Subject and Agency in Psychoanalysis: Which Is to Be Master? 9780814763261

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Subject and Agency in Psychoanalysis

PSYCHOANALYTIC CROSSCURRENT S General Editor: Leo Goldberger THE DEAT H O F DESIRE : A STUDY I N PSYCHOPATHOLOG Y by M. Gu y Thompso n THE TALKIN G CURE : LITERAR Y REPRESENTATION S O F PSYCHOANALYSIS by Jeffrey Berma n NARCISSISM AN D TH E TEXT : STUDIE S I N LITERATUR E AN D THE PSYCHOLOG Y O F SEL F by Lynne Layton an d Barbara Ann Schapiro , Editor s THE LANGUAG E O F PSYCHOSI S by Bent Rosenbaum an d Harly Sonn e SEXUALITY AND MIND : TH E ROL E O F THE FATHE R AN D THE MOTHE R I N THE PSYCH E by Janine Chasseguet-Smirge l ART AND LIFE : ASPECTS O F MICHELANGEL O by Nathan Leite s PATHOLOGIES O F THE MODER N SELF : POSTMODERN STUDIE S ON NARCISSISM , SCHIZOPHRENIA , AN D DEPRESSIO N by David Michael Levin , Edito r FREUD'S THEORY O F PSYCHOANALYSI S by Ole Andkjaer Olse n and Sim o Kopp e THE UNCONSCIOU S AN D TH E THEOR Y O F PSYCHONEUROSE S by Zvi Gior a CHANGING MIND-SETS : THE POTENTIA L UNCONSCIOU S by Maria Carmen Gear , Ernesto Cesar Liendo, and Lila Lee Scot t LANGUAGE AN D THE DISTORTIO N O F MEANIN G by Patrick de Gramon t THE NEUROTI C FOUNDATION S O F SOCIA L ORDE R by J. C. Smit h SELF AND OTHER : OBJEC T RELATION S I N PSYCHOANALYSI S AND LITERATUR E by Robert Roger s HISTORY, SCIENCE , AND PRACTICE : THE IDE A O F THE PAS T IN AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYSI S by Leonard Jonathan Lam m SUBJECT AND AGENC Y I N PSYCHOANALYSIS : WHIC H I S T O BE MASTER ? by Frances M. Mora n

SUBJECT AND AGENCY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS Which I s to B e Master? Frances M. Mora n

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York and London

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New Yor k and Londo n Copyright © 199 3 by New Yor k Universit y All rights reserve d Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Moran, France s M . Subject an d agenc y in psychoanalysis : which i s to be master? / Frances M. Moran . p. cm . — (Psychoanalyti c crosscurrents ) Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-5482- 1 1. Psychoanalysis—Philosophy—History. 2 . Self—Philosophy — History. 3 . Will—Philosophy—History . 4 . Freud , Sigmund , 1856-1939. I . Tide . II . Series . [DNLM: 1 . Psychoanalyti c Theory. 2 . Sel f Concept. W M 460.5.E 3 M829s] BF175.M67 199 3 150.19'52—dc20 DNLM/DLC for Librar y of Congress 92-4828 8 CIP

New Yor k University Pres s books are printed o n acid-fre e paper , and their bindin g materials are chosen fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n the United State s of America c1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Because of Peter William Musgrave

"When J us e a word," Humpt y Dumpt y sai d i n rathe r a scornfu l tone, "i t mean s just wha t I choos e i t t o mean—neithe r mor e no r less." "The question is, " said Alice, "whether yo u can make words mean different things. " "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master— that's all." —Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There

Contents

Diagrams x

i

Foreword by Leo Goldberger xii

i

Introduction: The Question Asked 1 The Presenting Proble m 1. Subjec t and Agent: The Case of the Hysterique ^Occasion 1

3

Freud's Schema s of the Min d 2. Th e Freud-Fliess Correspondence: The First and Second 2 Schemas

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3. Th e First Topography: The Third Schema 4

2

4. Th e Metapsychology: A Crisis Point 5

5

5. Th e Second Topography: A Compromise Solution 7

1

The Freudian Legac y 6. A Problem Concerning the Subject in Psychoanalysis 8 Anna Freud 9 0 Heinz Hartmann 9 4 Melanie Klein 10 5 IX

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Contents

X

7. A Problem Concernin g Agency in Psychoanalysis 12

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Jacques Lacan 12 0 A Propose d Solutio n 8. A Conceptual Tool of Structuration 15

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Notes 17

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Index 19

5

Diagrams

1. Th e Firs t Schema : R . Wollhei m (1971) , Freud (London : Fontana) , p. 52 adapted. 3 1 2. Th e Secon d Schema : S . Freud (1896) , The Complete Letters ofSigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, trans , an d ed. J. M. Masson (Cam bridge: Harvard Universit y Press, 1985) , p. 207 adapted. 3 8 3. Th e Third Schem a (1) : S . Freud (1900) , The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. 5 : 537 , adapted. 4 4 4. Th e Third Schem a (2) : S . Freud (1900) , The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. 5 : 538 , adapted. 4 4 5. Th e Third Schem a (3) : S . Freud (1900) , The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. 5 : 541 , adapted. 4 5 6. Th e Fourt h Schema : S . Freud (1923) , The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19 : 24, adapted. 7 4 7. Th e Fina l Schema : S . Freud (193 3 [1932]) , New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, S.E. 22 : 78 , adapted. 8 3 8. Schem a L : J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis1954-1955, ed. J . A . Mille r (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1988) , p. 243 . 12 8 XI

Foreword

The Psychoanalytic Crosscurrents serie s present s selecte d book s an d mono graphs tha t revea l the growin g intellectua l fermen t withi n an d acros s th e boundaries of psychoanalysis. Freud's theorie s an d grand-scal e speculativ e leap s hav e bee n foun d wanting, i f no t disturbing , fro m th e ver y beginnin g an d hav e le d t o a succession o f derisive attacks , shifts i n emphasis, revisions, modifications , and extensions . Despit e th e chroni c and , a t times , fierce debat e tha t ha s characterized psychoanalysis , no t onl y a s a movemen t bu t als o a s a sci ence, Freud' s geniu s an d transformationa l impac t o n th e twentiet h cen tury have never been seriously questioned. Recen t psychoanalytic though t has bee n subjecte d t o dramati c reassessment s unde r th e swa y of contem porary current s i n th e histor y o f ideas , philosoph y o f science , epistemol ogy, structuralism , critica l theory , semantics , an d semiolog y a s well a s i n sociobiology, ethology , an d neurocognitiv e science . No t onl y i s Freud' s place i n intellectua l histor y bein g meticulousl y scrutinized , bu t hi s texts , too, ar e bein g carefull y read , explicated , an d debate d withi n a variety o f conceptual frameworks an d sociopolitical contexts . The legacy of Freud is perhaps most notably evident within the narro w confines o f psychoanalysi s itself , th e "impossibl e profession " tha t ha s served a s the centra l platform fo r th e promulgatio n o f official orthodoxy . But Freud's contributions—hi s origina l radica l thrust—reach fa r beyon d the parochia l concern s o f th e clinicia n psychoanalys t a s clinician . Hi s writings touc h o n a wealth o f issues, crossing traditional boundaries—b e they situate d i n th e biological , social , o r humanisti c spheres—tha t hav e profoundly altere d our conception o f the individual an d society . Xlll

XIV

Foreword

A ric h an d flowerin g literature , fallin g unde r th e rubri c o f "applie d psychoanalysis,'5 cam e int o being , reache d it s zenit h man y decade s ago , and then almos t vanished. Early contributors t o this literature, in additio n to Freu d himself , cam e fro m a wid e rang e o f background s bot h withi n and outsid e th e medical/psychiatri c field, an d man y late r becam e psy choanalysts themselves . Thes e earl y effort s wer e characteristicall y reduc tionist i n thei r attemp t t o extrapolat e fro m psychoanalyti c theor y (ofte n the purel y clinica l theory ) t o explanatio n o f phenomen a lyin g a t som e distance fro m th e clinical . Ove r th e years, academic psychologists, educa tors, anthropologists , sociologists , politica l scientists , philosophers , ju rists, literary critics, art historians, artists, and writers, among others (wit h or withou t forma l psychoanalyti c training) , hav e joined i n th e prolifera tion of this literature. The inten t o f th e Psychoanalytic Crosscurrents series i s to appl y psycho analytic idea s t o topic s tha t ma y li e beyon d th e narrowl y clinical , bu t it s essential conceptio n an d scop e ar e quit e different . Th e presen t serie s eschews th e reductionis t tendenc y t o b e foun d i n muc h traditiona l "ap plied psychoanalysis." It acknowledges not only the complexity of psychological phenomena bu t als o the way in which the y are embedded i n socia l and scientific contexts that are constantly changing. It calls for a dialectical relationship t o earlie r theoretica l view s an d conception s rathe r tha n a mechanical repetitio n o f Freud' s date d thoughts . Th e serie s affirm s th e fact that contributions t o an d about psychoanalysis have come from man y directions. I t i s designed a s a forum fo r th e multidisciplinar y studie s tha t intersect wit h psychoanalyti c though t bu t withou t th e requiremen t tha t psychoanalysis necessaril y b e th e startin g poin t or , indeed , th e cente r focus. Th e criteri a fo r inclusio n i n th e serie s ar e that th e wor k b e signifi candy informe d b y psychoanalytic though t o r tha t i t be aimed a t further ing ou r understandin g o f psychoanalysi s i n it s broades t meanin g a s the ory, practice, an d sociocultura l phenomenon ; tha t i t b e of current topica l interest an d that it provide the critical reader with contemporar y insights ; and, above all, that i t be high-quality scholarship , free o f absolute dogma , banalization, an d empt y jargon . Th e author' s professiona l identit y an d particular theoretica l orientatio n matte r onl y to th e exten t tha t suc h fact s may serv e t o fram e th e wor k fo r th e reader , alertin g hi m o r he r t o inevitable biases of the author . The Psychoanalytic Crosscurrents serie s present s a n arra y o f works fro m the multidisciplinar y domai n i n a n attemp t t o captur e th e fermen t o f

Foreword

xv

scholarly activities a t the cor e as well as at the boundarie s o f psychoanaly sis. The books and monographs ar e from a variety of sources: authors will be psychoanalysts—traditional , neo - an d post-Freudian , existential , ob ject relational , Kohutian , Lacanian , etc.—socia l scientist s wit h quantita tive o r qualitativ e orientation s t o psychoanalyti c data , an d scholar s fro m the vast diversity of approaches and interests that make up the humanities. The serie s entertain s work s o n critica l comparison s o f psychoanalyti c theories an d concept s a s well as philosophical examination s o f fundamen tal assumptions an d epistemi c claim s that furnis h th e bas e for psychoana lytic hypotheses . I t include s studie s o f psychoanalysi s a s literatur e (dis course an d narrativ e theory ) a s well a s th e applicatio n o f psychoanalyti c concepts t o literar y criticism . I t wil l serv e a s a n oude t fo r psychoanalyti c studies o f creativit y an d th e arts . Work s i n th e cognitiv e an d th e neuro sciences will be included to the extent that they address some fundamenta l psychoanalytic tenet , suc h a s th e rol e o f dreamin g an d othe r form s o f unconscious menta l processes . It shoul d b e obviou s tha t a n exhaustiv e enumeratio n o f th e type s o f works that might fit into the Psychoanalytic Crosscurrents series is pointless. The studie s compris e a lively and growin g literatur e a s a unique domain ; books o f thi s sor t ar e frequend y difficul t t o classif y o r catalog . Suffic e i t to sa y tha t th e overridin g ai m o f th e edito r o f thi s serie s i s to serv e a s a conduit fo r th e identificatio n o f th e outstandin g yiel d o f tha t emergen t literature an d t o foster it s further unhampere d growth . Leo Goldberge r Professor of Psychology New York University

Subject and Agency in Psychoanalysis

Introduction: Th e Questio n Aske d

Truly fruitfu l researc h require s a twofol d abilit y i n it s initia l stage : first, the abilit y t o as k th e righ t questio n and , second , th e abilit y t o as k thi s question withi n th e righ t framework . Failur e t o formulat e th e questio n correcdy or failure t o pose it within the most appropriate framework lead s to problem s a t bot h a theoretical an d a practical level . Perhaps thi s poin t can bes t b e illustrated b y my recountin g m y own searc h fo r a n answe r t o a question concernin g the notion o f "self. " As I remembe r i t now, m y searc h began , a t least a t some level, when I was a n adolescent . Lik e m y friend s a t th e time , I wa s askin g th e then unformulated questio n cc Who a m I? " I suppose , i n retrospect , tha t I wa s undergoing wha t migh t b e terme d th e typica l Ericksonia n identit y crisi s even thoug h I wa s unawar e o f anythin g mor e tha n a serie s o f partiall y articulated querie s abou t myself , others , an d th e worl d i n whic h I lived . It i s thes e ver y sam e querie s tha t hav e give n impetu s t o numerou s at tempts t o searc h fo r answer s ove r a perio d spannin g man y years . I t i s probable tha t man y peopl e as k self-relate d question s a t varyin g stage s o f their existence . Whethe r o r no t the y engag e themselve s seriousl y i n th e pursuit o f answer s t o thei r question s i s perhap s a n indicatio n o f th e intensity and urgency with which the questions ar e asked. In my own case a seemingl y insatiabl e self-interrogatio n ha s i n som e sens e pursue d me , and I hav e mad e variou s attempts—som e mor e seriou s tha n others—t o deal with it. On numerous occasions I have fallen prey to time-consumin g introspection i n th e hope o f understanding myself . Dependent o n m y lif e circumstances, thi s introspection ha s bee n informe d b y either philosophi cal o r metaphysica l notions . Needles s t o say , lik e Davi d Hume 1 an d i

2

Introduction

Henri-Frederic Amiel, 2 I foun d tha t m y self-interrogatio n prove d t o b e unsatisfying. I n effect , I was led no further tha n to the point of an infinit e regression, fo r wh o wa s th e sel f that conducte d th e ac t o f introspection ? The continual failure of this method of investigation resulte d in my asking self-related question s withi n th e academi c aren a o f scientifi c psychology . Somehow I ha d imagine d tha t withi n thi s field I migh t fin d a mor e rigorous an d trustworth y approac h t o cop e wit h m y undiscipline d self related search—on e tha t migh t wel l b e recognize d b y som e a s n o mor e than a Franklian-like 3 searc h fo r meaning . I had hope d tha t th e demand s of the scientifi c paradig m woul d produc e a discipline of mind tha t woul d enable m e t o explor e productivel y th e issue s related t o m y self-interroga tion. Thus, I could b e relieved from m y growing sense of doubt i n regar d to the possibility of gaining some type of valid self-knowledge . As a n honor s thesi s withi n th e Schoo l o f Behavioura l Science s a t L a Trobe Universit y (Melbourne) , I explore d a n aspec t o f th e self-concep t self-esteem, becaus e it seemed to me that this notion might have potentia l as an explanatory concep t i n relation to one' s behavior . I late r worked o n a Master's thesi s withi n a Professional Cours e fo r Clinica l Psycholog y a t the Universit y o f Melbourne , wher e I investigate d a developmenta l ap proach t o th e concep t o f self . Bot h thes e these s wer e undertake n withi n the contex t o f th e statistical-experimenta l approac h o f contemporar y re search. Th e resul t o f th e combine d efforts , i n term s o f m y self-relate d search, was insignificant whe n compared with the time and effort involve d in thei r presentation . I n sum , I wa s disillusione d wit h th e potentia l o f scientific psycholog y t o giv e m e th e answer s t o th e self-referentia l ques tions tha t I continue d t o ask . I wa s n o neare r understandin g wha t wa s meant b y th e ter m self than I ha d bee n followin g m y prio r attempte d introspection. However , wha t I di d gai n fro m thes e academi c exercise s was a crystallizatio n o r clarificatio n o f th e natur e o f m y basi c question . Through th e proces s o f tryin g t o groun d m y idea s i n testabl e theoretica l formulations, I was able to distill the form o f the question that continue d to remai n unanswered : Ho w i s th e notio n o f sel f t o b e understood ? I n view of the failure o f both introspectio n an d scientific psychology to quell my appetite, I had the n to loo k for anothe r field within which to conduc t my investigation . Becaus e th e initia l questio n aros e i n relatio n t o sel f a s experienced i n th e everyda y world , i t seeme d obviou s tha t th e aren a i n which t o searc h woul d b e the aren a o f the world o f everyday life. Rathe r than theoriz e abstracd y abou t ho w th e notio n o f sel f migh t b e under -

Introduction

3

stood, what seemed needed at that time was an analysis of the experience d self, understood withi n th e context o f the everyday world. Consequently , as a mean s o f carryin g ou t a n investigatio n withi n th e precinct s o f the everyday world , a framewor k o f commo n sens e wa s formulated—on e based on the work of both George H. Mead4 and Alfred Schutz. 5 Because of the emphasi s place d upon th e notion o f experience, the cornerstone of the "reality " o f the everyday world , th e research wa s situated withi n th e hermeneutical tradition . A s a Ph.D. within th e Facult y o f Education a t Monash Universit y (Melbourne) , this thesis showed me above all else that a concep t suc h a s "self 5 gain s it s meaning fro m withi n th e terms o f the conceptual framewor k withi n whic h i t i s bein g investigated . I n othe r words, the notion o f "self" cannot b e said to have one definitive concep tualization but , rather, wil l be conceptualized accordin g to the particularity of the framework employed . This means that a question aske d must be situated an d explored withi n a specified fram e o f reference. Wha t becam e most apparen t t o m e was that failur e t o clarif y an d state th e theoretica l assumptions underpinnin g th e framework utilize d wil l inevitabl y lea d t o research difficulties . Unles s w e are clear a s to the nature o f the assump tions that we make, we will not know what we still have on hand to work with i n theor y constructio n itself . Th e dange r is , therefore , tha t unles s taken-for-granteds ar e brought int o relie f and acknowledged , w e run the risk o f confusin g theoretica l presupposition s wit h theoretica l formula tions. Consequendy , w e ca n readil y produc e contradictor y an d illogica l propositions.

My Question Within the Psychoanalytic Tradition Not surprisingly , m y searc h fo r sel f o r persona l trut h le d m e t o th e domain o f psychoanalysis . Her e I face d th e issu e bot h i n theor y an d practice. From th e point o f view of my own analysis, I personally experi enced th e disconcertin g discover y o f the unconsciou s an d its effects . I n addition, a s a practitioner i n the field of psychoanalysis I was challenged to conceptualiz e a t a theoretical leve l what I deal t with i n my day-to-day work. On e crucial proble m fo r me related t o how psychoanalytic theor y handled th e issue s o f subjec t an d agency . B y thi s tim e I wa s bette r equipped t o ask potentially productiv e question s tha n was previously the case. My question was now formulated as : How are the notions of subjec t

4

Introduction

and agenc y understoo d a t a theoretica l leve l withi n th e psychoanalyti c framework? Fo r the purpose of the argument o f this book the term subject refers specificall y t o the individual who speaks to the analyst, and the ter m agency to th e notio n o f the determinatio n o r contro l o f thoughts, words , and actions . Becaus e i n thi s boo k th e subjec t refer s t o th e subjec t wh o speaks to th e analyst , we will necessarily deal with th e theoretical concep tualization o f the subject i n the clinical situation . My discovery of the unconscious, however, brough t complication s an d complexities t o thi s question. Suc h was the case because now I needed t o contend wit h a situatio n i n whic h th e subjec t wh o speak s t o th e analys t does s o i n a ver y particula r way—tha t is , bot h consciousl y an d uncon sciously—and, wha t i s more, does this simultaneously. Fro m the point o f view o f th e speaker , th e subjec t i n th e clinica l situation , ther e i s bu t on e spoken discourse—tha t whic h i s consciously intended. Nevertheless , psychoanalytic experienc e teache s u s tha t th e speake r unawaredl y speak s another discourse , the discours e o f the unconscious—on e tha t i s embed ded within th e conscious discours e an d s o available to th e analyst' s ear. I f the speaker is unaware o f this discourse, if it is not intended ye t nevertheless has a meaning withi n th e contex t o f his or he r lif e history , wh o the n can b e sai d t o b e th e subjec t o f suc h speech ? Wh o i s th e agen t o f thi s conscious discourse , an d wh o i s the agen t o f the discours e o f the uncon scious? Ar e w e t o postulat e th e possibilit y o f tw o subjects ? I f not , ho w are w e t o conceptualiz e thi s undeniabl y comple x issue ? Ho w ar e w e t o understand th e enigm a o f th e doubl e discourse ? Thes e wer e som e o f th e many questions that gave impetus to the research presented in this book . Before proceedin g furthe r i t i s important , I think , t o mak e clea r m y own positio n i n undertakin g th e wor k reporte d i n th e page s t o follow . Although I n o doub t hav e a n affinit y fo r som e theoretica l persuasion s rather tha n others , especiall y i n m y ow n clinica l work , th e argumen t presented i n Which Is to Be Master? is not base d in any particular schoo l of psychoanalytic thought . Whe n I commenced thi s research, I attempte d t o distance mysel f an d s o vie w th e psychoanalyti c literatur e a s a whole . I t was i n th e proces s o f readin g th e primary-sourc e materia l fro m a "dis tanced stance " that th e centra l proble m becam e clea r t o me . M y metho d is a straightforwar d logica l analysi s o f th e wor k o f th e grea t theorist s i n the field. I n eac h instanc e I loo k fo r th e essentia l component s i n an y sound theor y construction—namely, logica l consistency an d coherence .

Introduction

5

Although my question has been rekindled within the domain of clinical psychoanalysis, I hav e chose n t o giv e lo w salienc e t o th e experientia l i n the constructio n o f m y argument . M y primar y sourc e materia l i s com prised of the published works of Freud, Hein z Hartmann, Melani e Klein , and Jacque s Lacan—al l o f who m us e knowledg e derive d fro m th e con sulting roo m i n thei r theor y construction . Eve n thoug h I d o no t mysel f draw o n clinica l examples , i t wil l becom e clea r t o th e reade r tha t man y problems regardin g logica l consistency aris e out o f the disjunction tha t i s to b e foun d betwee n theor y an d practice . Thi s i s to b e evidence d i n th e work of Freud an d Lacan in particular . I turned , then , first t o Freud , th e alph a o f psychoanalysis ; an d i n m y own readin g of the Standard Edition 6 I found tha t the question I brough t to his work concernin g th e notions o f subject an d agenc y in psychoanaly sis di d no t direcd y concer n hi m i n hi s theor y construction . Wha t I di d discover, however , wa s tha t whe n confronte d wit h a subjec t trouble d with a proble m o f faile d agency , Freu d bega n t o formulat e hi s ow n unique conceptua l system . Ye t i n s o doing , hi s attemp t t o grappl e a t a theoretical leve l with th e problem s tha t h e met i n hi s clinica l practic e le d him alon g a particula r path . Rathe r tha n focu s o n th e initia l proble m concerning subjec t an d agency , Freu d bega n t o schematiz e th e psychi c apparatus. I n hi s wor k h e los t sigh t o f th e importanc e o f th e issue s o f subject an d of agency and consequendy ultimately proposed a topography of th e min d unattache d t o an y subject . Furthermore , embedde d withi n his changin g formulation s ar e numerou s logica l inconsistencie s an d con tradictions tha t relat e t o th e assumption s mad e abou t th e agenc y o f th e subject. I n th e main , Freu d impute d agenc y t o th e apparatus . Thu s h e located th e concep t o f agenc y apar t o r separate d fro m th e concep t o f th e subject withi n th e psychoanalyti c framewor k o f though t tha t h e devel oped. This separatio n o f th e concept s o f subjec t an d agenc y ha s ha d signifi cant consequence s fo r subsequen t psychoanalyti c theor y construction . Those wh o adop t Freud' s secon d topograph y i n thei r ow n theorie s tak e with i t a number o f inherent problems of consistency as far a s the concep t of agenc y i s concerned. I n addition , i f these theorist s fai l t o questio n th e nature o f th e lin k betwee n subjec t an d apparatu s a t a theoretica l level , variations regardin g th e assumption s mad e abou t th e subjec t i n psycho analysis ar e produced. Thi s ca n b e evidenced i n th e work o f Heinz Hart -

6

Introduction

mann an d Melani e Klein . Th e forme r unwittingl y work s o n th e assump tion o f th e sociologica l subject , wherea s th e latte r assume s a n innatel y moral subject . One theorist , Jacque s Lacan , ha s addresse d th e concept s direcdy . Ye t Lacan, lik e Freu d befor e him , conceptualize s subjec t an d agenc y a s sepa rate variables. Lacan place s emphasis upo n th e importanc e o f language i n his theor y o f th e subjec t i n psychoanalysis . Fo r hi m th e subjec t i s struc tured, determined , o r constitute d b y th e symboli c order—tha t is , Laca n imputes agenc y t o th e symboli c orde r itself . Thi s i s a ke y theoretica l postulate throughou t hi s entir e work , on e tha t h e neve r rescinds . Never theless, a reading of Lacan's published works throws int o relief numerou s instances wher e hi s assumption s abou t th e subjec t i n psychoanalysi s ar e irreconcilable wit h hi s positio n concernin g agency . Thu s i t i s m y argu ment tha t th e separatio n o f the concept s o f subjec t an d agency , foun d i n psychoanalytic theory, is a core problem for theor y construction . In thi s boo k i t i s my aim , first, t o trac e i n somewha t carefu l detai l th e way in which Freud' s though t move d t o produc e what i s so much associ ated wit h hi s work—namely , th e secon d topograph y o f th e psychi c ap paratus. Th e chapter s o f th e boo k tha t describ e thi s initia l analysi s ar e lengthy. Thi s I conside r necessar y becaus e fe w theorist s o r writer s wh o utilize the id, ego, and super-ego terminology eve r attend to the nature o f the assumption s tha t underli e thei r formulation . Becaus e "th e en d i s where w e star t from, 5'7 i t i s importan t t o explor e th e basi s o f tha t upo n which w e buil d i f i t i s t o b e optimall y productive . Second , i t i s m y intention t o provid e a n illustratio n o f how th e proble m foun d i n Freud' s work ca n b e see n t o hav e influence d late r psychoanalyti c theorization . The wor k o f Hartman n an d Klei n wil l b e presente d wit h a n emphasi s upon th e assumption s mad e concernin g th e subjec t i n psychoanalysis . Lacan's work will be presented with an emphasis upon the problem foun d in his separation o f the concepts of agency and subject . Finally, i t i s m y ai m t o propos e a solutio n t o wha t I foun d t o b e a problem embedde d withi n th e cor e o f psychoanalyti c theory . Thi s pro posal involves the introduction o f the concept of structuration t o the fiel d of psychoanalysis. The ter m structuration i s derived fro m th e work o f th e sociologist Anthon y Giddens , bu t i t takes on a meaning particula r t o th e psychoanalytic domain . Th e advantag e o f thi s proposa l i s tha t i t elimi nates the need fo r th e concept o f agency an d provides a new approac h t o

Introduction

7

the wa y i n whic h th e subjec t i n psychoanalysi s migh t b e handle d withi n theory construction .

Primary-Source Material Before proceeding , i t i s necessar y a t th e outse t t o poin t ou t tha t I hav e used primary-sourc e materia l a s fa r a s i s possible , particularl y i n th e instances o f Freud , Hartmann , an d Klein . I hav e don e s o i n th e ligh t o f what I tak e t o b e th e wisdo m i n th e Frenc h sayin g "Reenter pour sauter mieux." However , becaus e o f th e well-documented 8 difficultie s inheren t in Lacan' s styl e a s well as the slo w publication o f translated transcript s o f his Seminars , I have found secondary-sourc e materia l indispensabl e whe n dealing wit h hi s theory . I d o no t rea d an y bu t schoo l French . Thi s i s a limitation I accep t an d on e tha t has , of course , place d restriction s o n m y access to unpublished primary-sourc e materia l in Lacanian psychoanalyti c theory. A consequence o f this situation i s that the Lacan presented here is the Laca n o f th e English-speakin g world . T o date , thi s i s predominantl y the earl y Laca n becaus e onl y th e publishe d translation s o f a selectio n o f his Ecrits 9 a s wel l a s th e transcript s o f Seminar s I, 10 II, 1 1 an d XI 1 2 ar e available. Apar t fro m a smatterin g o f translate d piece s publishe d i n psy choanalytic journals an d edite d collections , knowledg e o f th e though t o f the late Lacan ca n b e gained through secondary-sourc e materia l alone. I n terms o f th e argumen t o f thi s book , th e proble m identifie d i n Lacan' s early wor k i s carrie d int o hi s late r theorization . Thi s wil l b e deal t wit h briefly throug h referenc e t o commentarie s o n hi s work. I t will be eviden t that greate r acces s to Lacan' s late r Seminar s would mak e no differenc e t o my core argument . A furthe r relate d poin t abou t Lacan' s wor k need s t o b e mentione d here: Laca n ha s writte n ver y fe w texts . Hi s Seminars—th e principa l means o f hi s transmissio n o f psychoanalyti c knowledge—wer e spoke n and addressed , i n th e main , t o psychoanalyst s i n training . Thus, eve n fo r French readers , these work s hav e a special status . I t coul d b e said , there fore, tha t a logical analysis of such primary-source material as the Semina r transcripts i s inappropriat e becaus e Laca n di d no t inten d thes e text s fo r publication. Thu s som e might dee m it unfair t o criticize him for inconsis -

8

Introduction

tency given tha t hi s words wer e delivere d i n th e Semina r situatio n wher e he was both creativ e and spontaneous . It i s m y contentio n tha t sinc e Lacan' s Seminar s an d Ecrits have bee n published, they , lik e an y othe r writte n text , ar e availabl e fo r analysis . Furthermore, i t i s reall y Lacan' s though t itself , particularl y th e assump tions underpinnin g it , tha t wil l b e th e focu s o f ou r inquiry . Thi s i s so , irrespective of whether thi s is to b e found i n his articles for publicatio n o r published Semina r transcriptions . I t i s understoo d tha t th e wor k o f al l great theorist s involve s a process o f the transformatio n o f their idea s an d that wha t i s propose d a t on e perio d ma y b e inconsisten t wit h a late r o r earlier formulation . Th e criterio n o f logica l consistenc y applie d withi n this work specificall y refer s t o the underlying assumption s concernin g th e location o f human agenc y withi n centra l tenet s o f a theorist 5s positio n a t any given period . Two issue s wit h particula r referenc e t o Freu d requir e brie f discussio n before turnin g t o hi s work : th e proble m o f translatio n an d th e leve l o f theoretical explanation .

The Problem of Translation Before proceedin g t o argu e tha t Freud' s theor y lacke d consistenc y an d coherence, i t is important t o acknowledg e a possible proble m i n terms o f the accuracy of the translation use d throughout thi s research . Bruno Bettleheim , a psychoanalyst bor n int o a middle-class assimilate d Jewish famil y i n Vienn a fifty years later tha n Freud , ha s pointed ou t tha t much wa s th e sam e i n th e Vienn a h e kne w an d th e Vienn a o f Freud' s time. H e refer s i n particula r t o th e spoke n language . I n Freud and Man's Soul13 Bettlehei m point s t o th e nee d fo r correctio n o f th e translatio n o f some o f th e mos t importan t psychoanalyti c concepts . A s thi s presen t research is based on J. Strachey' s translation o f The Complete Works, many of Betdeheim's alternativ e translation s ar e of the utmost importance . Th e concept o f th e psyche , which i s central t o th e presen t work , i s translate d by Bettlehei m a s "soul. " H e claim s tha t "soul " i s th e bes t translatio n because o f th e man y emotiona l connotation s evoke d b y thi s word . Ac cording to Bettleheim , Freu d ofte n spok e of the soul—"o f it s nature an d structure, it s development , it s attribute , ho w i t reveal s itsel f i n al l we d o and dream." 14 Thus , wher e Strache y translate s "menta l apparatus " i t

Introduction

9

would rea d bette r a s "structure o f the soul" and "mental organization," as "the organizatio n o f th e soul. " Bettleheim make s th e poin t tha t i f Freu d had wante d a n equivalen t t o "mental " h e woul d hav e use d th e Germa n word geistig. Althoug h Freu d neve r provide s a precis e definitio n o f th e term soul, Bettlehei m writes: I suppos e tha t h e chose the ter m because o f its inexactitude, its emotional resonance. Its ambiguity speaks for the ambiguity of the psyche itself, which reflects many different, warrin g levels of consciousness simultaneously. . . . I shoul d poin t ou t however , tha t whe n Freu d speak s o f th e sou l h e i s talking about a psychological concept; it too is a metaphor. There is nothing supernatural about his idea of the soul... B y "soul" or "psyche" Freud means that which i s most valuable in man while he is alive . . . the soul is the sea t bot h o f th e min d an d o f th e passions . I t i s intangible , bu t i t nevertheless exercises a powerful influenc e on our lives. It is what makes us human. . . .15 Some problem s wit h translatio n ca n b e accounte d fo r i n term s o f th e difference i n linguistic properties an d differences i n underlying theoretica l perspectives. As Bettleheim notes , the German language itself does justice to th e ambiguitie s an d contradiction s tha t ar e composite s o f th e uncon scious, whereas English require s tha t suc h complexities b e avoided. Wha t is more , wherea s man y topic s wit h whic h Freu d deal t permi t bot h a hermeneutic-spiritual an d a positivistic-pragmati c approach , Englis h translators generall y op t fo r th e latte r becaus e positivis m i s th e mos t important Englis h philosophica l tradition . Th e resul t is , therefore , tha t Freud may well have been mistranslated an d so misunderstood . Nevertheless, wha t wil l b e argue d i n thi s wor k i s that, irrespectiv e o f this acknowledge d possibl e proble m o f translation , Freud' s inconsistenc y and incoherenc e i s much mor e relate d t o hi s failur e t o addres s question s concerning th e assumption s mad e i n hi s hypothese s tha n t o a failur e i n the translation o f his writings.

Levels of Explanation Freud mad e numerou s attempt s t o schematiz e th e huma n psych e throughout hi s writings , whic h wer e i n themselve s a continual endeavo r to conceptualiz e an d s o theoriz e upo n th e findings o f hi s clinica l experi ence. I t i s importan t t o not e tha t withi n Freud' s causa l explanatio n o f

IO

Introduction

human behavio r ther e ar e two level s of theorization tha t requir e differen tiation. According t o Erns t Mayr 16 ther e ar e tw o distinguishabl e causa l ap proaches in the life sciences: the proximate-causal an d the ultimate-causal . The proximate-causa l theoris t i s on e wh o studie s organi c phenomen a a s they manifes t themselve s i n th e individual' s lifetim e askin g th e questio n "How come? " Th e ultimate-causa l theoris t studie s organi c phenomen a within th e contex t o f evolutionar y biolog y askin g th e questio n 'Why? " The forme r theoris t migh t as k question s suc h a s "Ho w com e a person' s hormonal syste m can malfunction fro m eatin g a particular food?" whereas the latte r theoris t migh t ask , withi n a n evolutionar y context , cc Why d o human being s hav e a differen t hormona l syste m fro m thos e o f othe r species?" Freu d wa s a t time s a proximate-causa l theoris t an d a t othe r times an ultimate-causal theorist . Although hi s theory of the human min d does involv e bot h explanator y levels , this wor k i s concerne d wit h Freu d as proximate-causal theoris t alone . Thi s i s so becaus e th e questio n aske d is bes t place d withi n a proximate-typ e explanator y framework , thereb y avoiding all biological complexities . It i s ou r work , now , t o trac e th e origi n an d consequence s o f th e conceptual separatio n betwee n th e concept s o f subjec t an d agenc y i n psychoanalytic theory an d to explore a possible alternative to the proble m posed.

1

Subject an d Agent: Th e Cas e of the Hysterique (^Occasion

It i s a commonly hel d view that Freud' s interes t i n hysteri a an d hypnosi s gave birth to his psychoanalytic quest. This might be accounted for owin g to th e importanc e tha t Freu d himsel f gav e t o hysteri a an d th e catharti c method i n bot h "O n th e Histor y o f th e Psycho-Analyti c Movement 5 ' 1 and An Autobiographical Study? I t is interesting to note that in both thes e texts h e omitte d an y consideratio n o f th e crucia l elemen t i n th e earl y stages of his theorization: namely , the problem o f a subject trouble d wit h a failur e i n huma n agency . I n m y ow n readin g o f the Standard Edition, I found tha t i t wa s precisel y i n th e fac e o f a woman wh o wille d t o breast feed her baby but could not do so that Freud found impetu s to commenc e his own theory construction. Th e instance referred t o is the 1892-9 3 cas e of an hysterique d'occasion. Not onl y wa s Freu d initiall y challenge d t o understan d th e clinica l presentation o f faile d agency , bu t a s wil l b e seen , hi s firs t classificator y system was als o to b e based o n thi s very notion. Littl e attentio n ha s bee n given t o thi s point . Rather , emphasi s ha s bee n place d upo n th e sexua l aspects of Freud's theory . I n thi s chapter I will describe the movement i n Freud's thought fro m th e original conceptualization o f a patient (subject ) with a problem o f willpowe r (agency ) t o th e on e o f th e concept s o f eg o and th e repressed . I t i s i n th e ligh t o f hi s introductio n o f th e pivota l notion o f repressio n tha t man y problem s fo r theor y constructio n ensue , particularly with regar d to the concepts of subject an d agency . The mode l that Freu d develope d vi a th e movemen t i n though t trace d her e wil l b e 13

14

Subject and Agent

referred t o throughout thi s book as Freud's clinical model. In the chapter s to follow , th e developmen t o f wha t wil l b e referre d t o a s Freud' s topo graphical model will be given consideration .

A Subject Affected with Weakened Agency Freud's first actua l cas e report , on e tha t bear s th e mar k o f hi s earlies t clinically base d theor y construction , wa s publishe d contemporaneousl y with th e better-know n "Preliminar y Communication " o f 1893 . His less acknowledged pape r i s entided " A Case of Successful Treatmen t b y Hypnotism with Some Remarks on the Origin of Hysterical Symptoms Through 'Counter-Will'" an d i s foun d amon g th e Pre-Psycho-Analyti c Publica tions i n th e first volum e o f th e Standard Edition? I n thi s pape r Freu d presents th e cas e of a young woman betwee n th e age s of twenty t o thirt y years, whom h e refers t o in Jean Martin Charcot' s phrase a s an "hysterique d^occasion."4 Freu d report s tha t althoug h "he r capability , he r quie t com mon sens e an d he r naturalnes s mad e i t impossibl e fo r anyone , includin g her family doctor, to regard her as a neurotic,"5 she nevertheless exhibite d debilitating symptoms arisin g from he r effort s t o feed he r first child. Thi s woman ha d a poor flow o f milk, suffered pain s when th e baby was put t o the breast, lost her appetite , and became sleepless; yet, when the baby was given t o a we t nurse , he r healt h returned . When , thre e year s later , he r second chil d wa s born , he r attempt s t o fee d th e bab y wer e eve n les s successful, an d more distressin g symptoms becam e prominent. Freu d wa s brought in to hypnotize the woman, an d he reports that after two session s she was cure d b y the us e o f the suggestio n tha t contradicte d al l her fear s and the feelings o n which those fears were based : Have n o fear ! Yo u will make a n excellent nurse an d the bab y will thrive. Your stomach is perfectly quiet, your appetite is excellent, you are looking forward to your next meal, etc.6 However, give n the "occasion " once more o f bearing a child, the woma n yet a second tim e calle d o n Freu d fo r assistance . From hi s point o f view, he reports : " I foun d th e patien t i n th e sam e condition a s the yea r befor e and positivel y exasperate d wit h hersel f because her will could d o nothin g against he r disinclinatio n fo r foo d an d he r othe r symptom s . . ." 7 Afte r the secon d hypnosis , th e symptom s wer e s o completel y deal t wit h tha t a

Subject and Agent

15

third sessio n wa s no t required . I n th e fac e o f thi s successfu l treatmen t Freud notes : " C I felt ashamed, ' th e woma n sai d t o me , 'tha t a thing lik e hypnosis shoul d b e successful wher e I myself, with al l my willpower, wa s helpless. 5 " 8

The First Nosology It i s clea r fro m th e foregoin g cas e presentatio n tha t Freud' s hypnoti c treatment attempte d t o dea l wit h th e patient' s struggl e wit h wha t wa s experienced b y her a s a problem wit h agency—he r willpowe r was, in thi s instance, ineffectual. N o matte r ho w muc h thi s woman ma y have wante d to eat , sleep , an d breast-fee d he r bab y successfully , sh e could no t us e he r willpower t o d o so . This mean t tha t th e hypnotic suggestio n wa s used a s a mean s o f contradictin g o r counterin g th e symptoms . Here , symptom s were regarde d b y Freu d a s aspect s o f behavio r tha t wer e outsid e th e region o f th e contro l o f consciou s agenc y o r willpower . I t wa s fro m thi s vantage point that Freud conceptualized hysterical symptoms as "counterwill" whe n h e bega n t o conside r wha t ma y hav e bee n th e psychica l mechanism o f th e woman' s disorder . I n essenc e Freu d se t ou t t o under stand th e natur e o f th e experienc e o f a lack o f willpower . Hi s deductiv e solution to the problem tha t confronte d hi m was as follows. There ar e two types of ideas that have an expectancy attached to them . First, intentions—tha t is , idea s o f m y doin g thi s o r that—and , second , expectations—that is , ideas of this or that happening t o me. The effect o f expectancy attache d t o eac h i s dependen t o n tw o factors : (1 ) th e degre e of importanc e o f th e outcom e t o th e person ; an d (2 ) th e degre e o f uncertainty inheren t i n th e expectatio n o f th e outcome . Accordin g t o Freud, "Th e subjectiv e uncertainty , th e counter-expectation , i s itself represented b y a collectio n o f idea s t o whic h I shal l giv e th e nam e o f 'distressing antitheti c ideas. ' "9 These ar e exemplified i n the cas e of inten tion a s thinkin g tha t on e wil l no t succee d becaus e somethin g i s difficul t or becaus e o f wha t migh t happen . I n th e cas e o f a n expectation , on e thinks o f all the thing s tha t coul d possibl y happe n othe r tha n th e desire d one. Th e health y perso n deal s wit h anthitheti c idea s wit h powerfu l self confidence, suppressin g an d inhibiting these thoughts a s far a s is possible. The neurotic , however , havin g a tendenc y t o depressio n an d a lowere d self-confidence, gives great attentio n t o antitheti c ideas against intentions .

16

Subject and Agent

This ma y b e o n accoun t o f the subjec t matte r o f th e idea s fitting i n wit h the mood o f the neurosis or becaus e antithetic ideas flourish i n the soil of a neurosis. When antitheti c idea s relat e t o expectations , th e resul t i s a pessimisti c frame o f mind ; i f th e antitheti c idea s relat e t o intentions , folie du doute results. I n term s o f th e differen t nervou s states , Freu d classifie d neuras thenia an d hysteri a quit e separatel y accordin g t o th e mechanism a t work . In neurastheni a th e pathologicall y intensifie d antitheti c ide a combine s with the volitional idea. This combination form s a single act of consciousness. Becaus e th e antitheti c ide a take s awa y fro m th e volitiona l idea , weakness of will is brought abou t in neurasthenia. I n hysteria, the proces s differs i n tha t th e distressin g antitheti c ide a i s remove d fro m associatio n with th e intentio n an d continue s t o exis t a s a disconnecte d idea , ofte n unconsciously i n th e patient . Anothe r distinctio n i s to b e mad e betwee n neurasthenia an d hysteria . I n hysteria , th e inhibite d antitheti c ide a ca n become realize d b y enervatio n o f th e bod y jus t a s easil y a s doe s a voli tional ide a i n norma l circumstances . Freu d explains : "Th e antitheti c ide a establishes itself , s o t o speak , a s a 'counter-will, 5 whil e th e patien t i s resolute bu t powerless." 10 The abov e distinctio n ca n b e seen fro m a clinical perspective. The cas e of thi s woman , prevente d b y neurotic difficultie s fro m feedin g he r child , would hav e bee n evidence d quit e differentl y i f sh e ha d bee n a neuras thenic. Give n th e latte r condition , sh e would hav e fel t a conscious drea d of th e tas k befor e her , sh e woul d hav e bee n plague d b y thought s o f possible accidents , an d yet , give n tim e sh e would hav e eventually fe d th e baby satisfactorily . If , alternatively , th e antitheti c ide a ha d bee n mor e powerful, sh e probably woul d hav e abandone d th e tas k altogethe r ou t o f fear. Bein g a hysteric, this woman behave d differendy . Althoug h sh e may not hav e been conscious of her fear, sh e was determined t o feed th e child . Yet, sh e behave d "a s thoug h i t wa s he r will not t o fee d th e chil d o n an y account." 11 Furthermore , thi s wil l evoke d i n he r man y symptom s t o indispose her—los s o f appetite , aversio n t o food , an d pain s whe n th e child wa s pu t t o he r breast . I t i s thi s will , counter-will , tha t exercise d greater control over her bod y than di d consciou s thought. Freu d explain s the difference i n mechanisms in operation a s follows: Here, i n contras t t o th e weakness of will show n i n neurasthenia , w e hav e a perversion of will; an d i n contras t t o th e resigne d resolutenes s show n i n th e

Subject and Agent

17

former case , her e w e hav e astonishmen t an d exasperatio n a t a disunit y which is incomprehensible to the patient.12 For Freud , a t thi s point , hysteric s wer e th e helples s victim s o f thei r antithetic ideas when the emergence of a counter-will was responsible for the difficul t characteristic s o r symptom s tha t the y exhibited . Th e classifi catory syste m develope d an d employed b y Freud t o distinguis h betwee n neurasthenia an d hysteria wa s based o n the fundamental concep t o f willpower. What instigated this development was the clinical problem of why a woman who so much wanted to feed her child was unable to do so. Freud agai n mention s th e concept o f antitheti c idea s i n regard t o the patient Fra u Emm y Vo n N 1 3 an d later describe s th e case i n more detai l in Studies on Hysteria,}* Freud note s tha t Fra u Vo n N suffere d fro m th e symptom o f makin g a clackin g nois e wit h he r tongue—thi s being , o f course, against her will. He describes her as "a hysterical lady who showed great strengt h o f will i n thos e o f her dealing s whic h wer e unaffecte d b y her illness ; but in those which were so affected sh e showed n o less clearly the weight of the burden imposed on her by her numerous and oppressive hysterical impediment s an d incapacities." 15 Fra u Vo n N , therefore , suf fered fro m a perversion o f will. Similarly , i n the famous cas e of Anna O , Josef Breuer, Freud' s teache r an d friend, talk s of two state s of consciousness persisting sid e b y side: one in which willpowe r i s normal; th e othe r in whic h i t i s incapacitated. 16 Breuer' s "hypnoi d states " migh t wel l b e identified wit h that stat e in which counter-wil l assert s itself. Following thi s formulatio n o f th e first nosolog y Freu d shifte d hi s interest towar d th e ide a o f defense , the n finally towar d th e concep t o f repression. I n eac h movemen t w e will se e a gradually wanin g interes t i n the commonsens e ide a of human agenc y throug h willpowe r an d a growing interest in what eventuall y became define d a s the unconscious proces s of repression, an agency about which the subject has no conscious knowl edge. Will and Defense From a theoretical point of view Breuer and Freud had come to a number of conclusion s concernin g th e phenomenon o f hysteria whic h the y pub lished i n thei r 1893-9 5 Studies on Hysteria}7 Breue r hel d tha t hysteria ,

18

Subject and Agent

specifically hypnoi d hysteria , i s cause d b y a splitting o f consciousnes s i n the sens e tha t somethin g traumati c happen s t o a person tha t s/h e canno t remember bu t tha t i t happen s whil e th e perso n i s in a particular stat e o f mind aki n t o tha t whic h i s experienced i n hypnosis . The associate d idea s find n o resistanc e while the person i s in this hypnoid state . Freud initiall y accepted Breuer' s postulatio n bu t late r refuse d t o hol d t o i t a s explaine d in his 189 6 paper "The Aetiology of Hysteria." 18 In Studies on Hysteria bot h h e an d Breue r agree d upo n wha t the y termed retentio n hysteria . Thi s typ e o f hysteri a find s it s origi n i n a pas t traumatic situation , on e tha t th e patien t wa s unabl e t o dea l wit h fro m a psychological point of view at the time when it took place. The experienc e is no t cathected—tha t is , the excitatio n cause d i s denie d a n oudet , suc h as tellin g someon e els e wha t happened—an d s o sometime s become s converted into a somatic expression. Breuer thought that hypnoid hysteri a was th e mor e commo n bu t note d Freud' s suggestio n o f ye t a third typ e of hysteri a tha t wa s t o tak e th e latte r alon g a particularly fruitfu l path — namely, defense hysteria : Freud ha s foun d i n th e deliberat e amnesi a o f defens e a secon d source , independent of hypnoid states, for the construction of ideational complexes which are excluded from associative contact.19 Earlier i n th e sam e pape r Breue r define d defense s a s "th e deliberat e suppression o f distressing idea s which see m to th e subjec t t o threate n hi s happiness o r hi s self-esteem." 20 Furthermore , mentionin g Freud' s pape r "The Neuro-Psychose s o f Defense" 21 i n which he discusses the process o f defense, Breue r adds : "We cannot , i t is true, understand ho w a n idea ca n be deliberatel y represse d fro m consciousness." 22 Clearly , defens e pre sented a problem to Breuer, but it was Freud who pressed his theorization in tha t directio n rathe r tha n towar d hypnoi d o r retentio n hysteria : "I t i s to be hoped tha t fresh observatio n will soon decide whether I am runnin g the ris k of falling int o one-sidednes s an d erro r i n thu s favorin g a n exten sion of the concept of defense t o the whole of hysteria. 23

Will and Repression At thi s time , Freud use d th e concep t o f defense interchangeabl y wit h th e concept of repression. In some of its earliest appearances the term repressed

Subject and Agent

19

(verdranjjt) i s accompanie d b y th e adver b intentionally (absichtlich) o r b y deliberately (willkurlich), a s fo r example , i n th e 189 3 "Preliminar y Com munication" where retention hysteri a is described a s follows: In the first group are those cases in which the patients have not reacted to a psychical trauma because the nature of the trauma excluded a reaction, as in the case of the apparendy irreparable loss of a loved person or because social circumstances mad e a reaction impossibl e o r becaus e it was a question o f things which th e patient wishe d t o forget , an d therefor e intentionall y re pressed from his conscious thought and inhibited and suppressed. 24 In cc The Psychotherap y o f Hysteria" 25 Freu d explain s that , b y mean s of his clinical work, he had overcome a psychical force i n the patients tha t was oppose d t o th e pathogeni c idea s becomin g conscious—tha t is , re membered. I t was , h e argued , tha t sam e forc e tha t playe d a part i n bot h generating th e hysterica l sympto m an d i n preventing th e pathogenic ide a from becomin g conscious . Furthermore , Freu d hel d tha t thi s clinica l resistance, t o b e theoreticall y understoo d a s th e concep t o f repression , was a n endeavo r t o kee p distressin g idea s ou t o f consciousness . Thes e ideas "wer e al l of a kind tha t on e woul d prefe r no t t o hav e experienced , that one would rather forget." 26 Th e notion o f censoring distressing ideas or defendin g agains t idea s incompatibl e t o th e individual' s consciousnes s was understood t o b e the work of the ego: Thus a psychical force, aversion on the part of the ego, had originally driven the pathogenic idea out of association and was now opposing its return to memory. The hysterical patient's "not knowing" was in fact a "not wanting to know"— a no t wantin g whic h migh t b e t o a greate r o r les s exten t conscious.27 We ar e lef t wit h th e importan t question , then , o f t o wha t exten t th e patient's wil l was though t t o b e involve d i n th e proces s o f repression , o f defense. Accordin g to Strache y the word intentionally simply indicates th e existence o f a motive bu t carrie s n o implicatio n o f conscious intention. 28 This argumen t doe s no t see m i n lin e wit h th e whol e thrus t o f th e 189 6 paper o n whic h Strache y draw s t o provid e evidenc e i n referenc e t o th e concept o f repressio n o r defense . I t woul d see m fa r mor e accurat e t o argue that the question of whether will was or was not involved in the ac t of defense was a specific problem for Freu d a t this stage particularly in the light of his attention t o the problem of willpower in the hysterical patien t as describe d earlier . I n hi s 189 6 pape r wher e h e i s muc h mor e explici t

20

Subject and Agent

about th e notio n o f defens e i n th e neuropsychoses , whic h b y the n in cluded phobia s an d obsessions , Freu d discusse s th e proces s o f defense , contrary to Strachey' s note, employing the important concept of will. Freud argue s tha t i t i s impossible t o regar d th e splittin g o f conscious ness in two form s o f hysteria a s primary i n Pierre Janet's sense . Janet wa s a French followe r o f Charcot who wa s interested i n states of dissociation . Freud state s that : I was repeatedly abl e to show that the splitting of the content of consciousnessis the result of an act of will on the part of the patient; tha t is to say , it is initiated

by a n effor t o f wil l whose motiv e ca n b e specified . B y this I d o not , o f course, mea n tha t th e patien t intend s t o brin g abou t a splittin g o f hi s consciousness. His intention i s a different one ; but instead of attaining its aim, it produces a splitting of consciousness.29

In othe r words , defense i s the intentional ac t of the will, not th e splittin g of consciousness. That Freu d hel d defens e t o b e a consciou s intentio n i s eve n mor e clearly state d i n th e sam e pape r wher e h e explain s th e rol e o f will i n th e patient's memor y o f wha t happene d a t th e tim e o f th e origi n o f th e symptom: Furthermore, the most unambiguous statements by the patients give proof of th e effor t o f will, the attemp t a t defense , upo n whic h th e theor y lays emphasis, and at least in a number of cases the patients themselves infor m us that their phobia or obsession made its first appearance after the effort o f will ha d apparentl y succeede d i n it s aim . "Somethin g ver y disagreeabl e happened to me once and I tried very hard to put it away from me and not to thin k abou t i t an y more. I succeede d a t last; bu t the n I go t thi s othe r thing, which I have not been able to get rid of since."30 It seems , therefore , tha t a t thi s stag e o f hi s theorizatio n Freu d di d think defens e wa s brought abou t b y the conscious will of the patient, bu t his constan t us e o f th e concep t o f th e eg o introduce d a problem t o thi s understanding o f the process of defense . Freud talke d o f the rol e o f the eg o i n defendin g incompatibl e idea s i n his 189 4 pape r i n muc h th e sam e vei n a s i n "Th e Psychotherap y o f Hysteria" bu t wit h a clea r indicatio n tha t h e too k defens e t o b e a con scious and purposeful act . The ego, he said, was faced with a n incompati ble experience , idea , o r feelin g an d tha t "th e subjec t decide d t o forge t i t because h e ha d n o confidenc e i n hi s powe r t o resolv e th e contradictio n between tha t incompatibl e ide a an d hi s eg o b y mean s o f thought —

Subject and Agent

21

activity."31 It i s important t o note here that defense, understood a s an ac t of th e will , raise s a theoretica l proble m i n referenc e t o th e relationshi p between th e subject, th e ego, and willpower. On e i s introduced very early to a crucia l proble m tha t consistend y blight s Freudia n theory : namely , the confusio n surroundin g Freud' s theoretica l presupposition s regardin g the natur e o f huma n agency . I t i s difficul t t o ascertai n wha t attribute s Freud assume s pertai n t o eac h o f hi s concepts . Fo r example , wh o will s defense? I s i t th e ego , th e subject , o r i s th e eg o synonymou s wit h th e subject? I n th e instanc e abov e th e subjec t woul d see m to b e the on e wh o wills an d wh o employ s hi s eg o i n th e servic e o f defense , wherea s i n a previously quoted descriptio n o f the ego (p . 19 ) the latter seems to be the agent itself. The difference i n conceptualizations o f the ego is most appar ent wher e Feu d write s o f either th e ego , assumin g agenc y o n th e par t o f the ego , or th e individual' s o r subject' s ego , assumin g agenc y on th e par t of th e subject . Muc h attentio n wil l b e given t o thi s proble m throughou t the work to follow .

The Changed Nosology By 1898 Freud had moved from hi s initial classificatory syste m of nervous disorders. Whereas h e had though t i n terms o f neurasthenia an d hysteria , differing o n the basis of the mechanism utilized with regard to willpower , he nex t though t i n term s o f a classificator y syste m tha t employe d th e concepts, th e actua l neuroses , an d th e psychoneuroses . Th e ne w classifi catory syste m wa s understood , no t i n term s o f th e mechanis m utilize d with regar d t o willpower , bu t o n th e basi s o f th e sexua l etiolog y o f th e problems experienced . Th e actua l neurose s wer e distinguishe d b y virtu e of their connection wit h sexua l problems of the present: neurastheni a wa s held to be caused by immoderate masturbation o r spontaneous emissions ; whereas anxiet y neuroses were caused by enforced abstinence , unconsum mated genita l excitement , o r coitio n tha t wa s imperfec t o r interrupted . The psychoneuroses , however , wer e understoo d i n term s o f past sexua l experiences an d i n term s o f differing mechanism s o f defense employe d i n each category . Indeed , b y 189 6 i n "Furthe r Remark s o n th e Neuro psychoses o f Defense" 32 Freu d coul d sa y quit e definitivel y tha t hysteria , obsessions, and certain cases of hallucinatory confusion, groupe d togethe r as the neuropsychose s o f defense , ha d on e aspec t i n common : "Thi s wa s

22

Subject and Agent

that thei r symptom s aros e throug h th e psychica l mechanis m o f (uncon scious) defense —that is , i n a n attemp t t o repres s a n incompatibl e ide a which ha d com e int o distressin g oppositio n t o th e patient' s ego.' 533 This change i n hi s understandin g o f th e proces s o f defens e wa s extremel y significant. Thi s is so because once defense was no longer simply an act of the will, conceptualization o f the proces s a t a n unconscious leve l allowe d Freud t o enrich , throug h elaboration , hi s theor y o f neuroses . A s alread y noted, prio r t o 189 6 Freud held that hysteria could b e traced to a psychical conflic t arisin g throug h a n incompatibl e ide a settin g i n actio n a de fense o n th e par t o f th e eg o an d callin g upo n a deman d fo r continue d repression. A t thi s stag e h e di d no t hol d tha t defens e o r repressio n i n itself wa s pathologica l bu t tha t sometime s i t resulte d i n pathologica l symptoms. O n th e basi s o f hi s no w "sexual " rathe r tha n "willpower " orientation Freu d wa s abl e to provid e mor e informatio n regardin g whe n pathological effect s wer e brough t int o bein g i n hi s 189 6 pape r c The Aetiology of Neuroses": The defense achieves its purpose of thinking the incompatible idea out of consciousness if there are infantile sexual scenes present in the (hitherto normal) subject in the form of unconscious memories, and if the idea that is to be repressed can be brought into logical or associative connection with an infantile experience of that kind.™

Here, Freu d give s potenc y t o "th e defense " rathe r tha n t o th e subjec t who, i n thi s instance , undergoe s th e proces s passively . Furthermore , th e importance o f memor y i s highlighte d withi n Freud' s changin g under standing o f th e psycholog y o f neuroses . Unconsciou s memor y ca n b e associatively linke d wit h a n ide a an d s o bring s pathologica l effec t int o being. Wh y i t wa s onl y idea s o f a sexual natur e tha t cause d pathologica l repression becam e a key question fo r Freud . H e had , however, addresse d the problem of why childhood traumas operate in a deferred fashion . Thi s latter notio n le d t o th e fruitfu l pape r "Scree n Memories," 35 whic h dis cusses th e unconsciou s mechanis m o f displacemen t a t wor k i n thos e memories tha t ar e no t a s important fo r thei r ow n conten t a s they ar e t o the conten t o f memories tha t ar e relate d t o th e scree n memor y bu t hav e been repressed . By th e lat e 1890s , Freu d ha d year s o f clinica l experienc e behin d him . In ligh t o f hi s wor k wit h neuroti c patient s durin g thes e years , h e ha d formulated a clinica l mode l tha t informe d hi s day-to-da y practice . Thi s model i s one in which th e ego is imputed wit h agency . Although th e eg o

Subject and Agent

23

is generall y efficaciou s agains t unacceptable , sexuall y relate d though t ac tivity, symptoms form when there is a failure i n the ego's ability to repres s the incompatible idea .

Conclusion By the tur n o f the centur y Freu d ha d move d a distance fro m hi s point o f departure whe n confronte d wit h th e hysterique ^occasion. Thi s movemen t was fro m a nosology base d o n aberration s o f willpower t o on e base d o n unconscious memorie s an d mechanism s o f defense . Thi s mean s tha t hi s understanding o f menta l illnes s ha d undergon e a radica l change . Wit h this chang e cam e th e introductio n o f ke y concept s suc h a s th e ego , repression, an d th e unconscious , withi n a developin g psychologica l the ory o f th e huma n subjec t tha t n o longe r investigate d man' s psychica l lif e within th e term s o f a commonsense approach . Becaus e Freud' s theoriza tion move d t o th e real m o f th e unconscious , h e require d a mean s o f conceptualizing the subject tha t had never been attempted before . Freud' s theory neede d t o incorporat e th e notio n o f counter-wil l understoo d i n terms o f symptom , defens e understoo d i n term s o f repression , an d th e will understood i n terms of the ego. This shift was not a simple movemen t indicative o f a one-to-on e correspondenc e o f term s bu t a fundamentall y different constructio n o f the subject . One o f Freud' s mai n problem s i n buildin g a theory ca n b e attribute d to hi s failur e t o specif y an d clarif y th e natur e o f th e theoretica l assump tions tha t h e made i n regard t o th e problem o f the subjec t i n psychoanal ysis. In particular , h e was never clear as to where he located th e notion o f agency and consequentl y continuall y too k i t for grante d tha t this capacit y lay wherever hi s theory require d i t to b e for th e point o f discussion a t th e time. Hi s failur e t o specif y thi s crucia l elemen t underpinnin g hi s theor y meant tha t h e wa s neve r i n th e positio n t o kno w wha t wa s lef t t o b e conceptualized an d thus to b e employed i n the theory itself. This is not t o say that Freu d neede d t o philosophize regardin g the nature of the subjec t in psychoanalysis becaus e tha t would , i n al l probability, lea d to th e aren a of metaphysic s an d towar d a field tha t h e adamanti y refraine d fro m entering: cc We have nothing t o expec t from philosoph y excep t that i t will once agai n haughtil y poin t ou t t o u s th e intellectua l inferiorit y o f th e object o f our study." 36 I t i s to say, however, tha t problems of conceptual-

24

Subject and Agent

ization and theorization resulte d from hi s failure to state his pretheoretica l assumptions. Freud' s movemen t awa y fro m a n interes t i n willpowe r re sulted i n hi s leavin g asid e the questio n o f human agenc y fro m thi s poin t onward i n hi s theoretica l postulations . Th e focu s o f hi s theor y buildin g became, instead, the psychical apparatus . In th e followin g fou r chapter s w e wil l investigat e Freud' s attempt s t o schematize wha t h e term s th e psychi c apparatus . Freud' s emphasi s upo n conceptualizing th e psych e i n schemati c for m will b e show n t o lea d hi m to neglect a t a theoretical level that which underpinned hi s work: namely , the natur e o f hi s assumption s concernin g th e subjec t an d agenc y i n psy choanalysis.

2

The Freud-Flies s Correspondence : The First an d Secon d Schema s

The Letters Wilhelm Flies s (1858-1928) , a Berli n nose-and-throa t specialist , wa s advised b y Jose f Breue r t o atten d som e o f th e lecture s o n th e anatom y and mod e o f functionin g o f th e nervou s syste m tha t Freu d wa s the n giving at the University of Vienna. A mutual attraction aros e between th e two me n i n th e scientifi c discussion s tha t followed , an d s o bega n a correspondence tha t lasted from 188 7 to 1904 . When th e friendshi p ended , Freu d eithe r los t o r destroye d th e letter s that Flies s ha d writte n t o him . Th e Freud-Flies s correspondence , how ever, was preserved; an d following Fliess's death i n 1928 , his widow sol d the packet of 284 letters plus manuscripts an d scientific notes to Reinhol d Stahl, a Berlin bookseller , o n th e conditio n tha t the y were no t t o b e sol d to Freu d himself . Whe n Stah l fled t o Franc e durin g th e Naz i regime , h e offered th e document s t o Mme. Marie Bonaparte , one of Freud's favorit e pupils an d analysands , wh o immediatel y bough t them . Bonapart e tol d Freud, wh o offere d t o pa y hal f th e cost , bu t sh e refuse d realizin g tha t Freud migh t the n hav e rights ove r the m a s he wanted to . The correspon dence journeye d t o final safet y vi a th e Rothschil d Ban k i n Vienna , th e Danish Legatio n i n Paris, and across the English Channe l to London . In 195 0 a selection o f these letters becam e public in a German editio n of th e correspondence , an d i n 195 4 a n Englis h translatio n o f thi s wa s published b y Imag o entide d The Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to 27

28

The Freud-Fliess Correspondence

Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes, 1887-1902, b y Sigmun d Freud . Thes e publications wer e edite d b y Marie Bonapart e (Paris) , Anna Freu d (Lon don), an d Erns t Kri s (Ne w York) . I n bot h edition s onl y 16 8 o f th e 28 4 letters availabl e t o th e editor s wer e published . Th e reaso n give n i n th e editors' note reads as follows: The selectio n wa s mad e o n th e principl e o f makin g publi c everythin g relating to the writer's scientific work and scientific interests and everything bearing o n th e socia l an d politica l condition s i n whic h psycho-analysi s originated and of omitting or abbreviating everything publication of which would be inconsistent with professional or personal confidence. 1 In 197 9 Jeffre y Mousaief f Masso n approache d Ann a Freu d t o see k access to al l documents fro m 188 7 onward. With K . R . Eissler' s support 2 Anna Freu d gav e Masso n th e necessar y authorit y and , includin g docu ments located a t the Jewish National an d University Library in Jerusalem, at Maresfiel d Gardens , Hampstead , an d i n Rober t Fliess' s privat e collec tion, al l ar e presente d i n Masson' s ne w editio n o f 1985 . Ther e ar e 13 3 letters 3 presented for the first time as well as publication with no deletion s of thos e alread y availabl e i n th e 195 4 edition . Th e Masso n translatio n i s used i n th e presen t work . Th e choic e o f thi s translatio n i n preferenc e t o the 195 4 Origins ha s bee n mad e t o ensur e that , give n an y anti-Freu d tenor tha t migh t b e foun d i n th e translatio n o f th e correspondence , i t does no t alte r a n argumen t buil t o n theoretica l rathe r tha n persona l grounds. 4 However , th e Strache y translatio n o f th e "Project " i s use d because, to quote Masson : And the 1895 "Project for a Scientific Psychology," Freud's construction of a theor y o f th e mind , ha s bee n omitte d becaus e i t woul d b e difficul t t o improve on James Strachey's translation, published and still available in his Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud}

The First Schema: "Project for a Scientific Psychology One o f th e less-know n ye t nonetheles s importan t manuscript s foun d among Freud' s prepsychoanalyti c publication s i s his "Projec t fo r a Scientific Psychology. 55 Thi s tex t wa s neve r publishe d b y Freud ; a s alread y indicated, it appeared in London i n its first publishe d version, in German , in 1950 . Regardles s o f th e evidenc e tha t Freu d ha d wante d th e manu -

The Freud-Fliess Correspondence

29

script t o b e disregarded , hi s letters t o Flies s before an d afte r writin g i t i n late 189 5 clearl y indicat e ho w centra l i t wa s t o hi s thinkin g durin g thi s period. Althoug h th e problem s o f th e etiolog y o f th e neurose s an d o f defense absorbe d Freud' s thought s i n the 1895-9 6 period , h e was never theless draw n t o theoriz e abou t th e psychica l apparatus . Thi s interes t continued throughou t fift y o r s o productive years. Freud kne w that with out som e clarit y o f formulatio n i n thi s are a hi s clinica l applicatio n coul d well flounder fo r want of a firm theoretical base. The importance to Freu d of a n attemp t t o theoriz e abou t th e huma n psych e ca n b e gleane d fro m the correspondence . In a lette r o f Apri l 27 , 1895 , Freu d writes : "Scientifically , I a m i n a bad way; namely, caught up in "The Psychology for Neurologists, 55 whichN regularly consume s m e totall y until , actuall y overworked , I mus t brea k off. I hav e never befor e experience d suc h a high degre e of preoccupation . And wil l anythin g com e o f it ? I hop e so , bu t i t i s difficul t an d slo w going.556 The ful l fervo r o f hi s endeavo r i s bes t evidence d i n hi s lette r o f May 25, 1895 . He report s to Flies s that h e has had a n "inhuman amoun t to do, 55 thus h e ha s faile d t o correspon d a s h e woul d hav e wished , bu t further: The main reason , however, was this: a man like me cannot live without a hobbyhorse, without a consuming passion, without—in Schiller' s word— a tyrant. I have found one . In its service I know no limits. It is psychology, which has always been my distant, beckoning goal, and which now, since I have come upon the problem of neuroses, has drawn so much nearer. I am tormented b y tw o aims ; t o examin e wha t shap e th e theor y o f menta l functioning take s i f on e introduce s quantitativ e considerations , a sor t o f economics of nerve forces; and, second, to peel off from psychopathology a gain for norma l psychology. Actually, a satisfactory genera l conception o f neuropsychotic disturbance s i s impossible i f one canno t lin k i t with clea r assumptions abou t norma l menta l processes. During the past week I have devoted every free minute to such work; have spent the hours of the night from eleve n t o tw o with suc h fantasizing, interpretin g an d guessing, an d invariably stopped only when somewhere I came up against an absurdity or when I actuall y seriously overworked, s o that I had no interest lef t i n my daily medical activities . I t wil l still b e a long time befor e yo u ca n as k me about results.7 This all-consumin g psycholog y fo r neurologist s wa s mentione d i n a sequence o f Freud' s letter s t o Fliess : Jun e 12 , Augus t 6 , Octobe r 8 , October 15 , Octobe r 20 , Novembe r 29 , an d Januar y 1 , 1896 . Thes e

30

The Freud-Fliess Correspondence

letters revea l the intellectua l difficultie s tha t Freu d face d i n his attempt t o cope with hi s "tyrant." I t wa s with hi s Octobe r 8 , 1895 , correspondenc e that Freu d enclose d tw o notebook s fo r Fliess's appraisal . Ther e was , however, a n acknowledge d omission— a noteboo k dealin g with th e con cept o f repressio n a t a theoretical level . The importanc e fo r Freu d o f th e interchange betwee n theor y an d practic e i s clearl y enunciate d i n thi s letter: Now, th e tw o notebooks . I scribble d the m ful l a t on e stretc h sinc e m y return, an d they will bring little that is new to you. I am retaining a third notebook tha t deal s wit h th e psychopatholog y o f repression , becaus e i t pursues its topic only to a certain point. From there on I had to work once again wit h ne w draft s an d i n th e proces s becam e alternatel y prou d an d overjoyed and ashamed and miserable—until now, after an excess of mental torment, I apathetically tell myself. It does not yet, perhaps never will, hang together. What does not yet hang together is not the mechanism—I can be patient about that—but the elucidator of repression, the clinical knowledge of which has in other respects greatly progressed.8 In hi s letter o f November 8 , 1895 , Freud agai n mentions hi s "tyrant 55: "I rebelle d agains t m y tyrant . I fel t overworked , irritated , confuse d an d incapable o f masterin g i t all . S o I thre w everythin g away. 559 Yet , h e resumed wor k o n i t an d o n Januar y 1 , 1896 , sent Flies s a revision o f hi s earlier proposals: "You r remark s on migrain e hav e led me to a n idea, a s a consequence o f whic h al l m y (present ) theorie s woul d nee d t o b e com pletely revised—something I cannot venture to do now. I shall try to give you some idea of it, however. 5510 Freud's "Project" We tur n no w t o th e "Project, 55 considere d her e a s Freud's first attempte d schema o f th e huma n psyche . Freud 5s "Projec t fo r a Scientifi c Psychol ogy,55 which he commenced puttin g on paper while still in the railroad car following a visit t o se e Fliess i n Berlin , i s composed o f three mai n parts : (1) Genera l Scheme ; (2 ) Psychopathology ; an d (3 ) Attemp t t o Presen t Normal if/ Processes. Thi s mode l i s a neurologica l on e base d o n tw o fundamental hypotheses : (1 ) th e hypothesi s o f the neurone , which i s th e basis o f th e topographica l o r structura l poin t o f vie w tha t wil l b e th e focus o f attentio n throughou t th e presen t work ; an d (2 ) th e hypothesi s of quantity, the basis of the economic point of view that will be describe d

The Freud-Fliess Correspondence

3i

in chapter 4 with referenc e t o Freud' s metapsychology. Althoug h th e tex t contains five diagrams, none of these depicts the topographical layout tha t he present s i n th e descriptio n o f th e Genera l Scheme . This schem e mus t be place d withi n th e contex t o f a muc h large r intellectua l endeavor— a full psychology . I t is, however, basi c to the "Project 55 itself. To assis t in a n explanation o f thi s schem e fo r presen t purposes , a versio n o f R . Wollheim's 11 diagra m wil l b e used . Thi s figure depict s thre e differen t neurological system s whic h ar e designate d b y Freu d a s (phi) , ij/ (psi) and a) (omega). Thes e system s compris e th e organism' s psychica l appa ratus, providin g th e individua l wit h th e functiona l abilit y t o registe r experience an d remembe r i t an d t o tolerat e a n accumulatio n o f energy , which Freu d denote s with Q (quantity) .

4>SYSTEM pallium / neurones/

/ +-

/ SYSTE M

external stimul i

/

/

/ / nuclea

r neurons

internal stimuli

Diagram 1: The First Schema The systems , althoug h linked , ar e differentiate d b y th e natur e o f th e neurones involved . \p is a system of permeable neurones that filter out an d reduce stimulation. These neurones have a cutaneous barrier that provide s protection fro m externa l stimuli, (o is a system of neurones that is to som e degree impermeable an d offers som e resistance to the flow o f energy. The latter i s governed b y the primar y processe s an d essentiall y corresponds t o the unconsciou s i n late r conceptualizations . Thi s syste m provide s fo r memory, w i s a syste m o f neurone s tha t gives qualities—tha t is , th e experience of consciousness o r perception—bu t tha t neve r receive s quan -

32

The Freud-Fliess Correspondence

tity. Thi s syste m fall s alongsid e th e if* system . Freu d accounte d fo r th e ability of the mental to stor e energy by postulating th e notion o f contact barriers, those permanenriy "cathected" neurones in the t/ > system. The min d receive s tw o type s o f stimuli , externa l an d internal—th e external stimul i bein g receive d b y th e system , th e interna l b y th e if/ system. The latter system is subdivided int o nuclear neurones an d palliu m neurones—the distinctio n i s not importan t her e othe r tha n i n passin g t o mention th e directio n o f energy flow; quantit y originatin g fro m a n inter nal sourc e flows outwar d throug h th e nuclea r neurone s throug h th e pallium towar d th e syste m an d s o ultimately towar d th e moto r par t o f the apparatus . What bring s this flow into action is referred t o a s a wishfu l state—in othe r words , th e min d ca n operat e unde r th e influenc e o f a wish. Th e wis h seek s satisfactio n eithe r fro m th e oute r worl d o f realit y and/or th e inne r worl d o f fantasy. Becaus e th e menta l apparatu s tend s t o operate s o tha t pleasur e i s secure d an d unpleasur e avoided , a number o f processes are needed in the face of the wish: reality testing, defense agains t pain, thinking, judging, and remembering, an d so forth. Freu d postulate d the notion o f the ego, a group o f neurones that lie in the if/ system, whic h had a directive o r activ e role assigne d t o it . I n thi s schem a ther e coul d b e too muc h realit y fo r consciousnes s t o handl e becaus e ther e ar e bot h perceptual reality , comin g fro m th e externa l barrier , an d hallucinator y reality, resultin g fro m interna l stimulation . Th e rol e o f th e ego , which i s the nucleus o f the \\t system, is to permi t externa l reality alone to functio n so that , i n effect , it s functio n i s essentiall y inhibitive . I t endeavor s t o prevent hallucination—i t trie s to cu t of f th e exces s coming fro m interna l excitation. There i s a core , o r nucleus , eg o an d som e mobil e portio n tha t i s constituted b y processes o n whic h th e inhibitin g influenc e i s exercised. I t is th e latte r secondar y processe s tha t wil l i n late r conceptualization s b e represented b y the preconscious-consciou s system . A s well a s accountin g for "specifi c actions,' 5 preestabiishe d instinctua l action s t o achiev e relie f from hunger , endogenou s stimul i (late r to becom e instincts), respiration , and se x that ar e i n conformit y wit h reality , th e eg o i s abl e t o us e energ y at it s disposa l s o tha t unpleasur e i s no t experienced . Thi s inhibitio n o f unpleasure Freu d referre d t o a s primar y defense . Ther e i s no nee d t o g o into the fine details of Freud's exposition here, but we can already see that he postulated a neurologically based psychology of the mind that include d not onl y the simple reflex ar c of stimulus (acquisitio n o f energy)-respons e

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(giving of f energy ) bu t als o th e mor e comple x possibilit y o f interna l stimuli, th e notio n o f wish an d th e ide a o f hallucinator y satisfactio n o f a wish. Wha t i s important , nevertheless , i s t o understan d tha t Freu d di d attempt t o dra w u p a neurologica l accoun t o f th e min d tha t aime d a t corresponding t o the anatom y known a t the time: The hypothesis of there being two systems of neurones, and (/>, of which consist s of permeable elements an d i/ > of impermeable seem s to provid e an explanation of this one of the peculiarities of the nervous system—tha t of retaining and yet of remaining capable of receiving . . . It wil l b e objecte d agains t ou r hypothesi s o f contact—barrier s tha t i t assumes tw o classe s with a fundamental differenc e i n thei r condition s o f functioning though there is at the moment no other basis for the differen tiation. A t al l events , morphologicall y (tha t is , histologically ) nothin g i s known in support of the distinction . . . Where else are we to look for this division into classes? If possible in the biological development of the nervous system . . }2 Because Freu d wa s workin g withi n a neurological framework , h e talke d of all processes conceptualized withi n the terms of that particular domain . For example , h e define d th e eg o whos e wor k ha s bee n describe d a s follows: Thus the ego is to be defined a s the totality of the \fj cathexes, at the given time i n whic h a permanent componen t i s distinguished fro m a changing one.13 With regar d t o th e functio n o r organizin g capacit y o f the eg o i n relatio n to the wish, he wrote: We have brought forward th e hypothesis that, during the process of wishing, inhibition b y the ego brings about a moderated cathexis of the object wished for, which allows it to be cognized as not real. . ,14 Or again , the ego in relation to the process of judging is described as: Thus judging is a ^ proces s which i s only made possible by inhibition b y the ego and which is evoked by the dissimilarity between wishful cathexes of a memory and a perceptual cathexes that is similar to it. 15 In bot h thes e processes , wishin g an d judging , define d neurologically , there i s n o mentio n o f a n activ e subject . Freu d talk s i n term s o f "th e organism" an d th e processe s tha t tak e plac e withi n th e confine s o f th e neurological apparatus . Wh o judges ? Wh o wishes ? Th e ego , th e individ ual, or th e cognizer ? Freu d i s not a t al l clear. The wish itsel f is defined i n

34 The

Freud-Fliess Correspondence

neurological term s s o tha t ther e i s n o recognitio n o f a uniqu e an d will full subject : The wishful stat e results in a positive attraction towards the object wishedfor, o r mor e precisel y toward s it s mnemi c image ; th e experienc e o f pai n leads to a repulsion, a disinclination t o keeping the hostile mnemic image cathected.16 As indicate d i n chapte r 1 , Freu d ha d bee n ver y intereste d i n th e problem o f willpower an d use d th e concep t i n hi s later wor k The Psychopathology of EverydayLife.17 I n the "Project" he defines i t as follows: Here ip is at the mercy of Q, and it is thus that in the interior of the system there arise s th e impulsio n whic h sustain s al l psychical activity . W e kno w this power as the will—the derivative of the instincts. 1* What th e connectio n i s between th e subjec t an d will is never attende d to, s o tha t w e ar e lef t wit h concept s suc h a s wish, will , an d eg o tha t al l contribute t o th e workin g o f th e organism . On e furthe r commen t i s needed her e in reference t o the role of the ego: that concerning patholog ical defense . In th e "Project " Freu d relate s pathologica l defens e t o th e organism' s memory i n such a way that he requires the notion o f deferred action . Thi s concept wil l b e give n brie f consideratio n i n th e sectio n t o follow . I n th e meantime Freu d linke d th e eg o with thi s defens e jus t a s he was doin g i n his clinical practice—that is , as the agent of defense : By that means the release of unpleasure was quantitatively restricted, and its start was precisely a signal for th e ego to set normal defense i n action . . . Thus it is the ego's business not to permit any release of affect, becaus e this at the same time permits a primary process. . .. i n the case of the hysterical (compulsion). . . . Here . . . i s no perceptio n bu t a memory, which unexpectedly releases unpleasure, and the ego only discovers this too late. It has permitted a primary process because it did not expect one.19 Even thoug h Freu d ha d no t worke d ou t hi s pape r o n repression , a s already mentioned, i t is clear at this early stage of his theorization tha t th e whole are a of defense wa s vitally important t o his work. In th e introductio n t o th e "Project 55 Strache y points ou t tha t i t can b e suggested tha t th e huma n nervou s syste m b e regarde d a s simila r t o o r even identica l wit h a n electroni c computer—bot h o f the m machine s fo r the reception , storage , processing , an d outpu t o f information : "I t ha s been plausibl y pointe d ou t tha t i n th e complexitie s o f th e 'neuronal 5

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events describe d her e b y Freud , an d th e principle s governin g them , w e may see more tha n a hint o r tw o a t the hypotheses o f information theor y and cybernetic s i n thei r applicatio n t o th e nervou s system. 5'20 Freud' s neurological mode l doe s indee d strik e on e a s a compute r information processing model , on e devoi d o f th e notio n o f th e huma n subject . Yet , this mode l mus t b e understoo d withi n th e contex t o f Freud' s lif e work . Within th e terms of this understanding th e importance o f the "Project" is best viewe d retrospectively—severa l o f it s postulation s ca n b e see n i n a new form i n Freud's later writings. 21 Although Freu d wrot e t o Flies s i n hi s Januar y 1 , 1896 , lette r abou t changing hi s topographica l placement s o f th e neurone s s o tha t th e c o neurones wer e now t o b e understood betwee n th e $ an d th e if/ neurones, it wa s no t lon g befor e h e attempte d a ne w typ e o f conceptualizatio n o f the mental apparatus , as will be discussed in the section to follow. B e that as i t may , an d give n that , a s Strache y point s out , Freu d di d eventuall y "throw ove r th e whol e neurologica l framework," 22 i t i s importan t fo r present purposes t o see that Freud neglected here, as elsewhere, to specif y the assumption s tha t h e mad e regardin g th e natur e o f th e subjec t i n psychoanalysis. On e ha s t o remembe r tha t Freu d wa s writin g t o Fliess . Therefore th e natur e o f hi s conceptualization s bor e th e mar k o f tha t particular association . A t thi s tim e Flies s wa s Freud' s onl y reader— a reader wit h a similar backgroun d t o Freud's . Bot h me n were doctor s an d their commo n languag e was that of neurology, physiology , an d anatomy . Their share d assumption s abou t th e materia l o f thei r correspondence , although remainin g unarticulated , wer e clearl y thos e o f th e scientifi c en terprise. Thes e assumption s wer e neve r questioned , bu t simpl y take n fo r granted. A s a consequenc e Freu d produce d a typ e o f neurologica l com puter mode l o f menta l processe s that , fro m a theoretica l poin t o f view , did no t requir e th e underpinnin g notio n o f subject . Peopl e coul d b e assumed to be machines or biological organisms waiting for that stimulus, either externa l o r internal , whic h woul d se t th e refle x proces s i n motion . This i s s o eve n i f th e translatio n tend s towar d a mechanisti c accoun t rather tha n Bettleheim' s "soul-filled " accoun t o f Freud' s writings . Th e definitions o f wis h an d wil l provid e clea r evidenc e o f th e lac k o f a n assumed huma n subjec t wh o ha s a t time s t o com e t o term s wit h wil l versus counter-wil l i n day-to-da y life—tha t is , a subjec t wh o will s an d wishes, not a neurophysiological apparatus . Furthermore , th e problem o f agency fo r Freu d i s exemplifie d i n thi s mode l vi a th e concep t o f th e eg o

36

The Freud-Fliess Correspondence

already described . A t time s Freu d write s o f th e eg o a s a neurologica l agency, ye t a t other s th e eg o i s portrayed a s that whic h i s acted upon . J . Laplanche ha s captured thi s problem concernin g th e ego so precisely tha t his argument will be reported a t length : The Project for a Scientific Psychology of 189 5 posits the ego at the outset as not being essentially a subject: it is neither the subject in the sense of classical philosophy, a subject of perception and consciousness (it is not o>), nor the subject o f wishing an d desire , that subjec t whic h addresse s us psychoanalysts: it is not the whole of i/f, nor even the essential part of i//, but a specific formation withi n th e mnemic systems, an internal object cathecte d b y the energy o f the apparatus . That object however, i s capable o f action , an d i t enters int o conflict s a s a participant b y virtu e o f it s doubl e function : a n inhibiting functio n o r a function o f bindin g . . . and a defensive functio n . . . through th e dual modes of pathological an d normal defence. Thus no sooner have we presented the thesis that th e ego is not a subject tha n we have to withdraw it: the ego is indeed an object, but a kind of relay object, capable o f passin g itsel f off , i n a mor e o r les s deceptiv e an d usurpator y manner, as a desiring and wishing subject. 23 Not onl y doe s thi s paragrap h stat e th e proble m well , bu t i t als o state s i t in term s o f the ambiguitie s an d difficultie s tha t Bettlehei m ha s suggeste d are part o f the German language . The proble m o f agency is central even within th e neurological context . That Freu d di d not forwar d th e section o n Repression , th e third book , i s interesting especiall y i n th e ligh t o f the argumen t o f the previou s chapte r that h e was perplexe d a s to ho w an d wh y repressio n too k place . If it wa s not th e produc t o f willpower , the n wh y repression ? Wh o represses ? O n what basis ? Once repression is introduced, the concept of the unconsciou s is necessary an d Freud' s failur e t o handl e repressio n a t this stag e meant a failure t o incorporat e th e ide a o f th e unconsciou s withi n th e schem a o f the "Project. 55 Hi s clinica l experienc e wa s beyon d hi s theoretica l acume n at thi s point . Furthermore , th e concep t o f repressio n raise s problem s fo r the notion o f the subject i n psychoanalysis an d how one might adequatel y conceptualize th e possibilit y o f a subject wh o will s bu t doe s no t will—i n other words , wh o i s split . Freud' s failur e t o addres s th e proble m ade quately mean s tha t h e wa s abl e t o bypas s som e o f th e mos t vexin g problems o f his psychoanalytic endeavor . However , lik e the retur n o f th e repressed, i t is these very same problems that were later to bese t him tim e and tim e agai n whethe r h e recognize d the m o r not . I t i s a n argumen t o f this boo k tha t i t wa s no t unti l Laca n reconsidere d th e wor k o f Freud ,

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rereading i t in a new light, that th e problem o f the subject o f psychoanal ysis was taken into accoun t on a theoretical level.

The Second Schema: Speculation Anew In th e Freud-Flies s correspondenc e o f Januar y 1 , 1896 , Freu d ha s no t only rethough t hi s