and played key roles in his administration—pointedly rejected Lee’s characterization in favor of a position closer to the long-established ROC position. Tsai, as head of the Democratic Progressive Party and its ultimately successful candidate for the presidency, declared, “the DPP’s stance has always been clear: The Diaoyutais belong to Taiwan.”59 She repeated this assertion after her re-election in 2020.60 Former vice president Lu reinforced Tsai’s statement, with a broader assertion that Taiwan possesses sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea as well. The limits of alignment between Tsai’s and the DPP’s position and Ma’s were underscored when DPP members declined Ma’s invitation to accompany him to Itu Aba (Taiping) Island, which is not claimed by Japan but is disputed among China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Commenting on the visit, the communist-backed Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao denounced all parties, stating that while Tsai could get away with ambiguities before she was inaugurated, she could not “stand by with folded arms” on either Itu Aba or the Diaoyu: Taiwan public opinion would not allow her to foreswear sovereignty over the areas.61 While Tsai has indeed not foresworn sovereignty over the islands, her administration raised the issue, albeit briefly. Both her administration and the Japanese government and media have been at pains to minimize the conflicting views of sovereignty. With the Japanese government far more worried by the increasing numbers of Chinese ships in what Japan considers its territorial waters, concerns with Taiwan’s claims have lost salience. Given the good state of Taiwan-Japanese relations under the Tsai administration, the two sides may be moving toward a tacit equivalent of an American scholar’s proposed “grand bargain” under which Taiwan agrees to support Japan’s position on the Senkakus while Japan recognizes Taiwan’s sovereign status.62 To avoid retaliation from China, the agreement would have to remain implicit. In a maritime matter that does not involve a rival claims to sovereignty but constituted another point of friction in Taiwan-Japan relations, the Japan 58 59 60 61 62

Lee passed away on July 30, 2020, aged 97. Strong 2015. Cheng 2020. Ta Kung Pao 2016. Eldridge 2016.

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Coast Guard in April 2016 seized and fined a Taiwanese fishing boat in what the Japanese government claims as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The issue here is whether Okinotori should be considered an island entitled to an EEZ.63 Lame-duck President Ma protested, claiming that the Japanese government had violated international law in seizing the ship because Okinotori was merely a rock and that Japan therefore could not claim an EEZ. Ma ordered Taiwan’s coast guard to the area for a one-month deployment, which would extend beyond his term in office. Because the area had not been an issue between Taiwan and Japan, Ma’s critics suspected he had raised it as a favor to Beijing, while leaving Tsai a potentially contentious issue to address with Japan. Tsai’s administration quickly deescalated the issue. Within days of assuming office, Tsai’s cabinet spokesperson Tung Chen-yuan announced that, although the coast guard deployment might be extended, this and all other disputes would be settled through negotiation,64 and Tsai declared that her government would not take a specific legal stance over Okinotori.65 At the end of 2017, a memorandum of understanding on cooperation for search and rescue at sea was signed between the Taiwan-Japan Relations Institute and the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, signaling amicable relations on some maritime issues although carefully skirting the Okinotori issue.66 Defense cooperation Geopolitical factors give Taiwan and Japan compelling reasons to pursue defense cooperation. With Beijing vowing to unify Taiwan by force if necessary and Japan concerned about encroachments by China into its territorial waters, other maritime zones, and airspace, opportunities exist for mutually beneficial Taiwan-Japan security cooperation. Were Taiwan to be incorporated into the PRC, China’s sovereign territory and territorial waters would be perilously close to Japan. Movement toward greater defense cooperation has been growing for some time. In April 2014, Japan lifted its long-standing self-imposed ban on selling weapons abroad. Japanese representatives have made clear that Japan would never deviate from the 1972 communiqué’s formula on relations with Taiwan, which would seem to preclude the sale of weapons. However, some Japanese 63 Defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an area over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind. It stretches 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the coast. Badly eroded by wind and waves, Okinotori comprises an area of approximately two king-sized beds, around which the Japanese government has poured many tons of concrete and seeded with coralproducing organisms. 64 Lu and Wu 2016. 65 Mukai 2016. 66 Japan Times 2017c.

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statements have tacitly acknowledged Taiwan’s sovereign or near-sovereign status in ways that strain that formula. For example, Japanese statements add that “whoever is the president of Taiwan will not affect this basic policy”67— a pointed contrast to PRC sources which never refer to Taiwan’s president, preferring titles like “the leader of the Taiwan authorities” or “the Taiwan chieftain.” Such differences in terminology and nuance do not portend Japan’s sale of big-ticket items such as the submarines that Taiwan has for the past several decades sought in vain to acquire. Still, opportunities exist for cooperation that would attract a lower level of scrutiny. Advisers from Japanese manufacturers such as Kawasaki Heavy Industries can lend their expertise to Taiwan’s shipbuilders and to its Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology. And technology transfer can take place sub rosa. Immediately after Tsai’s first election, the Tokyo-Taipei-Washington Track II dialogue, in abeyance during the Ma administration, was resuscitated. Its first meeting, held in April, even before Tsai’s inauguration, discussed a range of possibilities that included multilateral exercises and operations designed to normalize the idea of the Taiwan military operating closely with other forces, and particularly with those of the U.S. and Japan. Also discussed were the usefulness of an asymmetric defense for Taiwan, and the need to revamp Taiwan’s marine corps to enable it to function as a mobile emergency force. A U.S. marine liaison officer could be assigned to Taiwan. Taiwan marines and naval officers could be invited to participate in U.S. naval patrols as observers. They could visit Japan, Hawaii, or California to train for assault amphibious vehicle operations, just as the Taiwan air force has for decades done for aerial training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.68 Mutual concern with disinformation emanating from China and with cyberattacks has also led to closer cooperation. Japan as well as Malaysia and the Czech Republic have participated in a security exercise co-hosted by Taiwan and the U.S.69 A Japanese cabinet reinterpretation of the constitution’s article 9, though controversial within Japan, now allows Japan to protect another country if it is hit by an attack that is thought to pose a clear and existential threat to Japan, thus strengthening the legal basis for Japan’s commitment to defend the shu-hen jitai. Supporters of close Japan-Taiwan defense relations hope that this could eventually result in a long-discussed Japanese version of the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act, although the possibilities for passing such a law remain remote. Something akin to the tacit agreement not to raise the issue of the Tiaoyutai/ Diaoyu/Senkaku islands may be quietly taking form. At a forum in Washington D.C., former chief of staff for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force 67 Statement of Nakayama Yasunori, Japanese consul-general in Toronto, to author at York University, Toronto, May 14, 2016. 68 Author’s interview May 25, 2016 with a participant in the exercise, Colonel Grant Newsham, U.S.M.C. (retired) and a research fellow with Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo. 69 Hille 2019.

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Admiral Takei Tomohisa suggested increased cooperation between the naval forces of his country and Taiwan.70 At another forum, also in Washington, retired Vice-Admiral Yoshida Masanori argued for more security cooperation among the U.S, Japan, and Taiwan under Japan’s newly announced Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. He pointed out that, since all three navies use American ships and planes, their forces are interoperable, which would facilitate joint training and, “if necessary,” fighting side by side.71 Given that calling the arrangement an alliance would be legally difficult as well as politically provocative, the more neutral term “federated defense” has been suggested. Taiwan and Japan are already reportedly sharing data on hacking attacks, cyberespionage, and major data breaches.72 However, Taiwan’s attempts to raise the salience of defense ties have been rebuffed. Then-Chief Cabinet Minister Suga Yoshihide, now prime minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kono Taro flatly rejected President Tsai’s suggestion, in an interview with a Japanese paper in 2019, of an intergovernmental dialogue about bilateral security cooperation that focused on sharing military information—an arrangement that, for Tokyo, the absence of formal diplomatic relations precluded.73 Speculation on why the normally ultra-cautious Tsai would make so provocative a statement centered around her desire to placate supporters who were dissatisfied with her not being tougher on China. The issue has not been raised, publicly at least, since then. High level contacts Several instances of high-level statements and contacts between Japan and Taiwan under Tsai provide illustrations of robust of bilateral ties and have tested the limits of Beijing’s tolerance. In February 2017, Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) issued its annual security report, subtitled “Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship.”74 To Beijing’s displeasure, the subtitle as well as the content of the report treated the two entities as separate.75 A particular point of irritation to China, conveyed privately to the Japanese government, were two references to “the Republic of China” —both referring to the period prior to 1972 when Japan had recognized the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China. The Japanese government replied that NIDS is an independent entity—a disingenuous response, given that the NIDS website describes the institute as the main policy research arm of the Japanese Ministry of Defense—and the references to “Republic of China” remained.76 70 Huang 2018. The meeting was at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation’s headquarters. 71 Grady 2018; The meeting took place at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 72 Hille 2019. 73 Matsumura 2019. 74 National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan 2017. 75 Xinhua 2017. 76 Private communication to the author from the Office of the Prime Minister.

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A month later, China’s foreign ministry lodged a “serious protest” with Japan after Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Akama Jiro- attended a cultural exchange meeting in Taiwan.77 The following year, responding to an invitation from the Japanese veteran’s association Taiyukai, the head of Taiwan’s Veteran’s Affairs Council visited Japan, reportedly to pave the way for regular interaction between the two organizations. Although Taiyukai has no formal government association, its headquarters are in the Japanese defense ministry and its directors are recently retired flag-rank officers.78 At the end of November 2017, Prime Minister Abe met with Taiwan’s envoy, former premier James Soong on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Vietnam, hours after being warned against doing so by Xi Jinping. According to the Japanese foreign ministry, Abe told Soong that Taiwan was an important partner with shared values and close economic ties, commented favorably on the progress in Taiwan-Japan relations over the past year, and said that he looked forward to further strengthening while maintaining the unofficial nature of the relationship.79 Abe also sent a letter of condolence to Tsai after the devastating Hualien February 2018 earthquake, addressing her as “your excellency” and urging her to ganbare, loosely translated as “hang in there.” The letter was briefly carried on the Japanese government’s website, but deleted after a protest from China.80 A few months later, former President Lee, visiting Japan, called for defense exchanges with Japan and, hinting at support for Prime Minister Abe’s plan to revise the Japanese constitution, urged Japan to rely less on the United States for protection and more on itself.81 Columnists for center-right Japanese newspapers like Sankei Shimbun and its English-language sister publication Japan Forward took up this call enthusiastically. One article advocated a Japanese equivalent of the TRA, presumably including its pledge to provide Taiwan with such weapons as are needed for its defense.82Sankei has also carried interviews with former presidents Lee and Chen,83 both of whom are regularly castigated by Beijing for their opposition to unification with China. Well before mass protests began in Hong Kong, Japan’s largest circulation daily, the center-right Yomiuri Shimbun, editorialized that China’s one country two systems formula for Taiwan is an “empty promise.”84 Such media content in Japan pointed to a level of support, and pressure, for strong Taiwan-Japan ties, especially in security affairs. 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

Reynolds 2017. Lin and Hsiao 2018. Reynolds 2017. South China Morning Post 2018. Yomiuri Shimbun 2018. Eldridge 2018. Yaita 2020. Yomiuri Shimbun 2019.

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People-to-people relations People-to-people relations have been a relatively uncontroversial bright spot in Japan-Taiwan relations. Taiwan’s tourist industry hopes that increases in already numerous Japanese visitors can compensate for cutbacks in Chinese tourist groups, whose numbers fell amid Beijing’s consternation at Tsai’s 2016 victory and are unlikely to rebound in the wake of her frustrating (for Beijing) re-election in 2020.85 In December 2019, Taiwan welcomed its two millionth Japanese visitor of the year, a new record.86 How soon and how strongly these numbers will rebound after the pandemic imposed travel restrictions in 2020 remains to be seen. Taiwan-Japan pop culture ties remain strong. For example, an all-girl pop group, TPE48, formed in Taipei on the model of Tokyo’s AKB48, and a new train featuring Japanese corporation Sanrio’s iconic Hello Kitty-themed cars began serving passengers on the Taipei to Taitung rail line. Taiwan’s Eva airlines flies a Hello Kitty jet, complete with a special check-in counter and logo tickets.87 Policy-related and academic exchanges are robust as well. Track II dialogues are also frequent, with one among countless examples being the Taiwan Society of Japan Studies and the National Sun Yat-sen University Center for Japanese Studies jointly-hosted seminar on “The Abe Doctrine and Japan’s New Grand Strategy,” with panels in Japanese, mandarin, and English.88 Natural disasters also have provided unfortunate opportunities for both people-to-people, as well as more official, cooperation. Annoyance over Japan’s initial failure to acknowledge Taiwan’s generous contributions for tsunami relief has been soothed by instituting yearly “Thank you, Taiwan” activities on March 11, the date of the disaster. After an earthquake shook Taiwan in February 2016, privately funded Japanese help arrived immediately. Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je led a delegation of schoolteachers and other relevant personnel on a visit to Tokyo to study techniques of disaster management. The following month, 300,000 Taiwanese participated in a preparedness drill that included students covering their heads with Japanese-devised padded safety hoods. A month later, the popular rock band Fire Ex., whose song “Island’s Sunrise” became the anthem for the Sunflower Movement protests in Taiwan in 2014, went to the earthquakedevastated area in Iwate prefecture to perform a song, “Keep on Going”, dedicated to the survivors.89 In 2017, the All Japan Taiwanese Union, the world’s largest overseas Taiwanese organization, was founded, with Sankei Shimbun reporting that Japanese financial leaders and conservative politicians who support Taiwan were present.90 85 See Tourism Bureau, M.O.T.C. Republic of China (Taiwan) for monthly and yearly visitor statistics by country. 86 Taiwan News 2019. 87 See e.g. Rizzo 2018 for a photo of the plane. 88 Chang 2016. 89 Ukai 2016. 90 Sankei Shimbun 2017.

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Unpredictable incidents also provide opportunities for people-to-people ties. When children in Suao who were participating in a beach-cleaning exercise discovered a camera, their teacher traced it via Facebook to a young Japanese woman who had lost it at sea more than two years before. The woman was reunited with her camera amid much publicity in both countries. News photographs of the ceremony showed the formal presentation against a background of placards praising the friendship between the two countries.91 Foundations for people-to-people connections also are reinforced by conscious efforts on both sides to present the Japanese colonial period in a favorable light. Efforts predate the Tsai-era improvement in Taiwan-Japan relations, as for example films such as the 2014 “Kano,” based on the real-life success of a mixed Taiwanese-Japanese baseball team in the 1930s. The tempo increased markedly after Tsai’s election. Many examples can be found even in the normally China-friendly Japan Times. In addition to editorializing that China should respect the will of Taiwanese with regard to unification,92 the paper characterized Taiwan as the place where Japanese go to feel at home while on vacation,93 printed the nostalgia-tinged story of the repatriation of a young Taiwan-born girl to a Japan she had never seen,94 gave a favorable review to the Taiwanese film “Le Moulin” (the name of a group of Taiwanese poets trying to create a literary movement in a foreign language),95 and covered an urban renewal project in Taipei that had retained Japanese colonial era features.96 Taiwan papers have done much the same, noting that a woman from Taiwan had won a medal in Japan’s annual manga competition,97 reporting that two popular Taiwanese comics set in colonial era Taipei were being made into films,98 and describing a traveling exhibition of painting showcasing early 20th-century Japanese colonial-era Taiwanese architecture.99 Not all mutual public perceptions have been positive and some play into political differences within Taiwan. Triggered by a cosplay incident involving Nazi uniforms at a school in Hsinchu, some Taiwan citizens complained that the DPP government has beautified the Japanese colonial era, prompting counter charges that the critics worshiped Chiang Kai-shek and were attempting to curry favor with China.100 The statue of Japanese engineer Hatta Yoichi, erected during the Ma administration, was decapitated 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Ko 2018a. Japan Times 2017b. Shoji 2017b. Ko 2017. Shoji 2017a. Ko 2018b. Taiwan Today 2017. Lin 2017. Huang and Hetherington 2017. Lu, Hsu, and Hsu 2016.

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101

by pro-China activists from the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP). Three weeks later, a ceremony was held for the now-repaired statue.102 The statue vandals, accompanied by two more CUPP members, then vandalized a pair of century-old stone komainu (lion-dog) statues, broadcasting the attack live on Facebook, and calling the statues “garbage left by imperial Japan.” They received prison sentences ranging from four to five months.103 Chinese netizens have joined in efforts that undermine Japan-Taiwan people-to-people ties. The Taiwan television channel Dai An canceled what it hoped would be a blockbuster drama series produced by the station’s owner (Taiwan’s Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation) after Chinese netizens complained that its first two episodes had romanticized the Japanese era in Taiwan. The series is based on the real-life story of a now-91-year-old woman who defied her family by becoming a nurse for Japanese soldiers during World War II. After the Foundation—presumably worried about its ability to continue operating in China—pulled the series, Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture expressed the hope that Beijing “would not allow political factors to affect Taiwan’s television programming.”104 No comparable incidents have arisen, though one cannot rule out self-censorship among the producers.

Conclusions Taiwan-Japan relations are likely to continue to deepen, relying where possible on non-governmental and quasi-governmental working relationships as the Japanese government seeks to avoid friction with China while endeavoring to protect its strategic and economic interests by partnering with Taiwan. Concern about this trajectory is evident in the PRC. Almost lost in foreign media ridicule about sexist remarks against Tsai by Wang Weixing, a member of Beijing’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait and a department chief of the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science, was his attack on Tsai’s connections with Japan and those of members of her family. Wang said, “needless to say, on an emotional level, Tsai Ing-wen’s political stance is Japanophilic” (Tsai Ing-wen zao qinggan shang naizhi zhengzhi lichang shang de qin Ri shi wuyong zhiyi de). Chinese censors quickly removed the article, which appeared in the May 20 edition of the Chinese-language International Herald Leader (Guoji Xianqu Daobao), a subsidiary of state news agency Xinhua, with the explanation that it was having “an adverse effect on public opinion”—referring to a netizen backlash against the sexist remarks rather than the comments on Japan. Chinese sources have repeatedly said that, if Japan wants better relations with the PRC, it must abandon its ambiguous attitude toward Taiwan’s status.105 101 102 103 104 105

Mainichi Shimbun 2017. Yang and Chang 2017. South China Morning Post 2017. Chung 2018a. Da 2017.

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During Tsai’s first term and into her second, Japan’s approach has served Taiwan-Japan relations well. When the PRC has engaged in heavy-handed pressure, it has tended to arouse popular resentment and charges that China is interfering in Japan’s domestic affairs, strengthening the inclination toward stronger Japan-Taiwan ties.106 With Tsai re-elected to a second term in January 2020 and Abe becoming Japan’s longest-serving post-war prime minister, a continuation of stable relations seemed likely. Taiwan was much praised in the Japanese media for its handling of the coronavirus contagion, with China formally complaining after Abe tweeted his thanks to Tsai for her support, which included donations of masks.107 After Taiwan’s digital minister, Audrey Tang, devised an app that enabled better tracking of mask inventories, Japanese netizens tweeted that Japan “should look at Taiwan’s use of technology for crisis management,” and suggested that Ms. Tang be made Japan’s cybersecurity minister.108 And Yomiuri’s headline announcing the results of Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election was “ ‘Nation of Immigrants’ Taiwan a Model for Democracy in Asia.”109 Note the reference, by Japan’s largest circulation daily, to Taiwan as a nation— which Beijing has vehemently and repeatedly insisted that it is not. In a slight change from 2016, perhaps occasioned by his desire to consummate a long-awaited visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping, Abe congratulated Tsai on her election in his capacity as head of the Liberal Democratic Party rather than as prime minister.110 Still, in a formal address to the Diet shortly after the election, Abe referenced Taiwan three times, the first time in 14 years that a serving prime minister has mentioned the country’s name in Japan’s parliament. Japanese newspapers reported that there was applause after each mention, along with opposition by some Diet members to inviting Xi Jinping to Japan as a state guest.111 Then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide congratulated Tsai on her inauguration in May, using her title as president.112 The picture is not entirely rosy. Repeated assertions in Tokyo about the need to improve ties with China—albeit without discernible results so far— arouse anxieties in Taipei that Taiwan may be used as a bargaining chip in Sino-Japanese relations. There are still clearly limits to how far Tokyo will go in relations with Taipei. Abe’s abrupt resignation from the prime ministership 106 This is an argument usually used by the PRC against other countries. In 1955, China signed the Pancha Shila, or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, one of which is non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, which the Chinese government frequently references as a cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy. 107 Yomiuri Shimbun 2020b. 108 Nikkei 2020. 109 Yomiuri Shimbun 2020a. 110 Yang 2020. 111 Asia News Network 2020. 112 Japan Times 2020.

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due to health reasons put Suga in his place. Though serving Abe, and Taiwan-Japan relations well during his time as chief cabinet secretary, Suga is also regarded as close to the pro-Chinese politician Nikai Toshihiro, sometimes referred to as the “shadow shogun.” In both Taiwan and Japan, relations are constrained by their ties to an increasingly assertive China and uncertainty about the policies of the incoming Biden administration in Washington. As Biden prepared to take office, Japanese State Minister of Defense Nakayama Hide specifically linked Japan’s stance on Taiwan to that of the United States. Urging Biden to be strong on Taiwan, which he called a red line in Asia, he stated that only after receiving an answer could Japan prepare an appropriate response on Taiwan.113 Nonetheless, bilateral relations have improved during Tsai’s first term and appear relatively secure as Taiwan moves into Tsai’s second term. The factors contributing to a positive relationship remain in place. And the Japanese government is unlikely to accede to pressure from Beijing to adopt its version of one-China policy or Beijing’s preferences or demands concerning JapanTaiwan relations. It can be expected that Japan will continue to profess adherence to a one-China policy, and limit the formality and the visibility of its ties with Taiwan, even as both Taipei and Tokyo continue to test the limits of Beijing’s tolerance.

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Wu, Debby, and Ting-fang Cheng. 2016. “Foxconn to Build New Huawei Smartphone Factory in Western China.” Nikkei Asian Review. May 22. http://asia.nikkei.com/ Business/Companies/Foxconn-to-build-new-Huawei-smartphone-factory-in-westernChina. Xinhua. 2017. “China Warns Japan Over Report on Taiwan-related Issue.” February 24. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/24/c_136083363.htm. Yaita, Akio. 2020. “Ex-President Chen Shui-bian: With No Action, Taiwan Will Be Swallowed by China.” Sankei Shimbun. January 20. https://japan-forward.com/inter view-ex-president-chen-shui-bian-with-no-action-taiwan-will-be-swallowed-by-china/. Yamazaki, Makiko, and Ayai Tomizawa. 2017. “Japan’s Sharp Swings to Profit Under Foxconn’s Watch as Costs Slashed.” Reuters. February 3. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-sharp-results-idUSKBN15I0J8. Yang, Ming-chu, and Lin Ko. 2018. “Taiwan, Japan Market Cooperation Committee Meets for First Time.” CNA. June 14. http://focustaiwan/news/aeco/201806140022.aspx. Yang, Sheng. 2017. “Japan’s ‘Tricks’ No Obstacle to Reunification.” Global Times. January 1. Yang, Sophia. 2020. “Japanese Prime Minister Mentions Taiwan in Diet for 1st Time in 14 Years.” Taiwan News, January 21. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/ 3861548. Yang, Sze-jui, and S.C. Chang. 2017. “Memorial for Japanese Engineer Held in Front of Repaired Statue.” Focus Taiwan, May 8. https://focustaiwan.tw/society/201705080027. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2016. “New Taiwan President Showed Will to Maintain ‘Status Quo’ With China.” May 22. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2018 “Ex-Taiwan Leader Lee Calls for Defense Exchange With Japan.” June 15. http://www.the-japan-news.com/news/article/0004534919. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2019. “China’s One Country Two Systems Formula for Taiwan is Empty Promise.” January 29. http://www.the-japan-news.com/news/article/0005509936. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2020a. “‘Nation of Immigrants’ Taiwan a Model for Democracy in Asia.” January 29. https://www.the-japan-news.com/news/article/0006314654?fp= 1e7a81b5ea55c0851b2617a2fdfabafb. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2020b. “China Protests Abe’s Tweet of Thanks to Taiwan.” April 11. https://the-japan-news.com/news/article/006482995.

10 Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era: adapting old strategies to new circumstances Jacques deLisle

In her inaugural address on May 20, 2016, and again at her second inaugural four years later,1 Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen affirmed that she would continue Taiwan’s long-running quest for international space and the benefits it offers for Taiwan’s security. Taiwan under Tsai, as under her predecessors, has pursued a multi-pronged agenda for “international space” (guoji kongjian) that includes: seeking access to international institutions, both well-established and newly emerging, whether as a member or through lesser forms of participation; preserving relations with various states, both formal ties with a dwindling number of diplomatic allies and robust informal relationships with major powers; and acting “as if” Taiwan were a member of international regimes that it is not allowed formally to join and by undertaking compliance with broader legal rules and norms. Expanding, or at least preserving, international space has become a vital concern for Taiwan during the last several decades as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has risen in power and influence and, in turn, increased its capacity to undermine the international standing of Taiwan/the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan). Tsai inherited a legacy of significant, but limited, success from her opposing-party predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, and a longer tradition of modest success from the previous two presidents of Taiwan’s democratic era, Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui. Taiwan has adjusted this longstanding strategy since Tsai and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) succeeded Ma and the Kuomintang (KMT). Changes partly reflect the preferences and priorities of a different government, specifically one led by a different party. But Taiwan under Tsai and the DPP also has been coping with an external environment that has increased the challenges, and arguably raised the stakes, for Taiwan’s quest for international space and security.

1

Tsai 2016, 2020b; see also Tsai 2020c (expressing “hope that Taiwan will be given a fair opportunity to participate in international affairs”).

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A more difficult environment Taiwan’s heightened challenges come primarily from Beijing, which has been openly dissatisfied with Tsai’s positions on cross-Strait relations, particularly her refusal to follow Ma’s precedent and accept the so-called 1992 Consensus and a “One China” principle (with different interpretations) that it embodies. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) dismissed Tsai’s 2016 inaugural pledge of peace, stability, and continuity as an “incomplete test paper.”2 Chinese sources warned that her failure to meet Beijing’s terminological demands meant—in a phrase favored by Xi Jinping—that “the earth will move and the mountains will shake” (didong shanyao).3 In response to Tsai’s second inaugural address, the TAO characterized Tsai’s refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle as unilaterally undermining the foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and provoking confrontation.4 Tsai’s reiteration in her October 2020 National Day address of a commitment to peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, and a call for peace, coexistence and meaningful dialogue fell on deaf ears.5 Beijing’s cold shoulder to Tsai has meant a cold peace or a cold confrontation—if not yet a cold war— across the Strait and, in turn, in the environment where Tsai’s government must pursue international space for Taiwan.6 Beijing’s tightening of the vise on Taiwan’s international space since Tsai came to power has complicated Taiwan’s pursuit of almost all aspects of its multifaceted strategy. Changes in Washington have complicated Taiwan’s push for international status. Early in Tsai’s tenure, indicators of U.S. positions careened from the apparent win of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s unprecedented phone call with a sitting ROC president, on one hand, to the newly inaugurated President Trump’s pledge to Xi Jinping that the U.S. would retain fealty to its One China policy and would consult China before any second call with Tsai, on the other hand.7 Thereafter, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-Strait issues returned to relative stability and turned strikingly supportive, as reflected in several pieces of pro-Taiwan legislation in Congress, numerous and varied statements from high-level U.S. officials backing or praising Taiwan, notable support for Taiwan’s inclusion in the 2020 WHA session, and pointed criticism of governments that switched diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing. Nonetheless, there were risks, or at least reasons for uncertainty, concerning Taiwan’s quest for international space, including Trump’s penchant for friction with allies and friendly governments, his apparent, if vacillating, warmth toward Xi (and 2 3 4 5 6 7

Xinhua 2016; see also Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC 2017. Xi Jinping uttered this now-much-referenced phrase in the midst of Taiwan’s presidential campaign. Xinhua 2015. Xinhua 2020. Tsai 2020a Ramzy 2016c; Lin 2016; Global Times 2020. Gearan, Rucker, and Denyer 2016; Bohan and Brunnstrom 2016; The White House 2017b; Mason Adler, and Holland 2017.

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authoritarian rulers more generally), and his disdain and distrust toward international organizations. As Tsai moved into her second term, another source of unpredictability and concern arose from the U.S. side. The election of Joe Biden as president brought both optimism and worries for Taiwan: an expected reduction in the volatility of U.S. policy, a promised re-engagement with allies and international institutions, a predicted tough line on China that incentivized—or at least did not weigh against—embracing Taiwan, and reassuring statements on the incoming administration’s Taiwan policy, on one hand;8 and the prospect that there might be some backsliding from the notably strong backing Taiwan had received during Tsai’s first term toward the less Taiwan-supporting policies of the Obama administration in which Biden and much of his foreign policy staff had served, on the other hand.9 As has been the case for decades, the success, or lack of success, of Taiwan’s government in protecting or enhancing Taiwan’s international space will reflect its leadership’s choices and skill, and Beijing’s and Washington’s policies toward Taiwan. Taiwan’s accomplishments, or frustrations, on this front will be important factors for Taiwan’s security in an often-inhospitable world.

The United Nations and other major international organizations Participation in major, established international organizations long has been a key element of Taiwan’s pursuit of international status, and has remained so under Tsai. In her inaugural addresses, she vowed that “Taiwan will be an indispensable partner for the international community” (2016) and, more specifically, to “continue to fight for our participation in international organizations” (2020). An especially prominent target has been the United Nations and affiliated organizations. Because the UN remains the pre-eminent international organization and is often described as an institution whose membership is open only to internationally recognized sovereign states, observer status or meaningful participation in the UN and its specialized organizations offers an especially potent marker of status for Taiwan. The UN itself has been beyond reach. The KMT regime under Chiang Kaishek endured one of the biggest setbacks to Taiwan’s international space when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 in 1971, reassigning the “Chinese seat” at the UN from Taipei to Beijing.10 Under Lee and Chen, Taiwan sought, in various forms, to regain a presence in the UN. This often took the form of resolutions, introduced by Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, calling for some form of representation. The most controversial effort was an unsuccessful referendum, pushed by the outgoing Chen administration in the 8

Central News Agency 2020a; Hernández and Chien 2020; Taiwan Times 2020; “Taiwan Hopes for Close U.S. Cooperation” 2020; Biden 2020a; U.S. Department of State 2021. 9 Hille 2020; Shih 2020a. 10 UN General Assembly, Resolution 2758 (1971).

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2008 election, asking whether Taiwanese voters supported seeking UN membership under the name Taiwan. Doubtless recognizing the futility of resuming the long-failed and sometimes-costly targeting of the core UN body, Tsai, like her immediate predecessor Ma, has not continued such efforts although she has persisted with Taiwan’s broader call to redress the exclusion of the people of Taiwan and individual Taiwanese from participation in UN institutions and related activities.11 UN specialized agencies and similar organizations Taiwan under Tsai has sought to preserve and advance the limited progress achieved under Ma in participating in UN-affiliated specialized organs and similar bodies. Early on, Tsai identified as priorities a list that resembled her predecessor’s: the World Health Assembly (WHA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).12 Taiwan’s regular attendance at the annual World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings beginning in 2009 was the signal accomplishment of the Ma administration in gaining access to major, established international institutions.13 Participation in the WHA has been a big prize in the pursuit of international space because the World Health Organization (WHO)—of which the WHA is the plenary meeting of members—is one of 15 specialized agencies affiliated with the United Nations.14 Ma’s policy of rapprochement toward Beijing, coupled with international pressure on China and the WHO born of the PRC’s mishandling of the SARS crisis and the resulting peril to public health in Taiwan and around the world, opened the door for Taiwan at the WHA. To be sure, this victory came with limits, including continued exclusion from full and direct participation in the international public health regime’s more functionally significant body (the WHO), and attendance at the WHA on a merely ad hoc basis, using the status-diminishing name Chinese Taipei and under the shadow of a WHO internal memorandum that accepted a One China principle and Beijing’s role as a gatekeeper to Taiwan’s participation.15 The Tsai era began with a veneer of continuity amid warnings of setbacks to come. Taiwan received an invitation to the 2016 session, which would be held a few days after Tsai’s inauguration. But the invitation arrived later than usual, only a few weeks before the meeting. As protocol demanded, the invitation went to the Minister of Health and Welfare of the Ma government, who was still in office. This made the 2016 renewal less than it seemed 11 Hsu 2016b; Lin 2020. 12 Taiwan Today 2016a; Taipei Times 2017a. Tsai had articulated this agenda during the presidential campaign as well. “DPP 29th Anniversary” 2015. 13 See deLisle 2011. 14 United Nations 2020. 15 See deLisle 2009; Yang 2010.

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because the timing allowed Beijing to frame the invitation as a parting gift to Ma, and to postpone a formal decision on whether to snub Tsai. In another bad sign for Taiwan, the 2016 invitation’s text contained new language that underscored Taiwan’s limited standing, including explicit references to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, the parallel WHO Resolution 25.1 which had ousted the ROC from the Chinese seat in the WHO, and a One China principle which had been embedded in earlier WHO documents and was orally reaffirmed in connection with the 2016 invitation by the WHO’s Director-General.16 In seeking continued participation in 2017, Tsai’s government invoked— including in statements from the president herself—familiar arguments that resonated with claims to state-like stature, citing the WHO’s principle of nondiscrimination, casting Taiwan’s exclusion as a violation of the WHO’s constitution and Taiwan’s right to “equal treatment,” and characterizing Taiwan as an “integral part of the global disease prevention system.”17 Nonetheless, when the time came for the 2017 WHA session, China’s opposition—based on Beijing’s insistence that Taiwan’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus was a precondition for Taiwan’s attendance—meant that no invitation was forthcoming, and Taiwan’s eight-year run of WHA participation came to an end.18 Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Taiwan renewed its push for attendance at WHA meetings and “full participation” in the WHO under what seemed like exceptionally promising, if dire, circumstances—ones that recalled the SARS epidemic. Taiwan’s arguments struck familiar notes, including principles of universality in the WHO system, and the need to include Taiwan (and others) to cope with a severe, invisibly frontier-crossing threat to global public health.19 In addition, Taiwan pointed to its extraordinary success in containing the novel coronavirus despite lacking full access to the WHO, the contrast between Taiwan’s conformity to the WHO regime’s norms of prompt reporting, transparency, and international cooperation and the PRC’s opacity and recalcitrance (notwithstanding the WHO’s effusive and questionable praise of Beijing’s performance), and Taiwan’s eagerness to share with the world its expertise and resources to help fight the pandemic.20 Amid mounting criticism of China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan’s call for inclusion at the WHA/WHO drew especially strong support from the United States, other major powers, and some of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.21 But Taiwan faced many obstacles: the reduction in U.S. leverage with 16 17 18 19

Yeh 2016a; Tai and Low 2016; Yeh 2016c; Hsiao 2016. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017a; Taiwan Today 2017b. Agence France Presse 2017; Horton 2017a. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020c; Taiwan Today 2020; see also Lee and Lin 2019. 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020a; Chiang 2020; Taiwan Centers for Disease Control 2020; Jennings 2020; Aspinwall 2020. 21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020b; Pompeo 2020a; Hinshaw and Alpert 2020.

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the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the WHO (a move reversed by the Biden administration), China’s familiar staunch opposition (which had only paused during the Ma years), the WHO’s long-standing “One China” rule and increasingly accommodating posture toward Beijing (which the U.S. characterized as subservience), and WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus’s sour relations with Taiwan (with the head of the WHO blaming Tsai’s government for not doing more to stop some Taiwan residents’ sometimes racially charged criticisms of Tedros over the WHO’s dealings with Taiwan).22 The WHO administration determined that the politically contentious question of Taiwan’s participation must be determined by the members, rather than addressed by an invitation from the Director-General, which had been the mode for inviting Taiwan to the WHA during the Ma years.23 China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson accused “the DPP authorities” of using Taiwan’s bid for WHA attendance and WHO participation to “seek independence under the pretext of the pandemic.”24 In the end, Taiwan withdrew its request and did not attend the virtual WHA session. Taiwan was also refused access to a special WHA follow-on session focusing on COVID-19 in November 2020.25 Taiwan’s pursuit of engagement with another UN specialized organization, the ICAO, has followed a broadly similar, although less dramatic, arc. Amid Ma-era cross-Strait rapprochement in 2013, Beijing countenanced a first-time invitation for Taiwan to attend the ICAO’s triennial Assembly—the rough equivalent of the WHA in the WHO system. The terms of Taiwan’s participation were contingent and constrained: Taiwan was an ad hoc “special guest” of the ICAO Council’s president and attended under the name “Chinese Taipei.”26 With Tsai in office, Taiwan’s bid for a renewed invitation was rejected in 2016 and 2019.27 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with its Conference of Parties (COP) is another UN-linked entity—specifically mentioned in Tsai’s inaugural address—where Taiwan’s pursuit of internationalspace-enhancing opportunities for engagement has made modest headway but has been largely frustrated. Taiwan’s requests to participate meaningfully in COP have been rebuffed consistently since they began in earnest early in the Ma administration. With the Paris Accords on climate change coalescing in late 2016, it became more valuable, in terms of international stature, for Taiwan to participate in the COP process. Although Taiwan’s Environmental Protection 22 Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC 2020; Lau 2020; Huang 2017; Shih 2020b; see also Chang 2020. 23 Kelly 2020. 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2020a. 25 Su 2020. 26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2013a; Shih 2013. 27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016d; Lin, n.d. (Minister of Transportation and Communications, Republic of China).

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Agency chiefs have been denied access to COP meetings, Taiwan has maintained very limited engagement into the Tsai era, for example by having technical delegations participate in side events, or make presentations, at post-Paris COP meetings.28 Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, no COP session was held in 2020. INTERPOL is another, broadly analogous but not UN-affiliated, major international organization that Tsai, like Ma before her, identified as a priority. INTERPOL has remained inaccessible amid rising stakes for Taiwan. The ROC had been a member from 1964 until its ouster in connection with the PRC’s entry in 1984. In late 2016 and again in 2018, Taiwan’s bid to attend the annual INTERPOL General Assembly was rejected.29 The expected snub was more freighted with implications for Taiwan’s international space because of other PRC-driven developments. Among INTERPOL’s key roles is to facilitate apprehension and return of fugitive criminal suspects abroad. During Tsai’s tenure, third-party states—including Malaysia, Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Kenya—had acceded to Beijing’s requests to repatriate Taiwanese accused of crimes to the PRC, and Taiwan’s concerns increased after Beijing adopted a National Security Law for Hong Kong that raised the specter of ROC nationals on China’s politicized wanted list being extradited to Hong Kong and handed over to PRC justice. Therein lay an especially pointed, if merely implicit, rebuke to Taiwan’s claims to state-like status.30 The limits to Taiwan’s success with UN-affiliated and similarly high-profile universal agencies are all the more striking, given what should have been relatively promising features. Taiwan was not seeking full membership in the “states member only” organizations in the UN system, but only some form of “meaningful participation” or observer status. And Taiwan’s efforts on this front have drawn some support from the United States and other states. The ICAO and other UN-affiliated agencies have institutional structures and rules broadly similar to those of the WHO/WHA, suggesting an easy analogy, but one that Beijing rejected, insisting on the unique character and structure of each organization. The bodies that have been the principal foci of Taiwan’s efforts mostly govern functional areas that have been relatively apolitical and not intimately connected to issues of statehood and sovereignty. They also concern fields, such as aviation or public health (in a world where recent pandemics have emanated from China), in which Taiwan is a major player— so much so that a global regime excluding Taiwan would be seriously incomplete and at risk of not functioning well. Or they regulate issue areas, such as public health and climate change, where Taiwan’s interests are at high 28 Ateuyi 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018b; Radio Taiwan International 2019; Taiwan Today 2019. 29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019a. Because of COVID-19, the 2020 INTERPOL General Assembly was not held, mooting Taiwan’s renewed request. See Huang 2020a. 30 Ramzy 2016b; Whiteman 2016; Thul 2016; Strong 2019; Associated Press 2017; see also Focus Taiwan 2020.

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risk if Taiwan is excluded from international cooperation and participation— a situation that strengthens the moral appeal of Taiwan’s bid, as shown by the surges in international support for Taiwan’s WHO/WHA access after SARS and again amid COVID-19.31 Nonetheless, Taiwan’s efforts largely have failed as Beijing’s resistance to Taiwan’s greater participation in major, established organizations has proved insurmountable in so many contexts.32 Beijing’s opposition is unlikely to abate, at least during the remainder of Tsai’s term. With Tsai as president, Taiwan is very unlikely to change its position on the issues that Beijing has defined as preconditions for a less unaccommodating line. The U.S., Japan, and other supporters of Taiwan are unlikely to be willing and able to override China in international organizations or induce Beijing to change its position. With Tsai, rather than Ma, in office, COVID-19 tellingly did not reproduce the post-SARS access that Taiwan gained to the WHA/WHO, and there is little likelihood of a breakthrough for Taiwan with other UN specialized agencies or their peer institutions. International economic organizations Under Tsai and the DPP, Taiwan has sought, generally successfully, to preserve the relatively high levels of participation that it had achieved in major international organizations focused on economic matters. Some of this success dates back decades and survived the erosion of Taiwan’s international space that began in the 1970s. Other gains are of more recent vintage—most notably membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)—obtained during the early years of Chen’s presidency. Taiwan’s place in the WTO—achieved as part of a package deal with the PRC’s entry—has remained secure despite Beijing’s mounting pressure on Taiwan’s international space, and despite Taiwan’s having had to accept the unwieldy and status-corrosive moniker “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).” Full participation and membership in the WTO—which, despite its many troubles, remains the foremost institution of the international economic order—is particularly important for Taiwan’s international space. Somewhat perversely, the benefits of WTO membership for Taiwan’s international stature may have become more significant because of Beijing’s toughening stance toward Taiwan under Tsai. With progress on further follow-on agreements to the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) stalled, much of the large portion of Taiwan’s trade and economic relations that cross the Strait remains formally subject to the WTO’s rules and dispute resolution procedures, which treat the PRC and Taiwan as equals. With the U.S. opting out of the TPP and with 31 deLisle 2003, 2020. 32 See deLisle 2011; Wang 2006.

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Beijing continuing to pressure other states—with increased zeal since Tsai came to power—not to make trade agreements with Taiwan, the WTO occupies an even more central place in Taiwan’s external economic relations and the economics-related dimension of Taiwan’s international space. During Tsai’s presidency, Taiwan has retained its memberships in key regional economic bodies, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping. Here, too, familiar limitations have persisted. At APEC (which Taiwan joined alongside China and Hong Kong in 1991), Taiwan’s president is not allowed to attend and must send surrogates—usually former senior officials or political leaders and occasionally a business leader—to represent “Chinese Taipei.” In the ADB (which the ROC joined as a founder in 1966 before the PRC entered in 1986), Taiwan remains a member, but must accept another international statuschallenging name: “Taipei, China.” The Beijing-led and Taiwan-excluding Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) may come to rival the importance of the ADB, potentially diminishing somewhat the status-enhancing benefits of ADB membership for Taiwan. Taiwan’s long-running relative success with such established international economic organizations—and its continuation in the Tsai era—is partly attributable to factors that also limit its impact in bolstering Taiwan’s international status and its prospects for replication with institutions that focus on other issue areas. International economic institutions are comparatively wellinsulated from the high politics of sovereignty and state-like status—areas where Beijing’s objections are sharpest and Taiwan’s potential gains from success, correspondingly, are greatest. Key international economic organizations where Taiwan has been able to gain or retain membership are ones that are unambiguously not states-member-only, such as the WTO and APEC. Where Taiwan enjoys membership or participation, it does so under names that eschew terms, such as “Taiwan” (as a stand-alone term) or “Republic of China,” that most strongly connote state status—and therefore are neuralgic for Beijing. Given the many moves Beijing has made to constrain Taiwan’s international space despite Tsai’s moderate positions on cross-Strait relations, it is not unthinkable that Beijing would go after what have been safe international spaces for Taiwan. Short of that, the shifting institutional locus of international economic relations, especially in Taiwan’s neighborhood, to China-led regional agreements and institutions, may erode the symbolic—as well as the practical—value of Taiwan’s long-held assets in this dimension of Taiwan’s struggle for international space.33

33 The situation is not as bleak as the focus on especially important and highprofile international organizations in this and the preceding section may suggest. Taiwan (under various names) is a participant or member in many, generally “lesser,” international organizations, from most of which Beijing has not, as yet, pushed strongly to exclude or expel Taiwan. For an inventory, see Glaser 2013, 44–46.

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Emerging international regimes Tsai’s government continued the Ma administration’s pursuit of membership in emerging regional economic institutions, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)34 and, later, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),35 the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),36 and the still-remote prospect of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).37 Joining such regimes offers opportunities not directly related to international status: helping Tsai fulfill her goal of reinvigorating Taiwan’s economy; and addressing the imperative to diversify away from the politically worrisome economic dependence on China that emerged after Taiwan lifted restrictions on cross-Strait economic relations in the late 1980s, that expanded through the 1990s and 2000s, and deepened qualitatively after ECFA was adopted in 2010. The potential gains in international space and status from joining such regimes are important as well, and increasingly so. With the WTO receding as the predominant institution of the international economic and economic-legal orders, regional arrangements will matter more as means to safeguard or expand Taiwan’s international space.38 Increasingly, robust participation in the international economic institutional order means membership in regional pacts and organizations. Taiwan’s prospects on this front are relatively poor and possibly diminishing. Under Ma, Taiwan’s expressed hopes for joining the TPP when it opened for an expected second round of membership faced daunting obstacles. The TPP’s consensus-based framework meant that opposition from a handful of members would be enough to stymie Taiwan’s bid, and Beijing was well-positioned to foment opposition. Although the Obama administration generally welcomed Taiwan’s interest in the TPP, the long-running frustrations of the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement talks cautioned that full U.S. support for Taiwan’s accession to the TPP would not come easily. Beijing is obviously the gatekeeper to Taiwan’s entry into the RCEP and showed no movement toward welcoming Taiwan in the near term.39 Throughout Ma’s tenure, Beijing continued to block Taiwan’s reaching free trade agreements with other states, disappointing expectations that ECFA would open the door to such pacts. Ma’s brief pursuit of membership in the AIIB quickly proved futile and was abandoned.40 With Tsai in power, all of these factors remained in place and were compounded by new difficulties, most notably a less friendly relationship with 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Tsai 2016; Hsu 2016c; Tsai 2015; Taipei Times 2017b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018a. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016d. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016c. See World Economic Forum 2014. Hioe 2020. For an overview of many of these issues, see Bush and Meltzer 2014; Bush 2014; see also Tiezzi 2016; Taipei Times 2016b; Shih 2014. Taiwan has four FTAs and five Economic Cooperation Agreements, as well as ECFA with the PRC.

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41

Beijing. It also became clear that the U.S. would not join the TPP, with Congress refusing to approve the Obama-backed accord, and Trump declaring U.S. withdrawal three days after taking office.42 Although Tsai’s government embraced the CPTPP (which includes the original TPP members minus the U.S.), the chances for Taiwan to join the smaller-scale accord are slim, given the absence of the U.S. as a member (a situation that the Biden administration is unlikely to move quickly to change), and despite growing support from Japan, the de facto leader of the CPTPP.43 With Tsai in office, Beijing stiffened its opposition to bilateral FTAs and other economic cooperation agreements for Taiwan, for example reportedly pressuring Australia not to proceed.44 In a notable bright spot for Taiwan, a mid-2020 concession by Tsai on the long-troublesome issue of U.S. pork and beef imports raised hopes for rapid progress on a bilateral trade pact.45 Even if Taiwan’s membership in the CPTPP, RCEP, and a future FTAAP could be pursued successfully, it would offer relatively limited value in affirming or enhancing Taiwan’s international space. At best, accession is years away. Moreover, these trade pacts are more “agreements among parties” than fullfledged “institutions with members” and, therefore, are less robust sources of stature and status for Taiwan than the WTO has been.

Formal diplomatic relations A high-profile accomplishment of the Ma presidency in securing Taiwan’s international space was an implicit “diplomatic truce” (waijiao xiubing): Beijing would not seek to persuade any of the ROC’s remaining diplomatic partners to shift ties to the PRC and would quietly rebuff entreaties from governments that sought to switch. The cohort, which had shrunk to 23 partners before Ma took office, held steady during Ma’s presidency.46 The partial exception that proves the rule was The Gambia. It severed ties with Taipei early in Ma’s second term but did not establish formal relations with Beijing until three years later, during the lame-duck phase of the Ma administration, thereby signalling that Tsai’s election meant an end to Beijing’s forbearance in squeezing this dimension of Taiwan’s international space.47 Although Taipei’s diplomatic partners lack geopolitical and economic heft, and the relationships can be a financial burden and occasional source of political embarrassment for Taiwan’s government, protecting formal ties with 41 Chen 2019. 42 The White House 2017a. 43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018a; Huang 2020b; Central News Agency 2020c. 44 Boyd 2018. 45 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020b. 46 Kan 2008; Her 2016 (interview with Foreign Minister David Y.L. Lin). 47 Ramzy 2016a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2013b, 2017b (stating that China did not expect The Gambia’s move).

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a small number of small states matters for Taiwan’s international space. Tsai expressed gratitude in her first inaugural address to the states that have maintained formal ties and the support they provide for Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations and the international community more broadly. The capacity to engage in international relations—especially formal diplomatic relations with governments of states—is a criterion for statehood in international law and, in turn, robust status in the international system.48 Having formal diplomatic partners also affords Tsai—like her predecessors—an opportunity to undertake Taiwan-status-enhancing presidential visits to foreign capitals and countries, and to make unofficial “transit stops” in the United States where she can meet with politicians and hold events that shore up Taiwan’s visibility and standing with its most important informal supporter. Just weeks into her presidency, Tsai traveled to Panama, where she joined several heads of state at ceremonies (to which Xi Jinping had been invited but did not attend) celebrating the expansion of the Panama Canal, and signed a guest book as “President of Taiwan (ROC).”49 In early 2017, she traveled to Nicaragua where she again joined heads of state at the inauguration of the host country’s president. Tsai’s travels also have taken her on more routine visits to more than a dozen countries that maintain formal relations with the ROC.50 With Tsai in office and with China having ended the diplomatic truce, Taiwan’s loss of formal partners has proceeded apace: after The Gambia (2016),51 São Tomé and Príncipe (2016),52 Panama (2017, particularly significant because it was one of the largest states still maintaining diplomatic ties),53 two more Central American States (El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, 2018—dropping Taiwan’s count below 20),54 Burkina Faso (2018—leaving Eswatini as the one formal partner in Africa),55 and a pair of Pacific Island states (Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019).56 The U.S. attempted to exert some counterpressure—briefly recalling U.S. ambassadors to Latin American 48 deLisle 2000; Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention) (1933) arts. 1, 3–4. 49 Jennings 2016b; Chung 2016a; Chan 2016; Hsu 2016d. 50 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016b; Tai and Kao 2016; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017b; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), n.d. 51 See Bush 2016; Y. Wu 2016; Jennings 2016a. 52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016d; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2016. 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2017a. 54 Taiwan Today 2018a; Ramzy 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018c. 55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018d; New York Times 2018. 56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019c; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019d; Cavanough 2019.

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states that switched ties, passing the provision in the TAIPEI Act calling for (but not requiring) a policy of rewarding or punishing states that strengthen, maintain, or reduce diplomatic engagement with Taiwan, and other, lesser measures—but without dramatic effect. Concerns have grown that Beijing will target the Holy See, where China has leverage because millions of Chinese Catholics could benefit from improved relations between the Vatican and the PRC.57 Losing the Holy See would be an especially big blow to the diplomatic relations-based element of Taiwan’s claim to international space. With the pope’s role as spiritual leader of more than one billion Catholics, the Vatican has international political significance far beyond its tiny size. Taiwan’s formal ties with the Vatican also resonate with a significant component of international human rights: religious liberty—an area where Taiwan’s domestic accomplishments have been important themes in Taiwan’s quest for international standing, receiving specific mention in Tsai’s second inaugural address. The Vatican is also Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partner in Europe and outside the developing world. Faced with these worries, Tsai’s government has worked to preserve relations with the Vatican.58 Although Taiwan’s formal diplomatic relations thus have come under substantially increased pressure from Beijing since Tsai became president, there is perhaps a sliver or two of silver lining in this dark cloud for Taiwan. If China were to induce or accept switches by several more governments among the 15 still retaining ties, it would not necessarily be disastrous for Taiwan. There is no clear “magic number”—some minimum tally—such that the loss of another one, or even a few, fatally undermines this element of Taiwan’s international space. Nor are such switches certain to occur, in part because Beijing may recognize that reducing Taipei’s diplomatic partners to zero or near zero risks being counterproductive. Too hard a squeeze might drive Taiwan to feel so besieged that it would take desperate and destabilizing actions—including but not limited to flirting with less hedged and nuanced declarations of independence—that could lead to crisis and conflict that ill-serve Beijing’s interests. Or Taiwan might conclude that the wiser course would be to abandon a hopeless policy of seeking to preserve formal diplomatic ties in favor of emphasizing Taiwan’s impressively robust informal international relations—arguably a stronger card for Taiwan to play in a game where the rules are ambiguous about what “counts” for international status.

Informal bilateral relations Maintaining and strengthening informal relations with other states, especially major powers, has been a major focus of Taiwan’s pursuit of international 57 Horowitz and Povoledo 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2020b. 58 Taiwan Today 2016c; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019b; “Taiwan Says it Has Vatican Assurances” 2020 (quoting Taiwan Foreign Ministry spokesperson).

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space under Tsai, as it had been under Ma and their predecessors. Informal or de facto international relations are an aspect of the capacity to engage in international relations that matters for statehood in international law and status in international politics. Broad and deep relationships with great powers are, of course, especially valuable and important for any entity that faces Taiwan’s external challenges, including a paucity of formal diplomatic relations with major states. For Taiwan, the most important of these informal relationships has been with the United States, which remains Taiwan’s indispensable source of security. A key accomplishment in Taiwan’s foreign relations under Ma was repairing the relationship with the United States. Ties between Washington and Taipei had become badly frayed by the end of Chen’s presidency. The tensions were starkly reflected in Washington’s rebuke of Chen when he put the Beijing-provoking referendum on Taiwan’s pursuit of UN membership on the ballot in 2008.59 With Ma in office, the United States was no longer concerned that Taiwan would provoke a needless crisis in cross-Strait relations and, in turn, U.S.-PRC relations. Ma characterized U.S.-Taiwan relations— not implausibly—as the best they had been since 1979—the year that the United States severed formal ties with the ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Throughout Ma’s tenure, U.S. officials often stated their support for Taiwan’s international space and participation.60 Tsai’s presidency began with very good prospects for a strong relationship with the United States. When candidate Tsai visited Washington in the runup to the 2016 Taiwan presidential election, her positions on cross-Strait relations—which emphasized peace, stability, and continuity—were wellreceived.61 The reaction was strikingly different from that which greeted her when she had gone to the U.S. near the end of her unsuccessful campaign in the 2012 presidential election. Then, leaks from officials and comments from analysts and former officials had made clear that Washington favored Ma’s re-election because of worries that Tsai would unravel the cross-Strait rapprochement achieved under Ma and thereby strain U.S.-China relations and, in turn, weaken Taiwan’s international stature and security.62 In contrast, by the 2016 campaign, Tsai’s critics in Taiwan (particularly in the KMT) warned that Tsai would be so assiduous in cultivating ties with the United States that she would overturn Ma’s priority of building relations with China. Tsai’s more U.S.-centric approach also promised to assuage the limited worries in the United States that a long-term continuation of Ma’s trajectory could move Taiwan too close to Beijing, diminishing U.S. willingness to incur costs to protect Taiwan.63 In her first inaugural, Tsai declared that 59 60 61 62 63

Christensen 2007 (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State); Tkacik 2007. Ketagalan Media 2015; U.S. Department of State 2018; Kan and Morrison 2014. Tsao, Chen, and Chen 2015; deLisle 2016a. Fifield, Kwong, and Hille 2011; Jacobs 2012. For examples of these views, see United Daily News 2016; Erlandson 2013; see also Tucker and Glaser 2001, 29–31.

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Taiwan would “continue to deepen [its] relationship with friendly democracies including the United States.”64 A few months into Tsai’s tenure, Taiwan’s relations with the United States began to experience the disruptive effect of Trump’s unexpected victory. Tsai’s late 2016 call with the president-elect, and Trump’s expressed skepticism toward the U.S. One China policy, seemed to indicate a significant rise in Taiwan’s status with Washington, with the prospect of a positive effect on Taiwan’s international space more generally. Yet, any apparent victory soon began to look hollow, even pyrrhic. When a strident response from Beijing drove Trump to reaffirm the One China policy and to pledge not to take calls from Tsai without consulting Beijing, Tsai was prompted to characterize the notorious phone call as not heralding a change in U.S. policy. Concern grew in Taiwan that Trump would treat Taiwan as a bargaining chip in pursuit of larger deals with China.65 Beyond these perturbations, Taiwan’s informal relations with the United States fared well during the presidencies of Trump and Tsai. Tsai has characterized the bilateral relationship as going from strength to strength.66 Senior U.S. officials have made many statements affirming strong U.S. support for Taiwan and, in some cases, portraying Taiwan (particularly in its struggles with Beijing) in terms that favor international space for Taiwan. When Panama shifted diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing, official U.S. statements urged both Taipei and Beijing to pursue constructive dialogue and creative, flexible, and patient approaches—a position of neutrality, to be sure, but one that also suggested an imputation of equality between the disputing parties.67 The U.S. responded to other diplomatic switches more forcefully. U.S. ambassadors to three Latin American countries that severed formal ties with Taiwan were recalled to Washington for “consultations.”68 When two Pacific island states flipped from Taipei to Beijing, the U.S. canceled Vice President Pence’s meeting with the Solomon Islands’ prime minister and suggested that U.S. aid might be imperiled.69 The opening of new and much larger offices in Taipei for the embassyequivalent American Institute in Taiwan recalled new U.S. embassy openings in major world capitals—a development interpretable as confirmation or enhancement of Taiwan’s standing with Washington.70 So, too, the U.S. continued its support for Taiwan’s participation in international institutions including those for which statehood is a requirement for membership, although not necessarily participation. This aspect of U.S. support for Taiwan’s international 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Tsai 2016. See sup. note 7; Lander 2016; Chung 2016c; Tiezzi 2017. See generally Bradsher 2018; Taiwan Today 2018b. Nauert 2017 (Spokesperson, Department of State); Taipei Times 2017c. Central News Agency 2018; Beech 2018. Rampton 2019; Brunnstrom 2019. American Institute in Taiwan 2018; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018.

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space returned to greater prominence amid the COVID-19 pandemic and escalating finger-pointing between Beijing and Washington, when Washington reprised—albeit less successfully—the efforts it had taken after the 2003 SARS epidemic to secure Taiwan’s attendance at the annual World Health Assembly and broader engagement with the WHO.71 In 2016 and more strikingly in 2020 (when the statements came from the Secretary of State), U.S. officials issued statements in response to Tsai’s victories and inaugurations that resembled the type of congratulations the U.S. would offer to democratically elected heads of government in states recognized by, and closely aligned with, the United States and having formal diplomatic relations with Washington.72 The United States has continued to allow Tsai the long-customary transit stops in the U.S., and the opportunities they provide for meeting with prominent U.S. politicians and giving speeches to public audiences—a set of opportunities and courtesies broadly akin to, albeit less than, what heads of governments of friendly states enjoy.73 U.S. officials regularly go to Taiwan, paralleling the types of trips taken to states with which Washington has formal diplomatic relations. In August 2020, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, in a COVID-themed visit, became the highest-ranking U.S. government official to travel to Taiwan in decades.74 During Tsai’s and Trump’s tenures, Congress departed from a long-standing pattern of considering but not passing legislation addressing U.S. policy on issues relating to Taiwan’s international space and status. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act called on the president to consider reciprocal port calls by the U.S. and ROC navies.75 The Taiwan Travel Act (2018) urged the President to allow higher-level officials (up to cabinet level) to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts.76 The 2019 NDAA called for closer military cooperation with Taiwan (including higher-level contacts and training exercises), special attention to asymmetric warfare capabilities, and a more predictable pattern of arms sales under the TRA.77 The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (2018) declared Congress’s view that U.S. policy is to faithfully enforce all existing commitments to Taiwan (consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiqués, and the Six Assurances), echoed the NDAA in calling for “regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China,” and called for implementation of 71 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2020; Jacobs, Shear, and Wong 2020; Chen and Lim 2020. 72 Kirby 2016a (Spokesperson, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State); Kirby 2016b; Pompeo 2020c; Pompeo 2020b. 73 Chow 2017; Horton 2017b; see also Bradsher 2018 (describing U.S. Senators’ visits to Taiwan); Horton 2018. 74 Ellis and Wang 2020. 75 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, § 1259(b)(7). 76 Taiwan Travel Act. 77 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, § 1257.

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78

the Taiwan Travel Act. The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act (2020) reprised some of the themes from the earlier laws, and squarely addressed U.S. support for Taiwan’s international space, calling for more robust efforts to support Taiwan’s membership in nonUN-affiliated international organizations and participation in UN-affiliated ones, and to promote Taiwan’s formal diplomatic relationships by rewarding states that upgrade relations with Taiwan and imposing costs on those that sever them.79 The 2020 and 2021 NDAAs covered much of the same ground as their predecessors and reaffirmed long-standing U.S. policies and laws governing relations with Taiwan and the major pieces of Taiwan related legislation adopted after 2016.80 These laws signaled congressional support for closer ties and higher status for Taiwan, approaching that of a “normal” allied or friendly government and, as a consequence, giving Taiwan more expansive and secure international space. Bilateral relations had become so strong that Taiwan’s Foreign Minister had to rebuff suggestions that Taipei was seeking formal ties with Washington.81 Taiwan still has reasons to worry about relations with the U.S. in areas that matter for Taiwan’s international space. In the Trump era, Tsai’s continuation of her predecessors’ practice of touting Taiwan’s accomplishments in democracy and human rights lost some of its power to enhance Taiwan’s standing in Washington and, thereby, the wider world. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, disdain for multilateral cooperation, and willingness to upend traditional U.S. policies and alliances created new sources of uncertainty and risk for Taiwan as it seeks international space. The pro-Taiwan laws passed since 2016 have modest agendas, contain few mandatory provisions, and confer no additional power on the president and the executive branch. Looming in the background is the longer-emerging question about U.S. capacity (in an era of relative decline of U.S. military and economic power) and Washington’s will (after the adventurism of the George W. Bush era gave way to the more restrained notion of American power under Obama, followed by the pointed aversion to providing international public goods in the “America First” foreign policy of the Trump administration). Nonetheless, the Biden administration’s approach to international friends and allies, and global leadership and norms, promises a partial reversal of some Trump-era patterns.82 More fundamental factors also point to continuation of strong U.S.-Taiwan informal relations and the support they can offer to Taiwan’s quest for international space. Much on this front has remained firmly in place: the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Communiqués, the Six Assurances, the U.S.’s One China policy, the relatively regular cycle of arms sales, and 78 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, § 209. 79 Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, § 4. 80 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 §§ 1260B–1260D; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 §§ 1260–1260B; 81 Xie 2020. 82 Biden 2020b; Sanger 2020; U.S. Department of State 2021.

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Washington’s long-standing practice of addressing downturns in cross-Strait relations by exerting pressure in favor of the party that the U.S. deems not to be at fault. Reluctance in Washington to support Taiwan and its agenda out of concern for the impact on what had been seen as a largely positive U.S.-China relationship has faded markedly. The decades-old bipartisan consensus in favor of “engagement” with the PRC unraveled during the late 2000s and early 2010s. It was replaced by a new, much more critical set of views about China, and a renewed tendency to view Taiwan as a quasi-ally and an asset in a more rivalrous U.S.-China relationship beset with problems that would not be ameliorated if the U.S. were to back away from support for Taiwan. The 2021 change in the party in power in Washington is highly unlikely to lead to fundamental change in these now well-entrenched features. Notably, Biden’s State Department called on China to cease intimidation and pressure against Taiwan, affirmed the core elements of long-standing U.S. policy on Taiwan issues, and declared the U.S. “commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid” and conducive to peace and stability.82A Tsai identified Taiwan-Japan relations as another foreign policy priority, with closer ties potentially helping Taiwan’s pursuit of international space. Although the Ma administration could point to increased Japanese support for Taiwan in areas that mattered for international space (including an agreement on fisheries in a disputed maritime region, and several economic and cultural accords), Japanese skepticism about Ma’s emphasis on relations with Beijing and persistent frictions over the East China Sea limited progress. Able to draw upon the DPP’s more proJapan reputation and her mentor former President Lee Teng-hui’s legacy of ties to Japan, Tsai emphasized cultivating ties between Taipei and Tokyo that could benefit Taiwan’s pursuit of international space. Tsai made a high-profile pre-election visit to Japan, included Japan among the handful of countries mentioned in both of her inaugural address, selected prominent DPP leaders for Japan policy posts, received unprecedented congratulations on her 2016 election—reprised in 2020— from Japanese Prime Minister Abe and high-level statements of Japan’s interest in deepening ties with Taiwan after Tsai’s re-election, persuaded Japan to rename its representative office in Taipei with a nomenclature more akin to that of an embassy, and enjoyed Japan’s support for Taiwan’s return to participation in the annual meeting of WHO’s plenary body amid the COVID-19 pandemic.83 Although the succession from Abe to his protégé Suga as premier introduced a degree of uncertainty, it was unlikely to bring a dramatic change in Taiwan-Japan relations. Here, too, there have been familiar limits to the gains available to Taiwan. Taipei’s positions on the fraught issues of maritime and territorial disputes in the East China Sea remain in principle close to Beijing’s and, thus, a weak point in JapanTaiwan relations. And when tensions between Japan and China wane—as they did early in Tsai’s tenure, with further improvement a possibility following Abe’s 82A U.S. Department of State 2021. 83 See June Teufel Dreyer’s chapter in this volume; Taipei Times 2015; Hsu 2017; Chao 2016; Taipei Times 2016a; Yeh 2016b; Gerber 2017; Kyodo News 2017; Taiwan News 2020; Kyodo News 2020a, 2020b: U.S. Department of State 2021.

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departure from the premiership in 2020—it typically reinforces Tokyo’s calculus not to damage ties with Beijing by greatly enhancing relations with Taipei.

“As if” participation in treaty regimes and conforming to international norms Taiwan also has pursued international space by acting “as if” Taiwan were a member of key international treaty-based regimes that it has not been allowed to join and, more broadly, by demonstrating conformity to major international legal rules and values.84 There are both institutional and normative components in Taiwan thus asserting parity with, and similarity to, states that are parties to, or compliant with, major treaty-based regimes. The most striking examples include the law of the sea, human rights, and climate change—all areas where Taiwan has important interests at stake. Tsai’s government built on Taiwan’s approaches from earlier periods and has paralleled the approach taken to UN-linked institutions. Law of the sea The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is one of the principal UN-linked international treaties that Taiwan has not been allowed to join. Regulating maritime economic, security, and environmental issues that are of vital concern to Taiwan, UNLCOS is at the center of the international legal regime for the oceans, although it is notably thin on institutions, except for dispute resolution.85 The chronic disputes over the South China Sea, where the ROC long has asserted territorial and maritime claims and where tensions among rival claimants spiked in the 2010s, have provided high-profile occasions for Taiwan to employ an “as if” approach in pursuing international status through engagement with international law. Tsai’s government did not depart markedly from its predecessor, which had addressed the South China Sea disputes (as well as the East China Sea disputes) in ways that asserted Taiwan’s international space—including in the literal, physical sense.86 In her 2016 inaugural address, Tsai reiterated the requisite pledge to “safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of China” with a notable reference to the “problems arising in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.” She used familiar language about “setting aside disputes” and pursuing “joint development”—positions that sought to steer clear of a futile conflict with Beijing (and other claimants to territory and rights in the disputed areas) but did not give ground on Taiwan’s assertions 84 deLisle 2007. 85 There are other UNCLOS-related institutions that are relatively substantial, including the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the International Seabed Authority. Neither has been a major focus for Taiwan’s engagement with UNCLOS and the law of the sea. 86 See, for example, Hickey 2018, 75–77; Lin 2018.

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of sovereignty and related rights of the type made by states in the international system.87 With tensions between China and rival claimants rising during Ma’s tenure, Taiwan was in an increasingly difficult, potentially international space-damaging posture. Taiwan’s claims were in longstanding if inexact alignment with PRC positions and had come into sharper conflict with those of U.S. friends and allies, and U.S. interests.88 But a pointed departure from Taiwan’s long-held views would be politically controversial at home, where public sentiment opposed yielding on sovereignty, and would create risks abroad, where a major shift would provoke Beijing by undermining or repudiating the ROC-era origin story of the PRC’s purported entitlements. Shortly after Tsai became president, an ad hoc international arbitration panel constituted under UNCLOS awarded the Philippines a sweeping victory in a case against the PRC. The tribunal rejected key PRC positions, including ones that were closely aligned with, and often had their roots in, arguments initially developed by the ROC, and still supported by Taiwan. The issues included sovereignty over land forms in the region (including Itu Aba / Taiping Island, the Taiwan-controlled, largest island in the area),89 and the significance of a dotted line on a map (nine-dashes in the PRC’s version, adapted from an 11-dash version found in ROC maps from the pre-PRC era).90 In ruling that Taiping Island could not anchor a claim to an up-to-200 nautical mile-wide Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and that China (or Taiwan or anyone else) could not hold sovereign rights or jurisdiction on the basis of the dashed line (rather than on the basis of ordinary application of the law of the sea rules governing maritime rights and zones derived from sovereignty over land), the tribunal rejected claims of the type that Taiwan had embraced. The Tsai administration’s response to the ruling was unsurprisingly critical—but restrained—particularly on the status of Taiping Island and the implications for Taiwan’s other claims within the dashed line, and Tsai’s Interior Minister notably referred to the 11-dash line in his criticism of the tribunal’s decision.91 Much of what matters in the South and East China Sea disputes for Taiwan’s international space has less to do with physical space and more to do with Taiwan’s assertions that it follows status quo international legal norms, both substantive and procedural. Here, too, Tsai built on precedents from her predecessor. Ma sought to claim a space for Taiwan as a peer or near-peer 87 88 89 90

Tsai 2016; Lee 2016; see also Liao 2020. deLisle 2012, 610, 618–624; Kuok 2015; S. Wu 2016. Song 2015; deLisle 2016b. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China) 2016; Submission for Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law as Amicus Curiae, South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China) 2016; deLisle 2017; Rapp-Hooper and Krejsa 2016. 91 Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016b; Taiwan Today 2016b (comments of Interior Minister Yeh Jiunn-rong concerning 11-dash line); see also Chung 2016b (quoting Chiu Chui-cheng, vice chair of the Mainland Affairs Commission, who declared tribunal’s rejection of the nine-dash line unacceptable); Lim 2020.

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party to the disputes in which Taiwan—unlike Beijing—was committed to following international law. Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI) of 2012, and the similar South China Sea Peace Initiative (SCSPI) of 2015 called for shelving disputes over sovereignty, refraining from non-peaceful means and actions that would increase tensions, pursuing cooperation in the disputed zones (including a code of conduct among claimant parties and, at a later date, shared development of natural resources), upholding the established international legal freedoms of navigation and overflight, and respecting the spirit of international law, including UNCLOS in the SCSPI and the UN Charter in both Peace Initiatives.92 The Ma-era engagement with the Philippines-China arbitration case—including making the case for Taiping Island’s EEZ-generating status through a trip to the island by the president and an amicus curiae brief to the tribunal from leading Taiwanese international lawyers—reprised some of these themes, cast Taiwan’s arguments on the merits in conventional international legal terms, and engaged with an institutionalized process of peaceful international dispute resolution. So, too, did an untenable proposal in the ECSPI to submit the dispute with Japan over the East China Sea islands to the International Court of Justice.93 Tsai’s government continued in much the same vein. It called on disputants to assure freedom of navigation and overflight, and pledged that it would uphold those same obligations in exercising its rights in the contested South China Sea area. Tsai reprised the exhortation to all parties to address the maritime and other disputes within the framework of international law, including UNCLOS. Tsai’s government called for the ROC to be included in multilateral mechanisms for resolving the disputes.94 These positions entailed assertions that Taiwan was acting, and would act, as if it were a law-abiding party to UNCLOS and/or as a faithful bearer of the customary international legal rights and obligations of all states in the international system. Therein lay an implicit claim to international stature, and thus international space, akin to that of all states making claims in the South China Sea region. Taiwan articulated these positions in terms that implicitly repudiated Beijing’s increasingly confrontational approach and criticized Beijing’s lack of regard for international law and legal process. Taiwan’s moves thus opened up a gap between ROC and PRC positions. This both reduced the problematic (for Taiwan) alignment between Taipei and Beijing and could be construed as a “Chinese” repudiation of PRC positions and practices that others (including Japan and several Southeast Asian states) found troublingly assertive. Taiwan thus offered something of value to China’s rivals, giving them reasons to be more receptive to Taiwan’s international space-enhancing gambit. 92 Wang 2015; Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2015. 93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016e; Torode and Wu 2016. 94 Lacorte 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), n.d. (“four principles and five actions”); Taipei Times and Central News Agency 2016.

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Taiwan’s approach to procedural dimensions of the Philippines-China arbitration focused on Taiwan’s relationship to the UNCLOS regime and assumed or asserted international status and, in turn, space for Taiwan. The amicus curiae brief submitted during the Ma administration, and a shorter position paper by the ROC government, resembled submissions that a state party might make in an UNCLOS arbitration and the documents that the PRC issued in lieu of formal submissions in the case in which the PRC had refused to participate.95 Under Tsai, official statements rejecting the panel’s decision included process-focused arguments that entailed claims to state or state-like status: rejecting the decision as non-binding on the procedural grounds that Taiwan had not been allowed to participate in a case that affected its legal interests; and taking umbrage at the tribunal’s slights to Taiwan’s status in not allowing Taiwan formally to participate and in referring to the ROC government as the “Taiwan Authority of China.”96 Here, too, Taiwan was making arguments similar to those that a party to UNLCOS would make if it had been denied its proper place in the treaty regime’s formal dispute resolution procedure. During Tsai’s presidency, this always-limited strategy faced increased challenges. Taiwan’s posture of alignment with UNCLOS and the law of the sea and support for formal methods for resolving maritime and related territorial disputes engaged increasingly besieged international norms. With Duterte taking the presidency in the Philippines, Manila largely abandoned the case that it had just won. At least in the near term and in terms of real-world effects, Beijing had successfully treated the tribunal’s ruling as, in the Chinese Foreign Minister’s phrase, a mere “scrap of paper.” The United States had never joined UNCLOS and thus was on relatively weak ground in criticizing Beijing’s scofflaw behavior or backing Taiwan’s pro-UNCLOS posture, especially where the issues implicated UNCLOS’s formal dispute resolution institutions. With U.S.-China tensions rising in the South China Sea and entwined with mounting conflicts over many other issues, China’s assertive posture and U.S. responses increased friction between the two great powers over interpretations of law of the sea rules, thereby complicating Taiwan’s efforts to bolster its international space through touting its conformity to a key international legal regime.97

95 Compare Submission for Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law as Amicus Curiae, South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China) 2016 with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2014. 96 Republic of China (Taiwan), Office of the President 2016e; Republic of China (Taiwan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016b; Liu et al. 2016; Republic of China (Taiwan), Mainland Affairs Council 2016. 97 Browne 2020; Santoro 2019; Mastro 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China 2017b (criticizing U.S. for “stirring up troubles,” “sowing discord,” and “disrupt[ing] the situation in the South China Sea”).

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Human rights Taiwan has pursued an elaborate “as if” engagement with the principal UN human rights treaties and related regimes. Here, again, Taiwan under Tsai has extended approaches begun under her predecessors, behaving like a responsible member of relevant treaty regimes, and a human rights-respecting state more broadly. Despite offering instruments of ratification, Taiwan has not been able to join UN-centered human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Ma responded to this predictable rejection with a pointed “as if”-style characterization: the UN’s rebuff “does not change the fact” that Taiwan’s government is “now subject to the binding legal force of the content of these two UN human rights covenants.”98 Building on Chen-era moves and following the example of some state parties to human rights pacts, Taiwan under Ma adopted legislation that implemented in Taiwan’s domestic law several major international human rights pacts, including the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.99 Under Ma, Taiwan also engaged in a process paralleling the universal periodic review that members of the principal covenants undergo with the UN Human Rights Council. The first such review was completed in 2012 and the second in early 2016, on the eve of Tsai’s presidency, and the third in 2020. The reports measured Taiwan’s laws and practices against the international legal obligations that Taiwan would bear if it were a party to the covenants. Paralleling practices of state parties to the treaties, Taiwan invited international experts as well as NGOs and domestic stakeholders to participate in the review process and produced government responses to observations and recommendations by invited committees of international experts.100 Although the 2016 report was prepared before Tsai took office, leading legal experts associated with the incoming DPP government participated, and the visiting international experts group issued its observations and recommendations in response under Tsai’s watch. Tsai praised the group’s work, and Taiwan’s ICCPR and ICESCR review procedure more generally, in “as if” 98 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016a. 99 Relevant legislation included the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Implementation Act (2009), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Enforcement Act (2012), the Convention on the Rights of the Child Implementation Act (2014), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Implementation Act. 100 Republic of China (Taiwan) 2012a, 2012b; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2012; Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016a, 2016b; Republic of China (Taiwan) 2013; Ministry of Justice, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2016, n.d., 2020; Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) 2020a.

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terms. She characterized the process as “a method for Taiwan to participate in the UN’s human rights protection mechanism.” She stressed her government’s commitments to “advance human rights protection,” and to establish a National Human Rights Commission—a goal articulated under Chen that would parallel mechanisms adopted by some parties to the covenants, and that culminated in the institution beginning operations near the beginning of Tsai’s second term.101 Tsai also directed reviews and reports of Taiwan’s performance under other UN human rights conventions that Taiwan had pledged to respect. Taiwan issued its first reports on compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. As with the ICCPR and ICESCR, these reports followed the format and process, including international expert review, used by parties to the conventions.102 Taiwan’s efforts to showcase its compliance with international human rights law has extended beyond engaging the UN treaties to touting Taiwan’s broader conformity to international human rights norms, which have been a factor in ratcheting up (or down) the international status of states or aspiring states, especially in the post-Cold War era. This approach, too, has deep roots in Taiwan. Leaders and officials regularly have stressed Taiwan’s commitment to human rights throughout Taiwan’s post-authoritarian era, often in ways that target, or are likely to reach, international audiences. During a high-profile visit to the U.S., President Lee told the audience at his alma mater Cornell University that “human rights are respected and protected to a very high degree” in Taiwan.103 In his 1996 inaugural address following his victory in Taiwan’s first fully democratic presidential election, Lee asserted that human rights are “universally adhered to values” that are “in full accord” with Taiwan’s values.104 In his 2000 inaugural speech, Chen pledged “a more active contribution in safeguarding international human rights” by a Taiwan that “cannot and will not remain outside global human rights trends.”105 He reprised the point in his second inaugural, characterizing Taiwan as “a completely free and democratic society” that collaborates with “other members of the global village” in advocating and defending human rights, and that bases its “long-term friendship” with the U.S. and others on shared “core values” that include human rights.106 Chen’s speech upon receiving an award from the International League for Human Rights in New York characterized the honor as “representative of the international validation that the people of Taiwan 101 Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017c; Liao 2015; Tsai 2020 a; Central News Agency 2019; Central News Agency 2020b. 102 Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017; Taiwan Today 2017a; China Post 2017; International Review Committee 2017. 103 Lee 1995 (Olin Lecture at Cornell University). 104 Lee 1996. 105 Chen 2000 (“Taiwan Stands Up”). 106 Chen 2004.

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have received” for their pursuit of human rights, and a “reminder” of their “duty of protecting human rights and upholding international human rights principles.”107At his first inaugural, Ma declared that the people of Taiwan could “rely on the constitution to protect human rights.”108 Beginning his second term, Ma expressed the hope that cross-Strait exchanges on human rights and related matters would draw the mainland closer to the levels that Taiwan had achieved.109 In her 2016 address, Tsai echoed her predecessors on these issues. She lauded Taiwan’s “persiste[nce],” during its democratic era, in “upholding” human rights and other “universal values” and thereby serving as a “model citizen in global civil society.”110 At her second inaugural in 2020, Tsai characterized the impending establishment of the National Human Rights Commission as a “milestone in the journey to place human rights at the center of Taiwan’s national ethos.”111 Taiwan’s presidents, and lesser officials, have used many meetings with international human rights groups, foreign media, and events reaching external audiences to reiterate Taiwan’s human rights accomplishments and commitments to international human rights norms. Other policies and practices that are human rights-adjacent have reinforced such messages and sought support for Taiwan’s international stature. For example, Taiwan’s success in handling COVID-19 had two international status-enhancing effects. It showcased Taiwan’s ability to contain the virus very effectively and with notably little infringement of civil liberties, especially compared to the draconian measures adopted on the Chinese mainland, and it gave Taiwan relevant expertise and a surplus supply of protective gear to share with a besieged world—reprising Taiwan’s long-running efforts to provide humanitarian relief and disaster assistance. Official Taiwanese sources, including the president and vice president, touted Taiwan’s accomplishments, offers of assistance and good global citizenship (under the slogan #TaiwanCanHelp), and presented them as a basis for Taiwan’s more robust international participation.112 Tellingly, Chinese sources attacked Taipei’s “mask diplomacy” as a provocative and perfidious grab for international status—and even independence.113

107 U.S. Congress, House 2003. (including speech by Chen). 108 Ma 2008 (“Taiwan’s Renaissance”). 109 Ma 2012 (“Upholding Ideals, Working Together for Reform and Creating Greater Well-Being for Taiwan”). 110 Tsai 2016. 111 Tsai 2020a. 112 Tsai 2020c; Hernández and Horton 2020. 113 Everington 2020 (providing full text of statement by PRC Taiwan Affairs Office spoksesperson Zhu Fenglian, accusing DPP authorities of using mask assistance abroad in pandemic to “seek independence”); Yang 2020 (quoting PRC “experts” opining that donating masks and other measures were examples of Taiwan “separatists using the pandemic to poison cross-Strait relations”).

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Democracy, which is contested as a human right, has received special emphasis in Taiwan’s pursuit of international space through spotlighting conformity—and contributions—to international rules and norms. Taiwan’s presidents from Lee through Tsai consistently have touted Taiwan’s democracy. The inaugural addresses and presidential speeches abroad that have stressed human rights also unfailingly have placed equal or greater emphasis on democracy. Tsai continued this tradition at her two inaugural speeches and in other contexts, echoing her predecessors in celebrating how “the people of Taiwan have shown the world” their commitment to “freedom and democracy,” declaring that “Taiwan has been deemed a democratic success story,” and characterizing “shared democratic values” as a basis for deepening “relationships with friendly democracies” or “like-minded countries,” including the United States, Japan, and Europe.114 Here, too, a venerable Taiwanese strategy for procuring international space faces growing challenges. In terms of Taiwan’s domestic human rights performance, Tsai’s agenda of social and economic fairness and reform inevitably turned attention to questions of social and economic human rights, where a sense of unmitigated success is more elusive than in civil and political rights. The DPP government’s pursuit of “truth and reconciliation” and focus on “transitional justice” have turned a spotlight on human rights failures in Taiwan before democratization.115 Although acknowledging and addressing past wrongs is an important way of signaling commitment to global human rights norms, this path also departs from prior patterns of primarily celebrating Taiwan’s progress on human rights, and faces criticism at home, especially from those on the KMT side who see inquiries into their party’s past misdeeds as serving the DPP’s partisan ends. Tsai came to power at a time of increased dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the performance of democratic institutions in Taiwan—a problem afflicting many democracies, new and old.116 As Tsai acknowledged, including in her first inaugural address, democratic success in Taiwan has become more complicated decades after the initial transition, in a new era when democracy has “gradually lost its ability to solve problems” and must become “efficient” and “pragmatic” and “take care of people.”117 Tsai’s second-term agenda gave a prominent place to “strengthening” democracy (including through specific institutional and procedural reforms). Long-standing overt and more recent covert China-based influence operations and disinformation campaigns in social media, and political polarization of Taiwan’s society, were significant sources of concern about the vulnerability of Taiwanese democracy during Tsai’s tenure.118 114 115 116 117 118

Tsai 2016, 2020b. Hsu 2016a. See, for example, Park and Chu 2014. Tsai 2016. See Chang and Yang 2020; Cole 2017; Doshi 2020; Zhong 2020.

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Worse still for this aspect of Taiwan’s quest for international space, the international norms to which Taiwan has appealed appear to be in significant trouble, and, thus, adherence to them may offer less support for Taiwan than they once did. Under the Trump administration, the often ambivalent and sometimes shallow U.S. commitment to international human rights as a principle of foreign policy took big steps backward, as was underscored by the U.S. withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council—a move that Biden has pledged to reverse as part of a re-emphasis on human rights in U.S. foreign policy that is significant but that is likely to stop short of qualitatively surpassing pre-Trump norms. Under Xi, the PRC has escalated its long-brewing pushback against universal human rights and international efforts to promote them, as has been reflected in China’s growing influence— and the ends to which it has wielded that influence—at the UN Human Rights Council.119 Climate change In engaging the emerging international regime for climate change, Taiwan has pursued—in yet another area—an approach of behaving as if it were a member of major accords that it has not been able to join, thereby implying that Taiwan has a claim to international status akin to that of a member state in good standing. Here, too, the broad pattern predated Tsai, and has been extended under her administration. By 1992, Taiwan had declared that it would implement the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances, even though it was not permitted to become a party. By 2002, Taiwan committed to abide by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, while also seeking, futilely, to accede formally to this principal international environmental pact. Under Ma, Taiwan sought observer status in the UNFCC-linked COP process.120 In her first inaugural address, Tsai declared a commitment to set goals “in accordance with the agreement negotiated at the COP21 meeting in Paris.”121 By promising to follow the Paris Accords, Taiwan affirmed—and asserted— that it accepted the same responsibilities as every state in the world (except for the United States under Trump). Continuing patterns established by its predecessors, Tsai’s government called for the world to allow Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UNFCCC, and stressed Taiwan’s adoption of domestic environmental laws similar to those of states seeking to meet the goals of environmental treaties.122 Tsai’s government has pursued this approach 119 See Ahl 2015; Piccone 2018. 120 Environmental Protection Administration, Republic of China (Taiwan). n.d.a., n. d.b.; Gao 2014. 121 Tsai 2016 (stressing importance of “responsibility to the environment” and “sustainability of development,” and listing “severe pollution” among the issues of intergenerational social justice); Loa 2016. 122 Biederman 2017, 25–26; Taipei Trade Office in the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2016.

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through many small efforts—for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a film highlighting Taiwan’s implementation of the UNFCCC, and cooperation on environmental protection has been featured in government statements as a means for Taiwan’s pursuit of international visibility.123 More diffuse, less treaty-linked normative claims have been in the mix as well. Taiwan long has stressed its green bona fides, with, for example, both Chen and Ma referring in inaugural addresses to their commitment to environmental sustainability, which had become the catchphrase of international environmental law and norms.124 Tsai’s first inaugural address gave environmental issues and international environmental standards an unprecedentedly prominent place. She also linked environmental protection and climate change to her high-priority goals, including creating a new model for Taiwan’s economic development and promoting social justice.125 Her second inaugural reprised this theme, naming green energy and renewable energy as one of six key industrial sectors of the future and promising to make Taiwan “a center for green energy in Asia.”126 In this area, too, Taiwan’s search for greater international space faces serious and mounting difficulties. At home, the Tsai administration’s commitment to ending reliance on nuclear power has been a polarizing issue politically. It has faced blowback—reflected in a successful 2018 referendum against a phaseout—fed by concerns about energy shortages, blackouts, and higher prices, and criticisms of the climate change impact of some of the substitutes for nuclear power.127 Globally, Taiwan’s potential gains from “as if” participation and normative conformity on environment and climate change are clouded by the inchoate character and shifting content of a still-emerging international legal regime that lacks a strong institutional structure and—until the Biden administration’s move to rejoin the Paris accords—the participation of the most potent supporter of Taiwan’s international space, the United States.

Taiwan’s challenges and opportunities Taiwan’s pursuit of international space by engaging with international organizations, states, and treaty-based legal regimes is a long-running practice that has continued after Tsai and the DPP-led government came to power. This sometimes-successful and always-challenging project has again increased in difficulty. Beijing’s efforts to constrain Taiwan’s international space, undermine its stature, and negate its status have been recurring problems that worsened with Beijing’s reaction to Tsai. The indispensable support of the United 123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019b; Environmental Protection Administration, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019. 124 Chen 2004; Bosselmann 2017. 125 Tsai 2016; Loa 2016. 126 Tsai 2020a. 127 Engbarth 2016; Freschi 2018; World Nuclear News 2018; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2019a; Chung 2017.

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States for Taiwan’s pursuit of international space, which has been strained occasionally over the last several decades, has continued to be robust during Tsai’s tenure, and in notable respects has strengthened amid a souring U.S.PRC relationship. But the gains for Taiwan may be less than they initially appear in light of the long-term relative decline in the capabilities of the U.S., and corrosive uncertainty—exacerbated under the Trump administration and perhaps reparable by the Biden administration—about the firmness of will in Washington for supporting the international institutions and values that have been foci of Taiwan’s quest for international space. Taiwan’s ability to achieve observer status or meaningful participation in significant international organizations, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations, has been highly constrained since the ROC’s ouster from the UN in the 1970s. And the modest progress achieved under Ma stalled, or reversed, under mounting pressure from Beijing after Tsai came to office. Taiwan’s small cadre of diplomatic partners began shrinking anew when Beijing abandoned the Ma-era “diplomatic truce.” Taiwan under Tsai has scored victories in cultivating informal ties with the U.S., Japan, and others. But progress has been limited, uneven, fragile and contingent. Taiwan stands to benefit from the greater wariness among other states toward a more powerful and assertive China and the bipartisan consensus in Washington that sees China as a rival and threat to American interests. Yet, the rising costs to other states of opposing a rising China—one that is taking a harder line on issues of Taiwan’s international space and status—still significantly limit Taiwan’s prospects. “As if” participation in UN-linked treaties and broader structures of international norms has been a relatively effective strategy for Taiwan, but such unilateral behavior without formal inclusion in regimes can only do so much. And the efficacy of the approach is at risk of decline in some areas that have been especially salient, including the law of the sea, human rights, and the environment. All of this gives reason for caution and concern, but not despair, for Taiwan and its perennial pursuit of international space. Under Tsai, as before, Taiwan has been playing a weak hand well, adopting a multifaceted strategy that pursues comparatively promising opportunities and that plays to Taiwan’s relative strengths. Circumstances have shifted, many unfavorably, for Taiwan in recent years. But the changes have not been all bad for Taiwan, nor have the negative trends yet been qualitatively transformative or necessarily irreversible.

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11 Taiwan’s culture wars from “re-China-ization”1 to “Taiwan-ization” and beyond President Tsai Ing-wen’s cultural policy in long-term perspective Fang-long Shih Tsai Ing-wen is the latest in a long series of Taiwan presidents to grapple with Taiwan’s culture wars. She has encouraged multi-culturalism and diversification, rejecting the binary choice between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism that characterized the approach of her predecessors. Tsai’s approach emphasizes democratic governance and internationalist cultural diplomacy. The success of her efforts to establish a distinct Taiwanese identity internationally while achieving reconciliation domestically between long-polarized Chinese and Taiwanese identities is not yet assured.

Introduction: culture wars in Taiwan In 1994, Edwin Winckler wrote, “There is practically no place like Taiwan— great tradition, small island; conservative state, drastic change; cultural imperialism, committed nationalism; localist sentiment, cosmopolitan sophistication.”2 The development of Taiwan’s cultural policy under successive governments presents two opposing views of Taiwan’s historic identity and destiny: the Kuomintang (KMT) has viewed Taiwan as a Chinese society with some local features, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views Taiwan as a distinct place, no more intrinsic to China than Ireland is to Great Britain. This dichotomy has defined Taiwan’s politics and cultural development since martial law ended in 1987, and has earlier roots. Current cultural policy is framed by the shifting policies of previous administrations.

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The term “re-China-ization” (Zai Zhongguohua) is coined here in order to differentiate it from the more commonly used English term “re-Sinicization” or “reSinification” (ZaiHan/Huahua). “Sinicization” or “Sinification” refers to instilling “Chineseness” conventionally in the cultural sense (Han/Zhonghua Wenhua), whereas “re-China-ization” better encapsulates the two Chiangs’ policy idea of re-establishing on Taiwan “Chineseness” specifically in both the political structure and nationalist culture of the Republic of China. Winckler 1994.

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In recent years, social and political movements have emerged outside of pro- or anti-China camps. One was the mainly student-led 2014 Sunflower Movement, which occupied the Legislative Yuan, (LY) and demanded closer monitoring of future agreements with China and the convening of citizen conferences to discuss constitutional amendment.3 During the LY occupation, activists transitioned from top-down mobilization to improvised, decentralized collaboration.4 In 2016, Sunflower participants voted overwhelmingly for the DPP, which won both the presidency and a legislative majority, and did so again in 2020. Will Tsai’s tenure end the pro-China vs. pro-Taiwan dichotomy? Does her vision of cultural transition correspond to changes in civic participation and democracy? This chapter examines cultural policy under Tsai’s presidency, focusing on attempts to end Taiwan’s long-running “culture wars”. During the 2015 presidential campaign, Tsai proposed: “Enhancing cultural strength and building a new era of Taiwanese Cultural and Artistic Renaissance.”5 Culture Minister Cheng Li-chun was subsequently tasked with putting forward a 21st Century Taiwan’s Overall Cultural Construction agenda.6 To bolster this policy, the 2017 Nationwide Cultural Congress a series of cultural conferences, was convened to aid preparation of a White Paper on Cultural Policy and framing of a Cultural Basic Law. Cultural policies in Taiwan have been a fiercely politicized battlefield between the KMT and DPP, long-lasting and frequently modified. This chapter explores three of Tsai’s emerging cultural policy projects in relation to their predecessors, emphasizing historical aspects related to re-China-ization and Taiwanization, which enable a better understanding of Taiwan’s culture wars and President Tsai’s initiatives. Section one examines Tsai’s Taiwanese Cultural and Artistic Renaissance vision, contrasting it with the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement promoted by Chiang Kai-shek after 1966, which was the first thorough implementation of the KMT’s re-China-ization policy. We cannot understand Tsai’s Taiwanese Renaissance without first analysing the impact of Chiang’s Chinese Renaissance. Section two explores Tsai’s 21st Century Taiwan’s Overall Cultural Construction which resonates with the Overall Community Construction7 proposed by President Lee Teng-hui (KMT) in 1994, and with the New Homeland Community Construction8 advocated by President Chen Shui-bian (DPP) in 2002. All three projects were effectively forms of the “Taiwanization”9 policy which gradually replaced Chiang’s re-China-ization policy after 1987.

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Hsieh 2015, 142–147. Ho 2018, 189–202. Tsai 2018. Ministry of Culture 2018a. Su 2009. Ministry of Culture 2002. Amae and Damm 2011, 3–17.

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Tsai’s Taiwan’s Overall Cultural Construction must be understood in relation to the previous forms of Taiwanization and its recent development. This section reviews the previous Community Construction policy projects and models for Taiwanization, before examining Tsai’s third form of Taiwanization. Section three examines Tsai’s Nationwide Cultural Congress. Convened by Lee Teng-hui in 1990, again in 1997, and in 2002 by Chen Shui-bian. Tsai’s re-convening of the Congress in 2017, to help produce a new Cultural Policy White Paper, signals a new direction for Taiwan’s cultural policy. However, her policy projects remain to be fully implemented and insufficient time has elapsed to assess their effectiveness. While re-China-ization and Taiwanization policies both had strong political profiles, Tsai’s cultural policy was still under development, even as she moved into her second 4-year term as president. The distinctive elements of her approach and prospects must be assessed in the context of Taiwan’s long-term culture wars. Will Tsai’s cultural policy facilitate wider societal transition, responding to demand for wider cultural and political participation? Has it nurtured a non-binary vision of Taiwanization/re-China-ization?

Tsai’s Taiwanese renaissance versus Chiang’s Chinese renaissance Tsai’s vision in cultural policy has been “to plant Taiwan’s cultural strength and let this multi-cultural soil create brilliant flowers and build a new era of Taiwanese Cultural and Artistic Renaissance.”10 On the eve of President Tsai’s inauguration in 2016, pro-China media questioned if she would follow her political mentor, Lee Teng-hui, to commit to “constructing a greater Taiwan” and “establishing a new Zhongyuan11/China?”12 However, Tsai did not provide an answer to this question, and this perhaps reflects her view of “the Chinese/Zhongyuan Cultural Renaissance” being like her attitude toward the 1992 Consensus: chiefly pragmatic, foregoing statements disputing “one China,” expressing respect for its historicity,13 and speaking neutrally of “both sides of the Strait.” Tsai did not explicitly address cultural policy at her 2016 or 2020 inauguration. This perhaps reflects her understanding of culture: Culture is life, and the root of a country. Culture forms our collective memory, formulates our local identification, and further agglomerates our feelings, so that we have a common home. Cultural development and talent cultivation ought to stem from the island that we live on.14

10 Taiwan People News Editorial Office 2015. 11 Zhongyuan refers to the Central Plains along the Yellow River where is China’s origin. 12 CTITV News 2016. 13 Tsai 2016. 14 Tsai 2015b.

Taiwan’s culture wars This was stated on her Facebook page in 2015 while the presidency. The absence of cultural policy in her not mean Tsai does not value culture, but rather that of culture should not be dominated and manipulated

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she was campaigning for inaugural addresses does she believes development by government leaders.

Re-China-ization policy ROC nationalism was formed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries when China was under threat from numerous imperial powers, and Taiwan was a Japanese colony.15 The KMT’s re-China-ization Renaissance Movement was intended to serve ROC nation-building in China, then later in Taiwan. As agreed by the Allied leaders at the Cairo Conference of 1943, Taiwan “reverted” to the ROC KMT government upon Japan’s surrender in 1945. In 1946, the KMT-run ROC regime, in surveying Taiwan, claimed that its people had been “enslaved” through 50 years of colonization.16 This enslavement claim distinguished between benshengren (“provincial natives” or “Taiwanese”), mainly Hoklo-speaking Taiwanese, Hakka-speaking Taiwanese and yuanzhumin (indigenous Austronesians);17 and waishengren (“provincial outsiders” or “mainlanders”) who shared common interests as a ruling group and identity as “people of China.”18 Tensions between benshengren and waishengren erupted into violence in February 1947, known as the “2–28 Incident,”19 and were exacerbated by the ensuing “White Terror” suppression and imposition of martial law in May 1949. In December 1949 after being defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, where it sought continuity with the Republican legacy on mainland China, making preparations for “Reconquest of the Mainland” and declaring itself the sole legitimate government of China.20 The KMT decided that benshengren should not be treated as equals with waishengren until they had been de-Japanized and re-China-ized.21 The formerly official Japanese language was banned in schools, media, and government, and the Japanese colonial era was characterized as a historical disgrace. “Re-China-ization” reframed Taiwan as a province of the ROC and mandarin as the national language. The Chief Executive Office of Taiwan Province established a Mandarin Language Promotion Committee in 1946.22 Mandarin 15 Shih 2012, 6–33 16 Chen 2002, 145–201. 17 Benshengren referred to the Han population resident on the island before 1945 and were seen as native to Taiwan. 18 Waishengren referred to those Chinese who came to Taiwan with the KMT 19451949 from various provinces other than Taiwan. 19 Some tens of thousands of Taiwanese were summarily massacred or in the case of selected intellectuals “disappeared.” 20 Rigger 1999. 21 Huang 2007. 22 This was renamed in 1948 as “the Taiwan Provincial Government’s Mandarin Promotion Committee” (Taiwansheng Zhengfu Guoyu Tuixing Weiyuanhui).

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was proclaimed the sole national language, and commonly used Hoklo and Hakka languages were denigrated as su (vulgar), liyu (slang), and tuhua (earthy/ peasant talk). Pupils were fined for speaking their native tongues at school. The Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) was founded in 1954 to make feature films to promote the mandarin language and anti-communist themes. “Descendants of the Yellow Emperor” directed by Bai Ke in 1956 served as an instrument for re-China-ization under martial law.23 Opening with a scene at a school, replete with ROC flag and Chiang Kai-shek portrait, pupils sing that they are descendants of the Yellow Emperor and people of one country, thus offering a visualization of the KMT’s Chinese nationalism on Taiwan.24 By the 1960s, the re-China-ization language policy had eliminated Taiwanese-language cinema. The CMPC introduced the “Healthy Realism” film genre in the 1960s, and in 1962 the Government Information Office founded the Golden Horse Awards to promote mandarin-language film-making, and to reward filmmakers in line with re-China-ization policy. The awards were named after the islands of Kinmen/Quemoy and Mazu/Matsu—areas of military confrontation between the ROC and the PRC—suggesting a desired combative spirit for a new age of ROC mandarin movies. The award ceremony was held annually on Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday, October 31. Director Lee Hsing was the prime exponent of “Healthy Realism.” His 1965 Golden Horse Award winning “Beautiful Duckling” embraced “healthy” Confucian ethics of family values and hard work, and “realist” depictions of resettlement of ordinary families in the Republic’s new home, Taiwan.25 The Taiwan Governor Museum, a symbol of Japanese colonial achievement, was closed in 1949 and renamed the Taiwan Provincial Museum. The National Palace Museum re-opened on a Taipei hillside in 1965. A visit to the museum resembled a pilgrimage: artefacts chronologically charting the development of Huaxia/Chinese civilization with the ROC as the telos,26 in justification of its possession of treasures exemplifying five millennia of “Chinese culture.” The museum was presented as the “temple” of “orthodox Chinese Culture” and the ROC as guardian of that legacy. The climax of re-China-ization was the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, initiated on November 12 1966, the centennial of Sun Yat-sen’s birth.27 It was at once about Taiwan and a reaction to Mao Zedong’s communist Cultural Revolution in China, which was a devastating attack on Chinese traditional culture and old ways of life. By contrast, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance reasserted Chinese tradition to “maintain cultural orthodoxy and revive the culture of Zhongyuan/China’s origin.” November 12 23 24 25 26 27

Hong 2011. Berry 2009. Berry 2009, 146–147. Vickers 2009. For the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, see Shih 1995. Lin 2005.

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was designated as Renaissance Day, “to promote the revival of Chinese culture and nurture the cultural construction of the Three Principles of the People.”28 Chiang declared that Sun’s Three Principles of the People embraced “the totality of Chinese Culture” and formed the basis for a revolution to protect national tradition and eventually “sweep the mainland clean of the Communists.”29 The Promotion Council for the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (PCCCRM) was established in 1967, with Chiang as Chairman. He defined ‘Chinese Culture’ as promoted in the Renaissance movement as daotong (Confucian moral tradition), echoing Sun Yat-sen’s writing: “There is an orthodoxy of China which never ends, beginning from Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, King Zhouwen, King Zhouwu, Zhougong, and Confucius; my thought is actually based on this orthodoxy, and my revolution is also inherited from this orthodoxy in an attempt to carry it forward.” Chiang’s invocation of Sun furthered his identification as Sun’s legitimate heir: “Inheriting the revolutionary legacy of the Father, my moral values and political ideology, following the Father, are to carry on the 5,000-year orthodoxy of the Chinese nation.”30 The cultural policy controlled by Chiang and the KMT was implemented by the Ministry of Education between 1950 and 1981. The MoE advocated a “New Life Movement,” emphasising moral discipline and echoing the New Life Movement of the 1930s in China. In 1968, it promoted etiquette through the Handbook of Citizens’ Life. An invented Chinese history was taught, beginning with the supposed common ancestor, the Yellow Emperor, followed in an unbroken line by about 20 dynasties, leading to Sun Yat-sen’s founding the ROC in 1912, and Chiang Kai-shek’s succession to Sun. Re-China-ization successfully imposed a single, monolithic version of orthodox Chinese Culture on post-war Taiwan. It asserted the superiority of orthodox Chinese Culture and mandarin language. As Chang Bi-yu writes: “All things Chinese were associated with sophistication, beauty and grandeur, while all things Taiwanese were regarded as vulgar, stupid, and coarse.”31 The “enslaved” benshengren had been transformed into ROC citizens, albeit at best second-class citizens. The KMT had, with some success, implemented a frozen-in-time version of an imaginary pre-communist Republican mainland. Modifications to Re-China-ization Re-China-ization was the ideological support for the KMT’s one-party authoritarian, quasi-colonialist rule over the majority benshengren. With the growing international recognition of the PRC as “China” during the 1970s, the legitimacy of the KMT government as the government of China became disputed and KMT claims to legitimacy were modified. After Chiang’s death in 1975, re-China-ization 28 Two slogans “Weihu Wenhua Zhengtong, Fuxing Zhongyuan Wenhua” and “Cujin Zhonghua Wenhua Fuxing, Fazhan Sanmin Zhuyi Wenhua Jianshe” quoted in Li 1979. 29 Tozer 1970, 83. 30 These two are quoted in Lingxiu yu Guojia written by General Wang Sheng, an apologist for Chiang’s authoritarianism. 31 Chang 2006a, 188–189.

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took different routes. Succeeding his father, Chiang Ching-kuo continued to valorize re-China-ization with completion of the “Chung-cheng Cultural Centre,” which included three iconic Chinese architectural-style buildings: the Chiang Kaishek Memorial Hall (1980), the National Theatre (1987), and the National Concert Hall (1987). The PCCCRM has continued under successive presidents. Established by Chiang Kai-shek in 1967, it was reorganized in 1990 under Lee Teng-hui’s administration as the General Association of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (GACCRM), commonly abbreviated as the General Cultural Association.32 In 1991 it changed from a government-funded entity to a civic organization. It continued the original aims of reviving Zhongyuan/Chinese Culture, and nurturing ethics and morality in line with the policy of the era of the two Chiangs.33 After taking office in 2000, President Chen Shui-bian promoted a “Cultural Taiwan and Millennial Revival” and set up the Presidential Cultural Award in 2001. The GACCRM was renamed the General Association of National Culture in 2006.34 The replacement of ‘Chinese Culture’ with ‘National Culture’ was condemned by some as de-China-ization. However, the Chinese Renaissance policy was resumed, in a more subdued form, during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (2008–2016). In 2010, the General Association of National Culture was again renamed the General Association of Chinese Culture (GACC).35 President Tsai, who has continued the tradition of the president as head of the GACC, justified retention of the name: “the GACC was born in a specific historical context with a particular political mission…and has completed different tasks at different stages;”36 an acknowledgement criticized by PRC media as “using ‘China’ in order to de-China-ize.”37 The GACC is now identified as an NGO, with a greatly expanded executive committee. Tsai seeks to promote classic works so that “the younger generation can stand on the shoulders of giants and continue to inherit and pass on the culture.”38 A recent example is GACC’s nostalgically subversive transformation of the Handbook of Citizens’ Life into LINE app stickers and computer games for the 2019 Lunar New Year.39 A more controversial modification centers on the National Palace Museum. Director Lin Cheng-yi proposed a six-year New Palace Museum Project, setting up a Youth Office to boost interest among young people.40 This is exemplified by 2018’s joint GACC–National Palace Museum “Open Data, Cross-Border, 32 Zhonghua Wenhua Fuxing Yundong Zonghui and its abbreviated name Wenhua Zonghui, see The General Association of Chinese Culture (2017) Organization History. 33 The mission Fuxing Zhonghua Wenhua, Fayang Lunli Daode. 34 The vision Wenhua Taiwan, Shiji Weixin and renamed as Guojia Wenhua Zonghui. 35 Renamed as Zhonghua Wenhua Zonghui. 36 UDN Video 2017. 37 Zhang 2017. 38 General Association of Chinese Culture 2017b. 39 General Association of Chinese Culture 2019. 40 National Palace Museum 2018a.

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Cultural Night: Hip Hop Palace” event promoting the integration of Chinese legacy and Taiwanese innovation.41 Museum artefacts have been digitized and this event combined Tang Dynasty calligraphy with hip-hop music and fashion catwalks, incorporating new design elements based on digitized museum artefacts. Such examples perhaps represent Tsai’s vision of a Taiwanese Cultural Renaissance, building on Chinese cultural legacy to highlight Taiwanese innovative values. However, the pro-China camp have criticized Tsai’s government for devaluing symbols of ‘Chinese Culture’ and using them for profit,42 asking whether such events uphold Chinese Culture or instead accelerate de-China-ization.

Tsai’s “21st century Taiwan’s overall cultural construction” as pluri-cultural Taiwanization At her first inauguration, Tsai referenced indigenous peoples five times, stating: “We dare not forget who arrived first on this island,” and promised to restore indigenous languages and cultures. She is the first Taiwan president of indigenous ancestry. Just as her administration seeks to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations,43 Tsai’s Taiwanization appears to be unprovocative. Eschewing nationalism, she has focused on conserving and reviving endangered indigenous languages, arts and culture(s). However, four decades of re-China-ization policy had resulted in an officially promoted Culture that amounted to a virtual ban on the culture(s) of Taiwan. The KMT’s enforced re-China-ization, no less foreign to benshengren than colonial Japanese culture, can be understood as a form of colonial rule.44 Chiang’s KMT paralleled the linguistic politics of its colonial predecessor, implementing a “national” language of little communicative value to benshengren while stigmatizing their languages.45 The psychological impact was enormous: benshengren internalized the negative stereotypes associated with their ascribed marginality while regarding the orthodox Chinese Culture as superior to Taiwan’s local culture(s).46 Since democratization, Taiwanization has once again become a powerful slogan. It has evolved through three phases in Taiwan’s history: the Wenhua Zijue (cultural self-consciousness) movement in the 1920s; the Xiangtu Wenhua (local culture) movement in the 1970s; and the post-martial law Bentuhua (Nativization) movement.47 All three phases have common grounds deriving from anti-colonialism and de-colonialization– respectively anti-Japanization, anti-Westernization, and deChina-ization. However, the third phase of Taiwanization has been subject to widely different ideological interpretations and emphasis by successive presidents. 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

National Palace Museum 2018b. Duan 2019. Hsiao 2018. Edmondson 2002. Klöter 2009. Klöter 2009, 106–107. Chen 1995, 66–79.

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Prelude to the inception of Taiwanization After the 1970s, the KMT’s claim that the need for wartime alertness and ideological preparedness warranted extending martial law and thwarting attempts to operate a democratically representative system became increasingly indefensible. Some waishengren and increasing numbers of benshengren were dissatisfied with authoritarian politics and no longer tolerated either the KMT’s refusal to grant democracy or Chiang Kai-shek’s re-China-ization cultural policy. Pressure grew from the dangwai (outside the [KMT] party) and Xiangtu Wenxue (Local Literature) movements, generating attempts at political and cultural reform. Partly as a consequence, Chiang Ching-kuo, who succeeded his father as President in 1978 and held office until his death in 1988, eventually adopted a more Taiwan-conciliatory approach, both politically and culturally. He began to encourage local cultural initiatives and, beginning in 1979, constructed local cultural centres nationwide, as the last of his 12 major construction projects. The Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) was founded in 1981, marking the first time that cultural affairs were controlled at the ministerial level in the Executive Yuan. While each county had a cultural center to demonstrate its local characteristics, the National Theatre and Concert Halls were to promote the performance of high Chinese Culture (for example, Beijing opera starring Ku Cheng-chiu in 1987). Since the 1990s these venues have included performances of local culture(s) (such as Taiwanese opera, starring Yang Li-hua in 1991).48 Toward the end of his life, Chiang Ching-kuo relaxed controls on free speech and opposition politics and, in a significant move, recruited benshengren Lee Teng-hui as vice president (1984–1988). Chiang’s 1987 acknowledgement that “he had lived in Taiwan for 40 years [and was therefore] Chinese, but also Taiwanese”49 heralded the post-martial law phase of Taiwanization. The first major opposition party, the DPP, was established in 1986 and formally legalized in 1989, while martial law finally ended in 1987. After Chiang’s death in 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded as the first benshengren president (1988–2000) and initiated changes in cultural policy and promoted nativization. Community construction and nativization By the time Lee became president, pressure was mounting for change in cultural policy. Intellectuals, artists, and film directors were breaking free from KMT censorship and embracing Taiwan’s languages and culture(s). The 1980s

48 Sugano 2005, 41–59. 49 Chi 1998.

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Taiwanese New Wave of film directors gave a more realistic, native representation of Taiwan’s suppressed past. Hou Hsiao-hsien’s film A City of Sadness (1989), the first taboo-breaking depiction of the 2–28 Incident, won the Golden Lion award at the Venice Film Festival. The protagonist is a deafmute, symbolizing the silence enforced on Taiwanese about their language, culture and the 2–28 massacre. Suspected of being a mainlander, he haltingly mouths the words “I am Taiwanese (guá sı- Tâi-uân-lâng)”.50 This poignant scene marked a key turning point from mandarin to Taiwanese language, from Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity. Re-orientation of cultural policy remained contentious, however. Waishengren elites felt threatened by democratic transition, and debates ensued over Taiwan-centric versus China-centric policies. Lee was cautious in modifying cultural narratives and served as head of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Council. After being elected president by the National Assembly in 1990, Lee courageously proposed his vision of a “new Taiwanese people.”51 On August 1, 1994, the ROC constitution was amended, changing the term “shanbao (mountain aborigines)” to “yuanzhumin.”52 For the first time a Taiwanese government thus recognized them as the “original inhabitants of Taiwan.” Lee’s new Taiwanese people constituted a new ethnic entity (zuqun) concept: regardless of benshengren, waishengren, and yuanzhumin distinctions, anyone who identified themselves with Taiwan would be considered as genuine Taiwanese. In 1996 Lee Teng-hui won Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, securing his third presidential term. At his inauguration, he asserted: Community construction is the foundation for building a greater Taiwan. Building a greater Taiwan is the driving force behind the establishment of the new “central plain” … Thus, the ROC on Taiwan is the root of the entire China nation. But only by developing and building the place we are living in now—Taiwan—can we take care of mainland China, and look outward to the international world.53 Lee Teng-hui made a play on the phrase Zhongyuan, literally “the central plain,” implying China’s origin, and reasserting Taiwan’s tie to China, yet turning from China-centric to Taiwan-centric policies. For Lee, making Taiwan a new center required building “a community of common destiny.” “Overall Community Construction” was the most innovative, diffusive and sustainable cultural policy in democratic Taiwan, formulated in 1994 by Chen Chi-nan,54 and implemented extensively under President 50 51 52 53 54

Kao 2017. Lee 1994. Center for Aboriginal Studies NCCU 2016. Lee 1996. Chen Chi-nan served as CCA Deputy Chair (1994–1996) under Lee Teng-hui’s KMT administration, and continued as CCA Chair (2004–2006) under Chen Shuibian’s DPP administration.

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Lee’s administration. Utilizing existing nationwide cultural centers, it proceeded from the premise that culture starts with the most fundamental locality, “the community,” which Chen defined as the place where people live, and which is itself a representation of a certain culture, type of place, way of life, and set of values.55 This policy aimed to cultivate “community consciousness,” seen as native to the community, regardless of its place of origin. It sought to combine local history and life experience with “modern civic consciousness”, through participation in public affairs, integrating community, scholarly and governmental resources, and jointly establishing common prosperity and destiny. Lee’s “Overall Community Construction” policy was effectively a form of Taiwanization with a focus on “nativization.” Homeland construction and Taiwanese nationalism The clashes between the differing nationalisms increasingly assumed the character of culture wars, with growing numbers of citizens supporting Taiwanization. Following his election as the first DPP president in 2000, Chen Shui-bian advocated Taiwanese nation-building based on culture. In 2002, after Beijing was chosen to host the 2008 Olympics, Chen launched the “Challenge 2008: National Development Key Projects” in response to China’s growing global economic and political power. CCA Chair Chen Yu-hsiu (2002–2004) focused on establishing what she called a Taiwanese culture of self-conscious subjectivity. At the Nationwide Culture Congress of 2002, Chen proposed a “Cultural and Creative Industry Development Plan,” aimed at extracting economic benefits from combining cultural legacies with technological innovation through demonstrating Taiwanese uniqueness amid the cross-Strait competition.56 The “New Homeland Community Construction” project was put forward by President Chen to utilize “Overall Community Construction” to develop the whole nation of Taiwan as “the new homeland.” It should be noted that this project emphasized the characteristics and uniqueness of local culture so as to strengthen Taiwan self-consciousness.57 Since this nation-building process challenged Chinese cultural hegemony, critics condemned it as de-sinification.58 Chen’s CCA advocated, “the place where the heart is, that is the hometown…. Everyone invests in creating his/her own community in/of Taiwan, which, even if not their native home, Taiwan would naturally become one single integrated community that everyone identifies with.”59 Priority was given to projects with potential to assist nation-building, particularly those related to ethnic revitalization. 55 56 57 58 59

Chen 1994. Shih 2006. Chen 2013. Chang 2006b, 1–19. Chen 2013, 162.

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The New Hakka Movement, which began in 2002, has become part of Taiwanization. A Hakka TV Channel was established in 2003, aiming to “Let Taiwan see Hakka, let the world see Hakka”.60 The New Indigenous Communities Movement has thrived since 2003, encouraging research into indigenous history and culture and sustaining indigenous life through development of the cultural economy.61 Director Wei Te-sheng spent 10 years in making an indigenous epic film Seediq Bale. The film is the first depiction of the infamous 1930 Wushe Incident, an insurrection by Taiwan’s Seediq people that was bloodily suppressed by a Japanese aerial bombardment. The film depicts how, after 30 years of humiliation, Chief Mona Ludo finally chose to fight for his people’s traditional belief in a hunting ground where they would join their ancestors. Life could be lost, but this was a place the Japanese could never enter and which could never be stolen.62 Chen’s “New Homeland Community Construction” policy was effectively a form of Taiwanization, one that included an effort to develop Taiwanese nationalism. President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) continued his predecessor’s policy as “The New Homeland Community Construction Phase II,” 2008–2015, considering “community construction as an important embodiment of grassroots democracy.” He highlighted “Taiwan’s achievement of democracy in Chinese society,” and sought to “exchange and share Taiwan’s experience with the mainland [PRC], Singapore, Japan, Southeast Asia and other European and American countries.”63 In 2011, the film Seediq Bale garnered awards and received acclaim upon its international release. Ma attended the premiere in Taipei, but while supporting indigenous culture, he still regarded culture in Taiwan as being Chinese Culture with local/Taiwanese characteristics.64 A pluri-cultural settler state At a ceremony on August 1, 2016 marking Indigenous Peoples’ Day, President Tsai called upon indigenous ancestral spirits to witness her apology for past unjust treatment: Four hundred years ago, there were already many different peoples inhabiting Taiwan. These people lived their own ways of life, had their own languages, cultures, customs and living spaces. Then, without their consent, another group of people came into this land. History was rewritten as late-comers deprived the indigenous peoples of their possessions. Indigenous peoples were displaced within their own familiar land, gradually

60 61 62 63 64

Hakka Affairs Council 2002. Council of Indigenous Peoples 2003. Sterk 2012. Ministry of Culture 2016. Ma 2010.

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Re-China-ization and pro-mandarin movements have devastated indigenous languages and cultural identities. In line with the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Tsai sought to redress historic injustices and to extend transitional justice to indigenous peoples.66 Taiwan’s government had long ignored the languages of various ethnic groups, even though they were listed by UNESCO in 2001 as endangered. In 2017, Taiwan adopted the National Language Development Law, 34 years after consideration of such a law had begun, followed in December 2018 by the Tsai administration’s adoption of the Regulations for the Establishment of the Foundation for Research and Development of Indigenous Peoples’ Languages to preserve indigenous languages, and to promote research, develop language teaching, and monitor standards of certification.67 Despite its relatively small size, Taiwan has remarkable language diversity. There are 16–20 Austronesian languages, known as the “Formosan languages,” mostly confined to Taiwan.68 Jared Diamond describes this cultural heritage as, “Taiwan’s gift to the world”.69 The National Museum of Prehistory, after 20 years of excavation, launched the Tainan branch of the Museum of Archaeology, in December 2019. This museum displays 8 million cultural relics (including 2,000 complete remains) found at 58 separate archaeological sites during the construction of Southern Taiwan Science Park. This is the largest archaeological excavation area in Taiwan. There are six cultural layers ranging from 5,000 to 300 years ago, and discoveries include the earliest person, dog, and rice crop found in Taiwan.70 Taiwan has become a showcase for a wide range of Austronesian cultures of both local and global interest. Tsai’s apology, resembling those from leaders of Australia, Canada, and the U.S. after the 2007 UN Declaration, suggests that she also sees Taiwan as a “settler state”. In this view, the majority of people in Taiwan are part of the Chinese diaspora who settled on indigenous peoples’ lands. Giving due recognition of the language and culture of each ethnic group is important to the promotion of pluri-culturalism in Taiwan. Tsai’s policy on indigenous languages and cultures represents a new form of Taiwanization, transcending the binary opposition of Chineseness and Taiwaneseness and thereby facilitating the emergence of the island’s pluri-culturalism.

65 66 67 68 69 70

Office of the President 2016. Nokan 2016. Indigenous Languages Research and Development Center 2018. Han-po 2016. Diamond 2000, 709–710. Ministry of Culture 2019a.

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st

Tsai’s 21 century Taiwan’s overall cultural construction While Tsai sees Taiwan from an indigenous perspective and thus regards Taiwan as a settler state, she also sees Chinese culture as an inherent part of Taiwan’s culture, in line with the island’s state of “natural independence”—a view that has resonated with her young supporters. In 2014 as DPP chairwoman, Tsai stated: “With Taiwan undergoing democratization,… identifying with Taiwan and insisting on the value of self-conscious independence have become the natural inheritance of the younger generation. In these circumstances, how could the Taiwan independence clause written in the DPP’s constitution possibly be ‘suspended,’ or even ‘abolished’?”71 The idea of Taiwan as a “naturally” independent state has gained popularity, but does not necessarily extend to advocating formal independence or pursuing full de-China-ization. Tsai’s policy avoids ideological battles, instead focusing on democratic governance and civic participation. The CCA was upgraded to the Ministry of Culture in 2012 under President Ma, gradually incorporating government agencies responsible for cultural affairs. Long before her inauguration and during her presidential campaign, Tsai established a “Nationwide Art and Culture Advisory Board” and developed her thoughts on cultural policy by reflecting on Ma’s failure to address the people’s expectations: It is hoped that the soil of pluri-culturalism will prove fertile and help to build a new era of Taiwanese Cultural and Artistic Renaissance… We must never forget that the foundation of a flourishing culture lies in the support of democratic values. Democracy and pluralism nourish the soil of culture and create a lifestyle that Taiwanese people can be proud of….72 Tsai further argued that, under Ma’s leadership the government had lost the people’s trust. It was therefore necessary to put a new mechanism in place to lead Taiwan towards the next era. Though not explicitly addressing cultural policy at her two inaugurations, Tsai stressed social justice issues, promising “to work with civil society to align its policies with the values of diversity, equality, openness, transparency, and human rights, so as to deepen and evolve Taiwan’s democratic institutions.”73 This process of governmental reform, together with Tsai’s agenda on social fairness and democratic values, has implications for cultural policy. Tsai’s government has emphasized formulating cultural policies to facilitate diversity and wider societal changes. In line with Chiang Ching-kuo’s countrywide construction of cultural centers as part of his 12 construction projects, Tsai Ing-wen undertook the 2017–2024 Forward-looking Infrastructure Construction Projects (FICP), which will invest NTD 6.47 billion to promote the digitalization of cultural assets and various forms of creation 71 Wong 2014. 72 Taiwan People News Editorial Office 2015. 73 Tsai 2016.

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and representation.74 Minister Cheng has proposed to revise the governance model: no longer to “govern culture,” but to let “cultural governance” penetrate “all ministerial departments of the governments.”75 To pursue this agenda, she has convinced the Executive Yuan to hold regular cultural audits. In 2017 Tsai convened an expanded Nationwide Cultural Congress, the first event of its kind since 2002, and tasked it with collecting the opinions of “cultural citizens” in preparation for the drafting of a new White Paper on cultural policy. The Congress endorsed the seven goals for new mechanisms of cultural policy proposed during Tsai’s presidential campaign in 2015: overturning topdown cultural governance; implementing inclusive cultural citizenship; ensuring cultural diversity; cultivating culture at local community level; conserving cultural heritage as a potentially valuable economic asset; providing younger generations with a creative environment; and promoting cultural diplomacy.76 Prior to the two-day Congress, the Ministry of Culture held 19 public consultative forums across Taiwan. Minister Cheng set “21st Century Taiwan’s Overall Cultural Construction” as the overall objective, incorporating the above-mentioned seven goals into six agendas for discussion: Cultural Democracy; Cultural Creativity; Living Culture; Cultural Sustainability; Cultural Inclusion; and Cultural Transcendence. More than 4,500 participants helped formulate cultural policy. Subsequently, a draft White Paper put forward five policy themes encompassing more than 50 projects and programs.77 This section addresses the five themes in detail.78 Democratic governance of cultural affairs First, re-organizing cultural governance and supporting artistic freedom, and implementing a Cultural Basic Law in 2019 to ensure culture is shared by all.79 This establishes a system for cooperation with one administrative corporation, two subordinate agencies and 14 affiliated museums and arts centers. Borrowed from the U.K., this model seeks to ensure autonomy of culture by delegating power to a semi-official and professional body—the National Culture and Art Foundation (NCAF). However, compared with the U.K.’s version, the much smaller resources going to the NCAF mean less financial power for cultural professionals to prevent domination by politics.80 This theme also reflects Tsai’s adherence to democratic values in cultural governance and equality of cultural rights. For example, Tsai’s Presidential 74 75 76 77 78

Office of the President 2017. Independence Evening Post 2017. Tsai 2015a. National Cultural Congress 2019. The examination of “five policy themes (wuda zhengce zhuzhou)” is based on author’s personal interviews with involved professionals and governmental officials. 79 Ministry of Culture 2019b. 80 Hung 2014.

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Cultural Award in 2017 was given to LGBTI rights pioneer Chi Chia-wei, the first time a member of the LGBTI community received such recognition from the state. The National Kaohsiung Center for the Arts (Weiwuying) opened in October 2018 after 15 years in construction. Kaohsiung has developed from a city of industries (e.g. manufacturing, steel-making, oil refining, freight transport, and shipbuilding) into the cultural and economic center of southern Taiwan. The Weiwuying was transformed from a military camp into a park and an arts and culture center. Its opening signaled greater equality in development throughout Taiwan: the National Theatre and Concert Halls in the north, the National Opera of Taichung in the central region, and Weiwuying in the south. Weiwuying’s operating policy is one of accommodation across cultures and across languages, bringing local and international talent to southern Taiwan. Another exemplar is the introduction of an exclusively Hoklo-language TV channel which had previously been blocked.81 Hoklo, also called Taiyü (Taiwanese language), was often criticized as a manifestation of cultural chauvinism, synonymous with Taiwanese nationalism and thus identified with de-China-ization. Eventually, as mandated by the National Language Development Law, all languages of Taiwan were granted equal rights, and the Hoklo-language channel came into being. In 2019, the government increased subsidies for the Taiyü TV channel,82 in line with the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity and the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights. Systematic management of cultural assets Second, promoting intangible cultural heritage, focusing on the connection between land and people, and moving from a focus on individual cultural assets to the systematic management of cultural resources. This policy theme enacts the 2016-amended Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, supports local governments in initiating regional cultural governance, re-plans and develops regions with historically significant cultural heritage, and regenerates the memories of the historical sites in the present time. This reflects Tsai’s vision that sustainable culture is rooted in the public memory of the land and can bind Taiwanese people more closely. The Regeneration of Historic Sites project, part of the FICP,83 was influenced by “America’s foremost living architect,” Louis Kahn’s idea that “a great city allows the children to see things on the street that inspire them to develop their professional careers.”84 Minister Cheng implemented this policy project of incorporating historical sites and buildings into overall national 81 82 83 84

Lin 2018. Li 2018. Executive Yuan 2020. Kahn 2013.

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spatial management, suited to the needs of current-day life.85 The project combines local craftsmanship and digital restoration to create virtual historical scenes at their original sites; for example, regeneration of a military dependents’ village named “Nation-Building,” an exiled KMT’s “imagined community,”86 in Huwei in Yunlin County.87 After its defeat by the CCP, the KMT evacuated about 600,000 soldiers with approximately the same number of dependents (waishengren) to Taiwan. The soldiers then searched for places to live and looked for materials (bamboo, mud and husks of grains) to build temporary houses for their fellows and dependents to dwell in, known as “juancun (military dependents’ village).” Regenerating these villages seeks to reconstruct diverse historic memories, to strengthen understanding of Taiwan’s history and deepen a sense of belonging among benshengren and waishengren. Another aspect of the Re-construct History policy is removing symbols of authoritarianism and preserving sites of injustice.88 The National Human Rights Museum was officially established in 2018 after 6 years of preparation.89 The transformation of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is a particularly contentious project. In order to avoid propagating authoritarian culture, the Ministry of Culture has since 2017 instructed the Hall to stop selling products with Chiang’s image, and to stop playing the “Commemorative Song of Chiang Gong” at opening and closing times. In 2018, a Social Discussion Forum was launched in an effort to reach a degree of consensus about redeveloping the Hall from the standpoint of transitional justice. In January 2019, a waishengren singer slapped Minister Cheng’s face, accusing her of “de-Chiang Kai-shek-izing.” In response, Cheng called on Taiwanese people to face historical conflicts rationally, and refrain from using violence. She asserted that this transformation is to “re-democratize,” meaning moving parliamentary democracy to a more genuine form of democracy that pursues transitional justice. Transitional justice is being promoted not to remove any historical memories, but to restore erased histories of victimization.90 Whether the aim of the transformation of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is to “de-Chiang Kai-shek-ize” or to “re-democratize” remains debatable. Memory construction from local knowledge Third, deepening existing Overall Community Construction by further constructing national memory based on local knowledge. Local knowledge in turn creates educational resources. This policy project also supports local cultural spaces in collaboration with museums to form community culture and reflects Tsai’s cultural vision that “the more localized we are, the more we 85 86 87 88 89 90

Taiwan News 2016. Anderson 2016. Li 2019. Xu 2019. National Human Rights Museum 2018. Hsu 2019.

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91

are internationalized.” According to this view, as long as Taiwanese culture is rooted in the community, it will convey Taiwan’s diverse vitality, and will be distinctive on the international stage. Two examples of this policy in action are the construction of a “Database of Ordinary People’s Memory” and of a “Taiwan Cultural Memory Bank.” The former was proposed by ex-Minister Lung Ying-tai to record personal oral histories in digital audio and video and to store them in the cloud, to form a comprehensive national history.92 The latter is part of Tsai’s FICP which seeks to accumulate cultural elements of Taiwan’s origins and use digital technology to capture local knowledge, native cultures, and people’s memories. It aims to generate a common memory of national culture, for the country’s development in knowledge research, education, industrial innovation, and tourism.93 The two projects are facilitated by the Culture and Technology Policy Enacting Project proposed by the Ministry of Culture in collaboration with Ministry of Science and Technology, using advanced technology to restore cultural assets and bring them up to date in the digital era. Economic stimulus from cultural content Fourth, upgrading cultural content as a means of boosting economic output, and enhancing cultural and creative industries as drivers of economic growth. This policy seeks to foster sustainable markets for cultural industries both nationally and internationally, and to boost private investment. It includes the existing Cultural and Creative Investment Project and the new Taiwan Creative Content Agency. Since 2003, the cultural and creative industries have been promoted as having the potential to become a “fourth-wave” driving force for the nation’s economic development. This policy theme advances Tsai’s economic vision that national cultural heritage is the source of the creative industry, and introduces Taiwan’s distinctive cultural characteristics to an international audience. It is argued that the cultural content industry can make significant economic contributions and help Taiwan withstand downward economic cycles by adding cultural value to Taiwanese products, increasing their prominence in world marketplaces.94 One significant project under this policy is the “Fashion Industry and Film and Television Sound Industry Integration Flagship.” This project launched the first Taipei Fashion Week in November 2018, as a collaborative venture of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, responsible for industry including textiles and fabrics, and the Ministry of Culture, responsible for the fashion design, access, audio, and video. Taipei Fashion Week aims to impress international buyers by injecting Taiwan cultural elements into the fashion industry.95 91 92 93 94 95

Storm Media 2017. Ministry of Culture 2013. Taiwan Cultural Memory Bank 2020. Chen 2018b. Chen 2018a.

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Another project is the newly established “Taiwan Creative Content Agency (TAICCA)” founded in November 2019 after 16 years of planning. Following the example of the Korea Creative Content Agency (established in 2009), Taiwan has attached importance to the cultural and creative industries, adopting Korea’s strategy of top-down change to enable Taiwan to catch up with global leaders in the field.96 In the face of competition from globally thriving Chinese cultural products, Taiwan urgently needs to revitalize original cultural content with its own particular characteristics. By adopting a national team approach, the TAICCA promotes the application and industrialization of cultural content and generates additional cultural value and investment through dissemination of cultural products, such as film and television, pop music, graphic arts, digital publishing, games, fashion, and technology application. The TAICCA serves as an intermediary to transmit Taiwan’s culture to the world, to strengthen Taiwan’s competitiveness in the international market, and to shape Taiwan’s national cultural brand.97 Internationalist promotion of cultural diplomacy Fifth, attaching particular importance to experimental culture, and promoting Taiwan’s soft power and cultural diplomacy. This policy encourages international cultural institutions to work in Taiwan while internationalizing local culture by promoting exports from Taiwan’s cultural content industries.98 It also advocates guarded cross-Strait cultural exchange and industrial collaboration, subject to restrictions necessary for the protection of Taiwan’s cultural brand. The policy seeks to rectify eight years of reliance on integration with China under Ma. The Tsai administration also has favored a New Southbound cultural policy, which has been pioneered by the film industry since directors Tsai Ming-liang (Malaysia-born) and Chao Te-yin (Myanmar-born) chose Taiwan to create films depicting Southeast Asian migrant workers’ and immigrants’ struggles. The policy also aids in the development of the Taiwanese film genre through exportation to countries specified in the New Southbound policy.99 The “Culture x Tech Next” forum provides domestic and international industry leaders with a platform to establish a new cultural-industrial ecosystem.100 A prominent example is a virtual reality experience of the Taipei Palace Museum’s painting, the well-known “Along the River at the Qingming Festival” by Chang Che-duan (1085–1145). In a virtual recreation of a Song dynasty setting, viewers look at a moving tableau of vivid scenes that depict lifestyles ranging from rich to poor, and civic activities at the Qingming 96 97 98 99 100

Han 2016. TAICCA 2020. National Cultural Congress 2019. Huang 2018. Drillsma 2018.

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festival. Technological innovation helps contemporary audiences appreciate the charm of the traditional painting.101 Construction of a new cultural industry ecosystem is a key part of what the Ministry of Culture seeks to achieve, and the new industries highlight the blending of cultural content and digital innovation through music, film, traditional art, or antiques exhibitions to create a new cultural economy. Among them, Tsai has selected the anime, comics, and games (ACG) sector for special promotion through increased funding, fostering interdisciplinary collaboration and establishing a national comics museum. Examples of the blending of these forms are two video ARGs (alternate reality games) Detention (2017),102 set in the 1960s, and Devotion (2018),103 set in the 1980s; both are games of horror, adventure, and puzzle-solving referencing Taiwan’s White Terror, and incorporating Taiwanese beliefs in the haunting of vengeful ghosts. Rely on Horror reviewed the Detention, saying that “every facet of Detention moves in one harmonious lockstep towards an unavoidable tragedy, drowning out the world around you.”104 Though both games received a high ranking in Steam globally, they did not gain Taiwan government funds but are 100% Chinese owned, which rendered them vulnerable to Chinese control.105 After Chinese players found an in-game puzzle/talisman that likened Chinese president Xi Jinping to Winnie the Pooh, “Devotion” became inaccessible. Since February 12, 2020, “Detention” and “Devotion” have been preserved in the Harvard-Yenching library.106 The lack of Taiwanese government funding for these two games raises the question of why subsidies are not reaching those with talent in innovation. The importance of cultural diplomacy has increased under Tsai and her Ministry of Culture. Taiwan has grown into a society representative of key universal values promoted by the United Nations, and Taiwan’s cultural soft power and cultural diplomacy may at least partially compensate for Taiwan’s lack of formal diplomatic relations with major powers, and loss of membership in principal international organizations.107 Drawing on Taiwan’s democratic values and human rights practices, the Ministry of Culture, together with individuals and civil society organizations, are utilizing Taiwan’s experience of democracy to strengthen international relationships and persuade the world to recognize Taiwan. Tsai has initiated ambitious projects that require considerable funding. The Ministry of Culture’s budget was a record NTD 20,283 billion in 2019.108 In contrast to previous administrations, the budgetary focus is on cultural 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Liu 2018. Oh 2018. Muncy 2019. Rely on Horror 2017. Hsu 2019. Carpenter 2020. Rawnsley 2014, 161–174. Xu 2018.

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software (programming) rather than hardware (building projects). Basic operating budgets have reached NTD 12,448 billion, an annual increase of 15.9%. The budget has doubled for training in traditional arts and performance, and tripled for the preservation of intangible cultural assets. Still, it is only one-ninth of that of South Korea’s budget. Accomplishing the Tsai administration’s ambitious policy goals with limited resources remains a challenge.

Conclusion In Taiwan’s post-1949 “culture wars,” although Taiwanization appears to be simply the opposite of re-China-ization, it also developed primarily in response to the re-China-ization drive of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance policy. It was both a counter-attack and a counter-balance to the KMT nationalists’ exclusive concern with orthodox Chinese Culture. Taiwanization/ Taiwanese nationalism and re-China-ization/KMT (ROC) nationalism both formed parts of a dialectical rhythm in Taiwan’s cultural policy and development. The version of Chinese Culture advocated by Chiang Kai-shek was presented as the epitome of cultural sophistication, founded on an invention of “daotong Confucian Culture” from a ruling class standpoint, largely unrelated to the cultural practices of ordinary people. It was used to distinguish the “authentic high culture” of waishengren, from what they regarded as the “low culture” of benshengren. This hierarchy corresponded to ethnic-based access to cultural resources, with Taiwanese culture treated as “other” and second-rate. Since its transition to democracy, Taiwan has had three benshengren presidents and one waishengren president. Each benshengren president, albeit with different emphases and attitudes, has espoused Taiwanization as well as Chiang’s re-China-ization. In line with re-China-ization, Lee Teng-hui promoted nativization to advance a vision of unifying all ethnic groups as a new Taiwanese people, thereby building the new Zhongyuan native to Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian advanced Taiwanization, extending Lee’s Community Construction policy to create a single integrated “new homeland/nation” involving Taiwanese nationalism, de-colonization, and thus de-China-ization. A third form of Taiwanization has evolved under Tsai’s presidency. She has sought to eliminate differences between ethnic identities, not by attempting to create a unitary national culture, but by emphasizing democratic values and pluri-culturalism. Tsai’s new cultural policy has facilitated societal change across Taiwan’s multiple cultures and nurtured widespread civic participation through decentralization of cultural resource allocation. It prioritizes preservation of cultural heritage and assets, the reconstruction of Taiwan’s art history, the cultivation of local community culture, the promotion of cultural diversity, and adopting cultural diplomacy to enhance Taiwan’s cultural brand in the international community. The difficulty many find in understanding Tsai’s cultural policy perhaps reflects the less directive character of her administration. In breaking free

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from the political straitjacket of Taiwanization versus re-China-ization, she has eschewed ideological division and recognized the inseparability of culture from community and the cultural sphere as a domain with its own autonomous values, needs, and concerns. On the one hand, Tsai has rejuvenated Taiwanization by aligning it with Taiwan’s new values of civic participation and democratic pluri-culturalism. On the other hand, she has upheld Chinese culture as an important element in the diverse mix of Taiwanese culture. Though her cultural policy is more concerned with issues of a mature civil society and multi-party democracy than the binary choices offered throughout the post-1949 culture wars, resistance persists from both extremes – fundamentalist advocates of Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms. The PRC has vehemently opposed Tsai’s cultural policy because it sees pluri-culturalism as deliberately trying to establish Taiwan’s culture as separate from China’s. What are the prospects for the future development of Taiwanese culture and the cultural politics of a mature civil society in Taiwan? Within the new, more pluralistic and voluntarist context of Taiwan’s cultural politics, even the persistence of the General Association for Chinese Culture takes on an altogether different significance. Freed from the burden of its past association with Chiang’s re-China-ization ideology, it can be revitalized to acquire renewed legitimacy by accepting its place as just one part of the new, multi-polar cultural scene. In this vision, de-Japanization, de-China-ization, and de-Taiwanization are not primary concerns for cultural creators. There has thus been a shift from the prescriptive parameters of negative identity (on the basis of what Taiwanese are not) to an inclusive cultural identification with the plural and diverse ways that people are. The choreography of the Cloud Gate dance troupe demonstrates Taiwanese life and history by adopting Chinese ways of movement, while the rock music of The Chairman expresses Taiwanese voices and desires by incorporating Chinese religious beliefs.109 Both are unique fusions of Chinese and Western elements with Taiwanese cultural content that transcend cultural boundaries yet express Taiwanese identities. Under Minister Cheng (2016–2020), completed policy projects included: Cultural Basic Law; the Human Rights Museum; National Language Development Law; the Weiwuying Arts Center; the Ministry of Culture’s 2019 budget, which for the first time exceeded NTD 20 billion (1% of the total government budget); and the Taiwan Creative Content Agency. These projects combine five aspects: democratic governance of culture; the propagation of Taiwan as home to multi-culturalism; the contemporization of culture and its dynamics; recognition of the value of cultural innovation and creativity; and the promotion of Taiwan’s cultural brand as a means of soft power diplomacy. Although many appreciated what she achieved as Minister of Culture, Cheng did not stay on for a second term. Her successor is Lee Yung-te. Of Hakka background, Lee previously worked as a journalist who took a leading role in fighting for media 109 Shih 2018.

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freedom, including flying illegally to China, via Japan, in 1987 to provide the first on-site reporting from China by a Taiwanese journalist in 38 years, and later serving as Minister of the Hakka Affairs Council (2005–2008; 2015–2020), and vice-mayor of Kaohsiung City (2008–2014). On taking up the position, Lee acknowledged the magnitude of Cheng’s achievements as a foundation for him to carry forward her policy projects. Given his media savvy he was well-positioned to prioritize building Taiwan’s national cultural brand internationally. Within six months of his appointment, Minister Lee, wanting to set up Taiwan’s national mass-media brand and content channel along the lines of the U.K.’s BBC, had devised the “Taiwan’s International Audio-Visual Streaming Platform” project.110 Lee seemed dedicated to informing the international community of Taiwan’s experiences and achievements with respect to its democracy, freedom, thriving pluri-culturalism, and exemplary Covid-19 prevention and control measures. However, the analogy with the BBC is somewhat flawed in that “Taiwan’s BBC-to-be” is entirely reliant on government funding, and thus lacks independence from direct government intervention. This presents a dilemma as to whether or when such media outlets’ promotion and representation of Taiwan involves propaganda in conflict with espoused democratic principles of free expression and a multiplicity of voices. Thirty-three years after his pioneering trip to the PRC, Minister Lee announced that, from February 2021, CCP and People’s Liberation Army publications must apply for and obtain permission before they can be disseminated in Taiwan, “because they are not books, but CCP propaganda materials”.111 He justified this stance by invoking a law enacted 30 years earlier. In the face of a recent increase in CCP aggression, he argued that a review of that law was needed to protect Taiwan’s democracy. This raises the fraught questions of the extent to which media freedom can be undermined by brainwashing and fake news, and the extent to which “reviewing” such materials involves censorship which violates that media freedom. Tsai’s first term as president with Cheng as Minister of Culture, was relatively successful in introducing new cultural policies. How well these successes will be continued in Tsai’s second term, with Cheng Li-chun replaced by Lee Yung-te, is mostly determined by matters other than changes in personnel. COVID-19 and China’s increasingly intimidating stance, since the start of Tsai’s second term as President, are factors which may well obstruct further pluri-cultural reforms. Will the transformation of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall be seen not as “de-Chiang-Kai-shek-izing / de-China-izing” but as “re-democratizing” and valuing the human rights of the victims of authoritarian rule? Will the proposed national brand mass-media retrogress to the previous era of Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwanization and become the mouthpiece of revived Taiwanese nationalism? Will Tsai’s pluri-cultural policy 110 Chu 2020. 111 Chen 2021.

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perpetuate the value of the common heritage recognized by Taiwan’s different ethnic groups to bring about reconciliation, coexistence, and common prosperity in a shared future? The rewards are potentially great, but if such undertakings are to succeed, then it seems that there may be, if not culture wars, then squabbles within Tsai's own party. It remains to be seen to what extent her professed cultural goals – representing a boldly creative vision and an historic attempt to overcome past divisions – will be realized or compromised amid a sense of a national security crisis in reaction to the PRC’s “reChina-ization.”

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Index

1992 Consensus 2–5, 10–11, 22–24, 41, 53–61, 130–133, 153–154, 164, 172, 174, 240, 182 2–28 Incident (1947) 112, 287, 293 21st Century Taiwan’s Overall Cultural Construction 285–286, 291 “26 Measures” (PRC Taiwan Affairs Office) 143–145, 176 “31 Measures” (PRC State Council) 141–143, 176 ‘49ers see waishengren) “5+2” industrial policy 78, 99 ’92 Consensus, see 1992 Consensus Abe Shinzo 103, 208–211, 217, 228, 232–233, 256 Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area 130, 139, 153, 172, 173 Aerospace Industrial Development Corp 125 Akama Jiro 228 All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots 152 Along the River at the Qingming Festival (painting) 302–303 alternate reality games, controversy over 303 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) 19, 180 Anti-Secession Law (PRC) 154, 166; “reunification law,” contrast with 166, 177 arms sales, U.S. to Taiwan 122–125, 154, 169, 181, 187–188, 193, 254–256 ASEAN economic community (AEC) 102 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 88–89, 247

Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 183, 254 Asia Silicon Valley 77 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 89, 247 Asian financial crisis 97 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 89, 247–248 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) 41, 129, 164, 168 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 102–103, 106 Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland 147 Azar, Alex 180, 254 Azevêdo, Roberto 87 Bai Ke 288 Batto, Nathan 31 benshengren 42–45, 287, 291–293, 300 Biden, Joe and Biden administration 8, 12–14, 17, 81, 95, 102, 161, 178–186, 192, 233, 241, 255–256, 267 black-gold (corruption) 25 Blinken, Tony 181 “blue” camp 20–21, 24, 32–33, 39, 44, 46–47, 51, 214–216 Bush, George W. and Bush administration 166–167, 184, 255 Bush, Richard C. 2–3 Chang Bi-yu 289 Chang Che-duan 302 Chang, Morris 78 Chao Te-yin 302 Chen Chi-mai 52 Chen Chi-nan 293–294 Chen Shih-chung 221 Chen Shui-bian 3–4, 40, 44–47, 55–57, 119–121; 2000 election 19–20, 44,

Index 55,113; cross-Strait relations 19, 24–25, 57, 174; cultural policy 285–286, 290, 294–295; de-sinification 165; “Four Noes and One Without” 165; human rights policy 262; “one country each side” 165; referendum on UN membership 166–167, 241–242, 252; relations with Japan 215–216; relations with U.S. 164–167, 170; Taiwan independence 30, 56 Chen Wei-ting 49 Chen, York 8–9 Chen Yu-hsiu 294 Chen Yun-lin 168 Chen Yu-hsiu 294 Chen Yunlin 168 Cheng Li-chun 285, 298–300, 305–307 Chi Chia-wei 299 Chiang Ching-kuo 4, 15, 17, 43, 113, 292 Chiang, Johnny 61 Chiang Kai-shek 15, 17, 35, 112, 211–212, 286–290, 304 Chiang Kai-shek Culture Centre and Memorial Hall 292, 300, 306 Chiang Ping-kun 168 Chien Fu (Frederick Chen) 56 China Unification Promotion Party 230–2311 Chinese Communist Party: Central Committee meeting on Taiwan affairs 140–141; Leading Small Group on Taiwan Affairs 140 Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement 285, 288 Chiou Yi-jen 14, 209 Chu Li-luan, Eric 2, 20, 23–14, 34, 39, 50, 53, 162 Chung Hwa Institution for Economic Research (CIER) 87 Chuo, Eric 222 City of Sadness (film) 293 Clinton, Bill and Clinton administration 19, 163–164, 192 cold confrontation 176, 240 cold peace 155, 173, 176, 240 Cold War 182, 186; U.S.-China new cold war 185, 192; cross-Strait cold war 176, 240 Cole, J. Michael 143 colonial rule (in Taiwan, by Japan) 14, 65, 111, 114, 230, 287–288 colonial rule (in Taiwan by Kuomintang) 291–292 comfort women 218–220

313

comparative advantage 66, 72–74, 95 “constructive engagement” 185, 256 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 261 Convention on the Rights of the Child 261 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 262 coronavirus, see COVID-19 COVID-19: cross-Strait relations 10, 12, 149, 175; impact on trade and economy 7, 81; Taiwan’s handling of 84, 173, 191–192, 263; Taiwan’s access to WHO/WHA 16, 177, 183, 243–246, 254; U.S.-China relations 17, 180, 185, 254 CPTPP see Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) 4, 22, 49, 91, 162, 170 Cultural Basic Law, 2019 298 Cultural and Creative Investment Project 301–302 cybersecurity 122–124, 127 Dai Bingguo 137, 152 Database of Ordinary People’s Memory 301 De-China-zation 290, 299 defense cooperation, Japan-Taiwan 218, 225–228 defense in depth 119, 121 defense strategy / overall defense concept 118–125 deLisle, Jacques 13–14, 16–17 democracy in Taiwan 1, 37, 232, 264–265 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 1–2, 5, 9–10, 184, 239, 244, 267, 292; 2001 election 47; 2016 elections 20–25, 40; 2018, 2020 elections 33–35, 40, 54; cultural policy 284–285, 289; crossStrait policy 55–57, 130, 161–162, 173–174; governing after 2016 25–28; KMT 39–40, 46–49, 51–52, 55, 60–61; relations with Japan, 209, 214–217, 224, 230, 256 Deng Xiaoping 95, 137, 151 Descendants of the Yellow Emperor (film) 288 Diamond, Jared 296 diplomatic partners (Taiwan) 133–134, 182–183, 249–251 diplomatic truce 168, 177, 193, 249, 267

314

Index

Dreyer, June Teufel 14–15 East China Sea disputes 92, 167, 218– 219, 223–225, 257–259 East China Sea Peace Initiative 188, 259 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 2, 35–26, 42, 75, 90–91, 115, 168, 246 economic development (Taiwan) 64–70, 84–85 economic integration of Taiwan: with mainland 5, 7, 22, 35, 91; international 7–8, 64–67, 86–88 economic reforms 76–82 electronics industry, Japan-Taiwan ties 222–223 energy policy 5, 26–27, 99, 266 Environmental Protection Agency (Taiwan) 244–245 factor price equalization and economic growth (Taiwan) 64–69 February 28 Incident see 2–28 Incident Feng Shih-kuan 125 financial sector reform 78–79 “five deficiency” economy 72–73 foreign direct investment (FDI) 95–99 Forward-looking Infrastructure Construction Projects, 2017–2024: 297 Foxconn 34, 53, 81, 222 Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Japan policy, 227; U.S. policy 105, 182, 184 free trade agreements (FTA) 8, 72, 75, 79–80, 84, 89–90, 100–105; and Taiwan’s international space 248–249 Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) 88, 248–249 Fukuda Takeo 212 Fukushima disaster: aid from Taiwan 217, 229; ban on food imports from 92–93, 218, 220–222 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 66 General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) 112–113, 117 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 66 Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF) 191 global financial crisis 7, 22, 85 global supply chains 6, 83, 89, 92, 100, 102 global value chains (GVCs) 100–102 Gou, Terry see Guo, Tai-ming

gray zone conflict 189 “green” camp 3, 20–21, 30–33, 39, 46, 53, 214–216 Guo Tai-ming 34, 53 Hakka 213, 305; Hakka Affairs Council 306; Language 287–288, 295; New Hakka Movement 295 Han Kuo-yu 3–5, 34–35, 40–41, 50–54, 59–61 Hatta Yoichi 230 Hau Pei-tsun 119–120 Hau Lung-pin 50, 221 Healthy Realism 288 Hills, Carla 93 Hon Hai see Foxconn Hong Kong 2019–2020 crisis and Taiwan 1–3, 10–11, 34, 92, 147–150, 154–155, 172–174, 245 Hou Hsiao-hsien 293 Hou You-yi 61 Hsieh Chang-ting (Frank Hsieh) 209 Hu Jintao 151 Hua Chunying 209 Huawei 154 Hung Chung-chiu 115 Hung Hsiu-Chu 2, 5, 23, 39, 50, 59, 133, 162 Identity, Taiwanese or Chinese 32, 47–48, 109–115, 130, 163–165, 167, 173, 214, 284, 287, 293 indigenous defense industry 124–127, 136 information and computer technology (ICT) sector 82, 86–87 Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 86–87 Institute of Taiwan Studies (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) 137 Interchange Organization see Japan Taiwan Exchange Association International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 168, 242, 244–245 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 261–262 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 261–262 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 168, 242 International League for Human Rights 262 international organizations, Taiwan participation and membership 241–249

Index ITA II see Information Technology Agreement Itu Aba, see Taiping Island Japanese Defense Agency 214 Japan mania 213 Japanese popular culture in Taiwan 229 Japan Self-Defense Forces 209 Japan Taiwan Exchange Association 209, 213 Jaw Shaw-kong 51 Jiang Zemin 151 Kahn, Louis 299 Kano (film) 230 Kennan, George 185 Kishisda Fumio 208 Kissinger, Henry 211 Ko Wen-je 33–34, 60, 229 Kono Taro 227 Koo Chen-fu 164 Krach, Keith 154 Kuomintang (KMT) 2–3, 60–62; 2016 elections 20–25, 39–40, 162; 2018, 2020 elections 33–35, 40, 146; authoritarian rule in Taiwan 15, 27–28, 112–113, 215; cross-Strait policy 54–60, 130, 153, 176–177; cultural policy 287–291; leadership crisis 42–54; New KMT Alliance 51; relations with Japan 216–217, 220 Lai Ching-te (William Lai) 33, 151, 220 Le Moulin (film) 230 Lee Teng-hui: cross-Strait relations 10, 54–56, 75, 172; cultural policy 285–286, 290–294; defense policy 119; democratization in Taiwan 43, 113, 262, 264; KMT 40–46, 50, 54–55; relations with Japan 213–215, 224, 228; relations with U.S. 163–164; support for independence referendum 30–31; speech at Cornell University 163, 262; “state-to-state” relations 55, 164; TSU 46–47 Lee Yung-te 306 Legislative Yuan (LY) 1–4, 19, 21–23, 39, 45–47, 91, 213 Li Chenghong 55 Li Keqiang 210 Li Zhanshu 154 Liang, Kuo-shu 79 Lien Chan 4, 44–47 Lighthizer, Robert 94

315

Lin Cheng-yi 290 Liu Jieyi 137, 140, 147 “locals” see benshengren Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu) 214 Lu Shiow-yan 52 Ma Ying-jeou 1–2; 2008, 2012 elections 22–25, 57; conflict with Wang Jinpyng 23, 47–49; cross-Strait peace accord 36, 59; cross-Strait relations 32, 36, 57–59,131, 137–138,188, 192, 244, 248; cultural policy 290, 295; defense policy 115, 119; economic policy 72–73, 75, 79, 90, 98, 104; human rights policy 261–263; international space for Taiwan 239, 242, 249, 259–260; “one China, respective interpretations” 167; relations with Japan 216–218; relations with U.S. 167–171, 193, 252; Singapore meeting with Xi Jinping 24, 58, 137–138 Mainland Affairs Council 19, 57, 139–140, 172, 176, 215 mainlanders see waishengren Mandarin Language Promotion Committee 287 marriage equality 3, 29, 34 martial law period (1949–1987) 110 Mattis, James 181 middle-income trap 69 Military Day 116 military-society relations 109–118 military-president relations 116–117 Ministry of Culture 231, 296, 298, 300–306 Ministry of National Defense (MND) 121, 125 Ministry of State Security (PRC) 137 Montreal Protocol 265 Moriarty, James 29, 180 Mundell, Robert 65 Mutual non-denial 150 National Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) 125–126 national critical infrastructure protection (NCIP) 122 National Culture and Art Foundation 298 National Defense Authorization Acts (U.S.) 183, 254–255 National Development and Reform Commission (PRC) 141 National Human Rights Commission 262–263

316

Index

National Human Rights Museum 305 National Kaohsiung Center for the Arts (Weiwuying) 299 National Language Development Law 296, 299 National Museum of Pre-History 296 National Palace Museum 288, 290, 302 National Society of Taiwan Studies (PRC) 152 Nakayama Hide 233 National Unification Council 164, 166 National Unification Guidelines 54, 164 Nationwide Cultural Congress, 2017: 285, 298 “naturally independent” (tianran du) 92, 171–172 New Indigenous Communities Movement 295 New Homeland Community Construction Phase II 295 New Life Movement 289 New Party (NP) 21, 43, 46 New Power Party (NPP) 5, 21 New Southbound Policy 27, 86, 98, 106, 143, 182, 190, 302 Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) 67–70 Nikai Toshihiro 14, 233 Niou, Emerson 44 nuclear power controversy 27, 266 Numata Mikio 209 Nuvoton Technology 223 Obama, Barack and Obama administration 169, 181–182, 185–186, 189, 241, 248–249 One China (Taiwan interpretation) 22, 31, 35, 41, 56–59, 167, 172 One China Policy (U.S.) 12, 132, 151, 153, 178, 240, 253, 256 One China Policy (Japan) 210–212, 233 One China Principle (China) 1, 10, 130–132, 146, 162, 175, 240, 243–244 One Country, Two Systems 1, 3, 10, 13, 34, 137–138, 145–146, 153–155, 174 original design manufacture (ODM) 71–76 original equipment manufacturing (OEM) 6, 71–76, 99, 102 outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) see foreign direct investment

Paolino, Philip 44 peaceful development of cross-Strait relations 240 peaceful unification 132, 137, 146, 151–152, 177 Pence, Michael 183, 185, 253 Peng Ming-min 30 pension reform 3, 5, 27–29, 32, 117 People First Party (PFP) 20, 45–47, 54 People-to-people relations (TaiwanJapan) 299–231 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 9, 11, 110, 120–123, 134–136, 148; coercive measures after 2016 134–135, 177, 189; naval parade in 2018 117–118 pivot to Asia (U.S. policy) 169, 182, 185, 189 pluri-culturalism 295–304 political warfare 9, 11, 110–112, 117, 133, 189 Political Warfare Bureau (see General Political Warfare Department) Pompeo, Michael R. 148, 180, 185 pork imports see beef and pork imports preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 87 productivity, economic (Taiwan) 69 Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 8, 15–16, 88, 90, 92, 99, 103–106, 190, 221–222, 248–249 Project 2049 135 rebalance to Asia, see “pivot” to Asia Re-China-ization 285–291 Referenda 30, 93, 166, 221, 166–167, 241–242, 252, 266 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 8, 88–90, 103–104, 178, 248 regional trade agreements (RTAs) 87–88 Republic of Formosa 110–111 research and development (R&D) 75–76 Resolute Defense, Multi-Domain Deterrence 121–122, 134–136 Rigger, Shelley 2–5 ROC Constitution 10, 30, 112–113, 129–130, 153, 172–174, 285, 293, 297 ROC discourse 167 Romberg, Alan 58 Saito Masaki 217 Samuelson, Paul A. 65 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 10, 192, 242–243, 246, 254

Index Seediq Bale (film) 295 Shanahan, Patrick 181 Shih, Fang-long 17 shumin (common people) 34, 54 Siew, Vincent 139 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship 210 Six Assurances 183, 187, 254–255 Solinger, Dorothy 44 Song Zhongping 210 Soong Chu-yu, James 4, 19–21, 24, 40–41, 43–48, 228 South China Sea territorial disputes 167, 257–260; Philippines-China arbitration 188, 258–260 South China Sea Peace Initiative 188, 259 Stokes, Mark 135 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 41, 129, 164, 168 strategic ambiguity (U.S. policy) 13–14, 189 strategic clarity 189 Su Chi 56, 172 Su Tseng-chang 94 Suga Yoshihide 14, 208–209, 219, 221, 227, 232–233, 256 Sun Yat-sen 11, 111, 133, 288–289 Sunflower Movement 2, 4–5, 21–23, 36, 49, 58, 75, 91, 170–171, 285 Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Tokyo 213 Taiping Island 188, 224, 258–259 Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC) 129, 137, 140–141, 143, 174, 176–177, 240 Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act 94, 183–184, 255 Taiwan Assurance Act 184 Taiwan Creative Content Agency 301–302 Taiwan Cultural Memory Bank 301 Taiwan independence 24, 30, 54–56, 132–133, 138, 146, 174, 176, 212, 297 Taiwan-Japan Relations Association 210 Taiwan People’s Party 34 Taiwan Provincial Museum 288 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 181–182, 191, 215, 254 Taiwan Travel Act 117, 141, 183, 254–255 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company 78, 81

317

Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 21, 46–47 Taiwan Strait Crises: 1954–55 119, 186; 1995–1996 155, 163, 187, 214 Taiwanese Cultural and Artistic Renaissance 285–286 Taiwanization 285, 292–295 304–306 Tang, Audrey 232 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus 244 Three Communiqués see U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués “three links” 168 Three Noes (Bill Clinton) 164, 192 Three Noes (Ma Ying-jeou) 59, 167, 169 Tillerson, Rex 153 Tokyo-Taipei-Washington Track II dialogue 226, 229 Tong, Kurt 191 TPP see Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) 87 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 8, 93–94, 169, 190 trade war, U.S.-China 100, 195 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 8, 15–16, 88, 90. 92 169, 178, 189–190, 221, 246, 248–249 transit diplomacy / transit stops (Taiwan president in U.S.) 166, 180, 250, 254 transitional justice 3, 26–28, 61,172, 264, 300 Trump, Donald and Trump administration 12, 16, 29, 131–132, 178–185, 240, 253–255, 265 Tsai Ing-wen, China’s policy toward 31, 35–36, 133–135, 148–149, 175–178; cross-Strait policy 5, 10–11, 31, 57, 59, 130–131, 149–155, 172–175, 240; cultural policy 285–287, 291, 295–298, 305–307; defense policy 108–110, 116–118, 121–127, 135–136; domestic policies 26–29; economic policies 64, 70–72, 76–81; election loss 2012 57, 162; election victories 2106, 2020 1–3, 20–24, 34, 39, 58, 147–148, 161–162, 171, 285; foreign economic policies 85–86, 99, 104–106; four principles (peace, parity, democracy, dialogue) 150; human rights policy 261–264; inaugural address, 2016: 10, 12, 26, 129, 172, 239; inaugural address, 2020: 10, 12, 35, 153, 173, 239; international space, pursuit of 239; National Day speeches 2016–2020 131, 132, 173, 240; “new mode of cross-Strait

318

Index

relations” 132–133; relations with Japan 92–93, 208–211, 218, 232–233, 256; relations with United States 12, 29, 155–156, 161–162, 179–186, 253–256; response to Xi 19th Party Congress speech 139–140, 173; telephone call with Trump 131–132, 179–180, 240; victory speech 2020 150 Tsai Ming-liang 302 Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf 171 Tung Chen-yuan 225 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 299 Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights 299 United Front work (PRC) 133, 137, 146–147, 152–154, 215 United Microelectronics 223 United Nations “Chinese seat” 241, 243 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 257–260 Unite Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 296 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 168, 244, 265–266 United Nations Human Rights Council 261, 265 U.S.-Japan-Taiwan security alignment 216 U.S. Navy 181 U.S. policy toward Taiwan 186–192. See also Chen Shui-bian, Lee Tenghui, Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués 183, 254–255 U.S.-Taiwan Economic Partnership Agreement 84 U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue 94 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 27, 93–94

Wang Daohan 164 Wang Jin-pyng 1–2, 23, 30, 45–50, 53, 162 Wang Ping-sheng 147 Wang, Vincent 13 Wang Weixing 231 Wang Yang 140, 145–146, 149 Wang Yi 130 Wei Chi-hung 56 Wen Jiabao 166 White Terror, 1949: 287 Winkler, Edwin 284 World Health Assembly (WHA) 168, 177, 242–243 World Health Organization (WHO) 168, 175, 242–243, 256 World Trade Organization (WTO) 7, 27, 86–88, 104–105, 246–249 Wu Den-yih 50, 59 Wu Si-huai 133 Wu Yu-shan 45, 47 Xi Jinping 3, 10–12, 133, 143, 148; 19th Party Congress speech 36, 137–138, 173, 176; 40th anniversary of Message to Taiwan Compatriots 34, 36, 145–147, 176; China dream 152; Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 152; relations with Japan 210–211, 232; statement on prospect of DPP/Tsai election 176, 240 Yang Jiechi 140 Yang Mingjie 137 Yasukuni Shrine 210, 216 Yoshida Masanori 227 Ye Jianying 145 Yen Teh-fa 121 youth vote 2, 33–34, 54, 61–62, 92, 147, 162, 171 Yu Ta-wei 119 Yu Zhengsheng 139 yuanzhumin 287, 293

Vatican, Taiwan’s relations with 251 waishengren 42–50, 111–113, 287, 292–293 300

Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 111 Zhou Enlai 211 Zhou Zhihuai 137, 151–152