Swords or Ploughshares?: The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946 0397473508, 9780397473502

Citation preview

W arren F. Kimball R u tg e rs University, Newark College

T h e A m erica’s Alternatives Series 1

=

Edited by H arold M. H ym an

Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946

J. B. L ipp in co tt C o m p an y Phlladelphla/New York/San Jose/Toronto

Copyright © 1976 by J. B. Lippincott Company. All rights reserved. This book is fully protected by copyright, and, with the exception o f b rief extracts fo r review, no part o f it may be reproduced in any form , by print, photoprint, m icrofilm , or any other means, without written permission o f the publisher.

ISBN 0-397-47350-8 Library o f Congress Catalog Card Number 75-33057 Printed in the United States o f Am erica 135798642

Library o f Congress Cataloging in PubUcation Data Kim ball, Warren F. Swords or ploughshares? (The Am erica’s alternatives series) Bibliography: p. 167 1. Reconstruction (1939-1951)—Germany. 2. Germany—H istory—A llied occupation, 1945- . 3. Reconstruction (1939-1951)—Germany—Sources. 4. Germany—History—A llied occupation, 1945- —Sources. I. Title. H. T itle: The Morgenthau plan fo r defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946. D829.G3K53 940.53’ 144’0943 75-33057 ISBN 0-39747350-8

For P A U L A , TO M , and D O N N A

Contents Foreword x i Preface xiii PAR T ONE 1

Swords or Ploughshares?

1

Introduction: thoughts on Postwar Germany, 1941* 1944 3

The Alternatives 4 Poin t o f Dissension: Plans fo r the Dismemberment o f Germany 7 Roosevelt and the Department o f State 9 2

The Alternatives Take Shape: Germany from Teheran to Quebec 13

Roosevelt, the R A N K IN Plans, and the Soviet Union Conference at Teheran 15 The Unconditional Surrender Policy 1 7 The Alternative o f Unified Occupation—Rejected 20 3

13

The Morgenthau Plan: The Internationalization o f the Agrarian M yth 25

The People Behind the Plan 25 The British Position 27 Roosevelt Inclines Toward the Plan 29 Persuading the President 31 4

The Morgenthau Plan—Accepted o r Rejected?

35

Back to Quebec 35 Alternative 1 Accepted: Churchill: and Roosevelt Approve the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany 37 Campaign Against the Plan 41 Decision by Bureaucracy 44 British Reactions 47

vU

Till

CONTENTS

The Alternatives StiU Open Yalta 53

5

51

Decisions at

D esili as Deciston*Maker: H ie R ejection o f the Morgen thau Plan 57

The Morgenthau Plan and the Cold War

P A R T TW O

Documents o f the D e c isi«»

58

63

1

The Quebec Memorandum

65

2

A M eeting o f the Minds

3

The State Department on Germany, September, 1943 68

4

Roosevelt on Germany: O ctober, 1943

5

R oosevelt and the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Novem ber, 1943 72

6

The Teheran Conference

7

Roosevelt on France and Germany, February, 1944

8

American Plans fo r Occupying Germany

9

"Com bined Directive fo r M ilitary Government in Germany Prior to D efeat or Surrender’* 82

66

\

71

75 78

80

10

The State Department on Germany and the W orld Econom y 86

11

The State Department on Reparations from Germany 90

12

The British Foreign O ffice on Germany and Russia, August, 1944 92

13

“ We Have G ot to be Tough with G e rm a n y ...”

14

“ Handbook o f M ilitary Governm ent fo r Germany”

15

The Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany

16

The Morgenthau Plan: Preventing a W orld War H I

17

Convincing R oosevelt

18

Opposition to the Plan

19

Harry Hopkins on Germany, September, 1944

20

The British Foreign O ffice on Germany and Russia, September, 1944 116

95 98

101 106

109 111 115

CONTENTS

U

21

Morgenthau on • Churchill*Roosevelt Agreem ent

22

British Opposition to the Plan

23

“ The Point o f D ifferen ce. . . is One o f Means”

24

Persuading the President Against the Plan

25

The President's Response

26

A D irective fo r M ilitary Government in Germany: Com* promise Against the Plan 130

27

Opposition to the Compromise

28

Churchill and Stalin on Germany and Am erica, O ctober, 1944 135

29

British Arguments Against the Plan

30

"T h e Department o f State B elieves. . . ”

31

Morgenthau Defends the Plan

32

An American Ambassador on the Future o f Germany, February, 1945 147

33

Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt on Reparations

150

34

The Big Three at Yalta: The Private Agreem ent

153

35

The Big Three at Yalta: The Public Agreem ent

36

"T h e Germans Cannot Escape Responsibility . . . ”

157

37

The M ilitary Decision: Against Deindustrialization

160

38

The M ilitary Decision: For Reconstruction

39

"B ein g 'Hard* on Germany Does N ot Call fo r Unnecessary Destruction” 164

40

The End o f the Morgenthau Plan, March, 1946

P A R T THREE

Bibliographic Essay

119

120 122

125

128

167

134

141 143

145

155

162

166

F orew ord “ When you judge decisions, you have to judge them in the light o f what there was available to do it,'* noted Secretary o f State George C. Marshall to the Senate Com mittees on the Arm ed Services and Foreign Relations in May 1951.1 In this spirit, each volum e in the “ Am erica's Alternatives” series examines the past fo r insights which History—perhaps on ly H istory—is peculiarly fitted to o ffer. In each volum e the author seeks to learn why decision-makers in crucial public p olicy or, more rarely, private choice situations adopted a course and rejected others. Within this con text o f choices, the author may ask what influence then-existing expert opinion, administrative structures, and budgetary factors exerted in shaping decisions: What weights did constitutions or traditions have? What did men hope fo r or fear? On what inform ation did they base their decisions? Once a decision was made, how was the decision-maker able to enforce it? What attitudes prevailed toward nationality, race, region, religion, or sex, and how did these attitudes m odify results? We freely ask such questions o f the events o f our tim e. This “ Am erica's Alternatives'* volum e transfers appropriate versions o f such queries to the past. In exam ining those elements that were a part o f a crucial historical decision, the author has refrained from making judgments based upon attitudes, inform ation, or values that were not current at the tim e the decisimi was made. Instead, as much as possible he or she has explored the past in terms o f data and prejudices known to persons contem porary to the event. 1. U.S., Senate, Hearings Before the Committees on the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations o f the United States, The Military Situation in the Far Ea$t, 82d Cong., 2d sess., part 1, p. 382. Professor Ernest R. May’s “ Alternatives” volume directed me to this source and quotation.

ai

sii

foreword

Nevertheless, the follow in g reconstruction o f one o f Am erica's m ajor alternative choices speaks im plicitly and frequently, exp licitly to present concerns. In form , this volume consists o f a narrative and analytical historical essay (Part O ne), within which the author has identified by use o f headnotes (i.e., Alternative 1, etc.) the choices which he believes were actually before the decision makers with whom he is concerned. Part T w o o f this volume contains, in whole or part, the m ost appropriate source documents that illustrate the Part One Alternatives. The Part T w o Documents and Part One essay are keyed fo r convenient learning use (i.e., the references in Part One w ill direct readers to appropriate Part T w o Documents). The volum e’s Part Three offers the user further guidance in the form o f a Bibliographic Essay. Vietnam triggered many sharp debates, especially on university campuses, among students o f Am erican diplom acy's ends and means. Critics who attended particularly to the developm ent and im plem entation o f United States foreign policy since 1941, have become increasingly skeptical about the purity o f this nation's purposes and methods. One o f the pivotal points in this ongoing argument is the policy which Am erica evolved during W orld War I I toward the enemy powers, especially Nazi Germany. Consequences o f enduring impact in our lives, and o f great magnitude globally, stem from that policy. Thirty years have passed since the events Professor Kim ball describes and analyzes In this volume. But readers in the Bicentennial decade need to know accurately the paths that our past heads o f state decided to travel, and to avoid, else distortions o f history creep to o easily into considerations about future alternatives. Professor Kim ball’s scrupulous, un-shrill review o f the Morgenthau Plan, one o f the m ajor options concerning H itler's Reich available to Am erica’s policy-makers o f W orld War H , is particularly meaningful today. Harold M . Hyman R ice University

Preface Alternatives are present whenever m ajor policy decisions are made, and identifying those alternatives as the decision-makers perceived them is an enlightening process. One quickly finds that alternatives which are once rejected often reappear, slightly disguised, again and again. What seems to be a d ear decision to select one plan o f action over another is frequently m odified or even reversed at a later date. Equally confusing is the continued life o f an alternative within the enormous and labyrinthian American governmental bureaucracy, even after being publicly dismissed by presidents and cabinet officers. What appears on the surface to have been the impulsive acceptance by Churchill and Roosevelt o f the Morgenthau Plan fo r the pastoralization and reform o f Germany was actually the culmination o f an intensive and wide-ranging debate within the American government. The repudiation, a few weeks later, o f that same plan, similarly turns out to be far more com plicated than a mere response to public opinion—the interpretation given the change by most historians. Paul Hammon has argued that the bureaucrats in the War Department triumphed on the question o f postwar planning fo r Germany, while Anthony Kubek has bitterly condemned the Treasury Department bureaucracy fo r exerdsing an unconstitutional degree o f control over American foreign policy. Bruce Kuklick and Gabriel K olk o have argued the same thing, though from slightly differing perspectives, fo r the liberalcapitalists within the Department o f State. Certainly the actions o f individual leaders can be understood only within the context o f the choices presented to them, and those options are understandable only within the context o f the society and bureaucracy which spawned them. Nevertheless, Franklin D. Roosevelt made decisions (o r procrastinated such decisions) in ways which frequently frustrated the bureaucracy. In spite o f steady pressure from tbe State Department, he refused to adopt a “ get tough” policy toward the

xlv

PREFACE

Soviet Union; nor did he ever waver from his b elief that all Germans, not just the Nazis, were guilty o f aggression and crimes against humanity even though the bulk o f the State and War department staffe took the opposite position. Ultim ately, the liberal-capitalism o f the State Department won out, but not until after R oosevelt’s death. This study proceeds from my long-term research into the foreign p olicy o f President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Am erican Council o f Learned Societies, the American Philosophical Soceity, and the Research Council o f Rutgers University have provided essential and extensive assistance fo r that research, and I am m ost grateful fo r their support. Ploughing through the documents has been made more pleasurable by the invariably courteous and wise assistance o f the staffs at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the State Department Archives at the National Archives, and the Public Record O ffice in London, England (in spite o f what a more suspicious person m ight think was a British and/or United States Postal Service conspiracy to lose documents). The series editor, Harold Hyman, has been remarkably patient and perceptive. It has been a privilege to be associated with him. I must also acknowledge an intellectual debt to Gabriel K olko and Anthony Kubek; fo r it was m y reading o f their totally contradictory and disparate analyses o f the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany which initially stimulated m y interest. Those who labor out o f friendship deserve special thanks. W ith their names usually buried in a brief preface (such as this), such unselfish scholars make indispensable contributions to our craft. Charles C. Alexander o f O hio University and Herbert P. M eritt o f the Newark College o f Rutgers University read the entire manuscript and added enormously to whatever style and logic it possesses. L lo y d C. Gardner o f Rutgers College cheerfully acted as a sounding board fo r all sorts o f my hare-brained ideas, often managing to make me confront my contradictions. M y already great debt to J. Joseph Huthmacher o f the University o f Delaware is on ly increased because o f his contribution. Most o f all I thank m y w ife, Jacqueline, fo r w ithout her this would still lie buried in my notes and in my mind. Warren F. Kim ball Rutgers University, Newark College

part One Swords or Ploughshares?

1 Introduction: Thoughts on Postwar Germany, 1941-1944 On Septem ber 15, 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime M inister Winston S. Churchill, m eeting at the Historic Citadel in Quebec, Canada, initialed a memorandum which indicated their agreement on what came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany. H ie key sentence in the b rief statement seemed clear and unambiguous: This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character (see Document 1).

1/7

The six priorities fo r such a reordering o f Germany’s econom ic and s o c ia l. structure were outlined in only fou r sentences. Initially came the goal o f \ fu ll disarmament. The tw o leaders reasoned that since heavy industry could always be converted easily to arms production, on ly deindus- ; trialization could effectively prevent the rebirth o f German war-making j capabilities. N ext the note recalled the devestation visited upon Russia / and the A llies and concluded that much o f the industry in the Ruhr and the Saar could be rem oved as reparations to replace those losses. Finally, ^ the paper called fo r the governance o f the Ruhr and the Saar by a world / organization then under consideration; in other words, the dis* \ memberment o f Germany. It was against that backdrop that Churchill \ and Roosevelt saw the picture o f a Germany “ prim arily agricultural and pastoral in its character” ; it is that last phrase which envisages tw o extensive social changes in Germany, denazification and demilitarization. A “ pastoral” state, with all the overtones o f peaceful, bucolic farmers which those words bring to mind, could hardly support a m odem m ilitary establishment or provide nourishment fo r the m ilitant, aggressive nationalism long associated w ith Prussia and Germany. With remarkable conciseness, this memorandum captured the essential elements o f the debate over the postwar future o f Germany. O nly the issue o f zonal boundaries did not appear, and that was largely a function o f geography and the questions o f reparations and dismemberment. Winston Churchill dictated the actual mem o. With his characteristic econom y o f words, the prime m inister managed to join together the 8

4

INTRODUCTION

many Issues which British and American planners had treated largely as separate, unrelated issues. As is so often true o f a decision made at the very top, Churchill and Roosevelt gave no precise instructions as to the way in which their goals were to be implemented. N or did they clarify some o f the more ambiguous phrases. For exam ple, the dismantling o f industry referred specifically on ly to the Saar and Ruhr, the heart but not the whole o f German industrial facilities. Y e t the conversion o f Germany into a pastoral nation im plied the elim ination o f heavy industry from the entire nation. More im portant than such vague instructions was the context within which the policy statement appeared. Roosevelt had consistently refused to make firm decisions about postwar Germany. As a result, no single department or organization within the American governmental bureau­ cracy could take control over such planning. Instead, the tw o offices most obviously concerned—the State Department and the War Department—each developed its own program fo r its own reasons. In the face o f indecision, the Treasury Department, initially interested only because o f the problems o f occupation currency and m onetary support fo r a postwar German currency, eventually seized the initiative by offerin g a comprehensive plan which took advantage not on ly o f Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s special personal relationship w ith the president, but also capitalized on the general anti-German atmosphere which understandably permeated o fficia l Washington.

The Alternatives Even before the 1944 Quebec m eeting, four broad schemes fo r the postwar role o f Germany had appeared. A ll o f them overlapped in some o f their details, but each was philosophically different. Alternative 1: the Morgenthau Plan. Em bodied in the RooseveltChurchill memorandum signed at Quebec, this plan aimed at psycho­ logical and social reform by destroying Germany both as a state and as an industrial power. Morgenthau and his advisors argued that the only sure means o f elim inating German aggression were to demolish Germany's m ilitary and industrial capabilities and to remake the German character— with the first contributing to the success o f the second. Alternative 2 : the War Department plan. This plan, developed prim arily by various army organizations concerned with the problems o f administering the immediate postwar occupation o f Germany, dealt largely with short-term questions, though the answers often had long-term ramifications. The army remained prim arily concerned w ith elim inating civilian interference during the occupation and avoiding political or econom ic responsibilities. Occupied m ore with law and order, efficien cy, and maintaining the traditional American separation between m ilitary and political planning which had characterized wartime thinking, army planners fo r postwar Germany addressed themselves prim arily to

THE ALTERNATIVES

ft

administrative structure and organizational problems within the m ilitary chain o f command, rather than to questions o f long-term econom ic reconstruction or dismemberment. Nonetheless, the army's concern fo r efficien cy quickly translated into such proposals as that suggesting the use o f prewar and wartime German bureaucrats as administrators and the immediate conversion o f German industry to peacetime production, which went against the spirit and the letter o f the Morgenthau Plan. Even so, the War Department found an ally in Morgenthau when it opposed the prim acy o f political planning over all else. A t least initially, both saw the State Department’s plan to reconstruct German industry, / even with adequate safeguards, as a negation o f the purpose o f the war. * Although army planning gave no indication o f any desire fo r a vengeful peace, m ilitary men had no inclination to sim ply let bygones be bygones. Alternative 3: the State Department's plan. This approach represented Secretary o f State Cordell Hull's thinking as w ell as that o f m ost o f the career foreign service officers. A bulwark o f Wilsonian thought, the Department o f State roundly condemned the “ unjust” and “ punitive" aspects o f the Treaty o f Versailles fo r having prodded Germany into accepting H itler and his policy o f war to redress the injustice o f the peace. They were determined not to make that mistake again. In addition, Hull's simplistic econom ic theories were generally in accord with the sophisticated political econom y sought by the department. Hull and his advisors firm ly believed that an ecpnomicaUy_ sound and . self* supporting Germany was essnetial to the econom ic rehabilitation o f '"W estern Europe and that Am erica's prosperity depended heavily upon recovery in Europe. Hull and the State Department were not immune to the prevailing hatred fo r N azi Germany; in fact, the Secretary o f State initially supported Morgenthau's concept o f a punitive peace. But the department was more concerned with long-term issues. Convinced that world peace could com e only when econom ic crises and jealousies had been elim inated, the State Department concluded that the best way to pacify Germany was to Am ericanize it; a solution they often extended to other parts o f the world. State Department officials tended to believe that the international econom y should be restructured into a m odem version o f a mercantilist empire, although without the political responsibilities that haunted Spain and England. By eliminating trade barriers, all the various national economies could m ove in what the State Department saw as the natural direction o f interdependence. Consciously or not, this form o f free trade advocacy would favor the established industrial nations, particularly the United States. Alternative 4: com plete American Occupation. A fourth alternative fo r postwar Germany—outright occupation by Anglo-Am erican forces before the Soviet army could establish control—was im plied in a letter from Roosevelt's erstwhile advisor and personal representative, W illiam C. Bullitt. Follow ing a theme he had developed earlier, Bullitt w rote in August, 1943, o f the dilemma posed b y trying to keep the Soviet Union in the war since that would perm it Stalin to establish Moscow-dominated governments in Germany. B ullitt did

•

INTRODUCTION

not suggest any specific postwar policy fo r Germany, but his dark warnings o f Soviet expansion im plied the integration o f German industrial and m ilitary strength into some sort o f anti-Soviet system. Roosevelt had already rejected Bullitt's thesis, but the idea surfaced again once the Anglo-Am erican armies broke through German resistance follow in g the invasion at Normandy in June, 1944. Although Roosevelt remained aware o f the possibility that Germany might become communist, either all or in part, he clearly agreed with British Foreigh Secretary Anthony Eden’s argument that the wise and practical policy would be to develop a friendly and trusting relationship with the Russians, avoiding hostility in every reasonable way. Even with that p olicy, the president deemed it advisable to have British and American troops either in Germany or ready to go there quickly in the event o f a rapid collapse o f German resistance. Cooperation with the Soviets was one thing; presenting them with temptations too strong to resist was quite another. The result was an instruction from Roosevelt to make contingency plans which culminated in Operation R A N K IN , a plan fo r an immediate occupation o f Germany once Germany surrendered or collapsed. However, such a plan was a far cry from any challenge to Russia’s clear-cut political goals, and it stimulated not fear and distrust in M oscow but instead negotiations regarding postwar zones o f occupation. R A N K IN im plied a deep concern over postwar Russian policy, but did not relate to long-term plans fo r Germany. Logically, die reconciliation o f such alternative policies rested with the ch ief executive. In fact, Roosevelt refused to com m it him self until just before meeting with Churchill in October, 1944. Part o f the president’s refusal may have stemmed from his personal reluctance to make concrete decisions. R oosevelt’s persistent procrastination was partly his politician’s unwillingness to say a final no to anyone, but it also indicated his distaste fo r intensive, analytical thought about any problem . Secretary o f War Henry Stimson characterized Roosevelt's mental processes thus: His mind does not allow easily a consecutive chain o f thought but he is full o f stories and incidents and hops about in his discussions from suggestion to suggestion and it is very much like chasing a'vagrant beam o f sunshine around a vacant room.1

A more immediate and practical consideration also influenced the president’s refusal to choose between one o f the four alternative policies fo r postwar Germany. His desire to create a lasting cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, a policy Roosevelt pursued until his death, demanded that m ajor decisions on the future makeup o f the world be made only at a postwar peace conference or as a result o f face-to-face negotiations with the Russians. As Roosevelt wrote to Churchill in February, 1944: I have been worrying a good deal o f late on account o f the tendency o f all o f us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives (see Document 7).

The experience o f W oodrow Wilson clearly influenced the president’s thinking. The famous “ secret treaties’ ’—those agreements between the major European allies in World War I in which they divided up the spoils (the M iddle East, A frica, and the Pacific islands) even before they were certain o f

THE ALTERNATIVES

T

winning the w ar-had haunted Wilson when he tried to reconstitute a w orld order along m ore liberal lines. Though it is likely that the Allies in World War I would have acted similarly in dividing up the colonial world without prieur agreements, Roosevelt and most other Wilsonians never forgot the way In which Clemenceau and other negotiators at Paris fenced Wilson in with those treaties. N or were the Americans and British in a particularly favorable bargaining position in 1944. In spite o f the June invasion o f Norm andy, it was not until 1945 that A llied forces com pletely broke through German resistance. Until that tim e the Russians had the best bargaining counters. With the Soviet army on the March by 1944, what had been possible in terms o f negotiating with Stalin in 1941 or 1942 was no longer realistic. R oosevelt’s refusal in 1944 to make long-term plans fo r Germany fit neatly into his overall desire to achieve a realistic and hence lasting peace. Some o f the broad goals outlined in the Quebec memorandum initialed by Churchill and Roosevelt were agreed upon by all, even though later disputes arose over methods o f implementation. N o one argued at the time against disarmament fo r Germany; denazification and dem ilitarization o f German society have remained part o f Anglo-American-Russian policy to this day; and all agreed that some sort o f reparations would be required. Only dismember­ ment and deindustrialization (which were to be made permanent by partitioning) stimulated directly contradictory proposals.

Point o f Dissension: Plans for the Dismemberment o f Germany The dismemberment o f Germany had been the goal o f many French planners since before World War I, and the close proxim ity o f the tw o world wars le ft many others convinced that the breakup o f Germany was a sine qua non fo r peace. Although most European nations suffered from the same sort o f internal disunity that characterized the split between northern (Prussia) and southern (Bavaria) Germany, the very recentness o f German unification (the 1860s) made disunity appear that much more reasonable. Even before Roosevelt began to think about it, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin proposed, the separation o f the Rhineland and possibly Bavaria from the remainder o f Germany. During talks held between Stalin and Anthony Eden in M oscow in December, 1941, the Russians suggested that only such dismemberment could prevent future aggression from Germany. Eden expressed fear that such a punishment could cause an intensification o f German nationalism behind a m ove fo r reunification, but he did not press the issue. Such thinking had already made an appearance in the United States. Early in 1941, under Secretary o f State Sumner Welles, who often reflected R oosevelt’s thinking, suggested to the British ambassador, Lord H alifax, that dismemberment o f Germany would be the best way to m eet Russia’s demands fo r physical security. Within the State Department, however, few agreed w ith Welles. Alm ost from the start, Secretary o f State Cordell Hull and

8

INTRODUCTION

the various planning groups within the department opposed any partitioning o f Germany. Like Eden, they feared a resurgence o f German nationalism in a campaign to restore the nation’s integrity, but there is also strong evidence that long-term econom ic planning played a role in their thinking. Hull and the State Department held firm ly to their Wilsonian ideal o f a w orld at peace because o f econom ic equality and prosperity fo r all, and the division o f Germany could interfere with that developm ent. Even when Hull occasionally appeared to support the notion o f dismemberment, it was on ly because he thought it would not prevent econom ic redevelopm ent. Actually, all parties, from the beginning o f W orld War H , had agreed on a partial breakup o f Germany. Starting with the initial Eden-Stalin talks In 1941, the Western Allies never seriously opposed Soviet demands that East Prussia be ceded to either Poland or Russia, or both. M oreover, given early Soviet demands fo r a westward adjustment o f the Russo-Polish border, the British and later the Americans soon came to accept some sort o f westward shift in the Polish-German border—thus m oving the entire Polish state westward, at German expense. N or was there the slightest doubt that the Sudetenland and Austria would be separated from Germany—in spite o f the strong b elief in the 1930s that those tw o areas were econom ically and culturally part o f Germany. Alsace and Lorraine would, o f course, be “ returned” to France, and some m inor territorial adjustment along the Belgian border appeared certain. In a sense, there never existed among the Grand Alliance any rational or ideological com m itm ent to the continued existence o f Germany as a nation. In spite o f President Roosevelt's desire to avoid any long-term p olicy commitments regarding Germany, his offhand remarks indicated the d rift o f his thinking. The “ unconditional surrender” statement made at the Casablanca Conference by Churchill and R oosevelt in January, 1943, called fo r the capitulation o f Germany (as w ell as Japan and Ita ly ) w ithout any prior conditions or terms, and im plied a degree o f control over the defeated nation which would allow permanent partitioning. Roosevelt assumed an A llied occupation and told French General Henri Giraud that the desire o f Marshal Foch and General Pershing to occupy Germany follow in g W orld War I had been foolishly denied fo r political reasons. Anthony Eden’s visit to Washington in March, 1943, prom pted the first J serious Anglo-Am erican discussions regarding Germany’s future (see Docu­ ment 2). Eden accurately labeled the question o f dismemberment as the m ost im portant question about post war Germany to resolve. When Roosevelt's d ose personal advisor, Harry Hopkins, asked Eden and R oosevelt what would happen if a spontaneous anti-Prussian separatist m ovement did not spring up in Germany, both men agreed that Germany would have to be forcib ly divided and that any such dismemberment would include the creation o f a separate Prussian state. The relationship o f R oosevelt’s French and German policies became apparent when the president suggested that a disarmed Germany would obviate the need fo r the rearming o f France. Eden continued to probe and soon found disagreement among Am erican planners. In a

POINT OP DISSENSION

conversation with Hull, Eden suggested that dismemberment would be the best p olicy, but the secretary o f state refused to com m it him self. Later that same day, when Eden made similar comments to Welles, the American strongly endorsed the idea o f a permanent breakup o f Germany. Although both Eden and Welles emphasized that they were expressing personal and not o fficia l views, the British foreign secretary could see that the United States had not arrived at a fixed p olicy—in spite o f R oosevelt’s apparent firmness. Although the immediacy o f m ilitary decisions obscured questions o f postwar planning during m ost o f 1943, the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Washington in May o f that year occasioned a plea from Czech President-inE xile Eduard Benes fo r the dismemberment o f Germany. Shortly thereafter, at a luncheon attended by V ice President Henry Wallace, Secretary o f War Henry Stimson, and Under Secretary o f State Welles, Prime M inister Churchill spoke o f separating Prussia from the remainder o f Germany; since fo rty m illion Prussians were a manageable unit. He adm itted that some people wanted to divide Prussia into even smaller parts but reserved judgment on such proposals.

Roosevelt and The Department o f State Although Hull and the State Department eventually came to be the staunchest opponents o f the Morgenthau Plan, Hull's initial attitude regarding postwar Germany dearly indicates that, as in almost everything else, the establishment o f worldwide liberal (that is, Am erican-styleyconom ic policies dom inated his thinking. The on ly significant discussions concerning Germany which took place at the August, 1943, Quebec conference were between Hull and Eden. Hull specifically asked fo r Eden’s opinion on the question o f postwar German unity, and agreed with the foreign minister's comment that dismemberment was not a bad idea but that forced partition was im practical. Eden surmised that only voluntary dismemberment could succeed, and when Hull suggested that giving southern Germany access to the Adriatic Sea through Fiume and Trieste could provide the econom ic impetus fo r a separate south German state, Eden and his advisors agreed. Both Hull and Eden worked from the assumption that the Anglo-Americans would not persist in any permanent partitioning scheme and that half-way measures would only stimulate the developm ent o f an anti-American, anti-British brand o f German nationalism. Hull’s position reflected the conclusions o f tw o lengthy reports sent to the secretary o f state on the subjects o f “ Boundary Problems o f Germany” and “ Unity or Partition o f Germany.” The discussion o f new boundaries fo r pœ twar Germany clearly recommended extensive changes which, in one sense, established a precedent fo r dismemberment, even though the m emor­ andum claimed to consider boundary questions separately from the issue o f partitioning. The second m em o, prim arily the e ffo rt o f the department's Advisory Com m ittee on Postwar Policy, examined in detail the tw o basic alternatives, dismemberment or continued unity. The argument fo r partition

10

INTRODUCTION

centered on one basic goal—the elim ination o f Germany's political and econom ic ability to make war. The defenders o f German unity offered three political rationales: that effective controls and safeguards could be con­ structed which would guarantee a peaceful Germany, that German opposition to dismemberment would require a long-term com m itm ent o f occupying troops which Americans opposed, and that German nationalism would bring about a reaction against the peace settlem ent similar to that which follow ed the Treaty o f Versailles. The report also presented arguments against partitim i based on the econom ic role a united Germany could and should play in the reconstruction o f the European and w orld economies, but the specific criticisms o f dismemberment centered on the lessons o f the post-World War I period—that is, the fear that a punitive peace would only create a Frankenstein monster. Although fears o f radicalism or communism in a divided Germany were neither m entioned nor im plied in the report, such arguments cropped up soon afterwards. The report offered an alternative which corresponded to the present status o f Germany, divided as it is into eastern and western parts, but only in connection with a long series o f other possible partitioning schemes. The growing concern o f State Department career diplomats that the Soviet Union would replace Germany as the greatest threat to peace and stability in Europe provided the rationale behind a strong recommendation that United States policy aim at the reintegration o f Germany into the European and w orld community. W ritten as part o f the briefing program fo r Secretary o f State Hull prior to his trip to the M oscow Foreign Minister's Conference in October, 1943, the State Department's Com m ittee on Germany asserted that democratic government in Germany could survive only under three condi­ tions: a decent standard o f living, a peace settlement which did not seek revenge, and agreement on policy between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians. The com m ittee believed the Soviet Union had already taken steps to gain control o f Germany after the war and that the collapse o f democratic postwar government would mean communization. Clearly, the recommenda­ tions led American policy in the direction o f just what Stalin suspected—a new version o f the cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union (see Document 3). Given President Roosevelt's well-known espousal o f postwar cooperation between the great powers, it is not surprising that such hard-line views never reached the White House. Only rarely did Roosevelt openly pursue foreign or domestic policies which lacked a consensus within his circle o f close advisors—even if that consensus was coerced and largely rhetorical.2 Policy on Germany was no exception. State Department postwar planning favored a unified Germany, but not until October, 1943, as part o f Secretary Hull's briefing prior to the M oscow Foreign Minister’s Conference, did State Department representatives have an opportunity to present their case to the president. With Sumner Welles’s resignation as under secretary o f state, partition had no influential advocate within the department, and Hull and the others attem pted to persuade Roosevelt that partition would not work. The president insisted that

ROOSEVELT AND THE DEPARTMENT OP STATE

11

Germany should be divided into three states, althoutfi some sort o f econom ic cooperation should be established. Roosevelt claimed that his travels in Germany (made as a schoolboy and as assistant secretary o f the navy follow in g W orld War I ) made him an expert and le ft him convinced that partitioning Germany was the only guaranty o f peace. Although the president admitted that perhaps his memories were to o old to be valid and that possibly experience might show that partition would not work, he neverthe­ less clearly wished to try dismemberment before rejecting it (see Document 4 ). Although Huil discussed the German question during his talks With Eden and Russian Foreign Minister V.M . M olotov in M oscow, no firm decisions resulted. Neither the British nor the American governments had decided upon a firm German policy at that stage, and the absence o f the final authorities—R oosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin—added to the indecision. Hull did present a paper which outlined the American proposal fo r the treatment o f Germany im mediately after the declaration o f an armistice, but the long-term problems o f dismemberment and deindustrialization came up only in the discussions which follow ed. Eden, follow in g his previously stated ideas, proposed that they encourage voluntary separatism but expressed doubt that forcible partition would work. Hull adm itted that dismemberment com ­ manded a m ajority o f supporters within the American government but acknowledged that no decision had been reached. M olotov appeared surprised that the United States did not favor partition more strongly and noted the existence o f strong support within the Soviet government fo r breaking up Germany, but he contented him self with an endorsement o f any measures which would guarantee a peaceful Germany. They all agreed to postpone the decision by referring the question to the newly created European Advisory Commission ( E A C ), but since such major policy could be made only at the highest levels, that referral only swept the problem under the rug. Reparations, a question which became integrally connected with the future make-up o f Germany, came up only at the next to the last session. Hull, who had distributed some position papers on broad econom ic questions, proposed general guidelines fo r reparations which specifically aimed at the eventual reconstruction o f Germany, thus eliminating reparations as a tool fo r permanently pacifying that nation. The overall tone o f the M oscow Foreign Ministers Conference and particularly Stalin's promise o f eventual aid against Japan elated Roosevelt, fittin g neatly into his b elief that cooperation with the Russians was both possible and necessary. Y et the details o f the meetings apparently made little impact. The cabled reports sent during the conference were no substitute fo r personal discussions with the president. Y e t when Hull returned, Roosevelt was preoccupied with his own planned trip to m eet Churchill and Stalin at Teheran. In spite o f the fact that Roosevelt had delayed his departure in order to have an opportunity to m eet w ith Hull on the secretary's return from M oscow, their talks consisted o f a brief chat in Roosevelt's car on the way back to the capital from Washington National Airport, and a one hour

It

INTRODUCTION

and forty-five minute luncheon m eeting the follow in g day. R oosevelt, as Hull somewhat forlornly w rote in his memoirs, "was more interested in discussing the forthcom ing conferences at Cairo and at Teheran. He was looking forward to his meeting with Stalin with the enthusiasm o f a b o y , . . . A few hours later the President was on his way to these historic meetings.” 3 R oosevelt did ask Hull fo r a position paper setting forth the department’s views on the postwar treatment o f Germany, but Hull had tim e only to send a copy o f the proposal he had submitted at the M oscow Conference, and there is no indication that the president read it or even received it before leaving fo r the Cairo/Teheran Conferences. I f any report did influence R oosevelt's thinking prior to the meetings in Teheran, it was probably a summary o f the results o f the Foreign Minister’s Conference sent to him personally from the American ambassador in Russia, W. Averell Harriman. R oosevelt had always preferred personal reports from his own ambassadors rather than the carefully constructed papers sent to him from the State Department. Harriman’s cable reinforced Roosevelt's inclination to support a harsh attitude toward Germany. The ambassador noted that the Russians were even tougher on that question than Britain or Am erica, that they were willing to accept the forcible partition o f Germany in order to guarantee their security, and that they believed the Germans should not have a higher standard o f living than Russian citizens. Harriman made no personal recommendations, but the overall tone o f his message was optim istic about the possibility o f cooperation with the Soviet Union. He closed by noting that the Russian representatives had thoroughly convinced him that Soviet flirtation with a Free Germany Com m ittee, which had previously been interpreted by American officials as an attem pt to establish a communist government in postwar Germany, was m erely propaganda designed to weaken German resistance. Hence Roosevelt le ft Washington fo r his m eeting with Stalin and Churchill without hearing any real challenge to his own notion o f imposing partition, reparations in kind, and a generally tough peace on Germany. Alterna­ tive 1, soon to be the Morgenthau Plan, seemed to have the inside track.

Notes 1. Diary o f Henry L. Stimson, December 18, 1040, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn, 2, “ Consensus” politics became a perjorative during the administration o f Lyndon B. Johnson, even though there is much to recommend it. Under Johnson, who consciously imitated Roosevelt’s style, consensus all too often meant the stifling o f dissent and unquestioning adherence to the president’s position. Under Roosevelt, consensus often meant protracted bickering, bitter arguments over policies, and compromise on all sides. Only occasionally would FDR take charge and directly order an official to toe the mark. This is not to say that the Roosevelt administration was consistently open in its policy-making process, but rather that the president’s personal administrative style often resulted in frequent “ public” airing o f disputes. 8. Cordell Hull, The M em oir» o f Cordell Hull (London: Hodder lc Stoughton, 1948), voL 2, p. 1313.

2

—

______________________________

-T h e Alternatives Take Shape: Germany, from Teheran to Q uebec Roosevelt, the R A N K IN Flans, and The Soviet Union The Teheran Conference in December, 1943, between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, was the most momentous o f the wartime Big Three meetings. Although the Yalta Conference has consistently received m ore attention, the basic outline o f the Yalta agreements took clear shape during the Téhéran talks. The status o f Western relations with the Soviet Union troubled the deliberations, and m ost, if not all o f the broad policy decisions made Teheran reflected R oosevelt's growing concern fo r achieving a cooperative relationship between Russia and the Western nations follow in g the war. Evidence, in 1943, o f American fears o f Soviet postwar policy goals is sparse and ambiguous. Herbert Feis, apparently drawing upon his own experiences in the State Department or upon documents he could not cite, refers to the anxiety o f State Department officials about dividing Germany, since that would make it easier fo r Russia to extend its influence in central Europe. Even Harry Hopkins, who was far more optim istic about the future o f Soviet-American relations than most State Department personnel, pre­ dicted that, unless some sort o f understanding was worked out with Russia and Great Britain, Germany—and possibly Italy and the rest o f Europe— would turn either to communism, or anarchy. A greater indicator o f such distrust was the policies adopted by the United States fo r occupied Italy and in the event o f a sudden collapse o f German resistance—the R A N K IN plans.1 When, throughout the later summer and fall o f 1943, the Russians demanded a meaningful role in the administration o f occupied Ita ly, the United States and Great Britain hemmed, hawed, and finally perm itted the Soviet Union to participate in the A llied Control Commission. On paper that seemed to be a substantive concession, but in reality the structure o f the Control Commission prevented the Russians from actually playing a meaningful role in the governance o f Italy. Whether that explains similar Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, o r whether Roosevelt was correct in that Russia would control Eastern Europe regardless o f it

14

THE ALTERNATIVES TAKE SHAPE

Anglo-Am erican p olicy, is not im portant; what is significant is that Am erican officials consciously excluded the Russians because they feared the expansion o f Soviet influence into Italy. The R A N K IN Plans (A , B, and C ) were drawn up at the direction o f the Anglo-Am erican Combined Chiefs o f S taff (C CS)2 and dealt w ith the m ilitary action required in the event o f a partial or total collapse o f German resistance. During discussions about that possibility held on board the battleship USS Iowa enroute to the Cairo and Teheran meetings, President Roosevelt commented that “ there would defin itely be a race fo r Berlin. We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible." ( Alternative 4: see Document 5). Harry Hopkins, hardly a knee-jerk anti-Soviet advisor, echoed that sentiment by recommending that the United States be prepared to send in an airborne division on tw o hours notice. This was not a new notion fo r Roosevelt. During the Quebec Conference in 1943 Roosevelt had told the Combined Chiefs o f S taff that United Nations forces should be prepared to get to Berlin as quickly as the Russians. That d early implies a political conception behind R A N K IN , but it just as clearly shows that the president had no plan to take Berlin before the Russians could arrive. The American Joint Chiefs o f S taff obviously understood Roosevelt's intentions since they called fo r collaboration with the Russians in the event o f a need to implement R A N K IN . Although some Am erican planners may have seen the R A N K IN plans as a first step toward a policy o f confrontation with the Soviet Union (Alternative 4 ), Roosevelt did not. Such conflicting interpretations can be resolved only by inducing certain general p olicy assumptions made by Franklin Roosevelt. There is ample evidence, here and elsewhere, that he was w ell aware o f the potential threat to Am erican security and interests posed by the Soviet Union in the event o f the sort o f sudden unconditional surrender o f Germany which R A N K IN envisaged. He received increasingly strong warnings from his advisors and the State Department along just those lines. Nevertheless, the president also seems to have concluded that a Russo-American confrontation was something to be avoided at any reasonable cost. It made little sense to figh t one war in order to plant the seeds o f another, and Roosevelt based his policies on that premise. He frequently dodged the tough questions when dealing with the Russians not only because he personally disliked unpleasantness but because he was afraid o f getting the wrong answer. Although political leaders are not autom atonlike prisoners o f their history and institutions, neither can they com pletely ignore the bureaucracy which supports them. M oreover, R oosevelt was cautious by inclination (as demonstrated by his relatively conservative domestic programs, even at the height o f the Great Depression), and consistently hedged his bets. He adopted a broad policy o f cooperation w ith the Soviet Union, y et he regularly tried to cover him self in case such cooperation failed. A prime exam ple is his refusal to im plem ent a policy o f econom ic coercion against the Russians, using Lend-Lease3 and the question o f postwar reconstruction loans as b a it He may have learned something from the disastrous effects o f such econom ic pressure on Japan prior to the Pearl

ROOSEVELT, THE RANKIN ELANS, AND THE SOVIET UNION

16

Harbor attack. It is certain that he drew back from such policies during World War II, in spite o f repeated and emphatic recommendations from advisors. So it is w ith R A N K IN and Roosevelt's decisions regarding control o f occupied Italy. He had no desire to utake” Berlin in order to keep the Soviet forces out; he m erely wanted to hedge his bets and insure that American forces would be in a position to guarantee that the Russians would not m ove into a vacuum. In Italy he apparently assumed that Russian demands fo r an administrative role were largely rhetorical and that the Soviet leaders hardly expected the United States to ask them in. Since he was willing to grant the Russians dominance in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt believed he could be tougher in Italy w ithout destroying the cooperative relationship he hoped to establish.

Conference at Teheran Nothing happened at the Teheran Conference to alter substantially the vague but general A llied agreement to dismember Germany. It is difficu lt, however, to determine why the question o f Germany's future took so little o f their tim e, even though the Big Three leaders agreed that it was the most im portant postwar problem . Stalin did take the initiative early in the talks, demanding strict, long-term measures to prevent the redevelopm ent o f militarism and criticizing as ineffective Churchill's suggestion o f constant supervision over German industry. Although the Russian premier did not call fo r the elimination o f German industry, he m oved in that direction when he pointed out that peacetime production could all to o easily be converted into arms production. Joining security with punishment, Stalin remarked that he strongly disagreed with Churchill’s distinction between German leaders and the German people. Stalin argued that German prisoners he him self had interrogated invariably defended their abuses o f civilians as obedience to orders. His points were clear: obedience was no excuse fo r German atrocities, and such a cowardly people would always be easy prey to every m ilitaristic demagogue who came along. Stalin's distrust o f the German people antedated W orld War H , fo r he condemned the failure o f German workers to break out o f their obedient m entality and support revolution, citing an incident in 1907 when German workers had not climbed aboard a train going to a rally because no conductor at the railroad station would punch their tickets. Stalin insisted that Germany would, unless rigidly controlled, make a com plete recovery in fifteen or twenty years, and he labeled President Roosevelt's proposal fo r intervention by the m ajor powers (R oosevelt called them the Four Policem en) an inadequate substitute fo r an occupation o f Germany. Roosevelt quickly agreed. The president and Stalin likewise concluded that factories could all too easily be converted to m ilitary production; the Russian again pointed out that such shifts could readily be concealed from outsiders. Stalin repeated those sentiments at a form al dinner the follow ing day and coupled them with a remark to Churchill that between 50,000 and 100,000 Germans ought to be

16

THE ALTERNATIVES TAKE SHAPE

executed. Although Roosevelt quickly tried to turn the com ment into a joke hy suggesting that only 49,000 members o f the German Commanding S ta ff be liquidated, Stalin’s prior brutal treatm ent o f his opponents within the Soviet Union argues fo r his seriousness. A few days later, R oosevelt brought up his proposal fo r the dismember­ m ent o f Germany into five small states plus tw o regions under international or United Nations control: the Ruhr/Saar and the K iel Canal/Hamburg areas.4 Churchill demurred and returned to one o f the old stand-by proposals fo r the reconstruction o f Central and Eastern Europe: confederation. The prime minister agreed that Prussia should be a separate state but suggested that southern Germans be united in a general Danubien Confederation. The Russians had long realized that such confederation proposals were directed towards lim iting Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as much as towards establishing political and econom ic stability, Stalin im m ediately rejected Churchill's proposal as both artificial and dangerous, claiming the Germans might w ell gain control o f such a confederation. Roosevelt agreed with Stalin’s argument that there was little to choose between Prussians and other Germans and mused that Germany had posed less o f a threat to civilization when it consisted o f 107 provinces. Since Stalin had already acknowledged that he preferred a Germany made up o f many little states, Churchill—seeing him self outnumbered—shifted the discussion to other matters. A t that point Roosevelt noted that they still had not referred the dismemberment question to any study group, and all agreed that the European Advisory Commission should examine the problem (see Document 6). So the German question lay unresolved at the dose o f the Teheran Conference. But why? Certainly part o f the reason was that O V E R LO R D , the projected Anglo-Am erican invasion o f German-held France, dominated the political and m ilitary discussions at the meeting. That the invasion o f the Norm andy peninsula, so long delayed, was clearly Stalin’s greatest concern, and Soviet negotiators exerted great efforts to pin the Americans down to a specific date and commander and force the reluctant British form ally to endorse the invasion. Nevertheless, that does not explain the vagueness and indecisiveness o f the talks on Germany. The real reason was the distrust and political tension which existed among the governments o f the three nations. Anglo-Am erican con flict had arisen over questions o f British colonialism and Am erican econom ic expansion, and there was a vague but persistent Am erican fear that Churchill hoped permanently to entangle Am erica in European power politics, thus perm itting Britain to expand her own influence. As Lord Moran, Churchill’s personal physician and confidant, put it: To the Americans the P.M. [Prime Minister] is the villain of the piece; they are far more sceptical o f him than they are o f Stalin. Anyway, whoever is to blame, it is clear that we are going to Teheran without a common plan.5

Given R oosevelt’s earnest desire to create an atmosphere o f cooperation and trust which would live on after the war, it is little wonder that he consistently made concessions to Stalin in order to create and preserve that sense o f

CONFERENCE AT TEHERAN

17

harm ony; just as Wilson had made concessions to French Premier Clemenceau follow in g W orld War I. Conflicts between the Americans and British were more on the order o f fam ily quarrels; quarrels which could, i f necessary, be resolved almost prerem ptorily by the Americans—the breadwinner. Already faced with Stalin-Roosevelt unity in principle on the question o f a massive invasion o f occupied France instead o f Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy, the British had to p lay a third-man-out role fo r the remainder o f the conference. The issue o f Germ any was no exception. The Russians had indicated a preference fo r dis­ memberment almost from the outset o f the war, and that fit neatly with Roose­ velt’s personal inclinations as w ell as with his policy o f cooperation. Nonethe­ less, R oosevelt did not want to see British opposition to extensive partitioning o f Germany becom e a truly divisive issue among the Big Three. His recom m endation that the EAC consider the problem was obviously designed to end the discussion and avoid forcing the issue with Churchill. Stalin’s m otives are, as ever, m ore d ifficu lt to determine. His heated references to the unworthy character o f the German worker indicates that his overiding concern fo r the physical security o f Russia against German m ilitarism was not feigned. N or did he ever demand or even suggest anything resembling permanent Russian control o f any portion o f Germany, except fo r the accepted share o f East Prussia. Stalin’s uncertainty was m ore lik ely a function o f his priorities. The future o f Poland and Eastern Europe was far m ore crucial, and the Soviet position on Germany depended upon those issues. Anglo-Am erican disagreement provided Stalin with an opportunity to extend Soviet influence i f that was his policy, but it is m ore lik ely that such disagreement only le ft him confused and reluctant to make specific commitments. Still, a few things about Germany appeared settled. Even Churchill had agreed that Prussia should be separated from the rest o f Germ any, and he and Stalin reaffirm ed decisions reached at the M oscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference to put German war criminals on trial at the locations where the crimes had been com m itted. Most im portant, the three agreed not to disagree, at least fo r the tim e being. Intriguingly, the basic issue which would underlie the Morgenthau Plan—deindustrialization—had been raised by Stalin and seconded by R oosevelt, though Churchill was less enthusiastic; all nine months before the actual birth o f the Morgenthau Plan itself.

The Unconditional Surrender Policy But m erely raising issues was about as far as Franklin Roosevelt wished to go on the question o f policy fo r postwar Germany. As he put it in a letter to Churchill w ritten tw o months after the Teheran Conference: I have been worrying a good deal o f late on account o f the tendency o f all o f us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives (see Document 7).

Even so, certain basic ideas regarding Germany remained constant In R oosevelt’s thinking. During the Teheran talks, Stalin had suggested that the

IS

THE ALTERNATIVES TAKE SHAPE

A llied p olicy o f Unconditional Surrender might prolong German resistance. Although he did not pursue the subject, Churchill and the British picked up that theme a few weeks after Roosevelt had returned to the United States. The president’s reaction was unusually unequivocal. He strongly condemned “ Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the ‘Master Race.’ ” 6 The Unconditional Surrender policy, join tly agreed upon by Churchill and Roosevelt during the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943, served tw o goals: to reassure the Russians o f Anglo-Am erican intentions in the absence o f a second front in Western Europe, and to guarantee a com plete and convincing defeat o f the German m ilitary establishment. H ie first o f these goals demonstrated the general state o f tension which existed between the Russians and the Allies. From the outset o f the war, Soviet leaders had demanded the opening o f a m ajor second front in western Europe in order to take pressure o ff the Russian army. Soviet Foreign M inister M olotov visited London and Washington in M ay, 1942, with the purpose o f obtaining a firm com m itm ent to just such a front. In spite o f Churchill’s strong warnings, Roosevelt grandly promised an Anglo-Am erican invasion o f Western Europe, possibly as early as the fall o f 1941—a m ilitary im possibility. R oosevelt’s purpose in making such a com m itm ent was political, fo r it was coupled with a sweeping verbal picture o f a postwar world protected and nurtured by the “ Big Four” (Britain, China, Russia, and the United States), acting in harmony and partnership. This vision, designed to hold the wartime alliance together by convincing the Russians that the Western powers could be trusted, ultim ately degenerated into sleight o f hand and procrastination by war’s end, but Unconditional Surrender lived on. lit e second purpose behind the Unconditional Surrender p olicy sprang from the president’s interpretation o f how W orld War II began. Put in the simplest terms, which was invariably how Roosevelt put it, the war came about because o f Prussian militarism and the overall German acceptance o f H itler’s expansionist program. Hemmed in by his reading o f history, Roosevelt believed that only a total defeat and the resultant discrediting o f the German m ilitary establishment could prevent a rebirth o f the old post-World War I m yth that the German civilians (m ainly the socialists) had stabbed the army in the back in 1919, thus preventing a victory. Franklin R oosevelt’s personal distaste and disgust fo r the German m ilitary in particular and the German “ race” in general permeates his wartime letters and memoranda. When the fate o f postwar Germany came up at the Teheran m eeting, the president's initial reaciton was to suggest that the concept and even the word “ reich” should be stricken from the German language. Although this can be interpreted as opposition to German unity, it also exhibited a strongly em otional anti-German attitude. Stalin’s com ment that he saw little to choose between Prussians and other Germans received a quick second from R oosevelt, who added that such differences had disappeared since the First W orld War. The president’s later insistence that plans fo r postwar Germany include the specific outlawing o f the goose-step is an

THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER POLICY

IS

almost ludicrous extension o f his loss o f faith in the German people as a whole. Although it is possible that insistence upon Unconditional Surrender, long after it had outlived its usefulness as a form o f political glue fo r the wartim e alliance, came from Roosevelt's desire to avoid hard decisions on Germany until Am erican policy was decided upon, the most consistent m otive behind the policy was fear o f German m ilitary expansion. T o the president and many American leaders, the destruction o f the prestige o f the German m ilitary was not m erely an alternative—it was a firm decision. As tenuous and vague as the Cairo and Teheran agreements on Germany were, Roosevelt acted as if everything had been settled. Dismemberment had received Big Three support, as had the concept o f an occupation o f Germany; war criminals would be punished; and aboard the USS Iowa enroute to the talks, the president had made clear to the m ilitary his desire that the zones o f occupation roughly coincide with natural political and geographic sub­ divisions o f Germany, which could then become three to five permanently separated German states. Specific occupation policies could be developed at a later date when m ilitary questions were less pressing and in the meantime the European Advisory Commission could prepare reports and recommendations on such matters. It appeared simple and logical but did not w ork that way. I b ree problems intervened. First, the Am erican members o f the EAC did not know o f the president's insistence on the United States occupying the northwestern zone in Germany. Second, m ilitary planning fo r the invasion o f Normandy (O V E R L O R D ) had assigned the Am erican forces to the southern sector from where they were ultim ately supposed to m ove across France into southern, n ot northwestern, Germany. M oreover, the logistical build-up fo r the invasion (code named B O LE R O ) had already proceeded on the latter assumption. Third, the planning impulse within the bureaucracy was to o ingrained and strong to wait fo r Franklin Roosevelt or events to resolve the unanswered questions. N o t only did R oosevelt insist that the E AC perform strictly in an advisoiy capacity, but he also assumed that his p olicy decisions on surrender terms and zones o f occupation had reached the Am erican representative on the commission, his ambassador in Great Britain, John Winant. The president had instructed Harry Hopkins to provide the guidance Winant needed, but H opkin's ill health follow in g the Teheran Conference prevented his carrying ou t those instructions. R oosevelt’s objections to an Am erican zone o f occupation in southern Germany came in response to a British proposal, which was made in the summer o f 1943. He had agreed w ith the notion o f three separate zones o f occupation but adamantly demanded the north­ western zone fo r the United States (see Documents 5 and 8). His reasoning was, as always, impressionistic though not w ithout logic. R oosevelt had repeatedly indicated both a strong distrust o f British political m otives and a fear that the southern zone would make France the responsibility o f the United States. Since he and his then dose advisor, Adm iral W illiam Leahy, believed that France would be tom by civil war and

SO

TBS ALTERNATIVES TAKE SHAPE

would require both p ric in g and extensive econom ic aid, the president insisted that the British take the southern zone, which was contiguous to France. Throughout 1944, until they settled the dispute during the second Quebec Conference in Septem ber o f that year, Churchill and R oosevelt exchanged frequent and heated messages on the question o f assigning occupation zones. The crux o f the president’s position was that the United States could not, should not, and would not become permanently involved in spheres o f influence in France or anywhere else in Europe. R oosevelt's alm ot m edianica! application o f his Four Policem en concept meant that European questions were the responsibility o f Great Britain and the Soviet Union, fo r Am erican forces would be withdrawn from Europe within one to tw o years after the war's end (see Document 7). The most com plete and troublesome exposition o f R oosevelt's views on zones came in conjunction with the conference he held with his Joint Chiefs o f S ta ff aboard the USS Iowa, just prior to the Cairo m eeting w ith Churchill in Novem ber, 1943. A t the end o f the discussion, the president crudely sketched the zonal boundaries he wanted on a National Geographic map o f Europe. The sketch gave the northwestern zone to the United States and included Berlin, although all o f the president's earlier remarks as w ell as a later version o f the map submitted to R oosevelt indicate that he favored a join t occupation o f the German capital. Although the map and the conference notes did not reach the E AC , the British Chiefs o f S ta ff received notice o f the proposal and im m ediately set to w ork developing arguments in favor o f a British zone in the northwest. On January 1 4 ,1 9 4 4 , at the first o ffic ia l m eeting o f the E AC , those arguments surfaced.

The Alternative o f Unified Occupation—Rejected The Am erican representatives on the E AC could not respond to the British initiative and quickly found themselves even m ore embarrassed when the Russians made a similar proposal, which called fo r three zones plus a tripartite occupation o f Berlin. In essence, that elim inated one variation o f the alternatives available to the United States ( Alternative 3: see Docum ent 8). Even though Roosevelt had strongly and consistently supported dis­ memberment o f Germany, some planners within the State Department as w ell as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme A llied Commander in Europe, had considered the option o f a tripartite occupation o f all o f Germany, thus elim inating separate zones. Regardless o f the advantages o f such a plan, Anglo-Russian agreement on the western boundary o f the Soviet zone meant that R oosevelt, who favored zones as a first step toward partitioning, would have to challenge directly Stalin and Churchill; an unlikely possibility given the president's goal o f postwar cooperation w ith the Russians. Thus, qu ietly and w ithout notice, consideration o f the only alternative to zones—zones whose boundaries eventually became the lines o f divided Germany—became impossible. R oosevelt's instructions to the State Department, repeated to Winant in London fo r his guidance, accepted by im plicatim i the Soviet zone's

THE ALTERNATIVE OF UNIFIED OCCUPATION—REJECTED

21

western boundary and argued on ly about the Anglo-Am erican occupation areas (see Document 8). Churchill and Roosevelt continued to argue the question until the Quebec Conference that fall, but its resolution proved less significant than the final acceptance o f the concept o f zones o f occupation. Franklin R oosevelt’s administrative style made fo r uncertainty and com petition within the American government, and the jealousy which characterized relations between the War and State departments finds no better illustration than in planning fo r Germany. Lack o f coordination between the tw o bureaucracies resulted in a dash when the army planners forwarded a zonal boundary proposal based upon R oosevelt’s original sketch. Initially reluctant to let the EAC discuss what they considered m ilitary matters, War Department officials finally decided to make a contribution lest the E AC w ork only from State Department directives. Since the original proposal called fo r a Soviet boundary far to the east o f the one already accepted, the War Department suggestion caused some consternation and anger among the Americans on the EAC. It took a trip to Washington by Winant’s counselor in the London embassy, George F. Kennan, to work that out. Although Roosevelt reacted to the confusion w ith amusement, the inddent placed a noticeable strain on relations between the tw o departments. Tbat was only a prelude to a more acrimonious dispute; this tim e over the broad question o f postwar policy during the occupation o f Germany and Involving the Treasury Department as well. War Department planning fo r the occupation o f postwar Germany began largely as a result o f unhappy memories among senior officers in the army over the disorganized m ilitary response to the occupation o f the Philippine Islands in 1902, Veracruz, M exico, in 1914, and Germany in 1917. By 1943 Secretary o f War Henry Stimson and Arm y C hief o f S ta ff George Marshall had established a m ilitary government school and a Civil A ffairs Division within the War Department. The m ilitary administration o f occupied Italy provided a precedent and early in 1944 specific plans began to emanate from within the m ilitary bureaucracy. In spite o f the army’s insistence that it could deal only with questions o f short-term m ilitary occupation p olicy, com mon sense indicated that even contigency plans should reflect long-term thinking. Since it appeared that reparations, the need to support both the German population and the occupying forces, and the war e ffo rt against Japan necessitated continued German production, War Department planners assumed the continued operation o f the German industrial plant. M ilitary planning fo r the occupation o f Germany finally produced a join t Anglo-Am erican p olicy directive. Supplemented by other plans but never replaced, the instruction (titled “ Combined Directive fo r M ilitary Govern­ ment in Germany Prior to D efeat or Surrender” and abbreviated as CCS 551) was issued by the Com bined Chiefs o f S taff as o fficia l guidance fo r the Supreme Commander o f the A llied Expeditionary Forces in Europe (S C A E F ), General Eisenhower ( Alternative 2 : see Document 9 ). As w ith all army/War Department plans, it called fo r com plete freedom o f action fo r the m ilitary governors. Ostensibly not intended to deal w ith long-term political

SI

THS ALTERNATIVES TAKE SHAPE

questions, CCS 551 offered no barriers to increasingly strong State Department support fo r the reintegration o f Germany into the European and w orld econom y. In spite o f the seemingly innocuous and even sympathetic War Department position, State Department planners looked askance at CCS 551 and any other m ilitary plans fo r postwar Germany. The reason was s im p le bureaucratic jealousy. In late Novem ber, 1941, Secretary o f State Hull had told Stimson that affairs were in the hands o f the m ilitary fo r the duration—but that statement had an im plied corollary: once the war ended, the Department o f State would deal with foreign relations. In the eyes o f State Department officials, planning fo r postwar Germany was their bailiwick, and trespassing would not be tolerated. Highly sensitive to President R oosevelt’s frequent bypassing o f Secretary Hull and o f established bureaucratic channels within the foreign policy-m aking establishment, State Department personnel struggled with increasing vigor to assert their views. They established the Working Security Com m ittee as a means o f securing War Department approval fo r State Department plans, even though the stated goal o f the com m ittee was coordination between the tw o departments. When that failed because o f the refusal o f the Joint Chiefs o f S taff to give up their authority over occupation policies, the State Department m oved to revise its standing position on postwar Germany—the position paper given earlier to the British and the Russians during the 1943 M oscow Conference. Department instructions to Winant in London made clear that German industry should contribute to the rehabilitation o f the European econom y in the postwar period; a view point which Winant strongly endorsed. In fact, Winant went a step further and recommended that representatives o f all the European nations study the question o f econom ic policy toward Germany, since their econom ies were intertwined. Finally, during the summer o f 1944, Hull forwarded to the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Secretary o f War Stimson, and R oœ evelt tw o long memoranda outlining the department’s recommendations fo r postwar econom ic and political p olicy toward Germany. The State Department program melded traditional Am erican liberal capitalism -w hat historian Bruce Kuklick has called multilateralism—with the econom ic and social planning approach which characterized a m ajor aspect o f the New Deal (Alternative 3: see Documents 10 and 11). Although the plan endorsed security measures required to prevent a rebirth o f German militarism , it rejected the argument that long-term restrictions on German industrial capability could achieve that goal. Y e t, in what is a seeming contradiction, the State Department proposed a system whereby the German econom y would be controlled as required by world security considerations. The key to reconciling these contradictory positions is the departm ent’s ultim ate policy—the re-creation o f the w orld in the Am erican image. Convinced that the firm application o f Am erican political, econom ic, and social principles would reform the German tendency toward militarism and econom ic selfishness, State Department planners assumed that controls over the German econom y could eventually be lifted once the Germans had

THE ALTERNATIVE OF UNIFIED OCCUPATION-REJECTED

II

adopted the American econom ic system. In the meantime, the German people would be reeducated and their econom y redirected so that, in the words o f the m em o; “ German econom ic self-sufficiency fo r war must be replaced by an econom y which can be integrated into an inter-dependent w orld econom y” (see Document 10). In other words, American policy would dictate what direction the postwar German econom y would take. This was not the plan o f evil men who aimed at the exploitation o f the world fo r Am erica’s benefit. Rather, it was the logical conclusion o f people who believed firm ly that on ly the creation o f a world-wide system which com bined republican governments with American style free enterprise economics could bring about permanent peace and prosperity. These planners had no great affection fo r the Germans, as Hull’s later actions indicate, but they refused to le t wartime emotions govern their postwar planning. As the war progressed, more people argued that a harsh peace would open Germany to bolshevism, but in mid-1944 the State Department planners dreamed o f far more than just the negative goals o f containment. They were determined to seize the opportunity which had eluded their intellectual father, W oodrow Wilson. This tim e a spirit o f revenge and demands fo r a Carthaginian peace would not firustrate the creation o f a novus ordo seclorum—a new world order. Ironically, the strongest challenge to the State Department program came not from the m ilitary, which cared prim arily about immediate control and order rather than long-term policy, but from another group o f bureaucrats who also considered the peace settlem ent follow in g W orld War I a failure and who vowed to do better. Treasury Department representatives at the EAC in London had reported, as early as July 15, 1944, that Am erican and British diplomats apparently assumed that German industry should be rehabilitated and restored as a m ajor elem ent in the European econom y. On August 6, 1944, Secretary o f the Treasury Henry Morgenthau read the State Department plan and labeled it “ a nice W PA job .” 7 Within a few weeks he advanced the alternative o f the planned and calculated destruction o f German industry—the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany (Alternative 1).

Notes 1. See p. OOO fo r an explanation o f the R A N K IN plana. 2. The Combined Chiefs o f Staff was the Joint Anglo-American organization repre­ senting the British and American Military Chiefs o f Staff. 3. Lend-Lease was the major World War II foreign and m ilitary aid program established in 1941 by the United States to support its allies, particularly Britian and Russia. 4. The five states were: (1 ) a small Prussia, (2 ) Hanover and the northwest, (3 ) Saxony/ Leipzig, (4 ) Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel, and south o f the Rhine River, and (6 ) Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg. 5. Lord Moran (Sir Charles W ilson), Churchill: Taken from the Diariet o f Lord Moran; The Struggle fo r Survival, 1940-1966 (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1966), p. 142. 6. Roosevelt to Churchill, January 6, 1944, Map Room Collection, # 4 3 6 , Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

24

THE ALTERNATIVES TAKE SHAPE

7. Statement by Morgenthau to the Subcommittee to Investigate the Adm inistration o f the Internal Security A ct and Other Internal Security Laws o f the Com m ittee on Judiciary« U.S., Congress« Senate« 90th Cong.« 1st sets., August 17« 1944« in Morgenthau Diary (Germany), 2 vols. (Washington« D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ffice« 1967), voL 1. p. 414.

3 ____ T he Morgenthau Plan: The Internationali­ zation of the Agrarian Myth Morgenthau and those who supported his plan fo r the pastoralization o f Germany could not have predicted the political and econom ic ramifications o f what they proposed. Full im plem entation would have meant the neutralization o f Germany, something which would have integrally changed the structure o f the Cold War equation. Whether European econom ic prosperity depended upon German industrial recovery is both doubtful and m oot; that equation became a self-fulfilling prophecy since Am erican policy-makers ultim ately acted as i f that was the case.

H ie People Behind The Plan In reality, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. acted prim arily out o f a very deep and honest hatred fo r Germany and a sense o f moral outrage. Convinced that Naziism represented the logical conclusion o f German nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism, the Treasury Secretary fought to elim inate permanently the German state and German war-making potential. Morgenthau’s intense feelings are only partially explained by his Jewishness. In fact, given H itler's atrocities it seems more significant to ask why virtually all Americans and th eir government officials did not feel the same way. Morgenthau had displayed strong interest in Jewish refugee problems and had, with assistance from his staff, forced the American government to confront its own hypocritical policy o f extending only verbal assistance to such refugees. His com m itm ent to that issue and to his plan fo r Germany both exhibit one o f / his prim ary personal characteristics? he was a very sensitive and humane man. ^ H is career as a close friend and aide to Franklin Roosevelt is replete with exam ples o f that humaneness. Although the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany later received widespread condemnation as a design to starve the German people, that was not his intention. A gentlemen fanner who loved the land (his early work with Roosevelt had been in agriculture), Morgenthau assumed that reestablishing contact with the land would turn the Germans into good, honest, dem ocratic yeom en farmers, the Jeffersonian ideal. He, along with R oosevelt, rejected as artificial the State Department's distinction between

M

26

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

Germans and Nazis. Alw ays a believer in the agrarian m yth, he sought to elim inate the tem ptations o f an industrial society so that the German people could reform themselves. Since hard-working farmers would never starve, Morgenthau rejected the accusations that the plan called fo r the destruction o f the German people. A t one conference Morgenthau compared his concept with the general social structure in Denmark; “ where the people, through small-scale farming, were in intim ate association with the land and were peace-loving and without aggressive designs upon others.” 1 Morgenthau w ent on to claim that he envisaged a program somewhat similar to those o f the Rural Resettlem ent and Farm Security Adm inistrations during the N ew Deal. The Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany assumed that the Germans deserved harsh punishment, but its ultim ate thrust was as an extension o f the N ew Deal reform impulse. Morgenthau’s assistants, many o f whom played a key role in the developm ent o f the plan fo r Germany, reflected his views fo r a variety o f reasons. As Treasury Secretary fo r ten years, Morgenthau had naturally surrounded him self with people who tended to think as he did. M oreover, the secretary engendered intense loyalty among his subordinates and repaid the debt in kind. Some were Jewish and possibly inclined to a deep personal involvem ent regarding Germany. Some, including the controversial Harry D exter White, had become concerned over the chances o f an “ easy” peace even before Morgenthau. W hite, the most influential o f Morgenthau’s advisors, later became the target o f accusations made by various congressional investigating com m ittees. Flim sy and uncorroborated statements made by a few witnesses before those groups, inspired speculations that White had form ulated the Morgenthau Plan on orders from M oscow. That is sim ply not true. White played a m ost im portant role, but Morgenthau provided the basic inspiration. M oreover, W hite’s key role in the negotiation o f the Bretton Woods agreements regarding postwar international m onetary policies found him supporting positions which were directly opposed to Soviet policy. In the case o f the Morgenthau Plan, White stands accused by one group o f writing a plan designed to fit in with Soviet foreign p olicy, and by another o f consistently follow ing, along with Morgenthau, goals which were clearly anti-Russian. The facts do not bear out either interpretation. W hite and Morgenthau supported R oosevelt’s program o f cooperation with the Soviet Union and at times went even further than the president in that direction. Y e t both men firm ly believed in Am erica’s liberal capitalism and, particularly in the area o f monetary policy, acted to reinforce and expand that system. A s w ill be discussed later, Russian policy regarding postwar Germany took many twists and turns but only b riefly did it resemble the Morgenthau Plan. I f White had instructions to reflect Soviet policy, then he did a p oor job o f it. Morgenthau’s first contact with the State Department proposal fo r postwar Germany came when White handed him a copy while they were aboard an airplane enroute to London. Morgenthau reacted angrily, and what began as an “ inspection” trip with the ostensible purpose o f discussing

THS PEOPLE BEHIND THE FLAN

ST

currency questions in liberated France, quickly developed into a series o f conferences to discuss postwar planning fo r Germany. As soon as he arrived in England, Morgenthau tried to pin down General Eisenhower. In language reminiscent o f the War Department position papers, the Supreme A llied Commander indicated a strong b elief in treating the Germans sternly, particularly in the m atter o f discrediting their m ilitary establishment, but avoided any meaningful discussion o f long-term political questions.

The British Position The Am erican representative on the European Advisory Commission, Ambassador Winant, argued that opinion in Britain follow ed three lines o f thought, with each group’s attitude toward the Soviet Union the determining factor in its recommendations regarding Germany. Foreign Secretary Eden led those who believed that only cooperation with the Russians could bring about a peaceful postwar situation, and since the Russians demanded a harsh policy toward Germany, the British did the same. Churchill and his supporters, though more dubious about coexistence with the Soviet Union, would not oppose Roosevelt. A third faction staunchly held that communism posed a greater threat than a m ilitaristic Germany and proposed building a series o f European alliances based upon a strong Germany and a strong France. More significantly, Winant and other State Department officials then in England and R obert Sherwood, one o f R oosevelt’s speechwriters, argued that Roosevelt had not made any final decisions. The British reaction to Morgenthau's queries regarding postwar planning fo r Germany le ft the Treasury Secretary with false impression o f strong support. Eden agreed with Winant's evaluation o f Britain’s debates over postwar German p olicy but claimed that Churchill had reluctantly agreed to fo llo w the policy decisions made at Teheran. Surprised at the Americans’ seeming ignorance o f the general agreement on Germany reached at that conference Eden claimed that the British planned a stem policy toward Germany and offered to let Morgenthau read the British minutes taken at Teheran. Winant, Morgenthau, and Eden claimed that agreement on policy fo r Germany among the Big Three was more im portant than their own personal desires. The impression le ft by Eden's strong statements received reinforcem ent when Brendan Bracken, British minister o f inform ation and one o f Churchill’s closest friends, asserted that a soft peace might push the Russians in the direction o f some sort o f deal with the Germans. Bracken supported drastic dismemberment o f Germany, including the establishment o f a Rhineland republic and the transfer o f territory to France. first emphatic indication o f British concern over reparations came when Sir William Strang, the British delegate on the E AC , explained that the commission had looked at the partitioning question from an econom ic point o f view. Strang pointed out that a divided Germany could not provide reparations and that the administrative problems caused by dealing with a m ultitude o f German governments meant that Germany should remain united

SS

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

in the early occupation stages. Eden and Morgenthau responded that the p olicy, discussions at Teheran, which the foreign m inister had just shown to Morgenthau, clearly indicated that the EAC should draw up its econom ic and political plans on the assumption that Germany would be partitioned (see Document 12). According to Morgenthau’s recollections, one State Depart* ment representative, Philip M osely, argued vehem ently that a harsh peace and radical dismemberment o f Germany would force the Germans to accept the Soviet embrace. Although W hite’s notes o f that conversation do not verify this argument, later events demonstrated that the specter o f the bolshevization o f Germany dearly affected British and American thinking. The only point o f com plete agreement among Morgenthau, the State Department members o f the E AC , and the British was that clarification from Roosevelt had to com e, and quickly, because A llied armies had made remarkable progress since the Normandy landings. Anglo-Am erican forces had broken the German lines in early August and by the tim e Morgenthau returned to Washington on August 17, A llied forces were less than fo rty miles from Paris. With the possibility loom ing o f a R A N K IN situation (the collapse o f Germany m ilitary resistance), Morgenthau feared that m ilitary planning fo r the occupation would no longer await political guidance. Although Morgenthau had interpreted Eisenhower's condemnation o f the enem y as support fo r deindustrialization, the general’s true beliefs are better illustrated by a m em o he sent to his advance command post three weeks after m eeting with Morgenthau. Concerned prim arily with law and order, the message speculated that the German econom y could w ell collapse during the initial occupation period and went on to suggest that therefore the m ilitary should not assume the task o f supporting and controlling Germany. In other words, the m ilitary wanted political decisions which could either prevent such a collapse o f order or absolve it from any responsibility. Though Eisenhower made no such recomm endation, the inference was that law and order, the primary goal o f the m ilitary, could not survive an econom ic collapse. Aware that such pressures could decide the issue without further debate, Morgenthau wasted no tim e. A fte r a quick and ultim ately unsuccessful attem pt to recruit the support o f Secretary o f State Hull, Morgenthau went directly to the top. During a half-hour m eeting with R oosevelt, he summarized his discussions with Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower, and the members o f the EAC. Morgenthau began by relating Churchill's unsettling statement that England was “ broken " (see Document 13). This proved a shrewd tactic, since the president expressed real surprise and concern and eventually began to see an industrialized Germany as a continued threat to British econom ic stability. When Morgenthau explained that the State Department and the British members o f the EAC had not developed plans fo r a harsh occupation p olicy, the president’s response was crude but revealing: We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis. You either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can’t just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.

THE BRITISH POSITION

SB

When Morgenthau pointed out that the British wanted to rebuild Germany so that th ey could collect reparations, R oosevelt contemptuously dismissed the idea. Morgenthau com plained that the m ilitary had planned fo r Germany as if it were a relief and rehabilitation project by the W PA, in spite o f Eisenhower’ s apparent toughness, and when the secretary remarked that the army had tacitly agreed on an Am erican zone in southern Germany, the president simply com mented that he did not care so long as France was not left “ in his lap” (Alternative 1: see Document 13).

Roosevelt Inclines Tow ard the Plan Although R oosevelt made no com m itm ent to action during the conversa­ tion w ith Morgenthau, the im plications were dear: the German people deserved punishment, the rebuilding o f Germany’s industrial strength should not occur, the small but thorny question o f the assignment o f specific zones o f occupation no longer stood in the way o f Anglo-Am erican cooperation, the United States had no interest in reparations, and the precarious state o f the British econom y concerned the president deeply. M orgenthau’s initial action after the talk with R oosevelt was to appoint a departm ental com m ittee charged w ith putting together an extensive presen­ tation o f the treasury's proposal fo r postwar Germany. Although a few Treasury Department officials, notably R obert E. M cConnell, proposed transferring most m ajor German industries to Am erican ownership rather than razing them , Morgenthau took personal command o f the planning and directed the Com m ittee to develop plans fo r dismemberment and deindustrialization. M ajor p olicy decisions during the R oosevelt administrations came only after the inevitable bureaucratic war, and while the Treasury Department labored over what would be known as the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany the first skirmishes in that battle occurred. Morgenthau was the hands-down winner. He passed on to the president a “ Handbook o f M ilitary Government fo r G erm any” w ritten by A llied m ilitary planners in London, along with a m em o which highlighted the handbook’s emphasis upon “ the gradual rehabilitation o f peacetime industry,” the conversion o f industry from wartim e to peacetime production, a centralized German administration, and the developm ent o f plans to provide the German people with a minimum fo o d intake o f tw o thousand calories per day (Alternative 2 : see Document 1 4 ). Obviously annoyed, the president issued instructions to Stimson that the handbook be revised. Complaining that the plan seemed to call fo r the restoration o f Germany as if it were Belgium instead o f thinking in terms o f soup kitchens, the president stated that he saw no reason fo r beginning any m ajor relie f program fo r the Germans along the lines o f the W PA, CCC, or PW A .2 Forced by m ilitary events and bureaucratic pressures to choose between tw o alternative policies fo r Germany, Roosevelt tended toward the position he had vaguely supported from the outset o f the war—a harsh, punitive, and

SO

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

forcible peace imposed upon Germany. This was to be another diktat3 like the Versailles Treaty, only this tim e it would w ork by permanently elim inating Germany's ability to wage war. I f Roosevelt considered the contradiction between the com mitment required in order to impose such a peace and his repeated refusals to entangle the United States in Europe’s postwar political problems, he never put his thoughts on paper. Possibly he reconciled the tw o by assuming that the pastoralization o f Germany would obviate the need fo r any sort o f long-term political role fo r the United States in Germany—though that did not answer the question o f how Germany was to be prevented from rebuilding its industrial machine and reuniting. Like W oodrow W ilson, Roosevelt tended to hide behind internationalism in order to avoid any confrontation with the dilemma o f creating an American w orld without deep political involvem ent. Wilson escaped reality by believing that the League o f Nations would solve such problem s; R oosevelt, as evidenced by a conver­ sation with Morgenthau, envisaged him self in the role o f elder w orld statesman working with the United Nations Organization.4 The Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany, written by the Treasury Department sta ff and finally titled "Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a W orld War m ," appeared in essentially final form by September 4, 1944 (Alternative 1: see Documents 15 and 16). Divided into tw o broad sections, the plan outlined long-term policies regarding dismemberment, deindustrial/ ization, denazification, and dem ilitarization, and follow ed w ith a section on the problem o f punishing war criminals. The dem ilitarization clause called fo r not only the com plete disarming o f all Germans but the elim ination and/or destruction o f those industries essential to the developm ent o f m ilitary power. The keys to achieving that goal were the dismantling and destruction o f all industry and mines in the Ruhr, the establishment o f international administration over the Ruhr, and a prohibition against long-term o r recurrent reparations—this last provision designed to head o ff any arguments that long-term reparations required the preservation o f German industry. Although no specific reform s were m entioned in the outline, it laid the groundwork fo r social change by forbidding any educational or news dissemination activities until the appropriate teachers, textbooks, and directions were available. Fearfiil o f inadvertent action by the m ilitary which would resuscitate the German econom y in the name o f law, order, and efficien cy, the Morgenthau Plan flatly forbade the m ilitary to take any policy-m aking role in German econom ic affairs except insofar as was necessary fo r m ilitary operations, i.e., the war against Japan. R eflectin g R oosevelt’s (and the Am erican public’s) preference fo r avoiding long-term political/m ilitary commitments in Europe, the proposal called fo r the policing o f Germany by her neighbors and fo r the relatively speedy withdrawal o f American troops. Oddly out o f place amidst such broad proposals were specific prohibitions against uniforms, m ilitary bands, marching, and all aircraft—each a point specifically requested by the president and carefully inserted on Morgenthau’s instructions.

ROOSEVELT INCLINES TOWARD THE PLAN

SI

T h e war crimes section was unyieldingly harsh, though m ore logical and less hypocritical than the war crimes trials which later to ok place. “ Arch-crim inals” whose names appeared on a master list would be summarily executed upon identification, and the mandatory death penalty would apply fo r any person who caused the death o f another in violation o f the rules o f war, in reprisal fo r the actions o f others, or because o f that person's race, nationality, or political beliefe. The mere fact o f membership in the SS,s the Gestapo, o r similar N azi organizations made an individual liable fo r service in Labor Battalions engaged in reconstruction w ork outside o f Germany. H ie rhetoric o f the N ew Deal made a tentative appearance in a clause calling fo r the elim ination o f all Junker6 land holdings and their division among the peasantry, and Germans were strictly forbidden to attem pt to escape the consequences o f their sins by emigrating to other lands. Taken as a whole, the Morgenthau Plan was a design fo r a radical reconstruction o f Germany. Imbued with the b elief o f many N ew Dealers in the efficacy o f grand plans as the solution to problems, it called fo r a total change in the occupations and life-styles o f m ost Germans. The plan had tw o m ajor premises: that all the German people and not just the Nazis deserved punishment fo r their crimes against humanity, and that an entire nation could be restructured and redirected by outside agents.7 The arguments advanced by Morgenthau that Europe did not need German industry, that Britain would benefit from the elim ination o f German industrial com petition, that the Germans could feed themselves w ithout having to buy foo d from other countries, and that a hard policy toward Germany would help to maintain Soviet-Am erican cooperation, all came after the fact. Punishment and reform lay at the heart o f the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany. Convinced o f the underlying goodness o f the common people in general, Morgenthau (and R oosevelt) believed that militarism and Nazi ideology had permanently tainted three generations o f Germans. In essence, Morgenthau proposed ^ returning the Germans to their primeval agrarian origins to start all over again.

Persuading the President With the bureaucratic battle joined, Morgenthau pulled out all the stops in his efforts to get Roosevelt to decide once and fo r all on deindustrializa­ tion, as w ell as the issues o f denazification and dismemberment. Using his close personal friendship with the president to good advantage, Morgenthau m et with him repeatedly in late August and early Septem ber and enlisted the support o f Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins. A t every opportunity the secretary played upon R oosevelt's disgust fo r Naziism, his desire to see the German people punished, and his increasingly strong b elief that the elim ination o f German industry would im prove Britain’s foreign trade and help prevent her econom ic collapse. In spite o f the president's preference fo r vague discussions and generalities, Morgenthau succeeded. A t a m eeting with the cabinet com m ittee designated to discuss the German question—

32

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

Morgenthau, Stimson, Hull, and Hopkins were the members—R oosevelt fla tly and unequivocally supported a hard-line policy. Reading from a summary o f the Morgenthau Han, Roosevelt quoted the line which denied that Europe needed a strong industrial Germany (see Documents 16 and 17). A fte r com menting that most others disagreed with that statement, R oosevelt fla tly endorsed it, adding that he favored the creation o f an agricultural Germany. f The m ajor opposition to the Morgenthau Plan came from Secretary o f War / Henry Stimson. Stimson's objections, summarized in a memorandum to the ' president dated September 9 ,1 9 4 4 , challenged the very premises upon which the Morgenthau Plan rested (see Document 18). He carefully distinguished between Nazis and/or militarists as opposed to the mass o f German people who had no choice but to obey. He scoffed at the notion that any outside force could successfully transmute an industrialized, com plex society in to a peaceful, contented, pastoral land devoid o f any strong sense o f nationalism. Echoing the arguments o f John Maynard Keynes tw o decades earlier regarding the so-called Carthaginian Peace follow in g W orld War I, Stimson predicted that such harsh measures would generate resentment and war rather than peaceful acceptance. He warned that, just as had happened after W orld War I, excessive severity would engender sympathy fo r the Germans and, m oreover, that Europe did need the industrial output o f Germany in order to rebuild and maintain econom ic prosperity. Secretary H ull, ill and prim arily concerned with personal questions o f his status rather than w ith the im plem entation o f his policies, tem porarily supported Morgenthau’s econom ic proposals. Harry Hopkins, eager to become the high commissioner o f the American zone in occupied Germany, cautiously agreed w ith the president, leaving Stimson alone in his attem pt to sway R oosevelt. H ie president expressed some doubts about destroying all o f the Ruhr's vast industry. Nevertheless, only tw o days before the start o f the Quebec Conference with Churchill on Septem ber 11, R oosevelt had firm ly endorsed the creation o f an agricultural Germany. State Department officials, aware o f the president's sympathy fo r the Morgenthau Plan, prepared a memorandum fo r Hull which on the surface went a long way toward the sort o f bureaucratic concensus R oosevelt usually favored. But careful reading made it clear that the State Department had n ot compromised at all. The position that Germany's econom y should not dom inate Europe or be reconvertible to wartime production still allow ed the preservation o f its industry. A ll references to communications and education referred to the elim ination o f N azi influence, not to the com plete reform o f German society; and the m em o recommended that the questions o f partition and reparations be postponed until British and Soviet policies became dear. State Department officials, far more interested in the politico-econom ic role o f Germany vis à vis the Soviet Union and in multilateralism—the search fo r an expansion o f Am erica's system o f liberal capitalism—could never quite bring themselves, to loo k at Germany as an enemy deserving o f punishment. Som e, like George Kennan, even opposed denazification programs, since that would elim inate the people upon whom Germany had to depend fo r

J

PERSUADING THE PRESIDENT

38

leadership. Hoping that mere m ilitary defeat would convince Germany o f the fu tility o f aggression, Kennan claimed that denazification would only prom ote disharmony and that attem pts to elim inate German nationalism were foredoom ed to failure. M oreover, as Kennan later put it, “ to m y mind a sensible p olicy toward Germany was the first requirem ent o f a sound postwar p olicy w ith relation to the Soviet Union its e lf.. . .” 8 In spite o f Stimson’s b elief, stated in his memoirs, that Roosevelt had not made any decision on postwar p olicy toward Germany before arriving in Quebec, Am erican p olicy guidelines had been drawn. Stimson later insinuated that th e president’s health had affected his attitude toward Germany, but that ignores the thrust o f R oosevelt’s thinking toward the Germans since the start o f the war. F D R ’s tired and wan physical appearance and his increasingly frequent lapses o f m em ory, both symptoms which Morgenthau and Stimson noted, probably stemmed from his cardio-vascular illness, but his p oor health does not change his earlier condemnations o f German society in general. Like Morgenthau, Roosevelt rarely referred to the Nazis in his public and private remarks, preferring to encompass all Germans in his condemna­ tions o f war crimes and atrocities. That attitude, consistently held since the outbreak o f the war, shaped much o f R oosevelt’s basic policy toward Germany. In spite o f other alternatives offered at various times, he advocated a stem denazification policy which included extensive reeducation programs; he supported the dismemberment o f Germany into a number o f independent states, all presumably constitutional democracies; he demanded the full dem ilitarization o f Germany, both physi­ cally and socially and never seriously considered the arguments that Germany should serve as a buffer against the Soviet Union; and, after a short but intensive straggle within the bureaucracy, he firm ly sided with Morgenthau’s proposals fo r the com plete deindustrialization o f Germany. Like White and others in the Treasury Department, Roosevelt appeared dubious about trying to destroy totally the Ruhr industrial com plex, but he clearly approved o f the overarching goal o f the Morgenthau Plan—the reordering o f German society through increased, i f not total, pastoralization. The Quebec Conference offered an opportunity to wrap up the package. Although the British did not know it, R oosevelt had already indicated a willingness to accept the southern zone in Germany, which was the only loose end le ft regarding the zonal boundaries worked out by the EAC. Reparations, another problem which had been postponed because the EAC found itself unable to obtain firm p olicy guidelines from any o f the three powers, were lim ited and defined by the Morgenthau Plan to immediate short-term payments based on dismantled industry. Long-term reparations would have required rehabilitation o f the industrial plant and hence were forbidden. N o one denied the legitim ate claims o f the Russians to substantial aid in order to rebuild their country, but such needs seemed likely to be satisfied more by an extension o f Am erican credits rather than by reparations. Thus, as Roosevelt le ft to m eet Prime M inister Churchill in Quebec C ity, he could assume that the question o f postwar Germany no longer posed any

34

THS lfORGENTHAU PLAN

great problem . He had reached a policy decision at hom e, an apparently workable plan existed, the Soviet Union had long favored a harsh peace, and Morgenthau's report o f his talks with British Foreign Minister Eden indicated general British support fo r a program aimed at reform ing as well as punishing the Germans. It was a classic example o f the Roosevelt style: a vague consensus achieved by virtually ignoring arguments which did not appeal to him—but he retained full freedom o f action to shift as he chose, since no form al policy statement y et existed.

Notes 1« Morgenthau, Memo o f a Conference at Red Rice, Andover, England, August 16, 1944, Harry Dexter White Papers, Box 7, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. 2. The Works Progress Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps, and Public Works Administration—all New Deal programs to provide relief during the Depression. 3. A d olf H itler labeled the Versailles Treaty a diktat; meaning a harsh, imposed settlement into which the Germans had no input. 4. Presidential Diary, Aug. 26, 1944, p. 1391, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N .Y. 6. The SS were the Storm Troopers—the Nazi elite politico-m ilitary force. 6. The Junkers were the Prussian land-owning nobility which resided primarily in East Prussia, now part o f Poland and the USSR, and Brandenburg /Prussia, now part o f East Germany. 7. The notion o f restructuring also characterized General Douglas Mac Arthur’s administration o f Japan after World War II, though in that case the changes were lim ited largely to the overt political structure, not the economy or society. His attempt to break up the large industrial oligopolies (zaibatzu) proved short-lived. 8. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: L ittle, Brown, & Co., 1967), p. 176.

4 The Morgenthau Plan: Accepted or Rejected? Back to Quebec British leaden approached the second Quebec Conference, code named O C TAG O N , with forebodings. With the war against Germany going w ell, pw tw ar questions became more pressing, fo r the nature o f American answers to British queries would play a m ajor role in determining Britain’s political and econom ic future. Because o f their general agreement on m ilitary strategy and R oosevelt’s policy o f avoiding postwar decisions, the Americans had stalled in arranging the meeting, but Churchill understood that postwar problems could no longer wait. As ever, the key postwar question was m oney, though it was raised largely in the form o f a request fo r an extension o f Lend-Lease, the vast American foreign aid program during the war. The problem o f Germany, more urgent than ever because o f A llied m ilitary advances, also demanded attention, and the British expected to discuss it during the talks. Even though no intrinsic relationship existed between American econom ic assistance to Britain and p olicy regarding postwar Germany, events indicate that during the Quebec Conference the resolution o f one affected the resolution o f the other. Both Roosevelt and Churchill fe lt deep concern over the econom ic plight o f Great Britain and hoped to prevent that nation’s collapse. Morgenthau, more concerned about the German question but still o fficia lly the president’s advisor on postwar financial conditions in England, had seen the possibilities o f connecting the destruction o f German industry to the expansion o f British industrial export markets and had regularly suggested that possibility to Roosevelt. British Foreign O ffice predictions o f the thrust o f the upcoming Quebec Conference picked up that new equation once they received reports o f the Morgenthau Plan. The British ambassador in Washington, Lord H alifax, inform ed his government o f the new proposal fo r Germany as w ell as o f the arguments presented pro and con within the American bureaucracy. Conversations with various American officials, among them Assistant Secre­ tary o f War John M cCloy and presidential advisor Hopkins, brought out the idea that the deindustrialization o f Germany could mean the reindustrial­ ization o f Britain. British diplomats remained dubious. One commented that the Americans “ may be toying with the idea o f supporting our econom y at the expense o f Germany’s” and that “ if they intend to put forward proposals o f this kind we may have some exceedingly embarrassing moments with the

as

M

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

European Allies,” and others in the Foreign O ffice suspected the Americans o f trying to find a way out o f the dom estic political dilemma which any postwar aid-to-Britain program would inevitably stir up.1 Even so, th ey warned Churchill and his advisors to be prepared to discuss such issues at the Quebec Conference even if Hopkins claimed that postwar Lend-Lease aid would not com e up fo r form al discussion. H alifax’s reports also noted a lessening o f support fo r a partition o f Germany beyond detaching East Prussia and the restoring o f AlsaceLorraine to France (see Document 19). American reasoning, as related by Hopkins was that such partitioning would require prolonged occupation with a number o f bad side effects, particularly to o much fraternization. As someone noted on the cover o f one draft o f the Morgenthau Plan, “ Every German girl who gets married means an American girl who does not.’ " Although Hopkins claimed to speak only fo r him self, he tended to believe that the A llies could best achieve security against Germany, while avoiding long-term occupation, through econom ic measures. Whether that required internationalization o f the Ruhr, removal o f German industry to Britain and Belgium, or some other steps remained unsettled; the point was that Churchill had best be prepared to discuss the issue during his upcoming talks with Roosevelt. Internal position papers prepared by various British Foreign O ffice officials indicated a consensus against dismemberment and in favor o f the decentralization o f Germany. Foreign Secretary Eden minuted his agreement to that concept, but suggested that the internationalization o f the Ruhr and Rhineland could provide the best protection against German aggression. Like the French, Eden saw international sanctions against Germany as the only way to involve the United States permanently in the preservation o f European security. The question o f Russia invariably cropped up in British internal p olicy discussions. Prophetically, dismemberment appeared to the British Chiefs o f Statt3 as the best guarantee against a Russo-German coalition and even offered the possibility o f bringing southern Germany into some sort o f entente w ith western Europe. But British Foreign O ffice officials remained uncertain o f Soviet intentions regarding Germany (see Document 20). Fearing that support fo r a united Germany might ignite Russian fears o f just such an anti-Soviet bloc, Eden and others flatly opposed such arguments as destructive o f existing “ high p o lic y ," namely the preservation o f the wartime alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union. I f Britain’s p olicy toward Germany ever became a function o f Cold War tension, such was not the case in the Fall o f 1944. Although Eden and the British Foreign O ffice obviously knew o f the Morgenthau Plan about ten days before the Quebec Conference convened on September 11, 1944, Churchill apparently did not. Memoranda about the problem o f postwar Germany uncharacteristically do not have any Churchill minutes attached, and one long paper intended fo r extensive circulation within the War Cabinet before the Quebec m eeting seems to have gotten lost in the bureaucracy until later in September. Whatever the reason, when the

BACK TO QUEBEC

87

Morgenthau Plan came up during the talks, Churchill did not respond with the arguments favored by the Foreign O ffice. Unlike Morgenthau and even Roosevelt, the prime minister had no positive proposal to make. TTie initiative lay with the Americans. A t the outset o f the Quebec talks, a number o f issues relating to Germany lay awaiting join t policy decisions. One appealing aspect o f the Morgenthau Plan was that it offered or at least indicated solutions to all o f those hang-fire problems. H ie com plete deindustrialization o f Germany provided physical security against future German aggression by elim inating that nation's military capabilities. Both deindustrialization and denazification presaged an overall reform o f German society and culture—a reform which would eventually perm it Germany to reenter the com munity o f nations. Dismember* ment, made easier and econom ically feasible after deindustrialization, would further inhibit any redevelopm ent o f German power or ultranationalism. The French and the Russians would receive some sort o f territorial compensation and short-term reparations in kind would m eet the immediate reconstruction needs o f the Allies. With the quick and long-term elim ination o f any German threat, the need fo r a prolonged occupation dissipated, thus perm itting the United States to accept the southern zone without fear o f becoming entangled in any sort o f guardianship over France. In the context o f grand strategy, Roosevelt believed that the Russians preferred a drastic program fo r Germany; hence the Morgenthau Plan fit his overall hopes o f postwar cooperation. N o one presented real alternative policies fo r Roosevelt to choose from a t Quebec. Churchill's response was negative and offered no alternatives, and the prime minister him self squelched Eden's attempts to enter th e discussions. Roosevelt did not bring Secretary o f State Hull or any oth er im portant State Department officia l to the conference, giving Morgenthau a dear field to influence policy. Although the American m ilitary leaders attended, only Adm iral William Leahy, the president’s m ilitary advisor, regularly discussed nonm ilitary matters, and even he was not present at the im portant discussion regarding Germany. M oreover, m ilitary interest centered on the question o f assignment o f occupation zones, and on the second day o f the O C TAG O N Conference the Com bined Chiefs o f S taff requested that the tw o heads o f state resolve the question and issue some sort o f guidance.

Alternative 1 Accepted: Churchill and Roosevelt Approve the Morgenthau Plan for Germany On September 19, 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt initialed the memor­ andum which called fo r the conversion o f Germany into a nation essentially pastoral and agricultural in nature (Alternative 1: see Document 1). Ib is came about as the result o f intensive discussions during the Quebec Conference. In those discussions, the full meaning and purposes o f the Churchill-Roosevelt decision were made clear.

38

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

On the second day o f the conference, after he had hinted to Churchill about the econom ic benefits which would accrue to Great Britain follow in g the destruction o f Germany’s industry, Roosevelt cabled Morgenthau to com e im m ediately to Quebec, prim arily, as he later told Churchill, to discuss Germany. The next afternoon, September 13, the president told Morgenthau that Churchill had appeared excited about British dom ination o f Europe’s steel industry. He suggested that the Treasury Secretary talk to Churchill's close personal advisor, Lord Cherwell (the British paymaster-general). Roosevelt interpreted Churchill's remarks as favoring the sort o f harsh peace proposed by Morgenthau, and believed that the prime minister intended to be tough. That prediction contradicted the impressions Morgenthau had gleaned during his trip to England, a few weeks earlier, and at dinner that evening the secretary's previous inform ation seemed vindicated. When, at Roosevelt and Cherwell's suggestion, Morgenthau outlined his plan fo r Germany, Churchill responded with annoyance and contem pt. Claiming he did not want to chain him self to a dead German, the prime minister labeled the entire plan as “ unnatural, unchristian and unnecessary."4 Morgenthau denied that his program would starve the Germans, but Churchill remained dubious. M oreover, in spite o f his earlier interest, he dismissed as insignificant the benefits which the destruction o f German industry would provide fo r Britain. Perhaps the prime minister was playing devil's advocate, but whatever his m otives, his reception to the plan gave Morgenthau a sleepless night. Morgenthau's most effective ally was Lord Cherwell. A scientist and long-tim e supporter o f Churchill, “ the P ro f." (as Churchill called him ) could invariably gain the prime minister's attention. Adept at boiling scientific and statistical problems down to essentials, Cherwell put those talents to work in analyzing the Morgenthau Plan. Keenly aware o f Churchill's overpowering worries about Britain’s postwar econom ic situation, Cherwell claimed that the American proposal offered Britain a chance to stay out o f bankruptcy by elim inating German com petition. In addition, why should not Germany instead o f Britain assume the burden o f postwar suffering? Churchill may have been toying with the old notion o f Germany as a barrier between Soviet Russia and the English Channel, but he obviously had not y et decided to break so sharply with the postwar cooperation policy advocated by Roosevelt and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. Given Morgenthau’s claim that his plan had the support o f Secretary o f State Hull, and obviously unaware o f the Foreign O ffice correspondence which indicated a sharp disagreement within the American government on the German question, Churchill had little reason to stand alone in favor o f what seemed in comparison a “ s o ft" policy toward Germany. There were other, more im portant questions which awaited decisions, particularly agreement on American financial aid to Britain. There was no sense in antagonizing Roosevelt on an issue which he apparently had decided. Whether those thoughts consciously occurred to Churchill is not known, but throughout the war the prime minister had usually follow ed a p olicy o f carefully selecting only the most im portant issues when he decided

ALTERNATIVE 1 ACCEPTED

St

to disagree openly with Roosevelt. Aware o f Am erica's overwhelming power and traditional go-it-alone tendencies, Churchill avoided direct confrontations when he could. His anger over disagreements concerning m ilitary action in the Mediterranean, fo r exam ple, related to Britain’s postwar strategic position; harsh treatm ent o f the Germans hardly seemed o f comparable magnitude. Given Lord Cherwell’s assurances o f the Morgenthau Flan's practicality, Churchill had no real argument against the proposal. B y the day after Churchill’s first exposure to the Morgenthau Plan, the prim e minister had made a one-hundred-eighty degree change in his position. Historians have tended to interpret that change as related to Churchill’s desire to obtain an agreement on postwar Lend-Lease aid to Britain. That is possible although there is no indication in any o f the extant records or memoirs o f such a direct connection. Morgenthau later denied that such was the case, although Churchill did hint at it in his memoirs. I f true, then there is some irony in the relationship, fo r the strongest practical argument fo r the Morgenthau Flan as far as Roosevelt was concerned was that it would aid Britain. Although the Treasury Department proposal solved many other problem s, R oosevelt’s concern about Britain’s possible econom ic collapse dearly provided Morgenthau with his major weapon against counterproposals from the State and War departments. Just as in 1940 and 1941, once convinced o f Britain’s real need, Roosevelt became determined to provide the necessary econom ic assistance. In fact, Morgenthau later claimed that, had it not been fo r his interference, Roosevelt would have made a more extensive com m itm ent to almost unconditional postwar Lend-Lease, in spite o f extensive State Department plans to use such promised aid as a lever against various restrictive British econom ic practices. It seems likely that at Quebec, Roosevelt would have supported postwar aid to Britain regardless o f Churchill’s position on the Morgenthau Plan. I f Churchill assumed that Roosevelt had elevated the Morgenthau Flan to the level o f vital policy, then the irony deepens. Roosevelt had opted fo r the plan, but only verbally and at least partly because Morgenthau had told him that Eden and Hull also favored such harsh treatment o f Germany. In his memoirs, Churchill casually dismissed his acceptance o f the Morgenthau Plan as something done in haste! His physician and occasional confidant, Lord Moran, thought otherwise. Claiming that Churchill refused to admit his mistake, Moran believed that Cherwell convinced the prime minister that the Morgenthau Plan should receive Britain’s support. Whatever the reasons, on September 14 Churchill not only endorsed the plan but complained that Cherwell’s presentation, carefully toned down in order to gain the prime minister's approval, was too soft on Germany. When Cherwell met with Morgenthau to discuss a draft memorandum o f the previous day’s consensus on Germany, the secretary expressed similar dissatisfaction with the relatively gentle tone. N oting that the prime minister had mused about changing Germany into a nineteenth-century agricultural nation, Morgenthau suggested that they again discuss the proposal and then rewrite the o fficia l memorandum.

40

THE MORGENTHAU ELAN

Their m eeting that afternoon included R oosevelt, Churchill, Morgenthau, Cherwell, and Eden, who had just arrived from London. A fte r signing the join t memorandum which provided fo r the continuance o f Lend-Lease to Britain after the defeat o f Germany and until the end o f the war against Japan, Churchill asked fo r Cherwell’s draft memo on planning fo r Germany. When Morgenthau explained that the Cherwell memorandum made to o weak a case, Churchill eventually ended up dictating one o f his ow n, using as a rough draft an outline which Morgenthau had prepared (Alternative 1: see Document 21). Roosevelt's on ly contribution, other than an occasional wisecrack, was the insertion o f the phrase “ in G erm any" follow in g the m ention o f those industries which could be easily converted from peacetim e to wartim e production. Taken in conjunction with the closing statement which referred to the pastoralization o f Germany, that phrase indicated that the memorandum concerned all Germany, not just the Saar and Ruhr industrial areas (see Document 1). A comparison o f Morgenthau’s draft and the m em o as dictated by Churchill demonstrates that, once converted to the Morgenthau Plan, the prime minister seemed w illing to pull out all the stops. As Morgenthau later pointed out, the word “ pastoral" came from Churchill, not the Treasury Department. The only objections came, to Morgenthau’s surprise, from Anthony Eden. Though Eden did not advocate the creation o f a German buffer state against Russia, as some British officials did, he also believed that the Allies would never have the perseverance actually to make the Morgenthau Plan work. Unlike R oosevelt, who saw the plan as an easy, workable solution which would perm it a relatively quick American withdrawal from Europe, Eden never swayed from his conviction that the destruction o f German industry and the internationalization o f the industrial areas would demand an even greater com m itm ent. Morgenthau, unused to the careful phrasing used by diplom ats who hope to avoid giving offense, never noticed that Eden had always qu alified his vague comments about Morgenthau’s overall proposals. Churchill, obviously annoyed and embarrassed by Eden’s objections, instructed the foreign minister not to bring up the subject with the War Cabinet. Rejecting Eden’s daim that the Morgenthau Plan went against a number o f statements and plans already made, the prime minister used Cherwell’s argument; everything boiled down to a question o f who would get the export trade and, given the choice between the German and the English people, the decision was obvious. A cable from the British War Cabinet, initiated by Eden, arrived on the follow in g day. It echoed Eden’s objections and presaged future British p olicy, but it came to o late to prevent Churchill’s approval o f the memorandum (see Document 22). Ironically, Churchill’s decision was more o f a snap judgment than that o f the supposedly haphazard and impulsive Roosevelt. Convinced by Cherwell and happy to take a harsh line with Britain’s enem y, Churchill made a potentially momentous decision with little or no reflection. R oosevelt had, at least, considered various elements underlying the Morgenthau Plan fo r much o f the war. Although the ink was scarcely dry on the actual docum ent, the

ALTERNATIVI 1 ACCEPTED

41

notions o f deindustrialization, denazification, and dismemberment had long been in his mind. Similar proposals had appeared in England, offered by Lord Vansittart and others, but Churchill apparently never gave them any thought. N o t surprisingly, agreement on the nagging problem o f occupation zones quickly follow ed . That same afternoon, R oosevelt agreed to take the southern zone o f Germany in return fo r Am erican lines o f communication which did not pass through France; a com m itm ent which eventually translated into Am erican control o f tw o German ports cm the North Sea, Bremen and Bremerhaven. Roosevelt later told Morgenthau that he had purposefully delayed on that issue until he found Churchill in a good humeur follow in g settlem ent o f all the other issues, but there was m ore to R oosevelt’s decision than mere tactics. Although he had indicated even before the Quebec talks that the zonal question did not pose any real problems, the Morgenthau Plan prom ised a speedy way out o f Europe and, more to the point, out o f any involvem ent in the chaos and revolution which threatened to engulf France. Possibly even more im portant, such zonal assignments meant that the British had to occupy and carry out the Morgenthau Plan in the tw o most industrialized areas—the Ruhr and the Saar. British willingness to deal with the problem o f occupying Austria also may have made the southern zone m ore palatable to Roosevelt.

Campaign Against the Plan A t the very m oment o f Morgenthau's triumph, his opponents in Washington were planning the defeat o f the Treasury Department's plan. A t the instigation o f James F. Byrnes, R oosevelt’s advisor and general trouble­ shooter, New York Times columnist Arthur Krock telephoned Secretary o f State Hull to inform him that Morgenthau had rushed o ff to Quebec—to a conference where only m ilitary and econom ic questions appeared on the preconference agenda. Obviously the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany would be discussed. Stimson, fearing such discussions, had talked w ith British Ambassador Lord H alifax and suggested that Churchill and R oosevelt be advised to refer any questions regarding the control o f Germany's postwar econom y to a small ad hoc com m ittee. The advice was sent to Churchill at Quebec, but obviously had little impact. Shortly after he and Churchill had initialed the m em o on postwar Germany, R oosevelt cabled Secretary Hull the tex t o f the agreement. The president’s transmittal remarks indicated that he assumed Hull would approve, but he failed to consider Hull’s long-standing pique over Morgenthau’s influence in what the secretary o f state considered his province. In spite o f previous promises, Roosevelt had once again made foreign p olicy without consulting Hull or other State Department spokesmen, and the secretary’s anger rose. Even though he had already given virtual command o f the departm ent to his eventual successor, Edward Stettinius, Hull decided to fight the issue. Though it is hard to say whether the substance or the behind-the-back approval o f the Morgenthau Plan most concerned him , Hull

41

TBS MORGENTHAU FLAN

reversed his earlier tacit approval and came out strongly against the program. The strongest and eventually most effective opposition to the M oigenthau Ran came from Secretary o f War Henry Stimson. Even though the Quebec memorandum included only a small portion o f the full Morgenthau n a n , Stimson realized that the broad philosophy had received approval and that im plem entation would follow . The main reason fo r the success o f Stimson and his assistant secretary, John M cCloy, who took control o f the German debate from his old and weary boss, was that the War Department accepted m ajor portions o f the Morgenthau nan, in both spirit and fact. Stimson’s most eloquent critique o f the Morgenthau nan challenged only the pastoralization program—nothing else. Granted, the Treasury Department saw that aspect o f the plan as integral to the hoped fo r reform s, but the dom estic N ew Deal had never actually adopted long-term reform o f such a nature, planned and im plem ented by government, and no one even suggested that such arguments would carry any weight with the president. Although Stimson seemingly endorsed Hull's overall econom ic program when he labeled the elim ination o f German com petition in order to benefit Great Britian as the “ shortsighted cupidity o f the victors and the negation o f all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933,” his real argument was that forcing such a revolutionary change on the German people violated fundamental rights— freedom and the pursuit o f happiness (Alternative 2: see Document 23). H ie concern o f generals Marshall and Eisenhower fo r law, order, and efficien t m ilitary government meant that the War Department also opposed some o f the harsher political measures espoused by Morgenthau. Still, both depart­ ments agreed on punishment fo r war criminals, the elim ination o f heavy industry related to war-making capabilities, total and com plete dem ilitari­ zation, extrem ely lim ited and short-term reparations, the break up o f the Junker estates, and the partitioning o f Germany—including the international­ ization o f the Saar and the Ruhr—once m ilitary occupation ended. Treasury officials were w ell aware that any delay in such things as partitioning only made them more d ifficu lt and hence less likely, but there is no indication that such delays were part o f some sort o f crafty plan on the part o f the War D epartm ent Stimson's sense o f moral outrage appears quite geniune, and the War Department had always avoided involvem ent in long-term planning fo r Germany. Roosevelt's endorsement o f the Morgenthau Plan flow ed from many factors, among them his very em otional dislike o f the Germans and his b elief that the plan could command general support in his cabinet and hence among the American public. The Stimson-McCloy approach still called fo r punish­ ment and reeducation o f the Germans, and Hull's shift from am biguity to opposition toward the Morgenthau Plan meant that Roosevelt had a m ajor dispute on his hands. As befits any Am erican decision in Am erica, particularly one by R oosevelt, dom estic politics probably tipped the balance. In spite o f

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PLAN

43

widespread predictions that he would easily win reelection to a fourth term—w ith the two-term tradition safely out o f the way—the politician inside R oosevelt never took anything fo r granted (at least not since the Supreme Court “ packing” fight and subsequent congressional elections defeat in 1938). H u ll’s appointment had originally stemmed almost exclusively from his dom estic political power base, not his proposals in international affairs alm ost exclusively—hence Roosevelt's frequent use o f others in government to make foreign policy. That had not changed by 1944, and the president did not w an t a public disagreement with Hull just before the election. Som eone, probably James Byrnes, understood the pressures working on R oosevelt and in true Washington fashion enlisted the aid o f the press. On Septem ber 21, investigative reporter Drew Pearson broke the story o f the division in the cabinet over the Arm y Handbook fo r Germany. Arthur K rock, a frien d and political ally o f both Byrnes and Hull, follow ed the next day w ith a column in the New York Times about Morgenthau’s trip to Quebec, bem oaning such bypassing o f the secretary o f state. On September 23 the Wall Street Journal published a fairly accurate summary o f the Morgenthau Plan, including a statement that the proposal would force thirty m illion Germans to move elsewhere, thus further weakening Germany’s ability to wage war. By every account, including British embassy press summaries sent regularly to London, overall press opinion o f the Morgenthau Plan was unfavorable. As the campaign against the plan reached a crescendo, Roosevelt began to back o ff. When Morgenthau attem pted, on September 29, to drop in at the White House to discuss the newspaper reaction, Roosevelt uncharacteristically refused to see him. Later that same day during a press conference, one o f the president's favorite forums fo r disclosing his decisions (even before telling his cabinet), Roosevelt flatly denied that a split had developed in his cabinet over the question o f postwar Germany. The president, dissembling, made no reference to the Cabinet Com m ittee on Germany, the form al location o f the dispute. M oreover, he also made public his letter to the head o f the Foreign Econom ic Adm inistration, Leo C row ley, containing instructions fo r Crowley to work out policies regarding Germany’s postwar econom y, particularly with regard to exports and future foreign trade. Even to m ention such notions was an almost direct repudiation o f the Morgenthau Plan. A t the same tim e, Hull and Stimson redoubled their efforts to get the president to back away from the Quebec memorandum. Hull tried to give Roosevelt an easy way out by suggesting that the entire question be referred to the European Advisory Commission, and commented in his published memoirs (which are, it must be said, notoriously unreliable) that the president m erely replied that he had not com m itted him self to the Morgenthau Ran. R oosevelt's decision the next day (Septem ber 2 6 ,1 9 4 4 ) to abolish the special Cabinet Com m ittee on Germany indicated his desire to squelch the controversy, and on the follow in g day he retreated even further. Telling Stimson that his intention had not ever been to turn Germany into an agricultural nation, Roosevelt daim ed his real m otive was to prevent an

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

econom ic collapse in Britain. That was, o f course, on ly a half-truth. R oosevelt had seized upon the Morgenthau Plan partly as a means o f aiding Britain's postwar econom y, but he had also accepted and made specific contributions to that portion o f the program which called fo r social reform . As ever, there was a problem with words, Churchill’s phrase, pastoralization, brought on visions o f the total destruction o f every elem ent o f German industry; but even the harshest version o f the Morgenthau Plan called on ly fo r the elim ination o f heavy industry, not those related to services and basic consumer goods. Stimson chose to take the extrem e meaning, while R oosevelt always viewed the Quebec memorandum as a statement o f general purpose rather than fixed policy.

Decision by Bureaucracy R oosevelt’s reaction when cornered in a bureaucratic, political, or diplom atic dispute was almost invariably to procrastinate, usually by either promising all things to all parties or by openly putting o f f any decision. He could not always threaten to lock the disputants in a room untU they reached agreement (a technique he did use once with his cabinet), so he frequently tried to achieve consensus by postponem ent, assuming that eventually one side or the other would weary o f the fight. So it was with postwar planning fo r Germany. With the failure in late Septem ber o f the daring airborne assault on Am hem , the chance o f a R A N K IN situation in Germany seemed doubtful, and the president had what he liked the most—m ore tim e. Since he could count on Morgenthau’s loyalty and unflinching support, Roosevelt—w ith the election in mind—preceded to massage the injured feelings o f Hull and Stimson. Obviously wishing to postpone a decision and not m erely transfer the initiative from the Treasury to the State Departm ent, he forcefu lly instructed Hull not to submit the question o f Germ any's postwar econom y to the European Advisory Commission, but simultaneously com mented that he did not intend to eradicate com pletely industry in the Ruhr and Saar. A few days later he disingenuously told Stimson that Morgenthau had “ pulled a b on er," and pretended shock and dismay at the very idea o f totally elim inating the industrial plant in the Saar and Ruhr and converting Germany into a pastoral nation.5 Roosevelt's deception apparently satisfied Stimson, who concluded that the Quebec memorandum was not a mature p olicy decision. He never again discussed the issue w ith the president Hull and those in the State Department who looked to Germany fo r b olh an econom ic and a political contribution to European stability were not so sure. Even before the president’s first retreat from the Quebec memorandum, the State Department attem pted to chip away at the overall concept o f Morgenthau’s plan (see Document 24). The alternatives offered by the department were subtle, but crucially different. A fte r claiming that the State Department had never had its day in court on the German question, the m em o used the vaguest o f terms to recommend dem ilitarization,

DECISION BT BUREAUCRACY

45

denazification, and controls (o f an unspecified nature and fo r an unspecified purpose) over the German educational and communications systems. On the key item s, partition and long-term econom ic objectives, the State Department recom m ended policies which differed radically from the Morgenthau Plan. It suggested that consideration o f partition (as separated from such territorial adjustments as the return o f Alsace-Lorraine) be deferred until Russia and Britain cou ld be fu lly consulted, and it proposed that any econom ic planning aim o n ly at preventing the developm ent o f war production and elim inating the supposed dom ination by Germany o f the European econom y. The State D epartm ent’s primary goal—the creation o f a w orld econom y com patible with th e American econom ic system—was reflected in a suggestion that German self-sufficiency be elim inated, but only to the point at which Germ any became dependent upon world (Am erican?) markets. R oosevelt, in one o f his last written responses to the debate, phrased a carefu lly ambiguous answer to Hull which mandated postponement o f any real decision (see Document 25). Rather than choose among various unsatisfying alternatives, the president tried to hold the entire issue in abeyance. Again emphasizing the advisory nature o f the EAC , Roosevelt expressed the fear that such bodies tended to carry out their own advice. R oosevelt knew that the EAC faith fu lly reflected State Department thinking, and his instructions demonstrate that the president did not want that departm ent to set p olicy fo r postwar Germany. N or was he ready to choose betw een the State and Treasury departments’ concepts regarding the controversial question o f deindustrialization. Although the president clearly endorsed those portions o f Hull’s memorandum which called fo r social and p olitical reform s, Roosevelt carefully side-stepped Hull's suggestion that Germ any be integrated into the overall world (Am erican liberal capitalist) system by agreeing in principle, while expressing confusion about the meaning o f some o f the language used. Since agreement in principle is, to any politician, a nonbinding and virtually meaningless com m itm ent, R oosevelt’s answer effectively returned the bureaucratic battle over Germany back to square one—but only as it concerned the top level officials. The cabinet-level struggle had degenerated into what the British called a “ wearisome claptrap d eb ate. . . undiminished in volum e or in confusion over term s,'*6 but others more concerned w ith providing immediate occupation directions to SH AE F (Supreme Headquarters A llied Expeditionary Force; Le., General Eisenhower's command) could still generate meaningful decisions, even i f they were o fficia lly only interim instructions. In the wake o f Roosevelt's order to withdraw the SH AEF “ Handbook fo r M ilitary Governm ent o f Germ any,” lesser officials working fo r the Cabinet Com m ittee on Germany agreed early in September, 1944, that a draft o f an interim directive fo r Germany should be drawn up and sent to Eisenhower. With the E AC bypassed and the R oosevelt cabinet unable to agree upon broad p olicy, the second-level bureaucrats took over. The lines o f negotiation at that level were still centered around the three basic alternatives offered back in 1943. The Treasury Department

46

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

representatives proposed the total econom ic, social, and political restruc­ turing o f Germany; the War Department people favored measures which would effectively eliminate any chance o f German m ilitary resurgence but tended to shy away from any long-term responsibility fo r reform s; and opposed any terms which could create long-lasting resentment or m itigate against the relatively speedy integration o f Germany into the world econom y. The fourth alternative, the use o f Germany as a pawn in the creation o f a new cordon sanitaire against Soviet Russia, remained only a vague idea lurking in the minds o f a few American and British planners. Treasury and War department suggestions fo r the tem porary instructions to Eisenhower differed prim arily on the econom ic issues. Bargains were suggested and struck over questions o f denazification, punishment o f war criminals, and fraternization with the Germans, but when the War Depart­ ment proposed m erely giving the m ilitary authorities control over the econom y without any clear-cut policy guidance, the Treasury representatives inserted guidelines which established positive direction. The Treasury hand was strengthened by news o f the Quebec memorandum on Germany, and John M cG oy, the primary War Department negotiator, finally settled fo r a statement which specifically called fo r m ilitary control over the econom y (as opposed to the Treasury’s suggestion o f leaving the Germans to stew in their own juices), but which included a strong statement prohibiting any steps aimed at the rehabilitation o f the German econom y as a whole (see Document 26). State Department officials unalterably opposed any such restrictions, but the Quebec memorandum le ft them little room in which to maneuver. Angrily, the diplomats reported to Hull that Treasury officials claimed Roosevelt had repudiated the State Department position and that all further policy regarding Germany had to be cleared with the Treasury Department. In a last ditch e ffo rt to prevent a bureaucratic fa it accompli, Hull approved the interim directive fo r Germany but added a reservation in the form o f a letter to Stimson (see Document 27). Innocuous as the reservation appeared, it perm itted the m ilitary com ­ mander in Germany to do whatever he wished i f it related to the safety o r health o f the occupying forces. It was only a short step from there to a statement that the health o f occupying forces requried that German coal mines produce, that German industry provide support, and so on. Both Morgenthau and M cG oy interpreted Hull’s letter as a face-saving gesture, and the enthusiastic support given the draft o f the interim directive by Eisenhower's deputy, General Bedell Sm ith, confirm ed the War Department’s position. Treasury Department fears were borne out tw o years later, in 1946, when General Lucius G ay, American high commissioner in Germany, utilized the authority granted the m ilitary to begin the rehabilita­ tion o f German industry. But as o f October, 1944, an elated Morgenthau believed that he had succeeded in getting the bureaucracy to im plem ent his plan, even i f the president had developed second thoughts.

DECISION ET BUREAUCRACY

4T

British Reactions That was no small victory, since the draft o f the interim directive, assigned the number JCS 1067 when circulated to the Joint Chiefs o f S taff, became the Am erican proposal fo r a Combined Chiefs o f S taff7 directive on Germany. T o Morgenthau’s dismay, the British refused to accept JCS 1067 as com bined Anglo-Am erican policy. Instead, late in O ctober, the British governm ent submitted its own proposed directive fo r Germany; a directive intended to establish long-term policy rather than m erely deal with the more im mediate postsunender situation. The British document, ninety-seven pages o f detailed directives to the future m ilitary commander in Germany, reflected the prevailing attitude in the British Foreign O ffice. Even M cCloy complained that the British proposal appeared overly concerned with preserving the baric structure o f German society, and the Treasury Department reacted even more strongly. In a m em o which M cCloy approved, Morgenthau castigated the British fo r violating almost every precept o f the Morgenthau Plan, from placing to o much emphasis upon econom ic rehabilitation to the suggestion o f arming the German police with tanks and heavy weapons. M cCloy suggested that the British document was the product o f the old guard professionals in the Foreign O ffice, though he did not draw the logical conclusion that anti-Soviet attitudes might have played a role. Morgenthau asked i f M cCloy wished the Treasury critique to go via Lord Cherwell to Churchill as an u n official join t Treasury-War departmental reaction, and M cCloy readily agreed. It illustrates the nature o f the bureaucratic struggle in Washington as w ell as M cC loy’s political slipperiness that the assistant secretary o f war flatly lied to State Department officials by claiming that he had tried to talk Morgenthau out o f giving the docum ent to Cherwell. The War Department cared prim arily about granting almost com plete freedom o f action to the occupation commander; the Treasury Department cared alm ost exclusively about the long-term im plications o f any decision. They could both agree that the British proposal was unacceptable, though fo r basically differen t reasons. Actually, British policy-m aking regarding postwar Germany was almost as confused and contradictory as in the United States. And, as in the United States, the trail o f confusion and uncertainty led directly back to the head o f government. In spite o f speculation by some Americans, including Harry D exter White, that Churchill had endorsed the Quebec memorandum on Germany on ly in order to obtain a favorable agreement on Lend-Lease, the prime minister’s com m itm ent to deindustrialization and pastoralization fo r Germany was more than m erely perfunctory. When he went to M oscow in m id-October, 1944, fo r the T O L S T O Y conference with Stalin, Churchill dearly and enthusiastically presented the outline o f the Quebec memorandum and the Morgenthau Flan. Asked by Russian Foreign M inister Vyacheslav M olotov fo r his opinion o f the Morgenthau Plan, Churchill obliquely replied that he still opposed any mass execution o f Germans after the war but believed “ it was necessary to kill as many as possible in the field .” 8 Stalin endorsed the concept o f a hard peace and stated that German

48

TBS MORGEN THAU PLAN

heavy Industry would have to be reduced to a minimum. Obviously fearing a resurgence o f German power, the Russian prem ier claimed that any chance o f revenge had to be denied to Germany; harsh measures which prevented future war were, in that sense, the most humane. He and Churchill agreed that England should get the markets previously dominated by German exports and that Germany should not have a merchant fleet. They likewise agreed on plans to internationalize the Saar, Ruhr, and K iel Canal areas, and also broached the question o f a separate Rhineland state. A pleased Churchill, long a supporter o f a Danubian federation, reported to Roosevelt that Stalin had changed his position and appeared w illing to see Vienna as the capital o f a south German state comprised o f Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, though the discussions make Stalin's fears o f an anti-Soviet entente very evident. Stalin’s m otives are never clear, but in this case he appeared as concerned about a unified German state which could aid the West as British diplom ats were about a unified German state siding with Russia. The tw o leaders were like tw o Cheshire cats; final exchange after the discussions on Germany and Europe epitom ized their satisfaction at having reached a spheres o f influence agreement by playing a sort o f children’s board game, using nations as the pieces: TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R thought that there was very little divergence o f opinion between them. It was a pity that when G od created the world he had not consulted them. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said it was G o d ’s first mistake (see Document 28).

Unlike discussions about Germany’s econom y or socio-political makeup, talks about postwar partitioning clearly fe ll Into tw o different phases: the im mediate or interim period, and the permanent arrangements which would com e with a final peace treaty. M oreover, partitioning did not refer to certain obvious boundary adjustments which all parties had agreed upon. It was firm ly settled that Alsace and Lorraine were to go to France and East Prussia to Russia and Poland, that some sort o f boundary adjustment between Germany and Poland would occur, and that the unification o f Austria with Germany would end. The existence o f a three-power agreement on zones o f occupation effectively elim inated any need fo r quick agreement on plans fo r the permanent breakup o f the German state once the boundary adjustments had taken place. In spite o f later claims by Soviet historians that Stalin had never supported the breakup o f Germany, Stalin’s position at the Teheran Conference, at the Tolstoy Conference, and his discussions with Charles de Gaulle in M oscow in early December, demonstrated his preference fo r a permanently partitioned Germany.9 The Foreign O ffice quickly expressed opposition to Churchill’s statements to Stalin. It claimed that dismemberment was impractical and that deindus­ trialization meant the end o f any chance o f gaining reparations as w ell as being injurious to general European econom ic health. The first indication o f Churchill’s m ove away from the econom ic aspects o f the Morgenthau Plan came in an exchange o f telegrams w ith his old friend and advisor, F ield Marshall Jan Smuts, prime minister o f South A frica. Churchill had sent Smuts

BRITISH REACTIONS

4»

a copy o f his report to Roosevelt after the M oscow Conference with Stalin. Smuts replied with a strong endorsement o f partition fo r Germany, suggesting that an isolated Prussia might depend upon Britain fo r security just as Prussia had during the Napoleonic Wars. Fearful o f Russian expansion, Smuts advised against giving Poland sizeable portions o f German territory, rince Poland appeared destined to becom e a Russian satellite. He agreed that German crimes deserved punishment, but asserted that they were a great people who should be integrated in to the European com m unity, fo r “ a ruined and poisoned Germany spells a frustrated Europe/’ 10 Churchill's response defended the transfer o f territory to Poland and explained that m oving the Germans out o f such territories should prevent future problems. He ignored the warning about Soviet expansion but agreed with Smuts that the Germans ought to have a “ reasonable means o f life .” 11 In spite o f Churchill's wavering, Foreign O ffice memoranda steadily advised that the British government oppose the econom ic portions o f the Morgenthau Plan, particularly those which called fo r drastic deindustrial* ization and those which would perm it unabated inflation. N oting that Eden had repeatedly stated publicly that he opposed letting Germany become a trouble spot which could infect all Europe, the Foreign O ffice supported various form s o f partitioning and decentralization, but expressed grave doubts about draconian econom ic measures which would only create chaos and bitterness. In a long report printed in late December, 1944, the Arm istice and Post-War Com m ittee in the Foreign O ffice concluded that none o f the basic tenets o f the Morgenthau Plan had any validity (see Document 29). The report claim ed that turning Germany into an agrarian nation was not the most effective means o f providing security against future German aggression; that there would be little or no econom ic benefits accruing to Britain because o f deindustrialization; and that the Morgenthau Plan would create econom ic havoc in the Ruhr and Saar, the areas Britain would have to administer (a fact Roosevelt understood when he finally accepted the southern zone). Thus, as preparations began fo r the m eeting o f Churchill, R oosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, the British government had begun to reach some sort o f agreement on opposing the Morgenthau Plan. K ept abreast o f the debate within th e Am erican government, Churchill apparently began to slide back to his pre-Quebec position. The only reference to postwar planning fo r Germany in the many Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges which crossed the Atlantic between October, 1944, and February, 1945, was a cryptic message drafted by the president which clearly indicated Roosevelt's b elief in the eventual redevelopment o f the German econom y. Sent to Churchill’s follow ing news o f the sinking o f the German battleship Tirpitz, the message read: The death o f the T IR P IT Z is great news. We must help the Germans by never letting them build anything like it again, thus putting the German Treasury on its feet.12

O fficial p olicy still called fo r disarmament, but deindustrialization seemed less certain.

BO

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

Bickering between the State and Treasury departments over basic p olicy toward Germany continued during the months before the Yalta Conference. As the same tim e, the War Department continually put forth suggestions fo r small revisions to JCS 1067, though the thrust o f those revisions was in the direction o f lessening restrictions on the authority o f m ilitary government, including its power to impose econom ic restrictions. Although the president toyed with the State Department and its new secretary, Edward Stettinius, he refused either to repudiate the Morgenthau Plan or endorse any specific long-term policy fo r Germany. In spite o f repeated meetings, exchanges o f memoranda, and the good personal relationship between Morgenthau and Stettinius (as opposed to Hull’s open resentment at Morgenthau's role in foreign p o licy ), nothing changed. Whenever any agency proposed a lessening o f the harsh peace Morgenthau proposed, his staff argued against it. Treasury officials used their clear authority over financial matters to insure that the Germans retained full responsibility fo r their fiscal and related econom ic affairs, lest conscientious army authorities conclude that they had the duty to maintain the German m onetary system. Morgenthau became increasingly concerned about arguments that the Soviet Union’s genuine need for reparations necessitated the rehabilitation o f the German econom y, and countered with a strong endorsement o f a no-strings-attached ten billion dollar credit to Russia. N ot only would that eliminate the need fo r long-term reparations, but it would, according to Morgenthau, cement Russo-American relations. Morgenthau detected within the State Department the rise o f the argument that a strong Germany was needed in order to offset the Soviet Union, and he hoped to nip that notion in the bud. The clearest statement o f the State Department program came in a memorandum sent by Stettinius to Roosevelt in late Novem ber. Although officials in the department forwarded additional statements on the subject, this one succinctly summed up their proposed p olicy. It differentiated between immediate occupation p olicy, which should be severe, and long-term programs. Security against Germany could com e only through an inter­ national peace-keeping organization, and the paper flatly stated that Germany should eventually be integrated "in to a liberal w orld econom y” (Alternative 3: see Document 30). The president indicated his continued opposition to reparations, but never really answered the memo. AU Morgenthau’s attempts to reinforce before the Yalta m eeting, the president’s fast-disappearing com mitment to the Treasury Department’s program m et with a similar fate. Apparently aware that the British no longer believed in the econom ic benefits they would gain from the Morgenthau Flan, the secretary instead emphasized the need to guarantee security against the rebirth o f German power and dropped a hint about the danger involved in trying to set up Germany as a buffer against communism and the Soviet Unirai (see Document 31). Even that attem pt to appeal to R oosevelt's favorite p olicy—cooperation with the Russians—failed to gain a response.

BRITISH REACTIONS

Bl

T he Alternatives—Still Open Thus, on the eve o f the Big Three m eeting in the Crimea, Roosevelt had the same set o f alternatives before him that had existed all along. He could reendorse the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany; he could change direction sharply and adopt the State Department program fo r security through econom ic interdependence in a world econom y which integrated the German industrial output into the broader picture; or he could make no decision which would be a choice o f the third alternative—letting the War Department set p olicy with a relatively free hand. The fourth alternative, using Germany as a bulwark against Russia, would never be form ally presented to Roosevelt. It is (me o f the great peculiarities o f history that lost causes should have dom inated Anglo-Am erican policy during the most critical and potentially prom ising o f all the m ajor wartime conferences—the meeting o f Churchill, R oosevelt, and Stalin at Y alta in the Russian Crimea from February 2 through 11, 1945. Churchill, and to a lesser degree R oosevelt, attem pted som ehow to wrest Poland from the Russian embrace; State Department and Foreign O ffice officials had recognized this to be a lost cause back in the fall o f 1944, although they often refused to admit it.13 Eager to get the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, Roosevelt made concessions to Russian territorial demands In East Asia, but not until he obtained a modicum o f support from Stalin fo r Chiang Kai-Shek’s Chinese Nationalist government— another lost cause. The United Nations Organization, which the State Department and Stalin saw as the means to preserve w orld peace, though fo r obviously different reasons, similarly proved a lost cause. However, Germany and the far-reaching ramifications o f the German question were anything but lost. A wide range o f alternatives remained available to Roosevelt and the other leaders—choices which ultim ately played a critical role in defining the nature and strategy o f the Cold War. Although no one spoke o f such great power conflicts at the Yalta talks, on ly die Americans failed to view Germany from such a Cold War perspective. Roosevelt looked at dismemberment as a means o f permanently relegating the divided Germanies to a position o f im potence in international affairs; he saw deindustrialization as a way to aid the British econom y; he preferred reparations in kind and fo r a short-term because he accepted Morgenthau’s argument that long-term reparations from production would stimulate the kind o f heavy industry which could com pete with British exports and quickly convert to wartime production. He also had an intense aversion to any Und o f postwar settlements which involved monetary obligation s-a result o f the unpleasant World War I war debts controversy. R oosevelt’s long-standing support fo r a general spheres o f influence arrange­ ment follow in g the war (i.e., the Four Policemen concept with Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and eventually, China, generally supervising affairs in their own geographic area, as w ell as his opposition to any permanent Am erican entanglement in European political problems, m itigated against any thoughts o f Russo-American confrontation in Germany. T o be sure,

BS

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

American planners, particularly in the State Department, expressed constant and increasing concern over the future role o f the Soviet Union in Europe, but as long as Franklin Roosevelt remained active and in control, those fears never came to dominate American policy. Germany was a unique and separate problem , and Roosevelt hoped to insure that such a problem never arose again. A t the same tim e, a solution to any m ajor problem had to contribute to the cooperative postwar relationship between the great powers. For that relationship, even if disguised by the rhetoric and structure o f a United Nations Organization, form ed the crux o f R oosevelt's hopes fo r peace in the postwar world. A prosperous Britain and a satisfied Russia outweighed any other considerations. The third member o f the Big Three, Stalin, arrived at Yalta with a somewhat distorted view o f Anglo-Am erican policy regarding Germany. Given the discussion with Churchill at M oscow four months earlier and the little to the contrary from the prime minister heard since then, the Russian had to assume that some form o f deindustrialization would occur, along with harsh punishment fo r German war criminals, total and com plete dis­ armament, and some kind o f dismemberment. A hint o f Churchill's desire to postpone any decision on partitioning, a policy he pursued successfully at Yalta, appeared in a message to Stalin in December, 1944, which suggested that firm decisions cm dismemberment should await the negotiation o f a form al peace treaty, though the issue could receive attention at the Y alta meeting. Whether from health, habit, or a conscious tactic, Roosevelt played on ly a m inor part in the Yalta discussions on Germany. The most detailed talks to ok place between the three foreign ministers—Eden, M olotov, and Stettinius. The Big Three leaders tended largely to ratify the recommendations com ing out o f those talks, although Churchill and Stalin did have particular axes to grind on certain issues. Churchill, increasingly fearful o f the future pow er relationships in Europe, fought to prevent any final decision on dismemberment; Stalin, deeply concerned about rebuilding devastated Russia before that country's econom ic and industrial weakness became fu lly known to the western powers, concentrated upon obtaining extensive reparations. Closely related to the Soviet demands fo r reparations was their request, made in January, 1945, fo r a large program o f credits from the United States. Morgenthau, who advocated a ten billion dollar credit as a means o f avoiding the need to rebuild German industry as w ell as a way to prom ote good Soviet-American relations, endorsed the concept. The State Department did not. Echoing the recommendations o f the American ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, Stettinius and his subordinates argued that such credits should depend upon Soviet willingness to cooperate on political issues. In other words, American econom ic pow er would be m ore wisely used as a coercive agent rather than as a means o f prom oting trust and good w ill. Morgenthau and Stettinius had the same goal—the enhancement o f Am erican security by establishing econom ic relationships with the Soviet Union. Both programs assumed that such relationships would put Russia on the road to

THE ALTKRNATIVES-STILL OPEN

»S

political, social, and econom ic reform s o f a western style. N o one spoke o r wrote o f the Soviet Union becoming a liberal capitalist state, but that clearly represented the ultim ate goal o f both State and Treasury departmental thinking. R oosevelt, uncertain about the e ffe c t o f either approach, typically refused to choose between them. He never answered Harriman’s steady stream o f recommendations from M oscow, y et he told both Treasury and State departm ent officials that he agreed with them. When Russian Foreign Minister M olotov broached the issue at Yalta, Stettinius stated that he would personally discuss sudi credits then, later in M oscow, or in Washington—but those discussions never took place.

Decisions at Yalta The Russians were the strongest advocates o f a firm com m itm ent at Y alta to the breakup o f the German state. When Churchill tried to evade the issue, Stalin summarized Anglo-Am erican statements on the question. Eventually, after R oosevelt agreed that the principle, though not the program, fo r partitioning should be agreed upon, Stalin accepted a vague statement regarding the terms o f German surrender to the e ffe c t that dismemberment could occur i f the three controlling powers thought it necessary fo r future security. Although m ost comments about Russian foreign p olicy m otives are sheer speculation, the strong Russian support fo r a com m itm ent to dismemberment may w ell have stemmed from Soviet fears that a united Germany might eventually join in some sort o f anti-Soviet bloc. Stalin had great contem pt fo r the German character and had expressed grave doubts that the Germans had the courage or intelligence to become believing communists. Later Western speculation that Stalin had hoped to expand communism by m oving into all o f Germany is belied by the Russian’s support fo r dismemberment, his consistent dismissal o f the Germans as unready fo r such revolutionary changes, and his willingness to accept a specific zone o f occupation at a tim e when Russian m ilitary forces appeared likely to conquer the largest portion o f Germany. As Roosevelt pointed out at Yalta, the zones o f occupation could w ell serve as the beginning o f a permanent partition o f Germany, and Stalin appeared to prefer a concrete accomplishment to grander schemes. That argument, as presented by the president, may have been suggested at some point by Stettinius or someone else from the State Department. The evidence is scanty, but on February 1, on ly a few days before the Yalta Conference began, Ambassador Winant in London claimed that current thinking was that zonal autonom y and control would increase substantially, thus effectively dividing Germany into three separate and compartmented zones (see Document 32). Although much o f this came from British sources, it is probable that similar Ideas had developed within the State Department. Given R oosevelt’s earlier strong com m itm ent to dis­ memberment, such an argument could explain his willingness to postpone the issue by referring die details o f partitioning to a com m ittee on the dismemberment o f Germany.

54

THZ MOBGENTH AU PLAN

H ie lengthy arguments over the role o f France in any German settlem ent again stemmed from Anglo-Russian concern over the postwar pow er relationships in Europe. The Russians obviously feared the creation o f some sort o f Anglo-French entente against the Soviet Union, which was in fact the precise goal o f British policy by that tim e. Nonetheless, R oosevelt’s firm statement that American troops would not remain in Europe more than tw o years after victory apparently troubled Stalin. The British had never possessed sufficient m ilitary strength to restrain Germany in the west, and unless such restraint were possible the British might well begin thinking in terms o f appeasing the Germans—again. Given that conundrum, Stalin appears to have concluded that taking a chance on Anglo-French cooperation was a better bet than relying on some sort o f vague and ineffective controls against a resurgence o f German power. In spite o f R oosevelt’s long-standing distrust o f the French and particularly o f deGaulle, the State Department argument that the United States should do all it could to restore France to her form er status as a stable world power eventually won out. M oreover, since the president assumed a relatively b rief American presence in Central Europe after the war, British appeals fo r assistance from France in policing Europe appeared more persuasive. By the dose o f the Yalta talks, Roosevelt had made the new American position clear, and Stalin—who rarely fought fo r lost causes— acquiesced. For the first tim e in the war, reparations became the most crucial and troublesome issue regarding Germany. As Morgenthau had long feared, discussions o f German reparations did not really consider the prevention o f W orld War III. When the Soviet negotiators made their demands for immediate and extensive removals o f industrial plants plus a ten-year reparations-in-kind program, Churchill attacked the proposals as unreasonable and impractical. Roosevelt, ever mindful o f the post-World War I experience, worried aloud that American m oney might have to finance such long-term reparations as well as some program to prevent the Germans from starving. That, thought the president, was unacceptable. Roosevelt expressed great sympathy fo r the suffering and destruction endured by the Russians, and agreed they were entitled to extensive reparations, but his eventual suggestion that the question be referred to a special reparations com m ittee smacks o f typical Rooseveltian procrastination (see Document 33). The president’s concern over avoiding any sort o f American-financed relief program fo r the Germans, plus the general tendency o f the Yalta talks toward increased A llied control over (and hence responsibility fo r ) Germany, rang the death knell fo r the Morgenthau Plan, at least as an alternative under consideration by the president. One aspect o f R oosevelt’s conduct at Yalta can be neither resolved nor ignored, and that is his health. Roosevelt suffered from congestive heart failure and had undergone treatment fo r heart disease since early in the war. Even his closest friends had commented in their private diaries about his physical deterioration by the fall o f 1944. Although the president’s personal physician, Adm iral Ross M clntire, claimed that R oosevelt's mental processes

DECISIONS AT YALTA

SB

bad not been a ffe cted -a statement backed up by a heart specialist whom M clntire brought in on the case-oth er observers disagreed. Whatever the effect o f the president’s health at Yalta, the comment o f Churchill's personal physician, Lord Moran, is worth noting: T o a d octor's eye, the President appears a very sick man. He has all the sym ptom s or hardening o f the arteries o f the brain in an advanced stage, so that I give him only a few months to live. But men shut their eyes when they do not want to see, and the Americans here cannot bring themselves to believe that he is finished.14 Whether o r not Roosevelt’s physical condition played a significant part in his policies and tactics at Yalta, however, is another question. Historians have frequently commented that he did not have the strength to battle Stalin, but such direct confrontations were so alien to Roosevelt’s style and personality that a hands-down struggle with the Russians was unlikely regardless o f his energy level. On the German question, at any rate, Roosevelt follow ed a line o f reasoning which was consistent with his previous policies. He kept the Russians relatively happy, he avoided fixed commitments wherever possible, and he avoided any long-term American entanglement in Europe. The effects o f p o o r health became far more apparent after Yalta when Roosevelt, exhausted by the strain o f the conference, was no longer able to play the game o f balancing his executive departments against each other. With the president spending m ore tim e resting at Warm Springs, Georgia, normal bureaucratic patterns asserted themselves and the State Department, in consultation with the m ilitary, took over the direction o f foreign policy. F or Germany, Yalta served only to mark tim e. N o final decisions appeared, but the outlines o f the final settlement had begun to develop. Occupation zones and boundary adjustments substituted fo r dismemberment; what the Russians called “ a modest but decent standard o f living” fo r the Germans replaced pastoralization; coordinated administration and control via a Central Control Commission eliminated the concept o f making the Germans responsible fo r their own problems; and deindustrialization was lim ited to “ industry that could be used fo r m ilitary production” (see Documents 34, 35). Only denazification seemed in the spirit o f the Morgenthau Flan. Even lim iting reparations to com ­ pensation in kind covered over the general agreement that the Soviet Union deserved a level o f reparations which might force the rehabilitation o f German industry. But Yalta was a meeting o f politicians and diplomats, not bureaucrats an d m id-rank Arm y officers assigned the job o f administering occupied Germany. Unaware o f the nuances and particulars o f the Yalta decisions, such people sim ply continued to plan on the basis o f previous policy guidelines-the o ld “ Arm y Handbook” and JC S 1067.

Notes 1« Minutes to the Foreign O ffice on Halifax« September 14« 1944« N o. 4941« FO 871/39080/4010« paper C12073/146/G18« Public Record O ffice, London, England. 2. Handwritten note on draft o f “ Germany is Our Problem ," November 16,1944 and F eb ru a ry 12, 1945, Harry Dexter White Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. 8. The British Chiefs o f Staff were the top m ilitary organization in that country, to the American Joint Chiefs o f Staff.

06

THS MORGENTHAU FLAN

4. U.S., Department o f State, Foreign R e la tio n o f the United States: Conference at Quebec, 1944, Memo by White o f Conversation o f September 13, 1944 (W ellin g ­ ton, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 1972), p. 826. 5. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (N ew Y ork: Harper 6 Brothers, 1948), p. 681. 6. Minutes to the Foreign O ffice on “ Political Situation in the United States: Weekly Political Summary,“ October 11, 1944, FO 371/88548/4206, paper A N 8869/261, Public Record O ffice, London, 7. The Joint Chiefs o f Staff consisted o f the m ilitary commanders o f the United States Arm y and Navy, and other officers appointed by the president. 8. See Document 28. A ctor Richard Burton, in an article written shortly after he had played Winston Churchill in an adaptation o f a portion o f Churchill’s memoirs, claimed that perform ing the role had been a depressing experience, because o f the prime minister’s bloodthirsty vindictiveness. Burton received a thorough scolding from various Churchill defenders. Nevertheless, unless one chooses to dismiss Churchill’s statements to Stalin as mere rhetoric, a reading o f the minutes o f the TO LS TO Y Conference lends some credence to the finding o f Burton’s artistic sensitivity. N ot surprisingly, Churchill makes no m ention in his memoirs o f his strong support fo r a harsh and punitive German settlement. The Burton article, “ To Play Churchill Is to Hate Him,” is in the New York Times, section 2, Novem ber 24, 1974. Some o f the responses can be found in the New York Times issue o f December 8, 1974. Another small but revealing entry in this potentially endless debate is Churchill's response to a suggestion in February, 1945, that British policy should be to help the Italians as much as possible since that was why they had fought the w a r-“ to secure liberty and a decent existence fo r the peoples o f Europe.” Churchill responded, “ N ot a bit o f It: we are fighting to secure the proper respect fo r the British people!” The Diaries o f Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1946, ed. David Dilks (N ew York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1972), p. 711. 9. De Gaulle was recognized shortly before this time by Roosevelt and Churchill as the leader o f the provisional government in liberated France. 10. Smuts to Churchill, October 29, 1944, PREM 8/192/3/58, Public Record O ffice, London. 11. Churchill to Smuts, October 30, 1944, PREM 8/192/3/52, Public Record O ffice, London. 12. Roosevelt to Churchill, Novem ber 13, 1944, Map Root Collection, N o. 647, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N .Y . 13. Although the bitter and tendentious arguments over the entire question o f the boundaries and government o f postwar Poland are largely tangential to the German problem , some brief mention o f Anglo-American policy is in order. There is still a real need for a thoughtful, comprehensive, and nonideological essay on the Policy issue in Anglo-American-Soviet relations between 1941 and 1956. My comment about the attitude held by State Department and Foreign O ffice officials comes from reading repeated references to the dominant Soviet position in Poland or comments which indicated that Britain and America needed a Polish settlem ent which looked (rather than was) good. That, o f course, is in con flict with many o f the arguments set forth during Anglo-Am erican negotiations with the Russians. Three elements seem to make up the Polish issue: appearances, a true desire to see a Poland which was not a Soviet client-state, and a b elief that the line had to be drawn somewhere with the Russians, so why not in Poland—even if victory seemed unlikely. It is worth noting that Churchill was under heavy attack in early 1946 fo r his harsh suppression o f the anti-Monarchists in Greece. 14. Lord Moran, Churchill: Taken from the Diaries o f Lord Moran, (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1966), p. 242. Moran’s comment may at least partially be a result o f the power o f suggestion, since he had received only a few days before a letter from an American physician, who wrote that Roosevelt had had heart trouble eight months earlier and was obviously very ilL Ibid, pp. 242-43. Moran was not a practiced diagnostician, nor do trained observers agree on the meaning o f R oosevelt’s symptoms. Nevertheless, the question o f Roosevelt’s health raises troubling issues regarding the transfer o f authority in the event o f serious Illness.

5 ■

—

Death a s Decision-M aker: T h e Rejection o f the M orgenthau Plan

During the few months between the Yalta Conference and the death o f R oosevelt, United States policy toward Germany received little guidance from the top. Hopkins told Eden in A p ril, 1945, that Roosevelt had not initialed m ost o f the thirty-seven cables sent over the presidential signature to Churchill since the Crimea meeting. Although none o f those messages concerned postwar Germany, Hopkins's remark indicates that R oosevelt no lon ger directed American foreign policy with any consistency. Even so, presidential approbation remained im portant and the State, Treasury, and War departments made attem pts to obtain presidential sanction fo r their programs, but to no avail. R oosevelt refused to com m it him self fu lly on e way or the other. A fte r approving a State Department memo which called fo r a centralized administration rather than control by the m ilitary governors o f each zone, Roosevelt backed o f f when Stimson and Morgenthau protested—Stimson because army p olicy was to maintain com plete freedom o f action, and Morgenthau because control im plied responsibility and the possibility o f reconstructing the German econom y.1 Eventually, on March 23, the president approved a policy statement drafted by the War Department (Alternative 2: see Document 36). That directive, Roosevelt's last on the German question, demonstrates how far Am erican policy had m oved since the Quebec memorandum and the concept o f pastoralization. Fighting a holding action, Morgenthau and his advisors had to accept the War Department's suggestion that some basic industries, including coal pro­ duction, be retained in order to m eet the needs o f the occupying forces and to prevent disease, starvation, or civil unrest. R oosevelt's natural penchant fo r avoiding decisions made the War Department position o f postponing any consideration o f long-term econom ic matters appealing. M oreover, M cCloy told Morgenthau that the president had flatly endorsed the moderate War Department approach since he wanted to change the character o f German industry, not destroy it. The Germans would have to support themselves, although w ithout reentering the w orld export market. In almost every other

57

M

DEATH AS DECISION-MAKER

plan which came from sources other than the Treasury Department, a reference to eliminating Germany's war-making industries appeared; but by 1945 such references had become as pro forma as spinning a prayer wheel, and they failed to explain how to lim it industry to only peaceful forms. The Morgenthau Plan had its last shot at success in the March, 1945, War Department proposal. In spite o f some ambiguity and obliqueness, the econom ic sections reflected Treasury Department thinking in calling fo r very lim ited production capabilities, no extensions o f credit to Germany except with special permission o f the Control Council, and econom ic decentrali­ zation with basic responsibility fo r the econom y resting with German authorities. N ot surprisingly, bureaucratic warfare broke out anew. The State, Treasury, and War departments, and a new entrant—the Foreign Econom ic Adm inistration—struggled to establish their views on postwar Germany, using as a vehicle the revision o f JCS 1067. That revision, approved by president Harry S. Truman on May 11, 1945, remained o fficia l American occupation policy until July, 1947. That, however, is a misleading statement. The War Department's desire fo r flexib ility with directives which le ft specifics up to the m ilitary occupation authorities eventually became the Trojan horse which Morgenthau had predicted. Although arguments in favor o f m ilitary autonom y reflected fears o f internal rebellion and chaos, when conflicts with the French and the Russians arose, JCS 1067 did not lim it the response o f occupation officials. The real impact o f the War Department attitude was hinted at when, early in A p ril, Secretary Stimson, concerned about the postwar econom ic developm ent o f Germany, raised the question o f instructing General Eisenhower to bypass the Ruhr industrial region in his m ilitary operations. Although the m ilitary leaders in Washington indicated reluctance to interfere with a field commander’s com plete freedom o f action in m ilitary operations, General Marshall did make an inform al inquiry about Eisenhower’s intentions (see Document 37). Ever sensitive to political factors, Eisenhower quickly responded that, even though he had to elim inate all German m ilitary forces in the Ruhr, he hoped to avoid unnecessary destruction o f industrial facilities. So much fo r Treasury hopes that the war itself would achieve a m ajor step towards deindustrialization.

The Morgenthau Plan and the Cold War A t three forty-five in the afternoon o f April 12,1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt died—and the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany died with him. Roosevelt and Morgenthau had always agreed upon one central fact regarding the people, not m erely their Nazi leaders. Roosevelt never ceased to condemn "G erm an” crimes, and whenever State and War department spokesmen m oved the president toward a separation o f N azi and German guilt, Morgenthau could always pull him back with an appeal to R oosevelt's intense

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN AND THE COLD WAR

W

dislike and distrust o f the overall German character; a character which the president believed had been Prussianized. Som e, particularly those who favored the com plete rehabilitation o f Germany from the start, argued that the spirit and substance o f the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany lived on in JCS 1067 and the actions o f the occupation authorities until at least 1946 and the decision o f the American high commissioner in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, to halt reparations payments to the Soviet Union. But that distorts the nature and purpose o f the Morgenthau Plan. Morgenthau’s proposals included harsh punishment, particularly in the form o f a refusal by the Allies to accept any responsibility fo r the econom ic well-being o f the German population, but the goal o f the plan never centered on revenge. From the beginning the ultim ate aim o f the program was the com plete and effective reform o f German national character and society. Some have claimed that the Potsdam agreements o f August, 1945, between the Am erican, British, and Russian governments, m odified but did n ot really change the thrust o f the Morgenthau Plan. That is far from the case. H ie Potsdam Conference, attended by Stalin, the new American president Truman, and the tw o British prime ministers—Churchill and his successor Clement A tlee—dealt extensively with the problem o f Germany. Truman, who later claimed in his memoirs that he had opposed the Morgenthau Plan from the outset, has a well-deserved reputation fo r decisiveness, but he also tended to fo llo w the advice o f the m ilitary and State Department Professionals. Although the new president tem porarily favored dismemberment o f Germany, his secretary o f state, James F. Byrnes, convinced Truman not to present such a program at the Potsdam talks. But to discuss piecemeal the various portions o f the Morgenthau Plan which seemed to crop up after A p ril, 1945, is to warp the nature o f Morgenthau’s proposal. Unless the Morgenthau Plan existed as a whole, it did n ot exist at all. Revenge, disarmament, dismemberment, punishment, and programs o f dem ocratization could and did exist w ithout being part o f that overall plan; but their goals were not the same as those offered by Morgenthau and the Treasury Department. With the death o f Roosevelt, Morgenthau quickly lost his privileged position in the Am erican government. On July 14, 1945, President Truman accepted the Treasury Secretary's prearranged resignation, and the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany was le ft w ithout a sponsor. Truman’s statement in his memoirs that he had always opposed the concept o f the Morgenthau Plan may w ell be a piece o f after-the-fact Cold War rhetoric, fo r when he wrote those memoirs, Truman was most eager to demonstrate his record as a staunch anticommunist. But the attitude o f the Am erican high commissioner in Germany from 1945 through 1949, General Clay, as expressed in messages written early in the first few months after V-E Day (V icto ry in Europe) indicate the direction o f his thinking. Policy fo r Germany had to be shifted from concern fo r preventing rearmament to

CO

DKATH AS DECISION-MAKES

concern fo r preventing econom ic collapse, and those persons who still thought in terms o f the Morgenthau Plan had a warped sense o f judgment (Alternative 2: see Documents 3 8 ,3 9 , and 40). G a y ’s attitude is critical to an understanding o f policy for, as John M cG oy later recalled, the Am erican m ilitary governor did exactly what the War Department expected; he utilized the escape clauses in JCS 1067 and made the directive fit army p olicy w ithout the chore o f pushing another revision through the bureaucracy. The desire to punish the Germans, supposedly a residue o f the Morgenthau Plan, d early con flicted with G a y ’s concept o f the tw o choices which existed fo r Germany—communism or dem ocracy (see Document 40). And where does that leave the Morgenthau Plan in the scheme o f history? A fte r all is said and done, does it really m atter that the plan even existed if It died so premature a death? I f what actually happened is the only concern o f historians, then the answer is obvious. But alternatives, even i f rejected, are a part o f history; they o ffe r penetrating insights into the minds and m otives o f decision-makers. T w o small but persistent myths about the Morgenthau Plan need to be firm ly dismissed. The first is the idea that R oosevelt did not really understand the meaning o f the Morgenthau Plan when he initialed the join t memorandum w ith Churchill during the Quebec Conference. In spite o f his deteriorating health, there can be no doubt that the president understood and agreed with the Treasury Department proposal. His earlier concern fo r an overall reform o f the German character, often expressed in seemingly antic comments against goose-stepping and uniforms, follow ed by his vigorous support fo r an im proved foreign trade situation in postwar Britain, indicate his awareness o f the nature o f Morgenthau’s proposal. H ia t it fit into his overall (i f ill-defined) concept o f Soviet-American cooperation—since the Russians apparently supported the p la n -o n ly added to the proposal’s attractiveness. The second is the claim that the Morgenthau Plan gave Nazi propagandists a field day and was “ worth thirty divisions to the Germans.” 3 Hull made such arguments to the president shortly after the Quebec Conference, and General Marshall did tell Morgenthau that German resistance had stiffened shortly after the Am erican press broke the story o f the Morgenthau Plan. On the other hand, Nazi Propaganda M inister Joseph Goebbels had long claimed that the destruction o f the German nation would fo llo w any German defeat. The Morgenthau Plan may have added some credibility to such appeals to German nationalism, but it hardly initiated that propaganda. More effective German defense in the late fall o f 1944 came from m ilitary, not psychological, actions. Their victory at Arnhem, which prevented a quick charge into Germany by Anglo-Am erican forces, occurred just as the Morgenthau Plan story h it the newspapers, and probably did far m ore fo r the morale o f the German troops than any fears o f what postwar plans the A llies had in store fo r them. T o take the question o f American policy toward postwar Germany beyond Roosevelt is to enter into an essentially new and d ifferen t set o f p olicy alternatives w orthy o f a separate study. With the inauguration o f Truman as

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN AND THE COLD WAR

61

president, a new approach to foreign p olicy began. M oreover, Truman faced a d ifferen t set o f problems. Whether Soviet-Am erican confrontation—the Cold War—cam e to dominate Am erica’s policy toward Germany in 1945 or in 1946, o r even later, is essentially m oot, fo r there can be no denying that the specter o f Russian pow er and communist expansion rearmed and integrated Germ any in to the Western alliance. Some have argued that French opposition to fou r-pow er cooperation in Germany during a crucial period from the end o f th e w ar until early 1946 ruined the one great opportunity to take advantage o f Russian desires to develop a quadripartite administration o f Germ any. However, that line o f reasoning seemingly ignores the broader scope o f Soviet-Am erican relations. Mutual distrust is frequently a selffu lfillin g prophecy, and such distrust had certainly existed between the tw o nations since the Russian R evolution in 1917. French vetoes in the A llied C ontrol Council may have blocked early steps toward Soviet-A m erican cooperation in Germany, but the confrontations in Turkey, Iran, Greece, and Russian occupied Eastern Europe did not occur because the French feared any sort o f unified Germany. M oreover, both the United States and the Soviet Union could count on French opposition to any real m ovem ent tow ard an effective join t administration o f Germany, which le ft them free to posture and still leave all their options open. In fact, it is easier to argue that the policies o f Franklin Roosevelt toward the S oviet Union, even with all their ambiguities and hedging, were an aberration rather than the norm. Antagonism toward Soviet Russia had been a hallm ark o f Am erican p olicy until Roosevelt extended diplom atic recogni­ tion in 1933, and that antagonism soon came to characterize the Truman adm inistration within a few months after R oosevelt’s death. Truman was eager to resolve the Soviet-Am erican confrontation but only on American term s; that is, through containm ent Since the containm ent concept had as a premise the b elief that communism contained within itself a set o f irresolvable tensions (i.e., the seeds o f its own destruction), patience and firmness became the tools o f victory, not accom m odation. Such a desire fo r foreign policy success is hardly reprehensible (a fter all, the president sweats an oath to achieve such nationalistic goals), but we should not pretend that file United States follow ed a p olicy o f conciliation, accommodation,and cooperation in an attem pt to create a situation where tw o very different p olitical /economic systems could coexist and w ork with each other. Truman’s instinctive reaction to Soviet policies was suspicion and belligerence, and his occasional statements about carrying on Roosevelt's policy o f cooperatim i becom e meaningless in the absence o f real action. A n y discussion o f the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany cannot avoid some speculation on the structure o f Europe and elsewhere had it been im ple­ m ented. Certainly it would have meant much more than just a w orld without the Volkswagen. The one alternative which Truman really never considered was the strong and insistent pursuit o f a neutralized and decentralized Germany. That alone would have reshaped and changed the basic structure o f the C old War. Possibly it would have helped to create a change fo r the worse,

62

DEATH AS DECISION-MAKER

i f we assume that Soviet belligerence toward the West existed w ithout regard fo r Western policies; possibly fo r the better, if we assume that Russian fears o f Germany were historic and real and that Soviet policies reflected, at least in part, the actions o f the Western nations. Even i f tension and con flict between pow erful nation-states is inevitable, the intensity o f the Cold War has proceeded from specific issues. Germany, where Soviet and Am erican pow er physically m et, was the greatest issue o f all. The Morgenthau Plan did not have im proved Soviet-Am erican relations as a primary goal, but a weak and neutral Germany lay at the very heart o f the proposal. When the Am erican government finally threw out the Morgenthau Ran fo r Germany, it threw out the baby with the bath water; fo r not only did the United States eschew a p olicy o f revenge, but it also tossed away programs which could have established a truly neutral, disengaged Germany. That alternative m ight have, with relatively little risk, significantly diminished the tension and length o f the Cold War.

Notes 1, Roosevelt claimed to have absolutely no recollection o f having signed the State Department memo. Whether that was a result o f his health or his dissembling cannot be determined—though Morgenthau attributed it to illness. 2. Statement by Lt, CoL John Boettiger, as quoted in John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nichols, The Semblance o f Peace (London: Macmillan it Co., 1972), p. 186n. Boettiger was a son-in-law o f President Roosevelt.

part two — Documents of the Decision

1 ■ — The Q uebec M em o ra n d u m This memorandum apparently com m itted R oosevelt and Churchill to an extrem e form o f the Morgenthau Plan. B rief but unambiguous, it went against the bulk o f opinion in both the British and Am erican governments. R oosevelt soon began to hedge on his com m itm ent, and Churchill quickly follow ed suit. Nonetheless, the shock waves created by this memorandum stimulated responses in the Am erican bureaucracy which resulted in some portions o f the harsh peace approach being permanently w ritten into occupation directives. Ib is memorandum is evidence that Roosevelt had considered S oviet cooperation in the postwar w orld as probable. It com pletely elim inated any chance o f Germany becom ing a factor in the postwar pow er equation.

D o c u m e n ti" A t a conference between the President and the Prime M inister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was fe lt that an essential feature was the future disposition o f the Ruhr and the Saar. The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion o f the industries o f Russia and o f other neighbouring Allies, and it is on ly in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be entitled to losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out o f action and dosed down. It was fe lt that the tw o districts should be put under some body under the w orld organization which would-supervise the dismantling o f these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfüge. This programme fo r elim inating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country prim arily agricultural and pastoral in its character. The Prim e M inister and the President were in agreement upon this programme. (In td .) O .K. F.D .R . (Intd.)W .S.C . 15 9. tFrom : Memorandum Initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill, September 16, 1944, in U.S., Departm ent o f State, Foreign Relation» o f the United State» (F R U S ), Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing O ffice, 1972) pp. 466-67.

aa

2 — A M eeting o f the M inds During discussions with Eden in March, 1943, Roosevelt clearly expressed his support fo r the dismemberment o f Germany and his b elief that the Soviet Union also supported that policy. The president's distrust o f the situation in postwar France is evident from his hope that German disarmament would make French rearmament unnecessary. Eden’s b elief that Stalin had no desire to be saddled with a defeated Germany contrasts strikingly with the Cold War assumption that the Soviet Union had always planned to conquer as much o f Europe as it could.

D o c u m e n ti" . . .Germany. Eden said that the most im portant thing we had to get a meeting o f the minds on in regard to Germany was the question o f whether we were going to be able to deal with Germany as a unit after the war, disarming them, etc., and also fo r the peace, or whether we were going to insist that it be broken up into several independent states. Eden said that from the conferences he had had with the Russians he was sure that Stalin would not trust the Germans; that in his speech the other day when he said the Russian armies were going to stop at the German Border, this was fo r propaganda purposes Inside Germany (Eden believed); that he, Stalin, has a deepseated distrust o f the Germans and that he w ill insist that Germany be broken up into a number o f states. The President said he hoped we would not use the methods discussed at Versailles and also prom oted by Clemenceau to arbitrarily divide Germany, but thought that we should encourage the differences and ambitions that w ill spring up within Germany fo r a Separatist M ovem ent and, in effect, approve o f a division which represents German public opinion. I asked what they would do if that spontaneous desire did not spring up and both the President and Eden agreed that, under any circumstances, Germany must be divided into several states, one o f which must, over all circumstances, by Prussia. The Prussians cannot be perm itted to dom inate all Germany. Eden said he believed that one o f the reasons Stalin wanted a second front in Europe was political; that if Germany collapsed he had no desire, in Germany, to take the full responsibility fo r what would happen in Germany or the rest o f Europe, and he believed it was a fixed m atter o f Russian foreign

tF rom : Memorandum by Hopkins o f Conversation with Eden and Roosevelt, March 16, 1943, in U.S., Department o f State, FRUS, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 1963), voi. 3, pp. 16*17.

66

DOCUMENT

67

policy to have both British and United States troops heavily in Europe when the collapse comes. Eden expressed this purely as his private opinion and said that he was sure that in Russia a different view was held in some quarters but, nevertheless, he thought he had stated Stalin’s position. We, then, discussed, at some length, the political e ffe c t o f our troops being in Italy as against France at the tim e o f the collapse o f Germany and, while both Eden and the President thought it would not be as advantageous it was Car better than not being there at all. I told the President it was im portant that we have the frankest kind o f talk w ith Mr. Eden about potential differences in Europe and that, at the m om ent, I saw tw o—1, The people o f Serbia and Croatia and, 2, the problem o f what countries, free and otherwise, should be disarmed in Europe. I fe lt that from what Mr. Eden had said he would not believe in a disarmed Poland o r France and I thought it would be very unfortunate if he went back to London without fu lly understanding the President’s position in this, even i f he did not fu lly agree and that he, Eden, should tell the Presdient, frankly, what his objections [w e re ] to the disarmament o f countries like France and Poland. The President reiterated to Eden what he had told Churchill, that after Germany is disarmed what is the reason fo r France having a big m ilitary establishment?

3 - T h e State Departm ent on G erm any, Septem ber, 1943 In preparation fo r Secretary o f State Hull*« trip to M oscow in O ctober, 1943, the State Department’s ad hoc Interdivisional Country Com m ittee on Germany prepared a strong recomm endation against partition and in favor o f the political reintegration o f Germany. Arguing that a dem ocratic government could survive in Germany only under favorable conditions, the com m ittee recommended in strong terms that the German econom y be rehabilitated. The tone o f the docum ent clearly indicates the strong feelings o f distrust and antagonism toward the Soviet Union which were held by many State Department officials. W ithout saying so, the report recommends that Germany join some sort o f Western entente against the spread o f communism.

D o c u m e n t't

The Political Reorganization o f Germany I. P A R T IT IO N The Departmental Com m ittee on Germany unanimously recommends that the United States Government oppose the enforced break-up o f Germany as a part o f the peace settlement. The Com m ittee bases its recomm endation on the follow in g considerations: 1. The crucial means o f attaining security against further German aggres­ sion fo r some tim e to com e w ill be controls to insure m ilitary and econom ic disarmament. I f these controls are effectively enforced Germany w ill be incapable o f waging war. 2. These measures w ill have to be maintained whether Germany is partitioned or le ft intact. Partition would make no useful contribution either to occupation or to the administration o f the basic controls; it m ight, on the contrary, com plicate the administration and, by setting up separate zones, lead to friction between the victor powers over the character o f the occupation and the treatm ent o f the several regions.

tF rom : “ The Political Reorganization o f Germ any," Recommendation o f the Interdivisional Country Com m ittee, September 23, 1943, in Poêtwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, by Harley A . N otter, Department o f the State Publication 3580 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 1949), pp. 558-59.

68

DOCUMENT

68

3. Because o f the high degree o f econom ic, political and cultural integration in Germany it is to be anticipated that partition would have to be im posed and maintained by external force and that such action would evoke a greatly increased resentment on the part o f the German people to the serious detrim ent o f their ultim ate recondiliation with the peace settlem ent. 4. An imposed partition would require the enforcem ent o f sweeping measures, over and above the basic m ilitary and econom ic controls, to prevent surreptitious collaboration o f the partite states and to restrain the nationalistic drive fo r reunification. The victor powers would consequently impose on themselves through partition a burden unnecessary fo r the attainm ent o f security and would give to the Germans, equally without necessity, a ready-made program o f national resurgence at the expense o f the peace. 5. By the tests o f effectiveness, enforceability and continued acceptability to both victors and vanquished, partition would make no contribution to security and would, on the contrary, create such Utterness and require such rigorous methods o f enforcem ent that it would constitute a grave danger to. future world order. D . D E M O CR AC Y The Departmental Com m ittee on Germany believes that it would be unwise fo r the United Nations to disinterest themselves In the kind o f governm ent which w ill be established in Germany after the war. The potentialities fo r evil on the part o f a reviewed aggressive state point to the desirability o f every feasible e ffo rt to prevent the resurgence o f a government and people dom inated by excessive nationalism. The com m ittee anticipates that there w ill be strong incentives fo r individual states to exercise influence and suggests that the best means o f forestalling such a dangerous procedure would be an agreement among the principal United N atiofis fo r a common p olicy insofar as it can be achieved. The com m ittee is o f opinion that, in the long run, the m ost desirable form o f government fo r Germany would be a broadly-based dem ocracy operating under a bill o f rights to protect the civil and political liberties o f the individual. The com m ittee is under no illusions as to the difficulties in the way o f creating an effective democracy in Germany. It suggests that there are three conditions under which a new dem ocratic experim ent might survive: 1. A tolerable standard o f living. 2. A minimum o f bittemess against the peace terms in order, insofar as possible, to avoid an appealing program fo r future nationalistic upheavals at home and disturbances abroad. The com m ittee is aware that the occupation and the permanent security controls which it deems imperative w ill give offense to many Germans, but it recommends, because o f the importance o f ultimate German reconciliation with the peace settlem ent, that the measures be kept to the minimum in number and in severity which w ill be com patible with security.

TO

THS STATS DEPARTMENT ON GERMANY, SEPTEMBER, 194S

3. A harmony o f p olicy between the British and Am erican Governments on the one hand and the Soviet Government on the other. In case o f friction Germany would be in a position to hold the balance o f pow er with disastrous results both fo r treaty lim itations and fo r political stability at hom e. The Soviet Government, in turn, would be in a position to use the Communist strength in Germany to the great disadvantage o f the internal political peace o f Germany and to the comparably great advantage o f Russian interests. The com m ittee therefore recommends that the United States Government adopt, in the interest o f fostering moderate government in Germany, the principle o f a program looking to the econom ic recovery o f Germany, to the earliest possible reconciliation o f the German people with the peace, and to the assimilation o f Germany, as soon as would be com patible with security considerations, into the projected international order. The Com m ittee further recommends that the Soviet Governm ent be invited to give its support to a new dem ocratic experim ent and to the principle o f the suggested program. The com m ittee believes that there is a marked disadvantage, both from the view point o f political warfare against National Socialism and from the view point o f preparing the dem ocratic forces o f Germany fo r action, in the failure o f the United States and British Governments to announce their support o f future German democracy. The com m ittee likewise believes that the recent appearance o f a dem ocratic German program under tacit Russian patronage might serve to give the Communists control o f the dem ocratic movement, and therefore establish a Russian hegemony in Germany, unless Anglo-Am erican support encourages the moderates to participate and make the m ovement genuinely dem ocratic.. . .

4

-—

— R oosevelt on G erm any: October, 1943 During conversations just preceding Hull's trip to M oscow, State Department officials learned o f the president’s strong support fo r a political but no econom ic dismemberment o f Germany. With the historically exaggerated success o f the Zollverein (a customs union among the German states that existed prior to the unification o f Germany under Prussia) clearly in mind, Roosevelt dismissed arguments that such Germany-wide econom ic coopera­ tion would not work without concom itant political unity. As o f those conversations on O ctober 5, 1943, the president obviously had no plan to deindustrialize Germany beyond the elim ination o f all arms-making capa­ bilities. Later in the same m eeting, R oosevelt adm itted that his reliance on memories o f a trip to Germany taken tw enty-five years earlier might be misplaced.

D o c u m e n tt Germany The President stated categorically that he favors partition o f Germany into three or more states, com pletely sovereign but joined by a network o f com m on services as regards postal arrangements, communications, railways, customs, perhaps pow er (although he thought pow er arrangements should be made on a continental basis), etc. The new German states should be deprived o f all m ilitary activities, including training, and o f armament industries. East Prussia should be detached, and all dangerous elements o f the population forcibly removed. As against the argument that partition would have many undesirable results and that the customs union arrangement would either prove to be unworkable or become a powerful instrument o f re-unification, the President stated that we are inclined to exaggerate these effects. Later in the discussion, however, the President said that the whole transitional period would have to be one o f trial and error, and that it may well happen that in practice we shall discover that partition, undertaken im m ediately after the war, may have to be abandoned. As regards reparation, there w ill be no exaction in m oney, but rather in manpower and equipm ent.. . .

tFrom : Memorandum o f Convermtion with Roosevelt and State Department O fficials, in U.S«, Department o f State« FR U S , 1943, voL 1, P. 642.

71

5

—

— R oosevelt a n d the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, N o v e m b er, 1943 Aboard the USS Iowa, enroute to the Cairo meetings w ith Churchill and the Teheran Conference with Churchill and Stalin in Novem ber and December, 1943, Roosevelt met with his Joint Chiefs o f Staff. Although the primary topic o f conversation related to m ilitary strategy, the possibility o f an early and com plete German surrender or collapse ( R A N K IN ) necessitated a con* sidération o f Am erican p olicy fo r postwar occupation. T w o themes pre­ dom inate: the president's desire fo r the partitioning o f Germany, and his absolute refusal to become involved in the problems o f postwar France. The president's policies clearly presume a harmonious relationship w ith the Soviet Union.

Documentt Spheres o f Responsibility in Germany— Europe-Wide “ Rankin” The President observed that in the memorandum he received from Adm iral Leahy on behalf o f the Joint Chiefs o f S taff asking fo r guidance regarding spheres o f influence as a result o f a European-wide Rankin, the paper makes certain suppositions w ithout actually saying so. He fe lt that whatever territorial dispositions were made should conform to geographic subdivisions o f Germany. He said that the Soviet Governm ent w ill o ffe r no objection to breaking up Germany after the war, that practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five. He said (1 ) we might take southern Germany, Baden, Wurtenburg [ Württemberg/, Bavaria, everything south o f the Rhine [M a in ?]. This area form s a sort o f southern state. (2 ) Take everything north and west o f that area, including Hamburg and Hanover, and so forth, up to and including Berlin to form a second state, and the northeastern part, that is, Prussia, Pomerania, and south, to form a third state. He believed these general divisions were a logical basis fo r splitting up tF rom : Minute« o f the President’« Meeting with the Joint C hief« o f S taff, Novem ber 19, 1943, in U.S., Department o f State .FA US, Conference at Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Waahington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 1961), pp. 263-64,266-66.

T2

DOCUMENT

73

Gennany. Especially was this so because the first or southern state was largely Roman C atholic; the northwestern portion is Protestant, a itile it might be said that the religion o f the northeastern part is Prussianism. He fe lt that Marshal Stalin might "o k a y ” such a division. He believed that the Chiefs o f Staff w ould want to make a European Rankin conform to such a division. Actually the British wanted the northwestern part o f Germany and would like to see the U.S. take France and Germany south o f the M oselle River. He said he did not like that arrangement We do not want to be concerned with reconstituting France. France is a British "b ab y.” United States is not popular in France at the present tim e. H ie British should have France, Luxem bourg, Belgium, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg. The occupation o f these places should be British. The United States should take northwest Germany. We can get our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg, also Norway and Denmark, and we should go as far as Berlin. The Soviets could then take the territory to the east thereof. H ie United States should have Berlin. Tb e British plan fo r the United States to have southern Germany, and he (th e President) did not lik e .. . . The President said he fe lt that the divisions now in North A frica, Sicily and Ita ly should be the divisions first to be sent back to the United States. He said one reason fo r the political "headache” in France was that De Gaulle hoped to be one mile behind the troops in taking over the government. He felt that w e should get out o f France and Italy as soon as possible, letting the British and the French handle their own problem together. There would defin itely be a race fo r Berlin. We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible. Adm iral Leahy observed it would be easy to go directly into northwest Germany. The problem o f occupational troops proceeding to northwest Germany would certainly be less d ifficu lt than their fighting their way there across the intervening territory from northwestern France. General Marshall observed that it was m ost im portant to keep commands in homogeneous control. The President said he envisaged a railroad invasion o f Germany with little or no fighting. General Marshall said he assumed there would be a d ifficu lt lack o f rolling stock and the land advance would have to be largely made on a m otor truck basis. Mr. Hopkins suggested that we be ready to put an airborne division into Berlin tw o hours after the collapse o f Germany. In reply to a question from the President as to Adm iral Leahy’s opinion o f the occupational area divisions, from a State Department point o f view , Admiral Leahy said that he fe lt we should defin itely get out o f France as soon as possible. We should accept any difficulties in order to get out o f France at the earliest possible tim e. I f we want to le t De Gaulle have France, all w ell and good. However, whatever troops there are in France at the tim e o f German collapse w ill certainly have to stay in order to supervise any elections. General De Gaulle wants to start the French Government right

74

ROOSEVELT AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER, IM S

now. Possibly there w ill be civil war in France. The British should clear up such a condition. On the other hand, it would be much easier fo r the United States to handle conditions in Germany. U te Germans are easier to handle than would be the French under the chaotic conditions that could be expected in France. The President said he personally envisaged an occupational force o f about one m illion United States troops. He expanded on Ute policy o f “ quaran­ tine.” He said that the four United Nations by their police power could, if necessary, maintain order in Europe by the “ quarantine” m ethod. For instance, we do not want to use our troops in settling local squabbles in such a place as Yugoslavia. We could use the Arm y and Navy as an econom ic blockade and preclude ingress or egress to any area where disorder prevailed. In reply to a question from General Marshall as to how long the President contem plated it would be necessary to maintain one m illion men in Europe, the President replied fo r at least one year, maybe tw o .. . .

6

—

— T h e T eh eran C on ference Although the Big Three made no binding com mitment at Teheran to any specific formula fo r the dismemberment o f Germany, they did agree on the principle o f a partitioning o f Germany after the war. Working in tandem against a slightly reluctant Winston Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt also raised the issue o f deindustrialization and seemed quite taken with the idea. Reparations, the issue which later caused a shift in Soviet policy regarding Germany's postwar econom y, did not make an appearance during the Teheran discussions.

D o c u m e n tf Turning to the question o f Germany, The President said that the question was whether or not to split up Germany. Marshal Stalin replied that they preferred the dismemberment o f Germany. The Prime Minister said he was all fo r it but that he was prim arily more interested in seeing Prussia, the evil core o f German militarism, separated from the rest o f Germany. The President said he had a plan that he had thought up some months ago fo r the division o f Germany in five parts. These five parts were: 1. A ll Prussia to be rendered as small and weak as possible. 2. Hanover and Northwest section. 3. Saxony and Leipzig area. 4. Hesse—Darmstadt Hesse-Kassel and the area South o f the Rhine. 5. Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemburg [ Württemberg]. He proposed that these five areas should be self-governed and that there should be tw o regions under United Nations or some form o f International control. These were: 1. The area o f the K iel Canal and the C ity o f Hamburg. 2. The Ruhr and the Saar, the latter to be used fo r the benefit o f all Europe. The Prime Minister said, to use an American expression, "H ie President had said a m outhful." He went on to say that in his mind there were tw o considerations, one destructive and the other constructive. 1. The separation o f Prussia from the rest o f the Reich.

tFrom : Minutes o f Tripartite Political Meeting, December 1,1943, U.S., Department o f State, FRUS, Teheran, pp. 600, 602-604.

7»

7«

THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

2. T o detach Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemburg [W ürttem berg] and the Palatinate from the rest o f Germany and make them part o f the C onfeder­ ation o f the Danube. Marshal Stalin said he fe lt i f Germany was to be dismem bered, it should really be dismem bered, and it was neither a question o f the division o f Germany in five o r six states and tw o areas as the President suggested. H ow ever, he said he preferred the President’s plan to the suggestion o f Mr. Churchill. He fe lt that to include German areas within the fram ew ork o f large confederations would m erely o ffe r an opportunity to the German elem ents to revive a great State. He went on to say that he did not believe there was a difference among Germans; that all German soldiers fought like devils and the on ly exception was the Austrians. He said that the Prussian O fficers and Staffs should be elim inated, but as to the inhabitants, he saw little difference between one part o f Germ any and another. He said he was against the idea o f confederation as artificial and one that w ould n ot last in that area, and in addition would provide opportunity for the German elem ents to control. Austria, fo r exam ple, had existed as an independent state and should again. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria likewise. The President said he agreed w ith the Marshal, particularly in regard to the absence o f differences between Germans. He said fift y years ago there had been a difference but since the last war it was no longer so. He said the on ly difference was that in Bavaria and the Southern part o f Germany there was no o ffic e r c a s t[e ] as there had been in Prussia. He agreed w ith Marshal Stalin that the Austrians were an exception. The Prim e M inister said he did not wish to be considered as against the dismemberment o f Germany—quite the contrary, but he fe lt to separate the parts above would m erely mean that sooner or later they w ill reunite in to one nation and that the main thing was to keep Germany divided i f on ly fo r fifty years. Marshall Stalin repeated what he had said as to the danger o f the re-unification o f Germany. He said no m atter what measures were adopted there would always be a strong urge on the part o f the Germans to unite. He said it was a great mistake to unite Hungary w ith Germans since the Germans would m erely control the Hungarians and to create large frame­ works w ithin which the Germans could operate would be very dangerous. He fe lt the w hole purpose o f any international organization to preserve peace would be to neutralize this tendency on the part o f the Germans and apply against them econom ic and other measures and i f necessary, force, to prevent their unification and revival. He said the victorious nations must have the strength to beat the Germans if they ever start on the path o f a new war. The Prim e M inister inquired whether Marshal Stalin contem plated a Europe com posed o f little states, disjoined, separated and weak.

DOCUMENT

TT

Marshal Stalin replied not Europe but Germany. He supposed fo r exam ple that Poland would be a strong country, and France, an d Ita ly likew ise; that Rumania and Bulgaria would remain as they always h a d ; small States. T h e President remarked Germany had been less dangerous to civilization when in 107 provinces. T h e P rim e M inister said he hoped fo r larger units. T h e P rim e M inister then returned to the question o f Poland and said he was n o t asking fo r any agreement nor was he set on the m atter but he had a statem ent which he would like to have the Marshal examine. This statem ent suggested that Poland should obtain equal com pensation In the W est, including Eastern Prussia and frontiers on the Oder to compensate fo r th e areas which would be in the Soviet Union. T h e President interjected to say that one question in regard to Germany rem ained to be settled and that was what body should be em powered to study c a refu lly the question o f dismemberment o f Germany. It w as agreed that the European Advisory Com m ittee [Com m ission] w ould undertake this task.

7 : R o o se v e lt o n F ran ce a n d G erm an y, F ebruary, 1944 In this letter to Churchill, R oosevelt's main concern is the broad question o f autonom y fo r SC AE F (Supreme Commander A llied Expeditionary Forces) in liberated France or occupied Germany. His approach to that problem is indicative o f his overall approach to foreign p olicy decisions. Given the slightest excuse or rationale, he postponed any sort o f binding, final decisions and le t events decide the hard issues. The final paragraph o f the letter demonstrates the depth o f R oosevelt's desire to avoid entanglem ent in European politics, particularly anything to do w ith France.

Docum enti President Roosevelt to the British Prime M inister (C hurchill) Washington, February 29,1944 Dear W inston:—I have been w orrying a good deal o f late on account o f the tendency o f all o f us to prepare fo r future events in such detail that we may be lettin g ourselves in fo r trouble when the tim e arrives. As you doubtless rem ember, at Quebec last Summer the S ta ff people took a shot at drawing up terms o f surrender fo r Italy. The Am erican d raft was short and to the poin t and was fin ally adopted and presented. But later on the long and com prehensive terms, which were drawn up by you r people, were presented to Badoglio. I did not like them because they attem pted to foresee every possibility in one docum ent. But, as so often happens, when such an attem pt is made, certain points were om itted and additional protocols w ith respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented. That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are join tly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages w ith detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible. Therefore, I re-drew them w ith the thought o f making the Commander-InC h ief solely responsible fo r O verlord and fo r the maintenance o f law , order and reasonable justice fo r the first few months after w e get in to France. I

+From R oosevelt to Churchill, February 29,1944, In U.S., Department o f State, FRU S, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1966), voL 1, pp. 188-69.

78

DOCUMENT

T»

have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and w ith representa* tives o f th e French National Com m ittee in such places as they have m ilitary status, b u t that he and his sta ff bear the sole responsibility. N o w com es this business o f what to do when we get in to Germany. I understand that you r S ta ff presented a long and comprehensive docum ent— w ith e v ery known kind o f terms—to the European Advisory Commission, and that th e Russians have done som ewhat the same. M y peop le over here believe that a short docum ent o f surrender terms should be adopted. This, o f course, has nothing to do w ith the locality o f the occu pying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument o f surrender which is in con form ity w ith the general principles. I am enclosing (a ) an argument—facts bearing on the problem and (b ) a proposed acknowledgm ent o f unconditional surrender by Germany. I h ope much that you w ill read the argument. I think it is very cogent. I am tryin g as hard as I can to sim plify things—and sometimes I shudder at the thought o f appointing as many new Com m ittees and Commissions in the Alture as we have in the past! 1 n ote that in the British proposal the territory o f Germany is divided up in accordance w ith British plan. “ D o please d o n 't” ask me to keep any Am erican forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back hom e. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity o f Belgium , France and Italy. Y ou really ought to bring up and discipline you r ow n children. In view o f the fact that they may be you r bulwark in future days, y o u should at least pay fo r their schooling now ! W ith m y warm regards, A s ever yours, F R A N K L IN D. R O O SE V E LT T h e tw o enclosures m entioned in the letter are n ot in the State D epartm ent o r R oosevelt Library files, but can be found in the British archives; see Prim e M inister's Operational Files (P R E M IE R 3)/file 197 /folder 3/pp. 167-77, Public R ecord O ffice, London. The enclosures, relating to surrender terms fo r Germ any, had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs o f S taff.

=

=

=

A m e ric a n P la n s for O c c u p y in g G e rm a n y

In this m em o to the acting secretary o f state, Edward Stettinius, R oosevelt d early set forth his reasons fo r demanding that the Am erican occupatim i zone in Germany be in the northwest, not the south. His reference to p olitical considerations in the United States necessitating such a decision is obscure, but m ay have been a reference to the long-standing Am erican b e lief that the British hoped to entangle the United States in European politics.

Docum entt Memorandum fo r the Acting Secretary o f State I disagree w ith the British proposal o f d ie dem arcation o f boundaries which would go in to e ffe c t in Germ any after th eir surrender or after fighting has stopped. 1. I d o n ot want the United States to have the post-war burden o f reconstituting France, Ita ly and the Balkans. This is not our natural task at a distance o f 3,500 miles o r m ore. It is d efin itely a British task in which the British are far m ore vitally interested than we are. 2. From the poin t o f view o f the United States, our prin dpal ob ject is not to take part in the internal problem s in southern Europe but is rather to take part in elim inating Germ any at a possible and even probable cost o f a third W orld War. 3. Various points have been raised about the d ifficu lties o f transferring our troops, etc., from a French fro n t to a northern German front-~w hat is called a “ leap-frog” . These objections are spedous because no m atter where British and Am erican troops are on the day o f Germ any’s surrender, it is physically easy fo r them to go any where—north, east or south. 4. I have had to consider also the ease o f maintaining Am erican troops in som e part o f Germany. A ll things considered, and rem em bering th at all supplies have to com e 3,500 m iles or m ore by sea, the United States should use the ports o f northern Germany—Hamburg and Bremen—and the ports o f the Netherlands fo r this long range operation.

+From : Memorandum from Roosevelt to Stettinius, February 21, 1944, U.8., Departm ent o f State Archives, Decimal F ile 740.00119 C ontrol (Germany/-2-2144, N ational Archives, Washington, D.C.

DOCUMENT

SI

5. T h erefore, I think the Am erican p olicy should be to occupy north­ western Germ any, the British occupying the area from the Rhine south, and also being responsible fo r the policing o f France and Ita ly, i f this should becom e necessary. 6. In regard to the lon g range security o f Britain against Germ any, this is n o t a part o f the first occupation. The British w ill have plenty o f tim e to w ork that out, including Helgoland, air fields, etc. The Am ericans by that rim e w ill be on ly to o glad to retire all their m ilitary forces from Europe. 7. I f anything further is needed to ju stify this disagreement w ith the British lines o f dem arcation, I can on ly add that p olitical considerations in the U nited States makes m y decision conclusive. Y o u m ight speak to me about this i f the above is n ot w h olly dear. F.D .R .

9

_________________________________________

"Combined Directive for Military G o vern m en t in G e rm a n y Prior to D efeat or Surren der” Although CCS 551 theoretically pertained on ly to the interim period o f occupation in Germany between a m ilitary takeover o f portions o f Germany and total surrender or occupation, it aimed Am erican p olicy in directions which could and did make other decisions foregone conclusions. The directive established extensive autonom y fo r the m ilitary commanders and called fo r the restoration o f coal and industrial production as required by the m ilitary. The clear emphasis was upon law, order, and a situation which w ould not produce civil unrest Punishment o f the Germans was lim ited to p olitical rather than econom ic measures.

D o c u m e n t't

Com bined Directive for Military Government in Germ any Prior to Defeat or Surrender A pril 28,1944 1. This directive is subject to such alteration as m ay be necessary to m eet join t recomm endations o f the European Advisory Commission in regard to the pœt-surrender period. It relates to the period before defeat or surrender o f Germany and to such parts o f Germany and Austria as are overrun b y the forces under you r command during such period. The same p olicy w ill be applied to occupied parts o f Austria as to occupied parts o f Germany excep t where d ifferen t treatm ent is required fo r Austria to m eet the provision o f the Political Guide at Appendix B o r other paragraphs dealing specifically w ith Austria. tF rom : Combined Directive fo r M ilitary Government In Germany Prior to D efeat or Surrender, Combined Chiefs o f Staff 661, A pril 28, 1944, in American MOttary Government, ed. Hajo H olbora (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Presa, 1947), pp. 186-89,143.

82

DOCUMENT

M

2. M ilitary governm ent w ill be established and w ill extend over all parts o f Germ any, including Austria, progressively as the forces under you r command capture German territory. Y ou r rights in Germany prior to unconditional surrender or German defeat w ill be those o f an occupying power. 3. a. By virtue o f you r position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority and pow er in the areas occupied by forces under you r command. This authority w ill be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deem ed by you necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to the exigencies o f m ilitary operations and the objectives o f a firm m ilitary governm ent b. Y ou are authorized at you r discretion, to delegate the authority herein granted to you in whole or in part to members o f you r command, and further to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate subdelegations. Y ou are further authorized to appoint members o f you r command as M ilitary Governors o f such territory or areas as you may determ ine. c. Y ou are authorized to establish such m ilitary courts fo r the control o f the population o f the occupied areas as may seem to you desirable, and to establish appropriate regulations regarding their jurisdiction and powers. d. The m ilitary governm ent shall be a m ilitary adm inistration which w ill show every characteristic o f an A llied undertaking, acting in the interests o f the United Nations. Whether o r not U.S. and U .K . civil affairs personnel w ill be integrated other than at you r headquarters w ill be a m atter fo r you r decision. 4. The U.S. and British flags shall be displayed at headquarters and posts o f the m ilitary government. The administration shall be identical throughout those parts o f Germany occupied by forces under you r command, subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances. 5. The m ilitary adm inistration shall contain no political agencies or political representatives o f the U.S. and U .K. U.S. and U .K . political officers appointed at you r headquarters w ill continue in o ffice. 6. Representatives o f civilian agencies o f the U.S.-U.K. Governm ents o r o f U N R R A shall not participate unless and until you consider such participation desirable when it w ill be subject, as to tim e and extent, to decision by the Com bined Chiefs o f S ta ff on you r recom m endation.. . .

Political Guide 1. The adm inistration shall be firm . It w ill at the same tim e be just and humane with respect to the civilian population so far as consistent w ith strict m ilitary requirements. Y ou v ili strongly discourage fraterni* zation between A llied troops and the German officials and population. It should be made clear to the local population that m ilitary occupation is intended; (1 ) to aid m ilitary operations; (2 ) to destroy Nazism-Fascism and the N azi H ierarchy; (3 ) to maintain and preserve law and order; and (4 ) to restore normal conditions among the civilian population as soon as passible, insofar as such conditions w ill not interfere w ith m ilitary op eration s.. . .

•4

COMBINED DULECTIVX FOR M ILITARY GOVERNMENT

6. The replacem ent o f local Governm ent officials w ho may be re* m oved w ill rest with the Supreme Commander w ho w ill decide whether the functioning o f the m ilitary governm ent is better served by the appointm ent o f officers o f the occupation forces or by the use o f the services o f Germans. M ilitary Governm ent w ill be effected as a general principle through indirect rule. The principal link fo r this indirect rule should be at the Bezirk o r Kreis level; controls at higher levels w ill be inserted at you r discretion. Subject to any necessary dismissals, local officials should be instructed to continue to carry out their duties. N o actual appointm ent o f Germans to im portant posts w ill be made until it has been approved by the Com bined Chiefs o f S taff. It should be made clear to any German, after eventual appointm ent to an im portant post, and to all other Governm ental officials and em ployees, that their continued em ploym ent is solely on the basis o f satisfactory perform ance and behavior. In general the entire N azi leadership w ill be rem oved from any post o f authority and no permanent m em ber o f the German General S ta ff nor o f the N azi Hierarchy w ill occupy any im portant Governm ental o r Civil position. The German Supreme Command and General S ta ff w ill be disbanded in such a way as w ill insure that its possible resuscitation later w ill be made as d ifficu lt as possib le.. . . 10. a. The propagation o f N azi doctrines and propaganda in any form d iali be prohibited. Guidance cm German education and schools w ill be given to you in a separate directive. b. N o political activity o f any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you . Unless you deem otherw ise, it is desirable that neither political personalities nor organized political groups, shall have any part in determ ining the policies o f the m ilitary adm inistration. It is essential to avoid any com mitments to , o r negotiations w ith, any political elements. German political leaders in exile shall have no part in the adm inistration. c. Y ou w ill institute such censorship and control o f press, printing, publications, and the dissemination o f news or inform ation by the above means and by m ail, radio, telephone, and cable o r other means as you consider necessary in the interests o f m ilitary security and intelligence o f all kinds and to carry out the principles laid down in this d ire c tiv e .. . . The follow in g directive relates to the period before the surrender o f Germany. In areas where there are no m ilitary operations in progress, when practicable and consistent w ith m ilitary necessity you should: (a ) see that the systems o f production, con trol, collection and distribution o f fo o d and agricultural produce are maintained, that fo o d processing factories continue in operation and that the necessary labor and transport are provided to insure maximum production. German fo o d and other supplies w ill be u tilized fo r the German population to the minimum exten t required to prevent disease and unrest Y ou w ill report on any surpluses that m ay be available as regards which separate instructions w ill be issued to you ; (b ) instruct the German authorities to restore the various utilities to fu ll working order, and to maintain coal mines in working condition and in full operation so far as transport w ill perm it. E xcept insofar as their production is

DOCUMENT

8ft

needed t o m eet you r requirements, o r as you m ay be instructed in subsequent directives, m unitions factories w ill be dosed pending further instructions. You w ill b e responsible fo r procuring such goods and materials fo r exp ort as you m ay fro m tim e to tim e be directed to obtain fo r the use o f the United Nations. Y o u w ill take steps to insure that no sabotage o r destruction is carried o u t b y the Germans o f any industrial plant, equipm ent o r stocks, or o f any b o o k s o r records relating thereto. Pending the issue o f further directives y o u w ill take such steps as you think desirable to preserve intact all such p lan t, equipm ent, books and records, paying particular attention to research an d experim ental establishm ent;. . .

IO— = ^ = ^ = The State Department on Germ any and the W orld E conom y The State Department’s long-term plans fo r Germany dem onstrate its conception o f the ideal postwar w orld. Although the proposals claim ed to be com patible w ith demands fo r guarantees against future German aggression, the departm ent’s real emphasis was upon the rehabilitation o f the German econom y. T o State Departm ent planners, the war provided an unparalleled opportunity to redirect com pletely the econom y o f a m ajor industrial nation toward a neom ercantile relationship w ith the rest o f the w orld; i.e ., an interdependent system where production and consum ption com plem ent and supplement that o f other nations rather than leading to cutthroat com peti­ tion. Convinced that econom ic con flict invariably lay at the ro o t o f any m ilitary con flict, the State Departm ent could honestly claim that its program w ould produce peace as w ell as prosperity.

Docum enti I. The Relation Between American economic Policy with Respect to Germ any and the Maintenance o f Peace and Security The basic long-term interest o f the United States is peace. Consequently, so far as Germ any is concerned, the basic objective o f the United States is to see that country does not again disturb the peace. Security against a renewal o f German aggression must fo r the m ost part be achieved by means other than econom ic controls. Econom ic measures d o not, and cannot by th eir nature, provide a substitute fo r the general international organization fo r the maintenance o f international peace and security, and fo r other measures o f security, to which the United States and its principal allies are pledged by the M oscow Declarations o f O ctober 1943. Am erican econom ic policies w ith respect to Germ any, as set forth below , are intended not to take the place o f but to buttress the instrum entalities which w ill have prim ary responsibility fo r maintaining peace and security by helping to create conditions in the econom ic sphere which w ill rem ove the danger o f future +From Memorandum o f the Executive Com m ittee on Foreign Econom ic P olicy, August 14 ,1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S, 1944, voL 1, pp. 279-86.

86

DOCUMENT

•T

aggression on the part o f Germ any. On the one hand, they aie Intended to provide necessary safeguards against resum ption by Germany o f its pre-war policies o f econom ic preparation fo r war. On the other hand, they are intended to create conditions under which Germany w ill contribute to the reconstruction o f Europe and the developm ent o f a peaceful and expanding w orld econom y in the benefits o f which Germany can hope, in due course, to sh are.. . .

II. General Objectives and Methods W ithin this fram ew ork, the over-all econom ic p olicy o f the United States w ith respect to Germany is directed to the achievement o f the follow in g fou r m ajor objectives: 1. The perform ance by Germany o f acts o f restitution and reparation required by the United Nations. 2. The control o f Germ any’s econom ic war potential, by the conversion o f German econom ic capacity directed to war purposes, and by rendering vulnerable to outside control the reconversion o f Germ any in to a war econom y able to launch and sustain a war o f aggression. 3. The elim ination o f German econom ic dom ination in Europe, which Germ any achieved b y the system atic exploitation o f the so-called MN ew O rder” in Europe and by a series o f other practices. 4. The effectu ation in due tim e o f a fundamental ch an ge in the organization and conduct o f German econom ic life which w ill integrate Germ any in to the type o f w orld econom y envisaged by the A tlan tic Charter.

III.

Reconstitution or Maintenance o f a Minimum Germ an Econom y

The objectives just stated cannot be achieved unless the German econom y is maintained at, or, i f necessary, restored to at least a predeterm ined minimum level o f effectiveness. The state o f the German econom y at the tim e o f surrender and the attitude o f the German people thereafter w ill have a decisive bearing on the nature and exten t o f the econom ic controls and measures which the occupa­ tion authorities w ill be able initially to put in force. Under the m ost favorable circumstances, econom ic disruption w ill be great. It is even possible that a m ore o r less com plete econom ic collapse w ill occur either before o r after surrender. Such a collapse would delay o r im pair the effective operation o f the econom ic controls proposed below . A t least a minimum degree o f operating effectiveness in the German econom y is especially im portant not on ly to facilitate the achievem ent o f the m ajor long-run objectives stated above, but also 1. to facilitate an orderly dem obilization and absorption o f the German armed forces in to peace-tim e occupations; 2. to facilitate the orderly return o f A llied prisoners o f war, foreign workers and other displaced persons to their countries o f origin o r choice; 3. to ensure the maintenance and safeguarding o f property in Germany and elsewhere under German con trol, in which the United Nations, fo r any reason, have an interest;

M

THZ STATE DEPARTMENT ON GERMANT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

4. to make possible prom pt German contributions to the re lie f and rehabilitation o f other countries; 6. to enforce, as far as possible, the econom ic rehabilitation o f m inority groups within Germany which have been system atically despoiled; 6. to make possible the early beginning o f a program o f restitution and reparation by Germany to other countries; 7. to facilitate the adm inistration o f the entire German inland transport, com m unication and pow er systems in the interests o f the European econom y as a w hole; 8. to guarantee the prom pt reorientation o f forces and resources, a fter the defeat o f Germ any, from Europe to the Pacific fo r the defeat o f Japan. I t is therefore essential that the occupation authorities should form ulate and be in a position to enforce a series o f econom ic and financial policies in Germany adequate to maintain or reconstitute a minimum German econom y prom ptly. Fur this purpose Germany should be required initially to retain and place at the orders o f the occupation authorities the adm inistrative machinery charged w ith econom ic responsibility which may be in existence at the tim e o f surrender. It is, further, essential to orderly reconversion to post-war production that prelim inary programs be developed in advance o f the m ilitary collapse o f Germ any fo r reparation deliveries to m eet the im m ediate needs o f claim ant cou n tries.. . .

IV . Restitution and Reparation W ith regard to restitution, the m ajor p olicy o f this governm ent is to require the return o f identifiable stolen property to the governments o f the form er owners, and the relinquishm ent o f German rights, claims, and controls over property in occupied countries obtained by duress o r fraud. The overriding principle w ith regard to reparation is that reparation p olicy should con form to the long-range objectives o f this governm ent respecting Germany and the w orld at large. Reparation cannot be regarded as a m ajor means o f accom plishing these objectives, but the effects o f an unwise reparation settlem ent may go far tow ard defeating them. The reparation program must be designed so as to make the maximum contribution to the rehabilitation o f the countries injured by German aggression, while at the same tim e avoiding o r m inim izing possible harm in other d irection s.. . .

V . Control o f Germ an Econom ic W ar Potential It is the intention o f this Governm ent to pursue a p olicy w ith regard to German econom ic war potential which w ill reinforce and supplem ent the measures o f strictly m ilitary disarmament which w ill be taken by the Allies after the unconditional surrender o f Germany and which at the same tim e w ill be consistent w ith the m ajor long-run econom ic objectives o f the United States. It is to be recognized that the pattern o f the post-war German econom y, and the steps to be taken in shaping it during the con trol period, w ill be influenced n ot on ly by policies relating to the German econom ic war

DOCUMENT

M

potential, but also by policies relating to the reestablishment o r maintenance o f at least a minimum German econom y in the con trol period, by policies relating to reparation and restitution, and by policies relating to the ultim ate integration o f Germany in to a w orld econom y. This section, w h ich deals w ith the con tro l o f the German econom ic war potential, must therefore be read in connection w ith the other related sections o f this paper. Since a m ultitude o f industries contribute to a country's econom ic war potential, the destruction, dismantling o r conversion o f plants producing arms, am m unition, o r im plem ents o f war w ill elim inate on ly one aspect o f this econom ic war potential. These m ilitary measures w ill be buttressed by strengthening the econom ies o f Germ any's neighbors under the program fo r restitution and reparation, and to elim inate those high-cost industries and agricultural activities which had been established in Germany to make it self-sufficient in terms o f the requirements o f a war e c o n o m y .. . .

V I. Integration o f Germ any into the W orld Econom y and the Elim ination o f German Econom ic Dom ination in Europe A m ajor objective o f this Governm ent w ith regard to Germ any is that the latter m ust in due course be given the opportunity o f finding a permanent place in the w orld econom y, and o f making a peaceful and constructive contribution to the developm ent o f the com m unity o f free nations envisaged by the A tlan tic Charter. On the other hand, it is vital to prevent Germany from again becom ing a prim ary focus o f restrictive trade and financial practices. German econom ic self-sufficiency fo r war must be replaced by an econom y which can be integrated in to an inter-dependent w orld e c o n o m y .. . .

11 -The State Department on Reparations from Germ any The State Departm ent’s view o f postwar reparations from Germany reflected its com m itm ent to the speedy reintegration o f that nation in to the w orld econom y. A fte r com plaining that reparations created an artificial pattern o f trade, the follow in g report on reparations calls fo r the quickest possible end to such payments so that Germany could again participate in m ultilateral trade. H ie departm ent’s pessimism about the chances o f the wartim e alliance surviving in the form o f postwar cooperation shows in the recom m endation o f quick action at the United Nations aim ed at im pie* m enting the Am erican program before the coalition collapsed. Although the political atmosphere did not perm it the State Departm ent to fla tly oppose reparations and harsh punishment fo r the Germans, that sentim ent d early prevailed w ith Hull and his advisors.

Documenti" III. Resume o f Recommendations on the Final Reparation Agreem ent Ih e essential elements o f the program recom m ended in the Reparation R eport may be summarized as follow s: 1. Tim e Period. The reparation period should begin as soon as the United Nations have the pow er to impose econom ic controls on Germany. It should be lim ited to a minimum o f about five years from its inception but perhaps may have to be extended to ten. Both political and econom ic considerations emphasize the need fo r a short reparation period. The urgent needs o f the devastated areas fo r re lie f and rehabilitation and the desirability o f restoring norm ally functioning econom ies in these areas as rapidly as possible demand quick and decisive action. M oreover, unless the United Nations stand ready to exp loit fu lly the opportunity fo r cooperative action during the early period after the surrender o f Germ any, it m ay prove d ifficu lt to accomplish the aims o f the program.

tF rom : Memorandum, Executive Com m ittee on Foreign Economic PoUcy, August 12, 1944, ln U.S., Department o f State, FRU S, 1944, voL 1, pp. 289-90.

90

DOCUMENT

»1

The one-way m ovem ent o f goods and services which takes place under reparation is artificial and necessarily d ifferen t from normal trade. The longer it continues the longer is deferred the full resumption o f regular m ultilateral trade and the desired integration o f Germany into the w orld econom y. From the political poin t o f view , it must be rem embered that the hum iliation and cost o f reparation w ill alm ost inevitably be associated in the m ind o f the German public w ith the regim e in pow er at the tim e. F or this reason, long-continued reparation would prejudice the establishment o f dem ocratic governm ent in Germany and, indirectly, the maintenance o f peace. The collection o f substantial reparation from Germany w ill probably be im possible w ithout fairly extensive controls over the German econom y. Since this Governm ent has taken the position that enduring controls o f this nature are undesirable the length o f the reparation period w ill need to be correspondingly lim ited. I t is realized, however, that the countries which have been devastated by Germ any w ill probably demand a much longer reparation period. Tue long-range objectives o f this Governm ent make a five-year period preferable to a lon ger one. I f it is found necessary to extend this period, however, reparation deliveries should in no event continue beyond ten years. In case a period in excess o f five years is adopted, deliveries should taper o f f toward the end o f the extended p e rio d .. . .

12

—

T he British Foreign Office on Germ any and Russia, August, 1944 Although British opinion was far from unanimous, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden consistently supported a p olicy o f prom oting postw ar cooperation with the Soviet Union. His conversations w ith Morgenthan during the latter's trip to England in August, 1944, show a willingness to punish Germany but a simultaneous insistence that p olicy tow ard Germ any serve the interests o f p olicy tow ard Russia. Morgenthau and his advisors did n ot present their views on the econom ic future o f Germany but instead dealt prim arily with the issue o f partition. Eden’s strong language about punishing Germ any must, th erefore, be understood in terms o f support fo r dismem ber­ m ent rather than pastoralization.

Documentt August 15,1944 Conference at Sir Anthony Eden's O ffice at 4 P.M . Present: Sir Anthony Eden Mr. W. Strang, British m ember o f the E AC Secretary Morgenthau Ambassador Winant Mr. H.D. W hite The conference had been arranged by Sir Anthony Eden on previous Sunday, who had suggested that if the Secretary could com e to his o ffic e he could show him that portion o f the Tehran conference dealing w ith the decision on partition o f Germany. Eden began by reading excerpts from a report on the Tehran conference. He said that the report had been prepared by Archibald K e n and was sort o f a telegraphic report and not a verbatim report. The gist o f the excerpts which Eden read was as follow s: President R oosevelt said that he w ould like to discuss the question o f the partition o f Germ any. (A t this poin t Eden explained parenthetically that Churchill had been pushing the Polish question tF ro m : H.D. W hite Memorandum fo r the Secretary'« File o f a Conference at Sir Anthony Eden'« O ffice, August 18, 1944, Harry D exter W hite Paper«, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. *

92

DOCUMENT

OS

and th at Stalin was tryin g to get away from it and he feared likewise President R oosevelt, but that Churchill kept trying to bring the Polish m atter back in to the discussion.) President R oosevelt said that Germany could be divided in to three or fifteen parts. Stalin indicated sm ilingly that Churchill wasn't listening because he doubted whether Churchill was in favor o f dividing Germ any. Churchill replied that he hadn’t y e t le ft L w ow (thereby indicating that he still wanted to discuss the Polish question). The President expressed the view that the European Advisory Commission should be instructed to report on the problem o f partitioning Germ any. Stalin agreed. Since Stalin and R oosevelt fe lt strongly about the p oin t Churchill said he was w illin g to agree that d ie Commission should exam ine and report on the question o f the partition o f Germany. A fte r Eden finished reading Secretary Morgenthau com m ented that the directive to the E AC to report on the partition o f Germ any apparently was n ot known to the technicians in the United States working on the problem o f reparations because nothing in their memorandum suggested an awareness o f that d ire c tiv e .. . . Strange said that i f Germ any were divided it couldn’t produce reparations. 1 replied that that m ight or m ight n ot be true, but in any case it raised the m ore im portant question as to whether o r not the main objective o f postwar p olicy tow ard Germany was to be obtaining reparations or some other m ore im portant objective. Eden heartily agreed and stressed the view that obtaining reparations was not the decisive consideration. Strange said that it would be possible to deal much m ore effectively w ith a single Governm ent in Germany during the early period and that therefore th ey (th e British technicians) had proceeded on the assumption that there w ould be a unified Germany fo r the tim e being. I said that that m ight be true w ith respect to m ilitary disarmament, or even during the transition period, but the econom ic memorandum to which Strange was referring and the one being prepared by Am erican technical com m ittee dealt w ith reparations and long-term postwar policy. I said I didn’t see how an econom ic memorandum could be intelligently prepared i f it assumed that there was to be an undivided Germ any whereas the p olicy decision according to which they were asked to d raft a report called fo r a Germany divided in to several o r m ore parts. Eden agreed w ith that and Strange then said that they were also working out a memorandum based on the assumption o f a divided Germany. I asked Winant i f as a m em ber o f the E AC representing the United States he had ever instructed to go forw ard on a study based on the assumption tentatively decided upon at Tehran that Germany was to be separated in to many parts. The Ambassador replied that he had been at Tehran and knew that decision had been made but that he didn’ t know how much he was supposed to tell to his ow n Departm ent back home and that he had never received instructions from his own Departm ent to w ork on such a proposal. Secretary Morgenthau said that it was clear that the group in the State D epartm ent working on this problem were not inform ed that the report on an econom ic program fo r Germany during the postwar years was to be based

M

THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE ON GERMANY AND RUSSIA

on the assumption o f a partitioned Germ any. Secretary Morgenthau said when he w ent back to the States he would talk to President R oosevelt and Secretary Hull about the matter. Eden said that Russia was watching this very closely and that i f w e w ere to make reparations and an undivided Germany a postwar p olicy that it w ould make Russia pursue a p olicy o f her ow n. Eden said that there were some groups in both the United States and in England who feared that Communism would grow in Germany if a tough p olicy were pursued by the A llies. This group believed that it was im portant to have a strong Germany as protection against possible aggression by Russia. He said it was a question whether there was greater danger from a strong Germany or from a strong Russia. F o r his part he believed there was greater danger from a strong Germ any. He asked Strange directly “ D o you agree w ith m e?'* and Strange replied “ I certainly d o.” . . . Winant said that the President had told General Elsenhower that his supreme authority was to be in e ffe c t on ly to the end o f hostilities. I remarked that there was a period o f transition o f several months after hostilities in which the Arm y would necessarily have control and that directives were being prepared fo r that period now. Those directives could be m ore intelligently drafted i f the Arm y knew what the general objective was. I f the general objective was to be divided their directives m ight be m odified. Furtherm ore, the long-run objectives would in part be determ ined by what was done during the transition period and vice-versa.. . .

13

_

_

KW e H ave Got to b e Tough with Germ any.. The Presidential Diaries in the Morgenthau papers (m em oranda dictated by M orgenthau follo w in g his frequent meetings and regular luncheons w ith President R oosevelt) com prise one o f the few records available o f R oosevelt’s private conversations on matters o f p olicy. Morgenthau and the president w ere close friends, and their discussions were usually far m ore candid than m ost o f R oosevelt's other p olicy meetings. U nfortunately, Morgenthau frequ ently read m ore in to the president's remarks than R oosevelt apparently intended. M oreover, the president seems to have view ed such discussions as bull sessions w ith a friend rather than binding statements o f p olicy. Nevertheless, when Morgenthau returned from England in August, 1944, and to ld R oosevelt o f the state and war departments’ planning fo r Germ any, the president clearly adopted a hard-line attitude which ran counter to such plans. He reiterated his condem nations o f the German people as a whole and d ea rly indicated that the southern zone o f occupation in Germany posed no insurmountable problem s.

Docum entt I saw the President about tw elve o ’d o c k fo r h alf an hour. It was a very bad atm osphere to w ork under because he was h alf an hour late getting started, and I was told I would have on ly five minutes and then I could have the rest o f the tim e on the train tonight. I stayed fo r a h alf hour but I couldn’t d o justice to m y subject because I fe lt that I was under such pressure, and I talked terribly fast. The President was very attentive and trem endously interested and m ost frien dly. I to ld the President I had seen Churchill, who started the conversation by saying that England was broke. The President said, "W hat does he mean by that?” I said, "Y e s , England really is broke.” That seemed to surprise the President, and he kept com ing back to it. I said that Churchill’s attitude was that he was broke but not depressed about England's future. The President said that that was w ell put. He said, "W hat is his ow n attitude?” I said, "W ell, he is going to tell Parliament about their financial condition at the right tim e ?From : Morgenthau Memorandum o f Conversation With Rooaeveit, August 19, 1944, Presidential Diaries, Morgenthau Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N ,Y „ pp. 1386-88.

95

M

WB HAVB GOT TO BB TOUGH WITH GERMANY

after the Arm istice, and that when he does that he Is through.** So the President said, “ Oh, he is taking those tactics now . M ore recently his attitude was that he wanted to see England through the peace.’ * . . . During the course o f the conversation, the President kept com ing back to England’s being broke. He said, “ This is very interesting. 1 had no Idea that England was broke. I w ill go over there and make a couple o f talks and take over the British Empire.** I told him how popular he was w ith the soldiers and h ow unpopular Churchill was. I told him about the d ifficu lty o f finding some one to taire me through the shelters because both Churchill and Sir R obert M orris has been Jeered when they w ent through them recen tly, and that fin ally th ey decided on Mrs. Churchill and Lady M ountbatten. I then got on this question o f the future o f Germ any, and I to ld him how little b y little I put pieces together, and that fin ally Eden bad read to me from the minutes o f the Teheran Conference about R oosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreeing to the dismem berment o f Germ any, and that as a result o f that the European Advisory Com m ittee had been set up. I said, “ Mr. President, here in the State Departm ent, under H ull, Pasvolsky has been «w M n g a study, but he didn’t know about the Tehran Conference agreem ent** I to ld the President that when I called on H ull yesterday, Hull to ld me that he had never been to ld what was in the minutes at the Tehran m eeting. The President didn’ t lik e it, but he didn’t say anything. He look ed very embarrassed, and I repeated it so that he w ould be sure to get it. I said that Pasvolsky couldn’t get any instructions from H ull because Hull didn’t know what had been agreed upon. I said, “ as far as Winant goes, I can’t quite understand it because he had a group study this, and Winant claims he knew what you did and still the group under him were not carrying out you r Instructions.” I said, “ I can’t understand the English because Eden knew what happened because he said he was there and he had the minutes o f the m eeting, and still his man Strang, w ho represents England on the European Advisory Com m ittee, had been making a study quite contrary to you r wishes, and I think he lied because he said that they had begun a restudy a month ago. The sum and substance is that from the tim e o f the Teheran Conference down to now nobody has been studying how to treat Germ any roughly along the lines you w anted.” The President said, “ G ive me th irty minutes with Churchill and I can correct this.” Then the President said, “ We have got to be tough w ith Germ any and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis. Y ou either have to castrate the German people or you have g ot to treat them in su di a manner so they can’t just go on reproducing people w ho want to continue the way they have in the past.” I said, “ W ell, Mr. President, nobody is considering the question along those lines in Europe. In England they want to build up Germ any so that she can pay reparations.” He said, “ What d o we want reparations fo r? ” He le ft no doubt in m y m ind that he and I are looking at this thing in the same w ay, but the people down the line arent. He used some exam ple about Japan, showing how tough he is going to be. I said, “ Mr. President, it is going to be the first three years that w ill count,” and he agreed.

DOCUMENT

97

I to ld th e President about m y talk w ith Eisenhower, w ho is p erfectly prepared t o be tough w ith the Germans when he first goes in, but I said that all th e plans in G-5 are contrary to that view . They are going to treat them like a W P A p ro je c t I again w ant to say that the thing that seemed to bother the President was not so m uch that the people down the line were not studying to be tough w ith th e Germ ans as it was that England was broke, although he le ft no doubt w hatsoever in m y m ind that he personally wants to be tough w ith the Germans. H e said, “ They have been tough w ith us.” I th en to ld him that the A rm y, contrary to what I thought his wishes were, were plan n in g to put the United States Arm y in to the south o f Germ any, and he said th a t that was unim portant. He said the on ly thing he cared about was that h e d id n ’ t want to be le ft w ith France in his la p .. . .

14

_________________________

"Handbook of Military Government for Germ any” Morgenthau and his sta ff believed that War Department planning fo r the m ilitary occupation o f Germany set in m otion steps which would inevitably lead to the econom ic rehabilitation o f that nation. M oreover, those plans assumed A llied responsibility fo r the quality o f life in Germ any, som ething Morgenthau claim ed would result in the Germans suffering less than those they had conquered. The follow in g summary o f the army guide fo r occupation authorities prepared the way fo r Morgenthau to argue that the Germans should be le ft com pletely to their own devices w ith A llied controls being only negative; i.e., disarmament and deindustrialization. C learly, the army hoped to avoid political questions and concentrated instead on law , order, and efficien cy.

Documentf The follow in g are extracts from the “ Handbook o f M ilitary Governm ent fo r G erm any", to be given fo r guidance to every U.S. and U .K . m ilitary governm ent o ffic e r entering Germany. They tend to indicate the typ e o f thinking and planning upon which the program o f m ilitary governm ent fo r Germ any is being form ulated. The “ H andbook" is based on and is in harm ony w ith the econom ic and political directives approved by the Com bined C ivil A ffairs Com m ittee under the authority o f the Com bined Chiefs o f S taff. “ Y ou r main and im m ediate task, to accomplish you r mission, is to get things running, to pick up the pieces, to restore as quickly as possible the o ffic ia l functioning o f the German civil governm ent in the area fo r which you are responsible.. . . The first concern o f m ilitary governm ent w ill be to see that the machine works and works e ffic ie n tly ". “ The principles with which O fficers in M ilitary Governm ent Staffe and Detachments w ill be concerned include: the reorganization o f the German Police and the maintenance o f Law and Order; the supervision o f the German Judiciary and the establishment o f A llied M ilitary Courts; the con trol o f the German Finances; the protection o f property; the establishment and

?F rom : Morgenthau, Memorandum (o r the President, August 26, 1944, Presidential Diaries, Morgenthau Papers, Roosevelt Library, pp. 1894*96.

98

DOCUMENT

99

maintenance o f an adequate standard o f public health; the prom otion o f agriculture; the control, supply and distribution o f fo o d and essential supplies o f every U n d; the restoration and maintenance o f public utilities; the provision fo r the gradual rehabilitation o f peacetim e industry and a regulated econom y; the em ploym ent o f Labour and the prevention o f industrial u n rest.. . “ M ilitary Governm ent O fficers w ill, in conjunction w ith other interested and affected agencies and authorities, ensure that steps are taken to : (1 ) Im port needed com m odities and stores. (2 ) Convert industrial plants from war to consumer goods production. (3 ) Subsidize essential econom ic activities where necessary. (4 ) Reconstruct German foreign trade w ith priority fo r the needs o f the United Nations. (5 ) M od ify existing German regulations controlling industrial and raw m aterial production.*' “ The highly centralized German adm inistrative system is to be retained unless otherwise directed by higher authority*'. “ A ll existing German regulations and ordinances relating t o . . .production, supply or distribution w ill remain in force until specifically amended or abrogated. E xcept as otherwise indicated by circumstances o r directed by higher authority, present German production and prim ary processing o f fuels, ores and other raw materials w ill be maintained at present levels**. “ H ie fo o d supply w ill be administered so as to provide, i f possible, a diet on the basis o f an overall average o f 2000 calories per day. Members o f the German forces w ill be rated as normal consumers. The control o f retail prices w ill be continued. The existing rationing system and classification o f consumer groups w ill be maintained subject to m odifications required by circum stances.. . . Should the indigenous products o f Germany be insuf­ ficien t to provide such a basic ration, the balance w ill be made up by imports**. “ A il possible steps w ill be taken to ensure the utilization o f German econom ic, m aterial and industrial facilities to an exten t necessary to provide such raw materials, goods, supplies o r services as are required fo r m ilitary and essential civilian needs, and to any additional exten t—as approved by higher authority—necessary to provide surpluses fo r international transfer, supplies fo r reparational requisition, and legitim ate industrial stock-piling” . “ The fishing industry has long been im portant in German econom y, but ow ing to the requisitioning o f trawlers fo r naval operations, the most im portant N orth Sea fish catch has been seriously curtailed. B efore extensive com m ercial fishing can be resumed, a considerable amount o f fishing gear w ill be required as w ell as stores and m aterial fo r the repair and reconditioning o f fishing vessels. There w ill possibly also be an im m ediate shortage o f fuel and lubricants'*. “ The Agricultural econom y w ill be freed o f N azi discrim ination. It w ill not otherwise be changed except where direct advantages are to be gained. Agricultural production control, and grain and other agricultural products

100

HANDBOOK OP M ILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY

collection agencies existing prior to occupation w ill be m aintained or re-established. Equitable prices co-ordinated at R eich level w ill be fix e d fo r tu rn products. V iolations o f farm price con trol, wages o r rationing regulations w ill be severely punished". “ The main objective o f A llied M ilitary Governm ent in the financial fie ld is to take such tem porary measures as w ill attem pt to m inim ize the potential financial disorder and chaos that is lik ely to occur and thus assist the m ilitary forces in their operations and ease the burdens that w ill face the m ore perm anent A llied C ontrol organization that w ill later deal w ith the problem s o f G erm any". “ W herever possible, rem ovals and appointm ents (o f civil servants) w ill be made b y M ilitary Governm ent officers acting through German officials who are vested w ith this authority under German law ; nothing w ill be done which would unnecessarily disturb the regular German civil service procedure or deprive the officia l o r em ployee to be rem oved o f any ultim ate rights to which he may be justifiably entitled under German law , after cessation o f m ilitary governm ent". “ International boundaries w ill be deem ed to be as they were on 31 Decem ber 1 9 3 7 ".

I S ______ -T h e Morgenthau Plan for Germ any This and the follow in g docum ent together summarize the Morgenthau Plan fo r G erm any. Although the Morgenthau Plan is frequently labeled m erely a program fo r the pastoralization o f Germ any, it is clearly much m ore than just th at. Educational and political reform through punishment and partition lay at th e heart o f M orgenthau’s proposals.

Documentf Suggested Post-Surrender Program fo r Germany 1 .. Dem ilitarization o f Germany I t should be the aim o f the A llied Forces to accomplish the com plete dem ilitarization o f Germany in the shortest possible period o f tim e after surrender. This means com pletely disarming the German Arm y and p eop le (including the rem oval o r destruction o f all war m aterial), the to ta l destruction o f the w hole German armament industry, and the rem oval o r destruction o f other key industries which are basic to m ilitary strength. 2. Partitioning o f Germany (a ) Poland should get that part o f East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion o f Silesia as indicated on the attached m ap. • . . (b ) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded b y the R hine and the M oselle Rivers. (c ) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas. (d ) The remaining portion o f Germany should be divided into tw o autonomous, independent states, (1 ) a South German state com prising Bavaria, W ü rttem b erg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2 ) a N orth German state com prising a large part o f the old state o f Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states. There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which w ill be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

fF to m : Morgenthau, Memorandum to the President, "Suggested Post-Surrender Program fo r G erm any," September 6, 1944, ln U.S., Department o f State, FR U 8, Quebec, 1944, pp. 101-106.

101

109

THS MORGENTHAU FLAN FOR GERMANT

3. Jhe R uhr Area (T h e Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the attached map, including the Rhineland, the K iel Canal, and all German territory north o f the K iel Canal.) Here lies the heart o f German industrial pow er, the caldron o f w an . This area should not on ly be stripped o f all presently existing industries but so weakened and con trolled that it can not in the foreseeable future becom e an industrial area. The follow in g steps w ill accomplish this: (а ) W ithin a short period, i f possible not longer than 6 m onths a fte r the cessation o f hostilities, all industrial plants and equipm ent n ot destroyed by m ilitary action shall either be com pletely dismantled and rem oved fro m the area o r com pletely destroyed. A ll equipm ent shall be rem oved from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked. It is anticipated that the stripping o f this area would be accom plished in three stages: (/) The m ilitary forces im m ediately upon entry in to the area shall destroy all plants and equipm ent which cannot be rem oved. (ii) Rem oval o f plants and equipm ent by members o f the United Nations as restitution and reparation (Paragraph 4 ). (iU ) A ll plants and equipm ent not rem oved within a stated period o f tim e, say 6 months, w ill be com pletely destroyed o r reduced to scrap and allocated to the United Nations. (б ) A ll people within the area should be made to understand that this area w ill not again be allow ed to becom e an industrial area. A ccord in gly, all people and their fam ilies within the area having special skills or technical training should be encouraged to m igrate perm anently from the area and should be as w idely dispersed as possible. (c ) The area should be made an international zone to be governed b y an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objectives. 4. Restitution and Reparation Reparations, In the form o f recurrent paym ents and deliveries, should not be demanded. R estitution and reparation shall be effected b y the transfer o f existing German resources and territories, e.g., (а ) b y restitution o f property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them : (б ) by transfer o f German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program o f partition: (c ) by the rem oval and distribution am ong devastated countries o f industrial plants and equipm ent situated w ithin the International Z on e and the N orth and South German states delim ited in the section on partition ; (d ) by forced German labor outside Germ any; and (e ) by confiscation o f all German assets o f any character whatsoever outside o f Germ any.

DOCUMENT

103

5. Education and Propaganda (а ) A ll schools and universities w ill be closed until an A llied Commission o f Education has form ulated an effective reorganization program . It is contem plated that it m ay require a considerable period o f tim e b efore any institutions o f higher education are reopened. M eanwhile the education o f German students in foreign universities w ill not be prohibited. Elem entary schools w ill be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available. (б ) A ll German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program form ulated. 6. Politica l Decentralization T h e m ilitary adm inistration in Germany in the initial period should be carried ou t w ith a view toward the eventual partitioning o f Germ any in to three states. T o facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the m ilitary authorities should be guided by the follow in g principles: (а ) Dismiss all policy-m aking officials o f the R eich governm ent and deal prim arily w ith local governments. (б ) Encourage the reestablishment o f state governments in each o f the states ( Länder) corresponding to 18 states in to which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states. (c ) Upon the partition o f Germ any, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal governm ent fo r each o f the new ly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form o f a confederation o f states, w ith emphasis on states’ rights and a large degree o f local autonom y. 7. Responsibility o f M ilitary fo r Local German Econom y The sole purpose o f the m ilitary in control o f the German econom y shall be to facilitate m ilitary operations and m ilitary occupation. The A llied M ilitary Governm ent shall n ot assume responsibility fo r such econom ic problem s as price controls, rationing, unem ploym ent, production, reconstruc­ tio n , distribution, consum ption, housing, or transportation, o r take any measures designed to maintain o r strengthen [th e German econom y, except those which are essential to m ilitary] operations. The responsibility fo r sustaining the German econom y and people rests w ith the German people w ith such facilities as m ay be available under the circumstances. 8. Controls Over Developm ent o f German Econom y During a period o f at least tw en ty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital im ports, shall be maintained b y the United Nations designed to prevent in the Newly-established states the establishment or expansion o f key industries basic to the German m ilitary potential and to control other key industries. 9. Punishment o f War Crimes and Treatment o f Special Groups There is attached (A p p en d ix B ) a program fo r the punishment o f certain war crimes and fo r the treatm ent o f N azi organizations and other special groups.

104

THZ MORGENTHAU PLAN POR GERMANY

10. Wearing o f Insignia and Uniforms (а ) N o person in Germ ani y ] (excep t members o f the United N ations and neutral countries) shall be perm itted to wear any m ilitary insignia o f rank or blanch o f service, service ribbons or m ilitary medals. (б ) N o such person shall be perm itted to wear, after 6 m onths from the cessation o f hostilities any m ilitary uniform o r any uniform o f any quasi m ilitary organizations. 11. Prohibition on Parades N o m ilitary parades shall be perm itted anywhere in G erm an [y] and all m ilitary bands shall be disbanded. 12. A ircraft A ll aircraft (including gliders), whether m ilitary o r com m ercial w ill be confiscated fo r later disposition. N o German shall be perm itted to operate or to help operate such aircraft, including those ow ned by foreign interests. 13. United States Responsibility (a ) The responsibility fo r the execution o f the post-surrender program fo r Germ any set forth in this memorandum is the Joint responsibility o f the United Nations. The execution o f the jo in t p o licy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international b ody which em erges from United Nations discussions. Consideration o f the specific measures to be taken in carrying ou t th e jo in t program suggests the desirability o f separating the task to be perform ed during the initial period o f m ilitary occupation from those which w ill require a much longer period o f execution. W hile the U.S., U .K . and U .S.S.R. w ill, fo r practical reasons, play the m ajor role (o f course aided by the m ilitary forces o f other United N ations) in dem ilitarizing Germ any (p o in t 1 ) the detailed execution o f other parts o f the program can best be handled by Germ any's continental neighbors. (b ) When Germany has been com pletely dem ilitarized there w ould be the follo w in g distribution o f duties in carrying ou t the German program : (0 H ie U.S. would have m ilitary and civilian representation on w hatever international commission or commissions m ay be established fo r the execution o f the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs. (iii) The prim ary responsibility fo r the policing o f Germ any and fo r d v fl adm inistration in Germany w ould be assumed by the m ilitary forces o f Germ any’s continental neighbors. Specifically these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, G reek, Yugoslav, N orw egian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers. (c ) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn w ith in a relatively short tim e. Actual withdrawal o f U nited States troops should not precede agreem ent w ith the U.S.S.R. and the U .K . on the principles set forth In this m em orandum .. . .

Appendix B

Punishment o f Certain W ar Crimes and Treatment o f Special G roups A . Punishment o f Certain War Criminals (1 ) Arch-criminals. A list o f the arch-criminals o f this war whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transm itted to the appropriate m ilitary authorities. The m ilitary authorities shall be instructed w ith respect to all persons w ho are on such list as follo w s: (а ) T h ey shall be apprehended as soon as possible and iden tified as soon as possible a fter apprehension, the identification to be approved by an o ffic e r o f th e General rank. (б ) When such identification has been made the person id en tified shall be put to death forth w ith b y firin g squads made up o f soldiers o f the United N a tio n s .. . .

16 T he Morgenthau Plan: Preventing a W orld W a r m Just prior to the president’ s departure fo r the 1944 Quebec Conference with Churchill, the Treasury Departm ent sent R oosevelt a briefing b oo k on postwar planning fo r Germ any. Although it repeated much o f the earlier m aterial in Morgenthau's Septem ber 5 memorandum (see Docum ent 1 5 ), it did elaborate extensively on the questions o f econom ic planning and reform o f the German character. M orgenthau’s emphasis on the benefits his plan would give to Great Britain not on ly fit in with R oosevelt’s desires but also reflected M orgenthau’s intention to build up Germ any’s neighbors.

Documenti* Reparations Mean a Pow erful Germ any I f w e were to expect Germany to pay recurring reparations, whether in the form o f m oney or goods, we would be forced at the very beginning to start a rehabilitation and reconstruction program fo r the German econom y. For instance, we would have to supply her w ith transportation equipm ent, public u tility repairs, foo d fo r her working population, machinery fo r heavy industry damaged by bom bing, reconstruction o f housing and industrial raw materials. N o m atter how the program would be dressed up, we w ould, in e ffe c t be doing fo r Germany what we expect to do fo r the liberated areas o f Europe but perhaps on an even greater scale, because o f Germ any’s more advanced industrialization. When reparation deliveries cease Germany w ill be le ft w ith a m ore pow erful econom y and a larger share o f foreign markets than she had in the Thirties____

It is a Fallacy That Europe Needs a Strong Industrial Germ any 1. The assumption sometimes made that Germany is an indispensable source o f industrial supplies fo r the rest o f Europe is not valid. U.S., U .K . and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial group could easily have supplied out o f unused industrial capacity practically all that

tF rom : U.S., Treasury Department, “ Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a W orld War III,” Septem ber 9, 1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S , Quebec, 1944, pp. 131-40.

106

DOCUMENT

107

G erm an y supplied to Europe during the pre-war period. In the post-war p e rio d th e expanded industrial capacity o f the United Nations, particularly th e U .S ., can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs o f Europe w ith o u t German assistance.. . . 5. In short, the statem ent that a healthy European econom y is dependent u p on German industry was never true, nor w ill it be true in the future. T h e re fo re the treatm ent to be accorded to Germany should be decided upon w ith o u t reference to the econom ic consequences upon the rest o f Europe. A t th e w orst, these econom ic consequences w ill involve relatively m inor econ o m ic disadvantages in certain sections o f Europe. A t best, they w ill speed up th e industrial developm ent o f Europe outside o f Germ any. But any disadvantages w ill be m ore than o ffs e t by real gains to the political objectives and th e econom ic interests o f the United Nations as a w h o le .. . .

H ow British Industry W ould Benefit by Proposed Program 1. The British coal industry wouid recover from its thirty year depression b y gaining new markets. Britain would m eet the m ajor portion o f the European coal needs form erly m et by the annual Ruhr production o f 125 m illion tons. The consequent expansion o f British coal output would allow fo r the developm ent o f a coherent program fo r the expansion and reorganization o f what has been Britain's leading depressed industry since 1918 and facilitate the elim ination o f the depressed areas. 2. The reduction in Germern industrial capacity would eliminate German com petition with British exports in the w orld market. N o t on ly w ill England b e in a position to recapture many o f the foreign markets she lost to Germ any after 1918, but she w ill participate in supplying the devastated countries o f Europe w ith all types o f consumer and industrial goods fo r their reconstruction needs in the im m ediate post-war years. 3. Transference o f a large section o f German shipping, both com m ercial and naval, and shipbuilding equipm ent to England w ill be an im portant item in England’s program o f post-war econom ic expansion o f restitution. 4. Britain's foreign exchange position m il be strengthened and the pressure on sterling reduced by the expansion o f her exports and shipping services. 5. The assurance o f peace and security would constitute England’s greatest single econom ic benefit from the proposed program designed to put Germany in a position never again to wage effective war on the continent. England would be able to undertake the program fo r econom ic and social reconstruction advanced in the Beveridge plan and the Governm ent program fo r fu ll em ploym ent w ithout having to w orry about the future financial burdens o f maintaining [a ] large army and huge armament Industries Indefinitely. 6. B ritain’s p olitica l stability would be reinforced by her increased ability to m eet the insistent dom estic demands fo r econom ic reform resulting from the assurances o f security and o f an expansion o f her exports.

[S ection 7 ]

H ie W ell-Being o f the Germ an Econom y is the Responsibility o f the Germans and N o t o f the A llied M ilitary Authorities Ih e econom ic rehabilitation o f Germany to the problem o f the German people and n ot o f the A llied M ilitary authorities. The German people must bear the consequences o f their ow n a c ts .. . .

W hat T o D o A bou t Germ an Education The m ilitaristic spirit which pervades the German people has been deliberately fostered by all educational institutions in Germ any fo r many decades. Schools, Colleges and Universities were used w ith great effectiveness to instill in to the children and the youth o f the nation the seeds o f aggressive nationalism and the desire fo r w orld dom ination. Re-education o f the German people must hence be part o f the program to render Germ any in effective as an aggressive pow er. Re-education cannot be e ffe c tiv e ly undertaken from outside the country and by teachers from aborad. It must be done by the Germans themselves. The hard facts o f defeat and o f the need fo r p olitical, econom ic and social reorienta­ tion must be the teachers o f the German people. The existing educational system which is u tterly nazi fled must be com pletely reorganized and reform ed. The ch ief task w ill be to locate p olitically reliable teachers and to educate, as soon as possible, new teachers w ho are animated by a new s p irit.. . .

German Militarism Cannot be Destroyed by Destroying Nazism Alone (1 ) The Nazi regime is essentially the culm ination o f the unchanging German drive toward aggression. (a ) German society has been dom inated fo r at least three generations by pow erful forces fashioning the German state and nation in to a machine fo r m ilitary conquest and self-aggrandizement. Since 1864 Germ any has launched five wars o f aggression against other powers, each war involving m ore destruction over larger areas than the previous one. (b ) As in the case o f Japan, the rapid evolution o f a m odern industrial system in Germany immeasurably strengthened the econom ic base o f German m ilitarism w ithout weakening the Prussian feudal ideology o r its hold on German society. (e ) The N azi regim e is n ot an excrescence on an otherwise healthy society but an organic grow th out o f the German body p olitic. Even b efore the N azi regim e seized pow er, the German nation had dem onstrated an unequalled capacity to be seduced by a m ilitarist clique offerin g the promise o f econom ic security and political dom ination in exchange fo r disciplined acceptance o f its leadership. What the N azi regim e has done has been to system atically debauch d ie passive German nation on an unprecedented scale and shape it in to an organized and dehumanized m ilitary machine integrated by all the forces o f m odem technique and scien ce.. . .

17 -■ — Convincing Roosevelt Discussions within the Cabinet Com m ittee on Postwar Germ any (consisting o f H u ll, M orgenthau, Stim son, and H opkins) illustrate R oosevelt's concensus approach to decision-making. Since on ly Stimson expressed any opposition to M orgenthau's proposals, the president could fo llo w his personal inclination to punish th e German nation. Nevertheless, he made no firm com m itm ents but on ly expressed general agreement with the idea o f an agrarian Germ any. R o o sevelt's concern fo r the e ffe c t any agreement would have on Soviet attitu des again indicates his priorities. Although this conversation occurred b efo re the president had fu lly exam ined either the Morgenthau Plan or Stim son's objections to it (see Docum ent 1 8), the discussion shows that M orgenthau's effo rts since August, 1944 had been quite successful.

Docum entt I saw the President, and Stimson started right in and he had these tw o m em os which he gave the President (copies attached). I think he said they were his answers to m y memorandum and to Hull’s memorandum. I then gave them each a copy o f our memorandum, and the President tried his best to read it and seemed very much interested. H opkins brought up the question o f partition and seemed to be the devil's advocate fo r it. Stimson has been talking to Bowman w ho is against partition. H ie President said that he would go along w ith the idea o f the trusteeship fo r the Ruhr, the Saar and the K iel Canal. The President also said that he is in favor o f dividing Germany in to three parts. Hopkins kept pressing the point about partitioning Germ any, and I frankly d on 't know where he stands. Hopkins said to the President, “ W ould it be correct to define you r position as saying you inclined toward 'p artition ?" and the President said, “ Y e s ," but he is in favor o f doing it now and not waiting. During the discussion, Stimson said that w e must get along w ith Rustia. H ie President kept looking through the book and wanted to know whether I had the part put in about uniform s and marching, and I said that it was in there. The President read out loud N o. 4, “ It is a fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial G erm any." The President said, “ This is the first tim e I have seen this stated ." He said that everybody seems to disagree on that point, but he said “ I agree with this id ea ." He said, “ Furtherm ore, I believe in an agricultural G erm any." (I evidently made a real impression on the

+From: Morgenthau, Memorandum o f a Conversation with Hull, Roosevelt, Stimson, and Hopkins, September 9, 1944, Presidential Diary, Morgenthau Papers, Roosevelt Library, pp. 1431-32.

10»

110

CONVINCING R008BVSLT

President the tim e he came to m y house, and the m ore I talk to him th e more I find that he seems to be coining around to our v ie w p o in t.). . . H ie President put up this question, “ Supposing the Russians want to insist on reparations, and the English and file United States d on 't want an y, what happens th en ?" So I spoke up and said, “ W ell, m y experience w ith the Russians at Bretton W oods was that they were very intelligent and reasonable, and I think that i f the m atter is put to them about reparations, that there is a good chance o f their going on w ith us, provided we o ffe r them som ething in lieu th ere o f." As a result o f this conference, I am very much m ore encouraged, and i f I could on ly have a chance to talk w ith the President alone I think I cou ld get som ewhere. I kept saying, “ D on 't you want this com m ittee to d raft fo r y o u a suggestion fo r the Am erican p olicy towards G erm any?" I said it a cou ple o f tim es and got nowhere, and then Hull said that he had sent some paper on the econom ic future o f Germany to Stim son, and he had n ot heard from Stim son. Stimson said he didn’t know what he was talking about. Hull just w o n 't get in on the discussion, and just what his game is I d o n t know. As I came in, the President was asking Hull whether he d id n 't w ant to com e to Quebec, and Hull said he was to o tired. A t the beginning o f the discussion the President said, “ W ell, I think there w ill be tw o things brought up at Quebec. One is the m ilitary and the other is the m onetary because Churchill keeps saying he is b ro k e," and the President said, “ I f th ey bring up the financial situation, I w ill want Henry to com e up to Q u ebec." This is the second tim e he has said th a t

18 — Opposition to the Plan T h e prim ary opposition to the Morgenthau Plan came from Secretary o f War Stim son. Firm ly convinced that a punitive peace would on ly create resent* m en t and the conditions fo r y e t another con flict w ith Germany» he also claim ed that the pastoralization o f Germany by force would violate all the principles which the United States had fought for. Stimson placed the blame fo r Germ any’s conduct on the Nazis, not the general public; his recommen­ dations therefore fundam entally d iffered from those o f Morgenthau. He also believed that Germ any’s industrial production could m aterially assist in the rehabilitation o f all Europe and that the destruction o f those industries was foo lish . T o Stim son, the war was sim ply another chapter in the history o f w orld pow er politics. T o Morgenthau, the war dem onstrated the m oral degeneracy o f all Germans and provided an opportunity to institute per­ m anent reform s in that land.

Docum entf Memorandum by the Secretary o f W ar (Stim son) Washington, Septem ber 9 ,19 4 4 . Secret Our discussions relate to a m atter o f m ethod en tirely; our objective is the same. It is not a question o f a so ft treatm ent o f Germ any o r a harsh treatm ent o f Germany. We are all tryin g to devise protection against recurrence by Germany o f her attem pts to dom inate the w orld. We d iffe r as to m ethod. The fundamental rem edy o f Mr. Morgenthau is to provide that the industry o f Germany shall be substantially obliterated. Although expressed on ly in terms o f the Ruhr, the fact o f the m atter is that the Ruhr and the adjacent territories which M r. Morgenthau would include in his program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are proposed, the core o f German industry. His proposition is “ th e total destruction o f the w hole German armament industry and the rem oval or destruction o f other key industries which are basic to m ilitary strength.’ ’ In speaking o f the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he says: ’ T h is area should not on ly be stripped o f all presently existing industries but so weakened and con trolled that it cannot in the foreseeable future becom e an industrial area-all industrial plants and equipm ent not destroyed by m ilitary

tF rom : Stimson, Memorandum to the President, September 9, 1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FRU S, Quebec, 1944, pp. 123*26. Ill

us

orrosmoN to the plan

action shall either be com pletely dismantled ore rem oved from the area or com pletely destroyed, all equipm ent shall be rem oved from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked.” I am unalterably opposed to such a program fo r the reasons given in my memorandum dated Septem ver 5 which is already before the President. I do n ot think that the reasons there stated need again be elaborated. In substance, m y poin t is that these resources constitute a natural and necessary asset fo r the productivity o f Europe. In a period when the w orld is suffering from destruction and from want o f production, the concept o f the total obliteration o f these values is to m y mind w h olly wrong. M y insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available fo r the benefit o f the w hole o f Europe, including particularly Great Britain. The internationalization o f the Ruhr or the trusteeship o f its products—I am not prepared at the m om ent to discuss details o f m ethod—constitutes a treatm ent o f the problem in accord w ith the needs and interests o f the w orld. T o argue that we are incapable o f sustained e ffo rt to control such wealth within proper channels is to destroy any hope fo r the future o f the w orld. I believe that the education furnished us by the Germans in tw o w orld wars, plus the continuity o f interest which sudi a trusteeship would stimulate is sufficient insurance that we can be trusted to deal w ith the problem . The unnatural destruction o f this industry would, on the other hand, be so certain, in my judgm ent, to provoke sym pathy fo r the Germans that we would create friends both in this country and abroad fo r the Germans, whereas now m ost o f the peoples o f the w orld are thoroughly antipathetic to them. The other fundamental poin t upon which I feel we d iffe r is the m atter o f the trial and punishment o f those Germans who are responsible fo r crimes and depredations. Under the plan proposed by Mr. Morgenthau, the so-called arch-criminals shall be put to death by the m ilitary w ithout provision fo r any trial and upon mere identification after apprehension. The m ethod o f dealing w ith these and other criminals requires careful thought and a w ell-defined procedure. Such procedure must em body, in m y judgm ent, at least the rudimentary aspects o f the B ill o f Rights, nam ely, notification to the accused o f the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable lim its, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not mean to favor the institution o f state trials o r to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment o f these men in a dignified manner consistent w ith the advance o f civilization , w ill have all the greater e ffe c t upon posterity. Furtherm ore, it w ill afford the m ost effective way o f making a record o f the N azi system o f terrorism and o f the e ffo rt o f the A llies to term inate the system and prevent its recurrence. I am disposed to believe that at least as to the ch ief N azi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal constituted to try them . They should be charged w ith offences against the laws o f the Rules o f War in that th ey have com m itted wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection w ith the prosecution o f the war. This law o f the Rules o f War has been upheld by our ow n Supreme Court and w ill be the basis o f judicial action against the Nazis.

DOCUMENT

US

Even though these offences have not been com m itted against our troops, I feel that o u r moral position is better i f we take our share in their conviction. Other w ar criminals w ho have com m itted crimes in subjugated territory should b e returned in accordance w ith the M oscow Declaration to those territories fo r trial by national m ilitary commissions having jurisdiction o f the offen ce under the same Rules o f War. I have great d ifficu lty in finding any means w h ereby m ilitary commissions may try and convict those responsible fo r excesses com m itted within Germany both before and during the war which have no relation to the conduct o f the war. I w ould be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation o f the Rules o f War but there is a certain fie ld in which I fear that external courts cannot m ove. Such courts would be w ithout jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court w ou ld be w ithout jurisdiction to try those who were guilty o f, o r condoned, lynching in our own country. The above are the tw o main points w ith which I d iffe r from the proposed program subm itted by the Secretary o f the Treasury.

Partition I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the m atter substantial consideration I have, as y e t, com e to no conclusion as to wisdom or m ethod o f partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively w ith that subject until w e have had an interchange o f views with the English and the Russians. 1, m yself, seek further light on this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous e ffo rt tow ard separation o f the country in to tw o or m ore groups.

Am putation I understand that there is some general recognition o f the probability o f Russia o r the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts o f Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but that we take no part in the administration o f the area. On the Western border the prim ary question is the m atter o f dealing with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland the the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor o f the automatic return o f Alsace and Lorraine to France but though m y m ind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the burden p ro o f lies on those who suggest giving France m ore territory. She w ill com e out o f this war w ith her Em pire practically intact, w ith a reduced population and already possessing a very valuable bit o f ore in the Longw y-Briey area. T o give her a substantial territory o f Germ an-speaking and German-bred people would create another problem in the balance o f Europe. T o counteract this, I w ould give France a share in the benefits o f the internationalization o f the Saar and the Ruhr and the advantage which this gives o f what would in e ffe c t be an international barrier between France and Germany. There are certain other m ethods o f punishment affectin g the personal lives o f individual Germans proposed by the Secretary o f the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting irritations o f no fundamental value and, indeed,

114

OPTOSm ON TO THS VLAN

o f considerable danger, but these are prim arily matters o f adm inistration which I think need not be discussed at this tim e. In some part, at least, they had best be determ ined by those w ho bave the prim ary responsibility fo r the adm inistration o f the occupation. As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which is all that w e can deal with at the m om ent, the President be recom m ended to approve a program generally in accord with the memorandum subm itted b y the Secretary o f State at the m eeting o f the Cabinet Com m ittee on Tuesday, Septem ber 5, except fo r a m odification o f subparagraph 2 (ft) o f that memorandum and certain other additions on which I hope w e can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.

IQ

= = = = = Harry Hopkins on Germany, September, 1944 T h e British regularly overestim ated the influence and role o f Harry Hopkins on Am erican p olicy, particularly later in the war (1944-45) when Adm . W illiam Leahy and James F. Byrnes to o k his place R oosevelt’s m ajor personal advisors. Hopkins’s desire to be the occupation governor o f Germ any may have contributed to his apparent opposition to partition, but he clearly agreed w ith Morgenthau's overall program fo r achieving security via a reorientation o f the German econom y and society. Hopkins’s vague state­ ments on ly contributed to British uncertainty about Am erican p olicy.

Documenti" I had a desultory talk tw o nights ago w ith Harry [H o p k in s], Sir A . Cadogan also p resen t Harry developed some very tentative ideas about the treatm ent o f Germany. He began by saying the d rift o f opinion here was against partition ; there m ight w ell be difficu lties about prolonged m ilitary occupation, not the least o f which in his views was the certain developm ent o f fraternization, and he had therefore been turning over the possibilities o f getting the security we all wanted through econom ic means. These were p retty vague, and ranged from physical destruction o f the Ruhr heavy industry, to the keeping o f all Germans in defin itely on a planned and national econom y. 2. H e said that urgent thought was being turned on to these subjects here and you may like to know direction in which his m ind is m oving.

tF ro m : H alifax to tha Foreign O ffice, September 7, 1944, FO 871/39080/4010, paper C11900, Public Record O ffice, London.

115

20 — The British Foreign Office on Germ any and Russia, September, 1944 The historic concern o f the British Foreign O ffice regarding the role o f Russia in any European political equation characterized its consideration o f plans for postwar Germany. When a Foreign O ffice paper, w ritten in early Septem ber, 1944, sharply criticized the m ilitary’s tendency to think in terms o f an anti-Soviet bloc, Foreign M inister Eden strongly supported the paper. Although Churchill remained doubtful, the Foreign O ffice steadfastly supported policies which would help preserve the cooperative atm osphere created by the wartim e alliance w ith the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, British officials tended to make postwar planning fo r Germ any a function o f postw ar planning fo r relations with Russia.

Document t V II. Anglo-Russian Relations 31. The question that raises the greatest d ifficu lty is the e ffe c t o f dismemberment on our relations with the Soviet Union. It can be considered from tw o points o f view , (a ) as a possible source o f dispute and (b ) as an insurance against Russian aggression. 32. The second point may be considered first, as the Chiefs o f S ta ff lay emphasis on the strategic advantage that would ensue from dismemberment as an insurance against the possibility o f an eventually hostile U.S.S.R. The argument seems to be that dismemberment could be used to keep Germ any prostrate just fo r so long as it might serve our purpose, and that at a given m om ent we could suddently reverse our p olicy and fin d in Western Germany a reliable ally prepared to reinforce our war potential and to join us in battle against a com bination o f the strongest m ilitary pow er in Europe and fo llo w Germans in the East. Sudi a suggestion seems little less than fantastic. But it is worse than that. I t is playing w ith fire. The p olicy o f His M ajesty’s Governm ent is to preserve the unity and collaboration o f the United Nations. I f we start preparing our post-war plans w ith the idea at the back o f our tF ro m : Arm istice and Post-War Com m ittee, “ The Dismemberment o f Germ any/' Septem ber 10, 1944, Foreign O ffice 371/39080/4010, Public Records O ffice, London.

11«

DOCUMENT

UT

minds that the Germans may serve as part o f an anti-Soviet bloc, we shall

qu ickly destroy any hope o f preserving the Anglo-Soviet Alliance and soon fin d ourselves advocating relaxations o f the disarmament and other measures which w e regard as essential guarantees against future German aggression. This is n ot on ly a m atter o f strategy. It is a m atter o f high p olicy. 33. The question then arises whether dismemberment is lik ely to give rise to friction with the Soviet Governm ent. This is not easy to answer because we d o not know i f they w ill advocate dismemberment or not. It is true that at Teheran Marshal Stalin advocated the division o f Germany in to smallish pieces and the use o f force, i f necessary, to prevent their re-uniting. Against this we have M. Gousev’s refusal to discuss the question in the E .A.C . and, still m ore significant, the Soviet proposals fo r control machinery fo r Germany to cover the first period o f occupation. These proposals not on ly advocate the use o f the German central governm ent and the German central organs fo r the purpose o f carrying out the terms o f surrender, but set out as one o f the most im portant objectives o f the A llied control agencies “ the preparation o f conditions fo r the creation in Germany o f central and local organs based on dem ocratic principles’ *. I t is d ifficu lt to believe that such realists as the Russians w ould wish to create central organs based on any principles i f their purpose was to destroy the unity o f Germany. A t any rate we cannot take it fo r granted that the Soviet Governm ent are now in favour o f dismemberment. 34. Should how ever we find them pressing fo r it, we shall be faced w ith a dilem m a. I f, on the bads o f the arguments in this paper, we hold out against it, the Russians may suspect our m otives and regard us either as appeasers or m ore probably as harbouring some deep-laid p lot to bring Germany one day in to an anti-Soviet bloc. This would be liable to vitiate all prospect o f fru itfu l collaboration w ith the Soviet Union. The Russians’ reaction would probably be to adopt whatever measures they considered necessary to achieve their ow n security, including all kinds o f intrigue and intervention in every country o f Europe and possibly an attem pt to collaborate closely w ith Germany herself in order to counteract our supposed p olicy. I f, on the other hand, we agree to dismemberment, acute differences are alm ost bound to arise in course o f tim e over its policing fo r the reasons given in paragraph 27. It is not im possible to o that dismemberment would lead to the division o f form er Germ any in to Eastern and Western spheres o f Influence which it is our p olicy to avoid. 35. Either course, therefore, has its dangers. But the greater danger seems to lie in supporting a p olicy against our better judgm ent on ly to fin d when it had to be enforced that public support fo r the ruthless measures required was n ot forthcom ing. I f therefore we fin d the Russians bent on dismemberment but decide that such a p olicy would be mistaken, it w ould seem best to make our views and our reasons abundantly d ear to them , leaving no doubt in their minds that a soft peace is no part o f our plan. 36. I f we can convince the Russians that we harbour no designs o f using the Germans against them—a poin t o f particular current Importance in the light o f the Chiefs o f S ta ffs R eport—there is no reason to believe that the

118

TBS BRITISH FOREIGN OPTICS ON GERMANY AND RUSSIA

preservation o f a united Germany would necessarily lead to a Russo-German com bination. H ie m ore lik ely result o f leaving Germany united w ould surely be to make the Russians m ore inclined to collaborate with us, always provided we remain strong and an A lly worth having. One can go further and suggest that the existence o f a united Germany m ight prove a factor o f the first im portance in holding the Soviet Union and ourselves together.

21 — Morgenthau on a ChurchillRoosevelt Agreem ent Unhappy with L ord Cherw ell’s suggested memorandum expressing a Churchill-Roosevelt agreem ent on p olicy fo r postwar Germ any, Morgenthau dictated his ow n. Although the m em o dealt w ith on ly a small portion o f the Morgenthau Plan, it did cover tw o critical issues: the punishment/reform o f turning Germany in to an agricultural state, and the lim iting o f reparations to the dismantling o f German industry. The question o f partition was on ly partially answered by the reference to the internationalization o f the Saar and th e Ruhr. Churchill’s changes strenghtened the m em o, as can be seen by com paring it w ith Docum ent 1.

Docum enti A t a conference between the President and the Prime M inister, Mr. Churchill said that he would sum up the discussion that we had been having in regard to the future disposition o f the Ruhr and the Saar. He said that they w ould perm it Russia and any other o f our A llies to help themselves to whatever machinery they wished, that the industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar would be shut dow n, and that these tw o districts would be put under an international body which would supervise these industries to see that they w ould n ot start up again. This program me fo r elim inating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is part o f a programme lookin g forw ard to diverting Germany in to largely an agricultural country. The Prim e M inister and the President were in agreem ent upon this program me.

tF rom : Morgenthau, Memorandum, September 15, 1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S, Quebec, 1944, p. 390.

119

—British Opposition to the Plan A t the instigation o f Foreign M inister Eden( the British War Cabinet sent a message to Churchill during the Quebec Conference in which they recom m ended that the prim e m inister not com m it him self or the governm ent to the Morgenthau Plan. The basic argument was an appeal to practicality. The message argued that the p olicy o f creating chaos sim ply would n ot w ork. In addition, it expressed concern at the lack o f reparations and the possibility o f having to provide re lie f fo r Germans who could no longer support themselves. Although the cable was based upon an inadequate understanding o f the Morgenthau Plan, irreconcilable differences obviously existed between the Treasury Departm ent ,plan and basic thinking w ithin the War Cabinet. Given Churchill’s reluctance (and even in a b ility) to go directly against war cabinet decisions, this message augered a quick end o f the prim e m inister’s support fo r the Morgenthau Plan.

Documenti" F ollow in g fo r Foreign Secretary. 1. As a result o f Cabinet M eeting on 11th Sept, follo w in g message fo r you to send to Prim e M inister was agreed w ith Deputy Prim e M inister, Chancellor o f Exohequer, Secretary o f State fo r War, M inister o f Production and V ice Chiefs o f S taff: “ There is some evidence that the President has been converted to a p olicy o f lettin g Germ any stew in her ow n juice after the surrender, im posing or making the Germans impose few controls in the sphere o f civil adm inistration and lettin g chaos have its w ay. Those w ho support this p olicy tend to regard it as the true “ hard’ ’ p olicy, and think it s o ft to try to re-establish order. “ This is a m atter o f great im portance, since what w e d o or fail to do in the first fe w weeks w ill influence all that follow s. A failure to maintain econom ic controls w ill lead to hoarding and eventually to another in flation , such as Germ any had before. “ This would be w h olly against our interests: (A ) The task o f our occupation forces would be made m ore d iffic u lt and we should need increased forces, control personnel and adm inistrative services (especially transportation services);

+From : British War Cabinet to Eden, September 14,1944, Prime Minister’s Operational F ilet (PR E M IE R 3 ), file 192/folder 1, pp. 8-0. Public Records O ffice.

ia o

DOCUMENT

H l

(B ) A fe w profiteers would again; the true sufferers would be the workers and th e m iddle classes; (C ) Our name would be associated w ith avoidable and purposeless su fferin g, not with just retribution; (D ) A ll hopes would vanish o f getting any adequate contribution out o f G erm any towards the reconstruction o f Europe. We should be strongly pressed to send re lie f goods in, i f on ly at the insistance o f our ow n forces w h o w ould inevitably be affected by the sight o f starving children. **A p o lic y which condenses or favours chaos is n ot hard; it is sim ply in e ffic ie n t, we d o not favour a so ft p olicy towards Germ any; but the su fferin g which she must underto should be the price o f useful results fo r the U n ited N ations, ordered and controlled by ourselves. **If th e President takes this lin e-w h ich is contrary to everything in the plans w e and the Americans have prepared—you w ill perhaps think fit to persuade him o f its unwisdom.** 2. M inister o f Labour is not prepared to com m it him self to views expressed in this message w ithout m ore knowledge o f President’s proposals and fu lle r exam ination o f arguments fo r and against them. 3. T h e purpose o f the Message was o f course to prevent a snap decision being taken on a m atter which everyone agreed demands very fu ll and careful study.

23 "The Point of Difference... is One of M eans” In a shrewdly conceived memorandum, Stimson attacked the econom ic proposals o f the Morgenthau Plan as both im practical and un-Am erican. Aware that the Treasury Departm ent argued that opponents o f the plan were soft on Germ any, the secretary o f war supported punishment o f Germ an war criminals and stem measures to prevent a redevelopm ent o f the German m ilitary. Calling Morgenthau’s proposals a “ revolution,” Stimson claim ed that th ey would not work and would be interpreted as mere vengence. Paraphrasing the A tlantic Charter, the secretary argued that such treatm ent violated Am erica's ow n principles. Stim son’s vacillation between sim plistic pow er politics (e.g., his recom m endations fo r a m ilitary reaction to Japanese expansion prior to Pearl H arbor) and this type o f appeal to m oral principle make him appear inconsistent, but his feelings were obviously genuine.

Docum enti Washington, Septem ber 1 5 ,1 9 4 4 .

Memorandum for the President Since the m eeting w ith you on Septem ber 9th attended by the Secretary o f State, the Secretary o f the Treasury, M r. Hopkins, and m yself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers subm itted to you by the Secretary o f the Treasury on the treatm ent o f Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. M y views have already been subm itted to you in other memoranda. I m erely wish to reiterate b riefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury w ould in the lon g run certainly defeat what w e hope to attain by a com plete m ilitary victory,—this is, the peace o f the w orld, and the assurance o f social, econom ic and p olitical stability in the w orld. H ie poin t o f difference is n ot one o f objective,—continued w orld peace—it is one o f means. When w e discuss means, the difference is n ot w hether we should be so ft o r tough on the German people; but rather whether the course proposed w ill in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

+From: Memorandum from Stimson to R oosevelt, September 16, 1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S, Quebec, 1944, pp. 482-86.

122

DOCUMENT

ISS

I f I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that ob jective, I w ou ld n ot persist in m y objections. But I cannot believe that they w ill make a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, n ot, in m y judgm ent, corrective o r constructive. They w ill tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor im possible in fa c t It is not within the realm o f possibility that a w h ole nation o f seventy m illion people, who have been outstanding fo r many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficien cy and energy have attained one o f the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous m ethods o f life , be reduced to a peasant level w ith virtually com plete control o f industry and science le ft to oth er peoples. H ie question is not whether we want Germans to su ffer fo r th eir sins. M any o f us would lik e to see them suffer the tortures they have in flicted on others. The on ly question is whether over the years a group o f seventy m illion educated, and efficien t and im aginative people can be kept w ithin bounds on such a lo w level o f subsistence as the treasury proposals contem plate. I d o n ot believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even i f you could do this it is good fo r the rest o f the w orld either econom ically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part o f the w orld helps to create prosperity in other parts o f the w orld. It also teaches that p overty in one part o f the w orld usually induces poverty in other parts. E nforced p overty is even worse, fo r it destroys the spirit not on ly o f the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crim e as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victim s—it w ould be a crim e against civilization itself. This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental b e lie f that all men, in the lon g run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit o f happiness. Under the A tlan tic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from econom ic want. But the proposed treatm ent o f Germany w ould, i f successful, deliberately deprive m any m illions o f people o f the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the w orld w ould suspect the validity o f our spiritual tenets and question the long range effectiveness o f our econom ic and p olitical principles as applied to the vanquished. The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all o f the basic m ethods o f life o f a vast section o f the population as w ell as a disruption o f many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an opera* tion would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the p eople’s lives which would inevitably be productive o f the deepest resentment and bittem ess towards the authorities which had im posed such revolutionary changes upon them . Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely d ifferen t geography and econom y, it w ould doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death fo r m any, and m igrations and changes fo r others. It would be very d ifficu lt, I f not im possible, fo r them to

1S4

THE POINT OP DIFFERENCE IS ONE OF MEANS

understand any purpose o r cause (o r such revolutionary changes oth er than mere vengeance o f their enemies and this alone w ould strongly tend towards the m ost bitter reactions. I am prepared to accede to the argument that even i f German resources were wiped o f f the map, the European econom y w ould som ehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help o f Great Britain and this country. And the w orld would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression o f German com petition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity o f the victors and the negation o f all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accom plish since 1933. I am aware o f England's need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind o f rem edy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could n ot a ffo rd to fo llo w this patii. The total elim ination o f a com petitor (w h o is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution o f a com m ercial problem . The sum total o f the drastic political and econom ic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession o f the bankruptcy o f hope fo r a reasonable econom ic and political settlem ent o f the causes o f war. I plead fo r no “ s o ft" treatm ent o f Germany. I urge on ly that w e take steps which in the light o f history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, nam ely, the prevention o f future wars. The Carthaginian aspect o f the proposed plan would, in m y judgm ent, provoke a reaction on the part o f the people in this c o u n ty and in the rest o f the w orld which would operate not on ly against the measures advocated but in its violence w ould sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could ju stifiably im pose. I have already indicated in m y memorandum o f Septem ber 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recom m end that we should go pending further light on other questions which can on ly be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge o f conditions and trends w ithin Germ any as w ell as o f the views and intentions o f our Allies. Henry L . Stimson

Secretary o f War

24 Persuading the President Against the Plan On th e surface, the State Departm ent position on Germany reflected in this m em orandum appeared com patible w ith the Morgenthau Plan. A ctu ally, it proceeded from a radically d ifferen t view o f the causes o f W orld War I I in Europe. The Treasury Departm ent blamed the war purely and sim ply on Germ an im m orality and m ilitarism ; the State Departm ent, while critical o f G erm any’s overeagemess to resort to m ilitary solutions and while con­ dem ning Naziism , found the basic cause o f the war in autarky—th e tendency o f governments to pursue narrowly nationalistic and illiberal international trade policies. Aw are o f M orgenthau’s success in prom oting his plan, this m em o attem pted to undermine the support given the treasury by R oosevelt.

D ocum enti Washington, Septem ber 2 9 ,1944.

Memorandum fo r the President The Cabinet Com m ittee has not been able to agree upon a statem ent o f Am erican p olicy fo r the post-war treatm ent o f Germany. The memorandum presented by the Secretary o f the Treasury is decidedly at variance w ith the view s developed in the State Department. In the m eantim e, I have received you r memorandum o f Septem ber 15, w ith the statements o f views respecting the Ruhr, Saar, etc., and the conversion o f Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country, which was form ulated at Quebec. This memorandum seems to reflect largely the opinions o f the Secretary o f the Treasury in the treatm ent to be accorded Germ any. I feel that I should therefore submit to you the line o f thought that has been developing in the State Departm ent on this m atter. 1. Status o f Negotiations With the British and Russians The instrument o f unconditional surrender o f Germ any has been recom ­ mended by the European Advisory Commission and has been form ally approved by this G overnm ent It is anticipated that British and Russian

tF rom : Memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, September 29,1944, in U.S., Department o f State, F R U S , Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1946, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 1955), pp. 156-58.

125

11«

RHCUAIM NG THZ PEE8IDEMT AGAINST THS PLAN

approval w ill be forthcom ing. The question o f the Am erican and British zones o f occupation was, according to you r memorandum, worked out at Quebec and there w ill presumably be no m ore d ifficu lty over this m atter. In the m eantim e, the European Advisory Commission is going ahead on plans fo r a tripartite con trol machinery and m ilitary governm ent fo r Germany during the occupation period. A ll three governments have subm itted proposals which are similar in their general outline. The Am erican proposal contem plates a Supreme Au thority consisting o f the three Commanding Generals o f the U.S., the U .K. and the U.S.S.R., which would coordinate A llied con trol o f Germany and supervise su di centralized governm ental functions and econom ic activities as the three powers deem essential. A C ontrol C ouncil, com posed o f representatives in equal numbers from each o f the three A llied Governm ents, would be established by the Supreme A llied A u th ority and w ill coordinate the adm inistration o f m ilitary governm ent throughout G erm any, induding detailed planning fo r the execution o f directives received from the three governments. We expect to have a recom m ended plan on this fro m the European Advisory Commission in the near future. 2. Im portant Problems F or Which High Policy Decisions M ight Be Worked O ut

by the Three Governments T iie fundamental question to be decided is what kind o f a Germ any we want and what p olicy should be put in to e ffe c t during occupation to attain our objectives. The m ost im portant o f these problem s are set forth b elow w ith an explanation o f the State Departm ent’s views. I t should be emphasized, however, that these objectives w ill have to be w orked ou t w ith our prindpal A llies i f they are to be applied throughout the German R eich. (a ) D em ilitarization o f Germany. The com plete dissolution o f all German armed forces and all N azi m ilitary, para-m ilitary and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping o f all arms, ammunition and im plem ents o f war should be effected . Further manufacture in Germany o f arms, am m unition and im plem ents o f war should be prohibited. (b ) Dissolution o f the N azi party and all affiliated organizations. The N azi Party should be im m ediately dissolved. Large groups o f particularly objectionable elem ents, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be tried and, i f found gu ilty, executed. A ctive party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number o f restrictions. A ll laws discrim inating against persons on grounds o f race, color, creed o r political opinion should be annulled. (c ) Extensive controls should be maintained over com m unications, press and propaganda fo r the purpose o f elim inating doctrines o r sim ilar teachings. (d ) Extensive controls over German educational system should be established fo r the purpose o f elim inating all N azi influence and propaganda. (e ) N o decision should be taken on the possible partition o f Germ any (as distinguished from territorial am putations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude o f our principal A llies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization o f the German governm ental structure and i f any tendencies tow ard spontaneous partition o f Germ any arise they should n ot be discouraged.

DOCUMENT

127

(f) Econom ic Objectives. The prim ary and continuing objectives o f our econom ic p olicy are: (1 ) to render Germany incapable o f waging war, and (2 ) to elim inate perm anently German econom ic dom ination o f Europe. A shorter term objective is to require the perform ance by Germany o f acts o f restitution and reparation fo r injuries done to the United Nations. T o achieve the first tw o objectives, it w ill be essential (1 ) to destroy all factories incapable o f conversion to peaceful purposes and to prevent their reconstruction, (2 ) to enforce the conversion o f all other plants, (3 ) to elim inate self-sufficiency by im posing reform s that w ill make Germany dependent upon w orld markets, (4 ) to establish controls over foreign trade and key industries fo r the purpose o f preventing German rearmament, and (5 ) to elim inate the position o f pow er o f large industrialists and land-owners. Ib is Governm ent has little direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germ any and no interest in building up German econom y in order to collect continuing reparations. H owever, the U.S.S.R. and a number o f other states which have been victim s o f German destruction and exploitation may press daim s fo r German production and labor service fo r rehabilitation and construction. Extensive controls over industry and foreign trade w ill be essential during th e im m ediate period o f dem ilitarization and dismantlement, as w ell as during th e period o f reparations. A fte r this phase, a system o f control and supervision o f German industry and trade w ill have to be worked out in the ligh t o f w orld security developm ents. This system should be o f such a character that the victor powers w ill be able and w illing to enforce it over a considerable period. It is o f the highest im portance that the standard o f living o f the German people in the early years be such as to bring home to them that they have lost th e war and to impress on them that they must abandon all their pretentious theories that they are a superior race created to govern the w orld. Through lack o f luxuries we may teach them that war does not pay.

- The President’s R esponse Caught In a cabinet and bureaucratic hassle, R oosevelt responded in typ ical fashion by postponing any decision. A lw ays convinced that problem s usually resolved themselves if given enough tim e, the president also refused to perm it the European Advisory Commission to make any sort o f decisions. His long-standing agreem ent w ith Hull's liberal internationalism in trade and econom ics made R oosevelt agree with some o f the broad principles ou tlin ed in H ull’s m em o o f Septem ber 29 (see Docum ent 2 4), but R oosevelt carefu lly avoided any direct repudiation o f the Morgenthau Flan.

Docum entf Washington, O ctober 2 0 ,1 9 4 4 .

Mem orandum fo r the Secretary o f State In regard to you r memorandum o f Septem ber tw enty-ninth, I think it to all very w ell fo r us to make all kinds o f preparations fo r the treatm ent o f Germ any but there are some matters in regard to such treatm ent that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present m om en t It m ay be in a week, o r it m ay be in a m onth, o r it m ay be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans fo r a country which w e d o not y e t occupy. Y ou r memorandum paragraph N o. 1 I agree except fo r going in to to o much detail and directives at the present m om en t and w e must emphasize the fact that the European Advisory Commission is “ A d v is o ry " and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is som ething which is sometimes overlooked and i f we do n ot rem em ber that w ord “ ad visory" they may go ahead and execute som e o f the advice, which, when the tim e comes, we may not like at all. Y ou r memorandum paragraph N o. 2 In view o f the fact that we have not occupied Germ any, I cannot agree at this m om ent as to what kind o f a Germ any we want in every detail. In regard to the problem s involved, there are some which are p erfectly d ear and which can be approved now. Sub-paragraph (a ) on the D em ilitarization o f Germ any is, o f course, correct but should include everything to do w ith aircraft. This should be made specific. It must apply not m erely to the assembly o f aircraft but to

tF ro m : Memorandum from Roosevelt to Hull, O ctober 20, 1944, In U .S „ Department o f State, F R U 8 , Yalta, pp. 168-69.

128

DOCUMENT

IM

everything that goes in to an aircraft. We must rem em ber that som ebody may claim that the aircraft is fo r non-m ilitary purposes, such as a transport plane. Germ any must be prevented from making any aircraft o f any type in the future. I am in hearty agreem ent with Sub-paragraph (6 ) Dissolution o f the N azi Party and all affiliated organizations. In the same w ay, I agree w ith Sub-Paragraph (c ) Extensive controls should be maintained over com munications, press and propaganda. Sub-paragraph (d ) Extensive controls over German educational system. I should like to talk w ith you r experts in regard to just what this means. I agree w ith Sub-paragraph ( e ) N o decision should be taken on the possible partition o f Germ any. Sub-paragraph (f ) Econom ic O bjectives. I should like to discuss this with the State Departm ent in regard to some o f the language. I agree w ith it in principle, but I d o not know what part o f it means. Much o f this sub-head is dependent on what we and the A llies fin d when we get in to Germany—and w e are n o t there y e t F [ran k lin ] D. R [o o se v e lt]

26 A Directive for Military Government in Germany: Com prom ise Against the Plan Basic guidance fo r the Am erican arm y's occupation o f Germany came from this docum ent, abbreviated as JCS 1067. Although it went through a number o f revisions, its thrust remained the same. R eflectin g a number o f com promises between the War and Treasury departm ents, JCS 1067 provided extensive autonom y fo r the m ilitary commander while simultaneously preventing the m ilitary from rehabilitating the German econom y. Treasury officials w ho had hoped to leave the Germans com pletely to th eir own devices, opposed the section which gave the m ilitary control over the econom y, but w ith R oosevelt backing away from the Morgenthau Plan they had to settle fo r this com prom ise. Eventually, as Morgenthau and his staff had feared, the wide grant o f authority to the m ilitary governor was used to establish a program aim ed at restoring the German econom y.

Docum enti [W ashington,] Septem ber 22,1944.

Directive to S C A E F Regarding the Military Government o f Germ any in the Period Immediately Follow ing the Cessation o f Organized Resistance (Post-D efeat) 1. In the event that Rankin “ C ’conditions obtain in Germ any o r that the German forces are either defeated o r surrender b efore you have received a directive containing policies agreed upon fay the three governments o f the U.S., U .K ., and U.S.S.R., you w ill be guided by the following policies, principles and instructions.

tP ro m : “ D irective to SCAEF Regarding the M ilitary Governm ent o f Germany in the Period Im m ediately FoUowing the Cessation o f Organized Resistance (Post-D efeat)” Septem ber 22, 1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S , Y A L T A , pp. 143-46,162-64.

ISO

DOCUMENT

iai

2. Prior to the defeat o r surrender o f Germany the prim ary objective o f you r d v il affairs adm inistration has been to aid and support you r m ilitary ob jective: the prom pt defeat o f the enem y. Y ou r objective now is prim arily the occupation and adm inistration o f a conquered country w ith such m ilitary operations as are necessary fo r the com plete elim ination o f all resistance. 3. Pending the receipt o f directives containing long range policies, you r objectives must be o f short term and m ilitary character, in order not to prejudice whatever ultim ate policies may be later determ ined upon. Germany w ill not be occupied fo r the purpose o f liberation but as a defeated enem y nation. The d ear fact o f German m ilitary defeat and the inevitable consequences o f aggression must be appreciated by all levels o f the German population. H ie German people must be made to understand that all necessary steps w ill be taken to guarantee against a third attem pt by them to conquer the w orld. Y ou r aim is not oppression, but to prevent Germany from ever again becom ing a threat to the peace o f the world. In the accom plish­ m ent o f this objective the elim ination o f Nazism and m ilitarism in any o f th eir form s and the im m ediate apprehension o f war criminals fo r punishment are essential steps. 4. Y ou r occupation and adm inistration w ill be just but firm and distant. Y o u w ill strongly discourage fraternization between A llied troops and the German officials and population. 6. Y ou w ill establish m ilitary governm ent over all parts o f Germany under you r command. Y ou r rights, powers and status in Germany are based upon the unconditional surrender or the com plete defeat o f Germany. 6. a. By virtue o f you r position you are clothed w ith supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority in the areas occupied by forces under you r command. This authority w ill be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deem ed by you necessary, desirable o r appropriate in relation to m ilitary exigencies and the objectives a firm m ilitary governm ent. b. Y ou are authorized at you r discretion to delegate the authority herein granted to you in whole o r in part to members o f you r command and further to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate sub-delegations. c. Y ou should take the necessary measures to enforce the terms o f surrender and com plete the disarmament o f Germ any. d. The M ilitary Governm ent shall be a m ilitary adm inistration which, until you receive further advices, w ill show the characteristics o f an A llied undertaking acting in the interests o f the United Nations. 7. H ie adm inistrative policies shall be uniform throughout those parts o f Germ any occupied by forces under you r command subject to any special requirem ents due to local circumstances. 8. Representatives o f civilian agencies o f the U.S., U .K . and UJ5.S.R. governments shall not participate unless and until you consider such participation desirable. Representatives o f the civilian agencies o f other A llied Governm ents o r o f U N R R A m ay participate on ly upon you r recom m en­ dation and the approval o f the Com bined Chiefs o f S taff.

IIS

A DUtBCTIVS VOK M U T A K Y GOVERNMENT DV O IIM A N T

9. It Is contem plated that a tripartite adm inistration by the U.S., U .K . and U .S.S.R., covering the w hole o f Germ any w ill be established. Y ou have previously received advices in this connection. 10. Y ou are authorized as SC AE F to enter in to arrangements w ith the U.S.S.R. m ilitary commanders as m ay be necessary fo r the occupation o f Germ any by the three powers. 11. M ilitary adm inistration shall be directed tow ard the prom otion o f the decentralization o f the political structure o f Germ any. In the adm inistration o f areas under you r com mand, all dealings in so far as possible should be w ith municipal and provincial governm ent officials rather than w ith Central governm ent o ffic ia ls .. . .

Appendix “ A ” Political Directive 1. Y ou w ill search out, arrest, and hold, pending receipt by you o f farth er instructions as to their disposition, A d o lf H itler, his ch ief N azi associates, all persons suspected o f having com m itted war crimes, and all persons who, i f perm itted to remain at large, would endanger the accomplish* m ent o f you r objectives. The follow in g is a list o f the categories o f persons to be arrested in order to carry out this p olicy. I f after you have entered the country and in the ligh t o f conditions which you encounter there you d o n ot believe all o f these persons should be subjected im m ediately to this treatm ent, you should report back giving you r recom m endations and the reasons therefor. (a ) O fficials o f the N azi party and o f units or branches o f the N azi p arty, dow n to and including the leaden o f local party units, as w ell as officials o f equivalent stature in associations affiliated w ith the N azi party; (b ) A ll p olitical police, including the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst der S.S.; (c ) The o ffic e n and non-com m issioned o ffic e n o f the W affen S.S. and all members o f the other branches o f the S.S. (d ) A ll high officials o f the police and o f the S A ; (e ) The leading officials o f all ministries and other high p olitical officia ls o f Germ any and those persons who have held high positions, either civil or m ilitary, in the adm inistration o f German occupied countries; { f) Nazis and N azi sym pathizers holding im portant and key positions in (1 ) National and Gau civic and econom ic organizations; (2 ) corporations and other organizations in which the governm ent has a m ajor financial interest; (3 ) industry; (4 ) finance; (5 ) education; (6 ) ju diciary; (7 ) the press, publishing houses and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda. It m ay generally be assumed in the absence o f evidence to the contrary that any persons holding such positions are Nazis o r N azi sym pathizers; (g ) A ll judges, prosecutors and officials o f the People’s C ourt; (h ) A n y national o f any o f the United Nations who is believed to have com m itted offenses against his national law in support o f the German war e ffo rt;

DOCUMENT

IM

(0 A n y oth er person whose name o r designation appears on lists to be subm itted to you o r whose name m ay be n otified to you separately. O f equal i f not greater im portance in the ultim ate destruction o f German M ilitarism is the elim ination o f the German Professional O fficer Corps as an institution. A ll General S ta ff Corps officers who are not taken in to custody as prisoners o f war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt o f fu rth er instructions as to their disposition. Y ou w ill receive further instructions as to how to deal w ith other members o f the German O fficers C o rp s .. . . A p p e n d ix “ C ” E c o n o m ic D ir e c tiv e 1. Y ou shall assume such con trol o f existing German industrial, agri* cultural, u tility, com m unication and transportation facilities, supplies, and services, as are necessary fo r the follow in g purposes: a. Assuring the im m ediate cessation o f the production, acquisition or developm ent o f im plem ents o f war; b. Assuring, to the exten t that it is feasible, the production and m aintenance o f goods and services essential (1 ) fo r the prevention or alleviation o f epidem ic or serious disease and serious civil unrest and disorder which w ould endanger the occupying forces and the accom plishm ent o f the objectives o f the occupation; and (2 ) fo r the prosecution o f the war against Japan (b u t on ly to the exten t that specific directives o f higher authority call fo r such goods o r services). c. Preventing the dissipation o r sabotage o f German resources and equipm ent which m ay be required fo r relief, restitution, o r reparation to any o f tiie allied countries, pending a decision by the appropriate A llied governm ents whether and to what exten t German resources or equipm ent w ill be used fo r such purposes. E xcept fo r the purposes specified above, you w ill take no steps looking tow ard the econom ic rehabilitation o f Germ any nor designed to maintain or strengthen the German econom y. Except to the exten t necessary to accom plish the purposes set out above, the responsibility fo r such econom ic problem s as price controls, rationing, unem ploym ent, production, recon* struction, distribution, consum ption, housing o r transportation w ill remain w ith the German people and the German au th orities.. . . A p p e n d ix “ D ” R e lie f D ir e c tiv e Y o u w ill be responsible fo r the provision and distribution o f supplies fo r civilian re lie f on ly to the exten t necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as m ight endanger or im pede m ilitary occupation. For this purpose you w ill make maximum use o f supplies, stockpiles and resources available within Germ any in order to lim it the exten t to which im ports, i f any, w ill be required. German im port requirements shall be strictly lim ited to minimum quotas o f critical item s and shall not, in any instance, take precedence over fu lfillm en t o f the supply requirem ents o f any liberated te rrito ry .. . .

27 — Opposition to the Com prom ise Aw are that he had been boxed in by the Treasury and War departm ents* agreem ent on JCS 1067, Secretary o f State Hull tried to leave him self som e room in wich to maneuver taking exception to part o f the econom ic d irective in the interim directive sent to SC AE F. Hull’s opposition was directed at the clause which prohibited any action designed to rehabilitate the German econom y or industry. The exception, put in the form o f a letter to Stim son, had no e ffe c t upon the authority o f JCS 1067. The follow in g excerpt is John M cQ oy reading to Morgenthau the te x t o f a letter sent to Stimson by H ull.

Docum entf M : N ow , Mr. H ull’s letter to the Secretary o f War was this: he said, “ I understand that representatives o f the State, War and Treasury Departm ents have been conferring fo r the purpose o f preparing an interim d irective to Eisenhower's Headquarters in regard to the m ilitary governm ent o f Germ any fo r the period im m ediately follow in g the cessation o f organized resistance, and I further understand that agreement has been reached on all p oin ts w ith the sole exception o f the final paragraph o f Section One o f the A p p en d ix, which is the econom ic directive. This departm ent is prepared to agree to Section One as now drafted on the understanding that the Suprem e Commander is authorized to interpret this section as enabling him to retain or im pose such econom ic controls as he may deem essential to the safety and health o f the occupying forces.”

tF ro m : Transcript o f Telephone Conversation between Morgenthau and McCloy September 28, 1944, ln U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Adm inistration o f the Internal Security A ct and Other Internal Security Laws o f the Com m ittee on the Judiciary .Morgenthau Diarie», 90th Cong., 1st sees., 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1967), vol. I, p. 669. 1S4

— Churchill and Stalin on Germ any and America, October, 1944 The British minutes o f the Churchill-Stalin M eeting in M oscow in O ctober, 1944, did n ot becom e available to the public until 1972. They contained a record which varies significantly from the description o f the talks found in Churchill’s memoirs. Although the prim e m inister makes no m ention o f the Morgenthau Plan after his b rief recounting o f the 1944 Quebec Conference, the T O L S T O Y minutes show that he gave it strong support during his talks w ith Stalin. This conference was also the scene o f the famous “ percent” agreem ent between Stalin and Churchill, and their closing com m ent below indicates their paternalistic approach to European politics. Although Stalin frequ ently teased Churchill about being to o easy on the Germans, these minutes demonstrate that the Englishman was quite w illing to im pose a harsh peace on Germ any. Churchill’s willingness to see a large number o f Germans killed in action, and his suggestion that massive population transfers should take place in East Prussia and Silesia (eastern Germ any) both indicate his desire to in flic t punishment upon the Germans.

Documenti" TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R suggested that in the presence o f Mr. Harriman th ey m ight have a talk about the future o f Germany. He suggested that fo r about a m onth or so they should not say anything publicly because it would make the Germans figh t harder. He had been shy o f breathing fire and slaughter, but they m ight discuss it qu ietly among themselves. M A R S H A L S T A L IN agreed. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said he was all fo r hard terms. Opinions were divided in the United States. The best thing would be to beat the Germans In to unconditional surrender and then tell them what to do. He wanted to hear Marshal Stalin’s opinion about the régim e to be applied and how Germ any was to be divided, what was to be done w ith Prussia, the Saar and the Ruhr, and w ith German weapons. Russian factories had been destroyed as tF rom : Records o f the Meetings at the Krem lin, Moscow, O ctober 9-17, 1944 (T O L S T O Y ), Prime Minister’s Operational Files, PREM 3/434/2/61-62, 92-94, pp. 8-9, PubUc Records O ffice.

136

IN

CRURCHILL AND STALIN ON GERMANY AND AMERICA

w ell as Belgian and Dutch and the machines taken away would have to be replaced. Perhaps the Foreign Secretaries could discuss this m atter w ith M. M olotov and Mr. Harriman. The President was fo r hard terms. Others were fo r soft. The problem was how to prevent Germany getting on her fe et in the lifetim e o f grandchildren. M A R S H A L S T A L IN thought the Versailles peace was inadequate. It had n ot rem oved the possibility o f revenge. Hard measures would stir a desire fo r revenge. The problem was to create such a peace that the possibility o f revenge would be denied to Germany. Her heavy industry w ould have to be destroyed. The State would have to be split up. H ow (hat was to be done w ould have to be discussed. H er heavy industry would have to be reduced to a minimum. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R suggested it should apply to the electrical and chem ical industries also. M A R S H A L S T A L IN agreed that it should apply to all industry producing war material. Germany should be deprived o f the possibility o f revenge. Otherwise every tw enty-five or thirty years there would be a new w orld war which would exterm inate the young generation. I f approached from that angle the harshest measures would prove to be the m ost humane. Eight to ten m illion Germans had been lost after every war. Reprisals in Germ any m ight n ot a ffect on ly one and a h a lf m illion Germans. As regards concrete proposals, Mr. Eden and M. M olotov should get together. M. M O LO T O V asked what was the Prim e M inister's opinion o f the Morgenthau plan. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said that the President and Mr. Morgenthau were not very happy about its reception. The Prim e M inister went on to say that as he had declared in Tehran, Britain would not agree to mass execution o f Germans, because one day British public opinion would cry out. But it was necessary to k ill as many as possible in the field . The others should be made to w ork to repair the damage done to other countries. T h ey m ight use the Gestapo on such w ork and the H itler You th should be re-educated to learn that it was m ore d ifficu lt to build than to destroy. M A R S H A L S T A L IN thought that a lon g occupation o f Germ any w ould be necessary. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R did n ot think that the Am ericans w ould stay very long. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said France should provide some forces. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R agreed. M A R S H A L S T A L IN suggested the use o f the small countries. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R thought United Poland could be em ployed. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said Silesia would go to the Poles and part o f East Prussia. The Soviet Union would take Koenigsberg and the Poles w ould be very interested in the occupation o f Germany. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R thought the population m ight be m oved from Silesia and East Prussia to Germany. I f seven m illion had been killed in the war there would be plenty o f room fo r them . He suggested that M . M olotov

DOCUMENT

1S7

and Mr. Eden, w ith Mr. Harriman, should talk this over and get a picture o f the general proposals fo r Marshal Stalin and him self to think about, and thus when the end came they would not be w ithout som ething unprobed. They should also decide what part the European Advisory Com m ission should play. M A R S H A L S T A L IN agreed .. . .

Dismemberment o f Germ any M A R S H A L S T A L IN asked what they were to do w ith Germany. T H E PR IM E M IN IS T E R asked Mr. Eden to make his suggestions. M R . ED EN explained that we had com e to no conclusion but there were three alternative courses:— (1 ) Dismemberment, w ithout any relation to the old German States (2 ) T o use some o f (he old States as a basis. (3 ) T o impose a permanent international control on the ch ief industrial area, the Rhine, the Ruhr, the Saar and W estfalia, after Russia and the other Allies had taken what they needed in material. This area w ould be separated from Germany. M A R S H A L S T A L IN asked: W ho w ould exercise control over the industrial area? M R . EDEN replied: The Allies. M A R S H A L L S T A L IN asked if it would on ly be econom ic con trol. M R . ED EN replied that it would be a general control. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R thought that Prussia was the ro o t o f the evil and the Prussian m ilitary caste. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said that Prussia contributed the man-power. T H E PR IM E M IN IS T E R suggested the isolation o f Prussia and control over the Ruhr and the Saar. H ow this was to be done could be discussed later. First, it was necessary to take away all the machinery and machine tools that Russia, Belgium, Holland and France needed. He would support Marshal Stalin in repairing the damage to Russia's Western provinces which had su ffered so much. It was on ly fair. The same applied to the smaller A llies. This was the p olicy which Mr. Morgenthau had laid b efore the President—to put the Ruhr and Saar out o f action. Mr. Morgenthau's hatred o f the Germans was indescribable. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said he must be a second Vansittart. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said that the President had liked what M orgenthau had said. Continuing, he asked why the British should n ot make the things needed by Europe fair com petiton w ith other countries. A fte r this war Britain w ould be the on ly great debtor nation. Their foreign securities, am ounting to £400,000,000 had been sold. Britain’s sterling debts now am ounted to £3,000 m illion. She would have to make every e ffo rt to increase her exports to buy fo o d . Russia's intention to take away German machinery was in harm ony w ith Britain's interests o f fillin g in the gap in the place o f Germ any. This was on ly justice.

m

cHumcHnx and staun on obbmant and amsrica

M A R S H A L S T A L IN said he would support any steps taken b y B ritain to receive com pensation fo r the losses she had suffered. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said he would support Russia in gettin g the machine tools required by the Ukraine and other ravaged regions. H ie Prime M inister w ent on to say that they had not been thinking o f Germany up to that point. They must now devote their minds to that problem . He would not trust Germany w ith the developm ent o f her m etallurgy, chemical or electrical industries. He would stop those altogether fo r as long as he had a word to say, and he hoped fo r a generation at least. He had not thought about the division o f Prussia, but on ly o f its isolation and o f cutting o f f those tw o centres, the Ruhr and the Saar, from Prussia. T h ey were centres o f war production and machine building. M A R S H A L S T A L IN asked i f he was to understand that Mr. Churchill's suggestion provided fo r an independent State o f Prussia after the cession o f territory to Poland. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R replied that Poland would get a slice o f East Prussia and Slesia. H ie K iel Canal would be neutralised. The Ruhr and the Saar would be put perm anently out o f action. M A R S H A L S T A L IN asked whether the Ruhr and the Saar w ould be separate States. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said that he had on ly been thinking o f destroying industry. He had a vivid m em ory o f the last war. We had stopped Germ any from having an arm y, navy and air force. We had destroyed her weapons. M A R S H A L S T A L IN interrupted to say that it was unwise to destory Germ any's weapons. The navy should not be sunk and artillery should n ot be blow n up. They m ight be useful against Japan. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R suggested that Russia could take what she wanted. M A R S H A L S T A L IN thought Britain could use some o f Germ any's ships. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R replied that Russia could d o the same, but in the future air would be stronger than the fleet. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said that Great Powers could not be w ithout navies. Germ any's mistake was that she had wanted to conquer Europe although she had no fleet. The poin t was she had no fUel in Europe and was short o f fo o d , and a fleet was necessary to carry fuel and food . Germany had not understood this. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said that Britain intended to maintain a strong fleet and a strong air com ponent. She would w elcom e the appearance o f a strong Russian fleet on all the seas. She w ould create no obstacles to Russia's having a fleet. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R w ent on to say that after the last war Rathenau had told the Germans after they had been deprived o f their army and navy that it would not m atter. He would arrange factories and make new weapons. I f factories were arranged Germany would becom e a great Pow er quicker than any o f the others. Brüning carried on w ith this p olicy, but no one dared go in to production until H itler appeared. H itler did not invent this them e.

DOCUMENT

139

Rathenau and Brüning had thought o f i t H itler only pulled the lever. It should n ot happen again. Industrial disarmament was the im portant thing. T o begin w ith, the machine tools must be taken away. M A R S H A L S T A L IN agreed and added that all metallurgical works should b e destroyed. They were d ifficu lt to restore. Germany produced fou r times m ore p ig iron than England. A map o f Germany was then produced. Marshal Stalin asked whether France wanted access to the Rhine. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said that France wanted the West bank o f the Rhine internationalised. Czechoslovakia was ready to give up a small area near Eger, but wanted some readjustment o f the fron tier in the N orth fo r strategic reasons. The Prime M inister suggested that Bavaria and Austria should go together w ith Vienna as the capital and form a separate State with Würtemberg and Baden. There would be three States in Germany: Bavaria and Austria—so ft treament. Prussia—hard treatm en t The industrial area on the Rhine—under international control. Saxony, when stripped, might go to Prussia. M R . EDEN pointed out that i f in the future Bavaria again wanted to com bine w ith Pnissia she m ight draw Austria after her. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said that Hungary would have to remain a separate State. N either the Hungarians nor the Slavs should ever form part o f any German State. They were to o weak and Germany was to o cultured. Germany w ould quickly dom inate them. Marshal Stalin said that the small nations in Europe should be made to police Germany. The Poles would be glad to take a hand in the occupation. The Poles deserved to get territory on their Western borders. They had suffered much fo r over a century. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R asked what the Marshal thought o f Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary form ing a separate grouping. M A R S H A L S T A L IN asked whether it would be an entente. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R explained that it would be m ore than an entente , it would be a Zollverein. The evil in Europe was that travelling across it one used many d ifferen t currencies, passed a dozen frontiers, many customs barriers, and all this was a great obstacle to trade. He wanted to see Europe prosperous and some o f the old glory return to her. In this way perhaps hatred would die. He thought this m ight be achieved by groupings fo r com m ercial and trade purposes. M A R S H A L S T A L IN suggested that this question m ight crop up som ewhat later but the im m ediate point was that after this war all States would be very nationalistic. The Hungarians, Czechs and Poles would first want to build up their national life and not restrict their ow n rights by com bining w ith others. The feeling to live independently would be the strongest. Later, econom ic feelings would prevail, but in the first period they would be purely nationalistic and therefore groupings would be unwelcom e. The fact that H itler’s regim e had developed nationalism could be seen in the exam ple o f Yugoslavia where Croats. Montenegrius, Slovenes, & c., all wanted som ething o f their ow n. I t was a sym ptom .

140

CHUm CULL AND S T A U N OK GBBMAMT AND AMEBICA

M. M O LO T O V said that after the last war many new small States had been form ed. Many o f them had failed. It would be dangerous to g o to th e other extrem e after this war and to force States to form groups. I t w ou ld be im possible fo r Czechs and Hungarians to unite and to fin d a com m on language im m ediately after this war. N or could the Czechs and Pedes d o so. They all had a great desire fo r an independent life . H ie fact was th at their independence had been o f short duration. TO E PR IM E M IN IS T E R hoped that som e o f the young men present would see it. M A R S H A L S T A L IN thought that M r. Churchill’s suggestion w ou ld be possible in the future but not just yet. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R suggested that Germ any should be deprived o f all her aviation. M A R S H A L S T A L IN agreed and suggested that neither civil nor m ilitary flyin g should be allow ed. A ll training schools fo r pilots should be forbidden. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R said that Mr. Morgenthau had suggested that Germany should have no merchant shipping. She should be made to hire ships from other countries to carry her goods. M A R S H A L S T A L IN agreed and said that a merchant fle çt provided m anpower fo r the navy. The absence o f a merchant fle et prevented the creation o f a navy. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R thought that there was very little divergence o f opinion between them . It was a p ity that when G od created the w orld he had n ot consulted them . M A R S H A L S T A L IN said it was G od’s first mistake. M R . ED EN suggested that M . Gusev should get on w ith the preparatory w ork in the E.A.C. M A R S H A L S T A L IN said that the principles should be laid dow n b y the three governments and that the E. A .C . should be given som e gu id an ce.. . .

2Q ....

— British Argum ents Against the Plan

B y D ecem ber, 1944, the British Foreign O ffice had developed a fu ll set o f arguments against the Morgenthau Plan’s proposal fo r the deindustrialization o f the Ruhr and Saar areas. Countering arguments that deindustrialization w ould benefit British trade, the Foreign O ffice sounded rem arkably like C ordell Hull and the State Departm ent when it claim ed that Germany played an integral role in the entire structure o f the w orld econom y.

D o c u m e n tf 14. Our conclusions m ay be summarised as fo llo w s:— (a ) The direct and indirect effects on the Rhineland, Westphalia and the Saar o f elim inating the m etal, chem ical and engineering industries in that area would be to deprive o f their norm al livelih ood about 2 m illion o f the pre-war working population o f 6 Vi m illion. The short-term prospects o f absorbing these unem ployed in other indus­ tries in the area are bad and even on a long view the creation o f new industries could never enable the area to support the high density o f population which it has done in the past w ith a standard o f living com parable w ith the rest o f Germany. Agriculture is already carried out intensively in the area and could n ot absorb an appreciable am ount o f additional labour. (b ) The absorption o f these 2 m illion unem ployed in the rest o f Germany w ould be very d ifficu lt i f at the same tim e 3 to 5 m illion workers from ttie ceded territories o f the East had also to be absorbed. Som e 600,000 could exp ect to find im m ediate w ork in agriculture, and over a period o f from 10 to 15 years a p olicy o f breaking up the larger estates m ight result in the settling on the land o f a further 720,000 i f East Prussia and Silesia on ly are ceded or 570,000 i f all the area east o f the O der is ceded. The capital investm ent needed fo r this and fo r the developm ent o f new industries to absorb the rem ainder would be very substantial, and its provision would be made even m ore d ifficu lt by the repercussions o f the proposals on Germ any’s exports and her balance o f trade. The industries in question norm ally provide some 60 tF to m : A.P.W . (4 4 ) 127, December 27, 1944, War Cabinet, Foreign 871/46720/4010, pp. 6-7, Public Records O ffice.

141

O ffice

149

BRITISH ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PLAN

per cent o f Germany*« exports and the loss o f production w ou ld far exceed the amounts norm ally exported so that a serious declin e in exports could scarcely be avoided. Indeed, the change in pattern o f the econom y would cause acute problem s o f re-adjustment which m ight w ell call fo r additional im ports during the period o f changeover. (c ) Since Germ any’s exports m ight w ell not be su fficien t even to pay fo r her essential im ports, there m ight be no reparation at all apart from certain “ once fo r all” deliveries. (d ) I f the elim ination o f the industries concerned were perm anently secured the objective o f econom ic security would be achieved, but these proposals would be less lik ely to be effective than sim ilar measures applied over the w hole o f Germany to selected industries covering a smaller field . M oreover, it seems doubtful whether it w ould be possible in practice to achieve the perm anent elim ination o f these industries. (e ) The effects o f the proposals on British com m ercial interests w ould be conflicting. The destruction would tend to im proverish n ot only Germany but the world as a whole. On the other hand, in so far as the industries concerned are com petitive with our ow n, we could hope to obtain a share o f their form er markets which would considerably exceed our pre-war share o f German im ports, and should be larger than any loss we m ight sustain in other exports through the increased com petition from perm itted German industries. O f the latter, coal is the m ost im portan t The loss o f some o f our traditional markets to Germany would reduce any net gain in visible trade to a figure nearer £300 to £400 m illion which has been suggested. On invisible account our prospects o f obtaining anything on account o f the substantial British investments in Germany would be further reduced. { f) H ie effects upon France, Belgium and Luxem bourg would probably be sim ilar to the effects on the United Kingdom . Denmark and N orw ay would probably be adversely affected by the loss o f the German market. Although Holland m ight gain in the lon g run from expansion o f her industry, she would also lose the German m arket fo r her agricultural produce and a valuable entrepot trade. S.E. Europe w ould be unlikely to gain anything, but should not lose in the long run since Austria, Czechoslovakia and perhaps the Soviet Union would tend to replace Germany both as a source o f supply and a market. 5th December, 1944.

30 =

_

________________________________

"The Department of State B elieves...”

The State Department never altered its views during the entire debate over postw ar planning fo r Germany. Hull’s departure m erely meant a d ifferen t signature at the bottom o f memoranda fo r R oosevelt. Invariably the arguments boiled down to tw o basic points; that a program o f deindustrial­ ization was im practical, and that Germany had a positive role to play in the w orld econom y. Stetti nius’s strong support fo r a severe p olicy was belied by his final sentence.

Docum enti [W ashington,] N ovem ber 2 2 ,1944. Subject: Summary o f Department’s View s on Econom ic Treatm ent o f Germany U te Departm ent o f State believes: (1 ) H ie German econom y should be operated as nearly as possible as a u nit during the occupation period. (2 ) A llied occupation p olicy should be severe— (a ) a rock-bottom standard o f living fo r the Germans; (b ) labor services fo r the rehabilitation o f devastated parts o f Europe; (c ) transfer o f such industrial equipm ent and stockpiles as liberated countries can put to effective use, lim ited on ly by necessity fo r maintaining a minimum German econom y; (d) conversion o f the German econom y to peacetim e production, in­ cluding production fo r minimum German needs and fo r reconstruction o f rest o f Europe on reparation account; (e ) elim ination from positions o f control o f those industrial and financial leaders who have been closely identified w ith the N azi regim e; o r who have derived large b en efit from Aryanization or spoliation o f occupied countries. (3 ) We must rely on an effective international security organization to keep Germany disarmed. We can’t make Germany so weak that it w ill be im possible fo r her to recover. A lo o k at Russia in 1920 and in 1940 demonstrates h ow quickly industrial strength can be built up i f a country is

tF rom : Memorandum from Stettinius to Roosevelt, Novem ber 22, 1944, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S, Yalta, p. 173. 14S

144

T U DBFABTMBMT OF STATE BELIEVES

le ft alone “ to stew In Its ow n Juice” . Disarmament requires prohibitions o f aim s and aircraft production and destruction o f specialized facilities fo r their manufacture. Som e other permanent o r semi-permanent industrial restrictions and controls m ay be necessary, but if the security organization is prepared to use force to prevent rearmament, we d on 't have to cut deep in to the German econom y, and i f it isn't, no am ount o f once-and-for-all econom ic destruction w ill make much lasting difference. (4 ) In the long run, we should lo o k forw ard to a German econom y geared in to a liberal w orld econom y on the basis o f e fficien t specialization. Ib is w ill im ply quitable German access to exp ort markets, abolition o f German self-sufficiency, and abandonment o f instruments o f German econom ic aggression—private international cartels, bilateral barter arrangements, etc. This alone Is com patible w ith the em ergence o f a stable non-agressive Germany. This m ay prove to be unattainable, but fo r the present w e should take no action which would prem anently preclude peaceful developm ent o f Germ any. E .R . Stettinius, hr.

31 — Morgenthau Defends the Plan Shortly b efore R oosevelt le ft fo r the Y alta Conference, Morgenthau prepared a statem ent which summed up the basic concept o f the program he proposed fo r postw ar Germany. Defensive in tone, the Treasury secretary chose to send it on ly to the State Departm ent instead o f to the president. His reference in paragraph l. (b ) to the provocative nature o f any plan to use Germany as a b u ffer against Russia indicated his b elief that such notions had becom e the m ajor reason fo r State Departm ent opposition to the Morgenthau Plan.

Docum entt [W ash ington ], January 1 9 ,1945.

Memorandum R e: Lon g Range Program fo r Germany 1. The single objective o f any long range program towards Germany is that o f doin g all that we can now to prevent Germany from starting a third W orld War in the next generation. T o accomplish this objective, the follow in g principles are dear: (а ) Germany must be rendered weak p olitically, m ilitarily and econ­ om ically and must be kept weak fo r many years to com e. (б ) A n y program which has as its purpose the building up o f Germany as a bulwark against Russia and communism w ill inevitably lead to a third W orld War. (c ) It is im possible to devise a program fo r Germany today which w ill guarantee peace in the years to com e. We can not expect to fin d a panacea. There are certain minimum steps which we must take now. Developm ents in the next five or ten years may require that we take additional steps at that tim e. So long as the German people retain the w ill to wage war, we must be ever vigilant to see to it that they do n ot obtain the means to exercise this w ill. (d ) Since the stakes are so high, our goal must be that o f seeing how far we can go in making certain that Germany is unable to embark upon another war rather than trying to find a minimum program which would convince m ost people that we had solved the problem .

tF to m : Memorandum from Morgenthau to the President (n ot len t), January 19,1945, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S, Yalta, pp. 176-76.

146

14«

MORGENTHAU DEFENDS TBE PLAN

2. liie r e are many essential facts to a long range program fo r Germ any. W ithout intending at all to exclude from consideration the oth er essential elements o f the program , it is desired at this tim e to em phasize the im portance o f dealing effectively with German heavy industry because industry represents an indispensable means by which Germany can exercise her w ill to wage war again. Although political, m ilitary and econom ic controls over Germany in the post-war period are essential, they a fford no reasonable assurance that a strong Industrial Germany could not within tw enty to thirty years again plunge the w orld into war. In order to make reasonably sure that we have deprived Germany o f the ability to make war again w ith in the next generation, it is absolutely essential that she be deprived o f her chem ical, m etallurgical and electrical industries. Although this does not mean that other measures are unnecessary, the elim ination o f heavy industry is one o f the essential steps we must take now. A t the same tim e that German heavy industry is elim inated in Germ any every e ffo rt should be made to build up heavy industry in the liberated countries surrounding Germany. The industrial equipm ent m oved from Germany as w ell as the resources in the Rhine and Ruhr areas could m ake a real contribution toward such a program. In this way the w hole balance o f industrial pow er in Europe w ill be shifted so that Germany w ill no lon ger be the dom inating pow er in Europe. 3. A fte r careful study, we com pletely reject the follow in g propositions: (a ) The fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germ any. ( b ) The contention that recurring reparations (w hich would require im m ediate reconstruction o f the German econ om y) are necessary so that Germ any may be made to pay fo r the destruction she has caused. (c ) The b elief that the rem oval or destruction o f all German war m aterials and the German armament industry would in itself prevent Germ any from waging another war. (d ) The illogical assumption that a “ soft*’ peace would facilitate the grow th o f dem ocracy in Germany. (e ) The fallacy that making Germany a predom inantly agricultural country, w ith light industries but no heavy industries, w ould mean starving Germans.

32 —A n Am erican A m bassad or on the Future of Germany, February, 1945 Frustrated by his inability to obtain d ear and firm p olicy guidance from Washington, the Am erican ambassador in London, John Winant, gave voice to his annoyance as w ell as his fears o f the Soviet Union in a conversation w ith a Treasury Department o ffic ia l on February 1, 1945. Winant obviously supported the overall State Departm ent position regarding Germany.

Docum entf The Ambassador then made what to me was a curious remark until he explained it. He stated that we was greatly w orried by some o f the thinking o f the people today. I t developed that the thinking that was w orrying him was some o f the thinking on the post-war treatm ent o f Germany. According to the Ambassador there is going to be all sorts o f m isery and disorder in Germ any and it w ill be such that it is going to create just the thing we are fighting against—another H itler. N o t knowing exactly what the Ambassador was hinting at, I made a rather general statem ent that conditions there would no doubt be very bad. In view o f the p olicy o f the N azi fanatics to resist until the last man, and apparently there would be terrible destruction in the country, but I was not quite clear how this was going to create another H itler. The Ambassador then went in to a lon g discourse which fin ally added up the fact that the thinking now is to divide Germany in to zones, each o f which w ill be controlled by the particular country occupying that zone. There w ill be no free intercourse between the zones. In fact, it w ill amount to som ething like independent states, each o f which w ill be a “ water-tight com partm ent.” This was a great mistake and the responsibility fo r it would be ours. Many who advocate this type o f thinking overlooked one thing, nam ely, that we were going to sign the unconditional surrender terms on behalf o f certain o f the other United Nations whose forces have n ot participated in the occupation. The British w ould have a good defense in that they originally had wanted to bring these other countries in to

tF ro m : James Mann, Memorandum o f a Conversation with Winant, February 1,19 46, in Mergenthau Diary, Germany, voL 2, pp. 947-48.

147

148

AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR ON THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

the occupation work. The Russians have sided w ith us, but on the oth er hand the Russians had wanted an overall control. The advocates o f the “ Separate Zones” theory also overlooked the fact that whether we had a hard peace o r a so ft peace we should have to have some machinery fo r control. H ie Ambassador had attem pted in the European Advisory Com m ittee to set up sudi a machinery. The machinery had been set up w ith the idea that there would be an abundance o f fo o d in one zone and a scarcity in another. The fo o d could be shipped from the abundant zone to the scarce zon e, and the same applied to coal and many other things. Railroads could run throughout Germany and there would be com munications throughout Germ any, but under the thinking which the Ambassador was criticizing there would be no such transportation or com munications. Railroads would stop at the zone line o f dem arcation. Hunger in one zone could not be alleviated w ith fo o d from another. Then at the on ly point in the conversation in which the Treasury was m entioned, he said “ Some o f the Treasury's fellow s thinking on this problem have even gone so far as to advocate the use o f d ifferen t currencies in d ifferen t zones.” That to the Ambassador was unthinkable. A t this point the Ambassador ceased talking in terms o f the d ifferen t zones and talked in terms o f the misery that would befall Germany and the Germans. He wanted a hard peace but the way we should have that peace was by setting up a control machinery which would force the Germans to can y ou t our w ill. There had to be a certain amount o f discipline and a certain amount o f order. We would have sufficient troops to run the water system , to mine the coal, to make the electric plants run. We should have the Germans d o this, but the way to do it was to tell them what to do and make them do it According to the Ambassador, how ever, there are a lo t o f people thinking about this problem who wanted to con trol the other. The Ambassador certainly wanted to take the “ plus” and use it to repay the countries that had been devastated, but there are certain obligations which we had to assume. We had to keep a certain amount o f discipline and order. H ow could we b en efit i f Germany were swept with epidem ics? He could not see how that would help us at all, and he predicted that there would be great epidem ics which “ would not recognize uniform or nationality.” He then m entioned that one had to admire the Russians fo r their efficien cy and fo r their discipline. I asked what kind o f controls the Russians had indicated that they w ould put in their zone. He said that they would keep discipline and that they would m ove in to the zone and carry everything away, “ even the machine tools.” He referred at this poin t to their m oving into Rumania and taking the Am erican property in the oil field . He was not critical o f that action, because the Russians needed oil to keep their Arm y going and he certainly wanted to see those Arm ies go. But, after the war when the fighting was over, the question was a d ifferen t one. (H e was not optim istic about the future, because the Russians would m ove in and devastate that area and anything that was given to the other United Nations to repay them fo r the damage they had suffered would have to com e from our zone and the British zone. He again pointed

DOCUMENT

14«

ou t that b y signing the unconditional surrender terms on behalf o f certain o f the other United Nations, we assumed an obligation to them .) The Am bassador seemed to fear that not on ly would it create a situation out o f which w ould arrive the very thing against which we were fighting but that we w ould also run the risk o f offen din g some o f the other United Nations. During this conversation I said very little . In fact, there was n ot much opportu n ity fo r me to talk and when the Ambassador started explaining his p oin t o f view I was careful not to interrupt him. M ost o f m y comments were o f a very general nature and generally referred to the newspapers and points o f view I had seen expressed in the British press. A t the end o f our interview I m entioned generally to the Ambassador that I was som ewhat disturbed b y som e o f the thinking which I had seen expressed in the British press. I m entioned that the press talked quite a b it in terms o f reparation as distinguished from restitution. That meant the retention o f German industry and thus meant the retention o f the German war potential. The Ambassador recognized that there were some British people w ho fe lt like that but certainly not all. He said it would be unthinkable i f we le t the German war poten tial and he certainly did n 't propose to do that. A t this poin t the Am bassador stopped discussing the post-war treatm ent o f Germany and I was unable to draw him out further on any o f the topics which he had m entioned.

33

=

_

= = = = = Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt on Reparations The question o f reparations, on ly partially settled at Y alta, eventually became the specific issue which brought on Soviet-Am erican disagreem ent in Germany. In this discussion, the attitudes o f the Big Three becom e very d ear. The Russians were w illing to perm it a m oderate redevelopm ent o f German industry so that reparations could be paid; the British believed overly harsh reparations demands would em bitter the Germans and eventually fo rce the Allies to provide econom ic assistance to prevent starvation; and the Americans tried to split the difference.

Docum enti M R . M A IS K Y then outlined the Soviet plan fo r reparations fo r Germ any. He said that the Soviet plan fo r reparations in kind envisaged tw o categories: (1 ) the rem oval from Hie national wealth o f Germany o f plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be com pleted within a period o f tw o years after the end o f hostilities, (2 ) yearly payments in kind to last fo r ten years. He said that in order to restore Soviet econom y which had suffered so much from German aggression, and to safeguard the future security o f Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry he meant iron and steel, electrical pow er and chem ical industries. Specialized industry useful on ly fo r m ilitary purposes should be 100% rem oved. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet Governm ent fe lt that w ith 20% o f her heavy industry Germany would be in position to cover the econom ic needs o f the country. He said file list o f goods to be delivered during the 10 year period could be d efin itely fixed later on. He further proposed that in the interests o f the orderly execution o f the reparations plan and fo r the security o f Europe there should be an Anglo-Soviet-Am erican control over German econom y which would last beyond the period o f the reparations paym ent. A ll German enterprises which could be utilized fo r war purposes should be placed under international control with representatives o f the Three Powers sitting on the boards o f such enterprises. Mr. Maisky went on to say that in the tF rom : Bohlen Miniti tes o f the Second Plenary Meeting o f the Crimea Conference, February 5,1945, in U.S., Department o f State, FRUS, Yalta, pp. 620-22,

100

DOCUMENT

161

calculation o f losses as a result o f German aggression the figures had been so astronom ical that a selection and the establishment o f a system o f priorities fo r com pensation had been necessary. He said that even direct m aterial losses, such as public and private property, factories, plants, railroads, houses, institutions, confiscation o f materials, etc. had been so large that no reparations could cover their loss. F or this reason, priorities had been established according to indices, (1 ) the proportional contribution o f any one nation to the winning o f the war, (2 ) the m aterial losses suffered by each nation. He said that those countries which had made the highest contribution to the war and had suffered the highest m aterial losses would com e in to the first category and all others would fall in to the second. Mr. Maisky proposed that there should be set up a special reparations com m ittee o f the three governm ents to sit in M oscow. He concluded that the total reparations shown in withdrawals and yearly payments in kind which the Soviets required would reach a total o f ten billion dollars. TH E PR IM E M IN IS T E R stated that he recalled very w ell the end o f the last war and that although he did not participate in the peace settlem ent he had been very fu lly inform ed o f the discussions. He rem embered w ell that there had been on ly tw o billion pounds extracted from Germany in the form o f reparations by the A llies after the last war and that even this would n ot have been possible had not the United States given Germ any credits. He said, fo r exam ple, that they had taken some old A tlantic liners from the Germans, w h o had im m ediately proceeded on credit to build new and better ships. He recognized that the suffering which the Soviet Union had undergone in this war had been greater than any other pow er, but he fe lt that the Soviet Union w ould get nowhere near the sum which Mr. Manisky had m entioned from Germ any. He said that at the end o f the last war the A llies had also indulged themselves w ith fantastic figures o f reparations but that these had turned ou t to be a m yth. He said that the British Isles had also suffered in this war and that the British Governm ent had disposed o f the bulk o f its assets abroad despite the generous help o f Lend-Lease. He said that the British Isles had to exp ort goods in order to im port fo o d , since they were dependent on im ports fo r one-half o f their fo o d supply. He said that there would be no victorious country so burdened in an econom ic sense as Great Britain and that, th erefore, i f he could see any benefit to Great Britain in large reparations firom Germany he would favor such a course but he very much doubted whether this was feasible. He added that other countries, such as Belgium, H olland and N orw ay also had claims against Germany. He said he was haunted by the specter o f a starving Germany which would present a serious problem fo r the A llies since we could either say “ It serves them right” or endeavor to help them. In the latter case, who would pay fo r the help. The Prim e M inister concluded that if you wished a horse to pull a wagon that you w ould at least have to give it fodder. M A R S H A L S T A L IN observed that that was right, but care should be taken to see that the horse did n ot turn around and kick you .

IM

S T A U N , CHUXCHILL, AND KOOSKVZLT ON REPARATIONS

TH E PR E S ID E N T remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he rem em bered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal o f m oney. He said that we had lent over ten b illion dollars to G erm any and that this tim e we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been turned back to the German ow ners, but that this tim e he would seek the necessary legislation to retain fo r the U nited States all German property in Am erica. He said that the Germans had no capital, factories, or other equipm ent that the United States needed but that he did n ot wish to have to contem plate the necessity o f helping the Germans to keep from starving. He said, however, that he would w illin gly support any claims fo r Soviet reparations since he fe lt that the German standard o f livin g should not be higher than that o f the Soviet Union. He added that just as we expected to help Great Britain expand her exp ort trade, we would also help the Soviet Union retain the reparations in kind which she required, as w ell as German m anpower to reconstruct the devastated regions, but he fe lt th at the Germans should be allow ed to live in order that they m ight n ot becom e a burden on the w orld. The President concluded, how ever, that despite his desire to see the devastated areas in all countries, in the Soviet U nion, in Great Britain, in France, and elsewhere, restored, he fe lt that reparations could n ot possibly cover the needs. H e concluded that he was in fa v o r o f extracting the maximum in reparations from Germ any but n ot to the exten t that the people would starve. M R . M A IS K Y then stated that while he appreciated the Prim e M inister’s points concerning the experiences after the last war in the m atter o f reparations, he fe lt that the failure in this respect had been due n ot to the fact that the reparations had been to o heavy but to the transfer problem which was the rock on which the reparations p olicy was founded. He said that he must add that the financial policies o f the United States and G reat Britain contributed to the German refusal to pay. He said that the Germans had never paid m ore than one-quarter o f the total reparations figure and had received a great deal m ore in credits and loans. Mr. Maisky stated that the purpose o f reparations in kind was to avoid the problem o f transfer. He poin ted out that the am ount desired by the Soviet Union was equal o n ly to 10% o f the present United States budget and equal to about six m onths’ o f the British expenditures in the war. The Soviet demands fo r German reparations equaled about 1V6 tim es the United States budget in peace and about 2V& tim es the British budget. He said, o f course, there was no intention to force Germany in to starvation but he pointed out that he did n ot fe el that the Germans had a right to a higher standard o f living than that o f Central Europe. He said Germany can develop her ligh t industry and agriculture and that since the Germans w ould have no m ilitary expenditures there was no reason why Germ any could not give a m odest but decent standard o f livin g to her p e o p le .. . .

34 —T he Big Three at Yalta: The Private Agreem ent This and Docum ent 35 are the agreements on Germ any reached at the Y alta m eeting o f the Big Three. This docum ent was kept secret until the C old War had developed, while Docum ent 35 was released to the press im m ediately a fte r the conclusion o f the Y alta Conference. A quick com parison o f the tw o makes evident the reason fo r the d ifferen t treatm ent. The first included specific com m itm ents to high reparations while the latter was phrased in the vague language to which diplom ats are addicted.

Docum entt Q I. Dismemberment o f Germ any It was agreed that A rticle 12 (a ) o f the Surrender Term s fo r Germany should be amended to read as follow s: “ The United Kingdom , the United States o f Am erica and the Union o f S oviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority w ith respect to Germ any. In the exercise o f such authority they w ill take such steps, including the com plete disarmament, dem ilitarisation and the dismember­ m ent o f Germ any as they deem requisite fo r future peace and security.” The study o f the procedure fo r the dismemberment o f Germ any was referred to a Com m ittee, consisting o f Mr. Eden (Chairm an), Mr. Winant and M r. Gousev. This b ody would consider the desirability o f associating w ith it a French representative.

IV . Zone o f Occupation fo r the French and Control Council fo r Germ any I t was agreed that a zone in Germ any, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone w ould be form ed ou t o f the British and Am erican zones and its exten t would be settled b y the British and Am ericans in consultation w ith the French Provisional G overnm ent It was also agreed that the French Provisional Governm ent should be invited to becom e a member o f the A llied C ontrol Council fo r Germ any.

fF ro m : Protocol o f the Proceedings o f the Crim e* Conference, February 11, 1946, in U.S., Departm ent o f 8tate, FR U S , Yalta, pp. 978-79.

168

164

THX n o T H U S AT YA LT A

V . Reparation H ie follow in g p rotocol hat been approved: 1. Germany must pay In kind fo r the losses caused by her to the A llie d nations In the course o f the war. Reparations are to be received in th e first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden o f the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enem y. 2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germ any in three fo llo w in g form s: a ) Rem ovals within 2 years from the surrender o f Germ any o r the cessation o f organised resistance from the national wealth o f Germ any located on the territory o f Germany herself as w ell as outside her territo ry (equipm ent, m achine-tools, ships, tollin g stock, German investments abroad, shares o f industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germ any e tc .), these rem ovals to be carried ou t ch iefly fo r purpose o f destroying the war poten tial o f Germany. b) Annual deliveries o f goods from current production fo r a period to be fixed . c ) Use o f German labour. 3. F or the working out on the above principles o f a detailed plan fo r exaction o f reparation from Germany an A llied Reparation Com mission w ill be set up in M oscow. It w ill consist o f three representatives—one from the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States o f Am erica. 4. W ith regard to the fixin g o f the total sum o f the reparation as w ell as the distribution o f it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and Am erican delegations agreed as follow s: “ The M oscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis fo r discussion the suggestion o f the Soviet Governm ent that the total sum o f the reparation in accordance w ith the points (a ) and (6 ) o f the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% o f it should go to the Union o f Soviet Socialist R epu blics." H ie British delegation was o f the opinion that pending consideration o f the reparation question by the M oscow Reparation Commission no figures o f reparation should be m entioned. The above Soviet-Am erican proposal has been passed to the M oscow Reparation Commission as one o f the proposals to be considered b y the C om m ission.. . .

35 The Big Three at Yalta: The Public Agreem ent D ocum enti The Occupation and Control o f Germany W e have agreed on com m on policies and plans fo r enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on N azi Germ any a fter German armed resistance has been fin ally crushed. These term s w ill not be made known until the final defeat o f Germany has been accom plished. Under the agreed plan, the forces o f the Three Powers w ill each occupy a separate zone o f Germany. Coordinated adm inistration and con trol has been provided fo r under the plan through a central C ontrol Com mission consisting o f the Supreme Commanders o f the Three Powers w ith headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the H iree Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone o f occupation, and to participate as a fourth m em ber o f the C ontrol Commission. The lim its o f the French zone w ill be agreed by the fou r governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission. I t is our in flexib le purpose to destroy German m ilitarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany w ill never again be able to disturb the peace o f the w orld. We are determ ined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up fo r all tim e the German General S ta ff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence o f German m ilitarism ; rem ove or destroy all German m ilitary equipm ent; elim inate or control all German industry that could be used fo r m ilitary production; bring all war criminals to just and sw ift punishment and exact reparation in kind fo r the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe ou t the N azi party, N azi laws, organizations and institutions, rem ove all N azi and m ilitarist influences from public o ffic e and from the cultural and econom ic life o f the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety o f the w orld. It is not our purpose to destroy the people o f Germ any, but only when Nazism and M ilitarism have been extirpated w ill there be hope fo r a decent life fo r Germans, and a place fo r them in the com ity o f nations. tF rom : R eport o f the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1946, in U.S., Department o f State, FRU S, Yalta, pp. 970-71.

166

IM

TBK B O T H R U AT Y A LT A

in.

Reparation by Germ any

>B

We have considered the question o f the damage caused by Germ any to the A llied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be ob liged make com pensation fo r this damage in kind to the greatest exten t possible. Commission fo r the Com pensation o f Damage w ill be established. T h e Commission w ill be instructed to consider the question o f the exten t and m ethods fo r com pensating damage caused by Germ any to the A llie d Countries. The Commission w ill w ork in M o sco w .. . .

36 ’T h e Germ ans Cannot Escape Responsibility.. By approving this memorandum, R oosevelt repudiated a State Departm ent m em o he had approved on ly a few weeks earlier. Even though Morgenthau considered that a small victory, this p olicy statem ent reflected the War D epartm ent’s views and was a far cry from the Quebec memorandum in itia led on ly seven m onths earlier.

Documenti" [A n n e x ] Memorandum Regarding Am erican P olicy fo r the Treatm ent o f Germany [W ashington,] March 2 3 ,1 9 4 5 . The follo w in g is a summary o f U.S. p olicy relating to Germ any in the in itial post-defeat period. As such it w ill be introduced in to the European A d visory Commission, and w ill be used as the basis fo r directives to be issued to the U.S. Commanding General in Germ any. The authority o f the C ontrol Council to form ulate p olicy w ith respect to m atters affectin g Germ any as a w hole shall be paramount, and its agreed p olicies shall be carried out in each zone by the zone commander. In the absence o f such agreed policies, and in matters exclusively affectin g his ow n zon e, the zone com mander w ill exercise his authority in accordance w ith directives received from his own governm ent The adm inistration o f affairs in Germ any should be directed tow ard the decentralization o f the political structure and the developm ent o f local responsibility. The German econom y shall also be decentralized, excep t that to the minimum exten t required fo r carrying out the purposes set forth herein, the C ontrol Council m ay perm it or establish central control o f (a ) essential national public services such as railroads, com munications and pow er: (b ) finance and foreign affairs, and (c ) production and distribution o f essential com m odities. There shall be equitable distribution o f such com­ m odities between the several zones. Germ any's ruthless warfare and fanatical N azi resistance have destroyed German econom y and made chaos and suffering inevitable. The Germans cannot escape responsibility fo r what they have brought upon themselves.

tF ro m : Memorandum Regarding Am erican Policy fo r the Treatm ent o f Germany, Annex to a memorandum from Joseph Grew to Roosevelt, March 23, 1945, in U.S., Department o f State, FR U S, 1946, (Washington, D.C.: Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1968), voL 8, pp. 471-78.

157

IM

TBK GERMANS CANNOT ESCAPR RESPONSIBILITY

Controls may be Imposed upon the German econom y on ly as m ay be necessary (a ) to carry ou t programs o f Industrial disarmament and dem ilitari­ zation, reparations, and o f relie f fo r liberated areas as prescribed by appropriate higher authority and (b ) to assure the production and m ainten­ ance o f goods and services required to m eet the needs o f the occupying forces and displaced persons In Germ any, and essential to prevent starvation o r such disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. N o action shall be taken, in execution o f the reparations program o r otherw ise, which would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that existing in any one o f the neighboring United Nations. A ll econom ic and financial international transactions, Including exports and im ports, shall be controlled w ith the aim o f preventing Germ any from developing a war potential and o f achieving the other objectives named herein. The first charge on all approved exports fo r reparations or otherwise shall be a sum necessary to pay fo r im ports. N o extension o f credit to Germ any o r Germans b y any foreign person o r Governm ent shall be perm itted, except that the C ontrol Council may in special emergencies grant sudi permission. Recurrent reparations should not, by their form o r am ount, require the rehabilitation or developm ent o f German heavy industry and should n ot foster the dependence o f other countries upon the German econom y. In the Im position and maintenance o f econom ic controls. German authorities w ill to the fullest exten t practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume adm inistration o f such controls. Thus it should be brought hom e to the German people that the responsibility fo r the adm inistration o f such controls and fo r any breakdowns in those controls, w ill rest w ith themselves and their ow n authorities. The N azi party and its affiliated and suprevised organizations and all Nazi public institutions shall be dissolved and their revival prevented. N azi and m ilitaristic activity or propaganda in any form shall be prevented. There shall be established a coordinated system o f con trol over German education designed com pletely to elim inate N azi and m ilitarist doctrines and to make possible the developm ent o f dem ocratic ideas. N azi laws which provide the basis o f the H itler regim e o r which establish discrim inations on grounds o f race, creed o r p olitical opinion, shall be abolished. A ll members o f the N azi party w ho have been m ore than nom inal participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile to A llied purposes w ill be rem oved from public o ffic e and from positions o f responsibility in private enterprise. War criminals and those who have participated in planning o r carrying out N azi enterprises involving o r resulting in atrocities o r war crim es, shall be arrested, brought to trial and punished. N azi leaden and influential N azi Supporten and any other persons dangerous to the occupatim i o r its objectives, shall be arrested and interned. A suitable program fo r the restitution o f property lo o ted b y Germans shall be carried ou t prom ptly.

DOCUMENT

109

H ie German armed forces, including the General S taff, and all para­ m ilitary organizations, shall be prom ptly dem obilized and disbanded in such a manner as perm anently to prevent their revival o r reorganization. The German war potential shall be destroyed. As part o f the program to attain this objective, all im plem ents o f war and all specialized facilities fo r the production o f armaments shall be seized or destroyed. The maintenance and production o f all aircraft and im plem ents o f war shall be prevented. Joseph C. G rew Frank Coe J.H. HUldring Harry D. W hite H. Freeman M atthews W illiam L . Q ay ton John J. M cC loy Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

37 The Military Decision: Against Deindustrial­ ization T iie connection between m ilitary strategy and p olitics m ay som etim es be hidden, but not fo r long. A s Morgenthau had long feared, p olitical considerations would eventually predom inate, and this cable from G eneral Marshall to General Eisenhower proves the poin t. Eisenhower responded that he also hoped that the m ilitary occupation o f the Ruhr could take place w ith a minimum o f destruction o f industrial facilities.

Documenti" FR O M : TO :

A G W A R , FR O M G E N E R A L M A R S H A L L S H A E F F O R W A R D , F O R G E N E R A L EISENH O W ER F O R H IS EYES O N L Y

R E F N O : W -64236,6 A p ril 1945 Discussion here by G-2 and Mr. STIM SO N relates to e ffe c t o f com plete destruction o f R U H R industry on econom ic future o f EU R O PE, destruction that would result from further A llied offensive action. Adm iral L E A H Y , K IN G , H A N D Y and H U L L are opposed to asking you any question. Aside from purely m ilitary considerations concerned w ith advancem ent o f campaign to destroy the German Arm y there are tw o schools o f thought in high governm ent circles here regarding a post war pastoral G E R M A N Y and a p olicy o f leaving some industrial capability to b en efit the related econom y o f other European countries lacking R U H R resources. We naturally assume that you are proceeding in the manner best adapted to the security and rapidity o f you r thrusts in to G E R M A N Y . W ithout thought o f com prom ising you rself or in e ffe c t lim iting you r present m ilitary intentions w ill you please give me fo r no other eyes but M r. STIM SO N 's, m ine, H A N D Y ’s and H U LL'S, m ost con fidentially you r present intentions as to R U H R pocket and you r view as to desirability or feasibility o f any procedure by which the R U H R proper m ight be sealed o ff. I assume you r forces are already deeply com m itted to operations directed against the p o c k e t This message must not in any way embarrass you o r have tF rom : Marshall to Eisenhower, A pril 6. 1945, Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

160

DOCUMENT

1«1

the slightest e ffe c t in lim iting you r present poin t o f view o r intentions. As y e t I have no views whatsoever in this m atter, excep t that I think the fa t Is probably now in the fire and whatever the p olitical conclusions it is to o late, t o [o ] im practicable to take any action fo r such reason.

38

_____________________

The Military Decision: For Reconstruction The follow in g excerpts from tw o letters sent by General Lucius D. C lay to Secretary o f State James F. Byrnes and Assistant Secretary o f War John M cCloy provide am ple evidence o f his b elief that Germany had already suffered enough destruction through warfare. Clay obviously believed that Germany had to be reconstructed and he used the vagueness in J C S 1067 to im plem ent his views.

Documenti" Conditions in Germany are getting progressively worse and large sections o f all im portant cities have been obliterated. O f course, we have a lon g range problem in preventing the restoration o f Germ any's war potential. H ow ever, this is not the short range problem as several years w ill be required to develop even a sustaining econom y to provide a bare minimum standard o f livin g. The com ing w inter months w ill be m ost d ifficu lt. I think that to o much o f our planning at home has envisaged a Germ any in which an existing governm ent has surrendered w ith a large part o f the country intact. In poin t o f fact, it looks as i f every fo o t o f ground w ill have to be occupied. Destruction w ill be widespread, and governm ent as w e know it w ill be non-existent. In solving the short range problem we should fin d the answer to the lon g range problem , i f at the same tim e we develop unanim ity o f action am ong the Allies.

Docum entft I think that Washington must revise its thinking relative to destruction o f Germ any's war potential as an im m ediate problem . The progress o f w ar has accom plished that and it is in view now (based on general impressions, I must adm it) that the industry which remains, w ith few exceptions, even when restored w ill suffice barely fo r a very long minimum living standard in Germany. I f this is to be provided, we must have sufficient freedom here to bring industries back in to production fo r that purpose. T o accomplish this w ill

tF rom : Clay to Byrnes, A pril 20, 1946, in The Popen o f General Lueiue D. Cloy; Germany, 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward Smith, 2 vols. Bloom ington: Indiana University Press, 1974), voL 1, p. 6. t+ F rom : Clay to M cCloy, A pril 26, 1946, in The Popen o f General Lueiue D. Cloy, voi.

lvP. 8. 162

DOCUMENT

ISS

require production controls. Th ey cannot be avoided i f we are to succeed in establishing reasonable order and m eet essential needs o f the occupying forces. I hope our final directive w ill not prohibit us from establishing such controls as are needed. Sim ilarly, w e should not be to o hasty in listing specific reparations. T h ey, to o , could make it im possible to bring order back in to Germ any. I hope you w on’t think from the above that I am getting soft. I realize the necessity fo r stem and spartan treatm ent. H ow ever, retribution now is far greater than realized at home and our planes and artillery have really carried war direct to the homes o f the German people. It is going to take all we can do to re-establish governm ent services and a semblance o f national econom y fo r many months. This much must be done i f on ly to make it possible to govern Germany w ith com paratively small occupational forces. When it has been done, we can lo o k at the lon g range picture w ith m ore clarity and understanding. Certainly, i f the A llies intend to enforce com pliance w ith their terms over the years, they can w ell make the decisions as to what to destroy a fter the facts have been gathered, rather than in haste based on data which war has rendered valueless.

39

_

"Being 'Hard’ on Germ any D oes Not Call for Unnecessary Destruction” In this letter to the director o f the War Departm ent's C ivil A ffa irs D ivision, Clay outlined his desire fo r full discretionary authority and a m ore positive p olicy aim ed at redeveloping the German econom y. His harsh w ords fo r Bernard Bernstein came because the colon el, form er aide to M orgenthau, continued to support an occupation p olicy, m odeled on The M orgenthau Plan.

Document? I doubt i f C olonel [B ernard] Bernstein is big enough to handle the overall financial problem . He is very smart and energetic but is som ewhat w arped in his judgm ent o f the problem as a w hole. In this field w e need a rea lly big man. We also need several outstanding econom ists, able to view the picture as a w hole and develop long-range programs. They can d o little In helping us evolve our short-range programs but are needed in developing a long-range philosophy. I am som ewhat disturbed over rumors which we get w ith respect to various commissions being set up. O f course, the Reparations Commission was set up at Yalta. Since then we understand here that consideration is being given to separate Commissions fo r Restitutions fo r the Trial o f War Criminals, fo r the Internationalization o f the Ruhr and fo r other purposes. We are going to face many difficu lties in making the A llied C ontrol A u th ority w ork. T o m e it seems clear that I f it doesn’t w ork we m ight as w ell th row the idea o f a United Nations out o f the window. I f it is to w ork, the representative governments must be w illing to place responsibility in their representatives on the Group Council and to give them enough authority to carry ou t its responsibilities. The m ore additional commissions that are created, the m ore places we have to develop discord and the less chance we have to m ake a successful experim ent out o f our proposed controls fo r Germ any. O f course, tF rom : Clay to General John Hilldxing, May 7,10 46, In The P a p in o f O ttu ra i L u cltu D. Clay, pp. 12 ,1 3.

164

DOCUMENT

16»

this argument sounds lik e the usual argument profered by the bureaucrat w ho wants to create and preserve fo r him self his ow n independent em pire. The o n ly evidence to the contrary that we w ill ever be able to present w ill be our showing that we are tryin g to develop a fram ew ork to pass over to the appropriate civil agency at an early date. I f that fram ew ork is to be sound it must be the fram ew ork o f governm ent in Germ any and the Am erican representatives must in fact truly represent the United States in Germany. I f the Reparations Commission in M oscow lim its itself to p olicy we can still develop satisfactory w orking arrangements. H ow ever, i f it is to specify item and quantity, then it, and not the A llied C ontrol A u th ority, w ill actually w rite the tick et fo r the German econom y. I hope that this letter does not sound pessimistic. I am an optim ist at heart and still have faith that the A llied C ontrol A u th ority can and w ill w ork. I f it does it w ill be because the representatives o f each governm ent have sufficient discretionary authority to give and take in conference and to develop harm ony through com prom ise. T o m e, being “ hard” on Germany does n ot call fo r unnecessary destruction o f econom y. I t can be accom plished over a lon g period o f tim e on ly i f we perm it Germ any a reasonably decent standard o f living under controls which prevent the direction and expansion o f those types and kinds o f industry which are adaptable to war purposes. Being “ hard” n ow is im portant psychologically to show the German people how badly German m ilitary m ight has been defeated. H ow ever, that is really easy to d o com pared w ith establishing controls which w ill require firm agreem ent am ong the Nations and a determ ination to continue the con trol o f Germ any fo r m any years.

40 — T he End of the Morgenthau Plan, March, 1946 T o Lucius G a y , there were on ly tw o choices fo r Germ any; communism or Am erican-style dem ocracy and econom ics. Like m ost Am ericans, he believed communism could appeal only to those with em pty stomachs and supported the idea o f foo d as a political weapon. Whatever remnants o f the Morgenthau Flan might have existed in the late 1940s quickly disappeared under the pressure o f Cold War. Am ong the casualties was the idea o f a neutral, disengaged Germany.

Docum entt . . . .It is our b elief that the Russian zone is feeding approxim ately 1500 calories and w ill continue to d o so until the next harvest season. We have insisted on dem ocratic processes in the U.S. zone and have maintained a strict neutrality between political parties. As a result the Communist Party has made little inroad. H ow ever, there is no choice between becom ing a Communist on 1500 calories and a believer in dem ocracy on 1000 calories. I t is m y sincere b elief that our proposed ration allowance in Germany w ill not on ly defeat our objectives in m iddle Europe but w ill pave the road to a Communist Germany. I know o f no additional data which we can furnish you which has n ot been furnished. As the occupying pow er in our own zone we have assumed some obligations even though the Germans are an enem y people. I t w ould seem to me that w e are making the accomplishment o f our objectives im possib le.. . .

tF rom : Clay to Echols and Peterson, March 27, 1946, In The Papere o f General Luciut Clay, voi. p, p. 184. 16«

p art three Bibliographic

I h e banc story surrounding the Morgenthau Plan fo r Germany can be found in tw o documentary collections: U.S. Department o f State, Foreign R elation» o f the United State» (F R U S ) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1862-), particularly the volume titled Conference at Q u ebec, 1944 published in 1972; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration o f the Internal Security A ct and Other Internal Security Laws o f the Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., M orgenthau Diary (G e rm a n y ) 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967). Valuable additional matériau can be found in the State Department Archives in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., in the Roosevelt papers and the Morgenthau diary/papers at the Franklin D . Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, N .Y ., and in the Prime Minister’s Operational and Confidential papers (Premier 3 and 4 ) and Foreign Office papers (F 0 371) at the Public Record Office in London, England. Insights into Russian policy can be found in Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the U SSR , Stalin's Correspondence with R o o sevelt and Truman, and Churchill and A tlee, 1941-1945 (N e w York: Capricorn Books, 1965), although those documents give no indication o f Stalin’s original desire fo r a harsh peace and the permanent division o f Germany—a choice o f documents which reflects Cold War needs. A recently published and illuminating collection o f documents which relate to the actual occupation o f Germany is Jean Edward Smith ed., The Papers o f General L u cius D . Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, 2 vols. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1974). Henry Morgenthau, Jr. published a comprehensive defense o f his plan titled G erm any is O u r P roblem (N e w Y o rk : Harper & Brothers, 1945). A number o f memoirs, when used with proper caution, afford real insights into the policy debate over Germany in general and the Morgenthau Plan in particular. The most useful, in spite o f a remarkable lack o f self-doubt, is Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, O n A ctiv e Service in Peace and War (N e w Y o rk : Harper & Brothers, 1948). John Morton Blum ’s quasi-memoir. F r o m the M orgenthau Diaries: Years o f War, 1941-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) utilized other secondary sources for background material, but is essentially written from Morgenthau’s point o f view. It must, however, be supplemented by research in the Morgenthau diaries themselves, particularly the so-called Presidential Diary in which Morgenthau recorded his notes on conversations with President Roosevelt. The best insight into Churchill’s thinking about Germany and the Morgenthau plan comes from Lord Moran, Churchill, Taken F ro m the Diaries o f L o rd M ora n : The Struggle fo r Survival, 1940-1966 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). Churchill’s ow n memoirs

touch on tiie Morgenthau Plan and planning for Germany, but with misleading brevity. See Winston S. Churchill, The S econd World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1948-1953), especially the last three volumes. The M em oirs o f A n th o n y E den (Earl o f A von ), voi. 2, The R eck oning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) do not indicate Eden’s ambiguous attitude toward Germany, but occasionally adds information not otherwise available. Robert Sherwood’s study o f R oosevelt and H opkins (N e w Y ork: Harper & Brothers, 1950), another quasi-memoir, is based too extensively on the Hopkins papers and Sherwood’s personal recollections as a Roosevelt speech writer to be completely reliable, though it adds much color and human interest. The memoirs by James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (N e w Y ork : Harper & Brothers, 1947), Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (N e w Y o rk : W.W. Norton, 1969), Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germ any (Garden City, N .Y .: Doubleday A Co., 1950), and Ivan Maisky, M em oirs o f a S oviet Am bassador: The War, 1939-1943, Andrew Rothstein, trans. (Lon don : Hutchinson & Co., 1967) are all largely peripheral to the time frame o f this study, though each contributed background material and perspective. The M em oirs o f Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (Lon don: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948) are probably the most factually unrealiable o f all World War II memoirs, although they provide an accurate picture o f h o w Hull thought history ought to have happened. 16 9

ITO

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

A few volumes from the various official histories o f World W ar II include material related to the Morgenthau Plan. Forrest C. Pogue’s The S uprem e Com m and (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954) remains the best analysis o f S H A E F and its commander, General Eisenhower; and Maurice M atloff’s Strategie Planning fo r Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959) is useful tor any examination o f the Combined Chiefs o f Staff. Both are volumes in the series United States A r m y in World War published by the Office o f the Chief o f Military History. Sir Llewellyn W oodw ard’s British Foreign Policy in the Second World War comes in tw o versions: an abridged volume (London: H M SO, 1962), and three volumes completed to date o f a projected four or five volume series (L o n d o n : HM SO, 1970* ). Unfortunately, most o f the story o f British planning for postwar Germany will be in the volumes not yet published, so scholars must presently use the abridged version. The books are seemingly an attempt merely to recreate the facts as they happened, but a look at the unpublished documents makes it clear that Woodward, like every other historian, selected his evidence in accordance with his prejudices. T w o other useful volumes in the British official history are John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vols. 5 and 6 (Lon don: HMSO* 1956). Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949) is a bland but informative combination memoir/official history by a State Department official. There are only tw o in-depth and up to date scholarly studies o f American planning for postwar Germany. Paul Y . Hammond, “ Directives fo r the Occupation o f Germany: The Washington Controversy,” in A m erican Civil-Military Decisions, ed, Harold Stein (Birmingham: Univ. o f Alabam a Press, 1963), pp. 311-460 examines bureaucratic planning in great detail. Hammond incorporates the material from two books by participants; Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, N.J.: D . Van Nostrand, 1957) and Hajo H obom , Am erican Military G overn m en t (Washing­ ton: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), though both add some detail, particularly regarding War Department actions. Bruce Kuklick, Am erican Policy and the Division o f G erm any: The Clash with Russia over Reparations (Ith aca,N .Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1972) is primarily interested in the reparations question, since he believes that it was the problem which determined Germ any’s fate. Nevertheless, he provides detailed background on other questions, including the Morgenthau Plan. More important, his analysis o f the inertial force behind the State Department’s liberal capitalism (multilateralism, as he calls it) is critical to any understanding o f American foreign policy during W orld War U —even if one disagrees as to the degree o f concensus those policies commanded. There are a number o f articles written in the 1950s and 1960s which deal with the Morgenthau Plan and which Kuklick cites in his bibliography. Both he and Hammond have made excellent use o f those articles (some o f which were written by participants) and there is little need to cite them here. The same is true for the long list o f journalistic accounts published immediately following the war. Some other secondary accounts represent the latest scholarship on the German question. William M. Franklin, ’'Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,” World Politics, voi. 16 (October, 1963), pp. 1-36, appears to be the definitive treatment o f the question o f zonal boundaries, although it does not explain Roosevelt’s decision to accept the southern zone in Germany. The question o f American policy and the Soviet Union as a factor in postwar planning for Germany is illuminated by George C. Herring, "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1944-1945,” Journal o f Am erican History, voL 61 (June, 1969), pp. 93-114, and his book, A id to Russia, 1941-1946 (N e w Y ork : Columbia Univ. Press, 1973) plus Thom as G.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

171

Paterson *8 “ H ie Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins to the Cold War, 1943*1946," Journal o f Am erican H istory, voi. 611 (June, 1969), pp. 70-92, and his book, Soviet-Am erican Confrontation: Postwar R eco n ­ struction and the Origins o f the C old War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973). The problem o f France as a factor in the early days o f the American occupation o f Germany is discussed in Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects o f Illusion: M e n and Ideas in Am erican Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), and John Gimbel, The Am erican O ccupation o f Germ any: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford:

Stanford Univ. Press, 1968). Gimbel, in a limited way, criticizes Gardner’s thesis that militant German socialism and Russo-American confrontation were the key problems in Germany in a review essay, “ Cold War: German F ro n t," The Maryland Historian, voi. 2 (Spring, 1971), pp. 41-65. A ll o f these studies, regardless o f their differences, treat the German question as one which was resolved, not by Roosevelt’s death, but by decisions made by Truman in the postwar years. A number o f general studies o f World War II diplomacy provide indispensable background material for any study o f a specific problem. John Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the C old War, 1941-1947 (N e w Y o rk : Columbia Univ. Press, 1972) is a good overview, though it must be supplemented by additional documentary research for individual episodes. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f War (N e w Y ork: Random House, 1968) posits a totally depersonalized concept o f history. Following the general thesis that all American policy-makers held the same views and therefore saw the Soviet Union as a threat, Kolko argues that Morgenthau and Harry White constructed the Morgenthau Plan as part o f an overall plot to prevent the Russians from getting extensive reparations. The opposite extreme is taken by Anthony Kubek in “ The Evolution o f the ’Treasury Plan’ for Postwar Germany: A n Introduction to the Morgenthau Diary on Germ any," in M orgenthau Diary (G erm a n y ), cited above, Kubek argues that the Morgen­ thau Plan was a plot hatched in M oscow and implemented by such communist agents in the Treasury Department as Harry White. A s ever with W orld War II diplomacy, William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their C o-O peration and Conflict, 1941-1946 (Lon don: O xford Univ. Press, 1953), provides insights and historical context, while Herbert Feis, Churchill, R oosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957) does likewise, though it tends to concentrate too much on only the Big Three leaders. Feis adds additional detail and much more interpretation and opinion on the German question in F ro m Trust to Terror: The O nset o f the C o ld War, 1945-1950 (N e w Y ork : W.W. Norton, 1970). Details on the most contro­ versial o f the World War II summit meetings is found in Diane S. Clemens, Yalta (N e w Y ork : O xford Univ. Press, 1970). One o f the latest pieces o f British scholarship on W orld War II diplomacy, John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Sem blance o f Peace: The Political Settlem ent A fte r the Second World War (Lon don : Macmillan, 1972), reflects a very strong belief that Russian intransigence and American naivete brought on the Cold War. Raym ond G. O ’Connor’s D iplom acy fo r V icto ry : F D R and U ncondi­ tional Surrender (N e w Y o rk : W.W. Norton, 1971) is persuasive, readable, and far broader than its title indicates. Elting E. Morison's biography for Henry L. Stimson, Turm oil and Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960) provides an excellent summary o f Stimson’s proposals for postwar Germany and, more importantly, places them within context o f Stimson’s overall political philosophy and moral code. The only recent dissertation which is devoted to a study o f the Morgenthau Plan is an overly long and tendentious one based on printed sources; Meredith L. Adams, “ H ie Morgenthau Plan: A Study in Bureaucratic Depravity" (Univ. o f Texas, 1971).

ITS

■nuooEAraic

bssat

like relationship between military operation» and planning fo r Germany can be traced through the books by Pogue and M atloff cited above, although Porrest Pogue’s G eorge C. M anhall: Organizer o f Victory, 1943-1945 (N e w Y ork : The Viking Press, 1973) adds so much detail and new information that it is indispensable for any person endeavoring to understand the relationship between politics and military strategy during W orld War IL Stephen E. Am brose, Eisenhower and Berlin: The Decision to Halt at the E lb e (N e w Y ork : W.W. Norton, 1967) effectively argues that the decision was strictly based upon military considerations. The late Cornelius Ryan has rescued the battle o f Arnhem from undeserved oblivion in a journalistic account, A Bridge T o o Far (N e w Y ork : Simon and Schuster, 1974). The foreign policy o f Stalin and the Soviet Union can be partly traced through Stalin’s Correspondence and the Anglo-American documents and memoirs, all cited above. Adam Ulam ’s speculations in Expansion and Coexisten ce: The H istory o f S oviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (N e w Y o rk : Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) demonstrate both the strengths and limitations o f such research restrictions. Although this bibliography is obviously not designed as a guide for researchers, it will provide direction for those who wish to read more about the question o f postwar planning for Germany during World War U . Those who wish to do additional research should, after examining the documents, consult the specialized bibliographies and citations in the books by Kuklick, Gimbel, Kolko, and Pogue which are cited above.